

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

2.1 INTRODUCTION

One of the central questions of planning theory¹ is whether planning theory can contribute to the practice of planning. Campbell and Fainstain (1996: 4) argue that planning is a messy, contentious field; planning theory should provide the means to address these debates and understand their deeper roots. McCloughlin (1993) further argues that human practices are based (unconsciously) on theory. Study of such practices must be theoretically informed. If planning theory is to be of real use to practitioners it needs to address practice as it is actually encountered in the worlds of planning officers and of elected representatives (Hillier 2002: 4). The development of planning practice is deeply connected to the most puzzling problems of planning theory. Without entering this theoretical field our practical efforts will be like *“fighting in the dark against an unknown enemy”* (Lapintie 2002: 2).

Within the context and ambit of this theoretical field (and relevant planning theory), this chapter develops a theoretical framework for analysis within which this study (and the Tshwane story) is located. However, within the scope of this study, it is not possible to give a full account of the whole spectrum of theories and therefore this theoretical framework will be limited to those theories and suppositions which are more directly concerned with power and power relations within the ambit of the local authority planning environment. McCloughlin (1993) confirms that there are a large range of theoretical positions and that it is important to be clear on which and why. Allmendinger (2001:221) argues that if we take the theme of the postmodern to include issues such as diversity, difference and opposition, then the question of power is central. Although there has been much theorising about power, there seems to be little agreement on the definition on the complex phenomenon of power (Hillier 2002: 47)².

¹ Campbell and Fainstain (1996: 1-2) argue that it is difficult to define planning theory in view of the fact that it overlaps with other disciplines and that it is difficult to define the boundaries between planning and other disciplines. They also state that (1) planning theory defines areas of inquiry and its central focus, and (2) it confronts principle issues that face planners. It is about the pressing and enduring questions in planning.

² See also definitions on power by Davis (1998: 71) in Hillier (2002: 47).

2.2 UNDERSTANDING “PLANNING AND POWER”

In order to conceptualize contemporary planning theories, specifically within the context of power relations, social rationality and the more recent “*communicative turn in planning*” (Healey), it is imperative to at least look at: (i) the critique on modernist/rational planning; and (ii) the influences (and thoughts) which had led to the unfolding contemporary postmodern planning theories.

The development of planning theory in most parts of the western world was largely dominated by modernist/rational planning theories and the application of the scientific rational planning model that emerged in the UK and the USA during the mid 1900s. The concept of rationality in planning developed through empiricism (the application of experience) and rationalism (the exercise of reasoning) (Muller 1994:7). As ‘a type of planning’ it was largely concerned with the scientific analysis and systems analysis in the planning process (Muller 1994:7; Stuart 1970: 1-5; Cuthbert 1985:89-90; and Sewell and Coppock 1977:1). Although this scientific approach broadened the base of planning methodology and elevated the ‘professional scientific status’ of the urban planning profession in most parts of the world, it over-emphasised the scientific, autocratic and undemocratic approach to planning, and the power of authority (and science). This scientific focus not only diminished the social focus of planning, but it resulted in a scientific rigidity and ‘powerful rationality’ that was widely criticised and resisted by anti-planners³. During the second half of the 1900s, the rational planning model was increasingly criticized for not directing and explaining planning activity satisfactorily⁴.

Beauregard (1996: 227) argues that the disintegration of the modernist planning project, had led to the “*centrifugal disintegration*” of planning theory - “...without a corresponding refocusing of knowledge around the social theories and a broadening of the planning debate”. Taylor (1998); Yiftachel and Huxley (2000); Watson (2001); Allmendinger (2001); and Hillier (2002) however argue that the resistance and critique on the instrumental rationality and modernism in general led to numerous counter-positions in planning theory such as the social turn in planning.

During the sixties and seventies, a number of social movements developed in reaction to the excessively narrow emphasis on physical and economic development and the neglect of broader

³ For a discussion on the above, see Muller (1994:8-10); Faludi (1996: 65); Sandercock (1998: 169); Minnerly (1985:39); and Lindblom (1996).

⁴ For more information on the critique on the rational planning model, see Muller (1994:8 -10); Sandercock (1998: 169); Lindblom (1996); Mellors and Copperthwaite (1987: 96); Hall (1996:332); Sewell and Coppock (1977:1); Carmona and Burgess (date unknown); Krumholtz and Clavel (1994: 1- 4); Watson (2001); Campbell and Fainstain (1996: 10); and Healey (1996 b: 234).

social development and social wants and needs⁵, viz: the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s; and the proponents of Advocacy Planning⁶, Radical Planning, Equity Planning⁷, Marxist planning⁸, and the Basic Needs Approach⁹. This reaction to the modernist project with its focus on instrumental rationality and neglect of the *'human urbanus'*¹⁰ (in most parts of the UK, USA and Western Europe), had led to a new social awareness and a new focus on a wider remit of social issues¹¹. This critique on modernist planning and the subsequent quest for new forms of planning is also associated with the "postmodern turn" during the same period (see Allmendinger 2001). According to Sim (1998:3), the postmodern turn is associated with amongst others; a commitment to cultural progress; the emancipation of mankind versus economic want and political oppression; the anti-authoritarian mind set; a new form of scepticism about authority, wisdom, cultural and political norms; the rejection of structuralism and its methods and also the ideological assumption that lies behind it.

Closely related to the above critique on instrumental rationality and the emerging social awareness is the (re)newed interest in democratic planning and community participation which developed in most democratic countries during the sixties and seventies¹². Although the neglect of the social environment and the emerging social awareness highlighted the role of communities in the planning and decision making processes, democratic planning was mainly inspired by the development of the emerging democratic movements. Thomas (1995:18) argues that the influences that affected the new focus on participation came from the public administration theorists that emphasised the role of the community in administration. Sewell and Coppock (1977:1-2), argue that the role for the public in planning was rooted in both philosophical considerations - the general belief that the individual had the right to be informed and consulted on

⁵ For more information on the reaction of these social movements, see Moser (1997: 47- 48); Claassen and Milton (1992:722); Alexander (1979:121); So *et al* (1979:500 - 6); Hall (1996: 32); and Sewell and Coppock (1997:1).

⁶ Advocacy planning was also opposed to the organized, institutionalised forces of government and planning (which could not effectively deliver the necessary services to the people) (Alexander 1979:121). For more information on the advocacy planners, see Kennedy (1993); Hall (1996:332); Brooks (1996: 117); Fainstein and Fainstein (1996:270); and Sandercock (1998: 117).

⁷ Equity planning focuses on the poor and elderly with few resources, the truly disadvantaged, and emphasises greater community. See also Krumholtz and Clavel (1994: 1-4 and 238); Teitz (1997:786-7); Fainstein and Fainstein (1996: 269 - 271); Sandercock (1998: 173 - 174); Campbell and Fainstein (1996:263); and Marris (1998:11 and 16).

⁸ The Marxist urban planners regard the fair distribution of "real income" as central to the planning process - so as to benefit the groups that have the least. See also Klosterman (1996:160-161); Carmona and Burgess (unpublished); Sandercock (1998: 176); Hall (1989:246-7); Fainstein and Fainstein (1996:278 - 280); and Sandercock (1998:173 - 173).

⁹ For more information on the Basic Needs Approach, see Carmona and Burgess (unpublished); and Abbott (1996:25-9); Sidabutar (1992: 17-24); Bastin and Hidayat (1992: 94-5); and Fritschi, Kristyani and Steinberg (1992: 152).

¹⁰ Cited in Hillier 2002.

¹¹ This remit of social issues includes amongst others: meeting basic human needs and wants; addressing poverty in general; the promotion of equity in all its forms; basic community development; combating discriminatory practices regarding race, gender, and cultures; helping the poor minorities, the marginalised and the truly disadvantaged (the bottom of the social society); respecting and assisting elderly people, handicapped people, orphans, unemployed and inoperative people, the homeless, and social misfit in general; and the promotion of local economic development.

¹² For more information on the development of community participation, see So *et al* (1979: 552); Oosthuizen (1986: 203 - 4); Thomas (1995: 2 -3); Burke (1983: 106); and Sewell and Coppock (1977: 1); Hampton (1977: 27); Bekker (1996:29); and Slater (1984: 2).

matters which affect him/her personally, and pragmatic considerations - the general belief that plans or decisions failed to identify public preferences correctly. Fainstein and Fainstein (1996: 275) further argue that democratic planning is primarily associated with the mainstream of democratic thought and the argument by Alexis de Tocqueville, which states that "*Everyone is equal and has an equal right to advance his or her cause*".

This new form of democratic planning with its extended focus and its cross-sectoral and socio-political nature not only had a major impact on the roles of local authority planners, managers and politicians¹³ but it resulted in numerous new power structures (in the form of representative community forums¹⁴), new types of power (e.g. the power of community leaders); and also new power relations (such as the power relations between communities and elected politicians)¹⁵.

This social/democratic movement not only redirected the course of urban planning practice in most democratic countries, but it opened up a new debate in planning theory. Yiftachel and Huxley (2000) provide a new light on contemporary theory debates with specific reference to the way in which planning theorists have increasingly, since the 1970s, redirected the focus of planning theory from the modernist/rational or the instrumental rationality with its modernist limitations, towards the rational-communicative. Healey (1997:29) refers to "*the communicative turn*" in planning and the new intellectual wave that had been building up since the 1970s, which is labeled as argumentative, communicative or interpretative planning theory. During the last decade, a growing number of communicative planning theorists such as Forester, Healey, Hoch, Innes, Mandelbaum (and more recently Hillier), have taken a communicative turn in planning practice in describing and theorizing urban and regional planning.

This communicative turn in planning ultimately liberated planning theorists from the con(de)defined instrumental rationality as it engaged them in poststructuralist and multicultural discourses on the nature of knowledge, ethics, and justice (and power). This in turn led to a considerable number of planning theorists engaging in the communicative-pragmatic logic, accumulating evidence about speech, narratives, professional profiles, consensus building and negotiation (and power)(Yiftachel

¹³ For more information on the impact of community participation on planners, see Wissink (1996:151); Thomas (1995:1- 2, 14, 34,178 -180); Koster (1996:100); and Slater (1994). See also Mc Clendon and Quay (1994: 40); Davidoff (1965 and 1996: 305); Sandercock (1998:175); and Flyvbjerg (1996:383 - 384) on the new social and political roles of planners.

¹⁴ In many cases in the world, including South Africa, community forums became so active and powerful that a controversy arose on the actual role of the community and the elected politicians - specifically with regard to who has the right to make decisions. For more information on the above, see Rich (1983: 151); Ward (1996: 56); Shepherd in Abbott (1996: 20); Thomas (1995:1and 48); Fainstein and Fainstein (1996:269); Burgess *et al* (1997:152 -153); National Department of Land Affairs, Development and Planning Commission (1998:13); and Oranje *et al* (2000).

¹⁵ For more information on the impact of these new (community) powers and power relations, see Thomas (1995:5); Susskind and Elliot (1986:156); Mc Clendon and Quay (1992:118); Bekker *et al* (1996: 85); and Mc Auslan (1992: 97).

and Huxley 2000)(underlined emphasis by author). Mandelbaum (1996 xviii) in Watson (2001) also states that there is a *“pervasive interest in the behaviour, values, character and experiences of professional planners at work”*. Theorists increasingly acknowledged the need to listen and register the daily interactive work of planning professionals (see also Watson (2001); and Mandelbaum (1996 xviii) in Watson (2001), Flyvbjerg (1998); and Hillier (2002). See also discussion on *“the practice movement”* in Chapter 3.

2.3 CONTEXTUALISING THE SOCIAL FABRIC IN THE LIFEWORLD

Although this study primarily took a Foucauldian viewpoint on the study of power relations as will be discussed in later paragraphs, it is believed that these power relations should be studied, also within the context of the social nexus and the web of social relations (and powers). Within the context of social/power relations, Habermas distinguishes between communication (which is associated with normal talk) and *“communicative action”* which is an action *“oriented to reach common understanding”*, an action associated with influences, strategic action and therefore power relations. Habermas further refers to the two concepts of *“lifeworld”* and *“systems”*. The *“lifeworld”* can briefly be defined as the social/cultural world or the realm of personal relations; while *“the systems”* could be e.g. the capitalist economy or the bureaucratic administration. These systems, which form the context within which the lifeworld operates, can suppress the lifeworld, creating conflict, distorting communication or communicative action - resulting in a power clash between the lifeworld and systems.

The interactive flow of knowledge, process of communication, and communicative (inter) action, negotiation, speech act, consensus building and negotiations, narratives at all levels, discourses and relations between *“different actors in the lifeworld”* (Habermas) provides a new/another perspective on the complex social nexus and the complex web of social relations in which we live our lives (Healey (1997: 57 -58). According to Healey (1997: 58), this complex web of social relations (hereafter referred as *“the social web”*), has points of intersection or nodes which are normally the common spaces of the institutions, associations etc or *“the arenas where systems of meaning, ways of acting and ways of valuing are learned, transmitted and sometimes transformed”*. It is the dynamics within these social webs that *“create”* different forms of power and power relations.

Thomas Wartenburg refers to the concept of a *“social alignment”* that *“provides a way of understanding the ‘field’ that constitutes a situated power relationship as a power relationship”*. According to Wartenburg, this social alignment (within the context of power relations) can only be

created if the coordinated practice of the social agents (which form the alignment) are so comprehensive that the social agents facing the alignment encounter it as having control over certain things he or she might need or desire (see Foucault in Gutting ed.1994). This argument further indicates that power is distributed through a complex social web and mediated by social alignments (Foucault in Gutting ed.1994). Kogler (1996: 235) also states that power is a system of social networks that are founded as such within the 'social and historical lifeworld'.

This relationship between social relations and power is also underscored by Antony Giddens' structuration theory which amongst others states that we as humans or social beings live through culturally bound structures of rules and resource flows, and in, and through dense and diffuse sets of relational webs, each one of which presents an active context of our lives. According to Giddens, these webs are continuously shaped by structuring forces - also referred to as the power(full) forces all around us (see Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994).

Based on the foregoing discussion and the works of Habermas, Healey, Wartenburg, Kogler, Giddens, and Hillier, it is evident that the dynamic and interacting social relations (and communicative action) are, not only associated with power relations, but also responsible for "creating" specific power relations. During the late nineties and early 2000, various planners in the academic field, such as Forester, Hoch, Healey, Flyvbjerg, Lapintie, Hillier, Allmendinger, and Watson explored these social relations in an attempt to better understand the dynamics of it, as well as its relationship with power relations.

Although Habermas was "somewhat silent" on the issues of power, Foucault provided "power(full)" viewpoints on the social nexus within which Habermas' communicative action is exercised .

2.4 MACHIAVELLI AND FOUCAULT ON POWER

The question of the exercise of power has always played a central role in human sciences Allmendinger (2001:221). Machiavelli already in the early 1500s presented a useful (and somewhat shocking and evil) discussion on power in his classic work "*The Prince*" (Machiavelli)¹⁶. Machiavelli states that the wish to acquire more power is admittedly a very natural and common phenomenon. He presented various tactics and strategies, based on his combat experiences, on how to obtain power (at all cost), how to maintain power through prowess and fortune, and how to exercise power, by fighting by law or by force. Machiavelli's aggressive ways of "becoming a Prince" is typical of the dominatory power, which is so synonymous with power in general.

¹⁶ Machiavelli's work was translated in 1961 by George Bull.

For many years power was seen as part of the juridical or dominatory authority concepts - something that was exercised (enforced) by some on others, similar to the powers held and exercised by "Machiavelli's Prince". Power in Western Capitalism was denounced by the Marxists as class or production domination while proponents of Soviet Social power referred to it as totalitarianism (Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994). It took many years for the Western world to realise that power is more than juridical and negative and that it could also be technical and positive (see also Allmendinger 2001; Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994: 122). During the 1960s, Foucault studied the mechanics of power in themselves "*on the basis of daily struggles at grass-roots levels, among those whose fight was located in the fine meshes of power*" (Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994: 122). Foucault, mainly based on his work "*Discipline and Punish*" (Foucault 1975, translated by Sheridan in 1977), radically reformulated the concept of power¹⁷. Drawing on the theories of Nietzsche, Foucault also linked power with the flow of knowledge (and communication) (Allmendinger 2001: 26; see also Forester 1982; and Hillier 2002: 49). Foucault's involvement with hermeneutic sociology and the study of people and institutions also resulted in a major (re)conceptualisation of strategic power relations in support of Habermas' theory of communicative action (Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994: 236 - 237).

Unlike Habermas who believes that power can be 'bracketed' in consensus seeking process, Foucault believes that power can not be 'bracketed' in view of the fact that it is everywhere and that it comes from everywhere. Foucault largely redirected the focus on power away from the centre, the nodes (in the social web), the locus, institutions, and juridical structures etc. He argued that power was something that flows from the centre to the peripheries, that it circulates through individuals and binds them together in a net or web of relationships (Foucault 1996; Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994; and Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994). This web (which was also referred to by Foucault as the general matrix of force relations at a given time in a given society) is loosely structured into disciplines within which power and knowledge are linked (Hillier 200: 49). Foucault specifically states that power relations are rooted deeply in the social nexus (Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994) and that it has become embodied within local discourse and institutions (such as planning) (Foucault in Allmendinger 2001: 219 - 220). Foucault in Faubion (ed.) (1994: 340) however argues that power only exists when exercised by some on others - it is not simply a relationship between partners but a way (the communicative action) in which some act on others. It's the type of behaviour between individuals and groups that create power - through communication and communicative action (see also Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994: 34).

¹⁷ Foucault's book "*Discipline and Punish*" presented an opportunity for inquiry and new kinds of knowledge of human beings - even as they created new forms of control. This book specifically highlighted the scale and continuity of the exercise of power (Foucault in Sheridan 1977).

Although Foucault and Habermas, as well as their follower-theorists, view social relations and power relations as different, non-interchangeable entities, it seems to be evident from the foregoing discussion that these social and power relations are somewhat related as they both form an integral part of the social nexus. This correlation between social relations and power further shows how strategic and communicative action mutually conditions one another, and secondly how a certain kind of power accompanies any speech action (see Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994: 237).

Based on this premise of this “integrated” social/power web, a number of other Foucauldian “power arguments and theories” are presented¹⁸. Foucault argues that power is not only a supplementary structure over and above society. This implies that the state (authority) cannot occupy the whole field of power as it can only operate on already existing power relations - the so-called metapower. Foucault refers to “*the whole set of little powers*” or “*little institutions*” at the lowest level. Unlike Machiavelli’s viewpoint on the power of “*The Prince*”, Foucault argues that power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; instead power is a matter of subtle and meticulous control of bodies rather than the influence by ethical and judicial ideas and institutions. This aspect is further supported by Thomas Wartenburg’s discussion on power, within the context of the social alignment discussed previously (see Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994). Foucault argues that power is not only disposed by agents (in the social alignment), but also through the so called “*instruments of power*” such as buildings, documents, tools etc. (Foucault in Gutting ed. 1994: 106). Power must be understood as a “*multiplicity of force relations*” that is “*produced from one moment to the next in all points and all relations*” (see also Flyvbjerg 2001:120). Foucault further argues that resistance is intrinsic to all power relations - “*where there is power there is resistance*”.

These characteristics and dynamics of Foucault’s “powers” are typical and reminiscent of the powers and power relations found in most planning environments, see McCloughlin (1992); McClendon and Quay (1992); Brooks (1996: 118 - 131); Marris (1998: 16); Flyvbjerg 1996; 1998 a and b; 2001; Allmendinger (2001); Watson (2001); Lapintie (2002); Hillier (2002); and Homann (2005). In view of the above, Foucault’s power(full) theories (within the context of the social nexus) were used as a basis for the theoretical framework for analysis for this particular study, as discussed in later paragraphs.

¹⁸ These arguments are derived from various readings and discussions on the works of Foucault, see Flyvbjerg (1998); Lapintie (2002); Hillier (2001); Allmendinger (2001); Watson (2001); Kogler (1996); Foucault in Gutting ed. (1994); and Foucault in Faubion ed. (1994: 345).

As a result of the dispersed nature of power, and the different types of power relations in different parts and levels of the so-called power web, this power web has the inherent potential to erupt (see also Hoch 1984). Allmendinger (2001:39) argues that, as a result of the power web that has no centre, we find micro political resistance to (increasingly) centralised forms of power, or the type of power possessed by *“The Prince”*. Foucault gives a central position to the concept of resistance by linking his power theory with that of localised forms of power struggles. He argues that resistance sets itself against every form of external determination that makes self-realisation impossible (Kogler 1996: 239). While Foucault was studying power, he also studied examples of resistance and opposition to power; anti-authority struggles; opposition of power over women; administration over people etc. Foucault identified three common types of struggles, viz: the struggles against forms of domination; exploitation; and subjection (Foucault in Faubion ed. 1994: 329).

Although emphasis is placed on the dominatory types of infra power [*sous-pouvoir*] such as juridical, economic and political power and panopticism¹⁹ (Foucault), there are many other types of power present and active in the power web such as professional power²⁰, community/ neighbourhood power²¹ (see Forester 1987; Hoch 1984; and Hillier 2002), and community and social power (Habermas). These different types of power (within Foucault’s web of power) each with its own strengths and weaknesses can result in unbalanced power relations (Forester 1987: 305). The weaker party normally loses, because the type of mediation/negotiation is normally a political strategy applied in such a way to favour the “power at hand” (Forester 1987: 305). This creates a range of power relations that are contingent and fragile (Allmendinger 2001:26-39) and relationships that are marked by power struggles and conflict (Kogler 1996: 235). Again, these power relations, struggles and conflict are typical of the planning environment, specifically in the local authority environment with its political influences and powers, see Forester (1982); Hoch (1984); McCloughlin (1992), McClendon and Quay (1992); Brooks (1996: 118 - 131); Marris (1998: 16); Flyvbjerg 1996; 1998 a and b; 2001; Allmendinger (2001); Lapintie (2002); Watson (2001); and Hillier (2002); and Homann (2005). Planners often work in imbalances of power and with conflicting political goals and a “communicative infrastructure” that are shaped by power structures

¹⁹ According to Foucault in Faubion ed. (1994) panopticism is one of the fundamental characteristics of power relations in our society. It is a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment and compensation and in the form of correction. It implies the molding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms.

²⁰ Professional power relates to the power of e.g. planners - to influence developments, processes, procedures decisions, communities etc (Forester 1987: 303). Planners’ information and knowledge is a strong source of power. It can be used to influence groups etc, it legitimises and rationalises the maintenance of existing power, control and ownership (watchdog). The information provides planners with the advantage of knowing where and how to find things and do things etc. (Forester 1982: 68; see also Hoch 1984).

²¹ Neighbourhood and community power is a type of power that is created through democratic rights, “the voice” of individuals and groups and social expression (Forester 1987: 303 and Hoch 1984).

(Forester 1987:303). In the light of the foregoing it has become increasingly important for planners (and those professions working with power and politics) to better understand the dynamics of power and power relations. Planners will have to resist a “bad” concentration of power or dominatory centres of power (Allmendinger 2001: 219 - 221), and to address the wrong types of communicative action that can in fact become weapons in a continuous power struggle (Lapintie 2002; see also Flyvbjerg 1998; and Watson 2001).

Based on the work of Healey (1997), Hillier (2002), and Forester (1987: 306 - 310), a wide range of strategies could be used to address the conflict and the power planning dilemmas and to reach common ground or consensus. This aim of balancing power relations (and struggles) largely resonates with Healey’s concept of achieving a “*shared language*” through a process of interactive imagining and consensus building (Healey1997). Hillier captured the essence of the challenge facing planners in local authorities with her theory on “*discursive democracy*”. This theory, which largely draws on the works of Habermas and Healey promotes: “*a process of open discussion in which all points of view can be heard and that the policy outcome/s which result/s is/are legitimate when they reflect the mutual understandings (through reciprocity, reflexivity, respect, cooperation, etc.)*” (Hillier 2002: 77).

Not only does Foucault’s theories present valuable insight on the typical power relations found in the local authority-planning environment as discussed earlier on, but his work also has significant value for planning, and more specifically the democratic and argumentative types of planning which seem to be dominating the planning praxis. His work enables us to better understand power in the multiplicity of micro practices that comprises everyday life, and to appreciate that power is a relational process rather than a commodity operating from the top down (Hillier 2001: 49). Watson (2001) states that Foucault’s concept of power has value in terms of its diffuse form, while the idea of the “micro- physics” of power suggests its location in everyday practices. Foucault helps us to understand that power is omnipresent and that there are various different types of power on different levels, unlike the old perception that power is a bad, evil and dominatory force, or something in the hands of “*The Prince*”, as presented by the classic work of Machiavelli. Foucault not only provides an understanding of the complex web of power relations, but his theories also help us to understand relationships and struggles between people in the lifeworld and in the planning domain. It shows how different powers work with, and against each other, and how power clashes can result in conflict. Foucault’s work further helps us to understand certain types of behaviour and actions of individuals and groups, why they do or don’t do certain things and why they react or resist certain influences, e.g. change. By having an understanding of power relations, individuals and groups, and planners working within such a power web could develop strategies to

exploit “good” powers and to combat “bad” powers. This could also help planners to deal more effectively with resistance, struggles and conflict. These aspects are much relevant in the planning environment and will therefore form part of the (theoretical) framework for analysis. There seems to be little doubt that future planning theory will have to focus more on the Foucauldian concepts of power and knowledge (Lapintie 2002).

2.5 POWER AND RATIONALITY - AND THE POWER OF (COMMUNICATIVE) RATIONALITY

Various studies, specifically in the field of planning have focused on the relationship and conflict between power and rationality and the role of politics in planning, see Forester (1982); Hoch (1984); McCloughlin (1992), McClendon and Quay (1992); Brooks (1996: 118 - 131); Marris (1998: 16); Flyvbjerg 1996; 1998 a and b; 2001; Allmendinger (2001); Lapintie (2002); Watson (2001); and Hillier (2002); and Homann (2005). These studies amongst others present an example of the web of inter-related social relations (the social web), the dynamic process of communicative action (or lack thereof) as well as the power struggles, conflict and resistance associated with it.

When it comes to the volatile role of the planner in the web of power relations and the planner’s “contingent and fragile” relation with other powers in the web (specifically within the context of the ‘lifeworld’ and the ‘realpolitik’), it is imperative to focus on the contributions by Bent Flyvbjerg on power (relations). Flyvbjerg who largely drew on the work of Foucault (Flyvbjerg 1998 b) developed a new insight on the conflict between ‘*power and rationality*’. Based on his recent case study in the City of Aalborg (Flyvbjerg 1998 a), he came to the conclusion that “*power defines rationality, and the greater the power, the less the rationality*”. Flyvbjerg specifically emphasises the power of realpolitik “over” that of rational planning actions, i.e. “*the force of deliberate distortion of documentation, behind-the-scenes negotiations, undemocratic coalitions, and the dominance of rhetorical persuasion*”; *vis a vis* “*the force of the better argument*” as promoted by Habermas. This provides a new insight on the planner’s role within the political arena and emphasises the need for planners to create consensus and to be neutral towards power.

Lapintie (2002) states that Flyvbjerg’s arguments are relevant in view of the fact that it provides a comprehensive and painstaking example of planning in a local political context, and that it provides an antithesis of the Utopianism of both the rational and communicative approaches to planning. Flyvbjerg’s spearhead (according to Lapintie 2002) is largely directed at planning theory that backs this *naïvete*: the idea of common objectives and evaluation of alternatives based on scientific documentation; and the communicative idea of ‘the force of the better argument’. Forester (1999) also views Flyvbjerg’s work as “*superb and compelling*”, but agrees with Lapintie that the

theoretical perspectives and analysis are over-generalized. See also critique on Flyvbjerg in Homann (2005). Hoch (1984: 342), based numerous empirical studies which were done during the last thirty years on the dominance of power relations in the conception, development and implementation of plans argues that the practical implementation of plans, allocation of resources are still mostly guided by *“the force of politics”* (Flyvbjerg) and less so by *“the force of the better argument”* as required by communicative action (Habermas).

Although the contributions of Flyvbjerg is recognised and highly valued in many planning circles, it can also be criticised (also from a Habermasian perspective) for not effectively focussing on “the power of (communicative) rationality”. Firstly, if one accepts the ‘power web relations theory’ of Foucault and the notion that power is omnipresent and on all levels, then we must also accept the power of other less important structures in the web e.g. the planners, communities, officials (Foucault’s *“whole set of little powers”* or *“little institutions”* at the lowest level). Secondly, as discussed previously (Healey, Wartenburg, Kogler, Foucault, and Hillier), power can be created or disposed through communicative action, speech, argumentation etc - the more effective these actions the stronger the power. Thirdly, when the omnipresent little institutions and little powers (Foucault) or agents are aligned and combined in a ‘proper social alignment’ (as defined by Wartenburg), exercising effective communicative action, new and stronger powers and power relations are created. Not only does this support Foucault’s viewpoint, that power is not *“something over another”* but rather *“something in relation to others”*, but it also supports Habermas’ argument relating to the “the force of the better argument”. It further highlights the fact that good arguments and effective communicative action, specifically within a proper social alignment does not have to be dominated by a power structure - on the contrary, such communicative actions, if exercised properly have *the “power”* and potential to challenge the so called dominatory central power structures (and political powers).

Again taking a Habermasian viewpoint on Foucault, and respecting the viewpoints of Healey and Hillier, on communicative action, it is imperative to recognise the role that effective and appropriate communicative action can play in combating power conflict, specifically in the planning environment. Hillier (2002:32) states that communicative action can assist actors to express defense reactions to colonisation of the lifeworld, e.g. through local protests against certain power actions or institutions, e.g. the anti-nuclear movement. Lapintie (2002) also supports the notion that communicative action, if applied successfully, could be used to solve problems of traditional planning and the related power/authority dominance. Flyvbjerg (1998) further states that the works of both Foucault and Habermas highlight an essential tension between conflict and consensus as it emphasise the need for planners to think more in terms of conflict and power - and to seek

consensus (see also Forester 1982: 67; Brooks 1996:118- 31; Harrison 1997: 40; Marris 1998:16; Lapintie 2002;and Hillier 2002).

Flyvbjerg has clearly underestimated the power of social relations and alignments, and communicative action, and more so the potential and combined effect/power of such social actions/powers. Lapintie (2002) also argues that Flyvbjergs' statement of "power defines rationality" could be widely criticised if this rationality is construed as 'communicative rationality'. This power of (communicative) rationality has become specifically relevant in argumentative and democratic planning. In the light of the above, this study primarily focuses on the relationship between power and rationality, and more specifically within the context of the social nexus and communicative action.

Allmendinger (2001: 201-202) based on a case study of a redevelopment scheme in the city centre of Frome (Mendip District Council) also examined the phenomenon of power relations within a planning environment. He refers to the "micro politics" of planning practice which resulted from the conflict and friction between the various role players in the planning and decision making process, e.g. the planners, the politicians and the developers. Like Flyvbjerg, Allmendinger also highlights the power (domination) of the politicians and the CEO in the planning process, and the way in which planners' roles were marginalised. Allmendinger, however unlike Flyvbjerg, also recognised the rational power of the planners and how the planners exercised their knowledge /professional power in enforcing their ideas on the design and layout of the proposed development (the typical modernist rational process). Watson 2001 (130 - 131), based on her case study of spatial planning in the Cape Town Metropolitan Council (which also draws on the works of Foucault and Flyvbjerg), refers to the "micro physics of power" which have shaped the planning process. She goes further to emphasise the power(full) and central role which "discourse - coalition building" played in shaping the planning process and helping the spatial planners to exercise their power within the metropolitan authority - yet another example of the power of communicative action and combined social/power relations.

Lapintie (2002:13) argues that it is difficult to maintain the clear dichotomies between rationality, power and knowledge. Instead of a struggle between rationality and power, "*the realm of planning consists of a multitude of smaller and larger power struggles, where the possible roles and agencies of different actors are in fact constituted*". The above discussion, not only highlights the confusion and different opinions on the relationship between power, rationality and communication, but it also highlights the need to better understand power relations and the dynamics of power in

the complex and volatile planning environment. It is this complexity of power relations that have become so important in the study of planning practice.

2.6 A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

Based on the foregoing theoretical framework, a framework for analysis is presented. Within the context of the specific postmodern and naturalistic nature of this study and the research as discussed in Chapter 3, this framework must be construed as a framework that directs the analysis, and not *the* framework that (de) confines the study.

The study uses the transformation of the urban planning system in the City of Tshwane during the period 1992 to 2002 as a case study to analyse and deconstruct the dynamic and complex power relations in a local authority-planning environment (specifically during a turbulent period of transformation). This Tshwane case study furthermore unravels and narrates the way in which powers and power relations were affected by the transformation, and in turn how it affected the transformation of urban planning in the City of Tshwane. As a result of the integrated nature of the so-called power web and the social web (power relations and social relations) as discussed earlier on, the study specifically explores the dynamics of power relations within the context of social relations and alignments and communicative action. The study further unravels the nature of power relations, specifically at the intersections or nodes of the web and deconstructs the fine grain of the power web or the so - called micro physics of power (Watson 2001) in terms of the local authority-planning environment. In an attempt to better understand the effect and behavior of power relations, the study explores the different types and levels of power and its characteristics, the ways in which the different powers traverse and change in the web, the impact on each other (the general matrix of force relations), and lastly its impact on people and systems.

The study further unpacks the illusive power relations in a local authority planning environment with specific reference to the relationship between power and rationality and the ways in which “power defines rationality” (similar to the work of Flyvbjerg 1998 and Watson 2001 with regard to power and rationality). In response to these studies, the study explores the possibilities (and power) of the “the force of the better argument” or rationality (within the context of communicative action, local discourse and social power) and the affect which this could have on power relations - “the power of (communicative) action”.