THE NEW INSURGENCIES AND MASS UPRISINGS IN AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT: SELECTED CASE STUDIES

By

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC	ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL
AFRICOM	US AFRICAN COMMAND
AIAI	*AL ITTIHAD AL ISLAMIYYA*
AMISOM	AFRICAN UNION MISSION TO SOMALIA
APC	ALL PEOPLES' CONGRESS
AQIM	*AL-QAEDA* IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB
ASU	ARAB SOCIALIST UNION
AU	AFRICAN UNION
AU/PSC	AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
BPC	BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES
CAR	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
DDR	DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
DPKO	UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT
DRC	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
ECOMOG	ECOWAS MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP
ECOWAS	ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES
EO	EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES
EU	EUROPEAN UNION
FRELIMO	*FRENTE DE LIBERTAÇÃO DE MOÇAMBIQUE*
GCP	GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
GDP	GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GNI	GROSS NATIONAL INCOME

GPC	GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES
GTI	GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX
HSM	HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENTS
HSMF	HOLY SPIRIT MOBILE FORCES
ICC	INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ICG	INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
ICISS	INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
ICT	INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY
IED	IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE
IMF	INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
ISIL	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT
ISIS	ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA
LAS	LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES
LCBC	LAKE CHAD BASIN COMMISSION
LIFG	LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP
LRA	LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY
MNJTF	MULTI-NATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
NDP	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
NGO	NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION
NPFL	NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA
NPRC	NATIONAL PROVISIONAL RULING COUNCIL
NRA	NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY
NTC	NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL

OLT	OPERATION LIGHTENING THUNDER
OUP	OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR
PAIGC	*PARTIDO AFRICANO DA INDEPENDÊNCIA DA GUINÉ E CABO VERDE* (AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE)
PSD	*PARTI SOCIALISTE DESTOURIEN*
R2P	RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT
RC	REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE MOVEMENT
RCC	REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL
RCD	*RASSEMBLEMENT CONSTITUTIONNEL DÉMOCRATIQUE*
RPF	RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT
RUF	REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT
SCAF	SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE ARMED FORCES
SIPRI	STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
SLPP	SIERRA LEONEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY
SMN	SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS
SPLA	SUDAN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
START	STUDY OF TERRORISM AND RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
SWAPO	SOUTH WEST AFRICAN PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION
TFG	TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
UCDP	UPPSALA CONFLICT DATA PROGRAM
UGTT	*UNION GÉNÉRALE DES TRAVAIL TUNISIENNE*
UIC	UNION OF ISLAMIC COURTS
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNAMSIL	UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE

UNDP	UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
UNGA	UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
UNICEF	UN CHILDREN'S FUND
UNITF	UN INTEGRATED TASK FORCE ON LRA
UNOMSIL	UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION TO SIERRA LEONE
UNSCR	UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
UNSMIL	UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN LIBYA
UPDCA	UGANDA PEOPLES' DEMOCRATIC CHRISTIAN ARMY
US	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WTO	WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

History is replete with numerous examples of violent and unconstitutional methods to change governments. These can be an uprising or a "spontaneous explosion of popular will" as occurred in the French and Iranian Revolutions of 1789 and 1979 respectively, or through an insurgency or "a struggle for power (over political space) between a state (or occupying power) and one or more organized, popularly based internal challengers" (United States Army, 2007:2; McCormick *et al*, 2007:3).

Insurgencies and mass uprisings have been recorded as early as 558-486 BC during the reign of King Darius of Persia and those reported in 356-323 BC under Alexander the Great (Hammes, 2005:3). These phenomena have received the attention of scholars and researchers over the years as indicated by the extent of the literature on the subjects. The concepts have also been referred to, interchangeably, as irregular or guerrilla warfare, limited war, rebel movements, low intensity conflict, internal wars and revolutionary or civil wars (Hough, 2005:2; Snyder and Malik, 1999:199; Snow, 1996:65-66). Invariably, the meanings show similarities depending on the level of involvement of the population; the extent of violence employed, and recognition of the belligerents by the government.

Although every mass uprising or insurgency is unique in time and space, the concepts have been broadly generalized based on motivation, political orientation, timelines, rate of escalation and level of violence exploited by such movements (Clapham, 1998(b):7-8; Wilkinson, 1986:31-32; Snow, 1996:49; Sarkesian, 1975). Consequently, the forms and categorizations of insurgencies have ranged from "people's war" or liberation wars to wars of self-determination in China, South Eastern Asia, Africa, Latin and Central America; urban insurgencies in Russia and Iran; and *foco* (armed insurgent band forming the nucleus of a revolution) in Cuba (Clapham, 1998(b):3; Lynn, 2005:22; Metz, 1993:2; Kilkullen, 2006-07:111-113; Guevara, 1961). Besides, the concepts have also been

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applied extensively to some armed conflicts in Africa, particularly to separatist movements and the conflicts relating to natural resources. Thus, insurgencies or revolutionary wars have variously been categorized as nationalist, separatist, reform, warlord; spiritual, criminal or resource-based (Clapham, 1998(b):3; Cilliers, 2000:4; Galula, 1964:3; Beckett, 2005:1). These have also been classified as classical or modern depending on the objective or motive, organizational strategy, base and origins of the movement (Kruys, 2005:30-36; Kilkullen, 2006-07; Metz, 1993:1-4).

Africa has witnessed most of these types of insurgencies or uprisings. Those associated with the liberation struggle tend to conform to classical insurgency, while post-independence insurgencies are often associated with modern insurgencies variously described as "criminal" or "resource-based insurgencies" (Cilliers, 2000; Clapham, 1998(a)). Thus, the traditional or classical insurgencies in Africa are based on ideology, self-determination or class struggle and are largely rural-based, while the modern tend to represent criminal, warlord and economic considerations or resource-based insurgencies.

However, the uprisings that occurred in 2011 in North Africa, while bearing similarities to the classical and contemporary insurrections, appear to be significantly different from the known typologies of insurgency or uprising in terms of "scale, intensity and duration" (SIPRI, 2012:43). The uprisings of 2011 seem to be large-scale, unorganized revolts; partially urban-based, and devoid of a clear leadership, program or structure. They cut across ethnicity and were motivated by the quest for identity, political inclusion, regime change and civil liberties, and high levels of violence in certain instances (SIPRI 2012: 45; ICG, 2011(a):19; ICG, 2011(b):ii). Indeed, another difference is the mutation of uprisings into an insurgency as in the case of Libya.

The response of the international community particularly the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and the United Nations Security Council to these insurgencies and uprisings has also changed significantly. While the national interest of states is not ruled out, the key driver of the change could be attributed to the emergence of strong global

governance institutions such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the concept of humanitarian intervention, in particular, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). The R2P calls on the international community to intervene timely and decisively to protect citizens of a state from mass atrocities, particularly "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity" (UNGA, 2005:30; UNGA, 2009; UNSCR, 1674 of 2006).

Consequently, the international community seems to be moving towards peace enforcement or military intervention, which invariably translates into regime change or the removal of the source of the discontent. As in the case of Libya, the protestors or rebels defeated the incumbent government only after direct armed intervention by the international community under relevant provisions of R2P contained in United Nations (UN) Resolutions. For instance, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973 authorized "all necessary means" to protect civilians and established a no-fly zone in Libyan airspace. This directive was enforced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other states. The debate that NATO exceeded the mandate of the UN confirms the elastic nature of the concept (UNSCR, 1674 of 2006; UNSCR, 1973 of 2011(a)).

Contrary to the case of Libya, the international community offered assistance to the government of Uganda against the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), as was the case with the international community against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels in Sierra Leone in the 1990s, and the *Boko Haram* and the *Al-Shabaab* insurgencies in Nigeria and Somalia respectively (US-LRA Act, 2010; Zack-Williams, 2012; Dorman, 2009; UNSCR, 2016 of 2011(b); Wise, 2011).

The cases of Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, for instance, present situations that do not only pose challenges in analysing the approaches of the international community to the insurgencies and uprisings on the African continent and elsewhere, but also call into question the effectiveness of international involvement.

The uprisings in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia also appear to have defined new correlations between uprisings and insurgencies in terms of organization, intensity, duration and

external support. The "Arab Spring" therefore not only partially falls within the framework of insurgency, but also raises questions regarding the mutual exclusivity of the concepts.

The above evolving trends call for an in-depth study to establish the characteristics of some of the contemporary mass uprisings and insurgencies in Africa specifically; the links between mass uprisings and insurgencies; and the implications of external intervention, particularly military intervention, in these situations.

2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Trends in insurgency and uprising discourse show that urban-based mass uprisings that are supported by the international community could develop into short-lived insurgencies due to the asymmetrical relationship between a multilateral force and a national army or the government losing support of the armed forces. The central concern of this research is whether this could be an emerging type of insurgency, in addition to the rural-based protracted people's or liberation war and the commercial or resourced-based wars associated with classical and modern insurgencies respectively. If this is the case, then what are the conditions or factors that account for the difference?

The aim of this research, therefore, is to examine the nature of some of the uprisings and insurgencies that occurred in Africa from the 1990s up to 2011, with particular reference to those that occurred in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. These countries appear to have exhibited some characteristics of classical, modern and other forms which do not clearly conform to the known characteristics of uprisings and insurgencies. It is incumbent to analyse the nature of these uprisings and insurgencies; the distinctive characteristics that define these conflicts, and the factors that shape them.

The objective is to examine the background causes, features, transitions and the similarities and the differences in the case studies. It also seeks to discuss the nature and forms of involvement by the international community and how that impacted on the

outcomes of the mass uprisings and insurgencies. The regional implications of these conflicts and the international responses are also discussed and analysed.

Other objectives are to compare classical and modern uprisings and insurgencies to establish similarities and differences, and to assess international involvement in domestic conflict, specifically the issue of military intervention in the context of the R2P. The question the thesis seeks to answer is whether intervention by the international community under R2P escalates a conflict from an uprising into an insurgency and whether intervention blurs the distinction between uprising and insurgency.

A final objective is the development of a framework for analysing the new mass uprisings and their transition or otherwise to insurgencies.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature abounds with definitions and categorizations that present conceptual difficulties in analysing mass uprisings, rebellions, insurrections, insurgencies and related concepts.

Although mass uprising is one of the main ways to achieve political change or revolution, scholarly studies and research on the concept are quite limited. Neither the concept nor its progression into an insurgency has been clearly established. In some instances, uprising, rebellion and insurrection have been used interchangeably with the broad concept of rebellion. Thus, Lalor (1884:632), regarded a rebellion or uprising as disobedience while Sarkesian (1975:8) similarly refers to uprising in terms of insurrection which relates to disobedience.

Gurr (1970) cited in Ogundiya (2010) further expands the debate with the inclusion of rebellion as part of political violence. To him political violence "subsumes revolution, guerrilla wars, *coup d'états*, rebellions and riots". Boswell and Dixon (1990) add that rebellion is a high level of political violence directed against the state by the civilian population.

Wilkinson (1986:32) also refers to the concept of uprising, albeit indirectly, as mass political violence that escalates from street violence through armed rebellion to a revolution or civil war. Wilkinson (1986:27) further utilizes the phrase "civil disobedience on a large scale" which becomes revolutionary, leading to the overthrow of a government. Although this assertion infers an escalation from uprising to insurgency, the distinction is not made explicit. Calvert (1970:15) and Greene (1984:13-14) highlight the terms uprising, insurrection, rebellion, among others as part of the processes of a revolution.

The relationship between uprising or mass uprising and insurgency presents difficulties for analysis. Scholars such as Fall (1998), Hough (2005), Baylis (1975), Viljoen (1984), see insurgency as part of revolutionary war, while Snyder and Malik (1999) equate the concept to "limited war" including unconventional war, civil war, guerrilla war, revolutionary war and low intensity conflict. Snow (1996) equally agrees that insurgency has been referred to as guerrilla war, unconventional war, low intensity conflict, and civil war among others.

Other scholars also view the concepts as mutually reinforcing. Ogundiya (2010) views insurgency as a form of armed rebellion while Wilkinson (2001:2) sees insurgency as an uprising against a government in power or civil authorities. Merari (1993:219) also describes insurgency as a strategy of uprising.

Wilkinson (2001:2) further identifies insurgency as "a relatively value-neutral concept denoting a rebellion or rising against any government in power or civil authorities", while Snow (1996) and McCormick *et al* (2007) see the concept as a military strategy to overthrow and existing government.

In acknowledgment of the "conceptual confusion", Greene (1984:14) reaffirms the assertion by Kornhauser (1964) that revolutions, civil wars, insurrections, *coup d'états*, revolts, among others are species of a genus, with rebellion as the genus. Thus, insurgency, insurrection or revolt could denote different aspects of a rebellion or different stages of power alteration.

The literature categorizes insurgency in terms of historical periods as well as other typologies. This is in part derived from the "discernible differences" (Snow, 1996:37) in the pattern of internal violence between the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras in terms of focus, perceived motives of the group, goals and ideology. Thus insurgency could be classical or traditional, modern, contemporary or "Third Generation Warfare" (Snow, 1996:37-67; Hammes, 2005:3; Kaldor 2011:5-11).

Classical modes of insurgency espoused in the writings of David Galula, Mao Zedong, Ernesto "Che" Guevara and Vo Nguyen Giap posit that insurgencies are protracted rural-based people's wars with a clear political or ideological aim; localized within national boundaries; organization; and identifiable leadership as occurred in Algeria, Vietnam, China and the Philippines (Snow, 1996:66-67, Kruys, 2005:30; Kilkullen, 2006-07:111-117; Beckett, 2006:23-25).

Contemporary forms of insurgency tend to be popular uprisings or urban insurrections based on religious and cultural motivations, economic considerations, criminal enterprises and ethno-nationalism. This was reinforced by the works of Bunker (2012); Kilkullen (2006/2007) and Metz (2012). This form usually lacks a clear ideology and centralized command, at least in the initial stages. It employs the use of terror as a weapon, and is sometimes transboundary or global in outlook (Metz, 2000:22; Beckett, 2006:26-27; Kruys, 2005:33-34; Wilkinson, 2001:1). Notwithstanding this distinction, classical forms of insurgency still occur in certain instances.

Africa has witnessed various levels and types of insurgencies. Clapham (1998(a)), Snow (1996) and Reno (2012) delineated the various forms and strategies that can either be termed classical or contemporary insurgencies in Africa. The former refers to the initial insurgencies which were mainly directed at decolonization or liberation from colonial domination in the name of "liberation insurgencies" as waged by the Mau Mau movement against the British in Kenya; the struggle by the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*-African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde- (PAIGC) against the Portuguese in Guineas-Bissau; the insurgent warfare in Angola and

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Mozambique against Portuguese rule; and opposition to minority rule in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The contemporary insurgencies reflect the post-1990 insurgencies that were defined by economic interest, ethno-religion, banditry or criminality as occurred in Sierra Leone, Uganda and Liberia. These categorizations did not appear to have addressed the further evolving nature of uprisings and insurgencies in Africa as witnessed in 2011.

In 2011, Africa witnessed a wave of popular uprisings or "popular democratically-inclined insurrections" in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt referred to as "The Arab Spring" (Duyvesteyn and Rich, 2012:368). The large demonstrations in centres of cities demanding improvement in economic conditions, an end to corruption, regime change and the institution of basic freedoms. However, the absence of single leaders, urban origins, the transformation of the rebellion into an insurrection, in some cases; and the duration, intensity and conduct of the conflict differed from known forms of uprisings, insurgencies or wars. The causes, nature of the uprising or war and the extent and degree of foreign involvement were developments that added another dimension to the uprising and insurgency discourse (SIPRI, 2012:45, 52; Lynch, 2012:9).

As with the concepts of uprising and insurgency, there is no unanimity on the literature on the developments in North Africa in 2011. The International Crisis Group (ICG) described the uprisings in Tunisia and Libya as "civil war" or unorganized revolt (ICG, 2011(b):ii, 2). Some writers such as Arditi (2012) described the developments as insurgencies while SIPRI (2012:43) referred to the uprisings as a new type of conflict. Metz (2012:42) indicated that Libya was vulnerable to insurgency in 2011, but described the developments in Egypt as a popular uprising. Thus both 'insurgency' and 'uprising' seem to at times be interchangeably used in these cases.

This distinction presents an opportunity to establish if the above developments provided another dimension to the insurgency discourse and an opportunity to investigate the escalation from uprising to insurgency to establish what accounted for the differences in the selected case studies.

The response of the international community to these wars has also varied, but it has largely been driven by the moral obligations of the international community to address impunity and violations of human rights. Snow (1996:116-139) notes that the responses have ranged from direct actions authorized by the UN to regional organizations acting on behalf of the UN or *vice versa.*

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, the concept of the R2P was invoked in the case of Libya as the regime reacted with disproportionate force with genocidal consequences. However, implementation of R2P gave another dimension to intervention as it seemed to have influenced the direction and outcome of the conflict (SIPRI, 2012:25-29). Similar explanations can be offered regarding the insurgency by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone and the ongoing LRA insurgency where intervention or otherwise has elicited varying responses.

The emergence of strong institutions and instruments of global governance such as the ICC and the concept of R2P invariably entails foreign military intervention in the internal affairs of another state (Vertzberger, 1998, cited in Hough *et al*, 2008:26).

Besides, international intervention, foreign involvement or external support (whether in the form of external military support), direct intervention or political statements have influenced the direction, success or failure of insurgents and ruling regimes (SIPRI, 2012:45-55; Greene, 1984:155; O'Neill, 2005:139-149). Indeed to Kaldor (2012:11), humanitarian intervention perpetuates wars and legitimizes war criminals.

The Arab Spring highlighted new patterns which reduced the difference between an uprising and an insurgency. Although the uprisings occurred in the three selected countries, the transitions varied, while the outcomes, the overthrow of the incumbent regimes, were the same. Thus within the Arab Spring, distinctions can be made between an uprising (a spontaneous insurrection by unarmed citizens) and an insurgency (an armed struggle between an incumbent regime and armed citizens, sometimes aided by the international community).

The new or emerging constructs have not been provided for sufficiently in the main literature regarding the topic which this research seeks to address. Application of R2P reveals unanswered questions, primarily the influence of intervention on the nature and duration of the war.

4. FORMULATION AND DEMARCATION OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The insurgencies and uprisings in Africa reflected both the classical, modern and undefined typologies that raise conceptual issues regarding the literature on the topic. In particular, those events that occurred in 2011 seemed to have blurred the distinction between the concepts of uprising and insurgency. Indeed 2011 appears to be the threshold for the emergence or evolution of other forms of insurgencies in which the role of the international community influenced the direction, duration and outcome.

The analysis of the uprisings and insurgencies is restricted to the case studies as they present various types of insurgencies as well as uprisings and modes of escalation, and elicited varying degrees of intervention by the international community. While some of the insurgencies followed the hitherto known patterns, others were a deviation that seems to have defined new patterns which the existing literature has not fully addressed. A framework for such distinctions can better explain the nature and duration of the uprisings and insurgencies in the selected case studies. Consequently, one of the objectives of this research is to establish the extent to which R2P influences the direction of conflict and escalates the level of violence from uprising to insurgency.

The fundamental questions that address that address the objectives are whether an uprising is coterminous with an insurgency; whether insurgencies in Africa reflect known types of insurgencies; whether the new type of uprisings/insurgencies are different from the known types and what accounts for such differences; and does intervention in the name of R2P influence the escalation of an uprising into insurgency?

These questions address the aim of this research. A clarification of the relationship between uprising and insurgency will not only address the ambiguities associated with

the concepts, but it will also give an indication of what the Arab Spring was about. Secondly, a distinction between uprising and insurgency will provide more clarity on whether those under discussion are departures or deviations from the known types of insurgencies in Africa.

Moreover, the importance of an assessment of the impact of external intervention, particularly multilateral intervention, in these conflicts is crucial as such interventions seem to have affected the outcomes in some of the uprising/insurgencies in the case studies.

Following from the research problems as formulated above, the study will be based on the following assumptions:

- Mass uprisings and insurgencies are different concepts explaining political violence.
- Insurgencies in Africa have mainly followed known patterns and types of insurgencies, with the addition of the so-called "criminal insurgencies".
- The uprisings in North Africa in 2011 represented a new category of insurgency which tended to be a fusion of mass uprisings and traditional insurgent methods.
- The role and extent of involvement by the international community influence the transition of an uprising (a mass uprising) into an insurgency and also impact on the nature, duration and level of violence employed in the selected cases.

The study focuses on uprisings and insurgencies on the African continent with specific reference to those in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. It discusses the underlying causes of the conflicts; regional implications; and the nature of international intervention and its impact on the conflicts. The study submits that while the conflicts prior to 1990 were similar in some respects, the conflict in the post-1990s to 2011, present deviations from known types.

Although an overview of insurgencies in Africa during the Cold War period will be provided, the main focus of the study will be on the developments in the post-Cold War period that led to the conflicts in the case study countries.

5. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The study uses description, case study analysis and some comparison. Conceptual analysis is used to develop a framework for insurgencies, uprisings and related concepts. This is based on the criteria for analysing new wars; models and differentiation of insurgencies developed by O'Neill (2005), Kaldor (2011), Miller (2000) and Snow (1996). Analysis and comparison is used to evaluate and compare the various uprisings and insurgencies that are discussed in the case studies.

The concept of insurgency as set out for instance by Galula (1964), Calvert (1970), Beckett (2006), Wilkinson (1986), Baylis (1975), Greene (1984), Snow (1996), Arditi (2012) and Kilkullen (2006/07) provide the framework for an analysis of the uprisings and insurgencies within the context of low intensity conflict.

The works of Wilkinson (1986) and Sarkesian (1975) form the basis of escalation ladders on increasing scales of intensity from mass uprisings to full scale civil wars. These determine the thresholds or transition from one form of violence to another.

The concept of foreign intervention and in particular, military intervention, humanitarian and foreign intervention in Africa, is discussed within the context of the works of Vertzberger (1998), Schmidt (2013), and Hehir (2010). This forms the basis of the theoretical approach to the discussion on the concepts. Primary sources outlining R2P and its implementation include documents from the UN, NATO and the African Union (AU). Other documents include resolutions and reports from the Organization of Islamic States and the League of Arab States/Arab League (LAS).

Also, the writings of Clapham (1998(a)) and Cilliers (2000) are employed to provide a historical analysis of the various types of insurgencies that occurred in Africa in particular, including the advent of the so-called "criminal insurgencies". Such a discussion should clarify the differences between the existing and the incipient insurgencies.

Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya underwent uprisings and insurgencies that elicited different international responses. There were differences in

the levels of violence, duration, and outcomes of the conflicts, among others. An evaluation of the uprisings and insurgencies in these case studies and the nature of international responses will assist in the understanding of the new types of uprisings and insurgencies.

Both primary and secondary sources are used in the study. Primary sources include official documents from governmental agencies such as the United States (US) Army, and resolutions, decisions and reports of the UN, NATO and the AU. These include UNSCR 1674 and 1973 of 2006 and 2011(a) respectively, reports of the UN Secretary-General (*Report of The Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, S/2012/376, 2012; *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* 2009); *Operation Unified Protector, Libya*. (NATO, 2011(a)); *Report of The Chairperson of the Commission on the activity of the AU High Level Ad Hoc Committee on the Situation in Libya* (AU/PSC/PR/2 (CCLXXV), 2011(a)) and *Report of The Chairperson of the Commission on the Operationalization of the AU-Led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA* (AU/PSC/PR/ (CCXCVIX) 2011(b)).

Secondary sources or data include books and journal articles on low intensity conflict. These comprise *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies*, (Baylis *et al*, 1975), *African Guerrillas* (Clapham, 1998(a)), *Comparative Revolutionary Movements* (Greene, 1984), *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Galula, 1964), *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare* (Sarkesian, 1975), *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response* (Wilkinson, 2001), *Religion and Politics in East Africa* (Twaddle and Hansen, 1995), *A History of Modern Libya* (Vandewalle, 2012), *Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Schmidt, 2013), *When the State Fails: Studies on Intervention in The Sierra Leone Civil War* (Zack-Williams, 2012), *Egypt from Nasser to Mubarak: A Flawed Revolution* (McDermott, 2012), *A History of Modern Tunisia*, (Perkins, 2004), *Libya Beyond the Revolution: Challenge and Opportunities* (Chami *et al*, 2012), *Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria,* (Stacher, 2012).

Among the journals are *Survival, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Review of African Political Economy, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of Modern African Studies, Third World Quarterly, History Compass, Journal of Conflict and Security Law, International Affairs, Terrorism and Political Violence, Middle East Report Online* and *Military Review*. Additional secondary sources will include media articles, reports of Non-Governmental Organizations, and reports of research institutions, in particular those of *Human Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group*, the *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute* (SIPRI) and the *International Institute for Strategic Studies* in London.

6. CHAPTER STRUCTURE

The research will be structured as follows:

Chapter One – Introduction

Chapter One forms the introductory chapter which establishes the context of the research. It outlines the objectives of the study, identifies the research problem and provides a literature review. It also indicates the methodology used in the study and concludes with the structure of the study.

Chapter Two - Mass Uprisings, Insurgencies and Related terms: A Conceptual Framework

Chapter Two provides the primary conceptual framework of the study, focusing on the concepts of political violence, political protests, rebellions, mass uprisings, insurrections, insurgencies, guerrilla wars, *coup d'états*, revolutions and civil wars. It highlights the similarities and differences as well as the interrelations and interconnections between the concepts within the context of civil war and political change. It also examines the causes, strategy, and patterns of civil wars, insurgencies and mass uprisings. An assessment of the classical or traditional and modern insurgencies and uprisings is also presented in this chapter in order to place the issue in perspective. The chapter examines the historical development of the various forms and types of insurgencies and mass uprisings and compares the classical and the new uprisings and insurgencies.

Chapter Three – International Involvement and Military Intervention in Domestic Conflict.

The concept of international involvement and in particular foreign military intervention is discussed in Chapter Three. This will include the types, forms and risks of intervention with a focus on foreign military intervention. The chapter also examines the basis of intervention with particular reference to multilateral concepts such as peace keeping, peace enforcement, peace building, humanitarian intervention and the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. A brief historical overview of military interventions in the various conflicts in Africa is also presented in the chapter.

Chapter Four - Historical Overview of Insurgencies in Africa

This chapter presents an overview of insurgencies in Africa with specific reference to the Cold War period and with emphasis on motivations and types of insurgencies as they have exhibited both classical and contemporary forms. So-called "criminal insurgencies" as occurred in Uganda which began in 1987, Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002, and Nigeria and Somalia that were initiated in 2002 and 2003 respectively, will also briefly be discussed. The chapter also highlights the similarities and differences between the insurgencies under these broad categories.

Chapter Five - Mass Uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt

An analysis of the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 is presented in Chapter Five. The chapter also highlights the nature, causes, organization, motivation and the urban roots of the mass uprisings, as well as the progression of a seemingly popular protest to a fully blown uprising. Regional implications of the uprisings are also discussed, both as far as North Africa and the Middle East are concerned.

Chapter Six -The Libyan Uprising and Insurgency

The causes of and motivation for the Libyan uprising in 2011 are discussed in Chapter Six. The discussion is preceded by a historical account of the socio-economic and political

conditions prevailing in the country in the years prior to the uprising. The unique case of the Libyan version of the Arab Spring, with particular reference to the nature of violence and the transition of the uprising to an insurgency, is also highlighted in this chapter. The implications of the events in Libya for the North African region are also discussed.

Chapter Seven -International Responses to the Uprisings and Insurgencies

Chapter Seven outlines the response of the UN, AU, NATO and the ICC to the new uprisings and insurgencies. The chapter examines the nature of such responses or intervention, and whether such responses impacted on the level of violence, duration and outcome of the conflicts. This also includes a comparison of the case studies.

Chapter Eight – Evaluation

The concluding chapter summarizes the text and evaluates the assumptions outlined in the introductory chapter. Certain conclusions based on the findings of the study are also presented.

CHAPTER TWO: MASS UPRISINGS, INSURGENCIES AND RELATED TERMS: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the concepts of uprising, mass uprising and insurgency are discussed. The chapter also analyses the concepts of rebellion, insurrection, *coup d'état* and war as related terms that should be clarified to avoid ambiguity in their use and to establish their interconnection. Subsequently, the similarities and the differences between uprisings, mass uprisings and insurgencies are established with an emphasis on the distinction between the concepts and the possible progression of a mass uprising to an insurgency. In this regard, an escalation ladder is presented indicating the thresholds of violence.

The causes of mass uprisings and insurgencies that reflect the underlying and immediate factors as well as trigger factors are also discussed. This provides some indication of the potential for these forms of political violence to erupt.

2. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

This section discusses the various concepts referred to above and their inter-relatedness. In some cases, certain terms are used synonymously or to describe the same phenomenon.

2.1 UPRISING

The concept of uprising has largely been defined within the context of rebellion, insurrection and revolution. Hence the use of the concept in the literature is often synonymous with the concept of revolt, rebellion or insurrection. For instance, Lalor (1884:632) sees "rebellion, uprising or insurrection" as "refusal of obedience." Sarkesian (1975:8) similarly defines insurrection as "a struggle from bottom-up, an uprising of a more or less politically unorganized group against an established authority." To Sarkesian,

an insurrection is an uprising or a contest for power between the rulers and the ruled. This view is reinforced by Merari (1993:218-219) who identifies both uprisings and insurgencies as political violence by citizens against the state, or upward violence from the bottom to the top. In this respect, an uprising is a vertical struggle by the powerless against the ruling authorities.

The definitions above indicate that an uprising is a rebellion against an established political authority. It is a protest by the masses to challenge the legitimacy of a ruling regime, or a reaction to a grievance or set of grievances. It can be organized or spontaneous, and violent or nonviolent. A spontaneous, but nonviolent uprising can lead to a revolution, as occurred in France in 1789 as well as those in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. These, however, became militant due to the reaction and the level of resistance of the regimes. Organized nonviolent uprisings include protests, demonstrations, labour strikes and civil disobedience as occurred in the uprisings in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Poland in 1989. Civil disobedience may be undertaken by individuals or groups, and on a large scale, can become revolutionary, leading to the overthrow of a government (Merari, 1993:219-244; Wilkinson, 1986:23-27; Aarts *et al*, 2012:6-10; US Army, 2007:3).

A spontaneous, but violent or militant form of an uprising may also lead to a change of government. This mode is, however, impulsive, unorganized and without clear political motives or clear leadership. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the Libyan insurgency in 2011 are examples of this form of uprising. Uprisings could also be a result of planned clandestine activities involving recruitment, organization, and education by insurgents to begin the process of an insurgency, as with the Leninist-Marxist model of insurrection or the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the Chinese Communist Revolution. A violent and armed uprising is what constitutes an insurgency (Merari, 1993:219-223).

An uprising can be a rural or an urban occurrence. Urban uprisings or insurrections are sudden and have a high impact since they occur in towns and cities that host the government. The French and the Iranian revolutions were relatively short and successful

largely due to their urban base. Conversely, rural uprisings become protracted insurgencies (Miller, 2000:62).

The composition of the forces challenging the authority of the government and the interests at stake also reveal the comprehensiveness of an uprising. For instance, in the case of the French Revolution, the uprising was a clash between mutually exclusive French interests and ideologies, while during the war of independence in the US, the uprising was the result of a national consensus on oppression and foreign domination (Bercovitch, 1976:603). The concept can therefore be applied to reaction to foreign rule. The latter is expressed in terms of nationalism, liberation or independence movements.

It should, however, be noted that not all uprisings result in a change of government. The motives for protest can also dissipate if the grievances of the protestors are sufficiently addressed by the ruling regime.

During an uprising, the forces marshalled against a regime or the articulation of interests could be dispersed. This could result in scattered incidents to express grievances. However, this becomes a potent force for change if there is an aggregation of these interests into a mass revolutionary movement or a mass uprising, which is discussed in the following section.

2.2 MASS UPRISING

The concept of "mass" differentiates the concepts of "uprising" and "mass uprising". Mass is defined as a "form of elementary collective behaviour within society, limited in time and directed toward some object of attention" (Lang and Lang, 2009:1003). According to Blumer (1935:18 cited in Lang and Lang, 2009:1003), the "mass" may belong to primary groups with certain patterns of behaviour, but alienated within the mass or crowd.

In the political context, a mass is composed of different crowds of people that congregate to express disagreement with an authority. Such crowds are composed of people who may instigate a local uprising, the contagious effect of which is a mass movement. This

mass movement constitutes a mass uprising (Lang and Lang, 2009:1005). A mass uprising is an aggregation of a large crowd of citizens to express either dissatisfaction with a government or indicate a withdrawal of allegiance (Gatmaytan, 2006:3). Such a mass is devoid of a structure, lacks leadership and is spontaneous in its actions.

For purposes of this research, a mass uprising is seen as an aggregation of large numbers of emotionally charged groups and/or unorganized individuals, within a diverse stratum of society and united by common grievances against a ruling authority, who aggregate spontaneously to effect political change.

The fundamental difference between an uprising and a mass uprising is the sheer numbers involved in a given situation. An uprising may involve limited numbers of individuals that rebel against an issue. In this sense, the concept of uprising is a broad term that includes different forms and acts of rebellion, including mass uprising. The actors in an uprising can be homogeneous or heterogeneous; organized or unorganized; violent or nonviolent. Mass uprising has also been used interchangeably with "people power", "popular uprising" or "mass insurrection".

2.3 INSURGENCY

The existing literature provides a number of definitions highlighting different aspects or perceptions of the concept. In some instances the concept is defined within the ambit of uprising or a rebellion against a government or civil authorities. In some other instances, insurgency is defined in terms of strategy and tactics.

When defined within the context of an uprising, insurgency is used interchangeably with insurrection and uprising. To Wilkinson (2001:2), insurgency denotes a rebellion or a rising against any government in power or the civil authorities, while Hough (2005:5) defines the concept as an "uprising against a government or civil authorities" by a small number of individuals. Kilcullen (2006-07:117) similarly views insurgencies as "popular uprisings that grow from, and are conducted through pre-existing social networks". These social networks can be political, religious or through kinship, among others. In this

context, insurgency is seen as an armed rebellion against a legally recognized government or authority (Ogundiya, 2010:26).

As a strategy, insurgency is seen as "an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control" (US Army, 2007:2). It is also seen as "a protracted struggle conducted methodologically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order" (Galula, 1968:4). The concept is as well seen as a contest between a state and one or more popularly based internal challengers over political space. To McCormick *et al* (2007:3) insurgency is "a struggle for power (over political space) between a state (or occupying power) and one or more organized, popularly based internal challengers. The objective of the state is to retain power and defeat or displace its competitor(s). The insurgency's objective is to expand its popular base of support and defeat and displace the state".

Snow (1996:65) defines insurgency as "unconventional warfare waged for the purpose of overthrowing an existing regime or seceding from an existing state". To Kitson (1971:3) insurgency refers to any use of an armed force by a part of the population to overthrow an existing government. O'Neill (2005:15) similarly sees insurgency as a "struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities, in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (organizational expertise, propaganda, demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics".

Adherents of this view opine that insurgency is unconventional war and that guerrilla war, low intensity conflicts, internal war, civil war and revolutionary war, indicate mere terminological differences or sometimes methods adopted by insurgents (Snow, 1996: 64-67; Snyder, 1999:199).

The definitions are indicative of the multidimensional nature of insurgency. The attempt to gain political power through the establishment of political structures goes hand in hand

with a military dimension. The latter involves varying degrees of military activity including guerrilla warfare, conventional war, ideological war, terrorism and a cultural and psychological dimension (Baylis, 1975:134-140).

The basic characteristics are that insurgency connotes an attempt to overthrow an existing government or occupy power through the use of an armed force. Insurgency is therefore the acquisition or intended acquisition of political power through a protracted unconventional war. It is an organized and violent uprising that usually begins with a small number of people.

In this sense, an insurgency is a political and military undertaking, namely the use of violence to achieve a political objective. It has the political aim of eroding the legitimacy of the ruling government in order to capture political power, and the military dimension reflects the level of organized violence to attain that objective.

Irrespective of the views postulated in the various definitions, common elements could be identified to delineate what constitutes an insurgency. In the first instance, it is an expression of grievances against a regime by the force of arms, and in terms of an uprising, it connotes an organized and violent mode of uprising.

Secondly, an insurgency is an intricate political and military struggle aimed at obtaining political power. The primary motivation of an insurgency is the access and control of political power through various forms of violence including terrorism and full-scale conventional war (US Army, 2007:8; Baylis, 1975:135-144). Different forms of insurgency will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.

2.4 RELATED CONCEPTS

Rebellion, insurrection and *coup d'états* are concepts that are often linked to insurgency. To Wilkinson (2001:2) a rebellion denotes an insurgency. With regard to an insurrection, Kitson (1971:6) views it as a failed attempt by insurgents to achieve their objective, namely, the replacement of the political leadership. In other words, when an organized

rebellion is defeated at the incipient stages, it is deemed an insurrection. Other writers such as Calvert (1970:15, 132) categorize "rebellions, revolts, insurrections or uprisings" as characteristics of failed revolutions. Thus uprisings can be discussed within the context of revolutionary warfare.

Indeed, Merari (1993:219) argues that the different forms and methods of insurgencies represent different strategies of uprising. This view suggests that an uprising is a broad concept encompassing other forms of political violence such as insurgency. Thus, what is categorized as an insurgency is a strategy of an uprising. In this sense, revolutions, *coup d'états* and guerrilla warfare represent forms of organized and violent uprisings.

In contrast to an insurrection, a *coup d'état* is planned and sudden action to replace an existing government and alter the policymaking structure through illegal means. This action is usually undertaken by the military and may not necessarily have the support of the general population (Calvert, 1970:22, 132, 144; Kiras, 2007:167).

Another distinction that needs to be made concerns the relationship between insurgency and war. Given that war is "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will" (Clausewitz in Kaldor, 2011:17), insurgency in all its manifestations is war. The centrality of the element of violence means that war can be organized (regular) or unorganized (irregular) between or within organized societies or groups.

Regular or conventional wars are mainly interstate warfare or total warfare where all available means of a state are devoted to the pursuit of victory (Kaldor, 2011:23-27). Conversely, any form of war devoid of conventional military tactics and formations is usually classified as irregular or unconventional warfare. This will include guerrilla warfare and terrorism which will be discussed later on as methods of unconventional warfare or insurgency.

3. VIOLENCE ESCALATION LADDER

The relationship between uprisings, insurgencies and revolutionary warfare is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Escalation Ladder of Levels of Violence

Riots, isolated acts of sabotage, sub-revolutionary terror	May include political motives short of fundamental revolutionary change.
Rebellion/insurrection	Militant opposition to authority with the issue relatively quickly settled.
Coup d'état	Aimed at the overthrow of political leadership, it usually involves a small group within the government structure. Not necessarily linked to fundamental change.
Revolutionary welfare/insurgency (including guerrilla and/or terrorist tactics. Tends to have an international character and may include acts of "international terrorism")	Overthrow of an existing political system and its replacement by a new regime and a new order. May be of civil war type (including secessionism) or the nationalist (anticolonial) type.
Civil war	Violent conflict within a society resulting from an attempt to seize or maintain power.
Source: Adapted from Sarkesian, S C, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Precedent Publishing Company, Chicago, 1975.	

Wilkinson (1986:31-32) presents a similar ladder of escalation of intensity of violence from riots and street violence escalating into an armed rebellion, a revolution or a limited war. In as much as these are all forms of rebellion against an established political authority, they are considered as forms of uprising separated by levels of intensity and the extent of involvement of the masses. The escalation ladder therefore shows a linear relationship or a continuum from one form of uprising to the other. However, one form of violence is not contingent on a previous form. For example, a revolutionary war may

not necessarily start with a riot. However, riots are indicative of discontent that can lead to a large-scale uprising (Hough, 2005:2).

A riot is an uprising of three or more persons who perform an "unlawful act of violence" to articulate some grievances (English Common Law, cited in Maier, 1970:21). A riot in this sense is a narrow or restricted expression of an uprising. Riots can lead to large-scale popular uprisings or a major insurrection as with the French Revolution of 1789; the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Palestinian *Intifada* (Paige, 1971:819; Merari, 1993:244; Calvert, 1983:162).

In addition to riots, Calvert (1983:162) includes demonstrations at the initial levels of violence. Demonstrations represent a group of socially disoriented people who aggregate under a leadership on the basis of a shared interest. Demonstrations occur in any part of a state, but are effective in urban areas and may include some level of violence to mount pressure on a government.

The fundamental difference is that riots are disorganized and uncontrolled while demonstrations represent controlled events. Whereas riots may not necessarily lead to civil war, all are indicative of grievances and defiance against the system with increasing levels of violence. Generally, riots and demonstrations constitute civil disorder which is an indication of the initial stages of an insurgency (Calvert, 1983:162; Kitson, 1971:83).

Riots, street protests and demonstrations are, therefore, forms of uprising which can escalate into mass uprising with psychological aggregation of the crowds. This could also precipitate an insurgency or armed resistance movement with an organizational structure.

Having delineated the various aspects and levels of uprising, the emphasis from here on will fall on the concept of mass uprising and insurgencies ("old" and "new"), as well as their causes.

4. A TYPOLOGY OF INSURGENCIES

This section discusses the classical and contemporary forms of insurgencies on the one hand, and the relationship between insurgency and mass uprisings on the other hand. This also includes the characteristics of each form to establish the basis for differentiation.

4.1 FORMS OF INSURGENCY

The existing literature classifies insurgencies into two distinct categories: classical or traditional insurgencies and contemporary or modern insurgencies. Others have alluded to "Third Generation Warfare" or new modes to depict what could possibly be post-modern or post-September 11 2001 insurgencies (SIPRI, 2012:43-45; Hammes, 2005:3; Kaldor, 2011:2).

Classical or traditional insurgency influenced the nature of the wave of insurgencies in the post-World War II era. Influenced by the events in the two world wars, insurgencies in the post-World War II era were more national than local and more transnational. Insurgency became synonymous with revolutionary warfare during this period as the political and ideological aspects, namely the overthrow of foreign occupation; the struggle against colonialism; and the replacement of illegitimate regimes were the primary motives. The period also witnessed the proliferation of wars, conducted mainly by the proxies of the Cold War superpowers (US Army, 2007:7, 8; Beckett, 2005:24; Metz, 2012:34).

In the classical sense, therefore, insurgencies tend to be prolonged or protracted wars in view of the methods adopted. Popularly called the "poor man's war", insurgencies are usually rooted in rural areas far from cities that host the central governments they fight. The rural base also offers the opportunity to acquire support from the rural inhabitants in terms of recruitment, supplies, and political support through indoctrination, while the guerrilla methods pose difficulties for national armies to engage insurgents (Snow, 1996:64; US Army, 2007:11).

In its modern or contemporary form, insurgency theorists, notably Kilcullen (2006-07), O'Neill (2005) and Metz (2000), argue that insurgencies are popular uprisings or urban insurrections based on religious extremism and cultural motivations, racial, economic considerations and ethno-nationalism. These are thus, conflicts over natural resources, commercial interests, and criminality. The contemporary forms were manifested mainly in wars that arose in the post-Cold War era due to the collapse of Cold War proxy regimes, and to an extent, the insurgencies that arose after September 11, 2001. The period saw the rise of global *Jihadism* embodied by *Al-Qaeda*, warlord insurgent movements represented by Charles Taylor in Liberia, and narco-insurgencies exemplified by the Mexican drug gangs. These forms usually lack clear ideology and centralized command, at least in the initial stages, and employ the use of terror as weapon (Snow, 1996:94-111; Kilcullen, 2006-07:112-121; Bunker, 2012:49).

Mass uprisings, however, reflect different patterns than insurgencies. They remain a spontaneous outburst of grievances; without visible leaders and can be militant or nonviolent. Typically, mass uprisings could be short-lived occurrences that mobilize the population based on technology as presented in the ensuing sections.

The foregoing indicates a fundamental difference between mass uprisings and insurgencies. It also indicates the evolutionary nature of insurgency and that the known patterns of contemporary insurgencies seem to be developing into hitherto unknown types. There is, therefore, the need for a set of criteria to differentiate between the classical/traditional or conventional insurgencies and contemporary or modern modes of insurgency, as well as to indicate the differences between contemporary insurgencies and mass uprisings. Such criteria may also assist in the identification of emerging patterns.

Separate frameworks for understanding the so-called "new" wars, which also provide pointers for a differentiation of types of insurgencies, have been provided by various writers such as Kaldor (2011), O'Neill (2005), Rich and Duyvesteyn (2012), Snow (1996), Metz (1993), and Kilkullen (2006-07). For the purposes of this research, a composite framework for differentiation of insurgencies will be constructed based on the common

elements in these frameworks, including goals and motivation of insurgents, strategy of warfare, leadership, duration, and form of external support. The framework will also differentiate between an insurgency and a mass uprising as depicted in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. Framework for Differentiation of Insurgencies

CRITERIA	CLASSICAL INSURGENCY	CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY	MASS UPRISING
Goals	Overthrow an existing regime; reorder the institutional base of the state.	Establish a sanctuary; create panic and insecurity; control parts of state; secede.	Political change; overthrow existing regime; transformation of leadership.
Motivation	Geopolitical/definite political agenda; single ideology; nationalistic.	Lack of clear ideology; identity wars (clan, religious, cultural, Ethno-nationalism); extremism; criminality; warlords.	Resolution of political and economic grievances; lack of ideology; indeterminate future.
Strategy of warfare	Planned military operations; violent; hold territory; disciplined; decisive, guerrilla warfare, protects civilians, localized.	Violent (extreme indiscriminate violence); hold territory for exploitation of personal or sectarian agenda; alienates population; conventional war; global appeal.	Spontaneous; nonviolent; unarmed; militant; demonstrations; riots; street protests.
Leadership	Single leader (centralized command); mobilization through human effort; material and financial support from the community; acquisitive.	Various organizations, different leaders; cell based structure; technology driven mobilization; material and financial support to the community; paternalistic.	Leaderless; amorphous; unorganized. Psychological aggregation; technology driven mobilization; passive economic relations; exploitative.
Duration	Protracted; rural-based.	Protracted; urban-based.	Relatively short-lived; rural/urban based.
External Support	Bilateral; usually covert.	Bilateral; usually covert.	Usually internal.

In order to distinguish more clearly between insurgencies and mass uprisings, each of the criteria in Figure 2 are discussed in more detail.

4.2 GOALS

Insurgencies and mass uprisings can be distinguished on the basis of the intended goals. The goal of classical insurgents is a radical change of the institutional structure of the state and the reordering of society based on a predetermined plan. This mode of insurgency envisions a replacement of the existing political system with the establishment of a distinctively different system, both in structure or organization and in terms of ideological orientation. Indeed, the system envisioned is brought to bear at the onset of an insurgency with the establishment of a "government-in-waiting" that administers "liberated areas". Thus the political dimension of the insurgency begins parallel with the military dimension (Metz, 2000:26; Snow, 1996:106).

In contrast, the changes sought by contemporary insurgents are not markedly different from the *status quo*. Essentially, the motivation is to create panic and insecurity to pursue a certain agenda. Insurgents pursuing this form may also seek to secede from the state based on a narrow definition of interests, guided by the motivation to begin the insurgency in the first place. Acquisition of political power may therefore not be the initial consideration, but a collateral benefit should the opportunity arise. Thus, the political objective is either lost in contemporary insurgencies, or defined in terms of a narrow centred interest (Metz, 2000:26; Snow, 1996:106).

The political goal is not lost in the case of a mass uprising. Such actions seek the replacement of a government or political system due to its inability to deliver, which spurs the grievances that initiate the uprising. In other instances, a mass uprising could be based on specific demands such as resignations of members of cabinet or some institutional reforms (Gatmaytan, 2006:9-15). The crowds become united by this common goal in a mass uprising. Acquisition of political power through civil disobedience on a large scale is the ultimate aim of a mass uprising (Aarts *et al*, 2012:32-38). However, these uprisings can readily become violent, although the violence may only be random.

The goals and motivation also account for the reason why some mass uprisings remain unorganized episodes while others transform into organized insurgent groups. As will be explained subsequently, certain factors account for such transformation: the reaction of the regime; emergence of a leadership; availability of resources; control of territory; and some level of external support. However, insurgent groups that do not emerge from mass uprisings usually have an organization and a leadership that initiates and directs the insurgency.

4.3 MOTIVATION

Classical insurgencies are motivated mainly by political determinants, usually bordering on patriotism, nationalism or liberation from foreign domination. Such groups are more national in character and composition and cut across social status. It must be emphasized, however, that sometimes the working class or an ethnic group could dominate the group as a result of its initial base of operation (Snow, 1996:66; Bunker, 2012:45, 46; Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012:12).

These insurgencies also have ideological underpinnings. Traditional insurgency is usually driven by a single ideology. In effect, an idea of the future is known from the beginning and has an effect on the goals; strategy of warfare and external support, among others. During the Cold War, this was mainly defined in terms of communism and anti-communism. This was manifested by proxy wars as reflected in the liberation wars in Africa (Beckett, 2005:24-29; Snow, 1996:55-56).

The contemporary modes are, however, motivated by identity, usually the interests of clan, religious or ethno-nationalism, which reduce the national appeal of the group to sectarian interests. In some instances where such groups are motivated by economic interests or criminal intent, control of enclaves mainly endowed with natural resources becomes the strategy (Snow, 1996:55-56, 106, 107; Bunker, 2012:45, 46; Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012:12).

Contemporary insurgencies also lack a single, identifiable ideology that directs or guides the actions of the movements. Where a semblance of ideology exists, it is more a question of competing or radical ideologies reflecting the motives they pursue (Beckett, 2005:24-29; Snow, 1996:55-56, 106, 107).

Mass uprisings are mainly motivated by shared grievances, usually political maladministration and economic mismanagement, by a broad spectrum of the population. The desire to change their circumstances is the driving force, and the composition of the masses similarly reflects this (Aarts *et al*, 2012:24-28).

Since the uprising is based on issues that affect the population irrespective of ideological orientation, the masses consist of a broad range of political, religious and civic organizations that aggregate to oust a common enemy. Thus such occurrences are devoid of ideological direction. Contrary to the classical forms, therefore, the direction and form of the future in an uprising is indeterminate (Ahmad, 1982:299).

The goals or motivations of insurgent groups, as discussed above, also reflect the type of insurgency. This can be defined by the insurgents from the onset, or based primarily on the character of the group and the perception of the group by the public. Several types of insurgencies could emerge in this regard.

Broadly, insurgent groups may fall under the categorization of armed conflict identified by Scherrer (1977 cited in Wilkinson 2001:6). These could be anti-regime wars or ideological conflicts; ethno-nationalist wars; decolonization or foreign occupation and gang wars. Other writers have identified similar types or variants of these. Snow (1996:66, 76) discusses criminal and democratic insurgencies, while Clapham (1998(b):7-8) indicates four types of insurgencies namely; liberation, separatist, reform and warlord insurgencies. Cilliers (2000:14) argues for the inclusion of resource-based insurgencies as a type of insurgency. Metz (1993) highlights spiritual and commercial insurgencies, while O'Neill (2005:19) classifies insurgencies as anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist, pluralist, apocalyptic, secessionist, reformist, preservationist and commercialist.

Some of the types, however, seem to be an overlap while others exhibit terminological differences. For instance, in what Metz (1993) defines as spiritual insurgency, O'Neill (2005:25) describes as traditionalist insurgency. Similarly, there is little or no difference between warlord insurgency (Clapham, 1998(a)); resource-based insurgency (Cilliers, 2000); and criminal insurgency or commercial insurgency (Metz, 1993). Again, pluralist or egalitarian insurgencies (O'Neill, 2005:20, 24) and democratic insurgencies (Snow, 1996:76) can be subsumed under reform insurgency (Clapham, 1998(a)).

For the purposes of this research, insurgencies will be classified under the following five broad types namely; liberation insurgencies, separatist insurgencies, reform insurgencies, warlord insurgencies and spiritual insurgencies.

Liberation insurgencies represent the anti-colonial insurgent movements or those that contested foreign domination or minority rule. These were ideologically-based Maoist and anti-apartheid movements that mobilized and radicalized the rural population to fight colonial and minority rule. The movements in Angola, Algeria and Zimbabwe fall under this type (Clapham, 1998(b):6; Reno, 2012:157, 158).

Insurgencies that aim to advance the interest of a particular ethnic group with the ultimate aim of seceding from a given state to acquire a special status for such ethnic identity, fall under separatist or secessionist insurgency. Secessionists seek to withdraw from the state, usually on account of deprivation. The group interest is either to create a new nation-state or join another state, more often than not, a neighbouring state. Examples of these were the secessionist movements in Casamance and Somalia (O'Neill 2005:24, 25; Clapham, 1998(b):6).

Reform insurgencies are those that seek to overthrow an existing government and reorganize the institutional structure of the state. The insurgency of the National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda and Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) fall under this category. Included in this type are pluralist and egalitarian insurgencies. The former

represents insurgencies motivated by the replacement of an existing political system by one based on liberal values such as the struggle by the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in the 70s and 80s. The reform sought by egalitarians, on the other hand, seem to be a more radical reordering of society based on Marxist political thought (O'Neill 2005:20, 24; Clapham, 1998(b):7).

As a more recent insurgency, warlord or commercialist insurgency aims at creating territorial enclaves within states, but not necessarily to establish a new institutional arrangement from that it seeks to overthrow. Political power is a means of control and exploitation of natural resources for personal gain other than ideological, ethnic or religious purposes. Included in this typology is what Cilliers (2000) describes as resource-based insurgency. These are insurgencies that arise out of the desire of states to gain resources and interests in neighbouring states that are in conflict. In other words, states intervene in conflicts in other states not to seek an end to war, but to acquire and control the natural resource base of the receiving state. Intervention is therefore often driven by strategic commercial interests. In this regard, the role of warlords are assumed by states. The participation of Liberia under Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leonean conflict in the 1990s, and the intervention of Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, and Namibia in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are such insurgencies. Narco-insurgency or criminal-based insurgencies, where mineral resources and drugs are the basis of the quest for power, are variants of warlord insurgencies (Clapham, 1998(b):7; Cilliers, 2000:5-6; O'Neill; 2005:28-29).

Spiritual insurgencies or traditionalist insurgencies are those that arise out of problems of modernization, alienation, and the resultant "search for meaning" and quest for justice. Spiritual insurgents seek a replacement of the existing regime and the socio-economic and political system associated with it, using religion as a justification for political violence. Thus the goal of spiritualists is the establishment of a theocratic state based on limited political participation and a concentration of political power in a few clerics or an autocratic leader. Such insurgencies operate within or outside of national boundaries. Primarily, this type of insurgency manifests as Islamic fundamentalism or liberation

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theology in Latin America as well as the continuing insurgency of the LRA in Uganda (Metz, 1993:1, 7-9; O'Neill; 2005:21-23).

4.4 STRATEGY OF WARFARE

Metz (2000:27) identifies guerrilla warfare, terrorism and full-scale conventional warfare as the three main strategies of warfare insurgents adopt, although terrorism does not always develop into a more fully-blown insurgency.

While these can be discussed separately at the conceptual level, in reality, insurgents adopt a mix of all the methods to achieve their motives. Moreover, a particular method may also appear dominant at any time during the insurgency depending on a number of factors including the terrain, the base of the insurgency (either urban or rural) and the counter-insurgency measures adopted by the government, among other things (Snow, 1996:61-76; Wilkinson, 2001:1, 2, 10-14; Merari, 1993:223-230).

Traditional insurgency is usually based on guerrilla warfare, seen as the most effective weapon. This method of insurgency is adopted in view of the weaker position of insurgents in relation to the government forces. The strategy gained prominence in 1808 during the Spanish War of Independence, and was popularized by the Chinese revolutionaries. Essentially, armed groups organized in small numbers engage in mobile hit and run attacks to harass government forces using cheap and low technology weapons. It is usually conducted in rough terrain that aids surprise and concealment, while the small numbers affords speed and flexibility (Marighella, 1969 cited in Hough, 2005:8; US Army 2007:3; Calvert, 1970:102, 103).

Another variant of guerrilla warfare is *focoquismo* or *focoism*. Under this model, insurgents are organized into small groups or the *foco* that form the vanguard of the war. The *foco* conduct violent attacks on government institutions to attract sympathizers to their cause and enlarge their base (Miller, 2000:69; Metz, 1993:2; Rich and Duyvesteyn, 2012:6).

Guerrilla warfare requires organization and resources, yet restraint in the selection of targets, as it attempts to avoid civilians in favour of government forces (army and police); political and economic institutions, and infrastructural targets (O'Neill, 2005:35, Wilkinson, 2001:10-12; Greene, 1974:132, 133).

In classical insurgencies, since the conflict between insurgents and the ruling regime is fundamentally a political contest, the support of the people becomes critical. The war then becomes a contest for the "hearts and minds" of the population between the armed group and the ruling government. Appeasement of the population thus becomes the centre of gravity of the war. The armed group attempts to pacify the population by reducing antagonisms and friction. Such insurgents are therefore disciplined fighting forces that attempt to avoid excessive civilian casualties. The insurgents progressively hold captured territories and establish an administrative system to govern such areas or work with the local governance system. Fighting in this instance is more localized (Snow, 1996:67; Kaldor, 2011:8-9).

Guerrilla warfare may eventually lead to or be combined with full-scale conventional war, usually at the terminal stages of the conflict where the small armed bands develop into large armed units that engage directly with the government forces (O'Neill, 2005:36; Wilkinson, 2001:10).

In contrast, contemporary insurgencies are characterized by indiscriminate violence and the resort to terror tactics as a method of warfare. As an act of indiscriminate violence, terrorism evokes various meanings and definitions depending on the motive of the individual or group that adopts the method as a means to attain an objective.

Wilkinson (1986:51, 55) defines political terrorism as "coercive intimidation", or use of force against "individuals, groups or governments into conceding to the political demands of terrorists through the use of murder and destruction". It is, in essence, the use of fear to attain a political demand. O'Neill (2005:33) similarly defines it as "the use of physical coercion, primarily against non-combatants, especially civilians, to create fear in order to achieve various political objectives". Terrorism in this instance is, therefore, the use of

indiscriminate and unpredictable violence aimed at the citizenry to create fear and despondency; erode the support base of a government, and ultimately overthrow the government. In other ways, it creates publicity for the insurgent group and a platform for the expansion of the popular base. The fear of reprisal is an incentive for the local community to either join the group or resist cooperation with government forces. In such instances, the insurgent groups seem to provide needed security as a result of insecurity and violence which is generated by their own actions (Greene, 1974:131, 132; Metz, 2012:38; US Army, 2007:16).

The adoption of terror is, in part, due to the fact that most contemporary insurgencies are undertaken by non-military organizations or irregular forces who lack a definite military objective and often operate in urban areas. This has popularized the notion of urban terrorism or the pursuit of acts of terrorism in populated areas, representing a strategy of weakening the resolve of the government, and forcing it to acquiesce to the demands of insurgents. The use of extreme violence can escalate the insurgency into a full-scale, conventional war even in the initial stages. The struggle for the hearts and minds of the population is largely non-existent in contemporary insurgencies since the intention is not necessarily to hold territory. Rather, contemporary insurgents seize the state or part of it for parochial motives. Such groups could be transnational, in view of their religious or criminal appeal (Snow, 1996:109-111; Greene 1974:130-132; Kilcullen, 2006-07:114-119).

Mass uprisings can include multiple actions such as riots, general strikes, street protests, boycotts and demonstrations. These largely unarmed, but sudden episodes could turn militant, usually in cities where discontent with government has reached high levels. The Iranian, French, and the Russian revolutions as well as the Arab Spring provide ready examples of these methods (Aarts *et al,* 2012:72-75).

4.5 LEADERSHIP

The notion of leadership as a feature that distinguishes mass uprisings and forms of insurgencies is discussed alongside organizational structure, mobilization and economic relations between insurgents and the general population.

Classical insurgencies exhibit a recognizable organizational structure, both militarily and administratively, in a hierarchical or centralized manner. Sometimes, the structure reflects the administrative system of the country. This aids the creation of sanctuaries for mobilization and recruitment, making classical insurgencies geographically defined and largely dependent on human efforts (Kaldor, 2011:9; Kilkullen, 2006-07:113, 118-119).

Such a structure also becomes dependent on the exploitation of local logistical support. Thus, in terms of economic relations between insurgents and the population, classical insurgents thrive on the support of the population (Kaldor, 2011:10; Kilkullen, 2006-07: 119).

In contrast, contemporary insurgencies exhibit multiple leadership in some instances. The organization of such groups is based on diffused cell structures or "leaderless-resistance" groups, with competing interests, which cooperate with each other. This distinction, to an extent, is influenced by the motivations of the group which also determines the organizational structure (Snow, 1996:109-110; Beam, 1992:1-2; Kaldor, 2011:9; Kilkullen, 2006-07:118).

In terms of mobilization, information and communication technology (ICT) provides a cheap and convenient platform for reaching out to the population and the propagation of the ideals of contemporary insurgents. The use of the internet, cell phones and tablets, and social networking sites have become important platforms for mobilization (cyber mobilization) of support and fundraising. This creates "virtual sanctuaries" that make contemporary insurgency a transnational venture with easy and unfettered access to communication (Kilkullen, 2006-07:113-119; Kaldor, 2011:9; Aarts *et al*, 2012:74).

The structure, motive, and method of mobilization impact on the population. In this respect, contemporary insurgents appear to be better resourced financially than the population in their areas of operation. This affords the opportunity to dispense patronage and become guarantors of the financial well-being of the people through financial inducements. They also offer "employment avenues" in terms of payments for sabotage and attacks. In this regard contemporary insurgents become more paternalistic in view of the abundance of resources available through donations by external sources far from their operating area; exploitation of resources (warlords), or revenue obtained from criminal activities (Kilkullen, 2006-07:119; Aarts *et al*, 2012:74).

In contrast, mass uprisings are characterized by leaderless or amorphous groups or large crowds, and their activities are not directed by a vanguard party. The masses are not defined by a form or formal structure, and the sense of direction is determined by crowd behaviour as well as the attitude of the ruling authority to their demands. However, in some instances, leading figures may have played an inspirational role as was the case with Ayatollah Khomeini in the Iranian uprising in 1979 (Aarts *et al*, 2012:72-75; Gatmaytan, 2006:15-16).

Similar to contemporary insurgencies, although mass uprisings are spontaneous, the crowds are mobilized and sustained through the medium of technology. This was evident in the Iranian Revolution and the uprisings in North Africa in 2011. The protestors in the Iranian mass uprising were inspired and sustained by the distribution or circulation of the preachings of Ayatollah Khomeini on cassettes. The crowds that poured into the streets and public squares during the Arab Spring exploited modern technology for mobilization. Cell phones aided by social media networks, notably Twitter, Facebook and YouTube became a source of coordination and provided an unimpeded dissemination of anti-establishment activities that were beyond the control of the regimes. This enabled the growth of cells that could be likened to a *foco* that provided the space for the mass uprising (Cottle, 2011:647-649; Kashami-Sabat, 2012 cited in Aarts *et al*, 2012:75).

The crowds in a mass uprising have few direct economic relations with the populace, and the economic might of the crowd becomes a weapon that is exploited through industrial actions to bring the government to capitulation (Kilkullen, 2006-07:119; Aarts *et al*, 2012:74).

4.6 DURATION

Both classical and contemporary insurgencies normally exhibit an element of protraction. While the rural base of classical insurgencies sometimes impedes a final assault on the forces of the ruling regime, it is equally challenging for those with urban roots, usually contemporary insurgencies, since regrouping as a force in an urban environment for a final assault poses difficulties. Likewise, the incumbent regime faces challenges defeating urban insurgents as the groups live among the citizens with all the challenges associated with fighting in built-up areas. Generally, however, classical insurgencies last for a much longer time as they thrive on attrition (Kilcullen 2006-07:120; Snow, 1996:66; Kiras, 2007:168).

In the case of a mass uprising, since the central authorities are based in the cities, direct confrontation and a change in or overthrow of government institutions happens relatively quicker, making urban-based uprisings of shorter duration than rural insurgencies. For instance, the Iranian uprising lasted for 13 months; the Tunisian uprising took four weeks; and that in Egypt 18 days (Miller, 2000:62.63; Omotola, 2012:714-715).

4.7 EXTERNAL SUPPORT

Lastly, insurgencies, and, to a lesser extent, mass uprisings, thrive on some form of international support. This may take the form of safe havens from neighbouring or other states; arms supply or some form of recognition either implicitly or explicitly; as well as financial support. The support offered by the diaspora of the states becomes critical in all the instances. In the case of Libya, the diaspora was instrumental in terms of communication and mobilization of internal dissent (Greene, 1974:151; Kiras, 2007:167, 171-172; ICG, 2011(b):5).

A historical account that highlights the distinction between mass uprising on the one hand, and insurgency (both classical and contemporary) on the other hand based on the criteria for differentiation, is presented in the following section.

5. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MASS UPRISINGS AND INSURGENCIES

The mass uprisings in France in 1789 and in Iran in 1979 will form the basis for further establishing the difference between a mass uprising and an insurgency as these events provide classic examples of mass uprisings.

The revolution in France started as a nationwide mass uprising following years of economic mismanagement and absolute rule of the monarchy. In July 1789 a mob stormed the Bastille, a fortress that represented the rule of the monarchy and political oppression. The subsequent mobilization of the masses began the process of the French Revolution. It was characterized by labour unrest and a series of uprisings in the major cities and towns, as well as a peasant uprising against the nobility resulting in the dissolution of the monarchy in 1792. It was thus a combination of rural and urban uprisings composed of a multiplicity of urban groups that cut across the social structure (Greene, 1984:29-31; Bevis, 2012:103, 111).

The mass uprising in Iran in 1979 was equally a popular, broad-based, urban uprising. It was an expression of latent discontent against suppression and authoritarian rule that began with strikes, riots, and demonstrations in 1978. The riots escalated into a mass uprising leading to the collapse of the political system in January 1979 (Aarts *et al*, 2012:74). The masses in the Iranian Revolution were composed of a broad range of political groupings, religious groups, and civic organizations. Although it was largely nonviolent, the masses grew into a militant force as their base was broadened. The protest was sustained for thirteen months with the death of about 30,000 protestors (Ahmad, 1982:293-300).

The distinction between a mass uprising and an insurgency becomes clearer when the Iranian Revolution is compared to the revolutions in China from 1946 to 1949; in Algeria

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from 1954 to 1962; Vietnam from 1945 to 1975; and Cuba from 1963 to 1959. The latter were protracted struggles during which the occupied territories were administered on the basis of an ideology and idea of the form of the future political arrangements. In contrast, the Iranian mass uprising had an indeterminate future (Ahmad, 1982:293, 299-300).

The above characteristics of a mass uprising bear similarities to the mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2010 and 2011. The so-called Arab Spring was a large scale spontaneous outburst of defiance, in some cases becoming a violent confrontation that transformed into a form of insurgency during the course of events. The spontaneity is endorsed by the inability of experts on North Africa and the Middle East to predict the occurrence (Aarts *et al*, 2012:6-10).

What erupted in Tunisia in December 2010 created a domino effect in the region (ICG, 2011(a):2, 49). The situation in Egypt was characterized by sustained street protests by a coalition of religious, ideological and generational stratum without identifiable leaders. The crowds occupied the *Tahrir* square, the main city square in Cairo, until the government fell (Lang, 2013:356; ICG, 2011(a):3). The Libyan version of the uprising reflected a similar sequence of events. Popular, unorganized protests against authoritarian rule among others, which started in the second largest city, spread across the country. The crowds represented a broad section of society with some support from the Libyan diaspora. The protests, however, degenerated into an insurgency, the cause of which will be analysed in this research (ICG, 2011(b):ii-5).

The characteristic features of these mass uprisings were that they were spontaneous outbursts of anger and grievances against ruling regimes or monarchies which also resulted in the overthrow of some governments while others stepped down or absconded. Although some could be scattered acts of civil disobedience at the initial stages, the mass uprisings became widespread with the aggregation of the crowds which resulted in a collective force for action. Thus, the main goal of these uprisings became the acquisition of political power.

While the above characteristics distinguish mass uprisings from insurgencies (both classic and contemporary) they also indicate that in contemporary terms, some mass uprisings could develop into a short-lived insurgency as was the case in Libya.

The cases of Iran, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, as described above, also present mixed outcomes for mass uprisings in terms of escalation of violence. In the case of Iran, although the masses became militant, the level of violence did not reach the threshold of becoming an insurgency. Those in Tunisia and Egypt were largely nonviolent, while in the case of Libya the initial mass uprising escalated into an insurgency or even a civil war.

A mutation from a peaceful mass uprising into a militant uprising or an insurgency may be due to multiple factors which may include the nature of the regimes; the reaction of the security forces to the crowds; defections from the government security forces; availability of arms either locally or from foreign sources to local groups; involvement of foreign insurgent groups; acquisition of territory; a form of representation on behalf of the masses; and foreign intervention (Atkinson *et al*, 2011:2; Bhardwaj, 2012:77).

In the cases outlined above, mass uprisings in countries where the ruling regimes tolerated some semblance of expression did not escalate into insurgency. In Tunisia and Egypt, where there was semblance of constitutionalism and existence of autonomous organizations such as trades unions and civil society groups, the level of violence was low compared to that in Libya where there was intolerance of free expression, a lack of civil society, and a restrictive political system (Aarts *et al*, 2012: 34-35).

The reaction of the security forces is also a determinant of the level of violence. Mass uprisings transformed into insurgencies where the security forces, acting on behalf of the regimes, reacted to the protests with disproportionate violence in the form of mass arrests, torture, summary executions and other repressive measures. This further undermines the legitimacy of governments and at the same time alienates the population. The masses similarly resorted to violent attacks on targets identified with the regimes in certain circumstances (ICG, 2011(b):4; Guttentag, 2012:5).

Another cause of the escalation of violence was the role of the defectors from the security forces that joined the protestors. These invariably formed a nucleus of an organized, armed militia group that reacted to the use of violence by the regime (Guttentag, 2012:5; ICG, 2011(c):1).

In addition, the emergence of a leadership that is recognized as representing the masses facilitates the creation of a structure with a hierarchy of command and an organized force to contest the regime. This is enhanced with the acquisition of territory within the state that creates a base for an insurgency (Bhardwaj, 2012:77, 81; Atkinson *et al*, 2011:2; ICG, 2011(c):1).

An intervention by a foreign power or powers, either directly or indirectly, is another factor that escalates a mass uprising into an insurgency. Intervention on the side of the masses, by way of arms supplies, training or recognition inevitably escalates the level of violence leading to an insurgency or even a civil war as was the case in Libya in 2011 (Atkinson *et al*, 2012: 8, 12; Bhardwaj, 2012:81-82).

In the case of Libya, besides the harsh and repressive regime of Gaddafi, the rebels also received recognition and arms supplies from the international community and regional governments such as Qatar. In addition to these, the military intervention by NATO and the LAS aided the militarization of the rebel forces and raised the level of violence to that of an insurgency (Bhardwaj, 2012:81-83; Guttentag, 2012:12).

Foreign intervention did not manifest in the Iranian mass uprising. However, the secret police associated with the regime reacted with violence, and there were defections from the military, yet the masses remained disciplined. The mass uprising did not transform into an insurgency due to the existence of a civil society; political and literary groups; and human rights associations that formed the origins of the uprising and shaped the discontent (Ahmad, 1982:294-299). These will be discussed in detail in the case studies.

The causes of insurgencies and mass uprisings are subsequently discussed in more detail in the following section. The causes often reflect genuine grievances, but are also exploited to pursue other motives. These also determine the type of insurgency.

6. CAUSES OF MASS UPRISINGS AND INSURGENCIES

Trotsky (1932:2) notes that "a mass uprising is not an isolated undertaking, which can be conjured up any time as one pleases unless the necessary conditions exist". Mass uprisings and insurgencies are therefore precipitated by some grievances and conditions that spur on the masses or drive the population to rebel against an established authority, irrespective of the spontaneity (Beckett, 2005: 2).

These conditions can be an interplay and manipulation of both remote and immediate causes, as well as some trigger factors that ignite a reaction from the population.

6.1 REMOTE CAUSES

Remote causes are the structural conditions prevailing in a society that have the potential to precipitate violence. These include population growth or changes in the demographic structure, ethnic cleavages, land tenure systems, and economic development.

6.1.1 POPULATION GROWTH

Population growth without a corresponding increase in the capacity of the state to meet the needs of the growing population creates social discontent that can increase the revolutionary potential of a society. The correlation between population growth and uprising is explained in terms of the social discontent theory as argued by Midlarsky and Roberts (1985) among others. The proponents argue that insurgencies arise out of social change associated with population growth and resultant pressure on the land that creates tensions within groups. When tensions or deprivation become intolerable, the discontent gives rise to movements that advocate change (Greene, 1984:183).

This view was endorsed by the agrarian revolutions in China, Algeria and Bolivia among others. These revolutions were preceded by the increasing demands for agricultural resources, notably land. The maladministration of land created unemployment in rural areas. Unemployed rural dwellers migrated to urban centres in search of non-existent jobs as industrialization and employment fell behind urbanization. Both the scarcity of land and unavailability of jobs created a pool of discontented peasants and urban dwellers who became easily radicalized, and increased their potential for a mass uprising or an insurgency (Greene, 1984:183; Beckett, 2006:25).

6.1.2 ETHNIC AND RACIAL CLEAVAGES

Migration and ethnicity are other factors that can create social conflict and political violence. Ethnicity or race and linguistic differences also constitute a potent force for mobilization for collective action. Since ethnic groups and migrant populations are distinctively recognizable from the existing population, the social and economic interaction between the groups forms a potential source of friction. Such cleavages reinforce rebellions especially during periods of socio-economic hardship. The Sierra Leonean *coups d'état* in 1967, 1968 and 1971, and the Rwandan genocide in 1994, provide ready examples of the destructive forces of ethnicity (Greene, 1984:185-188).

Allied to ethnicity are cleavages that arise within the same religious faith or between different faiths. Extreme religious differences and intolerance coupled with other socio-economic and political grievances in society have the potential for violence as religion becomes a source of mobilization and expression of discontent. The Algerian uprising against France in the 1920s was due to radicalization of religion in Algeria as a result of perceived economic exploitation (Greene, 1984:187).

When proselytizing occurs along ethnic lines, religion becomes intermeshed with ethnicity. Religion thus becomes a basis of uniting otherwise diverse ethnic groups. Any disenchantment is interpreted in ethno-religious terms that radicalizes ethnicity and also expands the base of the conflict (Nordås, 2008:9).

These cleavages become legitimized in countries that have a history of violence. Thus, the resort to violence is an accepted norm and part of the political culture (Hough, 2008: 3).

6.1.3 LAND OWNERSHIP

The relationship between land inequality and the revolutionary potential in a society has often been emphasized. It has also been argued that maladministration of, or inequality in, land distribution, is a major cause of insurgency especially in rural areas. This is especially so in agrarian societies where ownership of land is a determinant of social and economic status. In situations with large foreign ownership of land, agitations are manifested as anti-colonial struggle. One of the causes of the revolution in France in 1789 was due to the fact that peasants that comprised 80 percent of the population owned 40 percent of the land. In Mexico in 1900, one percent of the population owned 97 percent of the land. Russia, Cuba, Vietnam, Bolivia, Ethiopia among others, reflected similar patterns creating a major source of uprisings in these societies. The question of ownership and availability of land is therefore a determinant of the conflict potential of a society (Greene, 1984:189; Hough, 2008:3).

6.1.4 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economic development, industrialization and modernization of agriculture, and the accompanying changes in social structures create an enabling environment for uprisings. In traditional societies, the introduction of commercial agriculture is a catalyst for change in the economic and social relations associated with traditional agriculture. This affects the status of both peasants and nobility alike as it alters the value systems, structure of authority, and in some cases, the associated form of security. For the nobility, it may be destruction of the feudal system and the loss of authority as was the case in France in 1793, while the inability to compete in the new market relations created by commercial agriculture creates discontent for the peasants. The threat posed by commercial

agriculture to small holder farmers was the root cause of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya in 1952 (Greene, 1984:192; Hough, 2008:3).

In Iran, attempts at modernization of the economy and the military by the Shah elicited negative reactions leading to his overthrow. The programme included land redistribution which disrupted traditional farming and communal land ownership (Greene, 1984:193; Aarts *et al*, 2012:74).

Muller and Seligson (1987) highlight the relationship between economic development and insurgency. Economic development and the associated industrialization, urbanization, and modernization creates inequality in the distribution of income. High levels of income inequality tend to exacerbate political violence especially in urban areas, while the probability for insurgency is low in cases of agrarian income inequalities (Muller and Seligson, 1987:427).

6.1.5 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

The factors discussed above create a sense of frustration that eventually leads to aggression and violence. This is explained by the theory of relative deprivation that describes the psychological factors underlying a mass uprising, insurgency or revolution. Relative deprivation is defined as the "the perception of discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" (Hough, 2008:4). This includes rising expectations without a corresponding increase in capabilities to meet the expectation, and a sudden decline in the socio-economic situation that affect capabilities (Wilkinson, 1986:35-37; Hough, 2008:4-5; Greene, 1984:167-168).

A variant of relative deprivation is the "J-curve" which suggests that revolutions may occur after a long period of economic growth is followed by a sudden economic decline. This creates a discrepancy between expectation and capability, and the fear of continued economic decline propels a mass uprising or a revolution. Other psychological factors such as status discrepancy reinforce relative deprivation (Greene, 1984:167-168; Wilkinson, 1986:35-37; Hough, 2008:4-5).

6.1.6 OTHER CAUSES

Other remote causes include the inability of the political system to cope with rapid changes in society; collapse of both governmental and social institutions; and the inability of society to deal with the psychological problems associated with rapid urbanization (Greene, 1984:195-200; Metz, 1993:7, 8).

6.2 IMMEDIATE CAUSES

The conditions prevailing in a country immediately before a mass uprising or insurgency constitute the accelerators or trigger factors. These can be structural, institutional or psychological factors, as well as the associated socio-economic and political problems.

6.2.1 LEGITIMACY

The foremost immediate cause is the loss of legitimacy of the regime or the withdrawal of legitimacy by the population. A regime becomes vulnerable to a revolt when the legal system and the coercive apparatus of the state are viewed with suspicion and perceived with distrust. Such a condition signifies a decline in the attitudes of the citizens towards the government and institutions of the state. A number of factors including corruption, cronyism, loss of national cohesion and disunity within the ruling élite impact negatively on the legitimacy of a regime. This creates societal divisions and alienation of the regime from the people which could ignite a mass uprising or an insurgency (Greene, 1989:163; Snow, 1996:34, 35; Lynn, 2005:22).

6.2.2 ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

Major economic indicators such as a decline in agricultural output, rising rates of inflation, and unemployment provide the breeding grounds for an uprising. For example, increasingly poor harvests and unemployment in both cities and rural areas, and price increases accompanied by declining wages, formed one of the immediate causes of the French revolution (Greene, 1989:165).

6.2.3 NATURE OF THE REGIME

The nature of the regime refers to the level of political participation in a given society. Autocratic rule and absolutism exemplified by monarchies constricts political expression. Such regimes rely on excessive and indiscriminate use of force and repression as a measure of control. This radicalizes the citizens and is likely to explode at the least opportunity. In the case of Iran, widespread terror and repression preceded the revolution. Similarly, demonstrators in Paris in February 1848 were met with violence by the police, to which the crowds reacted through riots that led to the fall of Louis Philippe (Greene, 1984:169; Wilkinson, 1986:36, 37).

The nature of the regime thus reflects the level of violence employed on the citizens. Indiscriminate use of violence or use of terror and repression is usually met with a corresponding increase in political violence by the citizens until a certain threshold that increases the propensity for a mass uprising or insurgency (Greene, 1984:168-170). The linkage between government violence and political violence is presented in figure 3.

6.2.4 POLITICAL CHANGE

An attempt by part of the ruling class to reform and bring about political change signals a declining state of competence that may create élite disunity and cleavages that accelerate an uprising. In 1789 the reforms started by the French Government alienated the monarchy from its traditional support base, notably the nobility. Similarly, one of the immediate causes of the Iranian uprising in 1979 was an attempt by the Shah at political change in 1977, following years of authoritarian rule. This opened the avenue for expression of latent discontent through riots, strikes and demonstrations leading to the mass uprising. Conversely, the inability of the opposition political forces to effect political reforms through constitutional means or the failure of the incumbent regime to institute democratic reforms, is a potential source for a mass uprising or insurgency. In such instances the people resort to extra legal means to effect desired changes (Greene, 1984:171-172; Palmer *et al*, 2003 cited in Aarts *et al*, 2012:74; Wilkinson, 1986:37-39).

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Figure 3. Linkage between Government Violence and Political Violence

Source: Adapted from Greene, T.H. Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall, 1984.

6.2.5 DOMINO EFFECT

Mass uprisings seem to occur in a given space of time. Thus, citizens of a state are likely to replicate developments in neighbouring states given the same or similar conditions. Rebellions or revolutions therefore have a domino or contagion effect. The French Revolution was followed by other revolutions notably in Belgium, Ireland, and Hamburg, while the uprising in Tunisia in 2010 triggered the Arab Spring (Greene, 1984:174; ICG, 2011(a):49).

7. CONCLUSION

An uprising is an all-embracing concept denoting all aspects of a rebellion against an established authority, aimed at capturing political power. It can range from a small number of participants as with riots, to broad mass participation. An uprising can also be

peaceful or violent; organized or spontaneous. The progression from one level of violence to the other is explained by an escalation ladder which also indicates levels of participation by the citizenry.

In this sense, both mass uprisings and insurgencies are forms of uprising. A mass uprising represents a psychological aggregation of a large number of various individuals and groups driven by shared grievances. It is usually nonviolent and spontaneous, but could be militant.

In contrast, an insurgency is an organized political and military action which employs guerrilla warfare, terrorism and conventional warfare in pursuance of the cardinal motive of acquisition of political power. Insurgency appears in various forms depending on the political, military, and geographical factors as well as the motives of insurgents. The concept has evolved from the classical understanding to more contemporary forms which have not only dissipated the political underpinnings of the concept, but have also assumed other dimensions or types of insurgency and the establishment of multinational or cross-border insurgent movements.

That the concept is evolutionary has not been disputed (Siqueira and Sekeris, 2012:157; Bunker, 2012:52). Metz (1993:1,2) opines that none of the old models of rural insurgency namely; protracted "peoples war", *foco*, Russian style urban insurrection or the Iranian model are dominant; while new variants have evolved with technology aided mobilization. Moreover, multilateral intervention impacted on the duration and level of violence.

A framework for differentiation of classical and contemporary insurgencies and mass uprisings therefore provides the indicators to identify forms of insurgencies and the difference between a mass uprising and an insurgency. This framework also provides the basis for identification of new forms or types of insurgencies.

It was also argued that some mass uprisings transform into insurgencies based on the existence of certain factors. Those factors also account for the reason why in some cases, mass uprisings develop into an organized group while others remain unorganized. A

comparison of the mass uprisings in France in 1789; Iran in 1979; and the Arab Spring in 2011, highlighted the conditions that may have transformed a nonviolent mass uprising into a militant one or an insurgency.

Both mass uprisings and insurgencies emerge out of existential grievances arising from structural and institutional failures in a given society. These are intensified by other factors that constitute the triggers that ignite or initiate the uprising.

While insurgency and mass uprising are primarily internal politico-military developments, external involvement, to a large extent, shape the progression or otherwise of the direction of the expression of grievance and escalation of violence. In pursuit of its motives, contemporary insurgents relied on political terrorism and conventional war which increased the level of violence. In the same vein, some recent mass uprisings elicited disproportionate force from the ruling regimes. Both instances degenerated into genocidal acts that invariably awakened the international conscience. In such circumstances, the international community is inclined to intervene against the atrocities in accordance with the instruments of humanitarian intervention. Intervention tends to escalate the level of violence and impacts on the trajectory of the conflict. That seems to have given rise to new forms of insurgency which combines both classical and contemporary modes.

The following chapter will examine the concept of intervention to establish a framework for the nature, types and impact of involvement of individual countries, multilateral or regional organizations in domestic conflicts characterized by mass uprisings or insurgencies.

CHAPTER THREE: INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT AND MILITARY INTERVENTION IN DOMESTIC CONFLICTS

1. INTRODUCTION

Intervention in the affairs of other states is an age old phenomenon. In the classical era, Athens and Sparta, the powers at the time, intervened in the civil wars and other domestic political conflicts in the other Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian Wars (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:3). Indeed the first recorded use of economic sanctions, as an instrument of intervention, was in 432 BC when Athens enacted the Megarian Decree which limited the importation of products from Megara into Athens and triggered the Peloponnesian war (Elliot, 1992:97). Since then, economic sanctions have been widely applied either unilaterally or multilaterally against a number of countries.

Intervention occurred in more clandestine forms in ancient China and Greece. France under Louis XIV also interfered in the constitutional matters of Britain. In the nineteenth century, intervention was a tool for revolution and counter revolutions during the Napoleonic wars. The concept was popularized as an instrument for spreading ideology as the Soviet Union, Germany under the Nazi regime and fascist Italy intervened in the affairs of neighbouring states (Holsti, 1995:193).

This chapter focuses on third party involvement and especially military intervention in domestic conflicts. It begins with the concepts of international involvement and intervention, the forms and types of intervention, the basis as well as the mechanisms for intervention. The concept of humanitarian military intervention as the emerging form of military intervention is also discussed with an emphasis on the concept of R2P as a new norm in international affairs.

The expected outcomes of intervention are also discussed extensively. The outcomes include the possibility of an intervention escalating the levels of violence in a nascent conflict. Thus, a third party intervention to protect civilians from the excesses of a ruling

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regime during a militant mass uprising could create conditions for a transformation of a mass uprising into an insurgency.

A brief historical overview of military interventions in the various conflicts in Africa is also presented in this chapter. This highlights the major interveners and the evolving nature of interventions from the liberation era through the post-Cold War period to the US-led "war on terror" that began in 2001.

2. DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

This section defines the concepts of international involvement in domestic conflicts, as well as providing a broad definition of intervention. It also discusses the basis, goals, mechanisms and the various forms of intervention.

2.1 INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

Generally, conflicts can be terminated through military victory by one party or negotiated truces by the warring parties. Conflicts can also end through the involvement of third parties by means of negotiated settlements or peace imposition (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007:5-8). The involvement of third parties is construed as internationalization of a domestic conflict or international involvement in domestic conflict. International involvement, in this instance, is defined within the context of states in conflict and is used interchangeably with external involvement, foreign involvement or third party involvement.

In a broad sense, international involvement refers to efforts and activities of both international institutions and external powers to bring a conflict to an end (Sabanadze, 2002:6). Thus a range of efforts, including coercive and non-coercive methods undertaken by an individual, a state, a group of states, organizations or the international community, directly or indirectly towards influencing a conflict, may be deemed as involvement.

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International involvement is also deemed as modes of engagement by the international community to resolve conflicts which includes third party involvement; external support and neutral interventions (Allansson *et al*, 2012:45, 46). Third party involvement is an intervention to resolve a conflict or crisis through diplomatic means. This is distinguished from external support which refers to direct support to one party in a conflict. This support includes financial assistance, arms supply and provision of direct military support or dispatch of combat troops (Allansson *et al*, 2012:46, 52-53). In this respect, international involvement is a broad spectrum of activities and includes coercive means such as military intervention and economic sanctions and non-coercive measures such as negotiations.

The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP, 2015) also identifies foreign or third party involvement as support or active participation (in terms of troops) of other governments on one or both sides of an armed conflict between a government and a non-government party. These views blur the distinction between international involvement and intervention.

International involvement is aimed at reducing misconceptions and suspicions between parties in conflict, mount pressure through recognition and legitimization of one side, offering financial inducements and direct intervention to enforce settlements (Hartzell *et al*, 2001:193). In this respect, international involvement includes diplomatic measures such as mediation of conflict to bring warring parties to peace talks; observer missions to monitor ceasefires; humanitarian interventions, development assistance, and non-humanitarian assistance including military intervention and the range of actions under peace operations (Sabanadze, 2002:27). The broader issues of post-conflict peacebuilding undertaken by the UN agencies or Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as political reforms, economic transformation, including market access and economic liberalization and stabilization measures, are classified as such. The political aspects of international involvement relate to the restoration and building of institutions to reflect good governance, institutional reforms, entrenchment of democratic principles and the protection of human rights and other individual or group freedoms, including minority rights (Sabanadze, 2002:5).

The concept of international involvement thus includes the role and activities of NGOs or Civil Society Organizations. In view of their expanded role, recognition and importance in the multilateral system, NGOs are an important component in conflict management, stabilization and resolution, as well as provision of humanitarian assistance and capacity building (Alger, 2002:96-97; McGann and Johnstone, 2005:159, 161; Reimann, 2006:45, 49, 60).

Similarly, NGOs, whether international, national or local, are an integral part in post-conflict peacebuilding which involves an amalgamation of various types of NGOs, notably humanitarian NGOs; human rights; gender; developmental; and environmental NGOs. The study, however, limits the discussion to the involvement of international NGOs or those recognized by the UN that also cooperate with the UN agencies in the field (Charnovitz, 1997:185-187; Chandler, 2001:2-8; Willets, 2000:1).

International involvement may therefore include intervention in addition to other forms of involvement, or may be limited to military intervention and/or other forms of intervention such as economic and diplomatic interventions to obtain specific outcomes, especially in conflict situations. The concept is used in this study to include military intervention and post-conflict peace operations.

2.2 INTERVENTION

The concept of intervention is defined both in narrow and broad terms. Scholars who subscribe to the narrow school of thought define the concept in terms of adoption of force to meddle in the internal affairs of another state. Vertzberger (1998:3) for example defines intervention as "coercive military intrusion into the internal or foreign affairs of another state", while Jentleson and Levite (1992:5) see the concept as interference in another nation's internal affairs, usually by force.

In the broader view, intervention is defined as "the calculated use of political, economic and military instruments by one country to influence the domestic or the foreign policies of another country" (Schraeder, 1992(a):3). This view was emphasized by Regan

(1996:9) as the "granting or the withdrawal of economic or military assistance with the apparent purpose of influencing the course of an ongoing civil conflict"; while Pearson and Baumann (1988:173) define intervention as "coming between disputants or interjecting oneself into a dispute or a situation in a foreign state".

A summation of the main elements of both views indicate that intervention encompasses a number of actions by one state or a group of states to influence decisions or policies of another state. These sets of activities can include political, diplomatic, economic or military means either directly or indirectly. Thus any form of interference in the domestic and foreign affairs of a state is considered an intervention.

For the purposes of this research, the definition of the concept offered by Regan (2003:10) as "convention-breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces", will be used. This definition is appropriate as the study views intervention as an imbalanced power relationship with the intervener as the dominant power (Schmidt, 2013:2). It is, however, quite restrictive with its emphasis on only the military and economic aspects of intervention, to the exclusion of diplomatic and other forms. Diplomatic intervention is therefore included in the application of the concept to place this study into focus. This notwithstanding, intervention is construed primarily as military involvement in the domestic affairs of states.

2.2.1 MILITARY INTERVENTION

Foreign military interventions are seen as "coercive state-organized and state-controlled, convention-breaking, goal-oriented activities by one foreign state in the territory of another" (Vertzberger, 1998:114). Military intervention is also defined as "the movement of troops or forces of one government across an international boundary, in the context of some political dispute" or "coming between disputants or interjecting oneself into a dispute or a situation in a foreign state" (Pearson and Baumann, 1989:115; Pearson and Baumann, 1988:175). These definitions assume that military intervention is undertaken

by states to the exclusion of multilateral organizations such as NATO and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or the UN.

Military intervention assumes various forms and includes the total range of military activities from the supply of weapons, supply or transfer of troops, supply of intelligence, and training, among others (Pearson and Baumann, 1989:115; Regan, 1996:9). These actions can be direct or indirect. Direct military intervention is the deployment of troops of the intervening state in the target state. This can range from low intensity brief missions, to large scale occupation or the conduct of conventional warfare as with the US intervention in Korea or the intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia in 1990 (Vertzberger, 1998:114; Yoon, 2005:281, 284).

Indirect military intervention may involve paramilitary interventions by the intervener. This includes the dispatch of military advisers and financial support to irregular forces to initiate or support an insurgency against the government of a target state (Schraeder, 1992:131(b)). Indirect military intervention is typically a war fought by proxies of the intervening state involving insurgent groups composed mainly of nationals of the target state. It may also take the form of supply of weapons and provision of training and technical advice, provision of bases and supply routes among others (Vertzberger, 1998:114; Yoon, 2005:284).

2.2.2 HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

As with the concept of intervention, the concept of humanitarian intervention is broadly conceived to include all forms of humanitarian actions, or restrictively to mean military intervention to alleviate human suffering in conflict situations. A generally accepted definition is lacking.

The UN itself is yet to provide a comprehensive definition of the concept. Actions by the UN to create humanitarian access amongst others, have been undertaken under chapter

VII of the UN Charter, which authorizes the Security Council to take military action in the event of threats to international peace and security.

The often quoted definition is one provided by Verwey (1992:114) who defines the concept as "the threat or use of force by a state or states abroad, for the sole purpose of preventing or putting a halt to a serious violation of fundamental human rights, in particular the right to life of persons, regardless of their nationality, such protection taking place neither upon authorization by relevant organs of the United Nations nor with the permission by the legitimate government of the target state". Verwey's definition restricts the concept to military actions by individual states without taking into account actions by regional or multilateral institutions such as the UN.

To Pape (2012:44), "humanitarian intervention is the use of military force by one or more states within the jurisdiction of another, without its permission, to protect innocent people from violence by the target state's government". Bellamy and Wheeler (2008:30) similarly see the concept as "military intervention that breaches the principle of state sovereignty where the primary purpose is to alleviate the human suffering of some or all within the state's borders usually under the mandate of the United Nations".

A more comprehensive definition that expanded the concept to include non-forcible methods of intervention was provided by Scheffer (1992:265, 266) who identified humanitarian intervention as activities undertaken to alleviate mass human suffering within a sovereign state. Scheffer's definition broadens the subject to include a range of activities, both military and non-military, that are generally associated with humanitarian assistance.

A distinction is therefore made between forcible and non-forcible or consensual humanitarian intervention. As a non-forcible action, humanitarian intervention is generally conceived as the provision of relief aid in times of crisis, arising out of civil conflict or natural disasters, and involves assistance to refugees and internally displaced people. Civilian relief actions, with emphasis on human protection, became more pronounced in the 1990s with the interventions in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, northern

Iraq, Rwanda and Afghanistan among others, to end the carnage and protect citizens from the belligerents in internal conflicts (Regan, 2003:23; Bellamy and Williams, 2011:827).

In some instances, it becomes imperative to project force to create humanitarian corridors to achieve certain objectives. Thus the definitions above also presume that humanitarian intervention should protect the population (unarmed citizens and non-combatants) from atrocities arising out of the actions or inactions of their own governments as espoused by the concept of humanitarian military intervention. This is contained in the so-called R2P concept which developed from the year 2000 onwards.

2.2.3 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

A high level panel was mandated by the UN in 2000 to redefine peace operations by aligning it with the challenges associated with contemporary insurgencies. The panel concluded that the UN must be prepared to confront war and violence "with ability and determination to defeat them" and that "no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping is to succeed". The Report also called for a defeat of "forces of war and violence" and the protection of innocent victims from warlords. The report reinforced the debate for more effective measures for protection of civilians (UNGA, 2000(a):viii; Thakur, 2011(b):164; Evans, 2012:20).

This recognition confirms the inability of the existing UN mechanisms to deal with contemporary insurgencies, and to a large extent, also sacrifices the neutrality associated with traditional peacekeeping. It also legitimised the hitherto *ad hoc* approaches to the use of force in multilateral humanitarian military intervention.

Humanitarian intervention included a forcible dimension following the adoption of the concept of the R2P concept as contained in the *World Summit Report* in 2005. This concept of forcible humanitarian intervention called on the international community to intervene in situations where sovereign states are unable to execute their obligation to

protect their citizens from genocide, mass killing and other atrocities. The UNGA endorsed the concept in 2005 and it was subsequently reaffirmed by the UN Security Council (UNGA, 2005; UNSCR, 1674 of 2006).

The resolution of the question of sovereignty and protection of human rights became pronounced in the aftermath of the failures of the international community to intervene in the Rwandan genocide in 1994; and the divisions within the international community that impeded them to act during the crisis in Kosovo in 1999. This was followed by calls by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, on the resolution of that contradiction to alleviate human suffering in times of conflict. The Canadian government responded to this call with the establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 (Thakur, 2011(a):75; Thakur and Schnabel, 2011:52; Evans, 2012:20).

The main tenet of the report of the ICISS titled "Responsibility to Protect" was that "sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe-from mass murder and rape, from starvation-but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states" (ICISS, 2001:viii). In sum, the report advocated military intervention in situations where actions of states become a threat to their citizens and also induces suffering on the population due to "internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure" (ICISS, 2001:xi).

The ICISS Report set the stage for a new norm in humanitarian intervention, which was adopted by the UN World Summit in October 2005. The *World Summit Outcome Document* asserts the responsibility of states in the protection of populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It also asserts the responsibility of the international community to use "humanitarian and other peaceful means" to protect populations from grave harm. This was contained in paragraphs 138 and 139:

> 138.   "Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This

responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability."

139.   "The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect the populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out" (UNGA, 2005:30, Paragraphs 138, 139).

R2P then shifted the meaning of sovereignty from 'control' to responsibility. It called for the international community to react in situations that need human protection. This invariably implied coercion, which includes military intervention (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002:101,103)

The operationalization of the R2P was an endorsement of a previous UN Security Council resolution which called on the international community to "respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted and where humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed" (UNSCR, 1265 of 1999(a)). It is emphasised here that prior to 2010, some manifestations of R2P had been authorized by the UN Security Council.

R2P has been reinforced by other resolutions passed by the UN Security Council. For instance, UNSCR 1674 of 2006 and 1894 of 2009 on Cote d'Ivoire, and UNSCR 1973 of 17 March 2011 on Libya, emphasised its responsibility to protect civilians from grave crimes against the incumbent governments of the respective states. These resolutions confirmed the new direction for civilian protection namely intervention in the name of R2P to protect civilians from impending or perceived serious crimes (Bellamy and Williams, 2011:826; UNSCR, 1674 of 2006 and 1894 of 2009; UNSCR, 1973 of 2011(a)).

In terms of mechanisms, military interventions authorized by the UN in the form of humanitarian intervention since the 1990s had manifested as no-fly zones, aerial attacks; and deployment of ground forces as exemplified in Iraq (1991), Bosnia (1994), Somalia (1992), Cote d'Ivoire (2003) and Libya in 2011 (Kuperman, 2013:105).

Contrary to the ideal of R2P to end conflict and avert human suffering, the application of the concept has the inherent risks to increase the level of violence, thereby escalating a conflict and inducing more suffering than it sought to alleviate.

2.3 MOTIVATION AND GOALS OF INTERVENTION

A number of factors influence or underlie a decision to intervene in other states by third parties. These include the defense or spread of a political ideology; territorial acquisition; protection of military-strategic interests; regional stability; protection of economic or diplomatic interests and humanitarian reasons. It could also be on the basis of protection of religious or ethnic groups. The basis for an intervention is premised on multiple goals depending on the interest of the intervener. Generally, however, the basis of intervention,

whether economic, military or diplomatic, is to end a conflict and reduce the associated carnage and human suffering; create stability, install or maintain friendly regimes or remove unfriendly regimes (Vertzberger, 1998:115; Regan, 2003:8-12; Snow, 1996:116; Carpenter, 1992:153,154).

Broadly speaking then, intervention can be an undertaking to protect global or international security concerns or the national security interest of a particular state or group of states.

These notwithstanding, some factors become distinct or key drivers determining an intervention. During the Cold War, interventions were largely based on ideological grounds which manifested in the proxy wars in Africa, Latin America and Asia. In some instances, spheres of influence and colonial economic interests became the driving force. Third parties have therefore intervened in conflicts for either parochial reason to defend their national interest, for enforcement of stability and international security, or in recent times, to protect the citizens of the target state concerned (Vertzberger, 1998:115; Kupchan, 1992:245; Regan, 1996:7)

Moreover, irrespective of the domestic nature, internal conflicts tend to affect neighbouring states and entire regions in a variety of ways. For example, the flow of refugees impacts on the economics and political conditions of receiving states. Again, states or regions are interrelated and interconnected through sociological factors such as shared identity, religious beliefs, ethnicity and, in some instances, a large diaspora population. These factors influence the motivation to intervene (Carment and James, 1996:3; Holsti, 1995:196).

The end of the Cold War witnessed an increase in intrastate wars, some of which were barbaric or exhibited extreme violence that sought to decimate entire populations. This resulted in significant shifts from unilateral to multilateral humanitarian interventions aimed at creating humanitarian corridors for humanitarian relief operations. The post-Cold War interventions were focused on intrastate conflicts and motivated by the need to

end the carnage and atrocious behaviour of belligerents towards civilians in contemporary insurgencies, and uphold human rights. Intervention in this period has been determined by a defense of human rights, prevention or ending of genocide and creation of humanitarian corridors for relief operations (Snow, 1996:115-117; Regan, 1996:7; Enuka, 2012:17-23).

2.4 UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INTERVENTIONS

The activities that are deemed as constituting an intervention can be a unilateral or a multilateral undertaking and targeted at a state, which in most instances is the government, or opposition groups contesting the government, with the objective of changing and influencing the political system of the target state or the group (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:5).

Unilateral actions imply an action taken by an unauthorized party, in this case a third party, in place of that of a legally designated party (Reisman, 2000:3). In this context, an intervention decision taken by a single state that replaces decisions by the international community are deemed unilateral actions. Unilateral actions are therefore actions by individual states in pursuance of an interest (Carpenter, 1992:159; Snow, 1996:128).

Thus, a unilateral military intervention is "the dispatch of national armed forces to another sovereign state in an attempt to influence political, economic, or social conditions in the country" without the express authorization of the UN Security Council (Pearson and Baumann, 1993: iii cited in Pickering and Kisangani, 2006:363).

Multilateral or collective interventions are interventions involving a few countries with personnel undertaking a wide range of activities. The personnel could be military officers undertaking peacekeeping, or observers monitoring a ceasefire, or civilians involved in humanitarian relief operations and post-conflict reconstruction. This also includes the use of *ad hoc* coalitions of countries that intervene on behalf of the international community (Regan, 2003:102; Holsti, 1995:350).

Similarly, multilateral military interventions are usually those mandated by the international community and undertaken under the command of international or regional institutions such as the UN and other regional organizations. These include humanitarian relief assistance, infrastructural redevelopment, monitoring of ceasefire or observers among others. This has been prevalent in the post-Cold War era, when interventions have been authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and under the command of the UN. The UN intervention in Cambodia in 1991, East Timor in 1999, Somalia in 1992, Bosnia in 1992 and the UN military action against the rebels in the DRC in 1999, are examples of this form. Regional organizations, political, security organizations or other alliances such as NATO, AU and ECOWAS among others, have also provided the platform for military intervention as they act on behalf of the UN (Snow, 1996: 126; Regan, 2003:102; Carpenter, 1992:159).

Both forms of intervention have been used by states and the international community. During the Cold War, some military interventions were undertaken mainly under the mandate of the UN Security Council. These were multilateral military interventions that were reflected in peace operations. The first of such peace operations was the UN peacekeeping force dispatched to the Middle East in 1956 to monitor a ceasefire between Israel, England, France and Egypt. Peacekeeping has since been expanded into peace operations that include disarmament, elections supervision, reorganization of police forces and humanitarian assistance. The first peace operation in this sense was that in Cambodia in 1991. Unilateral interventions also occurred during the period either directly or indirectly mainly through proxy wars conducted on behalf of the main superpowers (Regan, 2003:101, 102, 108-111; Vertzberger, 1998:3, 114; Holsti, 1995:354, 355).

However, unilateral interventions were prevalent during the period prior to World War II and indeed during the Cold War, while contemporary wars have tended to draw multilateral interventions. Of the 22 intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War era, 45 percent saw multilateral interventions under the auspices of the UN including Cambodia, Georgia, Iraq, Bosnia, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This occurred as a result of the

end of the Cold War, the advent of a unipolar world and the recourse to multilateralism (Regan, 2003:102, 109).

In addition to the number of actors, the difference between the forms is that unilateral intervention may be illegal if the basis is not an accepted norm in international relations; for instance, if the basis is retaliation against a state or a claim of self-defense outside the legal conditions against the action of another state (Regan, 2003:102; Reisman, 2000:9, 10). In terms of economic intervention, retaliation is deemed illegal under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules (Brewster, 2009:1143). Secondly, multilateral interventions are legitimized by a broad consensus of the international community and more enduring in terms of time, and therefore likely to stabilize any peace following a conflict (Regan, 2003:106, 110, 114).

An intervention can also be hostile or supportive. Typically, intervention is deemed to be hostile when a third party intervenes on behalf of those opposed to the target government or state. Interventions that support the target government are classified as supportive or friendly. It can also be classified as neutral in a situation where there is a political vacuum or in cases undertaken under UN auspices. However, while UN peacekeeping can be neutral, peace enforcement is often aimed at one party only and can be hostile or supportive (Vertzberger, 1998:3,114; Pickering and Kisangani, 2006:363-364).

In relation to duration, some interventions can be quick and decisive while others become protracted. The former include the interventions by the US in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:9). Protracted cases are measured in terms of duration and cost (casualties) of the intervener. These include the US intervention in Vietnam, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Cuban intervention in Angola (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:10, 11).

Thus in terms of duration, the generally held view is that supportive intervention tends to shorten civil wars and reduce human costs. This assertion may not be applicable in

cases where the superpowers supported opposing groups in a conflict as in the case of Angola, where the belligerents of the Cold War lent support to the different parties in the conflict leading to a protraction (Pickering and Kisangani, 2006:364). The opposite is therefore often true with hostile interventions.

2.5 FORMS OF INTERVENTION

Intervention therefore manifests in various forms. The main forms are economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military intervention, including covert action. The latter is usually the last option, yet the most popular of the forms (Jentleson and Levite, 1992:8; Smock and Gregorian, 1993:1).

Economic intervention can assume the form of positive inducements or rewards in the form of aid or economic support for one side or punitive sanctions. The former includes foreign aid and favourable tariffs and quota regimes that are applied to reward acceptable behaviour of countries. Economic sanctions are defined as decisions or a threat by a government to withdraw trade or financial relations with other countries. These are punitive measures to coerce a target state into acceptable behaviour. Implementation of this form of intervention usually involves a reduction or withdrawal of goods, boycotts, embargoes, exports, financial assistance, and economic aid from the sender or interveners from the target state or groups (Elliot, 1992:97; Regan, 1996:7, 9; Holsti, 1995:167-170).

Diplomatic intervention refers to the use of statecraft including mediation, arbitration, negotiation and official missions by eminent personalities. Essentially, this form of intervention is aimed at creating common grounds for peace by reducing suspicions, building confidence and closing the communication gap between warring factions. This form of intervention usually does not alter the existing situation compared with economic and military intervention, which seek to realign the power structure of the target state (Regan, 2003:6-7; Regan *et al*, 2009:19; Holsti, 1995:351).

Covert interventions represent attempts by a state to influence the domestic policies of another state secretly, but directly in the performance of its foreign policy objectives. This involves a number of actions including propaganda and psychological warfare, supporting *coup d'états*, financial assistance, manipulation of the electoral process and assassination among other things (Ransom, 1992:113; Holsti, 1995:199).

While all the forms of intervention were applied during the Cold War period, military intervention or forms of it, such as an arms embargo, seemed to have been the preferred option in this period as intervention became synonymous with the use of military force. This is confirmed in a study by Regan (2003:27-30) which revealed that military intervention was the commonest form of intervention occurring in 73 percent of the 138 intra-state conflicts analyzed between 1944 and 1994. This confirms the preponderance of military intervention over other forms of intervention. In a similar pattern, 425 military interventions by regular armed forces were recorded in the post-Cold War period from 1990 to 2005 (Pickering and Kisangani, 2009:596).

3. MECHANISMS OF MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION

The mechanisms for multilateral intervention are contained in a UN Secretary General document titled an *Agenda for Peace*. The Report was in response to a request by the UN Security Council, at the levels of Heads of State and Government in January 1992, for it to provide recommendations for strengthening the capacity of the UN for peace operations (UNGA, 1992:1). This was against the background of a new dimension of insecurity with claims of nationalism and sovereignty, discrimination and exclusion, and ethno-religious and cultural strife, that threatened the existence of states and societies.

The document highlights three main mechanisms for multilateral interventions, namely preventive diplomacy; peacemaking and peacekeeping which also includes post-conflict peace building.

Preventive diplomacy entails "actions to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. Preventive diplomacy involves early warning, fact-finding missions and confidence building and other pre-emptive measures to resolve disputes before violence breaks out" (UNGA, 1992:5, 6). Preventive diplomacy then precedes full-scale conflicts and is primarily pursued by diplomats or eminent personalities through negotiations, among others.

Peacemaking on the other hand is to bring warring factions to resolve differences through peaceful means as espoused in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These include the implementation of a ceasefire and reconciliation. Peacemaking represents attempts to bring hostile parties together through the use of persuasion, mediation and negotiation as well as the application of sanctions where necessary. A last resort is the application of military force in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. That is the deployment of military units to enforce peace (UNGA, 1992:10-11; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:1-6). This was only legal at the invitation of states during the Cold War.

Peacekeeping and post-conflict peace building involve a number of activities to reduce the possibility of a recurrence of conflict. These include the deployment of military, police and civilians to monitor ceasefires; human rights, elections and humanitarian aid specialists among others, with the consent of the parties concerned. Peacekeepers are supposed to keep the warring factions apart (UNGA, 1992:5, 14; DPKO, 2010; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006:1-6).

These mechanisms assume that intervention can take place after the most violent phase of a conflict, an agreed ceasefire, and that the belligerents are finding ways to reconcile their differences (Regan, 2003:110). In this way, traditional multilateral intervention is premised on the existence of a basis for peace and considered as being neutral.

These concepts were, however, designed for particular types of conflicts and as such were inadequate to resolve the new insurgencies. This recognition called for new forms of intervention as espoused by the proponents of the concept of humanitarian military intervention.

4. OUTCOMES OF INTERVENTION

This section focuses on the outcome of humanitarian military intervention, in particular the R2P, as it relates to the level of violence in a conflict.

As stated earlier, the expected outcome of an intervention is to end violence, carnage and human suffering. This may not be the case in all circumstances. For instance, Regan (1996:12) affirms that while an intervention is supposed to end conflicts, it has the tendency to prolong the duration of hostilities. The same study outlined that military intervention on behalf of an opposition group or rebels in a given state, is less likely to succeed compared to those in favour of government. Again, of the 150 intrastate conflicts studied between 1945 and 1999, interventions occurred in 101 of those conflicts which worsened the conflicts (Regan, 2002:2). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) endorsed these findings by establishing a positive relationship between foreign intervention and the duration of wars. This assertion could be the bane of R2P as the concept is directed mostly at incumbent governments.

There is, however, the need for an operational definition of the outcome of an intervention in order to measure the success or failure. The definition of a successful intervention as advocated by Licklider (1993 cited in Regan, 2003:13) is that a civil war is considered as over when "multiple sovereignty ends or the violence is terminated for five years." While five years may be considered too long, the operational meaning is the end of violence even within a year.

This definition indicates that an end to violence becomes conterminous with the success of an intervention. By deduction, a humanitarian military intervention that raised the level of violence during and after the intervention may be deemed to have failed. Post-intervention violence, in this instance, is deemed to have occurred when a humanitarian intervention transforms a conflict into an insurgency or a civil war. Post-intervention violence is also construed as the failure of an intervention to end an existing insurgency or civil war. This also meant that the amount of force projected during the period of

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intervention and the ability to stabilize or subdue competing claimants to authority, are also factors that determine success.

The tendency for an intervention to create violence in the short term has been of concern to scholars. Jentleson *et al* (1992:305) pointed out that foreign military intervention brings in its wake extensive casualties and destruction and increases violence, during and after the intervention. Other studies similarly conclude that foreign military intervention tends to increase the levels of violence and exacerbates instability, confirming a positive correlation between intervention and increased levels of violence even beyond the actual fighting or the intervention phase (Pearson, 1974 in Jentleson *et al*, 1992:306).

Table 1. Number of Interveners and the Duration of the Conflict (1944 to 1994)

Number of interveners	Longer Than Mean Duration (%)	Less Than Mean Duration (%)
1	24	76
2	27	73
3	28	72
4	63	37
5	52	48
6	50	50

Note: Mean Duration- 9 years

Adapted from Regan, P. 2003. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict,* University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. P 32.

Regan (2003:33) confirmed the view that a prolonged conflict can be an outcome of an intervention. The mean duration of wars that ended without an intervention was 1.5 while those with intervention was nine years. Casualties also increased in conflicts with interventions as the table above indicates.

Table 2. Number of Interveners and Number of Casualties

(From 1944 to 1994)

Number of interveners	<4,000	4K through 27K	>27,000
1	19	11	8
2	10	8	19
3	6	17	20
4	11	11	8
5	5	5	19
6	6	0	6

Adapted from Regan, P. 2003. *Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict,* University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. P 32.

Reflecting a similar view in relation to R2P, Pape (2012:52) notes that where there is a disproportionate application of force, an R2P intervention can inadvertently generate or escalate internal violence, and create other intractable security problems.

Given the view that hostile intervention results in high levels of violence and uses higher levels of force, hostile interventions then do more harm to the target state than supportive intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004; Regan, 2002:76). Since humanitarian military intervention has generally been hostile, it invariably yields high levels of violence.

The foregoing suggests that contrary to the conventional wisdom of alleviating suffering, one of the outcomes of a humanitarian military intervention is the possibility of escalating the level of violence in an existing or nascent conflict thereby defeating the purpose of intervention. Indeed, this possibility was expressed by both the international community and scholars alike. In his *Millennium Report* in 2000, the then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, expressed concerns that humanitarian intervention "might encourage secessionist movements deliberately to provoke governments into committing gross violations of human rights in order to trigger external interventions that would aid their cause" (UNGA, 2000(b): paragraph 216).

Carment and James (1996); Rowlands and Carment (1998); Bloom (1999) and Kuperman (2008) similarly argue that third party interventions have adverse effects, as such interventions escalate violence in conflicts. Humanitarian military interventions are no exceptions to this rule. This dilemma is presented by the "moral hazard theory". The theory posits that the expectation of an intervention increases the propensity of groups that are vulnerable to genocidal violence to initiate a risky rebellion, and by extension, to provoke violence that will elicit a disproportionate violent response from the incumbent government, which will attract multilateral intervention (Kuperman, 2008: 49). This can be applied to initiate a rebellion or a militant mass uprising by political opponents against a dictatorial regime in anticipation of repression that could attract an intervention under R2P.

Thus the possibility of humanitarian intervention by the international community, in this instance, provides a form of insurance to a minority group or political opponents from anticipated excesses of an incumbent government (Rauchhaus, 2009:872; Grigorian, 2005:196).

It is argued that in a moral hazard situation, interventions ostensibly to protect the civilian population and non-combatants, will tend to escalate violence that can become an insurgency and inflict more destruction on the population than protecting them (Kuperman, 2013:106). Thus, rather than alleviating misery and averting genocide, R2P as a mode of humanitarian intervention has the likelihood or the prospects of unintended consequences that reward rebels; encourages rebellions and uprisings; and increases the transition of militant mass uprisings into insurgencies. This is particularly so as both government and rebel forces tend to target the civilian population in their attempts to expand their territory for any future negotiations.

Other scholars such as Rauchhaus (2009:872-873) have argued that contrary to moral hazard, "adverse selection" is the bane of conflict escalation in humanitarian interventions. In other words, an incorrect assessment of information on the real intentions of a minority group or rebels leads to adverse outcomes.

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The distinction between the two models stems from the underlying assumptions that while moral hazard is premised on indeterminate action, adverse selection arises out of undisclosed information on the real intention of a minority or rebel group. This arises out of the inability of the intervening party to monitor the actions of the minority or rebel group. That provides incentives for the latter to embark on actions that provoke the government. Thus the guarantee of an intervention is a disincentive for restraint, and that increases violence levels in a conflict (Rauchhaus, 2009:875).

The moral hazard theory has been applied to the rebellion which occurred in Kosovo in the 1990s. The framework confirmed that the attacks on the Yugoslav government institutions and other actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army prior to the intervention by the US, was premised on the certainty of an intervention in case of a reaction by the Yugoslav government. The prospect of such an intervention was an incentive for attacks by ethnic Albanians on Serbians (Kuperman, 2008:55; Rauchhaus, 2009:877-878).

The argument here is that humanitarian intervention by third parties, in this instance by multilateral institutions, can create an insurgency as it spurs on militants and engenders more rebellion leading to negative outcomes. This is exceptionally relevant to ongoing conflicts in the Darfur region (Rauchhaus, 2009:871; Kuperman, 2008:106).

Insurgency in this respect is interpreted as an escalation in violence by both an incumbent government and an opposing faction or a rebel movement. Besides rebel or minority groups, humanitarian interveners similarly employ massive firepower and exhibit superior weaponry to subdue governmental forces which inadvertently increase the levels of violence.

It is acknowledged that the question of measurement or parameters to determine an increase in violence may present difficulties. This is particularly so since measurement of an escalation may be contingent on a baseline or a minimum threshold for violence. At the same time, an analysis of an increase in violence is dependent on the level of violence if an intervention has not taken place; which remains an unknown variable.

Organizations employ different methods to measure success, and perhaps the failure, of a humanitarian intervention. NGOs and the UN agencies highlight the volume of relief supplies and donations received while defence officials rely on troops and equipment deployed, number of sorties and damage to the armaments of both the target and the intervener (Seybolt, 2008:31).

Another factor that influences the level of violence is the type of humanitarian military intervention. Seybolt (2008:42) identified four types of humanitarian military intervention that also impact on violence as depicted in Table 3 below;

Table 3. A Typology of Military Intervention

Type	Strategy
Help deliver aid	Avoidance
Protect aid operations	Deterrence and defence
Save the victims	Deterrence, defence and compellence
Defeat the perpetrators	Compellence and offence

Adapted from Seybolt, T. 2008. *Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure*, SIPRI, Oxford University Press. P 42.

Interventions to deliver aid or protect aid operations are more of a deterrent nature and as such exhibit a low level of violence. If the aim is to save the victims, violence is also sporadic since the application of force is used as a deterrent. A military intervention that is predicated on the defeat of the perpetrators usually adopts an offensive military strategy, which develops into a full-scale war with consequences for levels of violence.

Measurement of an increase in violence is based on the assumption that if the primary motive of humanitarian intervention is to end war and violence, then an intervention is meant to save lives. The outcome of an intervention can therefore be measured in terms of lives that were saved which otherwise would have been lost without military intervention. Kuperman (2013:107) applied this model in the analysis of a moral hazard

situation during the humanitarian intervention in Libya in 2011, while Seybolt (2008:30, 32-37) used a similar methodology to analyse the humanitarian military interventions in northern Iraq in 1991; Somalia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992); Rwanda (1994); Kosovo (1999) and East Timor in 1999.

Measurement of an escalation of violence will be based on this approach in addition to the nature of violence prior to and during an intervention (including the number of sorties by interveners; firepower employed, rebel actions/attacks on government position); outcome of the intervention; if the prospect for an intervention provided an incentive for rebellion followed by a crackdown by a government, and post-intervention actions by the international community.

5. INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

Historically, Africa has had a long history of involvement, both economic and military, with global actors since antiquity when northern Africa became part of the Greco-Roman empires and through trading with the Asian empires. These relations were a mix of mutually beneficial economic exchanges that also transformed into military interventions in the affairs of African states (Schmidt, 2013:4, 5).

In the modern era, as with most other regions, Africa has witnessed several conflicts and interventions since the 1960s in the Congo, Nigeria, Senegal, Gabon, Chad, Ethiopia, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Somalia among others. These interventions have been associated with various epochs or inflexion points in the history of the continent mainly linked with the decolonization process; liberation wars; internal dissent and secessionist wars and the war on terror. These interventions have been either intra- or extra-continental (Smock and Gregorian, 1993:3-6; Schmidt, 2013:1,180-181).

Military interventions in Africa reflected that which prevailed in most Third World states during the Cold War, namely superpower rivalries and the interests of colonial powers. The US, the Soviet Union and major colonial powers such as Belgium, France and Britain, were the main extra-continental interveners. Cuba, Israel, and China became actively

involved either directly or indirectly. This was particularly evident during the decolonization process in the 1960s and the associated internal conflicts and contradictions. The UN, the AU and regional organizations such as ECOWAS have also intervened under some circumstances (Smock and Gregorian, 1993:3, 8-9; Yoon, 2005:278; Schmidt, 2013:3, 7, 18).

Other African countries and regional hegemons on the continent, like South Africa, Nigeria and Libya, intervened in the internal conflicts of other African states. Indeed, Macfarlane (1983-1984:63) notes that most military interventions in Africa during the Cold War were undertaken by African states. This increased considerably in the post-Cold War era with the establishment of alliances and use of African states as proxies (Yoon, 2005:277; Smock and Gregorian, 1993:3, 7).

The struggle for independence by African states ushered in numerous forms of interventions in terms of requests for external assistance by factions in a liberation war, or in terms of support for a particular ideology. The 1960s to the 1980s thus became the age for interventions in Africa (Somerville, 1990:25; Schmidt, 2013:7, 22).

In terms of ideology, the contest between free market capitalism, the defeat of imperialism and establishment of socialism were the key drivers for intervention. The competing interests of the US, France, Britain and Belgium also played a role while the then Soviet Union, China and Cuba were divided over ideology and models of development and thus competed for allegiances. These often led to the support for rival faction in conflicts in Africa by allies as well (Schmidt, 2013:22-29).

The military intervention in Egypt in 1956 by France and Britain mirrored the ideological and economic basis for intervention in Africa. The upsurge of radical nationalism in the Middle East in the 1950s influenced similar sentiments in Egypt which resulted in the overthrow of King Farouk by Gamal Nasser in 1952. Nasser subsequently requested the withdrawal of the British from Egypt and nationalised the Suez Canal Company (jointly owned by the British and the French) in 1956. This culminated in the intervention by

Britain and France in October 1956, but they withdrew under international pressure (Schmidt, 2013:36-43).

The Congo crisis in 1960 was a classic case of foreign military intervention arising out of the decolonization process and which also bore the hallmark of both unilateral and multilateral interventions by Belgium and the UN respectively, as well as regional hegemons such as South Africa; using proxies and mercenaries. It also revealed the competing interests of the interveners. Between 1964 and 1965, almost all the interveners involved in Africa were active in the Congo, either supportive (as with the US, Belgium, France and Britain) or hostile (in the case of the Soviet Union, Cuba, China, Ghana and Algeria) (Somerville, 1990:12-22; Schmidt, 2013:70-74).

Following the crisis in the Congo, the French and the British, the foremost colonial powers on the African continent, intervened variously to restore order; support faltering regimes; to contain mutinies; or restore previous governments that had been overthrown. This resulted in about thirty military interventions by France between 1960 and 1992 (Somerville, 1990:22; Schmidt; 2013:165, 180).

France intervened in Africa since the 1960s, under defence and military cooperation agreements signed with most of its former colonies, to protect the newly independent colonies against internal uprisings; undermine rival European powers; and remove or reinstate legitimate heads of state as exemplified in the intervention in Gabon in 1964 to reinstate President M'ba. The British also intervened in Tanzania in 1964 to quell an insurrection against President Nyerere, and undertook similar actions in Kenya and Uganda in the same year (Somerville, 1990:23, 24; Smock and Gregorian, 1993:5).

The onset of the liberation struggle in the 1960s saw most of the liberation movements turning to the Soviet Union, China and Cuba for assistance in view of the perceived support of the West to the colonial powers (Somerville, 1990:29; Schmidt 2013:26-29). Most of the insurgent movements on the continent received military and financial assistance in various forms from these countries. China became an active intervener in Africa in the 1960s and the 1970s with its support to rebel movements in the Congo and

Angola; and often the breakaway movements from Soviet aligned groups as well as radical regimes in Ghana, Mali and Guinea. Cuba similarly intervened in Angola and Ethiopia in 1975, as well as in Mozambique and the Congo in support of liberation, economic development and solidarity with Africa in view of the large number of Cubans who owed their ancestry to Africa (Somerville, 1990: 170, 176-178; Schmidt, 2013:27-29).

The Soviet Union and its allies intervened in support of the insurgent movements or aided radical governments in Namibia, Guinea Bissau, South Africa and Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia, while the US also provided support to pro-Western groups and governments in Angola, Namibia, Ethiopia and the Congo. The motivations of these interventions were largely ideologically driven to maintain proxies and colonial interests defined in terms of spheres of influence as well as economic considerations (Smock and Gregorian, 1993:6; Schmidt, 2013:122-126).

Third parties also intervened in some of the secessionist wars that engulfed Africa in the immediate post-independence period. In the Sudan, Israel supported the insurgency of the South Sudan Liberation Army (SPLA) that advocated secession for southern Sudan (Somerville, 1990:38, 39), while the Arab states notably Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia supported the Eritrean Liberation Front in its war against Ethiopia (Somerville, 1990:47). There were manifestations of similar support in most of the conflicts that engulfed the African continent.

Military interventions in Africa during the post-Cold War period increased in numbers and also in complexity in view of the nature of internal conflicts during the period. While in some instances they were carried out by the UN, AU or regional organizations, in other cases it was an alliance of states that intervened in conflicts in other states as was the case in the intervention by Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda and Angola in the DRC in 1998 (Yoon, 2005:277, Schmidt, 2013:194, 211).

The terrorist attacks on the US in September 2001 and the subsequent declaration of a "war on terror" by the US, also engendered a new wave of intervention in Africa to

neutralize terrorist groups, in particular Islamic terrorist groups. Under the rubric of global counter terrorism, the US is involved militarily in a number of African countries primarily in East Africa and in the Sahel region which offers a basis for a number of Islamic terror groups or their affiliates (Schmidt, 2013:193, 213-217).

The interventions were also a mix of the supportive or hostile type, and either directly or indirectly in nature. Most of the interventions by France and Belgium involved the direct commitment of troops. Cuban intervention in the Congo and Angola, and the British intervention in Tanzania, were direct and supportive interventions. The Soviet, China and US interventions were largely indirect forms. The support for the liberation movements were hostile interventions as they sought to undermine incumbent regimes.

Several motivations have been attributed to military intervention in Africa in the post-Cold War period, either by the international community or by African countries (Yoon 2005:278). Regan (1996:338) and Taras and Ganguly (1998:76) identify ethnicity as a variable that facilitates intervention by other African states, irrespective of economic and other security concerns. Levy and Vakili (1992:118) and MacFarlane (1984:133) respectively argue that states facing internal conflict intervene in other states in order to build cohesion through internal mobilization, and thereby neutralize dissent. Buhaug and Gates (2002) also highlight the expected economic benefit such as the existence of natural resources as a reason for intervention by African states in conflicts in Africa.

These notwithstanding, the foremost among these reasons are interventions on humanitarian grounds. Arguably, most of the post-Cold War military interventions in Africa have been spearheaded or authorized by multilateral institutions such as ECOWAS, the AU and the UN, and as such can be described as humanitarian interventions as was the case in Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994, Liberia in 1990, Sierra Leone in 1998, the DRC in 1999, Cote d'Ivoire in 2004, and Libya in 2011. A feature of these interventions is that involvement of third parties are seen as obligatory to avert human suffering. However, the intervention in Libya is considered one that was authorized after the adoption of the concept of R2P and under the doctrine of R2P.

Within the context of Africa, Smock and Gregorian (1993:3, 4); Yoon, (2005: 277) and Schmidt (2013:2) identified a correlation between external military intervention and the level of violence in the wars in Africa. In their view, the supply of arms to belligerents, financial support or technical assistance by external players "significantly expanded the scope and intensity" of the wars in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and Somalia.

6. CONCLUSION

The concepts of international involvement and intervention are age old phenomena. International involvement is much broader than intervention and includes a range of activities including intervention. The two concepts are, however, used conterminously and that tends to blur the difference.

Although the study primarily focuses on military intervention, the concept of intervention also includes a variety of other measures including diplomatic and economic aspects geared towards a change of policy direction of the target country. Whilst the ultimate motivation is to influence policy, it is generally applied in conflict situations, with the aim of ending conflict and human suffering.

The post-Cold War period witnessed an increase in intrastate wars with disastrous human rights abuses and atrocities leading to genocidal acts by governments and rebels alike against their own citizens. The traditional peace operations by the UN based on the Westphalian notion of sovereignty were found inadequate to end these contemporary conflicts. This resulted in the agreement by the international community to protect civilians that are at risk from human rights and other abuses from governments that are unable or fail to do so, embodied by the responsibility to protect.

A redefinition of the concept of sovereignty, as responsibility, provided the legal basis for the international community to use force in a domestic conflict to avoid human suffering. The concept of humanitarian military intervention has thus evolved to include non-consensual use of force in situations sanctioned by the UN in order to confront the

conflicts associated with the post-Cold War era. The application of the concept therefore bears all the hallmarks of a military intervention.

However, the application of the R2P presents a dilemma as outlined by the moral hazard theory and the concept of adverse selection. In essence, R2P, like any other military intervention, could escalate violence, thereby creating a moral hazard. To enhance reliability and objectivity, a framework model based on counterfactual approaches is adopted in the evaluation of the case studies and to test the assumptions formulated in Chapter One.

The following chapter will present an overview of insurgencies in Africa with an emphasis on those that occurred in the post-Cold War period. The so-called "criminal insurgencies" as occurred in Sierra Leone in 1998; the ongoing insurgency by the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda; *Boko Haram* in Nigeria and *Al-Shabaab* in Somalia specifically, will be analysed as these reflect relatively new patterns of insurgency. The international response to these insurgencies will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

CHAPTER FOUR: OVERVIEW OF INSURGENCIES IN AFRICA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

1. INTRODUCTION

The African continent has been encumbered with insurgencies since the 1960s. Some of the insurgencies have arisen out of mass uprisings as was the case of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s; the Algerian uprising in the 1950s; the *Boko Haram* uprising in 2009 and that in Libya in 2011. Others such as the insurgencies in Guinea Bissau in the 1960s; Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola in the 1960s and 1970s; and that of the National Resistance Army in Uganda in the 1980s, were initiated by vanguard parties. Those by the LRA in Uganda from 1986; *Boko Haram* in Nigeria that started in 2009; and *Al-Shabaab* in Somalia in 2007, appeared to be a mixture of religion and societal problems, in addition to criminal activity (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(a):1, 16; Williams, 2011:43; Reno, 2012; Clapham, 1998(a)).

The conflicts exude various types of insurgencies with different motivations and have corresponded with the different phases of the political history of the African continent. The socio-economic and political situation of states, as well as the prevailing international environment seems to be the lynchpins that influenced the type and nature of an insurgency. Thus, while liberation and secessionist insurgencies dominated the struggle for independence and the Cold War period, the internal political fragmentation, maladministration and economic mismanagement that followed the period of political liberation created forms that portrayed reformist intents as well as those that could not be easily defined including acts of criminality and terrorism. These forms dominated the post-Cold War era (Bøås and Dunn, 2007:2(a); Clapham, 1998(a); Reno, 2012).

This chapter presents an analysis of the main insurgencies that occurred in the African continent in the post-Cold War period, with particular emphasis on so-called "criminal insurgencies" as an embodiment of the new insurgencies. In this regard, the chapter will focus on the insurgencies of the LRA in Uganda; the RUF in Sierra Leone; and *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* operating in Nigeria and Somalia respectively. The similarities and

differences between the insurgencies in the Cold War and the post-Cold War period are also analysed. The discussion will be preceded with an overview of those that occurred in the 1960s until the end of the Cold War with an emphasis on the basis, form, motivation and type of insurgency.

2. INSURGENCIES IN AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR

This section highlights some of the major insurgencies that were initiated in Africa during the Cold War period. A distinction is made between those that occurred during the colonial and the post-colonial periods to indicate the types, motivation and fighting methods of the insurgents. For instance, some of the insurgencies initiated in the colonial era were terminated in the post-colonial period, while some classical insurgencies have continued in the post-independence era. The types of insurgencies therefore overlap into the two periods and the distinctions made are for analytical purposes.

2.1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD

The increase in insurgencies in Africa in the period after the Second World War was motivated by nationalist sentiments and the desire to liberate the continent from colonialism, and, in some instances, the overthrow of white minority regimes. The clamour for self-determination was the key driver during the period. These were manifested as liberation or revolutionary armed struggles by the weaker liberation movements against the well-resourced colonial governments. This characterized the insurgent-driven liberation wars notably the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s; the PAIGC in Guinea Bissau in the 1960s; the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) in Mozambique in the 1960s; the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia in the 1970s; and the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, among others (Clapham, 1998(b):2-3).

2.2 POST-COLONIAL PERIOD

The insurgencies that dominated the post-colonial period were motivated by political maladministration by the post-independence governments in Africa, and the accompanying discontent of the people as well as the inability to engender national cohesion. The post-colonial insurgencies were then a combination of mainly reformist and secessionist movements (Clapham, 1998(a)).

A number of the reform-oriented insurgencies toppled the ruling regimes. These include the insurgencies by Hissen Habre and the *Forces Armés du Nord* that took over power in Chad in 1979; the NRA led by Yoweri Museveni which defeated the government forces in Uganda and assumed power in 1986; and that of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which defeated government forces with the capture of Kigali in 1994 after an insurgency that lasted for four years (Clapham, 1998(b):3-7; Bøås and Dunn, 2007:8(a)).

Alongside the so-called reformist insurgencies, the post-colonial period witnessed a rise in secessionist movements following the failure of the post-colonial states to build strong states based on national cohesion. Some of these include the Biafra insurgency in Nigeria in the 1960s; the separatist war in South Sudan by the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA); the insurgency by the Tigray People Liberation Front against Ethiopia; the secession war in the Casamance against Senegal; and the ongoing Tuareg insurgency in northern Mali. The SPLA and the Eritrean People's Revolutionary Liberation Front were the only successful movements that seceded from existing states (Clapham, 1998(b):3, 6-7; Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):9).

Reno (2012:160) asserts that the insurgent groups in Africa reflected the nature of the state authority they contested. This observation reflected every aspect of insurgent activity in Africa. In this instance, the structured, organized, hierarchical and ideological orientation of the ruling governments in Africa during the Cold War therefore influenced the objectives, ideology, organization, mobilization, and fighting strategy of the insurgencies in Africa during that period.

The goal of the insurgents in Africa during the Cold War was the overthrow of the existing colonial regimes or the regimes that replaced them. Thus issues such as nationalism, mobilization for development, and self-determination preoccupied these groups. The latter, in some cases, was interpreted as secession (Reno, 2012:159, 164-166; Clapham, 1998(b):10).

The insurgent groups were therefore focused organizations determined to gain political freedom or liberation for Africans and use that freedom as a basis for mobilization of economic development. Thus, insurgent organizations in this period were identified with massive mobilization of society for education, economic emancipation or economic transformation through agrarian policies, rural development and improvement of infrastructure and services. The insurgents presented themselves and were seen as agents of political and economic transformation (Gesnekter, 1975:25 cited in Reno, 2012:159; Reno, 2012:159-160).

Irrespective of the aim, these insurgencies were guided by a clear ideology that influenced the political direction, internal discipline and the behaviour of the fighters. Ideology served as a guide to building new administrative structures and a tool of indoctrination on the use of violence and in mobilization of the citizens. The insurgencies were initiated with a pre-determined programme of the future form of society. The ideology also defined the structure of these organizations and the alignment with the superpowers at the time (Reno, 2009:11; Reno, 2012:159, 164-166; Clapham, 1998(b):10).

The ideologies espoused also reflected the sources of external funding which mirrored the Cold War ideologies and alliances. Thus, most of the African insurgencies articulated free market principles or Marxist-Leninism. The latter had variations which reflected the support from the Soviet Union, China or Cuba. The insurgencies by PAIGC, FRELIMO, RPF, ANC, SWAPO and *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) among others, were guided by distinct ideologies (Schmidt, 2013: 25-29; Clapham, 1998(b):11; Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):17; Reno, 2012:164-166).

The leadership of these groups was clearly defined in a hierarchical organizational structure, usually by vanguard parties that tended to follow the hierarchical colonial administrative system or the governments they contended. The same structure determined the administrative system in the territories they controlled. The leadership of the vanguard parties that directed these groups was composed mainly of the educated élites or student radicals who established relationships among themselves either at their educational institutions or through solidarity organizations. Eduardo Mondlane, who founded FRELIMO in Mozambique in 1962, received a doctoral degree from North-Western University in Chicago in 1960 and was a research officer with the UN; Amilcar Cabral was educated at the Lisbon Agronomy Institute in Portugal and was an agronomist and researcher for the UN before the insurgency; and Museveni developed his political philosophy at the University of Dar es Salaam in the late 1960s before launching the insurgency in Uganda in 1981 (Reno, 2009:14; Reno, 2012:165-166; Clapham, 1998(b):9).

These movements were well-organized and disciplined forces that employed violence selectively, and mainly directed this violence at the symbols of the state they contested, as winning over the population was a cardinal motive of these groups. The level of discipline was crucial to reduce antagonism among the population. The combination of discipline and political education assisted and shaped the attitudes and perceptions of the citizens which enhanced mobilization. In this way, the insurgents presented themselves as the mouthpiece of the people and were seen as credible governments in waiting (Reno, 2012:158; Clapham, 1998(b):10; Gesnekter, 1975:25 cited in Reno, 2012:159).

In terms of fighting strategy, the African insurgencies during the Cold War adopted a mix of guerrilla warfare, terrorism and conventional warfare. In rural areas where state penetration was low, a guerrilla-style approach was adopted as in the case of the Mau Mau. In urbanized states such as South Africa and Namibia, the insurgents adopted a combination of rural and urban insurgency and the use of terror while others developed into full-scale revolutionary or conventional warfare (Reno, 2012:159-160).

These characteristics bore semblance to classical forms of insurgencies and can be described as such.

3. THE POST-COLD WAR INSURGENCIES

Contrary to that which existed during the colonial period, the insurgencies in Africa in the post-Cold War period were markedly different in terms of organization, ideology or political programmes, leadership, motivation, mobilization and methods of warfare. The insurgencies in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the DRC, Somalia, Guinea Bissau in 2003 and in 2008; Niger Delta in Nigeria in 2005, among others, were a deviation from the Cold War types (Bøås and Dunn, 2007).

In Liberia, a combination of corruption and ethnic rule initiated an insurgency that became an embodiment of a criminal insurgency. In 1989, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under Charles Taylor, with the support of the factionalised army, initiated the insurgency in Liberia against the government of Master Sergeant Doe (Clapham, 1998(b):4; Lodge, 1999:3).

In Nigeria, maladministration and resource control on the one hand and religious extremism on the other created two insurgencies in the North and the South in the mid-2005. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, the Niger Delta Liberation Front, and the Niger Delta Volunteer Front started insurgencies in the Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria over grievances on conditions of living in the oil-producing communities and demands for larger share of oil revenues. The state of development in the region was attributed to corruption by public officials, marginalization and politics of exclusion. These groups initiated separate insurgencies using these factors to create a common identity. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, however, was an organized and disciplined movement that articulated clear political goals (Souaré, 2010:13). That of the North, *Boko Haram*, is discussed in detail in subsequent sub-sections.

The numerous insurgent groups that emerged in the DRC from the 1990s, in *Côte d'Ivoire* from 2002 to 2007, as well as the insurgencies in the Sudan, either followed this pattern to exploit the mineral wealth of the country or portrayed insurgent forms contrary to those of the Cold War era (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(a):3). These insurgencies reflected a fragmented structure composed of local groups, ethnic militias, mercenaries, religious terrorists and criminal elements without any clear political programme. In search of economic opportunities and personal aggrandisements, they plundered the mineral wealth of states and other resources such as timber and even engaged in narcotics to exploit wars for personal gain (Clapham, 1998(b): 4-8; Reno, 2012:157, 158; Kaldor, 2011:3).

Two insurgencies that occurred in Guinea Bissau in the 1960s and the 2000s reflected the respective cases of Cold War and the post-Cold War insurgencies. In 1963, Amilcar Cabral led the PAIGC that initiated an insurgency against the Portuguese colonial power. The PAIGC was a disciplined and structured insurgent movement that successfully mobilized the masses to its ideology and enjoyed a broad popular support. The war was pursued alongside the establishment of an effective administrative and economic system based on the underlying ideology of the party as well as a better agricultural practice and trading system that uplifted rural income and living standards. The success and the effectiveness of the PAIGC is well acknowledged (Reno, 2009:8).

In contrast to the PAIGC, Guinea-Bissau experienced a succession of *coup d'états* in 1998, 2003 and in November 2008, which plunged the country into a brief insurgency in 2008, led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Mane. While the causes were attributed to a crisis of legitimacy of the government borne out of the marginalization of the Balante, the largest ethnic group, maladministration and cronyism, and motives regarding drugs and narcotics trafficking were at the centre of the insurgency (Souaré, 2010:4).

The UN attributed the instability to the activities of drug trafficking networks that had infiltrated the government and wielded a strong influence over politics and the administration of the country. With the sparsely inhabited islands and weak surveillance

systems, Guinea-Bissau was an ideal location for drug traffickers creating a label for the country as a narco-state (UN Office of Drugs and Crime, 2008:1; Reno, 2009:8; UN Security Council, 2008:4; Souaré, 2010:8).

In the Sahel or the Maghreb region and in West Africa, a number of insurgent groups that have been presented as Islamic insurgencies albeit with mixed motivations, appeared from the early 1990s. Religious fundamentalism erupted with the insurgency of the Islamic Federation Front in Algeria in 1992 following the loss of elections and the declaration of a state of emergency by the government. In January 2012, a Tuareg group, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, launched an insurgency in northern Mali with the aim of establishing an independent Azawad state in the region. The *Ansar Dine*, another Tuareg group, operates independently in pursuit of the imposition of Sharia laws in Mali. The Movement for Unity and *Jihad* in West Africa was also formed at the end of 2011 with the aim of waging a *Jihad* in West Africa. Also operating in the region is the *Al-Qaeda* in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a franchise of the *Al-Qaeda* that originated in 2007 and owed its roots to the Algerian civil war as adherents to the Salafist Islamic thought that did not accept the amnesty deal in 1999 after the war. The Tuareg in northern Mali and Niger led by Ag Bahanga also initiated an Islamic-based insurgency in 2006 that demanded autonomy from Mali. Islamic insurgents such as *Boko Haram* in Nigeria also reflect this type of insurgency (Souaré, 2010:10; Østebø, 2012:13; Lye and Roszkowska, 2013:4; Reno, 2009:7; (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(a):2).

A similar Islamic-based insurgency also emerged in Central and East Africa in the post-Cold War period. In Somalia, clan-based insurgent groups emerged in 1991, following the overthrow of Siad Barré that also led to the creation of *Al-Shabaab* (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(a):2).

Other insurgencies with Christian-influenced groups were initiated by the LRA in Uganda and by the anti-Balaka militias in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1987 and in 2013 respectively (Kah, 2014:30; Behrend, 1998:107). These groups are a mix of ethnic, religious, and smuggling networks, without clear political goals, but exploited local

grievances mainly using Islam as a basis for mobilization or as a façade (Østebø, 2012:13).

For the purposes of the study the insurgencies of the LRA, the RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* will be discussed as cases in detail. These insurgencies were initiated after the colonial period, but largely after the Cold War and within similar political and economic circumstances in their respective countries. They reflected similar goals and in some cases religious motivation, yet appeared to have traversed into terrorism.

4. CRIMINAL INSURGENCIES

The insurgencies described above have been euphemistically termed criminal or warlord insurgencies to reflect their motive, structure and methods of warfare among others. These insurgencies, in essence, created personal enclaves to establish autonomous areas to administer or control the resources for personal benefit, and not necessarily gain control of the entire state. The availability of resources may not essentially be the motive for initiating the insurgency, but may be a catalyst for perpetuating the war and a collateral benefit for the leaders (Clapham, 1998(b):4, 8; Keen, 2000:25).

The most lethal among this type of insurgent movements on the African continent were the LRA, the RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* which are analysed in this section. With the exception of the LRA, all the others emerged in the post-Cold War period. The discussion will highlight the salient characteristics of these movements in terms of ideology, mode of warfare and methods of mobilization among others. The political and economic conditions in the states prior to the emergence of these groups are also analysed.

4.1 THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

The political history of Uganda provides a perspective of the emergence of the LRA and its evolution from an organization espousing Christian beliefs to increasingly becoming involved in terrorism.

4.1.1 BACKGROUND

Historically, northern Uganda and in particular the Acholi ethnic group, have had a history of marginalization by the governments of Uganda, both in terms of economic development and political positions. The grievances or antagonisms between Acholi and other groups were rooted in manipulation of ethnic differences that created economic and political disparities between the North and South. Under a system of ethnic division of labour practiced by the British colonial administration, the North became a labour reserve for the South which was considered as an industrial zone and cash crop growing area. The North also served as a recruitment base for the ranks in the army. The South, particularly Buganda, became prosperous controlling the civil service, agriculture, trade and the economic sectors of the state and thus gained political advantage over the North. This system continued under successive governments, and created ethnic cleavages and mistrust (Otunnu, 2002:11, 12; Dunn, 2007:139; Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 1999:15; Williams 2011:141).

In an attempt to build national cohesion, the various ethnic groups had at one point formed alliances until the assumption of power of Yoweri Museveni in 1986, who concentrated political power in the South. The shift in power from the North to the South, in addition to the economic advantage of the South, reignited the previous North-South cleavage (Otunnu, 2002:12, 13; Kiyaga-Nsubuga, 1999:23).

The counter insurgency initiatives by the government against rebel groups in the North was perceived as part of a broader plot of exterminating the Acholi group which alienated them from the government (Finnström, 2003:145). It is against this background that the LRA emerged in 1987.

4.1.2 FORMATION OF THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY

The LRA evolved in 1987 from the Holy Spirit Movements (HSM) of Alice Auma and that of her father Severino Lukoya. These were groups that emerged in the Acholi ethnic areas in northern Uganda from 1986 to 1989, allegedly under the direction of a Christian spirit

named Lakwena, to wage an insurgency against the NRA and the government of Yoweri Museveni. The HSM was primarily motivated by the desire for the Acholi ethnic group to recapture political power from the NRA which had overthrown Tito Okello as President of Uganda. The Movement also aimed at purification of the Acholi society from witchcraft, sorcery, and from the spirits of those killed by Acholi soldiers who were defeated by the NRA, and establishment of a government based on the Ten Commandments (Behrend, 1998:109; Lodge, 1999:2; Dunn, 2007:132-133). The insurgent army was thus recruited after undergoing purification rites to cleanse them. The same 'spirit' instructed the establishment of the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces (HSMF) to execute the insurgency (Behrend, 1998: 107-111; US Department of State, 2012(a)).

The LRA is yet to advance a clear motive or grievance other than the implementation of the Ten Commandments and the liberation of the people living in northern Uganda (Dunn, 2007:137).

Relations with the local population were largely antagonistic as the HSMF did not only depend on them for weapons and food supplies, but also unleashed violence on them as a result of competing claims between the HSM and rival movements for supplies (Behrend, 1998: 113).

In October 1987, the HSM of Alice Lakwena was defeated by the NRA following their march to Kampala, and subsequently fled to Kenya (Behrend, 1998:113). Alice Lakwena was succeeded by her father Severino Lukoya who attempted to reorganize the movement into decentralized departments adopting a guerrilla strategy to continue the insurgency. The movement was short-lived as Lukoya was captured and imprisoned in 1989 until his release in 1992 (Behrend, 1998:114-115; Dunn, 2007:134).

An offshoot or a parallel movement of the HSM emerged in 1987 led by Joseph Kony, an alleged cousin of Alice Lakwena. The movement was based on the spiritual principles of HSMF, namely initiation and ritual cleansing, anti-witchcraft and paganism. This group had similar motives as Lakwena, namely the establishment of a theocratic state in Uganda

under the principles of the Ten Commandments. The struggle was seen as divinely ordained under the direction of the Holy Spirit (Van Acker, 2004:338; Dunn, 2007:134).

Odong Latek, who was also fighting the NRA, merged with the LRA in 1988 following a peace agreement between the LRA and his group, the Uganda People's Democratic Army. The name of the HSMF was changed to Uganda Peoples' Democratic Christian Army (UPDCA), and the movement was reorganized into a secular organization. The UPDCA was renamed the LRA after the death of Latek, retreating into its religious fervour (Behrend, 1998:116; Dunn, 2007:134-135; Williams, 2011:142; Otunnu, 2002:13).

The first attack against the Ugandan government was launched in 1986 primarily against maladministration, unequal distribution of natural resources, marginalization and discrimination against the Acholi people (Finnström, 2008:5).

The LRA gained international recognition in 1990 with the provision of weapons and transport by the government of Sudan as a reprisal action for the support of the Ugandan government to the SPLA. It has extended attacks to the CAR, South Sudan and the DRC for the past two decades. The LRA has since assumed the notoriety as the oldest insurgent group in Africa (Behrend, 1998:107, 116; US Department of State 2012(a); Finnström, 2006:1).

4.1.3 ORGANIZATION, MODE OF WARFARE AND TARGETS

In terms of structure, the movement followed a centralized, but less hierarchical structure compared to the movements in the Cold War period. The LRA is organized into three divisions that in turn had three departments. These are autonomous cell-based groups with limited contacts with the senior command of the group. The movement operated mainly in the Acholi area and in southern Sudan. The ultimate authority, however, rested with Kony who also controlled the divisions or Spirits (Behrend, 1998:115; Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):34).

The movement adopts unconventional tactics; a mixture of Western military warfare and ritualism called the "Holy Spirit Tactics" that are based on sheer brutality. The soldiers did not only plunder, but also killed, tortured, raped and kidnapped or abducted young boys and girls using the women as wives and the boys as fighters. The movement became dependent on violence and coercion to extract acquiescence and recruit fighters. The brutality of the group is displayed by the punishment meted out to alleged traitors or those who offered resistance as they had their noses, ears, arms and mouths chopped off. The use of landmines also increased casualties as the population were maimed. The targets of the attacks are mainly trading posts, schools, health facilities and villages (Behrend, 1998:115-117; Dunn, 2007:135-136). In essence, civilians became the main targets and that was a source of discontent among the population.

The mistrust affected mobilization and recruitment. The LRA thus turned to coercion and abduction. Children were the worst affected in the conflict as they were abducted and used as slaves or forced to commit atrocities as child soldiers while some were forced to marry LRA officers. As at 2001, 80 percent of the LRA forces were children (Dunn, 2007:131; Amnesty International, 2001:2).

The UN Children's Fund (UNICEF, 2007:2) estimates that 25,000 children were abducted by the LRA from 1986 to 2005 while a report by Annan *et al* (2006:55) for UNICEF estimated that 66,000, including children and youth, were abducted within that period. According to the UN Integrated Task Force on LRA (UNITF) (2012:2) the conflict displaced two million people in northern Uganda with over 465,000 displaced people or refugees in the CAR, the DRC and southern Sudan (347,000 in DRC alone).

Following some successes by the Ugandan Army, the LRA dispersed to the DRC, the CAR, and South Sudan, where it has operated since 2008 (US Department of State, 2012(a); UNITF, 2012:1).

Besides the "spiritual motive" to establish a theocratic society, the LRA did not exhibit a discernible ideology, a political or an economic programme, given the marginalization of the Acholis. At best, the insurgency may be equated to acts of lawlessness and banditry

and an avenue for profit for the soldiers (Dunn, 2007:140). As argued by Behrend (1998:116), "the war became a mode of production" with no desire for an end. While the main aim was to overthrow the Ugandan government, the military strategy was focused on attacking civilians and a combination of terror and abduction of children (Finnström, 2008).

Map 1. Map of Uganda Showing LRA controlled Areas Before 2008

Source: Mapsof.net.

The atrocities led to the designation of the LRA as a terrorist group by the US Department of State and the AU in 2001 and 2011 respectively (US Department of State, 2012(a); AU/PSC, 2011(c)).

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Map 2. Map of LRA Affected Countries by 2013

Source: christianaid.org.uk

4.2 THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

A brief political history of Sierra Leone from independence to the beginning of the war provides the causes and the conditions that precipitated the RUF insurgency.

4.2.1 SIERRA LEONE-BACKGROUND

Since independence in April 1961, society and politics in Sierra Leone have been dominated by the competing interests of the Temne in the North and the Mende in the South, the two dominant ethnic groups (Woods and Reese, 2008:1).

The Sierra Leonean People's Party (SLPP), the political party that ruled the country from independence until 1968, was dominated by the Mende. The first Prime Minister, Milton Margai, (1961-1964) and his successor (brother) Albert Margai (who ruled from 1964 until 1967) were Mendes from the South. Similarly, the All Peoples' Congress (APC) that succeeded the SLPP after a *coup d'état* and a counter *coup d'état* was led by Siaka Stevens (1967-1985) and later Joseph Momoh (1985-1992), both from the North, drew support from the Limba and the Temne groups. Both governments, the SLPP and the APC, were dominated by their ethnic kinsmen (Hirsch, 2001:28-29; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):15-19, Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(a):6).

Besides the politics of exclusion exemplified in the North/South nexus, the leadership of the country was characterized by inefficiency, dictatorship, economic mismanagement, corruption, and plundering of the natural resources, notably diamonds for personal wealth (Woods and Reese, 2008:2, 11; Kaldor and Vincent, 2006:15; Abdullah and Muana, 1998:175).

Although other minerals such as gold and rutile were mined, diamonds were the most important foreign exchange earner. Following the nationalization of the diamond mining company in 1971, control of diamonds effectively rested in Siaka Stevens and his cronies. The period also saw a decline in production due to increased smuggling which affected foreign reserves, a pattern that followed on Momoh's assumption to office. On the eve of the RUF insurgency, the Sierra Leonean economy had virtually grounded to a halt (Woods and Reese, 2008:13, 14; Abdullah and Muana, 1998:175; Williams, 2011:68).

This was exacerbated by the APC government that established a one party state built on "patrimonial networks". Distrust of the army and other security agencies led to the creation of a State Security Division that assumed pre-eminence over the armed forces. The latter was subsequently deprived of resources and equipment (Zack-Williams, 2012(b):16; Williams, 2011:68).

The result was a diminished capacity of the government to deliver critical services, and this eroded the legitimacy of the government which resorted to repression, co-optation

and political crackdowns to maintain control. The citizens, including labour unions and student groups, became restive and begun agitating (Gberie, 2005; Kaldor and Vincent, 2006:11).

Map 3. Map of Sierra Leone

Source: UN Cartographic Section. Available online at www.un.org/Depts/ Cartographic/ map/profile/sierrale.pdf

The resultant unemployment radicalized the unsettled youth, in particular students that aligned themselves with the prevailing radical ideology espoused by Libya at the time. These provided fertile ground for discontent that was exploited by the RUF. A number of the disgruntled students, who had been dismissed by the government of Momoh and living in Ghana, subsequently travelled to Libya for military and ideological training. Other opponents of the regime such as Foday Sankoh also received training in Libya (Woods and Reese, 2008:2, 11; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):15-19; Abdullah and Muama, 1998:176-177; Hirsch, 2001:31).

4.2.2 FORMATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

The RUF was founded in or around 1991 by a group of Libyan-trained revolutionaries including Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray. The aim of the organization at its inception was to end exploitation and corruption and establish a democratic society. In spite of this ideal, the insurgency turned out to be a criminal adventure to exploit the country's resources, in particular diamonds. The RUF later became an embodiment of a criminal insurgency (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:177; Hirsch, 2001:31).

While the prevailing conditions provided the remote causes for the insurgency, the uprising by the NPFL in Liberia led by Charles Taylor provided an inspiration and served as the immediate cause of the insurgency. The leadership of the RUF has been associated with the insurgency in Liberia and some acquired experience by fighting alongside the Liberian rebels. Thus, the RUF replicated the strategies of the NPFL while Liberia, under Taylor, offered sanctuary and support (Gberie, 2005:48-49; Abdullah and Muana, 1998:176-177).

In March 1991, the RUF initiated the insurgency in Sierra Leone, having been organized in Liberia with the assistance of Charles Taylor. Taylor also lent support as a reprisal action against President Momoh for granting permission for the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to use Sierra Leonean facilities in its intervention in Liberia and also for Sierra Leonean participation in ECOMOG. Small units of the RUF captured two small border towns in Bomaru in the Kailahun District and the Mano River Bridge in

Pujehun District. Since the region was known for its traditional opposition to the ruling APC government, the RUF expected large support from the area and thus used it as a springboard (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:176-178; Woods and Reese, 2008:2, 14, 15).

The anticipated spontaneous support for the group did not materialize largely because of the reports of atrocities during the Liberian crisis, which dissipated the potential of converting dissent against the APC into a rebellion. However, the existence of a large number of disgruntled youth whose source of livelihood was illegal diamond mining and smuggling was a potential pool for the RUF. This pool was attracted by the message of emancipation by the RUF and motivated by "acquisition of wealth through looting and of authority" by dislodging the country's leadership at all levels (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:178-179).

The rallying cry of the RUF was a call on Sierra Leoneans to rise against the government which had ceded control of the rich mineral wealth of the country to foreigners and political cronies (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:179; Hirsch, 2001:31). This call resonated with the restive youth that embarked on violence.

The insurgents met little resistance from the Sierra Leonean army. To contain the atrocities, the towns and villages, under the chiefs, formed Civil Defence Forces composed mainly of traditional hunters. The most visible of these units was the Kamajor militia. The Kamajors were initially well organized and disciplined and successfully repelled the RUF in the respective towns. The Kamajors, however, undermined their own successes when gang members joined their ranks and became involved in similar atrocities as the RUF, thereby alienating the group from the population (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:180; Woods and Reese, 2008:17, 18).

From its initiation until the end of the insurgency in February 2002, the RUF pursued the conflict under five different governments, besides that of Momoh's APC.

In 1992, a group of young officers led by Captain Valentine Strasser seized power, in a *coup d'état*, over the existing maladministration, salary and conditions of services of

soldiers at the frontline, and in a bid to end the war against the RUF. It constituted itself into a National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). It expanded the armed forces to 14,000 with the recruitment of unemployed youth and thugs. This reduced the quality of the army making it indistinguishable from the RUF Forces. This saw the rise of "*sobels*" (soldiers in the day, rebels in the night) soldier-rebels, a term used to describe the recruits who practically fought on both sides (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:181; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):23; Hirsch, 2001:35, 36).

The NPRC made gains against the RUF with the assistance of the private security companies and the ethnic-based civil defence organizations such as the Kamajors, but became embroiled in the cycle of corruption. In January 1996, Strasser was replaced by Captain Maada Bio who subsequently conducted elections that ushered in President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in March 1996 (Hirsch, 2001:40-42).

Kabah signed a peace treaty with the RUF, but his inability to secure the peace led to his overthrow in May 1997 by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma, which entered into a partnership with the RUF to form a joint fighting force against the Kamajors. A multi-national Force, ECOMOG reinstated Kabbah in 1998 (Zack-Williams, 2012(b):25).

Kabbah entered into a number of Peace Agreements with the RUF (Abidjan Agreement in 1996; *Conakry Peace Plan* in October 1997; and the *Lomé Accord* in 1999) (Gberie, 2005:13). The final Agreement, the *Lomé Accord*, granted the RUF leader immunity from prosecution and the position of Vice President. However, Sankoh was arrested by a mob in May 2000, following a decision by the RUF to scuttle the peace plan by controlling the diamond areas and resume the conflict. The insurgency was declared over in January, 2002 (Hirsch, 2001:84-87; Zack-Williams; 2012(b):29).

4.2.3 ORGANIZATION, MOBILIZATION AND RECRUITMENT

The mobilization of the citizenry and recruitment to the RUF was based on fear, terror and the use of force. For instance, traditional rulers, government workers or agents,

village elders and traders were summarily executed while opponents of the APC were forcibly recruited. The tactics include torture; beheading by knife; amputation of hands, ears, fingers and genitals; murder; rape and sexual slavery; looting. Other measures included hostage taking; mutilation and public executions to incite fear to either join or flee; extortion; forced displacement; and forced cannibalism. A significant strategy was the use of children or child soldiers who were indoctrinated to commit the atrocities (Abdullah and Muana, 1998:178; 183, 190; Woods and Reese, 2008:3; Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(a):10-11).

The Movement followed a hierarchical command structure although the battle commanders were autonomous. At the top of the ladder was the Leader and the Commander-in-Chief (Foday Sankoh). The Battle Group Commanders, Battalion and Battle Front commanders follow in that order. There was also an Élite Special Force Commander responsible for special operations. Alongside the military command was an administrative corps responsible for training and recruitment, civilian relations, and internal defence. A war council oversaw the entire structure (Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(a):47-48).

4.2.4 METHOD OF FIGHTING

The initial stage of the insurgency was confined to the forest area and became a conventional war as the government forces, expanded under the NPRC, contained the RUF. During this period, the RUF captured and destroyed mining installations and abducted the employees. As the conflict progressed it retained control of captured mining towns which provided an important source of revenue to finance the insurgency in terms of purchase of equipment, ammunition, and weapons. The control of the mines also deprived the Sierra Leonean Government of an important source of revenue, grounded industrial activities and attracted international attention to the cause of the RUF (Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(a):9; Zack-Williams 2012(b):23; Woods and Reese, 2008:18).

After 1993, the group adopted a hit and run strategy, became more agile and less predictable. The strategy enabled the expansion of attacks to every district in the country usually in the uniforms of the government forces. The attacks became lethal with an increase in human rights violations. The partnership with the AFRC in 1997 gave the RUF unfettered space and also increased its numbers. In order to control the political developments, the amputations, mutilations and chopping of hands increased to discourage voting in the elections (Hirsch, 2001:43; Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(a):9-10).

The citizens thus became victims of a vicious cycle of brutalities and violence by government troops, the RUF, mutinied soldiers and the Kamajors. Besides the atrocities, over 70,000 deaths were recorded, two million fled to neighbouring states and more than two million were displaced internally. This formed the background of a series of interventions including mercenaries that culminated in the humanitarian intervention by ECOWAS and later by the UN and the British Government (Kaldor and Vincent, 2006:6; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):13).

A number of explanations have been offered for the causes of the war. These include bad governance, contestations over natural resources (Collier, 2000); crisis of the youth (Abdullah, 2005, Richards 1996); and the impact of economic decline on patrimonial rule (Zack-Williams, 2012). These, however, failed to explain the motives for initiating the insurgency and methods adopted. This creates difficulties in categorizing the RUF in any form of insurgency.

As contended by Zack-Williams (2012(a):3), at the time the war begun in 1991, Sierra Leone had become a failed state with institutional and economic collapse. Yet, in view of the absence of any coherent ideology or a political direction, and an identifiable support base, whether ethnic or class, the RUF failed to articulate any grievance and to seize the momentum (Williams, 2011:70).

4.3 *BOKO HARAM*

The insurgency of *Boko Haram* is rooted in the political, economic and social conditions in northern Nigeria. The emergence of the organization and its views are a result of the historical evolution of religious groups in northern Nigeria that has been transformed into a tool in the hands of politicians and outright banditry.

4.3.1 BACKGROUND

Northern Nigeria has witnessed a multiplicity of Islamic groups, both from the Al Sunna and the Salafi sects since the 19th century that propagated different strands of Islam. Prominent among these groups was that of Usman Dan Fodio, who waged a *Jihad* in the 19th century and established a caliphate in northern Nigeria based on the tenets of Islam. The advent of colonialism and the introduction of secular education had a far reaching impact on Islamic thought and practices. Managing this contradiction divided the society into two broad groups, namely conservatives that wanted strict adherence to Islamic laws and liberals that favoured modernized forms of Islam. The latter were represented by Ahmadu Bello and Aminu Kano, influential Muslim leaders in the 1950s and the 1960s and by Abubakar Gumi, a Muslim scholar in the 1960s whose teaching became the foundation of the *Yan Izala* Movement in 1978. The movement advocated reforms in society, including quality Islamic education, education of women as a prerequisite for employment by government institutions, and emancipation of Muslims (Umar, 2012:121; Loimeier, 2012:13, 41; ICG, 2010).

The conservatives were made up of some religious and political leaders as well as radical movements that equated reform or innovation as un-Islamic and as another form of consolidation of Western cultural values that must be resisted. Among this group was the *Maitatsine* Movement that was established in the 1980s by Muhammed Marwa in Kano. This movement espoused unconventional religious practices and a heretical belief system influenced by ethnicity and religious violence. It undertook an unsuccessful uprising in the early 1980s, but continued to exist until the 1990s (Loimeier, 2012:140; Umar, 2012:120-121; Cook, 2011:6).

A number of breakaway and new radical groups emerged following the example of the *Maitatsine* Movement. One such group was the *Ahl al-Sunna Wa-l-Jama'wa-l-Hijra* (The people of the Sunna of the prophet and the Community of Muslims, as well as those who accept the obligation to emigrate from the land of unbelievers, namely from the heathen Nigerian state). The group is also known as the Nigerian Taliban, but popularly referred to as *Boko Haram*, a Hausa phrase meaning secular (book) or Western education is forbidden (Loimeier, 2012:138, 148; Cook, 2011:3; Umar, 2012:124).

4.3.2 FORMATION OF *BOKO HARAM*

Boko Haram was established in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf. As with the numerous Salafist/Wahhabi Islamic groups in northern Nigeria, the group advocated a puritan form of Islam based on the strict adherence to ultra-Salafist thoughts; the establishment of an Islamic society; and the enforcement of *sharia* laws in northern Nigeria. It also called for a *Jihad* to implement such reforms. This provides a semblance of the philosophical and ideological orientation of the group. In contradiction to the *Izala* thought, *Boko Haram* forbids both secular and modern Islamic education and employment by the state, as well as rejecting the traditional and existing institutional order of society, such as elections. The group also abhors other scientific principles including the evolution and the natural-science view of the world (Loimeier, 2012: 139, 149, 151, 152; Østebø, 2012:3, 4; Umar 2012:122; Cook, 2011:19, 17). This includes agriculture, the natural sciences, geography, English language, engineering, medicine, and mixed education (Umar, 2012:124).

It forbids government employment since the movement recognizes only an Islamic form of government. Thus Yusuf or *Boko Haram* does not recognize the state of Nigeria which it considers as a heathen or non-Islamic government that should forcibly be overthrown in accordance with Salafi philosophy. The conflict escalated in mid-2009 in five northern Nigerian states (Umar, 2012:126, 127).

4.3.3 CAUSES OF THE UPRISING

The uprising was initiated against the backdrop of a fractured state that was plagued by maladministration, institutional breakdown, corruption, and bad governance. The combined effect of these is the near collapse of the ability of the state to deliver basic services such as education, electricity, security, and health care, among others. This gave rise to unemployment and mass poverty, particularly in the northern part of the country (ICG, 2014:1-6).

The over reliance on oil (produced in the South) to the neglect of cash-crop production, the mainstay of economic activity in the North, also widened the disparity between North and South increasing tensions in the North. This exacerbated the already polarised situation within the competing interests of the various Islamic groups on the one hand, and between Christians and Muslims on the other hand (ICG, 2010:10-13).

The extreme despondency provided conditions for exploitation into radicalism and political agitation. The implementation of *sharia* law by some states in the North was thought to appease radical sentiments, but was also meant to address the pervasive corruption, insecurity and other social problems that emerged (Cook, 2011:6).

Boko Haram emerged from this background. The political influence of the group, especially under Yusuf, was not overlooked by politicians, some of whom entered into deals with the group for support against political opponents in return for implementation of its aims, notably enforcement of *sharia* laws. The group was co-opted by various politicians in northern Nigeria to advance their political interests and to instil fear in their political enemies. This also includes the provision of funds by some political leaders for *Boko Haram*. The enactment of *sharia* law as the civil and criminal code in 12 States in Nigeria in 1999 was largely to appease the group. However, failure of the politicians to deliver on their promises was one of the reasons for the radicalization of the movement against Muslim political leaders (ICG; 2014, 11-13; Williams, 2011:131).

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Boko Haram adopted a militant posture following clashes with police in Yobe State in northern Nigeria in December 2003. It, however, became visible in July 2009 when it initiated a militant uprising in Maiduguri in Borno state, which later spread to Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, Niger states and to the capital Abuja. Maiduguri remained the operational base of the group (Cook, 2011:3, 20; Umar, 2012:127, 128).

The lack of a clear distinctive ideology impacted on the organizational structure and thus *Boko Haram* was organized as diffused groups, operating as a franchise without a hierarchical command structure. The group is led by a commander-in-chief (*amir ul-aam*) who implements the decisions of the council (*Shura*) that is composed of the commanders (*kwamandoji*). The branches in the cities are led by an *amir* and the local commanders are assisted by deputies (*nabins*). The local groups are considered autonomous (ICG, 2014:18).

Yusuf also failed to establish a clear administrative system for the swatches of territory controlled by the group. A notable development, however, was a micro credit scheme that he established for start-up capital for his followers, and humanitarian assistance to refugees and the unemployed. He also established a mosque and a school in Maiduguri (ICG, 2014:12; Cook, 2011:10).

4.3.4 POST-YUSUF *BOKO HARAM*

Malam Abubakar Shekau assumed the leadership of the Council of Elders or the *Shura*, the highest decision making body of the group; following the death of Yusuf. Shekau maintained the diffused cell-based structure of the group for ease of movement. Ultimate control, however, rests with him although direct communication with units is virtually non-existent (Cook, 2011:21; BBC News, 2014:5).

Under Shekau, the official name of the group was changed to *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna Li-da'wa Wa-l-jihad 'ala Minhaj al-Selaf* (Community of the people of the Sunna who fight for the cause of Islam by means of *Jihad* according to the method of Salaf). The new

name also signalled a change of the outlook of the movement and its radicalization into a Salafist *Jihadist* group (Loimeier, 2012:151, 152).

The narrative of the movement subsequently changed. Initially, Western education was considered sinful. This was broadened to be the entire Western civilization, and that was forbidden. The group also pledged support and affiliation with *Al-Qaeda* and global *Jihadism*. The targets (or enemies) were then expanded to include the US. In May 2015, *Boko Haram* announced its affiliation with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and declared a caliphate in North-East Nigeria (Cook, 2011:13-14; Statement by Musa Tanko on 29th March 2010; The Guardian, 2015:1). These developments informed the changes in methods and target selection.

4.3.5 TARGETS, METHODS AND TACTICS

Boko Haram adopted a more militant posture under Yusuf. The initial targets were restricted to the security agencies notably police stations. The attacks were therefore directed at military barracks and Police stations, including the national police headquarters (ICG, 2014:i). The targets were expanded, following the death of Yusuf and the security crackdown by the Nigerian government, to include moderate Islamic clerics; assassinations of prominent politicians and attacks on local bars among others. The group, however, became more violent and indiscriminate in the selection of its targets following its rebranding. Extreme violence was manifested from 2010 with terrorist attacks in Borno in January 2010 and a prison break in Bauchi in September. Between 2011 and 2015, other new methods of fighting included drive-by shootings, hit-and-run attacks; attacks on police stations and prisons, attacks on Christian churches and Christians and bank robberies. This was followed by major attacks with the suicide attack on the national police headquarters in Abuja; bombing of the UN building in Abuja and the targeting of markets and educational institutions. Suicide bombings in crowded city centres and the use of children, particularly girls as suicide bombers, became another method. At the same time the movement spread violence beyond its traditional base in

Borno and Yobe to other northern Nigeria states and to the capital city (Østebø, 2012:2; Cook, 2011:7, 16, 21; Umaru, 2012:131).

The attacks have continued with two major suicide bombings in July 2015 where female suicide bombers killed 150 people in Borno state. *Boko Haram* casualties were estimated at 17,000 since the insurgency began in 2009 with over 1.5 million people displaced (Amnesty International, 2015; BBC News, 2015:2-3; Sergie and Johnson, 2015).

Boko Haram is a product of the political, economic and social and the evolution of Islamic thought in northern Nigeria over the years. It is therefore viewed as one of the Salafist-Wahhabi groups with suspicious perceptions of secular or Western education that gained ascendency in northern Nigeria (Umar, 2012:121; Loimeier, 2012:137,138). On the basis of this argument, Loimeier (2012: 151) asserts that *Boko Haram* was originally based on theological disputes among Muslims.

For a meaningful analysis of its transformation from a *Jihadist* group into a criminal insurgency, *Boko Haram* should be viewed in two phases. The first being the period from its origins to the death of the founder, Mohammed Yusuf in 2009, when it was more sedentary in nature; and the period after the death of Yusuf and the assumption of the leadership of Abubakar Shekau when it resorted to indiscriminate terrorism.

Umar (2012:131) argues that radicalization of the group was a product of the local political environment and retaliation for the actions of the security forces. However, the outlook of the group since its inception portrayed minimum semblance to a classical insurgent group.

Besides the call for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, there is no discernible ideology or a road map to achieve this. The absence of a discernible programme or a system of administration to implement its goals; the adoption of terrorism; the atrocities against civilians and bank robberies, among others characterises a criminal or

Figure 4.   Structure of *Boko Haram*

Islamic terrorist organization rather than one devoted to the implementation of Islamic society. The US has since designated the group as a foreign terrorist organization (US Dept. of State, 14 November, 2013).

In states like Borno and Yobe where Christians have fled and government machinery is largely eroded, the group has not organized any discernible Islamic administrative system in place (Cook, 2011:22). Although it had controlled some swatches of territory in the north-eastern part of Nigeria, it never established any administrative system to implement

a vision for society. It does not appear to be interested in holding and controlling territory. Neither is the group interested in winning the hearts and minds of the populace.

It is against this background that Cook (2011:22) argues that contrary to other radical Salafist militant groups, *Boko Haram* has refrained from attacking Sufi shrines while at the same time pursuing activities that can be described as pure criminal, such as bank robberies and abductions for ransom.

Map 4. Map of Nigeria Showing Locations of *Boko Haram* Attacks

Source: Edinburgh International. Available online at http://edinburghint.com/ insidetrack/boko-haram-incident-map-september-2014-january-2015/

4.4 *AL-SHABAAB*

This section analyses *Al-Shabaab* beginning with a background of the political and security conditions in Somalia from the 1990s until 2009, as that may explain the rise and acceptance of *Al-Shabaab* and its transformation into a criminal insurgent organization.

4.4.1 BACKGROUND

Islamic militancy has been part of the political situation in Somalia over the years, but was suppressed during the dictatorship of Mohammed Siad Barre, who ruled Somalia from October 1969 to January 1991. The anarchic situation that followed the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991 saw the rise of warlords that controlled areas and also the rise of clan warfare and the creation of semi-autonomous areas. The resultant chaos and insecurity created a mass exodus of over one million Somalis and led to the death of a large number (Wise, 2011:2; Shinn, 2011:204; Adam, 1999:172).

The search for normalcy led to the emergence of organizations or rejuvenation of benign ones that sought to create spheres of influence. Islamic groups, both moderate and extremist, became active in the struggle for space to propagate or implement Islamic ideologies (Shinn, 2011:204). Some resorted to Islamic principles as a way of sanitizing a chaotic or disintegrating society.

The competing interests of the warlords especially in the capital Mogadishu created high levels of insecurity and lawlessness including rape, robbery, kidnapping and murders. This led to the creation of *Sharia* Courts to enforce Islamic laws, by local leaders as a containment measure (Wise, 2011:2; Devlin-Foltz, 2010:3, 4). The leaders of the Courts wielded enormous influence over the ideological direction of the courts. Thus the Courts led by moderate Sufis were distinguishable from those directed by radical Salafists or Wahhabis (Wise, 2011:3).

A number of mediation attempts by local, regional and the international community to establish a government failed until an agreement in 2004 to establish the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which comprised representatives of the major Somali clans.

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The TFG was formed with the support of the UN, the AU and the LAS. The Transitional Federal Government was based in Baidoa and was propped up by Ethiopian troops from 2006 to 2009 thereafter by an AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) (Shinn, 2011:203; Wise, 2011:2).

The internecine violence among the warlords and the inability of the TGF to extend its control beyond the capital, was the basis of the establishment of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an amalgamation of the various courts (moderates and extremist) in 2004, to fight the warlords. By the end of 2006 the UIC controlled of southern and central Somalia (Shinn, 2011:206).

The UIC perceived the Ethiopian troops as 'Christian invaders' and references to a *Jihad* against Ethiopia aroused fear that the UIC would attack Baidoa. The Ethiopian forces subsequently drove out the UIC from Mogadishu in 2007. The UIC disintegrated into smaller groups from which *Al-Shabaab* emerged. In 2008 the moderate faction of the UIC was incorporated into the TFG (Williams, 2011:140; Wise, 2011:3, 4).

4.4.2 THE RISE OF *AL-SHABAAB*

The military intervention by the Ethiopian government served as a platform to rally nationalist sentiments, thus *Al-Shabaab* presented itself as a nationalist movement.

Al-Shabaab, a Salafist-*Jihadist* movement formed by Afghan-trained Somalis in 2003 became visible in 2007 after the arrival of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. It owes its roots to the defunct *Al Ittihad al Islamiyya* (AIAI) which operated in Somalia in 1982. The AIAI was the merger of the *Wahdat al-Shabab al Islamiyya* (Unity of Islamic Youth) and *al-Jama'a al Islamiyya* (the Islamic group). These were Salafist/Wahhabi organizations that proffered strict adherence to Salafist thoughts as against the moderate Sufi practised by the majority of Somalis (Shinn, 2011:204, 206; Ali, 2008:1; Marchal, 2009:383).

A relatively unknown group before 2006, the *Al-Shabaab* faction emerged as the most visible within the UIC that contended the warlords to establish an Islamic State, and saw

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the warlords as appendages of the West in view of the US support for them to counter *Al-Qaeda* (Devlin-Foltz, 2010:5).

In the initial stages, *Al-Shabaab* positioned itself as an Islamic resistance movement countering aggression by Christian Ethiopian invaders. The appeal to nationalist sentiments attracted a large following and enormous goodwill and support which served as a platform for recruitment, mostly volunteers, that increased its membership from the low hundreds to thousands, including Somali immigrants. It also served as a basis of radicalization making it a popular and foremost Islamic insurgent movement in Somalia and later an integral faction of the global *Jihadist* movement (Wise, 2011:1-5; Marchal, 2009:383).

State failure in Somalia created a conducive environment for the Islamists. The inability of the central government to extend effective governance provided the space for unimpeded operations of the group in large areas of Somalia especially in the South central region. This enabled the group to set up training camps and a form of administration in the "liberated areas" which collected "taxes" and extortion to raise funds. The "government system" established at least brought a form of normalcy and security and also support for the group (Wise, 2011:2)

By the time of the departure of the Ethiopians in January 2009, *Al-Shabaab* controlled a large part of Somalia with significant support from the population. As at 2011, it controlled almost the entire central and southern Somalia and most of Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia (Wise, 2011:3).

From 2008, the group moved beyond the local nationalist insurgent movement to an affiliate of *Al-Qaeda*. In 2009 it was renamed *Harakat Al-Shabaab al Mujahidin* (Mujahidin Youth movement) reflecting its global vision to establish an Islamic caliphate in the Horn of Africa (Shinn, 2011:208, Shuriye, 2012:6).

With this transformation, the motive, target selection and the tactics also changed dramatically. *Al-Shabaab* declared itself an affiliate of *Al-Qaeda* that aimed at the

establishment of an Islamic caliphate, under the control of *Al-Shabaab*, that will include Somalia and the areas in Kenya and Ethiopia that are populated by ethnic Somalis (Shinn, 2011:204, 211; Devlin-Foltz, 2010:5).

4.4.3 ORGANIZATION, RECRUITMENT AND MOBILIZATION

In terms of organization, *Al-Shabaab* has a vertical leadership structure that is made up of autonomous cells. It is headed by a Supreme commander (Amir) supported by a council of elders (*Shura*) which is the highest decision-making body. The leader (Sheikh Ahmad Abdi Godane "Abu Zubair"), however, controls critical departments such as finance, security and training, recruitment and suicide bombers. These departments have substantive heads. Control of the cells, however, rests with the regional Commanders who operate independently (Wise, 2011:7, 8; Shuriye, 2012:2; Ali, 2008:1).

Besides the voluntary participation, orphans and children from lower echelons of society created a large pool for recruitment. The Islamic schools then became the target for mobilization and recruitment. The new tactics alienated the group from many locals, making it reliant on coercion and blackmail. Recruitment was no longer based on ideology or nationalism, but threats to life or cash incentives (Shuriye, 2012:4; Wise, 2011:9).

There was increasing reliance on ICT to propagate its ideals, mobilization, recruitment and fundraising effort. For instance, the *Kata'ib* Foundation, which is the media department of the group, run a number of websites and a Twitter account for the group which indicated the shift from a local nationalist ideology to one of internationalism. ICT also aided the mobilization and recruitment of a large number of the Somali diaspora from North America and Ethiopia in addition to foreign *Jihadists* (Wise, 2011:7, 8; Shinn, 2011:208, 210; Marchal, 2009:397).

Taxation and exploitation in *Al-Shabaab* controlled areas remain critical to raise funds, but there is increasing reliance on the internet to solicit donations from the large number of Somalis in the diaspora and from *Al-Qaeda*, Arab donors and Salafi networks (Wise, 2011:9; Ali, 2008:4; Marchal, 2009:394).

Figure 5. Organizational Structure of *Al-Shabaab*

Source: Shuriye, A. 2012. "*Al-Shabaab*'s Leadership Hierarchy and its Ideology", *Academic Research International,* Vol. 2, No. 1. P. 3.

4.4.4 TARGETS, METHODS AND TACTICS

In the initial phases the group adopted classical guerrilla tactics, namely hit-and-run attacks; remote-controlled roadside bombing using locally manufactured Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's); assassinations of TFG officials and journalists; and bombings. The tactics changed considerably from 2009 with increasing reliance on suicide bombings, beheadings, kidnappings, and abduction of Somali women who were given in forced marriages to foreign fighters (Marchal, 2009:394; Shinn, 2011:210, 214). It also expanded attacks beyond Somalia to some neighbouring states, particularly Uganda and Kenya that have contributed troops to prop up the TFG. In July 2010, the group attacked two separate sites in Kampala, Uganda where individuals were gathered to watch the

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World Cup match, killing 80 Ugandans (Devlin-Foltz, 2010:2; Shinn, 2011:208; Østebø, 2012:2).

In September 2013, *Al-Shabaab* attacked the Westgate Shopping Centre in Nairobi killing 67 people, and another deadly attack on the Garissa University in northern Kenya in April 2015 killed 147 people (Kenya National Disaster Operation Centre cited in CNN, 2015:2; BBC News, 22 September 2013).

An analysis of *Al-Shabaab* presents a dual image. On the one hand, it was a local Islamic nationalist movement that was desirous of bringing stability in a lawless society, while at the same time fighting an invading army. On the other hand, the changes in its methods, mobilization and international appeal placed the group in the category of a post-Cold War insurgent group that bears the hallmark of criminality.

Map 5. *Al-Shabaab* Operating Areas in Somalia in April 2015

Source: BBC. Available online at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689

5. ASSESSMENT

While the insurgencies in Africa in the colonial period were motivated by nationalism, self-determination, and the desire to reform the existing political order, those in the post-Cold War era were largely motivated by criminality, religion, and terrorism. This explains the virtual absence of ideology in most of the insurgencies in that period, with the exception of a few reformist driven ones.

Table 4. **Comparative Table of Colonial, Post-Colonial and Post-Cold War Insurgencies in Africa**

VARIABLE	COLONIAL ERA INSURGENCIES	POST-COLONIAL INSURGENCIES	POST-COLD WAR INSURGENCIES
Motive/Goals	Nationalism, Liberation, Self-Determination.	Liberation, Secession, Overthrow existing regimes, Reformation.	Overthrow existing regime, Reformation, Warlords/Criminal, Religion, Terror.
Ideology	Defined Ideology.	Defined Ideology.	Lack of Ideology.
Organization	Centralized/Hierarchical.	Centralized/Hierarchical.	Centralized, but autonomous cells, Fragmented structure.
Leadership	Single Leader, Led by educated élite.	Single Leader. Led by educated élite.	Ill-defined and reclusive leadership.
Mobilization	Mass mobilization based on conviction.	Mass mobilization based on conviction, coercion.	Coercion, terror, abduction.
Strategy and Tactics	Disciplined forces, guerrilla style and conventional warfare, selective use of violence.	Disciplined forces, guerrilla style and conventional warfare, use of violence.	Terror, guerrilla style, indiscriminate use of violence.
Duration	Protracted	Protracted	Protracted

The organization of the insurgent groups, leadership, mobilization and strategy also reflected differences. The colonial and the post-colonial insurgencies shared similar patterns in contrast to those that occurred in the post-Cold War era which were characterized by autonomous cell units directed by reclusive and semi-educated leaders. Those leaders relied on coercion, terror, abductions and guerrilla style approaches in their organization, mobilization and tactics. In terms of duration, all the insurgencies became protracted.

The criminal insurgencies analysed in the case studies also exhibit similarities and differences in terms of the political and economic situations in the states in which the insurgencies were initiated; goals, motives and ideology of the insurgent groups; leadership including organization; mobilization and strategy and tactics of warfare. A comparative analysis of the resemblances and differences in the criminal insurgencies analysed in the chapter is presented in Table 5 below.

The table indicates that the criminal insurgent groups analysed reveal a diverse outlook. The LRA espoused a Christian and traditional belief system; the RUF appeared to be a secular group; *Boko Haram* is an Islamic insurgent group fighting a secular government, moderate Muslims and Christians, while *Al-Shabaab* is an Islamic organization perpetuating violence against, predominantly, Muslims in Somalia and a mixed population in the region (Williams, 2011:132). This notwithstanding, the movements were initially motivated by similar political situations in their respective states and the need to establish just, equitable and, probably, functioning states. The initial pursuits by all these insurgent organizations changed as they evolved into criminal and terrorist groups.

Table 5. Resemblances and Differences between selected Post-Cold War Insurgencies in Africa

VARIABLE	ORGANIZATION	RESEMBLANCES	DIFFERENCES
Context of Insurgency	LRA RUF BOKO HARAM AL-SHABAAB	Weak states, Economic mismanagement, Corruption, Patronage system.	No difference.
Goals/Motive/Ideology	LRA	Lack of Ideology. No clear political motive.	Implementation of the ten commandments.
	RUF		State capture.
	BOKO HARAM		Establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Anti-Western values.
	AL-SHABAAB		Establishment of an Islamic caliphate.
Leadership and Organization	LRA RUF BOKO HARAM AL-SHABAAB	Centralized/Hierarchical structure. Autonomous cells or units. Reclusive leadership.	No difference between the organizations.
Mobilization	LRA RUF BOKO HARAM	Exploitation of local resources. Coercion. Abductions. Taxation. Robberies.	No difference between the organizations

Mobilization (continued)	AL-SHABAAB	Exploitation of local resources. Coercion. Abductions. Taxation. Robberies.	ICT-based mobilization. Use of foreign fighters.
Strategy and Tactics	LRA RUF	Guerrilla style. Terrorism. (Indiscriminate violence). Abduction. Mutilations. Fear. Use of child soldiers.	
	BOKO HARAM AL-SHABAAB		Suicide bombings. Hostage-taking. Use of IEDs.

The mode of mobilization and fund raising is a notable difference which also accounts for the differences in attracting foreign fighters and propagating their ideals. The Islamic-based groups exploited the use of ICT as a mode of mobilization of external support and fundraising. This is explained in part by their allegiance to global *Jihadist* groups and Salafist organizations. Thus, the Islamic-based criminal insurgents became franchises of these groups which also came with technical expertise.

On the contrary, the LRA and the RUF depended on the resources available within the local context. This explains the seemingly unavailability of sources of finance for the LRA compared to the other groups. The local context of the fighting may also be an inhibiting factor in the use of ICT. In the case of Sierra Leone, while diamonds may not have been the cause of the conflict (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):11), it served as a readily available resource to fund the insurgency by the RUF. Thus the local context and the international networks in the different circumstances dictated the outlook of the groups.

Notwithstanding the differences, these groups reveal similarities that form the basis of categorization as criminal insurgent organizations.

6. CONCLUSION

In all the cases, the insurgencies occurred in weak states or failed states with weak or non-existent administrative systems resulting in the inability to control the entire territory. The states are also characterized by economic mismanagement, corruption, high levels of unemployment and insecurity and challenges with national cohesion. The attendant inability to deliver critical services creates a legitimacy crisis for the incumbent governments (Kaldor and Vincent, 2006:5, 97; Reno, 2012:167; Human Rights Watch 1994; Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):11).

In the absence of legitimacy, most of the incumbent regimes dispense patronage to maintain power, which is sustainable with a buoyant economy, but weak administrative controls. Such a system does not only exacerbate the economic problems, but also leads to economic decline (Reno, 2009:10).

The insurgent organizations seem to mutate this system by replicating a similar system of patronage based on co-optation of businessmen, government ministers, and defections by the top military hierarchy. With such a network they do not require mobilization for popular support or the administration of liberated zones. Soldiers go unpaid under the regimes the insurgents fight, and tend to brutalize and harass the population. This is matched by the brutality and the atrocious behaviour of the insurgents (Reno, 2012:167).

This also explains the absence of a clear ideology and a political programme that involves the mobilization of the masses to carry out programmes. Material interests and coercion are the basis of support (Reno, 2009:11, 16). The organization and leadership also reflect similarities with a hierarchical command structure yet autonomous units and cells while the leadership is reclusive.

Similarly, the methods of warfare adopted by these groups are a combination of guerrilla style attacks; terrorism and coercion of the population into accepting the groups (Lye and Roszkowska, 2013:5). The brutality is meant to instil fear, strengthen the control of commanders and to build internal cohesion of the groups (Van Walraren and Abbink, 2003:19, 20; Doom and Flassenroot, 1999 cited in Van Walraren and Abbink, 2003:20). It is emphasised that all the insurgencies in Africa in both the Cold War and the post-Cold War period, relied on terror to instil fear. However, as a method of warfare, terrorism became a predominant feature of the criminal insurgent groups analysed in this chapter. It also explains the chaotic nature of the groups and the inability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants (Williams, 2011:45; Kaldor and Vincent, 2006:98, 99).

The next chapter will examine the mass uprisings that occurred in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 highlighting the conditions prior to the uprisings. The chapter will also assess the conditions and circumstances that prevented the uprisings from transforming into insurgencies.

CHAPTER FIVE: MASS UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 that also led to the fall of the respective regimes in both countries. In the case of Tunisia the President fled to Saudi Arabia as the government collapsed, while that of Egypt resigned and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the government (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:35; Lang, 2013:345). The chapter analyses the remote and immediate causes which outline the motivation for the mass uprisings.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of the political and socio-economic history of Tunisia and Egypt, highlighting the structural factors and the policy options which served as a background for the mass uprisings. The prevailing developments that accelerated the protests in both countries are also discussed. An analysis of the causes is presented to explain the linkages with the prevailing political and economic environment.

A discussion of the conduct of the mass uprising is presented in terms of the linkage between spontaneity, organization, leadership, composition, coordination and mobilization of masses of people to maintain the momentum of protest. In this regard, the role and impact of social media in the mobilization and sustenance of the mass uprisings are highlighted to bring clarity to the perceived dichotomy between spontaneity, mobilization and organization. This analysis also examines the escalation of the localized protests into a national mass uprising, and the relatively nonviolent nature.

The factors that influenced the ambivalent role or the seemingly anti-regime posture of the military in both countries and the effect on the outcomes of the mass uprisings are also emphasised, as well as the implications of the mass uprisings for the region.

2. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A historical overview of both Tunisia and Egypt from the immediate post-independence periods to the mass uprisings in both countries, in 2011, is discussed in this section. It

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highlights the political and economic directions of the various governments and the consequences that created disenchantment and alienation of the masses, leading to the mass uprisings.

2.1 TUNISIA

Tunisia was part of the Berber and the Ottoman Empires, which covered parts of North Africa. It was ruled by the Hammouda Paeha monarchy and the Turkish Beys until the establishment of the French protectorate in 1881 (Boubakri, 2015:67; Nelson, 1986:xix; Bradley, 2012:3).

Agitation for independence started with the formation of the Tunisian Liberal Constitutionalist Party or the Destour Party that was founded in 1920. A more radical breakaway faction, the Neo-Destour Party, led by Habib Bourguiba, emerged in the 1930s. The latter led the country to independence on 20 March, 1956 under a republican constitution that was adopted in June 1959 which also abolished the monarchy. Bourguiba was elected President in 1957 by a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and later by general elections in December 1959 (Boubakri, 2015:65-70; Willis, 2012:38, 40, 122).

Bourguiba integrated social modernisation with Islamic principles in governing the country. Secularist restrictions which included a ban on group prayers and religious expression and the suppression of Islamist groups were enforced. These were followed by a closure of Islamic universities and private Koranic schools. Thus Tunisia was modelled as a secular state (Nelson, 1986:xx, xxii). The construction of a secularist state was underpinned by wide-ranging reforms in all spheres of the society. Among the reforms were that of the family code which, among others, granted extensive rights to women in terms of marriage, divorce, equality with men, socio-economic freedoms, legal and citizenship rights and in education. The veil was seen as representing division and inequality and a symbol of oppression and was banned in official buildings. These measures created a secular middle class that constituted 80 percent of the population (Arieff and Humud, 2015:4; Bradley, 2012:34-35; Clancy-Smith, 2013:25).

In terms of economic transformation, Bourguiba initially adopted state capitalism, and state-centred socialist economic policies were implemented. This was gradually changed to open market economic policies in the 1970s. Under his leadership, Tunisia witnessed economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s (Willis, 2012:4, 74-75, 233-240).

Free and universal basic education to all Tunisians was also realized. With this policy, a third of the total youth population entered universities of which women constituted 60 percent. The country had one of the most developed educational systems while a free healthcare system increased the life expectancy rate to over 74 years (Bradley, 2012:5, 33).

Regarding the political system, Bourguiba instituted a one-party system with the renaming of the party in 1964 as *Parti Socialiste Destourien* (PSD). He subsequently declared himself a president for life. In addition to economic decline in the late 1970s and 1980s, a number of protests and riots emerged. Notable ones were the general strike by the *Union Générale des Travail Tunisienne* (Tunisian General Labour Union) (UGTT) in January 1978 and the bread uprising in January 1984 during which a number of deaths were reported. This was compounded by the senility of Bourguiba. Following these developments, Brigadier General Zine Al-Abdine Ben Ali, the Prime Minister, staged a palace *coup d'état* on 7 November, 1987 in accordance with relevant articles of the constitution that stipulated that the Prime Minister assumed office in cases of disability, among others, of the President (Boubakri, 2015:70-71; Willis, 2012:53, 96, 122; Bradley, 2012:36).

On assumption of office, Ben Ali initiated measures to liberalize the political system by allowing political plurality and popular organizations. In a symbolic gesture to break away with the past, Ben Ali created the *Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique* (RCD) (Willis, 2012:122, 128-131; Nelson, 1986:xxvi; Boubakri, 2015:71).

Economically, Tunisia became a middle income country with textile production, phosphate mining and tourism as the main sectors of the economy. Agricultural production also

improved considerably. These successes created jobs and led to stable economic growth and reduced poverty levels (Dandashly, 2012:10; Chakchouk *et al.*, 2013:575; Clancy-Smith, 2013:19-20).

Tunisia was an economic success story under Ben Ali. Between 1987 and 2007, the economy grew at an average rate of 5 percent a year, *per capita* income rose from US$1,201 in 1986 to US$3,786 in 2008, and the country was ranked as number one in Africa and 32nd globally by the World Economic Forum *Global Competitiveness Report* in 2010 (Bradley, 2012:38; Global Competitiveness Report, 2010:16).

Given this background, it was difficult to comprehend why a spontaneous mass uprising should emerge in Tunisia. The causes were the consequences of the political choices made in the past, but more importantly the economic situation in the few years prior to the mass uprising.

2.2 EGYPT

Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire from the 16th century until the French and, later, British rule in the 19th and 20th centuries. Agitations and protests for independence and constitutional rule began in 1906 and gathered momentum after the end of the First World War. In 1922 the British handed over power and Egypt was declared independent under a constitutional monarchy (Lang, 2013:350-351).

The immediate post-independence period saw a polarized society marked by power struggles among the ruling élite on the one hand, and between the politicians and the monarchy (King Farouk), on the other. Another contentious group that came to the political forefront was the Muslim Brotherhood that sought political power to Islamise Egyptian society. In the chaos that ensued, Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a *coup d'état* on 23 July 1952. The monarchy was subsequently abolished and Egypt was declared a republic in June 1953. Nasser also proclaimed revolutionary change in 1954 (Cook, 2012:23, 26, 35-53; Lang, 2013:352).

In place of the monarchy, Nasser established a one-party socialist system with the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) as the vanguard party and undertook socio-economic reforms that included land and agrarian reforms that transformed Egypt from a feudal society to a state-directed one. This was based on nationalist rhetoric guided by a socialist ideology. It was complemented by the nationalization of critical sectors of the economy such as banks, insurance and shipping companies as well as utilities and manufacturing concerns. The nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956 resulted in the Suez War which elevated Nasser's popularity and legitimacy, both locally, regionally and at the international levels. The economy improved considerably from the mid-1950s to the 1960s (Osman, 2011:179; Cook, 2012:45, 65-71, 77-78, 113; Lang, 2013:354).

Anwar Sadat took over the Presidency in October 1970. At the time of his assumption to office, the Egyptian economy had declined with mounting external debt of 25 percent of gross national income, increasing underemployment and unemployment. This was compounded by the uncertainties in the region particularly the Suez Canal and the Israeli occupation of Sinai (Cook, 2012:117, 118-121, 132).

Sadat departed from the political ideology of Arab nationalism pursued by Nasser and crafted a new domestic and foreign policy that entailed political and economic liberalization, named *Al-infitah* or *infitah* (opening); a peace agreement with Israel and rapprochement with the West (Brynen *et al*, 2012:22; Osman, 2011:128). In line with *infitah*, the country was renamed the "Arab Republic of Egypt", and a new constitution was promulgated in 1971 that established due process with *sharia* law as the basis of legislation (Cook, 2012:123-125).

Militarily, prior to the peace treaty with Israel, Sadat attempted to retake Sinai from Israel in October 1973 during which Israeli troops were almost annihilated (Osman, 2011:129). While the above increased the popularity of Sadat, there were strong undercurrents of political dissent and particularly the uneasy relations with Islamic extremists. This included the *al Jihad* that was responsible for his assassination in October 1981 (Cook, 2012:155, 156, 165).

Hosni Mubarak who succeeded Sadat continued with *Al-infitah* in a bid to resolve the economic challenges. Together with an International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility Trust, the policy enabled an injection of foreign direct investments that spurred economic growth; efficiency and the expansion of the Egyptian companies (Cook, 2012:159-160; Osman, 2011:140-141). The results were the creation of some of Africa's foremost investment banks, private equity firms, telecommunication operators and construction companies. This period thus witnessed unprecedented economic growth (Osman, 2011:226; Cook, 2012:174, 177).

Politically, the government opened the political space with a constitutional amendment in 2005 that allowed multiparty presidential elections. Recognition of 24 political parties and a measure of freedom of expression also followed (Cook, 2012:168-185).

These policies and measures failed to meet the expectations of the people which affected the legitimacy of the regime and aroused the resentments of the masses that eventually created the remote conditions for the mass uprising in 2011.

3. CAUSES OF THE UPRISINGS

This section discusses the remote and immediate causes of the mass uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt. The similarities in the historical circumstances, the political systems, and the economic environment, of both countries, created comparable conditions for dissent. Consequently, the causes of the mass uprisings in both countries are discussed concurrently under the respective sub-sections.

The causes of mass uprisings and insurgencies have been discussed extensively in Chapter Two. These include a decreasing ability of the state to meet the needs of a growing population; ethnic or tribal and racial cleavages arising out of migration including radicalization of religion; the maladministration of land; and extreme income or regional inequalities as a result of economic development and urbanization. Other causes include the loss of legitimacy of the ruling regime due to corruption and cronyism and decline in economic indicators such as rising inflation and unemployment. The nature of the regime

explained in terms of the level of political participation, political expression, use of terror and repression, as well as the domino or the contagion effect of similar occurrences in a given region accelerate the conditions for a mass uprising.

Some of the causes may, however, be dominant or more prominent in some countries prior to a mass uprising or an insurgency. In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, both countries reflected most of the conditions that precipitate a mass uprising irrespective of the extent of the manifestation or dominance in each country.

3.1 REMOTE CAUSES

These are the consequences of the long term structural and policy choices by the various regimes that governed Tunisia and Egypt since independence as reflected in the political and economic management of both countries. Thus, the mass uprisings were a result of several factors including the nature of the regimes and the governance systems, expressed in the restrictive political space; flawed electoral systems; emergency laws; lack of freedom of expression amidst socio-economic challenges including the effects of economic liberalization; structural and regional inequalities; corruption and unemployment (ICG, 2012; Teti and Gervasio, 2011:34; Behr and Aaltola, 2011; Osman, 2011; Brynen *et al*, 2012). These factors are discussed in detail.

3.1.1 RESTRICTIVE POLITICAL SPACE

A major cause of the mass uprisings was the nature of the political systems and the governance structures of both countries that restricted the political space and avenues for political participation.

In the case of Tunisia, Bourguiba established an autocratic style of governance system without elections for 31 years. The establishment of the Neo-Destour, and its successor the PSD, as mass organizations, provided a base for popular support and legitimacy for Bourguiba from local to national levels. However, the mass of the people were marginalized from the political process (Willis, 2012:4, 64, 65-71).

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The establishment of a one-party dictatorship in 1964 and the proclamation of Bourguiba as a life President in June 1975 led to a fusion of the executive, legislative and judicial forms of government in the hands of one individual (Boubakri, 2015:70; Willis, 2012:122).

Ben Ali in turn amended the constitution and set a term limit of the presidency to five years for two terms and allowed formation of other parties. The constitution was later again amended which changed the term limits to allow three consecutive terms with a clause that a presidential candidate had to get signatures from 30 politicians to be qualified for elections. Under these conditions, Ben Ali was re-elected more than four consecutive times including the elections in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009 (Bradley, 2012:38; Arieff and Humud, 2015:3).

The political élite and the UGTT were also co-opted through patronage and financial inducements. This effectively neutralized opposition to the regime. This was reinforced by an electoral system under which the President sometimes obtained 99 percent of the votes (Brynen *et al*, 2012:18; Bradley, 2012:5, 6; Khosrokhavar, 2012:15).

Pockets of resistance emerged from 1998 with the formation of the National Council for Liberties in Tunisia and other civil society organizations that highlighted the human rights situation in the country (Boubakri, 2015:72).

The foregoing is indicative that both the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were intolerant of political freedom and open participation in the governance of the country, which provided the grounds for dissent in Tunisia.

In the case of Egypt, Nasser rode on the popular support to enact an all embracing *Emergency Law* (Law 162 of 1958) that enabled the regime to consolidate power. The law granted the government extraordinary powers under a state of emergency including press censorship, limitations of political organizations, and the establishment of state security courts to handle public and national security crimes. It transferred most of the legislative powers to the executive followed by the creation of parallel judicial system also

under the control of the executive (Cook, 2012:82, 112; Lang, 2013:353-355). The regime thus monopolized or controlled the political activity in Egypt.

On assumption to the presidency, Sadat initiated a "Corrective Revolution" to overturn the unpopular policies under Nasser. In an attempt to liberalize the political space, Sadat established the National Democratic Party (NDP) in place of the ASU in July 1978, and allowed political parties to operate under a new constitution in 1971 that guaranteed separation of power and strengthening institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to operate freely with the release of its members from prison in 1971. However, the existence of the *Emergency Law* in addition to a system of state patronage, fraudulent elections and intimidation of political opponents kept him in power (Cook, 2012:123-126; Brynen *et al*, 2012:22).

The *Emergency Law* was extended by Mubarak. Other legislation such as the amendments to the constitution in 2007 (Article 76) that effectively prevented other presidential aspirants from contesting unless endorsed by the regime, and an amendment to Article 88 of the constitution that whittled down the oversight responsibilities of the judiciary over elections enabled the regime to control and manipulate the political space (Ghabra, 2015:200-202; Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, May 2008; Cook, 2012:185, 190).

Allied to the restriction of the political space was the question of succession. Attempts that were made by Mubarak to be succeeded by his son, Gamal, deepened the resentment against the regime. Gamal rose meteorically within the NDP establishment. As the head of the Policy Secretariat of the party, he played a major role in drafting the amendment to the constitution. This was seen as paving the way for the succession of Gamal in the Presidential election planned for 2011. Moreover, the perception that he was an ally of the Minister of the Interior who was associated with the repressive policies of the regime, only fuelled the resentment (Ghabra, 2015:200-202; Brynen *et al*, 2012:23).

3.1.2 SUPPRESSION OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS

The restriction of the political space was accompanied by draconian measures, either through the legislative process or under the emergency laws, to clamp down on political dissent. This was pervasive in both Tunisia and Egypt until the mass uprisings. Thus internal security became an obsession for the various regimes in the two countries (Osman, 2011:185).

The mass party of Bourguiba afforded some legitimacy, but the patrimonial leadership suppressed dissent. Hence the resort to coercion to extract support was minimal, but nevertheless, the authoritarian political system relied on the security apparatus for survival (Mullin, 2015:91).

Ben Ali ruled for 23 years with absolute power that had strict control over the political system under a perpetual state of emergency and thus stifled freedom of expression and other individual freedom including freedom of speech and the formation of associations and groups. This was accompanied by human rights violations (Dandashly, 2012:11; Mullin, 2015:92, 95). The legitimacy of the Ben Ali regime was based on coercion and intimidation under a pervasive security system that established a police state (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33; Mullin, 2015:95).

Independent broadcasting was equally stifled with restrictions on radio and television, and other forms of electronic media such as the internet, broadcasting and the telecommunication network in the country. The system of pervasive censorship and secret manipulation of official institutions created difficulties for private investment in the media. The state media became the propaganda instrument of the regime (Chakchouk *et al.*, 2013:578-580).

In the case of Egypt, the *Emergency Law* was fully implemented, and it defined state power since the assassination of Sadat in October 1981. In 2005, this was replaced by Article 179 of the constitution that suspended certain individual rights in the pursuit of terrorists. This was renewed in 2008 and 2010 with clauses that expanded the powers of

arrest and trial of civilians in military courts. Thus the *Emergency Law* became enshrined in the constitution that conferred authority on the executive arm of government to enforce regulations that limited freedom of speech and expression, movement or assembly, formation of parties and the power to make arrest and detain individuals suspected to be threats to security. The *Emergency Law* also required the military to monitor communication through the print and electronic media. This violated the rights, privacy and confidentiality of the citizens (Cook, 2012:191-192; Ghabra, 2015:202; Rutherford, 2013:38).

As with Tunisia, the use of coercion was amply displayed by the increased expansion of the internal security apparatus in Egypt. The number was increased to about two million officers which were used to suppress dissent and enforce the emergency laws (Osman, 2011:209).

In reaction, a number of groups emerged to challenge the regime and the political system. The most vociferous was the Egyptian Movement for Change or the *Kefaya* (Enough) Movement established in 2004. This was an amalgamation of civil society groups, Islamists, professional associations and opposition figures that challenged the regime and demanded political and economic reforms. Through its incessant protests and defiance of the regime, *Kefaya* addressed the fear of intimidation which became an example for others. Other groups that emerged were the Judges Club, Doctors for Change, Workers for Change, 6th April Youth Movement, and a feminist group known as *Shayfenkom*. The protests by student groups and the Islamic movements, notably the Muslim Brotherhood and a host of radical elements mounted pressure on the government (Faris, 2013:8-9; Osman, 2011:148-149; Ghabra, 2015:201; Khosrokhavar, 2012:45-46). The agitations were marked by a number of protests. About 150 demonstrations and strikes by workers and students were recorded from 2007 to 2008, and these were met with heavy handedness by the security forces. It was estimated that 18,000 people were detained without trial between 2007 and 2008 (Osman 2011:128; Egyptian Organization for Human rights, cited in Osman 2011:128; Ghabra, 2015:201-202). These developments created the foundations for a mass protest.

3.1.3 ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION

Another factor that increased the level of dissent and disaffection for the regimes in both countries was the mode of implementation of the economic liberalization policies that were embarked upon by the regimes in the 1980s and the 1990s.

At independence, both Tunisia and Egypt adopted statist economic models directed by the socialist oriented vanguard parties of Bourguiba and Nasser. It was also inspired by nationalism, a vision to establish an egalitarian society and a break from feudalist or dynastic structure inherited from Ottoman and monarchic rule (Cook, 2012:45, 65-71, 77-78, 113; Lang, 2013:354; Willis, 2012:11, 38-40; Boubakri, 2015:65-68).

The initial stages of independence were therefore marked by massive investment in the public sector, nationalization of private companies and industries, and the establishment of state-owned enterprises. This was in addition to land reforms and collective ownership of agricultural lands in the rural areas, price controls, and the expansion of education that increased enrolment of students in Tunisia and Egypt (Brynen *et al*, 2012:217,218; Zemni, 2015:79).

To remedy the distortions caused by the socialist model, both countries, in the 1970s and 1980s, embarked on *Al-infitah* (market oriented economic reforms in accordance with neo-liberal reforms) with the support of the World Bank and the IMF as explained in Section Two (Brynen *et al*, 2012:217-219; Zemni, 2015:79; Willis, 2012:237-238).

Tunisia began the implementation of the structural adjustment programme in 1986 which saw the privatization of a number of state-owned companies, notably huge public concerns such as telecommunications, transport and cement manufacturing companies. This created a stable growth rate in the 1990s and 2000s (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33; Willis, 2012:4, 242), and included the sale of land in the rural areas. Both the sale of companies and land benefited the ruling family and the RCD élite who became the new landowners (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33; Willis, 2012:4, 242; Zemni, 2015:79, 80).

Another resource that came under the control of the ruling family was water. The wife of Ben Ali took control of aquifers in the hinterland to sustain a bottled water company owned by the family. Thus rural dwellers had to depend on the company for water instead of the municipal authorities. More importantly, control of water in an arid country also deprived farmers, the food processing and fruit export sectors, especially in the Sidi Bouzid region, of an important resource for livelihood (Clancy-Smith, 2013:19).

In Egypt the *infitah* began in 1974 under Sadat. It was envisioned as a political and economic concept meant to open up Egyptian politics and society. Economically, it was aimed at changing the statist economy and the adoption of liberalization and market-oriented policies. This meant the divestiture of state companies created or nationalized by Nasser. This was manifested in every aspect of the economy particularly in granting concessions of prime lands for real estates, contracts for goods and commodities among others (Osman, 2011:128, 130-131, 180).

Mubarak continued *infitah* on the assumption that addressing the economic challenges will serve as a bulwark against political dissent. The government subsequently complemented the *infitah* with structural reforms on the advice of the World Bank and the IMF. This resulted in the sale of over 300 large public sector companies including electricity, water, transport and telecommunications (Cook, 2012:159; Osman, 2011:140-141).

Al-infitah created a powerful private sector that enabled foreign direct investment that spurred growth with annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increasing from 6.7 percent in 2006 to 7 percent in 2010. It, however, led to a deterioration of the public sector as a result of decreasing government investment. This also widened the income inequality between the public and private sectors. The privatization of social services such as housing, healthcare, and education meant that a large sector of the population was deprived of this (Osman, 2011:133-135; Brynen *et al*, 2012:23-24; Rutherford, 2013:37).

The liberalization policy advocated and controlled by Gamal Mubarak, son of Hosni Mubarak, added another dimension to the liberalization process. Gamal who was in

charge of economic policy within the NDP and the government implemented a liberalization policy which was seen as élitist inclined. The policies benefited prominent businessmen and wealthy individuals who were also key members of the NDP and close cronies of the government. This created a new élite composed of the well-educated, diaspora, military and intelligence officers, and aristocratic families with loyalties to the regime. It also created a new power base in Egypt that owed allegiance to Gamal. This new group expanded the relationship between power and business that blurred the distinction between politics and wealth to the detriment of the ordinary people (Ghabra, 2015:201; Osman, 2011:135-155).

According to Osman (2011:127), most of the members of parliamentary committees that debated the causes of rising cost and increasing inflation in 2008 were prominent members of the NDP and owners of the largest businesses and beneficiaries of rising cost. At the level of the executive, Osman (2011:128) further asserts that a prominent owner of a consumer goods retailer was appointed the Trade Minister; the most prominent healthcare entrepreneur was the Health Minister; and the most successful wheat trader became the Minister of Agriculture.

Al-infitah then became a concept for self-enrichment, corruption and crony capitalism. The fusion of money and politics was in contrast to the redistributive society envisioned during the Egyptian revolution in 1952 (Rutherford, 2013:36).

3.1.4 CORRUPTION

Boubakri (2015:71) asserts that the repression and economic liberalization was compounded by corruption within the ruling class in both countries. This included low level corruption by government officials to political corruption associated with high ranking politicians.

In the case of Tunisia, the regime became coterminous with corruption. The corruption scandals among the top officials was estimated to be about US$ 1billion per year (AfDB, 2011:1). This included Ben Ali's wife, her family and cronies of the regime. The accusation

included a range of corrupt practices from extortion, bribes, money laundering, and property expropriation. The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranked Tunisia at 51 out of 163 countries in terms of perceptions of corruption in 2006. This slipped to 62 out of 180 countries in 2008 and further to 73 out of 183 countries surveyed in 2011 (Gana, 2013:21; Transparency International, 2006, 2008, 2011).

The massive accumulation of wealth was manifested in ostentatious living, vulgar opulence, greed and arrogance by the regime and its cronies. Indeed the lifestyle and mode of wealth accumulation compelled the US Ambassador to Tunisia to describe Ben Ali and his cronies as "a mafia like organization" (Khosrokhavar, 2012:38; Willis, 2012:242; Bradley, 2012:47, 44).

Egypt similarly reflected manifestations of corruption. Osman (2011:153) notes that corruption was an institutionalized and a pervasive aspect of Egyptian life. Thus similar to Tunisia, Egypt had endemic corruption involving high ranking members of the NDP (Osman, 2011:146-147).

In 2006, the CPI placed Egypt at 70 out of 163 countries. This ranking dropped in 2008 to 115 out of 180 countries and was at 112 of 183 countries surveyed in 2011. This perception ranged from large scale corruption involving the political leadership involved in the privatization process, and low level corruption by government officials and service agencies (Osman, 2011:152; Shahin, 2014:56; Transparency International, 2006, 2008, 2011).

3.1.5 INEQUALITY

Inequality is discussed both in terms of inequalities between the ruling élite and the marginalized, as well as unequal development between different regions in the same country. Prior to the mass uprising, Tunisia tended to reflect the latter while the inequalities in Egypt resembled the former.

Even though the Tunisian economy before the uprising seemed to be doing well, there were wide disparities and structural challenges between the regions which also led to

differing living standards of the citizens. Development and investment were concentrated more on the eastern coast, the North-East and Mid-East while the West, South and the Mid-western parts of the country were the underdeveloped regions. Thus the coastal regions (Sousse, Monastir and Mahdia and Tunis) that constituted less than 14.4 per cent of the population were more developed in terms of infrastructure, educational facilities, factories and hotels than the seven provinces in the Mid-West and South of the country. These regions therefore attracted wealth and investment and offered more employment opportunities (AfDB, 2011:3; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:31; Mullin, 2015:95; Zemni, 2015:80). According to Clancy-Smith (2013:22), 80 percent of the GDP was concentrated along the coast from Bizerte to Sfax while the South-West and the Centre-West regions that contained 40 percent of the population produced 20 percent of the GDP.

The resultant underdevelopment and unemployment meant the economy in these regions could only absorb low skilled and low paid-jobs with the attendant massive poverty. Poverty in these areas was estimated to be twice that of the country. For instance, poverty rates were 30-40 percent in Kasserine; in Sidi Bouzid 35- 45 percent and in Gabes 27-31 percent compared to the rest of the country (Achy, 2011:20; AfDB, 2011:3; Mullin, 2015:95; Boughzala, 2013:8).

Map 6. Map of Tunisia showing the administrative regions

The economic policies pursued in Egypt created extreme inequalities that widened the gap between the rich and the poor in society. This was noticeable in the wealth distribution in the country. Before 2011, 40 percent of the wealth of Egypt was owned by 5 percent of the population, while the ten companies listed on the Egypt stock exchange

that comprised 45 percent of the market capitalization were owned by less than twenty families. This development created a marked distinction between the 5 percent rich and the poor in every aspect of Egyptian life while 40 percent of the population were below the poverty line (Osman, 2011:127, 153, 154).

The inequalities were also reflected in settlement patterns which may be likened to a segregation of the rich from the poor. The élite began migrating from the cities to new modern suburbs with gated communities, leaving behind the marginalized (Osman, 2011:217).

3.1.6 DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE AND UNEMPLOYMENT

With an annual GDP growth rate at 3.4 percent from 1990 to 2010 for Tunisia and 6.7 percent for Egypt between 2006 and 2010, the economy of both countries appeared robust despite the distortions and structural problems. This was, however, overshadowed by the demographic structure that also influenced the level of employment in the two countries. This was a catalyst for dissent (IMF in Larémont, 2014(b):25; Brynen *et al*, 2012:23-24; World Bank, 2014:36).

The demographic structure of both countries in the years prior to the mass uprisings suggested the preponderance of a young population. In Tunisia, 52.2 percent of the population was under 30 years in 2011 (Tunisia National Institute of Statistics cited in Palencia, 2015:422). Again, 42 percent was under 25 years in 2010 while 43.55 per cent of the population was between 15 and 34 years. Youth unemployment was 30 percent, and 45 percent of this figure represented university graduates. Unemployment nationally was 18.9 percent in 2011 (Larémont, 2014(b):19; UN, 2014:1, 8; Boughzala, 2013:3, 5; World Bank, 2014:39).

The unemployment rate, particularly among graduates, has been attributed to the deteriorating economic conditions, the impact of the structural adjustment programme, the neo-liberal policies and lack of job creation by the government, but more importantly due to poor training and a mismatch of fields of specialization of the students. Agriculture

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that provided avenues for employment, particularly in the rural areas, was neglected in favour of oil production (AfDB, 2011:2; UN, 2014:7).

The educational system aided the levels of unemployment. In Tunisia, Bourguiba established one of the best forms of education in the world. Ben Ali continued with the system with the introduction of a free educational policy. The policy increased university enrolment and graduates, but the standards declined as the system was corrupted by the Ben Ali regime. Clancy-Smith (2013:26) asserts in this regard that "families were blackmailed, obliged to collaborate (with the regime) in order to assure their children's educational future". Thus the supply of graduates outstripped demand by the labour market. Moreover, the pursuit of further education was restricted due to the lack of recognition of the Tunisian certificates internationally. This created a large number of graduates with diplomas, in addition to university graduates without employment (Rufai, 2012:19; Zemni, 2015:83; Clancy-Smith, 2013:26).

Unemployment was particularly witnessed in the case of the *Compagnie des Phosphates de Gafsa*, a phosphates mining company in the Gafsa region (in southern Tunisia) which provided a livelihood to most of the inhabitants in the region. As part of the economic restructuring programme, the company embarked on a downsizing of the workforce from 14,000 workers in the 1980s to 5,500 in 2008. This was done through competitive examinations, the results of which were published in January 2008 (Khosrokhavar, 2012:28-29).

This triggered a revolt mainly by the unemployed and students, throughout the region which was suppressed in June 2008 (Zemni, 2015:79-81; Mullin, 2015:94-95). This was followed by another in Ben Gardane (also in the South) in 2010 that was similarly crushed by the government (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:31).

The countrywide unemployment and poverty levels increased due to the global economic crisis in 2008 which affected the tourism industry in Tunisia, the mainstay of the economy and one of the largest employers. Poverty levels increased to 32 percent. At the same

time, the removal of subsidies increased the prices of basic goods including food (Bradley, 2012:41; Mullin, 2015:94-95; UN, 2014:1; AfDB, 2011:3).

The case of Egypt was similar. By the end of 2010, 75 percent of the Egyptian population was under 35 years old resulting in a relatively young population that demanded employment and other social services that were unavailable (Osman, 2011:208-213). In addition to the sale of companies, the restructuring of public companies reduced levels of employment and in some cases meant redundancy of workers. This added to the high unemployment levels. The neglect or deterioration of social services and healthcare, reduction in social housing delivery, and high rates of inflation led to extreme poverty. By 2011, the majority of Egyptians lived on an annual wage of $2,000 while about 16 million earned $2 a day (Cook, 2012:175).

The unemployment rate in Egypt nationally was estimated at 20 percent at the end of 2006, while that of the youth was 30 percent with women and those living in poor regions in the West of the country being the worst affected. Among university graduates, it was 40 percent for men and 50 percent for women while 80 percent of the unemployed were high school graduates. By 2008, graduate unemployment was estimated at 25 percent (EIU, 2008:8, 32; Shahin, 2014:56; Khosrokhavar, 2012:170; UNDP, 2008:296).

The unemployment situation was in part due to the decline in the education system. Osman (2011:222) affirms that the educational system of Egypt declined during the Mubarak years with enrolments falling up to about 50 percent in the rural areas, and drop outs in the poor neighbourhoods amounting to about 25 percent. Inflation increased to 17.1 percent in 2008 and the public debt reached 100 percent of GDP in 2007. These, in addition to the removal of subsidies, food shortages and increases in the prices of food (up to 37 percent from 2009) led to incessant social protests including bread riots in 2007 and 2008 (Osman, 2011:222; Bradley, 2012:40; Rutherford, 2013:39).

3.2 IMMEDIATE CAUSES

As indicated in Chapter Two, the grievances that characterized the remote causes are activated by the prevailing conditions which can be institutional or psychological factors in the country that provoke masses of people into action or a state of agitation to create a mass uprising. These constitute the triggers or the accelerators which in the case of Tunisia were the events in Sidi Bouzid in 2010, the success of which ignited the subsequent Egyptian mass uprising in 2011.

On December 17, 2010 the wares of Mohamed Bouazizi were confiscated by the municipal authorities in Sidi Bouzid, a city in mid-western Tunisia, for selling without a permit. Bouazizi was a young, unemployed graduate who sold fruit and vegetables for a living. In his frustration he set himself ablaze at the entrance of the city office. The self-immolation of Bouazizi was interpreted as a desperate protest against bureaucratic indifference, injustice and police corruption in Tunisia. This started an uprising in Sidi Bouzid with demonstrations and strikes that spread to the West and South of Tunisia, the hot-bed of dissent, and later to the northern cities and to Tunis (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:31, 34; Rafai, 2012:16; Boubakri, 2015:65).

The regime initially reacted with force as the police opened fire on protesters and made sweeping arrests. An estimated number of 338 people were killed in the process. As the crowds overwhelmed the police, the army was deployed, but the Army Chief of Staff refused to comply with an order to use force. The regime also offered concessions by promising new elections, job creation, and a cabinet reshuffle in December 2010. These measures failed to influence the determination of the masses (Arieff and Humud, 2015:5; Nepstad, 2013:342; Brooks, 2013:206; Aljazeera, 2010:1).

After 28 days of scattered protests that coalesced into mass uprisings, especially in Tunis, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January, 2011 ending his 23-year rule. The development had far-reaching consequences for the region (Ramadan, 2012:1; Arieff and Humud, 2015:5; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:34).

The success of the Tunisian mass uprising, the question of succession by Gamal Mubarak, and the impact of alleged police brutality were the three main developments that triggered the Egyptian mass uprising.

On 18 January, 2011, Asmaa Mahfouz, a young activist, posted a YouTube video which spoke of the Tunisian experience and called for similar action in Egypt (Weyland, 2012:927). The November 2010 parliamentary elections were also seen as a precursor of the plan for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father in the September 2011 presidential elections. This spurred agitations to avert that possibility (Shahin, 2014:58-60; Ramadan, 2012:26). A further immediate cause was the torture and death of Khaled Said, a young Egyptian cyber activist, in Alexandria in June 2010. Pictures of the corpse that went viral on Social Media Networks (SMN) led to the creation of a Facebook page that mobilized the people into mass protest (Brynen *et al*, 2012:24).

These developments ignited a series of protests and demonstrations on 25 January, 2011 in Cairo, which later spread to other places such as Alexandria, Ismailiyah, Mahalla El-Kubra, Aswan, Suez and Port Said. An estimated 15 million people participated in the mass uprising throughout the country within the 18 days of protests, with the occupation of streets and various public spaces. At Tahrir square in Cairo, which became the main bastion of the mass uprising, the number increased to over four million on February 11, 2011, making it the largest "mass civil resistance in human history" (Cortright, 2011 cited in Shahin 2014:54). The protesters demanded the end of the 30-year rule of the President, freedoms and democratic reforms. The demonstrations were empowered by strikes from labour unions which increased the pressure on the government (Teti and Gervasio, 2011:31; Shahin 2014:55; Ramadan, 2012:1).

The army was called in as the police and other internal security organizations failed to control the crowds. As with the case of Tunisia, the armed forces similarly declined to use force against the protestors. To placate the masses, Mubarak announced several measures including a cabinet reshuffle on 31 January, 2011, appointment of a Vice President (the first in 30 years of his presidency), and a reinstatement of government

subsidies and an increase in salaries and pensions. In a televised address on 1 February 2011, Mubarak further rescinded a decision to seek re-election and promised to amend Article 76 of the constitution to ease restrictions on independent candidates to contest elections. This was followed by the resignation of Gamal Mubarak and the leadership of the NDP. Failure to appease the protestors led to the resignation of President Hosni Mubarak and his entire cabinet on 11 February 2011 and the subsequent takeover by the SCAF (Nepstad, 2013:342; Aljazeera, 2011:1-7).

Officially, the Tunisian regime described the protest as an act by "extremists and mercenaries" (Speech by Ben Ali on 29 December 2010 cited by Aljazeera, 2010:1), while an Egyptian government statement accused the Muslim Brotherhood of creating the disturbances (Aljazeera, 2011:1).

Map 7. Administrative Map of Egypt

Source: UN Cartographic Section. Available online at http://www.un.org/Depts/ Cartographic/map/profile/egypt.pdf.

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3.3 ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES

Behr and Aaltola (2011:4) rightly attribute the mass uprisings to the political and socio-economic conditions that prevailed in both countries, notably the lack of political freedom and public accountability, and mounting inequalities coupled with deteriorating standards of living. These have been explained in the preceding section. It is, however, argued that the mere existence of these factors may not necessarily lead to a mass uprising. The response and the conduct of the regimes within the context of the challenges is a key driver for agitation.

For instance, the lack of freedoms and control of political activity in Tunisia further raised the stakes when Bourguiba became personified with the political system and the regime as he created a personality cult that concentrated power on himself. This occurred concurrently with the intimidation of opponents that made the political system authoritarian, with the attendant political restrictions that created resentment among the people. Legitimacy of the regime was therefore derived from manipulation and control (Willis, 2012:4, 51-60).

Similar to Bourguiba, Ben Ali established a tyrannical and oppressive one-party system and a personality cult which restricted political expression and suppressed political participation. Freedom of speech and other rights including religious activism were also stifled (Bradley, 2012:38; Arieff and Humud, 2015:3).

Ben Ali acquired legitimacy through coercion and co-optation of groups. Under the co-optation system, the standard of living of the middle class was elevated in return for potential acquiescence.

There was some level of political liberalization; in the late 1980s and 1990s some political parties emerged that succeeded in gaining seats in elections between 1999 and 2001. Most of those parties were government-sponsored parties or proxies of the RCD intended to create a semblance of political liberalism and legitimacy (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33; Willis, 2012:122, 128-131; Boubakri, 2015:71).

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The system of control extended to individual freedoms with a pervasive internal security apparatus. The size of the internal security force was supplemented by two million members of the ruling RCD that reported on opponents of the government (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33; Mullin, 2015:95).

Other organizations also performed surveillance on individuals and political opponents. For instance, The *Bank Tunisienne de Solidarité* and the *Fond de Solidarité Nationale* were created to mitigate the impact of liberalization on the rural economy by creating access to loans for small businesses and reduce poverty, but became instruments of surveillance and control that entrenched the regime (Tsourapas, 2013:29 in Zemni, 2015:81). In essence, there was no avenue for expression in Tunisia prior to the mass uprising.

The Egyptian political system also reflected similar restrictions. Cook (2012:62) argues that an understanding of the uprising in Egypt on 25 January, 2011 lies in the authoritarian political system founded by Nasser in 1954 which was based on co-optation "bribery, coercion and normative appeals to support the revolution". The emergency laws enabled the establishment of a strong presidential system that emasculated parliament and effectively created a constitutional dictatorship in Egypt that limited political activity and participation even for the ASU, the mass organization Nasser created, and whittled down the independence of the judiciary (Lang, 2013:353-355; Cook, 2012:82, 112).

Nasser also circumscribed free speech and elections during his presidency. Although the regime had popular legitimacy, it maintained authority through surveillance and intimidation of the citizens. This method was used to sustain subsequent regimes. In spite of the cosmetic changes by the regimes after Nasser, Egypt remained a police state characterized by repressive laws and authoritarian rule enforced through a multiplicity of regulations, decrees and laws that stifled dissent and the right to express grievances (Cook, 2012:126, 185; Bradley, 2012:10).

Rutherford (2013:35) reinforces this assertion by arguing that the political order created by Nasser was based on political acquiescence in exchange for material benefits and security. The regime's part of the bargain was the provision of free or subsidized goods and services including free health services and education; and subsidized food, electricity and fuel among others. Such a system becomes unsustainable with changes in the fundamentals, notably population growth or economic decline.

Thus, notwithstanding the level of legitimacy and the transformation in the economic fundamentals, the political system remained authoritarian and there was widespread poverty at the time of Nasser's death in 1970 (Cook, 2012:113).

Although Egyptian society changed between the mid-1950s and January 2011, the political system remained authoritarian as established by Nasser, resulting in constant tensions between opponents and defenders of that system which created political alienation, economic dislocations and violence (Cook, 2012:63, 64).

Sadat attempted to liberalize the political space through the *infitah* and an independent judiciary. However, Egypt essentially remained under one party rule during his presidency. The assassination of Sadat was an indication that grievances in Egyptian society remained intense. This system was entrenched by Mubarak through a number of constitutional amendments. Through the state of emergency laws, power was concentrated in Mubarak who ruled the country without a Vice President for 30 years (Cook, 2012:285-287; Lang, 2013:355).

Cosmetic changes were made in 2005 which partially opened an avenue for freedom of expression on political issues. However, the so-called political liberalization was circumscribed by other regulations that entrenched the repressive system. For instance, to nominate a presidential candidate a party should have held 5 percent of the seats in parliament, and there were other stringent qualifications to become an independent candidate. This included the support of 250 parliamentarians. Similar changes to the political laws, which abolished the right to organize parties on a religious basis, required that new political parties disclose sources of funding and be an "addition" to the political

arena. These requirements limited the number of candidates and excluded independent parties since the majority of the parliamentarians were NDP members. The restrictions aided Mubarak, and the NDP obtained over 88.6 percent of the votes in 2005 for a fourth term in office (Cook, 2012:173, 185-186).

In the 2010 parliamentary election, the NDP won 93 percent of the seats in parliament. The elections were considered fraudulent, rigged with irregularities and voter intimidation. These developments made a mockery of multiparty democracy in Egypt (Osman, 2011:204, 206). The results of the 2010 parliamentary elections were seen as a precursor to the succession of the presidency by Gamal. Indeed, the emergence of *Kefaya* in 2004 was partly due to this speculation (Ghabra, 2015:200-202; Brynen *et al*, 2012:23). The groups that emerged constituted the nucleus of the mass uprising in 2011.

Arguably, some of the socio-economic problems were partly due to the global economic challenges, but largely the effect of policies in both countries and in particular the implementation of the *infitah* which created a fusion of wealth and politics and corruption, among others.

Al-infitah created a façade of economic development and prosperity in Tunisia. The initial successes of the programme were described by Cavatorta and Haughølle (2012:180) as a myth created by Ben Ali that clouded an understanding of the real political and economic situation. In reality, it was a patronage-based privatization and crony capitalism that benefitted Ben Ali and his family and a few allies (politically connected business élites) with the support of state finances. Through *infitah*, the RCD and the ruling family expanded control to the rural areas to the detriment of peasant farmers. This created massive poverty and anger against the regime (Willis, 2012:4, 242; Zemni, 2015:79, 80).

In other areas, Ben Ali's wife and family had monopolistic control over business interests and sections of the economy which were acquired under unexplained circumstances. The shares of some reputable companies such as banks, telecommunication and real estate concerns and car dealerships among others, were acquired at knockdown prices during

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the privatization process or through extortion, blackmail and outright seizure of businesses with the threat of prosecution (Bradley, 2012:45; Willis, 2012:4, 243; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:33).

In Egypt, *infitah* became a tool for business and the affluent to the detriment of the large majority of Egyptians. The economic and political arrangements restricted avenues for the ordinary Egyptian to express grievances. The wealthy class also became the political class by default. *Al-infitah* thus re-established the feudal society destroyed by Nasser, and that eroded the legitimacy of the NDP which had portrayed itself as the defender of the poor and the marginalized. Under those circumstances, the only avenue to express dissent was rebellion.

Thus *infitah* in both countries created avenues for cronyism and the creation of a new élite. The fusion of wealth and politics created a class that controlled economic and political leverages. This amounted to a state seizure by a few to the detriment of the masses. Unemployment was aggravated by the development model in Tunisia that created regional disparity between the interior and the coast which fomented social unrest and was one of the main reasons for the uprising (Khosrokhavar, 2012:34).

In light of the foregoing, the mass uprisings in both Tunisia and Egypt were a result of an interplay of political and socio-economic circumstances in both countries. This assertion endorses the postulations by Korotayev and Zinkina (2011), Ramadan (2012), and Bradley (2012). They argue that high food prices coupled with decades of the existence of the emergency laws, corruption, unemployment, and poverty led to the mass uprisings.

The high poverty levels coupled with increases in food prices and the removal of subsidies impacted negatively on the standard of living of Tunisians and Egyptians. This also added to the complex mix of resentments that created the drivers and momentum for the mass uprising in 2011. It was therefore not surprising that the immediate reaction of the regimes to the mass uprisings was the reinstatement of subsidies and reduction in prices of food, among others, to alleviate suffering.

4. NATURE OF THE MASS UPRISINGS

The distinguishing features of a mass uprising, as noted in Chapter Two, include the spontaneity of the action, the collectivity of the behaviour of emotionally charged individuals from diverse stratums of society, and the militant nature although not always violent, in response to a common grievance or challenge to the legitimacy of the ruling regime. Thus, the participants aim at a regime change in the search for a solution to political and economic grievances. In view of the spontaneity of the action, mass uprisings are usually unorganized and relatively short-lived political changes that lack ideology or organization, but depend on technology to mobilize and organize.

Aleya-Sghaier (2014:42-44), Khosrokhavar (2012:91-104) and Shahin (2014:54, 55) provide insights into the characteristics of the Tunisian and Egyptian mass uprisings. These were classless as they included individuals across statuses and professions and with a high level of female participation. They were also spontaneous and leaderless at inception with the involvement of a large size of crowds, yet largely nonviolent in nature; lacked specific programmes and ideological direction; lacked a vanguard party and structure; while the organization and mobilization was facilitated through the internet and social media networks (ICG, 2011(a):19).

The mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt conform to the classical forms of mass uprising. The difference, however, lies with the notion of spontaneity, the mode of organization, and mobilization.

4.1 SPONTANEITY

Different interpretations have been provided regarding the spontaneity of the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. The spontaneity of that in Tunisia was beyond dispute (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:30; Faris, 2013:156). In the case of Egypt, Shahin (2014:53-55) argues that rather than a spontaneous act, the mass uprising should be seen as a cumulative process involving numerous groups and figures over a decade from 2000 to 2011 due to political dissent, economic and structural problems. Ramadan (2012:22-30) similarly observes that Western governments and NGOs have directly or indirectly trained a

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network of bloggers and cyber activists from North Africa and the Middle East in nonviolent mobilization since 2003 and offered sanctuaries to such dissidents. Thus, the occurrences in 2010 and 2011 were purposefully organized over a period that gathered momentum with the death of Bouazizi in Tunisia, which also provided one of the immediate causes for that of Egypt. If this was the case, there should have been a recognizable leadership and organization, at least in the case of Tunisia.

In view of the above, the spontaneity of both mass uprisings was derived from the absence of a leadership and prominent figures at inception. The uprisings were largely unorganized and devoid of an agenda, and lacked any ideological direction or a vanguard party (Bradley, 2012:2, 24; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:42; Larémont, 2014(a):8). The argument that the occurrences were spontaneous can be tenable.

4.2 ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES

There was a need for some level of coordination of the various segments involved in the protest in both countries and to sustain the initial spontaneity as the duration increased. The organization was not necessarily a deliberate action, but rather a result of the participation of organized entities or groups including professional bodies, labour unions, and youth and Islamist groups, among others. Their structure therefore became a platform for coordination.

In Tunisia, since the protests were localized at inception, there was a form of coordination for a psychological aggregation of the forces into a mass uprising. The structures of the organized groups, notably the UGTT in Tunisia and the recognized professional bodies and youth movements in Egypt, were then coopted which gave dynamism to the protests. In view of its composition, the participation of the UGTT (with a membership of 400,000) was crucial for the success of the mass uprising in Tunisia as local units organized strikes (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:42; Zemni, 2015:78-85; Boubakri, 2015:73; Filiu, 2011:68).

In the case of Egypt, the coordination provided some control and a decisive strategy. For instance, in pursuit of a nonviolent strategy, coordination ensured that the participants

used the national flag to avoid competing ideologies and ownership or religious perceptions that could have divided their ranks. The coordinators called for restraint from provocation of the security agencies, and educated participants on ways to avoid direct clashes with the anti-riot police and respect the rights of non-participants including respect for traffic rules (Shahin, 2014:67; ICG, 2011(a):20). This strategy broadened the support base of the mass uprising.

The composition of the crowds and the base of the initiation of the mass uprisings also depicted mass and classless uprisings that cut across status, professional, religious and political considerations. In Tunisia it started as a peasant uprising, mainly by the unemployed rural youth, and escalated to the capital. This was joined by political groups, professional bodies such as the Tunisian Bar Association and Judges, and the UGTT (Shahin, 2014:54, 55; Larémont, 2014(a):4; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:39-44; Anderson, 2011:2).

In contrast, the uprising in Egypt was largely urban-based, and began in Cairo and Alexandria and included the urban youth, intellectuals, civil servants, professional associations (Lawyers and Doctors), judges, civil society, labour unions (including hospitals, telecommunications, Cairo Airport and the Suez Canal) and the unemployed. The rural dwellers were indifferent to the regime (Larémont, 2014(a):7; Brynen *et al*, 2012:24; Cook, 2012:284-293; ICG, 2011(a):22).

The prominent youth groups that organized effectively in Egypt included the April 6th Movement which was formed in 2008 in the Nile Delta region by industrial workers, in protest against measures to suppress industrial action. The adoption of the use of the internet was an important and successful strategy for cyber mobilization in addition to other electronic media instruments that were used during the 2011 uprising (Korotayev and Zinkina, 2011:157; Shahin, 2014:61; Ghabra, 2015:202).

The Popular Campaign for Support of El Baradei, a group of young activists in Egypt, used its webpage to mobilize support for the candidature for Mohammed El Baradei for the presidential elections and collected over one million signatures. The group was also

important in cyber mobilization using Facebook. We Are All Khaled Said is another group that attracted a number of followers online. Other youth groups that mobilized effectively for the uprising included Youth for Justice and Freedom, Youth of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Youth of the Tomorrow Party (Shahin, 2014:62; Filiu, 2011:48-49).

In both mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the protesters were a mix of groups from all the layers of society, but initiated by the youth. The organized groups declared general strikes, a boycott of court proceedings, and demonstrations and sit-in strikes. Their participation lent credence to the mass uprisings (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:43; Brynen *et al*, 2012:24). Moreover, the composition of the crowds made it indifferent to any ideology or political programme. It was a quest for a resolution of grievances that affected individuals in every stratum of society led by the youth that had a grasp of social media to organize and mobilize a "virtual constituency" of people from various backgrounds and segments of society (Shahin, 2014:59-62).

4.3 MOBILIZATION

The mobilization of large masses of people was achieved through a combination of traditional and modern social media. The media here included both big and small media, from mobile phones and laptops to large satellite networks such as *Al Jazeera* as well as the internet. In view of the strict censorship and suppression of the traditional media in both Tunisia and Egypt, the populations depended especially on the satellite channels, the internet and the mobile telephone for information. Despite the income inequalities and the imbalance in development, the media provided the bridge between the rural and the urban population and between the various layers of the social structure in the urban areas. These then became the prominent tools for organization, mobilization and coordination of a variety of actors and participants that represented different ideologies, religions and political orientations (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:46; Shahin, 2014:54; Zemni, 2015:84).

The effectiveness of each form of media, however, differed in Tunisia and Egypt. Larémont (2014(b):27, 28) observes that while the uprising in Tunisia was facilitated by

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Facebook, in Egypt there was more use of cell phone text messages, Twitter and face-to-face communication. Adopting a similar argument, Brynen *et al* (2012:234) observe that satellite channels, internet sites, Twitter users, Facebook groups and bloggers created a platform for deliberation, organization and mobilization. These media provided information and communication to overcome censorship and repressive measures to curb association and gathering. These assertions also confirm that a combination of media contributed to the mobilization efforts by the protestors in both countries as discussed below.

4.3.1 TRADITIONAL MEDIA

Notwithstanding the strict censorship, newspapers and television stations were the traditional means of information. Prior to the mass uprising, 11 major newspapers existed in Tunisia that were owned by the government, the ruling party, opposition political parties and private individuals. The latter were largely seen as appendages of the regime while the party newspapers were subdued through censorship by the government. The media was effectively a government mouthpiece (El-Issawi, 2012:4-5).

In Egypt, a range of newspapers including those owned by government, opposition newspapers, and party and privately owned newspapers existed that reported on the corruption and other inefficiencies of the regimes. The private newspapers that became vocal after 2004 did not only publicise political developments, but also challenged the monopoly of the government over the media (Faris, 2013:56; Shahin, 2014:65). These prepared the masses for any action to address their grievances.

4.3.2 SATELLITE CHANNELS

The advent of Arab satellite television channels provided avenues to evade censorship, and that influenced perceptions of the Arab audience against the repressive rule and excesses of the regimes. Of these, *Al Jazeera* became a prominent channel. By allowing free expression and views on corruption, poverty, inequality and other social grievances,

it created awareness and placed the issues on the agenda. With 50 million viewers since its establishment in 1996, the network galvanized the population in the Arab world with the coverage of the uprising in various countries that also caused or had a demonstration effect on mobilization and dissemination in the days before and during the protests. In addition, about 58 percent and 81 percent of the population in Tunisia and Egypt respectively viewed the television as a trusted source of information, hence the influence and credibility of *Al Jazeera*. This perception contributed to the sustenance of the mass uprising (Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 2012 cited in Palencia, 2015:423-424; Brynen *et al*, 2012:236; Abdelmoula, 2015:367-369).

4.3.3 INTERNET, CELL PHONES AND SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS

The internet, particularly websites and bloggers, became a critical source for alternative information, organization and mobilization. It provided the space for members of groups that will otherwise not have come together to share ideas for political mobilization and contestation (Brynen *et al*, 2012:237; Rutherford, 2013:40; Faris, 2013:16).

The influence of the internet is assessed by the number of users in both countries. Tunisia with a population of 10.2 million had 3.6 million internet users and 9 million people had access to mobile phones in 2010. At the end of 2011, the number of internet users had increased to over 3.8 million making it one of the highest internet penetrations in Africa (Chakchouk *et al*., 2013:577; Palencia, 2015:423).

This provided a medium that exposed the lifestyle and privileges of members of the Ben Ali government (private jets, palaces, luxury cars) especially those close to the first family and in particular the First Lady, Leila Trabelsi and her family (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:32,33).

In addition to the traditional opposition, the emergence of blogging became an avenue for political organization, mobilization and expressions of political dissent. Bloggers emerged in Tunisia who documented the excesses of the regimes in both countries on the internet. The bloggers who were unable to overcome the censorship techniques of

the regimes were, however, arrested and tortured (Cook, 2012:194, 195; Brynen *et al*, 2012:239; Palencia, 2015:422).

Egypt reflected a similar situation as the internet became a medium for mobilization by opponents of the regime, notably the youth groups. With over 17 million internet users by February 2010, this medium became effective as an alternative source of information, in spite of monitoring by the regime which led to the arrest and detention of activists (Palencia, 2015:423; Khosrokhavar, 2012:48).

Mobile phones were similarly used to transmit developments live onto the web or to satellite television channels such as *Al Jazeera* that showcased the mass uprisings, and sustained them while text messaging kept the population informed of programmes and actions (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:34, 46).

Social media networks galvanized the masses for the uprisings in 2011. According to Faris (2013:15), social media networks enhanced information sharing and convinced others to join the protests. The hashtag of Twitter facilitated planning. These changed or influenced the discourses, and assisted to circumvent actions by the regimes to disrupt organization and coordination. In Tunisia, Facebook and Twitter became the medium for political activists. Tunisia had about 2.8 million Facebook users as of December 2011. The Facebook groups *Nawaat*, *Tunisie* and *Takriz* were the platforms for mobilization and coordination as these became the fora for political debates for the youth and workers. They also carried images of the brutality of the regime that incensed the people. The large numbers of young people skilled in the use of the internet and social media responded to calls for mobilization from organizers (Brynen *et al*, 2012:239; Palencia, 2015:422-423; Khosrokhavar, 2012:41).

A study by Howard and Hussain (2013:50) shows that Twitter traffic increased everyday with over 1,000 tweets daily that had content relating to political change in Tunisia in the days prior to Ben Ali's departure. A similar increase was established with the blogging space. The study also established a positive correlation between the volume of social

media conversations and the size of street protests in the two months prior to the mass uprising. These findings confirm the impact of social media on the mobilization for the mass uprising in Tunisia.

In Egypt, Facebook, and to a lesser extent, YouTube and Twitter, became the defining platform of mobilization for the mass uprising. There were over 4.5 million Facebook users by December 2010. The youth groups that were key to the initiation of the mass uprising had Facebook pages with a relatively large following as depicted in the table below.

Table 6. Followers of Facebook Groups in Egypt

Organization	Social Media Network	Followers
The April 6th Movement	Facebook	70,000
Popular Campaign for Support of Mohammed El Baradei	Facebook	300,000
We Are All Khaled Said	Facebook	400,000

Source: Shahin, E. 2014. "The Egyptian Revolution: The Power of Mass Mobilization and the Spirit of Tahrir Square" in Larémont, R. (Ed). *Revolution, Revolt and Reform in North Africa: The Arab Spring and Beyond*, Routledge, New York.

The followers of these Facebook pages were unknown to each other, but the pages enabled information sharing and served as a point of mobilization for action. For example, at the invitation posted on the Facebook page of We Are All Khaled Said, 70,000 people confirmed their participation in the January 25, 2011 demonstrations and that created the largest opposition group (Ghabra, 2015:202; Rutherford, 2013:38; Palencia, 2015:424). In addition, 34 percent of Tweets studied in the 14 days before the resignation of Mubarak had contents referring to political change, while the number of protestors increased on days that Twitter usage was high. The use of YouTube to spread viral videos on the uprising encouraged those on the margins to join (Howard and Hussain, 2013:55-

56, 61). These were the key factors that assisted in spreading the demonstrations and the subsequent resignation of the regime.

Through the Tunisia Internet Agency, the government censored, blocked or limited access to various social media and other channels of communication. The Agency also adopted "Phishing" to remove photographs and some online information. Opponents to censorship were arrested which degenerated into violent clashes between the police and the protesters forcing the government to rescind its decision. A group of hackers reacted by paralyzing government websites and that of the Zitouna Bank, which was run by Ben Ali's son-in-law. The Egyptian government also interrupted internet traffic systems, mobile communications and detained bloggers as a way of controlling the protest to curtail the dissemination of information. Through the Egyptian Telecom companies, the regime limited texting plans and times to reduce the effect of cell phones and bulk SMS. The mobile phone networks were also used to misinform protestors. These actions by both regimes only increased the dissatisfaction (Decker, 2012:8; Faris, 2013:107-108; Khosrokhavar, 2012:42; Howard and Hussain, 2013:70-71).

The new and the traditional media reinforced each other in the dissemination of information, organization, mobilization and coordination of the protestors. Bloggers carried views and grievances while the transnational satellite televisions internationalized the blogs. In this way, Twitter and Facebook enabled information sharing by allowing images to be sent to *Al Jazeera* for a wider audience (Salvatore, 2015:348; Khosrokhavar, 2012:42; Faris, 2013:8, 15). The information and the action by Bouazizi that spurred the protest were circulated by social media, but captured national and international attention when it was broadcast by *Al Jazeera* (Naji, 2012:162 in Abdelmoula, 2015:371; Faris, 2013:8-9). Uploading information from small media to a bigger platform captured developments and guided the actions of the protestors.

As affirmed by Brynen *et al* (2012:240), social media was the "connective muscle" that strengthened the resolve of the protesters to confront the regimes. Echoing a similar sentiment, Faris (2013:90) expresses the view that social media networks provided the

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linkage for coordination and information transmission. The bloggers communicated the dates, times and location for demonstrations through articles posted on the web, text messages and email. The success of mobilization of the masses was an interplay of all available media that was facilitated by social media.

5. THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The reaction of the armed forces is an important factor influencing the termination or escalation of a mass uprising into an insurgency. Their role was therefore important for the success or failure of the mass uprisings in both Tunisia and in Egypt (Khosrokhavar, 2012:12; Brynen *et al*, 2012:24).

As explained in Chapter Two, a multiplicity of factors determine the success or otherwise of a mass uprising. These include the reaction of the security forces towards the crowds and defections. Within the context of the Arab Spring, this is interpreted as a display of support for the protestors by the military as opposed to loyalty to the ruling regime (Atkinson *et al*, 2011:2; Bhardwaj, 2012:77; Nepstad, 2013:338).

Nepstad (2013:338) argues that among other reasons, financial and political resources dispensed to the armed forces by the regimes determine their loyalty or otherwise. By inference, the military can withdraw its loyalty if there is the perception of withdrawal of these resources. Makara (2013:336) expands this view suggesting that the creation of parallel security institutions, exploitation of communal or ethnic relations in the composition of the army, as well as material incentives are *coup*-proofing methods available to regimes. Barany (2011:29) also suggests rivalry between security units as a determinant of support of the army. The presence or otherwise of these factors within the context of Tunisia and Egypt and the impact on the outcomes of the mass uprisings are discussed below.

Historically, the Tunisian army was detached from politics and excluded from joining political parties since the country's independence. This can be explained, in part, as a result of the role of the armed forces in the independence struggle of the country which

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was led by a vanguard party and efforts by Bourguiba to establish a modern state with defined institutions. The army had no role in internal security nor economic activities in the country (Barany, 2013:31; Brooks, 2013:209).

This also influenced the size, about 35,000 soldiers, and the budget of approximately 1.4 percent of GDP, compared to the internal security forces (Barany, 2013:31; Brooks, 2013:208). In the absence of extraneous duties, the army developed and maintained its professionalism over the years (Barany, 2013:31). They therefore commanded respect and a good reputation among the citizens (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:46, 47; Larémont, 2014(c):154).

As opposed to the army, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali developed and relied on the police and other internal security organizations, under the Interior ministry, for control and regime stability. At the time of mass uprising in 2011, the size of the police force was between 120,000 to 200,000 officers and composed of multiplicity of units including the Public Order Brigade, State Security Department, Rapid Response Brigade, the National Guard and the Anti-Terrorism Brigade (Brooks, 2013:207-208, 212). The police force became an appendage of the regime which insulated the armed forces.

Egypt reflected a similar state with the police, intelligence officers and hooligans associated with the NDP seen as the agents of the regime (Brynen *et al*, 2012:24). However, the position of the army in the political arrangement in Egypt was dissimilar to that of Tunisia. Since the *coup d'état* that brought Nasser to power in 1952, the military had been the vanguard of Egyptian politics and had produced all the Egyptian presidents. The army also owned more than 35 industrial complexes and other businesses, including aerospace, missile, electronics, hotels, water treatment plants, stationary and pharmaceuticals. It was also involved in dairy, poultry and fish farming and food processing and owned vast stretches of land. These companies employed thousands of people amounting to about 40 percent of the economy (Larémont, 2014(c):154-155; ICG, 2011(a):16, 17; Nepstad, 2013:342; Makara, 2013:346). The revenue from these

enterprises were controlled by the army and officers profited from it (Barany, 2013:32). The army thus benefited from material incentives, patronage and power.

This notwithstanding, power rested on the ruling regimes that established repressive systems and kept the military in check (Frisch, 2013:182). In the absence of an existential threat since the Peace Treaty with Israel, internal security and regime maintenance became a priority. This became pronounced under Mubarak with the establishment of a multiplicity of internal security units including the Central Security Forces, State Security Investigations and the General Intelligence Services that acted as a check on the other agencies and the army. The police in addition to these units employed over 1.4 million by 2011. The resources available to these units also increased steadily. The budget of the police for instance increased from US$583 million in the 1990s to US$3.3 billion in 2008. The internal security units thus enjoyed privileges and financial resources over the military that increased the rivalry between the institutions (Barany, 2013:32; Makara, 2013:345-346; Frisch, 2013:183).

With its economic interests, the army as an institution had a stake in the governance of the country. Politically, the question of succession by Gamal Mubarak, a civilian, was untenable for the army. Moreover, the possibility that the reforms could be extended to the army with the privatization of these commercial interests contributed to the ambivalent posture of the military during the uprising (Shahin, 2014:64; Ghabra, 2015:208; Rutherford, 2013:42).

In both Tunisia and Egypt, the internal security apparatus was perceived as the tool of repression, injustice, corruption and murder. In Tunisia, there were no political or economic incentives for the army to protect the regime and it was immune to patronage and manipulation.

In contrast, in Egypt there was competition for both political and economic space between the army and the NDP on the one hand, and between the army and the internal security forces on the other. The possibility of losing these political and economic leverages determined the reaction of the army to the regime.

The position of the army in both countries influenced their reaction towards the protestors, displaying reluctance to use force to dispel the protestors; they protected them from attacks by the police and refused orders to intervene. It acted as a neutral faction in the struggle (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:47; Ghabra, 2015:206; Brynen *et al*, 2012:20, 24). This emboldened the protestors and determined the outcome in their favour.

6. REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE MASS UPRISINGS

The mass uprising in Tunisia not only ignited a wave of mass uprisings in North Africa and the Arab world, but also influenced policy options of other states with interests in the region. Four main implications can be discussed. The contagion-effect resulted in the removal of authoritarian leaders; changes in domestic policies of otherwise authoritarian and conservative regimes as a measure to contain a restive population; changes in foreign policy options; realignment of alliances and the emergence of non-Arab powers in the region (Peleg, 2013; Khosrokhavar, 2012:4).

Besides Egypt, the contagion-effect was felt in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Oman, the Emirates, Jordan and Kuwait. Although the underlying reasons were similar, the impact and outcome were, however, dissimilar, and in some cases the protest failed to gather momentum in the first instance. While those in Libya and Yemen led to regime changes, the protests escalated into insurgencies with sectarian, ethnic and religious connotations and foreign involvement. In Syria, the mass uprising has not been successful so far. All the three countries became theatres for foreign interests and degenerated into theatres for global *Jihadism* (Khosrokhavar, 2012:3-4, 10; Haas and Lesch, 2013:3).

Indeed, that of Syria developed into a conflict involving global and regional powers notably the US, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and France. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey were the main countries in the region involved in the Syrian conflict either directly or through proxies. Hezbollah, ISIL, and sectarian and Kurdish groups fighting for self-determination are some of the non-state actors involved in Syria. In addition to the Syrian

opposition forces borne out of the initial protests, Syria has become a theatre of competing and conflicting interests and alliances. The presence of ISIL, a global *Jihadist* group that has established a caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq, is defining Syria as an incubator of radical Islamist and global terrorism. Besides a redefinition of the strategic alignments in the region, one impact of the Arab Spring is the global effect on the conflict in Syria (The Military Balance, 2012:10; Blanchard *et al*, 2014:9-11; Elakawi, 2014:4-6).

The mass uprising in Bahrain was suppressed by the regime assisted by Saudi Arabian forces. This confirmed the Saudi sphere of influence in the region (Brynen *et al*, 2012:261).

Other regimes in the region embarked on reforms of the existing political systems and economic incentives. Saudi Arabia embarked on economic packages that included "pay offs" such as an extra two months' salary to public sector employees; increases in minimum wage for the unemployed; plans to create new jobs, and promotion of senior military personnel. These, in addition to cooptation of religious leaders, neutralized a nascent protest movement. An initial protest was suppressed before it could develop into a mass uprising (Khosrokhavar, 2012:3, 9, 10; Aarts *et al*, 2012:53-54).

In Oman, the Emirates and Kuwait, the protests were suppressed while the regimes responded with cash donations, wage increase and promises of job creation. The Jordanian monarchy similarly reduced taxes on fuel, froze food prices, and announced plans towards constitutional reforms, including amendments to the electoral and political party legislation (Brynen *et al*, 2012:261; Haas and Lesch, 2013:3; Aarts *et al*, 2012:57-58).

Although not about regional security, hence not anti-Israeli, Israel perceived the mass uprisings in negative terms since the authoritarian rulers that were deposed had largely accommodated Israel, and thus Israel had been ambivalent towards the regimes (Peleg, 2013:174-186). This perception was based on the realization that although autocratic, Egypt, Jordan and Syria had ensured security along their respective borders with Israel, in contrast with Lebanon and the Palestinian authority in the West Bank which were

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deemed to be democratic. Possible instability in the region or the rise of Islamic fundamentalism through popular actions that might increase anti-Israel rhetoric was also a source of concern to Israel (Peleg, 2013:177-178).

According to Peleg (2013:184), these perceptions might influence Israel to direct its diplomatic offensive to countries in the Eastern Mediterranean and some European states such as Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. It also contributed to a waning interest in the Middle East Peace process.

Beyond the region, however, the development necessitated a realignment of policies that impacted on the engagements of the US and Russia, in particular, in the region. Willis (2012:332) argues that "(t)he conventional view, that the region contained passive, fatalistic populations who had no real appetite for either significant political change or democratic government and culturally predisposed towards authoritarian rule, rapidly disintegrated with clear evidence to the contrary coming from the crowds…" The perceived docility of the people changed with the mass uprisings. The support for autocratic regimes as a precondition for stability may have changed.

The occupation of public spaces to achieve objectives became a model in some Western countries led by the so-called occupy movements (Arditi, 2012:14). As argued by Khosrokhavar (2012:43), the organization of the mass uprising in Egypt for instance became a model and an inspiration for "the *Indignados* in Spain, Occupy Wall Street in the US" that launched protests to weaken the power and influence of financial centers.

7. CONCLUSION

The 2011 mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt were rooted in the political systems and socio-economic policies adopted by the various regimes at different stages in their political history.

This continued in the post-independent history of both countries with the creation of restrictive political systems. In the 55 years after independence until the mass uprising

in 2011, Tunisia was ruled by two presidents; while in the 59 years since the revolution in 1952, Egypt was governed by three presidents. The regimes had similar approaches to governance, namely the monopolization of the political system that was reinforced by control of the economy initially by the state and later by family members and cronies through *Al-infitah*. The regimes thus survived by using a combination of patronage and coercion to extract some legitimacy.

The political system and the economic policies resulted in pervasive corruption, extreme income inequalities and unequal regional development. The large young and educated, but unemployed populations of both countries also exacerbated the resolve of the people to challenge authority. The 2011 mass uprisings were therefore an interplay of the quest for freedoms and an improvement of the socio-economic circumstances of the masses. In the case of Egypt, Cook (2012:173, 275) correctly asserts that the 2011 mass uprising was the result of the long struggle to reform the nature and structure of Egyptian politics which has not encouraged dissent or opposition since the reign of the pharaohs in 2900 BC.

The uprisings conformed to the classical characteristics of mass uprisings, in that they were leaderless (at least initially), spontaneous, and lacked ideology. There were some levels of militancy and violence in both Tunisia and Egypt as the internal security organizations attempted to dispel the crowds leading to deaths. Generally, violence was subdued. In both cases, social media networks and satellite televisions played a crucial role in the organization, coordination and mobilization of the masses. The structures of organized groups that joined the masses, however, provided the platform for sustenance and a wider outreach.

The neutral posture of the armed forces of the two states, irrespective of the interest, and the absence of an organization that translated the mass action into an armed movement, despite the proliferation of social media networks, contributed to the outcome of the mass uprisings, namely the fleeing of the president of Tunisia and the cronies of the regime as well as the resignation of Mubarak and subsequent handover of the

government to the military. Thus, the two case studies did not escalate into an insurgency or armed movements (Reno, 2009:10).

The next chapter focuses on the mass uprising in Libya in 2011, which like Syria, ended in an insurgency and civil war.

CHAPTER SIX: MASS UPRISING AND INSURGENCY IN LIBYA

1. INTRODUCTION

The mass uprising in Libya in February 2011 was part of the domino effect of the occurrences in Tunisia and Egypt. Unlike the preceding mass uprisings, however, that of Libya escalated into an insurgency following the seizure of part of the state by insurgents, led by the National Transitional Council (NTC) with the assistance of the international community. Other insurgent groups emerged (mainly the sympathizers of the Gaddafi regime, ethnic militias and Islamists) to either contend the NTC or obtain a stake in the control of the country. This further escalated the conflict into a civil war that almost rendered Libya a failed state.

This chapter discusses the causes of the mass uprising and seeks to establish the reasons why the mass uprising in Libya resulted in high levels of violence. The discussion begins with a historical background of Libya to offer insights into the tribal configuration; the advent of colonialism and state formation. This will not only place the analysis into perspective, but will also provide an indication of the basis of the political structure of Libya until the *coup d'état* by Gaddafi in 1969, to the *Zuwara Declaration* in 1973 which heralded the construction of the *Jamahiriya* or a stateless society in Libya.

An analysis of the rule by Gaddafi is discussed extensively as the period highlights the long term structural causes. Emphasis is placed on the ideology that guided the political system from 1969 to the mass uprising in 2011 that toppled the regime. In this regard, the chapter highlights the salient aspects of the Third Universal Theory; the system of government created; and the inherent power dynamics that prevailed. The impact of the political system is discussed within the context of despotism; political repression; patronage; economic underdevelopment and other socio-economic problems including corruption; demographic changes and unemployment. These created the remote factors for the mass uprising. The immediate causes of the mass uprising are also discussed.

The mass uprising itself is analyzed in terms of spontaneity, organization and mobilization as well as the role of modern communication in its facilitation. The escalation into an insurgency is also discussed, which among others was predicated by the reaction of the regime to the mass uprising, the role of the armed forces, and the tribal alliances. The consequences of the Libyan mass uprising for the region are also emphasized.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A brief political history of Libya is presented in this section. This includes an overview of the tribal configuration; the period of Ottoman rule; the advent of Italian colonialism, and state formation in Libya. An account of the two administrations that governed the post-colonial state, namely the Sanusi monarchy from 1951 to 1969 and the Gaddafi regime from September 1969 to 2011 is also provided. This offers an understanding of the causes, mobilization and the outcome of the mass uprising in Libya, compared to those in Tunisia and Egypt.

2.1 LIBYAN TRIBES

Libyan politics is influenced by tribal affiliation which also defined the nature of the two regimes that governed the country from independence to 2011 and ultimately caused their demise. The tribal configuration must be understood to appreciate this situation.

The original inhabitants of the desert in Libya were the Berbers who inhabited the Fezzan region followed by the Arabs who arrived around the seventh century and settled mostly in Cyrenaica. The Ottoman conquests in the 16th century and the mid-19th century also had an impact as it introduced Islam to the country. Thus, ethnically and in terms of religion, Libya is a homogenous society as it is composed of Arabs and Berbers with an insignificant black African population in the South who are Muslims (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1269; Wright, 1981:11; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:33-34; Joffé, 1995:141-142).

In term of tribes, a multiplicity of tribes exists in the country. Libya has over 130 tribes or clans and powerful families of which about 30 wield enormous influence. These include

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the Warfala, (Werfalla or Warfella) which is the largest tribe and found around the North-West (Bani Walid and Tripoli). The second largest is the Magariha, (also called Maqariha or Magarha), mainly in the Fezzan; followed by the Tarhuna in western Libya. The Zuwaya, Kargala, Tawajeer, Ramla and the Bani Salim inhabit Cyrenaica or the East. Also in the Cyrenaica region is the al-Awaqir tribe that was instrumental in the resistance against colonial rule and was prominent during the monarchical rule as well as during the Gaddafi era. Other powerful tribes in Cyrenaica were the Abdiyat and the Masamir (Mokhefi, 2011:3; ICG, 2011(b):11; Khosrokhavar, 2012:138).

The largest tribe and perhaps the most influential in western Libya is the Misurata tribe in the district of Misurata. This tribe has alliances and influence in Benghazi and Derna in Cyrenaica. Others include The Zawiya, Zintan, Barassa, Bani Hilal and the Obeidat tribes (Khosrokhavar, 2012:138-139). A significant tribe is the Qadhadfa, a minority tribe found around Sirte. This group is a mix of tribes that became slaves to the Warfala and the Awlad (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:34). Historically, the Qadhadfa had survived through alliances with larger tribes. For instance, in the early 19th century, the leader of the Awlad assisted by the Qadhadfa and the Warfala overthrew the Karamanli dynasty that ruled Libya at the time on behalf of the Ottoman Turks. This historical alliance became the basis of the alliance formed by Gaddafi and the Warfala to legitimize his regime (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:34-35).

The al-Mujabra and the Farjan tribe inhabit parts of Tripoli. Groups of the Farjan are also found in Ajdabiya, Sirte and Zilten while the Fezzan region is composed of Zawiya, Warfala, Magariha and the Maslata tribes (Khosrokhavar, 2012:139).

Ottoman rule in the 19th century and Italian colonization failed to reduce the tribal influences and loyalties. Indeed, the tribes became politically active during the Italian rule as the resistance movement against colonialism from 1912 to 1943 was mobilized along tribal lines. Tribal influence was formalized during the short period of British administration between 1943-1951 when the British ruled through the existing institutions (Mokhefi, 2011:2).

The quest for tribal dominance and supremacy has been a defining feature of Libyan society and politics from the pre-independence period to the mass uprising in 2011. That also determined the outcome of the mass uprising.

Map 8. Map of Traditional Provinces and Tribes in Libya

Source: Fragile States Resource Centre. Available online at www.fragilestates.org.

2.2 STATE FORMATION

Before the advent of Ottoman rule in the 16th century, the entity known as Libya existed as three autonomous provinces of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. The Ottoman conquest in 1551 established the Karamanli dynasty under Ahmed Bey that ruled on their behalf until the second Ottoman conquest in 1835. This created resemblances to a federation or local autonomy. It was during this period that the Sanusiyya movement, a

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Sunni revivalist group, emerged that advocated a moderate interpretation of Islam (Sufi). This group was formed by Sayyid Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanusi (or the Grand Sanusi) (1787-1859), an Algerian Muslim scholar who ascribed to the Maliki school of Sunni jurisprudence and operated in the Cyrenaica. The movement created social and political structures with the creation of institutions of state governance in Cyrenaica known as the Sanusi emirate. At the same time, the Tripolitania Republic in the West was in the process of consolidation of state formation (St John, 2012:47; Joffé, 1995:141-142; Pargeter, 2012:13; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:36).

The modern state of Libya was established in 1911 during the Italian colonization which united the three separate Ottoman provinces of Fezzan, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica into the United State of Libya. The resistance to foreign Italian domination was led by the Sanusi movement led by Umar al-Mukhtar, a Sanusi Sheikh. This period was marked by military campaigns and massive atrocities against the Libyan insurgents. In the process, Libyans were unable to settle to develop strong administrative systems while the existing institutions of governance and education were destroyed. About 60,000 Libyans died in concentration camps while over 100,000 were interned. By 1922, both the Sanusi Movement and the Tripolitania Republic had been defeated by Italy to form a single entity with self-administered or autonomous provinces (Ahmida, 2012:72, 73; Joffé, 1995:141-144; Prashad, 2012:100).

Following the defeat of Italy in the Second World War, Libya was administered by the Allied Forces in North Africa (the British and the French) from 1943. A UN brokered mediation (Bevin-Sforza Agreement) resulted in independence in 1951 and the creation of a federal state governed by a constitutional monarchy with Idris al-Sanusi, the grandson of the Grand Sanusi, as the King (King Idris). Although there was a separation of religion from the state, the head of the board of religious affairs (*Hay´at Al-Awqaf*) provided legitimacy to legislation and the constitution (El Gomati, 2015:118; Vandewalle, 2012:34; Smits *et al*, 2013:8-9; Wright, 1981:61-65). The status accorded to the *Hay´at Al-Awqaf* confirmed the authority of the Sanusi movement under the monarchy.

In this vein, independence was negotiated on behalf of the Libyan people as opposed to the long armed struggle to agitate for independence. This development truncated the creation of a sense of national awareness or national identity, associated with political and civic organizations that agitate for independence. This void was filled by tribal groups and families that offered a semblance of political association and aggregation of interest or pressure groups (Pargeter, 2012:39; St John, 2012:109, 112). The tribe then became the most important organization for social and political advancement which the citizens had to depend on whilst tribal leaders became the decision making élite. Tribal consciousness then became a substitute for national consciousness (Paoletti, 2011:315; Vandewalle, 2012:41).

2.3 FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE *ZUWARA DECLARATION*

The immediate post-independence period was marked by the inability of the King to establish an institutional arrangement for the country and consequently an inclusive government. The tribal élite became the conduit for control and influence. This was accompanied by a system of patronage to induce loyalty and acquiescence (Pargeter, 2012:39; St John, 2012:112; Vandewalle, 2012:68). Consequently, political contestation and expression were restricted and parliamentary elections were manipulated in favour of the regime while the press was emasculated. The discovery of oil in 1959 enhanced the patronage system, but the distribution of rents accrued from oil widened inequality in incomes as well as unequal regional development. Indeed, by 1969 Libya received the lowest rent in the world while it produced over three million barrels per day. At the same time, the cohorts of the King became embroiled with bribery, corruption and incompetence leading to the classification of Libya as the most corrupt in the world at the time (Prashad, 2012:101, 104-105; St John, 2008:76; Vandewalle, 2006:4-5, 75).

In an attempt to establish his control, King Idris abolished the federation and established a unitary state in 1963. These developments were seen as authoritarian and raised questions over legitimacy. Isolation and security concerns led to his reliance on the US and the UK for the survival of the monarchy. This was reflected by the Anglo-American

treaty in 1953 which allowed the British to operate military bases in Cyrenaica. A similar agreement with the US in 1954 granted another base in Tripoli. By 1959, Libya was the largest recipient of US aid. This became a source of disenchantment amongst Libyans (Vandewalle, 2006:45; Djaziri, 1995:180-182; Wright, 1981:44; Lacher, 2011:151; St John, 2008:76).

Failure of the King to create leadership and political cohesion led to pressure for a new political order and to the emergence of two strands of opposition groups. On the one hand was a Salafist-oriented group that favoured Arab nationalism, and on the other hand was a modernist movement inclined to the development and modernization of Libyan society. These contestations and the desire of the people for a new political dispensation created the conditions for the *coup d'état* by Colonel Muammar Abu-Minyar al-Gaddafi on September 1, 1969 (Djaziri, 1995:180-181; Vandewalle, 2012:68; Ahmida, 2012:71).

A twelve member Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under the chairmanship of Gaddafi replaced the monarchy. Gaddafi initially adopted a populist, nationalist and anti-imperialist approach to building an egalitarian society. This was also influenced by Arab nationalism (as championed by Nasser in Egypt at the time) and Islam. The constitution was suspended; parliament was disbanded; and opposition groups were dissolved. The regime also nationalized foreign oil companies and private banks (Ahmida, 2012:73; ICG, 2011(b):6; Buera, 2015:105). The influence of the religious establishment was curtailed with the assumption of control of the Islamic religious scholars or the *Ulema*, while the Sanusi Order was disbanded (Joffé, 1995:147; Vandewalle, 2006: 80-82). To reduce their influence, the regime closed the military bases of the US and the British by 1970 (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:61).

There was initial success in the first decade as the regime embarked on massive welfare programmes with the increased revenues from oil. There were improvements in social housing delivery aided by an elaborate rent control system; expansion of the healthcare system; and improvement in education. Agrarian reforms were undertaken with redistribution of confiscated lands and the institution of interest free loans to farmers.

With 72.3 percent of expenditure allocated to development, these measures enabled the transformation of the country (Vandewalle, 1995(b):21; Pashad, 2012:104-107; St John, 2008:77). These measures increased the popularity and legitimacy of the regime.

3. GADDAFI'S RULE IN LIBYA

On 15 April 1973, Gaddafi delivered a speech in Zuwara that was dubbed the *Zuwara Declaration* which listed five points, implementation of which would re-orient the state and the reconstruction of the political and institutional arrangements in Libya. This included the suspension of existing laws; elimination of what was termed "political illnesses"; arming the population to defend the revolution; returning the bureaucracy and administration to the people; and a purge of the universities from "foreign influences". This roadmap set the basis of the ideology of the Third Universal Theory that was espoused in the so-called *Green Book* published in 1976 which set the guidelines for the new political, economic and social order in Libya (Green Book, 1976; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:85-86; Vandewalle, 2006: 84-86). The new political and socio-economic system and its impact on society is discussed in the following subsections.

3.1 THE *JAMAHIRIYA* SYSTEM

Vandewalle (2006: 86) asserts that the ideology of the Third Universal Theory was rooted in anti-imperialism, Arab nationalism and Bedouin culture, but was reflected by a personalized political system known as the *Jamahiriya* (direct democracy). The underlying basis of this concept was the elimination of basic need, identified as a house, an income, and a vehicle, the lack of which leads to domination by other individuals or institutions. It therefore advocates an anti-capitalist and anti-Communist mode of political and economic organization of society. It proscribes any form of political representation such as parliament, political parties or civil society organizations, and recommends direct participation by every citizen in the political process from the grassroots through a hierarchical system of "people's congresses" ushering in the "Era of the masses". According to the *Green Book*, parliaments are a barrier to democracy and "true democracy

exists only through the direct participation of the people…" (Green Book, 1980:7, 22-25). This system became consummated in 1977 with the *Declaration of the Authority of the People* and the *Declaration on the Separation of Rule and Revolution*. The official renaming of Libya as the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya formalized the new system (Brynen *et al*, 2012: 27; St John, 2008:77). In effect, the concept envisaged a society without formalized institutions of state or a stateless society where citizens represented themselves in the political process (Vandewalle, 2012:98).

The institutional structure of the state was modelled on a three-layered structure that comprises of a General People's Congress (GCP) or the legislature; General People's Committees (GPC) that composed the executive or the cabinet which was headed by a General People's Secretary (Prime Minister); and a judiciary. The GCP was a decentralized structure. At the lowest level were the Basic People's Congresses (BPC), which served as the deliberative and the legislative organ at the local level, through a Municipal People's Congress and ultimately to the GCP, the highest level. There were about 432 BPCs that met annually for about 15 days. Decisions at the GCP were presumed to represent the will of the "people" and "implemented" by the GPCs. The GPCs functioned alongside the structure of the GCP, hence Basic and Municipal People Committees ran the local administration (Green Book, 1980:22-26; Djaziri, 1995:191). Under the system, Gaddafi held no title and was commonly referred to as "the Brother/Leader" or "Guide of the revolution" (ICG, 2011(b):8-9).

The second part of the *Green Book*, titled the *Solution to the Economic Problem*, and published in 1978, outlines the economic system of the *Jamahiriya*. This likened wages or employer/worker relations to master-slave relations. It suggested the abolishment of the wage system and stipulated self-management of enterprises or businesses through partnership between management and workers. This was reflected by the slogan, "partners and not wage workers" (Green Book, 1980:40-41). Public and private enterprises then became self-management entities. Thus wealth would be generated and owned communally (share the profits equally) to eliminate exploitation associated with private capital or individual companies/businesses. The control and distribution of land,

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and limitations on the amount of cash through a demonetization process, were implemented to bring every citizen on par, with the dominance of the state in the overall trade and retail activities including imports, export and distribution. In enforcing the concept, the state assumed control of every aspect of businesses and agricultural lands (St John, 2008:77). The private sector was effectively destroyed.

The outline of the *Jamahiriya* system was indicative of a formalized hierarchical, political and economic structure of governance. However, alongside the congresses was an intricate structure made up of groups and individuals collectively referred to as the informal network that constituted the informal state, as discussed below.

3.2 THE INFORMAL STATE

El Fathaly and Palmer (1982 cited in Buera, 2015:107), Vandewalle (2006:150-151), and Sawani (2014) identified a number of groups that constituted the informal state. These can be categorized into three main groups: the "Men of the Tent", the Revolutionary Committee Movement (RC) and security operatives, and the co-opted tribal leadership.

3.2.1 THE MEN OF THE TENT

The first level and the most powerful of the informal network was the "Men of the Tent" or the *Rijal al-Khaimah*; the inner-circle of Gaddafi made up of advisors and trusted confidents; family members of Gaddafi, (his children, extended family and in-laws); the remnants of the RCC (Comrades of the leader); power brokers of the Qadhadfa tribe; and close friends and classmates of Gaddafi known as the *Al-Rifaq* (ICG, 2011(b):10; Vandewalle, 2006:151). On the periphery of this group were the members GCP and the GPC.

There was a struggle for dominance within this group. Over the years, the children of Gaddafi became increasingly visible in official positions and politics. His second son, Saif al-Islam, through his charity (the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation) became the advocate for reform and moderation through the promotion of

human rights and an improvement of the image of the regime, although without an official title. He was the architect of the negotiations and payment of compensation to the victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism leading to the rehabilitation of Libya into the international community. One son, Moatassim, was appointed as the National Security Advisor in 2007 and directly responsible for counter terrorism, while Khamis was the Commander of 32 Brigade (Khamis Brigade), an élite special force unit responsible for the personal security of Gaddafi (ICG, 2011(b):13; Hilsum, 2012:166; Brahimi, 2011:608). The activities of the children were other sources of internal conflict within the "Men of the Tent".

3.2.2 THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE MOVEMENT

The RC *lijan al-thawriyya* that was established in 1977, was not originally part of the institutional arrangement envisaged in the *Green Book*. It was set up with the sole objective of protecting the ideals of the revolution and mobilization of support to maintain the momentum and ideological direction following an increasing apathy of the citizens towards the congresses and the revolution generally (Vandewalle, 2006:119-120; Metz, 1987:74; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:116-117, 127). The element of protection of the revolution added a "security" function to the RCs as members acted as security operatives (Sawani, 2014:82).

The RC infiltrated every institution, including the armed forces, to purge them of opponents of the regime. It had power over the congresses and established revolutionary courts outside the formal legal system that conducted extra-judicial trials (ICG, 2011(b):10). The Secretariats of the BPCs and the GPC were elected openly, but dominated by members of the RCs. This group also controlled the administration of the local/municipal authorities known as the Shabiyah (ICG, 2011(b):9).

The RCs also operated from the Libyan Diplomatic Missions abroad where attacks and assassinations were carried out against opponents of the regime or "dissidents" who were labelled as "stray dogs". The power of this group whittled down from the 1990s as other elements within the "Men of the Tent", particularly Saif al-Islam, initiated the reform agenda (ICG, 2011(b):11).

The formation of the RCs created two opposing structures of authority: the congresses under the masses or the people, and revolutionary authority under Gaddafi that operated outside the formal government structure. Gaddafi officially resigned from the government and joined the RC in 1979. The RCs provided Gaddafi with a corps of overzealous cadres and dogmatic loyalists under his personal control and under the leadership of Mohammed Maghgoub, from the Qadhadfa tribe (Vandewalle, 2006:121; El Fathaly and Palmer, 1995:164).

3.2.3 TRIBAL LEADERS

An appendage of the informal structure was the Popular Social Leadership Committee or Social People's leadership consisting of 32 important tribal leaders that was established in 1993. The objective was to resolve local conflicts; coordinate the activities of the local congresses and the committees; counter corruption and bring the tribesmen in line with the revolution. The distribution of subsidies and issuance of legal documents was later included in their function (Brahimi, 2011:612-613; Vandewalle, 2006:151). This group was expanded in 2005 with the inclusion of the Social Youth Associations that coordinated the activities of the youth. These groups widened the control network and acted as informants for the regime (Pargeter, 2006:229).

The configuration of both formal and informal structures of the state meant that real power, authority and decision making in Libyan society rested with the informal arrangements and, by extension, with Gaddafi and an exclusive and intricate group of individuals who were linked to him in various ways (Buera, 2015:107; Brynen *et al*, 2012:27). The exclusivity of this group was manifested in the appointment of ministers. In the 30 years from 1969 to 1999, a small group comprising 112 individuals were reshuffled within the GPC. That is, ministerial positions rotated among these close knit individuals (IGC; 2011.8; Pargeter, 2012:194).

4. UNDERLYING AND IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE MASS UPRISING

The nature of the political system enabled the creation of a cabal of individuals under the authority of one individual. As argued by Sawani (2014:18), the governance structure of Libya reflected the overlapping systems namely an ideological system, a formal system, and the RCs that represented the informal arrangements of power and influence. These political arrangements permeated all aspects of Libyan society including economic, social, military, and security. It enabled the creation of an authoritarian regime based on a personality cult that stifled individual's freedoms and human rights in all aspects. The regime then became increasingly reliant on repression to control the population and maintain its legitimacy. The impact on Libyan society created the remote causes of the mass uprising and an insurgency as discussed below.

4.1 DESPOTIC RULE

Prior to the establishment of the *Jamahiriya*, the RCC enacted *Law Number 71* of 1972 which classified involvement in political or ideological activity opposed to the military *junta* as treasonable. Article 2 of the law also described political parties as anti-revolutionary and formation or membership of parties was considered high treason. Both offences were punishable by death (Buera, 2015:105).

The establishment of the *Jamahiriya* further restricted the avenues for political expression. The *Green Book* was based on the assumptions that the parliamentary system of governance is a deception and not truly representative of the people; and likened political parties to modern day dictatorships similar to tribal or sectarian system. Elections were also considered a fraud. It also proscribed the formation of civil society groups and professional bodies among others (Green Book, 1976:3-6; Buera, 2015:106; Sawani, 2014:83, 89). These restrictions alienated the élite and the mass of the people and deprived the country of the organization of social forces that could articulate alternative choices. However, a number of groups including Baathist, Marxists and businessmen among others, mounted resistance against the regime, but were brutally suppressed (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:116).

In the absence of the formation of political groups, opposition to the regime revolved around the religious establishment. Gaddafi initially maintained the relationship between the state and the religious authorities as existed under the monarchy. The destruction of state organizations that followed the proclamation of the *Jamahiriya* affected the nature of this relationship. The *Ulema*, who hailed mainly from the Sanusi Order, were described as heretics and were stripped of their legal and religious role. They were subjected to regime control, including the *Mufti* (the interpreter of Islamic law) who was appointed by the regime. Following the imprisonment or forced exile of some mainstream Islamic scholars, other Islamic groups emerged that were mainly adherents of Salafist teaching. This purge marked the introduction of Salafism and Salafi *Jihadism* in Libya (El Gomati, 2015:118-124; Smits *et al*, 2013:12; Brahimi, 2011:614-615).

Prominent among the *Jihadist* groups was the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that was formed in the 1990s by Libyan *Jihadists* in Afghanistan. The membership was, however, drawn from the eastern parts of the country that were under the influence of the Sanusiyya Movement and remained opposed to Gaddafi. The LIFG launched an insurgency against the regime with attacks in June 1996 in Derna; and attempted an assassination of Gaddafi in February 1996 in Sirte. A low level insurgency continued for ten years and ended with the arrest and imprisonment of its members while a number of its leaders went into exile (El Gomati, 2015:124; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:95; Ahmida, 2012:80; Hilsum, 2012:95, 101-110).

The Muslim Brotherhood represented another political entity prior to the 1969 *coup d'état*. Established in the 1940s, Gaddafi banned the group in 1973 and they were suppressed during attempts at regrouping in the 1980s. The National Front for the Salvation of Libya, led by Yusuf Magahrief, a former Ambassador to India, was another opposition group that also operated in the 1980s and was also suppressed (Khosrokhavar, 2012:141; Hilsum, 2012:81).

4.2 REPRESSION

The despotic rule was accompanied by repression. The determination of the regime to implement the *Jamahiriya*, against much resistance, influenced the institution of repressive measures euphemistically referred to as "Green Terror". In this way, the political system became sustainable only by coercion which was marked by purges; arbitrary arrests; torture and detentions; and a crackdown on students, organizations, and professionals in every sphere of Libyan society. These were also aimed at the army and "reactionary students", seen as supporters of the monarchy and political groups (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:117-120; Hilsum, 2012:76-78).

The system became reliant on overlapping internal security organizations that acted as a check on the other. These included the Intelligence Bureau of the Leader (*maktab ma'lumat al-qa'id*), the Military Secret Service (*al-istikhbarat al-askariyya*), the *Jamahiriya* Security Organization (*hai'at amn al-Jamahiriya*); World Centre for the Resistance against Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Reactionary and Fascism (*al-mathaba al-alamiyya*) and many others that developed repressive measures and excessive actions such as public hanging of critics and collective punishment of a tribe. These deterred even the most ardent critic of the regime (Sawani, 2014:83; Vandewalle, 2012:146; Smits *et al*, 2013:12).

The members of the RCs augmented the system of repression with the dogmatic implementation of the *Green Book*. They acted as enforcers of revolutionary purity in shops, factories and in the streets. Their actions exacerbated the state of repression (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:29, 117-123).

The collective punishment system enabled the regime to deprive families, clans or a tribe of a criminal of their rights and liberties or social services (including electricity, water, food subsidies) for their failure to report the illegal activity involving a kinsman (ICG, 2011(b):12; Mokhefi, 2011:2).

Faced with opposition from the Imams who used the pulpit to attack the regime, the *Ulema* was directed to stay away from politics. The regime established the Islamic Call Society to propagate the views of the Third Universal Theory and Gaddafi's views and interpretation of aspects of Islam. Gaddafi also encouraged clerics who succumbed to his dictates. The *Mufti* of Tripoli, Sheikh al Bashti, who resisted, was arrested, tortured and killed in 1980. This was followed by the destruction of mosques that hosted opponents of the regime (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:122-123).

These measures were complemented by censorship of the press and media which was extended to other forms of communication including telephones; hotel rooms and individual homes which were subjected to bugging. This also included filtering of emails and monitoring of some websites (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:29; US Department of State, 2010:12-15).

4.3 HUMAN RIGHTS

The repressive measures unleashed a number of human rights violations. This was enhanced by the security apparatus that constituted between 10 to 20 percent of the population which conducted surveillance at offices, educational centres, homes and of Libyans abroad. The human rights violations were reflected by the methods of repression employed by the security forces and RCs including summary executions; extrajudicial trials; detention of opposition figures; arrests; arbitrary torture and deprivation; and liquidation of opponents abroad. Other violations were reported extensively by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the US Department of State, during the Gaddafi era. These catalogued volumes of human rights violations including extra-judicial killings; secret execution by security agencies; disappearances; public or live coverage of executions by public television channels; and arranged accidents among others (Buera, 2015: 107; Hilsum, 2012:79; Eljahmi, 2006:14; US Department of State, 2010:2-8).

The height of the extra-judicial killings was the massacre (bombing) of about 1,270 political prisoners, mainly members of the LIFG, at the Abu Salim prisons in Tripoli in

June 1996 on the orders of General Abdullah al-Sanusi, head of Domestic Intelligence and brother-in-law of Gaddafi (Buera, 2015:108; Ahmida, 2012:77; Hilsum, 2012:95, 101-110). It was in view of these developments that Freedom House (2011) ranked Libya as "not free" and the country scored worst in the survey on political rights, civil liberties, and freedom ratings. In an earlier study by the UNDP in 2008, the country scored nil on political freedom, and three on human rights violations (UNDP, 2010:165). It must, however, be stated that the human rights situation in Libya improved considerably from the year 2000 (Kuperman, 2013:126).

4.4 PATRONAGE

Throughout its history, Libya has been ruled by authoritarian governments through a system of patronage, co-optation and cronyism that was enhanced by the control of the state resources. The system was formalized with the establishment of the *Jamahiriya* system which created a patrimonial statelessness in which every citizen depended on the state (Vandewalle, 1995(a):xvi; Vandewalle, 2012:1; Smits *et al*, 2013:3; Pargeter, 2012:113). The absolute control of the oil industry granted exclusive access to rents that expanded the political and economic strategies of the regime. The system depended on the mood swings of Gaddafi in view of the absence of institutional control (Sawani, 2014:75).

The first level of patronage was that of the individual. In the absence of a private sector, Libyans became dependent on the public sector for employment. In the process, individuals were bought off with offers of employment opportunities. This extended to leaders of some tribes who received material benefits from the regime, and who also became conduits for employment opportunities for members of their tribes. Libyans then became reliant on tribes for advancement. In this way, individuals became dependent on tribal leaders who also had to acquiesce the regime. The tribes then competed for the favour of Gaddafi (Vandewalle, 2012:161; Pargeter, 2012:113; Mokhefi, 2011:2).

The patronage system also influenced regional development, as Gaddafi's home region of Sirte and Tripoli received more resources than Cyrenaica (Benghazi) which was

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considered as the bastion of opposition to the regime (Brynen *et al*, 2012:28). The lines were therefore drawn between regions favoured and those considered opposed to the regime.

4.5 TRIBAL ALLIANCES

Gaddafi established a system of co-optation in which positions were offered to some tribes in exchange for acquiescence. As part of this calculus, the state was used to restructure tribal relations especially in uplifting his tribe, the Qadhadfa, a historically insignificant tribe that became the most influential and the most relevant. Besides patronage, the tribal re-engineering was achieved through alliances, marital ties and the system of collective punishment. By aligning his Qadhadfa tribe to larger tribes such as the Magariha and the Warfala, Gaddafi consolidated power through a tribal majority (Khosrokhavar, 2012:137; Mokhefi, 2011:2; ICG, 2011(b):11).

These tribes were favoured over others and were rewarded with the sensitive and senior positions in government. For instance, the Magariha and the Warfala monopolized the army and the security service (policy and intelligence) (Mokhefi, 2011:2-3; Khosrokhavar, 2012:138). Among the three, however, the Qadhadfa appeared to be the first among equals. This arrangement led to tensions within the tribal allies on the one hand, and between the allies and the marginalized tribes, particularly the tribes in the East that produced the bulk of the oil resources, on the other (Mokhefi, 2011:3).

4.6 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A consequence of the economic principles of the *Jamahiriya* was that the private sector was stymied and abolished. The state controlled production, importation, and distribution of goods (even consumables) and became the only actor of economic activity and commerce that was sustained by generous subsidies. These businesses were run by the workers of each organization in the form of Basic Production Committees with the exception of the petroleum industry. The system created dislocation and distortions in the Libyan economy leading to mismanagement, unequal distribution of wealth, and

massive shortages of goods and services (Buera, 2015:108, 109; Green Book, 1980:44-45, 59; Vandewalle, 2006:107; Sawani, 2014:83). The sustenance of such a system was dependent on state revenues, in this case oil production.

The over reliance on oil and hydrocarbons made the economy susceptible to the vulnerabilities of the global oil market. The economy thus recorded slow growth in the 1980s during the oil crunch, which induced austerity measures and consequent economic hardships that stoked internal unrest. This was, in addition to corruption and inefficiency, associated with the state-managed retail trade. This necessitated the adoption of economic reform in 1987 through privatization and liberalization, *infitah* that was termed "Revolution within a Revolution". An improvement in global oil prices averted an open revolt. However, over a decade of international economic sanctions, from 1992, constricted the economy and created another set of hardships for the citizens. The subsidies were reduced in addition to shortages of basic goods, while salaries went in arrears. Inflation which was around 42 percent in 1993 reached 50 percent in 1994. In 2003, Gaddafi acknowledged the failure of the public sector and attempted a series of structural reforms following the suspension of UN sanctions. The reform proposal contained in the five-year development plan (National Economic Strategy) recommended economic liberalization and development of entrepreneurship among others, accompanied by political and legal reforms (Sawani, 2004:84-87; St John, 2008:78, 79, 81; Prashad, 2012:123-125; Pargeter, 2006:220).

The recommendations included privatization of banks; easing import controls; the creation of free trade zones; and the establishment of a stock exchange and currency regulations among others. The privatization, however, curtailed the social welfare system and increased the level of inflation by 10 percent in 2008 from the levels of 2007. The increase in food prices and the resultant discontent increased tensions (Prashad, 2012:142, 143; St John, 2008:82).

By 2010, the economy recorded growth with a GDP of US$ 74.5 billion and a GNI *per capita* (purchasing power parity) of over US$ 28,000, the highest in Africa. This was an

increase from that of 2009 which was US$ 63 billion and US$ 27,380 respectively. At the same time basic foods and utilities were subsidized. This notwithstanding, by 2011 the Libyan economy was described by the Freedom House as a "repressive economy" as the stranglehold of the state remained (Ahmida, 2012:74-76; World Bank, 2016).

The social programmes undertaken by the regime from 1969 had a far reaching impact on the society. The elaborate educational system that was instituted by UN in 1951 was expanded by the Gaddafi regime. Indeed, *Law Number 134* of 1970 stipulated education as a right for all Libyan children. By 2010, there were two million students at various levels of education in Libya with 300,000 at the tertiary or university level. The gross enrolment ratio for education was 94.1 percent. This also included the education of women at all levels (Monastiri 1995:69; Ahmida, 2012:75, 76; UNDP, 2010). By 2010, the literacy rate of Libya was 88.4 percent (the highest in Africa) and the life expectancy rate was 74.5 years while the UN Human Development Index ranked Libya at 0.755, the highest in Africa, fifth in the Arab world and at 53 in the world out of 163 countries (Brynen *et al*, 2012:28; UNDP, 2010:144).

In spite of this elaborate system, Libya depended on expatriates for skilled labor especially in the oil and gas sector (Smits *et al*, 2013:14). This is explained in part by the content of education offered. The education philosophy of the *Jamahiriya* abhors conventional education based on a curriculum, describing that as "a method of suppressing freedom". In place, it implemented an educational system where the students "choose freely any subjects they wish to learn" (Green Book, 1980:98, 99). In this regard education became "idiosyncratic" following the implementation of the *Green Book* (Hilsum, 2012:59). Health care similarly deteriorated in the 1990s due to the international economic sanctions (Ahmida, 2012:76; Pargeter, 2006:223).

4.7 CORRUPTION

Despite the repression and controls, the chaotic local government structure created conditions conducive to corruption. Massive corruption permeated Libyan society,

estimated to be between 30 to 40 percent of GDP. In 2001, Gaddafi himself proposed a suspension of government expenditure unless corruption was addressed. In 2006, the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranked Libya at 105 out of 163 countries surveyed; in 2010 the country was ranked at 146 of 178 countries; and in 2011 Libya had dropped further to 168 out of 183 countries surveyed (Libya Centre for Economic Research 2005 in Buera; 2015:10; Transparency International, 2006, 2010, 2011; St John, 2008:81; Pargeter, 2006:223).

The liberalization programme was meant to create efficiency in the economic management practices. However, the main beneficiaries of the *infitah* that began from the year 2000 were the family members of Gaddafi and cronies of the regime. According to Hilsum (2012:168), the regime became "less of a dictatorship and more of a mafia" in the years after the removal of sanctions. The children of Gaddafi controlled the contracts by the state, the oil industry and communications, franchises, shipping and sports clubs; free trade areas; and charities with enormous funding. Mohammed was the chairman of the General Post and Telecommunications Company, and owned the two mobile phone companies that operated in Libya, as well as a sports club. Saadi owned a major construction company, a free trade area and a sports club; Hannibal owned the General Libyan Marine Company, while Saif had interests in media, petroleum, and a private airline through his investment portfolio company, the One Nine Group. The profligate spending and lifestyles of his children while the average professional earned below $300.00 a month, was another source of grievances (Ahmida, 2012:76; Hilsum, 2012:168, Prashad, 2012:144; Pargeter, 2006:222, 232).

4.8 FOREIGN POLICY

A radical foreign policy pursued by the regime also had a disastrous effect on the lives of Libyans. The regime did not only support liberation movements in Africa, but also resorted to the export of the revolution and supported radical movements globally. Eventually, the policy turned to state-sponsored terrorism that culminated in the support of terrorist organizations from the 1980s (Sawani, 2014:83-84).

In 1982 the regime established the *Mathaba* or Centre. The facility of the organization, in Benghazi, provided the grounds for training both local and international revolutionaries for the export of the *Jamahiriya* system to other countries. Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso, Charles Taylor of Liberia, Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone, and Laurent Kabila of the DRC, who captured power in their respective countries, were trained in *Mathaba* facilities (Hilsum, 2012:124-128, 152-154; Blundy and Lycett, 1987:121, 154).

Libya was also actively involved in conflicts in Africa sometimes switching or supporting both sides of conflicts. For example, Libya switched between Morocco and the Polisario Front in Western Sahara between 1984 and 1986; the SPLA and the government of Sudan in 1984 and 1985; and between the Eritrean rebels and the Ethiopian government in 1974. In his attempt to develop a nuclear capability, Gaddafi annexed the Aouzou strip in Chad in 1978 to gain access to the alleged deposits of uranium, leading to a conflict with Chad that ended in 1987 followed by the withdrawal of Libyan troops under UNSCR 915 (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:181-185; Hilsum, 2012:152-154; UNSCR, 915 of 1994; Prashad, 2012:121).

In June 1972, Gaddafi offered publicly to assist any anti-Western groups including the Irish Republican Army and the Black Power Movement in the US. This was followed with sponsorship and support for these groups and other radical organizations including the Basque separatist movement, the *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna*; the Palestinian Liberation Organization and other radical Palestinian groups. Libya also organized terrorist attacks including the bombing of the *Labelle* discotheque (a club patronized by Americans) in the then West Berlin in April 1986; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988 that killed 200 people; and the explosion of the *Union de Transports Aériens* (UTA) Flight 772 over Niger in 1989 that killed over 224 passengers (Blundy and Lycett, 1987:77-79; Hilsum, 2012:124-128; Smits *et al*, 2013:14).

In response to the bombing of the *Labelle*, the US under the Reagan administration bombed the residence of Gaddafi in 1986, followed by confrontations with the West that eventually led to the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions against Libya by

the UN in March 1992. Libya remained a pariah state until the regime renounced terrorism in mid-2003 followed by a decision to surrender its weapons of mass destruction and after paying compensation to the families of the victims of the two airline bombings and the *Labelle* discotheque (Prashad, 2012:121-126; Hilsum, 2012:130-131; UNSCR, 748 of 1992; UNSCR, 883 of 1993; UNSCR, 1506 of 2003). The removal of UN sanctions paved the way for the normalization of relations with the West, particularly the US, the UK, and France. This gave the regime a sense of legitimacy (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1268).

4.9 DEMOGRAPHY AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Another structural problem that precipitated the mass uprising was the demographic structure of Libya. In 1950, the population of Libya was one million. This figure reached six and a half million in 2010, and 65 percent of this number was below 30 years whilst 30 percent was under 15 years. The demographic and generational change after 40 years of revolution created a disconnection between the youth, the regime and the system. At the same time, unemployment reached 30 percent due to the inability of the state to generate employment (Ahmida, 2012:74). These figures indicate that as at 2010, 65 percent of Libyans were born after the launch of the Libyan revolution.

The economic challenges prior to the lifting of sanctions reduced the capacity of the state to employ. Unemployment, particularly graduate unemployment, soared while the removal of subsidies created hardships. At the time of the mass uprising in 2011, Libyans yearned for wealth redistribution and justice in view of the disparities especially between the family members of Gaddafi and the citizens (Sawani, 2014:87).

4.10 IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE MASS UPRISING

After 42 years of Gaddafi's rule, Libya became engulfed in the Arab Spring with protests that began in Benghazi on 15 February 2011. Inspired by the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the Libyans in the eastern parts of the country began a peaceful protest in January 2011 over the inability of the government to meet the demand for housing. The

shortage was attributed to corruption in allocation in cities such as Al-Bayda, Derna and Benghazi (Buera, 2015:109, 110).

The second development was the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a young human rights lawyer who represented the families of 1200 political prisoners who were massacred in 1996 at the Abu Salim prison. Terbil was arrested on 17 February 2011 on suspicion of instigating calls for a protest through the social media. His arrest (and subsequent release) led to a spontaneous nonviolent protest that escalated into an insurgency (Sawani, 2014:76-77; Buera; 2015: 109).

The ensuing violent confrontations between the protestors and the security forces in Benghazi led to the death of several protestors and attacks on buildings associated with the regime. The protests spread across other cities in the western parts of the country and climaxed with a mass uprising in Tripoli on February 20, 2011 dubbed "day of rage" (Sawani, 2014:78). The action was replicated in other cities including Derna, Tobruk, Tripoli and cities in the West notably Zintan, Misurata and Zawiya (ICG, 2011(b):3; Prashad, 2012:151).

5. THE MASS UPRISING

This section analyses the mass uprising in terms of spontaneity, organization and mobilization as well as factors accounting for the escalation into an insurgency.

5.1 SPONTANEITY, ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE MASSES

Although the mass uprising in Libya was a consequence of the political and economic policies over four decades, the actions of the masses in the streets were unplanned events that were devoid of a unified leadership, at least at its inception, nor did it have an ideological orientation (Sawani, 2014:92, 103; Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1271).

Unlike the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the organization and mobilization were more decentralized as it started as a series of spontaneous regional uprisings that begun

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in Benghazi and later expanded to other cities. The protesters were unable to coalesce into a mass national uprising and were successful only with the assistance of the military and other logistical support provided by NATO (Larémont, 2014(a):4, 5; Smits *et al*, 2013:15; Pargeter, 2012:216). The participants were composed of citizens from the various stratum of society including lawyers, judges, students, academics, journalists, doctors, women and other professionals (Sawani, 2014:92). It became a marriage of convenience of forces to overthrow a common enemy.

5.2 MOBILIZATION

By its nature, a powerful middle class could not develop under the *Jamahiriya* system. This explains the reason for mobilization along regions which also reflected tribal lines. Given the structure of the society and the relative underdeveloped communication system, it has been argued that the spontaneous unrest was driven by the under employed youth, but whose education and access to ICT was below those of Tunisia and Egypt. The internet penetration by 2010 was 5.5 percent in Libya or 353,900 out of a population of six and a half million. The strict controls on communications also impacted adversely on the level of penetration. Hence, technology including the internet, social media and mobile phones, played a less significant role in the mobilization of the citizens for the uprising (Lacher, 2011:140, 141; Khosrokhavar, 2012:173; Palencia, 2015:425).

In spite of these limitations, social media played some role in the mobilization effort. Facebook users as at December 2011 formed 5.9 percent of the population. Some followers of Facebook and Twitter were active and contributed to galvanizing the youth for the uprising. These included RNN Libya, Media Union Misurata and hashtag @EnoughGaddafi (Internet World Statistics in Palencia, 2015:425; Palencia, 2015:426). The calls for protest on behalf of the victims of the Abu Salim prison massacre was facilitated through Facebook which also broadcast images of the uprising (Sawani, 2014:75). It is significant in this regard that mobilization through social media was driven by the Libyan diaspora who, acting in a relatively uncontrolled media space, used the medium to influence the developments in the country. For instance, the protest on 17

February 2011 was initiated online on Facebook by the Libyan diaspora mainly in Switzerland and in the UK. When internet services were disrupted by the regime, cell phone text messages became the medium of mobilization. Quotations from Omar al-Mukhtar were circulated by cell phone text messaging and that motivated those participating in the uprising (ICG, 2011(b):3; Sawani, 2014:90; Ahmida, 2012:75; Palencia, 2015:425).

There was synergy between the social media and satellite television, particularly Al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya, as was the case in Tunisia and Egypt. Aljazeera facilitated the organization and communication of the protest as it broadcast images sent from Facebook and *vice versa* (Sawani, 2014:76).

Another source of mobilization was the appeal to tribal sentiments by both the regime and the protestors. The tribes in the East were portrayed as the insurgents and secessionists opposed to those in the West (Sawani, 2014:92). This tribal element also accounted for the division among the insurgents soon after overthrowing the Gaddafi regime (Lacher, 2011:140).

6. ESCALATION INTO AN INSURGENCY

The escalation of the mass uprising has been described as an insurgency (Daboné, 2011:402; Chossudovsky, 2013; Rifkind, 2011); a foreign-supported insurgency (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1274); a civil war (Bhardwaj, 2012; Stottlemyre and Stottlemyre, 2012) and a revolution (Sawani, 2014:92, 94; Dahan, 2014; Buera, 2015). These characterizations lent credence to the argument that the mass uprising escalated to high levels of violence. The view that the mass uprising escalated to an insurgency is endorsed. It is, however, emphasised that the insurgency further escalated to other forms that could be described as a civil war.

The characteristics of an insurgency were explained in Chapter Two. It is primarily an expression of grievances against a regime by the force of arms. In essence, insurgency is a political and military struggle aimed at obtaining political power through various forms

of violence including terrorism and conventional war (US Army, 2007:8; Baylis, 1975:135-144). Besides the goals and motivation, classical insurgencies are defined by a political agenda, an ideology, and a clear leadership with a centralized command structure that also uses violence to hold territory in a planned military operation. However, violence is mainly directed at the state institutions and representatives using guerrilla tactics. It is usually rural-based and protracted with external support. Contemporary insurgencies are characterized by a mix of ideologies including identity or tribal warfare, criminality and extremism or a sectarian agenda that also employs indiscriminate violence to hold territory. They are composed of various organizations with different leaders, usually urban-based, and protracted with some degree of external support.

As explained previously, some mass uprisings escalate into insurgencies due to the nature of the ruling regimes; the reaction of the security forces to the crowds in terms of support or otherwise; the level of violence used to disperse or control the crowds; defections from the government security forces; availability of arms; involvement of foreign insurgent groups; acquisition of territory; a form of representation on behalf of the masses; and foreign involvement (Atkinson *et al*, 2011:2; Bhardwaj, 2012:77; Nepstad, 2013:338).

These factors form the basis of analysis of the escalation and the outcome of the Libyan mass uprising.

6.1 NATURE AND REACTION OF THE REGIME

As previously noted, the nature and reaction of the regimes influenced, to a large degree, the outcome of the mass uprisings. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the despotic nature of the Libyan regime and the absence of a middle class, trades unions and a vibrant civil society created the space for the regime to react with unrestrained force in the attempt to suppress the uprising. The masses similarly mounted attacks on symbols associated with the regime (Aarts *et al*, 2012: 34, 35; Smits *et al*, 2013:15; Pargeter, 2012:216).

Initially, the government reacted to the protest with the release of some prisoners, promised a new constitution and also expressed the intent to resolve the housing

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problem. Gaddafi ordered the protestors to take what was rightfully theirs by taking over uncompleted housing units. The government also allocated 20 billion euro to address housing shortages as well as lifting of customs duties on foodstuffs (Sawani, 2014:77, 80-90; Buera, 2015:109, 110). However, as the protest increased momentum, the regime resorted to repressive measures with the arrest and detention of activists suspected of organizing the demonstrations. The demands of the protestors turned to an agitation for political freedom, human rights and an end to corruption. The authorities reacted with excessive force including the use of live ammunition and fighter jets against the protestors. On February 20, the protestors took over the Katiba Barracks in Benghazi. The "liberation" of Benghazi and the access to arms changed the trajectory and escalated the protest. By the end of February, the protestors had taken over some Libyan Air Force planes as air force units in the East defected *en masse*. Some naval vessels were also seized. The regime similarly resorted to live ammunition and Special Forces using anti-aircraft weapons and fighter jets against the crowds (Barany, 2011:34; Pape, 2012:63; Prashad, 2012:95, 96; Kuperman, 2013:109-110). From February 20, 2011 a full-fledged insurgency had emerged in Libya with the insurgent forces having land, sea and airpower to pursue both urban-based guerrilla warfare characterized by street fighting and ambushes, and a full-scale conventional war during the terminal stages with foreign involvement (Hilsum, 2012:239, 252). The defection of senior army officers aided the organization of a command structure.

The regime described the protesters as separatist, treasonable and serving foreign interests. In a speech on 20 February 2011, Saif al-Islam threatened a civil war and a determination to fight till the "last man, the last woman and the last bullet" rather than reconciliation (BBC, 2011(a); Hilsum, 2012:275). On 23 February, 2011 Gaddafi made the infamous *zenga zenga* (alley by alley) statement in a televised address, during which he described the protestors as rats and mercenaries, separatists under the influence of drugs and Salafists. He called on his supporters to go after the protestors "house by house" and to secure the streets. He also vowed to die as a martyr rather than surrender

(Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1268; Reuters, 2011(a); The Guardian 2011:1-3). This threat provided the pretext for a presumption of an impending genocide by the regime.

The disproportionate violence meted out both by ground forces and the air force of the regime led to the indiscriminate killing of about 6,000 people in the initial stages, prompting the international community to invoke the R2P (Sawani, 2014:79).

6.2 COMPOSITION AND ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Libyan army reflected the nature of the *Jamahiriya* system characterized by the primacy of tribalism; the existence of the revolutionary committees; and other *coup*-proofing strategies including financial and political resources dispensed to the armed forces by the regime to induce loyalty (Nepstad, 2013:338); the establishment of parallel security institutions and exploitation of ethnic (or tribal) relations in the composition of the army (Makara, 2013:336); and rivalry between security units as some units were directly connected to the regime (Barany, 2011:29). The construction of the post-independence Libyan army reflected these realities.

The Libyan Arab Army, inherited by the monarch, was established by the Sanusi Order to combat Italian colonization. Since its formation up to 2011, the army faced the dual issue of a national versus a tribal institution, as well as maintenance of cohesion and its influence on the political system. These questions impacted negatively on the structure and the development of professionalism in the army as well as its role in the political arrangements of the state (Vandewalle, 2006:43-76; Gaub 2013:225).

Both the monarch and Gaddafi identified a cohesive, national armed force as a threat and at variance with the tribal arrangements that formed the bedrock of their regimes. The size of the Royal Libyan Army was thus kept low (6,500 volunteers) and deprived of resources and equipment with unqualified commanders. This was in contrast to two well-armed paramilitary units created by the King with a total manpower of 14,000 Sanusi loyalists (Gaub, 2013:225).

By 2011, the size of the Libyan army was estimated at 76,000 officers and men composed of both conscripted soldiers and volunteers. The increased militarization of the country in terms of military equipment in the 1980s accorded Libya the highest ratio of military to equipment in the Third World. This notwithstanding, the standard and professionalism of the regular armed forces was questionable. The long period of sanctions further deprived it of equipment reducing its competence and efficiency. Unlike Egypt, the army had no role in the political arrangements and that also contributed to the conditions of the forces (Haddadt, 2011:2; Mattes; 2008:55-81; Gaub, 2013:226). The mistrust of the army was exacerbated by five attempted *coup d'états* by military officers from 1975. In August 1975, Bashir Hawadi and Umar al-Muhayshi, two members of the RCC, attempted a *coup d'état*. This was followed by others in 1983, 1984, 1985 and 1993 (Haddadt, 2011:2; Gaub, 2013:226, 229).

The state of the army was affected by the *Jamahiriya* system under which institutions had no role in the state. Moreover, the dichotomy between popular and revolutionary authority emasculated the army and effectively undermined the command structure (Gaub, 2013:227-228; Vandewalle, 2006:43-76).

The regime became reliant on "quasi-military" units and Special Forces including the Revolutionary Guard Corps (*al-Haras al-Thawri*); the Islamic Pan-African Legion, composed of Sub-Saharan Africans of Sahel origin (used as mercenaries in African countries); the popular militias and the People's Calvary Force (Haddadt, 2011:3, 38). Seven other élite units answerable directly to Gaddafi and his family members were created to protect the system and the leader. As stated, these included 32 Brigade that was commanded by Khamis and two other agencies commanded by his other sons, Saadi and Moatassim. These units were better equipped, more organised and well-resourced than the regular army (Haddadt, 2011:38).

The tribal considerations in the composition of the army have been explained. The army was recruited mainly from the two large tribes, the Magariha and Warfala tribes as well as from the smaller Qadhadfa tribe. Within the three tribes, however, Gaddafi favoured

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his Qadhadfa tribe and junior officers from the tribe were rewarded with the important and prominent command positions. For instance, the Qadhadfa tribe had hegemony over the air force to the exclusion of the Warfala. That was one of the reasons for a failed *coup d'état* by Warfala officers in 1993 which was brutally suppressed (Khosrokhavar, 2012:139; Haddadt, 2011:2, 3; Mokhefi, 2011:2; Guab, 2013:232).

There was therefore deep resentment within the regular army and between the regular army and the forces close to the regime. This development led to an implosion of the regular armed forces in the initial stages of the mass uprising characterized by high levels of desertion and rapid disintegration of some units. The defections caused fragmentation of the high echelons of the "Men of the Tent" that affected command and control. Of significance was General Abdul Fatah Younis, Minister of the Interior who became Chief of Staff of the insurgents in Benghazi, and General Salim al-Hasi who defected with entire units. Indeed, two Libyan fighter jets declined to open fire on the insurgents and flew to Malta where they requested political asylum while other air force officers defected to the insurgents with fighter jets (Gaub, 2013:236-237; Prashad, 2012:153-154). The impact of defection on the success of rebellions have been confirmed by Nepstad (2011, cited in Nepstad 2013). In the case of Libya, the training and availability of weapons was a major development as that enabled the defectors to constitute the nucleus of the insurgent forces.

Besides the defections from the army, diplomats and high level politicians including Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Minister of Justice who became leader of the National Transitional Council; Musa Kusa, former Intelligence Director, and then Foreign Minister; a trusted "Man of the Tent"; Abdul Salam Jalloud, the former second in command in the RCC; Shukri Ghanim, former Prime Minister and then head of the Libyan National Oil Company; the Permanent Representative of Libya to the UN and former foreign minister, Abdul Rahman Shalgam and a number of ambassadors also defected (Hilsum, 2012: 246; Ahmida, 2012:78-80). The defection of the diplomats afforded the insurgents representation abroad that eventually led to some international recognition.

Given the tribal structure and the state of the army, the protest became a struggle for political and military power between an insurgent force composed of a more or less autonomous brigades, and the regime, supported by cohesive well-trained élite forces and mercenary groups. The conflict became a "do" or "die" affair which caused both sides to escalate violence. For instance, the insurgents were organized in brigades along the regions or tribes, hence the Zintan, Zawiyah and Misurata brigades (Hilsum, 2012:239, 252).

6.3 TRIBAL INFLUENCES

The primordial loyalties to tribes and tribal alliances were equally exploited as a *coup*-proofing technique. The dominance of the army by some tribes was one of the reasons for the escalation and duration of the conflict as it became a competition for tribal influence and interest. Thus the Warfala in Bani Walid; the Magariha in the Fezzan and the Qadhadfa in Sirte, offered fierce resistance to the insurgent forces which contributed to the increased levels of violence in these areas. This was also the cause of the fragmentation of the armed forces along tribal lines. The defections of army officers and other political figures were determined by the decisions of the tribes to support the insurgents. Thus senior officials such as the Minister of the Interior defected only after the tribes of the North-East withdrew their support for Gaddafi in the initial stages of the repression (Lacher, 2011:144).

The conflict further degenerated into a tribal-based insurgency as the tribe determined loyalty or otherwise. The tribes in the East initiated the insurgency while other tribes joined mainly due to pledges of, or withdrawal of, support by the tribal leaders. Lacher (2011:144) confirms that "tribal loyalties were highly significant in shaping the course of uprising and the subsequent war". Zoubir and Rózsa (2012:1271) endorse this view with the assertion that the conflict was a tribal power struggle and a "patrimonial war for power" rather than primarily over socio-economic conditions as were the cases in Tunisia and Egypt. Guab (2013:235) similarly confirms that desertions from the army followed tribal and geographical loyalties. In Sirte and areas of the Qadhadfa, Warfala and

Magariha, desertions were low compared to the East. Eight thousand defections occurred in the East within a month of the fighting, and by June 2011 the army was reduced to under 20,000 men. In contrast, the Special Forces, such as 32 Brigade remained intact with less desertions, in view of the fact that they were composed mainly of the Qadhadfa tribe (Gaub, 2013:237). Others estimated the level of loyal troops by March 2011 at 8,000 men including mercenaries (Pape, 2012:66). A consequence was the tribal origins of the numerous militia groups that emerged to contest for power soon after the seizure of the state by the insurgents. This development further escalated the insurgency into a civil war.

6.4 CONSEQUENCES OF THE LIBYAN INSURGENCY FOR THE REGION

The insurgency created massive outflows of refugees and repatriation of foreign nationals that impacted on neighbouring states and countries of origin of the migrant workers. This created humanitarian challenges for Egypt, Tunisia, Chad, Algeria and Niger and an enormous strain on their economies. It was estimated that during five weeks of fighting 320,000 refugees fled Libya to Tunisia and Egypt among others. This was in addition to over one million migrant workers from sub-Saharan Africa (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1274; Kuperman, 2013:125; Pape, 2012:67).

The breakdown of the military command structure and the access to armouries resulted in the proliferation of large amounts of arms stolen from the stockpiles of sophisticated weapons available in Libya. The question of the returning mercenaries was another source of insecurity for the region. An estimated 3,000 Tuareg fighters that fought on behalf of Gaddafi returned to Mali not only with experience, but also with about 600 four-wheel vehicles which escalated their secession bid for the Azawad. Ansar Dine and AQIM hijacked the rebellion and established Islamic rule in northern Mali. The resultant instability led to a *coup d'état* in Mali and a massive displacement of people (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1275; Kuperman, 2013:128-129).

The proliferation of arms from Libya turned northern Mali into a launch pad for terrorist groups and militant organizations in Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria. It also increased the availability of sophisticated weapons on the illicit weapon market. AQIM for instance acquired a range of weapons from the insurgents including man-portable air-defense systems, rocket-propelled grenades launchers and missiles. About 15,000 man-portable air-defense system were presumed to be in circulation some of which have been acquired by *Boko Haram*, Palestinian militants in Gaza and *Al-Shabaab* in Somalia. The proliferation of arms extended to Somalia as pirates obtained Stinger missiles and ship mines from Libya (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1274-1275; Kuperman, 2013:129-131).

Besides the emergence of home-grown radical Islamists such as *Ansar al-Sharia*, Libya also became a safe haven for *Jihadists* notably ISIS, that controlled parts of the country and had over 2,000 fighters in Libya as at December 2015. The country gradually became a staging post that could support a *Jihadist* insurgency for longer periods with dire consequences for the region (CBS News, 2015; Kuperman, 2013:127).

The international ramifications of the Libyan insurgency extended to the composition of the NTC. The initial apprehension by Algeria to recognize the NTC was due to the inclusion of Abdel Belhadj, in view of his links with AQIM (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1277).

Another humanitarian and security challenge was that Libya became one of the main conduits for illegal migration to Europe. The chaos in Libya created a security vacuum that was exploited by human traffickers and organized crime syndicates to smuggle large numbers of migrants across the Mediterranean to Italy. In 2014, over 120,000 migrated to Sicily through Libya compared to 37,000 in 2013. The possibility of infiltration of *Jihadists* remained a security concern for the European Union (EU) (Toaldo, 2015:4-11; Murphy, 2015).

7. EVALUATION OF THE MASS UPRISING

The mass uprising in Libya and the violent outcome was rooted in the very nature of the political and social organization of the country. Hence unresolved historical grievances other than the socio-economic circumstances led to the events, when compared to Tunisia and Egypt (Prashad, 2012:92). Libyan society is more or less a collection of tribes. The sense of a state and identification with a nation were non-existent. Vandewalle (2006:40) notes in this regard that Libya was an "accidental state" that was established by the Great Powers. A conflict then existed between tribal allegiance and state identity, which continued until 2011. At the time of the commencement of the mass uprising in Libya in 2011, Libya remained as it was in the period prior to independence and cannot be described as an established functional state.

Vandewalle (2012:34) further confirms that the "first encounter Libyans had with the mechanisms of a modern state was that of an authoritarian and domineering administration that could be used, seemingly unchecked, to subjugate and often dispossess the people". This was the administrative system bequeathed to Libya by the Italians which was maintained by the Sanusi monarchy and reached a peak under Gaddafi with the establishment of the *Jamahiriya*, a system described by Burgat (1995:50) as "anarchist-Leninist", the implementation of which destroyed the already weak institutions in Libya, creating a recipe for chaos and anarchy. In the vacuum, the stage was set for Gaddafi and his cohorts to assume total control of the state.

The discovery of oil and the unfettered access to oil revenues by the two regimes also impacted on the ability to create viable institutions of state, as the revenue enabled the institution of a patronage system (Vandewalle, 2006:2-9).

The restrictions on political competition or the development of civic society by the *Jamahiriya* system and its reliance on informal structures bred power centres and a personality cult, and perpetuated primordial loyalties to tribes, clans and cronies who wielded political influence (Joffé, 2011:521-524). It created a confusing administrative,

economic and political system rooted in corruption and cronyism. This alienated the majority of the people and was sustainable only through patronage and repression.

The informal state was characterized by sibling rivalry on the one hand, and contestations between other "Men of the Tent" and the Gaddafi family. At the same time, cleavages existed between the tribes associated with the regime and between those tribes and the marginalized ones. Eventually, the "Men of the Tent" became divided between the reformers that advocated political change and neoliberal reforms, and hardliners that supported the *status quo*, led by Gaddafi's sons Saif and Moatassim respectively (Prashad, 2012:111,135). The competing claims between the children in business and politics was sometimes akin to state capture by a family. The state, politics, tribe and family became fused. The apprehension to reforms was explained in part by the concern that reforming meant a change of the ideology and a failure of the *Jamahiriya* system and would subsequently dissipate the power centres. The inability of Gaddafi to resolve these tensions facilitated the disintegration of the regime.

The institutionalization of primordial tribal loyalties was the underlying motive of the political system and the same accounted for the escalation of the mass uprising into an insurgency. Joffé (2011:522) notes that the *coup* in 1969 by Gaddafi was itself a revenge of the tribes in central Libya against the tribes in Cyrenaica whom they were traditionally subservient to. It was also clear that the eastern tribes and home of the Sanusi also sought their revenge in 2011. This also determined the mobilization along tribal lines and the decentralized nature of the mass uprising that ended with the formation of tribal militias and multiple armed units under different commands (Brahimi, 2011:613-614). Prashad (2012:98) notes in this regard that the existence of military brigades in the cities (Misrata, Zintan, Derna, Tripoli and Benghazi), with their own independent command without a central coordination structure, was the source of instability. This also explains the escalation of the insurgency into a civil war.

The inexperience or lack of political and civic organization; the reaction of the regime; the implosion and defection by army officers; the competing tribal influences; and support

for the insurgents by countries in the region and the international community, escalated the nonviolent protest into an insurgency (ICG, 2011(c):1; Khosrokhavar, 2012:97; Lacher, 2011:141-142).

The fall of Benghazi on February 2011 and the formation of an insurgent force necessitated the formation of an organized structure to coordinate defensive strategies and the expansion of the insurgency in other cities. This became imperative as the fighting became prolonged. The formation of the NTC that was formed on 27 February 2011 constituted the establishment of a formal leadership. In a statement on 5 March 2011, it declared itself as the only legitimate representative of the Libyan people. The recognition of the NTC by the international community notably France, the UK, Qatar, the EU, the AU and the LAS, enhanced its legitimacy as the political wing of the insurgents in the liberated areas. With that came access to arms and diplomatic representation (Buera, 2015:111; Khosrokhavar, 2012:91-96; Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1276).

The composition of the NTC, however, reflected the complexity of the tribal, regional and sectarian interests. According to Lacher (2011:142), the NTC included "scions of aristocratic and bourgeois families who had dominated Libya during the monarchy, and were mostly disempowered, expropriated and exiled under Gaddafi". This was in addition to former members of the Gaddafi regime, and former *Jihadists*, such as Adbel Hakim Belhadj, former leader of the LIFG and an *Al-Qaeda* operative with links to AQIM and Qatar. This background was a source of mistrust between the Zintan and the Tripoli brigades. The NTC itself had to secure the endorsement of the tribes with the co-optation of the Qadhadfa tribe (Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1271, 1278; Hilsum, 2012:270).

The massive force unleashed by the regime against the insurgents raised fears of genocide. In March 2011, the UN Security Council approved a resolution (UNSCR, 1973 of 2011(a)) that mandated a humanitarian intervention (Prashad, 2012:97; Zoubir and Rózsa, 2012:1273). This led to a UN authorized involvement, implemented by NATO with the support of some Arab states, which increased the level of violence of the conflict. The insurgency lasted for eight months when the insurgents overran Sirte, the last bastion

of the regime, on October, 20, 2011 followed by the capture and death of Gaddafi on October 23, 2011.

8. CONCLUSION

The mass uprising in Libya was consistent with the causes of mass uprising discussed in Chapter Two. Predominantly, however, the tribal nature of Libyan society and the *Jamahiriya* system of government that sought to eliminate the state created a chaotic administrative system. In addition to the discovery of oil, these two factors afforded a patronage-based system that resulted in the establishment of a despotic regime sustained by repression, cronyism and family rule, corruption, and the creation of regional and income inequalities. These were exacerbated by increased population and declining employment avenues. The fallout was an erosion of the legitimacy of the regime.

These remote or underlying factors needed accelerator or trigger events to cause a mass uprising. The dissatisfaction with housing delivery, the arrest of Fathi Terbil, and the domino effect of the Tunisian and the Egyptian mass uprisings, provided the accelerators for the uprising in Libya.

As symptomatic of mass uprisings, the Libyan mass uprising was spontaneous and unorganized, but urban-based, lacking a structure and organization at the initial stages. A unique feature was that it was regionally based, hence a series of regional mass uprisings also led to an incremental take-over of the administration of cities and regions from the regime.

The mass uprising, however, escalated into an insurgency. Again, as discussed in Chapter Two, escalation is determined by the level of intensity of violence and the extent of involvement of the masses. This is determined by a number of factors including the rate of defections among the security forces, acquisition of territory, and foreign involvement. The Libyan mass uprising exhibited these factors. The escalation from a mass uprising into an insurgency and later into a civil war was a classic case of an escalation ladder from peaceful protest to armed violence.

While an insurgency is also seen as war irrespective of the type of war, the insurgent phase of the conflict in Libya is distinguished from the phase categorized as civil war. The former characterizes the immediate stage of the transformation of the mass uprising into a conflict. That was the phase where the conflict was unidirectional or between insurgents (protestors) and the Gaddafi regime. A multidirectional phase involving multiple actors with different motives represent the escalation to a civil war.

The involvement of nationalist groups; sectarian interest groups; tribal militias; *Jihadists;* the involvement of the international community as well as the regional or localized nature of the rebellion, escalated the levels of violence into a sectarian war and later, a civil war. However, within the time period of this study, the development in Libya could be classified as a type of an insurgency which resulted in high levels of violence, in view of international involvement. This was characterized with the "liberation" of Benghazi; the formation of the NTC and the subsequent recognition by the international community; the existence of an insurgent army with access to ammunitions; and hit and run attacks on buildings symbolic of the regime including burning of police stations and other security and office buildings of the revolutionary committees (Sawani, 2014:77-78). It therefore became a political and military struggle to weaken the Gaddafi regime, and increased the control of the protestors.

The nature and impact of foreign involvement on the escalation and/or termination of conflicts presented as case studies, will be analysed in the next chapter.

Map 9. Provincial Map of Libya

Source: UN Cartographic Section. Map No. 3787 Rev.10 2015

CHAPTER SEVEN: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE UPRISINGS AND INSURGENCIES

1. INTRODUCTION

There was considerable external involvement in the insurgencies in Africa as already discussed in Chapter Three. Most of the insurgencies in Africa during the Cold War had support from the superpowers and from non-state actors and multilateral organizations. The support included the supply of weapons, provision of sanctuaries, diplomatic recognition, funding and access and supplies (Clapham, 1998(b):8, 15). This followed in the post-Cold War era in the form of proxy wars and regional conflict.

While the interventions primarily served the interests of the superpowers, they also reflected humanitarian intentions. For instance, the Liberation Committee of the Organization of African Unity (now AU) and the UN agencies provided support and assistance to the liberation movements in Africa which also helped in preserving the unity of those organizations to pursue their insurgencies. This was manifested in the assistance offered by the international community during the insurgencies against colonial or racial rule in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe among others. For instance, the UN assisted the Mozambican (FRELIMO) and the Namibian (SWAPO) insurgents financially and in terms of administrative and organizational methods. This was achieved by sponsoring the Eduardo Mondlane Institute in Tanzania and the Institute for Namibia in Zambia. Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland also offered humanitarian assistance to the liberation movements particularly in the Portuguese colonies. Other organizations such as the World Council of Churches also offered similar support (Schmidt, 2013:82; Reno, 2009:9).

This chapter focuses on the involvement of the international community in the case studies in terms of responses to the mass uprisings and the new insurgencies in Africa in the post-Cold War period and the outcomes regarding conflict escalation and termination. The involvement of neighbouring states, regional organizations and multilateral institutions in the case study countries will be assessed in this regard.

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The main instruments of intervention that will be the focus in this chapter are diplomatic intervention, bilateral and multilateral military interventions and humanitarian military intervention or the R2P. Thus the nature of involvement of states; the UN; AU; ECOWAS; NATO; and the ICC will be discussed where applicable. Particular emphasis is placed on the impact of such involvement on the escalation of the mass uprising into an insurgency; the duration of the mass uprising or conflict and the termination of the conflict. The impact of post-conflict measures on stability will also be highlighted.

The cases of the insurgencies in Uganda (LRA), Sierra Leone (RUF), Nigeria (*Boko Haram*) and Somalia (*Al-Shabaab*), as well as the mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are analysed within these parameters.

2. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE INSURGENCY OF THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN UGANDA

Although the LRA insurgency was primarily an intrastate insurgency against the government of Uganda, the group withdrew to the DRC, South Sudan and to the CAR in 2008, and it became part of the regional conflict system as it dispersed to these countries following military campaigns by the Ugandan armed forces (Project Ploughshares, 2011:1; US Department of State, 2012(a); UNITF; 2012:1). This transformed the insurgency into an international conflict with the involvement of various states and multilateral institutions that employed multidimensional approaches including non-military and military measures to end the conflict. Involvement is therefore a mix of activities including diplomatic actions, direct and indirect military interventions. The actors have been bilateral, regional, continental and multilateral (Williams, 2014:143).

2.1 NON-MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The non-military involvement included mediation efforts by regional, continental, multilateral and other actors as well as measure to bring pressure to bear on the leadership of the LRA.

The Ugandan government pursued other options in conjunction with the military engagements. At its request, the ICC issued arrest warrants for senior leaders of the LRA following their indictment in 2005 (Project Ploughshares, 2011:2; ICC, 2016). This limited the nature of support from third parties to the group and also restricted their movements. This might have compelled them into negotiations in 2006.

At the same time, a series of negotiations involving Uganda and the LRA under the auspices of South Sudan were undertaken between 2006 and 2008 with the support of the US government. One of the mediation efforts was the Juba Peace Talks in South Sudan in August 2006. This was a regional initiative that also included Mozambique, South Africa, the AU and the UN that led to a *Comprehensive Peace Agreement* in 2007. The negotiations collapsed following the refusal of the leader of the LRA to sign the agreement demanding the withdrawal of the arrest warrants. The government of Uganda also offered amnesty on various instances in addition to disarmament and reintegration of the LRA fighters (The Hague Justice Portal, 2008; US Department of State, 2012(a); Finnström and Atkinson, 2006; Project Ploughshares, 2011:1; Atkinson, 2009).

One of the first bilateral actions by the international community was the designation of the LRA as a terrorist organization with its inclusion in the *Terrorist Exclusion List* of the US in 2001. In 2008, the leader of the group was designated as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist", and in 2010 the US Congress enacted the *LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act*. The law called for support for regional efforts at resolving the conflict. The AU similarly declared the LRA as a terrorist organization in 2011 as indicated in Section 4.1 of Chapter four (US Department of State, 2012(a); US Congress, 2009; AU/PSC, 2011(c)).

The mandate of the various UN peace operations in the region were extended to include the support of a Regional Task Force on the LRA, which will be discussed in the following section. These included the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC, the UN Integrated Peace Building Office in the CAR, and the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, all of which offer humanitarian assistance and civilian protection in the LRA affected area (Maphosa, 2013:6; UNITF; 2012:1).

All these efforts failed to yield the desired outcomes as the war had progressed and became mutative with consequences for the civilian population in the region.

2.2 MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The government of Sudan was the only known external benefactor of the LRA that offered direct support, by providing bases and supplies, in retaliation to similar support by Uganda to the then SPLA. The action by Sudan was also designed to increase pressure on the US that allegedly offered military and political support to the Ugandan government and the SPLA as part of the efforts to curb the influence of Sudan in the region (Dunn, 2007:135; Van Acker, 2004:352; Williams, 2011:143; Otunnu, 2002:12-13). However, a peace agreement between Uganda and Sudan in 1999 that called for the cessation of support for rebel groups in either country, led to the withdrawal of Sudanese support for the LRA. In 2002 and 2004, Sudan agreed to the use of its territory by Ugandan troops in pursuit of the LRA in "Operation Iron Fist I and II" (Dunn, 2007:135; Ramos, 2010:65).

Following the failure of the peace efforts, a regional military strategy was adopted against the LRA. Over 10,000 troops from Uganda, South Sudan and the DRC, with the support of the US, intervened militarily in December 2008 under the codename "Operation Lightening Thunder" (OLT) that focused on the LRA bases in southern Sudan. This was the most elaborate multinational military intervention in the LRA insurgency (Project Ploughshares, 2011:3; US Department of State, 2012(a); Ramos, 2010:65; Atkinson, 2009). The OLT ended with disastrous failure with heavy civilian casualties.

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In November 2011, the AU launched the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA which deployed 5,000 troops from the four affected countries (Uganda, DRC, CAR and South Sudan) with the mandate to defeat the LRA by improving the effectiveness of the affected countries to wage the war. The Regional Cooperation Initiative also highlighted civilian protection, expansion of an existing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reconstruction (DDR) program and other peace building mechanisms supported by the EU, the UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur, and the US through the US African Command (AFRICOM). The latter provided financial support, as well as logistics and training, military advisors and military assistance to the Regional Cooperation Initiative and the affected countries (AU/PSC, 2011(b), AU/PSC, 2015(a), Maphosa, 2013; 3, 5; Arieff and Ploch, 2012).

2.3 OUTCOME

The arrest warrant issued by the ICC for the leaders of the LRA and the possibilities of lengthy jail terms, hardened their resolve to continue the fight (Dunn, 2007:147). However, it was the military intervention in 2008 that marked the transition from mediation to military intervention by the international community and also the period of documented carnage and casualties by the LRA. After three months of intensive fighting, the military intervention ended with large civilian casualties and widespread displacement in the region (Atkinson, 2009). While the OLT succeeded in driving out the LRA from Uganda, it ended up creating a security dilemma for the region as the LRA dispersed into an enclave in the jungle that traversed the borders of the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan. It dispersed into smaller units and waged a "nomadic war", becoming more lethal with increased attacks and casualties on civilians during and in the immediate period after the OLT from 2008 to 2010 (Atkinson, 2009; Project Ploughshares, 2011:1, 3-5; Maphosa, 2013:1). Thus the intervention created another moral hazard situation and an expansion of the international dimension of the conflict.

An assessment of LRA activities from 2008 to 2015 in three categories is presented in Table 8. The data indicates that the attacks, casualties and abductions reached a peak in

2009 during the OLT. There has been a significant decrease in LRA attacks and abductions since 2011, although there are selected cases of attacks in some areas of the DRC and in the CAR. The decrease is attributed to the presence of the AU troops deployed under the Regional Initiative (LRA Tracker, 2014).

Table 7. LRA Casualties from 2008 to 2015

YEAR	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
ATTACKS	38	227	227	90	28	28	8	12
CASUALTIES	801	1252	776	150	52	76	12	12
ABDUCTIONS	591	857	671	208	170	142	38	39

Source: LRA Tracker. Available online at www.lracrisistracker.com.

The intervention by the AU since 2011 in addition to other forms of involvement by countries in the region and the international community deprived the LRA of international support and sanctuaries and affected their ability to mount indiscriminate attacks. It also restricted its ability to manoeuvre, and access to supplies. In addition to a DDR program and peace building actions, coupled with significant defections, the group seemed to be losing ground (BBC, 2016; UNITF; 2012:3). Despite the marginal success in reducing the ability of the LRA, the dispersal of the group after the OLT partly prolonged the insurgency and directly or indirectly increased the overall casualties in the war.

3. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE INSURGENCY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT

The RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone has been discussed in Chapter Four. A number of interventions occurred during the ten year insurgency on both sides. The interventions were bilateral or multilateral and hostile or supportive of the ruling regimes. The intervenors included the government of Liberia under Charles Taylor; Libya under Gaddafi; Nigeria; ECOWAS; the British government and the UN. Prior to the regional and international interventions, the non-state actors that intervened at the invitation of the

various governments in Sierra Leone were the Gurkhas security group; Executive Outcomes (EO); and Sandline (Zack-Williams, 2012(a):5). The Sierra Leonean interventions therefore presented a complex mix of motivations and outcomes.

3.1 INVOLVEMENT OF NON-STATE ACTORS

The first military intervention was undertaken by a non-state actor at the invitation of the NPRC regime, under Captain Valentine Strasser. The Gurkhas Security Guards, a Nepalese company, was contracted by the NRPC to protect the rutile mines, in a bid to secure the sources of revenue to prosecute the war, and to train the Sierra Leonean army. The company did not make an impact and departed following the death of its American commander, Colonel Mackenzie (Zack-Williams, 2012(b):13, 23-24).

In April 1995, the Strasser government engaged EO, a South African based security company (mercenary firm) to offer training and air support for the counter-insurgency and also tracking the bases of the RUF following the departure of the Gurkhas. EO arrived with a force contingent of about 3,000 combat soldiers and 500 military advisers (Abdullah and Muama, 1998:187; Woods and Reese, 2008:29; Zack-Williams 2012(b):22). EO secured Freetown within ten days pushing the RUF into the hinterlands. By December 1995, EO had reversed the RUF offensive and recaptured important mines from the insurgents. The EO intervention changed the momentum of advantage in the conflict to the side of the government, forcing the RUF to agree to negotiate after more than five years of fighting, resulting in the Abidjan Agreement (Woods and Reese, 2008:30, Zack-Williams, 2012(b):24; Chauveau and Richards, 2008:535).

The first Kabbah administration maintained, but later disengaged the EO in January 1997 in accordance with the *Abidjan Peace Accord*, and under pressure from international donors particularly the IMF citing cost constraints (Woods and Reese, 2008:30; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):24). The government suffered reverses after the departure of the EO leading to the *coup d'état* by the AFRC under which the RUF became part of the government (Chauveau and Richards, 2008:536).

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Sandline International, a UK based firm and partner of EO was engaged by the Kabbah administration, then a government-in-exile in Guinea, in 1997 as the peace process faltered. Sandline was to offer support and training for one of the Civil Defence Forces, the Kamajors; and military equipment, arms and logistics to both the Sierra Leone Army and to ECOMOG. It supplied 30 tons of AK.47 rifles (Hirsch, 2001; 66-67; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):25-27).

Although operating for financial motives, including mining concessions, the private armies, notably EO, enforced peace and stability that reduced casualties (Hirsch, 2001:16).

3.2 BILATERAL INTERVENTIONS

There were a number of bilateral interventions, whether overtly or covertly, by neighbouring and other African states. Liberia, Burkina Faso, and Libya provided weapons, training, sanctuaries and logistical support to the insurgents. For instance, the Sierra Leone insurgency became an extension of that in Liberia as the insurgency was influenced and supported by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, while Libya under Gaddafi provided substantial support to the RUF (Van Walraren and Abbink, 2001:25, 26; Chauveau and Richards, 2008:535). Nigeria played a dual role as its forces operated at the invitation of the second Kabbah administration under a mutual defence agreement, while it also participated in ECOMOG. Guinea also actively supported the government (Levitt, 1998:367).

3.3 MULTILATERAL INTERVENTIONS

A number of multilateral interventions occurred during the RUF insurgency. This section focuses on the three main multilateral military interventions namely the interventions by ECOWAS, the UN and the British intervention in support of the UN Mission.

3.3.1 INTERVENTION BY ECOWAS

ECOMOG had operated in Sierra Leone since May 1992 using the country as a base for its intervention in Liberia. In February 1998, ECOWAS authorized deployment in Sierra Leone at the invitation of Kabbah and in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions to restore the Kabbah government. This followed the atrocious acts by the AFRC/RUF that overthrew the first government (Woods and Reese, 2008:42). ECOMOG reinstated Kabbah, but was unable to subjugate the AFRC/RUF forces until the *Lomé Peace Accord* in July 1999 and the deployment of a UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) and later the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (Woods and Reese, 2008:50, Zack-Williams, 2012:27; UNSCR, 1132 of 1997; UNSCR, 1156 of 1998(a)).

3.3.2 UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION TO SIERRA LEONE

In July 1998, the UN Security Council authorized UNOMSIL to monitor a DDR process under a *Peace Agreement in Conakry*, Guinea. UNOMSIL was not an enforcement mission and the mandate changed following the collapse of the *Conakry Agreement*. UNOMSIL was replaced by UNAMSIL in another UNSCR (UNSCR, 1181 of 1998(b); UNSCR, 1270 of 1999(b)) which required the new mission to assist in the DDR as stipulated in the *Lomé Agreement*. Resolution 1270 also authorized the use of force in protecting civilians. It was primarily a peace enforcement mandate with heavy weaponry and composed of 17,500 troops. However, it was beset by organizational challenges that rendered it ineffective. This enabled RUF troops to overrun the UN troops in a number of instances. The attacks ended with seizure of their weapons and armoured personnel carriers and taking UNAMSIL hostages (Woods and Reese, 2008:60). Thus the UNAMSIL intervention instead of protecting civilians, ended up rearming the RUF. This called for another intervention to bolster the UN troops. The shift in the mandate of UNAMISIL from a neutral force to enforcement in addition to support by the British forces, improved its effectiveness and that compelled the RUF to sign a ceasefire contained in the *Abuja Agreements* in 2000 and 2001 (UNSCR, 1289 of 2000; Woods and Reese, 2008:60-63, 72, 73).

3.3.3 THE BRITISH INTERVENTION

The British forces were deployed in May 2000 to offer technical and organizational support to both the Sierra Leonean Army and UNAMSIL and for humanitarian operations. Under the codename "Operation Palliser" the engagement was essentially an enforcement mission that contained the RUF offensive, and was responsible for driving the RUF into accepting a ceasefire. On 17 May 2000 Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF and then Vice President of Sierra Leone under the *Lomé Accord*, was arrested by local militia and handed over to the British troops (Woods and Reese, 2008:60-63, 72, 73; Chauveau and Richards, 2008:536).

3.4 POST-CONFLICT ACTIONS

A comprehensive post-conflict programme was implemented by the international community led by the UN and other bilateral donors after the ceasefire. This included a DDR and institutional building components. Under the DDR programme, the UN collected 45,000 weapons and over 70,000 RUF fighters in exchange for food, clothing and shelter and basic skills training that enabled reintegration (Woods and Reese, 2008:73; Chauveau and Richards, 2008:536).

This was complemented by an extensive institutional building programme which focused on the security sector, in addition to important national institutions and civil society organizations. The British government assisted with the training of a new police service and armed forces, fire and prison services, and the Justice Department. An entire national security framework under an act of Parliament was established to regulate security agencies. This was in addition to the establishment of intelligence organizations with enhanced skills and professionalism. The National Electoral Commission of Sierra Leone was restructured to make it an institution independent of government control to enable the conduct of free and fair elections; and an anti-Corruption Commission was established. The programme also covered social issues such as poverty alleviation and addressing youth marginalization; youth employment and gender equality (Kargbo, 2012: 73-85; Macauley, 2012:41-46; Kandeh, 2012:93-101; Gbla, 2012:133-139).

3.5 OUTCOME OF THE INTERVENTIONS

The intervention of EO was an unconventional military intervention that achieved a certain level of success. Comparable data on casualties before and after the EO intervention was unavailable. However, by compelling the RUF to negotiate and sign a peace accord that was intended to end the violence, the intervention might have reduced the casualties considering the atrocious behaviour of the RUF.

The interventions by ECOMOG and UNAMSIL increased the level of arms and weapons in the conflict and had the unintended consequence of rearming the insurgents, as the insurgents overran UNAMSIL battalions through ambushes or through corrupt practices. It was alleged that the ECOMOG commander and other military commanders supplied small arms and light weapons to the RUF in exchange for cash and diamonds, while the RUF captured arms and armoured personal carriers from UNAMSIL units (Montague, 2002; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):27-29). This escalated the conflict and extended the duration for another five years after the departure of EO.

The intervention by ECOMOG led to chaotic situations that created the conditions for extreme violence. On the one hand, the AFRC/RUF fighters directed attacks against the civilian population. On the other hand, ECOMOG troops in an attempt to restore order similarly used force against civilians. The populace also adopted vigilante violence due to the vacuum created by the absence of law enforcement. These occurrences added to the violence and casualties (Woods and Reese, 2008:44). It was during this period that insurgents (AFRC/RUF) undertook the most violent atrocities and human rights abuses marked by brutal killings, mutilations and abductions. Several thousand civilians were killed. The atrocities reached a peak in January 1999 when the RUF launched "Operation No Living Thing" (Amnesty International, 1998; Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(c):10; Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(b):319). Chauveau and Richards (2008:536) described the carnage during this period as "chaotic and uncontrolled violence" by the RUF. An attempt by another ECOMOG offensive to recapture Freetown led to intense fighting for three weeks resulting in the

death of over 10,000 people; 150,000 internally displaced people; abduction of over 3,000 women and children while 600,000 fled to neighbouring countries as refugees (Pratt, 1999 cited in Woods and Reese, 2008:47).

Based on statements provided by 40,242 victims and/or witnesses, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone generated data on some instances of casualties and violations from the beginning of the insurgency in 1991 up to 2000. An extract is presented in Table 8 below (Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(c):10).

Table 8. Data on Violations and Casualties in the RUF Conflict

YEAR	FORCED DISPLACMENT	KILLING	DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
1991	1089	713	392
1992	412	190	89
1993	245	159	115
1994	809	532	312
1995	1078	573	431
1996	310	281	132
1997	454	277	205
1998	1201	528	581
1999	961	509	551
2000	200	92	82

Source: Sierra Leone: Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004(c).

Table 8 indicates that violence in the insurgency was episodic throughout the duration of the conflict. The killings were high at the beginning of the insurgency in 1991. It also

increased reaching a peak in 1995 and in 1998, which also coincided with the ECOMOG interventions. This trend was consistent with other data although the actual figures may vary. It also affirmed the correlation between intervention and increased violence.

Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the outcome of the conflict was due to a combination of military intervention, mediation as well as the elaborate DDR programme. Firstly, the British intervention effectively ended the war, with superior organization, weapons and air power. The British provided support for ECOMOG and UNAMSIL, while at the same time creating fear among the insurgents (Zack-Williams, 2012(a):8). Besides, the British government also assisted in post-conflict peace building with institutional restructuring programmes (Zack-Williams, 2012(a):8; Zack-Williams, 2012(b):26-29). These measures contained a possible resumption or relapse of the war and an improvement in the overall governance system of the country.

Thus military intervention with a comprehensive DDR programme tended to ensure a durable peace.

4. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE INSURGENCY OF *BOKO HARAM*

As with the insurgency of the LRA, the insurgency of *Boko Haram* started as a local grievance that transformed into a regional security phenomenon. The conflict has extended to the Lake Chad Basin countries and subsequently involved both state and non-state actors.

4.1 INVOLVEMENT OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

From its formation *Boko Haram* was reputed to have links with other *Jihadist* groups that provided various forms of support. The micro-credit scheme and the elaborate welfare programme set up by Mohamed Yusuf, the first leader, were funded from external Salafi groups, notably Osama bin Laden (ICG, 2014:23). *Al-Qaeda*, the Afghan Taliban, and AQIM and other *Jihadist* groups, provided *Boko Haram* extensive training and expertise in bomb-making and the fabrication of suicide bombs. Besides training, AQIM also

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provided arms and equipment and financial resources (ICG, 2014:23-24, 28; Karmon, 2014:2). This support from non-state organizations expanded as the group transformed into a terrorist movement with alignment to other *Jihadist* groups within the sub-region and beyond.

Boko Haram activity assumed a regional dimension following the offensive by the Nigerian government in 2009 and in 2011. The remnants dispersed to Chad, Niger and Cameroon where they operated in the ungoverned spaces at the confluence of the Lake Chad basin countries (Niger, Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria) (ICG, 2014:25). This development made *Boko Haram* a regional phenomenon that also defined the nature of international involvement. The four affected countries initiated a regional approach to confront the insurgency. Cameroonian and Nigerian forces coordinated deployments in an offensive along their common border in May 2013. Niger and Cameroon also agreed on joint border patrols (ICG, 2014:26; Karmon, 2014:3).

The Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) comprising the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries (Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon) that was established in 1998 was reactivated in 2012 to confront *Boko Haram* along their common borders. However, the states had confronted the group unilaterally until the abductions of the school girls in Chibok in April 2014, which spurred renewed interest and calls for multilateral intervention. Following a summit in France in May 2014, the LCBC countries and Benin began coordinated efforts against the group and in January 2015 the AU/PSC authorised the deployment of the MNJTF with the support of the UN (AU/PSC, 2015(b), AU/PSC, 2015(c), Zamfir, 2015:2; Amnesty International, 2015). In 2014, the US deployed 80 troops following the abduction of the Chibok girls. The regional force began coordinated attacks in January 2015 (Aljazeera, 2016).

There has been growing influence and involvement of France in the *Boko Haram* insurgency since 2014. As part of Operation Barkhane in the Sahel region, French air force planes were involved in reconnaissance missions along the border of Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon in support of the armed forces of these countries (Griffin, 2015:4).

In 2015, France deployed 300 troops to Cameroon to assist the regional force in a non-combat role (Aljazeera, 2015(a)). The UK, and Israel also offered training to the Nigerian armed forces in counter-insurgency (Campbell, 2014:11).

Beyond the region, the US Department of State in 2012 added the leader of *Boko Haram* to the list of "Specially Designated Global Terrorist", and in 2013 the US State Department offered US$7m for information leading to his capture and classified *Boko Haram* as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (US Department of State, 2012(c), 2013(a), 2013(b)). These measures increased and reshaped the level of involvement.

Following these developments, *Boko Haram* has increased attacks in Cameroon and Chad since February 2015, and effectively extended the insurgency into Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The group even threatened to assassinate the leaders of these countries (Griffin, 2015:6-7).

International involvement in the insurgency has been growing. This was perhaps due to the perception of an alliance between *Boko Haram* and the ISIL in Libya. Such a development will expand the abilities of both organizations and insecurity in West Africa. This recognition is changing the nature of international involvement in the insurgency (The Telegraph, 2016).

In May 2016, another regional security summit was held in Nigeria to develop a holistic strategy to confront *Boko Haram*. It was attended by the leaders of the Lake Chad Basin in addition to those of Benin and France; the British Foreign Secretary; the US Deputy Secretary of State, and a representative of the EU. A statement by the UN Security Council on 13 May 2016 also expressed concern over the collaboration between the groups and the negative impact on, or consequence for regional peace and stability. The Council also called for a "comprehensive Strategy to confront the crisis" (UN Security Council, 2016; CNN, 2016).

4.2 OUTCOME

The international community was yet to intervene in the form of multilateral humanitarian military intervention. However, the MNJTF had an impact similar to that of other interventions by regional organizations. The outcome in terms of escalation is presented in Figure 6.

Figure 6. *Boko Haram* **Attacks and Fatalities* from 2009-2013**

Source: Global Terrorism Database.   *Includes Perpetrator Fatalities.
Available online at www.start.umd.edu/pubs/STARTBackgroundReport_BokoHaram RecentAttacks_May2014_0.pdf.

The figure indicates an increase in the fatalities caused by *Boko Haram* since the interventions. While there had been increased episodes in 2009 and in 2011 that coincided with the military campaigns of the Nigerian government, the casualties subsided from March 2012 to May 2013. It only increased from May 2013 during the coordinated offensives, and peaked in July 2013. The casualties rose to 6,644 in 2014, an increase of about 300 percent of fatalities (GTI, 2015). Uhrmacher and Sheridan (2016) similarly confirmed that 1,008 were recorded in 2013; 2014 recorded 3,425 while 6,006 fatalities were recorded in 2015. This trend is similar to that of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) that recorded increasing fatalities following the intensification of military action against

Boko Haram. While actual figures may vary, casualties associated with *Boko Haram* constituted about one-third of civilian deaths in conflicts in Africa which also signalled an increase in lethality of the group (Zamfir, 2015:1).

These fatalities were civilian deaths and not battle related casualties, and that made *Boko Haram* the third most deadliest or lethal insurgent group only after the Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban in 2013. In 2014 *Boko Haram* became the most lethal insurgent group in the world (START, 2014:4; GTI, 2015).

5. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE INSURGENCY OF *AL-SHABAAB*

Al-Shabaab expanded its insurgency in Somalia from a local-based group into an affiliate of global *Jihadist* organizations. As stated in chapter four, this impacted on the strategy of the group with attacks outside the borders of Somalia. These developments elicited international response to the insurgency.

5.1 STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS

The international community has responded in various ways to the developments in Somalia since the onset of the *Al-Shabaab* insurgency. As with other insurgencies, both non-state and state actors have been involved militarily and otherwise in the *Al-Shabaab* insurgency. The objective to establish a Pan-Islamic Caliphate attracted foreign *Jihadists* as well as the large Somali diaspora to the group. Thus, besides Eritrea that provided a refuge for Somali extremists, including *Al-Shabaab* at its incipient stages in 2006, international involvement in support of the insurgency was restricted to non-state actors and individuals (Williams, 2011:140; Shinn, 2011:206-208).

Al-Shabaab had a close relationship with other international *Jihadist* groups that lent support in the form of technology transfer in the development of communications and expertise in bomb making as well as recruitment of fighters. Saudi organizations such as the World Assembly for Muslim Youth and the International Islamic Relief Organization provided financial support (Ali, 2008:2, 4; Shinn, 2011: 207-210).

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The involvement of foreign fighters from Yemen, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Sweden and the US, and the large Somali diaspora gave *Al-Shabaab* an international nature from the beginning (Shinn, 2011:206). Fazal Mohamed, a key leader of the group was from the Comoros; the financier Sheikh Mohamed Abu Faid from Saudi Arabia; the director of training was a Pakistani; while Omar Hammami (Abu Mansur al-Amriki), an American, was in charge of financing foreign *Jihadists*. Other leaders were from Sudan and Yemen while the fighters came from some countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan, among others. According to Shinn (2011:210), 43 of the 85-member executive council of the group were foreigners.

The first direct military intervention was undertaken by Ethiopia in 2006, primarily to prop up the then Somali government and to preempt the establishment of an Islamic caliphate in the region (Wise, 2011:3). In 2009, the Ethiopian forces were replaced by AMISOM, supported by the UN. AMISOM was enlarged into a 21,500 peace enforcement mission composed of military personnel from Djibouti, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (McCormick, 2016; Masters and Sergie, 2015:2; AMISOM, 2016). Among others, AMISOM was mandated to take all measures, as appropriate, to assist with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation process. An update of the original resolution mandated AMISOM to contain *Al-Shabaab* and other armed opposition groups. It was a supportive intervention to protect and maintain the then Transitional Federal Government (Wise, 2011:4; AMISOM, 2007; UNSCR, 2036 of 2012; Masters and Sergie, 2015:2). The mission has been renewed continually with some amendments to the mandate (UNSCR, 2182 of 2014).

Besides financial assistance to AMISOM, the US intervened unilaterally in Somalia. In 2008, the US designated *Al-Shabaab* as a terrorist organization and in 2012 and later, placed a reward of US$3-US$7 million for information leading to the arrest of each leader of the group (US Department of State, 2008; US Department of State, 2012(b)). The US also pursued a military option with drone and air strikes on *Al-Shabaab* targets from 2007 to 2015 (McCormick, 2016; Freear and Coning, 2013:2). Kenya also intervened

unilaterally with "Operation Linda Nchi" against *Al-Shabaab* in southern Somalia in 2011 and 2012 (Williams, 2015:3).

5.2 OUTCOME

The increasing involvement by the international community elicited a corresponding increase in the violence perpetuated by the group. The capture of the capital by the Ethiopian armed forces drove the group from the capital to the rural areas and the ungoverned spaces in the southern-central region of Somalia where central government control was weak. It was able to launch a campaign against the Ethiopians and expanded its recruitment of volunteers (Wise, 2011; 5). The violence from 2009 could be seen as a direct result of the Ethiopian intervention. Thus, the interventions drew positive correlates with violence and the radicalization of the group (Wise, 2011; 4).

Figure 7 indicates the number of events and the associated casualties from 2009 to 2013. The figure confirms high casualties that coincided with each military intervention. The years 2013 and 2014 reflected similar increases with casualties at 405 and 800 respectively (GTI, 2014:22; START, 2015:1).

The level of violence extended to AMISOM itself from 2007 to 2014 when it recorded 3,485 casualties that made it the most dangerous peace operation in history (Williams, 2015:3).

AMISOM has, however, made some progress with the degradation of the capabilities of *Al-Shabaab* and the comprehensive institutional building component including training a national security force. This has had an impact on securing peace in Somalia. Nonetheless, by driving the group into the hinterlands, it extended the duration and the lethality of the insurgency (Freear and Coning, 2013:7-8).

Figure 7. Somalia: Conflict Events and Fatalities 2009-March 2013

Thus military interventions failed to reduce the ability of *Al-Shabaab* to launch indiscriminate strikes and with more violence. Indeed, *Al-Shabaab* escalated attacks with high casualties. The attack on Garissa, Kenya in 2015, where 148 people were killed, and the increased attacks on AMISOM killing 170 soldiers in June 2015 reflected the increased violence induced by the interventions (McCormick, 2016).

6. INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE MASS UPRISINGS IN TUNISIA AND EGYPT

In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the spontaneous mass uprisings were largely contained in view of the nature and position of the armed forces and the development of civil societies amongst others. International involvement therefore centred on statements that

called for dialogue and respect for the rule of law and for the legitimate aspirations of the people. These statements invariably conveyed tacit endorsement for, or acquiescence to, the protestors (Pressman, 2013:223-226; Allansson *et al*, 2012:52).

6.1 TUNISIA

In the case of Tunisia, initial involvement from Western countries, particularly the US and France were muted. This is partly due to the importance of Tunisia and the cooperation of Ben Ali´s regime in the war on terrorism. The French government at the time initially considered assistance to the regime in the form of expertise and logistics to contain the situation. This decision was rescinded after Ben Ali fled Tunisia (Wahba, 2011:20; Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:48).

US President Obama condemned the violence meted to the protestors by the regime and called for the respect for the rights and will of Tunisians. He also called for a free and fair election. He confirmed this position in the 2011 *State of the Union Address*, stating that the US "stands with the people of Tunisia and supports the democratic aspirations" (US President Obama, 2011; BBC, 2011(b)). The UK, Germany, the UN and the EU, among others, advocated dialogue for the resolution of the grievances. The EU, however, indicated its recognition of the demands of the protestors. A US Assistant Secretary of State was dispatched to Tunisia to assist the process of transition to democracy (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:48; BBC, 2011(b); Wagner and Machnowski, 2011:1). Although the US denied direct involvement, it was alleged that the decision by Ben Ali to flee was at the insistence of the US government through the AFRICOM commander (Aleya-Sghaier, 2014:49).

The nature of international involvement in the Tunisian uprising enabled a transition to democracy. A multiparty election was held in October 2011 resulting in the formation of a coalition government between an Islamist Party (Ennahda) and two secular parties namely the Congress for The Republic and Ettakatol. This coalition enabled broad support and legitimacy for the transition process that also established the basis for a pluralist society (Larémont, 2014(c):149, 151-152; Allansson *et al*, 2012:51).

The institution of individual freedoms also created the space for radical Islamists and *Jihadists* to operate freely in Tunisia. A number of extremists groups emerged after 2011 including the Ansar al Sharia and Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade. These groups have mounted attacks in the country to exert their influence. In March 2015, 20 tourists were killed in a museum in Tunis while a prominent attack that occurred in Sousse, a tourist resort, in June 2015 killed 38 tourists with a number wounded. This is in addition to a number of assassinations of prominent politicians. Besides, Tunisia has become an exporter of *Jihadists* with an estimated 3000 Tunisians fighting for militant groups in Syria (Su, 2015; Marks, 2015:7; Byrne, 2014; Arieff and Humud, 2015).

6.2 EGYPT

In the case of Egypt, the US similarly called on the regime to take steps towards political and economic reforms to address the "legitimate needs and interest of Egyptian people" (Wagner and Machnowski, 2011:4). It also called on the regime to ensure an "orderly transition" of power (Cooper, 2012:3). The LAS similarly called on the Egyptian leadership to address the demands of the protesters (Reuters, 2011(b)). Other African states such as South Africa called on the Egyptian President to resign to pave the way for the establishment of a democracy in Egypt (Rossouw, 2011). The AU reacted to the situation by calling for dialogue and a consensual solution taking into consideration the demands of the people (AU Press Statement on 3 February 2011). The position of the US and its annual financial support for the Egyptian armed forces, was instrumental in encouraging the military to take a neutral stance and eventually exerted pressure on Mubarak to resign (Pressman, 2013:224-225).

As with Tunisia, the outcome of the international involvement in the Egyptian mass uprising was a reconstruction and the realignment of the existing political system and the political forces. Free multiparty parliamentary elections were held in November and December 2011, with the Freedom and Justice Party, the party of the hitherto banned Muslim Brotherhood, obtaining 43.3 percent and the Al-Nour Party (another Islamic party)

21.8 percent. Thus the Islamist parties obtained 65 percent of the vote (Larémont, 2014(c):150).

In the presidential elections in June 2002, Mohammed Morsi, the candidate of the Freedom and Justice Party, won 51.7 percent. A tenuous relationship between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood in negotiating the transition, however, led to another mass protest in June 2013 that resulted in the overthrow of the elected government by the military led by the Chief of Staff, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi (Larémont, 2014(c):148; Wedeman *et al*, 2013). The mass uprising also reignited old antagonisms involving the religious, secular and the military establishments in Egypt. The tacit international support enabled the masses to remove a military government. However, the transition failed to change the fundamental order and structure of Egyptian politics. Eventually, the military prevailed as another Presidential election in May 2014 was won by General el-Sisi (Larémont, 2014(c):148, 157; The Guardian, 2014).

As stated previously the Tunisian and Egyptian mass uprisings were composed of a mix of or various sections of the population with different ideological background. While this may also have included Islamic extremists, their influence on the mass uprisings may have been minimal and could not have impacted on the outcome of the uprising. Their influence seemed to have grown with the institution of democratic values and liberalization of the political space as an aftermath of the mass uprisings.

The mass uprisings in the two countries were militant yet violence was distinctly limited, while the nature of international involvement reduced the possibility for violence escalation. Tunisia recorded 338 deaths while 846 fatalities occurred in Egypt (Cooper, 2012:3, 5). Both mass uprisings transitioned into democratic rule in a shorter space of time that reduced the possibility of a post-uprising violence.

7. LIBYA

International involvement in the mass uprising in Libya in 2011 was an R2P intervention by the UN, but executed by NATO and its allies while other states offered bilateral assistance to the insurgents. Prior to the intervention, however, there were some diplomatic or non-military actions, by way of attempts to mediate between the Gaddafi regime and the insurgents by the AU, while several views were expressed that called for restraint on both sides of the conflict. The ICC also weighed in with some indictments.

7.1 NON-MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

At the beginning of the conflict, the involvement was more sedentary and restricted to protest against the actions of the regime in Libya. On February 22, 2011, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed dismay at the excessive force against the protestors and human rights violations by the Libyan regime (Prashad, 2012:150). The AU/PSC similarly condemned the violent reaction by the Gaddafi regime to the peaceful protests yet attempted to mediate between the two sides and at the same time indicated an opposition to foreign military intervention. Another *communique* in March reiterated the condemnation of the AU/PSC of the use of force in Libya, irrespective of the initiator, which had "[resulted] in the loss of life, both civilian and military and the transformation of pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellion" (AU/PSC, 2011(d)). The *communique* further proposed a ceasefire and also called for a peaceful resolution under the auspices of the AU (AU/PSC, 2011(d)). It subsequently established a High Level *Ad Hoc* Committee on Libya led by the South African President, Jacob Zuma. At that time, both the insurgents and the Gaddafi regime indicated a willingness to accept the AU mediation that called for a cessation of hostilities, protection of foreigners and a political settlement through dialogue (Prashad, 2012:189-191). However, at a meeting with the AU *Ad Hoc* Committee in April 2011, Gaddafi agreed to the proposals while the insurgents (NTC) rejected the plan and insisted on the resignation of Gaddafi as a precondition for a ceasefire. Gaddafi himself later reneged on his promise to abstain from the transitional process although he expressed willingness in June 2011 to meet with France and the NTC on the possibility to

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step down (Waal, 2013:68-69, 71; Times of Malta, 2011). These led to a stalemate and created credibility problems on both sides.

Other regional organizations issued similar statements in condemnation of excessive, indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against the protestors. These included the Gulf Corporation Council, African Commission on Human Rights and People's Rights; the EU; LAS and the Organization the Islamic Conference which also called for a political solution. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights also condemned the regime (Prashad, 2012:96; Bradley and Levinson, 2011; Payandeh, 2012:373-374).

Following the escalation of the conflict, in the face of a massive build-up of arms by the regime, the insurgents represented by the NTC and Libyan defectors and supported by the UK and France called for a no-fly zone in March 2011. The Gulf States and the LAS also lent support to the operationalization of the no-fly zone (Prashad, 2012:155, 179-181; LAS, Resolution, 7360).

As the violence intensified, the UN Security Council referred the situation in Libya and members of the regime to the ICC, and in May 2011 the prosecutors issued arrest warrants for crimes against humanity, against leading members of the regime including Gaddafi, Saif Islam, and Abdullah Sanussi, head of Intelligence (UNSCR, 1970 of 2011(c); Prashad, 2012:152). The arrest warrants by ICC issued in the midst of the conflict hardened the resolve of the regime to fight, and at the same time emboldened the insurgents (Waal, 2013:71).

Subsequently, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 which called on member states to take all necessary measures to establish a no-fly zone. The same resolution also authorised "all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack" (UNSCR, 1973 of 2011(a); Prashad, 2012:166). This provided the legal basis for the implementation of humanitarian military intervention under R2P.

7.2 MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

The military operations stipulated under UNSCR 1970 and 1973 included the enforcement of an arms embargo against the Libyan regime, the establishment of a no-fly-zone, and the protection of civilians. Implementation began on 19 March 2011, under "Operation Odyssey Dawn", with air strikes by some Western countries including France, the US and the UK under the command of AFRICOM. NATO took over the implementation on 31 March 2011 and was codenamed "Operation Unified Protector" (OUP). Other countries including Turkey, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Jordan and Qatar, Canada, Norway and the UAE also contributed fighter jets among others to the NATO operations, while Qatar coordinated the identification of targets on the ground (NATO, 2011(b); The Military Balance, 2012:13-14; Prashad 2012:187; Payandeh, 2012:378-379). The bombing of targets in Libya by NATO enabled the insurgents to overrun Tripoli in August 2011 that heralded the defeat of the Gaddafi regime. The mandate was terminated on October 27, 2011 and NATO ended the intervention on 31 October, 2011 (Payandeh, 2012:371-380; UNSCR, 2016 of 2011(b); NATO, 2011(b)).

The multilateral intervention was limited to air and sea operations. Other states provided bilateral military support to assist the ground operations by the insurgents. These included Qatar, Sudan, UK, the US and France. Military instructors, mainly Special Forces from Qatar, France, Britain, the UAE and the US, assisted the insurgents with logistical support, training and communication equipment. Egypt also provided arms to the insurgents. Besides arms and the provision of anti-tank missiles, hundreds of military instructors from the Special Forces in Qatar trained the insurgents in every region in Libya including a 15,000 militia force that captured Tripoli (Prashad, 2012:187, 188, 225; Waal, 2013:73; Kuperman, 2013:114-115; Hehir, 2013:5; Payandeh, 2012:378-379).

Another country whose involvement seemed to have influenced the escalation of the violence was Sudan. Sudan provided communication equipment and trained the insurgents in military tactics, in particular the Tripoli brigade led by Abdel Hakim Belhaj; coordination of the different security elements on the ground; the planning and execution

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of naval operations, and a conduit of supplies to the NTC. By July 2011 Sudanese troops controlled Kufra that enabled the NTC to gain control of the Kufra oilfields. The Sudanese instructors were also active in the major cities in coordination with NATO forces (Waal, 2013:73-74). These activities emboldened the insurgents, extended the duration, and escalated the violence.

7.3 OUTCOME

This analysis focuses on the impact of the R2P intervention on the escalation of the conflict, and whether alternate forms of intervention could have reduced casualties or avoided the transformation of the mass uprising into an insurgency. On the one hand, the introduction of massive arsenals and firepower by NATO increased the levels of violence in the conflict. On the other hand, the provision of supplies and training for the insurgents also increased the violence used by the insurgents, which in turn extended the duration of the conflict (The Military Balance, 2012:14). As indicated previously, escalation is determined on the basis of firepower, arms introduced into the war, and casualties particularly, since the objective was the protection of civilians. Casualties in this respect will be deaths directly associated with the intervention including those of the regime, the insurgents as well as collateral violence as a result of bombardments and the arming of the insurgents.

Table 9 indicates the military assets deployed in Operation Odyssey Dawn and the OUP. In Operation Odyssey Dawn, over 273 air assets were deployed that undertook 1,602 sorties with 735 strike sorties. Thirty-six naval assets were also in operation. OUP carried out 26,500 sorties with 9,700 strike sorties using more than 269 fighter jets and 33 naval assets. OUP targeted and destroyed over 5,900 military targets (NATO, 2011(b)).

Table 9. Military Assets Deployed in Operation Odyssey Dawn and OUP

	Air Assets	Sorties		Naval Assets	Troop Levels
Operation Odyssey Dawn	273	1,602		36	
		(735 sorties)	strike		
Operation Unified Protector	269	26,500		33	8,000
		(9,700 sorties)	strike		

Sources: The Military Balance, 2012:14; NATO, Operation Unified Protector: Final Mission Statistics; Taylor, C., 2011. Military Operations in Libya.

The introduction of large quantities of arms into the conflict, in addition to arms and technical advice offered to the insurgents, had obvious implications for the escalation of violence.

Figure 8. Conflict Events and Casualties in Libya. October 2010-August 2013

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED). Conflict Trends Report No. 21. Available online at www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No-21-December-2013_final.pdf.

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There was a marked increase in the level of casualties from March 17. By June 2011, the UN Human Rights Council reported that about 10,000 to 15,000 people were killed within four months of fighting that included violence from the regime, the insurgents and NATO, while the Libyan Ministry of Health (under Gaddafi) reported 6,121 civilian deaths during the same period (Reuters, 2011(c); IB Times, 2011). Milne (2011) similarly reported that the death toll which was around 2,000 before the intervention, reached about 10,000 to 50,000 by October 2011.

In September 2011, the NTC casualty figures were estimated at 30,000, although the figures were reviewed downward to 25,000 in October 2011 (IB Times, 2011). This figure was reduced to 4,700 rebel deaths and same number for regime supporters, with 2,100 declared missing. The total number of casualties among combatants was 11,500 (Black, 2013), while the IB Times (2011) estimated the total number of fatalities at 100,000. This figure may have excluded civilian deaths, but granted that civilian casualties were included, the death toll from the time of intervention to 31 October 2011 outweighed the deaths during the pre-intervention period. These figures confirmed that the majority of the casualties occurred after 17 March 2011.

Prior to the support offered by NATO, the insurgent forces lacked the requisite skills and training, rendering them ineffective on the battlefield. The insurgents were a mismatch to the government forces as seen in their defeat and subsequent takeover of rebel-held cities such as Brega, Ras Lanuf by the regime (The Military Balance, 2012:13). This would have overrun the insurgents and that would have shortened the duration of the conflict and reduced casualties.

The training, logistics and fire cover by NATO increased the ability of the insurgents to defend territories they gained and also mount offensives against government forces. This enabled the insurgents to mount resistance and recapture cities and regions that had fallen to the government forces, as it created space for the insurgents to gain access to weapons to engage the regime while at the same time rendering the regime ineffective. This situation was repeated in the conflict and that extended the duration and also

increased the level of casualties (The Military Balance, 2012:14). Increased attacks by NATO from July 2011 targeting the regime, dismantled the defences of the regime and increased the confidence of the insurgents. In Tripoli, the insurgents had begun making an impact from the third week in August, 2011 after the NATO bombings had weakened the military capabilities of the Gaddafi regime (The Military Balance, 2012:13).

The death of Gaddafi marked the end of the organized insurgency phase of the conflict and the descent into sectarian or tribal civil war (The Military Balance, 2012:13). The insurgents disintegrated into 300 militia groups with a total membership of about 200,000 in quest of tribal and sectarian interests. These groups which included Libyan extremists aligned with ISIL, operated independently and also challenged the authority of the NTC. The entry of ISIL added to the atrocities committed against civilians. Concerns over further violence led to a call for foreign intervention in Libya by the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to finish the unfinished mission and to free Libya from the militias (Deeb, 2013:73; Aljazeera, 17 Feb. 2015). The post-R2P intervention violence continued to affect the civilian population three years after the intervention. In this regard, 2,825 and 1,523 fatalities associated with post-intervention sectarian violence were recorded in 2014 and 2015 respectively (Libya Body Count, 2016). This confirms the volatile nature of Libyan society that was created by the intervention.

8. A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CASE STUDY COUNTRIES

As indicated in Chapter Three, third party involvement in conflicts can be hostile (on the side of the insurgents) as in Libya; or supportive (on the side of the government or military regime) as in the cases of Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Somalia. Both types of interventions were undertaken by state, non-state actors, and regional or multilateral institutions. The cases analysed indicate that irrespective of its nature, the primary objective of international involvement was restoration of order and protection of human life. Viewed in this regard, the interventions should have de-escalated the insurgencies

and terminated the conflicts. However, the outcomes of the involvement were varied as depicted in Table 10 below.

Table 10. International Involvement and Outcomes

State	Type of Rebellion	Name	Type of International Involvement	Interveners	Outcome
Uganda	Insurgency	LRA	Mediation Military Intervention	Regional Unilateral	Conflict Continuation. Spread of Conflict
Sierra Leone	Insurgency	RUF	Military Intervention. Peace Operations. Humanitarian Military Intervention and Peace Building measures	Non-state Actors Regional (ECOMOG) Multilateral (UN-UNAMSIL)	Conflict Termination
Nigeria	Insurgency	*Boko Haram*	Military Intervention Peace Enforcement	Regional	Conflict Continuation. Spread of Conflict
Somalia	Insurgency	*Al-Shabaab*	Military Intervention	Regional (AMISOM)	Conflict Continuation. Spread of Conflict
Tunisia	Mass Uprising	-	Conflict Prevention (Diplomacy, Mediation) Limited conflict		Limited conflict
Egypt	Mass Uprising	-	Conflict Prevention (Diplomacy, Mediation) Limited conflict		Limited conflict
Libya	Uprising/ Insurgency	NTC Militias	R2P	Multilateral (UN/NATO) Bilateral	Escalation of violence Civil War

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The case studies revealed that the insurgencies by the LRA, the RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* were by themselves either rooted in, or developed into a regional conflict system. Thus by that very nature, the conflicts became internationalized. They portrayed the characteristics of criminal insurgencies and also adopted similar strategies to pursue the insurgencies. In all the cases, the insurgents operated in the ungoverned spaces that made it possible to recruit and establish safe havens in all the states.

The military interventions were also similar. There were unilateral interventions by both non-state and state actors, but generally the large scale military interventions were undertaken by regional organizations, the AU and the UN. However, that in Sierra Leone and in Libya were undertaken when the insurgencies had already developed into conventional warfare. This may also account for the high levels of casualties in these interventions.

Notwithstanding the similarities of the Sierra Leonean and the Libyan interventions, the outcomes in the two cases were dissimilar. The nature of the interventions and the post-intervention planning accounted for the difference in outcomes. The resumption of the war that followed the various interventions in Sierra Leone indicated that the interventions were not far reaching; they increased violence and extended the duration of the conflict. The intervention was effective only after the mandate was changed to an enforcement mission followed by comprehensive post-conflict DDR measures and the elaborate peace building measures undertaken to complement the military intervention.

In contrast, the intervention in Libya was limited to air campaigns and naval blockades without a comprehensive post-conflict peace plan. No major initiative was undertaken for peace building and stabilization especially regarding security and other institutional reforms. The UN Security Council established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) in September 2011 to support the political and economic transition of Libya including assistance in the restoration of "security and order" and to strengthen state authority and institutions (UNSCR, 2009 of 2011(d); Fanchini, 2012:103). This, however,

fell short of direct involvement of the international community to address the fundamental structural and institutional constraints in Libya.

In all the cases, the military interventions were accompanied by a rise in violence and casualties. The OLT and subsequent interventions in the Uganda insurgency; the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone; Ethiopian and AMISOM interventions in Somalia; the MNJTF in Nigeria and the NATO intervention in Libya, were accompanied by high levels of casualties.

The international involvement that was supportive of the governments of Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Somalia (either directly as in Sierra Leone or indirectly as in the case of Nigeria) explored alternate ways to complement or avoid military intervention through dialogue and mediation. Military intervention was undertaken when mediation failed. However, the R2P intervention in Libya was undertaken before other forms of involvement were exhausted. Libya therefore presented a mass uprising that transformed into an insurgency, and as an R2P intervention that escalated into increased violence contrary to the principle of ending carnage.

In anticipation of a possible ceasefire and negotiated settlement, the Gaddafi regime restrained from the use of force as indicated by casualties prior to the end of March, 2011, despite the superiority of the armed forces. This was explicit during the recapture of insurgent controlled cities in the East including Ajdabiya, Bani Wadid, Brega, Ras Lanuf, Zawiya and parts of Misurata (The Military Balance, 2012:13; Kuperman, 2013:112,117; Prashad, 2012:150). Gaddafi himself appeared reconciliatory when in an address on March 17 he called on the insurgents in Benghazi to emulate "your brothers in Ajdabiya and other places and throw away your weapons". He also assured them of clemency, as those in the other cities were not pursued (Kuperman, 2013:13).

These gestures in addition to those of the AU were ignored by NATO and the insurgents. Indeed, an offer by Venezuela to mediate was similarly rejected. A negotiated and peaceful exit for Gaddafi by the AU could have avoided the violence and the post-conflict violence chaos. Whether that would have indeed led to Gaddafi's eventual exit and

resulted in the reforms that spurred the mass uprisings in the first place, remains contentious. Indeed, operative paragraph one of the UNSCR 1973 called for a ceasefire and Gaddafi seemed to accept that without preconditions, but this was rejected by the NTC. The AU *Ad Hoc* committee similarly secured his consent, but the NTC insisted on the exit of Gaddafi as a precondition for a cessation of hostilities in expectation of continuing support from NATO (ICG, 2011(b):28; Prashad, 2012:168; Kuperman, 2013:115). Alternate conflict resolution mechanisms were thus ignored by the insurgents.

The mismatch between the insurgents and the regime has been articulated by various observers. In June 2011, the ICG reported that the opposition was "too unorganized and inexperienced to match the regime's forces" (ICG, 2011(b):28; Barry, 2011:9). The Military Balance (2012:14) endorsed this view with the assertion that the "rebels in Benghazi and eastern Libya would have been rapidly defeated, followed by the rebels further West". However, the implementation of the no-fly-zone introduced more fire power that gave impetus to the insurgents. It also "hardened the resolve" of the Gaddafi regime to fight both the insurgents and NATO which also increased casualties (ICG, 2011(b):28; Fanchini, 2012:102). The NATO attacks also provided air support for the insurgents, disabled air and naval defence systems of the regime, and enabled free naval access to transport arms between Benghazi and Misurata (The Military Balance, 2012:13; Prashad, 2012:172-173). This effectively created the space for the insurgents to mount an unimpeded attack against the regime.

Notwithstanding this support, the insurgents failed to make inroads beyond Benghazi by mid-March 2011 and suffered reverses in Misurata and Jebel Nafusa. They were able to mount offensives following air-drops of weapons by France. Thus with superior manpower and armaments, the regime could have defeated the insurgents thereby reducing the duration of the insurgency; reduced casualty and violence and de-escalated the war. This would have also effectively ended the insurgency (Kuperman, 2013:114, 115; Barry, 2011:7). Post-conflict measures such as institutional building including political and security reforms; a DDR programme and process towards reconciliation of the political

forces among others, would have created a semblance of stability after the intervention (Eriksson, 2014:4). Absence of this led to a continuation of the conflict.

9. CONCLUSION

International involvement in the insurgencies analysed, irrespective of the nature of the mandates, was primarily aimed at reducing human suffering and the protection of civilians. Although this chapter assessed the nature and forms of international involvement in the selected case studies, emphasis was placed on military intervention, either unilaterally or by multinational forces. Positive correlation between military interventions and increased violence as well as increased civilian casualties was established. Given that the aim was largely violence reduction, the interventions could be deemed to have failed to achieve the intended purpose, especially in the short to medium term.

The termination or continuation of the insurgencies was dependent on the stage of the insurgency prior to an intervention. This is evident in the case studies. The interventions in the insurgencies of the LRA, *Al-Shabaab* and *Boko Haram* were undertaken when the insurgencies were at the stage of guerrilla warfare including terrorism, and that accounted for the seeming failure and extended duration of the insurgencies.

However, a comparison of the RUF in Sierra Leone and the Libyan insurgencies revealed that while both were embarked on when the insurgencies were at the conventional war stages, there were mixed outcomes. The case of Sierra Leone confirmed that success of a multilateral military intervention may be dependent on other variables including the participation of ground troops to stabilize the post-conflict environment, and a comprehensive DDR programme in addition to post-conflict institutional reforms. These elements were not addressed in the intervention in Libya.

The case of Libya was analysed within the context of the R2P and possible reduction of violence through mechanisms other than military intervention. It established that a multinational military force under R2P may not necessarily reduce the levels of violence.

Indeed, it rather transformed a militant mass uprising into a violent insurgency and a civil war. The case of Libya called for the exploration of other forms of international involvement to de-escalate the insurgency and save lives.

The nature of international involvement in the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt underscored the assumptions that other forms of involvement may encourage political settlements of grievances, reduce violence and casualties, and engender smooth transitions although these are of course not the only factors that determine outcomes.

CHAPTER EIGHT: EVALUATION

1. SUMMARY

This chapter summarises the findings of the research and presents an evaluation of the findings based on the aim and objectives of the study as set out in the research objectives and assumptions in Chapter One.

The aim of this study, as stated in Chapter One, is to examine the relationship between a mass uprising and insurgency and if those that occurred in Africa from the 1990s to 2011 exhibited similar characteristics or can be classified as new types of insurgencies. To achieve this, the chapter delineated the research theme and objectives which was an examination of the insurgencies and the mass uprisings in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in terms of basis, characteristics, similarities and differences. Other objectives were a discussion of the nature and forms of international involvement. This was examined within the context of transformation of a mass uprising into an insurgency and an escalation of an existing insurgency. The regional implications of the interventions were also assessed. This was explained by the review of existing literature and in the formulation and demarcation of the research problem.

The conceptual framework for the study was presented in Chapters Two and Three. The concepts of uprising, mass uprising and insurgency as well as the interconnection between these concepts in relation to the concepts of rebellion, insurrection, *coup d'état* and war were examined in Chapter Two. In discussing the relationship between the concepts of uprising, insurgency and related concepts, emphasis was placed on a violence escalation ladder to establish the progression from one level to the other. The similarities and differences between the concepts were also highlighted as well as the causes of mass uprisings and insurgencies. The chapter further explained the evolutionary nature of the concept of insurgency and the characteristics of new forms that are driven by the use of technology for organization and mobilization. The impact of multilateral intervention on the duration and the level of violence was also highlighted.

A framework to identify the differences between mass uprisings and forms of insurgencies that could serve as a basis for identification of new types of insurgencies was also constructed in this chapter. The criteria for differentiation were based on goals, motivation, strategy of warfare, leadership, duration and external support. This established the differences between mass uprisings and insurgencies as well as the factors that transform mass uprisings into insurgencies.

The concepts of international involvement and intervention in domestic conflicts were analysed in Chapter Three. The basis of third party involvement, mechanisms for involvement and the outcomes of international involvement were also assessed. Primacy was placed on multilateral military intervention. The impact of international involvement on the outcome of conflicts in terms of duration and escalation of violence was established. Violence in this instance was measured in terms of casualties during an intervention and conflict continuation or termination. Third party involvement in the insurgencies in Africa during the colonial and the post-colonial period were also discussed briefly with emphasis on the motivations.

The various forms of intervention were discussed with an emphasis on humanitarian military intervention that was intended to protect civilians and contain the extreme violence associated with contemporary insurgencies. The moral hazard dilemma presented by the concept in relation to civilian protection was also analysed.

Chapter Four examined the insurgencies in Africa during the colonial and the post-colonial eras, in terms of criteria for differentiation established in Chapter Two. The discussion confirmed that the insurgencies in the colonial era were generally motivated by nationalist sentiments and driven by specific ideologies that also guided their organization, structure and the level of international involvement. In contrast, the post-colonial and the post-Cold War insurgencies portrayed a semblance of criminality and terrorism that exploited prevailing socio-economic situations in the respective countries and religion as tools for mobilization.

The chapter established that the post-colonial insurgencies reflected the patronage-based systems associated with weaker states in which such insurgencies emerged. This also explained the absence of ideology and a clear political programme for mobilization, and the reliance on coercion to extract legitimacy. While the post-Cold War insurgencies appeared diverse in terms of religion, they exhibited similar characteristics in terms of the context of the insurgencies; the lack of ideology; structure; dependence on violence and coercion; brutality; fear; and abductions for mobilization. The criminal nature of these insurgencies, notably the insurgencies of the LRA, RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab*, were analysed in this respect. Irrespective of the similarities, these insurgencies exuded differences in terms of mobilization (exploitation of ICT and use of foreign fighters) and strategy and tactics (use of suicide bombings, IEDs and hostage-taking). The chaotic nature of the insurgencies and the over-reliance on terrorism and violence were, however, defining characteristics of these groups.

The Tunisian and the Egyptian mass uprisings in 2011 were analysed in Chapter Five. The restrictive political systems and economic liberalization policies of both countries; the inability by the respective governments to provide employment for the restive youth, in addition to corruption; and inequality and cronyism, created the space for dissent. The chapter confirmed that the mass uprisings were similar to classical mass uprisings in terms of spontaneity, lack of organization, absence of ideology and composition of the crowds that transcended class and status. The role of ICT, particularly social media networks was confirmed as a virtual tool for mobilization and coordination of the masses. The mass uprisings in the two countries led to relatively peaceful transitions into democratic systems in view of the ambivalence displayed by the armed forces of the two states; the relatively developed civil society; and a façade of freedom of association in those countries.

The mass uprising in Libya was discussed in Chapter Six. While the causes were similar to those of Tunisia and Egypt, the primordial nature of Libyan society and the *Jamahiriya* system of government expanded the existing patronage-based system that was supported by oil revenues. Cronyism and corruption also enhanced the rule and

dominance of the Gaddafi family. The spontaneous outburst, however, occurred along regional or ethnic lines that conformed to the tribal nature of the society. The Libyan mass uprising escalated into an insurgency and a civil war due to the nature of the Gaddafi regime and the violent reaction of the regime to the mass uprising; the tribal composition of the country which was also the basis of the implosion of the armed forces; and the involvement of third parties.

International involvement in the mass uprisings and insurgencies, and its impact on the escalation of violence and outcome in terms of conflict termination or continuation was discussed in Chapter Seven. It placed emphasis on the impact of diplomatic, military and humanitarian military interventions or the R2P on the outcome of the mass uprisings and insurgencies in the case studies. The chapter concluded that while the primary aim of the interventions was to save lives, international involvement in the mass uprisings and insurgencies yielded mixed outcomes including escalation of violence leading to loss of lives. It was confirmed that the marginal and indirect nature of involvement in both mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt reduced the levels of violence and possible escalation into an insurgency, and created the environment for liberalization of the political system in both countries.

In discussing the outcomes of the interventions, the chapter established that all the military interventions escalated the levels of the violence in the insurgencies with increased fatalities that also resulted in conflict continuation, with the exception of the intervention in the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone which successfully terminated the insurgency. This was attributed to the implementation of a comprehensive DDR and institutional building programmes. The intervention in Sierra Leone contrasted with that in Libya under the R2P. It was also a hostile intervention that transformed a militant mass uprising into an insurgency with high levels of violence.

2. TESTING OF THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE STUDY

These following sections will test the assumptions formulated in the introductory chapter based on the findings of the research.

2.1 Mass uprisings and insurgencies are different concepts explaining political violence.

The study examined the concepts of uprising, mass uprising and insurgency within the context of political violence. An uprising, whether violent or nonviolent, spontaneous or organized, is recognised as a rebellion against an existing political order. It can be on a small scale or conducted by a larger group and thus multifarious groups or individuals from all the stratums of society unified only by a common grievance or grievances against the political establishment. The size of the individuals that congregate to register a protest elevates the uprising into a mass uprising. In terms of outcome, the study confirmed that an uprising can lead to a change of government or maintenance of an existing political order. Viewed in this sense, an uprising was presented as a broad concept denoting a rebellion against an authority and a continuum from rebellion to war. This can start as a riot with various inflexion points that either escalate or terminate the rebellion. The study identified insurgency as part of this continuum and it was defined relative to the magnitude and extent of violence employed and the level of organization. The study thus established insurgency as an uprising against an established authority.

The framework for differentiation between mass uprising and insurgency highlighted the parameters for distinction between the two concepts as well as the difference between the classical and contemporary forms of insurgency. While a mass uprising can evolve into an insurgency given certain conditions including the response of the regime to the crowds; foreign involvement and the resilience of the security forces among others; not all insurgencies emerged from mass uprisings (Atkinson *et al* 2011:2; Bhardwaj, 2012:77).

The insurgencies in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Somalia were confirmed as armed uprisings against the respective governments in those countries. These, however, were organised by vanguard organizations (namely LRA, RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab*) that mobilized segments of the society to pursue their insurgencies. The insurgencies were largely rural-based, protracted and also adopted different strategies including terrorism, guerrilla warfare and conventional strategy. The groups managed to control

swatches of territories in their respective countries. None of these groups propagated a definite ideology, a clear political aim or economic programme for their insurgencies in the territories under their control (Dunn, 2007:140).

This is contrasted with the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya which began as mass and unorganised movements, devoid of structures and form or political programmes. However, the case of Libya highlighted the relationship between the various segments of the continuum and the transition from a militant mass uprising to an urban-based insurgency that spanned eight months before degeneration into a sectarian civil war.

The case studies confirmed the distinction between mass uprising and insurgency. While both concepts represent an uprising against an established authority, an insurgency could be initiated by a small group of individuals. The aim may not necessarily be political. The insurgencies of the LRA, RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* confirmed that mobilization for an uprising (insurgency) may be based on criminal intent rather than political motives. Tunisia, Egypt and Libya established that a mass uprising involves a larger segment of society that dissipates class, social status, political affiliation, ethnic or religious inclination among others. Again the case studies confirmed that while mass uprisings are spontaneous and have shorter durations, insurgencies tend to be more organised and protracted. While the demand for political change is articulated in the mass uprisings studied, it is less pronounced in the insurgencies.

The foregoing indicates that an insurgency is a form of an uprising against an established authority with a high level of violence on the escalation ladder. However, not all the insurgencies explain political violence or political motivations as with the LRA, RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* which depicted forms of criminal violence. Thus an insurgency can represent criminal violence and not always clearly political violence. Both mass uprising and insurgency are therefore forms of uprising. However, not all insurgencies clearly represent political aims. The assumption that uprisings and insurgencies are different concepts explaining political violence is therefore partially proven by the study.

2.2 Insurgencies in Africa have mainly followed known patterns and types of insurgencies with the addition of the so-called "criminal insurgencies."

The study identified classical or traditional and contemporary insurgencies as two main types of insurgency (Kaldor, 2011:2) and established a framework for differentiation of insurgencies and mass uprisings in Chapter Two. The study also underscored the prevalence of classical and reformist oriented insurgencies in Africa during the colonial and the post-colonial period respectively (Clapham, 1998(b):2-3; Reno, 2012:158-160). Contemporary insurgencies were associated with the post-Cold War era (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b)). The study also established that whilst the origins of contemporary insurgencies reflected some attributes of classical insurgencies, the pattern, motivation and the military strategy to prosecute their insurgencies deviated from the traditional insurgencies. Mobilization in these cases were based on coercion, brutality, ruthlessness and fear.

The causes of the insurgencies in Africa conformed to the known patterns. The case studies analysed confirmed that insurgencies are borne out of political and socio-economic challenges existing in a state including politics of exclusion; demographic changes, economic maladministration; unequal regional developments; relative deprivation on a large segment of society; the existence of patronage-based systems; economic liberalization that benefited family and cronies; fraudulent elections and the loss of legitimacy and domino effect. These factors are accelerated by some immediate factors that trigger the masses or a vanguard group to initiate a rebellion. Criminal insurgencies exploited these grievances.

These attributes reflected in the insurgencies by the LRA, RUF, *Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab* emerged from similar backgrounds. The causes of these insurgencies included the inability of the ruling regimes to resolve differences in terms of marginalization of some ethnic groups; economic and political disparities (Williams, 2014:14). In terms of motivation, these groups were seen as an aggregation of ethno-religious terrorists, mercenaries or criminal groups that sought to control local or national resources using

genuine, national or local grievances as motivation. This explains the absence of coherent ideological basis for the pursuit of their insurgencies (Reno, 2012:157-158; Kaldor, 2011:3). Their structures were, however, similar to other classical insurgencies which were based on hierarchical, yet autonomous cells (Bøås and Dunn, 2007(b):34). External support was manifested in the cases studied. However, the Islamic-based groups (*Boko Haram* and *Al-Shabaab*) tended to affiliate with global *Jihadist* groups and influenced the target and fighting strategy of the groups (Devlin-Foltz, 2010:5; Marchal, 2009:394).

The mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya similarly followed the known patterns of mass uprisings in terms of causes, spontaneity and mobilization. The exploitation of ICT increased the permeability of the causes or actions with the populace. This broadened the base of the participants with real time information on developments. It also brought the developments to a global audience. The case studies thus revealed that mass uprisings in 2011 added another dimension which drew on both traditional media and cyber space. The mass uprisings studied were more potent, militant and successful in deposing regimes or leadership akin to historical antecedents. This did not define new elements in mass uprisings.

While the use of SMN for mobilization and organization was phenomenal, exploitation of technology in itself for mobilization was not a novelty. The study confirmed that existing communication technology was used for mobilization of the masses during the Iranian revolution (Kashani-Sabet, 2012:157 cited in Aarts *et al*, 2012:75). Thus the dependence on technology cannot be described as a novelty.

Although similarities exist, major differences were identified in the examination of the insurgencies in Africa during the colonial period and those analysed in the case studies. Indeed, the insurgencies analysed in the case studies were marked deviations from known patterns in terms of motivation and strategy of warfare. The assumption that insurgencies in Africa have mainly followed known patterns and types of insurgencies with the addition of the so-called "criminal insurgencies" could only partially be confirmed.

2.3 The uprisings in North Africa in 2011 represented a new category of insurgency which tended to be a fusion of mass uprisings and traditional insurgent methods

The characteristic features of mass uprisings and insurgencies (both classical and contemporary) were similarly highlighted by the framework for differentiation in Chapter Two. The mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya followed classical methods of mass uprising. The study also established that not all mass uprisings transformed into insurgencies, and at the same time not all insurgencies emerged out of mass uprisings.

Tunisia and Egypt did not transform into an insurgency because of the nature of the society, which permitted a semblance of democracy and freedom of association and expression. The fundamental difference in the political systems in Tunisia and Egypt on the one hand and Libya on the other hand, was a factor that created different outcomes (Joffé, 2011:511). As explained in Chapters Five and Six, although repressive, the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt tolerated a level of dissent and political or civic organizations with the existence of trade unions, professionals and civic organizations. Libya, on the other hand, maintained a highly informal system of governance without clearly defined institutions and the dominance of tribal groups. Besides the structure of the society, the undeveloped nature of communications also accounted for the localised or decentralised nature of the Libyan mass uprising, in contrast to the SMN-aided large-scale mobilizations associated with those in Tunisia and Egypt.

Again the armed forces in both Tunisia and Egypt have contrasting roles in the political and the economic arrangement of the countries, but both remained neutral during the mass uprisings and that posture appeared supportive of the masses. The position of the armed forces, and the sedentary level of international involvement subdued the escalation of the mass uprisings in the two states. Chapter Six concluded that in Libya, the army imploded and divided between the regime and the protectors, and that initiated an insurgency and a subsequent civil war. The exceptional case of Libya therefore escalated the mass uprising into an insurgency.

The discussion on Libya in Chapter Six indicated that the Libyan insurgency was characterised by high levels of violence; massive and open international involvement by way of R2P; chaotic or unorganised violence associated with the emergence of numerous tribal and sectarian-based militias controlling major cities; uncoordinated organisations; and short and urban-based conventional warfare. A political motive, namely the removal of Gaddafi, was made clear in the initial stage that was coordinated by the NTC. However, a political programme for the future of society was not articulated. The territories seized were controlled by autonomous groups including *Jihadists*, criminal militias such as ISIL, and tribal militias. The conflict became a contest for ethno-sectarian and other reasons than a total liberation and transformation of the country. These portrayed different motives for state capture. It was short-lived with chaotic violence and had a large measure of external support that rapidly transformed the insurgency into a conventional stage. These features contained elements of mass uprisings, as well as classical and contemporary forms of insurgencies.

The fall of Gaddafi, the hurried exit of NATO, and the absence of a plan for comprehensive post-conflict stabilization and institution building and reforms created a political and security vacuum. The tribal origins of Libyan society and the *Jamahiriya* system had directly eroded confidence in state institutions. This was exploited by *Jihadist*, sectarianism, tribal militias creating a semblance of criminal insurgencies or warlords in some instances (ICG, 2011(b):29).

Was the Arab Spring a new type of conflict or did it produce a new form of insurgency? Melvin (2012:43) argues that in terms of "scale, intensity and duration" the conflict conformed to the new patterns of conflict. While this assertion holds true, the rapid transformation of the mass uprising into an insurgency in Libya, the multiplicity of actors, the rapid transition to conventional war, and transition from an organized insurgency into a civil war as an outcome of an R2P intervention, support its consideration as a new type of insurgency.

The insurgency in Libya exuded motivations and characteristics of both classical and contemporary insurgencies as well as other elements that defined new features. The assumption that the uprisings in North Africa in 2011 defined a new category of insurgency which tended to be a fusion or a hybrid of mass uprisings and traditional insurgent methods is therefore confirmed with specific reference to the Libyan insurgency.

2.4 The role and extent of involvement by the international community influence the transition of an uprising (a mass uprising) into an insurgency and also impact on the nature, duration and level of violence employed in the selected cases.

Chapters Three and Seven highlighted that international involvement included a broad array of activities which can be military or non-military, and direct or indirect support for either side in a conflict. These activities evolved to include forcible humanitarian intervention by the international community to prevent genocide and alleviate suffering (Regan, 2003:23; Bellamy and Williams, 2011:826-827; Kuperman, 2013:8-12, 105). The study established that while not all forms of international involvement increased violence and fatalities associated with the conflicts, all the military involvements either directly or indirectly escalated the levels of violence and had a concomitant effect on fatalities associated with the conflicts analysed.

In terms of duration, the involvement in Uganda, Nigeria, Somalia and Libya did not only extend the conflicts, but also increased the levels of violence in the insurgencies as presented in Chapter Seven. *Boko Haram* remained an example of an uprising that transitioned into an insurgency because of counter measures by a government and a regional organization. These developments confirmed the findings by Regan (1996:12; 2002:2) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) that interventions could prolong the duration of conflicts. The intervention in Sierra Leone similarly increased the violence and the duration of the RUF insurgency in the short term. However, peace building measures by the international community contributed to the termination of the insurgency. The interventions in Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia and Libya, contrasted with the

benign involvement in the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that resulted in limited conflict.

The study demonstrated that multilateral military interventions, in whatever form, had a positive correlation with the level of violence, fatalities and duration and, therefore, had a strong impact on the outcomes of the mass uprisings and insurgencies in Africa.

The intervention by the international community under the R2P as was the case in Libya similarly escalated a militant mass uprising into an insurgency and increased violence as manifested by the casualties recorded. The introduction of weapons and support for protestors, either directly or indirectly, created asymmetrical relationships in their favour. Under such circumstances, the weaker party resorted to brutalities and indiscriminate violence to instil fear, engender support and maintain territory. This increased violence by either side in the conflict and created a stalemate that extended the duration of the insurgency in Libya. This confirms the view of Pape (2012:52) that an R2P intervention that employs disproportional force escalates internal conflict.

The assumption that international involvement in the form of direct or indirect military intervention can negatively impact on the nature, duration and the level of violence employed, is therefore confirmed in the cases of Uganda, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Somalia and Libya.

3. CONCLUSIONS

The case studies revealed that contrary to the objective of preventing genocide and atrocities, international involvement, particularly military intervention in any form (R2P or otherwise), created moral hazard situations leading to increased violence in established insurgencies in Uganda, Nigeria and Somalia. It also transformed a mass uprising into an insurgency and a civil war in the case of Libya. Protestors in a mass uprising can risk becoming militant in the hope of attracting a R2P intervention. When this coincides with the resolve or determination of a government to maintain its legal obligation of protecting the state, the basis of escalation of a mass uprising into an insurgency is created.

The need for risk reduction measures to avert moral hazard situations in future conflicts is therefore paramount. Two pertinent issues on the nature, type and extent of involvement by the international community in mass uprisings and insurgencies in Africa need to be considered. First, what type of involvement can terminate conflict or reduce violence, and under what conditions can a military intervention or for that matter an R2P intervention prevent escalation, terminate conflict and protect civilians?

The humanitarian interventions in Sierra Leone and in Libya produced different outcomes. While that of Sierra Leone was successful in ending the violence, that in Libya escalated violence. It is important to identify the factors that accounted for the different outcomes. The intervention in Sierra Leone indicates that an intervention, whether supportive or hostile, exacerbates insurgencies and prolongs the duration of conflicts with dire consequences for the populations, unless it is accompanied by comprehensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures with institutional reform. Thus, for R2P to be effective, it should be supported by sustained post-conflict peacebuilding measures, including a DDR programme and institutional reform.

The outcome of the Libyan intervention offers further probing into the operationalization and implementation of the R2P for the concept to achieve the intended purpose. It calls for a reappraisal of the application of the concept along the following considerations. Should an intervention be open ended; should the threat of R2P be withdrawn once a regime indicates a desire to negotiate; should R2P be made more comprehensive to include post-intervention peacebuilding measures; and must R2P include arming and logistic support for protestors or insurgents? These remain enduring questions to be answered if R2P is to be relevant and applied impartially.

Resorting to negotiations alone to resolve conflicts meant the international community should have engaged with *Boko Haram* or *Al-Shabaab*, or should have heeded to the overtures by Gaddafi. Brosché and Höglund (2015:119) found that out of 163 conflicts that terminated in Africa from 1946-2012, 46 ended with a peace settlement, while 55 ended with victory for one party and 62 were terminated due to unstated reasons. The

research further indicates that between 2009 and 2012, no conflict in Africa ended in a peace settlement which suggests that the lure of negotiated settlements to resolve conflicts in Africa which was in vogue in the 1990s has lost its lustre (Brosché and Höglund, 2015:119-120). The low success rate for negotiated settlement weakens the argument for consideration of negotiations to terminate conflicts.

Moreover, a negotiated settlement would involve a leading role for the AU. However, the response of the AU to the case studies was reflective of the inherent weakness of the AU security architecture to contain these uprisings. The nature of personal alliances between the leaders of the states in addition to the existence of regional hegemons within the organization, underscored the inability of the AU to forge a strong consensus to address the crisis, especially in the case of Libya. These also call for a rethinking and re-evaluation of the continental early warning system as well as the responses to possible conflict or perceived genocidal situations.

Other multilateral instruments such as the issuance of arrest warrants by the ICC in the midst of violence, implied that a party has been judged as guilty and tended to harden the resolve of the party. The development rather extended the duration of the conflict with the attendant violence. Application of ICC arrest warrants should be based on some criteria to objectively assess casualties and genocidal actions by all parties in a conflict. In this way, an incumbent regime, insurgents or interveners could be held liable. This may contribute to the reduction of violence in insurgencies.

To terminate conflict and establish enduring peace, any intervention to prevent genocide, protect citizens and end armed conflict should be well thought out with possible post-conflict measures. That is, a viable option should be an incremental use of force as complementary to a peaceful settlement.

ABSTRACT

Topic: The New Insurgencies and Mass Uprisings in Africa and

        International Involvement: Selected Case Studies

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The study examined the relationship between mass uprisings and insurgencies and the impact of international involvement on escalation of mass uprisings into an insurgency. The research used the insurgencies of the LRA (Uganda); RUF (Sierra Leone), *Boko Haram* (Nigeria) and *Al-Shabaab* (Somalia) as well as the mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as case studies.

The study established that insurgencies in Africa that relied primarily on terrorism and violence explain criminal rather than political violence. While the mass uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya revealed normal patterns of conflict, it was established that the case of Libya was a hybrid of mass uprising and insurgent methods that leaned towards a description of a new category of insurgency.

The study further confirmed that internal conditions in a state and the nature of international involvement define the outcomes of a mass uprising or an insurgency in terms of escalation, duration and termination. The comprehensive humanitarian interventions in the insurgencies of the LRA, *Boko Haram*, *Al-Shabaab* and the R2P intervention in Libya escalated violence and conflict continuation. In contrast, the limited involvement in the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt resulted in low levels of violence, while the intervention in Sierra Leone terminated the RUF insurgency in view of the associated DDR and institutional building programmes.

The study recommends that since humanitarian and military interventions invariably escalate violence and increased fatalities, interventions to end conflicts (mass uprisings and insurgencies) must be based an incremental use of force as a complement to peaceful negotiations.

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