COMPASSION – THE ESSENCE OF LIFE

A social-scientific study of the religious symbolic universe reflected in the ideology/theology of Luke

Piet van Staden

Hervormde Teologiese Studies
Supplementum 4
1991

Series editor: A G van Aarde

COMPASSION – THE ESSENCE OF LIFE

A social-scientific study of the religious symbolic universe

reflected in the ideology/theology of Luke

Piet van Staden

Hervormde Teologiese Studies

HTS Supplementum Series
Series editor: Andries van Aarde

Publication of the Faculty of Theology (Section A)
University of Pretoria

1. Barkhuizen, J H (red) 1989. *Hymni Christiani*.

2. Petzer, J H 1990. *Die teks van die Nuwe Testament: 'n Inleiding in die basiese aspekte van die teorie en praktyk van die tekskritiek van die Nuwe Testament.*

3. Potgieter, J H 1991. *'n Narratologiese ondersoek van die boek Jona.*

4. Van Staden, P 1991. *Compassion – the essence of life: A social-scientific study of the religious symbolic universe reflected in the ideology/theology of Luke.*

Editor's Foreword

In this book Pieter van Staden considers the view that in the Lukan narrative world the protagonist, Jesus, advocated an ideology/theology that was reflective in nature with regard to a concept of God who is typified as having compassion with the socially destitude. This ideological perspective on the part of the narrator is interpreted social-scientifically by making use of a conflict theory, since it can be contrasted with the perspective of the Pharisees as the antagonists in the story. The conflict with regard to ideology/theology is understood in terms of core values: inclusivity as against exclusivity; sympathy as a result of boundless compassion, as against narrow-minded purifying ceremonies and discriminatory perfectionistic legalities, causing social (i e familial, political, economic and religious) ostracism of people, things and places that could not be categorised as 'whole' or 'without blemish'. The three mealtime pericopes in Luke 14 have been selected as illustrative material because they suggest exclusion based on purity lines, occur in a framework of dispute, and communicate the opposing ideologies of Jesus and the Pharisees respectively. The author considers that there was an elite group of people in the Lucan community, who thought and acted like the Pharisees at the time of the historical Jesus. The narrator does not call on these elite people to abandon their social positions, but they should use their positions of authority to fulfil a paradoxical role, like Jesus himself, showing compassion towards the non-elites; this would have particular reference to the socially ostracised both inside and outside Judaism.

Pieter van Staden was born on the 18th of February 1953 in Ermelo, Transvaal. He is a minister of the Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika and has earned his D.D. degree from the University of Pretoria. During 1989 he studied under the guidance of Professor John H Elliott, Professor in Theology at the University of San Francisco. This book is a reworked edition of his dissertation, with Professor Andries van Aarde as supervisor. The Hervormde Teologiese Studies Supplementum Series is designed to introduce outstanding research in the field of theological studies, and we take pride in publishing this outstanding work in the series.

PROFESSOR J P OBERHOLZER
Chairman of the Editorial Board

November 1991

Foreword

by John H Elliott

The interpretation of the New Testament with a method which supplements conventional literary and historical analysis with that of the social sciences has made a significant advance in the past two decades. This enterprise of disciplinary cross-fertilization has provided a more comprehensive set of perspectives and lenses for reading and understanding the biblical writings not simply as articulations of theological ideas but as responses to and reflections of the historical, social, and cultural (including religious) conditions of life characterizing the world of the ancient Circum-Mediterranean. Historical criticism always had as its aim an analysis of biblical texts within their historical context. But it is only in recent decades that the social and cultural contours of the biblical world and its literature have begun to be systematically studied with the added resources of the social sciences. As a result of this merging of historical, social, and theological perspectives and methods, an impressive body of research has begun to shed new light on the social and cultural world of the Bible, the biblical writings themselves, and the manner in which their texts encode meanings determined by the social and cultural systems in which their authors and audiences were embedded. As I have indicated elsewhere, this undertaking, though still in its infant phase,

> has stretched our personal and scientific horizons, alerted us to the limitations of our received exegetical wisdom, sharpened our perception and deepened our understanding of early Christian texts as media of social interaction. It has developed our awareness of behavioral patterns, pivotal values, social structures, cultural scripts, and social processes of the biblical world, the world within which and from which our sacred traditions draw their vitality and meaning.
>
> (Elliott 1986:2-3)[*]

Dr van Staden's study is a significant addition to this growing current of biblical research. With methodology as its chief focus, it is itself a masterful demonstration of methodological organization and clarity. Here the reader seeking to gain some familiarity with social scientific criticism is introduced to the history of its emergence, an overview of its current proponents, and a balanced assessment of the

---

[*] Elliott, J H 1986. Social-scientific criticism of the New Testament and its social world: More on methods and models, in Elliott, J H (ed), 1986, *Social-scientific criticism of the New Testament and its social world*. Semeia 35, 1-33. Decatur/Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.

strengths and limits of their various approaches. In demonstration of a cardinal concern of social scientific criticism, namely the necessary exposition and explication of the theory, models and concepts which guide analysis, the author acquaints his reader with a wide range of topics which figure prominently in this form of criticism: the utility of the emic/etic distinction for differentiating the varying perspectives of ancient authors and modern interpreters, the relation of theology and ideology (ideas tied to specific group interests and programs), the meaning of such concepts as 'socialization' and 'symbolic universe', the interface of literary and social scientific analysis, the nature and function of conceptual models, and the research design by which hypotheses regarding the social relations and cultural scripts implicit in texts are operationalized and evaluated.

Along the way a map for exegetes venturing into the sociological thickets is provided by a brief but informative description of the various theoretical orientations current in sociology today (functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interaction) – a handy vademecum for unwary initiants to the sociological mysteries.

With his own research design clarified, Van Staden finally turns to the biblical text selected for analysis, Luke 14. The choice is a felicitous one for this text alludes to central concerns of Luke's society – issues of honor and shame, purity and pollution, patron-client relations, behavioral codes, and social boundaries – as recent study has shown (Neyrey, J [ed] 1990. *The social world of Luke-Acts: Models for interpretation.* Peabody MA: Hendrickson.). In addition, as these essays also indicate, the meal setting in which these issues are raised figures prominently in Luke-Acts as a narrative means for articulating key features of Luke's theological message. Directing attention in particular to the information contained here regarding roles, status, and social interaction in connection with meals, Van Staden is able to compare and contrast the attitudes, practice, and ideology of the Jesus movement with that of the Pharisees. Conclusions reached in connection with this illuminating text, in turn, are then used to test and validate his initial hypothesis regarding Luke's fundamental stress on divine and human compassion and the inclusive character of salvation offered through Jesus Christ.

There are further questions implied but not directly addressed in this study. These include the sum total of evidence supporting the main hypothesis, the relation between Luke's actual social world and the narrative world of the text, and the relation of the writing's situation and strategy. Examination of these questions should provide additional corroborating evidence of how the Gospel's narrative world both reflects and corrects the actual circumstances experienced by Luke and his intended audience thereby supplementing our understanding of Luke's overall

theology/ideology, the novel adjustments in Luke's 'symbolic universe', and the intended social impact of this writing upon its targeted audience.

This study, then, constitutes no *dernier mot* on Luke 14 or the Lukan gospel in general. But its agreements as well as disagreements with the essays contained in *The social world of Luke-Acts*, also a work along social scientific lines, indicate how, through a more rigorous explication and application of method and models, clarification of problem areas is possible and where concensus is emerging. In a field where so much dissensus still prevails, where so much exegesis still rests on little more than educated but unverifiable hunches, and where so many dominant interpretations are linked to dominant reputations, this accomplishment alone is no mean feat.

As a demonstration of methodological reflection and social-science criticism in action this study deserves a warm and hearty welcome. As a theological commentary on the inclusive character of salvation and Christian community, it has an important word to say to South African and all societies struggling with the demons of discrimination, segregation, and apartheid. And as the product of intensive international collaboration it hopefully offers a model for future international as well as interdisciplinary cooperation.

In regard to this latter concern, I would like to note in closing the pleasure I had hosting and working with Dr van Staden during his study sojourn in the California Bay Area in 1989 and introducing him to the Context Group, an international team of scholars engaged in the social scientific study of the Bible and its social world. In this group the emphasis is not on competition but on teamwork, cooperation, and the sharing of information and resources. Input from this team is evident on virtually every page of the present work. The friendship born in Berkeley and Oakland further deepened in 1990 when the Van Staden family was my gracious host while I presented a series of lectures and seminars in South Africa. Through Piet's mediation and that of his *Doktorvater*, Professor Andries van Aarde, along with J Botha, J Rousseau, S J Joubert, and J Smit, the network of international scholars collaborating in this field now includes our colleagues in South Africa as well.

I warmly wish this study the wide and careful reading it deserves and look forward to future years of continued collaboration.

John H Elliott
Professor of Theology
University of San Francisco
San Francisco, CA USA

November 1991

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Orientation

> Christians and Pharisees...would both claim to be faith-
> ful to Israel's God; they both appeal to the Scriptures
> for validation of their viewpoint; they both proclaim
> concern for holiness, forgiveness of sin, etc. But they
> are construing their systems on different core values,
> which imply different structures, and which prompt dif-
> ferent strategies.
>
> (Neyrey 1988a:80)

In the everyday life of the Jews in Palestine at the beginning of the first century CE,
the relationship between God and man was expressed by the *Shema*, a prayer com-
posed of three text segments (Dt 6:4-9; 11:13-21; Num 15:37-41) which the faithful
were to bind to the hand and the forehead and the doorposts[1] (cf Foerster 1955:145;
1968:106-107). The prayer (named after the first word in Dt 6:4) had to be recited
twice daily by every Jew, and had essentially two elements – the confession that the
God of Israel was an only God and, as a consequence, the setting apart of the belie-
ving Jews from those people who were not acceptable to God. The prayer served as
a mnemotechnic device by means of which all were reminded of the vital impor-
tance of keeping God's commandments (like the custom of sewing blue-stranded
tassels to the corners of their garments, referred to in Num 15:38-39), failing which
all kinds of life-threatening sanctions were invoked. It was, in Neyrey's words, 'a
sacred profession of belief which distinguished Jews from all other peoples in the
ancient world' (Neyrey 1988a:82). In other words, the concepts imbued by the
Shema were to remain a pervasive directional force in the everyday lives of the
people. This means that the *core value* of Judaism was God's *holiness*, expressed by
the utterance:

ἅγιοι ἔσεσθε, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἅγιος, κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὑμῶν
(*LXX*, Lv 19:2)

The implication of this core value was that the categories of creation should be kept distinct, because all things in creation should replicate and express the divine order of classification, discrimination, and order (Douglas 1966:53). *Holiness* (ἅγιος), therefore, is exemplified by *completeness* (τέλειος, cf Mt 5:48; see discussion below) – 'to be holy is to be whole, to be one; holiness is integrity, perfection of the individual and of the kind' (Douglas 1966:54). This *wholeness applies not only to the physical body in respect of sacrificial animals or individual worshippers at the temple* (Douglas 1966:51), but is also extended to signify completeness in a social context (Douglas 1966:52). *Purity* therefore signifies a classificatory pattern associated with order, which is the desirable state (cf Douglas 1966:53). Impurity, conversely, is regarded as disorder and spoils the pattern (cf Douglas 1966:94). In a discussion on 'dirt' as *matter out of place* Douglas (1966:35) remarks on this definition:

> It implies two conditions: a set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt, then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is a system. Dirt is the byproduct of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity.

Purity, therefore, is an abstract term for the overall system of ideology, values, structures, and classifications that provide order to a given culture (Neyrey 1988b:127). For the adherents to Judaism the temple and its sacrificial system became the normative expression of that ordering system, and so of holiness (Neyrey 1988a:67; 1988b:127). Cues for the structuring of everyday life therefore had to be taken from the temple as locus of holiness and purity. Neyrey (1988a:67) describes the task of the investigator as follows:

> It becomes the task of the observer to search out the structural expressions of this core value in the 'maps' which the Jews of Jesus' time made to give shape and clarity to their world. By 'map' we mean the concrete and systematic patterns of organizing, locating, and classifying persons, places, times, actions, etc.

In respect to the application of this approach to *persons*, Douglas (1966:95) states an important principle which should be heeded in any effort at explaining individual or collective behaviour towards outcasts described in the Bible:

> ...persons in a marginal state...are people who are some-how left out in the patterning of society, who are place-less...

and again:

> It seems that if a person has no place in the social sys-tem and is therefore a marginal being, all precaution against danger must come from others. He cannot help his abnormal situation.

> (Douglas 1966:97)

Outcasts are therefore people who for some reason or other do not fit into any of the categories that structure society. They pose a threat to the accepted pattern and order of society, and therefore need to be neutralized – either by being ostracized, or eliminated, or by some other means.[2] Douglas gives the following description of the plight of such a person:

> A polluting person is always in the wrong. He has de-veloped some wrong condition or simply crossed some line which should not have been crossed and this dis-placement unleashes danger for someone...Pollution can be committed intentionally, but intention is irrele-vant to its effect – it is more likely to happen inadver-tently.

> (Douglas 1966:113)

The polluting person therefore has no recourse – he/she is delivered up to the sanc-tions prescribed by the system.

Scheffler (1988) discusses the Gospel of Luke under the unifying theme of *suffering*. In formulating the aim of his study, Scheffler (1988:1) states his conviction that Luke's emphasis on the plight of social outcasts (women, children, Samaritans and gentiles) stems from a single concern – compassion for *any* suffering group. He is also of the opinion that Luke's portrayal of the suffering of Jesus is not only related to the remission of sins, but has a definite concrete relevance in so far as economic and social ethics are concerned (cf Scheffler 1988:2). For the purpose of analysis

and description Scheffler (1988:3) distinguishes six dimensions of suffering in the Gospel: economic, social, political, physical, psychological and spiritual suffering.

In a generally positive recension of Scheffler's work, Van Aarde (1989a:184) notes that the dissertation implies that Luke has portrayed Jesus' message as an *ethical* message. He expresses appreciation for Scheffler's insight that the ethical injunctions by Matthew and Luke are expressed by the expectations pertaining to God's children. In the case of Matthew the expectation is contained in the utterance: ἔσεσθε οὖν ὑμεῖς τέλειοι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τέλειός ἐστιν (Mt 5:48) – that is, the *holiness* of the believers is emphasized in terms of *wholeness*. In Luke's case the expectation is described as follows: γίνεσθε οἰκτίρμονες καθὼς καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν (Lk 6:36) – that is, the believers are expected to be *compassionate*. These distinctions correspond to what we have established above, namely that the term τέλειος indicates order and wholeness within the purity system, while the term οἰκτίρμων exhibits a particular Lukan understanding of that which is expedient. We can summarize by stating that the Gospel of Luke addresses ethical matters relating to real life experiences. At the same time it should be strongly emphasized that Luke is certainly not moralizing. His ethical injunctions are undeniably based in a system of (religious) values procured from his understanding of the prevailing symbolic universe. The gospel narrative in fact represents Luke's theoretical reflection about that symbolic universe. Based on a specific understanding of the wishes of God (who inhabits the symbolic universe), the narrative motivates people to become involved in the plight of anybody who has got hold of the wrong end of the stick in life – irrespective of the 'stick' – and hence has become a social outcast. The character of such involvement is expressed by the term οἰκτίρμων – *compassion*.

While I accept the insights proposed by Scheffler and affirmed by Van Aarde, it is not sufficient to say that there is an injunction to become compassionately involved. Luke gives a very specific shade of meaning to this compassionate involvement – it has to contain the willingness to take the role of the servant, the δοῦλος, in dealing with these outcasts. The emphasis on this gives a clear indication of the social position or status of Luke's addressees. One would only formulate such a plea bargain in a fashion as elaborate as a whole narrative if an appeal was made to people who had a choice in the matter. In other words, Luke is calling on all people who do not share the stratum of the social outcasts to become involved according to the principle of *serving* (διακόνειν). There is no indication, however, that Luke ever expects his addressees (presumed to be of high status) to vacate their statuses[3] (cf Van Staden 1988:352).

I consider Scheffler's work an important contribution in the clarification of Luke's interest in and understanding of Jesus. His differentiation between different kinds of suffering sensitizes the reader to take care not to confuse discrete categories of people, or to transfer the attributes or idiosyncracies of one category of sufferers illegitimately to another. In this respect Scheffler contributes to the *social description* of early Christianity, an aspect of research differentiated in a social-scientific approach to the text. At the same time I am not quite comfortable with his approach to the text under the unifying theme of *suffering*. I believe that such an approach can endanger precisely those positive aspects of differentiation noted above. Such a '*comprehensive view of suffering* in which different types of human suffering feature equally' (Scheffler 1988:2) to my mind represents a *view from below* – that is, it seems as if Scheffler has identified himself with the position of the sufferer, and consequently sees Jesus as having a comprehensive and encompassing compassion towards sufferers. By stating this, I by no means wish to negate or decry the fact that Jesus did have an encompassing compassion with any kind of suffering; on the contrary! I am of the opinion that one should rather view Luke's narrative *from the top*, as it were – that is, the primary interest should be in the *cause* of the position Jesus took in respect of the social outcasts. In other words: *Why* did Jesus espouse such an attitude of compassion towards them? In seeking the answer to this question, it seems that one would have to consider the crucial aspect of Luke's portrayal of Jesus' *religious ideology* or, as it is better known, his *theology*.

Prior to the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 CE the temple was not just a religious institution, but it was an economic and political one as well; it was the centre of national life in every respect (Horsley & Hanson 1985:231). According to Josephus (*Ant* 20, 251, quoted in Horsley & Hanson 1985:232) the Hasmonean monarchy was replaced by an aristocracy, and the High Priest and the chief priests were entrusted with the leadership of the nation. Saldarini (1988:298) expresses reservations about the assumption in most treatments of the Sadducees that all the chief priests and other leaders of Judaism in Jerusalem were Sadducees. He argues that Josephus does not say that all Jewish leaders were Sadducees, but that those who were Sadducees came from the governing class. If this was correct, it could be expected that the Sadducees would wish to retain the status quo, maintaining their own position as members of the ruling elite. This is, in fact, attested to by references in the New Testament about their rejecting the doctrine of life after death (cf Mk 12 par; Ac 23) – in other words, even in this respect they are not willing to relinquish power. The association of the Sadducees – as members of the ruling class – with the High Priest, the chief priests, other temple authorities (Ac 4:1; 5:17) and the Sanhedrin (Ac 23) suggests that the temple was controlled by political authori-

ties (Van Aarde 1990a). According to Saldarini (1988:234, 304) the Sadducees maintained the more traditional understanding of Judaism, and did not accept innovation. This brought them into conflict with the *Pharisees, who based much of their programme for Jewish life on a revised understanding of the purity* laws and their application to all Israel:

> The application of purity laws to the people at large was a new mode of understanding Jewish life, law and Scripture and it is reasonable and even inevitable that the Sadducees or someone else should oppose them...If many of the Sadducees were priests or supporters of the traditional priesthood, they would have had another motive to oppose the Pharisees. The priests would not want the purity practices characteristic of the Temple and priesthood to be diluted by adaptation to the multitude.
>
> (Saldarini 1988:234)

The *Pharisees wished to replicate the temple* purity system in the everyday lives of the people. The way they did this was by debating and teaching the law, using the purity regulations to impress upon the people the need for keeping pure by ob-serving and safeguarding the boundaries. They denied the claim of any social out-casts on their patronage, especially their generosity. These social outcasts were judged to be unclean and unfit to be part of the social order (cf Saldarini 1988:176). To compound this problem, they extrapolated from the *social* unacceptability of the outcasts that this category of people would also be unacceptable to God, and therefore declared them to be outside the realm of God's merciful involvement, outside of the covenant.[4] Access to the temple – as the dwelling-place of God on earth – was denied to such people. In this way the Pharisees were vying for the attention and support of the people.

The Lukan *Jesus* had the same purpose as the Pharisees – replicating the temple purity system in the lives of the people. There is a marked difference, though, in that Jesus' scheme provides for the incorporation of the social outcasts amongst those who are deemed acceptable to God, while in the scheme of the Pharisees they are excluded. Saldarini (1988:179) remarks:

> Luke's view of the Pharisees' social position is brought out in several passages where the Pharisees keep their distance from social outcasts. The contrast of the Pharisees with tax collectors and sinners is typological for

> Luke and symbolic of the paradoxical rejection of Jesus
> by Judaism and acceptance of him by the Gentiles. The
> Pharisees are presented as the guardians of the normal
> social boundaries against Jesus who seeks to change the
> boundaries and reconstitute the people of God...(T)he
> Pharisees (and presumably the majority of the people)
> who reject those usually considered to be social out-
> casts, such as sinners and tax collectors, are contrasted
> with Jesus who initiates a new community which in-
> cludes the outcasts.

Jesus debates the issue with the Pharisees, and holds them accountable for the un-
just relationships brought about by the use of purity regulations to maintain social
order. In terms of his conception of the core value as best expressed by *compassion*,
Jesus understands the temple as a place that includes all people, and wishes to ex-
tend this understanding to all spheres of social life, in which the outcasts should be
included (cf Van Aarde 1989b:6-8). This is not a simple difference of meaning – it
is a major clash of ideologies, signifying opposition at a much more fundamental
level than mere debate, namely different core values perceived to be prescribed by
the symbolic universe. Luke portrays the Pharisees as separating themselves from
the people and from Jesus.

> (He) sees them as claiming another and higher social
> status and he criticizes them for it. The Pharisees have
> demarcated sharp and tight boundaries for society and
> have excluded the normal outcasts and also Jesus and in
> some cases the people. When Jesus refuses to accept
> their boundaries, they challenge his legitimacy and en-
> ter into a contest with him for control over society.
>
> (Saldarini 1988:180)

The evidence seems to indicate that Jesus had no intention of gaining political
ascendancy by his behaviour. His primary Galilean opponents, according to Luke,
were the Pharisees (Saldarini 1988:181). Luke locates the Pharisees in Galilee and
disconnects them from politics by separating them from the Herodians (Saldarini
1988:177). Saldarini (1988:177) is convinced that the hostility between Jesus and
the Pharisees is not political – the latter are not sketched as being in league with the
highest authorities. In fact, in one instance they are described as collaborating with
Jesus when warning him to escape as Herod is seeking him (Lk 13:31). Significantly,
also, we encounter the Pharisees for the last time in Luke's description of Jesus' en-

trance into Jerusalem (Lk 19:39-40); they do not figure inside Jerusalem at all (Saldarini 1988:177 note 9). All this serves to indicate that the intervention of the Pharisees is independent. They are not connected to the highest governing circles in Jerusalem – their activity is limited to Galilee, and they are presented as local leaders engaged in a contest with Jesus for influence and control in Galilean society (Saldarini 1988:178).

1.2 The aim of the study

This study wishes to indicate how the author (subsequently called *Luke*) of this Gospel interpreted the significance of Jesus' life – his birth, behaviour, death and resurrection – for social life in his own day. We proceed from the assumption that Luke would have interpreted the (oral and literary) traditions in terms of his own ideology. Ideology, as we shall indicate (cf chapter 3, sections 3.2.2-3.2.2.4 below), consists of two interrelated components – a *noetic component* and a *pragmatic component* (the *noumenon* and *phenomenon* respectively, in Kant's terms). The noetic component attests to the fact that an ideology is a reflective form of knowledge that has the object of legitimating a pre-reflective form of knowledge of a symbolic kind, known as the *symbolic universe* (cf 3.2.2.3-3.2.2.4 below). The noetic component of ideology is therefore necessarily evaluative. Connected to the evaluative noetic component on an intra-personal (or intra-group) level is the pragmatic realization of such knowledge and values which, in turn, would be defined in terms of factors that were socially relevant in a specific social situation. Ideology therefore mediates between symbolic universe and social situation in the sense that it defines the type of conduct that is expedient within a social universe constructed according to the integrative, symbolic values procured through a specific understanding of the symbolic universe.

My aim is therefore to indicate specifically the ways in which Jesus' religious ideology (theology) – in the double sense defined above – differs from the ideology of other parties (notably the Pharisees) that interact in the social situation of Luke's narrative world. The thesis is that Jesus differs (noetically) from the Pharisees in terms of his idea of God. Luke understands God in his involvement with man as characterized by the concept οἰκτίρμων (compassionate). His interpretation of this aspect of his religious symbolic universe is based on the historical record of God's compassion, most recently connected to the history of Jesus (Lk 1:1-4). Luke is especially interested to show that God's compassion is inclusive, not exclusive or provisional. This understanding of the nature of God's involvement with man becomes the ideology that is seminal to the Gospel (and most probably also to Acts). He casts his ideology in relief by having the character Jesus in the Gospel become the protagonist of the same values, and contrasting him with an opposing ideology of ex-

clusiveness, boundaries, and usage of purity laws. The reason for Luke's ideology in the Gospel should be sought in his reference group (that is, the dominant group to which he belonged), namely the early church. A concept such as 'compassion' would necessarily extend into the realm of action (conduct) and interaction in all spheres of life – that is, the noetical and evaluative component would inevitably have moral-ethical consequences in the sense that it needs to be applied.[5] Indeed, I would think that the credibility and survival of *any* belief system – which is what *evaluative noetics* amounts to – is totally dependent upon its translation into practicalities.[6] Part of our investigation therefore concerns the moral-ethical disposition and conduct promoted by the Lukan Jesus, which I believe consists in the (innovative) call for spontaneous role reversal on the part of the elite who are occupying positions in the higher strata of society.

Ultimately I hope to demonstrate how – in accordance with the symbolic universe reflected upon in the ideology/theology – the essence of (social) life is construed in Luke-Acts: is it to be found in the attainment of the coveted status sets of society expressed by certain roles, and concomitantly in the praxis dictated by the religious ideology that covets purity – that is, holiness (ἄγιος) and wholeness (τέλειος)? Conversely, is that essence located in social relations characterized by compassionate involvement with social (and consequently religious) outcasts? Are these alternatives mutually exclusive, and if not, how is life defined within such parameters?

My own concept of the relationship between literature and society being that literature is both social product and social force (cf 1.3.1.4 below), the question arises: does the author envisage his directives to be functional only within the institution of the church, or in the whole of society? In other words, how are the structural relations between the church and the rest of society portrayed?

If the results confirm the hypothesis, the next step is suggested by the question: *why* did Luke find it necessary to emphasize this ideological/theological position? How can we deduce important indicators about his own social situation by analysing the social situations in the narrative world he created?

This brings us to the matter of the strategy of the investigation – assumptions, methodological premises, procedure of analysis. In short, the pertinent factors relating to the investigative programme will have to be indicated.

1.3 Investigative programme

This study is intended to be a *social-scientific investigation* of a religious literary work in terms of the matters we have formulated above in the form of a hypothesis (cf section 1.2). However, the *subject* under consideration is neither sociology or an-

thropology or any other social science, nor is it literature – the subject is *theology*. This assertion is meant to assuage fears that the theological enterprise might be endangered by the use of the social sciences – I am aware of the difference in study objects. At the same time there is no doubt that the social sciences and theology overlap in so far as man as culturally defined being is concerned. Religion is part of the cultural make-up and social enterprise of all men, and therefore becomes a phenomenon studied by the social sciences. Man and his activity are integral to the perception and understanding of God, and therefore become the object of study in theology. In this way the two disciplines are interconnected, and even overlap in important respects. Both disciplines should benefit from a responsible engagement of each other's basic theoretical assumptions and methodological instrumentarium. This is what this study endeavours to accomplish.

There are, of course, quite a few different theoretical approaches that can be distinguished within sociology. Some are interested in macro-sociological matters relating to groups, institutions and societies (i e, functionalism, conflict theory), while others concern themselves with micro-sociological issues relating to individuals (symbolic interactionism, role theory). These perspectives are not necessarily exclusive of each other, so that one could fruitfully combine theories on the macro-sociological level with perspectives on the micro-sociological level in an investigation. For the purpose of this study we shall combine an understanding of societal order (macro-sociology) from the perspective of conflict theory, with an analysis of interaction patterns described in the text from the perspective of role theory and symbolic interactionism (micro-sociology).

Added to this, it is important to recognize the importance of the literary aspect in the construction of the analytical and interpretive methodology. The social sciences are used in a theological study for the purpose of constructing the social background from which the texts originated and against which the texts can be read and perhaps be better understood. The primary presupposition in this kind of exercise is that some sort of relationship between the text and the socio-historical environment from which it originated is envisaged. The text must in some way reflect its 'contextual history'.[7] The fact that it is ancient societies and/or communities which are under discussion implies that the only view we have of them is offered by (the) 'texts',[8] and a 'biased' view at that. Therefore the starting point of a sociological study is an analysis of the texts themselves (cf also Van Aarde 1988b:3). Janet Wolff (1977:18) states succinctly:

> The question of interpretation is necessarily central to a
> discipline whose object is a text of one sort or another.
> The sociological study of literature presupposes an

understanding of the literature studied. If its object is to propose a theory of literature and society, or to perceive a relationship between them, it must start from a comprehension, explicit or implicit, of the works of literature themselves. It cannot be taken for granted that the sociologist's understanding of the literature studied is correct, or adequate. This is most clearly the case with the literature of the past or of another society, and the obvious immediate problem is that of understanding or translating the language correctly.

To orientate the reader with regard to the presuppositions and methodological problems involved in this kind of undertaking, some introductory remarks are given.

1.3.1 Literature and society – different perspectives

How this relationship between text and socio-historical environment is to be construed is a much debated issue within the sociology of literature, which is the sociological subdiscipline directed at exactly this problem. Attempts at defining the relationship include constructs such as the Marxist dialectic-materialist conception (cf Swingewood 1977; Steinbach 1974), the genetic approach of Lucien Goldmann (cf Routh 1977), the structuralist approach (cf Rutherford 1977; Bann 1977) et cetera. Routh & Wolff (1977:3-5) list the various approaches towards the relationship of literature and society according to the five broad conceptions that follow.

1.3.1.1 Sociological awareness

A *sociologically aware* study of literature uses information of sociological relevance to the origins or condition of the text, primarily for the purpose of conducting a more informed literary criticism of the text. According to Routh & Wolff (1977:3) the hermeneutic tradition can be regarded as such an approach. In a sociologically aware study of literature, sociological problems or the development of theory are not at issue. The focus of the study is literature. Literary criticism which is informed by, and makes reference to, the social coordinates and conditions of the literature, is an example of such an approach. Literary critics may avail themselves of the findings and concepts of sociology as a tool for criticism. Both the theoretical work and practical criticism of literary scholars may be informed by or compatible with a socio-historical perspective on the work.

1.3.1.2 Literature as a kind of sociology

Literature is sometimes seen as a valuable source of information on matters of sociological interest. It is regarded as a description, and an exact description, of either the time in which it was written or of the time it refers to. Routh & Wolff (1977:3-4) state:

> Literature has been used by some writers *as a kind of sociology*. It is seen as a source of data, often data of a type which would not otherwise be accessible to a sociologist, and as a carrier of crystallised values and attitudes, as well as information about institutions.
>
> (A)spects of social life (are) studied by sociologists with the aid of concepts like role, anomie, bureaucracy and deviance....

To this they add:

> The idea that literature tells us about social life raises a number of questions – apart from predictable arguments about 'objectivity'. The fact that we are likely to confirm the validity of literary evidence by reference to sociological and historical 'facts' suggests a disparity between the two types of social commentary. It may be a legitimate exercise for a sociologist to take literary texts as a source of data, but this must be justified by advancing at the level of theory an explanation of how a generalized reality can be transformed into a specific expression.
>
> (Routh & Wolff 1977:4)

Some careful consideration must therefore be given to the way in which sociological information (social facts) are absorbed into literature: reflectively or unreflectively?

1.3.1.3 The social genesis of literature

This approach considers the question of how literature arises in society. According to Routh & Wolff (1977:4) it would include theories which see literature as social facts or contradictions (including structuralism, and some versions of historical materialism) displaced on to another plane or as the symbolic transformation of social reality (semiotics).

This type of sociology of literature tends towards sociological reductionism, because 'it cannot acknowledge the unique and imaginative qualities of a writer's work, and leaves no room for individual creativity...[T]he author becomes merely a "midwife" at the birth of a work of literature' (Routh & Wolff 1977:4; see also Routh 1977:150-152).

1.3.1.4 Literature as social product and social force

Literature can be understood as both *social product* and *social force*, affecting society and continually involved in the process of social development (Routh & Wolff 1977:4). Taken on the micro-social level of the writer and the reader, writing is seen as a production which is both socially and historically situated and limited, but nevertheless capable of educating people politically, and transforming social conditions. On the macro-level the dialectical relationship of ideas and social structure within historical development is investigated.

1.3.1.5 The effect of literature on society

This approach focuses on the ways in which literature can affect society, and effect social change. This power can be perceived as a social problem (e g in the case of pornography), or as a positive feature of literature (e g in the case of the Bible).

The above relational issues are contemplated and debated on the theoretical and philosophical plane. Depending on the stance taken, certain methods and models are chosen with which to obtain the information necessary for a construction of the relevant social environment.

1.3.2 Interpreting the text

The implications of the stated intention of a social-scientific study of the New Testament (cf 1.2) are, first, that sociological data is needed for a construction of the socio-historical environment of a text. The primary sources from which to obtain such information relevant to ancient societies are texts – in this case, both biblical texts and non-biblical texts (which belong to and describe the same historical period as the biblical texts). This again, and importantly, implies that the texts should be approached and handled *as texts* – that is, according to their type and composition as described in the discipline of literary theory. In the case of a narrative text this would include such issues as the implied author, the ideological point of view, the function of the narrator, the roles of the characters, the plot, the implied reader, et cetera (cf Chatman 1978; Petersen 1984:38-43). At least some integration between the methods of literary analysis and that of the social-scientific investigation is needed (cf Petersen 1985:10-30).

A methodological first step in the social-scientific study of a New Testament text is therefore to ascertain the *type* of text and the *literary* principles according to which it can be studied (cf Van Aarde [1982b]:58). Second, what constraints are thereby placed on a *social-scientific* analysis of the text (cf Petersen 1985:1-42)?

What this boils down to, is that we should differentiate the different *units of analysis* that are of interest in this exercise. First, the basic unit of analysis of theology would be the unmistakably *religious* literary work. Second, the basic unit of analysis of literary criticism is the same literary work, but the character of its content is of no real consequence. It is studied in *literary-theoretical* terms – genre, composition, consistency to the norms of its kind. Finally, a social-scientific analysis is also interested in the text, but then in terms of its embodiment of *social values* and the insight it offers into the symbolic and social levels of its socio-historical time frame.

As far as the *interpretation* of a text goes, a formidable amount of literature has been forthcoming on the subject by scholars such as Dilthey (cf Palmer 1969), Betti (1962), Gadamer (1965; see Palmer 1969; Herzog 1983), Hirsch (1967), Palmer (1969), Ricoeur (1976), et cetera. This literature is highly informative and has done much to define the interpreting act. However, before engaging the task of interpretation itself, there are certain matters I consider important, because they can determine to a large extent the questions we ask of the text and the answers we get from it. These matters are related to our own preferences with regard to kinds of literature; to the question of whether it is at all possible to ascertain the 'real' meaning of a literary work; and to the literary presuppositions with which we approach a text. We shall now attend to these issues in the order as stated.

1.3.2.1 Why choose to interpret a specific text?

I use the term 'interpret' here not in the sense of the interpretation done by a naive reader, but as referring to the concerted efforts of informed readers to establish the most likely meaning of the text. Does a text present itself, as it were, for interpretation? Is it the form or the subject of a text that attracts us to it? By which laws or customs do we decide that one text is worth interpreting, and another not? Is it because of the stature the author or poet has attained? Is it because of a consensus about the stature of the work itself? Or is it because the theme or subject of the work lays claim to our attention by being of importance to our existence?

I would argue that our interest in a text is influenced primarily by social factors. Great literary works, like those of Shakespeare, have achieved greatness because of a consensus, according to certain criteria, that they are great. These criteria are actually *formulae* (Coward 1977:11) according to which we are conditioned to read texts. Where do the criteria come from? Coward (1977:9) states:

> Our personalities and therefore our tastes are unique,
> but they are shaped by factors some of which impinge
> on us all, and our literary likes and dislikes, like our po-
> litical or moral opinions, are not autonomous. They are
> inevitably determined by the experience we have, the
> social and ethical climate, by cultural priorities and
> other existential phenomena which affect our judgment
> and our feelings as readily as an attack of gout.

We are therefore conditioned in our choice of a text we wish to interpret by several factors relating to social life: fashion, taste, social status, academic standing, et cetera. The same goes for a biblical text. From infancy (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967:129-37 regarding the process of 'primary socialization'), or by the process of 'conversion' (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967:157-163 regarding conversion as alternation during the process of re-socialization), we have been conditioned to accept the Bible as authoritative, that is, as elucidating the origin and the ultimate meaning and goal of life, and as being prescriptive regarding our attitude and conduct *in everyday life*. So, even in our choosing a literary text from the Bible to interpret, we are guided by social factors (cf Berger 1973:42-60 for a description of religion as legitimating the social reality).

1.3.2.2 Does a text have a meaning?

Any thoughts – unspoken, spoken, written, acted, expressed in some art-form, conscious or unconscious – can only be constructed from and in terms of that which is known. If something has no meaning, it simply means that we cannot relate it to what is known, and therefore cannot accommodate it within our frame of reference. It is not possible to formulate thoughts on something that one does not know, except to philosophize about the category of the 'unknown'.

What is known to us are facts, interpretations, ideologies, world-views and beliefs pertaining to past history, or to present location in time, space and social environment, and to conjectures about the future (cf Gurvitch 1971:21-42).

A text, as a literary expression of thoughts, embodies all the above factors while speaking on and having some specific subject in mind. Such a literary text may be composed for different reasons. Normally, an enterprise such as composing a literary text of any magnitude is conducted with the intent of communicating some viewpoint relating to one or more of the above factors to a specific (probable) or an unspecified (possible) group of readers. This includes texts that comprise artistic self-expression, where the implied reader is the author himself. Referring to the de-

bate on this issue, the following question now arises: as far as the readers are concerned, does such a text have a (single identifiable) meaning?

The lexical ambiguity of words is demonstrated by the phenomenon of polysemy – that is, a word may have more than one dictionary definition (cf Combrink 1984: 27). Being constructed of language, which is intrinsically polyvalent, a text is also polyvalent (cf Combrink 1984:28-30). This polyvalence is described, according to semiotic theory, in terms of the concepts *denotation* and *connotation* (cf Eco 1976: 54-57). A word or expression would therefore simultaneously denote meaning and connote (some other related) meaning. Eco (1976:57; see also discussion in chapter 3, section 3.2.1) explains:

> Thus a single sign-vehicle, insofar as several codes make it become the functive of several sign-functions (although connotatively linked), can become the expression of several contents, and produce a complex discourse...I am saying that usually a single sign-vehicle conveys many intertwined contents and therefore what is commonly called a 'message' is in fact a *text* whose content is a multilevelled *discourse*.

Combrink (1984:28) states that these concepts (*denotation* and *connotation*) serve 'as illustration of the fact that a single sign-vehicle functioning within more than one code can convey more than one message'.

In order to determine the most probable meaning of a word or expression in a specific usage, the context has to be taken into consideration. The context of a *word* is provided by the immediate and wider co-text. The context of a macro-text, however, is the text itself. Susan Wittig (1977:96), discussing the 'plurisignificance' or 'multivalence' of a text, demonstrates that parabolic text allows for multiple meanings, indeed, calls for it, because 'the semantic structure of these texts is capable of generating a multiplicity of meanings, of creating a variety of significations'. Referring to the works of Roman Ingarden and Wolfgang Iser, Wittig (1977:100, note 8) states:

> (They) are concerned with texts which are syntactically incomplete – where the reader must fill out the details of what happens or the details of description. Here, I have extended their concept to the semantic structure, arguing that when the second-order signified is not supplied, the perceiver is challenged to fill up that incom-

plete structure by providing his own signification. The
parable text, then, is *semantically* indeterminate.

This, then, is the origin of the multivalence of texts: different readers allocate diffe-
rent significations (cf Wittig 1977:91-92). However, there are certain constraints in-
trinsic and extrinsic to the text which prohibit the conferring of just any meaning on
it (cf Wittig 1977:87-92). Furthermore, referring to the historian's axiom that a text
is first and foremost evidence of the time in which it was written, Petersen states
that additional constraints are provided by the contextual history, which has to be
constructed from the text itself (Petersen 1985:5-7). Included in this contextual his-
tory is the matter of authorial intent. Although, notwithstanding the constraints, the
unit (semantic or textual) might still retain some ambiguity, the possibilities are at
least lessened and defined and, even allowing for metaphorical application, a pro-
bable meaning can be distilled from the possible.

In summary: Granting the multivalence of a text, it is clear that as soon as textual
constraints and contextual information pertaining to the socio-historical determi-
nants of the *text itself* are brought into play, definite constraints are placed upon this
multivalence. Reference to the 'radical indeterminacy' of a text by someone like
Derrida (cf Petersen 1985:6), amounts to assigning the text the property of a multi-
faceted reflective disco-ball – what 'comes out' depends on what (colour of light-
beam) 'goes in', from what angle. This is to say that a text is perpetually changing its
meaning, depending on the 'coordinates' of the interpreter. However, such change
or changeability can only be perceived and described with reference to a constant.
If all were relative, no real change could be perceived, and to say that something has
many meanings would be meaningless. Therefore the notion of radical indetermina-
cy, denying a constant, delivers interpretation up to complete subjectivism and rela-
tivism. Even in admitting and demonstrating multiple meanings, there still is a con-
stant – I would argue that the constant is the text itself, containing the meaning in-
tended by the addresser to the addressee(s). Uncovering this meaning is what the
whole exegetical exercise is about. This is not to succumb to the 'intentional fallacy'
or the 'genetic fallacy' (cf Van Aarde 1985:551-562), for the *explanation* of a text
must be distinguished from its *understanding* (cf Combrink 1984:33). Explanation is
the process of uncovering the probable among the possible meanings of the text by
concentrating on co-text and context. Understanding, as the 'fusion' (Gadamer) or
the 'interpenetration' (Herzog 1983:118, note 10) of horizons, could only be effected
by the dialectical relationship between interpreter and text. Ricoeur (1981:158,
quoted by Combrink), describes this process as the *appropriation* of a text. In this

sense understanding is a subjective process, and one would have to acknowledge the multiple *significance* of a text as the meaning-for-the-reader.

In view of the above argument, it becomes clear that the resolve and intention of the author must be of some importance (cf Lanser 1981), or there would not have been a text. The variable factor does not lie with the author, who wanted to convey a specific message to his readers, but with the reciprocal relationship between the text and its interpreters. I therefore hold for a *probable*, as opposed to *possible*, meaning of a text that could be approximated by means of a scientifically con- structed and verifiable methodology (see also Ricoeur 1976:79; Eco 1979:9). As for explanation, I do not mean that one could necessarily ever arrive at *the* original meaning of the text, but in principle such a meaning exists, being the verbal meaning of the author (cf Hirsch 1967), and one ought to at least strive towards defining it as closely as possible. Wolff (1977:24), discussing Hirsch, formulates this as follows:

> The interpretation always remains a probability, but one
> which is supported by evidence, and which appears to
> be more probable than alternative hypotheses in the
> light of the evidence.

1.3.2.3 Literary presupposition

As far as presuppositions concerning the subject of the investigation go, I take for granted the narrative quality of Luke-Acts and will make use of the concepts of nar- rative exegesis (cf chapter 3, sections 3.4-3.4.2 below).

While Luke-Acts constitutes a double-volume work of a single author, this study will concentrate on the Gospel. The indication of the author that the story con- tinues in the book of Acts (cf Ac 1:1-5), however, has led me to assume that some themes and motifs found in the Gospel are in all probability continued in the book of Acts.[9] This assumption will be tested to the extent that references in Acts may be cited, but no detailed investigation of that work will be undertaken.

As far as the Gospel itself is concerned, the whole strategy of the author is rele- vant. *Strategy*, according to Elliott (1981:11), is the 'deliberate design of a document calculated to have a specific social effect on its intended hearers or readers'. This is also called the *pragmatic dimension* (Elliott 1987b:2) of a text by which the text is in- tended to serve as an effective medium of social interaction. Elliott (1987:2b) dis- tinguishes the following features that may serve as evidence of a text's strategy: A text

> 1. *describes* selected features concerning the situation
> (narrative world and social world), the sender(s) and re-
> ceiver(s) and their relationship; (in narrative, the mode

of emplotment of the story [romance, satire, comedy, tragedy] and the question of the relation of narrative world to social world);

2. *emphasises* these selected features;

3. *evaluates* these selected features;

4. *proscribes or criticises and/or prescribes or praises* certain actions, norms, sanctions, actors, traits, roles, institutions, attitudes, ideas, beliefs etc.;

5. *explains, justifies, and legitimates* ##1-4 and attempts to provide a plausible and persuasive rationale for the integration of experience and aspiration, group values and goals and lived reality; (in narrative, the modes of formal argument [formist, contextualist, organicist, mechanistic] and ideological implication [anarchist, liberal, conservative, radical]).

The passages in Lk 14 applied to the theme of *meals* will serve as the units of analysis for this study. They are chosen because they are suggestive of purity concerns, occur in a setting of dispute, and consequently embody opposing ideologies informed by different understandings of the prevailing symbolic universe. Furthermore, the implementation and arrangement of the metaphors could be fruitfully analysed for the bias of the author on the one hand, and for information concerning the socio-historical reality on the other.

1.3.3 Methodological problems
As for methodology, the following remark by Rockwell (1977:32) might suggest to the reader the problems involved:

What is wanted is a formula that will cover every form of literary expression and can be used as a key to its place and function in every form of society. It is unlikely, however, that such a formula can be found; and certainly we may say that it never will be found by empirical quantitative methods: we will never have all the data on every type, let alone every example, of literature...(W)e must instead attempt to understand society by inductive reasoning and by modelmaking, the imposing (or preferably the discovery) of patterns.

Because information on a society obtained from a single text or even a corpus of texts is limited and, in addition, has already been interpreted and used within an ideological framework, one cannot simply employ a text as a database from which to construct the contextual world that lies behind it (cf sections 1.3.1.2 and 1.3.1.3 above). Such a procedure would amount to a denial of the complexities involved in the social genesis of a text on the one hand, and of the metaphorical and referential characteristics of a text on the other. Stegemann (1984), for instance, conducting a 'sociohistorical interpretation' of the social category of the *poor* in the Gospels, seems to have succumbed to this methodological fallacy. He does not outline an overall theoretical perspective on the types of literature that form the subject of his investigation. Rather, he employs an eclectic semantic method in identifying the terms and phrases that pertain to the stated objective of his study, namely to determine the socio-historical position of the earliest Christians. This is a legitimate method in determining the meaning and reference of the words he has chosen as reflecting the social circumstances of a certain sector of society. It is doubtful, however, whether such an across-the-board reconstruction does justice to the nuances the author wanted to convey by his work. Stegemann seems to categorize the poor primarily in socio-economic terms (cf Hollenbach 1987:54). This is in accordance with categories that characterize modern industrialized society, but does not do justice to the possible cultural understanding of the poor in first-century Palestine.

It seems to me that Stegemann might have fallen prey to two kinds of fallacy. First, a *referential fallacy* regarding the way in which a text refers to its contextual world (cf Petersen 1978:39), and second, the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness* (cf Van Aarde 1985:568-571) regarding the way in which a text from antiquity might be applied to present-day problems. He is also guilty of what I would call the fallacy of the implied 'irrelevance of the author', leaving out of consideration the individual creativity of the author in choosing, arranging, and conferring meaning on his material (cf section 1.3.1.3 above).

1.4 Chapter sequence
The sequence according to which the investigation will proceed is outlined below.

1.4.1 Chapter 2
In this chapter I shall give an outline of the present state of research on the subject of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, by discussing and evaluating the work of certain major exponents of this subdiscipline. Their approach to the literature, and their theoretical exposition and methodological application of the social sciences to the New Testament will be taken into consideration.

1.4.2 Chapter 3

This chapter defines theoretical matters applicable to this study. It includes a discussion of general theoretical issues, such as whether the implementation of social-scientific concepts and methods in exegesis signifies a paradigm shift; concepts from the field of literary theory useful to demarcating a verifiable method of research – more specifically narrative exegesis; and information about macro and micro-sociological perspectives relevant to an understanding of the social-scientific approach.

1.4.3 Chapter 4

Chapter 4 contains the construction of a research programme embodying a correlated synthesis of the salient features from both the literary and the social-scientific fields. This includes: identifying and describing the problem; the formulation of a hypothesis; the construction and use of interpretive models to test the hypothesis; the identification of the analytical tools to be used in the test; the analysis itself; and finally, the synthetic interpretation of the data generated by the analysis.

In line with the methodological programme suggested by the quote from Rockwell (cf section 1.3.3 above), narrative texts should be taken as systems of interaction and be analysed by means of models. With inductive reasoning, the findings can be utilized to construct the social background for the text. For the purpose of this investigation the *narrative world* (Petersen 1978:9-48; 1985:7, 32-33 note 3) of Luke-Acts is recognized as one system of interaction, and the *contextual world* (Petersen 1985:7) as another. For an analysis of the social institutions, statuses and roles, interaction patterns, ideologies, and symbolic universe(s) depicted in the narrative world, the micro-sociological theoretical perspective of interactionism will be used in juxtaposition with the macro-sociological theoretical perspective of conflict theory. In addition, certain concepts from the sociology of knowledge as propounded by Berger & Luckmann (1967) will be utilized.

The literary analysis will be based on modern literary theory, and not (from the perspective of) the traditional historical-critical approach. However, this study should not be seen in opposition to the historical-critical approach, but supplementary to it. The designated text segments will not be analyzed as isolated units, but in relation to and as functional within the surrounding and wider context of Luke-Acts. We are aware, of course, that proof of the hypothesis will be relevant to the test case, and only provisionally for the whole of Luke-Acts.

1.4.4 Chapter 5

In conclusion this chapter discusses the implications of the results of the investigation for the (probable and possible) readers in terms of the ideological perspectives

(core values) of holiness and wholeness versus compassionate involvement, relating to church and society. Subjects that may merit further investigation are also suggested.

1.5 Summary

1.5.1 Social-scientific study of texts
A social-scientific study of the New Testament presupposes a relationship between the text and the socio-historical environment from which it originated. This relationship can be described in different configurations, in each of which specific elements are accentuated (cf sections 1.3.1.1-1.3.1.5). This study supports the view that a text is both a *social product*, its formation being prompted by some societal (including religious) stimulus, and a *social force*, able to effect some change within society.

1.5.2 The literariness of a text
At the same time a text is also a literary construct, and should be honoured as such. This implies that an integration of the principles of literary theory and those of the social-scientific method(s) employed, is required. In this case insights from literary criticism, macro and micro-social theoretical perspectives, sociology of literature, sociology of knowledge, anthropology and social psychology are considered in the construction of the conceptual model(s) which will direct the extraction of some workable information from the text (cf chapters 3 and 4 below).

1.5.3 Interpreting a text
An investigation such as this seeks to contribute to the process of interpreting a text, also known as the hermeneutical process. One should be clear as to *why* a specific text is chosen, and *for what purpose* that text is to be interpreted (cf sections 1.3.2-1.3.2.1 above). Referring to the hermeneutical debate on the meaning of texts, one should also decide whether one is pursuing *the* probable meaning, or simply one amongst several possible but legitimate meanings of the text (cf 1.3.2.2 above).

1.5.4 The intention of the study
This study seeks to demonstrate how, in accordance with the symbolic universe, the essence of social life is construed in Luke-Acts: is it to be found in societal structural relations, rigidly defined by measures calculated to ensure purity? Or is it to be sought in interpersonal social relations, characterized by compassion and the willingness to serve the marginal people of society (cf sections 1.1 and 1.2 above)?

1.5.5 The meal – a case study

The so-called *banquet parables in the Travel Narrative* of the Gospel of Luke – Lk 14:(7)8-11, 12-14, (15)16-24) – will serve as a case study in this investigation. They were chosen because of their highly social theme and the hierarchical differentiation assigned to the roles utilized in them. At the same time they serve as indicators of ideological differences within a setting of dispute. An analysis of the metaphorical reference of the elements of these parables might shed some light on the stated aim of this study (cf section 1.2 above).

1.5.6 Methodology

A text cannot be employed as a straightforward database from which to extract sufficient information to construct the contextual world that lies behind it (cf section 1.3.1.2 above). Rather, by making use of inductive reasoning and by applying models, one may discover patterns that could suggest something about the socio-historical background of a text (cf section 1.3.3 above). In this study Luke-Acts is taken as a system of interaction resembling, but at the same time revising, the system of interaction of the contextual world from which it sprung (cf section 1.3.1.4 above). *Interaction* is associated with the *roles* played by the characters in the narrative, and the roles signify status. The analysis will therefore be conducted from the perspectives of *role theory* and *symbolic interactionism* as it is understood in interactionist theorising (cf sections 3.5.3-3.5.3.3 below).

1.6 Endnotes: Chapter 1

1. Dt 6:8-9; 11:18, 20; Num 15:38-39.

2. This process is also referred to as *social control*, which is applied to deviant members of society either to get them to conform to acceptable standards of behaviour, or to neutralize them.

3. Even the passage in Acts 3:32-37 provides shaky ground for assuming that Luke exhorts 'rich' people to actually become poor. In fact, in passing judgment on the behaviour of Ananias and Sapphira (Ac 5:4), Luke's Peter explicitly indicates that there was no obligation on the owners to sell their land in the first place, and even after they have sold it the decision as to what to do with the proceeds of the sale is entirely theirs. It is only after they have decided to give it all to the apostles and then keep part of it, that they incur the penalty.

4. Van Tilborg (1986:31-34; cf also Kee 1989:70-102 on the subject of the Covenant), in a discussion on Matthew 5:7, argues that the concept of 'mercy' (ἔλεος) was central to the biblical covenant-practices: 'It is unthinkable to have a Jewish covenant without love, mercy, compassion, pity, fidelity, etc...' (Van Tilborg 1986:31-32). He indicates that this theme is redundant in the literature contemporaneous with the Gospel of Matthew: 'God's mercy is a central topic widespread in the actual paranese of Matthew's time and long thereafter' (Van Tilborg 1986:32). The concept of 'mercy' (ἔλεος) used here in Matthew is equivalent to the concept of 'compassion' (οἰκτίρμων) in Luke. Louw & Nida (1988) not only list the two terms under the same semantic domain, namely 'Moral and ethical qualities and related behavior' (Louw & Nida 1988:742), but under the same subdomain as well, i e 'Mercy, merciless' (Louw & Nida 1988:751). On the basis of Van Tilborg's exegesis one can deduce that the critical stance taken in Luke's narrative towards the Pharisees included the notion that they misunderstood and misrepresented the whole covenant relationship. Van Tilborg's description of a covenant relationship exhibits striking similarities with the relationships described in terms of the patron-client model (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 a). A study of the covenant in terms of this model may yield fruitful results (cf Malina 1988a).

5. Note the correspondence to the indicative-imperative scheme recognized in theology.

6. This is actually confirmed by the theory of cognitive dissonance, which states that adherents to a belief system would – in the face of social ridicule because of their beliefs being proved false – actually *make* their beliefs true by translating them into practical deeds, especially by proselytizing (cf Gager 1975; see below Chapter 2).

7. The text's 'contextual history' is not to be confused with its 'referential history' (cf Petersen 1978:9-23, 33-39, 81-92; 1985:6-10).

8. The term 'text' as used here is more inclusive than denoting a purely literary text in its final version. Van Aarde (1988b:3) argues that, in order to construct the context of a specific text where information on the reader is scant or absent, more substantial material is needed. Such material could be acquired by focusing on aspects from other 'texts'.

> Other 'texts' could be fragments in the co-text that have occurred previously or will occur later. They could also be references to pre-texts, for example quotations from and allusions to other texts, or the use of sources. Seen thus, each text is part of a constellation of texts. Every text presupposes an earlier one. Besides the other fragments in the co-text and references to pre-texts, intertextuality involves any human situation which, as a result of the essential denotative function of language, encroaches upon a text.
>
> (Van Aarde 1988b:3)

In this sense a 'text' may also be constituted by artefacts and other archaeological material.

9. The assumption that the Gospel of Luke and the Book of Acts form a unified narrative has recently been challenged by Dawsey (1989). He contends that certain factors such as differences in genre, stylistic characteristics and sequence (Acts following the Gospel) prohibit an uncritical assumption of narrative unity between the two works, and that an assumption of sequence should not necessarily lead to one of unity (Dawsey 1989:49-50).

Chapter 2

Current approaches within the

field of the social-scientific study

of the New Testament

2.1 Orientation

The nineteen-seventies heralded a renewed interest in the social background of the New Testament documents. A fresh approach was indicated – compared to earlier related efforts (see section 2.2 below) – by an appropriation by biblical scholars of the theoretical and methodological insights provided by the social sciences – sociology, anthropology and psychology. To orientate the reader, the differences between sociology, anthropology and psychology could briefly be summed up as follows (see 3.5 below for a more elaborate discussion):

Sociology is formally defined as the scientific study of all systems of social interaction (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:7). *Social interaction* is seen as the basic generic social phenomenon – from it all other social phenomena arise (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:6). An important aspect of this interaction is that it becomes routinized as 'a necessary condition for society as an ongoing enterprise' (Berger & Berger 1976:16). This routinization brings order and predictability into the interaction, so that the patterns of interaction form a system. A *system* refers to a certain relationship and interdependency between complexes of empirical phenomena. This relationship and interdependency between the different components results in the internal order or unity of the system. Furthermore, each component attributes to the dynamic and orderliness of the total system. A system, therefore, has two aspects:

i)   A structural aspect, comprising interaction patterns that consist of specific components and are interrelated to each other.

ii)   A functional aspect, comprising the contribution made by these components to the dynamic and functioning of the system as a whole.

Sociology is not primarily interested in individual personality or behaviour, but in systems of interaction – that is, social forms and structures such as groups, communities and societies within which man behaves in an orderly and regulated fashion.

While the discipline of sociology is mostly interested in the general structures and functions of social phenomena within the *own* group, *anthropology* directs its attention more specifically towards the economic, linguistic, religious, and other institutions of *alien* groups.

Other than sociology and anthropology, both of which are directed towards collectivities, *psychology* is primarily interested in individual personality and behaviour, *as influenced by the social circumstances to which man is exposed* (Cilliers & Joubert 1966:15).

2.1.1 Chapter outline

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to investigate the work of a few prominent scholars that have taken up the social-scientific study of the New Testament.[1] The discussion does not pretend to be an exhaustive critical appraisal, but rather a survey of the different possibilities that are currently employed. This will be done by way of a treatment under rubrics, which will be used as a template under which to read and evaluate the works chosen for discussion. First, the literary approach of the authors will be considered. Second, their understanding and exposition of those aspects of sociological theory that form the basis of their work will be discussed, as well as their choice and application of interpretive models, that is, the methodological procedure followed in the works.

The major works of the following authors, representing the mainstream of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, will be assessed: John H Elliott, John G Gager, Bruce J Malina, Wayne A Meeks, Norman R Petersen, Gerd Theissen.

2.2 Roots of the social-scientific study of the New Testament

Interest in the situational context of the biblical documents and the traditions which they contain, is not new. Well-known attempts at a sociological interpretation of early Christianity are the *Marxist reading* (Scroggs 1980:177-179) and the *Chicago school of New Testament studies* (Funk 1976:4-22), both of which have been implicitly or explicitly reductionist in postulating social causes for all religious phenomena (Schütz 1982:3-11; Meeks 1983:3). Also, the so-called *form-critical school* had an enquiry into the socio-historical background of a text as part of its exegetical programme as early as the beginning of the century.

Form criticism (Formgeschichte) is part of the historical-critical approach. It arose as a reaction to the so-called *Literargeschichte*, a literary-critical approach that sought to shed some light on the origins and growth of New Testament literature, especially the Gospels, from their inception to their completion. This goal the *Literargeschichte* could not attain, because it was usually applied either to the literary work, or to the process of oral traditions being transformed into literature. Either a literary appraisal was made of the documents, or they were subjected to a source analysis (Hahn 1985:427 note 2). It was the task of form criticism to divert this singular concentration on the origins of the textual unit to other areas of interest, in order to remedy the one-sidedness of the *Literargeschichte* and to expand the scope of investigation to include matters of social importance. *Hermann Gunkel* is acknowledged as the father of the form-critical method, as he first applied it to the Old Testament (Tucker 1971:4-6). Hahn (1985:441) states of Gunkel:

> Sein Methodenkonzept ist, inspiriert von Herder, anhand der Untersuchung biblischer Texte erwachsen. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist, dass die formgeschichtliche Analyse der Überlieferung hier gleichzeitig als Frage nach der aus Stoff und Form sich bestimmenden Gattung *und* als Frage nach dem Sitz im Leben in Angriff genommen wird.

Form criticism, as exegetic method applied to the Old Testament, was not identical in its application to the New Testament (cf Hahn 1985:442; Schütz 1982:8-9). That is why *Martin Dibelius* is described as the one with whom the New Testament strand of form criticism originated (Hahn 1985:442). Form-critical investigations into the *Sitz im Leben* of texts and traditions of the New Testament were also conducted by K L Schmidt and R Bultmann (cf Hahn 1985:1-255, 442-454; Zimmermann 1967:128-134), in order to obtain information about the world extraneous to the text, information that could aid their understanding of the texts. Dibelius ([1929]) formulated the task of form criticism as follows:

> Die Formgeschichte hat es bekanntlich nicht mit den abgeschlossenen literarischen Werken zu tun, sondern mit den kleinen Einheiten, die in mündlicher oder schriftlicher Überlieferung weitergegeben werden, deren Kenntniss wir aber freilich aus Büchern schöpfen, in die sie Aufnahme gefunden haben...Die Formgeschichte stellt sich vielmehr die grössere und schwierigere Aufgabe, Entstehung und Geschichte dieser Ein-

> zelstücke zu rekonstruieren, somit die Geschichte der
> vorliterarischen Überlieferung aufzuhellen, und – im
> Falle der Synoptiker – eine art 'Paläontologie der Evan-
> gelien' (K L Schmidt nach Overbeck in RGG² II, 638)
> zu schaffen.
>
> (Hahn 1985:23-24)

It is an assumption of form criticism, therefore, that a segment of traditional ma-
terial can be identified first of all by its form. This form is associated with a specific
situation, as a result of its repeated use in that situation. An analysis of the form
and content of such traditional material ought therefore to tell us something about
the situation that gave birth to it. Dibelius (in Hahn 1985:24) states:

> Formgeschichte kann also nur von der Voraussetzung
> aus getrieben werden, dass die Form jener Einheiten et-
> was über ihre Herkunft verrate und dass die Geschichte
> der vorliterarischen Überlieferung sich nach gewissen
> immanenten, nicht lediglich von schriftstellernden Per-
> sonen abhängenden Gesetzen vollziehe. Die formge-
> schichtliche Betrachtung ist also bewusst antiindivi-
> dualistisch und soziologisch....

In order to determine whether and how present-day sociological investigations of
the New Testament literature are related or indebted to the *Sitz im Leben* approach,
one must establish what the form critics meant by the term 'soziologisch'. Is John
Schütz (1982:10) correct when he says that 'the sociological interest latent in form
criticism makes it apparent that current attention to social questions is but conti-
nuous with the recent past of biblical scholarship'? Theissen (1982:186), it seems,
sees in the sociological approach a continuance of the form-critical *Sitz im Leben*
investigations (see also Osiek 1984:3).

2.2.1 Naive description of social settings

The *Sitz im Leben* interest was concerned with collecting *'explicit evidence* as to so-
cial and historical context' (Elliott 1981:3; see also K Berger 1977:219), and used the
data for a *social description* of the presumed reconstructed socio-historical back-
ground of the texts.

The same could be said about earlier investigations – termed 'social' or 'socio-
historical' – by scholars such as Lohmeyer, Von Dobschütz, Troeltsch, Matthews
and Case (cf Scroggs 1980:164-165; Schütz 1982:3-11, 21 notes 5 and 16; Osiek
1984:3). The interest was primarily historical in character for theological relevance,

and practically nothing can be found in those publications on the subject of social-scientific theory and/or method (Meeks 1983:3). This earlier approach could therefore be termed a *naive description of social setting*, whereby social information was used to undergird and supplement historical supposition. Klaus Berger (1977:219) deems this (i e collecting explicit social evidence for a socio-historical description) a questionable approach:

> Viele Texte des NT sind für diese Fragen wenig ergie-
> big. Die Ebene theologischer Traditionen wird weder
> tangiert noch erklärt, das Zusammenwirken von Theo-
> logie und Situation kann kaum in den Blick kommen.

In a qualified sense, then, the modern social-scientific approach to the New Testament can be termed both a continuance *and* a discontinuance of earlier socio-historical investigations (Schütz 1982:3). It is a *continuance* in so far as it values knowledge of the social setting of the text as the frame of reference within which to understand the text. It is a *discontinuance* in that it is not primarily interested in reconstructing history, or even in theology, but it is eminently interested in interpreting the substance and/or content of texts that relate to the disciplines of sociology, anthropology or psychology (cf 2.1 above). For this reason it avails itself of the sophisticated theoretical and methodological constructs of these disciplines. It is also a discontinuance in so far as it endeavours not to be reductionist, a charge that some of the earlier approaches could not escape, mainly because of their lack of social-scientific epistemology (see section 2.2 above).

2.3 Current state of the discipline

In contrast to the social description for historical relevance that resulted from earlier studies with a social interest (Harris 1984:102-103; see 2.2 above), the renewed interest by biblical scholars in the social dimension of texts from the outset stated its intention to take cognizance of and utilize the theoretical concepts and empirical methods of the scientific disciplines of sociology, anthropology and psychology, in order to *explain* the productive societal powers that gave rise to the biblical documents. The whole purpose of such an undertaking would be to better understand the text of the Bible. There being no previous guidelines along which to proceed, a theoretical basis and methodological structure for the application of sociological, anthropological and psychological principles to the texts of the Bible had to be constructed. The bewildering diversity of quantitative and qualitative methods and models that these disciplines present, has led to all kinds of exploratory work within the exegetical subdiscipline that has come to be known as the sociology of the New

Testament. Different scholars have opted for different approaches, methods and models in trying to uncover new information on the social background of the New Testament (cf Smith 1975:19-21; Scroggs 1980:167-171; Best 1983:187-190; Edwards 1983:431-444; Harrington 1988:77-85).

In the gathering momentum of publications on this new field of interest, the indiscriminate use of the terms 'social' and 'sociological' resulted in the equating of *social description* with *social-scientific explanation* (cf Elliott 1981:3; Malina 1982:241; Osiek 1984:4-6). This is unfortunate, because a genuine social-scientific approach operates on a different level from that of social description. Best (1983:185) distinguishes between two levels of application of social-scientific categories to the New Testament, namely *description* and *explanation* (see also Gager 1979:175), and states:

> For a truly sociological approach, however, one must move to the second level, that of *explanation*. Here the tools and techniques of modern sociological study are used, not merely to describe but also to probe the inner dynamics of the early Christian movement, regarded not as a unique event but as an example of patterns of behaviour which may be widely observed and objectively studied.
>
> (Best 1983:185)

Gager (1982) has shed even more light on the issue. Referring to an article by Smith (1975:19-20) in which no less than *four* different approaches within this field were distinguished, Gager reserved the description 'sociological' or 'social-scientific' for the approach that, according to Smith, encompassed 'an analysis of Christianity as a social world, as the creation of a world of meaning which provided a plausibility structure for those who chose to inhabit it' (Smith 1975:19-20; cf Domeris 1988:379). Gager states that only such an approach:

> ...can be properly characterized as sociological or, more broadly, social scientific, for it is only here that specific academic disciplines – sociology, anthropology and psychology – have contributed explanatory theories and hypotheses.
>
> (Gager 1982:258)

It is clear, then, that there is a difference between the reference of the terms 'social' and 'sociological', and that this difference needs further clarification. The most logical way to start would be to take a more detailed look at the different approaches denoted by the above terms (see also 2.3 above), in order to be able to judge the work of the authors under consideration properly.

2.3.1 Social versus sociological approach

It has been noted by several scholars that some confusion exists as regards the reference of the above terms (cf Gager 1979:175; Gottwald 1982:143; Schütz 1982:1; Osiek 1984:4). The words have apparently been used interchangeably to refer to the study of any *explicit* data in the New Testament texts on any societal phenomena (both concrete and abstract) in the period of early Christianity, and mainly for the purpose of historical interest. This means that the question facing the interpreter changes from 'What did the author mean?' to 'Was there anything in the contemporary societal structure that this utterance could be a reflection of?' The texts are processed in this way until every scrap of information that might have some social relevance has been tagged and included in a database. Then the database itself is sorted into categories such as 'cultural', 'political', 'economical', and 'religious'. Each of these categories contains the information on the different social institutions that could be assigned to it. Finally, the accumulated information serves as a new source from which to extract the information needed to reconstruct any of the settings that could be deemed connected to an utterance in order to facilitate the understanding of that utterance. Corroboration for the reconstructed setting is sought from both biblical and nonbiblical literary sources from the same period, and from archaeological evidence (Osiek 1984:4). In this way a picture emerges of the time of the origin of early Christianity – a picture containing much detail already, and being added to all the time as new data emerge. This whole exercise, as well as the results that it may produce, is called by different names: *social analysis, social description, socio-historical approach, social history,* even *sociological analysis.* This is where the confusion starts, and it becomes imperative to delineate the reference of the terms.

The procedure described above can be termed a *social description* or *social history,* but *not* a sociological analysis. A social description *accumulates* data that it regards as relevant in order to contribute to the historical understanding of the background of the New Testament texts or text-segments (Harris 1984:105). When needed, pieces of the amassed information are fitted together like a jigsaw puzzle. The structure of the text or the ideological point of view of the narrator or any other literary or *redaktionsgeschichtliche* concepts are of no consequence in this approach.

Texts are simply regarded as *sociological informants* of the most basic kind, containing unreflected social data on diverse subjects (see Domeris 1988:379-381 for a concise discussion of social descriptions and histories).

By the term *sociological analysis*, on the other hand, something completely different is meant. It is already clear from the discussion in 2.3 above, that 'sociological approach/analysis' refers to the implementation of methods of analysis and research based on epistemologies relevant to the social sciences. The term has a generic reference, but at the same time it applies to a specific discipline of the social sciences, namely sociology. For the sake of clarification it would therefore be better to replace it with the broader term, that is, *social-scientific analysis*. The purpose of such analysis, to my mind, is not simply to accumulate data. Depending on the end towards which the analysis is done – which is an exposition of the meaning of the narrative discourse as autonomous *object d'art* – it may utilize the results of the former method, while always striving to comprehend and explain the data. A social-scientific analysis *abstracts* data in the sense of unearthing, making explicit what is buried and implicit in the narrative discourse. An analogy to this process can be found in Genette's narratological theory (1980). He also abstracted the story (récit) from the narrative discourse (histoire). The analysis of the *récit* concerns the reciprocal relations between the characters (Van Aarde 1988c:238).

Methodologically speaking, the only *direct and explicit* social information we have for the contextual history of the text is the literary work itself, constituting a social fact. Social-scientific data within the narrative is not directly accessible or available for a historical (re)construction.[2] Such data have acquired the characteristics of *literary* elements, and should be analyzed as such. Translating such literary-social data into pure social data fit to be used in a historical (re)construction, is a rather complex procedure. It involves an integration of literary analysis and social-scientific analysis in a way that is beneficial to both disciplines, and, most of all, should deliver results that are able to stand up to critical evaluation. First, a thorough literary analysis should be made of the text, according to its type (i e narrative). Then, on the macro-social level of the relationship between ideas and social reality, the text can be analysed in terms of some macro-theory – Durkheimian, Weberian or Marxist. To use Theissen's terms, such a macro-sociological analysis could be termed a 'structural homologue'[3] (Theissen 1978:26-27, 121 n 8; 1982:190) of the narrative analysis of the work. Then, on the micro-social level of the relationship between the author and the reader, and using the results of the macro-sociological analysis, the text can be analysed in terms of communications theory by means of interpretive models from the fields of sociology, anthropology and psychology. Such analysis would constitute a 'structural homologue' to the literary analysis of

reader response. Finally, the results from both the literary and the macro and micro-sociological analyses are used to interpret and explain not the *historical* world, but the *narrative* or *referential* world of the text. In other words, at this time the interpreter is still moving *within* the text.

Only now can the interpreter use the database constructed by the accumulation of explicit social data, and use it for the purpose of comparison. The explicit data is considered to constitute that which is normal, that is, the 'habitualized activity' associated with the 'typificatory schemes' that apply to everyday life (Berger & Luckmann 1967:28-31, 53-54). The narrative world, created by the text, should be compared to the everyday historical world to which the text belongs in order for those elements within the narrative world that are new, different or strange, to be discernible and identifiable. Only on the basis of the information procured in this way can we begin to make inferences about the social setting for which the text was intended.

2.4 Approach to the literature of the New Testament

> Whatever we know is mediated by a language, if not by
> the language in which we know it. And if language is
> the sine qua non instrument of knowing, the knowledge-
> seeker had better be in control of the instrument. Bad
> language generates bad thinking; and bad thinking is
> bad for whatever the knowledge-seeker does next.
>
> (Sartori 1984:15)

The literary aspect, to my mind, is of primary importance in the process of extracting social-scientific information from a text (1.1.2). Some relationship must exist between a text and the society from which it evolved (1.1-1.1.1.5). If a literary text is taken as some sort of one-on-one 'commentary' on society, whether positive or negative, the extraction and interpretation of social-scientifically relevant data from the text would be fairly simple. However, from personal experience and the work of literary critics we know that a literary work is not as unidirectional as that. The meanings and nuances conveyed in and by a literary work such as a narrative must first of all be related to the *narrative world* (cf Petersen 1978:38-40) that is constructed by the narrative, and not to the 'real', in the sense of 'historical', world. This 'narrative world' is analogous to the 'real world' in nearly every respect: there are social institutions in this world which stand in a specific relationship to one another; various characters, representing these institutions, are involved in a network of social relations; it is not a static picture-world, but a dynamic, functioning system, exhibiting all the interests, ideologies, tensions and conflicts that may exist in

the real, everyday world. However, there is one very important factor that should be noted when a social-scientific analysis of this 'narrative world' is to be undertaken: this world did not come about as a result of the usual formation processes of which the 'real' everyday world is a result (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967); it is, of necessity, a conceptualized world that originated in the mind of an author. However much it may *seem* to be a straightforward description of the historical world, according to the principles of narrative interpretation (Petersen 1978:38-40; 1985:5-7) one is not allowed to presume a one-on-one relationship between the narrative text and the historical world. Petersen (1985:5) is adamant that 'at the very beginning of our explorations we will have to decide whether we are going to explore the world of history or the world of story'.

According to Petersen (1978:15; 1985:5) a literary text 'is first and foremost evidence for the time in which it was written. It is a primary source for that time, but only a secondary source for the events referred to in it'. The issue at stake here is the distinction that is made between the *contextual history* (= the historical context) of the text, and the *referential history* (= the history referred to in the text). Petersen (1985:7) describes the reference of the above terms as follows:

> Literary and historical critics are therefore in agreement when they associate the notion of context with the time of writing. But what in literary criticism corresponds to the history referred to in our narrative texts? In literary terms, this *referential history* comprises the *narrative world* of the text (or story). The narrative world is that reality which the narrator bestows upon his actors and upon their actions, a reality into which he authoritatively invites his audience, whether he is telling a fairy tale, a spy story, or a great novelistic adventure.

In view of the above it seems clear that a social-scientific analysis of, for instance, the gospel narratives, should be very precise about its goals and methods.

Should the goal of the analysis be to describe or (re)construct the social environment at the time of the historical Jesus, one could easily be tempted to take statements of social-scientific interest in the text as if they were a straightforward description of the history referred to. It should be kept in mind, however, that the narrative world of a text is only a secondary source for the referential history. In other words, in the case of the gospel narratives the authors employ material which refers to events that are – from their perspective – already historical. The purpose of the author in composing the narrative is to communicate some message to the

readers *of his own day* (see Malina 1982:229-230; 1983:120-131; 1986a:1-12, 166-167 on biblical narrative as communication). Therefore one cannot assume that the stories of Jesus and his disciples represented in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John directly represent history as it happened. Such an assumption would constitute a rather serious methodological fallacy, known as the 'referential fallacy' (Petersen 1978:38-40). Meanings and nuances conferred upon these statements by the author might be totally overlooked. 'The history of those events and lives has to be reconstructed from the stories that refer to them' (Petersen 1985:7; see also Malina 1983:120-129 on the question of 'inconsiderate' readers and writers).

Should the goal of a social-scientific analysis be to obtain some information on the *contextual world* of the text, the procedure would again be to first determine the meaning of a statement in terms of the narrative world, and afterwards to establish the reference to the extratextual context.[4]

In this section the authors under discussion will be reviewed with regard to the different points of view from which they approach the text as a literary composition, as they scan it for data relevant to a social-scientific analysis. These 'perspectives' are not meant to suggest that this is the sole angle of approach of any of the authors. It simply is a way of differentiating between the different approaches by means of some emphasis or inclination I have detected in their work. Therefore, by categorizing Theissen's approach to the literature a 'form-critical' one, it reflects an indebtedness to this method that I found in his work; and calling the approach of Elliott and Petersen a 'literary' one (cf below), it does not mean that their work goes begging for an understanding of communication theory – on the contrary! And, *mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to the 'communications' perspective ascribed to Malina and Meeks.

2.4.1 Gerd Theissen

Elliott and Petersen have a predilection for the literary 'perspective' (2.4.5 and 2.4.6 below), and Malina and Meeks for the communications 'perspective' (2.4.3 and 2.4.4) in their respective approaches to the social-scientific study of the New Testament. *Theissen* concentrates on the acquisition of sociologically relevant material by means of an analysis of the text in the *form-critical tradition*, trying to uncover the *Sitz im Leben* by a 'constructive', 'analytic' or 'comparative' approach (Theissen 1982:177). He cites again the perception by classical form criticism 'that literary forms, as genre-specific norms for the shaping of texts, express social relationships' (Theissen 1982:186). For Theissen the importance of the text is not so much to be found in its literary structure as in its creative composition. He views the text as 'a kind of sociology' (cf 1.1.1.2), in which 'sociological statements' as such are absent

and 'pre-scientific sociological references' are scant, but 'historical, paraenetic, poetic, ecclesiological, and mythical statements' are present (Theissen 1982:176). Underlying this view is an understanding of literature whereby the creation of the gospels, their form, content, substance and message may all be regarded as social facts (cf Theissen 1982:182-186) or contradictions (cf Theissen 1982:181-182) or even as symbols (cf Theissen 1982:187-191). This represents a perception of the social genesis of literature in which there remains very little scope for the concept of an individual creative author who has received some traditional material, interpreted it, added redactional commentary to it and (re)arranged it in such a way as to create a completely new narrative with a thrust and ideology that suits the needs of his own community (see 1.1.1.3). In a more recent work, though, Theissen (1987) has shown himself to be not only knowledgeable (cf Theissen 1987:19, 27, 55, 83) about narrative exegesis, but also quite adept at using the powerful instrument of narrative persuasion. His interest, however, remains focused on the 'referential history' – as opposed to the 'contextual history' – of the text (see 2.4 and 2.4.1 above).[5]

2.4.2 John G Gager

In a short discussion of the importance of the work of redaction criticism Gager (1975:8-9) points out that redaction critics have sought to sketch a picture of the beliefs and practices, the concerns and presuppositions that gave to each Gospel its final shape. This they did by analysing a Gospel in terms of its general structure, thematic development, and literary style. They also distinguished between traditional material and its reinterpretation by the final author or editor. If the results of this kind of analysis are transposed 'into the framework of early Christianity as a new world coming into being, we may properly speak of the Gospels as religious or mythological charters' (Gager 1975:8). The Gospels may serve as sources for recreating the social world of early Christianity. The Gospels themselves, of course, are based on sources, that is, contain inherited traditions. These traditions tended to influence the community's view of the world, and vice versa. Gager (1975:9) therefore regards the Gospels and their sources as 'models *of* as well as models *for* their respective groups'.

Apart from these observations, Gager says practically nothing about the (different types of) literature that he works with. His programme of re-creating the social world of early Christianity clearly belongs in the realm of social history, where the text is simply regarded as a receptacle full of socio-historical data.

2.4.3 Wayne A Meeks

Meeks (1972:68), like Malina, understands literature as a form of communication:

> So long as we approach the Johannine literature as a chapter in the history of *ideas*, it will defy our understanding. Its metaphors are irrational, disorganized, and incomplete. But if we pose our questions in the form, What functions did this particular system of metaphors have for the group that developed it? then even its self-contradictions and its disjunctures may be seen to be a *means of communication*.

Meeks takes a different tack from that of Malina; he emphasizes the *functional* aspect of literature as a social force, that is, the reaction that the literary work elicits from its readers, while Malina places a greater emphasis on literature as a *social product*, that is, as containing data of social-scientific interest (cf 1.1.1.4 above). Meeks (1972:68-69; see also 1983:7) forcefully argues the point:

> The reader cannot understand any part of the Fourth Gospel until he understands the whole. Thus the reader has an experience rather like that of the dialogue partners of Jesus...such an experience is grounded in the stylistic structure of the whole document. This is the way its language, composed of an enormous variety of materials, from the standpoint of the history of traditions, has been organized, partly by design, i.e., by the actual composition by the evangelist, and partly by pre-redactional collocation of the different ways of talking in the life of the community. *The book functions for its readers in precisely the same way that the epiphany of its hero functions within its narratives and dialogues* (emphasis by Meeks).

This means, according to Meeks (1972:69), that certain deductions about the Johannine community can be made by taking into account the structural characteristics of the literature. In this way the text itself, as a deliberately constructed entity for a specific purpose, becomes not merely a source of sociologically interesting information, but its structurality might be an indispensable clue to the understanding of its community. In more recent works (1982, 1983) Meeks, interestingly enough, gives

very little indication of his own assessment of the import of the composition of lite-
rary texts in the social-scientific investigation of early Christian origins.

2.4.4 Bruce Malina

Malina (1983:120) distinguishes between reading the Bible 'as a text containing
communication from an author' and reading it 'as a documentary source containing
historical information'. The reference here is to the *interpretation* of a text in order
to try to understand the substance and the meaning of what the author was trying to
say, and to the finding of historical data in order to set up a picture of some part of
history. In both instances '...one uses the Bible as a piece of communication, as lan-
guage. And using the Bible as historical record obviously requires a first step of
interpretation, with interpretation being rooted in reading. Thus any use of the
Bible as written text requires that it be read' (Malina 1983:120; see also 1982:229).
It seems as though Malina is in agreement with Elliott here, but there is also a diffe-
rence. Malina approaches the 'reading' of the Bible not from a *literary* perspective,
but from a *communications theory* perspective (cf Malina 1983:120-128), according
to which the communicative possibilities of a text are linked to the 'considerateness'
of an author in writing against the background of his/her audience's social system:
'Should a writer depict scenarios that can in no way be rooted in his/her audience's
social system, s/he can be fairly labelled an inconsiderate writer' (Malina 1983:122).
This is so, because meaning can only be effectively communicated if both reader and
writer share a common social system (Malina 1983:122). The argument implies, of
course, that there could also be such a thing as an inconsiderate *reader*, that is one
who is not sensitive to the social system of an author (Malina 1983:122).

Most of what Malina says here, can only be endorsed. That is why a social-
scientific study is indispensable for the hermeneutic and exegetic task. However,
when he labels the argument that a literary work of art has a life of its own a 'cute
personification' (Malina 1983:132, note 16), and thereby presumably negates the
possibility of polyvalence as an intrinsic quality of an autonomous text, one would
have to disagree. Referring to the debate on this issue (see section 1.2.2 above), the
autonomy and resulting multivalence of a literary text has been adequately demon-
strated. Even people sharing the same social system can sometimes completely mis-
understand one another. At the same time Malina is no doubt correct in his assess-
ment that an effort by a later interpreter to share the social system of the writer
would very much eliminate the 'wild blue yonder' as regards possible meanings for
the text, and provide (additional) valuable constraints within which to interpret a
text. His 'communications perspective', which is literary in nature, is closely related
to the 'literary perspective' of Elliott and Petersen (cf 2.4.5 and 2.4.6 below).

2.4.5 John H Elliott

Stressing the fact that the biblical text has a social dimension which should receive greater attention during the exegetic task, Elliott suggests a two-pronged approach to the text for which he coins the term 'sociological exegesis' (Elliott 1981:7). By this he describes 'the analytic and synthetic interpretation of a text through the combined exercise of the exegetical and sociological disciplines, their principles, theories and techniques' (Elliott 1981:7-8). Perhaps Elliott's most important contribution concerning the methodological approach of a social-scientific investigation of Scripture is the statement:

> ...the literary text serves as the primary focus, starting point, and empirical control of sociological analysis... The *textual* focus of the analysis distinguishes it from the wider diachronic scope of social history and from the synchronic analysis of an entire society at a given period.
>
> (Elliott 1981:8)

This constitutes a choice for an analysis of the text as the methodological first step in the process of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, and is indicative of a social-scientific investigation of a text from a *literary* perspective.

2.4.6 Norman R Petersen

Petersen has established himself as an expert in the field of literary criticism in his work *Literary criticism for New Testament critics* (1978) and subsequent articles. In his work that relates specifically to the social-scientific investigation of New Testament texts, *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the sociology of Paul's narrative world*, Petersen is quite clear about the importance he attaches to the application of literary-critical principles whilst conducting a 'sociological' investigation of a New Testament text (cf Petersen 1985:ix, 1, and especially 4-17). As has already been discussed in some detail (cf 2.2.2, 2.4, 2.4.1), Petersen urges very strongly that the interpreter should make a conceptual differentiation between two modes of worlds: the *narrative world*, which is a whole, complete world presented to the reader in and by a narrative, and which offers the reader the *only* way (cf Petersen 1987:5) to understand the *real, historical world* of which the narrative world is a reflection. An analysis of the text as a literary creation would therefore be a methodological first step in Petersen's social-scientific approach to the study of the New Testament (cf Petersen 1987:2-6 for a very clear and readable discussion on how to move from texts to their contexts).

Petersen has also been criticized on precisely his representations of reader(s), text, and extra-text (context), and the relations between them. According to Darr (1988:119; see also Hays 1987:175) Petersen's work exhibits a reaction against the excessive 'extrinsicality' of some historical-critical studies by attempting to dissociate the text from any contextual factors. At the same time Petersen asserts that the story is not the text but rather a construction by the one who reads the text (the reader). Darr (1988:120) states:

> In a sense, then, Petersen's system is a curious and somewhat uneasy combination of New Criticism's insistence on an autonomous, autotelic text and reader-response criticism's assertion that the reader plays an important role in the production of literary meaning. In order to combine these two notions, Petersen must posit implicitly a suprahistorical reader, that is, one who comes to the text without presuppositions and expectations based on specific, historically-conditioned extra-textual knowledge. As a result...the gulf that separates modern readers from ancient readers is far too easily bridged...Petersen seems to suggest that, at least initially, the literary and historical tasks can be done separately. In fact they must be integrated from the outset.

Darr (1988:120) suggests that the modern critic is obliged to reconstruct from other ancient sources the contextual knowledge presupposed by the text in order to understand and explain the specific text.

I find Darr's criticism an oversimplification of Petersen's argument on the issues discussed above. Petersen is quite aware of the problems in this regard. He states:

> ...in my experience the tendency has been to give greater weight to the historical context constructed from several texts than to the text we want to understand. My concern, therefore, is to undertake a more exhaustive search *within* the text for information about its own historical context...A more rigorous rendering of this principle would be to say that a text is *the* foremost evidence for the time in which it was written, and therefore for purposes of historical construction it has methodological priority over other evidence for that time. To be sure, a dialectical assessment of all the evidence is

> ultimately necessary. But at this stage...it is necessary to
> recover an appreciation of the text because it has be-
> come obscured by our greater appreciation of its con-
> text.
>
> (Petersen 1984:38)

In fact – referring to the quotation from Darr above – Petersen does *not* implicitly posit a suprahistorical reader. He distinguishes between intratextually encoded readers, which are *literary functions*, and *actual* readers, who are historical persons that are to be inferred from the text and belong to its historical context (cf Petersen 1984:39). *Encoded* or *authorial* readers belong to the text's own interpretive context, while *actual readers* belong to other interpretive contexts (cf Petersen 1984:40). This means that a text cannot signify for non-authorial readers what it signifies for authorial readers (Petersen 1984:40), and therefore Petersen (1984:41) warns against the interpreter illegitimately substituting his/her interpretive context for that of the text. I am therefore in agreement with Petersen – against Darr – as far as his (Petersen's) approach to the text is concerned.

2.5 The role of social science theory

With regard to the social sciences, this 'enemy' (Gager 1982:256-257; see also Meeks 1983:6) that theologians have been espousing for some time has presented us with many 'brides' (seen from the masculine point of view!), and the advocates of such marriages have not been the picture of faithful monogamous 'husbands' either. In fact, a somewhat 'open-minded' attitude has been encouraged for getting acquainted with (and making use of) the different theoretical and methodological possibilities presented by sciences such as sociology, anthropology and psychology (cf Gager 1979:175; Meeks 1983:6). Such an attitude might suggest that we are part of a generation of explorers, and that a new and uncharted land has opened up before us. Exploring this land has so far been an uncoordinated affair – the social sciences have indeed presented us with many possibilities in terms of surveying (angles of perception) and charting (actual methods). Gottwald (1982:146) states:

> ...it is evident that these varied types and instances of
> social scientific biblical study focus on different aspects
> of the subject matter, operate on different levels of ab-
> straction and concretion, and present methodological
> and theoretical pluriformity.

It is to be expected that sometime in the future all this effort will culminate in a method in which the different angles of perception will have been accommodated. In the meantime, though, the different approaches that are currently adopted should be described as being best to aid the *explanation* of the text.

2.5.1 Gerd Theissen

> The importance of pioneering studies lies not so much in their elegance or sophistication as in the sheer power and effect of their breaking new ground, of imaginatively and boldly advancing where no one else before has trod. The initial path forged might not be straight or tidy, but a path it is indeed, a breakthrough, a way clear enough for others to follow. Theissen has macheted his way through a jungle and has constructed a set of Rube-Goldberg bridges. He has forged a path leading to fresh sources of water.
>
> (Elliott 1986:10)

In his work entitled *Sociology of early Palestinian Christianity* (1978) Theissen uses the sociological method known as *functional analysis*. He analyses the texts in terms of roles, factors and functions in accordance with sociological insights into social dynamics (cf Theissen 1978:4). This entails that he scans the (designated) texts for information or data that can be construed as representing or reflecting matters of sociological interest. The aim of his study is to describe the Jesus movement in terms of its genesis, composition, conduct and influence. This is a purely descriptive and comparative study. In essence it is the same kind of enterprise as undertaken by the form-critical school in determining the *Sitz im Leben* of a specific phenomenon, albeit in this instance by means of the application of a scientifically constructed, verifiable method or interpretive model from the discipline of sociology.

Theissen (1978:1) makes a distinction between an analysis of roles – which investigates typical patterns of behaviour, an analysis of factors – which investigates the way in which this behaviour is determined by society, and an analysis of function – which investigates the effects of a group on society. He makes no attempt to find a social 'first cause', because economic, ecological, political and cultural factors cannot be separated in their reciprocal interaction.

In another essay on methodology, Theissen (1982:176-177; cf Malina 1982:238 for a similar view) states his conviction that a sociological statement seeks to

describe and explain interpersonal behavior with reference to those characteristics
which transcend the personal.

> First of all, then, a sociological question is less con-
> cerned with what is individual than with what is typical,
> recurrent, general. Second, it is less concerned with the
> singular conditions of a specific situation than with
> structural relationships which apply to several situa-
> tions.
>
> (Theissen 1982:177)

The procedure by means of which he proposes to accomplish the sociological task
sketched in the quotation above, is that used in the form-critical analysis of texts
(see Theissen 1982:177), by which he shows himself to be consistent in his in-
debtedness to the form-critical tradition for his whole approach (cf 2.4.1 above for
his approach to the literature).

According to this procedure sociological information has to be extracted from
the sources by a process of inference. Three different types of method may be dis-
tinguished (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:177; see also Osiek 1984:43):

Constructive conclusions are drawn from an evaluation of pre-scientific state-
ments which give either *prosopographic* information about the background, status
and roles of *individuals* (Scroggs 1980:174), or *sociographic* information about the
programme, organization and patterns of behaviour of *groups, institutions, organiza-
tions and other larger communities*. According to Theissen (1982:177) there are very
few sociographic statements about early Christian groups, while prosopographic
statements about individuals are more numerous (Theissen 1982:178). In accor-
dance with social-scientific methods of handling empirical data, such statements are
to be assessed in terms of reliability, validity and representativeness (Theissen
1982:178).

Analytic methods afford an indirect approach to sociological information. Such
methods are used – in the absence of explicit data – to draw inferences from state-
ments about (recurrent) historical events (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:181-182), about
conflicts between groups or over ethical and legal norms (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:
182-186), and from religious symbols like literary forms and poetic modes of expres-
sion, e g parables, structural homologues, et cetera (cf Theissen 1978:3; 1982:187-
191; see especially Theissen 1982:198 note 28 for a discussion on structural homo-
logues).

Comparative methods are geared towards establishing what is typical for early
Christianity. This can be done in one of two ways: either by analysing the *differences*

brought forward by a comparison between early Christianity and the surrounding culture, or by analysing the *analogies* between not only the said groups, but also between Christianity and any 'comparable movements, groups, or phenomena of whatever era' (Theissen 1982:192). According to Theissen (1982:192), therefore, it is possible to compare early Christianity to 'all messianic-chiliastic movements, where again and again we find comparable characteristics....' Theissen (1982:194) admits that 'the disadvantage of any such procedure relying on analogies is its relative lack of precision', but still thinks it worthy of investigation. It should be stated in critique against Theissen, however, that this admission negates his own remark about the social-scientific assessment of empirical data in terms of reliability, validity and representativeness (cf preceding discussion on 'constructive conclusions') – or is it a matter of inadequacy of theoretical explanation?

Concluding his discussion of methodology, Theissen (1982:195) remarks:

> It is not necessary to emphasize that the prospect of achieving an approximate comprehension of the matter to be investigated, by means of adequate statements about it, depends on the plurality, and methodological independence, of various procedures for drawing inferences.

Readers amongst the scholarly community have complained about the lack of reference to social-scientific theory or conceptual models in most of Theissen's work (cf Gager 1979:175; Schütz 1982:15; Osiek 1984:45; Edwards 1983:435; Elliott 1986:11), which makes it difficult to evaluate his approach and the results of his studies. It is clearly recognized, however, that Theissen has a wide knowledge of social-scientific theory, and can use the aspects of it that are applicable to the material (see for instance Gager 1979:175; Scroggs 1980:174). According to Schütz (1982:16) Theissen is concerned about 'a general critical theory of religion which will also be responsive to the historian's perception of religious data....' Within the general critical theory Theissen's choice for *functionalist analysis* assigns to him an intermediate position between *phenomenological analysis* on the one hand, which proceeds from the assumption that religion has distinctive characteristics that differentiate it from normal reality and therefore make it inaccessible to sociological analysis (cf Schütz 1982:16), and *reductionistic analysis* on the other hand, which assigns to all religious phenomena some non-religious origin, and which therefore exposes itself to the criticism of being reductionist (cf Schütz 1982:16; see Malina 1982:237 for a discussion of reductionism as the process of subsuming one model into another).

'Functionalism' as a methodological concept for sociological analysis proceeds from the theoretical assumption that the normal and desired condition for a group or society is to be in equilibrium, because a state of equilibrium is conducive to the proper and efficient functioning of the collective parts of society (cf Elliott 1985: 332). Functionalism distinguishes between 'manifest' and 'latent' functions, or, in Theissen's terms, 'subjective intention' and 'objective function' (cf Schütz 1982:17). According to this theory a religious phenomenon's subjective intention (= what it is meant to do) is not (necessarily) the same as its objective function (= what it does). Theissen limits his functionalist analysis to those aspects that serve basic social needs in a specific frame of reference (society); those needs are twofold: the produc-tion of order (that is, the integration of the members of that society), and the control and overcoming of conflict through change (cf Theissen 1978:2). Schütz (1982:17) states:

> These polar opposites are not regarded as mutually ex-
> clusive virtues (or vices), as if viewed from an ideolo-
> gical presumption of what the social frame should be
> like. Instead, they are regarded as two ends of a con-
> tinuum along which all social organisms seek an accom-
> modation or balance of forces.

To this axis, marked by the ends integration-conflict, Theissen adds another axis, marked by the ends creative-restrictive functions of religion. This results in a 'grid of theoretical perspectives on religion on which he is able to locate most of the clas-sical theories, and by means of which he can underline the centrality of the functio-nalist approach...' (Schütz 1982:18). For the different aspects compounded into this model, Theissen is dependent upon Durkheim, Marx, Berger & Luckmann, and Weber (cf Gager 1979:175). According to Theissen (1978:2; see also Edwards 1983:435) 'religion can be a social cement and an impulse towards renewal: it can intimidate people and force them to conform, or can help them to act independent-ly. In primitive Christianity the innovative function of religion appears most clearly'.

Precisely because of this stance 'functionalism' should be much more 'palatable' in more conservative theological circles[6] (although Kümmel 1985:343-348 severely criticizes Theissen), and very much in keeping with a position where the historical interests dominate and sociological data are intended to serve a historical recon-struction. It is therefore not surprising that Theissen has chosen this approach, con-sidering what has been established about him already, namely his indebtedness and loyalty to the traditional historical-critical approach (see the preceding discussion; cf also 2.4.1 above). That is why it can be said that he leans more toward social history

than towards abstract sociological theory in his works (Schütz 1982:20; cf Harris 1984:107). It is also clear, though, that Theissen is not bound to one method – he himself has pleaded for the use of any method if it proves to have heuristic value (Theissen 1978:4-5; 1982:195; see also Scroggs 1980:166-167; cf Elliott 1986:10-26, for a detailed discussion and evaluation of Theissen's functionalist approach; Malina 1982:240 note 18 for criticism on Theissen's use of psychological models).

2.5.2 John G Gager

Gager (1975) published one of the first books in America to employ the social sciences in an investigation into the social setting of the early Church as portrayed in the New Testament (cf Edwards 1983:432). In this work, *Kingdom and community: The social world of early Christianity*, he set out to give a comprehensive sociological account of the social world in which early Christianity had its origins (cf Tidball 1983:26).

According to Harris (1984:107) Gager is 'more intentionally sociological than Theissen', although Edwards (1983:435) maintains exactly the opposite view: 'The work of Gerd Theissen...shows considerably deeper immersion in sociological method.' Be that as it may, Gager does use a variety of sociological and anthropological models, such as conflict theory, the interpretation of symbols, sociology of knowledge and, especially, the theory of cognitive dissonance (cf Gager 1975; see also Malina 1982:235, 1986c:35-55; Edwards 1983:433; Harris 1984:108). Gager uses a *comparative approach* (cf Harris 1984:108; see 2.5.1 above). He studies early Christianity by comparing it with *millenarian movements*, and reasserts his acceptance of the validity of such a comparison several years later: 'I remain convinced that the most important insights into the fundamental character of early Christianity are to be derived from anthropological and sociological studies of popular and millenarian religious movements which have nothing to do with the time or region of the New Testament' (Gager 1982:261). According to Osiek (1984:39) 'Gager attempts...to understand the dynamics of Jesus' ministry and the early years of the Church as a movement of dramatic expectation' (cf also Tidball 1983:27; see Gager 1982:261 notes 21,22,23 for bibliographic references to anthropological studies on millenarian movements). The validity of drawing such analogies between early Christianity and (modern) millenarian movements (like the cargo cults) is accepted by some (cf Osiek 1984:40) and disputed by others (cf Edwards 1983:434; Malina 1986c:55; Tidball 1983:37-40).

To account for the fact that early Christianity, unlike other millenarian movements, endured and even grew, Gager used the psychological theory of *cognitive dissonance* – a theory proposed by Festinger (1957) to describe the state brought about

---

in individuals by 'discrepancies between action and cognition' (Sargent & William-son 1966:225). For example, a smoker who knows that smoking causes cancer but continues the habit, demonstrates an inconsistency between his overt behavior and his knowledge. He is engaging in counter-attitudinal behaviour and thereby becomes prone to cognitive dissonance.[7]

The following definitions of the concept are given:

- 'Cognitive dissonance may be described as "psychological tension having motivational characteristics" which occurs when a person has "two cognitions which are somehow discrepant with each other"' (Sargent & William-son 1966:225, quoting from Brehm & Cohen 1962:3, 11).
- '[T]he crucial and necessary condition for the production of dissonance is that psychologically the two elements are inconsistent in the sense that the opposite of one follows from the other' (Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:428).

The assumption of the theory is that there is in individuals a tendency toward cognitive *consistency*. Inconsistency, or dissonance, therefore needs to be reduced – the greater the dissonance, the more pressure there is to reduce it (Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:430). Dissonance therefore becomes a *drive* (Sargent & Williamson 1966:225; cf also Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:430). Festinger himself formulated the following basic hypotheses for the theory:

> 1. The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and to achieve consonance.
> 2. When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information that would likely increase the dissonance.
> 3. The presence of dissonance gives rise to pressures to eliminate the dissonance. The strength of the pressures to reduce the dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the dissonance.
>
> (Festinger 1957:18, quoted in Sargent & Williamson 1966:225)

Freedman, Sears and Carlsmith (1978:430) distinguish three major ways to reduce dissonance: first, by *reducing the importance* of the dissonant elements; second, by *adding consonant elements*; and third, by *changing* one of the dissonant elements so that it *becomes consistent* with the others.

A high level of dissonance is generated when a person puts a great amount of energy into a commitment or decision, and his expectations about its effects are disappointed (cf Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:434). The dissonance aroused by *disconfirmed expectations* can be reduced in various ways (cf Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:435), one of which is to confirm the correctness of the original belief, while conceding that the disconfirmed expectations were incorrect. This reaction was perceived by Festinger, Reicken and Schachter (1956) in their study of a group who predicted the end of the world, while they expected to be saved by a spaceship. Instead of giving up their belief and returning to normal life (which action would not have reduced the dissonance caused by all the energy expended in their planning), they decided that the day had been postponed, but the end of the world was coming soon. They also changed their style dramatically – instead of being reserved and avoiding publicity, they suddenly started recruiting new members. This gain in the number of members would presumably reduce their dissonance by showing that their original beliefs were correct, because more and more people were accepting them (cf Freedman, Sears & Carlsmith 1978:435).[8]

Gager (1975:20-40; cf also Gottwald 1982:145) employed the theory of cognitive dissonance to explain why an apocalyptic-prophetic group 'whose theory [myth] ceases to fit the observable facts' (Edwards 1983:434) may consequently cease to exist, but may also 'intensify its fervor and translate its energy into an expanded missionary movement' (Osiek 1984:41-42). Gager postulates both Jesus' crucifixion and the delay of the parousia as instances of 'disconfirmation', causing a sense of cognitive dissonance which resulted in 'the intellectual response of reassessment and reinterpretation..., and the social response of proselytism or mission activity...' (Osiek 1984:42; cf Scroggs 1980:173 for the conditions that are required if proselytizing is to occur following disconfirmation).

The most serious charge against Gager's *Kingdom and Community* (1975) is brought in by Smith (1978:123), and it concerns what he calls 'the imprecision of Gager's aims'. According to Smith (1978:123-124) this work's subtitle, *The social world of early Christianity*, consists of two parts, namely the phrases 'social world' and 'early Christianity'. The first of these signals theory and methodology (cf Smith 1975:21 for definitions of 'social world'), and the last is a matter of 'domain', that is the phenomenon that is being studied. Any social world in its concrete expression at basic level as a community must, according to Smith (1978:124), exist in some place at a certain time – it cannot remain in the abstract. Using the terms 'world-construction' and 'world-maintenance' as defined within the sociology of knowledge by Berger & Luckmann (1967), Gager displays a processual understanding of social world. Yet he fails to achieve concreteness, to arrive at that world he believes the

early Christians to be creating (Smith 1978:125). This fact gave rise to the title of Smith's review article: *Too much kingdom, too little community* – a play on Gager's own title (cf Smith 1978:123). Smith (1978:125) accuses Gager of adopting 'an all too easy functionalism' when being at all sociological, and claims that he is not really concerned with social construction, the analysis of symbolic worlds or asking social questions (Smith 1978:129). Smith's verdict (1978:124) on Gager's theoretical pretensions is: '...this book must be judged a noble failure....'

Other criticisms of Gager's approach are mainly directed at his assumption that early Christianity can be interpreted by reverting to comparisons with the millenarian movements (cf Best 1983:189), or that the continuing existence of Christianity, despite its beliefs and hopes and expectations being unfulfilled, can be explained by reference to the psychoanalytic phenomenon of cognitive dissonance. Malina, particularly, has taken up this issue, and is very critical of Gager: '...to employ a model from contemporary U.S. experience, such as Festinger's cognitive dissonance model, to directly explain something in the Mediterranean world, and the first century Mediterranean at that, seems highly suspect [I find this to be the case with nearly all of the explicit models used by Gager, 1975...]' (Malina 1986c:38; see also Malina 1982:240, and note 20 on the same page, for additional bibliographic references for a so-called 'balanced approach to the model'). Also, the theory of cognitive dissonance cannot adequately explain the *confirming* propensities of Jesus' resurrection (Osiek 1984:42-43; cf Tracy 1978:133). While Gager ascribes the survival of the early Christian groups to their overcoming their sense of cognitive dissonance, Malina (1986c:39) proposes exactly the opposite:

> Rather than any attempt to solve the cognitive dissonance resulting from the disconfirmation of its belief system, I will argue that it was the dissonance itself along with the normative inconsistencies typical of early Christian movement groups that best accounts for the survival and growth of these groups...(I)n the social setting of earliest Christianity, normative inconsistency was the rule.

It is clear that Gager has fewer followers than critics on the issues discussed above. It is equally clear, though, that Gager's major work, *Kingdom and Community*, exhibits the same pioneering spirit that Elliott found laudable in Theissen (cf 2.5.1 above) and for that Gager, too, should receive credit.

2.5.3 Wayne A Meeks

Even before Theissen and Gager started writing in earnest on the subject of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, Meeks (1972) wrote an article – *The man from heaven in Johannine sectarianism* – in which he utilized concepts and theories from the sociology of knowledge to explain the reason for the creation of the motif of the Johannine descending/ascending redeemer. Meeks (1972:41) maintains that the Gospel of John was actually *intended* to be incomprehensible to outsiders, because it was meant to provide 'a symbolic universe which gave religious legitimacy, a theodicy, to the group's actual isolation from the larger society' (Meeks 1972:70). It had its origin in the social context of the Johannine community. Berger (1977:230) criticized this notion of 'insiders', saying: 'Die "outsiders" des JohEv und der einzige "insider", Jesus, sind in dieser Position nur literarisch gesehen.' Still, even at that early stage Meeks had shown 'the immense possibilities in this approach' (Scroggs 1980:176).

Several years later, Meeks (1983) designated his major work on the subject of social aspects in the New Testament a *social description* or *social history* of Pauline Christianity (Meeks 1983:2; see also Gottwald 1982:144; Harris 1984:108). He defined his task in a double sense: '...to the limit that the sources and our abilities permit, we must try to discern the texture of life in particular times and particular places. After that, the task of the social historian of early Christianity is to describe the life of the ordinary Christian within that environment – not just the ideas or the self-understanding of the leaders and writers' (Meeks 1983:2). The work seems to be more complex than a mere description, however, because Meeks (1983:2-7) has shown himself to be quite aware of the problems surrounding the interpretation of historical texts. In his words:

> In writing social history, then, we cannot afford to ignore the theories that guide social scientists. But which of the competing schools of sociology or anthropology or social psychology shall we heed? At what level of our inquiry and on what scale are theoretical proposals useful? To what degree of overall coherence can we reasonably aspire, without endangering our appreciation of our object's stubborn particularity? There is no comprehensive theory of social movements so commanding that we would be prudent to commit our method to its care. Even if there were, we should be suspicious of it. Christianity, even at the earliest moment we can get any clear picture of it, was already a complex movement

> taking form within several complex societies. What
> social theory is adequate to grasp the whole?
>
> (Meeks 1983:5)

Defining his approach as *interpretive description*, Meeks (1983:6) sketches his appli-
cation of social science as 'eclectic', and his use of theory to be 'piecemeal, as
needed, when it fits'. Having said this, Meeks (1983:6) nonetheless speaks about a
'family of perspectives shared by a growing number of social scientists and historians
of religion' to which he also subscribes. According to this perspective 'society is
viewed as a process, in which personal identity and social forms are mutually and
continuously created by interactions that occur by means of symbols' (Meeks
1983:6). Meeks (1983:7) refers to his own position as that of a 'moderate functiona-
list' within this approach, and then again regards himself as 'adopting a functionalist
perspective in this moderate form' (1983:7), by which he hopes to avoid being reduc-
tionistic (cf 2.5.1 above and especially 3.5.1 and 3.5.1.1 below for an explanation of
'functionalism').

In a comprehensive and detailed review of Meeks's *The first urban Christians*,
Elliott (1985:333) expresses surprise at the fact that Meeks does not explicate his
theoretical presuppositions, and states: 'Meeks, it would appear, would like to have
it both ways – the safety of theory-free social description and the occasional dal-
liance with sociological research' (Elliott 1985:332). Again:

> Meeks...is reluctant to explicate his sociological theory
> and models and to spell out more adequately the impli-
> cations of his moderate functionalist perspective on the
> Pauline social world. Consequently, it is often unclear
> *how* his 'piecemeal theory' informs and shapes his con-
> clusions and how these conclusions are to be evaluated.
> (Elliott 1985:334; see also Gottwald 1982:144; Tiryakian
> 1985:1139; Rohrbaugh 1987:110-113, 117-118 notes 24,
> 25, 27, 30)

Tiryakian (1985:1139) confesses to having an 'impression of conceptual fragmenta-
tion rather than of a unified piece' after reading Meeks's work. Schöllgen (1988)
criticises Meeks on several points (not all of which are valid to my mind), the most
important of which are: too little information to build valid conclusions on, and:
transforming possibilities into certainties. Schöllgen (1988:75) formulates:

> Der methodische Fehler von Meeks, der sich der
> Schwächen vieler seiner Einzelargumente durchaus be-

> wusst ist, liegt in der Annahme, dass viele nur mögliche
> Interpretationen im Sinne einer Konvergenz-argumen-
> tation zusammengezogen die höheren Weihen der
> Wahrscheinlichkeit erhalten.

Whether Meeks intentionally sought to 'have it both ways' or not is unsure, but he seems to have succeeded where Theissen failed (cf 2.5.1 above), and that is to get a hearing with the more conservative theologians, if Kümmel (1985:359) can be regarded as their spokesman: '...im ganzen sind M.s Ausführungen überzeugend und weiterführend....'

On average, and despite the criticism, Meeks's work has been well received, described as 'the best single volume on the Pauline social world' (Elliott 1985:333) at the time and a 'balanced use of historical-critical and sociological-anthropological methods and theories' (Harris 1984:110).

2.5.4 Bruce J Malina

While, in the above discussion on Theissen (2.5.1), Gager (2.5.2) and Meeks (2.5.3), criticism has been voiced concerning the lack of explication of their theory and the models they use, the same could not be said about Malina. He has written extensively,[9] and has always been at pains to explicate both theory and model. Malina has also done some invaluable work towards making the complex realm of social-scientific theory and models accessible to the interested reader by writing clearly and concisely on the subject (cf Malina 1982:229-242; 1983:119-133 for short introductions to his work; cf 1986a, especially pages 1-27, for a comprehensive explication and application of 'practical models for biblical interpretation').

An important observation by Malina on the use of models is the following:

> ...human beings generate models in order to understand
> their experiences. No model that we know of is useful
> for every conceivable purpose. There is no model to
> help understand all models, just as there is no language
> that one could learn to be able to understand all
> languages. The use of models is like the use of tools; in
> this sense models are question-specific or area-specific
> constructs. The appropriate model depends on the type
> of information one seeks to generate and comprehend.
>
> (Malina 1982:237)

While this is true in general, it is also true of specific and controlled efforts to interpret human society or some aspect of it. A 'social system', according to Malina (1982:232), is actually a sort of model intrinsic to any human group. Its function is to provide 'categories of human experience and behavior that serve to help understand, control, and predict the flow of human interaction'. Therefore, any effort to understand or interpret human behaviour is based on some model of how the system works, and this is true whether it is acknowledged (explicit models) or not (implicit models) (cf Carney 1975:5; Malina 1982:232; Elliott 1986:6).

It is characteristic of the social sciences to use the models – whether sociological, anthropological, political, economic, educational, religious, cross-cultural or psychological (Malina 1982:232) – to examine human interaction in terms of what is typical and recurrent. This poses a problem when social systems are to be interpreted that are not available for observation, such as those of the early Christian groups. These groups are presented to us as part of the content of literary texts, whose main character is *not* simply descriptive, but ideological. In other words, the author would employ only such information (possibly of interest to the social sciences) as would be instrumental to his ideological point of view and purpose. In addition, the information would be in the guise of a way of expression peculiar to the author, and therefore incidental. This means that another set of models is needed besides those used to interpret the functioning of human social systems, and that would be models 'of the nature and function of language [linguistics]' (Malina 1982:232).

Another factor that has to be considered is the *historical* issue. The societies we wish to study are ancient, historical societies. They are not present to be observed and compared with other societies. They are contained in texts (units of meaning) from the past (cf Malina 1982:233). Because of the 'distance', in more than one sense, of those societies from our own, the meanings that prevailed in them would of necessity be alien to us. History, as a model for the interpretation of such alien meaning, 'seeks to explain events in terms of the distinctiveness of agents and agencies, in terms of particularities and differences. The other social sciences, rooted in the present, prescind from the past for the most part to seek out generalities, commonalities, samenesses' (Malina 1982:233). The problem is that 'in order to ferret out distinctiveness all the commonalities of the area under study have to be known and articulated' (Malina 1982:233). Therefore, models of the social science sort need to be combined with models of the history sort and models of the linguistic sort to interpret (biblical) texts from the past (Malina 1982:233).

Malina (1982:233) distinguishes 'three main types of social science models that one might use to understand social interaction', namely the structural functionalist model, the conflict model, and the symbolic model.[10]

The model (perspective) of *structural functionalism* presupposes that society is in equilibrium, and 'is a relatively persistent, stable, well-integrated structure of elements' (Malina 1982:234; see also Malina 1986c:40,43-44). According to this view, all the elements in society function towards the maintenance of society as a whole, integral system (Malina 1982:234). Adaptive change may occur over time, but non-adaptive change is regarded as deviance (cf Malina 1982:234). This model is useful for determining typical structures and patterns of behaviour within a society. Malina (1982:234 note 12) cites works by the following authors as examples of structural functionalist approaches to biblical texts: Gottwald (1979); Malina (1981a); Wilson (1980).

Another, and different, type of model (perspective) is that of *conflict theory*, also known as the *coercion, power* or *interest model* (Malina 1982:234; 1986c:42-44). This type of model presupposes that society and the elements of society are constantly changing, unless some force intervenes to prohibit the change. Malina (1982:235) states: 'From this perspective and in terms of this sort of model, a good way to understand biblical texts is to find out what elements or factors interfere with the normal process of change...Social change, deviance, is normal.' Gager's *Kingdom and community* (1975) is cited as an example of the application of the conflict model (Malina 1982:235 note 13).

The third main type of social science perspective focuses on the *symbolic* character of human interaction. Other than the structural functionalist and conflict models, the symbolic model does not presuppose 'that a social system is a group of interacting persons whose interactions are structured and oriented around common purposes' (Malina 1982:235). According to this approach a social system is regarded as a 'system of symbols, that is, meanings, values and feelings about the meanings and values that are attached to and embodied by persons, things, and events' (Malina 1982:235). The presupposition of this model is that individual and collective human behavior is organized around the symbolic meanings and expectations attached to objects that are socially valued (Malina 1982:236). Biblical interpreters could use this model to establish what roles, symbols, gestures, and definitions of situations are expressed or implied in the texts (cf Malina 1982:236). Some examples of the symbolic approach can be found in Feeley-Harnik (1981); Malina (1981b); Pilch (1981) (cf Malina 1982:236 note 14).[11] (For examples of how these different perspectives have been applied to the same text, see Malina 1988b; Pilch 1988; Neyrey 1988a).

Malina (1982:241; see also 1983:129-131) distinguishes five features that should characterize a good social science model for biblical interpretation:

> Minimally, the model should have the following features: (1) it should be a cross-cultural model, accounting for the interpreter as well as those interpreted in some comparative perspective; (2) it should be of a sufficient level of abstraction to allow for the surfacing of similarities that facilitates comparison; (3) the model should be able to fit a larger sociolinguistic frame for interpreting texts; (4) it should derive from experiences that match what we know of the time and place conditioned biblical world as closely as possible; (5) the meanings it generates should be irrelevant but understandable to us and our twentieth century United States society; (6) the application of the model should be acceptable to social scientists (even if they disagree with the validity of the enterprise).
>
> (Malina 1982:241)

Malina himself uses different interpretive models, although he is essentially committed to working from the perspective of cultural anthropology.[12] In the words of Neyrey (1986:107) Malina, in his recent major work (1986a), succeeded in developing 'a single macro-model for the investigation of the New Testament, viz., the cross-cultural model of British anthropologist Mary Douglas' (Neyrey 1986:107; for a discussion on the definition and application of anthropology, see Malina 1986b:150-151). An important benefit of the use of cross-cultural models is that it requires the interpreter to constantly take note of, and account for, his/her own social location, and so the use of such models should act as a deterrent for ethnocentric interpretation (Malina 1982:238-239; see Malina 1989 for a model of different time perceptions, and the importance of that for interpretation).

Ethnocentricity refers to the very common and universally found inclination of any individual or group to interpret the properties and/or behavior of any 'alien' individual and/or group in terms of the norms, values and characteristics of the own group. The concept 'ethnocentrism' was introduced by William G Sumner, and refers to a 'view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it' (Sumner 1940:13). The values of the own group, as the *in-group*, 'are equated with abstract, universal standards of morality and the practices of the in-group are exalted as better or more "natural"

than those of any out-group' (Noel 1971:33). Catton (1964:930) summarizes the essence of ethnocentrism as follows: 'Ethnocentrism makes us see out-group behavior as deviation from in-group mores rather than as adherence to outgroup mores.'

Deserving special mention is Malina's contribution in pointing out the distinction of four basic social institutions or structures in any society – namely kinship, economics, politics, and religion (Malina 1986b:152-153; see Gurvitch 1971:22-23 for a correlated notion from the sociology of knowledge).[13] As a general rule, one of these institutions maintains primacy over the others in societal arrangements:

> In Christendom in the past, and in Islamic republics in
> the present, kinship, economics, and politics are em-
> bedded in religion, i.e., the norms of kinship, economics,
> and politics are determined by the religious institution:
> representatives of the religious institution rule their so-
> cieties in one way or another.
>
> (Malina 1986b:153)

Malina (1986b:153-154) goes on to cite examples where either kinship, economics or politics maintained primacy and the other institutions were the embedded ones (cf also Hollenbach 1985:153). The importance of this contribution lies in the fact that it sensitizes the interpreter to the fact that the society being studied was configured radically different from ours. The interpreter should therefore take extreme care not to be ethnocentrically anachronistic.

2.5.5 John H Elliott

Elliott, even at a cursory reading, shows himself to have an excellent command of the theory and concepts of the social sciences, combining that with an informed way of perceiving and handling the texts. He is also the first of the authors under consideration[14] to concentrate on the sociological interpretation of one single New Testament writing (Elliott 1981:7; see also Edwards 1983:442). In his major work, Elliott (1981:1) states the intention of his 'sociological exegesis' as being to complement and improve 'the prevailing method of biblical interpretation through more rigorous attention to the social dimension of the biblical text and to the sociological dimension of the exegetical task'. He defines 'sociological exegesis' as:

> the analysis, interpretation, and synthesis (correlation)
> of (1) the literary, sociological and theological features
> and dimensions of the text (1 Peter) and (2) this text's

> relation to and impact upon its narrower and wider so-
> cial contexts.
>
> (Elliott 1981:8)

Wire (1984:209) underscores Elliott's emphasis on the importance of the text: '...the text itself is the only witness to its specific situation...So it all comes back to literary analysis or what is more exactly called rhetorical analysis, searching the text for what Elliott calls the "strategy" of the writer, and through that finding the situation...in which this particular strategy makes sense.'

The term 'strategy' is of interest and of importance. Elliott (1981:10) defines the term as referring to the deliberate design of a document calculated to have a specific social effect on its intended hearers or readers (see also chapter 1, section 1.3.2.3 above). This has to do with the pragmatic dimension of the text, and includes aspects such as its goals, means, and intended function (Elliott 1987b:2). Evidence of the strategy of a text can be found in its manner of description, emphasis, and evaluation of certain selected features; the way in which it *'proscribes or criticises and/or prescribes or praises'* certain actions, roles, institutions, attitudes, beliefs, et cetera, or *'explains, justifies, and legitimates'* these (Elliott 1987b:2). The 'strategy' has to be related to the 'situation' of the text. *Situation*, according to Elliott (1987b:1; Elliott's emphasis):

> ...involves various levels and phases. The *macrosocial level of a text* concerns the macrosocial context of the text, the total social system in which the text is pro-
> duced. *The microsocial level of a text* concerns the more specific social conditions and features of its specific sen-
> der(s) and receiver(s). The situation of a text can (be) viewed (a) *synchronically* (with attention to social pat-
> terns of behavior, institutions, structures, processes and their relations *at a given point or period in time*, or (b) *diachronically* (with attention to how these social fea-
> tures and arrangements *change over the course of time*).

This correlation between the *strategy* and the *situation* of a text in fact constitutes the integration of a literary and a social-scientific analysis of the text (cf sections 2.4, 2.4.5 and 2.4.6).

While a description of the strategy of a text is pursued by mainly *literary* methods, a description of the *situation* of a text is sought by mainly *social-scientific* methods. In an article on methods and models Elliott (1986:1-33) sketches a model of the process of making sense of things. A tree structure of this model would use

the term 'paradigm' to designate broad, inclusive ways of looking at realities (such as the historical-critical paradigm of biblical exegesis) and at a second level the term 'theoretical perspectives' to designate structural functionalism, conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, et cetera (cf Elliott 1986:7). According to these 'theoretical perspectives' specific models are employed to investigate, organize and explain social data (cf Elliott 1986:8).

2.5.6 Norman R Petersen
Petersen is the second author under consideration who undertook a social-scientific investigation of a single New Testament document, namely Paul's Letter to Philemon (Petersen 1985). Petersen's approach in this work could be appropriately described as an integration of the salient elements of three key fields – two of them taken from the social sciences (sociology and anthropology) and the other from literary theory (narratology) – into 'the traditional philological base of the historical critical method' (Petersen 1985:ix; cf Hays 1987:173; Osiek 1987:39; Darr 1988:118, and Wimbush 1988:121 for positive assessments of Petersen's accomplishment of this goal). Petersen (1985:ix) himself calls it a 'literary sociological method'. The terms used to describe the three fields of interest are already suggestive of Petersen's methodology: *literary theory* refers to the concepts *point of view*, *narrative world* (as opposed to *contextual world*), *plot*, and *closure*, which are all associated with narrative analysis; *social anthropology* refers inter alia to the concepts *institution* and *social interaction*, which are associated with social scientific analysis; *sociology of knowledge* refers to the concept *symbolic universe*, which is associated with an analysis of belief systems.

Petersen (1985:171 note 2) remarks that the sociology of knowledge, as explicated by Berger & Luckmann (1967), provides the theoretical framework within which he reads the work of both field and armchair anthropologists. In an evaluation of the social-scientific side of Petersen's work the remark referred to should serve as a starting point, for it indicates that the sociology of knowledge provides the primary frame of reference according to which he assays the import of any data of social interest.[15]

2.5.6.1 Sociology of knowledge
Elsewhere (Van Staden 1988:340-345) I have made a condensed survey of the sociology of knowledge and its key concepts (as explicated by Berger & Luckmann 1967) while attesting to its usefulness for the interpretation of biblical texts (see Scroggs 1980:175; De Villiers 1984:66; Lategan 1984:10 for similarly positive evaluations). Petersen utilizes several of these concepts in the construction and application of his

model – concepts such as *role, resocialization, legitimation, universe-maintenance, social institutions,* and *symbolic universe.*

One of the major premises of the sociology of knowledge is that all thought is inextricably linked to its delineation by the contemporary historical situation and locality (Klaus Berger 1977:240). Therefore Berger & Luckmann (1967:4) see the central problem of the sociology of knowledge as establishing 'the existential determination [Seinsgebundenheit] of thought as such'.[16] According to Berger & Luckmann (1967:5) this is a general problem that arises when specific factors such as the historical, psychological, biological, economical or sociological, are seen as determinative of human thought. The postulate that social reality is created by man, and that man in turn is shaped by that reality, has led to the seemingly paradoxical statement of the sociology of knowledge that society is a product of man (Berger & Luckmann 1967:1, 3, 15), and man is a product of society (Berger 1973:13-14). This observation, that man and society reciprocally define one another, is of fundamental importance for the exegesis of New Testament texts – it redirects our attention to the fact that time is a capturing device, both for the historically 'encapsulated' society that we study through its literary products, and for the 'encapsulated' society into which we find ourselves absorbed. In essence this means that whilst the relationship between man and society has some universal traits, it also differs substantially between one time and place and others. Malina (1982:241) is no doubt correct when he states that the meanings generated by a social-scientific model for the 'time and place' conditioned biblical world should be irrelevant but understandable to us in twentieth-century society.

While we have explored Petersen's approach towards the *literature* of the New Testament separately (2.4.6 above), it is immediately clear from a reading of his work (1985) that the *social-scientific* part of his interpretive model is based on his literary insight. In a discussion and evaluation of the social-scientific elements of his approach the key literary elements would therefore have to be referred to again.

Probably the most important one of these literary elements for Petersen, is the concept of the *referential history*, or the *narrative world* of a narrative discourse (see 2.4 above). Petersen, following Eco (1979), understands the concept to refer to the world as it is represented in the text, and that world represents the referential function of messages as explicated by Roman Jakobson (Petersen 1985:33 note 3; 1978: 9-48). Defining the concept, Petersen (1985:33 note 3) states: '[T]he world of a narrative is a literary construction, and the events which take place in that world have a narrative quality.' Elsewhere he formulates as follows: 'The narrative world is that reality which a narrator bestows upon his actors and upon their actions...' (Petersen 1985:7). This literary-theoretical statement provides the link between the literary

and social-scientific endeavours. According to Petersen (1985:ix), "'worlds" are human constructions, whether they are the constructions of societies or of narrators, and...narrative worlds are comprised of the same kinds of social facts – symbolic forms and social arrangements – as socalled real worlds'. In this way the literary concept of *narrative worlds* becomes accessible to social science analysis.

The link-up in Petersen's approach, between the literary concept of the narrative world as a *constructed world*, and the sociology of knowledge's presentation of social reality as a *constructed reality*, seems almost inevitable. Petersen (1985:17-22, especially 20-21) argues consistently from the premise that narrative worlds and social reality are somehow akin in terms of construction and operation. Both these kinds of 'worlds' are analyzed in terms of two social-scientific categories, namely *social arrangement* and *symbolic form*, which constitute what are known as *social facts* (see Petersen 1985:38 note 49; 40 note 66 for a brief discussion, and bibliographical references, on the subject of social facts). Petersen (1985:x) gives the following definitions of these two categories:[17]

> 'Social arrangements' have to do with the social struc-
> tures underlying the social relations comprised by the
> actions of the actors...'Symbolic forms', on the other
> hand, have to do with the overarching cognitive systems,
> the systems of knowledge, belief, and value, that define
> these actors' identities and motivate their actions.

Social arrangements, therefore, have to do with the social institutions one encounters in everyday life, institutions within the fields of economics, politics, family, religion and kinship. It has to do with the social relations enacted by the actors who represent these institutions. All these elements make up the fabric of what is known as the *social universe* (Petersen 1985:27-28) or *institutional order*. This order, however, is a segmented one, precisely by virtue of its institutionality. The discrete institutional processes need to be integrated into a comprehensive meaningful system. This is done by the *symbolic universe*, which is an all-embracing frame of reference that provides an integrative meaning for a society that consists of segmented institutions and diverse subjective experiences (cf Van Staden 1988:349, summarizing Berger & Luckmann). Petersen (1985:57) defines a symbolic universe as a body of traditional knowledge known through language and symbol, a system of meanings that defines and thereby creates a 'world'. It shapes and legitimates social institutions (cf Darr 1988:120). The *social universe*, according to Petersen (1985:27-28), is inhabited by both believers and non-believers, while God and Christ are absent from the social universe but present in the symbolic universe. They are present in the social

universe only as objects of knowledge. Therefore Petersen makes a distinction between *theology* and *symbolic universe* as representing two different kinds of knowledge. He states:

> Theology...is...a kind of knowledge that is the product of systematic reflection upon a symbolic universe, and indeed of reflection that serves to maintain that universe when it is in some kind of jeopardy, as for example from the threats of doubt, of disagreement, or of competing symbolic universes. Theology is...a kind of knowledge that is produced to defend and maintain the knowledge comprising a symbolic universe, and for this reason we can speak of a symbolic universe as a primary (pre-reflective) form of knowledge and theology as a secondary (reflective) form that is dependent on it.
>
> (Petersen 1985:29-30)

According to Hays (1987:173) the second chapter of Petersen's *Rediscovering Paul*, which scrutinizes the social structures and arrangements depicted in the narrative world, is 'the real heart of Petersen's work', offering the greatest advances in our understanding of Paul.

However, Hays (1987:174) is critical of Petersen's distinction between 'symbolic universe' and 'theology'. He describes Petersen's survey of Paul's symbolic universe as 'looking very much like a summary of Pauline theology under the unifying themes of kinship and master-slave relations'. He is also doubtful whether the social-anthropological categories allow Petersen to adequately display the *narrative* structure of Paul's 'symbolic universe'.

2.5.6.2 Using social anthropology

To study these institutions and the social relations as presented in the narrative, Petersen employs the discipline of *social anthropology, a subfield of the social science 'anthropology'*. He consciously chooses to use social anthropology, because it accomplishes what sociology cannot – namely it accounts for the category of *symbolic forms* and its relation to *social arrangements* (cf Petersen 1985:18).

The relationship between the worlds explored by anthropologists and the narrative worlds consists mainly in both being 'closed systems' (see Petersen 1985:40 note 61 and 63, for bibliographic references on this subject). This means that 'when and as such worlds are experienced, they comprise an internally ordered whole which is the ultimate object of interest, for it is the frame of reference in which the parts

make sense' (Petersen 1985:20). The reader of a narrative and the anthropologist are also alike inasmuch as they are both 'participant observers in other worlds' (Petersen 1985:20).

According to the exposition by Petersen the three fields, namely narrative criticism, sociology of knowledge, and social anthropology, are compatible enough for them to be incorporated into a model with which to study the narrative world of a New Testament narrative discourse. The primary factor promoting compatibility is the fact (cf 2.5.6.1 above) that all three of these fields apply to the study of 'worlds' – narrative worlds, social worlds and symbolic universes. Another link between the literary and social aspects of Petersen's work was noted by Darr (1988:120): 'Conspicuously absent from the field of view afforded by Petersen's literary lens is the element of characterization. This is hardly coincidental, for it is precisely at this point that the literary and the social are merged...That is, he treats the characters of Paul's story solely in sociological terms.'

Finally, the *sociology of knowledge* has a relative independence within the discipline of sociology in the sense of formulating its own epistemology for the purpose of providing an explanation for the coming about and persistence of everyday social reality. At the same time, the sociology of knowledge's understanding of social reality, as advocated by Berger & Luckmann, to my mind bears a close resemblance to *structural functionalism*, one of the main perspectives on the functioning of society distinguished within the social sciences (cf Turner 1982:19-116; see sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.4 above, 3.5.1 and 3.5.1.1 below).

2.6 Concluding comments

This survey of recent scholarship was intended to be more descriptive than evaluative, although some evaluation is unavoidable and perhaps desirable. Several articles exist which provide readers with an introduction to the social-scientific approach towards the New Testament (e g Scroggs 1980; Malina 1982, 1983; Best 1983; Osiek 1984; Elliott 1986; Botha 1989; Joubert 1991). The purpose of this survey was to determine the specific literary approach of the exponents under consideration, and secondly to determine the nature and content of their social-scientific approach. What remains now is to table and discuss the most important factors gleaned from the above discussions that have a direct bearing on our present interests.

Broadly speaking, there are three major conclusions to be drawn:

- A definite distinction should be maintained between approaches concentrating on constructing a *social history* from and for the text, and approaches

that wish to analyse the text by means of the methods and models developed in the *social sciences* (cf 2.3.1 above).

- Both in the case of *descriptive* studies (or studies with the purpose of constructing a *social history* of early Christianity) and in the case of explanatory or interpretive studies constituting a *social-scientific* analysis of the social forces and institutions of early Christianity (cf Elliott 1981:6-7), one should be especially aware of the danger of the *fallacy of misplaced concreteness*. This fallacy refers to the illegitimate application of the presumed meaning of a term or syntactical unit in antiquity to present-day problems. A case in point relating to a descriptive study is Stegemann's explication of the meaning of the term 'poor' in the New Testament and, based on that explication, his solution for treating the present-day poor (Stegemann 1984:54-64, 72-73 notes 68-77; see also 1.2.5.1 above). It is also possible that even interpretive social scientific studies could reflect the same fallacy, inasmuch as they make no distinction between the *narrative world* and the *contextual world* of a text, or between the *situation* and the *strategy* of a text (2.4.6 and 2.4.5 above, respectively).

- Finally, it has become clear that scholars in this field allocate differing levels of importance to the composition of the narrative text. In the case of Theissen it seems that meanings conferred on the material by a creative author were completely ignored. Meeks and Malina made more of the text, but it was Elliott and Petersen who proposed that the text should be treated in literary as well as in social-scientific terms. This is in agreement with my own assessment of the import of both these directional approaches. Therefore the salient elements of literary criticism and the social sciences will feature prominently in this study.

2.7 Endnotes: Chapter 2

1. Only a few South African scholars – such as De Villiers (1984), Joubert (1987; 1990), Domeris (1988), and Botha (1989) – have worked on the subject of the social-scientific study of the New Testament. Most of these works are general surveys of the field of study.

2. It can be, and is being, accessed in that way, but I would regard this as methodologically fallacious.

3. According to Theissen the concept 'structural homologue' designates a structural correspondence between different entities or phenomena, and by the correspondence a connection is established (Theissen 1978:26).

4. Elliott (1981:19, note 22), quoting Burke (1967:ix), states that 'critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose'. I am in agreement with this perspective, but would like to add that such works could also be *questions* levelled at the status quo.

5. This is also reflected by the subtitle of his work: *The shadow of the Galilean*. The subtitle reads: *The quest of the historical Jesus in narrative form*.

6. One of the criticisms of the functionalist perspective is precisely that it reflects a conservative bias (cf Cohen 1968:58).

7. Papineau (1978:168) uses the concept *attitudinal consistency* to describe the same phenomenon as is described by *cognitive dissonance*, even citing the same example. According to Papineau (1978:169) attitudinal inconsistency is experienced when two or more potentially conflicting desires are involved. The need to *reduce* attitudinal inconsistence and obtain *consistency* leads to the adoption of certain beliefs. Papineau regards such beliefs that serve to reduce inconsistency as *ideological*: 'The common notion of an "ideological" belief would...be of a belief which is promulgated in order to defend actions or policies which are in the interest of a certain group, by presenting those actions or policies as having results which are accepted as being in the general good' (Papineau 1978:169).

8. For a concise and informative discussion of all aspects of the cognitive dissonance theory, see Freedman, Sears and Carlsmith (1978:426-461). For reservations on the experiments and findings based on the theory, see Rosenberg (1965).

9. See the list of some of his work in *Works Consulted.*

10. Elliott (1986:7; see also note 13 on the same page) prefers to designate these and other styles of theorizing as 'theoretical perspectives' rather than 'models'.

11. For a discussion of the 'three criticisms leveled against the use of social science models in biblical interpretation', see Malina 1982:237-238.

12. Cultural anthropology, according to Gottwald (1982:145), is 'essentially structural-functional in character'. Gottwald (1982:155 note 14) cites Malina (1981b) as an example of a structural-functionalist approach. Malina himself, however, cites the same work as an example of the symbolic approach (1982:236 note 14).

13. I found a correlate for this notion of Malina in a discussion by Gurvitch (1971:22-23) on types and forms of knowledge. Gurvitch made the following important observation:

> Certain types of knowledge, most particularly the perceptual knowledge of the external world, but also knowledge of the Other and the We, groups, classes, etc., political knowledge, certain branches of scientific knowledge arising from the natural sciences (astronomy, physics, biology, etc.) or human sciences (including history and sociology), involve the study of the specific space and time in which their objects move.

Gurvitch (1971:23) goes on to say that the different types of knowledge range themselves in an *hierarchic* system as soon as it comes to social frameworks of major importance. And then, more importantly, ' ...*in this variable hierarchy the predominant type or types penetrate all the others*'. He gives the following example: 'In Ancient Greece, philosophical knowledge and perceptual knowledge of the external world, which held first place, penetrated all the other types of knowledge....' From these references it is clear that Malina's exposition on

basic social institutions is not a novel idea – it had its antecedents in sociology of knowledge's reflections on *different types of knowledge* belonging to the *different frameworks of knowledge* within a *specific time and place.*

I might add one more important observation by Gurvitch (1971:23 note 1) to this note: 'Sometimes a tendency towards isolation of types of knowledge is produced as a function of the intensity of the "We" as it asserts itself as an esoteric communion, and when particular groupings show a propensity towards becoming closed collective units.' See Gurvitch (1971:26-27; 48-64) respectively on 'We'-knowledge, and on masses, communities, communions and particular groups as social frameworks of knowledge.

14. According to Elliott (1989a) Fernando Belo (1975) was the first scholar to perform a social-scientific analysis of a single New Testament work, namely the Gospel of Mark.

15. The methodological question might be asked whether compromising oneself in this measure might not influence both one's perception and interpretation of the data. This is especially true when the sociology of knowledge, which is in essence a philosophical-phenomenological hermeneutic approach to social reality, becomes the filter through which a related but different social science, anthropology, is evaluated.

16. Other definitions that describe the general significance of the sociology of knowledge are the following, taken from Gould & Kolb's (1964:679), *A dictionary of the social sciences* (1964:679):
    – 'The proper theme of our study is to observe how and in what form intellectual life at a given historical moment is related to the existing social and political forces' (Mannheim 1952:237-260).
    – 'Sociology of knowledge is the analysis of the functional interrelations of social processes and structures on the one hand and the patterns of intellectual life, including the modes of knowing, on the other' (Becker & Dahlke 1941:310).
    – 'The sociology of knowledge...is concerned with the way in which systems of thought...are conditioned by other social facts' (Sprott 1954:141).

17. Petersen (1985:39 note 49) acknowledges his indebtedness to the work of Berger & Luckmann (1967) for the use of these categories.

Chapter 3

Theoretical issues

3.1 Orientation

Even a cursory reading of the Gospel of Luke leaves one with the impression that
the question of the *social location* of the people inhabiting this narrative world fi-
gures prominently throughout the story. There is much talk here not only of people
who seem to be in important positions – the masters, the rich, the powerful, the ones
who are 'first' – but also of people who seem to be in positions of little importance
in that society – the slaves, the poor, the powerless, the ones who are 'last'.
According to Luke's story the people occupying these positions interact with each
other, as is analogically described in the parables. What is distinctive about the de-
scriptions is that very frequently (almost consistently) someone in a high position
has something to do with someone in a low position. It really seems as if the posi-
tions are grouped together in a high-low configuration, for example as master-slave
(cf inter alia Lk 7:1-10; 12:35-48; 16:1-13; 17:7-10). The above observations are
really descriptions, in 'lay' terms, of what are known in the social sciences as the
categories of 'role' and 'status' within a social system, and of what is known in litera-
ry criticism as 'characterization' within a narrative.

3.2 Some preliminary methodological considerations

Before asking *why* there might be such a pattern, let us first reflect on the nature of
information that might merit social-scientific interest. Is the data readily accessible
to social scientific analysis? Or is a prior step required, preparing the 'raw' social
data, as it were, for analysis and interpretation by social scientific means?

Furthermore, on the strength of the assumption that this and any other narra-
tive contains and expresses a system of beliefs, that is, an understanding of the world
or (some aspect of) society from a specific point of view, the issue of *ideology* should
also be looked into.

3.2.1 Transforming *emic* data into *etic* data

Historical descriptions of behaviour contain what is called *emic* data, that is, infor-
mation about behaviour 'from the native's point of view' (Malina 1986:190).[1] The
term 'emic' emphasizes the fact that any information of a social nature within the
Gospel is historically 'dated', that is, both its *connotation* and its *denotation* are
necessarily different from our own (see Sartori 1984:15-34 for an extensive discus-
sion of denotation/extension and connotation/intension).

According to Sartori the general signification of *connotation/intension*[2] is that it
consists of the ensemble of characteristics and/or properties associated with, or
included in, a given word, term, or concept. He defines it as follows: 'The intension
(or connotation) of a term consists of all the characteristics or properties of that
term, that is, assignable to a term under the constraints of a given linguistic-semantic
system' (Sartori 1984:24). 'Connotation' or 'intension' therefore refers to 'meaning'
(cf Sartori 1984:22), and meaning realized in language, it might be added, is cultu-
rally defined because it is rooted in a social system (cf Malina 1986a:190; 1988b:7-8;
Nida & Reyburn 1981:14-19). Sartori's (1984:143) own definition of the term 'inten-
sion' reads: '[T]he ensemble of characteristics of [included in] a concept. Vulgarly:
the associations a word has in the mind of its users.'

According to Louw (1976:61; see also Van Aarde [1980]:1) a distinction should
be made between the 'meaning' and the 'usage' of lexemes, lexeme combinations
and sentences. This is based on the observation that the usage of a word could be
described according to three broad categories – comprehension, reference and im-
plication (Louw 1976:61). The first category is the connection between 'meaning'
and 'understanding' (Louw 1976:56-57), where 'understanding' indicates the cogni-
tion of the meaning of the words, as distinct from the comprehension of the sense of
the utterance. The second category consists of the relationship between 'meaning'
and 'reference' (Louw 1976:57-59), where 'reference' indicates the 'process of desig-
nating some entity, event, etc. by a particular symbol' (Nida 1975:15, quoted by
Louw 1976:58; cf also Nida & Reyburn 1981:6) – in other words, *figurative meaning*
(as against *literal meaning*). The third category is that of the relationship and be-
tween 'meaning' and 'implication', where 'implication' indicates the meaning of the
context (Louw 1976:59-61). These three categories are indicative of a definite dis-
tinction between *a word and its meaning* and *a word and its usage*.

The 'meaning' of a word is defined as '...the set of distinctive features which
makes possible certain types of reference...' (Nida 1975:15, quoted in Louw 1976:
59). In terms of its definition the term 'meaning' seems therefore to correspond to
Sartori's category of 'connotation/intension' discussed above. At the same time the
term 'denotation/extension' corresponds to Louw's distinction of the 'usage' of a

word.[3] This 'usage' implies more than the sender-code-receptor scheme. It also implies a *communicative situation*. To stress the importance of this 'situation', Van Aarde ([1980]:2, 24) quotes the maxim from L Wittgenstein: 'Don't look for the meaning, look for the use.'

The significance of the term *denotation* (or *extension*)[4] is that it is complementary to the term *connotation* (or *intension*). The important question is therefore: What is denotation? According to Sartori (1984:24) two different replies are given to this question in the relevant literature. The first is that 'the entire denotation of a word is the complete list of all the things to which the word applies', and that words do not denote classes of things: 'The denotation of a word is always an individual thing' (Hospers 1967:40, 42, quoted by Sartori 1984:24). This would be correct if 'denotation' was extralinguistic (Sartori 1984:24), that is, if reference was made to things that could be identified ostensively (Sartori 1984:66, note 11).

The second reply, however, maintains that the extension (or denotation) of a word 'consists of the class of all objects to which that word correctly applies' (Salmon 1964:90, quoted by Sartori 1984:24). Sartori's (1984:75) own definition of the term 'denotation' reads: 'The denotation of a word is the ensemble of things (objects) to which the word applies', and his definition of 'extension' reads: '...the referent or referents to which a term applies' (Sartori 1984:77). When 'things' is replaced by 'class of things', it is implied that the scope of the denotation is just as linguistic (and mental) as that of the connotation (Sartori 1984:24). Therefore, provided one takes this second reply to be valid (as I do), neither the characteristics or properties (meaning) of a word, nor its denotation (reference) is directly accessible to an interpreter.

In order to try to understand such data of sociological interest, we therefore need to apply analytical and interpretive categories to that material. This really means that we have to 'translate' that information into a type of language that makes it accessible for modern social-scientific analysis and interpretation. This results in an *etic* description of the originally *emic* data. According to Gottwald (1979:785 note 558) the terms 'emic' and 'etic' were coined by a linguist named Kenneth Pike by analogy with phon*emic* and phon*etic*. The following somewhat lengthy quotation should serve to explain the technical meaning of the two terms:

> '*Emics*' refers to cultural explanations that draw their criteria from the consciousness of the people in the culture being explained, so that emic statements can be verified or falsified according to their correspondence to or deviation from the understanding of the cultural actors. '*Etics*' refers to cultural explanations whose cri-

> teria derive from a body of theory and method shared in a community of scientific observers. These cultural explanations constitute 'a corpus of predictions about the behavior of classes of people'. Etic statements cannot be verified or falsified by what cultural actors think is true, but only by their predictive success or failure. 'Emics' systematically excludes 'etics', but 'etics' makes room for 'emics' insofar as what cultural actors think about their action is part of the data to be accounted for in developing a corpus of predictions about lawful social behavior.
>
> (Gottwald 1979:785, note 558)

Malina (1986a:190) describes *emic* descriptions of behaviour as descriptions *from the native's point of view*, and indicates that the New Testament writings could be considered 'an anthropologist's field book full of emic data'. Etic descriptions, conversely, are based on a model of how the world works. Such descriptions are therefore open to verification, their value depending on the scientific integrity of the model on which they are based. This distinction between 'emic' and 'etic' is a useful one – it allows us to understand the fact that we work with material that refers to a reality vastly different from our own and that we should therefore be sensitive enough not to modernize the meanings. These accepted perspectives in the social sciences recognize the conceptual gulf between observer and observed (Malina & Neyrey 1988:137). At the same time it allows us to investigate more precisely these original meanings by employing modern abstract research categories, in this case by the use of the social sciences. Malina (1986a:190) assesses the value of the distinction between *emic* and *etic* as follows: 'In philosophical terms the articulation of the emic in the etic mode overcomes the so-called "hermeneutical gap", the gap in understanding between people in different cultures, whether past or present.' The concepts *emic* and *etic*, therefore, facilitate the responsible interpretation of the communication strategies of ancient texts in social-scientific terms. The use of these concepts substantially reduces the danger of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness (cf chapter 1, section 1.3.3 above).

To restate in 'etic' terms, then, the initial observations about the frequency and varied forms of opposing social positions in Luke (cf 3.1 above), one would introduce social-scientific terms to describe for instance the pervasiveness of the issue of *status* throughout the macrotext, specifically as represented by the use of *contrasting roles* that reciprocally define each other, and by the descriptions of the type of interaction between these roles.

The identification of these categories for investigation is based on the assumption that the author of Luke constructed his narrative in such a way as to propose to his intended readers a new form of social interaction. According to this proposal the *attitude* and *action* of any person occupying a role representing high status should conform not to prevailing custom – concerning the expected behaviour associated with that particular role – but rather to the example set by the main character within the narrative, namely Jesus of Nazareth.

This strategy of the author represents what is known in *biblical studies* as the 'theology' of the author – his system of religious beliefs which he authoritatively presents in order to get his readers to share his viewpoint. This same strategy of the author of a literary text is known in the *social sciences* as 'ideology' – a system of beliefs and values that is used consciously or unconsciously to maintain or further the interests of a specific group (Elliott 1981:12, 104-105; Malina 1986a:178). In order to understand *why* the author has chosen to use this strategy, one first needs to know the substance and possible consequences of his ideology.

At this stage it becomes important to define and explicate the concept 'ideology', and to table the similarities (and differences, if any,) between 'theology' and 'ideology'. Some confusion might be anticipated if these terms' references are not clearly documented.

3.2.2 Theology and ideology: surrogate terms?

Sartori (1984:84) defines a *surrogate term* as a term that can be used interchangeably with another in order to avoid pedantic repetition. The issue at stake here is therefore whether 'theology' and 'ideology' really are interchangeable – are they terms that assume an identity of meaning?[5] Furthermore, are they interchangeable within each and between the three disciplines relevant to this study, namely literary criticism, social science and theology? We wish to show that *ideology* in both literary criticism and in the social sciences can indeed be seen as a surrogate term for the concept *theology*, when these terms signify the system of religious beliefs and values exhibited by a group or a document.

The logical place to start would be to delimit the semantic reference of the lexicographic terms 'ideology' and 'theology'.[6]

Ideology
1. Science of ideas. (This sense of the word is now anachronistic, cf Cronin 1987b:13.)
2. Visionary speculation.
3. Manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual.
4. Ideas at the basis of some economic or political theory or system.

| Theology | 1. | Study of or system of religion. |
| | 2. | Rational analysis of a religious faith. |

According to the lexicographic definition, then, the term 'ideology' signifies a 'manner of thinking' or 'ideas', while the term 'theology' signifies the study or 'rational analysis' of 'religion'. Is there any correspondence between 'ideas' and 'religion'? A further lexicographic study of these two terms reveals the following:

Idea	1.	Archetype, pattern, as distinguished from its realization in individuals; (Platonic Philosophy) eternally existing pattern of which individual things in any class are imperfect copies.
	2.	Conception, plan, of (objective genitive) or *of* (subjective genitive) thing to be aimed at, created, discovered, etc.
	3.	Notion conceived by the mind; way of thinking; vague belief, fancy.
	4.	(Descartes, Locke) immediate object of thought or mental perception; (Kant) conception of reason transcending all experience; (Hegel) absolute truth of which all phenomenal existence is the expression.

Religion	1.	Particular system of faith and worship (*the Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, religion*).
	2.	Human recognition of superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal God or gods entitled to obedience and worship; effect of such recognition on conduct and mental attitude.
	3.	Thing that one is devoted to or bound to.
	4.	Life under monastic conditions.

From the above it is clear that the term 'idea', both in its descriptive and philosophical definitions, has to do with the conception or plan of something to be created, or with a notion conceived by the mind. It therefore has a noetic/cognate element (*noumenon*) with affective overtones that, in Immanuel Kant's terms, transcends all experience. 'Idea' in this sense also has to find practical (or concrete) expression in phenomena (*phenomenon*).

'Religion' is seen as a system of faith and worship, a recognition of a controlling power and the effect of such recognition on conduct and mental attitude. While one gets the impression that within this definition of religion there is something akin to

the definition of 'idea' expressed above, a clear correspondence is not yet evident. The key term that needs further clarification is 'faith'. The following lexicographic definition is given:

Faith   1. Reliance or trust *in*; belief founded on authority.
       2. (Theology) belief in religious doctrines, especially such as affects character and conduct, spiritual apprehension of divine truth apart from proof; system of religious belief.
       3. Promise, engagement.

The correspondence becomes clearer now: terms such as 'belief' and 'spiritual apprehension' are strongly suggestive of the noetic or cognate, as well as the emotional or affective. In the case of both 'ideology' and 'theology' there seems therefore to be an evaluating aspect with cognitive and affective elements, as well as its practical consequences. On the basis of the lexical definitions of the various related terms, then, one could provisionally say that *ideology* and *theology* do seem to be surrogate terms.

The lexicographic definition of 'ideology' and 'theology' could therefore be expressed in the following formulaic expression:

Ideology/theology = *an evaluating aspect consisting of cognitive and affective elements + the practical expression or realization of such elements in conduct and mental attitude.*

With the above definition in mind, we shall now discuss the different applications or definitions of the concept 'ideology' within the three disciplines relevant to this study, namely literary criticism, social sciences and theology.

3.2.2.1 *Ideology* in literary studies
According to Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn (1981:97) *sociology of literature* is the discipline that encompassing the different interests (directions) in literary science that studies literature and its relationship to the social reality within which it functions. Three main approaches are distinguished:

a) The *empirical sociology of literature* is not interested in the literature itself, but in aspects associated with literary production, looking at factors such as the composition of the reading public, the social position of the author, or the correlation between sales figures and the recension of a work. *Quantitative methods* are mostly used.

b) The *historical-materialist sociology of literature* seeks to locate the literary texts in their historical contexts. At stake here is the much debated subject of the rela-

tionship between a work of literature and its socio-historical reality (cf 1.1 to 1.1.1.5 above). The description of this relationship has mostly been dominated by the mechanistic Marxist concept that relations of production in the economic base of society determine the social, political and cultural superstructure. It has been realized, however, that base and superstructure have a certain autonomy over and against one another, so that 'the superstructure is...determined by the base in a weak sense' (Goldberg 1987:30), which really means that the influence of the economic is not directly causal as some Marxists assert (cf Goldberg 1987:30).[7] Indeed, the mechanistic theory of direct causal influence has been criticised by later Marxists, for instance by the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser. Althusser held that the productive relations had as much influence on the cultural superstructure of society as the other way round – base and superstructure have a dynamic, dialectical relationship (cf Van Luxemburg et al 1981:101).

c) *Ideology critique* is the approach within sociology of literature that is concerned with the analysis of the ideologies within the literary text itself and in its reception.[8] The *analysis of the text* is the main purpose of this approach (see the interesting discussion by Du Plooy 1989:114-141 on the subject of text and ideology, especially pp 121-122 on ideology critique). The *methods of analysis* used are those developed in *literary criticism* (cf Van Luxemburg et al 1981:103). Differing from the historical-materialists, ideology critics do not a priori regard ideologies in a negative sense. Those who understand 'ideology' in a pejorative sense to mean 'false consciousness' must make the premise that it is in fact possible to avoid ideology. They hold the (ideological) opinion that there is a non-ideological, non-evaluating, 'neutral' position (see also Du Toit 1989:84). This is, of course, impossible. Every person has a perception of his/her relation to reality, which constitutes 'ideology' (Van Luxemburg et al 1981:103). The philosopher *Habermas* has had considerable influence on the field of ideology critique. He maintained that 'critical science', which is a type of science dependent upon critical selfreflection, can be used to identify ideologies that are detrimental precisely to those who recognize their validity and are governed by it. He advocated a systematic ideology critique that would be able to expose the mechanisms of ideological influencing. According to Van Luxemburg et al (1981:103) a confrontation between intratextual ideologies and ideologies relating to the reception of the text could provide some insight in the development of the ideologies. Religious texts (Bible stories) inter alia are deemed to be especially suitable for such analysis, because they have a well documented reception owing to their canonicity.

In *literary criticism* the concept 'ideology' is an analytical category expressing the viewpoint that a literary – in this case, narrative – work originates and survives in an

extratextual world. According to Van Aarde (1988c:235) a narrative therefore involves a *network of themes and ideas which are intended to have meaning within a particular context*, and which are therefore presented in narrative form from a specific perspective. This *network of themes and ideas presented from a specific perspective* constitutes the *ideology* of the work.

In an interesting discussion Van Aarde (1988c:235-237), referring to Uspensky (1973) and another work by Lotman and Uspensky discussed by Danow (1987), designates 'culture' as the mechanism generating texts. According to a remark quoted by Danow (1987:352) from the work of Lotman and Uspensky and taken up by Van Aarde (1988c:236-237), the understanding of a text is provisionally bound up with its relation to the culture, or the behaviour of the people contemporary with it. The term 'culture' is replaced by the term 'social context' by Van Aarde (1988c:237), and the latter is shown to be an indirect mechanism behind the generation of texts. *People* are regarded as directly responsible for the production of texts (Van Aarde 1988c:237).

While I believe that Van Aarde is correct in regarding the social context as an indirect mechanism behind the generation of texts, the fact that he seems to equate or assume identity of meaning between 'culture' and 'social context' could become problematic. Schnell (1987:142-145; 169-170), for instance, using the Parsonian model, indicates that groups in society could be distinguished in terms of (i) culture, (ii) social system, (iii) individual personality and (iv) physical organism. According to this model the four components interact functionally (cf Schnell 1987:144). Culture provides an overall conceptual pattern which supplies the other parts with information so that the whole may survive in integrated fashion. The social system converts the information it receives into viable social structures, that is, norms and organizations (Schnell 1987:144).[9] Parsons then divides each of these components into four subgroups (cf Schnell 1987:144), where *culture* comprises the elements of *religion, morality, art* and *rational science*. The *social system* is divided into *fiduciary agencies* (judiciary, schools, churches), *the community, politics,* and the *economy*. Schnell uses this distinction between the cultural and the social systems to categorize the substance of the texts, and then to inquire into the functional relations between the cultural system (mainly the religious subsystem) and the social system in Jesus' preaching. He uses the same model to place Jesus in his social context, to interpret the differences between the preaching of Jesus and its interpretation by Mark and John, and to study Jesus in terms of our own cultural and social system (Schnell 1987:145).

Without a discussion of the merits and deficiencies of the Parsonian model, at this stage it will suffice to point out that 'culture' and 'social system' cannot be

equated as easily as Van Aarde seems to have done above.[10] The whole Parsonian model depends precisely on maintaining the distinction and dialectical relationship between these two concepts. Also, within the social sciences in general there are very definite differences between cultural systems and social systems, as evidenced in the definitions of these two concepts. When we speak of a 'social system', we have in mind the orderly functioning or patterned behaviour (structured interaction) of a society or group of interacting persons, such as family, government, education and religion, around common concerns or purposes (cf Malina 1981:19-21). *Culture*, on the other hand, is a system of symbols relating to and embracing people, things, and events that are socially symbolled. That is, culture assigns meaning and value in such a way that all members of a group mutually share and live out of that meaning and value in some way (Malina 1981:11). Culture 'marks the area of the "we" over against the "they", the area of collective communication and sharing, the area of the limited and finite range of persons, things and events that a given group of people holds in common...This is the area of the *social*' (Malina 1986a:7). It marks the area of the social by 'symboling persons, things and events, endowing them distinctive functions and statuses, and situating them within specific time and space frames' (Malina 1986a:9).

Corroboration for maintaining the distinction between 'social system' and 'cultural system' is found in Steyn and Van Rensburg (1985:29-30), who distinguish three basic subsystems of action within a general action system – the concepts 'personality system', 'social system' and 'cultural system' (cf Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:30).

Within the *personality system* the action is regarded as the result of the acting person's orientation to the situation. The concept 'personality' applies to the actions of a single person. These actions are organized around the structure of his/her needs, and they exhibit a certain cohesiveness and integration in the process of satisfying the needs of the individual (cf Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:29).

Within a *social system* the action is understood as *interaction*, involving more than one person. The relationship of such a collectivity of persons towards their situation and towards each other is defined, mediated and directed by a system of shared symbols and norms (cf Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:29).

In contrast to the two subsystems of action just mentioned, the *cultural system* is not regarded as a system of action. It consists rather of (a) the organization of values and norms that give direction to the choices the acting persons have to make (or it restricts the types of interaction that can manifest between people); (b) the organization of symbols that mediates this interaction between people; and (c) the or-

ganization of knowledge (concerning science, philosophy, ideology and religion) that gives direction to behaviour within social systems (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:30).

To return, then, to the initial discussion – it is true that texts can be understood only in terms of culture. Texts consist of language, and language is a very important aspect of culture, embodying and expressing the values and meanings shared by the users of the language codal system (cf Sargent & Williamson 1966:303-306; Popenoe 1980:106-108; Malina 1981:12; 1986a:1-12, especially 2, 11-12; Petersen 1985:17-20). Nida & Reyburn (1981:14) distinguish five classes of underlying (cultural) presuppositions about world and life:

a) Presuppositions about the physical earth and human beings, comprising views about creation (taking place within a time structure of seven periods of 24 hours each), purity classifications (classifying living beings as clean and unclean), et cetera.

b) Presuppositions about history and destiny, comprising the concept of covenant within the scope of which both past experiences and future expectations are contained. Knowledge or hopes about the ultimate destiny of individual human beings form part of these presuppositions.

c) Presuppositions about supernatural beings, for instance about a personal sovereign God, or about the existence of other supernatural beings such as angels, demons, and the devil. Those beings are regarded as having the power to bless or curse, to reward faithfulness or punish neglect. They communicate through apparitions, dreams, visions, and the drawing of lots, and human beings can communicate with them by means of prayer, sacrifices and offerings.

d) Presuppositions about personal relations, often of the most complex kind. The acceptance, for instance, of slavery as a legal institution, or of the dominance of husbands over wives, is based on important presuppositions about personal relations.

e) Presuppositions about valid intellectual activity, comprising the acknowledgment of the contemporary canons of proof (the use of scriptural reference in the New Testament). Such use of Old Testament quotations rests on presuppositions about verbal proofs that are not compatible with present-day customs.

While these presuppositions, which are basic to any adequate comprehension of the meaning of any communication, are not always verbalized, they definitely do exist. Nida & Reyburn (1981:17) emphasize that 'they are constantly manifested in the daily life of the people of any culture, both in the recurring cultural patterns of behavior and in the ways in which people understand and interpret events'.

Van Aarde (1988c:237) distinguishes between *linguistic* and *perceptual* dimensions in verbal communication (such as texts).[11] The *linguistic* dimension concerns the configuration of language symbols in a text, and the text as a language symbol in

a constellation of texts.[12] The *perceptual* dimension 'refers to a particular social context in a network of textual themes and ideas',[13] and constitutes 'no more than evaluative imagining of particular social contexts'[14] (Van Aarde 1988c:237).

I understand this *evaluative imagining* to be done by the author of the text. In that case, however, the ideological perspective as evaluating point of view would be the same as the ideological perspective as perceptual dimension in the communication act. Is this possible? The perceptual dimension, being a particular reflected social context (the time of the earthly Jesus in Palestine or the time of writing?) in a network of textual themes and ideas, is an analytical category used by the reader/ interpreter to distinguish an object of study in his approach to the text. Surely this cannot be identical to the evaluating point of view, which is exactly the network of textual themes and ideas ascribed to the author, and which constitutes the ideological perspective of his work? I would therefore suggest that we differentiate for analytical purposes between the social context which provides the backdrop for the evaluating point of view (perceptual dimension), and the evaluating point of view (ideological perspective) of the author itself.

The means of communication of the ideological perspective depends on the form of the speech act – if the speech act is in the form of narration, the evaluating point of view (ideological perspective) of the author is communicated by means of a narrative act. A text therefore presupposes an ideology (a network of themes and ideas) which is communicated and has meaning only in a certain social context (cf Van Aarde 1988c:237).

In the communication process there are intratextual and extratextual components (Van Aarde 1988c:237; Rousseau 1985:95-96; Petersen 1984:38-43). The extratextual component has a bearing on the social context. To construct this social context knowledge is needed of other texts, of the frame of reference of the text, comprising the sociocultural aspects of both the sender and the receptor, of the linguistic and the philosophical backgrounds, and of the actuality experience of both (cf Rousseau 1985:96).

Van Aarde correctly asserts that extratextual factors have exegetical relevance only in so far as they manifest themselves in a specific text, and that the construction of the social context of a specific text depends on the text being read (1988c:237). It is not quite clear, however, what he wishes to assert in his following argument, reversing the procedure to that of first constructing a social context, and then reading the text against such context. Such an argument presupposes of course the existence of other texts from the same period, as well as information from other sources (e g, archaeology) from which to construct such a social context. In the case of the New Testament this is possible. At most, however, we would only be able to

construct a generalized social context, making vague assertions about the perso-
nality type of the Mediterranean people or about economics or religious affiliations.
While such a general background can indeed provide a starting point for exegesis,
we can only arrive at specifics by going through the gateway proffered by the
medium of the text itself (Rousseau 1985:95; cf also 2.4.6 above).[15] While my own
position on this issue is in agreement with that of Petersen (cf 2.4.6. above) rather
than Van Aarde, the latter is correct at least to the extent that the general back-
ground, constructed from several texts that witness to the same period, should be
utilized as a plausibility test for the interpretation of a single text (cf chapter 4, note
3 for the model implicit in Van Aarde's approach).

The concept of 'ideology' as a network of themes and ideas that occur in a
narrative as an 'imagined' version of a specific reality is used increasingly in narrato-
logy by various scholars (cf Van Aarde 1988c:236 for references to scholars who
make use of the concept). The representation by Van Tilborg (1986) of Althusser's
philosophical theory of the practical functioning of an ideology as a literary device
for the interpretation of biblical literature is a case in point. As a point of depar-
ture, Van Tilborg accepts the Marxist base-superstructure metaphor, where econo-
mics form the base (*Unterbau*) that 'ultimately' determines the social, political and
cultural superstructure (*Überbau*) of every society (cf Van Luxemburg, Bal & West-
steijn 1981:99), that is, the juridical, political and ideological constellation of every
existing social formation (cf Van Tilborg 1986:3). According to Van Tilborg
(1986:1) the individual sayings of the Sermon on the Mount should be seen as 'ideo-
logical interventions in the context of an existing social practice'. Van Tilborg
(1986:2) quotes the philosophical argument by Althusser which states that an ideo-
logy does not represent 'ultimate reality' as it exists in the productive relationships
of the economic base of society (which is regarded as reality *per se*). *Ideology* rather
represents an 'imaginary' relation of individuals to that Marxist 'ultimate reality', the
economic base: 'Ideology, therefore, does not represent the system of real relation-
ships which affect the lives of individuals, but rather the imaginary relation of these
individuals to the real relations under which they live' (Althusser 1976:104, quoted
by Van Tilborg 1986:2). Every ideology therefore has a binary structure (Van Til-
borg 1986:2). It has as its base the existing productive relationships (cf Cohen 1968:
80), but the expression of its own relation to the productive relationships is only
given in the imaginary order (that is, according to the individual's understanding) of
metaphors, symbols, word games, et cetera. Therefore, according to Van Tilborg
(1986:2) every ideological statement reveals and hides the truth at the same time.
While it touches on the real interest of the people because of its reality base, it
simultaneously obscures that interest by expressing it in language which is part of

the imaginary order. An ideological statement therefore provides a distorted insight into someone's relation to socially existing, politically realized and economically determined relations between people. The *expression* of such a relation is necessarily imaginary, however, because it promotes interests that are not reflected upon in ideology (Van Tilborg 1986:2). Texts, according to Van Tilborg (1986:9), belong to the sphere of ideology – a sphere of human life which expresses itself in fantasies, images and thoughts that are expressed in any society in language.[16]

Van Tilborg's adherence to the Marxist understanding of the functioning of society can be criticised for being too simplistic and unable to escape the mechanistic tendencies of that model in positing the economic component as the primary causal substructure of society (cf 2.5.4 above for Malina's discussion on the dominance of any of the religious, political, economic or kinship components in a specific society, and the embeddedness of the other in the dominant component; cf also chapter 2, note 9 above for a similar notion in the sociology of knowledge). In the discussion of Althusser's theory and the subsequent arguments, Van Tilborg imparts the impression of being negative towards the concept of 'ideology'. This reflects the typical Marxist attitude towards ideology, namely that the dominant ideology in any class-divided society is always that of the ruling classes (cf Van Tilborg 1986:6-7), and that such ideology serves to effect a 'false consciousness' in the people in order to get them to accept their inferior position as being inevitable. In this sense 'ideology', being used as *social weapon* (Smit 1988:446), constitutes for Marxism the instrument for the maintenance of privilege (Cohen 1968:81), and therefore acquires a pejorative sense.

In spite of imparting the impression of a negative assessment of the concept of 'ideology', Van Tilborg must be credited with perceiving that 'ideology' can be a valuable heuristic device in the determination of meaning in biblical texts. Three observations by Van Tilborg deserve special mention:

(i) The previously mentioned statement that the individual sayings of the Sermon on the Mount are perceived as 'ideological interventions in the context of an existing social practice'. From this it is but a short step to recognize that a text in its entirety may also constitute such an ideological intervention in the context of an existing social practice. If 'ideology' is defined as *an imaginary expression of the relation of someone to reality, which has the intention of persuading or inducing others to concur with this view on reality*, the above statement provides possible clarification of an aspect of the relationship between a text and its social context.

(ii) The second valuable contribution is made by calling attention to the fact that every ideology has a specific 'tendency' that indicates how that ideology is connected with the dominant structures in a society (Van Tilborg 1986:6). This opens

the possibility of ascertaining which interests are pursued by whom and for what purpose, and what this concretely means for those affected by the success or failure of the dominant ideology. In the case of a text this aim calls for the literary-critical analysis and description of the main ideological point of view presented in the narrative, and a corresponding social-scientific analysis by means of *conflict theory*, which is the theoretical approach that focuses on different (conflicting) interests (cf section 3.5.2 below).

(iii) Finally, the emphasis on the text as 'imagined' accounts of reality corresponds to the notion in narratology of the 'narrative world' or 'referential world' of a narrative text. This 'narrative world' is intratextual, and is to be differentiated from the 'real', historical world from which the text has come.

Within a communication model all pertinent factors that may influence the understanding of the message of a text are to be taken account of. The different constituents of the communication process are interrelated with each other in such a way that the exegetical-hermeneutical model will have a circular, cross-referential and double-checking effect (Rousseau 1985:98). According to Rousseau (1985:97) the basic constituents of the communication process, the linguistic-literary and the historical, are determined by the sender's perspective: '"Perspective" [in the sense of "ultimate commitment"] is the final and decisive contextual element determining the content and understanding of the message.' He also makes the following important observation: 'The author's perspective on reality [which includes his life and world view, values, commitments, etc.] dominates his entire message and is therefore the key to understand him.' Only when the audience shares the perspective of the author and reacts according to his intentions, can it be said that communication has succeeded (Rousseau 1985:97).

The term 'perspective', as used here, corresponds to the concept of *ideology* discussed above, constituting a network of themes and ideas within a narrative that has the purpose of eliciting concurrence amongst its readers. This *network* is an *imaginative perception* of a *contextual world* by a particular author.

From the discussion above it could be stated that there seems to be a correspondence between the understanding of 'ideology' in literature expressed by both Marxist materialistic exegesis and non-materialistic literary criticism (cf Van Aarde 1988c:236 for the distinction between the two viewpoints). The Marxist 'imaginary expression of an individual's relation to reality' corresponds to the literary-theoretical 'network of themes and values', both of which are reminiscent of the first component (the evaluating perspective) in the lexicographic definition of ideology (cf 3.2.2 above). Furthermore, in both the Marxist and the literary-theoretical explication the evaluating component finds practical expression in the inducement of others to

accept the point of view that is expressed in that evaluation. The evaluation itself is contained in the 'imagined' relation to reality or the network of themes and values associated with a specific group (or literary work). This 'inducement of others' corresponds to the second component in the lexicographic definition of ideology, namely that the evaluating component should be realized in the conduct and mental attitude of others (cf 3.2.2 above).

While we have voiced appreciation for Van Aarde's treatment of the subject of 'ideology', this same treatment is assessed and commented upon by Smit (1988). It might contribute to clarity to note and evaluate the main arguments brought forth by Smit.

According to Smit (1988:444) the term *ideological reading* as used by Van Aarde covers at least four different phenomena:

(i) 'Ideology' refers to the evaluating viewpoint of the narrator, who communicates that evaluating point of view by means of a speech act. This is referred to as the ideological point of view of the narrator (cf Van Aarde 1988c:247-248). Smit directs attention to the fact that in this sense there can be only one evaluating point of view in a narrative – that of the narrator who uses language in an attempt to manipulate the (implicit) readers into accepting his ideology.

(ii) According to Smit, Van Aarde (1988c:247-249), following Resseguie (1982), asserts that there can be more than one ideology present in a narrative. Smit (1988:444) contends that the use of the term 'ideology' for the phenomenon 'opposing points of view' is confusing. He argues that such a phenomenon is not evaluative or manipulative – it is simply a synonym for 'viewpoint' or 'perspective'.

I believe that Smit confuses the issue here. Surely the evaluative and manipulative aspects are to be found precisely in the contrasting of the opposing ideologies, and in vindicating the one against the other. Van Aarde is correct in speaking about ideological perspectives (plural), because these perspectives do indeed represent .conflicting networks of themes and ideas. To negate this fact could make one lose sight of the really important question, namely: where, in what realm, do these themes and ideas originate, these networks of values and beliefs, and why are there different evaluating perspectives or ideologies vying for acceptance? An understanding of anyone's perception of the essence of life is only to be reached through an analysis of their ideology. I differ substantially from the Marxist contention that one's ideology represents a distorted view of his relation to reality. Who defines what objective reality is? I strongly believe that perceived reality, as expressed in an evaluating perspective or ideology, in fact constitutes 'objective reality'. This 'perceived reality' (narrative world) is based on both the socio-cultural system in which there is a shared understanding of symbols (contextual world) and on the symbolic

universe that provides the integrative ingredient to actions and experiences that could otherwise be seen as disparate and disconnected and artificial.

(iii) Smit refers to Van Aarde's distinction between 'ideology' as understood from an ideal, non-materialistic viewpoint, and 'ideology' as understood from the Marxist viewpoint (cf Van Aarde 1988c:236). He relates these distinctions to those made by Cronin (1987a:111) between 'aesthetic ideologies' and 'sociopolitical ideologies'.

The *aesthetic ideology* within a text is, according to Smit (1988:446), the conscious and deliberate 'evaluating point of view' of the narrator, which comprises the main themes and ideas propagated through the medium of the story (Smit 1988: 445). The narrator is trying to manipulate the reader into his own evaluating perspective (cf Smit 1988:445). In order to discern this 'aesthetic ideology' or 'evaluating perspective' from the narrative, one 'moves within the field of narrative analysis, and one stays within the limits and strategies of the story, the language, the characters and the plot' (Smit 1988:445). The 'aesthetic ideologies' present a set of notions about what constitutes the 'beautiful', the 'proper', et cetera (Cronin 1987a: 111).

The *sociopolitical ideologies* within the texts, on the other hand, may be expressed unconsciously. They furnish answers to the sociopolitical question of who (what individual or group) stands to benefit most if the evaluating viewpoint of the narrator is accepted. In order to obtain these answers one has to move into the field of 'social analysis'. This means that one has to understand the 'public ideological discourse that serves as backdrop for the narrative or text, in order to understand the way the narrative serves to strengthen or weaken social relationships' (Smit 1988:445-446).

I believe that Smit is correct in pointing out that Cronin's distinction between *aesthetic ideology* and *sociopolitical ideology* in fact entails two distinct reading strategies that complement one another while answering different questions (Smit 1988: 446). I also believe, though, that while an understanding of the aesthetic ideology of a text can be pursued independently of the sociopolitical ideology, the reverse is not true. Understanding the aesthetic ideology of a text (the evaluating viewpoint of the narrator) is a prerequisite for attempting to understand its sociopolitical ideology.

I am not quite clear on what Smit understands by the term 'social analysis', defining it as the method by which to determine the sociopolitical ideology within the text. Presumably it entails the methodological procedure one would follow to come to an understanding of 'the public ideological discourse that serves as backdrop for the narrative or text' (Smit 1988:445). The term 'social analysis' leaves one with several choices as to its connotation – namely, compiling a social history from and

for the text; embarking on a social description, analysing the text for data of social interest; or conducting a social-scientific analysis, seeking to explain tendencies of interpersonal behaviour or human interaction described within the text by methods that are scientifically sound. The term 'public ideological discourse', however, is completely opaque to me. What does Smit have in mind when he uses this term? Does 'discourse' refer to a *written* text, expressing the (dominant) ideology prevailing in the contextual community? Does it refer to *oral* discussion, expressing the same, and where is that to be found? Perhaps the term is simply meant to designate the *social system* within which the text was produced, or to which the text refers. It is very confusing.

According to Smit (1988:445), then, pursuing the aesthetic ideology of a text is a *literary endeavour*. To this he contrasts the ascertainment of the sociopolitical ideology of the text with the instrument of *social analysis*. Is this also a literary endeavour? Smit (1988:446) states that one needs 'to understand the way the narrative serves to strengthen or weaken social relationships'. I take it that the 'social relations' he refers to are those that exist in the social context *outside* of the text, in the *contextual world* of the text. This, I believe, would be the correct conclusion drawn from Smit's (1988:445) understanding of 'sociopolitical ideology' as referring to the *effect* of the text on *society*. In this context he ascribes a pejorative sense to the term 'ideology'. The words, ideas, themes and stories of which the ideology consists are used as *social weapons* (Smit 1988:446).

The contention of this work is that the demarcation of the *sociopolitical ideology* of a text is as much a literary endeavour as is that of the aesthetic ideology. There is no way to determine the effect of the text on its socio-historical context other than through the text. To do it any other way would amount to a construction of a specifics-based socio-historical context merely on the basis of general truisms and descriptions of the time, procured from other sources. Such a procedure would be methodologically problematic. The answer, I believe, lies in a literary category identified by Petersen (1984:38-43), namely that of the intratextual *encoded reader*. According to Petersen (1984:39-40) 'the intratextual encoding points (deictically) to extratextual communicants, to people who belong to the text's historical, interpretive context'. At the same time this encoding of a reader creates another 'hermeneutically significant distinction' between *authorial readers* and *non-authorial readers*. Authorial readers are the 'authorially intended addressees of the textual communication', and they belong to the text's own interpretive context (Petersen 1984:40). Non-authorial readers belong to other interpretive contexts. The interplay between intratextual encoded reader and extratextual authorial reader provides the point of

mediation between the literary text and its extratextual context, and simultaneously presents us with the key to the sociopolitical ideology of the text.

(iv) Smit (1988:446) distinguishes a *fourth* phenomenon that can be referred to by the term 'ideological reading'. This includes the ideologies at the *reception end* of the text, involving the printing, publishing, distributing, performing, reading, teaching, examining and critical commentary of a text (cf Cronin 1987a:111-112). In this view the critical reading of the literary critic may itself serve as a social weapon (cf Smit 1988:446). This corresponds to the understanding of literature as a *social force*, as articulated in the sociology of literature (cf 1.1.1.4 above).

One may not agree with everything Smit says, but for the sake of methodological clarity it is important to be cognisant of his differentiation of the references of the term 'ideology'.

3.2.2.2 *Ideology* in the social sciences

> Mainstream sociology, for the most part, continues to insist that it is capable of producing scientific, objective knowledge, relevant to the solution of major social problems in contemporary society.
>
> (Kinloch 1981:3)

The attitude described in the above quotation is not surprising, considering that for a very long time it has been ingrained in students that the attainment of value-free, neutral knowledge is not only possible, but should be the ultimate goal of anybody who aspires to be somebody in the knowledge business.

There is, however, a growing awareness that all 'knowledge' is ideological, 'in that it represents the vested interests and viewpoints of particular social groups in specific situations' (Kinloch 1981:3). Indeed, the claim to 'value neutrality' for itself might stand in the service of a covert attempt to get certain values accepted. On the basis of this recognition there seems to be a growing interest in what Berger & Luckmann (1967) called the *social construction of reality*, with *knowledge* being regarded as part of that reality. Attention is directed towards the *social context* of knowledge.

Several aspects covered in the discussion of the preceding section (3.2.2.1) not only apply to the use of the term 'ideology' in literary criticism, but also belong to the more generic reference of the term. To get a better perspective, we will have a brief look at the origins of ideology.

3.2.2.2 (a) The origins of *ideology*

According to Kinloch (1981:4) the term *ideology* originated during the French Revolution. Referring to Lichtheim (1967), Kinloch (1981:4-5) ascribes the concept to 'liberals concerned with systems of normative ideas and the critique of absolute norms in an attempt to place "ideal" aims above the more "material" goals of post-revolutionary society'. He states that the term was first used in 1797 by Destutt de Tracy to refer to a newly invented discipline – the *science of ideas* (Kinloch 1981:5). The purpose of this new science was to support the formation of a new social and political order as opposed to the 'unscientific' past. Kinloch (1981:5) describes the programme of the science of ideas as follows:

> This new 'science' adopted an antimetaphysical approach to reality, attempting to create more 'scientific institutions'. Articulated by an important group of *Ideologues*, this viewpoint focused on purging old concepts in order to develop 'correct' reasoning and bring about a state and social system based on 'ideology' – the scientific analysis of ideas in the search for 'natural' order... Thus, the notion of ideology originated in the philosophical search for truth in postrevolutionary France as ideas were subjected to 'scientific' analysis to provide a 'natural' foundation for a new society.
>
> (Kinloch 1981:5, indebted to Drucker 1984)

Fanaeian (1981) also connects the origin of ideology with the time of the Enlightenment. He maintains, however, that ideology was at that time considered a 'kind of falsity' which was contrary to 'reason', and that this viewpoint constitutes the basis of the rationalist definition of ideology (Fanaeian 1981:46). This is in fact contrary to the point made by Kinloch (rendered above), namely that 'ideology' emphasized precisely the desirability of *science* over and against the unscientific approach. It would seem that Fanaeian is guilty here of an anachronism, ascribing a somewhat later assessment of ideology to its time of origin. At that time ideologies consisted of sets of ideas evolved by thinkers who reacted to political and social problems by attempting to develop *scientific* solutions. Ideologies were therefore 'philosophical, problem-orientated sets of ideas with political implications' (Kinloch 1981:5).

3.2.2.2 (b) Subsequent definitions of *ideology*

As indicated above (cf 3.2.2), the understanding of *ideology* as the *science of ideas* later became outdated. This happened primarily because of the influence of Marx,

who saw ideologies as blinding, self-reifying ideas, a form of false consciousness. In this sense, according to Kinloch (1981:5), ideology represents false ideas concerning reality, in so far as they reflect the exclusive interests of a particular class, and become a determining factor in human existence. Such ideologies would as a consequence mask the social context of ideas,

> making consciousness passive and uncritical, creating
> social blindness and determinism. In such a situation,
> consciousness (ideology) defines social being, producing
> alienation and an irrational order determined by blind,
> unconscious material necessity. As a result, creation of
> rational order requires emancipation from this materia-
> listic determinism of social consciousness and move-
> ment towards the conscious production of social life,
> rising above existence and transcending alienation.
> (Kinloch 1981:5, based on Lichtheim 1967:21)

Discussing subsequent definitions of ideology in the Marxist tradition by Habermas (1970) and D'Amico (1978), Kinloch (1981:6) identifies a major dimension of ideology – namely, *the manner in which certain ideas are limited to particular class interests and determine social being.* He isolates the following common viewpoint: 'Ideology represents the conceptual dominance of the particular material situation by an elite that equates social reality with characteristics of its own economic system through particular abstractions.'[17]

Apart from representing the 'conceptual dominance' of a material situation, ideologies also function to *legitimate* particular group interests, as in the case of Marxism, liberalism, communism and fascism (Kinloch 1981:7, referring to Seliger 1976). Based upon the conviction about the reinforcing and legitimizing functions of ideologies, four major types of ideologies are differentiated: conservative, revolutionary, reactionary, and counter-ideological (cf Kinloch 1981:7). Based on these observations, Kinloch (1981:7) identifies a *second* major dimension of ideology, represented in the way in which ideology:

> represents a belief system that intellectually legitimates
> the political interests of its advocates, constraining the
> behaviour and ideas of those subject to the dominance
> of an elite. This 'false consciousness' is rational in that
> it furthers the interests of its adherents.

He deduces that ideologies in general represent integrated, symbolic world views. Such world views reflect particular social motives, they simplify political and social environments, and they are legitimated through ultimate sources of causation and order. Hence, ideologies not only represent false consciousness and group interests, but they also involve particular definitions of reality (Kinloch 1981:9). A typical characteristic of such ideologies is 'their intolerance of opposing viewpoints with respect both to political ideologies (conservative versus radical) and intellectual standpoints (science versus metaphysics)' (Kinloch 1981:9). Ideologies therefore claim exclusive authority with respect to what is *true* and *politically expedient*, and from the highly integrated character of these belief systems it follows that they exclude opposite or different definitions of reality.

Ideologies *operate* by the total or unilinear abstraction and reduction of phenomena or occurrences. This represents a *third* major dimension of ideologies, that is, *the manner in which they reduce reality to abstractions and premises that reflect predominant characteristics of the social system*. Kinloch (1981:10) formulates the following provisional definition of 'ideology':

> Ideologies, therefore, are highly integrated and exclusive world views which represent forms of false consciousness by legitimating group interests through reductive abstractions. Ideology is the limited perception of a specific social situation by a particular group, thereby underlining the relevance of the social context to these thought forms....
>
> (Kinloch 1981:10)

By now it must be clear that ideologies do not just emerge *ex nihilo* – the social environment is seminal both to their origins and to their continued mode of existence. Kinloch (1981:10) maintains that symbols (social signs) as the basis of ideology may be viewed as a function of a society's division of labour system. Kinloch's schema for positing the *labour system* and the *division of labour* as the basis for the symbols of which ideologies consist reduces everything to a single cause, namely labour (Kinloch 1981:10-13). This looks suspiciously like the base-superstructure schema of Marx, who also reduces everything to a single cause, namely economics. This is especially evident in the following quotation, in which Kinloch (1981:13) formally defines ideology as:

> the symbolic reaction of particular socioeconomic groups to specific division of labor situations, representing attempts to reassert social order through highly integrated

and exclusive world views. These symbolic models of reality are forms of false consciousness in the sense that they legitimate such group interests through reductive abstractions. As societies become more structurally differentiated and specialized in their divisions of labor, specific groups react to these changing social relations, attempting to legitimate political arrangements which serve their vested socioeconomic interests by imposing their own symbolic world views on others. Whether termed 'knowledge,' 'science,' or 'sociology,' these group definitions of reality are ideological and reflect specific group interests. Thus ideology generally has widespread significance in society – sociological significance.

This explanation in itself exhibits exactly the operating procedure that Kinloch described as the third major dimension of ideologies (see preceding discussion), namely 'reducing reality to abstractions and premises that reflect predominant characteristics of the economic system' (Kinloch 1981:10). Concerning this aspect of his explanation of the influence of the social environment on the formation of ideologies, his own words can serve as indictment against himself: 'Such abstractions are self-fulfilling and reinforcing in that they become reified and viewed as explanatory, thereby obscuring their limited and ideological nature' (Kinloch 1981:10). Kinloch's explanation itself is highly ideological!

Several other definitions (representing different perspectives) of the concept 'ideology' are given by Van Straaten (1987:4-8). While they are instructive for the different perspectives they represent, practically all have in common a description of ideology as a *system of ideas/beliefs* (cf Van Straaten 1987:5-7). It is also said that it is characteristic of ideologies that they involve consequences for moral and political behaviour – in other words they also have a pragmatic or practical side (cf Van Straaten 1987:5). A provisional formulaic expression, reflecting both the definitions formulated by Kinloch above and those tabled in Van Straaten, would be: *ideology = value-laden reflection (system of ideas/beliefs) + practical imperative (for attitude and conduct), on the basis of which one group can clearly be distinguished from another.*

This definition also describes the understanding and application of the concept 'ideology' in the social-scientific study of the Bible. Elliott (1981:267-270), following Davis (1975) who follows Berger & Luckmann, defines ideology as 'an integrated system of beliefs, assumptions and values, not necessarily true or false, which reflects the needs and interests of a group or class at a particular time in history' (cf

Berger & Luckmann 1967:6, 9-10, 123-125, 127-128, 180). Malina (1986a:178) states in this connection: 'Ideology refers to the articulation of a social group's views and values that legitimate and reinforce the present order and practice against competing groups.' He uses the term *mode of ideological implication to refer to the 'ideological* setting' of the story, by which is meant 'an assessment of the world along with a set of prescriptions for taking a position in the world and for acting upon that position' (Malina 1986a:178). The ideology determines whether the current condition of the world should be changed or maintained. The mode of ideological implication therefore indicates how the audience of the storyteller 'must view the present because of the continuities with the past discovered by the historian' (Malina 1986a:179).

Malina (1986a:179) distinguishes four basic ideological positions that can be connected to the mode of ideological implication regarding action in the present. They are the following:

First, the position of the *anarchist*, where the purpose is to abolish society and set up a community based on fundamental humanity. Malina cites the Gospel of John as an example of this ideological position.

Second, the ideological implications of the *liberal* position, where the best option for the present is seen to reside in adjusting social arrangements for maximum efficiency. This will result in maximizing the current social scheme (Malina 1986a: 180). This view, according to Malina, is not found in the New Testament.

Third, the ideological implications linked to the *conservative* standpoint wish to allow and enable society to develop according to its own internal forces and natural rhythms, like an organism such as a plant. This view is not found in the New Testament either (cf Malina 1986a:181).

Fourth, the ideological implications linked to the *radical* standpoint lead to the conclusion that society should be restructured on an entirely new basis. Malina (1986a:184) maintains that all the New Testament writings – apart from the Gospel of John – exhibit the radical standpoint.

These descriptions by Malina perhaps properly belong in the preceding section on ideology in literary studies (3.2.2.1), because they pertain to the literary works contained in the New Testament. So does the following definition by Neyrey (1988: 5), in which 'verbal communication' is understood to include *literary communication* such as that found in the works of the New Testament:

> Verbal communications, such as confessions, can indeed imply a system of cognitive or moral maps of the universe and urge a social behavior in keeping with this world view.

However, since they so obviously reflect an understanding of 'ideology' that is de-
rived from the social-scientific definition of the concept, both Malina's and Neyrey's
definitions are retained here.

Gottwald clearly uses *ideology* and *theology* as synonyms, stating: 'The consen-
sual constitutive concepts and attitudes of early Israel, which I choose to call "ideo-
logy," are more commonly in biblical studies called "religious ideas or beliefs," "reli-
gious thought or symbols," or "theology."' (Gottwald 1979:65). He explains his prefe-
rence for the term *ideology* by referring to its ability to set a methodological distance
between sociological inquiry and the more familiar historical and theological ap-
proaches (Gottwald 1979:65). *Ideology* therefore denotes a field of study that con-
sists of the way in which internally coherent religious ideas are systematically related
to the fundamental system of social relations.

Gottwald (1979:66) states:

> ...when I refer to ideology in ancient Israel, I mean the
> *consensual religious ideas which were structurally em-*
> *bedded in and functionally correlated to other social phe-*
> *nomena within the larger social system,* and which served,
> in a more or less comprehensive manner, *to provide ex-*
> *planations or interpretations of the distinctive social rela-*
> *tions and historical experience of Israel* and also *to define*
> *and energize the Israelite social system oppositionally or*
> *polemically over against other social systems.*

And again:

> ...Israelite ideology is the religious beliefs as part of a
> system of social relations in which those beliefs serve
> explanatory and polemical functions intimately related
> to the specific social relations of the people who enter-
> tain the ideas. Ideology in this context is religious belief
> viewed from the angle of its social structure and func-
> tion.

While Gottwald's definition of ideology here is narrower than the other definitions
discussed above – in the sense that it focuses only on *religious* ideas[18] – it seems to
have essentially the same thrust.

Proceeding from the entire discussion under the present heading, it can be said
that the concept *ideology* in the social sciences can be defined in the same terms as

those used to describe the concept in literary studies (cf 3.2.2.2), and that *ideology* and *theology* are deemed to be surrogate terms within the social sciences, as well.

3.2.2.3 *Symbolic universe* in relation to *theology* and *ideology*

Malina (1981:7) distinguishes three types of knowledge about others as well as about the self:

- Awareness knowledge or that-knowledge: information about the existence of someone or something, its/his/her location in space (where) and time (when).
- Usable knowledge or how-to and how-knowledge: information necessary to use something or interact with someone properly or to understand how uses and interactions are generated (how).
- Principle knowledge or why-knowledge: information about the cultural scripts and cues, about the cultural models behind the applicable facts, combined with the commitment to the presuppositions and assumptions that make the cultural scripts, cues, and models evident. Why-knowledge is about the implied values and meanings that ultimately explain behaviour.

Both biblical commentators and historians focus on meaning – the first on the meaning of a literary form or of words in that culture, and the other on the meaning of behaviour. The question of meaning is a *why-question*. Malina (1981:10) states that the why-questions can only be answered in terms of cultural story.

Culture, as we have seen (cf section 3.2.2.1, inter alia p 78 above), relates to the sphere of the symbolic in society, that is, to the way everyday phenomena are symbolled and endowed with meaning so that they come to refer beyond their regular signifieds. When we engage the level of the symbolic, we are exercising the essence of social-scientific interpretive application and, at the same time, we are on the threshold of transcending the scope of this discipline. Inquiring into the ultimate meaning that integrates all discrete experiences that man may have, we are led to a reality whose objective existence can be neither described nor validated. What *can* be studied by social-scientific means is the *body of theoretical tradition about that reality* – that is, what men have come to *know* about that 'ultimate reality'. This is to say that the social sciences are restricted to very definite boundaries – they can analyse and study every single facet or element that is applicable to man, be it on the level of the concrete (physical, material) or the abstract (mental, theoretical, psychological, symbolic). However, when the realm of the transcendent or the metaphysical is reached, the social sciences must refrain from making ontological state-

ments or validations about such realities, or they would become susceptible to the charge of reductionism.

Having indicated our awareness of the limitations of the social sciences, we are now squarely confronted with the problem of trying to define and describe the relationship between ideology/theology (in the usage described above in 3.2.2.2) and the concept *symbolic universe*, which refers to that *body of theoretical tradition* about the 'ultimate reality' referred to above. What, precisely, is to be understood in respect of the concept *symbolic universe*? For instance, is ideology/theology to be equated with symbolic universe, or are they different entities?

First, let us consider the argument by Berger & Luckmann (1967:95) about symbolic universes being instances of legitimation. *Legitimation* is described as a process by which new meanings are produced – meanings that serve to integrate those other meanings already attached to disparate institutional processes (Berger & Luckmann 1967:92). It is a process of *explaining* and *justifying* which occurs when the institutional order has to be transferred to a new generation, but the self-evident character of the institutions has eroded to such an extent that both the cognitive and normative aspects of the institutional order have to be made intelligible again. The order is *explained* by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectified meanings, and *justified* by imparting a normative dignity to its practical imperatives (Berger & Luckmann 1967:93).

Analytically, four levels of legitimation can be distinguished: *incipient legitimation*, the most important form of which is the linguistic objectification of human experience – for example, kinship vocabulary legitimates the kinship structure; *theoretical propositions* in rudimentary form, found in highly pragmatic explanatory schemes directly related to concrete actions, such as proverbs and moral maxims; *explicit theories* that serve to legitimate an institutional sector in terms of a differentiated body of knowledge; and *symbolic universes*, which are bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality[19] (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967:94-96).

The symbolic sphere therefore relates to the most comprehensive level of legitimation; the sphere of pragmatic application is transcended (Berger & Luckmann 1967:95). All sectors of the institutional order are integrated in an all-embracing frame of reference. This frame of reference constitutes a literal *universe* within which all human experience take place (Berger & Luckmann 1967:96). Symbolic universes are regarded as social products with a history – in order to understand their meaning, one has to understand the history of their production. Their function is to provide 'order for the subjective apprehension of biographical experience' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:97). More specifically:

> ...the symbolic universe orders and thereby legitimates
> everyday roles, priorities, and operating procedures by
> placing them *sub specie universi*, that is, in the context of
> the most general frame of reference conceivable.
> (Berger & Luckmann 1967:99)

The universe is symbolic, therefore, 'because the realities of everyday life are comprehended within the framework of *other realities*' (Petersen 1985:59).

As cognitive constructions, symbolic universes are theoretical – they do not require further legitimation. They are constructed in processes of subjective reflection, are then socially objectivated, and result in the establishment of explicit links between the significant themes rooted in the several institutions (Berger & Luckmann 1967:104). However, as soon as a symbolic universe acquires an objectivated status as the product of theoretical thought, it becomes possible to systematically reflect upon the nature of that universe (Berger & Luckmann 1967:105). Such systematic reflection upon or theorizing about a symbolic universe is regarded as 'legitimation to the second degree', and all legitimations may in turn be described as 'machineries of universe-maintenance' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:105). Berger & Luckmann maintain that no specific procedures of universe-maintenance are needed as long as the symbolic universe remains unproblematic or unchallenged or naïvely held. In that case the symbolic universe 'is self-maintaining, that is, self-legitimating by the sheer facticity of its objective existence...' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:105). This is taken by Petersen (1985:59) to mean that a symbolic universe *cannot* be legitimated, only maintained:

> Technically and strictly speaking, as the *ultimate* form of
> legitimation it cannot be legitimated by anything else; it
> can only be *maintained*.

Berger & Luckmann (1967:106-107; cf also Petersen 1985:60) proceed to argue that if and when a symbolic universe is challenged by internal failures of the universe or by an external deviant version of reality held by 'heretical groups', a systematic theoretical conceptualization of the challenged symbolic universe is constructed in its defence. They cite Christian theological thought as an example of the conceptual machineries used to maintain – and thereby legitimate – a symbolic universe threatened by heresies (Berger & Luckmann 1967:107). The most conspicuous types of conceptual machineries for universe-maintenance are, in order: mythology, theology, philosophy, and science (Berger & Luckmann 1967:110). For our purpose the most important of these are the mythological and the theological, because the New Testament documents seem to fit both these categories (cf Petersen 1985:60).

That the mythological concepts are not simply replaced by theological ones is evident from the fact that:

> the populace may remain relatively unaffected by the
> sophisticated universe-maintaining theories concocted
> by the theological specialists. The coexistence of naïve
> mythology among the masses and a sophisticated theo-
> logy among an elite of theoreticians, *both* serving to
> maintain the same symbolic universe, is a frequent his-
> torical phenomenon.
>
> (Berger & Luckmann 1967:112)

Mythological and theological machineries for universe-maintenance are described as follows:

Mythology is regarded as the most archaic form of universe-maintenance, closest to the naïve level of the symbolic universe where there is the least necessity for theoretical universe-maintenance. Mythology is defined as 'a conception of reality that posits the ongoing penetration of the world of everyday experience by sacred forces' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:110). A high degree of continuity is envisaged between social and cosmic order.

Theology is regarded as a more elaborate and refined form of its mythological predecessor (Berger & Luckmann 1967:111). Theological concepts present a greater degree of theoretical systematization and are further removed from the naïve level than mythological concepts. While *mythology* concentrates on the *conti-nuity* between the world of the humans and that of the gods, confirming the impression that 'all reality appears as made of one cloth' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:110), *theology* is concerned with *mediating* between these two worlds because of a per-ceived and experienced *discontinuity* between the two orders (Berger & Luckmann 1967:111; see also Petersen 1985:60). Petersen directs attention to the fact that while social scientists have long distinguished between *social facts* and *theological facts*, the sociology of knowledge à la Berger & Luckmann 'treats theology as a so-cial fact also because it is a social form of knowledge that is dependent upon another social form of knowledge, a symbolic universe, not some "real" universe that is directly accessible apart from prior knowledge. We only "have" reality in the form of knowledge, and knowledge is dependent upon both social conventions – language – and cultural traditions' (Petersen 1985:271 note 7).

Berger & Luckmann provide us with another insight which I regard as of funda-mental importance in our understanding of symbolic universes:

> ...the symbolic universe is not only *legitimated* but also
> *modified* by the conceptual machineries constructed to
> ward off the challenge of heretical groups within a so-
> ciety.
>
> (Berger & Luckmann 1967:107; my emphasis)

Added to this, Petersen's (1985:60) description of the different machineries for uni-
verse-maintenance, to be 'at best' legitimations of the second degree, must not be
understood to mean that symbolic universes are persistent, unchanging structures.
On the contrary.   Petersen (1985:202) concurs with Berger & Luckmann when he
compares the knowledge comprising symbolic universes with the knowledge con-
tained in an encyclopedia – virtually inexhaustible and subject to change over time.
He elaborates:

> The knowledge is possessed in the form of pieces or clus-
> ters of pieces, or of frames, and as inherited communal
> products they are subject over time to alteration and re-
> arrangement by individuals...as well as communities...In
> this light theology is, as a *systematizing* form of reflection
> on the contents and structures of symbolic universes, one
> means of introducing *a new or revised order*, and therefore
> new meaning, to certain segments of the universes, or even
> to the whole.
>
> (Petersen 1985:203)

The importance of this insight will become obvious when – being able to draw con-
clusions from the data generated by the model – we consider the effect of the Gos-
pel itself (as conceptual machinery intended for legitimation or universe-mainte-
nance) on the body of traditional knowledge that constitutes the symbolic universe.
For the moment it will suffice to say that the postulate that a symbolic universe is
susceptible to change is fully consistent with the fact that while a symbolic universe
may refer to an external reality, that reality is only known and knowable *as the body
of traditional knowledge* of which it is made up, and knowledge is subject to change
(cf discussion above).

   To recapitulate: Symbolic universes and theology represent two different kinds
of knowledge. In Petersen's words:

> Broadly, a symbolic universe is the 'world' *as it is known*
> and therefore as the knowledge of it shapes one's expe-
> rience of it, not as something that exists apart from what

> is known. A symbolic universe is the 'world' *as it is
> viewed*, not as something that exists apart from the way
> we view it. To be sure, there is something out there out-
> side of us and apart from our knowledge of it, but it is
> not a 'world' apart from what we know about it...Theo-
> logy, on the other hand, is for the sociology of know-
> ledge a kind of knowledge that is the product of syste-
> matic reflection upon a symbolic universe, and indeed
> of reflection that serves to maintain that universe when
> it is in some kind of jeopardy, as for example from the
> threats of doubt, of disagreement, or of competing sym-
> bolic universes. Theology is, therefore, a kind of know-
> ledge that is produced to defend and maintain the
> knowledge comprising a symbolic universe, and for this
> reason we can speak of a symbolic universe as a primary
> (pre-reflective) form of knowledge and theology as a se-
> condary (reflective) form that is dependent on it.
>
> (Petersen 1985:29-30)

This distinction between *theology* and *symbolic universe*, where the former is re-
garded as dependent upon and a legitimation of the latter, will be maintained as one
of the assumptions upon which the rest of the investigation will be based.

To complete this discussion, one relation remains to be determined – that be-
tween a symbolic universe and ideology. If theology is defined as a reflective form
of knowledge developed to defend and maintain a symbolic universe, it follows that
theology is ideological in nature – in fact, in this sense theology *is* ideology (see defi-
nitions of ideology in 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2 above). Is it only the reflective form of
knowledge that is ideological, then, or can the pre-reflective form (=symbolic uni-
verse) itself already be ideological? Kinloch (1981:3; see also 3.2.2.2 above) main-
tains that *all* knowledge is ideological. Gager (1975:83; my emphasis) likewise
makes a straightforward identification of the two concepts, asserting that 'any chal-
lenge to a group's *ideology or symbolic universe* will be treated as a threat to the exis-
tence of the group itself'.

On the basis of what has been determined so far, we can draw a schematic re-
presentation of the relation between *social universe*, *symbolic universe* and *theology*:

Fig 1 Institutional order, symbolic universe and theology

The arrowed solid lines testify to the fact that the symbolic universe is constructed subsequent to the institutional order, which is legitimated and integrated by the symbolic universe. The dotted line indicates that the symbolic universe, when in jeopardy, is maintained and legitimated by a reflective form of knowledge that is produced in the institutional order. This reflective theorizing, having a social base, *modifies* the symbolic universe or parts of it. The implications are that a dialectical process of reciprocal influencing between institutional order and symbolic universe is established through the medium of reflective thought, which provides the link between social and symbolic universe.

Does it follow, then, that *symbolic universe* is the same as 'world view' or 'ideology'? Kinloch (1981:13) emphasizes the importance of the 'social self' and the influence of symbols in the process of self-communication, and indicates that ideologies function on both the group and the individual level to assert social order through an exclusive world view. He argues that the *social self* represents a symbolic link between the individual and the social environment through social relations. In this process ideology is important because it is involved in the individual's attempt to conceptually relate his/her *self* and significant groups to the surrounding physical and social world through symbols (conceptual names or signs) (Kinloch 1981:13). Kinloch (1981:14) argues further that ideology is central to social organization, re-

presenting an index of changing social environments in which affected groups react to such change, attempting to re-integrate themselves symbolically with that situation through world views and related policies. This is done by creating reductive abstractions and exclusive world views, which provide insight into group interests: 'Cultural, political, and intellectual ideologies provide social portraits of social systems as indices of the structure of need-fulfillment and its ongoing change' (Kinloch 1981:15). In this way an analysis of ideology can reveal a group's self-defined position in society. Kinloch is adamant that all modes of thought are ideological in that they represent group interests, and consequently 'symbolic models of reality are inherent in all sections of society as the ultimate foundation of social structure and order...Social order is not simply a matter of political, economic, and institutional arrangements; it also involves sets of symbolic models of order which define and control behavior' (Kinloch 1981:15).

Kinloch stresses the fact that the creation of ideologies is a consequence of individual or group needs: '...ideology represents the manner in which human beings meet their needs in the context of society through symbolic models of reality which legitimate individual and group interests through reductive abstractions' (Kinloch 1981:16). It would appear that Kinloch's concept of 'reductive abstractions' (the reduction of reality to simplistic concepts) refers to explanations of the social order relating to the natural (pecking order, homeostasis), historical, ideational, metaphysical (theological) or scientific. Furthermore, he considers such 'reductive abstractions' to be the basis of symbolic models of reality that legitimate individual and group interests (Kinloch 1981:19).

I have some difficulty in following Kinloch's arguments on the distinction between ideologies, reductive abstractions, and symbolic models of reality – I therefore use such tentative terms as 'would appear' and 'seem'. It has become clear, though, that there is a definite distinction between 'ideology' and 'reductive abstraction', the first being based on the last. 'Reductive abstractions', on the other hand, described as 'representing the foundation of symbolic models of reality' (Kinloch 1981:18-19), correspond more or less to the concept of 'symbolic universe'. If this interpretation is correct, Kinloch is in agreement with Berger & Luckmann and with Petersen in so far as 'ideology' can be regarded as expressing symbolic values, or as contained in reflective knowledge about symbolic models of reality.

Now – can the symbolic universe be treated as an ideology? Berger & Luckmann (1967:123) give the following description of 'ideology' which I find to be very clear: 'When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete power interest, it may be called an ideology', and they elaborate: 'The distinctiveness of ideology is...that the *same* overall universe is interpreted in different ways,

depending upon concrete vested interests within the society in question' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:124). Therefore, although one might regard symbolic universes as ideological in nature to the extent that they serve to answer certain needs in society (cf discussion on Kinloch above), and because they comprise knowledge which in itself is ideological, the matter of the ideological nature of symbolic universes will not feature prominently in the study, because I consider the different ideological viewpoints expressed in the Gospel of Luke as different *internal* conceptions of the symbolic universe, and not as an *external* threat to the (then) current symbolic universe by a deviant version of reality (cf p 95 above).

3.2.2.4 *Ideology:* Concluding comments

The ultimate purpose of the discussion on *ideology* is to vindicate the scientific discipline of *theology*. This has become necessary, because theology tends to lose its autonomy as science when brought into a cross-disciplinary relationship with the other human sciences that involve the pragmatic application of abstract values and norms.

The important question is: wherein lies the autonomy of theology? To amend this question in the light of the stated primacy of the text in this work: How does the New Testament retain its autonomy as theological expression when it is being read social-scientifically? According to Gottwald (1979:667) it boils down to exploring the relation between *biblical-sociological method* and *biblical-theological method* in order to obtain a 'social hermeneutic of the Bible that will be both scientifically and religiously cogent'. Gottwald – whom I find thoroughly deterministic – argues that we are heirs of the Cartesian-Kantian and Hegelian-Marxian break-ups of the metaphysical and epistemological harmony and union of perception (1979:704). This fact results in our not being able to fully grasp the fact that religious symbolism occurs within social and intellectual conditions, which makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to understand such inherited religious symbols (cf Gottwald 1979:705). For Gottwald 'the only way out of the impasse is to fix our attention on the relation between the persisting theological game patterns and the social conditions in which they are played from age to age, including our own social contexts' (1979:703). Gottwald regards religion as the function of social relations rooted in cultural-material conditions of life (1979:701). This leads him to the deterministic assertion that the concept of 'God' (or Yahweh) in Israel was a *transcending image* that stood in service of the praxis and ideology of intertribal egalitarianism – the really unique feature of Israel (cf Gottwald 1979:700). Gottwald sums up the relation of biblical theology and biblical sociology as follows:

> ...the most important contribution of a sociological ana-
> lysis of early Israel to contemporary religious thought
> and practice is to close the door firmly and irrevocably
> on the idealist and supernaturalistic illusions still per-
> meating and bedeviling our religious outlook.
>
> (Gottwald 1979:773)

With the terms *idealist* and *supernaturalistic illusions* he refers to the transcendent reality that people project in the future: 'Symbol systems that blur the intersection of social process and human freedom – by talking fuzzy nonsense, by isolating us in our private souls, by positing "unseen" worlds to compensate for the actual world we fear to see... – all such symbol systems, however venerable and psychically convenient, are bad dreams to be awakened from, cloying relics to be cast away, cruel fetters to be struck off' (Gottwald 1979:708).

With this functional analysis, Gottwald seems to have completely gone the Marxist way, regarding religion as instrumental, although this time not for false consciousness but for 'human freedom', consisting in 'meeting our genuine human needs and actualizing our repressed human potentialities' (Gottwald 1979:708). My assessment of Gottwald's argument is that by dissolving the metaphysical and the transcendent reality into the sociohistorical experiences of man he negates precisely that which he so fervently wishes for: the attainment of human freedom.

The answer to the matter of the autonomy of theology, it would seem, lies in the approach towards a (biblical) literary work as expressive of a certain kind of knowledge about a certain kind of reality that is to be distinguished from the 'everyday' reality consisting of personal interaction within social institutions within a social system (cf section 3.2.2.3 above).

The proper question from a social-scientific perspective would therefore concern the cause of the emphasis on Luke's part – *why* was this theme taken up by the author? The answer to this question will embody the intended goal of the current study, and will therefore be stated in the form of a thesis or proposal. To give credence to the argument about the relationship between literature and society (cf 1.1-1.1.1.5 above), the thesis will first be formulated in terms of the literary aspect of the research object, namely the Gospel as narrative world, and from this description certain proposals will be made as to the communicative purpose of the narrative within the author's real world.

If the above thesis is borne out by the evidence, some interesting inferences as to the Lucan community, the ideology (theology) of the author and even the time of writing might be made.

The method by which this study will seek to validate the thesis stated above, should be appropriate (a) to the *object* being studied, namely a *literary text of narrative nature*, and (b) to the *subject* being studied, namely *the symbolic universe that served as implicit motivation for the construction of the text, and the text itself as a mechanism for the maintenance of that symbolic universe by recommending to its readers a network of norms and values and the proper mental attitude and conduct associated with those values* (= the ideology of the text, cf Malina 1986a:179). This will entail defining and explicating the appropriate and relevant theoretical concepts from the field of literary theory, as well as from the social-scientific field. The only important prerequisite for the building of such a theoretical structure is rather obvious, namely that the different concepts from the different fields of study should not contradict one another. The theory, of course, needs to be applied, and therefore an interpretive model that takes account of the salient variables that could influence the outcome must be constructed.

In the rest of this chapter some issues pertaining to general science theory will be dealt with first. Then the attention shifts to the field of literary theory, and finally to the social sciences. In the next chapter an interpretive model will be constructed that takes account of the analytical requirements from these fields.

3.3 Theoretical issues: science theory
In this section we shall first explore the endeavours denoted by the terms *construction* and *reconstruction*, and then we shall attend to the question of whether the use of the social sciences in theology signifies a *paradigm shift* from the analytic to a holistic approach in the sciences in general.

3.3.1 Construction or reconstruction?
The ideal, surely, is to *reconstruct* the socio-historical setting within which a text had its origin. To reconstruct is to describe 'wie es eigentlich gewesen ist', in order to get to know what forces and/or interests gave rise to or had an effect on the composition of the text. However, we are temporally, spatially, historically, culturally and conceptually removed and different from both the contextual history and the referential history (cf 1.1; 1.1.2) of the text. Thus we do not know all the pertinent facts, and are probably ignorant of some important factors that may have influenced the formation of the text. Because much of the information we need is forever lost, there is no way in which we could ever attain the ideal of total reconstruction.

Apart from that there is also the philosophical and logical question of whether it is at all possible to even contemplate something like reconstruction. In order to answer this question, one must be clear about the following:

If we do want to reconstruct the socio-historical background of a text, what would we be reconstructing? Would it be a replica of that reality?

From the evidence provided by archaeological artefacts and/or literary and graphic description, one might be able to reconstruct the structure of an ancient building, or the means and methods of warfare of an ancient people. This would amount to a *social description* of those subjects. However, we would still not know what the offensive or defensive strategies would be on the battlefield in actual combat. One would have to be cognisant of all the possible choices in order to attain a responsible reconstruction. Even then it could only be an approximate reconstruction because the affective and intuitive possibilities are unknown, and perhaps unknowable. In other words, any such reconstruction, even in the case of social description, could of necessity only be a partial one. A total reconstruction, in the sense of an exact replica, is just an elusive ideal.[20]

It is interesting to note that Dibelius [1929] (quoted by Hahn 1985:26) had, even at that early stage, formulated some definitive standpoint on the matter of *construction* versus *reconstruction*:

> Eine 'Paläontologie der Evangelien' kann also nur auf
> dem Wege der *Konstruktion* geschaffen werden. Dessen
> ist sich die Forschung seit langem bewusst.

My own thoughts on this issue have been strongly influenced by what I found in Dibelius. As seen in the quotation above, he differentiates between the terms 'reconstruction' and 'construction', but at the same time he uses the terms practically as synonyms. This can be clearly seen when his references to the issue, all within an argument in defence of his standpoint, are isolated and strung together:

> Es kam mir darauf an, die Bedingungen zu rekonstru-
> ieren, unter denen sich jene ersten unbeabsichtigten
> Formungen des evangelischen Stoffes vollzogen haben
> ...An dieser Konstruktion ist vor allem der Begriff der
> Predigt kritisiert worden...Man vergisst dabei, dass es
> sich um eine Konstruktion handelt....
>
> (Dibelius [1929] in Hahn 1985:27)

It seems that to the mind of Dibelius *construction* and *reconstruction* are not mutually exclusive terms. Indeed, Dibelius seems to say that the criticism levelled against him would only be valid if the *Sitz* he proposed were a total reconstruction, a replica of the original setting. That was not his pretension. His proposal was a *construction*, that is, not quite a reconstruction. *Construction* in the argument of Dibelius seems

therefore to consist of a *partial reconstruction* combined with some careful, informed construction that completes the picture.

The evidence provided by a narrative text, furthermore, is not the same as archaeological evidence, artefacts or literary description. Narrative is to be seen as a commentary of sorts on (some aspect[s] of) society (see, however, 2.4 below), and commentary is never unbiased. It presupposes a specific value-order on the part of the author, which he/she may or may not share with others. Because of this idiosyncratic order of norms and values, the author (as commentator) looks at reality from a certain angle, selects certain aspects of it, combines them in a new order, and presents his interpretation as a description of reality (cf the discussion of Roman Jakobson in Petersen 1978:38-40, 45-48). A narrative, therefore, is a commentary on reality, based on the author's interpretation of (some aspect[s] of) society .

A reconstruction of reality or society, based on the narrative, would in fact be the reconstruction of an author's interpretation of reality.

This means that the job at hand is a dissecting one, cutting through the layers of 'interpretational tissue', assessing each in its own right as to ideological bias, until one arrives as close as possible to the realia which were interpreted. This statement, suggesting methodological direction, does *not* imply a movement *a minori ad maiorem*, as a value-judgment. After all, it would seem that the greater impact on our own present-day society was not effected by the society commented upon in the New Testament, but indeed by the commentary itself. The statement does suggest that, by following this method, we might be able to better understand both the commentary *and* the society/reality commented upon.

3.3.2 Social sciences in theology: A paradigm shift?

Lately, biblical scholars have begun to express misgivings about the ability of the historical-critical method to open up untrodden paths in biblical studies (cf Edwards 1983:431; Best 1983:181; Scroggs 1980:165, referring to Theissen). Indeed, mention is made of a paradigm shift in the offing, away from historical criticism to a more 'holistic' approach (cf Martin 1987:370-385). In their contributions to a recent work W S Vorster and A G van Aarde have given excellent treatment to the issue of paradigms as present and directionally functional within scientific endeavour. Referring to Kuhn's definition of 'paradigm' as a 'disciplinary matrix' which constitutes the framework within which solutions are sought for acknowledged problems, Vorster (1988b:31; see also Martin 1987:370-373, 381), states: 'The point I wish to make is that New Testament scholarship is heading for a new paradigm, that is towards a post-critical science.'[21]

He reaches this conclusion after comparing the present-day situation within New Testament scholarship to Kuhn's notion of 'normal science':

> *Normal science*, that is when there is a generally accepted para-
> digm, is normally preceded by a *pre-paradigmatic* period. This is
> when different explanations are offered for one and the same
> problem, and different convictions are held because of different
> views and theories about the same thing. Normal science is cha-
> racterized by agreement among scholars in the same discipline
> and about standards of solutions for problems. The methods
> and ways in which problems are solved are certain. Members of
> the scientific community share common beliefs, they have a
> similar world view and use the same concepts in explaining pro-
> blems they investigate.
>
> (Vorster 1988b:33)

Obviously, for Vorster New Testament scholarship is not in a state of 'normal science' today. This is indicated by changed views about what a text is and how it means (cf Vorster 1988b:36-40, especially p 39), and by constructing possible social contexts within which the different texts could have originated. Vorster (1988b:41) emphasizes that such social construction is

> ...totally different from constructions based on the so-
> called historico-critical paradigm...Social construction as
> a means of historical study of early Christianity is not an
> attempt to reconstruct. It is an attempt to construct
> possible social relationships of meaning.

The lack of 'normal science' would therefore indicate a crisis or 'revolution' (Vorster 1988b:33) within the accepted paradigm, which places us in a pre-paradigmatic phase (Vorster 1988b:45), or rather in the transitional phase between the replacement of one paradigm by another.

Both Elliott (1986:8, note 15) and Van Aarde (1988a:59) disagree with Vorster (and Martin) – they would prefer to see the vitality of this new direction as a supplementation and improvement/restoration of the current paradigm.

Kuhn's definition of 'normal science', quoted with affirmation by Vorster above, seems to rest on a basically *functionalist* (cf 3.5.1 below) view of society, where everything is seen to be in a state of equilibrium that tends to persist, and all the parts function to keep it that way (cf Malina 1981:19; see Turner 1982:19-114 for a more elaborate discussion). This view is sometimes called the 'consensus model'

(Tidball 1983:28) to indicate the harmonious integration of the system effected 'by consensus on meanings, values, and norms' (Malina 1981:19). According to this view, an upsurge in differences of opinion between scholars in the same disciplines would indeed signify a transitional phase towards a changed way of thinking and a different world-view.

However, there are also other perspectives on the functioning of society.[22] One such is *conflict theory*, which considers disagreement, conflict and force, as well as cooperation and consensus, the *normal* state, while 'absence of conflict would be surprising and abnormal' (Malina 1981:20). Without an analysis of all that conflict theory presents (cf sections 3.5.2-3.5.2.2 below; see Turner 1982:117-196 for a full discussion), at least it is clear that the notion of a paradigm shift, as articulated by Vorster above, is associated with a specific interpretation of the composition and functioning of society. Vorster's arguments in favour of a paradigm shift can be contested on the basis of the existence of other perspectives on the functioning of society.

Furthermore, Vorster's argument – that the social-scientific research on early Christianity differs from the 'historico-critical paradigm' in that it is not an attempt at *reconstruction*, but at a *construction* of 'possible social relationships of meaning', and therefore supports the idea of a change in paradigms – is inappropriate. The distinction that is made between the two terms is meant to suggest a different epistemological assumption whereby 'construction' would refer to a new, more creative understanding of the way in which texts 'mean', and *what* they mean (cf Vorster 1988b:36-44; see Van Aarde 1988b:3, 7-8 for a similar denotation; see 1.2.2 above for my own approach). However, my own view on the matter is that any such 'construction' would inevitably presuppose a measure of *reconstruction* if it wishes to retain some credibility concerning its integrity as a trustworthy, normative piece of literary communication (cf the discussion in 3.3.1 above).[23] Social-scientific study of early Christianity does not differ from the traditional historical-critical means of historical study because the former is *construction* while the latter is an attempt at *reconstruction*. A social-scientific approach differs rather to the extent that it introduces theoretical concepts and methodological procedures that are new and strange and even threatening to the traditional 'theological' way of thinking. The strangeness of these concepts and methods does *not* signify a transition to a new scientific paradigm. It signifies, rather, the fact that social scientific disciplines came into being within the same scientific paradigm as historical criticism, but had a different field of interest and, to a certain extent, developed their own distinctive epistemology and methods. To be sure, the social sciences differ substantially from historical criticism, both in their operational procedures and in what they aim to accomplish.

Elliott (1984) compiled the following table of general points of comparison between the social sciences and history:

		Social Sciences		History
General	a.	Social	a.	Personal
	b.	Collective	b.	Individual
	c.	Commonalities	c.	Peculiarities
	d.	Generalities	d.	Specificities
	e.	Ordinary, usual	e.	Extraordinary, unusual
	f.	Patterns of relationship	f.	Independent properties of parts
	g.	Systems	g.	Component parts
	h.	Synchronic structures and process	h.	Diachronic movement and change
	i.	Embeddedness	i.	Distinctiveness, independence
	j.	Explicit abstract conceptual models and theory	j.	Implicit models and theory, focus upon concrete
	k.	Regularities, recurrences, repetitions, typicalities	k.	Irregularities, rarities
	l.	Interconnections, interstices	l.	Independent features
Method	m.	Comparative (cross-cultural, cross-class, cross-strata)	m.	Singular focus on one society, culture, period
	n.	Sensitivity to etic/ emic distinctions	n.	Hazy distinction and tendency to prefer emic reports devoid of etic interpretive theory
	o.	Explication and justification of research design	o.	Intuitive procedures favored by the guild

This recognition and acknowledgement of the differences between the two kinds of discipline allows for the cross-disciplinary use by biblical scholars of theoretical and methodological concepts from the social sciences for the purpose of a better understanding of the texts. Such better understanding was always the purpose of the historical-critical approach to the study of the Bible. Therefore, while a social-scientific study of the Bible can be conducted for its own sake, it also 'complements and improves the prevailing method of biblical interpretation...' (Elliott 1981:1).

There is a remarkable correspondence between the notion of 'paradigm' expressed here, the concept of 'symbolic universe' within the sociology of knowledge (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967:92-104; see 3.2.2.3 above), and the philosophical concept of 'world-view'. All three these terms, in fact, denote the imposition of some type of causal structure on the institutions and events of this world in order to make sense of it. No human being can function properly without such sense-making.

3.4 Theoretical issues: literary theory

> (O)ur major sources for the social reconstruction of early Christianity are literary. We may expect to gain insight elsewhere – for example, from archaeological data and modern social theory; but eventually we are driven back to literary sources...(S)ociological study of early Christianity therefore cannot slight literary criticism. We must persist in seeking to determine the character and intention of different types of literature if we hope to discern how they functioned in relation to the communities with which they were associated...What is called for is greater appreciation for the different types of literature with which we are concerned.
>
> (Malherbe 1977:15-16)

In support of the view expressed above, it has repeatedly been emphasized (cf 1.1; 1.1.2; 2.4) that our main source of information for proving the hypothesis of this study is a *literary* one, and should be honoured as such. This implies that our study will be conducted in accordance with the principles formulated in the discipline of literary theory relevant to the genre we wish to study. Those principles and the methodological procedures of their application are indeed seminal in that they have to be integrated with social-scientific concepts to become the operational strategy of this work. However, given the fact that the relevant concepts from literary criticism have been thoroughly investigated, catalogued and described (cf inter alia Wellek &

Warren 1963; Chatman 1978; Petersen 1978; Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn 1981, Van Aarde 1982a, 1990b), and forged into models with which to interpret literary works, we shall not repeat that process. It will suffice to have a short general discussion on the importance of genre, and to indicate which literary concepts specifically we shall make use of.

3.4.1 General

First of all then, the macrotext (in this case the Gospel of Luke) must be categorized according to literary *type* or *genre* – as argumentation, exposition, narrative, apocalypse, et cetera. (Vorster 1981, 1984; Du Toit 1980:1-3; Van Luxemburg, Bal & Weststeijn 1981:153-163; Van Aarde [1982b]:58, 1990b:1). This is important, because the genre would indicate what methodological approach to use in the literary analysis of the work. The premise is that in the New Testament the genre of the Gospels, among others, is that of *narrative* (Du Toit 1980:2; Van Aarde [1982b]:58; Vorster 1988a:168). Van Aarde (1990b:1) defines narrative as:

> ...a discourse in which language is organized in terms of
> characters who move in a particular structure of time
> and space, and which entails a chronological sequence
> of episodes with a causal relationship to one another (a
> plot).

It follows therefore that narratives should be studied by means of an appropriate form of literary criticism, known as *narrative criticism* (Moore 1987:30)[24] or *narratology* (Van Aarde 1990b:1) – that is, the science that focuses on narrative discourses.

While the genre of a text is regarded as very important, it is also recognized that it does not constitute part of the intrinsic meaning of a text. Genre rather originates as cultural media, products of the surrounding society (Du Plooy 1986:6). This means that 'extrinsic relationships can be regarded as the sine qua non for both defining genre and determining its function as far as readers are concerned' (Du Plooy 1986:7). The question of genre could therefore be significant in respect of a social-scientific analysis of a text. It has been suggested, for instance, that the genre of *narrative* might represent the need of humans to impose order on society – a need which they cannot satisfy successfully in real life, but for which they can find a substitute in the creation of a narrative.

3.4.2 Narrative theory

In order to integrate concepts from the literary-critical and social-scientific fields successfully for the purpose of analysis, we need to familiarize ourselves with those aspects of literary criticism – narrative criticism in this case – that may serve as key elements for the conceptual integration of the salient elements from both disciplines into an interpretive model. Among the familiar elements of narrative like *plot* (the sequential course of events – cf Petersen 1978:33-48; Van Aarde 1990b:1-2), *point of view* (the manner of presentation – Van Aarde 1990b:2-4), *narrated time* as *story time* (Van Aarde [1990b]:15-16), et cetera, there are four that are especially significant when conducting a social-scientific study on narrative material. These are the concepts of characterization, narrative world, ideology and the so-called transparency theory:

- Narrative world as analytical category distinguished from the actual world of the author has been adequately discussed (cf chapter 2, section 2.4.6 above). What is important about the concept is that it provides, on the macro-level, the point of contact between the literary and the social perspectives of this study. 'Narrative world' namely corresponds to the concept of 'social system', in that it provides the researcher with an imaginary social world which he can study with social-scientific techniques.

- Characterization as an aspect of narratology is important for the same reason – it provides the point of contact on the micro-level between literary and social-scientific approaches (status and roles) (cf Van Aarde 1990b:18-20; [1982b]:66ff).

- The ideology/theology of the narrator is arguably the most important aspect in such a study. Information on that score provides us with clues to the society of the author.

- The transparency theory is a very important methodological concept in the interpretation of ancient texts. It refers to the fact that a historical narrative simultaneously refers to two worlds – it concerns people and things from an earlier time while the later period in which the narrative arose and communicated is transparent in the text (Van Aarde 1990b:8).

> In the gospels the world of Jesus, the disciples and the others is generally the most transparent. Nevertheless, the world of the early church is more transparent in certain places. The one world is never manifested totally isolated from the other. The world of the early church and that of Jesus and the disciples are, in a dialectical sense, simultaneously taken up in the gospel as a narra-

tive record. These two worlds are presented in accordance with the narrator's ideological/theological perspective.

<div align="right">(Van Aarde 1990b:8-9)</div>

3.5 Theoretical issues: social science theory

Even the name given to the exegetical subdiscipline devoted to this branch of exegesis – Sociology of the New Testament – is a misnomer, since it promotes terminological confusion by using as umbrella term a word that has become associated with a specific discipline in the field of the social sciences, namely sociology. This exegetical subdiscipline does not make use of sociology alone, but of other disciplines in the field of the social sciences as well, namely anthropology and psychology (cf Bain & Kolb 1964:678 for a discussion of psychology and anthropology contending with sociology for the position of the 'basic generic social science').

In order, therefore, for any terminological confusion to be cleared up, the following standardised terms are used:

- As an umbrella term denoting the branch of exegesis availing itself of what the social sciences have to offer, the term *social scientific study of the New Testament* is used.
- Specific social science disciplines that are presently used are sociology, anthropology and psychology.

Schematically it can be shown as follows:

Fig 2 Social sciences

<div align="center">Social-scientific study of the New Testament</div>

Sociology	Anthropology	Psychology

Each of these disciplines can be shown to have its own relevant substructure again:

Fig 3 Sociology

Sociology
of

| Literature | Knowledge | Religion | Communication | (...) | (...) |

The discipline of sociology proper is a relatively recent development, compared to some of the older sciences. According to Steyn & Van Rensburg (1985:1; see also Cilliers & Joubert 1966:5; Brown 1979:15-16) the term 'sociology' was first used by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in 1839. Apart from Comte, four other great scholars are named whose work had a decided influence on the development of modern sociology during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, namely Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Karl Marx (1818-1884), Emile Durkheim (1857-1917) and Max Weber (1864-1920) (cf Cilliers & Joubert 1966:5; see Sorokin 1928 for a wide-ranging discussion of the different approaches and their exponents within the field of sociology). In the 150 years since the discipline of sociology received its current name, the sociological tree has sprouted many branches, each of them concentrating on some aspect of human society – culture, economics, politics, religion and lite rature, to name but a few. Underlying all of these specializations, however, a common basic theme remains: sociology is the study of society, or of systems of human interaction (cf Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:1; see also chapter 2, section 2.1).

Fig 4 Anthropology

Anthropology

| Social Anthropology (Own group) | Physical Anthropology | Cultural Anthropology (Alien group) |

According to Malina (1983:128-129; cf also Homans 1951:192-193; Cilliers & Joubert 1966:16) 'sociology' applies to the study of the *own* group, and 'anthropology' to the study of an *alien* group. *Anthropology* can be further defined as 'social anthropology if it deals with the social structures of alien groups, cultural anthropology if it deals with their values and meanings' (Malina 1983:129; see also 1983:133, note 25, for further bibliographic references on this distinction; cf also Mandelbaum 1968:

313-319 and Firth 1968:320-324 for concise discussions of cultural and social anthropology respectively). According to Greenberg (1968:306) the separation of cultural and social anthropology is really a distinction between two different approaches to what is basically the same objective phenomenon of group behaviour.

Fig 5 Psychology

Psychology

| Social | Industrial | Clinical |
| Psychology | Psychology | Psychology |

Psychology is the scientific study of the thought processes and behaviour of individuals (cf Cilliers & Joubert 1966:15). The bridge between sociology and psychology is formed by the approach called *social psychology*, defined as 'the overlapping portions of psychology and sociology which are particularly concerned with describing and explaining how selves are modified through interaction with others and how their reciprocating behaviour is directed accordingly' (Foote 1964:663). A further distinction can be made between *psychologically oriented* social psychology, encompassing three main theoretical approaches (the psychoanalytic, behaviourist and gestaltist), and *sociologically oriented* social psychology, whose representatives are known as symbolic-interactionists because of the emphasis 'upon social interaction and communication as the matrix from which human selves arise' (Foote 1964:664).

In like manner, a tree structure can be completed for the whole of the social scientific study of the New Testament and all its parts. The 'social' and 'sociological' approaches would include the *descriptive approach* and the *explanatory approach* (cf Best 1983:185-186), both contained within the boundaries of the discipline of sociology as two different operational approaches/phases of analysis.

Before proceeding to the matter of choosing a specific approach and constructing a model for this investigation, it should prove beneficial to provide a description and evaluation of the different theoretical approaches or perspectives within the social sciences.

3.5.1 *Functionalism* or the *structural functionalist* approach
'Functionalism' as a theoretical approach tends to treat societies as having characteristics similar to those of organisms (Cohen 1968:34; Brown 1979:17; Gottwald 1979:238, 622; Turner 1982:19-25; Pilch 1988:31; Strauss 1988:165-176), and it emphasizes the 'systemic' properties of social wholes (Cohen 1968:14; Strauss 1988:

145-152, 160-162). The reason for such analogies is suggested by Brown (1979:17) to be the highly abstract nature of sociological theory. This factor resulted in explanations that used references to other, more concrete or known phenomena, in order to understand the mechanisms of society. This organic analogy was first proposed by the Frenchman Auguste Comte (1798-1857), and then taken up and added to by a British sociologist, Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) (cf Cohen 1968:34-35; Brown 1979:18; Turner 1982:20-25; Pilch 1988:31). It was subsequently adopted and refined in anthropology by persons such as A R Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) (cf Cohen 1968:37; Brown 1979:19-21; Turner 1982:28-31; Pilch 1988:31) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) (cf Cohen 1968:37; Turner 1982:31-33; Pilch 1988:31). In the French sociological tradition it was especially Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) who acted as the inheritor and supporter of Comte's organicism, which he brilliantly expounded upon (Cohen 1968:35-37; Brown 1979:24-34; Turner 1982:25-28), while in America this concept is connected to the name of Talcott Parsons (Cohen 1968:45-46; Brown 1979:23, 36-43; Turner 1982:38-59). Three main processes relating to the existence of living organisms are used to explain how society functions – *growth*, *structure*, and *equilibrium* (Brown 1979:17).

Growth as analogy is combined with Darwinism to produce the concept of *development* – both organisms and species develop by evolution from basic, simple entities to increasingly complex structures. What is involved is an increase in *size*, the development of a *definite shape*, increased *specialization* of the different parts, and finally, loss of function and even replacement of the individual parts, while the organism lives on. Societies seem to go through these same processes (Brown 1979:17-19). Herbert Spencer is credited with the analogy of growth[25] (Brown 1979:18; Turner 1982:22), but he also introduced another concept from biological terminology into sociology, namely the concept of functional 'needs' (Turner 1982:23). According to Turner (1982:24) this concept was to become extremely problematic for the functional perspective, 'since it could be taken to imply that events are caused by the social needs they meet', and that would amount to illegitimate teleology.

The organic analogy is also used to compare the *structure* of an organism with a society. Related to the previously discussed analogy, it nevertheless differs to the extent that it ignores the growth element and concentrates on the *social structure*. The British anthropologist Radcliffe-Brown is regarded as the classic exponent of this version of organic analogy, and he and his pupils referred to themselves as *structuralists* rather than *functionalists* (Cohen 1968:42; Brown 1979:19). Radcliffe-Brown based his *structural analysis* on the following assumptions:

> (i) If a society is to survive, there must be some minimal
> solidarity between its members; the function of social

> phenomena is either to create or sustain this solidarity
> of social groups, or, in turn, to support those institutions
> which do this. (ii) Thus, there must be a minimal con-
> sistency in the relationship between the parts of a social
> system. (iii) Each society, or type of society, exhibits
> certain basic structural features, and various practices
> can be shown to relate to these in such a way as to con-
> tribute to their maintenance.
>
> (Cohen 1968:42; cf also Turner 1982:29)

Radcliffe-Brown therefore understood society as an autonomous reality, and main-
tained that for this reason cultural items such as kinship rules or religious rituals
were explicable in terms of social structure – particularly its needs for solidarity and
integration (Turner 1982:29).

Finally, the term *homeostasis* serves to express a third aspect of the organic ana-
logy. Brown (1979:21) discloses that the term was first used in 1932 by an American
biologist called Walter Cannon, in a book entitled *The wisdom of the body*. With
this concept Cannon tried to describe the phenomenon by which the body maintains
an equilibrium between internal and external states, namely temperature regulation
through shivering and sweating (cf Brown 1979:21). *Homeostasis* would therefore
indicate the *automatic regulation to maintain a steady state* (cf Brown 1979:23; Tur-
ner 1982:24). According to Brown (1979:21) Cannon himself suggested that the or-
ganic concept of *homeostasis* be applied to societies as well, because a societal sys-
tem operates much like an organismic system, and is subject to defects as well. Any
departure from some notional state of equilibrium in a society would set in motion
homeostatic mechanisms which would return society to 'normal' functioning (Brown
1979:23).

Turner (1982:24) indicates that the conception of society as an organism intro-
duced three assumptions that typify sociological functionalism:

- Social reality is visualized as a *system*.
- The processes of a system can only be understood in terms of the *interrela-
  tedness* of its parts.
- A system, like an organism, is *bounded*, with certain processes operating to
  maintain both its integrity and its boundaries.

According to Turner functional theorizing in its most *extreme* form includes the fol-
lowing conceptions or assumptions:

1) Society as a bounded system is self-regulating, tending towards homeostasis and equilibrium.

2) As a self-maintaining system, similar to an organism, society perhaps has certain basic needs or requisites which must be met if survival is to ensue, if homeostasis is to be preserved, or if equilibrium is to be maintained.

3) Sociological analysis of a self-maintaining system with needs and requisites should therefore focus on the function of parts in meeting system needs and hence maintaining equilibrium and homeostasis.

4) In systems with needs, it is probable that certain types of structures *must* exist to ensure survival/homeostasis/equilibrium.

(Turner 1982:24)

These assumptions have been the cause of much debate regarding functionalism for nearly a century, with the following questions being asked:

Organisms do display homeostatic tendencies, but do societies? Organisms might reveal stable sets of survival requisites or needs, but do societies? Organisms may display interrelated parts that must exist to meet system needs, but is this a viable assumption for societies.

(Turner 1982:24)

In summary: functionalism as a methodological concept for the analysis of a society proceeds from the theoretical assumption that the normal and desired condition of a group or society is to be in equilibrium, because the collective parts of society can function effectively and properly in such a state. Theissen, as we have indicated (cf 2.5.1 above), uses this concept to analyse the text in terms of (a) *roles*, investigating typical patterns of behaviour, (b) *factors*, investigating the way in which this behaviour is determined by society, and (c) *function*, investigating the effect of a group on society.

3.5.1.1 Evaluating the functionalist perspective
Criticism of functionalism has been mainly of three kinds: logical, substantive and ideological (Cohen 1968:47; cf also Turner 1982:102).

The main *logical* arguments against functionalism are the following:

(a)   It encourages teleological explanation (cf Cohen 1968:47-51; Turner 1982: 102-108). This refers to an explanation that treats an effect as a cause, that is, showing that religion exists to undergird the moral foundations of society, whereby the consequence 'moral order' is used to explain the existence of religion (Cohen 1968:47; see also Turner 1982:26). Turner (1982:102) defines illegitimate teleologies as follows: 'Illegitimate teleologies exist when statements do not *document the causal sequences or mechanisms whereby end states (goals) set into motion the creation and/or operation of the structures and processes that are involved in their realization.*'

(b)   A functionalist hypothesis is really untestable. That is, statements cannot be deduced from it that, if disproved, would lead one to reject or modify that hypothesis (cf Cohen 1968:51).

(c)   The approach inhibits comparison and generalization. If a social or cultural element is to be examined within the totality of a society, it must be treated as unique, for the totality of one society is never the same as another (Cohen 1968:53).

The main *substantive* criticism of functionalism refers to the fact that it overemphasizes the normative element in social life; it minimises the importance of social conflict at the expense of social consensus; it stresses the harmonious nature of social systems; and it fails to account for non-adaptive social change and even treats it as abnormal. It is therefore said that functionalism reflects an ideologically conservative bias, tending to suggest that the existing system is the desirable one and should persist (cf Cohen 1968:58; Brown 1979:47; Turner 1982:109). However, Turner (1982:110-111) does not accept the validity of this point of criticism without qualification.[26] He states:

> It should be emphasized that many of the critics of functional analysis have assumed that the concepts of 'equilibrium' and 'homeostasis' *necessarily* connote a vision of the social world as unchanging and static. This interpretation is incorrect, for notions of equilibrium can also provide an analytical reference point for observing instances of change and disequilibrium. Thus, there is no logical reason for assuming that the concept of equilibrium allows only a static image of the social world.
>
> (Turner 1982:25, note 8)

Gottwald (1979:622) is basically in agreement with Turner on this point:

> The provisional strength of the functional model of so-
> cietal unity-amid-diversity is that it astutely circumvents
> premature or dataless speculation about cause or effect
> in social process. It does this by a methodological sus-
> pension of the diachronic and genetic plane, or at least
> by a rigorous subordination of the diachronic/genetic
> concern to the synchronic/ metabolic concern. How-
> ever, 'suspension' or 'subordination' is not 'annulment'
> or 'annihilation'. Functionalism on its own grounds
> gives rise to precisely those issues of processual deve-
> lopment which it initially suspends, i.e., to questions
> about the origins of a system..., about change within a
> system..., and about the impact of systems one upon
> another....

He recognizes, though, that the functional orientation is deficient at least in the scope it affords to diachronic change: 'The limited diachronic span in a functional model does not, however, provide a wide enough horison to examine change factors satisfactorily, i.e., with sufficient controls' (Gottwald 1979:623). It is inclined to be *ahistorical*, emphasizing part-to-whole causal relations and how part and whole mu-tually affect variation in each other (Turner 1982:110).

Finally, a major criticism of functionalism is that it does not provide an explana-tion of its *own* assumptions, that is, *why* functional interrelationships exist in social life, and why the degree of interdependence in societies or sectors of societies varies (Cohen 1968:66).

In conclusion, a few comments should summarise the critique on the functiona-list perspective in the social sciences.

Cohen (1968:64) is of the opinion that much of the criticism against functiona-lism is just, and maintains that 'theories which seek to explain the existence of social phenomena in terms of the contribution which they make to the preservation of a larger "whole" *are* quite unacceptable'. His argument is based on the fact that func-tionalism creates models which abstract certain features from 'the recurrent ongoing flow of social reality and presenting these *as though* they constituted totalities. But such totalities – or "boundary maintaining systems" – are not the totality of any real social phenomena; they are constructed totalities only' (Cohen 1968:65). He there-fore maintains that functionalism not only cannot explain social change, but that it cannot even satisfactorily explain social persistence (Cohen 1968:65).

Contrary to the negative assessment by Cohen, Turner grants a much more useful role to functionalism. He concedes that functionalism has rather severe logical problems of teleology and tautology (Turner 1982:112), but thinks that some of these logical traps can be avoided by focusing on causal relations between parts and wholes, and abandoning notions of functions and hypothetical states of integration and equilibrium (Turner 1982:112-113). Another shortcoming of functionalism is its inability to properly analyse history or non-orderly change (cf Turner 1982:113). To remedy this, functionalism will have to develop additional concepts that can explain the more revolutionary forms of change. A last but significant point is that some social systems seem to be conducive to functional analysis, while some do not. The interpreter will have to decide which perspective would best suit the analysis of a specific society.

3.5.2 Conflict theory or coercion theory

The conflict perspective is not new. It derives its existence from the works of two sociologists-cum-philosophers, namely Karl Marx and Georg Simmel (Turner 1982: 118). Marx had a practical or pragmatic goal in pursuing the theory of conflict – he wished to change society in such a way as to eliminate capitalism. He realized that there were abstract laws operative in society according to which the world was organized into patterns, but he viewed those laws as different 'sets' applicable only to a certain historical period, namely the period of feudal or capitalist society (Turner 1982:119).

Simmel, on the other hand, had more of an academic and scholastic interest – he wished to reflect upon and understand social life. In contrast to Marx he did not wish to uncover the 'set' of abstract laws that was linked to a specific time slot. He rather sought to discover *universal laws* which transcended space and time (cf Turner 1982:119).

Both Simmel and Marx emphasized the pervasiveness and inevitability of conflict within social systems. They differed substantially, though, regarding their assumptions about the nature of society. Referring to an article by the sociologist Pierre van den Berghe (1963), Turner (1982:121, note 8) directs attention to the fact that 'the ontological differences between Marx and Simmel have inspired vastly different theoretical perspectives in contemporary sociology'. Simmel saw conflict as the *cause* of various outcomes within society (Turner 1982:125). Marx, on the other hand, understood conflict as the *result* of contending powers and interests in society (Turner 1982:125). From the work of these two historical figures the two dominant contemporary conflict perspectives grew. They are the *dialectical conflict theory* propounded by scholars such as Ralf Dahrendorf,[27] and *conflict functionalism*, advo-

cated by, inter alia, Lewis A Coser (Turner 1982:138). Dialectical conflict theory owes its inspiration to Marx, while conflict functionalism was inspired by Simmel.

Dahrendorf argued that functionalism created a *utopian image of society* (Turner 1982:139), providing a view likened to a 'still photograph' (Brown 1979:46; see also Malina 1981:19).[28] The functionalist perspective, however, did not adequately explain the incidence and intensity of conflict in some societies. Dahrendorf therefore evolved from the works of Marx the so-called *dialectical-conflict* perspective (cf Turner 1982:140). He perceived the social order to consist of *imperatively coordinated associations* (ICA's) created by the process of institutionalization (cf Brown 1979:93; Turner 1982:140). Such ICA's represent a distinguishable organization of roles (Turner 1982:140). The roles are organized in groups or clusters, where some role clusters have the power to force others to conform. Such power relations within an ICA 'tend to become legitimated and can therefore be viewed as *authority* relations in which some positions have the "accepted" or "normative right" to dominate others' (Turner 1982:140, referring to Dahrendorf 1958b:170-183; 1959:168-169; 1961; 1967). According to Dahrendorf, the social order is maintained by processes creating authority relations within the ICA's. Depending on Max Weber, Dahrendorf sees authority as *legitimated power*. Discussing Dahrendorf's position, Brown (1979:93) states:

> A person in authority is one who has power over others
> who agree that he is the rightful owner of that power.
> By acknowledging his right to power they transform it
> into authority; this process is known as legitimation.
> The characteristic of power in most organizations is that
> it adheres to legitimated positions and is therefore ex-
> perienced as authority.
>
> (Brown 1979:93)

Power is therefore positional, not personal, and becomes authority. It is this differential distribution of the scarce resources of power and authority that creates conflict amongst, and change within, the competing subgroups in an ICA (cf Brown 1979:93; Turner 1982:140-141). In every ICA there are certain 'clusters of roles' which are typified in two basic types, namely the *ruling* and the *ruled* (Turner 1982:141). Any single role therefore adopts a position of either domination or submission towards other roles. The ruling cluster seeks to preserve the status quo for obvious reasons, while the ruled cluster seeks to have power or authority redistributed. The ICA polarizes into two conflicting groups that contend for authority (cf Turner 1982:141). When the contest is resolved, it inevitably leads to a redistribution of

authority, which in turn leads to the institutionalization of newly defined clusters of roles. These roles are again polarized into dominating and a subjugated groups, and under the right conditions they start another contest for authority. This understanding of institutionalization as a dialectical process where conflict becomes the cause for social change, has led Dahrendorf to identify three key causal relations (cf Turner 1982:142):

- Conflict is seen as an inevitable process occasioned by opposing forces within social-structural arrangements.
- Such conflict is promoted or inhibited by a series of intervening structural conditions or variables.
- When conflict is resolved at a specific point in time, a new structural situation is created which, under certain conditions, unavoidably leads to further conflict among opposed forces.

Like Marx, Dahrendorf explains conflict as the result of a causal chain of events that is directed at the procurement or redistribution of authority.

Lewis Coser, in his theorizing, criticised functionalism, especially the Parsonian variety, for not giving sufficient attention to conflict (Turner 1982:154). At the same time he followed the lead of Simmel rather than that of Marx and Dahrendorf, by emphasizing the *integrative functions* of conflict for social systems, rather than its disruptive effects (cf Turner 1982:155).

From the vantage point of conflict being a process that can, under certain conditions, function to *maintain* social systems, Coser's image of society stressed the following aspects:

1. The social system can be viewed as a system of variously interrelated parts.
2. All social systems reveal imbalances, tensions and conflicts of interests among variously interrelated parts.
3. Processes within and between the system's constituent parts operate under different conditions to maintain, change, and increase or decrease a system's integration and adaptability.
4. Many processes, such as violence, dissent, deviance, and conflict, which are typically viewed as disruptive to the system, can also be viewed, under specifiable conditions, as strengthening the system's basis of integration as well as its adaptability to the environment (cf Turner 1982: 156).

These assumptions have led Coser to try to establish the causal chains that are involved in the way that conflict 'maintains or reestablishes system integration and adaptability to changing conditions' (Turner 1982:157). The following consistent series of basic causal nexuses was abstracted:

> (1) Imbalances in the integration of constituent parts of a social whole leads to (2) the outbreak of varying types of conflict among constituent parts which, in turn, causes (3) temporary reintegration of the systemic whole which, under certain conditions, causes (4) increased flexibility in the system's structure which, in turn, (5) increases the system's capability to resolve future imbalances through conflict, leading to a system that (6) reveals a high level of adaptability to changing conditions.
>
> (Turner 1982:157)

There are problems with this causal scheme, the most important being the emphasis on processes that *contribute* to system integration and adaptation. Nevertheless, Coser's conflict perspective is regarded as most comprehensive, as is evident from his investigations of the following propositions: (i) the causes of conflict; (ii) the intensity of conflict; (iii) the violence of conflict; (iv) the duration of conflict; and (v) the functions of conflict (cf Turner 1982:158).[29]

In a section of his work entitled 'The future of conflict theory', Turner (1982: 175-193) attempts a synthesis between the different strands of conflict theory. *Conflict* is defined as 'a process of events leading to overt interaction of varying degrees of violence among at least two parties' (Turner 1982:183). Although the interdependency of social phenomena is recognized by conflict theory,[30] the interpretation of society is quite different from that of structural-functionalism.

Conflict theory views society as generating conflict because of the inequality of resource distribution (cf Lenski 1966:43-93 for a discussion on distributive systems and the distribution of resources), and therefore regards inequality as the ultimate source of conflict (Turner 1982:181). The following schematic presentation, taken from Turner (1982:181) shows the 'over-all causal imagery of conflict theory':

Fig 6 Conflict theory

```
        ┌──────────────◄──────────────────────◄───────────┐
        ▼                                                   │
┌──────────┐ Reveal ┌──────────┐ Causes ┌─────────┐ Causes ┌──────────────┐
│All social│        │Inequality│        │Conflict │        │Reorganization│
│systems   │───────►│of resource│───────►│which    │───────►│of social     │
│          │        │distribution│       │then     │        │system        │
│          │        │which     │        │         │        │              │
└──────────┘        └──────────┘        └─────────┘        └──────────────┘
```

To summarise: conflict theory explains the order in society as being mainly the re-
sult of the power some men have in demanding compliance from others (Cohen
1968:21). Malina (1988b:9) defines conflict theory as a perspective according to
which human social relations develop, are maintained and change because people
are motivated to act in terms of their own interests, which normally impinge on the
interests of others. Conflict theory therefore explains order in its various aspects
and also explains the breakdown of social order and the occurrence of change. So-
cieties are unstable systems – normally they tend to change (Cohen 1968:169). So-
cial conflict therefore exists where the goals of one group are pursued in such a way
as to ensure that the goals of another group cannot be realized (Cohen 1968:184-
185; cf also Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:89). Conflict theory really wishes to give
account of the causes of social change. At issue is not the sporadic formation of
groups that happen to be in conflict with one another, but the existence of *structural
conflict* between groups or social sectors which are likely to have enduring interests
(Cohen 1968:184). According to Malina (1981:20) the conflict model presupposes
that all units of social organization – persons and groups in a society – are continu-
ously changing unless some force intervenes to correct this change. The basic pre-
supposition of conflict theory is the existence of some sort of grievance on the part
of someone who is or believes to be oppressed (Malina 1988b:10).

3.5.2.1 Evaluating the conflict perspective
Conflict theory is not as unified a theoretical perspective as is the case with functio-
nalism (Brown 1979:108).[31] The label 'conflict theory' has but recently been applied
to a diverse body of theories whose common denominator is the view that societies
are always in a state of conflict over scarce resources. *Power* is regarded as one of
the most important scarce resources, and consequently society should be viewed as
an arena in which there is a constant struggle for power (Popenoe 1980:93). Con-
flict theory, like functionalism, seeks to provide an explanation for the order of so-
ciety. It regards functionalism as deficient in explaining the forms of non-adaptive
change perceived in some societies, and wishes to provide a remedy:

> A major assumption of most conflict theorists is that,
> rather than being held together by the 'glue' of shared
> values, societies and social order are maintained by
> coercion and constraint.
>
> (Popenoe 1980:93)

However, functionalism and conflict theory are not seen to be mutually exclusive, because they are not genuine alternatives (Cohen 1968:170; Brown 1979:91). The difference between them is one of emphasis rather than of kind – both are necessary to understand the complexity of society.

More substantial criticism on Dahrendorf's *dialectical conflict theory* has been given by Weingart (1969) (cf Turner 1982:144-153). Turner (1982:145) restates Weingart's charge that 'in deviating from Marx's conception of the *substructure* of opposed interests existing below the cultural and institutional edifices of the ruling classes, Dahrendorf forfeits a genuine causal analysis of conflict, and therefore an explanation of how patterns of social organization are changed'. Because of this, Dahrendorf is forced to reduce the origins of conflict to whims associated with individuals and groups, and thereby succumbs to a reductionist imperative dictated by his causal imagery (Turner 1982:145, dependent upon Weingart).

An important point of criticism of Dahrendorf's perspective is his failure to conceive of crucial concepts such as authority, domination-subjugation, and interest, as *variables*:

> He refuses to speculate on *what types* of authority displaying
> *what variable states* lead to *what types of variations* in domina-
> tion and subjugation which, in turn, cause *what variable types*
> of opposed interests leading to *what variable types* of conflict
> groups. Thus, Dahrendorf links only by assumption and defi-
> nition crucial variables that causally influence each other as
> well as the more explicit variables of his scheme: the degree
> of conflict, the degree of intensity of conflict, the degree of
> violence in conflict, the degree of change, and the rate of so-
> cial change.
>
> (Turner 1982:148-149)

The solution to this is to conceptualize his units of analysis (ICA's), legitimacy, authority, domination-subjugation, and interests as variable phenomena, and to attempt to describe the intervening empirical conditions that might influence their variability (Turner 1982:149).

A *methodological* problem is posed by the very general definitions Dahrendorf gives to concepts, 'a strategy that insures confirmation of his assumptions about the nature of social life, but which inhibits empirical investigation of these assumptions' (Turner 1982:150).

Finally, Turner (1982:151) points out that commentators have noted a remarkable similarity between Dahrendorf's units of analysis -the imperatively coordinated associations (ICA's) – and those of Parsons (the social systems). This is remarkable because Dahrendorf has criticised functional forms of theorizing – such as Parsonian functionalism – as reflecting an ideological utopia, and has proposed his dialectical-conflict scheme as the road out of utopia (Turner 1982:150). However, Dahrendorf is not able to explain how conflict and change emerge, because he does not adequately explain the problem of order:

> How and why is the organization of ICA's possible? To assert that they are organized in terms of power and authority defines away the problem of how, why, and through what processes the institutionalized patterns generating both integration and conflict come to exist... Yet it is from the institutionalized relations in ICA's that conflict-ridden cycles of change are supposed to emerge.
>
> (Turner 1982:152)

Dahrendorf has therefore fallen into the analytical trap he has imputed to functional theory: 'Change inducing conflict must mysteriously arise from the legitimated relations of the social system' (Turner 1982:145).

As far as Coser's *conflict functionalism* is concerned, the main problem the approach presents concerns its bias towards *functions* – that is, forces promoting system integration – of social conflict (cf Strauss 1988:196). The problem is really with the implicit assumptions behind the concept of *function*:

> If some process or structure has 'functions' for some other feature of a system, there is often an implicit assumption about what is 'good' and 'bad' for a system...In Coser's propositions on the functions of conflict, this problem is evident: Conflict is 'good' when it promotes integration based on solidarity, clear authority, functional interdependence, and normative control. In Coser's terms it is more 'adaptive'. Other conflict theorists might argue that conflict in such a system is 'bad' because integration

and adaptability in this specific context could be 'exploi-
tive'.

<div align="right">(Turner 1982:168)</div>

Coser's approach therefore represents an analytical one-sidedness which would pro-
duce a distorted view of the social world if followed exclusively (Turner 1982:172;
see also Strauss 1988:196).

To conclude: it seems as if the most basic issue to be resolved regarding conflict
theory is that of the definition of conflict (Turner 1982:176). What constitutes con-
flict, and what does not? Current definitions are so broad as to include practically
'any overt or covert state which hints of antagonism' (Turner 1982:177) under the
label of 'conflict'. As an example of such broad definitions Turner quotes the for-
mulation by Fink, stating that conflict is:

> any social situation or process in which two or more en-
> tities are linked by at least one form of antagonistic psy-
> chological relation or at least one form of antagonistic
> interaction.

<div align="right">(Turner 1982:177)</div>

Antagonism, in turn, refers to such states as 'incompatible goals', 'mutually exclusive
interests', 'emotional hostility', 'dissent', 'violent struggle', et cetera.

There are also *unit of analysis* problems in conflict theory. Very little attempt is
made to indicate exactly what units would typically be in conflict with each other –
individuals, groups, organizations, classes, nations, or communities? On the positive
side, leaving the units vague keeps the theory abstract and therefore applicable to
all social units (Turner 1982:179). On the other hand, it is surmised that the nature
of the units influence the nature of the conflict among them, and that one could be-
nefit by being more specific. Presently, conflict theory reveals a bipolarity – on the
one hand it consists of abstract schemes such as Dahrendorf's and Coser's, and on
the other there are several specific theories of international, interpersonal, racial,
class, sexual, religious, ethical, organizational, community, and occupational conflict
(Turner 1982:179).

Lastly, the question of the *implicit functionalism* imputed to conflict theory
should be addressed. By this is meant that 'end states or the consequences of con-
flict often take analytical precedence over the causes of conflict' (Turner 1982:180).
Conflict is regarded as 'both a dependent variable – that is, a process which is
caused by other forces – and an independent variable – that is, a process which
causes alterations in still other processes' (Turner 1982:181).

In his overview of the different conflict theories Turner (1982:192) remarks:

> In many ways, the problem with much conflict theory is
> its excessive claims: to visualize all social relationships
> in all social systems as rife with conflict. The only way
> to sustain this claim is to define conflict so broadly that
> virtually any social relationship will reveal conflict.

Still, if the three problems – the definition of conflict, the units of conflict, and the confusion over causes and functions – can be overcome, much could be won 'in understanding how and why patterns of social organization are created, maintained, and changed' (Turner 1982:193).

3.5.2.2 Comparing the functionalist and conflict perspectives
The following table (taken over from Cohen 1968:67) provides a direct comparison between the salient points of the functionalist/consensus/integration approach and the conflict/coercion approach to society:

Functionalist model		Conflict model	
a)	Norms and values are the basic elements of social life.	a)	Interests are the basic elements of social life.
b)	Social life involves commitments.	b)	Social life involves inducement and coercion.
c)	Societies are necessarily cohesive.	c)	Social life is necessarily divisive.
d)	Social life depends on solidarity.	d)	Social life generates opposition, exclusion and hostility.
e)	Social life is based on reciprocity and cooperation.	e)	Social life generates structured conflict.
f)	Social systems rest on consensus.	f)	Social life generates sectional interests.
g)	Society recognizes legitimate authority.	g)	Social differentiation involves power.
h)	Social systems are integrated.	h)	Social systems are malintegrated and beset by 'contradictions'.
i)	Social systems tend to persist.	i)	Social systems tend to change.

3.5.3 Interactionist theorizing

In the late 1800s European thinkers like Simmel, Weber, and Durkheim began to express interest in the micro-sociological concern for the relationships between society and the individual as exhibited in the interaction among individuals. Questions were being asked about the way in which society shapes individuals, or how individuals create, maintain, and change society. 'How are society and the personality of individuals interrelated, and yet separate, emergent phenomena' (Turner 1982: 305)? Interest was diverted from macro-social structures and processes – class, state, family, religion, evolution, the nature of the body social – to the study of processes of *social interaction* and their consequences for the individual and society. The term *social interaction* denotes the 'reciprocal influencing of the acts of persons and groups, usually mediated through communication' (Becker 1964:657).[32]

While Simmel is recognized as the one who pioneered the micro-sociology of interaction (Cohen 1968:126; Parsons 1968:435; Turner 1982:306), modern interactionism can be regarded as the legacy of the American philosopher *George Herbert Mead,* who taught at the University of Chicago during the years 1893-1931 (Brown 1979:114; Turner 1982:308). Mead borrowed key concepts from others – William James, John Dewey and Charles Horton Cooley – and combined them with his own insights to produce a synthesis that serves to this day as the base for modern interactionism (Turner 1982:308).

James, a psychologist, developed a clear concept of *self* – described as 'perhaps the most important and central idea in interactionism...which gives interactionism a base from which to switch away from the concerns of macro-sociology, and which roots it firmly in the concerns of the individual' (Brown 1979:115) – which refers to how people see themselves. *Self* can be defined as follows:

> Just as humans can *(a)* denote symbolically other people and aspects of the world around them, *(b)* develop attitudes and feelings toward these objects, and *(c)* construct typical responses toward objects, so they can denote themselves, develop self-feelings and attitudes, and construct responses toward themselves.
>
> (Turner 1982:308)

Based on this insight, James recognizes that the *self* is built up through social interaction, and that a person has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him/her (Foote 1964:664; Brown 1979:115; Turner 1982:309).

Cooley refined the concept of self to the extent that he regarded self as the process by which individuals see themselves as objects, along with other objects, in their

social environment (Turner 1982:309). He also recognized that self emerges out of communication with others – in other words, the individual's image of himself is formed on the basis of how others evaluate him (Brown 1979:116). Cooley called this process *the looking-glass self*: 'The gestures of others serve as mirrors in which people see and evaluate themselves...' (Turner 1982:309). He also perceived that some groups were more important than others in the genesis and maintenance of self. These he termed *primary groups*, stressing the fact that *self* arises out of symbolic communication with others in group contexts (Turner 1982:309-310).

Dewey's contribution was in terms of *human consciousness* or *mind*. *Mind* is seen as a 'process of denoting objects in the environment, ascertaining potential lines of conduct, imagining the consequences of pursuing each line, inhibiting inappropriate responses, and then, selecting a line of conduct that will facilitate adjustment' (Turner 1982:310). *Mind* therefore becomes an instrumental activity[33]: 'What usually are considered to be the units or aspects of purely psychological events – for example, attitudes, beliefs, motivation, perception, thought, or choice – are here interpreted as ingredients or aspects of instrumental activity' (Swanson 1968:441). *Mind*, as a process of adjustment rather than a thing or an entity, therefore emerges and is sustained through interactions in the social world (Turner 1982:310).

Using these concepts, Mead was able to indicate how *mind*, the social self, and society emerge and are sustained through interaction. His synthesis appears to have been based on two assumptions:

> (1) The biological frailty of human organisms force their cooperation with each other in group contexts in order to survive; and (2) those actions within and among human organisms that facilitate their cooperation, and hence their survival or adjustment, will be retained.
>
> (Turner 1982:312)

Proceeding from Dewey's contribution (cf discussion above), Mead uses the terms *imaginative rehearsal* (the process of using symbols or language to covertly rehearse lines of action) and *conventional gestures* (gestures that have acquired common meanings and thereby facilitate adjustment and efficient interaction among individuals) to refine the concept of *mind*. An organism possesses *mind*, accordingly, when it develops the capacity (1) to understand conventional gestures, (2) to employ these gestures to take the role of others, and (3) to imaginatively rehearse alternative lines of action (Turner 1982:313-314; see also Strauss 1988:212-213). *Taking the role of the other* (put oneself in another's place or seeing things as others see them)

refs to the capacity of individuals to *assume* the perspective of those with whom they must cooperate for survival on the basis of the interpretation of conventional gestures (Brown 1979:120; Popenoe 1980:56; Turner 1982:313).

A very important aspect of the *self*, used by Mead, is that of the *significant other* and the *generalized other*. He distinguishes three stages in the development of self – an initial stage called *play*, where the infant organism is only able to assume the perspective of a limited number of *significant others* such as parents (Berger & Luckmann 1967:129-132; Brown 1979:122-123; Turner 1982:314); a secondary stage called *game*, designating 'the capacity of individuals to derive multiple self-images from, and to cooperate with, a group of individuals engaged in some coordinated activity' (Turner 1982:314; see also Foote 1964:664-665; Parsons 1968:436; Brown 1979:123). The final stage in the development of self is indicated by the ability of an individual to take the role of the *generalized other* – that is, to assume the general beliefs, values, and norms of a community (Turner 1982:314; Strauss 1988:214-215). The concept is also described by Manis & Meltzer (1972) as the 'composite representation of others, of society, within the individual' (quoted by Brown 1979:123), and by Berger & Luckmann (1967:133) as the 'abstraction from the roles and attitudes of concrete significant others'.

To complete the picture of Mead's synthesis of *mind, self,* and *society*, it should be pointed out that Mead regarded *society* as dependent upon both *mind* and *self* as described above. Society and its institutions are maintained, perpetuated *and* altered through the adjustive capacities of mind and the mediating impact of self (Turner 1982:316). Yet, while society is viewed as a phenomenon *constructed* through the interaction of individuals as directed by mind and self, and therefore subject to alteration or change, such change exhibits an unpredictability that cannot be explained adequately by the concept *self* in its present definition. Therefore Mead employed two concepts first developed by William James – the *I* and the *me* (Brown 1979:117-118; Turner 1982:316; Strauss 1988:215-216). Mead proposed that we think of the self as having these two components – the *I* is the active element of the self, while the *me* is the passive, 'shaped' element.[34] The *me* is to be seen as the social self, and includes all the social roles we play (Brown 1979:117). Turner's formulation:

> For Mead, the *I* points to the impulsive tendencies of individuals, while the *me* represents the self-image of behavior after it has been emitted. With these concepts Mead emphasized that the *I*, or impulsive behavior, cannot be predicted, because the individual can only

>'know in experience' (the *me*) what has actually trans-
>pired and what the consequences of the *I* have been.
>
>(Turner 1982:316)

When Mead describes society as organized activity regulated by the generalized other, in which individuals make adjustments and cooperate with one another, the description points to the mutual interaction between individual and society. What the description really asserts is that society shapes mind and self, and that mind and self affect society (Turner 1982:317; see Berger & Luckmann 1967 for a similar assertion in the sociology of knowledge). While this is an important insight, it remains vague in the concepts used to denote the nature of social organization or society and the exact points of articulation between society and the individual (Turner 1982: 317).

In an attempt to fill in this broad description by Mead, theorists formulated a series of concepts to indicate the basic units from which society is constructed, and thereby clarify the relations between society and individuals. The problem of Mead's synthesis resided in an unsatisfactorily explanation of 'how participation in the *structure* of society shaped individual conduct, and vice versa' (Turner 1982:317). In an attempt to resolve the vagueness, attention was focused on the concept of *role*, and this line of inquiry eventually became known as *role theory*.

Built on the insights of Mead, there grew a theoretical perspective that is known as *symbolic interactionism*. This perspective focuses on how the symbolic processes of role-taking, imaginative rehearsal, and self-evaluation by individuals adjusting to one another, form the basis for social organization, or society (Turner 1982:320).

Another (more recent) theoretical course that makes use of the symbolic processes described by Mead is that called role theory; 'it focuses primary analytical attention on the *structure of status networks and attendant expectations* as they circumscribe the internal symbolic processes of individuals and the eventual enactment of roles' (Turner 1982:320).

Both symbolic interactionism and role theory represent a variant of interactionism.[35] However, they differ substantially in emphasis, and should therefore be discussed in their own terms. This will be done in an abbreviated manner in the next two sections.

3.5.3.1 Symbolic interactionism

As we have indicated above, the concept *symbolic interactionism* refers to a school of thought based on the work of Mead. Symbolic interactionism emphasizes the patterns of interdependency in microsystems on the interpersonal level. According to this theory the interdependency is the result of shared/common symbols by which

individuals negotiate in their interaction so that a structured whole develops and can be maintained (Steyn 1984:6). The maintenance or changing of the social reality depends therefore on symbolic communication (cf Foote 1964:665).

The meaning of the term *symbolic communication* is obvious – humans use symbols to communicate with each other. Such communication consists not only of language, but also of facial gestures, voice tones, body posture, and other symbolic gestures in which there is common meaning and understanding (Turner 1982:324). The process of *role-taking* is regarded as the basic mechanism by which interaction occurs (Turner 1982:324). In fact, interaction could not occur but for the ability to read gestures and to use them as a basis for putting oneself in the position of others (Turner 1982:324). Contemporary interactionists emphasize the phenomenon of interaction in society as a uniquely human endeavour. Society is actually made possible by the capacities that humans acquire as they grow and mature in society (Turner 1982:324). Present-day interactionists recognize the same human capacities as Mead: the genesis of mind and self (Turner 1982:325). However, newly included in the concept of *mind* is what is known as *the definition of the situation*. This refers to the fact that, with the capacities of mind, people (or *actors*)[36] 'can name, categorize, and orient themselves to constellations of objects – including themselves as an object – in all situations. In this way they can assess, weigh, and sort out appropriate lines of conduct' (Turner 1982:325; see also Brown 1979:121-122 on the subject). All this serves to emphasize the symbolic character of interaction (Foote 1964:665). In Turner's words:

> Humans create and use symbols. They communicate with symbols. They interact through role-taking, which involves the reading of symbols emitted by others. What makes them unique as a species – the existence of mind and self – arises out of interaction, while conversely, the emergence of these capacities allows for the interactions that form the basis of society.
>
> (Turner 1982:325-326)

Two prominent names associated with symbolic interactionism are that of *Herbert Blumer* and *Manford Kuhn*, associated with the so-called *Chicago School* and *Iowa School* of symbolic interactionism, respectively (Turner 1982:322; Strauss 1988:217). Both schools follow Mead's lead, yet Blumer and Kuhn often diverge, and in fact represent 'the polar extremes of symbolic interactionism' (Turner 1982:322). The divergence, according to Turner (1982:326), concerns the following issues:

> (1) What is the nature of the individual? (2) What is
> the nature of interaction? (3) What is the nature of so-
> cial organization? (4) What is the most appropriate
> method for studying humans and society? And (5)
> What is the best form of sociological theorizing?

From an investigation of their positions on these issues[37], it becomes clear that Chicago School interactionists view individuals as potentially spontaneous, interaction as constantly in the process of change, and social organization as fluid and tenuous (Turner 1982:330; Strauss 1988:217). Iowa School interactionists on the other hand are inclined to regard individual personality and social organization as structured, with interactions being constrained by these structures (Turner 1982:330). From these differences in assumptions there grew varying conceptions of how to investigate the social world and how to build theory (cf Turner 1982:330-338 for a discussion of the diverging assumptions about causality, diverging methodological protocols, and diverging theory-building strategies).

A major criticism of symbolic interactionism is that it ignores the structural aspects of society (cf Brown 1979:137-138; Strauss 1988:218). Blumer and Kuhn have tried to erect a total theory of society on the basis of symbolic interactionism. Blumer, especially, advocated that sociological theory be built through inductive reasoning 'from the ongoing symbolic processes of individuals in concrete interaction situations' (cf Turner 1982:339). However, this strategy has failed to link conceptually the processes of symbolic interaction (interaction of the selves) to the formation of different patterns of social organization (structures like institutions, organizations or societies) (cf Turner 1982:332). 'Furthermore, the utility of induction from the symbolic exchanges among individuals for the analysis of interaction among more macro, collective social units has yet to be demonstrated' (Turner 1982:339). However, on the positive side symbolic interactionism did focus attention on the need to conceptually link the structural categories to classes of social processes that underlie these categories. This need has arisen because macro-sociological theorizing (such as functionalism or conflict theory) has traditionally remained detached from the processes of the social world it attempts to describe.

To conclude, then, symbolic interactionism in its present form can provide a supplement to macro-analysis 'by giving researchers a framework, and measuring instruments, to analyze micro processes within macro social events' (Turner 1982: 342).

3.5.3.2 Role theory

Role theory constitutes the other direction – besides symbolic interactionism – in which Mead's synthesis developed (cf 3.5.3 above). Because that synthesis did not adequately explain how the structure of society shapes individual conduct, and vice versa, the concept of *role* came to denote the point of articulation between the individual and society (Turner 1982:317, 349). The following people contributed towards an understanding of what role theory is about:

Robert Park (1926:135) uttered the well-quoted line (cf Ralph H Turner 1968: 552; Turner 1982:318): 'Everybody is always and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role...It is in these roles that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves.' Park emphasized that roles are linked to structural positions in society, and that self, in turn, emerges from the multiple roles that people play. In this way he directed attention to the nature of society and how its structure influences the processes of mind, self, and society (Turner 1982:318).

Jacob Moreno, who pioneered the use of *role-playing* as a tool in psychotherapy and role-training (cf Sarbin 1968:546), viewed social organization as a network of roles that constrained and channelled behaviour (cf Turner 1982:319). Distinguishing three different types of roles – psychosomatic roles, psychodramatic roles, and social roles[38] – Moreno conceptualized social structures as organized networks of expectations that require varying types of role enactments by individuals. This led to an understanding of social organization as 'various *types* of interrelated role enactments regulated by varying *types* of expectations' (Turner 1982:319).

Ralph Linton distinguished the concepts of *role, status,* and *individuals* from one another. He held that roles consisted of behavioural prescriptions or norms bearing one-to-one correspondence with social status (R Turner 1968:552). To Linton, *status* is a collection of rights and duties, and a *role* represents the dynamic aspect of status – to put rights and duties into effect is to perform a role (Sweeter 1964:609; Ralph Turner 1968:553; Turner 1982:319). According to this insight, social structure reveals these distinct elements:

> *(a)* a network of positions, *(b)* a corresponding system
> of expectations, and *(c)* patterns of behavior which are
> enacted with regard to the expectations of particular
> networks of interrelated positions.
>
> (Turner 1982:319)

Park, Moreno, and Linton provided more conceptual insight into the nature of social organization, and thereby made clearer the interrelations among Mead's categories of *mind, self,* and *society*.

Turner (1982:343) suggests that the differences between role theory and symbolic interactionism could best be visualized as a continuum, at one end of which individuals are seen as players in the theatre, while at the other players are considered to be participants in a game. Turner explains:

> When human action is seen as occurring in a theater, interaction is likely to be viewed as highly structured by the script, directors, other actors, and the audience. When conceptualized as a game, interaction is more likely to be seen as less structured and as influenced by the wide range of tactics available to participants.
>
> (Turner 1982:343)

This *dramaturgical metaphor* (Sarbin 1968:546) expresses the assumptions of role theory about the social world. The concept of *stage* contains assumptions about the nature of social organization; the concept of *players* contains implicit assumptions about the nature of the individual as an actor in society; and the concept of *script* contains assumptions about the relationship of individuals to patterns of social organization (Turner 1982:345).

Turner (1982:345) describes how role theorists view the social world as a network of variously interrelated *positions*, or *statuses*, within which individuals enact roles.[39] Coupled to each position are certain expectations about the behaviour of anyone occupying that position. Social organization, or social structure (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:92) is therefore visualized as composed of various networks of status and expectation (Turner 1982:345). In accordance with the dramaturgical analogy to a play (noted above), three general classes of expectation seem to typify the way in which role theory views the world:

- Expectations from the 'script', referring to the norms in social reality that specify individual behaviour relevant to a specific position. Ralph Turner (1968:555) describes this class of expectation as *organizational goal dominance*:

> To the extent to which roles are incorporated into an organizational setting, organizational goals tend to become the crucial criteria for role differentiation, evaluation, complementarity, legitimacy of expectation, consensus, allocation, and judgments of adequacy.

- Expectations from other 'players', which are interpreted through the process of *role taking*. Such expectations represent a powerful force shaping human conduct (Turner 1982346); and
- Expectations from the 'audience' – that is, the audiences of individuals occupying statuses. The description of such audiences may differ – sometimes it is a one-person audience, sometimes a small-group audience, sometimes a large audience. And sometimes it is a symbolic audience, 'as in a writer's imagined picture of his reading audience' (Sarbin 1968:551). Such 'real or imagined' audiences 'comprise a frame of reference, or reference group, that circumscribes the behavior of actors in various statuses' (Turner 1982: 346-347).

Role theory therefore assumes that much of the social world is structured in terms of status and expectation. An important question that flows from this is the determination of the types of expectations attendant upon a given status or network of positions (Turner 1982:347).

As far as the *individual* occupying a position or playing a role is concerned – role theory understands such a person as having two interrelated attributes: (a) self-related characteristics, and (b) role-playing skills and capacities (Turner 1982:347-348). *Self-related concerns* have to do with the way in which self-conceptions influence the interpretation of certain expectations that guide conduct in a particular status (Turner 1982:348). *Role-playing skills* refer to the capacities to perceive different types (sets) of expectations, and to follow a selected set. However, according to this conceptualization the individual can contribute very little in the form of creative, unique responses with which to change and alter social structures. The creative consequences of mind and self for the construction of society are underemphasized (Turner 1982:349).

The nexus (= point of articulation, cf 3.5.3 above) between society and the individual is expressed in the concept of role, and 'involves individuals who are incumbent in statuses employing self and role-playing capacities to adjust to various types of expectations' (Turner 1982:349). The concept of role includes three different components – prescribed roles, subjective roles, and enacted roles. Depending on which component is emphasized, a different line of thinking is embarked upon.

The component of *prescribed roles* indicates a conceptual emphasis upon the expectations of individuals in statuses. Accordingly, the social world is conceived as composed of relatively clearly defined expectations, which the individual must live up to by means of his/her self and role-playing skills. Analytical emphasis is therefore accorded to the degree of conformity to the demands of a particular status (cf Turner 1982:349-350) – in other words, performance is rated against expectations.

The component of *subjective roles* indicates a conceptual emphasis upon the way in which the individual perceives and interprets certain expectations. Accordingly, the social world is seen as structured in terms of the individual's subjective appraisal of the interaction situation. As a consequence analytical emphasis is accorded to the interpersonal style of individuals in their assessment of, and adjustment to, expectations (cf Turner 1982:350).

The component of *enacted roles* indicates conceptual emphasis upon overt behaviour. Accordingly, the social world is understood as a network of interrelated behaviours. When overt role enactment is emphasized, less analytical attention is accorded to either expectations or interpretations of them (Turner 1982:350).

Taken separately, these three conceptual notions are inadequate to explain the structure of the social world. Any overt human behaviour inevitably involves a subjective assessment of various types of expectation. In fact, there is a complex causal relationship among these components (Turner 1982:350). Turner (1982:350-353) discusses what he calls the 'causal imagery of role theory' in terms of the general causal sequence among analytical units, specific causal chains among analytical units, and specific causal linkages within analytical units. He comes to the conclusion that little theoretical attention has been paid to the following connections:

> *(a)* broader social and cultural structure and specific patterns of interaction, *(b)* enacted role behaviors and their effect on role-playing capacities, *(c)* these role-playing capacities and self, and *(d)* enacted roles and the self-assessments that occur *independently* of role-taking with specific others or groups. Rather, concern has been focused on the relations between self and expectations as they affect, and are affected by, enacted roles.
>
> (Turner 1982:353)

Another deficiency of theoretical role concepts is the fact that, in the discussion up to now, they provide only a means for *categorizing* and *classifying* expectations, self, role-playing capacities, role-enactment, and relationships among these analytical units. 'The use of concepts is confined primarily to classification of different phenomena, whether attention is drawn to the forms of status networks, types and sources of expectations, relations of self to expectations, or the enactment of roles' (Turner 1982:354). Two tasks that need attention from role theorists are pointed out by Turner (1982:354):

- They must fill in the gaps in their causal imagery, developing propositions that specify the linkages between concepts denoting more inclusive social and cultural variables, on the one hand, and concepts pointing to specific interaction variables, on the other.
- The current propositions that do exist in role-theoretic literature should be reformulated so that conditional statements specifying when certain processes are likely to occur, will be more explicit.

Methodologically speaking, the study of expectations is a difficult enterprise. The problem with inferring from observed behaviour the expectations that guided that behaviour, is that expectations can only be known as a *consequence* of the behaviour they are supposed to circumscribe. This means that expectations cannot be measured independently of behaviour, and therefore role behaviour cannot be *predicted* from the expectations (Turner 1982:356). This kind of problem needs to be resolved because, if not, the implications would be that theory could be built with concepts that are not measurable, 'even in principle' (Turner 1982:357).

Substantively, role theory can be criticised for the overly structured vision of human behaviour that it connotes. Turner (1982:358) describes the problem as follows:

> Role theory assumes the social world to be structured in terms of status networks, and corresponding clusterings of expectations, within which individuals with selves and various capacities enact roles...The main analytical thrust is on how individuals adjust and adapt to the demands of the 'script,' other 'actors,' and the 'audiences' of the 'play'...The connotative impact of the concepts loads analysis in the direction of assuming too much structure and order in the social world.

The *causal imagery* (cf discussion above) of role theory has contributed to this problem. The inability to measure the causal nexus has resulted in role theory concentrating on the consequences of role-enactment for self-related variables, but at the same time underemphasizing the consequences for social-structural variables – that is, for changes in the organization of status networks, norms, reference groups, the responses of others, and other features of social structure (Turner 1982:359). Finally, there is also a *logical* problem in role-theoretic analysis, comprising the following:

> The vagueness of just how and under what conditions
> social structure affects self and role enactment leaves
> much of role analysis with the empty assertion that so-
> ciety shapes individual conduct.
>
> (Turner 1982:359)

Role theory is seen to have enormous potential for the study of organizations, groups, and individual conduct. However, the applicability of its concepts to more macrosocial structures and processes still needs to be demonstrated. It will have to develop theoretical propositions that incorporate its body of classificatory concepts, considering both self-related and social-structural variables (cf Turner 1982:360).

3.5.3.3 Evaluating interactionism

> ...interactionism focuses almost exclusively upon the re-
> lationship between the individual and society. How do
> individual actions shape the profile of society? And,
> conversely, how does society constrain and circumscribe
> the individual?
>
> (Turner 1982:361)

These questions are approached from different viewpoints – some emphasize the process of interaction, others the structure of personality and situation, and still others the expectations of social structures as these interact with self- and role-playing skills to produce role-enactments. However, from this diversity there emerge a number of key *substantive*, *methodological*, and *theory-building* issues. According to Turner (1982:361) the future of interactionist theory hinges upon resolution of these issues.

Substantive issues are those connected to the way in which a theoretical perspective portrays social organization. All interactionist theories employ the concepts of person, interaction, other, self, role, situation, and society. They are clearly differentiated, however, in terms of their differences in emphasis. Turner (1982:362-363) identifies three related substantive issues, the resolution of which may determine the future of interactionism. First, what is the range of phenomena to which interactionist theory applies? Is it only suitable for examining the micro-social world of individuals, or can its concepts also be applied to macro issues? Second, can the propositions and concepts of interactionism give a satisfactory account of processes related to the creation and maintenance of *relations*, and of concepts relating to the maintenance of patterns of *social organization*? Third, and very importantly – to

what extent are events in the world determined by causes? Is human action of a fully determinate nature, or is some (or all) of it simply unique and unpredictable?

The *methodological* problem revolves around the question of *how* the concepts and theories of the interactionist perspective are to be *measured*. In order to remain in contention as a *theory*, interactionism has to generate testable theoretical propositions (Turner 1982:363-364).

As far as *theory-building* matters are concerned, there are two basic standpoints. One states that sociological theorizing can, at most, consist of a body of sensitizing concepts which may allow for a partial understanding of social events. The other contrasting view sees interactionist theory as conforming to all other theory, consisting of clearly defined concepts grouped into abstract propositions that can explain why events occur. If it must be testable, interactionism cannot remain a general orientation – it will have to formulate verifiable abstract propositions. Turner (1982:364) emphasizes that such an effort is built on the assumption that the processes of the world are determinative and therefore measurable and predictable.

One strategy for accomplishing what has been set out above is the 'role theory' proposed by Ralph H Turner. Having consistently criticised role theory on several scores (cf Turner 1982:365), Ralph Turner sets out to build a theory by developing abstract propositions about key social processes. He starts off by formulating a series of statements that indicate what *tends to occur in the normal operation of systems of interaction* (Turner 1982:371). The purpose of highlighting such *main tendency propositions* is to link *concepts* to *empirical regularities* – the first step in developing a more integrated interactionist theory. These propositions are grouped with respect to the following issues (cf Ralph Turner 1968:552-556, and Turner 1982:371-376 for detailed discussions):

- The *emergence and character of roles*, based on observation of the social world. These observations reflect tendencies for role differentiation and accretion, for meaningfulness, for role cues, for behavioural correspondence, and for evaluation of rank and social desirability (cf Ralph Turner 1968:553; Turner 1982:371-372).
- *Roles as interactive framework*, based on the assumption that interaction cannot proceed without the identification and assignment of roles. Roles provide a means for interaction to occur by the tendency to interact *in terms of* roles, the tendency towards role complementariness, and for stabilized roles to be assigned the character of legitimate expectations (cf Ralph Turner 1968:553-554; Turner 1982:372-373).
- *Role and actor*, concerning the relationship between actors and the roles that provide the framework for interaction. Here observations confirm ten-

dencies for stabilized role structures to persist, regardless of a change in actors, tendencies for consistence in role allocation, role-taking as an adaptation of the ego's role to the alter's role, for assessing role adequacy in terms of a comparison between role behaviour and role conception, and for role reciprocity (cf Ralph Turner 1968:554-555; Turner 1982:373).

■ *Role in organizational settings*, noting the tendencies for organizational goals to become important criteria for role differentiation, evaluation, complementariness, legitimacy or expectation, consensus, allocation, and judgments of adequacy, for legitimate role definers, for linking statuses to roles, for role sets, and for formalization (cf Ralph Turner 1968:555; Turner 1982:373-374).

■ *Role in societal setting*, displaying tendencies for similar roles in different contexts to become merged, resulting in an economy of roles. Also, the differentiation of roles in a social context tends to link roles to social values. Finally, there is a tendency for individuals in society to be assigned or to assume roles that are consistent with each other (cf Ralph Turner 1968:555-556; Turner 1982:374-375).

■ *Role and person*, indicating a category where the emphasis is on the manner in which an individual manages the several roles he/she assumes or is allocated. Observations reveal tendencies to resolve role strain arising out of role contradiction, role conflict, and role inadequacy; the tendency to be socialized into a common culture by adopting a repertoire of role relationships to serve as a framework for own behaviour, and as a perspective for the behaviour of others; the tendency to self-conception by favouring certain roles as being more in concert with the self than others; at the same time self-conception stresses those roles which facilitate effective adaptation to relevant others, and reflects a tendency for the adaptiveness of self-conception; finally, the tendency for assigning role distance in the event that roles must be played that contradict the self-conception, demonstrating lack of personal involvement (cf Ralph Turner 1968:556; Turner 1982:375-376).

The *second step* in this strategy (cf p 141 above for the first step) concerns generating and organizing empirical propositions. The purpose of this is to determine the *independent variables* on which the above *dependent variables* are based (cf Turner 1982:376-381).

Having determined what the underlying empirical conditions are that shape the degree or rate of variation in tendency propositions, the *third step* in the process is to develop *explanatory propositions*. Ralph Turner identifies two explanatory proposi-

tions – one about *functionality*, and the other about *tenability* (cf Turner 1982:381-384 for a detailed discussion).

The *functionality proposition* can be defined as *the process using roles to achieve ends or goals in an effective and efficient manner.* In other words, roles are regarded as functional in obtaining certain goals.

The *tenability proposition* is intended to indicate that tenability exists when *the conditions surrounding performance of that role make it possible to play it with some personal reward.* In other words, what is the reward to the individual for playing a particular role?

Ralph Turner's strategy indicates the direction that interactionism will have to take, emphasizing both the theoretical and operational aspects of the perspective. In the words of Jonathan H Turner (1982:385):

> ...Turner's role theory represents an effort to incorporate all varieties of symbolic interactionism and role theory into a conceptual framework and strategy that stresses theory building and theory-testing.

3.5.4 Social science theory: Conclusion

In this section we have looked at different theoretical perspectives within the social sciences – functionalism (section 3.5.1 above), conflict theory (section 3.5.2 above), and interactionist theorizing (section 3.5.3) comprising symbolic interactio-nism (section 3.5.3.1) and role theory (section 3.5.3.2).

These, of course, are not the only theoretical perspectives in the social sciences. Turner (1982:197-301) gives much prominence to *exchange theorizing*, which comprises different exchange perspectives such as the *exchange behaviourism* as advocated by George C Homans (cf Turner 1982:212-241); *exchange structuralism* as advocated by Peter M Blau (cf Turner 1982:242-273); and R M Emerson's alternative to exchange theorizing (cf Turner 1982:274-301).

Exchange theory does not generally seem to be used in social-scientific studies of the Bible, although the *patron-client analogy* – posited by Malina (1988a:2; cf also Elliott 1987a) as the hermeneutical key used in synoptic theology to understand and present God – strongly suggests a theoretical base into which propositions of exchange theory have been assimilated.

Modern exchange theory is a merger of two traditions – the behaviourist tradition in psychology (cf Turner 1982:208-211), and the utilitarian heritage in economic theory (cf Turner 1982:197-200). The basic assumption of exchange theory is that people act in a certain way towards one another in order to receive a reward. Rewards do not have to be tangible – *emotional* rewards form the basis of many social

exchange relationships (Popenoe 1980:66). Finding their interaction rewarding, people form and maintain stable patterns of interaction, or institutions (Popenoe 1980:66). The notion of *reward* is borrowed from behaviourists, while from the utilitarian heritage the concept of *utility* has been dropped, but that of *cost* has been retained to indicate that an organism has to forego alternative rewards in seeking to obtain a particular reward (Turner 1982:209).

Exchange theory has been strongly criticised for neglecting the part that meanings and values play in social life, but the importance of exchange relationships in societies cannot be denied (Popenoe 1980:67; see also Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:79-80).

There are also *alternative forms of theorizing* (Turner 1982:387) to each of the major theories discussed above.

Alternatives to functional and structural theorizing are found in the *structuralism* of Claude Lévi-Strauss, the *systems theory* of J G Miller, and the *macro-structuralism* of P M Blau (cf Turner 1982:444-471).

Alternatives to conflict theorizing are found in *critical theory* (cf Papineau 1978: 179-184), *dialectical theory*, and R Collins' *synthetic conflict theory* (cf Turner 1982: 416-443).

Alternatives to interactionist theorizing are found in *phenomenology*[40] (cf Brown 1979:141-163; Turner 1982:390-399) and *ethnomethodology* (cf Papineau 1978:96-107; Brown 1979:163-170; Popenoe 1980:62-64; Turner 1982:399-415).

These alternatives have been listed for the sake of completeness. However, we shall forfeit a discussion of their characteristics because – except for phenomenology as incorporated in the sociology of knowledge – they do not at this stage figure prominently in social-scientific studies of the Bible.

The social-scientific theoretical perspective (cf Turner 1982:13-14; 14, note 13 & 14, and Elliott 1986:7-8 on the difference between 'theoretical perspectives' and 'models') which, in my estimate, naturally presents itself as the design by which to conduct the investigation, is that of 'role theory'. Being focused on the micro-social world – patterned in terms of status – and on interaction between individuals conducted in terms of role-playing and (symbolic) communication, it would blend easily with narrative criticism, itself making use of compatible equivalent categories such as *characterization* and *point of view*.

In his investigation of status and roles in the letters of Paul, Aloys Funk (1981: 12) indicates the bias of his own work: 'Die Begriffe Status und Rollen werden vorwiegend nach der strukturalistischen und funktionalistischen Theorie konzipiert.' The structural-functionalist approach in the social sciences understands society as a system composed of interdependent parts that all function to keep it in equilibrium

(cf 3.5.1 above). On the *interpersonal level* it is understood that individual roles are complementary and integrate in a harmonious way as a result of a shared value-orientation, and on the *institutional level* the harmonious interdependency and functional value of institutions are emphasized (Steyn 1984:5-6). The systems approach, which is a feature of especially the structural-functionalist perspective, is reminiscent of mechanical and organismic system models (Buckley 1967:1; see also Steyn 1984:6), and is therefore seen as having its roots in the fields of physics, mechanics and mathematics (Buckley 1967:8) where the terms *inertia* and *equilibrium* denote the desired condition (Steyn 1984:6), or in biology where the term *homeostasis* is used to refer to the self-regulating capacity of the biological organism to retain its desired state (Buckley 1967:12).

I do not regard structural functionalism as the best approach with which to study the Gospels. In this respect I am in agreement with Malina (1988b:13): 'The conflict approach seems far more appropriate to the study of Mark and the rest of the New Testament...than the structural functionalist approach, if only because of the agonistic quality of Mediterranean social life.' The present study, investigating role and status in Luke's gospel by means of *role theory*, therefore presupposes a view of society from the perspective of *conflict theory* rather than structural-functionalism. This means that the results obtained through an analysis on the micro-social level of interaction situations portrayed in the narrative will be subject to interpretation on the macro-social level constituted by the *narrative world*. This latter interpretation will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions pertaining to conflict theory as set out in section 3.5.2 above. In terms of literary criticism it is also correct to subject the interpretation of a smaller literary unit to correction by the interpretation of the larger whole of which it forms part.

3.6 Endnotes: Chapter 3

1. I understand this remark of Malina to mean that 'emic' data refers to informa-
   tion given and/or perceived by a contemporary of the author, that is, as
   understood at a specific time and in a specific place in history.

2. According to *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* the term 'intension' has the
   following lexicographic definitions:
   - Intensity, high degree, of a quality.
   - Strenuous exertion of mind or will.
   - (Logic) internal content of a concept.

   The last definition seems applicable to Sartori's usage.

3. Louw, however, would use the term *connotation* in reference to *usage*, and
   would indicate the possible relations between *designatum* and *denotatum* as the
   so-called *lexical meanings* of a word.

4. The following lexicographic definitions for the term 'extension' are reported in
   The Concise Oxford Dictionary:
   - Extending or being extended; extent, range; (Logic) group of things
     denoted by a term; prolongation; enlargement.
   - Additional part (of railway, plan, theory, etc.); (Number of a) subsi-
     diary telephone distant from main instrument; extramural instruction
     by university or college (*extension course*).

5. 'Theology' is used here not in the generic sense of referring to a specific
   discipline with its own epistemology and field of study. Reference is rather to a
   phenomenon that is denoted by the genitive, 'theology *of* Matthew/Mark/
   Paul...', by which is meant the author's understanding of the relationship
   between God and man and the subsequent ethical expression of that
   relationship in concrete interpersonal behaviour, as expressed in his work.

6. For all lexicographic definitions *The Concise Oxford Dictionary* will be used.

7. It is maintained by Goldberg (1987:29) that Marx did not advocate such a
   unidirectional influence of the economic base on the superstructure. The

mechanistic views of social change formulated in Marxist terms are, according to Goldberg, really based on a misunderstanding of both Marx and Engels.

8. Schreiter (1985:48-74, quoted by Du Toit 1989:96), in a discussion of the 'semiotic study of culture', suggests that society should also be perceived and studied as a text. Such a text consists of the total society in all the forms it takes, within which cultural and other sign systems are hierarchically constructed.

   This is an interesting reverse of the view held in this dissertation that a text should be viewed as a social system (albeit an imaginal one), and should be studied inter alia by social-scientific means.

9. Schnell works only with what he terms the *subsystems* of 'culture' and 'social system', leaving out of consideration for this work the components of the individual and the biological organism.

10. Van Aarde does not use the term 'social system'. He equates *culture* with *social context*: 'In this connection, therefore, the term "culture" can be replaced by the term "social context"' (Van Aarde 1988c:237). The term 'social context' presumably is used to render the expression 'behavior of the people' in the quote from Uspensky and Lotman (cf Van Aarde 1988c:236-237). Behaviour, however, in the context of the quotation refers to the actions of a collectivity of people. Such actions are called 'interaction', and this term properly belongs within a definition of the concept 'social system' (see the immediately following discussion in the text). In this connection, therefore, the term 'social context' can be replaced by the term 'social system'.

11. Nida & Reyburn (1981:6) maintain that the content of any message is derived principally from two different sets of relations:

    – The relation of verbal symbols to one another, which is known as the *formal meaning*, involving both syntactic and rhetorical levels.
    – The relation of verbal symbols to features of the nonlinguistic world, known as the *referential meaning*.

    These two categories seem to correspond to Van Aarde's 'linguistic' and 'perceptual' dimensions.

12. From whose vantage point? The author or the reader? Presumably the reader.

13. From whose vantage point, again? The author or the reader? Presumably the reader.

14. From whose vantage point this time?

15. Smit (1988:451-452) also noticed and commented upon Van Aarde's 'somewhat ambivalent description of the method employed'.

16. The difference between Van Tilborg and Van Aarde regarding their understanding of ideology is that Van Aarde concerns himself with ideology as pertaining to the *narrative world*, while Van Tilborg analyses the concept in the *contextual world.*

17. Fanaeian (1981:47) indicates that the French Neo-Marxist, Althusser, distinguished three 'instances' in any social formation – the economic, the political, and the ideological.

18. See Gottwald 1979:647-649, 667-709 for broader views. Here he (1979:66) explicitly indicates that ideology as presently used has nothing to say about the 'truth' or 'falsity' of the religious ideas, and does not imply any particular view about the genetic or causal relationship between the religious ideas and the social relations.

19. *Symbolic processes* are explained as 'processes of signification that refer to realities other than those of everyday experience' (Berger & Luckmann 1967:95).

20. The discipline of textual criticism is perhaps an exception to the extent that there cannot be anything like the 'sociological imagination' (cf Elliott 1981:5) at work in seeking the original text. The text is based only on existing evidence, and no construction is allowed.

21. Vorster (1988b:32) states: '..."post-critical" describes the period after the domination of historical criticism and the application of the so-called historico-critical methods. However, the term "post-critical" should not only be regarded as a name for a period of time. The term implies progress in New Testament research. It refers to new epistemologies and to new perceptions of what New

Testament science really is. "Critical" is not only the opposite of "uncritical" in the word "post-critical"; it refers to a new view of science.'

22. Jonathan H Turner (1982:14) lists the following four basic theoretical perspectives: (1) functional 'theory'; (2) conflict 'theory'; (3) exchange 'theory', and (4) interactionism and role 'theory'.

23. *Reconstruction* here indicates that whatever is to be constructed (i e the social world of the apostle Paul) must in some way be reality-based. Otherwise such constructions would be pure figments of the imagination.

24. Moore (1987:30, note 2) considers the term to have originated in New Testament scholarship and not in literary criticism.

25. Cohen (1968:34) contends that Spencer's fundamental concern was not to draw functional analogies between the processes of organisms and societies, but 'to show that sociology should aim to analyse the structure of societies in order to show how each part contributed to the functioning of the whole'.

26. Turner (1982:113) in fact maintains: 'As for the charge of conservatism, there is nothing inherently conservative in functionalism.'

27. Although there are several dialectical conflict models, the one by Dahrendorf is chosen for discussion because he 'is the most conspicuous conflict theorist in contemporary sociology' (Turner 1982:140, note 3).

28. Gottwald strongly disagrees with the notion of likening the functionalist view of society with a photograph portraying a static and unchanging society (a 'synchronic metabolism'). He states: 'Thus, functional models are never to be taken as photographs (they never attempt to include everything), but as highly selective dimensional models that trace significant relationships and are necessarily open to cross-questioning and reformulation' (Gottwald 1979:610-611).

29. For a discussion of the variables associated with each of Coser's propositions, see Turner 1982:158-172.

30. This is sometimes called the 'implicit functionalism' in conflict theory (Turner 1982:180; see also the discussion on Coser's 'conflict functionalism' in Turner 1982:154-174).

31. See Turner (1982:175, note 3) for a substantial list of conflict theories and theorists.

32. Becker (1964:657-658) distinguishes three main definitions of the concept *social interaction*:
    – The least sophisticated notion of the term is that of reciprocal influencing among persons or social forces.
    – The second kind of definition, used by sociologists and anthropologists, asserts that interaction, as applied to human beings, should be called *symbolic interaction*. This type of interaction is described as follows: 'Social interaction may be defined operationally as what happens when two or more persons come into contact (not necessa-rily physical contact) and a modification of behavior takes place' (Wilson & Kolb 1949: 681, quoted by Becker).
    – A third kind of definition regards the self as socially interacting with itself: 'A single individual in a room working at a problem, talking to himself or thinking out loud is...technically regarded as engaged in interaction, and insofar as the interaction is with the self – a social object – the actor is regarded as engaged in social interaction' (Bales 1953:31, quoted by Becker).

33. Swanson (1968:441) gives the following definition of instrumental activity: 'An activity is instrumental only if the probability of its appearance is affected by the relevance to the organism's needs of that activity's prior occurrence in similar situations. The term "learning" refers to changes in such probabilities.'

34. Parsons (1968:436) uses the terms 'acting agent' and 'object of orientation' to describe the 'I' and the 'me' respectively.

35. Strauss (1988:216-217) distinguishes seven variants *within* the symbolic interactionist perspective. He uses the term *symbolic interactionism* to refer to what Turner (1982:303) calls *interactionist theorising*.

36. Swanson (1968:441) explains: 'In his capacity as a minded organism, the individual is called an "actor". Groups or other collectivities can also be conceived of as actors, to the extent that they make decisions and relate to their own instrumental processes and to those of other collectivities.'

37. See Turner (1982:326-330) for a more complete discussion of the points of divergence.

38. Turner (1982:319) describes the reference of these categories:

    Psychosomatic roles refer to behaviour related to basic biological needs as conditioned by culture. Role enactment is typically unconscious.

    Psychodramatic roles refer to behaviour by individuals which is in accordance with the specific expectations of a *particular* social context (group, organisa-tion or society).

    Social roles refer to behaviour by individuals which conforms to the more *general* expectations of various conventional social categories (worker, Christian, mother, father, etc).

39. Steyn & Van Rensburg (1985:93) do not accept the identification that is made here between 'status' and 'position'. They wish to maintain a definite distinction between the two terms, in which *position* indicates the specific place of an individual within an interaction situation, and *status* refers to the esteem or prestige of a position compared to other positions. Status therefore implies a hierarchical order of positions (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:93, note **). Analytically, status is seen to consist of two elements – *prestige*, described as the appreciation and respect adhering to a position, and esteem, seen as appreciation and respect based on personal qualities and achievements (Steyn & Van Rensburg 1985:192-193).

40. The sociology of knowledge, as explicated by Berger & Luckmann (1967), is an example of the application of the theoretical principles of phenomenology derived from the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz (cf Brown 1979:141; Turner 1982:390-399).

Chapter 4

The model

> The key characteristic of a model...is that it is, before all
> else, a speculative instrument. It may take the form of a
> descriptive outline, or it may be an inductive – even a
> deductive – generalization. But whatever it is, it is first
> and foremost a framework of reference, consciously
> used as such, to enable us to cope with complex
> data...Each model presents an alternative view of rea-
> lity. Indeed, the whole purpose of employing a model
> may be to check whether the novel view of reality which
> it provides adds to our understanding of that reality.
>
> (Carney 1975:9)

4.1 Orientation

While due note has been taken of the utilization of social-scientific concepts and
models by New Testament scholars (cf chapter 2 above), the point of departure of
the present study is taken from, and the design of an appropriate model is based on,
primary sources from the field of the social sciences.

The social sciences developed the concept of the *model* as their characteristic
instrument for procuring and processing research data. Elliott (1986:3), however,
warns that the undifferentiated use of words such as 'metaphor', 'example', 'ana-
logy', 'illustration', 'symbol', or even 'paradigm', as synonyms for 'model', results in
terminological confusion. This has the effect of compromising the social-scientific
study of the New Testament. It is therefore important not only to heed Elliott's
warning, but also to support his effort at the clarification of the concept of 'model'.
While this study professes itself to be a social-scientific one, an explication of what
the concept 'model' entails is indispensable. In the next section we shall apply our
attention to that end. Chapter 4 will be devoted to a discussion of the research pro-
cess as explicated by Riley (1963) and Miller (1964), to the construction of a model

152

appropriate to the aim of the study (cf chapter 1, section 1.2 above), and to the classification of the data procured by the application of the model.

4.2 What is a model?

In the interest of a to-the-point discussion, we start by quoting a few definitions of the concept of 'model':

> (A) model is a *symbolic representation* of *selected aspects* of the behavior of a complex system *for particular purposes*.
>
> (Barbour 1974:6, quoted by Elliott 1986:4; my emphasis)
>
> A model is a theory or *set of hypotheses* which attempts to *explain* the connections and interrelationships between social phenomena. Models are made up of concepts and relationships between concepts.
>
> (Gilbert 1981:3; my emphasis)

A more comprehensive definition is offered by Malina (1983:231; my emphasis):

> (A) model is an *abstract, simplified representation* of some *real world object, event, or interaction* constructed for the purpose of *understanding, control, or prediction.*

Elliott directs attention to the pervasiveness of models in everyday life:

> ...models themselves come in different sorts an sizes and dot the scenery of everyday life, from the maps in our glove compartments and globes in our studies, to the mannequins and toy trains in our department stores, to the scale models of art and architecture, to the experimental and analytical models employed in the various fields of science. Thus models can range in size, complexity, and degree of abstraction from concrete scale models to highly abstract conceptual or theoretical models.
>
> (Elliott 1986:3-4)

For the sake of clarity, models should be differentiated from theories and paradigms. A *paradigm* is represented by the traditions, presuppositions, and methods of a discipline as a whole (Elliott 1986:7). Such traditions, presuppositions and

methods constitute what Kuhn (1970) calls a 'disciplinary matrix' within which solutions are sought for acknowledged problems (cf chapter 3, section 3.3.2). A *theory* is based on axiomatic laws and states general principles.

> It is a basic proposition through which a variety of observations or statements become explicable. A model, by way of contrast, acts as a link between theories and observations. A model will employ one or more theories to provide a simplified (or an experimental or a generalized or an explanatory) framework which can be brought to bear on some pertinent data. Models are thus the stepping stones upon which theories are built.
>
> (Carney 1975:8)

Elliott (1986:5) explains that models are therefore 'conceptual vehicles for articulating, applying, testing, and possibly reconstructing theories used in the analysis and interpretation of specific social data'.

This statement could be fruitfully employed to explain the difference between 'emic' and 'etic' states of social data (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.1), with the term *models* (*conceptual vehicles*) understood as reflecting the etic mode, and *specific social data* the emic mode.

Models are further differentiated from analogies or metaphors. The latter are terms that denote similarities among properties for the purpose of clarification through comparison, presenting the less well known in terms of the better known (Elliott 1986:3). According to Carney (1975:7), 'a model is something less than a theory and something more than an analogy'. A model differs from a metaphor, then, because it 'is *consciously structured* and *systematically arranged* in order to serve as a *speculative instrument* for the purpose of organizing, profiling, and interpreting a complex welter of detail' (Elliott 1986:5; see also Ricoeur 1978, McFague 1983, and Soskice 1985 in Van Aarde 1989b).

Basic to all the definitions is the conception of a model as a *tool* or *speculative instrument* (cf quotation from Carney at the beginning of this chapter). Elliott (1986:7) states: '"Models" are tools for transforming theories into research operations.' It is strongly emphasized that a social-scientific model, unlike other kinds of models (cf discussion below), is not a *replica* of whatever it represents. Carney (1975:8-9) points out that a model is – in terms of its nature – *highly selective*, obscuring the idiosyncratic peculiarities of the phenomenon under consideration and thereby highlighting its fundamental characteristics. Because of this need to be selective, a model can only be an approximation of reality, and needs to be constant-

ly modified by the very insights it generates. Gilbert (1981:4) explicitly warns against jumping to the conclusion that a model is a correct representation of the 'real world' on the basis of the discovery of structural correspondence between the relationship posited in the model and the relationship discovered in the data. He maintains that such correspondence provides evidence in support of the model, not definitive confirmation of its validity. Since every model is a simplified representation of the 'real world', Gilbert is convinced that a model can only provide a partial explanation of the data. Furthermore, Gilbert (1981:4) maintains, once the researcher has constructed a suitable model it can be said that he locates it in an 'imaginary world'. This world 'is identical in all respects to the "real world", except that the imaginary world includes the relationships specified in the model. Thus, the "imaginary world" is the world which would exist if the model were true' (Gilbert 1981:4). When the *imaginary world* is compared with the *real world* and the two are indistinguishable, that is evidence for concluding that the model is correct and, if they differ, it is evidence that the model is incorrect (Gilbert 1981:5). The following schematic diagram, taken over from Gilbert (1981:5), illustrates the relationship between 'real' and 'imaginary' worlds:

Fig 1 The relationship between 'real' and 'imaginary' worlds

Imaginary world

Real world

Gilbert describes the problem of establishing structural correspondence between the *imaginary* and the *real* worlds as follows:

> The problem of establishing correspondence is, there-
> fore, reduced to the problem of comparing the 'real'
> and the 'imaginary' worlds. The comparison is per-
> formed by making measurements in both worlds. Data
> from the 'real world' is obtained by observation, ques-
> tionnaires and the other usual collection procedures.
> Data from the 'imaginary world' is obtained, using one
> of the data analysis techniques – regression, factor ana-
> lysis, loglinear analysis, multidimensional scaling, or
> whatever is appropriate. These techniques generate the
> data (often called *expected* or *fitted* data) which one
> would have expected to collect, if the 'imaginary' world
> had really existed.
>
> (Gilbert 1981:5)

This exercise produces two data sets – one from the real observation of the 'real world' and one from the analytic technique used to simulate the collection of data from the 'imaginary world'.[1] Gilbert (1981:5) suggests that if the two sets of data are identical or sufficiently nearly identical, this provides evidence for supposing that the *real* and *imaginary* worlds are in fact the same – that is, that the model may correctly represent the true state of affairs contained in the phenomenon that is studied. Although Gilbert's argument may *seem* somewhat academic, it undoubt-ably is of importance. It sharpens our awareness of the fact that we should not con-fuse the conceptual instrument we use with the object we apply it to. Such a fallacy would, for instance, result if we saw ourselves as *re*constructing an (ancient) histori-cal phenomenon or experience (or part of one) by means of models. The term *reconstruction* is problematic if it suggests the possibility of reproducing in the sense of creating a replica of the original (cf the discussion on *construction* as opposed to *reconstruction*, chapter 3, section 3.3.1 above).

Riley (1963:14-15) differentiates between the use of models in *exploratory stu-dies*, and that in *hypothesis-testing* enterprises – identified by Elliott (1986:9) as *social description* and *social-scientific analysis* respectively (cf chapter 2, section 2.3.1 above). These represent the two main types of research objectives for which models are employed, and the difference between exploratory and hypothesis-testing enter-prises is located precisely in the type of objectives they generate (Riley 1963:14). In this respect the difference is not of kind, but of degree – in both instances concep-tual models are used which embody theories. 'Hypothesis-testing simply operates with more highly defined and articulated theories, whereas in exploration and

description the model remains skeletal and the theory it embodies, less explicit' (Elliott 1986:9).

In an article sketching the broad outlines of 'socio-historical' and 'sociological' interpretations of the New Testament, Botha (1989:486) distinguishes two 'schools' corresponding to the two types of research mentioned above. The 'socio-historical' approach – that is, the use of social sciences for exploratory studies – he ascribes to a group of scholars associated with Wayne Meeks and Abraham Malherbe, while the 'sociological' approach – that is, the hypothesis-testing type of research – is mostly practiced by a group in which John Elliott and Bruce Malina play a leading role (Botha 1989:486). Botha (1989:490-491) indicates that there seems to be a certain animosity between these two groups. It is to be hoped that the recognition of the value of each of these types of research may eventually obviate the need for any unfounded criticism of each other. There is no need for criticism of an effort to obtain theoretical precision for the use of social sciences in New Testament studies (cf Jennings 1985:2). Jennings warns that theoretical and methodological interest may be 'in danger of becoming an obsessional neurosis'. I believe that such a judgment might cast undue suspicion upon (arguably) the most important aspects of the research process.

To conclude this general discussion on models, we quote Elliott's remark about the usefulness of models:

> The utility of particular models is measured by the degree to which they clarify and explicate the theories and assumptions of the researcher, on the one hand, and, on the other, by the degree of their interpretive power; that is, their ability to reveal and explain the properties and relationships of social behavior, social structures, and social processes. The choice of models, in turn, is determined by the types of social phenomena to be analyzed and explained and by the theories which the researcher holds concerning the nature, interrelationships, and importance of these phenomena.
>
> (Elliott 1986:9)

4.2.1 Isomorphic and homomorphic models

Carney (1975:9) distinguishes two major kinds of models: *isomorphic* models, and *homomorphic* models.

Isomorphic models are scale models or replicas. He describes this type as follows: '...a globe in geography is such a model...There is a one-to-one relationship

---

between the features of the model and those of the thing modelled. Perfect isomorphism occurs when all the relationships are paralleled' (Carney 1975:9-10). He points out that such models may be *iconic* when they visually resemble the object modelled, and that they often take the form of *hardware models* – that is, physical representations of the original (Carney 1975:10). Their purpose is to replicate as many features as possible of the original (Elliott 1986:5).

Homomorphic models, on the other hand, do not try to duplicate all the detail of the original. They are cast in abstract terms and replicate only the broad features of the original. Elliott (1986:5) draws attention to the fact that the original itself often is an abstraction, such as a social system or a kin group. Homomorphic models are classified mainly as *analogue* or *conceptual* types. *Analogue models* are constructed when the formal assertions of the model are translated into the terms of either computer logic or mathematics. According to Carney (1975:10-11) this type of model is of little use for the study of antiquity because of the mathematical form in which it operates.

Social science is much more concerned with the second major subset of homomorphic models, namely *conceptual models*. They exhibit considerable variety of form and usage. Carney (1975:13) distinguishes five types of conceptual models:

- *Ideal type models.* Associated with Max Weber, this type of model has two basic forms, the one deductive and the other inductive:
  - In the case of the *deductive* model the ideal type is an extreme case (e g the 'ideal husband' or 'ideal church'), whose postulated constituent elements or characteristics serve as norm by which to judge the real phenomenon (husband or church). Sometimes another ideal-type model is constructed – the antithesis of the first – and is linked to the first, so that they form 'polar extremes' of the same axis. They are logically deduced abstractions and not actual instances of the real world – the latter will have a place on the connecting axis between the two poles.[2]
  - Ideal-type models based on *induction* are the most basic kind, used simply to describe things. A mass of data is compiled from various sources to construct a general picture (e g the concept of 'ideal reader' in reception aesthetics in literary theory, or that of the 'generalized other' in role theory).[3] That 'general picture', of course, is an abstraction – just the same as the deductive ideal type – that may not correspond to any real life reality. The 'average' or 'normal' arrived at in this manner, however, may serve as the basis of assessment when other phenomena are evaluated.[4]
- *Cross-cultural models.* An important assertion in the argument in favour of cross-cultural models is that facts only have meaning in relation to one's frame-

work of reference (cf Carney 1975:15; Malina 1981:7-12; Malina 1986a:9-12; see also discussion in chapter 1, section 1.3.2.2 above on *knowledge* as the frame of reference for understanding). This implies that any effort at interpretation of the values or behaviour that properly belong in a different culture, either present or past, should presuppose an understanding of the frame(s) of reference in that culture. In order to assess such frames of reference, a set of criteria is needed, and the cross-cultural model aims at providing those criteria. According to Carney (1975:16) such models are constructed in the following way:

- First, *cultural areas* are established, for instance the South American, Chinese, and Mesopotamian-Mediterranean areas.
- Second, a phenomenon (e g the forms of bureaucracy = administration) common to all these cultural areas are compared in a uniform, methodical and detailed manner.
- Third, the secondary literature – modern scholarly work on the subject – is reviewed and incorporated into the study.

   The resulting model is able to determine what kinds of attitudes were prevalent in respect of any specific phenomenon, which attitudes were unique to one culture area or time period, and which were common to all areas and periods. The benefit in the use of such models is twofold: First, it enables one to spot anachronisms in both assumptions about and interpretation of the data; second, it highlights the fact that assumptions may be very much culture-bound, and not as objective as we lead ourselves to believe. The model can also be usefully applied to fill in any gaps in our data for a specific society by generating information through the application of the cross-cultural model to other societies in the cultural area and in the same developmental stage. In this way a probable hypothesis may enable the analysis to proceed (Carney 1975:17).[5]

■ *Comparative models.* According to Carney (1975:18) models tend to develop in one of two ways: they either become more specific and detailed, or they become more theoretical and abstract. This latter type is regarded as a secondary development, based on the cross-cultural model discussed above. Its purpose is to cope with societies that change from one culture to another, or to analyse societies shaped by cultural traditions that differ extensively from one's own.

   Focusing on societies in rapid transition, political scientists who have used these models have had to devise a new means of analysis that reflects their dominant interest in change and conflict. This new mode of analysis provides an analytical infrastructure that is particularly useful for the study of antiquity, being designed to be free from forms of analysis bound up with modern Wes-

tern industrial man (Carney 1975:18). This model, evolved from cross-cultural studies, constitutes a basic conceptual tool for the purposes of comparison and the ranking of societies (Carney 1975:19).

Besides illustrating the benefits of the cross-cultural model in pointing out which of the observer's assumptions or interpretations are culture-bound or otherwise inapplicable, the analytical model may aid in the decision-making process. It may, in fact, prevent a decision overload by employing the insights and methods of analysis brought by other scholars from diverse disciplines. Such diverse methods and insights can be combined, and the resulting *analytical infrastructure* refined. Carney (1975:20) distinguishes between *maxi-*, *midi-*, and *mini-models*. The maxi-model provides the researcher with an overall plan of research, a strategy which covers the whole comparison. The midi- and mini-models are tactics for dealing with the various details of that comparison. A maxi-model therefore comprises many such mini-models.

Compared to an intuitive approach to the analysis and interpretation of social-scientific data, the cross-cultural model and the analytical infrastructure model for complex comparisons have two virtues: (a) They have a relatively precise format, and therefore can be taught to others. (b) Their structures and assumptions are available for inspection and therefore open to criticism, which is not the case with intuitive methods.

- *Postulational models.* Also known as the *thought experiment*, these models are used to search for some pattern amongst a mass of data, especially if the pattern or data is complicated and confusing (Carney 1975:21). The procedure is not to follow or trace a single causally connected chain or series of consequences, but to perform the analysis as a whole by means of some form of pattern matching. The 'pattern' is created by making a model of the complex for which one wishes to search, a master pattern, as it were. The pattern-matching technique is frequently used in *psycho-social* research, where it is called a *syndrome*. A syndrome is revealed by the existence of certain views or actions occurring in a predictable pattern.[6]

- *Multivariate (matrix-based) models.* According to Carney (1975:24) the matrix as model is a development of the postulational model. The thought experiment, in this case, is conducted by casting the thoughts in a particular form – that of a matrix or tabular layout. This effects a visual correlation between the variables intended for analysis. The matrix format increases analytical capacity in three ways:

- The matrix 'substructures' enquiry – this forces the observer to think through all the consequences of his leading ideas. After having established the relationship between two sets of ideas, the analyst thinks about that relationship. His thinking produces the 'serendipity effect' through substructuring – that is, the turning up of unexpected findings.
- The matrix also provides a screen for representing (as well as comparing or criticizing) alternative configurations of data in terms of the same frame of reference.
- Thirdly, the matrix transforms the thought process itself. By changing the nature of the categories for analysis (across and down) in the original matrix, new ways of conceptualizing the phenomena may emerge. The same result can be obtained by superimposing another matrix on the original, sometimes by means of a transparency.

According to Carney (1975:25) the purpose of this model is to guarantee the emergence of the serendipity effect by exploring novel possible combinations inherent in question and data. This boils down to a multivariate analysis of concepts, and therefore the model is called the *multivariate model*.[7]

Models, in Carney's (1975:38) words, 'are awkward and tricky to use...[But] for their purpose, they are the best thing we have by way of a technique'. At the same time he notes that models involve at least three major methodological weaknesses (Carney 1975:34):

- Firstly, by focusing attention on a carefully prescribed issue and approaching it from a specific viewpoint, a model acts like a pair of blinkers, restricting balanced perception.
- Second, model building frequently is plagued by an inherent subjectivity, as may be evident from the choice of categories to be analysed.
- Thirdly, there might be difficulty in interpreting one's findings. Inferences from results may simply mean a jumping to conclusions. Results therefore need to be corroborated and validated by applying other models and comparing the results.

To conclude: Carney (1975:37) warns against what he terms the *theology* [sic – i e ideology] *of models*, which refers to a tendency whereby one becomes so enchanted by a particular model that one uses it 'in and out of season'. This practice signifies a lack of control of models. It is not always the most elegant model that produces the best results – the best one is whichever gets the best results from a particular set of data for a particular problem.

Schematically, the concepts discussed above could be shown as follows:

Fig 2 Model diagram

Paradigm (highest level of abstraction)
|
Theory (theoretical perspective)
|
Model (makes theory operational)
|

Analogue models   Conceptual models

→ Computer logic   Ideal type ←

→ Mathematics   Cross-cultural ←

                                                   Comparative ←

                                                  Postulational ←

                                                   Multivariate ←
                                                   (matrix-based)

4.3 The research process

Riley (1963:1-31) has given an excellent exposition of the whole research process in the social sciences. She summarizes the purpose of social-scientific research as the enterprise of assembling, organizing, and interpreting facts that help to explain human society (Riley 1963:3). Two main phases are distinguished in the research process, each with its own methods or rules of procedure. Firstly, there is the *empirical phase*, during which the researcher is led by his social-scientific ideas and theories to certain facts (his research findings or data); secondly, there is the interpretive phase, during which the data are compared with the initial theories, and an effort is made to understand their larger significance (Riley 1963:4).

In every inquiry the researcher selects a particular set of methods to be followed in obtaining the research findings. This set of selected methods is referred to as the *research design* (Riley 1963:5).

However, preceding the research on the empirical level, there is a higher-level theoretical activity that takes place – the researcher has certain prior notions or theories about the nature of the social phenomena being studied (Riley 1963:5). According to these theories the researcher posits certain relationships between dif-

ferent phenomena, or between the constituent parts of a phenomenon – in other words, he has an organizing image of the phenomena to be investigated. This organizing image is known as a conceptual model – a set of ideas about the nature of the phenomena. Riley (1963:9) indicates that, ideally, the definitions and assumptions of a model are drawn from social-scientific theory. First-hand knowledge of the phenomena to be studied, together with 'hunches' of the researcher that seem to merit further investigation, may serve to 'round out' the model (Riley 1963:9). The portion of theory constituting the conceptual model forms an integral part of the research (Riley 1963:9-10). A general idea implicit in many models is that of the collectivity as a social system, whose parts and properties are interdependent. Riley (1963:10-11) defines a system as something (i) made up of identifiable *parts*, which are (ii) mutually *interdependent* so that each part influences all the others and is in turn influenced by them, and (iii) whose several parts form the *system as a whole.*

The conceptual model determines *'what questions are to be answered* by the research, and *how* empirical procedures are to be used as tools in finding answers to these questions' (Riley 1963:6). The model generally consists of ideas about (a) the human beings in collectivities (the *case*), (b) their aspects of behaviour (the *properties*), and (c) the ways these aspects fit together and affect each other (the *relationship* among properties) (Riley 1963:7). When the analyst constructs the model, he concentrates on the *social* aspects of groups. This implies that he should abstract from the total situation those social properties that are of special interest to him. His conceptual model therefore deals with individuals as they enter into typical or expected behaviour in social roles, and with their motivations as mechanisms through which the social system functions. It may also deal with values as these define the ideal patterns (norms) governing group behaviour – that is, with ideology (cf chapter 3, sections 3.2.2-3.2.2.4).

The social system and its social-structural parts may be defined at many different levels. On a *macro-social* level, society at large may constitute the system, with its constituent parts made up by the discrete institutions existing within that society. On a smaller scale, the institution itself may be regarded as the system, and the divisions within as the constituent parts. On a *micro-social* level, a *role-set* (the complement of roles in which a specific individual interacts) may serve as the system, while each individual role is taken as a constituent part. Or, in a dyadic relationship, the individual's total group role is the system, while his/her several dyadic relationships form the constituent parts. The differentiation of the social system in levels is rather important, because the systemic relationships between the parts and the whole require special research methods for dealing simultaneously at one level with the identifiable parts, and at a higher level with the inclusive larger system (Riley 1963:

12) – failure to be clear about the exact level being studied may land the researcher in all kinds of difficulty. Indeed, the problem of fitting together the lower-level parts of the collectivity (micro-sociology) – subgroups or roles played by individual members – to form the more inclusive, higher-level system of the collectivity as a whole (macro-sociology), has proved a daunting task to researchers (cf Riley 1963:700). We have noted this difficulty already in our evaluation of micro-sociological interactionist theorizing, discussed in chapter 3 section 3.5.3.3 above. It is, however, usually not necessary to conduct a full analysis on all levels of the system (such a full analysis is known as a *social system analysis*). Therefore most studies are selective in their focus. Some deal exclusively with a single level, group or individual, while others focus on one level but take another level into account. Riley (1963:701) suggests four types of partial analysis that can be useful to meet particular research objectives, namely individual analysis, contextual analysis, group analysis, and structural analysis.

Individual analysis focuses exclusively on individuals in roles, disregarding the groups to which the individuals belong. This approach seems to be useful for describing and comparing individuals and for analysing the interrelated properties of individuals (Riley 1963:701-702).

Contextual analysis likewise focuses on individuals, but locates and explains the role of the individual with reference to his group context. Theories about the individual in relation to the social system (his status, for instance, or his recourse in respect of the redress of grievances) may inter alia be concerned with how the individual relates to and is influenced by other individuals and groups (Riley 1963:702).

Group analysis deals exclusively with macro-social phenomena such as groups, disregarding the individuals who compose the group. This approach describes and compares groups or societies and studies relationships among the properties of groups (cf Riley 1963:702).

Structural analysis is concerned with the group, but retains some interest in the differentiated roles that interrelate to form the group's internal structure (cf Riley 1963:702-703).

The following table, taken from Riley (1963:702), summarizes the types of partial analysis discussed above:

Table 1 Some types of partial analysis of social systems

Type of analysis	Selective focus of model	Research case
Individual	Individual-in-a-role	Individuals
Contextual	Individual with reference to group context	Individuals characterized by properties of the groups to which they belong
Group	Group (collectivity)	Groups
Structural	Group with reference to internal arrangement of parts	Group segments characterized by properties of individual members

For instance, a conceptual model can be constructed for the purpose of investigating the relationship between the different interest groups in first-century Palestinian society. A hypothesis might be formulated about the nature of that relationship. For the purpose of validating the hypothesis, empirical research methods must be used to assemble the relevant data. The findings constitute reports of empirical regularities in the data, that is, recurring processes, patterns, and structures (Riley 1963:6). The circle that started with theory is completed in the interpretive phase by bringing the data back into the conceptual model, where the last step in the process is completed – the interpretation of the data.[8] The major aim of scientific research is indeed to supplement or test the ideas with which the research began – to extend, revise, specify, confirm, or discard the conceptual model (Riley 1963:7).

By making use of the approaches listed in the table above the researcher can unwittingly become the victim of some or other empirical or interpretive fallacy. This can happen because he fails to translate his conceptual model into operations at the appropriate social system level or because the single level to which he restricts his empirical analysis is by itself insufficient to uncover the relevant facts (Riley 1963:703). These difficulties may result in fallacious, inadequate, or misleading findings or interpretations. Riley lists the following possible fallacies:

Table 2 Some possible fallacies

(1) Fallacies arising because methods fail to fit model

Type of fallacy	Selective focus of model	Type of research case	Appropriate form of partial analysis (to prevent fallacies)
Aggregative	Individual	Group	Individual or contextual
Atomistic	Group	Individual	Group or structural

(2) Fallacies arising because methods fail to fit facts[9]

Type of fallacy	Type of research case	Implications of the facts	Appropriate forms of partial analysis (to prevent fallacies)
Psychologistic	Individual	Interpretation of individual findings affected by group context	Contextual
Sociologistic	Group	Interpretation of group findings affected by internal structure	Structural

With regard to the aggregative and atomistic fallacies Riley (1963:704) explains:

> One set of fallacies endangers the researcher who chooses his research case from a social system level that does not fit his conceptual model. If his model refers to individuals in roles, but his analysis is based on groups (small or large collectivities or aggregates), we shall speak of a possible aggregative fallacy. Conversely, if his model refers to the group, but his analysis is based on individuals, we shall speak of a possible atomistic fallacy.

Group analysis is therefore inappropriate if the hypothesis refers to the individual. Conversely, if the hypothesis refers to the group, an analysis based on individuals can lead to an atomistic fallacy, obscuring the social processes of interest (Riley 1963:706).

As far as the psychologistic and sociologistic fallacies are concerned, Riley (1963:707) gives the following explanation:

> Another set of fallacies may occur, even when the research case does fit the level emphasized in the model, when the exclusive focus on a single level conceals some of the information important to an understanding of the findings. Here the method, though it fits the *model*, fails to discover the relevant *facts*. Group data *alone* may not be enough to prevent a sociolinguistic fallacy even when the focus is on the group. By the same token, individual data *alone* may fail to prevent a psychologistic fallacy even when the focus is on the individual.

Riley (1963:15) indicates that a researcher makes use of the model at three different stages of the research process:

- He uses it in advance to select significant problems.
- He uses the model to select appropriate empirical methods for his research design.
- He interprets the empirical findings (data) with reference to his larger conceptual scheme.

The conceptual model, therefore, is a heuristic device that serves to guide the formulation and solution of social-scientific problems.

A crucial part of the construction of the model is the formulation of the research objective – that is, the purpose for which the data will be gathered and analysed must be stated. It must be indicated whether this objective will lead to exploration (social description) or to the testing of hypotheses. For instance, the research objective may be to test the hypothesis that clergymen tend to be absorbed into the high-status stratum of society. The objective must never be divorced from the larger set of underlying ideas, assumptions, and definitions in the conceptual model. It really consists of a few ideas selected from the model that specify the purpose of the investigation. In our hypothetical case one would therefore want to determine what the status of clergymen generally is.

Having worked out the conceptual model and having formulated a specific research objective, the researcher reaches the empirical phase of the process, where the model must be tested against reality to determine if the concrete phenomena fit the pattern he has ascribed to them in theory. This is done in terms of a *study design*

– the plan for assembling and organizing certain concrete facts by following certain procedures (Riley 1963:16).

Guided by the conceptual model and the objective, the researcher decides what his data are to be – what kinds of concrete cases from the real world he will use as specimens of the social system he has in mind. He decides what kinds of concrete data must serve as the properties of each case, so that he can organize such data and observe their patterns and relationships. He selects the empirical indicants or manifestations of the properties. For instance – the *case* may be a *group*; the *property* may be the *integration* of the group or the *ideology* of the group; the *indicants* of the properties may consist of the *interaction patterns* of the group members, or the *rules* for belonging to the group, or the *disposition* of the ingroup towards outgroups.

It is also important to decide what particular set of procedures, techniques, or rules should be followed in the selection and analysis of the data.

Riley (1963:18) gives the following series of basic choices that the researcher has in planning his research design :

Table 3 Research design

Paradigm: Some alternatives of sociological research design

P-I. *Nature of research case:*
Individual in role (in a collectivity)
Dyad or pair of interrelated group members
Subgroup
Group, society
Some combination of these

P-II. *Number of cases:*
Single case
Few selected cases
Many selected cases

P-III. *Sociotemporal context:*
Cases from a single society at a single period
Cases from many societies and/or many periods

P-IV. *Primary basis for selecting cases (sampling):*
Representational
Analytical
Both

P-V. *The time factor:*
Static studies (covering a single point in time)
Dynamic studies (covering process or change over time)

P-VI. *Extent of researcher's control over the system under study:*
No control
Unsystematic control
Systematic control

P-VII. *Basic sources of data:*
New data, collected by the researcher for the express purpose at hand
Available data (as they may be relevant to the research problem)

P-VIII. *Method of gathering data:*
Observation
Questioning
Combined observation and questioning
Other

P-IX. *Number of properties used in research:*
One
A few
Many

P-X. *Method of handling single properties:*
Unsystematic description
Measurement (of variables)

P-XI. *Method of handling relationships among properties:*
Unsystematic description
Systematic analysis

P-XII. *Treatment of system properties as:*
Unitary
Collective

In summary, Riley's research model consists of the following steps:

a) Define theoretical perspective(s) on which the research will be based.
b) Construct a conceptual model.
c) Formulate a research objective.
d) Explicate the research design.

4.4 Constructing a model

In constructing a model for the research undertaken in this work, we shall follow the steps set out by Riley (cf preceding section 4.3), integrated with the aspects set out in the very instructive outline guide for the design of social research by Miller (cf 1964:3-6 for the outline, and 1964:6-51 for explanations of each of the aspects of research).[10] As far as methodology is concerned, the *modus operandi* will be to integrate *explicatio* and *applicatio*. In other words, as the model is constructed and defined it will be applied to the chosen research case. This procedure will have the advantage of casting the operational capacities of our model into immediate relief, so that its potential may be properly assessed.

The model will thus be applied to the research case, namely role, status and interaction relating to the setting of a meal in Lk 14:1-24. The research objective is to test the hypothesis that Luke is advocating a redefinition of the generalized expectations connected to high status, whereby the willingness to serve – that is, to take a role associated with low status – becomes part of the expectations attendant upon anyone occupying a high status. The title of the work expresses the thesis that if such a design could be shown to exist in Luke's narrative world, the origin of that theme must be traced to Luke's symbolic universe. To substantiate this thesis reference is made to an expression in Luke 6:36, which affords us a direct insight into Luke's interpretation of the essence of God (in his dealings with man) as characterized by *compassion* (οἰκτίρμων) (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). From this interpretation stems Luke's conviction that any person occupying a high social position is obligated to practice compassion to all people who are somehow marginalized in society. He advances this core value of οἰκτίρμων – as the essence of social life – in the gospel narrative by having the main character, Jesus, advocate the ideological perspective of humbleness and willingness to serve. This viewpoint is cast in opposition to the ideological perspective of the antagonists, the Pharisees, which consist in

an interpretation of the essence of God in terms of exclusiveness, holiness and purity (cf chapter 1, section 1.1).

4.4.1 The sociological problem

The first step in the design of a research project is defined by Miller (1964:3) as the *selection and definition of a (sociological) problem*. Aspects to be considered under this heading are:

- A clear, brief description of the nature of the problem.
- Show that the extent of the problem is manageable within the bounds of the research. That is, delimit the scope of the problem.
- Describe the significance of the problem with reference to certain criteria. Miller (1964:3) lists a set of criteria, one or more of which may relate to the problem which is identified. Treatment of the problem

  (a) is timely;
  (b) relates to a practical problem;
  (c) relates to a wide population;
  (d) relates to an influential or critical population;
  (e) fills a research gap;
  (f) permits generalization to broader principles of social interaction or general theory;
  (g) sharpens the definition of an important concept or relationship;
  (h) has many implications for a wide range of practical problems;
  (i) may create or improve an instrument for observing and analyzing data;
  (j) provides an opportunity for gathering data that is restricted by the limited time available for gathering particular data;
  (k) provides the possibility of fruitful exploration with known techniques.

Each of the aspects mentioned above will now be treated in the stated order.

4.4.1.1 The nature of the (methodological) problem

The problem – as initially observed – is a *theological* one, relating to a biblical text. To be more precise, the problem is to be located in the field of biblical hermeneutics, concerning the interpretation of biblical texts. This study takes as a point of departure the assumption that a literary text constitutes a form of communication, and therefore can be regarded as a form of interaction between an author and his readers. At the same time we are convinced that a text – in this case, a narrative text –

being composed of language, which is the primary symbolic code system in any society and culture, should inevitably be related in some or other way to its social context (cf chapter 1, section 1.3.1-1.3.1.5). Because of the differences in code system (Greek versus English), era (first century versus twentieth century), social institutions (kinship and politics-based versus economics and politics-based), and cultural values (Mediterranean versus modern Western), it is clear that there is an inherent problem in the interpretation of such ancient texts by later interpreters located, for instance, in western, capitalist democracies. It is also evident that interpretive efforts, employing theological and literary methods only, could not possibly render a satisfactory interpretation of such an ancient text – these tools are simply inadequate for negotiating the social aspects implicit in and adhering to the text. Contrary to the view based on the implicit assumption that biblical texts only relate to the spiritual and metaphysical spheres, this study regards religious beliefs and social life as reciprocally determining each other. The problem that confronts us is therefore to devise a method of interpretation that accounts for those social factors that are not accounted for in traditional methods of interpretation.

4.4.1.2 The scope of the problem

The problem having been defined as mainly a methodological one (cf preceding section), its scope is limited to the construction of a viable method to account for and interpret certain data of social-scientific interest in the text as the phenomenon under consideration. To validate the model, it must be tested in respect of what it is able to accomplish. This means that the model must be translated into a research *operation* if and when it is applied to a research case. The object of study, in this instance, is the Gospel of Luke as narrative discourse.[11] Taking up the insight of Resseguie (1982:44) regarding the two opposing ideological viewpoints operative in the central section of Luke's Gospel – consisting in the *exaltation-oriented* point of view of the Pharisees, as opposed to a *humiliation-oriented* point of view of Jesus – we confine ourselves to that central section, the so-called Travel Narrative. We restrict ourselves even further by focusing on segments of that section in so far as they reflect the different ideological viewpoints. To be more precise, we shall focus on the three metaphoric narratives[12] in Lk 14 that carry the theme of a meal or banquet – namely Lk 14:(7)8-11, Lk 14:12-14, and Lk 14:(15)16-24. The reason for selecting these sections as our test case is contained precisely in the theme common to all three of them. There is no doubt that the subject of meals is a highly social one (cf Douglas 1974:249; Neyrey 1988a:76; see also chapter 1, section 1.1). Douglas (1975:260) describes the significance of meals in the following terms:

> ...the meaning of a meal is found in a system of repeated analogies. Each meal carries something of the meaning of the other meals; each meal is a structured social event which structures others (other social institutions – P v S) in its own image.

This description is a conceptual abstraction of the concrete meal, indicating that meals acquire the sense of institutions. Douglas (1975:273) argues – in the form of a generalized abstraction – that the ordered system which is a meal represents all the ordered systems associated with it. In this sense aspects associated with meals such as 'what may be eaten, how it is grown, how it is prepared, in what vessels it is served, when and where it is eaten, and with whom it may be consumed' (Neyrey 1988a:76; see also Elliott 1989b:3) are especially appropriate for social-scientific analysis. Elliott (1989b:9) suggests a close proximity between meals and domestic relations within the household. He contends that meals, like domestic relations, function in the following three related ways:

> They (meals) represent (1) physical means for sustenance and survival, (2) channels and codes of sociality, and (3) symbols of life shaped by the principles and values of the Kingdom of God.
>
> (Elliott 1989b:9)

Additional evidence for the assumption that social systems are replicated inter alia in meals is provided by Smith (1987), who argues that there is a parallel between Luke's literary motif of table fellowship in the Gospel, and the 'symposium' genre attested to by Plutarch (ca 50-120 C E).

> Meal traditions in the ancient world are most commonly associated with the institution of the symposium. The symposium as a social institution was...the second course of the traditional banquet, or the drinking party that followed the meal proper. It was during the drinking party that the entertainment of the evening was traditionally presented. In the philosophical tradition, this tended to consist of elevated conversation on a topic of interest to all in the group.
>
> The symposium also gave its name to a literary tradition, the symposium genre. Here the primary emphasis is on the description of banquets, especially philosophical banquets, utilizing a traditional format and traditional

> themes, with a emphasis placed on the philosophical dis-
> course that took place during the drinking party.
>
> (Smith 1987:614-615)

Smith (1987:616-617) identifies five 'themes' – associated with the symposium genre
– according to which to analyse the Travel Narrative (Lk 9:51-18:14 [sic]). These
are:

- Ranking at table as a symbol of status.
- Table talk as a mode of teaching.
- Eating and drinking as a symbol of luxury.
- Table service as a symbol for community service.
- Table fellowship as a symbol for community fellowship.

Smith regards the motif of table fellowship as one of Luke's 'favorite literary
devices'. He focuses on three instances where Luke 'enriches his Gospel story with
references to meal symbolism' related to the symposium genre, namely Lk 7:36-50,
Lk 11:37-54, and Lk 14:1-24. He considers these passages instances where the
author consciously employed the symposium motif of 'table talk' (cf 'themes' above)
whereby Jesus teaches while at a meal (Smith 1987:614). The last of these instances
(i e Lk 14:1-24) is also the one we are interested in.

The 'meal' as setting is also a significant theme in the Gospel of Luke because it
reflects the opposing ideological perspective (cf chapter 1, sections 1.1 and 1.2;
chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1) held by the Pharisees, and thereby places the Lukan Jesus'
(and the author's) own ideology in sharp relief (cf Resseguie 1982:45-46). Accor-
dingly, Luke's portrayal in his Gospel of what constitutes a proper understanding of
God's will for man should be translated into social-ethical terms. The focus of
attention is on Luke's understanding of God, his *core values*, his *theology*, his reflec-
tion on the religious symbolic universe (cf chapter 1, section 1.1; chapter 3, section
3.2.2.3; section 4.4 above), as expressed in his literary work – and, based on that, the
religious-ethical ordinances he prescribes.

In social-scientific terms (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.1 on the issue of 'emic' and
'etic'), the problem amounts to the investigation of Luke's religious *symbolic universe*
(cf relevant discussions in chapter 2, section 2.5.6.1 and chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3
above) as evidenced in his ideology (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.2-3.2.2.2b), which is ex-
pressed in the literary form of a Gospel (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.2.1 on the issue of
ideology in literary studies) in order to have a specific social effect.

Restricting ourselves to the aspects set out above will ensure that the scope of
the investigation stays within manageable bounds.

4.4.1.3 Significance of the problem
From the list of possible criteria suggested by Miller (cf 4.4.1 above) a few have been chosen as relevant to this research project. The treatment of the problem (described in section 4.4.1) is namely thought to be timely, to relate to a practical problem, and to fill a research gap.

4.4.1.3 (a) Timeliness
The problem of the methodological approach towards the social-scientific interpretation of religious narrative texts has not, to my mind, been sufficiently systemized and explicated. This type of interpretation appears to be practiced more widely nowadays, therefore the present study is a timely contribution towards the methodology of that kind of effort.

4.4.1.3 (b) Relation to a practical problem
The practical problem to which the study relates is that of the interpretation of a religious and normative text within a religious and prescriptive discipline, namely theology. The interpretive process consists of making sense of the text first, and then relating that interpretation to practical behaviour in everyday life. Traditional modes of interpretation are regarded as deficient in accounting for the social aspects relating to a text from antiquity.[13]

4.4.1.3 (c) Filling a research gap
It is our intention that this study should advance a methodological approach that might make a threefold contribution towards either filling gaps in the research or refining current thinking.

4.4.1.3 (c) (i) The neglected reality
In addition to the factor that the study is related to the practical problem of interpretation (cf preceding discussion), there is the question about the proficiency of traditional theological interpretation. In theology the causal relationship between (religious) beliefs and ethics has been described especially in terms of an indicative-imperative scheme. Advocates of a social-scientific study of the Bible have contended, however, that theology – in spite of the *Sitz im Leben* approach (cf chapter 2, section 2.2 above) – has been inadequate, from a social-scientific perspective, in its treatment of the *social* aspects relating to the text in the interpretive process. Consequently the interpretive instruments of biblical studies within the field of theology do not make provision for the analysis of a text in terms of the social factors that played a role both in the formation and in the functioning of the text.

Favouring the inclusion of a social-scientific analysis in the interpretive process relating to ancient texts, we have asked ourselves whether a social-scientific model has yet been developed that adequately treats our phenomenon of study, namely the Gospel of Luke as a narrative text. What type of existing social-scientific model would be compatible with the literary aspects relating to a narrative text? The one coming closest to what we have in mind is that used by Petersen (1985) (cf chapter 2, sections 2.4.6 and 2.5.6-2.5.6.2). Elliott (1981, 1987, 1989a; cf also chapter 2, sections 2.4.5 and 2.5.5) also emphasizes the importance of taking into account the literary work. In a discussion of the future agenda of the social-scientific study of the Bible, Elliott (1989a:26) notes certain limitations that the method has to contend with:

- There is a limit of available data.
- There is limited availability of contemporary and contiguous analogies to Christian social formations such as other Jewish factions (Pharisees, Sadducees, synagogal communities, et cetera), and Graeco-Roman groups (philosophic schools, voluntary associations, and the military). Also limited, are analogies from societies and cultures similar in situation (ecological, economic, social) but removed from early Christianity in terms of time and space.
- There is a limitation on the adequacy of the models employed to gather and analyse social data. Critical judgment must be exercised concerning the 'fit' between the features of and dimensions of the model and the phenomena being examined.
- There is also a limitation on the conclusions of the method, regarding theological beliefs and affirmations. A study of social phenomena does not involve *in its methodology* judgments about the possibility of revelation or the 'accuracy' or 'non-accuracy' of theological beliefs concerning the existence and nature of God, demons, miracles and the like.

Elliott (1989a:26) remarks that these limitations are the same that relate to the historical-critical method in general. Advising of the necessity of always remaining self-critical and aware of the limitations as far as methodology is concerned, he lists several issues that are items on the agenda for future social-scientific research, for instance the proper classification of the Jesus movement as a reform, millenarian, or Jewish sectarian movement, or as a Jewish faction; typecasting Jesus accurately as either charismatic figure or faction leader; et cetera (cf Elliott 1989a:28).

These issues are mostly related to the broad social-cultural-historical first-century Mediterranean world within which the New Testament texts originated. Such issues undoubtably constitute a basic part of the social-scientific purpose of clarifying the reality base from which the textual expressions within the New Testament

obtained their meanings, and to which they refer. This study wishes to emphasize, however, the importance of the texts of the New Testament as ideological/theological expressions mediating between the symbolic and the social universe.

Our purpose is not in the first place to explore the social system or its constituent parts as such, but rather to study the understanding and evaluation of that system by the author as evidenced in the text. This, of course, signals a difference in the *emphasis* of study, not in the *kind* of study – we reiterate our conviction that religious texts can only be properly understood by remaining aware of the contextualism of the New Testament statements (cf Elliott 1989a:27), and that even an investigation of ideology cannot succeed if its social context is ignored.

Taking note of existing insights, this study therefore hopes to contribute towards the improvement of the theological interpretive enterprise by constructing a model that accounts for both the literary and the social attributes of its phenomenon of study.

4.4.1.3 (c) (ii) A core value

In the process of constructing our model, we shall endeavour to validate it by applying it to the test case we have chosen. This involves arguing in favour of the presupposition that Luke's Gospel constitutes a theoretical reflection that has the purpose of legitimating a body of pre-theoretical concepts or knowledge, known as the symbolic universe (cf chapter 2, section 2.5.6-2.5.6.2 and chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3-3.2.2.4 on theoretical and pre-theoretical types of knowledge). Such pre-theoretical knowledge is reflected in theoretical form in terms of *core values* (Neyrey 1988a:80; see also chapter 1, section 1.1 above).

While in the Gospel of Matthew the core value seems to be expressed by the term τέλειός (Mt 5:48), Luke appears to have conceived of God in terms of the concept οἰκτίρμων (Lk 6:36) (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). In terms of our definition of ideology as consisting of an evaluative noetic component (the core value) as well as the translation of that value(s) into practice (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.2-3.2.2.4) Luke surely would have expected his readers to act out the core value in the network of social relations in which they partook. Therefore the core value, abstracted in terms of an understanding of aspects of the symbolic universe, would be advocated as the essence of social life. The hypothesis that the Lukan Jesus' understanding of God is expressed by the term οἰκτίρμων will have to be tested by finding corroborative evidence in the context of the social life of the first-century Mediterranean world. This, obviously, can only be done by the implementation of a social-scientific model constructed for that purpose. However, because the actual world of the author is not available for analysis, the Gospel narrative is treated as the social system and

the model is applied to that 'imaginary' world (cf section 4.2 above). The results of such an analysis may be utilized to make inferences about the actual world in which this imaginary world was constructed for a purpose.

4.4.1.3 (c) (iii) Averting reductionism

The third way in which this work might contribute towards future fruitful implementation of social-scientific models in the interpretive process, is by allaying fears about the instrument (the model) reducing the theological enterprise to mere 'social gospel'. This we hope to do by exercising control over the formulation of the significance of our findings, as well as by refraining from a positivist attitude that may result in positing a social base for any religious phenomenon.

In terms of the present issue: Why should οἰκτίρμων, as the expression of the dominant ideological perspective on the essence of life in Luke's gospel, be regarded as theology, and not merely as social ideology? *Compassion* surely does not need to be connoted to theology – often it is only an emotional expression, or else it remains a humanistic ideal to be accomplished. What is the case in the Gospel of Luke? In what sense did Jesus, or the evangelist himself, use οἰκτίρμων with a theological basis?

The answer to this question is provided by the *type* of symbolic universe or pre-reflective knowledge that is reflected upon. If the symbolic universe is religious in nature, the theoretical reflection on that symbolic universe would be called theology. The main factor distinguishing a religious symbolic universe from other kinds, is probably the fact that a social-scientific analysis could never pretend to have adequately described or explained such a phenomenon merely by observing and by compiling a list of attributes, causes, and effects. In the terms of Berger & Luckmann (1967), religious experiences are 'finite provinces of meaning' that do not form part of the experience of everyday life. While such experiences could only be expressed and observed in terms of actions and interaction pertaining to everyday life, they could never be explained away in social terms (cf also Van Staden 1988: 344-345). Elliott (1989a:27) argues in similar fashion that while there is nothing *inherently* reductionistic in the social sciences, there is a limitation on its conclusions in regard to theological beliefs and affirmations. In terms of its methodology a study of social phenomena (of which religion is one) should suspend any judgments 'about the possibility of revelation or the "accuracy" or "non-accuracy" of theological beliefs concerning the existence and nature of God, demons, miracles and the like' (Elliott 1989a:27).

> Social scientific interest is restricted to the social condi-
> tions, capacities, and consequences of such beliefs re-
> gardless of their being judged 'true' or 'false'. That is,
> the social sciences regard beliefs as real in their social
> consequences and it is this which they are interested in
> understanding and explaining.
>
> (Elliott 1989a:27)

4.4.2 Theoretical perspective(s) as basis of the research

The next major factor in the research project, after defining the sociological pro-
blem (cf section 4.4.1 above), is that of defining and explicating the theoretical pers-
pective(s) on which the research will be based (cf section 4.3 above). Miller (1964:
4) lists the following aspects which should receive attention under this heading: the
relation of the problem first to a theoretical framework, and second to previous
research.

4.4.2.1 Theoretical framework

Two disciplines are involved, and therefore two theoretical frameworks. As our
object of study is a literary text, theoretical matters relating to the literary-critical
aspect consist in the *genre* of the text and its way of reference. In social-scientific
terms genre can be regarded as a model, with its parts, applied to the data which is
the text itself. The *content* of the text is described as a *narrative world*. This concept
– *narrative world* – constitutes another (literary) model of the essence of that mate-
rial – an imaginary world constructed by the author in terms of his ideology. This
ideology is imputed to characters, places, and actions within the narrative world. In
social-scientific terms, the narrative world would be defined as a social system that
has all the features of an actual social system but for the fact that it is a closed sys-
tem[14] – the author has total control over who figures and what happens within the
system, while the researcher has no manipulative control over it.[15]

The second theoretical framework, of course, is a social-scientific one. The fact
that the study focuses on micro-sociological issues concerning the behavioural pat-
terns associated with single roles, dyadic relationships or role complements asso-
ciated with certain statuses, necessitates an appropriate theoretical framework,
namely role theory and symbolic interactionism (cf chapter 3, section 5.5.3.1-3.5.3.2).
However, to remain balanced, this investigation must eventually be evaluated within
a theoretical perspective relating to the order in society, and I take the view that
first-century Mediterranean society should basically be approached in terms of con-
flict theory (cf Malina 1988:13). Thus, we have two levels of theory – the macro-
and micro-sociological levels. The purpose of the *macro-sociological* perspective is

to ensure that the study does not reduce the social system represented in the narrative text to the single level of micro-social life – that is, to roles and the interaction between roles. The broader picture should be implicit in the model.

4.4.2.2 Previous research on the problem

Research relevant to the problem of constructing an interpretive model for the interpretation of a single biblical text, combining social-scientific and literary perspectives, has been initiated by the works of Belo [1975](1981), Elliott (1981), and Petersen (1985). Elliott (1981) approaches the type of research undertaken in this study with his concepts of *situation* and *strategy*, combined into an approach called *sociological exegesis* (cf chapter 1, section 1.3.2.3 and chapter 2, section 2.4.5). Petersen (1985) is the first scholar to have actually attempted a full integration of narrative and social-scientific concepts in an investigation of symbolic universe, in his work on Paul's letter to Philemon (cf chapter 2, section 2.4.6).

Among any works that employ the social sciences it is important to maintain the distinction between those that focus on the referential history, and those that focus on the contextual history. While both are legitimate enterprises, the latter seems especially prone to the referential fallacy, when socially significant elements of the narrative are taken as directly representing or mirroring the actual world or historical context. This study wishes to avoid that fallacy by employing the abstract concept of *narrative world*. The relationship between the narrative world and the actual world of the author is explored by employing the 'transparency' theory (cf Van Aarde 1990b; see sections 2.2 and 2.3). In my analysis I depend – though not exclusively, nor with complete agreement – on the works by Petersen (1978), Resseguie (1982), and Van Aarde (1990b), which I regard as seminal both to Lukan research in general and to this study in particular. These studies are strictly orientated towards a literary-critical approach to the text in terms of Uspenksy's classification of *point of view* in narrative analysis. Resseguie employs three of four analytical categories which Uspensky associated with point of view, namely: ideological, psychological, and phraseological (cf Resseguie 1982:42). Concentrating on the ideological point of view, Resseguie (1982:44) concludes that Luke plays off two opposing ideological points of view against each other in such a way that the dominant ideology, represented by Jesus, is vindicated.

4.4.3 The conceptual model

It would seem that Riley's concept of *conceptual model* (cf section 4.3 above) corresponds with Miller's use of the term *hypothesis*. Miller stresses the central importance of usable hypotheses, pointing out that the entire study rests upon their poten-

tial significance. He refers to the emphasis given by Goode & Hatt (1952:68-73) to the criterion that a hypothesis should be related to a body of theory, indicating that this is a priority item (Miller 1964:14). Therefore, while retaining the term *conceptual model* as the heading for this section, we shall make use of Miller's directives about *hypotheses*, understanding that the referent is the same. Miller (1964:14-20) suggests five aspects to consider in formulating a hypothesis. Adopting his outline, we shall proceed to set out the assumptions upon which this study rests.

4.4.3.1 Hypotheses must be conceptually clear

This demands that the concepts used in the research outline (cf chapter 1, section 1.1-1.3 above) should be clearly defined.

The theory is that Luke in his narrative advocates a different ideological perspective on the issue of what constitutes a 'marginal state' than the one prevailing at the time. He questions the values and practices shared by society in general and, presumably, by his intended audience, with regard to the concept and proper expression of 'status' in society inasmuch as it relates to acceptability before God. It therefore seems feasible to suspect that Luke implemented and/or composed literary scenes – and commented upon them – that alluded to, and probably reflected his objective of challenging or questioning some aspects of interaction behaviour (role performance) prescribed by structural expectations, regarding the status which is identified as the referent of the role. He stresses an alternative form of social relations, and he bases it on a new interpretation of aspects of the symbolic universe, notably the precepts about the essence of God in his relations with man. In advocating these values, Luke has the character Jesus in his story advance his viewpoint. Luke casts his ideological viewpoint in relief by contrasting it with an opposing ideology, namely that of the Pharisees and the scribes (as does Resseguie 1982:41; cf also Van Aarde 1988c). The core value which the character Jesus promotes on Luke's behalf is designated by the term οἰκτίρμων as an expression of the humiliation-oriented perspective (cf chapter 1, section 1.1).

4.4.3.2 Hypotheses must have empirical referents

Miller (1964:15) makes the important observation that while a hypothesis may involve the *study* of value judgments, such a study must be separated from a plea for acceptance of one's values. In other words, usable hypotheses may not embody moral judgments such as: 'clergymen are entitled to deference'. The referent must be empirical, not some vague feeling that cannot be investigated with proper research operations.

In this case the empirical referents for our hypothesis consist in the status and roles, and attendant expectations, associated with the characters in Luke's narrative as they interact in specific interaction situations. The value judgments within the text made in respect of these expectations, actions and interactions, are also taken as empirical referents, and are actually regarded as important indicants of Luke's ideology.

4.4.3.3 Hypotheses must be specific

If the operations and the predictions indicated by a hypothesis are made explicit, it becomes possible to assess the possibility of testing the hypothesis (Miller 1964:15). This means that, apart from conceptual clarity, a description of any indexes being used is expected. Such specific formulations increase the validity of the results because, according to Miller (1964:15-16), 'the broader the terms the easier it is to fall into the trap of using selective evidence'. Miller adds that the fame of most prophets and fortune-tellers lies in their ability to state predictions in such a general way that almost any occurrence can be interpreted as a fulfillment. In statistical terms, this means that the more specific the prediction, the smaller the chance that the prediction will be borne out accidentally (Miller 1964:16). Scientific predictions or hypotheses are therefore expected to be as definite and specific as possible.

The requirement for specificity has, in our case, been partially fulfilled already. The hypothesis is that Luke is addressing the problem of a rift in society between the high status stratum (the exaltation-oriented elite) and the low status stratum (the marginal people for whom there is no provision in the structure of society) by having certain characters and/or groups in his narrative enter into dispute with one another on certain issues. The types of issue debated or actions performed by the characters (individual or collective) could easily be abstracted to denote the two contending ideologies attested to by the narrative. The narrative in my view serves to promote one of these ideological perspectives over the other by deriving it directly from the religious symbolic universe. Both ideological viewpoints are concerned with the structure of society and who should or should not be accommodated within that structure, and therefore properly belong on a macro-sociological level of analysis. However, the narrative promotes one of the viewpoints by condoning the conduct of certain characters within the story world and denouncing the behaviour of others. All this belongs on a micro-sociological level where the emphasis is on individual behaviour and binary relations between roles. The present study concerns itself with this latter level of analysis, while recognizing that the roles are connected to the structure of the social system – represented by the higher-level collec-

tivity (group) – in terms of the status they represent. We have also restricted the application of the hypothesis to specific text segments (cf section 4.4.1.2 above).

What remains is for us to indicate what indexes we are going to work with. In keeping with the intention of applying ourselves to the micro-sociological level of social analysis, indexes will be made of the characters in the narrative world, the roles ascribed to each character, the expectations in respect of the roles, the status to which the roles refer, the expectations in respect of status, and the value judgments correlated with roles, status, and expectations.

4.4.3.4 Hypotheses must relate to available techniques

Theory should not be thought to oppose method (cf section 4.2 above). The theorist must use methods to test his hypotheses, and therefore should know what techniques are available for that purpose. Knowledge of available techniques could also prove beneficial for the formulation of usable questions (cf Miller 1964:16). Techniques for assessing status could, for instance, be found in the social-economic grouping of occupations and occupational prestige ratings, measurements of social class, and social status scales (cf Miller 1964:91-123). In the analysis of a narrative text with regard to status, one would use indicants within the text itself. Such indicants, contained in the reactions of characters, in literary terms that could be dubbed 'evaluative', or in value judgments in the narrator's commentary, are analysed to determine which social positions were deferred to, and which were despised. A much-used tool for social research is for instance the matrix model, which makes use of cross-tabulation that allows for different arrangements of data in order to spot recurring and significant patterns that might facilitate the interpretive process (cf Carney 1975:24-34). The analyses will employ this method of cross-tabulation.

4.4.3.5 Hypotheses must be related to a body of theory

As we have already indicated (cf section 4.4.2.1 above), this study is conducted on the micro-sociological level and is therefore related to interactionist theorizing, distinguished in two major approaches, namely *symbolic interactionism* and *role theory* (see chapter 3, section 3.5.3-3.5.3.3 above). While *role theory* seems a clear enough concept, *symbolic interactionism* is relevant to this study in terms of the symbolic models of *patronage and clientism*, *honour and shame*, and *purity maps*. I shall discuss each of these models shortly.

4.4.3.5 (a) Patronage and clientism

My remarks about the impression that the social location of people figures promi-
nently in Luke's narrative world, and that positions (statuses) seem to be grouped
together in a high-low configuration (cf chapter 3, section 3.1), brings to mind the
so-called *patron-client relationship* described and commented upon by historians and
social scientists (cf Carney 1975:149-150, 166-172, 199-200, 214-216; Malina 1981b:
79-90; 1988a; Elliott 1987a:42-43). According to Carney (1975:169-171) this type of
relationship grew out of the principle of *reciprocity*. Reciprocal exchange or recipro-
city involved the giving and receiving of gifts – the recipient of a gift was obligated
to reciprocate. In this way a person of substance could acquire influence over a
group of others, and could 'call in his debts' when needed (cf Carney 1975:167).
Malina (1981b:80) defines reciprocity as 'a sort of implicit, non-legal contractual
obligation, unenforceable by any authority apart from one's sense of honor and
shame'. He calls it a 'dyadic contract' and distinguishes two such types of contract,
namely those between persons of equal status – *colleague contracts* (Malina 1981b:
80) or *horizontal dyadic relations* involving the exchange of favours of similar quality
(Malina 1988a:6-7) – and those between persons of unequal status – *patron-client
contracts* (Malina 1981b:80) or *vertical dyadic relations* (Malina 1988a:7). The first
produces a symmetrical relationship, and the second an asymmetrical one (cf
Malina 1981b:81). Carney (1975:171) refers to the Roman *clientela* as the most well
known system of patronage, and states:

> The basic idea is that a man of position and power uses
> his influence to advance or protect inferiors. The latter
> then become his clients. Clients owe their patron, their
> benefactor, fealty, and must themselves in turn provide
> resources or services upon his demand...The client of a
> power wielder thus becomes a powerful man and him-
> self in turn attracts clients...So arise the distinctive pyra-
> mids of power – patron, then first order clients, then se-
> cond and third order clients and so on – associated with
> a patronage society.

According to Elliott (1987a:42) the patron can benefit the client regarding the
acquisition of 'goods' such as food, financial aid, physical protection, career
advancement, citizenship, freedom from taxation, et cetera. The client, in return,

> is obligated to enhance the prestige, reputation and
> honor of his patron in public and private life, favor him
> with...salutations, support his political campaigns, supply

>   him information...and give constant public attestation
>   and memorials of his patron's benefactions, generosity,
>   and virtue....

>   (Elliott 1987a:43)

The *colleague* and *patron-client* contracts (horizontal and vertical dyadic relations respectively) discussed above are really conceptual models used to interpret certain social phenomena.[16] These models also apply to the narrative section that will serve as the test case, namely Luke 14:1-24, and I shall return to them later (cf section 4.6.1.1 below).

Elliott (1987a:43) remarks that in this reciprocal relationship a strong element of solidarity is linked to personal honour and obligations, informed by the values of friendship, loyalty, and fidelity. This brings us to another model that may be useful in the analysis of the selected text, namely the *honour-shame* model.

4.4.3.5 (b) Honour and shame

According to Malina (1981b:25) *honour* and *shame* were pivotal values of the first-century Mediterranean world. Malina (1981b:27) gives the following description of the concept of honour:

>   Honor might be described as socially proper attitudes
>   and behavior in the area where the three lines of power,
>   sexual status, and religion intersect...Honor is the value
>   of a person in his or her own eyes (that is, one's claim to
>   worth) *plus* that person's value in the eyes of his or her
>   social group. Honor is a claim to worth along with the
>   social acknowledgment of worth.

Malina (1988a:29) distinguishes between *ascribed honour* (as the socially recognized claim to worth that befalls a person through birth, or which is ascribed to him by a notable person of power such as God or the king), and *acquired honour* (as the socially recognized claim to worth that a person acquires by excelling over others in the social interaction that is called challenge and response). *Challenge and response* is described as:

>   a sort of social pattern, a social game...in which persons
>   hassle each other according to socially defined rules in
>   order to gain the honor of another. Honor, like all other
>   goods in first-century Mediterranean society, is a limited
>   good...There is only so much to go around, or at least that

> is what people learn to perceive. Now since honor is the pivotal value (much like money in our society), nearly every interaction with non-family members has undertones of a challenge to honor.
>
> (Malina 1988a:29-30)

Malina (1988a:30) emphasizes that the interaction over honour, the challenge-response game, can take place *only between equals*. *Honour*, as the feeling of self-worth and the public, social acknowledgment of that worth, applies to both sexes.

Shame, on the other hand, is likewise a positive symbol, referring to the sensitivity for one's own reputation – sensitivity to the opinion of others (Malina 1988a: 44).

Concerning the acquisition of honour, Malina (1988a:46) states:

> People acquire honor by personally aspiring to a certain status and having that status socially validated. On the other hand, people *get shamed* (not *have* shame) when they aspire to a certain status and this status is denied them by public opinion. At the point a person realizes he is being denied the status, he is or gets shamed, he is humiliated, stripped of honor for aspiring to an honor not socially his. Honor assessments thus move from the inside (a person's claim) to the outside (public validation). Shame assessments move from the outside (public denial) to the inside (a person's recognition of the denial). To be or get shamed, thus, is to be thwarted or obstructed in one's personal aspiration to worth or status, along with one's recognition of loss of status involved in this attempt.

According to Malina (1988a:46) certain families and institutions such as first-century tavern and inn owners, actors, and prostitutes as a class, are considered irretrievably shameless because they do not respect any lines of exclusiveness, and therefore symbol the chaotic. This brings us to the last symbolic model, namely that of *purity maps*.

4.4.3.5 (c) Purity and pollution

I have already referred to the fact that the main difference between Jesus and the Pharisees can be ascribed to different interpretations of the symbolic universe, especially concerning the essence of God in his dealings with man (cf chapter 1, section

1.1; see also section 4.4 above). It has also become clear that the ideological diffe-
rences can for the most part be related to the question of boundaries – of inclusion
and exclusion, of acceptability or unacceptability, of wholeness and holiness in terms
of some gradation system. The symbolic model of *purity and pollution* can be used
to determine what the criteria of this gradation system actually were. We have
noted that anthropologist Mary Douglas has worked extensively with the question of
purity and pollution (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). The results of her studies, indicating
the replication of societal issues in prescriptions and proscriptions concerning for
instance the human body, are especially important for New Testament studies, and
have in fact stimulated several interesting studies already (cf inter alia Neyrey
1988a; 1988c; Elliott 1989b; 1991). Neyrey (1988a:67), dependent on Douglas
(1966), introduces the concept of purity 'maps'. He argues that the order of creation
served as a blueprint not only for the temple system, which became the central and
dominant symbol of Israel's political institution, its religious ideology and cultural
values, but also led to maps for structuring most aspects of Jewish life apart from the
temple. Neyrey (1988a:67) defines 'map' as 'the concrete and systematic patterns of
organizing, locating, and classifying persons, places, times, actions, etc'. He distin-
guishes maps of *places*, grading certain locations in an ascending order of holiness
where the principle of classification is the proximity to the center of the temple;
maps of *people*, graded according to the principle of holiness as 'wholeness', so that
people with physical deficiencies are ranked last in the hierarchical order and
people with damaged family lines second to last. This map also replicates the map
of places, ranking people according to their proximity to the temple (cf Neyrey
1988a:68). There is also a map of *times*, where holy times are listed with the rules
how to observe them (Neyrey 1988a:69). According to these maps a person, place,
thing, or time is pure in so far as it remains in its specified place. Douglas
(1966:114) reasserts that the origin of such strong purity concerns is society itself:

> The idea of society is a powerful image. It is potent in
> its own right to control or to stir men to action. This
> image has form; it has external boundaries, margins, in-
> ternal structure. Its outlines contain power to reward
> conformity and repulse attack. There is energy in its
> margins and unstructured areas. For symbols of society
> any human experience of structures, margins or bounda-
> ries is ready to hand.

This, then, is the essence of the ideological perspective of the Pharisees in Luke – a coveting of purity concerns expressed by their mapping of places, people, things, and times; but especially of people.

At the same time first-century Mediterranean society is viewed on the macrosociological level in terms of conflict theory, resulting in the assumption that both individuals and groups are contending with each other in terms of their respective needs and interests. Therefore the units of analysis have been chosen because they are taken to reflect an ideological dispute based on different precepts about God.

4.5 Study design

The units of analysis, as we have indicated (cf 4.4.1.2 above), will consist of the three small metaphorical narrative units embedded in Luke 14, namely Luke 14:(7)8-11, Luke 14:12-14, and Luke 14:(15)16-24. The gospel narrative, as an ideological form of communication, sets out to effect a change in society or in the perception of society on the level of certain aspects of inter-role behaviour, status, and structural expectations concerning role and status. The strategy of the author in his pursuit of this ideological motive is to paint a picture of a (imaginary) world in which the intended change in the real world is effected and acted out by the characters in the narrative world. As the title of the present work suggests, the investigation is directed at clarifying the religious ideology or theology of the author as it finds expression in the actions of and the interactions between people (characters in the narrative) (cf chapter 1, section 1.1; section 4.4 above). The point of articulation between the literary and social-scientific enterprises is, on a macro-level, the correspondence between the literary construct of the narrative as a world of story, and the narrative world as an imagined social world or social system. On a micro-level the point of articulation is located in the correspondence between the characters (collective or individual) as analytical categories in narrative exegesis, and concepts of status, role, and expectations as analytical categories in the social sciences (see also section 4.5.2 below). The proper analytical questions would therefore be: What was the status of individuals (characters) who enacted certain roles? How was the world perceived in terms of status differentiation? Who had control over whom, and on whose authority did things happen? Who was seen to belong in structured society and who was marginalized, and on what grounds?

Society is seen as structured according to the needs and expectations of individuals or groups, all of whom are pursuing their own best interests (=conflict theory, cf chapter 3, sections 3.5.2-3.5.2.2; see also section 4.4.3.1 above). Social interaction is defined by status, role, and expectations. The order in society is explained as the result of the power some men hold over others, and power is regarded as the scarce

resource which people are constantly competing for (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.2 above). Thus, conflict ensues in the course of social interaction when the legitimacy of the power of the current powerholders is questioned. 'Power' in this sense should not be understood as 'raw' power, a direct show of force, but rather as *legitimate* power, or *authority* (cf Dahl 1968:407; Peabody 1968:474; see chapter 3, section 3.5.2 above). 'Legitimacy' refers to the relationship between two offices, the one superior and the other subordinate, where the subordinate person feels normatively obliged to comply with the superior one, and both incumbents perceive the relationship as legitimate (cf Dahl 1968:412; Peabody 1968:473). In the case of the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law it can be assumed that they had authority (legitimate power) to the extent that their interpretation of the symbolic universe – resulting in the core value of holiness, wholeness and purity (that is, exclusiveness) that found ideological expression in their teachings regarding the definitions of the social order (cf chapter 1, section 1.1) – was accepted and acknowledged by and manifested in society. The charge that they are 'lovers of money' (Lk 16:14) can be taken as a *narrative aside*[17] (Moxnes 1988:147) that provides an inside view into the character of the Pharisees (Sheeley 1988:103), and serves to locate them in the high status group. In addition, according to Johnson (1977:29-78) the disposition towards possessions in Luke-Acts has the literary function to denote the sincerity of one's response to the gospel, and is used as a symbolic device to denote one's acceptance of the apostle's authority (cf Chance 1988:72). The Pharisees are therefore portrayed by the narrative asides (cf also Lk 14:7 concerning the 'seeking of honorable places') as part of the high status group, and by the symbolic device of possessions as not taking seriously the gospel.

In Malina's (1988b:10) terms, Jesus experienced the Pharisaic definitions as oppressive. This results in a grievance on his part, which causes him to reject their conception of the social order and the values that order mediates. Jesus then advances his own interpretation of the symbolic universe, from which he derives the core value of compassion (i e inclusiveness) as the essence of social interaction. In terms of our hypothesis, Luke is redefining the rights and duties of the person who holds authority (i e the οἰκονόμος) to include the obligation to serve as δοῦλος (cf Lk 12:35-48; see Van Staden 1988:346-352). A successful redefinition would contribute towards the integration of the social system (cf the discussion of Coser's emphasis on the *integrative functions* of social conflict in chapter 3, section 3.5.2). This conduct, being in the interest of Jesus and his group, in effect constitutes a challenge to the authority of the Pharisees, which inevitably results in conflict.

The metaphorical narrative units mentioned above were chosen for analysis because, in social-scientific terms, they are considered to represent interaction situations that reflect a setting of dispute (cf Malina 1988b:11-12 on 'dispute' as the esca-

lation of conflict by its being made public) and within which the interrelationship of status, role, and expectations is reflected. We intend to indicate the existence of a pattern of reversal of role or status that would bear out the theory about the two opposing ideological perspectives reflected in the Gospel of Luke. It would also confirm the hypothesis about compassion (οἰκτίρμων) being the proper respon-sibility of any individual occupying a relatively high status in society, judged in terms of Luke's understanding of the religious symbolic universe.

In short: based on his precepts about the essence of God as expressed by the term οἰκτίρμων, Luke argues that the expression of compassion should become an essential part of the expectations associated with (relatively) high status in society (cf section 4.4 above). The textual units are therefore both explicitly and implicitly (cf Elliott 1989a:5 about the explicit and implicit encodement of information con-cerning the social system) suitable to the theory (i e role theory and symbolic inter-actionism). Since Luke is a consistent author, we expect to find that such a pattern will repeatedly be used throughout the Gospel, and perhaps even in Acts, although we shall not be able to confirm this in the present study.

Leaving aside for a moment the fact that we focus on the narrative world as an imagined social world, we need to be clear about the text being first and foremost evidence of the time of writing (cf chapter 2, section 2.4). It therefore is a *synchro-nic* study, focusing on a single society of which the text is a product and to which it refers. However, this study is not intended to debate the issue of the time and place of writing of the Gospel.[18] We regard the text as a Hellenistic composition that is temporally located towards the end of the first century CE in the Mediterranean socio-cultural area.[19]

Based on the research objective formulated above, we can now proceed with our study design which, in Riley's terms (cf section 4.3 above), is the plan for as-sembling and organizing certain concrete facts by following certain procedures. We shall basically follow the steps set out by Riley in her paradigm of research design (cf table 3, p 168 above).

4.5.1 Nature of research case

Keeping in mind for future reference that our object of study is not an actual social system, but an imagined social world consisting only in the world of story, our hypo-thesis can best be served by taking a research case from the micro-social level accounted for in role theory and symbolic interactionism (cf chapter 3, sections 3.5.3.1 and 3.5.3.2). The study is selective in its focus, attending to the individual in a role (characters), but it takes the group level into account as well (e g Jesus group, Pharisees). We do not intend to do a full analysis on all levels of the system, known

as a social system analysis, but rather a partial analysis directed at meeting our research objective (cf section 4.3 for an explanation of the distinction between a full and a partial analysis). We choose to perform a *contextual analysis* which, in our estimate, can best account for both the individual in a role and his relation to the social system as articulated in his status (cf section 4.3, p 165 above for a discussion of the different types of partial analysis).[20] Our conception of the research *case* is therefore that it is located on the individual level of role and role expectation, but placed within and defined by the group context (as the higher-level collectivity).

4.5.1.1 System of classification
The process of classification is basic to the collection of data (Gilbert 1981:9).

4.5.1.1 (a) Aspects of classification
Gilbert distinguishes four main aspects of classification:

> ...the categories must all relate to some common pro-
> perty; the items to be classified into a category must be
> sufficiently similar with respect to that common proper-
> ty for them to be considered identical for analytical pur-
> poses; the categories must be mutually exclusive; and
> the set of categories must be exhaustive.
>
> (Gilbert 1981:9)

4.5.1.1 (a) (i) One property, one category
With regard to the first aspect, the formal qualification is that a classification should be based on only one property of the items being classified. This means that a category cannot be based on two variables, such as age and sex, at the same time (Gilbert 1981:9). The researcher alone decides how many properties from his model he wants to introduce and explore in line with his objective. Riley (1963:22) states:

> The more properties the researcher uses, the more
> rounded his picture of the system becomes, so that
> ideally he might like to deal with many (indeed all) of
> the relevant properties in the model. Yet, the more
> properties he uses, the more complex the handling of
> the interrelationships among them becomes.

If one wished to explore more than one property of the research case, it would be advisable to heed Gilbert's suggestion and define a category for every class of pro-
perties one identified.

4.5.1.1 (a) (ii) One category, similar properties

Items included in any one category should be as homogeneous as possible. This means that the items should be classified in carefully defined categories (cf Gilbert 1981:10-11).

4.5.1.1 (a) (iii) Categories are mutually exclusive

An item should be assigned to only one category. In other words, categories cannot overlap, otherwise the data would be worthless (Gilbert 1981:11).

4.5.1.1 (a) (iv) Categories are exhaustive

The *set* of categories (i e all the categories together) must accommodate every single item – that is, each item must be classified into one of the categories (Gilbert 1981: 11).

4.5.1.1 (b) Levels of classification

Classification is divided into two levels – the categorical (or nominal) level and the ordinal level (Gilbert 1981:12). When the categories are ordered or based on an underlying quantitative scale, the relationship between the categories is used to define the level of measurement of the scale (Gilbert 1981:12).

4.5.1.1 (b) (i) Categorical or nominal level

This is regarded as the most basic level of measurement. It involves classifying the items being measured by applying names to such items and thereby sorting them into categories, without implying any ordering amongst the categories (Gilbert 1981: 12). This corresponds to what Riley (1963:22) calls 'unsystematic description'. In this study the roles will be classified on the categorical level (cf section 4.5.2.1 below).

4.5.1.1 (b) (ii) Ordinal level

At this level the categories are ordered and ranked on a scale. However, no assumptions are made about the amount of difference between categories (Gilbert 1981:13). In the present study the roles which have been identified during the process of categorical classification will be separated into two major categories at the ordinal level, namely high status and low status. The distinction itself will be made by *mapping* the property on a scale – the property in this case being the *status* associated with each of the roles (items being measured). This methodological step corresponds in part to Riley's (1963:23) notion of systematic analysis, where the relationship between the categories is made explicit. Such a relationship between

categories on an ordinal scale should reflect the relationship between the items (roles) being measured (Gilbert 1981:13).

The procedure for analysis consists in determining the category of each item by taking note of the 'sense data' – or indicants – in terms of the general concept in the mind of the researcher. The concept, which in our case is the status stratum referred to by the role, thus becomes a variable in the analysis (Riley 1963:23).

4.5.2 Analysis

We have noted above (chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2) Turner's criticism of role theory for connoting an overly structured vision of human behaviour and for assuming too much structure and order in the social world. Such a vision is the result of a perception of the social system in analogy to a play or drama, where expectations from the script, from other players and from the audience, dictate every single aspect of the play. While this criticism is probably correct inasmuch as role theory is applied in the study of actual social systems, it does not apply in the case of the study of an imaginary social system contained in the narrative world of a narrative discourse. In literary terms the narrative discourse is a highly structured object (cf chapter 3, sections 3.4-3.4.2), as, by inference, is the narrative world or imagined social system expressed by the discourse. The imagined social world presented by the narrative discourse *is* in fact a play, and must be approached as such. The 'script' of the play is provided by the ideology of the author. Everything that happens in this imagined social world only happens because the author needs it to further his ideological purposes and because he can direct it to that effect.

Van Aarde (1986:63) argues that only when the events selected from a larger synchronous whole are combined in a causal fashion into a series to develop a plot, does the 'story' become a 'narrative discourse'. Elsewhere (Van Aarde 1988c:238) he states: 'The "narrative discourse" is the organised narrative available to the exegete as the real reader."

According to Van Aarde (1988c:238), following Roman Jakobson (cf Petersen 1978:116), the arrangement of events and sequences takes place in terms of the principle of 'equivalence', which consists of repetition and parallelism. Van Aarde (1988b:2) indicates that this principle is also known as 'resonance' (Lyons), 'redundancy' (Suleiman), or 'echo effect' (Tannehill). Van Aarde (1988c:238) proceeds to say that the linear, chronological story is not directly available to the exegete. It must be abstracted from the narrative discourse, since the ideological perspective in a narrative is construed from the techniques used to form a story in a narrative discourse. Therefore, in the conversion of a 'story' into a 'narrative discourse', or when abstracting a 'story' from a 'narrative discourse', one should attempt to identify the

echo effect in order to discern the communicative direction of the narrative. About the procedure of the analysis he states the following:

> The analysis of a 'narrative discourse' is primarily direc-
> ted at the description of characters' reciprocal relation-
> ships. This analysis is a precondition for the abstraction
> of the 'story'...The interaction between the situation of
> the narrator and the narrative discourse is usually de-
> scribed in terms of 'point of view' or 'focalisation'...The
> entire narrative record unfolds as an interrelation be-
> tween discourse, social context and ideological perspec-
> tive.
>
> (Van Aarde 1988c:238-239)

It becomes clear that the concept of 'script' used above (cf also chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2) to indicate how the ideology of the author determines the 'play' (the ima-gined social world presented in the narrative world, which is contained in the narra-tive discourse), corresponds to the notion in narrative criticism of how the plot of a narrative discourse is mediated by point of view. Even the objects of analysis corres-pond – the reciprocal relationships of the characters in the case of a narrative analy-sis, and the interaction between reciprocal roles (and status) in the case of a social analysis.

As we have seen in the discussion on the subject (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2), 'status' is defined as a collection of rights and duties which accords people a position in a social system (group, association, society). Such a position stands in relation to other positions in social systems, and is in each system endowed with a specific measure of social prestige (Funk 1981:13). Status should be seen as separate from the individual status-bearer, because it is not a quality of individuals, but an element of social systems. Status is inextricably linked to the concept of 'role'. A role is seen as the dynamic aspect of status, the putting into effect of rights and duties (cf chap-ter 3, section 3.5.3.2). Like status, roles are not attributes of the acting individual, but elements of the social system (Funk 1981:23). Certain (structural) expectations are therefore incumbent on the behaviour of anyone occupying a specific status. Those role expectations are called 'norms'. Norms are the rules of behaviour pre-scribed for anyone occupying a social position, and apply to that position irrespec-tive of who occupies it. They are structural expectations that eventually crystallize to form institutions (e g meals) that have a regulative function in society (cf Berger & Luckmann 1967:53-58; Funk 1981:24; Van Staden 1988:342-344). In this way it

becomes possible to measure individual role performance against the structural expectations attendant upon that role.

Funk (1981:24) makes a distinction between *role attributes* (*Rollenattribute*) and *role behaviour* (*Rollenverhalten*) as aspects of role expectations. 'Role attributes' would then refer to socially prescribed status symbols associated with a role (e g clothes, a place of honour at the table, a double invitation to a meal, the type of meal offered). 'Role performance' refers to the socially prescribed conduct in repeated similar situations (e g hosts and guests towards one another – that is, 'banquet etiquette'). With regard to role performance a distinction is made between the rights and duties attendant upon the role partners in a reciprocal role relationship. In such relationships the right of one role partner is the duty of the other (e g a host has the right to expect invited guests to attend his meal, and guests who have accepted have a duty to attend). Rights and duties can only be defined in terms of their reciprocal relation (Funk 1981:25).

Role expectations can be rated in terms of their compelling power. One criterion is the strength of the *sanctions* (both positive and negative) that society bestows in accordance with conforming to or deviating from the norm. Positive sanctions can entail the rewarding of conduct that conforms to the role. Such a reward may take the form of social prestige (Lk 14:10 – τότε ἔσται σοι δόξα ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν συνανακειμένων σοι), or may consist in the attainment of a status with high social prestige. Negative sanctions have the purpose of punishing behaviour that deviates from the norm, and may entail the opposite of positive sanctions, namely the loss of social prestige (Lk 14:9 – τότε ἄρξῃ μετὰ αἰσχύνης τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον κατέχειν) or the loss of status. Sanctions are applied with regard to external, observable behaviour (cf Funk 1981:26).

Another measure by which to establish the coercive power of role expectations is the solemnity with which such expectations are *legitimated*. Funk (1981:26) stresses that the weightiness of legitimations can only be ascertained through measurement in terms of criteria immanent in the contemporary social system – that is, first-century Mediterranean culture in general, or the early Church of which Luke formed part in particular. He distinguishes between two kinds of legitimation – empirical and 'metempirical' (Funk 1981:26). *Empirical* legitimation refers to purely social norms of behaviour which can be challenged, questioned and modified by new empirical arguments, or which can lose their persuasive power altogether. *Metempirical* legitimation, in contrast, is an appeal to God's will in the establishment of certain conduct. This behaviour is what God wants (cf Lk 14:11, 14) – it brooks no argument, and no criticism is allowed. Legitimations, unlike sanctions, are applicable to the internal disposition towards the social norms.

On the individual level several references to roles are found in the metaphoric narratives that are to be analysed (cf section 4.5 above). These roles will be analysed first on the level of the individual in a role (categorical level – cf section 4.5.1.1 b i above). In other words, we shall simply list all the references to roles in the metaphoric narratives, which narratives we treat as representing interaction situations.

On the group level these roles refer to the status they represent. In terms of our hypothesis we shall only differentiate between two statuses, namely a high and a low status. The procedure to determine the status is to analyse the text in terms of role attributes – that is, to explore the text for (explicit or implicit) indicants of status (cf discussion above). In the analyses the citation form will only be used to render some elements that are analysed – all other elements will be cited as they appear in the text, in order to remain true to what the author wishes to convey.

An important indication of the ideology of the author is constituted by the way in which the actions or behaviour connected to the roles are assessed – positive, negative, or neutral. We shall therefore analyse the selected metaphoric narratives in such a way as to correlate the action with the role, and determine what (explicit or implicit) evaluation the text expresses regarding such action. In other words – how is the action sanctioned (positively or negatively), and/or how is the action legitimated (empirically or metempirically)?

Following every cross-tabular analysis we shall interpret the data generated by the analysis by discussing the significance of any possible relationship among the items that became obvious in the form of a pattern or in any other way. When all the analyses are done, the results will be integrated in a synthesis that will also entail a comparison of the findings with information procured from other sources (e g the Old Testament, and the results of scientific studies done on the same or related subjects). Such a procedure will ensure that conclusions do not become so far-fetched as to be implausible. Finally, all the results will be assessed in terms of the model in order to determine whether the hypotheses have been proved and whether the model has been validated.

4.5.2.1 Role compendium

All references to persons within the narrative units will be taken into account. In the analysis the various references within each of the literary units are roughly aligned in order to somewhat narrow down the categories. A list of these references within each narrative unit reveals the following:

Luke 14:(7)8-11	*Luke 14:12-14*	*Luke 14:(15)16-24*
τινος (someone) (vs 10)	συ (ποιῇς) (vs 12, 13)	ἄνθρωπός τις (a man) (vs 16) ὁ κύριος (the master of the servant) (vs 21, 22, 22) ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης (the householder [master, host]) (vs 20)
ὁ κεκληκώς (host) (vs 10)	ὁ κεκληκώς (host) (vs 12)	------
ἐντιμότερος (more eminent [guest]) (vs 8)	ὁ φίλος (friend) ὁ ἀδελφός (brother) ὁ συγγενής (kinsman) γείτων πλούσιος (rich neighbour) (vs 12)	πολλούς (many [guests]) (vs 16) κεκλημένους (the invited, the guests) (vs 17) πάντες (all the [initial] guests) (vs 18) τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων τῶν κεκλημένων (those people who were first invited) (vs 24) ὁ πρῶτος (the first [of the initial guests]) (vs 18) ἕτερος (another [of the initial guests]) (vs 118) ἕτερος ([yet] another [of the initial guests]) (vs 20)

φίλε (friend) (vs 10)	ὁ πτωχός (the poor) ὁ ἀνάπηρος (the maimed; a cripple) ὁ χωλός (the lame) ὁ τυφλός (the blind) (vs 13)	ὁ πτωχός (the poor) ὁ ἀνάπηρος (the maimed; a cripple) ὁ τυφλός (the blind) ὁ χωλός (the lame) (vs 21)
συνανακειμένους (other guests = audience) (vs 10)	------	------
------	ὁ δίκαιος (the just) (vs 14)	------
------	------	ὁ δοῦλος (servant) (vs 17, 21, 22, 23)
πᾶς ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτὸν (he who exalts himself) (vs 11)	------	------
ὁ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτόν (he who humbles himself) (vs 11).	------	------

The analysis shows that some of these references can be grouped together as the same *type* in the sense of referring to the same social position or status, and that in reality we shall work with only a few roles.

Firstly, although the term 'host' (ξένος – cf Louw & Nida 1988:455) is used in none of the three units, other terms are used that within the setting of a meal would denote the role of 'host'. The following terms from all three units clearly serve to indicate the host as the one who invites, prepares for and cares for his table guests: τινος, ὁ καλέσας, ὁ κεκληκώς (2x), ἄνθρωπός τις, κύριος, and οἰκοδεσπότης.

In terms of role theory a term such as 'host' refers to only one partner in a dyadic relation (known in literary theory as a binary actantial relation – cf Van Aarde 1986:117), implying that the role of 'host' can only be seen in perspective as and when it is defined by its counterpart, namely the 'guest' role, within an interaction situation (e g a meal) that requires the presence of both host and guests.[21] In the

---

case of our units of analysis the following terms refer to certain roles: ἐντιμότερός κεκλημένος (a more eminent guest) (vs 8); συνανακειμένους (other guests) (vs 10); φίλους, ἀδελφούς, συγγενεῖς, γείτονας πλουσίους (friends, brothers, family, rich neighbours) (vs 12); πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, χωλούς, τυφλούς (poor, maimed, lame, blind) (vs 13, 21); πολλούς (many [guests]) (vs 16); κεκλημένους (the [initially] invited) (vs 17, 24); ἀπὸ μιᾶς πάντες (one and all) (vs 18); ὁ πρῶτος...καὶ ἕτερος...καὶ ἕτερος (the first...then another...then another) (vs 18-20).

While every one of these terms refer to a (collective) role, all of them designate the role of the guest(s). It is also clear that in all three units the guests are divided into two major groups – the more and the less eminent, those who are able to reciprocate by 'paying back' the invitation and others who are unable to reciprocate, those who are invited first and those who are subsequently invited. Terms that belong in the first group are: ἐντιμότερος (vs 8); συνανακειμένους (vs 10); φίλους, ἀδελφούς, συγγενεῖς, γείτονας πλουσίους (vs 12); πολλούς (vs 16); κεκλημένους (vs 17, 24); ἀπὸ μιᾶς πάντες (vs 18); and ὁ πρῶτος...καὶ ἕτερος...καὶ ἕτερος (vs 18, 19, 20). To the second group belong: πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, χωλούς, τυφλούς (vs 13, 21).

Basically, therefore, we have a dyadic relationship between the role partners designated as the 'host' and the 'guest(s)' expressed in all three units. In the last and most elaborate of these units (Lk 14:[15]16-24) another dyadic relationship is mentioned, namely that of master-servant (κύριος-δοῦλος) or householder-servant (οἰκοδεσπότης-δοῦλος), and this latter dyad is also regarded as important in terms of its reference to the actual world of the author.[22]

Finally, we can identify one more role in the units – that of the 'audience'. The concept of *audience* (like that of *role*) was taken over by the social sciences from the field of drama and employed as 'etic' categories through which to study certain phenomena in society. In the first narrative unit we have an explicit reference to an audience – ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν συνανακειμένων = 'all the other guests' (Lk 14:10). As we have seen (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2 above), an audience can consist of only one person up to a large group. There is implicit evidence in the selected metaphorical narratives of a one-person audience in addition to any other, namely God (implied in the passive voice whenever a reversal of roles or status or fortunes is mentioned).

We have thus identified four basic roles in the selected metaphorical narratives – those of host, guest, servant and audience.

4.5.2.2 Status associated with roles

As we have indicated above (cf section 4.5.1.1 b ii), for the purpose of analysis we regard status as the property of the role. In our analysis we shall therefore classify the roles in terms of the status to which they refer. At the same time we do not believe that Luke is at all interested in the gradation of relative statuses in society.[23] Rather, in line with our hypothesis about Luke's interest in convincing his addressees to practice compassion toward the marginalized members of society, we see Luke as arguing his case in terms of a simple distinction of society into two major categories, namely high or low status.[24] Therefore the whole problem of *status consistency*, whereby any generalized status should be judged according to the status that the individual is accorded within each of the several social domains he enters in terms of roles (i e segmental status), does not enter into this discussion (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2).[25] In order to classify the four roles identified in the previous section (4.5.2.2) according to status on the ordinal level on a scale of high-low, one has to determine the amount of status of each role. This can only be done by an analysis of the explicit and implicit indicants that might refer to someone's status or prestige (see sections 4.5.2 and 4.5.1.1 b ii above).[26]

In the following sections the items suggested above will be attended to.

4.5.2.2 (a) Reference classification: high or low status

The criteria for the positive (high) or negative (low) rating of status in a social system are the values that are valid in that society (Funk 1981:15). In what follows we shall first list the references in each unit which on a categorical level seem to belong in either the high or the low status category (cf section 4.5.2.2 a i below). Following that, the references will be sorted in terms of the roles to which they are taken to refer. On purely perceptual grounds we shall note any pattern or significant aspect that may emerge.

4.5.2.2 (a) (i) Cataloguing the references

A cross-tabulation of the references in each of the literary units in terms of the categories high status and low status shows the following:

Unit	High status	Low status
Luke 14:(7)8-11	ἐντιμότερός σου (a person more eminent than you are) (vs 8) ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτόν (he who exalts himself) (vs 11)	
	ὁ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτόν (he who humbles himself) (vs 11)	
	τινος, ὁ καλέσας (host) (vs 8, 9)	
	God (implied in the passive voice of the terms ταπεινωθήσεται and ὑψωθήσεται) (vs 11).	
Luke 14:12-14	ὁ κεκληκώς (host) (vs 10)	
	φίλους, ἀδελφούς, συγγενεῖς, γείτονας πλουσίους (obvious and acceptable group of guests [ingroup]) (vs 12)	πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, χωλούς, τυφλούς (non-obvious and unacceptable group of guests [outgroup]) (vs 13)
	God (implied in the passive voice of the term ἀνταποδοθήσεται) (vs 14).	

Luke 14:(15)16-24	ἄνθρωπός τις, κύριος, οἰκοδεσπότης (host)	δοῦλος
	πολλούς (vs 16), κεκλημένους (17, 24), ἀπὸ μιᾶς πάντες (vs 18), ὁ πρῶτος...καὶ ἕτερος...καὶ ἕτερος (vs 18, 19, 20)	πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, τυφλούς, χωλούς (first group of substitute guests) (vs 20) ἀνάγκασον εἰσελθεῖν (second group of substitute guests) (vs 23)

4.5.2.2 (a) (ii) Sorting the references

If we concatenate the items that belong in each category, weeding out the duplications, we find the following:

High status

Low status

τινος, ὁ καλέσας, ὁ κεκληκώς, ἄνθρωπός τις, ὁ κύριος, ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης (host)

ὁ δοῦλος (servant to the host)

ἐντιμότερός, φίλους, ἀδελφούς, συγγενεῖς, γείτονας πλουσίους, πολλούς, κεκλημένους, ἀπὸ μιᾶς πάντες, ὁ πρῶτος...καὶ ἕτερος...καὶ ἕτερος, τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων τῶν κεκλημένων (guests who merit an invitation on account of their status)

πτωχούς, ἀναπείρους, χωλούς, τυφλούς (guests who do not merit an invitation on account of their status)

In order to substantiate the results on the categorical level regarding status (section 4.5.2.2 a i), we conduct an analysis of the *attributes* of the roles in the next section.

4.5.2.2 (a) (iii) Role attributes

In terms of the role compendium (cf section 5.4.2.1 above) four basic roles can be identified within the three selected metaphorical narratives, namely the host role, the guest role, the servant role, and the audience role. The guest role is differentiated into three groups in line with the text, represented in the analysis as G-1, G-2 and G-3 (G=group). Within the text the following attributes are mentioned with regard to these roles:

Attributes

Roles		Luke 14:(7)8-11	Luke 14:12-14	Luke 14:(15)16-23
Host		type of meal (wedding feast); control over seating positions	type of meal (ordinary or main meal); choice of guests (privileged equals or marginalized inferiors)	type of meal (great feast, big meal) ; choice of guests; owner of a servant
Guest	G-1	merit an invitation to a wedding feast	self-evident guests, being the closest (brothers, family) and of equal status; in the position to return the invitation and pay back the host	self-evident guests who merit an invitation to a big meal; double invitation indicates prominent position
Guest	G-2	absent	do not have the means to repay the host	not self-evident guests – located on the streets of the city
Guest	G-3	absent	absent	not self-evident guests – located outside the city
Servant		absent	absent	does the bidding of the master – invites and leads

		the guests to the meal
Audience	fellow table guests – equal position; God (superior position) (vs 11)	God (superior position) (vs 14).

4.5.2.2 (a) (iv) Interpreting the tables

The following conclusions can be drawn from the tables above:

– All the references identified in the first metaphorical narrative (Lk 14:8-11) are associated with the high status group (cf section 4.5.2.2 a i above). The theme of this unit is the prescription of proper banquet etiquette for guests when they take their places at a wedding feast. The host and guests in the metaphoric narrative take their status from Jesus' host (τινος τῶν ἀρχόντων τῶν Φαρισαίων = one of the leading Pharisees – Lk 14:1) and fellow guests at the meal, consisting of religious equals (τοὺς νομικοὺς καὶ Φαρισαίους = teachers of the Law and Pharisees – Lk 14:3) and social equals (τοὺς φίλους...τοὺς ἀδελφούς...τοὺς συγγενεῖς...γείτονας πλου-σίους = friends, brothers, relatives, rich neighbours – Lk 14:12). It is the conduct of those fellow guests that provides the opportunity for the admonishment.

– It is clear from the tables that the category comprising the 'guest' partner in the dyadic relation of host-guest in the narrative units is not a simplistic homogeneous category. The items comprising the category of 'guests' can unmistakably be divided into two major subsets, namely references to guest roles characterized by the property of high status and references to guest roles characterized by the property of low status. In the first category there is one group of guests, but in the second two groups are identified (cf section 4.5.2.2 a i).

– The fact that, within the dyadic relation of host-servant (Lk 14:[15]16-[23]24), the servant is placed in the low status category (cf section 4.5.2.2 a ii), has implications for determining the referent of the role – first within the imaginary social system constituted by the narrative world, and also in the actual social system of the author.

– Connected to the preceding observation is the question of whether the host-servant dyadic relation has any significance for – or influence on – the

possible reciprocal relationships between the servant and the various guest groups he serves with an invitation. For instance, is any further differentiation in status *within* the low status category implied as far as the roles of servant and guest are concerned? The answer to this question depends both on the identity of the servant and that of the guests.

- The *attributes* of the roles (see section 4.5.2.2 a iii) could be summarized as follows: the *host role* is characterized by the type of meal the host is able to offer (common or special, big or small, et cetera); by the fact that the host can choose whom he wishes to invite to take part in the meal; by his control over the seating arrangements – that is, which guest he seats in a place of higher or lesser honour; and by the fact that he is the owner of a servant to whom he gives certain instructions regarding the meal. The *guest* role, as the analysis shows, is divided into three distinct guest groups designated as G-1, G-2 and G-3. *Group 1* (G-1) is characterized by being portrayed as self-evident guests to the meals, and this fact reflects their (high) status; by their implied ability to repay the host; and by the double invitation implicitly referred to in Luke 14:16-17. *Group 2* (G-2) is characterized by clearly not being self-evident guests on account of their being located on the streets of the city (Lk 14:21); and by not being able to repay the host. *Group 3* (G-3) is characterized by the implied injunction of being even further removed from acceptability than the previous group (Lk 14:23). The *servant* role is an extension of the host, but at the same time defined by the host role. The role is characterized by strictly executing the wishes of the master by inviting the guests, and leading them to the (place of the) meal. The role of the *audience* is to respond to whatever actions the other roles take, and by the response to signal approval or disapproval of conduct (Lk 14:9, 10). The audience is explicitly indicated to belong in the high status category (Lk 14:10). Implicitly another one-person audience is indicated – God, who can and will respond to the conduct of the guests or the host.

Such a fundamental distinction on the ordinal level, evidenced within the property regarded as the essential analytical variable (i e status), should have an important influence on the dyadic relation between host and guests. Whether this is in fact the case will have to be ascertained by cross-tabulating the actions of the abstracted roles of host, servant, and high or low status guests with any evaluation of such actions within the narrative units. The assessment will be again be given as positive, negative or neutral.

4.5.2.2 (b) Correlate action, actor, and evaluation

4.5.2.2 (b) (i) Luke 14:(7)8-11 – Admonishing the guests

Action	Acting agent	Assessment
ὅταν κληθῇς ὑπό τινος εἰς γάμους (when you are invited by somebody to a wedding)	host	neutral
κατακλιθῇς εἰς τὴν πρωτοκλισίαν (take the most important place)	high status guest	negative
ἐντιμότερός σου ᾖ κεκλημένος ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ (in case he has invited a more eminent man than you)	host	neutral
ἐλθὼν...καὶ ἐρεῖ σοι (he comes and requests [commands] you)	host	negative
δὸς τούτῳ τόπον (give up the seat/place to this man)	high status guest	negative
μετὰ αἰσχύνης τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον κατέχειν (take the lowest seat/place) with shame)	high status guest	negative

ὅταν κληθῆς (when you are invited)	host	neutral
πορευθείς (go, accept [the invitation])	high status guest	positive
ἀνάπεσε εἰς τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον (take the lowest place)	high status guest	positive
ὅταν ἔλθῃ ὁ κεκληκώς σε ἐρεῖ σοι, Φίλε (he would come and request you: Friend...)	host	positive
προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον τότε ἔσται σοι δόξα ἐνώπιον πάντων τῶν συνανακειμένων σοι (move up to the best seat with honour in the presence of the fellow guests)	high status guest	positive
ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτόν (he who exalts himself or assumes too high a status for himself)	any (high status) guest	negative
ταπεινωθήσεται (he shall be humbled/shamed)	God (implied in the passive voice)	negative
ὁ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτόν (he who humbles himself or takes the lesser position)	any (high status) guest	positive

| ὑψωθήσεται (he shall be exalted/honoured) | God (implied in the passive voice) | positive. |

The following deductions can be made from this arrangement of the data:

- The act of invitation by a host is given the label of 'neutral', because in this metaphoric narrative it is an action providing the general setting in respect of a meal. It has no significance other than providing the general case. This holds true even in the case where a differentiation is made between a more and a less eminent guest (ἐντιμότερός σου).
- The *type* of meal is indicated to be a *marriage feast* (γάμους – vs 8).
- In this unit all the guests that are mentioned are considered to belong in the category of high status. This viewpoint is provided by the frame within which this metaphoric narrative is placed, namely the setting of a meal. The meal is hosted by one of the leading Pharisees (Lk 14:1), and is attended by Jesus together with some Pharisees and teachers of the Law (Lk 14:3), some family, kinsmen and village friends (Lk 14:12). The narrative is occasioned by Jesus' perception of the conduct of the other guests (teachers of the Law and Pharisees) in their struggle to procure for themselves the most honourable seats (Lk 14:7). As the metaphoric narrative is clearly meant to admonish the other guests for their behaviour, their status would determine the status of the guests within the metaphor – therefore the tag of 'high status'.
- A pattern emerges that whenever the actions of a guest are perceived to reflect too high an opinion of the self, too much self-confidence, such actions are assessed negatively. Taking the most honourable place at the wedding is proscribed behaviour, because it reflects an absence of humility and does not take into consideration the possibility of being relegated to a lower place and the consequent shame.
- Conversely, the pattern just noted also has a flip side: whenever the actions of a guest are perceived to reflect a proper humility by a willingness to take the lowest place, such actions are assessed positively. Such behaviour actually becomes prescribed, with the added incentive of the possibility of honour being bestowed as recognition for proper conduct.
- Finally, the argument of the metaphoric narrative – in respect of the proper social conduct of guests within the interaction situation of a meal – is generalized and made applicable to all aspects of social relations, through its theological basis. God himself, it is suggested, is not favourably disposed

towards status-seekers who have no eye for the humble – He will humble such people and lower their status. On the other hand, people who humble themselves will be honoured by God – He will elevate them.

4.5.2.2 (b) (ii) Luke 14:12-14 – Admonishing the host

Action	Acting agent	Assessment
ποιῆς ἄριστον ἤ δεῖπνον (when you give a light meal or dinner) (vs 12)	host	neutral
μὴ φώνει τοὺς φίλους κτλ (do not invite your friends, etc) (vs 12)	host	negative
ἀντικαλέσωσίν (return the invitation) (vs 12)	(high status) guests	negative
γένηται ἀνταποδόμα σοι (you will be repaid) (s 12)	(high status) guests	negative
ὅταν δοχὴν ποιῆς (when you give a reception/banquet) (vs 13)	host	neutral
κάλει πτωχούς, κτλ (invite the poor, etc) (vs 13)	host	positive
μακάριος ἔσῃ (you will be fortunate [blessed/happy]) (vs 14)	host	positive

ἀνταποδοθήσεται γάρ σοι (for you will be repaid) (vs 14)	God (implied in the passive voice)	positive.

The arrangement of the data in this unit reveals the following:

- 'Giving a meal' is assessed a neutral action within the metaphor, because it refers to a general case and provides the general setting within which the theme of the metaphoric narrative is developed.
- The issue in this narrative unit clearly revolves around the invitation itself, and to whom it is extended.
- The *type* of meal, in this case, is either the earlier meal of the day (ἀριστον) or the main meal towards the evening (δεῖπνον).
- An invitation (action) extended to guests belonging in the equal (high) status of the host, is assessed negatively, because such an action is regarded as a deliberate strategy aimed at establishing the need for reciprocation. The term μήποτε should not be translated with 'lest' (RSV) or 'for' (GNB), but with the stronger 'in order that' (New Afrikaans Bible translation). The guests are obligated to return the favour in terms of the principle of reciprocity.
- The possible return of the invitation by high status guests as a repayment is assessed negatively, and thereby the principle of reciprocity itself is put in question.
- An action is prescribed whereby the (high status) host should deliberately extend his invitation to guests who do not have the means to reciprocate and therefore cannot repay him.
- Finally, the argument of this metaphoric narrative – concerning the proper social conduct of hosts with regard to whom they should favour for inclusion in their guest lists for meals – is generalized and made applicable to all similar aspects of social life by providing it with a theological basis. The host can regard himself as fortunate/blessed that his guests cannot reciprocate, because now God himself will repay him in/with the resurrection of the just.

4.5.2.2 (b) (iii) Luke 14:16-24 – Included/excluded guests?

Action	Acting agent	Assessment
ἐποίει δεῖπνον μέγα (he gave a big meal/ banquet) (vs 16)	host	positive
ἐκάλεσεν πολλούς (he invited many [guests]) (vs 16)	host	positive
ἀπέστειλεν τὸν δοῦλον αὐτοῦ (he sent his servant) (vs 17)	host	positive
εἰπεῖν τοῖς κεκλη-μένοις, "Ερχεσθε... ἕτοιμά ἐστιν (to tell/say to the invited, Come, all is now ready) (vs 17)	servant	positive
ἤρξαντο ἀπὸ μιᾶς πάντες παραιτεῖσθαι (one and all began to make excuses) (vs 18)	initially invited guests	negative
ὁ πρῶτος εἶπεν αὐτῷ (the first/leader said to the servant) ᾿Αγρὸν ἠγόρασα...ἐξελθὼν ἰδεῖν αὐτόν· ἐρωτῶ σε, ἔχε με παρῃτημένον (I have bought a field and must go and see it; I request you to have me excused) (vs 18)		

καὶ ἕτερος εἶπεν, Ζεύγη βοῶν ἠγόρασα πέντε καὶ πορεύομαι δοκιμάσαι αὐτά· ἐρωτῶ σε, ἔχε με παρῃτημένον (another one said, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to examine them. I request you to have me excused) (vs 19)	another of the initially invited guests	negative
καὶ ἕτερος εἶπεν, Γυναῖκα ἔγημα καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ δύναμαι ἐλθεῖν (Yet another said, I have married a wife, therefore I cannot come) (vs 20)	yet another of the initially invited guests	negative
παραγενόμενος ὁ δοῦλος ἀπήγγειλεν τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ ταῦτα (the servant went back and told all this to his master) (vs 21)	servant	neutral
ὀργισθεὶς ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης (the householder became angry) (vs 21)	host	negative
εἶπεν τῷ δούλῳ αὐτοῦ, ῎Εξελθε...καὶ...εἰσάγαγε (he told his servant, Go out...and bring here...) (vs 21)	host	positive

εἶπεν ὁ δοῦλος, Κύριε, γέγονεν ὃ ἐπέταξας, καὶ ἔτι τόπος ἐστίν (the servant said, Sir/master, what you commanded has been done, and still there is room) (vs 22)	servant	positive
εἶπεν ὁ κύριος πρὸς τὸν δοῦλον, "Ἔξελθε ἀνάγκασον εἰσελθεῖν, ἵνα γεμισθῇ μου ὁ οἶκος (the master told the servant, Go out and compel the people to come in, that my house may be filled) (vs 23).	host	positive

This is the most elaborate of the selected metaphoric narratives, and also the most significant. The arrangement of the data produces the following deductions:

- All the actions pertaining to the host and his servant are assessed as positive. In this case the invitation by the host is labelled 'positive', because it does not refer to a general case, but a specific one. It is also *told* in such a manner as to take up the reference in the remark of the guest (v15) to the meal in the kingdom of God (βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ), and therefore the invitation has an added positive significance within the context.
- A new role is introduced in this metaphoric narrative, namely that of the servant (δοῦλος). The servant acts on the orders of his master – his job is to go out and invite and lead the guests to his master's banquet. His actions within the context are either positive (when he extends the invitation by the host to the guests) or neutral (when he reports the reaction of the guests).
- The reaction of all the initially invited guests, declining the invitation even when everything has been prepared, is labelled strongly negative. They have insulted and dishonoured the host.
- The host becomes angry (ὀργισθεὶς ὁ οἰκοδεσπότης – vs 21) and suspends the possibility of them ever taking part in his great banquet (vs 24). His actions are labelled as negative in view of their consequences.

- The host orders the servant to go out and find substitute guests to bring to his banquet (vs 21). His decision and his sending out of the servant are labelled positive, this time in terms of the consequences for the new target group.
- The servant returns and reports to the host that the instructions have been carried out, and still there is room for more guests (vs 22). These actions of the servant are labelled positive within the context.
- The final action on the part of the host is to send the servant out again to yet another target group – people from the country roads and lanes – so that his table may be filled (vs 23). Within the context this action on the part of the host is labelled positive.
- This metaphoric narrative presents a structure much more complex than the previous two. It is a story with a plot in which characters (roles) function in an interrelationship connected to the structured social event of a meal. However, the distinction between high and low status which we have noticed in the previous metaphors, is continued here.

Having determined the status associated with the roles by classifying them into high and low status categories (4.5.2.2 a), and having correlated action, actor (role) and the evaluation of the action, we can now proceed to describe the roles we have identified in terms of the expectations attendant upon the performance of such roles in ancient times.

4.5.2.3 Role expectations

Status, roles, sanctions and legitimations all serve to indicate which values prevail in a social system. In real terms, and as far as this investigation is concerned, status and role are identical – the distinction between high and low status categories is directly mirrored in the roles belonging in each (cf also Funk 1981:32). Having already determined which roles belong in which category, and having analysed the actions performed by the roles as either positive, negative or neutral, we shall now proceed to summarize the roles with regard to their expected behaviour within the text.

Expectations for behaviour

Roles	Luke 14:8-11	Luke 14:12-14	Luke 14:16-23
Host	determines who sits where	chooses the guests for invitation	sends his servant to invite the guests
Guest G-1	choose the lower places	reciprocate and pay back the host	come to the banquet
Guest G-2		cannot pay back the host	come to the banquet
Guest G-3			come to the banquet
Servant			delivers the invitations to the guests, and brings them to the banquet
Audience	grants or withholds prestige and honour.		

The tables on role attributes and expectations reveal the following:

- The host role in all three metaphors is considered to be a high status role. The expectations associated with this role consist of ensuring that every guest sits at the right place according to his status; choosing which guests should attend the meal; and sending out his servant to inform the guests that the time has arrived for the meal to start.
- The guest role is ordinal divided into a high status guest group and a low status guest group. Different expectations seem to apply to each of the groups. In the case of high status guests, they are expected not to choose

the highest places; not to reciprocate by later returning the invitation and thereby repay the host; and to attend the banquet to which they have accepted the invitation. In the case of the low status guests they are expected not to be able to reciprocate and repay the host, and to attend the banquet.

- The servant role is indicated to be a low status role in which the servant is expected to do the bidding of the master – deliver the invitations and lead the guests to the banquet.
- The audience role is a high status role that forms the reference group who has the task of granting or withholding honour.

4.6 Synthetic interpretation of data

The term 'synthetic interpretation' refers to an interpretation that takes into account all the data that have been assembled during the process of the investigation and interprets it in the light of the hypothesis. At the same time the findings will be compared to the results obtained by other scholars who worked on the same subject. The procedure followed will take the following course:

I shall start by discussing the social setting or interaction situation within which the three selected metaphorical narrative units are embedded. Secondly I shall indicate how the actions performed by the roles are sanctioned and/or legitimated within the text, and how the metempirical legitimations serve to further the aims of Luke's ideology. Thirdly I shall use the concept of the challenge-response game from the honour-shame model (cf section 4.4.3.5 b) to indicate how, on a symbolical level, the concepts of reciprocation (cf section 4.4.3.5 a) and purity (cf section 4.4.3.5 c) were implicitly criticised and rectified by Luke's message.

4.6.1 The setting – Luke 14:1-6

Up to now only passing reference has been made to the social situation within which Luke located the 'events' constituted by the metaphoric narratives (cf section 4.5.2.2 a iv). However, this setting of a meal seems to be much more than incidental. Several scholars have recently emphasized the importance of the motif of 'meals' in Luke's Gospel (Neyrey 1985:8-11, 1988a:76; Esler 1987:71; Smith 1987:614; Donahue 1988:140; Moxnes 1988:127; Elliott 1989b:2). The fact that Jesus frequently taught within the setting of a meal has led some scholars to assume a connection between Jesus' table talk and the literary genre of the symposium, where table talk was a significant feature (cf Harrison 1962:800; Smith 1987:614-615; Donahue 1988:140; see also section 4.4.1.2 above). Elliott (1989b:2) stresses the conceptual association between domestic relations, food, and dining, and argues that the social codes, interests, and ideologies associated with the temple in Jerusalem are replicated in the

meals of the household (cf also Van Aarde 1989b:7-8). The table at which meals were eaten was regarded as the equivalent of the sacred altar in the temple. Pharisaism taught that each righteous Jew 'before eating had to attain the same state of ritual purity as the priest in the sacred act of making a sacrifice' (Neusner 1979:47). Meals are therefore symbols of larger social structures and values, and are regarded as a form of symbolic interaction (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.1 above; see also section 4.4.1.2 above).

I believe that the meal settings in the Gospel of Luke reflect a mode of dispute or conflict (Johnson 1977:146 refers to a 'hostile audience'; cf also section 4.5). For this reason I approach the Gospel on the macro-level from the social-scientific perspective of conflict theory by making use of the honour-shame model. The setting for this particular meal is the house of a leading Pharisee on the Sabbath. The meal was probably held round about noon after completion of the morning worship (Strack-Billerbeck 1924:202; 1928b:615, note a).[27] From the outset there is tension. Luke narrates the fact that the Pharisees and teachers of the Law were watching Jesus (Lk 14:1). Suddenly a man with dropsy appeared before Jesus. Ellis (1966: 192) suggests that the 'watching' by the Pharisees and the sudden appearance of the sick man may indicate that the occasion was staged by Jesus' opponents. I do not believe that is the case (so also Rengstorf 1969:176; Creed 1969:189) – one should rather note the suggestion by Strack-Billerbeck (1928b:615; cf also Carson 1962:542; Harrison 1962:800; Rengstorf 1969:175) about the house where the meal was held being an 'open house', where anybody could come in and watch the proceedings (cf also Lk 7:37).[28] The 'watching' by the Pharisees is to see whether Jesus keeps the rules of purity or the Sabbath observance (Moxnes 1988:128). Tannehill (1986:182-183) suggests that the watching can be understood 'as the continuation of the sharpened opposition reported in 11:53-54, where the scribes and the Pharisees began to "lie in wait" to trap Jesus'.

4.6.1.1 Role, status and expectations
There are basically three roles interacting with each other in this setting of a meal, namely the host (a leading Pharisee); the guests (some other Pharisees, teachers of the Law, people from the village, and Jesus); and the man with the ailment. I shall discuss each of these roles in terms of its status and the expectations connected to that role in terms of rights and duties.

4.6.1.1 (a) The host role
Moxnes (1988:128) regards Luke 14:1-14 as a story set within the context of a patron-client relationship: 'A Pharisee acts as host at a meal to which Jesus and a

number of people from the village are invited.' I do not think that this is correct. The analysis of status (cf section 4.5.2.2 a i) has shown that all the roles in the first metaphoric narrative (Lk 14:7-11) belong in the high status group, and that the roles in this narrative have taken their status from Jesus' host and fellow guests at the Sabbath meal (cf section 4.5.2.2 a iv). This would mean that all the guests at the Sabbath meal were of equal, or at least compatible, status. Strack-Billerbeck (1928b:611) note that it was an obligation of the host to ensure that the guests were compatible:

> Dazu nötigte schon das exklusive gesellschaftliche Ver-
> halten des pharisäischen Chaberbundes...Wenn irgend
> möglich, vermieden es seine Mitglieder, bei Gastmäh-
> lern mit Leuten zusammenzutreffen, die es mit der ri-
> tuellen Reinheit weniger streng hielten als sie selbst.

The origin of this obligation is to be found in the purity laws of the Pharisees, which determined that 'common people' could cause different kinds of objects to lose their purity simply by touching them (cf Strack-Billerbeck 1924:500). Moxnes (1988: 130) correctly notes kinship distance and wealth as decisive factors in the composition of the guest group, and concludes that 'this is a dinner for the "upper class" of the village'. This fact is confirmed by the honour-shame model, which states that the challenge-response game (which I consider to be reflected in this setting) can only take place between persons of equal status (cf section 4.4.3.5 b above). I would therefore typify the setting as a *colleague contract* (horizontal dyadic relationship) rather than a patron-client one. The difference is subtle, but important. It means that the question of inferiors, which is an important aspect of the patron-client relationship, did not even enter the thoughts of Jesus' host or fellow guests. The significance of this fact will become evident later in the interpretive process.

4.6.1.1 (a) (i) Host rights
What rights does a host have in terms of the general expectations adhering to his role or status? Luke portrays the host as the one who determines who will be invited (Lk 14:12-14; cf Strack-Billerbeck 1928b:611), and what the seating arrangement will be (Lk 14:8-11). From the reaction of the host to the declinations of the guests in Luke 14:16-24, it appears that the host also had the right to expect guests who had earlier accepted the invitation, to attend his banquet (cf Creed 1969:191; see section 4.6.1.1 a ii below for a discussion of the custom of a double invitation).

4.6.1.1 (a) (ii) Host duties

Luke refers to the following host duties: greeting the guest with a kiss (Lk 7:45); providing water to wash his feet (Lk 7:44); anointing his head (Lk 7:46). In Luke 14:17 there is an implicit reference (καὶ ἀπέστειλεν τὸν δοῦλον...εἰπεῖν τοῖς κεκλημένοις) to a double invitation. Several scholars refer to a double invitation as a custom in ancient times (cf Ellis 1966:194; Leaney 1966:214; Linnemann 1966:88; Ross 1968:316; Creed 1969:191; Rengstorf 1969:179; Eichholz 1971:129; Fitzmyer 1985:1055). According to Jeremias (1972:176; cf Fitzmyer 1985:1055 for criticism regarding Jeremias' source) the repetition of the invitation at the time of the banquet was a special courtesy practiced by upper circles in Jerusalem. Strack-Billerbeck (1926:880-881) found evidence in *Midr KL 4,2 (74a)* that the double invitation was indeed a common custom. On the basis of this information, we can conclude that the double invitation was an obligation on the part of the host.

Host duties at a meal naturally form part of a much wider phenomenon, namely the custom of *hospitality*. In a wideranging discussion on this subject Stählin (1967: 17) argues that the origin of this 'noble and world-wide custom is to be sought primarily in the sense of the mutual obligation of all men to help one another, for which there is divine sanction'. Strack-Billerbeck (1928a:565) indicate that the custom of hospitality was very highly appraised in Jewish life:

> Man sagte von der Gastfreundschaft, dass sie am Verdienstlichkeit dem frühzeitigen Besuch des Lehrhauses gleichkomme, ja dass sie grösser sei als die Begrüssung der Gottheit...Sie gehört zu den sechs Dingen, deren Früchte (Zinsen) der Mensch in dieser Welt geniesst, während das Kapital (der Hauptlohn) ihm anstehen bleibt für die zukünftige Welt.

According to Josephus (*Ant 1,* 250f, quoted by Stählin 1967:19, note 141) true hospitality was to be extended without commandment or reward – it was a selfevident duty, patterned on God's 'condescending generosity' (Stählin 1967:20). However, there arose among the Jews a severe restriction concerning hospitality towards non-Jews (cf Strack-Billerbeck 1928a:565; 568, note h; Stählin 1967:20). It is possible that the horizontal dyadic relationship on which the meal which Jesus attended was based, reflected the restricted hospitality already prevalent amongst the Jews in Jesus' or Luke's time.

4.6.1.1 (b) The guest role

As we have stated before (cf section 4.5.2, p 195 above), reciprocal roles define each other in terms of rights and duties. That means that most of the duties expected from the host (cf section 4.6.1.1 a ii above), may also be considered the rights of the guest, and vice versa.

4.6.1.1 (b) (i) Guest rights

The kiss, feet washing and anointing of the head seem to have been actions that were considered rightful expectations on the part of the guest in terms of the hospitality expected from the host (cf Lk 7:44-46; see section 4.6.1.1 a ii above). So would the double invitation have been (or perhaps only in certain circles?).

4.6.1.1 (b) (ii) Guest duties

Guest duties would consist of the reverse of host rights, namely to attend a banquet to which they have accepted an invitation, and to accept the places at table indicated to them (cf section 4.6.1.1 a i above). Strack-Billerbeck (1928a:569-571) mention several other guest duties, such as not bringing along another (uninvited) guest; not misusing proffered hospitality; not praising the hospitality of the host too much, thereby exposing him to many strangers imposing on his hospitality; not giving food from the table to the children of the host; being responsible for the concluding table prayer; et cetera. However, the sources referred to are late (second, third and even fourth century), and it is difficult to determine which of these pre- and proscriptions would have been in use at the time of the writing of the Gospel.

4.6.1.1 (c) The man with dropsy

The episode – which is Lukan Sondergut – is used as an introduction to the following episodes of the meal discourses. Tannehill (1986:182) refers to Luke 14:1-6 – together with Lk 13:10-17 – as 'type-scenes of Sabbath healing' (cf also Fitzmyer 1985:1038). Creed (1969:188) regards the scene as 'a literary device to provide a setting for the sayings, all of which have in common the theme of a feast'. However, I must disagree with Creed's (1969:188) remark that 'the motive for including the healing of the dropsical man in the same setting is less obvious'. The encounter with the sick man becomes the occasion for Jesus to challenge the Pharisees on their stand on strict observance of the rules in the interest of purity, as their way of maintaining their ideology of exclusivism. The implicit reference to their purity system lies both in the *Sabbath* and in the *disease*.

The *Sabbath* refers to the Pharisees' purity map of *times*, in which specific times were arranged according to their holiness, and prescriptions were given for ob-

serving such special times (cf section 4.4.3.5 c above). In terms of these prescriptions, the Pharisees and teachers of the Law would question the legitimacy of healing on the Sabbath. Creed (1969:189) calls it the 'unspoken suspicions of the watching Pharisees'. In terms of the challenge-response game described in the honour-shame model (cf section 4.4.3.5 b above), Jesus' question whether it is lawful to cure people on the Sabbath can be regarded as a challenge to his fellow guests – a challenge concerning the interpretation of the Law as regards their purity rules. They do not answer – that is, they do not respond to the challenge, they back down.

The *disease* refers to the Pharisees' purity map of people, in which people were arranged in a hierarchical order in terms of their proximity to the temple, or in terms of their physical 'holiness' as measured by 'wholeness'. As stated before (cf section 4.4.3.4 c above), people with physical deficiencies or deformities were placed in the least pure, or most polluted category within the map of people. Also, they polluted everybody and everything that came into contact with them. Such people were marginalized and ostracized by the Pharisaic purity rules. Against this background Jesus actually takes hold of (ἐπιλαμβάνομαι) this man and heals him. The healing act in itself is a challenge to the Pharisees and teachers, to which Jesus adds the question whether a child or an ox that had fallen into a well may be saved on the Sabbath. And again they did not answer.

By his actions Jesus states his belief that the criterion for interpersonal conduct, even on the Sabbath, is the need of people, and that need should be met with compassion.[29] Twice it is said that the teachers of the Law and Pharisees could not answer, and therefore Jesus' argument carries the day – he is portrayed as the one who acquired honour from this confrontation. The introductory part of Luke 14 thus places us directly in a mode of dispute, which Jesus not only continues, but intensifies in the sections to come. The purpose of the author in emphasizing the conflict or dispute is to maintain in the mind of the reader the impression of a strong ideological difference between the Pharisees as elitist character(s) and Jesus as the humble one who teaches and practices compassion.

4.6.2 Sanctions and legitimations

We have argued (cf section 4.5.2 above) that an analysis of role expectations in terms of *sanctions* and *legitimations* could provide valuable clues as to the ideology of the author. *Sanctions* are applied in terms of conformance with or deviance from the *norms* prescribed for a role (i e role expectations or rules of behaviour). Sanctions can be *positive* (pertaining to conformance with the norms) or *negative* (pertaining to deviance from the norms), and are associated with a gain or loss in social prestige respectively.

The coercive power of role expectations (norms) is associated with the type of *legitimation* provided for such norms. Two types of legitimation can serve to strengthen norms – *empirical* and *metempirical* legitimation. Empirical legitimation refers to generally accepted social norms of behaviour – that is, societal norms. Metempirical legitimation indicates the use of metaphysical arguments to promote certain conduct – that is, an appeal to God's will to provide a very strong incentive for performing some specific act or line of conduct.

The concepts of *sanctions* and *legitimations*, with their respective double applications, will be employed as analytical categories in a brief analysis of each of the metaphoric units. The purpose of such an analysis is to provide additional confirming evidence that the pattern that has been identified by assigning values to the actions performed by the roles (cf sections 4.5.2.2 b-4.5.2.2 b iii), and by cross-tabulating the roles with the behaviour expected of them in the text (cf section 4.5.2.3), does exist. Such confirming evidence will substantiate the hypothesis that the expectations relating to high status are being redefined by Luke to include the concepts of compassion and service.

4.6.2.1 Luke 14:(7)8-11

In the case of the first metaphoric narrative (Lk 14:[7]8-11) Jesus reacts to the efforts of his fellow guests to procure for themselves the places of honour at the meal hosted by one of the leading Pharisees. Referring to the general case of receiving an invitation to a wedding, he gives directives for proper guest behaviour. Places of honour at the meal are reserved for eminent guests. In such a setting, where the structure of the institution exhibits a hierarchical differentiation, it makes good sense for any guest to take the lowest place at the meal rather than the highest. Assessing one's own status too highly might conceivably result in the host requesting the person who took the highest place (πρωτοκλισίαν – Lk 14:8) to move to the lowest place (τὸν ἔσχατον τόπον – Lk 14:9). The person who erroneously locates himself within the high status group, who aspires to a prominent position, will be shamed (in public) by being relocated in the low status group. The more expedient thing to do is to take the lowest place, for then one will be publicly honoured when the host asks you to move up to a place of greater prominence (προσανάβηθι ἀνώτερον).

The conduct of the high status guests in competing for the places of honour at the meal (Lk 14:7) is clearly censured. Jesus explicitly proscribes such behaviour (Lk 14:8). He sketches the possibility of the guests that strive for honour and status ('social climbers' – Ellis 1966:192) being relegated to a lower position, thereby being shamed (Lk 14:9). The episode is portrayed as a public one (wedding feast or ban-

quet), and therefore the 'shame' is implied to be public 'loss of face'. This means that status-seeking and self-assurance is negatively sanctioned as deviance from the accepted social norms pertaining to the role of the guest. However, there is even more at stake. Not only is such conduct *socially* unacceptable, but it is indicated to be *metempirically* rejected as well – God himself, no less, will reverse the status of such people (Lk 14:11; cf section 4.5.2.2 b i above).

While castigating his fellow guests for their unacceptable behaviour, Jesus simultaneously indicates the correct conduct which would conform with the role expectations. He namely prescribes humbleness, taking the lowest place at the banquet. This would inevitably result in the host coming up to him, calling him 'friend', and giving him a seat that signifies more prestige. Such humbleness is then positively sanctioned by Jesus in that he refers to the gain in social prestige – '[Y]ou will be honored in the presence of all who sit at table with you' (*RSV* Lk 14:10). All conduct that reflect an attitude of humbleness is then given the ultimate approval – a metempirical legitimation by Jesus, stating that God himself will elevate such people (Lk 14:11; cf section 4.5.2.2 b i).

To summarize: Behaviour that reflects an attitude of self-righteousness, self-assuredness and a striving for social honour and status, is depicted by means of a negative sanction as socially unacceptable. This negative assessment is augmented by a negative metempirical legitimation – it is suggested that such conduct is unacceptable to God himself, and that He will reverse the position of such people. At the same time the opposite, namely behaviour that reflects an attitude of humbleness, is represented by means of a positive sanction as socially correct and in conformance with the norms. This positive assessment is augmented by a positive metempirical legitimation, indicating that God himself will honour such a person and elevate his status.

The significance of these directives is that they are directed to people of high status. That was indicated by our analysis of status (cf sections 4.5.2.2 a-4.5.2.2 a ii) and the listing of role attributes (cf sections 4.5.2.2 a iii-4.5.2.2 a iv). Such an incident at a public function such as a wedding feast (or banquet) would result in great shame to the demoted guest. Contrary to expectations regarding what is 'fitting' for a certain status, a guest should be willing to humble himself, because such behaviour can only lead to greater honour in the eyes of the fellow guests (audience) when he is asked to move into a place of greater honour. The reverse is true for anyone who assesses his status too highly, and is asked to move to a lower position. Honour or prestige is therefore procured not by acting in accordance with the expectations associated with a specific status, but by precisely the opposite – a willingness to take a position or perform a role associated with a lower status. If one insists on

retaining one's status and even strives for greater prestige, God himself will reverse the positions.

4.6.2.2 Luke 14:12-14

The subject of discussion shifts from *guest behaviour* in the previous metaphoric narrative to *host conduct* in the present one. The setting is still that of a meal. The over-arching theme remains to my mind the ideological opposition between the exaltation-oriented perspective of the Pharisees (that finds expression in the laying down and enforcing of exclusive boundaries in accordance with their purity concerns), and the humiliation-oriented perspective of Jesus (that finds expression in the transcendence of boundaries through inclusive compassion).

First, the custom of inviting *status equals* to either the noon meal or the more important evening meal is discussed. Such conduct on the part of the host is indicated to be wrongly motivated and therefore expressly and explicitly discouraged (even rejected). As we have argued in the analysis of the actions in this narrative (cf section 4.5.2.2 b ii), the negative sanction on the host for inviting status equals is based on the perception of that conduct as a deliberate strategy aimed at establishing the need for reciprocation. We have argued above (cf section 4.6.1.1 a) that this strategy of establishing reciprocity among equals should be interpreted as customary within a certain kind of reciprocal relationship, namely the *colleague contract* (horizontal dyadic relationship) (cf section 4.4.3.5 a). It is clear, therefore, that the negative sanction is *empirically* legitimated with reference to the self-centeredness of the host as expressed in his self-serving, calculated invitation of only people who are able to reciprocate. Of special interest here are the words καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀντικαλέσωσίν σε καὶ γένηται ἀνταπόδομά σοι (Lk 14:12) – they imply that the host will get exactly the reward that he calculates in his strategy, and nothing more. We shall return to that in a moment. The analysis thus far proves that the negatively sanctioned conduct of the host in this narrative is but a continuation of the negatively sanctioned conduct of the guests in the first metaphoric narrative (cf section 4.6.2.1 above).

Then directives are given about the people who *should* be on the guest list of the host – the poor, the maimed, the lame and the blind (Lk 14:13). I do not believe that each of these categories of people have much significance by itself. I think it much more probable that the four categories together should be seen as a contra-group to the first one (consisting of the friends, brothers, kinsmen and rich neighbours – Lk 14:12). The second group therefore consists of people of inferior status, marginalized people who do not have the means to reciprocate and repay the host. And, it is said, it will be fortunate for the host that these guests cannot repay him, because then God will repay him in the resurrection of the just (Lk 14:14). This fact

signifies that Jesus rejects the horizontal dyadic relationship among equals, and the principles of reciprocation upon which it operates, in favour of a vertical dyadic relationship between people of differentiated status. Such a relationship is strongly reminiscent of the asymmetrical relationship described by the patron-client model – a relationship that operates on the basis of reciprocation. However, there is one crucial difference between the patron-client relationship and the one proposed by Jesus. That is namely the fact that the principle of reciprocation is completely removed from the relationship between the people engaged in this asymmetrical relationship, and is replaced by the principle of responsibility and compassion on the part of the high status group for the low status group. When this happens, the principle of reciprocation becomes operative on the transcendental level in the relationship between the high status 'host' and God himself, in that God will reciprocate in/with the resurrection of the just.

This raises again the question about repayment in vs 12 and vs 14. It would seem that the formulation of these references to repayment implies a cancellation of the second by the first. In other words, if the host includes only such people in his guest list that are able to repay him and are willing to accept the principle of reciprocation in equal measure (cf section 4.4.3.5 a), that repayment is all that he will receive. Calculated repayment by 'colleagues' seems to cancel any subsequent reward or repayment by God. Such behaviour is therefore negatively portrayed by the implied lack of metempirical legitimation, even though there is no negative *sanction* in the sense of loss of social prestige. On the other hand, if calculated reward is absent from the relationship, and compassion takes its place, there certainly is a metempirical legitimation of such a relationship – God will repay that compassion.

4.6.2.3 Luke 14:(15)16-24

In the final metaphoric narrative we reach what Fitzmyer (1985:1049) calls 'the climax of this group of topically arranged sayings of Jesus, having to do with dining....' According to Ellis (1966:192) Luke uses the final parable to apply the episode to his theme:

> As the long invited guests reject the final invitation, so religious Judaism rejects Jesus' urgent invitation to the messianic banquet in 'the kingdom of God'. Like the excluded guests, the churchmen will be replaced at the messianic feast by the social and religious rejects, 'the poor and the maimed'.

We have argued previously that the metaphoric narratives reflect a mode of dispute. The altercation in Luke 14:1-6 clearly suggests some tension at least, if not outright conflict. In terms of the honour-shame model, honour was a commodity that was constantly competed for, and the competition was along the lines of the challenge-response game (cf section 4.4.3.5 b above). Malina (1988b:10) indicates that conflict is always rooted in grievance. On whose side would the grievance be in this case? I believe that grievances, challenges and responses are part of Luke's plot, and have their origin in the ideological contentions mirrored in the Gospel. They should be thought of as a 'running fight' between Jesus and his opponents during the course of the plot. The grievance in this case is on the part of Jesus, because of 'watching' of the Pharisees. That constitutes the challenge. Jesus responds by healing the sick man on the Sabbath, and proving to the Pharisees from their own laws that it was acceptable; he castigates his fellow guests for their improper behaviour in competing for the seats of honour at the table; and then he challenges the host (as representative of the high status guests) for the fact that he invited only 'ingroup' people.

One of the fellow guests responds to this verbal attack by asserting: Μακάριος ὅστις φάγεται ἄρτον ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ (Blessed/fortunate is he who can eat in the Kingdom of God – Lk 14:15). How should this be interpreted? If this is a conflict situation, the utterance surely cannot be regarded as a 'pious exclamation' (Creed 1969:191; Leaney 1966:214) or as if this one guest 'shows some comprehension of what Jesus has been saying' (Fitzmyer 1985:1049), nor should it simply be taken as a macharism (contra Eichholz 1971:135; Tannehill 1986:129; Linnemann 1966:91; 163, note 11). The utterance is a new provocation, a challenge. It is a reaction to the offense taken from the criticism by Jesus in the first two metaphoric narratives, meaning: You may verbally abuse us for not accommodating those impure creatures, or for being elitist, but blessed are those (substitute 'we') who will eat in the Kingdom of God. Understood thus, the expression is an ironic play on the beatitudes (cf Lk 6:20-22), expressing the exaltation-oriented ideology of the Pharisees.

To this Jesus reacts with the parable.

Our analysis (cf section 4.5.2.2 a i) has shown that there are basically three roles operative in this metaphoric narrative – the host role, the guest role and the servant role. The guest role was shown (cf section 4.5.2.2 a iii) to consist of three separate subgroups, namely the natural, self-evident guests (G-1), the first group of substitute guests (G-2), and the second group of substitute guests (G-3). The first group we shall characterize as the *ingroup* (being of acceptable high status), and the second and third as the *outgroup* (the marginalized, and of low status).

When certain roles are juxtaposed, they reciprocally define each other and represent an institution within which the behaviour and status of actors in such roles are strongly defined. Reciprocal roles employed here are:

- Master – slave, representing the institution of slavery;
- Host – guests, representing the institution of banquet etiquette.

Initially invited guests and subsequently invited guests, representing the status scale in social relations, are substitute roles.

The principal character/actor taking part in the interaction portrayed in the delimited network of social relations at a meal is that of the master/host (ἄνθρωπός τις, κύριος, οἰκοδεσπότης). The analysis has shown that all the actions performed by the host and his servant are assessed as 'positive'. In keeping with the expectations defining his role (cf section 4.5.2.3), the master/host first sends his slave to invite people from his *associate group* (status equals), consisting of friends, brothers, family, rich neighbors (cf Lk 14:12), to come to his banquet. These guests shame (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 b) the host by staying away on the grounds of excuses reflecting economic and personal concerns. The master/host reacts in anger to this rude rejection of his invitation, and promptly changes the guest list from the associate group to the *dissociate group* (status inferiors), consisting of the poor, maimed, blind and lame. This group does not merit an invitation, not simply because of their actual fate, but primarily because they represent the dissociate (deviant) group in terms of power, status and class compatibility, and are regarded as *impure* according to the purity map of people held by the Pharisees (cf section 4.4.3.5 c). In other words, they represent the opposite end of the continuum marked at the one end by 'high status' and at the other end by 'low status', where purity is the differentiating principle.

A role reversal has resulted because of the (negative) reaction of the associate group to the invitation of the host. The associate group (high status) becomes the deviants, the dissociate group, dishonouring the invitation of the host because of a preoccupation with the acquisition of goods (and therefore higher status), both human (wife) and non-human (land, oxen). In this context the description of the acquisition of 'goods' can be seen as a 'status assignment device' (cf Gadzar 1977). Donahue (1988:141-142) argues that the excuses by the initial guests 'may best be explained in reference to the OT'. He connects the excuses with the concept of the Holy War (cf also Johnson 1977:146, and note 3 on the same page), where similar reasons exempted one from partaking in the war (cf Dt 20:5-7; 24:5). Toombs (1962:797) formulates: 'The fearful, the newly married, and those entangled in financial or domestic worries were invited by the commanding officers to go

home....' I believe that this explanation is correct, because that would fit the ideolo-
gical perspective imputed to the Pharisees, namely that they belonged in a special
category that exempted them from the exigencies that went with the acceptance of
the invitation to the banquet. That becomes clear from Luke 14:25-35, where Jesus
warns the crowd that sacrifices have to be made in the course of faith. The disso-
ciate group becomes the associate group, proper guests at the banquet, by virtue of
their acceptance and appreciation of the invitation and the hardships. I therefore
cannot agree with Linnemann (1966:91-92; 159-162, note 8; cf also Jeremias 1972:
176-180; Van Aarde 1986:73) that the excuses of the initial guests were for coming
late, and not for a refusal to come. Luke is debating precisely the issue of inclu-
sion/exclusion, and therefore the excuses are *refusals*.

Schematically the relationships can be shown as follows:

Fig 3 The banquet parable

The direct reciprocal relationship between the host and the servant is indicated by
the double-arrowed vertical line. The servant has the duty in this relationship to do
what the master indicates him to do, namely to go out and invite the guests to the
banquet, and to lead them to the house of his master. The master has the right to
expect from the servant to do his bidding. Between the servant and the various
guest groups there is also a reciprocal relationship. However, it is a relationship

that will only become complete when the master himself becomes part of it. There-
fore the relationship with the first guest group breaks down because the guests do
not come to the master's banquet. This is indicated by the broken line between G-1
and the host. This means that Luke, with his emphasis on compassion, is advocating
the practical application of this quality in everyday life.

4.6.3 Redefining reciprocation

It has become clear that the episode described in Luke 14:1-24 is a well composed
section, exhibiting the ideological perspective of the author. The analyses have
shown an irrefutable pattern of disapproval for status-seeking behaviour, and appro-
val for humbleness and compassion. It is especially the so-called *colleague contract*
between people of equal or compatible status that has been criticised, with the
warning that anyone who calculates his reward in terms of the principle of equal
reciprocation, will not be recognized by God. On the positive side the host role in
the second and third metaphoric narratives acquired a new duty in terms of the ex-
pectations associated with that role. The host in the third metaphoric narrative was
actually shown to invite the marginal people and the strangers – people who could
not repay him. This is completely in line with and evidence for the hypothesis that
Luke has a very strong theological orientation, derived from the symbolic universe
as legitimating instance for the social universe. His core value is οίκτίρμων (com-
passion) – an inclusive orientation which advocates the values of humbleness and
the willingness to serve. This concept is derived from the symbolic universe, and
embodied in and applied by the protagonist in the narrative, namely the character
Jesus. In the imaginary social world created by the narrative this ideological pers-
pective is opposed by the antagonists of the main character Jesus, namely the cha-
racter of the Pharisees and their associates. They embody and apply an exclusive
and exultation-oriented perspective (cf Brawley 1987:84) expressed in the concept of
τέλειος (wholeness) as their core value, and undergirded by 'status' as a differen-
tiating principle.

Up to now we have concentrated on the narrative itself, and on the narrative
world or imagined social world for which the narrative provides direct information.
However, we have argued from the outset that a narrative such as this also provides
indirect information concerning the contextual world or historical context of the text
– this 'real world' becomes *transparent* in the text (cf chapter 3, section 3.4.2 above;
see also Moxnes 1988:162). What remains now, is to make some inferences about
the world *outside* of the text on the basis of what we have learned about the
imagined social world presented in terms of the ideology of the author.

4.6.4 Inference by transparence

In the imagined social world presented by the narrative the plot was woven around two competing ideological perspectives. These perspectives are expressed in the arguments and conduct of the characters 'Jesus' and the 'Pharisees'. Both of these ideologies are based on the symbolic universe, and concern the pre- and proscriptions for man regarding his inner disposition as well as his outward behaviour (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). The criterion of evaluation is the measure of conformance to the essence of God.

The dominant perspective[30] is articulated by the main character, Jesus. It portrays God as one who compassionately accepts and cares for the marginalized people in society. The Pharisees, who are cast as Jesus' opponents, harbour a perspective of purity and exclusiveness, thereby denying God's involvement with the marginalized. The character Jesus can therefore be regarded as the 'hero', and the character of the Pharisees as the 'villain' of the story. In terms of the notion of the 'endophoric' and 'exophoric' use of reference items in language – references to the world inside or outside the text respectively (cf Van Aarde 1986:72) – the question arises as to the relevance of Luke's Gospel for his own readers. Do any people or circumstances in the world of the author become transparent through the portrayal of the characters in their interaction with each other, or through the ideology/ theology of the author as expressed in the commentary of the narrator?

An important question in Lukan research concerns the possible social composition and the intra- or intergroup relations of Luke's audience. The results of our investigation may be applied to this problem.

Moxnes (1988:163) refers to attempts to identify the 'rich Pharisees' with rich members of Luke's community, and to proposals that Luke speaks not to the poor, but to the rich, and that he addresses their concerns about the danger of money. He argues that it is unlikely that Luke intended the Pharisees to be 'types' of rich Christians. He bases his argument on the fact that the Pharisees are characterized in the narrative as rich people who rejected Jesus, and Christians would hardly have done that. He prefers to regard the Pharisees as negative representations of outsiders to the community: 'The literary construct of the rich Pharisee might function as an exaggerated picture of the nonbelieving world...' (Moxnes 1988:163). Rather than trying to identify members of Luke's community behind figures in the Gospel, Moxnes (1988:163-164) proposes that one should focus on the structures of the social and economic relations that Luke describes. From his study he derives two clues that point to the social composition of Luke's audience:

- 'The rich' are negative figures.
- Luke's criticism was based on 'the moral economy of the peasant' – a mode of thinking with emphasis on the need for subsistence.

Moxnes (1988:164) maintains that the rich were not just people with much wealth. Status was more important than money, and therefore the first-century Mediterranean world should be understood in terms of the categories 'elite' and 'nonelite', rather than 'rich' and 'poor'. On the basis of his two clues Moxnes (1988:165) contends that Luke would not have used the term 'rich' to characterize members of his community, even to admonish them. He argues that Luke's community should not be thought of as a group with great disparity between some members who belonged to the rich elite and some who belonged to the city poor: 'It is more likely that most members belonged to the same nonelite class' (Moxnes 1988:165). Furthermore, Luke himself did not belong to the rich elite:

> (H)e does not speak from their pespective, nor does he support the ambitions of the affluent nonelite who might want to become patrons of the community. His admonitions to give are based on the need for subsistence for those with few resources. Moreover, his emphasis for a 'nonreturn' represents a pressure from a perspective 'from below'. The lowly and needy are not to be put in a dependent position. In this way, Luke argued for a community structure that undercut the very basis for patron-client relations.
>
> (Moxnes 1988:165)

The results of our own investigation do not seem to support the conclusions drawn by Moxnes. While he is probably correct in stating that the rich are negative figures, we have argued that the notion of the 'rich' is but one element of the category of *high status*. In other words, we agree with Moxnes that 'rich' and 'poor' are imprecise categories to describe Luke's community, and that the categories of 'high status' (elite) and 'low status' (nonelite) would serve that purpose better. However, we differ from Moxnes in that we do not believe that Luke calls for a general reciprocity among equals. The concept of *redistribution* (Moxnes 1988:151) in our view is also an imprecise term to describe what Luke is advocating. As we have argued in the course of the study Luke is conducting his argument on a much more fundamental level, namely as an ideological perspective based on the symbolic universe and expressed in the concept of 'compassion'. This ideological position, of which Jesus was the proponent, can only be properly understood when it is defined in terms of its op-

posing ideology, of which the Pharisees were the advocates. *Compassion* refers to an ideology of inclusiveness, which includes all marginalized people, irrespective of whether they were poor, sick, deformed, outsiders in terms of ethnic classification, even rich. This was opposed by the exclusive ideology of the Pharisees that was also derived from the symbolic universe, and found its expression in the concept of wholeness as holiness. If Jesus is presented as the 'hero' of the story, it stands to reason that the audience would have acknowledged that fact, and therefore one could assume with a high degree of probability that the narrative is directed at Christians, perhaps members of Luke's community. A further assumption would be that the ideological clash depicted in the narrative between Jesus and the Pharisees reflected a similar problem that existed in Luke's community. In that case there existed in that community a group of people who operated on the ideological principle of exclusiveness which Luke denounced in his Gospel. Taking into consideration the third metaphoric narrative which we analysed, where the initially invited guests refused the invitation to the banquet, the exophoric use of referents in a text seemingly dictates that we identify those initial guests with the high status members of the community, the elite. They regarded themselves worthy of the seats of honour at a banquet (Lk 14:7-11) and belonged in a special social class where equal reciprocation (balanced reciprocity) was the customary behaviour (Lk 14:12-14). They were so preoccupied with economic and familial issues (cf the refusals to attend the banquet, Lk 14:18-20) that they did not even attend the banquet to which they had been invited. It was precisely because of this attitude that they lost their priviliged position as self-evident guests, and were replaced by others. Those others were first the marginalized people (the 'street people', Lk 14:21), and also the outsiders (those outside the city, Lk 14:23). Against Moxnes (cf discussion above) I therefore contend that Luke's community was definitely composed of affluent, high status people (cf Van Tilborg 1988:214-215; Scheffler 1988:186), as well as marginalized, low status people. Luke is undoubtable addressing those high status people who had become complacent about their involvement with the community. He criticizes an attitude amongst his readers that conformed to the exclusive ideological perspective imputed to the character of the Pharisees in his narrative. The criticism is relevant both to the exclusion of marginalized people of the own community (those 'street people' in the city – Lk 14:21), as well as outsiders, probably Gentiles (those outside of the city – Lk 14:23). To whom would such criticism apply? This question has a direct bearing on the identity of Luke's readers. These people are elite – they covet an exclusivist attitude. They interact on the basis of reciprocation in equal measure, and give no thought to marginalized people or outsiders. On the

basis of the criticism noted above, we infer that Luke is addressing hellenistic Jewish-Christians who still subscribe to the Pharisaic purity concerns.

The results of our investigations also do not confirm Moxnes' notion that Luke proposes an 'economy of the Kingdom', by which he means a redistribution of possessions and the introduction of a totally new and unique concept of an egalitarian societal structure. We agree that the prevailing pyramidal patron-client structure was revised by Luke. We have reservations, however, about the uniqueness of his own proposed interaction model. The change from a dependency-orientated patron-client structure to an egalitarian societal structure is profound. The question arises: How unique can a concept be before it becomes irrelevant? We infer from our own results that Luke did not simply want to replace the structure of society with a new model that can be described in terms strongly reminiscent of present-day socialist philosophy. He rather wished to imbue in people the core value of *compassion*. On the basis of this value, derived from the symbolic universe, the asymmetrical relationship between patron and client, directed at generating as much reciprocal benefits as possible, would be changed into a relationship of compassionate caring on the part of the elite for the non-elite. His main strategy for accomplishing this, is to have the main character in his narrative, Jesus, *proclaiming and demonstrating* this value in his life's story, thereby giving divine sanction to it. When compassion becomes the essence of a person's life, there is both positive sanction in the accrual of social prestige (Lk 14:10),[31] and metempirical legitimation in the the promise of divine reciprocation for such compassionate behaviour (Lk 14:14).

4.7 Endnotes: Chapter 4

1. Note – again – the correspondence of this description with 'emic' and 'etic' (see chapter 3, section 3.2.1). In the case of Gilbert's model, the collected data gathered from the real world would be 'emic' data, while the expected data collected from the imaginary world by analytical techniques would constitute the 'etic' data.

2. The structural functional approach with its mechanistic or organismic conception of the social system as striving for equilibrium, seems to properly belong in the cadre of ideal-type models of the deductive kind. Such models conceive of society in terms of the 'needs' of society as a whole and of its constituent elements, which needs serve to promote the evolution of the perfect society (cf Pilch 1988:59; see also Elliott 1986:24 for his criticism of Theissen's functionalist analysis of Palestinian society).

3. Van Aarde's suggestion about first constructing a background from different sources against which a specific text can be read and evaluated, constitutes an example of ideal-type models based on induction (cf Chapter 2, section 3.2.2.1).

4. See Carney (1975:13-15) for a full discussion of ideal-type conceptual models.

5. The 'symbolic approach' used by Neyrey (1988) employs cross-cultural models taken over from the anthropologist Mary Douglas (cf Neyrey 1988:65, 71).

6. See Carney (1975:21-23) for a full discussion of postulational models.

7. See Carney (1975:25-33) for a full theoretical explanation of the application of the multivariate model.

8. The following similar sequence of designed research is suggested by Miller (1964):
    (a) Selection and definition of a sociological problem.
    (b) Description of the relationship of the problem to a theoretical frame-work.
    (c) Formulation of working hypothesis.
    (d) Design of the experiment or inquiry.
    (e) Sampling procedures.

(f)   Establishment of methods for gathering data.

(g)   Preparation of a working guide.

(h)   Analysis of results.

(i)   Interpretation of results.

(j)   Publication or reporting of results.

9.   See the discussion on sociology, anthropology and psychology in Chapter 3 (section 3.5).

10.   Miller, in turn, acknowledges his dependence on Ackoff (1953) for the design. He indicates that he has adapted it to suit his own needs (Miller 1964:3).

11.   For examples of treating the Gospel as a whole as research case, see inter alia Du Plooy (1986), Tannehill (1986), and Kurz (1987).

12.   Van Aarde (1986:59-62) argues persuasively that the traditional distinction between 'allegory' and 'parable', originating with Jülicher, cannot be upheld in narrative analysis. Following the thesis of Weder (1978) that metaphoricity is a constituent element in the theoretical forms of both 'allegory' and 'parable', Van Aarde contends that – within narrative – metaphoricity becomes an element of the poetics of a parabolic speech. This is the reason why the three text segments chosen for analysis are called 'metaphoric narratives'.

13.   The present study has definite implications for the South African context. However, it does not fall within the scope of this study to attend to that problem.

14.   See Steyn 1984:5-16 for an explication of the concept 'closed system'. This concept, which derives from systems theory in the social sciences, should not be confused with the *disclosure theories* which are a prominent feature in the interpretation of narrative texts (cf Moore 1987).

15.   One of the variables in an empirical investigation of a social phenomenon is the measure in which the researcher might consciously or inadvertently manipulate (some aspects of) the social system.

16. Malina (1988a:11-31) employs the model of a 'social entrepreneur' or 'broker' to describe the mediating role of Jesus as a dominant analogy behind synoptic theology (cf Elliott 1987a:43-44).

17. Sheeley (1988:102) defines narrative asides as follows:

> Narrative asides may be defined as parenthetical remarks addressed directly to the reader which interrupt the logical progression of the story, establishing a relationship between the narrator and the narratee which exists outside the story being narrated.

He continues:

> Narrative asides are an essential tool in the establishment of the relationship between the narrator and the reader. Often a narrator will begin his or her narrative with an aside addressed directly to the reader in the form of a preface or prologue. Such an address sets the tone of the narrative relationship, especially in cases in which the reader is to be dependent on the narrator for much of the information necessary to read and understand the story correctly. Luke's Gospel and Acts are such narratives (Sheeley 1988:102).

Moxnes (1988:147) explains that these asides are usually not observations of visible facts – they rather give information about the hidden motivations and forces that make people behave the way they do.

18. An early date (before the death of Paul, which Luke does not mention) was proposed by inter alia Jerome, M Albertz, F Blass, J Cambier, E E Ellis, A von Harnack, W Michaelis, B Reicke, H Sahlin, and J A T Robinson (Fitzmyer 1981:54). Ellis (1966:58), for instance, suggests a date of about A D 70. Others, like P W Schmidt, M S Enslin, F Overbeck, J Knox, and J C O'Neill have suggested a date in the second century (Fitzmyer 1981:57). Fitzmyer (1981:57) regards the date A D 80-85 as the best solution (see Kümmel 1975:151 for a date 'between 70 and 90').

19. Van Aarde (1988c:244) regards Luke-Acts as a *political apology* that should be understood against the background of two major events in the second half of the first century, namely the reorganization of the Jews under Pharisaic leadership

after the fall of Jerusalem, and the persecution of the Christians of Asia Minor by the Roman state at the end of the reign of emporer Domitian from A D 81 to A D 96. He argues that these two events are related, and on that basis he locates the events, the readers/listeners and probably the writer of Luke-Acts in northern or western part of Asia Minor. Van Aarde (1988c:245) finds the primary cause for the political apology in the story of Luke-Acts in the conflicts that were caused by the mingling of the Jewish and Hellenistic worlds, and in the accommodation of converts from paganism.

20. The *contextual analysis* is to be differentiated from what Funk (1981:49) calls 'Inhaltsanalyse' (content analysis). *Contextual* analysis – in the sense that we employ the term – refers to the *social* context in which we theoretically locate our research case. *Content* analysis, in the sense that Funk uses the term, refers to a method of interpretation:

> Die Inhaltsanalyse ist eine wissenschaftliche Interpre-
> tationstechnik, die auf alle kommunikativen Ausdrucks-
> gefüge, also sprachliche und nichtsprachliche, ange-
> wandt werden kann...Die inhaltsanalytische Untersu-
> chung sprachlicher Ausdrucksgefüge geht von folgenden
> Überlegungen aus: 'Sprache ist nicht nur eine wichtige
> Voraussetzung sozialen Handelns, sofern dieses auf der
> Kommunikation van Bedeutungen beruht, sondern
> Sprechen und Schreiben ist selber eine Form sozialen
> Verhaltens. In dem, was [und wie] Menschen sprechen
> und schreiben, drücken sie ihre Absichten, Einstel-
> lungen, Situationsdeutungen, ihr Wissen und ihre still-
> schweigenden Annahmen über die Umwelt aus. Diese
> Absichten, Einstellungen usw. sind dabei mittbestimmt
> durch das sozio-kulturelle System, dem die Sprecher
> und Schreiber angehören, und spiegeln deshalb nicht
> nur Persönlichkeitsmerkmale der Autoren, sondern
> auch Merkmale der sie umgebenden Gesellschaft wider
> – institutionalisierte Werte, Normen, sozial vermittelte
> Situationsdefinitionen usw. Die Analyse von sprach-
> lichem Material erlaubt aus diesem Grunde, Rück-
> schlüsse auf die betreffenden individuellen und
> gesellschaftlichen, nicht-sprachlichen Phänomene zu
> ziehen. Damit ist die Ausgangsposition und die

Aufgabe der Inhaltsanalyse allgemein gekennzeichnet.'
Methodologisch wird die Inhaltsanalyse als eine Art der
indirekten Beobachtung klassifiziert.

21. This corresponds to the role partners 'husband' and 'wife' within the interaction situation of the marriage. Parsons (1968:438) emphasizes that the expectations attendant upon the roles are not for identical, but for different yet complementary performances.

22. The master-slave dyadic relation might be a very important indicant of Luke's addressee(s), and certainly warrants a full investigation in its own right (cf Van Staden 1988; Van Tilborg 1988).

23. Categorical and ordinal analyses are regarded as *non-metric* scales. *Metric* scales consist of the mapping of the properties of items according to a system where the category labels are ordinary numbers. The numbers represent the amount of the property possessed by the item being measured (Gilbert 1981:14), and allows for the use of arithmetical procedures in determining the relationship between the category labels. Metric scales are also broken down into types, of which the most important is the *interval* level of measurement. Items are defined in terms of a base unit of measurement (such as dollars, examination marks, age, or in our case, status, et cetera), and then classified into categories according to the number of base units they possess (Gilbert 1981:15). A second type of metric scale is the *ratio* scale. In addition to the properties of an interval scale, the ratio scale includes items that feature nothing of the property being measured. Such items are classified into a 'zero' category. Households, for instance, may be classified according to the number of children in them. Households with no children would then be classified in a zero category, households with one child in category #1, et cetera. Gilbert (1981:15) indicates that status is a concept which can in some circumstances be measured at the interval level, but not at the ratio level because nobody has 'zero status'.

24. The concept of 'status', of course, is not one used by Luke. It is an 'etic' term used in the social sciences to categorize and analyse 'emic' concepts that denote positions of relative importance in society such as 'eminence', 'power', 'importance', 'authority', et cetera.

25. Any social position or status is always correlated with other social positions and stands in a certain relation to such other statuses. If the relation of one status towards another is seen as a segment, a status can be seen as a (bigger or smaller) mixture of 'status segments' or 'positional sectors' (Funk 1981:13-14). Applied to our case, this means that the status of the host towards the guests, or towards the servant, are status segments that contribute towards the general status of the master or householder.

26. The criterion for determining status is described by Funk (1981:15) as follows:

> Die soziale Bewertung der Status wird vor allem
> manifestiert durch die Statussymbole. Deren Funktion
> besteht darin, die Träger eines bestimmten Status als
> solche zu kennzeichnen, sie dadurch von anderen
> Statusträgern zu unterscheiden und so die Beachtung
> der Rechte und Pflichten zu sichern, die mit dem Status
> verbunden sind.

27. Within the text different terms are used to refer to meals – ὁ γάμος (Lk 14:8); ἡ δοχή (Lk 14:13); τὸ ἄριστον (Lk 14:12); and τὸ δεῖπνον (Lk 14:12, 16, 17, 24).

Louw & Nida (1988:252, n 23.23) define ἄριστον as 'a less important meal, normally in the earlier or middle part of the day'. According to Strack-Billerbeck (1924:204) Jews normally ate two meals a day, except on the Sabbath when there were three. The meal designated by the term ἄριστον was the earlier one, taken around nine or ten o'clock in the morning (cf Ross 1962:316). It consisted of 'small loaves, goat's-milk cheese, figs, olives, and the like...' (Harrison 1962:799).

τὸ δεῖπνον refers to the second meal of the day. This was the main meal, and took place at about four or five o'clock in the afternoon (Louw & Nida 1988:252, n 23.25; see also Strack-Billerbeck 1924:206; Behm 1964:34). As a generic term, δεῖπνον can also refer to a banquet or feast, and in that sense would be equivalent to ἡ δοχή (banquet, feast – Louw & Nida 1988:252, n 23.27). Fitzmyer (1985:1046, n 8) furthermore indicates that γάμος, especially in the plural (as in Lk 14:8), can also be used in a generic sense to mean 'banquet'.

28. Strack-Billerbeck (1928:615, note f), referring to *Berakah 31b*, relate:

> Zur festgesetzten Stunde...begaben sich die Geladenen
> ...in das Haus des Gastgebers. Unter Umständen lässt

> sich der Diener, der die Geladenen nicht persönlich kennt, die Einladung vorliegen, um etwaige ungeladene Gäste von vornherein fernzuhalten. Das mochte um so nötiger sein, als Häuser, in denen ein Gastmahl stattfand, allgemein als offene Häuser galten, in die sich auch Ungeladene hineindrängten, um etwas von der Tafel zu erhaschen.

29. Although the term 'compassion' is not used here, it is clear that the suspension of the rules for Sabbath observance in the interest of human need invokes the idea of compassion (cf also Moxnes 1988:128).

30. Resseguie (1982:42) states:

> Though disparate points of view may be expressed on the lips of various characters only one voice emerges as authoritative, giving expression to the underlying ideological point of view of the narrative as a whole. That voice is Jesus' own. His voice or speech shifts and evaluates all other voices in the narrative. Whenever a voice emerges that is noncurrent with Jesus' own it is reevaluated from his perspective. Therefore it is not uncommon to see Jesus rebuking or correcting a character's speech. For example, he corrects and condemns the Pharisees and scribes for their misplaced emphasis on external acts of piety (11:39-44) and for their exaltation-oriented worldview (16:14-15).

31. The term μακάριος does not only have eschatalogical significance (rendered as 'blessed'), but should also be understood in its this-worldly dimension (rendered as 'fortunate' – cf Louw & Nida 1988).

Chapter 5

Conclusion

5.1 Compassion – the essence of life: A synopsis

This study has two main objectives – to be both a *methodological exercise* and a *theological enterprise*. It is a *methodological* exercise in that it applies social-scientific theory and method to the study of a New Testament subject, and a *theological* enterprise in its effort to divulge the author's understanding of (certain aspects of) the symbolic universe by an analysis of his ideological bias. That ideological bias, evident in his literary work, represents his theology.

We have conducted this investigation on the basis of the hypothesis that Luke composed his Gospel with the purpose of redefining the understanding of his readers concerning the disposition and conduct of 'insiders' towards 'outsiders' and of elites towards non-elites. This basis signifies the fact that our interest was directed towards the *contextual* rather than the *referential* history of the text (cf chapter 2, section 2.4 for the distinction). We accepted as part of the premise of our investigation the thesis by Resseguie, namely that the Gospel of Luke is structured in terms of two opposing ideologies (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.2.2) – an exaltation-oriented ideological perspective imputed to the Pharisees, and a humiliation-oriented perspective connoted to Jesus.

We have also conducted an investigation into the works of six major exponents of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, namely Gerd Theissen, John G Gager, Wayne A Meeks, Bruce J Malina, John H Elliott, and Norman R Petersen (cf chapter 2). The investigation was not the usual general survey – it concentrated on specifically two aspects:

- The approach towards the literature of the New Testament.
- The role of social science theory (and method) in the respective works.

The purpose of that investigation was both to serve as an introduction to what is done in the field of the social-scientific study of the New Testament, and to give an indication of the important role the two aspects mentioned above would play in the present work.

Methodologically speaking, in a cross-disciplinary study such as this one it is especially important to reach a sufficient measure of competence in the discipline(s) *not* one's own. For this purpose we investigated those aspects of literary and social-scientific theory we thought relevant to the purpose of this study (cf chapter 3, sections 3.4-3.5.4). We believe that the results of our investigation have demonstrated the compatibility of narrative criticism and social-scientific methods. Valuable data have been generated by treating the narrative as an imagined social world and by performing certain social-scientific analyses on it. On the micro-level the analysis of role, status and expectations in terms of the theoretical perspective of *role theory* (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.2), and the evaluation of actions in terms of sanctions and legitimations, revealed certain patterns which provided important clues to the ideology of the author. These findings were corroborated by interpreting the data in terms of three conceptual models – the patron-client model (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 a), the honour-shame model (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 b), and the purity model (cf chapter 4, section 4.4.3.5 c). These models are applications of the theoretical perspective of *symbolic interactionism* (cf chapter 3, section 3.5.3.1). At the same time we have indicated that the study is not intended to be a full social system analysis, but a *partial* analysis – known as a *contextual analysis* – focusing on individuals, but locating the role of the individual with reference to its group context (cf chapter 4, section 4.3). Basic to our model was the exposition of theory directed at explaining the interaction between individuals within the system. In addition the model needed to include a theoretical perspective on the social structure itself, which could provide an explanation of the higher-order level of group structure and intergroup behaviour. As our macro-sociological perspective we chose *conflict theory*, thereby indicating the premise that first-century Mediterranean culture was agonistic in terms of social (especially intergroup) dynamic, and that the Gospel of Luke reflects and comments upon this aspect of social life.

Even before methodological matters receive attention, however, there are other important questions of principle that should be resolved. One must be very clear about the relationship between the various disciplines that are to be employed in the investigation. In what frame of reference will the results of the study be interpreted: a theological, sociological, or narratological frame? We have indicated that the subject of this study is *theology* (cf chapter 1, section 1.3). To look for an author's *theology* in a literary work is identical to looking for his *ideology* (cf chapter 3, sections 3.2.1-3.2.2.4). Theology, furthermore, is a kind of knowledge that is closely linked to another kind of knowledge – the knowledge comprising the *symbolic universe*. Symbolic universes, as we indicated (cf chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3), is related to the matter of *legitimation* – that is, *explaining* the institutional order by ascribing cog-

nitive validity to its objectified meanings, and *justifying* that order by endowing its practical imperatives (custom; role expectations) with normative authority. This raises the question of the manner in which a symbolic universe is constructed, what factors influence the composition of such symbolic universe, and how it functions conceptually and socially. Is it constructed in order to confirm the status quo or to challenge it? Is the symbolic universe a replica of the social world, or does the social world conform to the values prescribed by the symbolic universe? When does a symbolic universe come into existence? If it has an integrative function for the purpose of maintaining the current social order, is the symbolic universe constructed simultaneous with or subsequent to the social universe? This is really a question about the relationship between belief systems and the social reality in terms of causality. Is it sufficient to say that one is a result of the other, or one is maintained by the other, or is there a much more complex dialectical relationship between the two?

The relationship between these two kinds of knowledge, as we stated, has to do with causality.

Theologically speaking, we hypothesized that the *religious ideology or theology* of the author was derived from his interpretation of the essence of God in his relationship with man (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). In other words, we argued that Luke understood God's actions towards man as characterized by the element of compassion, and that he advocated this value and recommended that it become part of the expectations attendant upon especially the roles that were linked to a high status (i e the rich, the powerful, the authoritative). This implies that Luke is moving to change the practical imperatives (role expectations) prevalent in his social world to conform with his understanding of the values of the symbolic universe. This was confirmed by the analyses relating to our test case, Luke 14:1-24. A clear pattern emerged in the assessment of actions, showing that status-seeking and exclusivity was negatively evaluated, while humbleness and caring received endorsement. This was corroborated by the results of an investigation of the sanctions and legitimations pertaining to such actions – self-asserting behaviour was both empirically and met-empirically rejected, while humbleness and compassion was shown to find empirical and metempirical approval (cf chapter 4, section 4.6.2-4.6.2.3).

If we accept the fact that a symbolic universe serves to legitimate the social order, we have to postulate that Luke is arguing from and presenting a totally new symbolic universe. This I find just as inconceivable as I found Moxnes' contention about the uniqueness of Luke's message (cf chapter 4, section 4.6.4). We therefore have to explore another avenue, namely that of the dialectical relationship between the two kinds of knowledge. In our discussion on this subject (cf chapter 3, section

3.2.2.3), we indicated that while the symbolic universe legitimates the social world, the symbolic universe itself needs to be legitimated when challenged. A symbolic universe consists of a body of pre-theoretical or pre-reflective knowledge. Its legitimation is constituted by a body of *reflective knowledge*. If the symbolic universe is religious in nature, then its legitimation, as a reflection on a religious symbolic universe, is known as *theology*. However, we have indicated that legitimation is not the only thing that theology does for the symbolic universe – it may also *modify* that universe (chapter 3, section 3.2.2.3). On the basis of this information I contend that Luke's view is intended to be both a *legitimation* of the values he finds in the symbolic universe, and a *modification* of the symbolic universe of his readers. The prevalent social order was strongly divided into elites and non-elites, who had very little to do with one another except in constructing mutually beneficial, asymmetrical relationships described as *patron-client* relationships. The elites, furthermore, seem to have been involved in horizontal relationships based on the principle of reciprocation in equal measure. People not of their status were regarded as 'impure', and not given any consideration for fear of 'pollution' (cf chapter 1, section 1.1). Such conduct was quite in keeping with the practical imperatives (role expectations) at that level of society, which expectations were given normative character by deriving them from the symbolic universe. Luke advocates a new value derived from the symbolic universe – compassion (οἰκτίρμων), being inclusive, so that both the marginalized people in society and the outsiders can be accommodated. That is a theological enterprise, pure and simple.

While we have set out to perform a social-scientific investigation of the religious symbolic universe reflected in Luke's ideology/theology (cf title of the present work), we were at pains to indicate that a social-scientific investigation of this kind need not be regarded as reductionist in that it would of necessity reduce theology to social dynamic (cf chapter 3, sections 3.2.2-3.2.2.4). The results of our investigation have shown that Luke's call, based on his core value derived from the symbolic universe, is for compassion and caring towards all people, even those originally thought of as 'polluted'. We believe thereby to have proven our hypothesis and validated our model.

That means that we have accomplished our theological goal as well. For even today, as in Luke's time, compassion should be the essence of life.

-------------------#-------------------

Works Consulted

Ackoff, R L 1953. *The design of social research*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Althusser, L 1976. *Positions*. Paris.

Bain, R & Kolb, W L 1964. s v 'Sociology'. *A dictionary of the social sciences*.

Balch, D L 1981. *Let wives be submissive: The domestic code in 1 Peter*. Chico: Scholars Press.

Bales, R F 1953. A theoretical framework for interaction analysis, in Cartwright, D & Zander, A (eds), *Group dynamics*. Illinois: Row, Peterson.

Bann, S 1977. Structuralism and the revival of rhetoric. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 68-84.

Becker, H 1964. s v 'Social interaction'. *A dictionary of the social sciences*.

Becker, H & Dahlke, H O 1941. Max Scheler's sociology of knowledge. *PPR* 2, 310ff.

Behm, J 1964. s v δεῖπνον κτλ. *TDNT*.

Belo, F 1975. *Lecture matérialiste de l'évangile de Marc: Récit-Pratique-Idéologie*. 2nd rev ed. Paris: Cerf.

Berger, K 1977. *Exegese des Neuen Testaments: Neue Wege vom Text zur Auslegung*. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer.

Berger, P L 1973. *The social reality of religion*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Berger, P L & Berger, B 1976. *Sociology: A biographical approach*. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Berger, P L & Luckmann, T 1967. *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. New York: Doubleday.

Best, T F 1983. The sociological study of the New Testament: Promise and peril of a new discipline. *SJTh* 36, 181-94.

Betti, E 1962. *Die Hermeneutik als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften*. Tübingen: Mohr.

Botha, J 1989. Sosio-historiese en sosiologiese interpretasie van die Nuwe Testament. *Koers* 54/4, 480-508.

Brawley, R L 1987. *Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, apology, and conciliation*. Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Brehm, J W & Cohen, A R 1962. *Explorations in cognitive dissonance*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Brown, C H 1979. *Understanding society: An introduction to sociological theory*. London: John Murray.

Buckley, W 1967. *Sociology and modern systems theory*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Burke, K 1967. Foreword to *The philosophy of literary form: Studies in symbolic action*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Carney, T F 1975. *The shape of the past: Models and antiquity*. Kansas: Coronado Press.

Carson, H M 1962. s v 'Hospitality'. *NBDict*.

Catton, W R 1964. The development of sociological thought, in Faris, R E L (ed), *Handbook of modern sociology*, 912-950. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Chance, J B 1988. *Jerusalem, the temple, and the new age in Luke-Acts*. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Chatman, S 1978. *Story and discourse: Narrative structure in fiction and film*. London: Cornell University Press.

Cilliers, S P & Joubert, D D 1966. *Sosiologie: 'n Sistematiese inleiding*. Stellenbosch: Kosmo-Uitgewery.

Cohen, P S 1968. *Modern social theory*. London: Heinemann Educational Books.

Combrink, H J B 1984. Multiple meaning and/or multiple interpretation of a text. *Neotestamentica* 18, 26-37.

Coward, D 1977. The sociology of literary response. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 8-17.

Creed, J M 1969. *The Gospel according to St Luke: The Greek text with introduction, notes and indices*. London: St Martin's Press.

Cronin, J 1987a. Ideology and literary studies in South Africa, in Van Straaten 1987:110-133.

--- 1987b. One word 'ideology': Many meanings, in Van Straaten 1987:12-16.

Dahl, R A 1968. s v 'Power'. *IESS*.

Dahrendorf, R 1958a. Out of utopia: Toward a reorientation of sociological analysis. *AJS* 64.

--- 1958b. Toward a theory of social conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, 170-183.

--- 1959. *Class and class conflict in industrial society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

--- 1961. *Gesellschaft und Freiheit*. Munich: Piper.

--- 1967. *Essays in the theory of society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

D'Amico, R 1978. Desire and the commodity form. *Telos* 35, 88-122.

Danow, D K 1987. Lotman and Uspenski: A perfusion of models. *Semiotica* 64, 343-357.

Darr, J A 1988. Review of Petersen (1985). *Religious Studies Review* 14/2, 118-121.

Davis, D B 1975. *The problem of slavery in the age of revolution 1770-1823*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dawsey, J 1989. The literary unity of Luke-Acts: Questions of style – a task for literary critics. *NTS* 35, 48-66.

De Villiers, P G R 1984. The interpretation of a text in the light of its socio-cultural setting. *Neotestamentica* 18, 66-79.

Dibelius, M [1929] 1985. Zur Formgeschichte der Evangelien. *ThR* NF 1, 185-216. [Hrsg von Hahn, F, *Zur Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. (*WdF* 81.)]

Domeris, W R 1988. Social scientific study of the early Christian churches: New paradigms and old questions, in Mouton, Van Aarde & Vorster 1988:378-393.

Donahue, J R 1988. *The Gospel in parable: Metaphor, narrative, and theology in the synoptic gospels*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Douglas, M 1966. *Purity and danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

--- 1975. *Implicit meanings: Essays in anthropology*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Drucker, H M 1974. *The political uses of ideology*. New York: Harper & Row.

Du Plooy, G P V 1986. The narrative act in Luke-Acts from the perspective of God's design. DTh dissertation, University of Stellenbosch.

Du Plooy, H 1989. Teks en ideologie. *South African Society for General Literary Studies-Papers* 9, 114-141.

Du Toit, A B 1980. Algemene inleiding tot die evangelies, in Du Toit, A B (red), *Handleiding by die Nuwe Testament*, Band 4, 1-30. Pretoria: N G Kerkboekhandel.

Du Toit, C 1989. Tussen ideologie en utopia. *South African Society for General Literary Studies-Papers* 9, 81-102.

Eco, U 1976. *A theory of semiotics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

--- 1979. *The role of the reader: Explorations of the semiotics of texts*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Edwards, O C 1983. Sociology as a tool for interpreting the New Testament. *AThR* 65/4, 431-448.

Eichholz, G 1971. *Gleichnisse der Evangelien: Form, Überlieferung, Auslegung*. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag.

Elliott, J H 1981. *A home for the homeless: A sociological exegesis of 1 Peter, its situation and strategy*. London: SCM.

Elliott, J H 1984. Social sciences compared with history – focus and interests. Unpublished class notes composed for a course on 'The early church in social-scientific perspective'. University of San Francisco.

--- 1985. Review of Meeks (1983). *Religious Studies Review* 11/4, 329-335.

--- 1986. Social-scientific criticism of the New Testament: More on methods and models. *Semeia* 35, 1-33.

--- 1987a. Patronage and clientism in early Christian society. *Forum* 3/4, 38-48.

--- 1987b. Text, situation and strategy: Definitions and methodological considerations. Unpublished class notes composed for a course on 'The early church in social-scientific perspective'. University of San Francisco.

--- 1989a. Social-scientific study of the Bible and the biblical world. Unpublished study material providing an introduction to the subject. University of San Francisco.

--- 1989b. Household and meals versus the Temple purity system: patterns of replication in Luke-Acts. *HTS* 47, 386-399.

--- 1990. Temple versus household: A contrast in social and symbolic realities, in Neyrey, J H (ed), *The social world of Luke-Acts: Models for interpretation*. Minneapolis: Fortress. (Also in *HTS* 47, 88-120.)

Esler, P F 1987. *Community and gospel in Luke-Acts: The social and political motivations of Lucan theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fanaeian, E 1981. An introduction to a critique of the methodology of social science. PhD thesis, Claremont Graduate School.

Feeley-Harnik, G 1981. *The Lord's table: Eucharist and Passover in early Christianity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Festinger, L 1957. *The theory of cognitive dissonance*. New York: Harper & Row.

Festinger, L, Reicken, H W & Schachter, S 1956. *When prophecy fails: A social and psychological study of a modern group that predicted the end of the world*. New York: Harper & Row.

Fink, C F 1968. Some conceptual difficulties in the theory of social conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12, 429-431.

Firth, R 1968. s v 'Social anthropology'. *IESS*.

Fitzmyer, J A 1985. *The Gospel according to Luke X-XXIV: Introduction, translation, and notes*. New York: Doubleday.

Foerster, W 1955. *Das Judentum Palästinas zur Zeit Jesu und der Apostel*. 4. Aufl. Hamburg: Furche.

--- 1968. *Neutestamentliche Zeitgeschichte*. Hamburg: Furche.

Foote, N N 1964. s v 'Social psychology'. *A dictionary of the social sciences*.

Freedman, J L, Sears, D O & Carlsmith, J M 1978. *Social psychology*. 3rd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Funk, A 1981. *Status und Rollen in den Paulusbriefen: Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung zur Religionssoziologie*. Innsbruck: Tyrolia.

Funk, R W 1976. The watershed of the American biblical tradition: The Chicago School, first phase 1892-1920. *JBL* 95, 4-22.

Gadamer, H-G 1965. *Wahrheit und Methode*. Tübingen: Mohr.

Gadzar, G 1977. Conversational analysis and conventional sociolinguistics. *Analytical Sociology* 1/1, D08-F09.

Gager, J G 1975. *Kingdom and community: The social world of early Christianity*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

--- 1979. Review of Grant (1977), Malherbe (1977) and Theissen (1977). *Religious Studies Review* 5/3, 174-180.

Gager, J G 1982. Shall we marry our enemies? Sociology and the New Testament. *Interp.* 36/3, 256-265.

Genette, G 1980. *Narrative discourse*. Transl by J E Lewin. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gilbert, G N 1981. *Modelling society: An introduction to loglinear analysis for social researchers*. London: Allen & Unwin.

Goldberg, M 1987. Ideology as false consciousness, in Van Straaten 1987:27-40.

Goode, W J & Hatt, P K 1952. *Methods in social research*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Gottwald, N K 1979. *The tribes of Yahweh: A sociology of the religion of liberated Israel, 1250-1050 B C E*. London: SCM.

--- 1982. Sociological method in biblical research and contemporary peace studies. *American Baptist Quarterly* 2, 142-156.

Grant, R M 1977. *Early Christianity and society: Seven studies*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.

Greenberg, J H 1968. s v 'Anthropology: The field'. *IESS*.

Gurvitch, G 1971. *The social frameworks of knowledge*. Transl by M A Thompson & K A Thompson. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Habermas, J 1970. *Towards a rational society*. Boston: Beacon.

Hahn, F 1985. *Zur Formgeschichte des Evangeliums*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. (*WdF* 81.)

Harrington, D J 1988. Second Testament exegesis and the social sciences: A bibliography. *BTB* 18/2, 77-85.

Harris, O G 1984. The social world of early Christianity. *LexTQ* 19/3, 102-114.

Harrison, R K 1962. s v 'Meals'. *NBDict*.

Hays, R B 1987. Review of Petersen (1985). *JAAR* 55/1, 173-175.

Herzog, W R 1983. Interpretation as discovery and creation: Sociological dimensions of biblical hermeneutics. *American Baptist Quarterly* 2, 105-118.

Hirsch, E D 1967. *Validity in interpretation.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hollenbach, P 1985. Liberating Jesus for social involvement. *BTB* 15/4, 151-157.

--- 1987. Defining rich and poor using social sciences, in Richards 1987:50-63.

Homans, G C 1951. *The human group.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Horsley, R A & Hanson, J S 1985. *Bandits, prophets, and messiahs: Popular movements in the time of Jesus.* Minneapolis: Winston.

Hospers, J 1967. *An introduction to philosophical analysis.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Ingarden, R 1973. *The cognition of the literary work of art.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Iser, W 1974. *The implied reader.* Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.

Jennings, T W 1985. Introduction, in Jennings, T W (ed), *The vocation of the theologian.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

Jeremias, J 1972. *The parables of Jesus.* 3rd rev ed. London: SCM.

Johnson, L T 1977. *The literary function of possessions in Luke-Acts.* Missoula: Scholars Press. (SBLDS 39.)

Joubert, S J 1987. Die armoedeprobleem van die Jerusalemgemeente: 'n Sosio-historiese en eksegetiese ondersoek. DD thesis, University of Pretoria.

--- 1991. 'n Verruimde invalshoek tot die verlede?: Die sosiaal-wetenskaplike benadering tot die Nuwe Testament. *HTS* 47, 39-54.

Kee, H C 1989. *Knowing the truth: A sociological approach to New Testament interpretation.* Minneapolis: Fortress.

Kinloch, G C 1981. *Ideology and contemporary sociological theory.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Kuhn, T S 1970. *The structure of scientific revolutions.* 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kümmel, W G 1985. Das Urchristentum, II. Arbeiten zu Spezialproblemen. b: Zur Sozialgeschichte und Soziologie der Urkirche. *ThR* 50/4, 327-363.

Kurz, W S 1987. Narrative approaches to Luke-Acts. *Biblica* 68, 195-220.

Lanser, S S 1981. *The narrative act: Point of view in prose fiction.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lategan, B C 1984. Current issues in the hermeneutical debate. *Neotestamentica* 18, 1-17.

Leaney, A R C 1966. *The Gospel according to St Luke.* 2nd ed. London: Black. (*Black's New Testament Commentaries.*)

Lenski, G E 1966. *Power and privilege: A theory of social stratification.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Lichtheim, G 1967. *The concept of ideology and other essays.* New York: Random House.

Linnemann, E 1966. *Parables of Jesus: Introduction and exposition.* London: SPCK.

Louw, J P 1976. *Semantiek van Nuwe Testamentiese Grieks.* Pretoria: Beta.

Louw, J P & Nida, E A 1988. *Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament based on semantic domains.* Vol 1. New York: United Bible Societies.

Malherbe, A J 1977. *Social aspects of early Christianity.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Malina, B J 1981a. The apostle Paul and law: Prolegomena for an hermeneutic. *Creighton Law Review* 14, 1305-1339.

--- 1981b. *The New Testament World: Insights from cultural anthropology.* Atlanta: John Knox.

--- 1982. The social sciences and Biblical interpretation. *Interp.* 36/3, 229-242.

--- 1983. Why interpret the Bible with the social sciences. *American Baptist Quarterly* 2, 119-133.

--- 1984. Jesus as charismatic leader? *BTB* 14, 55-62.

--- 1986a. *Christian origins and cultural anthropology: Practical models for biblical interpretation.* Atlanta: John Knox.

--- 1986b. Interpreting the Bible with anthropology: The case of the poor and the rich. *Listening* 21, 148-159.

--- 1986c. Normative dissonance and Christian origins. *Semeia* 35, 35-59.

--- 1986d. 'Religion' in the world of Paul. *BTB* 16, 92-101.

--- 1988a. Patron and client: The analogy behind synoptic theology. *Forum* 4/1, 2-32.

--- 1988b. A conflict approach to Mark 7. *Forum* 4/3, 3-30.

--- 1989. Christ and time: Swiss or Mediterranean? *CBQ* 51/1, 1-31.

Malina, B J & Neyrey, J H 1988. *Calling Jesus names: The social value of labels in Matthew.* Sonoma: Polebridge.

Mandelbaum, D G 1968. s v 'Cultural anthropology'. *IESS.*

Manis, J G & Meltzer, B N (eds) 1972. *Symbolic interaction: A reader in social psychology.* 2nd ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Mannheim, K 1952. *Ideology and utopia.* London: Kegan Paul.

Martin, J P 1987. Towards a post-critical paradigm. *NTS* 33, 370-385.

McFague, S 1983. *Metaphorical theology: Models of God in religious language.* London: SCM.

Meeks, W A 1972. The man from heaven in Johannine sectarianism. *JBL* 91, 44-72.

--- 1982. The social context of Pauline theology. *Interp.* 36/3, 266-277.

--- 1983. *The first urban Christians: The social world of the apostle Paul.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Miller, D C 1964. *Handbook of research design and social measurement.* New York: McKay. (McKay Social Science Series.)

Moore, S D 1987a. Are the Gospels unified narratives?, in Richards 1987:443-458.

--- 1987b. Narrative commentaries on the Bible: Context, roots, and prospects. *Forum* 3/3, 29-62.

Mouton, J, Van Aarde, A G, & Vorster, W S (eds) 1988. *Paradigms and progress in theology.* Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Moxnes, H 1988. *The economy of the Kingdom: Social conflict and economic relations in Luke's Gospel.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

Neusner, J 1979. *The way of Torah: An introduction to Judaism.* 3rd ed. North Scituate: Duxbury.

Neyrey, J H 1985. *The passion according to Luke: A redaction study of Luke's soteriology.* New York: Paulist Press.

--- 1986. Social science modeling and the New Testament. *BTB* 16, 107-110.

--- 1988a. A symbolic approach to Mark 7. *Forum* 4/3, 63-91.

--- 1988b. *An ideology of revolt: John's Christology in social-science perspective.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

--- 1988c. Unclean, common, polluted, and taboo. A short reading guide. *Forum* 4/4, 72-82.

Nida, E A 1975. *Exploring semantic structures.* München: Fink.

Nida, E A & Reyburn, W D 1981. *Meaning across cultures.* New York: Orbis.

Noel, D L 1971. A theory of the origin of ethnic stratification, in Yetman, N R & Steele, C H (eds), *Majority and minority: The dynamics of racial and ethnic relations*, 32-50. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Osiek, C 1984. *What are they saying about the social setting of the New Testament?* New York: Paulist Press.

--- 1987. Review of Petersen (1985). *BTB* 17, 39.

Palmer, R E 1969. *Hermeneutics: Interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer.* Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Papineau, D 1978. *For science in the social sciences.* New York: St Martin's Press.

Park, R E 1926. Behind our masks. *Survey Graphic* 56, 135-139.

Parsons, T 1968. s v 'Social interaction'. *IESS.*

Peabody, R L 1968. s v 'Authority'. *IESS.*

Petersen, N R 1978. *Literary criticism for New Testament critics.* New York: Fortress.

--- 1984. The reader in the gospel. *Neotestamentica* 18, 38-51.

--- 1985. *Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the sociology of Paul's narrative world.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

--- 1987. Prolegomena to a reader-orientated study of Paul's letter to Rome. A working paper for the *SNTS Reader Response Seminar,* 1987.

Pilch, J J 1981. Biblical leprosy and body symbolism. *BTB* 11, 108-113.

--- 1988. A structural functional analysis of Mark 7. *Forum* 4/3, 31-62.

Popenoe, D 1980. *Sociology.* 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Rengstorf, K H 1969. *Das Evangelium nach Lukas.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck. (NTD 3.)

Resseguie, J L 1982. Point of view in the central section of Luke (9:51-19:44). *JETS* 25/1, 41-47.

Richards, K H (ed) 1987. *Society of Biblical Literature 1987 seminar papers.* Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Ricoeur, P 1976. *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the surplus of meaning.* Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press.

--- 1978. *The rule of metaphor: Multi-disciplinary studies of the creation of meaning in language.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

--- 1981. What is a text? Explanation and understanding, in Thompson, J B (ed), *Paul Ricoeur. Hermeneutics and the human sciences: Essays on language, action and interpretation,* 145-164. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Riley, M W 1963. *Sociological research, I: A case approach.* New York: Harcourt.

Rockwell, J 1977. A theory of literature and society. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 32-42.

Rohrbaugh, R L 1987. 'Social location of thought' as a heuristic construct in New Testament study. *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 30, 103-119.

Rosenberg, M J 1965. When dissonance fails: On eliminating evaluation apprehension from attitude measurement. *JPSP* 1, 28-42.

Ross, J F 1962. s v 'Meals'. *IDB.*

Rousseau, J 1985. The communication of ancient canonized texts. *Neotestamentica* 19, 92-101.

Routh, J 1977. A reputation made: Lucien Goldmann. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 150-162.

Routh, J & Wolff, J 1977. Introduction. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 1-7.

Routh, J & Wolff, J (eds) 1977. *The sociology of literature: Theoretical approaches.* Staffordshire: University of Keele. (*Sociological Review Monograph* 25.)

Rutherford, J 1977. Structuralism. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 43-56.

Saldarini, A J 1988. *Pharisees, scribes and Sadducees in Palestinian society: A sociological approach*. Delaware: Glazier.

Salmon, W C 1964. *Logic*. New York: Prentice-Hall.

Sarbin, T R 1968. s v 'Role: Psychological aspects'. *IESS*.

Sargent, S S & Williamson, R C 1966. *Social psychology*. 3rd ed. New York: The Ronald Press Company.

Sartori, G 1984. *Social science concepts: A systematic analysis*. Beverley Hills: Sage.

Scheffler, E H 1988. Suffering in Luke's Gospel. DD thesis, University of Pretoria.

Schnell, C W 1987. Sociological-historical interpretation of Mark and John, in De Klerk, J C & Schnell, C W, *A new look at Jesus: Literary and sociological-historical interpretations of Mark and John*, 135-272. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Schöllgen, G 1988. Was wissen wir über die Sozialstruktur der paulinischen Gemeinden? Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem neuen Buch von W A Meeks. *NTS* 34, 71-82.

Schreiter, R J 1985. *Constructing local theologies*. London: SCM.

Schütz, J H 1982. Introduction, in Theissen, G 1982. *Essays on Corinth: The social setting of Pauline Christianity*, 1-23. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Scroggs, R 1980. The sociological interpretation of the New Testament: The present state of research. *NTS* 26, 164-79.

Seliger, M 1976. *Ideology and politics*. New York: The Free Press.

Sheeley, S M 1988. Narrative asides and narrative authority in Luke-Acts. *BTB* 18/3, 102-107.

Smit, D J 1988. Responsible hermeneutics: A systematic theologian's response to the readings and readers of Luke 12:35-48. *Neotestamentica* 22, 441-484.

Smith, D E 1987. Table fellowship as a literary motif in the Gospel of Luke. *JBL* 106, 613-638.

Smith, J Z 1975. The social description of early Christianity. *Religious Studies Review* 1/1, 19-25.

--- 1978. Too much kingdom, too little community. *Zygon* 13/2, 123-130.

Sorokin, P A 1928. *Contemporary sociological theories*. New York: Harper & Brothers.

Soskice, J M 1985. *Metaphor and religious language*. Oxford: Clarendon.

Sprott, W J H 1954. *Science and social action*. London: Watts.

Stählin, G 1967. s v ξένος κτλ. *TDNT*.

Stegemann, W 1984. *The gospel and the poor*. Transl by D Elliott. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Steinbach, D 1974. Grundlagen einer theoretisch-kritischen Literatursoziologie: Die dialektische Theorie und Methode, in Bark, J (Hrsg), *Literatursoziologie: I Begriff und Methodik.* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.

Steyn, A F 1984. Buckley: Die moderne oop-sisteembenadering. *South African Journal of Sociology* 15/4, 5-16.

Steyn, A F & Van Rensburg, H C J 1985. *Sosiologie.* Kaapstad: Academica.

Strack, H L & Billerbeck, P 1924. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch: Das Evangelium nach Markus, Lukas und Johannes und die Apostelgeschichte.* Zweiter Band. München: Beck.

--- 1926. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch: Das Evangelium nach Matthäus.* Erster Band. München: Beck.

--- 1928a. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch: Exkurse zu einzelnen Stellen des Neuen Testaments.* Vierter band. Erster Teil. München: Beck.

--- 1928b. *Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch: Exkurse zu Einzelnen Stellen des Neuen Testaments.* Vierter Band. Zweiter Teil. München: Beck.

Strauss, D F M 1988. *Die grondbegrippe van die sosiologie as wetenskap.* Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council. (Navorsingsverslaereeks: 8.)

Sumner, W G 1940. *Folkways.* Boston: Ginn.

Swanson, G E 1968. s v 'Symbolic interaction'. *IESS.*

Sweeter, D A 1964. s v 'Role'. *A dictionary of the social sciences.*

Swingewood, A 1977. Marxist approaches to the study of literature. *Sociological Review Monograph* 25, 131-149.

Tannehill, R C 1986. *The narrative unity of Luke-Acts: A literary interpretation. Vol 1. The Gospel according to Luke.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976. s v 'faith'.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976. s v 'idea'.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976. s v 'ideology'.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976. s v 'religion'.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary 1976. s v 'theology'.

Theissen, G 1978. *Sociology of early Palestinian Christianity.* Philadelphia: Fortress.

--- 1982. *Essays on Corinth: The social setting of Pauline Christianity*, ed and transl by J H Schütz. Philadelphia: Fortress.

--- 1987. *The shadow of the Galilean: The quest of the historical Jesus in narrative form.* Transl by John Bowden. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Tidball, D 1983. *An introduction to the sociology of the New Testament.* Exeter: Paternoster.

Tiryakian, E A 1985. Review of Meeks (1983). *AJS* 90/2, 1138-1140.

Toombs, I E 1962. s v 'War, ideas of'. *IDB*.

Tracy, D 1978. A theological response to 'Kingdom and Community'. *Zygon* 13/2, 131-135.

Tucker, G M 1971. *Form criticism of the Old Testament*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Turner, J H 1982. *The structure of sociological theory*. 3rd ed. Illinois: Dorsey.

Turner, R H 1968. s v 'Role: Sociological aspects'. *IESS*.

Uspensky, B 1973. *A poetics of composition: The structure of the artistic text and typology of a compositional form*. Transl by V Zavarin & S Wittig. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Van Aarde, A G [1980]. 'Betekenis' en 'gebruik' in die Makarismereeks (Matt 5:3-10). *HTS* 36/3 & 4, 1-28.

--- 1982a. God met ons: Dié teologiese perspektief van die Matteusevangelie. D D proefskrif, Universiteit van Pretoria.

--- [1982b]. Die vertellersperspektief-analise: 'n Literatuurteoretiese benadering in die eksegese van die evangelies. *HTS* 38/4, 58-82.

--- 1985. Skrifgebruik: Hermeneutiese riglyne. *HTS* 41/4, 547-578.

--- 1986. Plot as mediated through point of view: Mt 22:1-14 – a case study, in Petzer, J H & Hartin, P J (eds), *A South African perspective on the New Testament: Essays by South African New Testament scholars presented to Bruce Manning Metzger during his visit to South Africa in 1985*, 62-75. Leiden: Brill.

--- 1988a. Historical criticism and holism: Heading toward a new paradigm?, in Mouton, Van Aarde & Vorster 1988:49-64.

--- 1988b. Resonance and reception: Interpreting Mt 17:24-27 in context. Paper presented at the SBL meeting at the University of Sheffield, England.

--- 1988c. Narrative point of view: An ideological reading of Luke 12:35-48. *Neotestamentica* 22, 235-252.

--- 1989a. Proefskrifbespreking: Scheffler, E H (1988). *HTS* 45/1, 183-190.

--- 1989b. Hand 7:48 – 'Die Allerhoogste woon nie in mensgemaakte konstruksies nie...': Die relevansie van die Nuwe-Testamentiese wetenskap na aanleiding van die metafoor 'tempel'. Inaugural lecture delivered on the occasion of his inauguration as Professor and Head of the Department of New Testament Studies, Faculty of Theology (Section A), University of Pretoria.

--- 1990a. Opinions expressed in a postgraduate seminar on the social-scientific study of the New Testament. Department of New Testament Studies, Faculty of Theology (Section A), University of Pretoria.

Van Aarde, A G 1990b. Narrative criticism applied to Jn 4:43-54, in Hartin, P J & Petzer, J H (eds), *Text and interpretation: New approaches in the criticism of the New Testament*. Leiden: Brill.

Van den Berghe, P 1963. Dialectic and functionalism: Towards a theoretical synthesis. *ASR* 28, 695-705.

Van Luxemburg, J, Bal, M & Weststeijn, W G 1981. *Inleiding in de literatuurwetenschap*. Muiderberg: Coutinho.

Van Staden, P 1988. A sociological reading of Luke 12:35-48. *Neotestamentica* 22/2, 337-353.

Van Straaten, Z 1987. The theory of ideological beliefs, in Van Straaten, Z (ed) 1987:4-10.

Van Straaten, Z (ed) 1987. *Ideological beliefs in the social sciences*. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council.

Van Tilborg, S 1986. *The sermon on the mount as an ideological intervention: A reconstruction of meaning*. Assen: Van Gorcum.

--- 1988. An interpretation from the ideology of the text. *Neotestamentica* 22/2, 205-215.

Vorster, W S 1981. *Wat is 'n evangelie?: Die plek van die tekssoort evangelie in die literatuurgeskiedenis*. Pretoria: N G Kerkboekhandel.

--- 1984. Der Ort der Gattung Evangelium in der Literaturgeschichte. *VF* 24/1, 2-25.

--- 1988a. Oor die Nuwe Testament, vertelkunde en prediking. *HTS* 44/1, 164-177.

--- 1988b. Towards a post-critical paradigm: Progress in New Testament scholarship?, in Mouton, Van Aarde & Vorster 1988:31-48.

Weder, H 1978. *Die Gleichnisse Jesu als Metaphern: Traditions- und redaktionsgeschichtliche Analysen und Interpretationen*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck.

Weingart, P 1969. Beyond Parsons?: A critique of Ralf Dahrendorf's conflict theory. *Social Forces* 48, 151-165.

Wellek, R & Warren, A 1963. *Theory of literature*. 3rd ed. Middlesex: Penguin Books.

Wilson, L & Kolb, W L 1949. *Sociological analysis*. New York: Harcourt.

Wilson, R R 1980. *Prophecy and society in ancient Israel*. Philadelphia: Fortress.

Wimbush, V L 1988. Review of Petersen (1985). *Religious Studies Review* 14/2, 121-124.

Wire, A 1984. Review of Elliott (1981) and Balch (1981). *Religious Studies Review* 10/3, 209-216.

Wittig, S 1977. A theory of multiple meanings. *Semeia* 9, 75-103.

Zimmermann, H 1967. *Neutestamentliche Methodenlehre*. Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk.

Authorial Index

A

Althusser
75, 80, 81

B

Bain & Kolb
112

Bal
74, 80, 110

Bann
11

Becker
129

Belo
180

Berger, B
26

Berger, K
26, 29, 30, 51, 60

Berger, P L
15, 21, 25, 35, 46, 49, 59, 60,
61, 63, 86, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96,
97, 100, 101, 109, 131, 132,
178, 194

Best
31, 50, 63, 105, 114

Betti
14

Billerbeck
217, 218, 219, 220

Blau
143, 144

Blumer
133, 134

Botha
63, 157

Brawley
229

Brehm
48

Brown
113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 121,
124, 125, 129, 130, 131, 133,
134, 144

Buckley
145

C

Cannon
116

Carlsmith
48, 49

Carney
54, 152, 154, 158, 159, 160,
161, 183, 184

Carson
217

Catton
57

Chance
189

Chatman
13, 110

Cilliers
27

Cilliers
113, 114

Cohen
48, 80, 81, 114, 115, 116, 117,
118, 119, 120, 124, 125, 128,
129

Festinger
47, 48, 49, 50

Fink
127

Firth
114

Fitzmyer
218, 220, 225, 226

Foerster
1

Foote
114, 129, 131, 133

Freedman
48, 49

Funk
144, 194, 195, 200, 214

Funk, R W
27

G

Gadamer
14, 17

Gadzar
227

Gager
27, 31, 32, 37, 42, 45, 46, 47,
49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 98, 241

Genette
33

Gilbert
153, 155, 156, 191, 192, 193

Goldberg
75

Goode
181

Gottwald
32, 42, 49, 51, 52, 70, 71, 92,
101, 102, 114, 119

Greenberg
114

Gurvitch
15, 57

H

Habermas
88

Hahn
28, 29, 104

Hanson
5

Harrington
31

Harris
30, 32, 47, 51, 53

Harrison
216, 217

Hatt
181

Hays
41, 59, 62

Herzog
14, 17

Hirsch
14, 18

Hollenbach
20, 57

Homans
113, 143

Horsley
5

Hospers
70

I

Ingarden
16

Iser
16

J

James
129, 131

Jennings
157

Jeremias
218, 227

Johnson
189, 216, 227

Joubert
27, 63, 113, 114

K

Kinloch
86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 98, 99, 100, 101

Kolb
112

Kuhn
105, 106, 133, 134, 154

Kümmel
46, 53

L

Lanser
18

Lategan
59

Leaney
218, 226

Lenski
123

Lévi-Strauss
144

Lichtheim
87, 88

Linnemann
218, 226, 227

Linton
135

Louw
69, 198

Luckmann
15, 21, 32, 34, 35, 46, 49, 59, 60, 61, 63, 86, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 109, 131, 132, 174, 190

M

Malherbe
109, 157

Malina
27, 31, 36, 38, 39, 43, 45, 47, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 66, 69, 71, 72, 77, 78, 81, 91, 92, 93, 103, 106, 107, 113, 121, 124, 143, 145, 153, 157, 159, 179, 184, 185, 186, 189, 225, 241

Malinowski
115

Mandelbaum
113

Manis
131

Martin
105, 106

Marx
87, 89, 113, 120, 121, 122, 125

McFague
154

Mead
129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 135

Wolff
          10, 11, 12, 13, 18

Z

Zimmermann
          28

Index of biblical references

A

Acts
8, 9, 18, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29, 30, 31

Ac 1:1-5
18

Ac 4:1
5

Ac 5:17
5

Ac 23
5

D

Dt
227

Dt 6:4
1

Dt 6:4-9
1

Dt 11:13-21
1

L

Lk 1:1-4
8

Lk 6:20-22
226

Lk 6:36
4, 170, 177

Lk 7:1-10
68

Lk 7:36-50
174

Lk 7:37
217

Lk 7:44
218

Lk 7:44-46
219

Lk 7:45
218

Lk 7:46
218

Lk 9:51-18:14
174

Lk 11:37-54
170

Lk 12:35-48
68, 189

Lk 13:10-17
220

Lk 13:31
7

Lk 14
19, 25, 172, 188, 221

Lk 14:1
204, 208, 217

Lk 14:3
204, 208

Lk 14:1-6
216, 220, 225

Lk 14:7
189, 208, 222

Lk 14:7-11
217, 232

Lk 14:(7)8-11
23, 30, 172, 188, 196, 200, 203, 206, 222

Lk 14:8
222

Lk 14:8-11
204, 214, 218

Lk 14:9
195, 222

Lk 14:9, 10
205

Lk 14:10
195, 199, 205, 223, 233

Lk 14:11
222, 223

Lk 14:11, 14
195

Lk 14:1-14
217

Lk 14:12
204, 208, 224, 227

Lk 14:12-14
23, 30, 172, 188, 196, 201,
203, 209, 214, 218, 223, 232

Lk 14:1-24
170, 174, 185, 228, 243

Lk 14:13
224

Lk 14:14
224, 233

Lk 14:15
226

Lk 14:(15)16-23/24
23, 30, 172, 188, 196, 199,
201, 203, 204, 225

Lk 14:16-17
205

Lk 14:16-23
214

Lk 14:16-24
210, 218

Lk 14:17
218

Lk 14:18-20
232

Lk 14:21
205, 232

Lk 14:23
205, 232

Lk 14:25-35
227

Lk 16:1-13
68

Lk 16:14
189

Lk 17:7-10
68

Lk 19:39-40
8

Lv 19:2
2

M

Mt
4, 177

Mk 12
5

Mt 5:48
2

N

Num 15:37-41
1

Subject Index

A

anachronistic
57, 72

anthropology
10, 22, 26, 27, 30, 31, 33, 42,
51, 56, 59, 62, 112, 113, 115

C

city
205, 231, 232

clientism
183, 184

cognitive dissonance
47, 48, 49, 50

compassion
3, 5, 8, 9, 22, 170, 189, 190,
200, 221, 222, 224, 225, 229,
231, 233, 241, 243, 244

conceptual models
45, 108, 156, 158, 181, 185,
242

conflict theory
10, 21, 47, 59, 82, 107, 120,
121, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128,
134, 143, 144, 145, 179, 188,
217

construction
10, 13, 21, 22, 39, 41, 50, 59,
60, 61, 79, 85, 86, 103, 104,
105, 106, 107, 137, 152, 167,
172

core value(s)
1, 2, 7, 22, 170, 174, 177, 181,
189, 229, 233, 244

counter-ideological
88

cultural anthropology
56, 113

D

deviance
12, 55, 122, 221, 223

dyadic
163, 179, 184, 185, 199, 204,
205, 218, 219, 224, 225

E

economic
3, 4, 5, 27, 43, 54, 72, 75, 76,
80, 81, 88, 90, 100, 143, 176,
227, 230, 232

economics
57, 61, 77, 80, 89, 113, 172

economy
142, 231, 233

emic
69, 70, 71, 108, 154, 174

ethnocentric
56

ethnocentrism
56, 57

etic
70, 71, 108, 154, 174, 199

exchange theory
143, 144

F

fallacy
17, 20, 36, 64, 62, 71, 156,
165, 166, 167, 180

familial
232

family
52, 61, 77, 129, 187, 199, 203,
208, 227

form-critical
28, 29, 36, 43, 44

Form criticism
26, 28, 29, 36

functionalism
114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120,
121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127,
134, 143, 145

G

Gospels
20, 28, 37, 110, 111, 145

guest(s)
195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 223, 224, 225,
226, 227, 228, 229, 232

H

healing
220, 221, 226

hermeneutics
171

high status
4, 72, 100, 239

high-status
167, 170, 182, 189, 190, 192,
200, 201, 202, 204, 205, 207,
208, 209, 210, 215, 216, 218,
222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 231,
232, 243

historical Jesus
35

historical world
34, 35, 40

holiness
1, 2, 9, 22, 171, 187, 189, 220,
221, 232

homomorphic models
157, 158

honor
184, 185, 186

honour
100, 183, 185, 186, 195, 205,
207, 208, 215, 216, 217, 218,
221, 222, 223, 226, 232, 242

host
195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202,
203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208,
209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215,
216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222,
223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228,
229

household
173, 217

hypothesis
9, 21, 109, 118, 156, 157, 159,
165, 166, 167, 170, 177, 181,
182, 183, 189, 190, 196, 200,
216, 222, 229, 241, 244

I

ideological
9, 13, 19, 20, 21, 23, 32, 46,
54, 75, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84,
85, 86, 90, 91, 98, 100, 101,
105, 112, 117, 126, 177, 194,
228, 241

ideology
2, 5, 8, 9, 37, 72, 73, 74, 75,
78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,
86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94,
98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103,
111, 161, 163, 174, 177, 178,
179, 180, 181, 182, 187, 188,
193, 194, 196, 216, 220, 221,
226, 229, 230, 232, 242, 243,
244

implication
91

individual-in-a-role
165

interactionism
21, 129, 132, 134, 135, 140,
141, 143

N

P

Compassion – The Essence of Life

HTS Supplementum 4 (1991)