

SUICIDE ATTACKS AS A TERRORIST TACTIC: CHARACTERISTICS AND COUNTER-MEASURES

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ABSTRACT

As a systematic terrorist tactic, suicide attacks are a relatively new phenomenon. The article surveys the dimensions of this phenomenon, influencing factors, and counter-measures. After an overview of the political and strategic significance of this tactic, the article discusses the distribution of suicide attacks around the globe, arguing that although suicide attacks have grown dramatically in recent years, the bulk of them occur in *foci* of acute violent conflicts. A description is also provided of how Palestinian groups prepare for suicide attacks, emphasising the role of community support and the perpetrating group in the process. The article concludes with a brief discussion of counter-measures.

1. INTRODUCTION — THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION

Suicide terrorism constitutes a political and strategic problem of considerable import. This observation seems obvious after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States (US). Yet even prior to the attacks in New York and Washington, suicide attacks have had, on some occasions, far-reaching political consequences. Attacks against

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US and French forces and diplomatic missions in Lebanon in 1983 resulted in the evacuation of the Multinational Force from that country. This step enabled the Syrian *de facto* takeover of the country and had a vast influence on Lebanese domestic and international politics in the following years. In another arena, Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel during 1996 resulted in a change of the Israeli government and had a major deleterious impact on the Middle Eastern peace process.

1.1 The proliferation of suicide attacks

Suicide attacks currently constitute the most deadly form of terrorism. Suicide attacks have been the most lethal method of all terrorist tactics used so far. In Israel, suicide attacks have comprised less than one percent of all terrorist attacks during the second *intifada*, yet they caused more than 50 per cent of the fatalities. The number of fatalities of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the US — about 3 000 people — was nine times higher than the number of casualties of any previous terrorist attack.¹⁾ In the period from January 1981 through June 2007, at least 18 732 people were killed and 41 716 were wounded in suicide attacks around the globe.²⁾

Apart from being the most deadly form of terrorism, suicide terrorism is proliferating. The systematic use of suicide attacks by terrorist groups started in the early 1980s, but more than 70 per cent of the attacks have taken place during the recent three years (2004-2006). The growth is not only in the frequency of attacks, but also in their geographical distribution and the number of groups involved. In the 19-year period of 1981-1999 suicide attacks took place in 17 countries, whereas in the seven-year period of 2000-2006 suicide attacks occurred in 29 countries. During the period of 1981-2006 the problem has, therefore, been growing rapidly (see *Figure 1*).

This trend is perceived as an alarming indication that this form of terrorism is spreading exponentially and may reach disastrous proportions. However, suicide terrorism, unlike an epidemic or a new technology (for example, the use of the internet or cell phones), does not proliferate in ever growing circles. A closer look at the geographical distribution of suicide attacks reveals that the bulk of them have occurred in countries where an acute conflict has taken place at the time (see *Table 1*). Thus, three countries — Iraq, Israel and Afghanistan — account for 78 per cent of the world's total of suicide

FIGURE 1: WORLDWIDE NUMBER OF SUICIDE ATTACKS PER YEAR, 1981-2006




TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF SUICIDE ATTACKS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: 1981-2006

Country	Number of Attacks	Percentage of World Total
Iraq	908	58.7%
Israel (including Occupied Territories)	183	11.8%
Afghanistan	139	9.0%
Sri Lanka	81	5.2%
Lebanon	41	2.7%
Russia (including Chechnya)	34	2.2%
Pakistan	30	1.9%
Turkey	26	1.7%
India	15	1.0%
Saudi Arabia	9	0.6%
Egypt	8	0.5%
Indonesia	7	0.5%
Bangladesh	7	0.5%
Morocco	6	0.4%
Uzbekistan	6	0.4%
United States of America	5	0.3%
China	5	0.3%
Other countries	36	2.3%
World Total	1 546	100%

attacks and Iraq alone accounts for 56 per cent of the world's total of suicide attacks since 1981.

The table only lists countries where five or more suicide attacks have taken place. Smaller numbers of suicide attacks took place in Jordan, the United Kingdom (UK) and Yemen (four attacks each); in Argentina, Kenya and Kuwait (two attacks each); and in Bolivia, Croatia, the Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Spain, Tanzania, Tunisia and Uganda (one attack each).

1.2 Recent trends

The distribution of suicide attacks around the globe over a quarter of a century only partly reflects recent trends. Because suicide attacks tend to concentrate in countries where a violent conflict is waged, and their occurrence is by and large limited to the duration of the conflict, the present distribution of suicide attacks is different from

what it was two decades ago (see *Table 2*). Whereas in some countries the rate of suicide attacks has increased during the period under consideration, in others it has declined.

Evidently, the frequency of suicide attacks reflects the state of the conflict at any given time. In Israel, the rate of suicide attacks has declined steadily since 2003 as a result of several factors, mainly effective Israeli counter-measures, the death of Arafat, and a decline in Palestinian public support for the continuation of the armed struggle. A steady decline in suicide attacks has also taken place in Russia, apparently as a result of the Russian success in incapacitating the Chechen rebels.

A sharp rise in suicide attacks, on the other hand, has taken place in Afghanistan starting from 2005, in line with an intensification of the Taliban struggle against the United Nations (UN) forces. The rising frequency of suicide attacks in Afghanistan is due to the strengthening of the Taliban and their decision to adopt suicide attacks as a systematic tactic (probably in view of the effectiveness of this method in Iraq). In Pakistan, the increase in suicide attacks signifies the intensification of the struggle between militant Islamic groups and the Musharraf government. *Table 2* does not, however, reflect the sharp rise in suicide attacks in Pakistan in the wake of the siege and eventual storming of the Red Mosque (*Lal Masjid*) by government forces in July 2007. The mosque had been a haven for radical Islamists, many of them from the North-West Frontier Province (Waziristan area), known for widespread support for the Taliban and

**TABLE 2: RECENT TRENDS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES:
2003-2007**

Country	Year				
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007*
Iraq	35	137	461	161	237⇒474
Afghanistan	2	3	19	100	64⇒128
Israel	26	16	7	5	1⇒2
Russia	10	7	1	0	0⇒0
Pakistan	2	10	3	9	13⇒26
Sri Lanka	1	1	0	13	5⇒10
Turkey	7	1	1	1	3⇒6

* Actual data for the first six months of 2007 and extrapolated projection for the whole year.

al-Qaeda. In the month of July 2007 alone 14 suicide attacks were carried out against government forces, more than the total number in the preceding six months. The projected number of suicide attacks in 2007 may thus be considerably larger than reflected in the table, which is based on data of the first six months of 2007.³⁾

Another case of a recent rise in suicide attacks has been Sri Lanka. This rise has accompanied the collapse of the cease-fire, which was signed in 2002, and lasted until 2006. During the period of 1987-2002, which preceded the cease-fire, the Tamil Tigers carried out nearly 70 suicide attacks, but in the four years of the cease-fire they conducted only two such attacks. In the 18 months period after the cease-fire broke down, the Tamil Tigers have already carried out 19 suicide attacks, a pace higher than the average rate before the cease-fire.

Marked fluctuations in the frequency of suicide attacks within the short time span under consideration have taken place in Iraq and, on a much smaller scale, in Turkey. In Iraq, suicide attacks started after the foreign military intervention by Coalition Forces in 2003 and rose rapidly to a peak of 461 attacks in 2005. Successful counter-measures curtailed the rate of attacks by two-thirds (161 in 2006), but the insurgency has by no means been crushed. The rate of attacks has increased again in 2007 to the 2005 level, presumably as a result of an influx of Jihadists from Middle Eastern and North African Arab countries, who have presumably carried out the majority of suicide attacks in Iraq.

In Turkey, suicide attacks have been perpetrated by groups of different types. Militant Muslims associated with al-Qaeda carried out most of the attacks in 2003. One attack was carried out by a left wing group, the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party (known by its Turkish acronym DHKP-C). These groups have not carried out any more suicide attacks so far. All suicide attacks in the years 2004-2006 were carried out by Kongra-Gel (KGK), formerly known as the Kurdish Labor Party (PKK).⁴⁾ The PKK campaign of suicide attacks started in 1996 but was halted in 1999, when the group stopped its armed struggle after a series of defeats, including the arrest of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The resumption of armed struggle (including suicide attacks) has presumably been influenced by hopes aroused by the establishment, under the auspices of the Coalition Forces, of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Iraq, just across the border,

as well as by frustrated demands for autonomy in the Kurdish regions in Turkey.

Suicide terrorism has been widely associated with Islamic fanaticism. Indeed, of the 1 655 suicide terrorist attacks after 11 September 2001, 98 per cent have been carried out by Muslims, most of them members of militant Islamic groups. Many authors have attributed suicide attacks to Islamic fanaticism and religious fervour.⁵⁾ Yet, Islamic fanaticism is certainly not a necessary factor for carrying out suicide attacks. Since 1981, many attacks have been carried out by non-Islamic organisations, such as the Tamil Tigers, the Kurdish Workers' Party (an ethnic-nationalist group, which also espouses a quasi-Marxist ideology), and a plethora of secular groups in Lebanon and Palestine (the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Fatah, and the Lebanese Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Ba'ath and the Lebanese Communist Party). The current prevalence of Islamic groups in suicide attacks is, presumably, a result of the fact that the most acute and violent conflicts today are conducted by Islamic groups, usually against Western adversaries (notably, in Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, and Chechnya). Yet, it seems that in addition to their proven effectiveness as a terrorist tactic, for Muslim groups suicide attacks have also become a fashion, a demonstration of devotion and self-sacrifice for the cause. Moreover, whereas groups such as the Tamil Tigers and the PKK justify suicide attacks on account of their tactical effectiveness, Muslim groups present such attacks as an end in itself, emphasising the personal value of 'martyrdom' as the shortest way to Paradise and the wish of every devout Muslim.

2. THE MAKING OF SUICIDE TERRORISTS

2.1 Community support

The magnitude of public support for suicide operations affects both the terrorist group's willingness to use this tactic and the number of volunteers for suicide missions. Most, if not all terrorist groups that have used suicide attacks are not indifferent to the opinions and attitudes of what they view as their constituency — the population whose interests they claim to serve and from whom they recruit their members. In choosing tactics and targets, the group tends to act

within the boundaries of its constituency's approval. On the individual level, it is easy to understand that where the community views suicide attacks as the utmost form of patriotism and heroism, many youngsters would be willing to volunteer for a suicide mission, or at least find it hard to refuse a request to become a 'martyr'.

In the Palestinian case, the frequency of suicide attacks has roughly corresponded with the level of public support for such attacks. Public opinion polls conducted by reliable Palestinian polling institutions have shown that at the peak of the second *intifada*, public support for suicide attacks was always higher than 50 per cent and often reached 70 per cent or more.⁶⁾ At times when Palestinian public support for suicide attacks was low (before the second *intifada* and after the death of Arafat in November 2004), the frequency of attempted suicide attacks was much lower than at the height of the *intifada*. Before the *intifada*, the highest rate of support was 35.5 per cent,⁷⁾ but usually less than 30 per cent.⁸⁾ After the death of Arafat support for suicide attacks dropped to a level below 60 per cent.⁹⁾

Community support for suicide attacks is an important factor in motivating youngsters to undertake suicide missions. In itself, however, it is insufficient for generating a large wave of suicide attacks locally. Polls conducted by the Pew Research Center have shown that justification of suicide attacks against civilians, for defending Islam, was quite high in several Muslim countries. Thus, in a poll conducted in 2005, 57 per cent of the respondents in Jordan, 39 per cent in Lebanon, 25 per cent in Pakistan, and 15 per cent in Indonesia justified suicide attacks.¹⁰⁾ In some of the countries higher rates of support for suicide attacks were found in earlier polls.¹¹⁾ A specific question regarding suicide attacks against Westerners in Iraq also found high rates of support.¹²⁾

Despite these considerable rates of support, Jordanian, Moroccan, Lebanese, Indonesian and Turkish Militant Muslims have only carried out a small number of suicide attacks in their own countries in recent years. A larger number of them have, presumably, travelled to fight in Iraq. By and large, the conglomeration of suicide bombers in Iraq represents the ideological zeal of Muslim militants around the globe. The little information available on their countries of origin, however, suggests that most of them came from Saudi Arabia, the source and hub of Wahabbism. An Israeli scholar, Reuven Paz, analysed the obituaries of 'shahids', which appeared in al-Qaeda-associated

Islamic websites.¹³⁾ The 154 'shahids' in his study included 61 per cent Saudis, 10.4 per cent Syrians, 7.1 per cent Kuwaitis, and 8.4 per cent indigenous Iraqis. Only four of the 'shahids' (2.6 per cent) were Jordanians and two (1.3 per cent) were Moroccans. Thirty-three of the 154 'shahids' carried out suicide attacks; only one of them was from Morocco (3 per cent) and none from Jordan.

Comparing the magnitude of public support for suicide attacks, found by the Pew polls in Muslim countries with the actual country distribution of suicide bombers in Iraq, leads to the conclusion that other factors, besides community support, influence the intensity of campaigns of suicide attacks. For driving a large number of people to carry out suicide attacks (or to risk themselves in other forms of terrorist activity, for that matter), three other conditions must exist. Firstly, a feeling that the struggle involves immediate existential interests of the community; secondly, support for and encouragement of suicide attacks by generally accepted social agents, such as the media and figures of authority; and thirdly, an organisation that transforms the raw readiness to actual behaviour by recruiting the suicides and preparing the mission.

2.2 The role of the group

Practically all suicide bombers have been sent by a group. With the exception of two cases, no suicide bomber has carried out the attack on his (or her) own whim. The group has a critical role in suicide terrorism. In practically all cases it was an organisation that decided to use this tactic, chose the target and the time, prepared the explosive charge, and arranged the logistics necessary for getting the human bomb to the target. Evidently, therefore, the terrorist group's decision to use suicide attacks as a tactic and its influence on the candidates, are key elements in this phenomenon.

In the Palestinian case, preparation of a suicide attack has become a fairly standard practice in all groups. Throughout the process, the local leader of the group supervises the preparations. The first stage involves procuring an explosive device and recruiting a candidate for carrying out the suicide mission. About half of the candidates have volunteered on their own initiative — that is, approached, on their own initiative, a person known to them as a member of one of the militant groups, and asked to be sent on a suicide mission.

The other half have been first approached by a recruiter and agreed to the suggestion to carry out a suicide attack. In both cases, social pressure plays an important role.

Having agreed to undertake the mission, the candidate is taken to meet the local group's leader, who tries to ascertain that the candidate is trustworthy and would not abandon or otherwise jeopardise the mission. For the candidate, a teenager or a young, unimportant man, the leader is an awe-inspiring figure, widely revered in the community. Displaying hesitation in his presence is out of question for most candidates. Therefore, the typical candidate gives his consent once more, thus strengthening his commitment further.

For fear of detection by the Israeli intelligence, during the second *intifada* the Palestinian groups tried to cut the preparation period as short as possible. About one-third of the candidates have been dispatched to their target within 10 days after their recruitment, and the remaining two-thirds within a month. During this period, the leader and his assistants instruct the candidate on the operational aspects of the mission (carrying and activating the explosive device and behaviour on the way to the target). Talks during these meetings are also aimed at further bolstering the candidate's commitment to the mission.

The final act of strengthening the candidate's resolve usually takes place on the day before launching, and sometimes immediately prior to dispatching. This act consists of videotaping the candidate reading his last statement. In the statement, which is often written by the leader rather than by the candidate, the candidate refers to himself as 'the living martyr'. After this ritualistic and documented statement of his commitment to die, it is extremely difficult for the candidate to abort the mission. Thus, the build-up of commitment to the leader and the group is a critical factor in ensuring the candidate's persistence through the mission.

2.3 Individual characteristics

Most suicide terrorists are young, unmarried men (there are some differences between countries). Other demographic characteristics do not explain the willingness of individuals to embark on a terrorist suicide mission. Suicides are not poorer or less educated than other people of their age in their community. Usually, they do not have a

personal reason to take revenge (such as for the killing of a family member by the security forces). Most of them (even those belonging to religious groups) are not more religious than others in their community. Findings of preliminary studies in Israel suggest that Palestinian suicide bombers tend to be socially marginal, have low self-esteem, are easily influenced, and some of them display suicidal tendencies.

3. COUNTER-MEASURES

At the security forces level, measures designed to prevent suicide terrorism include physical defence and proactive measures. The following analysis is mainly based on Israel's experience.

3.1 Physical defence measures

Physical defence measures against suicide attacks include guards and procedures designed to prevent the suicide attacker from reaching the target. These measures have been quite effective in preventing suicide attacks against selected potential targets (for example, military units and government offices) where access can be controlled, but cannot completely forestall attacks against the public at large (such as buses, restaurants, and shopping malls). In Lebanon, after the initial suicide attacks which caused a large number of casualties, Israeli forces instituted simple procedures that effectively diminished the success of suicide attacks.

The effect of these measures on the number of attacks and fatalities, was clearly evident (see *Table 3*). The table covers the period from 1982 when the first suicide attack against an Israeli or Western target occurred, to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in May 2000. As indicated, the number of attacks declined sharply after 1985. This decline was not incidental. The diminishing mean number of fatalities per attack, due to the counter-measures, made the groups that perpetrated suicide attacks reconsider the worth of this tactic. In fact, as early as 1985, 15 years before Israel's final withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah's spiritual leader, Mohammad Hussayn Fadlallah, realised that suicide attacks failed to achieve their intended results and ruled that under these circumstances they were to be stopped. In Fadlallah's words:¹⁴⁾

We believe that suicide operations should only be carried out if they can bring about a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb ... But the present circumstances do not favor such operations anymore, and attacks that only inflict limited casualties (on the enemy) and destroy one building should not be encouraged, if the price is the death of the person who carries them out.

Preventing and obstructing suicide attacks against random targets in civilian population centres is much more difficult. In Israel, in the wake of suicide attacks on board buses, in coffee shops and shopping malls, hired guards have been placed at shops and public entertainment entrances. On several occasions these guards have prevented suicide bombers from entering their intended target, often at the cost of their own lives. Had the suicide bombers exploded inside an enclosed area crowded with people, the number of casualties would have been considerably higher.

3.2 Proactive measures

Throughout the second *intifada* Israel has used proactive measures, such as preventive attacks on organisers of suicide attacks and bomb-makers located within the Palestinian-controlled areas. These hits have been effective in reducing the number of suicide attacks by temporarily incapacitating local cells, but they have had no deterring effect. All three major Palestinian militant groups, Hamas, Fatah and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), have been able to replace the lost men within weeks or a few months. These proactive operations require not only precise and timely intelligence on the identity of the key terrorist operatives and their exact location at a given point in time, but also smooth and effective co-ordination between intelligence and operational units, which are assigned to act in real time on the basis of intelligence information.

3.3 Influencing the population's attitudes

In the long run, coping with suicide attacks (as well as with other forms of terrorism) requires policies designed to influence the political attitudes of the population from which terrorists emerge. Admit-

Year	Number of attacks	Fatalities	Mean fatalities per attack
1982	1	89	89
1983	4	482	120.5
1984	2	23	11.5
1985	22	46	2.1
1986	2	5	2.5
1987	1	0	0
1988	4	11	2.75
1989	2	0	0
1990	0	0	-
1991	0	0	-
1992	0	0	-
1993	0	0	-
1994	0	0	-
1995	2	12	6.0
1996	1	1	1
1997	1	0	0
1998	0	0	0
1999	1	1	1
2000	0	0	-

tedly, the practical value of this suggestion is limited and, therefore, this is a rather pessimistic observation. Militant Islamists — who, in recent years, have generated the great majority of suicide attacks around the globe — want a basic change in the political and economic global power distribution. It is extremely unlikely that Western powers are going to make significant concessions so as to satisfy these demands, however slightly. What is at stake is much more important than the limited loss of life caused by Islamist terrorist attacks. Local conflicts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian, the Russian-Chechen, and the Turkish-Kurdish disputes, are also difficult to resolve. These, like other ethnic-nationalist conflicts, are very resolute, and most of them are centuries old.

Presumably, influencing the public opinion of minority communities that have generated suicide attacks is more realistic. In the UK, the majority of the Muslim community has opposed the London sui-

cide attacks of July 2005. Similar attitudes to suicide attacks were found among Muslims living in several other European countries. In a Pew Research Center poll conducted in 2006, 15 per cent of the Muslims sampled in the UK, 16 per cent of those in France and Spain, and seven per cent of those in Germany, thought that suicide bombing against civilian targets, in order to defend Islam from its enemies, is often or sometimes justified. However, most of the respondents in all European countries sampled, 64 per cent in France, 69 per cent in Spain, 70 per cent in the UK, and 83 per cent in Germany, said that suicide attacks against civilians were never justified.¹⁵⁾ This is the main reason why, despite the existence of small clusters of militant Muslim youngsters, suicide attacks in Western Europe have so far been a rather rare occurrence. The first tenet of a wise anti-terrorism policy must, therefore, be that the population that serves as the potential recruiting ground of the suicide bombers, must not be alienated.

4. CONCLUSION

Based on the history and characteristics of suicide terrorism, a forecast of this phenomenon may be ventured. Similarly to other fashions in terrorism, suicide attacks will, presumably, continue for quite a while. Similarly to the present situation, the bulk of attacks will occur in the context of acute conflicts, alongside with other forms of insurgent violence. As has been observed in the cases of Israel, Turkey, and Russia/Chechnya, the frequency of suicide attacks will fluctuate in line with the intensity of the local conflict.

Bearing in mind that the vast majority of suicide attacks have been carried out by militant Islamic groups around the world, the most important factor that will determine the scope of suicide terrorism in future is the intensity of the conflict between militant Islam and the West. It seems that this conflict is not going to subside in the foreseeable future. Similarly to the 'Afghanis' phenomenon, Islamic veterans of the current war in Iraq will probably constitute a radicalising element upon their return to their native countries and will also strengthen co-operation between militant Islamic groups around the world.

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2. These figures are derived from a database of suicide attacks around the globe compiled by the author.
3. Forty suicide attacks have taken place in Pakistan in the first 10 months of 2007.
4. During its 8th Congress, held in April 2002, the PKK changed its name to The Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). At the time KADEK announced its decision to conduct its struggle by non-violent means. In late 2003 the group changed its name to Kongra-Gel. Despite its declared intention to relinquish armed struggle, the group has not disbanded its military wing, nor has it surrendered its arms.
5. See, for example: Taylor, M, *The Terrorist*, Brassey's Defence Publishers, London, 1988; Hoffman, B, *Inside Terrorism*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1998; and Israeli, R, "Islamikaze and their significance", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 9, 1997, pp 96–121.
6. For example: Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC), Public Opinion Poll No 40 (April 2001) found 73.5 per cent support for suicide attacks; and JMCC Poll No 44 (March 2002) (available at: <http://www.jmcc.org>) found 72 per cent support for suicide attacks. Poll No 9 (October 2003) of the Center for Policy and Survey Research at Birzeit University (PSR) (available at: <http://www.pcpsr.org>) found 74.5 per cent support for a suicide attack conducted a few weeks before.
7. Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) Public Opinion Poll No 29 (September 1997) (available at: <http://www.pcpsr.org>).
8. For example: CPRS Poll No 19 (August-September 1995) found 18.3 per cent support for "armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets"; JMCC Poll No 8 (August 1995) found 24.5 per cent support for "(t)he continuation of Hamas and Islamic Jihad's suicide operations against Israeli targets"; and CPRS Poll No 22 (March 1996), found 21.1 per cent support for suicide attacks carried out by Hamas a few weeks before.
9. The average of 11 polls, conducted by JMCC and PSR between December 2004 and September 2006, was 49.9 per cent support for suicide attacks.
10. See: "Where terrorism finds support in the Muslim world", Pew Research Center (available at: <http://pewresearch.org/obdeck/?ObDeckID=26>).
11. For example, in Morocco the rate of support for suicide attacks was 40 per cent, in Pakistan 41 per cent in 2004, and in Lebanon 73 per cent in 2002. Pew poll, *op cit*.

12. According to the 2005 Pew poll, rates of support for suicide attacks against Westerners in Iraq were: Morocco – 56 per cent (66 per cent in 2004), Jordan – 49 per cent (70 per cent in 2004), Lebanon – 49 per cent, Pakistan – 29 per cent, Indonesia – 26 per cent, and Turkey – 24 per cent. Pew poll, *op cit*.
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