The journey toward forgiveness: A case of reconciliation and strategic governance in Burundi and the Great Lakes Region of Africa

Recent leadership developments and policy decision-making

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ABSTRACT

The process of justice and reconciliation is not only a matter of healing memories and receiving forgiveness. It is rather a matter of addressing the social structures that provoked, promoted, and sustained the occurrence of acts of violence. This article examines the journey toward forgiveness focusing on the case of reconciliation and strategic governance in Burundi. An emphasis will be essentially placed on the recent developments. In this article the intention is not to examine the social structures but to identify some of the theories that can assist the Burundian people to engage in the peace-building process in the aftermath of conflicts. The case of Burundi is not unique hence the ideas outlined in this article are also applicable to other countries in the Great Lakes region and even beyond. The article will suggest the adoption of a leadership model most suited for the region, as it contains the elements that are appropriate for a leadership paradigm that could work in sub-Saharan Africa. This article further interrogates the assumption that, decision-making and policy analysis in the public sector realm can be 'rational', against the inherent messiness of politics in the developing world.

INTRODUCTION

Huyse and Salter (2008) postulates that "When a civil war, genocide or a brutal dictatorship ends, the inevitable question arises of how to deal with those who have committed grave human rights abuses". (IDEA:2008). The interpretation and cultural nuances behind the concept of leadership are not only questionable but are subject to different meanings to different people. Yet, within the organisational context, there are specific boundaries that must be adhered to in order to inculcate certain values. Leadership at a political level is not excluded from democratically instated norms. The failure to maintain order in a constitutional framework for the personal gain of individuals tends to create a recipe for dictatorship in any modern thinking process. The same holds for leadership at nation states and those of international dimensions.

> In the classic world of governance and leadership, the adage is premised around the notion that "to manage is not to control". But the notion of control is also debatable. (Kuye:2010).

This article will suggest the adoption of a leadership model most suited for the region, as it contains the elements that are appropriate for a leadership paradigm that could work in Africa. The article will further interrogate the assumption that, decision-making and policy analysis in the public sector realm can be 'rational', against the inherent messiness of politics in the developing world. In this article a thorough examination of the role of different conventional players in the policy process is made, in respect of their capacities to rational policy outcomes.

A country's type of government directly influences the manner in which states use power against citizens and when this structure is democratic in nature less repression would exist. This refers to the promise of democratic pacification. The logic here is rather straightforward. Democracy, through its institutions: eliminates the desire for repressive activity by opening up the political system to its members, eliminates the need for repression by providing other mechanisms of influence, and eliminates the capacity for repressive behaviour by curtailing the freedom of coercive agents within society. The world over, this proposition has not only influenced everyday citizens, social movements, and revolutionaries who have spent enormous human resources to bring it to life, but it has also influenced NGOs, private corporations, and government leaders who have spent enormous financial resources and political wherewithal toward the same end (Davenport 2004:539–540). During the second half of the 20th century, despite the hope after the Holocaust that such horrors would not be repeated, there has been a great deal of violence within states between groups differing in ethnicity, religion, political ideology agenda, power and privilege (Chiro & Seligman 2001). In other parts of the world such as South Africa and the United States of America, racial differences have been the major cause of violence and atrocity. However, Staub *et al*. (2005: 298) state that the level of violence in many of these cases was intense in the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Rwanda and other countries in Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

The Western world and its values have affected Africans deeply. The article will firstly make an analysis of leadership in the African context, and the leadership challenges facing South Africa in particular. Developed countries have always reviewed our continent as a place plagued by corruption, dictatorship, military coups, rebellious leaders, greediness,

misuse of power, incompetent leadership, politically as well as economically ineffective leaders who undermine their own democracies. (Kuye:2010). The new century has already been preoccupied with terrorism and violent responses to it. With continuous changes in technology, values, and political systems; increased differences between rich and poor; globalisation; overpopulation; aspirations by groups for self-determination; and an increase in fundamentalism; conflicts and violence between groups are likely to be a significant problem in the new century. Preventing such violence is essential. There is likely to be a set of universal principles of prevention. However, they have to be applied and adapted to particular circumstances, so that practices will vary depending on the specifics of culture, current social conditions, and the history of group relations. Preventing conflict from becoming intractable, halting the evolution of intense violence, dealing with the aftermath of great violence between groups, and preventing new violence have both overlapping and differing requirements (Staub *et al.* 2005: 298).

In the today's world which is torn apart by constant conflicts and acts of violence, issues such as reconciliation, forgiveness and healing require particular attention if human beings are to live in peace with one another. Now, how do we create an environment that allows former enemies to live in unity without being able to retaliate with violence or new conflict? To answer this question, this article examines the journey toward forgiveness insisting on reconciliation and strategic governance in Burundi with a particular focus on recent developments. Since early 90s Burundi has been the scene of conflicts of various forms and the latest set of elections (2015) added more to the list of atrocities committed in the country. To meet its objectives the article is structured as follow: After the introduction, the article will lay a theoretical foundation before it can provide a brief overview of politics and ethnicity in Africa. Thereafter, one will highlight the historical background of conflicts and acts of violence in Burundi. Paradigms to forgiveness and reconciliation will also be examined before identifying the forms of justice. This will pave a way for examining avenues available in the journey to sustainable peace-building in Burundi.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights not only fuelled the rise of movements in favour of emancipation from colonial rule, but also galvanised people's aspirations for equal participation and for egalitarian access to education, employment and economic well-being. While these aspirations have become reality for some groups, they remained a dream for others, thus creating a sense of discrimination that is prone to resentment and civil strife among the latter. Intra-state group conflicts and violence have become a worldwide phenomenon and an important feature of political life. There is certainly a decline in the number of inter-state armed conflicts in the recent years, but the scale, intensity, persistence and number of internal conflicts has increased tremendously. As new countries joined the international community as a result of the process of decolonisation, the ruling classes in post-colonial societies failed to establish legitimacy by ensuring economic and social justice to the people. This has created a political challenge for the ruling elite who were further driven into unholy political alliances among themselves. In plural and multi-ethnic societies, it has caused polarisation along religious, linguistic and ethnic lines. Regional and

international factors contributed to the complexity of the situation. The level of internecine struggles has sometimes become so high that they pose not only a threat to the unity and integrity of the state and the society, but also threaten regional and even global peace and security (Rwantabagu 2001:41–42).

There are two clear implications of ethnic identification. First, if ethnic identities are tools that people use to get access to political power, then they are likely to be rendered most salient when political power is at stake, that is, at election time. We would therefore expect people's ethnic attachments to be stronger during the periods around national elections (given the highly centralised nature of political power in most African countries, especially presidential elections) than at other times. Second, if the role that ethnicity plays is to secure an advantage in the competition for power, then it is likely to be most useful, and to become most salient as a social identity, during elections that are closely fought (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010:494).

Mass political behavior directed against the state, its policies and its practices is generally viewed as being a threat to those in authority. Its manifestation can disrupt society, and it can undermine the position of those in power. In an effort to regulate this threat and reduce the possibility that these outcomes might take place, governments often use political repression: e.g., censorship, political restrictions. This behaviour is expected to neutralise political opponents and/or increase the costs of the behaviour to such a large extent that it is no longer deemed a worthwhile strategy of protest. There has been a great deal of theoretical discussion about this causal linkage (Gurr 1986a, 1986b, 1989; Tilly 1978; Oommen 1990; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992; Eberwein 1987; Lopez 1986) as well as empirical support (Markus and Nesvold 1972; Hibbs 1973; Goldstein 1978; 1983; Muller 1985; Davis and Ward 1990; Davenport 1991; Alfatooni and Allen 1991). There are those who find that repression increases political conflict (for example, Ziegenhagen, 1986). This does not mean that repression is not intended to regulate political challenges. On the contrary, it simply means that it is not always effective (Davenport 1995:685–686). Ordinarily, no group or class that stands to profit from a given system of rule is ever willing and ready to give up power and privilege freely. And for authoritarian political orders threatened by such a loss of power, the military is invariably the means seized upon to attempt to prevent the change; while the opposition movements are left with the choice of either going into direct confrontation with the military, or attempting to win some of the military members over to the democratic cause. This is in the nature of civil-military relations in all rapidly democratising countries everywhere (Adekanye 2010:55).

However, the literature on state repression (state terror, political repression, negative sanctions, human rights violations, protest policing, etc.) is generally unified in its characterisation of why this behaviour is used (e.g., Dahl 1966; Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Gurr 1986; Duvall and Stohl 1988; Karklins and Peterson 1993; Simon 1994; Lichbach 1995). The model itself is simple. After considering various benefits and costs as well as how the political-economic context influences these factors, authorities decide whether they should use repressive behaviour. If costs exceed benefits, then repression is not applied. If, alternatively, benefits exceed costs, then repression is employed. The costs to state authorities are clearly enough understood: when used, repression can provoke resistance, deplete human and material resources, and reduce political legitimacy at home as well as abroad. The benefits of this behaviour are equally clear as well: when used, leaders can eliminate

opposition, stay in power, and bolster perceived legitimacy as individuals come to understand that the state has the monopoly of force within society (Davenport 2004:539–540).

According to Gurr (1986:160) once specialised agencies of state coercion are in operation, elites are likely to calculate that the relative costs of relying on coercion are lower... These strategic considerations tend to be reinforced by habituation; thus, the development of elite norms that coercive control is not only necessary but also desirable. Moreover, a bureaucratic law of the instrument may prevail. The professional ethos of agencies of control centres on the use of coercion to restrain challenges to state authority. Their directors may therefore recommend violent solutions to suspected opposition, or use their position to initiate them, as a means of justifying the agencies' continued existence (thus providing a benefit to the agents as well as to those who rely upon them). These theories justify what we have witnessed in most African countries in the past two to three decades when it comes to conflicts and violations of human rights.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF POLITICS AND ETHNICITY IN AFRICA

Ethnic identities are believed to be powerful motivators of behaviour in Africa, but the source of their salience in political and social affairs remains debated. One perspective holds that ethnic identities are salient in Africa because they reflect traditional loyalties to kith and kin. By this view, ethnic identities are hardwired, intrinsically part of who people are, and their salience follows directly from their link to people's natural makeup. A contrary perspective argues that ethnicity is salient because it is functional. The world is a competitive place, proponents of this position hold, and, in that world, ethnicity serves as a useful tool for mobilising people, policing boundaries, and building coalitions that can be deployed in the struggle for power and scarce resources. By this view, the salience of ethnicity is intrinsically bound up in political competition (Eifert, Miguel and Posner 2010:494).

History is a tale of unrequited injustice. Treaties have been broken, communities wiped out, cultures plundered or destroyed, innocent people betrayed, slaughtered, enslaved, robbed, and exploited, and no recompense has ever been made to victims or their descendants. Historical injustices cast a long shadow. Their effects can linger long after the perpetrators and their victims are dead. They haunt the memories of descendants, blight the history of peoples, and poison relations between communities. They are the root cause of many existing inequities. Historical grievances have provided people with a justification for enmity, a reason for seeking revenge. They are at the heart of some of the bloodiest struggles and deeds in both historical and contemporary times. For many of the descendants and successors of those who were wronged, they are a motivation for seeking justice – the focus of demands for reparation (Thompson 2002:vii). For instance, hundreds of thousands of people have died in the Great Lakes region of Africa in the 90s (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and even Uganda). Most of them were innocent civilians massacred by armies or militias or decimated by disease or starvation as they fled from danger. These horrors can be traced to intense struggles over power carried out by leaders-struggles involving the politicisation of ethnicity and a perverse dynamic of violence and fear. The conflicts have been based in part on intellectual foundations, on mental maps of history (Newbury 1998:7).

It is important to note that many African countries have suffered the consequences of the contrast between politics and ethnicity. Perhaps the most extreme case is that of Rwanda, where each party's perception of the other (Hutus or Tutsis) was based on previous violent or even genocidal actions. Despite some promising movement at the negotiating table, other events leading up to the genocide of 1994 did little to convince many Hutus in the government that power-sharing with the Tutsis was a viable option. As René Lemarchand has recently noted, the Tutsi-led RPF (which invaded Rwanda from Uganda in 1990) showed little restraint in dealing with Hutu civilians, killing thousands and forcing others into camps. Then in October 1993, in neighbouring Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi's first elected Hutu president, was assassinated in a Tutsi-led coup, forcing an estimated 800 000 Hutus into exile. In light of these events, Lemarchand (1997) observes that one gains an appreciation for the depth of anti-Tutsi sentiment, which in turn helps explain not only why power-sharing was a nonstarter for many of Rwanda's Hutus but also why so many of them ended up supplying the bulk of Habyarimana's genocidaires.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CONFLICTS AND ACTS OF VIOLENCE IN BURUNDI

Burundi is a small country (27 834 km²) that has been independent since 1962. An administrative system of a dynastic monarchy had been in place for several centuries before it was colonised by Germany (1896–1912) and Belgium (1912–62). It is situated in the Great Lakes region of Africa with Rwanda to the north, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the west, and Tanzania to the south and east. With agriculture accounting for 90 per cent of the economy and with one of the highest population densities in Africa (about 290 inhabitants/ km²), the country continues to experience huge development difficulties. Its population consists of four groups that are usually qualified as ethnic groups: the Bahutu, the Batutsi, the Baganwa and the Batwa. These ethnic groups speak the same language, share the same culture and history, and live in the same territory. Despite this linguistic and cultural commonality, over four decades Burundi has experienced different violent conflicts of an ethnic and political nature. Since independence in 1962 it has gone through cycles of violence based on the issue of access to and retention of power, involving the manipulation and exploitation of the ethnic groups by the political elite in their power struggles (Naniwe-Kahurahe 2008:149). One explanation for why conflict happened is the introduction of ethnicity as a primary determinant of access to power, starting from the colonial era. The 1929 reorganisation of the territorial administration by the Belgian colonisers marked a turning point in the country's history with regard to the political role of ethnicity and resulted in the increasing marginalisation of the Hutu in politics. Chiefs from the Tutsi ethnic group became increasingly dominant; in 1929, 20% of the chiefs were Hutu but by 1945 the administration contained none. Tutsi domination of the political system continued after independence and consolidated especially after the 1972 massacres (Ndikumana 2007:416).

In his influential book on conflict on Burundi, Lemarchand (1995) pointed out an important 'paradox' in the history of the country. He noted that uncharacteristically for a sub-Saharan African country, Burundi's ethnic groups have a long history of peaceful cohabitation, speaking the same language, sharing the same culture and having submitted to

the same traditional monarchy. However, towards the end of the colonial era and throughout the independence era, the country experienced conflicts that, on the surface, opposed the Hutu to the Tutsi. Given that the Hutu and the Tutsi have not always been antagonistic, it must therefore be asked what happened during the colonial and postcolonial periods to generate violent conflict along ethnic lines.

One can argue that ethnic diversity is not a direct cause of conflict in Burundi but ethnicity is intertwined with other political and regional factors that contribute to conflict (Hintjens 1999:248). For instance, in countries such as South Africa and Rwanda where the civil society has been able to voice their opinion, the request for the reparation of acts of violence and injustices committed in the past have been consistently exposed to public attention. The impact of intense violence on survivors is enormous. Their basic psychological needs are profoundly frustrated: their identity, their way of understanding the world, and their spirituality disrupted. These disruptions, along with those of interpersonal relationships, and the ability to regulate internal emotional states, co-exist with and give rise to intense trauma symptoms. As a result, people feel vulnerable, the world looks dangerous to them, and other people, especially those outside their group, seem untrustworthy (McCann & Pearlman 1990a; Staub 1998). To address this trauma, it is essential to create a framework that enables perpetrators of atrocity and victims to come together in order to find a way of restoring justice and heal the wounds. There are a number of approaches to the promotion of forgiveness and reconciliation. The following section will look at some them.

PARADIGMS TO FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION

Paradigms to forgiveness and reconciliation vary from a place to another thus in relation to culture, traditions, belief or religion. For the purpose of this article three theories are presented. The first is about the secular approach to forgiveness. The second approach is about the Christian approach and the third regards the African perspective to forgiveness and reconciliation. They are briefly outlined below.

Secular Approach

The approach outlined here is based on Griswold's argument on the issue of forgiveness and reconciliation. However, Griswold (2007:110–112) argues that for forgiveness to take place the two parties must establish a moral relationship and intertwine their narratives. They both have to commit to change: the one to reform her ways, the other to forswear resentment. At a minimum, the commitment to forgiveness entails that neither will interfere with the other again as they go forward. If reconciliation is taken to mean 'acceptance', in the minimal sense of non-interference, then we may say that forgiveness may lead to it. But if reconciliation means 'affirmation' – the relevant sense of which here would be something like friendship and support or a renewal of any previous ties of affection – then there is no reason to think that forgiveness must lead to affirmative reconciliation as one might call it. Such an outcome might be neither warranted nor desirable. However, affirmative reconciliation through forgiveness is not an appropriate political goal, or so. Political reconciliation as mutual support, collaboration, solidarity, and even friendship also requires much more than

forgiveness, including quite possibly the changing of institutional structures, social practices, and reparations. Severe injury is likely to lead, at least on the part of the injured, to a long term sense of loss, and therefore to present a challenge that in a religious context would be called a 'crisis of faith,' but that in a secular context raises issue not just of forgiveness but of 'metaphysical forgiveness.' How could the world be such that so terrible a thing was done? We are particularly familiar with this question after the mass slaughters of the last century, but it has certainly been asked repeatedly throughout humankind's extraordinarily bloody history. Here there is no intention of saying that interpersonal forgiveness somehow 'solves' this problem. But it does contribute to a viable response.

Under the secular approach one can outline the approach adopted by Bishop Desmund Tutu in the instance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). This was named as a political approach to forgiveness and reconciliation. Nevertheless, Tutu's argument for political forgiveness (forgiveness functioning in a political context) was presented in the course of the transition from apartheid to a democratic state in South Africa. The argument was made through his many public speeches, his writings, as well as his position as Chair of the TRC, and in that broad sense was a political act.

In his argument Tutu (1999:260, 273) made it clear that he views forgiveness, in both a one to many and a one to one context, as morally appropriate as well as politically salubrious. He insists that: "it is ultimately in our best interest that we become forgiving, repentant, reconciling, and reconciled people because without forgiveness, without reconciliation, we have no future". He uses the term 'restorative justice' as synonymous with the forgiveness that is offered in times of great social and political conflict and wrong-doing, and in contrast with retributive justice. Especially where systematic wrongdoing has privileged one class above another economically, forgiveness requires reparations 'where feasible'. Considering the above, one might also look at what Christian principles recommend in terms of forgiveness and reconciliation.

Christian Perspective

There are a number of publications that address the relevance of Christian principles in conflict resolution. The article relies on some of them since they have provided a clear picture of the matter from different stands. Nevertheless, De Gruchy (2002:45) states that in Christian doctrine, the word 'reconciliation' carries a range of meanings and is used in two fundamental or primary ways. First of all, it is to express the sum total of what we believe about. As such it is the equivalent of the more comprehensive German *Versöhnung*, and is interchangeable with 'salvation', 'redemption' or 'atonement', each of which has been used to describe the doctrine. Yet each word gives the doctrine a particular emphasis and character, drawing on different traditions and metaphors.

African Approach

In Africa, human community is vital for the individual's acquisition of personhood, self identity and sustenance of one's existence. Basing on the African Philosophy of Communitarianism of '*I am because we are*' and therefore the understanding that '*an injury to one is an injury to all*': Africans have over the centuries developed context specific

mechanisms of resolving and transforming conflicts and restoring harmony (peace) and order at the family, clan, community and inter-tribal/ethnic levels (Nkabahona 2007 [online]). Furthermore, Nkabahona (2007) highlights the following guiding principles to forgiveness and reconciliation in the process of healing communities:

- On the side of the Offending Party the expectations are as follow: voluntary confession; truth telling: what exactly happened? This is one of the most difficult moments and sometimes this is expressed emotionally, by the offender simply bursting into tears; accepting responsibility and accountability; repentance; asking for mercy and forgiveness; accepting to go through the cleansing rituals (where applicable); and agreeing to compensate the aggrieved party.
- On the side of the Offended/Grieved Party the expectations are as follow: coming to terms with the loss/offence/crime committed against him/her; preparedness to forgive (though may not forget); and prepared to reach out to the offender to amend the broken relationship (reconciliation).
- On the side of the Mediating Party (whose composition has been shifting poles over years: council of elders, religious leaders, now sometimes local government leaders get involved or a combination of all or some of the above categories). What has been the role of the mediators? The role of mediators will consist of: promoting dialogue between the parties; listening to both parties; allowing each to tell his/her/their story; providing impartial counsel; overseeing the reconciliation process (may involve certain rituals); and determining an appropriate compensation (restorative justice) where applicable (Nkabahona 2007).

It is essential to note that Desmond Tutu, chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), insists that Western-style justice does not fit with traditional African jurisprudence. He argues that it is too impersonal. The African view of justice is aimed at 'the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrators, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence' (Tutu 1999:51).

WHICH FORM OF JUSTICE: RESTORATION, RECONCILIATION OR BOTH?

Way Forward: A New Direction?

Kuye (2010) adumbrates that issues pertaining to leadership are inextricably linked to generic issues that are of concern to the international community and as a result leadership could be the determining factor in terms of the achievement of the international goals, through regional integration. Consequently, leadership issues in a particular country cannot be confined to that country alone, as globalisation and its impacts are the order of the day. Regional integration as in the case of the Great Lakes, is however a regional agreement that is entered into by member states to enhance regional co-operation, through the usage of economic, legal and political policies. Regional integration is fostered through institutions

such as the European Union, South African Development Community, and New Partnership for Africa's Development, among others. These organisations were established in the view of safeguarding against members' isolation in terms of the economic and political participation in the global arena. Furthermore, this leads to the paradigm shift, which leads to African leaders adopting specific beliefs pertaining to leadership and encouraging co-operation. A need arises for the establishment of a leadership style that supports the African value system as well as pursuing the development agenda of the continent. Transformational African leadership could possibly be the answer to the leadership quandary in Africa, as explained below.

Transformational African leadership is a panacea for reform.

The valuing of diversity and inclusion will promote efficiency in government administrations, and the absence of integration of unique diversities and differences can lead to a lack of trust and a lack of confidence in government. Kuye (2010) concurs that Nigeria is an example of a country that from time to time faces massive ethnic and religious clashes that have led to catastrophic deaths. In the case of the Great Lakes Region, the Burundi situation should re-think the principle of Ubuntu, meaning a person's humanity is measured according to their relationship with others and saying "umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu", translated as a person is a person through other people contends the endorsement of an inclusive culture and neighbourliness. One other important value of leadership in the African context is courage.

Upholding good governance in African countries is not the sole responsibility of one organisation, it is a collective effort by a conglomerate of entities, namely the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). A further organisation that was established with the main purpose of promoting better leadership is known as the African Leadership Council. This Leadership Council comprises past and present African leaders, who promulgated a Code of African Leadership with 23 commandments. The theory behind the establishment of such a body was to propose a series of courses to train political successors in the art of good governance and thus promote effective leadership. The Code of African Leadership sets absolute leadership standards that identify a good leader as adhering to the following standards: delivering security of the state and a person, promoting the rule of law, good education and health services, and a framework conducive to economic growth. Such leaders should encourage public participation, dissent and disagreement, respect human rights and civil liberties, strengthen the rule of law, the promotion of policies that eradicate poverty and improve the well-being of their citizens, ensure a strong code of ethics, refuse to use their offices for personal gain, oppose corruption and bolster essential corruption (Ritberg 2004:17).

There are two even three discourses about responses to wrongdoing. The first is 'legalistic'. It talks about rights and obligations, restoration and compensation. It is the discourse with which the term 'reparation' is most often associated. The second is more 'theological'. It is concerned with apology, forgiveness, contrition, atonement and reconciliation. Nevertheless, neither discourse excludes the other. Those who adopt the first discourse do not think of apology or the reconciliation of the parties as a requirement of reparation. They are more likely to regard apology or acknowledgement of wrong as an extra courtesy that wrongdoers ought to extend, and reconciliation as a desirable effect that might be achieved by reparation.

But apology or expression of regret for the wrong done is central for those who adopt the second discourse. They regard reparation as incomplete or unsatisfactory without it (Boxill 1972:118).

Those who adopt the first discourse think that reparation has not been made until the victims have been restored to the position they were in before the injustice was done or have been provided with something equivalent in value. Those who adopt the second think that reparation has been achieved when the parties have been reconciled: when the wrongdoer has apologized and made recompense, and when the victim has forgiven the wrong, or, in cases where forgiveness is not possible, is at least prepared to resume peaceful, co-operative relations. For those who adopt the discourse of reconciliation, reparation can be achieved even when restoration has not, or cannot, be made. Indeed, they insist that restoration by itself is not sufficient to achieve reparation. If parties remain un-reconciled, the process is incomplete. The first discourse can be described as being about 'reparation as restoration', and the second as being about 'reparation as reconciliation'. Each of these discourses can be understood as an account of what reparation means. In the internal and external affairs of nations, reparation usually has the meaning of restoration or compensation. But some nations in their response to past wrongdoing have chosen the path of reconciliation (Thompson 2002:47). This article puts an emphasis on the second discourse because it is through forgiveness and reconciliation that a durable peace and collaboration can be established and future acts of violence prevented. This position is strengthened by the fact that restoration without reconciliation can pave a way for retaliation. Most of time when there is no proper reconciliation, restoration will not help achieve sustainable peace but rather it will put communities on a brink for future acts of violence since those who have been wronged have gained power and use their past situation as an alibi for perpetrating violence and atrocities. It is only through reconciliation and forgiveness which lead to healing that both parties can get to a point of accepting their differences and be willing to be united in their diversities. This is true in these modern days where globalisation has created more multicultural societies.

JOURNEY TOWARD FORGIVENESS RECONCILIATION AND HEALING

Confession and forgiveness mark a turning point in a broken relationship. Reconciliation is established. Fresh beginnings are possible. However, restoration is rarely automatic, especially if the relationship has had chronic or severe problems. Usually there is a season, after the promise of forgiveness is granted, where both parties still 'feel' uncomfortable around each other. While both parties may have sincerely repented and forgiven each other, memories of past pain lurk beneath the surface of our consciousness. Emotional scars remain tender, old patterns of relating endure. Thus, more than forgiveness is necessary for true restoration. Rebuilding broken relationship is not easy. It takes time. Trust must be re-established; new ways of relating established. Practical avenues of affirmation and encouragement must be attempted (Love 2001:37).

Healing and reconciliation need to go together, especially when the groups that have engaged in violence against each other continue to live together. It has been a common

belief that healing for trauma survivors requires a feeling of security. Healing can begin when there is at least limited security, that is, when physical conditions are relatively safe (Staub *et al.* 2005:302). There can be no method for healing than direct communication. Moving toward healing will mean transformation; recovery will be a step by step process. Hence, as reconciliation and forgiveness become part of the wider consciousness, the nature of progression will be toward a community more and more inclined to fully embrace the Gospel message of healing. Growth from seeking wholeness can enliven each follower of Christ to truly live life as a reconciler, as one always ready to forgive. In this way each person and the community begin to explore the message of healing integral to the profession of faith in Jesus (**http://www.paulist.org/boston/pdf /group**). For instance, a reconciliatory theory requires an obligations-dependent approach. Reconciliation makes sense only if there is a wrongdoer able and willing to engage in act of reconciliation. Those who are not wrongdoers do not need to repair relations. A restorative approach, does not logically entail, nor is it logically entailed by, a rights-centre approach; it is compatible with either. However, rights-centred theories are usually restorative. They generally assume that reparation for a violation of a right restores the victim to the enjoyment of that right (Thompson 2002:47–48). Both 'reparation as restoration' and 'reparation as reconciliation' are concerned with past injustices, whether historical or more recent, but restorative reparation is 'backward-looking', in that it insists that reparation should restore the victim to his prior position. By contrast, reconciliatory reparation is 'forward-looking', in the sense that it aims to achieve a good outcome now or in the future. In this respect restorative reparation is similar to the retributive theory of punishment, which insists that wrongdoers be punished according to the nature and severity of their crime, and reconciliatory reparation resembles the utilitarian theories of punishment, which holds that punishment should aim to produce good effects for society. However, retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment are well worked-out, independent positions. Restorative and reconciliatory views of reparation are not independent of each other, and neither is adequate by itself. One difficulty with the objective of restoration is that achieving it is often beyond human powers. Those unjustly killed cannot be brought back to life; property can be returned, but not the opportunities that the victims' children would have had if the injustice had not been done (Thompson 2002:48). To heal the wounds of the past and eradicate enmity it is essential to restore peace through forgiveness and reconciliation that lead to healing of both parties. One of the obvious advantages of a reconciliatory theory is that it is able to explain how reparation can be made in cases where restoration, or even compensation, is impossible. It explains why symbolic gestures like apologies can count as reparation (Robinson 2000:216). Nevertheless, forgiveness happens to be an instantaneous act but healing is a long process. Though victims of acts of violence might be eager to forgive even when the souvenir of the atrocity they went through is still hunting their lives, it is essential that they go through a healing process. This latter is not an instantaneous process. It is rather a long process that requires a thorough thinking and strategy. To make sure that peace is restored and healing is taking its due course within the society one needs to consider the approaches proposed above.

From an Ubuntu perspective, forgiveness is simply about an individual's sincere and true moral response to another's injustice. This may well be at the heart of what the 'reconciliation' initiative can best guide and support. Forgiveness involves the humble person seeking out ways to face their own hurt, anger, disappointment, resentment – whatever feelings and actions resulting from an injustice perpetrated upon them. The activity of forgiveness is conducted

within the soul searching of the human person. The positive energy of forgiveness finds its strength in facing the perceived injury and meeting it with the choice to become healthy, free and at peace. And this energy is found within the individual, by the choice of the individual. Letting go of the pain, the hurt, the bitterness is how one journeys toward becoming whole. Forgiveness is offered freely, without conditions or requirements of the other. Human persons do honor to nature and therefore grow in happiness, serenity and healing through the activity of forgiveness. In essence, the best of the human person is discovered in the activity of letting go and extending forgiveness. To put it more simply, when we forgive we are made whole. The generosity of self required putting aside vengeance and celebrating compassion and mercy is powerful and liberating (http://www.paulist.org/boston/pdf /group).

However, forgiving is at times presented as a change in a harmed party. Reconciliation is inherently mutual, a change in both parties. However, if forgiving occurs in an optimal way, that is, in respect to acknowledgement by perpetrators of what they have done and apology for their actions, which have been found to facilitate forgiving (Bies & Tripp 1998), it is likely to facilitate reconciliation and may even be regarded as an aspect of it. This is essential especially when former victims and perpetrators continue to live next to each other, for forgiveness to be constructive, benefiting survivors and the future relationship between groups, it must have such mutuality. Under such circumstances, forgiveness without acknowledgement of responsibility and expressions of regret (something perpetrators unfortunately rarely do) can be harmful. It maintains and perhaps even enhances an imbalance in the relationship and may contribute to impunity. Constructive forgiveness, in contrast, may help all parties' heal-survivors, perpetrators and members of the perpetrator group who have not themselves engaged in violence (Staub *et al.* 2005:301). To create an environment that promotes a culture of durable peace and coexistence, there is a need for both parties to enter into a covenant of forgiveness.

SUSTAINABLE PEACE-BUILDING IN BURUNDI

This article argues that engaging in the process of building a sustainable peace in Burundi will require three critical issues; (a) building state capacity, (b) democratise state institutions and (c) promote strategic systems in the governance of the state. The two first aspects go hand in hand as there isn't one without the other.

Building state capacity and democratisation state institutions

In most of the African countries, the modernisation of state institutions was implemented even before democracy could take place. The history of wars and conflicts in the region is partly responsible for this state of affairs. The lack of human rights was a catalyst factor. Germany is considered to be the precursor in facing this phenomenon. During the constant military pressure from its neighbouring countries, Germany was compelled to modernise a patrimonial state. Starting from 1648 after Westphalian Treaties, this reform was completed or achieved through the implementation of Stein-Hardenberg reforms of early 19th century. With the exception of Germany and in the similar circumstances, many European states started first with the building of effective states and promoted the rule of law before the establishment of democratic systems (Gwet 2015).

Sustainable peace building in Burundi will first require building institutional capacity and thereafter democratising state institutions. This means that empowerment must come before democratisation. For instance, nation-building isn't a natural occurrence because people from different cultural and social backgrounds cannot spontaneously merge to live as one nation. To build a nation, there is a need for a political will which relies on various means in order to orchestrate the emergence of a nation-state. In the current context of Burundi, one must start with the basics. A strong state must exist before the country could engage on the path of democracy. A strong state in Burundi means restoring the traditional functions that characterise a civilised state. Anderson (1989:19–22) argues that a state has seven basic functions, namely: provide economic infrastructure, provide various collective goods and services, resolve and adjust group conflicts, maintain competition, protect natural resources, minimise access by individuals to the goods and services of the economic, and finally, stabilise the economy. To this end, Tshiyoyo (2014:130) insists that a basic reason for the existence of the state, is among other things to resolve conflicts in order to protect justice, order and stability. Thompson (2002:52) described reconciliation as a process of mutual accommodation that presupposes the acceptance of moral conditions and objectives. Nations and individuals ought to establish relations of respect (except when there is good reason to believe that the other is not worthy of respect, either in a particular context or in general). In their negotiations nations and individuals ought to treat each other with respect. They ought to seek an agreement that enables them to maintain these respectful relations. These moral requirements, when fulfilled, will predispose parties to reach an agreement that each from their point of view can regard as fair. They will be prepared to appreciate each other's position, accommodate themselves to it, and make compromises. The reconciliation is a process involving discourse, in which each attempts to reach what Rawls calls an 'overlapping consensus': a result that each can endorse from his or her point of view (Brooks 1999:7). In reaching this consensus, the parties, to satisfy the moral requirements of reconciliation, will be predisposed to take into account present conditions and needs. Since their aim should be to reach a settlement that enables them to maintain respectful relations, and, if possible, put behind them grievances rooted in the past, they should be prepared to interpret restorative demands or treaty provisions in the light of present realities and needs. Those who make demands will not impose conditions that would threaten the existence or security or undermine the economic well-being of the other. A reconciliatory approach is thus in a position to solve, at least in theory, the problem of relating reparative demands to other requirements of justice (Thompson 2002:52). In the context of Burundi, a well-functioning state machinery will be able to create an environment that allows people of different backgrounds to peacefully live together and accommodate each other as required by the law. In this context, it will not be about the winner or the loser, the stronger or the weak, the Hutus or the Tutsis, the rich or the poor but about Burundian people. It is only then that one could think of the next step which will be the democratisation of state institutions.

Strategic governance through power sharing

Arthur Lewis's *Politics in West Africa (1965)* is one of the early works that stood out in terms of promoting power sharing. Lewis (1965:124) identifies two meanings of democracy:

Everyone affected by a decision should have the opportunity to participate in making that decision, either directly or through representatives; and the preferences of the majority should prevail. Lewis also identifies two types of society – a class society and an ethnically plural society – he argues that the form of democracy must be appropriate to the type of society. Lewis insists that by offering representation to all, Africans can enjoy democracy and avoid the political conflict that would take place between a government based on one ethnic group and an essentially disenfranchised opposition based on one or more other ethnic groups.

Given the turmoil and tension that reigned in Burundi before and after the 2015 elections, it is suggested that the government must investigate the possibility of engaging in an inclusive approach to governance. Up to date, the tension is high and still mounting, and in the process, human rights violations occur daily. To promote durable peace and stability in the country, it is essential for people of Burundi particularly the government to adopt a strategic move whereby it will engage all stakeholders in the peace process. This will require the government to do away with exclusive approach in which winners rule single handedly while sidelining the other parties.

CONCLUSION

In the second half of the 20th century and even early in the 21st century, the world faced many acts of violence and atrocity in a number of places. In Africa, the most striking were apartheid in South Africa and genocide in Rwanda, to name but few. In the aftermath of these acts of violence, we have found that communities are still bound to live together despite their enmity. This is the case even in the particular context of Burundi. One must note that when victims and perpetrators of violence live together, forgiveness, reconciliation and healing is indispensable in order to restore peace and trust between parties and consequently break the continuing cycle of violence. This process is more than just an act of forgiving. It requires that, beyond forgiveness parties must be willing to reconcile and accept to live near each other. This speaks of reconciliation. But forgiving can be a difficult task to do especially when one thinks of the horrible acts committed by the opposing camp. Nonetheless, Staub (2000:367–368) argues that forgiving is important because it makes reconciliation possible. It is in this instance that the article looked at some of the approaches that make it easier for forgiveness, reconciliation and healing to take place. The main emphasis was on the Ubuntu approach. This particular approach was considered based on its ability to promote forgiveness without condition.

When speaking of healing, not only victims but perpetrators need to heal for a proper reconciliation to take place. Without engagement with their own pain, perpetrators are likely to continue to blame and devalue their former and potential future victims. Only as they begin to heal can the protective psychological shell they create around themselves weaken. This in turn can open them to the people they have harmed and allow a process of reconciliation to begin. This is important because it can also stop victim groups to restrain from retaliation and then accept to live united in diversity. However, forgiveness, reconciliation and healing are mutually interconnected. Without forgiveness there is no proper reconciliation and in the absence of reconciliation, healing might not take place. Together reconciliation,

forgiveness and healing can enhance the accomplishment of basic human needs pertaining to unity in diversity, security, positive identity, positive connection to other people, and a comprehension of reality that offers hope.

Although decision-making and policy analysis are largely informed by a political process, the leadership agenda in conflict-driven societies must be informed and fine-tuned by the nature and structure of the existing political environment. The role of the different actors in the policy process including public bureaucrats/agencies, the donors, mass media, interest groups and civil society has been examined, also pointing to the fact that, politics overtakes the conventional *rational* model.

As Kuye (2010) suggests that in some countries where participation and devolution of powers have taken strong root, decentralised planning supplements and strengthens central planning. All effort should, therefore, be made to promote a democratic dispensation in all government spheres. Governments should have the political will to building viable institutions that are independent and free from political manipulation if professionalism and rationalism in the policy process are to be enhanced. Part of strengthening institutions requires that the appointed officials be equipped with the necessary training and skills, owing to their central role in the policy process. Likewise, paying a viable living wage and a competitive market value salary will facilitate the of *new blood* within the public service and at the same time allow public servants to build formidable institutional capacities It is important that government strives to gain credibility and trust through accountability, transparency and fulfillment of its promises. It should thus, open up political space for contestation and allow dissenting views from interest groups and the media to enrich debate and widen options. Citizen and civil society participation are still crucial, but it should outlive the mockery exercise of consulting the people only during election time.

As peace remains fragile to attain in conflict infested regions, every effort is needed to establish some benchmarks for addressing reconciliatory programs. The issues facing the leaders of Burundi and the surrounding states must be constructed around a path of recovery and reconciliation.

NOTES

1   Professor Jerry O. Kuye plays a major facilitation role in the Burundi situation.

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