

**ASSESSING ADLER AND BARNETT'S THREE TIER FRAMEWORK OF A SECURITY
COMMUNITY: SADC, EMERGING AS A SECURITY COMMUNITY?**

by

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that: “Assessing Adler and Barnett’s Three Tier Framework of a Security Community: SADC, emerging as a Security Community?” is my own work, that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this dissertation was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another University.

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ABSTRACT

The study assesses Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework with a specific focus on the mature phase of their framework that emphasises mutual trust and collective identity as necessary conditions for establishing a security community. Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is applied to SADC's efforts of establishing a security community in the Southern African region. The study explores the reasoning behind SADC's creation with a specific focus on regional integration and how it defines its security architecture and political rationale. By focusing on regional integration and defining SADC's security architecture and political rationale the study outlines how the organisation is making efforts of establishing a security community. This is indicated by describing how SADC has attained the nascent and ascendant phase through its various initiatives and programmes such as the RISDP, SIPO I and II and MDP which provide evidence that there is a sense of cooperation and coordination among SADC member states. The study argues that SADC has reached the nascent and ascendant phase – although the regional organisation has not yet progressed to the mature phase of establishing itself as a security community. The study critiques Adler and Barnett's (1998) third phase, which stresses the importance of two necessary conditions of mutual trust and collective identity. Mutual trust and collective identity are evaluated and analysed in respect of whether or not they are relatable and recognised within SADC as a possible emerging security community. The main finding of the study is that mutual trust and collective identity are not recognised in SADC in the manner in which Adler and Barnett (1998) describe them in their three tier framework. However SADC does make efforts to strengthen mutual trust, coordinate strategies and policies to develop collective identity, rather its efforts are not sufficient to make it a security community in the manner Adler and Barnett (1998) understand it. SADC continues to uphold a strict adherence to sovereignty, and is also characterised by domestic instability, lack of common norms and interests among member states and these are major problems for the organisation to create a security community.

KEYWORDS

Security community, Southern African Development Community, nascent phase, ascendant phase, mature phase, mutual trust and collective identity.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC - African National Congress

AU - African Union

DRC - Democratic Republic of Congo

EBC - Elections Boundaries Commission

FLS - Front Line States

ISDC - Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

MDC - Movement for Democratic Change

MDP - Mutual Defence Pact

OPDSC - Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation

OPDS - Organ on Politics Defence and Security

RISDP - Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan

SADF - South African Defence Force

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SADCC - Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

SIPO I - Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ I

SIPO II - Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ II

UK - United Kingdom

US - United States

USA - United States of America

ZANU PF - Zimbabwe African National Union, Patriotic Front

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CHAPTER ONE

IDENTIFICATION OF THE RESEARCH THEME

1.1 Background

The concept of a security community was first coined by Karl Deutsch and his associates in 1957. Deutsch et al (1957) were concerned with establishing possible ways of abolishing war and from the onset they realised the complexity of the problem. There is no common agreement on alternatives to war and there is ambiguity in the use of the terms “war” and “peace”. War cannot be entirely eliminated but society has to find ways to minimise the possibility and occurrence of war. And yet, “peace” is not also entirely the absence of war. However, the problem is that society needs to work together to eliminate war as a social institution. Deutsch and his associates believed that the formation of “security communities” provided real assurance to members of a community to avoid fighting each other physically but to rather settle disputes in an alternative, less violent manner (Deutsch et al, 1957: 3-5).

The writings of Deutsch et al (1957) made a significant contribution to peace studies. Deutsch et al (1957: vii) were writing from an interdisciplinary approach they aimed to provide new light to on an old problem. The old problem being eliminating war and the new light came from the historical evidence gathered from concepts that Deutsch et al (1957: vii) considered as under searched by historians. Deutsch et al (1957: vii) research was concerned with building a wider political community. In chapter two of this study an explanation of how Deutsch et al (1957: vii) defined a “political community” is discussed. The research of Deutsch et al (1957: 22) focused on re-examining the concept of political integration by questioning the belief that modern life with advanced transport systems, mass communication and literacy tends to be more international than it was in past decades hence it is more likely to create a growth of international institutions. However Deutsch et al (1957: 22) note that neither in their research nor in examining economic and social development there is evidence towards more internationalism. They pointed out that in modern conditions it is more difficult to find instances of successful amalgamation of two or more previously sovereign states. The only example Deutsch et al (1957) considered as closest to developing a security community were the Scandinavian

countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) because they had functional amalgamation although it has remained pluralistic. It is through this example that Deutsch et al (1957: 29) recognised greater potential in pluralistic security communities. In the study an in depth understanding is discussed as to why a pluralistic security community is more viable instead of an amalgamated security community.

Deutsch et al (1957: 31) emphasise the main reason for their research was to address the political goal overshadowing states which is “keeping peace among participating units”. In their research they highlight that states and participating units “seek a political community that would not merely keep peace among its members but that would also be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes” (Deutsch et al, 1957: 31). Moreover, the significance of Deutsch et al’s (1957: 115) research indicates the unattractive nature of war among political units – war is unattractive because it is devastating and indecisive thus Deutsch et al (1957: 31) aimed at providing a framework of how political units could achieve peace.

Achieving peace is a critical objective for states particularly those in the of political community that Deutsch et al (1957) refer to, therefore the research done by Deutsch et al (1957) provides a foundation for scholars such as Adler and Barnett (1998) to continue to seek and develop concepts and frameworks that are aimed at eliminating war and establishing stable peace.

Scholars Adler and Barnett (1998) have built their argument in support of Deutsch’s conception of a security community. Deutsch’s concept of a security community acknowledges that reality is a “social construction driven by collective understandings, including norms that emerge from social interaction” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 10, 12). Adler and Barnett (1998) support Deutsch and further expand on the paradigm by stating that the phenomenon of a security community is “socially based and is premised on shared knowledge, ideational forces and a dense normative environment” (Ngoma, 2003: 19).

Adler and Barnett (1996) set the emergence of a security community in a three tier framework emphasising transnational and interstate interactions and the production of a transnational community which, in their understanding, can help create dependable expectations of peaceful changes (Adler and Barnett, 1996:74). Therefore, this study focused on analysing Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework of a security community. The third tier of Adler and

Barnett's (1998) framework outlines two necessary conditions in the formation of a security community. These two conditions are mutual trust and collective identity. The two conditions mentioned above will form part of the central critique of this study. These two necessary conditions will be analysed in terms of their applicability in the formation of a security community. The study refers to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and how these two necessary conditions are possibly recognised within the organisation. The study intends to refer to official documents and publications released by SADC. This is because it will provide an understanding of whether or not SADC's position is a possible emerging security community in the manner Adler and Barnett (1998) conceptualise it. There is no specific period stated to limit the study to a particular context because SADC in this regard is observed with regards to its progression towards establishing a security community. Therefore, SADC is referred to as a unit of analysis because it is a long standing regional organisation that dates back to the Front Line States (FLS). The FLS are later discussed in detail in chapter three of this study. SADC evolved from a collection of states that had formed mutual security within the Southern African region against an aggressive apartheid-South Africa. Selecting SADC as case of study is because the regional organisation has a long history of a security architecture and as discussed in the literature overview below debates have emerged regarding its questionable status of it, being a security community or not.

1.2 Literature overview

The literature overview is divided into two sections. The first section is a discussion on the scholarly debates on how Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework of a security community has been viewed and contested as a theoretical construct. The second section presents a brief discussion on scholars that have done significant research on SADC in relation to distinguishing whether it is a security community or not.

1.2.1 Debates on Adler and Barnett's three tier framework of a security community

Beyer (2005) has commented on Adler and Barnett's framework on the study of security communities. Beyer offers his views and further compares the three stages which the framework provides. In Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework of developing security communities, the last tier stresses the importance of mutual trust as a necessary condition in the

development of a security community. For Beyer (2005) the concern is to overcome mistrust, because the notion of trust is at the centre of the debate in theorising about security community construction. This is because trust derives from circumstantial conditions which are based on integrative processes. It also provides a foundation to have better interaction among individual actors and creating a lasting transformation. He argues that the main focus is to establish a model of conflict solving created on the basis of deep integration. Beyer (2005) further mentions that liberal domestic structures are insufficient in explaining peaceful power transition (Beyer, 2005: 13, 14, 19).

Schoeman (2002) describes the three tier framework that Adler and Barnett (1998) present as a continuum that implies an evolutionary development. However, the nature in which a security community develops does not necessarily follow the pattern of the three tiers. Schoeman (2002) argues that the evolution of a security community should not be confined to the three tiers that Adler and Barnett (1998) propose. Instead the formation of a security community is a product of its own histories. Furthermore, a community can leap from one stage to another without following the proposed growth pattern. Another critical issue that Schoeman (2002) mentions, is on the view which Adler and Barnett (1998) recommend, that a security community is essentially an “intra-community effort and process”. According to Schoeman (2002: 7) this recommendation is inapplicable to Africa because the continent is faced with multiple threats which demand external participation in order for a security community to emerge. Schoeman (2002) notes that African states are facing internal threats which inhibit their participation in processes of building a security community. Although Schoeman (2002) was writing from a continental perspective she does make a critical point by stating that African states are facing internal threats – thus whether at a continental or regional level African states are at a position that inhibits them from establishing a security community.

Pouliot (2007) wrote about the Russian-Atlantic security community which comprised of North America and Western Europe and has historically developed high dependable expectations of peace. He used Adler and Barnett’s (1998) theoretical framework as a point of reference to indicate how the Russian-Atlantic security community emerged without any meaningful collective identity among the states belonging to that community. Pouliot’s (2007) observation challenges Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework, by pointing out that the framework

does not consider what it means in practice to be at peace. Furthermore he highlights the need for an alternative way of theorising a security community. He proposes that a revised framework should focus on the reasonable points that have guided states into peaceful practices and to contextualise and historicise peace in order to recover its subjective meaning. Essentially, for Pouliot (2007) the problem with Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is that it does not define what it means to be at peace (Pouliot, 2007: 617, 618). Peace is not necessarily the total absence of war.

Ngoma (2005) highlights how in the discourse of security communities there appears to be selective bias with regards to its application in the African continent. He mentions that scholars such as Adler and Barnett (1998) have done significant work on the study of security communities but have failed to apply their theories to an African context. Instead they focus on European and American states. Ngoma (2005) emphasises that there is a gap that needs to be filled in respect to the research done on the African continent (Ngoma, 2005: 40, 41). Ngoma (2005: 41) further explains that Adler and Barnett (1998) are aware of the gap in their research. In fact Adler and Barnett (1998: 17) expect their work to provide “an intellectual inspiration for other scholars to use the concept of security communities for regions that they do not cover”. In his book titled *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Regional Security in the Southern African Development Community* - Ngoma (2005) applies Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework of a security community to the Southern African region using SADC as practical example in his findings he concludes that SADC is emerging as security community.

Wallensteen (2002) raises an important matter about the composition of security communities. He argues that Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework does not mention the size of states forming security communities. According to Wallensteen (2002) security communities are often made up of smaller states that often do not follow principles of peaceful co-operation and are likely to be hostile towards larger and stronger states outside of the community. Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework needs to stipulate the size of the states which are to be part of a security community. This is because in a security community some states are likely to depend on the power of another state in a situation whereby one state has more power in terms of influence and other aspects compared to another. Wallensteen (2002) refers to the necessity of having hegemonic states that will have a leading role in a security community (Wallensteen, 2002: 267, 268).

Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework embraces democracy as a precondition for the emergence of a security community. But Mohammed, Tesfagiorgis and de Waal (2002) argue that there are various elements linked to the establishing of a security community: they consider internal peace, regional power and democracy linked to peace and security. Their argument provides an alternative understanding of Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework. Mohammed et al (2002) highlight the importance of inter-state security as critical for creating conditions of interconnectedness within the continent however the lack of inter-state conflict does not mean there is stable peace among states. Mohammed et al (2002) then provide a different perspective. By considering the less democratic states they explain such states as those that have militarised governments. These are governments that have the tendency to centralise security apparatus as national security as well as using military threats as a means of exerting power. Mohammed et al (2002) claim that militarised governments are able to have peaceful relationships with one another, hence indicating the possibility of a security community. But the trio doubts whether or not such a community can enjoy sustained peace and security. Despite these criticisms, Mohammed et al (2002) support Adler and Barnett (1998) by stating that a security community is not only established based on political and economic interests, but also on common identity and common destiny (Mohammed, Tesfagiorgis and de Waal 2002: 5, 6).

1.2.2 SADC, a security community?

Since this study refers to SADC as a case it is important to note the opinions and perspectives that various key authors have on SADC in relation to the concept of a security community. Nathan is one of the prominent scholars who have done significant research on security communities and SADC. He has written and presented papers that tackle key issues in questioning SADC in relation to the concept of a security community. According to Nathan (2006) a regional organisation like SADC which consists of unstable states cannot develop into a security community if it continues to focus on interstate relations and strongly adheres to the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. Internal state violence cannot be isolated or ignored because, overall, it causes regional instability. As a regional organisation, SADC does engage in peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building. However, its ability to strengthen weak states and transform authoritarian ones is limited. This is because the strength of the organisation stems from member states and SADC member states are weak states and weak

states are likely to establish weak organisations. Thus Nathan (2006) highlights that domestic instability generates tension between states and inevitably, can lead to an insecure region of states (Nathan, 2006: 293, 294).

Ngoma (2003) has written on specific developments in SADC moving towards a security community. He notes the establishment of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in 1996 as a significant effort of the organisation attempting to integrate national political institutions and coordinating their values. The common concern among SADC member states is enhancing solidarity, as a majority of SADC's programmes emphasise the need of promoting common values. Ngoma (2003) states that the SADC 2001 Summit was the most critical in the development of security structures for the region. Additionally, Ngoma (2003) stresses that the relationship among states has improved although states have not fully implemented the security agreements made by the organisation (Ngoma, 2003: 17, 26). In 2003, at the SADC Summit heads of state and governments established a Mutual Defence Pact (MDP). The pact was aimed at "stabilising the region, cultivating an atmosphere conducive to investment and long-term stability, providing a mechanism to prevent conflict" (Ngoma, 2004: 411, 414). Ngoma (2004) considered the MDP but believes that the disparity among member states caused inability to operationalise the pact. Nonetheless, Ngoma (2004) remains optimistic that SADC is determined to achieve success through its common structures regardless of the obstacles it encounters (Ngoma, 2004: 421).

Van Aardt (currently Schoeman) (1996) argues that the concept of a security community can be applied to the sub-region of SADC. She points to the institutionalisation of security co-operation within the region. According to Van Aardt (1996) the development of the OPDS in 1996 indicated the start of a new process to build and maintain security in the region. Van Aardt (1997) thus considers SADC to have made a definitive move towards a security community rather than focusing on security through regional co-operation. Moreover Van Aardt (1997) attempts to apply Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework of a security community to the African continent and concludes that the continental body, the African Union (AU), conforms to an emerging security community. In her later work Schoeman (2002) argues that the AU could possibly emerge as a security community because it reflects the faith of Africans in their

common identity and common destiny which propels it towards the formation of a security community.

Booth and Vale (1995) allude to a different perspective. The scholars argue and wonder whether or not the Southern African region can develop into a security community because of a previous history of deep insecurity which was created by apartheid in South Africa. They consider the region as a “community of insecurity” instead of a security community. Booth and Vale (1995) argue that states in the region are inclined to form a regional structure in order to enhance their national interests rather than regional security concerns. Furthermore, they mention that the development of a security community in the region is delayed by the lack of communication within the region. According to Booth and Vale (1995) communication in the region is both slow and costly and has detrimental effects on economic and political issues. Although they refer to the current conditions existing in Southern Africa as unfavourable to the development of a security community, they applaud the possibility of developing a security community based on the shared disasters and common rivals the region has. The region should use this common identity to create a sense of mutual interest and obligation.

Van Schalkwyk (2005: 33) refers to the prominent need for creating a security community in Southern Africa because conflict and political instability characterise African states and international security trends have moved towards responsibility of conflict management. Therefore sub-regional security arrangements such as SADC need to create regional security communities. He argues that the legal basis exists in treaties and protocols. However, the political will to fully implement such a community is absent. Van Schalkwyk (2005) describes the current status of the region as collaborative or co-operative security regime consisting of mechanisms such as the MDP and a number of weak institutions. Van Schalkwyk (2005) considers the main problem for the region is the lack of maintaining sufficient political will and admits that once the region has overcome that it will be able to create a well-functioning sub-regional security community (Van Schalkwyk, 2005: 35, 41).

In essence, the first section of the literature overview discussed the various perspectives of scholars on Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework. But none of the scholars probe into the significance of the two necessary conditions which the framework highlights. The second section of the literature overview states that SADC is not considered a security community and

none of the scholars mentioned above make reference to it as a security community. The scholarly perspectives discussed above present the various issues that hinder the sub-regional organisation into forming a security community. Some scholars suggest methods which the organisation can abide by to establish a security community in the region, but did not go deep into analysing how these methods can facilitate the creation of a security community. The common theme among the literature available on SADC in relation to the organisation forming a security community is based on the shortcomings of the region which subsequently caused unfavourable conditions for developing a security community.

This study will investigate in what ways SADC embodies the two necessary conditions which Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasise. This study aims to provide a different perspective, using the two conditions namely, mutual trust and collective identity as a tool of assessment. The perspective adopted in this study is analytical because it investigates whether Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework can be used to assist SADC into establishing itself as a security community. Possibly, this approach will distinguish the importance of the two necessary conditions and most importantly, debate how SADC embodies these two necessary conditions. Essentially this study attempts to analyse the importance of theory and its applicability.

Additionally, this study will make reference to the first two tiers of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework since they are preliminary in the framework. The first two tiers of the framework will be unpacked with reference to SADC. This will provide an analysis of SADC's position in relation to the framework. The study aims to investigate the last tier of the framework in an in-depth analysis because of the high emphasis Adler and Barnett (1998) place on the two necessary conditions in the third tier.

1.3 Formulation and demarcation of research problem

The research question of this study is as follows: how is Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework significant to SADC's progression into developing itself as an emerging security community? The secondary research question is: how has SADC interpreted its policy and strategic plans into assisting it to emerge as a security community?

The first research question is concerned with the significance of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework – whether their framework has significant impact on SADC developing itself as a

possible security community. Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework explores how a security community should ideally develop and their framework is then applied to SADC as an emerging security community. The second research question focuses on ways in which SADC has explained and created policies and strategies to assist it to develop into a security community. Most importantly do the policies and strategies developed by SADC support the development of a security community.

The focus of this study is centred on Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework of developing a security community. The problem addressed in this study is based on analysing the applicability of the two necessary conditions which Adler and Barnett (1998) present as the final stage of their three tier framework of developing a security community. This study seeks to investigate how the two necessary conditions are understood and identified in the formation of a security community. Furthermore, the study will investigate how deeply entrenched these two necessary conditions need to be, within a community of states in order to resemble or develop what Adler and Barnett (1998) describe as security community.

Since Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework proposes that a security community can be developed from following their three tier framework, their framework emphasises the importance of the last tier – which highlights the two necessary conditions mutual trust and collective identity. Hence, according to Adler and Barnett (1998) a security community can only exist if the two necessary conditions are present. For this reason, mutual trust and collective identity become the central ground of a security community. Because mutual trust and collective identity are identified as the central ground for the formation of a security community it implies that no other conditions can exist and aid the formation of a security community. Hence, this study focuses on attempting to distinguish as to whether SADC embodies the two necessary conditions which Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasise in their three framework.

Furthermore, SADC is selected as a case because a significant amount of research has been done on it as an emerging security community thus this study aims at expanding and questioning the existing research done on SADC. SADC is a regional organisation that has a violent past and has made numerous efforts in establishing security strategies to bring peace and security to the region. This study will focus on the efforts made by SADC towards establishing itself as a security community.

1.4 Methodology

The study used a qualitative method. Qualitative data is non-numerical data as it is categorical information that is presented in a narrative form (Yin, 2012: 11). A qualitative method is centred on the researcher's judgement in determining which content is important for the study. The content used in this study was selected based on answering the research question(s) and on the relevance of the study. A qualitative method is relevant for this study because the research questions are theory based, therefore, the information gathered needed to focus on the existing content and literature which can assist in answering the research questions. The purpose of using a qualitative method is to get a deep understanding of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework and to further analyse the framework with reference to SADC. Thus the unit of analysis is SADC as an organisation and Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework provided the theoretical work.

The study is literature based - it mainly refers to tertiary sources. Tertiary sources are material written after an event to reconstruct the event (Burnham et al, 2004: 165). Tertiary sources refer to material such as books, peer-reviewed journal articles, published diaries, memoirs, biographies, autobiographies, newspapers, periodicals and reports. More specifically, the work on Adler and Barnett's (1998) *Security Communities* will be used as a theoretical basis to understand the three tier framework and its components. As stated above, the case used is SADC and there is no specific period which the study intends to focus on. Rather, the study is concerned with a particular context of questioning whether SADC is emerging as a security community in relation to Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. Documents and publications released on the official SADC website, peer-reviewed journal articles, newspaper articles, reports and books published by key authors will be reviewed.

The research will be based on a deductive approach as it critically examines Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework as a proposed theory to the development of a security community. More specifically, the deductive approach will ensure that an understanding of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is presented. The approach allows one to further probe into the three tiers and their significance towards the development of a security community.

Since the study is based on a deductive approach, it means specific literature needs to be selected. The literature selected will be found using the library, online journal databases as well as the SADC official website. The literature will include the key works done by Adler and Barnett (1998) on security communities, documents and publications released on the official SADC website. After the literature has been collected it will be critically engaged with thematically and discussed in respect to the proposed structure of the study.

The limitations of this study are based on the fact that there is no selected period which the study intends to focus on, thus it could be problematic with regards to the literature and theme the study centres on. This study is limited in scope. For practical reasons it relies only on a restricted number of examples to illustrate the argument the study presents. This study is not large in scope, therefore, it cannot cover SADC from inception to its current status. Thus it is important to note the study is not period bound. Another limitation is measuring and assessing the two necessary conditions, particularly mutual trust since it is a social phenomenon and its assessment is dependent on that of another actor. It will require a high level of review and analysis of particular key events that were well documented and covered in academic sources and media. Finally, it should also be noted that the study is not without other limitations which may arise during the course of the research process.

1.5 Chapter outline

Chapter one provides an outline of what the study entails. It discusses the scope of the study with reference to the background, literature overview, formulation and demarcation of the research problem and research methodology.

Chapter two provides the theoretical framework, focusing on Adler and Barnett's three tier framework. This chapter presents the conceptual background which the study is based on. It provides a conceptual account of the origins of a security community and how Adler and Barnett (1998) developed their framework. This chapter discusses each tier of the framework with regards to components that exist within each tier.

Chapter three provides an analysis of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework with a more detailed emphasis on all three tiers presented in their respective phases. Chapter three explores the reasoning behind SADC's creation with a specific focus on regional integration and

how it defines its security architecture and political rationale. This chapter utilises SADC as a case in which the three phases namely the nascent, ascendant and mature phases are unpacked in reference to their applicability to SADC. This chapter applies Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework to SADC and attempts to distinguish the extent to which their framework can be applied to SADC.

Chapter four critiques Adler and Barnett's (1998) third phase that stresses the importance of two necessary conditions of mutual trust and collective identity. In this chapter mutual trust and collective identity are evaluated and analysed in respect to whether or not they are relatable and recognised within SADC as a possible emerging security community. This chapter accounts for the inconsistency that mutual trust and collective identity present in relation to the context of SADC and its progression towards establishing itself as a security community. Therefore, chapter four attempts to rethink mutual trust and collective identity in the perspective of SADC. Furthermore, this chapter makes use of selected literature from key scholars who have made significant scholarly research within the study of security communities.

Chapter five is the conclusion and draws a summary of the key findings of the study, it provides a recapitulation of the significance of the study which includes the methodology utilised in the study and the intended contribution the study aimed to produce. The chapter concludes with recommendations for future prospects for forthcoming research purposes related to the theoretical and practical development of security communities.

CHAPTER TWO

ADLER AND BARNETT: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF A SECURITY COMMUNITY

2.1 Introduction

Within international relations theory the notion of a community existing seems improbable, since the idea of states sharing values and norms which influence the formation of identity as well as various interactions is questionable (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3). The difficulty with forging a community is the incorporation of the various interests each state holds – thus it raises the question of how actors would be able to inscribe such a community. Nonetheless, states do engage in security cooperation. Some states have advantages over others and act according to their interests.

In the early 1950s, Richard Van Wagenen was initially the first to propose the concept of a security community. Deutsch and his associates in 1957 reintroduced the concept and provided a more theoretical and empirical description of a security community. Deutsch et al (1957) pioneered the concept - forty years later Adler and Barnett (1998) provide a re-examined outlook on the concept. Adler and Barnett (1998) re-examined security communities outlining a three tier framework. Above all Deutsch et al (1957) and Adler and Barnett (1998) provide a common understanding of a security community as based on state cooperation and the idea of states forming a community of states that are integrated to a level where it creates stable peace and settling disputes without physical violence.

This chapter will present the theoretical framework of a security community, tracing it back to its inception and how it has developed over the years. Firstly, this chapter will present the Deutschean model. Deutsch et al (1957) coined the definition of a security community, the definition was further re-examined and drew attention within research on inter-state security. Since Deutsch et al (1957) introduced a definition of a security community it is important to present the concept according to Deutsch et al's (1957) understanding and present how Adler and Barnett (1998) later came formulate their three tier framework. Secondly this chapter will provide a description of Adler and Barnett's three tier framework – the theoretical

framework presented in this chapter is a vital component to the study as it explains why the research problem under study exists. The framework presented in this chapter explains how a security community develops and distinguishes the necessary indicators for the development of a security community.

2.2 The Deutschan Model

Deutsch's definition of a security community is centred on recognising state sovereignty, societal togetherness, national interest, co-operative relationship and shared identities - these elements are relatable to the constructivist theory. Deutsch's security community is built upon political communities. Political communities are "social groups with a process of political communication, some machinery for enforcement and some popular habits of compliance" (Deutsch et al 1957: 5). Deutsch et al (1957) further explains that although a political community is not necessarily able to prevent war within the area it covers, it can eliminate war and the expectation of war within boundaries.

Deutsch et al's (1957) research on security communities is based on particular historical cases. The definition which they formulate opens a series of definitions which they break down in order to have a complete understanding of a security community. By way of a definition, a security community is:

[a] group of people which has become 'integrated'. By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a 'sense of community' and institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure... dependable expectations of 'peaceful change' among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief... that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of 'peaceful change'. (Deutsch et al, 1957: 5)

Therefore, a security community is one that has created a real sense of closeness among the members of that community at a structural and personal level. The closeness existing in a security community is able to create a peaceful co-existence whereby members of that community will not fight each other physically but would rather resolve disputes in a peaceful manner. Interstate and intrastate conflicts would be eliminated if communities were integrated to the level Deutsch et al (1957) describes a security community. However, the

term ‘integration’ is ambiguous. According to Deutsch et al (1957) ‘integration’ does not necessarily mean merging peoples or governmental units into a single unit. Instead, Deutsch et al (1957) distinguish two types of security communities: “amalgamated” and “pluralistic”. By amalgamation they mean a formal merger between two or more independent units into a single larger unit for example the United States of America (USA). A pluralistic security community is one that retains the legal independence of separate governments, where two separate governments form a security community without merging - for instance the shared territory of the USA and Canada (Deutsch et al, 1957: 5-6).

For Deutsch et al (1957) the critical part of their research is founded on ensuring stable peace within a community. Therefore, whether an amalgamated or pluralistic security community would develop the prime goal is for that community to achieve integration and above all avoid large scale physical violence. Deutsch et al (1957) pointed to the relevance of integration for both types of security communities. Integration is critical regardless of how long it takes for it to manifest. Because if members of communities do not fear war and are not prepared for it – when they reach a stage of integration it should not matter how long it took to integrate since integration is an essential element to achieving a security communities. In essence Deutsch et al (1957) establish that integration creates a sense of community which strengthens institutions and it seems an increased sense of community helps reinforce the operational value already existing within institutions (Deutsch et al, 1957: 6-8).

Deutsch et al’s (1957) research contributed to significant findings that shaped how security communities can be understood as a concept. The most important aspect which they highlighted in their findings was that both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities are practicable ways to achieving integration. The research Deutsch et al (1957) undertook was based on contextual practical examples. In their findings they noted that pluralistic security communities turned out to be somewhat easier to attain and preserve compared to amalgamated security communities. Pluralistic security communities have less rigid requirements in terms of background conditions and political processes (Deutsch et al, 1957: 28, 29). According to Deutsch et al (1957) pluralism has a decreased chance of breaking

down - they found that pluralistic security communities have a more efficient approach to eliminating war.

The second finding of Deutsch et al (1957) refers to the thresholds of integration. Integration can be regarded as a two-fold process. On the one side populations and policy makers have considered war among states and have prepared for it. On the other side, they too, were supposed to do the same, but did not. Deutsch et al's (1957) research attempts to apply the presence and absence of integration among particular states. In studying the threshold of integration they expected that for a security community to be formed it would involve crossing the threshold, meaning moving from a situation whereby war between states seemed likely and was being prepared for, to another situation where it was neither. Moreover, Deutsch et al (1957) found that integration involves a broad zone of transition; that states can move between a zone of transition several times in their relations with one another and they might spend a long period of time in an uncertain position. Therefore, states could acquire weaponry and armed forces in preparation for warfare against each other, but simultaneously not be committed to use the acquired weapons and armed forces. In concluding their attempt in understanding the threshold of integration Deutsch et al (1957) consider the process of integration as lengthy and uncertain (Deutsch et al, 1957: 29-35).

The third finding Deutsch et al (1957) mentions is linked to integration – referring to integration in a revised form it leads to a deeper understanding of “sense of community”. Integration can result in different outcomes, Deutsch et al (1957) explains that in some instances populations of different territories can share the same values and norms and have a sense of community – this type of integration leads to political integration. They further explain a sense of community that is relevant for integration is based on mutual sympathy and loyalties, of “we-feeling”, trust and mutual consideration and cooperative action among populations of different territories and communities. Without this kind of sense of community “peaceful change” cannot be assured (Deutsch et al, 1957: 36).

The fourth finding focuses on growth around core values. Since a sense of community requires some particular habits of political behaviour as a result these habits become processes of social learning. People become integrated on the basis of their background conditions and their integration is influenced by political, economic, social or psychological

facts. The outcome of an integrative process among a group of states depends on the relationship between the effects of the background conditions. Deutsch et al (1957) generalise their findings – mentioning that in order for integration to occur there are certain background conditions in politics, administration, economic life, social and cultural development influencing the integrative process (Deutsch et al, 1957: 37, 38).

The fifth finding is the need for raising capabilities; Deutsch et al (1957) explain the importance of integrative capabilities as having a critical role in moving towards amalgamation as well as necessary for future development of the process. But they further highlight the increase of these capabilities in the progression of amalgamation. According to Deutsch et al (1957) the presence or the absence of growth in capabilities is key because it has played a major role in every integrative processes studied by Deutsch et al (1957) particularly in cases of amalgamation. Amalgamation does not occur because participating political units have become weaker or inefficient, nor do they occur because men have been forced to withdraw from incapable organisations and to build a larger government. Instead amalgamation occurs after a substantial increase in the capabilities of some of the participating political units increasing (Deutsch et al, 1957: 39).

The final finding is the race between capabilities and loads; Deutsch et al (1957) found that there are certain problems infringing on the tangible and intangible resources of political units. Deutsch et al (1957) note that political amalgamation increases the demands of material resources and the decision-making capabilities of governments because the decisions of larger areas have to be made by fewer central institutions. Thus, the success or failure of amalgamation depends on the relationship of two rates of change; the growing rate of claims and burdens on central governments and the growing or insufficiently growing - level of capabilities of the governmental institutions (Deutsch et al, 1957: 41, 42).

The above findings are based on certain historical cases. Deutsch et al (1957) were writing in the context of the 1940-1950s East-West struggle. Their intent in writing on the North Atlantic area was an attempt to get a different perspective on the conditions and processes involved in attaining permanent peace. Deutsch et al (1957) were well aware that they would not be able to find the whole answer since every political problem is unique (Deutsch et al, 1957: 3, 4).

Deutsch et al (1957) in their observation of security communities indicated the importance of integration and the various relationships it has with other political dimensions. Deutsch et al (1957) explained that integration, which brought a sense community created an assurance of settling disputes without war. The most significant contribution that Deutsch et al (1957) made was to claim that such integration would result in states existing in a security community where there was stable order and peace (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 3). Their observations also focused on measuring this “sense of community” they referred to. Deutsch et al (1957) were concerned with transactional flows, emphasising on the interaction among states. This transactionalist perspective offered an alternative in understanding international politics, Deutsch et al (1957) took it further, they imagined the same processes involved in national integration and nationalism would be relevant in international politics and in international community development (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 7, 8).

Although Deutsch et al (1957) had done significant research on the development of security community, their research failed to generate a following because scholars began referring to new theories, attempting to solve new problems. Scholars interested in integration and international cooperation used international regimes to explain the process of integration. The idea of a community of states also seemed unrealistic especially in the context of the aftermath of the Cold War and the possibility of a nuclear war (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 9).

Forty years later, Adler and Barnett (1998) resurrected the work of Deutsch et al (1957) after it had been neglected and criticised. Their intention was to revive the concept’s importance in understanding contemporary events and to suggest reformulation to the initial concept of Deutsch et al (1957) security community model.

2.3 Adler and Barnett’s three tier framework

Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework attempts to correct the shortcomings of Deutsch et al (1957) concept of a security community. Adler and Barnett’s (1998) provide vocabulary explaining how their approach differs from Deutsch et al (1957) but at the same time defining how it is closely linked. The study of security communities raises a variety of fixed concepts such as community, governance and institutions. Adler and Barnett (1998) provide a conceptual and definitional map presenting their three tier framework.

2.3.1 The conceptual underpinning of a security community

Adler and Barnett (1998) refer to the pluralistic security community because it seems theoretically and empirically closest to the developments that were unfolding at the time in international politics and international relations theory (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). They define a pluralistic security community as “a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30). Pluralistic security communities can be distinguished between two types, known as loosely coupled and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30).

Adler and Barnett (1998) define a loosely-coupled security community as a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Members of a loosely-coupled security community do not expect aggressive behaviour from one another thus they have self-discipline. A tightly coupled security community is more demanding. Firstly it requires a “mutual aid” society whereby collective systems are arranged. Secondly it is a system of rule ranging between a sovereign state and a regional, centralised, government (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 30).

Adler and Barnett (1998) attest that like Deutsch et al (1957) they too are interested in the transnational and interstate interaction which could possibly produce a community of states with a governance structure that has dependable expectations of peaceful change. The distinct feature of a security community is that stable peace is linked to the existence of a transnational community. Adler and Barnett (1998) go further by asking the question, what defines a community? There is a conceptual uncertainty in defining a community and it has caused doubt among scholars of international politics when attempting to determine whether international politics has characteristics of a community. States often claim they make decisions based on the interests of the wider community however their decisions derive from self-interest. But this self-interest behaviour has decreased over the years, and states acknowledge there is increased interaction which possibly resembles a community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 31). There has been a significant increase in research concerned with defining characteristics of a community.

Taylor (1979) outlined several characteristics in defining a community. Firstly, members of a community share identities, values and meanings. Secondly, those in a community interact on different levels – directly or indirectly in specific or isolated domains. The last characteristic is communities express a degree of long term interest because of being familiar with those they are interacting with as well as having a sense of responsibility and obligation towards others (Taylor, 1979: 51). The last two characteristics indicate communities as areas functioning based on interest among members.

Another prominent scholar that thought of an alternative way in defining the type of interaction necessary to constitute a community is Benedict Anderson. Anderson (1983) pioneered the notion of an “imagined community”. Anderson (1983) argues that national identities emerge as part of social interactions occurring at different levels of self-consciousness. Thus a community is an imagined entity because even the members of a small community cannot all know each other. Anderson (1983) further explains that an imagined community is limited because it cannot incorporate mankind, it also is sovereign making it the highest source of authority and finally such a community is able to make commitments for its advancement across territories (Anderson, 1983: 4-6).

James (1997) argues that a community is a social formation expressed through abstraction, meaning in order for a community to form there are material and ideational processes. Communities are formed through the exchange of abstract ideas that occur through local practices. Furthermore, the abstract ideas that frame a community are rooted in the identities of individual actors and in the process of social learning that a community comes to existence (James, 1997: 185-192).

It is clear there are various understandings of how a community is forged. The basic understanding in the formation of a community appears to be based on integration as highlighted by Deutsch et al (1957) and social learning and interaction as noted by Adler and Barnett (1998) Taylor (1979) Anderson (1983) and James (1997). However, this study seeks to determine how a community can exist in the absence of war, forging what is known as a security community.

Scholars, Adler and Barnett (1998) note that various communities will establish different mechanisms to address conflict. In some communities, a dependable expectation of peace may develop, and, in others, it may not. This means there is a possibility of other communities being able to regulate their security. However, there is no assurance the communities will settle disputes in a nonviolent manner. Communities have conflict and in fact, there are some communities that exist because of conflict, known as “war communities”. In this regard the mechanisms implemented in dealing with the conflict are part of individual’s identity. Therefore, it means to be a member of a community means dealing with conflict in a specific manner as such a member of a community of a democratic state in the contemporary era would have to use certain war-avoidance tactics. In general different communities subscribe to different practices in dealing with conflict – what distinguishes a security community from other kinds of communities is that its members rely on dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 33, 34).

According to Adler and Barnett (1998) peaceful change can be best defined as neither “the expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 34). The assumption is that states do not undertake security actions which may be interpreted by others as military threats. Therefore, a security community can exist without a strategic alliance (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 34, 35). Thus, states need to equally be prepared for war. However, in their preparations other states should not feel threatened. The important point is that although states need to be prepared for war, they should seek other means of settling disputes in a non-violent manner.

The habits and practices which states used for peaceful resolution of conflicts and the shared norms they are based on can be defined as crude structures of governance. Governance is best defined “as activities backed by shared goals and intersubjective meanings that may or may not derive from legally and formally prescribed responsibilities” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 35). However, Deutsch et al (1957) imagined security communities would function coherently and eventually produce self-enforcement mechanisms. Thus, a security community relying on enforcement mechanisms is probably not a security community – security communities rely on compliance and collective acceptance of norms. States in a security community rely on their government structures to understand other member states’

behaviour in the international sphere as well their domestic behaviour. In other words, a security community's governance structure depends on state's external identity and the associated behaviour it has with other states (Adler and Barnett 1998: 35, 36).

Since stable peace is the main objective of a security community, it raises questions about whether the sovereignty and authority of states belonging to a security community is affected. Adler and Barnett (1998) claim that a state's sovereignty is not replaced. According to Adler and Barnett (1998: 36) "states comprising a security community are still sovereign in a formal-legalistic sense, their sovereignty, authority and legitimacy is a contingent on the security community in two aspects". Firstly, the more a tightly coupled security community exists, the more the state's role is affirmed. This is because prior to being part of a security community a state is the highest authority and protector of its citizens. But when it becomes a member of a security community it expands its role, becomes an agent that advances needs of the community, needs such as economic welfare and security. Secondly when a state is part of a security community there are certain rights, obligations and duties it abides by as part of the normative structure. Consequently, it means member states receive their legitimacy and authority to act from the community as a whole and they share their authority. Essentially security communities are a rare development, their existence is difficult to conceptualise because international security focuses on realist theories. Adler and Barnett (1998) identify the conditions which can assist the development of a security community and produce stable peace. They provide a three tier framework (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 36, 37).

2.3.2 The three tiers

The first tier is concerned with the precipitating conditions. States create relations and aspire to coordinate with others because of external factors. Some of these external factors include technological developments which create external threats to the states, states then coordinate their security apparatuses and strategies to reduce their insecurity. Other dynamic factors such as transformations in the economy, demographics and migration patterns and climate change encourages states to coordinate their policies with each other to gain mutual advantage. Adler and Barnett (1998) mention there is no guarantee that these acts of cooperation will produce trust or mutual identification. But since they are based on the notion of creating agreeable interactions there is a possibility of producing the desired outcomes.

When states coordinate their policies and interact new social bonds development and the possibility beneficial outcomes is likely (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 37, 38).

The second tier observes “the positive, dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the structure of the region, defined by material power and knowledge, and social processes, defined by organisations, transactions and social learning” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 37). The distinctive feature in this tier is that states become involved in social interactions which transform the environment they exist in. Adler and Barnett (1998) divide this tier into two categories: structural and process categories. The structural categories are power and knowledge. Power is central in understanding the development of a security community. Power is an important factor because a state that has power is able to coerce others to maintain a collective stance. Power can also be a magnet, when a community is formed around a group of power states it creates the expectation that the weaker states joining the community will enjoy security and benefits provided by the power states in the community. Knowledge in this case refers to the shared meanings and understandings; shared meanings are created out of practice and social interactions and as a result perceptions develop that are tied to mutual trust and identity. Within a security community it is likely that states will share the same set of political ideas and meanings. Adler and Barnett (1998) note that liberalism and democracy are necessary conditions for the formation of a security community because liberal ideas promote collective identity, mutual trust and peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 39, 40).

The process category includes transactions, international organisations and institutions, and social learning. Tilly (1998) defines a transaction as “a bounded communication between one actor and another” (Tilly, 1998: 20). Thus a transaction involves different type of exchanges including material, economic, political, technological and various others. The amount and types of transactions occurring between states reshapes the collective experience in a community of states (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 41).

International organisations and institutions also contribute to the development of security communities; they promote other factors contributing to mutual trust and shared identity. They can encourage and facilitate transactions as well as build trust by establishing norms of behaviour, monitoring mechanisms and sanctions to enforce those norms. International

organisations are able to engineer the conditions viable for developing mutual trust and collective identity. They are able to foster and create a culture based on commonly understood attributes such as democracy and human rights (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 41-43).

Social learning also has a critical role in the emergence of security communities, it is facilitated through transactions occurring in organisational settings. Through social exchanges and communication people develop self-understandings and different perceptions of reality. Consequently, people progress to having collective understandings and values. Social learning alone is not sufficient for development of a security community – it needs to be connected to functional processes that will improve a state's condition. Overall social learning explains how transactions and institutions encourage mutual trust and collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 44).

The third tier is the combination of the first and second tier. Both tiers provide a description of the links existing in the factors that are the basis of mutual trust and collective identity. Adler and Barnett (1998) consider mutual trust and collective identity as the necessary conditions for developing expectations that will result in peaceful change. They further explain the aforementioned statement by stating that “trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 45). When trust develops it strengthens mutual identification and in general there is a predisposition of trusting others based on mutual identification. Since mutual trust is needed in order to have collective identity, it therefore means trust is prior to identity. When there is collective identity there is probability for it to reinforce and increase the depth of trust (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 45, 46).

According to Adler and Barnett (1998) trust is a “social phenomenon and dependent on the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with normative expectations” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 46). Trust is often facilitated by third party mechanisms for instance the beliefs which people share are likely to encourage trust among people. Within international relations anarchy makes trust a highly indefinable phenomenon. It is for this reason that states establish international organisations in order to monitor the behaviour of others, mostly to verify trust among states. Another critical role trust has, is assisting states in making judgements based on the experiences and encounters states have

with one another they are able to determine potential threats because of the level of trust between states (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 46).

Another critical factor in the development of a security community is the creation of transnational collective identities. Collective identity entails that people relate with others, but also that they relate with themselves, as well as those other people, as a group in relation to other groups. Identities are often influenced by symbols and myths which define a group and its boundaries (Klandermans, 1992: 81). Since this study is concerned with tightly coupled security communities, in such communities it is social identity that generates positive identification between members of states. In tightly coupled security communities, members begin to develop corporate identity – identities of members derive less from the international environment but instead arise from the community's identity and norms. In summary, the interaction between the variables existing within the three tiers indicates the development of trust and the process of collective identity and results in dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 47, 48).

2.4 An applied understanding of a security community

Adler and Barnett's (1998) translated their three tier framework into a viable research program. They established three phases in the development of a security community namely – nascent, ascendant and mature. These three phases offer corresponding indicators to the development of a security community. Adler and Barnett (1998: 48) consider the three phases as “heuristic devices rather than as uncomfortable teleological exercises” this suggests that the three phases provide a practical approach into establishing a security community. Moreover it is critical to remain mindful that these three phases are not optimal or perfect. The three phases differ from the three tiers in that they are a practical application whereas the three tiers are a theoretical approach. Adler and Barnett (1998) offer a social constructivist approach, they trace back how dependable expectations of peaceful change can come about, with regards to when they are imagined to exist and the processes that led to their development. They believe through these three phases they can provide a practical three step approach to a security community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 48, 49).

The nascent phase

In this phase governments do not explicitly seek to be a security community. Rather, they begin to coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual security as well as lower transaction costs of exchanges and interactions. In this regard the expectation is increased diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges. There are many other triggers for initiating the desire to create institutions or organisations that will foster relations. One of these is a mutual security threat (Ngoma, 2005: 47). In this instance, a security organisation and a strategic alliance are virtually indistinguishable because there is no expectation that people of these states will have a collective identity. However, what is important is that states should acknowledge they have joint interests which require collective action and can mutually benefit from coordination. This can also result in security cooperation and coordinating security policies among states overall it can create security programs that will serve mutual interests (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 50).

Other aspects such as cultural, social, political, and ideological similarities can lead to greater interaction and association between states – it may even create the desire and the expectation of creating a security community. People sharing cultural, social, political and ideological attributes across national borders have interest developing an institutional form that is intended to provide mutual obligation (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 51).

Patently, the relationship pursued in the nascent phase is one whereby dynamic and positive transactions occur between and among states, and social institutions and organisations emerge with the prospect of mutual trust. In this phase a core state or a coalition of states will act as the facilitator, because only such a state is or group of states are capable of providing the leadership, protection and material benefits required at this phase (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 53).

The ascendant phase

The ascendant phase displays a rise in the development of a security community. According to Adler and Barnett (1998), in this phase an intensive and extensive network between states exists and is said to result in the emergence of various international institutions and organisations. These new institutions and organisations are likely to indicate increased

military co-ordination and co-operation and as well as a reduction of fear by member states of the emerging security community from external threats. At this phase member states promote and act together “deepening the level of mutual trust and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 53).

Adler and Barnett (1998) claim that increased interactions encourage the development of new social institutions and organisations which reflect shared interests and collective identity. Subsequently greater regional interaction and acceptance are promoted by governments, security and other intergovernmental organisations. Networks and relations become intensified between and among societies, states and organisations strengthening mutual trust and responsiveness. Among states trust becomes a critical factor for co-operation and trust building (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 53, Ngoma, 2005: 49).

Social learning is also regarded as critical in this phase since it is responsible for the development of new social and political structures that are related to the emergence of a security community. In summary, the key function of the ascendant phase are the changes that occur in the organisation and production of security and defining threats based on how states manage and coordinate their beliefs and identities (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 54).

The mature phase

According to Adler and Barnett (1998: 55) the mature phase is reached when “regional actors share an identity and therefore entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and as security community now comes into existence”. In the mature phase regional actors believe that peaceful change is inevitable thus the existence of a security community is likely to occur. In this phase it becomes difficult for member states to organise instrumental ways and prepare for war among each other. Adler and Barnett (1998) distinguish between two types of security communities that can emerge at this stage namely; loosely and tightly coupled security communities. As already mentioned above, this study is concerned with a tightly coupled security community for that reason the indicators of such a community are discussed below (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 55).

In a tightly coupled security community mutual aid becomes a custom, and common identity is expressed through multilateral power changes. The use of power is no longer the responsibility of individual states; rather, it shifts to the collectivity of sovereign states and is legitimate only when used against external threats or against community member states that have failed to adhere to the norms of the community. There are certain indicators that demonstrate the existence of a tightly coupled security community, the following indicators are identified by Adler and Barnett (1998).

The first indicator is cooperative and collective security, when member states move from “reciprocal arms control and confidence building to co-operative security”. Basically member states make collective decisions regarding security threats within the community or outside the community. The second indicator is the high level of military integration. In a security community, military integration is not required; however because of shared identities and high level of trust it results in member states combining their military resources. This indicator illustrates the high level of trust as well as security being viewed as interdependent among member states of the community. The third indicator is policy coordination against “internal” threats, member states within the community have greater policy coordination. They are vigilant against common security threats emerging from within the community. The fourth indicator is free movements of populations, and having a multilateral policy that permits the free movement of people between states without visas reflects a decrease in states rendering each other as potential threats. It decreases the tendency of “us against them”. The fifth indicator is internationalisation of authority which focuses on sharing and co-ordinating practices and policies that can create an informal system of rule. Authority can become internationalised by means of international states exerting a higher authority over individual states. Consequently, it results in external international states leading their own agendas that are unsuitable to the community. Internationalisation of authority can also lead states to coordinate their domestic laws resulting in a single “enforcement of mechanism” (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 56, 57).

Adler and Barnett (1998) argue that political communities disband because of the lack of interconnectedness between core values and collective identity, as well as the unpredictable nature of values and identities. Thus the same factors and social processes responsible for the

development of a security community can also be responsible for its breakdown. However, the most important factor in weakening of a security community is when member states lose mutual trust, and the possibility of war is increased (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 58).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided the theoretical framework of a security community, it outlined the concept from its inception whereby it was developed by Deutsch et al (1957) and forty years later it was reintroduced by Adler and Barnett (1998). The chapter outlined the three tiers and phases that Adler and Barnett (1998) developed as part of the process in states achieving a security community. The three tiers provide the theoretical foundation – all three tiers appear to be interlinked meaning that what occurs at the first tier makes it possible for the second tier to exist. For instance at the first tier when states coordinate their policies they are able to move onto the second tier whereby they share meanings and understanding. Only then can they move onto the last tier and develop mutual trust and collective identity. Adler and Barnett (1998) then provide a practical approach to development of a security community which is presented in the three phases. They assert that it is critical for all three phases to occur in order to develop a security community. They further, identify specific indicators involved in the process of developing a security community. They emphasise the importance of mutual trust and collective identity in the formation of a security community.

Using the above theoretical framework this study will apply an analysis in the Southern African context. The indicators that Adler and Barnett (1998) identify will be referred to as guiding elements in answering the research question. In this respect the three tiers and phases are the theoretical basis of this study and will serve as a point of reference in determining the position of the Southern African region with specific reference to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in relation to Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. But as already noted above in chapter one in the literature overview scholars such as Beyer (2005), Schoeman (2002) and Ngoma (2005) question the applicability and structure of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. Also in the same section scholars Booth and Vale (1995) and Nathan (2006) argue that SADC is far from establishing itself as a security community. These critiques provide a point of departure into probing how

Alder and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is applicable to SADC and determining whether SADC is a security community or not.

CHAPTER THREE

SADC'S NASCENT, ASCENDANT AND MATURE PHASES

3.1 Introduction

Adler and Barnett's (1998: 3) three tier framework of understanding how a security community develops is based on the Western context. This context is based on a period marked by the end of the Cold War whereby policymakers and scholars were offering various approaches on developing a peaceful and stable international order. Ngoma (2005: 40, 41) highlights his doubts about the utility of the framework and its accuracy since it is not applied to any African state – he considers the framework to selective in its application. He argues that there is a need for further research to be done on the subject of security communities in relation to Africa (Ngoma (2005: 40, 41). However, other notable scholars, Ngoma (2003) again, as well as Nathan (2012), Hammerstad (2005), Van Schalkwyk (2005) and Van Aardt (1997) have done significant work on security communities and the challenge of Africa and its Southern African region's quest to establish peace and security in the sub-region. The research done by these scholars points to an inconclusive understanding of the Southern African region and its prospects of becoming a security community.

Firstly, this study refers to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as a case, Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework will be used to establish whether a security community exists in the case of SADC. This chapter will begin by providing a brief background on the development of SADC as an organisation and how it has redefined itself as a regional bloc. Secondly, the chapter will focus on SADC and the initiatives it has made towards establishing a security community – by examining the three phases associated with Adler and Barnett's framework and demarcating where they can be recognised within SADC. Thirdly, this chapter will assess the actions taken by SADC member states in their efforts at creating a security community as well as probe the issue of SADC member states and their individual decision making affecting the collective objectives of the organisation. The Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-), Swaziland and the Democratic Republic of Congo will be referred to as examples to further explain the issue of member states having difficulty in achieving collective identity.

Finally, the indicators and factors in the three phases that were discussed in chapter two will be referred to as tools of analysing SADC. Therefore, each phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework will be used as a reference in establishing SADC's status.

3.2 SADC and its logic of creating regional integration

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) developed from the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) and which was the predecessor to the Front Line States (FLS). All three organisations will be discussed below in regards to SADC's formation and its progression of creating regional integration. Thus it is critical to begin the discussion with focusing on the FLS since it is the origin of SADC.

The Front Line States

The Front Line States (FLS) emerged in 1976 as a diplomatic coalition consisting of independent Southern African Frontline States. It consisted of the following member states: Mozambique, Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and Tanzania. The FLS was concerned with diffusing the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe war and when the resolution of the conflict resulted in an independent Zimbabwe in 1980, it strengthened the organisation (Evans, 1984: 1) The FLS was an intergovernmental political and security grouping that coordinated a common front in response and opposition to the apartheid state and it eventually gave rise to SADCC. Between 1977 and 1978 the five independent member states (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia) of the FLS held discussions on how they would reduce South Africa's economic domination in the region (Holland, 1988: 306). The FLS wanted to separate their economies from apartheid South Africa – this became a political and economic objective which was funded by donor governments that wanted to assist in the removal of apartheid (Cohen, 1994: 190). According to Evans (1984: 5) “the FLS presented a unique idiosyncratic diplomatic alliance fully committed to the anti-apartheid cause and the Southern African liberation movements”. The FLS had structured itself into an alliance which was increasingly being pressured into creating a security posture because South Africa was instigating a sustained campaign of destabilisation in pursuit of its “total strategy” of defending white privilege (Evans, 1984: 5, Anglin, 1988: 552). South Africa had advanced its status as a self-appointed “regional power”, it had conferred the responsibility to maintain security in Southern Africa, but ironically maintaining security in the

region meant that neighbouring states should be in a position of insecurity (Anglin, 1988: 552). South Africa was determined to dominate the region through dissidence, sabotage, and economic chaos in the FLS. South Africa relied on three techniques: the first was “transport diplomacy” – because six states of the FLS were landlocked, South Africa, exploited their vulnerability strategically and financially by increasing transport tariffs and sabotaging competing rail routes. The second is “coercive diplomacy” – the South African Defence Force (SADF) invaded Angola in 1988 despite General Vernon Walters of the US pleading that they do not invade Angola. Lastly, the SADF would publicly assert that they will use military force to warn the FLS of the risk they were taking in supporting South African liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) (Anglin, 1984: 552, 553, Evans, 1984: 5).

But despite the tactics South Africa imposed on the FLS, the organisation had made significant developments towards a formal military agreement as well as establishing a formal defence pact. Evans (1984: 6) notes that the FLS were filling an intense role of developing a structure for regional security affairs. They functioned as diplomatic machinery, that was highly personalised and informal which always accounted for the national interests of the states involved. The FLS represented a loose coalition founded on common perceptions of regional liberation and Africanist ideology (Evans, 1984: 7). The principal structure of the FLS resembles a community states that had established a diplomatic network aimed at achieving a sense of peace within the Southern African region. Undeniably the FLS is reminiscent of the mature phase of Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework. Nonetheless FLS political liberation was the key component that initiated the beginning of FLS, SADCC and now SADC (Omari and Macaringue, 2007: 59).

Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) that was established in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia. SADCC was created by the leaders of the FLS. The formation of the SADCC was a result of various meetings held between representatives of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. It was only in 1981 that SADCC become formalised through a Memorandum of Understanding. SADCC was formed to support the movement of national political liberation in Southern Africa and to also minimise the dependence on the then apartheid era South Africa (SADC, 2012). SADCC’s main objective

was “to reduce economic dependence on and vulnerability to South Africa through building economic and particularly infrastructural security in the region” (Schoeman, 2016: 3). SADCC was formed based on four principal objectives namely, reduction of member state dependence, forging linkages to create genuine and equitable regional integration, mobilisation of member states’ resources to promote the implementation of national, interstate and regional policies and concerted action to secure international cooperation within the framework of the strategy for economic liberation (Hwang, 2007: 72).

SADCC adopted a Program of Action that identified and defined economic activities and development projects. The program encouraged coordination of members’ development initiatives rather than formulating a regional economic development strategy. The aim was to boost individual economic state capacity. The organisation wanted to establish better cooperation in the field of transport infrastructure in order to lessen dependence on South Africa. Schoeman (2016: 5) notes that SADCC was recognising the link between security and development – although this link was not clearly stipulated in their main objectives it did set a precinct for the formation of SADC.

In 1989, the Summit of Heads of State or Government was held in Harare, Zimbabwe it was decided that the Memorandum of Understanding signed in 1981 should be formalised into an agreement, charter or treaty. This marked the establishment of SADC’s Treaty (SADC, 2012).

Establishing SADC

In 1992 a Summit was held in Windhoek, Namibia where member states of SADC namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Republic of South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe signed the SADC Declaration and Treaty. Article 5 of the treaty set out the following main objectives: integration of economic development, enhancing the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, poverty alleviation, peace, security and evolution of common political values and institutions (Nathan, 2006: 605). These objectives were aimed at increasing regional integration, consolidating democratic principles and sustainable development. When one closely analyses these objectives they resonate with the core elements of Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework. They outline integration as an

integral part of the organisation's development and emphasise achieving peace and security through common values and institutions. Another important element of the treaty was Article 4(a) which stipulates that SADC member states are to adhere to principles of sovereign equality, solidarity, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, mutual benefit and peaceful settlements of disputes (SADC, 2012). In essence, SADC's treaty was based on establishing a pure sense of regional integration among member states.

The SADC Treaty established the following series of institutional mechanisms: the summit of heads of state or government, council of ministers, standing committee of officials, a secretariat and a tribunal. SADC also outlined a common agenda which is linked to its objectives and originates from its Treaty (SADC, 2012). The common agenda outlines the key strategies and policies of the institution and its values. One of the significant institutions to develop from SADC is the OPDS which was restructured in 2001 at the Extraordinary Summit held in Winhoek, Namibia into its current form as the Organ on Politics Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC). It is responsible for promoting peace and security in the SADC region and it highlights the need for an institutionalised policy framework that will achieve regional integration (Farah, Noor, Kisame and Hussein, 2014: 323). Ever since SADC was established, it strove to invent new regional security frameworks in order to increase regional security.

SADC aims at establishing regional integration, in fact regional integration is a rational response by member states that are landlocked, and for national markets. There are various integration initiatives which SADC has established and implemented, namely the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) and the Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO). RISDP and SIPO will be discussed in depth below with regards to how both frameworks reinforce regional integration (SADC, 2012). But at the centre of this sense of developing regional integration was the struggle for national liberation. Osmari and Macaringue (2007: 55) acknowledge that liberation movements among African states have had a critical role in establishing solidarity and depth of regional integration. What should be noted is that in order for SADC to achieve a sense of regional integration, member states need to coordinate policy formulation. However state-centred security concerns make it a challenge for regional developmental objectives to be achieved (Tjonneland, 2005: 181). Nathan (2006: 606), points out that the problem of SADC member states is that they detest having to surrender their

sovereignty to achieving a common security policy. Nonetheless SADC continues to make initiatives in promoting peace and security, establishing common political values, strengthening and consolidating historical, social and cultural similarities.

SADC's Security Architecture

Another important element to consider when analysing SADC's logic in pursuing regional integration is how the regional community defined its security architecture. As already mentioned, the OPDSC is SADC's body responsible for promoting peace and security in the region. In fact the formation of the OPDSC is part of the transformation of the regional economic community. As many organisations often do, SADC inherited the structures of its predecessor [SADCC] and one of its main objectives set by FLS was to deal with defence and security matters. The FLS formed the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDC) which was set up to lobby for the liberation of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. Thus, during this period the region defined a security threat through dominant political events and the ability to protect independent states against domination from an apartheid South Africa (Bam, 2006: 29). Therefore, the security paradigm for SADCC was state centric. SADCC and FLS implemented no agenda towards political and economic integration. It was only when the 1992 Declaration Treaty and Protocol was signed in Windhoek, Namibia the organisation abandoned its old state-centred security concerns and gave way to regional developmental ones and peace and stability brought about by economic and political forms of integration (Bischoff, 2012: 48). The OPDSC has remained the organ responsible for SADC's security agenda. Despite its sophisticated nature the region is exposed to various security challenges such as tensions between member states, limited internal and external coordination, resource deficits and social discontent (International Crisis Group, 2012).

Hertz (2009) argues that the nature of security threats is likely to influence the forms of regional economic integration and possibly redefine a particular regional security order. According to Hertz (2009) "building a security community in the developing world therefore, calls for new architectural principles" (Hertz, 2009: 189). Hertz (2009) also indicates that in the case of SADC the free trade area and functional cooperation will create insecurity rather than security. This is because SADC member states are faced with new security threats and are highly interdependent. He claims that the combination of regional interdependence and regional economic integration

will cause unequal rates of growth that will generate or worsen new security threats. Additionally, Nathan (2006: 280) asserts that in Africa intra-state threats are more prominent compared to interstate threats, and that states do not usually threaten other states directly. However, domestic instability in a weak state causes destabilisation in a region. Thus Hertz (2009: 190) promotes the idea of security being observed in the regional context. Farah, Noor, Kisame and Hussein (2014: 321) assert that the humanitarian crises caused by the civil wars in Africa are too large in scope to be dealt with through a continental response. Rather, regional security arrangements such as SADC need to provide new policy recommendations for the future.

SADC has security challenges, which begin at a domestic level and transpire into affecting the region because these interstate security threats create a “spill over” effect causing destabilisation in a region. According to the International Crisis Group (2012) in order for SADC to develop a well-functioning security body it requires regional security cooperation with proficient infrastructures underwritten by political commitment. There must be an “effective common security policy framework to improve coordination with international partners, harmonise and clarify its role with other SADC structures” (International Crisis Group, 2012).

SADC’s Political Rationale

It can be argued that the formation of SADC was driven by political factors rather than economic because the member states of the organisation who were advocating for change against apartheid South Africa were also the same members that supported the political integration process forward (Peters-Berries, 138). Political factors have been instrumental in promoting regional integration within SADC and are an important variable in intensifying and deepening it. One of these factors is sovereignty – the SADC Treaty stresses the importance of sovereignty. In Article 4(a) the SADC Treaty emphasises that in the period of intra- and inter-state conflict the principles of strict respect of sovereignty, sovereign equality, political independence and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states should apply (Mwanawina, 2011: 472).

Since member states are to adhere to the principle of sovereignty, interference in domestic politics of member states is regarded as defying the SADC Treaty, thus making it difficult for member states to intervene when domestic politics reach a point for turmoil. For instance,

turmoil in the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) and Swaziland are both examples that will be discussed below.

Nonetheless the rationality of creating regional integration in Southern African region consists of various dimensions that include economics, security and politics and these dimensions are interlinked. The main objective of SADC remains the promotion of economic development through cooperation and integration (Chingono and Nakana, 2009: 396). However, Chingono and Nakana (2009) argue that there is a lack of clarity on guiding principles for regional integration and how to achieve it. But in their understanding, regional integration discourse “assumes that neighbouring countries that have similar economic, socio-political and security problems may benefit from integrating their economies because this creates a situation of mutual inter-dependence and development” (Chingono and Nakana, 2009: 397). In this sense regional integration is beyond achieving economic objectives thus one can argue that the reasoning for SADC to pursue regional integration was not only for the purpose of economic integration but for integration that encompassed various dimensions. This understanding of integration is similar to that of Adler and Barnett (1998) and affirms their concept of a security community. Thus SADC’s reasoning for pursuing regional integration can be observed as the organisation’s search of developing a security community.

3.3 SADC and the logic of a security community

Chapter two discussed Adler and Barnett’s theoretical framework and the framework outlined three phases that are critical in developing a security community. Adler and Barnett’s three tier framework was conceptualised in a Western context, this study attempts to utilise their framework using SADC.

According to Adler and Barnett (1998) in the nascent phase, governments do not explicitly seek to be a security community. Instead they coordinate their relations in order to increase mutual security and there is an increase in diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges (Ngoma, 2005: 47). In fact in the early years of SADC’s formation there was an evident disposition coming from member states, between 1992 and 1994 signifying a formulation of a regional security policy. In 1993 SADC released a document titled, *Southern Africa: A Framework and Strategy for Building the Community*. The framework aimed at a “non-militaristic security

order”. It was directed at adopting non-offensive defence doctrines, it also noted the importance of addressing non-military sources of security such as the violation of human rights and underdevelopment (SADC, 1993: 24-26). Then in July 1994 at Windhoek, Namibia a meeting was held - the focus of the meeting was democracy, peace and security because these three components were identified as essential for stability, co-operation and development. The aim of the meeting was to explore how SADC could include political and security matters in their mandate (Van Aardt, 1996: 146).

The themes addressed at the meeting indicated that SADC member states supported a security centred mandate – not only in terms of state security threats but also with regards to human security threats. The objectives of the treaty further point towards establishing mutual security in the region, because member states committed themselves to collective security arrangements. Although the treaty did not explicitly label SADC as a community seeking to be a security community, the objectives of the organisation resemble Adler and Barnett’s nascent phase. This is because SADC member states coordinated relations in order to establish the 1992 SADC Treaty: moreover, member states were able to identify strategies towards mutual security in the region.

Furthermore, diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral relations increased during the early years of SADC’s establishment. The July 1994 meeting held in Windhoek, Namibia, was attended by ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, home affairs, police and security, representatives of political parties, members of non-governmental groups, researchers and academics (Nathan, 2006: 608-609). This meeting triggered the development of the various institutions that were developed under SADC such as the OPDSC, and the Troika and SADC National Committees. These institutions have representatives from SADC member states and the positions which member states occupy are rotational, meaning various member states are able to have the opportunity to experience and understand the functioning of a specific position (SADC, 2012). This rotating nature of SADC institutions simultaneously fosters relations between member states, it increases bilateral and multilateral relations because representatives of states interact during summit meetings or any other meeting scheduled at regular intervals. When assessing SADC at the nascent phase of Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework, it is evident that elements of the nascent phase are recognisable within SADC.

According to Van Aardt (1996) the 1992 and 1994 Summits held in Windhoek, Namibia presented ground-breaking ideas for building a regional security community. She further notes that the SADC, OPDS that was launched in June 1996 initiated the process of building and maintaining security in the region through a formal structure (Van Aardt 1996: 144, 160). Van Aardt (1996) acknowledges that SADC was making the necessary initiatives through its structures but notes the uncertainty whether the organisation has the conditions and mechanisms to establish itself as a security community.

Ngoma (2003) argues that SADC is moving towards establishing itself as a security community. This is reflected in the numerous protocols which the organisation has developed as well as the improved relationships among states. He considers the most significant protocol in the development of security arrangements the one on politics, defence and security co-operation. The new objectives set by SADC promote common political and foreign policy values when interpreted this is a movement towards a security community (Ngoma, 2003: 26). The relationship developed by states at a nascent phase is for developmental purposes and is classified by interdependence among states. However, interdependence is intensified depending on the extent to which member states want to deepen their collaboration (Ngoma, 2005: 48).

The institutional mechanisms established by SADC reflect a coordination of relations among states and most importantly member states recognise the importance of mutual security. Evidently, it is recognisable that the early years of SADC can be classified as the nascent phase of the organisation. The nascent phase of SADC can be demarcated between 1992 [when the organisation was transformed and the treaty and declaration were signed] and 2005 [when the RISDP and SIPO were initiated].

In the years following the “nascent phase” of SADC – the organisation displayed an increase in creating intensive and extensive networks between member states. As such SADC introduced strategies like the RISDP and SIPO which were launched in 2003 (SADC, 2012). The latter aims to “promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socioeconomic development through efficient production systems, deeper cooperation and integration, good governance and durable peace and security” (Isaksen, 2003: 3). The RISDP was introduced as a new strategy that would express deepening the level of co-ordination and co-operation among SADC member states. The RISDP in fact reflects the core principles of the SADC Treaty – they speak to the

principle of b) solidarity, peace and security within the region. Moreover it speaks to SADC's Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation which was signed in 2001 before RISDP was introduced. In Article 2(d) the protocol states "promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defence and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end" (SADC, 2001: 3). This is an indication that prior to developing RISDP and SIPO I and II the organisation was already aiming at developing a sense of regional security and prioritising peace and security in the region. SADC reflected a clear signal that the region was forging a strong sense of integration (Saurombe, 2012: 92). The official document on RISDP released by SADC outlines its purpose and scope. The document states the following: "based on the strategic priorities of SADC and its Common Agenda, the RISDP aligns the strategic objectives and priorities with the policies and strategies to be pursued towards a diversity of these goals over a period of fifteen years" (RISDP, 2005).

The RISDP was a fifteen year plan to facilitate regional integration and development, it was also meant to review objectives aimed at enabling SADC to realise its integration development agenda (Ngwawi, 2014: Newspaper) The emergence of collective identities was also an anticipated result of RISDP because it meant that through deep integration SADC member states would influence one another and eventually progress to having a collective identity. The RISDP echoes Adler and Barnett's (1998) ascendant phase because one of the key elements in this phase is the process of deepening integration. Adler and Barnett (1998: 53) describe how increased interactions among states fosters a sense of deep integration. According to the scholars the ascendant phase "displays a rise in the development of a security community" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 14). Therefore, the RISDP reflects the intensification SADC had towards establishing a common agenda among member states. The RISDP outlined a series of milestones to be achieved within the context of integration and, most importantly, it marks coordination and cooperation among SADC member states.

However, the plan was reviewed and SADC published a document tracing the progress of the plan - the *Desk Assessment of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 2005-2010* released in November 2011. The document focused on findings of key priority areas. The areas included trade, industry, finance and investment; infrastructure and services; food, agriculture and natural resources; social and human development and special programmes and cross-cutting

cultural issues. The document outlines the “lessons learned, recommendations and conclusion”. One of the critical “lessons learned” outlined in the document is “fostering implementation at member state level”. Although member states sign and ratify regional and international binding documents and policies – the domestication of these policies becomes a challenge and eventually causes a slowdown for regional integration. The recommendation the document made was for member states to “prioritise the implementation of RISDP at member state level” – member states should urgently implement RISDP by strengthening cooperation structures, planning and monitoring the programmes. Overall, the document highlighted that the implementation of RISDP between 2006 and 2010 was satisfactory, although the rate of implementation varied from sector to sector (SADC, 2011: 95, 96, 99). On the 11th of August 2012, SADC held a think tank conference on Regional Integration in Maputo, Mozambique and a report was released. It argued, that the limited success of RISDP was a result of problematic governance structures. Van Nieuwkerk (2012) presented a paper at the conference and pointed out that the success of RISDP is dependent on peace and security. Moreover, he alluded to fact that SADC’s Secretariat does not have the institutional capacity to coordinate the plan. Kaunda (2009) has also pointed out that the institutional weakness as well as inadequate financing of SADC’s Secretariat has made the implementation of RISDP slow, uneven and inconsistent (SADC Research and Policy Paper Series, 2012: 9).

It is difficult for one to make an adequate observation of whether RISDP was a success or not, since very limited literature is available on its implementation and progress and SADC has not yet published an official document assessing RISDP since the one published in 2011. However, creating RISDP indicated that SADC was moving towards increased interactions and encouraging the development of new institutions and organisations which would reflect shared interests and collective identity.

SIPO and RISDP were initiated in the same year, SIPO provides the RISDP’s corresponding framework for member state cooperation within a regional integration scheme. SIPO indicated a bias towards a security community, because in its official document it outlines an acceptance of “democratic elections and consultations designed to improve democratic culture and the acknowledgement of good political cooperation” (Ngoma, 2003: 23). This fits well with the ascendant phase of security community development. Furthermore, SIPO acknowledges that

regional coordination and cooperation is critical on matters related to security and defence, and requires establishing appropriate mechanisms as well as developing a collective security capacity and a mutual defence pact to deal with external military threats (Ngoma, 2003:24). Should the appropriate mechanisms be put in place and implemented adequately this would decrease fear and increase trust among SADC member states and this is another characteristic of Adler and Barnett's (1998) ascendant phase.

According to Van Nieuwkerk (2013: 147) SIPO was poorly implemented in various aspects. For instance, no serious efforts were made to develop strategies for operationalising the plan. Van Nieuwkerk (2013: 147) considers the relationship between the SADC Secretariat and the member states as key to effective functioning of SADC and argues it needs to be headed by visionary leadership. He further notes that there is a lack of political will in using this instrument and a critical problem is the lack of harmonisation between SADC's security architecture and the African Union (AU). It appears that SIPO and RISDP have inconsistencies in their implementation. Kaunda (2009) argues that both plans are not coordinated and harmonised in their implementation, but they are interrelated and complement each other. He makes the claim that SADC's organisational structure is not coordinated and its secretariat does not exercise the power it needs to (SADC Research and Policy Paper Series, 2012: 9).

In 2010 at the SADC Summit in Arusha, Tanzania, SIPO II was signed and launched. It aimed at promoting democracy, observing universal human rights and conflict prevention. SIPO II was developed after SIPO I had reached the end of its five year cycle. The revised SIPO II was a voluntary agreement with no legal obligations on member states. The nature of SIPO II evidently makes its implementation have shortcomings, since it is not a binding policy and has no legal framework for collective decision-making and it further makes collective behaviour and compliance of its implementation likely to be minimal (Motsamai, 2012).

Although SIPO I was poorly implemented it provided the foundation for the mutual defence pact (MDP). In August 2003 at the SADC Summit held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, the MDP was finally approved and signed by SADC member states (SADC, 2003: 7). The establishment of the MDP signified a sense of "we-ness" described by Adler and Barnett (1998) as necessary for a security community. Ngoma (2004: 411) refers to this notion of a "defence pact" that implies that states believe their defence and security requirements would be best met in a community. It

also indicates that there are states that have become closer in their relations and entrust their security needs to other member states. Maeresera and Uzodike (2010: 97, 98) described the pact as closely related to a non-aggression treaty, because at the centre of it is the ability to stop member states from having hostile behaviour in each other's territory and supporting each other in the case of a potential threat.

In operationalising the pact, Articles 4, 6 and 9 reflect the interdependence of member states on issues of defence and security. Article 4 states: "In order to achieve the objectives of this Pact, State Parties shall individually and collectively, by means of continuous co-operation and assistance, maintain and develop their individual and collective self-defence capacity to maintain peace, stability and security" (SADC, 2003: 3).

Article 6 promotes the notion of establishing relationships within the sub-region and with external organisations – it states: "An armed attack by against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action" (SADC, 2003: 3).

Article 9 promotes defence cooperation in order to realise the objectives of the pact. It states: "...State Parties shall co-operate in defence matters and facilitate interaction among their forces and defence-related industries in the following and any other areas of mutual interest: the training of military personnel in any field of military endeavour and, to that end, they may from time to time hold joint military exercises in one another's territory ..." (SADC, 2003: 4).

The above-mentioned articles in the MDP indicate that there is great feasibility in forming close and concrete relationships among member states of which these relationships can be defined by an interdependence nature. SADC member states can co-operate their defence strategies and protect one another when encountered with a military threat (Ngoma, 2004: 415, Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010: 98, 99).

All states in the SADC region have shown a desire for collective defence and cooperation by signing the MDP. However, there have been several draft versions of the pact and this illustrates hesitation by member states to approve the pact. Article 6(1) of the pact suggests a timely response to an armed attack on a member state and article 6(2) emphasises total agreement by all member states – in alignment with the spirit of cooperation (SADC, 2003:3). But this can delay

implementation: For instance, between 2008 and 2015, new crises of governance and peace and security arose in Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Madagascar and Lesotho. Some of these crises were all initiated by hostile and potential armed attack on the state, but the reluctance and late response of member states made it difficult for a unified reaction (Maeresera and Uzodike, 2010: 101,102, Van Nieuwkerk, 2013: 148).

Even with the myriad of shortcomings, the RISDP, SIPO I, II and MDP have encountered their minimal successes are evidence that SADC has made effort in developing strategies and mechanisms displaying elements of being an ascendant security community (Hammerstad, 2005: 77). The ascendant phase is characterised by building regional institutions and organisations and member states within the region have a decreased sense of fear and there is an emergence of collective security. However, the institutions discussed above indicate that SADC is weak in implementation and is lagging behind. Moreover a strong sense of a security community among SADC member states does not yet exist (Hammerstad, 2005: 77, Nathan, 2006: 605).

Nathan (2006: 606) argues there are four major problems which have contributed to the challenge of achieving a common security within the SADC region and are impeding the organisation's possibility of establishing a security community. He argues that there is an absence of common values among member states. SADC member states are reluctant to surrender their sovereignty and the region is underdeveloped, and has weak administrative capacity which delays the effectiveness of the organisation's strategies and mechanisms (Nathan, 2006: 605, 606). SADC states are more interested in maximising their sovereignty instead of limiting it and this makes it a challenge for increased cooperation (Hwang, 2007: 68). Buzan and Waeber (2003: 219) make a generalisation stating that "most African states are weak powers, having limited economic, political and military resources and are also weak states having low levels of socio-economic cohesion". Hammerstad (2005), Nathan (2006), Hwang (2007) and Buzan and Waeber (2003) argue that SADC is not yet at the mature phase which Adler and Barnett (1998) refer to. These scholars identify SADC as an organisation that has numerous challenges and as a result of these challenges the organisation has not reached the mature phase of collective identity and mutual trust.

3.4 Individuality impeding collective objectives?

It can be argued that the individual actions of member states also restrict the organisation into reaching the mature phase and expressing characteristics of collective identity and mutual trust. In some cases member states do not share the same perspective for addressing dealing with a challenge affecting the entire region. Thus conflicting ideas make it difficult for achieving collective objectives. For instance SADC is an organisation consisting of 15 member states (SADC, 2012). Each state makes a decision based on protecting its national interests first, although SADC member states signed a treaty obligating them to principles of regional integration their national and interests and sovereignty will always guide states into making a decision. Mwanawina (2011: 472) mentions that often, heads of states and ministers will deliberately structure documents in a way that ensures their political interests are not compromised. SADC is a region that stresses the importance of sovereignty. In some cases this “obsession” with sovereignty has led the organisation into delayed responses or failure to act in situations that required swift reaction. Below are a few significant examples of crises and opposing ideas that have emerged in the SADC region which required collective effort and joint decision making but because of different national interests, effective collective decisions were not made and eventually ensued into further turmoil.

In the wake of the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) which can be marked from the first decade of the new century, the Zimbabwean government was faced with deep economic and social inequalities, political antagonism, the erosion of political legitimacy and human rights (Pallotti, 2013: 17- 19). However, economic integration had gained momentum in the Southern African region, through implementing the SADC Free Trade Area and on the other hand political, and security cooperation was being affected by interstate conflicts and different national interests. The formation of the new SADC had encouraged states to discuss how to collectively maintain security and promote democracy in the region. Amongst these discussions were two disagreements that came from the discussions: the first was about the proposal of Zimbabwe having the permanent chairmanship of the new SADC and the second disagreement was about the guidelines that would support the SADC peace-building and peace-enforcement activities. It was only in 1996 that a solution was reached – the OPDSC was established and SADC leaders also decided that the organisation would have rotating chairmanship on an annual basis and

Zimbabwe would serve as the first chairman (Pallotti, 2013: 26, 27). Both disagreements marked a pivotal point for the organisation because member states were either for or against Zimbabwe having a permanent chairmanship.

According to Alden and Schoeman (2003) in 1998 political tensions increased among SADC member states when the governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe used military intervention in the DRC. South Africa did not support the intervention and this indicated that it was an isolated member in the organisation. During this period the discussions that were being held by SADC were mainly concerned with security cooperation. This would assist SADC in promoting democratic practices and human rights. This was during the period SADC had adopted RISDP and SIPO. The organisation had taken the responsibility to support the development of democratic institutions and practices within the region (SADC, 2012, Pallotti, 2013: 28). But the organisation was somewhat failing because Zimbabwe had unveiled contradictions to political legitimacy as Zimbabwe was faced with declining election turnout, there was growing support for President Robert Mugabe - a leader- who some understood as exploiting racial and ethnic cleavages. A critical point of the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) was the March, 2008 national elections. Mugabe's Zanu PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) lost the elections to Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC (Movement of Democratic Change). A political compromise was reached to share control of parliament between the two rivals but this failed to bring a sense of security and justice Zimbabwe needed. Zimbabwe's inflation rate has fallen from 231 million per cent to 1 per cent, the economy remains stagnant and the population of Zimbabwe remains in a state of chronic malnutrition. Although the sanctions placed on Zimbabwe are directed at a handful of business and political leaders the vast majority is suffering (Baldauf, 2009). Baldauf (2009) argues that SADC need to redeem itself, the organisation needs to stop embracing Mugabe, put pressure on his regime and dismantle it. Aside from the pressure exerted on SADC, South Africa's quiet diplomacy towards the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) was also debated. South Africa opted for a method of quiet diplomacy – this meant Mbeki (Former President of South Africa) and Mugabe met on several occasions to discuss and broaden the space for conflict resolution. The belief was that this type of diplomatic act would be more effective and South Africa had a comparative advantage over other state in the region because of its dominant political, economic and military capabilities (Prys, 2008, Mhango, 2014: 18, 19). However South Africa's quiet diplomacy did not help defuse the crisis,

or brings forth the question of leadership and the responsibility of peace making in the region. Quiet diplomacy excluded other member states and made it difficult to achieve a sense of collectiveness if problems are not been addressed together by the members of the organisation.

Another critical element that enables organisations to have collective identity is sharing common interests. SADC aims at achieving regional integration within the economic and political spheres. The economic rationale for regional integration focuses on creating larger markets, improved welfare for citizens, developing markets that will attract funding and the political rationale focuses on security issues, democratic principles and creation of political entities (Peters-Berries, 2011:14). In order for both rationales to be implemented agreements, treaties and protocols need to be signed by member states – member states need to ratify and accept the conditions of which the agreements, treaties and protocols outline. Accession and ratification of protocols indicates willingness, interest and capability in the member states of SADC (Pallotti, 2004: 516-518). However, DRC and Angola seem less committed to collective efforts that foster regional integration. According to Peter-Berries (2011) by August 2004 the DRC had not yet accepted 14 of the 26 treaties and protocols and Angola had refused to sign 6 documents and 16 were not ratified. The attitude of the DRC and Angola can be regarded as behaviour impeding SADC to achieve its collective objectives and the organisation then is perceived as fragmented.

Swaziland is another example of a SADC member states overstressing their sovereignty and refusing to contribute to creating a sense of “we-ness” in the region. The SADC Council of Non-governmental Organisation has urged Swaziland to stop denying citizens their inalienable right to participate in electoral and democratic processes and has called upon SADC to ensure Swaziland establishes a constitutional democracy (Mwanawina 2011: 475). Swaziland is a monarchy ruled by King Mswati III. He and his government are known to be intolerant of any political organisation or political action. The judiciary, executive and legislative powers are vested in King Mswati III – the king appoints and controls the judiciary and has the power to veto any bills passed in by parliament. The Elections Boundaries Commission (EBC) was unilaterally appointed by the King, is accountable to him and cannot be challenged in court. The chair of the EBC is Chief Gija Dlamini who is the brother of the King thus the independence of the EBC is questionable (International Crisis Group, 2012).

There have been numerous calls from SADC for Swaziland to restructure its' constitution but the King seems adamant to maintain the status quo. The political administration of King Mswati III violates the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. Swaziland's unjust political administration and the fact that it is the third SADC member state lagging behind with signing agreements, treaties and protocols makes it a state unwilling to comply with the core principles of SADC. Furthermore, it gives the impression that it is disjointed of the organisation and acts on its own individual capacity regardless of its membership to SADC.

SADC member states overemphasise their sovereignty and this affects the ability of the organisation to build a unified organisation that reflects a collective identity which will ensure member states act in accordance to the objectives the organisation has set out.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter argued that the nascent and ascendant phases of Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework are evident within SADC. The strategies and plans such as RISDP, SIPO I and II and MDP developed over the years are evidence that there is a sense of cooperation and coordination among member states. Although the organisation struggles with implementation and operationalising its strategies and plans it cannot be overlooked that the organisation is making efforts in establishing the Southern African region into a security community.

But scholars like Nathan (2006), Hammerstad (2005), Hwang (2007) and Buzan and Waever (2003) argue that SADC has not yet reached the mature phase of being a security community. They base their observation on various aspects such as sovereignty, weak institutions, lack of political will, poor administration and basically argue that African states are weak states and have the inability to produce a security community in the Southern African region. On the other hand scholars such as Van Aardt (1996), Ngoma (2005), Motsamai (2012), Maeresera and Uzodike (2010) and to some extent Hammerstad (2005) consider SADC as an organisation that is making progress towards establishing a security community. According to these scholars a sense of cooperation and coordination is being achieved within the organisation and this is indicated by strategies such as the MDP. Moreover these scholars believe SADC has attained a common security within the region and most importantly it equals the nascent and ascendant phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) framework.

Furthermore the few examples discussed above indicate that a few member states use sovereignty to refuse to abide by the principles and objectives of SADC. This impedes the spirit of regional integration and most importantly makes it problematic for member states to develop a collective identity and mutual trust. Thus making SADC stagnant and not moving to the mature phase of a security community.

This chapter argued that despite the shortcomings of SADC's implementation and operationalisation, the organisation has achieved the nascent and ascendant phase. It is the lack of implementation and various other reasons such as an overemphasis of sovereignty that have made it a challenge to reach the mature phase.

CHAPTER FOUR

RETHINKING MUTUAL TRUST AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

4.1 Introduction

The preceding chapter argued that SADC has surpassed the nascent and ascendant phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. This was further supported by evidence presented in the chapter. However, the organisation is unable to accomplish the status of a security community because it has struggled to attain the significant attributes of mutual trust and collective identity. It seems appropriate, therefore, to rethink mutual trust and collective identity in the context that Adler and Barnett (1998) present it and reveal an alternative that captures mutual trust and collective identity in the context of SADC. This chapter is an attempt to highlight how SADC defines its mutual trust and collective identity as a regional bloc for the purpose of shaping and strengthening regional integration. The purpose of this chapter is to explore how SADC defines and embodies mutual trust and collective identity in contrast to how Adler and Barnett (1998) define their third tier. This chapter critiques the manner in which Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework does not match SADC's approach to developing itself as a security community. It further attempts to explore the significance of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework in the progress SADC has made as towards creating a security community. Thus this chapter attempts to answer the primary research question of the study.

The chapter will provide a contextual account of SADC and how the characteristics of mutual trust and collective identity are displayed by the organisation. This chapter presents the paradox of mutual trust and collective identity and the possibility of developing a new approach to a security community. The paradox existing within mutual trust and collective identity is presented in the inconsistencies found in SADC. This chapter will outline how mutual trust and collective identity within SADC do not often emulate the same components found in Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework.

4.2 The paradox of mutual trust

Chapter 2 presented Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework which outlines the three phases that are critical for the development of a security community. The third tier of the framework is the mature phase. In this phase states that belong to a particular region are expected to have mutual trust and collective identity in order to develop into a security community (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 45, 46). In the mature phase, regional actors share an identity and have expectations of peaceful change being inevitable. Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework identified indicators in the mature phase – one of the indicators is based on the high level of military integration. Additionally, they explain that in a security community military integration can be redundant because members of that community share identities and this creates a high level of trust and security among themselves. Therefore, there is an interdependent relationship between members of that community thus creating a sense of stable peace (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 56, 57).

However the manner in which Adler and Barnett (1998) present the notion of mutual trust as an outcome/precondition of a security community is problematic. This is because they do not explicitly describe how member states develop mutual trust, the notion of mutual trust is underspecified and unclear (Ditrych, 2014: 353). According to Ditrych (2014), the idea that member states develop mutual trust through interaction is flawed – it does not explain the link between interaction and mutual trust. Boas (2000) also raises concerns about how Adler and Barnett (1998) predict how security communities are developed. Adler and Barnett (1998) advocate that military cooperation and coordination can decrease fear between member states of a community. In such a community members states establish cognitive structures promoting common understanding and the willingness to act together and in so doing, deepening mutual trust and the emergence of collective identities. Boas (2000: 313) argues that the problem with this argument is that frequent interaction does not necessarily mean building trust and providing peaceful change. Boas (2000) and Ditrych (2014) are sceptical and dismissive of the idea of mutual trust and its relevance to creating expectations of peaceful change.

According to Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2012: 25) SADC member states are unable to achieve mutual trust because there is a tendency among member states whereby some consider themselves to be more equal than others and as result mutual trust cannot be achieved. Mapuva

and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2012: 24, 25) make reference to the SADC Tribunal and its failure to uphold justice and act as a unified body. Zimbabwe dominated the proceedings and verdict of the SADC Tribunal to a point where there was a lack of honesty. Nathan (2013: 206) also expresses the same sentiments as Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2012) that SADC member states have failed to develop mutual trust due to an absence of common values among member states. Nathan (2013) further explains that the lack of mutual trust within SADC is a deep-rooted and structural challenge and it will not be over-come quickly or easily. Vale (2003: 121) also argues that SADC member states lack mutual trust because of the internal instability of member states, and this makes it difficult to build trust within and among members. Nathan (2006a: 277) alludes to the fact that a security community needs to be understood as more than the absence of war but it needs to also be understood as states trusting one another to resolve conflicts without war. There has to be a certain level of trust among member states in order to resolve conflicts in a peaceful manner.

Chingono and Nakana (2009: 405) refer to the Cold War as one of the factors for producing a lack of trust among SADC member states. They claim the Cold War reduced certain states such as Angola and Mozambique into battlegrounds of the pro-capitalist and pro-communist conflict. The end of the Cold War saw a subsequent emergence of new challenges and threats like terrorism and as a result, this diverted development aid coming into the region. It further led to new strategic alliances between certain African states and the US. Such alliances consequently led to fragmentation and suspicion among member states in the region. The change and instability in a unipolar/multipolar world and the growth of terrorist threats increased SADC member states tendency to acquire weaponry and invest in defence strategies (Chingono and Nakana 2009: 405). Eventually it leads to mistrust because member states will continue to acquire weaponry and neighbouring states will feel threatened and insecure – as a result they too will procure weaponry and in due course causing an arms race.

Another element that has caused distrust among SADC member states are the disagreements on political interventions pursued by member states against other member states. For instance there is a division among leading states – between those who support military solutions such as Zimbabwe and those who support diplomatic solutions such as South Africa. This division played out in the DRC intervention that took place in 1998 when Uganda and Rwanda's military

attacked the DRC and Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe intervened and prevented the invaders seizing the capital city of Kinshasa (Ancas, 2011:142, Hammerstad, 2003: 24). According to William (2005) SADC acted as a “bipolar” entity adopting two incompatible strategies led by two sub-regional leaders. Ancas (2011) argues that the distrust caused by interventions will continue and is likely to manifest in declarations stressing the importance of sovereignty and non-interference. Hammerstad (2003: 21) also considers SADC member states lacking mutual trust. Although the organisation has made improvements towards displaying solidarity there are strong differences and opinions among SADC member states on what the organisation should be about. Hammerstad (2003: 23, 24) refers to the development of the OPDSC as a critical point that marked the deadlock of two distinct and conflicting ideas on how the security structure of SADC should be like. Hammerstad (2003: 24) refers to the same strategies that Ancas (2011) mentions – the first being a militaristic and traditional strategy that calls for military action against a threat or external aggression from a member towards another thus calling for member states to protect one another. The second is based on human security - it focuses on governance, human rights, minority rights, negotiation, mediation and other means to resolve conflict.

The emerging tone from the discussion above seems unconvinced on the relevance of mutual trust in creating a security community. The scholars question the interaction between building trust and providing peaceful change. Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework does not specify how mutual trust is developed from interaction between member states. The lack of this specification raises the question of the role and significance mutual trust has on developing a security community. Since Adler and Barnett (1998) do not clearly identify the link between mutual interaction and mutual trust and collective identity, it therefore becomes problematic for one to identify mutual trust among member states and to identify how it develops. The manner in which Adler and Barnett (1998) describe the significance of mutual trust in developing a security community is not present within SADC. SADC member states lack mutual trust among each other – consequently the lack of thereof makes cooperation and coordination flawed. Member states will be less inclined to disclose their strategic and operational plans amongst each other since they do not trust each other, cooperation and coordination among member states becomes a face value factor that is not truly embodied when implemented.

There is also a substantial group of scholars that argue against the idea of SADC member states having mutual trust. The range of scholars that doubt the relevance of mutual trust in building a security community and those that question the existence of mutual trust within SADC leads one to question the mature phase and the necessary components that Adler and Barnett's (1998) present in their framework.

Adler and Barnett (1998) consider mutual trust as one of the critical elements in the development of a security community but it is difficult to observe since trust is an abstract component. According to Adler and Barnett (1998) as already stated in chapter one of this study - trust is a social phenomenon and it can only be assessed by the consistency of normative expectations of that particular actor. But it is through social construction that trust is based on "beliefs that we have about others, beliefs that, in turn, are based on years of experiences and encounters" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 46). Adler and Barnett (1998) state that one of the reasons international organisations are established is to monitor the behaviour of states. But they further expand their argument for the development of a security community – by verifying that in a security community states do not need an international organisation to monitor behaviour among states (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 46). This is because of the existence of dependable expectations of peaceful change – meaning in a security community all states want to achieve peace that is beneficial for all states.

Nonetheless chapter three indicated that SADC has not yet reached the mature phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework because it lacks the two essential components of the mature phase namely mutual trust and collective identity. It can be argued that SADC has made some significant developments towards establishing a security community. Although the developments made by SADC may not follow the linear framework of Adler and Barnett (1998) they do attempt to make a substantial difference in the region. Thus it is important to highlight the efforts made by SADC and how the organisation understands and embodies mutual trust. There are a few scholars that consider SADC to have made progress towards establishing trust among its members and even the SADC Treaty itself refers to building mutual trust. The proposed structure of the SADC Organ mentions that the organisation will pursue "long term processes of engagement, building trust and informed debate" (Malan and Cilliers, 1997: 6).

Thus, SADC's institutional framework illustrates that it is concerned with building trust and does consider trust as critical to its functioning and development.

Franke (2008) acknowledges that increasing institutionalisation of cooperation contributes to the development of mutual trust among member states and it also provides a framework for a system of collective security and military integration. According to Franke (2008), increased institutionalisation of military cooperation, developing a common peace operations doctrine to share intelligence indicates seriousness of member states to overcome suspicions of the past and establish a lasting relationship. Furthermore, it is noted that the ongoing cooperation within other areas such as agriculture, education and health also indicates an increase in developing a security community (Franke, 2008: 328). However these are sectors that Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework do not explicitly cover as significant indicators of developing a security community – they focus is on military integration and cooperation of security forces in creating and the absence of war. It appears then that SADC is progressing towards cooperation to build mutual trust however it in sectors that do not necessarily speak to military integration and cooperation. Hence it is questionable as to whether SADC's progress has relevance in it establishing mutual trust.

There are other sectors that can be considered as contributing to SADC member states developing mutual trust. Dzinesa and Tjonneland (2013) reviewed Nathan's (2012) book titled *Community of insecurity: SADC's struggle for peace and security in southern Africa*. In their review they do not necessarily pronounce SADC to have achieved mutual trust. But they are optimistic – they note that state interests generally influence the behaviour of states and it can help build cooperation and trust between states. According to Tjonneland (2013) “cooperation in Southern Africa also began with functional cooperation in areas such as transport and energy, and later progressed to trade integration” (Tjonneland, 2013: 194). Tjonneland (2013) considers state interests crucial in forging a sense of regional identity and community. State interests are based on individual state goals that are addressed by government policies. It is common state interests which bring states together to develop trust. Although there is uncertainty of how deeply rooted is that trust and the length of time to establish trust but they do acknowledge that progress towards establishing peace and security can be achieved through state interests (Nathan, 2013: 206).

Rubert and Beetlestone (2014: 703, 704) write about disaster risk reduction in the SADC region. According to these scholars the SADC Secretariat has been able to provide regional climate forecasts and early warnings to member states this has improved the quality of SADC's Disaster Risk Reduction Unit. The Disaster Reduction Unit was developed to provide technical assistance to regional and national projects aimed at strengthening the capacities of states to manage and minimise hazards and disasters internally and externally. The regional forecast facility has enriched sharing of hydrological data among member states and has supported building mutual trust. Trust between member states and towards SADC institutions is being built. For instance, currently the main activity of the unit is providing a platform for discussions among member states to increase coordination. This indicates that other domains of SADC are building institutions that are aimed at fostering mutual trust among member states (Rubert and Beetlestone, 2014: 703).

Thus on an institutional level, SADC does outline strategies towards developing mutual trust. However it appears that SADC lacks sufficient implementation and operationalisation of its institutions. Moreover, member states have a difficulty in developing trust amongst one another through interaction.

4.3 The paradox of collective identity

The mature phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework emphasises collective identity as one of the necessary conditions of developing a security community. Their three tier framework outlines that mutual trust needs to be present first, then afterwards collective identity is formed. The understanding is that "collective identity reinforces and increases the depth of trust" (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 45, 46). As discussed in chapter two collective identity is critical for the development of a security community because it requires people to be able to relate with others but also that they relate with themselves as part of a group in relation to other groups. Additionally, Adler and Barnett (1998: 53) claim that "increased interactions encourage the development of new social institutions and organisations which reflect shared interests and collective identity". When member states share collective identity there is a likelihood of greater regional interaction. Therefore, networks and relations become intensified and eventually strengthen mutual trust and collective identity (Adler and Barnett, 1998: 53). A collective identity also speaks to a common identity or understanding, and this means that member states

perceive themselves as a collective unit. Adler and Barnett (1998) also note that political communities split up because of the lack of interconnectedness and the unpredictable nature of identities. Therefore, the same factors responsible for developing a security community can also be responsible for its breakdown. Adler and Barnett (2000: 324) interpret the relationship between security and identity as follows: shared identity creates the possibility of mutual association or new forms of institutionalised arrangements. Therefore, shared identity is not critical at the early stages of developing a security community but rather “shared identity is collective meaning that becomes attached to material reality, thus helping to constitute the practices of security community at a later stage” (Adler and Barnett, 2000: 324). Adler and Barnett (2000) consider shared identity as the basis of how member states interact and relate to one another. Thus, they stress the importance of collective identity in the formation of a security community. Although they stress the importance of collective identity in the development of a security community for an organisation such as SADC determined to be a security community, it lacks this critical factor.

According to Hammerstad (2003: 21) “SADC countries do not sufficiently share a sense of common values and mutual trust to embark on a rapid and deep security integration project as outlined in the protocol”. SADC member states do not have a common vision. An example of this is that when the organisation was building its security Organ, there was a deadlock of two distinct ideas as already mentioned above. The first view is militaristic and traditional and the second is based on human security. This manifests in the organisation lacking a collective identity: each state wants to pursue a vision that will be beneficial for its national interest. Hammerstad (2003: 25, 26) notes that SADC leaders do share a sense of solidarity, that is created by a common history of colonial struggle and apartheid. SADC member states also have a shared suspicion of the motives and intentions of Western powers in the sub-region.

Respectively SADC member states have a strong commitment to sovereignty – as discussed in chapter three they are dedicated to honouring the doctrine of non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs. Although their commitment to sovereignty makes the organisation have a sense of collective identity concurrently it creates a division within the organisation because in some instances member states might make a decision to act against an aggressor state that is violating human rights and democratic principles. But because of the strict respect of sovereignty they are

unable to interfere and dreadful domestic issues are not resolved. The lack of a common vision among SADC member states is a serious weakness to establishing long term peace and stability in Southern African region.

Ditrych (2014: 354) argues that Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is complex: he describes the elements of the model as ambiguous and unclear. For instance how would one recognise shared meanings – furthermore this assumes that among member states of a security community meanings must be shared. It is also not clear which actors must share meanings. This makes it difficult for one to be able to identify collective identity unless if states disclose that they share an identity.

Nathan (2006b: 612) refers to SADC's poor record of peacekeeping missions and that it has caused the stalemate of the OPDSC. According to Nathan (2006b) SADC lacks establishing “an agreed set of norms, strategies and procedures for addressing high intensity conflict contributed to collective inertia, divergent and parochial approaches by individual states, ill-conceived interventions and a confused mixture of peace-making and peace enforcement” (Nathan, 2006b: 612). Nathan (2006b) points out that SADC does not have a common agreement on conflicts, member states follow strategies that seem suitable for their capabilities and even national interests. There is no consensus among SADC member states when dealing with peace-making and peace enforcement. The organisation presents itself as having a strong sense of unity amongst its member states but through implementation and decision making there are disagreements. Nathan (2006b) refers to the DRC intervention discussed in chapter three where there were differences with the action taken despite these differences member states embarked on military action in the name of SADC.

Baker and Maeresera (2009: 109) acknowledge that the “absence of common national interests and common values among member states inhibits the development of trust, institutional cohesion, common policies and unified responses to crises” (Baker and Maeresera 2009: 108). Baker and Maeresera (2009: 108, 109) note that without common national interests and common values member states do not trust each other and they are unable to act in unison. They argue that SADC lacks a collective identity and just like Nathan (2006b) also refer to the DRC debacle that resulted in a division between militarist and pacifist states. However, Baker and Maeresera (2009) also recognise SADC's MDP as a strategy of collective defence, although they argue that

it is unclear. However, Article 6(1) of the MDP states that “an armed attack on a state within the sub region as an attack against all provides adequate justification for intervention in member state in respect of grave circumstances” (SADC, 2003: 3). Therefore, the MDP indicates that in terms of strategy and planning SADC has made efforts in developing a collective identity regarding defence strategies.

Van Nieuwkerk (2003: 1) contends that although the MDP indicates a collective self-defence and collective action the pact also states that member states have an option choosing how to respond to a call of immediate action. They can either do nothing – should they decide to do nothing the remaining member states are likely to prefer either the military solutions or the peaceful diplomatic approach. Van Nieuwkerk (2003: 2) mentions that at some point or another all SADC member states will form part of a brigade on a mandate to intervene or deliver an appropriate policy to intervene but the challenge for the sub-region will always remain as getting a consensual position among all SADC member states. This indicates that a collective identity among SADC member states is not present – SADC member states act on the basis of pursuing their national interests and protecting their sovereignty.

Therefore, similarly to mutual trust, collective identity does present a paradox to SADC, institutionally the organisation has aims at building mutual trust and establishing a collective identity. However, when inspecting the reality of the organisation it indicates an adequate level of mutual trust and collective identity – there are moments where member states attempt to uphold mutual trust and collective identity but it is not sufficient enough to make SADC reach the mature phase of Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework.

4.4 SADC and its unconventional approach to a security community

SADC’s profile as an organisation striving to achieve peace and security in the African continent, is complex. Scholars such as Buzan and Waever (2003), Ngoma (2005), Schoeman (1997), Hammerstad (2005) and Tjonneland (2013) argue that SADC is on the correct path towards establishing a security community in the Southern African region. According to these scholars SADC is at the nascent phase of Adler and Barnett’s (1998) three tier framework. However, these scholars do not clearly stipulate how long it will take or what sort of action is

required for SADC to be at the mature phase. They complement SADC on establishing bodies such as OPDSC and strategies and plans such as the RISDP and SIPO 1 and II.

Nathan (2004) affirms that a necessary condition for a security community is domestic stability. He affirms that domestic violence generates tension among states and can affect neighbouring states, eventually causing instability within a region. Nathan (2004) therefore suggests that SADC cannot be a security community if any of its member states has domestic instability, because the violence is likely to spill over into a neighbouring state and he dismisses the argument of SADC is emerging as a security community. Laako (2005) asserts that it is difficult to disagree with Nathan (2004); however the consequence of this argument is that the concept of a security community becomes useless in an African context. Since states are the building blocks of a security community one cannot establish a security community without states. Nonetheless, regional organisations such as SADC need to focus on establishing a mandate, capacity and political will to strengthen or replace weak and collapsed states in the region.

Although Nathan (2004) affirms that the necessary condition for a security community is domestic stability, Buzan and Waever (2003) highlight that security problems in Africa are rooted in both domestic affairs and interstate affairs. However they do state that most of these security issues come from domestic issues such as an influx of refugees and civil wars. According to Buzan and Waever (2003) security developments and interaction for increasing security integration is destabilised by weak states. Soderbaum (1998) and Nathan (2004) maintain their argument that the main source of insecurity in the region is domestic conflicts.

However, there is an alternative argument that describes SADC as a regional security complex and with South Africa acting as a key regional power. Buzan (1988) defines a security complex based on the assumption that “local sets of states exist whose major security perceptions and concerns link together sufficiently that their national security problems cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan, 1988: 2). Security complexes are often defined hostility and fear, therefore the current status of SADC does not completely reflect a security complex (Buzan, 1988: 2). However, according to Hammerstad (2005) the history of the apartheid regime in South Africa and its neighbouring states is the main reason for the region to become a regional security complex, there was tension between apartheid-South Africa and other newly independent states in the region. This security complex was intensified by disputes

between Zimbabwe and South Africa. Hammerstad (2005) then acknowledges SADC as an emerging security community, she describes the organisation being at a stage where it is able to coordinate its actions and have better interaction in order to increase security and mutual trust. Additionally, she mentions that SADC has characteristics of an emerging security community, they are identified in regional institutions the organisation has developed and states feel less threatened by one another.

Kelly (2007) proposes that developing states such as those in Africa should not use security theories, because Africa has different problems and concerns. The notion of a common enemy is always what guides a security architecture. The security concern may come from an internal element. Job (1997: 181) refers to “internal security dilemma”: this concept underlines that some states have domestic security concerns and issues that affect the maintenance of their government – these are weak and failed states. Some African states are faced with an “internal security dilemma” – such states are those that Nathan (2004) and Soderbaum (1998) would describe as having domestic instability. Job (1997) also suggests that insecurity comes from internal instability. Therefore, these scholars suggest that SADC member states have domestic instability resulting in the inability to develop a security community.

Thus, SADC needs to rather focus on what it is doing correctly to achieve the status of a security community. There are scholars that acknowledge that the organisation is emerging as a security community. As already mentioned above some of these scholars include Buzan and Waever (2003), Ngoma (2005), Schoeman (1997), Hammerstad (2005) and Tjonneland (2013). On the other hand are those that point out to the shortcomings of the organisation such as Nathan (2004) that highlights the problem of domestic instability, the lack of common values and the inability of SADC member states to surrender their sovereignty. In his book, he writes about struggles the organisation faces in establishing peace and security in the Southern African region. Nonetheless SADC is on the correct path of establishing a security community – the organisation can be considered as taking an unconventional approach compared to that of Adler and Barnett (1998) because it does not follow the linear framework which they propose. The above discussions reflect that SADC has established a sense of mutual trust and collective identity although what the organisation has achieved is not adequate for it to be at the mature phase of Adler and

Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. But SADC still remains an emerging security community that could be setting its own approach in establishing a security community.

4.5 Conclusion

To conclude, this chapter argued the inconsistency of mutual trust and collective identity in the context of SADC. The chapter outlined shortcomings and struggles of SADC in establishing mutual trust and collective identity among its member states. The two necessary conditions as outlined by Adler and Barnett (1998) are not prevailing within SADC. The scholars above note that SADC does make efforts to develop and build mutual trust and collective identity. But the organisation cannot establish a satisfactory level of mutual trust and collective identity that reflects the mature phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier phase.

Furthermore, this chapter outlined the perspectives of various scholars with regards to the efforts the organisation has made towards establishing a security community. The discussion above illustrated that there is no irrefutable argument when it comes to categorising SADC as a security community or not. There are scholars that consider SADC as an emerging security community and there are others that point to certain major problems that make the region insecure and thus making SADC lack the ability to develop into a security community. Thus it is critical for the organisation to continue focusing on the elements that will make it achieve stable peace and security in the region and optimistically it develop into a security community.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework presents an outline of how a security community can be developed through a three phase process. Chapter two presented the three tier framework - the first tier describes the nascent phase – this phase is concerned with precipitating conditions. These conditions refer to states creating relations and aspiring to coordinate with others. Adler and Barnett (1998: 50) maintain that at this phase states do not explicitly seek to create a security community, instead they begin to coordinate their relations to increase mutual security. The second tier outlines the nascent phase: in this phase states have a positive and reciprocal relationship that is defined through organisations, transactions and social learning. Adler and Barnett (1998: 39-40) note the distinctive feature in this phase as states being involved in social interactions that transform the environment they exist in. The final tier describes the mature phase: when states have reached this phase they have achieved a security community. According to Adler and Barnett (1998) in order for states to develop a security community there has to be mutual trust and collective identity among member states. The assumption, therefore, is mutual trust and collective identity are the necessary preconditions to developing a security community. This assumption upholds that states cannot develop a security community if they lack mutual trust and collective identity.

Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is conceptualised in the Western context – their framework was more concerned with application in a post-Cold War era. However this study aimed to apply the three tier framework to an African context in particular the Southern African region focusing on SADC. The reason for selecting SADC as a case study is because the regional bloc is one of the most notable in the African continent for its history of establishing a functioning regional community, for developing bilateral and multilateral relations between its member states. Most significantly for its efforts in attempting to create stable peace and security in the region especially during the hostility between the FLS and apartheid-South Africa. This study explored Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework of developing a security community with reference to SADC as an emerging security community and questioned whether

SADC as a regional bloc has followed the linear framework of Adler and Barnett (1998). The discussion in chapter three indicated that SADC has attained the precipitating conditions of the first tier. SADC member states have created positive and reciprocal relationships that have fostered diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral relations among member states. In 1992 when the SADC Treaty was signed by member states at Windhoek, Namibia they committed themselves to coordinating relations in combating state security threats, human security threats and establishing mutual security in the region. The treaty resembled the nascent phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework. Ngoma (2003: 48) states that SADC is moving towards a security community this is recognised in the interdependence among member states. Moreover it can be observed that the period between 1992 and 2005 marked the nascent phase of the organisation. It is the period from when the organisation was established till RISDP and SIPO were initiated. From 1992-2005 SADC was positioning itself as a regional bloc concerned with uniting member states through coordination, increased interaction and sharing a common purpose to create a stable and secure region. In order to achieve a common security architecture and form a unified community of states SADC embarked on creating institutions and strategies foster and encourage a deeper sense of integration and coordination. SADC established various institutions such as the OPDSC, the Troika and SADC National Committees (SADC, 2012). The institutional mechanisms developed by SADC reflect coordination and recognition of the importance of mutual security among member states and this indicates that SADC embodies characteristics of the nascent phase as Adler and Barnett (1998).

Adler and Barnett (1998), describe the ascendant phase as a point in which a community of states is deepening integration. SADC displayed the characteristics of the ascendant phase by implementing strategies such as the RISDP, MDP, SIPO I and II. As indicated in chapter three SADC has struggled with implementing and operationalising these strategies. However, the organisation has managed to decrease a sense of fear and there is an emergence of collective security. Although SADC has accomplished a sense of collective security among its member states the organisation struggles with implementing its strategies. For instance as discussed in chapter three SADC lacks adequate implementation of its strategies – RISDP and SIPO I were initiated in the same year and they had corresponding frameworks. However, van Nieuwkerk (2013: 147) argued that SIPO I was poorly implemented because minimal efforts were made to operationalise the plan. Kaunda (2009) argued that RISDP and SIPO I were not coordinated and

harmonised. Aside from these struggles – the regional institutions built by SADC are classified as a step for the organisation in reaching the ascendant phase. Although SADC has struggled with operationalising its strategies it cannot be disregarded because it is making efforts towards establishing a security community in the Southern African region.

Nonetheless, chapter three also illustrated that SADC has not yet reached the mature phase. Scholars such as Nathan (2006), Hammerstad (2005), Hwang (2007) and Buzan and Waever (2003) dispute the idea of SADC as a security community. However they do mention the specific shortcomings that hindered SADC into establishing itself as a security community. One of these major shortcomings discussed in chapter three is the issue of strict respect of sovereignty that is highly emphasised in the SADC Treaty. Article 4(a) of the SADC Treaty highlights the importance respecting the principle of sovereignty during intra- and inter-state conflicts and non-interference in domestic affairs of member states (Mwanawina, 2011: 472). SADC member states abide by the principle of sovereignty and this was clear in both cases of the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) and the Swaziland's political issues. It can be argued that SADC member states seem to hide behind the principle of sovereignty because respecting sovereignty has come across as inaction from member states. The Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-) still remains as a crisis and Swaziland also still remains with unjust political administration. SADC member states tolerate domestic instability of other member states in the name of preserving the principal of sovereignty within the organisation. Nathan (2006: 606) maintains that it is problematic for SADC member states to refuse to surrender their sovereignty because it impedes the organisation from achieving a common security policy. Since SADC member states are more concerned with maximising their sovereignty ultimately it limits coordination.

Aside from refusing to surrender their sovereignty, SADC member states have weak institutions, lack political will and poor administration: all these major problems hinder SADC into developing as a security community. Nonetheless van Aardt (1996), Ngoma (2005), Motsamai (2012), Maeresera and Uzodike (2010) and Hammerstad (2005) insist that SADC is making significant progress towards establishing a security community in the region. Therefore, SADC has remained stagnant at the ascendant phase and according to the Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework in order for a security community to emerge member states of that community need to have mutual trust and collective identity.

Adler and Barnett (1998) state that a security community cannot develop without two necessary conditions namely: mutual trust and collective identity. Chapter four presents a focal point for this study - it discussed how SADC expresses mutual trust and collective identity for the purpose of shaping and strengthening regional integration. SADC's Treaty and strategies aim to attain a unified organisation through coordination and cooperation between member states.

However, SADC is confronted by a paradox of both mutual trust and collective identity. Member states in SADC do not have mutual trust – one of the most significant examples was the Zimbabwe Crisis (2000-). Mapuva and Muyengwa-Mapuva (2012: 24, 25) refer to the failure of SADC's Tribunal in upholding justice on the Zimbabwe proceedings and verdict. Moreover SADC member states do not have common values, Nathan (2013: 206) claims it is for that reason that they lack mutual trust. He asserts that member states need to understand a security community as more than just the absence of war but also as a way in which they can resolve conflicts peacefully. SADC member states need to trust each other in order to resolve conflicts peacefully. Vale (2003: 121) notes that internal instability also contributes to the lack of mutual trust among SADC member states. Particularly political interventions directed at internal domestic affairs can decrease the lack of trust among member states. SADC member states have a history of disagreements when it comes to political interventions. The division between member states went as far as creating two opposing sides: on the one hand were those who support military solutions and on the other hand were those who support diplomatic solutions. In fact, in 1998 a political intervention took place in the DRC – SADC member states were divided amongst those who supported military action such as Zimbabwe and those who supported diplomatic action such as South Africa. This resulted in two incompatible strategies and it perpetuated distrust among SADC member states because of opposing opinions from two regional leaders.

The perception of mutual trust as a necessary element in developing a security community is highly questioned by Boas (2000) and Ditrych (2014) they oppose that there is a link between building trust and establishing peaceful change. They argue that Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework does not specify the role and significance of mutual trust in developing a security community.

Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework also emphasises collective identity as a necessary condition in developing a security community. Collective identity occurs through increased interactions, it encourages developing institutions which reflect shared interests and it also distinguished when member states perceive themselves as a collective unit. Hammerstad (2003), Nathan (2006b), Baker and Maeresera (2009) contend that SADC member states do not share a collective identity. SADC member states do not have common national interest and values, they do not have a common set of norms and procedures in dealing with inter- and intrastate conflicts. Overall these are shortcomings that inhibit the organisation from developing mutual trust because there is no cohesion among SADC member states.

However, it can be argued that SADC may be using an unconventional approach to developing a security community. Also considering that the organisation has surpassed the nascent and ascendant phase of Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework and there are scholars that argue SADC is emerging as a security community. SADC does not embody mutual trust and collective identity as Adler and Barnett (1998) describe in the mature phase but, to a certain extent member states do have mutual trust and collective identity. Although the strict adherence of sovereignty, domestic instability, lack of common norms and interests among member states remain as major problems for the organisation to create a security community.

Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework makes the assumption that if regional blocs follow the three tier outline in a linear course they are likely to develop into a security community. They do not, however, in their framework recognise that some regional blocs may follow an unconventional approach. An approach that is less rigid and mechanical. The key insight revealed in this study is that the Adler and Barnett's (1998), three tier framework is not entirely applicable to SADC. The mature phase stresses the importance of mutual trust and collective identity – SADC does not embody these two necessary conditions as described by Adler and Barnett (1998). Although SADC does make efforts to strengthen mutual trust, coordinate strategies and policies to develop collective identity, its efforts are not sufficient to make to make it a security community in its current form.

Since Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework is not entirely applicable to SADC, the shortfall of the framework makes a case for alternative frameworks to be developed that are more suitable for the regional community and the overall African continent. The type of

frameworks that need to be developed have to attempt to explain the resistance or incompatibility the Southern African region has with regards to a security community. Alternative frameworks can be developed from existing empirical research. Southern African states share a common history of the anti-colonial struggle and state independence. To a certain extent this common history has created common principles and norms among African states. One of the most valued principles is the strict adherence to sovereignty. When developing a framework suitable for African states such principles should be considered to guide the formulation of frameworks – with that noted there is a need for frameworks that are founded for African and based an African perspective.

This study aimed to investigate how mutual trust and collective identity can assist SADC into establishing itself as a security community. However, as discussed above the organisation is not a security community. But it remains important to question Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework in reference to SADC and whether in the case of SADC a security community needs to be formalised and established in a linear course. This study is also mindful that Adler and Barnett's (1998) three tier framework was established in the context of Western regional communities and thus it may only be applicable to only those communities. Thus further research is necessary, research that focuses on the African context which is attentive to security issues such as political legitimacy, democratic consolidation, human rights and socio-economic development. Such research will assist in developing theories that will suit the African context and hopefully assist in establishing security communities.

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