

INTELLIGENCE FAILURES: CAUSES AND CONTEMPORARY CASE STUDIES

**Brig Gen G P H Kruys (rtd)
Research Associate: Institute for Strategic Studies
University of Pretoria**

ABSTRACT

Intelligence, like warfare, is not a science but an art. If a science at all, it is certainly far from an exact science. It is an intellectual endeavour which requires much training, common sense, experience, team work, technological expertise and the ability to communicate the product to the user, to name but a few of the basic requirements. It also requires intellectual bravery to give the result of the intelligence assessments to the user, without the tendency to be vague, so as to excuse faulty intelligence predictions in the future. It remains a human endeavour prone to mistakes. Intelligence failures are thus to be expected, but good tradecraft, and above all sound analysis, can lead to success. In this article, the concept of intelligence and the underlying reasons for intelligence failures are discussed, and subsequently applied to a number of case studies involving some apparent intelligence failures.

1. INTRODUCTION

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York, the terrorist attack on the Madrid railway system, the London bombings in 2005 and the war in Iraq, have given the success or failure of intelligence communities (ICs) tremendous prominence in the international news media. Public consciousness of intelligence efficiency, or the lack thereof, and its influence on government and security service decision-making, regarding public safety,

is on a previously unknown level.

A number of United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) intelligence commissions have specifically investigated the functioning, efficiency and reasons for intelligence failures of their respective ICs as well as the effectiveness of the co-ordination between Western allied ICs. They were also required to report on the alleged tendencies of the US and UK governments respectively, to place political pressure on their ICs to produce intelligence reports supporting decisions which policy-makers required for political purposes.

2. BACKGROUND OVERVIEW

Referring to the report of 31 March 2005 of the Presidential Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, a Cable News Network (CNN) publication was headed "Report: Iraq intelligence 'dead wrong'".¹⁾ The Commission had in its letter to the US President pointed out that it had concluded that the IC had been 'dead wrong' in virtually all its pre-war judgements about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).²⁾ In the body of its report it concluded that no political pressure had been put on intelligence analysts to skew or alter their judgements. At the same time the analysts had not worked in an atmosphere that encouraged scepticism about widely held beliefs.³⁾

The former US Secretary of State, General Colin Powell, made a presentation to the United Nations (UN) Security Council in February 2003 offering proof that Iraq had WMD, so making the case for the Coalition's invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In September 2005, however, he was quoted as saying that he was the person who made the presentation, "that it would always be part of his record", and that he regretted ever having made the case for war based on the intelligence provided. He pointed out that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director had not aimed to mislead and that the director had believed the intelligence to be accurate.⁴⁾ This was confirmed by the US Commission's letter to the president regarding intelligence pertaining to WMD, where it is stated that the intelligence presented to the president was what the intelligence professionals had believed, but they were simply wrong.⁵⁾

The US intelligence effort is massive by any standards. It has had numerous successes most of which will be unknown, since they will not draw media attention like failures do, and the IC will tend to keep successful operations and methods classified. For example, the US IC correctly assessed the state of Libya's nuclear and chemical weapons programmes. Evidently new techniques made it possible to penetrate the AQ Khan nuclear network and so allow the US government to pressurise Libya to dismantle its programme. Moreover, the US IC has improved its counter-terrorism activities particularly in respect of overseas tactical operations. The latter was made possible by the "fusion of interagency intelligence capabilities".⁶⁾

It was reported in 2004 that to gain success the CIA had an estimated employment level of over 20 000. The National Security Agency (NSA) was estimated at 21 000 and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) at 8 500.⁷⁾ These figures do not include other intelligence related organisations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). Commonly the US IC budget has been estimated at US\$30 billion since 1999. However, some 2002 estimates placed the figure to be somewhere between US\$35 billion and US\$40 billion.⁸⁾

In spite of the massive effort and the reported efficiency and professionalism of a large part of the US IC, there have been many intelligence failures. The following are examples of where there was a lack of warning prior to occurrences which were of obvious importance to the US.⁹⁾

- The German attack on the Soviet Union, June 1941.
- Pearl Harbour, December 1941.
- The German attack in the Ardennes Battle of the Bulge, December 1944.
- The October 1973 Yom Kippur War.
- The fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979.
- The Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980.
- The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
- The 1983 terrorist bombings that killed 250 US Marines and destroyed the US embassy in Beirut.
- The failure to foresee the Soviet collapse in 1989.
- The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

- The failure to foresee the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US.
- The wrong evaluation of the presence of WMD in Iraq prior to the Coalition invasion in 2003.

The world's best funded, best staffed intelligence agency has clearly had many unfortunate intelligence failures. The question is what makes it so difficult for intelligence reporting and forecasting to be accurate? Some considerations could be whether the theory of intelligence is sound; whether the problems lie in the organisational and bureaucratic field; or whether the fault lies in analysis at policy level or in the IC itself, or both? Possibly intelligence failures are simply inevitable, and given the nature of the work and the prominence of the human factors involved, failures are both inevitable and natural. A prevailing view amongst writers on intelligence failures is rather pessimistic, namely "that intelligence is intrinsically difficult and not likely to improve".¹⁰⁾

3. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE THEORY

Theory can be explained as the exposition of the principles of science.¹¹⁾ Whether intelligence is a science or better classified as an art, as is the operational art in warfare, is not of great importance, but it is clearly not an exact science. If theory is seen as the systematic thought process used to understand how and why things happened in the past, and the application of the result in future practice, it can indeed be of great value for intelligence as it has been in the study of warfare.

3.1 The meanings of the term 'intelligence'

In 1949 *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, written by Sherman Kent, was first published. His book is widely regarded as the trigger for establishing intelligence as a serious subject for academic study. In it he wrote that intelligence practitioners use the word intelligence to mean knowledge (information), the organisation that produces knowledge and the activities carried out by such organisations.¹²⁾

Generally, intelligence is also understood to mean the pro-

cess of gathering or collection of information, and the analysis or collation of that information to turn it into intelligence. Thereafter the dissemination and use of the produced intelligence is also understood to be part of the intelligence process. In this sense the intelligence process is seen as a sequence of events.

Intelligence can according to other theoretical exposés be divided according to four different types of activity, referred to as the elements of intelligence, namely collection, analysis, covert action and counter-intelligence. Covert action and counter-intelligence are not part of the 'process' as previously explained, namely that of collection, collation, dissemination and use. Covert action is used to influence political events directly and has been described as an activity which is halfway between war and diplomatic action. Counter-intelligence seeks to protect the state and its intelligence service against harm which an enemy intelligence service might inflict on it.¹³⁾ Usually it is also understood to mean the effort to keep classified intelligence from the opposition.

The term intelligence thus includes many activities as well as the nouns 'knowledge' or 'information' and 'producing organisation'. Its meaning is thus often understood to include all its 'elements' or else only those aspects understood to be referred to within the context of a specific communication, be it verbal or written. This can be most confusing and might be due to the fact that intelligence theory is relatively new. Consequently, after fifty and more years of academic study of the subject, some writers still regard intelligence as a 'little-understood' and 'under-theorised' subject.¹⁴⁾

3.2 The use of the terms 'strategic' and 'tactical' when applied to intelligence

An example of the use of the words 'strategic' and 'tactical' in the context of intelligence failure, is available in the report of the US Commission which investigated WMD. In its overview the Commission stated that the US IC is overburdened by demands for "current intelligence" to meet the tactical requirements of the war on terror. Clearly tactical intelligence is essential in support of the military and to predict terrorist activity. But it is argued that the IC must be subjected to a "broad and deep change" to give it much greater strategic capabilities. The strategic capacity, it is said, is needed to

counter the threat posed by nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, by inference in the hands of terrorist organisations and/or rogue states.¹⁵⁾

It is assumed that the concepts strategic and tactical intelligence are easily understood, and so they should be. However, the following descriptions of the terms may be useful:

- Strategic intelligence is intelligence concerned with the policies, cultural tendencies, thinking processes, intentions, capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities and possible courses of action of foreign or enemy nations or international terrorist organisations. It is used in carrying out national security measures, in determining foreign and anti-terror policies or in conducting general security and/or military operations.¹⁶⁾
- Tactical intelligence is intelligence pertaining to the capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities or reactions of a hostile force (or terrorist organisation), either air or surface, and which is used in carrying out tactical operations.¹⁷⁾
- Tactical or actionable intelligence is an awareness of the target, timing and type of attack being planned by an enemy.¹⁸⁾

4. INTELLIGENCE THEORY AND A REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS

Much has been written about a possible revolution in military affairs (RMA). Taking into consideration the large number of intelligence failures, it may be very necessary to have a revolution in intelligence affairs (RIA). The US Commission on WMD concluded that the IC had to be transformed; that the intelligence agencies were massive government bureaucracies filled with people who were ruled by the laws and procedures of bureaucratic behaviour; that they had developed risk-averse cultures; and that they were prone to taking outside advice badly. A number of commissions had identified the same failings to no avail. The IC was seen by the Commission as a 'closed world' with an almost perfect record of resisting any form of change based on external recommendations.¹⁹⁾

The Commission's conclusion is hardly surprising. Staff work

required to produce a paper in large bureaucratic organisations often follows a specific sequence which results in a mediocre product. Supervisors at the different levels, in trying to anticipate what the next level requires, subject the focus of important studies to endless amounts of time-consuming tinkering. It is not uncommon for a manager at one level to order an analyst to rewrite a report completely, only to have the next level's manager order it to be redone, as it was originally written. The process leads to a lack of accuracy and sharpness in analytical judgements and long-service managers tend to water down the judgements of talented analysts.²⁰⁾ A famous British intelligence analyst, R V Jones, (after whom a medal is named which is presented as a prize for skilled scientific analysis in the CIA), wrote that "intelligence is best done by a minimum number of men and women of the greatest possible ability".²¹⁾

The Rand National Security Research Division published a technical report entitled "Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs" which seems to confirm the need for RIA, even if it is merely the first movement in that direction. Some of the most striking recommendations in the document are the following:²²⁾

- The belief that intelligence requires a massive budget to be successful should be challenged. Al-Qaida has established a global intelligence network. It has included the latest commercial information technology in its system and in so doing has exploited the weaknesses in US and Western security defences.
- The common belief that the centralisation of intelligence will improve its functioning may be wrong. Rather, US intelligence should be organised to behave more like its adversaries; decentralised, continuously changing and thus difficult to gauge and deceive.
- New intelligence theory should help establish what intelligence can and should do, and also what it should not do. In the light of the changed security threat the functions of intelligence should be studied to establish its proper modern functions.
- The report recommends that a US National Intelligence Strategy should be set up based on the latest National Security Strategy, and that the aim should be the implementation of a RIA over a

realistic period of time. It is mentioned that the recent appointment of a US Director of National Intelligence may well enhance the process.

- It is further recommended that a revolutionary national intelligence doctrine should be developed to follow the acceptance of the strategy. It should be used as the military uses doctrine, and it should be taught at intelligence training institutions.
- It is pointed out that technological innovation is of prime importance in the development of a RIA. The IC, it is stated, could do well to study how the military and the business sector have introduced recent technological innovations into their systems.
- New technology, it is argued, makes it possible for information sharing and analytical collaboration between agencies. If this does not happen it is due to old policies and procedures which have not changed enough to establish new behaviours in the work place. The doctrine of 'need to know' will have to shift to 'need to share'.
- The report suggests that in order to enhance reasoned debate on intelligence transformation, the occasions, if not the specifics, of intelligence successes should be made known, and used as references. At present the public and those outside the IC who influence it, are only aware of failures.
- Lastly, it is pointed out, amongst many other recommendations, that intelligence missions should be based on the National Security Strategy, the National Intelligence Strategy, and the transformation aims which are established to bring about a RIA. The whole process must involve enough outsiders and people who are inclined to take contrary views, so ensuring that different ways of doing business are always considered.

5. REASONS FOR AND CAUSES OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURE

An intelligence failure is fundamentally a misinterpretation of a situation which leads a government or its security forces to take actions that are counter-productive to its own interests. Whether

the government or security force is surprised by what happens, is of lesser importance than the fact that it continues to do the wrong things to handle the situation, wrongly analysed in the first place.²³⁾

A common cause for failure is simply that the information is not forthcoming or that it is inaccurate. This was the case with WMD misinformation related to Iraq prior to the 2003 Coalition invasion. In turn the unavailability of information can be caused by the secretive nature of the target, as Iraq was, or by the lack of the means to gain the information. It is widely believed that too much emphasis is being placed on technological means to gain information, and that it gleans less than human intelligence (HUMINT) could do in insurgency warfare. CNN and other news media have consistently reported the lack of specific HUMINT since the advent of counter-terrorist operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Unfortunately unavailability of information at the point where a specific analysis has to be done is often caused by common bureaucratic problems. Different officers may work on different parts of a problem, and key pieces of information may be ignored, because their significance could only be apparent if all the available data was analysed. Bureaucratic jealousies and power struggles between intelligence agencies can also lead to them not sharing information. There can, in addition, be a lack of awareness of other agencies' information needs, once again leading to them not sharing it.²⁴⁾

An intelligence failure may simply be caused by mistakes in the analytical process. The importance of certain data may be ignored or misinterpreted, or the mistake may be an error in judgement, as takes place in any other intellectual endeavour. While intelligence analysis is rightly seen as an intellectual activity, it takes place in a bureaucratic system which makes the product a systems product.²⁵⁾ It is thus vulnerable to the weaknesses of so-called systems approaches. These weaknesses should be remedied, and a large number of the recommendations made by commissions ordered to investigate intelligence processes lately, are related to organisational systems problems.

Clearly there are a host of reasons for intelligence failures, but there is hardly agreement among writers on the subject as to who is ultimately responsible. A number of researchers believe that the blame lies at the level of accountability, that is, at the level of the

policy- and decision-makers. Some believe it to lie at functional intelligence practitioner level, whilst some place the emphasis on the result of deception by the enemy.²⁶⁾

There is little doubt that a large measure of the intelligence failure related to Iraq's WMD lies at the door of the IC. However, in the case of terrorism it is generally agreed by scholars of intelligence failure that terrorism presents a particularly difficult problem for intelligence. This is due to the terrorist loose cell structure and decentralised command and control, which limit information collectors to use only a few of the available intelligence techniques, to establish the real intentions and capabilities of the terrorists. They agree that HUMINT is of primary importance in the fight against terror, to the extent that some writers place relatively little emphasis on the importance of intelligence analysis. They contend that the focus should be on better information collection from people, and for increased counter-terrorist operations, such as covert action and counter-intelligence action.²⁷⁾

A list of reasons for intelligence failure gleaned from various sources could be of value, but no list is likely to be complete due to the complicated nature of the subject. Some causes have been given prominence by recent intelligence investigating commissions, a few of whose main findings will be listed later in this article. The following are some of the reasons listed for contemplation:

- Unavailability of information, as already mentioned.
- Underestimation of the enemy's intentions.
- Overestimation of the intentions of the enemy.
- Lack of communication between intelligence agencies, and between them and the executive or operations.
- Embedded opinions also referred to as 'received opinion' or 'conventional wisdom'. It means that certain opinions are accepted without reinvestigation.
- The tendency to predict enemy actions by own actions in similar conditions — sometimes called 'mirror imaging'.
- Poor tradecraft: A lack of professional analysts and intelligence practitioners who know the work.
- An abundance of information without the means to handle it, often a shortage of analysts.
- Competition between agencies and a resultant lack of co-

- operation.
- Poor training of intelligence personnel.
 - Failure to see the relationship between pieces of information.
 - Subordination of intelligence to policy. This can happen where intelligence practitioners are goaded into supplying intelligence to suit policy, or when aspects of intelligence which do not support policy are ignored.

Many of the reasons for intelligence failure are interconnected, with one weakness leading to the other. The relationship between them makes it possible to find causes which have slight nuance differences. Such lists could fill pages. The above list should suffice to illustrate a reasonable variation, however.

6. CASE STUDIES OF INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

Case studies of intelligence failures bring out lessons learnt, and from that point of view are of definite value. They also show how natural failures are, because they underline the fact that a large percentage of intelligence failures are invariably caused by human error. Two major US intelligence failures contributed firstly, to the 1983 terrorist attacks on the US Embassy and the US Marine contingent in Beirut and, secondly, to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001.

6.1 The failure to detect and foil the 1983 attacks

On 18 April 1983 a car bomb attack on the US Embassy in Beirut was launched. The incident led to the death of 17 US citizens and more than 30 people of other nationalities. An FBI report noted that the terrorists had used a "gas acetylene-enhancement process" combined with "explosive activated gas bottle bombs". The technique was reported as simple to employ and it resulted in a "blast multiplier effect". The US Department of Defense (DoD) was not given this report. It remained in the FBI but was made available to the CIA and the State Department.²⁸⁾

On 23 October 1983 a truck was crashed into the US Marine compound at the Beirut International Airport. It penetrated the Bat-

talion Landing Team Headquarters and resulted in the death of 241 US military personnel. It had been loaded with the equivalent of between 12 000 and 18 000 pounds of TNT. The US Marines were part of a Multinational Force (MNF) based at the airport. At roughly the same time the French contingent of the MNF were attacked in the same manner, killing 56 soldiers.²⁹⁾

On 20 September 1984 a third attack using a vehicle laden with explosives was carried out on the newly occupied US Embassy annex in East Beirut. In this attack two Americans and at least ten Lebanese citizens were killed.³⁰⁾

Prior to the attack on the Marine barracks in October 1983 and after the Embassy bombing in April 1983 the Marine commander realised that he faced a terrorist threat. In May 1983, long before the attack on the Marine position, he is reported to have said that his intelligence officer could tell him what was going on in the Bekaa Valley and in Tripoli, but that he had no idea what was going on right outside the barracks' gate.³¹⁾

This statement indicates faulty collection of masses of irrelevant information for the commander concerned. It also lends to the suspicion that intelligence analysts at higher levels than his intelligence officer, were not evaluating information with a specific aim of establishing the terrorist threat, in spite of the April attack on the Embassy. Possibly the Marines felt that in a military security area they were safe from attack. There was thus a failure on the part of intelligence, and the chain of command to perceive and judge how such an attack could be carried out.

A recognised expert on terrorism testified before a US Commission investigating the Beirut attack of 23 October 1983, that terrorist's actions were hard to predict and hard to penetrate, but it was mainly a matter of obtaining HUMINT. The chairman of the Commission, a retired Admiral, testified himself before the US Senate that the main lesson to be learnt from Beirut was that better HUMINT was required to support military planners and operations.³²⁾

The first attack on the US Embassy and the attack on the Marine barracks preceded the 1984 attack on the Embassy annex. Moreover, an ex-director of the CIA wrote in 1991 that technical intelligence imagery analysts had failed to see the significance of satellite photos showing a mock-up of the Embassy annex and its

defences. The terrorists had evidently practised driving trucks through the mock-up. This evidence was overlooked because the analysts were not focused on the situation in Beirut and thus failed to realise the significance of the photos.³³⁾

The failure to upgrade security at the airfield was an intelligence and command failure, but even if the satellite photos were not analysed properly, it is clear that the Embassy annex bombing was a major failure in security management. The intelligence threat must have been clear and even if actual terrorist targeting plans were not available, the necessary defensive measures should have been taken.³⁴⁾

6.2 The failure to detect and foil the 2001 attacks

In order to prevent the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington DC, the US counter-terror officials had to establish who the attackers were, how the attacks were to be carried out, what the targets would be and when the attacks were to be executed. US intelligence was never able to glean the needed information from inside the al-Qaida networks, since al-Qaida 'compartmentalised' the operation using the now known cell system, commonly employed by modern post-Cold War terrorist organisations. The plot was not even discussed in detail with the perpetrators until the last minute.³⁵⁾

In spite of the closed, secretive al-Qaida security system, intercepted communications between al-Qaida operatives had enlightened US intelligence analysts as to the possible dates of a coming attack. The owners of the World Trade Center were aware that an attack on the centre could be launched by means of flying aircraft into the towers. Evidently the indications were sufficient to lead a senior security official of a large firm with offices in the south tower of the centre, to advise his employers to move the company out of the premises. He was convinced that an attack could be done by dive-bombing the towers using aircraft. His advice to move, based on scant intelligence, was not accepted for sound financial reasons, but he was authorised to drill and train the firm personnel to evacuate quickly. Due to the training, all but six of the 3 700 employees of the firm managed to leave the building before it collapsed. Typical of such escape drills, the official who must have been the leading co-ordinator, was one of the six who lost their lives.³⁶⁾

The conclusion from the above is that since Rick Rescorla, the security official of the private firm, proved to be correct, that everyone else was stupid. Fact is that for good reason and lack of solid evidence, even his own firm did not move out of the building. Richard Clarke, a senior Whitehouse terrorism adviser, reported in testimony to a US 9/11 Commission investigating "Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9/11", that al-Qaida threats and other terrorist threats were in the tens of thousands, probably hundreds of thousands. Yet the IC would have had difficulty to conclude that a specific suicide hijacking was to take place. Based on available intelligence it would simply have been another speculation.³⁷⁾

It is reported that as early as 10 July 2001, a US FBI agent, Kenneth Williams, sent a message to three FBI counter-terror units that he suspected that al-Qaida was sending Islamic extremists for pilot training in the US. He recommended to FBI headquarters that intelligence should liaise with flight schools around the country in regard to the threat of al-Qaida airborne attacks.

The Pan Am International Flight Academy also reported to the FBI that a student showed undue interest in steering a 747 in flight, while he was not interested in how to carry out take-offs and landings. His further interest in the fact that the cabin doors of the aircraft could not be opened whilst the plane was in flight, and his aggressive and belligerent attitude towards the academy's staff, led to the flight school warning the FBI that a 747 loaded with fuel could be used as a bomb. The man, a certain Zacarias Moussaoui, was arrested but refused to answer questions, and like any other hijacker, he did not have detailed knowledge of the plan regarding the target and the time of the attack.

After hearing the evidence of the Kenneth Williams' message, the 9/11 Commission concluded that even if it had been acted on promptly, and it was not, it is doubtful that the plot would have been uncovered. To prevent the 11 September attack the target and timing of the hijackings would have been required. Neither the suspicions of the FBI agent, Kenneth Williams, nor the arrest and interrogation of Zacarias Moussaoui produced that type of detailed information.³⁸⁾

There are numerous reports telling of occasions where the plot to target the twin towers could have been foiled had the differ-

ent agencies such as the FBI and CIA worked closely together.³⁹⁾ However, even if some of the terrorists who were receiving flight training had been arrested, they would probably not have provided useful information about the forthcoming attacks.

The people who had valid suspicions and those with snippets of useful information simply did not bring it all together. There would seem to have been a large measure of good fortune and luck needed to gain a complete picture. Clearly the terrorist strategic level organisations should be infiltrated to improve the chances of obtaining accurate, complete intelligence. No matter how difficult and dangerous it may be to obtain, HUMINT produces the best intelligence during irregular conflicts. It is usually more successful than other forms of intelligence such as signals or electronic intelligence.

7. CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

7.1 The United Nations and the United States

In the introduction to this article, the 31 March 2005 report of the Presidential Commission on the "Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction" was quoted. The Commission stated that the IC had been wrong in almost all of its judgements about WMD. General Colin Powell had also accepted by September 2005 that no WMD had been found and that intelligence supplied to him as Secretary of State had been wrong. It is, however, of value in studying intelligence failure, to refer to some of the considerations and arguments presented along the way leading to the above conclusion.

On 4 February 2004 CNN and British Sky News reported that both President George Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair had ordered that the intelligence gathering functions in their respective countries be investigated. This was the logical outcome of the fact that prior to the war with Iraq in 2003, the US and the UK governments had argued that the Saddam Hussein regime posed a definite threat, in that it possessed stockpiles of WMD and that it could supply terrorist groups with the weapons, if it had not already

done so. To date no evidence has been found substantiating those concerns.

Time Magazine dated October 2003 reported that to make matters worse, it was estimated by the US government as result of an appreciation done by a workgroup of the then National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, that the cost of reconstructing Iraq after the war would be about US\$50-60 million. However, the US was to spend US\$87 billion for military operations and the rebuilding of Iraq and Afghanistan. This evidently included US\$20 billion in grants to rebuild Iraq alone. The failure to estimate the costs correctly was caused by two false assumptions namely, that Iraq's infrastructure was in a reasonable state, and secondly, that the oil exports would pay for reconstruction. Neither have proved feasible. According to this report, the economic intelligence failures combined with the WMD intelligence failure were 'catastrophic'.⁴⁰⁾

The media seeking a debate was extremely critical of the intelligence agencies, knowing that the governments and the agencies themselves would be forced to respond. Both the CIA and the US DoD responded on 5 February 2004. Their responses argued that there had not been an Iraq intelligence failure at all.

The previous CIA director, George Tenet, made a much-publicised speech on CNN, the gist of which was the following:

- The US Administration was given an intelligence report that Saddam Hussein was a serious threat to the interests of the US, and not an imminent threat.
- That Iraq had WMD in stockpiles, or was at least developing the ability to make biological and chemical weapons in a short period of time.
- The regime had every intention of developing and obtaining nuclear weapons.
- The intelligence reports were based on estimates as all intelligence is. Estimates, he said, were never totally wrong or totally right.
- The search for WMD was not completed. About 85 per cent of the task was still to be done.
- The CIA needed more time and only the future would tell what WMD were in place in Iraq, prior to 20 March 2003 when the war began.

The US DoD Office of Public Affairs, published a *communiqué* on the same day. It postulated that the intelligence community knew before March 2003 that the Iraqi regime had used chemical weapons on its own people and in the Iran-Iraq War. It was also known that inspections after the 1991 Persian Gulf War had discovered weapons development, particularly a nuclear programme, which was more advanced than 1991 pre-Gulf War intelligence had indicated. There had also been evidence of high-level negotiations between Iraq and North Korea for the transfer of long-range missile technology. Should Iraq have developed a 'surge capability' to produce biological and chemical weapons, its missiles could have been armed with WMD.⁴¹⁾

The search for WMD by UN weapons inspectors in Iraq was a military intelligence type task. The difference was that they were allowed to gather information inside Iraq. The inspections prior to the operations in March 2003 uncovered the fact that Iraq had more military hardware than was expected. In spite of the findings, two senior members of the inspectorate in a submission before the US House Armed Services Committee in September 2002, stated that it had proved to be difficult to unravel the information about WMD programmes to establish where the weapons were at any point in time. They said that the inspectors "faced a serious, organized, world-class deception, denial and clandestine hiding of programs". A further point made by an inspector was that the Iraqis were able to "perfect over eleven years, a deception, denial and concealment program that was based on mobility, prior knowledge and quick movement".⁴²⁾ During the same presentation it was stated that a proper search for secret weapons in a country as large as Iraq could take years, even if the UN deployed thousands of inspectors.⁴³⁾

The international media has given the impression that the decision to go to war against Iraq was a mistake. This is based on the conclusion that the intelligence gathered about Iraq's WMD was poor, and that Iraq had no such weapons in 2003, since what had existed previously had been destroyed prior to the war. However, the motivation to invade Iraq was debated openly in the UN and in the media for months on end, allowing ample time for the Iraqis to export the weapons to their allies or maybe even hide them effectively. The Secretary of Defense of the US stated that it had

taken the coalition forces ten months to find Saddam Hussein, who was hiding in a hole large enough to contain sufficient biological weapons to kill thousands of human beings. Unlike Saddam, the weapons could stay buried, and the chances that they would be found without members of the coalition forces being led to them were minimal.⁴⁴⁾

7.2 The United Kingdom

An intelligence assessment of Iraqi WMD done by a British parliamentary committee in September 2003 came to the following conclusions, amongst others:⁴⁵⁾

- That obtaining intelligence from Iraq was difficult due to the dictatorial nature of the state of Iraq.
- That the intelligence community of the UK had done well to obtain what they had collected. The staff of the intelligence agencies had made tremendous efforts, sometimes at great personal risk, to obtain valuable secret intelligence.
- What had been made known to the British parliament and the public in a February 2003 document had not been prepared properly for public consumption, and was more suitable for intelligence professionals. The public and the media had consequently drawn the wrong conclusions from the document. An example was the conclusion that Iraq could have attacked the UK by preparing missiles in 45 minutes armed with biological or chemical weapons. The reference in the document was only to battlefield tactical missiles.
- That the British government had not set out to mislead the members of parliament, and that the verdict as to the accuracy of the intelligence was still pending in September 2003.

In July 2004 a British group chaired by Lord Butler published its findings on the intelligence used to justify the war in Iraq in 2003. It came to most of the same conclusions as the parliamentary report of September 2003, particularly with reference to the conclusions listed above. Conclusions about intelligence gathered from other countries showing intelligence successes were the following:⁴⁶⁾

- The uncovering of Libya's weapon programmes was a "major intelligence success".
- It had proved to be difficult to obtain intelligence about North Korea, but ingenious methods to obtain it, had led to an understanding of the systems used involving the exports of missile delivery systems.
- Good co-operation between the US and the UK agencies had led to the uncovering of the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A Q Khan's efforts to sell nuclear technology to other countries. This is regarded as a "remarkable tribute" to the work of the intelligence community.
- Intelligence gleaned in Iran, Libya, North Korea and Pakistan confirmed the importance of exploiting the relationships between suppliers and buyers when combating weapon proliferation.
- The successes showed that they were achieved based on knowledge developed over many years, and close collaboration between all the intelligence agencies involved.

Since the end of the Iraq War of 2003 when stabilisation operations began, investigations in Iraq found documentation revealing negotiations between North Korea and Iraq between 1999 and 2002 for the sale of sophisticated missile technology. Analysts believed that negotiations broke down and deals were shelved because North Korea feared detection as a result of the attention centred on Iraq.⁴⁷⁾

From the above statements and Commission findings it can be deduced that gaining accurate information about WMD in Iraq was in fact difficult. The conclusion is drawn that the UK government did not set out to deceive the public, but that intelligence reports should have been made understandable for media coverage and public consumption. The media debate has given the impression that intelligence failed throughout, but the investigations list some major successes. The successes will not be given too much publicity since the reasons for success will obviously remain classified.

It is clear that the WMD intelligence failure was not established beyond doubt until well after the conventional phase of the Iraq war. Possibly some doubt may arise again in the future as to

the absolute absence of WMD in Iraq prior to the war. It remains remarkable that the run-down, poor condition of the Iraqi state was not realised in the US prior to the start of the war.

8. COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS

The unclassified March 2005 report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction is extremely long and detailed. Many findings are repeated where they are included in specific chapters pertaining to various subjects, for example, intelligence regarding Iraq and intelligence regarding Afghanistan. This does, however, confirm the value of many findings and recommendations. A large number of recommendations are rightly aimed at the US IC but many have universal intelligence application. As mentioned earlier, the Commission concluded that US intelligence had been "dead wrong" in its findings regarding WMD, and that the IC had not been forced to conclude that which suited the policy-makers in the administration. The above conclusions accepted, a summary of the findings and recommendations of the greatest universal value follows:⁴⁸⁾

- The IC's errors were caused by poor intelligence collection and an analytical process that was based on assumptions and deductions rather than facts. Information gleaned from dubious intelligence sources was accepted as valid without confirmation, and intelligence tradecraft in various processes was not up to standard.
- The IC's assessments and deductions as regards WMD programmes were wrong, but the intelligence failure was worsened and compounded by the way in which these assessments were communicated to the policy-makers. Where conclusions were based on unreliable and dubious intelligence sources, the situation was seldom reported as such.
- Analysts based too many of their assessments on their assumptions about Saddam Hussein's past behaviour and intentions. To illustrate how widespread this weakness was, it should be pointed out that the CIA, the DIA, the NSA and the

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGIA) collected little intelligence for the analysts to work on, and much of what was collected was of little value and misleading. Policy-makers were then not informed adequately by any of the agencies as to how little intelligence had been based on concrete evidence.

- The IC needs to be integrated. There is a need for diversity of analysis and some competition is healthy but the US IC is too fragmented, loosely managed and uncoordinated. To rectify this problem a Director National Intelligence (DNI) has been appointed. The Commission supports the appointment and adds that his staff should remain small and his authority considerable. There is an element in the IC that believes the DNI appointment will change little and merely increase the size of the bureaucracy. The problem foreseen is that the CIA, the FBI and the DoD are powerful independent organisations which will not easily be forced to co-operate. This type of problem is definitely universal, particularly when the security classification of police department's criminal evidence, makes them loath to share information.
- The way analysts think, research, evaluate information, write and communicate has to improve. In order to improve analytic tradecraft the CIA has created a Senior Analytical Service, so that analysts can remain analysts, be promoted in the service, and not be required to move into management posts to advance their careers. The Commission concluded that this would improve expertise.
- Daily intelligence briefings tended to be alarmist due to attention-grabbing headlines, and repetition of reports from day-to-day, gave the wrong impression that the intelligence had been corroborated. Daily reports also gave the impression that intelligence was being sold in order to keep the client interested. These weaknesses obviously had to be countered.
- The Commission recommended that the HUMINT activities of the various departments should continue to increase, as was clearly the case. Moreover, a new Human Intelligence Directorate should be created to ensure co-ordination of HUMINT operations overseas. This directorate, it was suggested, should set the standards for training and tradecraft, and help to develop a national HUMINT strategy. It was recommended

- that the directorate be established in the CIA.
- The Commission also recommended the establishment of an intelligence organisation which would perform only long-term strategic analysis. This was necessary since the demand for current tactical intelligence was so pressing, that strategic analysis was barely done and as a result, analysts were losing their ability to do it. The new unit was foreseen as being staffed by both permanent and temporary members emanating from all the intelligence agencies.
 - An additional recommendation was that policy-makers, the users of intelligence, should question analysts as to the soundness of the intelligence being presented. It was stated that such questioning was not seen by the Commission as politicisation, and that analysts should expect aggressive testing of their intelligence presentations.
 - The technical complexity involved in collecting and evaluating intelligence involving WMD, led the Commission to suggest that the task requires a cadre of case officers with technical background, or at least technical training.
 - The Commission advised that the IC should introduce a formal system for contrary competitive analysis. It was pointed out that enemy 'red teams' should really take contrary positions, and not make similar harder line propositions in the same vein as the own forces 'blue teams'.
 - Evidently a considerable amount of faulty intelligence had been based on single human sources that proved to be unreliable. Iraqi defectors who gave wrong information were too easily believed, and even when their reliability had been proved questionable, it was not reported strongly enough in subsequent intelligence. Consequently the Commission felt that analysis that relied on a single source should be highlighted as such.
 - Similarly, the fundamental assumptions on which analytical judgements were made had to be highlighted and clearly explained.
 - Lessons learnt studies used extensively in the military were recommended for use by the IC, who according to the Commission should improve their internal processes for self-examination. Some intelligence personnel, it was found, still

- regarded processes which had led to intelligence failure as sound.
- A recommendation repeated many times was that several 'Mission Managers' should be appointed on the staff of the DNI. These managers, it was foreseen, should oversee all aspects of intelligence relating to priority targets. Clearly the idea is to bring intelligence emanating from all the agencies to bear on priority topics.
 - The Commission specified that the role of analysts was to tell policy-makers what they knew; what they did not know; what they thought; and why they thought that way. Analysts, the Commission felt, should not be used as clerks or administrative aides. If they spent their time and energy on their core tasks, they would feel that their time and skills were valued. That in turn would allow them to apply their minds with greater concentration on analysis. It would result in the retention of gifted analysts who are drawn to the task because they find it interesting.

9. SOUTH AFRICAN INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

The US has an open society which allows the unclassified publication of many of the findings of presidential commissions, even when the topic is intelligence efficiency of the US IC. Senate and congressional investigations are openly shown on international television. In consequence, the causes for intelligence failure can be studied based on the US experience. South African intelligence efficiency has until recently not been a topic for much public scrutiny. However, some major failings have made the news over the last year or so.

For some time there have been reports in the media which give the impression that poor tradecraft is a problem in the South African intelligence agencies. First there was the report of bungling outside the German Embassy where technological equipment was installed across the road in order to gain information. The presence of the equipment was evidently noticed by third parties and reported. The media reported the matter extensively to the embarrassment of

the South African authorities.

The matter which received negative media coverage for close on a year was the arrest of a South African agent, Aubrey Welken, in Zimbabwe on 10 December 2004. He was only released a year later, having been in the custody of the Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO). The *Sunday Times* of 18 December 2005, reported that Welken was a South African Secret Service (SASS) agent.⁴⁹⁾ The agency's mandate is the collection of information outside the borders of South Africa by means other than through diplomatic channels and open sources.⁵⁰⁾

Welken's mission seems to have been to pay Zimbabwean informants in US dollars. He was reported to have been reluctant to go because he had been followed on a previous mission to Zimbabwe by agents presumed to have been from the Zimbabwe CIO. Although he feared he would be arrested if he returned, the SASS Deputy Director-General, George Madikiza, ordered him to return on another mission. The Minister of Intelligence Services emphasised that Welken had not been ordered to enter Zimbabwe from Zambia. He had decided to do so himself.⁵¹⁾

The Welken affair was finally played out before the Zimbabwean media. The media coverage had been approved by the Zimbabwean Intelligence Minister, Didymus Mutasa, without an agreement to that effect with the South African Minister for Intelligence Services.⁵²⁾

Prior to Welken's release the South African Minister for Intelligence Services, Ronnie Kasrils, received a call from Mutasa, after months of pleading for his release, that he would indeed be set free.⁵³⁾ Why the South African government allowed itself to be bullied and treated with such contempt is not clear. The South African Minister's conciliatory demeanour shown on television, clearly in an effort to placate the Zimbabwean government, was there for all to see. He was obviously forced to do so to satisfy South African government policy but it was embarrassing for South Africans to witness.

Both the German Embassy and the Zimbabwe-Welken affairs gave the impression of poor tradecraft, but intelligence agencies with reputations of almost mythical efficiency, such as the British and Russian intelligence agencies, have had similar mishaps. In January 2006 CNN and Sky News reported how British agents had

used a false rock with technological equipment inside, placed in a suitable position to gain information from Russian sources in Russia itself. The discovery of the 'rock' by the Russian services certainly made the British services look inept.

The Soviet Union's ability to spy and gain information from the West during the Cold War was excellent. In spite of their single-mindedness, however, they also lost agents to Western countries who were able to provide valuable information regarding Russian intentions. Some defected, some were arrested. The latter were usually deported or handed over to Soviet authorities after interrogation.

The ultimate intelligence failure, that of the politicisation of the South African intelligence agencies in internal politics, received considerable coverage in the media. To his credit, the Minister removed the Director-General of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Billy Masetlha, from his post, temporarily at first, since he went on full pay pending investigations into alleged NIA agents spying on certain people with specific political leanings. Some other intelligence officials such as the deputy director-general of operations and the chief of counter-intelligence were also removed from their posts.⁵⁴⁾

The Minister for Intelligence Services is reported to have admitted that it was a continuous battle to impress non-partisanship on the South African IC. He convened a meeting with all officials from the rank level of director upwards, on 21 October 2005, to underline the intelligence agency's role as a non-partisan state body. The Minister warned at a media briefing on 22 October 2005 that using the NIA as a political tool was "playing with fire ... its political conspiracy and leads to criminality. This will drag our country down".⁵⁵⁾

The Inspector-General for Intelligence, Mr Zoliki Ngcakani, investigated the NIA's spying on a certain Saki Macozoma. His report criticised the NIA's bungling since the presence of their operatives was "picked up almost immediately" by the police, the targets' hired security company and even by his wife.⁵⁶⁾ The Inspector-General evidently urged intelligence operatives to ignore orders which would lead them to conducting illegal espionage. He reported that insufficient training and lack of knowledge contributed to them not knowing when an order was illegitimate, and he emphasised that intelligence agencies had to stay out of internal party politics.⁵⁷⁾

On 24 November 2005, President Thabo Mbeki addressed people at a ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of South Africa's new civilian intelligence services. In his address he stressed that members of the intelligence services must be "politically non-partisan". Agents could not carry out illegal actions and claim that they were simply following orders.⁵⁸⁾

Politicisation of intelligence agencies is a major intelligence failure. Clearly the South African President, the Minister of Intelligence Services and the Inspector-General for Intelligence realise this, and are willing to combat it. Poor tradecraft shown again by the operatives ordered to spy on Macozoma, is a problem which can over time be rectified by diligent training and employment of only efficient personnel. Officials who are incompetent should be forced leave such critical and sensitive services as the NIA and SASS. They are not institutions which should employ persons incapable of good judgement and professionalism.

The problem of politicisation will probably not be overcome soon. The political struggles leading to the new 1994 South African dispensation were fought in the days of the Cold War. The thinking of the section of the populace which was against the old order, was strongly influenced by communist insurgency and revolutionary warfare doctrine. That doctrine classified virtually everything as being political. It will take time before the insights of Mbeki and Kasrils are understood and take hold among the rank-and-file. Moreover, the country needs professional and accountable intelligence services who supply intelligence to the decision-makers, not merely advise as if they, the intelligent agents, are politicians themselves.

10. CONCLUSION

As a general conclusion it would seem that most writers about intelligence failures, as well as senior decision-makers, have concluded that intelligence is a complicated endeavour that is prone to inaccuracies. Actionable or tactical intelligence in the global war against terrorism has to be accurate in order to capture terrorists and foil their attempts to carry out attacks. How successful intelligence agencies are in this field is not clear. Successes are seldom reported and security forces prefer it that way.

It is also widely propagated by researchers and investigating

commissions into intelligence failures, that strategic intelligence must receive more prominence. This includes intelligence and information about the intentions and capabilities of potentially hostile states, as well as information about economic, social and political conditions in states either friendly or otherwise.⁵⁹⁾

10.1 Intelligence failure against terrorist attacks

It seems remarkable that the US intelligence agencies failed to predict the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. Intelligence collected after the event shows how much was known about activities at flight schools and the suspicions which those activities engendered among personnel at the schools. A flight academy reported its suspicions to the FBI which led to the arrest of a man who refused to answer questions, but who was clearly involved in terrorist activities. An FBI agent also reported his suspicions that Islamic extremists were undergoing flight training in the US. However, to accurately predict such an attack, specific tactical intelligence is needed about the target, the time of the attack and the method of attack.

In the case of the World Trade Center the tactical intelligence never became available on time and it was evidently not available to the perpetrators of the attack, until just before they carried it out. No HUMINT by way of agents higher up in the terrorist network was available, and what was known was never co-ordinated in one agency or centre. Further intelligence collection and co-ordination of what was known, was thus not followed up with the necessary interest and singleness of purpose.

It seems that an analytic intelligence centre is needed to focus intelligence analysis on a specific threat. To this end a National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) has been established in the US as the IC's centre for analysis of terrorist activities. This centre integrates the comments and concerns of analysts in the whole IC, to identify terrorist threats and to decide on the way in which the senior decision-makers are to be provided with the "threat warning intelligence".⁶⁰⁾

What further complicates the failure and makes it even less understandable, is that the Commission which investigated the 9/11 terrorist attacks, did not conclude that better information sharing

would have prevented the attacks. Nevertheless, nine out of ten operational opportunities were identified as missed opportunities, which could possibly have thwarted the attacks had information been shared.⁶¹⁾

The enemy's efforts not to have their intentions determined, are a major factor to consider when the reasons for intelligence failure are investigated. The cell structure of al-Qaida and its affiliates and the fact that it networks with no common strategy and no centralised command with only a unifying objective, certainly makes them less vulnerable to counter-intelligence efforts.⁶²⁾ This fact must rank high among the causes for intelligence failure where terrorist attacks were involved.

10.2 Failure to establish the whereabouts of weapons of mass destruction

It has been repeated many times in the media and accepted by the US president's administration, that the US IC and the CIA in particular, were "dead wrong" about the presence of WMD in Iraq.⁶³⁾

In the fact sheet given to the US Commission on the "Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction", the mission of the members of the Commission was spelt out. Prior to the mission specification, the following two sentences are presented as the first part of a general outline introduction: "Intelligence collection has always been difficult against closed, highly secretive, and regimented societies that actively seek to conceal their conduct through denial and deception. The technical challenges for the collection and analysis of intelligence on weapons of mass destruction programs — especially concerning programs carried out by rogue states and terrorist organizations — are even more complex than at any time in the past".⁶⁴⁾

It summarises the recent American experience adequately. The lack of HUMINT was once again evident, and it must not be forgotten that the UN inspectors prior to the 2003 Iraq war were also unable to establish, to their satisfaction, whether WMD were present or not.

10.3 The need for accurate strategic intelligence

Many studies on intelligence stress the fact that tactical intelligence takes up too much effort on the part of intelligence agencies, at the expense of strategic intelligence. The point is made that specific centres in the agencies should be tasked to produce strategic intelligence and that analysts in those centres should specialise in it.

The fact that the US government as a whole did not foresee the collapse of the Iraqi state after the US military's seizure of Baghdad in April 2003, and that Iraq was a type of failed state in an advanced state of decay,⁶⁵⁾ underlines that strategic intelligence was lacking. In retrospect it is remarkable that the ICs of the Western nations did not predict the insurgency which has taken place in Iraq. The involvement of neighbouring countries, Syria and Iran, as well as the enmity between Sunnis and Shiites, not to mention the involvement of al-Qaida in the insurgency, should have been predicted by experienced strategic analysts.

The type of information needed to make the correct predictions was not secret. It should have been gleaned from open sources which include speeches by officials, Middle Eastern media and the mood of the people living in Iraq and its neighbouring states. Analysts who are good observers and who are able to conceptualise what mass tendencies will bring about, must be given the time, facilities and the mission to produce strategic intelligence.

10.4 The need for greater HUMINT capabilities

The many successful terrorist attacks which have taken place recently have focused attention on the need for HUMINT. Many writers on the subject of intelligence believe that HUMINT is uniquely effective against terrorist organisations. At the same time there is a belief that Western intelligence agencies have favoured technical intelligence to the extent that HUMINT capabilities have suffered. Media reports in 2003 and 2004 indicated that the CIA and the US military services were increasing their HUMINT capabilities to better collect counter-terrorism information.⁶⁶⁾ One can conclude that these reports are true, and that all the US and many other Western intelligence agencies will have improved their HUMINT coverage since 11 September 2001.

The idea that HUMINT means only intelligence collected by spies infiltrated into terrorist cells or other intelligence targets, is incorrect. HUMINT can also be collected by recruiting people in the target area, who may or may not be aware that they are supplying information, or who in spite of realising this involvement, may not know to whom they are giving information. Liaison with foreign intelligence services, defectors, émigrés and a number of other sources could be tapped to provide information. This includes diplomats and military attachés posted on foreign service, but whilst they may well collect information of importance for the development of strategic intelligence, they are unlikely to collect actionable intelligence from terrorist-related sources.

10.5 Intelligence theory

There is a school of thought that contends that intelligence is a subject which is under-theorised.⁶⁷⁾ Too little attention has been given to the theory of intelligence and as the conditions are ripe for a RMA, it is suggested that the conditions are conducive for a RIA. Intelligence organisations must be aware of the changes in the security environment and to remain relevant, they must accept change or continue to be plagued by intelligence failures.⁶⁸⁾ To bring about meaningful change intelligence theory, philosophy, strategy and doctrine need to be studied extensively.

10.6 South African intelligence failures

There are indications that poor tradecraft has led to certain intelligence failures on the part of South African civilian intelligence agencies. They may or may not be common failings, since media reports about such failings are few and far between. The tradecraft weaknesses that are reported, have plagued even the intelligence agencies of countries with reputations indicating highly efficient intelligence processes.

A major intelligence failure in South Africa has been the reported politicisation of the NIA. This led the Minister for Intelligence Services to suspend senior intelligence officials, which included the NIA's director-general, from their posts.⁶⁹⁾ Subsequently, after further investigations had taken place, the South African head of state,

President Thabo Mbeki, terminated the services of the director-general of the NIA in March 2006.⁷⁰⁾ The Minister is reported to have said that it was a continuous battle to impress non-partisanship on the South African IC.⁷¹⁾ It is imperative that he succeed. There can scarcely be a greater intelligence failure for a country's intelligence agencies than when they harbour striving elements within their own organisations.

REFERENCES

1. CNN.com Report, *Iraq Intelligence 'Dead Wrong'*, April 2005, p 1.
2. Silberman, L H and C S Robb (co-chairmen), "Transmittal Letter to the President", *The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005*, United States Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 31 March 2005.
3. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Overview", *op cit*, p 11.
4. "Powell slams US intelligence on Iraq", 5 September 2005, iafrica.com/news/world_news.
5. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Letter to the President", *op cit*.
6. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Overview", *op cit*, p 11.
7. Taylor, S A and D Goldman, "Intelligence Reform: Will More Agencies, Money, and Personnel Help?", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 19, No 3, Autumn 2004, p 423.
8. *Ibid*, p 422.
9. Goodman, M A, "9/11: The Failure of Strategic Intelligence", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 18, No 4, Winter 2003, p 61.
10. Dahl, E J, "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 28, No 1, February 2005, p 33.
11. *The Concise Oxford Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, London, 1954, alphabetical.
12. Kent, S, *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1949, cited by Scott, L and P Jackson, "The Study of Intelligence in Theory and Practice", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 19, No 2, Summer 2004, p 141.
13. Shulsky, A N and G J Schmitt, *Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence*, Brassey's Inc, Dulles, 2000, p 8.
14. Scott, L and P Jackson, *op cit*, p 141.
15. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Overview", *op cit*, p 5.
16. *Military Dictionary*, SA Defence Force, Personnel Division, Director Language Services, Pretoria, 1993, alphabetical (updated by author).

17. *Ibid.*
18. Derksen, K M, *Commentary: The Logistics of Actionable Intelligence Leading to 9/11*, *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2005, p 253.
19. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Overview", *op cit*, p 6.
20. Young, J T, "US Intelligence Assessment in a Changing World: The Need for Reform", *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol 8, April 1993, pp 127-128, cited in Taylor, S A and D Goldman, *op cit*, pp 427-428.
21. *Ibid*, p 423.
22. Barger, D G, *Toward a Revolution in Intelligence Affairs*, RAND National Security Research Division, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2005, pp 109-111, 113-118, 130 and 136. (http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR242/index.html, last accessed 22 March 2006).
23. Shulsky, A N and G J Schmitt, *op cit*, p 63.
24. *Ibid*, p 65.
25. *Ibid*, p 64.
26. Dahl, E J, "Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 28, No 1, February 2005, pp 33-34.
27. *Ibid*, pp 35-36.
28. *Ibid*, pp 37-38.
29. *Ibid*, pp 37 and 44.
30. *Ibid*, p 37.
31. *Ibid*, p 41.
32. *Ibid*, p 45.
33. Turner, S, "Intelligence for a New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 70, No 4, Fall 1991, pp 154-155, cited in Dahl, E J, *op cit*, p 43.
34. *Ibid*, p 49.
35. Derksen, K M, *op cit*, pp 254-255.
36. *Ibid*, p 258.
37. *Ibid*, p 256.
38. *Ibid*, pp 259-261.
39. Riebling, M, "The Real Intelligence Failure", *National Review Online*, 2002, theme of report is that the CIA and FBI failed to share information. (<http://www.nationalreview.com>).
40. Elliot, M, "So, What went wrong?", *Time*, 6 October 2003, Vol 162, No 13, p 26.
41. US Department of Defence Office of Public Affairs, *Talking Points — Intelligence and Iraq's WMD*, 5 February 2004.
42. Venter, A J, *The Iraqi War Debrief*, Earthbound Publications, Hermanus, South Africa, 2004, pp 10 and 11.
43. *Ibid.*

44. *Pentagon Briefing*, a weekly Report from the Department of Defence, 5 February 2004.
45. United Kingdom, Intelligence and Security Committee, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction — Intelligence and Assessments*, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, September 2003, pp 51 to 57.
46. BBC News, UK Politics At-a-Glance, "Bulter report", 14 July 2004, p 3. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/3892809.stm)
47. Blinken, A J, "From Pre-emption to Engagement", *Survival, The IISS Quarterly*, Vol 45, No 4, Winter 2003-2004, pp 43-44.
48. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Overview" and "Report", *op cit*, pp 47, 46, 3, 5, 6, 12, 175, 14, 22, 25, 27, 159, 170, 176, 341, 311, 387 and 424.
49. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 18 December 2005.
50. Republic of South Africa, Ministry of Intelligence Services, *R Kasrils: Intelligence Services Dept Budget Vote 2004/2005*, (<http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04062310151001.htm>), p 5.
51. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 18 December 2005.
52. *Ibid*.
53. *Beeld* (Pretoria), 14 December 2005.
54. *Beeld* (Pretoria), 22 October 2005.
55. *Saturday Star* (Johannesburg), 22 October 2005.
56. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 15 January 2006.
57. *The Star* (Johannesburg), 26 October 2005.
58. *The Star* (Johannesburg), 25 November 2005.
59. Taylor, S A and D Snow, "Cold War Spies: Why They Spied and How They Got Caught", in Wirtz, J J (ed), *Strategic Intelligence Windows Into a Secret World*, Roxbury Publishing Company, Los Angeles, 2004, p 301.
60. Silberman, L H and C S Robb, "Commission Report", *op cit*, pp 282-283.
61. *Ibid*, p 285.
62. Metz, S and R Millen, *Insurgency and Counter-insurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004, p 14.
63. CNN.com – "Report on intelligence 'dead wrong'", April 2005, p 1.
64. United States of America, Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, *op cit*, Fact Sheet.
65. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 2004/5*, Routledge, London, 2005, p 181.
66. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *Strategic Survey 2003/4*, Oxford University Press, London, 2004, pp 28 and 35.

67. Scott, L and P Jackson, *op cit*, p 141.
68. Barger, D G, *op cit*, pp 2-3.
69. *Beeld* (Pretoria), 22 October 2005.
70. *Independent Online*: "NIA chief sacked after 'breakdown' in trust", 22 March 2006. (<http://www.iol.co.za>, accessed 23 March 2003).
71. *Saturday Star* (Johannesburg), 22 October 2005.