CHAPTER 5   POLITICO-SECURITY REGIONALISM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: SADCC AS A RESPONSE TO APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA IN THE COLD WAR ERA

5.1   Introduction

In 1980, the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was established, its members (Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland) succeeded the Frontline States (FLS)[24] in order to counter apartheid destabilisation in the Southern African region. Before and after the inception of SADCC, the terms, South Africa's apartheid policy, had a significant impact on both the creation and evolution of security regionalism in Southern Africa. These unfriendly terms were deeply embedded in European colonialism and its legacy which had continuously bred a series of fear, enmity and confrontation in terms of ideological and material values. Although Southeast Asia also experienced relations of enmity amongst the ASEAN bloc and the Vietnamese bloc, yet, the major difference of the regional history of Southeast Asia from Southern Africa was the absence of racial conflict based on racism.

The region's construction, as a site called 'Southern Africa', was, according to Vale (2003:30), 'premised on the discovery of minerals and, equally so, that these were located in South Africa'. Since the discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) in South Africa, copper in Zambia, and coal in Zimbabwe, the regional setting of relations within and among nations have had 'a long (though infamous) pedigree' (Hull, 1996:33), even so much as to influence the current regional orders. Therefore, the present and future scenario of politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa can be, to some extent, approached and understood in the context of the past. Given the fact that current SADC politico-security regionalism evolved out of the region's past experiences – the FLS and SADCC – it is necessary to provide a historical overview of politico-security regionalism(s) which was not only represented as the driving force, aim and strategy of each regional organisation, but also utilised as the defensive instrument of

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[24] The original members of the FLS were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria (briefly), Tanzania and Zambia and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of the organisation for most of its existence (see Baregu, 2003:20; Nkiwane, 2003:60).

'nation-building' and 'state-making' in the name of 'region-making' in Southern Africa. Just as ASEAN (as a group of newly independent states) prioritised the state-centric orientations of sovereignty and non-interference in the affairs of states, SADCC, (which had a strong sensitivity to loss of sovereignty in terms of the group of newly independent states), was also a national interest-driven organisation to address national concerns through regional coordination and cooperation. According to Schoeman (2001:143), in this sense, 'the attempts to regionalise Africa including the case of Southern Africa has been first and foremost aimed at state-building, … For this reason, any aim and approach that may be considered as threatening sovereignty of a state were destined to dissolve the realm of regionalisation'.

Politico-security regionalism(s) in Southern Africa, which manifested in the FLS and SADCC, evolved over time, with roots being of a nature of nationalist sovereignty orientation and deeply embedded in the colonial history of the region. In this context, Southern African politico-security regionalism (involving the FLS and SADCC) illustrated complex networks in dealing with regional concerns and problems. Whereas the BLNS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland)[25] were, despite the various contexts of dependence, interdependence and domination, subordination, deeply linked to and interacted with the hegemonic South Africa's economic might, the BLNS countries supported the opposition to apartheid South Africa (Vale, 1996:6-13). This implies that military and political state security in this period was placed in a paramount position higher than economic or other concerns. Thus, 'SADCC's anti-apartheid stance and its resistance to South African regional hegemony became the organisation's … source of unity' (Gibb, accessed on 18 September 2004) to create and enhance a regional identity in the midst of intense ideological diversity among member states and South African destabilisation.

Yet, although one of SADCC's major objectives was to reduce dependence on South Africa and European imperialists, the member states increased their dependence on South Africa and foreign aid instead of decreasing these influences. By implication, this can be comprehended in the sense that the (then) regional order was aligned against a

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[25] Prior to Namibia's membership, the acronym for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was BLS. Namibia joined at independence (1990), formerly being part of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) as a South African Colony. Throughout the period of apartheid, the BLNS countries remained highly dependent on South Africa (see Hull, 1996:33-34).

background of weak states and powers of (black) majority versus a hegemonic regional power, South Africa. In this regard, Zacarias (1999:171) noted:

> The recent history of instability in Southern Africa is not associated with wars caused by border disputes, entrenched rivalry between states, peoples or tribes, but to colonialism and apartheid. Indeed, … instability and the fear and fragmentation it generated were particularly related to apartheid's struggle for survival and reflected South Africa's hegemonic ambitions.

This chapter will analyse the creation, evolution and process of SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa up to the end of the Cold War and apartheid. In doing so, the case of ASEAN, which was studied in the previous chapter 4, will be instrumental in unfolding the differences and similarities of the nature, character, and focus of both the ASEAN and SADCC politico-security regionalisms. The primary and root causes of current SADC politico-security regionalism, which were intricately embedded in the course of development of the past regional projects including the FLS and SADCC, will be elaborated from the earlier period of European colonialism and its counterforce of Pan-Africanist movement to the ending of the apartheid era. In this chapter, focusing on evolutionary SADCC politico-security regionalism in Southern Africa in times of relations of enmity among and within nation-states, it will highlight the fundamental mechanisms of the regional organisation, its aim, value and *modus operandi*. This will, as a result, facilitate an understanding of the character, nature and type of contemporary SADC politico-security regionalism of post-apartheid Southern Africa (see Chapter 7).

5.2   The Origin of SADCC

Before the outbreak of the colonial fervour in the 1890s, Europeans had already made tangible intrusions into Southern Africa[26]. Before this date, Southern Africa evolved through the growth of pastoralism of the indigenous people and inflows of Bantu-

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[26] By the 1880s the stream of settlement (dominated by the expansion of Europeans) was already touching the Limpopo, over a thousand miles into the interior from its base at Cape Town (see Oliver and Fage, 1988:139).

speaking farmers[27] from the north with knowledge of iron-working, together with trade, in fostering large-scale polities (Iliffe, 1996:98; Thompson, 1995:242). Yet, it has often been assumed that during this period the region was 'economically more underdeveloped, politically more inexperienced and culturally more backward than any of the greater colonies of settlement. After one and a half centuries the colony contained one town worthy of a name and five or six little villages' (De Kiewet, 1957:30). This situation was greatly changed and transformed following the discovery of mineral wealth such as large deposits of diamonds and gold in the region, specifically in South Africa, in the late 19th century.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, just as the Southeast Asian region was subjected to the exploitative forces of colonial powers, the Southern African region was also suffering predatorion, resulting from international colonialist and imperialist system. The Southern African region's history has been, according to Poku (2001:18), 'more influenced by European colonialism than indigenous factors. … [N]ot only the main components of the Southern African boundary framework but the political status of the regional territories were determined'. In more detail, between 1795 and 1870, radical changes took place throughout Southern Africa[28]. The expansion of the Europeans led to the movement of Africans into different places. During the early nineteenth century, the combined impact of ecological and European pressures and the consolidation of power in some African states generated the *mfecane*, a massive dislocation and movement of peoples which had a profound impact on the size of political communities and their respective distribution (Omer-Cooper, 1994:59-66).

Towards the end of the 19th century, the imperialist powers of Europe competed in a 'scramble for Africa' to secure the largest possible areas of control. Their rivalries, however, were resolved at the Berlin conference of 1884-85, which carved Africa into 'spheres of interest' and of intended occupation by the Europeans. The national boundaries that were drawn up in Berlin have remained almost unchanged until the

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[27] These became later on the majority of the population of the region.

[28] There were two major processes. One was a series of significant disturbances among the African farming communities throughout much of Southern Africa. The other was an expansion of White people northward and eastward from the Cape Colony at the expense not only of Khoisan communities, as before, but also of Bantu-speaking Africans. Both processes were punctuated by violence and resulted in the creation of new states (see Thompson, 1995:268).

present time (Ostergaard, 1990:19).

Despite the justification of colonialism in the name of the civilisation of the region, of particular importance is that as these settlers moved further inland, infrastructure was built to meet their needs. In this context, Vale (1996:7) pointed out that 'the region's indigenous peoples were excluded from its rewards, and so began the long history of violent suppression and deprivation designed to keep them in their place'.

In the first half of the twentieth century, Southern Africa experienced a number of important developments in the region[29]. In these major developments in the region, the Union of South Africa set up the passage of the Land Act of 1913 which established the 'native reserves' or 'homelands'. The efforts at embedding racial discrimination in the historical-economic framework in the region that were developed into the implementation of apartheid following the National Party's victory in the election in 1948, ultimately made Southern Africa a 'raced space'. This raced space could, once produced, limit and channel further efforts at creating the Southern African region[30] (Niemann, 2000:108-109). In this context, in 1944, the issue of racial equality, which was supported by the Pan-African Federation[31], became an essential part of the spirit

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[29] (1) the establishment of a Union of South Africa (1910) following the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902); (2) the withdrawal of Germany as a colonial power in South West Africa (now Namibia) after the First World War; (3) the formation there of a South African Mandate under the League of Nations auspices; (4) Portugal's intensified exploitation of Angola and Mozambique (from the mid-1920s); (5) and the creation of a Federation in Rhodesia and Nyasaland by the present Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (1953) (see Omer-Cooper, 1994:158-261).

[30] The pass laws in South Africa, the housing of labour in hostels and compounds adjacent to mines and, later, manufacturing facilities all reflected the racialisation of space in Southern Africa.

[31] In 1944, the International African Service Bureau and twelve other active welfare, students' and political organisations came together in Manchester to form the Pan-African Federation which played a crucial role in consolidating the ideology of Pan-Africanism. The Federation had the following objectives: (1) to promote the well-being and unity of African peoples and peoples of African descent throughout the World; (2) to demand the self-determination and independence of African peoples and other subject races from the domination of powers proclaiming sovereignty and trusteeship over them; (3) to secure equality of rights for African peoples and the total abolition of all forms of racial discrimination (see Ajala, 1974:9-10).

of Pan-Africanism. Later on, in 1963, when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established, one of the most significant shared perspectives of African leaders was the need to terminate colonialism, racial discrimination and the apartheid system in Southern Africa (Ajala, 1974: 65; 231-233; 356-357; 380-382; also Dumor, 1991: 164-170).

Meanwhile, once the Second World War ended, just as the Southeast Asian states achieved formal independence, in the late 1950s, the 'winds of change' began also to blow over not only Southern Africa but the whole of Africa. In the period 1961-68, the British government agreed to grant independence to Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. But despite the euphoric hopes of the people, the early independence process failed to transform the regional status quo. The newly independent states in the region were unable to dislodge the colonial legacy in which their own security was weaved deeply into the region's integrated economy, protected and promoted by global capitalism[32]. Moreover, even after their independence, as Southeast Asia remained an unstable and volatile area in the Cold War confrontations, Southern Africa was also put under the complex and insecure milieu of both racial confrontations and great power interventions.

After the Second World War, however, although both regions (Southeast Asia and Southern Africa) saw the importance of decolonisation which was perceived as the most urgent need to restore the regional states in fragments, the depth and length of the process of decolonisation differed. Whereas Southeast Asia experienced unexpectedly a sudden and quick process of decolonisation (e.g. Burma gained independence in 1948; Singapore in 1946; Malaysia in 1948; see Acharya, 2000:44-45), the prospect for the decolonisation in Southern Africa was relatively lingering, spanning approximately three decades from the 1960s to the early 1990s (e.g. Tanzania gained independence in 1961, Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980 and Namibia in 1990). The reason why the decolonisation of Southern Africa was delayed can be seen as a focal point of understanding the root causes of the region's own character of conflict, that is, racial conflict (white versus the black). Under the auspices of Pan-Africanism, in 1963, when the OAU was established, therefore, the theme of decolonisation and racial equality was treated as a significant unifying force among the competing

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[32] The labour migration to South Africa continued, and South Africa's railways provided cheap routes for the export of primary products to international markets (see Vale, 1996:7).

intergovernmental groups in Africa, e.g. the radical Casablanca group, the moderate Monrovia group and a conservative francophone group (for details see Ajala, 1985:4; 1974:25-43; also Wallerstein, 1967). Although African leaders within these different groups had tensions and disagreements on how to attain the issue of continental unification, they agreed that support for liberation from racial inequality in Southern Africa was a responsibility of all Africans (Klotz, 1995:75).

As an impetus for the Pan-Africanism (of liberation)[33], the organisation known as the Frontline States (FLS) came into being in 1974. The original members were Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Nigeria[34], Tanzania and Zambia and after it gained independence in 1980, Zimbabwe joined and acted as chair of the organisation for most of its existence (Baregu, 2003:20; Nkiwane, 2003:60). Unlike the several short-lived attempts at regional cooperation in Southeast Asia (e.g. SEATO in 1954, ASA in 1961, MAPHILINDO in 1963, and ASPAC in 1966; see Chapter 4), the FLS was not only a long-lived organisation in the Southern African region, but also continually an important entity together with and within SADCC later[35]. The FLS, which was established as a loose (military) alliance of the black majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, set as its highest goal that of supporting the liberation forces in their struggle for decolonisation and racial equality[36] (Matlosa, 2001:398). Within an anti-colonial context, thus, the FLS can be viewed as one of the most important mechanisms to appear in the mid-1970s at a time when the ending of colonialism and racial oppression were the hottest issues in the subregion, as well as on the continent (Cilliers, 1999:3).

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[33] According to Mazrui and Gordon (1980:186), African leaders attempted to realise two forms of Pan-Africanism: the Pan-Africanism of liberation and the Pan-Africanism of integration. The former seeks to reduce foreign control over African affairs, while the latter seeks to encourage Africans to form larger economic communities or wider political federations.

[34] Nigeria, which was voted as a member of the FLS by Zimbabwe, participated in a number of meetings as an informal associate member (see Matlosa, 2001:399).

[35] The FLS impacted on the establishment of SADCC in terms of the structure, driving force, aim, and strategy. In addition, even after the existence of SADCC, the FLS continued to play a crucial role in attaining the overall objectives of SADCC.

[36] For the first decades since the outset of independence movements in the late 1950s, the focus of efforts was on decolonising and terminating white minority regimes in the former Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa.

The evolution and framework of the FLS was, thus, deeply influenced by the Pan-Africanist influence. The activities of the FLS often took after those of the OAU's African Liberation Committee (ALC), whose primary goal was to promote the decolonisation process. In addition, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) was, in particular, formed in 1975 as an important structure of the FLS with the mandate to address various security challenges related largely to the South African apartheid ideology facing the member states in the Southern African region (Matlosa, 2001:399).

As the other impetus for the Pan-Africanism (of integration), since the Second World War, the principle of sub-regional economic cooperation was also encouraged by the global as well as continental forces in the Southern African region[37]. In particular, the vision of African regionalism which was best captured in 1981 by the OAU's publication of a document, (Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000),[38] as well as the establishment of the EEC in 1957, played a crucial role in influencing the creation and evolution of SADCC.

Apart from its ideological underpinnings of Pan-Africanism, the solidarity of the FLS was based on three other factors. First, it operated within an *ad hoc* fashion of decision

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[37] The post-war (after the Second World War) progress towards the integration of Europe made a considerable impression on many countries, as the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 proved highly infectious in the countries of the developing world. Influenced by the experiences of European integration and pan-African movement of the 1950s and 1960s, and promoted by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) since the early 1960s, the African leaders recognised the significance of establishing economic integration schemes. As a result, this ignited the optimistic enthusiasm that accelerated the flourishing of experiments in regional cooperation and integration during the post-independence period (for instance, UDEAC, CPCM and LCBC founded in 1964, CEAO and MRU in 1973, and ECOWAS in 1975) (see Asante, 1997:2-44).

[38] In this document, African leaders committed themselves to the 'creation, at the national, subregional and regional levels, of a dynamic and interdependent African economy' and thereby opening the door to the eventual establishment of an African Common Market (ACM) leading to an African Economic Community (AEC). In this regard, the Lagos Plan of Action implies that the creation of regional economic institutions in each of Africa's five major regions –North, East, West, Southern, and Central Africa – is considered as the best instrument for realising the ultimate creation of a continental AEC (see Schraeder, 1996:140).

making with presidential summitry. The FLS summit would involve heads of state and government as well as representatives of the liberation movements.   Second, the FLS' self-imposed restriction on membership generated a simplified management structure and a reduction of intra-FLS conflicts. Third, the informal nature of the FLS afforded members the flexibility to pursue independent policies. (Khadiagala, 1994:257). These factors later on impacted substantially upon the structure and nature of SADCC (which was perceived as an extension of the decolonising resistance to the apartheid system) in terms of an *ad hoc* fashion of decision making and informal nature of the organisation.

The FLS, like SADCC later, aimed not only at fighting for independence of member states but also at 'providing these states with an organisational framework for meeting some of their (political as well as economic) security needs'[39]. In this sense, it can be argued that toward the late 1970s, the attempts by the FLS to address their security problems in Southern Africa evolved into a much broader and deeper search for a regional institution to enhance 'political and economic liberation' through coordinated development initiatives (Khadiagala, 1994:219-248). For the purpose of this, as one of the roles of the FLS, the 'internationalist role' was implicit in the actions of the FLS. The FLS states sought to arouse the international organisations (such as the United Nations, the Commonwealth, the European Community, and the Organisation of African Unity) in various documents not only to condemn apartheid in South Africa, but also to call for sanctions to isolate the white minority regime (Sesay, 1985:29-31). The FLS was also a crucial instrument which promoted and strengthened the basis for more effective (political and economic) security cooperation among the black majority states[40].

However, although the FLS expressed its roles in economic cooperation outside the region as well as inside, the key to steer the function of the organisation was the politico-security oriented strategy as a response to destabilisation of an apartheid

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[39] Hence, the FLS as an antecedent of SADCC was a passage for 'alternative external access to the region' (see Khadiagala, 1990:131).

[40] In the period of 1970s, there were some good examples for the achievements of the FLS to promote political and economic cooperation: the rail link between Tanzania and Zambia, the closure of the border between Rhodesia and Zambia and improved relations between Tanzania and Mozambique in the period when Mozambique struggled for liberation from Portuguese rule.

South Africa's policy. Unlike the policy of *Konfrontasi* (initiated by Indonesia against Malaysia), which only lasted from 1963 to 1966 during the pre-ASEAN period, the policy of destabilisation of the white South African regime against the black states in Southern Africa continued throughout the1980s till the defeat of South Africa at Cuito Cuanavale in Angola in 1988 (Davies, 1990:198-206). In this period, the destabilisation of the region was led by the Botha regime's 'total strategy'. This strategy sought to promote economic and political collaboration with its neighbours on its own terms, and to preserve access to regional resources without compromising its own political system. This policy was formalised early in 1979 in a 'Constellation of Southern African States' (CONSAS) programme, to be underwritten by mutual security agreements as well as various forms of political and economic association[41].

The idea of CONSAS was propagated by Pretoria as an instrument for formulating an anti-Marxist group to destroy the perceived 'total onslaught' [42] of Angola and Mozambique against the white South African government, at a time when Western support for South Africa was diminishing. The independence of Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) in 1980 frustrated South African ideas of CONSAS, however, and prompted South Africa's white regime to adopt a hard-line strategy of destabilisation. Under the circumstances, the black majority states in the region came to draw themselves closer in responding to CONSAS with the BLS states and Zimbabwe choosing not only to reject the South African formula, but also to establish and join SADCC in 1980 (Tow, 1990:65-66; Jaster, 1986:45-48).

5.3   The Evolution of SADCC

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[41] CONSAS was to include South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (the so-called BLS countries), Rhodesia, Namibia, and the Bantustan states (Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei).

[42] The theme of total onslaught was pioneered and led by the USSR and the Eastern bloc with the goal of overturning the South African government and substituting it by a Marxist one. The governments of Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe were relatively seen as advocates of the total onslaught. Lesotho, Zambia and Botswana were seen as its tacit supporters by criticising the apartheid system, upholding sanctions and offering South African political liberationists refrugees. Only Swaziland and Malawi were seen as moderate regimes with which the apartheid regime could, to some extent, cooperate (see Matlosa, 2001:402).

SADCC was established in Lusaka on 1 April 1980 by nine independent African states: the six Frontline States (FLS), Botswana, Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Angola, together with Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland[43].

SADCC's founding statement, the Lusaka Declaration of 1980, provided the guidelines for economic liberation in Southern Africa. By adopting the Declaration, the SADCC states' leaders agreed to create a regional economic organisation that would solidify the members, harmonise their policies, and lessen the influence of South Africa's hegemony (Khadiagala, 1994:228). As derived from this Declaration, the regional grouping's goals were as follows:

- reducing the economic dependence of member states, especially but not exclusively, on South Africa;
- creating and rehabilitating the regional network of transport and telecommunications infrastructure as a precondition for genuine and balanced regional integration;
- mobilising resources in order to promote national, bilateral and regional development policies and programmes;
- co-ordinating action so as to secure international cooperation with and support for SADCC projects (Southern Africa Record, 1987:4).

Just as the 1967 ASEAN Bangkok Declaration emphasised the economic cooperation to promote regional solidarity as an essential prerequisite for the achievement of cooperation in other areas, the 1980 SADCC Lusaka Declaration also focused on the economic cooperation to liberate the region from the legacy of colonialism and in particular, its dependence on apartheid South Africa. However, whereas the ambitions of ASEAN states in the area of regional economic cooperation were largely neglected, the SADCC states saw relatively substantial achievements in regional economic (development) coordination initiatives.

In order to achieve the goal of economic liberation in the region, SADCC member states prioritised the pursuance of collective self-reliance as a way of constructing the 'political emancipation of the region' (Zacarias, 1999:164). However, as SADCC emerged out of the interactions of regional, continental and global forces, the evolution

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[43] Namibia joined in 1990 after winning its independence from South Africa.

of it could (and should) not be limited to Southern African efforts alone either. In fact, both the influence of Western actors and African states themselves were substantially responsible for creating and evolving SADCC (*cf* Ostergaard, 1990). Thus, it is important to note that the evolution of SADCC was a mixed and intertwined product of African initiatives and European influences. In that regard, Mandaza (1990:143) argues, '… Even analysts on the left should remind themselves of the dialectical relationship between imperialist domination and revolutionary pressures'.

Yet, notwithstanding the enormous support that it received from Western donors in the northern hemisphere, SADCC evolved not only out of considerations voiced by African leaders (such as Nyerere, Kaunda and Khama) in the early 1960s[44], but also from its unique approach to regional cooperation. The SADCC leaders chose its own way of project or sectoral responsibility which differed from those of other organisations like the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that pursued mainly economic (market-oriented) integration.

Within this context, as major driving forces to evolve SADCC, two points were highlighted by the leaders of the organisation, which were included in the objectives of the Lusaka Declaration. The first was the reduction of dependence (particularly but not only) on South Africa and the second was the forging of links to generate 'equitable development' in the pursuit of balance and equity through regional cooperation. Its two major objectives were, however, in effect contradictory: while the fact that 'more than 90 percent of financing for SADCC projects came from foreign funding' (Ramsamy, 1995:202) implies the organisation's severe dependence, the fundamental theme of SADCC was to liberate the economy from the legacy of colonialism and imperialism. Moreover, it was inconceivable to create a genuine and equitable region while diminishing reliance on South Africa 'since the entire region had been constructed around South Africa with the peripheral states tightly integrated into the core' (Niemann, 2000:111).

According to Thompson (1991:65), Southern African economic relations, especially

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[44] For example, as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was being dissolved in 1963, African leaders were considering how best to develop regional political and economic cooperation out of the imperialist Federation (see Mandaza, 1990:142-151; Khadiagala, 1994:229-248).

trade ties, were products of the colonial system, in terms of economic links and infrastructure, which caused an 'economic regime' between South Africa and seven of the nine SADCC countries to develop[45]. She goes on to argue that:

> South Africa also provides a link with western markets, and also serves as an outpost for these markets in terms of multinational corporations within South Africa. … [the] dominant economic regime in the region, between South Africa and SADCC, is reinforced by the dependency patterns which link the region to the Western capitalist system (Thompson, 1991:67).

Although reducing economic dependency on South Africa was identified as the major objective of SADCC, Lee (1989:5) points out that, ironically, that during the SADCC era, several states increased, rather than decreased, their economic dependence[46]. SADCC should therefore not be considered as having been an attempt to create a totally different region, but as a defensive effort to, paraphrasing Niemann (2000:111), eschew or circumvent the effects of the distorted integrative structure in the region including South Africa. In this way, some argue that the value and ability of the SADCC's organisation was fundamentally limited and fractured by the nature and framework of SADCC. Mumbengegwi (1987:79-80) summarises this contradiction as follows:

> Despite its claim to political strength and unity, the very framework of [SADCC] cooperation chosen indicates the shaky foundation on which SADCC is built. Desire for collective independence from South African domination is one thing but commitment to regional integration is another. …. Consequently, cooperation in SADCC is a loose arrangement from which a member state can opt out without any serious repercussions on its domestic economy. Thus, SADCC's claim to political strength and unity is its economic weakness.

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[45] Although the degree of dependence differs, South Africa played the leading role of trading partner with all of the SADCC countries, with the exception of Angola and Tanzania (see Thompson, 1991:64-65).

[46] For details on the extent of the SADCC member states' economic dependence both on South Africa and on the advanced capitalist nations (see Lee, 1989:66-116).

Nonetheless, SADCC was not only the symbol but the substantial and authentic embodiment of the states of the region in their struggle for liberation. It was a political-economic project of the independent states of the region, which was perceived by apartheid South Africa as a dangerous enemy of its regional hegemony (Green and Thompson, 1986:261). As mentioned in the previous section 5.2, the emergence of SADCC in 1980 can be partly seen as a reaction to South Africa's proposal of a CONSAS programme in 1979 with a view to preventing the SADCC member countries from being turned into South African satellites. Although economic development was an important goal of the SADCC members, the organisation was, in essence, politically motivated by the FLS not only to ward off South Africa's hegemonic destabilisation but also to attract (more) foreign aid (Davies and O'meara, 1985:196-211; Ostergaard, 1990:51-79). As a whole, however, the South African threat to SADCC in the region gave the organisation an opportunity to 'represent the Southern African dream of economic development, self-determination, mass welfare and winning free of South African domination' (Green, 1989:A25).

During the Cold War, 'politico-economic security strategy' and 'politico-military security cooperation' largely dominated the SADCC security regionalism. The former was to reduce dependence on the South African economy, and the latter aimed at responding to South African destabilisation policies. The SADCC member states' response to these dual security issues reflected their Pan-Africanist perspectives that apartheid and racial discrimination brought forth economic exploitation and regional insecurity (Klotz, 1995:80). The norm of racial equality underpinning Pan-Africanism, in this sense, played a crucial role in operating objectives, values and *modus operandi* of SADCC. These were embedded in the two security issues above, which will be further discussed in the following sections (see 5.4 and 5.5).

5.4   Politico-Economic Security Strategy

During the 1980s when SADCC was initiated and shaped by neo-liberalism, which advocates the primacy of the market mechanism over government intervention in the economy, was a dominant theoretical approach to development including the issues of regional cooperation. Yet, in terms of regional cooperation, SADCC, from its inception,

rejected neo-classical economic theories that deal only with 'benefits from trade'[47]. As Davies (1992:63) argued, the neo-liberal approach is indifferent to existing inequalities between the SADCC members, assuming that they are either not serious problems or that they will eventually be solved by the market. However, because colonial legacies linked to apartheid, which tend to reinforce the uneven development among and within the SADCC region, are still prevalent in the region, SADCC members were disinterested in 'relying solely on exchange relations' based mainly on trade and market integration to manage their economies (Thompson, 1992:132-133).

Thus, SADCC chose a different approach to regional cooperation from other sub-regional and continental approaches, including both European and ASEAN examples. Although the initiation of SADCC was inspired by the (then) EEC's success and encouraged by the Lagos Plan of Action, SADCC succeeded, to some extent, in shunning the predominant influence of concepts and strategies alien to their needs and interests: that is, 'SADCC neither embraced the EEC-type model with its economic-community foundation nor did it adopt concepts emanating either from a CONSAS or from the Lagos Plan of Action' (Weimer, 1991:80). Given the ineffectual and inefficient outcomes of regional economic integration schemes elsewhere in Africa, as proved especially in the case of EAC, SADCC purposely rejected a common market or free trade approach to integration. Rather, SADCC chose a 'project coordination approach' which emphasised the need to promote projects in the areas of industrial production and infrastructure in order to boost cooperation in regional development projects (see SADCC, 1989).

Although the ASEAN states were reluctant to push economic integration and cooperation among and within themselves due to the differences in member states' levels of development and the high level of competitive exports, they could succeed in achieving a steady economic growth for three decades since its inception of ASEAN through the market-focused economic orientation, more specifically extra-regional

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[47] Given a number of attempts such as the Central African Federation (CAF), East African Community (EAC) and SACU, which led to the severe unbalances and inequities in the distribution of gains, it is conceivable why SADCC began to challenge the neo-liberal approach to regional cooperation by encouraging 'production before trade' (see Thompson, 1992:130-132).

trade[48] (Lim, 1995:238-245). In terms of economic structure, both ASEAN and SADCC can be characterised by the general lack of complementarities in production and industrial structure among the member countries. This is seen in the fact that the degree of intra-regional trade in both regions was very low and inactive (for the ASEAN case, see Narine, 2002:24-30; for SADCC, see Ndlela, 1987:43). Rather, the member states in both the regional organisations were heavily dependent on the West to sustain their economic development strategies.

Moreover, whereas the economic structure of the ASEAN countries was guided by capitalism, the SADCC economies were a mixture of capitalist (e.g. Botswana), socialist (e.g. Tanzania), and Marxist (e.g. Mozambique) states. The homogeneous economic system of capitalism in ASEAN, which was supported by the U.S.-led Western enterprises during the Cold War, helped ASEAN advance the economies of member states through a favourable access to an increasingly world free trading system. In contrast, the heterogeneous economic systems in the SADCC region are seen as one of critical elements to hinder the regional organisation from aligning its economic security strategy with either liberal market system or socialist. Rather, the SADCC states tried to devise an economic development strategy of regional cooperation in order to enhance the economies of member states through the project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a particular sector. In this respect, the SADCC case is mainly different from the ASEAN.

During the inaugural SADCC Summit in Lusaka 1980, together with the Lusaka Declaration, the organisation adopted a framework for the Programme of Action which concretised and specified economic activities and development projects to be pursued. The Programme of Action explains the initial approach to regional cooperation, which was based on discrete projects, focusing on the promotion of allocating specific sectors (transport and communications, mining, agriculture, energy, tourism, and so on) for coordination by each country (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:31-67). Within this

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[48] When ASEAN was created in 1967, most of the member states, with the exception of Singapore, pursued import-substitution policies and used tariffs and regulatory deterrents to protect their economies from external penetration. However, the ASEAN member states gradually shifted import-substitution industrialisation to export-oriented manufacturing toward extra-regional economic partners, primarily the U.S., the European Economic Community (EEC), and Japan (see Narine, 2002:26-27).

context, SADCC adopted a mechanism that was termed 'sectoral programming'[49]. That is, the founders of SADCC rejected the formulation of a regional economic integration scheme based mainly on a neo-liberal (market integration) approach. Rather, they pursued the economic development through the project coordination approach with each member state taking responsibility for a specific sector.

The SADCC states affected by the policy of destabilisation concentrated a large portion of their material and financial resources on the revitalisation of the transport and communication sector headed by Mozambique (Valigy and Dora, 1992:144). As a top priority, about 75 percent of the proposed projects targeted this sector. SADCC emphasised re-establishing the Beira Corridor route between Zimbabwe and Mozambique (previously cut as a sanction against Rhodesia) and improving the Tazara route connecting Zambia and Tanzania (established during Zambian sanctions against Rhodesia) (Klotz, 1995:82; see also Mongula and Ng'andwe, 1987:102-107). These re-established route played an important role in not only saving the costs and the time of transport (Valigy and Dora, 1992:145), but also guaranteeing and sustaining an intra-regional 'balanced trade' which aimed at a widely spread regional development, rather than a 'free trade zone' (Hanlon, 1987:20)).

Despite the large efforts of achieving collective self-reliance by the SADCC states, the process of restructuring particularly within transport and communication sector was constrained by the destructive engagement of the South Africa's destabilisation policy. As Weimer (1991:79-80) put it, 'the material cost of South African destabilisation for the period between 1980 and 1988 was estimated as high as US$60 billion: this is more than four times the amount the SADCC received as Official Development Assistance (ODA) over the same period'. It can, therefore, be understood why and how the organisation chose the lessening of economic dependence on South Africa as a prime objective of the Lusaka Declaration in terms of facilitating development initiatives through the coordination of each member's particular sector of responsibility.

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[49] Advocates of the sectoral programming were reluctant to use the term 'integration'. Instead they viewed this mechanism of SADCC as an instrument of 'self-reliance' among developing countries to generate 'a redistribution of world production, control over the creation and allocation of surplus and the power to make decisions on matters that affect their societies' (see Chitala, 1987:13).

The project or sectoral responsibility approach as functional cooperation brought forth the de-centralised (and relatively *ad hoc*) structure of SADCC with power resting in the Heads of State Summit and the Council of Ministers (Ostergaard, 1990:58). This created the anti-bureaucratic structure of the organisation, which implies that the political structure of SADCC purposefully placed constraint on the progress of an autonomous bureaucracy. Furthermore, this means that SADCC, from the start, eschewed formal legally-binding mechanism. Rather, SADCC resorted to a consensual decision-making approach, which aimed not at unanimity, but at cohesion within the organisation (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:73). In this respect, the SADCC case is similar to the ASEAN case. Both ASEAN and SADCC preferred to facilitate their regional cooperation through 'informality[50] best understood as a device for minimising the impediments to cooperation, at both the domestic and international levels' (Lipson, 1991:500).   .

The decentralised structure of the SADCC institution was linked to the emphasis of national autonomous responsibility for allocated sectors. This implies that the various commitments to regional cooperation in each member state could consequently leave large rooms to generate management problems. In this sense, as Thompson (1992:139-140) states: 'SADCC was caught up in the term *etatism*[51], looking to the state to solve all problems'. As in the case of ASEAN, SADCC's informal structure can therefore be seen in the context of 'the insistence on the sanctity of national sovereignty which is fundamental to SADCC's *modus operandi*' (Anglin, 1983:692). In this sense, Anglin (1983:695) goes on to argue that   'SADCC's administrative arm was deliberately kept small, weak and fragmented', apparently in order to preserve and strengthen each member state's influence and authority above any other intervention or interference. Under this great challenge to overcome, it was required of SADCC that the member states reconsider the issues of decentralisation (informal and *ad-hoc*-based) versus centralisation (formal and legal-binding) of the organisation. In this context, for SADCC to be much more credited in the post-apartheid era, SADCC (now SADC) was required to do some reformations in order to play a more autonomous role (see Chapter 7).

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[50] It is largely referred to as informal agreements and/or informal bargains.

[51] According to Thompson, it (the term *etatism*) refers to the exaltation of the state, which leads to subsuming many social and economic activities under a highly centralised state.

Nonetheless, SADCC, which was composed of newly independent states, aimed not at establishing regional (economic) integration but at enhancing regional cooperation placing emphasis on the role of individual states in areas of coordination, such as transport and communication, manufacturing and agriculture. This determined the character of SADCC's organisational structure focusing on the sectoral responsibility approach in attempting to avoid a supra-national, centralised or bureaucratic system.

The decentralised nature of SADCC, which was an explicit rejection of neo-functionalist regional integration[52], ultimately was to help not only to protect each country's national dignity and sovereignty, but also to soothe the fragmentation and diversity caused by a colonial influence of unequal regional development. That is, in terms of its emphasis and promotion of 'equality' among member states, the decentralised structure through a sectoral responsibility approach was advantageous to SADCC which was fighting against apartheid and racial inequality. Moreover, the informality and decentralisation of SADCC contributed to the creation of a Southern African identity through 'fostering a spirit of 'we' among its members, as opposed to excessive centralisation, which would result in SADCC being perceived as 'they' by the member states – a factor which weakened regional integration efforts in Africa' (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:72; see also SADC 2000:23).

5.5   Politico-Military Security Cooperation

In the Southern African region, the regional conflictual framework (which evolved particularly out of the rivalry (in 1979-1980) between the FLS and apartheid South Africa) was a focal point to militarise the region. In this period, as pointed out earlier, the two power blocs were promoting SADCC and CONSAS respectively as future regional orders in Southern Africa. Consequently, material (economic and military resources) and ideological (anti- or pro-apartheid) clashing confrontations were a critical event in shaping the politico-military security environment of alliance, conflict, and destabilisation in the region (Evans, 1986:1-2).

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[52] The neo-functionalist approach is problematic for its ultimate focus on supranationalism for both SADC and ASEAN. For those weak states in these two regions which prioritise state-building/nation-building, not even the least viable state in both regions is willing to abandon sovereignty and/or independence for political integration (for the study of neo-functionalism, see Haas, 1968:24-27; Nye, 1971:224-226; Hurrell, 1995a:348-349; 1995b:59-61).

Both ASEAN and SADCC were unable to form a formal military alliance like NATO mainly due to the lack of military capability. ASEAN largely approached regional security problems through political consultation and consensus building rather than a military alliance strategy (see Chapter 4). While SADCC, as an extension of the FLS[53], played a significant role in the politico-military security arena, with being instrumental in mobilising economic and military assistance from both within and without the region.

Moreover, the absence of regional power[54] in Southeast Asia is seen as an important variable to prevent the two different blocs of ASEAN and Vietnam from forming a military alliance against each other. In terms of power structure, whereas Southern Africa was characterised by a uni-polar system, Southeast Asia had a multi-polar structure without relatively having a dominant power in the region. Although Vietnam had a military power, its power was limited to occupy and communise Indochina alone. And its power was only possible within the Soviet Union's client. Furthermore, Vietnam was not equipped with a strong 'econom[y] to support any bid for regional hegemony' (Buzan, 1988:5). On the contrary, South Africa was a regional superpower that was strong enough to dominate other states in military and economic terms in the region. This point was an important determinant to evoke the emergence of the FLS-led (political and military) alliance against the white South African regime.

Meanwhile, during the 1970s and 1980s, South Africa's policy of destabilisation of the region left a deeper and broader apartheid legacy of flashpoints. The SADCC's role in the politico-military security cooperation was largely seen as a defensive response to this policy of South Africa. Though first initiated by military strategists, the destabilisation led by the Total Strategy was not a simple militarist strategy (Davies and O'meara, 1985:185). Rather, the means of destabilisation were comprehensively utilised by the South African white regime in terms of the target (black) states' political, economic and military vulnerabilities and penetrability (Geldenhuys, 1995:44-45).

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[53] The FLS was seen as an informal political (military) alliance (see Khadiagala, 1994:18-45).

[54] Although Vietnam was partially seen as a regional power against the ASEAN bloc in Southeast Asia, during the Cold War, the ASEAN states, in particular Malaysia and Indonesia, saw China as a greater threat to the region than Vietnam. Even though Malaysia and Indonesia collaborated in pressuring Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia, they preferred to see a Vietnam that would play a balancing role against China (Khong, 1997:334; see Chapter 4).

The destabiliser sought to dissolve the newly independent black states in the region with supporting the rebel groups (e.g. UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique) economically and militarily. The economic and military actions, in this sense, were closely linked. The four surrogate armies [55] all focused on economic targets, particularly transport links including roads, railways, and oil pipelines (Hanlon, 1987:28). This implies that the region was a battleground in which it was divisive and further fragmented among and within the newly independent states. Consequently, as Zacarias (2003:34) notes, 'the region witnessed increased militarisation, on the one hand by forces that viewed colonial regimes as hampering their freedom, independence, and security and on the other hand by the colonial powers, who saw their acquired benefits and interests in peril'. This indicates that economic and political stability in the region were deeply connected with the military security.

Despite South Africa's economic and military pressures on its neighbours, the SADCC states endeavoured to respond to the destabilisation of South Africa. Mozambique was, in particular, a critical point for not only realising the SADCC's economic development (transport) project, but also responding to the politico- military threats from, in particular, South Africa. On the one hand, the former, as previously mentioned, indicates that the country's ports and harbours would give the SADCC states the substantial alternative route to diminish dependence on South African transport facilities. On the other hand, the latter indicates that the country served as a military base for both Zimbabwean guerrillas (during the period of sanctions against Rhodesia) and ANC guerrillas against white South African regime.

By 1984, with its mounting military vulnerability to the continually growing insurgency of the rebel group RENAMO, the FRELIMO government of Mozambique was substantially weakened with a great loss of its popularity due to the desperate economic security situation[56]. In addition, by then, Mozambique's president Machel was convinced that

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[55] UNITA in Angola, RENAMO in Mozambique, LLA in Lesotho, and the so-called 'super-ZAPU' in Zimbabwe.

[56] The South African-supported RENAMO was spreading havoc in the countryside, and gradually increasing its field of activities. The hardships of FRELIMO government were intensified by the worst drought of the century which had forced over 100,000 peasants to migrate to Zimbabwe in search of food, and left approximately 300,000 people either dying from

once the military support from the Soviet bloc began to diminish, the Marxist government was obliged to turn to the aid from the West (Legum, 1987:93-94). Faced with these complex crises from both military and economic threats, Machel conceded to a security treaty with South Africa, the Nkomati Accord, signed at their border in March 1984. According to the resulting Accord on Non-Aggression and Good Neighbourliness, Mozambique expelled ANC leaders in exchange for South Africa's pledge to end support for RENAMO (Legum, 1987:95-96).

During the post-Nkomati Accord, though, after noticing that South Africa neither disarmed RENAMO, nor did it dismantle its military bases, Mozambique officially suspended the Accord in October 1985 (Isaacman, 1988:25-26). Nonetheless, the break-up of the Accord led to the further consolidation of military cooperation between Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and later on Malawi. The connection between FRELIMO's survival and SADCC's regional security increased pressures for these regional allies' commitment to Mozambique to resist South African destabilisation efforts[57] (Khadiagala, 1994:195-199).

Moreover, the Mozambique government also succeeded in obtaining additional international military assistance. For example, in 1986, Britain offered to arm and train a force of 600 troops, and by 1987 the Commonwealth agreed to provide military aids to protect core economic development (transport) projects (Isaacman, 1988:33). During the late 1980s, whereas the Mozambican government was able to gather security assistances from the West, including Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy (Baynham, 1989:91), RENAMO was unable not only to guarantee its leadership with a cohesive popular support, but also to garner any support from both black and the Western countries (Isaacman, 1988:34).

During the late 1980s, change within South Africa appeared, resulting from, among

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starvation, or suffering acutely from dietary deficiencies (see Legum, 1987:93).

[57] In terms of regional military self-reliance, there were a number of efforts to increase military assistance to Mozambique. For instance, in 1985, the Tanzanian president, Nyerere, agreed to train Mozambican recruits to fight in the northern provinces. Zimbabwe also committed three thousand combat men, backed by a further two thousand in support troops. Malawi and Mozambique signed the Lilongwe Agreement in 1986, which called for coordinated efforts against RENAMO.

other factors, regional and extra-regional pressures[58]. South Africa's own economic and military strengths were substantially damaged and weakened (see Brown, 1991:284-288). Beginning in late 1988, the change inside South Africa contributed to the resolution of regional conflict with ending the policy of destabilisation[59]. In addition, South Africa renegotiated the Nkomati Accord with Mozambique in 1988. By 1989, with Namibian independence and F.W. de Klerk's election in South Africa, the conditions for regional security had much bettered.

5.6   Conclusion

The end of destabilisation led to the elimination of apartheid in the Southern African region. Despite substantial political and economic differences, together with ideological (politico-economic) diversity[60], the FLS succeeded in establishing SADCC in order to tackle the most important dual security problems (economic and military threats). While the SADCC member states, in particular the FLS states, opted to bear considerable economic and military costs for their anti-apartheid resistance to South Africa, they tried to mobilise international support for decolonisation and racial equality in the region. Moreover, the SADCC states did not overlook the importance of the close interconnection between economic and politico-military security cooperation. As was seen in the case of Mozambique, survival of each member state could be the overall security of the organisation.

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[58] By 1986 most of South Africa's trading partners had exercised some form of international economic sanctions. The U.S congress passed a sanctions package despite the objections of the Reagan administration. Even the Thatcher government in Britain, long considered as South Africa's strongest Western ally, agreed to Commonwealth and European Community voluntary 'measures' restricting trade with South Africa (see Klotz, 1995:3-4).

[59] In the late 1980s, South Africa reduced, and even eliminated its support for rebel groups such as RENAMO. In addition, South Africa no longer launched commando raids against its neighbours and imposed no new economic sanctions on them (see Brown, 1991:282).

[60] For example, while the BLS countries (Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland), which have been members of SACU, emphasised foreign investment and a freely convertible currency, Mozambique and Tanzania stressed respectively Marxist and socialist centralisation and state ownership. Political variations were also substantial, with traditional monarchies, parliamentary systems, and one-party states (see Klotz, 1995:81).

Throughout the origin and evolution of SADCC, the organisation managed to succeed, to some extent, in diminishing and clearing the fears of members of losing their independence by allocating sectoral responsibilities to each member state in order to put more emphasis on the matter of 'equality' rather than 'equity'. Moreover, the SADCC states (particularly the member countries of the FLS) committed themselves to a unique style of alliance[61] to resist South African destabilisation efforts as evidenced by Mozambique. ASEAN, on the other hand, played the role of conflict manager through a measure of diplomacy and dialogue without forming a military alliance against its common external threat. ASEAN consolidated a collective identity of the 'ASEAN Way' which was generated mainly by its political security interdependence, neither by their economic nor military security interdependence. For example, in the case of Cambodian conflict, ASEAN chose to neutralise the Vietnamese threat not through implementing collective (military) defence, but through applying collective diplomacy, (e.g. fashioning anti-Vietnamese coalitions, within the UN and throughout the international arena). In contrast with the non-military way of resolving the regional security problems in ASEAN, SADCC relied largely upon the FLS' politico-military cooperation by eliciting military assistance not only from inside the region, but also outside.

As ASEAN was approaching the regional security problems by consensus, SADCC also attempted to form a consensual collective-identity based primarily on the principle of racial equality informed by Pan-Africanism. In so doing, SADCC was instrumental not only in promoting the ideology of anti-apartheid consensus, but also in meeting practically the economic and military security needs for the member states. That is, just as ASEAN advanced the norms of non-intervention and non-use of force as an ASEAN consensus that helped the member states forge a common position toward the Cambodian issue, SADCC also shared the belief that as long as apartheid was alive, security in the region was far aloof.

In terms of flexibility in resolving the regional security problems, the ASEAN states were relatively flexible in utilising America's and, later on, China's intervention and support against Vietnam to punish Hanoi for its use of force in Cambodia at the

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[61] Unlike conventional alliance, which was largely formed in line with the East-West rivalry during the Cold War, SADCC opted to follow an unconventional alliance that was inclusive to the Western as well as the Eastern bloc.

expense of its norm of regional autonomy providing a 'regional solution to regional problems'. Likewise, SADCC also avoided the fixed framework of conventional (East-West) rivalry with a view to seeking substantial security aid from the Western as well as the Eastern bloc.

The presence of the apartheid ideology of South Africa was the focal point to distinguish SADCC's security regionalism from that of ASEAN, which was devoid of that kind of racial conflict. The domestic ideology of apartheid not only led to the value and meaning of norm such as racial equality throughout the African continent, but also affected the creation and evolution of SADCC. Furthermore, it played a critical role in bringing about the counterforce from regional, continental and global arena. Within the dialectic among these forces and with particularly forming the FLS and SADCC, the black-majority states of Southern Africa took the risk of paying a substantial cost to regain regional security of justice and freedom based on racial equality.

The move towards amity in the post-apartheid Southern African region coincided with the transformation of SADCC into SADC (1992) which expanded to include the regional power, South Africa. In the face of a changing, and increasingly complex, regional and global environment[62], SADCC was challenged to change and transform its cooperative and integrative strategy so that it would enable the countries of the region to cope with the problems from external as well as internal forces more effectively. Furthermore, in the absence of apartheid Southern Africa, it has been asserted that the region's security should be enhanced by balanced and concerted cooperation to address the region's new security challenges and/or hidden conflicts (such as the protracted civil war in Angola) which emerged in the post-Cold War era (Van Aardt, 1997:3; also Swatuk and Omari, 1997:90-103; Söderbaum, 2001:108-110).

Within the new circumstances of the post-Cold War security environment for Southern Africa, therefore, it became imperative for SADC to set up its own security mechanism for enhancing regional security. As will be discussed in chapter 7, for instance, although the SADC Organ (OPDS) was not initially integrated into the SADC structure (so that

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[62] In the security field in the post-Cold War era, the United States has little strategic interest in Africa so that it is reluctant to be involved: rather, the US government 'expects … African regional organisations to manage conflicts in that continent' (see Alagappa, 1995:359; also Fry, 2000:120; Chapter 1).

the security mechanism was deeply divided), the emergence of the Organ can be viewed as the evolutionary process of structures such as the FLS, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), SADCC, SADC, the Association of Southern African States (ASAS), and the OPDS in order to react to the security challenges from both internal and external ones (see Chapter 7).

In the post-apartheid Southern African region, nonetheless, the effect and role of such norms as racial equality (which played a critical role in brining forth the end of the apartheid regime in South Africa) got relatively weakened. What is important, yet, is that regional norms and ideas are still important for not only constructing politico-security regionalisms in both SADC and ASEAN, but also being constructed and reconstructed by the member states of each regional organisation. In this context, hence, the fundamental mechanisms of SADC politico-security regionalism in the post-Cold War era will be explored by comparing SADC with ASEAN in chapter 7.