

SUMMARY

LEE TENG-HUI'S POLITICAL CROSS-STRAITS POLICY AND MAINLAND CHINA'S REACTION

by

Chia-lin Chi

Supervisor	:	Professor Michael Hough
Department	:	Political Sciences University of Pretoria
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By the end of the twentieth century, there were many secessionist groups, but, the move towards Taiwanese secessionism has arguably been the most significant of these. It triggered the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, which resulted in a historical military confrontation between Mainland China and the US.

As will be shown, from 1988 to 2000, Lee Teng-hui, as president of Taiwan, manipulated the political Cross-Straits relationship to promote what was ultimately a secessionist policy. This caused Mainland China to react strongly and triggered sharp tension between Taiwan and Mainland China.

This thesis considers what motivated Lee Teng-hui to implement a secessionist Cross-Straits policy and why he supported unification while adopting a substantive secessionist policy. It looks at how he was able to instigate Taiwanese hostility towards Mainlanders, to transform the hostility into a sense of Taiwanese national identity and ultimately into Taiwanese secessionist ideology.

A historical approach was used in exploring the origins of secessionism, and descriptive and analytical methods to review systematically and comprehensively political developments in the ROC and its civil war, and to

study Lee Teng-hui's life; the national identity of Taiwan and Mainland China; the implementation of Lee Teng-hui's political Cross-Straits policy; and the reaction of Mainland China.

The study showed that the main cause of Taiwanese secessionism was ethnic conflict between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. It originated from the 228 Incident of 1947, in which Mainlander-led troops slaughtered many Taiwanese. Soon after, the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan from Mainland China, and many Taiwanese (including Mainlanders) were killed during the State of Emergency in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the Mainlander-led government fled to Taiwan in its original central government form, the Mainlander élite occupied key positions in the government during the 1950s and 1960s. It resulted in unfair power-sharing for Taiwanese, and caused the Taiwanese élite to believe that they had to establish their own government (nation). Lee Teng-hui had participated in the CCP and had been under political surveillance by the Mainlander-led government for over twenty years. He weathered these political difficulties, but by reasonable inference, there was a close relationship between the political oppression by the Mainlander-led government and his secessionist political Cross-Straits policy.

Because Taiwanese residents were indoctrinated by Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, Chiang Kai-shek's administration for about 40 years, Chinese ideology was dominant and Lee Teng-hui initially paid lip-service to Cross-Strait unification whilst working towards secessionism as reflected in the Chingdao-Lake Incident (1994); the private dialogue between Lee Teng-hui and Shiba Ryotaro (1994); the address at Cornell University (1995); and his two-state theory (1999). However, due to strong pressure from Mainland China, he did not reach his secessionist goal during his presidential term (1988-2000).

In conclusion, this thesis shows that Taiwan Island's geopolitical importance is at the heart of the US' support for Taiwan's secession from the Mainland. Therefore, Lee's secessionist Cross-Strait policy aside, US national interests lie in containing Mainland China and it has, therefore, always played an

important role in the secessionist issue and always will. From the perspective of Mainland China, either in terms of nationalism or national security, Taiwan's secession is a life-and-death issue. If Taiwanese authorities were to declare independence, the only option for Mainland China would be to launch a unification war. For the US, Taiwan is only a pawn that it uses to contain Mainland China. Therefore, in the Cross-Straits issue, the US has more options than Mainland China, namely, to use military intervention in the future to deter Chinese unification or to decide to share common peaceful international relations with Mainland China by accepting Cross-Straits unification.

OPSOMMING

LEE TENG-HUI SE POLITIEKE BELEID TEENOOR VERENIGING MET DIE SJINESE VASTELAND EN DIE VASTELAND SE REAKSIE

deur

Chia-lin Chi

Promotor	:	Professor Michael Hough
Departement	:	Politieke Wetenskappe Universiteit van Pretoria
Graad waarvoor proefskrif voorgelê is	:	Doctor Philosophiae in Internasionale Verhoudinge

Teen die einde van die Twintigste Eeu was daar verskillende sessessionistiese groepe, maar die beweging in Taiwan bly onbetwisbaar die belangrikste hiervan. Dit het tot die 1996 krisis geleid waarin daar 'n historiese militêre konfrontasie tussen die Verenigde State van Amerika en Sjina plaasgevind het.

Soos aangetoon is, het Lee Teng-hui terwyl hy president van Taiwan was, die politieke verhouding met die Sjinese Vasteland gemanipuleer om sy eie beleid, wat eintlik sessesie was, te bevorder. Dit het 'n sterk reaksie van Sjina ontlok en het spanning in die verhouding met Taiwan veroorsaak.

Hierdie proefskrif bestudeer die motivering vir Lee Teng-hui se sessessionistiese beleid en hoe dit moontlik was vir hom om die Taiwanese bevolking eerstens teen die Vastelanders te draai en om daardie negatiewe persepsies in Taiwanese nasionalisme te omskep en, uiteindelik, in 'n Taiwanese sessessionistiese ideologie.

Die ontstaan van sessessionisme is op 'n historiese wyse ondersoek en analitiese metodes is gebruik om die politieke ontwikkelinge in die Republiek van Sjina en die burgeroorlog sistematies en deeglik te ontleed – so ook Lee

Teng-hui se geskiedenis, die nasionale identiteit van Taiwan en Sjina, en die implementasie van Lee Teng-hui se beleid teenoor Sjina en die Sjinese reaksie daarop.

Die ondersoek het aangetoon dat die hoofrede vir Taiwanese sessessionisme etniese konflik tussen Taiwan en die Vasteland was. Dit het ontstaan as gevolg van die 228 incident in 1947, waarin troepe, geleis deur die Vastelanders, lojale Taiwanese aangeval het. Kort daarna het die regering na Taiwan gevlug en vele Taiwanese, (Vastelanders ingesluit) is vermoor gedurende die noodtoestand. Omdat die Vasteland regering in sy volle sentraal-regering vorm na Taiwan gevlug het, het sy amptenare die belangrikste posisies in die regering in die 1950s en 1960s beklee. Dit het geleid tot 'n onregverdig stelsel vir die Taiwanese en hulle laat glo dat hulle hulle 'n eie regering (nasie) moet stig. Lee Teng-hui het deelgeneem in die CKP en is dopgehou deur die Vasteland-regering vir meer as twintig jaar. Hy het hierdie politieke probleme oorleef, maar dit is waarskynlik dat daar 'n noue verband was tussen die onderdrukking onder dié regering en sy eie sessessionistiese beleid.

Die Taiwanese is geïndoktrineer deur Chiang Ching-kuo en sy vader vir omrent veertig jaar, en daarom het Sjinese ideologie gedomineer. Oorspronklik het Lee Teng-hui voorgegee dat hy Sjinese unifikasie met die Vasteland ondersteun terwyl hy eintlik sessesie probeer bereik het, soos bewys deur die Chinqiao-Meer Incident (1994); sy persoonlike interaksie met Shiba Ryotaro (1994); sy toespraak by Cornell Universiteit (1995); en sy twee-state teorie (1999). Maar, as gevolg van sterk druk van die Vasteland, het hy nie sy doel van sessesie bereik gedurende sy termyn as president nie (1988-2000).

Ter afsluiting, toon hierdie proefskrif dat die geopolitiese belangrikheid van Taiwan-Eiland die werklike rede is waarom die VSA sessesie ondersteun. Lee Teng-hui se eie sessessionistiese ideologie niteenstaande, is dit in die VSA se strategiese nasionale belang om Sjina te beperk. Vir Sjina is dit 'n kwessie van oorlewing uit die oogpunt van nasionalisme asook van nasionale

veiligheid. As die Taiwanese regering onafhanklikheid probeer verklaar sal die enigste opsie vir Sjina wees om 'n herunifikasie oorlog te loods. Taiwan is slegs 'n pion wat die VSA gebruik om die bedreiging van Sjina te neutraliseer. Daarom het die VSA die keuse om 'n militêre opsie te volg om die unifikasie van Taiwan met Sjina te verhoed, óf om so 'n unifikasie te aanvaar.

Key Terms

Sleutelsterme

Autonomy	Outonomie
Chinese Communist Party (CCP)	Sjinese Kommunistiese Party
Civil war	Burgeroorlog
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)	Demokratiese Progressiewe Party
Divided nations	Verdeelde nasies
Ethnic identity	Etniese identiteit
Independence	Onafhanklikheid
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC)	Vasteland Sakeraad
Nationalism	Nasionalisme
Nationalist Party (KMT)	Nasionalistiese Party
Secessionism	Sesessionisme
Self-determination	Self-determinasie
Separatist movement	Sesessionistiese beweging
Special Administrative Region (SAR)	Spesiale Administratiewe Streek