The *hattat* ritual and the Day of Atonement

in the Book of Leviticus

BY

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A Thesis

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". . . because the good hand of my God was on me" (Nehemiah 2:8)

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Declaration

I declare that the thesis, which I hereby submit for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria, is my own work and has not previously submitted by me for a degree at this or any other tertiary institution.

Signature:

Date: 2013. 4. 30

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By suggesting a new theory concerning the mechanism of the *hattat* ritual, Milgrom challenged the traditional conviction that the *hattat* sacrifice is to remove the offerer's sin or impurity and atone for or expiate him. He argued that the *hattat* sacrifice is only offered to purge the sanctuary and its sancta rather than to atone for the offerer; thus the verb כִּפֶּר (hereafter *kipper*) in the *hattat* context is rendered 'to effect purgation (for the offerer)' or 'to purge/purify (the sancta),' instead of 'to atone for/make atonement for' or 'expiate.' Consequently Milgrom discarded the traditional rendering of *hattat* as, 'sin offering,' and suggested 'purification offering.'

Since the stir caused by Milgrom, a number of scholars have refuted his argument, although a few followed it. N. Kiuchi, A. Rodriguez, N. Johar, and R. E. Gane are the prominent opponensts who have posed their own alternative theories. In particular Kiuchi and Gane have greatly contributed to this study field. However, their new theories are based on different starting points and presuppositions, and as a result it led to divergent trajectories in explaining the ritual dynamics and the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* sacrifice.

Milgrom's starting point that interprets the verb *kipper* to mean 'to effect purgation for' or 'purge' is wrong in terms of the semantics of the term *kipper* and its syntax in various contexts. While J. Sklar contributed to discern the semantics of *kipper*, refusing Milgrom's view, Gane demonstrated that the syntax of *kipper* refers to the remedy of the offerer's sin or impurity, rather than only to purge the sancta according to Milgrom.

Scholars have misunderstood the meanings of *kipper* and *kipper*-affiliated verbs (נָשָׂא עָוֹן, נִסְלַח, קִדֵּשׁ, טִהַר, חִטֵּא), as well as their relationship in the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering (ch. 2). In addition, they base their theories on a wrong interpretation of the prescription of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4. The text of Leviticus 4 must be interpreted in

light of Leviticus 16, and conversely by a supplementary and complementary reading (the theory of gap-filling), because the two prescriptions are given in an integrated *hattat* system. In this respect, a thorough analysis of the ritual logic stipulated in Leviticus 16 is significant (ch. 3), because the ritual activities in the chapter shed light on the meaning of the same ritual activities in Leviticus 4, the functions of which are not mentioned there.

The investigations into each component of the *hattat* ritual help to understand their synthetic dynamics and mechanism in the entire atoning process (chs. 5 and 6). In particular, the alleged understanding about the function of hand imposition is thoroughly challenged by this thesis. It sees its function of sin-transference only in the *hattat* offering (and probably the guilt offering), and not in the other sacrificial offerings. The *hattat* flesh is impure and its defilement comes from the sin-transference to the victim through hand imposition and the impurity-absorption into the victim's flesh through blood rites.

The results of the investigations are synthesized in chapter 6 and 7. Several major theories are compared and refuted by the new theory that is suggested by this thesis. In chapter 7 four paradigms for the *hattat* mechanism are displayed and explained in detail as the conclusion of this research.

Chapters 6 and 7 stated that the atonement mechanism in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4-5; Lev 12-15) and that in the special *hattat* ritual (Lev 16) for sins basically operates in the same ritual dynamics, while in the latter the Azazel goat forms a unique variant part of the *hattat* offering. The atonement for the offerer(s), whether the atonement is for a person (Lev 4-5; Lev 12-15) or for the nation (Lev 16), and the consequent forgiveness and purification of the offerer(s) are completed with the purification of the sanctuary and its sancta, because the offerer's sin or impurity defiled the sancta. Therefore, the atonement of the offerer and the purification of the sancta are inseparable. Without the latter, the former cannot be fulfilled.

Key words

- *kipper*
- *hattat*
- The Day of Atonement
- Atonement
- Sacrifice
- Sin
- Purity and impurity
- Purification
- Atonement mechanism
- Hand imposition
- Blood manipulation
- Disposal of the *hattat* flesh
- The Azazel goat
- Contamination of the sanctuary
- Holiness

Abbreviations

AOTC	Apollos Old Testament Commentary
ASV	American Standard Version
AT	*Alten Testament*
AUSDS	Andrews University Seminary Dissertation Series
AUSS	Andrews University Seminary Studies
BAG	Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, trans.* William F. Arndt, & F. Wilbur Gingrich (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957)
BI	Biblical Interpretation
Bib	*Biblica*
BKAT	Biblischer Kommentar: Altes Testament, ed. M. Noth and H. W. Wolff
BS	*Bibliotheca Sacra*
BZAW	Beihefte zur *ZAW*
CBC	Cambridge Bible Commentary
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*
CJB	The Complete Jewish Bible
CPNIVC	The College Press NIV Commentary
CSB	Holman Christian Standard Bible
DARCOM	Daniel and Revelation Committee Series
diss.	Dissertaion
ESV	English Standard Version
ESV	English Standard Version
FAT	Forschungen zum Alten Testament
GKC	*Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar* ed. E. Kautzsch (revised and trans. A. E. Cowley)
HAT	Handbuch zum Alten Testament
HUCA	*Hebrew Union College Annual*
ICC	International Critical Commentary
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society*
JBL	*Journal of Biblical Literature*
JPSTC	Jewish Publication Society Torah Commentary
JSOTSup	*Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* Supplement Series
KEHAT	Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum *AT*

LBC	Layman's Bible Commentary
LHBOTS	Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies
LXE	LXX English Translastion of Septuagint by C. L. Brenton
LXX	Septuagint
MT	Masoretic Text
mss.	manuscripts
NAC	New American Commentary
NASB	New American Standard Bible
NCB	New Commentary Bible
NCBC	The New Century Bible Commentary
NICOT	New International Commentary on the Old Testament
NIV	New International Version
NJB	The New Jerusalem Bible
NJPS	New Jewish Publication Society version
NRSV	New Revised Standard Version
NT	The New Testament
OED	*Oxford English Dictionary*
OT	The Old Testament
OTL	Old Testament Library
OTS	*Oudtestamentishce Studiën*
OTWSA	Die Ou Testamentiese Werkgemeesskap in Suid-Afrika
RBL	*Review of Biblical Literature*
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SBLDS	Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation
SBLSP	Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers
SJLA	Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity
TDOT	*Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*
THAT	*Theologiesches Handwörterbuch zum Alten Testament,* edited by E. Jenni and C. Westermann; München
TOTC	Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
VTSup	*Vetus Testamentum*, Supplements
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WMANT	Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten and Neuen Testament
ZAW	*Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft*

Chapter 1
Introduction and Methodology

1.1. The aim of the thesis

This thesis aims at investigating the dynamics and atonement mechanism of the unique ritual of the so-called 'sin offering' or 'purification offering' (חַטָּאת) performed on 'the Day of Atonement' (Lev 16), [1] while comparing it with the ordinary חַטָּאת rituals prescribed respectively for sins in Leviticus 4-5 and physical impurities in Leviticus 12-15 (hereafter *hattat,* the transliteration for the Hebrew term חַטָּאת, or 'the *hattat* offering,' rather than translated renderings for it like 'purification offering' or 'sin offering').[2]

The main issues of this thesis are divided between the *hattat* ritual in general and the unique ceremony performed on the Day of Atonement (hereafter frequently 'the Day') in Leviticus. The *hattat* ritual performed on ordinary days for specific sins (Lev 4-5) and ritual impurities (Lev 12-15) will be called 'the ordinary *hattat* ritual.' The *hattat* rituals practiced only once a year on the Day of Atonement will be called 'the special *hattat* ritual,' although a few cases could be treated as a special type of *hattat* offering: for example, the

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[1] The 'Day of Atonement' is employed as a rendering for יוֹם כִּפֻּרִים in this study. Milgrom (1991b: 24, 1062) prefers 'the Day of Purgation' to 'the Day of Atonement,' since he is sure that the basic meaning of the verb כִּפֶּר in the חַטָּאת context is 'to purge' or 'effect purgation.'

[2] The renderings, 'sin offering' and 'purification offering,' fail to embrace the intricate meaning of חַטָּאת. Traditionally 'sin offering' had been favored as the rendering of חַטָּאת, but lately 'purification offering' is accepted by many scholars since Milgrom suggested it (1991b: 253). According to Milgrom, חַטָּאת was derived from the *piel* of חטא rather than the *qal* of חטא 'to sin'. The meaning of the *piel* of חטא appears to be 'to cleanse' in ritual contexts. He (1991b: 253-54) contends that the blood of חַטָּאת is always treated at the sancta only to purge them, but not to cleanse the offerer, whether he is a sinner or an impure person. That is why Milgrom translates חַטָּאת as 'purification offering.' Contrary to the recent trend to favor 'purification offering' following Milgrom's suggestion, the traditional rendering is still 'sin offering,' along with some scholars and most English Bible versions. But the rendering 'sin offering' does not fully satisfy the meaning of חַטָּאת, since *hattat* deals with the problem of ritual impurity as well. The difficulty in translating the term can be seen in Kiuchi's quest (1987) for the determination of a suitable English rendering for חַטָּאת; he employed *hattat* (חַטָּאת) for discussion despite the title of his thesis, "Purification Offering . . ." (1987); however, he adopts the rendering 'sin offering' for חַטָּאת in his later work (2007; cf. 2003), though he is himself not satisfied with it. Because of the difficulty of rendering, the transliteration *hattat* or the *hattat* offering is used in this thesis, although *hattat* is not a transliteration which precisely corresponds to the Hebrew word חַטָּאת.

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hattat offerings in the cultic inauguration (Lev 8-9) and the unique ritual of the red heifer, which can be considered to be an anomalous type of *hattat* in a broad sense (Num 19).

The main rituals of the Day of Atonement are the ritual of the two *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat ritual, while the ritual of the two burnt offerings is made as a supplementary one to finalize the Day's ceremony. Since it will be argued in this study that the Azazel goat is a part of the special *hattat* ritual of the Day, the main focus of the Day's ceremony is on 'the special *hattat* ritual.' Therefore, the issues will be treated in two divisions: (1) general issues that the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual have in common; (2) the issues of the special *hattat* ritual, which are related to the Day of Atonement only. This investigation will reveal that while there are functional differences between the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual, the two *hattat* rituals are cooperatively performed in a macro *hattat* ritual system in the book of Leviticus, each with its own role, so as to remedy the sins and impurities of the Israelites.

1.2. Main issues

1.2.1. General issues of the *hattat* ritual

The questions concerning the *hattat* ritual in general are as follows:

1. What is the meaning of כִּפֶּר?; 'atone for' or 'expiate'? or 'purge'?
2. If כִּפֶּר refers to an action of purgation, what does the *hattat* offering purge (כִּפֶּר)?; people or the sancta? or both?
3. How does the *hattat* ritual accomplish the effect of כִּפֶּר, namely, atonement (it is a temporary rendering)? What is the function of each ritual procedure to make atonement: slaughter, blood manipulation, hand imposition, and disposal of the remaining flesh (eating and burning)?
4. What is the meaning and function of blood in the *hattat* sacrifice and other sacrifices like the burnt offering, the guilt offering, and the peace offering? Why and how does blood make atonement for people in terms of Leviticus 17:11?
5. Do sins and impurities defile the sanctuary and its sancta? If so, what are the aspects of the defilement of the sancta?

6. If the sanctuary and its sancta are defiled by a person's sin or impurity, how does it occur? And why does it impact on them? What is the relationship between the people of Israel and the sanctuary?

1.2.2. Issues of the ceremony on the Day of Atonement

The issues related to the special *hattat* ritual which is performed on the Day of Atonement are as follows:

1. What form does the entire ceremony of the Day take, while the ceremony consists of several rituals? In what respect does the form of the special *hattat* ritual that is made on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16) differ from the form of the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4-5)?
2. What are the kinds of sin and impurity that are dealt with on the Day?
3. How do the *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat remove sins and impurities to atone for Israel? Why is the Azazel goat required to remove sins (or iniquities) on the Day of Atonement in contrast to the ordinary *hattat* ritual?
4. What is the relationship between the ceremony of the Day in Leviticus 16 and the ordinary *hattat* rituals in Leviticus 4-5 and 12-15? How did they function respectively in the *hattat* system of Israel? These questions are connected with question (3) in § 1.2.1 above.
5. What is the identity of Azazel?
6. Can the live goat, which is sent to Azazel, be regarded as a sacrifice?
7. Why are the two burnt offerings of the Day said to make atonement as well, since it is stated that the *hattat* rituals and the ritual of the Azazel goat have accomplished the atonement of Israel prior to them?; the burnt offerings in Leviticus 16 will also be explicated in chapter 3, as parts of the unified ceremony to accomplish the national atonement on the Day.

1.2.3. Theories on the *hattat* ritual in confusion

A number of scholars have presented their own answers and theories on the diverse questions posed above about the *hattat* ritual and the ceremony of the Day. This thesis contends that all scholars failed to present cohesively and convincingly the ritual dynamics and the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering, and to explain the meaning and significance of the atonement that is accomplished with the *hattat* offering for the following reasons.

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Firstly, there has been different views among scholars about definitions and correlations of the verb כִּפֶּר and its affiliated terms, קָדַשׁ ,טָהַר ,נָשָׂא עָוֹן ,חָטָא; the failure to explain logically and coherently the ritual dynamics of the *hattat* offering can be ascribed to misinterpretations of these terms.

Secondly, it has been argued whether the *hattat* ritual is *expiatory or purificatory*, because the *hattat* texts seem to say that it makes expiation for the sins of the people in some cases (e.g., Lev 4-5) and purification of the impurity-bearer (e.g., Lev 12-15) or the sancta (e.g., Exod 29, Lev 8 and 16) in other cases. Scholars have suggested wrong solutions to this question, because they failed to discern that the verb *kipper* has the double meanings, expiatory and purificatory, and because they did not read the related *hattat* texts in a macro *hattat* system. Possible answers will be presented in this thesis.

Thirdly, in their discussion of *hattat,* scholars do not clearly classify the *hattat* rituals into categories. This leads to inconsistent and ill-elaborated conclusions. The *hattat* offerings have various functions and purposes on different occasions. In this thesis, the scope of study is limited to the *hattat* rituals that are made to resolve *specific* sins and impurities*.* If necessary, the discussion refers to the other *hattat* categories, in which the *hattat* rituals have different functions and purposes. It will be revealed that there is a cohesive ritual logic in the demarcated categories.

Fourthly, scholars are also misled by treating the concessive types of *hattat* for the poor (i.e., bird offerings and grain offerings) as having equal value and meaning to the type of the quadruped *hattat*. Therefore, they say that blood is not always an essential element in the *hattat* rituals, as in the case of the grain offering, for example. However, in Leviticus 17:11 the principle is stated that the power of atonement is in blood: "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life" (ESV). Scholars confuse the basic principle and the concession or mitigation of the principle. A fundamental principle must not be deduced from a concession.

Fifthly, interpretative perplexity is also caused by their misunderstanding concerning the functions of the ritual gestures practiced in blood manipulation and hand imposition. They argue that ritual gestures themselves do not have inherent meanings and therefore the same gesture could have different or opposite meanings not only in other ritual systems, but even in the same ritual system (see ch. 4). Though it could be possible, it seems that a ritual activity

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has a consistent meaning in the same ritual contexts rather than an opposite function, although a secondary function can be added to it.

Sixthly, many scholars fail to understand the particular nature and ritual logic of the ceremony performed on the Day of Atonement. It is unique, not only in terms of its form, but also of its function. As will be argued in chapter 3, the high priest performed a *unified* ceremony on the Day for Israel, which consists of five individual rituals. The analysis of the unified ceremony will expose the ritual logic, nature, and function of a series of the special *hattat* ritual and the burnt offerings, which were consecutively performed on the Day of Atonement.

1.3. The approach to the texts

Leviticus is seen as a separate book, a final product written with elaborate literary artistry and sophisticated ritual theology (for this issue, see R. Rendtorff, 1996 and especially W. Warning, 1999). For the convenience of discussion, the term 'priestly literature,' borrowed from J. Sklar's term and definition (2005: ix), will be used to indicate the priestly legislator's corpus in Exodus 19 to Numbers, encompassing Leviticus. Following Sklar's definition, the term 'priestly literature' employed in this thesis does not indicate the specific corpus or strata of P, regarding which no consensus exists, including the matters of its date, origin and authorship; thus when the term 'priestly' is used, it does not refer to a particular priest or priestly circle, but just to an author, a writer or a legislator who had a priestly concept. In a synchronic view, Sklar restricts his 'priestly literature' to the texts in Exodus 25 to Numbers, "which deal with issues related to the cult of ancient Israel" (Sklar, 2005: ix); thus Exodus 25 is as a starting point of the unit, because God's instruction for the construction of the Tabernacle begins in that chapter.

But this thesis alters slightly the scope, while accepting Sklar's suggestion; the 'priestly literature' employed in this study covers the scope from Exodus 19 to Numbers. Exodus 19 is the beginning of so called 'Sinai pericope.' The discussion of the *hattat ritual*, which is prescribed to resolve 'sin' and 'impurity' of Israel, must begin with the commandments of God given to Israel in the Sinai covenant, as implied in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 where the *hattat* offerings are required for the violations of the *prohibitive commandments*. Particularly Exodus 24:1-8, the establishment of covenant between God and the Israeliets, sheds light on the relationship between the people of Israel and the sanctuary. Furthermore Mount Sinai is a paradigm of the Tabernacle (Milgrom, 1991b: 58;

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for more details, see ch. 6). On the other hand, the regulations and laws of Leviticus are girded to the Sinai covenant in light of Leviticus 26 which promises blessings for obedience and cureses for disobedience of the covenant code. Therefore, this study takes Exodus 19 as the starting point of the 'priestly literature' that is defined in the present thesis.

The focus will be on the final text that prescribes and describes the variety of the *hattat* rituals, especially in the book of Leviticus.[3] From a synchronic view this study will discern the priestly legislator's literary strategy and cultic scheme in Exodus 19-Numbers in which the laws are interwoven with the narratives: how and why the priestly legislator systemized the *hattat* rituals which are depicted in the extant text (see N. Kiuchi, 1987: 17; B. D. Bibb, 2009: 1-2; cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 61). On the same line, this thesis does not accept the division between so called 'P' (Lev 1-16) and 'H' (Lev 17-26 [27]) in the book of Leviticus, as alleged by numerous scholars; recently Knohl (1987: 65-117) and Milgrom (1991b: 42-51)[4] argued that the H priests, a later priestly circle and P's successors, were the final editors of the P corpus in the Pentateuch.[5] Refusing such division, Kiuchi (2007: 17) states:

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[3] A. Noordtzij (1982: 8) says that the book of Leviticus "does not in all respects constitute a systematically organized whole." For a similar view, see R. K. Harrison (1980: 15) who sees as Leviticus as a 'haphazard and repetitious' book. But Leviticus was intended as a separate and well-organized book (Rendtorff, 1996; Rendtorff and Kugler, 2003; W. Shea, 1986; B. D. Bibb, 2009; especially see the matchless contribution of W. Warning, 1999). On the other hand, for the interdependent literary continuity between Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers as independent books, see R. Rendtorff (1996: 22-35) and G. A. Auld (1996: 40-51; 2003: 41-53).

[4] Milgrom (1991b: 61) takes Lev 17-26 as the work of H and called it the 'Holiness code,' except for parts of Lev 23 that he assigns to P.

[5] These scholars argue that P is interested in the holiness of materials such as offerings and the sancta (static holiness), and not in human holiness (dynamic holiness). They maintain that, while H, the later redactor(s), had a worldview that at times differs from P's, they did not change P's rules, but incorporated them into their cultic renovation, giving them a new meaning (Milgrom, 1991b: 42-51). Milgrom (1991b: 34) argues for the antiquity of P, tracing P's origin to the sanctuary of Shiloh and dates H to be written at the time of King Hezekiah (for the antiquity of P's language, see A. Hurvitz, 1974). The Holiness code is the independent legal product of H's activity. Milgrom and Knohl see traces of H (e.g., Exod 6:2-8; 19:6; 22:30; Lev 9:17; 11:44-45; 16:29b-33) outside the Holiness Code as evidence of H's final edition. But other scholars use the same marks as evidence that the Holiness Code was not an independent corpus, and that H did not exist; for the scholars and their views, who refuse the division between P and H in Leviticus, see Sun, 1990: 3-50 and n. 445 in chapter 6 (§ 6.3.3). The idea of H was refuted by Sun's thorough investigation into so called Holiness Code (Lev 17-26) (Sun, 1990), who agrees with Wagner's following argument (1974: 315):

> Die Kapitel Lev 17-26 sind nur teil eines grösseren Ganzen, dessen Aufbau mit
> der Annahme ihrer ehemaligen Eigenständigkeit unverständlich wird. Von

The recent scholarly discussion appears to revolve around the question of whether it is appropriate to view the book as divisible into two parts, as assumed by Milgrom and Knohl, while scholars, including Milgrom, are increasingly attempting to interpret the book as it stands, Warning's study on the rhetorical aspects of Leviticus may contain a serious challenge to traditional critical judgments concerning literary layers within the book (Warning, 1999).

It means that the division between P and H is not useful and meaningful for the study of Leviticus as a final product (for more details, see § 6.3.3). This shares the same view with P. Jenson (1992), who demonstrated that in view of the systematic ritual and cultic concepts of P, all the *hattat* rituals in so-called P may constitute a cohesive and integrated cultic system, no matter whether it is presumed to be P or H, or even P^1, P^2, P^3 or the like.[6]

1.4. The aim of each chapter

Chapter 2 investigates the definition of the verb כִּפֶּר and its affiliated terms (חִטֵּא ,טִהַר ,קִדֵּשׁ ,נִסְלַח ,עָוֹן נָשָׂא), and their relationship to כִּפֶּר. The meaning of כִּפֶּר in its context and formulae was thoroughly examined by Gane (2005) and Sklar (2005); especially Sklar's study is significant in that it sheds a new light on the definition of כִּפֶּר. Recent scholars, following Milgrom, tend to see כִּפֶּר as meaning 'to purify' or 'to cleanse,' equal to חִטֵּא and טִהַר in the *hattat* context. However, this chapter will reveal that these verbs differ in function and meaning.

Chapter 3 seeks the ritual logic of the unique ceremony performed on the Day of Atonement by analysing the structure of Leviticus 16. The analysis of its structure will show that a series of rituals are combined, integrated, and unified for the national atonement for Israel on the Day of Atonement. This study

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dieser Sicht der Dinge aus muss die Hypothese vom 'Heiligkeitsgesetz's abgelehnt werden.

After his elaborate and exhaustive form-critical analysis and examination of Lev 17-26, Sun (1990: 40) concludes: "it is therefore apparent that the modern trend is to reject the hypothesis of an originally independent legal corpus behind Lev 17-26."

[6] Milgrom (1991a: 182-91; 1991b: 62-63) infers the existence of P^1, P^2, and even P^3 who was probably involved in the edition of Lev 11; he poses the possibility that P^3 could be the final editor next to H. But for the refutation against such a multiple division of P, see R. Rendtorff (1993: 75-81).

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reveals clearly that the *hattat* offerings and the Azazel ritual form an integrated *hattat* complex, and that the blood rites were performed in each of the three precincts of the sanctuary with the same motions and gestures by the high priest, and with the same function. This investigation of Leviticus 16 helps to figure out the functions of the ritual activities performed in the ordinary *hattat* ritual of Leviticus 4.

In chapter 4 the general ritual theory is discussed with the following questions: what function or meaning can a specific ritual action have?; whether can it have multivalent meanings? In chapters 4 and 5 the conclusion of the study will be applied to three major components of the *hattat* ritual: hand imposition, blood manipulation, and the disposal of the *hattat* flesh. In addition, chapter 4 investigates particular function of the hand imposition on the *hattat* animal, in reference to all its occurrences in the Hebrew Bible, including sacrifial rituals in general.

Chapter 5 continues to investigate the ritual activities of the *hattat* offering: blood manipulation and disposal of the *hattat* flesh. This thesis will argue that the unique mode of the gestures preformed in the blood rites of the *hattat* offering, as used only in the *hattat* offering, is always to purify the sancta. Regarding the disposal of the *hattat* flesh, this thesis will argue that its function is to remove and eliminate sin and impurity, while the flesh is contaminated by the sin or impurity of the people and the impurity of the sancta. Chapter 6 is to discuss the matter of the sancta defilement. Prior to tracking the trajectories of sin and impurity in the defilement of the sanctuary, moral sins and ritual impurities must be classified into graded categories. Refering to the grades of human evil, this chapter will inquire how and why human evil defiles the sanctuary and its sancta.

Chapter 7 summarizes and compares the various *hattat* theories of major scholars. Consecutively it presents a new theory by refuting their ideas and by synthesizing the results of the previous investigation. This chapter will illustrate four paradigms of the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism operating in the offering of the *hattat*, highlighting the unique dynamics of the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement.

1.5. Categories of the *hattat* offerings

The confusion of the categories of the *hattat* rituals has led scholars to their wrong conclusions on the *hattat* theory. For example, the *hattat* rituals in

Leviticus 8 and 9 are unique rituals for the priestly ordination and the inauguration of the altar. Therefore, these cases of *hattat* probably have meanings and functions different from the *hattat* rituals offered for *specific* sins and impurities in Leviticus 4-5 and 12-15.

However, many scholars have attempted to find standardized principles and meanings of the *hattat* ritual from such special cases and to apply them to the *hattat* cases for *specific* sins and impurities. The confusion has to be removed prior to the discussion. This study classifies the various *hattat* offerings into categories according to its aim in a variety of contexts, and the scope of study on the *hattat* ritual will be demarcated for the aim of this study.

The categories of the *hattat* rituals can be divided as below, according to their purpose or occasions:[7]

1) Sin: Lev 4:1-5:13; Num 15:22-31
2) Impurity: Lev 12-15
3) The Day of Atonement: Lev 16; Num 29:7-11 (cf. Lev 23:26-32; 25:9)
4) Feast: Lev 23:19; Num 28-29
5) Special occasions
    a. Consecration of the priests and the altar: Exod 29; Lev 8
    b. Inauguration of the altar: Lev 9[8] (cf. Num 7)
    c. Ordination of the Levites: Num 8:6-26
    d. Vow of the Nazirites: Num 6:1-21
6) Anomalous *hattat* of the red heifer: Num19 (cf. Num 8:7; 31:19-23)

   * Supplementary rules: consumption of the *hattat* flesh: Lev 6:18-23 (25-30)
     (hereafter, the verses in the square refer to the verses of the English Bibles)
   * The *hattat* flesh incident: Lev 10:17

As said above, the *hattat* rituals in the cultic inauguration of Leviticus 8-9 were unique cases. In these occasions, the *hattat* offerings were made for the ordination of the priests and the dedication of the altar (Lev 8), and all the sacrifices prescribed in Leviticus 1-7 were offered for the first time (Lev 9). These *hattat* rituals must be treated as special cases and should not be explained in the light of the principles of the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus

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[7] Cf. Kiuchi (1987: 39) with several differences. For example, Kiuchi places Num 15:22-31, which deals with specific sins, under the group of festive and unique occasions. Perhaps the purpose of Kiuchi's classification is simply to display all the sources of *hattat* in the priestly texts rather than categorizing the *hattat* rituals.

[8] It is called 'the eighth day service' (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 39).

4:1-5:13 and Leviticus 12-15, because it does not seem that the *hattat* rituals in Leviticus 8-9 were performed for a *specific* sin or impurity of the people (cf. Jenson, 1992: 156). In particular the initial sacrifices in Leviticus 9 were ratified by God with the divine fire in distinction from other cases.

Some of the formulized principles of the *hattat* ritual for *specific* sins and impurities should not be deduced from such special cases as the ordination of the priests and the altar, or from the *hattat* offerings in the vow of the Nazirites, nor from the concessive types of *hattat* offerings.

This study will concentrate on the *hattat* texts of Leviticus which stipulate the *hattat* offering for specific sins and impurities, with references to the related texts of Exodus and Numbers in the priestly literature. [9] Therefore, the concern of this thesis is with categories (1), (2), and (3), including the supplementary rule about the consumption of the *hattat* flesh (Lev 6:18-23 [25-30]) and the *hattat* flesh incident (Lev 10:17).

1.6. The definitions of technical terms and phrases

To avoid confusion it is necessary to define some technical terms and phrases which are used and coined in this discussion.

1. The semantic scope of cultic terms has to be circumscribed, because scholars use different terms for the same referent. For example, one favors the word 'rite' of the Azazel goat and the other the word 'ritual' of the Azazel goat. Sometimes it causes confusion in the discussion. Therefore, the terms are defined as follows: (1) ceremony: a larger ritual consisting of a series of minor rituals; (2) ritual: a separate ritual unit consisting of a series of rites; (3) rite: a specific gesture or act practiced in a ritual. Hence 'the ceremony of the Day of Atonement,' which refers to the unified rituals of the Day; 'the ritual of the Azazel goat' or 'the Azazel goat ritual,' 'the *hattat* ritual'; 'the blood rite,' 'the rite of disposal,' etc.

2. While the plural 'sancta' is used to indicate the three precincts and their furnishings of the sanctuary, in many cases the word 'sancta' may indicate the sanctuary itself: therefore, 'defilement of the sanctuary' can be expressed as 'defilement of the sancta' or 'the sancta defilement.'

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[9] In many cases, the *hattat* offering is accompanied by and combined with other offerings, especially the burnt offering. Nevertheless, the *hattat* ritual is the most essential component for atonement and its subsequent effects, forgiveness and cleanness or consecration.

However, in some cases where it is necessary to indicate one definite precinct or furniture of the three-partite sanctuary, the single 'sanctum' is employed.

3. For the term that refers to the laying of hand on animals or people, various phrases have been used, like 'imposition of hand,' 'laying on of hand,' 'hand laying,' and 'hand leaning.' Here 'imposition of hand' or 'hand imposition' are employed; thus 'one hand imposition' or 'two-hand imposition.'

4. Scholars adopt diverse English terms that refer to the three precincts of the sanctuary, using generally 'the holy of holies,' 'the holy place,' and 'the altar' in the court. This thesis uses Milgrom's terms: 'the *adytum*,' 'the shrine' and 'the outer altar.' Hence the *adytum hattat*, the shrine *hattat* and the outer altar *hattat* are sometimes used respectively, according to where the *hattat* blood rite took place.

5. Human moral sin and ritual impurity, and the impurity of the sancta are phrased concisely as 'evil.' That is, where human sin/impurity and the impurity of the sancta, which is a consequence of human sin/impurity, are indicated together, the term 'evil' can refer to both sin and impurity. On the other hand, 'ritual impurity,' a comparative term with 'moral sin,' is equal to 'physical impurity' that refers to the human impurities spelled out in, for example, Leviticus 11-15.

6. The term 'dynamics' (e.g., 'ritual dynamics') generally refers to a certain movement or operation of each individual ritual activity, and the term 'mechanism' (e.g., 'atonement mechanism') indicates the entire and synthetic process by the ritual dynamics. Although the two definitions may sometimes be overlapped, it is not important.

7. The rendering 'atone' or 'atonement' is used as an English equivalent of the Hebrew term כִּפֶּר and its effet (see ch. 2). Therefore, 'atonement' can have several meanings according to its contexts, because the meaning of כִּפֶּר may differ between them.

8. The terms 'burnt offering' (Lev 1), 'grain offering' (Lev 2), 'peace offering' (Lev 3), and 'guilt offering' (Lev 5:14-26 [5:14-6:7]) are employed to indicate each offering in the priestly literature.

9. The following terms are alternatively used as synonyms that carry the meaning of 'purity' and 'impurity': 'cleanse'/'purify'/'purge,' and their nouns, 'cleanness'/'purification'/'purgation'; 'impure'/'unclean,' and their nouns, 'impurity'/'uncleanness.'

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Chapter 2
The definition of כִּפֶּר and its affiliated terms

2.1. Introduction

The following terminological problems must be settled prior to the discussion of the *hattat* ritual and the Day of Atonement: (1) the concept of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context; (2) the concepts and functions of the actions affiliated to כִּפֶּר, which are נָשָׂא עָוֹן, נִסְלַח, קִדֵּשׁ, טִהַר, חִטֵּא, and their correlation with כִּפֶּר in their contexts.

Scholars get to divergent conclusions concerning interpretation of כִּפֶּר and its affiliated terms that lead to various theories on the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering. Due to the misinterpretation of the terms in question, however, they have suggested wrong *hattat* theories. For example, whereas Milgrom (1991b) misunderstood that the meaning of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context refers only to 'to purge' or 'to effect purgation,' Kiuchi (1987; 2007) and Gane (2005) made a mistake regarding the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן. As a result, they reach erroneous conclusions on the dynamics of the *hattat* offering via their deviant trajectories of investigation.

2.2. The definition of כִּפֶּר

2.2.1. General problems of כִּפֶּר

With regard to the word כִּפֶּר, generally two questions are posed: (1) the meaning of כִּפֶּר in connection with its root and contexts[10]; (2) the relationship of כִּפֶּר with other affiliated terms: נָשָׂא עָוֹן, נִסְלַח, קִדֵּשׁ, טִהַר, חִטֵּא.

The etymology and contextual meaning of כִּפֶּר have been argued without consensus. Consequently the various renderings of כִּפֶּר are suggested in the

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[10] For the discussion on כִּפֶּר, see B. Lang (*TDOT* 7: 288-303); B. A. Levine (1974: 55-63); B. Janowski (1982: 1-26, 29-60, 95-102); N. Kiuchi (1987: 87-109, esp. p. 94; 2007: 52-58); J. Milgrom (1991b: 1979-84); B. J. Schwartz (1991: 34-66); W. K. Gilders (2004: 28-32); J. Sklar (2005: 1-8).

contexts (J. Sklar, 2005: 72-77): 'appeasement,' 'propitiation,' 'composition,'[11] 'expiation,' 'atonement,' 'reconciliation,' 'ransom.'[12] As far as the *hattat* context is concerned, 'purgation' or 'removal' has been suggested additionally, because the *hattat* offering is thought to purge the impurity of the sancta or to remove the evil of persons.

Generally, when the effect of כִּפֶּר focuses on an injured party (either God or a person), who is in the position to forgive a fault, the injurer should 'appease,' 'propitiate,' or 'compose' the injured party. Not only in the priestly literature (e.g., Num 35:31-32; Exod 21:30) but also outside it (e.g., Gen 32:21 [20]; Pro 16:14), the meaning of כִּפֶּר can refer to 'appease' the injured party in case that the object of כִּפֶּר is injured. By contrast, when the effect of כִּפֶּר is directed to an object as an injurer (a sinner, or an impurity-bearer), the injured party could 'expiate' or 'atone for' the injurer in response to the injurer's ransom.

However, in the *hattat* context, the situation becomes more complicated with the argument that it has the meanings of 'purgation' or 'removal.' The question is condensed into whether כִּפֶּר signifies 'make/effect expiation' or 'effect purgation' for the object in the *hattat* context: that is, 'expiation' or 'purgation'? If the meaning is 'purgation,' what is the object? Is it the offerer (sinner or impurity-bearer), or the contaminated sancta? If the meaning is 'expiation,' is it possible that the object is the sancta, since the building cannot sin? Furthermore, does not the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context have the meaning of 'appeasement' or 'propitiation'? These questions will be inquired into in this chapter.

To examine the term כִּפֶּר, on one hand the root of כִּפֶּר and its meaning were compared to the affinitive languages of Israel's neighbours, and on the other hand it was interpreted in its distinct contexts of the biblical texts. The meaning and nuance of כִּפֶּר become more intricate with the combinations with specific prepositions like כִּפֶּר אֶת and כִּפֶּר עַל. Since it is not easy to clarify the meaning of the root of כפר and at a glance the verb seems to have several nuances according to its contexts and combinations with prepositions, decades of investigation have not led to consensus.

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[11] In modern English, the verb 'compose' (the noun 'composition'), which has the meaning of 'to soothe, placate,' is seldom used.

[12] The LXX: ἄσομαι 'propiciate.' Cf. Hartley's incorrect and insufficient question (1992: 64): "Determining the best translation for כִּפֶּר in Eng. is complicated by the theological debate regarding whether כִּפֶּר means 'expiate' or 'propitiate.' Is the sacrificial system designed primarily to appease God or to remove sin?"

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As noted, while the verb כִּפֶּר has been generally translated as 'atone (for)' or 'make atonement for,'[13] lately some scholars prefer to use different renderings like, for example, 'effect purgation' (Milgrom, 1991b: 245; Gane 2005, 49-50) or 'effect removal' (Gilders, 2004: 29) on their own grounds. Even though scholars use the general rendering, 'atone (for)' or 'make atonement for,' they have attached diverse meanings and natures to it: 'covering,' 'dedicating person's life to holy God,' 'reconciliation,' 'cleansing,' and 'ransom' (see Sklar, 2005: 2, 44-47). This thesis employs frequently 'atone for' or 'make atonement for' as an English equivalent for כִּפֶּר and its noun, 'atonement.'[14] But the rendering 'atonement' may have different nuances according to כִּפֶּר contexts.[15]

The difficulty of כִּפֶּר becomes clear, when we examine Milgrom's renderings for כִּפֶּר in his commentary of Leviticus (1991b; 2000a; 2000b). While he investigates a variety of the meanings of כִּפֶּר, Milgrom (1991b: 1079-84) thinks that it experienced historical development and amplification in the biblical literature. Thus he sets a sharp distinction between the senses of כִּפֶּר according to contexts: the *hattat* context, the contexts of other types of sacrifices (burnt, grain, and peace offerings), and the context of the non ritual texts like in the prophets and Psalms.[16]

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[13] The rendering 'atone (for)' or 'make atonement (for)' is favored in most English Bibles like ASV, NASB, NIV, ESV, NRS. Rarely the similar meaning 'expiate/make expiation' is employed in a few English versions (NJB and NJPS).

[14] As far as the usual rendering of Hebrew verb כִּפֶּר, 'make atonement,' is concerned, according to *OED*, the term 'atonement' is known as originated in the early of 1510s to signify "a condition of being at one (with others)" before William Tyndale that has been recognized as the first person who used the word 'atonement' in his first English Bible to denote 'at one + ment,' i.e., 'reconciliation' with God. In terms of the declaration of the offerer's forgiveness, the concept of 'recociliation' might be added to the concept of כִּפֶּר as an interpretative meaning. But it is not an inherent meaning of כִּפֶּר.

[15] Scholars have translated the term *kipper* in various ways, sometimes considering the relevant contexts, as follows: 'atone for/make atonement for' (general rendering), 'effect purgation for' (Milgrom, but only in the *hattat* context),' 'expiate/make expiation for' (Kiuchi; Rodriguez), 'effect removal for' (Gilders), etc. However, all these renderings are not satisfactory, as indicated by some scholars and lately Sklar (2005). כִּפֶּר always bears both nuances of 'ransom' and 'purgation' at the same time in the context of the *hattat* ritual (contra Milgrom). Therefore, a choice between two alternative renderings, 'ransom' and 'purgation' cannot be made and consequently there exists no English term to express both meanings.

[16] Milgrom's postulate (1991b: 1079-84) that the meaning of כִּפֶּר experienced the historical development of its Hebrew usage is summarized as follows: (1) in the early stage, 'purge, wipe off'; (2) later, 'ransom'; (3) in the final stage, 'expiate' in the text of H, who had renovated the cultic system and theology. He (1991b: 1083) goes on to say: "Outside the cult,

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To limit the scope to the priestly literature, firstly, Milgrom argues that in the *hattat* context, כִּפֶּר must be consistently rendered as 'effect purgation,' because he is convinced that the function of the *hattat* blood manipulation is only to purge the sancta rather than to cleanse or atone for the offerer of the *hattat* sacrifice.[17] Secondly, in the contexts of the other types of sacrifices,[18] except for the context of *hattat*, Milgrom employs 'expiate/make expiation.' Besides, 'atone,' 'effect atonement,' and 'make atonement' are also used in diverse sacrificial contexts for a variety of reasons.[19] 'Ransom' is finally employed as the meaning of כִּפֶּר in Leviticus 17:11, while it may be counted as a P text; he explains it as a result of later innovation in the history of Israel's cult.

Milgrom's various renderings reveal the difficulties and confusion of scholars in grasping the diversity of the nuances of כִּפֶּר in each context. There is more or less inconsistency in his renderings,[20] although he has endeavoured to be consistent on the basis of his postulate.[21] In addition, his renderings get more problematic and intricate, when כִּפֶּר occurs in various phrases and formulae accompanied with prepositions in the *hattat* contexts (see below). Indeed, he chooses different renderings depending on whether the object of the *hattat* ritual is an offerer or the sancta (house once [14:53]). However, such

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kipper undergoes a vast change"; that is, the development extended to a sense of moral expiation in later biblical books (cf. Sklar, 2005: 6-7; Watts, 2007: 131).

[17] According to Milgrom (1991b: 254-55), the sin of the offerer was already cleansed by his confession and repentance before he brings the victim; he was forgiven. But by presenting the victim on the altar and shedding the blood, he should purge the precinct of the sanctuary that is contaminated by his sin. By so doing, he fulfills his responsibility for defilement of the sancta, and consequently he acquires another forgiveness in this stage. As a result, in his view, his forgiveness mentioned in Lev 4:20, 26, 31 refers to a distinct forgiveness attained by cleansing the sanctum rather than through confession and repentance of sin. However, this view has a vital error; for the refutation of his view, see § 7.2.1.

[18] The burnt offering (Lev 1:4; 12:7-8, combined with a *hattat* offering), the guilt offering (5:16, 18; 6:7 [5:26]; 7:7), and the grain offering (14:20, combined with a burnt offering).

[19] Lev 8:15, 34; 9:7; 16:24.

[20] For example, Milgrom (1991b) renders כִּפֶּר made by the burnt offerings respectively as 'expiate' in Lev 1:4 and 'effect atonement' in Lev 16:24, although they are similar in a sense; 'effect purgation' is employed in the cases of the combination of two birds (a *hattat* + a burnt offering) in Lev 5:10; 15:15, 30, because the two birds constitutes a *hattat* ritual. In contrast, he employs 'make expiation' in the case of the combination of a bird *hattat* + a lamb burnt offering (or a bird burnt offering as a concession) in 12:7-8. More seriously, his two distinct renderings appear alternately even in the same syntaxes within Lev 14: 'make expiation' (vv. 18, 20, 21, 29, 31) and 'effect purgation' (vv. 19, 53).

[21] See also Hartley's inconsistent renderings in his commentary on Leviticus (1992); on one hand, he employs 'make atonement' in Lev 1:4 (for people) and 8:15 (for the altar), and on the other hand, 'make expiation' in Lev 4:20; 8:34; 16:6, 10, 11, 24, 33, 34 (for people) and Lev 16:16, 18, 33 (for the sancta).

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laborious and sophistic renderings result from his misinterpretations which overlooked an inseparable complex definitions that כִּפֶּר connotes in the priestly literature, especially in the *hattat* context, as Sklar demonstrates in his recent contributions (2005; 2008).

Finally, as mentioned, כִּפֶּר is closely related to its affiliated terms in the *hattat* context: חָטָא, טָהַר, קָדֹשׁ, עָוֹן נָשָׂא. Especially the verbs חָטָא and טָהַר are not simply synonyms for כִּפֶּר, but refer to the actions leading to כִּפֶּר as their consequent effect. As for the phrase עָוֹן נָשָׂא in the *hattat* context, in one place it is a priestly action performed by a priest(s) as an agent of God to remove the iniquity of the Israelites (Lev 10:17), and in other place it is an activity done by the Azazel goat (Lev 16:22). On the other hand, the verb קָדֹשׁ is achieved via כִּפֶּר plus the rites performed with the anointing oil in the ritual of ordination.

2.2.2. Etymology of כִּפֶּר and its meaning in contexts

As mentioned, the confusion about the definition of כִּפֶּר comes from the ambiguous origin of כִּפֶּר and its multiple nuances in different contexts. Some scholars have contended that it might originate from the Arabic *kafara* ('to cover'); therefore it means 'covering' over sins or impurities of objects or the objects themselves.[22] By being covered, the problems are solved.[23] Thus כִּפֶּר means 'expiation' of an offerer (a sinner or an impurity-bearer), or 'expiation' of a polluted building (house or sanctuary) in virtue of 'covering.' The biblical evidence presented to bolster this theory is the parallel between Jeremiah 18:23 and Nehemiah 3:37 (4:5) where the latter probably cited the former, using the verb כָּסָה 'cover' in place of כִּפֶּר.

(Jer 18:23)   אַל־*תְּכַפֵּר* עַל־עֲוֹנָם וְחַטָּאתָם מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אַל־תֶּמְחִי

(Neh 3:37 [4:5])   וְאַל־*תְּכַס* עַל־עֲוֹנָם וְחַטָּאתָם מִלְּפָנֶיךָ אַל־תִּמָּחֶה

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[22] For other proponents, see Karl Elliger (1966: 71) and J. H. Kurtz (1980: 67-71). They insists that the original meaning of כִּפֶּר is 'to cover' and it developed into the meaning 'to atone' (*sühnen*) and 'to forgive' (*vergeben*). For his summarized argument and evaluation of this view, see Sklar (2005: 44-45).

[23] Cf. M. Douglas (1993b: 116). She prefers 'cover' to 'purgation, cleansing' as the rendering of כִּפֶּר. The covering is required for various damaged objects, whether human or nonhuman objects, which have bodily leakages, disease, a hole, a torn or broken parts. Regarding כִּפֶּר accomplished with sacrificial blood, she says that blood is required to repair the breach caused by sin.

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However, this opinion has not attracted much attention, because it occurs only once throughout the Hebrew Bible, and it falls outside the P's literature. Furthermore, scholars have cast some doubt on the authenticity of the original meaning of כִּפֶּר, 'to cover,' suggested by its proponents (see Sklar, 2005: 44-45). More significantly, as Sklar (2005: 45) points out, the parallel between the two verses itself by no means guarantees that the two words כִּפֶּר and כָּסָה in the parallel are synonymous, because even though comparative words in the parallelism may often invite the same result, they do not necessarily have the same meaning. In fact, in the very sentence of Nehemiah 3:37 (4:5), the two verbs, אַל־תְּכַס 'do not cover up' and אַל־תִּמָּחֶה 'do not blot out' are displayed in parallel; they have different meanings but refer to the same result, namely, removal of sin.

Others argue that the meaning of כִּפֶּר is more closely related to the Akkadian *kuppuru* ('wipe off, cleanse') than to the Arabic *kafara* ('cover'), and they see כִּפֶּר to be the meaning of 'purify, purge, cleanse' in many contexts.[24] At a glance this definition of כִּפֶּר seems to be appropriate for the *hattat* contexts. Nevertheless, the idea has limits in that the meaning of cleansing can be deficient for the *hattat* cases that denote 'expiate,' or 'atone/make atonement' in connection with forgiveness as in Leviticus 4:1-5:13.

The situation is more complicated by the fact that the conception of 'ransom' is contained in כִּפֶּר. This is true in many cases not only in the priestly literature but throughout the Hebrew Bible (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 1080-82). In these occurrences, כִּפֶּר is thought to originate from the noun כֹּפֶר which may denote 'ransom,' 'gift,' or 'payment.'[25] Particularly, Leviticus 17:11, which describes the meaning and function of blood, is recognized as a significant verse of the so called P, in which כִּפֶּר denotes 'ransom' (כֹּפֶר): "For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to *make atonement for your souls* (לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם), for it is the blood that *makes atonement by the life* (כִּי־הַדָּם הוּא בַּנֶּפֶשׁ יְכַפֵּר)" (ESV; emphasis mine).

What is the concept of the Hebrew term כֹּפֶר that might be the origin of the verb כִּפֶּר? There is not an exact English equivalent for it. Thus Sklar (2005: 68-69) says: "the term כֹּפֶר includes elements which the English word 'ransom'

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[24] B. Levine (1974: 56-61, 123); B. Janowski (1982: 29-60); J. Milgrom (1991b: 1080-82). For more detailed discussion, see Sklar (2005: 3 n. 7).

[25] Gen 32:21 (20); Exod 21:30; 30:11-16; Num 31:50; 35:33. Cf.: 1 Sam 12:3, 'bribe.'

does not necessarily include, most notably the idea of appeasement of the *injured* party";[26] however, not only 'appeasement,' it can denote the definitions of 'punishment' and 'composition' (Sklar, 2005: 71-77).[27] Therefore, it becomes all the more difficult to clarify the exact meaning and concept of כֹּפֶר in the Hebrew Bible.[28]

To this problem, Sklar's conclusive alternative (2005: 77) is to understand the noun כֹּפֶר as the concept of either 'ransom' or 'appeasement' by the context. That is, 'ransom' is highlighted in some contexts as the meaning of כֹּפֶר, whereas 'appeasement' is more suitable for the other context.

The question is whether the verb כִּפֶּר includes the concept of כֹּפֶר in the Hebrew Bible. If so, does it apply to the context of *hattat* ritual as well? It is indicated in all appearances of כִּפֶּר throughout the Hebrew Bible,[29] including the

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[26] Sklar (2005: 68) points out the difference between the Hebrew word כֹּפֶר and the English word 'ransom,' citing the definition of 'ransom' in the *OED* as follows: "The sum or price paid or demanded for the release of a prisoner or the restoration of captured property." As he indicates, even though the English word 'ransom' corresponds to כֹּפֶר in that כֹּפֶר refers to releasing one person from the power of another by payment, 'ransom' cannot encompass, however, the concept that "*a party that has done wrong* is giving the כֹּפֶר to *the person that they have wronged*, by which they appease the injured party and are reconciled" (Sklar, 2005: 68). H. Brichto (1976: 27-36) argued that the meanings like 'compensate, settle a legal claim' are the best translations for most occurrences of כִּפֶּר. Watts (2007: 131), favoring Brichto's view, points out: "in many contexts, the term seems to move far beyond any substitutionary and legal connotations to more general economic ones, and a better translation would be 'pay, make payment, settle matters.'"

[27] There are two kinds of approach generally to examine a specific term: one through its etymology and another from its contexts. They are called a 'concept-oriented approach' and a 'field-oriented approach.' These approaches are required for כֹּפֶר as well (see Sklar [2005: 48] who explains the definition of כִּפֶּר by adopting these approaches from Peter Cotterell and Max Turner [1989: 145-81]). By so doing Sklar (2005: 61-67) attempts to discern the definition and meaning of כֹּפֶר from its context and through some similarly used terms in similar situations of other fields (e.g., the occurrences of פָּדָה and גָּאַל). These two approaches correspond to the 'syntagmatic' and 'paradigmatic' used by Moisés Silva (1983: 119-20), according to Sklar (2005: 48).

[28] In the same vein, Gane (2005: 193-94) said: "Whether the origin of the verb כִּפֶּר should be sought outside Hebrew, within Hebrew as a denominative of the noun כֹּפֶר, 'ransom' or 'compositary payment' . .. or both, it seems impossible to explain the semantic range of כִּפֶּר without allowing for the possibility that some meanings of the word are derived by extension or metaphorical usage, a factor that diminishes the relevance of etymology."

[29] In the Pentateuch except in the context of *hattat*, the occurrences of כִּפֶּר are as follows: appeasement of a person's grudge with a gift (Gen. 32:21 [20]); payment of the life price with shekel or jewelry (Exod 30:12-6; Num 31:50; 35:31); appeasement of God's wrath with supplication (Exod 32:30-32); ransom of life with blood (Lev 17:11), with an incense

hattat context, that the verb כִּפֶּר might include the basic and fundamental notion of כֹּפֶר as 'random, compensate, pay' and 'appeasement' for some damage or injury. Therefore, it seems that the verb כִּפֶּר might possibly be derived from כֹּפֶר.

For convenience and conciseness of discussion, 'ransom' as the English equivalent of כֹּפֶר is employed, although the Hebrew noun כֹּפֶר will be used, if necessary. But the rendering 'ransom' does not exclude the meaning of 'appeasement' implied in some contexts. In other words, the concept of כֹּפֶר indicates 'ransom,' while 'appeasement' may underlie it. That seems to be the basic and common concept of כִּפֶּר in all occurrences of the *hattat* offering.

Where כֹּפֶר is required, it indicates a situation in which something must be paid to *ransom* some objects, while referring to such meanings as 'to compensate' as an injurer's punishment (sinner and impure person),[30] or 'to restitute' an injured building from destruction or dismantlement (contaminated sancta or house), and 'to appease' implicitly the injured God or person to avert his wrath upon the injurer.

Nevertheless, an important fact in connection with the *hattat* ritual in particular is that while כִּפֶּר has the meaning of 'ransom' (כֹּפֶר) in the *hattat* context, it includes the meaning of 'purify, cleanse,' as discussed below. Accordingly Sklar (2005) says that the definition of כִּפֶּר, specifically in the *hattat* context, indicates 'כֹּפֶר + purgation.' Sklar's suggestion for the solution to the puzzle of כִּפֶּר will be examined in more detail.

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offering (Num 17:11), killing rebels (Num 25:11-13), and blood of the murderer (Num 35:33; Deut 21:1-9; 32:43). Outside the Pentateuch also the principle seems to be the same: ransom of sins with offering or sacrifice (1 Sam 3:14, where הִתְכַּפֵּר appears as a *hapax legomenon*); payment for lives for innocent victims (2 Sam 21:1-14); supplication for ransom ('forgive' in many English Bibles) of sins (Ps 65:4[3]; 78:38; 79:9; in these cases, no specific measures for כֹּפֶר are not mentioned except prayers); ransom for sins with kindness and truth (Prob. 16:6); appeasement of the king's fury with wisdom (Prob. 16:14); likewise in the prophetic texts. That is, כֹּפֶר effects always a payment or compensation for damage or injury to either God or humans. On the other hand, there is another technical Hebrew term פָּדָה corresponding to 'ransom, rescue, compensate' in the priestly literature: Exod 13:13,15; 21:8; 34:20; Lev 19:20; 27:27,29; Num 3:49; Num 18:15ff.

[30] It is stated in Lev 5:6-7 that the *hattat* animal should be offered as אָשָׁם. Certainly this is a nontechnical use of אָשָׁם that refers to 'penalty' (NIV; RSV) or 'compensation' (ESV), instead of the guilt offering (Snaith, 1977: 41-42).

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2.2.3. כִּפֶּר as כֹּפֶר + purgation in the *hattat* ritual

As mentioned, while the rendering 'atone/make atonement' is the English equivalent for the Hebrew term כִּפֶּר[31] in this thesis, as in the most English Bibles and many scholarly works, it comprehends several nuances.[32]

The opposing opinions on the meaning of כִּפֶּר used in the *hattat* ritual point either to 'expiation' or to 'purgation' by and large. This is closely connected with the question about the function of the *hattat* offering: whether is it expiatory (Lev 4:1-5:13) or purificatory (Lev 12, 14-15) (Kiuchi, 1987: 16)? This thesis argues that even in the *hattat* context, the meaning of כִּפֶּר cannot be restricted to 'purgation,' like Milgrom's view (1991b: 254-55) that כִּפֶּר means exclusively 'purge/effect purgation' in the *hattat* context. As noted, he has attempted to interpret and translate diversely כִּפֶּר depending on contexts. Milgrom (1991b: 254-55) maintains that in the *hattat* context, כִּפֶּר should always be understood as 'effect purgation for/purge (sancta),' since the blood manipulations of the *hattat* ritual function to purge the sancta only.

On the other hand, B. A. Levine (1974: 64-68) presented another solution by suggesting two distinct forms of כִּפֶּר that originated from the disparate roots: (1) כפר I, the primary *piel*, 'to cleanse,' from the Akkadian *kuppuru*; (2) כפר II, a secondary denominative, 'to ransom,' from the noun כֹּפֶר 'ransom, expiation gift.' But he limits the meaning 'ransom, pay' in the so called P to only three appearances of the root (Exod 30:15-16; Lev 17:11; Num 31:50).

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[31] Of course, as Driver (1902: 131) pointed out, "'make atonement' (at-one-ment, reconciliation) may express a *consequence* of כִּפֶּר, but it is not what the word itself denotes." Gane (2005: 194) also presents the same view: "Ritual כִּפֶּר must be something preceding completion of reconciliation/atonement: removal of that which comes between the divine and human parties and thereby stands in the way of reconciliation." However, Gorman (1990: 16) states that "at the most general level, כִּפֶּר means 'to deal with disruptions in the divine-human relations.'" Here he uses 'disruptions' to cover both sins and physical ritual impurities (Gane, 2005: 106). This thesis argues that כִּפֶּר refers to the entire process to 'remove' the wrong and to make restoration to the original state, rather than an independent and specific, or separate action. Thus, it does not seem unnatural that 'reconciliation through כִּפֶּר' brings with it the final effects, i.e., the forgiveness of sinners and the purgation of impure persons or contaminated buildings. Therefore, the rendering 'atone/expiate (for)' or 'make atonement/expiation (for)' for the Hebrew verb כִּפֶּר is maintained.

[32] For this reason, even though scholars use 'atone/make atonement' for כִּפֶּר, they differ in its content and meaning (Sklar, 2008: 19).

Some scholars, though, insist on a consistent meaning and rendering, using usually 'atone/make atonement.'[33] For example, Kiuchi (1987: 101) holds 'to atone/make atonement' as the only rendering of כִּפֶּר, stating:

"Rather the concept of כִּפֶּר is related directly to 'uncleanness' or 'sins.' Therefore we venture to assume the existence of the homogeneous concept of cultic כִּפֶּר which probably consists of the two main elements, purification and bearing guilt."[34]

Kiuchi argues against divergent meanings of *kipper 'al* that depends on the nature of the objects. Rather the phrase has a consistent meaning 'atone for,' whether it has a human object or a non-human object (Kiuchi, 1987: 93), although his rendering for כִּפֶּר, 'atone for/make atonement for,' may encompass two meanings, 'purification and bearing guilt.' Thus he criticizes Milgrom's idea, complaining that "even though Milgrom acknowledges the connection of כִּפֶּר in Leviticus 17:11 with כִּפֶּר, he does not apply this connection to other verses especially in the context of *hattat*" (1987: 107).

Kiuchi (1987: 127) concludes that כִּפֶּר includes both the substitutionary bearing and removal of guilt for a person as well as the cleansing of sancta in the context of *hattat*. From different angle but similarly, Hartley (1992: 64) said, "כִּפֶּר has a twofold effect: it removes pollution and it counteract sin," even though many scholars do not advocate this two effects of כִּפֶּר. He continues (1992: 65):

It needs to be underscored that the sacrificial system loudly proclaims that the penalty of sin is death. Thus the giving of a life (נֶפֶשׁ) on the altar for the life (נֶפֶשׁ) of the offerer upholds justice. The blood rites then have a twofold function: to cleanse the sanctuary from the pollution of sin and

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[33] Gane (2005: 194) also states this difficulty with the translation of כִּפֶּר, presenting his own probable conclusion: "[because] the verb expresses a conceptual range for which no single English word is entirely appropriate, it is enough for our purposes to understand that it signifies the removal of some impediment to the divine-human relationship, prerequisite to completion of reconciliation. This may be removal of debt or culpability by means of compository payment or removal of ritual impurity through purification." In fact, Gane's alternative is the same as that of Gilders (2004: 29): 'effect removal.'

[34] But Kiuchi's definition of *kipper* is more or less altered in his late work of 2007. The verb *kipper* refers to 'sacrifice oneself (itself) for propitiation,' while it has two meanings, 'uncovering and bearing guilt.' For details, see Kiuchi (2005: 52-58; 2007: 56-57, 304).

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to release the offerer from the penalty for his sinning. כִּפֶּר, 'make expiation,' is the achievement of both of these goals.

Hartley's insight is noteworthy in that the two nuances of כִּפֶּר must be retained together in all the *hattat* context without the necessity to distinguish a suitable meaning for each context.

This idea is developed later in Sklar's work (2005) devoted to this issue. His argument is that the concept of כִּפֶּר is equal to כֹּפֶר (ransom)[35] + purgation in the *hattat* context. In both contexts of sin and impurity, the same principle is applied, while in the former the aspect of כֹּפֶר (ransom) is more conspicuous and in the latter the aspect of purgation is more prominent. Therefore, we do not need to debate on whether כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context refers to 'expiation' or 'purgation.'

Regarding כִּפֶּר in the sin context (e.g., Lev 4:1-5:13), the sinner must 'appease' the injured God and be 'ransomed' to avert God's wrath, that is, an expected death for his sin. Thus כֹּפֶר is required for the injurer. At the same time, the sancta are aerially contaminated by his sin from a distance (contra Johar and Gane).[36] This situation requires 'purgation' as well. By so doing, the *hattat* ritual deals with a person's sin and its consequent impurity of the sancta: thus כִּפֶּר refers to solving both problems of the offerer and the sancta simultaneously. By virtue of כִּפֶּר for the offerer, his forgiveness is obtained. Therefore, Milgrom's idea that כִּפֶּר means just only the 'purgation' of sancta must be declined.

On the other hand, insofar as the impurity context (e.g., Lev 12-15) is concerned, the impure object (person or building) is not a sinner. That is, the impurity-bearer did not commit any sin. But why is the *hattat* ritual for כִּפֶּר required? Sklar (2005: 127-28, 130; 2008: 28-29) states that an impurity-bearer endangers the sancta by contaminating them with his impurity. That is, the impure person is responsible for the pollution of sancta. He argues on the impure person's state (2005: 130):

In short, it is not simply that the person is defiled. Rather, through their

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[35] As mentioned, the meaning of כֹּפֶר denotes both 'ransom' and 'appeasement,' though only 'ransom' is generally employed.

[36] For Johar's idea (1988: 609-18), followed by Gane (2005), that blood rites are to carry the offerer's sin into the sancta rather than to purge them from them, see § 7.2.4. Besides, for various ideas of scholars concerning the defilement of the sancta, see chapter 6.

impurity they have also (inadvertently) defiled sancta, a sin of the most serious consequences. It thus stands to reason that the verb כִּפֶּר in these contexts does not simply refer to cleansing: in keeping with its use elsewhere in the context of inadvertent sin – it also refers to ransom (כֹּפֶר). Stated differently, the major pollutions do not only *defile*, they also *endanger*, and thus the כִּפֶּר-rite must cleanse the impurity (purgation) and rescue the endangered person (כֹּפֶר). True, it was never the intent of the parturient, leper, or the one suffering from a flow to defile the sanctuary or its sancta. This is granted. Nonetheless, even the inadvertent defiling of sancta was considered sinful, as is made clear by the case of the Nazirite in Numbers 6.

Contrary to some scholars like Milgrom, Sklar contends that just as the Nazirite's contamination of the sancta with a corpse, though inadvertent and unexpected, can be considered a sin in the priestly system, so the ordinary people's defilement of the sancta can be sinful (also Rodriguez, 1979: 104, 121).[37] In other words, according to Sklar (2005: 131), the defilement of the sanctuary and its sancta may constitute a sin: "from the priestly perspective, the Nazirite has sinned, and is in need of atonement." His conclusion in his article of 2008 that rewrote and summarized his work of 2005 needs to be cited continually (2008: 28):

> In sum, major impurities that require כִּפֶּר not only pollute, they also endanger, while inadvertent sins requiring כִּפֶּר not only endanger, they also pollute. This suggests that the כִּפֶּר-rite in each context effect both "random" and "purgation," that is, that כִּפֶּר refers to כֹּפֶר-purgation. The possibility of this understanding of כִּפֶּר finds support in two further avenues.

This thesis agrees with Sklar's idea, except his statement that "even the inadvertent defiling of sancta was considered sinful." As will be argued in §7.3.2, defiling the sanctuary does not constitute a sin. The defilement of the sancta is simply a consequence of human evil. In spite of that, the situation of the sanctuary in Leviticus 12-15 requires a ransom, because it was spoiled by human impurity.

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[37] But to Milgrom (1991b: 256), the case of the Nazirites is exceptional, due to their special status similar to the priests.

A strong biblical ground for his idea lies in Numbers 35:30-34, part of the regulation for the city of refuge (Sklar, 2005: 129, 154-157). V. 33 declares:

> So *you shall not pollute the land* (וְלֹא־תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ) in which you are; for *blood pollutes the land* (הַדָּם הוּא יַחֲנִיף אֶת־הָאָרֶץ) and *no expiation can be made for the land* (וְלָאָרֶץ לֹא־יְכֻפַּר) for the blood that is shed on it, except by the blood of him who shed it. (NASB; emphasis mine)

The pollution of the land with blood-shedding by a murderer is parallel to the contamination of the sancta with sin and major impurity. In his interpretation on the meaning of כִּפֶּר, Milgrom (1991b: 1082) contends that only ransom is required for this situation and thus כִּפֶּר in this case means just 'ransom': "כֹּפֶר in this verse is a denominative from כֹּפֶר, whose meaning is undisputed: 'ransom.'" However, Milgrom overlooked the side of the 'pollution' of the land by shedding of innocent blood in this case, while he focused only on the situation of 'ransom' for the innocent murderer. Indeed, the 'pollution' of land obviously requires 'purgation,' which also is performed only by the 'blood' of the murderer. Thus Sklar (2008: 30) states:

> What is particularly important to note, however, is that while כִּפֶּר here does refer to the payment of a suitable ransom, the *intended result of the* כִּפֶּר-*action* – that is, the payment of a suitable כֹּפֶר – *is that of cleansing,* since it is the *pollution* and *defilement* of the land that is being addressed (vv. 33-34). In short, it appears that כִּפֶּר here refers to the effecting of a ransom payment which has purgative result.

This principle may be extended and applied both to the sin context and the impurity context of the *hattat* texts, as mentioned above. That is, a sinner or an impurity-bearer endangers the sanctuary and its sancta through his own sin or impurity that contaminates them. This situation calls for a 'כֹּפֶר' that averts God's wrath and punishment as a consequence of his fault, and for 'purgation' that means the cleansing of the contaminated sancta. Both are indicated in כִּפֶּר which is fulfilled by blood. Thus כִּפֶּר denotes 'כֹּפֶר + purgation' in the *hattat* context. In short, atonement is 'ransoming purgation' and 'purifying ransom' effected by the *hattat* offering (Sklar, 2005: 182).

To apply this idea in detail to the specific procedures of the *hattat* ritual, this study argues: (1) 'ransom' is fulfilled by slaughter, blood-giving on the altar

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and the offering of the fat by burning on the altar; and (2) 'purgation' is obtained through the distinctive blood rites[38] performed at the sancta in the *hattat* ritual. Thus כִּפֶּר is a comprehensive action to bring about the effect through the entire process of the *hattat* ritual (cf. Gane, 2005: 67), in which blood is a decisive factor.

It will be argued in chapter 5 that this principle does not apply to the other sacrifices like the burnt offering, the peace offering, and the guilt offering. It seem that in terms of the mode of the blood rites, the blood rites of these offerings do not have purificatory function to purge the sancta in distinction from those of the *hattat* offering. Therefore, when it is mentioned that the burnt offering or the guilt offering makes atonement for a person (כִּפֶּר עַל), it is assumed that the כִּפֶּר in those cases may refer to expiation by כֹּפֶר (ransom) alone *without the meaning of 'purgation'* (see ch. 5).

Because כִּפֶּר is fulfilled throughout the whole procedure of the *hattat* ritual, the concept of כִּפֶּר in the priestly literature may be 'to perform a rite in order to free a person or object from the matter of sin and impurity,' as stated by K. Elliger (1966: 71). It seems that 'free a person or object' is appropriate as the meaning of 'atone/make atonement for a person or object.'

Therefore, this thesis suggests that the rendering 'atone/make atonement' in the context of *hattat* comprises both the meanings of *'ransom' and 'purge' to free the object*, while it can mean just 'expiation' or 'ransom' in other occurrences without the meaning of 'purgation.'[39]

2.2.4. Combinations of כִּפֶּר with prepositions

כִּפֶּר usually occurs in combinations with prepositions, like אֶת, בַּעַד, עַל, and בְּ.[40] The following transliterations will be used for the combinations of כִּפֶּר +

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[38] The gestures of the blood rites in the *hattat* ritual are 'daubing or putting' (נָתַן) and 'sprinkling (הִזָּה)' blood in sancta, contrary to 'dashing or splashing (זָרַק)' that is common in other animal sacrifices (see § 5.2.1).

[39] Cf. Levine's insufficient definition (1974: 64): "The cultic texts understood the verb *kipper* primarily in a functional or technical sense: 'to perform rites of expiation,' rather than: 'to cleanse.'"

[40] In fact, אֶת is a particle that refers to an objective case rather than a preposition. However, for convenience of discussion in this thesis, it is placed into the category of preposition. Here we do not deal with '*kipper be* + a place' because this *be* only refers to a locus rather than to a direct or indirect object. This combination has a clear meaning: 'atone/make

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a preposition respectively: *kipper ʻal*, *kipper baʻad,* and *kipper ʼet*. These various combinations make it more difficult to grasp the concept of כִּפֶּר in addition to its abstruse original and contextual meaning. Indeed there is no consensus among scholars on the interpretation of the combinations of *kipper* + a preposition.

As a rule, the meanings of prepositions *baʻad* and *ʼet* in *kipper baʻad* and *kipper ʼet* is clear. The latter *ʼet*, a particle in the objective case, refers to a direct object, while the former *baʻad* means 'for, on behalf of.'

The main problem lies with interpretation of the preposition *ʻal* in *kipper ʻal*. Contrary to most scholars and the English Bibles, Milgrom (1991b: 255) assigns different meanings respectively to *ʻal* in *kipper ʻal* + human object and *kipper ʻal* + nonhuman object: 'effect purgation *for* (a person)' for the former and 'effect purgation *on* (a sanctum)' for the latter. His interpretation results from his conviction that כִּפֶּר means purging the sancta rather than a person. As Milgrom (1991b: 255) said, with regard to the meaning of כִּפֶּר, "a study of the *kipper* prepositions is decisive." But it should be questioned whether Milgrom's interpretations on *kipper ʻal* are validated.

The combination *kipper baʻad*, which occurs only thirteen times in the Hebrew Bible[41] is not used with nonhuman objects, except in Exodus 32:30 where sin is the object. Interestingly ten occurrences are concentrated in Leviticus 9 and 16 with an indirect human object.[42] The consensus is that the prepositions *ʻal* and *baʻad* in '*kipper ʻal* + a human object' and '*kipper baʻad* + a human object' have the same meaning: 'make atonement *for/on behalf of*' (most English Bibles and many scholars including Kiuchi) or 'effect purgation *for/on behalf of*' (Milgrom), although there might be a slight difference of nuance between *ʻal* and *baʻad*.

Regarding the peculiarity of *kipper baʻad*, Milgrom (1991b: 255) states: "The difference is that *ʻal* can only refer to persons other than the subject, but when the subject wishes to refer to himself he must use *baʻad* (e.g., 9:7; 16:6, 11, 23; Ezek 45:22)." That is to say, when the benefit of the priests' *hattat* offering returns to themselves, *kipper baʻad* is used. It is supported by Kiuchi (1987: 89) and Gane (2005: 137). However, strictly speaking, it is not correct, because the object of *kipper baʻad* can be 'sin' (Exod 32:30) and the beneficiary can include the congregation (Lev 9:7b; cf. 2 Ch 30:18-19 and Ezek 45:17).

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atonement in (a sanctum),' though Milgrom translates it as 'purge in (a sanctum)" in keeping with his conviction about the meaning of כִּפֶּר in the context of *hattat*.

[41] Exod 32:30; Lev 9:7 [x2]; 16:6 [x2], 11 [x2], 17 [x2], 24 [x2]; 2 Ch 30:18; Ezek 45:17.

[42] The remaining cases occur in the following places: Exod 32:30 with sin as mentioned above; 2 Ch 30:18 with the heart of people; Ezek 45:17 with the community (house) of Israel.

Besides, *kipper ʿal* is also used, even when the priests alone are the beneficiary (Lev 16:33; Num 6:11).[43]

At any rate, it can be concluded that the combination *kipper baʿad* + people has the same meaning as that of *kipper ʿal* + people, whether it is rendered as 'to purge for/effect purgation for' or 'to expiate for' or 'to atone for/make atonement for' people, as will be examined in the next section.

But as noted, Milgrom presents different translations for *kipper ʿal* + a human object and *kipper ʿal* + a nonhuman object. For the rendering of *kipper ʿal* + a nonhuman object (a sanctum), Milgrom (1991b: 255) adopts 'effect purgation *on* a sanctum' in such all occurrences of the combination in the *hattat* ritual. To him 'expiate/make atonement *for* a sanctum' is not acceptable, because the sancta cannot commit sin and does not have to be expiated;[44] he does not use 'effect purgation *for* (a sanctum)' as well, because he probably thinks that a sanctum is the direct object of purgation; instead, therefore, he employs 'purge the sanctum' or 'effect purgation *on* the sanctum' for *kipper ʿal* + a non-human object.

Meanwhile, Milgrom employs 'effect purgation *for/on behalf of* (people)' for the combinations of *kipper ʿal/baʿad* + people, in which there is no difference of meaning between *ʿal* and *baʿad* except that, in Milgrom's view, *baʿad* is used only when the benefit of the purgation returns to the priests themselves who are offerers. The rendering 'effect purgation for/on behalf of people' indicates that the people is not a direct object of כִּפֶּר but a secondary or indirect beneficiary.

Provided that the *hattat* offering never purges or expiates people but always purges the sancta, Milgrom's rendering 'effect purgation for (people)' for '*kipper ʿal* + people' in the *hattat* contexts seems to have virtually the following meaning: 'purge the sancta for/on behalf of people.' The benefit of purging the sancta returns indirectly to the offerer who incurred the contamination of the sancta by his sin or impurity. By so doing, he maintains his conviction that the *hattat* ritual does not purge the people directly, but always purges the sancta. In contrast, Milgrom argues that *kipper ʾet*, which always appears with a nonhuman object (sancta),[45] means 'to purge the object (sancta)' directly.[46]

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[43] Janowski (1982: 188-89 n. 23) also does not think that there is a difference between *kipper al* and *kipper baʿad*.

[44] Milgrom (1991b: 255) criticizes the idea of the sancta expiation, saying "Janowski (1982: 185 n. 5) who claims that *kipper al* always means 'expiate for,' must entertain the absurd idea that sancta [and the scapegoat, 16:10] are capable of sinning."

[45] *kipper et* occurs four times in the OT, always with the sancta as direct objects: Lev 16:20, 33; Ezek 43:26; 45:20.

Milgrom's idea has been confronted with a number of oppositions. His errors will be revealed in the next section that examines the meanings of *kipper* + a preposition, particularly by comparing *kipper 'al/ba'ad* and *kipper 'et* in parallel occurrences.

2.2.5. The meanings of *kipper 'al/ba'ad* and *kipper 'et* in light of parallels

This study starts with the conclusion below, following Kiuchi (1987: 93):[47]

(1) *kipper 'al* + sancta = *kipper 'et* + sancta
(2) *kipper 'al* + people = *kipper ba'ad* + people

It indicates that the combination of *kipper ba'ad* + people has the same meaning as that of *kipper 'al* + people. While *kipper 'et* is not used with people, the meaning of *kipper 'et* + sanctum is equal to that of *kipper 'al* + a sanctum. There are several evidences in the priestly literature.

Firstly, as in the cases of *kipper 'et* and *kipper 'al*, the meaning of the combination חִטֵּא *'al* + a sanctum is likely equal to that of the combination חִטֵּא *'al* + a sanctum in the priestly literature, although the latter occurs only once.[48]

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[46] See Levine's similar but different explanation (1974: 64-65). He states regarding *kipper al* + object whether a human object or non-human object: "*kipper* + *'al* can connote two processes: (1) the relational process, i.e., 'to perform rites of expiation with respect to-' persons, places, etc. Thus, לְכַפֵּר עַל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל means: 'to perform rites of expiation with respect to the Israelites," i.e., in relation to them. . . . It means merely that the effects of these acts accrued to the Israelites" rather than a direct effect by the act performed 'over' the Israelites. He continues to explain: (2) "the spatial process, i.e., 'to perform rites of expiation in proximity to, upon-' sacrificial animals, persons, places, etc." But he renders *kipper* + *'al* and *kipper 'et* of Lev 16:33 in his commentary of Leviticus (1989: 110) into respectively 'make expiation for (people)' and 'purge (the sancta).'

[47] See Kiuchi's useful diagram below (1987: 93). He says that in terms of the usage of *kipper 'al*, כִּפֵּר made by *hattat* can mean atoning not only for the sancta, but also for persons.

He does not agree with Milgrom who argues that the meaning/function of כִּפֵּר in *hattat* is to 'purge.' According to Kiuchi, 'make atonement for' is appropriate for *kipper 'al* + sancta as well.

[48] In most occurrences, *ḥitte 'et* is accompanied by both a non-human object (altar or building) and a human object not only in the priestly literature but also outside it: altar (Lev 8:15; Ezek 43:20, 22; 45:18); house (Lev 14:49, 52); persons (Num 19:19 cf. Ps 51:9 [7]). The wording, וַיְחַטְּאוּ אֶת־דָּמָם הַמִּזְבֵּחָה, in 2 Ch 29:24 is uneasy to interpret, but it seems to say that the priests purged the altar with blood. On the contrary, *ḥitte 'al* occurs just once with the altar,

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(Exod 29:36) וּפַר חַטָּאת תַּעֲשֶׂה לַיּוֹם עַל־הַכִּפֻּרִים *וְחִטֵּאתָ עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ* בְּכַפֶּרְךָ עָלָיו

(Lev 8:15) וַיִּתֵּן עַל־קַרְנוֹת הַמִּזְבֵּחַ סָבִיב בְּאֶצְבָּעוֹ *וַיְחַטֵּא אֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ*

In the contexts of these two occurrences, there is no reason at all for a semantic difference between them, although *ḥiṭṭe ʿal* has an indirect object (the altar) in contrast to *ḥiṭṭe ʾet* which has a direct nonhuman (the altar, the leprous house[49]) or human object (the offerer). Therefore, the similar *kipper* phrases can be understood in the same way. The relationship between כִּפֶּר and חָטָא will be explored in a large scale below.

Secondly, in Leviticus 16 it can be hardly thought that there exists an fundamental semantic difference between *kipper ʾet* + sancta and *kipper ʿal* + sancta in the adjacent context, except for a possible slight variation of nuance caused by the indirect and direct objects (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 92-93).

(v. 16) *וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ* מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל . . .

(v. 18) וְיָצָא אֶל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ אֲשֶׁר לִפְנֵי־יְהוָה *וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו* . . .

(v. 33) *וְכִפֶּר אֶת־מִקְדַּשׁ הַקֹּדֶשׁ* וְאֶת־אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד *וְאֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ יְכַפֵּר* . . .

Thirdly, the cases which display *kipper ʿal* + a non-human object and its consequent effects imply that the effect of *kipper* is the same as that of *kipper ʾet* + a non-human object. For example, Leviticus 14:53 and Exodus 29:37 in a parallel syntax shows that the effects of כִּפֶּר (respectively purgation in the former and consecration in the latter) are direct consequences of the כִּפֶּר action on the object. These cases are conspicuously compared with Ezekiel 43:26 where *kipper ʾet* + the altar appears.

(Lev 14:53) *וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר* . . .

(Exod 29:37) שִׁבְעַת יָמִים *תְּכַפֵּר עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ* אֹתוֹ . . .

(Ezek 43:26) שִׁבְעַת יָמִים *יְכַפְּרוּ אֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְטִהֲרוּ* אֹתוֹ . . .

Especially, Exodus 29:37 and Ezekiel 43:26 in sheer parallel, though the latter occurs outside the priestly literature, is likely evidence that there is no

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obviously indicating the same meaning as that of *ḥiṭṭe ʾet* + sancta. However, *ḥiṭṭe ʿal* + persons does not appear at all.

[49] The צָרַעַת symptom of the house is just a kind of simple 'mildew' (NIV). Therefore, precisely speaking, the expression 'leprous house' is not correct. However, for convenience of discussion, it is used for the house contaminated with the 'mildew' (for details, see § 7.3.3).

difference of meaning between *kipper 'et* + a sanctum and *kipper 'al* + a sanctum.[50]

Furthermore, from a commonsense perspective, the rendering 'upon' for the preposition *'al* in וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת (Lev 14:53) and in וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ (Lev 16:16) seems to be unnatural. How can the blood be sprinkled 'upon' the house and the *adytum*? Rather, the preposition בְּ is probably suitable for a locus that has a room inside.[51] This situation implies that *kipper 'al* has a direct effect on the object like *kipper 'et*. Therefore, Kiuchi (1987: 90-94) argues that the cases of *kipper 'al* + sanctum should also be understood as 'make atonement for,' and thus it has the same meaning as *kipper 'et* + sanctum.

In sum, it can be concluded that *kipper 'et* and *kipper 'al* for a non-human object have the same semantic meaning, referring to the same effect, although there might exist a difference of nuance. As a result, Milgrom's renderings for these combinations must be declined.

The following cases in parallel show obvious evidence that *kipper 'al* probably has consistently the same meaning in the *hattat* contexts, whether it is accompanied by a nonhuman object or a human object. They are presented in the relationship of the various objects of כִּפֶּר and its consequent effects or

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[50] Compare *kipper 'al* and *kipper 'et* with some usage of the verb נָשָׂא. The meaning of the phrase נָשָׂא לְפֶשַׁע (Gen 50:17b; Exod 23:21; Josh 24:19; 1 Sam 25:28) is not different from that of the phrase נָשָׂא פֶּשַׁע (Gen 50:17a; Exod 34:7; Num 14:18; Job 7:21). Though Gen 50:17 is outside the priestly literature, it may be a typical example:

(Gen 50:17) כֹּה־תֹאמְרוּ לְיוֹסֵף אָנָּא *שָׂא נָא פֶּשַׁע* אַחֶיךָ וְחַטָּאתָם

כִּי־רָעָה גְמָלוּךָ וְעַתָּה *שָׂא נָא לְפֶשַׁע* עַבְדֵי אֱלֹהֵי אָבִיךָ וַיֵּבְךְּ יוֹסֵף בְּדַבְּרָם אֵלָיו

The comparable cases in the priestly literature are as follows:

(Exod 23:21) הִשָּׁמֶר מִפָּנָיו וּשְׁמַע בְּקֹלוֹ אַל־תַּמֵּר בּוֹ כִּי לֹא *יִשָּׂא לְפִשְׁעֲכֶם* כִּי שְׁמִי בְּקִרְבּוֹ

(Exod 34:7) נֹצֵר חֶסֶד לָאֲלָפִים *נֹשֵׂא עָוֹן וָפֶשַׁע* וְחַטָּאָה

[51] Kiuchi (1987: 90) also pointed out that Milgrom's idea is problematic with the phrase וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ in Lev 16:16. He says that although Milgrom's 'on/upon' for *'al* in *'al* + sanctum (also the house in Lev 14:53) seems to be suitable for some verses (Exod 29:36, 37; 30:10b; Lev 8:15; 16:18; but this thesis interprets *'al* in these verses to be 'for' rather than 'on/upon'), however, Lev 16:16 does not fit his idea. Kiuchi (1987: 90) states: ". . . it would be unreasonable to assume that עַל means 'on, over,' if the *adytum* (הַקֹּדֶשׁ) were understood as room. Since 'on, over' is unlikely to be the meaning of *'al* in this passage, it is also dubious whether the general distinction between human and non-human objects can be justified." To the contrary, Gane (2005: 138) supports Milgrom's position on the ground that there is the ark cover inside the *adytum* and blood is sprinkled 'on/over' it. But how about the house in Lev 14:53? As for the house that is contaminated from place to place, blood is sprinkled 'in' the house. How can blood be sprinkled 'on' or 'over' the house? Therefore, Milgrom's rendering, 'effect purgation on (the house/sancta' must be refused.

implied effects:

1) כִּפֶּר for people's inadvertent sin and its effect (forgiveness):

(Lev 4:20, 26, 31) וְכִפֶּר עֲלֵהֶם הַכֹּהֵן וְנִסְלַח לָהֶם

2) כִּפֶּר for an impure person and its effect (purification):

(from childbirth) (Lev 12:7) וְכִפֶּר עָלֶיהָ וְטָהֲרָה מִמְּקֹר דָּמֶיהָ

(from leprosy) (Lev 14:20) וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵר

3) כִּפֶּר for a contaminated house and its effect (purification):

(from leprosy) (Lev 14:53) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר

4) כִּפֶּר for of a contaminated sanctum and its effect (purification):

(Lev 16:16) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

(Exod 30:10)[52] וְכִפֶּר אַהֲרֹן עַל־קַרְנֹתָיו

5) כִּפֶּר for a sanctum and its effect (consecration):[53]

(Exod 29:37) תְּכַפֵּר עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ אֹתוֹ

(Lev 8:15)[54] וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו

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[52] As far as this case is concerned, many scholars, including even people who stand in opposition to Milgrom's persistent rendering, 'effect purgation on' for *kipper 'al* + sancta, translate it as 'effect purgation *on*' or 'purge *on*' the horns of the incense altar. However, it appears that they overlook the principle of *pars pro toto* which here indicates that the horns are representative of the whole altar, because the effect of כִּפֶּר for the horns covers the entire incense altar. Therefore, 'make atonement *for* the horns' can be validated as the consistent rendering of *kipper 'al*.

[53] Consecration is fulfilled with special rituals with the anointing oil and special garments as well as a *hattat* ritual. Sklar (2005: 125-27) categorizes 'consecration' as an intense form of purification. This thesis argues that the *hattat* ritual brings about the effect of 'atonement by purgation' in all cases of *hattat*, whereas the anointing oil effects 'consecration.' Purgation is a prerequisite to consecration. That is, the ritual of *hattat* as itself does not effect 'consecration.'

[54] The phrase לכפר in Lev 8:15 has caused many interpretative difficulties, because כִּפֶּר follows קֹדֶשׁ (וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו) in contrast to Exod 29, which is the prescription of Lev 8 where קֹדֶשׁ follows כִּפֶּר as an effect of it (תְּכַפֵּר עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְקִדַּשְׁתָּ אֹתוֹ). Milgrom (1991b: 524) translates it, following Rashi (1970) and Ibn Ezra (1986): "Thus he consecrated it to effect atonement upon it." It refers to the future use of the altar for a variety of atoning sacrifices (Gane, 2005: 132). However, this view does not match its prescription of Exod 29:37. It seems that the sequence כִּפֶּר ← קֹדֶשׁ is logical. If it is maintained, the meaning of the preposition ל might refer to 'time,' "expressing concurrence (at) rather than duration (in)" (*BDB*, 516: e.g., Gen 3:8; Gen 15:12). If it

As exemplified above, the parallel between Leviticus 14:20 and v. 53 in the same context makes Milgrom's idea unconvincing. It is unlikely that the identical syntax dealing with the same problem (צָרַעַת) may have different meanings, namely, 'for' and 'on.'

(Lev 14:20) וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵר

(Lev 14:53) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר

The person and the house are inflicted by צָרַעַת or have a symptom suspectable as צָרַעַת and thus become impure.[55] In order to cleanse the impurities and resolve the problems, the *hattat* sacrifices are offered with other purificatory rites and some combined sacrifices. Meanwhile the objects, either person or the house, undergo the process of כִּפֶּר to recover their 'pure state.' Hence both of them are the beneficiaries of כִּפֶּר, even though in the former the blood of birds is sprinkled on the sanctum rather than on the person, whereas in the latter the blood is sprinkled on the house.

As noted, in the *hattat* ritual, the כִּפֶּר activity is not performed only by the purgation of the sancta with blood, but also its effect is the result from a series of the procedures (slaughter, hand-impositions, blood manipulations, fat-burning, and disposal of remaining flesh), though the blood rites play a vital and decisive role. Through the entire process, the double effects of כִּפֶּר (ransom and purgation) is given to the object. Thus the rendering 'atone for/make atonement for' is justified for both persons and the sancta, given such double meaning of כִּפֶּר. In sum, the *hattat* ritual makes atonement for both persons and the sancta.

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is applied to Lev 8:15, it could be rendered, "when he expiates it (the altar), he should consecrate it." Otherwise, the meaning of לְ might be 'by,' as Lev 8:15 is exemplified in *GKC* § 114o. In this case, the translation 'consecrate *by* making atonement' can be suggested. If it is accepted, the order of כִּפֶּר and consequent קֹדֶשׁ is still maintained. As in Exod 30:10, the syntax of Lev 8:15 shows that putting blood on the horns of the outer altar brings out the effect to purge (חִטֵּא) the entire altar. In this manner, the horns of the altar are also *pars pro toto* for the entire altar.

[55] To be exact, if the house is judged as having malicious צָרַעַת by the priestly inspection, it must be dismantled. The ritual of two birds can be performed only to atone for (*kipper al*) the house, if the symptom is not a malicious צָרַעַת. For detail, see § 7.3.3..

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2.3. The כִּפֶּר affiliated terms

2.3.1. Actions related to כִּפֶּר: חטא, טהר, קדשׁ, עון נשׂא

The terminology of כִּפֶּר together with its affiliated words, and their correlation must be precisely examined. This study will shed light on exploring the mechanism of כִּפֶּר. Many scholars have thought that the *piel* verbs חִטֵּא and טִהַר are synonyms of כִּפֶּר in the context of *hattat*. For instance, Milgrom (1991b: 255) states: "in the context of the *hattat*, כִּפֶּר means 'purge' and nothing else, as indicated by its synonyms חִטֵּא and טִהַר." By contrast, Kiuchi (1987: 99) argues that כִּפֶּר is a hypernym to encompass חִטֵּא, טִהַר, קִדֵּשׁ, and נָשָׂא עָוֹן; therefore, the scope of semantic meanings could overlap. However, these כִּפֶּר-affinitive terms seem to be verbs that indicate either penultimate actions that subsequently leads to כִּפֶּר, or the ultimate effect of כִּפֶּר.

2.3.2. חִטֵּא and טהר

The *piel* חִטֵּא and טִהַר will be mainly examined, with reference to their *hithpael* forms, because the meanings of their *qal* forms are generally agreed.

Whereas the verb טִהַר is a broad term to signify the action to bring about general cultic 'purgation, cleansing,'[56] the verb חִטֵּא is used to stand for a similar meaning exclusively in the *hattat* related contexts.[57] However, this limited usage of חִטֵּא has been neglected in scholarly discussion, although its restriction of use is an important feature. Indeed, this purificatory concept of חִטֵּא has a direct or indirect connection with the *hattat* offering, even though it does not always appear in all the cases of the *hattat* related contexts.[58]

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[56] This is the factitive use of the *piel*. For details, see Waltke and O' Conner (1990: 24.2).

[57] The *hattat* related contexts refer to the *hattat* context and some contexts where the effect of the *hattat* ritual is implied (e.g., the purificatory ritual for the leprous house in Lev 14:51-53; the ritual of the 'ash water' made of the red heifer called a kind of *hattat* in Num 19:9).

[58] In many cases of the *hattat* ritual, it does not appear, while טִהַר is used as a synonym for it. In other words, while טִהַר or חִטֵּא appears to mean 'cleanse' in the *hattat* related contexts, טִהַר is broadly used in various contexts including the *hattat* context, and חִטֵּא is exclusively limited to the *hattat* contexts or a certain context where the effect of the *hattat* is implied (e.g., Lev 14:51-53).

In addition, the *hithpael* הִתְחַטֵּא also occurs only in such contexts. A difference between חִטֵּא and הִתְחַטֵּא lies in that whereas חִטֵּא is generally employed to indicate the cleansing of nonhuman objects,'[59] הִתְחַטֵּא relates to the cleansing of human objects, meaning 'to purify themselves.'[60]

As far as the concept of the *piel* חִטֵּא is concerned, it refers likely to either 'purify, decontaminate,' 'de-sin,'[61] or 'bring a *hattat* offering, perform the ritual of the *hattat*' (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 95). Judging from close investigation into the occurrences of חִטֵּא and הִתְחַטֵּא throughout the cultic literature of the Hebrew Bible,[62] it is assumed that the verb signifies the action which refers to a *special cultic* cleansing in relationship with the *hattat* offering rather than to a *general cultic* cleansing, probably except in two cases where it seems to denote 'perform the *hattat* ritual': Leviticus 6:19 (26) and 9:15.[63] In other words, חִטֵּא is

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[59] Exceptionally, חִטֵּא has a direct human object in Num 19:19, though it is a personal pronoun: וְחִטְּאוֹ בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי "and on the seventh day he shall purify him" (NASB).

[60] As a possible exception, Num 31:30 seems to show that הִתְחַטֵּא could have direct nonhuman objects: וְכָל־בֶּגֶד וְכָל־כְּלִי־עוֹר וְכָל־מַעֲשֵׂה עִזִּים וְכָל־כְּלִי־עֵץ תִּתְחַטָּאוּ

[61] These are the privative sense of *piel*. For this use of the *piel*, see Waltke and O' Conner (1990: 24.4f); Joüon (1993: 52d). Milgrom argues for 'cleanse, purge, expurgate.' But Janowski (1982: 241 n. 287) says that his renderings are restricted, posing 'de-sin' that denotes a meaning of the root *hattat* (for the debate between Milgrom and Janowski, see Kiuchi, 1987: 16).

[62] The *piel* (חִטֵּא): Exod 29:36; Lev 6:19; 8:15; 9:15; 14:49, 52; Num 19:19; 2 Ch 29:24; Ezek 43:20, 22-23; 45:18. The *hithpael* (הִתְחַטֵּא): Num 8:21; 19:12, 13, 20; Num 31:19, 20, 23. הִתְחַטֵּא also occurs with a privative sense. Cf. the rare occurrences outside the cultic texts: the meaning of הִתְחַטֵּא in Job 41:17 is obscure (probably 'be bewilered' [NASB; cf. *BDB*, 307]); חִטֵּא in Ps 51:9 is used to mean metaphorically purification of heart.

[63] In these two verses חִטֵּא seemingly indicates 'perform a *hattat* ritual.' Thus J. Durham (1987) and Kiuchi (1987: 96) insist that in Exod 29:36-37 as well, חִטֵּא mean 'offer a *hattat*' (cf. J. Durham's rendering, 'make a sin offering [for the Altar],' along with a few English Bibles [CJB; NJB; RSV; NRSV]). To the contrary, other interpreters (e.g., Milgrom, 1991b: 279; D. K. Stuart, 2006: 619) and many other English Bibles translate this verse as "purge the altar." Although 'offer a *hattat*' is acceptable in Lev 6:19 (26) and 9:15, this thesis favors 'purge the altar' insofar as Exod 29:36 is concerned. Indeed חִטֵּא in Exod 29:36b seems to be in parallel to the previous action in 36a where the meaning is 'offer/make a bull of *hattat* (וּפַר חַטָּאת תַּעֲשֶׂה):

36a וּפַר חַטָּאת תַּעֲשֶׂה לַיּוֹם עַל־הַכִּפֻּרִים
         B   A
36b וְחִטֵּאתָ עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בְּכַפֶּרְךָ עָלָיו וּמָשַׁחְתָּ אֹתוֹ לְקַדְּשׁוֹ
         B¹   A¹

In pattern A-B-A¹-B¹, while the rendering 'offer/make a *hattat* bull' (וּפַר חַטָּאת תַּעֲשֶׂה) in 36a corresponds to 'you shall purify for the altar' (חִטֵּא) in 36b, the rendering 'for atonement'

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a technical term for indicating 'cleanse/purge with (the blood of) a *hattat*,' while it occurs only in the *hattat* related contexts throughout the cultic literature.

Then, is חִטֵּא a synonym for כִּפֶּר? In light of Exodus 29:36b (see n. 63), for example, these two actions are obviously distinguished:

וְחִטֵּאתָ עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ בְּכַפֶּרְךָ עָלָיו וּמָשַׁחְתָּ אֹתוֹ לְקַדְּשׁוֹ

Therefore, contrary to some scholars like Milgrom, the two verbs cannot be regarded as synonyms. Rather, כִּפֶּר refers to the effect consequent to, or attained through the actions חטא, נשׂא עון, and טהר. To put the focus on חִטֵּא, the dynamics proceeds as follows: חִטֵּא ← כִּפֶּר (rather than חִטֵּא ≤ כִּפֶּר).[64]

Leviticus 14:52-53 demonstrates the order as follows:

. . . וְחִטֵּא אֶת־הַבַּיִת . . . וְשִׁלַּח אֶת־הַצִּפֹּר הַחַיָּה . . . וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר

As displayed, the first verb חִטֵּא ('purge [the house]') is linked to the next action, 'to send the bird,' and leads to כִּפֶּר as a consequential effect. That is, כִּפֶּר is attained via cleansing (חִטֵּא) the house and sending (שִׁלַּח) the bird. Likewise, many cases of חִטֵּא show the same dynamics,[65] indicating that חִטֵּא is not a synonym for כִּפֶּר.

The verb חִטֵּא also appears in close connection with מֵי נִדָּה ('purifying water') (Num 19:9). In Numbers 19 and 31, the 'ash water' (the ash of the red heifer plus water) cleanses the persons contaminated by contacts with corpses.

(עַל־הַכִּפֻּרִים) matches 'when you make atonement for it' (בְּכַפֶּרְךָ) in 36b. Here the חִטֵּא action, however, is unlikely just to repeat the former action. If so, it will be superfluous. Therefore, probably it will refer to a new meaning rather than 'perform a *hattat*.' If this is the case, it is likely to mean 'cleanse the altar' in order to make atonement (see above) in keeping with the more general usage of חִטֵּא in the *hattat* context; hence to paraphrase it in reference to 36a, 'cleanse the altar by performing the *hattat* on it.' It finds support in the translation of NJPS: "you shall purge the altar by performing purification upon it." That is, this cleansing of the *hitte* phrase חִטֵּא עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ in Exod 29:36b means 'purify the altar with the blood of *hattat*' rather than general 'cleansing.' In this way, the meaning of חִטֵּא as 'cleansing with *hattat*' seems to be applied to most occurrences of חִטֵּא in the priestly literature. Incidentally, v. 36b shows that חִטֵּא has a function distinct from כִּפֶּר, in light of the phrase בְּכַפֶּרְךָ that is distict from חִטֵּא, contrary to Milgrom's opinion (1991b: 255; cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 97) that כִּפֶּר is a synonym of חִטֵּא and טָהֵר in the *hattat* context.

[64] Contra Milgrom (1991b: 255) who treats them as synonyms and Kiuchi (1987: 97-99) who says that כִּפֶּר could be not only a synonym for חִטֵּא, but is also a hypernym to encompass חִטֵּא as well as טָהֵר, קֹדֶשׁ, and נָשָׂא עָוֹן.

[65] Outside the priestly literature, Ezek 43:20 is a typical example: "thus you shall cleanse it (וְחִטֵּאתָ אֹתוֹ) and make atonement for it (וְכִפַּרְתָּהוּ)" (NASB).

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The ash water is named 'purifying water' (מֵי נִדָּה) and is strikingly called a type of *hattat*: ‏. . . לְמִשְׁמֶרֶת לְמֵי נִדָּה חַטָּאת הוּא (Num 19:9)

"‏. . . for the water for cleansing. It is a purification offering" (NRS).

Obviously the 'water of *hattat*' (מֵי חַטָּאת) in Numbers 8:7, which was sprinkled to ordain the Levites, is the same as the 'purifying water' (מֵי נִדָּה) in Numbers 19:9.[66] Therefore, 'cleansing' (חִטֵּא) both in Numbers 19 (vv. 12-13, 19, 20) and 31 (vv. 19-20, 23) is also related to the special type of *hattat*. That is, חִטֵּא is different from other cleansing actions: a *cultic cleansing* by the *hattat* ritual.

Number 31:19-24 (see Num 19:11-22 as well) betrays again the difference. In this passage, הִתְחַטֵּא appears several times instead of חִטֵּא. The meaning of the text is clear: the soldiers and the captives came back from the battle where blood was shed and the contact with corpses was inescapably committed; they 'should cleanse themselves (הִתְחַטֵּא)' with the ash water rather than by general washing.

It is noteworthy that in Numbers 31:19-24, two modes of cleansing are presented: (1) cleansing (טִהַר) of the metal spoils by burning with the fire (v. 23);[67] (2) cleansing (הִתְחַטֵּא) with the ash water of both the persons (v. 19) and spoils which consist of the non-metal (v. 20) as well as the metal which has already undergone the cleansing with the fire (v. 23).[68]

Of course, the effects of these actions are the same: purification or cleanness. However, whereas טִהַר is used with the fire, הִתְחַטֵּא is employed with the ash water (named מֵי חַטָּאת [Num 8:7] or מֵי נִדָּה [Num 19:9] mixed with the ash of the red heifer). In v. 24 טִהַר appears again to indicate a different kind of cleansing from הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא, whether it points to the cleansing simply by

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[66] 'Water for impurity' (RSV) or 'water of lustration' (Milgrom, 1990: 160).

[67] Regarding the unmentioned items, which are made of earthen ware and stone, whereas the pottery had to be destroyed according to the rule of Lev 6:21, stone is probably not subject to impurity (Milgrom, 1990: 261).

[68] As instructed in v. 23, the metal items that have already been cleansed with the fire should be cleansed again with the ash water. On the other hand, v. 23 says also that the nonmetal items, which have already been cleansed with the ash water, should pass again through water (not the ash water) (Milgrom, 1990: 261). Milgrom (1990: 261) presumes that the passing through water is performed on the seventh day after the items have been sprinkled with the ash water. He says, following the rabbis' theory, that "the passing of objects through fire or water is not part of the purification ritual from corpse contamination but that it is a preliminary cleansing of these objects from food they may have absorbed" (1990: 261).

washing their clothes or to a final result through the entire process of cleansing that might include הִתְחַטֵּא with the ash water.[69]

The use of the verb הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא implies that the water of *hattat* (מֵי חַטָּאת) brings about the purificatory effect of *hattat*. Therefore, this thesis argues that the occasions, in which הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא appears with the water of *hattat*, must be considered as a variant or special type of the *hattat* ritual in a sense. There are three occurrences of the *hattat* water throughout the priestly literature, as seen above: the ordination ritual of the Levites in Leviticus 8; the purifying ritual for the persons and stuffs that had contact with corpses in Numbers 19:11-22; the purifying ritual for the persons and spoils who/that returned from a battle in Numbers 31:19-24.

At this point, the statement in Numbers 19:5 deserves attention: it says that the 'ash of *hattat*' (Num 19:17), which will be mixed with water, contains the *blood* of the red heifer, along with its hide and flesh. This implies that in these cases as well, the same principle, *atonement by blood*, works implicitly with the rite of the ash water (the water of *hattat*), even though the verb כִּפֶּר or the noun כֹּפֶר (atonement) does not appear in its contexts. Instead, 'cleansing' (טָהֵר) appears usually as an effect of חִטֵּא action in the contexts where כִּפֶּר/כֹּפֶר is not mentioned, as presented in Num 19:12 and 19 (see Num 31:34; for the case of Lev 8, see Milgrom's comment below):

v. 12 הוּא *יִתְחַטָּא־בוֹ* בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁלִישִׁי וּבַיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי *יִטְהָר* . . .

v. 19 *וְחִטְּאוֹ* בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי וְכִבֶּס בְּגָדָיו וְרָחַץ בַּמַּיִם *וְטָהֵר* בָּעֶרֶב

Despite no mention of atonement, the uses of the ash water made from the sacrifice of the red heifer *hattat* seem to allude to the effect of the atonement mechanism operating in the special type of *hattat*. Significantly Gane (2005: 181-89) states that the ritual of the red heifer, which is slaughtered outside the camp and blood of which is shed toward the sanctuary, purge future impurities *proleptically*. Although Gane does not specifically express it, it is presumed that the principle of the atonement mechanism by the *hattat* offering in this ritual is still working. Thus it is likely that the purification effected by the ash water is

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[69] Note the consecutive purificatory verbs in vv. 23-24:

(v. 23) כָּל־דָּבָר אֲשֶׁר־יָבֹא בָאֵשׁ תַּעֲבִירוּ בָאֵשׁ *וְטָהֵר*

אַךְ בְּמֵי נִדָּה *יִתְחַטָּא* וְכֹל אֲשֶׁר לֹא־יָבֹא בָּאֵשׁ תַּעֲבִירוּ בַמָּיִם

(v. 24) וְכִבַּסְתֶּם בִּגְדֵיכֶם בַּיּוֹם הַשְּׁבִיעִי *וּטְהַרְתֶּם* וְאַחַר תָּבֹאוּ אֶל־הַמַּחֲנֶה

ultimately attained through an atonement process. That is, the purity is the final effect or result of the implied כִּפֶּר action via the הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא action.[70]

Moreover, it can be stated that the *hattat* red heifer was sacrificed ahead of time as a ransom for persons or stuffs who/which would be contaminated by corpses later, and its blood was sprinkled toward the sanctaury to purge it of future impurities *proleptically*; then the ash water mixed with its blood would be sprinkled (חִטֵּא) on them. Thus the same principle of atonement as in the ordinary *hattat* ritual is applied to the case of the ash water rite:

'ransom + purgation' (כִּפֶּר) → 'purification' (טָהֵר)

If the sprinkling of the ash water (i.e., the חִטֵּא rite) causes an effect corresponding to the *hattat* ritual in a broad sense, it can be argued again that חִטֵּא is used exclusively in the *hattat* related context. That is, the purificatory function of חִטֵּא is absolutely restricted to the dynamics of the *hattat* ritual with the meaning of 'de-sin' or 'decontamination.'

In fact, the חִטֵּא action itself does not focus on the ransom function of *hattat*, although it might be implied that the effect of ransom is inherent in the ash of the sacrificed red heifer. Rather, in most cases the חִטֵּא action means only 'purgation' effected by the *hattat*.[71] The 'purgation' (חִטֵּא) is an action that consequently leads to the implied atonement (כִּפֶּר) which causes the ultimate effect, 'purification.' The implied atonement is accomplished by 'purgation' (חִטֵּא) + 'ransom' (slaughter and blood-shedding of the red heifer as a substitutionary victim).[72] That is why כִּפֶּר cannot be classified as a synonym with חִטֵּא like Milgrom's idea (1991b: 255).

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[70] Sklar (2005: 114) also states: "One could argue, perhaps not altogether convincingly, that the omission of the verb כִּפֶּר in these contexts is simply incidental." But he considers this case of the ash water ritual as another exception to a rule that blood is required, that is, a concession like non-blood *hattat* offerings (Sklar, 2005: 104). However, as stated, it must be reminded that the blood of red heifer is mixed with the ash. Thus the power of blood still works in the ash water possibly to make atonement.

[71] Possibly except two cases, Lev 6:19 (26) and 9:15, as mentioned above

[72] The verb כִּפֶּר has a priest or Moses as subject in most cases, possibly except the following cases: animals (Lev 1:4a [the animal of the burnt offering]; Lev 10:16 [the Azazel goat; for the identity of the Azazel goat, see n. 128]; Neh 10:33 [the *hattat* itself]); God (Lev 8:34; cf. Deut 32:43 and Ezek 16:63), blood (Lev 17:11). However, while the subject of חִטֵּא can also be a priest or Moses, both הִתְחַטֵּא and חִטֵּא can have a non-priestly person as subject (the Levites in Num 8:21; the Israelites in Num 19:12, 19).

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As noted, טָהֵר/הִטַּהֵר/טָהַר has a wider application than חִטֵּא/הִתְחַטֵּא. Primarily the former, which is an antonym of טָמֵא/טִמֵּא ('contaminate'/'become impure'), signifies a general and broad action to cleanse/purify impure objects throughout the priestly literature.[73] It differs from the restricted usage of the latter that indicates a specialized action only in the *hattat* related contexts.[74] Thus, טָהַר encompasses חִטֵּא; therefore, the former can sometimes be used as a synonym of the latter.

The comparison of ritual process in the following verses, which show parallel syntactical features, displays explicitly the relationship of טָהַר and חִטֵּא in consecutive processes: (1) process A: sevenfold blood sprinkling; (2) process B: the effect of blood sprinkling; (3) process C: release of the animal.

(Lev 14:7)[76] וְהִזָּה עַל הַמִּטַּהֵר מִן־הַצָּרַעַת שֶׁבַע פְּעָמִים וְטִהֲרוֹ[75]

B   A

וְשִׁלַּח אֶת־הַצִּפֹּר הַחַיָּה . . .

C

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[73] The objects of the verbs are as follows: e.g., the leper (Lev 14:7); the leprous house (Lev 14:53); the contaminated altar (Lev 16:19); the sinful Israelites (Lev 16:30; cf. Je 33:8; Ezek 36:33); the Levites in the ordination (Num 8:6, 7, 15, 20) where the Levites cleanse themselves (הִטַּהֵר) by shaving their bodies and washing their clothes (Num 8:7; cf. Ne 12:30). Cf. the objects of cleansing outside the priestly literature: the temple and its items (2 Ch 29:15-16, 18); Judah and Jerusalem (2 Ch 34:3, 5, 8); the gate and wall of city (Neh 12:30); land (Ezek 39:12, 16). Regarding Num 8:7, whether הִטַּהֵר is passive or reflexive is questionable. As Milgrom (1990: 62; cf. Sklar, 2005: 108) argues, it might more likely have a reflexive sense. To the contrary, however, the *hithpael* participle מִטַּהֵר which occurs many times in Lev 14 is obviously a passive sense: 'the person who is purified' of leprosy (cf. Sklar, 2005: 108).

[74] For this reason, Sklar's conclusive statement (2005: 111-12) is not correct, when he says, "it would seem that the factitive use of the *piel* and the *hithpael* of טהר and the privative use of the *piel* and *hithpael* of חטא are more or less synonymous," because חִטֵּא has a restricted use only to indicate special cleansing within the *hattat* related context.

[75] Most English Bibles and interpreters translate the phrase as declaratory *piel*: "he [the priest] shall pronounce him clean" (for this use of the *piel*, see Waltke and O' Connor 1990: 24.2f; Joüon, 1993: 52d). Except in Lev 14:7, most cases of the *piel* טָהֵר in Lev 13-14 in particular is acknowledged as declaratory (declaration of purity: Lev 13:6, 7, 13, etc, and 14:8; cf. declaration of impurity: 13:3, 8, 11, etc). However, in light of the parallel verses, the *piel* טָהֵר in Lev 14:7 must be translated in the same manner as in Lev 16:19: '(thus he shall) cleanse him.' Only NJPS assumes this rendering. Milgrom (1991b: 839) also refuses the declaratory rendering on the ground that the leper still requires laundering his clothes and bathing himself.

[76] In this ritual, the birds are not expressly called *hattat* and are not offered to sanctuary. However, they might be thought *hattat* victims in that the ritual is the same as that of the two-bird ritual in Lev 5:7, 12:8, and 14:22, and in that the verb חִטֵּא is used to describe the purgation. As explained, חִטֵּא always appears in the *hattat* related contexts.

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(Lev 14:51-53) וְהִזָּ֤ה אֶל־הַבַּ֙יִת֙ שֶׁ֣בַע פְּעָמִ֔ים *וְחִטֵּא֙* אֶת־הַבַּ֔יִת בְּדַ֖ם הַצִּפּֽוֹר . . .

          B   A

. . . *וְשִׁלַּ֛ח* אֶת־הַצִּפֹּ֥ר הַחַיָּ֖ה

                  C

(Lev 16:19-21) וְהִזָּ֨ה עָלָ֧יו מִן־הַדָּ֛ם בְּאֶצְבָּע֖וֹ שֶׁ֣בַע פְּעָמִ֑ים *וְטִֽהֲר֣וֹ* וְקִדְּשׁ֔וֹ מִטֻּמְאֹ֖ת . . .

          B   A

. . . (the live goat) *וְשִׁלַּ֛ח* בְּיַד־אִ֥ישׁ עִתִּ֖י הַמִּדְבָּֽרָה

                  C

The Leviticus 14, which prescribes the remedies from צָרַעַת, shows that there exist the different nuances between טהר and חטא. But its comparison with Leviticus 16:19-21 confirms that טהר has a broader sense than חטא and thus can be used as a synonym for it.

On the whole, the section for the leper prescribes two stages to atone for him[77] (Lev 14:1-32): (1) stage 1 - a series of purificatory rites to purge the impurity from the leper's body (vv. 1-9); and (2) stage 2 - a series of sacrificial rituals performed in the sanctuary to atone for him (vv. 10-32).

In contrast, while the measures adopted for the leprous house are the same as that of stage 1 for the leper,[78] stage 2 is not applied to the house (for details, see § 7.3.2 and § 7.3.3). Remarkably, the same ritual with the two birds, accompanied by other components (cedar wood, hyssop, scarlet yarn), is made in both cases to cleanse respectively the leper and the leprous house: one bird is slaughtered to shed blood, and the other is released alive. The ritual for the leper is performed outside the camp, but that for the leprous house is made in the town outside the sanctuary.

Strikingly, whereas the verb טהר is used in the two-bird ritual for the leper (v. 7), the verb חטא replaces it in the same ritual for the house (vv. 49, 52). Thus the appearance of the different verbs in the same syntactical structure

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[77] For convenience of discussion, 'he' or 'him' is used as the English pronoun for a person, whether masculine or feminine, except in cases related to a woman only, for example, the parturient woman in Lev 12.

[78] Significantly, Lev 14 demonstrates an important principle in Israel's cult that inanimate objects like houses or garments never incur aerial contamination in the sancta. As Milgrom (1991b: 260) argues, human beings are the only medium to generate pollution of the sancta from a distance without direct contact with them. For this reason, Milgrom (1991b: 882) is wrong and self-contradictory in stating that the צָרַעַת impurity of house is too weak to contaminate the sancta. At the same time, it indicates that in the case when the *hattat* ritual is required for people, the atonement for them is always made with the purgation of the contaminated sancta, differently from the atonement for a house.

recapitulates the fact that חִטֵּא has a meaning and function distinct from טִהֵר; the meaning of חִטֵּא, to 'purge with a *hattat*', which is suggested above, can be applied in Leviticus 14 as well.

In Leviticus 14:7 the sevenfold sprinkling of the bird blood on the leper is a 'cleansing action' (טִהֵר), but in 14:51 the same gesture is expressed as a 'cleansing action' (חִטֵּא) with a different nuance. It is stated that the former rite (v. 7) is just to cleanse (טִהֵר) the leper without causing atonement, because it is not a *hattat*, and because atonement is made through stage 2 with the *hattat* ritual accompanied by the other offerings in the sanctuary. However, the latter rite (v. 51) is to purge (חִטֵּא) the leprous house, making atonement (כִּפֶּר) for it, without stage 2, namely, a series of rituals in the sanctuary.

In both occasions, as shown above, the declaration of the final effect is the same: the priest shall *make atonement* for him or the house, and he or it will become clean.

(Lev 14:20b) וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵר

(Lev 14:53b) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר

Whereas the final effect, 'purification' of the former, is a consequence through stage 1 (two-bird ritual) and stage 2 (*hattat* offering + other offerings) for the leper, that of the latter is attained only after the two-bird ritual for the house.

Regarding these two final declarations, Milgrom translates them diversely from one another in line with his idea on the meanings of כִּפֶּר in contexts: "and (he) shall make *expiation for* him" for v. 20b in the non-*hattat* context (Milgrom, 1991b: 828, 858)[79] and "and (he) shall perform *purgation on* the house" for v. 53b in the *hattat* context (Milgrom, 1991b: 829, 882). But it is unacceptable, because there is no reason that we should understand this same statement and syntax to have different meanings between the two verses.[80] Therefore, we hold

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[79] The reason that Milgrom (1991b: 858) does not translate this phrase here as 'effect purgation for him' is because he considers the כִּפֶּר as the effect resulting from all of the sacrificial rites rather than from the *hattat* ritual alone (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 760 who states the reason for the same rendering for *kipper 'al* in Lev 12:7). It should be reminded that while he insists 'effect purgation on/for' alone for *kipper 'al* in the context of *hattat*, he employs the renderings 'expiate,' effect expiation for' or 'atone for' in other sacrificial rituals.

[80] As we have seen, Milgrom insists that כִּפֶּר is a synonym of חִטֵּא in the context of *hattat*. However, the following comparison shows additional evidence that his argument is not convincing:

(Lev 14:49) וְלָקַח *לְחַטֵּא אֶת־הַבַּיִת* שְׁתֵּי צִפֳּרִים

(Lev 14:53) *וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת* וְטָהֵר

the same rendering for them: 'make atonement for (or expiate) him' and 'make atonement for (or expiate) the house.' [81] That is, this thesis uses 'make atonement for' for all the occurrences of *kipper 'al*; therefore, 'make atonement for the sancta' is also accepted.

If it is the case, the question is why the verb טִהַר is used in the two-bird ritual for the leper rather than חִטֵּא, since a bird is slaughtered and its blood is sprinkled on him outside the sanctuary in the same way as in the ritual for the house.

It must be recalled that the atonement for the leper is not made yet until the sacrifices are performed in the sanctuary. In other words, the ritual of the two birds for the leper as such cannot bring about atonement for him, although it might be essential for the final effect of atonement; that is, the blood of the bird sprinkled on the leper in stage 1 is presumed to contribute somehow to his atonement in accord with the principle that atonement is made by blood (Lev 17:11), but it does not directly bring about atonement. Whereas in the case of house the ritual is completed with the two birds, in the case of the leper the priest should perform an additional cleansing of the sanctuary for him with the *hattat* ritual accompanied by other offerings.

Significantly, whereas stage 1 for the leper is not a *hattat* ritual, the ritual for the contaminated house, which corresponds to stage 1 for the leper, may be taken as matching a kind of *hattat* in terms of its mechanism.[82] For this reason, in the case of the leper the verb טִהַר is used, but in the case of the leprous house the verb חִטֵּא is employed.

As regards the meaning of טִהַר, it can be used as a synonym of חִטֵּא as well, due to its broader use, as mentioned. This becomes clear from the

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(Lev 16:16) *וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ*
(Lev 16:33) *וְכִפֶּר אֶת־מִקְדַּשׁ הַקֹּדֶשׁ וְאֶת־אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְאֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ יְכַפֵּר*

If his idea is right, עַל of the phrase כִּפֶּר עַל in Lev 14:53 and 16:16 probably had better be אֶת to read as follows: *וְכִפֶּר אֶת־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר* "he shall purge the house and it will be clean." In Lev 16, on the other hand, the two phrases וְכִפֶּר אֶת (v. 33) and כִּפֶּר עַל (vv. 16, 18, 30) appear alternately even within the same context, having the sancta as objects. Although Milgrom (1991b: 1036) allots 'purge' and 'effect purgation on' for the two phrases respectively, it is unlikely, however, that they have different meanings.

[81] Therefore, 'make atonement for the sancta' is also acceptable.

[82] Sklar (2005: 115) also points out: "Technically, this is not a sacrifice, insofar as the bird is not offered upon the altar. This exception, however, only proves the rule, since the text makes clear that it is blood of this bird which cleanses the house (Lev 14:51-52)."

comparison of Leviticus 14:51-53 and 16:19-21, displayed above. The former passage is similar to the latter in terms of the manner of the ritual; just as the two birds constitute a combined ritual in Leviticus 14, so the sacrificial goat and the live goat for Azazel are combined to form a *hattat*.[83] In this comparison, whereas the verb חִטֵּא is used in the former ritual to describe cleansing of the house, the verb טִהַר is employed in the latter ritual to describe the purgation of the altar. That is, the priest purges (טִהַר) the outer altar by putting and sprinkling blood on it. The priest's activities result in 'purification' and consequent 'consecration'[84] of the altar as the final effects, as stated in Leviticus 16:19:

וְהִזָּה עָלָיו מִן־הַדָּם בְּאֶצְבָּעוֹ שֶׁבַע פְּעָמִים *וְטִהֲרוֹ וְקִדְּשׁוֹ* מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

In conclusion, the state of cleanness (טָהֵר) is acquired as a result of a variety of activities: the טִהַר action (e.g., purgation of the altar by priests) as well as the other purificatory rites like washing clothes and the ritual of ash water. This indicates that טִהַר is broadly used even in the context of *hattat* beyond the scope of a synonym for חִטֵּא.

Importantly, 'purification' (טָהֵר), along with forgiveness, is accomplished as the final goal and effect via חִטֵּא and כִּפֶּר, even though טִהַר often appears also on the way to the final goals as intermediary purifying action and its consequent 'cleanness.' To sum up, the various effects via טִהַר or חִטֵּא and כִּפֶּר are as follows:

1) Intermediary cleanness of a person from minor impurity
   via purificatory rites[85]

2) Final cleanness of a person from major impurity
   via כִּפֶּר and טִהַר in the sanctuary[86]

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[83] In chapter 3, it will be argued that a sacrificial goat and a live goat constitute a *hattat*, following a few scholars like Kiuchi and Keil & Delitzsch.

[84] As mentioned, some interpreters (e.g., Sklar, 2005: 1, 125-27) consider 'consecration' as a type of purification.

[85] Lev 11:32; 13:6, 34, 58; 14:8, 9; 15:3, 28; 17:15; 22:7; cf. Ezek 36:25.

[86] Lev 12:7, 8; 14:20. The cleaning (טִהַר) of the altar is undoubtedly implied, as will be argued in chapter 7 (contra Johar and Gane), although the text keeps silence.

3) Final figurative cleanness (forgiveness) of a person from sin
via טָהֵר and כִּפֶּר in the sanctuary[87]

4) Cleanness of the sancta from impurity that is generated by sin/impurity
via טִהַר/חִטֵּא and כִּפֶּר in the sanctuary[88]

5) Cleanness of a house from impurity (doubtable symptom of leprosy)
via חִטֵּא and כִּפֶּר[89]

6) Cleanness of a person from impurity by contact with a corpse
via חִטֵּא (implied כִּפֶּר).[90]

This shows clearly the relationship between כִּפֶּר and other cleansing actions (חִטֵּא and טִהַר) and the different nature of cleansing (טִהֵר) in each stage. For example, the intermediary cleanness resulting from the טִהֵר rite for the leper's body in Leviticus 14:7 differs from the final purification made with the subsequent sacrificial rituals in the sanctuary to make atonement for him. In other words, cleanness (טָהֵר) via טִהֵר in 14:7 is not the same as that via כִּפֶּר in 14:20, while טָהֵר in the former is essential for the final legal declaration of טָהֵר in the latter. Indeed, his final purification (טָהֵר) is declared in v. 20 via כִּפֶּר ('making atonement for him') after finishing the sacrifices in the sanctuary:

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[87] Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13, 16, 18, 26; Num 15:25, 28; cf. the guilt offering in Lev 19:22. Exceptionally, Lev 16:30 states that כִּפֶּר brings cleanness of the Israelites from sins instead of forgiveness. However, in this case, the cleanness from moral sins must be considered as the other expression for forgiveness. In contrast, Gane (2005: 123-25, 175, 231-33) argues that in Lev 16:30 the sins are cleansed from the sancta where sins were accumulated, but not from the Israelites; therefore, the verb טִהֵר in this verse must not be taken as the same meaning as that of נִסְלַח. However, Gane's idea must be refused on some grounds (e.g., the symbolic usage of טִהֵר; cf. Je 33:8; Ezek 36:25, 33; Ps 51:4). For detail, see § 7.2.4.

[88] Cleansing by חִטֵּא: Exod 29:36; Lev 8:15; cf. Ezek 43:20, 26. The cleansing (טִהֵר) of the sancta is implied in (1) and (2), although the texts keep silence. In contrast, the cleansing of the sancta in Lev 8 and 16 is a prerequisite action to consecration of the altar (Lev 8) and to reconsecration of the altar (Lev 16). Ezek 43:20-26, though it is outside the priestly literature of the Pentateuch, displays the typical dynamics: חִטֵּא (v. 20) → כִּפֶּר (v. 26) → טִהֵר (v. 26). Via חִטֵּא the altar is atoned for and via כִּפֶּר the altar gets the final cleanness.

[89] Lev 14:53 only.

[90] For the uses of חִטֵּא in the ritual of ash water outside the sanctuary, see above.

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וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵר "he [the priest] shall make atonement for him and he will be clean."

The ordination of Levites in Numbers 8 also exposes this idea. From its beginning in v. 6, the ceremony starts with the statement of its goal: "Take the Levites from among the other Israelites and make them ceremonially clean" (NIV). The dynamics of atonement for the Levites is displayed in two stages: (1) stage 1 - cleansing (חִטֵּא) the Levites with the water of *hattat* (מֵי חַטָּאת) (v. 7a), and cleansing (טִהַר) them by shaving their bodies and washing their clothes (v. 7b); (2) stage 2 - making atonement for them (כִּפֶּר) with a series of sacrifices in the sanctuary (vv. 8-13) and then attaining the purification (טִהַרְתָּ) suitable for entering and ministering to the sanctuary in place of the Israelites (v. 15).

To sum up: טָהֵר ← כִּפֶּר ← טִהַר/חִטֵּא[91]

2.3.3. נָשָׂא עָוֹן

The phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן, which appears frequently in the *hattat* context as well as in other contexts of the priestly literature, represents another important action in the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* ritual. Scholars have various opinions on the meaning of this phrase. Generally two questions are asked on נָשָׂא עָוֹן in connection with the *hattat* debate:[92] (1) what is the meaning of the noun עָוֹן in the context of *hattat*?; (2) how should the verb phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן be interpreted in the context of *hattat*?

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[91] The same ritual logic is detected also in the concluding statement of Num 8:21-22:

"The Levites *purified themselves* (הִתְחַטְּאוּ) and *washed* (כִּבֶּס) their clothes. Then Aaron presented them as a wave offering before the LORD and *made atonement* (כִּפֶּר) for them to *purify* (טִהַר) them. After that, the Levites came to do their work at the Tent of Meeting under the supervision of Aaron and his sons. They did with the Levites just as the LORD commanded Moses" (NIV, italics mine).

By contrast, many English Bibles (NASB, ERV, ESV, RSV) read v. 21: "the Levites purified themselves from sin. . ." But this rendering is not appropriate, because the text does not say whether specific sins or impurities are purified.

[92] A few similar phrases like נָשָׂא חֵטְא/חַטָּאת 'bear sin' (Exod 10:17; 32:32; Lev 19:17; 24:15) or נָשָׂא פֶּשַׁע 'bear transgression' (Exod 23:21; cf. 1 Sam 25:28) lie under the same category. These terms appear frequently in combinations rather than a single: in concise transliterations, *nasa pesha* and *hattat* (Gen 50:17); *nasa awon* and *pesha* (Num 14:18); *nasa awon, pesha* and *hatta'* (Exod 34:7; Num 14:18); etc.

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The noun עָוֹן has given difficulties to interpreters, as indicated in Kiuchi's statement (1987: 50), who refers to Knierim (1965: 237 ff):[93]

> The term עון basically means 'iniquity.' But, being a dynamic concept and deep-rooted in Israelite *Ganzheitsdenken*, it expresses the iniquitous *act* and its consequence, or any combination of these ideas. Inevitably it must be translated 'iniquity', 'guilt', or 'punishment,' according to the context. For convenience's sake, we adopt the translation 'bear guilt' for נשא עון in the following discussion.

That is, the noun עָוֹן can have multiple nuances in different contexts. Therefore, it is not easy to grasp the correct meaning of the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in a specific context. By and large its meaning may boil down to three possible alternatives: 'to remove iniquity;' 'to bear iniquity'; 'to bear guilt.'[94] Depending on which rendering is taken, explanation of the dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering leads to totally different trajectories.

Kiuchi (1987: 50) chose the rendering 'guilt' for עָוֹן in his discussion rather than 'sin' or 'iniquity'; hence to him the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in the *hattat* context means 'bear guilt,' instead of 'bear iniquity/sin' or 'remove sin.' In other words, נָשָׂא עָוֹן is an action to 'bear guilt' as the consequence of a sin, which is punitive (Kiuchi, 1987: 38), and not to bear the sin itself.[95]

In contrast to his idea, this thesis will employ 'iniquity' in accordance with its basic lexical sense, except when necessary, while envisaging that guilt and

[93] Also Knierim ('עון' *THAT*, II, cols: 243-49). Besides עָוֹן, according to Milgrom (1983: 124), חֵטְא, פֶּשַׁע, עָוֹן, אָשָׁם, and רָעָה also have two connotations: the wrong and the retribution. Milgrom (1983: 124) says that it is feasible except for the term אָשָׁם in the context of the *hattat* ritual. As Kiuchi (1987: 31-34) points out, אָשָׁם does not stand for the wrong itself but 'realize guilt' only as consequence of sin in the context of the *hattat* ritual, rather than Milgrom's 'feel guilt.' Milgrom (1991b: 343) considers 'feel guilt' as a kind of punishment of heart, but Kiuchi (1987: 31-34) declines this idea in favor of the rendering 'realize guilt' as the meaning of אָשָׁם.

[94] The rendering 'bear/take punishment' may converge into 'bear iniquity,' the usual meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן, because 'bear iniquity' connotes inherently 'punishment' as a consequence of sin. The sin terms in the Hebrew Bible "refer not only to the wrong itself, but also to the consequences of the wrong" (Sklar, 2005: 12). On the other hand, 'remove sin' may contain the meanings of 'taking away,' 'lifting off,' or 'erasing,' amounting to forgiveness in the case where its subject is God.

[95] Kiuchi (1987: 115) states that sin (or iniquity) and guilt are distinguished in that the latter is the former's consequence and the former has the power of contamination but the latter does not. For this reason, it means that the priest (Lev 10:17) and the Azazel goat (Lev 16:21) that are bearing the guilt (נשא עון), but not the sin, do not incur defilement.

punishment are inseparably attached to נָשָׂא עָוֹן, as Knierim (1965: 237 ff) and Kiuchi (1987: 50) pointed. Its subject and context decide the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן. This thesis argues that when the priest is the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן, it denotes 'remove iniquity (and guilt)' (= to eliminate sin) (Lev 10:17); in contrast, when a non-priest is its subject, it means 'bear iniquity' which may connote 'bearing punishment' for the evil (the offender's bearing in Lev 5:1, 17, etc; the Azazel goat's bearing in Lev 16:22).

Significantly, the interpretation on נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17 and 16:22 is a crucial key to the understanding of the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering. The former verse relates to the priests' bearing the iniquity of congregation and the latter mentions the Azazel goat's bearing the iniquities of the congregation. The diverse interpretations of נָשָׂא עָוֹן in these verses have led scholars to different conclusions on the atonement mechanism. With regard to the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן in the contexts, by and large it is agreed that its meaning depends on who or what the subject of עָוֹן נָשָׂא is. What does the subject perform in the action of נָשָׂא עָוֹן? There are two images of the subject regarding sin/guilt: a remover or a bearer.

Baruch Schwartz (1991: 34-36; 1995: 8-15) made a great contribution to this issue. He (1995: 9) argues that when a wrongdoer bears his sin, נָשָׂא עָוֹן[96] means 'bearing guilt' with the meaning of punishment; however, when the injured party bears the sinner's burden, "it no longer rests on the shoulders of the wrongdoer; the latter is relieved of his load and of its consequences," and thus the guilty party is released from guilt.[97] In this case, the action נָשָׂא עָוֹן may denote that the injured 'removes sin (and guilt)' and thereby forgives the sin.

In the same vein, Milgrom (2000a: 1488) says about the case where God is the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן as the injured party:

> When a person is the subject of נשׂא עון or its synonym נשׂא חטא, he literally bears the sin "and eventually perishes under its weight" (Schwartz 1991: 38 n. 4). However, God, as the subject, "lifts off" the sin from the erstwhile sinner; that is, he forgives him . . . Interestingly, when

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[96] נָשָׂא חֵטְא/חֲטָאָה and נָשָׂא פֶּשַׁע as well.

[97] In this regard, the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן has a similar feature as that of כִּפֶּר examined above, the meaning of which depends on who or what the object of the action is: the injurer or the injured.

God is the subject, this idiom appears in only non-priestly texts (Gen 4:13; Exod 34:7; Num 14:18, etc)

Milgrom (1991b: 1045) claims that in the priestly texts, נָשָׂא עָוֹן/חַטָּאת does not have God as a subject. Therefore, the phrase, the subject of which is a human injurer rather than God, cannot mean 'forgive sin/iniquity' but either 'remove or take away sin/iniquity' or 'bear or suffer punishment.' According to him (1991b: 1045), only in three cases throughout the priestly texts (Exod 28:38; Lev 10:17; 16:22), נָשָׂא עָוֹן/חַטָּאת means 'remove sin/iniquity,' but in all the other occurrences it means "bear or suffer punishment"[98] rather than "bear iniquity" (1991b: 1488). Thus he refuses the agent's substitutionary 'bearing sin/iniquity' in the cases of non divine subject.

Although Milgrom's argument is agreeable, however, his textual division is questionable, when he distinguishes between non-priestly texts and priestly texts, while finding the cases that YHWH is the subject. In this thesis, in line with its methodology declared in chapter 1, the texts are considered to be integrated in the priestly literature which shows a coherent ritual system and a systemized theology (see Jenson, 1992). Therefore, the following Gane's statement (2005: 104) on Exodus 34:7 is accepted:

> The close parallel between the language of Exod 34:7, in which YHWH is נֹשֵׂא עָוֹן וָפֶשַׁע וְחַטָּאָה, "bearing iniquity and transgression and sin," and Lev 10:17, in which his priest bears עָוֹן, indicates that there is a close relationship between the two. . . It appears that, by eating the flesh, the priests participate in the process through which YHWH grants forgiveness.

Gane points out that when the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is God, it always signifies 'remove and forgive iniquity.'[99] Likewise, when it is a human subject who is injured or offended, he stands in the position to forgive and bestow

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[98] Milgrom (1991b: 1045) confirms his opinion with evidence of twenty cases displaying various types of punishments: "In other words, the sinner does not carry his sins as if it were a weight, but must pay the consequences for his sin." The punishments are inflicted in this manner: death (מוּת), feeling of guilt (אָשֵׁם), cutting off (כָּרַת), childlessness (עֲרִירִי). However, as Kiuchi (1987: 31-34) and Sklar (2005: 31, 39-41) point out, it is wrong to consider אָשֵׁם as a kind of punishment.

[99] In addition to Exod 34:7, see Exod 23:21; Num 14:18; and cf. Josh 24:19; Job 7:21; Ps 2:5; etc. Levine (1993: 366) states that the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן/פֶּשַׁע emphasizes God's compassion.

mercy on the injurer or offender who made the wrong,[100] although most cases occur outside the priestly literature. For example, Joseph' brothers ask him to forgive them for the sin that they committed to him (Gen 50:17), and Saul begs Samuel's pardon for his sin (חֲטָאת) (1 Sam 15:25). In sum, the injured party, whether he is God or a person, has the right to remove and forgive the sin/guilt throughout the Bible. It is just vanished under his authority. In this case, the injured subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן does not bear the burden of the sin, but he removes it; neither the injured party does bear the sin/guilt, nor does the injurer or the third party.

From this ground, the two biblical principles can be formulated (cf. Sklar, 2005: 88-89): (1) when the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is the injured, the phrase always may mean 'forgive (by removal)'; (2) in contrast, when the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is the injurer, who injures either God or other person, the injurer must bear his sin/guilt. Therefore, it always connotes 'suffer punishment.'[101]

However, the problem is the case where the third party is the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן who is neither the injurer nor the injured. In these cases, for whom does the third party become an agent? For the injurer or the injured? What does the agent do for the object?

The third party can be either of two kinds: a human subject and a nonhuman subject. Firstly, the sole case of the nonhuman subject is the Azazel goat in Leviticus 16:22. This live goat functions clearly as the substitutionary agent in place of the Israelites. The high priest transfers their iniquities (עֲוֹנֹת) on the goat by imposing his two hands on it. Then the goat bears them away into the wildness.[102] Thus in the case of the Azazel goat, the meaning of the phrase נָשָׂא עֲוֹנֹת is obviously "to bear the iniquities (into the wildness)." Therefore, in this case, this action of bearing as such can be understood as 'removing or taking away,' rather than 'forgiveness';[103] at the same time it means that the live goat suffers the punishment substitutionally for the congregation.

In fact, most difficult are the cases in which the subject of the human third party is a priest(s). This thesis does not deal with the priests and Levites'

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[100] Gen 50:17; Exod 10:17; Exod 32:32; 1 Sam 25:28.

[101] Lev 5:1,17; 7:18; 10:17; 17:16; 19:8; 20:17, 19; Num 5:31; etc.

[102] The full examination of this mechanism will be made in chapters 6 and 7.

[103] On the Day of Atonement, although God removes the iniquities of the Israelites through the live goat, the atonement of Israel and its effect (the purification or the forgiveness of Israel) are accomplished by both the *hattat* rituals and the live goat ritual.

substitutionary task which were executed in the sanctuary for the Israelites, because it seems to be another issue with a different feature.[104] The present question is concentrated on the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן performed by the priests in the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 10:17. To recapitulate the previous questions, what was the role of the priests in this action of נָשָׂא עָוֹן: a bearer or a remover of iniquity?; did the priests bear their iniquities or guilt as the substitutionary agent for the people (Kiuchi; Gane; for their view, see § 5.3.3.2), or did the priests simply remove the iniquity from people and/or the sancta (Milgrom; Kaufmann; for their view, see § 5.3.3.1 and § 5.3.3.2)?[105]

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[104] In these cases, the human subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן are either the priests or the Levites. Most cases are related to the priests (Exod 28:38, 43; Num 18:1), except that the case of the Levites' נָשָׂא עָוֹן in the sanctuary is once mentioned in Num 18 (v. 23) along with the priests' duty. Sklar (2005: 92, 98) acknowledges only Exod 28:38 as the case of the third party who bears iniquity in place of the people of Israel: וְנָשָׂא אַהֲרֹן אֶת־עֲוֹן הַקֳּדָשִׁים אֲשֶׁר יַקְדִּישׁוּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל, "Aaron shall take away the iniquity of holy things which the sons of Israel consecrate" (NASB). He (2005: 98) interprets this verse as relating to the problem of a blemished sacrifice which a person brought and offered unwittingly; the mistake or iniquity is nullified by the plate of pure gold which Aaron is wearing. In contrast, U. Cassuto (1967: 385) notes this phrase as follows: "he [Aaron] will atone for all transgressions committed in connection with the order of the service, the purity of the consecrated things, or the use of the holy gifts." The interpretation of Exod 28:38 can be supplemented by comparison with Num 18:1 in parallel. It seems that the parallel phrases in Num 18:1, אֶת־עֲוֹן הַקֳּדָשִׁים "the iniquity in connection with the sanctuary" (NASB) and עֲוֹן כְּהֻנַּתְכֶם "the iniquity in connection with the priesthood" (NASB), must be considered to be in the same category as עֲוֹן הַקֳּדָשִׁים "the iniquity of the holy things" in Exod 28:38. That the Levites bear the iniquity of the Israelites ('bear their iniquity') (הֵם יִשְׂאוּ עֲוֹנָם) in the sanctuary in Num 18:23 must be understood in the same manner. The clergy's נָשָׂא עָוֹן in the sanctuary, whether the priests (in Exod 28:43; Num 18:1) or the Levites (Num 18:23), may be regarded as their commission to bear sin/guilt that might result from their task executed in place of and on behalf of the congregation. However, if sin would be committed either by mistake or negligence to observe the regulations, it is incurred by the clergy themselves. For this reason, precisely speaking, these cases cannot be taken as the third party's substitutionary bearing of the injurer's iniquity or guilt. Regarding the context, Num 18:1 related to the priests is instructed right after the Israelites' appeal in Num 17:13, "Anyone who even comes near the tabernacle of the LORD will die. Are we all going to die?" (NIV). YHWH's response is that Aaron and his sons should bear the sin/guilt connected with the sanctuary in place of the Israelites. Likewise, Num 18:23 related to the Levites is regulated right after the statement in v. 22, "And henceforth the people of Israel shall not come near the tent of meeting, lest they bear sin and die" (RSV). YHWH's alternative is that the Levites should risk "bearing the sin/guilt" instead of the congregation. In particular, the feature of priests' duty in Num 18:1 should be regarded as corresponding to that in Exod 28:38 and 43. The question is raised again: who incurs the sin/guilt in connection with the sanctuary?; the priests/Levites or the lay Israelites? As mentioned above, the potential sin/guilt belongs to the clergy dedicated for the community.

[105] Is the iniquity removed from persons and/or the sancta? This question is also related to Lev 10:17. What is the meaning of עָוֹן in this verse? Is it iniquity or guilt? Is it a concept which contains impurity in addition to sin? These questions are explored in § 5.3.3.2.

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The argument on this question will be delayed until chapter 5. In brief, the priest is the 'surrogate' of God (Milgrom, 1991b: 623) who removes the sins of the people for them. He does not bear the guilt of the people substitutionally but remove and destroy their sin through his action of נָשָׂא עָוֹן (contra Kiuchi and Gane; see § 5.3.3.2). At this stage, suffice it to say that the נָשָׂא עָוֹן action brings the effect of כִּפֶּר, 'make atonement,' as the syntax of Leviticus 10:17 shows:

וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם *לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם* לִפְנֵי . . .

Therefore, the נָשָׂא עָוֹן action also corresponds to the חִטֵּא/טִהַר action in that it leads to the atonement by virtue of 'removing the sin/impurity' in the *hattat* context. In sum, the following dynamics of the *hattat* ritual is formulated:

נִסְלַח/טָהֵר → כִּפֶּר → נָשָׂא עָוֹן/חִטֵּא/טִהַר

Significantly, this ritual logic requires Sklar's conception of כִּפֶּר to be supplemented by adding the effect of נָשָׂא עָוֹן, removal of evil. It means that as far as the *hattat* ritual for sin is concerned, the twofold concept of כִּפֶּר, 'ransom + purgaion' includes the concept of removing sin; that is, the 'purgation' can refer to both removal of impurity from the sancta and removal of sin from the offerer. Sin of the offerer is removed from him by its transferene to the victim through his hand imposition and confessin of sin (see § 4.3.5), and impurity of the sancta is purged and removed by its absorption to the victim through the priest's blood rites. The evils conveyed to the victim are ultimately removed and eliminated by the priest's נָשָׂא עָוֹן through disposal of its flesh, either eating or burning (for details, see § 5.3).

2.4. Conclusion

To sum up, הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא, which has the meaning of 'purge with a *hattat*,' is a technical term that exclusively occurs in the *hattat* related contexts. טִהַר, which is used in a broader sense, can sometimes be a synonym of הִתְחַטֵּא/חִטֵּא with the meaning of 'purify/purge' in the context of *hattat*. On the other hand, טָהֵר/טִהַר can also refer to a result that is consequent on כִּפֶּר in the process of the *hattat* ritual via atonement to the final goals, namely, 'purification' (טָהֵר) and

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'forgiveness' (נִסְלַח). That is, the priest makes atonement for an object to accomplish its purification, and it becomes clean. With regard to sin, the final effect of atonement is 'forgiveness,' although it can be also expressed as 'become clean' like in Leviticus 16:30 (see n. 87; contra Gane, 2005: 123-25, 175).

Here, the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanisms of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus are summarized in a diagram, in reference to other texts in the priestly literature.

<Atonement mechanism of the *hattat* rituals>

This diagram indicates how the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offerings works in the *hattat* ritual system. In chapter 7, this diagram will be subdivided into four paradigms according to the object and purpose of the *hattat* ritual: (1) a sinner; (2) an impurity-bearer; (3) a contaminated building; (4) the Day of Atonement.

Contrary to most scholars, this thesis will argue that atonement of the offerer is a final result of both activities: (1) removing the sin/impurity of the offerer; (2) purging the impurity of the sancta contaminated by his sin/impurity. Therefore, removal of an offerer's evil alone is not sufficient for his atonement; without the purgation/atonement of the sancta, the atonement for the person is not accomplished. In this respect, it is unnecessary to dispute whether the *hattat* ritual atones for the offerer or purges the sancta, and whether it is expiatory or purificatory.

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Chapter 3
The Unified Ceremony of the Day of Atonement

3.1. Introduction

3.1.1. The aim of this chapter

The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate the following ideas by way of analyzing the structure of Leviticus 16 from a new angle: (1) the five rituals of the Day of Atonement (hereafter 'the Day' is sometimes used for it) are associated into one *single unified ceremony* for a sole purpose, that is, the national atonement of Israel; (2) the two *hattat* rituals with a bull and a goat are combined to purge (טִהַר) and atone for (כִּפֶּר)[106] the three precincts of the sanctuary in due order (it is named as the *combined hattat ritual* or the *two-combined hattat rituals*)'; (3) the sacrificial goat and the live goat (i.e., the Azazel goat) form a *hattat* for the atonement of the congregation; (4) the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual are merged into a larger ritual unit named the *integrated atonement ritual*; (5) whereas the two combined *hattat* rituals purge and atone for the sancta contaminated by the sins of the people, the Azazel goat ritual removes the sins (נָשָׂא עֲוֺנוֹת) of the people, and by so doing the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual accomplish the national atonement of Israel on the Day;[107] (6) the two burnt offerings are offered to ratify and confirm the atonement already accomplished by the integrated atonement ritual, while they are also bound to the integrated atonement ritual to make a *unified ceremony* of the Day.

Significantly, the structural analysis of Leviticus 16 will show clearly the proper functions of the rituals carried out on the Day of Atonement. Besides, through the exegesis, a few important elements which are related to the aim of this thesis will be expounded, while the ritual dynamics and the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering will be interpreted fully in chapter 7.

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[106] As mentioned in chapter 2, in this thesis the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context is rendered as follows: 'atone (for)' or 'make atonement (for).' But the definition of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context and our rendering for it, 'atonement,' in the *hattat* ritual has double meanings ('ransom + purgation'), in contrast with the meaning of כִּפֶּר in other sacrificial offerings where it refers only to the effect of 'ransom' without the effect of purgation for the sancta.

[107] Issue (5) will be investigated in detail in chapter 7 as the main aim of this thesis in comparison with the ritual dynamics of the ordinary *hattat* offering in Lev 4:1-5:15 (for sin) and Lev 12, 14-15 (for impurity).

3.1.2. The definition of the terms coined for referring to ritual units

Leviticus 16 prescribes five rituals to be performed on the Day of Atonemnt in a systematic structure:

1) Designation ritual of the *hattat* animals (vv. 6-10)[108]
2) The two-combined *hattat* rituals (vv. 11-19)
3) The Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22)
4) The ritual of the two burnt offerings (vv. 23-25)
5) The concluding ritual (vv. 26-28)

Each of these five rituals is combined and integrated into larger ritual units in consecutive stages, which are named with the terms below. These combined and integrated forms will be discerned by making a scrutiny into the successive rituals in Leviticus 16. To avoid confusion, the terms coined in this thesis are defined as follows:

A) The *combined hattat ritual*:
 the bull *hattat* offering + the goat *hattat* offering

B) The *integrated atonement ritual*:
 designation of animals + the combined *hattat* ritual + the Azazel goat ritual

C) The *unified ceremony (of the Day)*:
 the integrated atonement ritual + the burnt offerings + the concluding ritual

(A) The combined *hattat* ritual: to begin, the two *hattat* offerings (i.e., the bull for the priestly household and the goat for the congregation) are merged into a 'combined *hattat* ritual.' The evidence of this combination lies in what will be argued in detail below. In brief, the two *hattat* animals form a combined *hattat* ritual by the mingling of the blood of the two animals in the final stage of the blood manipulations performed on the outer alter (vv. 18-19).

(B) The integrated atonement ritual: this begins with the designation ritual of the *hattat* animals, including the rite of casting lots (vv. 6-10) which prepares the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual. Significantly these three

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[108] This ritual is performed for preparation of ritual (2) and (3).

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rituals must be taken as one large ritual unit to form a 'ritual complex unit,'[109] which 'makes atonement' for the sancta and the people. There are reliable evidences of this ritual association, as will be presented below.

(C) The unified ceremony: the 'integrated atonement ritual' is finally combined with the two burnt offerings, and furthermore with the concluding ritual to form a massive 'unified ceremony' of the Day.

In sum, the five rituals of the Day are integrated into one single unified ceremony to accomplish the ultimate purpose of the Day, the national atonement of Israel. There are lots of links to connect the separate constituents of these individual rituals with the massive ritual edifice in the well-organized structure of Leviticus 16. R. E. Gane (1992) and A. M. Rodriguez (1996) have already detected such integration of rituals in Leviticus 16,[110] but they failed to provide sufficient evidence for it.

The analysis of the structure and the subsequent examination of the rituals arranged in the structure will indicate how the ceremony of the Day is united to accomplish the atonement of Israel: while the combined *hattat* rituals make atonement for the sanctuary and its sancta by cleansing its impurities, the Azazel goat ritual does it for the people by taking away their sin; by contrast, the ordinary *hattat* ritual makes atonement for both the sanctuary (implied in Lev 4) and the people at the same time without the Azazel goat (see § 7.3).

Therefore, on the special Day, the two functions of the ordinary *hattat* ritual are separated into the purifying function (sancta impurities) of the 'combined *hattat* ritual' and the removing function (human evils) of the Azazel goat ritual. That is, the two sacrificial animals (a bull and a goat) and the live goat play separate parts and are associated to remove the sins of the people and to cleanse the consequent impurities of the sanctuary.[111] By so doing, the national atonement of Israel is accomplished in a unique way.

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[109] The term 'ritual complex unit' is borrowed from Gane (1992: 210-11), accepted by Rodriguez (1996: 277, 284). Gane created it to describe only the integration of the two *hattat* rituals performed with the bull for Aaron and the goat for the people in Lev 16.

[110] According to Gane (1992: 210), the *hattat* rituals performed with Aaron's bull and the people's goat form 'a ritual complex unit.' Rodriguez (1996: 284) extends it to a new 'ritual complex unit' to indicate the unification of the three rituals in Lev 16 (the bull *hattat*, the goat *hattat*, and the Azazel goat ritual). This thesis agrees with Rodriguez's idea that the 'ritual complex unit' to denote the integration of the three rituals. But in this thesis the term 'integrated atonement ritual' is used to indicate the feature of the larger ritual unit than Rodriguez's ritual complex ritual, which includes the ritual of casting lots in addition to the combined *hattat* ritual (the bull + the goat) and Azazel goat ritual. Apart from his right insight on the ritual integration, Rodriguez's analysis of ritual dynamics in Lev 16 is wrong, as pointed out below.

[111] Of course, as noted in chapter 2, the concept of *kipper 'al* + sancta contains also the meaning that the sancta is expiated from the contamination.

Despite the unique nuance of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* ritual ('ransom + purgation') argued in chapter 2, the following renderings are often employed in this discussion: 'to purge the sancta' for *kipper 'al* + the sancta and *kipper 'et* + sancta. Thereby the purificatory function of the *hattat* ritual to purge the sancta on the Day will be highlighted. However, as mentioned in chapter 2, basically the rendering 'atone (for)' or 'make atonement (for)' is maintained as the rendering of the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context , not only for the sancta but also for the people, while the atonement connotes 'ransom + purgation.'

3.1.3. Approach to the text of Leviticus 16

Regarding the text of Leviticus 16, many scholars have attempted to find evidences of multiple layers in it and to explain the redactional history behind the present structure,[112] in accordance with their approach to other portions of the Pentateuch. They have argued that some particular redactions have resulted in the present textual tensions and contradictions within Leviticus 16, while it displays the unique nature of the content, the vocabulary and the style.[113]

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[112] For instance, E. Gerstenberger (1996: 214) says that at the first glance the present text "shows quite clearly just how multilayered and incomplete is the extant tradition of this day of penance, and an analysis of chap. 16 only strengthens this impression."

[113] Noth (1965: 117) commented that the present form of Lev 16 presents "unusual difficulties" to the understanding along with "a strange lack of continuity and unity about the whole," which probably indicate a long previous history of Lev 16. He sets forth the difficulties related to "a linguistic and grammatical nature" and the inconsistencies of the contents, saying that "different themes run parallel and intermingle" (1965: 118). For instance, the Azazel goat ritual is frequently dealt with as a separate material that has originated from a primitive tradition or foreign influence (for miscellaneous views on the Azazel goat, see n. 128 in this chapter; cf. Jenson, 1992: 197 n. 4). Milgrom (1991b: 36) argues that Lev 16 provides a rich source for the terminological shift from P to H, saying (p. 62):

> It is clearly the work of a redactor who united chap. 16 with chap. 10 (chap. 11-15 being inserted later); vv. 29-34a betray the handiwork of H. The preponderant part (vv. 2-28), originally an emergency rite for purging the sanctuary, stems from P; but its use of such basic terms as אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד and קֹדֶשׁ and the unique word פְּשָׁעִים does not correspond to P.

According to Milgrom (1991b: 36), the use of the terms קֹדֶשׁ and אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד in the P stratum in Lev 16 are unique in that they denote the *adytum* and the shrine respectively, altogether differently from general use of the terms in P and H. Usually in P the term קֹדֶשׁ is used to indicate the shrine and the phrase אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד to the entire 'Tent of Meeting' (e.g., Exod 26:33;

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However, the present text of Leviticus 16 presents a well-organized structure, as demonstrated by our analysis of structure. This thesis is not interested in the historical development of the text, but in the present text. Therefore it does not investigate original strata of the text and their history. Rather, following several scholars who have argued for the structural unity of Leviticus 16,[114] its systematic structure and the ritual logic arranged in it will be examined. Thereby it will be revealed that the organic combinations of rituals are integrated into a unified ceremony by the author's minute ritual logic.

Along with the exegesis, possible answers will be given to the seemingly self-contradictions and tensions in the text of Leviticus 16. Thus our study will demonstrate that this text contains highly-elaborated rituals, an outstanding literary structure, and a consistent theology of atonement associated with the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4:1-5:13, and 11-15.

In the priestly literature, other texts referring to the Day of Atonement also appear: Leviticus 23:27-32; Numbers 29:7-11.[115] They seem to be supplementary and complementary prescriptions of the Day. Leviticus 23:27-32 supplement 16:29-32 with the warnings of 'cutting off' and 'destruction' and the strengthened exhortations about the observance of the Day, whereas Numbers 29:7-11 stipulates additional sacrifices apart from those of Leviticus 16.[116]

Lev 1:1), while the phrase קֹדֶשׁ הַקֳּדָשִׁים refers to the *adytum* (e.g., Exod 26:33); by contrast, however, H employs the different phrase מִקְדַּשׁ הַקֹּדֶשׁ to indicate the *adytum* (Lev 16:33) (see n. 157). For Hartley's interpretation on the contradictions in Lev 16 and our refutation on it, see n. 527 in § 7.4.2.

[114] For literary and structural unity of Lev 16, see Rodriguez (1996); Jensen (1992); Hartley (1992); Warning (1999). For instance, Hartley (1992: 231) appreciates the text of Lev 16 as a 'remarkable tapestry,' interwoven with a variety of threads, though he takes them as the distinctive threads of 'different rites from different texts.' For the same reason, the conclusion should be modified that there exist contradictions and inconsistencies in the final text of Lev 16 (Rodriguez, 1996: 269).

[115] Cf. Ezek 45:18-20, the regulations of which are more or less similar to those in Lev 16. Milgrom (1991b: 1070) denies, however, its connection with the Day of Atonement. In Lev 25:6, it is proclaimed that the Jubilee year begins on the Day of Atonement. For the relationship of the Day of Atonement and the Jubilee year, see R. S. Kawashima (2003: 370-89) and § 8.2 in this thesis.

[116] In Num 29:7-11 other offerings are prescribed: additional burnt offerings accompanied by fine flour mixed with oil and the regular burnt offering (vv. 8-10), the grain offering and their drink offerings (v. 11). The additional burnt offerings are remarkable: one young bull, one ram and seven male lambs a year old which are without defect. If the textual coherency and consistence of the priestly literature are honored, it is likely that these burnt offerings were offered as supplementary sacrifices for joyfulness and gratification of the national atonement accomplished on the Day of Atonement, in addition to the sacrifices prescribed for the atonement in Lev 16. The statement of Num 29:11 is noteworthy: "Include one male goat as a sin offering (חַטָּאת), in addition to the sin offering for atonement (חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים) and the regular

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Since the supplementary rules of Numbers 29:7-11 requires another discussion, for our aim this chapter will focus on the present text of Leviticus 16, with references to the supplementary texts, when necessary.

3.2. Structure of Leviticus 16

The structural analysis of a text is an essential step prior to its interpretation, since it is not only the vehicle to convey the meaning of the text, but also frequently indicates crucial clues to the interpretation of it. This is

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burnt offering with its grain offering, and their drink offerings" (NIV). Interestingly, v. 11 states that 'the *hattat* offering for atonement' (חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים) should be added to a male goat of the *hattat* offering. The prescription of v. 11 related to the Day of Atonement differs from the other prescriptions for the seven days in Num 29:12-39 which starts on the fifth day of the seventh month in that the latter does not mention חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים: "Include one male goat as a sin offering, in addition to the regular burnt offering with its grain offering and drink offering" (vv. 16, 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 38 NIV). This fact implies that the legislator of Numbers envisaged the law of Lev 16. This Hebrew phrase חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים, which is a rare wording that occurs only here and in Exod 30:10, raises some questions including the problem of translation. In most English Bibles it is translated as 'the sin offering of expiation' (e.g., NJPS) or 'the sin offering for atonement' (e.g., NIV). Milgrom (1990: 327) also comments: "The form *kippurim* is an abstract plural (see Exod 29:36; 30:16)." For this reason and in line with his idea about the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* ritual, he notes: "Rather [than 'sin offering of expiation' of NJPS], 'purification offering of purgation,' referring to the purgation ritual of the sanctuary, described in Leviticus 16. It is mentioned to avoid confusing the *hattat* of the *musaf* with the *hattat* of purgation" (1990: 327). However, NJB takes it as 'a victim for sin on the feast of Expiation. True, in light of Exod 30:10 the phrase חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים in Num 29:11 may refer to a calendaric sacrifice and therefore to the annual חַטָּאת of the Day prescribed in Lev 16. If it is the case, the term הַכִּפֻּרִים then indicates the occasion rather than the purpose. For this reason, Jenson (1992: 198) thinks that this phrase might have referred to the very live goat on the Day in Lev 16 and therefore another 'male goat as a sin offering (חַטָּאת)' is prescribed besides חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים (i.e., the live goat) in Num 29:11. Although Jenson's argument seems to be plausible, however, why is the *hattat* offering of a bull not mentioned in Num 29:11? Gane (2005: 221) suggested a creative solution to the puzzle. He argues that חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים in this verse, as "a collective singular," is an idiom to denote the two *hattat* offerings with the bull and the goat in Lev 16, stating: "the two special purification offerings performed on the Day of Atonement . . . are designated as חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים 'purification offering of purgation' (Exod 30:10; Num 29:11). Several factors support the idea that this construct expression, which refers to a single חַטַּאת הַכִּפֻּרִים, must cover both rituals." This idea accords with our argument of this chapter that the two *hattat* offerings with a bull and a goat form a combined *hattat* ritual. If so, while Jenson's opinion is declined, the following question is posed: what is the 'male goat as a sin offering (חַטָּאת)' in Num 29:11? If the arguments above are acceptable, the remaining alternative is that the goat is the Azazel goat, i.e., the live goat presented on the Day of Atonement. Strikingly this idea matches the conclusion of this chapter below that the sacrificial goat and the Azazel goat constitute a unique *hattat*, as Lev 16:5 states: "From the Israelite community he is to take *two male goats for a sin offering* and a ram for a burnt offering" (NIV; emphasis mine).

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typically the case with Leviticus 16.

This thesis does not aim to analyze thoroughly the literary structure of Leviticus 16 by unveiling its surpassing literary artistry, as Rodriguez (1996) did.[117] Rather, the structure proposed in this chapter will be centred on the logical sequence and phases of the ceremonial procedures executed on the Day. For this reason, the numbering like I, 1, 1), (1), a, and the like in this structure are signs to indicate the sequence of the rituals and their functions rather than to signify the characteristics of rhetorical or chiastic structures.

The structure of Leviticus 16 is as follows:

I. Instruction of ceremony (vv. 1-5)

        1. Introductory statement (vv. 1-2)

        2. preparation of the ceremony (vv. 3-5)

            1) for Aaron (vv. 3-4)

                (1) offerings (v. 3)

                    a. a bull for a *hattat* offering (v. 3bα)

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[117] Rodriguez (1996) indicates the literary artistry and rhetorical devices of Lev 16 like repetitions, chiasms, and parallelisms with their special functions, even though not all of his ideas are acceptable. Furthermore, he detected a considerable chiasm in Lev 16. Even though he admitted (1996: 283) that it could be risky to identify specific structures like chiasms "on the basis of the general content of a text rather than linguistic and structural similarities," the chiasm shows two similar formulae to constitute an envelope, "And Yahweh said to Moses" and "As the Lord commended Moses":

          "And Yahweh said to Moses"
     A Aaron should not go into most holy place any time he wishes 16:2
       B Aaron's sacrificial victims and special vestment 16:3-4
         C Sacrificial victims provided by the people 16:5
           D Aaron's bull, goat for Yahweh, goat for Azazel 16:6-10
             E Aaron sacrifices his bull as a sin-offering 16:11-14
               F Community's goat is sacrificed as a sin-offering 16:15
                 G Make atonement 16:16-19
                 G' Atonement is finished 16:20a
               F' Community's goat for Azazel sent to the wilderness 16:20b-22
             E' Aaron's closing activities 16:23-25
           D' Goat for Azazel, Aaron's bull, goat for sin-offering 16:26-28
         C' People rest and humble themselves 16:29-31
       B' Anointed priest officiates wearing special garments 16:32-33
     A' Anointed priest makes atonement once a year 16:34
        "As the Lord commanded Moses"

According to Rodriguez, the entire process of rituals is developed centering on the rituals for the community, i.e., the sacrificial goat ritual (v. 15) and the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20b-22), and reaching the climax on the statement of atonement (vv. 16-19 and v. 20a).

b. a ram for a burnt offering (v. 3bβ)

    (2) ablution and putting on linen garments (v. 4)

  2) for the Israelites (v. 5)

    (1) offerings (v. 5)

      a. two goats for a *hattat* offering (v. 5a)

      b. a ram for a burnt offering (v. 5b)

II. Unified ceremony of the Day (vv. 6-28)

  1. integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22)

    1) designation of the animals (vv. 6-10)

      (1) bringing a bull for Aaron and his household: (v. 6)

      (2) taking and placing the two goats before the Lord (v. 7)

      (3) casting lots to decide the roles of the goats (vv. 8-10)

        a. decision by lot (v. 8)

          a) one goat for YHWH (v. 8a)

          b) one goat for Azazel (v. 8b)

        b. allotment of goats (vv. 9-10)

          a) the goat for YHWH: for a *hattat* offering (v. 9)

          b) the goat for Azazel: for release to atone for him (v. 10)

    2) combined *hattat* ritual: for purgation of the sanctuary (vv. 11-19)

      (1) for purgation of *adytum* (vv. 11-16a)

        a. procedure of rituals (vv. 11-15b)

          a) the bull for Aaron and his household (vv. 11-14)

            (a) bringing the bull (v. 11aα)

            (b) purpose: for purgation on behalf of Aaron
                and his household (v. 11aβ)

            (c) slaughtering the bull (v 11b)

            (d) burning incense in *adytum* (vv. 12-13)

            (e) blood rite in *adytum*: sprinkling (v. 14)

              α. upon on the front of Atonement Seat: x1 (v. 14a)

              β. before Atonement Seat: x7 (v. 14b)

          b) the goat for the Israelites (v. 15)

            (a) slaughtering of the goat (v. 15a)

            (b) blood rite in *adytum*: the same sprinkling (v. 15b)

              α. upon Atonement Seat (v. 15bα)

              β. before Atonement Seat (v. 15bβ)

        b. purpose of rituals (v. 16a): purgation of *adytum* from evils

      (2) for purgation of shrine[118] (vv. 16b-17)

        a. purpose of the same blood rites: purgation of shrine (vv. 16b)

          a) for shrine (v. 16bα)

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[118] The 'shrine' refers to the Tent of Meeting (אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד).

             b) shrine in the midst of impurities of Israelites (v. 16bβ)

          b. caution against approach to the shrine (v. 17a)

          c. purpose of the blood rites: atonement for people (v. 17b)

             a) on behalf of[119] Aaron and his household (v. 17aα)

             b) on behalf of the Israelites (v. 17aβ)

       (3) for purgation of outer altar (vv. 18-19)

          a. blood rite for outer altar (vv. 18-19a)

             a) Aaron's coming out to outer altar (v. 18a)

             b) blood rites: mingled blood of bull and goat (v. 18b-19a)

                (a) putting it on horns of outer altar (v. 18b)

                (b) sprinkling it on outer altar (v. 19a)

          b. purpose (v. 19b)

             a) purgation and consecration of the altar (v. 19bα)

             b) from impurities of the Israelites (v. 19bβ)

    3) the Azazel goat ritual: for elimination of sins of the Israelites (vv. 20-22)

       (1) bringing the live goat (v. 20)

       (2) execution of rite (v. 21-22)

          a. transfer of iniquities of the Israelites (vv. 21aα-21bβ)

             a) laying of the high priest's two hands on its head (v. 21aα)

             b) confession of evils (21aβ)

             c) transference of evils to its head (vv. 21bα)

          b. removal of iniquities to the wildness (vv. 21bβ-22b)

             a) sending the goat to the wildness by the sender (21bβ)

             b) bearing all iniquities to the solitary land (v. 22a)

             c) releasing the goat to the wilderness (v. 22b)

2. burnt offerings: for (ratification of) atonement (vv. 23-25)

   1) preparation of Aaron (vv. 23-24a)

      (1) entering into shrine (v. 23a)

      (2) divestment of linen garments (v. 23b)

      (3) bathing and return to regular garments (v. 24a)

   2) execution of the burnt offerings (v. 24b)

      (1) coming out of shrine (v. 24bα)

      (2) burning the burnt offerings for Aaron and the Israelites (v. 24bβ)

   3) purpose: atonement on behalf of Aaron and the Israelites (v. 24bγ)

   4) burning the fat of *hattat* (on the burnt offering) on the altar (v. 25)

3. concluding ritual (v. 26-28)

   1) entrance rite for goat-sender (v. 26)

      (1) washing of his clothes (v. 26aα)

      (2) ablution (v. 26aβ)

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[119] In this thesis, the phrase *kipper ba'ad* is rendered as 'make atonement *on behalf of*.'

    (3) admission to camp (v. 26b)

   2) disposal of remains and entrance rite for remains-handler (vv. 27-28)

    (1) burning of remains outside the camp (v. 27)

    (2) washing of remains-handler's clothes (v. 28aα)

    (3) ablution (v. 28aβ)

    (4) admission to the camp (v. 28b)

III. Calenderic instruction (vv. 29-34)

  1. statutes for Israelites (v. 29-31)

   1) rules for the Day (v. 29-31a)

    (1) as a permanent statute (v. 29a)

    (2) fixation of date: tenth day of seventh month (v. 29bα)

    (3) duties of the Israelites: ascesis and no work (v. 29bβ)

    (4) objects: both native and foreigner (v. 29bγ)

   2) purpose (v. 30)

    (1) atonement for cleanness of the Israelites (v. 30a)

    (2) cleanness of the Israelites from sins before YHWH (v. 30b)

   3) recapitulation of the statute (v. 31)

    (1) duties: solemn Sabbath and ascesis (v. 31a)

    (2) as a permanent statute (v. 31b)

  2. statutes for the anointed priest (vv. 32-33)

   1) requirements of the priest (v. 32)

    (1) anointed and appointed successor (v. 32a)

    (2) holy linen garment (v. 32b)

   2) duty of the priest (v. 33)

    (1) atonement for the three sancta (v. 33a)

    (2) atonement for priests and people (v. 33b)

  3. conclusion (v. 34)

   1) the Day as a permanent statute (v. 34aα)

   2) for atonement of the Israelites from their sins once per year (v. 34aβ)

   3) report of compliance (v. 34b)

In short, this structure displays three major sections:

 I. Instruction of the ceremony (vv. 1-5)

 II. Procedure of the ceremony (vv. 6-28)

 III. Calenderic instruction (vv. 29-34)

Section I, as an introduction, presents the solemn instruction of God that Aaron should prepare the requisites to enter the *adytum*: preparation of animals for the rituals, Aaron's ablution, and putting on particular vestments made of linen. Section II, being the body of Leviticus 16, prescribes the concrete and substantial procedure for the ceremonial rituals of the Day consisting of three major parts:

1. The integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22)
    a. The designation ritual of the *hattat* animals (vv. 6-10)
    b. The two-combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 11-19)
    c. The Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22)
2. The ritual of the two burnt offerings (vv. 23-25)
3. The concluding ritual (vv. 26-28)
    a. The entrance rite of the goat-sender (v. 26)
    b. The disposal of the *hattat* remains and
       the entrance rite of the remains-handler (vv. 27-28).

With regard to section II, this chapter will explain below the reason why the Azazel goat ritual might be integrated into the larger 'integrated atonement ritual' with the two combined *hattat* ritual.

Section III consists of the calenderic instruction to fix the date for the unique atonement and the regulations for the Israelites and Aaron's household to observe on the Day, like self-affliction and no work.

This chapter will pay special attention to section II, because it has raised vigorous debates on the nature, dynamics, and functions of the rituals of the Day. Section II represents a large unified ceremony, the purpose of which is to purge/atone for the sancta and to atone for the people, as stated in v. 33.[120] Significantly in vv. 30 and 34 the purpose is finally condensed to the purification and atonement of Israel from all their sins. Therefore, this thesis argues that the national atonement of Israel is accomplished through both purgation of all impurities from the sanctuary (by the combined *hattat* ritual) and removal of all sins from the Israelites (by the Azazel goat ritual).

At this point, an important question is to be raised that leads to scholarly confusion: if the *hattat* animals function to purge the sancta, why does the text state that they function to make atonement for people in vv. 6, 11, 17 (cf. v 24).

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[120] For combinations of the verb כִּפֶּר with various objects and prepositions, see chapter 2: the atonement/purgation of the sancta (*kipper ʾet* in vv. 20 and 33 and *kipper ʿal* in vv. 16 and 18) and the atonement for the people (*kipper baʿad* in vv. 6, 11, 17, 24 and *kipper ʿal* in vv. 10 [by the Azazel goat], 30, 33, 34).

Scholars have argued about this puzzling question for ages without consensus. In response to various opinions, this thesis argues that the atonement of a person is accomplished both by transferring his sin to the *hattat* animal and by cleaning the sancta contaminated by his sin, as will be argued in detail in chapter 7. Therefore, the purgation of the sancta serves as an essential stage for getting to the atonement of the people. Hence the *hattat* animals are integral element for the atonement of the people even on the Day of Atonement.

The integrated atonement ritual, that is, the first part of the ceremony, consists of three rituals: it starts with the designation ritual of the *hattat* animals (the presentation of the bull and the rite of casting lots for the allotment of the goats in vv. 6-10) and subsequently two rituals are performed with the animals: the combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 11-19) and the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22).

The combined *hattat* ritual is to purge the whole sanctuary by cleansing the sancta (vv. 11-19) in sequence: the *adytum* (vv. 11-16a), the shrine (vv. 16b-17), and the outer altar (vv. 18-19). Then the Azazel goat ritual is executed to remove the sins of the people (vv. 20-22). In this way, the integrated atonement ritual accomplishes the integral atonement for Israel as a whole, though it is mentioned that another atonement is made with the burnt offerings (vv. 23-25).

Next the second ritual part (vv. 23-25), that is, the two burnt offerings, are performed with Aaron's return to his ordinary ornate apparel to make atonement on behalf of him and on behalf of the people (v. 24). What is this atonement? Now that the atonement has already accomplished with the integrated atonement ritual, is it a new or additional atonement? As discussed in detail below, the statement of atonement in this part can mean the *ratification of the atonement* already accomplished in the prior stages rather than another, different atonement. It may probably indicate the confirmation of the same atonement, that is, the achievement of the Day, while the burnt offerings signify the devotion of the congregation, according to the implied meaning of the burnt offering in Leviticus 1.

With regard to the structural division of the text, Rodriguez (1996: 271, 280-81) classifies the burnt offerings (vv. 23-24) under the category of the 'concluding ritual acts' together with the final rituals in vv. 26-28. However, it is already stated in the first section (vv. 1-5) that the burnt offerings are integral and essential elements for the national atonement as the purpose of the Day's ceremony.

In the third part of the unified ceremony (vv. 26-28), the concluding ritual is carried out at the end as the final procedure of the ceremony. Generally it is argued that the activities for disposal do not influence the effect of the Day's

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ceremony and so they are usually not taken as essential part for the atonement. However, the concluding ritual is an integral component of the ceremony of the Day as postrequisite (see § 5.3.4.4), though the accomplishment of atonement is already declared, prior to this final stage. The elaborate and specified prescription of the concluding ritual denotes its importance. Significantly, the concluding ritual also gives hints to support the assumed 'unified ceremony.'

This chapter avoids issues irrelevant to its aim like the meaning of the seven-time sprinkling of blood and the meanings of 'the east,' 'front,' or 'on' of the Atonement Seat (vv. 14-15), leaving them to chapter 5. Rather, it explores the unique forms, functions and theological meanings of the rituals revealed in the literary structure of Leviticus 16 and concentrates on issues related to the discussion on the atonement mechanism of the Day in the chapter 7.

3.3. Section I: instruction of the ceremony (vv. 1-5)

The account of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16 is embedded in the macro historical narrative of the so-called 'Sinai Pericope' (Exod 19-Num 10:10). The focus of this section is on the adjacent context of Leviticus 16.

In the flow of the narrative of Leviticus, it is likely that the establishment of the Day of Atonement was urgent, because the serious contamination of the sanctuary was caused by Aaron's dead sons, although at the first glance the corpus of the purity law in Leviticus 11-15 seems to be an abrupt interruption and intrusion.[121] It is stated in Leviticus 16:1-2 that the instruction for the Day was given just after the death of Aaron's two sons who performed a rite of illegal fire (Lev 10). In addition, the report of compliance in Leviticus 16:34, which states "Aaron carried out just as the Lord had commanded," alludes to the nature of the consecutive narrative that reports the first historical execution of the ceremony of the Day, although there is disparity between the interpreters about the timing and actuality of its historical performance.[122]

In Leviticus 16:3-5, YHWH announces the requirements for the Day's ceremony to Aaron through Moses. Although the animals, which are to be

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[121] However, there is a reason that Lev 11-15 must be placed before Lev 16: "chs 11-15 provide essential background for understanding the significance of the day of atonement (16)" (Wenham, 1979: 161). For detailed discussion on the structure of Leviticus including Lev 11-15, see chapter 8.

[122] For the answers to the questions and doubt of the historical performance, see Milgrom (1991b: 1070-71); cf. Hartley (1992: 33).

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brought by Aaron and the congregation of the Israelites respectively, are enumerated in these verses, the focus is on Aaron, the main character of the Day; Aaron's ablution and his particular garments are spotlighted in the animal prescription in section 1 (vv. 1-5).

Generally two crucial issues have been debated in this section, which are significant to explore the dynamics of the integrated rituals in Leviticus 16: (1) the meaning and function of the priestly linen garments (v. 4);[123] and (2) the interpretation of 'two goats for a *hattaṭ*' (v. 5a).

3.3.1. Aaron's holy linen garments

Aaron's linen garments which he must wear only on the Day, as described in Leviticus 16:4, are simple and unadorned, though called 'holy'. The characteristics of these garments can be compared to his magnificent ordinary vestments recounted in Exodus 28:1-42. Apparently the function of the linen garments was to secure Aaron's entrance into the *adytum*. That is, "*the rite of entrance* requires the use of a special priestly vestment" (Rodriguez, 1996: 273).

Several possible answers have been suggested to the question why these special garments were required.[124] Haran (1978: 174) thinks that the clothes being peculiarly white, signify a higher level of holiness tantamount to that of the angels. Similarly, Milgrom (1991b: 1016), referring to the rabbis' literatures, comments that the purpose of the garments was to alter Aaron's status in the *adytum* to the same as the angels in heaven, who it was believed are dressed in white linen clothes as evidenced in the Hebrew Bible (Ezek 9:2-3, 11; 10:2; Dan 10:6; cf. Mal 2:7). In contrast to Haran, however, Milgrom does not state that Aaron's white linen apparel for the Day had a higher level of holiness than that of the ordinary priest's garments. Aaron's "entry into the *adytum*," being dressed in the linen garments, "is equivalent to admission to the heavenly council" (Milgrom, 1991b: 1016) where the angels dressed in linen are doing their ministrations. In other words, "like them [the angels] he was being given access to the divine presence" (Milgrom, 1991b: 1016).

Milgrom (1991b: 1016-17) adds an important practical reason, following D. P. Wright who stated that the simple linen clothes may have had the purpose

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[123] The holy linen garment consist of the following four items (v. 4): the holy linen tunic (כְּתֹנֶת־בַּד קֹדֶשׁ), the linen undergarments (מִכְנְסֵי־בַד), the linen sash (אַבְנֵט בַּד) and the linen turban (מִצְנֶפֶת בַּד). For a detailed exposition of the priestly clothing, see Haran (1978: 65-74).

[124] For detailed discussion, see Milgrom (1991b: 1016-17).

to "prevent soiling the regular high priestly clothing with blood which is sprinkled in abundance in the ceremony."[125]

However, in accordance with many interpreters, it is likely that the linen garments might have alleviated Aaron's special high-priestly status of holiness by the removal of all ornaments out of his regular garments and thereby symbolized the humility of Aaron who would enter the holiest place before the presence of YHWH. In light of the nature of the Day when all Israelites shall afflict their souls and shall do no work (Lev 16: 31), this opinion looks most plausible, whether the high priest's temporary apparel was approximate to that of the ordinary priests by stripping of luxurious ornaments (Abravanel cited in Milgrom, 1991b: 1016), or he identified himself with the common Israelites (Jenson, 1992: 200). Jenson's view is more likely than that of Abravanel, since the high priest in the state of wearing the linen garments had to confess 'all sins' of all the Israelites[126] and to transfer them to the live goat (v. 21), not only as a representative for the Israelites, but also as a member of the congregation so that he could make atonement for Israel from all their sins.

It is significant for two reasons that with the linen garments, Aaron becomes part of the congregation and executes the integrated atonement ritual for the whole Israel. First, Aaron's linen garments bolster the validity of the 'integrated atonement ritual' as a ritual complex unit. Second, that he is a representative for the congregation as a member of the Israelites gives a clue for interpreting the meaning of לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו in v. 10,[127] which is alleged to be the most perplexing phrase in Leviticus 16.

Leaving the second significance of Aaron's linen garments to the discussion in § 3.4.1.1, the first point is discussed here. Aaron's linen garments are a potent evidence of the integrated atonement ritual, but this point has been neglected. While the high priest wears the special linen garments, he performs

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[125] From Milgrom's written communication with D. P. Wright cited from Milgrom (1991b: 1017).

[126] The phrase כָּל-עֲוֹנֹת in Lev 16:21 seems not to mean 'all guilts' but 'all iniquities' (i.e., sins) of the Israelites (contra Kiuchi) in that the plural עֲוֹנֹת indicates 'iniquities' in about fifty occurrences of עֲוֹנֹת in the OT in comparison with the singular עָוֹן which may often refer to 'guilt' as consequence of sin. The juxtaposed phrases in the same verse, 'their transgressions' (כָּל-פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם) and 'their sins' (כָּל-חַטֹּאתָם), imply that כָּל-עֲוֹנֹת also refer to a kind of sins. Therefore, it is more natural that the triple sin terms are considered as having similar meanings with different nuances.

[127] As will be discussed below, the pronominal suffix *waw* in the phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו may refer to 'him,' i.e., Aaron, as Kiuchi (1987: 150-52; 2007: 297) argued, and hence the rendering is 'to make atonement for him (Aaron).'

the designation ritual of the *hattat* animals (vv. 6-10), the two-combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 11-19), and the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22) one after another. It is noteworthy that after executing the ritual of the Azazel goat to remove the sins of Israelites, Aaron should enter the shrine and return to his normal high priest apparel with ablution 'in the holy place' (בְּמָקוֹם קָדוֹשׁ, v. 24). Then he should perform the ritual of the two burnt offerings for himself and the people (v. 24).

This alludes to the fact that the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual are linked to the 'integrated atonement ritual' unit for one ultimate purpose, namely, the national atonement for Israel which is achieved through the purgation of the sanctuary with the two combined *hattat* offerings and the removal of the Israelites' sins with the Azazel goat.

3.3.2. Two goats for a *hattat* offering? (v. 5)

Having brought a bull for the *hattat* offering and a ram for the burnt offering for himself and his household, the high priest should take 'two goats for a *hattat* offering' and 'a ram for a burnt offering' from the congregation for them (16:5). A puzzling problem in this verse is the statement that both goats should be taken for 'a *hattat*' (חַטָּאת):

וּמֵאֵת עֲדַת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל יִקַּח *שְׁנֵי־שְׂעִירֵי עִזִּים לְחַטָּאת* וְאַיִל אֶחָד לְעֹלָה

"He shall take from the congregation of the sons of Israel *two male goats for a sin offering* and one ram for a burnt offering" (NASB)

It is prescribed that both goats should be brought as a *hattat* offering, even though only one would be slaughtered for a *hattat* offering (vv. 9, 15) and the other sent to Azazel[128] alive into the wilderness (vv. 8, 10, 21-22). How can

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[128] Regarding the identity of Azazel (עֲזָאזֵל) which occurs four times only in Lev 16 (vv. 8, 10[x2], 26) and not in the rest of the OT, several opinions have been presented since ancient times. For detailed arguments, see Hartley (1992: 237-38) and in particular Milgrom (1991b: 1020-21, 1071-78) who explains it against the background of the Ancient Near East. Many modern versions (NIV; KJV; NASB) take it as a descriptive name, 'scapegoat,' following the early versions like the LXX ('the one carrying away the evil') and Vulgate ('the goat that departs'). However, it is absurd that the live goat, which is the scapegoat, should be sent 'to/for itself.' The more widely accepted view, following the rabbinic traditions, is to interpret it as a specific 'place' like 'a rough and difficult place' or 'a rocky precipice' described in Lev 16:22, to which the goat is sent. For example, John Calvin (1950, 2:317) identified Azazel with a 'solitary and uninhabitable spot.' On the other hand, there are some opinions that see Azazel as an

the two goats, which have the separate uses from one another, be a *hattat* offering? The answer to this question is very important, since it may provide an additional evidence to support the argument of this chapter that the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual, during which the high priest is dressed in the holy linen garments, are assembled into one 'integrated atonement ritual.'

With regard to the enigma of the phrase 'two goats for a *hattat*,' one possible explanation is that the author wanted to make a concise and short statement to avoid a complicate verse by mentioning only a *hattat* (Hartley, 1992: 236). Rodriguez (1979: 113; 1996: 275) contends that "since the goat for *hattat* has not been chosen yet (v. 5), potentially either one of them was a *hattat*."[129] These suggestions do not take the live Azazel goat as part of a *hattat*, differently from Kiuchi and a few scholars who argue that the two goats form a unique *hattat*.

Kiuchi (1987: 147-58) says that the two goats are combined to function

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abstract term which means 'entire removal' (Feinberg, 1958: 331-33) or a 'metathesized form' of the two Hebrew terms עזז 'strong' and אל 'God' which denotes either 'the powerful wrath of God' (de Roo, 2000: 233-42) or 'the strength of God' (D. J. Mooney, 2004: 46-50, borrowing de Roo's definition). However, they are hardly acceptable in light of the syntax of v. 8. Importantly לעזאזל and ליהוה form a syntactical parallel in v. 8 (cf. vv. 9 and 10):

$$\text{וְנָתַן אַהֲרֹן עַל־שְׁנֵי הַשְּׂעִירִם גּוֹרָלוֹת}$$
$$\text{גּוֹרָל אֶחָד } \underline{\text{לַיהוָה}} \text{ וְגוֹרָל אֶחָד } \underline{\text{לַעֲזָאזֵל}}$$

For the reason, Azazel may be taken as a name of devil (Noth, 1965: 125; Milgrom, 1991b: 1021). In the thought of ancient Israel, Azazel may have been a devil who was abiding in the wilderness and playing an active part as the antithesis to YHWH (cf. Lev 17:7, "and that they may offer their sacrifices no more to the goat-demons [שָׂעִיר] after whom they stray" [NJPS]). Gane (2005: 263) also says: "the theory that Azazel is a source of evil or chaos agrees with biblical evidence for a tempter (Gen 3), with the idea that wilderness areas can be inhabited by שְׂעִירִים , apparently 'goat-demon' (cf. Lev 17:7; Isa 13:21)." Milgrom (1991b: 1021), who also considers Azazel as a demon in the wildness, states: "In the Priestly ritual he [the demon] is no longer a personality but just a name, designating the place to which impurities and sins are banished." Of course, it is admitted that the live goat could not be offered to a demon as a sacrifice in light of theological concept of the OT. In addition, the live goat, which is neither slaughtered nor blood of which is shed, does not match standards for a sacrifice. Nevertheless, it serves to make atonement in functional terms as part of the integrated atonement ritual. If it is a demon, the Azazel goat ritual "means that the sins carried by the goat were returned to this demon for the purpose of removing them from the community and leaving them at their source in order that their power or effect in the community might be completely broken" (Hartley, 1992: 238).

[129] Gorman (1990: 97) also says: "This could be read to mean that both goats are חַטָּאת, but it may also be read to mean that from the two goats brought, one only will be offered as a חַטָּאת.

as a single *hattat* offering for the congregation.[130] Significantly, he contends that "the Azazel goat ritual is a special form of the burning of the *hattat*" (1987: 149) performed in a clean place (Lev 4:12) outside the camp in Leviticus 4:1-5:13. In other words, the release of the Azazel goat into the wildness in Leviticus 16 corresponds to the burning of the *hattat* flesh outside the camp in Leviticus 4:1-5:13, both carrying out the function of 'removal of guilt.'[131]

From a different angle, D. J. Mooney (2004: 152) attempts to explain this matter. He takes the two goats to be equal to the value of one bull on the basis of Jenson's view that the sacrificial animal derives its worth from both its size and value (Jenson, 1992: 177). In the prescription for the ordinary *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4, a male goat is worth one degree less than a bull (Lev 4:3-26). Thus two goats here might amount quantitatively to one bull which is required for the ordinary *hattat* offering of the high priest or the whole congregation, although the actual market price of the two goats in ancient Israel may have been considered as inferior to that of one bull and moreover only one goat is very often prescribed for the *hattat* offering of the congregation in some occasions, for instance in Leviticus 9.[132]

Mooney's idea seems feasible, considering the legislator's mindset who envisioned the systemized cult. On the Day of Atonement, whereas a bull is commanded in keeping with the usual quota of the high priest and his household for their *hattat* ritual, two goats equal to one bull in quantity are required for the congregation. The two goats are combined for a *hattat* ritual. Therefore, the two goats have the same value as one bull, as required for the congregation in Leviticus 4, to make a unique *hattat* ritual for the atonement of

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[130] For some similar views, see also Feinberg (1958: 332-33); N. H. Snaith (1977: 112); Mooney (2004: 152).

[131] For Kiuchi's detailed explanation (1987: 135) about the disposal of the *hattat* flesh and its functions, see § 7.2.2.

[132] At the inauguration of the altar in Lev 9, Aaron is to take 'a bull calf' as a *hattat* offering for him and his household, and 'a male goat' as a *hattat* offering for the congregation, which is compared with Lev 4 where 'a bull' for the congregation is required. The rule of the *hattat* offerings in Lev 9 implies that the prescriptions in Lev 4:1-5:13 are not the standardized rules for all the other occasions of *hattat* in the priestly literature. In the priestly literature, a goat is frequently an alternative to the *hattat* offering for the congregation in contrast with the regulation of Lev 4:1-5:13 (e.g., Lev 9:2-3; 23:19; Num 15:24; 28:15 ff; 29:5 ff; cf. 2 Ch 29:23; Ezr 6:17; 8:35; Ezek 43:22, 25; 45:23). Furthermore, while the *hattat* ritual for *specific inadvertent sins* is prescribed in Lev 4:1-5:13, the *hattat* ritual for *specific inescapable impurities* is stipulated in Lev 11-15. However, in many occasions that require a *hattat* offering, a *specific* sin or impurity is not conceived (e.g., *hattat* for the consecration of the priests and the altar in Lev 8, *hattat* at the inauguration of the altar in Lev 9, and *hattat* at the feasts). For this reason, other explanations are necessary for them.

Israel on a totally new level. This combined unity of two animals is corroborated by the combined 'rite of cleansing' by two birds to purify (טִהַר) the leper (Lev 14:4-7), or to cleanse (טִהַר) and atone for (כִּפֶּר עַל) the leprous house (Lev 14:49-53),[133] although its function is not exactly the same as that of the two goats in Leviticus 16.

The problem of this idea is that, as noted above, the live Azazel goat cannot be classified as a sacrifice in the strict sense of the word, for want of any sacrificial procedures like slaughtering and blood-shedding. Furthermore, Leviticus 16:9, 15 and 20-22, which relates the Azazel goat in addition to v. 5, give no indication that the Azazel goat is handled as if it is a *hattat* offering according to a sacrificial procedure.

However, chapter 4 will explain why the Azazel goat could be regarded as a part of the *hattat* sacrifice by suggesting six grounds (see § 4.3.3). At this stage, suffice it to say that both goats are essential to make atonement for the people through an associated process and they are inseparable from each other for this purpose. The two goats are taken out of the congregation and are combined to constitute a *hattat* sacrifice for the atonement of Israel, one removing the impurities from the sancta and the other taking away the sins from the people of Israel. Therefore, although according to the criteria for sacrifices, the live goat cannot be categorized as a sacrifice, *in a functional sense*, however, it plays a part in making atonement for the Israelites, as the normal *hattat* offering does in Leviticus 4:1-5:13.

For this reason, Milgrom (1991b: 1018) commented on the wording 'two goats for a *hattat* offering' in v. 5: "the term *hattat* may have been chosen for its philological sense 'that which removes sin,' which precisely defines the function of the scapegoat." In other words, the ritual of Azazel goat could be understood as 'part of the larger *kipper*-process' (Gorman, 1990: 97).[134]

At this point, it should be remarked again that an integrated atonement ritual consists of the two-combined *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat. In order to avoid confusion, the three modes of integration must be distinguished.

(1) Firstly, the two goats are inseparably presented together to form a *hattat* offering from the outset (v. 5).

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[133] For details, see chapter 2.

[134] But Gorman (1990: 97) does not think the live goat as a sacrifice, either. He states: "it is improbable that it should be termed a 'sacrifice' at all, since sacrifice normally includes the act of slaughter when concerned with animals. The purpose of the live goat is specified in v. 10: to *kipper* on it. Thus, the live goat for Azazel need not be interpreted as a חַטָּאת or sacrifice: rather it must be understood as part of the larger *kipper*-process."

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(2) Secondly, the two *hattat* offerings for the priestly household and the congregation are inseparably combined into a *hattat* ritual unit by the mingling of the blood taken from the sacrificial bull and goat for the blood rite in the outer altar (vv. 18-19).

(3) Consequently the combined *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat are integrated to constitute a macro ritual unit, namely, the 'integrated atonement ritual.'[135]

Here it should be noticed that although the live goat is a running mate of the sacrificial goat for the congregation, while the two goats may be equal to one bull in quantitative value, the function of the live goat corresponds to that of the two-combined *hattat* animals (the bull and the sacrificial goat) for both the priestly household and the congregation rather than only to that of the sacrificial goat for the congregation (see § 7.4.2.1). It is because the function of the Azazel goat is to carry away both the iniquities of the congregation and those of Aaron's household.

3.4. Section II: the procedure of the ceremony (vv. 6-28):
the unified ceremony of the Day of Atonement

Section II (Lev 16:6-28), the body of the structure, is comprised of three rituals:

1) The integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22)
2) The ritual of two burnt offerings (vv. 23-25)
3) The concluding ritual (vv. 26-28)

This section must be scrutinized to figure out the mechanism of the national atonement achieved by the unique rituals of the Day, and the theology of Leviticus 16. As indicated above, the three rituals constitute the 'unified ceremony' of the Day to achieve a full-scale atonement for Israel on the Day. The integrated atonement ritual (the combined *hattat* ritual + the Azazel goat ritual) is bound into a larger ritual unit (= the unified ceremony), with which

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[135] In other words, while the two goats form inseparably a *hattat* unit from the outset (v. 5), the sacrificial goat chosen between them is combined with a bull by the mingling of blood in the ritual process. Therefore, the three animals, which cannot be separated, constitute an integrated atonement ritual. Moreover, as argued above, the nature of integration is also evidenced by the high priest's linen garments for the process.

subsequently the ritual of the two burnt offerings and the concluding ritual are merged.

The concise outline of section II below helps to grasp the whole process of the Day's ceremony in one glance.

1) The integrated atonement ritual: for national atonement of Israel (vv. 6-22)
   a) Designation of the animals (vv. 6-10)
   b) The combined *hattat*: to purge the impurities of the sanctuary (vv. 11-19)
      i) For purgation of the *adytum* (vv. 11-16a)
      ii) For purgation of the shrine (vv. 16b-17)
      iii) For purgation of the outer altar (vv. 18-19)
   c) The Azazel goat ritual: to remove the iniquities of the people (vv. 20-22)
2) The ritual of two burnt offerings: for ratification of atonement (vv. 23-25)
3) The concluding ritual (vv. 26-28)

This structure shows clearly that the integrated atonement ritual consists of (1) designation of the animals (vv. 6-10); (2) the combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 11-19); and (3) the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22).

Moreover, the purpose of each ritual is clearly revealed. The aim of the combined *hattat* ritual is to remove the impurities from the sanctuary by cleansing the three precincts in sequence: the *adytum* (vv. 11-16a), the shrine (vv. 16-17), and the outer altar (vv. 18-19). In contrast, the function of the Azazel goat ritual is to remove all the iniquities of the Israelites (vv. 20-22) by transferring them to the live goat. By so doing, the integrated atonement ritual finally achieves the national atonement of Israel, as implied in the concluding statement in verse 34.[136]

Thus the purgation of the sanctuary is required as an essential and integral part for the complete atonement of the people. In other words, the atonement of the people cannot be accomplished without the purgation of the sanctuary. It means that the confession of sin alone is not sufficient for the sinner to be atoned and be forgiven, contrary to Milgrom (1991b: 254-255; see § 7.2.1) who insists that confession of sin and remorse purifies the sinner completely ('inner purification' called by Milgrom).[137] This provisional conclusion

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[136] Although it is mentioned in v. 24 that the burnt offerings make another atonement, this atonement should be considered as the very atonement that has been already accomplished by the integrated atonement ritual.

[137] Milgrom (1991b: 254-55) noted that physical impurity is removed by ablution (Lev 15:8), spiritual impurity is cleansed by inner purification, i.e., feeling guilt, and impurity of the sacturary is purged by the blood of *hattat* animal. Therefore, blood is not connected with the

is a crucial key to understanding the atonement mechanism that operates respectively in the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4:1-5:13; 12-15 and the unique *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 16, though in distinct ways. It will be discussed later *why* the atonement of people cannot be completed without purgation of the sanctuary in light of the relationship between the people and the sanctuary (see § 6.4.3).

3.4.1. The integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22)

3.4.1.1. The designation ritual of the *hattat* animals (vv. 6-10)

This integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22) is introduced with the designation of the *hattat* animals (vv. 6-10) for the combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 6-19) and the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22), while the *hattat* animals are brought as prescribed in section I (vv. 1-5).

The designation ritual (vv. 6-10) starts with a *rite of bringing* (הִקְרִיב, v. 6), which launches the integrated atonement ritual (vv. 11-19), while preparing the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual. The verb הִקְרִיב 'to bring near or 'to present (the bull)' in v. 6 is a technical term to indicate frequently a 'rite of bringing' or a 'rite of presentation' in the sacrificial contexts.[138] Commentators and the English Bibles choose inconsistently either 'bring' or 'present' according to the context. However, in the designation ritual (vv. 6-10), the verb הִקְרִיב for the bull in v. 6 seems to mean 'bring near,' namely, the 'rite of bringing' in light of the meaning of vv. 9 and 11 in parallel.[139] In addition, the verbs לָקַח 'take' and

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removal of person's sin or impurity. However, it is hardly acceptable, as will be criticized in § 7.2.1.

[138] Lev 1:13; 3:3, 7, 9, 14; 4:3; 5:8; 7:12, 14; 14:12; 16:6, 9, 11, 20; Num 5:16, 25; 6:14, 16; 15:4, 9; 16:5. The Greek verb ἀναφέρειν 'bring, take up' or 'lead up' (Mt 17:1) is the same case in the NT. It is used as a religious technical term for presenting sacrifices with the meaning 'offer up' or 'bring (to altar)' (He 7:27) (*BAG*, 14).

[139] Compare the three verses in Lev 16:

(v. 6) וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־פַּר הַחַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר־לוֹ

(v. 9) וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־הַשָּׂעִיר אֲשֶׁר עָלָה עָלָיו הַגּוֹרָל לַיהוָה וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת

(v. 11) וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־הַשָּׂעִיר . . . וְשָׁחַט אֶת־פַּר הַחַטָּאת אֲשֶׁר־לוֹ

Just as it is natural to understand the order of the actions in vv. 9 and 11 as 'bring near' and 'slaughter,' so the הִקְרִיב in v. 6, which appears in the same context of the designation ritual, can

וְהֶעֱמִיד 'station (the two goats)' in v. 7, which refer to the parallel ritual action to הַקְרִיב in v. 6, also support this opinion. On the Day of the Atonement, the rite of bringing is unusually followed by the special 'rite of casting lots' to decide the role of each one of the two goats.

The *hattat* animals, which are brought at this stage, are designated only for the integrated atonement ritual consisting of the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual, but not for the burnt offerings. This fact indicates that the designation of the animals belongs to a component of the integrated atonement ritual. In other words, the designation ritual is performed for both the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual. This supports that the three rituals form a single larger ritual unit: the designation ritual + the combined *hattat* ritual + the Azazel goat ritual. Importantly, it is mentioned in v. 5 that the 'two goats for a *hattat*' are brought together in this rite of bringing, implying that they would be used for one purpose in the integrated atonement ritual.

At this first stage of the integrated atonement ritual, the chosen *hattat* animals must be brought to YHWH: a bull for Aaron and his household, and two goats for the congregation. One of the two goats must be designated by lot for a sacrifice and slaughtered for a *hattat* offering, whereas the other will be stationed alive before YHWH to be used for the Azazel goat ritual.

Interestingly the ritual of designation displays an envelope; the 'rite of bringing' with the verb הַקְרִיב 'bring near (the bull at the entrance)' in the beginning (v. 6) lies in antithetic parallel to the 'rite of release' with the verb שִׁלַּח 'send (the goat to Azazel, into the wilderness)' at the end (v. 10):[140]

(v. 6) *וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־פַּר הַחַטָּאת*

(v. 10) *לְשַׁלַּח אֹתוֹ* לַעֲזָאזֵל הַמִּדְבָּרָה

It indicates that vv. 6-10 consist of a well-structured literary unit as an envelope structure. Furthermore, v. 10 anticipates the release rite of the Azazel goat in vv. 20-22. Thus, it is observed that in broader view, the 'integrated atonement ritual' (vv. 6-22) starts with the 'bringing rite' of the bull (vv. 6) and ends with the 'release rite' of the live goat (v. 22b):

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be also understood as 'bring near.' But NIV shows inconsistent renderings of הַקְרִיב in vv. 6, 9, and 11. Compare the NIV rendering of הַקְרִיב in v. 11 ('bring the bull') with that in v. 6: "Aaron is to *offer* the bull for his own sin offering to make atonement for himself and his household" (v. 6; emphasis mine).

[140] For the chiasm of vv. 6-10, see Rodriguez (1996: 273).

(v. 6) *וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־פַּר הַחַטָּאת*

(v. 22b) *וְשִׁלַּח אֶת־הַשָּׂעִיר* בַּמִּדְבָּר

This is an additional reliable clue to the argument that vv. 6-22 form an associated corpus of rituals, that is, the integrated atonement ritual.

In the designation ritual of the animals (vv. 6-10), two issues are raised: (1) the meaning of the combination, *kipper ba'ad*, in v. 6 (in vv. 11, 17, and 24 as well); and (2) the interpretation of לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו in v. 10a. Now that the former have been already investigated in chapter 2, we turn to the latter.

Most scholars take it for granted that the impersonal subject of the phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו in the end of v. 10a is most likely to be Aaron (see n. 141). Had Aaron been the subject of the verb, how should עָלָיו be understood? What or whom does Aaron make atonement for? What is the meaning of the proposition עָלָיו? To these questions, some plausible answers have been presented. Among others, Milgrom and Kiuchi deserve our attention, due to their creative suggestions.[141]

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[141] Besides Milgrom and Kiuchi, other opinions are as follows (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 150-51; Levine, 1989: 103; Rodriguez, 1996: 274): (1) Keil & Delitzsch (1956 vol. 2: 683) took the phrase as 'to make atonement for it [the goat])' in line with the usually accepted meaning of כפר על. However, an atoning activity for the Azazel goat that was going to bear the sins of Israel soon seems to be absurd. Furthermore, the concept of atonement for an animal is unfamiliar to Israel (Rodriguez, 1996: 274); (2) According to A. Dillmann, the phrase refers to 'the consecration of the scapegoat' to perform the Azazel goat ritual in v. 21 (cited from Kiuchi, 1987:150). However, it is not clear why it is necessary to atone for the Azazel goat for the sake of its consecration (Kiuchi, 1987: 150); (3) Some interpreters like Noth (1965: 121) and Elliger (1966: 201) think that the phrase originated from a textual error or mistake; (4) Other critical scholars like J. R. Porter (1976: 127-28) explained it, relying on the history of tradition and redaction criticism; the discord was caused by "an attempt to assimilate an alien rite to the dominant priestly sacrificial practice and theology of expiation"; (5) B. A. Levine (1974), followed by G. F. Hasel (1981: 121), suggested 'to make expiation in proximity to,' saying that the preposition על in this case has a special and exceptional meaning, 'in proximity to.' However, Levine preferred 'with' to it in his later work (1989), relying on Rashi (1970) and Ibn Ezra (1986) who suggested 'over.' He explained that 'over' is actually closer to 'with' because the goat was an instrument of expiation; (6) Similarly, 'by means of' was suggested by Péter-Contesse (1993: 253-54; but he had proposed 'over' in his former work [1990: 246]). According to this meaning, atonement is made 'through it' by sending the sin-bearing goat to the wilderness. But in that case (Levine's later suggestion also) the preposition ב would have been preferred, since ב seems to be more appropriate "to express instrumentality rather than על" (Rodriguez, 1996: 274); (7) Hartley (1992: 237) put forth the opinion that the pronominal suffix *waw* (ו) represents 'the congregation' (עדה) as the object of the preposition על. However, as he agreed, the gender of the pronoun is masculine, whereas the noun עדה is feminine.

Milgrom (1991b: 254-55, 1023) argues, as seen in chapter 2, that the meaning of *kipper 'al* depends on the nature of objects that are combined with the preposition *'al*; the combination of '*kipper 'al* + inanimate object' should always be rendered as 'to effect purgation *on* (the sancta)' rather than 'to effect purgation *for* (the sancta)'; but for '*kipper 'al* + animate object,' the rendering 'effect purgation *for* (people)' is employed, instead of 'atone for/make atonement for people' or 'expiate people.' To paraphrase 'effect purgation for (people),' it is thought to be 'effect purgation *on/in the sancta* for people' or '*purge the sancta* for people.' The reason is that the blood of the *hattat* animal does not purge the people but the sanctuary (i.e., non-human object) in all occasions (Milgrom, 1991b: 254-55). By contrast, the blood of the other sacrificial animals (i.e., the burnt offering, the guilt offering, and the peace offering) does not have the function to purge the sancta. Therefore, in these sacrifices, 'expiate (people)' or 'effect/perform expiation for (people)' is recommended as the rendering of *kipper 'al* + human object.

In the same vein, Milgrom explains the phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו in v. 10b with 'on/upon' for עַל[142] Accordingly he concludes that it means 'to perform expiation *upon it*' (1991b: 1009, 1023),[143] a bit ifferent from his usual rendering, 'to effect purgation on,' because he thinks the live goat is not a sacrifice which may purge the sancta. That is, the verb כִּפֶּר in this verse refers to 'expiation' through 'ransom' by the live goat, instead of 'purgation.' Although the object is an animate one, that is, an animal, he justifies his logic, saying: "Here, uniquely, the object is an animal, but it is treated as an inanimate object: hence *kippur* (purgation) takes place *upon it*" (1991b: 1023). Milgrom (1991b: 1023) vindicates this inconsistent view, arguing that the goat itself is not purged, but the transference of sins to the goat results in the purgation of the sanctuary, while simultaneously it brings about the expiation of the congregation from their evils. But according to our investigation on the combination of *kipper 'al* in chapter 2, Milgrom's idea is not convincing.

At this point, the question is raised concerning the subject of לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו:

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[142] Also Gane (2005: 136, 261-62); Rashi (1970 on Lev 16:10); see other proponents in Gane (2005: 262).

[143] Milgrom (1991b: 1083) vindicates his own rendering by tracing various meanings of the verb *kipper* throughout its historical development, saying "the final stage in the evolution of the verb *kipper* yields the abstract, figurative notion 'atone' or 'expiate'" and "it is found in the scapegoat rite, which, according to its text (16:10, 21), atones for all of Israel's sins." In other words, the more abstract meaning 'to expiate' is added to *kipper*, and as a result, "the original purpose of the scapegoat, to eliminate the impurities removed from the sanctuary, has been altered to accommodate a new theological notion" (Milgrom, 1991b: 1023).

is the subject really Aaron, as usually accepted? Kiuchi (1987: 149-53), who is followed by Rendtorff (2005: 542) and Sklar (2005: 97), posed a fundamental question against it. He suggested that the pronominal suffix וֹ might refer to Aaron who was playing the role of a representative agent for the congregation. In that case, the subject of כִּפֶּר is the live goat. This idea is acceptable on several grounds, although only a few scholars have favored it.

Firstly, there are syntactic grounds for Kiuchi's view, although it has been argued that the syntax of v. 10 does not support his proposal.[144] In his review (Gane, *RBL* 2006) on Sklar's work of 2005, Gane continues to insist the traditional view by repeating the general grammatical and syntactic ground:

> If the third masculine singular pronominal suffix in לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו, "to כִּפֶּר for/upon him/it," in Lev 16:10 refers to Aaron as receiving כִּפֶּר through Azazel's goat (97 n. 41, with Kiuchi), why do preceding and following third masculine singular pronominal suffixes in the same verse (lit., "went up upon *it* ... to send *it* away") have the goat, rather than Aaron, as their antecedent? If לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו means "to כִּפֶּר upon it (the goat)," to whom would such a כִּפֶּר be offered—to Azazel or someone else? Or does this exceptional use of כִּפֶּר in the context of a nonsacrificial purification ritual only refer to purgation? (2) If impersonal objects could need a כִּפֶּר arrangement, as suggested by the fact that they can be beneficiaries of כִּפֶּר (e.g., Exod 29; Lev 8, 16; p. 134), why would this be so? Could it mean that their owners benefit? In the case of sancta, could this mean that the deity needs a kind of כִּפֶּר-purgation, perhaps at least partly for vindication of his justice when he has forgiven guilty people?

However, it seems that Kiuchi's argument is not impossible from the syntactical view, as he evidenced by syntactic and thematic comparisons between Leviticus 16:10 and 16:7, 21b-22, and Leviticus 1:4 (Kiuchi, 1987: 151-52).[145]

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[144] E.g., Rodriguez (1996: 274); Milgrom (1991b: 1023).

[145] The strong clue to his argument is Lev 1:4b that is parallel to Lev 16:10a 'thematically and syntactically' in the same passive voice (Kiuchi, 1987: 152):

(1:4b)   וְנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו
(16:10a)   יָעֳמַד־חַי לִפְנֵי יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו

According to Kiuchi, in Lev 1:4b, the subject of the infinitive phrase (לכפר על) is assumed to be the animal of the burnt offering. If it is the case, 1:4b means that in the burnt offering the animal will be accepted (נִרְצָה) *for the offerer to 'make atonement for him* [the offerer].' The implied

In addition to Kiuchi's evidences, the comparison of v. 10a with v. 9 in an adjacent context of Leviticus 16 supports his suggestion.

v. 9   וְהִקְרִיב אַהֲרֹן אֶת־הַשָּׂעִיר אֲשֶׁר עָלָה עָלָיו הַגּוֹרָל לַיהוָה וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת
                  E   D   C   B   A

v. 10a   וְהַשָּׂעִיר אֲשֶׁר עָלָה עָלָיו הַגּוֹרָל לַעֲזָאזֵל יָעֳמַד־חַי לִפְנֵי יְהוָה לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו
        E^1 (D^2) A^1 D^1 C^1

v. 10b   לְשַׁלַּח אֹתוֹ לַעֲזָאזֵל הַמִּדְבָּרָה

Remarkably, the syntax of v. 10a is changed to a passive voice after v. 9 and the previous verses, which assume Aaron as the subject. Hence v. 10a lies in the syntactic comparison with v. 9 as an antithetic parallel. V. 10a could be considered as a separate semantic segment by the accent *atnah*, if we accept the Masoretic accentuation.

In v. 9 the subject is Aaron (B) with the active verb (A), while the object is the goat (C). In E, the subject is still Aaron and the pronominal suffix is the objective with the goat as its antecedent. But v. 10a is converted to passive sentence with the verb *hophal* (A^1) where the object (C, i.e., the live goat) of the verb in v. 9 is also changed to the subject (C^1). The intentional syntax arrangement is clearer by comparison between C/D and C^1/D^1.

Consecutively, the infinitive phrase E^1 also is possibly a parallel to E, although it returns to the active voice, while its implied subject could still be the goat. If it is the case, the objective pronominal suffix of E^1 could refer to Aaron. Besides, vv. 9 and 10a make a conceptual parallel in that Aaron 'makes the *hattat* offering *with it*' [i.e., with the sacrificial goat]) (וְעָשָׂהוּ חַטָּאת) in E of v. 9, whereas conversely the live goat 'makes the atonement *for him*' [i.e., for Aaron]) (לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו) in E^1 of v. 10a. Therefore, it is not unnatural to regard the subject of לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו as the live goat and render it as 'to make atonement for him (Aaron).'

The accent *atnah,* as a signal for interpretative reading, divides v. 10 into two segments. The *atnah* is located at the phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו, implying that v. 10a is to be read as one syntactic and semantic segment. V. 10b after the *atnah* assumes the active voice, while the implied subject is either Aaron, who commands to send the goat, or the goat-sender, by whom it will be sent into the wildness. Therefore, a syntactic conversion occurs between vv. 10a and 10b

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subject of לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו is the animal. Likewise, he contends that in Lev 16:10 the live goat shall be placed before God so that it [the live goat] can 'make atonement for him [Aaron].'

with the *atnah*. If it is accepted, the idea that the subject is alternated in the same syntactic segment (v. 10a) does not seem to be persuasive. To take Aaron as the subject, otherwise, the *atnah* should have been situated between לִפְנֵי יְהוָה (D²) and לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו (E¹), creating a different division to have a distinctive meaning. Therefore, provided that the Masoretic punctuation is honoured, in the syntax of v. 10a the subject of the infinitive phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו is construed to be the first word in v. 10a, that is, 'the goat (הַשָּׂעִיר)' which is the subject of the preceding passive verb, 'be placed alive (יָעֳמַד־חַי).'[146]

Secondly, there is a considerable ground from a theological view. The high priest, as a representative of the whole congregation, transfers all their sins to the live goat. In other words, the Azazel goat's counterpart at this stage of the ritual is not the congregation but Aaron as their substitutionary agent. The atonement is made in the manner where the live goat confronts Aaron rather than the whole congregation in order to bear their sins. The goat removes their sins by receiving them from Aaron. Just as the sin of the high priest actually amounts to that of the congregation by the principle of representation, so the atonement for Aaron results in the atonement for the congregation.

Aaron is not only a representative of the Israelites but also a person who takes part in the sins of the congregation. In other words, the high priest, as a member of the covenant community, is an accomplice in their sins and a sinner together with the Israelites, whether his sins come from himself or from the congregation. At this moment, he is an Israelite, dressed in the simple linen garments. Just as his sin is the community's sin, so the community's sin is his. Reversely Aaron enjoys the benefit of the atonement, that is, the effect of the *hattat* ritual, together with them, as a member of the community. Therefore, when the live goat atones for Aaron, who is both a representative of the congregation and a participant in their sins, it does so for the whole congregation. When the live goat bears the sins of the Israelites, it is suffering the punishment for the evil substitutionally by being released into the wildness where death is destined and envisaged.

In fact, it is God who makes atonement for the people of Israel through

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[146] If it may be accepted, with regard to the interpretation of the infinitive phrase in v. 10b in an active voice, the impersonal Hebrew syntax is possible to be rendered into passive in English for the natural reading like some English versions (e.g., ESV, NJB and RSV). Therefore, our possible translation could be suggested as follows: "but the goat on which the lot fell for Azazel shall be presented alive before the LORD to make atonement for him, that it may be sent away into the wilderness to Azazel" (v. 10).

Aaron and the live goat on his instruction. That is, the subject of atonement is God who has its initiative, and the live goat is merely an instrumental agent. Hence the Azazel goat, as an instrumental agent of God, bears away all the sins of both Aaron (also his household) and the congregation by dealing with Aaron. By so doing, the live goat '*makes atonement for him* (לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו).' The live goat is the substitutionary victim for the congregation and at the same time an instrumental agent of God for their atonement.

Significantly, this interpretation is consistent with the meaning of the phrase 'two goats for a *hattat* offering,' which would bring the effect of atonement for the congregation (v. 5). It means that the live goat also plays a role as the main character to make atonement for the congregation by means of Aaron, together with the sacrificial goat, the other main character.

3.4.1.2. The combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 11-19): purgation of the sanctuary

Now that the preparation of animals has been done in the first stage, the main procedure of the combined *hattat* ritual begins with the two *hattat* offerings. The function of the *hattat* offerings with a bull and a goat, by means of the blood rites, is to purge the entire sanctuary of three precincts in sequence (v. 20a), whereas the function of Azazel goat ritual is to remove and eliminate the sins of people (vv. 21-22).

At this stage, two kinds of rites attract our attention: the incense rite in the *adytum* and the blood rites in the three precincts of the sanctuary. The former is a prerequisite for the latter.

3.4.1.2.1. The incense rite in the *adytum* (vv. 12-13)

Aaron starts this procedure with the slaughtering of the bull, which is the animal for atonement of himself and his household (v. 11). Then, significantly, suspending the blood manipulation for a while after slaughtering the bull, he should take fire from the altar and put the incense on the fire before the YHWH: "the cloud of the incense may cover the Atonement Seat that is over the testimony, so that he does not die" (Lev 16:13 ESV).

On the other hand, this activity reminds us of the warning against the incident of Nadab and Abihu that led to their tragic death (Lev 10:1-2). Aaron

and his two dead sons are dramatically compared with 'die' and 'not die'; Aaron averts death by bringing the incense on 'legal' fire in contrast with his sons.

As stated in v. 13b, the cloud of incense (עֲנַן הַקְּטֹרֶת) from YHWH's fire is the essential element for Aaron's admittance into the *adytum*. Moreover, prior to the incense rite, he must have bathed his body in water and put on the linen garments for preparation to enter the *adytum*. Therefore, bathing, putting on the particular garments, and the cloud of incense from the Lord's fire, were prerequisites for his admittance into the most sacred sector.

In addition, the text (v. 9) implies that the slaughtering of the bull for Aaron and the blood-shedding are obligatory for his approach to the holiest precinct as a prerequisite, since the slaughtering rite of the bull came prior to the incense rite. True, the goat for the congregation was not yet slaughtered. Therefore, it gives an impression that the substitutionary death and blood-shedding of the animal for Aaron serves to effect atonement to some extent for Aaron by ransom for his guilt,[147] endowing him with the qualification to enter the *adytum*, although his atonement is not yet made fully.

The order of the rites indicates that the incense rite also is an integral component of the integrated atonement ritual, since it intrudes itself between the two slaughtering rites for the bull and the goat. The purpose of the incense rite is clearly to cover the Atonement Seat (כַּפֹּרֶת) with the cloud so that the high priest could avoid a death-blow caused by the overwhelming glory of YHWH's presence in the holiest place: וְלֹא יָמוּת "so that he does not die" (v. 13b ESV).[148] Thereby paradoxically God's revealing becomes also a concealing

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[147] It does not mean the removal of his *sin*. Slaughtering and blood-shedding of animals indicate the substitutionary punishment for the *guilt*, i.e., the consequence of sin. This thesis argues that while a person's sin is removed by *confession and transference* to the substitutionary animal with his hand-imposition, the impurity of sancta contaminated by his sin is purified and ransomed with the blood rite of the *hattat* animal for the sancta. By so doing, the atonement for the sinner is accomplished.

[148] As Milgrom (1991b: 58) stated, the function of the cloud of incense in the *adytum* corresponds to that of the cloud descended atop Mt Sinai and on the newly constructed tabernacle in that the cloud covered the glory (כָּבוֹד) of YHWH before the people of Israel. Although he ascribed the analogy between the cloud of incense and the cloud, and between the tabernacle and Mt Sinai to P, Milgrom's comment is noteworthy (1991b: 58):

> Just as the כָּבוֹד fire makes itself visible to Israel at Sinai (Exod 24:17), so it appears before the assembled Israelites at the Tabernacle's inauguration (9:6b, 23b, 24a). Thus the P tradition stakes out its claims that the Tabernacle is equivalent to Sinai - indeed, is a portable Sinai - assuring Israel of God's permanent presence in its midst.

in the cloud of incense.

3.4.1.2.2. Blood rites in the sancta (vv. 14-19)

The high priest performs the blood rites to purge the sancta of impurities in three consecutive stages:

1) Purgation of the *adytum* (vv. 14-16a)
2) Purgation of the shrine (vv. 16b-17)
3) Purgation of the outer altar (vv. 18-19)

At the first stage, Aaron carries out the first blood rite in the *adytum* that is filled with the incense cloud; he purges it by sprinkling some of the blood for himself and his household around the Atonement Seat (v. 14). Then he must slaughter the goat and repeat the same rite with its blood for the congregation in the same place (v. 15).[149] At the second stage, the consecutive two blood rites should be performed in the shrine to purge it, after the priest's egress from the *adytum* (vv. 16b-17). Finally the blood rite should be made in a particular way[150] for the purgation of the outer altar in the court (vv. 18-19). Hence the purgation of the entire sanctuary is completed.

V. 20a states the full achievement of purgation/atonement of the entire sanctuary. Significantly, v. 20a functions as not only the concluding statement of

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He (1991b: 58) added:

> At Sinai he [Moses] was admitted into the divine cloud (Exod 24:18a), but henceforth he must never penetrate the divine cloud, condensed into *adytum*. That is to say, he must never see God but may only hear him in the outer shrine, his view blocked by the veil. The same restrictions apply to the priests. . . the high priest who is commanded to purge the *adytum* annually is explicitly warned that he must block his vision by a smoke screen of incense lest his entry prove fatal to him.

For similar arguments of the analogy between the tabernacle and Mt Sinai, see Sailhamer (1992: 296-97); M. Douglas (1999: 79-80), who emphasizes the analogy of the body of sacrificial animals with Mt Sinai and with the Tabernacle in three paradigms. But Douglas' application of the animal autonomy to the Tabernacle and Mount Sinai is thought as a subjective overinterpretation (see n. 472 in § 6.4.3).

[149] Precisely, regarding the blood rites, there are some slight differences between those of the special *hattat* ritual in Lev 16 (the Day of Atonement) and those of the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Lev 4:1-5:13, although they are almost the same. For details, see § 5.2.2.

[150] For detailed argument on the activities and gestures of the *hattat* blood rites, see § 5.2.1. As argued in § 5.2.1, it is clear that the gestures of blood rites and their functions in the *hattat* ritual differ from those of the other sacrificial rituals.

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the *hattat* offering (vv. 11-19), but also the introduction to the ritual of the Azazel goat (vv. 20-22) to indicate the exact timing of its start:

וְכִלָּה מִכַּפֵּר [151] אֶת־הַקֹּדֶשׁ וְאֶת־אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְאֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ וְהִקְרִיב אֶת־הַשָּׂעִיר הֶחָי

"When Aaron has finished making atonement for the Most Holy Place,
the Tent of Meeting and the altar, he shall bring forward the live goat" (v. 20 NIV)

The concluding statement asserts that the blood rites of the *hattat* offerings have purged/atoned (כפר את)[152] the three precincts of the sanctuary rather than the people (cf. vv. 16, 18).

But there seems to be an intra-textual contradiction and inconsistency between the statement of v. 20 about the atonement/purgation of the sancta and the statements of vv. 6, 11, 17 which declare also that the *hattat* offerings are sacrificed to 'make atonement on behalf of (כפר בעד)' Aaron and the congregation. If the atonement of the people has already made with the sacrificial animals, why is the Azazel goat ritual, which removes the sins of the people and atones for them, necessary? Scholars have long argued with this puzzling problem, suggesting their own answers. In chapter 7 (§ 7.4.2.1), this issue will be thoroughly investigated. In this chapter, the provisional answer is given: on the Day of Atonement the *hattat* offerings functioned to purge the sanctuary only, while the Azazel goat removed the sins of the Israelites, differently from the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4:1-5:13, which removed the sin/impurity of people and simultaneously cleansed the impurity of the sancta caused by the people's sin and impurity. This conclusion is corroborated by the present analysis and interpretation of the structure of Leviticus 16.

The concise arrangement of the entire ritual process presented below displays that the object of each blood rite is not the people but the sancta. That is, the blood manipulations of the two-combined *hattat* rituals purge the three precincts of the sanctuary.

1) Purgation of the *adytum* (vv. 11-16a)

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[151] In the phrase אֶת־הַקֹּדֶשׁ וְאֶת־אֹהֶל מוֹעֵד וְאֶת־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ which refers to the three precincts of the sanctuary, the word הַקֹּדֶשׁ uniquely indicates the *adytum* in Lev 16 (vv. 2, 3, 16, 23, 33), i.e., the 'Most Holy Place' (NIV), as agreed with most modern scholars (see n. 157 below; cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 36, 62). But outside Lev 16, this word refers to the shrine, i.e., the Tent of Meeting (Lev 4:6; 10:4, 18; see the phrase in Exod 26:33, "the veil will make a separation for you between the holy place and the most holy place [בֵּין הַקֹּדֶשׁ וּבֵין קֹדֶשׁ הַקֳּדָשִׁים]" [CSB]).

[152] For the interpretation and rendering for the phrase *kipper 'et*, see chapter 2. There is no actual difference between כפר על and כפר את which are followed by the inanimate object (i.e., the sanctuary).

a) Blood rites in the *adytum* (vv. 11-15)
   i)   Blood rite of the bull for Aaron and his household (vv. 11-14)
   ii) Blood rite of the goat for the congregation (v. 15)
b) Purpose of rites: purgation of the *adytum* (16a)

2) Purgation of the shrine (vv. 16b-17)
   a) Purpose of the same blood rites: purgation of the shrine (vv. 16b)
   b) Caution against approach to the shrine (v. 17a)
   c) Purpose of the blood rites : atonement on behalf of the people (v. 17b)

3) Purgation of the outer altar (vv. 18-19)
   a) Blood rite on the outer altar (vv. 18-19a)
   b) Purpose of rite: purgation and consecration of the outer altar (v. 19b)

4) Ultimate purpose of the ritual: purgation of three precincts (v. 20a)

First of all, it should be pointed out that scholars have made mistakes with the division of this passage (vv. 11-20a). For instance, Rodriguez's structure fails to show that the blood of the two animals (the bull and the goat) purges each sanctum,[153] while he misunderstands v. 16 as the statement of purging the sancta with the goat alone. That is, it is wrong that he classifies vv. 16-20 under the category of the goat *hattat*. Contra Rodriguez, the statement of v. 16a obviously speaks of the purgation of the *adytum* with the blood of the bull and the goat rather than with the blood of the goat alone, and subsequently vv. 16b-19 describe the purgation of the shrine and the outer altar with the two

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[153] In comparison with our outline, see his wrong structural analysis of this passage:

B Community's Goat for Yahweh: A Sin-offering 16:15
   B1 Slaughtered 16:15
      B2 Bring blood Behind the Veil 16:15
         B3 Blood Manipulation 16:15
            C Atonement for the Sanctuary, Tent of Meeting, the Priesthood, the
              Congregation of Israel, and the Altar 16:16-19
               C1 Atonement for Sanctuary and Tent of Meeting 16:16
               C2 Atonement for Priesthood and Assembly 16:17
               C3 Atonement for the Altar 16:18-19
            C' Atonement Finished for the Sanctuary, the Tent of Meeting
              and the Altar 16:20
B' Community's Goat for Azazel 16:20-22

The inaccuracies are caused by his wrong way of division centered on the animals rather on the place. For a similar mistake, see Hartley (1992: 224). In contrast, Milgrom's division is correct (1991b: 1060).

animal's blood. Therefore, the purpose of stage 1 (vv. 11-16a) is to purge the *adytum* through the two individual blood rites, first with the bull's blood and then with the goat's blood, as is stated in v. 16a:

וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ [154] מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם

"In this way he will make atonement for the Most Holy Place
because of the uncleanness and rebellion of the Israelites,
whatever their sins have been" (NIV)

Stage 2 (vv. 16b-17) is to purge the shrine. V. 16b requires Aaron to repeat the same blood rites as in the *adytum* (וְכֵן יַעֲשֶׂה לְאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד), this time in the shrine that abides among the Israelites in the midst of their impurities. It is implied that the purpose of the same blood rites is to purge the shrine. V. 17a warns the people to stay outside the shrine, while the high priest performs the rites in the *adytum* and the shrine during his ingress into and egress from the *adytum*.[155]

In stage 2, there is another statement of the purpose of the blood rites, the atonement of the people (v. 17b, כִּפֶּר בַּעֲד 'make atonement on behalf of [the people]'). Even though v. 17b is included in stage 2 for the sake of convenience to discern the three stages of the blood rites that purge the three precincts of the sanctuary, it is actually the statement of purpose about another aspect of the כִּפֶּר (atonement) accomplished by the *hattat* rituals, that is, the atonement of the people. As pointed above, it seems to be a contradiction, because the text states two distinctive purposes (כִּפֶּר) at the same time in different verses: the purgation/atonement (כִּפֶּר) of the sancta (vv. 16, 18, 19, 20,

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[154] For the interpretation of the triple evil terms in v. 16a, which are rare and difficult wording in terms of the Hebrew syntax, see § 7.4.2.2. The meaning of the phase must be determined in light of vv. 16b, 19, and 21-22, in particular, v. 21aβ which is parallel to v. 16a (see n. 159).

[155] On the basis of the fact that there is no mention about the incense altar in Lev 16, since J. Wellhausen (1973: 65-66), many modern scholars (e.g., Knohl, 1995: 29 n. 62) have said that Lev 16 belongs to Q, which was the original source of P, because the writer of P did not know the incense altar, in distinct from Lev 4 that refers to it. See Janowski (1982: 227-40) who says in the same view that Lev 8-9 did not know the blood rite in the shrine. But the occasions of Lev 8 and 16 differ from that of Lev 4 (Kiuchi, 1987: 122) and Lev 16:16b is an abbreviation of the ritual procedure (Gane, 2005: 26-27). It must be recalled that the *hattat* offerings in Lev 8-9 were not to expiate a *specific* sin(s) or ritual impurity of the Israelites like that of Lev 4-5 and 12-15. For the archeological evidence about the antiquity of the incense altar, see Gane (2005: 27 n. 6).

30, 33; cf. v. 24 with the burnt offerings) and the atonement (כִּפֶּר) of people (vv. 6, 11, 17, 33, 34). This thesis argues that the atonement for the people in the current stages (vv. 6, 11, 17) envisages and anticipates the ultimate atonement of the people in vv. 30, 33-34 that will be accomplished with the Azazel goat ritual.

At any rate, the atonement of the people is regarded as the result of the purgation of both the *adytum* and the shrine (vv. 16-17), although it still awaits the Azazel goat ritual for accomplishment of the atonement. As for the translation of v. 17, NASB is recommendable:

(17a) וְכָל־אָדָם לֹא־יִהְיֶה בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד בְּבֹאוֹ לְכַפֵּר בַּקֹּדֶשׁ עַד־צֵאתוֹ
(17b) וְכִפֶּר בַּעֲדוֹ וּבְעַד בֵּיתוֹ וּבְעַד כָּל־קְהַל יִשְׂרָאֵל

"When he goes in to make atonement in the holy place, no one shall be in the tent of meeting until he comes out, that he may make atonement for himself and for his household and for all the assembly of Israel"

This translation connotes that the *waw* conjugation (וְכִפֶּר) in v. 17b should be taken as 'sequential *wqtl*' "to represent a situation as a sequence of a preceding situation" of v. 17a (Waltke and O'Connor, 1990: 526-27). Therefore, the effect of atonement for the people in 17b can be understood as the result of the previous blood rites in the *adytum* and the shrine (vv. 16-17),[156] possibly including the observance of the warning against the approach to the shrine. The purgation of the *adytum* and the shrine leads to the atonement of people.

Thus the important principle, which is argued in this thesis, is identified: the purgation/atonement of the sancta is directly connected to the atonement of people; that is, the former brings about the effect of the latter. However, on the Day of Atonement the atonement for the people stated at this stage does not mean a fully accomplished one, since the atonement for the people is not completed until the Azazel goat ritual is performed. Scholars' confusion has been caused by the misunderstanding on the atonement for the people which is stated in the intermediate stage.

In stage 3 (vv. 18-19), Aaron comes out of the shrine[157] and then purges

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[156] Milgrom (1991b:1036) says that v. 16b "introduces the purpose of the high priest's rites in the shrine." Thus for him the atonement of v. 17b is related to the shrine only rather than both to the *adytum* and the shrine.

[157] As for 'in the holy place' (בַּקֹּדֶשׁ) in v. 17a, at a glance the syntax of v. 17 looks to indicate 'in the shrine (בְּאֹהֶל מוֹעֵד)' in v. 17a. For the reason, since ancient Jewish interpreters, it has been understood that the high priest exited from the '*adytum*' and performed the blood

the outer altar in the court particularly with both the blood of the bull and the goat. Here it is implied that the high priest should mingle the blood taken from the two animals. Significantly this mingled blood is a strong sign of the unification of the two *hattat* offerings (cf. Gane, 2005: 211). That is, the two is combined into one. The effect of the purgation is 'reconsecration' of the altar (and maybe 'reconsecration' of the entire sanctuary). The reconsecration means the restoration of the sanctuary to its original sanctity that was endowed in the dedication of the altar in Leviticus 8 (= Exod 29), rather than an individual effect through the blood rites (see § 5.2.2.3).

In conclusion, every stage has its own role to purge the three sacred precincts to accomplish incorporatively the purgation of the entire sanctuary. As mentioned, the concluding statement (v. 20a) of the purpose, which is the introduction of vv. 20b-22 as well, sums up the ultimate achievement by the combined *hattat* ritual. The recapitulating statements of purpose which occur at the end of each stage (vv. 16a, 17, and 19b) bolster the reliability of our argument: that is, the combined *hattat* offerings purge the sanctuary at three levels.[158]

We can summarize the entire process of the combined *hattat* ritual as follows:

Stage 1 (vv. 11-16a) - purgation of the *adytum*
Stage 2 (vv. 16b-17) - purgation of the shrine
Stage 3 (vv. 18-19)   - purgation of the outer altar

rites on the incense alter 'in the shrine,' instead of the outer altar (Hoffmann, 1905: 450; Rashi, 1970: 24-25; D. Z; Harrison, 1980: 173; Levine, 1989: 103-5). However, as mentioned in n. 151 above, the term הַקֹּדֶשׁ refers uniquely to the *adytum* in Lev 16. For this reason, Josephus (*Ant.* 3.243) and Ibn Ezra (1986 on Lev 16:18; see Gane, 2005: 76) identified 'the altar before YHWH' in v. 18 as the outer altar. This view is supported by a number of modern scholars (Kurtz, 1980: 392-93; Milgrom, 1991b: 1035; Hartley, 1992: 510; Gane, 2005: 76-77). It is presumed that Aaron exited from the shrine after he finished the blood rites in the *adytum* and the shrine in sequence. In this regard, the *adytum* ('the holy place') is understood to be a concise expression to indicate the precincts of Aaron's activities inside the sanctuary. Lev 16:16b clearly refers to purification of the shrine. Subsequently, vv. 18-19 must indicate the purification of the outer altar, with regard to the stament of cleansing the tripartite sanctuary in Lev 20. In view of the elaborate ritual logic interwoven in the systematic structure of Lev 16, it is likely that the outer altar was the final destination of the blood rites in the tripartite sanctuary.

[158] The statement of purpose in vv. 6, 11, and 17 is related to the atonement of the people by the integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22): "to make atonement on behalf of (כפר בעד) the people." Why is the atonement for the sancta and the people stated alternately? As noted, this is another question which will be investigated in § 7.4. For the combination of *kipper ba'ad* + people, see chapter 2.

The most important point is that the two *hattat* rituals "are interwoven with each other, that is to say, the second ritual begins before the first ritual is completed and similar activities belonging to the two rituals alternate. When the mixed bloods of both animals are applied together to the outer altar (vv. 18-19), the rituals are merged" (Gane, 2005: 218; cf. 1992: 210-11; 2004: 155).

That is to say, in stages 1 and 2, the slaughtering and the blood rites of the bull are followed by those of the goat. Significantly, in stage 3 the blood of two animals is mingled and used for the purgation of the outer altar. Thereby the mixture of the two animal's blood is a decisive evidence of the integration of the rituals.

We may take account into two additional evidences for the integration. Firstly, the fat of the *hattat* animals shall be burned *together* right after the execution of the burnt offerings (v. 25), and secondly, the remains of the *hattat* animals shall be disposed of *together* in the concluding ritual at the end. Thus, it is clear that the two *hattat* animals are incorporated into one ritual in order to purge the sanctuary.

The ritual incorporation can be extended to merging the Azazel goat ritual with the combined *hattat* ritual to make a ritual complex unit named the 'integrated atonement ritual.' Furthermore, the unification of the rituals does not cease with the Azazel goat ritual; finally the burnt offerings are also merged into the integrated atonement ritual to form the 'unified ceremony' of the Day. Indeed, the burning of the fat taken from the *hattat* animals, which is prescribed in principle as the final rite of the *hattat* offerings in Leviticus 4, is deferred and transposed after the burnt offerings. The transposition of the fat-burning implies that it is inseparably united with the previous rituals by tying them into one: the combined *hattat* ritual, the Azazel goat ritual, and the burnt offering ritual. Thus, these three ritual units are regarded to be a large package of the rituals, which form a 'unified ceremony' for one ultimate purpose, the national atonement of Israel.

3.4.1.3. The ritual of the Azazel goat (vv. 20-22): removal of the sins of Israel

After Aaron has finished the purgation of the whole sanctuary, he should perform the ritual of the Azazel goat as the third part of the 'integrated atonement ritual.' As stated, v. 20a has two functions: the concluding statement of the combined *hattat* ritual (vv. 6-19) and the introduction to the Azazel goat ritual (vv. 20-22). Thus the Azazel goat ritual starts with the confirmation of the

sanctuary purgation.

Now that some questions on the live goat and its ritual have already been discussed above, other issues in this section are as follows: (1) the meaning of the two-hand imposition on the live goat; (2) the transference of sins on it; (3) the interpretation of the triple evil terms in v. 16a and v. 21aβ[159] in parallel; (4) the dynamics and function of the release rite to send the live goat into the wildness; and (5) the purpose of the Azazel goat ritual.

These questions are not addressed here, but discussed in the next chapters, since the primary aim of this chapter is to inquire into the elaborated edifice of the unified ceremony as a whole performed on the Day and the unique integration and association of the rituals. Therefore, the focus is still on exploring the linking devices between the previous combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual.

It is stated in v. 20 that right after the combined *hattat* ritual has been completed, the Azazel goat ritual should be executed next:

"When Aaron has finished making atonement for the Most Holy Place,
the Tent of Meeting and the altar, he shall bring forward the live goat" (NIV)

V. 20 starts with a circumstantial clause (v. 20a) which points out the timing for the performance of the live goat ritual, and alludes to the continuity and integration of successive rituals. But more importantly, the high priest still wears the holy linen garments in this ritual, as pointed above, indicates that the entire process of the two successive rituals (the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual) constitutes an 'integrated atonement ritual' to atone for Israel. The linen garments signify the high priest's humanity as a member of the congregation and their representative before YHWH. Dressed in the clothes, Aaron confesses the sins of Israel and transfers them to the live goat. After finishing the ritual, he shall change back into his normal high priest's garments (vv. 23-24).

Thus the two *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat ritual are tied into the 'integrated atonement ritual.' The purpose of the integrated atonement ritual is a

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[159] (v. 16a) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ *מִטֻּמְאֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל *וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם*
" . . . because of the uncleanness and rebellion of the Israelites,
whatever their sins have been" (NIV)

(v. 21aβ) וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו *אֶת־כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל *וְאֶת־כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם*
" . . . all the wickedness and rebellion of the Israelites--all their sins " (NIV)

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full scale atonement of the whole Israel which is attained by virtue of the purgation of the sanctuary with the combined *hattat* ritual and the removal of the people' sins with the Azazel goat ritual. By so doing, the virtual atonement for Israel is achieved on the Day, even though there is the statement in v. 24 that seemingly another atonement will be made with the burnt offerings (vv. 23-24).

3.4.2. The burnt offerings (vv. 23-25): ratification of the atonement

3.4.2.1. Aaron's return to the regular apparel (vv. 23-24)

The ritual of the two burnt offerings (vv. 23-25) should be performed directly after the integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22). In this ritual, the high priest should change back into his regular apparel and offer the two rams of the burnt offering on the outer altar respectively for Aaron/his household and for the congregation.

It is assumed that Aaron performs his ablution to purify the contamination generated by the blood rites (v. 24), just as he bathed his body in water before entering the *adytum* (v. 4). But why should the high priest change the linen garments to his regular apparel? Scholars suggest diverse purposes. Hartley (1992: 242) thinks that the change of clothes may signify the 'removal of holiness,' but in direct opposition to him, Kiuchi (2007: 305) argues that it means 'purification of uncleanness.' By contrast, Milgrom (1991b: 1016; see above for detail) argues that the change of garments might be simply for practical purposes: that is, the clothes got soaked with the blood after the severe blood rites. The problem of these ideas is clear: if so, why did Aaron and the priests not put on the linen garments in the ordinary *hattat* ritual to perform the blood rites in the sanctuary (Lev 4), because their ordinary apparel would be soaked with the blood? The same critique can be applied to Kiuchi and Gane.

Since the high priest has to wear the linen garments exclusively on the Day of Atonement to enter the holiest *adytum* before YHWH, the changing dress simply has a theological meaning. The purpose of the linen garments, as proposed above, might be that the high priest assumes the state of lower holiness in order to become a member of the congregation and to enter the holiest place in his humble state before the presence of YHWH. Otherwise when he performs the integrated atonement ritual for the atonement of Israel, the garments could signify the status of the angels who escort YHWH. No matter which is correct, it seems that the change of the clothes has nothing to

do with the removal of holiness or impurity permeated into them, and with the practical purpose to put off the clothes soaked with blood. If the practical purpose is correct, Aaron had to change his linen garments before he starts the next ritual, the Azazel goat ritual. But he keeps on wearing the linen garment until he finishes dealing with the Azazel goat.

Therefore, the dressing of the linen garments is an evidence for the integration of the combined *hattat* ritual and the Azazel goat ritual. While Aaron is in the *special status* with the special garments, he should purge the sancta with the combined *hattat* offerings and remove the sins of the Israelite with the live goat. With Aaron's changing back into his regular garments, the *function* of the special garments comes to an end.

It is stated in v. 24b that the purpose of the burnt offerings is also to make atonement. If the virtual atonement is accomplished with the previous rituals, why is it necessary to make another atonement with the burnt offerings? What is the meaning of the atonement? The reason for it is also explored below in observing that the combined rituals are tied even with the burnt offering.

3.4.2.2. Linkage of the burnt offerings
with the integrated atonement ritual

Many interpreters classify this section of the burnt offerings under 'the concluding ritual acts' (vv. 23-28).[160] Especially Rodriguez's opinion (1996: 280) is based on the several changes of the clothes, accompanied by bathing, that appear as a common feature in vv. 23-28.[161]

However, in vv. 3-5 the burnt offerings are prescribed as an integral element of the ceremonial rituals for the atonement of Israel. That is, YHWH commanded Aaron to bring the two rams for the burnt offering as essential for the achievement of the Day's purpose, along with the *hattat* offerings (a bull and a goat) and the Azazel goat.

In contrast to the ritual of the burnt offerings, the concluding ritual (vv. 26-28) does not serve to effect the atonement attained through the entire process of the previous rituals, even though there might be a possibility that the effect of atonement could be annulled in theory in light of Leviticus 7:18 which prescribes the rule for the consumption of the peace offering flesh.[162] It means that the two

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[160] E.g., Wenham (1979: 235); Levine (1989: 107); Kiuchi (2007: 305).

[161] See vv. 23, 24, 26, and 28.

[162] Lev 7:18 states that the effect of the peace offering can be annulled even after three days have passed, if the offerer fails to deal with the flesh according to the regulations, although

burnt offerings on the Day of Atonement could not be classified into the concluding ritual.

The special element in this stage is the 'burning rite' which burns the fat of *hattat* animals on the outer altar (v. 25). Though this rite is classified into the section of the burnt offerings (vv. 23-25) in this chapter for the sake of convenience (see the structure), in the strict sense it does not belong to the burnt offering, since in light of the rule of Leviticus 4[163] the burning of the *hattat* fat should be a component of the *hattat* ritual. Leviticus 4 prescribes that the fat of the *hattat* animals should be burned (הִקְטִיר)[164] on the outer altar as the final and integral rite for atonement (vv. 4:8-10, 19-20, 26, 31), whereas the remains of the animals should be burned (שָׂרַף) outside the camp (v. 21; 6:23 [30]) or eaten by the priests (6:19 [26], 22 [29]). In Leviticus 4, this disposal of the *hattat* remains is performed after the proclamation of atonement and forgiveness for the congregation which denotes the completion of the *hattat* offering (4:20).[165]

Despite the rule for the *hattat* ritual, Aaron should not burn (הִקְטִיר) the fat of *hattat* offerings (bull and goat) on the outer altar until the two rams of the burnt offerings are offered by burning them [הִקְטִיר] on the altar in light of Leviticus1:9, 13. Rodriguez (1996: 285) notes correctly:

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the offering has been accepted as "a pleasing aroma to the Lord" (Lev 3:5 ESV). Likewise, even though the priestly literature, including Leviticus, keeps silence, the same principle can be applied to the *hattat* offering in a distict way from the peace offering (see n. 165 and § 5.3.4.4).

[163] According to Milgrom (1991b: 1050), the rabbis regarded the burning of *hattat* fat after the burnt offering as a normal sequence just for a practical reason; but it is thought that the sequence of their blood rites is arranged for a theological reason: "The blood [rite] of the purification offering precedes the blood [rite] of the burnt offering because it appeases; the members of the burnt offering precede the suet of the purification offering because they are entirely given over the [altar] fire (*m. Zebah.* 10:2)." The rabbinic rule probably means that if the fat is burning on the altar, it would be hard to burn entirely the animals of burnt offering. It seems, however, that the transposition of the fat burning was caused by a theological and ritualistic intention to integrate the rituals into one larger ritual unit.

[164] It is usually argued that the verb הִקְטִיר refers to a ritual burning in contrast to the verb שָׂרַף to indicate non-ritual burning. However, the burning (שָׂרַף) of the *hattat* flesh also is a ritual activity. That is, in the *hattat* context the שָׂרַף activity outside the camp must be considered as a ritual burning with a specific purpose or function (removal or elimination of evil), different from הִקְטִיר on the altar.

[165] For this reason, it seems that the disposal of remains is not related to the function of atonement and does not influence the effect of the achieved atonement. However, the failure of the flesh disposal could lead probably to the failure of the *hattat* offering, although its effect of atonement could be still valid for the offerer; the responsibility for the failure would be ascribed to the officiating priest, instead of the offerer (compare with the case of the peace offering in Lev 7:18).

"What was in the regular sin-offering a series of consecutive steps in the sacrificial process (Lev 4) is intentionally separated in the ritual of the Day of Atonement in order to make room for new details in this sophisticated and complex ritual unit. Thus, the unity of the chapter is emphasized."

Significantly it supports that the burning of fat was a final procedure to complete the whole ceremony, leaving the concluding ritual (vv. 26-28): the two-combined *hattat* ritual, the Azazel goat ritual and the two burnt offerings.

If it is the case, it is possible to say that in Leviticus 16 the entire ceremony for atonement is not finished until the fat of the *hattat* animals is burned on the outer altar. That is, the eventual finish of the *hattat* offerings is made with the fat-burning of the *hattat* animals after the burnt offerings, even though it is declared in many verses of Leviticus 16[166] that virtual atonement has already been achieved with the integral atonement ritual before the burning of the fat. Thus this fact implies again that the two-combined *hattat* offerings and the Azazel goat, together with the two burnt offerings, constitute a 'unified ceremony' which is finally tied with the burning of the *hattat* fat.[167]

3.4.2.3. The meaning of the atonement by the burnt offerings

It must be recalled that the virtual atonement is accomplished by the integrated atonement ritual (vv. 6-22). But what is the atonement made by the burnt offerings? This thesis argues that the burnt offerings bring about the ratification and effectiveness of the atonement accomplished by the integrated atonement ritual. By so doing, the burnt offerings play a part to make atonement for Aaron and the congregation. Hence the burnt offerings make atonement for the people.

The function of the burnt offering in Leviticus 1 and the meaning of כִּפֶּר accomplished with it have incurred a confusion. Leviticus 1:3-4 implies that the primary purpose of the burnt offering focuses on the honouring of God

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[166] V. 17 about the atonement of the people; vv. 16, 18 about the purgation of the sancta. However, the atonement of the people stated in v. 17 does not means the completion of the atonement which will be accomplished with the subsequent ritual of the Azazel goat.

[167] In agreement with Rodriguez (1996: 284) who said: "The chiastic structure [of Lev 16] combines the main elements of the ritual of the Day of Atonement with its fundamental purpose, forming a well-structured literary unity . . . In Lev 16 we have three rites tightly integrated to create a new ritual complex unit with a very specific purpose." However, Rodriguez did not give clear evidences for the integration of the rituals except the structural ties.

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('pleasing' to God) (Jenson, 1992: 155). L. M. Trevaskis states in his recent work (2011: 176): "two theological purposes are assigned to the 'burnt offering' which are not mutually exclusive"; either a 'gift of entreaty' or a symbol of 'religious ideal' (Trevaskis, 2011: 176-78). Regarding its function as a gift of entreaty, Levine (1989 : 5-6) claims that the burnt offering "was a signal to God that His worshippers desire to bring their need to His attention; its purpose was to secure an initial response from Him," and for this reason it is usually offered as the first sacrifice in occasions with other sacrifices.[168]

A 'religious ideal' is favored as the meaning of the burnt offering, as Trevaskis (2011: 176-77) explains,[169] because the burnt offering brings about the effect of כִּפֶּר (atonement) as well, which indicate 'ransom.' Levine (1989: 7) notes that the burnt offering which is offered as a valuable gift of entreaty makes ransom for the offerer's life from 'God's wrathful disposition toward him.' Due to this feature of the burnt offering, it may be argued that it has the two functions of 'gift' (Gabe) and 'atonement' (Sühne) (E. Blum, 1990: 317).

It is clear that the burnt offering is not utilized to atone for a specific sin in the priestly legislation, because there is the *hattat* offering for it. It must be noticed that there is no declaration of forgiveness for a specific sin unlike in the case of the *hattat* offering (Lev 4:20, 26). For this reason, Hartley (1992: 18, 24) notes that "As an atoning sacrifice the whole offering (i.e., the burnt offering) was offered not so much for specific sins but for the basic sinfulness of each person and the society as a whole." Trevaskis (2011: 206) also remarks that "the rebellious disposition of humanity" is envisioned in the burnt offering to appease the wrath of God.

In the same vein, this thesis contends that probably the atonement by the

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[168] In his previous work (1974: 25-26), Levine argued in more detail, relying on many biblical occurrences, that whereas only the burnt offering without other sacrifices serves to attract God's attention (e.g., Num 23:1-6; 1 Kgs 18; Jdg 6, 13; 2 Kgs 3), the burnt offering that usually precedes the peace offering has "the purpose of invoking the deity preparatory to joining with him in a fellowship of sacrifice, which was the context for petition and thanksgiving, and for the expression of other religious attitudes of this character." Although some scholars (e.g., J. W. Watts, 2007: 70) are not fully satisfied with the order of sacrifices argued by Levine, generally it is acceptable. But in most appearances of the *hattat* offering accompanied with the burnt offering, the overwhelming evidence is that the *hattat* offering precedes the burnt offering, except in rare cases (Lev 12:6, 8; cf. 2 Ch 29:21-24).

[169] As L. M. Trevaskis (2011: 177) cited them as an interpretation of the 'religious ideal,' Watts (2007: 71) illustrates such meaning of the burnt offering with biblical stories of human sacrifice like the stories of Abraham and Isaac (Gen 22), Jephthah and his daughter (Jdg 11:31), and Mesha King of Moab and his son (2 Kgs 3:27), saying: "The prominence of the עֹלָה in biblical rhetoric emphasizes this ideal of self-denial, even though it prohibits the specific act of child sacrifice (Exod 13:13; Lev 17:21; 20:3-5; Deut 18:10)."

burnt offering in Leviticus 1 denotes 'ransom' for the offerer's life from God's wrath incurred by human *existential deficiency* before שְׁכִנָה of the holy God, as implied in the encounters of humans with the holy God (e.g., Exod 3:5; Isa 6:5). But it must be acknowledged that the primary purpose of the burnt offering may be 'devotion to God' by offering and burning the whole animals on the altar.

The two burnt offerings in Leviticus 16 are also placed under the same debate. Some interpreters regards them as either an 'invocation' to soothe YHWH's wrath for the acceptance of the congregation to Him (Levine, 1974: 107) or the 'total dedication' of all the people to YHWH (Kiuchi, 2007: 307). Geller (1992: 97-124) thinks that "the whole burnt offerings restart the daily cult" after the "re-establishment of creation" attained by the atonement rituals of Leviticus 16:11-23. However, Milgrom (1991b: 1049) notes that they just expiate the people without function to purge the sancta, in line with his consistent argument on the *hattat* ritual.[170]

But the problem with the case of Leviticus 16 lies in that the burnt offerings should come after the atonement of Israel accomplished with the integrated atonement ritual to remove all the sins of the people and to cleanse all the impurities of the sancta contaminated by their sins.

For the reason, this thesis argues that the atonement for the people by the two burnt offerings stated in 24b might denote the *ratification of the atonement* which has already accomplished by the integrated atonement ritual, along with the dedication of the congregation. In other words, the atonement by the integrated atonement ritual is ratified with the two burnt offerings for Aaron and the congregation, even though it is true that at ordinary times the burnt offering as such can make an independent atonement, in addition to the implied meaning of devotion (Lev 1:4). In the burnt offerings on the Day of Atonement, it is not assumed that the ransom is made to avoid the wrath of God, because the ransom is satisfied with the integrated atonement ritual. In light of the occurrences of the burnt offering in the Hebrew Bible, it is unnecessary to think that the burnt offering always has the function of atonement, although Leviticus 1 states it.[171]

This moment, the spontaneous and joyful response of the people to the

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[170] Milgrom's argument (see § 2.2.1) is that the *hattat* offering *purges only the sancta*, but the other expiatory sacrifices *expiate only the persons* without the purgation of the sancta.

[171] There is another possible interpretation on the function of the burnt offerings. In some cases, the burnt offering may have a quantitative meaning which supplements the *hattat* offering in quantity. Certain combinations of the *hattat* offering and the burnt offering imply that this idea may be plausible (Lev 12:6, 8; 14:19, 22, 31; 15:15, 20; Num 6:11; 8:12; 2Ch 29:24; cf. Num 15:24). However, the burnt offerings in Lev 16 seem not to have such meaning.

achieved atonement would be expressed by burning the rams of the burnt offering on the outer altar. This ritual may be, therefore, symbolize a total and fresh dedication of the whole congregation (following Kiuchi, 2007: 307) as well as its ratification after the achievement of atonement. By accepting the burnt offerings (i.e., dedication of the people) as an aroma pleasing to himself (Lev 1: 9, 17), YHWH would approve finally the accomplished atonement and be present among the purged and re-consecrated sanctuary in order to abide with his people.

Therefore, the burnt offerings were also an essential part of entire ceremony to effect the atonement, whatever meaning they could have. Although the virtual atonement has been fulfilled with the integrated atonement ritual, it could not be effective without the ratification through the burnt offerings. In other words, the statement that the burnt offerings in v. 24 should be offered to 'make atonement for the people' might indicate that it would be an essential condition for the effectiveness of the atonement achieved by the integrated atonement ritual. In this respect, it is likely that the failure of the burnt offerings might lead to the nullification of the attained atonement.

3.4.3. The concluding ritual (vv. 26-28)

The concluding ritual of the unified ceremony is a final procedure in section II (vv 6-28). It consists of two parts in parallel: (1) the entrance rite of the goat-sender (v. 26); and (2) the entrance rite of the remains-handler after the disposal of the *hattat* remains (vv. 27-28). These consecutive concluding rites as such also form a combined ritual.

Strikingly, the same entrance rite (ablution and clothes washing) is required for the admittance to the camp of both the goat-sender and the remains-handler respectively. This indicates that the two entrance rites have the same function: cleansing the impurity of the persons who are contaminated by the live goat and the remains of the *hattat* animals. Moreover, it is implied that the impure substances are borne in both the Azazel goat which is sent to the wildness and the flesh of the *hattat* animals which is burned outside the camp (in a clean place according to Lev 4:12).[172]

As mentioned, the disposal of the *hattat* remains presumably does not

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[172] This thesis will argue in § 5.3 that on the Day of Atnoement the flesh of the *hattat* animals bears away the impurities of the sanctuary which were absorbed in it through the blood rite, whereas the live goat carries away the iniquities of the Israelites which were transferred into itself through the imposition of Aaron's both hands on it.

have the virtual function of atonement, whether in the combined *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement or in the ordinary *hattat* ritual. Nevertheless, it was a postrequisite for the intact accomplishment of atonement. If the high priest fails to perform the ritual procedures on the Day of Atonement, including the burnt offerings and the concluding ritual, it is presumed that the responsibility of the failure is not only ascribed to the high priest, but also to the whole congregation, because of the socio-religious state of the high priest who represents the congregation. As a result, atonement would not be achieved on the Day of Atonement. Therefore, this procedure would have to be carried out cautiously so that the failure in the concluding activities could not result in the annulment of the atonement together with an additional sin incurred by its failure.

This situation can be compared with the priest's cultic failure in the ordinary *hattat* offering. In that case, if the sinner completes to offer the *hattat* animal through the ritual procedures, his sin is removed and he is expiated, although the priest does not yet dispose of the flesh. But when the priest neglects to dispose of the flesh by eating or burning, the responsibility of the failure will be ascribed to the officiating priest, and not to the offerer.[173]

Significantly, the integration of the rituals is evidenced in the concluding ritual (vv. 26-28) as well. First of all, the reversed order of the two entrance rites reinforces our argument. As for the order of the entrance rites, the goat-sender's rite comes first and the remains-handler's rite follows it. By contrast, the integrated atonement ritual was in the reverse order: the combined *hattat* ritual is prior to the Azazel goat ritual. In short, the order is reversed in the concluding ritual.

If the prescriptive order of the entrance rites refer to a chronological sequence, the remains-handler could not take the remains outside the camp to burn them until the goat-sender comes back into the camp (v. 26). It means that even after the burnt offerings was finished (v. 24) and the fat of the *hattat* animals was burned on the outer altar (v. 25), the remains of the *hattat* animals had to wait for the goat-sender to return to the camp.

In other words, with the burnt offerings and the Azazel goat ritual done, the remains of the *hattat* animals were burnt outside the camp. This indicates that the disposal of the *hattat* remains was a final rite to complete the ceremony of the Day. At last, all the procedures of the ceremony end with the entrance rite for the remains-handler. Therefore, the fat of the *hattat* animals was burned to complete the atonement process, and the remains of the *hattat* animals were

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[173] For further argument of this issue, see n. 165 above and § 5.3.4.4.

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burned to finalize the entire ceremony of the Day at the end.

To sum, the unified ceremony started with the *hattat* ritual and ended with the final procedure of the *hattat* ritual, making an inclusive ritual form to contain the Azazel goat ritual and the burnt offerings. In this manner, all the rituals on the Day constituted the large polysynthetic ritual unit, the unified ceremony.

3.5. Section III: calenderic instruction (vv. 29-34)

This final section is to institute the Day of Atonement for Israel by fixing the date, and by instructing eternal statues of the Day for the anointed priest and the Israelites. It has three divisions:

1) Statutes for the Israelites (vv. 29-31)
2) Statutes for the anointed priest (vv. 32-33)
3) Conclusion (v. 34)

This institutionalization of the Day is supplemented by Leviticus 23:27-32 with the reiterated emphases on the rest and the self-denial of the congregation in the context of the feast days in the month of Tishri.

While the passage of vv. 1-28 is an administrative prescription, this section (vv. 29-34) is a didactic instruction with the change of the verbs from the third to the second person. Probably, because this section is rather instructive, it betrays more explicit literary techniques like the chiastic structure in its first division (vv. 29-31), the statutes for the Israelites (Milgrom, 1991b: 1057).[174]

The second division (vv. 32-33) repeats the preparation required of the high priest in the first section (i.e., the linen garments of the high priest) and adds other qualifications of the successor of the high priest; he has to be

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[174] For instance, Milgrom (1991b: 1057) shows that the repetition by chiasm in the first division (vv. 29-31) emphasizes the practice of self-denial for the achievement of the Day's purpose centered on X. Each pair of stanza is displayed in a thematic or terminological parallel.

A וְהָיְתָה לָכֶם לְחֻקַּת עוֹלָם (v. 29)
B תְּעַנּוּ אֶת־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם (v. 29)
C וְכָל־מְלָאכָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ (v. 29)
X כִּי־בַיּוֹם הַזֶּה יְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיכֶם לְטַהֵר (v. 30)
C^1 שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן הִיא לָכֶם (v. 31)
B^1 וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם (v. 31)
A^1 חֻקַּת עוֹלָם (v. 31)

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anointed and ordained as the successor of his father.

The date is fixed on the tenth day of the seventh month (Tishri). Remarkably, this date is the same one as the day of proclamation of the Jubilee Year for some theological reasons.[175] The day is called שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן, an idiom that refers to a special rest day with the features of rest and self-denial (23:32).[176]

Milgrom (1991b: 1054) notes that on the grounds of the biblical semantic range and rabbinic definition of 'self-denial,' the phrase וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם[177] contains fasting, sleeping on the ground, no changing of the clothes, refraining from sex, no bathing, and so on. These abstinences imply that confession and remorse of sin were accompanied as well. This self-denial would be a prerequisite for the atonement on the Day. Without the self-denial, the entire ceremony would be invalid.

The threefold statement on the purport of the statutes as the aim of the Day is repeated in this section (vv. 30, 33, 34): the purgation/atonement of the sancta and the atonement of the Israelites. V. 34, as the final conclusive statement, declares the ultimate purpose of the Day:

לְכַפֵּר עַל־בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל מִכָּל־חַטֹּאתָם אַחַת בַּשָּׁנָה וַיַּעַשׂ כַּאֲשֶׁר צִוָּה יְהוָה אֶת־מֹשֶׁה

"to make atonement for the sons of Israel for all their sins once every year." (NASB)

This final statement indicates that the aim of the purgation of the sanctuary and the removal of the people's sins is to make the national atonement for the community of Israel.

Chapters 6 and 7 will make it clear that purgation of the sanctuary is an essential process to make atonement/forgiveness for people. Without the former, the latter could not be achieved; the purgation of the sanctuary leads to the atonement of the people. That is, the atonement of the people requires both the

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[175] We do not discuss the historical background of the fixation of the date of the Day and the starting date of the Jubilee Year, because it falls outside and does not match the aim of the thesis. For theological meanings implied in the coincidence of the date of the Day and the starting date of the Jubilee Year, see Kawashima (2003: 370-83) and the brief note in the concluding chapter of this thesis (§ 8.2).

[176] 'A Sabbath of solemn rest' (NASB; ESV; Wenham, 1979: 227; Hartley, 1992: 221); 'a Sabbath of complete rest' (CSB; RSV; Levine, 1989: 109; Milgrom, 1991b: 1011); 'a great Sabbath' (E. Gerstenberger, 1996: 214). This idiom is also used for the sabbatical day in Lev 23:3; Exod 31:15; 35:2, and particularly in the phrase of the sabbatical year in Lev 25:4.

[177] "you shall afflict your souls" (ESV; ASV) or "you shall practice self-denial" (NJPS followed by CSB and Milgrom).

purgation of the sanctuary and the removal of the people's sins. Thus this threefold statement of the purpose indicates that the function of the unified ceremony aims to make atonement for Israel by purging the sancta with the sacrificial animals and by removing all the sins of the people with the live goat.

Chapter 4
Activity components of the *hattat* ritual (1)
Ritual theory and Hand imposition

4.1. Introduction

On the Day of Atonement, a national atonement is accomplished with the 'integrated atonement ritual,' hereafter called the 'special *hattat* ritual,' consisting of the 'two combined *hattat* rituals' and the Azazel goat ritual.[178] The special *hattat* ritual, as a macro ritual unit, was performed for all the sins of the Israelites and all the impurities of the sanctuary that were accumulated throughout the year. Thus atonement for sin and impurity is made with the *hattat* ritual, whether the ordinary *hattat* ritual on ordinary days (Lev 4-5; 12-15) or the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16).

Now the question is how the atonement is made with the *hattat* ritual. To put it another way, what is the *atonement mechanism* operated through the *hattat* ritual? What is the difference between the mechanism of the ordinary *hattat* ritual and that of the special *hattat* ritual. Although the primary focus of this thesis is on exploring the atonement mechanism operating in the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement, a close examination of the relationship between the special *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 16 and the ordinary *hattat* rituals in Leviticus 4-5:13 (for sins) and Leviticus 12-15 (for impurities) is required.

To grasp the dynamics and mechanism of the *hattat* ritual, it is necessary to explore the activity components of the *hattat* ritual and their meanings or functions.[179] This study assumes that basically a *hattat* ritual activity has a consistent meaning and function in both cases of the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4-5:13, 12-15 and of the special *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 16, even though let alone the Azazel goat ritual, there are some minute differences in

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[178] The Azazel goat is taken as a special part of the special *hattat* ritual complex, as argued in chapter 3.

[179] In this discussion, the terms 'meaning' and 'function' of a ritual activity are usually employed as the same concept. In this respect, the meaning of hand imposition and the function of hand imposition refer to the same. However, sometimes the two terms are distinct, as in the case of blood. That is, the meaning of blood is distinguished from the function of blood. In the sacrificial context, whereas 'the life of the flesh is in blood' (Lev 17:11) or 'the life of all flesh is blood' (v. 14) refers to meaning of blood, 'atone for (= ransom) your souls' (לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם) (v. 17b) points to function of blood.

ritual practice between the two cases of the *hattat* ritual; for instance, in the case of the special *hattat* ritual, blood of the bull and the goat are dashed and sprinkled in each of three precincts, and hand imposition[180] is performed on the live goat rather than on the sacrificial *hattat* animals.

The ritual activities of the *hattat* sacrifice are as follows in chronological order: (1) hand imposition; (2) slaughtering; (3) blood manipulations; (4) burning of fat; (5) disposal of the remains and flesh.

In this thesis, the three main activities, (1), (3), and (5), are investigated, because they have been points of dispute for decades of years, and because the understanding of their functions/meanings are important to connect the complicate chains of atonement mechanism operated in the *hattat* ritual. The other activities will be partially treated in the arguments on the main activities.[181] The two-hand imposition on the Azazel goat, which was only performed on the Day of Atonement for the transference of sins to the live goat, will be examined in the discussion of hand imposition as to relationship, correspondence and difference between one hand imposition and two-hand imposition.

Admittedly the meanings of the activities practiced in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4) are applied to those of the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16). Conversely, can the meanings and functions of the activities practiced in the special *hattat* ritual be applied to those of the ordinary *hattat* ritual where meanings of a few activities are silent? This will be a main issue in this chapter.

What are the meanings/functions of the ritual activities and gestures performed in the *hattat* ritual? This chapter will concentrate on hand imposition and burning of fat, together with preliminary discussion on the theory of ritual in general, that is, on how to interpret meaning/function of a ritual activity. The other matters will be discussed in the next chapter with the question concerning the function of the Azazel goat. The investigation will prepare the discussion of chapter 7 about the synthetic atonement mechanism through the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual which constitute a macro *hattat* ritual system.

The meaning/function of hand imposition will be debated in length, because this activity has been misinterpreted among scholars, while it is a key to the understanding of the atonement mechanism operating in the *hattat* ritual.

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[180] The phrase וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ is usually translated 'the laying on of hand,' but this study employs 'hand imposition' as the rendering for it.

[181] For the other activities like 'bringing' into the camp, 'casting for lot,' and 'sending' into the wildness, see chapter 3.

4.2. General problems

4.2.1. Difficulties in interpreting ritual activities

In discerning a certain meaning of a ritual activity, four major questions are raised at the outset:[182] (1) does a ritual action have a specific inherent meaning?; (2) or else, can the same gesture have a different meaning, depending on the context, or conversely can the different gestures have the same meaning?; (3) since the biblical ritual texts usually keep silence or provide only partial implications about the meanings of ritual activities and gestures both in the prescriptions and the descriptions of rituals, how can their meanings be apprehended?; (4) how should we understand the ostensible differences of the prescriptions and/or description[183] of the same ritual between the *hattat* texts? These questions need to be settled before exploring each ritual activity to figure out the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* ritual.

4.2.1.1. Differences between the ritual texts

The discussion begins with the third question. There are two aspects to the differences between the ritual texts. Whereas one is an obvious prescriptive difference, the other is a difference caused by textual omission of a specific activity. As for the omission, it is not easy for us to judge whether it results from exemption of the activity or from abbreviation of the regular prescriptions.

Leviticus 4 prescribes that a bull should be presented as the *hattat* offering for the congregation, and the blood manipulations should be practiced at the inner altar in the shrine. But in many other cases a male goat is required[184] for the congregation, and the blood is generally daubed/put (נָתַן) on

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[182] Cf. Kiuchi (1987: 17-18); Gane (2005: 3-24). In particular, Gane makes a thorough argument for application of general ritual theory to the field of biblical ritual. For the miscellaneous references to ritual theory, see Gane (2005: 3 n. 1).

[183] For example, Lev 8 is the practical description of Exod 29 that is the prescription about the ordination of Aaron and his sons as the priesthood.

[184] See the cultic inauguration in Lev 9; the supplementary rules of the *hattat* offering in Num 15:22-31; the feasts in Num 28-29; cf. the Day of Atonement in Lev 16 which has a unique form of the *hattat* offering. In these cases, a goat is required as the *hattat* offering for the congregation, whereas Lev 4 prescribes a bull for each of the high priest and the congregation. However, the Day of Atonement should be excluded from the category, because as argued in chapter 2, two goats, the sacrificial goat and the live goat, for the congregation constitute a unique form of a *hattat* offering equal to the value of a bull. The blood manipulations are also performed in a unique way on the Day.

the horns of the outer altar.[185] The answer to this difference is that as it was argued in chapter 1, the rules of Leviticus 4 are not the formalized standards for all cases of the *hattat* ritual, because it stipulates the *hattat* ritual only for *inadvertent sins*.

By the same token, in the *hattat* offering for *unavoidable impurities* in Leviticus 12 and 14-15, the rule differs from Leviticus 4. For instance, Leviticus 12 prescribes that every parturient woman, regardless of social status, should bring a year-old lamb and a young pigeon or dove, allowing a concession of two pigeons or doves for the poor that are offered respectively as a burnt offering and a *hattat* offering. In the cases of leprosy (צָרַעַת, Lev 14) and discharge (Lev 15), two birds are offered respectively for a burnt offering and a *hattat* offering, in addition to other purificatory measures. There is no disparity of animals between social ranks, differently from the case of inadvertent sins in Leviticus 4. Therefore, it is not contradictory within a *hattat* system that a variant *hattat* animal or ritual activity is prescribed for other occasions with different purpose as, for instance, at the inauguration of the altar.[186]

Furthermore, not only Leviticus 4 that prescribes the *hattat* offering, but the legislation of Leviticus 1-7 as whole also does not provide a criterion for kind

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[185] In the cases of the *hattat* ritual performed at the cultic inauguration and the feasts, the blood is daubed on the horns of the outer altar. The case of the *hattat* ritual in Num 15:22-31 is unique. Presumably the blood is daubed and sprinkled in the shrine in accordance with the case of the bull *hattat* offering for the congregation in Lev 4, but the kind of animals are different from the case of Lev 4 in that a goat *hattat* offering and a bull burnt offering should be offered for the whole community; Lev 4:13-21 prescribes only a bull for it. While some scholars explain that it results from different sources, others think that the two diverse prescriptions are due to the difference of the occations (for detailed discussion and a variety of scholarly solutions, see Gane, 2005: 85-87 n. 46). For instance, G. A. Anderson (1992: 19) suggests that rather than Lev 4, where a bull is required for the congregation, Num 15:22-26, where a goat is prescribed for it, gives a general rule applied to other cases, That is, a bull for the congregation in Lev 4 is rather a special case. In contrast, Milgrom (1991b: 264-69) endeavors to explain the difference by distinguishing between inadvertent violation of the *prohibitive commandments* (Lev 4:1-5:13) and negligence of *performative* commandments (Num 15:22-31). Gane (2005: 85-86) submits possibility of a diachronic modification of the rule, although he accepts Lev 4 as the general rule.

[186] Jenson (1992: 156) says that the *hattat* offering may be offered also in some cases where there is no specific sin or impurity in view. He argues that in the cases of Lev 8:14-17; 9:8; Num 8:8, "it [the *hattat* offering] is likely to be part of a comprehensive ritual to insure that purification is complete or fully assured." A. Marx (1989: 27-48, cited from Milgrom, 1991b: 289-92) argues that the *hattat* ritual is basically a 'sacrifice of separation,' which is part of a rite of passage. For example, the combination of the *hattat* offering and the burnt offering at the ordination of the Nazirites is performed as a rite of passage. To Marx while the *hattat* offering is to separate them from the previous state, the burnt offering is presented as a 'rite of aggregation' to effect a new or renewed state (for detailed reputation against him, see Milgrom, 1991b: 289-92; Gane, 2005: 195; 2008: 11-12).

of animals in all types of sacrifices. Again this point is confirmed by animals for the guilt offering: in Leviticus 14:12-14, 24-25, a lamb is required as a guilt offering for a leper, whereas a ram is regulated in Leviticus 5:14-26 (5:14-6:7) for a sinner.

4.2.1.2. Omission of ritual activities: exemption or abbreviation?

Specific activities of the ritual are omitted in certain cases that address the same sacrificial ritual. In these cases, is the absence of the activities an exemption from the regular prescriptions, or a textual abbreviation for a concise statement? In particular, hand imposition has been problematic, while it has been admitted that other activities, like blood rites or disposal of remains, were invariably practiced, although they are often absent in the texts as well.

For instance, scholars point out that hand imposition is not mentioned in the cases of the sacrifices offered at the feasts (Lev 23; Num 28-29),[187] at the inauguration of the altar, called 'the eighth day service' (Lev 9), and on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16). Does this omission of the gesture indicate an exemption or merely a textual abbreviation of regular procedures?

To begin with the case of the feasts, silence about hand imposition in a variety of sacrifices of the feasts does not automatically warrant that the activity was not performed.[188] But the Tannaites (*m. Menaḥ*. 9:7), supported by Milgrom (1991b: 153) and Gane (2005: 54-55), claimed that there is no evidence that hand imposition was required in the public or calenderic sacrifices except in the cases of the ordinary *hattat* offering of a bull for the congregation (Lev 4:15) and the Azazel goat ritual (16:21).[189]

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[187] Gane (2005: 54) insists that hand imposition is exempted in the sacrifices of the feasts, because they are calenderic sacrifices.

[188] To paraphrase Gilders' (2005: 11) statement that "actions carried out in consistent patterns present their own rules, without verbal expression, in the very enactments," a certain activity prescribed in a consistent pattern is a standardized rule for other cases, although it is omitted there. Therefore, the ritual activities and procedures regulated in the same pattern in Lev 1-7 are likely taken as indispensable in all sacrifices (slaughtering, hand imposition, blood manipulations, and disposal of the remains), though variant form or other kinds of animal are allowed. Therefore, it cannot readily be concluded that the omission of an activity is a result of exemption.

[189] According to Milgrom (1991b: 153), the ordinary *hattat* offering of a bull for the congregation is not an exception of public sacrifice. He argues that it can hardly be called a public one, although it was performed by the whole congregation through the high priest as their representative. It was an offering made at any time for specific and aggregate sins committed by individual members that affect the whole congregation. To Milgrom the simpler reason that the ordinary *hattat* offering of a bull is not a public sacrifice in a strict sense is because it is not a national event. On the other hand, as for the Azazel goat ritual, although scholars regard the

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If it is true, why is it exempted? Milgrom (1991b: 152-53) and Gane (2005: 54-55) argue that it is because hand imposition is an expression of ownership. That is, hand imposition for confirmation of ownership was unnecessary in such public sacrifice for the whole congregation, because there cannot be ambiguity regarding the ownership of the animal between the people. But this explanation is not convincing, because the *hattat* offering of a bull for the sins of the congregation (Lev 4:13-21) requires hand imposition; in this case there will be no uncertainty of the ownership between the people, although probably it is not a public offering, according to Milgrom's argument above. Therefore it seems that hand imposition was not performed to confirm the ownership of the animal, as argued below.

Gane (2005: 54) divides sacrifices into two categories, following the Tannaites and Milgrom: calenderic and non-calenderic. According to him, whereas non-calenderic sacrifices require hand imposition, calenderic sacrifices are exempted from it. Although Gane (2005: 54) allows for the possibility that hand imposition might be performed in the feasts and the prescriptions for the sacrifices might be abbreviated, he is in favor of its exemption, relying on two grounds: (1) on the Day of Atonement, the activity is not mentioned in both the *hattat* and burnt offerings; (2) the confirmation of animal ownership by hand imposition was needless in such public ceremonies as the Day of Atonement. Gane's idea should be refused, both because on the Day of Atonement hand imposition is inverted to the Azazel goat from the *hattat* animals and because hand imposition is not a sign of ownership (see below).

As said, silence of an activity as such does not mean non-performance of it. Rather, with regard to the fact that not only hand imposition but also other rites, including blood manipulations, are invariably not mentioned in the ceremonies of the feasts (Lev 23; Num 28-29), there is no reason to argue that only hand imposition was exempted in the public or calenderic and national ceremonies of the feasts, while the other activities were performed. The texts of the feasts merely prescribe the list of sacrificial items, omitting the instructions on the ritual activities and procedures which otherwise would be extravagant. It was sufficient for the purpose of the texts. Therefore, omission of hand imposition is not particular in these cases. On the other hand, it is dubious whether other rabbinic traditions in addition to the Tannaites (*m. Menaḥ* 9:7) exist to support exemption of hand imposition in the feasts.

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case of the Azazel goat as non-sacrificial, this study takes it as a part of special *hattat* ritual, as mentioned in chapters 2 and 3.

The inauguration of the altar in Leviticus 9, where hand imposition is not mentioned, is more perplexing, because other rites and procedures except for this activity are stated in detail. In this case, it is more difficult to judge whether the omission means exemption of the gesture or abbreviation of the rules. It was not a calenderic ceremony but a one-time event where the offerings prescribed in Leviticus 1-7 were performed for the first time on the outer altar.

For this matter, Milgrom's explanation is convincing (1991b: 579). While Milgrom argues that hand imposition is an indispensable component required for quadrupeds in non-calenderic sacrifices, excepts for birds, he suggests that probably hand imposition was practiced in the occation of Leviticus 9, but omitted in the text. The reason for the silence is that Leviticus 9 concentrates on activities practiced on the altar, while omitting nearly every rite that is unrelated to the altar. He (1991b: 579) says: "its omission from the text as well as the omission of all other rites unrelated to the altar are due to the deliberate intention of the writer to focus attention solely on the rites of the altar, ending with the climactic theophany upon it".[190] Considering the peculiarity of the ceremony which inaugurates the altar with the initial offerings and concentrates on the rites related to the altar, it is likely that mention of hand imposition was cumbersome. Moreover, Leviticus 9:16 implies that all procedures of the initial sacrificial rituals were carried out in keeping with the rules of Leviticus 1-7: "He also presented the burnt offering, and offered it according to the ordinance (וַיַּעֲשֶׂהָ כַּמִּשְׁפָּט)" (NASB).

The ceremony of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16 is another problem. On the Day, various animals were sacrificed: a bull and a goat for the *hattat* offering and two rams for the burnt offering, besides the live goat for Azazel. The mention of hand imposition on the sacrificial animals is absent in

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[190] Although Gane basically agrees with Milgrom, he also accepts the possibility that hand imposition might have been exempted at the cultic inauguration, as at the feasts, "because the inauguration ceremonies were calenderic in the sense that they took place at a time set by YHWH, even though they constituted a one-time event" (2005: 55). But it is not convincing, both because the inauguration of the altar was a special and one-time event rather than a chronic and calenderic event and because hand imposition might be practiced in the calenderic sacrifices as well. Nevertheless, in some respects, the ceremony of the cultic inauguration is close to that of the feasts. First of all, the animals prescribed for each sacrifice of the cultic inauguration correspond to those required in the feasts. For example, the animal of the *hattat* offering for the congregation is a ram as usually in the ceremonies of feasts (Lev 23) rather than a bull in line with Lev 4. In addition, the *hattat* offerings in the cultic inauguration were not made for a specific sin(s) of the Israelites as at the feasts. For the reason, presumably the sacrifices offered at the cultic inauguration may be a paradigm to public sacrifices of the forthcoming feasts (Lev 23; Num 28-29) rather than personal sacrifices of individual members (Lev 1-7).

the text, except for the rite on the live Azazel goat. Was it practiced on the sacrificial animals? If not, for what reason?

Gane (2005: 54) insists that hand imposition was exempted from the sacrifices on the Day of Atonement, because the Day is a calenderic event. But Milgrom (1991b: 1024), following the rabbis (*m. Yoma* 3:8; 4:2), contended that it was certainly practiced, because the activity is indispensable. He says: "it is at times taken for granted (e.g., at the inaugural service, 9:8-11). Here, however, another motivation may be detected: to accentuate the unique hand-leaning that will take place on the goat for Azazel (v. 21)."

Milgrom's elucidation of this omission corresponds with his reason for omission of the hand imposition at the cultic inauguration. But for two reasons, it is not acceptable. Firstly, he did not take it into account that the ritual procedures of the special *hattat* ritual (the two combined *hattat* rituals plus the Azazel goat ritual) need to be minutely prescribed as a new institution, although not all the inevitable actions are included.[191] Such an elaborated delineation of the procedure is in striking contrast with the burnt offerings that are briefly mentioned and abbreviated in a short statement (Lev 16:14b) without mention of slaughtering and blood manipulation as well as hand imposition.[192] Considering the writer's intention to state the procedures of the unique '*hattat* ritual complex' down to the minute details, it seems that the absence of hand imposition on sacrificial *hattat* animals was not done by chance and thus Milgrom's reason for the omission is a forced interpretation.

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[191] For example, the text of Lev 16 reports that the high priest enters the *adytum* three times during the ceremony on the Day of Atonement: to burn the incense (vv. 12-13); to perform the blood rite with the blood of the *hattat* bull; to perform the blood rite with the blood of the *hattat* goat. Although he should enter the *adytum* one more time to remove the censer and fire pan, the text does not mention it at all (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 1015). Likewise, sacrificial texts also do not provide all the details essential for the ritual procedures. For example, where should the layman stand in relation to the priest and the animal? What kind of knife should be used in the slaughter? (cf. Hartley, 1992: 7).

[192] For this reason, the following statement of Gane (2005: 22) must be refused:

> A ritual activity paradigm may be subject to adaptation in different contexts. While noncalendric/private burnt offerings require the gesture of leaning one hand on the head of the victim before slaughter (Lev 1:4), calenderic burnt offerings performed on behalf of the priests and laity on the Day of Atonement (16:24) most likely do not need such identification of transferring ownership.

In the burnt offerings on the Day of Atonement, not only hand imposition but also other activites are omitted. The situation is the same in the sacrifice of the feasts. Why must only the omission of hand impostion be particular?

Secondly, Milgrom did not consider that the sacrificial goat and the live goat constitute a special form of the *hattat* offering. As will be argued in this chapter, this thesis contends that hand imposition is normally practiced in the macro *hattat* ritual complex on the live goat, instead of the sacrificial bull and/or goat; it was not exempted. Mooney (2004: 52-56) also has the same idea, expressing that the hand imposition is inverted to the live goat from the sacrificial bull and goat. In other words, hand imposition, though made by a changed form, namely, by two hands, and in an altered manner, was not exempted, but performed in the special *hattat* ritual as a large ritual unit. Therefore, the calenderic feature is not related to the omission or exemption of hand imposition in the special *hattat* ritual.[193] In this respect, it is assumed that in the burnt offerings (v. 24) as well, hand imposition was performed, though it is not mentioned.

4.2.1.3. Meaning of a ritual activity: single or multiple?

The third problem with the biblical rituals, including the *hattat* ritual, concerns meaning/function of a ritual activity. Many scholars say that a ritual activity does not have an inherent meaning in itself. Meanings are attached to the ritual activities.[194] Thus "rituals must consist of physical activities plus meaning that is attached to them" (Gane, 2005: 7). The problem is that in most cases some meanings of the ritual activities are not explained in the related texts. Nevertheless, we cannot deviate from the text, and the meanings of ritual activities should primarily be explored in the text itself,[195] although references to extra-biblical sources are necessary.[196]

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[193] In contrast to Gane, Milgrom's argument is not consistent in explanaing the exemption of hand impostion. On the one hand, he (1991b: 153) says that calenderic sacrifices may be exempted from hand imposition, because they are public/calenderic ceremonies in which he thinks the confirmation of ownership to avoid ambiguity between the offerers is unnecessary. On the other hand, Milgrom comments that in the cases of the cultic inauguration (Lev 9; 1991b: 579) and the Day of Atonement (Lev 16; 1991b: 1024), hand imposition is indispensable, because quadrupeds require the activity in any case, even though they are public (Lev 9 and 16) or calenderic (Lev 16) events as the national ceremonies.

[194] This principle is also applied to ritual substances like blood. Milgrom (1991b: 279) states: "ritual substances have no intrinsic force: they are powered by the will of God."

[195] For detailed discussion, see Kiuchi (1987: 17-19); Gilders (2004: 5-11); Gane (2005: 4-24). Kiuchi (1987: 18) states:

> Because the text rarely mentions explicitly the symbolic meaning of ritual acts,
> we know very little about the meaning of the ritual. . . rather the meaning of the
> ritual acts are rarely spelled out because they were self-evident to them [the

Diverse meanings can be assigned to the same activity or ritual form, according to the theory of ritual. For the reason, a ritual act can sometimes have multiple meanings rather than one fixed meaning (Gilders, 2004: 10, 81-82). Reversely, an identical meaning can be included in diverse activities and ritual forms. On the basis of this theory, Gane (2005: 4, 8) discovered several cases pertinent to the *hattat* offering in Leviticus as follows:

1) Whereas the suet of the peace offering is called an אִשֶּׁה, 'food gift'[197] presented to YHWH (3:3-5, 9-11, 14-16), the suet of the *hattat* offering is not (e.g., 4:8-10, 19, 26, 31, 35).

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ancient Israelites]. Nevertheless, we shall endeavour to point out some hints in the text itself.

[196] Scholarly approaches to the study of the biblical ritual have been divided into two groups. For example, regarding the problem of the dietary law in Lev 11, one group follows a text-centered approach (M. Douglas, 1966; M. P. Carroll, 1985; E. Firmage, 1990), but others (W. R. Smith, 1894; M. Harris, 1979) adopt a background-centered or historical approach (for the division, see W. Houston,1993: 16-25). But many scholars (e.g., Milgrom and Houston) have followed both approaches. As for research for the Day of Atonement, Milgrom (1991b: 1067-79) attempts to discover the meaning of the Day and the function of the special ceremony not only within the biblical context, but also with reference to similar national holidays of Israel and ceremonies of Israel's neighbors: e.g., temple purgation in Babylon and the elimination rite in the Ancient Near East that seems to be related to the Azazel goat ritual. This study basically prefers the text-centered approach to the historical approach, although it sometimes uses the data from the background of the Ancient Near East. In this regard, we agree with E. Firmage (1990: 177-78), who inquires into the meaning of pure/impure animals and the function of the dietary law, stating:

> We must discover whether in fact the present criteria can be explained as indicating a coherent purpose behind the definitions of animal purity. Only having done that is it admissible to speculate about the prehistory of the present law. The text before us must be the starting point for any discussion of the issue. . . (p. 177)
>
> . . . Whatever version of the prehistory of the dietary law we accept, there remain a number of important questions whose answers must largely come from the present text. . . (p. 178)

It is argued that even though the biblical writers utilized old data or source of their culture and referred to practices of Israel's neighbors, they reinterpreted them, gave them new meanings, and created new cultic customs (Houston, 1993: 20). For example, Milgrom (1991b: 255) says, "Still, the rationale for blood in Israel is *sui generis*." That is, blood is creatively reinterpreted and given a new meaning in Israel (for detail, see Milgrom, 1991b: 705-12). In this respect, the extant ritual texts must be the first object of investigation, and the rituals in the texts must be explained primarily within their contexts and between the lines.

[197] The term אִשֶּׁה has been taken as a derivation of אֵשׁ 'fire' leading to the rendering 'fire offering' (Milgrom, 1991b: 1661). However, the rendering is not suitable for the biblical

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2) The flesh of the eaten *hattat* offering is given to the officiating priest as a prebend (6:19 [26], 22 [29]) and simultaneously the consumption of the flesh "contributes in some way to expiation (10:17)" (Gane: 2005: 8). That is, the consumption of the flesh is both the priest' privilege and duty.

3) A grain offering, which can have its own independent function (Lev 2), may be allowed as a *hattat* sacrifice (5:11-13) for atonement of a poor person in place of a living creature (cf. vv. 6-10).

4) For Gane (2005: 4), the activity of sevenfold blood sprinkling in the *hattat* ritual of Leviticus 16 is an evidence for the theory that an identical ritual activity can have different functions. He argues that whereas the activity 'purifies' (כִּפֶּר)[198] the outer altar in v. 16a, the same activity 'consecrates' (קִדֵּשׁ) it in 16:19.[199]

Gane's argument and illustrations are important for this study, because his thorough investigation on the comprehensive atonement mechanism operating in the 'system of the *hattat* ritual,' which consists of the ordinary *hattat* in Leviticus 4-5, 11-15 and the special *hattat* in Leviticus 16, relies on this ritual theory and examples, taking them as a starting point. Therewith, he attempted to overturn his teacher Milgrom's idea concerning the ritual dynamics of the *hattat* offering. Although Gane's study of the *hattat* ritual is elaborate and creative, he failed, however, to replace his teacher's theory by an alternative logical and consistent theory.

Even though the general theory of ritual can be accepted that a ritual activity can have different meanings attached by the legislator, it is doubtful whether the theory can be applied to all the above examples in Leviticus that

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range of usage, because certain offerings that are not burnt on the altar are also called אִשֶּׁה (e.g., the wine libation in Num 15:10). Conversely although certain offerings (e.g., the suet of the *hattat* offering) are burnt on the altar, they are never called אִשֶּׁה. Most likely אִשֶּׁה indicates 'food gift' as a term derived from Israel's neighbors (for details, see Milgrom, 1991b: 163).

[198] But as argued in chapter 3, the rendering 'effect purgation' or 'purge/cleanse' does not correspond to the meaning of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context, 'ransom + purgation.'

[199] Gane states (2005: 4-5):

"Although 4:6 and 17 do not state the meaning of their sevenfold sprinklings, 16:16a explains such aspersions in the inner sanctum as effecting purgation (כִּפֶּר) of this area from the impurities and moral faults of the Israelites. Later in the same ritual, however, v. 19 attributes another meaning to the sevenfold sprinkling on the outer altar: to (re)consecrate (קִדֵּשׁ) it. Thus, the same activity carries two related but distinct functions *in the same ritual*."

Gane displayed. The justness of theory and the exactness of its application are separate problems. With regard to the application of the theory to the ritual activities made in the *hattat* sacrifice, this study disagrees with Gane in a few cases on several grounds. It seems that whereas the first two examples are acceptable, the others are not. Gane's examples, though some of them are inappropriate, must be treated in detail, because they provide significant hints that the *hattat* sacrifice is distinct from the other sacrifices. These examples, except example (3), will be examined below in the discussion about the peculiar trait of the *hattat* ritual activities which are thought to bring distinctive meanings.

Regarding example (3), the grain offering is allowed as a concession for the poor who cannot afford even birds for the *hattat* offering. In this respect, this can be a typical example for the rule that a ritual type or activity can have two or multivalent function/meaning in different occasions. But the concessive type of the *hattat* offering cannot be a model for fundamental ritual principles of the *hattat* ritual; that is, it is not a normal form of the *hattat* offering. Therefore, on the basis of the concessive cases, it must not be argued that hand imposition or blood is not indispensible in sacrificial rituals. For the reason, in our discussion the concessive types are excluded.

4.2.2. The peculiarity of the *hattat* offering

The *hattat* offering is distinct from the other offerings in many aspects. It has a distinguished purpose with unique forms and modes of the ritual activities that imply peculiar meanings: (1) It is offered for an *inadvertent sin* or an *unavoidable serious impurity*; (2) Only the *hattat* sacrifice is not called a אִשֶּׁה 'gift offering' or 'food gift' in contrast to other sacrifices; (3) The blood rites differ remarkably from those of the other sacrifices in mode and meaning; (4) The disposal of the flesh also has a distinguished meaning; (5) As demonstrated in chapter 2, the meaning of the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context is 'ransom + purgation,' differently from the other sacrificial contexts, including non-sacrificial contexts, where the verb generally has only the meaning of 'ransom.' Now that the unique usage of כִּפֶּר has been investigated in detail in chapter 2, the other features will be examined in this chapter.

To begin, the *hattat* offering is a mandatory sacrifice, together with the guilt offering, whereas the others are voluntary.[200] The *hattat* offering is made

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[200] Of course, in public ceremonies like the feasts, the burnt and the peace offering are also mandatory.

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for either inadvertent sins or serious ritual impurity, whereas the guilt offering is performed for several sins that are intentional but expiable with reparation (Lev 5:20-26 [6:1-7]). Even though the *hattat* offering shares common features with the guilt offering, the former is distinguished from the latter at some points, including the form and mode of ritual activity. It is assumed that such peculiar traits of the *hattat* ritual are closely related to its function to remove sin from the offerer and to purge the sanctuary of impurity.

Secondly, exceptionally (the suet of) the *hattat* sacrifice is not taken as a אִשֶּׁה 'gift offering' among sacrifices. Even though the burning of the suet is identical in kind and form, the suet of the peace offering and the entire burnt offering are called a 'אִשֶּׁה,' but the suet of the *hattat* offering is not. The suet of the *hattat* offering is a typical case, as illustrated by Gane, where an identical activity performed with the same form in a ritual can have a different meaning in another ritual. Significantly, except for the suet of the *hattat* offering, not only the suet of the peace offering, but the burnt portions of all other sacrifices and even certain offerings that are not burnt on the altar, like the wine libation (Num 15:10), are depicted as a אִשֶּׁה 'gift offering' to YHWH.[201] In this respect, it is clear that the *hattat* offering is purposely excluded from אִשֶּׁה in all *hattat* ritual texts,[202] in contrast with the other sacrifices. This is a strong sign to indicate the peculiarity of the *hattat* offering.

In principle, all the fat must return to YHWH, as it is declared in the regulation of the peace offering in Leviticus 3:16: "all the fat is the LORD's" (כָּל־חֵלֶב לַיהוָה NIV).[203] Except to the *hattat* ritual, this principle is applied to all the sacrificial animals; their fat returns to YHWH as a אִשֶּׁה 'food gift,' as stated in the commandment that it should be burnt as a אִשֶּׁה (Lev 3:3-5, 9-11, 14-16).

Why is only the suet of the *hattat* animal not called as a אִשֶּׁה? The reason for the difference is not explained in the text. There are two possibilities

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[201] All portions of the burnt offering (Lev 1:9, 13, 17; 8:21; 23:18; cf. Exod 29:18, 25, 41) except the skin that is allotted to the officiating priest (7:8); a handful of the fine flour of the grain offering with oil and all the frankincense (Lev 2:2, 9, 11, 16; 23:13) except the remaining portion that belongs to the priests; the suet of the guilt offering (Lev 7:5, 25); the suet and right thigh of the ordination offering (Lev 8:28) except the breast as Moses' portion (v. 29) and the remaining flesh as Aaron and his sons' portion (v. 31).

[202] For a manifest evidence, see Num 15:24-25 where the *hattat* offering is excluded in the list of אִשֶּׁה (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 161).

[203] The rule, 'all the fat is the Lord's' (Lev 3:16), does not indicate that all the fat of edible animals should be offered and burnt on the altar. Actually it is inferred that the remaining fat, except the specific fat for the altar, was given to the offerer or the priests and all the fat of animals gained by secular slaughter could be eaten or used by the offerer.

for the silence: due to omission by abbreviation or to the peculiar meaning/function of the *hattat* sacrifice. In light of the nature of the *hattat* offering, the latter is more probable. It can be inferred that the distinctive meaning of burning the suet on the altar in the *hattat* ritual results from the fact that the nature of the *hattat* ritual is distinguished from the other sacrifices; it is performed specifically for the offerer's sin or impurity that contaminates not only himself but also the sanctuary and its sancta. For the very reason, it is likely that the *hattat* offering and its suet could not be considered to be a 'gift offering,' although its odour ascends as "an aroma pleasing to the LORD" (4:31, NIV)[204]in accordance with the rule, "all the fat is mine," as in all the other sacrifices,

If this is the case, why is the suet of the guilt offering burned as a אִשֶּׁה on the altar in contrast with that of the *hattat* offering, since it is also offered for specific sins, though the sins are thought to be classified in a disparate category? This thesis argues that the sins removed by the guilt offering differ in nature

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[204] For the nature of the *hattat* offering as 'payment of debt' incurred by evil (sin/impurity) to God, rather than as a 'gift' to him, see Gane (2005: 66-67). In short, whereas (the suet of) other sacrifices are offered as 'gift' to God, only (the suet of) the *hattat* sacrifice is offered as 'payment of debt' to him. In light of this view, the guilt offering, which is also called a אִשֶּׁה 'gift offering' (Lev 7:5, 25), might be presented as a 'gift' rather than a 'payment of debt' to God for the sin. In fact, it is true that in the guilt offering the payment of the damage (debt) caused by the sin is made by adding the fifth part to it; either to the priest as representative of the divine injured (God) for the damage of Lord's holy things (Lev 5:16) or to the human injured (Lev 5:24). Therefore, Gane (2005: 67) argues:

> However, reparation offerings are distinguished from purification offerings in that the former are required in cases of offenses that create literal/quantifiable debt, which calls for literal restitution if possible. This reparation occurs before the reparation offering is performed (5:16, 24 [6:5]). Since reparation offerings follow debt payments, their suet can be called "food gifts." Purification offerings, on the other hand, constitute rather than follow payment of debt.

Nevertheless, it is likely that in light of the purpose and nature of the guilt offering, the ram might be offered partially as a 'ransom,' that is, a 'payment of debt' for the offerer's evil, although its suet is called a 'gift offering' and its blood did not function to cleanse the sancta (for further explanation, see n. 337). In particular, its blood is shed and dashed (זָרַק) to the altar as 'ransom' in keeping with the meaning and function of sacrificial blood in Lev 17:11. Lev 5:16 (cf. v. 18) stipulates: "The priest shall make atonement for him with the ram of the guilt offering, and it will be forgiven him." It indicates that the ram is prerequisite for the forgiveness. The ram is mandatory, because its sacrifice is probably offered as a 'payment of debt' to God. According to Schenker (1997: 698-99) and Milgrom (2000b: 2450; cf. 1991b: 332), the function of the guilt offering is distinguished from the *hattat* offering as follows: "the חַטָּאת expiates for the *contamination* of the sanctuary and its sancta by both severe impurities and moral transgressions. The אָשָׁם expiates for the *desecration* of the sanctuary and its sancta (including God's personal sanctum – his name" (Milgrom, 2000b: 2450).

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from the sins treated in Leviticus 4-5:13. The difference is this: the sins that require the guilt offering do not contaminate the sanctuary and its sancta. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the mode and function of blood manipulations practiced in the guilt offering differ from those in the *hattat* offering; in light of the modes of the blood rites, it seems that while the blood rite of the *hattat* offering cleanses the sancta, the blood rite of the guilt offering does not have such function in accordance with that of all the other animal sacrifices.

That is, the third feature of the *hattat* offering is that it has unique modes and forms of blood rites in distinction from other sacrifices. Such peculiar blood rites of the *hattat* offering indicate that they have a different function from the blood rites of other sacrifices; its function is to 'purge' (טָהַר) the sanctuary and its sancta, as revealed in Leviticus 8:15 (= Exod 29:36) and 16:19, although Leviticus 4-5:1-13 is silent about the purificatory function of the *hattat* blood rites. As refused in chapter 2, Milgrom, followed by Gane (2005: 180, 291, 298-99) and others, contends that in Leviticus 16 the phrase 'the offerer + כִּפֶּר עַל' must be interpreted as 'effect purgation for (the offerer)' in light of the parallel use of the same verse כִּפֶּר עַל / כִּפֶּר אֶת, and in light of the meaning of the verb טָהַר in the same context of the *hattat* ritual and Leviticus 16.

Gane takes Leviticus 16:14-16 and v. 19 as strong evidence of his argument that an identical activity can have a different function in other rituals or activities. He (2005: 298-99) argues, with Milgrom, that whereas the sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה, *hiph* of נזה) of blood performed respectively in the *adytum* and the shrine (vv. 14-16) is to 'cleanse' (כִּפֶּר) them (v. 16a), the same activity made at the outer altar (v. 19a) is to 'consecrate' (קִדֵּשׁ) it (v. 19b). Insofar as the outer altar (vv. 18-19) is concerned, while putting (נָתַן) of blood is performed for cleansing (טָהַר, in place of כִּפֶּר) of the outer altar, the sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood is done for consecration (קִדֵּשׁ) of it (also Kiuchi, 2007: 302).

However, Gane's suggestion cannot stand, because as argued in chapter 2 the meaning of כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context is not so much 'to effect purgation (of the sancta)' or 'to purge (the sancta)' as 'ransom + purgation'; that is, the verb כִּפֶּר cannot refers to the same meaning of 'purge/cleanse' as the verb טָהַר in such context.

In addition, the 'consecration' of the outer altar mentioned in Leviticus 16:19 is likely a consequent result of its intense purification by reinforced blood rites (double blood activities) for the accumulated impurities of the outer altar, rather than an distinctive and individual result of the sevenfold sprinkling of

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blood on the altar.[205] Just as the double blood rites performed in the *adytum* (vv. 14-15) and the shrine (implied in v. 16b) are to cleanse them, so the double blood rites practiced in the same pattern at the outer altar (v. 19) are likely to purify it with the result of its reconsecration. In this respect, it is inferred that just as it is done at the outer altar, so the *adytum* with the ark and the shrine with the inner altar are intensely purified as well, and consequently consecrated, although the text is silent (for detail, see § 5.2.2). Therefore, this example is not an adequate evidence of Gane's ritual theory.

There is a more serious problem with Gane. He (2005: 169-182) applies the principle of the ritual theory to the function of blood manipulations in Leviticus 4, where the dynamics or function of the activities is not explained.[206] According to him, the same gesture acted in the blood rites has directly opposite functions respectively in Leviticus 4 and Leviticus 16. Following N. Johar (1988: 612; cf. A. Rodriguez, 1986: 173-80),[207] he argues that whereas sprinkling (הִזָּה) of the blood in Leviticus 4 (on ordinary days) is performed to 'transfer the sin or impurity' of a person(s) to the sancta through the medium of blood, resulting in its contamination, the same gesture in Leviticus 16 (on the Day of Atonement) is practiced in converse function to 'purge' and 'consecrate' the sancta contaminated by the transferred sins. In other words, in Leviticus 4 the blood manipulations of the *hattat* ritual at the sancta do not purge them of impurity, but convey the offerer's sin/impurity to them and consequently the sancta become contaminated (contra Milgrom).

Rodriguez, Johar and Gane's idea assumes that blood absorbs the sin/impurity from the offerer before the blood rites are performed in each precinct, although the way of absorption differs between them (see § 7.2.3 and § 7.2.4). The transference of sin/impurity to the sancta is the most critical point in their theories on the *hattat* ritual. As for Gane, as a result, he poses triple

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[205] This thesis opposes several scholars' opinion (e.g., Milgrom, 1991b: 1037; Gane, 2005: 4-5) that the two different modes of activities in the blood rites in Lev 16:18b-19 are performed respectively to *cleanse* and *consecrate* the altar. It seems that the function of the gestures is only to cleanse the altar, and the consecration of the altar is the consequent and natural result of the cleansing. For the expanded argument, see chapter 5.

[206] In Lev 4, the purgation of the sancta by the *hattat* blood rite is not mentioned, but it is implied. For details, see § 6.3.4.

[207] Rodriguez (1986: 177-80) also suggests a similar idea, stating: "we would like to suggest that it is the sin of the repentant sinner, the confessed sin, which makes necessary the cleansing of the sanctuary once a year. It is these confessed sins to which Leviticus 16 refers by the expression, 'all their sins.' These sins were transferred there through the expiatory sacrifices."

function of the *hattat* blood rites: transference of human evil to the sancta, purification of the sancta, and consecration of the sancta.

However, it is doubtful that an identical gesture with blood performed in the same ritual can have direct-opposite meanings in the same ritual system, even though a ritual activity has different meaning/function in other rituals, as shown in the functional difference of the same suet burning between the *hattat* offering and the peace offering. Therefore, Gane's idea on the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* ritual is not acceptable from his presumption.

It is obvious that the blood rite of the *hattat* offering has unique modes with a particular meaning/function, in distinction from the other sacrifices; it functions consistently to purify the sancta, as revealed in Leviticus 8:15 (= Exod 29:36) and 16:19b, rather than either to transfer sin/impurity to the altar in one case, or to purify or consecrate it in another case.

The fourth feature of the *hattat* offering is disposal of the flesh that also has a unique mode and function, although the guilt offering shares the same feature with the *hattat* offering, as an expiatory offering with a similar purpose. In the *hattat* sacrifice the priestly eating of the *hattat* flesh has double function: prebend for the priests (Lev 6:17-23 [24-30]) and removal of the offerer's sin/iniquity (Lev 10:17). This can be evidence that an activity can have double or multivalent function.

Finally, from the fact that most activities of the *hattat* ritual are performed with distinctive meaning from that of other sacrifices, this thesis presumes that hand imposition on a *hattat* animal might also have a distinctive function from that of the other sacrifices (see below), although the gesture of hand imposition performed in all the types of animal sacrifices has the same form (i.e., by one hand) without any explanation.

4.2.3. Methods for interpreting the ritual activities in the *hattat* texts

Due to the scarcity of explanations about the meaning/function of the ritual activities in the sacrificial texts, including the texts of the *hattat* ritual, a prudent approach to the problems is required. Here we suggest the following presuppositions and methods for this study.

4.2.3.1. The *hattat* rituals form a *hattat* ritual system

This thesis, following Gane and Kiuchi (also Milgrom in part), presupposes that the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual form 'a

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single system' of the *hattat* ritual, together with the other texts of the *hattat* ritual in the priestly literature.[208] This is close to Jenson's structural approach (1992: 152) that postulates a systemized cult, including the *hattat* ritual, in the priestly literature. From this perspective, a complementary and supplementary reading of the texts is required to discern function of each ritual activity and mechanism of personal (Lev 4, 11-15) or national atonement (Lev 16) accomplished in 'a system of the *hattat* ritual.'

Significantly the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4 and the special *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 16 (the Day of Atonement) are associated to deal with specific sins and severe impurities of Israel cooperatively in 'the *hattat* ritual system.'[209] The ordinary *hattat* sacrifice is offered on ordinary days in order to resolve inadvertent sin or unavoidable serious impurity of a person(s) and the consequent result of his sin or impurity, namely, contamination of the sancta, making personal or congregational atonement (Lev 4, 12-15).

On the other hand, the special *hattat* sacrifice is offered on the Day of Atonement to remove all the impurities of the sanctuary and all the sins of the congregation, which are unresolved and accumulated throughout the year, making a national atonement for Israel. By so doing, the two kinds of *hattat* ritual have their own functions in complementary cooperation and association to accomplish the purpose of the *hattat* ritual, atonement of the Israelites, either personal or national, in a macro ritual system.[210]

4.2.3.2. Gaps in a text are filled by other texts

The presupposition that the various *hattat* rituals form a single system of the *hattat* ritual naturally requires a synthetic and comprehensive reading of the

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[208] For detailed explanation about a larger ritual system of *hattat*, see Gane (1992: 25-42); he says that a variety of the *hattat* texts are dispersed in the Pentateuch and form a large *hattat* ritual system. Therefore, they require supplementary and complementary reading. Furthermore, the rituals of the solemn day in Lev 16 belong to the larger system of Israelite cultic practices and its prescriptions "depend on other pentateuchal passages in the final form of the text" (Gane, 1992: 30).

[209] Probably Num 15:22-31 can also be included, because the rules of the passage also deal with inadvertent sins that may be regarded as of different kinds from the sins in Lev 4-5:13. But this study excludes Num 15:22-31 from the present discussion, because the dynamics and meaning/function of the *hattat* ritual in its prescription may be the same as those in Lev 4:1-5:13.

[210] As noted in chapter 2, the purposes of certain *hattat* rituals in the *hattat* texts differ from the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Lev 4 and the special *hattat* ritual in Lev 16 in that they do not deal with *specific* sins or impurities: e.g., the *hattat* ritual for the consecration of the priests and the altar in Lev 8, the *hattat* ritual at the inauguration of the altar in Lev 9, and the *hattat* ritual in the feasts.

related texts to discern the integral meaning of an activity. Therefore, this study adopts the theory of 'gap-filling' of Wolfgang Iser (1980: 50-69), followed by W. K. Gilders (2004). Gilders (2004: 10) says: "According to Iser, readers inevitably experience 'gaps' in the text before them and variously fill those gaps in order to arrive at a coherent understanding of the 'meaning' of any text. The reader plays a vital role in constituting the 'meaning' of any text."

According to the theory of 'gap-filling,' a gap in a certain text is filled by supplementary rules or implications in other texts. The theory can be applied to the sacrificial texts, including the *hattat* ritual, in two aspects: one gap comes from omission of some ritual components and the other gap results from absence of an explanation concerning meaning of a ritual activity in the text.

With regard to the gap of ritual component, unlike in modern legal literature, not all procedures of a ritual in the Hebrew Bible are prescribed in a well-systemized legal code; although most of its contents are clustered in a normative ritual text, some of them are omitted. Instead, prescriptions of some activities are deferred to related texts in other places.[211] This invites a synthetic reading of the *hattat* texts by the gap-filling. When meaning of a ritual activity is not clear, it is inevitable for readers to infer the meaning of a ritual activity from the given texts. Thus, the gaps of meaning are filled to some extent whether by explicit meaning in other texts or by implicit meaning in the context or between the lines.

There are three methods in gap-filling of meaning/function: (1) some omitted rules are often stipulated in other complementary texts or in related texts; (2) in case that explanation of an activity is never given throughout the texts, its function must be inferred in the context or between the lines, although it might be vague in the texts; (3) sometimes meaning of an activity that is absent in a text may be filled and depicted in other places within the same ritual system.

To limit the range of discussion to the *hattat* texts in Leviticus, as an example of the first method, the disposal of the *hattat* flesh in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 is supplemented by Leviticus 6:17-23 (24-30). Whereas it is prescribed in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 that the entire remains of the *hattat* animal offered for the

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[211] As an example outside Leviticus, the identity of the 'water of *hattat*' (מֵי חַטָּאת) sprinkled on the Levites in Num 8 is not revealed until the manufacturing process is prescribed in Num 19. As another case, the anointing of the Tabernacle is omitted in the prescription for the ordination of the priests in Exod 29. It is supplemented in Exod 30:25-29 and 40:9-11 and in the practice of the ordination that is described in Lev 8:10-11. But Milgrom (1991b: 514) suspects that the passage on the anointing of the Tabernacle (vv. 10-11) may be a later interpolation.

high priest and the whole community of Israel should be burned in a clean place where the ashes are thrown outside the camp (4:11-12, 20), the disposal of the flesh is not stipulated in the *hattat* cases for the chiefs and the common Israelites. The gap is filled in 6:17-23 (24-30) which regulates that the flesh should be given to the officiating priest.[212]

As another example, Leviticus 4:12 specifies a clean place where the *hattat* remains are burned outside the camp; but it does not specifically mention the remains-handler who should take them away, and his entrance rite that is required for return to the camp.[213] This textual and prescriptive gap is filled in Leviticus 16:27-28. It is clear that in the ordinary *hattat* ritual also an appointed person took the *hattat* remains away to the clean place outside the camp, and then he underwent the entrance-rite for return to the camp. Therefore, in Leviticus 4, the remains-handler and his entrance rite are assumed on the basis of the *hattat* rules in Leviticus 16 (Milgrom, 1991b: 1053). Conversely, in the legislation of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16, the clean place, where the remains are burned, is not specified, because it is already prescribed in Leviticus 4.[214] By this way of gap-filling, Leviticus 4 and 16 supplement and complement one another.

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[212] In addition to the disposal of the *hattat* flesh, disposal of the remains after the sacrificial ritual is not prescribed in Lev 1:1-6:7, while it is supplemented in Lev 6:8-7:38. Disposal of the skin after completion of the burnt offering is not prescribed in Lev 1. The rule is given in 7:8 regulating that the priest who offers the burnt offering shall take the skin for himself. The disposal of the remaining portion of the grain offering and the peace offering is also supplemented in Lev 6:8-7:38. The remains of the guilt offering should follow the rules of the *hattat* offering (7:7; 14:7). In a sense, in terms of the quite systematic and elaborated contents of Lev 1-7, it may be said, of course, that Lev 6:8-7:38 is not a gap-filling passage. Nevertheless, silence about how to dispose the remains of the *hattat* offering made for the chiefs and the common people makes a gap in Lev 4, because it is stipulated for the case for the high priest and the whole community in the same chapter.

[213] Although the 'he,' the subject of the verbs in v.12 (and v. 21), may refer to 'the high priest,' it cannot mean that the priest must take away the remains to the outside of the camp to burn them, because "he would be rendered impure" (Milgrom, 1991b: 239). It caused M. Noth (1965:40) to interpret it as 'the offerer.' Probably for the reason, the subjects of the verbs take unspecified plurals in the LXX and Sam (cf. Kiuch, 2007: 95). The subject ('he') could be treated as impersonal that may denote passive nuance (Milgrom, 1991b: 239; NASB). Even though the subject 'he' refers to 'the high priest' in grammatical and contextual view, the statement in v. 12 and v. 21 can be understood that the entire procedure in the disposal rite of the *hattat* remains should be handled and implemented under the supervision of the high priest, while the third agent(s) carry out the remains to a 'clean place' outside the camp.

[214] Gane (2005: 279; cf. p. 57) refuses this view, saying that the instruction of Lev 4:11-12 is not abbreviated from the purification of the remains-handler. His purification was unnecessary in Lev 4, because the ordinary *hattat* flesh is either so holy as to be consumed by the priests, or so pure as to be disposed of in the clean place. However, Gane's view is not convincing. For detailed refutation against Gane's opinion, see ch. 6.

As for the second method, some ritual activities are not given any explanation throughout the texts, and therefore it should be inferred from the implications in the texts or their contexts, and between the lines. For example, a meaning/function of hand imposition is not explained at all throughout the sacrificial prescriptions (Lev 1-7). It should be inferred from implications in the texts. From the statement concerning the effect of the burnt offering in Leviticus 1 (v. 4), it is inferred that hand imposition has the function of *substitution* or *identification* of the offerer with the victim as a common denominator of its meaning in all kinds of sacrifices (see § 4.3.4).

The third method can be applied to meaning and function of blood in sacrifices. The meaning and function of blood, and furthermore the reason for prohibition of the blood consumption are not explained throughout the priestly literature until Leviticus 17 (vv. 11, 14; cf. Gen 9:4). In this place, while the meaning of blood is explained: "the life of the flesh is in the blood" (v. 11a); "the blood of all flesh is its life" (v. 14), the function of blood that is given to the altar is specified: "to make atonement for the souls of the Israelites" (v. 11b). Of course, it appears that the meaning and function of blood might be applied not only to the *hattat* offering, but also to other expiatory sacrificial offerings (the burnt offering and the guilt offering), except for the peace offering (for discussion on it, see § 5.2.3).

Another example of the third method is related to the function of the *hattat* blood rites: 'dashing' and 'sprinkling' of the blood at the sancta.[215] While the function of the activities is not specified in Leviticus 4:1-5:13, the gap is filled by Leviticus 8:15 (= Exod 29:36) and 16:19b where it is stated that the activity with blood purifies the outer altar.[216]

On the other hand, from the perspective of the *hattat* ritual system, it is likely that the function of hand imposition on the *hattat* animal which is absent in Leviticus 4-5 could be filled by that in Leviticus 16. In light of the fact that the ritual activities of the *hattat* offering have a distinctive functions from those of other sacrifices, the hand imposition of the *hattat* offering also might have a

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[215] For the Hebrew verbs equivalent to these renderings and the functions of the gestures, see the discussion on the function of blood in chapter 5.

[216] The silence concering the function of blood in the prescription of the *hattat* offering in Lev 4 has thrown scholars into heated controversy. In particular, since Milgrom's unprecedented theory that blood of the *hattat* sacrifice purges solely the sancta, but does not cleanse or expiate the offerer, the issue has become a keen topic of conversation in the study of Leviticus. Although some interpreters agree with Milgrom, other interpreters have presented alternative theories against him. But this study judges that they failed to overcome Milgrom and to suggest a reasonable solution (see ch. 7).

unique function. According to this study, it is likely that hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual may have the function of sin-transference as a secondary function, in addition to the common function of 'substitution' or 'identification.' The secondary function of the hand imposition in the *hattat* sacrifice is investigated below from perspective of the whole *hattat* system and the cooperative dynamics of ritual activities referring to Leviticus 4 and 16.

While Leviticus 4 is silent about meanings of most ritual activities, the function of the blood rites in the *hattat* ritual is revealed in Leviticus 16. Likewise, this thesis suggests that the function of hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual also can be inferred from Leviticus 16. The reason is that the Azazel goat, on which Aaron's two hands are laid (16:21), is part of a variant or special form of the *hattat* offering, as argued in chapter 3. As for the form of hand imposition, it will be revealed below that the one handed imposition on the ordinary *hattat* animal might have the same function as the two handed imposition on the Azazel goat.

In this way, Leviticus 16 fills the gaps in Leviticus 4 with supplementary prescriptions or implications in the system of the *hattat* ritual, while a few *hattat* texts fill the gaps as well.

4.2.3.3. Additional function can be attached to a ritual activity

The eaten *hattat* flesh is allotted to the officiating priest as his prebend for his performance of the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 6 (vv. 19 [26], 22 [29]). Yet an additional function of the flesh-eating by the priest is explained in Leviticus 10:17 where Moses reproached Aaron for neglect to eat the meat; Aaron violated the mandatory rule by not consuming the flesh of the *hattat* sacrifice offered for the congregation. Moses states in v. 17:

> "Why did you not eat the *hattat* offering in the sacred area? For it is most holy, and God has given it to you to remove the iniquity (נָשָׂא עָוֹן)[217] of the congregation, to make atonement on their behalf before the LORD" (Rendering mine)

Here another function of the flesh consumption by the priest is added: 'removal of the iniquity,' which leads to atonement for the offerer(s).[218] Hence a synthetic reading discovers that the priestly eating of the *hattat* flesh has two functions: *prebend* and *removal of sin*.

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[217] For the rendering 'remove iniquity,' equivalent to נָשָׂא עָוֹן, see chapter 2.

[218] The guilt offering also comes under the same rule (Lev 7:7; 14:13).

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4.2.3.4. An activity in a ritual system has a consistent function

Another presupposition employed in this discussion is that a ritual activity or gesture practiced in the same ritual or the same ritual system has a consistent function, although an additional function is attached to the activity in the same ritual system, and although the very activity can have different functions in *other* rituals or ritual systems. Therefore, Gane's idea (2005: 4-5) is refused that whereas the same mode of blood sprinkling conveys sin/impurity to the sancta in Leviticus 4, it reversely purges the sancta of the conveyed sin/impurity and consecrates it in Leviticus 16. It is hardly conceivable that the same mode of ritual activity has a directly opposite function within the same ritual system.[219]

In the following section, the meanings and dynamics of the ritual activities made in the *hattat* ritual are examined with these presuppositions and methods. As stated above, three main activities of the *hattat* sacrifice will be examined: (1) hand imposition; (2) blood manipulations; (3) disposal of flesh. In the problem of hand imposition, the two-hand imposition on the Azazel goat, which is practiced for transference of sins to the live goat on the Day of Atonement, should be explored. In this chapter, only the problem of hand imposition, which requires a good deal of space, is treated and the others are left to the next chapter.

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[219] In this respect, this study agrees with Jenson's remark (1992: 151) rejected by Gane (2005: 10):

> Instead of and atomistic approach, it is preferable to begin with the movement and structure of the sacrificial ritual as a whole, since this larger context should determine the primary significance of the individual symbols. The value of a structural approach is that it looks for patterns at the level of the complete ritual. The symbols and actions will be combined in such a way as to communicate the nature and purpose of the sacrifice. Certain meaning of a multivalent symbol will not be stressed in a ritual in which they are unnecessary.

4.3. Hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual

This study is not to make a thorough investigation on all cases of hand impositions in the Hebrew Bible,[220] but to examine the function of the action practiced on the sacrifices, including the *hattat* sacrifice, and to inquire if there is a functional difference of hand imposition between the *hattat* sacrifice and the other sacrifices. In addition, it is required to discern the relationship between the hand imposition on the *hattat* animal and that on the Azazel goat.

4.3.1. General problems with hand imposition

In this issue, several questions are raised: (1) How can the meaning of the hand imposition performed in the sacrificial rituals be known, because the sacrificial text does not provide a certain explanation concerning the meaning of the hand imposition?; (2) Do the non-sacrificial hand impositions in the Hebrew Bible cast light on the function of the sacrificial one?; (3) As there are two distinct forms of hand imposition described in the Hebrew Bible, either by a hand (e.g., on the sacrificial animal) or by two hands,[221] what is the difference of meaning between the two forms?

Throughout the Hebrew Bible, there is no explicit explanation about the meaning and function of the hand imposition, except in the case of the Azazel goat ritual where the two-handed imposition on the live goat functions to transfer all sins of the congregation to it. Therefore, the gap must be inferred from hints in the texts, and/or in broader contexts, or else in reference to certain related texts or to the whole system of the ritual.

Scholars have attempted to fill the gap in the meaning and interpret the function of the hand imposition on the sacrificial animals in reference to, or in comparison with the non-sacrificial hand impositions in the Hebrew Bible, and in light of the extra-biblical data. In many cases, however, it seems that they employed wrong data or relied on inadequate references.

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[220] For a detailed discussion on the issue of the hand imposition, see Rodriguez (1979: 193-238); D. P. Wright (1986: 433-46; especially with his miscellaneous references in pp. 433-44).

[221] For example, the high priest's two hands laid on the Azazel goat in Lev 16 and Moses' two hands laid on Joshua in Num 27.

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4.3.2. Hand impositions in the Hebrew Bible

Above all, it can be questioned whether the cases of hand imposition in the Hebrew Bible may cast light on the understanding of the gesture practiced in sacrifices. The hand(s) could be imposed on the head of a person or an animal for a variety of purposes, as suggested in the occurrences of the gesture in the Hebrew Bible that are displayed below:

1. On the head of person(s)
   1) For blessing of person(s): Gen 48:14, 17-18
   2) For ordination or appointment of person(s):[222]
      a. Ordination of the Levities: Num 8:5-26 (collective)[223]
      b. Appointment of Joshua: Num 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9 (by two hands?)[224]
   3) For punishment of the blasphemer: Lev 24:14 (collective)

2. On the head of animal
   1) On the burnt offering: Lev 1
   2) On the peace offering: Lev 3
   3) On the *hattat* offering[225]
      a. For specific sin: Lev 4; cf. 2 Ch 29:23 (collective)
      b. For the ordination of the priests: Lev 8:14 = Exod 29:10 (collective)
      c. For the ordination of the Levites: Num 8:12 (collective)
   4) On the ram of ordination for the priests: Lev 8:18 = Exod 29:19 (collective)
   5) On the Azazel goat: Lev 16:21 (by two hands)

The two distinct verbs are used to indicate the gesture of the hand imposition: שִׂים / שִׁית 'to put' (Gen 48:14, 18) and סָמַךְ 'to impose/lean' (in all other cases). Milgrom (1991b: 150) distinguishes between the two actions by the different verbs: שִׂית יָד / שִׂים and סָמַךְ יָד. He says that the former is simply a gesture to put hand(s) on the object, but the latter is made by pressing it with hand(s). Thus he employs the rendering 'hand leaning' (followed by Gane) for

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[222] In these cases, although 'on the head of' is not mentioned, it is likely that the imposition of hand on head is taken for granted (Milgrom, 1991b: 152).

[223] Although it is stated that the sons of Israel laid their hand on the Levites, it is natural to infer that the representative of the congregation, i.e., the elders or the chief of the tribes, would have performed the rite.

[224] The text raises confusion: in Num 27:18 YHWH prescribed 'one handed imposition' to Moses, whereas Num 27:23 and Deut 34:9 describe that he practiced 'two handed imposition.' For several answers to this confusion, see below.

[225] For the omission of hand imposition in the guilt offering, see below.

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סָמַךְ יָד rather than 'laying-on of hand' or 'hand imposition.' This study follows Kiuchi's rendering, 'hand imposition' or 'imposition of hand,' regardless of the possible different strength of the gesture.

Although it is possible that these two verbs indicate difference of strength applied in the action of hand imposition, the related texts do not confirm that the disparity of strength implies a difference in the inherent meaning of the action.[226] The same principle can be applied to the form of hand imposition (one hand or two hands). As discussed below, the meaning of hand imposition must rather be explored in the statement described or implied in the texts or in their contexts, than in the difference of the strength or the forms

Regardless of whether hand imposition is practiced on person(s) or on animal(s), some scholars have insisted that there are two formal modes of the gesture, by one hand or by two hands, with *qualitative* difference of function.[227] In contrast, other scholars argue that the form itself does not carry an inherent meaning, and that the difference between one hand and two hands indicates *quantitative* difference of function.[228]

Generally the group, who disregards the *qualitative* distinction of the two forms, contends that non-sacrificial hand impositions, including the activity on the Azazel goat, shed light on the function of the sacrificial hand imposition. For example, according to the rabbis and a few modern scholars, the meaning of *transference* (of sin) on the Azazel goat can be applied to all sacrificial hand impositions, although two hands were used on it.[229] That is, sin is transferred to

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[226] It seems that the action שִׂים / שִׁית ('to put') of Jacob's hands on the heads of Ephraim and Manasseh in Genesis 48:14, 18 implies *transference* or *impartation* of Jacob's blessings to his grandsons that he enjoyed with the primogeniture taken from Esau, although it is Jacob's supplication to God for blessings. The text states that the right hand is laid on the younger grandson, indicating that it has more powerful *transference* of blessings than the left hand. The fact that the right hand had greater power implies that the hand imposition had the power of transference of God's blessing through Jacob's special status. Likewise, the action סָמַךְ 'to lean' the hand(s) of Moses on Joshua (Num 27:18, 23 and Deut 34:9) indicates that it is practiced to 'confer the authority' (נָתַן הוֹד) (Num 27: 20 CSB; probably the transference of Moses' authority) or 'filling with the spirit of wisdom' (מָלֵא רוּחַ חָכְמָה) (Deut 34:9). If Moses' hand imposition had the meaning of 'transference' of authority to Joshua, as implied in Numbers 27:20, probably there is no inherent difference of meaning in the two Hebrew verbs שִׂים/שִׁית יָד and סָמַךְ יָד used for the hand(s) imposition (contra Milgrom).

[227] R. Péter (1977: 48-55); Wright (1986: 434-36); Milgrom (1991b: 151); Gane (2005: 57).

[228] Ehrlich (1968 v. 2: 197); Kiuchi (1987: 113; 2007: 304); Johar (1988: 612-23).

[229] The early Jewish exegesis (*m. Menaḥ.* 9:8) stipulates that the two handed form practiced on the Azazel goat and its meaning of transference (of sin) in Lev 16:21 should be the standard for the gestures in all sacrificial rituals (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 151; for additional rabbinic

the sacrificial animals by the action. The other group, who accepts the distinction of *qualitative* functions between the two forms, argues that whereas 'the two handed form' was practiced in non-sacrificial rituals, 'the one handed form' was executed in sacrificial rituals.[230] Therefore, the various cases of non-sacrificial hand imposition do not give any clue to the function of sacrificial hand imposition, because each of two forms has a different meaning.

But this thesis contends, with Kiuchi (contra Wright), that the distinct forms classified by the number of hands as such do not guarantee a functional difference of the gesture. In fact, the number of hands in the activity does not have an inherent meaning.

The function of sacrificial hand imposition must be primarily assumed from the implications in the context of Leviticus 1-5 (especially Lev 1), and by analogy with the hand imposition on the Levites for the ordination (Num 8:5-26). The deduced meaning may well be applied to all other kinds of sacrifices. In addition, this study will argue that the hand imposition on the *hattat* animal may have the meaning of sin-transference as a special and additional function to the common function shared in all sacrifices by inference from the case of the Azazel goat ritual.

4.3.3. Two forms of hand imposition

According to Milgrom (1976: 765) and R. Péter (1977: 48-55, cited in D. P. Wright, 1986: 434), followed by some scholars, there is evidence in the Hebrew Bible that the two kinds of hand imposition, by one hand[231] or two hands, existed in the ancient cult of Israel, and they had different meanings. Wright (1986: 434) states about Péter's two forms:

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literatures, see Wright, 1986: 434 n. 3). There are still some modern proponents for transference of sin in all sacrifices like Wenham and Gerstenberger (see below; cf. Kiuchi's critique, 1987: 113-14), although they also deny the two handed form in the sacrificial cases. To the contrary, according to Ibn Ezra's comment (1986), followed by Milgrom and the majority of modern scholars, the mandatory use of two hands on the Azazel goat implies that the meaning of the gesture differs from that of the one hand used in other sacrifices and therefore the transference theory automatically eliminated from sacrificial cases (Milgrom, 1991b: 151; Gane, 2005: 57). However, this idea is not convincing, as discussed below.

[230] Following Wright's terms (1986: 434), the two types of hand imposition are frequently named 'the one handed form' and 'the two handed form' in this thesis.

[231] In *Tg. Ps.-J.* on Lev 1:4, the hand is translated as 'the right hand' (cf. Wright, 1986: 436; Milgrom, 1991b: 150).

One was found in nonsacrificial contexts and was performed with two hands, while the other was found only in sacrifice and was performed with one hand. The distinction in form allowed Péter to give each a separate meaning. For him, the two-handed gesture indicated transfer, such as the transfer of authority from Moses to Joshua (Num 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9) or the transfer of sins to the scapegoat (Lev 16:21-22), while the single handed gesture indicated an identification between the offerer and animal. The offerer thereby affirmed that it was he who was offering the animal and that he was offering himself by means of the victim (Péter 52).

Wright agrees with R. Péter's two types of hand imposition in which the one handed form is sacrificial and the two handed form is non-sacrificial, but his interpretation about the function of the two handed form differs from Péter's. As far as the function of the one handed form is concerned, Wright (1986: 438-39) accepts Péter's 'identification,' which to him is actually the same meaning as 'ownership,' that is, an 'attributive identification.' It seems to him that Péter's identification means identification of the offerer *as the owner* (i.e., ownership) rather than identification of the offerer *with the victim*[232] (cf. Gane, 2005: 57). However, as regards the meaning of the two handed form, Wright (1986: 435-36) sees it as 'designation' rather than Péter's 'transference.' In sum, for Wright the one handed form indicates 'ownership' and the two handed form means 'designation.'

Wright categorizes non-sacrificial cases *en bloc* into the two handed form:[233] the Azazel goat ritual (Lev 16:21); Joshua's appointment by Moses (Num 27:18, 23; cf. Deut 34:9); and the punishment of the blasphemer (Lev 24:14). Contrary to many scholars who take these non-sacrificial cases as 'transference,'[234] Wright (1986: 435-36) argues that it signifies only 'designation' in those cases of the two handed form. On the other hand, Milgrom's

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[232] Wright (1986: 439) uses his own term 'attributive identification' as the meaning of 'ownership,' saying that it means 'this is mine' rather than 'this is me' (i.e., a substitutionary identification). But there is an interpretative confusion among scholars on Péter's view. For Milgrom (1991b: 151), Péter's statement means 'declaration' of purpose. Kiuchi (1987: 113) and Hartley (1992: 20) understand it as 'identification of the offerer with the animal.' However, Wright's understanding, 'ownership,' is probably right (also Wenham, 1979: 62).

[233] Wright (1986: 434 n. 7) does not consider the imposition of Jacob's two hands on the two grandsons (Gen 48:14, 17-18), because it has the meaning of blessing.

[234] Admittedly the transferred things are the Israelites' iniquities to the Azazel goat (Lev 16:21) and Moses' authority to Joshua (Num 27:18, 23). The case of the blasphemer (Lev 24:14) is debatable. According to Milgrom (2000b: 2113), the pollution of the witnesses, which is caused by uttered blasphemy, is transferred to the blasphemer.

interpretation about the non-sacrificial cases differs from Wright, as explained below, although he also maintains the functional difference between the two forms. Each case will be examined to see if their arguments can be justified.

To begin with the case of the blasphemer (Lev 24:14), Wright (1986: 435) infers that the two hands of each witness were imposed on the sinner, although it is difficult to discern from the plural אֶת־יְדֵיהֶם ('their hands') whether both hands are required or only one hand. He (1986: 435) interprets the gesture as "a means whereby the witnesses designate the blasphemer as guilty of the crime and worthy of death. By it the witnesses symbolically confirm their testimony to the community and also acknowledge their responsibility in the death of the criminal" (cf. B. J. Van der Merwe, 1962: 40). The case of Susanna (Sus 34 = Dan 13:34 LXX), who was falsely accused of adultery by the two wicked elders, bolsters his interpretation of the hand imposition on the blasphemer in Leviticus 24, although the nature of the two cases is not identical. According to Wright (1986: 436), who categorizes this case also into the 'two handed form,' each of the two elders laid both hands on her to designate her as the guilty party, although it is not manifest whether two hands of each were laid on or one hand, due to the collective hand imposition. Therefore, he (1986: 436) says that this hand imposition "cannot be interpreted as a means of transferring pollution or the like."

Secondly, Wright (1986: 436), by amending the singular 'your hand' (יָדְךָ) of MT in Num 27:18 to the dual 'your hands' (τὰς χεῖράς σου) in accord with the LXX,[235] contends that the two-hand imposition was commanded (Num 27:18) by YHWH and performed on Joshua by Moses (v. 23; cf. Deut 34:9). He interprets the gesture likewise as 'designation.' He (1986: 436) notes: "the imposition of hands serves to designate Joshua as the focus of the ritual action; the rite demonstrates who is to receive Moses' authority and glory." In other words, the two-hand imposition on Joshua means 'designation' rather than 'transference.' Therefore, "blessing and authority do not flow from the person of Moses through his arms to Joshua" (Wright, 1986: 436).

Continually Wright (1986:436) insists that the two-hand imposition on the Azazel goat can also be interpreted as 'designation' that indicates where the

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[235] While God commands Moses to lay his one hand on Joshua (Num 27:18), Num 27:23 and Deut 34:9 state that Moses' two hands are laid on him. Wright (1986: 435) considers Num 27:18 as a textual defect from dual or plural. Although he bases his view on the LXX's support, Wright admitted that there is also possibility that "LXX's dual in v. 18 may simply be a harmonization to v. 23" in light of the contrary statement in the Samaritan text where "in v. 23 and Deut 34:9, the dual is changed to a singular" (Wright, 1986: 435).

sins of the Israelites are to rest, instead of 'transference' of the sins to the goat. The transference of sin is done by the high priest's confession rather than by the hand imposition. Hence the placement of the sins on the goat is made both by the 'designation' and by "the spoken confession which concretizes the sins which then fall on the head of the goat" (Wright, 1986: 436).

Milgrom (1976: 756), independently before Wright, submitted the same categorization of the hand impositions into the two forms.[236] However, his interpretation of the two handed form differs from Wright. He comments on the appointment of Joshua in Numbers 27:18, amending singular 'your hand' to 'your hands' with the LXX, as Wright did: "Transfer of authority and power can only be performed by the laying of both hands. This is clear from Numbers 8:10 and Leviticus 16:21. The leaning of only one hand is limited to the ritual whereby the offerer of a sacrificial animal identifies himself as its owner and declares its purpose"[237] (Milgrom, 1990: 235). That is, in contrast with Wright's 'designation,' Milgrom interprets the meaning of the two handed type as 'transference' of something through the actor(s) of the gesture to the object: sins (Lev 16:21), authority (Num 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9), the pollution of the witnesses (Lev 24:14), and bloodguilt (Sus 34).

In the case of the blasphemer (Lev 24:14), though the text is not clear due to collective hand imposition, Milgrom (2000b: 2113) infers that "here the hand-leaning rite is performed with both hands. It serves a transference function: to convey the pollution generated by the blasphemy back to its producer." That is, the persons who heard the blasphemy on the spot were contaminated by it and they transferred the pollution through the hand imposition back to the blasphemer. Then the pollution is eliminated with his execution outside the camp (Milgrom, 1991b: 1041).

Milgrom's main objection to 'designation' (2000b: 2113) is stated with the analogous case of the wood-gatherer (Num 15:32-36). In this case, significantly hand imposition was not practiced on the accused by the witnesses, either to

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[236] See also Milgrom (1990: 235; 1991b: 151, 1041; 2000b: 2113).

[237] It seems that Num 8:10, as an example of two hands, is Milgrom's wrong reference by mistake or confusion, because in the same commentary on Numbers, he comments on the verse as follows: "It must be assumed that the elders used *one hand* (emphasis mine) just as the Levites did upon their offerings (v. 12). Thus the Levites are designated as Israel's 'sacrifice' – their representatives in the sanctuary" (1990: 62). Milgrom's additional inconsistency is detected between his earlier commentary on Numbers (1990) and the later commentary on Leviticus (1991b). While he admitted 'declaration' as a function of hand imposion along with 'ownership' in the former book (1990), he argues only for 'ownership,' refusing 'declaration' in the latter book (1991b: 151).

designate the culprit or to take responsibility for his death. Milgrom (2000b: 2113) comments correctly on the reason for the witnesses' non-performance of hand imposition in this case: "The difference between the two cases rests in their respective crimes: Sabbath violation has no effect on its witnesses, whereas cursing God generates *pollution* (emphasis mine) that impinges on all who hear it." It implies that the function of hand imposition in non-sacrificial cases is not to designate the culprit, but to transfer something to him.

As far as the case of Susanna similar to the case of the blasphemer is concerned, Milgrom (1991b: 1042) says that the hand imposition of the two elders on Susanna functions to transfer the 'bloodguilt' (responsibility) rather than 'pollution,' while he admitted that he was baffled by the inconsistency of meaning between the two cases.[238] Thus, in this case also, "the transference still takes place, not of pollution but of bloodguilt. This rite is the same even if its content has changed."[239]

Although they differ in interpreting the function of the two handed imposition, Wright and Milgrom's categorization of the gesture in one hand and two hands are maintained. But their view has several crucial holes.

Above all, except for the case of the Azazel goat (Lev 16:21), the other two cases cannot be taken as authentic evidences that the two hands were obliged, due to their textual ambiguity. In the case of the Azazel goat only, the imposition of two hands is unquestionably required, as stated in Leviticus 16:21. The specific phrase "his two hands" (אֶת־שְׁתֵּי יָדוֹ [יָדָיו])[240] indicates that two hands are compulsory and indispensable. By contrast, in the cases of Joshua's appointment (Num 27:18, 23; Deut 34:9), and the blasphemer's execution (Lev 24:14), it is not clear whether both hands are required or not.

In the case of Joshua's appointment, the attestation is not consistent even in the same context of Numbers. Whereas Numbers 27:18 says that God commanded Moses to lay one hand on Joshua, v. 23 states that Moses

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[238] Milgrom (1991b: 1042) infers that the transference of bloodguilt upon the capital criminal probably might be a postexilic development when the hand imposition became a rite to remove the blood guilt from those responsible for the death sentence.

[239] Nevertheless, Milgrom (1991b: 1042) suspended final judgment on the case of Susanna, accepting that Wright's interpretation could be possible. But in the case of the Azazel goat, he argued that although the two-hand imposition might designate the recipient of the gesture, transference has occurred. In this respect, Milgrom disagreed with Wright (1986: 436) who refused 'transference' of sins by the two-hand imposition. According to Wright, the transference of sins was made by the spoken confession of the Israelites and thus the two-hand imposition designated where the sins are to rest. Wright's idea is by no means acceptable, as argued below.

[240] Ketib יָדוֹ and Qere יָדָיו in this phrase.

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practiced two handed imposition on him in line with Deuteronomy 34:9. In addition, the variants of the text display different attestations, presumably in attempts of harmonization (see n. 235). In the same vein, Wright amends the singular 'hand' in Numbers 27:18 to the plural 'hands,' preferring the LXX to the single 'hand' of the Samaritan. Although the variants are divided into two incompatible attestations, this thesis receives the present Masoretic text as such at face value and interprets that there was essentially no qualitative difference of function between one hand and two hands in many cases of hand impositions, including this case of Joshua. It is likely that except for the case of the Azazel goat, two hands were not obligated but could be used at the discretion of the person(s) who should practice the activity.[241] Probably this might be the reason that in the collective hand impositions (Lev 8:14, 18; Num 8:10; Lev 24:14; etc), whether one hand or two hands were not specified. However, only in the case of the Azazel goat, both hands are commanded as compulsory by the unique phrase 'two hands' (אֶת־שְׁתֵּי יָדוֹ).

Likewise, the case of the blasphemer's execution (Lev 24:14) does not state clearly whether two hands or one hand of each witness were laid on, because the hand imposition was performed collectively in a group. For the reason, this case also cannot be employed as an authentic support for the idea that non-sacrificial hand imposition is practiced by two hands, with the meaning of 'designation' (Wright) or 'transference (of pollution)' (Milgrom). Therefore, Wright' argument (1986: 435) about the case of the blasphemer with the assumption that "since this is not a case of sacrificial hand placement, the witnesses were each to place two hands on the culprit" is *circulus vitiosus* or *petitio principii* that follows the wrong syllogism: the two handed form is performed for non-sacrificial cases; the case of the blasphemer is non sacrificial; therefore, two hands should have been imposed in this case. As a result, the assumption that non-sacrificial cases require two handed form is not a categorical proposition corroborated by the texts.

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[241] Rodriguez (1979: 197) submits a tentative view, leveling the distinction between one handed type and two handed type: "In the light of Num 27:18, 23, it may be suggested that, while descriptive cultic texts employ the singular, the actual performance of the ritual involves both hands, as in Lev 16:21." That is, it is possible that the two handed form were practiced in the actual performance, while the one handed form was prescribed in Lev 1-7. But admittedly it seems that one hand on sacrificial animals is constantly prescribed in the sacrificial rituals except in the unique case of the Azazel goat, although some cases of collective hand imposition are ambiguous. This thesis infers that both of two forms, whether one hand or two hands, were possible at the actor's discretion in sacrificial hand impositions, though one hand is prescribed in Lev 1-7. That is, it seems that one hand was not compulsory in sacrifices in light of the cases of collective hand impositions on the animals.

Besides, the ordination of the Levites (Num 8:10), where the hand imposition is performed on the Levites by the elders as representatives of the Israelites,[242] is excluded by Wright and Milgrom, even though their hands are also imposed collectively on the Levites in the same way as in the cases of the blasphemer and Susanna. Also in this case, it is not clear whether one hand or two hands were used.

According to Wright (1986: 436) and Milgrom (1990: 62), because "the Levites are designated as Israel's 'sacrifice'" (Milgrom), this case must be classified under the one hand category. In other words, although both the blasphemer and the Levites go through collective hand imposition, they argue that whereas one hand was used in the case of the Levites, because it is a *sacrifice-like* case, two hands were laid in the case of the blasphemer, because it is a non-sacrificial case. However, the texts of both cases do not specify whether the hand imposition is to be one handed or two handed form; therefore, Wright and Milgrom's assumption is subjective.

Since both Wright (1986: 439) and Milgrom (1990: 62) think that one hand was laid upon the Levites, they interpret the gesture as the identification of 'ownership,' in line with their view that the one hand form required in sacrificial rituals has the meaning of 'ownership.'[243] In contrast, whether one hand or two hands were used in both cases, some scholars (e.g., Rodriguez, 1986: 182) claim that in the ordination of the Levites, 'transference' of a kind was made, that is, 'transference of responsibility,' so that they could serve at the sanctuary in place of the Israelites (for details, see below).

On the other hand, in the case of the Azazel goat, Wright and Milgrom insist that it is not a sacrifice by applying strict standards of sacrifice to it with the support of many other scholars. That is, it is not a sacrifice in light of sacrificial standards requiring slaughtering and blood-shedding. However, they do not take into account the fact that the live goat shares part of the *hattat* sacrifice, as follows: (1) the Azazel goat is designated as a *hattat* sacrifice together with another goat (Lev 16:5); (2) like sacrificial animals, it is chosen and taken from the congregation of Israel and '*placed before YHWH'* together with its partner goat; (3) it is clear that the live goat should also be chosen as an unblemished one, in line with the qualifications of sacrifices (Lev 22:18-25; cf. Lev 1:3, 10; 3:1, 6; etc.); (4) the hand imposition (though by two hands) should

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[242] As stated in n. 223, although the text states that the sons of Israel should lay their hands on the Levites, it is obvious that in actual practice, the elders executed the rite as representatives of the congregation.

[243] Wright (1986: 436-39); Milgrom (1991b: 151, 1041; 2000b: 2113).

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be practiced on the goat, as in other sacrifices, although a majority of scholars consider it as having a different function with its two handed form; (5) it should be sent into the wildness to Azazel, as 'a special form' of the burnt *hattat* flesh (Kiuchi, 1987: 149), and thus presumably to be destroyed (cf. Gerstenberger, 1996: 73, 221),[244] like the *hattat* animal that were burnt outside the camp; (6) the Azazel goat played a role to make atonement for Aaron, the representative of all the Israelites (Lev 16:10), and served to make atonement for the whole Israel through Aaron (see chapter 3),[245] carrying out the role of a *hattat* offering for atonement in terms of function.

For these reasons, as mentioned in chapter 2, this thesis argues, following Kiuchi (1987: 149), that the live goat is a special form of the burnt *hattat* flesh, and that it can be considered as part of 'one *hattat* offering' consisting of the two goats (שְׁנֵי־שְׂעִירֵי עִזִּים לְחַטָּאת) to make atonement for the congregation (Lev 16:5).

Therefore, it seems that Wright and Milgrom's examples are inconsistent, and their categorization of the one or two handed form is arbitrary, in that they accept only the ordained Levites as a *sacrifice-like* case but refuse the Azazel goat as non-sacrificial case, even though the live goat also may be a *sacrifice-like* case at least. Moreover, they lead to the subjective conclusion that one hand was used on the Levites and two hands were laid on the blasphemer (Lev 24:14), even though both are collective hand impositions.

Of course, it is inferred that in principle one hand was used in all sacrifices, as prescribed in Leviticus 1-5.[246] But if the Azazel goat can also be

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[244] Gerstenberger (1996: 221) comments: "under no circumstances, is it permitted to return to the human society that has sent it out (v. 22b). Later generations saw to it that the scapegoat was guaranteed not to return; they had a non-Jew, if possible, push the animal into a ravine, where it broke its neck" (cf. *m. Yoma* 6:6). It implies that the final elimination of the sins in the wildness would be expected as completed with the death of the goat, although the effect of atonement is already given to the people through the removal of their sins from the camp. In case that the goat returned alive to the community, it is dubious that they recognized the ritual as successful.

[245] Cf. Kiuchi's refutation (1987: 113) to Janowski, who contended that Lev 16:21 must be excluded as a suitable case, because the Azazel goat is not a sacrifice and both hands are used in its case.

[246] Therefore, it is inferred that the collective hand impositions on sacrifices by the priests (Exod 29:10, 15, 19) and the Levites (Num 8:12) at their ordinations might be practiced by one hand. Nevertheless, it is not sure whether one hand was *mandatory* or *obligatory* in sacrificial rituals, in view of the fact that the textual attestations are divided into two views without explanations about whether one hand or two hands of Moses were laid on Joshua, and the fact that there existed also a few rabbinic opinions that the two handed form practiced on the Azazel goat was applied to all other sacrifices.

counted as a *sacrifice-like* case, like the ordained Levites, it remains a question why the two hands were *obligatory* in this case, as stated by the explicit phrase 'two hands' in Leviticus 16:21, and not in the case of the hand imposition on the Levites and all other cases.

Except for the case of the Azazel goat, the other cases cannot be presented as evidence to prove Wright and Milgrom's principle that the two handed form is always performed in non-sacrificial rituals for a fixed *qualitative* function like, for example, 'transference' (Milgrom, 1991b: 1041) or 'designation' (Wright, 1986: 434-45). Thus their theory is questionable. It is unlikely that difference between one hand and two hands as such signifies a *qualitative* difference of function. There is a possibility that two hands can have the same meaning as one hand, as implied in the case of Joshua's appointment. Therefore, it must be questioned whether there is an intrinsic *quantitative* difference rather than *qualitative* between the two forms.

As noted, the specific phrase 'his two hands' (אֶת־שְׁתֵּי יָדוֹ [יָדָיו], Lev 16:21) in the case of the Azazel goat implies that the imposition of both hands is indispensable and mandatory, differently from the other cases. In this regard, it is likely that in other cases, except for the Azazel goat, either one hand or two hands could be used at the actor' discretion, as implied in the case of Joshua and perhaps in certain cases of the collective hand impositions, although it is thought that in sacrificial cases one hand was generally used.

The unique mention of 'two hands' indicates that the action was required for a special function in the ritual of the Azazel goat. This thesis argues that it may function to *intensify quantitatively* the transference of all sins in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement, while the one handed form has the functions of 'sin-transference' in the ordinary *hattat* ritual on the ordinary days.

The meaning of hand imposition in the non-sacrificial cases, whether it was one-handed form or two-handed form, may well generally be regarded with Milgrom to be 'transference' rather than 'designation.' However, it does not mean that hand imposition itself does have a fixed inherent meaning and function like 'ownership,' 'transference,' or 'designation.' Rather, the meaning or function of hand imposition is endowed by the actor of the gesture to accomplish the proper purpose of a ritual in question. It is similar to the ritual customs practiced in modern churches where a hand imposition on a person's head can have a variety of meanings, depending on the purpose of the gesture in the ritual, whether one hand is laid on or two hands: for blessing, healing,

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exorcism, transference or impartation of power, and for sprinkling baptism (in some churches), etc.

Although Wright (1986: 439-46) relies on the Hittites' texts to corroborate his idea, the cases drawn from them seems rather to encroach his idea for several reasons. Firstly, even though one hand imposition might be accepted as a sign of ownership in some cases, not all the cases that he illustrated fall under this category. For instance, why was a three-fold hand imposition performed in some cases?[247] Three-fold or multiple actions would be extravagant to confirm ownership, because one-time action would suffice for it. Therefore, it is doubtful whether these cases had the meaning of ownership.

Secondly, in one case at least, Wright (1986: 446) agrees that its meaning can be 'transference,' instead of 'designation' or 'ownership.' It is the ritual of the Hittite Ambazzi where the practitioner transfers the evil (the patients' pollution) upon a mouse which was sent to the high mountains or deep valleys.

Furthermore, there are several other cases that Wright forcibly interprets as ownership. For instance, in a birth ritual, an expectant mother bows down to the birth stool that she will use in parturition and places her hand on or toward it (Wright, 1986: 444). According to Wright, by so doing she identifies the birth stool as hers. But it is not plausible, because there would be no confusion or ambiguity of ownership with the birth stool at that place. Rather, it seems that the woman either dedicates the birth stool, or infuses it with power. Or it can be an action of supplication for a safe child birth.

The hand imposition in the case of Mursili (Wright, 1986: 445) is also misinterpreted as ownership, because he should place his hand upon the bull that was already prepared and decorated, and send it as "his substitute bull (GUD *puḫugari-*) to be burned at Kummani."[248] The gesture of ownership would not be required for the decorated bull about which there was no ambiguity. Probably the gesture was practiced to confirm the substitution. In conclusion, ownership is not a sole and consistent meaning of hand impositions in the Hittites rituals; rather, it could also have various meanings, like 'transference' and 'substitution.'

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[247] In the Hittites' cases (only one hand is used), an actor sometimes places his hand without contact, toward an object from a distance (Wright 1986: 441; cf. Exod 9:22). Wright says that the distance placement of the hand also may express the same meaning as the contact placement, i.e., a sign of ownership. In one instance, the king places his hand three times toward a vessel from which a priest libates three time to the god Zabara (Wright, 1986: 441).

[248] Kummanni was the name of the Anatolian kingdom of Kizzuwatna, that is, the ancient city of Turkey which was its major cult center.

This thesis postulates that the meaning of Wright's 'designation' is *automatically* and *inherently* accompanied by the gesture in the activity of hand imposition, whether by one hand or by two hands. It is likely that hand(s) might function *automatically* to 'index' who/what the object is that receives a specific effect endowed by the gesture, as Gilders (2004: 81-82, 108) suggested.[249] In other words, hand imposition as such was not practiced to confirm ownership. In addition, this thesis argues with some scholars that various meanings can be granted by the actor to the activity on the *designated* or *indexed* object, depending on a specific purpose of the rite.[250] In the same vein, Kiuchi (1987: 113; cf. 2007: 304) argues that "the difference in form as such does not necessarily imply a difference in the meaning of the gesture."

Therefore, it can be said that in some non-sacrificial cases and the Azazel goat case, the meaning of 'transference' is endowed by the actor or the legislator, whether in the one handed form[251] or explicitly in the two handed form[252] although transferred things might differ in each case, as displayed above.[253]

Wright (1986: 436) states that the two handed form on Joshua merely demonstrates who is to receive Moses' authority and glory, and designates where the sins of Israel are to rest, and therefore, "blessing and authority do not flow from the person of Moses through his arms to Joshua." But he must explain *how* authority or glory, and sins (in the case of Azazel goat) are moved to the designated objects. Moses 'put' or 'imparted' his authority or glory on Joshua

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[249] Gilders (2004: 75, 78) states that any view on meaning of hand imposition cannot be confirmed, because "an explanation is not articulated in the Priestly texts," even though he is in favor of 'ownership' and 'substitution.' Rather, he suggests that "the hand pressing indexes a relationship between offerer and animal. It is the one who offers the animal who presses his hand on its head" (Gilders, 2004: 81; cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 112 also, who says that "the gesture expresses some relationship between the offerer and the sacrificial animal," arguing for the substitution theory [pp. 113-14]). Gilders' view seems to be similar to Wright's 'designation.' But, as Wright does, he also overlooks ritual meanings endowed to the gesture beyond the function of index. On the other hand, Gilders (2004: 82) views also the primary function of blood rites as an 'index' of existential relationship and linkage between the offerer and the altar, or the offer and the priest, or the community and YHWH. For details, see below.

[250] For a similar idea, see D. Daube (1956: 224-29). They contended that "in some cases one principle should apply, while in other cases, another principle was operative" (Wright, 1986: 434). It means that "the offerer himself determined what the meaning of the rite was" (Wright, 1986: 437).

[251] E.g., as prescribed in the case of Joshua.

[252] E.g., as practiced in the case of Joshua and prescribed for the Azazel goat.

[253] See Milgrom's interpretation noted above: the authority of Moses to Joshua (Num 28:18, 23; Deut 34:9); the pollution of the witnesses (Lev 24); the sins of the community (Lev 16:21); blood guilt (Sus 34).

(נָתַתָּה מֵהוֹדְךָ עָלָיו, Num 27:20). The object's reception means that something came out through the gesture from the actor. It is by 'transference' that something was conveyed to the object with the gesture.

4.3.4. Meaning of hand imposition in sacrifices

If a specific meaning is diversely endowed to hand imposition according to the actor's or legislator's intention and the ritual purpose, what meaning is given to the activity practiced in sacrifices? In all types of sacrifices,[254] one hand is imposed on the head of quadruped animals without any explanation of meaning, although it appears that the meaning is sometimes implied by the context of the activity (e.g., in Lev 1:4 concerning the burnt offering). Only in the case of the Azazel goat ritual, the meaning of the gesture is explained, while it is performed with two hands: the high priest imposes his 'two hands' on the live goat and transfer 'all the iniquities' (עֲוֹנֹת) of Israel to the goat (Lev 16:21); thus in this case, transference of sin is an effect endowed to the gesture.

Due to the sparse explanations concerning the meaning of the hand impositions practiced in sacrifices, the following questions are raised: how can the meaning of the gesture be inferred from the textual silence or dim implications?; Is there a common denominator of meaning in the identical gesture practiced in all the sacrifices?; Is it possible to apply the meaning of the gesture detected in non-sacrificial cases to sacrificial cases (i.e., transference)?;

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[254] It is inferred that the guilt offering (Lev 5:14-26 [5:14-6:7]; 7:1-7) also requires hand imposition, though in its prescription the activity is not specified. The ram of the guilt offering could be converted into a silver money. Concering the omission, Milgrom (1991b: 151) argues for the possibility of its exemption (followed by Wright, 1986: 439 n. 34), although he admits as an alternative possibility a textual abbreviation as well, which is usual in the cultic texts. Milgrom notes: "In the Priestly tradition, this is the only sacrifice commutable in money, which may be the reason that hand-leaning is not required . . . because the offerer was given the option of commuting the אָשָׁם to money (except in case of the scale-diseased person; see at 14:21), hand-leaning could not be required." However, many scholars (e.g., Rodriguez, 1986: 180; Kiuchi, 1987: 180; Hartley, 1992: 20; Gane, 2005: 54) are in favor of a textual abbreviation, admitting that the gesture is a prerequisite in all sacrifices. Hartley (1992: 20) states, for example: "Even though no ritual is given for making a reparation offering, it may be assumed that this rite was also a part of the ritual for that sacrifice." That is, it is likely that hand imposition was practiced, when a ram (Lev 5:14-26 [5:14-6:7]) or a lamb (Lev 14:12-14; 24-25) was required. In fact, the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering have most ritual components in common: "the same law applies to both the sin offering and the guilt offering" (Lev 7:7 NIV; cf. 14:13).

Does the hand imposition on a *hattat* animal have the same dynamics and function as the action on the other sacrificial animals?

In principle, this thesis accepts, with the majority of scholars, that the sacrificial offerings basically have a denominator of meaning concerning hand imposition, although they are divided in a variety of opinions on what the meaning is. As mentioned, in non-sacrificial cases and the special case of the Azazel goat, the hand imposition, whether it is done with one hand or two hands, seems to have the meaning of *transference*, while it may convey various things like authority/power, pollution, responsibility (i.e., bloodguilt), and sins to an object. If so, may the meaning of transference be applied to all sacrificial hand impositions?

As noted, although a few scholars have attempted to apply the idea of transference to the sacrifices, relying on the case of the Azazel goat ritual (Lev 16:21), most scholars do not so on a number of grounds (see below).

They have sought the meaning of sacrificial hand imposition, referring to Leviticus 1:4 where they believe this meaning of the gesture in sacrifices is implied.[255] But there is no scholarly consensus in explaining the meaning implied in its vague wording: וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הָעֹלָה וְנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו.[256] For example, whereas Kiuchi interprets it as the meaning of 'substitution' (1987: 114; cf. Noth, 1965: 22) or 'identification' (2007: 30, 56; cf. Janowski, 1982: 210), Gane (2005: 54) endeavours to find the meaning of 'ownership' in it. Hence a variety of theories have been submitted: transference, identification, substitution, ownership.[257]

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[255] Cf. Kiuchi (1987: 114; 2007: 56); Gane (2005: 54).

[256] "He is to lay his hand on the head of the burnt offering, and it will be accepted on his behalf to make atonement for him" (Lev 1:4 NIV). Scholars usually say that hand imposition is an essential component for acceptance or atonement (cf. Levine, 1974: 73 n. 51; Hartley, 1992: 21; cf. Rendtorff, 1985: 35-40). However, the theories on how it leads to the effect diverge between scholars.

[257] As other theories, there are 'declaration of the purpose' (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 152) and 'consecration' or 'dedication' of the victim (cf. Wright, 1986: 437); but these are excluded in the present discussion, because of limited space. For detailed debates and miscellaneous references on the function of the sacrificial hand imposition, see Rodriguez (1979: 210-18; 1986: 180-83); Wright (1986: 436-39); Kiuchi (1987: 112-19); Milgrom (1991: 151-52); Hartley (1992: 19-21); Gane (2005: 53-59).

4.3.4.1. Transference

Some scholars have contended that the meaning of hand imposition in sacrifices may also be taken as *transference* of something to the object of the gesture. It means generally 'transference of sin,'[258] although a few pose 'the transference of personality.'[259] For example, Rodriguez (1986: 180-83) argues for transference of sin to sacrificial animals. Claiming that non-sacrificial cases[260] have the idea of transference in common, apart from the manifest case of the Azazel goat ritual, he submits that the hand imposition upon a sacrificial animal probably has the same function, although he concentrated on the *hattat* offering as a major expiatory sacrifice. Gerstenberger (1996: 26, 47, 73) also contends that hand impositions on all sacrifices, as well as on the Azazel goat (1993: 221), has the meaning of 'transference of sin.'[261] Especially in the *hattat*

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[258] Keil & Delitzsch (1956 vol. 2: 355); Noth (1965: 38-39); Wenham (1979: 62, 75); Rodriguez (1979: 217-19; 1986: 180-83); Noordtzij (1982: 22-23); Gerstenberger (1996: 73). Wenham (1979: 62) argues for two functions: probably all sacrifices have 'transference of sin' and/or 'substitution' in place of the offerer. It is certain that Wenham is using 'substitution' in the sense of 'identification' in light of his comment (1972: 75): "thereby [i.e., by the hand imposition] identifying himself with the animal or transferring his guilt to it." For Wenham the distinctive nature of *hattat* lies in the different mode of its blood rites (see below).

[259] E.g., M. Bernoulli (1958: 230). But it seems that the transference of personality is nearly the same as 'identification' or 'substitution.' M. Noth (1965: 22) also argues for 'the transference of person' in the burnt offering, stating that the activity may function to transfer the offerer's own person to the animal, "thus making it his substitute" and this meaning may have extended to all animals so that it may mark the sacrifices as "a giving of oneself." Noth's statement is understood as 'substitution' (Kiuchi, 1987: 117) or 'identification' (Wright, 1986: 437). Noth (1965: 38) continues to insist in his note on Lev 4:4 that the hand imposition performed in the *hattat* sacrifice "doubtless preserved its original and special meaning, the transference to the animal of guilt" (cf. Johar, 1988: 613). On the other hand, Gane (2005: 56), who argues for the identification of 'ownership,' recognizes that 'a legal transference of ownership' occurred simultaneously at the moment of the action.

[260] Judgement of the blasphemer (Lev 24:14); appointment of Joshua (Num 27:18-23); and the ordination of the Levites (Num 8:10). Rodriguez's interpretation concerning the first two cases is nearly the same as Milgrom's, but his view on the hand imposition on the Levites (Num 8:10) differs from Milgrom's (1990 :62).

[261] Gerstenberger (1996: 73) comments on the *hattat* sacrifice:

The laying of hands upon the sacrificial animal (vv. 4, 15, 24, 29; cf. Lev 3:2, 7, 12) is a transferal gesture; the continuum of sin flows over the animal, which is then killed representatively for the perpetrator (cf. the driving out of the scapegoat in Lev 16:20-22). People today also transfer their guilt complexes to 'scapegoats': Mr. Clean then eliminates these complexes by pursuing, tormenting, and destroying the 'scapegoat' (Cf. René Girard, *Dad Ende der Gewalt*)."

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ritual, the sacrificial animal 'neutralizes the sin' by taking the substance of sin upon itself with the laying on of hand (Gerstenberger, 1996: 71).

However, a majority of scholars disagree with the transference theory on account of a number of reasons, including several points that are mentioned above:[262] (1) because the Azazel goat ritual is not a sacrifice, the meaning of hand imposition on the goat cannot be applied to sacrifices; (2) different handed forms, by one hand or two hands, produce distinctive functions between the Azazel goat ritual and the sacrificial ritual; (3) transference of sin at least seems not to occur in the peace offering (Lev 3:2, 8, 13) that is not expiatory, setting aside the burnt offering (Lev 1) that is admitted to have expiatory function to a certain extent;[263] (4) the sacrificial flesh is declared as holy after the hand imposition, indicating that the flesh is not contaminated by the transferred sin;[264] (5) this gesture is not practiced on the birds and grain for the *hattat*, even though they are also prescribed as expiatory *hattat* sacrifices; (6) Confession of sin, which is taken as an activity to remove sin, takes place before the sacrifice is brought and offered (Lev 5:5; Num 5:7);[265] (7) the implied explanation on the hand imposition in the burnt offering (Lev 1:4) seems to indicate 'substitution'(Kiuchi, 1987: 116-17) and/or 'identification' (Janowski, 1982: 210) or 'ownership' (Gane, 2005: 54) rather than 'transference of sin;' (8) there is no evidence in the sacrificial text, including the *hattat* text, that the hand imposition transfers sin to the victim.

This thesis argues for the transference of sin by the hand imposition in the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering which are made for specific sins, and denies its same function in other sacrifices. Now that the several answers to the objections are already given above, other objections will be discussed in § 4.3.5 below.

For the case of the blasphemer in Lev 24, however, Gerstenberger (1996: 363; cf. Wright, 1986: 435 also cited above) considers it as a ritual gesture to take responsibility for the truth of their statements against the culprit (if false, the curse will return to the accusers) (contra Milgrom, 1991b: 1041; 2000b: 2113, who argues for the idea of transference in this case).

[262] Wright (1986: 437-38); Kiuchi (1987: 115); Milgrom (1991b: 151-52); Hartley (1992: 20); Gane (2005: 56-57).

[263] Wright (1987: 437 n. 20, 438); Cf. Hartley (1992: 20). A few scholars limited the function of sin-transference to the expiatory sacrifices for a specific sin, i.e., the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering (see references in Rodriguez, 1986: 183; Wright, 1987: 437).

[264] J.C. Matthes (1903: 97-119); Van der Merwe (1962: 39); Snaith (1977: 42); Kurtz (1980: 228-30); Kiuchi (1987: 115-16); cf. Gane (2005: 57, 91). They say that impure animals cannot be sacrifices (cf. Rodriguez, 1986: 180).

[265] Kiuchi (1987: 118); Milgrom (1991b: 151).

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4.3.4.2. Confirmation of ownership

Chief proponents of this idea are Wright and Milgrom.[266] While the two handed form in non-sacrificial cases has another function, the one handed imposition in sacrifices is a gesture to confirm the offerer's ownership of the animal,: "this is mine" (Wright, 1986: 439). With this gesture "the offerer attests that this victim is his indeed" (de Vaux, 1961: 28). It also confirms who the beneficiary of the sacrifice is (de Vaux, 1961: 28; Gane, 2005: 54).[267]

According to Milgrom (1991b: 151-52), the following cases, for which hand imposition is not required, support the ownership theory: silver money commutable for the guilt offering goat, the grain offering (or 'cereal offering' in Milgrom's term), and sacrificial birds. In these cases the offerer holds the offerings in his hands, while he demonstrates that "clearly it is his" (1991b: 152). Therefore, hand imposition is not necessary. But the gesture was essential for all quadrupeds, because they would be dragged in by rope to the sanctuary.[268] Since another person might be able to bring the animal to the sanctuary, the gesture must be performed to "eliminate any possible doubt regarding the identity of the owner/offerer" (Gane, 2005: 54).

However, as Kiuchi points, the ownership is already assumed in the phrase 'from the herd' (2007: 56), and before he brought it to the sanctuary, the offerer had to choose an unblemished animal as his own (Lev 22:18-25). Even though the animal might happen to be dragged into the sanctuary by a third person, it is doubtful whether the hand imposition is required to identify the ownership, because it is most likely that the ownership should have been confirmed before the sacrifice begins at the altar with the hand imposition. If the offerer could not identify his own victim, how could he lay his hand on it, because he might be confused with its ownership?; conversely, if he identified an animal as his victim, hand imposition for removing ambiguity would be unnecessary. Therefore, confirmation of ownership must be prior to hand imposition; in that case probably the ownership could simply have been certified by the offerer's oral identification before the priest ("I am the offerer of this animal"), though the text is silent on it.

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[266] Wright (1986: 433-46); Milgrom (1991b: 151-53); Gane (2005: 53-59) who follows them. Cf. R. de Vaux (1961: 416).

[267] Gane (2005: 53, 56) thinks that 'transference' of ownership, a kind of transference, also occurs with confirmation of ownership. Cf. Van der Merwe (1962: 40), who takes it to be a sign to renounce his right of property.

[268] For Milgrom's inference (1991b: 151) that hand imposition might be exempted in the guilt offering, see § 4.3.4.2.

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On the other hand, if their theory is correct, the *hattat* sacrifice for the whole congregation (Lev 4:15) also must be exempted from hand imposition, because the ambiguity or confusion of ownership among the people would not be possible.[269] As for the sacrifice examples of Milgrom, they are a commutable type (silver) or concessive types (cereal or bird) rather than standard types. The concessive types are endowed with the effect of the normal sacrifice by the will of God, even though they deviate from the normal type, with a couple of variant and/or exempted rites, like no hand imposition, no consumption of the flesh, even no blood rite. Likewise, the effect of the normal guilt offering made with a goat is given to the commutable type (silver) by God. But the meanings of ritual activities must not be explored from these concessive and mitigated forms.[270]

Finally, as refuted, the extra biblical evidences submitted by Wright and followed by Milgrom are also unacceptable; these cases rather indicate that hand imposition could have multiple functions, depending on the purpose of that rite.

4.3.4.3. Substitution and identification

It seems that these two concepts, substitution and identification, are commutable and interchangeable in scholarly arguments. Therefore, they may well be treated together in this section.

The theory of substitution is that "the victim is a vicarious substitution of the donor himself" (E. R. Leach, 1976: 89).[271] Kiuchi (1987: 117-18) draws the conclusion from a lengthy exegesis of Leviticus 1:4 that the hand imposition in

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[269] Contra Milgrom (1991b: 153) and Gane (2005: 54), who suggest 'theory of ownership' and argue that hand imposition should be executed on the *hattat* animal for the congregation in Lev 4:13-21, because the *hattat* ritual for the congregation is not a calenderic sacrifice and can hardly be called a public one (see § 4.2.1.2).

[270] In this regard, Gane's theory about the *hattat* ritual is wrong from outset, because he attempts to draw out many principles for his idea from such concessive cases as the bird and the grain offering. For instance, Gane (2005: 8) presents the grain offering as an example of different ritual activities with the same meaning, because the grain offering for the *hattat* ritual accomplishes the same function as the *hattat* offering of quadrupeds. Besides, he (2005: 60) argues that slaughtering and blood are not indispensable for a sacrifice by illustrating the *hattat* offering of grain as an example. But his examples are wrong, because a concessive case cannot be the paradigm for general standards. Blood and slaughtering to shed blood are indispensable for a sacrifice in light of the declaration of Lev 17:11.

[271] Cf. Kiuchi (1987; 117-18); especially Noordtzij's statement (1982: 33): "The laying on hands in a sense made the animal into the successor of the person who presented it. It came to stand in his place . . . ."

the burnt offering expresses the idea of substitution and this meaning can be applied to other sacrifices.

There are dissenting opinions about the mechanism of substitution among the exegetes who advocate this theory. For one scholar, sin or guilt is transferred to the animal by the hand imposition and the victim is killed as his 'substitute' (Wenham, 1979: 62, 75). For others, the offerer transfers his personality to the substitutionary animal through the gesture, but there is no transference of sin/guilt. It leads to the offerer's identification' with the animal, and thus the animal is put to death as a 'substitute' in place of the offerer (see Wright, 1986: 437). In the latter view, it is found that the transference or substitution of the offerer's personality and his identification with the victim can be used interchangeably, while they generally refuse the transference of sin/guilt. It seems that for this reason Kiuchi, who argued firmly for 'substitution' in his first work (1987: 112-119), turned to 'identification' in his later work (2007: 30, 56),[272] which is judged to have the same meaning as 'substitution.'[273] Because of interchangibility of the two concepts, an evaluation of substitution theory will be made after the explanation about some feature of identification.

The theory of identification claims that hand imposition in the sacrificial ritual creates a close relationship between the offerer and the victim.[274] The offerer is identified with the animal by this gesture.[275] As said, some scholars think that this occurs by transference or substitution of the offerer's person, signifying 'this is me' (see Wright, 1986: 437; cf. Kiuchi, 2007: 56). That is, 'identification' is an interchangeable concept with 'substitution.' It indicates that the victim brings the offerer nearer to God in the ritual by its turning into smoke on the altar (Milgrom, 1991b: 151). This identification allows the animal to be offered to Yahweh as a substitute or representative for the offerer (cf. Gilders, 2004: 74). By so doing, the victim's blood, as its life, substitutes for or represents the life of the offerer.

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[272] Kiuchi states in his later work (2007: 30): "it [hand imposition] probably symbolizes an offerer's identification with the animal."

[273] For a different interpretation concerning Noth's statement (1965: 22), see n. 259. This confusion is another sign to indicate that conceptual scope of substitution is overlapped with identification among interpreters.

[274] H. H. Rowley (1967: 133); Péter (1977: 48-55). Kiuchi (1987: 112) sets out from a similar statement for his substitution theory: "In sacrificial contexts, . . . the imposition of hand(s) is performed by the offerer of the beneficiary of atonement. Hence it appears natural to assume that the gesture expresses some relationship between the offerer and the sacrificial animal." Their identical statements indicate that identification and substitution are closely connected with each other.

[275] Elliger (1966: 34); Janowski (1982: 210, 218-21); Kiuchi (2007: 56).

Milgrom (1991b: 151) is sceptical of 'identification,' saying that it is an unknown concept in the Hebrew Bible, "both because it is magical and because it presupposes the belief that death brings one close to God." But identification is symbolic rather than magical, and it is likely that the substitutionary death effects reconciliation with God by making atonement.[276]

Which theory is the more acceptable, substitution or identification? As noted, many scholars have attempted to find the meaning of the sacrificial hand imposition in Leviticus 1:4 where the activity is explained to some extent, rather than in Leviticus 16:21 where the transference of sin/guilt to the Azazel goat is manifestly stated as the function of the gesture performed by two hands. Leviticus 1:4 is the only place where the activity is stated, except for Leviticus 16:21 which is treated as a different case.

The main scholarly conviction is that all sacrificial animals are not defiled by the transference of sin to them; that is, sin is not transferred by the hand imposition, even in the *hattat* offering. The ground for it lies in that the animals are stated or implied to be pure or holy.[277] Therefore, the majority of scholars have contended that Leviticus 16:21, where the sin/guilt is transferred to the live goat by the two-hand imposition, cannot give a clue to the meaning of sacrificial hand imposition like Leviticus 1:4.

Leviticus 1:4, וְסָמַךְ יָדוֹ עַל רֹאשׁ הָעֹלָה וְנִרְצָה לוֹ לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו, indicates that hand imposition brings beneficial effect to the offerer; 'his acceptance on his behalf to make atonement for him.'[278] It implies the existential relationship between the offerer and the victim made by the gesture.

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[276] Janowski (1982: 210) states that sacrificial hand imposition signifies 'substitutionary death' in addition to 'identification.' Kiuchi (1987: 118) says that Janowski's idea reads too much into this gesture, because the gesture itself is simply the action of substitution without the meaning of substitutionary death. But it is true that the very hand imposition to entail the substitution of person causes the victim's death to be a substitutionary death. "The gesture is a distinct act by which the animal is officially surrendered to its subsequent sacrificial death" (Knierim, 1992: 38)

[277] After the *hattat* offering has been finished, it is stated that the *hattat* flesh is most holy (Lev 6:20 ff; 10:17) and burnt in a clean place (Lev 4:12). The flesh of the guilt offering is also the same (Lev 7:7). The flesh of the peace offering is obviously clean in light of Lev 7:19: "Also the flesh that touches anything unclean shall not be eaten; it shall be burned with fire. As for *other* flesh, anyone who is clean may eat *such* flesh" (NASB). It is assumed that the flesh of the burnt offering is also clean, because the flesh should be burnt on the altar. Presumably, while the *hattat*, the guilt, and the grain offering are called 'most holy,' the cleanness of other sacrificial animals offered to the altar refers to their implied holy state (but not most holy), given that the common animals permitted for food are called 'pure' in Lev 11.

[278] To interpret לִרְצֹנוֹ in 1:3b and וְנִרְצָה לוֹ in 1:4b, Kiuchi (1987: 116-17) refers to Lev 22:19-25 where the same phrases appears in a similar syntax. His conclusion is that לִרְצֹנוֹ

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The implied relationship between the offerer and the victim is supported by Leviticus 7:18b that warns against delayed consumption of the peace offering meat (Kiuchi, 1987: 117). The violation of the regulation will cause the sacrifice not to be accepted and consequently its effect will be nullified. Kiuchi (1987: 117) points out correctly the implied result of the violation, saying: "It could be inferred that here the rejection of the sacrifice is identical with that of the offerer." In addition, Kiuchi finds more important implication in Leviticus 1:3-4: the order of the hand imposition is located between the bringing of the animal to be accepted before YHWH (3b) and the declaration of its effect (4b, 'it may be accepted for him'). It indicates that the function of the gesture is to make the victim acceptable. Then, as Kiuchi (1987: 117) states, the subsequent effect, namely, 'to make atonement' (לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו) is "the purpose of the acceptance of the sacrifice" caused by the hand imposition rather than the direct effect of the gesture. That is, acceptance leads to atonement. His conclusion is that the hand imposition of the burnt offering in Leviticus 1:4 probably bears the idea of 'substitution' and this meaning can be applied to the other sacrifices where the same gesture is practiced.

Following Kiuchi (1987) and others, this thesis argues that the sacrificial hand imposition refers to 'substitution.' The reliability of this theory is bolstered by the analogy with the Levites' ordination in Numbers 8:6-25. As Milgrom said (1990: 62), "the Levites are designated as Israel's 'sacrifice'." God declares that he has taken the Levites for himself 'in place of (תַּחַת)' all the first borns of Israel (Num 8:16, 18; also Num 3:12, 41, 45). Israel should consecrate to YHWH all first born males both of man and beast, because they belong to Him.[279] But YHWH permitted the Levites to be the *substitute* for all the first born men of Israel.

Significantly just as sacrifices, which should 'be brought' (יַקְרִיב) from the herd or the flock (Lev 1:2) and be 'unblemished' (תָּמִים) (v. 3), were dedicated and offered to the altar before YHWH (cf. Lev 22:2) as substitutes for the offerer with the hand imposition, so the Levites, who should be 'taken' (קַח) from the Israelites and be 'purified' (טַהַר), were dedicated and offered (הֵנִיף) to the

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could be 'for acceptance on his behalf' and וְנִרְצָה לוֹ could mean 'and it (sacrifice) will be accepted on his behalf.'

[279] Exod 13:2, 13; 22:29; 34:20; Lev 27:26; Deut 12:6. Furthermore, YHWH claims that Israel is his first born son (Exod 4:22).

sanctuary before YHWH (Num 8:11-15)[280] as substitutes for the congregation with the same activity. In this respect, the hand imposition on the Levites may shed light on the meaning of the same activity on the animals. It will be nothing but 'substitution.'[281]

As noted, substitution is possibly thought to be an interchangeable concept with 'identification'; an animal substituted for the offerer could be considered as one identified with him. Therefore, either 'substitutionary identification' is often employed in this study, or simply 'substitution' will be used as a concept to contain 'identification.'

Nevertheless, as far as the case of the *hattat* sacrifice is concerned, this thesis will argue that the meaning of 'transference of sin' is added to the common denominator 'substitution' in sacrifices on several grounds that will be suggested below. The double meanings of hand imposition are not strange in view of the ritual theory and the peculiar trait of the *hattat* ritual.

4.3.5. Transference of sin by hand imposition in the *hattat* sacrifice

Except for a few, the majority of scholars have denied the function of sin-transference by sacrificial hand imposition, even in the case of the *hattat* sacrifice. Kiuchi (1987: 117) warns: "the meaning of it (hand imposition) should not be determined by overemphasizing any particular ritual: the symbolic meaning of the gesture in different sacrificial contexts must be the same." But as pointed out above, several unique and peculiar features of the *hattat* ritual must be taken into consideration. It was indicated that its activities have distinctive functions, while some of them have unique modes and forms.

With regard to this issue of hand imposition, scholars, including Kiuchi, have failed to apply the ritual theory to this action, namely, that the same ritual activity can have multivalent functions according to the purpose of ritual. As hand imposition can have a variety of meanings in modern ceremonies, even in the same form, so the hand imposition with the same form might well have a different function or an additional function in another ritual performed for a different purpose. As a supportive example, it is noteworthy that the meaning of fat-burning in the *hattat* ritual probably differs from the peace and the guilt

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[280] ". . . and Aaron shall offer (הֵנִיף) the Levites before the LORD as a wave offering (תְּנוּפָה) from the people of Israel, that they may do the service of the LORD." (Num 8:11 ESV)

[281] Rodriguez (1986: 182) notes that the collective hand imposition on the Levites transfer to them the responsibility of serving at the sanctuary, which originally belonged to the firstborn of the people.

offering, even though the part of the fat and the form of its burning on the altar are the same in all the cases.

This thesis contends that the hand imposition on the *hattat* animal has a particular function to remove sin/impurity in addition to the common meaning of 'substitution'; it would be the 'transference of sin.' There are three reasons for this conviction.

4.3.5.1. The hand imposition on the live goat in the *hattat* ritual system

The ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 and the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16 belong to a macro *hattat* system that aims to remove the sins of Israel and purge the sanctuary of impurities for the national atonement.[282] They supplement and complement each other. The meaning of the hand imposition practiced in the *hattat* sacrifice has to be discerned in the whole *hattat* system. Here the theory of gap-filling is used to detect the meaning of the activities in the *hattat* ritual.

As noted above, for instance, the function of the *hattat* blood rites described in Leviticus 4, modes of which are distinctive from other sacrifices, is revealed in Leviticus 8:15 where the altar is purified and consecrated, and Leviticus 16:19 where it is stated that the blood purges the sancta to sanctify it. Likewise, it seems that the meaning of the hand imposition performed in the *hattat* ritual, without any explanation, as in other sacrifices, can be detected in Leviticus 16; it is supplemented with the explanation of the gesture on the Azazel goat

At this point, it is necessary to point out again that the Azazel goat ritual is a part of the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement. As argued in chapter 3, on the Day the two sacrificial animals (a bull and a goat) and the Azazel goat form 'a special *hattat* ritual,' called 'integrated atonement ritual' in our term, combined with each other. In particular, whereas the *hattat* bull is sacrificed for the atonement of Aaron and his household, the *hattat* goat and the live goat are offered for the atonement of the congregation. The *hattat* goat and

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[282] As will argued in chapter 7, this thesis claims that the Day of the Atonement is not related to removing the ritual impurities of the Israelites, but to their sins. Their impurities must be cleansed on ordinary days. If the impurity-bearer fails or neglects to cleanse impurity, it turns to an inexpiable serious sin. The serious offender may be put to death (Lev 15:31) or cut off for the failure (Num 19:13). However, the result of the wanton sin, namely, the contamination of the sancta, is not resolved until the Day of Atonement.

the live goat are called 'a *hattaṭ* (16:5) and thus constitute a *qualitative* and *quantitative* value equal to the *hattat* bull for the priestly household. Thus the two goats form a unique *hattat* offering. The hand imposition is executed on the live goat of the unique *hattat* offering rather than on the sacrificial goat. The action is inverted to the live goat from the sacrificial goat, as Mooney (2004: 52-56) comments.

Furthermore, the bull of the *hattat* offering for the priestly household was also exempted from the activity, because the bull is part of the 'combined *hattat* ritual' (see chapter 3) that consists of the *hattat* bull and the *hattat* goat, which are merged by the mingling of the two animal's blood at the outer altar (16:19). As argued in chapter 3, the combined *hattat* ritual is tied with the Azazel goat ritual to constitute a special *hattat* ritual, called the 'integrated atonement ritual' in our term. Therefore, the two sacrificial animals (the bull and the goat), which are merged by blood mingling, are in an inseparable relationship with the Azazel goat; from the outset, the sacrificial goat and the live goat form a *hattat* offering (Lev 16:5). Hence the two sacrificial animals and the Azazel goat are integrated into a special *hattat* ritual of a macro unit for the national atonement of Israel.

If the hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual has the function of sin-transference, one-time hand imposition is enough in the macro *hattat* ritual unit to transfer the iniquities of Israel on an animal. It was executed on the Azazel goat, and thereby the iniquities of the congregation, including those of the priestly household, are transferred to it. Then the live goat is released to the outside of the camp. In this regard, this study agrees with Kiuchi (1987: 149) that the Azazel goat is 'a special form' of the disposal of the *hattat* remains (i.e., incineration outside the camp in Lev 4:11-12). For the reason, the conviction of most scholars may be declined that hand imposition on the sacrificial bull and goat was taken for granted as an indispensable element and therefore abbreviated.[283]

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[283] For instance, Milgrom (1991b: 1024) comments on the omission of hand imposition in both the sacrificial bull and goat: "Because it (hand imposition) is indispensable, it is at times taken for granted (e.g., at the inaugural service, 9:8-11)." But he suggests another motivation: the omission was "to accentuate the unique hand-leaning that will take place on the goat for Azazel (v. 21)." On the other hand, Milgrom (1991b: 1024) comments, citing the rabbis, that the high priest imposed his hand on the bull and recited the confession of sin for himself and for his family, and then for the rest of the priests. To the contrary, Gane (2005: 54-55) insists that probably no hand imposition was performed on the bull and goat on the Day of Atonement, because it was made only in non-calenderic sacrifices, whereas it was exempted in calenderic sacrifices; the reason is that the confirmation of ownership by hand imposition was unnecessary in public sacrifices, due to public recognition of the animal's ownership. However, as pointed out

Regarding the function of the hand imposition, this thesis argued that the two handed form as such does not have the inherent meaning of 'transference' that is alleged to be distinguished from a certain meaning of the one handed form. Rather, the employment of the term שְׁתֵּי "two" in the Azazel goat ritual (Lev 16:21) is intentional, indicating that the use of two hands was mandatory and compulsory only in this case. It implies that in other cases, two hands might be discretionary, as implied in the case of Joshua's appointment (Num 27:23). This distinctive wording of אֶת־שְׁתֵּי יָדוֹ (two hands), a *hapax legomenon* in the texts of hand imposition,[284] may well be interpreted to imply *the intensification of transference* in terms of the nature of the rituals performed on the Day of Atonement for all sins of Israel.

This study has argued that the forms of hand imposition, whether one handed or two handed, do not have an innate and inherent meaning in themselves (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 113; 2007: 304). A specific meaning is attached to the gesture according to the purpose of the ritual. Likewise, the activity with the two hands as such does not have the function of sin-transference. Rather, as Gane (2005: 245) has suggested, the transference of the sins is made cooperatively by the very confession of sin and the two hand imposition on the live goat.[285] That is, the function/meaning of sin-transference was attached to the two-hand imposition by the legislator. On the other hand, conversely the meaning of 'substitution' can be applied to the Azazel goat (Kiuchi, 1987: 119,

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above (§ 4.2.1.2), his explanation for the reason is not consistent, because in the case of the *hattat* offering for sin of Israel's congregation (Lev 4:13-21), hand imposition is required, despite the public perception of the ownership without ambiguity.

[284] In attempt to justify the theory of sin-transference in sacrifices, W. Kaiser (1994: 1011) infers that the sacrificial texts (the burnt offering in Lev 1:4 and others) also might originally have had 'his hands' (יָדָיו) that indicates 'two hands,' even though the word is consistently vocalized as singular (יָדוֹ) in the MT. But it is excessive reasoning from the absence of proof. On the other hand, as remarked above (see n. 241), Rodriguez (1979: 197) submitted a creative possibility, referring to Joshua's appointment by Moses' hand imposition in Num 27:18 (description of one hand) and 27:23 (performance by two hands): while the one handed form is described in the sacrificial texts, the two handed form might be practiced in actual performance of the gesture. However, it is also a farfetched inference without the textual substance (cf. Gane, 2005: 244-45 n. 5).

[285] Therefore, Gane (2005: 245; cf. 58-59) refutes a few scholars' view (e.g., H. Gese, 1981: 105-6) that sin-transference is achieved by confession alone. Arguing for the cooperative function of the two handed form for sin-transference, Gane (2005: 245; cf. 58-59) explains simultaneously an extra function of the two handed form on the Azazel goat: whereas the one handed form is practiced for the identification of 'ownership,' the two handed form is made for identification of 'the route of transfer' of the sins rather than that of ownership, because the ownership was confirmed through the casting of lots (2005: 59).

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141). Hence, the hand imposition on the live goat, as part of the special *hattat* offering, also has double meanings of substitution and sin-transference.

This study infers that the same principle might operate in the ordinary *hattat* ritual too; in light of Leviticus 16:21, it is likely that the confession and transference of sin might be made at the moment when the hand was imposed on the *hattat* victim, even though the text (Lev 4) keeps silence about it.

Significantly, it is stated in Leviticus 5:1-13 that the confession of sin (v. 5) must be made before the sinner brings the *hattat* animal to the sanctuary. On the ground of it, Milgrom (1991b: 302) and his followers believe that the confession of sin is not necessary in the rite of the hand imposition, because it precedes the 'bringing' of the *hattat* animal to the sanctuary.

However, presumably the confession of sin was not one-time event but a continual and repeatable event that was proceeding on until the *hattat* ritual was finished, either on ordinary days when the general *hattat* was offered, or on the Day of Atonement when the unique *hattat* was made.

True, self-affliction and remorse were practiced throughout the Day of Atonement as an incessant expression of repentance to confess their all iniquities (Lev 16:29, 31), even though the confession and transference of sin was once made on the Azazel goat by the high priest at a specific moment (v. 21). In the same way, the confession of sin presumably was not a one-time action and the remorse for it continued throughout the ordinary day until the *hattat* ritual for the sin was completed with the conviction of forgiveness. Although the confession of sin in Leviticus 5:5 might be made just in their dwelling place by the sinner, it is likely that the persons' sin was confessed before YHWH in the sanctuary, God's dwelling place. Therefore, it may be natural to think that in the ordinary *hattat*, the offerer confessed his sin at the moment of the hand imposition in the sanctuary.[286]

If it is true that the transference of sin occurred by one hand imposition with the confession of sin in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the two hand imposition in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement would be made to intensify the transference of sin, due to all the sins of Israel that are accumulated throughout the year.[287] Hence it is likely that the meaning of hand imposition on the live

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[286] Milgrom (1991b:146) states: "it is presumed by the text that the offerer himself will state its designation to the priest at the time of its presentation, most likely during the hand-leaning rite." If it was true, in the case of the *hattat* offering, it is conceivable that the confession of sin was uttered to transfer it to the animal during the hand imposition to confirm the usage and purpose of the offering.

[287] While many scholars interpret the imposition of two hands as a *qualitative* distinction (Péter; Wright; Milgrom; Janowski; Gane), others have defended it as a *quantitative* distinction

goat in the special *hattat* ritual, namely, the transference of sin, can be applied to the same activity in the ordinary *hattat* ritual.

4.3.5.2. Contamination of the *hattat* flesh by hand imposition

The contamination of the *hattat* victim is another authentic ground to support sin-transference through hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual. As will be argued in the next chapter, there are reliable evidences that the *hattat* flesh is contaminated by sin/impurity. Above all, Leviticus 10:17 states that the priests' eating of the *hattat* flesh is to remove and eliminate the sin/iniquity of the congregation. It implies that the sin is transferred from the offerer to the victim and retained in its flesh. Therefore, this study contends that since the sin of people is transferred to the *hattat* animal by the hand imposition with confession of the sin, the victim is contaminated by it. But as will argued in chapter 5, human impurities in Leviticus 12, 14-15 are not transferred by this gesture, because they are removed by several other measures like washing and day-elapse.

On the other hand, the impurity of the sanctuary and its sancta, caused by human sin/impurity, is cleansed and absorbed into the victim's blood as *pars pro toto* for the animal by the priest's blood manipulation, and as a result, the flesh of the *hattat* offering is contaminated by the sin of the offerer and the impurity of the sancta.

This is an important point to understand the definition of 'iniquity' in Leviticus 10:17, which the priests should remove by consuming the *hattat* flesh. Milgrom (1991b: 623-24) sees it only as the impurity of the sancta purified by blood activities, because he does not accept the absorption of sin into the flesh through the hand imposition. But others insist the transference of sin alone to the animal.[288] In contrast, certain scholars argue that neither transference of sin nor absorption of impurity occurs.[289] In the next chapter, this issue will be examined in detail.

(Ehrlich; Kiuchi; Johar). For the former, whereas the one handed form is made to indicate 'ownership' or 'identification,' the two handed form bears the meaning of 'transference.' In regard to the quantitative distinction, Keil & Delitzsch and Kiuchi (1987: 113; 2007: 304) interpret the double hands as the 'expression of solemnity,' and others (Ehrlich, 1968 v. 2: 197) take it as the 'intensification of transference.' To Johar (1988: 612-23), the two-hand imposition refers to 'a difference in degree' (1988: 613 n. 24) or a 'difference of intensity,' because the action must transfer more severe sins (1988: 615 n. 31).

[288] Rodriguez (1979: 218; 1986: 180-83); Wenham (1979: 62).

[289] Matthes (1903: 97, 119); Van der Merwe (1962: 39); Kiuchi (1987: 115).

4.3.5.3. The *hattat* ritual in Hezekiah's reformation (2 Ch 29)

The account of 2 Chronicles 29 may shed light on the function of the hand imposition on the *hattat* animal. Even though scholars have taken the text as secondary or trivial for the study of the sacrificial rituals in the priestly literature, this passage may be significant for the present issue, in that it alludes to the cultic thought of ancient Israel about sacrifices throughout times.

In the radical reformation of Hezekiah, accompanied by the great repentance like on the Day of Atonement, though it was not the Day, a number of animals were offered on the altar as the burnt offerings and the *hattat* offerings for "the royal house,[290] the sancta, and Judah"; they consist of seven bulls, seven rams, seven lambs and seven male goats (2 Ch 29:21). After the seven bulls, seven rams, and seven lambs were presented for the burnt offering, the seven male goats were finally offered for the *hattat* offering.[291] At this point,

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[290] Most English Bibles and interpreters adopt 'kingdom' as rendering of מַמְלָכָה. The 'royal house' is the rendering by E. Curtis & A. Madsen (1910: 467); Milgrom (1991b: 285); NJB (cf. W. L. Moran, 1962 cited in Milgrom). The rendering 'royal house' is preferable, because if the first word in the triple words means 'kingdom,' it is overlapped more or less with the last word 'Judah.'

[291] The statement in 2 Ch 29:21 seems to be strange, because it is stated that the four sets of seven animals are brought only for *hattat* offering with no mention of the burnt offering. True, the subsequent vv. 22-24 make it clear that the first three sets were offered as burnt offerings and the last one as *hattat* offerings. Therefore, others have suggested that the phrase לְעוֹלָה 'for burnt offering' is omitted from the text (W. Rudoph, 1955: 296), and the apparatus of BHS also recommends an insertion. But R. B. Dillard (2002: 232) pointed out that there is no textual evidence to prove that the phrase was original. At any rate, the phrase 'for *hattat* offering' is only connected with the last set of animal, i.e., seven male goats, apart from the first three sets, which were obviously presented for burnt offering, as stated in v. 29:24b. These combined four sets of sacrifices served to make atonement of the whole Israel by combining together. Probably, while the *hattat* offerings played a central role for the atonement, the burnt offerings were supplementary sacrifices to the *hattat* offerings (for the meaning of these burnt offerings, see E. Curtis & A. Madsen, 1910: 467). Interestingly Milgrom (1991b: 285) contends that these four sets of seven-animals were offered three times for the royal house, for the sanctuary, and for Judah (29:21) respectively. The total number of animals is 84 = 3 X (7+7+7+7). But the calculation seems to be an excessive inference without textual support. The reason for his calculation lies in that he thinks four sets of seven animals cannot be divided by three into the three beneficiaries. However, the designation of the three objects probably is thought as an all-inclusive phrase to indicate 'all Israel' (2 Ch 29:24). The purification of the sanctuary is an integral and indispensible element for the atonement of Israel. Therefore, it is inferred that all the sets of sacrificial animals were offered for Israel as a whole rather than each of them carried out its individual function respectively for the three objects. Likewise, in Lev 16 the 'special *hattat* ritual' which consists of a bull and two goats, is performed as a united ritual for the priests, the congregation, and the sanctuary. Although the sacrificial bull and goat are allotted respectively to the priests and the congregation, the two animals are combined to the live goat to make atonement of Israel by cleansing the impurities of the sanctuary and by removing the

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however, it is noteworthy that the 'hand-imposition' is mentioned only in the *hattat* sacrifices (seven male goats) offered for the atonement of the people of Israel.[292]

Most scholars, including Milgrom (1991b: 285), are not concerned about the omission of hand imposition in the burnt sacrifices and its occurrence in the *hattat* sacrifices. They simply see it as an abbreviation. But Gane (2005: 55) recognizes that it is a problem, because these offerings made on the day of Hezekiah's reformation were non-calenderic sacrifices that required hand imposition. Gane comments (2005: 55 n. 33):

> "In 2 Chr 29:22 lack of hand leaning in noncalendric burnt offerings on behalf of the community that were part of a special complex of sacrifices ordered by Hezekiah to meet a special need is strange (pointed out to me by J. Milgrom). This omission does not appear to be simply an abbreviation in the text because the next verse explicitly mentions hand-leaning as part of the purification offerings that followed (v. 23). We could suggest that hand-leaning is noted in connection with the purification offerings because in this case the gesture was performed by representatives of the community, as in Lev 4:15, due to the specificity of the expiation (cf. Rendtorff, Leviticus, 1:39). Hand-leaning in the burnt offerings would be less worthy of mention if they were simply performed by the priests."

Gane's suggestion is not a persuasive and adequate answer to the particular mention of the hand imposition appearing only in the case of *hattat* offerings. It is likely that the answer to the enigma lies in the peculiar function of the hand imposition performed with the *hattat* sacrifices on the day of reformation.

The aim of the reformation day was to remove and purge the impurities from the sanctuary and to remove their sins (vv. 1-5) with implied public confession of sin and repentance (vv. 6-9). Probably this might be the reason that the hand imposition is only mentioned and with these *hattat* offerings. The

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sins of the Israelites. Hence the atonement of the three objects is tantamount to the atonement for all the sons of Israel (Lev 16:33-34).

[292] The *hattat* offerings were presented for 'all Israel' (2 Ch 29:24). Here the word 'Israel' could be considered as a synonym for 'Judah' in v. 21 in terms of the current context (cf. Dillard, 2002: 294). However, in Hezekiah's mind, who was interested in the Northern Kingdom, it is likely that 'all Israel' might embrace the Northern Kingdom (cf. Dillard, 2002: 235). The evidence of 2 Ch 13:5 implies that the kingdom probably refers to 'all Israel': "Do you not know that the LORD God of Israel gave the rule over Israel forever to David and his sons by a covenant of salt?" (NASB) If so, v 21 does not conflict with "for all Israel" in v 24. Beyond Judah, it is claimed that all Israel including the Northern kingdom still belongs to David's house.

activity was highlighted, because it had a distinguished function to remove the sins of people, differently from the hand imposition of the other offerings. It is likely that the king and the princes of the city elders, the representatives of the Israelites, imposed hands to transfer the sins of Israel, with confession and repentance, to the *hattat* animals.

Thus this case implies that the hand imposition in the *hattat* offerings could have the function of sin-transference to the *hattat* animals. The unique mention of hand imposition only in the *hattat* offerings makes it difficult to understand anything else about its function but the transference of sin as the unique function of the gesture, apart from 'substitutionary identification' that is a common denominator of all the sacrifices.

To sum up, it is inferred that the sins of people were transferred to the goats through the collective hand imposition. Thus the seven male goats were obviously slaughtered for *the sins of Israel* with the collective hand imposition performed by the king and the princes of the city, representatives of the Israelites (2 Ch 29:23).

4.4. Conclusion

The study of chapter 4 is summarized as follows:

1. Ritual activity does not have an inherent meaning/function, but a specific function of the ritual activity can be endowed by the divine or the officiant's discretion or by the purpose of the ritual activity.
2. Although a ritual activity can have multivalent meanings, and another function is added, it is unlikely that an opposite function can be attached to the same activity.
3. In line with this ritual theory, the disposal of the *hattat* flesh can have a double meaning: 'prebend' of the officiating priest, and 'removal' of evil. This theory can also be applied to the blood rites of the *hattat* sacrifice (see ch. 5); 'cleaning the sancta wit blood' and 'assigning the blood to the altar for ransom of the evil' (Lev 17:11).
4. This rule might also be applied to the hand imposition of the *hattat* ritual. A common meaing of the hand imposition in all sacrifices is assumed 'substitution' that includes the meaning of 'identification.' But as far as hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual is concerned, the transference of sin

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could be added to the function of 'substitution' that is the common denominator in the hand impositions of all the sacrifices.[293] Conversely 'substitution' is envisaged in the two-hand imposition of the Azazel goat ritual as well.

5. Sin is transferred to the *hattat* animal through hand imposition and contaminates it; then the impurity of the sancta is cleansed and absorbed into the *hattat* flesh; that is, the offerer's sin and the sancta impurity are conveyed to it.

6. But it is provisionally argued that human impurity is not conveyed to the victim through the hand imposition in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, because the offerer is fully cleansed through a series of purificatory rites before he goes up to the sanctuary to offer the required sacrifices (for this discussion, see ch. 5). It means that the *hattat* offering for ritual impurities does not retain the human impurity, but only the impurity of the outer altar (in this case of impurity the outer altar is only defiled) by absorbing it from the sanctum through the blood rite.

7. Since it is assumed that both the hand imposition of the ordinary *hattat* ritual and that of the special *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement have the function of 'sin-transference,' the two handed form of the latter is quantitatively distinguished from the one handed form of the former rather than qualitatively. It indicates an intensive transfer of the accumulated sins of the Israelites.

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[293] For a similar conclusion that sacrificial hand imposition can have double functions, see R. Rendtorff (2005: 45-46).

Chapter 5
Activity components of the *hattat* ritual (2):
Blood manipulation and disposal of the flesh

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the blood manipulation and flesh disposal of the *hattat* ritual are treated. The blood rites of the *hattat* sacrifice have peculiar traits in terms of the mode and function of the ritual gesture. The function of the unique blood rites practiced in the *hattat* ritual will be investigated in comparison with the blood rites of the other sacrifices. The result of this investigation will reconfirm that the *hattat* sacrifice has a particular function, namely, 'purgation of the sancta,' in distinction from the other sacrifices.

On the other hand, Leviticus 17 gives the only explanation about the meaning and function of blood throughout the Hebrew Bible.[294] V. 11 (and v. 14) declares that the life of the flesh is in the blood and the blood given on the altar effects 'ransom.'[295] Blood has power of ransom endowed by God. Thus v. 11 indicates that blood is a key element for atonement in the *hattat* ritual, although the atonement is a result of the entire *hattat* ritual activities, like the fat burning, the blood rites, and the flesh disposal. If so, the question is on whether this ransom by blood in Leviticus 17:11 can be applied to all kinds of sacrifices or not. This question must be explored in the structure and context of Leviticus 17 and its extended context.

Apart from 'ransom,' it will be also explored whether 'blood-giving'[296] on the altar refers to another theological meaning and whether it could be a common denominator of all sacrificial blood rites, including the *hattat* sacrifice.

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[294] This function of blood is not explained or specified in any places until Lev 17:11.

[295] As argued in chapter 2, the verb כִּפֶּר means 'ransom' in Lev 17:11.

[296] The term 'giving of blood' or 'blood-giving' is coined from the phrase, "I have given it [blood] to you on the altar (וַאֲנִי נְתַתִּיו לָכֶם עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ)" (Lev 17:11), in accordance with the view of this thesis that blood, which is equal to life, returns to the owner or source of blood, God, through medium of the altar which stands for YHWH. The verb נָתַן in this phrase does not correspond to the verb נָתַן of the priest's blood activity in the *hattat* ritual in that the subject of נָתַן is God instead of a priest. It indicates that in 17:11, the verb merely means 'to give' in a general meaning rather than a priestly ritual activity, referring to God's allocation of the blood on the altar. In the *hattat* ritual, however, the verb probably indicates a specified technical gesture of 'daubing' of blood, while its subject is a priest.

The problems are condensed into the following questions: is the blood on the altar 'an offering' or 'a gift' to YHWH? Or is the blood-giving an action to return the blood to the owner of blood-life, YHWH? Can this meaning be applied to all scarifies?

The final investigation of the *hattat* ritual activities concerns the disposal of the *hattat* remains. The focus of the problem is on whether the consumption and burning of the *hattat* flesh effect removal or elimination of sin/impurity. Scholars are divided by and large into two groups regarding this issue, while each view on it induces a scholar to take a divergent track in the other ritual procedures. For example, if an interpreter does not accept the contamination of flesh by transference of sin to a sacrificial animal, he is also led to refuse the view that the hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual has the function of sin-transference. It means that he will pose a different atonement mechanism of the *hattat* ritual.

5.2. Blood manipulation in the *hattat* ritual

5.2.1. The modes of blood manipulation in the sacrificial rituals

There are several modes of gestures in sacrificial blood manipulations, that indicate and symbolize distinctive meanings: (1) זָרַק; (2) הִזָּה (*hiph* of נזה); (3) נָתַן; (4) שָׁפַךְ or יָצַק ; for their meanings and motions, see below.

Despite lexical and semantic differences between them, quite a few English Bible versions and scholars' versions do not discriminate between the meanings of the verbs that require distinctive renderings.[297] For instance, NASB and NIV render both זָרַק (Lev 1:5) in the burnt offering and הִזָּה (4:6) in the *hattat* offering as 'sprinkle.' This leads to failure to discern the peculiar functional meanings of the ritual activities with blood in the *hattat* offering.[298]

The verbs are classified as follows:

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[297] For motions of the verbs and their appropriate renderings, see Gilders (2004: 25-28). But he fails to notice the distinct functions of the unique modes in the blood manipulation of the *hattat* offering.

[298] In Exod 29:20-21, the first three actions (נָתַן ;הִזָּה ;זָרַק) are displayed with the ram of the ordination at the ordination ritual of the priests. It implies that each of these actions has distinctive function.

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a. In other sacrifices except for in the *hattat* sacrifice:

זָרַק 'dash'[299]

b. Only in the *hattat* sacrifice:[300]

הִזָּה (*hiph* of נזה) 'sprinkle'[301] / נָתַן 'daub, put'[302] / שָׁפַךְ or יָצַק 'pour'[303]

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[299] The LXX προσχέω. This gesture indicates 'to toss or throw in a volume' (*BDB*, 284). The various renderings for this verb are employed in English Bible versions and by scholars, leading readers to confusion about the functions of the blood manipulations: 'sprinkle' (NASB, NIV, KJV; C. M. Woods & J. M. Rogers, 2006: 44); 'throw' (ESV; Noth, 1965: 19; R. Péter-Contesse and John Ellington; 1990: 16), 'dash' (JPS; NRS; Milgrom, 1991b: 133; Hartley, 1992: 12); 'splash' (CJB; Wenham, 1979: 48); 'toss' (Gilders, 2004: 25). This thesis adopts 'dash' with the majority of English versions and scholars. On the other hand, the verb זָרַק is used also for 'dashing' blood on people (Exod 24:8), not only on the sancta. Water can also be dashed upon people (Ezek 36:25; cf. Num 19:13, 20) to purify them.

[300] In the concessive *hattat* sacrifice of a pigeon or dove, another verb יִמָּצֵה (Niph impf of מצה) is used to indicate that the blood of the bird is 'drained' upon the side of the altar (Lev 1:15; 5:9). But it is excluded in this discussion as a concessive type.

[301] The LXX ῥαίνω. This verb means 'to spurt, spatter' in *qal* and 'sprinkle' in *hiph* (*BDB*, 633). In line with the lexical meaning, most English Bible versions and interpreters have rendered the verb הִזָּה as 'sprinkle' (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 226). Milgrom employs 'sprinkling' as the meaning of 'aspersing' (1991b: 155). Usually, the sprinkling of either blood or oil is practiced seven times in most cases and its object is the sancta. In a couple of cases, blood could be sprinkled on people as well (Exod 29:21 = Lev 8:30; 14:7). While usually the blood of *hattat* animal is 'sprinkled' at the sancta, uniquely at the ordination of priests, Moses should 'sprinkle' blood of the ram of the ordination taken from the altar and the anointing oil upon Aaron and his sons, and their garments (Exod 29:21; Lev 8:30). In the purificatory ritual for the leper (Lev 14), the priest should sprinkle the blood of the killed bird on him and release the live bird into the field (vv. 6-7). Oil was also sprinkled on the altar in some cases. At the ordination of the priests, Moses should 'sprinkle' the anointing oil on the altar, and in the purificatory ritual for the leper, the priest should 'sprinkle' some of the log of oil before YHWH (Lev 14:16). The 'water of *hattat*' (מֵי חַטָּאת, Num 8:7), also called 'purifying water' (מֵי נִדָּה, Num 19:9) was sprinkled on the Levites in the ordination ritual (8:7) and on the unclean person contaminated by touching a corpse (19:18, 19, 21), along with the contaminated tent and furnishings (v. 18). In the case of the person contaminated by corpse contact in Num 19, the two verbs זָרַק (vv. 13, 20) and הִזָּה (vv. 18, 19, 21) are used alternatively to probably indicate the same meaning. It is likely that in Num 19 whereas the *qal* pass זֹרַק is used in vv. 13 and 20 to express the gesture from perspective of the contaminated person, the gesture of הִזָּה was employed to indicate the virtual gesture from the perspective of the sprinkling person, namely the clean person who purifies the unclean person.

[302] The LXX ἐπιτίθημι. In the ritual context of the *hattat* offering, this verb נָתַן refers to a gesture by which substance like blood is 'placed' on an object. Although most English versions and scholars take 'put' as its rendering, probably this action means 'daubing' or 'smearing' (Gilders, 2004: 26). Sometimes Milgrom (1991b: 249) also adopts 'daub,' although he renders it as 'put' in the translation of the texts (1991b: 226-27).

[303] The two verbs are synonyms that occur in the same *hattat* contexts (cf. Exod 29:12; Lev 8:15; 9:9), while שָׁפַךְ occurs more frequently than יָצַק in the OT. For instance, whereas the

As seen, in the sacrificial context, whereas the verb זָרַק is employed in the burnt offering,[304] the peace offering,[305] the guilt offering,[306] and the ram of ordination[307] for the blood rites at the sancta, the verbs הִזָּה and נָתַן are used exclusively in the *hattat* sacrifice.[308] The unique modes of the *hattat* blood rites indicate that the function of the *hattat* blood is undoubtedly distinguished from the mode in the other sacrifices, implying that they have particular functions.

The mode of pouring (שָׁפַךְ) has not been considered as a cultic activity but merely as the non-cultic disposal activity of the remaining blood at the base of the outer altar,[309] with the exception of a few scholars (e.g., Gorman). As argued below, however, this thesis sees שָׁפַךְ in the sanctuary, apart from the activity in the open field outside the sanctuary, as a kind of ritual activity with a certain theological meaning, although it does not have the function to purify the altar and the like.

Leviticus 16 does not mention the pouring (שָׁפַךְ) of blood at the base of the outer altar unlike in Leviticus 4 (vv. 7, 18, 25, 30, 34). Probably the reason is simply because all the blood was utilized to purge the sancta with a series of multiple and intense blood activities (cf. Gane, 2005: 64).

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hattat prescription for the ordination of the priests employs יָצַק (Exod 29:12), the description that reports the actual practice of the *hattat* ritual adopts שָׁפַךְ (Lev 8:15). In Deuteronomy, שָׁפַךְ can also be used for the common or secular disposal of blood (12:27), although it generally indicates a ritual disposal of blood (12:16; 12:24; 15:23; 19:10).

[304] Lev 1:5, 11; 8:19; 9:12.

[305] Lev 3:2, 8, 13; 7:14; 9:18; 17:6; Num 18:17; 2 Ki 16:13; 2 Ch 29:22; etc.

[306] Lev 7:2 is the only occurrence in the text of the guilt offering. In Exod 24:5-8 the blood of the burnt offering and of the peace offering is 'dashed' on the altar and the congregation of Israel respectively at the temporary altar under Mt. Sinai.

[307] Exod 29:20; Lev 8:24.

[308] Lev 4:6, 17; 5:9; 16:14, 15, 19; Cf. sprinkling of the *hattat* water on persons (Num 8:7; 19:4, 19-21); sprinkling of oil 'before YHWH' (on the altar?) for the leper (Lev 14:16); sprinkling of the bird blood (not *hattat*) on the leper (Lev 14:7) or the leprous house (14:51); sprinkling of blood and oil on the Aaronites and their garments in the ordination of the priests (Lev 8:30 = Exod 29:21). Kiuchi (1987: 130) says that in regard to the fact that the verb הִזָּה is generally related to the *adytum* and the veil of shrine in the *hattat* contexts, the הִזָּה gesture is 'more potent than the נָתַן gesture' (cf. Hartley, 1992: 60). It appears that the part of the altar sprinkled and daubed with the *hattat* blood also differed from that in other sacrificial rituals; Milgrom (1991b: 156) said: "The rabbis also aver that in all sacrifices the blood rite for quadrupeds was performed on the lower half of the altar (*b. Zebaḥ.* 10b, 53a), with the exception of the blood of the purification offering, which was daubed on the altar's horns (4:25, 30, 34)."

[309] Noth (1965: 39); Milgrom (1991b: 238); cf. Lev 17:4, 13; Num 35:33; Deut 12:16; etc. For a detailed argument, including Gorman's different view, see below.

5.2.2. Function of the blood manipulation in the *hattat* ritual

Leaving the dashing (זָרַק) of blood practiced in the other sacrifices to the later discussion, the blood rites of the *hattat* sacrifice are investigated in this section. The same modes of blood rites in the *hattat* ritual are performed in a slightly variant way between the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement as follows:

A. The ordinary *hattat* ritual (each of 'a' and 'b' stands for an individual process)
   a. In the shrine (4:6-7, 17-18): 7 + 1
      sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) in front of[310] the veil of the shrine[311]
      one daubing (נָתַן) on the horns of the incense altar
      (then pouring [שָׁפַךְ] at the base of the outer altar)
   b. In the outer altar (4:25, 30, 34)
      one daubing (נָתַן) on the horns of the outer altar
      (then pouring [שָׁפַךְ] at the base of the outer altar)

B. The special *hattat* ritual ('a,' 'b,' and 'c' form a consecutive process)
   a. In the *adytum* (16:14-15): 1 + 7
      one sprinkling (הִזָּה) on the Atonement Seat
      sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) before the Atonement Seat
   b. In the shrine (16:16b): 1 + 7
      the implied same activities as in A-a above
      (but in reverse order)[312]
   c. In the outer altar (16:18-19): 1 + 7
      one daubing (נָתַן) on the horns of the outer altar
      sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) on the outer altar
      (no pouring at the base of the outer altar)

On ordinary days, apart from the pouring at the base of the outer altar, whereas the two kinds of gestures (sevenfold sprinkling and one daubing of

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[310] Or 'before the veil of the shrine,' equivalent to אֶת־פְּנֵי פָּרֹכֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ (Lev 4:6, 17). For the meaning of the preposition אֶת־פְּנֵי, the exact spots of the blood activities in each precinct, and the sequential order of the blood rites, see Gane (2005: 281-84).

[311] For the rendering of הַקֹּדֶשׁ in Lev 4:6b, this thesis follows JPS (Milgrom also) which employs 'the shrine,' rather than 'the sanctuary' of most English versions.

[312] For the reverse order of blood rites in the shrine on the Day of Atonement, see Gane (2005: 280-83).

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blood) are practiced on the inner altar in the shrine, only one gesture (one daubing of blood) is acted on the outer altar.[313]

Although the same modes of the blood manipulation on ordinary days in Leviticus 4 are applied to the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16, the pattern and way of the blood rites in the latter differ slightly from those in the former.

Each of the bull's and the goat's blood is used in the *adytum* and the shrine, and the blood of the two is merged in the stage for the outer altar; in this way each blood is sprinkled and daubed to purify the whole sanctuary.

Whereas in Leviticus 4 (vv. 25, 30, 34) the priest should 'sprinkle' (הִזָּה) blood on the altar alone seven times with his finger, in Leviticus 16 the high priest should 'daub' (נָתַן) once blood on all the horns of the altar and subsequently 'sprinkle' (הִזָּה) it seven times on the altar in the same pattern (1 + 7) as in the *adytum* and the shrine. That is, the sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) on the outer altar is added in Leviticus 16 to the one daubing (נָתַן) on the horns of the outer altar.

Besides, the 1 + 7 sprinklings in the *adytum* were performed by the high priest once per year only on the Day of Atonement. The blood manipulation in the shrine is conjectured to be identical with that in the shrine performed in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4), but it is likely that the order is reversed from the 7 + 1 pattern in the ordinary *hattat* ritual to the 1 + 7 pattern in light of the course of the blood rites.[314]

In the regulations of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4:1-5:13, the function of the blood rites with the peculiar modes is not explained as in the other sacrificial rituals. While 'atonement' for the offerer is declared in vv. 20, 26, 31 (*kipper 'al* + person) as the final effect of the entire process of *hattat* ritual, including the blood manipulation (see ch. 2),[315] an immediate and direct effect

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[313] In the case of the bird *hattat*, the blood is sprinkled (הִזָּה) on the outer altar, as the blood of quadrupeds is sprinkled in the shrine. But it must be recalled that the bird *hattat* was a concession for the poor. The verbs listed above refer only to the gestures acted in the *hattat* ritual of quadrupeds.

[314] Gane (2005: 280-83) shows convincingly that the order 1 + 7, namely, the reverse order from that practiced in the shrine in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, was practiced in the special *hattat* ritual, contra Milgrom (1991b: 1034-35) who suggested 7 + 1, namely, the same order as in the blood rite of the ordinary *hattat* ritual.

[315] As argued in chapter 2, this study refuses Milgrom's argument that *kipper 'al* + person' is rendered 'effect purgation for/on behalf of person.' His statement actually indicates 'to purge the sancta for the offerer,' because for him the verb כִּפֶּר always refers to the action of cleansing the sancta alone for the offerer in the *hattat* context.

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of sprinkling or daubing blood on the sancta is not mentioned. Significantly, this gap is later filled to some extent with Leviticus 8:15 and 16:18b-19.[316] In these places, the function of some gestures acted in the blood rites is articulated or implied.[317]

> Moses slaughtered the bull and took some of the blood, and with his finger he put (נָתַן) it on all the horns of the altar to purify (חִטֵּא) the altar. He poured out (יָצַק) the rest of the blood at the base of the altar. So he consecrated (קִדֵּשׁ) it to make atonement (כִּפֶּר) for it.
>
> (Lev 8:15 NIV)

> He shall take some of the bull's blood and some of the goat's blood and put (נָתַן) it on all the horns of the altar. He shall sprinkle (הִזָּה) some of the blood on it with his finger seven times to cleanse (טִהַר) it and to consecrate (קִדֵּשׁ) it from the uncleanness of the Israelites
>
> (Lev 16:18b-19 NIV).

In Leviticus 8:15, the verb חִטֵּא indicates 'to purify with the *hattat* offering' rather than a common cleansing (see § 2.3.2). The ritual dynamic is obvious: daubing (נָתַן) of blood brings about 'purification of the altar.' The same ritual dynamics is applied to 16:18b-19. The two gestures in the blood rites, 'one daubing' (נָתַן) and 'sevenfold sprinkling' (הִזָּה) of the blood on the altar with his finger, were performed to 'cleanse' (טִהַר) and '(re)consecrate' (קִדֵּשׁ) the outer altar. Concerning this dynamics of the *hattat* blood rites in Leviticus 4, 8, and 16, several interpretations have been posed. The interpretations of Vriezen and Gorman among them are controversial, and Milgrom and Gane's view attracts a special attention.

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[316] Milgrom (1991b: 233, 1037) and Gane (2005: 191) insist that Lev 16:16, 20 also reveals the meaning of the verb כִּפֶּר as 'purgation' of the sanctuary and its sancta. However, these verses must be excluded in this discussion, because כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context always indicates 'ransom + purgation,' contrary to their understanding of כִּפֶּר as only 'purgation' or 'removing' (see ch. 2). The direct and immediate effect of blood sprinkling and daubing are given in vv. 18b-19: 'purgation' (טִהַר), leading to '(re)consecration' (קִדֵּשׁ).

[317] Why are Lev 4-5 and 12-15 silent concerning the purgation of the sancta, namely, the effect of the blood rites on the sancta? The reason is that the focus of the *hattat* ritual in these cases was on the 'offerer' as a sinner or an unclean person rather than the 'sancta.' Chapter 6 will deal with this matter in detail.

5.2.2.1. Vriezen and Gorman

T. C. Vriezen (1950: 201-35) argued that as far as the blood of the *hattat* offering only *for the high priest* in Leviticus 4 is concerned, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood before the veil is acted to *consecrate the blood* in the shrine and the daubing of the consecrated blood on the incense altar is performed to *purge it*.[318]

But his view is rejected on several grounds:[319] (1) The blood of the *hattat* bull *for the congregation* (4:13-21) is also treated in the same way (vv. 17-18), in which the high priest is not directly involved, while he may take collective responsibility for the sin; (2) On the Day of Atonement, the blood of the *hattat* goat *for the congregation* is likewise sprinkled before the veil in the same mode, after the blood of the *hattat* bull for the high priest and his household is sprinkled (Lev 16:16b); (3) "The reverse sequence (נָתַן rite → הִזָּה rite) is attested in Leviticus 16:18ff." (Kiuchi, 1987: 120). In light of point (3), the הִזָּה rite cannot be a prerequisite for the נָתַן rite. Thus the gesture הִזָּה is not practiced to consecrate blood.

On the other hand, Gorman (1990: 86-89) endeavours to interpret the relationship between the function of the sevenfold sprinkling on the outer altar in the special *hattat* offering (Lev 16:19) and the function of the action יָצַק/שָׁפַךְ (pouring) in the ordinary *hattat* offering.[320] He proposes an ingenious idea by comparing Leviticus 16:18b-19 with Leviticus 8:14-15 that describes the ordination of the priests and the consecration of the altar. According to him, the effect of pouring blood (יָצַק/שָׁפַךְ) at the base of the altar in the ordinary *hattat* offering (Lev 4) and the ordination ceremony (Lev 8) is equivalent to the effect of the blood sprinkling (הִזָּה) on the outer altar in the special *hattat* on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16): 'consecration' (Lev 8 = Exod 29; implied in Lev 4) or 'reconsecration' (Lev 16) of the altar.

In particular, Gorman relies on the statement of Leviticus 8:15 for his idea. Concerning the motions in this verse, Gorman (1990: 86) explains that while the 'placing' (= daubing) of blood on the horns of the outer altar is to 'purify' it, the pouring of blood at the base of the outer altar is to 'consecrate' it.

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[318] Accepted by Noth (1965: 39) and Rodriguez (1979: 124).

[319] Cf. Janowski (1982: 226-27); Kiuchi (1987: 119-20); Milgrom (1991b: 233); Gane (2005: 5, 88).

[320] שָׁפַךְ in Lev 4:7, 18, 30, 34; יָצַק in Lev 8:15.

Subsequently, he (1990: 88) applies this idea to the blood rites of the ordinary *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4, although the text remains silent about it; the pouring of the blood at the base of the outer altar in the ordinary *hattat* offering[321] would also 'reconsecrate' the outer altar, after the blood is daubed on the altar to 'purify' it,

Focusing on the absence of the blood-pouring in Leviticus 16:18-19, Gorman (1990: 87) casts a question: "How, then, can the absence of the act of pouring the blood at the base of the altar in Lev 16.18-19 be explained?" His answer is that the pouring of blood at the base of the outer alter is replaced by the sprinkling of blood on the horns of the outer altar. Consequently the sevenfold sprinkling of blood effects the reconsecration of the altar on the Day of Atonement, while the daubing of blood on the horns of the altar purifies it. Gorman (1990: 88) seems to apply this principle by extension to the case of the *adytum*: on the Day the sevenfold sprinkling before the Atonement Seat (הַכַּפֹּרֶת) in the *adytum* brings about reconsecration of the *adytum*, while the daubing on the Atonement Seat effects purgation of it (vv. 14-16a). But he does not give any explanation concerning the case of the shrine in Leviticus 16.[322]

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[321] Lev 4:7, 18, 25, 30, 34.

[322] Gorman's argument is summarized as follows:

A. The ordinary *hattat* ritual
    a. In the shrine (4:6-7, 17-18)
        a) Purgation of the shrine
          by sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood in front of the veil (?)
          and by one daubing (נָתַן) of blood on the horns of the inner altar
        b) Consecration of the shrine
          by pouring [שָׁפַךְ] of blood at the base of the outer altar (vv. 7, 18)
    b. At the outer altar (4:25, 30, 34)
        a) Purgation of the altar
          by one daubing (נָתַן) of blood on the horns of the altar
        b) Consecration of the shrine
          by pouring (שָׁפַךְ) of blood at the base of the altar (vv. 25, 30, 34)

B. The special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement
    a. In the *adytum* (16:14-15)
        a) Purgation of the *adytum*
          by one sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood on the Atonement Seat
        b) Consecration of the *adytum*
          by sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood before the Atonement Seat
    b. In the shrine (16:16b)
      (No comments by Gorman)
    c. In the outer altar (16:18-19)
        a) Purgation of the altar

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Gorman's idea poses several serious problems and wrong inferences. Firstly, his interpretation concerning the function of the sevenfold blood sprinkling is not consistent. In the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4), Gorman (1990: 85) says, the sevenfold blood sprinkling before the veil in the shrine was practiced to 'purify' the precinct (4:6, 17), in association with the one daubing on the inner incense altar, whereas in Leviticus 16:19 the same action creates a different effect, namely, (re)consecration. As a result, in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the shrine is 'purified' by the two gestures, sevenfold sprinkling and one daubing of blood, while the outer altar is 'purified' by the daubing of blood and 'consecrated' by the pouring of blood.

This view is in direct conflict with his argument that the same action, namely, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood, is made to 'consecrate' the *adytum* and the altar on the Day of Atonement,[323] while the one daubing alone is to 'purify' them. He does not explain the reason why the same gesture brings about such divergent effect. This inconsistency is unacceptable and does not correspond to the ritual theory that is assumed in this study: an activity retains a consistent function within the same ritual or ritual system.

Secondly, concerning Leviticus 16:16b, Gorman does not mention the dynamics of the blood rites in the shrine on the Day of Atonement. Nevertheless, it appears that he assumes the same activities as those in the shrine that was prescribed in Leviticus 4, while he implies '(re)consecration' of the shrine as the effect of the activities in Leviticus 16. If it is the case, he contradicts himself again, because he states that in Leviticus 4, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood is to purify the outer altar, whereas in Leviticus 16 the same action serves to '(re)consecrate' the shrine. This view must be rejected, because his logic incurs a contradiction within the ritual system of Leviticus 4 and 16.

Thirdly, a reasonable explanation about absence of the blood-pouring is that probably there was no blood remaining after the *hattat* rituals on the Day of Atonement, because multiple and profound blood rites were practiced in three precincts on the Day, in comparison with the ordinary *hattat* ritual (cf. Gane, 2005: 64).

Fourthly, his interpretation on Leviticus 8:15 is unconvincing. The phrase וַיְקַדְּשֵׁהוּ must be taken as 'a summary statement recalling 8:11' (Gane, 2005: 64)

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by one daubing (נָתַן) of blood on the horns of the altar (v. 18)

 b) Consecration of the altar

by sevenfold sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood on the altar

[323] Consecration of the shrine is implied in Gorman's argument.

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with the rendering 'thus he consecrated' (JPS). In other words, this statement explains the result of the entire ritual procedure. The 'sanctification' of either the priests or the altar (*pars pro toto* for the whole sanctuary) is accomplished with both the rite of oil atoning and the blood rite of the *hattat* sacrifice. That is, the effect of 'consecration' is not only made with (the blood sprinkling of) the *hattat* offering;[324] the sacred oil is an indispensible element for the consecration of objects.

Finally, the sanctuary was consecrated once for all at its cultic dedication (Exod 29; Lev 8). But right after that, it would start to be contaminated by sins and impurities and have to be purified by the ordinary *hattat* offering. However, some abominable sins are inexpiable, contaminating severely the sancta. The *hattat* offering was not allowed for the inexpiable sins, but the sinner should be cut off or put to death (for terminal punishment, see § 6.2.1). Such pollution was accumulated in the sanctuary and not purified until the Day of Atonement. The contaminated sanctuary is annually restored to its original sanctity by the national atonement through the 'unified ceremony' on the Day of the Atonement.

Therefore, it is doubtful that the pouring of blood under the base of the altar effects (re-)consecration in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, although the purification of the sancta by the unique modes of the blood rites might serve *partially* to restore the sanctity of the sanctuary on ordinary days. It remains still impure, due to the unsettled contamination by inexpiable sins. The full sanctity of the sanctuary is restored only on the Day of Atonement. In this respect, the pouring of the remaining blood at the base of the altar is seen as an activity to return the blood to the Creator (Milgrom, 1991b: 251), instead of an activity to effect '(re)consecration.'

5.2.2.2. Milgrom and Gane

Milgrom (1991b: 1037), followed by Gane (2005: 191), declined Vriezen's and Gorman's theories and suggested an alternative idea concerning the function of the sevenfold sprinkling of blood with reference to Leviticus 16:18b-

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[324] This principle is the same in all the *hattat* contexts. In the first ritual for consecration like the ordination of priests (Exod 29; Lev 8), the anointing oil is indispensable for the initial consecration of the objects. Once the objects were consecrated, they do not need to be consecrated again. Only their purification is necessary to recover their original holy state. A full reconsecration or restoration to the sacred state can be achieved by intense blood manipulations on the Day of Atonement, though it is implied that partial reconsecration could be made on ordinary days by purifying the contaminated sancta with the *hattat* offering.

19: the high priest shall take some of the bull's and goat's blood and daub (נָתַן) it on all the horns of the altar, and sprinkle (הִזָּה) some of the blood on the altar to purify (טִהַר) it and to consecrate (קִדֵּשׁ) it from the uncleanness of the Israelites.

Milgrom's exegesis on this verse (1991b: 1037) is that on the Day of Atonement whereas the daubing of blood on the horns of the outer altar 'purifies' the entire altar by the principle of *pars pro toto*, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the outer altar 'reconsecrates' it. That is, the ritual dynamics in theses verses is as follows:

daubing of blood on the altar (נָתַן) → cleansing of the altar (טִהַר)
sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the altar (הִזָּה) → consecration of the altar (קִדֵּשׁ)

Milgrom and Gane's idea amounts to the conclusion that the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16 had distinctive functions between in the inner precincts and at the altar in the court. They argue:

> . . . just as the sevenfold sprinkling of the purification blood purges the adytum on the annual Day of Purgation, so it purges the outer shrine, in this case, when the high priest performs it before the veil.
> (Milgrom, 1991b: 233)

> . . . whereas a sevenfold sprinkling in the inner sanctum on the Day of Atonement purges an area of the Sacred Tent (Lev 16:14-16a), the same activity performed on the outer altar *in the course of the same ritual* re-consecrates it (v. 19).
> (Gane, 2005: 191)

Their theory is problematic on two grounds: (1) the ritual theory assumed in this thesis: a ritual activity has an identical function/meaning in the same ritual or ritual system; (2) the contextual exegesis of Leviticus 16 with reference to Leviticus 4 and 8 which imply the function of the blood rites.[325]

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[325] In addition, it can be pointed out again that even the (re)consecration achieved on the Day of Atonement is the natural and consequential result of intense purgation rather than another separate result of the extra seven-fold sprinkling as individual ritual activity to bring about consecration. The reconsecration means restoration of the original state through profound purification of the sancta.

5.2.2.3. Interpretation of the sevenfold blood sprinkling

As argued in chapter 2, this thesis contends that 'reconsecration' of the altar means the restoration to its original holy state (cf. Gorman, 1990: 61-62),[326] as a result of the thorough cleansing through the intense blood rites. The holy state of the sanctuary was initially established *once for all* through the purgation of the outer altar, *pars pro toto* for the sanctuary at the cultic consecration in Leviticus 8. Because the consecration of the priests and the altar was a *one-time* event for the initial dedication, the verb קָדֵשׁ in Leviticus 16:19 must be considered as referring to restoration of the original sanctity through the full purgation performed on the Day of Atonement, rather than a separate and independent action for consecration.[327] On the Day of Atonement, the reconsecration of the altar and perhaps of the whole sanctuary is a natural consequence of the multiple and intensive purgation with the special *hattat* ritual that was performed in a unique way. Both activities (daubing and sevenfold sprinkling) served to effect 'purgation' of the altar and its consequent effect, 'reconsecration,' while they play different purificatory roles (see below).

Of course, Milgrom (1991b: 1040), in a similar sense, says concerning the cultic reconsecration of the Day: "it is not consecration but reconsecration that is effected here. Indeed, the sanctuary and its sancta were consecrated at the time of their completion and installation (8:10-11)." But regarding the nature of the reconsecration, this study differs from Milgrom's idea. Whereas Milgrom and the others insist that the sevenfold sprinkling of blood is performed to independently reconsecrate the altar rather than to purify it, this study claims that the gesture means an *intense purification* of the altar and its consequent result is *restoration of the altar to the original holy state*. This is the meaning of 'reconsecration' in this study.

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[326] Gorman (1990: 60-61, 102) sees the purpose of the ceremony on the Day as a 'ritual of restoration,' stating (60):

> It (the ceremony of the Day) serves to restore the community to its prescribed and founded state. . . The concern of the ritual is a concern for the reestablishment of order, and the restructuring of the categories of order and chaos. Thus, the ritual reflects the need for an annual reestablishment of the order of creation, an order consisting of cosmic, social, and cultic categories.

[327] As mentioned in chapter 2, in a sense קָדֵשׁ falls under the category of purgation. Sklar (2005: 1, 125-27) considers 'consecration' as an intense type of purification.

Therefore, Milgrom (1991b: 1037) and Gane's argument (2005: 191) must be rejected, when they say that whereas the daubing of blood on all the horn of the altar is executed to 'purify' the altar, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the altar is practiced to '(re)consecrate' it.[328] Of course Gorman's idea that the pouring of blood at the base of the outer altar is to reconsecrate it is also declined for this reason in addition to the above grounds.

By virtue of the intense purgation with the blood, the altar returns to the original sanctity that was already attained by the consecration of the altar in Leviticus 8. Therefore the sevenfold sprinkling of blood, as well as the daubing of blood, always has only the power of purification for sancta rather than that of sanctification (see below).

Of course, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the altar is an additional activity to the blood rite of the ordinary *hattat* sacrifice. But it is likely that the new gesture was added to strengthen the purification of the altar from the severe impure state caused by the accumulated sins of Israel throughout the year. This point is supported by the fact that the sequential triple blood rites were executed in the same 1 + 7 pattern for the *adytum*, the shrine, and the altar respectively. It indicates that the same pattern of blood rites has the same function, namely, 'purification.' Just as the 1 + 7 pattern is to 'purify' the first two precincts thoroughly, so the same pattern for the outer altar is also to 'purify' it thoroughly.

Therefore, Milgrom's diagram of the ritual dynamics about the blood rites in Leviticus 16:18b-19 must be amended:

Daubing of blood

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Cleansing (טִהַר) of the altar → Its consecration (קִדֵּשׁ)

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Sevenfold sprinkling

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[328] Kiuchi (1987: 128) also points out that the functional division between the two gestures seems to be artificial and both gestures together could be practiced to 'cleanse and sanctify' the altar. He expresses the same idea in his later work (2007, 303): "V. 19b describes the purpose of daubing and sprinkling of blood; i.e., 'purify it' (טִהַר) and 'consecrate it' (קִדֵּשׁ) . . . These two terms, 'purify' and 'consecrate,' refer to the daubing of blood on to the horns of the altar as well as to the sprinkling of blood on it . . ." But at the same time he seems to show an inconsistence in the same work, because in the preceding page (p. 302), he notes "Its original sanctity, given by the sprinkling of oil, is now regained by the sprinkling of blood seven times."

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The two modes of the blood manipulation (נָתַן and הִזָּה) of the *hattat* ritual in 16:18b-19 serve together to purge the outer alter and consequently bring about the result of reconsecration. By extension, not only the outer altar, but also the *adytum* and the shrine, that is, the entire sanctuary may be purified and reconsecrated by the same activities. In this view, Milgrom's argument (1991b: 1040) is wrong, when he says that only the altar was (re)consecrated, because the altar was 'the most vulnerable target' of the incessant impurities generated by Israel and "would be so polluted that its very holiness was endangered. Hence, a periodic rite of consecration was prescribed."

The one sprinkling on the Atonement Seat and sevenfold sprinkling of blood in front of it were performed in the *adytum* only on the Day of Atonement. The set of blood rites was made twice, each with the blood of the bull and of the goat. It indicates that the intensity of the blood effects the profound purification of the *adytum*, amounting to its reconsecration. In the shrine as well, the same pattern is repeated, following the rule of the ordinary *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4. But its intensity and purificatory power differ from that of the ordinary *hattat* ritual, in that the blood rites of the Day were practiced twice in the shrine, each with the blood of the bull and of goat.

In the court, the mingled blood of the two animals, signifying the same intensity as that of the double blood rites, was 'daubed' once and 'sprinkled' seven times on the altar. In comparison with the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the latter activity was added as a new element. This addition is obviously to make a full purgation of the court by thoroughly cleansing the outer altar, *pars pro toto* for the court, rather than to independently make reconsecration of the altar as its separate role.[329]

To sum up, in the three precincts, the same modes of blood rites were practiced, implying that they retain the same effect. The blood rites were intense and extensive in that much more blood of two animals was used in sequence and in the three precincts. Each of the three precincts is purified and restored to the original holy state through the same modes of profound blood rites; the

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[329] For this reason, Gilders' argument (2004: 141) must be declined, when he says that the sprinkling is not related to 'purification' but exclusively to '(re)consecration' in P. In the ordinary *hattat* ritual, there is no sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the outer altar, whereas the gesture is practiced only in the shrine on the *hattat* bull for the high priest or the whole congregation. If the sevenfold sprinkling of blood effects '(re)consecration' in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the outer altar is not (re)consecrated, because the one daubing of blood is practiced on it without the sevenfold sprinkling of blood. This situation is unreasonable, if only the two precincts are (re)consecrated, except the outer altar. Therefore, the conclusion is clear: both sevenfold sprinkling of blood and once daubing of blood have the same function, 'purifying the sancta.'

same intensity to effect its full purification results in the reconsecration of each precinct which means the reconsecration of the whole sanctuary.

Then, a question is raised: why is the phrase, "and to cleanse it and to consecrate it from the uncleanness of the Israelites" only expressed in the case of the outer altar (Lev 16:19b)? The altar is frequently treated as *pars pro toto* for the entire sanctuary, representing it. By this principle, at the cultic dedication (Exod 29; Lev 8), the consecration of the whole sanctuary was accomplished by the consecration of the outer altar alone, with the anointing oil on the outer altar and the *hattat* offering. Therefore, the statement about the consecration is given only with the blood rites on the outer altar (Lev 8:15; cf. Exod 29:36). In this case, it must be recalled that the entire sanctuary was newly established and consecrated. The *hattat* offering probably might purify the altar from some latent sin or impurity for its initial consecration. Therefore, the outer altar only was purified and consecrated with the *hattat* offering and the oil anointing, as *pars pro toto* for the entire sanctuary, although the rituals were repeated for seven days (Exod 29:36-39; Lev 8:11, 15, 33).

On the same line, the function of the *hattat* ritual at the cultic inauguration, called the 'eighth day service' (Lev 9), must be understood as a similar case. The sanctuary was not yet contaminated by specific sins or impurities in its initial sacred state, although they could occur unconsciously and affect the altar more or less. Therefore, the *hattat* ritual at the cult dedication was not offered to cleanse the sanctuary from *specific* impurities or to remove *specific* sins or impurities of the Israelites that might have contaminated the sanctuary. Probably, the *hattat* ritual could be made to cleanse some implicit impurity of the altar that might have been caused by latent sin or impurity of the Israelites. This purification of the altar in the cultic inauguration can be compared to a case in daily life: a newly bought dish will be washed with unconscious anxiety about latent impurity before using it, even though it is warranted to be clean.

In the case of the ordinary *hattat* ritual, not both the gestures were performed around the outer altar in the court, in contrast to the blood rites in the shrine. The daubing of blood on the horns of the outer altar alone was acted without the sprinkling of blood. That is, the sevenfold sprinkling was not practiced in the court in this case. It differs from the case of the special *hattat* ritual where the sevenfold sprinkling of blood was executed on the outer alter.

Probably the reason is as follows: whereas the pollution of the shrine by sin of the high priest or the congregation is so severe and powerful that it could contaminate the whole shrine, the pollution by sin of the common Israelites was not so severe that it could be pervaded in the whole court, although the pollution

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could slightly affect the court area. Therefore, one daubing of blood was enough to purge the court, and the light purification of the outer altar as a representative of the court might affect sufficiently the whole court area. This may be the reason that there was no sevenfold sprinkling around the outer altar in the court to purge it on ordinary days.

In contrast, on the Day of Atonement, the whole sanctuary was not purified and sanctified only by the purgation of the outer altar. The same modes of blood rites were intensely practiced in each of the precincts, probably bringing about the same effect, namely, full purification amounting to reconsecration. That is, the restoration of sanctity is implied in the other sancta as well, through the same blood rites. But the complete reconsecration of the entire sanctuary was not finalized until the reconsecration of the outer altar is accomplished with the thorough blood rites on it. Therefore, when the outer altar was intensely purified, the purification and reconsecration of the whole sanctuary was completed.

5.2.2.4. Function of the two motions in the *hattat* blood rites

If both the actions, daubing and sprinkling of blood, function to purge the sancta, then, what is the functional difference between the two gestures? Kiuchi (1987: 130) suggested that the gesture הִזָּה is acted to purify the Tent (Num 19:4; Lev 4:6, 17; 16:14-15, 16b), while the gesture נָתַן is acted to purify the altars. However, this principle is not applied to the blood activities in Leviticus 16, for which Kiuchi had to submit another explanation, because the gesture הִזָּה should be performed on the outer altar to purify it in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement. Therefore, his explanation is not consistent.

Milgrom (1991b: 233-34, 1034) has presented a feasible suggestion: while the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the shrine floor before the veil (4:6)[330] is to purge the entire shrine,[331] the daubing of blood on the horns of the incense

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[330] Thus the blood did not touch the veil (Milgrom, 1991b: 234).

[331] The number seven indicates 'completion and perfection' (Milgrom, 1991b: 1039; cf. 234). For the various occurrences of the number seven in the Bible, including the cultic calendar and the rituals, see Milgrom (1991b: 234). Even though he says that "the magical use of seven is attested in the Bible" (1991b: 234; e.g, Naaman's seven-time baths in the Jordan [2 Kgs 5:10, 14]), it seems that the number seven stands for the completeness, as he states in the other place (1991b: 1039). Therefore, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood refers to powerful purification (Kiuchi, 1987: 130) for covering the entire sacred area.

altar (4:7) is to purge the entire incense altar by the principle of *pars pro toto*.[332] As mentioned, however, Milgrom (1991b: 233) and Gane (2005: 191) also poses another explanation concerning the sevenfold sprinkling of blood on the outer altar in the special *hattat*: its function is 'to consecrate' the altar, instead of 'to purify' it. In this respect, Milgrom also shows inconsistency.

Nevertheless, Milgrom's suggestion about the primary distinctive functions of the two motions of the *hattat* blood rites acted in the shrine is acceptable, in light of the above argument on the two modes of blood rites. Probably the distinctive functions may also be applied to the two modes of blood rites in all the precincts that were purified on the Day of Atonement, including the *adytum* and the outer alter. Hence whereas the one daubing of blood is connected with the purification of the sanctum itself, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood is associated with the purification of the sanctum area.

A conclusion is deduced: the blood rites in the *hattat* ritual are performed in unique modes to purify the sanctuary and its sancta.[333] It corresponds with the fact that the sanctuary and its sancta are contaminated by sin or impurity, even though the explanations on causes and dynamics of the contamination vary among scholars, as discussed in chapter 6. The daubing and sprinkling of blood in the *hattat* ritual are to purge the sanctuary and its sancta, while the latter is likely more powerful than the former (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 130). This function of the blood rites is a peculiar trait of the *hattat* ritual.

The sprinkling of blood has invariably the same function in the *hattat* ritual: it is performed to purify the sanctuary and its sancta. There is no biblical evidence that the seven sprinkling of blood invites independently 'consecration'

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[332] The horns of the outer altar also stand for the entire altar as *pars pro toto* (Milgrom, 1991b: 249). If so, why is the blood daubed on the horns of either the inner altar or the outer altar. The reason is unknown, but it is inferred that the horns are vulnerable to the attack of pollution, because they are the extremities of the altars (Milgrom, 1991b: 249; cf. daubing of the oil on the extremities of the leper in Lev 14:14-17, 25-28).

[333] Interestingly, at the ordination of Aaron and his sons as the priests prescribed in Exod 29 (vv 12, 20-21; practiced in Lev 8 [vv. 24, 30]), all the verbs used in sacrificial blood rites are employed: the blood of the ram for the ordination is 'daubed' (נָתַן) on their extremes probably to purify them (Exod 29:20a), and is 'sprinkled' (הִזָּה) on their clothes to consecrate them with a blend of oil and blood (Exod 29:21); in contrast, the blood is 'dashed' (זָרַק) on all sides of the altar. It is noteworthy that the blood of the *hattat* bull is 'daubed' (נָתַן) on the horns of the altar and the rest of blood is poured out (שָׁפַךְ) at the base of the altar in accordance with the regulation of the *hattat* sacrifice in Lev 4. It implies that whereas the 'daubing' of the *hattat* blood is primarily to purify the altar of (unspecific but latent) impurity in accordance with its use, the blood of ram for the ordination is 'dashed' on all sides of the altar to make an existential relationship between the priest and the altar by reverting the blood to God (see Gilders, 2004: 79).

of the object.[334] In terms of the ritual theory assumed in this thesis as well, the view that this same gesture can effect 'purgation' in one case but also 'consecration' in another case is rejected.[335]

By the same reason, the recent idea that Gane (2005: 169-71; 180; 298-99) has presented, following Johar, must be denied: the same modes of blood rites in the *hattat* ritual can have divergent meanings between the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4-5; 12-15) and the special *hattat* ritual (Lev 16); whereas the gestures נָתַן and הִזָּה in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4) function to *transfer the sin/impurity* to the sanctuary and its sancta through medium of blood, the same gestures in the special *hattat* (Lev 16) serve to *purge the sancta* of the sin/impurity accumulated by the blood-vehicle of the ordinary *hattat* on the Day

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[334] The sprinkling (הִזָּה) of blood (water also) is an action to 'purge' or 'cleanse' the object in all occurrences of in the Hebrew Bible (for its occurrences, see n. 301). Only in a couple of cases, it is addressed that this action with blood effects 'consecration,' but it is made with the oil anointing (Exod 29:21; Lev 8:30), rather than it is result of the independent sprinkling.

[335] Apart from the case of Lev 16, Milgrom (1990: 158, 440) points to Num 19:4 where the blood of the red heifer is sprinkled seven times by the priest toward the sanctuary in a place outside the camp; the activity effects a consecration of the blood (1990: 158), otherwise, the red cow (1990: 440). Milgrom (1990: 440) says that in a similar manner, the oil is consecrated through the priest's sevenfold sprinkling with his finger 'in front of YHWH' (Lev 14:16; maybe on the outer altar), before he put the oil on the extremities of the leper to purify him (Lev 14:17). "That is, he must consecrate it before he can use it" (Milgrom, 1990: 440). As a supporting parallel, he suggests the sevenfold sprinkling of the *hattat* blood on the Day of Atonement, where the high priest's action effects the consecration of the altar. Contrary to Milgrom, however, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood in Num 19:4 is likely performed "as an indirect way of purifying the Tent" (Kiuchi, 1987: 124). According to Gane's expression (2005: 185), the 'proleptic defilement' would be expected and the blood is sprinkled toward the sanctuary 'proleptically' to purge future impurities which would occur some day (see chapter 2). Milgrom's examples are inconsistent, because he argues that in one case the sevenfold sprinkling consecrate the material (blood or oil) and in another case the same activity consecrate the object (the altar or the person [Lev 14:7 where the blood of the bird was sprinkled on the leper seven times]). Contra Milgrom, it is likely that the sevenfold sprinkling of the oil on the altar for the leper is to purify intensely the altar (Lev 14:16), due to the severe pollution caused by the leprosy; that is, the oil sprinklings were added to the *hattat* blood to cleanse intensely the altar in a special manner. The severity of the leprous pollution is implied in the list of sacrifices and the rigorous purificatory procedures: the required sacrifices (Lev 14:10) are a male lamb for the guilt offering (vv. 12-13; 24-25), a male lamb for the *hattat* offering (v. 19a) and an ewe lamb for the burnt offering (vv. 19b-20); the concessions for the *hattat* and the burnt offering are the two birds (vv. 21-22; 30-31). In the next stage, the oil is put on the extremities of the leper, probably to purify him, as it purified the altar. Significantly, the fact that the oil is placed on top of the blood of the guilt offering that was put on him, prior to the oil (v. 17), implies that the blood of the guilt offering is placed (נָתַן 'daubed') on the extremities of the leper to cleanse him as well. The extremities of either the body or the altar are most vulnerable to pollution (Milgrom, 1991b: 249); this is the reason why the blood and oil were placed on them. However, it must be recalled that the blood of the guilt offering does not purge the altar like the burnt and the peace offering, in terms of the mode of their blood rite (זָרַק 'dash').

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of Atonement (for his *hattat* theory and its comparison with other theories, see §7.2). Gane (2005: 130-33) classifies the function of the blood rite in the *hattat* offering performed at the cultic dedication in Leviticus 8 into the same category as that in the special *hattat* on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16); that is, as stated in Leviticus 8:15, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood was to purge the altar on the day of the cultic dedication; it is the same function with the special *hattat* ritual of Leviticus 16. Hence the function of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4 differs from that of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus 8 and 16, due to the functional difference of blood (cf. § 7.4).

But it is unacceptable that an activity made in the same ritual system might have the different meaning, as refuted above. In addition, Gane and Johar failed to catch the reason why the purgation of the sancta was not articulated in the minute prescriptions in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 (see § 7.2.4).

An additional significant fact is uncovered in connection with the guilt offering: in light of the modes of blood rites, it seems that the sin removed by the guilt offering did not contaminate the sancta, although it is an expiatory sacrifice. The reason is that the mode of blood rite used in the guilt offering is זָרַק 'dash,' the same as that in the burnt offering and the peace offering, which do not cleanse the sancta.[336] It indicates that atonement and the consequent forgiveness made with the guilt offering are accomplished not by 'ransom + purgation' as in the *hattat* sacrifice, but just by 'ransom' (= payment) to God for the offerer's sin,[337] along with the reparation by adding its fifth part for the loss of the injured party.[338]

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[336] For the reason, the following argument of Levine (1974: 73) is wrong:

Most often, כִּפֶּר relates to the placing of blood from חַטָּאת or the אָשָׁם on various cultic objects – the horns of the incense altar, or of the altar of burnt offering; on the פָּרֹכֶת curtain, etc., or on other objects or persons, in an effort to eliminate impurity already contracted, or to prevent contamination, in the first place. This is best exemplified in the purificatory rites prescribed in Leviticus chapter 16.

[337] It is likely that the guilt offering has an effect of 'ransom' (payment) to the injured (God) with its blood and sacrifice, even though its suet is offered as 'gift offering' (אִשֶּׁה) (see § 4.2.1.3). Of course, the reparation for the damage to the injured is made as a payment by adding the fifth part to it. But the ram for the guilt offering itself is sacrificed and its blood is dashed (זָרַק) on the altar as a 'ransom,' indicating that the blood is reverted to the owner God and makes atonement for human souls (Lev 17:11). In fact, the flesh of the guilt offering is thought to be contaminated by sin that is transferred by hand imposition, as in the *hattat* offering. Therefore, the officiating priest must consume the flesh of the guilt offering to remove or eliminate the sin. Nevertheless, the suet of the guilt offering is called 'gift offering,' whereas the suet of the *hattat* offering is not listed in the category. This alludes to the peculiar trait of the

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Now that the purificatory aspect of the *hattat* blood rites has been debated, it is necessary to examine their expiatory aspect. Milgrom (1991b: 254-55) has argued that the *hattat* offering is made only to cleanse the impurity of the sancta, but not to cleanse the offerer's sin/impurity. It means that the *hattat* blood does not have the expiatory power to effect 'ransom' for the offerer's sin or impurity. Thus the meaning of כִּפֶּר refers to 'effect purgation' in all cases of the *hattat* ritual, although it can have different meanings in the other sacrificial cases, like 'expiation' or 'ransom' (see § 2.2.2).[339] But in the *hattat* offering, while the ransom is fulfilled by paying the blood-life (*pars pro toto* for the animal) for the evil to the injured party (and probably by reverting the blood to the owner, God, at the same time), the purgation of the sancta is made by the peculiar blood activities of the *hattat* ritual.

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hattat sacrifice. The suet of the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering is offered by burning it on the altar; it is declared that all the fat belongs to God (Lev 3:16). Therefore, it is inferred that only the suet of the victims, whether the *hattat* animals, or the ram of the guilt offering, is not contaminated by sin or impurity, although the flesh of the victims is defiled by the transferred sin or impurity. In this view, while the suet of the guilt offering is offered as 'gift offering,' the flesh of the guilt offering is eaten by the priest as his prebend to remove the sin. Although the blood of the guilt offering is dashed to the altar for 'ransom,' it does not purge the altar. In contrast, the *hattat* suet is not called 'gift offering,' while the *hattat* flesh is either eaten by the priest as his prebend or burned outside the camp to remove the offerer's evil. Therefore, as far as the *hattat* suet is concerned, presumably it is also offered as a kind of 'ransom' (payment') to God, although it is given to God, according to the rule, 'all the fat is the Lord's' (Lev 3:16).

[338] In Num 5:8 'the goat of the guilt offering' (אֵיל הָאָשָׁם) is called 'the goat of atonement' (אֵיל הַכִּפֻּרִים).

[339] Kiuchi (1987: 101) says that the concept of cultic כִּפֶּר "probably consists of the two main elements, purification and bearing guilt" (cf. 1987: 52; 2007: 47). Because כִּפֶּר is a synonym with נָשָׂא עָוֹן, when the priest performs כִּפֶּר,' "he does not just 'purify' the sancta, but also bears the guilt of the offerer" (Kiuchi, 2007: 47). Nevertheless, he affirms in his later work (2007) that the essential meaning of כִּפֶּר in sacrifices is 'ransom' or 'sacrifice oneself,' saying "in preference to the common assumption that כִּפֶּר in the context of the *hattat* means 'decontaminate,' it is more likely related to the idea of 'ransoming' or 'making compensation' . . . " (2007: 57). For this reason, his later work (2007) renders כִּפֶּר as 'sacrifice it [the animal]' in Lev 1:4 and as 'sacrifice himself [the priest]' in 4:20. According to Kiuchi, in the burnt offering, the animal is the subject (agent) of כִּפֶּר, while it is sacrificed as 'ransom' for the offerer (the animal sacrificed it); however, in the *hattat* offering, the priest is the subject of כִּפֶּר, while he acts as the agent to bear the offerer's guilt rather than the animal bears it. Neverthelss, his idea is not acceptable, in terms of the definition of the verb כִּפֶּר and the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן that were investigated in chapter 2, and in terms of the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism operating in the *hattat* ritual.

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Leviticus 17:11 substantiates that sacrificial blood can be offered to the altar for atonement as the meaning of 'ransom.'[340] Milgrom's interpretation (1991b: 417; 2000a: 1083) on this verse differs from the majority of scholars, because he applies the expiatory power of blood in the verse exclusively to the peace offering. The investigation on meaning and function of blood in Leviticus 17:11 will show that the blood of the *hattat* animal is treated for two functions: 'ransom' and 'purgation.' These double effects of the *hattat* blood rites correspond to the meaning of כִּפֶּר made by the *hattat* offering. Indeed, it indicates that the blood plays a key part for atonement in the *hattat* ritual, although the atonement is a result of the entire *hattat* procedures.

Besides, it is inferred that the divine assignment of blood on the altar ("I have given it on the altar" [Lev 17:11]) as such bears a certain theological meaning, in addition to the effect of ransom, although the text is silent. As argued below, the 'blood-giving' on the altar is the action to revert the blood to the owner, God, and simultaneously it seems to have the function to 'index' the relationship between God and the offerer (Gilders, 2004: 78-84). These meanings of blood may well be applied to all sacrifices. The next section will deal with this issue by interpreting Leviticus 17:11.

To sum up, while the *hattat* blood rites have a common denominator with the other sacrifices in their function and meaning, they have a peculiar function (purification of the sancta), distinctive from the blood rites of the other sacrifices. In this respect, this feature of the *hattat* blood rites is similar to the features of the other *hattat* ritual components, each of which has a peculiar function in addition to a common function with the other sacrifice.

5.2.3. The meaning of blood: the exegesis of Leviticus 17:11

The question is why the blood of animal has the function of atonement, either by 'ransom + purgation' or by 'ransom' only? The answer is not given in the priestly literature until Leviticus 17 (vv. 11, 14). Concerning Leviticus 17:11, scholars have posed several interpretations, but its meaning must be discerned in the structure and context of Leviticus 17 and in the extended context.

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[340] . . . וַאֲנִי נְתַתִּיו לָכֶם עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם "and I have given it to you on the altar to make atonement [= ransom] for your souls" (Lev 17:11, ESV).

5.2.3.1. Concise exegesis of Leviticus 17 in light of its structure

From a literary perspective, Leviticus 17 is located in a suitable place, because the verse, which explains the meaning of blood, is arranged right after the blood rites have been prescribed and described throughout Leviticus 1-15, and have reached their climax with the special *hattat* ritual that is performed with the triple blood manipulation to purge the three sacred precincts of Israel's impurities/iniquities on the Day of Atonement.[341] This point is vital for the argument of chapter 8, the concluding chapter of this thesis, which will discuss the meaning of atonement accomplished on the Day of Atonement in light of the structure of Leviticus.

What is the purpose of the regulations in Leviticus 17? At a glance, it seems that several divergent laws are inconsistently stipulated in this chapter. For instance, H. T. C. Sun (1990: 83-87) observed that there are three sections in the unit according to its contents: (1) concerning illegitimate sacrifice (vv. 2-9); (2) concerning the treatment of blood (vv. 10-14); and (3) concerning the consumption of an animal's carcass (vv. 15-16). It seems that the contents are not related to each other.

Nevertheless, the main focus of this unit is on blood; while the word דָּם 'blood' (x10) and its verb אָכַל 'eat' (x7) are frequently used, the prohibition against ingesting blood (vv. 10-12) is placed in the pivot of the laws that are juxtaposed in the symmetrical structure (Milgrom, 2000a: 1448; cf. Hartley, 1992: 263). The laws centering on the pivot either lead up to it (vv. 1-9) or depend on it (vv. 13-16) (Milgrom, 2000a: 1448).

The first section of Sun (vv. 2-9) stipulates the prohibition of illegal sacrificial slaughter rather than that of secular slaughter. This section is divided into two parts: (1) the Israelites must not slaughter domestic animals in the camp outside the sanctuary, or in the open field outside the camp, for sacrificial offerings to 'goat demons' (or 'satyrs,' NJB) (vv. 3-7); (2) both the Israelites and the aliens living among them must not offer a burnt offering and sacrifice (i.e., peace offering)[342] outside the sanctuary (vv. 8-9).

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[341] Cf. B. Jürgens (2001: 123). For details, see chapter 8 where this study will argue that Lev 16-17 are placed in a heart of Leviticus both in theological and structural perspectives.

[342] Hartley states that the phrase עֹלָה אוֹ זֶבַח in Lev 17:8 is merism to cover all sacrifices, because the burnt offering (עֹלָה) is the principal official public sacrifice (cf. Num 28:3-8) and זֶבַח usually refers to a private sacrifice (i.e., peace offerings, Lev 19:6; 23:37; Num 15:3, 5, 8; Josh 22:26, 27; cf. Hartley, 1992: 37-39).

In particular, vv. 3-4 of the first part has aroused exegetical debates since the ancient times of the rabbis, whether these verses prohibit all secular slaughters or only illegal sacrificial slaughters, because the verb שָׁחַט is used not only in a cultic slaughter, but also in an ordinary slaughter.[343] V. 13 allows them to eat edible nondomestic animals or birds without blood. But apart from vv. 5-9 where illegal sacrificial slaughters are prohibited, was the secular or 'nonsacrificial slaughter' (Milgrom's term, 1991b: 28) of domestic animals not allowed in vv. 3-4,?

The verb שָׁחַט in v. 3 must be regarded as a sacrificial slaughter (Levine, 1989: 113; Hartley, 1992: 269-71) rather than a secular slaughter (profaner schlachtung)[344] for the following four reasons:

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[343] Gen 37:31; Num 11:22; 14:16; Jdg 12:6; 1 Sam 14:32, 34; 1 Ki 18:40; Isa 22:13. Scholars have argued over the meaning of the verb שָׁחַט, 'slaughter' in Lev 17:3, whether it refers to secular slaughter or to sacrificial slaughter (for a detailed debate between two groups of proponents, including rabbi R. Akiba and R. Ishmael, each of whom has a number of the followers, see Milgrom, 2000a: 1452). Many commentators, since R. Akiba and Wellhausen (1973: 117-18), see the verb שָׁחַט as the meaning of secular slaughter, (e.g., Wenham, 1979: 241; Milgrom, 1991b: 28-29; 2000a: 1452).

[344] Jürgens (2001: 174) refuses the term 'profaner schlachtung,' namely, 'nonsacrificial slaughter,' because only the difference of slaughtering lies between ritual activity *in the sanctuary* and ritual activity *outside it*, rather than between 'profaner' (secular) activity and 'sakraler' (sacred) activity. He states:

> Die Differenz besteht nicht zwischen "profaner" und "sakraler" Schlachtung, sondern zwischen Schlachtung im Kontext eines Opfers und damit im Heiligtum oder Schlachtung außerhalb eines Opferrituals und damit außerhalb des Heiligtums. Die Schlachtung außerhalb eines Opferrituals ist nicht einfach "profan" da auch hier das Blut ausgegossen und nicht verzehrt werden darf (Dtn 12,16).

In Jürgens' view (2001: 174-75), even the slaughter outside the sanctuary is not a secular one, because blood must still be shed, and its consumption is prohibited like blood of the sacrificial animals slaughtered at the sanctuary. However, his refutation is not precise, because the draining of blood and the prohibition of its consumption as such do not mean that they are ritual activities. The practices are applied to both sacrificial animals and nonsacrificial animals solely for meat, merely in keeping with the prohibition of blood in Lev 17:11. Moreover, the way of killing (שָׁחַט), which means 'cut the throat' as a technical term, could be used for nonsacrificial animals 'on improvised stones' (e.g., 1 Sam 14:32, 34) but not 'on an altar.' That is, the way of killing as such does not refer to a ritual activity. Therefore, such killing of animal, draining of blood, and pouring it into ground in the open field cannot be taken as ritual activities. In light of required blood-draining, it is doubtful whether other means of killing like bludgeoning, strangling, or stabbing was allowed (cf. Milgrom, 2000a: 1452).Therefore, the use of the phrase 'secular slaughter' in this discussion is still valid for some cases, although שָׁחַט in 17:3 does not refer to secular slaughter.

First, the context of vv. 3-9 as a whole makes it clear that vv. 3-4 refer to the prohibition of sacrificial slaughter (שָׁחַט) for illegal peace offerings, in light of the fact that vv. 3-9 address overall illegal sacrifices by adding 'the burnt offering and sacrifice' in v. 8. All animals are required for the altar ("to the entrance to the Tent of Meeting to present it as an offering to the LORD in front of the tabernacle of the LORD" v. 3); certainly they refer to the sacrificial animals without blemish. Therefore, it is not prohibition of secular slaughter or 'nonsacrificial slaughter,' but of illegal sacrificial slaughter that was made in some illegal altars, whether in the camp or in the fields outside the camp (vv. 3, 5). It implies that secular slaughter for meat was permitted in Israel.

Second, as Hartley (1992: 269-71) pointed out, it sounds unreasonable that any secular slaughter of domestic animals was not allowed at all to Israel and that all the animals should be offered on the altar before eating, because if it was the case, many domestic animals with blemishes would have to be discarded as waste in keeping with the requirement of Leviticus 3:1 (cf. 1:3; 4:3; 5:25 [6:6]) and 22:17-25.[345]

Third, it might be pointed out that domestic poultry can also be added to animals with blemish. If vv. 3-4 prohibit all secular slaughter, why are birds omitted? Probably the domestic poultry was allowed in keeping with game birds under the stipulation in v. 13. Leviticus 3, however, excludes birds as animals

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[345] For scholars who see שָׁחַט in Lev 17:3 to be an all-inclusive secular slaughter and therefore all secular sacrifices to be prohibited, this prohibition seems to be a collision with Deut 12 where secular slaughter is permitted for mear meat. Milgrom (1991b: 28-29; 2000a: 1452-57) explains the problem on the base of redactional criticism, as follows: in light of 1 Samuel 14:31-35 P presumably permitted 'common slaughter,' but judging from Lev 17:3-9, H rejected it on the ground that it may lead to satyr worship; later, however, D innovated and reintroduced secular slaughter, relying on P, because "the expanded borders of Josiah's kingdom had made common slaughter an absolute necessity (Deut 12:15-16, 21-25)," while D's centralization of the temple took place in the new national situation. Conservative scholars also have suggested their solutions in a similar way, with no reference to redactional criticism: Lev 17:3-9 was applied only to camp life in the desert, where Israel could keep the law, due to the easy approach to the altar next to their tent places; but in Deut 12 the situation was changed to life in the land of Canaan and it was nearly impossible for the Israelites to bring an animal from their distant places to the altar for meat; hence the law of Lev 17 became obsolete and a new law in Deut 12 was ordained (Keil & Delitzsch, 1956 vol.2: 409; Kaufmann, 1961: 180; Harrison, 1980: 179; Wenham, 1979: 241; cf. Jürgens, 2001: 175). Nevertheless, this view cannot explain the statement of 17:7b, חֻקַּת עוֹלָם תִּהְיֶה־זֹּאת לָהֶם לְדֹרֹתָם "This shall be a permanent statute to them throughout their generations" (NASB), which points to the unit of vv. 3-7 rather than v. 7a alone, proclaiming it as a permanent law. Therefore, Hartley's explanation is most convincing: whereas שָׁחַט outside the sanctuary in Lev 17:3 means illegal sacrificial slaughter (peace offering) for meat that was permanently prohibited, שָׁחַט in the open field in Deut 12 was secular slaughter for meat; as a result, secular slaughter was not prohibited in Lev 17 in accordance with Deut 12.

for the peace offering. Presumably the scanty meat of a bird was not sufficient as food that was the secondary purpose of the peace offering. This supports the view that vv. 3-4 is a prohibition of illegal peace offerings rather than of common or secular slaughter for meat.

Fourth, it seems that the peace offering, whether illegitimate or legitimate, was made primarily for special purpose like thanksgiving, but not only for meat. Therefore, it is assumed that the secular slaughter of livestock, including the animals with blemishes and poultry, was allowed purely for meat either in the camp or in the open field with the same stipulation as in vv. 13 that the blood of game must be drained out and covered with earth.

Therefore, the law of vv. 3-9 primarily prohibits illegal peace offerings, motivated by a special purpose (e.g., thanksgiving) at a private altar in the camp or in the open field outside the camp (vv. 3-4). A private altar is illegal and worshipping goat-demons before an altar in the field was banned. Subsequently vv. 8-9 expand the scope to all sacrifices (the burnt offering and sacrifice); all illegal sacrifices, as well as illegal peace offerings are forbidden. Then a warning is given not to consume blood at their disposal, while the meaning and function of blood is explained (v. 10-11).

Why do vv. 3-7 caution against illegal peace offering only, without mentioning other sacrifices. As implied in v. 7, the reason may be that "when Israelites desire to eat meat, they are wont to slaughter their animals in the open field and offer them to goat demons" (Milgrom, 1991b: 28). Moreover, it is likely that the misuse of blood by the Israelites would easily be committed with the peace offering that was made for meat. In other words, the peace offering was most vulnerable to misuse of blood. That is why the caution about the peace offering is spotlighted and emphasized.

Vv. 8-9 are not merely a superfluous repeat of vv. 3-7 (contra Milgrom, 2000a: 1448), because they include the foreigners who are living among the Israelites. In these verses, the prohibition of illegal slaughter is extended to all sacrifices beyond the peace offering, probably because the foreigners were vulnerable not only to the peace offering, but also to the other illegal sacrifices offered to other gods. Hence, 17:3-9 stipulates that illegal sacrificial slaughter is prohibited as illegal activity in Israel, rather than secular slaughter.

In conclusion, the first section (vv. 2-9) instructs Israel to offer all sacrifices exclusively in the sanctuary, while it focuses on the legal use of its blood. It implies that the gist of this section is to block the presentation of blood to goat demons: blood of sacrificial animals must be offered exclusively to God. The disposal of blood by placing it on the illicit altar would be counted as guilty

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of bloodshed, while vv. 6, (cf. 11) demands the blood to be placed only on the altar of YHWH. The offender should be cut off from his people (vv. 9-10, 14), because he misused the blood by presenting it to illicit gods.

The second section (vv. 10-14) legislates the prohibition of blood consumption with the warning of 'cutting off' (כָּרַת; see ch. 6) for its violation and explains the meaning and function of blood for the first time in the priestly literature (v. 11, 14; cf. Gen 9:4-6). While it focuses on the blood problem, v. 13 extends the list of edible animals to game, namely, wild animals and birds, in the precaution of blood disposal. By so doing, Leviticus 17 completes an all-inclusive law to encompass edible domestic animals and wild animals.

The third section (vv. 15-16) stipulates that an animal which dies of itself or is torn by wild animals is forbidden to eat. How is this section related to blood? At a glance it seems simply to prohibit the consumption of "נְבֵלָה, an animal that died of natural causes or accidently" or "טְרֵפָה, an animal that had been mauled by another wild animal" (Hartley, 1992: 277) and prescribes the purificatory rite for impurity generated by its consumption. But it must be recalled that "the blood of such an animal has not been properly drained from the meat" (Hartley, 1992: 277) and thus "the blood is still inside the carcass" (Milgrom, 2000a: 1486). For this reason, eating such animals leads to consuming blood.

To sum up, Leviticus 17 is concerned about addressing the significant meaning of blood, its cautious treatment, and the prohibition of its consumption; the explanation of blood in v. 11 is highlighted in the structure and context of Leviticus 17.

5.2.3.2. Interpretation of Leviticus 17:11

A major problem related to this study is about the meaning of 17:11:

כִּי נֶפֶשׁ הַבָּשָׂר בַּדָּם הִוא וַאֲנִי נְתַתִּיו לָכֶם עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ
לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם כִּי־הַדָּם הוּא בַּנֶּפֶשׁ יְכַפֵּר

For the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it for you on the altar to make atonement for your souls, for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life (ESV)

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Commentators have been wrestling with the exegesis of this verse concerning two matters: (1) the scope that this verse covers; (2) the interpretation of the wording in v. 11b, כִּי־הַדָּם הוּא בַּנֶּפֶשׁ יְכַפֵּר in connection with the meaning of the preposition בְּ. Regarding the meaning of בַּנֶּפֶשׁ in v. 11b, the בּ is taken as *beth instrumentii* with the majority of recent scholars, with the rendering, 'by the life' (ESV); or 'by means of life' (Milgrom, 2000a: 1478; NET). [346] Hence the rendering of v. 11b: "for it is the blood that ransom by means of the life" (Milgrom).

The more important question is raised: what sacrifices does this verse refer to? Concerning what v. 11 refers to, scholars are divided into two groups by and large. A general view is that 17:11 refers to all types of bloody sacrifice. [347] But Milgrom, [348] followed by Jürgens (2001: 169-75), restricts the statement of 17:11 to the peace offering mentioned in the previous verses. He comments:

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[346] Three views have been submitted on the phrase בַּנֶּפֶשׁ (for detailed discussion, see Rodriguez, 1979: 244-257; Kiuchi, 1987: 105-9 and Hartley, 1992: 273-77). The divergent renderings of English versions reveal difficulty in interpreting the phrase, and some chief scholars have even retracted and corrected their views.

beth essentiae or *beth* of equivalence: 'as life' (JPS; NRSV); 'as the seat of life' (NAB); 'lifeblood' (CSB). Hence the translation of v. 11b is "it is the blood, as life, that effects expiation." Cf. Milgrom (1983: 96); Levine (1989: 112, correcting 1974: 67ff).

beth pretii: 'for' referring to subsitution (Levine, 1974: 68); 'in exchange of' (Rodriguez, 1979: 250); the LXX ἀντὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 'for the soul' (LXE), i.e., 'instead of the soul'; cf. 'for one's life' (NIV); 'for the soul' (KJV). In this opinion, the בַּנֶּפֶשׁ refers to human life opposite to the animal life of '*beth instrumentiĭ* or '*beth essentiae*.' Hence Levine's rendering (1974: 68): "for the blood may expiate according to the value of life." But in Wenham's rendering (1979: 245) 'the blood ransoms *at the price* of life' (emphasis mine), he states that the life indicates the life of an animal. In this case, it seems that the meaning is similar to that of *beth instrumentii* below.

beth instrumentii: 'by the life' (ESV); 'by reason of the life' (NASB; ERV; JPS; RSV), 'because of life' (CJB); 'through life' (Kiuchi, 1987: 106); 'by means of life' Milgrom (2000a: 1478, correcting 1983: 96). It also indicates that the נֶפֶשׁ is animal's life. This view is most appropriate, because above all this interpretation matches the meaning of כִּפֶּר בְּ occurring frequently in the Hebrew Bible (Gen 32:21; Exod 29:33; Lev 5:16; 7:7; etc; for detailed comment and biblical attestation, see Hartley, 1992: 273-77; Milgrom, 2000a: 1478). The reason that blood has expiatory power is because it is the life-force of an animal. "Since the animals' life has a value analogous to that of the supplicant's own life, Yahweh accepts the sacrifice as the basis for maintaining the divine-human relationship" (Hartley, 1992: 276). Cf. Füglister (1977: 146-47); Janowski (1982: 245-46); Gilders (2004: 174-75).

[347] E.g., Levine (1974:68); Kiuchi (1987: 102); Hartley (1992: 275). Sun (1990: 99) defends this position from the standpoint of redactional criticism. The composition of 17:1-7 was completed first through several stages and then vv. 8-9 were added later to it in two directions: (1) to apply it to aliens; (2) to apply it to 'the sacrificial system as a whole.'

[348] Milgrom (1983: 96-103; 1991b: 417, 1083; 2000a: 1472-79).

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Thus 17:11 refers to the well-being offering, the only sacrifice eaten by the offerer. Yet this nonexpiatory sacrifice bears in this context a strictly expiatory (kpr) function! Moreover, the expression לְכַפֵּר עַל־נַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶם 'to ransom life' implies that a capital crime has been committed (see Exod 30:12-16; Num 31:50), yet it is expiated by sacrifice! This double paradox is resolved by 17:3-4: if one does not slaughter his animal at the altar, "bloodguilt shall be imputed to that man; he has shed blood." The animal slayer is a murderer unless he offers its blood on the altar to ransom his life (v. 11). (Milgrom: 1991b: 417)

. . . in 17:11, where the blood of the *selamim* sacrifice must be drained on the altar to ransom the life of the offerer for slaughtering the animal for food. (Milgrom, 2000a:1083)

However, his idea is problematic in three points.

Firstly, it is dubious if the peace offering can make expiation/atonement, as most scholars have pointed out. While the prohibition of blood is applied to all animals (17:10, 12, 14) and the meaning of blood (17:11, 14) is a common denominator in all animals, it is likely that the principle of atonement with blood in Leviticus 17:11 is pertinent to expiatory sacrifices only. That is, probably 17:11 refers to all expiatory sacrifices: namely, the sin offering and the guilt offering, possibly including the burnt offering. Therefore, in diametric opposition to Milgrom who says that v. 11 refers only to the peace offering, the peace offering must be excluded, because it does not have expiatory power.

However, the majority of interpreters contend that Leviticus 17:11 encompasses the bloody sacrifices of all kinds including the peace offering.[349] Although the general focus of Leviticus 17:1-11 may well be on the peace offering, v. 11 certainly addresses "a general principle underlying the prohibition of blood consumption" (Kiuchi, 1987: 102) and blood of other sacrifices also makes a special contribution to כִּפֶּר (Gane, 2005: 65). In this regard, they defend generally the partial power of expiation inherent in the peace offering, although expiation is not its major function. Kurtz (1980: 74) says:

If the sprinkling of blood in connection with the burnt-offering and trespass offering [i.e., *hattat*] served as an atonement (לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו), the sprinkling of blood of the peace-offering, which was performed in

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[349] Levine (1974: 68); Rodriguez (1979: 226-29); Kurtz (1980: 74); Kiuchi (1987: 102); cf. Gilders (2004: 23, 168-176).

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precisely the same way, must necessarily have had the same significance.

Kurtz's statement can be refuted for three reasons: (1) he disregards the difference of the blood rites by modes between sacrifices; the gesture 'sprinkling' of blood in the burnt offering is not correct; as argued above, the function of blood rite differs between the burnt offering and the *hattat* offering with their distinctive gestures of blood manipulation; (2) consequently, the meaning of atonement (כִּפֶּר) attained in each offering differs between the two offerings: 'ransom' by the burnt offering, but 'ransom + purgation' by the *hattat* offering as a final effect through the entire process[350]; (3) even though Kurtz's statement may be acceptable, it does not warrant that the peace offering has expiatory power, because the mention of atonement (כִּפֶּר) as the final effect of the sacrifice does not take place in the context of the peace offering in the priestly literature, apart from the adduction of the following ambiguous Ezekiel text.

Rodriguez (1979: 226-29) used Ezekiel 45:15-17[351] as evidence where the sacrifices for כִּפֶּר seems to cover the burnt, grain, *hattat* offerings, and the peace offering. But Milgrom (1991b: 221) answers: "כִּפֶּר probably refers to the burnt, cereal, and purification offerings in the list and not to the well-being offering." The last appearance of the peace offering in the list of sacrifices is significant, because it may imply that a feast was held at the end of a series of the sacrifices (Milgrom, 1991b: 221).[352] His refutation is plausible and thus the peace offering may be excluded from expiatory sacrifices.

Moreover, it is revealed from the context of the following verses (Ezek 45:18-25) that the primary focus of the series of sacrifices is on the *hattat*

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[350] As stated in chapter 2, this study argues: in other expiatory sacrifices (the burnt offering and the guilt offering) except the *hattat* offering, atonement as only the meaning of 'ransom' is made through slaughter, blood-shedding, blood-giving on the altar (but their blood does not cleanse the sancta), and a whole burning (burnt offering) or a fat-burning (the guilt offering), all of which can be regarded as the process for ransom, although blood manipulations, that is, blood-shedding by slaughter and its giving to the altar, are most important; however, in the case of the *hattat* offering, atonement as the meaning of 'ransom + purgation (of sancta)' is made with unique blood manipulations. In other words, the blood rite of the *hattat* sacrifice is not only to give it on the altar to the life-giver, God, but also to cleanse the sancta.

[351] ". . . he shall provide the sin offering, the grain offering, the burnt offering and the peace offerings, to make atonement for the house of Israel.'" (Ezek 45:17b, NASB)

[352] Hartley (1992: 3) also notes: "in practice, it [the peace offering] was usually offered after the other sacrifices so that a clan or family might eat a festive meal after the various sacrificial rituals of the day."

sacrifice named first. The other offerings were probably made as subsidiary and supplementary to the *hattat* offerings for the Israelites. If this is the case, the fact that the collective offerings were listed under the keynote of atonement does not necessarily affirm that each had the same function. Therefore, there is no authentic biblical evidence on the expiatory power of the peace offering. If the peace offering is excluded in Leviticus 17:11 and Milgrom's view is declined, the possibility is that this verse may apply solely to the expiatory sacrifices: the burnt, the *hattat*, and the guilt offering.

Secondly, Milgrom (1991b: 221-22; 417; 2000a: 1475) also accepts that the peace offering does not make expiation for a specific sin. Nevertheless, he contends that because Leviticus 17:11 refers only to the peace offering in terms of the context where it is exclusively mentioned, the atonement in this verse must be regarded as that made by the peace offering. Milgrom answers to this paradox that the draining of blood on the altar in Leviticus 17:11 ransoms the offerer for the sin/responsibility caused by slaying the animal of the peace offering; "the offerer has slain the animal for selfish reason: he wants meat and will kill to get it" (Milgrom, 1991b: 417).[353]

However, killing the animal for sacrifice was not an illegitimate act at all, including the peace offering; therefore, "he has not committed a murder" (Kiuchi, 1987: 102-3; cf. Hartley 1992: 275). Moreover, if the secular sacrifices were not prohibited in Leviticus 17, as argued above, and game was allowed for meat, as for the slaying of an animal in the open field, how could the killer ransom himself for his sin of slaying? In secular slaughter in the open field purely for meat, the blood was simply required to be drained in accordance with the prohibition of its consumption; on the other hand, in a sacred slaughter for the peace offering, which was made in the sanctuary for several specific reasons[354] as well as the

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[353] Jürgens (2001: 173) states in the same vein:

Der Unterschied zwischen dem Sprengen des Bluts beim *zebah selamim* und den Blutapplikationsriten bei der *hattat* und dem *asham*, für die bezeichnenderweise andere Termini gewählt werden (233), besteht darin, dass *hattat* und *asham* zur Sühne für eine außerhalb des Rituals bestehende Sünde dargebracht werden, während das Blutsprengen beim *zebah selamim* das Schlachten des zum Verzehr estimmten Opfertieres legitimiert. Mit anderen Worten: Während die Blutapplikationsriten bei der *hattat* und beim *asham* und die dadurch erreichte Sühne der Zweck der Rituale sind, hat das Sprengen des Bluts beim *zebah selamim* eine Funktion innerhalb des Rituals (als Legitimierung des Schlachtens), dessen Hauptzweck im verzehr des Opfertiers besteht.

[354] Lev 7:11-16: for the thanksgiving offering (תּוֹדָה, 7:12; cf. 22:29; Pss 50:14; 56:13;

purpose of meat to be consumed, the blood had to be assigned to the altar, that is, to God as the life-giver.

Although there is no divine statement, "blood is mine," in the Hebrew Bible like "all the fat is mine" (כָּל־חֵלֶב לַיהוָה; Lev 3:16), it is presumed that blood belongs to God, the life-giver, in light of the statement of Genesis 9:6[355] and Leviticus 17:11, 14 (see Gilders, 2004: 17, 20). In keeping with the principle that it is prohibited from its consumption, either the blood of animal slaughtered for worshipping (thanksgiving and so on) reverts to the Creator of its life in the sanctuary, or the blood of animal for meat consumption is poured to the ground in the open field. Furthermore, as argued, the reason that the peace offering is solely stated in 17:11 would be because it was most vulnerable to violation of the dreadful blood-prohibition in the ritual process.

Thirdly, that a ransom for the slain life is made with the blood of the very slain animal is absurd and not biblical, due to the principle of blood ransom: the blood of the killed one must be ransomed with the blood of the killer, or by a substitute animal for the killer.

In conclusion, Milgrom's idea that Leviticus 17:11 refers only to the peace offering must be declined. Rather, it covers expiatory sacrifices, while the peace offering may be excluded as a nonexpiatory sacrifice.

As regards expiatory sacrifices covered by this verse, it is necessary to distinguish between the meaning of blood and the function of blood concerning the conceptual sphere that each covers. Whereas the meaning of blood as life must apply to all animal sacrifices as a common principle, the function of blood as an expiatory instrument is restricted to expiatory sacrifices. Therefore, the fact that the blood of all animals is equivalent to the life of creature (17:11, 14) does not mean that the blood of all sacrifices atones for human lives. V. 11aβ (וַאֲנִי נְתַתִּיו לָכֶם עַל־הַמִּזְבֵּחַ), where the subject of the injunction אֲנִי ('I am') is YHWH, indicates that "blood is the divinely appointed means of atonement" (Kiuchi, 1987: 104). However, the expiatory power given by divine authority is applied solely to expiatory sacrifices through the divine giving of blood to the altar (cf. Hartley, 1992: 273).

116:17-19); for the votive offering that was made for the fulfillment of a vow (נֶדֶר, 7:16; 2 Sam 15:7-8; Prov 7:14); for the freewill offering (נְדָבָה, 7:16; Num 15:3, 8; Ezek 46:12).

[355] (Gen 9:6) שֹׁפֵךְ דַּם הָאָדָם בָּאָדָם דָּמוֹ יִשָּׁפֵךְ כִּי בְּצֶלֶם אֱלֹהִים עָשָׂה אֶת־הָאָדָם
"Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed;
for in the image of God has God made man" (NIV)

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Among expiatory sacrifices, the burnt offering is basically not so much a compulsory expiatory sacrifice for *specific* sins as a voluntary sacrifice for 'devotion,'[356] 'fulfillment of vow' (נֶדֶר, Lev 22:18), and a 'freewill offering' (נְדָבָה, Lev 22:18), similar to the purposes of the peace offering. Although atonement by the burnt offering is declared in Leviticus 1:4, it is clear that the primary purpose of the burnt offering was not for atonement,[357] in view of overall evidence throughout the OT with a few exceptions.[358] If some cases of the burnt offering has expiatory power in the priestly literature, it is assumed that it atones for the fundamental 'sinfulness' of people, rather than for the offerer's specific sins (Hartley, 1992: 18, 24). In this view, it is admitted that the burnt offering is also covered by Leviticus 17:11, because it has expiatory power probably for human sinfulness as its subsidiary function. Therefore, the idea that this verse is restricted to the *hattat* sacrifice must be declined,[359] although a couple of scholars have suggested it.[360]

On the other hand, from perspective of the context of Leviticus, there is another possibility to understand the meaning of Leviticus 17:11. As questioned above, why is the rationale and function of blood explained in Leviticus 17 in the priestly literature? Except for vague implications in Genesis 9:4-6, the meaning

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[356] The sacrifices listed in Lev 1-5 are classified into two categories: (1) the *hattat* and the guilt offering as compulsory sacrifices for a specific sin or impurity (Lev 1-3); (2) the burnt, the grain, and the peace offering as voluntary sacrifices from several motivations of a person or a group (Lev 4-5). All sacrifices on the national festivals were mandatory. But the order of sacrifices prescribed in Lev 6-7 differs in that the peace offering is listed last. Milgrom (1991b: 134) explains: whereas the order of Lev 1-5 is made from the point of view of the offerers, Lev 6-7 is listed from the point of view of the priests. According to A. Rainey (1970: 486-88), Lev 1-5 address didactic legislations and Lev 6-7 describes administrative details. Hartley (1992: 3) adds a practical reason concerning the peace offering that is listed last in Lev 6-7: "in practice, it [the peace offering] was usually offered after the other sacrifices so that a clan or family might eat a festive meal after the various sacrificial rituals of the day."

[357] For the meaning of the burnt offering, see § 3.4.2.3.

[358] In narrative, only Job 1:5, 42:8. Milgrom (1991b: 153) argues that in a cultic text, the burnt offering effects atonement, either as combination with other offerings (with the *hattat*, e.g., Lev 9:7; with the grain offering, e.g., Lev 14:20) or as the burnt offering alone (e.g., Lev 16:24). However, this thesis argues that these sacrifices accompanied by *hattat* are taken as subsidiary or supplementary sacrifices to the *hattat* sacrifice that plays a primary part. The burnt offerings in Lev 16:24 can also not be considered as independent expiatory sacrifices in terms of the ritual scheme organized for the Day of Atonement, as argued in chapter 3. On the other hand, in canonical perspective, it is likely that the burnt offering was presented for expiation of human sin before the technical expiatory offerings, the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering, were instituted in Leviticus.

[359] Milgrom (2000a; 1477-78; cf. Gane, 2005: 170) countered this idea, reconfirming that the context of Lev 17 is related to the peace offering.

[360] Rendtorff (1985: 26-28); Johar (1988: 611, 617).

and function of blood are not given until Leviticus 17. The enactment of expiatory sacrifices through Leviticus 1-16 comes to a climax in Leviticus 16 with the establishment of the Day of Atonement when the full-scale blood rites are performed. But the explanation about the meaning and function of blood is not given yet. Then Leviticus 17 explains for the first time that the blood of animal makes atonement for its offerer and the reason for it, together with the meaning of blood. Indeed, this is the most suitable place for the explanation of blood, where it could be expected to appear.[361]

It is likely that Leviticus 17:11 immediately envisions the special *hattat* sacrifices in Leviticus 16 that culminated in the ceremony for the national atonement of Israel, with the enormous blood manipulation on the Day of Atonement, even though it might cover other expiatory sacrifices in the previous chapters: the burnt offering and the guilt offering that likewise necessitate the explanation why the blood of the sacrifices can make atonement.

As a final consideration, Leviticus 17:11 makes it clear that blood is the fundamental factor for atonement in expiatory sacrifices, even though other stages and ritual components undeniably contribute to atonement; indeed, atonement is the final result of the entire procedure of an expiatory sacrifice. For example, as for the *hattat* offering, atonement is made by the *hattat* ritual through slaughter, hand imposition, blood manipulations, burning of the suet, and disposal of the flesh (either by eating or burning). But Leviticus 17:11 declares that blood is the decisive component of atonement.

On the other hand, the power of atonement in the concessionary grain *hattat* of without blood is given by the grace of YHWH at his discretion. That is the reason why the idea that atonement is basically possible without blood as well, as in the case of grain *hattat*, must be rejected; it is only a concessional option for the regular quadruped *hattat*. Hence the concessions must be excluded in the argument about the general atonement mechanism of *hattat*.[362]

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[361] For contextuality between Lev 16 and 17 and the meaning of Lev 16 in terms of the structure of Leviticus, see chapter 8.

[362] The fact that the grain *hattat* without blood shedding functions to 'purge' the sancta (5:11-13) seems to be unnatural. How can grain or cereal purge sancta like blood? Milgrom (1991: 306) suggests some grounds for it from the cultic system of Israel's neighbors: "How can semolina effect purgation when it contains no blood, the ritual detergent of the purification offering? It may be no accident that in ancient Mesopotamia flour was indeed used in the *kuppuri* rituals (Geller, 1980: 190-91)." But this thesis argues that in principle atonement is made with blood in keeping with the statement of Lev 17:11: "for it is the blood that makes atonement by the life" (ESV). Hence, the effect of atonement with the grain offering, which is allowed as a concession, is made by God's will and mercy. This thesis points out that while the atonement is made with the grain offering without blood on the authority of God, he virtually

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5.2.4. The meaning of blood-giving on the altar

Scholars have debated about an underlying theological meaning of blood-giving on the altar, apart from the meaning of blood as such declared in Leviticus 17:11 and its function.

Prior observation is that sacrificial blood is never taken to the outside of the camp in the sacrificial rituals, but used in the sanctuary or assigned to it. It implies that all activities with blood in the *hattat* are ritual activities performed around the sanctuary, including even the pouring of blood under the altar, which is regarded as general disposal of blood. In other words, the pouring of blood under the altar in the sanctuary, apart from in the open field, can also be considered a ritual activity in some respects. If not, the blood might as well be taken out to the outside of the camp with the other remains to pour it on the ground and cover it with earth (Lev 17:13; cf. Deut 12:16, 24; 15:23; 1 Sam 14:32-34).

In the sacrificial blood rites, giving of blood on the altar was executed with several modes of gestures that have distinctive functions, as argued above. The questions are raised: does the various ways of blood-giving on the altar have a common theological meaning in all sacrifices, although the gestures differ between the *hattat* sacrifice and the other sacrifices?; or does it have distinctive theological meanings in each of sacrifices?; if the meaning is the same in all sacrifices, what is it?; what is the meaning or function of the action זָרַק 'dash' acted in the other sacrifices except in the *hattat* sacrifice?

It seems that the gesture זָרַק does not have a peculiar trait like the gestures of the *hattat* blood rites that have function to purify the sancta. This thesis presumes that the gesture זָרַק denotes a common theological meaning of blood activities in sacrifices, though the understanding of the meaning is diverse among scholars. It is likely that the gesture זָרַק has the identical theological meaning with the peculiar gestures הִזָּה and נָתַן (possibly including שָׁפַךְ) in the *hattat* ritual, in terms of the fact that all the gestures are the actions to give the blood to the sancta of the sanctuary, though the modes are distinctive. Each of the gestures conveys blood to the altars or the sacred precincts. Therefore, although the gestures in the *hattat* ritual are unique, it is likely that they have the

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gives the semolina the power to purge the sancta by God. Therefore, the כִּפֶּר in the grain *hattat* can also refer to 'purgation' of the sancta contaminated by human evil.

same theological meaning with the gesture of the blood rite in other sacrifices, apart from their purificatory function.

Regarding the 'dashing' (זָרַק) of blood, some scholars argue that the gesture is an action that indicates 'the act of offering blood' (cf. Gilders, 2004: 72-73). When blood is offered to the altar, "the animal is devoted to the altar *pars pro toto*" (Gilders, 2004: 72; cf. Noordtzij, 1982: 35; Budd, 1996: 48). It seems that blood may be a gift or an offering to God. In light of the burnt offering, it appears that the blood might be devoted as part of the 'offering,' because the whole animal, excepts for the skin, is burned on the altar, and the blood is placed on it. For this reason, some scholars contend that blood may be an 'offering' to God.

However, the peace offering indicates that blood is not 'offering' or 'gift. The treatment of the victim's flesh differs between the burnt and the peace offering, although the mode of the blood rite (זָרַק 'dash') is the same between them (Gilders, 2004: 89). Whether the whole carcass or part of it (fat) is burned, only the part burnd on the altar is always called 'food gift' (אִשֶּׁה) of a soothing aroma to the Lord.' Blood is never called 'food gift.' It indicates that blood does not form part of offering.

On the assumption that the meaning of blood-giving to the altar is identical in the burnt and the peace offering, its meaning is more likely the *return of blood to YHWH*, the owner and source of life (M. Noth, 1965: 22-23; cf. Gilders, 2004: 70-71). Knierim (1992: 56) also insists that because blood belongs to Yahweh, "it cannot be part of the offerers' sacrificial gift burnt with his gift upon the altar." That is, blood is not offered as a human gift to God, but returned to its owner God as his. This rationale might be applied to the ram of the ordination and the guilt offering as well, because the gesture זָרַק is still the same in them as well.

On the other hand, the unique gestures in the *hattat* blood rites can also be regarded as the actions that return the blood to the altar, in addition to their purificatory and expiatory function (purgation + ransom), in terms of the fact that the *hattat* blood is placed on/around the altar or the other sancta. Therefore, it is likely that the same rationale can be applied to the *hattat* ritual as a common denominator: in the case of the *hattat* ritual, blood is also returned to the source or the owner of life, to God, through the unique blood rites. Hence the concept that the owner of blood is God and blood is returned to its owner basically underlies the blood rites of the *hattat* ritual which is made for 'ransom' of the soul and 'purgation' of the sancta.

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To the function and meaning of blood, Gilders' view (2004: 78-84) must be added. According to him, hand imposition on the animals and blood-giving on the altar are 'indexical signs' of the relationship between the animal, the offerer, and the altar. Symbolic meanings are attributed to the ritual activities: a symbol conveys a sign. Gilders (2004: 79) says that "a sign may be understood as an index. And the index is in an existential relationship with its object and indicates rather than represents it."

Firstly, hand imposition "indexes a relationship between offerer and animal" (Gilders, 2004: 81). By hand imposition, the offerer is connected with the animal's slaughter,[363] whether he kills it or the officiating priest does;[364] that is, an indexed relationship is created between the offerer and the slaughtered animal.

In the next step, blood manipulation is executed just after slaughter. The application of blood to the altar indexes a relationship between the offerer and the altar, a relationship mediated by the animal and its blood. Significantly, "the altar is a locus of the divine presence" (Gilders, 2004: 82); thus the relationship between the offerer and the altar refers to "a relationship between the deity whose altar it is and the offerer." The officiating priest mediates the offerer's access to the altar by performing the blood manipulation in his place.

Gilders (2004: 82) sums up the relationships between the victim, the offerer, and the altar:

> Thus, apart from any explicit theorizing about what is achieved by the application of blood from the burnt offering to the altar, we can identify an existential linkage, an indexing of a relationship, achieved through the gesture. The offerer, whose relationship with the animal was indexed by the hand-pressing gesture, is linked to the altar, and to Yahweh, . . .

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[363] See Kiuchi's similar view (1987: 112) on the meaning of hand imposition. In this respect, slaughter is a momentous event and a crucial moment in the ritual process (contra Gane, 2005: 60 who devaluates the meaning of the slaughter rite), because the activity is the very moment of seizing the life from the victim by shedding its blood.

[364] Whereas the verb שָׁחַט in MT is singular, the verb σφάξουσι equivalent for it in the LXX is plural: καὶ σφάξουσι τὸν μόσχον (Lev 1:5). A majority of scholars claim that the offerer should slaughter the animal, relying on MT rather than on the LXX (Keil & Delitzsch, 1956 vol.2: 286; Elliger, 1966: 35; Wenham, 1979: 53; Rendtorff, 1985: 49; Hartley, 1992: 21; Gerstenberger, 1996: 29). A few interpreters maintain that the rabbis restricted the slaughter to priests alone (Eilberg-Schwartz 1986: 164). But Milgrom (1991b: 154; also Wright, 1986: 439) argues: "anyone was permitted to perform the immolation (see *Tg. Ps. –J.*; *Jos., Ant.* 3.226), even foreign slaves (Ezek 44:9)."

Through the blood rite, the offerer is connected in some fashion with Yahweh.

Gilders' insight concerning the theological meaning of the blood-giving on the altar is very significant for this thesis, because it gives a clue to the enigma on why human evil, either sin or impurity, contaminates the sanctuary and its sancta. Although Milgrom detected that such a source contaminates the sanctuary, the reason for it has not been explained, why the sanctuary and its sancta are inflicted by human evil even far from the sanctuary.

In chapter 6, this unsolved question will be explored, in light of the establishment of the blood-covenant between YHWH and the Israelites under Mount Sinai narrated in Exodus 24:1-8.

5.3. The disposal of the *hattat* flesh

5.3.1. Peculiarity of the flesh disposal in the *hattat* ritual

After the blood manipulations are finished, the priest should dispose of the remains of the *hattat* sacrifice. The disposal of the *hattat* remains differs from that of the remains in the burnt offering and the peace offering, while the guilt offering follows the same rule of the *hattat* offering (Lev 7:7). In the burnt offering the whole animal, including the entrails that are washed with water, is burned on the altar (Lev 1:8-9, 12-13),[365] except for the skin that is allotted to the officiating priest (Lev 7:8). In the peace offering all fat and certain internal parts[366] should be burned on the altar (Lev 3:3-5, 14-16), and the rest of the flesh should be shared with the lay offerer and the officiating priest (Lev 7:11-34).[367]

The portions of the *hattat* offering burned on the altar are basically the same as those of the peace offering (Lev 4:9-10),[368] but the disposal of its

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[365] As for the bird *hattat* offering, a concessive type, the bird's crop and feathers (or 'contents' [of the crop]; the meaning of the Hebrew term נֹצָה is uncertain) should be taken away in the place of the ashes (Lev 1:16).

[366] The two kidneys and the lobe of the liver (Lev 3:4, 10, 15).

[367] The breast and the right thigh belonged to the priest (Lev 7:29-35), and the other flesh was assigned to the lay offerer (Lev 7:15-21). The offerer, who offered the peace offering, takes the major portion of the meat for the meal with his family and clan (Hartley, 1992: 100).

[368] Lev 4:9-10 (NASB): "and the two kidneys with the fat that is on them, which is on the loins, and the lobe of the liver, which he shall remove with the kidneys, just as it is removed

remains is executed in different ways. There are two ways to deal with the disposal *hattat* flesh. In one case the whole remains of the animal should be burned in a clean place outside the camp where the ashes of sacrificial animals are thrown (Lev 4:11-12; 16:27; Lev 6:4 [11]; cf. Num 19:9). In another case its flesh is assigned to the priest (Lev 6:19-23 [29-30]).[369]

In this chapter, the following problems are discussed: (1) criteria to divide the disposal of the *hattat* remains into the two ways; (2) the function of each disposal; (3) the meaning of Leviticus 10:17 with regard to the function of the disposal.

5.3.2. Two kinds of flesh disposal: the burnt and the eaten *hattat*

The *hattat* sacrifices can be classified into 'the burnt *hattat* sacrifice' and 'the eaten *hattat* sacrifice' according to the ways to dispose of its flesh (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 263). Why should the *hattat* flesh be burned in one case, and be eaten by the priest in the other case? There are two reasons for the difference.

The first is the place of the sanctuary where the blood of the sacrifice is manipulated (Milgrom, 1991b: 261). In the case where the blood is treated outside the shrine, that is, at the outer altar (4:25, 30), the meat is assigned to the officiating priest (6:19 [26]). But when it is brought into the shrine (i.e., in the shrine *hattat*) (4:6-7), the carcass, except for its suet, should be burned 'on the ash heap outside the camp' (4:11-12) (Milgrom, 1991b: 261); the text confirms this rule several times (Lev 6:23 [30]; 10:18; 16:27).[370]

However, this rule is not applied to the *hattat* rituals for the priests that were made in the cultic inauguration (Lev 8-9). In these cases of the outer altar *hattat*, the blood of the *hattat* bulls for the priests was daubed on the outer altar:

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from the ox of the sacrifice of peace offerings, and the priest is to offer them up in smoke on the altar of burnt offering."

[369] In this case, the other parts of the *hattat* animal, like its skin, entrails, other internal organs and dung, are not mentioned in the text. In light of the fact that the entrails of the burnt offering are washed to remove the dung and offered on the altar, it is implied that the entrails of the eaten *hattat* animial are allotted to the priests. The skin of the eaten *hattat* animal is also presumed be given to them (cf. Lev 7:8), while the skin of the burnt *hattat* animal is burnt outside the camp.

[370] NIV: "But any sin offering whose blood is brought into the Tent of Meeting to make atonement in the Holy Place must not be eaten; it must be burned" (Lev 6:30).

[371] (1) the *hattat* offering for the high priest and his household at their ordination service (Lev 8:17 = Exod 29:4); (2) the *hattat* offering for the priests in the inauguration of the altar on the eighth day service (Lev 9:11) (the *hattat* offering for the congregation should be eaten, because on this day the priests were treated separately from the congregation). In these cases, the carcass of the *hattat* animal for the priests was burned outside the camp, rather than eaten by the priest, even though the blood was daubed on the horns of the outer altar, instead of bringing it into the shrine.[372] Milgrom (1991b: 264) found out another rule from these cases, saying: "In both cases the offerers of the *hattat* are the priests and not the people, and here another rule comes into play: priests are

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[371] That is the reason why Kiuchi categorizes them into three types of *hattat*: (1) the blood rite at the outer altar + the carcass burned outside the camp (Exod 29:12, 14 = Lev 8:15, 17; 9:9, 11); (2) the blood rite at the outer altar + the flesh consumption of the priest (Lev 4:25, 30, 34; 6:17-22 [24-29]; etc); (3) the blood rite at the inner sancta + the carcass burned outside the camp (Lev 4:5-12, 16-21; 16:14ff, 27; cf. 6:23 [30]; 10:18).

[372] Why was the blood of the burnt *hattat* offerings for Aaron and his household not brought into the shrine at the cultic inauguration, unlike in Lev 4? Milgrom (1991b: 580-81; 636-37) suggests two possibilities. First, the two cases differ from the cases of the *hattat* offerings in Lev 4:1-5:13 in their purpose and nature (1991b: 581). Whereas the *hattat* offering for the anointed priest is made for inadvertent sins (4:3-12), that for him and his household on this inaugural day (Lev 9:8-14) is not for their specific sin. Nevertheless for the consecration of the altar (Lev 8 = Exod 29), it is described that the *hattat* offerings are to be repeated to decontaminate the altar everyday for a week (8:33-35). Milgrom (1991b: 581) thinks that because of human proximity to the altar during the period, "it is not difficult to contemplate the incidence of unavoidable physical impurities (e.g., a nocturnal emission in Lev 15:16-17)," and the *hattat* sacrifices were offered "to purge the altar of the pollution they may have inadvertently caused." In other words, the sins/impurities were too minor for blood to be brought into the interior of the shrine. The effect of sins/impurities was limited to the pollution of the altar (Milgrom, 1991b: 522). The second possible an111swer, as followed by the majority of scholars (Janowski 1982: 227-28; Milgrom, 1991b: 581, 636-37) is that both of Lev 8 and 9 belong to this block of Priestly material (Lev 8-9) which preserves an older form of the *hattat* ritual. "Originally, every *hattat*, regardless of where its blood was applied, was burned outside the camp and only subsequently did the Priestly legislators introduce an innovation: the *hattat* whose blood was daubed on the outer altar had to be eaten by the priests" (Milgrom, 1991b: 637). If this is true, why were Lev 8 (Exod 29) and 9 preserved? It is because "anomalous rituals are those of the priestly consecration and the inaugural service. They took place once, never to be repeated again" (Milgrom, 1991b: 636). Preferring to this historical interpretation, Milgrom (1991b: 581) refuses the first answer, because, according to the Priestly sacrificial system, the *hattat* offering is brought for known sins (Lev 4:14), not for suspected ones that requires the guilt offering. However, as argued in chapter 1, Lev 4 must not be regarded as a standardized form for all other *hattat* offerings, because the rule was stipulated only for specific sins. The *hattat* offering is also required in some cases where no specific sins or impurity are envisaged, as in Lev 8:14-17; 9:8; Num 8:8. The *hattat* ritual in Lev 8, for example, contributes to 'the unique processes' for the consecration of the priests and the altar at the cultic inauguration (Gane, 2005: 45; cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 44-46; Gorman, 1997: 62). Therefore, "perhaps we can understand the difference in the loci of blood applications in terms of ritual function, without resorting to a diachronic resolution and/or a theory of differing authorship" (Gane 2005: 45).

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not to eat their own expiatory sacrifices (cf. 6:16). They are not to benefit from their own offenses" (cf. Hartley, 1992: 61; Gane, 2005: 46, 88).[373]

In sum, there are two guidelines for the cases where the priests are not allowed to eat the flesh of the *hattat* sacrifices: either (1) when the blood of the victim is brought and treated in the shrine (and the *adytum*, as revealed in Lev 16, though only once per year); or (2) when the animal is offered for the priests, whether it is the shrine *hattat* or the outer altar *hattat*, because they cannot acquire a benefit from their own *hattat* offering.

By and large these two standards can converge on rule (2), because the *hattat* sacrifice, the blood of which is brought into the shrine, is always related to the priests,[374] as implied in Leviticus 4:1-21, except for the case of the sacrificial goat for the congregation that was not offered for the preists on the Day of Atonement[375] (cf. 6:16 [23] where the priest may not eat his grain offering but had to burn it on the altar).

5.3.3. Function of the *hattat* flesh disposal

Scholars have debated on the function attached to the disposal of the *hattat* flesh. Their primary consensus is that the eaten *hattat* flesh was given to the officiating priest as a prebend for his performance of the *hattat* ritual, as Leviticus 6:18-23 (25-30) prescribes. However, they have debated whether the disposal of the *hattat* flesh has an additional function, focusing on the exegesis of Leviticus 10:17, which appears to indicate its particular function. Also this is closely related to the interpretation on the function of burning the *hattat* flesh outside the camp.

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[373] Kurtz's view (1980: 237) is that as for the *hattat* sacrifices (bulls) for the priests in Lev 8-9, they were not allowed to eat its flesh as unique cases, and burned it outside the camp, although it is the outer altar *hattat*, because it was too holy for the priest to consume its flesh. However, this must be denied, because the *hattat* sacrifice for the congregation on the eighth day service was performed on the outer altar in the same manner and should be eaten by the priests, although a goat was offered rather than a bull, unlike that for the priest.

[374] Hartley (1992: 63) notes: "Because the priests participate in this sin [of the congregation] as members of the covenant community, they may not receive any of the animal's parts."

[375] The only case where the blood of the *hattat* goat was brought into the inner precincts is the sacrificial goat of the special *hattat* on the Day of Atonement. The blood of the goat is treated in the *adytum*, in the shrine, and in the court (on the outer altar). But in this case the goat was one of a pair that consists of the two goats equal to the value of a bull so as to be a *hattat* for the congregation (cf. ch. 3). Therefore, in a special way this case could fall under the rule of Leviticus, which requires the *hattat* offering of a bull for the whole congregation.

5.3.3.1. Contradictory implications between the texts

Many scholars contend that since the *hattat* animal is declared to be most holy (קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים) by the texts, it could not be contaminated with sin or impurity, and therefore the priest should eat it inside 'a holy place' in the court of the Tent of Meeting (Lev 6:19 [26]; cf. 10:17). Consequently, they deny the transference of sin/impurity to the *hattat* animal.[376] It seems to be confirmed by the fact that either the carcass is burned in 'a clean place' outside the camp, or the flesh is eaten by the priest in 'a holy place' inside the sanctuary. Moreover, the offerer's forgiveness is declared before the disposal of the *hattat* flesh is finalized (4:20-21).

In this respect, it seems that the disposal of the flesh is not connected with the removal of sin. The fact that the *kipper* and forgiveness are mentioned before the instructions concerning the burning of the flesh implies that the latter does not constitute a part of the *kipper* process (Kiuchi, 2007: 97). The same rule can be applied to the priestly eating of the *hattat* flesh in light of the context of Leviticus 9-10; the atonement is achieved before the eating of the flesh, because the divine fire certified the effect of the *hattat* ritual (Lev 9:24) before the flesh disposal (Kiuchi, 1987: 49). Thus Kiuchi (1987: 51) confirms:

> With regard to the symbolic meaning of eating the *hattat* we do not accept the view that atonement depends on eating the *hattat*, simply because neither v.17 (Lev 10:17) nor any other passage suggests this.

In addition, some scholars (e.g., Gane, 2005: 57) point out that in Leviticus 4 the *hattat* flesh is burned in a 'clean place' outside the camp, and it does not require the ablution of the remains-handler for his entrance into the camp; therefore, the flesh is not contaminated by sin/impurity, and its disposal are not to remove sin/impurity and to effect its consequent atonement.

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[376] Matthes (1903: 97-119); Van der Merwe (1962: 39); Snaith (1977: 42); Kurtz, (1980: 228-30); Kiuchi (1987: 115-16). Distinguishing between 'sin' and 'guilt' (1987: 115), Kiuchi (1987: 49) contends that the officiating priest bears the 'guilt' of the ordinary Israelites as their agent through the blood manipulation rather than the eating of the flesh. To him, the flesh is clean and not connected to 'guilt' or 'sin.' On the other hand, Kiuchi (1987: 114) distinguishes between the victim's sacrificial death in the sanctuary and non-sacrificial death outside it, saying that the sacrificial death is not regarded as defiling, but giving 'life' in place of the sinner (Lev 17:11), whereas "the death of an animal outside the sanctuary may defile (e.g., Lev 11:38ff)." According to Kiuchi, therefore, it is wrong to say that the *hattat* sacrifice becomes impure through the hand imposition.

But it was already argued in chapter 4 that hand imposition may have the function to transfer sin. In addition, there is a certain hint in the context and statement of Leviticus 10:17 to indicate that the *hattat* flesh is defiled by sin or impurity.

Referring to Leviticus 10:17, a number of interpreters have argued that the eating or burning of the *hattat* flesh serves to 'remove/bear the iniquity' (עָוֹן נָשָׂא) of the offerer, because the *hattat* flesh became contaminated by human evil.[377] Keil & Delitzsch (1956 vol.2: 355) comment that 'to bear the iniquity' in 10:17 signifies "to take the sin of another upon one's self, for the purpose of cancelling it, to make expiation for it." By eating the flesh, the priests took away the sin. Milgrom (1991b: 262) has the same idea, following Y. Kaufmann's argument (in fact, he dismissed his previous view [1976: 333-34]): "Y. Kaufmann suggests that because both *hattat* offerings are purificatory, they are dangerous and must be eliminated either by eating or by burning (1937-56: 1. 568-69). He correctly adduces 10:17b to prove that the *hattat* is eaten by the priests who thereby destroy Israel's sins."

Finally, some commentators interpret that Moses' anger and rebuke for Aaron's negligence of the *hattat* flesh consumption in Leviticus 10:17 may give an additional hint that the flesh is contaminated by sin or impurity, because in view of the syntax it can be understood that Moses' anger was due to Aaron's failure to remove the iniquity of the congregation (נָשָׂא עָוֹן) by not eating it. Therefore, Leviticus 10:17 seems to support the rule that the *hattat* animal for the congregation should be eaten by the priest to remove the iniquity of the congregation. But other scholars have countered it by suggesting a different interpretation of v. 17.

5.3.3.2. Syntactic exegesis of Leviticus 10:17

In Leviticus 10:17, Moses reproaches Aaron for his neglect to consume the flesh of the eaten *hattat* offering:

מַדּוּעַ לֹא־אֲכַלְתֶּם אֶת־הַחַטָּאת בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הוּא
וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם לִפְנֵי יְהוָה

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[377] Keil & Delitzsch (1956 vol.2: 355); Milgrom (1991b: 261-62; 623-27; 635-40); and others.

This is the only place in the Hebrew Bible that explains the function of the *hattat* disposal, giving a decisive clue to the puzzle of the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering.

In connection with this verse, two questions are raised: (1) what is the meaning of לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם לִפְנֵי יְהוָה in 17b?; (2) what is the cause of Moses' anger? For the present discussion, the word עָוֹן is rendered 'iniquity,' although it has been translated as a variety of meanings (iniquity, sin, transgression, guilt, culpability),[378] depending on the divergent views of scholars on the ritual dynamics and the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* offering.

There are three interpretations of this sentence: (1) the priests simply 'remove the iniquity/sin' by eating the *hattat* flesh;[379] (2) the priests 'bear the guilt' substitutionally for persons until the Day of Atonement;[380] (3) the priests 'bear responsibility' as their duty to purify the sanctuary on behalf of the people and they receive the flesh as a prebend for the duty.[381]

The syntactical exegesis of the verse should be attempted to discern the meaning of this verse. In interpreting the infinitive phrase, לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה, the first question is thrown about the meaning of the preposition ל that is divided into two views, and the second question concerns itself with the meaning of the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in this context, which was discussed in chapter 2.

With regard to the preposition ל, scholars, who think that the *hattat* flesh is not contaminated by sin or impurity, attempted to interpret it as 'for' or 'because of,' while rendering the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן with 'bear responsibility'; "[it was given to you] for bearing the responsibility of the community" (Milgrom, 1983: 70). However, as Kiuchi (1987: 50, following Knierim, 1965: 221-22) points out, the rendering 'responsibility' is a neutral word so that it may be not suitable for the term 'עָוֹן' that has a negative nuance. In addition, such a use of the preposition ל in the infinitive phrase (לָשֵׂאת) lacks grammatical grounds.

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[378] The renderings are: τὴν ἁμαρτίαν (LXX); 'sin' (GWN; Milgrom, 1991b: 262); 'iniquity' (Milgrom, 1991b: 623; ESV; JPS, KJV, RSV); 'guilt' (Kiuchi, 1987: 49; NASB; NIV; NRSV); 'culpability' (Gane, 2005: 104)'; 'transgression' (Schwartz; 1991: 34-36; 1995: 8-15).

[379] Kaufmann (1937-56: vol. 1. 568-69); Keil & Delitzsch (1956, vol. 2: 355); Rodriguez (1979: 130-36); Levine (1989: 62-63); Milgrom (1991b: 262, 623). The rendering of עָוֹן in this verse as the concept of *sin* differs between scholars. For instance, Schwartz (1991: 34-36; 1995: 8-15) employs 'transgression': "so that the priests can carry away the transgression of the community." But most interpreters employ 'iniquity.'

[380] Kiuchi (1987: 46-49); Rendtorff (2005: 542); Gane (2005: 99-105, 294).

[381] Ehrlich (1968 vol. 2: 37); Milgrom's earlier view (1976: 333-34).

The preposition is likely to be the meaning of 'purpose' from the syntactic perspective, referring to 'in order to remove or bear iniquity.'[382] It means that the officiating priest does not simply eat it as a 'prebend' for his responsible labor in the *hattat* ritual. The activity is rather performed to remove/bear the iniquity of the Israelites.

As for the phrase לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם in v. 17b, Janowski's view (1982: 239 n. 27) is that the first infinitive phrase, 'to remove the iniquity of the community' (לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה), is explained by the consecutive infinitive phrase, 'to make atonement for them' (לְכַפֵּר עֲלֵיהֶם). It means that "the priests are assigned to bear the guilt for the congregation of Israel as mediators *by* (ל; Hebrew and emphasis mine) making atonement for them with the *hattat* sacrifice" (Kiuchi, 1987: 47; NIV also).[383] But the meaning 'by' of ל is rare and seems not to fit the syntax.[384]

Concerning the meaning of phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן, several interpretations have been submitted. Generally the term עָוֹן is rendered either 'iniquity' that refers to a kind of sin, or 'guilt' that connotes the responsibility for a sin. Kiuchi (1987: 49) contends that throughout the *hattat* context, this Hebrew term generally refers to 'guilt' as a consequence of sin, saying that the two English terms, 'sin' and 'guilt,' which have led scholars to misunderstanding and wrong arguments, must be discriminated. Hence Kiuchi translates לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה as 'to bear the guilt of the congregation.'

However, Kiuchi does not take the phrase 'to bear the guilt' as referring to the effect of the priestly eating of the flesh, posing a different interpretation about the first sentence וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם ('I gave it to you' v. 17bα) in אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה. וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם לָשֵׂאת Following Kurtz (1980: 242-43), he (1987: 49-50) sees 'it' in the clause as the *hattat* animal, instead of its flesh; "for it [*hattat*] is most holy; He gave it [*hattat*] to you" (כִּי קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים הוּא וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם).

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[382] Cf. the LXX: ἵνα ἀφέλητε τὴν ἁμαρτίαν τῆς συναγωγῆς (Lev 10:17bα). Since the LXX, this has been widely accepted by interpreters, especially by modern scholars who insist that the priests bear or remove the iniquity of the congregation by eating the *hattat* flesh which absorbed sin and/or impurity.

[383] Cf. Milgrom's rendering (1983: 70): "and I (*sic*) have given (the *hattat*) to you for bearing responsibility of the community *by* performing purgation rites before the Lord on their half" (emphasis mine).

[384] The meaning 'by' of the preposition ל seems to be possible in some cases of לְ in light of *GKC* § 114o which explains that in those cases it can express motives (cf. Lev 8:15). But the precise meaning of the cases cited in *GKC* is not clear.

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According to this view, because it is the *hattat* animal rather than its flesh that was given to the priests for removing the sin of Israel, eating of the flesh is not related to bearing/removing of the 'sin.' Rather, the very *hattat* animal was given to the priests so that they perform the blood manipulation on the altar in order to bear their guilt and thereby resolve their sin: "through the blood manipulation the priests bear the guilt of the congregation" (Kiuchi, 1987: 49; cf. p. 52). As a result, the flesh is assigned to the priests only as the prebend for their duty and "eating the *hattat* does not belong to the atoning process" (1987: 51). That is, Kiuchi (1987: 135) contends that the priestly eating of the *hattat* flesh does not serve to make atonement for the offerer, but "*signifies* (emphasis mine) that priests have substitutionarily borne the guilt of the people."[385] The priests would keep bearing the guilt of the congregation until they will transfer it to the Azazel goat through the two-hand imposition on the Day of Atonement (see ch. 6).

However, in light of the syntactical structure of v. 17, as displayed by Gane (2005: 94-95),[386] 'it' manifestly refers to the *hattat* 'flesh.' Therefore, the flesh was given to the priests. They should eat it to remove the sin of Israel. Furthermore, if the flesh is merely a priestly prebend, why did Moses get angry with the priestly neglect of the practice? Therefore, the syntax and context of v. 17 implies that the priestly eating is connected with the bearing/removing of the sin.

What is the meaning of the priestly נָשָׂא עָוֹן? Is it 'to bear the iniquity' or 'to remove iniquity'? As debated in chapter 2, the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן depends on who/what the subject is. It seems that the answer may be found in the priests' socio-religious status as mediators between God and the congregation

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[385] However, Kiuchi (1987: 135) continues to argue that as far as the burning of the *hattat* carcass outside the camp is concerned, it "probably symbolizes 'removal of guilt' [of the priests] . . . this rite may have some bearing on the atoning process." In this way, Kiuchi distinguishes between the eaten *hattat* and the burnt *hattat* concerning the function of the flesh disposal. For the criticism on Kiuchi's argument, see chapter 7.

[386] The syntactical meaning is revealed in the chiasm of v. 17 (Gane, 2005: 94):

A אֲכַלְתֶּם	אֲכַלְתֶּם אֶת־הַחַטָּאת
B בִּמְקוֹם הַקֹּדֶשׁ	X
B¹ קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים	וְאֹתָהּ נָתַן לָכֶם
A¹ נָתַן לָכֶם	

A and B correspond with B¹ and A¹ in this chiasm. In addition, as displayed on the right chiasm, 'you [did not] eat the *hattat*' is equivalent to 'he gave it to you.' In this syntax, 'it' means the *hattat* as 'flesh' rather than the *hattat* offering.

of Israel. They are the representatives of the Israelites before God and simultaneously the 'surrogate' of God (Milgrom, 1991b: 623) before the Israelites. Thus the question is: when a priest makes the נָשָׂא עָוֹן action for a person's sin, is he removing the sinner's iniquity in place of God? Or does he take the evil on himself and bear it as a substitutionary agent for the sinner? As argued in chapter 2, it is very likely that the former idea is more feasible. That is, the priest performs the *hattat* ritual to 'remove' the offerer's sin (even his own sin) and to 'purify' the consequence of the evil, namely, the impurity of the sancta; thus the priest makes atonement for the sinner so that he could be forgiven.

As Gane (2005: 104) says, in view of Exodus 34:7 and Leviticus 10:17 the priest is involved in God's נָשָׂא עָוֹן action by eating the *hattat* flesh, although he interprets the phrase to be 'bear the culpability'[387] (of the congregation) rather than their 'sin/iniquity.'[388] Likewise, Milgrom (1991b: 623) comments on the phrase "to remove the iniquity of the community" (לָשֵׂאת אֶת־עֲוֹן הָעֵדָה) in v. 17: "True, the subject is man, not God, but in this case it is the priest who serves as the divine *surrogate* (Italics mine) of earth and exclusively so in the sanctuary."

Milgrom's view is feasible in light of the priestly cultic concept. The priests do not function as the agents for persons or for the congregation who take over the guilt/iniquity from them in exchange of and in the substitute for them (contra Kiuchi and Gane), although they are the representatives of the congregation before God. Throughout the priestly literature it seems to be the

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[387] Gane's 'culpability' corresponds to Kiuchi's 'guilt.'

[388] Gane (2005: 100) explains the mediatorial role of the priests between the people and YHWH:

> By eating the flesh, the priests serve as a mediatorial bridge between the Israelites and YHWH: by taking the iniquity of the people that they would otherwise continue to bear (cf. 5:1), the priests identify with them. By removing the iniquity, the priests identity with YHWH, who removes iniquity (Exod 34:7)

Even though this statement is acceptable, his argument concerning the definition of the term עָוֹן in Lev 10:17 is not consistent between 'iniquity' and 'culpability,' as far as 'iniquity' is used as a meaning of sin. According to his theory of the *hattat*, the offerer's sin/iniquity is conveyed to the animal with the transference of its ownership (not through hand imposition), and removed from him; but the culpability, a consequence of the sin, still remains and the priests take it substitutionally at the moment when they eat the *hattat* flesh (for the summary and refutation of his theory, see ch. 7).

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sacrificial animals which take over and bear the iniquity of the Israelites.[389] The animals are slaughtered and their blood is shed in the stead of the offerers. They are substitutionary sacrifices which YHWH permits in exchange for the people of Israel.

Therefore, there is no reason that the priests must bear the 'sins' of the Israelites as if they are substitutionary victims for them. In this regard, Milgrom (1991b: 262) is right, when he says "the *hattat* is eaten by the priests who thereby destroy Israel's sins."[390] The priests carry out their duty to *remove the sin* (נָשָׂא עָוֹן) of the people by eating the flesh (or by burning it under his control as well), while they minister in the sanctuary as 'divine surrogate of earth.'

The final question of this verse is this: what is the definition of the term עָוֹן in this verse? Is its rendering 'iniquity' or 'guilt'? As noted, the interpreters and the English Bibles are divided between 'guilt' and 'iniquity.' Lately, a new rendering, 'culpability,' is suggested by Gane (2005: 101-02), who says that it is in 'the sense of negative responsibility' that the sinner may suffer the consequence of sin.[391] In this respect, Gane's rendering 'culpability' is similar to Kiuchi's 'guilt' that signifies the consequence of sin. Gane (2005: 100) argues that the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן refers to the culpability caused by the offerer's moral fault alone, and it is not related to a person's physical impurity. Therefore, in the *hattat* ritual for impurity (Lev 12-15), the flesh is given to the priests purely

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[389] Cf. Isa 53:4-5 that describe a human agent who bears "our infirmities/grieves" (חֳלָיֵנוּ, v. 4). In this passage, however, he is the righteous servant of YHWH (צַדִּיק עַבְדִּי, v. 11) rather than a priest. Further, he is metaphorically portrayed as a *lamb* which is sheared and slaughtered as a substitute for the people of Israel (Isa 53:7). As for Ezekiel's case who was commanded to bear the iniquity of Israel (Ezek 4:1-17; vv. 4-6), his bearing was a dramatic performnance to demonstrate and warn against the impending fearful punishment of Israel for their sins rather than he had to bear their iniqutieis and punishment substitutionally in place of them. In the tradition of the New Testament as well, Jesus is depicted as a substitutionary *lamb* which bears the iniquities/sins of the people (Joh 1:29, 36; Act 8:32; 1 Co 5:7; 1 Pe 1:19; Rev 5:6, 12) rather than as a priest. The blood of Jesus indicates that he was sacrificed as a symbolic sacrificial animal (Joh 1:7; Rom 5:9; Eph 1:7; Heb 9:12, 14; 10:19; 13:12; Rev 1:5), but not as a symbolic high priest who ministers in the sanctuary before God as representative for the people (Heb 2:17; 3:1; 7, etc in Hebrews).

[390] Here Milgrom's rendering for the term עָוֹן is 'sin,' but in other places (1991b: 623), he employs 'iniquity.' His inconsistent renderings of the term עָוֹן in his commentary (1991b) is problematic and self-contradictory, because he (1991b: 623-24) argues that the iniquity (עָוֹן) in Lev 10:17 refers to 'impurity' of the sancta, instead of the offerer's sin.

[391] To Gane, this refers to the offerer's 'responsibility' (= culpability) for the consequence of his evil, and not to the priestly 'responsibility' as their duty that is performed to offer the *hattat* sacrifice at the sanctuary for the sinner; the priests bear the offerer's responsibility (= culpability) substitutionally.

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as a prebend without bearing 'culpability' (Gane, 2005: 100). By contrast, in the *hattat* ritual for sin, the officiating priest bears the offerer's 'culpability' for his sin as his substitute by eating the *hattat* flesh, and at the same time the flesh is given as his prebend for his bearing of it.

Gane's idea is the same as Kiuchi's one in that the *hattat* flesh is not contaminated by sin or impurity. Therefore, it is given to the priests purely as their perquisite for bearing the culpability of the congregation as a substitute or an agent for them. However, Gane and Kiuchi differ in understanding the dynamics of the *hattat* blood rites (for details of difference between them and the references, see ch. 7). Kiuchi contends that the officiating priest purifies the sancta with the *hattat* blood, and by so doing, he bears the guilt of the offerer until the Day of Atonement when the high priest transfers all the guilt of Israel to the Azazel goat, as the representative of the congregation. In contrast, Gane (2005:169–71) submits a unique explanation, following Johar: the offerer's sin is transferred from him to the sancta through the blood rite; blood is a vehicle to convey sin from the offerer to the sancta. The sanctuary and its sancta are in the polluted state until the Day of Atonement when the high priest should purify the accumulated impurities from each precinct of the three partite sanctuary.

On the other hand, Milgrom (1991b: 623-24) argues that in Leviticus 10:17 the term עָוֹן denotes 'impurity,' the substance that is removed from the sancta, although he consistently translates it as 'iniquity.' Milgrom's idea comes from his conviction that the impurity is generated in the sancta by the congregation's iniquity: there is no more sin or impurity of the offerer, because it was already removed and purified by his confession or by the purificatory rites. Therefore, in Leviticus 10:17 the evil עָוֹן belongs to the sancta rather than to persons. Hence in this verse the 'iniquity' refers to the impurity of the sancta.

Consequently, there is an inconsistency in Milgrom's note concerning the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17. In one place he sees the destruction of 'Israel's sins' as the function of the priestly flesh consumption (1991b: 262), but in other places he basically prefers 'iniquity' to 'sin' for the term, saying that although the Hebrew term can be rendered 'iniquity,' it refers to the 'impurity' of the Israelites; it is "the impurity arising from Israel's ritual and moral failings that has polluted the sanctuary" (1991b: 624); in brief, when the priest eat the flesh, he swallows and remove the impurity of the sancta absorbed into the blood, *pars pro toto* of the animal, through the blood rites.

In sum, according to Milgrom, when the priests perform the נָשָׂא עָוֹן action, they always 'remove the impurity' from the sancta rather than 'remove

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the sin/iniquity' from the offerers. By contrast, Gane and Kiuchi regard עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17 as 'guilt' or 'culpability,' that is, a consequential liability of sin. Therefore, what is borne by the priests is guilt or culpability, rather than the iniquity or sin of person(s). But they differ in that to Kiuchi, 'bearing the guilt' is done through the blood rites, and not through 'eating the flesh,' whereas to Gane, 'bearing the culpability' is a resultant effect of eating the flesh. Kiuchi's idea is a logical result of his conviction that atonement is not related to the disposal of the flesh, because the atonement and forgiveness is accomplished before the flesh is eaten or burned. Both Gane and Kiuchi contend that the priests keep bearing the guilt or culpability until the Day of Atonement. However, despite this agreement, their explanations about the ritual dynamics and the atonement mechanism of the *hattat* sacrifice follow divergent track, as will be argued in chapter 7.

This thesis argues that עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17 can contain the meaning of both the offerer's sin and the sancta impurity. It is a natural conclusion of the *hattat* theory that will be submitted by this study in chapter 7: the sin of the offerer is transferred to the victim, and the impurity of the sancta is absorbed into its flesh through the blood rites. In the case of impurity, however, because the offerer's ritual impurity is fully cleansed before the *hattat* offering is made in the sanctuary, only the impurity of the altar, which is generated by his impurity, is absorbed into the carcass and removed by the priest's eating of the flesh.

Since the impurity of the sancta is caused by human evil, 'the iniquity' (עָוֹן) of the congregation in 10:17 is used as an all-inclusive term that encompasses the consequence of their sin, namely, the impurity of the sancta. In view of the context, it seems that in this verse Moses conceived the general rules of the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 4-6, while its rules concerning ritual impurities were not yet stipulated, because they appear in Leviticus 11-15. If so, the evil term 'iniquity' in 10:17 may refer to 'sin(s)' of the congregation rather than 'ritual impurity,' although it was not a *specific* sin(s), but probably a latent or implicit sin(s).

5.3.3.3. Functional difference between two disposals of the *hattat* flesh

With regard to the above conclusion, the following ritual dynamics is deduced from the statement of Leviticus 10:17 and the burning rite of the *hattat* flesh:

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Eating or burning of the *hattat* flesh → removal of evil (נָשָׂא עָוֹן) → atonement

It is inferred that this rule can also be applied to the *hattat* offering for impurity (Lev 12-15). That is, the priest would eat the flesh that absorbed the impurity from the outer altar that was defiled by the offerer's ritual impurity (the ritual impurity defiles only the outer altar). As mentioned, in the case of a ritual impurity the flesh becomes impure by transference of the impurity from the outer altar, but the offerer's impurity is not absorbed into the flesh, because it was fully cleansed through the purificatory rites.

For this reason, it is assumed that in the case of the *hattat* offering for the priestly impurity, whether it is made by a high priest or by a member of the priestly house, he or she would be obliged to offer a *hattat* animal for it, according to the rules in Leviticus 12-15. Although the blood would be applied to the outer alter (there is no graduated *hattat* offerings by the offerer's socio-religious status in Lev 12-15), the priest could not eat the flesh of the *hattat* sacrifice offered for his impurity, because of the rule that the offerer cannot benefit from his offering.

By contrast, in the case of a moral impurity, the victim becomes defiled with both the sin from the sinner and the impurity from the sancta. Therefore, when the priest eats or burn it, he would remove and destroy both the human sin/impurity and the impurity of the sancta.

To sum up, there are two types of *hattat* offering: the eaten type and the burnt type. There are two standards to distinguish between the two types. The flesh must be burned: (1) when the blood of the *hattat* animal is brought into the shrine; (2) when the *hattat* animal is sacrificed for the priest himself.[392] Each mode of the flesh disposal has its own function to remove the evil.

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[392] Milgrom's opinion (1991b: 625) concerning disposal of the *hattat* flesh is as follows:

> Once the blood has removed the impurities [of the sancta] they are transferred to the carcass, which must now be disposed of. Because a carcass bearing severe impurities is burned (4:12; 16:27), it must therefore follow that the carcass bearing lesser impurities is eliminated by ingestion.

His view is insufficient, because it is inferred that in the case of a ritual impurity, the standard cannot be the gravity of impurity. Only when the priestly household offers the *hattat* sacrifice for their own impurity, they could not eat it but have to burn it outside the camp.

5.3.4. Other implications on the contamination of the *hattat* flesh

Even though the exegesis of Leviticus 10:17 indicates that the *hattat* flesh is contaminated by sin and/or impurity, a number of scholars have denied that the state of the flesh becomes impure, referring to the declaration that the *hattat* animal is most holy (6:18 [25], 22 [29]; 7:6; 10:17). But there are additional hints to support the contamination of the *hattat* carcass.

Milgrom refers to extra biblical data to prove the contamination of the *hattat* flesh. According to him (1991b: 637), the rabbis thought that the priestly ingestion of the *hattat* flesh led to expiation: "the priests eat and [thereby] the offerers are expiated" (*Sipra*, Shemini 2:4; etc). In the ancient Near East there were a number of cases where sin or impurity was absorbed into the ritual substance like an animal (Milgrom, 1991b: 264). On these grounds, he concludes that the same concept can be applied to the *hattat* sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible.

To these extra biblical proofs, however, several biblical data can also be added. A question is readily raised: if the *hattat* animal is most holy, why did the burnt *hattat* offering, let alone the eaten *hattat* offering, have to be burned outside the camp rather than on the outer alter in the sanctuary? After burning it why should the remains-handler take the purificatory rite before his entrance into the camp?[393] Such disposal of the carcass outside of the camp gives an impression that it is impure, although it is instructed that it should be burned in a clean place outside the camp. That is, it is likely that the thrown carcass of the *hattat* animal is too unclean to be burned on the altar of the sanctuary inside the camp. The assumption might be corroborated by other sacrificial cases.

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[393] As for the reason of the flesh burning, three suggestions are presented (see Kiuchi, 1987: 133). First, the burning was to prevent profanation of the *hattat* flesh (Dillmann, 1880: 422). But it must be declined, because "profanation could have been prevented by eating the flesh" (Kiuchi, 1987: 133). Second, the flesh is regarded as a useless part of a sacrificial animal (Wenham, 1979: 158). However, if it was holy, why was it useless (Kiuchi, 1987: 133)? Why was it not burnt on the altar, if it could not be eaten by the priest, because it was offered for the sin of the priest himself? Third view is that because the *hattat* sacrifice is purificatory, probably its flesh is contaminated with sin or impurity and becomes unclean. If so, why was the eaten *hattat* animal consumed by the priest, since it is unclean? This thesis is in favor of the third view, as argued above: the priest removed and eliminated the evil by eating the *hattat* flesh where mild evil was absorbed. At the same time it was given to the priest as a prebend, while it is still holy as a sacrifice offered to the sanctuary. For coexistence of holiness and impurity, see § 5.3.4.2.

5.3.4.1. Analogy with the remains disposal in other offerings

In the grain offering for the priests, the cereal should be burned on the altar (Lev 6:16 [23]), probably by the rule that the officiating priest are not to benefit from his own offering. Significantly, it is not burned outside the camp, because perhaps it is clean. In contrast, the *hattat* offering for the priests is burned outside the camp, although the *hattat* offering for nonpriestly persons, including the grain *hattat* (Lev 5:11-23), is eaten by the priests. It implies that the *hattat* flesh is unclean.

This can be compared with the rule stipulating the disposal of the peace offering flesh (Lev 7:15-21). The flesh of the peace offering for thanksgiving must be eaten on the very day of its offering, and the offerer must leave nothing of it until the morning (v. 15). The flesh of a votive or a freewill offering may be eaten on the next day; however, it must be burned outside the camp from the third day onwards (v. 16-17), presumably in the clean place where the ashes of the burnt offering were thrown (Lev 6:4 [11]) and the *hattat* remains are burnd (Lev 4:12). It is forbidden to eat the flesh that is overdue, because it is 'impure' (פִּגּוּל) (v. 18 NIV; 'abomination' RSV).

From this observation, a rule can be deduced: after a sacrificial ritual is finished, any unclean remains should be taken out outside the camp to be burned and destroyed, except the eaten *hattat* flesh contaminated with mild evil. If this rule is applied to the *hattat* sacrifice, the conclusion is clear: the reason that the remains of the burnt *hattat* animal is removed and burned outside the camp is because it became impure through the ritual process (for the similar view, see Milgrom, 1991b: 423).

5.3.4.2. Implication of Leviticus 6:19-22 (26-29)

Leviticus 6:19-22 (26-29) states:

[19] The priest who offers it for sin shall eat it. In a holy place it shall be eaten, in the court of the tent of meeting. [20] Whatever touches its flesh shall be holy and when any of its blood is splashed on a garment, you shall wash that on which it was splashed in a holy place. [21] And the earthenware vessel in which it is boiled shall be broken. But if it is boiled in a bronze vessel, that shall be scoured and rinsed in water. Every male among the priests may eat of it; it is most holy (ESV; verses numbers following MT)

The ritual washing and boiling in this passage have been traditionally interpreted as the activities to remove holiness from the garment.[394] But M. Haran (1985: 176) countered this received belief by suggesting a biblical principle that holiness cannot be removed (cf. Gane, 2005: 165-66). Holiness causes an object to come into a permanent possession of the sanctuary. He refers to Numbers 17:2-3 (16:37-38) where the censers of the rebellious Korah and his company are recycled as material for the plating of the altar, instead of being taken away to the outside of the camp, because the censers were presented before YHWH and became holy (17:3 [6:38]). It signifies that the censers were still sacred in spite of their rebellion.[395]

Likewise, if the garment becomes holy by contact with blood in Leviticus 6:20-21 (27-28), the holiness cannot be removed by washing (Milgrom, 1991b: 403-4; Gane 2005: 166). By the very reason, it can be confirmed that the garment did not become holy by the *hattat* blood, but was contaminated by it. It is likely that the same rule is applied to the earthenware vessel.[396]

Milgrom (1991b: 403) comments on Leviticus 6:20b:

> The blood spots alone need to be washed out, not the entire garment . . . . The garment does not become holy by coming into contact with the blood of the purification offering. Instead of being confiscated by the sanctuary, as would any object that is rendered holy, it is restored to its former status by having its so-called holiness effaced through washing. Thus the garment is actually treated as if it were impure, for it is impure clothing that always requires laundering (e.g., 11:25, 28, 40; 15:5-8, 10-11). This ambivalence of the purification offering, which will be present in even sharper form in the following verse, should occasion no surprise. The ability of the purification offering to impart impurity has already been noted . . . . For its blood, having absorbed the impurity of the sanctum upon which it is sprinkled now contaminates everything it touches.

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[394] For miscellaneous proponents of this opinion, see Gane (2005: 166-67).

[395] However, after their death-penalty, their censers were not used as such for the sanctuary. Instead, the censers had to be hammered into sheets for plating of the altar. It seems to imply that the censers were contaminated so that it is purified through the hammering process and recycled to overlay the altar.

[396] Milgrom (1991b: 404) introduces the rabbis' interpretation that the vessel became holy; after the vessel is broken, its pieces were buried in the sanctuary's courtyard (*b. Yoma* 21a; *b. Zebaḥ*. 96a). But Milgrom (1991b: 405) maintains that "only impure earthenware needs to be broken (see Lev 11:33, 35; 15:22), because its porous nature so totally absorbs the impurity that it can never again be purified."

For Milgrom, v. 20a relates to 'holiness contagion,' but vv. 20b and 21 refer to the matter of 'uncleanness contagion' (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 136). That is, they deal with different topics. Even though the blood belongs to the most holy *hattat* animal, it does not convey holiness to objects; rather, it purges the sancta by absorbing their impurity by absorption and becomes impure.

Kiuchi (1987: 136), who is in favor of 'holiness contagion' in this whole passage, disagrees with Milgrom, saying "this view seems to present a grave difficulty, because it assumes the coexistence of holiness and uncleanness in the same *hattat*, which is termed קֹדֶשׁ קָדָשִׁים . . . different topics do not necessarily mean different rules." However, according to Milgrom, the coexistence of the two poles may be possible in the priestly cultic concept: "holiness has swallowed impurity" (Milgrom, 1991b: 638). [397] Furthermore, Milgrom (1991b: 638) argues that within the sanctuary the priest is immune to impurity so that he can perform the perilous process of the *hattat* ritual that is full of impurity, while he maintains his holy state; impurity does not "pollute the priest *as long as he serves God in the sanctuary*." In addition, it must be recalled that the holy sancta are defiled by human evil; it signifies that holiness may coexist impurity, while the the latter must be removed.

As for Haran's argument, it is insufficient and unsatisfactory, because the sacrificial texts testify that when a certain holy thing is defiled, it can be removed and destroyed outside the camp. For instance, the holiest *hattat* carcass is taken away and burned outside the camp. Therefore, attention must be given to Milgrom's analogy between the washing of the garment and other launderings. If it is clear that laundering of clothing is always the activity to wash and remove impurity from it, a conclusion is naturally deduced: the garment became contaminated by the animal's blood. Milgrom (1991b: 403-4) goes on to argue that the blood absorbs the impurity of the sanctum when the priest sprinkles the blood on it, and contaminates everything that it contacts.

The contamination by its blood denotes that the entire *hattat* animal becomes impure,[398] because blood is *pars pro toto* for an animal in sacrificial rituals. If it is clear that laundering of clothing is always performed to wash and

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[397] Rodriguez (1986: 196) also claims that the coexistence of impurity and holiness is possible in the context of the ritual atonement; the sin, that is transferred to the animal through hand imposition and later conveyed to the priest through the blood rites, did not affect their holiness (for his theory of the *hattat* dynamics, see ch. 7).

[398] Probably except for the suet that is offered and burnt on the altar as a soothing aroma before God.

remove impurity from it, it can be deduced that the garment is contaminated by the animal's blood.

Another decisive point deserves attention. The garment mentioned in v. 20 [27] obviously refer to the priestly apparel, which are already consecrated and dedicated to the sanctuary (Lev 8:30 = Exod 29:21; cf. Lev 6:3-4 [10-11]). That is, the garment is already holy. Therefore, it is unnatural that the contact with the blood causes the sacred contagion on the holy garment.

The entire context of Leviticus 6:19-22 (26-29) bolsters Milgrom's opinion, except for the rendering of the verb יִקְדָּשׁ in v. 20.[399] In this context, this verb should be rendered 'shall be holy' or 'must be holy' that refers to the holy state of the priests and objects that touch the flesh (Levine, 1987: 246; NASB; ESV; KJV; RSV), rather than 'become holy' that indicates contagiousness of the holiness by touching the flesh (Milgrom, 1991b: 403, 443-45; CJB; NRSV).[400] Even though the contagion of holiness is possible in light of other biblical data (e.g., Ezek 46:20),[401] it is not appropriate, however, in this present context.[402] V. 20 refers to a requirement and qualification for touching the sancta: what contacts the flesh must be holy. It matches well the regulation that the holiest *hattat* flesh should only be eaten by the holy priests. A common Israelite cannot touch or eat holy flesh and cannot approach or contact the sancta, due to his unqualified state, namely lack of holiness. If an unqualified person touches a

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[399] The LXX ἁγιασθήσεται.

[400] The ambiguity of its meaning is well revealed in that the rendering 'shall be holy' of RSV of Lev 6:20 (27) is replaced by the rendering 'shall become holy' of NRSV. Milgrom (1991b: 443-56) argues for sacred contagion, submitting several cases: Exod 29:37; 30:26- 29; Lev 6:11 [18], 20 [27]; Num 4:15; Ezek 46:20). The problem is the interpretation of the verb יִקְדָּשׁ in these cases. The majority of scholars, including Milgrom, have interpreted it as the meaning of a *qal* impf, 'will become holy' that indicates sacred contagion on philological and contextual grounds: the *qal* impf of קדשׁ "only means 'become holy' and cannot denote 'must be holy.'" But Levine (1989: 37, 40), followed by Hartley (1992: 97) who refuses contagion of holiness, renders it as a jussive mode, 'must be holy' or 'shall be holy' (e.g., 6:11 [18], 20 [27]).

[401] For interpretation on Hag 2:11-13 cited as an example of sacred contagion, Milgrom (1991b: 445, 449-50) states that although the priest denies the contagion of holiness through a person's garment in which holy meat is wrapped, it is implied, however, that "holiness is contagious by *direct contact*." At the same time, a person who touches the sancta incur death (e.g., Num 4:15). Therefore, Milgrom (1991b: 450) concludes that "the sancta would appear to transmit both holiness and death to those who touch them." Nevertheless, some cases of Leviticus like Lev 6:11 (18), 20 (27), apart from Exod 29:37; 30:27, seems that Levine's interpretation is right; the statements are to require qualification for contacting the sancta: 'it must be holy' for touching the sancta.

[402] The subject כֹּל in the sentence כֹּל אֲשֶׁר־יִגַּע בִּבְשָׂרָהּ יִקְדָּשׁ (Lev 6:20), whether it is animate or inanimate, is generally rendered,: 'whatever' (NIV; ESV; NJB; JPS; Milgrom, 1991b: 379; Levine, 1989: 40); but 'anyone' (NASB; Hartley, 1992: 97-98) .

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sanctum, whether intentionally or inadvertently, he injures and contaminates the holy thing. As a result, he becomes an encroacher who incurs death on account of his infliction on the sanctum.[403]

It is noteworthy that Leviticus 6:19-22 (26-29) address a supplementary instruction concerning the priestly consumption of the *hattat* flesh in an envelope structure, where the statement of the priestly consumption (v. 19 and v. 22) encircles vv. 20-21. It is inferred that the content of vv. 20-21 refers to the priestly requirements and qualifications for eating the meat. In order to eat the meat in a holy place, he 'must be holy' (יִקְדָּשׁ) (v. 20; cf. v. 11). Furthermore, it is assumed that the sacrifices are basically 'holy' (see n. 277), while the *hattat*, the guilt, and the grain offering are 'most holy.' In these sacrificial rituals, the technical washing of spurted blood is not required. It implies that holiness of the *hattat* sacrifice does not generate sacred contagion to the garment and utensils.

Finally the contaminated garment should be washed in 'a holy place' (v. 20b). Probably in the court of the sanctuary the earthenware vessel, which was used in blood manipulation, should be broken and buried, and a bronze vessel, which was used for boiling the meat, should be scoured and rinsed in water (see n. 396). Such activities are not seen to remove and erase holiness from the garment and utensils, because the place was holy. Rather, impurities must be removed in a holy place.

Hence it can be alleged that the garment and utensils were contaminated by the impurity of the blood, generated by human evil. It leads to the conclusion that the contamination of the flesh was caused by transference of human evil from the offerer and from the sancta.

5.3.4.3. The entrance rite for the remains-handler and the goat-sender

Additional evidence of contamination of the *hattat* flesh is the entrance rite of the remains-handler in parallel with that of the goat-sender in Leviticus 16 (cf. Johar, 1988: 611). The legislation of the *hattat* offering in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 does not mention the entrance rite through which the remains-handler should

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[403] However, it must be recalled that the remains-handler's activity (and probably the goat-sender) in the *hattat* ritual was legitimate, so he did not incur death by touching the holiest meat. But such concessive mitigation was not applied to contamination of impurity. Therefore, the remains handler and the goat-sender were contaminated by the impure *hattat* carcass which was loaded with sin and impurity.

enter the camp after burning the *hattat* remains. This gap is filled by Leviticus 16 that stipulates the rule (v. 28). Conversely, whereas Leviticus 4 specifies 'a clean place' (v. 12; cf. Lev 6:4 [11]) outside the camp where the ashes of sacrifices are discarded and the remains-handler should burn the remaining portions of the *hattat* sacrifice, Leviticus 16 does not mention it. To this case the theory of gap-filling can also be applied. That is, it is likely that on the Day of Atonement the remains of the *hattat* animal are burned in the same clean place as in Leviticus 4:12.

Significantly, in Leviticus 16 the rule for the remains-handler is exactly juxtaposed to the rule of the entrance rite for the goat-sender (cf. § 3.4.3).

"He (the goat-handler) . . . shall wash his clothes and bathe his body in water, and afterward he may come into the camp." (v. 26 ESV)

"He (the remains-handler) . . . shall wash his clothes and bathe his body in water, and afterward he may come into the camp." (v. 28 ESV)

This parallel indicates that the two entrance rites have the same function: the purification of the persons that dealt with the remains and the Azazel goat. Conversely, it implies that the release of the Azazel goat has the same function as the burning of the *hattat* flesh outside the camp, and therefore the former is regarded as a special form of the latter, as argued in chapter 3 (Kiuchi, 1987: 149).

However, Gane (2005: 57) sees the flesh not to be contaminated in Leviticus 4, denying that the offerer's sin or impurity remains in the *hattat* animal; the offerer's evil is transferred to the animal and finally conveyed to the sancta through the blood rite (see § 7.2.4). For him and many interpreters, the burning of the flesh in a clean place outside the camp is taken as a sign that the carcass was not contaminated. Moreover, in Leviticus 4 there is no mention of the entrance rite that requires the remains-handler to wash clothes and bathe his body in water, in contrast with Leviticus 16 that demands both the goat-sender and the remains-handler to take the same entrance rite, without mentioning a clean place. To Gane (2005: 240) this is a strong hint that in Leviticus 16, differently from Leviticus 4, the *hattat* flesh and the Azazel goat are contaminated by impurity and sin respectively.

Gane's argument is declined in terms of the premise of this thesis presupposed in chapter 4. By the theory of gap-filling Leviticus 4 and 16 supplement each other to complete the *hattat* ritual system (see § 4.2.3.3). Just

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as the function of the *hattat* blood rites and the hand imposition, which remains silent in Leviticus 4, are stated or implied in Leviticus 16, so the entrance rite for the remains-handler, which is not mentioned in Leviticus 4, is stipulated in Leviticus 16. Conversely, the clean place for burning the carcass, which is specified in Leviticus 4, is omitted in Leviticus 16. It is natural to infer that in Leviticus 4 there was the same entrance rite, and in Leviticus 16 it was performed in the same clean place.

Recently Kiuchi (2007: 305-6) suggested another idea that more or less retracts his former work (1987):[404] on the Day of Atonement, whereas the goat-sender is contaminated by the holiness the Azazel goat which carries only the guilt rather than sin, the remains-handler is defiled by the burning of the *hattat* flesh. Holiness contagion of the live goat, is a natural result of his idea that the goat bears 'guilt' which does not generate 'defilement,' rather than 'sin.' In additon, he contends that in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the remains-handler does not become defiled but "when the perfect cleansing of the sanctuary is achieved on the Day of Atonement, the burning of the flesh brings about uncleanness, and the person who handles it becomes defiled" (Kiuchi, 2007: 306).

However, in light of its parallel with the release rite of the bird in Leviticus 14 where the bird was bearing the impurity of the leper or the leprous house and released into the wildness outside the town (vv. 7 and 53), it does not seem that the live goat did bear 'guilt' instead of 'sin/iniquity.' Therefore, it is unlikely

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[404] In his former work Kiuchi argued (1987: 137):

> .. . the fact that the handlers of the Azazel goat and the *hattat* flesh need to wash their clothes and undergo ablution (vv. 26-28) appears to disprove the assumption that the Azazel goat and the *hattat* flesh are not unclean. What is clear is that the handlers of the Azazel goat and the *hattat* flesh become unclean. But it is not clear why or how they do so.

Kiuchi (1987: 140) poses a possible solution to the puzzling problem: "the *hattat* sacrifice conveys holiness within the sanctuary but it defiles outside the camp." He continues to say that "In view of the fact that עָוֹן and טֻמְאָה are both associated with 'death,' it may be better to assume that the handlers of the Azazel goat and the *hattat* flesh are both defiled because they have had contact with death." However, it is not persuasive how the contact with the *live* goat is related to 'death,' although its death would be envisioned in the wilderness. Furthermore, the ash of the burnt offering (Lev 6:4; probably including the ashes of all sacrifices) was handled by the priest who changed his garments into other garments. The ashes also are traces of death, but the priest-handler of the ashes does not undergo the entrance rite. Rather, the fact that another ordinary person was required as a handler in the case of the *hattat* offering, instead of the priest, indicates strongly that the *hattat* flesh was contaminated through the ritual process. Therefore, it is more reasonable to think that the live goat and the *hattat* flesh were unclean, because they were bearing sin and impurity.

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that the Azazel goat defiles the goat-sender with its holiness, given that it was bearing all sins of Israel and was sent into the wildness, namely, to Azazel, the source of evil.

That the burning of the carcass should be performed in a clean place does not necessary mean that it must be clean. Rather, it seems that this place was designated as a particular area fixed for *disposal of ritual substance* (Lev 1:16; 6:4 [11]), along with the deposit of the *hattat* ash of the red heifer (Num 19:9), whether the discarded *ritual substance* was clean or unclean. This view is reliable in light of the existence of an 'unclean place' outside the camp fixed for *disposal of non-ritual substance* like the debris of the dismantled house (Lev 14: (vv. 40, 41, 45).[405] Therefore, it is clear that both the *hattat* carcass and the Azazel goat are contaminated by the evils,[406] and for that reason both the goat-sender and the remains-handler were obligated to take the same entrance rite to cleanse the defilement from them.

5.3.4.4. Cause of Moses' anger (Lev 10:16-20)

This text addresses an episode right after the tragic deaths of Aaron's two sons. When Moses found out that Aaron did not eat the *hattat* flesh,[407] why did he get angry? If the priestly consumption of the flesh was mandatory for atonement, why did Aaron burn it, instead of eating it? Was Moses worried about the nullification of atonement, namely, the effect of the *hattat* ritual? But why did Moses ultimately approve of Aaron's alteration of the rule?

Milgrom (1991b: 638) argues that "there is a strong possibility that they had to be eaten by the priests in order to complete the expiatory process," and moreover in the situation of Leviticus 9-10 the *hattat* offering had to absorb the severe pollution of the sanctuary generated by the corpses of Nadab and Abihu.

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[405] Lev 14 (vv. 40, 41, 45) designates an unclean place outside the camp where contaminated stones or plaster and the debris of the dismantled house were thrown away. For discussion on the identity of a clean and an unclean place, see Milgrom (1991b: 262). According to the Jewish tradition, the 'clean place' for the deposit of the ashes of the red heifer in the land of Canaan was located on the Mount of Olives (see J. Neusner, 1999: 76). It might be the same place where the ashes of the burnt offering gathered up and the *hattat* flesh was burned (H. Bonar, 1858: 532). If so, it is assumed that the ashes of the red heifer had to be deposited in a separate locus in the same clean place to be distinguished from other ashes.

[406] This thesis argues that whereas the impurities of the sanctuary are absorbed into the special *hattat* animals (the sacrificial bull and goat), the sins of Israel are transferred to the Azazel goat.

[407] Milgrom (1991b: 402) notes that the *hattat* flesh should be eaten on the very day.

He (1991b: 638) goes on to say: "it is precisely because the *hattat* offering is associated with impurity that its ingestion by the priest becomes so crucial." But Kiuchi (1987: 49, 75) notes that Moses' anger was not connected with the anxiety of the nullification of atonement, because the effect of the *hattat* offering was already certified with the divine fire and the people's awful response (Lev 9:24).

On the other hand, as for Aaron's alteration of the rule, Milgrom says (1991b: 639): "the deaths of his sons and the consequent pollution of the sanctuary by their corpses had changed the status of the sacrifice from an eaten *hattat* to a burned *hattat*." Kiuchi (1987: 75) also suggests a similar idea: the reason of Aaron's alteration is because "the expiation of the minor offence may well be regarded as meaningless or insignificant when it is seen in the light of the man's subsequent execution"; and Aaron is responsible for his two son's sin and death as a representative of the priestly household. Therefore, he could not enjoy the right to the people's *hattat* flesh, while he is still guilty of their sin.

However, these are not satisfying answers to the cause of Moses' anger, although it may explain the reason why Moses complied with Aaron's elucidation of the situation (namely, the reason of his abstinence).

Two points can be considered to explain the cause of Moses' anger. Firstly, it is clear that the *hattat* offering was accepted with the divine fire (Lev 9:24). If so, what was the cause of Moses' anger? The context of Leviticus 10 is likely to indicate what Moses was afraid of. In terms of the particular divine reception, probably he did not worry about YHWH's cancellation of atonement. It seems that Moses' anger is related to the previous tragic incident. The deaths of Aaron's two sons were incurred by their illegal cultic practice. In this situation Moses realized that Aaron deviated again from the rule of the flesh disposal prescribed in Leviticus 4-6. This is assumed to incur Moses' anger. He was irritated and provoked with the repeated violation of the ritual regulations and its consequent result: the *hattat* rules prescribed in Leviticus 4-6.

Secondly, if this is the case, could the priestly failure by intentional deviation or neglect or by unintentional mistakes annul the effect (namely, atonement) of the *hattat* offering? What will happen, if the priest fails to eat or burn the flesh? The text does not give any instruction about the situation. In contrast with the case of the *hattat* offering, it is specified in Leviticus 7:15-21 that the offerer's failure to eat the peace offering would bring out nullification of the peace offering (v. 18). It seems that the reason for this explicit and strict warning about the failure in the peace offering is because the ordinary Israelites were vulnerable to such violations and failure in the ritual of the peace offering,

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whether by mistake or by neglect, in their places. However, probably the priestly failure to dispose of the *hattat* flesh was hardly possible in terms of the austere tasks of the priests which were performed at all perils. Nevertheless, such a situation could be conceivable.

In light of the divine response to the offerings in Leviticus 9:24, it is likely that the effect of the *hattat* ritual is valid, independent of the priestly failure or deviation of the rule. Gane (2005: 92) confirms:

> Once the suet was burning on the altar, the offerer could go his way assured of expiation prerequisite to the divine forgiveness, as indicated by the *kipper* formulas in ch. 4, trusting that the priest would finish whatever remained to be done.

Even though the effect, namely, atonement, of the *hattat* offering is approved and confirmed by the particular response with the divine fire in the case of the initial inauguration of the altar, it is likely that this principle is applied to general *hattat* rituals: the timing of the virtual atonement achieved by the *hattat* ritual is just after the burning of the suet and before the disposal of the remains, although the disposal process is prerequisite to the completion of the ritual

Here we need to distinguish between *removing* evil and *eliminating* it. Speaking strictly, the activity of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is to eliminate or destroy the evil rather than to remove it from the offerer or the sancta. Human evil is removed from the offerer by hand imposition and from the sancta through blood rites. The *removed* evil is *eliminated* by the disposal process of the flesh, while on the Day of Atonement, the Azazel goat ritual is added for the same function.[408] But the two activities constitute an inseparable consecutive process for atonement and forgiveness/purification; the entire process can simply be called 'removing the evil.'

More importantly, the action נָשָׂא עָוֹן may refer to the final procedure of the entire atoning process that makes atonement for the offerer. However, it is unlikely that the failure to eliminate the evil might lead to the annulment of the

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[408] Kurtz (1980: 411-12) argues that the elimination of sin by the Azazel goat is not essential for atonement, because atonement is fully accomplished by expiating the sancta with the *hattat* sacrifices. The Azazel goat eliminates the *already expiated* sins from the camp (see ch. 7). However, in the case of the special *hattat* ritual on the Day, if the high priest failed to eliminate the sins through the Azazel goat, it is inferred that the failure of the *hattat* ritual is ascribed to the whole congregation (cf. Lev 4:3), because of his particular position that affects the whole people.

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effect of the offering. If the officiating priest fails to eliminate it, whether by mistake or by neglect, the responsibility for it would return to the priest instead of the offerer, in contrast with the case of the peace offering. But Gane (2005: 93) contends that the neglect could have made the atonement of the people invalidated; this was the cause of Moses' anger. In contrast, the atonement for the priests was still valid, because the victim offered for the priests was burned according to the rule. He said (2005: 93):

> The magnitude of Moses' reaction (10:16-18) indicates his perception that, if the priests did not correctly complete the purification offering, the people would suffer some kind of loss even though YHWH had already manifested his acceptance of the victim by consuming the suet in theophanic fire on the altar (Lev 9:24).

As Gane argues, such failure could incur serious problems. This certainly explains Aaron's anger. However, as mentioned, it is unlikely that Moses was anxious about the annulment of atonement. Moses' satisfied response to Aaron's explanation about his deviation of the rule indicates clearly that the day's ritual did not fail. Atonement was accomplished with the divine fire and the ritual was accepted and not annulled. Certainly there was the possibility that a serious problem could occur by neglect or failure to eat the *hattat* flesh, which incurred Moses' anger; and the responsibility for the failure would be ascribed to the officiating priest. By so doing, the priest would commit another sin and generate a new situation that requires an additional *hattat* offering. It might endanger the priest and possibly thereby the community. The same principle would be applied also to the burning of the flesh under the priest's control.

This situation would put the accomplished atonement of the offerer in the shade and be considered as the virtual failure of the *hattat* ritual. In other words, the failure of the offering will make the effect of the *hattat* ritual meaningless (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 75). Therefore, the action נָשָׂא עָוֹן was an essential element for accomplishing an *intact* or *unimpaired* atonement by the *hattat* ritual.

Finally, it is unnecessary to think that Moses' rebuke relates to a specific sin of the congregation that might be envisaged at the cultic inauguration in Leviticus 9. In this occasion the congregation did not commit a particular sin. Rather, the sacrifices of the inaugural day might be a paradigm of the sacrifices for the forthcoming national festivals (Lev 23) in light of the fact that a goat was offered as the *hattat* offering for the whole congregation. In such festivals the *hattat* offering was presumably required for their ever-sinful or ever-impure state

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before God, and for the latent or implicit contamination of the sancta that might be caused by it. When Moses states that Aaron should have eaten the *hattat* flesh to "remove the sin of the congregation and to make atonement for them," he probably was keeping the *hattat* rules of Leviticus 4-6 in mind. Thus, this seems to be a statement concerning the general function of the flesh-consumption.

Aaron had to observe the rule. Moses was anxious about the violation of the *hattat* rule that would incur a new serious problem with the failure of the *hattat* ritual, after Aaron's two sons died on the spot, due to a cultic violation. In this situation, Moses could not be convinced if Aaron disposed of the flesh according to the required procedure of *hattat* rule, whether by burning or by eating. This interpretation explains the reason for Moses' final reception of Aaron's alteration of the rule. It is inferred that since eating the flesh is not the only way to eliminate the evil, even though it is the eaten *hattat* offering, Moses could be satisfied with Aaron's alteration of the rule (from eating to burning), after he heard about the reason for it.

Throughout the cultic prescriptions in the priestly literature, the legislator of Leviticus does not mention the priestly failure to eat the *hattat* flesh and its consequence. Instead, by narrating this episode he implies that in Israel's cultic operation deviation of the *hattat* rule in the rite of the flesh disposal could sometimes be tolerated as a legal alteration in a special situation.

5.4. Conclusion

From the investigation of the blood manipulation and the disposal of the flesh in the *hattat* ritual, the following conclusions are deduced:

1. The peculiar modes of the *hattat* blood rites indicate that the activities were performed to cleanse the sancta in the light of Leviticus 8:15 and 16:19. Furthermore, the peculiarity of the activity modes in the *hattat* blood as such, in distinction from that of the other sacrifices, is strong evidence that their distinguished function is to cleanse the sancta.
2. Since a ritual activity does not have an opposite function in the same ritual system, the identical modes of blood rites cannot indicate contrary functions in the *hattat* ritual system. That is, Gane's idea is declined in this thesis, that in the *hattat* ritual of Leviticus 4 the blood rite is to convey

human evil to the sancta, its function in Leviticus 16 is to cleanse the sancta.

3. According to this view, the sevenfold sprinkling of blood is not to sanctify persons in Leviticus 16:19, but it is an intense purgation of the endangered sanctuary and its sancta that are severely defiled with the accumulated sins and impurities. The result of the thorough purgation with the double blood rites is the restoration to the original sanctity of the sanctuary; therefore, 'shall be consecrated' (Lev 16:19) is an expression of the recovery of the holiness, in distinction from the initial consecration of the sanctuary in Leviticus 8:15 (Exod 29:36-37) where the anointing oil is required for the consecration of the altar. In this respect, it is assumed that the sevenfold sprinkling of blood does not effect consecration of the object in all its occurrences, but functions to cleanse it. Consecration of an object requires application of the oil dedicated to the sanctuary, along with the purificatory blood rites.

4. The exegesis of Leviticus 10:17 indicates that disposal of the *hattat* flesh is performed to remove the offerer's sin and the sanctuary's impurity generated from the offerer's moral sin or ritual impurity. It means that the *hattat* flesh become defiled by the evils. The flesh defilement is supported by several biblical indications and implications.

5. The two kinds of disposal of the *hattat* flesh, the eaten *hattat* and the burnt *hattat*, function to remove and eliminate the human sin and the sanctuary's impurity by either the priest's eating or burning of the *hattat* flesh. As Milgrom argued, it is assumed that whereas the eaten *hattat* offering retains minor contamination by human sin or impurity, the burnt *hattat* offering is contaminated by more severe and major sins and impurities.

6. It is inferred that the failure to dispose of the *hattat* flesh did not nullify the atonement of the offerer, because his evil was removed by his confession of sin and hand imposition (for sin), and cleansed through a series of the purificatory procedures (for impurity); but the *hattat* ritual might be considered to be a failure, on account of the priest's neglect to dispose of the flesh. If so, the failure would generate another sin, while the responsibility is ascribed to the officiating priest; that is, the new situation requires an additional *hattat* offering to avoid a punishment for it, while it affects the congregation. Therefore, the atonement by the *hattat* offering would be regarded as a virtual failure, while the situation put it in the shade.

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Chapter 6
Sin, impurity, and contamination of the sanctuary

6.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to discern the categories of moral sin and ritual impurity by grade, and to inquire into their impact on the sanctuary and its sancta. The classification of sin and impurity is essential for an epidemiological study of the sanctuary (if it may be called so) about its defilement, and for the investigation into the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* sacrifice that is offered to remedy human evil and its consequent defilement of the sanctuary.

This study is also essential to discern between the role of the ordinary *hattat* ritual and the role of the special *hattat* ritual in the next chapter; what kinds of evil did the former remedy throughout the year?; by contrast, what kinds of evil should the latter treat on the Day of Atonement? But these questions cannot be answered, unless the categories of human evil are classified.

6.2. Graded sins and impurities

The *hattat* sacrifice is offered to remedy sins and impurities. But according to the Hebrew Bible, not all sins and impurities require a *hattat* offering. They are classified into several classes according to their gravity, and according to whether they contaminate the sanctuary and its sancta.[409] In the priestly cultic concept, the sanctuary and its sancta, and the land are contaminated by some sins and major impurities.[410]

Although inadvertent sins require the *hattat* offering for remedy, some sins incur such a severe pollution that the opportunity for the *hattat* offering is

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[409] For some sins, a guilt offering is mandated for expiation, instead of a *hattat* offering, because as explained in § 4.2.2, the nature of the sins that each offering remedies differs between the two expiatory sacrifices.

[410] Klawans (2006: 53-56) explains a number of important differences between 'ritual impurity' and 'moral impurity.' For example, while moral impurity defiles the land with 'its deleterious effect' on it, ritual impurity 'poses no threat to the land'; moral impurity does not have contagious power, but ritual impurity defiles other person (p. 55).

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not given for them; they are inexpiable sins and impurities. Others are seen to be mild and require simple remedy measures without the requirement of the *hattat* offering. This discussion relies largely on Milgrom's contribution.

6.2.1. Classification of sin

Sins are classified into four categories, according to whether it is expiable or inexpiable, and whether it is inadvertent or deliberate/wanton.[411]

Expiable inadvertent / Expiable deliberate / Expiable wanton / Inexpiable wanton

Generally sins that violate the prohibitive commandments of God[412] can be classified into two types, according to whether it is expiable or not. That is, there are expiable sins and inexpiable sins. The *expiable* sins are subdivided into three classes: inadvertent, deliberate, and (presumably) wanton.

An expiable inadvertent sin[413] refers to an unintentional violation of the *prohibitive commandments* (Lev 4-5:13; cf. Num 15:22-29) that requires the

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[411] Cf. Gorman (1990: 79); Gane (2005: 285-302).

[412] For neglect of the *performative commandments*, see Milgrom (1991b: 229). He says that the commandments of YHWH are divided into two categories: prohibitive and performative, pointing out the difference between them:

> "The performative commandments are violated by refraining from or neglecting to do them. The omission of a religious duty is a personal failing; but the sinner alone is affected. Because no act was performed, his sin carries no impact upon his environment. The violation of prohibitive commandments, by contrast, involves an act. . . an act forbidden by God generates impurity, which impinges upon God's sanctuary and land."

In the interpretation of Num 15:22-31, as mentioned in chapter 4 (see n. 185), Milgrom (1991b: 264-69) poses the possibility that another type of the *hattat* offering, distinctive from that in Lev 4, might be made on account of the neglect of the performative commandments. He (1991b: 230) goes on say that the term מִצְוֹת (commandments) refers to religious law (*fas*), and not to civil law (*jus*). For example, unintentional homicide does not require a *hattat* offering, since it is not the violation of YHWH's commandments. Instead, such a civil offender must be banished to a city asylum until the high priest's death that will exempt him from the responsibility for the homicide (Num 35:25). This law is called מִשְׁפָּטִים 'norms, procedures' (v. 24) and חֻקַּת מִשְׁפָּט 'law of procedure' (v. 20), instead of מִצְוֹת.

[413] Accepting Milgrom's suggestion (1991b: 228), followed by Kiuchi (1987: 25), the rendering, 'inadvertently' is employed for בִּשְׁגָגָה (Lev 4:2, 22, 27; 5:15, 18, 22:14; etc) or לִשְׁגָגָה (Num 15:24), instead of 'unintentionally' (ESV; NASB, NIV; NKJV; NRSV) or 'unwittingly' (RSV;

offender's remorse and confession of sin (Lev 5:2; cf. Num 5:7),[414] and the *hattat* offering for the remedy of the sin, if either the sin is known to him (4:14, 23, 28) or he 'realizes guilt'[415] after his sin was committed inadvertently.

For this type of sin, the graduated *hattat* offerings are regulated in Leviticus 4:1-5:13. Judging from the grade of the *hattat* animals and the sacred precincts where the blood of each animal could be brought, the expiable sin is assumed to contaminate the outer altar and the shrine, depending on the offerer's socio-religious status. But the *adytum* is not inflicted by this type of sin (contra Kiuchi, 1987: 125).

The second group belongs to *expiable deliberate* sins (Lev 5:1-4;[416] 5:20-26 [6:1-7]). This category of sin must be distinguished from the 'wanton'

JPS; ASV), because the root שׁגג or שׁגה presumes the notion of consciousness about an act. He is conscious of his act, but unconscious of that it constitutes a sin.

[414] Remorse and confession of sin are prerequisites to the *hattat* sacrifice. However, Milgrom (1991b: 301) insists that inadvertence does not require 'confession of sin' in distinction from deliberate sin. For refutation against this view, see n. 426 in § 6.2.2.

[415] As for the meaning of the verb אָשֵׁם in Lev 4-5, Milgrom (1991b: 343) sees it as 'to feel guilt' that indicates emotional 'suffering,' namely, 'remorse,' 'conscience-smitten or guilt-stricken.' This is regarded as an expression of repentance. By contrast, Kiuchi (1987: 31-34) and others (e.g., Hartley, 1992: 44-45; JPS; ESV) render it as simply 'to realize guilt.' On the other hand, J. Sklar (2005: 31, 39-41) submits 'to realize the sin because of suffering.' This means that the offender happened to realize the sin by his 'suffering guilt's consequences.' Sklar (2005: 31 n. 68) summarizes three major opinions on the verb אָשֵׁם, including his own view, as follows:

> The main differences of the three translations of אָשֵׁם in cases of unknown sin are that Milgrom understands אָשֵׁם to refer to the guilt that comes from realizing the sin, whereas Kiuchi understands אָשֵׁם to refer primarily to the recognition of the sin. The proposal of the current writer differs still, in that it understands אָשֵׁם to refer to the suffering that comes because of the sin, which in turn prompts a recognition that some sin has been done.

This thesis follows 'to realize guilt' with Kiuchi and other scholars, especially against Milgrom's interpretation (1991b: 342-43) that the verb אָשֵׁם includes the meanings of remorse and psychological punishment, namely, 'self-punishment of conscience' in the expiatory sacrificial texts, apart from the use of the verb in other contexts. According to Milgrom (1991b: 342-43), through confession of sin (הִתְוַדָּה Lev 5:5) or psychological punishment (אָשֵׁם), his heart contaminated by sin is purified; therefore, the *hattat* offering is not to remove or purify his sin, but to purify only the sancta (for the refutation of his *hattat* theory, see § 7.2.1).

[416] Milgrom (1991b: 298-300) argues that the sins in Lev 5:1-4 constitute the results of the offender's reluctant witness to imprecation (v. 1), his neglect to purify himself within the prescribed time (vv. 2-3; one day or seven days), and his failure to fulfill his vow within a time limit (v. 4). Thereby he increased "the possibility that he will pollute the sanctuary and its sancta." In other words, in contrast to the inadvertent sins in Lev 4, the sins in Lev 5:1-4 may be

category. In Leviticus 5:1, for example, "the witness's defiance of the imprecation is indisputably a deliberate, if not a brazen, misdemeanor" (Milgrom, 1991b: 295). Why is this sin expiable by the *hattat* sacrifice (or by the guilt offering for the cases in 5:20-26 [6:1-7])? Milgrom (1991b: 295) answers that it is because he confessed his sin and felt remorse for it, while his confession mitigated the deliberate sin to an inadvertent sin.

Then the next group is *wanton/defiant* sins, which are presumably divided into expiable and inexpiable. A wanton sin is a brazen violation of the commandments. It is called 'defiant sin' or 'wanton sin' which is acknowledged as being committed with a 'high hand' (בְּיָד רָמָה; Num 15:30-31), in distinction from mild deliberate sins as those in Leviticus 5:1-4 and 20-26 (6:1-7).

In principle, wanton sin invites a terminal punishment, like 'cutting off' (כָּרֵת)[417] or 'death penalty' (מוֹת יוּמָת; e.g., the cases in Lev 20) (hereafter

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deliberate, but expiable by sacrifice (Milgrom, 1991b: 301). Because these acts were deliberate but forgotten, the meaning of the phrase וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ in v. 2b refers to 'the fact escapes him' (JPS), instead of 'it is hidden by him' that implies a deliberate hiding (Milgrom, 1991b: 298). Many English versions employ the rendering 'it is hidden from him' that indicates unconsciousness and inadvertency (NASB; KJV; JPS; ESV). But many other scholars contradict this view, seeing the cases in vv. 2-4, except for v. 1, to be unintentional sins that were committed unconsciously or by ignorance (Knierim, 'שׁגג' *THAT*, II: 871; Rodriguez, 1979: 84; Janowski, 1982: 255; for detailed argument, see Kiuchi, 1987: 22-31). Kiuchi (1987: 29) concurs with Milgrom's view that the act was practiced consciously, noting that each case in vv. 2-4 refer to a situation where "an act was consciously performed (וְהוּא יָדַע) but it was forgotten (וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ)." But he (1987: 29) says that "though the sinner was conscious of his action, he was not aware that it was sinful; 'deliberately' is different from 'consciously.'" Kiuchi's conclusion is that the sin of v. 1 is deliberate, but the sins of vv. 2-4 are unintentional, at variance with Milgrom (1983: 124; 1991b: 310-11) who possibly regards vv. 1-4 as a deliberate category. As for Kiuchi's interpretation of the subtle and difficult wording וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ וְהוּא יָדַע in Lev 5:3-4, Kiuchi (1987: 28-29) argues that with reference to the paralleled phrase in 5:2, this *waw* consecutive must not be understood in a chronological sequence, but as a circumstantial clause.

(v. 2) וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ וְהוּא טָמֵא וְאָשֵׁם
"it was hidden from him, though he was impure, and he realized guilt"

(vv. 3-4) וְנֶעְלַם מִמֶּנּוּ וְהוּא יָדַע וְאָשֵׁם
"it was hidden from him, though he was aware of it, and he realized guilt"
(renderings mine)

[417] For the meaning of 'cutting off' (כָּרֵת), see Milgrom (1991b: 457-60; 2000a: 1733-34; Sklar, 2005: 15-20). Four opinions have been proposed for the meaning of this terminal penalty, as Sklar summarized: (1) excommunication from the covenant community (P. J. Budd, 1996: 122); (2) (premature) death (G. J. Wenham, 1979: 125, 242); (3) extinction of lineage (D. P. Wright, 1987: 164 n. 2); (4) punishment in the afterlife (Wenham, 1979: 242 along with view (1); Milgrom, 1990: 405-7, following the rabbis). Milgrom (1991b: 458-59) is in favor of the third and

'extirpation' is frequently used for כָּרֵת, together with 'cutting off'). As argued in § 6.4, this sin is assumed to incur the contamination of the *adytum*, due to its severity. The 'transgressions' (פְּשָׁעִים) in Leviticus 16:16, 21, which perhaps contaminate the *adytum*, belong to this category (Milgrom, 2000a: 1425). The *adytum* contaminated by this type of sin could be purged only by the high priest on the Day of Atonement. Both expiable sin and inexpiable sin generated the contamination of the sanctuary and its sancta, although the brazen sinner was punished by terminal penalty;[418] the sancta have to be purged by the *hattat* sacrifice.

Conspicuously, some brazen sins may incur the 'death penalty,' as in the case of Molech worship (Lev 20:1) and of the rebellion of Korah and his company (Num 16:31-35); a wanton sin is destined to the dreadful punishment. Nevertheless, it is inferred that some wanton sins were still expiable in light of Leviticus 16:16, 21

Leviticus 16:16, 21 mention atonement of 'wanton sins' (פְּשָׁעִים) which are generally rendered as 'transgressions.' It implies that some wanton sins were given opportunity for expiation. It is unlikely that the warning of a 'death penalty' or an 'extirpation' for a defiant sin committed by delay or neglect to cleanse a person's impurity (Lev 15:31; Num 19:13, 20) means an immediate execution of such a punishment. Presumably the punishment could be later executed according to divine discretion, while an opportunity for atonement was given.

Rodriguez (1986: 178), followed by this thesis, suggested that in light of Leviticus 16:16, 21, some wanton sins (פְּשָׁעִים) could be atoned, if the sinner confesses his sin. Several scholars (Milgrom, 1991b: 48, 1043; Gane 2005: 86) also, referring to the rabbinic comments, explain how it was possible. Like in the

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fourth opinions. Therefore, for Milgrom the punishment of 'cutting off' is of a distinctive type from death-penalty (Milgrom, 2000a: 1733-34); in this regard, Milgrom's interpretation is convincing, when he (1991b: 458-59) sees the mention of the two terminal punishments in Lev 20:2-3 to be double penalties rather than alternatives.

[418] As argued in chapter 5, judging from the mode of the blood rite, the sins that are expiated by the guilt offering do not contaminate the sancta. The sin is called מַעַל that is the legal term to indicate 'a sin against God' (Lev 5:15, 21 [6:2]; Num 5:6). Milgrom (1991b: 345-56) comments that מַעַל means 'a sin against God' in all occurrences, but it is not correct, because Num 5:27 describes a case where a wife would "have done trespass (מַעַל) against her husband" (KJV), and not against God. Although it is assumed that מַעַל in the context of the guilt offering does not contaminate the sancta, in many other cases, however, מַעַל is employed to signify severe sins, like rebellion against God, that certainly incurs the contamination of the sancta (Lev 26:40; Num 31:16; Josh 22:16; 2 Ch 26:16-18; 28:19, 22-25; 36:14).

case of expiable deliberate sins, they argue, it was possible to mitigate the gravity of a wanton sin through confession and repentance. "Confession release sins, and its function is to reduce the gravity of an inexpiable wanton sin to an inadvertency expiable by sacrifice" (Milgrom: 1991b: 1042; cf. 301; 373-378).[419]

Concerning this matter, Milgrom (1991b: 374) raises a fundamental question: "Yet the modus operandi of this doctrine is baffling. How is it possible for a *post hoc* confession to ameliorate a crime that perforce has already been committed?" His answer is: "repentance neutralizes the sting of a false oath by reducing its status to that of an involuntary sin" and "confession is the legal device fashioned by the Priestly legislators to convert deliberate sins into inadvertencies, thereby qualifying them."

If so, what kind of wanton sin could be mitigated with the opportunity of repentance? When and how? The text does not stipulate a specific standard rule about this matter. Whereas one wanton sin incurs immediate 'extirpation' or 'death penalty,' others are pardoned through expiatory measures. For instance, even in the adjacent contexts in Numbers, Korah and his company were swallowed up under the earth and consumed by the divine fire (Num 16:31-35),[420] whereas Miriam's leprosy, which is caused by her slander against Moses, the proxy of God, is pardoned in virtue of Moses' supplication (Num 12:9-15).

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[419] For details of the priestly repentance doctrine that confession and payment mitigate an advertent sin to an inadvertent sin, see Milgrom (1991b: 373-78). Milgrom recapitulates the same idea in his later work (2000a: 1425) by citing the example of the guilt offering in Lev 5:20-26 (6:1-7): the offender's remorse and confession of the crime, payment of a 20 percent fine to the victim in addition to the principal fine, and a guilt offering to YHWH have "the power to correct retroactively his advertent sin into an inadvertent offense, which is expiable by sacrifice."

[420] Biblical narratives in the priestly literature of Exod 19-Num 26 attest that although a sin was defiant, it was given an opportunity for forgiveness; for example, it is indicated in the episode of Miriam's leprosy. When Miriam became leprous, due to Aaron's and her blame concerning Moses' marriage to the Cushite woman (Num 12), she was expelled from the camp. A high handed defiance to Moses was actually equal to that to YHWH, because he was endowed with a divine authority from YHWH. However, Miriam's sin could be mitigated and remedied by Aaron's confession of sin and repentance, and decisively by Moses' supplication to God. She was readmitted to the camp only after seven days confinement outside it. Perhaps it was possible due to Moses special status, as proxy for God. But Milgrom regards this episode as an early narrative. According to him, repentance and confession of sins often appear in the early narratives like the episodes of Israel's kings (David [2Sam 12:13-14]; Ahab [1 Kgs 21:27ff] and Josiah [2 Kgs 22:18ff.]). Milgrom (1991b: 376) explains that repentances in these cases are distinctive from that of P and D, and that of the prophets; the early repentance was 'ineffectual' and therefore "at best it mitigates retribution (e.g., David)." In addition, "it is a human virtue, not a divine imperative. God calls neither upon man to repent nor upon his prophet to rouse him to repentance" (Milgrom, 1991b: 376). Contrary to Milgrom, this thesis takes the episode of Miriam's leprosy as an episode in the literary arrangement of Numbers and further in a final form of the priestly literature. From a synchronic perspective, the narrative of Miriam, including

In this view, in the priestly literature the punishment of some wanton sins might be reprieved by God's mercy, instead of its immediate execution. Presumably the Day of Atonement would be the final opportunity for repentance of the defiant and wanton sins and for forgiveness of the offenders. This implication corresponds to the statement of Leviticus 16:16, 21 about the atonement and purification of the wanton sins: that is, some wanton sins could be expiated on the Day. But other wanton sins incurred irrevocable punishment without the opportunity of atonement, although sometimes it was not executed on the spot (cf. Lev 26:40).

6.2.2. Classification of impurity

Impurities are roughly categorized into three groups as follows:

Minor / Expiable major / Inexpiable major
(Impurity → Expiable deliberate sin → Inexpiable wanton sin)

There are two kinds of physical impurities: minor and major.[421] The major impurity requires the *hattat* offering, but the minor does not. Instead, the minor impurity of both people and objects is purified by simple purificatory measures like washing and the time lapse of one day: for example, the defilement by touching or eating a carcass requires the time lapse of one day for the impurity-bearer to become clean (Lev 11:24-28; 7:15) (cf. Jenson, 1992: 226).

A major impurity is so severe to require a lapse of time more than seven days for physical purification.[422] Besides time lapse and washing, in some cases major impurity is treated with several rigorous measures.[423] After these

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her mitigation of punishment, is integrated with the *hattat* ritual system, while narratives are interwoven with the cultic corpus. Therefore, Miriam's episode can be taken as an example that attests to mitigation of a wanton sin in the final form of the priestly literature.

[421] For these two categories of minor and major physical impurities and the elaborate divisions of the impurities within each category, see the tables in Jenson's work (1992: 225-26); cf. Wright (1987: 179-219).

[422] For example, 7 days for the leprous house and 14 days for the leprous person (Lev 13); 7 days for a discharge or menstruation (Lev 15:19-23). Childbirth, as a special case, requires the new mother to have many days for purification: 7 days + 33 days for a boy and 14 days + 66 days for a girl (Lev 12).

[423] For example, burning of defiled clothing (Lev 13:52-57); the leper's segregation for seven days (Lev 13:4-5, 21, 26, 31, 33); dismantlement of the leprous house (Lev 14:45),

purificatory rites, the *hattat* sacrifice must be offered in the sanctuary by the unclean person, because this impurity is so strong as to contaminate the sanctuary.[424] That is, this major physical impurity defiles the sanctuary like a moral sin. It differs from minor impurity that necessitates merely the time lapse of one day or a washing/ablution.

Some major impurity is more severe and inexpiable; it can be compared and paralled with an inexpiable wanton sin in that there is no opportunity of atonement for such impurities. For instance, the malicious צָרַעַת is so severe that the building contaminated with it must be dismantled (Lev 14:45); a wanton sinner must be punished by a terminal penalty. For these cases, the *hattat* offering is not required, because they are inexpiable.

Another aspect of the ritual dynamics is that some impurities can be aggravated to inexpiable impurities,' if they are not properly treated (Lev 15:31; Num 19:13, 20). In other words, negligence and failure of the purificatory procedures for an impurity, whether it is minor or major, will turn it to an inexpiable impurity; thus, the impurity may change to a 'deliberate' (probably expiable) or even 'defiant sin' that calls for the *hattat* offering for a sin. This means that an impurity can be inevitably aggravated to a serious sin, due to failure to observe the mandatory ritual procedures.

Many scholars, including Milgrom and Kiuchi, think that neglect to purify impurity is equal to a defiant sin that is inexpiable, because Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20 warn about its terminal penalties (death or extirpation). Therefore, an offender's neglect to purify himself leads him to such penalty.

However, Leviticus 5:2-3 implies that some negligence of purification does not invite an instant punishment, although the cases in the passage are limited to several impurities. In these cases the neglect could be considered as

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sprinkling of blood on the extremities of the body (Lev 14:25-29), and the cleansing rite with the two birds (Lev 14:5-7).

[424] But the means of remedy for corpse-contamination was unique (see ch. 2). To remedy a persons' corpse-contamination, the 'water of *hattat*' (מֵי חַטָּאת, Num 8:7; or 'purifying water' [מֵי נִדָּה], Num 19:9) must be sprinkled on his body (Num 19). The ashes of the burnt red heifer were mixed with water before the sprinkling (Num 19:17), whenever the corpse-contamination occurred either within the camp (e.g., by contacting a dead body) or outside the camp (e.g, by killing in a battle). It means that only one cow was sacrificed as a unique *hattat*, the ashes of which could be used a number of times for long period to cleanse the persons who contacted corpses. Presumably this special type of the *hattat* sacrifice was allowed as a kind of concessive type, because of a frequent, collective and mass defilement caused by corpse-contact (e.g., funerals and burials; killings in a battle; touching bones of a dead man or a grave).

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a deliberate act.[425] Milgrom (1991b: 301) notes on the cases of 5:1-4: "these cases are the only ones in all of P wherein deliberate sins are expiable by sacrifice . . ." He (1991b: 299) infers that such a situation could be applied to the following cases: touching a gonorrheic or anything he or she sits or lies on (Lev 15:4-10, 26-27); touching a menstruant or anything she sits or lies on (Lev 15:19-24); touching a corpse or being in the same room with it (Num 19:14-16). But the physical impurities that the impurity-bearer can be fully conscious of his uncleanness are excluded: e.g., leprosy (Lev 13-14), an emission of sperm (15:16-18), parturient (12), etc (Milgrom, 1991b: 299).

For these expiable sins of negligence, an opportunity is given for the *hattat* offering with his confession of sin, although the relevant cases are limited to Leviticus 5:2-3. For atonement and forgiveness, the offender must confess his sin and a regular *hattat* sacrifice should be offered in accordance with Leviticus 4:1-5:13.[426] Therefore, the actual execution of the terminal punishment, as warned in Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20, would be applied to the case where the offender does not make use of the opportunity for atonement.

The next question is on how sin and impurity are related to defilement of the sanctuary. It must be explained how these graded sins and impurities contaminate the sanctuary and its sancta.

6.3. Contamination of the sanctuary

6.3.1. Theories of the sanctuary contamination

Milgrom submitted a systemized idea concerning the dynamics of the sancta contamination. His concept is that each sanctum and its area within the tripartite sanctuary become defiled by human sin and impurity. Milgrom (1991b: 253) uses the term '*miasma*,' a kind of magnetic power generated from sin and impurity to explain the epidemiology of the sanctuary, while Maccoby (1999: 18-22) suggests 'ray.' The words '*miasma*' or '*ray*' is not an appropriate term,

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[425] For the relationship between Lev 4 and 5:1-13, see Kiuchi (1987: 23-24); Milgrom (1991b: 308-10). As they argued, the graduated *hattat* offerings for sins in 5:1-13 fall under a category distinctive from the inadvertent sins in Lev 4.

[426] Milgrom (1991b: 301) argues that "confession is never required for inadvertence . . . but only deliberate sin." However, his argument is not feasible, because in Lev 4 'forgiveness' is declared for inadvertent sins. This declaration implies that 'confession of sin' is a prequisite to the *hattat* offering.

because it seems that its concept causes the power of human evil to be regarded a physical substance and the like.[427] Nevertheless, Gane (2005: 160) says that the term *miasma* or *ray* "may be helpful as metaphors for explaining to the modern mind a dynamic that connects objects located at some distance from each other." Milgrom (1991b: 257) argues that the '*miasma*' may penetrate into the sacred place; the more severe the wrong is, the more deeply it breaks through the sanctuary even up to the *adytum*. Milgrom's creative idea was accepted by several scholars.

However, many scholars, who follow the rabbis, have denied Milgrom's idea, arguing that not all sins or impurities automatically defile the sanctuary and its sancta.[428] They restrict the cases of automatic defilement to Leviticus 15:31,[429] 20:3[430] and Numbers 19:13, 20.[431] Milgrom also relies on these data to generalize and apply his theory of defilement to all other cases.

Leviticus 15: 31; 20:3 and Numbers 19:13, 20 have been taken as clear grounds for proving that a defilement of the sanctuary is possible. Here is the issue condensed into two questions: (1) can a general theory of the sancta defilement be deduced from these passages so that it can be applied to other cases of sin and impurity?; (2) otherwise, is the sancta defilement in these passages restricted to the very cases? The scholars who hold the second view, following the rabbis,[432] and refuse to generalize defilement of the sanctuary, are divided into two groups: (1) the sanctuary is defiled, when an impure person enters it; (2) he defiles the sanctuary from a distance, when either he delays or neglects to purify himself, or he is engaged in the idols like Molech worship.

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[427] For refusal of the term '*miasma*' and its concept, and alternative suggestions like 'ray', see Maccoby (1999: 18-22) and Gane (2005: 160). The concept of *miasma* seems to be similar to Levine's 'evil force' or 'force of impurity' (1979: 77-78).

[428] Levine (1974; 1989); Rodriguez (1979; 1986); Kiuchi (1987; 2007); Maccoby (1999).

[429] NASB: "I will also set My face against that man and will cut him off from among his people, because he has given some of his offspring to Molech, so as to defile My sanctuary and to profane My holy name" (Lev 20:3)

[430] NASB: "Anyone who touches a corpse, the body of a man who has died, and does not purify himself, defiles the tabernacle of the LORD; and that person shall be cut off from Israel. Because the water for impurity was not sprinkled on him, he shall be unclean; his uncleanness is still on him" (Num 19:13).

[431] NASB: "Thus you shall keep the sons of Israel separated from their uncleanness, so that they will not die in their uncleanness by their defiling My tabernacle that is among them" (Lev 15:31).

[432] *t. Šebu.*, 1:8; *Sipra*, Ḥobah 13:10; the rabbis assumed that impurity came into direct contact with the holy, only when the unclean person enters the sanctuary and ate of the sacred food in his impure state (Milgrom, 1991b: 257).

Rodriguez (1986: 173-77) affirms the second view with several biblical references: [433] "The sanctuary is said to be contaminated only when an individual enters into it in a state of uncleanness, or when it is used to worship idols or false gods" (1986: 176). If a proper cleansing ritual is not performed to purify the person, he must not approach the sanctuary; "otherwise, he would contaminate the holy dwelling" (Rodriguez, 1986: 173). The contamination of the sanctuary is the result of the unclean person's approach to the sanctuary in his impure state. Molech worship is another example. The offender's sin refers to a person's sacrifice of his child to Molech without the knowledge of the people; [434] when he comes to the sanctuary for this illicit sacrifice, he contaminates it; thus divine punishment is executed to him, because only God knows what he committed (Rodriguez, 1986: 175). Sin and impurity do not automatically defile the sanctuary, except for public rebellion against God.

Rodriguez (1986: 177-78) contends: if the offender does not confess the sin, the defilement of the sanctuary mentioned in the passages is purified with the sinner's punishment, that is, the death penalty or cutting off, even though some of such offenses (פְּשָׁעִים) are expiable, as implied in Leviticus 16:16, 21. However, it is unlikely that the contaminated sanctuary could be automatically cleansed just with the sinner's death or cutting off, that is, simply by the penalty for the guilt of the illicit act.

H. Maccoby's view (1999: 172-73) basically stands in line with the rabbis and Rodriguez. But he denies every argument for distant defilement of the sanctuary through sin or impurity, whether it is the general defilement applied to all other cases (Milgrom) or the restricted defilement pertinent to Leviticus 15:31; 20:3; Numbers 19:13, 20 (Gane). For example, the human corpse itself does not defile the sanctuary from a distance. Rather, when the corpse-contaminated person enters or contacts the sanctuary, he defiles it. Maccoby (1999: 9) explains:

> The whole purity code in the Torah . . . is a protocol for a dedicated group living constantly in the presence of God . . . It is a kind of palace protocol or etiquette, observed in the court of a monarch, but not required outside the confines of the palace.

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[433] Lev 15:31; 20:2-3; Num 19:13, 20; Ezek 23:38-39; 2 Ch 36:14.

[434] If it is known in public, it constitutes 'revolt' or 'rebellion' against God which contaminates automatically the sanctuary from afar (Rodriguez, 1986: 176-178). For the treatment of this sin, see below.

To him the sanctuary corresponds to the divine palace of YHWH. Therefore, before entering the sanctuary, a person should purify himself. If an unclean person does not approach the sanctuary, but keep himself far from it, his impurity never becomes the source of defilement that contaminates the sanctuary.

"The only time that sin enters the picture is when a person, knowing himself to be in a state of impurity, enters sacred areas or comes into contact with sacred food such as the sacrifices, or priestly food . . . " (Maccoby, 1999: 38-39); it means that the offender's prolonged state of impurity is not sinful in itself. For this reason, according to Maccoby it is not a sin for a person to remain in his impure state by neglecting to purify himself, though his impurity could be so aggravated. That is, a prolonged impurity does not grow to become a defiant sin, unlike Milgrom and Gane's idea.

Maccoby declines the distant defiling power of moral sin as well, following the rabbis. What is required of the sinner is his confession of sin, and the *hattat* offering would bring about the effect of atonement for him rather than purgation of the sancta. He (1999: 197) states:

> As for transgressions of the prohibitions of the Torah, the rabbinic view is that these have no defiling effect at all. They are moral lapses which must be repented in due measure whether they are deliberate or merely negligent. The offering of a *hattat* ('sin-offering') is part of a process of 'atonement' or reconciliation with God, not a detergent for the altar, which does not need to be cleansed.

It is true that Maccoby's basic concept is rooted in a biblical ground, because 'impurity' and 'profane' must be separate from 'clean' and 'holy' (Lev 10:10), and because uncleanness is required to be barred or removed from the sacred place and the camp (Lev 12:4; Num 5:1-3). An unclean person must undergo a series of purificatory procedures, before he comes to the sanctuary to offer the *hattat* sacrifice and other sacrifices. Moreover, it is inferred that the whole people of Israel must be purified by the *hattat* sacrifice, when they should stand before God in Israel's public and calenderic ceremonies on the festivals, as implied in the first public sacrifices initiated at the cultic inauguration (Lev 9; cf. § 5.2.2.3).

But Gane (2005: 147) criticizes correctly: "Maccoby's assumption that ordinary Israelites were required to purify themselves only when they were about to contact sacred areas or objects is not in the biblical text." It is true that

in some cases an unclean person's entrance into the sanctuary is legitimately allowded under God's permission. For example, the leper must come to the sanctuary to present the *hattat* offering, the guilt offering, and the burnt offering, after he took the required purificatory rites (Lev 14). It must be noticed that the blood of the guilt offering goat is daubed on the leper's extremities for his additional cleansing to the above procedures. That is, the offerer's entrance into the sanctuary, though he was still unclean, was legitimate,[435] and did not incur impurity of the sanctuary.

Maccoby and Rodriguez's immediate problem is that they do not properly treat the automatic defilement in Leviticus 20:2-3 as a case of a distant defilement. This passage mentions neither the offender's approach to the sanctuary for worshiping other deities like Molech worship, nor his approach to it after performing such worship in other illegal sanctuaries; the illicit worshipper's approach to the sacntaury does not lead to its defilement. Instead, the text warns that the illicit practice itself would incur the defilement of the sanctuary and consequently 'death penalty' or 'extirpation.' It was certainly an automatic and aerial defilement from a distance.

Along with the statement of Leviticus 20:3, the unique modes of the *hattat* blood rite performed to purify the sancta (§ 5.2.1) provide a reliable evidence of distant defilement, because the cleaning of the sanctuary presupposes its defilement by the offerer's sin or impurity.

The statement of Leviticus 17:16 is significant: it warns about negligence to purify oneself from the impurity incurred by eating a carcass, because it

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[435] This thesis argues that a sinner, who commits an inadvertent sin, has to bring a *hattat* animal to the sanctuary, while he is still in his sinful and thereby unclean state. Confession and repentance do not remove the sin from him (contra Milgrom); such a penitence is just a qualification required of the sinner to approach the sanctuary, while they might mitigate the power of the sin; the offender's sin is removed by transference to the victim through his hand imposition, as indicated in the Azazel goat ritual of Lev 16 (see § 4.3.2.1). His atonement and forgiveness/purification from his sin are not declared until his *hattat* ritual is to purge the sancta, because the purification of the sancta, which is defiled by the offender's sin, is indispensible for the accomplishment of his atonement and forgiveness. This thesis argues, however, that in an impurity case, the impurity is completely cleansed through a series of purificatory procedure, before the offerer makes the *hattat* offering at the sanctuary. But as far as the case of the leper is concerned, his impurities are not completely cleansed from his body until at the sanctuary he undergoes the additional cleansing procedures, including the blood sprinkling of the guilt offering on the leper's extremities, to cleanse the residual impurity from his body. Yet the altar must still be purged in order to accomplish the offerer's integral purification, because without the purification of the sancta, his purification is not accomplished; for this purpose, the *hattat* offering is made. Therefore, the sin paradigm and the impurity paradigm display slightly discrete ritual dynamics and process in making atonement for the offerer through the *hattat* ritual (see § 7.3.).

would lead to 'his bearing of the guilt' (נָשָׂא עָוֺן) that implies his ominous and prospective death penalty.[436] It is confirmed that the reason for the penalty is "not because he might enter the sanctuary while impure. His very neglect to purify himself is sinful and punishable" (Milgrom, 2000c: 730). This case implies that in light of Leviticus 15:31; 20:2-3 and Numbers 19:13, the mild impurity would be aggravated to a severe impurity, while generating defilement of the sanctuary, although the text is silent.

As a conclusion, Milgrom (2000c: 731) responds to Maccoby's view on the reason why an unclean person is prohibited from approaching the sanctuary: he will be killed by divine (Lev 10:1-3) or human agency's immediate punishment (Num 18:1-7), while standing in the sacred areas in his dangerous state. That is, the unclean person's death-stroke, rather than its contamination with his impurity, is the direct reason for his prohibition of approach to the sanctuary.

On the other hand, Kiuchi suggested an idea similar to Maccoby but in a different way. With regard to defilement dynamics, he distinguishes between the prompt sancta pollution by general physical impurities (Lev 12, 14-15) and the 'long-term sancta pollution' by delay or negligence of purification (Lev 15:31; Num 19:13, 20). In the case of the general impurities, an unclean person, suffering from an impure source, could contaminate the sanctuary with his impurity at the moment when he enters it, rather than the *miasma* of the impurity defiles it from afar (contra Milgrom). Kiuchi (1987: 61) says:

> Milgrom assumes that sancta become defiled when a person becomes unclean. Consequently sancta are defiled before the priest undertakes purification rites: since the sancta are defiled, the priest cleanses them. We rather assume that uncleanness is envisaged in the sancta when an unclean person stands before the Lord, i.e., at the entrance of the Tent, and that when the priest purifies the sancta, the unclean person becomes clean concurrently. Thus the *hattat* blood indeed purifies the sancta but not the sancta that have been defiled for a lengthy period.

To put it another way, Kiuchi also accepts the contamination of the sanctuary through human impurity, but his view on the timing of defilement differs from Milgrom's, who contends that human major ritual impurity or moral sin defiles the sanctuary from a distance.

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[436] For the various meanings of נָשָׂא עָוֺן, including punishment for sin, in the contexts, see § 2.3.3.

On the other hand, concerning the delay or negligence of purification, Kiuchi proposes an epidemiology distinctive from that of general impurities. He comments on Leviticus 15:31 which he sees as similar to Numbers 19 (1987: 61-62):

> Therefore, the passage hardly implies that the uncleanness dealt with in Lev 15:2-30 defiles the tabernacle. Rather what v. 31 says is that when the rules in vv. 2-30 are not kept, that defiles the tabernacle. Thus Lev 15:31 does not contradict our proposal that the *hattat* ritual in Lev 12-15 does not assume sancta pollution in Milgrom's sense. Seen this way, Lev 15:31 closely resembles Num 19:13, 20, though in the latter the *karet* penalty is prescribed. As in Num 19:13, 20 it is unnecessary to assume, as the rabbis did, that in Lev 15:31 defiling the tabernacle meant or involved actually entry into the sanctuary in an unclean state.

To sum up, Kiuchi suggests that there are two ways in which defilement of the sancta could occur: (1) it occurs at the moment when the impurity-bearer enters the sanctuary, that is, a prompt defilement of the sanctuary by the unclean person's approach; (2) it occurs by deliberate delay or neglect of purificatory rituals, that is, a long-term defilement of the sanctuary from a distance. In this view, he rejects automatic and distant defilement of the sanctuary by physical impurities themselves (or moral sins).[437]

Kiuchi's problem is clear in three aspects: (1) he did not take sufficiently into account the case of a distant defilement in Leviticus 20:3, even though it is questionable whether a generalized rationale of a distant defilement could be deduced from this case so as to be applied to other cases of sin or impurity; (2) Leviticus 15:31 was not interpreted in the context of the purity law (Lev 11-15) with regard to the theory of the *hattat* ritual; (3) the peculiar modes of the blood rites practiced in the *hattat* ritual, and their function, namely, cleansing the sancta by the special blood rites, were not duly considered. These points will be discussed in the next section after Gane's view is treated.

Declining all theories above, Gane submits an alternative idea. He also denies an automatic aerial defilement of the sanctuary from a distance by general impurity (Lev 11-15) or inadvertent sin (Lev 4-5) (contra Milgrom), except for Leviticus 15:31, 20:3 and Num 19:13, 20 where the distant defilement

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[437] Kiuchi does not clearly mention the case of moral sin: also in the case of a sinner who committed an inadvertent sin, does he contaminate the sancta, just when he enters the sanctuary to offer the *hattat* sacrifice? The application of the same rule to the sin case seems to be implied in his theory.

of the sanctuary are clearly stated. In other words, he restricts distant defilement of the sanctuary solely to those cases, excluding all the other cases where the text is silent. Impurity and sin do not emit aerial defiling power that contaminates the sanctuary from a distance through its *miasma*.

According to Gane, the evils that incur the sancta defilement from outside the sanctuary are moral faults, either Molech worship (Lev 20:3) or intentional neglect of some purificatory measures to cleanse the impurity (Lev 15:31; 19:13, 20). Although a person's defilement through contact with a corpse is not a sin except for priests and the Nazirites[438] (Lev 21:1-4, 11; Num 6:6-7), negligence of required purification, however, means disobedience (Gane, 2005: 144). In the same vein, he refuses Kiuchi's idea that when an unclean person enters the sanctuary, his impurity incurs its pollution, saying: "there is no indication in Lev 15:31; 20:3; Num 19:13 and 20 that defilement of the sanctuary occurs only if wrongdoers physically enter the sacred precincts, whether during or after the time when they commit their sins" (Gane, 2005: 147-48). Instead, in these verses, only when the ritual impurities are not handled by the proper purificatory rituals, the automatic and distant defilement of the sanctuary occurs and invites divine punishment (Gane, 2005: 155). He concludes: "Therefore, there is no clear evidence for automatic defilement of the sanctuary by any kind of physical ritual impurity itself." (2005: 155)

Concerning the result of neglecting the purificatory measures for impurity, Gane (2005: 150-51) agrees with Milgrom's view (2000c: 730) that argues for quantitative growth of the same impurity, saying that the unclean person's neglect to purify himself will change his minor impurity to major impurity that will pollute the sanctuary; the prolonged impurity threatens the sanctuary. At the same time, Gane (2005: 150-51) says that the sins in Leviticus 5:1-4 are the result of *inadvertent* neglect to purify an unclean person, and the *hattat* ritual is required for these sins.

It is therefore certain that "the growth of impurity during delay is not simply quantitative; it involves a qualitative transformation from physical ritual impurity to moral fault" (Gane 2005: 151). For the reason, the ultimate penalty of neglect to purify the impurity is either 'death' or 'extirpation,' punishments pertinent to wanton moral sins.

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[438] Rodriguez (1979: 104, 121) generalizes the case of the Nazirites in which their defilement by corpse-contact is called a sin (Num 6:11). By so doing he argues that a ritual impurity could be regarded as a kind of sin. However, as Milgrom (1991b: 256) replies, the case of the Nazirites is exceptional, due to their special status similar to the priests: they are holy (Num 6:5, 8) and "the contamination of the holiness is a serious 'sin'."

Apart from his view that distant defilement of the sanctuary is restricted to a few cases, Gane's theory of the sancta defilement had another aspect. Following Johar's *hattat* theory, he argues for the pollution of the sanctuary casued by another trajectory on ordinary days: uncleanness of the sanctuary results from sin and impurity that are transferred to it from the offerer through the *hattat* blood rites (Gane, 2005: 169-171). Then the impurities accumulated in the sanctuary throughout the year are kept there until they are removed by the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement. Gane's idea, including Kiuchi's, will be refuted in the following section.

6.3.2. Interpretation of Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20

Following Sklar (see § 2.2.3), the starting point of this study is that the primary function of the *hattat* blood rites is always to cleanse the sanctuary and its sancta, while the *hattat* victim and its blood effect 'ransom' for the offerer's evil. As argued in chapter 5, the peculiar modes of the *hattat* blood rites signify that the blood is daubed and sprinkled on the sancta to purge them of impurity. It assumes that the sanctuary and its sancta are contaminated by the offerer's sin or impurity. From this perspective and starting point, all the theories discussed above must be judged and the related passages need to be interpreted. Scholars have led to each wrong conclusion concerning defilement dynamics of human evil, due to their misunderstanding of Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20 where the sancta defilement is clearly mentioned.

These passages must be distinguished from one another, because each case belongs to a different category. Firstly, Leviticus 20:3 clearly states an automatic defilement of the sanctuary that is generated by the abhorrent sin, Molech worship. On the other hand, Numbers 19:13, 20 treat an automatic defilement of the sanctuary by the impurity-bearer's intentional negligence to purify himself from the contamination caused by his contact with a corpse; he may invite a 'death penalty.' In other words, this case of the sanctuary defilement is a result of a delayed action, in distinction from the case of Molech worship that is not a delayed action, because it is "a sin of commission rather than neglect"' (Gane, 2005: 145). Leviticus 15:31 seems to be another case that is distinguished from the two cases above, although many interpreters tend to categorize it into the same group as the case of Numbers 19. It is because this verse appears to presuppose the minor defilement of the sanctuary, prior to the mortal defilement by the negligence of the purificatory procedure.

Numbers 19:13 and v. 20 state that if anyone who touches a corpse of a person and does not purify himself, he will defile the tabernacle of the Lord, and consequently the penalty of extirpation will be assigned to the person. The purificatory rite required of him is the sprinkling of the 'water of *hattat*' on him. Scholars think that corpse-contact as such does not incur the defilement of the sancta, but the delay or neglect to purify the unclean person brings about the defilement of the sancta.[439]

In chapters 2 (§ 2.3.2.) and 5 (§ 5.2.2.4), it is argued that the sprinkling of the blood of the red heifer toward the sanctuary refers 'proleptically' to the purgation of future impurities (cf. Gane, 2005: 181-89). It implies that the sprinkling rite of the ash water mixed with the blood of the red heifer[440] on the unclean person presupposes the proleptic cleansing of the sanctuary. In other words, the contaminated person is treated as if his corpse-contact has already contaminated the sancta "back through time and space" (cf. Gane, 2005: 183). It implies that the contamination by a corpse was taken as a severe defiling source to defile the sanctuary from a distance. However, it does not require regular *hattat* sacrifice; it is given as a type of concessive *hattat*, presumably because of the collective and incessant occurrence of contamination by corpses in their ordinary life (e.g., natural death or collective death in wars).

For this reason, the defilement of the sanctuary through neglect to purify the unclean person can be considered as nullification of the proleptically cleansed future impurity and a growth of the defilement of the sanctuary.

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[439] Milgrom (1990: 438-43) endeavors to explain the red heifer ritual and the purification of 'corpse contamination' through historical approach, referring to a Mesopotamian Namburbi ritual; just as in Mesopotamia, so the power of corpse contamination was *originally* taken as dangerous in Israel. Corpse contamination "evoked an obsessive, irrational fear in individuals" probably requiring a rigorous purificatory process like that for a leper, but "the power of corpse contamination has been vastly reduced" in the legislation of the red heifer ritual (Milgrom, 1990: 442). That is to say, "the priestly legislators have reduced the degree of impurity in corpse contamination from the most to the least severe . . ." (p. 443); therefore, corpse-contamination was not considered to be powerful in Israel, so it could not defile the sanctuary (also D. Wright, 1991: 161).

[440] It is unique and significant that the blood of the heifer is burned with its skin, flesh, and dung, because blood of animals must be always poured at the base of the outer altar or to the ground and covered with earth in the open field (Lev 17:13; cf. Deut 12:16, 24; 15:23; 1 Sam 14:32-34). The blood was sprinkled toward the sanctuary before its burning with other portions of the red heifer. It implies that the blood purified proleptically the assumed defilement of the sanctuary that would be incurred by impurity of corpse, and the ash water mixed with blood might have power to cleanse and furthermore to effect latent atonement for the unclean person from his corpse-contamination.

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Aggravating impurity may constitute a deliberate or even wanton sin, the defiling power of which reaches the *adytum*, the innermost precinct of the sanctuary.[441]

Secondly, the usual scholarly interpretation of Leviticus 15:31 is not acceptable, because of their wrong assumption that the physical impurities treated in Leviticus 15:2-30 (and probably also all impurities treated in Leviticus 12, 14-15) do not contaminate the sanctuary. However, Kiuchi and many scholars failed to consider the double functions of the *hattat* ritual: 'ransom + purgation.'

Kiuchi (1987: 61) is right, of course, when he says that the defilement of the Tabernacle articulated in v. 31 results from a violation, namely, the neglect of the purificatory rules in vv. 2-30.[442] However, the *hattat* ritual has the double function, 'ransom + purgation' as argued in chapter 2. The blood of the *hattat* animal is assigned to the altar as 'ransom' of blood-life for the offerer (Lev 17:11), because "its blood is identified with its life" (Lev 17:14 NASB)'; at the same time it is daubed and sprinkled on the altar to 'cleanse' it (see ch. 5). This double effect of the quadruped *hattat* ritual is endowed by God's will to concessive *hattat* offerings of a bird or grain (no bloody sacrifice). This rule is applied to the cases of the bird *hattat* rituals in Leviticus 12, 14-15. Considering this respect, it can be argued that defilement of the Tabernacle was assumed in Leviticus 12, 14-15, and therefore the statement in 15:31 may refer to a growth of the same impurity by neglecting the proper purificatory procedures. The aggravation of the impurity leads to the 'death penalty,' which implies that it turned to a deliberate or even wanton sin.

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[441] Wright (1991: 161) says that such aggravating impurity may generate very severe contamination of the sanctuary, commenting on Num 19:13, 20:

> "Since corpse contamination does not normally pollute the sanctuary, one might think the sanctuary pollution here is on a par with the sanctuary pollution that is caused by inadvertently delayed non-sacrificial impurities according to the implications of Lev 5:2-3 – that is, that the outer altar of the sanctuary is what is polluted. But the rhetoric of Num 19:13, 20 is much stronger than that in Lev 5:2-3 and hints that a greater pollution occurs."

[442] Possibly Lev 15:31 may overarch all such rules in Lev 11-15, a separate unit called the 'purity law' or 'purity code' (Elliger, 1966: 196; Hartley, 1992: 208), although some scholars restricts it to Lev 15 (Kiuchi, 1987: 61; for three views on v. 31, see Milgrom, 1991b: 945). This verse might be considered as a concluding warning against all the violation or delay of the purificatory measures by extension as well as those of Lev 15, although vv. 32-33 are supplemented as a concluding statement of Lev 15 (Koch, 1959: 9, cited in Milgrom, 1991b: 945; Elliger, 1966:193).

From the observation of the above cases, a possible principle could be deduced: in the same context of sin or impurity, the text tends not to mention a relatively mild defilement of the sanctuary, while spotlight is turned on severe defilement on account of its gravity. In other words, when defilement of the sanctuary is mentioned in a text, its context implies that it is very powerful and particular. This principle seems to be pertinent to the case of the sancta defilement in Leviticus 20:2-3.[443]

6.3.3. Interpretation of Leviticus 20:2-3

Leviticus 20:2-3 is the only place where it is stated that defilement of the sanctuary is generated by an intentional violation of prohibitive commandments, rather than by delay or neglect of purification in the cases of impurity. The penalty for the sin is declared to be 'death' (v. 2) and 'cutting off' (v. 3).[444] Within the content of Leviticus 18-20 that can be regarded as an individual unit, defilement of the sanctuary is not mentioned except in 20:3, even though this unit is packed up with a number of abominable sins which invite 'death,' 'cutting off,' and 'vomiting from the land.' The question is raised whether the warning of 20:3 can be applied to other wanton and defiant sins, and immediately to the brazen sins in the adjacent context (Lev 18-20).[445]

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[443] Likewise, this rule seems to be applied to the common occasions of the ordinary *hattat* ritual (Lev 4 and 12-15) and the particular occasions of the special *hattat* ritual (Lev 8 and 16). In the former there is no mention about the purification of the sancta, but it is mentioned in the latter, because either the defilement of the sancta is very severe (Lev 16) or the purification of the sancta was particular (Lev 8).

[444] Milgrom (2000a: 1733-34) notes that the mention of the two terminal punishments in Lev 20:2-3 is understood as double penalties rather than two expressions for the same (see § 6.2.1. n. 421)

[445] At this stage, the approach to the text declared in chapter 1 must be recalled: many scholars have doubted the existence of H and thrust out a number of evidential data that the Holiness Code never existed as an independent corpus (Noth, 1965: 12; Wenham, 1979: 6-8; D. Patrick, 1986: 152; J. Hartley, 1992: 249; Gerstenberger, 1996: 354-355; Rendtorff, 1996: 22-35; Kiuchi, 2007: 17; B. D. Bibb, 2009: 147-49; especially, a thorough investigation of H. T. C. Sun, 1990). Following them, this thesis does not acknowledge the editorial division and ideological collisions between P and H in the final book of Leviticus, while preferring a synchronic study. Therefore, this discussion excludes such arguments that P was primarily interested in cultic matters and the holiness of the sanctuary, but H was tilted to moral matters and the holiness of the land; P identified the priests to be holy, but H extended the holiness to the common Israelites; "P's doctrine of holiness is static; H's is dynamic" (Milgrom 1991b: 42-51). In relation to the present issue, Molech worship, as well, Milgrom (2000a: 1734) states:

> To be sure, P implies that the violation of prohibitive commandments, of which
> idolatry is surely one, pollutes the sanctuary . . . , but P's only explicit statement

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Gane (2005: 296) says that the Molech worship of Leviticus 20:3 refers to פְּשָׁעִים (פֶּשַׁע) of Leviticus 16:16. This sin can be classified into the same category as 'the high-handed' sin of Numbers 15:30-31,[446] because "both are committed defiantly/rebelliously and therefore the offenders are barred from the benefit of expiation" (Gane, 2005: 296). However, Gane prefers to restrict the cases of automatic defilement to Leviticus 20:3 and Numbers 19:13, 20, because there is no mention of the same automatic defilement in Numbers 15:30-31. This fact "leaves open the possibility that other cases of defiant sin do not affect the sanctuary in this way" (Gane, 2005: 296). Probably Gane's view is that this kind of defiant sin in Numbers 15:30-31 invites the punishment by 'death' or 'cutting off' without contamination of the sanctuary.

On the other hand, Milgrom (1991b: 257) contends that the same dynamics of defilement works in other wanton sins as well. The wanton sinner defiles the sanctuary with his defiant sin, and he is shut off from bringing his *hattat* sacrifice to cleanse the pollution of the sanctuary caused by his sin until the Day of Atonement (Num 15:27-31). When the high priest performs the special *hattat* ritual to purge the sanctuary of all impurities on the Day of Atonement, the pollution of the sanctuary incurred by his wanton sin is also cleansed. Wright's view is similar (1988: 186-87), but to him the wanton sin is punished without opportunity of expiation; all intentional and inexpiable sins defile the sanctuary and are punished by terminal penalty, but the defilement of the sanctuary contaminated by such sins still remain and should be removed by the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement.

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to this effect is in regard to the ritual impurity of genital fluxes (15:31). Nonetheless, that H regards Molek worship, which takes place outside the sanctuary, capable of polluting the sanctuary indicates that it accepts and continues P's doctrine of 'Dorian Gray'; that is, severe impurity committed anywhere registers on the face of the sanctuary . . .

(For Milgrom' metaphor of Dorian Gray, see § 6.3.3 below)

However, concerning the mention of the sanctuary defilement in Lev 15:31 and 20:3, it is possible to make a consistent systematic explanation on the base of the presumed priestly cultic system and the *hattat* ritual theory. As several scholars have contended, and in terms of the systematic structure and elaborate cultic scheme of Leviticus, it is doubtful whether the final text of Leviticus discriminated between P and H, and whether its writer inserted contradictory contents into the book that was integrated as a whole.

[446] NASB: "But the person who does *anything* defiantly, whether he is native or an alien, that one is blaspheming the LORD; and that person shall be cut off from among his people. Because he has despised the word of the LORD and has broken His commandment, that person shall be completely cut off; his guilt *will be* on him." (Num 15:30-31)

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To limit the discussion to the unit of Leviticus 18-20 that includes Molech worship, the automatic defilement of the sanctuary might be generalized and applied to all other prohibitions in the unit on several grounds, although the defilement of the sanctaury caused by Molech worship in Leviticus 20:2-3 is a solitary case among a variety of prohibitions where it is mentioned.

Firstly, Molech worship can be regarded as a crux or apex of a variety of abominable prohibitions in Leviticus 18-20. Probably for this reason the defilement of the sanctuary from a distance by Molech worship is solitarily highlighted as the most dreadful case among them, while it covers all other violations of a lower grade. Here the principle deduced above needs to be recalled: in a context of sin or impurity, the text tends not to mention the relatively mild defilement of the sanctuary, while a severe one is spotlighted because of its gravity. The same principle may well be applied to this case of Leviticus 20:3 within Leviticus 18-20.

Milgrom (2000a: 1728) displays a chiasm structure of Leviticus 20 where vv. 1-6 address the Molech and necromancy prohibitions, which constitute a sub-unit. It indicates that the two illicit practices are tied together. Therefore, it is implied that necromancy also contaminates the sanctuary, because it is in essence the same offense as Molech worship. The whole chapter forms an inclusio that is enveloped by the first subunit of vv. 1-6 and the last verse 27 (Milgrom, 2000a: 1736).

A Worship of chthonic gods (Molech and necromancy, vv. 1-6)
  B Sanctification (v.7)
    C Exhortation to obedience (v. 8)
      X Penalties for violation (vv. 9-21)
    C[1] Exhortation to obedience (vv. 22-25)
  B[1] Sanctification (v. 26)
A[1] Worship of chthonic gods (necromancy, v. 27)

This structure implies that the defilement of the sanctuary by Molech worship and/or necromancy, as the apex of the illicit practices in the poles of the structure, may encompass other cases.

Furthermore, the same punishments for Molech worship in v. 3 are declared for the other illicit practices: 'death,' 'cutting off,' and 'vomiting from the land'. It may denote that the violations of such prohibitions incur the same consequence as in Molech worship: that is, defilement of the sanctuary. These illicit practices are called in Leviticus 20 as follows: טַמֵּא 'impure' (v. 3); תֶּבֶל

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'confusion' (v. 12); תּוֹעֵבָה 'abominable' (v. 13); זִמָּה 'wickedness' (v. 20); נִדָּה 'abhorrent' (v. 21).

By extension this principle can be applied to Leviticus 18, which forms a pair with Leviticus 20 concerning the same sexual prohibitions, while Leviticus 19, which stipulates the miscellaneous commandments, is sandwiched between them.[447] Leviticus 18 is likewise packed up with the warnings about the same punishments. In addition, that Leviticus 18-20 form a unit is clear from the warning against following the practices of Israel's neighbors. Leviticus 18 starts with a warning (v. 3) about the illicit practices and ends with it (v. 30).[448] Furthermore, Leviticus 20 states the same warning at the concluding verses (v. 23), which indicates a close connection with Leviticus 18.

In fact, all the prohibitions are called on the Egyptian and Canaanite practices (18:3, 30; 20:3). At the peak of the practices, are placed Molech worship and necromancy. All the illicit practices are the result of following other deities. The abominations cannot be separate from Molech worship. Worship of other deities would lead to different moral and ethical standards.

In this unit, all the violations of prohibitions in Leviticus 18 are identified in almost the same terms as in Leviticus 20: טָמֵא 'impure' (vv. 20, 23, 24; etc); תּוֹעֵבָה 'abominable' (v. 22, 26, 27; etc); זִמָּה 'wickedness' (v. 17). Kiuchi (2007: 309) explains that frequent and intensive appearances of תּוֹעֵבוֹת in the final section (vv. 26-27, 29-30) of Leviticus 18 are to "bring all the prohibitions under the rubric of תּוֹעֵבוֹת" (v. 29)[449] and that all the violations of the prohibitions are defiling to the offender (v. 30). It alludes to the defilement of the sanctuary by such violations, just as in Leviticus 20.

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[447] A. P. Ross (2002: 346) comments that the sexual offence is a kind of deviation from the boundary. Jenson (1992: 84)'s statement is more concrete: ". . . sexual integrity had a fundamental social and religious dimension. At the heart of the Priestly view of man and woman was a belief that the order of the world and society was based on marriage and the extended family." In terms of structure, Lev 19, which stipulates miscellaneous moral and civil laws, is enveloped by the two units concerning the sexual offences (Lev 18 and 20); this seems to betray the legislator's tenet that sexual integrity and marriage are the most important device to maintain a stable society. The maintenance and restoration of the social and cosmic order are a significant concept in the theology of Leviticus. It remains condensed in the ultimate purpose of the Day of Atonement: 'reestablishment of the order of creation' (Gorman, 1990: 61-62)

[448] NIV: "You must not do as they do in Egypt, where you used to live, and you must not do as they do in the land of Canaan, where I am bringing you. Do not follow their practices" (Lev 18:3)

[449] For the list of sins that belongs to the category of תּוֹעֵבָה, see Milgrom (2000a: 1569). On the other hand, for the intertexual and similar meanings of such impurity terms within Leviticus, see J. F. A. Sawyer (1996: 15-20) who denies the division of P and H in the book.

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Secondly, all the prohibited practices defile the land as well as the offenders. Leviticus 18:30 warns that the Israelites must not 'defile themselves' (אַל־תִּטַּמְּאוּ) with their neighbor's practices (also 18:20, 23-24; 19:31). [450] It certifies that moral sins also contaminate human beings, just as physical impurity does so (Lev 11:43; 20:25; 22:4). [451] At the same time, it is declared that the illicit practices defile the land with the result that the land will vomit them, as being polluted (Lev 18:25, 27-28; 20:22). [452] Because Molech worship and necromancy are included in the category of all the illicit practices, they will defile the land as well as the sanctuary. [453]

The general defilement of the sanctuary is implied in the statement concerning the pollution of the land. Wenham (1979: 96) said: "If sin polluted the land, it defiled particularly the house where God dwelt." Many scholars have explained that defilement of the land is H's concern, while P is interested in defilement of the sanctuary; therefore, in an ideological view the two themes are not related to each other (Milgrom, 1991b: 44, 48-49), although they are integrated in the single book of Leviticus. However, it appears that there is no conflict or contradiction between defilement of the sanctuary and defilement of

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[450] In this view, the prohibitive commandment of Lev 18:19 may be understood in a moral perspective within the context of Lev 18 that prohibits all illicit sexual relationship, although it envisages a warning against ritual uncleanness caused by sexual contact with a menstrual woman (Lev 15:14). In the context of Lev 18 that warns against illegal sexual relationship with a moral motivation, it is likely that a husband's sexual approach to a menstrual wife was considered as degrading her personality, in addition to his ritual defilement by her impurity.

[451] Many scholars admit with Milgrom that moral sins bring about impurity so that they contaminate the offender and the sanctuary (Wenham, 1979: 96; Levine, 1989: 19; Gane, 2005: 200).

[452] Cf. Jer 2:7; 3:1-2, 9; 16:18; Ezek 36:17-18.

[453] For the destroying power of sin that inflicts on society and the social order or well-being, see Gorman (1990: 80). A wanton sin endangers the whole society with its formidable power. Borrowing von Rad's term (1962, 1: 265), Israel has a 'synthetic view of life.' Therefore, sin is associated with the whole community and it is a dynamic power in motion to devastate not only the individual sinner, but also the community. Kiuchi (1987: 158) poses a similar statement: "The very fact that the whole people are constituted of individuals suggests that the sins of individuals are in some way related to the sins of the whole people and thus to *adytum*." However, Kiuchi's idea is forcedly to justify the defilement of the *adytum* by lay Israelites' mild sins in order to support his *hattat* theory (see § 7.2.2). It is true that all sins are related more or less to the community as a whole, in that individual or congregational sins are accumulated in the sanctuary throughout the year and thereby can inevitably endanger the life of the congregation. However, it is unlikely that a persons' mild or inadvertent sin incurs collective responsibility that invites the devastation of God upon the congregation. The defiling power of an ordinary person's sin does not reach even the shrine, needless to say the *adytum*, unless it is a wanton sin that endangers the whole congregaton.

the land. When the wanton violation of prohibitive commandments and the disgusting illicit practices generate severe pollution of the land, it is unnatural to exclude the sanctuary in the scope of the all-inclusive defilement that covers the whole land.[454]

Furthermore, the vomiting by the land implies that the pollution of the sanctuary could exceed the critical mass that was tolerated (cf. Ezr 9:6-7).[455] From the perspective of Leviticus 18-20 it is clear that all the illicit practices not only inflict pollution on the sanctuary and its sancta, but also defile the people and the land. It can be stated that the *miasma* of abhorrent sin radiates into two trajectories toward both the sanctuary and the land, while it defiles the offender on the spot.

However, in the case of ritual impurity, there is no evidence that it contaminates the land, apart from the offender and the sanctuary. That is, the pollution of the land is incurred only by *abominable* sins, and not by mild sins or physical impurities. In this respect it is unlikely that the inadvertent sins in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 contaminate the land, while they incur mild defilement of the sanctuary.

6.3.4. Generalization of the sanctuary contamination

If the abominable sins in Leviticus 18-20, the apex of which is Molech worship, defile the sanctuary, can the defilement of the wanton sins be generalized to inadvertent sins and physical impurities? As mentioned, Milgrom bases his general theory of defilement on Leviticus 15:31; 20:3; Numbers 19:13, 20, while the dynamics of defilement in these verses can be consistently applied

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[454] As noted above, some sins that belong to civil law (*jus*) may defile only the land without defilement of the sanctuary, because they are not related to religious law (*fas*).

[455] About the critical mass of pollution that is tolerable to the sanctuary and the land, Milgrom (2000a: 1583) said:

> How much pollution can the land tolerate before it vomits out its residents? How many violations are required before they cause the exile of the nation? The text is silent. Perhaps H is following P's model of the pollution of the sanctuary. Just as it can be presumed that YHWH tolerates a low level of pollution in the sanctuary as long as it is purged by the purification offerings of inadvertent wrongdoers (Lev 4) and advertent miscreants (by the high priest, Lev 16) but will abandon the sanctuary (and the nation) if the pollution level of the sanctuary reaches a point of no return (vol. 1.254-61), so the progressive pollution of the land ultimately leads to its regurgitation of the pollution together with its inhabitants. H, then, has merely borrowed P's theology of the sanctuary and applied it to the land.

to all other sins in other cases. The above debate has shown that this generalization can be justified on several grounds in Leviticus 18-20. But Milgrom did not give a concrete reason why the rationale of the sanctuary defilement can be applied to other cases like inadvertent sins and physical impurities. Therefore, explanations are required for application to these cases.

This thesis has argued for the presupposed defilement of the sanctuary by human evils in Leviticus 4-5 and Leviticus 11-15 on the basis of the peculiar modes and functions of the *hattat* blood rites and several textual implications. In fact, the most authentic evidence for a general defilement of the sanctuary and its sancta lies in the peculiar blood rites of the *hattat* ritual itself. That the blood rites are performed to purge the sanctuary and its sancta indicates that they are contaminated by sin or impurity; and their purificatory function is invariably consistent in all occasion (contra Johar, Rodriguez, and Gane).

On the other hand, Leviticus 4:1-5:13 do not ostensibly verbalize whether the defilement of the sanctuary occurs, when a person commits an inadvertent sin (Lev 4) or an expiable deliberate sin (Lev 5:1-4); the silence is maintained in Leviticus 12-15 which deal with impurities. However, it should be noticed that textual silence does not always mean that something did not occur or exist. Probably defilement of the sanctuary and its sancta, and its purification are presupposed in the regulations of the *hattat* ritual (contra Gane). Nevertheless, the text keeps silence. The reason of the textual silence about the defilement of the sancta probably is that the focus of the text is on *the offerer* and his atonement/forgiveness, and not on the sanctuary. For this reason, the text does not concern itself about the defilement and puritifcation of the sancta. In addition, the principle suggested above must be recalled: mild defilement of the sancta tends not to be mentioned in the *hattat* text. In this respect, it must not be confirmed from textual silence that its defilement did not occur.

The assertion of this thesis is that defilement of the sanctuary is confirmed by the unique modes and functions of the blood rites in the *hattat* ritual. As argued in chapter 4 and 5, the gap of silence in Leviticus 4:1-5:14 with respect to the function of the *hattat* blood rites is filled with Leviticus 8:15 and 16:19. The function of the blood rites is to cleanse the sancta and it alludes to the contamination of the sancta from a distance by sin or impurity.

By the same principle Leviticus 17:16[456] must be understood that it presupposes defilement of the sanctuary, even though the verse does not

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[456] NASB: "When any person eats *an animal* which dies or is torn *by beasts*, whether he is a native or an alien, he shall wash his clothes and bathe in water, and remain unclean until

mention it. This verse stipulates the same rule as Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20, in that it warns against delaying or neglecting to purify the defiled person's impurity and that the wanton neglect will invite 'bearing the sin/guilt' (נָשָׂא עָוֹן) that envisions ultimately a death penalty. [457] Defilement of the sanctuary is not enunciated in Leviticus 17:16, unlike other similar cases of Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 9:13, 20, because the violation is the neglect to cleanse a mild impurity (contact with an animal carcass) that requires a time lapse of a day. Nevertheless, defilement of the sanctuary is assumed in this verse, requiring a *hattat* sacrifice (for similar cases, see Milgrom, 2000c: 730-33). The theory of gap filling is applied to this case.

The same rationale of the sancta defilement can be applied to Leviticus 12, 14-15 where the *hattat* ritual is prescribed to remedy impurities, but no automatic defilement of the sanctuary from a distance by impurity is ostensibly expressed. Through filling the gap with the cases of Leviticus 8:15 and 16:19, and in light of the function of the *hattat* ritual to purge the sancta that is confirmed from the verses, defilement of the sanctuary by physical impurity is presupposed in those passages.

In this respect, as for the interpretation of Leviticus 15:31 and Numbers 19:13, 20, the scholarly view on these passages must be amended, because the cases can be understood as growth and aggravation of the sanctuary defilement that was already incurred by a person's impure state (the impurities in Lev 12-15 and contamination by corpse in Num 19). Furthermore, by analogy with Leviticus 15:31 and Num 19:13, 20, it is inferred that delay or neglect to remedy a mild sin (e.g., an inadvertent sin) might turn to a wanton sin that would defile the deeper precincts of the sanctuary (contra Gane), although there is no textual evidence for it.

Based on the discussion above, the following dynamic spectrum is reconfirmed, according to the graded level of sin and impurity:

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evening; then he will become clean. But if he does not wash *them* or bathe his body, then he shall bear his guilt" (Lev 17:15-16)

[457] When the subject of the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן is a person(s), except in case of the priests who are 'divine surrogates' for God (Milgrom's term in 1991b: 623), it envisions a dreadful punishment like 'death penalty' (see ch. 2). Gane (2005: 150, 154) attempts to distinguish between the two cases as treating different impurities, saying that Lev 17:16 refers to minor impurity (one-day impurity) and Num 19:13, 19 is related to major impurity. Therefore, to him the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Lev 17:16 does not indicate 'terminal punishment.' Nevertheless, the nuance of נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Lev 17:16 as a meaning of punishment envisages 'death' or 'cutting off' as a severe warning about the violation or negligence to remedy the mild impurity.

Impurity: *minor / expiable major / inexpiable major*
(→ expiable deliberate sin → inexpiable wanton sin)
Sin: *expiable inadvertent / expiable deliberate / expiable wanton / inexpiable wanton*

To recapitulate: impurities are divided into three categories. Minor impurity is merely purified by observing a simple purificatory procedure outside the sanctuary, without a *hattat* and other sacrifices. However, a major impurity requires a *hattat* and other sacrifices at the sanctuary to remedy it. If an unclean person with such impurity delay or neglect to purify his body, his impurity is deteriorated into a deliberate or defiant sin by the violation; it will invite the 'death penalty' (Lev 15:31) or 'cutting off' (Num 19:13, 20). But it cannot be confirmed from the text whether such terminal penalty would be executed on the spot or will be done some day in the future by God's discretion. From the biblical evidence, it is inferred that to some wanton sins the opportunity for atonement can also be given.

Sins are classified into four categories. First category, namely, expiable inadvertent sins, can be remedied by the *hattat* with presumed confession of sin (Lev 4; Num 15:22-29), if either the sin is known to him (4:14, 23, 28) or he 'realizes the guilt,' after committing an 'inadvertent' sin. Second category refers to expiable deliberate sin (Lev 5:1-4). This category of sin must be distinguished from the wanton category. Next group is wanton/defiant sins, which are divided into expiable and inexpiable. Some wanton sins seem to be remedied by the *hattat* sacrifice, but others cannot be expiated, receiving a terminal punishment. In all these cases, the sanctuary and its sancta are defiled at various pollution levels by the sins and impurities. The next section will treat this issue.

6.4. Dynamics of the sanctuary contamination

6.4.1. Dynamic trajectories of the sanctuary contamination

At this stage, subsequent to the previous investigation into the graded evils, the following questions are raised: how do the graded sins and impurities defies the sanctuary?; why do human evils defile the sanctuary?; how can the defilement of the sanctuary be purified? It appears that all major impurities contaminate the outer altar, because in all cases the *hattat* blood is treated there (Lev 12-15). But graded sins have graded defiling powers which contaminate each sanctum and its area in proportion to its gravity.

Milgrom's lengthy statement (1991b: 257) deserves notice:

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The dynamic, aerial quality of biblical impurity is best attested by its *graded power*. Impurity pollutes the sanctuary in three stages: (1) The individual's inadvertent misdemeanor or severe physical impurity pollutes the courtyard altar, which is purged by daubing its horns with the *hattat* blood (Leviticus 4:25, 30; 9:9 ff.). (2) The inadvertent misdemeanor of the high priest or the entire community pollutes the shrine, which is purged by the high priest by placing the *hattat* blood on the inner altar and before the *paroket*-veil (Leviticus 4:5–7, 16–18). (3) The wanton, unrepented sin not only pollutes the outer altar and penetrates into the shrine but it pierces the veil to the holy ark and *kapporet*, the very throne of God (cf. Isaiah 37:16). Since the wanton sinner is barred from bringing his *hattat* (Numbers 15:27–31), the pollution wrought by his offense must await the annual purgation of the sanctuary on the Day of Purgation, and it consists of two steps: the purging of the *adytum* of the wanton sins and the purging of the shrine and outer altar of the inadvertent sins (Leviticus 16:16–19). Thus the entire sacred area, or, more precisely, all that is most sacred . . . is purged on Purgation Day (*Yôm hakkippurim*) with the *hattat* blood. In this way the graded purgations of the sanctuary lead to the conclusion that the severity of the sin or impurity varies in direct relation to the depth of its penetration into the sanctuary.

Milgrom's diagram displayed below shows clearly the 'mathematical relationship' (1991b: 227) between sin/impurity and sanctuary:[458]

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
[458] Defilement of the outer altar by physical impurity is added to Milgrom's diagram (1991b: 258). The terms in Milgrom's diagram are replaced in this revised diagram: 'inadvertencies,' instead of his 'unvoluntary'; 'wanton sins,' instead of his 'brazen and unrepented offenses.'

Milgrom (1991b: 257) goes on to say: "this diagram provides graphic confirmation that P propounds a notion of impurity as a dynamic force, magnetic and malefic to the sphere of the sacred, attacking it not just by direct contact but from a distance." Major impurities defile the outer altar (Lev 11-15) from afar. It indicates that the *miasma* of impurities does not reach the inner side of the sanctuary. A person's inadvertent sin also defiles the outer altar, and inadvertent sin of either the whole congregation or the high priest can reach the shrine and contaminate the inner altar and probably its area. The *miasma* of a wanton sin is so serious that its gravity can reach even the *adytum* and contaminate the Atonement Seat and its area.

Although Milgrom's diagram is useful to figure out the dynamics of the defilement by sin and impurity, it does not show, however, the dynamic movement by transition of the evil's grade. The following diagram supplements Milgrom's:

This diagram displays clearly the relationship between each grade of sin, and its defilement of the tripartite sanctuary, and the dynamic movement of defilement by aggravation of sin and impurity. The stages can be explained as follows:

1. An inadvertent sin could be altered to a wanton sin that could defiles the *adytum*, when the offender neglects to take the atoning process through a *hattat* sacrifice and sin-confession in order to remedy the mild sin.

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2. Some deliberate sins would be expiated by the *hattat* offering (Lev 5:1-4).[459] When the offender does not confess it with the *hattat* offering, the sin is inferred to be aggravated to an inexpiable wanton sin, which would defile the *adytum*.

3. Physical impurity would turn to an expiable deliberate sin, when for example, the offender neglects to take a series of purificatory procedures by a time lapse or by washing (Lev 5:2-3).[460] The converted state would defile the outer altar, requiring a *hattat* animal appropriate to the sin according to his socio-religious status.

4. It is inferred that if the offender still remains in his negligence of the atoning process for the deliberate sin that was the result of aggravation from his first impurity, it will turn to an inexpiable wanton sin and be punished by a terminal penalty, either by death or extirpation (Lev 15:31; Num 19:13, 20). It is supposed that this inexpiable wanton sin, either by the congregation or by an individual, would contaminate the *adytum*, the seat of God's presence, and the whole sanctuary, including the land.

Several inferences are deduced as natural consequences of the dynamic movement of the defilement.

Firstly, from this observation, it is not clear which kind of the *hattat* animal must be offered, when an offender neglects to purify himself from his impurity and consequently he commits a deliberate sin. Although the text is silent, it is presumed that while the purificatory procedures are still required, the offender may offer the *hattat* animal in line with his socio-religious state, as prescribed in Leviticus 4.

Secondly, a person's defilement by contact with a corpse (Num 19:13, 20) may be treated as a category similar to the ritual impurity (Lev 12-15), while it is inferred that the defilement would impact proleptically on the outer altar. Although the verses in Numbers 19 warn about cutting off in case that a person

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[459] Several deliberate sins in Lev 5:20-26 (6:1-7) are remedied by the guilt offering accompanied with additional reparation to the injurer.

[460] Milgrom (1991b: 307-10) points out correctly that Lev 5:1-13 does not relate to violation of a prohibitive commandment as in Lev 4. In this regard, he (1991b: 311-12) suggests the possibility that this neglect may have been done deliberately, saying (p. 312): "It is now obvious why vv. 2-3 say nothing about inadvertence; because no prohibition was violated, it makes no difference whether the impurity was contracted deliberately or inadvertently." He contends that the neglect (1991b: 313) could refer to 'forgetting,' saying: "That is, "someone has contracted impurity knowingly, even deliberately, but has forgotten to purify himself within the prescribed time limits."

contaminated by corpse-contact neglects to purify himself (cf. Lev 15:31), it is unlikely to be a warning about immediate execution of the punishment. Instead, like in the warning of Leviticus 15:31, it may mean that if the offender continues to remain in his neglect, consequently he comes to commit a wanton sin, and the divine punishment of cutting off will be executed for the severe sin.

Thirdly, defilement of the *adytum* is a consequence of wanton sins. The purification of this pollution is allowed only on the Day of Atonement by the high priest's entrance and through the *adytum hattat*. Some wanton sins were expiable. When an inexpiable wanton sin is committed by an individual person (e.g., Molech worship [Lev 20:2-3]) or a collective group (e.g., rebellion of Korah and his company [Num 16:31-35]), or even by the whole congregation, the offender(s) is punished for the disgusting sin; but the defilement of the *adytum* by the brazen sin is not purified until the *adytum hattat* is performed on the Day of Atonement, because the wanton sinner is barred from bringing his *hattat* offering to the sanctuary due to the unrepented sin, and will be punished (Milgrom, 1991b: 257). On the other hand, as Milgrom (1991b: 257) points out, it is inferred that a wanton sin defiles the whole tripartite sanctuary by penetrating through each precincts up to the *adytum*, given that it could contaminate even the land (Lev 18:25, 27; 20:22).

Therefore, the kinds of sins that are treated on the Day of Atonement are as follows: (1) expiable wanton sins, for which opportunity of atonement is given on the Day of Atonement; (2) inadvertent sins that were not remedied, due to forgetting them;[461] (3) presumably deliberate sins by neglect to purify unclean persons by forgetting it but still forgotten until on the Day of Atonement; the sins were not remedied yet, because it is still unknown. However, categories (2) and (3) would not be considered as a wanton category, because it is not defiant. In

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[461] As for some forgotten sins, this thesis infers that the *hattat* sacrifices offered at the national feasts (Lev 23) were offered to make atonement not for some *forgotten* specific sins and/or impurity, but for ever sinful or impure state of the human beings, or their latent sin or impurity, who are comparatively impure in front of their holy deity, and for its consequent implicit contamination of the sancta. At the feasts, when the congregation came to the sanctuary to stand before God, they had to offer the *hattat* sacrifice to ransom and remove their latent evil, and to purify the sancta. In contrast, it is likely that their forgotten sins were treated on the Day of Atonement; presumably, their forgotten purification of ritual impurity would turn unknowingly to a kind of inadvertent sin, due to its aggravation. On the other hand, the personal burnt offering could be presented for "the basic sinfulness of each person and the society as a whole" (Hartley, 1992: 18, 24) as well as a sign of devotion (see § 3.4.2.3). But at the feasts, when they gathered together to the sanctuary, it is assumed that they were required to present the *hattat* offering for their sinful state together with other sacrifices in order to purify the latent or implied impurity of the sanctuary. At any rate, it is difficult to figure out the function of the public *hattat* offerings performed at the feasts, because of the textual silence.

this case, the sins would still defile each appropriate precinct, depending on the offender's socio-religious status.[462] As for the inexpiable wanton sins that were already punished, the contamination of the sanctuary generated by them is purified on the Day of Atonement.

At this stage, it must be confirmed that the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement is not to purify ritual impurities of the Israelites. Instead, it was to purify *the impurities of the sanctuary* and to remove *all the sins of Israel*. In other words, all impurities of the Israelites are cleansed on ordinary days. If an impurity is not treated by an ordinary *hattat* ritual, it would be changed to a sin, whether it was done inadvertently or defiantly. Therefore, there exist no impurities of the Israelites that should be remedied on the Day of Atonement. Only the impurities of the sanctuary, which are generated by the Israelite's sins, including the sins of negligence to purify their impurities, would be purified by the blood of the special *hattat* sacrifices (but presumably the impurities of the sancta too, which were not cleansed, due to neglect that leads to a sin, could still be stuck to the sancta).

This point is very important for understanding atonement mechanism operating through the special *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement. Many scholars, including Sklar (2005: 139-40), contend that human impurities are purified on the Day, but they failed to see that delay or neglect to cleanse impurities turns to a sin. Milgrom (1991b: 1033) says that the impurities of the sanctuary are ones that were generated by human ritual impurities and moral impurities and accumulated there. But he also does not consider that such ritual impurities were completely purified and removed by the ordinary *hattat* sacrifice,

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[462] Klawans (2006: 55) contends that moral sins do not defile the sanctuary by contact with or approach to it, saying:

> Since Moral impurity does not produce ritual defilement, sinners – in contrast to those who are ritually impure – are not excluded from the sanctuary. In the case of the suspected adulteress (Num 5:11-31), the woman is brought into the sanctuary itself in order to determine her moral status. It also appears that Israelite murderers sought sanctuary *in the sanctuary* (Exod 21:14; cf. 1 Kgs 1:50-53 and 2:28-30). Moral impurity does indeed defile the sacred precincts (e.g., Lev 20:3). But the effect of moral impurity does not penetrate the holy realm by the entrance of sinners into it. Moral impurity is a potent force unleashed by sinful behaviour that affects the sanctuary even from afar, in its own way.

But the biblical examples cited by him are a suspected sin or an unintentional civil sin (*jus*), instead of a religious sin (*fas*) as a violation of YHWH's commandments (see n. 412). It is doubtful that an offender, whose religious sin is known, had permission to entrance into the sanctuary.

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although presumably some impurities of the sanctuary generated by human ritual impurities could still remain and stuck to the sancta, due to negligence to purify himself and the sancta that would turn to a sin.

Still, there is one more point to be considered in the matter of the sanctuary defilement. It is 'the doctrine of corporate culpability for sins' (Milgrom, 1991b: 349) or 'the notion of collective guilt' (Joosten, 1996: 45).

6.4.2. The sanctuary contamination by collective responsibility for sin

An inexpiable wanton sin is punished and eliminated by death or extirpation of the offender(s). But the sanctuary that is contaminated by the sin is not purified until the Day of Atonement.

Yet it is supposed that by the principle of the collective responsibility for sin, the whole congregation of Israel should have born the guilt of the wanton sin, even though the offender(s) was executed by death or extirpation for his sin. It is likely that on the Day of Atonement, the collective guilt also, atonement for which is postponed until the Day, would be removed and forgiven. Probably this may be the meaning of the statement of Leviticus16:16 and 21 that the wanton sins (פְּשָׁעִים) will be treated on the Day.

If this is right, the wanton sins remedied on the Day are divided into two groups: (1) expiable wanton sins that are given the opportunity of atonement until the Day; (2) collective sins of the whole congregation, for which they have collective responsibility, after inexpiable wanton sins were eliminated by the offender's death or expiation. Therefore, the pollution of the whole sanctuary, including the *adytum*, which is generated by inexpiable wanton sins, is a consequence of the offender's brazen sin and of the collective responsibility of the whole congregation for it.

In his comment on the consequences of Egyptian and Canaanite illicit practices, including Molech worship (Lev 20:2-8), and the case of the blasphemer (Lev 24:10-23), Joosten (1996: 45) defines the notion of collective involvement in sin as follows:

> On this understanding the notion of collective guilt in our passage comes into focus: the guilty party must be punished by the people of the land; if they refuse to do their part, the perpetrator will still receive his due; however, by allowing these crimes to happen, the land will be defiled and the entire people will ultimately suffer terrible collective punishment, i.e., exile from their land. In both Lev 24:10-23 and Lev

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20:2-5, we find the underlying notion of collective guilt resulting from the crime of one man.

According to Joosten's concept of collective guilt, on condition that the people of the land do not duly treat the wanton sinner with a fatal punishment, they would incur the result that they become accomplices of the sin. He acknowledges the automatic collective guilt for a wanton sin unpunished by the congregation.

However, Milgrom contradicts Joosten's view by presenting several biblical data. According to him, Joosten's interpretation on the cited cases is wrong. As for the case of Molech worship and the collective punishment for it (20:2-8), the reason why YHWH destroys the Molech worshiper's kinsmen (מִשְׁפָּחָה) is that they were involved in the crime by covering and hiding it or by protecting the kinsman worshipper rather than that they are automatically responsible for the illicit sin (Milgrom, 2000a: 1422-23). In the case of the blasphemer, the community was not punished for the sin. Only those who heard the curse (הַשֹּׁמְעִים) were responsible for it, because they were contaminated through their ears (Lev 24:10-23). The curse, which was absorbed in their ears, must be transferred and return to the blasphemer through their hand imposition so that it may not endanger their lives (v. 4) (Milgrom, 2000a: 1423; see ch. 4).

Despite this observation, Milgrom (2000a: 1423) admits that if the community does not execute the death sentence on the offender, they would be considered to be 'conspirators' (Lev 20:5). He goes on to say that if the community is culpable, Israel will be driven from the land, although "the sanctuary/land (i.e., God) can tolerate a limited amount of pollution caused by a few." Milgrom argues for 'collective responsibility for a sin' against God in his earlier commentary (1991b: 349):

> The doctrine of corporate culpability for sins against God informs not only P but all biblical literature. The tribes under Joshua are alarmed lest the sacrilege of Gad and Reuben bring down God's wrath on all Israel (Josh 22:18, 31), specifically citing Achan's sacrilege (v. 20) as a case in point (cf. Josh 7). According to Chronicles, Ahaz's trespass led to the political subjugation of Judah (2 Chr 298:19). That destruction and exile on a national scale follow in the wake of the מַעַל of oath violation is clear from the structure of the covenant itself (Lev 26:15-45; see explicitly Neh 1:5). Thus Ezekiel can pronounce exile for the entire nation because its king violated his solemn oath (Ezek 17:19-21).

Apart from Milgrom's biblical references, the narratives that are interwoven with the cultic legislations in the priestly literature address the collective responsibility of sin. In the episode of Korah and his companion's rebellion (Num 16:1-35), YHWH was about to pour his anger on the whole congregation who stood together on Korah's side by his summons at the entrance of the tent of meeting (v. 19). Then Moses and Aaron fell on their faces and supplicated:

> ". . . O God, God of the spirits of all flesh, when one man sins, will You
> be angry with the entire congregation?" (v. 22 NASB)

Their supplication had evaded the punishment of God upon the congregation for their silent alignment or looking on as spectators. This indicates that the whole congregation was treated as accomplices in Korah's crime.[463]

Besides, several episodes imply that an offender's wanton sin is automatically tantamount to the community's sin, as in Achan's episode (Josh 22: 20; Cf. Ananias and Sapphira's fraud in Acts 5), although it occurs in the non-priestly literature:

> "Did not Achan the son of Zerah act unfaithfully in the things under the
> ban, and wrath fall on all the congregation of Israel? And that man did
> not perish alone in his iniquity" (Josh 22:20 NASB)

Of course, as Joosten argues, it is inferred that the people could be exempted from collective responsibility of a wanton sin by punishing it. Nevertheless, in the cases where the divine punishment was executed by God himself or a divine agent, instead of the people, it seems that the community is still responsible for the sin.

Finally, Leviticus 26:40 addresses the connection of the present generation with the old generation' sins. It means that in the priestly concept, the collective responsibility of wanton sins is not restricted to time and space, but it could be continued beyond generations (cf. Ezr 9:7).

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[463] Sklar (2005: 84) sees it as a case where the original penalty of sin could be mitigated by a way of a persons' supplication.

6.4.3. Rationale of the sanctuary contamination

Milgrom's theory concerning defilement of the sanctuary was received favorably by scholars, except for several dissenters: the *miasma* of sin and impurity defiles the tripartite sanctuary, and the more severe they are, the deeper they penetrate into the sacred precincts.

Milgrom (1991b: 260) argues that this theology is completely the result of the priestly innovation that expunged the demonic nature from Israel cultic system. Citing Kaufmann,[464] he argues that there is 'an unbridgeable chasm' between Israel and its neighbors in their cultic concept. Israel's neighbors feared impurity, because "it was demonic, even metadivine, capable of attacking the gods," but in Israel "there are no traces of demonic impurity" (Milgrom, 1991b: 259). Instead, by the priestly innovation, man became the source of impurity in place of demon. "He alone is the cause of the world's ills. He alone can contaminate the sanctuary and force God out" (Milgrom, 1991b: 260).

Milgrom explains the relationship of man and the sanctuary by the analogy of Oscar Wilde's novel, *Picture of Dorian Gray*. His lengthy statement deserves citation:

> . . . It (the sacrificial system) constitutes the priestly theodicy. No intellectual circle of ancient Israel evaded the challenge of theodicy. . .
> Now we know what the priestly theodicy is. It is found not in utterances but in rituals, not in legal statutes but in cultic procedures—specifically, in the rite with the *hattat* blood. I would call their response the priestly *Picture of Dorian Gray*. On the analogy of Oscar Wilde's novel, the priestly writers would claim that sin may not leave its mark on the face of the sinner, but it is certain to mark the face of the sanctuary; and unless it is quickly expunged God's presence will depart. In truth, this teaching is not a startling innovation; it is only an extension of the doctrine of collective responsibility, a doctrine which, all concur, is basic to the priestly theology. It is only natural that they would regard the sanctuary of which they were the stewards as the spiritual barometer to measure and explain God's behaviour to his people. They knew full well that the prophet was justified in protesting "Why does the way of the wicked prosper?" (Jeremiah 12:1), and they provided their answer: the sinner may be unscarred by his evil, but the sanctuary bears the scars, and, with its destruction, he too will meet his doom.

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[464] For the references from Kaufmann, see Milgrom (1991b: 259).

According Milgrom, when man commits a sin, the sanctuary is automatically defiled from afar. It is an aerial and distant defilement. In this way, man and the sanctuary lie in an inseparable relationship, as if they are an organic corporate body. This view is valid in light of the fact that human evil impacts on the sanctuary by defiling it. However, Milgrom's statement, "sin may not leave its mark on the face of the sinner, but it is certain to mark the face of the sanctuary," is not acceptable, because when a person commits sin, whether inadvertently or deliberately, it is implied that he pollutes himself[465] as well as the sanctuary. In other words, when a person is contaminated by his evil, the sanctuary is also defiled at the same time from a distance. The defiled sanctuary cannot be separate from the defiled man. That is, the two entities seem as if they are existentially connected.

Therefore, Milgrom's theory that argues for only defilement of the sanctuary in the unilateral direction from man to the sanctuary is insufficient. The defilement of the sanctuary reverts to the defiled man's responsibility and conversely the purification of the sanctuary returns its benefit to the man. In this way, man and the sanctuary affect one another circularly and mutually. Man's defilement generates the sanctuary's defilement, and conversely the sanctuary's purification leads to man's final purification.[466] Man's forgiveness or purification from his sin is not accomplished until the sanctuary is purified by the *hattat* blood.

Likewise, man's purification from a ritual impurity is completed with purification of the sanctuary by the same principle. When a person becomes unclean by a certain impure source, at the same time he defiles the sanctuary. He must undergo a series of purificatory procedures to cleanse the impurity from his body. This process is sufficient to cleanse his impurity (contra Gane, 2005: 113, 176) in light of the case of the leprous house where the defiled

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[465] The statement concerning purification of the Israelites in Lev 16:30 presupposes their contamination by sins. Furthermore, Lev 18-20 repeatedly warns the Israelites not to defile themselves with illicit practices (Lev 18:20, 23-25, 27-28, 30; 19:31; 20:2, 25).

[466] Milgrom (1991b: 1056) expresses a similar idea: "as the sanctuary is polluted by the people's impurities, their elimination, in effect, also purifies the people." Gane (2005: 231) comments in a similar sense: "Purging the sanctuary purifies the Israelites because its condition and fate is theirs." However, their theories on the *hattat* ritual are basically that the removal of sin or the cleansing of impurity from the offender is an activity *unrelated to the purgation of the sanctuary*. More fundamentally, their statements above do not suggest the reason why the purification of the sanctuary results in the accomplishment of the offender's purification or forgiveness.

house is completely purified by the same purificatory measures as that for the leper, without some additional remedial procedure that is required of the leper.

By contrast, as for a human, if the sanctuary, defiled by the offender's impurity, is not purified by the blood of the *hattat* offering, the offender's purification is not accomplished yet, even though his body is already cleansed. In this regard, Gane's idea (2005: 113, 176) is incorrect, when he argues that the *hattat* sacrifice is offered to remove the offerer's 'residual ritual impurity' from the offerer, "even after other means of purification have been carried out" (2005: 176; 2008a: 219-22). There does not remain any residual impurity, once a series of purificatory procedures are finished before offering the *hattat* sacrifice at the sanctuary.

Just as the defiling power of human evil generates the defilement of the sanctuary from outside it, so the purifying power of blood at the sanctuary effects the purification of the offender from inside it in the reverse direction. Therefore, the purification of the sanctuary by the *hattat* blood is a prerequisite for the purification or forgiveness of the offerer.[467] Without the cleansing of the sanctuary that is contaminated by the offerer's sin or impurity, the purification or forgiveness of the offerer cannot be accomplished.[468]

This relationship between the people and the sanctuary is also attested at the cultic inauguration (Lev 8). As the priests are ordained by consecration, the altar is dedicated by consecration. The consecration of the altar is a prerequisite for the consecration of the priests, as revealed in the anointing oil and the blood rites which are to be applied to both objects.

At this stage, the remaining question must be raised: why does sin and impurity contaminate the sanctuary? Or conversely, why does the purification of the sanctuary affect the offender? In a word, why do man and the sanctuary affect one another mutually? This question has not been raised and consequently the reason for their mutual relationship has not been explored, especially from a biblical standpoint.[469] This thesis argues that from a synchronic perspective, the establishment of the covenant in Exodus 24:1-8

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[467] At the same time, with the sacrificial blood that signifies the victim's life, YHWH's justice is satisfied, because it is offered as 'ransom' for the offerer's evil. By doing so, atonement is achieved, that is, by 'ransom' and 'purification.'

[468] Jensen (1992: 159) also states that the offerer's forgiveness is achieved through purification of the sanctuary and the offerer. However, he did not develop this idea and explain the reason for the mechanism.

[469] For example, Kiuchi (1987: 40) poses three main questions on the *hattat* problem: (1) what does the *hattat* blood purify?; (2) when is the sancta defiled?; (3) what is the relationship of sins and impurity? But he did not question this reason why the sancta are defiled by human evil.

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created the existential relationship between the altar (i.e., the sanctuary) and the Israelites, although the altar was a temporary one that was built under Mount Sinai (v. 4). The covenant was established by medium of sacrificial blood called 'the blood of covenant' (דַם־הַבְּרִית v. 8).[470]

Significantly, Mount Sinai is understood as an archetype of the Tabernacle (see § 3.4.1.2.1 and n. 148).[471] Milgrom (1991b: 58) comments:

> In its first appearance, the Lord's fire cloud descends atop Mount Sinai (Exod 24:16-17). In its second appearance, it descends on the newly constructed Tabernacle (Exod 40:36). Just as כָּבוֹד fire makes itself visible to Israel at Sinai (Exod 24:17) so it appears before the assembled Israelites at the Tabernacle's inauguration (9:6b, 23n, 24a). Thus the P tradition stakes out its claim that the Tabernacle is equivalent to Sinai – indeed, is a portable Sinai – assuring Israel of God's permanent presence in its midst.[472]

That Moses alone went up to the top of the mountain (Exod 24:15-18; cf. 19:3, 20) is parallel to that the high priest alone entered the *adytum* once a year. Just as the cloud covered the mountain (Exod 24:15-16), so the cloud of the incense fire had to cover the Atonement Seat (Lev 16:13). If so, the temporary altar built at the foot of the mountain with twelve pillars for the twelve tribes of Israel (Exod 24:4) may correspond to the outer altar later installed in the Tabernacle.

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[470] The burnt offerings and the peace offerings were made at the ceremony for the establishment of the covenant (Exod 25:5). But Milgrom (1991b: 222; also Levine, 1974: 37-41) have doubt whether the peace offerings, apart from the burnt offerings, were indispensable to the covenant ceremony, because he thinks that the general purpose of the peace offering lies in a meal of the offerer's family or clan. He (1991b :222.) suggests that "rather, it may just have been the means of celebrating the covenant's successful conclusion (see Ps 50:5)." However, Milgrom overlooks the significance of the blood of the peace offerings applied to both the altar and the people.

[471] Milgrom (1991b: 142) comments: ". . . the immediate archetype for P's Tent of Meeting is not some mythic Canaanite model or hypothetical Hittite example but the ancient Israelite tradition of theophany at Sinai."

[472] As mentioned in § 3.4.1.2.1 (n. 149), similarly M. Douglas (1999: 79) illustrates the forced analogy between the tabernacle and the sacrificial animal by posting the table 'three paradigms of the tabernacle,' which shows the paralleled resemblance between Mt Sinai, sacrificial animal, and the tabernacle; for example, the entrails and intestines burned at the summit of the pile correspond to the holy of holies and the cloudy summit or head of the mountain. For the analogy of the body-sanctuary between human existence and the sanctuary, see also Kiuchi (2007: 306-7).

They offered the burnt offerings and peace offerings on the altar. The blood rite in the ceremony was unique, as vv. 6-8 report:

> Moses took half of the blood and put it in basins, and half of the blood he dashed against the altar. Then he took the book of the covenant, and read it in the hearing of the people; and they said, "All that the LORD has spoken we will do, and we will be obedient." Moses took the blood and dashed it on the people, and said, "See the blood of the covenant that the LORD has made with you in accordance with all these words." (NRSV)

Moses 'dashed' (זָרַק) half of the blood from the sacrifices on the altar and put the other half in basins. In the next stage, he took the book of the covenant, and read it before the congregation. They responded to the commandments of the book by promising their obedience. Then Moses took the basins with remaining blood and dashed the blood, saying to them that it is the blood of the covenant. Significantly, the blood from the burnt offering and the peace offering is merged in basins and daubed on the Israelites.

These peculiarities of the blood rite imply that the ritual activities had a certain special meaning. Probably the unique blood rite created the existential linkage between the two parties upon whom half of the sacrificial blood each was dashed, while the altar, though it was temporary, was the representative of YHWH as the locus of his presence.[473] Due to this connection between the two parties, they affect each other mutually. Thus Man's evil defiles the sanctuary in one direction, and the sanctuary's purification finalizes man's purification or forgiveness in the reverse direction.

The existential relationship between man and the sanctuary is well revealed by comparison with the case of the leprous house. In distinction from man, a non-human object does not have a defiling power to contaminate the sanctuary from afar. Therefore, the leprous house could not be a defiling medium that generates the defilement of the sanctuary. It is assumed that the

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[473] On the other hand, it seems that the existential relationship between man and the sanctuary is indicated at the ordination of the priests (Lev 8 = Exod 29). In this ceremony, the blood of the ordination goat is daubed (נָתַן) on the extremities of Aaron and his sons and consecutively it is dashed (זָרַק) on all the sides of the altar (Lev 8:23-24). After several rites (vv. 25-29), Moses took of the anointing oil, and of blood that was on the altar, and sprinkled (הִזָּה) it on the Aaronites and their garments for sanctification (v. 30). These peculiar ritual activities that are mutually practiced on the would-be priests and the altar indicate the close association between the two dedicated and consecrated objects (cf. Gane, 2005: 132).

צָרַעַת of the house is the same as that of the leper in terms of its symptoms and the same remedial means.[474] Nevertheless, the צָרַעַת of the house did not defile the sanctuary and therefore the *hattat* offering was not required, differently from the case of the leper, because only the Israelites are connected with the sanctuary in their covenantal relationship with YHWH. In this respect, Milgrom's argument (1991b: 882) is wrong, when he says: "The impurity generated by the house is not strong enough to contaminate the sanctuary from afar."[475]

Finally the violations of prohibitive commandments (מִצְוֹת יְהוָה)[476] in Leviticus 4 (v. 2, 13, 22), which require the *hattat* ritual, envisage the 'Covenant Code,' namely, 'the words of the Lord' (Milgrom, 1991b: 230). It implies that the *hattat* ritual that treats the covenantal people's evils and their consequence, namely, the defilement of the sanctuary, is rooted in the blood-covenant established between God and the people at Mount Sinai before the altar built at the foot of the mountain.

6.5. Conclusion

This chapter is summarized as follows:

1. Sins and impurities are graded into several categories. Sins can contaminate each sanctum in line with its grade and gravity and the offerer's socio-religious state, while ritual impurity defiles only the outer altar. An advertent sin of an ordinary Israelite contaminates the outer altar. The same sin of the high priest (probably of every priest too) defiles the shrine and its incense altar. It is assumed that all wanton sins defile the *adytum*, and probably even the entire sanctuary, including the land.

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[474] The *hattat* offering is made in the sanctuary for the *human bearer* of severe impurity (Lev 14:1-32), but not for the *inhuman bearer* like house (e.g., the mould spread in house; Lev 14:33-53), although both are considered grievous scales. For the latter case, the two birds are required for the purification; one is slaughtered and the other released, but both birds are not dealt with in the sanctuary. It indicates that they are nonsacrificial animals, and moreover the birds are not identified as 'pigeons' or 'doves,' sacrificial birds (the rabbis commented that probably the birds would be sparrows; see Milgrom, 1991b: 833). Nevertheless, as argued in chapter 2, the purificatory ritual with the bird's blood for the leprous house implies an effect of atonement for it, resulting in its purification (Lev 14:53).

[475] This statement of Milgrom is contradictory to his earlier argument in the same book (1991b: 260) that man became the only source of defiling power by replacing demon's position.

[476] It must be recalled that this term "applies only to the religious commandments (*fas*), not to civil ones (*jus*), to those enforceable by God, not by man" (Milgrom, 1991b: 230).

2. Neglect to purge an impurity can turn to a defiant sin; therefore the impurity is aggravated to an inexpiable impurity; presumably it is an expialble sin.

3. It is assumed that some deliberate sins, including neglect to cleanse an impurity, are expiable, and wanton sins are basically inexpiable. But not all wanton sins are punished by death penalty or cutting off. Some of them have the opportunity of atonement until the Day of Atonement. A brazen sinner may be punished with a terminal punishment for his defiant sin, and the *adytum* (probably the entire sanctuary and even the land) is defiled by his sin. Despite the dreadful punishment of the offender, the collective guilt of the whole congregation would still remain, awaiting the Day of Atonement. Therefore, there are three kinds of wanton sins, which are remedied on the Day of Atonement.

4. Some inadvertent or unconscious sins could not be remedied, because they are unrevealed and unknown. This kind of sins are accumulated until the Day of Atonement when they can be resolved annually. The Day of Atonement is not to remedy ritual impurities of the people, but only moral sins.

5. Milgrom's generalization of distant defilement of the sancta can be supported and corroborated by textual proofs and implications. The peculiar modes of the *hattat* blood rites as such presuppose the defilement of the sanctuary; the modes are regarded as the actions to cleanse the sancta.

6. The reason why human evils impact on the sanctuary and its sancta is elucidated by the existential relationship between the sanctuary and the Israelites, which was created through the Sinai covenant between God and the Israelites at Mount Sinai (Exod 24:1-8).

7. In this relationship, the purification of the sancta is an essential precondition for the offerer's atonement to accomplish his forgiveness or purification.

Chapter 7
Hattat theories and the *hattat* of the Day of Atonement

7.1. Introduction

In this chapter the results of previous investigation into the *hattat* ritual will be synthesized so that the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism of the *hattat* sacrifice can be explained in a systemized theory. The *hattat* theory suggested by this thesis differs from various theories posed by major scholars. In previous chapters, their problems, weak points and inconsistencies were pointed and refuted, but their *hattat* theories were not explained in their own systems. Therefore, the entire atoning process suggested by each of their theories needs to be articulated and summarized. This summarization and comparison between the *hattat* theories will show the particular feature of each theory.

As examined in chapter 3, on the Day of Atonement, the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism operating through the special *hattat* ritual complex were unique and peculiar. In this chapter, four paradigms of the atoning process by the *hattat* ritual are displayed in each diagram: sin paradigm, impurity paradigm, building paradigm, and paradigm of the Day of Atonement. Among these paradigms, the *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement shows a remarkable and particular ritual process. In this unique manner, the *hattat* ritual of Israel reaches the climax, making a national atonement for Israel. For debate on the special *hattat* of the Day, this chapter refers to chapter 3, which investigated the ritual logic of the 'unified ceremony' performed on the Day of Atonement in light of the structure of Leviticus 16.

7.2. Major theories on the *hattat* mechanism

Among major scholars in this field, this thesis will examine Milgrom, Kiuchi, Rodriguez, Johar, and Gane. They have offered their own creative theories in different ways. In particular, recently Gane investigated this issue thoroughly by introducing and analyzing most theories which have been argued so far. His contribution is monumental. Nevertheless, his new theory is not convincing, because of his wrong starting point and presumption. This section will assign lengthy space to the examination of his theory.

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7.2.1. Milgrom's theory

Now that Milgrom's idea about the sancta defilement is already explained, it is necessary to explore his theory on the function of the *hattat* offering. His suggestion on the function of the *hattat* offering is that the *hattat* blood is to purify the sancta and not the offerer (Milgrom, 1991b: 254). Milgrom's idea, that the sanctuary is defiled by human sin or impurity from a distance and the *hattat* offering is made to purge only the sacnta, was an unprecedented theory that overturned the commonly accepted idea that the *hattat* sacrifice is offered to remove the offerer's evil and atone for him.[477]

Milgrom's *hattat* theory is summarized as follows:

1. The defilement of the sanctuary and its sancta is a result of a distant and aerial defilement by the offerer's evil (1991b: 257). The major impurity can defile the outer altar (Lev 11-15); but the *miasma* of sin can penetrate into the three precincts, while the depth of defilement depends on the severity of sin and the socio-religious status of the sinner; an inadvertent sin of the congregation or of the high priest defiles the shrine.

2. But a wanton sin, whether it is committed by a person or by the whole congregation, contaminates the *adytum* and the entire sanctuary (1991b: 257).

3. The *hattat* offering is not to cleanse and remove the offerer's sin or impurity, but to purge the sancta of impurity that was generated by his sin or impurity; therefor the *hattat* blood is never applied to the offerer (1991b: 254-55).[478]

4. There are three types of ritual impurities that require the purificatory measure in their own ways (1991b: 254-55):

    a. *Physical impurity* in Lev 11-15; Num 19; etc. It requires a series of purificatory means to remedy it: washing (Lev 14, 15); the lapse of time (Lev 12, 15); sprinkling of blood on the extremities of body (Lev 14); and the two-bird ritual (Lev 14).

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[477] Even though many scholars are agreed with Milgrom's idea that sin and impurity contaminate the sanctuary *aerially*, only a few commentators accept his opinion that the *hattat* blood is only to purge the sancta (Wright, 1987: 72-73; Gorman, 1990: 76-78; Hartley, 1992: 58; Schwartz, 1995). For more proponents, see Gane (2005: 272 n. 19).

[478] Contra Janowski (1982: 185 n. 5), who said that the sancta could be also expiated, Milgrom (1991b: 255) said it is an absurd idea that sancta are capable of sinning.

b. *Spiritual impurity* in Lev 4-5. It refers to a heart defiled by a sin. The feeling of guilt or remorse or confession, that is, 'inner purification' is required for the sin (Lev 5:2). In other words, the confession and remorse purges this impurity.

c. *Sanctuary impurity* caused by human sin and impurity. It requires the blood manipulation for purgation. That is, the *hattat* blood purges the impurity of the sanctuary.

5. The verb כִּפֶּר means 'to purge, to effect purgation' in the *hattat* context, and the *hattat* blood '*effects purgation for*' (כִּפֶּר עַל) the offerer and 'purge the sancta' (כִּפֶּר אֵת). In other words, the *hattat* blood rite does not *make atonement for the person* but *purges the sancta on behalf of him* (1991b: 255-56; for the discussion of the *kipper* formulae, see ch. 2).

6. Because the spiritual impurity is cleansed by confession of sin, and because the physical impurity is purified through purificatory procedures before the offerer comes to the sanctuary to offer the *hattat* (and other sacrifices in some cases), the offerer's evil is not transferred to the animal through his hand imposition (for Milgrom, the function of hand imposition is 'ownership; 1991b: 151). Therefore, the *hattat* sacrifice is required only to purge the sancta contaminated by the offerer's evil in no connection with the purification or removal of the offerer's evil.

7. The impurity of the sancta is absorbed into the flesh through the *hattat* blood, *pars pro toto* for the animal, when the priest applies it to the sancta. The absorbed impurity is removed and eliminated by either the priestly consumption (Lev 10:17) or its burning in a clean place outside the camp (1991b: 261-62). Sin is not treated by the *hattat* ritual, because it is already removed by the offerer's confession of sin.

8. When a wanton sin defiles the *adytum*, it cannot be purged until the Day of Atonement, because ingress into the *adytum* for its purgation is permitted only to the high priest on the Day of Atonement (1991b: 257) once per year.

9. The annual purgation of the sanctuary on the 'Day of Purgation' takes place in two steps: "the purging of the *adytum* of the wanton sins, and the purging of the shrine and outer altar of the inadvertent sins (16:16-19) (199b: 257).

10. On the Day of Atonement, the *hattat* animals (a bull and a goat) and the Azazel goat play their distinctive roles respectively: the blood of two

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hattat sacrifices (a bull and a goat) are applied in each of the three precincts to absorb all impurities of the sancta that were contaminated by the ritual impurities noted in Leviticus 11-15 and the moral impurities generated by the violation of the prohibitive commandments (Lev 4:1-5:13) (1991b: 1033); then, the Azazel goat bears away all the sins of the Israelites into the wildness, after the high priest transferred the sins upon the goat through his two-hand imposition (1991b: 1043-44).

11. In this respect, the function of the ordinary *hattat* ritual differs from that of the special *hattat* rituals performed on the Day of Atonement. On ordinary days the *hattat* ritual alone is required to purge the sancta without a live goat, because confession of sin or guilt-punishment was made to remove the sin. In contrast, following the rabbis' conviction, Milgrom says that on the Day of Atonement, "it is clear that the blood purges the impurities of the sanctuary and the scapegoat purges the sins of the people" (1991b: 1043). That is, "the sacrificial *hattat* animals purge the sanctuary of Israel's impurities whereas the live goat atones for Israel's sins" (1991b: 1043-44).

Although Milgrom's theory was astounding and sensational, it has a variety of problems and illogical points.

Firstly, his statement that the verb *kipper* means always 'to effect purgation' or 'purge' in the *hattat* context is not correct, as refuted in chapter 2. Instead, Sklar's suggestion (2005: 98, 133) is acceptable: *kipper* indicates 'ransom + purgation' in the *hattat* context of sin, and 'purgation + ransom' in the *hattat* context of impurity. This corresponds to the function and meaning of the *hattat* blood that were explored in chapter 5: the *hattat* blood has double functions: 'purgation' of the sancta in light of Leviticus 8:15 and 16:19 and simultaneously 'ransom' for a person's wrong as stated in Leviticus 17:11 (cf. Sklar, 2005: 163).

Secondly, Milgrom's argument that the *hattat* sacrifice is offered to purge only the sancta is challenged by a number of scholars, due to the plain contextual meaning that is addressed in the *hattat* text,[479] although accepted by

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[479] Many scholars argue that the *hattat* sacrifice is clearly offered to make atonement for the offerer by removing his evil (e.g., Levine 1974: 63-67; Jenson, 1992: 155-60; see Rodriguez, Kiuchi, and Gane who are mentioned below). Jenson (1992: 157), who supports the purification of "the divine [i.e., the sanctuary] and the human side," infers that the reason for no blood rite on the offer's body could be practical; that is, perhaps it was exempted, due to practical trouble that the mass personal occasions would make.

several interpreters. Indeed, it is disapproved in light of the syntactical meaning of *kipper* in the *hattat* context and the meaning of the combinations *kipper* + prepositions as investigated in chapter 2. In particular, the thorough critique on Milgrom was provided by Gane (2005: 108-43; 2008a: 209-222) with reference to the meanings of the *kipper* formula that displays various combinations of '*kipper* + preposition' (see § 2.2.4 and 2.2.5).

Thirdly, in accordance with his consistent contention that the *hattat* blood is applied simply to purge the sancta, so as to absorb the impurity from them, Milgrom (1991b: 624) contends that although the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17 is rendered 'to remove iniquity,' the meaning of the 'iniquity' in the phrase should be understood to be 'impurity' of the sancta. In other words, the priests should eat the *hattat* flesh to remove the iniquity of the people, but the iniquity does not include the 'sin' of the Israelites, because the sin was already removed by the offerer's spiritual purification, namely, 'remorse and confession.' It is a natural result from Milgrom's assertion: the *hattat* blood is only to purge the sancta, and not to cleanse the offerer.

But it is doubtful if there is biblical evidence that the term עָוֹן is ever used to signify 'impurity' itself of either a person or of the sancta.[480]

Contrary to Milgrom, Gane (2005: 100) insists that this term in Leviticus 10:17 is related to only a moral fault. But for him (2005: 101, 294), the term does not mean 'moral fault' itself, but the 'culpability,' namely, "consequential liability to punishment that an offender must bear" due to his sin (2005: 294). This accords with his theory that the *hattat* blood does not absorb the impurity from the sancta and rather it transfers the offerer's sin or impurity to the sancta, when it is daubed and sprinkled on them (Johar and Rodriguez also). Therefore, in Gane's view, the priest does not remove the impurity absorbed from the sancta by eating the *hattat* flesh, but bears substitutionally the offerer's 'culpability,' a consequence of his sin.

This study, however, argues that in Leviticus 10:17 while עָוֹן basically refers to 'iniquity' or 'sin,' it is used as an inclusive term that indicates both the offerer's sin that was transferred to the *hattat* flesh through his hand imposition, and the impurity of the sancta that was generated by human evil, connoting the nuance of responsibility for such evils. It is obvious that in some contexts, it can indicate a *cultic responsibility* for damage of the sancta that is generated by

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[480] In the cases of the Nazirites (Num 6:11) and the priests (Lev 22:9) whose status were special, their contamination with corpse-contact is called 'sin.' But in the former, the sin term is חֵטְא or חָטָא rather than עָוֹן.

wrong treatment of the sancta or illegal approach to them, and encroachment on them, whether it is intentional or unintentional (cf. Exod 28:38, 43; Num 18:1, 23).

In the case of the *hattat* offering for ritual impurities, the offerer's impurity is not transferred to the flesh, because it is fully purified through the purificatory measures before he brings the *hattat* offering to the sanctuary (contra Gane). For the reason, in this case, only the impurity of the sancta is removed by the priestly consumption. In this respect Milgrom's view can be applied only to the case of the *hattat* offering for impurity. Nevertheless, the nuance of the responsibility for the consequence of his ritual impurity is still retained in the term עָוֹן, although contamination of the sancta as such does not constitute a sin but a consequence of human evil.

The fourth problem of Milgrom's theory is that he misinterprets the declaration of forgiveness of the offender (see n. 17 in § 2.2.1):[481] "So the priest shall make atonement for them, and they will be forgiven" (Lev 4:20b NASB). He comments on this forgiveness (1991b: 256; cf. 1983: 77):

> The inadvertent offender needs forgiveness not because of his act per se—as indicated above, his act is forgiven because of the offender's inadvertence and remorse—but because of the consequence of his act. His inadvertence has contaminated the sanctuary and it is his responsibility to purge it with a *hattat*. Confirmation of this thesis is provided by the Tannaites: "All the (*hattat*) goats make atonement for the impurity of the Temple and its sancta" (*m. Šebu.* 1:4-5; cf. *t. Šebu.* 1:3). This rabbinic tradition has preserved the postulate that the *hattat* blood is the ritual detergent employed by the priest to purge the sanctuary of the impurities inflicted upon it by the offerer of the sacrifice.

In sum, the reason why this forgiveness does not refer to the forgiveness of the offerer's sin is that his sin is already purified and forgiven by his confession or his feeling of guilt (אָשֵׁם).

As Kiuchi (1987: 35) pointed out, his idea can be criticized on two major accounts. Firstly, there is no textual evidence that the inadvertent act is forgiven before the *hattat* sacrifice is offered at the sanctuary; "sequentially forgiveness (נִסְלַח) is always granted after the *kipper*-acts and never before them" (Kiuchi,

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[481] Lev 4:20, 26, 31, 35; 5:10, 13.

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1987: 35). Secondly, the meaning of the term אָשֵׁם in the *hattat* context is unlikely 'to feel guilt' (see § 6.2.1).

In addition, a more critical refutation comes from syntactical evidence given by comparison of paralleled *kipper* formulae. For example, the statement of Leviticus 12:8b is parallel to Leviticus 4:20:

(Lev 4:20b) וְכִפֶּר עֲלֵהֶם הַכֹּהֵן וְנִסְלַח לָהֶם

(Lev 12:8b)[482] וְכִפֶּר עָלֶיהָ הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵרָה

The meaning of Leviticus 12:8b is clear: after the priest offers the *hattat* sacrifice, it is declared that the unclean offerer is clean. That is, the effect of the *hattat* sacrifice is the offerer's 'purification.' If Milgrom's idea is consistent in this case, the forgiveness must be declared here as well as in Leviticus 4:20. The reason is obvious: the sanctuary (the outer altar in this case) is contaminated.

To paraphrase his reasoning: the unclean person needs forgiveness not because of his impurity *per se* - his impurity is purified because of the unclean person's inevitable impurity and purificatory procedures - but because of the consequence of this impurity; his inevitable impurity has contaminated the sanctuary and it is his responsibility to purge it with a *hattat*. Consequently, if Milgrom is correct, Leviticus 12:8 must also declare the offerer's forgiveness.[483]

A conclusion is clear from this observation: just as the result of *kipper* for an impurity-bearer is his purification in the impurity context of the *hattat* sacrifice, so the result of *kipper* for a sinner is his forgiveness in the sin context of the

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[482] See also Lev 12:7; 14:20; cf. Lev 14:53; Num 8:21.

[483] His illogical argument goes on in his debate with Maccoby. Maccoby (1999: 179) points out Milgrom's self-contradiction correctly: "If God forgives the sin, why should he insist on its defiling consequence?" Milgrom (2000b: 2462; 2000c: 732) replies to him, standing firmly by his opinion:

> Maccoby fails to take into account that the latter verb is a *qal* whereas the former is a *piel*. The expression וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן מֵחַטָּאתוֹ (Lev 4:26) is precisely equivalent to וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַמִּטַּהֵר מִטֻּמְאָתוֹ (Lev 14:19). Thus, מֵחַטָּאתוֹ refers to his impurity, not to his sin. His repentance (אָשֵׁם) has wiped out his sin. What remains is its contaminating effect, necessitating a purification offering.

However, his reply to Maccoby must be refused for the same reason stated above. Furthermore, seeing מֵחַטָּאתוֹ to be 'his ritual impurity' is contradictory to his statement against Rodriguez (1979: 104) that ritual impurity differs from sin and that bearing a ritual impurity does not constitute a sin, except for the Nazirites: "he is 'holy' and the contamination of holiness is a serious sin" (Milgrom, 1991b: 256; also Sklar, 2005: 130).

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hattat sacrifice. Hence, the *hattat* sacrifice is offered to forgive the offerer's sin and purify his impurity as well as to purify the sancta.

Another problem with Milgrom is that his view on the removal of human evil is not coherent within the *hattat* ritual system. He (1991b: 1033) states that the 'impurities' of the Israelites in Leviticus 16:16[484] refers to the *ritual impurities* in Leviticus 11-15 and the *moral impurities* generated by the violation of the prohibitive commandments in Leviticus 4. On the Day of Atonement the blood manipulations are to purge the sanctuary of its 'accumulated pollution.' However, it must be recalled that the impurities of the sanctuary were already purged by the ordinary *hattat* ritual, if they were generated by inadvertent sins (Lev 4-5) or expiable severe impurities (Lev 12-15). Therefore, the impurities that are purified from the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement are ones that were generated both by inexpiable wanton sins and probably by some expiable wanton sins that were given an opportunity of atonement and forgiveness on the Day. In this respect, his concept of 'accumulated pollution' (1991b: 51, 1033) is not clear: did which sins generate it throughout the year?[485]

On the other hand, the various sins that are removed by the Azazel goat are not clearly distinguished from those that are treated by the ordinary *hattat* ritual. While Milgrom categorizes the פְּשָׁעִים in Leviticus 16:16, 21[486] into brazen and wanton sins ('transgression'), he accepts the rabbis' opinion, in regard to the terms 'all sins' (כָל־חַטֹּאתָם) in vv. 16, 21 and 'iniquities' in v. 21: the 'all sins' includes "minor or grave, wanton or inadvertent, conscious or unconscious, through commission or omission" (Milgrom, 1991b: 1034) and 'iniquities' are defined as "deliberate wrongdoing . . . , whose gravity is one notch below that of 'transgressions'" (1991b: 1043). But the ordinary *hattat* sacrifices had been offered to remedy inadvertent sins, some 'expiable deliberate' and presumably 'expiable wanton' sins. Therefore, the sins that are removed on the Day of Atonement are restricted to specific sins that were not remedied by the ordinary *hattat* ritual on ordinary days.

Finally, Milgrom's theory does not provide a plausible answer why the Azazel goat-like animal was unnecessary for removing the offerer's sin in the ordinary *hattat* ritual; conversely, if only through remorse or confession of sin, the sins were purified and removed, the same thing could have occurred in the

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[484] (v. 16) . . . וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ *מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל*

[485] Hartley (1992: 226) also does not specify which sins are accumulated, when he says, "these rituals expiate the aggregate of the sinful deeds committed by members of the congregation or the congregation as a whole during the last year."

[486] (v. 21) . . . וְאֶת־כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו אֶת־כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל

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special *hattat* ritual on the Day by performing self-affliction, without the high priest's confession of sins and the transference of their sins on the live goat.

Although it is not precise, this thesis accepts by and large Milgrom's view on the ritual dynamics of the special *hattat* for the national atonement by correcting his several errors. But his interpretation of the ordinary *hattat* ritual is declined, because it is based on a number of illogical ideas.

7.2.2. Kiuchi's theory

Since Milgrom created a stir in the *hattat* debate, it is Kiuchi who refuted thoroughly his theory and submitted an alternative theory, conducting an exhaustive investigation into the *hattat* offering in the priestly literature. Although in Kiuchi's later work (2007) several points of argument are altered, the basic theory of his first work (1987) still remains. His theory is summarized as follows:

1. The impurity of the sanctuary is not generated by a distant defilement of sin or impurity. Instead, when an unclean person comes to the sanctuary to offer the *hattat* (and other sacrifices) for his evil, it is envisaged that his uncleanness defiles the sanctuary; "when the priest purifies the sancta, the unclean person becomes clean concurrently" (1987: 61, 65).

2. The *hattat* ritual "deals with both sin and its consequence, which is punitive" (1987: 38). Sin also is a kind of uncleanness; therefore sin constitutes uncleanness and guilt that are its two aspects (1987: 66). In this respect, sin must be distinguished from 'guilt' (1987: 115; cf. 154); the *hattat* offering removes 'sin' by dealing with the uncleanness and the guilt (consequence of sin).

3. In Leviticus 4:3-21, it is assumed that the *adytum* is contaminated by the high priest (vv. 3-12) or the whole congregation (vv. 13-21) in light of the blood sprinkling 'before the veil of the shrine'; but it is not cleansed until the high priest would enter the *adytum* to cleanse it on the Day of Atonement; it gives "the impression that the two rituals in Lev 4:3-21 are somehow incomplete" (1987: 126).

4. In the *hattat* prescription for the high priest's inadvertent sin in 4:3-12, there is no mention of the anointed priest's atonement and forgiveness, while it is supposed that the effect of the *hattat* ritual is reserved until the full purification is made on the Day of Atonement; the reason of reservation is because in Leviticus 4:3-12 "there is no agent who can bear substitutionarily the guilt of the anointed priest and the whole

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people (affected by the high priest's sin; the addition is mine), since the anointed priest himself is guilty" (1987: 127), whereas in 4:13-21 the high priest bears substitutionarily the guilt of the congregation for their forgiveness. Furthermore, from the tragic incident of Leviticus 10, it seems that the high priest cannot bear the guilt of his house caused by Nabab and Abihu; "Thus it may be inferred that Aaron cannot bear the guilt of particular sins committed either by himself or by his family members" (1987: 127). This situation envisions the Day of Atonement, while it requires a third agent for Aaron;[487] "both Lev 10 and Lev 4:3-14 assume – each in its own way – the Azazel goat ritual, by which the guilt of all Israel is to be removed from the sanctuary" (1987: 127)

5. The phrase נָשָׂא עָוֺן in Leviticus 10:17b is rendered as 'to bear the guilt' (of the congregation), instead of 'to remove or bear iniquity'; eating is not related to 'bear the guilt' (see ch. 5); rather "v. 17b declares that through the blood manipulation the priest bears the guilt . . . of the congregation" (1987: 47); in other words, atonement does not depend on eating the *hattat* and therefore "eating the *hattat* does not belong to the atoning process," because the flesh does not absorb the offerer's sin/impurity or the sanctuary's impurity (1987: 51; the function of hand imposition is 'substitution,' and not 'transference' [pp. 112-19]), and because it was confirmed by the divine fire before the disposal of the flesh in Leviticus 9 (v. 24) (1987: 49). To sum up, the priests bear the guilt of the offerer through blood manipulation (1987: 47, 116).

6. While the agent of atonement for the people is the priest(s), the agent for the priest(s) is the *hattat* flesh; the guilt of the priests is removed by the burning of the flesh (1987: 134);[488] the reason why the priest must not eat the burnt *hattat* flesh is because they cannot take the benefit of atonement from the *hattat* offering for them, and because the flesh is

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[487] As discussed, to Kiuchi the reason for not mentioning the priest's forgiveness in Lev 4:1-12 is because he cannot remove his own guilt under the necessity of the third substitutionary agent for his guilt, and simultaneously he, as a substitutionary agent for the Israelites, is still bearing their sins/guilty (נָשָׂא עָוֺן). In addition, the serious sin of Aaron's two sons, leading to death in Lev 9, was not solved until the Day of Atonement (Kiuchi, 1987: 77, 84).

[488] He states (1987: 134): "In the case of the eaten *hattat* it is priests who bear the guilt. The question is: who or what bear the guilt in the case of the burnt *hattat*?" Aaron cannot be the agent for himself and the priests, because he cannot be the beneficiary of the *hattat* offering for the priests. "There must be some agent for disposing of the guilt Aaron bears, other than Aaron himself. Since there is no cultic representative higher than Aaron, it may be inferred that the burning of the *hattat* is related to the notion of 'removal of guilt.'

bearing their guilt. To sum up, "the priestly consumption of the *hattat* signifies that priests have substitutionarily borne the guilt of the people, though the act of eating does not form part of the atoning process. The burning of the *hattat* outside the camp probably symbolizes 'removal of guilt';" in distinction from the eating of the flesh, this burning of flesh "may have some bearing on the atoning process" (1987: 135).

7. The guilt that Aaron bears substitutionarily is transferred to the Azazel goat on the Day of Atonement; the live goat is a new substitutionary agent for Aaron (Lev 16:21-22) (1987: 149-53).[489] In this regard, the phrase לְכַפֵּר עָלָיו in Leviticus 16:10 is rendered 'to atone for him [Aaron]' (1987: 152; for detail discussion on this phrase, see § 3.4.1.1); that is, the live goat atones for Aaron as an agent for him and by so doing it atones for the congregation, because Aaron is the representative of the congregation.

8. The Azazel goat carries out the duty to remove the guilt in the same way as the *hattat* flesh burned outside the camp; this function is implied in that the entrance rite of both the goat-sender and the remains-handler are the same procedure in parallel (Lev 16:26-28) (1987: 134-35). It indicates that "the Azazel goat ritual is a special form of the burning of the *hattat*," while the Azazel goat and the sacrificial goat form 'one *hattat*' (16:5) (1987: 148-49; for details, see the debate in ch. 2). "Since the *hattat* flesh is also part of the *hattat*, it is not implausible to infer that the Azazel-goat ritual is also regarded as functioning as the burning of the *hattat* flesh" (1987: 149);

9. Therefore, on the Day of Atonement, atonement is made through the cooperate function of the two continuous ritual activities, blood manipulation at the sancta and the Azazel goat ritual, in the same way as in the ordinary *hattat* ritual; "by purifying sancta from 'uncleanness' Aaron bears the guilt of the Israelites. Then the 'guilt' he has borne is devolved upon the Azazel goat when Aaron lays his hands on it and

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[489] Kiuchi notes in the work of 2007 (208): "Vv. 9-10 indicate a switch of agent from Aaron to the Azazel goat, analogous to the syntactical construction in 1:4 (נִרְצָה – סָמַךְ)." He goes on saying about Aaron's confession of sin, "he is not only confessing the guilt and rebellion of the people; he also confesses his own self-hiding alongside that of his house. Thus Aaron's role is not purely substitutionary" (Kiuchi, 2007: 304; for the definition of 'self-hiding' as the meaning of חַטָּאת that is generally rendered as 'sin,' see Kiuchi, 2003; cf. 2007: 36, 90-92, who argues that חַטָּאת refers to 'the condition of the sinner's heart' rather than to 'violation of any specific commandment' in light of the use of חַטָּאת in Lev 5:1-5).

confesses the sins" (1987: 148); this corresponds to the idea that sin constitute 'uncleanness' and 'guilt' (1987: 156) and the *hattat* ritual "deals with both sin and its consequence, which is punitive" (1987: 38).

10. The accomplishments of the Day of Atonement, namely, the removal of all sins and all impurities and consequent atonement for the people, seems to be overlapped with those of the ordinary *hattat* offering and therefore to be redundant, because the same sins are treated on the regular occasions (Lev 4:1-5:13). The *hattat* offering for the high priest and the whole congregation in Leviticus 4:3-21 and the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 9 seem to be insufficient, because the implied defilement of the *adytum* is not purified, while it awaits the Day of Atonement. But atonement and forgiveness are granted to the offerer(s), except in the case of the high priest (4:3-12), and therefore, it is valid as such. Despite the fact, "all the sins over a certain period of time are envisaged as being atoned for again on the Day of Atonement by the most potent blood manipulation" (1987: 159). His argument is reconfirmed in his work of 2007 (306): "the rituals in ch. 4 are only temporal: though the ritual in ch. 4 is valid on its own, it is seen as insufficient and temporal in view of the more potent purification achieved by the Day of Atonement ritual."[490]

To sum up, Kiuchi takes several observations from the *hattat* texts as crucial clues to his theory on the dynamics of the *hattat* ritual. His idea is based on three important grounds: (1) in Leviticus 4:3-12 forgiveness of the anointed priest (i.e., the high priest) is not given while it is not mentioned; it implies that he is still substitutionally bearing the guilt of the congregation until the Day of Atonement (1987: 126-27); (2) Leviticus 10:17, in which נָשָׂא עָוֹן should be understood as the priests' substitutionary bearing the guilt of the congregation, implies that the high priest bears the guilt of the congregation in Leviticus 4:3-12 throughout the year as the substitutionary agent for them (1987: 46-49); (3) On the Day of the Atonement, these guilts that Aaron have been bearing will be transferred to the Azazel goat through the imposition of his two hands and subsequently the goat, as a substitute for the high priest, 'bears the guilts' (עֲוֹנוֹת נָשָׂא) in his stead (Lev 16:21-22) (1987: 114-16, 148); hence, the high priest's purification-atonement spans two different occasions (Lev 4:3-12 + Lev 16:14ff).

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[490] Kiuchi confirms the same idea in 2007: 106: "This is not to say that the rituals in Lev 4 are inefficacious; these are efficacious to some extent but the same sins must be dealt with on another dimension."

Kiuchi's theory was accepted by Rendtorff (2005: 542) who argues for the same idea: the sin of the high priest is not resolved until the Day of Atonement. But on the whole Kiuchi failed to receive a great response from scholars, even though his thorough investigation made tremendous achievements in this study field. It seems that his theory is based on exegetical inaccuracies and wrong inferences.

Firstly, the absence of atonement and forgiveness for the anointed priest 4:3-12 can be explained by the literary artistry of Leviticus 4 and the same nature and function of the *hattat* offering for the high priest and the congregation.[491] Milgrom (1991b: 241) annotates to the passage by referring to Abravanel's opinion: "Abravanel deduces from this anomaly that the notice of the community's purgation and forgiveness (v. 20b) also covers the case of the high priest." It must be noticed that when the *hattat* is offered for the whole congregation in Lev 4:13-21, the priest and his household is also included in the congregation, as members of the community.[492] Therefore, it is plausible that the declaration of the priest's atonement and forgiveness in Leviticus 4:3-12 is reserved and integrated in v. 20b, while the entire unit is bound to the rubric of the *hattat* offering in v. 21 ("it is the *hattat* offering for the congregation"). Milgrom concludes: "the purification offering of the high priest and the community comprises a single case."[493]

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[491] Noth (1965: 41) suggested that this absence is a textual omission by a scribal error.

[492] The high priest and the congregation of Israel are in an inseparable relationship due to the collective responsibility as mentioned in § 6.4.2. The high priest's sin is tantamount to that of the entire Israel. Conversely, the sin of the entire community of Israel might be accompanied by the responsibility of the high priest as a member of the community. For this reason, Gerstenberger (1996: 73) notes: "these first two sin offering regulations deal with Israel as a cultic community."

[493] Who is 'the anointed priest' (הַכֹּהֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ)? Is this the high priest? Scholarly consensus is that he is 'the high priest.' If so, why is there no mention about the common priests in Lev 4? Which animal is required for a *hattat* sacrifice of a common priest, if he commits an advertent sin? What about the Levites? The text is silent about this matter, and this problem has been not answered, except by a couple of scholars. Gerstenberger (1996: 73) explains that "presumably, the high priest is mentioned as the person primarily responsible for cultic life at the sanctuary." Retracting his former view (1987: 166 n. 3), Kiuchi (2007: 92) sees 'the anointed priest' to indicate 'a common priest,' because it is attested that not only the high priest (Exod 29: 7 = Lev 8:12), but all the priests were anointed (Exod 28:41; 29:29; 40:25; Lev 7:36; 10:7; Num 3:3). The article ה in הַכֹּהֵן הַמָּשִׁיחַ "should not be taken as expressing definiteness but as 'denoting a single person or thing as being present in the mind under given circumstances' (*GKC* 126 q-r)." Setting apart the case of the Levites, this thesis infers that if a common priest committed an inadvertent sin, presumably the high priest had to offer a bull for his *hattat* sacrifice as a representative of the priesthood. This may be the reason why other common priests are not mentioned. Given that the Levites were counted as a tribe, probably a Levite's sin might have been equal to a common Israelite's sin, although they ministered to the

Furthermore, the fact that the high priest sacrifices his *hattat* offering for himself, separate from the people (Lev 9:1-15; 16:3-19), indicates that he can make atonement for himself due to his sin or impurity so that he can be forgiven and purified.[494] If this is right, Kiuchi's theory took a wrong track from outset.

Secondly, it is a wrong assumption that the *adytum* was contaminated by the high priest's or the congregation's inadvertent sin (Kiuchi, 1987: 125), given that an inadvertent sin is not severe. Moreover, as for the blood sprinkling 'before' the veil of the shrine, the meaning of the preposition אֶת־פְּנֵי in the phrase אֶת־פְּנֵי פָּרֹכֶת הַקֹּדֶשׁ (4:6, 17) refers to merely 'before (the veil)' rather than 'toward (the veil),'[495] as refuted thoroughly by Gane (2005: 72-80; 289-84). In other words, the blood sprinkling before the veil is not an indirect or incomplete purification of the *adytum* and does not envisage and necessitate its full and sufficient purification on the Day of Atonement.

Thirdly, the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17b may be translated 'to remove iniquity/sin,' instead of 'to bear guilt.' In other words, the priests 'remove the iniquity' of the congregation in place of God rather than they 'bear the guilt' (a consequence of sin) of the congregation substitutionally until the Day of Atonement. That is, in the matter of treating 'sin' the priests play the role of the 'divine surrogate' of God in order to remove it,[496] rather than they are 'substitutionary agents' for the congregation in order to bear it for a long term with a punitive meaning.[497] Above all, it remains difficult to understand that the priests must continually carry out the sacred duty at the sanctuary in their guilty and sinful state until the Day of Atonement, while they bear the guilt/sin of the congregation (cf. Hartley, 1992: 46). By contrast, in the case of the Azazel goat,

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sanctuary by separating themselves from the Israelites. Perhaps this is the reason why the Levites were not treated as a particular class.

[494] Kiuchi (1987: 127) also admits that the priest may make atonement for himself in light of Lev 9:7; 16:6, 11, 17. But he defends his position by explaining that the cases differ from Lev 4 in that Lev 9 does not deal with a specific sin, and Lev 16 prescribes the Azazel goat as an agent for bearing the guilt, instead of the priest.

[495] Kiuchi (1987: 125) states: "the phrase refers to the direction where the *adytum* is located."

[496] As noted in chapter 2, when the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is God, this means that God removes the sin/iniquity and forgives the offender. In the *hattat* context, the priests remove the offender's sin to make atonement for him.

[497] As noted in chapter 2, Kiuchi takes the term עָוֹן in Leviticus as 'guilt' that corresponds to the meaning of a punishment as a consequence of sin. For him, this understanding of נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Lev 10:17 and 16:22 is the starting point to the solution of the complicate puzzle raised in elucidating the dynamics and function of the *hattat* ritual. That is, his theory depends absolutely his interpretation on נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Lev 10:17 and 16:22.

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it is right that the live goat bears sins of the people through Aaron to remove them, because the text states the transference of sin on the goat by Aaron's hand imposition and the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is an animal, instead of God or a priest who is God's surrogate.

Fourthly, apart from the case of נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17b, the term עָוֹן in the same phrase of 16:22 cannot be rendered 'guilt' that refers to the live goat's bearing guilt, because in v. 21 this is understood to be a sin term in juxtaposition with the other two sin terms:

(v. 21) אֶת־כָּל־עֲוֺנֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֶת־כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם

Fifthly, Kiuchi's statement that the effect of the ordinary *hattat* is valid but insufficient seems to be contradictory, because the text of Leviticus 4 clearly declares atonement and forgiveness without hint of their insufficiency. As a result, in Kiuchi's theory there is a tension between accomplishments of the ordinary *hattat* ritual and those of the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement; for a full accomplishment of atonement and forgiveness, the offender must await the Day of Atonement with necessity of an additional atoning process in the second stage. But it is unlikely that the sacrifice of an animal by shedding its blood ('life is in the blood') is insufficient for the offerer's atonement and forgiveness/purification. In sum, the idea that all sins remedied by the ordinary *hattat* should be treated again on the Day is hard to accept.

Kiuchi (1987: 148) states regarding Aaron's cleansing of the sancta on the Day of Atonement: "by purifying sancta from 'uncleanness' Aaron bears the guilt of the Israelites. Then the 'guilt' he has borne is devolved upon the Azazel goat when Aaron lays his hands on it and confesses the sins." This idea seems self-contradiction, because the priest has been bearing the guilt of the congregation until the Day. Then it seems illogical that the priest, who is already bearing the guilt of the congregation, attempts to bear the same by purifying the sancta. Are they different guilts from one another?

Sixthly, it seems contradictory, when he states that on one hand, the agent for the high priest, who cannot bear his own guilt, could be the burnt flesh which is probably involved in the atoning process (1987: 134), and on the other hand, the high priest was not yet given forgiveness in the *hattat* ritual for himself (Lev 4:3-12) (1987: 127). If the flesh removed the high priest's guilt by bearing it substitutionally, it is likely that forgiveness should be declared for his own sin and guilt, although he is still bearing the guilt of the congregation substitutionarily.

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Finally, if the Azazel goat plays the role as a special form of the flesh-burning to remove all guilts of Israel, why is the *hattat* flesh burned outside the camp? Kiuchi argues that on the Day of Atonement, Aaron bears the 'guilts' of the Israelites by purifying sancta from 'uncleanness,' and the 'guilts' he has borne is transferred on the Azazel goat through his hand imposition and confession of the sins. If so, what was the function of the carcass burning? It also seems to be a self-contradiction.

Despite Kiuchi's critical problems, he suggested some ingenious and convincing ideas in interpreting the Azazel goat ritual. This thesis is agreed, in particular, with his argument that "the two goats form one *hattat*" and the Azazel goat ritual is a special form of the *hattat* flesh burning (1987: 148-49).

7.2.3. Rodriguez's theory

Rodriguez (1986; 1996) and Johar (1988), followed by Gane (2005), argue with one voice that sin or impurity is transferred to the sanctuary and its sancta through hand imposition and blood manipulation that consequently defiles them. Rodriguez's theory is examined here, and Johar and Gane will be treated in the next section.

1. Contrary to Milgrom, the sanctuary becomes defiled in three ways (Rodriguez, 1986: 173-80): (1) when a person enters it in an unclean state;[498] (2) when illegal idol worships, like Molech worship, are practiced in it (cf. Ezek 23:38-39);[499] (3) "when the people in open rebellion break the covenant and reject God's *Torah*" (1986: 176). Thus, for Rodriguez 'rebellious sins' are the only distant defiling source that inflict on the sanctuary from afar.

2. Although these sins defile the sanctuary, its contamination is not cleansed and removed through a cleansing ritual, but "through the destruction of the one who contaminated it" (1986: 177).

3. Therefore, the sins that are purified and removed on the Day of Atonement are not the rebellious sins that incurred the terminal punishments. Rather these are the sins that were transferred to the sanctuary through the ordinary *hattat* ritual (1986: 177-78).

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[498] For this reason, to Rodriguez (1986: 173-75), the defilement of the sanctuary in Lev 15:31 and Num 19:13 (20) is generated by the unclean person's approach to it.

[499] Rodriguez (1986: 174 n. 8) does not recognize the defilement of the sanctuary by pagan rites conducted elsewhere outside the sanctuary.

4. The sins retained in the sanctuary consists of 'all sins' (כָּל־חַטֹּאתָם), 'iniquities' (עֲוֹנֹת) and 'transgressions' (פְּשָׁעִים), as in Leviticus 16:16, 21; in light of these verses, it is confirmed that some of the rebellious sins (transgressions) can be expiated in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (1986: 178).

5. Among the modes of the blood rites,[500] 'sprinkling' can have a directly opposed function between Leviticus 4 and 16. In Leviticus 4 "it is not the sanctuary which is in need of purification in the daily rituals, but the individual . . . in these cases, the sprinkling (of blood) cleanses not the object receiving it but the person who brings the sacrifice" (1986: 189); but the function of the blood is reversed in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement: "it is the sanctuary and the altars which are purified during the Day of Atonement and not the people" (1986: 179, 189).

6. In this way, all the sins, which were transferred to the sanctuary through the ordinary *hattat* ritual, must be removed from that sacred place once a year (1986: 179); that is, on the Day of Atonement, the sins are cleansed and removed from the sanctuary through the blood rite, and conveyed to the live goat through the high priest's hand imposition (Rodriguez, 1996: 285 n. 15).

7. In the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the transference of sin to the sanctuary is made by the expiatory sacrifices through hand imposition, eating the flesh, and blood manipulation: a person's sin is transferred to the animal through the priest's hand imposition; "the sin of people was transferred to the sacrificial victim and from it to the priest" through his eating of the flesh (Lev 10:17) (1986: 187) and await the Day of Atonement when it is conveyed to the live goat; but the sin of the priest and the congregation is transferred to the flesh through the high priest's hands imposition and in turn conveyed to the sanctuary through the sprinkling of the blood; "sin was not transferred vicariously to him. In that case, sin was transferred to the sanctuary through some other means. This was done through the 'sprinkling' of blood before the veil of the holy place" (1986: 190).[501]

8. Therefore, the function of the two handed imposition on the Azazel goat can be applied to the other expiatory sacrifices;[502] that is, the offerer's sin

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[500] Rodriguez's renderings (1986: 189) for each mode of the blood rites are 'sprinkling', 'throwing,' 'putting,' and 'pouring' (at the base of the altar) (cf. our renderings in ch. 4).

[501] Rodriguez seems to argue that the priest cannot bear his own sin again by eating the flesh, because the sin was transferred to it through his hand imposition.

[502] Rodriguez (1986: 190) contends, with the exegesis of Lev 17:11, that all sacrifices "result in atonement for the persons involved," because in all cases blood is applied to the outer

is transferred to the victim through his hand imposition, though it is one handed form (1986: 180-83).

9. On the Day of Atonement, the high priest cleanses all evils through the blood rites and transfer the very evils to the live goat through his hands imposition; therefore the two rites remove the same evils (Rodriguez, 1986: 178; 1996: 285).

10. How can the victim be called 'most holy,' if it was contaminated by sin? This situation is the same in the cases of the priest and the sanctuary. That is, although sin was transferred to the victim, the priests, and the sanctuary, they remained holy and their holiness is not destroyed by the uncleanness (1986: 192, 195). Rodriguez (1986: 196) answers: "this is possible only in the context of divine atonement. In the process of atonement, holiness and sin, life and death, purity and uncleanness are brought together in an unfathomable, paradoxical relation"; the 'legal' contamination of the sanctuary by sin-transference must be distinguished from the 'illegal' contamination by approach to it in a state of impurity which incurs his death penalty.

To sum up, the sin of the common offerer is transferred to the *hattat* animal through hand impostion, and further transferred to the priest through his eating of the *hattat* flesh. But the sin of the priest or the congregation is transferred to the *hattat* animal and further transferred to the sancta through his blood manipulation (sprinkling). Some sins are at the sanctuary 'in the person of the priest' (1986: 188), and the other sins are stuck to the sancta in the sanctuary until the Day of Atonement (cf. 1979: 136, 219, 305-7). All the sins are transferred to the Azazel goat through the high priest's two-hand imposition on the Day of Atonement.

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altar. On the other hand, he endeavors to make a functional discrimination between the blood activity 'on the horns' of the altar (Lev 4:18, 25, 30, 34; 9:9) and the bood activity 'all around the horns' (Lev 8:15; 16:18). He (1979: 128-30) argues that whereas the *hattat* ritual in Lev 8:15 and 16:18 is to purge the sancta, the *hattat* ritual in the other cases is performed for atonement of the persons offering it. The ground for his logic is that when blood is put 'all around the horns' of the altar, it purges the altar, whereas when it is put 'on the horns,' it purges the offerer. Furthermore, Rodriguez (1981: 143-44; 1986: 190 n. 55) contends that the blood activity 'all around the horn' is to cleanse the offerer, but the same activity 'on the horns' is to put sin/impurity "under the controlling power of YHWH." However, as Milgrom (1991b: 254) refuted him, his distinction between the two modes of blood activity is unacceptable, because Exod 29:12, which is the prescription of Lev 8:25, mentions simply 'on the horns' of the altar, and because furthermore in other sacrifices like the burnt offering (1:5, 11), the peace offering (3:2, 8, 13), and the guilt offering (7:2), the four sides of the altar are specified.

On the whole Rodriguez's theory is unacceptable, although some ideas are useful, like the transference of sin through hand imposition and the distinction between legal and illegal contamination of the sanctuary. The problems with his theory are as follows:

Firstly, there is no biblical ground for the idea that when the wanton sin is punished by death or cutting off, the sanctuary is purged of the impurity generated by the sin. It seems unreasonable that the impurity of the sanctuary is automatically removed with the punishment.

Secondly, as argued in chapter 4, it is not feasible for a certain ritual activity to have two directly opposed functions in the same ritual system. Therefore, the idea must be refused that the 'sprinkling' of blood is performed to remove the offerer's sin by transferring it to the sanctuary in Leviticus 4, whereas the same activity is to purge the sancta of the sin in Leviticus 16.[503]

Thirdly, his idea on the defilement of the sanctuary must be declined, because the unique motions of the blood rites that are understood to purify the sancta presuppose the contamination of the sancta. Besides, Rodrigued's exegesis of Leviticus 17:11 that blood of all sacrifices has expiable function is incorrect (1979: 226-29; see § 5.2.3.2) and he did not adequately treat the remedy for the physical impurity.

7.2.4. Gane's theory

Gane (2005) submits a profound and elaborated theory through a thorough investigation into the *hattat* ritual in a huge volume (2005), overturning all preceding theories. For the reason, his theory requires lengthy discussion. Basically he takes Johar's idea (1988) as the starting point of his theory, and partially adopts Kiuchi's idea of guilt-transference. Therefore, we need to begin with Johar's theory. The main points of Johar's argument are as follows:

1. He starts by criticizing Milgrom's theory: it is wrong to say that the *hattat* rituals purify only the sanctuary instead of the offerer, whether it is the ordinary *hattat* rituals or the special *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement,
2. The statement of Leviticus 17:11 applies to the *hattat* sacrifice, but not to the peace offering (1988: 611, 617; contra Milgrom), while blood has 'the atoning power.'

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[503] Gane (2005) has the same idea, following Johar and Rodriquez.

3. "It is clear that special contamination attaches to the carcass. This is why the more severe *hattat* must be burned, contaminating meanwhile all who handle it, and why even the flesh and blood of the less severe *hattat* (the 'eaten' one cause contamination" (1988: 611).

4. How does the *hattat* flesh become contaminated? As noted above, Milgrom argues that the impurity of flesh comes from the sancta through blood that absorbs it. But Johar's question is "how and why would the impurity *leap from* the inner shrine to the carcass, which lies outside?" (1988: 612; emphasis mine); why is the remaining blood and flesh defiled, when some portion of blood is used on the sancta? Therefore it is clear that the flesh and blood becomes contaminated before the portion of blood is used on the sancta; the impurity of the flesh and blood comes from the offerer. In other words, the source of the impurity is not the sanctuary but the offerer himself (cf. Gane 2005: 168-69).

5. How is the impurity, which is already moved from the offerer, conveyed to the victim? The ritual of the Day of Atonement gives the hint to the question; Aaron's two-hand imposition transfers the sins of the congregation to the Azazel goat. This function of the hand imposition can be applied to the ordinary *hattat* ritual, although one hand is prescribed in that case, in distinction from the case of the live goat (1988: 612-13). That is, when the hand is laid on the *hattat* animal, the sin is transferred to it; the two handed imposition indicates 'a difference in degree' (1988: 613 n. 24) or a 'difference of intensity' to remove "sins that more deeply imbedded in the sinner's נֶפֶשׁ" (1988: 615 n. 31). In Leviticus 4 also, when the hand imposition is practiced on the victim, the offender probably exhibited his confession of sin and repentance (1988: 614); repentance is not separate from the *hattat* ritual.

6. The impurity of sin "would enter into and contaminate the whole animal, but especially its נֶפֶשׁ, which . . . means its blood (Gen 9:4; etc.)" (1988: 613). In addition, some of the contamination is absorbed into the flesh.

7. How would the impurity that is conveyed to the altar be removed? Johar (1988: 615) suggests two possibilities: either (1) "God can completely annihilate the objective contamination-essence, 'erasing' it on contact; or (2) the residues of contamination . . . are heaped up at the altar, contained (but not eradicated) by God's superior power, and finally removed to Azazel by the yearly general cleansing of the sanctuary on the Day of Atonement"

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Regrettably, Johar's theory was not fully developed. Therefore, several points are not clear. For example, the final disposal of the impurity conveyed to the carcass is open to two possibilities for it. His idea on the contamination of the victim seems to imply that the impurity of sin is absorbed into the 'blood' that is put or sprinkled at the sancta, 'flesh' and even the 'remaining blood' that is poured out at the base of the altar. If it is the case, each disposal of the dispersed impurities must be explained, but he did not comment on it except on the impurity of the sanctuary.

This thesis is in accord with some of Johar's suggestions. In particular, the view on the function of the hand imposition is identical with this study (ch. 4): both of the hand impositions in the two occasions of the *hattat* ritual are practiced to transfer sin(s), whether it is one handed or two handed form. In addition, this thesis agrees with Johar's view that "the experience of repentance is not detached from the ceremony: it is embodied in the ritual form itself" (1988: 615; cf. 614). But Johar's theory has fundamental problems, which will be refuted after reviewing Gane's theory which is based on Johar.

Gane made a thorough investigation of the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus on the basis of Jahar's theory and expanded it into various trajectories. His theory is very complicated and it is not easy to trace the trajectories of his ideas where sin and impurity are treated according to their categories. His theory can be summarized as follows:

1. The functions of the blood activities in Leviticus 16 (vv. 14-16, 19) cannot be applied to those in Leviticus 4, because they are different occasions (2005: 6; it is the same idea as Rodriguez'). Gane applies this rule to hand imposition as well, so as to contend that each hand imposition in these two passages has a distinctive function.

2. it is ascertained in Leviticus 4 that only the offerer's 'forgiveness' (נִסְלַח) is accomplished (vv. 20, 26, 31, 35) as a result of *kipper* made by the *hattat* ritual, but not the 'purification' of the sancta (contra Milgrom), because there is no mention of it in the text. But in Leviticus 16 the effect of *kipper* by the special *hattat* ritual is the offerer's (the whole congregation in this case) 'purification' (טְהַר) (v. 30; instead of his 'forgiveness') and the sanctuary's 'purification'; that is, on the Day both the purification of the congregation and of the sanctuary are

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accomplished and not their 'forgiveness' that was already declared in the ordinary *hattat* ritual (2005: 123-25, 127, 154, 160).[504]

3. The sanctuary is not defiled by sin or impurity aerially from afar (contra Milgrom), except two inexpiable defiant sins, the Molech worship (Lev 20:2-3) and wanton neglect to purify corpse-contamination (Num 19:13, 20), which are expressively stated that they defile and would be punished by death or cutting off (2005: 157, 296, 299); the defilement of this two wanton sins cannot be purified on ordinary days, but must awaits the Day of Atonement so that they are removed and purified from the sanctuary. Hence Gane (2005: 156) acknowledges a limited distant defilement of the sanctuary against Milgrom who argues for a general defilement of it.

4. Following Johar (1988: 613), Gane (2005: 169-171) contends that the "expiable nondefiant sins" (i.e., inadvertent sins) of the Israelites in Leviticus 4:1-5:13 are transferred to the *hattat* animal and contaminates it throughout the year.

5. How is sin or impurity transferred to the *hattat* animal? The way of sin-transference to the victim differs between Johar and Gane: whereas Johar (1988: 612-13) argues for transference of sin by hand imposition as its vehicle, Gane (2005: 176) suggests that it is done by transference of ownership to YHWH by the same activity;[505] he is convinced that one handed imposition does not have the function of transference, considering that no hand imposition is practiced for the birds and grain *hattat* sacrifices, because seizing them with two hands identifies their ownership (for refutation of it, see ch. 4).

6. In the case of the physical impurity as well, the offerer's 'residual ritual impurity' is conveyed to the victim (2005: 113, 176) through the ownership transference (2005: 56), when a series of purificatory measures are finished for the offerer and when he comes to the sanctuary to offer the sacrifices.

7. Then the sin or impurity transferred to the victim is subsequently conveyed to the sanctuary by blood manipulation of the *hattat* ritual

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[504] Gane says (2005: 127): the difference between *kipper* of the ordinary *hattat* ritual and *kipper* of the special *hattat* ritual is "that on the Day of Atonement the sanctuary and its sancta are also purged, resulting in the purification (טהר) of the Israelites from sins for which they had earlier received forgiveness (סלח) but not cleansing (e.g., 4:20, 26, 31).

[505] Gane (2005: 56) argues for identification of ownership as well as transference of ownership as the function of hand imposition.

throughout the year (2005: 176-77; cf. 170, 180, 292-93, 299); [506] by so doing the *hattat* sacrifice removes the sins from the offerer and makes atonement for him (כִּפֶּר עָלָיו); subsequently he is forgiven (נִסְלַח), but he should still wait until the Day of Atonement for his purification by the special *hattat* ritual (16:30, 34).

8. The meaning of Leviticus 10:17 is that the priests bear substitutionally the 'culpabilities' of the people that are caused by their moral sins, by eating the *hattat* flesh (2005: 99-101; a similar idea to Kiuchi); [507] by eating the flesh and thereby bearing the culpabilities of the people, they participate in the "primary *kipper* transaction between YHWH and the offerer(s)" (2005: 100).

9. The priests transfer them to the Azazel goat (16:16) and banish them from the camp (2005: 294, 299). However, the burning of the carcass does not have a specific meaning[508] except that it must not be eaten because "an offerer may not benefit from his own sacrifice" (2005: 89).

10. Therefore, the blood manipulation of the ordinary *hattat* ritual is not to purge the sancta, but to transfer the offerer's evil to the sanctuary. But there are the exceptional cases that the *hattat* blood rites purge the

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[506] Johar (1988: 611-13) contends that while blood transfers the sin to the sanctuary, the flesh still retains the contamination generated by it. It is inferred that the contaminated flesh should be eaten or burnt to destroy the sin. In contrast, however, Gane (2005: 168-69) sees the entire contamination of the carcass to be transferred to the sanctuary through blood, *pars pro toto* for the animal.

[507] Gane (2005: 99-105, 294) has almost the same idea as Kiuchi concerning נָשָׂא עָוֹן. He interprets עָוֹן as 'culpability' that is similar to 'guilt,' even though his overall explanation on the dynamics of the *hattat* ritual is totally different from Kiuchi's. Gane says (2005: 294): "In Lev 1-16, however, עָוֹן is restricted to blame in the sense of 'culpability,' which refers to a consequential liability to punishment that an offender must bear (נָשָׂא; 5:1, 17; 7:18), unless a priest bears it. Here עָוֹן is not distinguished from חַטָּאת as a separate act of sin." That is, Gane and Kiuchi's basic concept is the same in that the high priest bears the עֲוֹנֹת of the congregation substitutionally and transfers them on the Azazel goat on the Day of Atonement. However, Gane (2005: 294) limits this meaning of עָוֹן to Lev 1-16, arguing that the meaning of נָשָׂא עָוֹן or נָשָׂא חַטָּאָה in Lev 17-27 refers to 'suffer or take punishment' as the consequence of sin. His conceptual division of נָשָׂא עָוֹן between the passages seems to be subjective; rather, as argued in chapter 2, the concept of נָשָׂא עָוֹן depends on who the subject is in each context throughout Leviticus. Except in cases where the subject is the third party (Lev 10:17; 16:22), all the cases where the subject is an injurer have the same meaning to denote 'to suffer punishment.'

[508] Gane (2005: 254) insists that "there is no evidence that an officiating priest likewise bears culpability resulting from officiation of a burnt purification offering (contra Kiuchi's assumption: p. 134), including the inner-sanctum sacrifices that are incinerated outside the camp on the Day of Atonement (16:27)."

sancta: they are restricted to two occasions: "initial decontamination of the outer altar, prerequisite to its consecration, and the inner-sanctum sacrifices of the Day of Atonement" (2005: 163).[509]

11. The sins and impurities accumulated at the sanctuary throughout the year are also purified and removed from it through the blood rite on the Day of Atonement (2005: 180, 291, 298-99); by cleansing the inadvertent sins that are conveyed to the sanctuary, the whole congregation is declared to be purified; there is no declaration of forgiveness that was accomplished by the ordinary *hattat* ritual. Thus, "the people are cleansed through purgation of the sanctuary" (2005: 255 n. 44; see his conclusion in p. 284).

According to Gane (2005: 285-302), "the trajectories of distinct categories of evil" could be traced and explained according to the dynamics of each sin and impurity; they are arranged in a diagramed table as follows (2005: 299):

	Throughout year		On the Day of Atonement		
	Removed from offerer (Lev 4-5, 12, 14-15)	Borne by priests (Lev 10:17)	Purged from the sanctuary (Lev 16:16)	Banished from the camp (Lev 16:21)	Cleansed from people (Lev 16:30, 34)
1	טֻמְאָה		טֻמְאָה		
2			פֶּשַׁע	פֶּשַׁע	
3	חַטָּאת		חַטָּאת	חַטָּאת	חַטָּאת
4	עָוֹן	עָוֹן		עָוֹן	

Gane endeavored to trace and scrutinize the trajectories of the triple evil terms listed in Leviticus 16:16a and 16:21b, observing some overlapped dynamics of each removal.

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[509] Gane (2005: 154) concludes:

Outer-altar and outer sanctum purification offerings purge (כִּפֶּר) evils from . . . their offerers, rather than from the sanctuary. So in these kinds of cases, moral faults or physical ritual impurities could not have affected the sanctuary from a distance when they occurred. Following the initial consecration of the sanctuary, only the inner-sanctum sacrifices of the Day of Atonement, which purge the sanctuary, could remedy automatic defilement. So although the tripartite gradation of Milgrom's general *hattat* theory . . . is neat and symmetrical, the first two gradations (outer altar and outer sanctum polluted automatically by expiable inadvertent faults) do not work.

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(v. 16) וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ *מִטֻּמְאֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל *וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם*

(v. 21) וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו *אֶת־כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וְאֵת־כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם

Each evil takes the following trajectories.

1. טֻמְאָה: in the ordinary *hattat* ritual the offerer's 'residual impurities' after purificatory procedures are conveyed to the sanctuary from the offerer through the victim's blood (Lev 12-15); on the Day of Atonement, they are purged from the sanctuary through blood rites. That is, the 'residual impurities' stuck to the sanctuary are removed by the blood rites.

2. פֶּשַׁע: the defiant/wanton sins, which are punished by terminal penalty (death or cutting off), but defiles the sanctuary from afar, are purged and removed from the sanctuary through the blood rites (16:16, 21); they are conveyed to the live goat through the high priest's hand imposition and confession; then they are banished by the goat from the camp into the wildness.

3. חַטָּאת: the inadvertent sins stuck to the sanctuary, which are transferred from the offerer through the blood rites in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, are purged from the sanctuary through the blood rites in the special *hattat* ritual; then they are transferred to the live goat through the high priest's confession and hand imposition; the purification of the people, which is reserved in the ordinary *hattat* ritual is finally declared and accomplished.

4. עָוֹן: in the ordinary *hattat* ritual the priests bear substitutionally the culpability of the offerer(s) by eating the *hattat* flesh (10:17); on the Day of Atonement the high priest, as the representative of the priests, transferred all the culpabilities to the live goat so that it bears them away to the wildness.

In sum, on the Day of Atonement the *hattat* blood rites purge all the impurities of the congregation, their transgressions, and their all (inadvertent) sins (16:16). Aaron transfers to the Azazel goat their 'culpabilities' from himself that he was bearing in substitute for the people, and their 'transgressions' and 'all their (inadvertent) sins' which were purged and removed from the sanctuary through the blood; then Azazel goat bears away the evils to the wilderness (v. 21). The ritual impurities are not conveyed to the live goat.

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Significantly, the inadvertent sins (כָּל־חַטֹּאתָם) accumulated at the sanctuary (16:16, 21) are purged by the blood rites and transferred to the Azazel goat through the high priest's hands imposition. In this way, when the inadvertent sins are finally banished from the camp, it results in the 'purification' of the Israelites (16:30) that was reserved in Leviticus 4 (2005: 298-99).

Gane's theory reveals a number of discrepancies and self-contradictions. His problems come from disregarding the textual *implications*, while he concentrates on the ostensible statements in the texts. As a result, he had to make excessive and forced explanations in tracing the trajectories of evil and in scrutinizing the dynamics of atonement by the *hattat* ritual.

First of all, his starting point is based on a wrong ritual theory that a ritual activity can have *opposite* meanings/functions in a ritual system with an identical gesture and motion (Gane, 2005: 3-24). As refuted in chapter 4, it is unacceptable that a ritual activity has a directly opposed function in the same ritual system, although it is right that a ritual activity with the same form and mode can have multiple or additional functions. Therefore, his presupposition is denied, that the blood activities of the same modes have different functions between the ordinary *hattat* and the special *hattat* ritual of the Day of Atonement.

Secondly, Gane (2005: 122, 125-27; cf. 157, 296, 299) contends that there is no mention or evidence that the *hattat* sacrifice purges the sancta in Leviticus 4-5, 12-15, and therefore the sanctuary is not defiled by inadvertent sins or expiable impurities. Hence his assertion (2005: 136-143) is that the ordinary *hattat* sacrifice is to purge only the offerer, and not the sancta (contra Milgrom).

It is true that the texts in question do not mention the purgation of the sancta. However, it must be recalled that the legislation in Leviticus 4-5, 12-15 concerns *the offerer* who necessitates forgiveness or purification, rather than *the sanctuary*, while the contamination of the sancta was mild. Presumably for the reason the contamination and purification of the sanctuary (and its sancta) are not mentioned, whereas the atonement for the offerer and its consequential forgiveness (Lev 4) or purification (Lev 12-15) of him are declared as the result of the *hattat* ritual. That the spotlight is on the offerer is also revealed in that both the subject of the passive verb נִסְלַח 'be forgiven' (Lev 4)[510] and the subject

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[510] Kiuchi (2007: 96) says that the reason for the passive form of the verb נִסְלַח is questionable. He (2007: 96) answers "if *qal* were used, that might have implied that the priest was the one who had granted forgiveness." Milgrom (1991b: 245) contends that the reason is because it is God who has authority to forgiveness: "only God dispenses סלח." However, the

of the active verb טָהֲרָה 'be clean' (Lev 12-15) are the offerer. By so doing the prescriptions start with the focus on the offerer (e.g., 'if a person sins . . .' or 'when a woman gives birth . . .), and ends with the spotlight on him/her (his forgiveness or purification).

On the contrary, the textual focus of Leviticus 8 (= Exod 29) and Leviticus 16 is on *the sanctuary as well as on the offerer* (the ordained priests in Lev 8 and the whole congregation in Lev 16). In Leviticus 8, the sanctuary should be initially purified and consecrated with the *hattat* sacrifice and the anointing oil, while other sacrifices are offered each with its own purpose. According to Leviticus 16 the sanctuary should be purified from accumulated impurities throughout the year and reconsecrated on the Day of Atonement with the special *hattat* sacrifice.

The absence of an activity in a text does not always mean its nonperformance. As argued in chapter 5, the blood rites in the *hattat* context show the same patterned gestures and motions, indicating that they are practiced for its consistent purpose: to purge the sancta. This implies that the blood rites in the ordinary *hattat* ritual were performed to purge the sancta contaminated by human evil.

Thirdly, Gane's assertion is partially right, when he contends that the ordinary *hattat* sacrifice 'only purges its offerer' (2005: 136). It is argued in chapter 2, following Sklar's idea, that the meaning of the verb כִּפֶּר in the *hattat* context corresponds to 'ransom + purgation.' Sklar means with this double nuance that while the victim (or its life) is offered as 'ransom,' namely, as compensation to God who is injured by human sin or impurity, its blood is applied to the sancta for 'purgation.' Sklar's suggestion is reasonable in light of Numbers 35:31-33.[511]

Nevertheless, Sklar's opinion must be supplemented with Gane's idea, because Gane's interpretation that the *hattat* ritual removes the offerer is partially valid in case of sin, apart from case of impurity. That is, the offerer's sin is conveyed and removed from him to the victim; therefore, sin is 'purged' from him. In other view, the victim 'purges' the offerer's sin. In this regard, the concept of 'purgation of the offerer' can be added to the meaning of כִּפֶּר in the

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reason could be simply because the offerer is the focus of the *hattat* ritual as the beneficiary of its effect. Just as the subject of טָהֲרָה ('be clean') is the offerer, so the subject of נִסְלַח is the offerer.

[511] Sklar (2005: 6) affirms in his commentary on Num 35:31-33: ". . . shed blood pollutes (חנף, *hiph*; v. 33) and defiles (טמא, *piel*; v. 34) the land, suggesting that the act of *kipper* must not only ransom, but also cleanse. . ." For details, see chapter 2.

hattat ritual for sin. Hence it can be concluded that כִּפֶּר for a sinner means 'ransom + purgation of the sancta and the offerer.' In contrast with the case of sin, however, this thesis argues that the physical impurity is never transferred from the unclean offerer to the victim contra Gane (see below). Therefore, in case of impurity, the *hattat* ritual makes 'purgation of the sancta + ransom,' without the purgation of the offerer's impurity.

Fourthly, Gane's concept of 'residual impurity' (2005: 113, 176) is wrong, because in light of the leprous house which is cleansed through a series of purificatory procedures without any sacrifice at the sanctuary, it is clear that the physical purification for the unclean person is completely accomplished before he/she comes to the sanctuary to offer his/her sacrifices. Rather, the residual is the impurity that is stuck to the sancta.

Fifthly, Gane argues that in the *hattat* sacrifice for his sin only forgiveness of the offerer is declared, but his purification awaits the special *hattat* on the Day of Atonement (16:30, 34), and on the Day the sin is cleansed and removed from the sanctuary so that his purification can finally be accomplished (2005: 198). If so, why does not the residual impurities of the unclean offererer that were conveyed to the sanctuary in Leviticus 12-15 await an additional declaration of complete purification for him on the Day? If the sinner's purification must wait until the Day of Atonement, because his sin is still at the sanctuary after it was removed from him, the unclean person's complete purification must also await the Day, because his impurity is still at the sanctuary after its removal from him.[512]

Sixthly, according to Leviticus 19:22, the result of the guilt offering is atonement and forgiveness, as in the case of the *hattat* ritual. However, it does not require additional purification on the Day of Atonement. Therefore, Gane (2005: 120) regards it as an exceptional case. But it is not convincing. As in the case of the guilt offering, forgiveness from moral sins (Lev 4-5) and purification from ritual impurities (Lev 12-15) via atonement are ultimate and complete accomplishments of the *hattat* ritual. It is sufficient as such, and does not require an additional ritual for another effect like the later accomplishment of the offerer's purification on the Day of Atonement.

Seventhly, Gane insists that 'purification' of the people in Leviticus 16:30, 34 refers to a concept that is different from 'forgiveness' in Leviticus 4-5. But

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[512] If Gane is right, just as purification of the offerers from their moral sins that were conveyed to the sancta is declared in Lev 16:30, so full purification of the offerers from their residual physical impurities that were transferred to the sancta must be declared in Lev 16. Why must only the sins be particular in Lev 16? Therefore, his argument sounds inconsistent.

biblical evidence, though they occur outside the priestly literature, supports the view that the two concepts could be mutual and interchangeable (Je 33:8; Ezek 36:25, 33; Ps 51:4).[513] Gane (2005: 152) agrees that "moral faults have a defiling effect that must be removed and that this pollution affects the sanctuary." Therefore, the purification or removal of moral sin may refer to its forgiveness.

Eighthly, according to Gane, when the offerer's hand is imposed on the victim, his sin or residual impurity is conveyed to it with the confirmation and transference of the ownersip to YHWH. However, he must explain how such dynamics can be possible.The donation of a person's animal to the other party does not guarantee the transference of the donor's existential or spiritual state to the accepter; thus, transference of his sin or impurity is not connected with the transferecne of ownership.

Ninethly, the most serious problem is Gane's explanation on the ritual impurities that are cleansed from each of the three precincts (Lev 16:16). In fact, ritual impurities were conveyed *to the outer altar* through the outer altar *hattat* (Lev 12-15). If so, how could the ritual impurities come *to the shrine and even to the adytum*? Gane (2005: 180) seems to be baffled by it. He replies to it with principle of *pars pro toto* applied to the outer altar; when the altar is contaminated by the impurities, the inner precincts are also inflicted. However, this is a forced explanation. He must comment the same on the case of inadvertent sins that defile the outer altar and the inner altar; when the inadvertent sin defiles the outer altar, it would also defile even the *adytum* by *pars pro toto*. This idea is hardly acceptable, because if this is the case, there would be no discrimination between mild sins/impurities and severe (wanton) sins in the matter of the sanctuary defilement.

Finally, with regard to the consecration of the sanctuary in Leviticus 8, where the outer altar is purified by the *hattat* blood, Gane must answer why the altar should be cleansed, because any of two cases in which Gane admitted the sancta can be defiled did not occur: sin or impurity was not conveyed to the new altar through some *hattat* sacrifice, nor did a wanton sin defile them from afar. When Gane (2005: 131) comments on the *hattat* ritual in Leviticus 8 that the *hattat* blood is applied to 'decontaminate the altar,' it does not correspond to his

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[513] Jer 33:8 in particular displays the synonymous parallel between 'purification' of sin and 'forgiveness' of sin indicating that the two concepts are the same: "I will *cleanse them from all their iniquity* by which they have sinned against Me, and I will *pardon all their iniquities* by which they have sinned against Me and by which they have transgressed against Me" (emphasis mine).

assertion that the purification of the sanctuary envisages its defilement by the transference of human evil. In this case, although nothing was transferred to the sancta, the *hattat* blood is sprinkled to purge the altar. It seems rather to demonstrate that all *hattat* sacrifices *always* function to purge the sancta, whether it is defiled by specific sin (Lev 4-5) or impurity (Lev 12-15), or by latent human evil or human ever-sinful or ever-impure state (e.g., Lev 8-9; Num 8; and calenderic festivals).

Besides, several other problems of Gane's theory can be indicated. As argued in chapters 2 and 5, his interpretation of the phrase נָשָׂא עָוֹן in Leviticus 10:17 as 'bear culpability' is not accepted ('bear guilt' of Kiuchi as well), because this probably refers to 'remove iniquity' by the priests. His view on hand imposition as identification of ownership also does not rest on biblical evidence, as refuted in chapter 4.[514]

7.3. Atonement mechanism of the *hattat* ritual

In this section, the results of the previous investigations will be synthesized into our *hattat* theory. Atonement mechanism reveals different aspects in four paradigms according to the object and occasion of the *hattat* ritual: (1) Atonement for a sinner; (2) Atonement for an unclean person; (3) Atonement for nonhuman object (building); (4) Atonement accomplished on the Day of Atonement. Each paradigm will be illustrated by a diagram. The first three will be discussed in this section, leaving the forth paradigm to the next section, because it demands a lengthy argument.

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[514] For example, Gane (2005: 57) points to five problems with J. Porter's interpretation (1976: 38) that the flesh is contaminated through hand imposition (cf. Gerstenberger, 1996: 73): (1) the carcass of the burnt *hattat* sacrifice must be burnt in 'a clean place' (Lev 4:12); (2) there is no requirement that the remains-handler who burnt it should take an 'entrance rite' to purify himself, unlike on the Day of Atonement in Lev 16:28; (3) the flesh of the eaten *hattat* offering is called 'most holy' and must be eaten in a 'holy place' by the priest rather than be burned (Lev 6:19 [26], 22 [29]); (4) hand imposition is not essential for expiation in all *hattat* sacrifice in light of the cases of birds and grain; (5) hand imposition was required in other quadruped sacrifices: the burnt offering (Lev 1:4) and the peace offering (Lev 3:2, 8, 13). However, these are refuted as follows: (1) that the flesh is burned in a clean place does not certify as such that the flesh is clean; (2) the absence of the remains-handler's entrance rite is filled with Lev 16:28 by the theory of gap-filling (3) the holy state and the impure state can coexist in one entity and in the sanctuary, as argued in § 5.3.4.2; (4) because the cases of birds and grain are concessive *hattat* types, a general rule must not be deduced from them; (5) the function of the *hattat* sacrifice is unique, while it functions to transfer sin, as argued in chapter 4.

In accordance with the purpose of this thesis, the next section (§ 7.4) will show how the atonement reaches its climax on the Day of Atonement on a national level, and will explain what the theological significance of the national atonement is. For clarity, it will return to chapter 2 that investigated the special *hattat* complex by analyzing the structure of Leviticus 16.

7.3.1. Atonement for a sinner (Lev 4-5)

The ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism for an expiable sin can be illustrated as in diagram 1 below:

<Diagram 1>

Purging the sancta
of impurity with blood

↗   ↓

Transference   Sin and impurity   Forgiveness (purity)
of sin   →   absorbed in flesh   →   *kipper*   →   of persons
to the animal

↓   ↗   ↘

Removal
of sin and impurity   (Purity of the sancta)

This *hattat* sacrifice is offered for a person who commits an inadvertent sin. It results in the offerer's atonement and finally his 'forgiveness.' Although the text is silent about it, the sancta are purified at the same time by peculiar blood rites.

1. An advertent sin contaminates the sancta from a distance.
2. The offerer's sin is transferred to the animal through his confession of sin and his hand imposition on it; as argued in § 4.3.5, the hand imposition in the *hattat* ritual signifies 'identification + sin-transference'. It is inferred that the confession of sin is a prerequisite to forgiveness that is given for the offerer's sin rather than for his responsibility for the defilement of the

sancta (contra Milgrom); the confession was probably made at the sanctuary at the moment that the offerer laid his hand on the victim, as the high priest did so on the Day of Atonement, although the offerer could already have admitted and confessed it in public before he comes to the sanctuary to present the *hattat* offering. His confession in the camp would qualify him to enter the sanctuary by mitigating the power of sin, although he is still impure on account of his sin.

3. The blood rites are practiced in peculiar modes[515] at the sancta to purge them of its impurity and to absorb it; that is, the impurity of the sancta is absorbed into the victim's flesh through its blood applied to them, while the blood is *pars pro toto* for the victim.

4. In sum, the offerer's sin is removed by his confession of sin and his hand imposition on the victim, and the impurity of the sancta is erased and absorved by the blood rite; the sin and the impurity are retained in the victim's flesh through the hand imposition and the blood manipulation.

5. The sin and the impurity that are retained in the flesh are eliminated either by the priest's eating of it or by the burning of the carcass in a clean place outside the camp; *removing t*he evil from the offerer and the sancta and *eliminating* it from the camp by eating or burning are an inseparable consecutive process for its removal. Therefore, as argued in chapter 6, it is implied that a neglect to eliminate the evil might lead to a virtual failure of the *hattat* sacrifice itself in light of the case of the peace offering (Lev 7:18), and the atonement will be discolored, although the atonement and forgiveness of the offerer, who already confessed and transferred his sin to the victim, might be valid and exempted from the responsibility for the failure.[516]

6. The result of these activities is 'atonement' ('ransom + purgation'), leading to the final effect: the offerer's forgiveness; this means that through this ritual he returned to the pure state from his impure state caused by sin.

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[515] For the unique motions in the *hattat* blood rites, see chapter 5.

[516] As argued in chapter 5, it is unlikely that nullification of the *hattat* means annulment of the offerer's forgiveness, unlike the nullification of the peace offering where the offerer is responsible for the failure to eat the meat within the given period. The responsibility for the failure would be ascribed to the officiating priest, while it generates an additional sin, which requires another *hattat* ritual. Therefore, the disposal of the carcass was essential for the intact accomplishment of the atonement. It is assumed that for the very reason the rubric of the *hattat* offering is placed in Lev 4:21 after the burning of the victim with the details specified in Lev 4:11-12, 20, although the eating of the flesh is supplemented later in Lev 6:25-30.

7. The purification and atonement of the sancta in the *hattat* texts are also implied in light of the function of the *hattat* blood rites to cleanse the sancta, although the text is silent about it except in Leviticus 8:15 and 16:19; the sancta also requires 'atonement' with the same double nuance, 'ransom + purgation,' because it was defiled by external evil, requiring ransom and purgation like the leprous house.

Regarding the defilement and purification of the sancta that are absent in the texts, the focus of Leviticus 4:1-5:13 (sinner) and 12 and 14-15 (bearer of impurity) is on the offerer rather than on the sancta, as argued in the refutation on Gane (see § 6.3.4 and § 7.2.4). The textual silence does not confirm that the ordinary *hattat* ritual does not make purgation and atonement for the sancta. By contrast, Leviticus 8 (= Exod 29) and 16 concern the sancta, while describing that blood 'purges' them (יְחַטֵּא in Lev 8:15 = Exod 29:36; טִהַר in 16:19). It is due to the particular purpose of the occasions to create a special purgation of the sancta. In these occasions, the priest, who was then being ordained, had to 'consecrate' the sanctuary for the first time (Lev 8 = Exod 29), and to 'reconsecrate' (קִדֵּשׁ Lev 16) it annually by atoning and purging it of all impurities and sins on the Day of Atonement. That is the reason why the sancta are highlighted in these cases.

However, in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, atonement and forgiveness of an offerer from sin or impurity are its primary purposes with its focus on the person, instead of the sanctuary. For this reason, the atonement/purgation of sancta is not mentioned. To sum up, the *hattat* blood always atones for and purges the sancta even in the cases that it is not mentioned as in Leviticus 4-5 and 12-15. This idea underlies this thesis.

The offerer's atonement and forgiveness cannot be accomplished without cleaning the defiled sancta which he contaminated with his sin, even though his sin is removed and cleansed from him through confession and hand imposition. The purification of the sancta is a prerequisite to his atonement and forgiveness in his existential relationship with the sanctuary (i.e., with God) established in the Sinai covenant between YHWH and his people.

7.3.2. Atonement for an unclean person (Lev 12-15)

The ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism for an expiable major impurity can be illustrated with diagram 2 as below:

<Diagram 2>

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                            Purging the sancta
                            of impurity with blood

                    ↗               ↓

Cleansing of            Impurity of the sancta                    Purity
impurity                absorbed in flesh       → kipper →        of persons
from the body

                        ↓               ↗               ↘

                    Removal of impurity                    (Purity of the sancta)
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The ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism for expiable impurity reveals a trajectory that is slightly distinctive from that for sin. The difference lies in the removal of the impurity from the offerer. Except this difference, the entire ritual dynamics is the same as in the sin case. In distinction from the sin case, the unclean person should purify the impurity from his body outside the sanctuary, before going up to it, because the offerer's clean state is a prerequisite for his approach to the sanctuary.[517]

1. The unclean person's physical impurity defiles the outer altar.
2. The unclean person should undergo a series of appropriate measures for his purification from his physical impurity.
3. The offerer lays his hand on the victim only as a symbol of his 'substitutionary identification' with it, in its functional distinction from the same activity of the sin case; that is, it is not to transfer or convey his impurity or 'residual ritual impurity' (contra Gane) to the victim, because it is likely that the impurity is completely cleansed by the purificatory

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[517] J. Klawans (2006: 4) states correctly: "In Leviticus it becomes clear that ritual purity is the prerequisite for those who would come to the sanctuary to offer sacrifices, for those priests who regularly officiate at sacrifices, and for any animals that are to be offered as sacrifices."

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measures; moreover, he does not confess the impurity or the responsibility for defiling the sanctum, because this physical impurity or its consequence (defilement of the sanctum) is not a sin.

4. The blood manipulation cleanses the outer altar and removes the impurity by absorbing it; the impurity is absorbed into the victim's flesh through the blood by the principle of *pars pro toto*.

5. The victim's flesh is eaten by the officiating priest[518] and by so doing the impurity is destroyed and eliminated.

6. Atonement is finally made for the offerer, and his purification is accomplished with the cleansing of the sancta where the defilement is generated from a distance by his impurity.

The declaration of the offerer's purification after the *hattat* ritual and other required sacrifices does not mean that the physical cleaning of his impurity is imperfect before coming to the sanctuary. The case of the leprous house (Lev 14:33-53) implies that the purificatory process for the unclean object effects a full purification and requires no additional measures like sacrifices at the sanctuary. V. 53 declares: " . . . So he (the priest) shall make atonement for the house, and it (the house) will be clean." It is corroborated by the comparison of vv. 4-7 with vv. 49-53 that both the leper and the leprous house require the same purificatory process.

Of course, in the case of the human צָרַעַת several additional and intricate measures are prescribed (14:8-12), including a *hattat* sacrifice and other sacrifices. It implies that human impurity is more potent and serious than non-human impurity, while it can defile the sancta. [519] However, it is likely that the ritual impurity is fully cleansed from the unclean person through the strict purification process (contra Gane). If it is the case, why should the person go up to the sanctuary to offer the *hattat* and other sacrifices? Purification of the altar and 'ransom' for the offerer and the altar are still required, because his

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[518] The pigeons or doves for the *hattat* offering are also ascribed to the priests (Milgrom, 1991b: 305).

[519] But it must be recalled that only man is the defiling source to inflict on the sanctuary, and that can affect the dwelling place of YHWH with his evil due to the covenantal relationship with him. Therefore, as mentioned in § 6.3.3, Milgrom's view (1991b: 882) must be denied that the leprous house did not defile the sancta from afar, due to the weak power of the impurity generated by the house. The leprosy of a person was simply considered to be more severe than that of the building, probably due to the covenantal relationship with God. For this reason, in addition to the two-bird rite, which is required for the leprosy house, more rigorous purificatory procedures were required to cleanse the leper before the mandatory sacrifices.

purification cannot be complete unless the defilement of the altar, which was caused by his ritual impurity, is remedied.

Therefore, when it is declared that "she shall be cleansed from the flow of her blood (מִמְּקֹר דָּמֶיהָ)" (Lev 12:7 NASB), it means that her purification from birth-uncleanness is brought to completion with the purification of the altar that was contaminated by it, rather than that it refers to a cleansing of her 'residual ritual impurity.' Because the impurity paradigm differs from the sin paradigm in many aspects (e.g., required animals and purificatory procedures for ritual impurity), we do not have to think it to be natural that the residual impurity is transferred to the victim like in the sin paradigm.

With regard to the contamination of the sancta, Sklar (2005: 130; see ch. 2) argues that defiling the sancta can be considered as 'a sin of the most serious consequences,' although it is incurred by an inescapable impurity: "the major pollutions do not only *defile*, they also *endanger*" the sanctuary. It is exemplified by the case of the Nazirite in Numbers 6. Sklar contends that this situation requires 'ransom' as well as 'purgation;' therefore, the *hattat* sacrifice for the impurity case must be made on the same ground as in the sin case: to effect 'purgation + ransom.'

Although Sklar's view on the double functions of the *hattat* sacrifice in the impurity case is correct, however, he misunderstood the defilement of the Nazirite. The text simply says that when a Nazirite defiles himself, it was considered as a sin (Num 6:11)[520] rather than when he defiles the sanctuary. Therefore, defilement of the sanctuary is a consequence of his defilement. Indeed, when the priests and the Nazirites defile themselves by contact with a certain unclean thing like a corpse (Lev 22:9, 16; Num 6:11), it is counted as a sin, due to their particular status as consecrated and devoted to the sanctuary (Milgrom, 1991b: 256). Therefore, the case cannot be a general rule that is applied to the impurity cases of common Israelites.

Defiling the sanctuary is not another sin added to the offerer's initial sin that incurs the defilement of sanctuary.[521] The defilement of the sanctuary is just

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[520] Kiuchi (1987: 55) says that in the case of the Nazirites at least his *unclean condition* is 'a sin,' but it is not correct, because contacting a certain unclean thing and thereby defiling himself, rather than his *unclean state*, constitutes 'a sin.' That is, a person's action or activity, like violating, enchroachin, or contacting, can create a sin, but not his condition or state. The unclean condition or state is merely a consequence of the sin.

[521] Maccoby (1999: 18; contra Milgrom, 1983: 77; cf. 1991b: 256; 2000b: 2462). Milgrom also does not see an impurity to be a sin except defilement of the priests and the Nazirites. But he falls into self-contradiction, when he argues that the forgiveness in Lev 4 is declared not for

a consequence of either human sin or his impurity. This proposition is not established: a person must not defile the sanctuary, because it is a sin. Conversely a person must not commit a sin, because it defiles the sanctuary. And when he is defiled with ritual impurity, he must cleanse it without delay according to the prescribed procedures, because defiling the sanctuary and its sancta with human evil brings about a dangerous situation. Therefore such evil must be kept away and removed immediately. Of course, if he comes close to the sanctuary in his impure state, and defiles the sanctuary, it could constitute a sin, because he *violated* a rule. Only In this case, the generation of the defilement could be considered as a sin.

In sum, the temple pollution as such does not constitute a sin and even a great sin (contra Milgrom, 1991b: 259). Rather, some severe ritual impurities defile the outer altar, minor (inadvertent) sins defile each precinct (except the *adytum*) in line with the offerer's status, and major (wanton) sins like Molech worship (Lev 20:2-3) presumably contaminate the entire sanctuary, including even the *adytum*, on a serious level. Hence it cannot be said that a wanton sin is severe, because the act defiled the *adytum*; conversely, the illicit act defiled the *adytum*, because the sin is severe. At any rate the defilement of the sanctuary is a consequence of human evil.

Nevertheless, this consequence of the altar's defilement by a ritual impurity requires 'ransom,' because the sanctum is injured, and therefore the *hattat* sacrifice should be offered for ransom, at the same time purging the sanctum. Hence it is still valid that the *hattat* sacrifice for impurity is made to effect 'purgation + ransom.'

7.3.3. Atonement for a nonhuman object (building)

The ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism for nonhuman objects must be explained as an independent paradigm in distinction from the others. The leprous house and the contaminated sancta fall under this category. This is illustrated by diagram 3:

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his sin but for the consequence of the sin, namely, the defilement of the sancta by the sin, because forgiveness is only a concept related to sin.

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<Diagram 3>

Cleansing of impurity → Impurity of house → *kipper* → Purity
from house   absorbed in flesh   of house

↓   ↗

Removal of impurity

This building paradigm is applied to both the divine dwelling place (sanctuary) and a human dwelling place (house). A difference between them is that whereas purification of the sanctuary is a prerequisite to the offerer's atonement and purification, purification of the house is not connected with such an effect on humans. This paradigm will be explained by the case of the leprous house:

1. The house becomes contaminated by צָרַעַת, which can be rendered a 'malignant fungus' (Milgrom) or 'grievous growth' (Hartley) with regard to a house. The impurity of the house is cleansed and removed by two birds in association with other detergents;[522] one bird is slaughtered, and the other left alive.

2. The impurity is absorbed into the live bird through the blood of the slaughtered bird by the principle of *pars pro toto*; the live bird is released into the wilderness to banish the impurity from the camp.[523]

3. Atonement is thereby made for the house, and its purification is accomplished.

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[522] In the case of leprosy (צָרַעַת), the two birds are used to clean the objects (the leper [Lev 14:4] and the leprous house [Lev 14:49]) in association with other detergents like the cedar wood and the scarlet string and the hyssop. However, these birds are not sacrifices, because they are not offered on the altar. As mentioned in § 6.4.3 (n. 474), they are assumed to be 'wild birds,' which are not domesticated, rather than pigeons or doves (Milgrom, 1991b: 833). The live bird is released to the wildness in order to eliminate the uncleanness from the camp (as for the killed bird, it is assumed that after the rite of release is finished, the bird is burned with the associated detergents in a clean place outside the camp, although the text is silent about it). In this respect, this two-bird rite differs from the combination of a bird *hattat* offering and a bird burnt offering (Lev 12:8; 14:22).

[523] In the purgation of the contaminated sanctuary, the impurity of the altar is likewise cleansed by the *hattat* blood (the outer altar alone is defiled in the cases of the ritual impurity) and absorbed into the victim's flesh through the blood, *pars pro toto*; it is then eaten by the priest to destroy and eliminate the impurity.

Whereas Leviticus 14:1-32 deals with a leper, vv. 33-57 provides prescriptions for a leprous house which seems to be inflicted by צָרַעַת. As far as the latter is concerned, if the symptom of צָרַעַת is established to be a malignant צָרַעַת by the priest's inspection after the lapse of seven days, the house must be dismantled and the debris is taken out of town to an unclean place (vv. 44-45).[524] However, if it is identified as simple 'mildew' (NIV),[525] the house must be cleansed through the rite of the two birds (vv. 48-53). Because it is just a kind of simple 'mildew,' precisely speaking, the expression 'leprous house' is not correct. However, for convenience of discussion, it is used for the house contaminated with the 'mildew.'

A critical question is raised: why does a nonhuman object like a house or the sanctuary require atonement? Milgrom (1991b: 255) denied Janowski's concept (1982: 185 n. 5) that the phrase כִּפֶּר עַל always indicates 'to expiate for.' Milgrom (1991b: 255) says that the sancta cannot commit a sin and therefore the phrase means 'to effect purgation *on* a sanctum.' This issue was debated in chapter 2 where it is suggested that from the syntactical view on the *kipper* formulae in parallel passages, the combination 'nonhuman object + עַל

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[524] Because this is not a tent but a house, this law is regulated for the life in the land in terms of a canonical view. If the symptom is confirmed to be צָרַעַת, the house should be dismantled, instead of being purified. Uniquely Lev 14:34 states that the צָרַעַת of a house comes directly from God: וְנָתַתִּי נֶגַע צָרַעַת בְּבֵית אֶרֶץ אֲחֻזַּתְכֶם "when . . . I inflict a fungous infection upon a house in the land you possess" (Milgrom's translation). The phrase נֶגַע צָרַעַת broken out in the house has been translated into diverse renderings: 'leprous disease' (Noth, 1965: 33; Kiuchi, 2007: 246; NRS; ESV, etc); 'unclean mildew' (Ross, 2002: 299); 'spreading mildew' (NIV); 'the affliction of a serious skin disease' (Wenham, 1970: 205); 'a mark of leprosy' (NASB). In this thesis, however, for convenience of discussion, the צָרַעַת of the house is translated as the 'leprosy of the house.' Interestingly, some English Bibles translate it as 'the plague of leprosy' (ERV; KJV; JPS), due to the lexical meaning of נֶגַע in the phrase. These versions keep consistently the same rendering in other verses in Lev 13-14 as well. This, together with "I put," seems to envision the likelihood that the leprosy probably might have broken out in the house by God's act, and that it might be the result of the sins of its owner (Milgrom, 1991b: 867). If the leprosy is identified as malicious one, the house must be dismantled. But if it is found as a general mark (נֶגַע), the house must be cleansed (חִטֵּא) and atoned for (כִּפֶּר). On the other hand, as mentioned, although Milgrom (1991b: 882) states that the power of the impurity generated by the leprous house is not strong enough to incur aerial contamination in the sanctuary from afar, it is, however, not convincing.

[525] Sklar (2005: 111-12) misunderstands this priestly declaration of the result of the inspection, when he says: "the object of cleansing is a house that has been 'healed' of leprosy. . ." If the house is identified as being inflicted by צָרַעַת, it must be dismantled without opportunity of cleansing. The same principle works in a garment contaminated with mildew (Lev 13:47-59). The garment identified as having malignant צָרַעַת by the priestly inspection, it must be burned in the fire.

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כִּפֶּר' can be used to express 'to atone for / make atonement for it' or 'to expiate for it,' and the same meaning can be applied to 'human object + כִּפֶּר עַל' and 'nonhuman object + כִּפֶּר אֶת' (see § 2.2.4 and § 2.2.5).

Just as an unclean person is injured and defiled by inescapable natural phenomena, so the unclean altar is injured and defiled by the irresistible power of a person's sin or impurity. Although the defilement of the altar took place unavoidably, this situation requires כִּפֶּר, that is, *ransom* (for injury) and *purgation* (from defilement) for the impurity, lest it should be destroyed or dismantled.

Kiuchi (1987: 91-92; cf. 2007: 303) argues, advocating Janowski, that 'expiate for non-human object' is affordable concept: "it must be argued that to translate the עַל as 'for' does not personify the sanctum; 'for' simply refers to the 'beneficiary' of the atonement"; therefore "Aaron can make atonement (or expiate) for sancta." As Kiuchi points, the benefit is *purification*, and not *forgiveness*, because the sancta are not personal.

The comparison of the parallel clauses in Leviticus 14 strengthens this view (see § 2.2.5):

וְכִפֶּר עָלָיו הַכֹּהֵן וְטָהֵר (Lev 14:20b): atonement for the offerer and his purification

וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַבַּיִת וְטָהֵר (Lev 14:53b): atonement for the house and its purification

If the same syntax of the two verses is acknowledged as having the same meaning, it is presumed that the same mechanism of the *hattat* offering is working even in the ritual for the leprous house, although in the ritual a bird is not slaughtered for a sacrifice in the sanctuary but at the house.

To sum up, the atonement mechanism for the contaminated house is specified as follows; the house has been inflicted and contaminated with a suspicious symptom of צָרַעַת, although it is finally not identified as צָרַעַת; ransom and cleansing are then required; one bird is sacrificed (ransom) and its blood is sprinkled (cleansing); the other live bird takes away the removed impurity (disposal of impurity); thus, כִּפֶּר is made (ransom + purgation).

The legislator of this rule would have considered this ritual as having a function that corresponds to the *hattat* ritual, although a bird is not called a *hattat* and slaughtered in the sanctuary. Furthermore, it is stated in v. 53b that the ritual makes atonement (כִּפֶּר) for the house as the effect of the חִטֵּא action. In this view, it is assumed that the author intentionally employed the verb חִטֵּא

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instead of טָהֵר, even in the syntax of 14:51-53, in comparison with 14:7 where the verb טָהֵר is used in the same syntax, because it is not related to the offerer's atonement but to his physical purification (for the comparison, see § 2.3.2).

On the other hand, the prescription for the contaminated house is also parallel to that of the contaminated sanctuary in that both are expiated (*kipper al*) by the same atonement mechanism. Therefore, impurity-bearers with a major impurity like a parturient woman or a leper, a contaminated house, and a contaminated sanctuary go through the same atonement mechanism as follows: they are inflicted with unavoidable contamination; ransom and purgation are necessary; the *hattat* animals are required (with other offerings in some cases). Hence כִּפֶּר is fulfilled (ransom + purgation) and purification is declared.

To sum up the three paradigms, while atonement is a result of removing a sin, it finally leads to *forgiveness* of the offerer's sin (Lev 4:20, 26). Meanwhile, it is implied in Leviticus 4 that *purification* of the sancta is also effected. However, because the impurity of the offerer has already been purified by a series of purificatory measures, like ablution and time-lapse, the impurity absorbed into the flesh comes from the altar that was contaminated by the offerer's impurity like with child birth. In other words, the physical cleansing is sufficient to remove his physical impurity. But his purification cannot be accomplished without cleansing the sanctuary with the *hattat* offering, as is contaminated by his impurity. Therefore, in the impurity cases of Leviticus 12-15 the final result of the consecutive ritual activities is a complete *purification* of the offerer and an implied *purification* of the sancta.

On the other hand, the *forgiveness* of the sinner in Leviticus 4 is equivalent to the *purification* of the Israelites from their sins in Leviticus 16 (v. 30) (contra Gane). Therefore, forgiveness and purification of the sinner are different expressions for the same result of the *hattat* sacrifice for a sinner. On the Day of Atonement, both the people and the sanctuary experience the full purification through the special *hattat* ritual. Hence the dynamics diagram of the *hattat* ritual, which is displayed in chapter 2, is reconfirmed:

נִסְלַח/טָהֵר → (טִהַר) → כִּפֶּר → נָשָׂא עָוֹן/חִטֵּא/טִהַר

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7.4. Accomplishment of the Day of Atonement: National atonement and restoration of holiness

Chapter 3 explored the logic and process of the rituals performed on the Day of Atonement in light of the structure of Leviticus 16. The investigation showed that the special *hattat* ritual of the Day differs from the ordinary *hattat* ritual in many aspects. Chapters 4 and 5 investigated the ritual components of the *hattat* offering: hand imposition, blood manipulations, burning of fat, and disposal of the flesh.

Through the lengthy discussion, the most prominent scholars in this field were evaluated and a number of new and alternative ideas and theories were introduced. In this section, the results of the study will be synthesized and explained with diagram 4 that displays the mechanism of the national atonement accomplished on the Day of Atonement. Besides, Additional exegeses that were reserved in chapter 3 will be made to clarify the meaning of a few baffling verses and clauses in Leviticus 16.

## 7.4.1. National atonement accomplished on the Day of Atonement

To recapitulate and summarize the results of the investigation in chapter 3, the special *hattat* ritual practiced on the Day of Atonement show a few differences from the ordinary one including possible abbreviations:

1. Except on the Azazel goat, there is no mention of hand imposition on the sacrificial animals, not only on the bull and the goat of the *hattat* offerings, but also on the rams for the burnt offerings. It is inferred that hand impostion was made in the burnt offerings, but abbreviated, whereas it is converted to the Azazel goat in the special *hattat* ritual.

2. The high priest's two-hand imposition is performed on the Azazel goat in the 'integrated atonement ritual' (see ch. 3), which refers to a unique and macro *hattat* ritual consisting of the two combined *hattat* rituals and the Azazel goat ritual; the 'integrated atonement ritual' was usually called the 'special *hattat* ritual' in this thesis to compare with the ordinary *hattat* ritual.

3. Two goats form a *hattat* in a unique way, which is offered for the congregation: [526] one goat is offered as the *hattat* offering for the congregation and the other is released as a live goat to the wildness, bearing the iniquities of the congregation.
4. The blood rites were performed in each of the three precincts, effecting atonement for each sanctum and its area. The modes and dynamics of the blood manipulation with the special *hattat* ritual differ slightly from that of the ordinary *hattat* ritual.
5. There is no pouring rite of blood at the base of the outer altar, because it is inferred that the multiple blood rites were exhaustively practiced to purge the sanctuary fully.
6. The same entrance rite is prescribed for the remains-handler and the goat-sender, whereas it is absent in Leviticus 4; presumably it was performed in the ordinary *hattat* ritual as well.

The synthetic explanation of these rituals in this section will show that the unified rituals were performed in a unique way, while a special ritual dynamics is operating. The ritual dynamics and atonement mechanism operating in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement are illustrated by diagram 4:

<Diagram 4>

Cleansing impurities of the sancta (with *hattat*) → *kipper* of the sancta → Full purity of the sancta (Restoration of holiness)

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kipper of Israelites — Holiness of Israel

Removing sins of Israelites (with Azazel goat) — Full purity of Israelites (Restoration of holiness)

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[526] Chapter 3 has already argued that the sacrificial goat and the live goat form a special *hattat* ritual with which the atonement mechanism operated in a special way on the Day of Atonement.

Whereas the ordinary *hattat* ritual is only concerned about the offerer and his evil, the focus of this special *hattat* ritual is both on the offerer (the whole Israel) and the sanctuary. The reason is because the main purpose of the ordinary *hattat* ritual is to remedy the offerer's sin or impurity, but the special *hattat* ritual is performed to remove all sins of Israel and to purify fully the whole sanctuary for national atonement. By so doing the original sanctity of the sanctuary that was given on the day of dedication is restored (Lev 8 = Exod 29) and the Israelites returned to the holy state as the people of God.

The blood of the two victims (a bull and a goat) is daubed once and sprinkled seven times in each of three precincts to purge them thoroughly; these exhaustive blood rites are to reconsecrate the sanctuary by purifying the sanctuary fully.

1. The impurities of the sanctuary and the sins of the Israelites are accumulated throughout the year.
2. The blood absorbs and removes all impurities; through the blood, *pars pro toto* for the animals, the impurities are conveyed to them; by so doing, the whole sanctuary is purified and expiated from its impurity, and consequently its holiness is restored.
3. Hand imposition is exempted from the two victims and inverted to the Azazel goat; the high priest performs the two-hand imposition on it to transfer all the sins of Israel; by so doing, the people of Israel are purified and expiated from their sins, and it is assumed that consequently their holiness is restored.
4. The impurities of the sanctuary that are absorbed into the two victims' carcasses are eliminated by burning them outside the camp (Milgrom, 1991b: 1053); in contrast, the sins of Israel that are transferred on the live goat are eliminated by sending it to the wildness.
5. In this unique way the national atonement of Israel and the restoration of its holiness are accomplished once a year on the Day of Atonement, while the whole congregation should undergo self-affliction and abstain from their work.

7.4.2. Additional exegeses on baffling problems

There are a couple of unanswered problems or insufficiently answered in the previous chapters. These are related to the two major rituals: the ritual of the two *hattat* animals and the ritual of the Azazel goat.

The first exegetical problem comes from statements about atonement in the text of Leviticus 16. The legislation of Leviticus 16 declares that the *hattat* animals and their blood make atonement (כִּפֶּר) for both the people (16:6, 11, 24, 34) and the sanctuary (v. 16, 17, 18, 20, 27, 30). Many scholars were baffled by this tension, because the effect of the *hattat* ritual is shifted between the people and the sanctuary.[527] In addition, it is stated that the Azazel goat ritual is also performed to make atonement (v. 10). What is a difference between the two atonements? This question requires a study concerning the functional relationship between the sacrificial victims and the Azazel goat.

Another problem is that the two sets of the triple evil terms paralleled in v. 21aβ and v. 16a invites various exegetical views on them with interpretative difficulty.

7.4.2.1. Role of the *hattat* goat and the live goat

Probably it was the legislator's cultic scheme that the *hattat* ritual can make atonement for both the people and the sanctuary. Therefore, it is

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[527] This seemingly textual tension has driven many scholars to explain it as originating from textual editions by inserting different traditions (see § 3.1.3). For example, J. Hartley (1992: 228) observes that whereas Lev 16:11a states *atonement* (כִּפֶּר) *of the priests* by a bull, v. 16, which deals with a goat *hattat*, alters this issue into *purgation* (כִּפֶּר) *of the sancta* by the goat. He says: "a possible reason for this shift may have been to distinguish between the achievements of the ritual with the living goat and those of the ritual with the goat offered to Yahweh," in distinction from the case of the bull that was offered to make atonement only for the priests; thus the sacrificial goat is sure to function to purge only the sancta, because the live goat makes atonement for the people by removing their sins; it is confirmed by the concluding statement of the sacrificial goat's function in v. 20a. Hartley (1992: 228) points out that this issue is shifted again in v. 17b that articulates atonement of both the priestly household and the congregation by the same goat. He concludes that this conflict originated from its editorial insertion of another tradition that did not accept this functional division between the two goats. However, Hartley's attempt is not an appropriate way of solving the problem, given that the text addresses a systematic ritual logic. As demonstrated in chapter 3, from the perspective of the final text the textual tension can be explained both by the priestly ritual theology, in which the *hattat* can also make atonement for the sancta and their atonement is a prerequisite to atonement of the people, and by the delicate ritual logic that is well arranged in the systematic structure of Lev 16 (for the major debates on the structure of Leviticus, see Warning, 1999; cf. C. R. Smith, 1996; Douglas, 1999).

unnecessary to think that the textual conflict is envisioned in this final, well-structured text, as debated in the previous chapters. But the functional relationship between the Azazel goat and the sacrificial animals has led scholars to chaotic debates, because the necessity of the Azazel goat seems to imply that the *hattat* animals were insufficient to make atonement for the community of Israel. As explained in the refutations against various theories of the prominent interpreters, there are several suggestions on this issue (cf. Kiuchi, 1987: 145-47; Jenson, 1992: 205-7)[528]

1. The two rituals remedy two kinds of evils, namely, sin and impurity, through their respective functions (Milgrom, 2000b: 1043-44 and D. P. Wright, 1987: 17-21 who follow Mishnah); the impurities of the sanctuary are treated by the *hattat* animals' blood that is applied to the sancta to purge it by absorbing the impurities. In contrast, the sins of the people are removed by the Azazel goat ritual by transferring the sins to the live goat through the high priest's two-hand imposition on it, and conveyed to the wildness through the goat-vehicle.[529] This thesis agrees with this position.

2. The two rituals are different versions of the same sin-removal (J .H. Kurtz, 1980: 411-12).The Azazel goat was only to eliminate the sins that were *already expiated* through the sacrificial goat. In other words, the sins of the people were expiated by the atonement of the sancta without the Azazel goat ritual; therefore, the atonement of the people was already accomplished with the *hattat* sacrifices only. The sins that were *already expiated* are transferred on the Azazel goat through the high priest's hand imposition and conveyed to the wildness. In this respect, sin-transference on the live goat and releasing it to the wildness are other symbols of the same sin-removal. But Kiuchi (1987: 147; cf. Mooney,

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[528] Jenson's classification and evaluation of the views (1992: 205-7), following Kiuchi's arrangement, are inaccurate. In particular, his explanation about Milgrom's *hattat* theory is wrong, because he says that Milgrom sees the two rites to deal with 'two kinds of fault'; the sacrificial goat deals with defiant sins in the *adytum*, but the live goat functions to remove sins in general. However, Milgrom (1991b: 1043) argues for complementary functions of the two rituals; the sacrificial goat purifies impurities from the three precincts, together with the bull, and the live goat removes sins from the people.

[529] Milgrom (1991b: 51, 1033, 1044) says, with reference to the bird release ritual, the similar one as the Azazel goat ritual in Lev 14:4-7, 49-52, that originally the high priest's confession over the live goat referred only to the impurities already purged from the sancta, and that the live goat ritual was to dispatch these impurities into the wilderness; but the priests innovated the ritual and assigned a new role to the live goat.

2004: 165) corrected it: "if the sins are already disposed of in the purification of the sancta, the Azazel goat ritual appears to be unnecessary."

3. The two rituals have continuous functions to remove the same evils (Rodriguez, 1986: 178; 1996: 285; cf. Levine, 1989: 105; Hartley, 1992: 234); the *hattat* animals serve to cleanse evils from the sancta, and the Azazel goat is to remove the cleansed evils to the wildness.

4. Similar to view (3) but different in details, the two rituals have continuous functions to remove some same evils in one aspect (Kiuchi, 1987: 145), and simultaneously have their own functions to remove the other evils in another aspect (Kiuchi and Gane).

This thesis generally follows Milgrom's idea on the function of the two rituals, claiming to amend some errors: for example, it was argued in chapter 3 that the sacrificial goat and the live goat comprise 'a *hattat*' for the atonement of the whole congregation.

Levine (1989: 106) contends that the high priest lays his hands on the live goat and "confesses over it the sins of the people, not his own transgressions or those of the priesthood," because his and his household's sins "would be adequately expiated by the blood rites associated with the sin offering of the priesthood and by the final destruction of parts of that offering by fire outside the camp."

However, Levine overlooks that the bull's blood and the goat's blood are associated to purge the sancta by merging at the stage of the outer altar purgation (cf. ch. 3). In addition, the phrase 'the children of Israel' in Leviticus 16:16, 19, 21, and 34 obviously contains Aaron and his family (Milgrom, 1991b: 1034). If it is the case, the Azazel goat ritual is performed for the atonement for all Israelites, including the priesthood, by removing their sins. The following diagram sums it up:

Bull *hattat* offering Goat *hattat* offering	→	Associated purgation of the sancta
Azazel goat ritual	→	Removal of all Israelites' sins

This conclusion indicates that the Azazel goat ritual corresponds to the two *hattat* offerings. The two *hattat* offerings purge the sancta of all impurities on behalf of the priesthood and the Israelites respectively, whereas the Azazel

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goat ritual plays a role to remove all sins of Israelites including those of the priesthood.[530] Therefore, Milgrom argues, following the rabbis:

> Thus it is clear that the blood purges the impurities of the sanctuary and the scapegoat purges the sins of the people. . . (1991b: 1043)

> In the purgation rite of the shrine in Lev 4:3-21, the sacrificial *hattat* suffices: and additional live animal is not required (answering Rodriguez 1979: 117). Thus, from the standpoint of P, the sacrificial animals of Lev 16 also suffice to purge the sanctuary. This leaves the live goat to function in an entirely different sphere: the elimination of Israel's sins. (1991b: 1044)

Although Milgrom's view is acceptable concerning the special *hattat* ritual, however, he does not answer why in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, an additional animal like the Azazel goat which removes the sins is not required. If the sacrificial animal suffices without the Azazel goat in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, it had to be the same in the special *hattat* ritual on the Day. This is Milgrom's critical weak point. Conversely, if in the special *hattat* ritual the Azazel goat was

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[530] Lev 4:3-21 are more or less parallel with Lev 16 in some aspect, although they refer to different occasions, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Ordinary *hattat* ritual in Lev 4:3-21			Special *hattat* ritual in Lev 16		
a bull	P	silence about atonement and forgiveness	a bull	P	no hand imposition/ no transfer of sin
a bull	C	declaration of atonement and forgiveness	two goats = a bull	C	hand imposition on the live goat/ transfer of sin

- P = for the priest(s) / C = for the congregation

In the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the declaration of atonement and forgiveness of the anointed priest are reserved until the case of the congregation is stipulated, although it is obvious that these effects would be true for the priest as well. It appears that the passage constitutes a single unit (Milgrom, 1991b: 241). The reason for the backward arrangement of the effects is because the *hattat* offering of the high priest and that of the congregation have the same effect: atonement and forgiveness for the whole congregation, including the high priest. By contrast, in the special *hattat* ritual, transference and removal of the congregation's sins are reserved due to no hand imposition until it is made on the Azazel goat. However, this case differs from the ordinary *hattat* ritual, in that the *hattat* of a bull and the *hattat* of two goats constitute a macro ritual complex unit called 'an integrated atonement ritual' in our term (see ch. 3). In this combined ritual unit, the live goat plays a role to remove the sins of the congregation, including that of the high priest. At any rate, these two cases indicate that the priest also enjoyed the effect of the *hattat* ritual for the whole congregation.

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necessary to remove the sins of the Israelites, in the ordinary *hattat* ritual as well a certain agent had to remove the sin of the offerer rather than the sin is removed just through confession or remorse. It must be recalled that even though the congregation undergo their self-affliction and abstinence of their works throughout the Day of Atonement, probably along with their confession of sin, their sins required the Azazel goat for removal.

This thesis argues that in the ordinary *hattat* ritual, the same thing occurred in a different manner; the offerer's sin is transferred to the victim through his confession and hand imposition; his sin is conveyed to the victims' flesh and the impurity of the sancta is absorbed into the flesh through the blood, *pars pro toto* for the victim; and the flesh is eaten by the priest or burned outside the camp to remove the sin and the impurity.

7.4.2.2. Triple evil terms in Leviticus 16:16a and v. 21aβ

As mentioned in the exegesis of Leviticus 16 in chapter 3, the parallel clauses of v. 16 and v. 21 in Leviticus 16 have attracted interpreters' attention. They have rare and difficult wording in terms of the Hebrew syntax:

v. 16a . . . וְכִפֶּר עַל־הַקֹּדֶשׁ *מִטֻּמְאֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל *וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם*

v. 21aβ . . . וְהִתְוַדָּה עָלָיו *אֶת־כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת* בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל *וְאֶת־כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם*

Our renderings of each term are as follows: 'impurities' (טֻמְאֹת), 'iniquities' (עֲוֹנֹת), 'transgressions' (פְּשָׁעִים),[531] and 'sins' (חַטֹּאת). The immediate problem in the interpretation of these two verses is the rendering of לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם in regard to the preposition לְ, concerning which the English Bible versions and scholars show a variety of translations.[532] This study employs 'including all of their sins'

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[531] The term פְּשָׁעִים means 'rebellion' (the verb פָּשַׁע 'rebel'); "it is the term that characterizes the worst possible sin: open and wanton defiance of the Lord" (Milgrom, 1991b: 1034).

[532] The following renderings indicate the difficulty of this wording: 'for all their sin' (Wenham, 1985: 226); 'whatever their sins' (JPS; Levine, 1987: 15-16); 'with respect to all their sins' (Kiuchi, 1987: 154; 187 n. 50; NASB); 'including all of their sins' (Milgrom 1991b: 1010); 'for all their sins' in v. 16 and 'all their sins' in v. 21 (Hartley, 1992: 221-222); 'as well as all their חטאות (expiable nondefiant sin)' (Gane, 2005: 290); 'all their sins' (ESV; NJB; RSV); 'even all their sins' (JPS); 'in all their sins' (KJV); 'for all their sins' (NKJV); 'whatever their sins have been' in v. 16 and 'all their sins' in v. 21 (NIV).

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with Milgrom (1991b: 1010), while interpreting לְכָל as having 'generalizing force' ('*as regards all . . .*') (*BDB*, 514) and having the meaning of 'all-inclusiveness.'

That these terms are plural is unique: throughout Pentateuch, the plurals, טֻמְאֹת (sg. טֻמְאָה), עֲוֹנֹת (sg. עָוֹן), פְּשָׁעִים (sg. פֶּשַׁע), and חַטֹּאת (sg. חַטָּאת) occur intensively and exclusively in Leviticus 16, except in Numbers 14:34 (פְּשָׁעִים) and Numbers 16:26 (חַטֹּאת).[533] The extraordinary occurrences of a pair of the three terms in Leviticus 16 allude to the special usage in its current context. Conspicuously they indicate all-inclusiveness.

The parallel between the two clauses is clear. Whereas the evils in v. 16 are cleansed from the sancta through the blood manipulation, those in v. 21 are removed from the camp through the Azazel goat. But the following questions are raised: how must the functional relationship between the two rites be understood?; do they treat the same evils in different ways or not?; as stated in v. 16, how could the two kinds of moral sin be cleansed from the sancta, since these two are not impurities that refer to the defilement of the sanctuary?

First of all, the difference between the two sets of the triple evil terms must be noticed. Milgrom (1991b: 1033) remarks on v. 16a:

> "Of the three Israelite malfeasances listed in this verse, the focus is clearly on the term 'pollution.' This is shown by its repetition in the second half of this verse and its sole mention in the purging of the altar (v. 19). Its predominance is only logical, for the result of Israel's wrongdoing is the creation of impurity, which the attaches itself to the sanctuary and pollutes it. . ."

That is, the intention of v. 16a is to corroborate the function of the blood rites as purging the sanctuary of its impurities. Milgrom (1991b: 1033) goes on say about v. 21aβ:

> There too three malfeasances of Israel are enumerated. Two of them, "transgressions" and "sins," correspond to ones purged here by the blood. Only "pollution" is not repeated; instead we find "iniquities" (עֲוֹנֹת). Thus the ritual in the sanctuary concerns itself with removing its pollution (also caused by Israel's wrongs . . .); the rite with the Azazel goat, by

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[533] טֻמְאֹת only in Lev 16:16 [X2], 19; עֲוֹנֹת in Lev 16:21, 22; 26:39; Num 14:34; פְּשָׁעִים only in Lev 16:16, 21; חַטֹּאת in Lev 16:16, 21, 34; Num 16:26.

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contrast, focuses not on pollution, the effect of Israel's wrongs, but exclusively on the wrongs themselves.

The dominant word in the three evil terms in v. 21aβ is 'iniquities,' while this verse confirms that the purpose of the Azazel goat ritual is to remove them. Considering the terminological parallel and functional symmetry between the two clauses, the phrase כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת in Leviticus 16:21 seems not to mean 'all guilts' but 'all iniquities' (i.e., sins) of the Israelites (contra Kiuchi); in fact, the plural עֲוֹנֹת seems to indicate 'iniquities' in most of about fifty occurrences of עֲוֹנֹת in the Hebrew Bible,[534] in contrast with the singular עָוֹן which may often refer to 'guilt' or 'punishment' for the guilt as a consequence of sin.[535]

Furthermore, the parallel evil terms in the same clause, 'their transgressions' (כָּל־פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם) and 'their sins' (כָּל־חַטֹּאתָם), imply that כָּל־עֲוֹנֹת also belongs to a category of sin. In fact, in all combinations of the terms עוֹן and פֶּשַׁע in the Hebrew Bible, the term עוֹן refers to a category of sin. Therefore, it is more natural that the triple sin terms are considered as having homogenous meanings with different nuances.

From the evidence of Leviticus 16:16b, 19, and 21-22, it is assumed that in v. 16a the term 'impurities' encompasses 'their transgressions, including all of their sins,' whereas in 21aβ, the term 'iniquities' covers 'all their transgressions, including all of their sins.' As for the plural term 'impurities,' the occurrence of this term alone in v. 16b and v. 19 (cf. Milgrom, 1991b: 1033) imply that the three evil terms in v. 16a can be condensed to 'impurities': "the Tent of Meeting, which abides with them in the midst of their *impurities*" (v. 16b NASB; emphasis mine); "from the *impurities* of the sons of Israel" (v. 19b NASB; emphasis mine). It is noteworthy that the rare plural form 'impurities' used in vv. 16b and 19b corresponds to the same term in v. 16a. Likewise, the fact that the phrase "all iniquities" alone is mentioned in v. 22a indicates that it is the key term for "all iniquities, all transgressions, including all of their sins" in v. 21aβ: "The goat shall bear on itself *all their iniquities* to a solitary land; and he shall release the

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[534] Num 14:34; Ez 9:6f; Neh 9:2; Job 13:23, 26; Ps 38:5; 40:13; 51:11; Prov 5:22; Isa 43:24; 50:1; etc.

[535] As argued in chapter 3, when the subject of נָשָׂא עָוֹן is the offender, its meaning is 'bear guilt' or 'bear punishment' (see § 2.3.3; cf. Gen: 4:13; Exod 28:38; Lev 5:1, 17; 7:18; 19:8; 20:17, 19; 22:16; Num 5:31; etc). In contrast, when the subject of the verb is the priest, its meaning is 'remove sin.'

goat in the wilderness" (v. 22 NASB; emphasis mine). In other words, the three sin terms in v. 21aβ is condensed to 'iniquities' in 22a.[536]

To sum up, it seems that while in v. 16a the key term 'impurities' includes the 'transgressions, including all of their sins', in 21aβ the key term 'iniquities' encompasses 'transgressions, all of their sins.'

On the other hand, 16:30b addresses another point: "you will be clean from *all your sins* (כָּל־חַטֹּאתָם) before the LORD" (NASB; emphasis mine). The phrase 'all your sins' (כָּל־חַטֹּאתָם) in v. 30b is the same as that in v. 16a and 21aβ. This concluding verse states that the very evils cleansed and removed through the special *hattat* ritual on the Day of Atonement can be regarded as 'all their sins.' The implication is clear: while each of the terms 'impurities' and the 'iniquities' refer to 'transgressions, whatever their sins' in v. 16 and v. 21; in the concluding statement, the term 'all their sins' in v. 30 is used as all-inclusive term to encompass all kinds of evils.

In this respect, Gane's intricate trajectories of the evils in the ritual dynamics are based on the wrong interpretation on the two sets of the three evil terms in vv. 16 and 21. Likewise, Milgrom's grade labeling of evils remedied on the Day is not correct, when he endeavored to divide the evil terms by their gravity, following the rabbis. He says that the term 'impurities' refers to uncleanness generated from ritual impurities and moral impurities (1991b: 1033); 'iniquities' are defined as "deliberate wrongdoing . . . whose gravity is one notch below that of 'transgression'" (1991b: 1034); 'transgressions' are wanton and defiant sins (1991b: 1034). For this reason, Milgrom comments that the phrase 'all of their sins (לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם) in vv. 16 and 21 does not include 'transgressions' (פְּשָׁעִים).

However, Milgrom sees the same phrase לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם in v. 30 as "the all-inclusive term for wrongdoing (found in vv. 16, 21), which therefore combines both the pollution of the sanctuary and the iniquities of the people." The different interpretations on the same term in the same context seem to be inconsistent. His idea is refused, because v. 30 declares that on the Day, atonement will be made for Israel and they will be purified from 'all their sins' (אֶתְכֶם מִכֹּל חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם

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[536] Exod 34:7 has a parallel phrase to Lev 16:21 in the same order: " . . . keeping steadfast love for thousands, forgiving *iniquity* and *transgression* and *sin*, but who will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the *iniquity* of the fathers on the children and the children's children, to the third and the fourth generation" (ESV, emphasis mine). Significantly, in this verse the 'iniquity' alone is repeated in the following phrase as if it were the hypernym of the three terms: "the iniquity of the fathers on the children . . ."

לְטַהֵר). This scope of 'all their sin' must include 'transgressions.' That is, the phrase 'all of their sins' is an all-inclusive term.

This thesis contends: while the key terms טֻמְאֹת and עֲוֹנֹת encompass the other evil terms in v. 16 and v. 21 respectively, the same phrase לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם '(all) transgressions, including all of their sins' indicates simply all kinds of sin.[537] All kinds of sins are covered: from inexpiable wanton sins (פְּשָׁעִים), which were punished but are still required a collective responsibility of the whole congregation, to all defiant sins that were unsolved on ordinary days but were still given an opportunity for forgiveness until the day of the national atonement. Yet 'transgressions, including all of their sins' can be condensed into 'all their sins,' as expressed in v. 30.

To sum up, from the evidence of v. 16b and v. 19, the two initial terms 'impurities' (v. 16a) and 'iniquities' (v. 21aβ) encompass the phrase 'transgressions, including all sins.' On the other hand, in light of v. 30, the phrase 'transgressions, including all sins' can be converged on 'all their sins.' Therefore, our renderings for the two clauses which have the two sets of threefold evil term are suggested as follows:

"And he shall make atonement for the *adytum* from[538] all impurities, namely, all transgressions, including all of their sins" (v. 16a)

"(And he shall) confess over it all the iniquities of the people of Israel, namely, all their transgressions, including all of their sins" (21aβ)

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[537] Hartley (1992: 240) has a similar comment on v. 16: "the use of these two terms with the prepositions מִן 'from' and לְ 'to' means that every kind of wrongdoing, from an overt act to something done accidentally, is covered by this ritual." But his interpretation 'from A to B' cannot be applied to the similar phrase in v. 21 where the preposition אֵת is used: פִּשְׁעֵיהֶם לְכָל־חַטֹּאתָם וְאֵת־כָּל.

[538] Most interpreters and English versions renders the preposition מִן of the phrases, *מִטֻּמְאֹת בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל וּמִפִּשְׁעֵיהֶם* in v. 16a (and מִן also in other similar *kipper* phrase) as the causative sense, namely, 'because of.' But Gane (2005: 118, 134; 2008a: 209-22) argues for the privative sense, that is, 'from' in all *kipper* phrases of the *hattat* context, including this phrase (contra Milgrom, 1991b: 260; 2007: 161-63, who insists 'causative'). This thesis follows Gane, because the verb *kipper* always indicates to purify the object from its impurity or sin, in addition to the sense of 'ransom' for the evil. Even when it means to purify the sanctum from its impurity for the offerer, the rendering 'he shall make atonement (*kipper*) for him *from* his impurity or sin' is valid, instead of '*because of* his impurity or sin' (e.g., Lev 12:9), because the impurity stuck to the sanctum came from the offerer and therefore without cleansing it, his purification cannot be accomplished.

In these renderings the first two terms in the two verses are expressions centered on the object in each. It is assumed that the legislator employed a term appropriate for the function of each ritual. For the purification of the sancta, the term 'impurities' is proper, while for the removal of the people's sin, the term 'iniquities' is appropriate. The first set of triple evil terms in v. 16a is an expression related to the sanctuary which is contaminated by the 'transgressions, including all the sins'; in contrast, the second set of triple evil terms in v. 21 is an expression centered on the congregation who contaminated the sanctuary with all the sins (cf. A. Büchler, 1967: 265, cited by Gane, 2005: 287). Hence it is argued that 'impurity' and 'iniquity' are two ways of expression about sin, depending on the object. The impurities of the sanctuary are the sins of the congregation which penetrated into it throughout the year. The impurities do not refer to the ritual impurities, but to the moral sins (neglect to purify a ritual impurity turns to a 'sin').

In v. 16a, the term 'impurities' is a catchall word for all kinds of sins (transgressions and all the sins). The impurities cleansed from the sancta were the very defilement generated by the transgressions and all the sins of Israel and not from their ritual impurities (contra Milgrom). That is the reason why v. 30 declares that Israel is purified from 'all their sins,' and not from 'ritual impurities.'

On the other hand, in 21aβ, the term 'iniquities' is a catchall word for all kinds of sins (transgressions and all sins). They are the sins that were not resolved by the ordinary *hattat* ritual throughout the year. These sins constitute wanton sins that were already punished, but retain Israel's collective responsibility for them (e.g., the sins in Lev 18-20),[539] and defiant but still expiable sins (probably some deliberate sins like neglect to follow the mandatory purificatory process); inadvertent sins and inescapable ritual impurities were already expiated by the ordinary *hattat* ritual.

The conclusion of chapter 3 is affirmed: the combined two *hattat* offerings (a bull + a goat) and the Azazel goal ritual constitutes a huge complex atonement ritual that atone for the sanctuary and the people. While the

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[539] Kiuchi, who did not deal with this matter in his first work of 1987, notes the same idea in the later work (2007: 339): ". . . does the ritual of the Day of the Atonement purify the uncleanness caused by the violation of the prohibitions listed in this chapter (= Lev 18)? Prima facie, the latter defiles the sanctuary, and if all the self-hidings are confessed on the Day of Atonement, then both the sanctuary and the land are purified" (for Kiuchi's definition of 'self-hiding' as the meaning of חַטָּאת, see n. 489).

combined *hattat* offerings deal with the *impurities* of the sancta in this mechanism, the Azazel goat ritual disposes of the *iniquities* of the people.

7.5. Conclusion

In this chapter the *hattat* theories of major scholars were compared and criticized in the light of the results of the previous investigations. It is argued that their theories are illogical and inconsistent. The new theory suggested by this study synthesized the ritual dynamics and atonement mechanisms operating in the *hattat* ritual. They are displayed in four paradigms.

Milgrom's theory concerning the special *hattat* of the Day of Atonement is acceptable, although it needs to be partially corrected. But his idea of the ordinary *hattat* ritual is wrong, when he argues that the *hattat* sacrifice is only offered to purge the sancta, instead of the offerer. In this chapter as well as previous chapters, his idea was refuted as illogic on textual grounds and the study of the *kipper* formula.

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Chapter 8
Conclusion: atonement and holiness

8.1. Summarized conclusion

The ordinary *hattat* ritual and the special *hattat* ritual performed on the Day of Atonement form a large *hattat* ritual system with the cooperative and supplementary function to atone for Israel. In chapter 3, it was demonstrated that the five rituals of the ceremony of the Day of Atonement were combined, integrated, and unified for one goal, the national atonement of Israel. On the Day all sins were removed from the congregation, and all impurities were purged from the sanctuary and its sancta, which were contaminated by the accumulated sins of Israel. The special *hattat* ritual was performed to remove the sins of Israel, but not their ritual impurities which were already purified throughout the year; if it was not purified, whether by negligence or by unconsciousness, it will turn to a sin.

In the ordinary *hattat* offering the offerer's sin is removed by its transference to the victim and its blood that is 'daubed' and 'sprinkled' to cleanse the sancta which is contaminated by his evil. The evil retained in its carcass is destroyed and eliminated through its disposal by the priest, either by eating or burning the flesh. In this respect, Milgrom's theory is wrong that the *hattat* offering is only to purge the sancta and is not related to remove the offerer's sin. Additionally, in light of the definition of the verb *kipper* and the *kipper* formulae, his *hattat* theory is not convincing.

He seems to be right with the impurity case, because the offerer's physical impurity is fully cleansed by the purificatory measures prior to the presentation of the required sacrifices to the sanctuary in this case. The *hattat* sacrifice purges only the impurity of the sancta. However, his theory is wrong even in the impurity case, given that the offerer's atonement and purification are accomplished with the purgation of the sancta. That is, the purification of the sancta is mandatory to complete the offerer's purification. Without cleansing the impurity from the sancta, the offerer's atonement cannot be accomplished. The impurity paradigm differs from the sin paradigm in that in the latter the sin is transferred to the victim, rather than removed and cleansed through his confession or remorse ('inner purification' termed by Milgrom).

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In sum, the statement that the *hattat* offering for the impurity-bearer is to make atonement for him means that when the *hattat* sacrifice purges the contaminated sancta, the offer receives his atonement and complete purification (contra Milgrom).

Kiuchi's alternative theory was not successful, because it makes the ordinary *hattat* offering insufficient, although it acknowledges that its effect of atonement as such is valid. To Kiuchi the atonement and forgiveness on ordinary days await their full accomplishment on the Day of Atonement. It is unlikely that an effect of a *hattat* sacrifice and of other sacrifices is as such insufficient. On the whole his theory is based on wrong presumptions and the misinterpretation of the נָשָׂא עָוֹן action in the *hattat* context and his wrong exegesis of Leviticus 4:1-13.

Johar, Rodriguez, and Gane's idea is that human evils are conveyed to the sancta and therefore they are accumulated in the sanctuary through blood manipulation throughout year. Their idea is refuted by the ritual theory proposed in chapter 4, that a ritual activity cannot have a directly opposite function in the same ritual system. If the function of the *hattat* blood is to purge the sancta in Leviticus 8 and 16, it must be so in Leviticus 4-5. Rather, the peculiar gestures in the *hattat* blood rites that are thought to purge the sancta imply that the sanctuary was contaminated by human evils.

The reason for the textual silence about the purification of the sancta in Leviticus 4-5 is because the focus of the text is on the offerer, his atonement and forgiveness/purification, rather than on the sancta, and because probably the defilement of the sancta on ordinary days was mild. But the purification of the sancta is specified in Leviticus 8 (= Exod 19) and 16, because the concern of the text is with the initial consecration of the altar (*pars pro toto* for the sanctuary), and because the major purpose of the offering was to purge the sanctuary and its sancta of the accumulated impurities, along with the removal of Israel's sins.

The exegesis of the triple evil terms in Leviticus 16:16, 21 confirms that the unified ceremony on the Day was performed annually to remove all the sins from the congregation and the impurities (generated by the sins) from the sanctuary, and thereby to make the national atonement for the community of Israel. It is condensed on the expression 'to purify them from all their sin' in Leviticus 16:30.

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8.2. The Day of Atonement and holiness

The national atonement and purification (implied forgiveness) signify that Israel and their sanctuary are restored to their original holy state, which was given when they were called and appointed by YHWH as his 'holy people' in the covenant established between God and Israel at Mount Sinai. The Day of Atonement is "the climax and crown of Israel's theology of sanctification" (J. L. Mays, 1963: 52). Although Leviticus 16 does not mention the holiness of Israel, the Day of Atonement was the most important institution for Israel to restore their holiness as the people of God. If the Israelites lose their holiness before God, there is no reason for them to live as the people of God. They were called to be the holy people devoted to YHWH from all nations. For the reason the restoration of their holiness was essential.

On ordinary days, holiness was partially restored by means of purification rituals or atonement rituals. However, these measures left wanton sins and some other sins unsolved. Therefore the peril of losing their holiness still existed. For this reason the Day of Atonement was instituted as a special cultic device, once a year to fully recover the original holy state of Israel by making a special atonement for Israel (both the sancta and the people) through the unified ceremony of the Day.

"Be holy" is an "overarching commandment" (Milgrom, 2000a: 1616) and an overwhelming demand on Israel by the holy YHWH throughout Leviticus.[540] Holiness is an eminent topic, not only in Leviticus, but throughout the OT, as W. Eichrodt (1961, vol. 1: 270) stated:

> Of all the qualities attributed to the divine nature there is one which, in virtue both of the frequency and the emphasis with which it is used, occupies a position of unique importance-namely, that of holiness.

According to Milgrom (2000a:1735), holiness is "the quintessential nature of YHWH, which distinguished him from all other beings." His statement indicates that *separation* is the fundamental and intrinsic definition of holiness. When YHWH commands that his people should "be holy like he is holy," he demands that just as he is distinguished from all other things, so the Israelites, who are called to be a holy people, must set them apart from all other nations:

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[540] Cf. Houston (1993: 225-26), who states that the commandment of the holy life to the Israelites corresponds to the tenet of both Leviticus and Deuteronomy.

"Thus you are to be holy to Me, for I the LORD am holy; and I have set you apart from the peoples to be Mine" (Lev 20:26). His demand that they be a holy nation calls on them to dedicate them to YHWH and to separate them *from* all the nations *to* YHWH.[541] Separateness is a necessary consequence of holiness (Jenson, 1992: 48).

Holy/holiness, or the holy life of Israel, is more highlighted as the central theme or motto of Leviticus. In Leviticus the aspects of holiness are displayed in space, time, objects, and people that are set apart from the profane or impure (Jenson, 1992). Since holiness is YHWH's quintessential characteristic, everything in close proximity to Him and present in His scope is or must be holy. Hence all things dedicated to Him by separation are holy: all sacrifices, sacred items, and the priests.[542] Likewise, it might be said that the Israelites are holy and must be holy, since they are separated and dedicated to YHWH with the commission to be holy.[543]

As for the people, apart from space, time, and objects, they have to be holy in three realms: the ritual, the physical, and the ethical realms. In the ritual realm, ordinary Israelites must keep purity by abstaining from assumption of impure animals (Lev 11) and cleanse impurities from their body and place of residence (Lev 12-15); in contrast, the priests are required to comply with the higher ritual requirements for purity/holiness (Lev 22:1-16). In the physical or bodily aspect, some objects consecrated for the sanctuary like priests (Lev 21:16-24) and sacrificial animals must not have bodily blemishes (Lev 1-7; Lev 22:17-25); such holy objects must have bodily perfectness, although the bodily standards are not required of the ordinary Israelites (cf. Deut 23:1-2 that mentions partial bodily defects related to reproduction). The ethical dimension of holiness is revealed in Leviticus 18-20 that instruct the ethics for ordinary Israel, and in Leviticus 21:1-15 that is regulated for the priest in the higher requirements.

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[541] Cf. Snaith's statement (1944: 30) that consecration is a separation to God rather than a separation from the world (cited from Jenson, 1992: 48).

[542] Though the burnt offering and the well-being offering are not mentioned to be holy, it is implied in the light of the other offerings. Kiuchi (2007: 42) says about it: "the reason why the fellowship offering is not explicitly described as holy probably reflects that, of all the offerings, it was the most likely to be profaned. Thus there are degrees of holiness among the five types of offerings."

[543] In his comment on Lev 10:10, Jenson's suggestion of the reason for the categorization of "holy/profane" and "pure/impure" is noteworthy. He says that 'holy/profane' belongs to God's realm and 'pure/impure' to the human realm.

In particular, from bodily perfectness required of the priest and sacrificial animals, it is assumed that the holiness has the definition of *perfectness* or *wholeness* (M. Douglas, 1966: 51-70; cf. Mat 5:48). Probably the same principles underlie the physical standards to discriminate between some pure and impure animals like quadrupeds and fish in Leviticus 11. The ordinary Israelites, unlike the priests, have nothing with bodily blemish in attaining the holiness in Leviticus; instead, ritual purity and ethical purity were important for the holiness of the ordinary Israelites. For the people of Israel to be holy, they must be perfect/whole in both ritual and ethical terms without any defects, in separation from all the nations, especially from the Egyptians and the Canaanites.

The separation between the holy God and sinful Israel is filled up through legitimate cultic devices like sacrificial rituals,[544] whether it is an existential separation (through the *hattat* offering for ever-sinfulness before God, when they approach the sanctuary at the feasts), or the separation is caused by the people's impurities and sins (through the *hattat* offering for specific evils). With the expiatory sacrifices, like the *hattat* offering and the guilt offering, the people of Israel are admitted to approach the sanctuary through the mediation of the priests, and thus they maintain the holiness in the presence of the holy God so that they can meet and communicate with Him.

However, if the ritual system is ignored, their impurities and sins, which were caused by the violations of the commandments (whether inadvertently or defiantly) and by natural phenomena, will result in "profanation or defilement of the sanctuary which in turn would make it impossible of YHWH to maintain his presence among the Israelites" (Joosten, 1996: 128). For this reason, the sanctuary was cleansed from human evil by the ordinary *hattat* offering throughout the year. But most importantly it had to be fully purged from accumulated evils on the Day of Atonement. "There is a regular need of cleansing in order to maintain its full efficacy" (Rendtorff, 2005: 541).

Milgrom comments on the urgency of cleansing the sanctuary that is contaminated by human evil:

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[544] Cf. Eichrodt (1961 vol. 1: 270), who said:

Moreover, because this separation of the sacred from the profane involves the necessity of definite rites, which must be strictly observed, for regulating the intercourse of ordinary men with this unique power, the concept of holiness acquires overriding importance for the whole province of cultus.

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> Why the urgency to purge the sanctuary? The answer lies in this postulate: the God of Israel will not abide in a polluted sanctuary. The merciful God will tolerate a modicum of pollution. But there is a point of no return. If the pollution continues to accumulate, the end is inexorable: "Then the cherubs raised their wings" (Ezek 11:22). The divine chariot flies heavenward, and the sanctuary is left to its doom. The book of Lamentations echoes this priestly theology: "The Lord had abandoned his altar, rejected his Sanctuary. He has handed over to the foe the walls of its citadels" (Lam 2:7). (cf. 2 Kgs 18:4; 2 Kgs 21:3; 2 Kgs 23:16, 20). – Milgrom, 1983: 81-82; 1991b: 258.

If the accumulated sins exceed the critical mass, God will depart from the sanctuary where he is dwelling, "since his holiness is incompatible with impurity" (Joosten, 1996: 127).

The result of YHWH's departure leads to the complete ruin of the sanctuary as well as of the land: "I will lay waste your cities as well and will make your sanctuaries[545] desolate, and I will not smell your soothing aromas." (Lev 26:31). Hence "Israel's life depends on this day being celebrated regularly" (Rendtorff, 2005: 542).

In Leviticus the demand to 'be holy' by separating them from surrounding nations is intensively and exclusively reiterated between Leviticus 11-20 (Lev 11:44-45; 19:2; 20:7-8, 24-26). There are a couple of hints that these chapters can be seen as a large literary unit. The first chapter (Lev 11) and last chapter (Lev 20) of the assumed macro section have the same slogan 'be holy like I am holy' (see the verses above). Furthermore, the concluding part of Leviticus 20 (vv. 25-26) ends with the same topic as Leviticus 11: pure animals and impure animals.

It appears that Leviticus 16-17 are located in the centre of the macro section enveloped by Leviticus 11-15, which prescribe the purificatory measures and warn about the ritual impurities, and Leviticus 18-20, which stipulate the prohibitive commandments and warn about moral sins.[546] Both Leviticus 11-15

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[545] Why did Lev 26:31 mention multiple sanctuaries? For possible answers to this question, see Milgrom (2000b: 2320). Several variants (fifty-three mss. *Sam.* and *Syr.*) read the singular, while another alternative is that this term should be rendered "your sancta." But Milgrom argues that "H acknowledges the existence and legitimacy of multiple sanctuaries."

[546] It is true that Lev 19 is interwined with the moral and the ritual commandments, as Milgrom (1991b: 686-87) notes: "Israel became holy . . . by obedience to God's moral and ritual commandments (cf. chap. 19 . . .)." Therefore, as Milgrom (1991b: 21) points out, Knohl is wrong in arguing that P's cult system is "detached from morality" (Knohl, 1988: V. cf. 125-26,

and 18-20 are undergirded with the same motto, "be holy," and Leviticus 16-17 is placed between them.[547] Leviticus 11-15 is connected with Leviticus 16 by the warning of 15:31 where it is stated that the failrure to cleanse the ritual impurity would lead to a terminal penulty that probably could generate the contamination of the adytum; the link of Leviticus 18-20 to Leviticus 16 is implied by the warning about wanton sins and illicit practices in the section.

As argued in chapter 5 (§ 5.2.3.1), the placement of Leviticus 17 along with Leviticus 16 is suitable in light of the ritual logic and literary strategy of Leviticus, because Leviticus 17 explains for the first time the meaning and function of sacrificial blood, right after the role of sacrificial blood reached its climax with multiple blood rites in Leviticus 16. In this respect, Leviticus 17 is clearly not the opening unit of the Holiness Code that is alleged to be an independent corpus.[548]

It is likely that furthermore Leviticus 16 is placed in the center of Leviticus along with Leviticus 17. Scholars have submitted a variety of its structure and divisions.[549] Most of their structures show a lineal frame. In contrast, Douglas

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133-34, 138, cited from Milgrom, 1991b: 21). Nevertheless, it is clear that Lev 18-20 feature generally the moral laws.

[547] For the reconstructed and summarized outline of Wagner's whole structure of Leviticus (1974: 315) which sees Lev 11-20 as one separate section of Exod 25-Lev 26 that forms a unity, see Sun (1990: 32-33); to Wagner Lev 11-20 is a sub-section that belongs to 'Cultic impurity' section (Lev 11-22).

[548] Gerstenberger (1996) and Jürgens (2001) also place Lev 16 and 17 together in the structure of Leviticus, binding them into a section. As argued by Jürgens (2001: 17-20), the two chapters have an intertextual and thematic relationship, and furthermore it is likely that there is some reason why Lev 16-17 is arranged in the centre of Lev 11-20. Jürgens (2001: 185) states:

> Allerdings wird die Möglichkeit des Scheiterns gezielt in den Blick genommen, indem der Ethik ein rituelles System vorangestellt wird, mit dessen Hilfe die Konsequenzen von Verfehlungen behoben werden können. Dieses ganze System ist, wie das Blut (vgl. Lev 17,11b!), Gabe des heiligen Gottes. Nicht ein perfektes Einhalten des Gesetzes ermöglicht das Leben in unmittelbarer Nähe des heiligen Gottes; vielmehr ermöglicht erst Gottes Angebot zur Sühne ein Leben in seiner Gegenwart trotz der Sünde. Den beiden Texten Lev 16/17 kommt damit eine Scharnierfunktion zwischen dem eher rituell geprägten ersten Teil und dem eher ethisch geprägten zweiten Teil des Buches Levitikus zu.

Jürgens pointed to the importance of the ritual system that achieves the restoration of holiness, and the significance of the location of Lev 16-17 that is placed prior to the ethical admonitions in Leviticus. For an additional intertexuality between Lev 16 and 17, see B. Britt and P. Creehan, (2000: 398-400) that attempts to see Lev 16:29-17:11 as one unified unit.

[549] Scholars have presented various structures of Leviticus with several divisions. Most proposed structures are lineal. Sun (1990), who denies the Holiness Code, suggests two

(1993: 11; 1995: 247-55) posed an ingenious ring structure, accepted by Milgrom (2000a: 1364-65). Her ring structure takes Leviticus 19 as the pivot of Leviticus. She argues that the ring structure is a literary reflection and embodiment of the Tabernacle.

However, it seems that she overlooks the symmetry of Leviticus 11-20 centered on Leviticus 16-17.[550] In addition, that it is a literary embodiment of the Tabernacle seems to be a forced idea. By extension it is likely that the symmetric feature is applied to Leviticus 8-9 and Leviticus 21-22 which are the sections concerning the priests. In this view, this thesis poses the following structure of Leviticus provisionally, leaving the detailed discussion to a later study:

A. Lev 1-7: Sacrificial offerings
    B. Lev 8-9: Priests: Ordination and first offerings
        C. Lev 10: Defilement of the altar by two priests
            D. Lev 11-15: Ritual purity for the holiness of Israel
                X. Lev 16-17: Day of Atonement and Blood
            D^1. Lev 18-20: Moral purity for the holiness of Israel
    B^1. Lev 21-22: Priests: Qualifications and duties
A^1. Lev 23:1-24:9: Festivals and offerings
        C^1. 24:10-23: Defilement of the Name by a layman
            D^2. Lev 25-26: Cosmic purity for the holiness of Israel
A^2. Lev 27: Various offerings

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divisions: chapters 1-10; 11-26 + 27. Wenham (1979: 3-6): chapters 1-7; 8-10; 11-16; 17-27 (followed Ross [2002]). Noordtzij (1982: 2-4): chapters 1-7; 8-10; 11-15; 16; 17; 18-20; 21-25; 26; 27. Hartley (1992): chapters 1-7; 8-10; 11-15; 16; 17-26; 27. Kiuchi (2007): chapters 1-7; 8-16; 17-22; 23-26 (27). Gerstenberger (1996): chapters 1-7; 8-10; 11-15; 16-17; 18-20; 21-22; 23-25; 26-27. C. R. Smith (1993: 17-32) poses a creative structure that displays the mutual alternation of law section and narrative section. "This yields seven-fold divisions: law, narrative, law, narrative, law, narrative, law" (Smith, 1993: 22): 1-7 (Law 1 sacrifice); 8-10 (Narrative 1 the episode of priests); 11-15 (Law 2 cleanness); 16 (Narrative 2 the Day of Atonement); 17:1-24:9 (Law 3: holiness); 24:10-23 (Narrative 3: the episode of a mixed blood); 25-27 (Law 4: redemption). For structural meaning of Leviticus against Sinai periscope (Exod 19-Num10:10), see A. Ruwe (1993).

[550] For the centrality of Lev 16 in the book of Leviticus, also see Warning (1999). Hartley (1992: XXXV) says that Lev 16 is the 'keystone' of the structure and at the center of 'the logical arrangement of the material' as a turning point from the regulations of sacrifices and ritual purity to the laws on holy living; cf. Rendtorff (2003: 252-58) that suggests briefly a possibility that Lev 16 might be placed to read as a center of Pentateuch.

The symmetry is clear in light of the thematic connections and relations in the structure.

A and A[1] deal with the establishments of public cult: prescription of sacrifices and the occasions to offer the sacrifices. A and A[2] form a macro-inclusio that overarches the whole book by the similar theme of offerings. The former regulates generally obligatory sacrifices to the sanctuary, and the latter roughly voluntary contributions to it.

B and B[1] consist of the contents on priests in general, even though the former is the narrative section and the latter is the law section. They address: the ordination of the priests and their first performance of animal offerings (B); the qualification of the priests and the animals which are allowed for the altar (B[1]).

C and C[1] consist of striking narrative sections in Leviticus interspersed with the bundles of laws and regulations. Making a symmetric pair on the axis of chapters 16-17, they also have the thematic relationship, because both sections deliver respectively the stories of tragic incidents that led to the fearful deaths incurred by their respective infringements on the Deity (the altar and the Name). Furthermore, the two incidents compare with each other in that one was committed by priests and the other by a laity, though he was a hybrid. Such a comparable and symmetric presence of the two incidents in Leviticus can be hardly occurred by chance, but rather it seems to imply the considerable literary intentions of the author.

D and D[1] are the laws for holiness of the Israelite community. Both of them are undergirded on the slogan, "be holy, because I am holy." This slogan does not appear in Leviticus except in D and D[1]. The ultimate purpose of both D and D[1] is the holy life of Israelites.

Significantly chapters 16 and 17 are located between D (ritual impurities) and D[1] (moral impurities). The Day of Atonement was to remedy the accumulated sins that were unresolved throughout the year. The evils must have come from failure to cleanse the ritual impurities and from wanton violations of moral prohibitions. The evils of the Israelites, which are listed in D and D[1], enclose chapters 16 and 17. Furthermore, B and B[1], namely, the violations, failures and evils of the priests will also be treated on the Day of Atonement (Lev 16) with the sacrificial blood (Lev 17). The infringement on the altar and the blasphemy of the Name are tantamount to the defilement of YHWH. It is clear that the blasphemy also contaminated the sanctuary. Such severe defilement of the sanctuary had to be cleansed, along with the collective guilt of the whole Israel, on the Day of Atonement.

On the other hand, D^2 is closely connected to D and D^1 in terms of the purity/holiness concept. While D is the purity laws for holiness, D^1 is the moral laws for holiness. In fact, it is likely that D^2 is the laws for purity/holiness of the land, in terms of the restoration of the order of the land. The Day of Atonement cannot be separated from D^2 (Jubilee law), because it, the tenth of the seventh month (Tishri) is the starting day of Jubilee. The Day of Atonement is the very day to proclaim the advent of Jubilee. The Day of Atonement is the opening day of Jubilee every fiftieth year. It is difficult to see the same date as a coincidence.[551] It implies that Jubilee is the year for the restoration to the original order of land, that is, "reestablishment of the order of creation" (Gorman, 1990: 61-62). In short, the accomplishments of the Day of Atonement (Lev 16) are extended to D^2 (Jubilee laws), and thereby the Day is closely related to D, D^1, and D^2, Therefore, the treatment of D, D^1, and D^2 as the sections of the related theme can be justified.

This structural view implies that the ultimate purpose and goal of the Day of Atonement in Leviticus 16 is to provide a national atonement for Israel, to purify them from all sins, and to restore their holiness before God.

The Day of Atonement is the opening day of Jubilee. While the Day of Atonement was the day to recover the people and the sanctuary from sin and impurity (moral and cultic disorder), Jubilee was the year to restore the Israelites from their slavery and debt[552] with the proclamation of liberty, and to recover the boundary of the land (social disorder). It is implied that slavery, debt, and the disorder of land may well be a kind of social impurity and defilement. Jubilee is the year of cosmic restoration from such social defilement. R. S. Kawashima (2003: 370-89) named it 'cosmic purity' by borrowing Gorman's term.

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[551] Kawashima has an insight into the significance, saying:

The Priestly legist guarantees the possibility of such a restoration by abolishing slavery and the permanent sale of land, so that the proclamation of "liberty" on the Day of Atonement at the start of the Jubilee, in returning people and land to this proper state, symbolizes and completes the atonement of societal pollution.
(2003: 387)

Thus, the proclamation of "liberty" on this day merely symbolizes the cleansing of socioeconomic pollution, though it also completes it by restoring the order of people and land. (2003: 388)

[552] Although debt is not mentioned in Lev 25, it is probably implied, because debt leads a person to slavery.

That the opening date of Jubilee is the same as the Day of Atonement probably implies that the national atonement of the Day of Atonement would envision social and cosmic dimension.[553]

Thus, it seems that the theological significance of Leviticus 16 is revealed in terms of the structure of Leviticus. While placing the enactment of the great Day in the center of Leviticus, the legislator intended to accentuate the purpose of the Day of Atonement; the enactment of the Day was to purify and recover annually the whole community of Israel to their holy state in all dimensions: space (the sanctuary and land), people (priests and Israelites), and time (occasions).

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[553] If the priestly concept of כִּפֶּר envisioned its social dimension, it is likely that כִּפֶּר is affiliated to גָּאַל in conceptual relationship (for conceptual affinity and interchangeability of כִּפֶּר with גָּאַל, see Sklar, 2005: 64-65).

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Early Jewish Literature

Ant.	Josephus, *Antiquities*
b. Yoma	*Babylonian Talmud Yoma*
b. Zebaḥ	*Babylonian Talmud Zebaḥ*
m. Menaḥ	*Mishna Menaḥot*
m. Šebu.	*Mishna Šebuot*
m. Yoma	*Mishna Yoma*
m. Zebaḥ	*Mishna Zebaḥ*
Sipra	*Sipra*
Tg. Ps.-J.	*Targum Peudo-Jonathan*
t. Šebu.	*Toshefta Šebuot*

Other ancient versions

Sam.	*Samaritan Hebrew Text of the OT*
Syr.	*Syriac Version of the OT*