

CHAPTER ELEVEN: HOW GREEN IS *NAMIBIA VISION 2030*s WORLDVIEW?

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1.0 Introduction

Research question 2 (Chapter One, section 3) is: How green is *Namibia Vision 2030*'s worldview? The main purpose of this chapter is to attempt to answer this question, but, as I explain in section 3 of this chapter, with focus primarily on its human-nature relationship. A parallel task is to assess whether or not the seeing green criteria list is sufficient to enable a reader to form a confident opinion on the green-ness of a text: do the criteria “work”? Are they relevant, is the coverage of their indicators “wide” enough, are the discussions from which they were developed, “deep” enough?

1.1 Seeing green briefly recalled

Chapter Eight set out seeing green's stories about the pathological western Self/Other relationship - Self divided against self, against other human beings, against “the female”, against women, against nature, against animals. On the green view, there will be no solution to the ecological crisis, until the pathological Self/Other relationship, which is its context, is healed.

One summary of seeing green's key ideas is -

1. A fundamental critique of the dominant western capitalist techno-industrial society, including of the [masculinist] ontological idea that there is a Self/Other dichotomy, of the epistemological dominance of [masculinist] science, of the idea that human progress entails the conquest, mastery or exploitation of nature, thus legitimating an instrumental ethic towards the natural world; of the values of technological and rational efficiency, materialism and consumerism.
2. A fundamentally different view of self, of self vis-a-vis other persons, and of self vis-a-vis nature, is necessary to re-orient western culture, and to address the increasingly global ecological crisis.
3. A nature ethic which “crosses the species divide” in one way or another, to include some, or all of nature, *for its own sake*, not merely for human-instrumental reasons. There is agreement that long-range, wide ecological sustainability, and animal suffering, matter morally, not merely instrumentally.
4. Personal transformation, and radical political and socio-economic changes are needed to achieve a green, or ecological society. This transformation involves the adoption of ecological/post-patriarchal values.
5. Adherents of seeing green are required to try to implement the necessary changes in self and in society's structures, by clarifying their worldview, and by living out/enacting their personal beliefs in the public sphere.

1.2 Methodology for research question 2 briefly recalled

The methodology used is critical qualitative content analysis, as set out in Chapter Ten, section 2.2. This involves close attention to key ideas, words or phrases present or absent in the text, which might represent clues to/traces of an implicit worldview, and specifically, of its view of the human-nature relationship. The focus throughout is on what *Namibia Vision 2030* says, or implies, or fails to say, when compared with the seeing green worldview criteria list. It is not to subject to critical analysis, the viability of the Vision's contents, nor to establish whether or not it is reaching its “Targets”, for example, those set for 2005. Though I do on occasion ground what the Vision says in what is actually happening in real Namibian life, this has not been a primary aim of this chapter's critical analysis.

Finally, the assessment in this chapter does not re-enter into a discussion of the ideas which contributed to the establishment of any green criterion or its indicators. Those mentioned in this chapter should therefore be understood within the context of ideas discussions in Chapter Nine on environment and development; and Chapter Eight, the synthesis of “seeing green”, which is itself only an abstraction of far richer discussions of its constituents in Chapters Three to Seven. Sometimes I found it helpful to refer directly to one of the base data chapters, and sometimes it was necessary to refer directly to

seeing green source documents such as early Die Grünen political programmes (1980b, 1983). Without reference to the base data context, the discussion in this chapter runs the risk of appearing “shallow”, and ungrounded.

1.3 Method and presentation explained

Within that methodology, I dealt with the tasks of this chapter as follows:

(a) I began by reading what I consider the introductory section of Vision 2030. This comprises the Foreword, Preface, and Part 1 of Vision 2030’s Main Document (pp. 9-42). In turn, Vision 2030s Part 1 comprises:

- In its chapter 1, the background to the Vision as key policy document;
- in its chapter 2, an overview of Namibia: its people, their history, their future challenges, and particularly, the “Principles cherished by the nation”, “...priority issues” and “New ways of thinking”, and
- in its chapter 3, a summary of the sources which informed the final Vision 2030 text:
 - (i) the eight research or “thematic” reports (Chapter Ten, Figure 8):
 1. Inequalities and social welfare,
 2. Peace and political stability,
 3. Human resources, institutional and capacity building,
 4. Macro-economic issues,
 5. Population, health and development,
 6. Natural resources and environment,
 7. Knowledge, information and technology, and
 8. External environment, and
 - (ii) views on these thematic reports as gathered during
 - (iii) the opinion leader survey, and
 - (iv) the National Aspirations Conference.

From this page by page reading of Vision 2030s introductory texts (Foreword, Preface, Part 1), I hope to show that a reader could, using the green worldview criteria even superficially, come to some tentative conclusions on whether any given text contains an explicit or implicit worldview, and whether this worldview tends to be more, or less, green. The results of this paragraph by paragraph analysis are presented in section 2 of this chapter Eleven.

(b) I then read Part 2 (pp. 43-216) of the *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document*. Essentially, this presents the Vision:

**A prosperous and industrialised Namibia,
developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony and political stability.**

which is broken up into what the text calls three overarching concepts:

The People’s Quality of Life	Sustaining the resource base	Creating the enabling environment
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These three overarching concepts form the content of chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the Vision 2030 Main Document. Each chapter is presented as a series of issues with a matching Sub-Vision, 43 in all:

Vision 2030 A prosperous and industrialised Namibia, developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony and political stability.		
The People's Quality of Life	Sustaining the resource base	Creating the enabling environment
Chapter 4	Chapter 5	Chapter 6
25 issues/Sub-Visions	8 issues/Sub-Visions	10 issues/Sub-Visions

The presentation of each issue in Vision 2030 follows the same pattern:

- (i) an introductory discussion,
- (ii) a Sub-Vision,
- (iii) a summary box [Current situation, Things to do, Things to avoid, Worst-case scenario, and Where we want to be (2030)],
- (iv) Targets,
- (v) Objectives, and
- (vi) Strategies.

The unit of analysis for chapters 4-6 of Vision 2030 was not page by page, but issue/Sub-Vision by issue/Sub-Vision. There were always three tasks in assessing each issue and its Sub-Vision:

- (1) deciding whether or not it related to the Vision's human-nature relationship, which is my primary interest. If it did, I discussed it in some detail,
- (2) deciding whether or not it contained any clues to/traces of, the other elements of a worldview - epistemology, or ontology, for example. If it did, I highlighted these, and
- (3) assessing the relevance of the criteria, and breadth and width of their indicators.

Occasionally during the discussion of Vision 2030s chapters 4-6, it was necessary to read what some of its contributing thematic reports had to say on some of these issues, or to read external documents to which *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document* refers. The discussion always makes such external sourcing of information clear. I report on chapters 4 – 6 of Vision 2030 Main Document in sections 4 – 6 of this Chapter Eleven.

So, to summarize Chapter Eleven's analysis and presentation of Vision 2030:

- section 2 presents a page by page analysis of introductory texts to, and Part 1 of Vision 2030;
- section 3 explains the narrowing of focus from a page by page assessment of the Vision 2030s worldview generally, to an issue/Sub-Vision-based discussion of its human-nature relationship, and
- sections 4-6 comprise a discussion of Vision 2030s chapters 4 – 6.

Because confidence in this Chapter's assessment of Vision 2030 rests ultimately on confidence in the seeing green criteria, I present my own subjective critique of these in section 7, to be read together with Chapter Ten, section 4.1.

And finally, in Section 8, I bring together, and draw some conclusions on, one construction of the *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document* worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship.

A word on referencing Vision 2030 in this chapter. It appears throughout as (Vision 2030, page number). However, in the study's reference list, it is entered as Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2004a, *Namibia Vision 2030 Main Document*.

2.0 Reading the Introductory texts to, and Part 1 of *Namibia Vision 2030*

As explained above, the task of this section two, which begins with Vision 2030's cover page and ends with its p. 42, is (2.1) to establish whether one can pick up such a text and, using the green worldview criteria list as guideline, form an idea of its green-ness from a superficial page-by-page reading. In (2.2), I reflect on the analysis so far.

2.1 Page by page analysis

Cover and inside title page

1. The values prosperity, harmony, peace and political stability are given prominence. 'Harmony' is an ecological/green value [green indicator 3.1c], and so is 'peace' [green criterion 16]. Will the value 'harmony' be understood in the text, to signify *also* an end to the war with nature (its "rational domination", its "mastery") which is assumed necessary in the enlightenment understanding of progress/development (Hayward, 1995, p. 11; Oskamp, 2000a, p. 382), and critiqued in seeing green [green indicator 1.3], or will it refer to people-people relations only? And, does 'peace' mean seeing green's radical peace, or does its understanding still allow for money to be spent on 'life-threatening' activities such as armies and weapons, which would not be 'green' [indicators 16.1 and 14.3]?

2. The sub-title is 'Policy framework for long-term national development'

Two thoughts here. Long-term is coupled to the year 2030, so 'long-term' in this text means at most 30 years – one generation. Not the 'long-term' meant in seeing green at all [indicators 10.1, 14.14].

And is it at all significant that the cover page talks not about 'sustainable development', just 'development'? Might this suggest a tendency to equate development with economic development, which would suggest that the text adopts a 'weaker' [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2] rather than a 'stronger' version of sustainable development?

Table of contents, pp. 3-4

What presences/absences, 'clues to/traces of' are there here?

1. The first one that strikes me is 'Namibia's comparative advantages': chapter 2, p. 32. This is a term which is associated with mainstream economic theory, and reformist environmental economics, in which nature is unproblematically conceptualized as resources for humans [grey-green criterion GG 6]. It is also a concept which is problematized for possibly jeopardizing production for local needs in favour of overseas market wants (Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.2.1; not a green approach [indicators 14.6 and 14.7]). So again, could one perhaps expect the text to embrace a conception of development as mainly economic growth? [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2].

2. However, I note the heading of the Vision's chapter 4, p. 44, which suggests that the document will deliver a vision of 'quality of life', rather than 'standard of living' conceived only economically; this is a potentially green understanding of development [Chapter Eight: 6.3.4].

3. 'Employment and unemployment', p. 69, suggests that we are dealing here with a mainstream vision of society, if I think by contrast, of radical green's visions of alternative communitarian societies, outside industrialization and the world market [green indicator 11.2.1].

4. Technology features twice in the headings for the Vision's chapter 4 on 'quality of life' – p.77, and p. 83. Will technology which represents instrumental attitudes to people, or nature, or both, be problematized, as it is in seeing green [indicators 2.1.4, 14.9]?
5. I see also in chapter 4, 'equity' – p. 101, and 'gender' – p. 108, two prominent green issues [indicators 3.1.b, and 15.2 and 15.3 respectively], as well as suggestions of the green commitment to social inclusion of the marginalized [indicator 15.5]: women, senior citizens, those with disabilities, orphans, the sexually different....
6. The headings 'Civic affairs' and 'Civil society and its organisation' in the Vision's chapter 4 – will these reflect the fundamentally green rejection of hierarchy [indicator 1.2], commitment to direct democracy and decentralization [indicator 11.2.2], and real citizen participation in political life [criteria 17 and 18]?
7. The heading of chapter 5 – 'Sustainable resource base' prompts two early thoughts: 'resource base' is a clue to/trace of an anthropocentric, and seeing green-problematized valuing of nature [grey-green criterion GG6 and indicator 1.1]. 'Resource base' is also a clue to/trace of a reformist environmental economic approach, rejected in seeing green as a sufficient solution to the environmental crisis [indicators 11.3; GG 1.1.1].
8. Will the 'Sustainable development' given as a title in chapter 6, p. 175, be a stronger or weaker version of sustainable development? [indicator GG 2.2]. Sustainable development, through seeing green eyes at least, needs to prove its credentials as something more than just free market business as usual, with a few green trimmings added [indicator GG 11.3].
9. Here at chapter 6, p. 201, p. 204, is mentioned 'Democratic governance' and 'decentralization' – two potentially green-sounding values [indicator 11.2.2 and criterion 17].

Acronyms and abbreviations, pp. 5-8

No comment.

Foreword by former President Nujoma, pp. 9-12

Page 9

p. 9, par 1: Already here, 'quality of life' [**'the good life'**, in other words] is defined for Namibians as "the level of their counterparts in the developed world". So, here is valorized what seeing green problematizes, i.e. progress as industrialization [indicator 2.1.2], with its attendant fundamentally flawed **human-nature relationship** [green criterion 7, as just one example of the green critique of mainstream understandings of the human-nature relationship].

p. 9, par. 1: also here, and in par. 2, the talk is of 'development', not 'sustainable development', suggesting perhaps a 'weaker' version of sustainable development? [GG 2.2.2]

p. 9, par. 2: 'long-term perspectives' as equivalent to 30 years, which is roughly equivalent to one generation, is by green standards, short-term [indicators 10.1, 14.14].

p. 9, par. 3: "Our future is about the people". Here is a direct, and unproblematized, anthropocentric statement [green indicator 1.1]. There is not a mention of nature, nor even of the grey-green term 'natural resources', in this paragraph. Nature is backgrounded, invisible. However, concern for food security, within certain conditions, *is* a green issue [Chapter Eight: 6.5.7].

p. 9, par. 4: Here is talk of "a diversified, open market economy". This suggests that one cannot expect in this text, radical economic green-ness, i.e. a critique of the capitalist market economy, and a favouring of communities living outside the market system [indicators 2.2, 11.2.1.c for example], or even a radically changed society [see point 4 of the brief summary of seeing green in section 1.1 of this

Chapter]. This *absence* suggests that Vision 2030 is likely to embrace reform environmentalism rather than radical ecology [indicator 11.3].

p. 9, par. 4: “a resource-based industrial sector” - here are at least three clues to/traces of grey-green-ness rather than dark green:

- (i) one of anthropocentrism - nature as resources for humans [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1];
- (ii) one of ‘the good life’ as unproblematized industrialism [green indicator 2.1.2]; and
- (iii) one of the promotion of ‘competitiveness’, rather than seeing green’s favouring of the values of harmony, symbiosis, and interdependence [green indicator 3.1.c].

pp. 9-10: Two things strike me here. The use of the term ‘sustained development’ – a Freudian slip indicating a weaker version of sustainable development? [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2]. Not the same thing as ‘sustainable’ development, surely? And quite apart from the reformist re-affirmation of commitment to a market-based economy, there seems to be a naive belief that a growth economy can deliver full employment, something no industrialized nation has achieved. Nor does economic growth necessarily reduce joblessness, according to the International Labour Organisation (*The Namibian*, 26 January 2007, p. 15, Global growth fails to reduce joblessness). Compare here, Die Grünen Rudolf Bahro’s fundamentally green critique of employment and unemployment in a market system, in Chapter Seven: 6.2.

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p. 10, par. 1: Here –

- (i) a grey-green commitment to keep up with western-defined globalization, problematized in green indicator 2.1.1, and criticized as maldevelopment by some ecofeminists (Chapter Six: 6.4);
- (ii) an uncritical or at least unproblematized belief in science and technology as the way to progress [green indicator 2.1.4], and
- (iii) another unproblematized commitment to industrialization as means to **the good life** [green indicator 2.1.2].

p. 10, par. 2: A further unproblematized commitment to technology [green indicators 2.1.4, 14.9].

p. 10, par. 3: Equity and tolerance are emphasized here; both strong green values [indicators 3.1.b, 3.1.c]. But ‘land’ appears to be seen solely in an anthropocentric and instrumental way as ‘productive resource’ – a not-green view [grey-green criterion GG 6 and indicator GG 1.1.1].

p. 10, par. 4: Here, in its proclamation of a definite *moral* content to **the good life**, is an indication that the Vision does not adhere to mainstream political liberalism’s neutrality, in which government declines to prescribe the moral good life. The peace, equity, and social inclusion proposed here are all green values [green criterion 16, green indicators 11.1.b, 15.5]. It is not clear yet, whether the envisaged moral emphasis is within a context of renewed spirituality, which would also be a marker of seeing green [green criterion 4].

p. 10, par. 5: The emphasis here on ‘external threats’, ‘destabilizing elements’, and warfare as protection against security threats, is militaristic, and hence a non-green language use vis-a-vis the Other [green indicator 1.5]. It cannot be argued that the Vision 2030 text is insensitive to the ontological role of language, for there is implicit recognition of it in a discussion of women and development (p. 110), for example, under “Strategies”, which include language adjustments to change women’s ontological status. Seeing green would look to a radical understanding of peace – the dismantling of armies, security forces, and weaponry, and social, rather than the armed defence envisaged here [indicators 14.3, 16.1, 16.3].

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p. 11, par. 1: ‘Partnership’ is a strong green value! [green indicator 11.1.c]. But its green-ness fades on reading the rest of the paragraph, which is only about partnership between people, and Namibians, specifically. There is nothing about partnership with nature, which would be a marker of a green understanding of partnership [green criterion 10].

p. 11, par 2: (i) There is a commitment here to *sustainable* development, but this qualifier has up until now, not been used consistently in the text, suggesting that [economic] development is the over-riding aim; (ii) the use of the concept ‘driving force’ - emphasized in bold too! - suggests an underlying mechanist **ontology** which is not-green [grey-green criterion GG 6 and green indicator 1.5 for example]; (iii) unproblematized science and technology [green indicator 2.1.4] are again seen as agents of development; (iv) ‘sustainable agriculture’ is a term usually reserved for organic-based, reciprocal agriculture, yet the Vision would seem to mean rather, commercialized agriculture (p. 9, par. 4 of the Foreword) which is problematized in seeing green [indicators 12.6, 13.2]; (v) peace [green criterion 16], social justice [green indicator 15.5] and gender equality [green indicator 15.3] are all green values.

p. 11, The challenges, par. 1: Militaristic and thus not-green terminology [green indicator 1.5] is again used here, perhaps unwittingly: “*deploying* - to the fullest – our human and natural resources’ (my italics).

p. 11, The challenges, par. 2: (i) The values listed here - peace, human rights, individual freedoms, civil liberties, good governance, equity, poverty alleviation - are all green values; (ii) the Foreword’s understanding of ‘security’ appears more grey-green than green [green indicator 16.1]; and (iii) land is seen again in an anthropocentric and instrumental-only way as ‘productive resource’ [grey-green criterion GG 6 and indicator GG 1.1.1].

p. 11, ‘Environmental degradation’ – will the concern only be for its consequences for humans?

p. 11, The challenges, par 3: The promotion of Small and Medium Enterprises [SMEs] here is a green value, particularly if it entails promoting locally-oriented, ecologically-appropriate self-sufficiency, and base democratic management in economic affairs [indicators 14.4 to 14.6].

pp 11-12, The challenges, par. 4: Again here is the not-green use of a military metaphor [green indicator 1.5]: ‘As we *march forward...*’ (my italics). It seems doubtful that a text can employ military metaphors and be committed to radical green peace [indicator 16.1] at the same time.

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p. 12, par 1: Again a not-green military metaphor [indicator 1.5]: “... as well as *mobilizing...* resources.” (my italics).

p. 12, par 2: This final paragraph represents one version of the document’s vision of **the good life**: “... an industrial nation enjoying prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace and political stability’. Industrialism, if not problematized, is not-green [indicator 2.1.2].

Preface by National Planning Commission Director General, pp. 13-16

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p. 13, par. 3: presents another version of **the good life**:

Everyone would like to have access to good education for their children, good and accessible health care, a

clean and productive environment, an efficient and profitable economy that supports full and rewarding employment, low levels of crime, a just and tolerant society and meaningful transparent governance.

One would need to read the whole document to see whether these ingredients of the good life are understood in a green way. In seeing green, (a) ‘good’ education would mean real-world, integrated, holistic education, intended to promote the full flowering of a person’s potential, and not merely to produce Homo *economicus*, well-suited to the industrial production system [green indicator 8.2.6]; (b) ‘good’ health care would mean, non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care [indicator 15.6]; (c) an efficient and productive economy would mean, an ecologically-oriented economy [green criterion 14], (d) a ‘just and tolerant society’ would be one in which fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society’s values and structures are proposed [green criterion 11] and in which living in solidarity [green criterion 15], non-violence and radical peace are advocated [green criterion 16]; and (e) ‘meaningful, transparent governance’ would be within a green understanding of democracy, which is considerably more direct than traditional western representative democracy [green criterion 17]. The green-ness of the text’s understanding of these ingredients of the good life should become clearer as one reads further.

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p. 14, “The Key Elements for the Vision for 2030 will depict;

(i) That interpersonal harmony, and peace are green values [criteria 15 and 16] has already been noted; but the emphasis here on ‘achievement’, if it is intended to signify an adversarial or competitive orientation towards the Other, would not be compliant with green [indicators 11.1.a, 11.1.c].

(ii) Here might be noted again, that to realize the four desired values – prosperity, interpersonal harmony, peace, and political stability, would require ecological sustainability [green criterion 10], yet this key green value is *absent* in “the collective wish of the Namibian people”.

p. 14, “The People and Resource Base will Reflect that’:

This paragraph essentially presents one version of the document’s **view of nature**.

Natural resources- the nation’s ecological wealth: healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding. Perennial rivers running permanently and clear, underground water levels stable and no silting of dams. No atmospheric pollution from croplands and rangelands and minimal pollution from urban and industrial areas will be permitted. Farms and natural ecosystems shall be productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically. Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems will be open, diverse, stable and productive.

Its ontological greenness can therefore be assessed against criterion 6, whether it implies a re-conceptualized human-nature relationship against criterion 7, and whether it adheres to or differs from a mainstream and non-green anthropocentric valuing of nature, against criterion 1.1.

Some early questions to consider in establishing the green-ness of the view of nature described in this paragraph are:

(i) ‘healthy, productive land’: It is difficult at this early stage of reading the text, to say what its understanding of ‘healthy’ and ‘productive’ (Chapter Nine: 5.2 and 5.3) might be – an understanding of healthy and productive as in the high biomass production, but more unstable, stage of early ecological succession [grey-green criterion GG 6], healthy as productive-for-humans, or ‘healthy’ as in

an ecosystem having reached its (purposive?) state of dynamic equilibrium/stability? [green indicators 3.2 and 6.4].

(ii) “Farms and natural ecosystems shall be productive, diverse, stable and sustainable”. The emphasis here on the values “diverse, and stable”, suggests that the text here supports the key green diversity-stability hypothesis [indicators 3.2.b, 3.2.c, 6.4], and not a deconstructive or permissive understanding of ecology [grey-green criterion GG 3]. But will there be any implicit or explicit suggestion later in the text of the seeing green understanding that nature’s *purposeful* tendency towards diversity and stability is a property which confers on it, intrinsic value, that human intervention in nature therefore has normative, not merely instrumental-productive implications? [seeing green indicators 6.3 and 6.4]

(iii) “ecological sustainability” is a green value [green criterion 10]. How it is understood is not yet clear.

(iv) The value “open” applied to an ecosystem broadly means, the degree to which an ecosystem [or conservation area] allows for connectivity with, and biotic mobility between, other ecosystems/conservation areas¹. It is argued by some writers in ecology-as-science² that a greater degree of ‘openness’ in ecosystems/conservation areas contributes positively to the evolutionary process by enabling species richness, and countering species extinction. Even though the term ‘open’ was not personally encountered in deep ecology thought, which takes a dark-green stance on biodiversity conservation [Chapter Four: 4.1.4, 4.1.4.2], “openness” in biotic conservation is clearly a dark-green value.

(v) But at this stage of reading, it is not yet clear *for whom* these values in nature are valuable, though the term ‘Natural resources’ at the beginning of the paragraph perhaps represents a clue to/trace of non-green anthropocentrism, even strong anthropocentrism [green indicator 1.1; grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1]. An answer to the *For whom?* question will also indicate whether or not the text tends towards a ‘weak’ environmental sustainability approach [green indicator GG 12.1].

pp. 14-15, A Basic Principle, and Sustainable Development

The text commits itself explicitly here to the concept of sustainable development, as expressed in the United Nations Agenda 21 which formed part of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. Mainstream UN understandings of sustainable development tend more towards grey-green³ than green [GG 2.2]. Some initial thoughts then are (i) the text here makes no mention of the contested nature of the concept ‘sustainable development’, essentially presenting it as an unproblematic and unproblematized concept, or (ii) of its conservative to radical versions (Chapter Nine: 7.2). It is still too early to tell towards which version the text tends more. But (iii), I understand commitment to the concept ‘sustainable development’ to be a clue to/trace of an unproblematized anthropocentric view of nature [green indicator 1.1]. Finally (iv) one might ask what the text’s understanding of ‘future generations’ is? In other words, *for how long* must what be sustainable for whom? This is one of the three key questions to ask of a text’s understanding of ecological sustainability [grey-green indicator GG 12.1].

¹ Oral communication Dr Chris Brown, Executive Director of the Namibia Nature Foundation, team leader of Vision 2030s thematic report 6 on natural resources (NPC, 2002c, no page number but last line of Foreword) and leader in the production of Namibia’s “Green Plan” and “12-point Plan” (Chapter Ten: 1.1.1 and 1.1.2)

² Diamond (1975) proposed six principles of nature reserve design: large vs small; single large vs several small of equal area; close together vs dispersed; clustered around each other vs in-line; connected vs unconnected; round vs elongated. These principles are still debated in ecology-as-science’s “island theory” of biotic conservation

³ On (environmental) psychologist Oskamp’s view (2000a), the WCED/Brundtland *Our common future* vision of sustainable development “does not actually represent a sustainable scenario” (p. 384), and its environmental impact is “terrible” (p. 381).

Page 15

p. 15, The National Development Process⁴

Here we have one possible answer to the *For how long?* question. This paragraph suggests that “Vision 2030 provides ... [a] long-term perspective”. One can perhaps safely already assume, that “long-term” is understood as thirty years, or one generation, which in seeing green, amounts to nothing more than a short-term political-economic perspective [green indicators 10.1, 14.14].

Page 16

p.16, par. 1

The value of ‘partnership’ emphasized here has already been noted [p. 11, par. 1] as a strong green value [indicators 3.1.c, 4.1, 11.1.c, and criterion 15]. However further reading of the paragraph again suggests that the partnership value is limited to people-people relationships: the key green value of partnership with nature [green criterion 10] is *absent*.

p. 16, par. 2

Both this paragraph, and the Acknowledgements (p. 17) suggest that the green value of bottom-up participation in development planning [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.1.c] was followed. But a reading of Appendix 2 suggests that this text’s understanding of a participatory approach is more managerial than bottom-up. This could mean, in turn, that the text tends towards a ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.2.c].

Acknowledgements, p. 17

The same comment as at p. 16, par. 2.

Part One: Background and summary of vision

Title page, page 18

No comment

Chapter 1, Background to Vision 2030, pp. 19-23

Page 19

p. 19, Introduction, par 1

Here again, quality of life – **the good life** - is defined as that of Namibians’ “counterparts in the developed world”. In other words, an unproblematized techno-industrial society, rejected in seeing green in so far as it confuses standard of living with quality of life [green indicator 2.1].

p. 19, Introduction, par 4

Despite the commitment to the principle of sustainable development on p. 14, the word choice is simply ‘development’. References to its sustainability are *absent*.

p. 19, Why a vision for Namibia?, par. 1

Here, in the first paragraph, the reference *is* to sustainable development. But in the remaining four paragraphs of this section, there is a reversion simply to ‘development’. ‘Development’ rather than

⁴ NDP2 expired in 2005/2006, and NDP 3, which will cover the next 5-year planning period was scheduled for release in August 2007. Its overall theme is “Accelerated economic growth through deepening rural development” (*The Namibian*, 24 January 2007, p. 5, Govt prepares new development plan, public, private sector can participate). NDP 3 has not yet been released (pers. comm. Brigitte Weidlich, *The Namibian*, September 2007)

‘sustainable development’ is also the term used in the final paragraph of pp. 21-22, Implementation of the Vision. *Internalized attitudinal*, as opposed to *written* commitment to sustainable development in this text appears less than consistent.

Pages 20-21

The Vision formulation strategy

The commitment here to public participation in policy formulation is a green-sounding value. However, the description of the public participation process described here, and in Appendix 2, section 2.6, pp. 235-238, is not the kind of radical direct democracy envisaged in green criterion 17, nor even the bottom-up kind of development planning envisaged in ‘stronger’ versions of sustainable development [grey-green indicator GG 2.2.1.c]. In both these criteria, people themselves determine objectives and strategies, rather than being ‘sensitized’ about them (p. 21, the ‘Sensitization Mission’s aims) from above.

Pages 21-22

Implementation of the Vision

The same comment as at p. 19, Why a vision for Namibia?, par. 1, applies here.

Pages 22-23

Organisation of this document

This section identifies the three major concepts to emerge from what is called “the visioning process”: “the People’s Quality of Life”, a green-sounding value (Chapter Eight: 6.5.5); “Sustaining the Resource Base” which is a clue to a not-green and anthropocentric valuing of nature [green criterion 1], and “Creating the Enabling Environment”, which at this stage, suggests neither seeing green or grey-green.

Page 24

No comment on this blank separator page.

Chapter 2, Namibia – An overview, pp. 25-37

Page 25: 2.1 Introduction

No comment.

Pages 25-27: 2.2 Geography

In section 2.2 Geography, paragraphs 2 and 3 (p. 25), “productive” is used more than once to describe the land; however no definitive answer can yet be given to the question *productive for whom?* [grey-green indicator GG 12.1], which would give a broad indication of the text’s ecocentric or anthropocentric orientation.

No comment on the maps on p. 26.

On p. 27, only paragraph, (i) water is recognized as a scarce natural resource, which might be related later in the text – chapter 5 perhaps? - to an explicit recognition of ecological limits to the economy, a marker of seeing green [indicator 14.1]. (ii) Further reading is expected to indicate whether the concern expressed here for availability of drinking water for livestock animals is an instrumental, anthropocentric concern only [seeing green in any event (differentially) problematizes commercial

animal production – green indicator 13.2], or relates also, to concern for the animals themselves, a seeing green value [green indicator 10.2.2].

Page 28: 2.3 People

No comment.

Pages 28-29: 2.4 Political history

No comment on the paragraphs on p. 28.

Here in the second and third paragraphs (p. 29), is mentioned resistance to colonization, a form of hierarchical oppression. Resistance to, and liberation from such oppression is a marker of green [indicator 1.6.a].

Pages 29-30: 2.5 Economy, and 2.6 Social debt

p. 29, 2.6 Social debt

(i) The critique of the destruction of traditional, as opposed to western, forms of culture is a marker of seeing green, which values multi-culturalism [green indicator 15.4]

(ii) Again a **view of nature** and land as ‘natural resources’ in the 2nd paragraph. This is now becoming a consistent and not-green ontological tendency [grey-green indicator GG 6]. The use of ‘resources’ in the Vision’s view of nature far outweighs less economically-oriented terms such as ‘landscape’, ‘wilderness’, or even ‘nature’ [This statement is based on the count results of a search for these four terms in *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document*, which any reader having access to a digital copy of Vision 2030, and Adobe Reader software, can undertake and verify]. The predominance of the term “natural resources” represents I suggest, a trace of/clue to strong anthropocentrism [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.1], and a grey-green economisation of reality [grey-green indicator GG 6].

Pages 30-31: 2.7 Environmental debt

The first paragraph (p. 30) contains (i) an acknowledgement of the reliance of Namibia’s economy on its natural resources. There is as yet no indication of whether or not the text accepts these limits, a marker of seeing green [indicator 14.1], or seeks to transcend them, in a grey-green way, through instrumental science and technology [indicator 2.1.4].

(ii) Both the first and second paragraphs (p. 30) contain a critique of the environmental exploitation and degradation of the colonial regime. This is a marker of seeing green, even though it has not been included in the list of criteria in Chapter Ten. See for example, the ecological economists’ critique of the concept of ‘Raubwirtschaft’ (Chapter Nine: 3.2); the ecofeminist critique of centrism, and ‘logic of domination’ (Chapter Six: 4.2.1 and 4.2.2); and Fundi Die Grünen Bahro’s centre-periphery critique of development based on colonial exploitation (Chapter Seven: 2.1.3.2.1).

However, it remains to be seen whether the Vision proposes grey-green reform environmentalism [indicator 11.3], or the green, fundamentally changed **human-nature relationship** [criterion 7] to replace colonial exploitation and degradation of the environment.

Pages 31-32: 2.8 Post-independence progress

(i) In its use of the terms “resources”, “stocks”, and “exploitation”, the first paragraph under this heading (p. 31) contains several clues to/traces of grey-green-ness: an anthropocentric view of nature’s value [green indicator 1.1]; and an economization of reality [grey-green criterion GG 6]. The sustainable use of resources *for humans* is to be achieved by changes in property rights, legislation, stock counting and monitoring. This is a reform environmentalism approach [green indicator 11.3],

rather than the fundamental changes in the human-nature relationship for which seeing green argues [green criterion 7].

(ii) Paragraph 2 (p. 31) contains a suggestion that water resources might prove to be a limiting factor in sustainable development, which approaches a green view of gracious acceptance of ecological limits to the economy [green indicator 14.1].

Page 32: 2.9 Challenges for the future

Paragraph 2.9 “challenges for the future” distinguishes between ecological and environmental capital, but does not explain the difference between these two concepts. The by now generally-naturalized concept of “capital” in mainstream thought, actually implies an economization of nature, a marker of grey-green-ness [grey-green indicator GG 6]. The concepts “efficient use of resources” and “comparative advantages”, both reformist environmental economic terms (Chapter Nine: 3.3 and 3.4), tend to strengthen this suggestion.

Pages 32-33: 2.10 Comparative advantages

p.32, “comparative and competitive advantages” and “fully exploited”
Do such concepts, even though by now naturalized to the point of invisibility, not also represent traces of/clues to the kind of adversarial approach in self/other relationships critiqued in seeing green? [green indicator 8.1].

p. 32 “relatively small population”
I focus on these words here, because seeing green, except in the case of marginal human populations, would argue for a *global* stabilization and reduction of population growth as one way of maintaining long-range, wide ecological sustainability [green indicator 12.2]. And even ‘weak’ (or ‘sophisticated’, or ‘enlightened’) anthropocentrism would set a population policy for a generation as a whole based on the carrying capacity of the environment [green indicator GG 1.1.2.f.iv]. Population vis-a-vis ecological sustainability in development is unproblematic in this paragraph at least. It might however be addressed in Vision 2030s chapter 4, section 4.1 on Population and Health. The absence of the qualifier ‘sustainable’ for ‘development’ is again noted.

p. 32, “clean and uncontaminated meat and fish, tourism, ... biodiversity and wilderness”
A **view of nature** presented in economic advantage terms, in a global market.

p. 32, “... rich cultural diversity”;
The valuing here of, and tolerance towards, cultural diversity, maintenance of one’s own culture in the face of globalizing and totalizing western capitalist culture (p. 33, first paragraph), and social harmony (p. 33, first paragraph) are strong green values [indicators 11.1.d; 15.4]. It is as yet unclear whether they are derived from the seeing green viewpoint of ecology as normative for personal and social values [green criterion 3.1].

p. 33, first bullet point, “... economic growth and progress”
This coupling of terms suggests a trace of/clue to a non-green and ‘enlightenment’ understanding of progress, with its underlying premise of the necessity of an adversarial relationship between people and nature (Chapter Eight: 6.3.3.1).

p. 33, second bullet point, “globalization”
Here a non-green, unproblematic acceptance of western capitalist globalization [green indicator 2.1.1.c].

p. 33, second bullet point, “harness aggressively”, “optimising”, “competitive advantages”
Without exception, these are all non-green values, and dependent on a non-green adversarial, *Homo economicus* **view of the human being**. This contention is strengthened by the economic **rationality** implicit in the term ‘optimise’ (Chapter Nine: 3.1.3). There is no trace here of the green demand for a radically different Self, or radically different non-adversarial self/other relationship [green indicator 8.1].

p. 33, third bullet point, ‘mega-cities’

The avoidance of mega-cities supported here is a green value, in so far as it supports decentralization, solidarity, and human scale in human habitat spatial planning [indicators 11.2.1.b; 11.2.2, 15.7].

Pages 33-34: 2.11 “Principles cherished by the Nation”

“Good governance” (p. 33) is a green value to the extent that it means full transparency, accountability, accessibility to public information, and protection of private data [indicators 17.4 and 17.5].

“Partnership” (p. 33). *Absent* in this understanding of partnership, which is a green value [indicator 11.1.c], is the key green idea of partnership also with nature [criterion 10’s description of a green ethic for nature, and indicator 10.3.e, for example].

“Comparative advantage” (p. 33), “People-centered economic development” (p. 34), “Sustainable development” (p. 34)

(i) Despite the re-affirmation of the principle of sustainable development here, which is generally held to seek a balance between environmental, economic and social goods, primacy appears to be given to the economic aspect, which would suggest a falling short of green indicator 12. The explanation of sustainable development given – that it ‘embraces all the other principles’ – also fails to mention ecological sustainability.

(ii) The concept development here, as elsewhere noted, continues to appear often without its qualifier ‘sustainable’ – a backgrounding of [environmental] sustainability?

“People-centered economic development” (p. 34)

A non-green principle, both in its explicit and unproblematized anthropocentrism [green indicator 1.1], and its equation of development with economic development.

“National sovereignty and human integrity” (p. 34)

(i) This paragraph essentially presents one version of Vision 2030’s **view of the human being**. It could be, but is not here, compared for its green-ness with seeing green criterion 8.

(ii) The nationalism and statism cherished here are problematized in radical versions of seeing green, as expressions of the idea of hierarchy, and power-over [green indicator 1.2].

“Environment” (p. 34)

Absent here is a statement on ecological sustainability as cherished principle – essential for any kind of development!

“Peace and security” (p. 34)

While radical peace is a green value [green criterion 16], it would not include the militaristic overtones already identified elsewhere in the Vision’s understanding of security.

Pages 34-36: 2.12 “Identification of priority issues”

p. 35, final paragraph, “The concept of sustainable development is the cornerstone...”

This paragraph does note that “economic development, social development and environmental development” should be “adequately addressed at the same time...”. But the concept “environmental *development*” (my italics) does not sound the same as seeing green’s ‘ecological sustainability’ [green criterion 10] in which the *reduction* of excessive interference in nature, its ‘letting be’, rather than its ‘development’, are important ingredients. And the inevitable question in trying to determine a text’s broad valuing of nature [anthropocentric or ecocentric?]: environmental development *for whom?*

p. 36, first paragraph, ‘Wealth needs to be thought of in financial terms...’

The **view of nature** in this paragraph is of ‘natural resources’ as environmental wealth. The final sentence is ‘Only when all three forms of wealth [i.e. environmental, social, financial] are stable and positive by [being? (word or words missing in text)] linked to production, will sustainable development be achieved.’ I pick out this idea that environmental wealth is only ‘positive’ when linked to production, because it is exactly this *western*, and not universal, economic idea that nature is ‘passive’ and ‘unproductive’ until taken up in a market economy, that ecofeminist and critic of western-style sustainable development Vandana Shiva refutes (Chapter Six, section 6.4(b)).

Pages 36-37: 2.13 “New ways of thinking”

A fundamentally changed way of thinking about the human-nature relationship [a key part of seeing green [green criterion 7] is *absent* from the bulleted list (pp. 36-37) of “important” new ways of thinking and working...

p. 36, 2nd par. of section 2.13

In the phrase “Chapter 5 covers the ecological and environmental issues of sustaining the resource base...” is again the distinction between ecological and environmental issues, which remains unclear at this stage. The continued **view of nature** as “resource base” by now confirms the text’s grey-green economization of reality [grey-green indicator GG 6].

p. 37, Figure 2.8: Structure ... of the Vision 2030 Report

The **view of nature** in this diagram (green oval) is presented in more detail under the oval as ‘Sustaining the resource base (ECOSYSTEMS)’. Against the background of the discussion of the implicit values in the term “ecosystem” (Chapter Nine: 5.1), I take this word choice to be a clue to/trace of a (philosophical) mechanist, reductionist, rather than an organic, holistic, and more green [green criterion 6] view of nature.

Chapter 3, Namibia Vision 2030, pp. 38-42

Page 38: 3.1 Introduction


No comment

Page 38: 3.2 Issues for Vision 2030

This paragraph gives a further clue to/trace of the text’s grey-green anthropocentric orientation [green indicator 1.1]: The issue of “Natural resources and environment’ is identified as an issue for its usefulness in *peoples’* development. Nature’s value-for-itself [green criterion 10] is, in this paragraph at least, *absent*.

Pages 38-40: 3.3 Namibia Vision 2030

p. 38, Box 1, The Vision



Here, in what can be argued as a key summary of the Vision’s **view of the good life**, presented in a key chapter,

- (i) industrialization as value is not problematized as in seeing green [green indicator 2.1.2];
- (ii) nature, the base for all life, is *absent* as key value, backgrounded, even in its grey-green version as sustainable natural resource base. To illustrate how easily this green value could have been included: “A prosperous and industrialized Namibia, developed by her human resources, enjoying peace, harmony, political stability *and environmental sustainability*”; and
- (iii) any feminist/ecofeminist [even the radical feminists I think, in this case] would critique the androcentric personification of Namibia as female in this vision, because the text so far takes a possessive and managerial approach to “her resources”.

pp. 39-40

The explanation of the key values on these two pages essentially provides another description of the Vision’s view of **the good life**. One can note that the definition of “prosperity” (p. 39) is largely, but not exclusively, presented in economic terms: “sustained high economic growth”, “decent wage”, “gainfully employed”, “access to productive resources”, “equity in income distribution”.

Many of the elements in the Vision’s view of the good life however represent green values, for example, in the paragraph on “Prosperity” (p. 39),

- (i) equity [green indicator 11.1.b]. A qualification though: the equity here means equity amongst humans, and not the radically-green ecological egalitarianism of, for example, deep ecology (Chapter Four: 5.1.1),
- (ii) a social security support system guaranteeing a decent quality of life for the disadvantaged/marginalized. This is particularly a viewpoint espoused by Die Grünen (Chapter Seven: 6.1.2.4), and incorporated in green indicator 15.5,
- (iii) the rejection of all kinds of –isms, as symbols of a hierarchical, power-over mentality [green indicator 1.2], and
- (iv) in the ‘Harmony’ paragraph (p. 39), for example, the emphasis on living together in harmony, and the recognition of diversity are also green/ecological values [green indicator 11.1.c].

However, I do experience some hesitancy in reading this version of the good life:

- (i) The term “critical mass” in the ‘Industrialised Nation’ paragraph (p. 39), is a mechanist metaphor, perhaps representing a trace of an underlying mechanist worldview, both rejected in seeing green [indicators 1.4, 1.5, and Chapter 8: 1.1]. This mechanist approach might however not yet represent a tendency?

(ii) There is a strong emphasis in the ‘Harmony’ paragraph (p. 39) on family as institution (“sacred”, and “fundamental”), as well as a reference to child discipline. As family is not problematized as social institution, the high value placed on it here could contain implicit patriarchal and hierarchical tones, at least as these two concepts are understood in social ecology (see the description of hierarchy in green criterion 1, and also Bookchin’s rejection of the domination inherent in patriarchal family arrangements, in Chapter Five: 6.1.2, 5th paragraph; and 6.2). Some ecofeminists also call for a radical transformation of the family as social institution (Chapter Six: 2.1.3). Seeing green tends more towards the *community* as basic social unit [green indicator 11.2]. Seeing green’s support for liberated sexuality [green indicator 8.2.2] as part of the re-conceptualized Self also appears at odds with the restrictive phrasing “Men and women marry (as provided for in the Constitution)...”

(iii) Another is the unproblematized acceptance of rights in the Vision’s view here of the **Self/Other relationship**. Even though some seeing green adherents find the rights concept useful in their quest to gain recognition of nature’s value-for-itself, making explicit, and problematizing, the concept’s underlying adversarial self/other ontology is a green marker [green indicator 9.6]. A green ethic would tend to be based more, or also, on alternative concepts such as identification, reciprocity, care and partnership [green indicator 9.3] in self/other relationships, rather than only on the justice concept.

“(iv) The phrase “the fear of God” in the ‘Harmony’ paragraph (p. 40) is a trace of a *western* Christian understanding of God (Armstrong, 1999). It is precisely the western interpretation of Christianity, with its traditionally ‘male’ view of the human being, and often anthropocentric attitude towards nature, that is problematized in seeing green. Under the influence of seeing green, several attempts to ecologize, and re-interpret, the western Christian dominion/stewardship tradition are underway (Chapter Two: 2.5.1; Chapter Nine: 7.3.2).

(v) The final paragraph of the ‘Harmony’ section contains

(a) another instance of the non-green mechanistic metaphor [indicators 1.4, 1.5] “driving force” (p. 40), as does the first paragraph of the “Peace and political stability” section (p. 40). The human being is reduced to an atomist “element in the system’ where seeing green would strive for more relational language, and

(b) another confirmation of a ‘male’-value-oriented ethic of justice here – “*just* and morally upright society” (p. 40, my italics) – rather than the more ‘feminine’ seeing green ethic of care [green indicator 9.3]. Traces of this androcentric ethic are found in paragraph 4 of “Peace and political stability” (p. 40) too – “fairness”, “neutrality”. Into this last value, any ecofeminist would, I think, read the ‘male’ preference for universality in ethical standards, rather than the seeing green attention to context and particularity [green indicator 9.4].

(vi) The phrase “*man-made ... calamity*” (my italics) in the 3rd paragraph of “Peace and political stability” (p. 40) would be taken by a feminist/ecofeminist as another trace of androcentrism [green criterion 1], and confirmation of its disastrous ecological results! Perhaps the authors of this text, while explicitly espousing here and elsewhere the more green concepts of gender responsivity, and care (3rd paragraph), are unaware of their deep-seated androcentrism?

Pages 40-41: 3.4 Objectives of Vision 2030

p. 40 “... in which all citizens are able to realise their full potential”

So far, this preliminary assessment has suggested a largely economic **view of the human being**, which on the green view, falls far short of the human being’s full potential [green indicator 8.2]. Further reading of the text might however challenge this initial assessment.

pp. 40-41

The objectives listed here range in colour from green to grey-green. For example, a value such as

(i) “gender responsivity” (objective (i) on p. 40) is green to the extent that it means women’s liberation and re-conceptualized post patriarchal gender roles for men and women in society [indicators 15.2 and 15.3],

(ii) caring (objective (i) on p. 40) is a green value in so far as it is based on a relational ontology [green indicator 8.2.3, for example], re-admits the emotional into the ethical [green indicator 9.3], and includes caring about and for nature [green indicator 8.2.4]

(iii) citizens reaching their full potential (objective (i) on p. 40) would include meaningful work in the many-faceted green sense [green indicator 14.10], some of which would be base-democratic production [green indicator 14.4], and the use of non-demeaning, non-exploitative technology in the workplace [green indicator 14.9.1], all the aspects of the reconceptualized Self set out under green criterion 8, and opportunities for meaningful and direct democratic participation and self-management [indicators 17.1, 17.2]

(iv) the value of democracy (objective (ii) on p. 41) is green to the extent that it allows self-management in political affairs, or at the least, meaningful political participation [green indicator 17.1]

(v) one would need to read further in the text to establish what is meant by the definitely green-sounding values “(vi) ecological well-being” (p. 41), and “(vii) eco-friendly nation” (p. 41).

Objectives which sound more grey-green, are those associated with unproblematized (at this stage of the document, at least) western style industrial capitalism [green criterion 2.1.2], held up here on p. 41 in objectives (iv) and (vii) as end value; or the competitive spirit mentioned on p. 41 in objectives (iii), (iv) and (vii) [green indicator 8.1.2]. One could also be cautious about the green-ness of a text which presents nature in terms of “natural capital” (objective vi on p. 41), unless this is within a context of at least ‘sensible’ ecological sustainability [grey-green indicator GG 10.1] or tending towards ‘strong’ ecological sustainability (Chapter Nine: 3.4.1.3).

Pages 41-42: 3.5 Broad strategies for Vision 2030

(i) Not enough detail about what “sustainable” in the context of a “sustainable, efficient, flexible and competitive” economy in strategy (i) on p. 41 might mean here, or in strategy (xvii)’s “sustainable economic climate” (p. 42) is yet available. The green-ness of “sustainable” would need to be assessed against for example criteria 10, 12 and 14.

(ii) The word “efficient” used in strategy (i) on p. 41 is often a clue to/trace of an **epistemology** characterised by economic rationality, critiqued in seeing green for its instrumental approach to the Other, including nature [grey-green indicator GG 5.1]. And, as already pointed out, a competitive orientation toward the Other (the same strategy) is not a green value either [green indicator 11.1 for example].

(iii) The meaning of ‘gainful’ (objective (iii) on p. 41) is not yet clear, but if the text does provide more information, its green-ness could be assessed against green indicator 14.10. The concept of “full ... employment” within the market-orientation which this document unproblematically accepts, rules out this text as embracing radical green ideas on the economy [indicators 2.1.1, 11.2.1.c, 14.4, 14.5 as examples].

(iv) The strategy or value ‘excellent, affordable health care for all’, (strategy (iv) on p. 41), and strategy (v) relating to HIV/AIDS (p. 41), are green to the extent that they mean, non-patriarchal, holistic, close-to-home health care [green indicator 15.6.]

(v) The concern for food security expressed in strategy (vi) on p. 41 is a green value, provided it is understood within a context of local production for local needs, production for local consumption not profit [indicators 14.6, 14.7], and production based on reciprocal agriculture [green indicator 12.6].

(vi) Strategy (vii) on p. 41 could be assessed for its green-ness against indicator 8.2.6: Real-world, integrated, holistic and ongoing education, geared to the development of the whole person, not merely *Homo economicus*, and including meaningful participation in political life.

(vii) “Leveraging” in strategy (viii) on p. 41 is a further use of mechanistic metaphor, suggesting perhaps by now a tendency rather than unreflected-on use. Such a tendency would be rejected in seeing green [grey-green criterion GG 6, green indicator 1.4,], as a clue to/trace of a mechanist ontology and epistemology.

(viii) The values of interpersonal harmony in strategy (ix), and peace in strategy (xi) on p. 41 have already been commented on as green values.

(ix) The term “morally upright” in strategy (x) on p. 41 does not convey quite the same flavour as seeing green’s conviction that renewed *spirituality* is needed for the personal and social transformation [green criterion 4] that constitutes seeing green, but perhaps the content of “morally upright” will become clearer later in the document.

(x) “Maintaining stable, productive and diverse ecosystems managed for long-term sustainability” in strategy (xii) on p. 41 provides another description of the Vision’s **view of nature**. Within the context of the whole document, all the terms in this description could be unpacked and assessed for their green-ness against markers such as indicator 3.2, and criterion 10. The results of such unpacking should also indicate whether the text tends toward a “stronger” or ‘weaker’ interpretation of environmental sustainability [green indicator 12.1 and grey-green indicator GG 12.1]. This in turn would help to establish whether the text represents a “stronger” or ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development [indicators GG 2.2.1 and 2.2.2].

(xi) The tolerance expressed in strategy (xiv) on p. 42, as well as in strategy (x) on p. 41, and the valuing of diversity, are both green values [green indicator 11.1].

(xii) The ‘low-level’ bureaucracy mentioned in strategy (xv) on p. 42 is a green value to the extent that it distances itself from hierarchical, power-over thinking [green indicator 1.2], and allows the practice of real citizenship [green indicator 17.1]. Public responsiveness and accountability are also green values [green indicator 17.3].

(xiii) Land in strategy (xvi) on p. 42 is again seen as productive resource for use by human beings, i.e. in an anthropocentric way, rather than in the more green way, as of a community of living beings, in which human beings are also just citizens.

2.2 Reflections on the assessment so far

Using the seeing green criteria, it does seem possible to construct from the pages of *Namibia Vision 2030 Main document* read so far, the main ingredients of a worldview:

(a) There have been explicit references to the philosophy and principles of sustainable development (p. 13, p. 14).

(b) There are explicit descriptions of “the good life” as western-style techno-industrialism.

- (c) It seems too early to speculate on what the text's implicit epistemology might be, but the unproblematized references to science, and use of environmental economic terminology so far, might be a clue to/trace of a rational-instrumental epistemology.
- (d) There have been clues to/traces of an implicit ontology: mechanistic metaphors are used; nature is described primarily in economic terms; unproblematized references to an ethic of justice and rights suggest an implicit atomist ontology as far as human-human relationships are concerned.
- (e) As far as the human/nature relationship is concerned, there are already several indications of anthropocentrism.
- (f) On the text's ethic for nature, the implicit commitment to anthropocentrism displayed so far, would suggest that the text follows an instrumental approach to environmental sustainability. Further reading might indicate whether this will tend towards a 'weaker' or 'stronger' version.
- (g) One can expect in Part 2, which discusses the Sub-Visions of Vision 2030 in more detail, to be focussed on 'real-world' issues, also an essential element of a worldview.

The assessment of the indicators' usefulness [their coverage, and depth] continues in sections 4 – 6 of this Chapter, which deal with the Vision's views on The People's quality of life (section 4), Sustaining the resource base (section 5), and Creating the enabling environment (section 6). The numbering and topic of sections 4 –6 in this Chapter therefore match the chapter numbering of those topics in the Vision.

In section 3 next, I explain that the method changes now from assessing the Vision's general worldview page by page, to a more issues/Sub-Vision-based assessment of its human-nature relationship.

3.0 Reading Part 2 of Vision 2030: its worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship: overview

In this section, rather than investigate in detail to what extent each of the 43 issues and their Sub-Visions which Part 2 of Vision 2030 discusses, is green, I shall be focussing more on what each Sub-Vision and its discussion [regardless of the particular issue] conveys of the text's explicit or implicit view of the human–nature relationship, within its view of the good life. I defend this focus because I believe, along with seeing green, that our instrumental relationship with, and valuing of, nature must be revised, if we are to avert the ecological crisis, and honour the evolutionary process⁵. And personally, because environmental philosophy and environmental psychology, rather than sociology, development or economic theory, are my interests.

Within this delimitation, I ask the following five questions of the Vision 2030 text:

1. What is its view of the good life?
2. What is its view of nature [i.e. terrestrial nature]?
3. Does it re-conceptualize the dominant anthropocentric human-nature relationship?
4. What is its ethic for nature?
5. Does it provide a framework for a 'serious'⁶ environmental policy?

⁵ "... nature as well, in the world that we have received and used, must have the opportunities to survive (integrity) in the diversity which is characteristic of the biosphere. This is a non-anthropocentric argument. Nature *deserves* these opportunities when its 'self-standingness' and its own or intrinsic value have been recognized" (Achterberg, 1993, p. 97, his italics).

⁶ "By 'serious environmental and nature policy', I mean a policy that aims at structural changes within society in order to achieve an enduring solution to environmental problems, or at least to create a situation in which they can be controlled. Such a policy is not only directed at maintaining nature as a basis of our social activities for generations to come (sustainability of our use of the environment), but also at protecting, maintaining and developing nature for its own sake (sustainability of nature) (Achterberg 1990)" (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 81-82). A serious environmental policy not only delivers human well-being but also does justice to/seek to protect "the intrinsic values of plants, animals and ecosystems" (Achterberg, 1993, p. 87). And, deep ecologist Arne Naess: "In short, it is my opinion that a *necessary, but not*

The seeing green criteria most related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship are:

1. What is Vision 2030s view of the good life?

Criterion 2: Is Western capitalist techno-industrialism as definition of “the Good Life” challenged? (Ch 8: 2.1.1, 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 6.3.3.1)

2. What is Vision 2030s view of nature?

Criterion 5: Is rationality/rationalism as sole way of knowing critiqued, or problematized? (Ch 8: 3, 3.1)

Criterion 6: Is there a holistic, organismic, purposive view of reality/nature? (Ch 8: 4.1, 4.1.1 – 4.1.6)

3. Does Vision 2030 re-conceptualize the dominant anthropocentric human-nature relationship?

Criterion 1: Are the ideas of androcentrism, anthropocentrism, hierarchy and patriarchy [their value dualisms and logic of domination] critiqued ? (Ch 8: 2, 2.1)

4. What is Vision 2030s ethic for nature?

Criterion 10: Is there an ethic for nature in which environmental sustainability is understood as long-range, and wide, not merely as human-instrumental-only sustainability? (Ch 8: 5.1, 5.5, 5.5.1)

A seeing green ethic for nature will approximate the following description: An empathetic, caring, respectful partnership ethic, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, which recognizes nature’s value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis.

5. Does it provide a framework for a ‘serious’ environmental policy?

Criterion 12: Do policies place long-range, wide, ecological sustainability at least on par with social or economic sustainability? (Ch 8: 6.4, 6.4.1, 6.4.2)

Criterion 13: Do policies provide for radical changes to ensure animal liberation/welfare? (Ch 8: 6.4.9)

Criterion 14: Is an ecologically-reoriented economy proposed? (Ch 8: 6.5, 6.5.1)

Criterion 11: Are fundamental, ecologically-informed, post-patriarchal reformation of society’s values and structures proposed? (Ch 8: 6.3, 6.3.1, 6.3.4, 6.3.5, 6.5.5, 6.6.2): Specifically, is reform environmentalism alone rejected as insufficient to resolve the ecological crisis? (Ch 8: 6.2.3)

On the grounds of answers to these five questions, I should be able to assess whether or not *Namibia Vision 2030s ultimate premises* are green. I turn now, in section 4 of this Chapter, to a reading of Vision 2030s chapter 4 on The People’s Quality of Life.


4.0 Vision 2030 chapter 4: The People’s quality of life (pp. 44–135)

4.1 Population and health (pp. 44-60)

4.1.1. Population size and growth (pp. 44-47)

A healthy and food-secured nation in which all preventable, infectious and parasitic diseases are under secure control; people enjoy a high standard of living, good quality life and have access to quality education, health and other vital services. All of these translate into long life expectancy and sustainable population growth. (p. 46).

sufficient, criterion of the fully attained greenness of a society is that it is ecologically sustainable in the wide sense.” (Chapter Eight: 6.4, his italics)



The “fantastic” growth” of the world’s human population in the Industrial Age is “a central source of the Earth’s environmental problems” (Oskamp, 2000a, p. 376; chart also). Limits to population growth is a serious seeing green concern. Vision 2030s stance on this issue provides then a “litmus test” of its green-ness on this aspect of the human nature relationship. The key part of this Sub-Vision is its last sentence: “All of these translate into ... sustainable population growth”. This sentence can be related to assessing whether or not the text proposes a “serious” environmental and nature policy, via

indicator 12.2: Human population growth rate stabilized/reduced?

To do so, I will consider, together with Vision 2030s section 4.1.1, (a) Thematic report 5: *Population, health and development* (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 2002b; hereafter GRN, 2002b) which informed the Vision 2030 Main document (Vision 2030, p. 15), and (b), Namibia’s 1997 National Population Policy for sustainable human development (Government of the Republic of Namibia, 1997; hereafter GRN, 1997).

Namibia’s 2001 population was 1,830,330 (Vision 2030, p. 45). Following the medium variant of the population projection model used (Vision 2030, p. 45, Table 4.1), the text envisions a population of about 3.5 million in 2030 (p. 46, Summary box Population size and growth (Where we want to be (2030), 3rd bullet point), the result of a planned reduction in the population growth rate from 2.6% in 2001, to 2.0% by the year 2030. Still, this represents an almost-doubling in population numbers within a 30 year period. In a Ministry of Environment and Tourism Research Discussion paper [Nr 21, August 1997] on environmental threats and opportunities in Namibia, Byers (1997, p. 56) notes that

Given the threat to sustainable development, GRN should have a population policy that explicitly recognizes that because of Namibia’s aridity, its sustainable carrying capacity for people is low, and that its current population [i.e. in 1997] is already using about all of the resources of the country. Thus, any population growth will be hard to handle. As for any country, the objective of the policy should be to achieve a zero population growth rate as soon as possible, thus eventually stabilizing the absolute population size.

Curiously though, Vision 2030s Sub-Vision 4.1.1 and its discussion (Vision 2030, pp. 44-47), make no explicit mention of what seeing green also sees as the crucial relationship between the land’s carrying capacity for people, and its population policy.

Vision 2030 ascribes considerable importance (p. 46, summary box Population size and growth, Things to do, 1st bullet point; Things to avoid, 1st bullet point) to the design and implementation of an Action Plan for the 1997 **National population policy for sustainable development**. The policy’s major goal is “to contribute to the improvement of the standard of living and quality of life of the people of Namibia ... through the harmonisation of the dynamics of Namibia’s population ... with the country’s resource potentials in order to accomplish development objectives (GRN, 1997, p. iv). While the policy talks about “the harsh and fragile nature of the country’s ecological environment” (p. 1, also p. 15), and notes that Namibians’ livelihoods depend on the country’s natural resources (water, land, energy) (p. 19, principle 6.9), it never goes so far as to say that this means that *Namibia has a limited carrying capacity for people*. Instead of seeking to estimate that carrying capacity, and limiting population growth to within it, the population policy emphasizes rather “the need to develop strategies that use these dwindling resources in a more efficient and sustainable manner” (p. 19, principle 6.9). A population policy objective is to “achieve proper management and sustainable utilization of the resources of the environment through reduction of both unsustainable consumption and production

patterns and the development of appropriate policies and programmes” (p. 20, objective 7.2.7). However, no strategy is listed under “Population policy strategies” to achieve this, other than that “environmental education shall be promoted, with emphasis on efficient management of natural resources, at all levels of the educational system as well as in the population at large” (p. 22, strategy 8.4.1). This responsibility is allocated to the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (p. 32, section 11.12).

Theme report 5: *Population, health and development* (GRN, 2002b), even though it notes in its executive summary that Namibia’s “natural endowment” is the basis of any development (p. xi), does not in its more than 90 page discussion of population, health and development, contain more than a few sentences on the land’s carrying capacity for people. It notes that Namibia is “not a richly endowed land in terms of agriculture. A significant part of the countryside is classified as desert or semi-desert, and ecological conditions are harsh” (p. 1). The last paragraph on page 2, and the first paragraph on p. 3, note the ecological limits to agriculture, “the fragility of Namibia’s ecology” as well as current pressure on natural resources. A telling sentence is this:

Continued natural growth in the rural areas of Namibia, even when reduced by the impact of HIV/AIDS, is likely to further increase pressure on natural resources, even if efforts continue to be made to support environmentally sensitive development programmes.

Despite this sobering assessment, there is no explicit recognition in the theme 5 report that Namibia’s ecological carrying capacity for people is *limited*. There is an oblique reference to it in the population policy mission statement to “ensure sustainable development through the harmonisation of Namibia’s population dynamics ... with the country’s financial and natural resource availability and potential.” (GRN, 2002b, p. 12), a phrasing it appears to have taken from the 1997 National population policy. The theme report 5 SWOT⁷ analysis on population (GRN, 2002b, p. 96) notes only the following as an environmental threat: “Resource endowment makes it difficult to improve household food security, thus maintaining high levels of migration”. There is no mention of Namibia’s water scarcity in this report (section 5.1 of this Chapter to come). In its chapter 6 Overall strategies, section 6.2 on Population (GRN, 2002b, pp. 93-94), the theme report’s strategies for population policy, population management, and population dynamics make no mention of environmental limitations.

But even a weak anthropocentric position is brave enough to recognize that the environment’s carrying capacity *limits* population numbers, and to make an explicit connection between that carrying capacity and a sustainable national population policy [grey-green indicator GG 1.1.2.f.iv and green indicator 12.2]. Vision 2030s strategies for managing population size and growth (Vision 2030, p. 47) do not include any plans to establish the land’s carrying capacity. But despite this *absence*, Sub-Vision 4.1.1s notion of “sustainable population growth” is at least pale green in that it seeks to *reduce* Namibia’s population growth rate.

However, in its approach to “harmonising” natural environment capacity with increasing population numbers, it is grey-green. Despite current pressure on natural resources, and current levels of environmental degradation, the envisaged “harmonisation” is not to be achieved through radical reduction of population growth rate to zero or near-zero, but through the reform environmentalism approach:

(i) The National Population Policy (GRN, 1997, pp. 15-16, my italics) notes that

If natural resource management is not improved, rapid population growth will lead to further degradation of the environment and reduction of the ability of the resource base ... to support future generations. Therefore efforts should be made *to enhance the productivity of natural resources* and protect essential

⁷ Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats

eco-system functions, to tackle and to improve understanding of Namibia's environmental constraints and how to support a growing population and economy within them.

(ii) The Vision 2030 theme 5 report talks of sustainable approaches to urbanisation which will relieve pressure on rural natural resources (p. 14, 3rd bullet under "Rural-urban balance"), the sustainable utilisation of natural resources (p. 14, 5th bullet under "Rural-urban balance"), the development of "appropriate institutional mechanisms for land and resource management" at local level (p. 14, 2nd bullet under Environment and sustainable development), environmental education which emphasizes "efficient management of natural resources" (p. 15, 1st bullet point under Population information, education and communications), and legislative measures (p. 15).

The only concessions I see in these documents to the limits which ecology places on population growth is the customary grey-green technical-managerial approach. This is an example of that optimistic and rational-instrumental approach to environmental problems which O'Riordan terms "technocentrism" (Chapter Two: 2.2.1.3, Chapter Four: 1.3.1, footnote 4), and which is also a feature of grey-green "reform environmentalism" [green criterion 11.3]. His table showing the dualistic patterns of environmentalist ideologies (ecocentrism/technocentrism, or ecological/environmental) is shown next, as Figure 9:

Figure 9: O’Riordan’s pattern of environmentalist ideologies (O’Riordan, 1981, p. 376)




Figure 10.1. The pattern of environmentalist ideologies.

The population reduction advocated in the three documents (Vision 2030, Theme report 5 on Population, health and development, and the National Population Policy) is exclusively homocentric. An ecocentric orientation to population policy would approach that of the deep ecology viewpoint:

“4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.” (Ch. 4: 1.3.4.1).

Absent from the Vision 2030 section 4.1.1 discussion, is any reference to the benefits of reduced human population pressure on, for example, habitat for other species. The National population policy’s title alone suggests an anthropocentric orientation. This is confirmed by reading for example, its Principle 6.3 (GRN, 1997, p. 19), which “places people (the national population) at the centre of development”. While Principle 6.9 of the policy (GRN, 1997, p. 19) expresses concern for water, productive land and energy, these are seen instrumentally as resources for livelihoods and the economy, an anthropocentric orientation. Thematic report 5’s Vision for the Population refers to

homocentric issues such as heightened economic growth, dealing with the HIV/AIDS epidemic, increased human life expectancy, and progress towards establishing Namibia as a higher middle income country (GRN, 2002b, p. x, p. 92). Theme report chapter 2: “Population in development” (GRN, 2002b, pp. 6-23) makes not a single mention of the impact of an increasing human population on non-human species.

While *Namibia Vision 2030*'s population policy is pale green in its desire to reduce the population growth rate, this is within a context of anthropocentric, reform environmentalist grey-green. The avoidance of expressly linking Namibia's low carrying capacity for people to a policy of stabilizing population growth rate to near-zero, suggests to me, *strong* anthropocentrism.

4.1.2 Migration, urbanisation and population distribution (pp. 47-50)

There is free movement of the population within the country and population distribution is maturely adjusted to the location of resources for livelihood. Namibia is a highly urbanised country with about 75 per cent of the population living in proclaimed urban centres, while the predominance of Windhoek has considerably reduced as a result of growth of other urban centres throughout the country. (p. 49).

Indicator 15.7: Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning, partly relates to this Sub-Vision, and a superficial assessment in terms of it would confirm that seeing green values [indicators 11.2.1.b, 11.2.2.b] are opposed to the high urbanisation envisaged here, unless it also includes spatial planning which supports the value of *community*. The seeing green database (Chapters Three-Seven) did not discuss migration and population distribution. This could be remedied by further research, beginning perhaps with the policies and programmes of the early Die Grünen (the 1980b Saarbrucker programme, the 1983 Sindelfingen programme).

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the Vision's human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed further.

4.1.3 Population age and sex distribution (pp. 50-53)

Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society with legislative, economic and social structures in place to eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups and people of different ages, interests and abilities. (p. 51).

The relevance of this Sub-Vision to the section heading under discussion here – population age and sex distribution (p. 50) – is unclear. This section heading in Vision 2030 should probably rather have been the “Equity in age and gender matters” which is the title of the summary box on p. 52, and in which context, the Sub-Vision would make more sense. The green-ness of Vision 2030 views on gender equity could be assessed against the green demand for a total rejection of the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy [criterion 1, and indicator 1.2], indicator 15.2 which demands full emancipation for women, including their right to manage their own fertility, as well as indicator 15.3 which calls for post-patriarchal gender roles for men and women. Other than a broad green indicator dealing with the rejection of the idea of racism [indicators 1.2], there is no specific indicator to assess the green-ness of a text's affirmative action stance, which is also a concern of this section. However, the indicators do address the issue of inclusion of the socially marginalized, such as the elderly [green indicator 15.5], also discussed here, but not in any great depth (Chapter Seven: 6.3.4).

The issues of race, age and gender equity, which form the content of section 4.1.3 of the Vision, do not relate to the Vision's human-nature relationship, and so are not discussed further.

4.1.4 Healthy living for longevity (pp. 53-57)

Namibia is free of the diseases of poverty and inequality; and the majority of Namibians are living healthy lifestyles, provided with safe drinking water and a comprehensive preventive and curative health service, to which all have equal access. (p. 55).

Though this Sub-Vision does not fall within the ambit of the five specific questions (section 3) being asked of Vision 2030's worldview, there are in the seeing green list, some indicators which can be related to it: the green demand for egalitarianism [indicator 11.1.b], and also for holistic and non-patriarchal and close-to-home health care [indicator 15.6]. Given its preciousness for life, Die Grünen were particularly concerned about the wasteful use of water on non-life-conserving activities (Chapter Seven: 5.4.5). This could have been included as another indicator under green criterion 12, but was not. Concern is also expressed for food security in this section of Vision 2030. This is a green viewpoint (Chapter Eight: 6.5.7), to the extent that achieving it is understood within a context of local production for local needs, production for local consumption not profit [indicators 14.6, 14.7], and production based on reciprocal agriculture [indicator 12.6].

4.1.5 Promoting healthy human environment (pp. 57-60)

All the people of Namibia have equitable access to high quality and affordable health care services; the health infrastructure is strong, equitably distributed, and is being supported by adequate human, material and financial resources. (p. 58).

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the Vision's human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed further. However, it could be related to indicator 15.6 to assess its green-ness.

4.2 Wealth, livelihood and the economy (pp. 61-77)

4.2.1 Macroeconomic environment (pp. 61-65)

Namibia operates an open, dynamic, competitive and diversified economy that provides sustained economic growth, the basis for availing resources for the fulfilment of major national objectives like poverty reduction, human resource development, employment creation, and the provision of adequate social services and infrastructural facilities. (p. 63).

This Sub-Vision is related to the human-nature relationship. Amongst the many topics covered in this section, are the need for 'accelerated' (p. 61) and 'sustained' (p. 63) economic growth, Gross Domestic Product [GDP], the Gini-coefficient, employment and unemployment, trade, and balance of payment.

The fundamental and unmentioned assumption underlying this whole section, and indeed the whole document, is an uncritiqued acceptance of capitalism [green indicator 2.1.1], and of its internal and external market economy. Production for profit instead of for needs, is not critiqued [green indicator 14.7]; the need to industrialize and to be a part of globalizing capitalism's free trade is taken as given (Objective, on Vision 2030 p. 65). The following excerpts from elsewhere in the Main Document support this assertion:

It has been shown that Namibia can position itself to be responsive, reactive, proactive and manage change effectively and efficiently. Namibia should embrace globalization, and not be afraid of or resist it – but rather to manage and harness aggressively the opportunities that it offers for optimising Namibia's comparative and competitive advantages; (p. 33)

The benefits of globalisation outweigh the costs of that free trade results in countries that specialise in the production of those goods efficiently, while importing goods that they cannot produce efficiently, from other countries. (p. 197, section 6.6, wording as it is in Vision 2030).

The Sub-Vision expresses a desire for ‘sustained’ economic growth⁸. This is a neo-classical economic assumption which equates economic growth with success (Hayward, 1995, p. 93) and progress. On the seeing green view, sustained economic growth is an impossibility; ecological limits to growth must be recognized [green indicator 14.1]. Even on the sustainable development natural resource accounting view, economic growth can only take place within the limits of a country’s stocks and flows of natural resources (Chapter Nine: 3.4). But *absent* in this section at least, is any reference to the introduction of a System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA], as agreed at the 1992 Earth Summit, and reflected in Agenda 21⁹, section 8D “Establishing systems for integrated environmental and economic accounting” [green indicator 14.2].

GDP features frequently in this section as a macro-economic indicator. The text points out that “GDP per capita can hardly be used to accurately reflect the welfare of the population in a country where income distribution is highly skewed” (p. 62). It corrects this inaccuracy by referring to Namibia’s unacceptable Gini-coefficient¹⁰. Although the Vision explicitly considers Namibia’s natural resources as the ecological wealth on which the Vision’s achievement rests (p. 14), *absent*, and unproblematized therefore, in this section at least, is any mention of the skewed vision which GDP growth gives of losses and gains in Namibia’s environmental stocks and flows [green indicator 14.2.2.c]. A “greened” GDP – known as “EDP” [Environmentally adjusted Gross Domestic Product] is needed to correct such skewness (Chapter Nine: 3.4.2); Namibia does not have such an indicator. Nor does the “Macroeconomic Environment” summary box on p. 64 suggest under its “Things to do”, the need for *formal* establishment of natural resource accounting at all [green indicator 14.2].

This absence, together with the absence of an SEEA, and absence of a greened GDP, suggests that the text might tend towards a ‘weaker’ interpretation of environmental sustainability [green indicator GG 12.1].

4.2.2 Transport infrastructure (pp. 65-69)

Safe and cost-effective transport infrastructure is available throughout the country, and so also specialised services in their different modes, to balance the demand and the supply thereof in an economically efficient way; and there is freedom of participation in the provision of transport services, subject mainly to quality regulation. (p. 66).

This Sub-Vision relates to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship indirectly here, but directly elsewhere, through the key phrase “in an economically efficient way”. This is a trace of grey-green instrumental economic rationality-speak, a marker of an instrumental **epistemology** [grey-green criterion GG 5.1]. Efficiency as value is strewn throughout the Main Document text. A word search¹¹ for the root spelling ‘Efficien’ [which allows for the occurrence of both ‘efficiency’ and ‘efficient’] delivers several instances of its use, on topics ranging from development (p. 12), to the economy (p. 14), health provision (p. 60), entrepreneurship (p. 65), education and training (p. 87), and infrastructure (p. 200), to name some.

But it is the application of economic, instrumental rationality to human dealings with nature which marks this text as, in this respect, not-green [GG 5.1]. Some examples are:

⁸ It sets a GDP growth of 6.2% by 2030 (p. 63, Targets by 2030). Actual growth in 2006 was estimated at 4.6% in 2006, and projected at 4.8% for 2007 (Bank of Namibia Director of Research Dr John Steytler in the Namibian, 14 March 2007, p. 12, Positive prospects for Namibian economy). The Bank of Namibia said that GDP growth rate needed to grow at an average of around 11% per year for the goals of Vision 2030 to be reached (The Namibian, 2 April 2007, p. 11, ‘Strive harder for Vision 2030’)

⁹ Namibia has though, adopted the UN Agenda 21 principles (Vision 2030, p. 14, A basic Principle).

¹⁰ This was 0.70 at the time of Vision 2030s publication (Vision 2030, p. 62); it has since dropped to 0,6 (The Namibian, 28 February 2007, Poverty rate down, says new survey); the Vision (p. 63) sets a target Gini coefficient of 0,3 by 2030

¹¹ Using Full Reader Search in Adobe Reader 8.0

(a) In the context of land and agricultural production:

To ensure that all Namibians have equitable access to land and other natural resources, and that these resources are sustainably and efficiently used, while maximizing Namibia's comparative advantages. (p. 145)

Compare this instrumental approach with the desire in seeing green for use of land in the spirit of reciprocity with nature [green indicator 12.6].

(b) In the context of management of marine fisheries for greater economic growth:

It is important to note that Namibia's post Independence marine fisheries management policies have been commended internationally for their effectiveness and efficiency. (p. 162; also p. 157)

(c) And in the context of biodiversity protection:

- Create incentives for landowners and managers to diversify into wildlife and tourism in more efficient and cost effective ways. (p. 169).

Although it is not a selected green criterion, *absent* from this discussion on infrastructure is a seeing green prioritizing of Namibia's *railway* infrastructure as an energy-saving, environmentally-friendly transport network [green indicator 12.5.6]. The emphasis instead is on the provision of transport services "in an economically efficient way" (p. 67, *Where we want to be (2030)*), and focussed exclusively on human well-being [employment creation, poverty alleviation, economic growth (p. 67, *Where we want to be (2030)*)]. Nature is implicitly backgrounded. However, there is in the Transport Infrastructure summary box (p. 67), under Things to do, one potentially green note: "Design user friendly urban traffic system". This system will be green to the extent that it is easily accessible, practically free for users, and ecologically harmonious [green indicator 15.7].

4.2.3 Employment and unemployment (pp. 69-74)

The economic environment is suitable for all citizens who are able and willing to work, and there is full employment in the economy, with a well-established and functioning Labour Market Information System for the effective management of the dynamics of the labour force. (p. 72).

This Sub-Vision and its discussion is not directly relevant to Vision 2030's human-nature relationship, but it could be related to seeing green indicators such as 14.9: Instrumental technology problematized, and 14.10: Work provides creative activity, not meaningless labour. Where these provide insufficient depth to judge the green-ness of this Sub-Vision, Die Grünen's "canonical" (Goodin, 1992, p. 184) 1983 electoral platform provides a compromise fundamental/radical eco-socialist green view on employment and unemployment.

In reading through this section, I note **the view of nature** presented under Objective on p. 74:

To ensure that all factors of production in an economy (land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship) are fully utilised.

This represents another marker of a grey-green text, in which nature – land in this case - is described in only, or predominantly, economic instrumental terms [the economization of reality], a grey-green tendency [grey-green criterion GG 6]. The difference between this understanding, and for example, proto-green Leopold's understanding of land as an ethical community comprising all living beings (Chapter Two: 2.5.2.d), is considerable.

4.2.4 Data and research (pp. 74-77)

Namibia has a wealth of accurate, reliable and current information on aspects of its population in relation to social and economic development planning and programme management; through research, the range of information available on population and development in Namibia is consolidated, the national research programme continues to identify and fill gaps in knowledge. (p.75).

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria.

However, nor did the seeing green database include any intensive discussion of green views on data gathering by the State, except for the green demand for protection of privacy in data collection, and the demand for personal information gathered by the State to be open to the person concerned [green indicator 17.4]. Someone interested in this aspect of societal functioning could fill this gap in indicator coverage.

However, in its discussion here of research, the Vision appears to take an unproblematized stance on the benefits of science and technology (p. 75). This aspect could be assessed against green indicator 2.1.4: Instrumental, or ‘masculine’ science and technology problematized, if not rejected?

4.3 Developing a knowledge-based society (pp. 77-100)

4.3.1 Information and communication technology (pp. 77-82)

Advanced microelectronics-based Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are used to achieve social and economic transformations in Namibia; the costs of ICTs continue to fall as their capabilities increase, and ICTs are being applied throughout all sectors of the economy and society to serve development goals. (p. 79).

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to the Vision’s human–nature relationship. However, I must note here, a gap in the seeing green list of indicators.

Indicators 2.1.4 and 14.9 are related to a seeing green problematization of technology, and thus in principle, to computer technology as well. However Chapter Eight contains no discussion of ICT, largely because at the time of street green’s emergence, computer technology, and its application in the fields of work, science, and information and communication, was in its infancy. Social ecologist Bookchin held rosy views on “cybernation” as means to a “materially abundant, even toilless era in which most of the means of life can be provided by machines” (Bookchin, 1965d, in Biehl, 1997, p. 107, in Chapter Five: 6.2). But in their early programmes, Die Grünen were concerned about computers’ possible demeaning effects in the workplace: “Computers are given the most important work to do, while humans are left to carry out meaningless mechanical activities...” (1980b, Section 4. Work and technology, pp. 8-9, this quote on p. 8; the 1983 Sindelfingen programme, p. 7, paragraph (b) is also relevant). They were also concerned about the increased dangers of an undemocratic, and non-transparent use of personal data which computer technology made possible (Chapter Seven: 6.3.5). A more in-depth, and modern green view of information and communication technology can be obtained by reading for example Die Grünen’s 2002 base programme. It continues to highlight inter alia, traditional green concerns such as the necessity for democratic access to, and democratic control of the information created through ICT.

4.3.2 Production technology (pp. 83-87)

Namibia is an industrialised nation, with a viable natural resources export sector, increased size of skills based industrial and service sector, and market oriented production; there is high level of self

sufficiency, reliable and competitively priced energy, meeting the demand of households and industry. (p. 85).

Indicators 2.1.4 and 14.9 can be related superficially to this section too, as well as indicator 12.5, which provides reasonable depth in the seeing green view on energy, but they are not amongst the assessment criteria selected for this section.

This Sub-Vision is however directly related in some ways to the assessment's focus on the human-nature relationship. Despite the statement in the opening paragraph of Vision 2030s section 4.3 Developing a knowledge based society that

The modern world is moving from heavy industry to a knowledge-based economy based on specialist services, specialised industries, communications, and information technologies. Namibia needs to fast track its development process, and springboard over the heavy industry development path taken by the industrialised countries...(p. 77)

the Sub-Vision on Production Technology (Section 4.3.2. of Developing a knowledge based society), confirms again, industrialization as an end [and non-green – indicator 2.1.2] value in **the good life**: “Namibia is an industrialised nation...” (p. 85). The only aspect of heavy industry singled out for *implied* critique is its heavy water use:

We must focus on high value-added services, specialised industries that are modest in their water requirements[,] and information technology. (p. 77)

This is a key sentence, because it highlights – only indirectly though – that water scarcity (section 5.1 to come) is a key limiting factor to sustainable development in Namibia. However, this section's **view of nature** presents an image of Namibia as “rich in [natural] resources” (top of p. 83, and Summary box, Current situation, first bullet point, p. 86), limited only by skills and technological capacity to use these resources. This image of unlimited natural resources to fuel industrialization, provided they are used sustainably (Summary box, Where we want to be (2030) first bullet point, p. 86), persists throughout the main text [despite worries in section 4.1.4 on population growth and the already considerable pressure of people on natural resources], and is perhaps a clue to/trace of the optimism which O’Riordan sees as part of “Cornucopian” technocentrism (Figure 9). The critically limiting factor of water availability vis-a-vis Namibia’s expanding population, is backgrounded here.

As the Sub-Vision which opened this section, as well as its discussion in the text makes clear, industrialization is highly valued both as part-definition of the good life, and as means to attain it. Examples from page 83 are:

“The shortage of human capacity ... are factors contributing to the low rate of Namibia’s industrialisation”, and

“Newly educated Namibian technicians and engineers could engage themselves in the maintenance area as a starting point where they can gain experience and additional knowledge to drive [another clue to/trace of a mechanist **ontology**!] the industrialisation of the country..”.

Otherwise stated, *Namibia Vision 2030* fails to offer an alternative conceptual model to development as capitalist techno-industrialism [green indicator 2.2]. One trace of this failure is left in the phrasing of the Sub-Vision:

Namibia is an industrialised nation, *with a viable natural resources export sector* (p. 85, my italics).

Compare that with Galtung’s alternative model of development for emerging countries (Chapter Seven, section 2.1.3.3.(c)), one aspect of which was that a developing country should *not* make its raw materials available to a developed country. “They should do something with these themselves, either

independently or in collaboration with each other, that is as South-South trade, not South-North. If this is problematic for us [industrialized countries], that is our problem. We must find a solution for it...”. Namibia’s growing export of its natural resources (uranium, fish, marble, copper) to a rapidly industrializing China, does not I think, meet Galtung’s requirements¹² (The Namibian, 5 February 2007, p. 7, The Chinese charm offensive; The Namibian, 4 April 2007, p. 11, Namibia and China sign thirteen agreements).

And of course, a clear mark of the absence of an alternative development model to capitalist techno-industrialism [green indicator 2.2], is the Sub-Vision’s reference to “market oriented production”. A more radical version of seeing green would have encouraged as priority, local production for local needs, and production for exchange above profit, rather than participation in the [global] market system [indicators 14.6 and 14.7]. Vision 2030 by contrast, encourages Namibia’s participation in globalization [section 4.2.1].

The inclusion of a sub-heading and discussion of “Natural resources” (p. 83) under the heading “Production technology” is a telling clue to this text’s **view of nature**, I think: nature is seen mechanically [a technological means], and economically [a factor of production]. Quite unlike seeing green’s view of nature as organic, holistic, pursuing its own interests and agenda [green criterion 6].

And, I cannot resist noting in passing, another clue to this text’s non-green economization of reality, via its strong views here on education serving to produce, rather than to critique, Homo *economicus* [green indicator 8.1.1]: “entrepreneurship and technological innovation training” are to be integrated into the education system from early childhood (Objectives, 2nd bullet point, p. 87); education in science and technology is also to be prioritized (Strategies, 3rd and 5th bullet points, p. 87). Homo *economicus* is based on a competitive aggressive **view of the human being**, confirmed in this section on production technology by the value placed on competitiveness (for example, p. 83, 2nd paragraph, 6th paragraph, the Sub-Vision on p. 85, the Summary box, Current situation, 6th bullet, on p. 86, Objectives, 6th bullet, p. 87).

4.3.3 Education and training (pp. 87-96)

A fully integrated, unified and flexible education and training system, that prepares Namibian learners to take advantage of a rapidly changing environment and contributes to the economic, moral, cultural and social development of the citizens throughout their lives. (p. 89.)

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria, but could be partly assessed via green indicators 8.2.5 and 8.2.6. However the discussion supporting these indicators is not deep enough to assess all the aspects covered in this section of Vision 2030. It could be remedied partly by reading deep ecologist Arne Naess’s views (1989, see ‘education’ in Index, p. 219), or those of social ecologist Murray Bookchin (in Biehl, 1997, for example), or early Die Grünen proposals for reform of education, and the education system, or views contained in charters such as those of the European (European Greens, 2004, 2006) or USA Greens.

Despite that limitation, I believe a seeing green perspective would problematize

- (a) the [over-?] emphasis placed in this section on science and technology, if of the variety which merely perpetuates western techno-capitalism’s instrumental attitude towards nature;
- (b) the Objective (p. 95) of an education and training system which is “capable of producing a balanced supply of human resources, in response to demands in the labour market”. This is again nothing other

¹² “...President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa warned that China’s push for raw materials from Africa held the risk of a “colonial relationship” (The Namibian, 5 February 2007, p. 7, The Chinese charm offensive)

than education to produce Homo *economicus* [green indicator 8.1.1], or cogs which will slot easily into the industrial machine, to use Die Grünen’s imagery. Not a seeing green **view of the human being**.

4.3.4 Early childhood development (pp. 96-99)

All children aged 0 to 6 years have opportunities for early childhood development, in addition to the care of individuals and communities. (p. 97)

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to the selected human-nature relationship criteria, so is not discussed in that context.

No specific indicator was developed for the seeing green criteria list by which the green-ness of the Sub-Vision proposed here could be assessed. However, as can be expected from their partial genesis from the women’s liberation movement, children are a special concern in Die Grünen’s early political programmes (for example, 1980b, Section V 2.5 Children, p. 34). In line with their demand for post-patriarchal gender roles [indicator 15.3], they proposed a series of measures which would enable either parent to remain at home with their young children, and be paid to do so, even though not in a formal job at the time. They also encouraged the kind of parenting education programmes which Vision 2030s section 4.3.4 envisages.

4.3.5 Aspects of the legislative/regulatory framework (pp. 99-100)

Cross-sectoral internal and external developments in the field of knowledge, information and technology are constantly monitored to assess their impact on the rights of the individual and the functioning of society and the national economy, and appropriate legislation and regulations are promulgated. (p. 100).

The objective of this section of Vision 2030 is to “ensure the safe use of science and technology systems, including indigenous knowledge, while upholding the constitutional provisions for education and training” (p. 100). ICT and education have already been discussed above.

But some of the topics in this discussion in Vision 2030 can be related to and assessed in terms of the seeing green criteria/indicators:

- (a) I interpret “Legislation in place to protect the rights of the individual...” (Summary box, p. 100, Where we want to be (2030), 1st bullet point) as a reference to either data privacy protection or freedom of access to information, or both. These are green ideas [indicators 17.3, 17.4]
- (b) There is an unproblematized affirmation of an ethic of justice and rights, which on many ecofeminist views, is an ethic generated by an androcentric, atomist, rather than relational view of Self/Other relationships [seeing green criterion 1, and indicator 9.6].
- (c) The discussion refers to biotechnology, and the national policy on biotechnology. This latter policy could be assessed in terms of seeing green indicator 12.4.3, which is wary of biotechnology’s potential threat to biodiversity, or which is undertaken within an instrumental science/technology orientation, rather than in a reciprocal/partnership orientation to nature [indicator 12.6].
- (d) *Absent*, in what is surely the perfect location in which to discuss it, is any discussion of a changed science/technology ethic towards nature.

4.4 Equity: individuals, community and the state (pp. 101-135)

4.4.1 Poverty reduction (pp. 101-108)

Poverty is reduced to the minimum, the existing pattern of income-distribution is equitable and disparity is at the minimum. (p. 104).

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030's human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

No indicator has been developed to assess the green-ness of a text's poverty reduction stance, which must be considered a gap under criterion 15 Living in solidarity, because poverty reduction is part of the radical egalitarianism and redistributionism of ecological economics (Chapter Nine: 3.2), which contributed to ecologism's emergence as radical cultural critique (Chapter Two: 2.3.1.d).

Seeing green's radical egalitarianism in resource sharing, and solidarity of lifestyle with have-nots, appears in sustainable development discourse, and in Vision 2030, as a rather tamer "equity", one of the three "desiderata" of the WCED/Brundtland Report (Hayward, 1997, p. 97; the other two being "environment" and "futuraity"). Poverty reduction assumes in sustainable development discourse, the same kind of legitimating narrative status which seeing green accords to a western counter-cultural critique, or ecology as normative. But ecological economist Martinez-Alier (1987, p. xi), for example, takes the cynical view that poverty reduction as story is deliberately cultivated by the Northern elites in order to deflect too much probing into their continued and unequalitarian pursuit of resource-intensive, and ever higher standards of living. It is often noted that this standard of living, for example that of the USA, "is not replicable in the rest of the world because it implies such a disproportionate use of the earth's resources" (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 237; see his comments on "Raubwirtschaft" in Chapter Nine, section 3.2).

Martinez-Alier points out that underlying the growth and poverty alleviation debate is an ethical question not always clearly spelt out, particularly in the context of the developed world vis-a-vis the developing world. If continual economic growth *is* possible, then developed world countries currently enjoying the high standard of living aspired to by the rest of the world [Namibia included], are not called upon to introduce any fundamental change to their lifestyle – 'tinkering' perhaps, but not a *fundamental* re-organization. By "assuming miraculous technical change and economic growth in the future" (Martinez-Alier, 1987, p. 236), they expect that developing countries will eventually reach the same high standard of living as in the developed countries, and there is thus no need to give up "the last great conservative ideology" (p. 15) of growth, or to become involved in the painful business of redistribution of wealth. But, if continued growth is *not* possible, if our energy reserves are indeed limited, and not capable of delivering the same high standard of living across all peoples and all countries, should the developed countries then not be sharing the available resources in an egalitarian way, starting right now? And, closer to home, what about Die Grünen Rudolf Bahro's contention that the elites in developing countries should also be engaging in the same kind of egalitarian, distributionist thinking [e.g. the introduction of a Basic Income Grant (indicator 14.11)], rather than pursuit of what he called, the "Mercedes culture"? (Chapter Seven: 2.1.3.2.1).

As far as the text's human-nature relationship is concerned, one can note, while reading this section 4.4.1, that it continues the text's commitment to market development (p. 101), and again presents **an economic view of nature**: "Namibia is *endowed with rich natural resources*, such as diamonds and other mining products, fish, agriculture and outstanding [nature-based?] tourist attractions. This has led to a relatively high per-capita income....". (p. 101, my italics). [*Absent* again however from this cornucopian view of nature, is Namibia's limited access to water]. This economic view of nature continues on p. 102 (my italics), in the context of a discussion on land, in the phrase "Access to *productive assets* also determines the vulnerability of households".

4.4.2 Gender and development (pp. 108-110)

Namibia is a just, moral, tolerant and safe society, with legislative, economic and social structures in place that eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity between women and men, the diverse ethnic groups, and people of different interests. (p. 109).

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail. However, it can be related to the seeing green criteria list which includes demands for the social inclusion of women equal to men¹³, for women’s local, non-expert livelihood knowledge to be taken into account in development planning, for post-patriarchal gender roles in society, and for an end to structural violence [criteria 15.2, 2.1.4, 15.3 and 16.2 respectively, but see also Chapter Six: 3.4 and 6.3 for ecofeminist views on “standpoint epistemology” and its relationship to development, and Chapter Nine: 4.2.3 for differing approaches to the role of women in development].

4.4.3 Youth and development (pp. 111-115)

Namibia will be a just, moral, tolerant and safe society, with legislative, economic and social structures in place that eliminate marginalisation and ensure peace and equity and a conducive environment for child and youth development. (p. 113)

This section covers a variety of real world issues pertaining to the youth: substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and other negative health behaviour patterns, high unemployment rate, for example. No specific green indicators were developed for these issues, but the street-greenness of the measures proposed here (Vision 2030, pp. 114-115) to deal with these and other youth issues could possibly be judged by Die Grünen’s children and youth policies developed subsequent to 1980 (the 1980 base programme mentions only that such policies were under development), and also the section on youth unemployment and training in the 1983 Sindelfingen political platform (Die Grünen, 1983).

Anyone interested in constructing this document’s implicit **epistemology**, might take this next sentence as yet another marker of a mechanist, and linear worldview:

The youth’s ideas on democracy and politics allows one to *predict* the political future of the country. The opinions they form at present will *impact* on this generation of opinion-makers and voters as they grow older and assume their positions in the economy and political system.” (p. 112, my italics)

Phrasing such as “allows one to speculate on [or make an informed guess on] the country’s future political tendency. The opinions they form at present will affect this generation...” could have been used, but was not.

The section does relate in one specific way to the **human-nature relationship**, which, as one expects by now from this document, is cast in economic, and enlightened self-interest terms:

“One of the five priority areas of action of the National Youth Policy focuses on environment and agriculture, especially environmental degradation as a result of deforestation, desertification, and soil erosion. Young people have a responsibility to be actively involved in the protection and conservation of the natural resources of Namibia. ...” (p. 112).

The ethic of conservation mentioned here is discussed in more detail at Biodiversity loss (pp. 164-165) under section 5.2.6.

4.4.4 Senior citizens (pp. 116-117)

The elderly citizens are acknowledged and well esteemed for their past contributions to the development of our country, and in their old age they are well cared for and remain happy senior citizens in a safe and loving environment. (p. 116).

¹³ For example, African Heads of State at the 1997 SADC Summit set a quota of 30% for appointments of women into positions of higher authority. Namibia along with some other African states, is “lagging behind at 20 per cent” (*The Namibian*, 9 February 2007, SADC states fail to meet women quota)

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to the criteria selected to assess Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

However, it can be related to the seeing green criteria list through criterion 15: Living in solidarity, which includes demands for the social inclusion, physically and emotionally, of the elderly [indicator 15.5]. Indicator 16.2: No structural violence, is also related. Pleasantly green in this Sub-Vision, is the implicit characterization of human-human relationships not only in terms of justice, rights and duties, but balanced by the ‘feminine’ value of care (Chapter Eight: 4.3.3.3). The summary box “Senior Citizens”, and sub-section “Where we want to be (2030)” has reverted though, to ‘malestream’ values such as “honour and respect” (p. 117). To support my contention that there is an implicit androcentric murmuring through this text, note the phrase [again!] “man-made and or natural calamities” (Objectives, 1st bullet, p. 117). This despite the commitment to gender responsivity in language given on p. 110 (Strategies, 4th bullet point). The limitations of indicator 15.5 noted at Vision 2030 section 4.1.3 apply here too.

4.4.5 People with disabilities (pp. 117-120)

Namibia is a caring state and society, which pays particular attention to vulnerable people and groups, who are unable to utilise capabilities, care for themselves or get assistance from family networks. (p. 119)

This Sub-Vision and discussion can also be related to the seeing green indicator 16.2 No structural violence, and indicator 15.5: Social inclusion of the disabled. “We want them to live with us”, said Die Grünen (1980b, p. 46) in their 1980 street-green political programme (1980b, section V.9. 4, p.46).

However, it is not directly related to the Vision 2030 human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed any further.

4.4.6 Fostering and orphanage (pp. 120-122)

Families are available and willing to accommodate orphans and are being assisted, when necessary, by the government/community through a well managed public orphanage programme, in which such disadvantaged children are supported to live a meaningful life that prepares them adequately for the future. (p. 120).

Though this Sub-Vision, and its discussion could be related in principle to the same seeing green indicators as those related to the social inclusion of the marginalized [16.2, 15.5], there is no discussion in the base data chapters on orphans, orphanages or fostering. This indicator gap would need to be filled by those interested in this aspect of seeing green’s demand for living in solidarity.

4.4.7 Culture and tradition (pp. 122-125)

People and society are tolerant and supportive of a diversity of religious beliefs, cultures and ethnicity, and work to optimise the strengths of diversity. (p. 123).

This should have been the section in which the authors of the text, had they been serious adherents of seeing green, would have problematized western techno-industrialism as economy and culture. However any such problematization is entirely *absent*, thereby conferring on the western capitalist version of **the good life**, the mantle of “naturalness”. And while the text notes that changes in culture are “necessary and inevitable” (p. 122), the other key cultural changes demanded in seeing green – a reconceptualized Self [criterion 8], a reconceptualized Self/Other relationship, including the human relationship with nature [criterion 7] are equally absent. These absences are clues to/traces of a grey-green text which embraces reform environmentalism rather than radical ecologism.

The section is a curious mixing of shades of green. More-green tones are present in the condemnation of colonialism and racism, though it is unclear whether this is on the grounds of the idea of hierarchy and ‘power-over’ [seeing green indicator 1.2]. Diversity, a green value, is recognized as strength; multi-culturalism is valued too [indicators 11.1.d, 15.4]. The freedom of expression of beliefs, and religions, noted in the summary box, “Current situation” (p. 124) is a strong green value (Chapter Seven: 6.3.3), though freedom of expression of cultural practices produces ecofeminist ambivalence on vegetarianism, for example, as absolute expression of an animal ethic of care (Chapter Six: 5.4.4.3). Less-green is the phrase “the fear of God” (p. 123), suggesting a western understanding of Christianity (Armstrong, 1999), problematized in seeing green as far as its dominion/stewardship-informed human-relationship with nature is concerned. Again too, is the already noted trace of a mechanist **ontology** in the phrase ‘driving force’, as well as a suggestion of an androcentric ethical understanding in the phrase “just and morally upright” society (p. 123). And the word ‘optimise’ in the Sub-Vision wording is a clue to/trace of an economic rationality, usually understood as an instrumental **epistemology** (Chapter Nine: 3.1.3).

4.4.8 Civic affairs (pp. 125-128)

All Namibians have national documents, and there is a smooth and efficient regulative and controlling mechanism for refugees and immigrants into Namibia as well as their residence in the country, supported by a well developed criminal justice system. (p. 126)

This Sub-Vision and section is not directly related to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

As far as the indicators’ assessment is concerned, registering of vital events (p. 125) could be related to the green concern for privacy of data and access to information gathered by the state on self [indicators 17.3, 17.4]. But as the base data chapters do not discuss international migration, no seeing green indicator was developed for this topic. It is however one on which a street-green viewpoint could easily be constructed (for example, from Die Grünen, 1980b, section V.5.1 Discrimination against foreigners, p. 38).

4.4.9 Public safety (pp. 128-130)

Namibia provides a socio-cultural environment which marginalises social evils and creates a societ[y], in which the rule of law and order is respected, and which, to a large extent, is free from violence. (p. 129).

Given its roots inter alia in the feminism and peace social movements, rejection of domination and violence is a key value in seeing green. The section could be assessed in terms of criteria relating to gender equity, and radical peace, which rejects both physical and structural violence [criterion 16, indicators 15.2, and 15.3]. Namibia has high rates of violence against women:

Prime Minister Nahas Angula, who officiated at the closing ceremony [of a national conference aimed at ending gender-based violence], said it was evident from daily reports in the media that gender-based violence had reached alarming proportions. ‘Due to some traditional stereotypes, women and girls are viewed as second-class citizens and – worse – the properties of men. I urge all traditional leaders to address these harmful traditional practices within our communities,’ he emphasised (*The Namibian*, Monday 25 June 2007, p. 3 “Women treated as property”).

This Sub-Vision, and its discussion of violence against women and children – rape, domestic violence and child abuse – appear not to be directly related to Vision 2030’s human-nature relationship. But on the feminist/ecofeminist view, violence against women, and violence against nature are *coupled subsets of the same androcentric construction of the Self/Other relationship*, which manifests itself in

the related ideas, structures, and values of hierarchy, patriarchy, and naturism. This contention is explored in detail in Chapter Six: 4.2 as Warren's logic of domination, and Plumwood's centric critique, and in Chapter Eight: 6.6.1, where I wrote that:

Nature is included in green solidarity politics: "How can we be non-violent to nature unless the principle of non-violence becomes central to the ethos of human culture?" (Gandhi in Swaminathan, 1990, p. xiii, in Ch 7: 6.4 footnote 150).

Where Vision 2030 assumes that pursuing a strategy of gender equity will eventually ease human-human violence (p. 129, 4th paragraph), a green viewpoint would suggest that the entire text should also be critically assessed for its continued implicit or explicit stance on *violence towards nature* [e.g. naturism: indicator 1.3]. For on the green view, even if the gender equity strategy succeeds, naturism is a continuing expression of the idea of hierarchy and domination rejected in seeing green. Could one successfully argue for example, that the annual clubbing of seals permitted in Namibia's protected areas, is *not* just another a manifestation of physical violence, unless one *also* argues that animals are beyond ethical concerns?

The Vision 2030 objective (p. 130) of ending violence in Namibia:

Objective

To ensure that people in Namibia enjoy peace and harmony in their relationships, and violence (including homicide, rape, human abuse of all descriptions) is completely eliminated in relationships at home as well as outside, within the community and in the country.

fails then, in its **view of the Self/Other relationship** here, to make any connection between the seeing green linked ideas of human-human and human-nature violence [indicator 8.2.4].

4.4.10 Civil society and its organisations (pp. 131-133)

Civil society, its individuals, groups and organisations are highly resourceful and co-operate with Government and its agencies at local, regional and national level; respect each other and strive to consolidate democratic ideals, and collaborate in social and economic development for the benefit of all. (p. 132).

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail. Its green-ness could be assessed though, in terms of the seeing green understanding of direct democracy and real citizenship [criterion 17].

In passing, one can note in this discussion of the links between civil society organizations and development, again, the *absence, the backgrounding*, of nature. The 4th paragraph (p. 131) and the Summary box on p. 132, refer to a variety of civic organisations which on the authors' view *are* related to development: community development committees, small business organizations, women's groups, trade unions, teachers' groups, church groups... but no grassroots environmental organizations, such as those whose presence was so strong in the emergence of the green movement (Chapter Two: 2.3.3).

4.4.11 The family (pp. 133-135)

The family is sacred and well respected, and parents fulfil their responsibilities, while children remain obedient and responsible. (p. 133).

This Sub-Vision is not directly related to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and so is not discussed in any detail.

Its green-ness would be difficult to assess though, as there is in the seeing green criteria only a minimal, and implied negative reference to the family as expression of hierarchy and patriarchy [social ecologist Bookchin and some feminists are particularly outspoken here].

Intuitively though, I feel that there are in the text of Vision 2030, lingering traces of hierarchy, and patriarchy, in its stern, cold morality, expressed here in this section, and elsewhere:

- The family is “sacred” (p. 133, Summary box The Family, “Where we want to be (2030), 1st bullet point, p. 134)
- “Disrespect for family authority” (p. 129), and breakdown in family structure, are cited as a cause of crime (p. 129) and ‘Moral degeneration’ (p. 133)
- There are references to “a high sense of morality” as opposed to “widespread moral decadence” (Summary box for civil society and its organisations”, p. 132, “Where we want to be (2030), and “Worst-case scenario”)
- The church, and the family, are two western-cultural social institutions which have been critiqued for patriarchal attitudes. Nevertheless, they are the *unproblematized* social bodies which will generate Namibia’s desired moral status: “Church ... must actively contribute to the upholding of morality in our society” (Summary box, p. 132, “Where we want to be”, 4th bullet; and Sub-Vision on p. 133)
- The androcentric “Respect” [not “feminine principle” values such as warmth, love, or caring] is a key value in family relationships (Sub-Vision, p. 133)
- Children are “obedient” (Sub-Vision, p. 133), and “disciplined” (p. 134, Summary box the Family, “Where we want to be (2030)”, 3rd bullet point) - surely both a clue to/trace of commitment to the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy?

Missing for me in this text is the warm, mutual-aid solidarity of community and spirituality, which, on my understanding of seeing green [criterion 4, and indicator 4.1], will generate “where we want to be” in our Self/Other relationships. But any researcher interested in this aspect would need to develop a seeing green indicator based on a more focussed discussion of critique of patriarchal institutions such as family and church than provided in this study (see for example Chapter Five: 6.1.2, 5th paragraph; and 6.2; also Chapter Six: 2.1.3 on the family, Chapter Two: 2.5.1; Chapter Nine: 7.3.2.1 on the western Christian church).

Part of where seeing green wants to be in its Self/Other relationships, is a re-conceptualized, partnership ethic with nature, so it is with great interest that the assessment of Vision 2030s chapter 5, on sustaining the resource base, begins next.

5.0 Vision 2030 chapter 5: Sustainable resource base (pp. 136-173)

As preparation for reading this key chapter on the human-nature relationship, as well as environmental sustainability in Vision 2030, I first read the authoritative, well-constructed and presented thematic report, produced by the Namibia Natural Resources Consortium¹⁴, which informed it: Theme 6: Natural resources sector (GRN, 2002c).

It is evident that the Consortium’s approach and philosophy were influential in informing the final Vision 2030 Main document generally, and its chapter 5 specifically. Some examples of its influence are:

¹⁴ Consortium members were Dr. Chris Brown, Dr Peter Tarr, Dr John Mendelsohn, Dr Jon Barnes, Mr Carl !Aribeb and Mrs J. Tarr (Vision 2030, p. 234)

(a) Much of Theme 6s Foreword is taken up in the Vision 2030 Main document as the Preface by the Director General of the National Planning Commission (Vision 2030, pp. 14-16). In particular, three “higher-order questions” were asked in the preparation of the Theme 6 report:

- “1. What is the national ideal that we are all working towards?
2. What is the cornerstone of our approach and philosophy?
3. How does this initiative fit into the national development process?”

These higher-order questions, the theme 6 report diagram on the national planning process, and the view of nature which appears in their report as “How the ... resource base will have to be” [all in the Theme 6 Foreword], appear in the Vision 2030 Main document on pp. 14-16.

(b) Much of Theme 6s Executive Summary is taken up in the five different sections of the Main document’s chapter 5. As one example, its Executive Summary on freshwater and freshwater resources (pp. v-vii) appears in Vision 2030 (Main document) on pp. 136-137, only slightly edited.

(c) Much of section 6.1 of Vision 2030 on Sustainable Development is taken from the Theme 6 report. For example, the key threats to sustainable development listed in the report (GRN, 2002c, pp. 76-77) are the same as those listed, with minor editing changes, in Vision 2030, pp. 175-176. Another example is the inclusion on p. 142 in the Vision 2030 Main document, of the Theme 6 report’s Figure B1.1 (GRN, 2002c, p. 78) on “Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia”.

It would also be fair to say, that Theme 6’s report “Key strategies” (GRN, 2002c, section 3, pp. 79-89) has largely informed the Vision 2030 discussion of sustainable development as its cornerstone philosophy on pp. 14-15, as well as in chapter 6: 6.1, pp. 175-179.

The Theme 6 report adopts a vigorous, and explicit, environmental economics approach to nature, an approach which has implicitly permeated Vision 2030s view of nature so far. I shall be referring to the Theme report 6 during the discussion of Vision 2030s chapter 5, and its eight Sub-Visions, beginning next. Other than seeking to understand the Vision 2030 chapter 5 view of nature, a recurring key question will be, what is its view of environmental sustainability? What is to be sustained?, For whom? and For how long? Answers to these questions will provide an indication of whether the text’s ultimate human-nature relationship premise is anthropocentric [grey-green] or ecocentric [dark green].

5.1 Freshwater and associated resources (pp. 136-140)

Namibia’s freshwater resources are kept free of pollution and are used to ensure social well-being, support economic development, and to maintain natural habitats. (p. 137).

This Sub-Vision provides a clue to/trace of a homocentric and economic **view of nature** in the word ‘resource’. Water as resource is to be sustained for social well-being [homocentric/anthropocentric], and economic development [also homocentric/anthropocentric]. Less easy to pigeon-hole, is the phrase “to maintain natural habitats”. The answer to the *For whom?* question here is not immediately clear.

Unlike the largely cornucopian view of “natural resources” appearing elsewhere in Vision 2030, the discussion here (p. 136) begins with a clear, and green acknowledgement [indicator 14.1], of the limits to growth posed by water scarcity in Namibia:

Namibia suffers from extreme water scarcity. The only permanently flowing rivers lie near to, or form part of, the country international boundaries. The lack of readily available freshwater in the interior of the country remains the most important limiting factor for development.

The limitation which water scarcity will impose on development is again stated on p. 137, 3rd paragraph: “As water in some areas becomes scarce and expensive, development options become increasingly limited”.

□ Broad overview of Namibia’s water resources and consumption (p. 136)

The discussion of water resources here is almost exclusively focussed on human use: on farms, in towns, livelihoods for local fishers, economic activities such as aquaculture and agriculture. There is though, at the 3rd bullet point, a potentially ecocentric statement:

The water table associated with these rivers is high and their banks characteristically support vegetation that provides important resources for people *and wildlife* living in the arid areas of Namibia (p. 136, my italics).

This small italicised statement leaves room to wonder about the answer to the *For whom?* question. Are these resources for wildlife important for the sake of the wildlife [which would constitute a green recognition of nature’s value-for-itself], or only because wildlife represents an economic opportunity for humans?

□ Future water demand, freshwater depletion and degradation (pp. 136-137)

The *For how long* question is answered in the first sentence here as 30 years, which simply echoes the time frame set by the Vision as a whole.

This section expresses green-sounding concern for the health of the environment, its over-exploitation, its vulnerability to pollution. But *For whom?* For humans: “Freshwater depletion and degradation threatens human and livestock health, and socio-economic development. It reduces livelihood options and exacerbates rural poverty. ... As water in some areas becomes scarce ..., development options become increasingly limited.” (p. 137, 3rd paragraph).

□ Efforts to reduce freshwater depletion and to enhance the value of water (p. 137)

This section sets out the strategies which Namibia employs to realize its goals of “social well-being, economic development and environmental health”, the latter goal, one is beginning to suspect, in service of the two former, and not on an equal footing with them [seeing green criterion 12]. In the strategies listed here, and their phrasing, are three points of interest, I think:

(i) “*Tools* such as Natural Resource Accounting and Strategic Environmental Assessment are being adopted. Ultimately these tools will help guide policies regarding future water use, and will prevent *impact* on freshwater ecosystems and the resources and services that they provide.” (p. 137, my italics).

“Tools” and “impact” are again traces of/clues to a mechanist worldview, but in the world of environmental management, their use has naturalized the **ontology** they mirror to the point of invisibility.

(ii) Namibia has no National Environmental Action Plan (Blackie, 2000, pp. 135-136); no Environmental Management Act in operation as yet (September 2007), and therefore no Commission on Sustainable Development; and no System of integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting [SEEA – green indicator 14.2.1] to account for stocks and flows in Namibia’s ‘natural resources’. One could perhaps, as substitute, investigate the extent to which the results of the donor-funded Natural Resource Accounting programme mentioned here are being taken up in the national development planning process (Vision 2030, p. 15). This is done in section 5.2.2.

(iii) *Absences* are also of interest. Given this section’s explicit recognition of water scarcity in Namibia (see also Theme 6 report, p. 15, Box A2.1, which characterizes Namibia as suffering from “Absolute water scarcity” and “High water stress”), many of Die Grünen’s early demands (1980b, pp. 21-22) to preserve water have not yet been implemented in Namibia. These include the compulsory erection by businesses of effluent purification plants for water recycling, and separate transmission systems for water destined for life-support as opposed to industrial use.

□ Summary box “Freshwater and Associated Resources” (p. 138)

I highlight here, the glimpse which the summary box provides of this chapter’s **view of nature**: “essential ecological services” (“Current situation, 7th bullet), and “valuable resources and essential services” (“Things to avoid”, 4th bullet), “Productive and healthy natural wetlands with rich biodiversity” (“Where we want to be (2030), 5th bullet).

This is basically a view taken from Theme 6 report’s Table A2.1 “Goods and Hidden Services Provided by Natural Aquatic Ecosystems” on p. 16, and reproduced next as Figure 10:

Figure 10: Goods and hidden services provided by natural aquatic ecosystems (ex Theme 6, 2002c, Table A2.1)

VALUABLE GOODS	Vital services (indirect use values of aquatic ecosystems)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •→ Freshwater. Essential for life processes, maintaining human health, agriculture and industry. • Riverine and wetland vegetation. Can be used for grazing, building materials, fuel and food. •→ Aquatic animals. Fish and other edible aquatic animals provide a valuable source of income and protein to rural subsistence communities. •→ Wild birds and terrestrial animals concentrate around natural water bodies. These rich and varied wildlife populations can be used by communities for food and to attract tourists to an area. •→ Fertile soils. Floodplains associated with the seasonal flooding of rivers contain organically rich silt and other sediments that provide a rich substrate for cultivation. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •→ Rooted aquatic plants (like reeds and rushes) reduce floods by regulating stream flow. In addition aquatic plants improve water quality by recycling excess nutrients. •→ Many small water animals are detritivores. By breaking down and consuming dead and decaying plant and animal matter these animals play a vital role in aquatic food chains and help to keep natural water sources clean.

Quite apart from the obvious, and grey-green economization of reality [GG 6] conveyed here – “goods” “services”, “efficiency” - there is also a grey-green anthropocentric orientation [GG 1.1] – the goods and services are mostly for homocentric benefit: human health, agriculture, industry, building materials, fuel, tourists.

□ Summary box “Freshwater and Associated Resources” (p. 138), read together with

□ Strategies (pp. 139-140)

These two sections, taken together, are replete with grey-green, environmental economic-, and reform environmentalism-speak [GG 11.3]. With their abundant references to legislation, education and awareness, improved management and monitoring, changed policies, price structure incentives and disincentives, efficient use, improved technology, and so on, almost all the ingredients of indicator GG 11.3s description of reform environmentalism are present:

Reform environmentalism holds that there is no need for radical reform of those structures of society which embody anthropocentric attitudes [eg capitalism which views nature-as-resources-for-humans]. Instead, the following kinds of measures are advocated:

“...enacting legislation, changing public policy, increasing education, altering tax laws, returning ‘public lands’ to private ownership, emphasizing moral obligations to future generations of humans, promoting wise ‘stewardship’ of

nature, and otherwise encouraging more prudent use and more equitable allocation of natural resources” (Zimmerman, 1993, in Zimmerman et al., 1993, p. viii, in Ch 8: 6.2.3).

It is not that these strategies are not pro-environmental in their stance, they are. But they are not ecological, as seeing green understands ecology as normative: the key context of western cultural critique, and changed Self/Other relationship, including fundamentally changed attitudes to nature, is *absent*.

□ Targets for Freshwater and Associated Resources

The threat of water scarcity in Namibia by 2016 – halfway through the Vision 2030 period – is presented quite starkly here, making the cornucopian images of natural resource abundance, or understatement of Namibia’s limited ability to support a growing population, elsewhere in the text appear out of touch with reality, unless interpreted as a sign of technocentrism’s boundless optimism and faith in technological progress (Figure 9 in this chapter).

5.2 Production systems and natural resources (pp. 140-170)

This section of Vision 2030s chapter 5 covers land and agricultural production (5.2.1), forestry (5.2.2), wildlife and tourism (5.2.3), fisheries and marine resources (5.2.4), non-renewable natural resources (5.2.5), and biodiversity (5.2.6).

It also includes Figure 5.1, which depicts “Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia. This is the first of two aspects of this section on which I wish to focus next. Here is Figure 5.1 from Vision 2030, p. 142, reproduced as Figure 11:

Figure 11. Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia (Tarr, 2000, p. 12)




Figure 5.1: Some of the interlinked issues that threaten sustainable development in Namibia

What for me is strikingly absent from this assessment of the causes of the ecological crisis – here cast in the grey-green mode of threats to sustainable development of people – is the human species. It is as though it is invisible to itself, as from its centric position, it surveys its en-virons: degradation, pollution, urbanization, and so on. The *person*, the locus of valuing of, and attitudes towards nature is *absent*. This backgrounding of the human species, the person, means that Vision 2030 loses an opportunity to re-conceptualize the human-nature relationship [criterion 7], and at individual level, also an opportunity to urge the undertaking of the kind of self-work – actively thinking about one’s worldview, and reviewing it, which seeing green demands [indicator 18.1].

Consider now by contrast, ecosystemic thinker and early green guru Gregory Bateson’s (1972, Fig 1, p. 499) view of the causes of the ecological crisis, which was introduced in this study’s Chapter One, as Figure 3. It is re-presented here as Figure 12:

Figure 12. Bateson’s Dynamics of ecological crisis (1972, p. 499)




Fig. 1 The Dynamics of Ecological Crisis

Here, what Bateson calls “Hubris” – the human being’s attitude of arrogance towards nature – is an integral part of the dynamics of the ecological crisis, together with the other aspects which the two diagrams share in common: pollution, population, famine (poverty), for example. This is a key difference, I think, and marks Bateson’s understanding of the ecological crisis as green, requiring both reform environmentalism, *and* a philosophical re-conceptualization of the human-nature relationship to resolve it. One may say then, that seeing green criterion 7: Is there philosophical concern for a re-conceptualized human-nature relationship? is not met in Vision 2030’s depiction of the ecological crisis here.

The second aspect I wish to highlight, is on p. 141 of Vision 2030, at the 4th bullet point:

- ▶ Educating all Namibians with respect to environmental and development issues, and the *total economic value* of Namibia’s natural resources

The phrase ‘total economic value’ is an *explicit view of nature* economized, that up until now, has been implicitly suggested in economic-speak terms and values such as “comparative advantage”, “natural resources”, “natural capital”, “efficient”, “maximise” and “optimise”. The text’s consistent

economization of reality marks it as grey-green [criterion GG6]. This approach surely derives from the Theme report 6 (GRN, 2002c), which explicitly adopts the homocentric-utilitarian Total Economic Value approach. I provide next three examples taken from it.

(1) The first is in the context of a discussion of Namibia's "comparative advantages within the global market" (GRN, 2002c, p. 74 (p. 75 of electronic text)):

Abundant and diverse wildlife populations that are well adapted to Namibia's harsh climatic and physical conditions, and have extremely high *direct* and *indirect use value*. Some species of wildlife in Namibia also have high *non-use value* which include the values perceived in their preservation for later use (their *option value*) or their value as resources to be handed down to future generations (their *bequest value*). (italics as in original text)

(2) The second example (Box 1.2 on p. 75 of the Theme 6 report (p. 76 of electronic version)) is in the context of "Capitalizing on comparative advantage – the sustainable development of the Namib Desert through the recognition of Total Economic Value"

The Namib Desert spans a great diversity of habitats that incorporate spectacular tracts of natural scenery including well-wooded ephemeral rivers, the Fish River Canyon, extensive sand dunes and vast open plains. In addition, it incorporates areas of high species endemism ...

In today's overcrowded, rapidly developing world, natural environments which provide solitude, silence and natural beauty have become sought after commodities. In this light the Namib Desert must be regarded as a valuable national asset unique to Namibia ...

... The above [a discussion of sustainable use options] illustrates that, although largely useless in terms of direct value from land use activities like agriculture, the *Total Economic Value* of the Namib Desert is immense. With careful planning and the right mechanisms in place, all values associated with this unique piece of land could be captured as income on a sustainable basis.

(3) The third is within the context of "Improving development planning and reducing the negative impacts of industrialization".

a) Prepare economically and ecologically rational development plans

Economically and ecologically rational development plans are essential for sustainable development.

- Such plans aim to make a positive net contribution to the economy in terms of Total Economic Value (TEV). Ultimately, it is essential for Namibian decision makers to recognise, not only the direct values, but also all the other values of natural resources in Namibia. This is because these values are associated with people's willingness to pay¹⁵. With the right mechanisms in place, all values associated with natural resources could be captured as income by those investing in the resource (i.e. the nation and local communities of Namibia). (GRN, 2002c, p. 82; p. 83 of electronic text)

These three examples show to my mind, an explicit, entirely economic, and entirely instrumental **view of nature**. Silence in nature seen as "commodity". Land as "useless" if not under production. Land and non-human species having no value-for-themselves other than their direct, indirect, option, or bequest value for humans.

And, Namibians are *to be educated* in adopting this homocentric, instrumental **view of the human-nature relationship**. This is not what is envisaged in seeing green indicator 12.7: Is consciousness-changing environmental education advocated? Vision 2030s Figure 5.1 (p. 142), in combination with this small bullet point (Vision 2030, p. 141, at the 4th bullet point), place for me, every Sub-Vision, Objective and Strategies list in this entire section 5.2 "Production Systems and Natural Resources" discussed next, within the context of grey-green, anthropocentric reform environmentalism [GG 11.3], rather than the radical ecologism of seeing green.

¹⁵ This is the Contingent Valuation Method in environmental economics. The text here is silent on its shortcomings as a means of valuing natural resources and nature in monetary terms. See for example, Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.6 and van Dieren, 1995, p. 171, p. 209

5.2.1 Land and agricultural production (pp. 140-142)

Land is used appropriately and equitably, significantly contributing towards food security at household and national levels, and supporting the sustainable and equitable growth of Namibia's economy, whilst maintaining & improving land capability. (p. 144).

This green-ness of this sub-section could be assessed in terms of indicator 12.6: Reciprocity in land use: agriculture as example. The discussion which supports this indicator (Chapter Eight: 6.4.8) provides an adequate starting point, I think.

The anthropocentric-instrumental tenor of the text, now established beyond doubt, I suggest, continues in statements such as: “The environmental manifestations of land degradation in Namibia ... are causes of economic loss and escalating poverty, through declining agricultural production and a loss of food security...” (p. 143), and in the Sub-Vision’s “Land is used... supporting the sustainable ... growth of Namibia’s economy...” (p. 144).

And the emphasis on rights to ownership of, and tenure over natural resources throughout this sub-section, is a good example of the discussion in Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.1 on the necessary relationship (in environmental economic thought) between ownership rights and market efficiency in natural resource allocation.

5.2.2 Forestry (pp. 146-150)

Namibia's diverse natural woodlands, savannahs and the many resources they provide, are managed in a participatory and sustainable manner to help support rural livelihoods, enhance socio-economic development, and ensure environmental stability. (p. 148).

No indicator was developed to assess the greenness or otherwise of the forestry objectives and strategies proposed here. There would be sufficient information available in literature on emerging green thought, to do so, given early green opposition to Pinchot-type forestry management practices (Chapter Two: 2.2.1.1 – 2.2.1.2), the forest preservation concern inherent in emerging Nordic Europe ecologism (Bramwell, 1994, p. 26), and Die Grünen’s concern too (Chapter Seven).

The phrase “environmental sustainability” in this Sub-Vision can however be related to the selected seeing green indicator 12.1: Do policies tend towards a ‘stronger’ environmental sustainability approach? This, as described in Chapter Nine: 3.4.1.1 – 3.4.1.3, would entail policies supporting “absurdly strong”, “irreversible nature” or “strong” environmental sustainability, in which there would be for example, no substitution, or very limited, and fully-accounted for substitution between natural and human-made capital. These types of environmental sustainability also take nature’s value-for-itself into account.

How does this sub-section fare against seeing green indicator 12.1? Let’s begin with the *For whom?* aspect of environmental sustainability. The section lists, as expected, the benefits of maintaining forest ecosystems for humans, [“sources of economically valuable products”, “fuel, construction materials, wild foods, medicine, and browse and grazing for livestock” (p. 146)]. It misses an opportunity to make even a modest statement in support of nature and wildlife’s value-for-itself in this sentence: “In addition they [the woodland ecosystems] support a wealth of biodiversity and game, *which are the mainstay of the tourism sector...*” (p. 146, my italics).

Reading the text generously though – giving it the benefit of doubt - perhaps the reference to riparian deforestation (p. 147, immediately below Figure 5.2) which “has led to ... threats to biodiversity (invertebrates, mammals and bird species)” implies a greener nature-has-value-for-itself view, for one

may assume that not all the invertebrates, mammals and bird species meant here have human use value? The same generosity could perhaps be accorded to the sentence on p. 148 that “These [i.e. “fast growing, exotic soft wood tree species” (p. 148)] are unable to support native birds, insects, mammals and other wildlife adapted to the natural vegetation of an area”. The Strategies (on p. 150) also include a reference to “Extending the Protected Areas Network to incorporate as many natural wetlands and river systems (and their accompanying vegetation) as soon as possible”, which is a green value. Do these examples represent clues to/traces of nature’s value-for-itself, or are they really only instrumental grey-green values in service of tourism? The sections on Wildlife and Tourism (5.2.3), and Biodiversity (5.2.6) to come might help answer this question.

What about the substitution aspect of environmental sustainability; i.e. what measure of substitutability between human and natural “capital” is considered acceptable? [this is the *What of* nature must be sustained? question]. Any level of substitution requires well-established natural resource accounting (NRA). Vision 2030 chapter 5 mentions this approach on pages 137, 139, and 140 in connection with water, for example, “Tools such as Natural Resource Accounting¹⁶. and Strategic Environmental Assessment are being adopted” (p. 137).

For any kind of environmental sustainability – even the “sensible” or “weaker” versions which tend to be adopted in grey-green texts, - to be “serious”, there must not only be natural resource accounting, but *integrated* environmental and economic accounting (United Nations, 1993a). In Namibia, natural resource accounting is centred primarily in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, even though some of the accounts which were initially developed there, have subsequently been handed over to their responsible line ministries (water accounts, for example). The National Accounts on the other hand, are developed and published by the Central Statistics Office of the National Planning Commission (NPC). While there is informal exchange of information between the economists of these various government bodies, and the natural resource accounts developed so far influence individual sectoral policy planning, constraints of time, money and staff in the NPC have so far prevented the establishment of formally integrated environmental and economic accounting¹⁷ (oral communication, Dr Jonathon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007). Seeing green indicator 14.2.1 for an ecologically re-oriented economy is thus at the moment not met. Because the fully operational natural resource accounting needed to ensure even ‘weaker’ forms of environmental sustainability [GG 12.1] is absent, this suggests in turn, that Vision 2030 adopts a ‘weaker’ version of sustainable development, in this respect at least [GG 2.2.2].

5.2.3 Wildlife and tourism (pp. 150-157)

The integrity of Namibia’s natural habitats and wildlife populations are maintained, whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable, low-impact, consumptive and nonconsumptive tourism. (p. 152)

A different **view of nature** emerges in this section. In fact, this is one of the few places in the text which uses the word “nature”. In addition to the usual goods-and-services approach, there emerges in this sub-section, descriptions and values such as “a wildlife-centered experience” (p.151), “spectacular arid scenery and wide-open spaces” (p. 151), “solitude, silence and natural beauty” (p. 151), and, interestingly, a “sense of place” (p. 153, Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Things to do, 3rd bullet;

¹⁶ In 1993, the Government of Namibia established with donor aid, a small environmental and resource economics unit in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism to “support government in bridging the gap between conservation and economics” (<http://www.dea.met.gov.na/programmes/nra> 21 January 2004). Direct and indirect donor funding for the Natural Resource Accounting programme, which commenced in 1996, ended in 2006. In that period, natural resource accounts were developed to varying degrees for the fisheries, forestry, minerals, water, energy, livestock and wildlife sectors. Satellite accounts have been developed for tourism, but these do not include the nature on which eco-tourism is based (oral communication, Dr Jon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007)

¹⁷ There are currently (November 2007) donor-funded plans to establish a NRA unit within the National Planning Commission

Things to avoid, 5th bullet, Worst-case scenario, 2nd bullet). However “sense of place” appears not to mean the seeing green emotional connection to place, or the re-inhabitory sense of living in harmony within an ecological niche, or the ethical implications of these understandings (Chapter Eight: 5.2, 5.2.3, 5.4.2), but aesthetic pleasure for transient tourist consumption: “tourist enterprises using low impact designs, materials and technologies, so as not to damage the environmental or cultural assets that tourists seek to experience...” (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Things to do, 3rd bullet).

The use of the word “nature” in this section, as in “nature-centered tourism” (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 5th bullet) is fascinating. Why not “environmental goods and services-centered tourism”? Or “natural resources-centered tourism”? Is this perhaps a subtle recognition that nature cannot be reduced to sources, sinks and services alone? Could it be an indirect acknowledgement that nature has its own agenda? But this ineffable “other” quality in the natural environment, acknowledged in the use of the word “nature”, is itself quickly economized and commodified: “valuable natural assets” (p. 151), “sought after commodities” (p. 151), and on p. 166 (3rd paragraph of section entitled Conservation outside protected area...), a “unique tourism product”. Clear signs of a grey-green ontological view [criterion GG 6].

The meaning of “healthy” on which I speculated in the view of nature presented on p.14 of Vision 2030: “The ... Resource Base will reflect that...”, also begins to acquire definition as meaning economically productive, rather than nature’s progress towards fulfilling its purposivity, if one reads bullet point 14 under Where we want to be (2030) in the Wildlife and Tourism summary box on p. 153: “Healthy, diverse and productive wildlife populations of economically important species...”.

This section advocates strong and green-sounding support for wildlife conservation (p. 150, 1st bullet point under 5.2.3). Much of this is to be achieved through Namibia’s Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programme, to which Vision 2030 devotes in its section 5.2.3, considerable space. Progress in adoption of the programme throughout Namibia serves as one indicator for Namibia’s international reporting on progress towards meeting Goal 7 of the Millenium Development Goals (MDG), to which Namibia is a signatory (GRN, 2004b). Such international reporting fulfils seeing green indicator 12.8: Participation in global control measures to promote natural environment protection?. As Figure 13 (taken from GRN, 2004b, p. 31) next shows, MDG Goal 7 relates to environmental sustainability:

Figure 13: Namibia's progress towards environmental sustainability as Millennium Development Goal
(GRN, 2004b, p. 31)

GOAL 7

Ensure Environmental Sustainability

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT

INDICATOR	1990	2001	2006 target	Progress towards target
Land area protected to maintain biological diversity, as percentage of all land:				
Protected areas	13.6%	16.8 %**	15.1%	Good
Registered conservancies	0.0 %	4.9 %	10.9 %	Slow
Freehold land	5.0 %	6.1 %	8.5 %	Slow
GDP per unit of energy use	-	0.27 NSTJ*	0.45 NSTJ	Lack of data

Source: Ministry of Environment and Tourism.

Note: Table excludes other state land managed for biodiversity protection, e.g. tourism concessions and non-proclaimed wildlife areas.

* = 2000; ** = 2004

So what can one learn from this section of Vision 2030 about its understanding of environmental sustainability, i.e. do its policies tend to follow a “stronger” environmental sustainability approach [seeing green indicator 12.1], or the “sensible” or “weaker” versions of environmental sustainability which mark a grey-green text [indicator GG 12.1]. I propose to focus here only on Vision 2030's view of wildlife. Biodiversity views will be considered in this Chapter's section 5.2.6.

From the text, it is clear that the view of wildlife is as an “industry” to be managed (Wildlife and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 12th bullet point). *Absent* in the innocent 2nd paragraph of p. 152 “There is a growing interest among tourists ... to visit the seal colonies ...” is the commercial clubbing of seals, annually protested by animal rights activists (<http://www.boycottnamibia.co.za/> visited 16 August 2007). One may learn in a local newspaper from a coastal tourist lodge owner, that “the seal tours are between 10h00 and about 17h00, whereas the culling takes place in the early morning...He said by the time tourists can enter the reserve, there are no signs left that seals had been killed there” (*The Namibian*, Wednesday 25 July 2007, p. 3, Lodge says it's not organising seal hunt trips). The explicit support given to sport fishing, trophy hunting (p. 151), commercial game farming (p. 156, 1st column top left), and live game sales (p. 156, 1st column bottom left) would also be rejected out of hand by the animal rights view in seeing green (Chapter Three: 6.3.3). Here then the text fails to meet the radical seeing green indicator 13.3 i.c.w. wildlife:

Commercial, culling and sport hunting, trapping and related trade totally or partially condemned, except in cases of vital human need.

From a less radical, but still seeing green viewpoint, the text achieves at most grey-greenness for its wildlife conservation policies, for these appear to focus exclusively on wildlife's economic value for humans: investing in wildlife is advocated for its “resulting tourism development opportunities” (p. 151), recovering wildlife populations on land outside parks is advocated for its “economic opportunities” (p. 151, last paragraph), maintaining wildlife population integrity is advocated for its contribution to “national socio-economic development” (Sub-Vision, p. 152). Conservation policies in some cases would appear to distinguish between species which are “economically important” (Wildlife

and Tourism summary box, Where we want to be (2030), 14th bullet point), and those which are not. A thoroughly anthropocentric, and instrumental view of wildlife, which accords with grey-green indicator GG 12.1 when the *For whom* is the wildlife to be sustained question is answered as unequivocally as it is here – for example in the Objective on page 157: “To advance sustainable management of wildlife ... for the social and economic well-being of the people of Namibia”. Particularly the instrumental-only concern for economically important species strikes me as an example of naturism [seeing green indicator 1.3]. I would take this section of Vision 2030 then to mean that it tends towards a “sensible” or “weaker” environmental sustainability approach.

5.2.4 Fisheries and marine resources (pp. 157-161)

Namibia’s marine species and habitats significantly contribute to the economy without threatening biodiversity or the functioning of natural ecosystems, in a dynamic external environment. (p. 158).

No indicator was developed to assess the greenness or otherwise of the fisheries and marine resources objectives and strategies proposed here. It could probably be developed inter alia by starting with Die Grünen’s early views on the fishing industry (1980b, Section II, 7.3, p. 13).

The by-now well-established economic **view of nature** continues in this section, with phrases such as “commercially exploitable fish species” (p. 157), “maximum sustainable yields of fish stocks”(p. 157), as well as “marine species and habitats significantly contribute to the economy” in the Sub-Vision (p. 158). The value “healthy” in nature continues to be understood as *economically* productive: “... as a result of poor management, overexploitation of some of the most productive fisheries occurred.” (p. 157). Pollution is to be strictly controlled for example for this will lead to “increased exportation of high value fish and increased mariculture opportunities” (Where we want to be (2030), the Fisheries and Marine Resources summary box on p. 159).

There is one brief glimpse of a green concern for those fish species not possessing high economic value in the 3rd bullet point at the top of page 158 (my italics): “Fishermen inadvertently kill and *waste* large numbers of marine species when they target one economically valuable species”. One million sharks are for example caught in Namibian waters as “bycatches” (*The Namibian*, Tuesday 24 July 2007, p. 5, Namibia to host fisheries secretariat). The Things to avoid list in the Fisheries and Marine Resources summary box on p. 159 continues this concern: “The targeting of by-catch species and any activities that threaten marine biodiversity or cause pollution”.

Continued use of the phrase “efficiency” (3rd par. Under Vision 2030 section 5.2.4, repeated at the top of page 161), and the use of “cost-effective” (14th bullet point under Strategies on p. 161) leaves clues to/traces of economic instrumental rationality - a preferred **epistemology** in a grey-green text [GG 5.1], and problematized in seeing green [indicator 5.1].

5.2.5 Non-renewable resources (pp. 162-164)

Namibia’s mineral resources are strategically exploited and optimally benefited, providing equitable opportunities for all Namibians to participate in the industry, while ensuring that environmental impacts are minimised, and investments resulting from mining are made to develop other, sustainable industries and human capital for long-term national development. (p. 162).

Economic instrumental rationality continues here to be this text’s preferred **epistemology**, as in this section’s Objective (p. 164, my italics): “To *exploit* Namibia’s non-renewable resources *optimally* and equitably for the benefit of all”.

Indicator 14.2.2 relating to non-renewable resources can be usefully applied to this Sub-Vision and its discussion. This indicator, which assumes the existence of natural resource accounting, asks whether, as part of its keeping track of the stocks and flows of natural capital, depletion schedules exist for non-renewable resources [such as minerals], and whether steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, that suitable substitutes are provided.

Now, we have seen that natural resource accounts do exist for Namibia's minerals (section 5.2.2. of this Chapter), but I do not propose to enquire into their exact status, or whether or not they meet this indicator. What is clear from the wording of Sub-Vision 5.2.5, is that the non-renewable resources policy it advocates, allows us to answer the *What?* question of environmental sustainability [GG 12.1]. There is clear substitutability of 'natural' and 'human' capital here: "...while ensuring that ... investments resulting from mining are made to develop other, sustainable industries and human capital ..." (p. 162). Even the weaker environmental sustainability approach problematizes substitutability between the various types of capital beyond a certain point [indicator GG 12.1a], a point which can only be established through full-scale natural resource accounting. The Sub-Vision also answers the *For whom?* question: "... for long-term national development" [of people] (p. 162). The *For how long?* question is implicitly answered too, for this text's understanding of long-term is 30 years. Putting all these answers together, again suggests that this text tends towards a "sensible" or "weaker" version of environmental sustainability [indicator GG 12.1].

Absent in this section's discussion of non-renewable resources, is any problematization of the potential contribution of Namibia's uranium mining to nuclear technology (p. 162). This connection however exists in the political and public consciousness, as for example, in the opening sentence of an article which appeared in *The Namibian*, Tuesday 20 March 2007: "Namibia's progress towards the forefront of the global nuclear power industry has been accelerated by last week's opening of the Langer Heinrich Uranium Mine". The article notes further Namibian President Pohamba's statement that "Our Government advocates the use of uranium for peaceful purposes in countries where Namibian uranium is exported... the option to explore the peaceful use of nuclear fuel for power generation and other peaceful purposes should not be closed for Namibia¹⁸." (Elma Roberts, p. 14 under the title "Langer Heinrich heralds nuclear future"). But seeing green would problematize, or reject outright, *all* nuclear technology, on the grounds of its threat to the community of life, and its threat to civil liberties (indicator 12.5.4).

5.2.6 Biodiversity (pp. 164-170)

The integrity of vital ecological processes, natural habitats and wild species throughout Namibia is maintained whilst significantly supporting national socio-economic development through sustainable low-impact, high quality consumptive and non-consumptive uses, as well as providing diversity for rural and urban livelihoods. (p. 167).

Biodiversity/ecological process protection and environmental sustainability are interconnected. I regard this sub-section of Vision 2030 then, as a good indication of the kind of environmental sustainability it envisions – "stronger" or "weaker"? A key differentiating aspect of these two versions, is the value they accord to nature: instrumental or intrinsic or both? A strong statement of seeing green's

¹⁸ The World Energy Council, through the Ministry of Mines and Energy, commissioned a study to develop energy scenarios for Namibia until the year 2050. The report, titled *Namibian Energy Policy Scenarios until Year 2050*, investigates, inter alia, nuclear energy as an option for Namibia. However, "given the current technical standards, uncertain fuel supply and economic parameters and conditionalities, nuclear energy was regarded as unfeasible and was thus not included in Namibia's energy mix until 2050.". The report, submitted to the WEC in July 2007, is currently under review and not yet available in the public domain (written communication from Robert W Schultz, Energy Desk Coordinator, Desert Research Foundation of Namibia, 31 August 2007)

commitment to ecocentric biodiversity protection and environmental sustainability is found in the deep ecology platform¹⁹ (Chapter Four: 1.3.4.1), but specifically in its first few points:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life *requires* a smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
6. Policies must therefore be changed....”


On the seeing green view, environmental sustainability is an end-value, a value-in-itself value, not an instrumental value only. So, as always, the key questions to keep in mind in trying to understand whether a text follows a predominantly stronger [seeing green indicator 12.1] or weaker version of environmental sustainability are: What is to be sustained, For whom? and For how long? One could also ask the question *How?* I think. The answer to this question represents for me, the conceptual nature ethic guiding the policies – is it similar to seeing green kinds such as biospherical egalitarianism, reciprocity, care [seeing green indicator 10.3], or is it perhaps the more grey-green conservation and stewardship [GG 10.3] approach? So, while reading through what this section of Vision 2030 has to say on biodiversity, let us keep these four questions in mind.

□ Namibia’s biodiversity and wildlife resources (p. 164)

This section highlights that the high prevalence of endemic species shown to exist so far in Namibia, is located in the Namib Desert and in the pro-Namib transition zone. This is depicted in Figure 14 next:

¹⁹ Glasser (1997, p. 74, in Chapter Four: 1.4.3.1) calls the platform “a radical, activist-oriented series of principles for ecological sustainability”

Figure 14: Namibia's high endemism in biodiversity (ex GRN, 2002c, Theme 6, Figure A3.2, p. 33)



□ The critical importance of Namibia's wildlife resources (p. 164)

The answer to the *For whom* are species useful? question in this paragraph is *For people*, directly and indirectly. This is stated explicitly: “only some species are directly useful to humans”, and implied I suggest, in the matching “indirect benefits” [to humans]”. Species are seen as resources and functions for humans: food, fibre, medicine, tourism opportunities. Ecosystems are valued for what they can do for humans: “vital genetic material ... that is regularly required to enhance domestic crop and livestock species” (p. 164). The last sentence under the heading “The critical importance of Namibia's wildlife

resources”, on the benefits of ecosystem functions “These include the provision of life sustaining air, water and productive soils”, appears to be cast homocentrically too: *productive* soils.... But perhaps there might be, in the phrase “all species, even those that are too small to see, are of ecological importance” a hint of recognition of nature’s value-for-itself?

□ Biodiversity loss (pp. 164-165)

There is another implicit answer to the For whom? question in this paragraph too, in the form of “future generations” (p. 164). We can safely assume this means future *human* generations, because the loss is described as “vulnerability to drought, floods and other extreme events” which in turn threaten food supplies, sources of wood and medicines, the ability of rural communities to sustain themselves (p. 164). The viewpoint is homocentric. It is the *exclusive* focus on nature’s value for humans which makes this section non-green. I can find no clue to/trace of the idea that nature also has value-for-itself, an essential part of the seeing green both/and approach:

1. The well-being and flourishing of human *and* non-human life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. (Point 1 of the deep ecology platform, Chapter Four: 1.3.4.1, my italics).

Another clue to/trace of this section’s grey-greenness lies in its approach to addressing the problem of biodiversity loss: answers will be found not in re-conceptualizing the pathological [on seeing green’s view] human-nature relationship, but in managerial techniques such as “secure and exclusive tenure” (2nd par. on p. 165), “intersectoral policy co-ordination” (2nd par. on p. 165), and “effective management” (3rd par. on p. 165). The seeming suggestion in the second paragraph that something needs to be done about reducing human population pressure [a seeing green demand] to prevent biodiversity loss for its own sake, is, in the context of the discussion of section 4.1.1 of Vision 2030 on population (section 4.1.1 of this Chapter 11), really an instrumental-only view.

In the third paragraph of page 165 is also a clue to/trace of the **conceptual ethic** guiding biodiversity protection: “The successful *conservation*...”. The word choice “conservation” is meaning-full, and harks back to the early philosophical divide in environmentalism, discussed in Chapter Two. As noted in Chapter Nine: 7.3.1, conservation was, from its beginnings, an anthropocentric, utilitarian nature ethic. In the World Conservation Strategy (IUCN/UNEP/WWF 1980), conservation is defined as “the management of human use of the biosphere so that it may yield the greatest sustainable benefit to present generations while maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of future generations” (Naess, 1990, in Engel & Engel, 1990, p. 89). It is the environmental ethic upheld in key United Nations sustainable development texts such as the Rio Declaration (1992), and Agenda 21 (1992), to which Namibia subscribes (Vision 2030, p. 14, A Basic Principle).

Both these UN system documents subscribe to, rather than critique, anthropocentrism [seeing green indicator 1.1]. As its first principle, the Rio Declaration places *human beings* at the centre of sustainable development (principle 1). It then considers human development “a right” (principle 3); confirms eradicating poverty as an “indispensable requirement” for sustainable development “in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living” (principle 5). While noting that peace, development and environmental protection are “indivisible” (principle 25), environmental protection is nevertheless *subsumed under* the development process (principle 4). Thus, on my interpretation, further principles relating directly to the natural environment (principle 7) or to legislative/managerial measures for protecting it, are also subsumed under the objective of sustainable *human* development (cited text from Quarrie, 1992, pp. 11-13). Environmental ethicist Atfield (2003, p. 154, footnote 2) considers the Rio Declaration to represent an “explicitly anthropocentric posture”.

The anthropocentric approach to nature in Agenda 21 is essentially captured, in my view, in the title to its Section II: “Conservation and management of resources for development” (Quarrie, 1992, p. 96 and index to Agenda 21, p. v). There is in Agenda 21, one brief lapse from the otherwise consistently instrumental view of nature as storehouse of goods and services for humankind. It appears in the foreword by Maurice Strong, then Secretary-General to UNCED, and key author of the altogether more ecocentrically-inclined Earth Charter²⁰: “ A new world order, as we move into the 21st century, must unite us all in a global partnership – which always recognizes and respects the transcending sovereignty of nature, of our only one Earth” (Quarrie, 1992, p. 9).

The United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000, to which Namibia has subscribed, also adopts an anthropocentric, conservation ethic for nature. The following extract shows that its “respect for nature” is grounded not on nature’s intrinsic value, or value-for-itself (the ecocentric view), but on nature’s instrumental value for humans:

“ I. Values and principles

... 6. We consider certain fundamental values to be essential to international relations in the twenty-first century. These include: ...

Respect for nature. Prudence must be shown in the management of all living species and natural resources, in accordance with the precepts of sustainable development. Only in this way can the immeasurable riches provided to us by nature be preserved and passed on *to our descendants*. The current unsustainable patterns of production and consumption must be changed *in the interest of our future welfare and that of our descendants*.” (United Nations General Assembly A/Res/55/2 18 September 2000; my italics).

Absent however from Vision 2030 is any reference at all to the idea of either “respect for nature” or the stewardship ethic, which the Millennium Declaration embraces:

“IV Protecting our common environment

.... 23. We resolve therefore to adopt in all our environmental actions, a new ethic of conservation *and stewardship*....” (United Nations General Assembly A/Res/55/2 18 September 2000; my italics)

It is not that these ethical ideas in the context of nature are unknown in Namibia. They appear explicitly in Namibia’s strategic plan on biodiversity and development, in its basic principle 2:

“2. Namibia’s thousands of life forms ... warrant our *respect and stewardship*, whether or not they are of direct use to us.” (GRN, ca. 2000, p. 23, my italics).

Vision 2030s silence on stewardship as the UNs most recent (but still anthropocentric) nature ethic (Chapter Nine: 7.3.2) is intriguing. However, I am at a loss even to surmise the reasons for this absence.

The last sentence of the 3rd paragraph (p. 165, my italics) contains a glimpse of another **view of the human-nature relationship**:

“The successful conservation of this entire area ... will depend ... on the establishment of a cross-boundary conservation zone, linking *unspoiled habitats* and some of the ...”.

As one can only assume that people have been responsible for the “spoiling” occurring elsewhere, the text misses here, an opportunity to review what it also seems to believe implicitly, that the existing human-nature relationship is abusive.

²⁰ Submitted in draft form to the Rio Summit in 1992, finalized only in 2000 outside the UN system, and still not recognized at the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, 2002 (<http://www.earthcharter.org/> visited 2 June 2006)

Lastly, the *For how long* question is here answered differently, in the sense that “future generations” clearly means to convey a longer time frame than the one generation so far implied in the Vision 2030 text.

□ The importance of wildlife harvesting to subsistence economies (p. 165)


The answer to the *For whom* question here is *people*. The protection of the traditional way of life of subsistence communities is a seeing green value, in as far as the communities are still practising their traditional ways of ensuring environmental sustainability. There is common ground then between the seeing green view, and the sentence which closes this section: “There is no conflict between using natural resources and the notion of conservation, provided that resources are used sustainably and equitably” (p. 165).

□ Contribution of protected areas to wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection (pp. 165-166)

Vision 2030 sees protected areas as “the principal means of maintaining essential ecological functions and conserving biodiversity and *scenic areas*” (p. 165, my italics, to mark this phrase as **a view of nature**). If one were in doubt as to the answer to the *For whom?* question, it is supplied in the next sentence: “for tourism, capture for resale, research and education” (p. 165).

One can relate this paragraph’s biodiversity maintenance strategy to seeing green indicator 12.4.1: Large areas of “free nature” set aside from human techno-industrial progress? Figure 15 next, taken from the Theme 6 report, shows land intended to be protected through parks and conservancies to maintain biological diversity:

Figure 15: Existing and proposed land to maintain biological diversity (Vision 2030 Theme 6 report, Fig. A3.4, p. 38)



The deep ecology concept (Chapter Four: 4.1.4) of “free nature” in seeing green indicator does *not* mean “wilderness”. By “wilderness”, Naess understands areas where people do not live, and resource extraction is prohibited. He uses the terms “near-wilderness” or “free nature”, (for example, in Sessions, 1995, p. 69) to mean, “areas of relatively sparse human habitation ... where wild natural processes are still essentially intact and dominant”. The human habitation, if present, is “nonexploitative bioregional living”, and/or traditional tribal living, which has minimum impact on wild ecosystems (Sessions, 1992, in Sessions, 1995, p. 366).

However, mineral prospecting, and mining, the latter surely a prime example of extractive techno-industrialism, is permitted in land areas which are already, or will become, protected areas for the maintenance of biodiversity. Figures 16 and 17 next, if compared with Figure 15 above showing existing/proposed parks and conservancies, make this clear:

Figure 16: Mines and prospecting licences in Namibia (Vision 2030 Theme 6 report, Figure A5.1, p. 64)





Figure 17: Land use: mining concessions (Vision 2030 Theme 6 (GRN, 2002b), Figure A4.1, p. 51)



Vision 2030 also notes that mining continues to be allowed in protected areas, at least presumably until the zoning referred to in the Things to do list (1st bullet) of the summary box Non-renewable Resources (p. 163) is in place. This approach is not without its critics: Tarr, co-author of the Theme 6 report (2002c), notes in a subsequent paper (2007 June, in preparation, p. 1) that

As a developing country, Namibia understandably wants to reap benefits from all aspects of its resource base, and there are as yet no signs that government is prepared to ban mining in areas of high conservation, tourism or scientific value. This is in spite of the fact that it has stated its intention in the Constitution to place great value on the conservation and wise management of living and non-living natural resources....

Further exacerbating factors noted by Tarr (2007 in prep) are “Ineffective use of Impact Assessment tools... because they are either not done, are poor quality or done too late in the planning process, and/or the results of EAs [Environmental Assessments] are simply ignored in decision making” (Assessment of challenges, p. 11). Nor is the Environmental Management Bill which will inter alia manage the environmental impacts of mining, yet promulgated (September 2007), despite Namibia’s commitment to the principles of Agenda 21 (Vision 2030, p. 14, A Basic Principle), and years of discussions (Chapter Ten, section 1.1.4).

From this, I argue that Vision 2030, even if it does intend setting aside large areas of “free nature” as protected areas, does not fully meet the seeing green indicator of protecting them from human techno-industrial progress. A weaker [GG 12.1], rather than stronger version of environmental sustainability seems predominant.

□ Conservation outside protected areas: conservancies and CBNRM initiatives (p. 166)

Land area protected to maintain biological diversity also includes the setting aside of a fixed percentage of land under conservancy protection. Namibia has included the percentage of land registered as communal and private conservancies as one of its indicators of its progress towards meeting Millennium Development Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability (Figure 13 in this Chapter). The location of existing and planned communal conservancies can be seen in Figure 15 above.

Taking a closer look now at Vision 2030s discussion of “Targets for community based natural resource management” (pp. 154-156), it is clear that the protection for natural resources offered within the CBNRM programme for land and its resources [biodiversity] is *exclusively* for people – “Communal area residents” (e.g. p. 155, Table 5.1, row 4, columns 3 and 4).

This anthropocentric orientation persists in documents related to the Strengthening the Protected Area Network (SPAN) project. This Ministry of Environment and Tourism project is funded by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and is designed as three phases, covering the period 2004 - 2016. It is referred to in Vision 2030 on page 150, 6th bullet, in the context of a discussion of natural wetlands and river systems. Although the SPAN website refers to improved park management in Namibia as its main aim, improved protected area management would be a better description. In turn, such improved management “...is expected to significantly contribute to the national and local *economy* through park tourism” (www.span.org.na visited 30 July 2007, follow Project link, my italics). The **view of nature** here as a tourism product was already discussed under Vision 2030s section 5.2.3 Wildlife and tourism (pp. 150-157).

Lastly one can note that the **epistemology** of economic rationality dominant throughout this text so far, continues in this biodiversity section, replete with economic-speak such as “competitiveness” “efficient” and cost-effective” (for example, Summary box Biodiversity, p. 168, Things to do, 9th bullet, and 3rd bullet). The key-term “cost-effective” brings up the question of discounting, which as conveyed in Chapter Nine: 3.4.3.4-3.4.3.6, is seen by ecological economists as comprising ethical choices made on behalf of future economic agents. Ecological [as opposed to neo-classical environmental] economists advocate a zero, or close-to-zero discount rate in cost-benefit analyses of nature-based enterprises which will affect future generations. Discussions with a resource economist in the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism however, indicate that the Ministry has set a standard 8% discount rate in cost-benefit analyses related to proposed nature-based enterprises (oral communication, Dr Jonathon Barnes, resource economist in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 26 July 2007). This would be at odds then with seeing green indicator 14.14: More than one future human generation included in economic decisions?

There is also a clue to/trace of the mechanist **ontology** which frequently accompanies economic rationality as epistemology in the concept of “economic instruments” in the opening sentence of Strategies, (b), p. 169.

A closing thought on nature’s value-for-itself vis-a-vis Vision 2030s **view of nature**. The idea of nature’s having value-for-itself is not unknown in Namibian government policy. It is explicitly stated in Namibia’s ten-year strategic plan of action for sustainable development through biodiversity

conservation 2001-2010 (GRN, ca. 2000). Its Part A contains, on pp. 22-23, the biodiversity strategy's goal, and fifteen fundamental principles. While the goal is homocentric, and the valuing of nature anthropocentric:

The goal of the Government of the Republic of Namibia through this strategic plan is to protect ecosystems, biological diversity and ecological processes, through conservation and sustainable use, thereby supporting the livelihoods, self-reliance and quality of Namibians in perpetuity (p. 22),

one of the fifteen fundamental principles contains an explicit reference to nature's value-for-itself:

2. Namibia's thousands of life forms *have intrinsic value* and importance, and warrant our respect and stewardship, whether or not they are of direct use to us. (p. 23, my italics).

Such explicit recognition in Vision 2030 is absent. There *might* be muted suggestions of it in phrases such as "Recognise that wildlife tourism on communal land is a valid land-use option with high potential to combat poverty, stimulate rural development *and* conserve biodiversity" (p. 168, Summary box Biodiversity, 2nd bullet under Things to do, my italics), or in the Sub-Vision "the integrity of vital ecological processes, natural habitats and wild species throughout Namibia is maintained *whilst* significantly supporting national socio-economic development..." (p. 167, my italics), or in the phrase "Extended and well managed protected areas network to include biodiversity 'hotspots'.." (summary box, p. 168, "Where we want to be (2030)", 6th bullet), but these are drowned out by a strident chorus of anthropocentric voices. Or, to change the metaphor, one could conjecture that the idea *might* be there, cunningly concealed beneath a grey-green economic cloak, so as to slip it by the Namibian decision-makers unnoticed. Given that the national biodiversity strategy explicitly recognizes the concept of nature's value-for-itself, one can only conclude that its *absence* in Vision 2030 is deliberate.

5.3 The urban environment (pp. 170-173)

Despite high growth rates, Namibia's urban areas will provide equitable access to safety, shelter, essential services and innovative employment opportunities within an efficiently managed, clean and aesthetically pleasing environment. (p. 171).

This Sub-Vision and its discussion is not directly related to the five questions being asked of the Vision 2030 Main document text, and so is not discussed in any detail.

I note in passing though some aspects which do provide clues to/traces of this section's worldview:

(i) the many references to Agenda 21 (on p. 170, 6th paragraph of section 5.3, and p. 173, Strategies (e), 1st bullet, for example) as guide for local authorities [not the same as seeing green's "community"]. Agenda 21 is generally agreed to represent a "strong" anthropocentric **human-nature relationship** position (Hattingh, 2002, p. 11). Its tendency towards reform environmentalism rather than radical ecologism is reflected in Vision 2030s section 5.3, in its emphasis on planning (p. 170, 1st paragraph under section 5.3), policies, legislation, and management (p. 173, Strategies)

(ii) The tendency to employ mechanistic metaphors [rejected in seeing green indicator 1.4] continues in phrases such as legislation as "planning *tool*" (p. 170, 5th paragraph under section 5.3, my italics), and is another clue to/trace of a mechanist **ontology**.

The section is not all grey-greenness though. There is a **view of nature** in the city as "green spaces" (p. 171, 4th paragraph) instead of the usual sources, sinks and services approach. The bicycle-friendly approach advocated in the Summary box (p. 172, things to do, 5th bullet) is also green in its desire to lessen climate change (though a reference here to the energy-saving aspect of bicycles would have been an additional green feather in the Vision 2030 cap). So is the emphasis on accountability,

decentralization, partnership, and caring in Strategies (e) and (f) on p. 173. Though a whole series of indicators would apply to assessing the green-ness of this sub-section, one could perhaps begin with seeing green indicator 15.7: Re-integrated, ecologically-harmonious human habitat spatial planning.

6.0 Vision 2030 chapter 6: Creating the enabling environment (pp. 174-216)

As indicated in its opening paragraph, chapter 6 of Vision 2030 covers a variety of topics which it describes as “the necessary conditions for the realization of sustainable development” (p. 174, 2nd paragraph), specifically, “democratic governance, peace and political stability; national, global and regional security; regional integration; international relations; development cooperation; and globalisation.” (p. 174).

With the exception of its section 6.1 on sustainable development, most of the topics covered in chapter 6 of Vision 2030 do not relate directly to the five questions being asked of the text. I propose then a different approach in reading and discussing chapter 6. The focus of my discussion will be sub-section 6.1, Sustainable development. I then group together, and discuss together, what seem to me the related “necessary conditions” of 6.2 International relations (pp. 179-184), 6.4 Peace and security (pp. 187-190), and 6.5 Regional integration (pp. 190-197). This is followed by discussion of topic 6.3 Development Co-operation, and thereafter, in numerical order, the topics of Globalisation (6.6), Democratic governance (6.7), Decentralisation (6.8), and Responsible Decision-making (6.9).

In the discussion of all these topics, I continue the approach taken so far in my assessment of the text. That is, whether or not they relate directly to the five questions being asked, I continue to be alert to any presences/absences, and “clues to/traces of” their worldview. And I continue too, my assessment of the coverage and depth of the seeing green indicators.

6.1 Sustainable development (pp. 175-179)

Namibia develops a significantly more equitable distribution of social well-being, through the sustainable utilization of natural resources in a mixed economy, characteristic of higher income countries, primarily through stronger growth and poverty-reduction. (p. 177)

This study never claimed to be an in-depth study of the concept of sustainable development (Chapter Nine). But what is noticeable in this Vision 2030 discussion of the concept, are some crucial *absences*. The standard, and bland, definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present, without limiting the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” is presented at the beginning of the section (p. 175). It remains silent over the differing versions available: Jacobs (1995, in Chapter Nine: 7.2.1) “faultlines of contestation” distinguishing more radical from more conservative understandings, or Hattingh’s (2002) four ideologically-differing versions. While the Vision 2030 chapter 6 discussion notes that sustainable development calls for environmental protection, there is no suggestion that this too, comes in stronger and weaker versions (Chapter Nine: 3.4.1), a key differentiating factor being the accordance, or not, of value-for-itself to nature. These absences naturalize (strong) anthropocentrism through silence.

What explicit statements, or traces of/clues to does this section’s discussion of 14 key threats to sustainable development in Namibia (pp. 175-177), its summary box (p. 178), Objective (p. 179), and Strategies (p. 179) provide on the five questions being posed to this text?

(a) **The good life** continues to be that of “higher income countries” (Vision 2030, Sub-Vision, p. 177). Primarily stronger economic growth (Sub-Vision on p. 177) is going to get us there. Centric

industrialization (which got these countries to where they currently are) is problematized in threat (iii) as “inappropriate” if it does not “make optimal use of Namibia’s comparative advantages” (p. 175). Its negative effects will be addressed by “preparing economically and ecologically rational development plans” (p. 179, Strategies, 5th bullet). Entirely absent here, or elsewhere in the text, is the seeing green cultural critique of industrialism [indicator 2.1.2]. Threat (vii) agrees with the green view that wealth and “excessively consumptive lifestyles” (p. 176) push us closer to our ecological limits. However, not a rethink of our worldview and its values [seeing green indicator 18.1], which even weak anthropocentrist Bryan Norton demands (Chapter Nine: 6.3.1), but “policy incentives” will address this issue.

(b) Two **views of nature** can be seen in this sub-section. The one in the Summary Box on p. 178, under the heading, Where we want to be (2030), is, for want of a better description, an ecology-as-science description:

- Healthy, productive land with effective water and mineral cycling, leading to infrequent, low-level drought and flooding.
- Farms and natural ecosystems are productive, diverse, stable and sustainable – socially, economically and ecologically.
- Forests, savannas, deserts, wetlands, coastal and marine ecosystems are open, diverse, stable and productive.

Reality is predominantly seen as “natural resource capital” (p. 178, summary box on Sustainable Development, Things to do, 4th bullet; p. 179 Objective; p. 179, Strategies, 6th bullet), for human benefit. For example,

- population growth is seen as a threat (i), not because it diminishes other species’ opportunities for self-realization, flourishing and well-being, but because it means increased demand amongst people (Namibians) for natural resources (p. 175)
- biodiversity loss (iv) “impacts on our development options” and threatens “our [humans] very survival” (p. 176)
- the land’s low productive capability will be further degraded if the “open access” and lack of tenure problems are not dealt with (v). The use of words and phrases such as “conflict”, “incentives for people” and “dissipation of net benefits”(p. 176) marks this approach to nature as homocentric.

But in this statement, on p. 179:

Objective

To achieve the development of Namibia’s ‘Natural Capital’ for the benefit of the country’s social, economic and ecological well-being.

might there be, again concealed within a grey-green environmental economic cloak, a hint of clear green in the idea that Namibia’s natural capital is to be developed for its *own* well-being?

(c) The partnership **ethic** which is strongly emphasized in this sub-section (for example, p. 175, 1st bullet under the heading 6.1 Sustainable Development; p. 178, summary box Sustainable Development, Where we want to be (2030), first three bullets), fails to include the seeing green partnership with nature [criterion 10 description]. Indeed, *any* conceptualization at all of **an ethic for nature** is absent in this section. Not even a lack of commitment to the customary grey-green ethical approach of conservation is listed as a threat to sustainable development.

(d) The **human-nature relationship** is explicitly instrumental. In the wording of the Sub-Vision (p. 177), *Namibians* will achieve a more equitable distribution of social well-being “through the sustainable utilization of natural resources”.

(e) A “**serious environmental and nature policy**”. What is striking about threat (xiv) is the *acceptance* of climate change it seems to convey (p. 177). This intuition is confirmed in the last bullet point of Strategies (p. 179), which is “Preparing for the adverse impacts of climate change”. There is no indication here of seeing green’s normative understanding of ecology. I read these two references to climate change as a pragmatic invitation to “adapt or die”, rather than as a challenge to reverse a *morally* wrong situation. This is a clue to/trace of the kind of reform environmentalism which seeing green rejects [seeing green indicator 11.3].

As part of this reform environmentalism approach however, Namibia is signatory to several key multi-national environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Framework Convention on Climate change and its associated protocols (GRN, 2002c, Appendix 5, p. 118; p. 119 in electronic text), even though this is not mentioned in Vision 2030. Participation in global control measures to promote natural environment protection is a seeing green indicator [12.8].

There are some other clues to/traces in this section, of other aspects of the text’s worldview that I would like to note. One is an alternative to this text’s usual economic rationality as **epistemology** approach which appears in threat (xii) on page 177:

Rapid modernisation threatens the survival of valuable traditional knowledge and practices in Namibia. Traditional knowledge is seldom acknowledged as providing any contribution to development - despite the fact that it is often better suited, than Eurocentric technology, to conditions in Namibia.

This is a clear seeing green view [indicator 5.2]. To the extent that it also values *women’s* local knowledge in development, it is practically an ecofeminist view (Chapter Six: 3.4 and 6.3).

There are again signs of an underlying mechanist **ontology** in the use of a keyword such as “mechanisms” in the summary box Sustainable Development, p. 178, Things to do, 2nd bullet. The editors could just as easily have used words such as “modes” or “approaches”, but didn’t. The biodiversity loss which in threat (iv) “*impacts* on our development options” (p. 176) is another mechanistic metaphor.

6.2 International relations (pp. 179-184), 6.4 Peace and security (pp. 187-190), and 6.5 Regional integration (pp. 190-197)

A new international order, has been established based on sovereign equality of nations, where sustainable development, peace and human progress is ensured. (Sub-Vision for 6.2 International Relations, p. 182)

Collective regional and international peace and security have been accomplished (Sub-Vision for 6.4 Peace and Security, p. 188)

Namibia enjoys full regional integration in terms of socio-economic and political structures through effective supra-national organisations. (Sub-Vision for 6.5 Regional Integration, p. 192).

I propose to deal with these three sub-sections together, as they are closely related. None of the Sub-Visions and their discussion is directly related to the five questions being asked of the Vision 2030 (Main document) text, and so are not discussed in any detail. Their green-ness could be assessed for

example, in terms of green values such as egalitarianism and partnership [seeing green indicator 11.1], its more radical critique of statism and nationalism as expressions of the idea of hierarchy and the value of power-over [seeing green indicator 1.2], as well as seeing green's demands for non-violence, and radical peace [seeing green criterion 16]. I note again though, that references to “military hardware”, and “well-trained and well-equipped army” (p. 189, summary box Peace and security, “Things to do” 1st bullet point, and “Where we want to be (2030)”, 3rd bullet point) mark this text as falling short of the radical green understanding of non-violence and peace.

One lack to note here in the seeing green criteria list are indicators on the kind of monetary agreements discussed in section 6.5 Regional Integration. Policies on this real-world issue were only at a developmental stage in early Die Grünen political programmes (Die Grünen, 1980b, p. 10; Die Grünen, 1983a, pp. 28-30).

I also wish to note two presences and absences, clues to/traces of, which might help in constructing one version of Vision 2030s worldview:

The first is, further clues to/traces of the mechanist **ontology** already noted elsewhere:

The ‘Foreign Policy Response Model’ presented in Fig 6.1, is used to illustrate how Namibia could deal with the external challenges which will *impact* on the country in the years up to 2030, and which will *impact*, to a greater or lesser degree, on the attainment of the objectives set by Vision 2030 (p. 180, my italics).

Again I suggest that the editors could just as well have used words such as “affect” or “influence” instead of “impact”, but didn’t.

A further clue to/trace of this text’s mechanist ontology – often closely linked to economic rationality as epistemology - can be seen in the sentence immediately preceding the Sub-Vision on International Relations: “NEPAD will serve as a recovery development plan *and an economic engine.*” (p. 182, my italics). In the context of strategies to achieve peace and security, the first bullet point is: “Using collective security as an *instrument* of national security” (p. 190, my italics). Such word choices might appear inconsequential, but seeing green takes the ontological role of language in Self/Other relationships seriously [seeing green indicator 1.5].

The second is an indication that Namibia sees globalization, problematized in seeing green [indicator 2.1.1.c], as part of its view of **the good life**. The “best case” scenario (p. 194) for Namibia as far as economic integration is concerned, is that in the period 2025-2030 “Namibia is fully integrated into the global trading and financial system” (p. 197, 5th bullet point from top of page).

6.3 Development co-operation (pp. 184-187)

Namibia has achieved a level of transformation in the flow of development cooperation resources, and has advanced from a recipient of grant assistance to a provider of assistance to countries in need. (p. 185)

The green-ness of this Sub-Vision could be assessed against seeing green indicator 14.13: Fair [ethical] trade/development aid is practised. The thought in the sentence at the bottom of page 184 of Vision 2030, “...external assistance should not perpetuate dependency ...” is clearly green.

One sentence in this Sub-Vision’s discussion of development co-operation perhaps represents a “clue to/trace of” which might help in judging whether the Vision 2030 text meets one of the seeing green criteria for a “**serious environmental and nature policy**”, that is, criterion 12: Do policies place long-range, wide, ecological sustainability at least on par with social or economic sustainability”? Here it is:

“The main priority of development cooperation remains poverty reduction through economic growth. This can only be achieved... through sustainable development that is socially balanced... Environmental preservation is a new interest of the 1990’s. It is now integrated with development issues for commitment to sustainable development. (p. 185, first two paragraphs at the top of the page, my italics).

Despite Vision 2030s commitment to sustainable development which supposedly gives equal consideration to environmental, social and economic issues, the concept “development” frequently appears in this text without its qualifier “sustainable” – the best example being the sub-title of Vision 2030: “Policy framework for Long-term National Development”. And here, I feel, the balance between the three is tipped towards economic growth. Compare here too the first “faultline of contestation” in Jacobs (1995) understanding of conservative vis-a-vis radical sustainable development, which was discussed in Chapter Nine: 7.2.1:

Figure 18: Degree of environmental protection as faultline of contestation between conservative and radical sustainable development (Davidson’s (2000, p. 29) adaptation of Jacobs, 1995, pp. 4-5)

FAULT LINES OF CONTESTATION	CONSERVATIVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT	RADICAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
<i>Degree of Environmental Protection</i>	“Weak” Permits trade-offs between economic growth and protection	“Strong” Acknowledges intrinsic values in natural environment

We saw this trade-off clearly in that mining is allowed in areas which are, or will be, “protected” areas. Also, up till this point in the text, Vision 2030 has given no acknowledgement of intrinsic values in the natural environment. All this suggests to me that Vision 2030 tends rather, on this “faultline”, towards a conservative understanding of sustainable development.

There are continuing clues to/traces of a non-green mechanist **ontology**:

Another trend is the move towards decentralised cooperation, a political *instrument* that also creates a new financial approach. Government spending for development cooperation is then organised on a local rather than a central lever [level] (p. 185, my italics).

Though decentralization and local autonomy are strong green values, the green-ness is somewhat tarnished by being phrased as “a political instrument”.

6.6 Globalisation (pp. 197-200)

The benefits of technology, trade, investment and capital flows have contributed to a significant reduction in poverty in most regions of the world, and Namibia enjoys optimal participation and integration in the global village. (p. 198).

What traces of/clues to can this section provide on the five questions being posed to this text?

(a) First, the Sub-Vision (p. 198), and the mostly positive assessment of globalization in the three opening paragraphs of section 6.6 (p. 197), make clear that the text here supports a capitalist, free-market model of sustainable development. This naturalization of the free market sustainable development model is assisted by the text’s silence on alternative models, such as an “ecology” model, or “neo-Marxist” model (Elliott, 1994, pp. 107-112, in Chapter Nine: 7.1). Seeing green problematizes free-market, techno-industrialist models of development [criterion 2].

(b) An earlier **view of the good life** for Namibians as equivalent to “higher income countries” (Sub-Vision, p. 177) is here confirmed by the specific comment that “Globalisation would not bring Namibia to the level of the USA and Japan overnight” (p. 197). But seeing green argues that for developing countries to reach the levels of these industrial countries is simply impossible, given the planet’s ecological limits²¹, and developing countries’ lack of colonies to exploit [seeing green indicator 2.1.1.c]. Seeing green would also reject the values required for successful participation in globalization, such as the explicit mention of competition (p. 198, “competitive edge” in 1st paragraph; and “compete” on p. 199, summary box Globalisation, Things to do, 1st bullet, 6th bullet, p. 200, Strategies, last bullet point), and implied in economic values such as “exploit their comparative advantage” (p. 197, 1st paragraph under 6.6 Globalisation). The rational economic and instrumental, but un-ecological values (Chapter Nine: 3.1.2 footnote 18, 3.1.3) of “efficiency” (p. 197), and of “maximisation” (p. 199, summary box Globalisation, Things to do, 6th bullet) are also evident in this text. In short, this section of Vision 2030 actively seeks globalization (Objective, on p. 200), where seeing green would critique it [seeing green indicator 2.1.1.c].

6.7 Democratic governance (pp. 201-204), and 6.8 Decentralisation (pp. 204-208)

Namibia maintains, consolidates and extends the good governance practices of a multi-party democracy with high levels of participation, rights, freedoms and legitimacy (under the Constitution), which continue to serve as a model for other countries. (Sub-Vision for 6.7 Democratic Governance, p. 202).

Local communities and regional bodies are empowered, and are fully involved in the development process; they actually formulate and implement their respective development plans, while the national government - working hand in-hand with civil society organizations - provides the enabling environment (laws, policies, finance, security, etc.) for the effective management of national, regional and local development efforts. (Sub-Vision for 6.8 Decentralisation, p. 207).

These two issues are so closely linked, that they may be grouped together. Neither Sub-Vision relates directly to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, but both can be assessed by beginning with seeing green criterion 17: Grassroots [“direct”] democracy advocated? and its indicators, as well as indicator 11.2: Ecologically-informed, and/or post-hierarchical forms of political and socio-economic organization advocated?

Vision 2030 traces ruling party support-in-principle for the idea of decentralization as far back as 1989 (p. 205). Despite such early support, and intervening initiatives by the ruling party government, consultations in 1996 “revealed that decentralisation was not proceeding as expected” (p. 205, 4th paragraph). A decentralization policy was approved in 1997. A Decentralization Implementation Plan is currently [2004] “in its final draft form” (p. 206, last paragraph). May one attribute the painfully slow implementation of decentralization to lingering commitment to the idea of hierarchy, so critiqued in seeing green [criterion 1]?

6.9 Responsible decision-making (pp. 209-212)

Namibia’s goal is to promote and strengthen “smart partnerships” for sustainable development, to optimise her comparative and competitive advantages, and to generate and manage good quality information and knowledge by supporting and fostering active and critical science and research through well-structured national institutions, as well as in partnership with institutions abroad. (p. 210.)

²¹ Oskamp (2000a, p. 377, citing an estimate by Wackernagel & Rees (1996) notes that “increasing the rest of the world to the resource-use level of the United States and Canada would require the land and other natural resources of three Earths – an obviously impossible ambition”

Despite its title, this section is essentially about “smart partnerships”, and the value of information generated through “critical” science and research (Sub-Vision, p. 210) in promoting sustainable development. Partnership is a green value, so indicator 4.1, and criterion 10 would be relevant. On the seeing green view, partnership with nature would be amongst the smartest partnerships of all. But the discussion of partnership in section 6.9 falls short of green-ness in that it fails to include nature *as partner*. That is, nature does appear in the discussion as “clean and uncontaminated fish and meat”, “biological diversity”, “scenic diversity”, and “wilderness” (p. 209), but these are immediately placed into a homocentric and instrumental economic context to be “exploited” (p. 211, summary box Responsible Decision-making”, Where we want to be (2030), 2nd bullet; p. 212 Objectives, 1st bullet point; p. 212 Strategies, introductory sentence) as “comparative advantages” in a globalised market (p. 209, last sentence of first paragraph under 6.9).

One may note again, the **view of the good life** as that of the “Industrialised countries” which spend “up to 60% of their GDP, in one form or another, on science and technology.” (p. 210). Seeing green problematizes instrumental science and technology [indicator 2.1.4]. It is not clear whether this section’s call for “vibrant science and technology research, with particular attention to areas related to Namibia’s comparative advantages and development needs” (p. 211, summary box Responsible Decision-making”, Where we want to be (2030), 3rd bullet) is of the instrumental kind which seeing green problematizes. However, given the instrumental **view of nature** here as “comparative advantage”, it would seem so.

6.10 Institutional capacity for development (pp. 212-216)

Namibia has well-established democratic institutions that provide the enabling environment for effective participation of all citizens in modern social and economic development. In support of the process of capacity-building, the nation’s education system consists of public and private initiatives that, together respond adequately to the challenges of modern technologically developed and industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel. (p. 213).

This Sub-Vision does not relate directly to Vision 2030s human-nature relationship, and the related assessment criteria. Though its focus is on institutional capacity-building (p. 213, last paragraph before Sub-Vision), much of that depends on human capacity-building. The expression “human capital” has become so naturalized, that its origins in an economization of reality as **ontology** pass practically unnoticed. This **view of the human being** as capital to serve the industrial machine is confirmed in phrases such as “the nation’s education system consists of ... initiatives that respond adequately to the challenges of modern technologically developed and industrial society by producing all the required managerial, technical and professional personnel” (Sub-Vision, p. 213), and, “Uncoordinated educational policies cause over-production of graduates in disciplines that do not reflect the labour market signals for capacity” (p. 214, summary box Institutional capacity for development, Worst-case scenario, 2nd bullet point). This explicitly Homo *economicus* view of the human being may be compared with the seeing green re-conceptualization of the Self in criterion 8.

Now that the reading of the Vision 2030 text through seeing green glasses is completed, I reflect next on the relevance of the seeing green criteria, and the breadth and depth of their indicators.

7.0 Reflections on the “workability” of the criteria and their indicators

Thoughts on the reliability, validity and generalizability of the criteria and their indicators are presented in Chapter Ten, section 4.1. Here I reflect on the “workability” of the criteria: their relevance (7.1), the breadth of the indicators, and the depth of their discussion (7.2).

7.1 On the relevance of the criteria

All 18 green criteria could be related to terms, issues, and values appearing in the Vision 2030 Main Document (Cover to p. 216). Most of the indicators were useful too, as the table next shows:

Figure 19: Overview of criteria and indicators used

Green criterion 1 ✓	6.3 ✓	11.1.d ✓
1.1 ✓	6.4 ✓	11.2 ✓
[GG 1.1]	GG 6 ✓	11.2.1 ✓
GG 1.1.1 ✓		11.2.1.a
GG 1.1.2.f.iv ✓	Green criterion 7 ✓	11.2.1.b ✓
1.2 ✓	7.1 ✓	11.2.1.c ✓
1.3 ✓		11.2.2 ✓
1.4 ✓	Green criterion 8 ✓	11.3 ✓
1.5 ✓	8.1 ✓	GG 11.3 ✓
1.6.a ✓	8.1.1 ✓	
	8.1.2 ✓	Green criterion 12 ✓
Green criterion 2 ✓	8.1.3	12.1 ✓
2.1 ✓	8.2 ✓	GG 12.1 ✓
2.1.1 ✓	8.2.1	12.2 ✓
2.1.1.c ✓	8.2.2 ✓	12.3
2.1.2 ✓	8.2.3 ✓	12.4
2.1.3	8.2.4 ✓	12.4.1 ✓
2.1.4 ✓	8.2.5 ✓	12.4.2
2.2 ✓	8.2.6 ✓	12.4.3 ✓
GG 2.2 ✓		12.5 ✓
GG 2.2.1.c ✓	Green criterion 9 ✓	12.5.1
GG 2.2.2 ✓	9.1	12.5.2
GG 2.2.2.c ✓	9.2	12.5.3
	9.3 ✓	12.5.4
Green criterion 3 ✓	9.4 ✓	12.5.5
3.1 ✓	9.5	12.5.6 ✓
3.1.b ✓	9.6 ✓	12.6 ✓
3.1.c ✓		12.7 ✓
3.2 ✓	Green criterion 10 ✓	12.8 ✓
GG 3 ✓	[description of nature ethic] ✓	
	10.1 ✓	Green criterion 13 ✓
Green criterion 4 ✓	[10.2]	13.1
4.1 ✓	10.2.1	13.2 ✓
	10.2.2 ✓	13.3 ✓
Green criterion 5 ✓	10.3 ✓	13.4
5.1	GG 10.3 ✓	13.5
GG 5.1 ✓		
5.2 ✓	Green criterion 11 ✓	Green criterion 14 ✓
	11.1 ✓	14.1 ✓
Green criterion 6 ✓	11.1.a ✓	14.2 ✓
6.1	11.1.b ✓	14.2.1 ✓
6.2	11.1.c ✓	14.2.2

14.2.2.c ✓	14.14 ✓	16.3 ✓
14.3 ✓		
14.4 ✓	Green criterion 15 ✓	Green criterion 17 ✓
14.5 ✓	15.1	17.1 ✓
14.6 ✓	15.2 ✓	17.2 ✓
14.7 ✓	15.3 ✓	17.3 ✓
14.8	15.4 ✓	17.4 ✓
14.9 ✓	15.5 ✓	17.5 ✓
14.9.1 ✓	15.6 ✓	
14.9.2	15.7 ✓	Green criterion 18 ✓
14.10 ✓		18.1 ✓
14.11 ✓	Green criterion 16 ✓	18.2
14.12	16.1 ✓	18.3
14.13	16.2 ✓	

Some indicators could not be related to Vision 2030 at all - those which are not marked with a ✓ in the above table. I list next (7.2) for any reader for whom the seeing green criteria list appears useful, issues in Vision 2030 not covered by an indicator in the criteria list, and issues in Vision 2030 covered by an indicator and discussion, but not to any great depth:

7.2 On the breadth and depth of the indicators

Some issues encountered in *Namibia Vision 2030* are not covered by an indicator in the seeing green criterion list:

- 4.1.2 Migration and population distribution
- 4.1.3 Population age and sex distribution
- 4.1.3 Affirmative action
- 4.1.4 Water protection and use
- 4.3.1 Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
- 4.3.4 Early childhood development
- 4.4.1 Poverty reduction
- 4.4.3 Youth problems such as substance abuse, teenage pregnancies, HIV/AIDS and other negative health behaviour patterns, high unemployment rate
- 4.4.6 Orphans, orphanages, and fostering
- 4.4.8 National documentation vis-a-vis registration of vital events, and international migration
- 4.4.11 Family as expression of the ideas of hierarchy and patriarchy
- 5.2.2 Forestry
- 5.2.4 Fisheries
- 6.5 Monetary policy

Some issues are covered by an indicator, but the discussion on which the indicator was based could probably be deepened, depending on one's personal interest in the issue:

- 4.1.3, and 4.4.4 The elderly/senior citizens (indicator 15.5)
- 4.2.3 Employment and unemployment (indicators 14.9 and 14.10)
- 4.2.4 Gathering of population (personal) data by the State (indicator 17.4)
- 4.3.3 Education (indicator 8.2.6)

I make suggestions on further research on the criteria/indicators in Chapter Twelve, section 3. But I conclude here by re-iterating my confidence in the synthesis of seeing green in Chapter Eight, as well as its summary, repeated in section 1.1 of this chapter.

8.0 One version of *Namibia Vision 2030s* worldview, with focus on its human-nature relationship

It is Vision 2030s worldview, more specifically the green-ness of its assumptions on the human-nature relationship, which interests me, for these provide the *ultimate premises context* within which Vision 2030s policies and programmes on the natural environment are to be understood. I present briefly next what I see as one version of Vision 2030s worldview, based on the critical qualitative content analysis of this chapter. The discussion broadly follows the standard order in which worldview themes have been presented throughout this study.

8.1 Legitimizing narrative: the “good life” of London, Washington or Paris²²

The Doomsday Clock

The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’* Doomsday Clock conveys how close humanity is to catastrophic destruction--the figurative midnight--and monitors the means humankind could use to obliterate itself. First and foremost, these include nuclear weapons, but they also encompass climate-changing technologies ... Fossil-fuel technologies such as coal-burning plants powered the industrial revolution, bringing unparalleled economic prosperity to many parts of the world. ... Fifty years later, leading scientists agree that carbon-burning technologies continue to make Earth warmer at an unprecedented rate. ... The future looks even bleaker, as scientists continue to observe cascading effects on Earth’s complex ecosystems (<http://www.thebulletin.org/minutes-to-midnight/> retrieved 25 August 2007).



I find in *Namibia Vision 2030* no urgent sense of an impending ecological crisis, which provides the legitimacy for seeing green’s normative understanding of ecology [seeing green criterion 3], and linked demands for a radical re-conceptualization of the Self, Self–Other relationships, and an accordingly changed society. Even at real-world, political-party level, the early Grünen insisted that ecology must be the value within which all other values are to be understood:

“...Europe cannot remain trapped in the industrial society, which assesses all issues in economic terms. Europe’s future will be determined in future by ecology, not economy” (Die Grünen, 1979, p. 2, par.4).

Fundi Die Grünen Bahro argued (Chapter 7: 2.1.3.2.1) that “All experience shows that those who have less want to have the same as others, and essentially in the same form because it is the only one they can conceive” (Bahro, 1984, p. 147). This “form” was achieved through colonialism’s exploitation of people and nature. Western-type industrialism in the Third World/developing countries, he felt, would mean “poverty for whole generations and hunger for millions” (Bahro, 1984, p. 184), a “tunnel without an exit, because the living standard they are aiming for is no longer achievable” (Bahro, 1984, p. 211).

“We Greens consider it amongst our most important international tasks to remove here at home this destructive model of “the good life”, which lures the remainder of humanity into a tunnel without an exit” (Die Grünen, 1983b, p. 7).

But it is just that standard of living currently practised in countries in the “developed” world, and critiqued in seeing green [green criterion 2], which appears as legitimating narrative in Vision 2030:

The goal of our Vision is to improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030.... (Vision 2030, p. 9).

²² Bahro, 1984, p. 110

Even though Vision 2030 notes that

Namibia does not have to work through the development pathways followed by the current industrialised countries. Instead, by concentrating on skills development, services and its comparative advantages, Namibia can leap ahead to where currently developed countries are likely to be in 30 years. (p. 33, last bullet point of paragraph 2.10 Comparative advantages)

the route to progress which it recommends, remains industrialization. Its critique of industrialization is limited to extravagant water use (p. 77, 175), and a potential failure to make full use of economic comparative advantages (p. 175). Other unnamed negative impacts of industrialization are to be managed by “preparing economically and ecologically rational development plans” (p. 179). On Vision 2030’s view, industrialization will allow Namibia to participate in the international global capitalist market system. Industrialization in Vision 2030 is not only a means, but an end too (p. 38, Box 1, The Vision). Seeing green’s radical economic and cultural critique of industrialization is absent in *Namibia Vision 2030*, marking it in this respect, a grey-green rather than green text.

As in seeing green, there is in the Vision 2030 worldview, a definite *moral* content to the good life. Where seeing green condemns the pursuit of materialism and consumerism as morally bankrupt values [indicator 2.1.3], and prescribes renewed spirituality as motivation to personal and social transformation [criterion 4], Vision 2030 critiques Namibian society’s “moral degeneration” (p. 13) evident in high rates of teenage pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse, indecent assault, irresponsible parenthood, and undisciplined children (p. 133, p. 134). Western Christianity is to provide “the driving force” for “promoting a high sense of morality” in society (p. 132), “the maintenance of a just and morally upright society” (p. 40), and “the moral basis of our interpersonal dynamics, harmony and peaceful co-existence” (p. 40). The difference between seeing green and Vision 2030s view of morality, I see as threefold: first, spirituality in seeing green begins as an overwhelmingly *personal* experience, a “conversion” almost. Conversion leads to “conviviality”, that is, living in authentic community with other human beings, *and* with nature [indicator 4.1]. There is no connection in Vision 2030 between “a high sense of morality” and a changed relationship with nature. And, where seeing green problematizes the presence of the idea of hierarchy and patriarchy in both the western church and family as social institutions, Vision 2030 does not.

The sense of urgency in Vision 2030 is not to avert any impending ecological crisis brought about by an environmentally destructive and/or morally wanting view of the good life, but for Namibians to achieve western techno-industrialism. It is not that Vision 2030 ignores ecological concerns in achieving this version of the good life; it does not - the “ecologically rational plans” serve as example, even though they may be critiqued on seeing green grounds for their economic-instrumental rationality. It is that seeing green’s radical critique of western cultural ultimate premises on Self and Other – androcentrism, hierarchy, militarism, naturism, for example, is absent.

8.2 Its ultimate premises

8.2.1 Epistemology

Epistemology is the pair of glasses, if you will, through which we seek to know the world. Throughout this chapter, I have suggested that Vision 2030 implicitly places primacy on rationality as epistemology. The idea of rationality “is that there is one correct procedure” (Botzler & Armstrong, 1998, p. 49), and in the Vision 2030 text, non-green economic rationality [seeing green indicators 5.1, and GG 5.1] is this correct, and unproblematized, way of knowing. Seeing green critiques rationalism as primary way of knowing [seeing green criterion 5], on at least two grounds: for its undervaluing of subjectivity, emotion, intuition, empathy, sensitivity, involvement, and value-recognition in knowing (Chapter Eight: 3.1), and for the instrumental use of the Other – people and nature - which it legitimates.

8.2.2 Ontology

Through its grey-green rational epistemological glasses, I suggest that Vision 2030 on the one hand, tends to mechanize reality [It also economizes reality, as I note in 8.2.2.2]. Callicott (1986, pp. 302-303) describes the “received metaphysical foundations of the modern world view” as including “a fundamental ontology of atomic materialism” (p. 303), a “material, reductive, particulate, aggregative, mechanical, geometric, and quantitative paradigm”. Implicit in such a view, is the idea that one can reduce things to separate, replaceable, components which can be manipulated. Even though the science of ecology has shown that this is not an accurate ontological reflection of reality, it persists at implicit level in the Vision 2030 text. If this seems a far-fetched assessment, consider Vision 2030s use of metaphors such as “elements”, “driving force”, “critical mass”, “tools”, “instruments”, “leveraging” and “impacts”. Seeing green [indicators 1.4, 1.5, and 8.1 for example] critiques such mechanistic metaphors as indicative of a non-relational, and instrumental view of the Self/Other relationship.

8.2.2.1 View of nature

On the other hand, Vision 2030 describes nature in terms of ecosystems. The text itself provides no definition of an ecosystem. But it has been defined elsewhere by a member of the Consortium (Vision 2030, p. 234), which produced the Theme 6 report on natural resources (GRN, 2002c), as “A dynamic system of plant, animal (including humans) and micro-organism communities and their non-living physical environment interacting as a functional unit. The basic structural unit of the biosphere, ecosystems are characterised by interdependent interaction between the component species and their physical surroundings...” (Tarr, July 2007 in prep., Glossary of Terms). In Vision 2030, ideal ecosystems are described in strong green value terms such as open, stable, diverse, and complex [indicators 3.2.b, 3.2.c, 6.4].

This appears close to the seeing green’s organismic, holistic, purposive view of nature [criterion 6], except in one important respect: purposivity. Both the term, and the idea of purposivity - i.e. the autonomy of living beings pursuing their own agenda - is absent in Vision 2030s description of ecosystems. Instead, there is talk of “productivity”, which is consistently homocentrically economized, rather than seen as ecosystemic productivity-for-themselves. Ecosystems are basically presented as goods and services; sources and sinks for humans, which can be given a “total economic value” (p. 141). Such “economization of reality”, which downplays nature’s autonomy, thus value-for-itself, is critiqued in seeing green [indicator 2.1.1].

8.2.2.2 View of the human being

Influenced by its view of ecology as normative, and the eco-feminist critique of androcentrism (Chapter Eight: 2.1.1), seeing green radically re-conceptualizes what it is to be a human being. Western atomist, aggressive individualism is problematized, particularly its manifestation as *Homo economicus* [indicator 8.1.1]. There are in seeing green, wonderfully rich, alternative views of the human being as an “ecological self”, or “self-in-relation”, to name but two, and correspondingly different understandings of self-realization. I contend though, that all explicit statements of the valuing of partnership and harmony to the contrary, the implicit and dominant view of the human being in Vision 2030 is *Homo economicus*. Namibians are to be trained to fill slots in the industrial, capitalist market system, surely the most aggressive economic system yet devised, and dependent for its success on an atomistic view of human beings pursuing their own, however enlightened, self-interest. In an economic context, the Vision 2030 text is replete with positive evaluations of human qualities such as aggression and competition.

Hayward (1995) explains well I think, how these two ideas – nature as goods and services, and the human being as *Homo economicus*, are linked in the predominantly economic view of development which I suggest Vision 2030 follows:

... [an] enlightened conception of human development ... would necessarily heed natural limits and promote the ideal of working in harmony with nature. [new paragraph] Yet it has to be acknowledged that such an enlightened conception of human development is not the one most usually pursued in the modern world. A different conception of development prevails – one which is defined, above all, *economically*. The goal of economic development is, of course to maximize human welfare; but on the prevailing view of it, welfare is measured first and foremost by the quantity of goods consumed, and human potentialities are measured largely in terms of their productive employment. This conception of development, so closely tied to the idea – and ideal – of economic growth, is in many respects the antithesis of ecological ends. For it is precisely the drive to maximize the production of material goods which is provoking the overuse of resources, destruction of habitats, disturbance of ecosystems, and so on. (Hayward, 1995, p. 87).

8.2.3 View of the human-nature relationship

As shown in many examples in this chapter, Vision 2030 adopts a grey-green anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship, rather than the seeing green ecocentric understanding.

Can one now at this stage characterize Vision 2030s anthropocentrism as tending at least toward the “better” [from a seeing green perspective] “weak” or “sophisticated” or “enlightened” version [indicator GG 1.1.2], rather than strong anthropocentrism?

Let’s remind ourselves of some of the descriptions provided in Chapter Nine, sections 6.1, and 6.3.2 of this study, of the more-green “weak” anthropocentrism, and compare them with the Vision 2030 text:

“ [It]...focuses not on immediate human gratification so much as on the satisfaction of basic needs for the whole human community, present and future ...,” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

“It also generally rejects the cost-benefit analysis – especially the sort that discounts future costs and benefits – that guides strong anthropocentrist decision-making...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

“and they acknowledge nature’s intrinsic value²³...” (Barrett & Grizzle, 1999, pp. 33-34)

denies “... that preference satisfaction is the only measure of human value” (Norton, 1984, p. 138); considered preferences within a reflected-upon worldview should act as “ ... a limit upon felt preferences” (Norton, 1984 p. 138).

The environmental ethic of such a reflected-upon worldview would include at least the following resource allocation principles: ... [it] should apply to nonrenewable resources as well as to renewable ones (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [see indicator 14.2.2], and

should also imply a population policy” (Norton, 1984, p. 145) [see indicator 12.2].

On the whole, I would say that Vision 2030 does *not* satisfy the spirit of these descriptions of “weak” anthropocentrism. My main reasons for this are that Vision 2030 -

- (i) explicitly avoids according intrinsic value to nature, although policy-makers are aware of this concept through Namibia’s strategic plan for biodiversity protection,
- (ii) does not prioritize the fully implemented natural resource accounting programme which would be needed to satisfy environmental ethicist Bryan Norton’s understanding of renewable and non-renewable resource allocation in weak anthropocentrism (Chapter Nine: 6.3.2),
- (iii) does not reject cost-benefit analysis where natural resources are involved, and fails, on the ecological economics view, to ensure inter-generational equity in future costs and benefits through its standardized 8% discount rate (Conservation outside protected areas: conservancies and CBNRM initiatives (p. 166) under this chapter’s section 5.2.6),
- (iv) fails to explicitly place its envisioned population growth rate within the context of Namibia’s limited carrying capacity for people (section 4.1.1 of this chapter), and
- (v) for me the strongest reason of all, makes no reference to the need for people to reflect on their worldviews, including their understanding of the human-nature relationship (section 5.2 of this chapter, specifically its discussion of Figures 11 and 12).

²³ But recall that Norton’s version of weak anthropocentrism does not accord intrinsic value to nature (Ch 9: 6.3)

8.2.4 The ethic for nature

A seeing green nature ethic (Chapter Eight: 5.1, 5.5, 5.5.1, and criterion 10) approximates the following description: “An empathetic, caring, respectful, partnership ethic, which extends beyond a humans-only focus, recognizing also nature’s value-for-itself, now, and on a long-term basis”. In other words, key markers of such an ethic would be (i) crossing the species divide in some way or another to admit non-humans into the sphere of morality, (ii) a recognition of both instrumental and intrinsic value in nature, and (iii), a focus on the long-term [understood as at least more than one generation] rather than on the short term political-economic. I find none of these markers in the Vision 2030 text.

Vision 2030 contains no explicit discussion of the role of an environmental ethic in achieving sustainable development. There is no trace even, of the concept of “stewardship”, which one could have expected because (i) there are religious versions of stewardship (Chapter Nine: 7.3.2.1) within the Christian conception of morality to which Vision 2030 subscribes, and (ii), “stewardship” is an established secular approach within the UN sustainable development system.

Instead, one must assume from indirect references to the concept, that Vision 2030 subscribes to “conservation” as its environmental ethic. In Chapter Nine: 7.3.1, I noted deep ecologist Rodman’s view that the “resource conservation” form of ecological consciousness, also called the “RCD [resource conservation and development] scientific management of Nature” approach (Devall & Sessions, 1984, p. 301), is not a suitable starting point for “a general environmental ethic”, on at least two grounds. First, because its “ethic of ‘wise use’ remained within the worldview of anthropocentric utilitarianism”, which assumes that the value of the non-human biotic/abiotic world is limited to its instrumental value to humans. Second, its assumption that only the human world possesses intrinsic value, and that the non-human world possesses only instrumental value, is arbitrary because (a) it is not necessary - not all world cultures have made this assumption and (b) it is not justified, because no one has yet succeeded in identifying that “essence” or “observable, morally relevant quality” which at the same time categorically includes humans yet excludes non-humans (Rodman, 1983, in Sessions, 1995, p. 122). Conservation is an ethic for the human *use of nature*, rather than an ethic *for nature* (Regan, 1980, in Chapter 3: 5.3.2).

And, on the Vision 2030 view, conservation as environmental ethic must somehow “pay its way”, as it were; it must have a direct land-use, or a clearly-demonstrated, of benefit to humans, indirect use. For example, in the context of a discussion on wildlife conservation and biodiversity protection in protected areas, one may read that “It is now generally accepted that to make conservation efforts sustainable, they must contribute in some meaningful way towards rural development” (Vision 2030, p. 166).

To sum up, I would suggest that the ultimate premises of Vision 2030s ethic for nature are little more than grey.

8.3 The green-ness of Vision 2030s vision for Namibian society?

Here I do not intend to assess in any further detail than already suggested in this chapter, the green-ness of each of the 43 real-world issues which Vision 2030 covers. Instead I am going to partly use the three-point heuristic frequently suggested by Naess for assessing the green-ness of a society:

... it is important to retain a vision of what we would consider a perfect Green society. Among the proponents of the ideals of a Green society, there is fairly substantial agreement that an established Green society is supposed to have reached three main goals, of which only one is ecological sustainability. The two others are the goals of the peace movement and those of the social justice movement (if we allow the term “social justice” to have a wide meaning that includes the elimination of large scale human starvation and subjugation). (Naess, 1991, in Sessions, 1995, p. 447).

Of these three, I feel confident, within my academic training, and this study, to assess the green-ness of Vision 2030's ecological sustainability (8.3.1), and its vision for peace (8.3.2). In section 8.3.3, rather than commenting on the green-ness or otherwise of Vision 2030's social justice vision, I attempt to characterize its understanding of sustainable development.

8.3.1 A “serious” nature and environmental policy?

Does the text's worldview, specifically, its understanding of the human-nature relationship, provide the framework for what Achterberg calls, a “serious environmental and nature policy” (Achterberg, in Wissenburg, 1993, p. 15)? We can remind ourselves here of what Achterberg means by this:

By ‘serious environmental and nature policy’, I mean a policy that aims at structural changes within society in order to achieve an enduring solution to environmental problems, or at least to create a situation in which they can be controlled. Such a policy is not only directed at maintaining nature as a basis of our social activities for generations to come (sustainability of our use of the environment), *but also at protecting, maintaining and developing nature for its own sake* (sustainability of nature) (Achterberg 1990)” (Achterberg, 1993, pp. 81-82, my italics).

A serious environmental policy not only delivers human well-being but *also does justice to/seeks to protect ‘the intrinsic values of plants, animals and ecosystems’* (Achterberg, 1993, p. 87, my italics).

Through its rational epistemological glasses, Vision 2030 sees nature primarily as an economic reality. And because the holy grail of economic thinking is efficiency, this legitimates the instrumental-only attitude towards nature we have seen in this text. This approach, which robs nature of any value-for-itself, cannot on my view, be the framework for a “serious” environmental and nature policy, as Achterberg, or seeing green, means it [indicator 12.1].

I further argue that Vision 2030's understanding of environmental sustainability approximates at most the grey-green “sensible” or “weaker” version [indicator GG 12.1]. In this version, conceptual answers to the questions What is to be sustained? will tend toward accepting substitutability between the various types of capital – natural (renewable and non-renewable), human-made, and human-social *up to a point*, after which it is not. Thus, notes environmental economist van Dieren, “efforts should be made to define critical levels of each type of capital, beyond which concerns about substitutability could arise and these should be monitored to ensure that patterns of development do not promote a total decimation of one kind of capital no matter what is being accumulated in the other forms of capital” (van Dieren, 1995, p. 103). Such monitoring requires that some kind of formal in-country accounting other than GDP is undertaken to keep track of any transformation of “natural” capital into “human” capital (Neefjes, 2000, p. 29 in Ch 9: 3.4.1.6). But we have seen in this chapter's discussion, that Namibia's natural resource accounting programme is neither developed to this extent, nor as yet formally integrated with the country's economic accounting.

Answers to the question For whom is the natural environment to be sustained? will tend towards “For people” in the “sensible” or “weaker” versions of environmental sustainability. We have seen that this is so in Vision 2030. And finally, in such weaker versions of environmental sustainability, the answer to the question of how long the inter-generational equity is to last? is for the next generation only. This too we have seen in Vision 2030.

I conclude then, that Vision 2030's understanding of environmental sustainability is of the “weaker” variety, tending towards reform environmentalism rather than seeing green's understanding of long-range, and wide, ecological sustainability.

8.3.2 Radical peace?

Here I wish to reflect briefly on Vision 2030s understanding of peace, recalling at the same time, that its ultimate premises context is the brief glimpses this text has given us of its understanding of the Self/Other relationship.

Given its roots *inter alia* in the feminism and peace social movements, rejection of domination and violence, and the promotion of peace, harmony and partnership are key values in seeing green. They are also valued in Vision 2030, for example in this objective (p. 130):

Objective

To ensure that people in Namibia enjoy peace and harmony in their relationships, and violence (including homicide, rape, human abuse of all descriptions) is completely eliminated in relationships at home as well as outside, within the community and in the country.

I argue on four grounds though, that the text, despite this vision, falls short of the seeing green understanding of radical peace and non-violence, also one of Naess's three criteria for a green society.

(i) Vision 2030 fails to radically re-conceptualize the human-nature relationship. Nature continues to be seen as Other. Neither the standard western cultural sharp dichotomy between humans and nature is problematized, nor is human continuity with, rather than discontinuity with nonhuman nature emphasized (seeing green indicator 7.1). Not only does the Vision 2030 value of partnership fail to include nature as partner, but Namibians are to be educated in instrumental relationships with nature (section 5.2s discussion of 4th bullet point on p. 141).

(ii) Vision 2030 appears to espouse conflicting values as far as the human-human relationship is concerned. On the one hand, peace, harmony, partnership and caring between people are proposed, all strong green values. The text's vision that peace between men and women, and differing social and age groups must be established, is also green. On the other hand, the competitive, aggressive even, relationships demanded in successful economic functioning are valorized. This is problematic from a seeing green point of view, for, as we have seen, this text takes a predominantly economic view of reality, seeing nature as goods and services, people largely in a *Homo economicus* light, and the education system as functioning effectively when it "produces" people suited to instrumental techno-industrialism.

And, as argued in section 4.4.9 of this chapter, on the feminist/ecofeminist view, instrumental relationships with women, and instrumental relationships with nature, are *coupled subsets of the same androcentric construction of the Self/Other relationship*, which manifests itself in the ideas, structures, and values of hierarchy, patriarchy, and naturism. The Vision 2030 text, in this aspect of its understanding of the self/other relationship, fails then, to make any connection between the seeing green linked ideas of human-human and human-nature violence [indicator 8.2.4].

(iii) Vision 2030s understanding of peace and security falls short of the radical green understanding, which would require the dismantling of armies, security forces, and weaponry, rather than the upgrading of military forces and military hardware envisaged in Vision 2030 [indicators 14.3, and 16.1]. The use of military metaphors found in this text is also a sign of a non-green Self/Other relationship.

(iv) Namibia is the world's 5th largest uranium producer, producing 8% of annual world demand (*The Namibian*, 15 May 2007, p. 5, "Use of Namibian uranium only for 'peaceful purposes'). *Absent* in the Vision 2030s discussion of energy resources for production is any problematization of uranium mining's contribution to nuclear technology (p. 30, p. 162). Vision 2030 mentions nuclear energy not

at all. The Namibian Government's White Paper on Energy Policy (GRN, 1998), which according to Vision 2030 (p. 85) "encourages the exploration and exploitation of the country's energy resources in a sustainable manner", says nothing at all about nuclear energy either.

But as discussed under section 5.2.5 in this chapter, the President of Namibia has not excluded the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes in Namibia. According to a local newspaper, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov held private talks with Namibia's President and Prime Minister in March 2007 on the possible construction off the Namibian coast, of "floating" nuclear power plants (*The Namibian*, Friday 23 March 2007, p. 3, "We want no Chernobyl: Earthlife"; *The Namibian*, Wednesday 28 March 2007, p. 5, "NSHR in nuke protests").

No green text, as part of its radical understanding of peace, would have missed the opportunity to problematize, and reject outright, any use of nuclear technology, "peaceful" or otherwise (seeing green indicator 12.5.4).

8.3.3 Sustainable development in Vision 2030: "stronger" or "weaker"?

Vision 2030 subscribes to the "philosophy and principles" of sustainable development (Vision 2030, p. 14), without indicating that there are more conservative or radical understandings of this concept, or "stronger" [tending more towards green] and "weaker" versions [indicator GG 2.2].

Some indicators of the stronger versions [indicator GG 2.2.1] are that they tend towards

- a. sensible or even strong environmental sustainability, including a view of nature as possessing intrinsic value and rights,
- b. intra-generational egalitarianism expressed in zero rate of discount for example for non-renewable resources or "depletion schedules", and steps have been identified, and are being taken, to ensure in the process of depletion, the provision of suitable substitutes for renewable resources. For renewable resources, models established which indicate what the maximum sustainable yield of a resource is, so that present generations do not harvest beyond this limit
- c. a bottom-up local participation approach in development planning, which involves public participation in both the setting of objectives and their implementation, "since participation is held to be a good in itself – that is, it has intrinsic value. For managerialists, participation has extrinsic value; it is a means to implement sustainable development." (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31)
- d. social restructuring.

Weaker versions [indicator GG 2.2.2] tend towards

- a. weak environmental sustainability [GG 12.1]
- b. a non-zero rate of discounting is adopted in economic decisions pertaining to future economic agents (Ch 9: 3.4.3.5)
- c. a more top-led, managerialist approach to development planning: (Ch 9: 7.2.1c): "The 'top-down' version ... is that favored by most governments, because, by limiting participation to major stakeholders, including business, local government, interest groups and other nongovernment organizations, they can retain control of the sustainable development agenda. It is a technocratic strategy in that objectives are set by governments using experts, with public participation limited to the implementation stage of policy formulation." (Davidson, 2000, pp. 30-31, in Ch 9: 7.2.1c)
- d. a reform environmentalism approach.

While one cannot absolutize, I suggest that the Vision 2030 understanding of sustainable development tends towards the "weaker" version on at least three grounds discussed extensively in this chapter: (i) it accords no intrinsic value to nature, (ii) it tends towards weaker environmental sustainability, and (iii), it embraces reform environmentalism.

8.4 How green is Vision 2030s worldview?: Conclusions

To answer research question 2: How green is Vision 2030s worldview?, I argue on the strength of this chapter's discussion, that it is no more than grey-green at most – Wissenburg's "grue" introduced in Chapter One, Figure 2. This is not really surprising. From his heuristic, which illustrates how green ideas diminish in importance from dark green in the new social movements, to what he calls "grue" in political parties' thought, one could already have expected *Namibia Vision 2030* as political document to be anthropocentric rather than ecocentric in its valuing of nature, and to adopt a 'reform environmentalism' rather than radical ecological approach. My assessment of this "real world" level text confirms Wissenburg's hypothesis.

CHAPTER TWELVE: REFLECTIONS

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Chapter One opened with the assumption that there is an increasingly global ecological crisis. It introduced the idea of “seeing green” as an alternative western worldview to what has been called, inter alia, the Enlightenment worldview, or the “dominant social paradigm”. I also introduced there, Wissenburg’s heuristic (1993, in Chapter One, Figure 2) which suggested that green ideas diminish in importance from more important in ecocentric/biocentric environmental philosophy, green political ideology, and real world new social movements, to less important in anthropocentric environmental philosophy, mainstream political ideologies, and in the policies and programmes of real-world political parties. The analysis in subsequent chapters of what “seeing green” means, and the application of self-generated green/grey-green criteria to a real world, ruling political party-led text such as *Namibia Vision 2030* in Chapter Eleven, confirmed Wissenburg’s heuristic.

In Chapter One, I also noted the difficulty of accommodating all aspects of the idea “green” within the discipline of environmental psychology, and presented a justification for an interdisciplinary approach to understanding “green” as a response to the global ecological crisis. It is these two “circles” – the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought, and whether or not environmental psychology can contribute to averting the ecological crisis - that I wish to “close” in this chapter, in sections (1) and (2) respectively. In section 3, I make some suggestions for further research.

1. The problem: the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought

I found the overwhelmingly anthropocentric, economic rationality approach of *Namibia Vision 2030* a stark contrast to seeing green. Given radical environmentalism’s or seeing green’s contention that the ecological crisis can only be addressed by a fundamental change in beliefs, and accompanying fundamental social and economic changes, the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream texts such as *Namibia Vision 2030* must represent a political problem. It is hardly less a problem for environmental psychologists seeking to find the antecedents of their more narrowly defined environmentalism (Chapter One: 4.4.2). I wondered if the University of Namibia [UNAM] offered its students - our future policy-makers and decision-takers - any insights into what radical environmentalism means, other than its mainstream pro-environmental behaviour meaning? I limited my enquiry to a text study of the courses listed in its 2007 Prospectus. I did not for example, interview academic staff on course content.

Unsurprisingly, the mainstream approach of natural resource management is well-represented in UNAMs Prospectus. One example is the two-week course (EBL6159) in Resource Management offered as part of the Faculty of Science’s MSc in Biodiversity Management and Research (University of Namibia, 2007b, p. 116). Another is the Environmental Economics Course offered by the Faculty of Economics and Management Science, Department of Economics (University of Namibia, 2007a, p. 42). Its course content sounds quite familiar from Chapter Nine: Environment and Development:

- Market failure, public goods, common resources, externalities
- Cost-benefit analysis, Discounting and inter-generational equity
- Valuation methods
- Management of renewable and non-renewable resources, resource rents, property rights
- Old and new debates on environmental problems
- Policy instruments for environmental management
- Economic sustainability – definitions, planning and policy implementation for a better environment
- Environmental accounting
- Development, economic growth and the environment

International environmental issues – trade and the environment, international treaties.

I then searched the UNAM Prospectus for some course which would also present alternatives to mainstream anthropocentric and economic-utilitarian managerialism: perhaps a course in environmental philosophy, or environmental ethics, or environmental psychology, or ecologism as political ideology, or environmental education? I found none of these.

2. Can environmental psychology help?

Given this “absence”, how could Namibian university students be introduced to the ideas and cultural-socio-economic challenges of seeing green? I argue here that Environmental Psychology holds the potential to do so, provided it is prepared to meet certain challenges.

In the 1990s, Kidner (1994, p. 368) charged mainstream psychology with “muteness” about the environmental crisis, and wondered if environmental psychology had something to offer: “One might look to the rapidly growing field of environmental psychology for effective comment on the human relationship with the natural world. However, one finds that in this area, too, the anthropocentric viewpoint is overwhelmingly predominant ...”. Supporting Kidner’s contention, is leading environmental psychologist Robert Gifford’s view (2007, p. 205) that the WCED/Brundtland Report’s anthropocentric understanding of the human-nature relationship, represents a “utopian” (!) definition of sustainability. On the other hand, psychologists Zelezny and Schultz (2000, p. 366) refute Kidner’s charge of muteness. Titles of papers such as Oskamp’s (2000b) “A sustainable future for humanity? How can psychology help?” show that psychology is indeed trying to help resolve the environmental crisis. And psychologists are well aware of ecocentrism as an alternative theory of environmental valuing (e.g., Thompson & Barton, 1994).

In Chapter One, I noted as strengths of environmental psychology, its interest in worldview, in “environmentalism”, in researching increasingly global aspects of the real-world human-nature relationship, and its open-ness to, insistence really, on an interdisciplinary approach in solving our ecological problems. Environmental psychology holds promise then, as one possible academic “home” for an exploration of the ideas and themes of seeing green. To illustrate the challenges that it must however meet in doing so, I briefly discuss what I see as leading work on “environmentalism” and “ecology” in the field, and its limitations: (2.1) the Values-Beliefs-Norms work of Stern and his colleagues, and (2.2) Dunlap and colleagues’ work on the New Ecological Paradigm. In section 3, I suggest that research on a revised environmental psychology syllabus would be a valuable contribution to understand green ideas on the nature of, and remedy for, the increasingly global ecological crisis.

2.1 Values-Beliefs-Norms theory

The Values-Beliefs-Norms [V-B-N] theory can be considered, I think, as a premier example of social-psychological theorizing on environmentalism [i.e. environmentalism understood primarily as individual-based pro-environmental concern and behaviour]. In developing their explanation of environmentalism, Stern et al (1999, p. 85) reviewed six main social-psychological theories:

1. “Worldview” theories such as that of Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), “which explains environmentalism in terms of an egalitarian ‘cultural bias’ or ‘orienting disposition’ (Stern, 2000, p. 413, p. 414; Stern et al., 1999, p. 86). They also considered Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig and Jones’ (2000) theory which proposes that environmentalism “flows from adopting a New Environmental (or Ecological) Paradigm, within which human activity and a fragile biosphere are seen as inextricably interconnected” (Stern, 2000, p. 411).

2. Inglehart’s (1977, 1990, 1995, 1997) *post-materialist values theory*, which “holds that a new set of ‘post-materialist’ social and political values and attitudes is emerging in the industrial world as a result of increasing affluence and security. These values emphasize quality of life and self-expression as important desiderata in a society, in contrast to materialist values that have emphasized economic well-being and personal and national security” (Stern et al., 1999, p. 86; also Stern, 2000, p. 411).

3. *Sacredness of nature theories*. Stern et al (1999) also considered

the idea that a spiritual or religious world view may have an important influence on environmentalism (White 1967; Greeley 1993; Kempton, Boster and Hartley 1995; Eckberg and Blocker 1996; Dietz, Stern and Guagnano 1998). We focused on the view that people who hold nature sacred, whether because it was created by God or because it is sacred in itself, are more active in supporting environmental protection. Religious or spiritual beliefs may be especially important because they offer an absolute standard that supersedes appeals to efficiency, practicality and expedience. (Stern et al., 1999, p. 86; also Stern, 2000, p. 411).

Stern et al. (1999) included in their own proposed Values-Beliefs-Norms [VBN] theory of support for environmentalism and pro-environmental behaviour, the three other theories of environmentalism which they had identified:

4. Schwartz’s (1972, 1977) *moral norm-activation theory* of altruism in pro-environmental behaviour,
5. Schwartz and colleagues *personal values theory* which “links proenvironmental behavior to particular basic types of values” (Stern et al. 1999, p. 85; also Stern, 2000, pp. 411-412), and
6. Dunlap and colleagues’ *New Ecological Paradigm theory*.

Stern (2000) presents the Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of support for environmentalism schematically as:

Figure 20: A Values-Beliefs-Norms theory of support for environmentalism and pro-environmental behaviour (Stern, 2000, p. 412)




Fig. 1. A schematic representation of variables in the VBN theory of environmentalism^a

^aArrows represent postulated direct effects. Direct effects may also be observed on variables more than one level downstream from a causal variable.

^bEmpirically, measures of egoistic values have been negatively correlated with indicators of environmentalism.

Results of empirical research on VBN theory show that there are four “causal variables” for “environmentally significant behaviors”, and that of these, “personal moral norms are the main basis for individuals’ general predispositions to proenvironmental action” (Stern, 2000, p. 413):

Figure 21: Major types of environmentally significant behaviours and causal variables (Stern, 2000, p. 421)

Table 3. Major Types of Environmentally Significant Behaviors and Causal Variables Influencing These Behaviors

Causal variables	Environmentally significant behaviors
<i>Attitudinal</i> General environmentalist predisposition ^a Behavior-specific norms and beliefs ^b Nonenvironmental attitudes (e.g., about product attributes) Perceived costs and benefits of action	<i>Environmental activism</i> <i>Nonactivist public-sphere behaviors</i> Environmental citizenship (e.g., petitioning, joining groups) Policy support
<i>Personal capabilities</i> Literacy Social status Financial resources Behavior-specific knowledge and skills	<i>Private-sphere environmentalism</i> Consumer purchase behaviors Maintenance of household equipment Changes in equipment use, lifestyle (curtailment) Waste disposal behaviors “Green consumerism”
<i>Contextual factors</i> Material costs and rewards Laws and regulations Available technology Social norms and expectations Supportive policies Advertising	<i>Other</i> Behaviors affecting organizational decisions
<i>Habit and routine</i>	

^aThe VBN theory incorporates various attitudinal variables believed to create this predisposition.

^bThese norms and beliefs figure prominently in applications of norm-activation theory and the theory of planned behavior to specific proenvironmental behaviors.

It is not my intention here to discuss this theory of support for “environmentalism” in any further detail – a full description of it is given in Stern et al. (1999), and Stern (2000). What I wish to highlight here, is its narrow understanding of environmentalism. Pro-environmental behaviour is but one aspect of seeing green. It is unclear to me how Stern et al’s model could explain for example, such green and non-environmental related behaviours as demands for grassroots democracy, inclusive models of social welfare delivery, or demands for radical peace. Nor do the model’s “causal variables” make room for radical cultural critique. Dunlap, Van Liere, and colleagues’ New Ecological Paradigm work appears to hold more promise in this respect.

2.2. The New Ecological Paradigm

Dunlap, Van Liere, and colleagues’ New Ecological Paradigm is of particular interest for this study because it is (1) a *worldview* explanation of environmentalism (2) it is “prominent... in social psychology” (Stern, 2000, p. 411), and widely used (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 428), and (3) because it claims to be able to measure “seeing the world ecologically” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 428). This should be broadly the same thing as “seeing green”. But on my view, the NEP doesn’t fulfil its promise.

Dunlap and Van Liere’s (1984) sociological work on the “Dominant Social Paradigm” was briefly mentioned in Chapter One: 2.1. They conceptualized it then as comprising eight major dimensions: “(1) commitment to limited government, (2) support for free enterprise, (3) devotion to private property rights, (4) emphasis on individualism, (5) fear of planning and support for the status quo, (6) faith in the efficacy of science and technology, (7) support for economic growth, and (8) faith in future abundance (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1984, pp. 1014-1015). Their empirical work showed that support for the Dominant Social Paradigm was negatively correlated with environmental concern (p. 1018).

In other sociological¹ research, Dunlap, van Liere, Mertig and Jones (2000, p. 425) argue that in contrast to the Dominant Social Paradigm, a New Ecological Paradigm is emerging:

The emergence of global environmental problems as major policy issues symbolizes the growing awareness of the problematic relationship between modern industrialized societies and the physical environments on which they depend (Stern et al., 1992). Recognition that human activities are altering the ecosystems on which our existence – and that of all other living species – is dependent and growing acknowledgement of the necessity of achieving more sustainable forms of development give credence to suggestions that *we are in the midst of a fundamental reevaluation of the underlying worldview that has guided our relationship to the physical environment* (e.g. Milbrath, 1984). ... [new paragraph] In this context, it is not surprising to see that traditional measures of ‘environmental concern’ are being supplemented by instruments seeking to measure ‘ecological consciousness’ (Ellis & Thompson, 1997), ‘anthropocentrism’ (Chandler & Dreger, 1993), and ‘anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism’ (Thompson & Barton, 1994)... (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 426, my italics).

Dunlap and Van Liere believe that implicit within environmentalism is “ a challenge to our fundamental views about nature and humans’ relationship to it.” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427). Their original 12-item New Environmental Paradigm (Dunlap & Van Liere, 1978) focussed “on beliefs about humanity’s ability to upset the balance of nature, the existence of limits to growth for human societies, and humanity’s right to rule over the rest of nature.” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427). [All seeing green themes!]. On Dunlap et al’s view (2000, p. 427), the NEP Scale can be “fruitfully employed to examine the structure and coherence of ecological worldviews and the relationships between these worldviews and a range of more specific environmental attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 431). In short, they say, “a proecological orientation or ‘seeing the world ecologically’, reflected by a high score on the NEP Scale², should lead to proenvironmental beliefs and attitudes on a wide range of issues...” (p. 428).

So, if the NEP Scale can be considered a mainstream sociological/social-psychological shorthand version of “seeing ecologically”, what is its content? Briefly, it hypothesizes five facets³ of an ecological worldview (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 432):

- (1) the reality of limits to growth
- (2) anti-anthropocentrism
- (3) the fragility of nature’s balance
- (4) rejection of exemptionalism, that is, rejection of the idea prominent in the DSP, that human beings unlike other species, are exempt from the constraints of nature
- (5) belief in the possibility of an ecocrisis.

Support for, or rejection of these five facets of an ecological worldview is measured through 15 statements (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 432, and 431). These statements are listed below and related to each of the five worldview facets:

1. We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support (Facet 1)
2. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to suit their needs (2)
3. When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous consequences (3)
4. Human ingenuity will insure that we do NOT make the earth unliveable (4)
5. Humans are severely abusing the environment (5)
6. The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them (1)
7. Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist (2)
8. The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations (3)

¹ This is perhaps why Stern et al (1995) criticized NEP theory for its lack of grounding “...in social-psychological theories of attitude structure” (Dunlap et al., 2000, p. 427).

² Most studies have found support for the NEP to be positively related to younger ages, better education, and liberalism as political ideology (Dunlap et al., 2000, pp. 429-430)

³ As alternative view, Hayward (1995, pp. 31-32), from within political philosophy, offers three “core ecological values”: live in harmony with nature; overcome anthropocentric prejudice; recognize intrinsic value in beings other than humans value

9. Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws of nature (4)
10. The so-called “ecological crisis” has been greatly exaggerated (5)
11. The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and resources (1)
- 12 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature (2)
- 13 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset (3)
- 14 Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature works to be able to control it (4)
15. If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major ecological catastrophe (5)

Although the NEP is claiming to describe the essential facets of an ecological worldview, it is really only describing one (important) facet: the human-nature relationship. But on the green view, the human-nature relationship is itself located within, is the product of, implicit, unchallenged epistemological and ontological assumptions. There will be, on the green view, no real solution to the ecological crisis until *all* the facets of our dominant western cultural worldview change - its epistemology, ontology, moral philosophy, psychology, and political and economic practices too. These elements of seeing green’s *cultural-philosophical* critique are absent in Dunlap et al’s New Ecological Paradigm. In section 3 next, I suggest inter alia, that further research seems needed before environmental psychology can fulfil its promise to address the ecological crisis.

3 Suggested further research

It is customary in a study such as this, to suggest future avenues of research. I make next three suggestions pertaining directly to the content of this study, and one concerning the role of environmental psychology in dealing with the ecological crisis.

(1) The seeing green criteria created in section 3.4 of Chapter Ten, represent *one* possible sample from the base data in Chapters Three to Nine. They should nevertheless be generalizable to other texts, but as suggested in section 4.1 of Chapter Ten, this should be verified and amplified by analysing policies similar to *Namibia Vision 2030*. The indicators I have created should also be generalizable to other texts. However, other researchers with other interests than mine might wish through further research to verify this, or to deepen the discussion of some indicators, or include in the criteria, indicators for those aspects of seeing green which I did not. These are listed in Chapter Eleven, section 7.2.

(2) One of the reasons I employed Morley’s cultural hegemony encoding/decoding model as methodology (Chapter Ten, section 2.1.3.2) was because I felt its “decoding” half offers the possibility of future research into whether, and how, ordinary members of the public do actually deconstruct *Namibia Vision 2030*.

(3) And for those researchers interested in ideology, a critical examination of *Namibia Vision 2030*s power relationships, via questions such as those that Hattingh (2002, p. 14) poses about sustainable development as discourse, is surely a tempting prospect:

Whose interests are served by adopting this or that agenda of sustainable development? Whose power is served and through which mechanisms? And who or what stands to win or lose in which ways from adopting this particular agenda of sustainable development, rather than that one? Are new forms of dependency created by adopting this or that interpretation of the agenda of sustainable development? Are new forms of domination and exploitation created...?

But, based on the discussion in section 2 of this chapter - Can environmental psychology help in reversing the diminishing importance of green ideas in mainstream thought? – I believe that the further research for which this study calls, more than on any of the topics listed above, is on the role which

environmental psychology might play in the academic training of our future Namibian policy-makers and decision-takers on what green really means.

Environmental psychology is capable of speaking to the environmental crisis, and does so, but in mainstream language, and partially. And that is just the challenge, isn't it, which environmental psychology must meet: it must recognize, and respond to seeing green's fundamental challenge to mainstream views of the good life, to alleged mainstream androcentric assumptions on the nature of knowledge, of reality, on what it is to be a human being, and on the nature of Self-Other relationships, whether these are with people or the planet.

To do so, environmental psychology needs to continue reaching out to other disciplines:

The world has problems but universities have departments (Brewer, 1999, p. 328, in Uiterkamp & Vlek, 2007, p. 194).

It is ... critical to underscore the need to draw on insights from across the behavioral and social sciences, because the important causal variables [of pro-environmental behaviour] lie in the domains of various disciplines and because the variables interact. Thus, interdisciplinary research is necessary for full understanding (Stern, 2000, p. 422).

This reaching out should not be restricted only to mainstream academic fields such as sociology, political theory, education, and environmental philosophy/ethics. It is also on my view, critically necessary that environmental psychology should reach beyond its present mainstream confines to the ideas and values of the new social movements: radical peace, feminism, and ecology. Only then will it be able to present in its research, the full range of green ideas, and, to borrow Carol Gilligan's (1982) phrase, speak "in a different voice".

What is needed now I believe, is research on how to set a new agenda for environmental psychology (Reser, 1995, Chapter One, section 4.1.3).