"The Speeches of Scipio Africanus in the Third Decade of Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*"

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Contents

Foreword

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Texts

The Oxford text of R.S. Conway and C.F. Walters (1968) has been used for Livy and the Loeb ed. (1968) for Polybius. I have drawn on A. de Sélincourt's translation of Liv. XXI–XXX (Penguin Books, 1970) and on W.R. Paton's rendering of Polybius in the Loeb library (1968).

Abbreviations

AJPH	–	*American Journal of Philology*
Bull. Inst. Class. Stud.	–	*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*
Ét. class.	–	*Les études classiques*
FGH	–	*Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*
HRF	–	*Historicorum Romanorum Fragmenta*
Phil. Woch.	–	*Philologische Wochenschrift*
RE	–	Pauly/Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*
RhM	–	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*

Introduction

The feature of ancient history-writing which has met with most criticism in modern times, especially from scientific historians, is the introduction of fictitious speeches into a historical narrative. A factor which is frequently overlooked in criticizing Greek and Roman historians for this practice is the close affiliation of ancient historiography with politics and rhetoric.

The insertion of speeches was ingrained in Greek and Roman historiography,[1] and it was recognized from the time of Thucydides that the historian had a relatively free hand in the composition of such speeches. The logical justification behind the convention, recalling the long association of historiography from its earliest beginnings with epic and drama, is the concept that man is a rational being, whose actions are the result of conscious decisions which originate from discourse in the form of speeches. This is the concept which founds the traditional Greek view of history as "actions and speeches" (Thuc. I.22.1),[2] and which is at the roots of the remark by Polybius (XII.25b.1) that the function of history is first to discover the words actually spoken, and next to ascertain why what was said or done led to failure or success. Good advice means successful policy and the reader of history can learn from this. In short, speech is at the roots of all political life.

Most of the ancient historians, again, had been politically active at some stage in their lives – Livy being a notable exception – and this meant that they were trained in rhetoric, the indispensable requirement for admission to a political career.[3] And the ancient rhetorician, at least during his training, was often concerned with historical themes, the reading of certain historians being recommended to him especially for their skill in the composition of speeches.[4]

It is hardly surprising, in virtue of the affinity between the rhetorician and the historian, to find that Livy's literary reputation at Rome rested above all on the com-

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1) Exceptions are Cratippus and Trogus Pompeius. Cf. *FGH* 64 F 1 (Cratippus) and Justin XXVIII. 3.11 (Trogus).

2) This division is echoed in later writers. Cf. Plato, *Tim.* 19c; Ephorus, *FGH* 70 F 9; Dion. Hal., *de Imit.* 3.3; Quint. X. 1.101.

3) That Livy had a sound rhetorical training is beyond dispute. For his interest in the subject, Seneca, *Contr.* IX.2.26; for his virtuosity, Quint. X.1.101.

4) Quint. III.8.49. X.1.74; 5.15.

posed speeches in his history. As witness there is the testimony of Quintilian (X.1.101), Tacitus (*Agric.* 10; *Ann.* IV.34.3) and Seneca (*ep. mor.* 46.1:100.9). A remark in Suetonius (*Dom.* 10) suggests further that the speeches were published and studied separately in Domitian's day. There are few modern scholars who echo this enthusiastic reception, however, and the speeches have been denigrated, not only because they are fictitious and insufficiently instructive, but also because the gallery of portraits they bring before us is allegedly no more than a collection of abstractions or dummies.[5)]

Although they are not in themselves a method of characterization – "[s]ie sind wie Mommsen es definirt, Darlegungen des Sachverhalts, die den handelnden Personen in den Mund gelegt sind"[6)] – the speeches of ancient historiography may be used to delineate character indirectly, especially when the historian wishes to portray a particular quality in the speaker. Apart from their other functions,[7)] then, Livy's speeches can serve a very real and valid purpose in enlightening the reader about the character and policy of historical personages; it is not only rhetorical virtuosity that is important in their composition but also the psychological content, "das Menschliche im weitesten Sinne, das hinter jeder Rede steht."[8)]

A main aim of this study will be to establish which assessment of the speeches is the more accurate, Quintilian's praise *cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt* (X.1.101), or the judgment of those modern scholars who assert that the speeches present us with little more than a collection of abstractions or dummies. We shall therefore first consider how Livy's rhetorical and psychological treatment of the subject matter has been dealt with by those scholars who have studied the speeches. This

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5) Cf. M.W.L. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* 1st paper-bound ed. (Berkeley, 1963), 96; citing R. Ullmann, *La technique des discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite* (Oslo, 1927) and R.M. Henry's address to the Classical Association (cf. his n. 28, p. 175). Henry showed sounder judgment, as Laistner points out, in his ed. of Book XXVI (cf. below, n. 11).

6) I. Bruns, *Die Persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten* (Berlin, 1898), 22.

7) They provide variety in the narrative, illustrate rhetorical virtuosity, create atmosphere, and allow the historian to remain "objective" while putting a subjective argument. Polybius also remarks (XII.25a.3) that speeches "as it were ... hold the whole composition together." Yet in Livy, as indeed in any ancient historian, the function of the speeches varies from situation to situation. Cf. E. Burck in *Livy* ed. T.A. Dorey (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 41.

8) R. Treptow, "Die Kunst der Reden in der 1. und 3. Dekade des livianischen Geschichtswerks" unpubl. Diss. (Kiel, 1964), 2.

is best done under the two categories into which the literature has been divided, viz works which deal only with and others which include discussions of, the speeches.[9)]

A. Canter, "Rhetorical Elements in Livy's Direct Speeches" (1917/1918) analyses the salient rhetorical elements in the speeches. He lists some valuable details on Livy's usage in this context, but gives no account of his psychological characterization.

R. Ullmann, *La technique des discours dans Salluste, Tite Live et Tacite* (1927), extends Canter's discussion with a detailed analysis of 90 of the longer speeches. He often adverts to the importance of the psychological content, but devotes no detailed discussion to it. His analysis, which is chiefly concerned with rhetorical *topoi,* shows the virtuosity of Livy's talent but not the human elements behind the speeches.

Ullmann extended the scope of the discussion again with his *Étude sur le style des discours de Tite Live* (1929), a general systematic survey of the rhetorical devices in the speeches. On account of the approach adopted, however, this work is of little use for the specific analysis of single speeches. Nor does it contain any detailed discussion of Livy's psychological methods.

K. Gries, "Livy's Use of Dramatic Speech" (1949), deals with "dramatic" speech in Livy – direct and indirect – under different captions: type, content, circumstances, speakers, length and form. This is a departure from the purely rhetorical treatment of the speeches, but the findings are chiefly statistical. The most important conclusion is that Livy, in contrast to his predecessors and contemporaries, made approximately equal use of direct and indirect "dramatic" speech in his work.

R. Treptow, "Die Kunst der Reden in der 1. und 3. Dekade des livianischen Geschichtswerks" (1964), stresses the importance of studying the rhetoric to indicate the artistry in Livy's speeches. The speeches are not directed only to the reader, however, but also to an audience. It is therefore important to consider, *i.a.*, the impressions conveyed by the speakers in their speeches, the psychological mould in which the speakers are cast, the methods they use to persuade the audience, and the attitude the audience is made to adopt.

We turn now to the second category into which the literature has been divided, viz works which incorporate discussions of the speeches.

The most extensive treatment under this caption is to be found in H. Borneque, *Tite-Live* (1933). Although this work contains no detailed discussion of single speeches,

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9) Cf. K. Gries, *AJPh* 70 (1949), 118.

certain conclusions are drawn about Livy's use of rhetoric and the psychological effects that he achieves. The majority of the speeches belong to the deliberative category, which is especially suited to the depiction of thoughts and motives, to characterization, and to the dramatization of events. The speeches also contain a wealth of rhetorical devices, ordinarily used with restraint and usually suited to the particular situation and to the character of the individual.

L. Catin, *En lisant Tite Live* (1944) deals in very general terms with the rhetorical and psychological aspects of the speeches. There is a close affinity between their artistic form and their psychological content. Each speech reveals the character of the speaker and is precisely adapted to the spirit of the audience.

M.W.L. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (1947), confines his discussion to general remarks. He points out that the speeches, when properly used, can serve a very real and valid purpose in enlightening the reader about the character and policy of historical personages.

P.G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (1961) demonstrates the central thesis of his discussion – that the speeches are greatly influenced by Greek rhetorical theory – with examples from the *genus deliberatiuum.* He shows that the speeches are generally apposite to the occasion and to the character of the speaker, and adverts to Livy's tendency of adjusting his source-content for characterization or from other artistic motives. Like Ullmann, however, with whom he is in substantial agreement, he is chiefly concerned with the rhetorical aspects of the speeches.

It is clear, then, that although several important contributions have been made towards understanding the speeches, the majority of the discussions – no doubt because of their comprehensiveness – are primarily concerned with a mechanical or statistical treatment of the rhetorical content. The authors have chiefly employed the categorization into the three *genera causarum* (*iudiciale, deliberatiuum,* and *demonstratiuum*), their main purpose being to illustrate the disposition throughout the speeches of the well known rhetorical *topoi* (*utile, rectum, honestum,* etc., or their opposites). Detailed analysis of single speeches, or classes of speech, is lacking in the main and specific discussion and illustration of the differentiation of the psychagogy and of the other artistic elements underlying the rhetoric have scarcely been attempted.[10] It is there-

10) Except by Treptow, whose dissertation has pretty well filled this lacuna as regards the third decade, though he has not analysed all Scipio's speeches. Further analyses are to be found, e.g., in E. Burck, *Einführung in die 3. Dekade des Livius* (Heidelberg, 1950), in G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius* 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1964) and, of course, in Ullmann's *La technique.* They are all restricted, however, by their particular contexts.

fore not very surprising to find that Livy should be praised as a consummate portrait painter on the one hand, yet be condemned for forcing his characters into a Procrustes bed on the other.[11)]

Which tendency inclines in the right direction? We may answer this question by analysing Scipio's speeches in the third decade. What is the attitude adopted there, the content and the scope? What effect does this have on the characterization of Scipio? What impression of him does Livy wish to convey and what rhetorical, psychagogic and other artistic methods does he use to achieve his purpose? Is Scipio an abstraction, a dummy? Or the living *fatalis dux huiusce belli?* Does the portrait bear out Livy's reputation as a great Roman historian, literary artist and psychologist? These are the questions which will be considered when Scipio's speeches are analysed.

11) Cf. R.M. Henry's ed. of Bk XXVI (London, 1905), xii: "How well ... is Scipio's character sketched in a few slight strokes in the speech ... to his soldiers before the start from New Carthage, and again with consummate skill in the short speech to Allucius after the capture of the town." Contrast R. Ullmann, *Étude sur le style des discours de Tite Live* (Oslo, 1929), 11: "T.L. ne réussit pas à s'émanciper de l'école et à peindre d'après la vie."

Chapter 1

The Tradition of Rhetoric in Historiography

Before we consider Scipio's speeches in the third decade, it is necessary to make an outline study of Livy's approach to history. We must analyse his fundamental attitude to the great Roman individuals whom he characterized in his speeches and the concept of history Cicero bequeathed to him for the composition of his work; for Livy is, of course, indirectly heir to the views of many Greek historians, shaped by Cicero into a doctrine about what the form and content of history should be.[1] The Ciceronian dogmas are not original, however, but are an attempted synthesis of earlier historiographical theory, particularly that of the Hellenistic period. An outline study of these earlier influences is therefore also necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of Livy's approach to history. The emphasis must fall on rhetoric, which finds full expression in the speeches of Greek and Roman historiography.[2]

Jacoby has piquantly observed that the difference between one ancient historian and another lies in the consciousness and intensity of the political factor.[3] The bonds uniting historians are therefore the concept of history as a political matter and the conviction that the historian is a political teacher who can influence public opinion. As he is an artist at the same time, however, it is conceivable that the forces of rhetoric can blunt his sense of political responsibility and make his narrative epideictic. These two concepts, the one of the historian as a political teacher and the other of him as a rhetorical artist, incorporate the principles of *docere* and *delectare,* which, after Thucydides, underlie the entire historiography of Greece and Rome.[4]

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1) It has often been noted that Livy's work incorporates many of the virtues Cicero demanded of the ideal historian. Cf. R. Heinze, *Die augusteische Kultur* (Leipzig, 1939), 96: "Was Cicero ersehnte, hat Livius erfüllt." Cicero's views culminate, of course, in the notion of history as *opus oratorium maxime* (*de Leg.* I.2.5). The significance of this concept to our theme is discussed below, 13f.

2) Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 5: "Comme l'antiquité regardait l'art de l'historiographie comme une branche de la rhétorique, ... il est naturel de chercher les tendances oratoires de l'histoire surtout dans les discours insérés."

3) F. Jacoby, *Atthis* (Oxford, 1949), 130. Hence the important Greek concept of "pragmatic" history. The term derives from the verb "to act" and is used of political action. Cf. C.P.T. Naudé, *Die Ontstaan van die Romeinse Geskiedskrywing* (Unisa, 1961), 11 n.72. The difference between Greek and Roman "pragmatic" history, which is important to Livy's portrayal of individuals, is noted below, 14.

4) Cf. F. Wehrli, *Eumusia: Festgabe für Ernst Howald* (Zürich, 1947), 55.

For with his survey of causes and effects, his impartiality in securing evidence from both sides, his speeches in which he does his best to remain anchored to τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα,[5] and his rigorous accuracy of detail, Thucydides established a balance between the two concepts, "das von keinem zweiten Historiker der Antike mehr ebenso vollkommen gehalten wurde."[6] Moreover, the whole picture changes after him; the surviving material of the historians of the fourth and third centuries is tenuous, but sufficient to suggest that his standards were largely abandoned.[7]

The reasons for such a retrogression are doubtlessly connected with the spread of the schools of rhetoric which followed upon the activities of the sophists, and from which grew theories of "rhetorical" history aiming at effects not always compatible with the truth.[8] At the heart of this development is Isocrates, who plays an important part in the growth of "rhetorical" history through his influence on his pupils. It is not in rhetoric only, however, that his influence is felt, though the Isocratean "narrative virtues" become canonical;[9] another dominant feature in Hellenistic historiography that can be traced back to him is the moral purpose given to history: the portrayal of the lives of great men should spur the reader to imitation of their deeds and so effect the moral betterment of man-

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5) Thuc. I.22.1. His speeches constitute a problem of first-class dimensions, but the issues are concisely treated by F.W. Walbank, *Speeches in Greek Historians* (Oxford, 1964), 3f. He rightly elects for Thucydides' honesty. Cf. too R.M. Finley, *Three Essays on Thucydides* (Harvard, 1967), 1ff. That his programme constituted an unfortunate legacy to his successors, however, is borne out by the residual contradiction it contains. One cannot record at the same time what was said and what was called for: the criterion of the one is the truth, that of the other is suitability, τὸ πρέπον, πιθανότης a concept which was frequently to arise in connexion with speeches in history-writing. Cf. Walbank, *op. cit.*, 4; P.G. Walsh, *Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge, 1961),23.

6) Wehrli, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 4).

7) Cf. Walsh, *Livy*, 22; Walbank, *Speeches*, 8ff; J.B. Bury, *The Ancient Greek Historians* paper-bound ed. (New York, 1958), 160ff. It is not until the second century that a worthy extant successor appears in the person of Polybius, to reassert the pragmatic value of history and the need to record what was actually said or done on any occasion, however commonplace (II.56.10).

8) On the influence of rhetoric, Bury, *op cit.*, 165. For the historians who eschewed its effects, Walsh, *Livy*, 22.

9) Cf. Theon, *progymn.* 79, 20 ἀρεταὶ διηγήσεως(*narrandi uirtutes:* Quint. IV.2.61). Cf. too Quint. IV.2.31 (on *narratio*): "Maximeque qui sunt ab Isocrate uolunt esse lucidam, breuem, uerisimilem, neque enim refert, an pro lucida perspicuam, pro uerisimili probabilem credibilemue dicamus." Cf. M. Gelzer, *Hermes* (1935), 270.

kind.[10] It is largely through his influence that Thucydides' *docere,* an essentially political concept, assumes moral overtones which persist in historiography down to Livy and beyond. Such is the other important aspect of Isocrates' legacy to Rome.

All these considerations, especially those concerning epideictic, are prominent in the historians subsequent to Thucydides who espouse the techniques of "rhetorical" history. Theopompus is criticized by Duris for his preoccupation with τὸ γράφειν, display diction after the Isocratean fashion,[11] and is praised by Dionysius (*ad Pomp.* 6) for including in his history "everything strange and wonderful found on every land and in every sea" (congenial topics for rhetorical presentation!). Callisthenes and Clitarchus' accounts of Alexander's Asian expedition, too, are marked by exaggeration, sensationalism, and love of the marvellous.[12] "Anyone who sets out to write", the former remarks again in an important fragment,[13] "should not fail to hit off the character, but should match his speeches to the person and the situation." This is the Isocratean concept of suitability, τὸ πρέπον, πιθανότης, received by Isocrates from Gorgias, expanded by Aristotle (*rhet.* III.7), and applied now to the individual in historiography.[14] Polybius censures Timaeus, another "rhetorical" historian, for this same practice (Polyb. XII.24.5). The debasing effects of epideictic can be witnessed in the speeches Timaeus attributes to Hermocrates and Timoleon, that of Hermocrates having been

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10) In conjunction with this tendency the emergence of biography brings the individual to the centre of the historian's canvas. Cf. Bury, *op. cit.,* 154. Hence the individual's central position in Hellenistic historiography and the importance of a portrayal of his moral qualities. Cf. E. Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst des T. Livius* 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1964), 228: "Der hellenistische Mensch hat auf einmal lebhaftes Interesse am Individuellen in allen seinen Ausstrahlungen, und da ist es nur natürlich, dass der Historiker auch das Privatleben der führenden Männer ... in den Kreis seiner Darstellung einbezieht."

11) On the meaning of τὸ γράφειν, F. Schwartz, *Hermes* (1909), 492 n.1. For Duris' criticism, *FGH* 76 F 1.

12) Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 24 n.2.

13) *FGH* 124 F 44.

14) For the development of τὸ πρέπον – "die formale Angemessenheit von Wort und Handlung für den Charakter einer Person bezeichnet" – cf. M. Pohlenz, *Antikes Führertum* (Leipzig, 1934), 58ff. (He cites the definition at 62.) The new application of the concept to the individual (Thucydides having composed speeches in a manner apposite to the occasion only) must be ascribed to the emergence of the new interest in the personality, evident alike in the Platonic corpus, in the biographies of Isocrates, and in Theophrastus' *Characters.* So Walbank, *Speeches,* 5.

analysed in detail by Nestle.[15] Its influence extended also to other features of the narrative; Polybius (*ibid.*) censures Timaeus for his use of "dreams, prodigies, incredible tales and in short craven superstition and a womanish love of the marvellous". He is also critical of the methods of one or two other historians of this period. Sosylus and Chaereas present speeches allegedly delivered in the Senate after the Saguntine débacle, although, as Polybius says, they themselves admit that the senatorial proceedings were strictly secret. The result, he points out, is nothing more than "the gossip of the barber's shop" (III.20.5).

Down to Phylarchus, then, whose histories were important for the period 272–220 B.C., Hellenistic historiography had strikingly declined from the standards of Thucydides. The object of most of the extant historians was now not to give political instruction, but to charm, divert and edify. The effect of rhetoric on their work was manifest, not only in the general choice of epideictic subject matter, but also in the frequent insertion of composed speeches, many of which seem to have had slight association with actual historical circumstances. Clearly, Polybius' criticism of Phylarchus (Polyb. II.56), the fullest programmatical treatment we have of the contemporary theory of historical composition, derives from a period during which the concepts of *docere* and *delectare* were at opposite poles.[16]

After describing the emotional treatment Phylarchus accords to events – dishevelled women with breasts bare; children and aged parents lamenting as they are led away to slavery – Polybius remarks (II.56.10): "A historian should not, like a tragic poet, try to imagine the probable remarks of his characters ... but should record what actually took place and what was really said, however commonplace". This criticism is directed at another tendency manifest in some Hellenistic historians – the emulation of tragedy in its goals and methods.[17] The distinction between "rhetorical" and "tragic" history is not, however, invariably clear; some "rhetorical" historians turn also to "tragic" methods. It is thus misleading to allude to "tragic" history as a separate genre used exclusively by some particular school, e.g. the Peripatetics. In fact, it has been

15) *FGH* iii b 554 = W. Nestle, *Phil. Woch.* (1932), 1357ff. He leaves Timaeus little claim to have his speeches seen as anything else than rhetorical fireworks.

16) Wehrli, *op. cit.*, 55.

17) On the origins and methods of "tragic" history, F.W. Walbank, *Bull. Inst. Class. Stud.* London (1955), 4–14. "Tragic" historians sought to thrill their audience rather than instruct them – whether by emotional persuasion, or by emphasizing the vicissitudes of fortune or the suddenness of events.

persuasively argued that "tragic" history goes back to the fifth century, as there is indication enough that its salient features extend well beyond the Hellenistic period, and Aristotle, who is alleged to have played so vital a part in their formulation.[18)]

The significance of Polybius II.56 in this connexion is clear. His strictures on Phylarchus are not to be seen simply as an attack against a single school, but are to be taken seriously as a demand for new standards and canons in Greek historiography. Despite the personal prejudice which lies behind much of his polemics against earlier authors, there seems to be no doubt that Polybius was vitally concerned about standards in history-writing.[19)] In particular, he sought to eliminate the romantic approach (*delectare*) which was an obstacle to the political and moral instruction (*docere*), which he, like Thucydides, held to be the most important part of the historian's task. Hence his rejection of τὸ πρέπον, his disparagement of epideictic in the composition of speeches (XXXVI.1.7), and his emphasis on the need to record what was in fact said, and even of this only τὰ καιριώτατα καὶ πραγματικώτατα (XXXVI.1.8). It was only by composing truthful speeches, which echoed the actual voice of leading Greek statesmen and allowed the reader to share in their dilemmas and clashes of policy, that Polybius could make history become that manual of political and moral instruction which he so earnestly wished it to be.[20)]

The distinguishable threads in the tradition of rhetoric in Hellenistic historiography – the concern of the few (notably Polybius) for truth and serious political treatment, the emphasis of the many on rhetorical presentation influencing both the form and content of history, the efforts of some to produce effects like those of tragedy, and the widespread view that history should have a didactic purpose

18) Cf. F.W. Walbank, *Historia* (1960), 216–234 for full references. Having proved that tragedy and history are linked together (a) in their common origin in epic, (b) in their use of comparable subject matter, and (c) in their moral purpose, he concludes (p. 233) that the link between them "is in fact a fundamental affinity going back to the earliest days of both history and tragedy, and insisted upon throughout almost the whole of the classical and later periods down to the Byzantine scholiasts."

19) This follows from the fact that he alone, of a long line of historians, sought to eliminate the elements of tragedy from his work. Cf. Walbank, *op. cit.* (above, n.18), 216–234.

20) In this connexion it is significant that his programme as a whole comes very close to Thucydides' τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα. He owns that in his speeches, owing to the vast scale of his work, he must invariably use the same disposition, the same treatment, or indeed actually the same words as on a previous occasion (XXIX.12.10). Thus the residual material of XXXVI.1.8 may be recast in a "Polybian" form, so that τὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ῥηθέντα (XXXVI.1.7) means "the sense of what was said" – something very close to Thucydides' τὰ ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα. In fact he goes further than Polybius, however, who was content to compose speeches in a manner apposite to the occasion. Cf. Walsh, *Livy*, 23; Walbank, *Speeches*, 8f.

associated with the sphere of morals – all exert a good deal of influence on the Roman tradition of historiography. It is a long way from the simple style and form of annals, however, until the stage is reached where historians have from *narratores* become *exornatores rerum* and full-fledged historiography, in the tradition to which Livy was the heir, can be propounded as *opus oratorium maxime*. Nor is it style and form only which are concerned here, but also the concept and method of Roman pragmatic history. For whereas annals present historical facts, *historia* not only presents them but analyses and explains them in their inner relations.[21)]

This is the development which must concern us now, for at its centre, under the influence of Greek historiographical theory, are the great historical Roman individuals whose actions dictate the policies, political and military, and whose rational motivation is explained and embodied in composed speeches.[22)]

The course of this development cannot be traced among the early Roman historians. Starting with Cato, however, the second-century historians who wrote in Latin offer conclusive evidence that they are affected by Hellenistic theory in guaging the aim of their writing. Thus Sempronius Asellio claims that for the historian to retail deeds only is not enough; the basic causes must also be outlined.[23)] The debt to Polybius is notable here, and the causes are therefore to be found in the policies and motives of the individuals who are at the centre of history.[24)] So the depiction of the lives of great Roman heroes should make men eager to defend the State, and slow to do wrong; this for Asellio is the true function and purpose of pragmatic history.

We need hardly add that the second-century historians respond also to the stylistic enticements of Hellenistic historiography. Where the earlier writers, for serious moral or political reasons, had prepared the way, the entertainers soon follow-

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21) Cf. Jacoby, *op. cit.* (above, n. 3), 86.

22) Thuc. I.22.1 incorporates the traditional Greek view of history as "actions and speeches". Cf. Polyb. XII.25b.1: the peculiar function of "pragmatic" history is to discover the words actually spoken, and next to ascertain why what was said or done led to failure or success.

23) Cf. *ap.* Gell. V.18.9 for his distinction between *historia* and *annales*. Cato was presumably making the same point when he preferred the former to the latter (*HRF* 77); he too, wished to interpret the events of the past rather than merely relate them.

24) Polyb. II.56.16. Cf. K. Ziegler, *RE*, "Polybios", 1536: "... dass die wesentlichen Ursachen, die Zielsetzungen und Berechnungen der handelnden Menschen sind."

ed without scruple, converting history into romance.[25] If we are to judge by Livy's source-content, however, certain later annalists, notably Coelius, had absorbed the Hellenistic doctrines and were competent stylists who could use them to good effect. This is strikingly shown by the contrast in Livy's treatment of individuals in the first and third decades. Whereas the characters in the first decade are largely stereotypes, those in the third – where he first used Coelius extensively as a source – are depicted as an integral part of the narrative in such a way that they become "Menschen von Fleisch und Blut".[26]

In spite of Cicero's lament (*de Leg.* I.6) that Roman historiography was from a stylistic point of view negligible, then, it was in fact neither *sine doctrina* (Nep., *Cato* 3), nor *sine ullis ornamentis* (*de Orat.* II.53) by the end of the Ciceronian age. The adoption of Hellenistic techniques had paved the way for Livy's maturer achievements.[27]

All the programmatical considerations just outlined are prominent in the discussions which Cicero records. So the historian must analyse motives or intentions, assess the causes of events, and give an account of the lives and characters of important individuals.[28] History must have a moral function and be the *magistra uitae* as Isocrates had demanded. Moreover, it must be truthful and should embody no trace of partiality or hatred.[29] Of such precepts for the historian Polybius would have heartily approved, and Cicero's debt to him here is manifest. Yet Cicero was not satisfied with these sober tenets; he further adopted the Isocratean ideal of the "rhetorical" historian. His discussion of early Roman historiography

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25) Cf. E. Badian in *Latin Historians* ed. T.A. Dorey (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 19.

26) W. Hoffmann, *Livius und der 2. punische Krieg* (Berlin, 1942), 111.

27) Thus he is profoundly influenced by these techniques in the composition of his work. Cf. below, Ch. 3. But it would be wrong to trace these influences back to the Peripatos as Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst,* 176ff. has sought to do. Livy is rather developing and refining, in partial reliance on his sources, the fundamental affinity between history and tragedy against which Polybius had so firmly set his face.

28) *De Orat.* II.63. The causes must be explained, "whether they are due to chance, wisdom or rashness". Human qualities, and beyond them chance and divine intervention, are seen as the basic considerations necessary to explain the past. For the comparable attitude of Thucydides and Polybius, F.M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (London, 1907), 67ff.

29) *De Orat.* II.62. He further maintains that historians should exclude the element of the fabulous from their work and distinguish clearly between legend and sober history (*De Inv.* I.2.7; *de Rep.* II.10.18–19.) In this regard he owes much to the standards exemplified by Thucydides and Polybius.

(*de Orat.* II.12.52ff.) is based to a large extent on a distinction between *narratores* and *exornatores rerum:* mere story-tellers as against artistic prose-writers. It is in this context that the Romans are judged inferior to their Greek counterparts; hence his ideal concept of history as *munus oratoris* and *opus oratorium maxime.*[30] At the same time, however, he distinguished clearly between history and oratory. "Cicéron n'a jamais envisagé l'art oratoire comme une préparation à l'histoire; au contraire l'histoire fait partie intégrante de la formation de l'orateur."[31] In brief, it may be claimed for Cicero that he sought to assimilate the doctrines of Hellenistic historiography in such a way as to propound a canon of Roman history-writing which would include the best of both worlds – scientific and truthful history (*docere*) in a worthy literary setting (*delectare*).

Such are the standards which Livy inherited, and by which he may be judged. In the handling of his essentially military theme, three categories of historical material can be differentiated – the narration of campaigns, the inclusion of speeches, and traditional annalistic subject matter.[32] This basic framework of deeds and words – the πράξεις καὶ λόγοι of Thucydides – is above all suited to the indirect delineation of character; a man's outlook and qualities are easily assessed by his deeds and words and by the indirect remarks of others. Within this basic framework, Livy consciously strove to attain the principles of the rhetorical, or Isocratean, historian that Cicero advocated.

The embodiment of the Isocratean principles of history in Cicero's concept of the genre as *opus oratorium maxime,* as may be deduced from our foregoing analysis, entails (i) the explanation of history in its inner relations, a process in which the depiction of individuals occupies a central position; (ii) the expression of a didactic moral purpose in the total presentation of the subject matter (*docere*); and (iii) the conception of the whole as an elegant literary corpus in which Hellenistic techniques of form and presentation find full expression (*delectare*). The importance of Livy's composed speeches in this context hardly needs to be emphasized; on the one hand they display his rhetorical accomplishments, on the other they incorporate his attempts to characterize the great historical Roman individuals at the centre of history.[33]

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30) *De Orat.* II.15.62; *de Leg.* I.2.5. In fact, the inconsistencies in his discussions indicate that his emphasis on literary standards tended to overshadow his concern for truthful history. Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 33.

31) P. Defourny, *Ét. class.* (1953), 158.

32) So Walsh, *Livy,* 35.

33) Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 6: "Les discours historiques sont avant tout des études de caractères sous une forme empruntée à la rhétorique."

As we have already noted, Thucydides' *docere*, a basically political concept, assumed moral overtones after Isocrates which persisted in the subsequent historiography of the Hellenistic period. It is therefore not very surprising to find that Livy's treatment of individuals is deeply influenced by the notion that history is a medium for moral instruction, which Cicero greatly emphasized. "I invite the reader's attention", he remarks (*Praef.* 9), "to the *kinds of lives and customs* of our ancestors, and to the *men and the qualities* at home and in war by which the empire was obtained and increased." The portrayal of individuals thus assumes a vital position. Livy unites this sense of ethical purpose in historiography with a belief in its practical value for statesmen. Hence his injunction (*ibid.*) to consider the institutions of the past, which may be used as a guide for later political organization. The debt to Thucydides and Polybius is manifest here, and pragmatic history is thus to be understood in a wider sense than with Asellio – as political history for the instruction of the statesman.

Yet Greek and Roman historiography differ essentially in their pragmatism. Whereas the Greeks were concerned mainly with political instruction, the Romans were engrossed rather with the ethical function given to history by Isocrates.[34] It is in the light of this moralizing tradition, which obviously took firm root in his work, that Livy's portrayal of Scipio in the speeches must be assessed. The young commander was a central figure in the Second Punic War, the importance of which is greatly emphasized in the prooemium to Book XXI. Livy thus tried to show, especially from the moral viewpoint, the role of Scipio's motives and policies in the final outcome of the struggle. It is vital to remember, however, that he is the exponent of Isocratean theories of "rhetorical" history, in which historiography is seen as *opus oratorium maxime.* Not the least of the salient features embodied in this concept, as we have already noted, is the composition of speeches in a manner apposite to the occasion and to the character of the individual. Despite Polybius' castigation of this practice, it became a central feature of Roman historiography, forming the basis of the praise conferred by Quintilian on Livy's speeches.[35] As can be deduced from Quintilian's remarks, Livy attempts to adapt his source-material in such a way as to achieve the double effect of enhanced eloquence and

34) Cf. C.P.T. Naudé, *Acta Classica* IX (1966), 116.

35) Quint. X.1.101. Nor did the succeeding line of historians heed Polybius. Cf. Walbank, *Speeches,* 18f.

more subtle characterization. In short, he attempts to "get inside" his characters by means of speeches and to delineate an eloquent psychological portrait of their qualities.

Such, for our purpose, are the general considerations necessary to obtain a fuller understanding of Livy's approach to history. The rhetorical system bequeathed to him for the composition of his work embraced the principles incorporated in Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* as analysed later at Rome by the author of the treatise *ad Herennium,* by Cicero and by Quintilian. The extent to which he used this system successfully in his portrait of Scipio will be reserved for later discussion. We turn next to a study of the sources for Scipio's speeches in the third decade.

Chapter 2

The Sources for Scipio's Speeches

Livy is an independent stylist; he uses a method of narrative construction to portray individuals, while Polybius was content with the subjective analysis of individual actions.[1] Livy's usual practice is accordingly to conceal his judgment of individuals within the structure of his narrative, or between the lines of the speeches he puts into the mouths of his orators.[2] If we are to analyse this method of indirect characterization adopted in Scipio's speeches, [3] by comparing the form which the speeches take in Livy with their form in the sources on which he drew for their composition, the provenance of the various speeches must be accurately established. Except in cases where he relies primarily on Polybius, however, Livy's sources for the speeches are not readily ascertainable, mainly because of the fragmentary nature of the available evidence. "Nun steht es aber fest," Bruns[4] very justly observes, "dass Livius schon in der dritten Dekade, jedenfalls aber vom 26. Buche an, wo die Grossthaten des Scipio beginnen, den Polybios vor Augen hatte." Our analysis will therefore concentrate on establishing for which of the longer speeches Polybius was the indisputable primary source; for by comparing the structure and content of these speeches of Scipio in Livy with their structure and content in the Polybian versions on which they were based, we shall be able to discern some of the central features of Livy's method of portraying Scipio in the speeches.[5]

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1) Cf. Bruns, *Die Persönlichkeit,* 9: "Sein Streben geht auf Analyse, nicht auf Construktion." Cf. too A. Klotz, *Livius und seine Vorgänger* 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1964), 103.

2) Such treatment of his subject matter is in virtue of the indirect, or epic, method of characterization he inherits from Thucydides. Cf. Bruns, *Die Persönlichkeit,* V.

3) This applies, of course, only to the longer speeches. A comparison is not feasible in the case of the shorter ones.

4) *Op. cit.,* 15. He does not, however, acknowledge the importance of a stringent analysis of Livy's source-material. Cf. his *Persönlichkeit,* VII: "Es handelt sich hier nicht darum, festzustellen, woher Livius seinen Stoff entnahm, sondern nach welchen Gesetzen er ihn formte." This view could be self-contradictory. With what is one to compare the final form, if not with the original? Cf. below, n.5.

5) Polybius' importance as a source for the third decade is indisputable. Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 111: "Die Grundfrage für die richtige Beurteilung der Quellenverhältnisse ist die Beziehung des Livius zu Polybios." The most acceptable general thesis in this context seems to be that Livy first read Polybius in his entirety and then turned to the composition of the third decade with his other sources to hand, using them to gain enhanced literary effects. Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 177; G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius* 2nd ed.

In this study we accept Treptow's concise definition of a speech as "alle Äusserungen in wörtliche Rede."[6]

The provenance of the following speeches of Scipio, then, in special consideration of Livy's reliance of Polybius as a source for the third decade, must be established: XXII.53. 10–12 (to the Roman defaulters after Cannae.); XXV.2.7 (at the aedilitian elections in Rome); XXVI.41.3–25 (to the Spanish veterans); XXVI.43.3–8 (to his troops before the attack on New Carthage); XXVI.49.14–15 (to Mandonius' wife); XXVI.50.4–8; 12 (to Allucius); XXVIII.27.1–29.8 (to the mutineers at Sucro); XXVIII.43.2–44.18 (to the Senate in Rome); XXIX.1.8 (to the laggard soldier in Sicily); XXIX.27.2–4 (his prayer before sailing to Africa); XXIX.27.12 (his words on sighting Africa); XXIX.34.7 (his exclamation over Hasdrubal's camp at Salaeca); XXX.14.4–11 (to Masinissa); XXX.16.13 (to the Carthaginian delegation); XXX.31.1–9 (to Hannibal before Zama). The emphasis will, of course, fall on the longer speeches.

Some preliminary remarks on Livy's likely method of composition are desirable before we briefly consider the ancient authorities he used to recount the Second Punic War. His work comprised 145 books which he composed within the space of 40–42 years. This will have left him with little more than 100–108 days for each book, which means that he is unlikely, e.g., to have checked the contradictory accounts in his sources unless they were so closely linked as to make any deviations conspicuous. "Ferner ist es bei dieser Arbeitsmethode von vornherein eine Unmöglichkeit," Kahrstedt rightly observes, "dass Livius öfters al gelegentlich mehrere Quellen in einander verarbeitet, ein Ereignis so erzählt, dass er zwei nicht völlig stimmenden Quellen gerecht wird, etwa Details aus der einen in den der anderen entnommenen Hauptbericht einsetzt."[7] Generally, then, Livy's use of his various sources is clearly distinguishable in the course and development of his narrative;

(Amsterdam, 1964), 162. For the majority of Livy's speeches an indirect comparison with Polybius is therefore feasible. Cf. E. Burck in *Livy* ed. T.A. Dorey (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 41. But such a comparison, though it might suit a collation of Livy's narrative techniques with Polybius', could do the Roman historian undue justice where the speeches are concerned. It could even reflect the independence of the (non-Polybian) source he is following and not his own. We shall therefore attempt to establish which speeches derive indisputably from Polybius. In this way Livy's true independence, and its purpose, can be accurately assessed.

6) Treptow, *Die Kunst der Reden,* 10. Excluded from this definition are: (i) verbal reports which are not spoken, e.g. inscriptions and oracles; (ii) religious formulas; (iii) brief expressions, e.g. "satin salve".

7) U. Kahrstedt, *Geschichte der Karthager von Otto Meltzer* III (Berlin, 1913), 143.

the only difficulty, again because of the fragmentary nature of the available evidence, is to establish the actual provenance of the non-Polybian sections.

We turn now to a brief enumeration of the ancient authorities Livy used to recount the Second Punic War. Foremost among them was, of course, Polybius: the earliest and by far the most important extant source for the period. We shall be especially concerned here with the partly incomplete Polybian books X. XI. XIV and XV.

Who was the intermediary or intermediaries used by Livy when he did not make direct use of Polybius? Briefly, the Roman annalists, in particular Coelius, who wrote a monograph on the Second Punic War, excluding any reference to events in Rome and drawing on Silenus, Fabius, other annalists and Polybius. He is one of Livy's main sources and is cited 11 times in the third decade. Where Livy used him, the greater part of the speeches, external ornaments, arbitrary changes and imaginative touches have been attributed to him rather than to Livy, who would not ordinarily have had time for such embellishments.[8)]

The later generation of annalists, notably Q. Valerius Antias, also contributed their quota to Livy. Valerius wrote a historical work in at least 70 books and was used extensively by Livy, who quotes him 35 times in the extant books.[9)] Livy also had access to two authors – one was again probably Antias – from whom he derived his account of events in Rome.

Such, in briefest outline, were the ancient sources Livy used to recount the Second Punic War. There are additional later authorities for the period as well, whose works may be mentioned here although they were not used by Livy for his account. For they are often useful in establishing the provenance of a particular section of his narrative, e.g. when they clearly used the same source as he did. Here we number only Appian, Book VI (*Iber.* 1–38: *The Wars in Spain*) and Book VIII (*Lib.* 6–48: Part One of the Punic Wars), whose sources included Polybius, Antias, Coelius and Livy; Dio Cassius (Books XIII–XVII), whose incomplete narrative may be supplemented by Zonaras' abridgement (VIII.21.1–IX.15.1), and whose chief source appears to have been

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8) Cf. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War* (Cambridge, 1930), 21.

9) The earlier annalists, however, do not seem to have had much influence on the third decade. Fabius Pictor and Cincius Alimentus, for example, are cited only once. Cf. XXI. 38.3–5. XXII.7.4.

Coelius rather than Livy; Diodorus (some fragments of Books XXV–XXVII); and finally, Silius' *Punica,* an epic history of the Second Punic War in 17 books.[10]

We have noted that Polybius was Livy's main authority for the history of the Second Punic War; he is the chief source for the events in Sicily and Greece and for the account of the war in Africa. But Livy also used Coelius and Valerius in the third decade, the former especially at the beginning and the latter especially at the end, in the main to recount events in Rome.[11] In the light of this simplified pattern of Livy's sources we now consider the speeches in the individual books.

Scipio's speech to the Roman defaulters after Cannae is not Polybian (Liv. XXII.53.10–12). Polybius' account of the battle does not retail a comparable episode (but cf. Polyb. X.3.4). Livy's report of the events before the battle derives from two distinct annalistic sources: 43.1–44.7; 48.2–49.13 from Antias and 45.1–48.1; 49.14–18 from Coelius; the actual account of the battle and of the subsequent events (50.4–52.6) are also Coelian.[12] The narrative continues uninterrupted up to 52.6.3: "Consulem quoque Romanum conquisitum sepultumque *quidam auctores sunt.*" There is a parallel to this sentence in the *Punica* (X.503f.; cf.XIII.714), but Silius further gives a detailed account of the finding and burial of Paulus' body. Livy is therefore unlikely to have been his source here. It is probable, however, that Silius used Antias for his account.[13] Liv. 52.4.4 and 52.7.1 (which are linked; *Canusium perfugissent ... eos qui Canusium perfugerant*) are thus probably from Antias. The section of the narrative which incorporates Scipio's speech extends the digression at 52.7 and is therefore also assigned to Antias.

Nor was Polybius the source for Scipio's next speech (XXV.2.7), as he is first used in Book XXV to recount the revolt of Tarentum (Liv. XXV.7.10–11.19 = Polyb. VIII.24–34); this speech, too, must be assigned to Antias.[14]

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10) The main work consulted for our discussion of the sources for Scipio's speeches is Klotz, *Livius* (above, n.1), 119–199. But many of the conclusions there are based on previous studies and so tend to be peremptory. They have accordingly been supplemented, where necessary, with the following studies by the same author: *Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums* 20 (1936), Vol. II (=*Appian* 1936); *RhM* 85 (1936), 68–116; *RhM* 82 (1933), 1–34; *RhM* 84 (1935), 125–153.

11) Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 111.

12) Dio's account (Zon. IX.1.9ff.), which is from Antias, deviates entirely from Livy's except for the two cited passages. Cf. Klotz, *RhM* 85 (1936), 91f. On Coelius as Livy's source for the subsequent events, compare Liv. 50.11. Coel. *HRF* 22; Liv. 51.2. Coel. *HRF* 25.

13) So Klotz, *RhM* 82 (1933), 25f.

14) On Antias as the source for XXV.1.6–7.9 cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 165; and for Livy's initial use of Polybius in Book XXV, Kahrstedt, *op. cit.* 257.

Book XXVI contains five speeches by Scipio, two of which derive from a section of the narrative (41.1–46.10) for which Polybius is commonly thought to have been the source. Compare Polyb. X.6–15.[15] There are of course many parallels on which to base this assumption, some of them verbal, but there are several divergences also, which seem to be more significant than the parallels, e.g.

42.6 "Septimo die (ἑβδομαῖος Polyb. X.9.7) ab Hibero Carthaginem uentum est"; Scipio's place of departure is not at Polyb. X.6.7.

42.6 *uallum obiectum* is τάφρον καὶ χάρακα διπλοῦν at X.9.7.

42.8 "incertae altitudinis utcumque exaestuat aut deficit mare" is wanting in Polybius.

Of particular significance is the unmilitary Livy's portrayal of the part played by the fleet in the successful capture of the town:

42.5 Laelius plans a simultaneous attack from the sea.

43.1 The deployment of the fleet.

44.10 The assault on the town.

Polybius has excluded these considerations from his report; whether to give more prominence to Scipio's achievements, or because he had personal doubts about the operation of the fleet, must remain a moot point. What we are rather concerned to note is that the divergences are inextricably linked to the course and development of Livy's narrative and could not possibly have been glossed into a primarily Polybian report.[16] So too:

45.8 the time of the ebb, *medium ferme diei erat:* Polyb. X.14.2 προσδοκῶν ἤδε τὸν τῆς αμπώτεως καιρόν, . and the effect of the North wind on it, *acer etiam septentrio ortus.*

These factors receive their full significance in Livy's report, although Polybius has omitted them as secondary. "Solche Dinge erfindet man nicht am Schreibtisch; sie setzen eine klarere Ortanschauung voraus, als Livius sie vermutlich besass."[17]

Similar considerations may be applied to Scipio's two speeches, which are of course inalienably linked to Livy's whole account of the sack of New Carthage. The

15) Cf. Kahrstedt, *op. cit.,* 289: "Die Ähnlichkeit mit Polybios ist so augenfällig und so oft betont worden, dass jeder Einzelnachweis von Parallelen und Analogien überflüssig wäre."

16) Cf. *Appian* 1936, 73ff. for these and other divergences. It is clear, however, that the same original source underlies both reports, viz Fabius. Kahrstedt *(op. cit.,* 292) and Scullard (*op. cit.,* 81) believe it is Silenus; but all the action is depicted from the Roman side, which makes him an unlikely original source. Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 178.

17) *Appian* 1936, 75.

first is in substance the same in Polybius (X.6.1–6), but much expanded in Livy; the second, too, in Polybius largely a repetition of the Ebro speech, is little more than a faint echo of Livy's more extensive version (cf. Polyb. X.11.5f.). Despite the weight of opinion to the contrary, then, we cannot accept that Polybius was the primary source for Liv. XXVI.41.1–46.10 but follow Klotz in assigning this section to Coelius.[18)]

The sources for the remaining three speeches in Book XXVI have yet to be considered. The Coelian section of the narrative continues up to 47.4: "Extra hanc multitudinem Hispanorum obsides erant, quorum perinde ac si sociorum liberi essent cura habita." This theme is expanded at 49.1 *Tum obsides ... uocari iussit,* after which Livy introduces a digression from Antias (*HRF* 24), before resuming the Coelian section of the narrative at 49.7: *Ceterum, uocatis obsidibus* etc. The analogy with Polybius, evident in the report of the sack of New Carthage, now resumes:

49.11	X.18.7
"Mandonii uxor, qui frater Indibilis Ilergetum reguli erat"	τῆς Μανδονίου γυναικός, ὃς ἦν ἀδελφὸς Ἀνδοβάλου τοῦ τῶν Ἰλεργητῶν βασιλέως

Polybius' account of the interview with Mandonius' wife, however, does not contain a direct speech by Scipio (cf. Liv.. XXVI. 49.14–15). There are further divergences between the two accounts as well. Livy's is, for example, more pathetic and dramatic. It also develops, apart from the central theme of Scipios virtue, a broader theme of Roman *prisca seueritas* (cf. 49.14–15), which does not recur in the *or. obl.* of Polybius' account. Scipio's speech is an integral part of the theme expanded at 49.1 *tum obsides uocari iussit*, and is therefore assigned to Coelius.[19)]

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18) Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 178. Elsewhere he proves conclusively that "Dio für die Darstellung des zweiten punischen Krieges den Coelius benutzt hat". Cf. *RhM* 85 (1936), 84. And as Scullard – obviously following Kahrstedt – rightly observes, Dio (57. 42.43; Zon.IX.8) is very close to Livy and emphasizes the (non-Polybian) Coelian episodes of the quarrel for the crown and the anecdote of Allucius in his report. Cf. Scullard, *op. cit.*, 87 n.1; Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, 293. Cf. further E. Burck, *Einführung in die 3. Dekade des Livius* (Heidelberg, 1950), 126 n.44: "Mir scheint, dass Coelius dem Livius nicht nur in dem gewichtigen Ansatz der Rede, sondern auch in der Dramatisierung der Kampfhandlungen vorgearbeitet hat."

19) Kahrstedt, *op. cit.* 292–293, assigns this episode also to Polybius. He erroneously accounts for the differences by claiming that "die Umwandlung der bekannten Liebesgeschichte bei Polyb. 19, 3ff. in die Form von Livius 50 ist nicht für das Quellenverhältnis, sondern nur für die Kulturgeschichte und den Wandel der Zeiten charakteristisch."

Having recorded the interview with Mandonius' wife, Polybius introduces a digression (X.19.2) before recording the story of the beautiful girl captive (19.3–7). Livy, however, proceeds straight to this report (XXVI.50.1–14). Here again there are variations in the two accounts similar to those above. Polybius' report is brief and pointed but Livy expands his theme at some length; he introduces from his source the story of the girl's betrothal, a sentimental speech in which Scipio addresses Allucius (Polybius merely hints at a speech by the girl's father), and a final token of Scipio's *clementia* and generosity to the young man (50.12), which Polybius again does not mention.

That Livy used Antias for the story of the beautiful prisoner is negated by *HRF* 25, in which Antias recounts an opposed tradition. Nor would it appear, in virtue of the differences noted above, that Polybius was the direct source here. In his report of the capture of Syphax and of Sophoniba's death (XXX.11.1–15.14: see below), Livy shows a propensity for sentimental and dramatic treatment similar to that in his story of the beautiful prisoner. For the former account Coelius was indisputably his source (Coel. *HRF* 44 = Liv. XXX.12.1). Scipio's two speeches to Allucius (XXVI.50.4-8; 12) are therefore also assigned to Coelius.[20)]

Scipio's next speech is to the mutineers at New Carthage (XXVIII.27.1–29.8). Livy's account of the mutiny (24.1–29.12) is very similar to Polybius' (XI.25.1–30.5). The few variations are chiefly stylistic. It is therefore likely that Polybius was the primary source here.[21)] Thus Livy's report seldom contains more than Polybius' does, though 24.13 (the names of the two leading mutineers) is not echoed in Polybius and 26.1–3 (the report of the military council) is at least expansive, if not divergent, by comparison with Polybius (26.3). Neither deviation is significant, however, for the names of the two leading mutineers are surely spurious (a coincidence of Black and White), having probably been introduced to gloss over the Roman elements in the mutiny, and Livy's prolixity at 26.1f. can be explained by reference to Polybius' narrative techniques: "er beschneidet die Erörterung und teilt nur das Endergebnis mit ... um nicht zu breit zu werden."[22)] It is conceivable that Coelius also put a speech into Scipio's mouth in recounting the mutiny, as borne out by Zon.IX.10.5. Besides sending a despatch to the mutineers, Scipio is there reported

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20) Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 179.

21) So Kahrstedt, *op. cit.,* 320; Klotz, *Livius,* 188.

22) Klotz, *Livius,* 189. For a satisfactory resolution of the other divergences, Kahrstedt, *op. cit.,* 321f.

to have addressed them as well (IX.10.7). There is no further evidence to support this view, however, and we accept that Polybius was the primary source for Scipio's speech at XXVIII.27.1–29.8 (cf. Polyb..XI.28.3–29.13). In both accounts the substance of the speech is the same, only the spirit is different.[23)]

After the account of the Spanish campaign the narrative proceeds to Rome where Scipio addresses the Senate (XXVIII.43.2–44.18). At 48.1 he hands over control of Spain to Lucius Lentulus and Lucius Manlius Accidinus. According to Polybius (XI.33.8) he relinquished the army τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἰούνιον καὶ Μάρκιον. Livy's report of events in Rome, with its account of the elections, the allotment of provinces, the disposition of the armies and the popular games indicates an annalistic source. He deviates at 38.1 from Polyb. XI.33.8 as he is now following this source. There is a recurrent theme in 38.1–46.6: the four enemy generals whom Scipio has conquered (38.3; cf. 43.14). This consolidates the unity of the annalistic section in which Scipio's speech is embodied. That Antias was the source for the speech can be shown by comparing Plut., *Fabius* 25.26 with Liv. 40–45.[24)]

The start of Book XXIX (Scipio's preparations in Sicily (1.1–18)) expands the annalistic narration of XXVIII.46.1–6 and includes a short speech by Scipio (XXIX.1.8). There are several parallels between XXVIII.46.1–6; XXIX.1.1–18 and Appian (*Lib.* VIII), which show that Antias was the source for XXIX.1.1–18. We need only cite the 7 000 volunteers who are mentioned in *Lib.* VIII and in Liv. 46.1 and the 300 ἀρτιγένειοι ἐπίλεκτοι of the former report, which coincides with Liv. XXIX.1.1ff. and so links it to XXVIII.46.1.

Scipio's crossing to Africa is reported by Livy at XXIX.24.7–27.15. The entire account, which incorporates two speeches, is homogeneous. Coelius is cited twice in contradiction of the narrative (25.3; 27.14; 15) and is therefore excluded as a source. That a Latin writer underlies the report, however, is witnessed by the archaism "mihi populo *plebique Romanae*" in Scipio's prayer (cf. 27.2). The

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23) Cf. Scullard, *op. cit.*, 149. Klotz, *Livius,* 189 assigns the whole Spanish campaign (12.10–37.10) to Coelius. "Es wäre ja auch das einzige Stück der spanischen Geschichte, das Livius aus Polybios entnommen hätte". There do not seem to be sufficient reasons for such a conclusion, however, especially as the divergences from Livy in Zon. IX.10.4–8 are insignificant and analysis of Appian *Iber.* 34–36 provides no definitive evidence for rejecting Polybius as Livy's primary source. Cf. Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, 322f.

24) Cf. Klotz, *Livius,* 189; *Appian* 1936, 85; *RhM* 84 (1935), 151.

report of Scipio's departure for Africa is closely linked to the prayer and is thus from the same source. The annalistic character of the report is borne out also by the survey (26.1f.) of the fortunes of earlier Roman naval expeditions against Carthage.[25)]

One last, short speech remains in Book XXIX (34.7). Livy turns to Polybius, his main source for the war in Africa, at XXIX.28.1. The narration of the war in Book XXIX occupies 28.1–36.3. To derive the above speech from Polybius must, however, rest on analogy with the rest of Livy's report of the African campaign, as Polybius is not extant here.

Book XXX contains three speeches by Scipio: 14.4–11; 16.13; 31.1–9. The first is addressed to Masinissa and is incorporated in a uniform section of the narrative which treats the capture of Syphax and Sophoniba's death (11.1–15.14). As noted above (p. 22), the evidence points to Coelius as the primary source (*HRF* 44 = Liv. XXX.12.1). This is supported by a significant deviation in Livy as compared with Appian *Lib.* 8 who is echoed by Zonaras IX.13.6 and Diodorus XXV.7 (= Antias). At XXX.15.6 Sophoniba is given the poison by a slave, whereas in Appian's account it is Masinissa himself who gives her the cup before riding away: κρύφα δὲ αὐτῇ φέρων φάρμακον πρῶτος ἐνέτυχε.[26)]

Polybius would have treated this scene more pointedly, as in the account of the beautiful prisoner, and Livy, as in his report of that episode, again places great emphasis on Roman *continentia* and *moderatio* in Scipio's speech (14.4–11). These considerations, too, point to Coelius as the source for 11.1–15.14.

At 16.1–15 Livy turns to the peace negotiations with the Carthaginians; he is following Polybius here:[27)] but at 16.12 three different authorities are cited for the terms laid down by Scipio (*alibi – alibi – alibi*). Besides Polybius, then, Coelius and Antias were probably consulted.[28)] Polybius is in any event not extant for this episode. At 15.1f. we see the Carthaginian delegation in Rome, but not their negotiations with Scipio, which in Livy's account precede their

25) Cf. *Appian* 1936, 87.

26) Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, 341 again assigns 3–16 to Polybius. "Über die Benutzung des Polybios ist hier kein Wort zu verlieren". He does not, however, deal specifically with Sophoniba's death or account for its expansive treatment by Livy. But cf. *Appian* 1936, 91.

27) So Klotz, *Livius,* 195.

28) For a detailed discussion, *Appian* 1936, 92ff.

mission to the city. That Polybius might conceivably have included such a report, however, is witnessed by several passages (XV.1.3. 6; 4.8).

The source for Scipio's final speech in the third decade, that to Hannibal at Zama (XXX.31.1–9), must now be established. Polybius is the primary source for the African campaign, which is narrated in Book XXX at 29.1–38.5.. "Die Benutzung des Polybios", Kahrstedt[29] rightly observes, "ist bei den Parallelen, die 15, 1–19 bieten, ausser Zweifel und allgemein anerkannt." It is thus perhaps unnecessary to consider the inferior tradition incorporated in Appian and Dio's accounts (Lib. 33–48. Zon. 9–14); an outline of a few significant parallels must suffice to illustrate Livy's reliance on Polybius (Liv. 29.1–31.9 = Polyb. XV.5–18). Incorporated here, of course, are the respective speeches of Scipio and Hannibal.

Scipio first proceeds to Zama in both accounts (5.3; 29.1). Polyb. 5.13 recounts that 6 000 foot and 4 000 horse with Masinissa join him. The numbers are reiterated by Livy at 29.4; but he reverses the Polybian order, placing Masinissa's arrival before the preparations for the conference of the two generals. Livy then incorporates a deviation from Antias (29.7). In both accounts Scipio next moves to Naraggara, where he is "within a javelin's throw of water" (5.14; 29.9). Hannibal's difficulties in this connexion are equally stressed by both historians (6.2; 29.10). Livy's confusion of the 30 stades in Polybius with four miles (29.10) is without significance. Both generals, each with an interpreter, finally advance to meet between the opposing ranks of armed men (6.3; 30.1). Then follows the Polybian speech by Hannibal (6.4f.), which Livy, too, introduces at this point (30.3f.). "Selbst bei den Reden Hannibals und Scipios 30f. schimmert Polyb. 15,6ff. durch, so selbständig Livius auch in solchen Stücken arbeitet und ausmalt."[30]

Our study has shown that Polybius was the primary source for four of Scipio's speeches in the third decade. As noted above, however, he is not extant for XXIX.34.7 and XXX.16.13; their brevity would in any event preclude these speeches from our comparison. Therefore only two speeches, viz XXVIII.27–29 (to the mutineers = Polyb. XI.28–29) and XXX.31.1–9 (to Hannibal before Zama = Polyb. XV.6–7) will be kept for later discussion and comparison.

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29) *Op. cit.*, 353. Cf. Klotz, *Livius*, 197; Scullard, *op. cit.*, 235.

30) Kahrstedt, *op. cit.*, 353.

Chapter 3

The Compositional Significance of Scipio's Speeches

In Chapter 1 we pointed out that Livy was indirectly the heir to Cicero's Isocratean concept of history as *opus oratorium maxime* and all that it embodied. His legacy therefore included the depiction of the individual at the centre of history and the adoption of Hellenistic techniques of form and presentation to the composition of a historical work.[1] It followed from this that Scipio's speeches were a valid and integral part of Livy's narrative, for according to the traditional Greek view of history the individuals who dictate the policies must be revealed by their deeds and speeches.

Our task now will be to establish whether Scipio's speeches occupy any carefully thought-out position in the course and development of Livy's narrative in the third decade. Do they perhaps enhance the structure, intensify the psychagogy, or create an atmosphere of dramatic tension, so that the reader – although fully aware of the final outcome of the war – is none the less impressed by the techniques as he would be by the style and effect of a drama?[2] Do the speeches, all in all, accord with the circumstances in which they were delivered?[3] Such were the demands set by the Hellenistic canons for the composition of a good work of history, in which the insertion of speeches occupied a central part.

And what of Scipio? Does Livy bring him to the centre of the narrative in accordance with the Hellenistic theory about the treatment of great individuals in history-writing? Do the position of the speeches and the adjunct psychagogy play

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1) These canons are not applied merely for rhetorical effect; they are an integral part of Livy's didactic techniques. Cf. Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst,* 241.

2) E. Burck in *Livy* ed. T.A. Dorey (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), 40 refers to the "avowed aim of the hellenistic-peripatetic school of history" in this context. It seems a sounder view, however, to see Livy as taking his place in the long line of anterior historians (Polybius excluded) who from Thucydides on applied "tragic" techniques to historical composition. Cf. above, Ch. 1, 9f.

3) Cf. Quint, X. 1.101. Here we deal only with the situational aspect of the speeches. The appropriateness of the longer speeches to Scipio's character will be considered in Ch. 4.

any role here? These issues may be considered by analysing the compositional significance of Scipio's speeches in the third decade.[4]

Scipio is introduced into the narrative at the Battle of the Ticinus, where we see him save his father's life (XXI. 46.8ff.). Our interest in him is awakened at once by a pregnant reference to his future victory in the war: "Hic erit iuuenis, penes quem perfecti huiusce belli laus est, Africanus ob egregiam uictoriam de Hannibale Poenisque appellatus" (46.8). The next scene in which he features is in Book XXII, and centres round his first pithy speech in the decade.

XXII.53.10–12

By this stage of the narrative the defeat of the Trasimene Lake and the almost total destruction of Rome's armies at Cannae, for which Hannibal is responsible, have plunged Rome into an abyss, from which it seems scarcely possible to rise (cf.54.8). Imposed on the fear and consternation in Rome, however, is the dramatic picture of Scipio at Canusium, his sword aloft, energetically rebuking the defaulters from Cannae. Livy precedes the speech with another pregnant reference to Scipio's significance for the future development of the war, referring to him auspiciously as [*Scipio*] *iuuenis, fatalis dux huiusce belli* (53.6).[5] The underlying psychagogy thus juxtaposes Scipio with Hannibal, *non dux solum, sed etiam causa belli* (XXI.21.1). A similar artifice is evident in the depiction of the defaulters' craven reaction to the speech: "Haud secus pauidi quam si uictorem Hannibalem cernerent, iurant omnes custodiendosque semet ipsos Scipioni tradunt" (53.13).

By thus juxtaposing Scipio with *uictor Hannibal,* at the critical time when the Carthaginian seems about to achieve his goal of crushing the political and military power of Rome, Livy greatly heightens the dramatic tension of the narrative. The action is momentarily retarded and the reader made to wonder, either with anxiety or hopeful expectation, not only how this little event at Canusium will

4) There is very little commentary available on this theme. Cf. Burck, *Livy* (above, n. 2), 41. But there are good indirect discussions on the position of the major speeches in W. Hoffmann, *Livius und der 2. punische Krieg* (Berlin, 1942) and especially in E. Burck, *Einführung in die 3. Dekade des Livius* (Heidelberg, 1950). Our own analysis relies largely on these works, especially Hoffmann's, pp. 71–102.

5) Most MSS support the reading *Scipio,* although its omission heightens the dramatic tension of the scene. The identity of the auspicious *fatalis dux* is not revealed until the scene closes: "semet ipsos *Scipioni* tradunt".

influence the course and development of the major action, but also what role the *iuuenis, fatalis dux huiusce belli* will play in the successful outcome of the war.

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A third fleeting scene in which Scipio features occurs in Book XXV. At this point we see his entry into public life during his election to the aedileship. The events turn again on a pithy speech.

XXV.2.7

Saying that Scipio has not yet reached the legal age which qualifies him to stand, the tribunes oppose his election. "[S]i me omnes Quirites aedilem facere uolunt," he counters, "satis annorum habeo". Such is the effect of these words on the people that the tribunes are obliged to waive their objection.

In spite of its brevity this scene depicts a memorable feature of Scipio's personality. We witness his supreme confidence and the inspirational effect of his personality on the people. The action is momentarily retarded and Livy again heightens the tension with a third integrated reference to Scipio as the future victor in the war (2.6). Scipio's fateful career has now begun, and the reader awaits with renewed interest the next scene in which he will appear.

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We meet Scipio again in Book XXVI, when he is elected to the pro-consulship of Spain. By this stage of the history the tide of the war has begun turning in Rome's favour. Book XXVI has been so ordered that at the very beginning the re-capture of Capua (1.1–5; 5.1–2) and the new dispositions for the Spanish theatre of war stand out as turning-points in the struggle. The Spanish campaign is accordingly now the focus-point of the interest. Cf.XXVI.18.2: "et Romae senatui populoque post receptam Capuam non Italiae iam maior quam Hispaniae cura erat." Scipio's election to the pro-consulship is thus especially significant; hence the unusually graphic portrayal which Livy gives of the scene at the polls.[6] Amid senatorial and popular disconcertment as to who will take the critical Spanish command, Scipio alone steps forward and confidently proffers his candidature; a roar of approval greets him and he is unanimously elected to the office (18.2ff). After this additional proof of popular support at the second stage of his public career he sails to Spain (19.11ff.). He lands at Tarraco, and we do not see him again until XXVI.41.1. In

6) Cf. 18.1–19.1. In his vigorous presentation he again juxtaposes Scipio with Hannibal. "Wer sieht nicht, dass Livius mit dieser Schilderung eine Art Gegenstück zum ersten Auftreten und zu dem berühmten Eid Hannibals im Anfang des 21. Buchs hat schaffen wollen?" So Burck, *Einführung,* 123–4.

the meantime, however, the tide of the war has continued to turn in Rome's favour.[7] Livy can therefore justly observe, before Scipio's first major speech in the decade, "Ita aequante fortuna suspensa omnia utrisque erant, integra spe, integro metu, uelut illo tempore primum bellum inciperent" (37.9). At this critical juncture, when for both sides all hangs in the balance, the action is retarded and Scipio is introduced to the soldiers through the speech which opens the Spanish campaign.

XXVI.41.3–25[8]

The three virtues which are introduced at the outset of the speech determine its further development: the soldiers' *pietas* to Scipio's father and uncle (§§ 4; 8–9); their *uirtus* and the *uirtus Romana,* which have guaranteed Rome's survival in Spain (§§ 5; 10–13); and the *benignitas deum,* which has ensured Rome's durability since Cannae and now foreshows to Scipio, through dreams and portents, the successful end of the Spanish campaign (§§ 6; 14–19).

This is the first speech by a Roman general since the Battle of the Ticinus, where Scipio's father addressed the troops.[9] Rome has recovered steadily since then, however, and Scipio's speech now marks the stage when she and Carthage are on equal terms. At this vital point in the narrative it is fitting that he should translate Rome's circumstances into a fundamental evaluation, not only of her inner powers, but also of the significance behind all the prior development of the action. In this context he unerringly declares himself to be the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.* This aspect of the psychagogy is proclaimed by his awareness of Rome's history, his resolute faith in the gods and in a benevolent destiny, and his unshakable trust in the *uirtus Romana.*[10] He is accordingly not content with the present balance, as it were, in the war but intrepidly prophesies the successful conclusion of his Spanish campaign. The background to his first major enterprize in the history is fittingly set up in this formulation. At the same time the reader is made to wonder,

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7) Witness the glorious triumph of Marcellus (21), the alliance with the Aetolians to counter Hannibal's treaty with Philip (24), Hannibal's loss of Salopia (28.6–14), and the final pacification of Sicily (40). Cf. Burck, *Livy,* 24.

8) The précis of the speech is Burck's. Cf. his *Einführung,* 126. In reality, however, the psychagogy of the speech is complex and varied. Cf. below, Ch.4, 45ff.

9) XXI.40–41.17. This careful arrangement of the orations dramatically marks the prevailing balance in the war. Whereas Rome was on the brink of defeat in Book XXI, she is now poised to recover through her *fatalis dux,* whose first palpable contribution to the action is heralded by his speech.

10) Cf. § 9: "Ea fato quodam data nobis sors est ut magnis omnibus bellis uicti uicerimus"; § 12: "In hac ruina rerum stetit una integra atque immobilis uirtus populi Romani; haec omnia strata humi erexit ac sustulit."

either with anxiety or hopeful expectation, whether Scipio will be able to fulfil his destiny as the *fatalis dux huiusce belli* by carrying the Spanish operation to its successful conclusion and so gaining for Rome the upper hand in the war. Great tension springs from the apposite position allotted to Scipio's first major speech in the decade.

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The assault on New Carthage (XXVI.42–47) is the crucial operation through which Scipio's earlier predictions to his soldiers will be verified. The report of the assault is preceded by a speech. Having marched to the spot, Scipio justifies the impending siege and encourages his soldiers to look forward to the capture of the town.

XXVI.43.3-8

Scipio first stresses that the capture of New Carthage will entail the subjugation of the whole of Spain (§ 3). The reasons for his conviction are then set forth (§§ 4–6). He finally specifies the strategic advantages which the sack of the town entails (§§ 7–8). All his considerations are marked by a confident optimism directed wholly to the future.[11)]

It is appropriate that, before undertaking this operation, Scipio should clarify his objectives to the soldiers. The apposite position allotted to the speech greatly accelerates the main action. In the formulation of his wide-ranging plans we are made to visualize the end of the Spanish campaign before the assault on New Carthage has even begun. The dramatic tension is heightened by this artifice; the reader expectantly awaits the successful outcome of the project and the consequent materialization of the advantages it entails. Will the first critical operation of Rome's *fatalis dux,* which will mark the climax of the Spanish campaign, come to fruition through the *benignitas deum* as he confidently prophesied in his previous speech?

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After the sack of New Carthage, the triumphant Scipio is confronted with the hostages who have fallen "in populi Romani potestatem, qui beneficio quam metu obligare homines malit exterasque gentes fide ac societate iunctas habere quam tristi subiectas seruitio" (49.8). His treatment of the hostages is animated by three brief speeches, one to the aged wife of Mandonius and two to Allucius.

XXVI.49.14–15.

Scipio comforts the old woman, who fears what might befall Indibilis' beautiful daughters, by reassuring her that her *uirtus, dignitas* and *decus* will remain inviolate by dint of his own and Rome's *disciplina.*

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11) Cf. below, Ch. 4, 50ff.

XXVI.50.4–8

In the speech to Allucius, the betrothed of the girl captive, Scipio first points out that he understands the young chieftain's love for his betrothed (§§ 4–5). He tactfully identifies himself with Allucius' circumstances, but stresses his own preoccupation with the *res publica,* which precludes him even from marrying (§ 5). He has accordingly treated the young girl with all the delicacy she would have found in her own home, and now presents her to Allucius as a *donum inuiolatum et dignum* (§§ 6–7). All he asks in return is that Allucius should be a friend of the Roman people (§ 8).

XXVI.50.12

In his second speech to Allucius, Scipio renounces the gold offered to him by the grateful parents and generously gives it to the young chieftain as a wedding gift.

The underlying psychagogy of these graphic scenes, in which Livy again retards the main action to paint an edifying but stereotyped portrait of Scipio the gentleman, recalls the assertion in the prooemium that Rome is waging a *bellum iustum ac pium* on behalf of the allies, and that these accordingly offer her material and moral support.[12] Hence the *beneficium* with which the *exteras gentes* are treated here (cf. 49.8 above), as witnessed by the unimpeachable conduct of the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.* Livy appropriately portrays Scipio's outstanding moral qualities at the end of the Spanish campaign to justify a spellbound Allucius' assertion that the young Roman carries all before him through his *benignitas* and *beneficium.*[13] In effect, then, these three integrated cameos trenchantly depict the *bona fides* of Rome's cause on behalf of her allies.

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The initial development of the war culminates with Scipio's military and moral successes in New Carthage.[14] The balance prevailing at the outset of the Spanish operation has now been tipped in Rome's favour. This important advance is ex-

12) Cf. XXI.10. Compare Allucius' reaction to the speech: "Itaque dilectu clientium habito cum delectis mille et quadringentis equitibus intra paucos dies ad Scipionem reuertit" (50.14).

13) In this context Livy uses Allucius as his mouthpiece for indulging in some (very un-Roman) praise of Scipio: "His laetus donis honoribusque dimissus domum, impleuit populares laudibus meritis Scipionis: uenisse dis simillimum iuuenem, uincentem omnia cum armis, tum benignitate ac beneficiis" (50.13).

14) Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 83; Burck, *Livy,* 24.

clusively Scipio's work: "Hoc maxime modo ductu atque auspicio P. Scipionis pulsi Hispania Carthaginienses sunt, quarto decimo anno post bellum initum, quinto quam P. Scipio prouinciam et exercitum accepit" (XXVIII.16.14). Livy's observation marks the completion of a major phase of the action, which has since developed in Book XXVII through the death of Marcellus and Rome's glorious victory on the Metaurus, by which she snatches the initiative in the war, to the final expulsion of Hannibal into the southernmost part of Italy. Scipio's activities in Spain – notably his triumph over Hasdrubal at Baecula (XXVII.17.1–20.8) – are perforce of secondary importance in this context. Yet Livy has kept him, as in Book XXVI, at the centre of our interest through a key passage inserted into his report of the elections for 208: "Romae fama Scipionis in dies crescere, Fabio Tarentum captum astu magis quam uirtute gloriae tamen esse, Fului senescere fama, Marcellus etiam aduerso rumore esse, superquam quod primo male pugnauerat" (XXVII.20.9f.).

This careful ordering and accentuating of events brings to Book XXVIII, and to the above-cited recognition of Scipio's *res gestae* in Spain, a vivid impression of his waxing reputation and of the seeming inglorious end to Hannibal's campaign in Italy, as reported at the close of Book XXVII (51.12f.). At this point in the action, when Scipio has been drawn closer to the centre of the history and Rome has taken the initiative in the war, Livy introduces a fresh stratum into the narrative: "Et cum ceteri laetitia gloriaque ingenti eam rem uolgo ferrent, [i.e. Scipio's subjugation of Spain] unus qui gesserat, inexplebilis uirtutis ueraeque laudis, paruum instar eorum quae spe ac magnitudine animi concepisset receptas Hispanias ducebat. Iam Africam magnamque Carthaginem et in suum decus nomenque uelut consummatam eius belli gloriam spectabat" (17.2–3). Now for the first time in the history a crossing to Africa and the end of the war seem to be real possibilities. Again it is Scipio who is at the centre of the narrative; his new project is independently conceived. The rest are content with his brilliant subjugation of Spain; he alone turns his mind to Africa and Carthage. At this critical juncture, when victory in the war seems to hinge on him alone, events suddenly take an unprecedented turn. He falls gravely ill, and the whole project threatens to collapse; the Spanish army mutinies and the allied princes defect (24–29). When the rumour of his illness loses hold, however, the growing mutiny immediately crumbles (24.12–16; 25.1–3). By the time he arrives at Sucro to address the soldiers, the situation is as it was before.

XXVIII.27.1–29.8

Scipio first stresses his bewilderment to the soldiers. Is he to call them *ciues* or *hostes*? (27.1–4). Their conduct in giving *auspicium* and *imperium* to two common soldiers is so execrable that they cannot all have been responsible (§§ 5–6). He is bitterly disappointed in them and must conclude that they were influenced by the mutineers (§§ 7–11). The mutineers' crime is so serious it can be expunged only by their own blood (§§ 12–16). Unlike the mutineers of Rhegium, whose rebellion was innocuous, they conspired with Rome's enemies (28.1–7). Yet their undertaking was doomed from the start, as he would easily have crushed them (§§ 8–9). Rome would in any event have survived his death, and would have put their mutiny down through other generals who would immediately have replaced him (§§ 10–15). Although Coriolanus was unjustly exiled, his *pietas* stayed him from attacking his country; their pay grievances were no justification for their crime (29. 1–3). The soldiers' conduct is unaccountable: the mutineers who influenced them must be executed at once (§§ 4–8).

The motif of Scipio's illness is the cardinal element that determines the apposite position allotted to this speech, which closes the Spanish campaign. Livy uses this aspect to account dramatically for the outbreak of the mutiny, an event which threatens to abort the projected African operation. There could be no better proof to what extent the further development of the action depends on Scipio. Livy's presentation of him accordingly assumes a new dimension in the narrative. All our attention is focused on him and on his projected operation. He is now clearly at the very centre of the history prior to the second phase of the major action. By the time he reaches Sucro, however, the mutiny has crumbled of its own accord and events are virtually what they were before. Livy retards the action entirely as we see Scipio deal with the mutiny in the way set forth above. It is the speech which puts matters right and guarantees the further development of the action. The tension which springs from it is accordingly restricted to the immediate context, an appropriate artifice in virtue of the gravity of the crime of mutiny in Rome and the personal repercussions for Scipio which sprang from this event.[15)]

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15) Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 84 rightly stresses that a mutiny was "etwas Unerhörtes" in the Rome of this time. Cf. too E. Burck (ed.), *Wege zu Livius* (Darmstadt, 1967), 430–431.

Immediately after his election to the consulship for 204 B.C., Scipio's plan of crossing to Africa meets with the Senate's opposition. The conflict assumes such proportions that he allegedly threatens to override the Senate by obtaining popular support for his proposal (XXVIII.40.2). A motion is then put to the house and Fabius, the most influential member of the Senatorial party, confronts Scipio.

XXVIII.40.3–42.22

Fabius starts by stressing that Scipio's motion is out of order; his own deeds, as exemplified by history, will exonerate him from any charge of envy or ill will (40.3–14). He then stresses the perils inherent in an African operation, especially in virtue of Hannibal's stature as a general (41.1–11). Italy will be exposed to great danger if Scipio leaves the country; history teems with examples of generals who invaded foreign soil with disastrous results (§§ 12–17). Scipio's operations in Spain bear no comparison with the dangers he will have to face in Africa (42.1–7). He dare not trust Syphax and the Numidians, and will have to fight Hannibal (§§ 8–17). The strategic advantages of a campaign in Italy are obvious; let Scipio recall the example of his father, who returned from Spain to protect Italy against Hannibal, and abandon his African project which the Senate ought not to sanction (§§ 18ff.).

XXVIII.43.2–44.18

After intimating Fabius' deliberate disparagement, Scipio affirms his resolution to surpass Fabius' renown (43.2–8). His triumphs in Spain foreshow a victory in Africa; the difficulties of the operation are being exaggerated to keep him at home (§§ 9–16). Africa's harbours and approaches are readily accessible, which means that Fabius' deterrent *exempla* are inappropriate (§§ 17–21). Is Hannibal himself not the best example of what can be achieved in a foreign country? (44.1–6). His confidence of success in Africa is based on his trust in the *uirtus* and *fortuna* of Rome and in her allies (§ 7). He will indeed be fighting Hannibal, but will draw him from Italy and rout him in Africa; Italy's own resources meanwhile being ample protection for her (§§ 8–11). Patriotic considerations justify the African operation, for Italy has now suffered long enough (§§ 12–15). He has not been concerned, in his turn, to disparage Fabius and will abide confidently by the Senate's decision (§§ 16–18).

These two speeches, which briefly retard the main action, allow us to share dramatically in the conflict of policy which precedes the start of the African campaign. Although Scipio does not convince the Senatorial opposition with his arguments,

he does obtain Sicily as his province with a grudging right of crossing to Africa (45.1–8). The allotment of Sicily was treated conclusively before the clash with Fabius (cf. 38.12), so that the aim of the antithetical dialogue is obviously to juxtapose the two generals. [16] In this context Livy auspiciously contrasts one man's confident proposal of an ultimately successful *Niederwerfungs-Strategie* with the widespread support, exemplified by Fabius, of a negative *Ermattungs-Strategie;* the background against which he is to portray Scipio's *res gestae* in Africa is set up in this formulation. It is fitting that, before his last glorious campaign in the war, the *fatalis dux huiusce belli* should overshadow his last Roman rival of any stature.[17] The psychagogy thus sustains Scipio's position at the centre of the history and at the same time imparts great dramatic tension to the narrative. What role, we are made to wonder, will Scipio and his revolutionary project play in the subsequent development of the action? Will he surpass all other Roman generals in the war by drawing Hannibal from an exhausted Italy and finally routing him in Africa?

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The two central themes of Book XXVIII were the ending of the Spanish war and the introduction of Scipio's plan of crossing to Africa. The major interest accordingly centred on Rome's *fatalis dux*, whose personal destiny became inextricably linked to the development of the war after the account of the mutiny at Sucro. The major themes of Books XXIX and XXX are the preparations for and successful conclusion of the African campaign. Book XXIX, the latter part of which draws the decisive meeting between Scipio and Hannibal inexorably closer, contains several speeches by Scipio.

On reaching Sicily Scipio calls a parade of the 300 local cavalrymen who were supposedly intended to accompany him to Africa. They now shirk the impending campaign, however, and he proceeds to deal tactfully with their grievances.

XXIX.1.8

The pithy speech which follows is reported mainly in *or. obl.*, but its end is animated by a few words in *or. rect.* in which Scipio proclaims his willingness to hear the Sicilians out.

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16) Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 89–90, 92.

17) See below, Ch.4, 62ff. for a detailed discussion.

His actual treatment of the grievances (1.5f.) is also reported in *or. obl.* He assigns to the young soldier whose complaints he has heard one of the volunteers kept unarmed about his person, with instructions that he is to train him in horsemanship and in the use of arms. The other 300 Sicilians promptly follow their companion's example; the end result is that Scipio rids himself of 300 unreliable volunteers and obtains in their place, at no cost to the state, a trained Roman platoon who are said to have turned out admirably and done the country good service in many battles (1.11).

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With his report of Scipio's crossing to Africa Livy breaks the tension he has built up in the anterior course of Book XXIX.[18] The account of the spectacular departure is framed by two sections of the narrative (24.10–25.13; 27.1–29.4) which indirectly proclaim the significance of the historic day. The reader participates fully in the joyous public expectation of a victory in Africa (24.11). The census of the troops, animated by the optimism of the survivors from Cannae, is followed by a report of the meticulous instructions issued by Scipio to his generals (24.10–25.4; 25.5–13). The utmost care has been taken to ensure the success of the impending operation. To the Roman mind, however, all human endeavours also needed the help and protection of the gods. Having brought Scipio to the centre of the tableau (26), Livy accordingly has him say a fervent prayer.

XXIX.27.2–4

Scipio prays that his undertaking may prosper for himself and for Rome, for the allies and for the Latins (§ 2); that the Roman victors may return safely to share his triumph after the defeat of the enemy (§ 3); and that he may be given the power to inflict vengeance and such suffering on Carthage as she has inflicted on Rome (§ 4).

By momentarily retarding the action this speech imparts great dramatic tension to the narrative. When Scipio invokes the gods on his own behalf, and on behalf of Rome and her allies, the hopes and joys of the whole nation (10.6; 14.1), and now too of the Senate (22.11–12) are given palpable expression. All Rome is now behind the *fatalis dux*, who is again at the centre of the action. At this critical juncture, as Scipio imparts deep religious significance to the impending

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18) Cf. Burck, *Einführung*, 144.

campaign, the reader is made anxiously to wonder what the outcome of the operation will be. Will the gods vindicate the *bellum iustum ac pium* undertaken by Rome on behalf of her allies? All these elements crystallize out dramatically in the formulation of Scipio's spectacular departure.

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When Scipio first sights Africa, Livy makes him turn again to the gods with a prayer that his glimpse of the country might prove a blessing to himself and to Rome (27.9). Next day, when the fog has dispersed, he is able to see the whole line of the coast.

XXIX.27.12

On asking the name of the visible promontory, Scipio is told that it is the Cape of the Beautiful One. His reply is made up of a pithy speech: "Placet omen; huc dirigite naues."

These words recall the veracious *prodigia* introduced at two other important compositional stages of the third decade: the one, at the outset of the war, presaging an ultimate victory to Scipio's father (XXI.29.4); the other, during the second phase of the struggle, victory to Scipio at New Carthage (XXVI.45.9).[19] The above exposition, which seems to entail a thematic and compositional flash-back to the start of the war, imparts great tension to the narrative. As the initiator of the whole African project fittingly gives the order to steer for the beach we are made to wonder, at the outset of the last dramatic phase of the action, whether the third auspicious omen will materialize and usher in the successful conclusion of the war.

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The portrayal of the effect of Scipio's landing in Africa on the civilian population and on the inhabitants of New Carthage creates a vivid impression of his aggressive power (28.1–29.5). This theme is extended in the depiction of Scipio's rapid victories and culminates when he joins forces with Masinissa.

XXIX.34.7

Hasdrubal has meanwhile enlisted cavalry and with a force of 4 000 has taken

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19) Burck, *Einführung,* 145 n. 52. In this context it is worth noting that Hannibal's landing is unhappy; his ship heads straight for a ruined tomb (XXX.25.11–12).

a town called Salaeca about 15 miles from the Roman position (34.6). Scipio on hearing this news is said to have exclaimed: "Aestiua sub tectis equitatus! Sint uel plures dum talem ducem habeant."

His intrepid confidence turns out to be fully justified, for with Masinissa's competent help he soon routs Hasdrubal's contingent and takes the town, killing the Carthaginian commander Hanno. The only function of the pithy, almost anecdotal speech seems to be to animate Livy's report and demonstrate Scipio's intrepid confidence during his first overwhelming operations in Africa.

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The subject matter of Book XXX, which contains three speeches by Scipio, is linked to that of Book XXIX in that it develops the African campaign, which is to culminate when Scipio and Hannibal meet at Zama.

Since being mentioned with Syphax in Scipio's speech to the Senate (XXVIII.44.7), Masinissa has played an important role in the African war. Livy has also noted Sophoniba's treachery; she has inspired Syphax to take up arms against the Romans (XXX.11.3). After routing Syphax Masinissa concludes a headlong marriage with Sophoniba (12.20). *Victus deinde precibus Masinissae,* Laelius agrees to leave the resultant dispute to Scipio (12.22). Syphax then arrives a prisoner in the Roman camp, where he bitterly denounces Sophoniba's moral perfidy; she is the cause of his waging an unjustified war against Rome (13.9). Masinissa's actions, however, show an even greater folly, a more despicable yielding to the moment's lust (13.14). Scipio faces a critical situation, the inherent dangers of which were fully instanced by Fabius (XXVIII.42.7–11). Its *foedus* seems even worse because, as a young man in Spain, he never once fell a victim to the beauty of a female captive (14.13). Laelius and Masinissa then arrive, and he draws the Numidian aside.

XXX.14.4–11

Masinissa saw some good in him in Spain and thus put himself and all his hopes into Scipio's hands in Africa (§ 4). But the virtues Scipio prizes most, and would have Masinissa add to his other qualities, are self-control and superiority to the lusts of the flesh: their absence spells the greatest danger to young soldiers on campaign; the man who bridles them has won a resounding victory (§§ 5–7). Masinissa's achievements have earned him a reputation in Rome, and Syphax has been defeated under the auspices of the Roman people (§ 8). All that belongs

to him, including his wife, is accordingly now the property of Rome (§ 9). Sophoniba's fate must therefore be decided by the Senate and the Roman people (§ 10). Let Masinissa not spoil his many fine qualities by a single defect and so ruin the gratitude of Rome (§ 11).

The tension which springs from this speech is again restricted to the immediate context. The main action is momentarily retarded and we witness another of Scipio's resounding moral successes, as depicted especially in Masinissa's dramatic reaction to the speech (15.1). The moral corruption of Carthage, as portrayed in the narrative preceding the speech, is graphically juxtaposed with Scipio's reflexions, which at this important stage in the action guarantee Masinissa's decisive role at Zama (XXX.17.8; 35.1). His vital part in the war is made to turn on the moral virtues of Scipio and on his own sterling qualities as a loyal ally of Rome.

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After the rout of Syphax, in whom they placed more hope than in Hasdrubal and his army, the Carthaginians are in a quandary (16.2). They finally elect for negotiation; an influential delegation visits Scipio in camp, where they bargain with characteristic *fraus Punica* (16.14).

XXX.16.13

Although he has come to Africa in the hope of victory – not peace – Scipio is willing to consider an armistice, "ut omnes gentes sciant populum Romanum et suscipere iuste bella et finire" (16.9). Having accordingly formulated his terms, he utters a pithy speech: "His condicionibus placeatne pax triduum ad consultandum dabitur. Si placuerit, mecum indutias facite, Romam ad senatum mittite legatos."

Rome's *fatalis dux* is here appropriately at the centre of a decisive event before the last stage of the war. He unerringly lays down the peace terms which Carthage, so precipitating the impending engagement at Zama, is soon wilfully to breach (25.10). Without suppressing his personal ambition for victory and glory, yet in a spirit of true Roman *iustitia* and *clementia,* he shows conclusively before the last phase of the action that the *populus Romanus* begins and ends its wars in accordance with justice. There is a clear echo of the prooemium here (cf. XXI. 18.1: "ut omnia iusta ante bellum fierent"), which imparts considerable dramatic tension to the scene. Scipio emphasizes again that Rome is blameless in the war, as at the outset of the decade, whilst the reader, aware of the impending breach

of the treaty, expectantly awaits the further development of the action which will now evolve in its last phase through the reiterated theme of Rome's innocence. The action is thus momentarily retarded and the pithy speech, besides animating the scene in which it is embodied, initially hardens the thesis of Carthage's war-guilt before the decisive engagement at Zama.

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The speeches of Scipio and Hannibal (30.1–31.9) and the description of the battle (32.4–35.11) are central features of Livy's account of Zama. The speeches are preceded by a description of the widespread suspense which heralds the impending battle (28.1–9) and by a brief report of the malaise in Carthage (28.10–11), the last words of which clearly echo the outset of the decade: *uelut fatalem eum ducem in exitium suum natum* (cf. XXII.53.6). The start of the decade is reflected, too, in the content and compositional arrangement of the speeches; not only the prooemium, but especially the colloquy of Scipio's father and Hannibal.[20]

XXX.30.3–30

After appraising the auspiciousness of their meeting, Hannibal contrasts himself with Scipio, greatly enhancing the latter's significance (§§ 1–5). The Punic Wars, having brought both Rome and Carthage to their knees, show the value of a lasting peace (§§ 6; 9). A longer juxtaposition of the two generals follows: Hannibal acknowledges Scipio's high qualities whilst warning him against pride and arrogance; the whole anterior course of the war fills the canvas at this point (§§ 10–15; 16–17).[21] But fortune is frivolous; a lasting peace is better than an undecided battle which may capriciously reverse Scipio's fortunes (§§ 18–22). Witness the fate of Regulus in Africa (§§ 23). Finally, Hannibal lays down his proposals for peace (§§ 24–30).

XXX.31.1–9

Scipio rejects Hannibal's entreaties, emphasizing Carthage's perfidy in breaching the treaty (§§ 1–3). He then tersely reviews the two Punic Wars, showing how Carthage was the aggressor whereas Rome took up arms only to protect her allies;

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20) So Burck, *Einführung,* 156. This careful arrangement underlines the complete change in the fortunes of Rome and Carthage. In Book XXI Rome's plight was desperate, whereas it is now Carthage which is on the brink of defeat.

21) For some remarks on the compositional significance of Hannibal's praise of Scipio in this speech, see below, Ch. 4, 73f.

the gods have witnessed this and will end the war in accordance with human and divine law (§ 4–5). Hannibal's warning about the fickleness of fortune is idle: Scipio has not acted with any insolence in the war (§ 6–8). Only the payment of compensation by Carthage could prompt further negotiation (§ 9).

By again referring to Scipio as the *fatālis dux* before introducing these two speeches, which herald the close of the African campaign, Livy breaks the tension he has spun across the entire decade since the introductory scene at Cannae. His hero's destiny is at last about to be fulfilled, and the presentation of Scipio accordingly culminates at this point. The dramatic tension which was broken by the reference to the *fatalis dux* is immediately carried over into the two speeches, however, which again retard the action before the last, decisive engagement. The reader is thus made to hang expectantly on the combatants' words. By eschewing Hannibal's counsel to pursue a policy of caution rather than engage in an indecisive battle – just as he earlier rejected Fabius' virtually analogous advice[22] – Scipio becomes poised to win the greatest *honos* and *gloria* of all Roman generals in the war: the defeat of Hannibal. The Battle of Zama accordingly acquires a fitting and dramatic independence within the presentation. When Hannibal, the *dux et causa belli,* addressed Scipio's father in Book XXI – the only other paired speeches in the decade by opposing generals – he seemed about to crush the political and military power of Rome. The position is now reversed, however, and in Book XXX Scipio, the *fatalis dux huiusce belli,* is poised to rout him. The wheel has clearly come full circle. Scipio's speech therefore fittingly reflects the convictions set forth at the start of Book XXI as the central theme of Livy's whole presentation of the Second Punic War.[23] In short, this last speech in the decade appropriately justifies Rome's undertaking at the most dramatic point in the action by hardening the two theses of Carthage's war-guilt and the innocence of the Romans. As each general summarizes the war from his own point of view, the significance of the enmity of the last 70 years, the vindication of Rome's god-sent destiny to become the ruler of the world, and the utlimate justification of her *fatalis dux* emerge dramatically before Zama.

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22) Cf. especially XXVIII.41.11–17.

23) A feature of his treatment is that Rome, the centre of the negotiations, is detached from the main thread of the action and the events leading up to the war are portrayed as taking place in Spain and in the Carthaginian Senate. Cf. XXI.3.2–4.1; 10.1–11.2; 18.1–14. This artifice serves to emphasize Hannibal's war-guilt and the innocence of the Romans at the outset. Cf. Burck, *Livy,* 30.

Our analysis has shown that the majority of Scipio's speeches do occupy a carefully thought-out position in the course and development of Livy's narrative in the third decade. Four great speeches enhance the overall structure of the decade, two encompassing the Spanish campaign (XXVI.41ff.; XXVIII.27ff.) and two the African campaign (XXVIII.43ff.; XXX.31ff.). The major phases of the action fittingly evolve within the framework of the words, thoughts and emotions of the central figure in the presentation. The position allotted to the shorter speeches, even those made up of a few words, also frequently serves to intensify the psychagogy or heighten the tension. We recall only Scipio's speech at Canusium, his pithy words at the Spanish elections, and his terse order to steer for the beach on sighting Africa. Although some of these events were conceivably based on tradition, it is the location Livy allots to them within the decade which gives the various episodes their particular force. The major speeches also frequently advance or retard the main action, at the same time sustaining the reader's interest and the dramatic tension through the underlying psychagogy. Frequent recourse to these tendencies – heightening the excitement, intensifying the psychagogy, accelerating or retarding the major action – imparts a vital quality to the whole decade, conferring on it something of the style and effect of a drama, in accordance with the ancient canons applied to the composition of a good work of history.[24] And of course, again in conformity to these canons, Scipio is drawn steadily and portentously closer to the centre of the history. So he is introduced in a series of brief pointers to what is to follow, two of which turn on speeches – at Canusium and at the Spanish elections – and the portrait is then filled out *i.a.* by the insertion of further speeches at appropriate points in the decade, until it finally culminates at Zama.

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24) Cf. Burck, *Livy*, 40; and n. 2 to this Chapter.

Chapter 4

The Formulation of Scipio's Longer Speeches

In the Introduction to this study we eschewed a purely mechanical or statistical treatment of the rhetorical content of Scipio's speeches. We observed that specific discussion and illustration of the differentiation of the psychagogy and of the other artistic elements underlying the rhetoric had scarcely been attempted. One of our concerns in the following analysis will therefore be the psychagogy behind Scipio's longer speeches.[1] What is the attitude adopted there, the content and the scope? What effect does this have on the characterization of Scipio? Is he, as portrayed in the longer speeches, an abstraction, a dummy? Or the living *fatalis dux huiusce belli*? [2] And are the speeches, in accordance with the central concept of τὸ πρέπον, appropriate to his character? [3]

We have just analysed Scipio's position, in conformity to the Hellenistic canons posited for a good work of history, at the centre of Livy's narrative. We pointed out in Chapter 1 that Livy's Hellenistic legacy also included the adoption of a didactic moral purpose in the presentation of his subject matter.[4] We shall therefore also consider here whether a preoccupation with morality, the formulation of which was an organic element of Roman pragmatic history-writing, emerges in the speeches. What effect does the formulation, psychagogic and rhetorical, of the longer speeches have on this aspect of the portrait? Does it support Livy's reputation – witnessed by Quintilian, Tacitus and Seneca[5] – as a great Roman historian, literary artist and pyschologist?

These matters will be considered by analysing the following speeches: XXVI.41.3–25; 43.3–8; 50.4–8. XXVIII.27.1–29.8; 43.2–44.18. XXX.14.4–11; 31.1–9.

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1) The shorter speeches, important though they are to the presentation, do not lend themselves to a detailed analysis. The following speeches are accordingly excluded from our discussion: XXII.53.10–12. XXV.2.7. XXVI.49.14–15; 50.12.XXIX.1.8; 27.2–4; 27.12; 34.7. XXX.16.13.

2) Cf. the Introduction, 2,5.

3) Cf. Ullmann, *Étude* 15: "[L]e style de tout discours doir être accomodé au caractère de l'orateur, point cardinal dans la rhétorique ancienne, qui s'applique surtout aux prosopopées des ouvrages historiques".

4) Cf. above, Ch. 1, 14f.

5) Quint. X.1.101: "cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt"; Tac., *Agric.* 10; *Ann.* IV.34.3; Sen. *ep. mor.* 46.1: 100.9.

Before treating these speeches we must indicate our approach to the two basic elements which will found our analysis, viz the underlying psychagogy and the rhetorical formulation of the subject matter.

The first concept denotes the totality of elements in the speeches (rhetoric, attitude adopted, content and scope) which help to persuade the reader. The second (adjunct) concept incorporates:

(A) The three *genera causarum: iudiciale, deliberatiuum,* and *demonstratiuum* (Arist., *rhet.* I.3ff.; Quint. III.4.12ff.);[6]

(B) the three allied *genera dicendi: subtile, grande* and *medium* (Quint. XII.10.59);

(C) the four basic *partes orationis: exordium, narratio, argumentatio* and *peroratio* (Quint. IV.1.1);[7]

(D) the well known rhetorical *topoi: utile, rectum, honestum,* etc., or their opposites[8] (Quint. III.8.22ff.); and

(E) the technical formulation of the linguistic elements, as set forth especially in Quintilian's analysis (Quint. VIII and IX).[9]

In accordance with the approach outlined at the outset of this Chapter, however, we shall not consider these elements independently or schematically in our analysis, but will treat them in conjunction with our discussion in Chapter 3 of the underlying psychagogy and the position allotted to the longer speeches.

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6) This matter is so well settled as to need no special discussion in our analysis. The majority of the speeches in the *A.U.C.* are *deliberatiuum.* Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 221; H. Borneque, *Tite-Live* (Paris, 1933), 159f.; A. Canter, *AJPh* 38 (1917), 128: "They are political and legislative in character, *suasiones* or *dissuasiones,* which most readily serve the purposes of the historian."

7) This division strictly applies only to the *genus iudiciale,* but may be transferred to the other two *genera.* Cf. H. Lausberg, *Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik* (Münich, 1960), 147. The terminology used to designate the various *partes* differs among ancient critics, as it does among modern scholars. For convenience, however, we adopt the Latin tradition.

8) For a good discussion of these elements and of the *partes orationis,* Ullmann, *La technique,* 9ff. On the *genera dicendi*, below, n. 19.

9) We shall therefore be dealing with "l'ornement stylistique en général et spécialement les tropes et les figures". So Ullmann, *Etude,* 15. Ullmann's elements (via Quint. VIII and IX with some judicious pruning) provide more scope for discussing the import of Livy's rhetoric than do the abbreviated *tropi* and *figurae* of A. Canter, *AJPh* 38 (1917), 125ff. and *AJPh* 39 (1918), 44ff.

As we noted in Chapter 3,[10] Livy sees the Spanish campaign as a turning-point in the war. The action is, as it were, retarded at this point whilst he brings Scipio to the centre of the history after his election to the Spanish command; the reader accordingly awaits with interest the speech which opens Scipio's campaign. Now for the first time Livy can present his own "objective" view of the *iuuenis, fatalis dux huiusce belli.*

XXVI.41.3–25

The *exordium* (§§ 3–5) is a *principium ab auditoribus.*[11] Scipio is the first general ever to have thanked his soldiers before he has experienced what they can do for him (§ 3). Fortune made a bond between him and them even before he saw Spain or their headquarters (§ 4). Their *pietas* to his father and uncle, *uiuos mortuosque,* and their *uirtus* in recovering Spain for the Roman people make up the bond (§§ 4–5: note how their meritorious conduct is framed by the two concepts).

Scipio's opening words, which constitute a *captatio beneuolentiae,* echo the *exordium* of an earlier speech by Marcius after the loss of the two Scipios (XXV.38.2).[12] Marcius observes that the two fallen generals haunt his thoughts and dreams, pressing him to avenge them and their country (§ 5). It is their memory which impells the Spanish troops into battle, proving to the Carthaginians that the *nomen Romanum* did not perish with the Scipios (§ 9). It is clear that Rome's survival in Spain is inextricably linked to Scipio's *gens* and to the *pietas* and attendant *uirtus* which the memory of his father and uncle inspires in the troops. This aspect of the psychagogy proclaims the full significance behind the *principium ab auditoribus* and *captatio beneuolentiae.*

We recall Scipio's own *pietas* and *uirtus* as demonstrated when he saved his father's life at the Ticinus (XXI.46.8).[13] The *exordium* is appropriate, not only to the prevailing circumstances, but also to his character.

10) Above, 28f.

11) Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 112. Our analysis is based on his rhetorical division. For further discussions of the speech, G. Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius* 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, 1964), 141ff.; Burck, *Einführung,* 126f.

12) So Stübler, *op. cit.,* 141.

13) Scipio's devotion to his house is a recurrent theme in the speeches: XXVI.41.4; 9; 13; 22; 24; 50.7. XXVIII.28.12; 43.10; 12. It is also reflected in the compositional arrangement of the only paired speeches by opposing generals in the whole decade – the colloquies between Scipio's father and Hannibal and Scipio himself and Hannibal. See above, Ch. 3, 40 n. 20. Cf. too XXX.30.13 (Hannibal's speech to Scipio): "patris et patrui persecutus mortem ex calamitate uestrae domus decus insigne uirtutis pietatisque eximiae extitisti". The motif clearly culminates in this lavish praise of Scipio's *uirtus* and *pietas.*

After this portentous *exordium* Scipio turns to the *narratio* (§§ 6–7); his reflexions incorporate a fresh theme, the *benignitas deum*.[14] It is through the blessing of God that the Spanish army is to undertake the campaign which he now sets forth. The rhetoric vividly proclaims the clarity of his objectives and his eagerness to start the projected operations (§ 6: two antitheses, homoioteleuton, prepositional anaphora). Yet he is afraid that the soldiers might have misgivings about the scope and boldness of his project; Rome has suffered some signal defeats, and he is young (§§ 7).

The first *topos* of the *argumentatio,* to which he next turns, is accordingly the *possibile*; he seeks to instil confidence in his troops and to dispel their fears (§§ 8–13). His reflexions start from his own awareness of Rome's defeats in Spain: their significance for him lies rooted in his devotion to the Scipionic house (cf. § 8). The following consideration extends this motif; a bad omen is allayed by a good one. To be left all but orphaned and desolate was enough to break his spirit – yet his confidence in the fortune and valour of the Roman nation forbade him to despair of the final issue (§ 9). The antithesis suggests how closely his *pietas* is linked to Rome's *fortuna* and *uirtus*; a metaphor enlivens the meaning of the two concepts. *Fortuna* and *uirtus* next converge in his affirmation of the destiny granted to the Roman people by an inscrutable *fatum* – that in all their wars, they have emerged victorious from defeat (§ 9, last sentence: note the isocolon and the alliterative poliptoton). The import of the poliptoton is then extended in a passionate review of the misfortunes which have befallen Rome in her past wars (§§ 10–12).

Rome's early struggles against Porsenna, the Gauls and Samnites are impatiently dismissed (§ 10, first part: note the asyndeton). A triple anaphora proclaims the disastrous losses sustained during the First Punic War (§ 10, last part). The review of the present war is introduced by a *percunctatio.* So intimately, by dint of his *pietas* and *uirtus*, is Scipio involved in the terrible struggle – *omnibus ... sensi* (§ 11) – that he is uncertain where to begin. Yet it is this very involvement which enables him, despite his youth (cf. § 7), to recount the disastrous course of the Second Punic War with justified vehemence. Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, what do they signify but the destruction of Rome's armies and the deaths of her consuls? (§ 11: note the asyndeton). Add the defection of Italy, much of Sicily, and

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14) Cf. too § 14: *nunc benignitate deum;* § 18: *nunc di immortales.* Thus the motif recurs three times in the speech; on each occasion it refers to the projected success of Scipio's operations. Cf. §§ 14 and 18. It does not, however, seem to have any structural significance.

Sardinia; add the moment of ultimate horror and fear – the Carthaginians encamped between the Anio and Rome, victor Hannibal almost within the gates (§ 12).

The rhetoric – two anaphoristic imperatives, asyndeton, and polysyndeton; note too the balanced homoioteleuton and the alliteration – emotionally proclaims the full extent of Rome's disasters, both as regards Italy (first *adde*) and the city itself (second *adde*).

Amidst this ruin of Rome's fortunes, however, one thing alone stood firm and ensured her continuance – the inviolable, unshakable *uirtus* of the Roman people (§ 12: note the metaphor). Scipio here equates the *uirtus populi Romani* with the *fatum quoddam* of § 9; the *exemplum* of Rome's misfortunes is framed by his affirmation of confidence in these two analogous elements of the nation's greatness. The argument in encouragement of the soldiers attains great cogency through this formulation.

The *possibile* closes on an intimate note (§ 13); the Spanish soldiers, too, have shared in Rome's recovery. Had they not checked the Carthaginian advance after Cannae, under the leadership and auspices of Scipio's father, Rome would have ceased to exist. Their *pietas* and *uirtus* are again[14a)] set off as the prop which has sustained the *nomen Romanum* in Spain (§ 13, last part: a trenchant antithesis).

Having thus encouraged the soldiers Scipio reverts to his projected campaign. His reflexions, which embody the *utile* (§ 14–17) extend the argument under the *narratio*. Now, by the favour of the gods, Rome's affairs in Italy and Sicily are prospering (§ 14: the homoioteleuton suggests his animation). The new developments are then excitedly set before the soldiers (§ 15: note the asyndeton, alliteration, and homoioteleuton); Hannibal, too, has been driven from Italy and is on his knees in Bruttium (§ 16). All these elements next converge to form the full significance behind Scipio's argument under the *utile*. What could be more unreasonable now than for the soldiers to be faint-hearted – they who upheld Rome's tottering fortunes, with his father and uncle, during the terrible disasters of the past? (§ 17).

Both the Scipionic *gens* and the Spanish army have been afflicted by a series of misfortunes (§ 17; § 8). By dint of the *benignitas deum*, however, both are poised to recover through Scipio's impending operations.[15)] This forceful psychagogy closes the *utile*.

14a) Cf. the *exordium*, § 3–5.

15) See above, n. 14.

Scipio then extends the foregoing argument (§§ 18–19: the *religiosum*). His reflexions centre on himself and his relationship with the immortal gods, the guardians of Rome's empire. Having ensured his election to the Spanish command they now foreshow to him nothing but prosperity and success (§ 18). His own mind, too, always his most trusted seer, forecasts that Spain is Rome's; that the Carthaginians will soon be covering land and sea in cowardly flight (§ 19: note the pregnant use of the present tense and the alliteration).

A seer (§ 18: *uates*) is not concerned with the interpretation of the future only, but with the meaning behind the present and the past; he is concerned, all in all, with *fatum.* These elements were set forth under the preceding *topoi* where Scipio dealt with the past and present developments in the war. The formulation in § 19, however, makes up a dénouement of his entire argument – past, present, and future converge in the affirmations of the *uates*; his inward eye, as it were, shows to him the whole significance behind the prior development of the action. "Aus der allgemeinen Geschichte Roms, aus dem bisherigen Verlauf des Krieges und der gegenwärtigen Lage hat er beinahe rational den Willen der Gottheit erkannt; in dem Teil der Geschichte sieht er das Ganze; Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft schliessen sich ihm zur Einheit zusammen."[16] In short, Scipio here proclaims himself to be the *fatalis dux huiusce belli*; at the same time his argument in encouragement of the soldiers attains its culmination.

Scipio then turns to the *facile* (§§ 20–22), the last *topos* under the *argumentatio.* His reflexions start from a *sententia* in isocolon (§ 20); the rational considerations of the general must support the mystical confidence of the *uates.*[16a] He accordingly points out that Carthage's allies, having become weary of their burdens, are now seeking Rome's protection; her three generals are at odds with one another and their respective forces are widely separated (§ 20). The same ill fortune which recently dogged Rome is now gathering impetus against Carthage (§ 21: another metaphor). These considerations, as treated from the Roman side, are then re-emphasized from Carthage's point of view (§ 22). This careful formulation, pivoting on the metaphor in § 21, shows how completely *fortuna* is now behind Rome.

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16) Stübler, *op. cit.*, 145.

16a) Compare the apposite comment of a French scholar: "Ce que l'esprit conçoit de lui-même, *sua sponte,* c'est proprement l'intuition; elle peut être l'essence divine; mais cette inspiration doit coïncider avec le fruit d'un raisonnement bien conduit, *ratio,* qui est du domaine de l'homme." R. Seguin, "La religion de Scipion l'Africain", *Latomus* 33 (1974), 16. (Above, n. 14 for further passages which seem to suggest Scipio's communion with the gods.)

Under the circumstances Scipio asks only one thing of his soldiers – that they give their loyalty to the name of Scipio, the scion of their lost commanders, growing again from the lopped branch (§ 22, last sentence).

The apt simile, which applies to Rome herself,[17] extends the argument set forth under the *utile* where Scipio hinted that the Spanish army and his *gens* were poised to recover from their setbacks. The *res publica* is about to bloom again, through *pietas,* with Scipio's house; the projected operations portend nothing but success and revival.

The peroration (§§ 23–25) incorporates an *exhortatio.* The rhetoric heightens with the intensity of Scipio's appeal. Three imperatives in asyndeton urge the soldiers to action, their *uirtus* is acknowledged again in an alliteration, and an anaphoristic *traducite* fittingly echoes the initial formulation of the campaign (§ 23; § 6). Finally, as Scipio thanked his soldiers for their *pietas* in the *exordium,* so he makes a cogent appeal to it in the *peroratio.*[18] Physical likeness to his father and uncle shows that he is the reincarnation of their *gens;* he will try to emulate their qualities, too, so that the soldiers may believe through his deeds that their two beloved generals have risen from the dead (§§ 24–25).

As *pietas* and *uirtus* converge in him and Rome's ancestral religion echoes in his words, a cardinal aspect of the psychagogy behind Scipio's whole argument attains new force. We recall the *exordium,* which dealt with the past vis-à-vis the *pietas* and attendant *uirtus* which the Spanish soldiers showed to his father and uncle (§§ 3–5). These are the moral qualities which, in conjunction with the *fortuna populi Romani* and the nation's intrepid *uirtus,* have sustained Rome's fortunes in Spain and throughout the Second Punic War. The psychagogy of the present argument, however, inclines wholly to the future; the projected operations, as set forth under the aegis of the *benignitas deum* in Scipio's formulation, portend another glorious triumph for the army's *pietas* and *uirtus.*

The primary aim of Scipio's speech is to encourage the soldiers before the start of the Spanish operation which is to mark the turning of the war in Rome's favour. A vivid moral portrait of him emerges in this context, filled out to some extent by the linguistic formulation. The fiery review of the Seond Punic War, for example, clearly proclaims his passionate involvement (§§ 11–12); the vivid metaphors,

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17) Cf. XXIV.45.3. So Stübler, *op. cit.,* 149 n. 162.

18) The motif of the soldiers' *pietas* and their attendant *uirtus* thus frames the entire speech. Cf. too §§ 13. 17. 24.

constantly used when crucial themes such as *uirtus, pietas* and *fortuna* are at issue, suggest his understanding of the operation of these elements on Rome's history (§§ 4. 9. 12. 13. 21). All in all, however, in accordance with the generally conservative use of tropes and figures in the speech – it is clearly of the *genus medium*[19] – the fullest details of the portrait are cerebral rather than emotional and spring from the psychagogic formulation of the arguments rather than from the rhetoric. As Quintilian remarks, "all will agree that the counsel given is in accordance with the speaker's character" (III.8.13); the reader makes his assessment by the types of argument used.

In the foregoing context, too, a vivid and dramatic portrait emerges. We recall the affirmation of Scipio's faith in the *uirtus* and *fortuna* of Rome (the *possibile*); his almost mystical profession of confidence in the gods (the *religiosum*); and his optimistic *pietas* and *uirtus,* which frame the speech and found his entire argument. The constituent elements of the address combine, all in all, to form a lively moral portrait and the presentation fully deserves Quintilian's praise, "cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt".

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Scipio's next speech to his soldiers, as we noted in Chapter 3,[20] is aimed at encouraging them before the assault on New Carthage; the action is momentarily suspended as we see him excite their fighting form before an important phase of his first campaign.

XXVI.43.3–8[21]

Though he does not deny the difficulties of the impending operation, Scipio starts by stressing that a successful assault on New Carthage entails an *emolumentum*

19) For a standard discussion of the *genera dicendi* (which correspond, of course, to the *officia oratoris: docere, mouere, conciliare*), G.L. Hendrickson, *AJPh* 26 (1905), 249ff. The earliest occurrence of a three-fold division (there having originally been only two *genera*) is in the *auct. ad Her.* (IV.8.11f.). The grand style is there characterized as highly figurative, flamboyant and stylish; the middle as moderately impassioned; and the plain as a *narratio.* Cf. too Cic., *Orat.* V.20. The *genus grande,* then, is rhetoric itself (ψυχαγωγία: Plato, *Phaed.* 271D), the *genus subtile* dialectic, and the *genus medium* an intermediate *tertium quid.* Ullmann, *Étude,* devotes Ch. 6 of his work to Livy's *genera dicendi.* He has classified all the speeches discussed in our analysis, except the fragmentary XXVI.43.3–8. We agree entirely with his classification, which we follow without further comment.

20) Above, 30.

21) The fragmentary nature of the speech makes a division into *topoi* impossible.

for the soldiers (§ 3). He then extends this argument by observing that the soldiers will be attacking one town, but that in that one town they will have taken the whole of Spain (§ 3, last part).

The cogency of Scipio's argument is assisted by the rhetoric (§ 3: note the antithetical isocolon). His confidence emerges clearly in the tense of the two verbs (*oppugnabitis* x *ceperitis*); the success of the Spanish operation is anticipated before the action has even begun.

The remainder of the fragment seems to demonstrate the truth of Scipio's opening statements, that the impending project holds great profit for the soldiers and that it will entail the subjugation of the whole of Spain (§ 4–8). The first stage of the argument (§ 4–6) is marked by a triple anaphoristic *hic* (= *in urbe*). Scipio stresses that New Carthage contains the hostages of all the Spanish nobility and peoples – their capture will entail the surrender of all that is now subject to the Carthaginians (§ 4); and that it contains all the enemy's money the loss of which will cripple them but help the Romans (§ 5); and that it contains the enemy's war material, too, the capture of which will supplement his soldiers' equipment but strip the enemy bare (§ 6: note the antithetical metaphor).

A recurring verbal device in § 4.5.6 seems to be the juxtaposition of a present-tense verb (or verbs) with a future-tense verb (or verbs);[22] the former group refers to the enemy, the latter group to the Romans. Thus the underlying psychagogy supersedes the impending assault by anticipating the results of its successful outcome. Scipio's aim of encouraging his soldiers attains great cogency through this artifice.

Having enumerated three of the benefits which the sack of New Carthage entails, Scipio turns to a fourth advantage – the capture of a splendid harbour, from which Rome's military needs can be supplied by land or sea (§ 7). The benefit to Rome of all four advantages inherent in the sack of the town is then summarized in an antithesis (§ 7, last part: *quae ... maiora*). After which Scipio expands his argument (this point seems to entail a fifth benefit for the Romans) by justifying the antithetical assertion in § 7: New Carthage is the enemy's citadel and granary, their treasury and arsenal – in short, the storehouse of their every need (§ 8: note the asyndeta and the homoioteleuton). The final part of § 8 (*huc ... Africa*) seems to

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22) § 4: *sunt* x *erunt* x *tradent;* § 5: *possunt, alant* x *erit;* § 6: *est* x *instruet.*

expand this last consideration from a strategic point of view – hither lies the direct course from Africa; a rare and safe anchorage; an easy route from Africa to Spain. + + [23]

The primary aim of this address, as Livy himself remarks, is to encourage the soldiers before the assault on New Carthage (43.2). The persuasive tendency of the psychagogy complies fully with this aim. Although the muted rhetoric plays a secondary role in this context – the fragment is clearly of the *genus medium* – the psychagogy sustains a constant tension between the present and the future.

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23) Although Polybius is not Livy's direct source here (above, Ch. 2, 20f.) it is worth noting, especially in view of the lacuna in Livy's speech, that in his version of the same address (X.11.5f.: *or. obl.*), Polybius makes Scipio assert that it is Poseidon who suggested the strategy of scaling the walls of New Carthage to him (even if this is in the context of the mural crowns, which are not mentioned in Livy) and who promised that his intervention in the operation would be manifest to the whole army (11.7). As Livy later records Neptune's intervention in describing the assault on the town (XXVI.45.9), it is reasonable to assume that he might conceivably have retailed a similar claim by Scipio in the lacuna at XXVI.43.8. (Above, n. 16a for further passages in which Scipio claims communion with the gods.) These considerations, of course, plunge the modern reader directly into the problems of the so-called Scipionic legend; i.e. that Scipio, like Alexander, was descended from the gods. The following works include (or constitute) major discussions of this issue: E. Meyer, *Kl. Schr.* II 423ff.; Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War,* 6ff.; R. Haywood, *Studies on Scipio Africanus* (Oxford, 1933), 9ff; Hoffmann, *Livius und der 2. punische Krieg,* 72ff.; Seguin, *op. cit., passim.* The primary Livian passage at issue is the famous character-sketch in Book XXVI (19.3–9; cf. Polyb. X.9) inserted after Scipio's election to the Spanish command to account for his rapid preferment. It is unnecessary for us, however, to go into the details of the legend. In the context of Livy's (epic) compositional techniques and Scipio's speeches in the third decade it is sufficient to note (regarding the above passage) that Livy does not adopt any specific view on the veracity or otherwise of the legend. "Im Rahmen der ... Erzählung kommt es ihm zwar nur darauf an, darzulegen, was die Menge über Scipio denkt und warum sie ihn gewählt hat." Burck, *Einführung,* 124. Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 78: "Er berichtet ganz schlicht, was man von ihm zu erzählen pflegte, ohne dabei etwa eine der hier [Liv. XXVI.19.3–9] geäusserten Ansichten als die richtige herauszustellen." As to the significance of the legend-motif to Scipio's speeches, it is worth noting that the theme recurs again (negatively) only in the speech to the Sucrian mutineers. "Will hier Livius nicht das Bild Scipios," a scholar asks of XXVIII.28.11, "das er in der Charakteristik entworfen hat, korrigieren (vgl. XXVIII 57,1), lässt er nicht Scipio selbst Front gegen seine Geburslegende machen, wenn er seine Sterblichkeit gegenüber der Ewigkeit der gottgewollten römischen Herrschaft so stark betont, dass ein Vergleich mit einem Gott und erst recht mit Juppiter ganz widersinnig sein muss?" Stübler, *op. cit.,* 136–137. Cf. below, n. 34.

Scipio's confidence is vividly portrayed by this artifice. As in the speech at the outset of his campaign the future still foreshows to him nothing but prosperity and success; the truth of his previous assertions is about to be cogently demonstrated in the assault on New Carthage. This aspect of the presentation lends a lively and dramatic quality to the fragment and the portrait it embodies loses anything of the "abstraction or dummy" it might otherwise have possessed.

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The compositional significance of Scipio's speech to Allucius is cardinally important for demonstrating the *beneficium* with which Rome treats the *exteras gentes* (cf. XXVI.49.8). The scene in which it is incorporated recalls Livy's assertion in the prooemium that Rome is waging a *bellum iustum ac pium* on behalf of the allies – as testified to even by Hanno – and that these accordingly offer her material and moral support.[24] How does Livy depict Scipio under these important circumstances?

XXVI.50.4–8

Scipio addresses Allucius on equal terms out of consideration; he wishes as little *uerecundia* as possible to arise between them (§ 4). The central theme of the speech is Allucius' distracted love for his betrothed (50.3). When this motif is introduced into the address, however, Scipio's tone is kind and moderate (§ 5: *audirem ... esse*). Although he professes to understand Allucius' passion – *et forma faceret fidem* – two considerations prevent him from enjoying even an upright and legitimate love; the one being his sense of commitment, the other his preoccupation with Rome (§ 5): were it not for these considerations he, too, should wish to find indulgence (*ueniam*) for loving his bride too ardently; but under the circumstances he can only give his blessing where he may (§ 5: *tuo cuius possum amore faueo*).[25]

The central theme of the speech is here translated into an affirmation of Scipio's *moderatio* and *clementia* in relation to his sense of commitment and total preoccupation with the *res publica*.[26]

24) Cf. above, Ch. 3, 31.

25) This surprisingly complex sentence (§ 4–5: *Ego ... faveo*) probably embodies the *accuratiore sermone* (than in the speech to the parents) with which Livy has Scipio address Allucius (50.3).

26) It is well known that Scipio had a reputed weakness for women. Livy, however, invariably depicts him with his mind intent on greater things. Cf. below, n. 50.

Allucius' bride-to-be has been treated with proper delicacy under Scipio's protection; she has been kept for Allucius, an inviolate gift worthy of Scipio and of him (§ 6). The only payment Scipio asks in return is that Allucius should be a friend of the Roman people (§ 7). At this point the motif of Rome's war on behalf of the allies is introduced in conjunction with an illustration of Scipio's *pietas* (§ 8). There are many *boni uires* of the Scipionic stamp – the peoples of Spain will recall his father and uncle[27] – in the Roman state; there is no nation in the world whom Allucius could less wish to be his enemy or more wish to be his friend.

Scipio chooses his words in this speech "with more care than in what he said to the father and mother" (50.3; n. 25); but there is no extended argument and a division into *topoi* is thus impossible. The speech is further marked by an almost total lack of rhetoric, its only conspicuous adornent being alliteration (§ 5.6.8). Livy's *uerba dicendi,* as Treptow has shown, can indicate the tone and character of the speech that is to follow; this address is prefaced by *inquit,* which denotes a colloquy rather than a carefully constructed oration.[28] Scipio is addressing an ingenuous Celtiberian chieftain, who is passionately in love, as one young man to another; the *genus subtile* is the appropriate vehicle for indicating Rome's *beneficium* to him.[29] At the same time the formulation under this *genus* aptly proclaims Scipio's kindness and understanding. In this context a vivid if somewhat stereotyped impression of his *clementia* and *moderatio* emerges, together with a portrayal of his total commitment to the *res publica* and to the cause in hand.

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The presentation of Scipio, as depicted from his voluntary acceptance of the Spanish command and capture of New Carthage down to his final subjugation of Spain, culminates when he quells the mutiny at Sucro; as a mutiny was virtually unprecedented in Rome, and the episode had important political repercussions for Scipio, Livy introduces one of the longest speeches in the entire *A.U.C.* at this

27) Cf. above, n. 13. The underlying psychagogy seems to imply that Scipio's devotion to his father and uncle is one of the elements which holds him bound to the sense of commitment mentioned earlier in the speech (§ 5: *si frui liceret ludo aetatis*).

28) For a brief discussion of the *uerba dicendi* in the first and third decades of the *A.U.C.*, Treptow, *Die Kunst der Reden,* 30.

29) For some acute remarks on the *genus subtile* in this context, Ullmann, *Étude,* 123f.

point.[30] The awe-struck soldiers assemble before their *imperator* (the like of his stern expression they cannot recall even in the battle-line (26.14)) who then addresses them.

XXVIII.27.1–29.8

The *exordium* (27.1–4) is a *principium ab auditoribus.*[31] Though he has lived with the army almost from boyhood (§ 2), Scipio is dumbfounded and nonplussed before his own soldiers (§ 1; § 3). This unprecedented situation has arisen because, owing to their conduct, he is unable to find the appropriate name to describe them (§ 4). His perplexity is illustrated in the contradicition of the import of two interrogatory nouns (*ciues? an milites?*) by their dependent relative clauses. The seeming anomaly of a third possible title (*hostes*?) is embodied in an antithesis: "Corpora, ora, uestitum habitum ciuium adgnosco: facta, dicta, consilia animos hostium uideo" (§ 4, last part). Scipio's avowed bewilderment is skilfully portrayed (note the asyndeton, homoioteleuton and isocolon) as he ominously touches on all the treachery and deceit behind the mutiny; the soldiers seem to be Romans, but their disposition (*consilia, animos:* isolated in the formulation) is that of enemies. The *exordium* could not, under the circumstances, have opened more appropriately.

The *narratio* (27.5–6) is introduced by a question. What did the present mutineers share if not the hopes and aspirations of the Ilergetes and Lacetani? (§ 5). This implies that *hostes* is the apt name to describe them; the *exemplum* equates their aims with those of the enemy. The objectives of the mutineers are not, however, a central theme of the *narratio.* Scipio is concerned rather with how they sought to attain their goal. The Ilergetes and Lacetani followed the leadership of princes; the present insurgents, on the other hand, instigated a mutiny and gave *auspicium* and *imperium* to two common soldiers (§ 5: note how the homoioteleuton in the second leg of the antithesis suggests his scorn). Scipio is clearly scandalized by the conduct of his soldiers. But let them only deny that they all participated in the mutiny, or approved of it when it was under way, and he will be ready to believe their denial and that the mutiny sprang from the *furor* and *insania* of a few;[32] for if it were

30) Above, Ch. 3, 32.

31) So Ullmann, *La technique,* 115. We again follow his rhetorical division. For less formal discussions of the speech (both works entailing a comparison with Polybius) see Treptow, *op. cit.,* 185ff.; E. Burck (ed.) *Wege zu Livius* (Darmstadt, 1967), 430ff.

32) There is clearly a mispunctuation in the Oxford text: "Negate uos id omnes fecisse aut factum uoluisse, milites; paucorum eum furorem atque amentiam esse libenter credam, negantibus" (§ 6, first part). The reading makes proper sense only if the semicolon is put after *esse.*

the responsibility of the entire army it would call for a terrible sacrifice to wipe it out (§ 6).

At this early point in the speech, then, Scipio introduces a compromising element into his argument. The psychagogy behind the latter part of the *narratio* is conciliatory; the soldiers (note the unexpected vocative in § 6) can escape the awful punishment, here hinted at for the first time, which awaits the mutineers.

Scipio then turns to the *honestum* (§ 7–12), the first *topos* of the *argumentatio*. He is loath to touch the sores of the mutiny, but unless they are touched they cannot be healed (§ 7). Before applying the painful therapy, however, he sets forth the personal feelings that the mutiny has provoked in him (§ 8–10). The intimate nature of his relationship with the soldiers emerges clearly from his words; the psychagogy sustains the distinction between them and the mutineers. After his victories in Spain he did not think that there would be a single person anywhere in the country – note the anaphora, asyndeton and homoioteleuton – to whom his life could be hateful (§ 8). What a bitter disappointment it was (the *exclamatio* proclaims his emotion) to discover that his own soldiers not only expected, but eagerly awaited his death (§ 9). He does not accuse all the soldiers of this conduct, however, as he would rather die than be hated by them all and by his fellow Romans (§ 10). But a crowd is like the sea, of itself motionless, yet stirred by winds, gentle or strong; the soldiers too have their calms and storms (§ 11, first part).

Before applying his "therapy" Scipio prepares, through a simile couched as a *sententia*, to distinguish again between the soldiers and the mutineers. The gist of the simile seems to be that the soldiers were not responsible for the mutiny but were moved to it by an impulse from without; they caught the contagion of the *furor* and *insania* of those who instigated it (§ 11, last part).

Having thus distinguished the soldiers from the mutineers and shown that the former are not culpable, Scipio applies his "therapy" by setting forth the full extent of his soldiers' *amentia* as well as the nature of their crimes (§ 12). The rhetoric intensifies now with his emotion; the formulation incorporates six asyndeta, the first three covering the soldiers' crimes against *pietas* (anaphoristic *in*) and the last three their crimes against *disciplina* (anaphoristic *aduersus*).

Under the *pium* (§ 13–16) Scipio expands, from the point of view of the Roman constitution, the motifs touched on in § 12. A *praeteritio* introduces the

topos; the betrayal of Rome in co-operation with Mandonius and Indibilis is of greater moment than Scipio's reflexions about himself (§ 13). The compact made by the mutineers with the enemy has resulted in an unwarranted violation of Rome's constitution – the lawfully elected tribunes have been stripped of their *imperium* and the *fasces* of the commander have been conferred on two worthless individuals (§ 14). This reflexion expands two important motifs of the speech (§ 5; § 12) as Scipio unerringly exposes all the treasonable significance behind the mutiny. The full meaning underlying the situation is then clarified again in a vivid *repraesentatio* (§ 15). A series of seven short, unattached sentences depict the various stages leading up to the final execrable act of treason by the leading mutineers. Albius and Atrius' actions (as described in the *repraesentatio*) are so heinous as not to bear any comparison with natural *portenta* (§ 16, first part). Nor can they be expiated in the usual way – note the anaphora and the asyndeton – but will have to expunged by the blood of those responsible for the crime (§ 16, last part).

The foregoing part of the *pium* (§ 16) again distinguishes the mutineers from the soldiers and embodies another ominous hint at the awful punishment awaiting them. As Scipio ruthlessly spins out this motif it is easy for the reader to imagine what terror his words must strike into the hearts of the captive mutineers.

Scipio now turns from his preceding ethical considerations to the practical objectives of the mutineers (28.1). He specifies the hopelessness of their project and expands a foregoing motif by once more emphasizing the gravity of their crimes. His reflexions, which incorporate the *utile* (28.1–7), start from an *exemplum* – the capture of Rhegium by a Roman legion which held the town for 10 years (§ 2). The conduct of the present mutineers does not bear comparison with that of the mutineers of Rhegium: it is more heinous. The leader of the Rhegian mutineers was a military tribune, not the despicable *semilixa* Atrius Umber; nor did they conspire with Rome's enemies (§ 4). Their Sucrian counterparts, however, have shared their plans with Mandonius and Indibilis and meant to join them in arms as well (§ 5: note the polysyndeton). Again, the objectives of the Rhegian mutineers, too, were more sensible. They were prepared to live permanently at Rhegium (§ 6: two *exempla* compromise their decision) and did not envisage making war against Rome or her allies. In fact they were ready, unlike the Sucrian mutineers, to live permanently at Rhegium, in exile from Rome, far from their wives and children (cf. § 7).

The *utile* closes with this compassionate reflexion. Scipio's conciliatory thoughts on Rhegium are dominated, however, by the consideration that the mutineers, despite their innocuous rebellion, were all subsequently executed in the Forum at Rome (§ 3). The conduct of the Sucrian mutineers, in that they conferred *imperium* on a despicable *semilixa* and conspired with Rome's enemies, is more serious than that of the Rhegian mutineers; they can accordingly expect a worse punishment than that meted out to their Rhegian counterparts. The underlying psychagogy clearly reiterates the motif of the awful penalty awaiting the captive mutineers.[33)]

Scipio now abandons his considerations on the foregoing *exemplum* and proceeds to nullify the mutineers' projected course of action. His reflexions incorporate the *possibile* (§ 8–15). At the outset he juxtaposes the 8 000 soldiers and their insignificant leaders with his own fully equipped army and overwhelming victories in Spain. His aim is to prove to the soldiers that while he was alive they could never have wrested Spain from the Roman people (§ 9, last part). The futility of the mutineers' hopes is shown in his triumphant rhetoric. An anaphoristic *cum quo* proclaims his capture of New Carthage in a single day and his utter rout of four – anaphoristic *quattuor* – Carthaginian generals and their armies (§ 9: note the alliteration and the rapid asyndeta). Scipio now diverts the soldiers' attention from himself, but not before touching briefly on the personal affront to him which their conduct has entailed (§ 10: note the *praeteritio*). Two indignant questions then follow, the first a transitional *quid.* Scipio extends the theme touched on in § 9 – the futility of the mutineers' ambitions – by introducing the motif of his illness into the speech. Even had he been dying would the country have expired without him? Would the *res publica* have fallen when he fell? God forbid that a city founded for all time under Jupiter's divine aegis should be thought the equal of his frail and mortal body! (§ 11: note the anaphoristic *mecum* and the asyndeton). Despite his brilliant achievements, set forth at the start of the *topos,* Scipio subjects himself utterly to the notion of Rome's enduring greatness.[34)] His indignant juxtaposition of his own transitory life with the city's permanence will have left his audience with a concrete impression of Rome's durability. It is in this context that he now expands, through an *exemplum,* the motif of the futility of the

33) Cf. too 27.6; 11; 16.

34) Stübler, *op. cit.*, 136–7 rightly points out that Scipio is here probably correcting the popular (and very un-Roman) belief that he was decended from the gods. Cf. above, n. 23 *ad fin.*

mutineers' aspirations. His passionate rhetoric incorporates a series of eight asyndeta, first tersely summarized (*tot...absumptis*) and then set off against the durable intrepidity of the *populus Romanus* (§ 12, first part). The permanence of the *res publica,* which transcends the mortal life of the individual, has ensured that Rome has survived the loss of nine of her best generals in the war. Did the mutineers, then, imagine the *res publica* would crumble with his death? (§ 12, last part). The irony in the pithy question proclaims the actuality[35] and the greatness of his *pietas* and at the same time the permanence of the constitution under which the mutineers are soon to be punished (cf. especially 27.14–16).

Scipio then reverts to the situation in Spain. After the death of his father and uncle the Spanish troops were obliged to choose Marcius as their interim leader, to continue the war against the *exsultantes Poenos* (§ 13).[36] Scipio in fact took over Marcius' "command" – but this does not signify that Spain would have been without a commander had Scipio died; there were other generals available (of equal rank with his own) who would have vindicated the majesty of the supreme command by crushing the mutiny (cf. § 14: note the ironical formulation of the question). Another ironical question then follows – note the anaphoristic *an,* the asyndeton, poliptoton and alliteration – by which the futility of the mutineers' aims and the hopeless inadequacy of their resources are stressed again (§ 15, first sentence). Even had the two armies been comparable, and the leaders and the leaders' rank, and the cause they would have been fighting for – even had the mutineers been better in all these respects: Scipio here ironically extends his considerations in the first part of § 15 – would the mutineers have marched against their country and compatriots, or have wished Africa to rule Italy and Carthage to be the mistress of Rome? For what fault did their country deserve it? (§ 15, last part).

Scipio here plays relentlessly on the *pietas,* not only of his soldiers (he seems indirectly still to be explaining the implications of their conduct) but of the

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35) Compare the apposite comment by Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 88: "Diese tiefe Deutung des Verhältnisses von Einzelmensch und Staat trägt die Merkmale des ersten Jahrhunderts. Erst in einer Zeit, wo man die Grösse und die Grenzen der Einzelpersönlichkeit kennen lernte, konnte man der Nichtigkeit des einzelnen die Ewigkeit Roms gegenüberstellen."

36) Cf. 25.37 for Livy's account of the election by the troops of L. Marcius Septimius as their commander. (Above, n. 12 for some remarks about the speech he delivered on this occasion.) Fabius has some (very Senatorial) praise for Marcius in the present context: "ille L. Marcius et militari suffragio ad tempus lectus, ceterum si nobilitas ac iusti honores adornarent, claris imperatoribus qualibet arte belli par ... " (XXVIII.42.12). For more details on Marcius, H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician* (Thames and Hudson, 1970), 37, 39, 91, 96, 105.

mutineers as well. The way in which his foregoing reflexions have stressed the mutineers' complete inadequacy, and his emphasis now on the unlikelihood of their projected course of action ever having materialized, primarily by virtue of Rome's innocence, must surely leave the guilty parties with a sense of hopeless desolation.

The *dignum* then follows (29.1–2) under which Scipio introduces another *exemplum* to indicate the unjustified impiety of the mutineers' conduct. Coriolanus was once driven to march against his country (note the strong alliteration: *oppugnandam patriam impulit*), but the sacred bonds of *pietas* ultimately stayed his hand (note the stronger alliteration: *reuocauit ... a publico parricidio priuata pietas*) (§ 1, first part). Coriolanus was unjustly exiled; but what *ira* or *dolor* can have moved the mutineers? (§ 1, last part). Unless they imagine – yet another ironical question, stressed by an anaphoristic *cur* in asyndeton, follows – that their pay grievances were sufficient excuse for declaring war on Rome, going over to the Ilergetes and leaving nothing, human or divine, free from the touch of their impious hands? (§ 2). The exposure of the execrable elements behind the mutiny[37] seems to culminate in this last bitter indictment of the mutineers' crimes against *pietas.* The rhetoric again sets forth the elements behind their conduct and the underlying psychagogy clearly echoes the content of 27.13–16: the *pium.* Not only were the mutineers' crimes against *pietas* exposed there as here under the *dignum,* but Scipio further touched on the awful punishment awaiting them; the climax of the speech is being drawn inexorably closer.

The *dignum* closes the *argumentatio* and the peroration follows (§ 3–8: *amplificatio*). Scipio again stresses the pathological *insania* of the mutiny in a vivid metaphor (§ 3). The psychagogy clearly recalls the formulation of 27.11;[38] the motif of the soldiers' inculpability and of the mutineers' guilt is now the focus-point of the address. Scipio then passionately affirms his wish to forget the hopes and aspirations (which he shudders to recall) of the men who were responsible for the mutiny (§ 4: note the triple anaphoristic *quid,* the asyndeton and homoioteleuton). After which he effectively justifies the harshness of his speech (§ 5: a pithy chiasmus: *quanto ... dicta mea*) before intimating the permanent shame which will attach to the mutiny (§ 6: note the ironical *exclamatio*). All that now remains is the matter of the penalty for the mutineers' crimes (§ 7). This motif, seemingly kept in

37) Cf. too 27, 5–6; 12; 13–16. 28.1–7.

38) Where Scipio introduced a vital element into the speech, viz the guilt of the mutineers and the inculpability of the soldiers by reason of the *furor* and *insania* with which the mutineers contaminated them.

deliberate abeyance until this point, marks the culmination of the psychagogy behind a recurrent theme of the speech; a final distinction is drawn between the soldiers and the mutineers and the penalty for the chief actors is pronounced.[39] The soldiers will have been punished enough if they are sorry for their mistake; but Albius and Atrius and the other leaders of the mutiny shall pay with their blood for what they have done (§ 7).[40] If the soldiers have now recovered their sanity – Scipio's tone is ironical – they will rejoice in the spectacle of the mutineers' death, rather than feel any compunction over it; for the mutineers have sinned against *pietas* and transgressed the army's *disciplina,* and are accordingly the soldiers' worst enemies (cf. § 8, last part).

Two cardinal aspects behind this speech determine the nature of the portrait of Scipio that it embodies – the first is the obvious gravity of the crime of mutiny in Rome; the second seems to be the fact that the mutineers have been taken captive and are listening to Scipio's words. The first aspect accounts for his terrible look (26.14) which immediately strikes terror into his audience – and for the harshness of the speech, for which he finds it necessary to apologize (29.5). The second aspect seems to determine the way in which the elements of the mutiny are gradually and frighteningly unravelled as the speech proceeds (27.4; 6; 12; 13–16. 29.2). Scipio exposes to his soldiers, step by relentless step, the full implications behind the mutineers' crime – and hence, indirectly, behind their own conduct as well – inserting into the exposition and underlying psychagogy scattered references to the awful punishment which awaits the mutineers (27.6; 16. 28.3; 12. 29.1–2; 7). Again, as regards the soldiers he appeals warmly to their personal feelings, their old loyalty to Rome, their sympathy for himself, newly recovered from illness, and their gratitude for the forgiveness he promises so early in the speech (27.6; 8–10; 11. 28.7–15). "[D]er Feldherr steht unangreifbar über seinen Leuten," Hoffmann well observes, "und seine auctoritas ... kommt ganz zur Geltung."[41]

The preceding formulation is also fully in accordance with the high moral ethos of Scipio's character; his severity springs exclusively from the fact that the mutiny has constituted an affront to *pietas* and *disciplina.*

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39) Cf. too 27.6; 11; 16. 28.3; 11–12. 29. 1–2.

40) Scipio's ultimate solution to the mutiny is satisfactory, as the mutineers are guilty whereas the soldiers are inculpable by reason of the *furor* and *insania* with which the mutineers contaminated them; a severe moral lesson will suffice in their case. See above, n. 38.

41) *Op. cit.* 87.

All the foregoing elements are reflected in Livy's rhetorical formulation, the intensity of which assigns this speech at once to the *genus grande.*[42] Unlike the first major speech in the decade, then, this address presents as vivid an overall portrait through the language as it does through the disposition of the various *topoi.* We recall only Scipio's realistic expression of bewilderment before his soldiers; his repeated and emphatic cataloguing of their crimes against *pietas* and *disciplina;* his self-assured exposure of the mutineers' inadequacy as an armed force to be reckoned with; and, of course, his passionate affirmation of the continuance of the *res publica* in face of his own mortality and the futile aspirations of the mutineers. The constituent elements of the presentation combine once more, all in all, to form a compelling moral portrait dominated by Scipio's intense *pietas,* and Livy's artistry again fully warrants Quintilian's praise, "cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt".

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After his suppression of the mutiny at Sucro, Scipio's decision to transfer the war to Africa becomes cardinally important for the further development of his projected campaign – the decision to carry the war to Africa is his alone, and it is accordingly necessary for him to put considerable pressure on the recalcitrant Senate to bring its members round to his point of view; Livy therefore juxtaposes him with Fabius, the most influential member of the Senatorial party, to whose address Scipio now replies.[43]

XXVIII.43.2–44. 18

The *exordium* (43.2–8), which is fittingly a *principium ab aduersariis,* counters point by point the arguments set forth by Fabius in the opening of his speech.[44] Scipio's reflexions accordingly start from Fabius' assertion that he cannot be accused of disparaging his young rival (§ 2). In spite of his deference, Scipio's suspicion of such motives in Fabius cannot be wholly set aside (§ 3). Fabius' self-praise has given the impression that Scipio need fear only nobodies and not a man who owing

42) So (rightly) Ullmann, *Étude,* 125. Cf. above, n. 19.

43) For a brief discussion of the compositional significance of this speech, above, Ch. 3, 34f.

44) Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 120. We rely on his (pretty formal) discussion of the two speeches (118–121) for the parallels and divergences noted in our own analysis and for the rhetorical division. See too Stübler, *op. cit.,* 152ff.; Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 88ff.

to his pre-eminence (which Scipio is determined to attain!) was unwilling that a rival should be thought his equal (§ 4). By representing himself as an old man and Scipio as even younger than his son, Fabius has made the desire for fame seem co-extensive with the span of human life – a *sententia* here proclaims young Scipio's conviction – forgetting that it lives on in the memory of posterity (§ 5). The psychagogy intimates that Scipio has the power and the courage to achieve what to Fabius seems impossible. The latter's disparaging assertions are then opposed on a wider plane: the noblest minds compare themselves with the illustrious men of every age, not merely with their contemporaries (§ 6).

After having countered the points raised in Fabius' *exordium* (XXVIII.40.3–5) – and having demonstrated his rival's lack of magnanimity – Scipio reiterates his determination to equal – no more, even surpass: an ironical parenthesis – Fabius' renown (§ 7); he trusts that this will not result in any jealousy, which would be universally harmful (§ 8). "Sofort ist der entscheidende Gegensatz", Hoffmann rightly observes of the juxtaposition of the two generals, "gegeben. Während Fabius zurückschaut auf die Taten von einst und den bisher befolgten Grundsätzen nichts hinzuzufügen hat, ist in Scipio alles vorwärtsdrängende Energie."[45]

The first *topos* of the *argumentatio,* to which Scipio next turns, is the *tutum* (§ 9–16; cf. 41.11–17). Having openly affirmed his *cupiditas gloriae* in the *exordium* he proceeds to demonstrate the feasibility of his projected African operation in contradiction of the objections raised by Fabius under the dominant *topos* of his speech. Fabius, by emphasizing the dangers Scipio would meet in crossing to Africa, seemed anxious about him personally (§ 9). But whence this sudden solicitude? (§ 10, first part). The pithy ironical question heralds an affronted review of the grave crises, personal and military, which faced Scipio at the start of his career (§ 10–11). Amid the critical circumstances which marked the outset of the Spanish war (§ 10, second part: note the fourfold anaphoristic *cum* and the asyndeton) when he alone and at the age of 24 years, dared offer himself for appointment to the command (§ 11: twofold anaphoristic *cum* and asyndeton) – then, why did no one instance his youth,[46] the enemy's strength, the difficulties of the campaign, the defeats of his father and uncle? Having thus specified the

45) *Op. cit.,* 89. This theme, as we shall show below, recurs several times in the speech.

46) Scipio himself specifies his youth as a bad omen in his first major speech in the decade: XXVI.41.7.

crises, personal and military (the fourfold anaphora) which faced him at the start of his career (the twofold anaphora), Scipio carries his indignation over into the ironical question embodying the foregoing inauspicious *portenta* which embrace the import of Fabius' entire argument under the *tutum* (§ 12, first part: note the asyndeton).

After showing that Fabius' "solicitude" is misguided, Scipio turns to his projected African operation. His review of the situation in Africa is introduced by a question; a chiasmus juxtaposes the earlier situation in Spain, as just set forth, with the situation prevailing in the proposed field of operation (§ 12, last part). The argument is then developed through three further questions, the ironical formulation of which is successfully aimed at asserting the very reverse of what Scipio asks (§ 13–14: note the supporting anaphoristic *an*); Scipio forcefully impresses on the Senate that the African campaign will be no more difficult than the Spanish operation was. It is of course easy, despite his total subjugation of Spain, to belittle what he achieved there – a *gradatio,* through a fourfold anaphoristic *post* in asyndeton, proclaims (ironically again) the sweeping rapidity of his Spanish campaign (§ 14–15) – just as it would be easy, were he to return victorious from Africa, to belittle the very things of which the danger is now being exaggerated to keep him at home (§ 16: note the interjectory *hercle*).

The ironical tendency of the psychagogy under the *tutum* clearly recalls Fabius' assertion that he is not disparaging his young rival; and with the foregoing impassioned counter-appeal by Scipio for recognition of his past achievements – and of his consequent ability to undertake a successful African campaign, the *topos* closes.

The following *topos* is the *facile* (43.17–44.5); Scipio now counters Fabius' arguments under his corresponding *topos* (42.1–11). Starting from Fabius' assertions about the strategic difficulties of a campaign in Africa, as supported by the *exemplum* of Regulus' capture (42.1; 6–7), Scipio roundly discredits the alleged lack of harbours and approaches in Africa and, at the same time, discredits Fabius' negative *exemplum* (§ 17). Had Regulus been captured in the present war could not Scipio – by virtue of Regulus' experience of the accessible harbours and approaches in Africa (cf. § 17) – have crossed to the continent now as easily as he did to Spain after the death of his father and uncle? (§ 18: note how the antithesis supports his argument). Scipio here turns Fabius' deterrent *exemplum* to his own advantage in a skilful *percunctatio.* In the event the portent of Xanthippus' birth would have been expunged to Rome's advantage – and with it, Regulus' defeat –

whereas Scipio's confidence would have grown through the awareness of what a single man can do for a campaign (§ 19). Scipio then passes to the *exemplum* of the Athenians, who, as Fabius pointed out, quit Greece and sailed to Sicily where they were roundly defeated (41.17). It was tiresome listening to the argument (§ 20: note the gerundive); as Fabius has the time to spin out tales about Greek history – *enarrare:* the tone is disparaging – he could at least have specified a more appropriate example! Scipio then supplants the negative *exemplum* by instancing Agathocles, King of Syracuse, who was able successfully to divert hostilities from Sicily to Carthage (§ 21).

Scipio's "vorwärtsdrängende Energie", noted at the outset of our analysis, emerges again in his disparagement of the negative *exempla* adduced by Fabius in his endeavour to thwart the projected campaign; the latter's deterrent considerations are translated by Scipio into a lively and wholly pragmatic affirmation of his confidence in the feasibility of the African operation.

Scipio then turns to the second part of the *facile* (44.1–6). There is no corresponding formulation in Fabius' speech: Scipio's unfettered considerations, which take up the thread of the *exemplum* in 43.21 receive free rein. His eager pre-occupation with a *Niederwerfungs-Strategie* is evidenced at once; Hannibal himself has shown that the aggressor invariably holds the psychological advantage (§ 2: the antithetical *sententia* (*multum...uideas*) clarifies and adds weight to the assertion). The deterrent of unfamiliarity, too, is cancelled out when one is in enemy territory (§ 3). Having thus emphasized the psychological advantages of an offensive against Africa, Scipio instances the more palpable consequences which will result from his presence there (§ 4–5). Hannibal's experiences in Italy with Rome's wavering allies (note the poliptoton) – presuppose that in Africa the Carthaginians are even less likely (homoioteleuton stresses their infamous qualities!) to find the country strong and stable in support (§ 4). Nor will Carthage's mercenary troops give her the support which Rome will get from her own indomitable soldiery (§ 5).

Scipio's free considerations under this *topos* are practical and optimistic; having negated Fabius's anachronistic *exempla* he concentrates entirely on the encouraging aspects of his own projected operation.

The next *topos* is the *utile* (44.6–11) in which there is only a broad correspondence with Fabius' speech (41.1–20). Scipio starts by stressing the need

for haste in undertaking the African campaign (§ 6: four graded polysyndeta proclaim his optimism and impatience to start operations). He founds his belief in the projected success of his campaign, as set forth in the foregoing rhetoric, on his trust in the *fortuna populi Romani* and in Rome's allies (§ 7). Action on the spot will reveal what is now obscure: the redoubtable general exploits any propitious changes of fortune to suit his own designs (§ 8: *sententia*).

Fortuna and *ratio* converge in this dramatic statement, but any notion of blind submission to chance is eschewed; the vicissitudes of destiny must be rationally exploited: *ratio* controlls *fortuna.* Scipio shows that Fabius' attack on his "rashness" is a misrepresentation of his standpoint. In seizing the random chances offered by fortune he is not abrograting his rational faculties of generalship. The fortune on which he here relies, as at the outset of his first campaign, is the fortune of the *populus Romanus* – a concept which contains no element of chance, but which is intimately connected with his own destiny as the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.*[47] The broad corresponding issues in Fabius' speech dealt essentially with a negative *Ermattungs-Strategie,* by virtue of Hannibal's frightening stature as a general; after this weighty *sententia,* however, there can be no doubt who is the man chosen by destiny to win the war: Scipio or Fabius; the former is all auspicious and confident energy, the latter all negative and doubtful caution.

Scipio then turns directly to Fabius (§ 9, first part: note the vocative) and portentously accepts from him a direct confrontation with Hannibal: at the same time he clarifies his projected strategy (note the antithesis) and sets forth the prize awaiting him in Africa, juxtaposing it deliberately with the meagre rewards of his Spanish operation (§ 9, last part). The psychagogy behind this graphic scene, especially the reference to the Spanish campaign, recalls Fabius' disparagement of his rival's *res gestae.*[48] Scipio's intrepid confidence and forward-looking energy, however, clearly intimate the further eclipse of Fabius.

Scipio now abandons his considerations on Africa to reassure Fabius about Italy. While he is busily engaged in Africa – § 10: the anaphoristic *dum* makes the projected stages of the campaign a vivid reality – the *res publica* will come

47) The psychagogy of § 8 thus seems to contain an appropriate echo of XXVI.41.20 (above, n.16a). Scipio's unwavering confidence in the *fortuna populi Romani* was, of course, also stressed in the speech preceding his first great campaign, e.g. XXVI.41.9. For discussions of the meaning behind the present key passage, Walsh, *Livy,* 95; Stübler, *op. cit.,* 157.

48) Cf. especially Scipio's ironical justification of his achievements in Spain at 43.14–15.

to no harm. Fabius is then ironically juxtaposed with Licinius, who, in Scipio's absence can do equally well what Fabius has already done, i.e. protect the *res publica* (§ 11). Scipio well realizes that Fabius is effete; his concern is alone with the African campaign and the glory of ending the war.

The next *topos* is the *honestum* (§ 12–15) of which there is no corresponding formulation in Fabius' speech. Scipio is concerned only to justify his campaign to the listening Senators. His projected operations, even if they do not end the war any earlier, will propagate the *dignitas* and *fama* of Rome (§ 12, first part: note the interjectory *hercules*); for they will prove that Rome has offensive as well as defensive capacities (§ 12, second part). *Dignitas* thus attaches to a defence of the country, but *fama* to Scipio's projected operations. The foregoing reflexion is then extended in a second argument to justify the African campaign (§ 13). Foreign nations should not believe, either, or bandy it about that no Roman general ever ventured to rival Hannibal – the psychagogy juxtaposes the projected campaign with Hannibal's offensive against Italy – or that Africa stayed unmolested during the critical circumstances of the Second, though it was repeatedly attacked during those of the First Punic War. This appeal to vindicate Rome's *dignitas* then becomes an apology for a vengeful offensive (§ 14–15). Let long-suffering Italy rest, it is Africa's turn to be ravaged (§ 14: note the antithesis). Again, Africa must now be the seat of the war – all the horrors of which (note the graded asyndeton and the metaphor) must be heaped on her as they have been heaped on Italy for the past 14 years (§ 15).

The motifs of Scipio's confidence and forward-looking energy culminate in the *honestum,* of which there is, as we have already noted, no corresponding formulation in Fabius' speech; his *pietas,* centred on Africa by reason of his confidence in the *fortuna populi Romani* and in Rome's allies, is essentially militant whereas Fabius', directed towards the need of protecting Italy rather than carrying the war overseas, is simply cautious and negative. The insertion of the independent *topos* into the speech thus heralds Scipio's final eclipse of his rival.

The peroration follows incorporating an *amplificatio* and a *captatio beneuolentiae* (§ 16–17; 18). To have spoken of high policy and of the imminent campaign and of the duties at issue is enough for Scipio (§ 16–17, first part). Yet alternative tactics presented themselves throughout the course of his address: he too might conceivably, while bolstering up his own military reputation, have

brought Fabius' reputation into disrepute – even as Fabius belittled his Spanish campaign (a subtle *praeteritio*); this would, however, have been irrelevant and tedious for the Senators (§ 17, last part: the isocolon proclaims his composure). Let the Senators therefore be pleased with his moderation of speech – his achievements are such that he can rest content with their impartial decision (§ 18).

Scipio's primary aim in this speech is to make the Senate support the projected African campaign: the speech also has an important compositional function in that it juxtaposes Scipio with Fabius before the last, decisive phase of the major action. A lively moral portrait emerges, as Scipio attempts to bring the Senate round to his point of view; the presentation is dominated by his resolution to win the glory of ending the war, his aggressive *pietas,* and his optimistic self-confidence (his outstanding trait as the *fatalis dux huiusce belli*). The generally muted rhetoric in the speech – it is again of the *genus medium*[49] – fills out the portrait somewhat. We recall only Scipio's ironical yet proud affirmation of his achievements in Spain (43.14–15); his skilful manipulation of Fabius' deterrent *exempla* (43.17–21); and the vivid and defiant statement – in his eminent rival's very face, at a point where the psychagogy clearly proclaims him to be the *fatalis dux huiusce belli* – of the anticipated course of the African operation (43.10).

As at XXVI.41.3–25, however, the fullest details of the portrait emerge from the disposition of the various *topoi.* Thus the dominant *topos* in Scipio's speech is the *facile,* whereas in Fabius' it is the *tutum.* Scipio is accordingly portrayed as an individual imbued with confidence and ambition; Fabius is filled only with antagonistic and jealous caution. The former's *pietas* is positive, then, and the latter's negative. We recall in this context, too, that the *honestum* is without correspondence in Fabius' speech. Under this *topos* Scipio proclaims his wish to entrench Rome's stature among foreign nations and his overmastering wish for *fama* and *gloria:* the future, as at the outset of his career, yet foreshows to him nothing but prosperity and success; it is fitting that before his triumphant campaign the *fatalis dux huiusce belli* should thus eclipse his last Roman rival of any stature. Nor is there anything of the "abstraction or dummy" in the portrait that emerges in this context; the rhetoric in the speech and, more especially, the underlying psychagogy and lively cogency of the arguments preclude such a criticism.

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49) So (rightly) Ullmann, *Étude,* 125.

When Masinissa becomes infatuated with the treacherous Sophoniba and precipitately marries her, Scipio is filled with gravest anxiety (XXX.14.1); the further development of the campaign depends on Masinissa's competent help. Scipio also finds the situation unsavoury, as he has never yet fallen a victim to any woman's beauty at an inopportune time (14.3).[50] He accordingly draws Masinissa aside and speaks to him privately.

XXX.14.4–11

Scipio suggests at the outset – *exordium: principium a nostra persona* – that it was because Masinissa saw some good in him that he first sought his friendship in Spain and then put himself and all his hopes into Scipio's hands in Africa (§ 4: note the depreciatory tone and the polysyndeton). Extending this argument on a deferential note (§§ 5–7: *honestum*), he urges Masinissa to add self-control and superiority to the lusts of the flesh to his other outstanding qualities; these are the virtues he would have been proudest to have Masinissa recognize in him when he first sought his friendship in Spain (§§ 5–6).

After this kindly personal appeal, based on their friendship and on Masinissa's admiration for him, Scipio stresses the danger of lust to young men on campaign (§ 6, last part: the asyndeton, parenthesis and anaphora embody the emphasis). He deferentially includes himself in the ranks of the tempted – *aetati nostrae* – though in reality he finds the whole situation distasteful,, having never yet fallen a victim in such circumstances (see above: 14.1–3). The argument in § 6 is then extended and summarized in an over-elaborate *sententia* (§ 7).

After these stoical reflexions, Scipio turns to the practical aspects of Masinissa's conduct in relation to Rome (§§ 8–11: *rectum*). Masinissa's commendable achievements have been remembered and mentioned in Rome; for the rest, let him think it over privately, to save embarrassment (§ 8: note the isocolon). Rome's military rights in the present situation are then explained. Syphax is a prisoner of Rome and all his possessions – everything he once owned: note the asyndeton – now belong to Rome (§ 9). Both the King and his wife – even if she were not a Carthaginian and her father no commander of the enemy troops (§ 10: note

50) Scullard, *op. cit.* (above, n. 36), 64, though he mentions Scipio's reputation as a φιλογύνης, adds that Livy's portrayal of the young general's *moderatio* probably gives a true picture of his character. Walsh, however, imputes dishonesty to Livy on this score – without much justification, it seems – simply observing that he ignores the tradition of Scipio's weakness for women. See his *Livy*, 97. Cf. too above, n. 26.

the emphatic anaphora), must be sent to Rome; the Senate will there decide the fate of a woman who incites allies to make war on the Romans (§ 10). Masinissa's passion for Sophoniba is thus set off against the favour he has found in Rome, his standing as an ally,[51] and the supervening military rights of the *populus Romanus.*

A strong exhortation, in summary of §§ 8–10, marks the *peroratio.* Masinissa must be master of himself; let him not spoil his many fine qualities by one defect, nor ruin Rome's gratitude by a fault so infinitely graver than its cause (§ 11: note the two imperatives and the strong alliteration *culpa...corrumpas*).

An obvious analogy to this speech is Scipio's earlier address to Allucius (XXVI.50.4–8). Both speeches are directed to foreigners and centre round beautiful women. The circumstances of the present address, however, are more important than those of the speech to Allucius; and Masinissa too, one of Rome's loyalest allies and Livy's great heroes, obviously enjoys a higher standing than Allucius. Hence the more complicated structure, argument and rhetoric of this speech, which assign it to the *genus medium* rather than to the *genus subtile.*[52] The foregoing elements of the speech combine to give us a rather stereotyped impression of Scipio's *moderatio, continentia* and *comitas;* Livy depicts him as the thorough-going Stoic, teaching a foreign subordinate the vital importance of control of the passions.[53] The errant Masinissa's loyalty as an ally and his devotion to Scipio likewise emerge vividly, if rather melodramatically, in the account of the copious tears that he sheds after hearing the speech (15.1–2).

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The paired speeches which herald the impending Battle of Zama are so closely linked and are so integral a part of Livy's portrait of Scipio that they must be analysed together for their full import to be appreciated; they mark the end of the war just as the paired speeches of Scipio's father and Hannibal marked its outset.[54]

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51) For some remarks on Masinissa (one of Livy's great heroes), Walsh, *Livy,* 87.

52) Cf. Ullmann, *Étude,* 124.

53) For Livy's repeated emphasis on Scipio's high moral qualities, Walsh, *Livy,* 97.

54) For a discussion of the compositional significance of these two speeches, above, Ch. 3, 40f.

XXX.30.3–30

In the *exordium* (§ 3–5: *principium ab auditoribus*),[55] Hannibal openly acknowledges his war-guilt: although an ineluctable *fatum* and *sors*, which decreed that he should be the aggressor in the war, have reversed his fortunes and now compel him to sue for peace he is pleased it is Scipio he can petition (§ 3). The psychagogy behind the *captatio beneuolentiae* clearly proclaims the irony of his words; destiny has brought him to a meeting with Rome's *fatalis dux* who is soon to reject his overtures and rout him. The next two sentences show to what extent his fortunes have been reversed: Scipio now holds the whip hand (§ 4–5). Two aspects of Scipio's many titles to honour (*inter multa egregia*) are stressed in this context; the first is that he has received Hannibal's submission, the second is that he has terminated Carthage's military successes (§ 4). Again, is it not a pretty example of the irony of fate that Hannibal – who took up arms: *arma ceperim*; he again acknowledges his war-guilt – when the father was consul, should now come to the son *inermis ad pacem petendam*? (§ 5).

The significance behind major elements in the structure of the whole decade emerges in the *exordium*.. *Fatum, sors, di* and *fortuna* (§ 3. 4. 5) – all have contributed to bring an aging Hannibal, the *dux et causa belli* before Scipio, the *fatalis dux huiusce belli;* the motif of Scipio's devotion to his house, evident early in the decade when he saved his father's life at the Ticinus, is also clearly echoed in Hannibal's words[56] (§ 5). Nor are these the only central elements of the *exordium;* at the outset Hannibal stresses his role as a petitionary: *inermis ad pacem petendam* (§ 5); his career is in eclipse whereas Scipio's hour of destiny is

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55) The rhetorical division of both speeches is set forth by Ullmann, *La technique,* 127ff. whom we again follow. For further discussions, Treptow, *op. cit.,* 129ff. and 200ff.; Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 440ff. Both works entail a comparison with Polybius. Further comparisons with Polybius have been made by S. Cavallin and A. Lambert, both in *Eranos:* 45 (1947), 25–36 and 46 (1948), 54 71; and by Ingrid Edlund, *Eranos* 65 (1967), 146 168. These studies are considered in some detail below (Ch. 5, 97ff.), where Polybius' and Livy's versions of the two speeches are compared. They are only treated incidentally in the present analysis, although special attention is paid to Cavallin's assertion (below, n. 58) that Hannibal's speech constitutes a *manifestation de la perfidie punique,* which is a very central issue.

56) See above, n. 13. Compare Edlund's remark (*op. cit.,* 150): "The same feeling that had filled Hannibal and Scipio's father at Ticinus (Liv. XXI.39.7) is prevailing when the aged Hannibal meets the son."

to hand. This tendency in the psychagogy also reflects the careful ordering and accentuating of events in the anterior narrative. From the start of the decade until this portentous meeting (Hannibal recognizes its significance (§ 4)) Scipio's fortunes have waxed steadily: but Hannibal's have declined.[57] It is therefore only fitting that Hannibal should stress his ill-starred fortunes at this point and in so doing intimate his enemy's greatness.[58]

Under the *utile* (§§ 6–9), the first *topos* of the *argumentatio,* Hannibal initially sets forth the past and present developments in the war. By withdrawing their rational influence (*mens*) the gods caused his and Scipio's forefathers to engage in a bitter struggle for power, the outcome of which did not justify the terrible cost (§§ 6–7: note the anaphora and asyndeton). It is easier, however, to censure what has been done than to alter it (§§ 7, last part: a *sententia* proclaims his resignation). The present war has affected both countries equally and their respective positions have been completely reversed (§§ 8: the chiastic formulation underlines the argument). He then points out that it is accordingly the Romans who can now negotiate from strength – although both he and Scipio have much to gain from peace, the benefits of which can redound to their respective countries; all that is necessary is that the negotiations proceed calmly and rationally (§§ 9).

In asserting that the gods withdrew their rational influence by precipitating the war, Hannibal intimates that the combatants were seized with *amentia.* The damage done, however, is irreversible. Yet the maelstrom of the war has brought Carthage to her knees: Rome now holds the whip hand. One of the central tendencies of the *exordium,* Hannibal's ill-starred destiny and Scipio's impending success, is fittingly transferred to their respective countries. Peace has its advantages, however, for all concerned: only let the negotiations (unlike the war!) proceed calmly and rationally. The psychagogy behind Hannibal's petition is intensely persuasive, but reasonable and wholly germane.[59]

57) For the way in which Livy depicts Scipio's waxing fortunes, Ch. 3, 27ff. For detailed discussions (in this particular context) of Hannibal's decline in the anterior narrative, Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 445ff.; Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 101.

58) To ignore this matter easily leads to misinterpretation of the speech. Cavallin, for example, sees the whole address as "une nouvelle et dangereuse manifestation de la perfidie punique" (*Eranos* 45 (1947), 34). We believe that Stübler, however, is closer to the truth when he emphasizes the tone (evident even at this early point) of seductive entreaty marking parts of the speech (*op. cit.* 164, 167).

59) Again there seems to be no trace of *perfidia.* The concept of τὸ πρέπον, rather, seems to be uppermost in Livy's mind.

The next *topos* is the *prudens* (§§ 10–15) under which the aging Hannibal extends his argument on the need for rational calm in the negotiations envisaged. His own experience – *senem:* he exaggerates his years – and the unaccountable fluctuations of fortune (note the anaphora) have taught him to follow the dictates of reason rather than to trust to luck (§ 10).[60] Yet he is afraid, on account of Scipio's youth and unbroken fortunes, that he might be intolerant of the *quieta consilia* proposed in § 9: youth and good luck commonly blind people to the vicissitudes of destiny (§ 11: the *sententia* proclaims his wisdom and experience). The first part of the foregoing argument is then expanded in a review of the various stages of Scipio's brilliant career (§§ 12–14). Starting from the present and juxtaposing himself with Scipio, Hannibal points out that the young Roman is now what he was at the peak of his own career; his unqualified success has sprung from his boldness and from the *fortuna* which has nowhere failed him (§ 12). Hannibal then clarifies this assertion by instancing Scipio's achievements (§§ 13–14). The psychagogy is again fraught with irony; Scipio's adversary unwittingly proclaims him to be the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.* In avenging the terrible misfortunes of his house he won great honour in Spain through his *pietas* and *uirtus* – expelling four Carthaginian generals from the province and recovering it for Rome (§ 13); and in Africa, having crossed there after his election to the consulship, he achieved further spectacular success, his greatest exploit being that he drew him, Hannibal, from Italy[61] (§ 14: note how effectively the four abl. abs. in asyndeton suggest the sweeping rapidity of Scipio's African victories).

The psychagogy behind the foregoing part of the *prudens* (§§ 12–14) extends the tone of seductive entreaty evident thus far in Hannibal's speech (n. 58). "Welch Hochgefühl für einen Römer, den Feind so von Rom und seinem grossen Feldherrn sprechen zu hören ... so spricht der Feind; es ist also kein Eigenlob,

60) Like Scipio Hannibal, too, overcomes the conflict between *ratio* and *fortuna.* We recall Scipio's words in a key passage of his speech to the Roman Senate: "id est uiri et ducis, non deesse fortunae praebenti se et oblata casu flectere ad consilium" (XXVIII.44.8). Cf. too XXVI.43.20 (above, n. 16a). There is one cardinal difference, however, between their views – Scipio founds his resultant confidence on a fervent trust in the *benignitas deum* and in the *fortuna populi Romani.* Cf. XXVI.43.14; 18. XXVII.44.7. Compare Stübler's comment: "Die Gottheit steht über der Fortuna, sie ist nicht blind und unberechenbar; wer ihr folgt, kann sich auf sie verlassen. Sie ermöglicht auch das sinvolle, Vollendung erreichende Handeln des Menschen, das Hannibal leugnen will" (*op. cit.,* 167).

61) Compare Scipio's prophetic words to Fabius: "Habebo, Q. Fabi, parem quem das Hannibalem; sed illum ego potius traham quam ille me retineat" (XXVIII.44.9).

sondern ein Eingeständnis, das doppelt wertvoll ist, da es aus Feindesmund kommt."[62] As the whole course of the war, then, fills his canvas Livy fittingly invokes his indirect (epic) techniques of characterization to vindicate Scipio's entire career (and the motif of his devotion to his house)[63] in a most striking way: the unqualified praise he puts on ill-starred Hannibal's lips. The psychagogy and techniques of presentation used are again wholly appropriate.[64]

Hannibal then reverts to the argument which opened the *topos* (cf. § 10). Scipio's illustrious career could affect his disposition making him prefer victory to peace; Hannibal himself understands the aspiring spirit better than the politic brain: fortune once shone on him, too (§ 15). The underlying psychagogy again vividly suggests the full greatness of Rome's *fatalis dux:* the *fortuna* which has now brought him to the imminent climax of his career – and in which he has fervent confidence[65] – is deluding Hannibal who yet fails to see its impending purpose, soon to effect his downfall.

Under the *certum* (§§ 16–17) Hannibal expands his preceding reflexions on fortune's fickleness by again juxtaposing himself with Scipio. His argument starts from a weighty *sententia* which proclaims his *bona mens*: if in prosperity the gods also gave him wisdom man should consider, not what happened in the past only, but what might happen in the future (§ 16). Hannibal's own lot, the supreme example of all that the vicissitudes of destiny might bring, will best prove the truth of this assertion (§ 17, first part). An illustration of the complete reversal of his fortunes then follows in a graphic *repraesentatio*: the climax and nadir (*modo...hic*) of his whole career appear with rapid and vivid immediacy before Scipio (*uideris...cernas*) (§ 17, last part: note the pathetic reference to the death

62) Lambert, *op. cit.,* 57. He points out that Livy often uses the enemy to praise his Roman heroes (*loc. cit.*). Cavallin, however, wrongly sees § 12–14 as another manifestation of *fraus Punica* in that, to his mind, it simply makes up an "énumeration flatteuse des exploits de Scipion". It is undeniable that there is such an element in the passage, but Hannibal's objective praise is wholly appropriate to the situation.

63) Cf. above, n. 56. The motif seems to culminate in this passage in Hannibal's recognition of Scipio's *pietas, decus* and *uirtus.*

64) Especially in virtue of the waxing and waning of Scipio and Hannibal's respective fortunes, as set forth in Livy's anterior narrative (above, n. 57). But contrast Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 449 n. 19: "Hier trifft Quintilians Lob über Livius' Reden und Darstellungsweise *omnia cum rebus tum personis accommodata sunt* (10, 1, 101) nicht zu; um so stärker gilt dies aber für die Antwort Scipios." We cannot agree. See too, below, n. 79.

65) Above, n. 60.

of his two brothers, *fortissimi uiri, clarissimi imperatores,* and the direct appeal of the two verbs to Scipio's senses).

Just as the motif of Scipio's waxing fortunes, as developed through Livy's anterior narrative, culminates fittingly under the *prudens* in Hannibal's praise of his exploits (§ 12–14), so the motif of Hannibal's waning fortunes seems here appropriately to culminate in the pathetic affirmation – *satis ego documenti in omnes casus sum* – of his ill-starred destiny. Livy's presentation squares again with the prevailing circumstances: we detect no *manifestation de la perfidie punique* in the formulation of Hannibal's eclipse; indeed his argument though intensely persuasive is again sober, rational and germane.[66]

Throughout the foregoing part of his speech (§ 3–17) Hannibal has been intent on trying to dissuade Scipio from essaying the summit of his exploits; peace is the alternative which can obviate the possibility of his being deluded by fortune at the height of his career. Two central features of this part of the speech were accordingly Hannibal's praise of Scipio's *res gestae* (to prove that fortune had nowhere yet deceived him (§ 12–14)) and the pragmatic illustration of his own ill-starred destiny (to indicate the vicissitudes of fortune (§ 16–17)). Scipio then, is poised to essay the summit of his African enterprize and of his whole career, victory at Zama; Hannibal, on the other hand, faces the very nadir of his whole career, the prospect of imminent defeat. This trenchant psychagogy behind the foregoing part of the speech ushers in the last *topos* of the *argumentatio* (§ 18–23: the *tutum*), which appropriately concerns the impending battle. Hannibal's argument starts from a *sententia* based again on his pragmatic mistrust of *fortuna*:[67] the greater a man's success the less it must be trusted to endure (§ 18). Thus it is advisable for Scipio to make peace in his hour of glory – the consequent benefits and advantages for Rome and Carthage support the suggestion (§ 18, last part) – for he now has the power to do so: peace is therefore safer than victory which is dispensed at the whim of the gods (§ 19, first part: another *sententia*).[68] Having warned Scipio not to stake his reputation on a single battle (§ 19, last part) – by reason of the contrary factors involved in the outcome: the might of fortune, the God of war, the human element – Hannibal caps the argument with another *sententia:* results seldom answer hopes in battle (§ 20). The strong negative

66) Cf. above, nn. 58,59,64.

67) Cf. § 9. 11. 15. 16. 19.

68) Hannibal's second reference to the gods in his speech (cf. too § 6) is again negative.

psychagogy of §§ 19–20 is then developed through a summary (Scipio will win more glory by granting peace than he will lose of it by suffering defeat (§ 21, first part: note how the vague *si quid aduersi eueniat* supports Hannibal's foreboding of destiny's fickleness)) to another supporting *sententia* – fortune can undo at a stroke both what has been won and what is hoped for (§ 21, second part: note the homoioteleuton). The seductive reference to the advantages of granting peace in the first part of § 21 then culminates in a last *sententia.* In making peace – note the solemn vocative – all is Scipio's; otherwise, he must take what the gods might give (§ 22).[69]

The seductive psychagogy of the speech is nowhere more intense than in the foregoing part of the *tutum.* Hannibal adduces no fewer than five *sententiae* in his efforts to discourage Scipio from joining battle. Both *sententiae* dealing with the advantages of Scipio's granting peace (§ 19.22) are followed by negative remarks on the role of the gods in dispensing victory; the other three embody general reflexions on fortune's fickleness. In this context we again find no elements of *Punica fides* in Hannibal's remarks; the psychagogy is larded rather with tragic irony, especially the negative observations on the role of the gods. Unlike Scipio, Hannibal has no faith in the gods: the *dux et causa belli* cannot prophesy, with the unwavering confidence of the *fatalis dux huiusce belli,* that they will end the war *secundum ius fasque.*[70] He is therefore eager to avert a direct conflict at all costs (even desperate: he faces total ruin in defeat) and thus sets forth his credo as cogently as possible.

Hannibal's argument under the *tutum* culminates in a negative *exemplum* (§ 23). At this point he turns from his theoretical considerations to instance a pragmatic illustration of his arguments – the fate which befell Regulus in Africa.[71] Scipio's situation is similar to the one in which his countryman found himself: Regulus' career, too, would have been crowned with success (one of few such instances!) had he granted the Carthaginians peace when they sued for it after his victory (§ 23, first part); but instead he overplayed his hand and, by

69) A third intimation of the negative influence of the gods.

70) XXX.31.5. Compare the scene at the outset of the decade where Livy indirectly voices the hope that the gods will take the side of the Romans as they did in the First Punic War, and give Rome the victory (XXI.10.9). Cf. above, Ch. 3, n. 23 for this as a central theme of Livy's whole presentation of the Second Punic War.

71) Fabius adduced the same *exemplum* in his attempts to thwart Scipio's African operation (XXVIII.42.1). He too, like Hannibal under the *tutum,* raised negative arguments to discourage Scipio.

so doing, came to a disgraceful fall (§ 23, last part: note the trenchant antithesis *quanto...corruit*). The psychagogy behind the *exemplum* is again fraught with irony– the *felicitas* and *fortuna* which betrayed Regulus are soon to wreak Hannibal's own downfall and thus lift Scipio to the summit of his career.

The *peroratio* (§§ 24–30) incorporates a *mandatum* and two *amplificationes*. It is introduced by a *sententia* – to define terms is the privilege of him who grants a peace, not of him who sues for it (§ 24, first part) – which echoes the petitionary tone of foregoing parts of the speech.[72] The adjunct theme of Carthage's submissiveness (§ 24), likewise evident in the body of the speech,[73] is extended in the *mandatum*. Hannibal there sets forth his proposals for peace, incorporating a seductive reference to the *imperium* which in terms of his proposals would accrue to Rome vis-à-vis Carthage (§§ 24–26). The first of the two *amplificationes* then follows (§§ 27–28). Skilfully understating the *fraus Punica* in the recent breach of the treaty, Hannibal extends his argument first through a *sententia* – the reliability of peace depends on those by whom the request is made (§ 27) – and then again through an explanatory parenthesis: witness Rome's rejection of the unimportant Carthaginian envoys who sued for peace (§ 28). He then pathetically (and astoundingly) juxtaposes himself with the insignificant envoys, eclipsed though he is: *Hannibal peto pacem* (§ 29, first part). "Héros de tragédie, il parle de lui à la troisième personne";[74] deluded by fortune, and with no trust in the gods, he can only take the last resort at this most critical time: a final, desperate appeal to Scipio. There is undeniably a tone of seductive entreaty in his words; but the presentation also squares fully with the surrounding circumstances.[75] Hannibal then extends his plea in the second *amplificatio*. He himself, a victim of jealous destiny, provides the best guarantee of peace – he knows its value and can, as he has proved before, persuade Carthage to share his view (§§ 29–30: note the strong alliteration *pacis...paeniteat* and the way in which Hannibal again acknowledges his war-guilt and attributes to the whim of the gods all the misfortunes that have befallen him down to the present).[76]

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72) E.g. §§ 5. 9. 15.

73) Cf. especially §§ 8–9 under the *utile*.

74) L. Catin, *En lisant Tite Live* (Paris, 1944), 58.

75) Above, n. 66.

76) These two motifs are accordingly central elements of the speech. Hannibal's war-guilt frames the whole speech and the malignant influence of the gods, too, is stressed several times (above, nn. 67, 68, 69).

XXX.31.1–9

In his *exordium,* which starts from Hannibal's *peroratio,* Scipio turns at once to the breach of the treaty by Carthage (§§ 1–3: *principium ab aduersariis*). His resoluteness emerges when he stresses (*non me fallebat*) that the armistice was violated, and all hope of peace accordingly lost, by virtue of Carthage's knowledge that Hannibal would soon be in Africa (§§ 1: the polysyndeta suggest his conviction). The projected terms of peace, as just proposed by Hannibal, support this belief: the Carthaginian has openly attempted to deprive Rome of her former possessions (§§ 2). In the next sentence Scipio juxtaposes himself directly with Hannibal: the latter is eager to make his countrymen realize from how great a burden he has relieved them; Scipio in his turn is bound to punish their *perfidia* (§§ 3: note the functional antithesis and the strong alliteration *pacis...perfidiae*). The psychagogy clearly proclaims Scipio's ethical commitment and sets him off against Hannibal, the sole obstacle to the fulfilment of his duty.

Scipio then turns to the *dignum* (§§ 4–5), the first *topos* under the *argumentatio.* Initially he stresses and summarizes the argument set forth under the *narratio;* though the Carthaginians do not deserve peace, even on the same terms as before [the recent breach of the treaty], they are actually asking to better the terms by their dishonesty (§§ 4, first part). He then extends the theme of Carthage's undeservingness by showing up her guilt in the war; Rome was not responsible for the war in Italy, nor for that in Spain (note the antithesis and polysyndeton): both were *pia ac iusta bella* undertaken in defence of the allies (§§ 4, last part: another polysyndeton; note the virtually poetical formulation *pia...arma*). Hannibal himself has admitted his country's guilt and this, as in the First Punic War, will now be borne out by the gods (§§ 5). Scipio's own unflinching conviction of Carthage's war-guilt and his confidence in the gods are vividly proclaimed by the rhetoric (fivefold polysyndeton and a poliptoton).

As we noted in analysing Hannibal's speech, he is filled with mistrust of *fortuna* and so of the gods as well; yet the gods are not blind or inscrutable: the man who relies on them will have his hopes realized, for they control *fortuna.*[77] Hence Scipio's unwavering confidence depicted in the foregoing passage; the gods will ensure, through the person of the *imperator Romanus* (31.1), that the war ends *secundum ius fasque.*

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77) Above, n. 60.

Under the *iustum* (§§ 6–8), Scipio turns to Hannibal's warnings about *fortuna* and the contention that he knows nothing about chance and accident; he refutes the allegations, tersely but emphatically (§ 6: note the polysyndeton). As he has behaved ethically in the war, with no *superbia* or *uiolentia,* he is not bound to consider Hannibal's feelings at all: especially as the Carthaginian is now in Africa (§§ 7–8).

We recall Scipio's observation in § 1 – that as a result of Hannibal's return, the Carthaginians were prompted to breach the treaty.[78] Scipio now emphasizes his own moral blamelessness, however – he has not treated Hannibal with any *superbia* or *uiolentia* – which seems to entail that he accordingly has no reason to fear what destiny might bring. Hannibal's forebodings about destiny's fickleness, as we have already noted, occupy a large part of his speech to Scipio. The *fatalis dux huiusce belli,* however, bears no moral guilt in the war – rather, he will be destiny's instrument in terminating it in accordance with human and divine law (§ 5). He can therefore tersely – and appropriately[79] – reject Hannibal's effusive warnings about the perfidy of *fortuna.*

The *peroratio* (§ 9) embodies Scipio's conclusions. Under the circumstances – Carthage's guilt in breaching the treaty, Hannibal's return to Italy, his attempt to inveigle the Romans into ameliorating the peace terms – Scipio can consider an armistice only if Hannibal is ready to add compensation for Carthage's actions to his earlier proposals[80] (even at this stage, Scipio's conduct precludes any charge of *superbia* or *uiolentia*). If Hannibal finds that too great a burden, however, let him prepare to fight – his war-guilt is emphasized again in the strong alliteration, clearly an echo of the close of his speech, with which Scipio finally justifies this decision: *quoniam pacem pati non potuistis* (§ 9, last part).

Hannibal's primary aim in his long address is to persuade Scipio to accept his terms of peace. Two peripheral aspects of this primary aim are his endeavour to dissuade Scipio from essaying the summit of his exploits and his desperate attempt to discourage him from joining battle. He accordingly stresses his role as a petitionary (§§ 3. 5. 17. 18. 24. 29.), alludes 11 times to *fortuna* (§§ 5. 9. 10. 11.

78) Scipio thus seems to absolve Hannibal of any guilt in this matter. But see n. 80.

79) Contrast Burck, *Wege zu Livius* (above, n. 64). We again cannot agree with his view.

80) Whereas Scipio previously seemed to absolve Hannibal, he now puts the responsibility on his shoulders; the breach of the treaty becomes the primary cause of the battle.

12. 15. 18. 20. 21. 22. 23), six times to the unhappy intervention of the gods (§§ 4. 6. 16. 19. 22. 26), and openly acknowledges his war-guilt. (§§ 3. 5. 10). His reflexions in these contexts often embody *sententiae,* which clearly proclaim his wisdom and experience: §§ 7. 11. 16. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 24. 27. He is at the end of his career, tired and desperate, and this formulation squares fully with his character. Several of the foregoing *sententiae* deal with the fickleness of fortune (e.g. §§ 10. 11. 15. 16. 18. 21) and several with the unbenign influence of the gods (e.g. §§ 7. 16. 19. 22). "Ce n'est plus Hannibal stratège ni diplomate, c'est Hannibal philosophe, qui s'adresse moins à Scipion qu'au lecteur de Tite-Live."[81] Hannibal's arguments are aimed, as we have just noted, at persuading Scipio to accept his terms of peace: his speech is far longer than Scipio's. Burck rightly notes that "der Bittende zur Begründung seines Antrags einer ausführlicheren Rechtfertigung und Beweisführung bedarf als der Ablehnende zu seiner Zurückweisung."[82] This aspect of the presentation thus proclaims Scipio's proud self-confidence, a portrayal which is fully in accordance with his character, too. Again, Hannibal has been deluded by fortune and has no confidence in the gods; major parts of his argument expand the meaning behind these central motifs. Scipio, on the other hand, has boundless confidence in the gods and thus in his own destiny as well;[83] he fully understands the workings of *fortuna,* having now been brought by their operation to the summit of his career. As the *imperator Romanus* (31.1) – a title fraught with political idealism – he can thus tersely and proudly reject Hannibal's effusive warnings, admonitions and proposals.[84] Whereas Hannibal's speech was marked by *sententiae,* Scipio's is characterized by polysyndeta (§§ 1. 4. 5. 6. 7). The totally divergent form and content of the speeches thus proclaim, *i.a.,* Scipio's religiosity vis-à-vis Hannibal's "atheism". The foregoing rhetoric in Scipio's speech – it is again of the *genus medium*[85] – also suggests his dedication to Rome and unflinching ambition to end the war. In short, Livy's presentation again squares fully with the characters of the two

81) Catin, *En lisant Tite Live,* 58.

82) *Einführung,* 157.

83) Cf. above, n. 60.

84) The divergent length of the two speeches thus has a definite compositional function in the presentation (cf. nn. 81, 82). Cavallin, *op. cit.,* 31 wrongly claims in this context that "[c]hez Tite-Live, l'équilibre est rompu". Lambert's view is closer to the truth: "Wir dürfen ... wohl sagen, dass das Gleichgewicht, – das innere Gewicht, nicht das der Zeilen – gewahrt ist, und dass Livius auf meisterhafte Weise die Situation in ihrer dramatischen Bedeutung ausgestaltet" (*op. cit.,* 58).

85) Cf. Ullmann, *Étude,* 124.

actors. The portrait of Scipio which emerges, however, is not as human as that of Hannibal; he is concerned only with moral aspects of Rome's cause – hence the lofty title *imperator Romanus* – and the presentation accordingly loses much of the liveliness we have seen in the other speeches.

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Our detailed analysis has shown that Scipio, as portrayed in the longer speeches in the third decade, is not an abstraction or a dummy. Although the portrait presented is above all a moral one, dominated by his intense *pietas,* there is considerable flexibility in the presentation: the hero at the centre of Livy's history is vivid and alive. We accordingly share the full gamut of his emotions, ranging through the boundless optimism of his first great speech (XXVI.41ff.) and impassioned indictment of the mutineers (XXVIII.27ff.) to his lively eclipse of Fabius (XXVIII. 43ff.) and firm rejection of Hannibal's entreaties (XXX.31ff.). Inserted into this dramatic framework of the major action are the speeches to Allucius and Massinissa – less grand in their scope and characterization, but none the less embodying a vivid impression of Scipio's majestic bearing, as depicted especially by the effect of his personality on the two foreigners. The fragmentary speech to the troops prior to the assault on New Carthage, too, incorporates a graphic portrayal. The rhetoric and psychagogy in the longer speeches contribute greatly to enlivening the portrait and all the addresses square fully with Scipio's character and with the circumstances in which they were delivered. The total presentation, all in all, fully deserves Quintilian's praise, "cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt".

Chapter 5

Comparison with Polybius

We showed in Chapter 1 that Polybius spurned the concept of *delectare,* which had characterized ancient historiography from Thucydides onwards, and shifted the emphasis to the adjunct concept of *docere,* which for him entailed mainly political instruction; he thus set his face firmly against so-called "tragic" techniques of historical composition.[1] Livy accepted from Cicero, on the other hand, the Isocratean concept of history as *opus oratorium maxime* (*de Leg.* I.2.5) which entailed the composition of scientific and truthful history (*docere*) in a worthy literary setting (*delectare*); the didactic emphasis had then shifted to moral instruction.[2]

It is against this background that we now compare the two historians' presentation of Scipio in the speeches in the third decade for which Polybius was the primary source: that to the mutineers at Sucro (Polyb. XI.28–29. Liv. XXVIII. 27–29), and the two which make up an integral part of the tableau of Zama (Polyb. XV.6–7. Liv. XXX.30; Polyb. XV.8–14. Liv. XXX.31). Livy's versions of these speeches were analysed in detail in Chapter 4; the discussion there must form the background to the following comparison.[3]

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The respective reports preceding the speeches to the mutineers are recorded by Polybius at XI.25–27 and by Livy at XXVIII. 24–26. As we showed in Chapter 3, Livy makes the mutiny break out as a direct result of Scipio's illness (24.5f.). When news is received that Scipio is in good health, however, the mutiny collapses; Scipio thus assumes a new importance in Livy's narrative and we are made to realize to what extent the further development of the action depends on him.[4]

It is clear that Polybius, too, was aware of Scipio's illness. The first part of his report is fragmentary, however, because of a lacuna at 24.4. He might con-

1) Above, 9ff.

2) Above, Ch. 1, 14ff.

3) Above, 55ff. for a full discussion of Livy's version of the speech to the mutineers. The present comparison draws on the following works: Ullmann, *La technique,* 115ff.; Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 83ff.; Treptow, *op. cit.,* 179ff.; and especially Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 430ff.

4) Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 86; Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 438.

ceivably have dealt there with Scipio's illness, the defection of the allies, and the initial reprisals against the mutineers. That he included the first motif is borne out by the words with which he precedes his version of the speech.[5] Because of the fragmentary nature of the available evidence, however, it is impossible to instance any details in this connexion.

From XI.25.8 the extant Polybian report is directly comparable with Livy's version; but there are few significant divergences in Livy from his source. It is worth noting, however, that Polybius makes a scientific appraisal of the meaning underlying a mutiny (25.1–7), of which there is no echo in Livy, and that he sets forth more concisely and clearly the implementation of the decisions taken in the military council (26.3–27.5; cf. Liv. 26.1–11), a formulation through which he illustrates Scipio's practical sagacity (25.8). Because of the fragmentary nature of the Polybian evidence, however, the foregoing distinctions are the only two we can make as to the presentation of Scipio in the reports preceding the speeches. The one version makes the mutiny break out as a direct result of his illness, whereas the other incorporates an illustration of his sagacity in the implementation of the decisions taken in the military council.

Polyb. XI.28.3–29.13:[6] Liv. XXVIII.27.1–29.8

The Polybian version of Scipio's speech is introduced by a pithy *or. obl.* (28.1–2). Scipio instances with amazement (§ 1: θαυμάζειν) the three grounds which can move men to mutiny against their country and officers: (i) fault-finding and displeasure with those in command; (ii) dissatisfaction with their circumstances; (iii) an enticing hope of some improvement in their situation (§ 2). Although his reflexions are couched in general terms he touches directly on the motives of the mutineers; the foregoing elements thus form the basis on which his whole argument is developed (in *or. rect.*).

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5) Cf. XI.27.8. Contrast Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 86: "Dieses Motiv [of Scipio's illness] hat Polybios noch nicht gekannt, denn an keiner Stelle macht er eine Anspielung darauf." But see Walsh, *Livy,* 100 n.1: "Scipio had been ill before the mutiny, and in Polybius it is the surprise of the soldiers on seeing him recovered which stupefies them (XI,27)."

6) Ullmann, *La technique,* 115 gives the following division of Polybius' version of the speech: 1) 28.1–2. 2) 28.3–29.6: a) 28.3–11; b) 29.1; c) 29.2–6. 3) 29.7–11. 4) 29.12–13. We follow this division in our analysis of the speech.

Livy's version of the speech is composed according to the formal theories of rhetoric. At the outset he inserts an *exordium* (in *or. rect.*) independently of his Greek source.[7] The cool and factual introduction to the Polybian speech is supplanted by the lively depiction of Scipio's amazement at his soldiers' conduct, the central feature of the *principium ab auditoribus* in Livy's version (27.1–4).

Both Polybius' pithy *or. obl.* and Livy's formal *exordium* postulate central themes which are to be developed in the bodies of the respective speeches and which plunge the reader *in medias res.* Thus in Livy Scipio is initially concerned to impress on his soldiers the full extent of the treachery and deceit behind their conduct and to move them to shame,[8] whereas in Polybius he is concerned to instance the three grounds which he is later to refute (28.3–11; 29. 1–2; 5) as having conceivably given rise to the mutiny. The introductory tone of Livy's speech is emotional, then, whereas that of Polybius' is rational. Polybius is not concerned to entertain his readers but to record what was actually said – and even of this only the essence.[9] He can set forth the central elements of his speech at the outset and develop them soberly as he proceeds; the vigorous emotional tone of Livy's version, on the other hand, precludes such a logical thematic division.

In Polybius Scipio then refutes the possibility that the soldiers could have found any fault or displeasure with his (or earlier, Rome's) delay in paying them their arrears: and with his personal treatment of them (§§ 3–11). The argument opens with a brief question which places the three possible causes of the mutiny within the context of the *or. rect.* (§ 3). Scipio then distinguishes the first cause by pointing out that the soldiers were evidently displeased with him for not paying their wages (§ 3, last part). This point is tersely rejected – ever since he has been in command they have been paid in full (§ 4). He then extends his argument by dealing with the soldiers' conduct in relation to Rome (§ 5). Now for the first time Polybius makes him introduce a moral element into his speech. If the soldiers had a grievance against Rome over their arrears was it the proper course

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7) On the *exordium* as a regular feature of Livy's speeches, Walsh, *Livy,* 222. Livy's immediate use of *or. rect.* seems to signify Scipio's awareness of the urgency of the situation.

8) A moral tendency is accordingly evident from the outset in Livy's version. As we shall show, he develops this element far more strongly than Polybius does.

9) Above, Ch. 1, 10.

of action to take up arms against their country? (§ 6, first part).[10] Should they not rather have come and spoken to him? (having asked their friends to take up their cause and help them): a pithy reflexion affirms that this would have been the proper method of complaining (§ 6, last part). Scipio then indirectly compares the soldiers with mercenaries who may sometimes be excused for revolting against their employers – although there can be no excuse for those who are fighting for their wives and children (§ 7). A comparison of the relationship between a father and his son, which indicates the seriousness of the mutineers' conduct, extends the foregoing sentiment (§§ 8–9, first part).

After these considerations (§§ 5–9), which do not concern him personally, Scipio reverts to the point set forth in § 3: the soldiers' possible dissatisfaction with his command. He starts by stressing his own position (νὴ Δί' ἀλλ' ἐγώ), and then affirms that he has treated them as fairly as he has the other soldiers (§ 9, last part). The soldiers will not dare gainsay this; nor could they prove their allegations if they did (§ 10). Scipio caps his entire argument with a pithy question – what then can have made the soldiers so dissatisfied as to revolt against him? (§ 11). He would very much like to know, as he is convinced that there is not one of them who could tell or think of any grievance (§ 11, last part).

The *narratio* of Livy's speech (27.5–6), in which Scipio invokes an *exemplum* from a familiar Roman milieu to instance his soldiers' traitorous conduct and shameful infringement of *disciplina,* has no echo in the foregoing Polybian excerpt: the aims of the two speeches are totally divergent. In Livy, as Hoffmann has observed, Scipio is not concerned (as he is in Polybius) simply to specify the aimlessness of his soldiers' conduct – "sondern er zeigt ihnen in immer neuen Wendungen die Schwere ihres Vergehens, dass sie gewagt hätten, die geheiligten Zeichen der römischen Befehlsgewalt auf Unwürdige zu übertragen."[11] At this point already, then, Livy prepares us for the relentless ending of his speech by distinguishing for the first time between the soldiers and the mutineers and hinting accordingly at the awful punishment which awaits the crimes of the leading actors. The elements which

10) Livy introduces the matter of the soldiers' *stipendium* in a similar context (29.1–2); but his version of the speech depicts the mutineers' *ira* and *dolor* through a specifically Roman *exemplum* and only as the culmination of the dramatic moral catalogue of their crimes. Above, Ch. 4, n. 37.

11) *Op. cit.*, 87. Cf. 27.5: "uos auspicium et imperium ad Vmbrum Atrium et Calenum Albium detulistis."

are to predominate in his version of the speech – a fitting penalty for the mutineers; a severe and frightening moral lesson for the errant soldiers – are introduced under the *narratio.* Hence the conciliatory tone of the psychagogy behind this *topos;*[12] Scipio is preparing to appeal indirectly (as he does by repeatedly instancing the crimes of which the mutineers are guilty)[13] to his soldiers' personal feelings, their sympathy for himself, their old loyalty to Rome, and their gratitude for the forgiveness he now intimates. At the same time, however, he includes a hint at the punishment awaiting the chief actors – the adjunct theme which is frighteningly unravelled with their crimes as the speech proceeds.[14] None of these dramatic elements, as we have just noted, are evident in the foregoing Polybian excerpt. Yet they are to constitute a central feature of the remaining *topoi* in Livy's version of the speech.

It seems justified to hear an echo of the foregoing Polybian excerpt, however, in the next *topos* of Livy's speech where Scipio sets forth the personal feelings which the mutiny has provoked in him (cf. Polyb. 28.3; 9–11); especially by virtue of the function and position of the simile which Livy independently takes over from Polybius under this *topos.*[15] Like Polybius, Livy has Scipio launch the argument from his own person (27.8; Polyb. 28.9); but he imbues his hero's words with emotion (the motif of Scipio's illness, which Polybius does not mention in his speech, comes into play) to indicate Scipio's intimate relationship with the soldiers and his bitter disappointment at their conduct (§§ 8–10 of the *honestum*). It is only on this footing that the Livian Scipio can logically extend the psychagogy behind the *narratio* – a fitting penalty for the crimes of the chief actors; a conciliatory attitude to the errant soldiers – before going on to point out accordingly to his men, for the first time, the nature and implications of the conduct involved in the mutiny (§ 12, the last part of the *honestum*). Before applying this "therapy", however, Livy properly takes over the simile used by Polybius in a similar context – though more clearly, at the end of his speech (29.8–12) – to enforce the argument that Scipio's soldiers were not responsible for their actions in joining the mutiny, but caught the contagion of the *furor* and *insania*

12) Cf. above, Ch. 4, 56.

13) *Ibid.*, 61.

14) *Ibid.*, n.39.

15) Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 436 for Livy's adaptation of the simile from Polybius in this context.

of those who instigated it (Liv. 27.11). Emotional and moral elements then again supersede the rational tone of Polybius' version as Livy – with free recourse to strong rhetoric – sets forth the first of a whole series of arguments in which Scipio vigorously stresses the nature and extent of his soldiers' *insania* and *amentia*.[16] Their execrable conduct against himself, their country, parents and children, and finally against all moral and military precepts, as shown especially by their conferring *auspicium* and *imperium* on Albius and Atrius, are exposed (27.12). The divestment of the elements behind the mutiny and conduct involved continues under the *pium* (§ 13–16), the last part of which embodies another distinction between the mutineers and the soldiers and another hint at the punishment awaiting the chief actors.

Livy thus spins out his central themes – exposure of the execrable elements behind the mutiny and preparation of the penalty for the chief actors – independently of Polybius and far more expansively. The moral motifs in Polybius of the soldiers' conduct vis-à-vis Rome, their parents and children, hinted at in the foregoing excerpt (28.6–8) are greatly extended in Livy and are juxtaposed with Scipio's innocence and more especially with the innocence of the Fatherland and of the Roman nation (27.12–16). A strong emotional element, as reflected especially in the florid rhetoric, and an intenser Roman ethos thus supplant Polybius' rational, sober considerations. Accordingly, in preparation for the moral lesson Scipio is to give his soldiers as his speech develops and the penalty he is finally to pronounce over the guilty mutineers, Livy has here taken over the simile used by Polybius at the end of his speech in distinguishing between these two groups.[17]

At 29.1 the Polybian Scipio considers the second of the three points set forth at the outset of his speech, viz the soldiers' discontent with their present situation. This possible reason for the mutiny is also tersely rejected (§ 1: note the negative formulation and the supporting anaphoristic πότε). The last part of § 1, μείζους ἐλπίδες ἢ νῦν, marks the transition to the following part

16) Polybius deals with soldiers' conduct in relation to Rome – one of the themes of Liv. 27.12; cf. § 13–16 – at 28.5–9. Although he, too, introduces a moral element into his speech at this point his treatment is not as emphatic and ornate as Livy's.

17) Thus, whereas Polybius stresses the inconstancy of the sea in his use of the simile, Livy appropriately develops the motif of the soldiers' aberration. Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 117.

of the speech (§ 2–6). Perhaps the soldiers imagined there would be more profit or more certain expectations with the enemy (§ 2). Scipio then considers how deceitful were the aspirations of the mutineers in making common cause with the Spanish defectors and relying on the inept leaders they had appointed for their enterprize. Who are the enemy? Are they Indibilis and Mandonius? But are not all the soldiers aware that these two first revolted from Carthage to Rome and have again broken their oaths and declared themselves Rome's enemies? (§ 3). The second pithy question specifies the first and leads on to the third, longer one in which Scipio scornfully exposes the enemy's duplicity. A fine thing to sacrifice the friendship of one's country for such men! (§ 4). Scipio here instances with ironical bitterness the futility of the hopes which the mutineers had pinned on Rome's enemies. This argument is then extended (§ 5: οὐ μὴν οὐδ'...) with reference to the mutineers' intention of conquering Spain. These hopes are also tersely rejected – the rebels would have been no match for Scipio even had they joined forces with Indibilis (§ 5, last part).

Scipio's reflexions seem to embody the third point set forth at the outset of his speech, viz the possibility of some improvement in the mutineers' circumstances. He now nullifies their hopes entirely by indicating that their reliance on their appointed leaders was also futile (§ 6).[18] These reflexions are prefaced by a pithy question through which he expresses his inability to grasp the aims of the mutineers. He then ironically imputes skill and valour to the leading actors before again indirectly venting his scorn by stating his wish to speak no further on the subject (§ 6, last part).

Under the *utile* (28.1–7) the Livian Scipio turns from the ethical considerations which have occupied him thus far to the more palpable aspects of the mutineers' conduct. Livy here engages his reader in a specifically Roman historical context by comparing the present mutineers with their Rhegian counterparts of 280 B.C. who captured the town of Rhegium and held it for 10 years. The conduct of the present mutineers is more heinous than that of their Rhegian counterparts, however, for they have conferred the supreme command on a despicable private soldier and have made common cause with the enemy (§ 1–5). Livy here touches on Polybius (Polyb. 29.2–4), though only for the development of his

18) This is the first time Polybius mentions the leaders of the mutineers (nowhere does he name them). Livy, however, introduces the motif early in his speech (27.5), repeating it several times with far greater vehemence than in the foregoing Polybian excerpt: 27.15; 28.4, 15; 29.7.

own central theme; this free treatment enables the Livian Scipio dramatically to expand the scope of the psychagogy behind his speech by again exposing the elements behind the mutiny and including another hint at the punishment awaiting the chief actors.[19]

Livy's independent adaptation of the source-content in his treatment of the practical aspects of the mutineers' conduct is extended further under the *possibile* (28.8–15), where Scipio makes another penetrating assessment of the situation prevailing in Spain. Livy here again touches on Polybius (Polyb. 29.5–6: the third point of Scipio's argument), but the scope and tone of his treatment are entirely different. The Polybian Scipio's assessment, if coloured by scorn, is characteristically cool and rational; his observations are founded on the mutineers' futile hopes of conquering Spain. His counterpart in Livy, however, emphasizes the futility of their hopes of wresting the province from the *populus Romanus* (§ 9); adducing argument after argument to support his central premise. Thus he first introduces the impressive survey, enhanced by a functional rhetoric, of his exploits in Spain through which he discredits the chances of their inferior army (§§ 8–9); after which he again introduces the motif of his illness into the speech (§ 11),[20] using it to illustrate the permanence of the *res publica* which transcends the mortal life of the individual, however brilliant his exploits. He then expands his central argument through an *exemplum* (enhanced again by an impassioned rhetoric) and indicates that Rome has survived the loss of nine of her best generals in the war; capping his central premise with another affirmation of the continuance of the *res publica* (§ 12, last part): after which he reverts to the situation in Spain (§ 13), expanding the motif of his illness and highlighting yet again the futility of the mutineers' aims and the inadequacy of their resources (§§ 13–15).[21] He then juxtaposes their incredible aims once more with the innocence of the Roman nation (§ 15, last part).[22]

19) Liv. 28.3. Cf. too 27.6; 11; 16. This is, of course, part and parcel of Livy's moral treatment of the subject matter.

20) Cf. too 27.9–10.

21) Thus Scipio's theoretical considerations on Rome's permanence are framed by his practical considerations on the hopeless inadequacy of the mutineers' resources. For the psychagogy behind this artifice, above, Ch. 4, 58f. Burck seems to be wrong (*Wege zu Livius,* 437) in asserting that the "Bekenntnis von der Ewigkeit Roms" (28.11) is framed by the historical *exempla* of the Rhegian mutineers (28.1–7: the *utile*) and of the generals lost in the present war (28.12: the *possibile*). To our mind, his forced disposition of the *exempla* divests Livy's argument under the *possibile* of all its cogency.

22) Cf. too 27.12–16.

Polybius' pithy observations on the situation prevailing in Spain, then, are expanded with great independence by Livy (Polyb. 29.2–6; Liv. 28.5–15). Livy's treatment, besides giving his reader a direct and vivid impression of Scipio's *pietas,* constitutes an indirect assessment of Rome's continuance in face of the futile aspirations of the mutineers. The development of his central theme – exposure of the elements behind the mutiny; preparation of the penalty for the chief actors – acquires added dramatic force as he indicates the permanence of the constitution under which the mutineers are to receive their punishment. As we have just intimated, there is no echo of this in Polybius; Livy has transformed his source from artistic motives and for purposes of characterization.

In Polybius Scipio next refutes all justification for the mutiny, both as regards himself and Rome (29.7).[23] He then suddenly affirms his wish to plead for the soldiers in the foregoing context, i.e. as regards Rome and himself; the plea he will use is universally acknowledged among men (§ 8).[24] At this point he introduces, as a new aspect of his address, the broad general simile in which he compares the fickleness of a crowd with the vicissitudes of the sea (§§ 9–11). The significance of the simile for the mutiny is that as the sea, of itself harmless, seems to sailors to assume the character of the winds that fall violently on it, so a crowd seems to those who deal with it to be of the same character as its leaders and counsellors (cf. §§ 10–11); as the winds stir the placid sea, so the mutineers have aroused the soldiers: the mass of the troops are innocent, the mutineers are guilty.

The simile leads the Polybian Scipio on to conclude his speech (§§ 12–13). In view of the innocence of the mass of the troops, he is prepared to be reconciled with them (§ 12).[25] The guilty parties, however, are to be punished for their offences against their country and himself (§ 13).

Under the *dignum* (29.1–2), the Livian Scipio introduces another specifically Roman *exemplum* independently of Polybius through which he again exposes the

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23) This is the second time that the Polybian Scipio has hinted briefly at Rome's innocence vis-à-vis the mutiny (cf. too, 28.5–6). His Livian doppelgänger, however, treats this motif at some length and far more directly and sternly. Cf. 27.12 and especially §§ 13–16: the *pium.*

24) As in his reflexions on the significance behind a mutiny, made before the start of his speech (25.1–7), the Polybian Scipio here argues scientifically from broad general truths – in this case, the inconstancy of the sea – to account for the behaviour of his soldiers. Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 433. On Livy's divergent use of the same simile, above., n. 17.

25) The first time he mentions this motif. Livy, however, introduces it early in his version of the speech. Cf. 27.11.

conduct underlying the mutiny (29.2);[26] this last motif culminates here in his bitter indictment of the mutineers' crimes against *pietas*. The psychagogy clearly echoes the content of 27.13–16 – the *pium* – where Scipio not only exposed the mutineers' crimes against *pietas* (as here) but also touched on the punishment awaiting them. Livy thus proceeds independently of Polybius to the conclusion of his speech, ushered in by the first part of the *peroratio* where Scipio stresses the extent of his soldiers' *insania* (29.3). The psychagogy of this passage clearly recalls the formulation in 27.11 (Livy's adaptation of the Polybian simile), where Scipio first stressed the guilt of the mutineers and his soldiers' inculpability. It accordingly paves the way for the dramatic close of Livy's version of the speech, two main features of which are a last distinction between the soldiers and the mutineers (29.3) and the final passing of the death sentence on the chief actors (29.7).[27]

Both Burck and Hoffmann have rightly stressed the importance of the Sucrian mutiny to Scipio's political reputation and the extent to which it preoccupied the anterior historians down to Livy.[28] It is therefore reasonable to assume that in his treatment of the mutiny (he conceivably absorbed the accounts of his predecessors), Livy will have provided his own independent assessment of Scipio, especially vis-à-vis the doppelgänger whose reflexions on the episode were set forth in his primary source. What pertinent elements, then, emerge from the main divergences as outlined in our analysis?

The background reports to the two speeches are very similar. Polybius' treatment is, however, marked by a scientific appraisal of the prevailing circumstances in terms of broadly valid psychological-ethical norms and rules (25.1–7). This approach is typical of his methodology and of Greek scientific thought in general, but has no effect, in the present context, on his presentation of Scipio. Again, the implementation of the decisions taken in the military council is more clearly described in Polybius than in Livy. The result is that Polybius gives his own lucid impression of Scipio's sagacity; this is, of course, not reflected in Livy's (epic) treatment of his subject matter: "Eigene Reflexionen fehlen so gut wie ganz."[29]

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26) Above, n. 13.

27) Both motifs echo passages at the end of Polybius' speech. Cf. Polyb. 29.10–11; 13. Livy's treatment of these two central themes, however, has been expanded through the anterior development of his version of the speech and culminates under the *peroratio*.

28) Burck, *Wege zu Livius*, 430f.; Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 85ff.

29) Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius*, 434.

For the rest, however, there are no striking divergences between the reports preceding the two speeches that have any effect on the presentation of Scipio (the fragmentary evidence makes it impossible to assess Polybius' initial treatment of the motif of Scipio's illness). A point worth noting in this context, however, is that Livy's immediate use of *or. rect.* in his version could signify Scipio's awareness of the urgency of the situation facing him.

The motif of Scipio's illness, as we have just intimated, is not incorporated anywhere in the body of Polybius' speech. Livy, however, deals with it independently in two key passages: 27.8–10; 28.11–12 (cf. too 29.2). The first passage is vital to the whole further development of his speech: it enables Scipio to show at the outset his intimate relationship with the errant soldiers; it is only on this footing that he can apply the "therapy" by means of which he distinguishes them from the guilty mutineers – through his early and fitting adaptation of the Polybian simile (27.11); and that he can repeatedly emphasize the full extent of their *furor* and *insania.* It is clear, then, that the illness-motif is structurally connected with the impression of *Scipio imperator* which Livy conveys in this particular context. The foregoing motifs, as we noted in the body of our analysis, constitute central and independent themes of his version of the speech, and are included in parts of it where Scipio touches on the thoughts of his Polybian counterpart, but which Livy has greatly expanded. The moral element, then, in which Scipio spells out the crimes behind the mutiny to his inculpable soldiers – and his intimate relationship with them, which emerges indirectly from this recurring motif[30] – are greatly amplified in Livy's speech. The foregoing tendencies depend respectively for their further development on his appropriate introduction of the illness-motif (27.8–10) and on the simile fittingly adopted (27.11) from the very end of the Polybian speech. They fill the greater part of the Latin version (27.12–29.2).

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30) Cf. the remarks of Prof. Conway, cited (with no reference) by Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War,* 149: "I greatly doubt whether any mutineer who had heard the speech which Polybius gives would have been influenced by any motive but that of fear; whereas the speech, as Livy gives it, is an appeal to the warmest personal feelings of the soldiers, their old loyalty to Rome, their sympathy for their general, newly recovered from illness, and their gratitude for the forgiveness which he promises. Livy shows us Scipio entering into the feelings of the mutineers with a quite divine comprehension." (If he is intimating that a mutineer who had heard the speech Livy gives would *not* have been moved by fear he is, to our mind, quite wrong!)

Livy's early introduction of the simile precedes an adjunct theme which he also expands independently of Polybius in the body of his own speech, viz the motif of a suitable punishment for the guilty mutineers.[31] Polybius introduces the matter of their punishment only at a very end of his speech, in conjunction with the broad general simile through which he distinguishes them from the inculpable soldiers.

The second passage in which the Livian Scipio touches independently on his illness (28.11) embodies the initial stages of the argument through which he indicates to the mutineers the futility of their aspirations in face of the permanence of the *res publica.*[32] His Polybian counterpart states simply in this context that they could never have conquered Spain (29.5); but in Livy Scipio asserts that they could never have wrested the province from the *populus Romanus* (28.9). Hence the whole series of specifically Roman arguments which he adduces to instance this point under the *possibile*. At the same time, however, he subjects himself, too, to the concept of Rome's greatness despite his brilliant exploits on the strength of which he could easily have routed the mutineers.

The foregoing differences in presentation, which are based on a structural divergence in Livy's adoption of the Polybian simile (27.11) and on his independent introduction of the motif of Scipio's illness (27.8–10; 28.10–11) contribute in themselves to a more voluble and satisfactory (moral) portrait of Scipio in Livy's speech. We witness his indignation at the conduct involved in the mutiny; the nature of his relationship (probably an accurate reflexion)[33] with the Roman soldiery; and his stern and unwavering *pietas* as reflected, not only in his catalogue of the elements behind the mutiny and self-effacement before the notion of Rome's permanence, but also in his relentless and frightening hints at the punishment awaiting the chief actors. Yet there are further differences of presentation which, to our mind, support and harden this basic thesis. One is the way in which Livy, in contrast to Polybius, makes Scipio speak with great immediacy and from an intensely personal point of view.[34]

In both historians, as Treptow has observed, Scipio faces the same situation – the outbreak of a mutiny which has since petered out, and the same alternatives –

31) Cf. above, n. 14.

32) For the development of this argument under the *possibile,* above, Ch. 4, 58.

33) Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 438.

34) *Ibid.,* 437: "...mit stärkster persönlicher Anteilnahme, mit einem unmittelbaren Engagement sprechen lässt."

either ignore the whole matter, or impose a drastic punishment on all the soldiers.[35] Neither alternative is feasible, however, as Scipio cannot condone a flagrant transgression of *disciplina;* nor can he afford to be without the troops in view of his wide-ranging plans for the African operation (Polyb. 24.1–3; Liv. 17.2–3). His main concern in both accounts, as a general, is accordingly to follow a *uia media* between leniency and severity, which he can only do by distinguishing between the soldiers – who are in any event guilty – and the mutineers. It is in this context that the difference emerges in the immediacy of the attitude of the two speakers.

In Polybius, Scipio's whole argument is cool and rational. Indeed it has been persuasively argued that Polybius' speech is ill adapted to the reprimanding of the mutineers and that it constitutes the residue of a version originally composed for an entirely different audience, viz Scipio's political opponents in Rome.[36] Polybius has obviously adopted this version independently, however, using it to set forth his own objective, essentially political thoughts on the situation. Witness the reasons instanced in the introductory *or. obl.,* for example, as the possible causes of a mutiny (28.1–2) and the formulation of the simile through which his Scipio distinguishes the soldiers from the mutineers. In Polybius Scipio is depicted as an essentially political figure, a person of exceptional prudence and wisdom, whose rational capacities enable him to specify and limit broad themes of relevant human experience.

If in Polybius Scipio's engagement and attitude adopted are cerebral and subdued, however, in Livy they are intense and dramatic. Whereas the guilty parties in Polybius are simply struck (ultimately) with terror and dread at witnessing the punishment of the mutineers, their counterparts in Livy receive a protracted and frightening moral lesson into the bargain. This tendency is especially evident in those parts (already discussed) of Livy's speech which he, while touching on his source, has yet expanded with great independence. It is in this context that, as we noted in our foregoing discussion, Scipio repeatedly distinguishes the soldiers from the mutineers, explains at far greater length than in Polybius the full significance behind the mutiny, and hints ominously in several excerpts at the punishment awaiting the chief actors.

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35) *Op. cit.,* 194. Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 85; Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War,* 148.

36) Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 85; Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 433. This tendency is especially evident from the way in which Scipio emphasizes his innocence in the mutiny. Cf. Polyb. 28.2–5; 9–11. 29.7. Livy, as we have shown, emphasizes Rome's innocence rather in his version.

The intensity with which these central, independent motifs are couched and expanded in Livy's version of the speech is greatly enhanced by the formal rhetoric with which he clothes Scipio's sentiments. The only notable artifice in Polybius' version is the anaphoristic πότε of 29.1 and the recurring questions which mark the middle part of the speech (29.1–6). Livy's version is of the *genus grande,* however, and parts of it are filled by a florid (but wholly functional) rhetoric. Anaphoristic devices recur in several important passages (27.8; 12. 28.8; 15. 29.2; 4) as do asyndeta (27.4; 12. 28.8; 12; 15. 29.2; 4). Ironical and disbelieving questions, too, both long and short, are a marked feature of the oratorical equipment, especially at 28.14–29.2. This fuller and more varied rhetoric greatly enlivens the Livian portrait of Scipio vis-à-vis the cool, rational figure embodied in Polybius' speech. Several of the rhetorical parts embrace the didactic moral aspect (e.g. 27.4; 12. 28.9; 11;15. . 29.2–4) through which Scipio exposes either the elements behind the mutiny or the utter hopelessness of the mutineers' aims. "C'est que dans Polybe l'orateur se tient trop strictement aux faits pour pouvoir donner libre cours à ses différentes émotions," Ullmann observes in our context, "tandis que dans Tite Live l'effusion de l'orateur donne à son discours une peinture vive des sentiments et des qualités morales qui le caractérisent."[37)]

A final and very radical difference between the two speeches which, to our mind, contributes further to a more voluble and convincing portrait in Livy is the specifically Roman ambience of his version.[38)] Whereas the Polybian Scipio starts and ends with a broad theoretical appraisal of human conduct and motives – and remains essentially detached throughout vis-à-vis the statements he makes – his Livian doppelgänger repeatedly introduces Roman elements into his version. This tendency is evident at the outset in an incredulous Scipio's reluctance to address his troops as *commilitones.* Livy develops it through the denigration of the two common soldiers on whom the troops have conferred *auspicium* and *imperium*: and through Scipio's emphatic catalogue of his soldiers' crimes against their country, the gods of Rome, and the army's usages and customs; the moral *Leitmotiv* behind the speech in which the essence of its Roman ambience is embodied. It is especially evident, however, in the functional *exempla* introduced independently to specify and expand Scipio's moral lesson to his soldiers (27.1. 28.2; 12. 29.1) and to instance as adjunct themes the futility of the mutineers'

37) *La technique,* 118.

38) Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 439.

aims (28.12) and the punishment awaiting the chief actors (28.2). In this same context it is, of course, also strikingly witnessed in the paean to Rome's enduring greatness (28.10–11) which is not echoed in Polybius, but which, in Livy, provides a graphic impression of the greatness and actuality of Scipio's *pietas.*

We may now summarize our findings, having discussed the two speeches to the mutineers and the meaning behind the main differences in Livy's version.

Livy has composed his speech with great independence; his free treatment is especially evident throughout its middle part (27.12–29.2). His divergent presentation of Scipio is based initially on an early introduction of the illness-motif (27.8–10) through which he instances at the outset Scipio's close relationship with the soldiers and the intensely personal viewpoint from which he is to speak; and on his appropriate adaptation (soon afterwards) of the Polybian simile by means of which Scipio distinguishes his inculpable soldiers from the guilty mutineers (27.11). Livy's expansion and adjustment of his source-content – the introduction of the illness-motif being an innovation, the adoption of the simile an independent structural change – provide a logical background to the emphatic and protracted moral lesson which he, freely expanding and innovating his source, makes Scipio repeatedly give the errant soldiers. (We recall the moral element behind the concept of *docere* in Roman pragmatic history-writing, which largely supplanted Polybius' political instruction.) The foregoing motifs include scattered but frightening references to the punishment awaiting the mutineers as well as a much-expanded demonstration of their inadequacy in face of the continuance of the *res publica,* the illness-motif being introduced independently again in the latter context (28.9–15). Whereas the events at Sucro provided the rational Polybius with an opportunity for the didactic political assessment of the meaning behind a mutiny (hence his depiction of Scipio as a person of exceptional prudence and wisdom, who can specify and limit broad themes of relevant human conduct) they provided Livy with an opportunity for a graphic moral portrayal of his hero. By virtue of the foregoing central motifs in his speech, then, his portrait of Scipio transcends the cool and rational presentation embodied in Polybius. His depiction is more human, frightening and specifically Roman; Scipio's arguments have a greater cogency and realism under the circumstances; they embody a more graphic and impressive indication of his high moral ethos and of Rome's greatness than do the rational, crypto-political considerations of Polybius' speech. Livy's vigorous and independent rhetoric (we

recall his conception of history as *opus oratorium maxime*) further enhances the presentation which culminates fittingly in the Roman ambience which he imparts to his speech quite independently of Polybius.

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We now compare the speeches which make up an integral part of the tableau of Zama in each historian's account: Hannibal to Scipio and the latter's reply (Polyb. XV.6–7. Liv. XXX.30; Polyb. XV.8–14. Liv. XXX.31). Livy's versions of these speeches were analysed in detail in Chapter 4; the discussion there must form the background to the following comparison.[39] Our treatment will concentrate on the presentation of Scipio in the two speeches.

Perhaps the most striking divergence in the background reports to the speeches is the depiction of the motives through which the two historians make Hannibal desire and implement his meeting with Scipio. In Polybius Hannibal, having encamped at Zama, sends out three spies with orders to discover the position of Scipio's camp and the arrangements in it (15.4–5). The spies are captured, however, and are brought before Scipio who does not punish them, as expected, but sends them back after having pointed out the disposition of his camp to them (5.5–8). Hannibal is filled with admiration of Scipio's μεγαλοψυχία and τολμά and conceives an inexplicable, urgent wish to meet him.[40]

Livy's account of this episode is similar to that of his source in all except one significant respect. The remarks in Polybius on Hannibal's reaction, which make up a pithy (indirect) hint at his uncertainty about the outcome of the

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39) Cf. above, Ch. 4, 70ff. for Livy's presentation of the two speeches. The present comparison draws on the following works: K. Witte, *RhM* 65 (1910), 301ff.; Ullmann, *La technique,* 127ff. (on formalistic and rhetorical aspects of the two speeches); Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 93ff. (on less formalistic points of presentation); A. Lambert and S. Cavallin, *Eranos* 45 (1947), 25–36 and 46 (1948), 54–71 (on *Quellenkritik* and salient features of content); Treptow, *op. cit.,* 129ff. and 200ff. (on the structure and psychagogy); Ingrid Edlund, *Eranos* 65 (1967), 146ff. (on rhetorical and psychological aspects of the presentation); Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 440ff. (a purely thematic comparison). Cf. too, especially on the religious aspect, Stübler, *Die Religiosität des Livius,* 162ff.

40) Polyb. 5.8. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 94 n. 2 sees this explanation of Hannibal's motives as historical. Cf. too, Scullard, *Scipio Africanus in the Second Punic War,* 234 who points out that the story of the spies "is not impossible, and may be accepted with caution."

battle, become a central motif in Livy[41] and are expanded as such in his version of Hannibal's speech (see below). Rome's good chances of winning the battle, as depicted already in Scipio's treatment of the Carthaginian spies, are increased at this early point by Hannibal's uneasy reflexions on the significance behind this tactical move.

Another meaningful divergence in the preliminary reports is Livy's obvious dramatization of his account. As we have noted he has so ordered the anterior narrative that he brings to the impending Battle of Zama a clear impression of Scipio's waxing fortunes and of Hannibal's decline.[42] One could expect his report preceding the speeches to specify the protagonists' chances accordingly, but he chooses a more dramatic method of presentation. After his annalistic report on the outset of 202 B.C. (26–27), he introduces a vivid account of the malaise gripping Rome and Carthage into his narrative (28.1ff.); including an indirect report, made through the uneasy Roman citizens, of Hannibal's exploits (which exceeds the scope of any similar report in the third decade) and a pregnant reference, made through the citizens of Carthage, to the fear they feel for Scipio as the man of destiny born to destroy them (28.11). His treatment effectively heightens the tension of the narrative and leaves the reader with a dramatic impression of the importance of the impending battle (28.8) and with an understanding of the significance behind the imminent fulfilment of Scipio's destiny as the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.*

Polybius too, includes in his preliminary report a hint at the importance of the impending battle; observing that not only all the inhabitants of Italy and Africa, but those of Spain, Sicily, and Sardinia were kept in suspense while awaiting the outcome (3.1–4). His résumé is characteristically matter-of-fact and objective; as the statesman *ex professo* his concern is simply to make the reader appreciate the political meaning behind the occasion. His brief report contains no trace of the vivid sense of participation prompted by Livy's attempts at συμπαθεῖν.[43]

41) Liv. 29.2–5. Edlund claims that in Livy "it is not admiration which fills Hannibal but fear" (*op. cit.*, 148). This is to our mind too strong an interpretation of the Livian passage. It is rather a wholly rational concern which fills Hannibal and prompts him to press for peace at this opportune time: "tamen si integer quam si uictus peteret pacem aequiora impetrari posse ratus, nuntium ad Scipionem misit ut conloquendi secum potestatem faceret" (29.5).

42) Cf. above, Ch. 4, n. 57.

43) Nor does it signify the impending culmination of Scipio's destiny, an element which emerges indirectly from Livy's treatment. (Polybius makes another, more impressive and dramatic evaluation of the meaning behind the battle at 9.2f.)

Polybius has no intention of entertaining his reader (*delectare*), but gives a clear and pragmatic account of events (*docere*) in a way contrary to that used by the authors of "tragic" history; for Livy, on the other hand, historical composition tallies with Cicero's conception of the genre as *opus oratorium maxime*: *delectare* is cardinally important.

Polyb. XV.6.4–7.9:[44] **Liv. XXX.30.3–30**

The Polybian Hannibal opens his speech with a pithy *or. obl.* (6.4–5). He regrets that Rome and Carthage ever coveted possessions outside Italy and Africa; both were fine empires and their borders had, as it were, been fixed by Nature herself. The foregoing reflexions lead on to the first part of the speech in *or. rect.* through which Polybius at once takes the reader to the very heart of the negotiations (§§ 6–7). Hannibal makes a brief summary of the results of the war, observing that as both nations fought each other for Sicily and Spain – refusing to heed the warnings of fortune: the result of this is that Rome was, and Carthage still is in imminent danger (§ 6) – the only solution is to consider ways of averting the anger of the gods and of resolving the present impasse (§ 7).

Hannibal then extends his argument and in the course of his reflexions juxtaposes himself with Scipio (6.8–7.1). As he is aware of the fickleness of fortune, of how radically and imperviously she induces changes of the greatest moment, he is ready to negotiate (6.8: note the emphatic ἐγώ). Yet he is afraid that Scipio, on account of his youth and unqualified success in Spain and Africa – he has never yet fallen into the counter-current of fortune – will not be convinced by his words, however credible they are (7.1: note the emphatic σέ).

At the outset Livy, of course, inserts a formal *exordium* (30.3–5: *or. rect.*)[45] independently of Polybius into his version of the speech. As we noted in Chapter 4, major elements behind the structure of the entire decade emerge in the *exordium;* we witness how *fatum, sors, di* and *fortuna* (§§ 3. 4. 5) have fittingly contributed to bring Hannibal, the *dux et causa belli,* before Scipio the *fatalis dux huiusce belli*; how the motif of Scipio's devotion to his house is clearly echoed in Hannibal's words (§ 5); and especially how, while acknowledging his war-guilt

44) Ullmann, *La technique,* 127 provides the following division of Polybius' speech: 1) 6.4–5. 2)(a) 6.6–7; (b) 6.8–7.1; (c) 7.2–4; (d) 7.5–6. 3) 7.7–9.

45) Cf. above, n. 7. On Livy's immediate use of *or. rect.* in this context as an indication of Scipio's awareness of the importance of the situation, Lambert, *op. cit.,* 56.

(nowhere is this echoed in Polybius), Hannibal stresses his role as a petitionary (§ 5: *inermis ad pacem petendam*), which squares with Livy's depiction of his declining fortunes in the anterior narrative.[46] None of these dramatic elements emerge in the first excerpt from Polybius, which posits an essentially political theme – the cause of the war as the combatants' unwillingness to observe Nature's disposition of their borders. In Livy, then, the reader's attention is riveted on Scipio. Again, in Polybius Hannibal's demeanour is firm and dignified, his reasoning plain – it rests with Scipio, as much as with him, to end the unhappy war. In Livy, on the other hand, his attempt to speak respectfully to Scipio is manifest in the *captatio beneuolentiae.*[47]

Under the *utile* (§§ 6–9) Livy draws on Polybius for the first time. The Polybian Scipio, we have just noted, posited the cause of the war as the combatants' unwillingness to observe the natural disposition of their borders (6.6); a political theme became a central element in his speech at the outset. In Livy, however, as a result of the divergent *exordium* the political element recedes into the background. Thus although the Livian Hannibal also wishes the gods had given Rome and Carthage satisfaction with their borders (Sardinia[48]) and Sicily, the disputed territories which caused the war, were no compensation for the heavy losses on both sides: the result is that Carthage must sue for peace (§§ 6–9; cf. Polyb. 6.6)), this is only a secondary theme of the psychagogy behind the *utile.*[49] In Livy Hannibal is concerned rather, as in the *exordium,* to conciliate Scipio and achieve his goal of peace. Hence Livy's expansive treatment of Polybius' remarks (6.6) on the danger that once faced Rome but which now faces Carthage (this motif is enlivened by the Livian Hannibal's avowal that it

46) Above, Ch. 4, 71f. Witte, *op. cit.,* 302 thus seems to be wrong in claiming as to the *exordium* that Livy has simply "einige der von der Rhetorik seit jeher für Bittflehende vorgesehenen τόποι ... eingeführt" and that he has accordingly given his source a rhetorical form aimed primarily at effect. There is a great deal more behind the *exordium;* its import covers major themes in the whole decade. Witte's notion of Livy's composition as a series of *Einzelerzählungen* (as applied to the speeches at Zama) is rightly corrected by Cavallin, *Eranos* 45 (1947), 25f. and by Lambert, *op. cit.,* 54.

47) So, rightly, Edlund, *op. cit.,* 151. "Scipio appears as superior to Hannibal", she adds, "in spite of his having not yet won the battle." This is especially evident in Hannibal's admission that his unhappy fortunes have made him sue for peace.

48) Livy's change of Polybius' Spain (6.6) to Sardinia is not without significance. It incorporates the Roman view that Hannibal started the war on account of Sicily and Sardinia. Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 99 n. 1.

49) Cf. above, Ch. 4, 72.

is now Carthage which hears the "mutter and stir" of the Roman camp at her gates (§ 8: we recall Rome's horror of *Hannibal ad portas*))[50] and the emphasis he makes Hannibal put on the expediency of Rome's now granting peace (§ 9). Livy thus keeps the reader's attention focused on Scipio and on Hannibal as his petitionary.

This tendency is expanded in another notable divergence in Livy, viz the reason his Hannibal gives as a conceivable obstacle to Scipio's appreciating his argument on the expediency of peace (§ 9, last part; cf. Polyb. 7.1). In Polybius he fears that Scipio, due to his unbroken good fortune, will reject his words however credible they are, whereas in Livy he is apprehensive of Scipio's possible *animus abhorrens a quietis consiliis.*[51] Livy's reason is more intensely personal, less detached, than that in Polybius and we receive a vivid impression of Scipio's dynamic bearing and of Hannibal's attempts to secure a patient and benevolent hearing for his proposals.

Under the next *topos* in Livy's speech (§ 10–15: the *prudens*), Hannibal extends his argument on the need for rational calm in the negotiations envisaged. In juxtaposing himself with Scipio in the second excerpt from Polybius' speech (6.8–7.1) he instanced the fickleness of τύχη as the reason why he was prepared to negotiate; adducing Scipio's unflagging good luck in Spain and Africa as a conceivable obstacle to his understanding the argument. Livy's motivation of this point, as we have just noted, is entirely different; he makes Hannibal fear Scipio's intrepid disposition: his good luck is not instanced at all. Under the present *topos,* however, he touches on this Polybian theme (§ 10–11); a minor structural adjustment to his source enables him to expand his version of the speech with great independence. He makes Hannibal use the Polybian τύχη-motif to specify Scipio's brilliant exploits in the course of the war (§ 12–14); the political theme of Polybius' speech recedes even further into the background under the *prudens* as Livy again focuses the reader's attention on Scipio. In Polybius Hannibal's own lot founds the argument he adduces to show the expediency of peace on the ground of pragmatic political considerations (6.4–7.1). The structural change in Livy's version, on the other hand, ensures that it is the destiny of the *fatalis*

50) Cf. Edlund, *op. cit.*, 152. She rightly points out that Hannibal's remarks must give Scipio considerable satisfaction!

51) The reader involuntarily recalls the negative psychagogy behind much of Fabius' speech, especially his attack on Scipio's "rashness". Cf. above, Ch. 4, 65f.

dux in the present war that Hannibal now specifies. Scipio's unflagging good luck ensured the decisive turn of events in Rome's favour during his Spanish campaign: he has won the glory of carrying the war from Italy to Africa; victory, too, must be his as fortune's favourite.[52]

The psychagogy behind Livy's adaptation of the τύχη-motif aptly proclaims the full greatness of Rome's *fatalis dux* before the last, decisive battle in the war. None of the dramatic elements of §§ 12–14, in which the Livian portrait of Scipio in the third decade culminates,[53] are directly echoed in Polybius (6.8–7.1). Livy has expanded his source from artistic motives and for purposes of characterization. This formulation, which is an integral part of his total anterior portrayal of Scipio, clearly indicates the young Roman's superiority to Hannibal and indirectly re-emphasizes the Carthaginian's role as his petitionary.

At 7.2–4 the Polybian Hannibal expands the argument set forth at 6.8 (his awareness of the wiles of τύχη) and contrasts his previous successes with his present situation in an attempt to prove his credibility. He starts by instancing himself as the example of his premise (7.2). He who after Cannae became master of almost the whole of Italy – and having soon advanced to Rome itself, pitched camp close to the walls, deliberating how to treat the Romans and their native soil (§ 3) – is now negotiating with a Roman in Africa for his own safety and that of his country (§ 4). This pragmatic and sober affirmation of his bad fortune culminates in the next part of his speech in a direct appeal to Scipio (7.5–6). Let Scipio consider his foregoing thoughts and take fitting counsel by choosing the most good and the least evil (§ 5). No man of sense would rush into the danger facing him: victory will add little to the fame of Rome and defeat will nullify all the glory in his past (§ 6).

Under the *certum* the Livian Hannibal, as in Polybius, instances himself as the supreme example of all that the vicissitudes of destiny might bring (§ 16–17). Under the *prudens* (§ 10–15) he specified Scipio's exploits to prove that fortune

52) For a discussion of the striking psychagogy behind the *prudens*, above, Ch. 4, 73.

53) Cf. above, Ch. 4, n. 64; Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 100. Witte, *op. cit.*, 302 is therefore wrong in seeing § 12–14 simply as a "schmeichlerische Aufzählung der Taten Scipios". As part of an *Einzelerzählung*, of course, it might warrant such a description. But in the context of the whole decade it is an important aspect of Scipio's portrait, especially by reason of Livy's introduction here of the τυχη-motif. It is his own ill-starred destiny which compells Hannibal to make this seductive praise of Rome's *fatalis dux*.

had nowhere failed him; but he now instances his own unhappy lot (the *sententia* at 30.16 marks the transition of the argument) to offset the catalogue of Scipio's *res gestae*. Livy's treatment is accordingly far more vivid that Polybius'; Hannibal the petitionary is intent on dissuading Scipio from essaying the summit of his career – the more cogent the argument, the greater its efficacy. Hence the *repraesentatio* in which Hannibal couches the rapid decline (*modo ... hic*) of his whole career; hence the pathetic reference to the death of his brothers and the immediacy of his formulation.[54]

As Livy's anterior portrayal of Scipio culminated under the *prudens* (cf. §§ 12–14), so his anterior portrayal of Hannibal culminates under the *certum* in Hannibal's pathetic affirmation of his ill-starred destiny. None of the two foregoing elements emerge from the Polybian speech: Hannibal's argument is there cool and rational (7.2–4). But for Livy history is an oratorical concept; he expands the central motif of his speech dramatically under the *certum*: Hannibal remains, while stressing fortune's fickleness at the nadir of his career, appropriately supplicant and humble before Scipio.

As we noted in Chapter 4, the preceding part of Livy's speech (§§ 3–17) embodied Hannibal's attempts to dissuade Scipio from essaying the summit of his career; peace is the alternative to the danger of final delusion.[55] The last *topos* of the *argumentatio* (§§ 18–23) appropriately concerns the impending battle; the τύχη-motif, so dominant a theme after § 11 in Livy's expansive use of his source, prevails under the *tutum*. Thus the Livian Hannibal starts from a *sententia* based on his pragmatic mistrust of *fortuna* (§ 18) – developing his argument through a specification of the advantages of peace for both Rome and Carthage (§ 18, last part),[56] two further *sententiae* about the uncertainty involved in a pitched battle (§ 19, first part; § 20), and a summary of his sentiments (Scipio will win more glory by granting peace than he will lose of it by defeat (§ 21)) – to another *sententia* based again on his mistrust of *fortuna*: destiny can undo at a stroke both what has been won and what is hoped for (§ 21, second part). This aspect of the *topos* then culminates (as in Polybius) with a personal appeal to Scipio, couched by Livy as another *sententia*. In making peace all is Scipio's, or else he must take what the gods might give (§ 22).

54) Above, Ch. 4, 74f. for the rhetoric and psychagogy behind the *certum*.
55) *Ibid.*, 75f. for the psychagogy behind the *tutum*.
56) Cf. Polyb. 7.9.

The foregoing part of Polybius' speech (7.5–6) embodied the high point of Hannibal's argument on the wiles of τύχη : let Scipio not be proud, having considered Hannibal's downfall, but take rational counsel and so abrogate the chance of losing his reputation in a pitched battle. Livy too, touches on this motif (§ 21: the antithesis corresponds to Polyb. 7.6), but expands the whole *topos* independently. At § 18 his Hannibal introduces a *sententia* in summary of fortune's ruin of his whole career and develops the *fortuna*-motif at length under the *tutum;* referring especially to the dangers for Scipio of a pitched battle (§ 19. 20. 21: the theme is interwoven with *sententiae*). In Polybius, on the other hand, Hannibal appeals to Scipio's rational judgment (7.5–6). It is *fortuna* and its disastrous effects, then, which preoccupy the Livian Hannibal.[57)]

In Polybius Hannibal cautioned Scipio against arrogance at 7.5: the supreme good is to be satisfied with one's present attainments. Livy does not deal directly with this motif, but the *exemplum* with which he caps Hannibal's foregoing reflexions (§ 18–22) embodies a similar import: Scipio must avail himself of his superiority and conclude peace, or, by overplaying his hand, he could meet the same fate as Regulus (§ 23). At this point in Livy Hannibal's argument acquires great cogency: he caps his theoretical considerations with a pragmatic illustration of fortune's fickleness in contradistinction to the advantages of Scipio's granting peace.

Nowhere is the seductive psychagogy of the Livian Hannibal's speech, as we noted in Chapter 4, intenser than under the *tutum.* Livy touches on Polybius at § 21 (Polyb. 7. 6), but expands the whole *topos* freely. It opens with the *fortuna*-motif (§ 18), and Hannibal is made to emphasize the advantages of peace several times (§§ 18. 19. 21. 22. 23) – more often than in any preceding part of the speech[58)] – and to instance the danger of a pitched battle for Scipio in three *sententiae* (§ 19. 20. 22 (cf. § 23)). None of these motifs is specified in Polybius. The independent elements in Livy's speech clearly proclaim Hannibal's desperation to achieve his goal of peace and to avoid a direct conflict with Scipio at all costs. The adjunct psychagogy re-emphasizes his role as Scipio's petitionary and his fear of defeat and final ruin.

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57) Cf. Edlund, *op. cit.,* 155. The intensity with which he formulates his argument under the *tutum* squares, of course, with the more dramatic depiction (vis-à-vis Polybius) or his downfall under the *certum.*

58) Cf. § 3. 5. 9. 15.

Having warned Scipio indirectly against the dangers of a pitched battle (7.5–6), the Polybian Hannibal concludes his speech (7.7–9), introducing a new aspect into it, heralded by a pithy question – what was his aim in interviewing Scipio? (§ 7). The significance behind his whole argument emerges in the terms of peace he then sets forth (§ 8). The countries which were formerly a subject of dispute – Sicily, Sardinia, Spain – will belong to Rome: Carthage will never make war on account of them; the other islands between Italy and Africa will also be Rome's. Hannibal then caps his proposals with an assurance that they will entail security for Carthage and glory for all Romans (§ 9).[59]

The *exemplum* of Regulus (§ 23) brings the Livian Hannibal, too, to the end of his speech (§ 24–30: the *peroratio*). He introduces his terms of peace, which occupy the first part of the *peroratio* (§ 24–26) independently of Polybius: a *sententia* echoes the petitionary tone of foregoing parts of the speech (§ 24, first part).[60] Except for the patent attempt to speak flatteringly to Scipio, however, the peace terms set forth in Livy correspond with those in Polybius (7.8).[61] The Livian Hannibal, however, stresses that the Carthaginians will be confined to Africa as a result of the peace terms and that, as it is the will of the gods, they will from there see Rome extending her sway over land and sea (§ 26: this flattering yet bitter remark is not echoed in the Polybian Hannibal's essentially political justification of the peace terms (7.9)).[62]

Livy has composed the last part of the *peroratio* (§ 27-30), which incorporates two *amplificationes,* independently of Polybius. Hannibal starts by understating the *fraus Punica* in the recent breach of the treaty – extending his argument through a *sententia* (the reliability of peace depends on those by whom the request is made) and an explanatory parenthesis: witness Rome's rejection of the envoys who sued for peace (§ 27–28: the first *amplificatio*). He then juxtaposes himself with his perfidious countrymen – *Hannibal peto pacem* – in a last attempt to persuade Scipio that he, the aggressor in the war but a victim of destiny, provides the best

59) Cf. Liv. 30.18. Compare Polyb. 6.6 where as in this passage the Polybian Hannibal sets forth a purely political consideration to support his argument.

60) Above, Ch. 4, 77 for the psychagogy behind the *peroratio.*

61) As Edlund observes (*op. cit.,* 156), Hannibal specifies only the territorial aspects of the terms originally laid down by Scipio (Liv. XXX.16.10–13). He ignores the surrender of prisoners, the payment of an indemnity, the handing over of war ships, etc.

62) A political theme thus frames the Polybian Hannibal's speech. In Livy, however, it is rather Hannibal's role as Scipio's petitionary that is stressed in the *exordium* (§ 5) and in the *peroratio* (§ 24. 29).

guarantee of peace and can persuade Carthage to share his view (§§ 29–30: the second *amplificatio*).

Central elements in the foregoing parts of Livy's speech are echoed in his independent formulation of §§ 27–30. Hannibal again stresses his role as Scipio's petitionary[63] and again acknowledges his war-guilt.

The Polybian Hannibal, as we noted in the body of our analysis, argues repeatedly from broad, crypto-political tenets based on general human experience. We recall his reasons for the outbreak of the war (6.6), his exposition of the political advantages of Scipio's granting peace (7.9) – the themes that frame Polybius' speech – and his broad formulation of the lesson to be learnt from his own downfall (7.5–6). Livy takes every opportunity, however, of referring to prior events in the war. We recall Hannibal's reference in the *exordium* to the Battle of the Ticinus (§§ 5) – introducing the suppliant-motif, which frames Livy's speech – his exposition of Scipio's brilliant exploits (§§ 12–14) and of his own dramatic downfall (§§ 16–17), and his *exemplum* of Regulus. He instances these elements at the nadir of his career; they are all aimed at conciliating Scipio or at discouraging him from a pitched battle, the successful outcome of which will crown his career.[64] "Beim Griechen dominiert eine philosophisch-weltanschauliche Deutung des Geschehens, während Livius die historischen Fakten des römischen Aufstiegs zur Erhöhung des römischen Selbstbewusstseins benutzt."[65] In this general context, then, we now summarize the effect of the divergences in Livy's speech on the portrait of Scipio vis-à-vis his doppelgänger in Polybius.

First, in the *exordium* (§§ 3–5: without correspondence in Polybius) we witness the dramatic elements – the operation of *fatum, sors, di* and *fortuna;* the motif of Scipio's devotion to his house; Hannibal's admission of his war-guilt and of his role as Scipio's petitionary – which have contributed to bring the *dux et causa belli* before the *fatalis dux huiusce belli.* Livy intimates Hannibal's downfall and Scipio's impending triumph at the outset. Polybius, however, opens his speech with political reflexions; Livy focuses the reader's attention instead on Scipio.

63) But note the reference (§ 30) to the way in which he has waged war against Rome. That the supplicant-motif never dominates the speech is ensured by the references Hannibal makes to the danger which once threatened Rome through his person (§§ 3. 4. 8. 12. 17. 30).

64) Cf. the two major divisions of Livy's speech: §§ 3–17 (Hannibal's attempt to dissuade Scipio from the summit of his enterprise) and §§ 18–23 (his endeavour to discourage him from a pitched battle).

65) Burck, *Einführung,* 158.

Again, Hannibal's attempts to conciliate Scipio – evident in the *exordium*: he hints at his outstanding achievements (§ 4) – are extended under the *utile* (§ 6–9). The political element recedes into the background and the reader's attention remains centred on Scipio, whose intrepid disposition emerges clearly in Hannibal's fear of his *animus abhorrens a quietis consiliis*. The Polybian Hannibal, on the other hand, instances a broad, neutral factor in this regard (7.1).

Under the *prudens* (§ 10–15), Livy adjusts his source and introduces the *fortuna*-motif[66] at a different point than Polybius (§ 10–11; cf. Polyb. 6.8–7.1); so enabling Hannibal to specify Scipio's exploits and instance him as fortune's favourite. The irony behind the psychagogy proclaims the full greatness of Rome's *fatalis dux*: "Mit innerer Notwendigkeit wird ... vor Zama Hannibal selbst zum Künder der Grösse seines Gegners."[67] This tendency is also evident under the *certum;* Hannibal juxtaposes himself with Scipio to offset his exploits and instance the ruin into which *fortuna* plunges those who trust in her (§ 16–17; Polyb. 7.2–4). The irony behind his words and the specification of the *fortuna*-motif again proclaim Scipio's greatness vis-à-vis Hannibal's decline.

The climactic psychagogy behind the *tutum* (§ 18–23; cf. Polyb. 7.6) keeps Scipio at the focus-point of the interest. Hannibal's desperation to avoid a pitched battle and his role as Scipio's petitionary are again vividly portrayed. This tendency is developed in the specifically Roman *exemplum* (§ 23) with which the Livian Hannibal caps his theoretical reflexions on fortune's fickleness in an attempt to persuade Scipio to grant peace.

As the Polybian Hannibal opened his speech with a political reflexion (6.6: the cause of the war and its possible resolution), so he closes it (7.7–9: the terms of peace and their pragmatic justification). His doppelgänger in Livy, on the other hand, though he specifies the same terms in the *peroratio,* re-emphasizes his role there as Scipio's petitionary and acknowledges his war-guilt, as under the *exordium* (§ 27–30: the two *amplificationes*).

Outwardly, then, the only parts of Livy's speech without any echo at all in Polybius are the *exordium* (§ 3–5) and the latter part of the *peroratio* (§ 27–30).[68] Hannibal there acknowledges his war-guilt and stresses his role as Scipio's petitionary;

66) As from this point, the *fortuna*-motif predominates in Livy's speech (see too, § 5): § 12. 15. 18. 20. 21. 22. 23. 29. Polybius too, deals with it extensively (6.8–7.6). Much of his treatment is indirect, however, and it does not contain the element of dramatic irony evident in Livy.

67) Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 101.

68) Cf. Ullmann, *La technique,* 129; Witte, *op. cit.,* 301.

neither motif is echoed in Polybius.[69] The theme of Hannibal as Scipio's petitionary is greatly expanded by Livy – it underlies all the *topoi* in his version of the speech, except the *certum,* where the psychagogy rather juxtaposes Carthage with Rome. In Livy, then, Hannibal is clearly desperate to appease Scipio, the *imperator Romanus* (31.1), and to persuade him to grant peace. In Livy he appears as Scipio's petitionary, panders to him, admits his own war-guilt, and confers express and extensive praise on Scipio's exploits. On the one hand this formulation shows Hannibal at the end of his career, weary and desperate – we recall a climactic point in the speech: *Hannibal peto pacem* (§ 29) – and on the other it indirectly suggests Scipio's greatness and so that of Rome, too.[70] In Polybius, on the other hand, Hannibal is depicted essentially as the rational statesman. Although he is there weary, mistrustful of his chances in battle, and determined to avert his doom[71] nowhere does he pander to Scipio, play up to him as his petitionary, or ackowledge his own war-guilt. In short, he remains largely dispassionate – as shown especially by the wide-ranging basis of general human experience on which he founds much of his argument. In Polybius, then, there is no glorification of Scipio or of Rome by Hannibal, although in Livy Hannibal is clearly eclipsed by Scipio. Livy accordingly gives his reader an optimistic impression of the likely course of the impending Battle of Zama.

A cardinal element of the eclipse of Hannibal in Livy's version of the speech is his divergent use of the *fortuna*-motif.[72] Livy deals extensively with it – clothing Hannibal's words with an ornate rhetoric[73] – and specifies it frequently. In Polybius, however, it is instanced only three times (6.6; 8. 7.1) although its work-

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69) The one passage in which the Polybian Hannibal appeals directly to Scipio (7.5) is based on a broad philosophical premise and does not detract from his ego at all.

70) Cf. Burck, *Einführung,* 160; Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 98ff.

71) Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 100. These tendencies are especially evident in that part of the speech (6.6–7.6) which deal with the wiles of τύχη, which uplifts man only to plunge him to ruin.

72) Cf. Stübler, *op. cit.,* 162ff.

73) Above, Ch. 4, 71 for a full discussion. A marked feature of the rhetoric vis-à-vis Polybius' neutral formulation is the *sententiae* in Livy's version which recur with greater frequency than in any of his other speeches. Cf. Ullmann, *Étude,* 28; *id., La technique,* 129; Burck, *Einführung,* 157. On the use of *sententiae* to depict the subject's wisdom and experience, Aristotle, *rhet.* II.21.9. Livy's independent formulation underlines the standpoint from which Hannibal tries to make Scipio accept his terms and proposals.

ings underlie much of the speech.[74] In both historians it is used to account for Hannibal's downfall and for Scipio's triumphs. We recall Hannibal's admission in the *exordium* that fortune has contrived, through a *ludibrium casus,* to bring him before Scipio (§ 5); his extensive statement of Scipio's exploits to instance his destiny as fortune's favourite (§ 12–14; Polyb. 7.1); his vivid depiction of his own downfall (§ 16–17; Polyb. 6.8; 7.2–4); and his desperate remarks on the impending battle, which are larded with negative references to *fortuna* (§ 18–23; Polyb. 7.6). Again, the Livian Hannibal mixes the *fortuna*-motif with references to *fatum* and to the gods, who are nowhere mentioned in Polybius; the gods especially are often referred to in a basically negative context. Hannibal notes that they gave him many victories over Rome (§ 4: they have abandoned him now); that it would have been best had they made Rome and Carthage satisfied with their respective possessions (§ 6: their influence in causing the war is implied); that if they gave man wisdom in prosperity, he should not consider the past only, but what might happen in the future (§ 16: we recall his own abandonment by the gods); that Scipio ought to bear in mind that peace is in his hands, whereas victory is dispensed at the whim of the gods (§ 19: this tallies with his own experiences); that all is Scipio's in granting peace – or else he must take what the gods might give (§ 22: his own experiences again justify this); that it is the will of the gods that Carthage should remain in Africa and see Rome extending her sway abroad (§ 26: consistent with his foregoing remarks); and finally, that he is a victim of the envy of the gods (§ 30: having been abandoned by them, he is now at the end of his career).[75] The motif of the gods is used negatively, then, in an attempt to dissuade Scipio from engaging in a pitched battle (§ 16. 19. 22); the irony behind this formulation – "als ob die Götter nicht schon auf der Seite Scipios stünden, als ob nicht die Fortuna, die sie geben, etwas anderes wäre als die Fortuna, die er sonst immer im Munde führt! "[76] – clearly pro-

74) Cf. above, n. 75. We cannot agree with Stübler (*op. cit.,* 167) when he avers that the *fortuna*-motif occupies "einen viel grösseren Raum ... [in Livy] als bei Polybios (7.5)". Proportionately, the treatment is about the same. Livy specifies the theme more often, however, besides expanding the contexts in which it occurs. Cf. too (wrongly) Edlund, *op. cit.,* 164: "Fate ... [is] no marked element in the Polybian version of Hannibal's ... [speech]."

75) The whole argument is, to our mind, consistently logical and tallies with the nuances in the psychagogy. Contrast Stübler, *op. cit.,* 165: "Hannibal ... gebraucht vor allem den Namen der Götter in sehr widerspruchsvoller Weise."

76) Stübler, *op. cit.,* 166.

claims Scipio's religiosity (cf. XXX.31.5) vis-à-vis Hannibal's atheism. The moral element in the speech, too, emerges ironically from Hannibal's words. His references to the gods and to *fortuna* are negative. But the reader recalls Scipio's destiny as the *fatalis dux* and the remarks of his father at the outset of the decade that the gods are fighting on Rome's side (XXI.40.11) and that victory will ultimately be Rome's (XXI.29.4). Livy's divergent use of the *fortuna*-motif and his independent introduction of the motif of the gods accordingly provide us with another optimistic impression of the likely outcome of Rome's *bellum iustum ac pium* before Zama.

It is only in Livy, then, that Hannibal appears as Scipio's petitionary, that he indirectly stresses (through numerous *sententiae*) his wisdom and bitter experience in warning his enemy against the wiles of *fortuna* and the duplicity of the gods; and that he admits his war-guilt and confers such express and extensive praise on Scipio's exploits. And it is only in Livy, too, that he admits to the compulsion with which *fortuna* has made him sue for peace; so that his whole speech there acquires an element of submissiveness which elevates Scipio *in maiorem gloriam populi Romani,* and which is nowhere echoed in Polybius. At the same time, however, the reader is appropriately kept aware of Hannibal's former greatness.[77] "So gelingt es Livius, auch durch die Rede Hannibals", Burck remarks, "... die Ebenbürtigkeit der Gegner nach ihrer Persönlichkeit und ihren Siegen evident zu machen und dadurch die Spannung auf die Entscheidung von Zama noch mehr zu intensivieren."[78] The total presentation, all in all, squares fully with the Roman view of history as *opus oratorium maxime.*

Polyb. XV.8.4–14: Liv. XXX.31.1–9[79]

The Polybian Scipio's speech, like Hannibal's, opens with a short *or. obl.* (8.1–3). The Polybian Hannibal at once took the reader to the heart of the negotiations, asserting indirectly at the outset that both countries were responsible for the two Punic Wars (6.6–7). Scipio now emphatically refutes this point, however, observing that the Romans were not responsible for either war: the Carthaginians were the authors of both (§ 1). The reasons for his conviction are

77) Above, n. 63. Cf. Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 450.

78) *Ibid.,* 450.

79) Above, n. 46 for the literature and other references. Ullmann, *La techique,* 130 gives the following division for the Polybian speech: 1) 1–2. 2 a) 3–5; b) 6–9; c) 10–12. 3) 13. 4) 14. Above, Ch. 4, 78ff. for Livy's version.

then set forth. Hannibal himself knows the true position and the gods, too, have justified it by giving victory, not to the unjust agressors, but to those who took up arms to defend themselves (§ 2).

Scipio then turns to Hannibal's extensive warnings (6.8–7.6) about the wiles of τύχη : he himself is aware of fortune's fickleness and, as far as possible, takes the uncertainty of human affairs into consideration (§ 3). This remark heralds the end of the introductory *or. obl.* and the start of the speech in *or. rect.* At § 1–3 Scipio refuted Hannibal's remarks about Rome's possible *Kriegsschuld*[80] and his allegations about τύχη. He now turns to the proposed terms of peace (7.8–9), relating them to his own reflexions on the past developments in the war (§ 4–5). Had Hannibal retired from Italy and made his proposals before the Romans crossed to Africa, his expectations would probably not have been disappointed (§ 4).[81] As it is, however, he was forced reluctantly to leave Italy after the Romans had crossed to Africa and had taken command of the open country; the situation is now obviously very different (§ 5).

Having thus intimated, in relation to the prior developments in the war, that Hannibal's proposals have been made too late Scipio turns to the prevailing situation (§ 6–9). His reflexions start from a pithy question: what is the position the parties have now reached? (§ 6). The rest of this part of the speech concerns the treaty concluded between Rome and Carthage, from the time of its inception until its final breach by Carthage (§ 7–9). Scipio starts by specifying the terms included (besides Hannibal's recent proposals) in the original treaty, considerately drafted after Carthage's defeat – the surrender of prisoners and war ships, payment of an indemnity, and giving of hostages (§ 7). Then he extends his reflexions, emphasizing the political aspects behind the ratification of the treaty. Both parties sent envoys to Rome; the terms of the treaty were set before the Senate and people: the Romans consented to the terms offered and the Carthaginians begged that they might be ratified (§ 8). The Senate agreed, as did the people, too; but the Carthaginians, after their request had been granted, treacherously violated the peace (§ 9).

These reflexions, in which Carthage's war-guilt and thankless breach of the treaty emerge so clearly, are followed by another short question – what remains

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80) Edlund, *op. cit.*, 157 is wrong is implying that "the first point in Scipio's speech in Polybios, the responsibility of the Carthaginians for the war, lacks a direct connection with what Hannibal has earlier said ...".

81) For an assessment of the veracity of this assurance, Edlund, *op. cit.*, 158f.

to be done? (§ 10). Having urged Hannibal to put himself in his place and answer (§ 10, last part), Scipio ironically turns to the terms of the present treaty (§ 11–12). Is Rome to withdraw the most onerous of the conditions imposed? No, that would be to reward the Carthaginians' perfidy, teaching them to continue betraying their benefactors (§ 11: the tone is ironical). Or is she perhaps to grant Carthage's request in the hope of earning her gratitude? (§ 12, first part: the tone is disparaging). Again, no – having obtained their request by earnest entreaty, the Carthaginians conceived some hope as a result of Hannibal's return, whereupon they treated the Romans as enemies and foes (§ 12, last part: Carthage's motives in breaching the treaty emerge).

Scipio caps his reflexions on the breach of the treaty (§ 7–12) by observing that it might be possible to refer the issue to the Popular Assembly with the addition of more onerous terms (§ 13, first part). If some of the conditions were withdrawn, however – as Hannibal has proposed – it would be useless even to mention the present conference in Rome (§ 13, last part). There is accordingly no point to the interview: let Hannibal, then, either put himself and his countrymen at Rome's mercy, or fight and conquer the Romans (§ 14). The breach of the treaty and Hannibal's proposal of amended terms thus become the primary cause of the impending battle.

Livy precedes his speech with an *aduersus haec* and with a lofty reference to Scipio as the *imperator Romanus* (31.1); neither aspect is echoed in Polybius. The direct sharpness of Scipio's reply and the idealistic political overtones with which it is larded are intimated at the outset. Livy then starts his speech in *or. rect.*, linking Scipio's reflexions to the two *amplificationes* which closed Hannibal's address (XXX.27–30), and which are not echoed in Polybius. Hannibal there understated the *fraus Punica* in the recent breach of the treaty (§ 27) and stressed that the reliability of peace depended on those by whom the request was made (§ 28); going on to emphasize pathetically his role as a petitionary (§ 29) and to assure Scipio that he himself provided a safe guarantee of peace (§ 30). Scipio proudly ignores the supplicant element in Hannibal's entreaties, however, and turns at once to the breach of the treaty (30.1–3: *exordium*). His resoluteness emerges (*non me fallebat*) in his conviction that the Carthaginians violated the treaty, so destroying all chances of peace, as a result of the hopes they pinned on Hannibal's arrival in Africa (§ 1; cf. Polyb. XV.8.12). Hannibal's projected terms of peace, as just set

forth, support this view; he has attempted openly to deprive Rome of her former possessions (§ 2; cf. Polyb. 8.7). Yet he was eager to relieve his countrymen of their burdens; Scipio is bound, on the other hand, to punish their *perfidia* by not omitting any of the previous conditions from the treaty (§ 3; cf. Polyb. 8.11).

Livy's rearrangement of his source in the *exordium*, and his independent linking of Scipio's words to the end of Hannibal's speech, emphasize at the outset the moral aspect of Rome's cause vis-à-vis Carthage. Scipio's proud and unflinching resoluteness – all hope of peace is lost (§ 1) – is founded on this aspect of the presentation, i.e. Carthage's breach of the treaty. Hannibal has no direct responsibility in this last event; his countrymen breached the treaty on his arrival in Africa: his proposals for peace are legitimated by his eagerness to relieve them of their burdens.[82] Scipio is directly juxtaposed with him in this context, however, so that he appears as the champion of Rome's moral cause. None of these elements emerge from the first part of Polybius' speech (§ 4–5).

The Livian Scipio then turns to the *dignum* (§ 4–5), which opens with a restatement (independently of his Polybian counterpart) of Carthage's deceit in the matter of the treaty: although Carthage does not deserve peace, even on the same terms as before the breach of the treaty, Hannibal has tried to improve her terms treacherously (§ 4, first part). This reflexion leads Scipio on to the question of the *Kriegsschuld* (§ 4, second part: in reply to 30.6–8). Rome was not responsible for either of the two Punic Wars: both were *pia ac iusta bella* undertaken in defence of the allies. Hannibal himself has admitted this and it will, as in the First Punic War, be borne out by the gods (§ 5).

Under the *dignum* Livy draws directly on Polybius (8.1–2). The Polybian Scipio, however, did not point out that Rome's war was a *bellum iustum ac pium,* or that it was undertaken in defence of the allies; he simply stated baldly that Rome was not responsible for the war and that the Carthaginians were its authors (8.1). Nor did he directly state Hannibal's war-guilt, which is nowhere ex-

82) Cf. Treptow, *op. cit.*, 206. Cf. Polyb. 8.12. Hannibal's personal guilt is not stressed there, either. Contrast Edlund's incorrect view on the Livian passage as against Polyb. 8. 12: "The final words in this part of Scipio's speech in Polybios ..., a statement where Hannibal's role in the renewed war is not especially stressed, are to be found in Scipio's Livian speech where they are given the shape of an assail [sic] directed to Hannibal personally..." (*op. cit.*, 161). See too, *ibid.*, 159: "... in the Livian speech ... Scipio only takes interest in Hannibal's responsibility for the break of the truce ... (XXX.31.1)".

pressed in the latter's speech in Polybius (but see Liv. 30.3; 30). Again, his reference to the gods referred only to their past influence in the war (§ 2: περιθέντας τὸ κράτος), not to their future influence too, as in Livy (*dederunt et dant et dabunt*). The justification of Rome's whole cause in the war emerges clearly in Livy's independent formulation; the reader recalls Hanno's misgivings – expressed at the outset of the decade (XXI.10.9) – that the Romans would soon be attacking Carthage, led by the gods who blessed their revenge for the breach of the treaty in the first war.[83] Scipio too, is again depicted as the inflexible champion of this cause: his resoluteness is founded entirely on his unshakable trust in the gods. None of these triumphant moral elements emerge from Polybius' neutral formulation.

Under the *iustum* (§ 6–8) Scipio turns to Hannibal's warnings about *fortuna* and the contention that he knows nothing about chance and accident (cf. 30. 10; § 10–23). He refutes the allegations emphatically (§ 6), then points out that if Hannibal had sued for peace before coming to Africa (having voluntarily evacuated Italy and embarked his army) and he, Scipio, had then turned a deaf ear to his proposals, he would have been acting *superbe et uiolenter*; under the present circumstances, however, on the brink of battle having forced Hannibal, despite his bitterest reluctance, to come to Africa he is not bound by any *uerecundia* to consider his feelings (§ 7–8).

Here, as under the *dignum,* Livy has drawn on Polybius (8.4–5). As in Polybius Scipio's remarks on his awareness of fortune's contrariety (§ 6: *omnia quaecumque agimus subiecta esse mille casibus scio*) lead on to an assessment of the position as it would have been had Hannibal sued timeously for peace. Hannibal has destroyed all chance of peace through his conduct, however, so that Scipio is not bound to consider his feelings at all (§ 8: *nulla sum tibi uerecundia obstrictus*). The two chief actors are not juxtaposed in this way in Polybius, whose Scipio founds his conviction that Hannibal is too late on the military changes which have ensued since he left Italy (8.5). The reason given by the Livian Scipio, however, is a moral one; the basis on which he rejects Hannibal's entreaties is founded on the Carthaginian's own conduct, which does not deserve a benevolent hearing. The close link between Scipio's foregoing reflexions and Hannibal's warnings about *fortuna* seems to imply that Scipio has no reason to fear its fickleness because he is acting legitimately in

83) Cf. Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 100; Burck, *Einführung,* 159.

refusing to give Hannibal a hearing. This further triumph of Rome's moral cause, on the basis of which Scipio tersely rejects Hannibal's entreaties, does not emerge in Polybius.

The *peroratio* (§ 9) embodies Scipio's conclusions. He can consider an armistice only if Hannibal is prepared to add compensation for Carthage's actions to his earlier proposals. If Hannibal finds that too great a burden, however, let him prepare to fight – his war-guilt is emphasized again in the strong alliteration with which this decision is justified (*pacem...potuistis*).

In the *peroratio* Livy has again drawn directly on Polybius (8. 13–14). In Polybius Scipio pointed out that it might be possible to refer the treaty to Rome again if more onerous terms were added (§ 13). This is expanded in Livy, and Scipio there bitterly specifies Carthage's actions in breaching the treaty, mentioning the attack on Rome's ships during the armistice and the violence offered to her envoys. Only if compensation is added for this conduct will he take the matter to Rome. Carthage's war-guilt and the moral triumph of Rome's cause through the person of her *imperator* are again manifest. The Polybian Scipio offered Hannibal a simple alternative: surrender to Rome, or fight and conquer her people (§ 14). The Livian Scipio's words have a similar import. They are more closely linked to Carthage's war-guilt, however, and Livy has added the alliterative indictment of Hannibal's war-lust independently of his source. Scipio's proud rejection of the Carthaginian's entreaties culminates in this formulation, which again emphasizes Hannibal's war-guilt.

It is clear then that in this speech, as in the other two, Livy has drawn extensively on Polybius. The import and arrangement[84] of his material, however, are again quite different. The *exordium* comprises an abbreviation of the central part of Polybius' speech (8.6–12)[85] – which entails that the basically political account of Carthage's thanklessness in breaching the treaty has been left out of Livy's (moral) version – and the Polybian introduction (8.1–3) has been shifted to the middle (30.4–5), though its content coincides closely with that of the primary source. The *iustum* too, coincides as to disposition (and fairly closely as to content) with the middle of Polybius' speech (8.4–5). The same applies to the *peroratio*; the content is only slightly different there, too. We now summarize the effect of the divergences on the respective presentations of Scipio.

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84) Cf. Edlund, *op. cit.*, 157: "It is a constant feature in the composition of Scipio's speeches that they differ very much as regards the disposition of the lines of thought common to Polybios' and Livy's accounts."

85) Edlund, *op. cit.*, 162 wrongly thinks the middle part of Polybius' speech is missing in Livy. Cf. too Ullmann, *La technique*, 131.

First, Livy's rearrangement of his source in the *exordium* – which he links to the independent *peroratio* of Hannibal's speech – makes Carthage's *perfidia* a central feature of his version at the outset. It is in this context that Scipio is juxtaposed with Hannibal in Livy – as the *imperator Romanus,* the man bound to punish Carthage's *perfidia;* so that his moral obligation to Rome's cause is manifest at once (§§ 1–3). This aspect of the portrait does not emerge in the Polybian Scipio's bald negation of Rome's guilt in the war (8.1–3).

Livy's *exordium* constitutes an abbreviation of Polyb. 8.6–12. This part of Polybius' speech is linked to the introductory *or. obl.* (§§ 1–3); the two parts make up a refutation of Rome's war-guilt together with a disconnected acknowledgement of the wiles of τύχη (§§ 1–3) and an extensive treatment, on the strength of this, of Hannibal's proposals for peace (§§ 6–12). Scipio's reflexions there are basically political[86] and have to a large extent, save for §§ 4–5, been omitted from Livy's speech. The only aspect of the Polybian Scipio's portrait that we miss in this context, however, is his ironical assumption of Hannibal's role (§§ 11–13), through which he exposes Carthage's treachery and her "gratitude". In our view, however, this is no shortcoming in Livy's speech.

Under the *dignum* of Livy's speech Scipio is again depicted as the unwavering champion of Rome's cause. He there considers the *Kriegsschuld* (§§ 4–5), but expands his Polybian doppelgänger's bald remarks (8.1–2). His absolute trust in the gods, as Rome's mentors, emerges vividly together with the triumphant justification of his country's whole undertaking.

Under the *iustum* (§§ 6–8) Scipio is directly juxtaposed with Hannibal. The Polybian Scipio founded his rejection of Hannibal's terms on the changed military situation: the Carthaginian has come too late (8.4–5). In Livy, however, Scipio's terse rejection of the entreaties is based on Hannibal's own conduct and has a moral foundation: *nulla sum tibi uerecundia obstrictus* (§§ 8). The indirect linking of this resolute aspect of the portrait with Scipio's destiny as the *fatalis dux* does not emerge in Polybius, where the two generals are not directly juxtaposed.

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86) Hoffmann, *op. cit.,* 95f. rightly notes the Polybian Scipio's ties "an Rom, an das Gesetz der Vorfahren und an den Willen der Götter." But he goes too far, in our view, when he claims that this conflicts with Polybius' conception of Scipio as a general and statesman, "in dem klare und nüchterne Überlegung alle gefühls- und traditionsgebundenen Erwägungen ausschaltet." That it might signify a Roman source for Polybius is undeniable; but a rational political element none the less predominates in his speech.

In the *peroratio* Livy's treatment shows a similar tendency to that in the preceding parts of his speech. The form is much the same as in Polybius (8.13–14), but the content has been expanded. The Livian Scipio specifies Carthage's conduct in breaching the treaty and extends the motif of the punishment awaiting this conduct. Livy also includes Scipio's sharp indictment of Hannibal's war-guilt independently of Polybius, on the grounds of which Scipio justifies his final decision: *bellum parate.* The triumph of Rome's moral cause, through the person of her *imperator,* again emerges more clearly than in Polybius.

All in all, then, Livy's speech embodies the more vivid and dramatic portrait. He makes the *imperator Romanus* translate Polybius' basically political reflexions into a triumphant and unyielding expression of Rome's moral cause. This tendency is clearly borne out by the divergent style of the two speeches. Polybius has included both long and short sentences in his version. The latter group comprises mainly inductive or deductive questions (§§ 6. 10. 11. 12), which frame the longer periods that embody Scipio's arguments.[87] His speech accordingly contains an element of the brisk. In Livy's version, on the other hand, virtually all the sentences are of the same length, the most striking rhetorical feature of the speech being the polysyndeta. Scipio's inflexibility is vividly depicted in this formulation.

The most striking difference, in this context, between the two overall presentations of the interview before Zama is perhaps the divergent length of the respective speeches of Scipio and Hannibal in Polybius and Livy. In Polybius the two speeches are almost equally long; in Livy Hannibal's speech is about three times longer than Scipio's and about twice as long as his Polybian doppelgänger's. Much has been written on this point,[88] and the effect of the divergence on Livy's presentation of Scipio was discussed in some detail in Chapter 4. Relating our findings there to the present context, we find that the divergent length of the two speeches in Livy provides a more striking impression of the unflinching rejection of Hannibal's entreaties by Scipio – "[d]ie Kürze verstärkt die Schärfe der Ablehnung"[89] – and that it clearly reflects his proud self-assurance (based on his trust in the gods) vis-à-vis Hannibal's doubt and uncertainty on the one

87) Treptow, *op. cit.,* 211.
88) See the works cited in n. 39.
89) Stübler, *op. cit.,* 167.

hand, and, on the other, "der gewünschten Diktion idealer römischer Oberbeamten"[90] (witness Scipio's proud title: *imperator Romanus* (31.1)). The basis of this foregoing presentation of the moral hero is the way in which Scipio is made to fall back on the Roman state, i.e. on moral and legalistic aspects of his country's cause: the breach of the treaty by Carthage, Rome's duty to her allies, the support of the gods in her *bellum iustum ac pium.* In this context, too, Livy's presentation of Scipio transcends that of Polybius.

Although Livy, then, has relied extensively on his primary source in both speeches, the untrammelled conception of Rome which emerges from his formulation, like the sense of participation he evokes in the reader through his vivid depiction of the personalities of the chief actors, is his own independent work. The tableau of Zama, all in all, squares, vis-à-vis Polybius, with the Roman concept of history as *opus oratorium maxime,* with Livy's reputation as *eloquentissimus,* and with the moral didacticism embodied in these notions.

90) Burck, *Wege zu Livius,* 451.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In the Introduction we posited it as a main aim of this study to establish which assessment of Livy's speeches was the more accurate, Quintilian's praise *cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt* (X.1.101), or the judgment of those modern scholars who assert that the speeches present us with little more than a collection of abstractions or dummies.[1] We set out to assess this question – specifically vis-à-vis Scipio's speeches – against the background of Livy's conception of historiography and his use of Polybius as the primary source for the speeches. A summary of our findings in these two contexts is necessary before we set forth our conclusions on the central theme.

As we noted in Chapter 1,[2] Livy was indirectly heir to the views of numerous Greek historians, moulded by Cicero into a doctrine about what the form and content of history should be. Cicero's Hellenistic conception of historiography, which Livy inherited, culminated in his view of the genre as *opus oratorium maxime* (*de Leg.* I.2.5), a conception in which the following salient features are embodied: (i) the allotment of a central position to the individual in explaining history in its inner relations; (ii) the expression of a didactic moral purpose in the total presentation of the subject matter (the concept of *docere*); and (iii) the notion of the whole as an elegant literary corpus in which Hellenistic techniques of form and presentation find full expression (the concept of *delectare*). The speeches that Livy, in accordance with a long-established tradition, inserted into his narrative were, we went on to show, a valid and integral part of the foregoing basic framework; on the one hand they displayed his rhetorical virtuosity, on the other they incorporated his attempts at the psychological characterization of the great individuals who, to his mind, dictated the course of Roman history.[3]

In discussing the sources Livy used to compose Scipio's speeches in the third decade we established that Polybius was the primary source for three of the major speeches;[4] the one being the address to the mutineers (Liv. XXVIII.27–29 =

1) Cf. the Introduction, 2f.
2) Above, 6ff.
3) Above, Ch. 1, 14.
4) Cf. above, Ch. 2, 19ff.

Polyb. XI.28–29) and the other two the antithetical speeches (the first by Hannibal) which make up an integral part of the tableau of Zama in each historian's account (Liv. XXX.30 = Polyb. XV.6–7. Liv. XXX.31 = Polyb. XV.8–14). Applying our comments in Chapter 1 on Polybius' programmatical tenets for the composition of speeches in historiography to the present context, we recollect that he spurned the concept of τὸ πρέπον (XII.25.5), disparaged the use of epideictic in the composition of speeches (XXXVI.1.7), and emphasized the need to record what was in fact said, and even of this only the essence (XXXVI.1.8). In short, he set his face firmly against the application of so-called "tragic" techniques to the composition of speeches in historiography (II.56.10: the fullest programmatical treatment we have of the contemporary theory of historical composition). For it was only by recording the words actually spoken that he could make history become that manual of political and moral instruction he so earnestly wished it to be.[5] It was in the light of these basic tenets that we compared the presentation of Scipio in the speeches for which Polybius was the primary source.

We now set forth our conclusions on the central theme. In Chapter 3 we sought to show that Livy was profoundly influenced by Hellenistic techniques of form and presentation in the position he allotted to Scipio's speeches. We pointed out that the speeches – especially the major ones – showed a recurrent tendency, manifest in the underlying psychagogy, to create an atmosphere of dramatic tension; the reader – although fully aware of the final outcome of the war – was none the less impressed by the techniques as he would be by the style and effect of a drama.[6] In this context we recall only the prophetic utterances of XXVI.41 – Scipio intrepidly forecasts the successful end of the Spanish campaign, and so the turning of the whole war in Rome's favour – and those of XXVIII.43–44, e.g. the words: "Habebo, Q. Fabi, parem quem das Hannibalem; sed illum ego potius traham quam ille me retineat" (44.9). The appropriate position allotted to these two speeches, which open the Spanish and African campaigns respectively – the reader recalls the situational aspect of Quintilian's praise (X.1.101) – greatly

5) Cf. above, Ch. 1, 10.

6) Livy thus develops and refines, in partial reliance on his sources, the fundamental affinity that existed between tragedy and history from the time of Thucydides onwards. Cf. above, Ch. 1, nn. 18, 27.

accelerates the main action and imparts considerable dramatic tension to the narrative. Again, the two great campaigns in the decade are closed, respectively, by the speech to the mutineers (XXVIII. 27–29) and the speech in reply to Hannibal's entreaties (XXX.31). Here the action is retarded (but the tension again increased) as the reader sees Scipio, on the one hand, pave the way for the implementation of his wide-ranging plans for the African operation, and, on the other, tersely yet triumphantly justify Rome's whole moral cause before Zama. The course of the major action, then, fittingly evolves within the framework of the thoughts, words, and emotions of the chief figure in the presentation. Livy here shows himself to be heir to the views of Hellenistic historiography, which crystallized out in Cicero's doctrines: the causes of history must be explained, "whether they are due to chance, wisdom, or rashness" (*de Orat.* II.63). Human qualities, and beyond them chance and divine intervention, are seen as the primary considerations necessary to explain the past. The Hellenistic conception of the whole as an elegant literary corpus – a ἓν καὶ ὅλον with the *telos* of Rome's final victory – in which a didactic moral purpose finds expression, is evident, too, in Livy's deliberate formulation: "Durch die Form seines Werks ... die Leser zum Miterleben, zum συμπαθεῖν, zu führen, gelingt es ihm auch wirklich, jeden, der sein Werk in die Hand nimmt, an die Welt jener Werte heranzuführen und ihn unter ihren Eindruck zu stellen."[7]

What of the portrait embodied in the speeches themselves? Is it that of an abstraction, a dummy? Or that of the living *fatalis dux huiusce belli?* Several factors, as we pointed out in Chapter 4, contribute to a lively and realistic portrait, especially in the major speeches. The first factor is, of course, the disposition of the *topoi*; the reader, as Quintilian observes, makes his assessment by the type of argument used (III.8.13). Thus at XXVI.41 the *possibile* (§§ 8–13) and the *facile* (§§ 20–22), which frame the *argumentatio,* provide the reader with a vivid impression of Scipio's overmastering confidence, whereas the *religiosum* (§§ 18–19) portrays his absolute trust in the gods and in Rome's destiny. Again, at XXVIII. 27–29 the *pium* (§§ 13–16) spells out his disbelief and indignation at the mutineers' crimes against Rome; the *possibile* (§§ 8–15) the hopeless inadequacy of their goal in relation to his unshakable belief in the permanence of the *res publica;* and the *dignum* (29.1–2) his further bitterness at the execrable conduct of the mutin-

7) Burck, *Die Erzählungskunst,* 241.

eers vis-à-vis their innocent Fatherland. In the antithetical speeches before the Senate in Rome (XXVIII.40–42. 43–44) the disposition of the *topoi* plays an important part in the eclipse of Fabius. The dominant *topos* in Scipio's speech is the *facile* (43.17–44.5); but in Fabius' it is the *tutum* (41.11–17): Scipio is portrayed as filled with confidence and ambition, whereas Fabius is all jealous and negative caution. Again, the *honestum* (§§ 12–15) is without correspondence in Fabius' speech. Scipio there justifies his projected campaign to the Senators on the ground of patriotic considerations; his militant *pietas* clearly signifies the final eclipse of Fabius. Lastly, as to the brief speech before Zama (XXX.31) we note that the *argumentatio* is made up of a *dignum* (§§ 4–5) and a *iustum* (§§ 6–8), whereas Hannibal's address constitutes *topoi* of a more pragmatic kind: the *utile,* the *prudens,* the *tutum.* Scipio's moral superiority to his calculating enemy is suggested by this formulation.

The shorter speeches, too, embody a lively portrait although a division into *topoi* is not always possible here. At XXX.14 – the speech to Masinissa – the *honestum* (§§ 5–7) and the *rectum* (§§ 8–11) suggest Scipio's ethical preoccupation vis-à-vis Masinissa's physical infatuation. And in the short speech to Allucius (XXVI.50: there is no *topoi*-division), the *genus subtile* suggests his kindness and understanding. This speech has much in common with that to Masinissa, however, and the stoical presentation inclines a little to the "conformity to type" of which Walsh has accused Livy.[8)]

The disposition of the *topoi* is not the only factor that contributes to a lively and realistic portrait; the rhetoric, too, plays a vital part. Livy, as we have just intimated, has composed all the major speeches in the decade in full compliance with the formal rules of rhetoric; and within the framework of the richly varied *topoi* has had free recourse to specific stylistic ornamentation. What are the central features of his treatment and how do they affect the presentation of Scipio?

The rhetoric in the speeches is greatly varied and clearly reflects the different moods prevailing under the specific circumstances (we recall the psychological aspect of Quintilian's praise (X.1.101)). Thus the first major speech in the decade (XXVI.41) is characterized by frequent recourse to metaphor (§§ 4. 9. 12. 13. 21); at the outset of his role in the major action the *fatalis dux* fittingly proclaims his understanding of the operation of *uirtus, pietas,* and *fortuna* on Rome's

8) Cf. his *Livy,* 88.

history.[9] This speech, too, like many of the others, is marked by asyndeton and polysyndeton (cf. §§ 10–12. 23–25); Scipio's confidence in and excitement at the projected operations emerge clearly and appropriately. Again, the rhetoric in XXVIII.43–44 (in reply to Fabius) also suits the prevailing mood. We recall only the anaphora and asyndeton of 43.10–11, which proclaim Scipio's justified indignation at the disparagement of his Spanish campaign; the use of the same devices at 43.14–15 in a similar context; the skilful manipulation of the *exempla* at 43.17–44.5 through which his unshakable confidence is implied; and – perhaps the high point of the speech – the use of the graded polysyndeta at 44.6–7 with reference to the African campaign in a context where the psychagogy clearly proclaims him to be the *fatalis dux.*[10] The same consideration – suitability to the prevailing mood – applies to the terse rejection of Hannibal's entreaties (XXX.31). The salient feature of the rhetoric is the polysyndeta (§§ 1. 4. 5. 6. 7), which vividly proclaim Scipio's proud self-assurance and unflinching repudiation of Hannibal.[11] Hannibal's own speech, too (XXX.30) deserves brief mention in this context. It is characterized by a greater number of *sententiae* than any other Livian speech;[12] this formulation aptly proclaims Hannibal's weariness at the end of his career and the desperation with which he attempts to dissuade Scipio from essaying the summit of his career and engaging in a pitched battle.

All the foregoing speeches are of the *genus medium;* the rhetoric is accordingly muted. Only one of Scipio's speeches in the third decade is of the *genus grande:* that to the mutineers (XXVIII.27–29). The rhetoric there is, of course, intenser than in the other speeches we have discussed. We recall only the passionate asyndeta of 27.12 (Scipio sets forth the elements of the mutineers' crimes); the anaphoristic formulation of his triumphant Spanish campaign in the light of the mutineers' futile aspirations (28.9); the use of the same device when he subjects himself to Rome's permanence (28.10–11); the asyndeta of 28.12 which again proclaim his triumphant conviction of Rome's permanence; and the emphatic alliteration of 29.1 where the essence of the mutineers' crimes against *pietas* is stressed again. An especially marked feature of this speech vis-à-vis the others is the number of questions, both long and short, with which it is studded (27.4; 5;

9) Cf. above, Ch. 4, 49f.
10) *Ibid.* 65f.
11) *Ibid.* 80.
12) Above, Ch. 5, n. 73.

13. 28.6; 10; 11; 12; 14; 15). Scipio's indignation and disbelief emerge clearly in this formulation.[13)]

Livy has not composed the shorter speeches analysed in this study as ornately as he has the longer ones. The fragmentary address to the soldiers, for example, is comparatively unadorned (XXVI.43). Its only notable rhetorical features are an anaphoristic *hic* (§ 4–6), antithesis (§ 6), and asyndeta and homoioteleuton (§ 8). The underlying psychagogy, however, supersedes the rhetoric in ensuring a lively presentation.[14)] Again, in the address to Allucius (XXVI.50) the only conspicuous rhetoric is the elaborate structure of § 4–5 (*Ego* ... *faveo*) and the alliteration in § 5. The psychagogy is embodied essentially in Livy's casting of the speech in the *genus subtile,* however, a formulation which gives a vivid, if stereotyped, impression of Scipio's gentlemanly kindness and understanding. The speech to Masinissa, being of the *genus medium,* is a little more ornate both as regards argument and rhetoric. The principle features of the rhetoric are the polysyndeton (§ 4), the parenthetical formulation in § 6 (incorporating asyndeton and anaphora), and the anaphora of § 10. Except for the emphatic parts the rhetoric plays a small role in the presentation; the fullest details of the portrait emerge from the disposition and contents of the *topoi.* But the stoical presentation, as we have already observed, is somewhat stereotyped and the portrait not especially striking.

A final aspect of Livy's lively presentation of Scipio, which we have already hinted at, and a sovereign aspect of his work is the psychagogic formulation of the speeches; the persuasive psychological currents which underlie the presentation. It is hard to specify or define this feature – especially by virtue of Livy's "epic" techniques of characterization – but some brief illustrative remarks on its application in the major speeches are necessary. We recall the motif of the soldiers' *pietas* and *uirtus,* as used in the first major speech in the decade (XXVI.41). It frames the address – with reference to the past in the *exordium* (§ 3–5) and with reference to the future in the *peroratio* (§ 23–25). At the outset the reader is given a clear and suspenseful impression of the likely outcome of the Spanish operation. Again, the speech before the Senate in Rome (XXVIII.43–44) has a similar effect vis-à-vis Scipio's African campaign. We recall the key passage

13) On questions in this regard, Ullmann, *Étude,* 63; Canter, *AJPh* 38, 139.
14) Above, Ch. 4, 50ff.

under the *utile* in which the psychagogy clearly proclaims him to be the *fatalis dux* and in which he, at the same time, confidently sets forth the stages of his projected operation (44.8–9). This tendency is also manifest in the speech to Hannibal where Scipio emphatically prophesies that the gods will grant Rome victory at Zama (XXX.30.5). The striking effects of Livy's psychagogy are, however, best seen in the speech to the mutineers. As from XXVIII.27.11 (the first distinction between the soldiers and the mutineers) the psychagogy repeatedly stresses the mutineers' guilt, sustains the distinction between them and the inculpable soldiers, and incorporates frightening hints at the punishment awaiting the chief actors.[15] This impressive tendency contributes greatly to Livy's basically realistic and frightening portrayal of Scipio. The ironical psychagogy underlying much of Hannibal's speech, too, can be mentioned (XXX.30). We recall only the way in which his repeated, deterrent references to *fortuna* and to the gods indirectly yet strikingly proclaim the full greatness of Rome's *fatalis dux.*[16]

It is clear, then, that Scipio is not depicted as an abstraction or dummy in the speeches. The varied disposition of the *topoi,* the lively and appropriate rhetoric, and the adjunct psychagogy ensure a realistic and impressive portrayal. It is true that the portrait presented is above all a moral one;[17] but this does not detract from the overall impression of contextual realism – except, perhaps, in the two short speeches to Allucius and Masinissa – and it is, besides, an integral and valid part of Livy's conception of the didactic role of the individual in historiography. In short, Livy has revealed considerable flexibility in his moral portrayal of Scipio, and the total presentation fully deserves Quintilian's praise.

To what extent was this formulation Livy's own independent work? To what extent did he rely on his sources for the portrait? Unfortunately, these questions cannot be assessed vis-à-vis his annalistic predecessors, whose accounts he conceivably adapted and absorbed. In the speeches for which Polybius was used, however, a detailed comparison with the primary source is feasible. As can be deduced from our analysis in Chapter 5, Livy keeps fairly close to the basic tenor of his primary source, although he shows a clear tendency to independence especially in his rearrangement of the disposition in Polybius. Thus in the speech

15) Above, Ch. 4, 56ff.

16) *Ibid.*, 71ff.

17) Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 99; Burck, *Livy,* 34 n.26.

to the mutineers he reallocates the key passage in which they are distinguished from the inculpable soldiers;[18] a compositional alteration which enables him validly to make Scipio give an extended moral lesson to the soldiers and, at the same time, to hint at the punishment awaiting the mutineers. Again, he does not hesitate to introduce a specifically Roman ethos into his adaptation of the source-content; the moral elements in the address to the mutineers – their crimes against *pietas,* the gods of Rome, and the army's usages and customs – are founded on this aspect of the presentation, as on the *exempla* which are a regular and integral part of Scipio's speeches (examples from the past have a pragmatic, moral value). Hence the more frightening, realistic, and specifically Roman portrait in Livy vis-à-vis that in Polybius, whose primary concern in the speeches is political. Another distinct tendency in Livy's use of his primary source is his seeming lack of scruple in adjusting the content *in maiorem gloriam populi Romani.* This is especially evident in the two speeches before Zama where his independent treatment of Hannibal's speech and his adjustment and realignment of the disposition in the primary source clearly intimate Scipio's greatness and so that of Rome, too.[19] The moral element of Roman pragmatic historiography is manifest in this tendency; Rome will wreak vengeance through the person of her *fatalis dux* – through the operation of *fatum, sors, di* and *fortuna* - on the *dux et causa belli.* It emerges even more clearly in Scipio's speech, where the justification of Rome's whole cause crystallizes out before the final battle at Zama.[20]

We need hardly add that Livy's versions of the speeches are rhetorically more ornate than Polybius'; this treatment tallies with Cicero's conception of historiography as *opus oratorium maxime* (*de Leg.* I.2.5). The more ornate rhetoric, as we have already implied, contributes – like the function of the speeches as an organic part of the composition – to a more lively overall portrait of Scipio in Livy than in Polybius.

As we noted in Chapter 1, Polybius, in pleading for new standards and canons in historiography, stressed the need to record what was actually said or done on any occasion, however commonplace.[21] If we judge by the way Livy has used Polybius in the speeches, however, it becomes clear that the Roman

18) Cf. above, Ch. 5, 85f.

19) *Ibid.*, n. 70.

20) *Ibid.*, n. 83.

21) Above, Ch. 1, 9f.

historian – a consideration of his likely secondary sources excluded – inclines to the class of so-called "tragic" historians, who, in Polybius' words, "tried to imagine the probable remarks of their characters" (II.56.10). In this context – restricted though it be – can our historian, finally, be justly accused of deliberately falsifying history, a charge often laid at his door? [22] A German scholar must have the last word. Livy, Burck has observed, approached his source-content "mit der ganzen Liebe und Wärme eines Menschen, dem es um die eigene Sache, um die Geschichte des eigenen geliebten Volkes geht."[23] In short, then, it is Livy the patriot, the artistic historian, who depicts Scipio, the moral hero, at the centre of the third decade of the *A.U.C.*

22) Cf. Walsh, *Livy,* 109: "He has falsified history not by error but by design."

23) *Die Erzählungskunst,* 236.

Summary

"The Speeches of Scipio Africanus
in the Third Decade of
Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita*"

by

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Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF ARTS.

The Introduction includes a review of the salient literature. This shows that many of the studies amount to an unimaginative treatment; little attention has been paid to the psychagogic aspects and their influence. The study starts from this point vis-à-vis Quintilian's judgment, *cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt* (X.1.101).

Chapter 1 outlines the applicable tradition of rhetoric. The starting-point is *docere* (didactic) and *delectare* (epideictic). Emphasis is put on the Hellenistic doctrines Livy inherited from Cicero. The elements traced are the individual's position in historiography, the didactic moral aspects underlying form and presentation, the concept of suitability (τὸ πρέπον), and the influence of epideictic. Polybius' relevant programme for political historiography (II.56.10) is considered vis-à-vis "tragic" history. Livy's germane attitudes are then culled from Cicero's synthesized canons.

Chapter 2 is a discussion of the sources for the speeches. The approach adopted is that Livy's "epic" techniques of characterization can be assessed only if it is established for which of the speeches Polybius was the indisputable primary source.

The structural allocation of the speeches is considered in Chapter 3. Attention is given to Scipio's position at the centre of the decade and to Hellenistic techniques of presentation (accelerating or retarding the action, increasing the tension, intensifying the psychagogy). The findings are assessed against Quintilian's judgment (X.1.101).

Chapter 4 is a detailed discussion of the major speeches. Livy's vivid characterization of Scipio is considered in the light of the underlying psychagogy, as set off against the formal rhetorical background (the *genera causarum,* the *genera dicendi,* the various *topoi,* and the technical formulation of the linguistic elements). The lively total portrayal is favourably assessed against Quintilian's judgment (X.1.101).

Livy's and Polybius' respective presentations of Scipio in the relevant speeches (Liv. XXVIII.27–29 = Pol. XI.28–29; Liv. XXX.30 = Pol. XV.6–7. Liv. XXX.31 = Pol. XV.8) are analysed in Chapter 5. Especial attention is given to the differences of portrayal based on general programmatical divergences in the outlook of the two historians (the moral element as against the political, the oratorical style as against the plain). The palm goes to Livy for his more vivid, impressive, and specifically Roman portrait.

Chapter 6 embodies the conclusions. The portrait is reviewed against the background of Livy's conception of historiography, the position allotted to the speeches, the portrayal they embody, and the use made of Polybius. The effect of the salient features in the framework of the whole study – history as an oratorical concept having a moral value; the arresting allocation of the speeches; the disposition of the *topoi,* the influence of the rhetoric and psychagogy; the effect of the source-divergences – is related to the overall presentation, which is then briefly vindicated.

Opsomming

"The Speeches of Scipio Africanus
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deur

Allan Douglas Botha

Leier: Prof. D.M. Kriel

Departement: Latyn

Voorgelê ter vervulling van 'n gedeelte van die vereistes vir die graad MAGISTER ARTIUM.

Die Inleiding gee 'n oorsig van die belangrikste literatuur wat aandui dat baie van die studies op 'n verbeeldinglose behandeling neerkom. Min aandag is aan die invloed van die psygagosiese aspek gewy. Die studie neem 'n aanvang met hierdie punt, met inagneming van Quintilianus se oordeel *cum personis tum rebus accommodata sunt* (X.1.101).

Hoofstuk 1 omlyn die relevante retoriese tradisie. Die begrippe *docere* (didaktiek) en *delectare* (die epideiktiese) dien as uitgangspunt. Die invloed van die Hellenistiese leerstellinge wat Livius van Cicero geërf het, word beklemtoon. Die volgende elemente word nagespoor: die posisie van die indiwidu in die geskiedskrywing, die didakties-morele aspekte wat vorm en aanbieding ten grondslag lê, die toepaslikheidsbegrip (τὸ πρέπον) en die invloed van die epideiktiek. Polubios se relevante program vir die politieke geskiedskrywing (II.56.10) word teenoor die "tragiese" geskiedskrywing behandel. Daarna word Livius se toepaslike houdinge uit Cicero se "kanon" opgevang.

Hoofstuk 2 is 'n bespreking van die bronne van die toesprake. Die uitgangspunt is hier dat Livius se "epiese" karakteriseringstegnieke beoordeel kan word slegs indien daar vasgestel is vir watter toesprake Polubios die ontwisbare primêre bron is.

Die strukturele plasing van die toesprake word in Hoofstuk 3 behandel. Aandag word aan Scipio se posisie in die middelpunt van die dekade gewy en aan Hellenistiese aanbiedingstegnieke (versnelling of vertraging van die aksie, verhoging van die spanning, intensifisering van die psygagogie). Die bevindinge word opgeweeg teen Quintilianus se oordeel in X.1.101.

Hoofstuk 4 is 'n bespreking van die belangrikste toesprake. Livius se lewendige uitbeelding van Scipio word in die lig van die onderliggende psygagogie oorweeg teenoor die formele retoriese agtergrond (die *genera causarum,* die *genera dicendi,* die verskillende *topoi,* en die tegniese formulering van die taal-elemente). Die lewendige geheel-uitbeelding word gunstig gemeet aan Quintilianus se oordeel in X.1.101.

Livius en Polubios se onderskeie aanbiedinge van Scipio in die relevante toesprake (Liv. XXVIII.27–29 = Pol. XI. 28–29; Liv. XXX.30 = Pol. XV.6–7. Liv. XXX.31 = Pol. XV.8), word in Hoofstuk 5 ontleed. Aandag word veral gewy aan die verskille in aanbieding wat op algemene programmatiese afwykings in die benadering van die twee geskiedskrywers gebaseer is (die morele teenoor die politieke, die oratoriese styl teenoor die eenvoudige). Livius verdien die louere weens sy lewendiger, indrukwekkender en meer spesifiek Romeinse uitbeelding.

Hoofstuk 6 bevat die gevolgtrekkings. Die portret word in oënskou geneem teenoor die agtergrond van Livius se opvatting van geskiedskrywing, die posisie wat aan die toesprake toegewys word, die uitbeelding wat hulle bevat, en die gebruik wat van Polubios gemaak word. Die effek van die belangrikste kenmerke teen die raamwerk van die hele studie – die geskiedskrywing as 'n oratoriese begrip met 'n sedelike strekking; die opvallende plasing van die toesprake; die plasing van die *topoi,* die invloed van die retoriek en die psygagogie; die implikasies van die bronneafwykings – word met die algemene uitbeelding in verband gebring en lg. word dan kortliks geregverdig.

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