

Drawing Hands (1948) – M.C. Escher

**Neither flesh nor fleshless:
an object-relational study of the experience of
Philophonetics-Counselling**

by

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Abstract

Philophonetics-Counselling is a specific form of a *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach*, defined for the purposes of this study as an approach that uses the non-verbal bodily modalities of movement, gesture, visualisation, and sound, as well as forms of artistic expression, as elements of a process, which furthers the physical and psychic integration of an individual. In view of the recent rise in bodily-oriented therapeutic processes, this study intends to describe and explore the role of especially bodily representation, but also mental representation in the *phenomenon of the transformation and representation of sensory-emotional experience* in the developing psyche.

This is achieved by exploring the *essence* of described ‘lived experience’ of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, which is a means not only to elicit this *phenomenon of transformation*, but also to gain access particularly to *bodily representation* and *bodily knowing*. This exploration is guided primarily by a dialogue with *object relations theory*, exploring conceptualisations provided by Bollas, Ogden, Winnicott, Bion, and Klein. This dialogue is also, however, informed by contemporary bodily-oriented theorists, including Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin, and Shapiro.

The essence of this experience is explicated from *qualitative* material according to the *Duquesne Phenomenological Research Method*, which requires of the researcher to allow the inherent constituents and dynamic process to emerge such that the phenomenon can present itself to his/her awareness as it is in itself. Following this, by engaging with psychological theory in an attempt to understand this explicated structure, specific attention is given to the manner in which *bodily representation* and *bodily knowing*, particularly as applied or encouraged in therapeutic process, is intimately involved with the *transformation and representation of sensory-emotional experience*. This research process reveals a means to rework and explore perhaps more directly the representations of *self* and *other*. Furthermore, through the open-ended and playful engagement with both the theory and the material, this *descriptive-dialogical* study concludes with the notion that although linked to the phenomenon of transformation and representation, *consciousness*, understood in terms of *psychic truth*, seems to extend beyond the seemingly differing *mentalities* of both *mind* and *body*, as perhaps dwelling in (the) *neither flesh nor fleshless...*

Key Words

<i>Philophonetics-Counselling</i>	transformation
bodily-oriented expressive therapies	representation
object relations	raw sensory-emotional experience
representational world	consciousness
<i>self-other</i> representations	psychic truth
immediacy and conflated representation	time/timeless
reflection and differentiated representation	essence of experience
paranoid-schizoid/depressive	phenomenological research
container-contained	qualitative

Opsomming

'*Philophonetics-Counselling*' is 'n spesifieke vorm van liggaamsgeoriënteerde ekspressiewe terapie, gedefinieër vir die doeleindes van hierdie studie as 'n benadering wat die nie-verbale liggaamsmodaliteite van beweging, gebaar, visualisering en klank, sowel as vorms van artistiese uitdrukking insluit. Hierdie nie-verbale modaliteite vorm elemente van 'n proses wat die fisiese en sielkundige integrasie van die individu bevorder. In die lig van die onlangse toename in liggaams-georiënteerde terapeutiese prosesse, beoog hierdie studie om die rol van spesifiek die liggaamlike, maar ook van die verstandelike verteenwoordiging van ervaring te beskryf en te verken, binne die *fenomeen van die transformasie en verteenwoordiging van sensories-emosionele ervaring* in die ontwikkelende psige.

Dit word bereik deur die verkenning van die essensie van beskree 'geleefde ervaring' van *Philophonetics-Counselling*, wat 'n middel is nie net vir die ontlokking van die fenomeen van transformasie nie, maar ook vir die verkryging van toegang tot veral liggaamlike verteenwoordiging en liggaams-'weet'. Die ondersoek is primêr gelei deur 'n dialoog met objekrelasies-teorie, insluitende konseptualiserings deur Bollas, Ogden, Winnicott, Bion, en Klein. Hierdie dialoog is egter ook beïnvloed deur hedendaagse liggaams-georiënteerde teoretici, insluitende Merleau-Ponty, Gendlin, en Shapiro.

Die essensie van die belewenis is uit kwalitatiewe materiaal uitgelig volgens die Duquesne Fenomenologiese Navorsingsmetode, wat van die navorser verwag om die inherente elemente van die dinamiese proses so tot die bewussyn te laat kom dat die fenomeen duidelik word soos dit insigself is. In 'n poging om die uitgeligte struktuur te verstaan word vervolgens, deur die omgang met sielkundige teorie, spesifieke aandag gegee aan die wyse waarop liggaamlike verteenwoordiging en liggaams-weet intiem betrokke is by die transformasie en verteenwoordiging van sensories-emosionele ervaring, in besonder soos toegepas en aangespoor in die terapeutiese proses. Deur hierdie navorsingsproses word 'n meer direkte wyse vir die hervertenwoordiging en verdere verkenning van *self* en *ander* blootgelê. Verder kom hierdie *beskrywend-dialogiese* studie, deur die onbevange en speelse omgang met beide die teorie en die materiaal, tot die gevolgtrekking dat bewustheid wanneer verstaan word in terme van psigiese waarheid, en selfs al verbonde by transformasie en

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verteenwoordiging, moontlik verder strek as die blykbaar uiteenlopende ‘denksentra’ van verstand en liggaam - in (die) *neither flesh nor fleshless...*

Sleutelterme

<i>'Philophonetics-Counselling'</i>	transformasie
liggaamsgeoriënteerde ekspressiewe terapie	verteenwoordiging
objekrelasies	rou sensories-emotionele ervaring
verteenwoordigende wêreld	bewussyn
<i>self-ander</i> verteenwoordiging	psigiese waarheid
onmiddellikheid en saamgesmelde verteenwoordiging	tye/tydloos
besinning en gedifferensieerde verteenwoordiging	essensie van ervaring
paranoïes-skisoïed/depressiewe	fenomenologiese navorsing
houer-behouer	kwalitatief

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CHAPTER 1

SYNOPSIS

1.1 Introduction

When looking at a sketch or drawing the impact of its black-and-whiteness is somehow different to that of a written page. It leaves one with a different ‘sense’ within – perhaps more ‘bodily-felt’ than ‘logically-minded’. It suggests there is a *knowing* that resides beyond the realms of the word, but still within the reign of *representation*. In the inner world it speaks the language of the body, and in the outer it plays with form and content in artistic expression.

This *knowing* resembles awareness, even *consciousness*, as it punctuates and abstracts within the more oblique domains of the body, exhibiting a form of self-reflective capacity within its representations (Gendlin, 1981). This study is curious to explore the notion that such *bodily knowing* and *representation* contributes to the *transforming of raw sensory-emotional experience* and therein the *birth of meaning*. It is, however, elusive and easily missed in the pervasive worded world of the mind.

In dwelling on the impact of Dutch artist M.C. Escher’s *Drawing Hands* (1948), it is my hope that the reader is reminded of the presence of this *bodily knowing* – reminded by the impact of this work in its ‘felt-sense’, a wordless and fleeting but direct experience reverberating in the inner realms of the *body’s knowing*, alongside the thoughts that may have begun to emerge in the continuous attempt to find meaning.

The choice of beginning this dissertation with this specific sketch, however, may not only remind in an *experiential* manner of *knowing*, as implied, on a more ‘bodily-felt’ or ‘intuited’ level that is possible to express in *bodily modalities* of movement, gesture, visualisation or sound as the literature review will reveal. The choice is meaningful also in that with the sketches form and content, and in its very essence of being a work of art, it furthermore, quite tangibly, becomes a means to expand on the notion of *representation*, which is central to this debate.

In this vein, art is a means of *representing* or *symbolising* experience, giving form to emotions or abstractly depicting thoughts and ideas. It thus holds together and expresses in its own language what an artist strives to differentiate or communicate. But in its creation, in the very process of taking on form, it becomes an entity in its own right, a symbol somewhat removed from the artist, such that s/he can interact with or relate to it, much like the transformation from two- to three-dimensionality in Escher's drawing may imply (Robbins, 1984). Within this the drawing, furthermore however, depicts the notion of the oscillation between varying degrees or types of representation in experience.

The sketch, and therein also the notion of artistic expression, on a more abstract level provides a useful analogy which may be likened to the representational process of the psyche, which in turn creates a psychic structure consistent of varying types and forms of representation that in turn allow for further experience, along with the emergence of *consciousness* and *self-awareness*. *Drawing Hands* (1948) thus facilitates an inquiry into the interplay of the realms of both *body* and *mind*, during which somewhere within or through our being, raw sensory-emotional experience that simply 'is-what-it-is' is *transformed* into *representation*, experience that Ogden (2001, p. 8) states "has accrued to itself a modicum of 'I-ness': that is, self-reflective awareness mediated at least in part by verbal symbolization", which he relates to Freud's dictum of "*Wo Es war, soll Ich werden*" translated as 'Where it was, there I shall become'.

This may appear as a rather simplistic statement, suggesting perhaps a linear 'forward' progression from it-ness to I-ness, from thing-in-itself to higher order symbolisation and reflective self-awareness. The reality, however, seems to be otherwise such that ideas and theories amass, attempting to capture the emerging complexities in the *process of transformation and representation* and its movement through the *material* and the *immaterial*.

This is particularly relevant for *therapeutic endeavours*, which concern themselves with the characteristics and development of such *transformation* and its ensuing *internalisations* or respective *representations*. This debate thus spans amongst others the drive- versus object-driven dilemma, as well as impacts teleological notions of psychological theory. The scope of *this* paper however, does not allow for an expansive exploration of these complexities and

motivations for the transformation of raw emotional experience alongside and/or because of its *representations*. It will thus only touch on the most basic punctuations, with a particular focus on the role of the *body* in its involvement with enabling *consciousness* and/or *meaning* to emerge. It thus merely hints at some of the complexity, which includes from the *transforming* of intense feeling-states, to the *internalisation* and *representation* of the *transformative function* itself.

Stated somewhat differently then, of particular interest to this study is the role of *self-reflective awareness* that finds expression in the *non-verbal, more bodily-oriented domain* of *representations* in this so-called *transformation process*. It lingers on the notion of the body entailing a reflective and thus mentalist space, which is not usually accessed by the conscious mind although it appears to be constantly informed and influenced by it.

This inquiry thus explores, much like Escher's image depicts, the continual movement between direct experience (suggested by the three-dimensional) and its representations (the two-dimensional) in *both* mind and body, as well as how the complexities of *being*, and therein the notion of healthy functioning with the emergence of *consciousness* or *psychic truth*, seem to rest on this never-ending interplay and dependence between the two.

The British-based school of thought, *object relations*, a development of classic Freudian psychoanalytic theory, seems in its thinking to coincide with this emphasis on *consciousness* and *representations*, as well as its seeming interdependence with the 'bodily-felt' and the more 'experience-near' and will thus form the basis of the theoretical exploration (Gomez, 1997). Nonetheless, the practical implementation of its understanding results in therapy being characterised primarily by conversation, lingering mostly in the verbal domain and thus appears to make much less use of the body and its *knowing* in its attempts of healing.

The recent rise in *bodily-oriented therapies*, however, indicates a renewed interest in the *body* as a means of creating therapeutic change, and encourages a revisiting of contemporary notions of *health* and *healing* (Caldwell, 1998). Various schools of thought have returned to the body to explore its involvement in psychic development, and therein its role in *representation* and the *transformation of raw sensory-emotional experience*. The theoretical

exploration will thus further extend into the less apparent potential of the body in therapy, based on a renewed understanding of our embodied existence.

Yet, before I become further drawn into the intricacies and complexities of these varying phenomena, I would like to share with the reader how it is that I came to ponder these thoughts, and why it is that I find it relevant to impart this thinking unto others.

1.2 Motivation for this Study

What glancing at this picture seems to evoke may be particular to me, and emergent in this manner only in that I am involved with psychological thought and thinking. Be that as it may, the drawing provides a means of representing or holding (together) thoughts and notions, which became meaningful to me in attempting *to understand and explore the therapeutic space* as it aligns itself with contemporary thoughts on health and particularly the practices of healing.

I had been moving on the psychological ‘fringe’ in this quest and have come across a therapeutic modality, which introduces novelty in its creative use of both the verbal contributions of talk therapy, as well as the non-verbal, expressive realms of more action-based bodily-oriented approaches. The modality is termed **Philophonetics-Counselling**, where, according to Tagar (1999), *Philophonetics* means an individual’s awareness of his/her experience through body awareness, movement, visualisation, and especially the *sounds of human speech*, originally developed as a method of deep observation of the interactive dynamics of body, psyche, and consciousness. Applied to counselling, it combines verbal exchange, with artistic expression, body-awareness, and self-observation as aspects of the therapeutic process. Furthermore, the patient is deemed to be in charge, being the primary source of information, observation, choices, direction, as well as *action*.

Tagar (1999) describes it as an innovative process, which focuses specifically on non-verbal communication¹ that seems to enable individuals to reach beyond the limitations of verbal

¹ For the sake of clarity, the non-verbal communication implied in this instance is considered to be a form of *conscious expression* and an *active process* of symbolisation and must therefore be distinguished from the more

expression and ‘saturated’ cognitive knowing. It allows individuals instead to access directly feelings, emotions, reactive patterns, old defences, as well as new potentials, claimed to be embedded in ‘deep layers’ of the *knowing* of the *living body*. This thus coincides with the definition of **bodily-oriented expressive therapies**, which, for the purposes of this paper, are considered to be therapeutic approaches that use the non-verbal body modalities of movement, gesture, visualization, and sound, as well as forms of artistic expression, as elements of a process, which furthers the physical and psychic integration of an individual.

From her clinical practice, psychoanalytically-oriented Dosamantes-Beaudry (1999) supports this bodily orientation in claiming that such methods show how *directly* unconscious meanings of a patient’s psyche may be revealed when his/her internal world is approached initially through a receptive, bodily-felt movement process, as opposed to merely thinking or talking about it. This reminds also of Bion’s (1962) distinction between knowing and having a piece of knowledge in moving between *being in* and *thinking about* O, which is elaborated on in the literature review. Of interest is that this seeming direct access, along with the emphasis and creative use of the non-verbal, bodily-felt expression, compels one to reconsider the current assumptions that the debate around the possible interrelatedness of *physiological* and *psychological* processes, the time-old *body/mind debate*, have brought forth; a debate fundamental to notions of the *transformation and representation of raw sensory-emotional experience* and its contributions to the unfolding of individual *consciousness*.

1.3 Rationale for this Study

The presence of a therapeutic modality, which introduces a seemingly effective novel approach, encourages one to dare the quagmire of philosophical and psychological constructions once again as they continually attempt to create some clarity with regards to the seeming dualities of the *material* and the *immaterial*. Within this debate lies the cornerstone of understanding or conceptualising the human being, our possible ideal and purpose, and thus intricately linked, our intimations of health and conceivable healing processes.

commonly assumed non-verbal communication a person may unwittingly transmit by means of for instance their body language or tone of voice (Tubbs & Moss, 1994).

Exploring the boundaries of that which can and cannot be directly observed by the senses, which exists in matter or purely in the processes thereof, such as processes of *transformation* and *representation*, stems fundamentally from our experience of being both of mind and body. This experience seems to underlie all our thinking around, for instance, notions of truth, or what is real; in essence all that appears to be ‘outside’ of us, as well as exploring the seemingly ‘inside’, the conscious and the unconscious; *self* and *other*, or individuation and symbiosis; as well as symbol and experience.

Its presence lures one into these numbing intricacies by its renewed emphasis on the role of the body in striving for health; by its promise of the untapped potentials within the bodily-oriented, active processes of expressive therapies. In challenging contemporary assumptions not only of a theoretical nature, but particularly on the practical implementation thereof, it allows for the development of a more in-depth understanding and improvement on current models of the nature and functioning of the human being, the *body/mind relationship*, as well as the dilemmas and possibilities that stem from such models for the development of ever more efficient and effective therapeutic endeavours.

I hope to have sensitised the reader to the circularity of influence from lived experience, to thinking and conceptualising around it, which in turn guides action and impacts again on lived experience. I also hope therein not only to have provided a further example of the complexities of representation as informing and enabling to some extent both experience and the reflecting on it, but also to have illustrated its implicit inseparability, to thus have illustrated that our attempts to punctuate are directed at phenomena which in fact exist indistinguishably. However, it is not my intention to portray such attempts as futile aspirations. Instead, it appears that our continued movement between attempting to divide what seems indivisible, giving form to what appears chaotic, delineating, for instance, experience from its transformation and representation, may in fact be the very essence of our experience of *being*.

1.4 The Purpose of this Study

Throughout this writing I will attempt to remain aware and delicately attuned to the various positions and opinions this paper unavoidably elicits. I believe that it is in the balance between thoughts on the sculpting of therapeutic practices, their tangibly lived experiences,

and the more fleeting murmurs around its theoretical underpinnings, its implicit or explicit assumptions on what is real or true, that the more meaningful contributions may be found.

In brief, the purpose of this dissertation is intricately involved with exploring the body/mind relationship as it pertains to the *representation* and *transformation* of raw sensory-emotional experience throughout the development of the psyche. This is enabled by its focus on the immediate, for instance *personal experience* of a therapeutic session, as well as the more removed, namely some of the *theoretical underpinnings* regarding the symbolizing of emotional experience. Its purpose is *not* of a definitive nature, but instead, in its open and curious manner, it attempts to enliven current theoretical debates and the contributions of their practical implementation. Thus, in a *descriptive* light, by *exploring* the *experiences* of individuals who undergo the body-oriented therapeutic approach of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, the possible role of the body in the transformation of experience and eliciting of patient's 'representational world' may become more apparent, particularly through the lens of preliminary open-ended *object relational* descriptions of their specific experiences. It is important to note, however, that the results of this study are *not interpretive* in kind, but remain *exploratory* and *descriptive*.

In summary then, an inquiry into such a novel therapeutic mode, albeit at this stage in a mere *descriptive* fashion, may prove beneficial by illuminating and addressing previous limitations experienced in more conventional approaches to therapy. These range from the length and cost of some therapies, to difficulties around language and cultural differences, and finally to the question of the patient experiencing meaningful change over time. Furthermore, it may reveal insight into the possibilities dormant within the *body's knowing* and its seemingly *representational capacity*, which, if appropriately mobilized, perhaps enables *transformation* and *representation* in a manner that offers more holistic options to therapeutic endeavours in their striving for insight and effective change.

1.5 Summary and Chapter for Chapter Overview

This paper attempts to explore the development of *representation* in the seemingly different *organising mentalities* of *body* and *mind*, in the assumption of it being fundamental to processes of *transformation of sensory-emotional experience* and therein the emergence of *consciousness* enabling healthy functioning and personal growth. This study aims neither to

be inclusive nor conclusive and thus strives in its literature review to provide a general overview of this phenomenon in *Chapter Two* by exploring after an initial orientation into *object relations theory* the different forms and functions of *representation* as they develop throughout the psychogenesis of the self. The discussion thus touches on the *transformational* and *transitional object*, explores the eventual *differentiation* between *self* and *other*, and considers this emergence of consciousness in the representational realms of thoughts and thinking. However, in view of the recent rise in bodily-oriented therapies, the chapter then returns to a more in-depth exploration of the representation in the body and its possible contributions to the transformation of experience.

This then leads the *literature review* to consider a further realm, such that *Chapter Three* is concerned with the *practical implications* to the *therapeutic space*, in that *object relational therapeutic aims and goals* are equally defined in terms of this *transformative phenomenon*. Familiarised with this conceptualisation of therapeutic practice, it is then possible to explore the contributions of a more bodily-oriented approach, considering specifically the structure of *Philophonetics-Counselling* sessions, as it provides a means to explore bodily realms of expression and representation, which may motivate a shift in emphasis from the more passive conversational tradition to a more holistic approach.

In that the theory regarding this phenomenon seems not only limited but also contradictory, this study set out with a *descriptive-dialogic* rationale to return to exploring its *essence*, based on the written descriptions of participants' *lived experience* of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session. *Chapter Four* thus presents the appropriately chosen research approach, namely the Duquesne Phenomenological Research Method, which in evolving from an existential-phenomenological epistemology, places much emphasis on *experience* and the manner in which its explication allows for the phenomenon's essence to 'show itself' to the researcher as it is in itself. This chapter thus delineates the methodology's philosophical orientation, followed by the setting out of the specific research design. This includes a purposefully information rich sample, which provides the necessary material for the explication of the phenomenon of the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, a *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach*. The processes of data generation, collection and explication are also discussed, whilst taking note of researchers' responsibilities with regards to the possible impact they may have on the value of the study through their personal inclination and attitude

in their unavoidable presence in the research process. Continuing in this vein, the chapter concludes with a brief exploration of the criteria of dependability, credibility, transferability, and confirmability, as they impact on the trustworthiness and thus the value of this study. This approach thus enables the ‘bodily-felt’, which cannot be observed or measured from the outside, to be subjectively explored and reported on, enabling research that is as *experience-near* as seems possible.

Chapter Five reflects the results and analysis of the research material obtained from the three voluntary participants, in which central themes and processes of the specific descriptions of their individual *situated structures* of the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling* are then reviewed and integrated into a coherent and organized *general description*.

On having presented the results of the research in the previous chapter, *Chapter Six* applies itself to finding a *language* for the essence of this phenomenon and therein being able to situate it to some extent in a *theoretical framework* such as *object relations theory*. By attempting to understand the enduring frameworks, the stages and constituents, as well as the dynamic movement emergent in this general structure from this theoretical perspective, it seems as though patients experience transformation in that the process appears to entail a reworking of the representations of self and other, particularly through the use of physically active, bodily modalities. This leads to considering contributions, limitations and recommendations of the study, concluding in this vein with seemingly pivotal unsaturated thoughts.

The *Appendix* forms the last section of this study, presenting the original protocols of participants, categorised as the *Naïve Descriptions*, which are then followed by the *Natural* and *Transformed Meaning Units* of these original descriptions, as required by the chosen research method.

Perhaps this writing will manifest or represent some of the elusive ambiguity around existence, being, and healing, possibly even pin down momentarily of its forms or patterns, its meaningful connections. But as yet, such demonstrations seem only able to speak *of* life and not explain life in itself. It remains to be lived, forever tracing its essence and edges in the *neither flesh nor fleshless...*

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL EXPLORATION

2.1 Introduction

In the process of drawing, an artist is able to express some form of experience by creating a *representation* or *symbol* thereof. Often, the artist undergoes a kind of *transformation* not only in the creating but also in the aftermath, the *reflection on* or receiving of what the work mirrors to the artist as an accomplished gesture. Robbins (1984, p. 80) goes so far as to state that “self and work create and transform each other” as *consciousness* expands.

This externally creative process may perhaps be paralleled to the inner interplay between *direct experience* and its *transformation* to *representation* in the *psychic reality* of the individual. It reflects a process of mental growth from primitive delineation, which is the first attempt to wrest something from chaos, to a highly sophisticated and abstract idea as it moves through various levels of *representation* in both *body* and *mind* (Shapiro, 1985; Symington & Symington, 1996).

Transformation of sensory-emotional experience thus appears to occur in part as a *progressive* development of *mentalism* from concrete to highly abstract levels as it differentiates the undifferentiated. This will be probed from various angles within an *object relational* perspective. In view of the rise in *bodily-oriented expressive therapies*, theory regarding the *body's knowing* and particularly its possible *reflective* and *representational capacities* will be explored, so as to reconsider its role or possible contributions to the process of *transformation*, and thus, as will be explored in the following chapter, of respective *therapeutic processes*.

The content of Escher's *Drawing Hands* provides an appropriate symbol for this continuous circular movement between *experience* and its *representation*. More so, it clearly depicts how one hand comes into existence only due to the other's *representation* of it, therein hinting at metaphysical and teleological notions, which however fall beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that there seems to reside inseparability between *experience*, its *transformation* and *representation*, *consciousness*, purpose, and the birth of *meaning*. The

sketch thus becomes an appropriate analogy and abstraction for the human experience of *being* and *healing*.

The chapter thus aims in its review of the literature to integrate and assimilate of the most influential thoughts in a manner that may sensitise or stimulate new ideas (Mouton, 2001; Neuman, 2000). This will be achieved through an initial exploration into *experience and its representation* in general, thereon moving into an overview of the *inner worlds of representation*, which will lead into a discussion regarding the *emergence and progression of transformation and representation*, particularly as it pertains to the intimate interplay between the *material* and the *immaterial*. The thoughts and concepts regarding *transformation* and particularly *representation* will then be explored in terms of the realms of *mental representation* and therein possibly *consciousness of psychic truth*, following which a brief integration of the various characteristics, *forms* and *functions* of *representation*, its relation to *experience*, *transformation*, *perception*, and ultimately the emergence of *consciousness*, will lead to a more specific inquiry into the role of the '*knowing body*' in this regard.

2.2 Experience and its Representation

The ability to say 'I' to some marks the beginning of self-awareness and reflection, what to most seems to distinguish us as human beings. It perhaps punctuates the presence of *psychic reality* more distinctly than any other manifestation, as it carries with it the complexities of meaning, brought forth in symbol or metaphor, *representations* born of the implicit *transformation of raw emotional experience* from the inescapable context of relationship.

This notion of self-awareness or consciousness, represented by the single letter 'I' or the utterance of this sound, also emerges through the eventual discernment of self and that of 'not-self' or (m)other – in that knowing is born from difference (Eigen, 1992). The possibility of such discernment or distinction seems to lie closely in the ability to abstract, to symbolize or represent in mind.

Such abstraction or mentalism allows for recognition, differentiation, and when more sophisticated, for thought, later held in language. But, perhaps more importantly, it therein seems to *enable emotional development and integration*. It creates the needed distance from

experience, a means of containing psychic pain, allowing a ‘looking on’ or ‘looking at’ rather than only ‘being in’, so that form emerges from chaos, assumed necessary to be able to internalise experience and relationships in a meaningful, conscious manner (Symington & Symington, 1996).

Emotional experiences, possible through the close relationship with another, are expressed both through and because of the physical and the mental characteristics of the *lived body*. A tender touch, the soothing words, or the look of intent in another’s eye linger in our embodied being, both in a sensuous and psychic manner. Our attempting to ‘divide the seemingly indivisible’ of, for instance, body and mind, in striving to understand our existence seems to leave with us only fleeting impressions, transient punctuations of these inseparable realms (Eigen, 1992; Gomez, 1997; Stolorow & Atwood, 1984).

Indeed, the initial familiarity and seeming simplicity or clarity often present whilst speaking this word – “I” – this symbol, this abstraction, may be indicative of how intricately involved our human experience is with both the *material* and the *immaterial*, how comfortably we traverse these domains in our lived experience, yet at the same time how difficult they are to grasp in that we can never entirely step outside ourselves. It almost appears as though the nature of the struggle in moving from direct experience to representation by a single individual is echoed in the contentions of humankind as a whole.

This is illustrated as theories abound, attempting to capture or lay bare, to represent, this subtle threshold, the seemingly shifting boundaries between the more concrete and abstract dimensions, the sensory and the psychic, taunted by the nebulous nature of these processes of transformation and representation, of being and consciousness, which we cannot quite outline, define, and most certainly struggle to explain.

And yet clinical experience reveals time and again how integral this amorphous phenomenon of transformation is to effecting change and inviting awareness, as it dwells somewhere between the body and the mind. It seems to repeatedly remind us to take cognisance of how our humanness compels us to express our being, to become aware of the known but not yet thought, to bear the pain of consciousness, and give voice to the inarticulate as it pushes for

symbolization both in mind and body (Bion, 1962; Bollas, 1987; Ogden, 2001; Woodruff, 1999).

On closer perusal these strutting propositions appear to be delicately hinged on age-old debates around complexities of thinking and perception, questions regarding consciousness, soul, psyche and knowing, and particularly, as manifesting both in the *material* and the *immaterial*. Oft unwittingly, such debates give form to our intimations of health, of ideal human functioning, therein extending also to the multifarious notions of healing and the use of the *therapeutic space* (Gomez, 1997; Sprigge, 1984).

The progressive clarification of what psychology and particularly therapeutic practice concern themselves with is a continuous process in which, through abstraction this discipline attempts to find more general principles that underlie its understanding and practices (Symington & Symington, 1996). This began with Josef Breuer (1842-1925), who recognized the importance of reclaiming the repressed elements in the mind from the unconscious, therein initiating the notion of reclaiming some sort of order from chaos. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) then proposed that this reclamation takes place in the therapeutic setting, especially through interpretation of the transference relationship, and finally Melanie Klein (1882-1960) greatly elaborated the significance of internal objects or representations and in so doing described the inner world of object relations (Symington & Symington, 1996; Wollheim, 1980).

Of the psychological theories struggling with notions of psyche and its seemingly symbolizing nature, the more ‘experience-near’ clinical theory of *object relations* emerged, concerned with concepts of *the self* and *others* in a *representational world*. This representational world is considered the symbolic construction of significant interpersonal experiences, placing much emphasis on the *development of representation as a major psychological process*, which this paper accordingly attempts to explore (Brennan, 1998; Hergenhahn, 1992; Jacobson, 1964; Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002).

2.3 Inner Worlds of Representation

The British-based school of thought, *object relations theory*, a development of classic Freudian psychoanalytic theory, seems in its thinking to emphasize a ‘body-felt’ knowing or

becoming conscious of *self* and the subject's experience of 'otherness'. One of its contributors, Wilfred Bion (1897-1979) took an even greater step in abstraction and thoughts on representation suggesting that what lies underneath it all is the yearning for *psychic truth*, for realizing what he terms *O*, ultimate reality or absolute truth, the thing-in-itself, experienced in increasing consciousness in the close relationship with another (Grinberg, Sor, & de Bianchedi, 1977).

It is further posited that without *relationship* there would be no emotional experience, no meaning, and no consciousness, as we know it. In assessing the construction of meaning from raw emotional experience and the articulation of motives in human relations rather than trying to explain psychological functioning as the result of changes in energies, force and counterforce, *object relations theory* appears to give fuller recognition to the development of the individual's construction or representation of his/her reality – both internalised relationships that make up the psyche and the external ones in the 'real' world (Blatt & Ford, 1994; McWilliams, 1994; Stadter, 1996).

This perspective, as already stated, was initiated by Klein, who, from her clinical findings developed the theory of a person's *psychic structure*, which she explained, in contrast to Freud's, consisted of phantasised or imaginary ego-object relations that had become persistent, almost permanent, *organizational* features of the deeper psychic life of a matured individual (Guntrip, 1961). The structure of personality, from an *object relational* point of view, is thus thought of as *primarily* influenced by the varying ways in which the self interacts with its internal and external object world during the *preoedipal* developmental phases. Character is thus seen as reasonably predictable patterns of behaving in the same manner, or unconsciously inducing others to behave like, the experienced objects of early childhood (Gomez, 1997; McWilliams, 1994; St. Clair, 1994).

According to Atwood and Stolorow (1984), this concept of *character* refers to the overall organization of a person's ultimately *subjective* sense of reality. Furthermore, based on the influence of the preoedipal, such structures thus constitute a unique realm of unconsciousness that has been termed 'prereflective'. This may be understood in the sense that Klein posited the first object relations or representations to exist in unconscious phantasy. This will be explored in more detail further on, but in essence, "Klein emphasized that phantasy is *first a*

non-verbal experience that starts as a somatic experience, then becomes visual and then more like verbal forms, narrative in nature. It is generally expected that the rudimentary, infantile or primitive object-relations continue to exist in unconscious phantasy and that they continue to exert their influence even though they are repressed in the normal adult” (Fletcher, 1979, p. 136). Ekstein and Wallerstein (in McWilliams, 1994) propose a phenomenon of *parallel process*, claiming that individuals draw on their early emotional and preverbal infantile knowledge in *all* the realms of making contact, therein both predating and transcending the formal, logical interactions that are easily expressed in words.

Furthermore, as will be explored in some detail within this paper, the detailed way in which an individual reconstructs and manifests this internal world is not just mental, in terms of perception, image or thought, but is also physical. It is assumed that all mental activity is reflected in the body in terms of some motor or visceral activity. In this vein, the body as well as the mental realms of the psyche acts out these object relations of unconscious phantasy (Fletcher, 1979).

In the absence of reflection, however, an individual is presumed mostly unaware of his/her role as a constitutive subject in elaborating and creating his/her personal reality. The world that an individual experiences therein presents itself as though it were something independently and objectively real. The *patterning and thematising of events* that uniquely characterize an individual’s personal reality are thus seen as if they were properties of *those* events rather than *products* of the person’s *own subjective interpretations and constructions* (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; McWilliams, 1994).

From this perspective, psychotherapy, as focused on in the next chapter, is viewed as a procedure through which a patient acquires reflective knowledge of his/her unconscious structuring activity. As this is intimately involved with internal representations, notions of treatment have evolved where symptom analysis rests fundamentally on *character analysis*, and therein the time-honoured aim of making the unconscious conscious has increasingly come to apply to the organizing principles and dominant leitmotifs in the form of structures of representation that *prereflectivity* shape a patient’s experiences and conduct. As an individual begins to acquire mental representations and therein reflective knowledge of the *thematic patterning of his/her psychological life*, s/he becomes able to step back from what

up until that moment had seemed to be the sheer factuality of existence and hence to recognize that his/her experiences of reality are at least partially constituted by the structures of his/her own subjectivity (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1993; Vaughan, 1997).

Klein was thus the first of these influential writers, that considered *the organization and content* of such object relations; in particular, relations with the flux of the complex world of internal objects, as the central determinants of experience and behaviour, which become increasingly structured and integrated with further development (Blatt & Ford, 1994; Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Segal, 1973; Stadter, 1996).

The *structure and integration* of these *symbolic representations*, however, may easily be overlooked in *coarse misappropriations of their characteristics and functions*, and particularly *their genesis in processes of transformation*. The representational process is complex and transient in nature, but distinguishable in significant moments or modes in which it appears (Blatt & Ford, 1994).

It seems an intricate interplay of representations enabling further, more abstract representations and an increased ability to represent, capturing functions and the silent processes of being. It also seems that in symbolising these implicit logics, manifesting the ‘known but not yet thought’, or even the ‘thoughts that need a thinker’, the human being is liberated, able to bear consciousness or psychic truth (Bion, 1962; Bollas, 1987).

The following section will explore some of the *content and structure* of the *representational world* as it develops at various nodal points throughout life, continually emerging through the incessant transformation of raw emotional experience. Thereafter, the focus shifts to a more specific exploration of the body’s role in this phenomenon, the implications of which the ensuing chapter explores in view of therapeutic practices.

2.4 The Emergence and Progression of Transformation and Representation

The interplay of experiences of attachment and emotion in early life is important, in that it gradually furthers emotional growth and fosters psychic structures by teaching us to tolerate intense feeling-states and to regulate them ourselves through the processes of transformation and representation. It is often disturbances in our early life experiences that result in problems of self-esteem, attachment, and dysregulation of painful moods that bring most patients to intensive psychotherapy (Vaughan, 1997).

The unfolding of this emotional life, the inner being, thus appears to occur within and because of the relationship between one individual and another. This reality or psychic quality can be intuited through the moment-to-moment interaction between two people, but seems impossible to describe or represent adequately in language (Symington & Symington, 1996).

Our attempts thus far extend to a model which distinguishes *representations* of *self* and *others*, conceived of as conscious and unconscious-mental schema, which consist of cognitive, affective, and experiential components that evolve out of significant interpersonal encounters (Blatt & Ford, 1994).

These *representations* begin as vague, diffuse, variable, sensorimotor experiences of pleasure and displeasure, and gradually develop into differentiated, consistent, relatively realistic *representations* of the *self* and significant *others*. Thus earlier *forms of representations* are based on action sequences associated with need gratification (as seen with Bollas' *transformational object*), intermediate forms are based on specific perceptual and functional features (for instance, Winnicott's *transitional object*), whilst higher forms are more symbolic and conceptual (as seen in the move from Klein's *paranoid-schizoid position* to the *depressive position*, and therein the completion of the distinction between *self* and (m)other) (Blatt & Ford, 1994). At this stage, Bion's clinical thinking on the processes of transformation and representation and their resultant consciousness proposes perhaps the most intricate model of these complex phenomena, as he relates it closely to the development and *use of thoughts* and *thinking* and therein *psychic truth* (Anderson, 1995).

The *processes and nature of representation* in relation to transformation of experience and consciousness thus seem to *vary in function and complexity* throughout an infant's development. Such representations and transformations seem to entail conscious and unconscious elements, in both mind and body, and of particular interest to this study is thus the threshold or interplay between the two as together they enable knowing.

Although, as already stated, this interplay or the movement across this threshold is never linear, the logic and progression of *representation* as it unfolds throughout the *psychogenesis of the self* in the developing infant provides a means of delineating some of its characteristics in a more logical fashion. The following section thus explores the nature of *transformation and representation* of experience as it traverses in shifting emphases the realms of body and mind. It thus begins with a description of an example of the most basic of representations, namely the *transformational object*, and moves to a more complex use of representation, visible in the *transitional object*, as well as pondering more closely the interplay between experience and representation, and how this affects perception and the creation of meaning, as seen in the movement from the *paranoid-schizoid position* to the *depressive position*. What is particularly apparent in this discussion is the emergent ability of *distinguishing the self* from the *(m)other*, a manner of representing which enables further differentiation between *fantasy* and *reality*. Finally, Bion provides a somewhat different approach to the notion of experience, its transformation and representation, exploring the role and development of *thoughts* and *thinking*, as degrees of representations enabling consciousness or awareness of psychic truth, which he otherwise refers to as *O*. This section thus culminates in a brief description of Bion's contributions in this regard, but first the discussion turns to the *transformational object*.

2.4.1 *The Transformational Object*

The phenomenon of transformation and representation is perhaps most concrete in the infant's first experience of an object, what Christopher Bollas (1987) terms the *transformational object*. During this period in which the infant is assumed to be still a bundle of un-integrated impulses, sensations, and movements, which Thomas Ogden (1992b) terms the *autistic-contiguous phase*, these disparate fragments are able to gradually cohere and integrate through the mother's necessary care and nurturing which *transforms* the infant's experience of arousal (from, for example hunger to satiation, cold to warm) and therein leads

the infant to experience itself as having a form or shape (Gomez, 1997; Ogden, 1992b; Walsh & Rosen, 1988).

At this stage the infant is mainly aware of itself as the subject of the hedonic, a nexus of emergent needs, experienced pleasures, and displeasures, yet within the context of relationship and as such of attachment seeking warmth and safety in the eyes, body, and voice of another human being, in essence the presence of Winnicott's *good enough mother* (Vergote, 2002; Winnicott, 1964).

However, even at this most *concrete level of transformation*, the link to *representation* seems to exist. Klein posits that a mental representation of instinctual life is active from birth in the form of unconscious phantasy (Segal, 1973). This phantasy springs from bodily impulses and is interwoven with bodily sensations and affects, and thereby colours the infant's experience of real objects, whilst the impact of reality constantly modifies phantasy life (Case & Dalley, 1992). In this egocentric stage of development, where *primitive psychic processes are bound up in the all-embracing bodily sensations* of infancy, Weir (1987) posits that the infant believes that it has created its mother, a perception, much like all communication, which is informed by its bodily senses, constituting the '*body ego*'.

Another *form of representation* occurs as described for instance by Bion (1962), namely how something near sensory and somatic in the infant is transformed into a more mental representation by the mother, which the child could then use for thought or store as memory. The mother thus introduces the infant's mind and body one to the other, a process Winnicott called *personalisation*, facilitating the infant's sense of its body as being a dwelling place, the home, for its developing psyche. Therein the child's sense of itself is forged as a good and competent *mind-body self* (Farber, 1997).

Not surprisingly, on *yet another level of representation*, the identification that emerges from this symbiotic relating is internalised as a *process* that alters self-experience, so that the infant's first object is 'known' not so much by putting it into an 'object representation', but rather as a recurrent experience of being. Bollas (1987) describes this as a more *existential* as opposed to *representational* knowing, where the mother helps to integrate the infant's being (instinctual, cognitive, affective, environmental) through the rhythms of this process.

The continuous movement between *integration* and *disintegration* thus informs the *nature* of this '*object*' *relation* rather than the *qualities* of the *object as object*. Bollas named this the *unthought known*, namely the countless rules for being and relating that have been operationally determined, but have not yet been thought, or to be precise, mentally represented other than in perhaps phantasy (Bollas, 1987).

As suggested amongst others by Bion, this enables the infant's own emergent ego capacities – of motility, perception, and integration, which also begin to *transform* its experience. Bollas (1987) claims that it is not surprising that the infant identifies these ego achievements and adaptive abilities with the presence of an object, in that the failure of the mother to maintain provision of the facilitating environment, through for instance prolonged absence or bad handling, can evoke ego collapse and precipitate psychic pain.

Similarly, Hedges (in Farber, 2000) propagates the notion of a pathological organizing experience in some infants as a failed contact with an attuned mother that becomes internalised as the 'lost' or 'dead' mother of infancy. This internalisation of the lost mother of infancy is later manifested in the infant's failure to use fantasy, symbolism, or abstraction. The capacity to develop mental representations of the body and its contents, including feelings, is interfered with, forcing the individual to rely upon the immediate experience of his own body to elicit some representation of the self. The self-representation is then not symbolically achieved but through the experience of the body self.

This ability to transform sensory-emotional experience perhaps culminates in the acquisition of language, in that it is considered the most significant form of transformation enabling an individual to express and communicate his/her being. According to Bollas (1987) however, being instructed in the processes and logic of being and relating, and therein learning to handle and to differentiate between objects, and to remember objects that are not present, are transformative achievements in themselves in that they result through primary representations in ego change, which alters the nature of the infant's internal world. This will become more apparent in the ensuing discussion of the transitional object and therein the more advanced use of representations.

2.4.2 *The Transitional Object*

During the phase Winnicott (1971) called *transitional experiencing* the child develops object representations that function between the inner and outer realities, in an intermediate area, and are thus termed *transitional objects* (St. Clair, 1994). According to Winnicott, it is in this intermediate *potential* space that the child, through play, brings its inner world to the outer world as its evolving representations become more discrete.

An object from a child's day-to-day existence (such as a teddy bear or blanket) takes on the qualities of a transitional object when it becomes imbued with symbolic value. It exists between the inner and outer world in that it is seen as a *symbol* for the presence of the mother, though, at the same time it is not the 'actual' mother. The transitional object thus exists in an intermediate area where it brings together the 'me' and 'not-me' through the child's symbolic attachments, and thus forms part of the basis of abstraction and representation in the individual psyche (Winnicott, 1967). Such reliance on a suitable external object represents an aspect of the varying stages of needing to manipulate concrete objects in order to think, and being able to think about and manipulate objects in their absence (Symington & Symington, 1996).

Atwood and Stolorow (1984) linger on the psychic or emotional reality and therein emphasize the presence of a seemingly general psychological process observable even in adult life whereby needed configurations of experience are symbolically materialized by means of concrete physical objects.

They propose Winnicott's concept of the transitional object as perhaps the first instance of this process in an individual's life. They posit that the transitional object is a means in which a small child makes use of a soft object so as to master the anxiety and depressive affect evoked by early experiences of separation – both physical separation from the mother as well as the associated psychological differentiation of self from non-self, and therein of *subjective* from *objective reality*. As already described, the transitional object stands for the breast-mother and creates an *illusion* of reunion with the missing maternal presence. In other words, the material object symbolically encapsulates the soothing, comforting, calming qualities of the maternal self-object, and the concretisation serves as a restitutive function in mending or replacing the broken merger (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984).

Bollas (1987, p. 15) elaborates on this notion, claiming that “with the transitional object, the infant can play with the illusion of his own omnipotence (lessening the loss of the environment-mother with generative and phasic delusions of self-and-other creation); he can entertain the idea of the object being got rid of, yet surviving his ruthlessness; and he can find in this transitional experience the *freedom of metaphor*.” Therein, and only if supported by the mother, what was experienced as an actual process can be displaced into symbolic equations, which abate the loss of the original environment-mother: “In a sense, the use of a transitional object is the infant’s first creative act, an event that does not merely display an ego capacity – such as grasping – but which indicates the infant’s subjective experience of such capacities” and therein introduces the notion of the intricate interplay between transformation, representation and self-awareness or consciousness (Bollas, 1987, p. 15).

Ogden (1992a) goes so far as to argue that this transitional space can be compared to Bion’s notion of *being in the O*, which will be discussed a little further on, in that the infant is in a realm where the object is simultaneously created and discovered in the continuous process of symbolisation and re-symbolisation of the area between *self* and *other*, the illusionary of the in-between world. Fundamental is thus how symbolisation or representation is pivotal to developing the ability to know the inner from the outer world.

It thus seems that the experience of *being*, of ongoing transformation and representation, involves exploration and tolerance of frustration, of bearing absence, and therein the eventual realization of the separation between *self* and (*m*)*other*. Furthermore, this ultimate process of separation and individuation appears also to be intimately tied to and influential of the developing mental apparatus of a child. Bion explores this realm at length – the immaterial world of mental representation, where thoughts and thinking appear to be born of the transformation of this very frustration experiences of absence. Before the discussion turns to this interdependency however, a more in depth exploration of this realisation of self and other as being distinct or independently functioning entities ensues, particularly pent on establishing how this form of representation, either springing from or bringing about different modes of perception and experience, further facilitates the infant’s more objective awareness of external reality and thus consciousness.

2.4.3 *Self-Other Differentiation*

In *object relations theory* human experience is deemed to be composed of the dialectical interplay between three different *modes of generating experience*, namely the already mentioned *autistic-contiguous* mode, the *paranoid-schizoid* mode, as well as the *depressive* mode (Ogden, 1992b; Segal, 1973; Solomon, 1995). With the theory of the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions* Klein offers a creative, innovative, and compelling understanding of the psychological birth of the infant as the evolving complexity of its psychic and mental structures, its perceptions and thus experience are affected (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002). Klein's contributions with regards to the psychogenesis of the self thus add further elements to the notions of transformation and representation of psychic reality.

At this level of discussion it becomes even more difficult to delineate the various elements of experience and their representation, in that layers of the foregone experience (such as the transformational and transitional objects) have accumulated and acquired meaning that invariably impacts on any transformation, representations and their creation of meaning that follow. So many varied levels of representation and degrees of abstraction allow for much variance in the experience of being and therein the emergence of consciousness.

This level of discussion thus involves many psychological dynamics of representations and defences, which in their *content* fall beyond the scope of this discussion, but nonetheless need to be acknowledged in their intimate relation to *processes* or *mechanisms* of transformation and representation, as well as their varying *characteristics* dependent on the mode of functioning. This will thus become particularly apparent whence comparing the psychological processes of the *paranoid-schizoid position* based partly on its limited representations and means of abstraction or symbolisation, resulting in the experience and representation being practically equated, as opposed to the space and abstraction created in the more advanced levels of representation of the *depressive position* as the child enters the 'symbolic matrix' of language. It is only when the capacity for true symbolisation develops, that ideas can be communicated as ideas, rather than as actions (Gomez, 1997). The most important of these changes is perhaps the ability to finally distinguish *self* from (m)*other*, and therein integrate internal representations into whole objects, which clearly results in a different experience and perception of being and reality (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002; Ogden, 1992b).

This in mind, the following section attempts to illuminate these varying positions of direct experience and their inherent approach to transformation and representation. Of interest is that these positions are considered *stages* of development, but referred to as *positions* in that unlike stages they are not just grown through and subsumed by a later stage, but are perspectives or modes of experiencing which are continually returned to even throughout adult life. This is apparent when individuals are seen adopting a specific set or attitude through which events are perceived and interpreted, therein impacting on the emergent meaning. A constant dialectical tension thus exists between these experiential poles as, according to Klein, anxiety is experienced and managed in a variety of ways (Gomez, 1997; Ogden, 1992b).

As already discussed, the **autistic-contiguous mode** is thus most primitive, where the rudimentary sense of self is formed by the rhythm of sensation in and on the body. Because it is basic to the earliest relations with objects – for instance, the nursing experience or the experience of being held, rocked, sung and spoken to – it is a mode that is difficult to describe in words. Instead, it is a ‘knowing’, which resides in the modalities of the body. In essence, the autistic-contiguous mode provides a good measure of the sensory continuity and integrity of experience, along with the ‘unthought known’, and holds a mostly background presence throughout life (Ogden, 1989). The importance of this presence with regards to the transformation and representation of experience is perhaps greatly underestimated and will be explored at length further on.

As already implied, in the **paranoid-schizoid mode**, there is virtually no real difference between the symbol and the symbolized, which is referred to as *symbolic equation*, and therein contributes to the sense of immediacy and intensity of experience (Segal, 1973). Even *phantasy* retains a basic concreteness and is not a symbolic language, but a bodily-framed language in which body parts stand for ‘gifts’ or ‘weapons’, and the exchanges between individuals are experienced as though they are actually being carried out, due to the symbolic equation. There is thus no difference between thought and action (Gomez, 1997).

In attempting to manage the disruptions, deprivations, and anxieties of post-natal life, it is more important at this stage for the infant to achieve some order than make an accurate picture of reality. Representation thus functions on a very elementary level, so that there is

for instance no experience of absence, regret or loss, in that absence is simply felt as something *bad* rather than as something *good* not there. The urge to make sense of chaos leads the baby to order its experience by splitting or dividing it into what it feels is good and what it feels is bad experience, therein representing on a very basic level (Gomez, 1997).

This early ego's primary function, like the later, more fully developed ego, is, as already stated, to manage anxiety, which Klein describes as involving processes of splitting, projective identification, idealization, and omnipotence. This is echoed by Ogden (1992b, p. 614) who characterizes the paranoid-schizoid position as:

“...ahistorical, relatively devoid of the experience of an interpreting subject mediating between the sense of I-ness and one's lived sensory experience, part-object related, and heavily reliant on splitting, idealization, denial, projective identification and omnipotent thinking as modes of defence and ways of organizing experience. This paranoid-schizoid mode contributes to the sense of immediacy and intensity of experience.”

Klein argues that the young infant possesses a rudimentary ego, which "largely lacks cohesion" and "has a tendency towards integration alternating with a tendency towards disintegration, a falling into bits" (Klein, 1945, p. 140). Things and others are therefore not experienced as continuous, autonomous beings, but are instead organized or represented according to the above mentioned feeling states ('good' or 'bad') such that others and things become extensions of the infant's self and, vice versa, the feeling-states of others are taken on as its own. Clearly, there resides a decided lack of ego-boundaries or "I"-ness, which has a profound impact on the experience and perception of relationship, on reality (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002).

With the interaction of symbolic thought with each 'acting out', the more primitive paranoid-schizoid and autistic-contiguous modes shift to the background and lose power as the **depressive mode** comes to the foreground and gains ascendancy (Farber, 1997; Ogden, 1989). The depressive position is the most mature form of psychological organization according to Klein (1930), and is marked by a richness of layered symbolic meaning, which enables the individual to experience him/herself as a person, thinking his/her thoughts and feeling his/her feelings (Gomez, 1997; St. Clair, 1994; Solomon, 1995). Ogden, (2001) conceptualises what occurs in this process of symbol or metaphor-making as the creation of

verbal symbols that ‘substantiate’ (give shape and emotional substance to) the self as object (‘me’), thereby creating symbols that serve as mirrors in which the self as subject (‘I’) recognizes/creates itself, and consciousness is born.

It is not exactly clear *how* the depressive position emerges developmentally, but it is deemed that this developing capacity for creating true symbols, and thereby meaning, is not a linear process (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002). Ogden (1992b) quite emphatically argues that the emergence of the depressive position is a project, which is never fully completed, and continues by claiming that it never should be. As already mentioned, it extends beyond a mere phase of development. He describes the depressive position as (Ogden, 1992b, p. 614):

“...characterized by (1) an experience of interpreting 'I-ness' mediating between oneself and one's lived sensory experiences, (2) the presence of an historically rooted sense of self that is consistent over time and over shifts in affective states, (3) relatedness to other people who are experienced as whole and separate objects with an internal life similar to one's own; moreover, one is able to feel concern for the Other, guilt, and the wish to make non-magical reparation for the real and imagined damage that one has done to others, and (4) forms of defence (e.g., repression and mature identification) that allow the individual to sustain psychological strain over time [...]. In sum, the depressive mode generates a quality of experience endowed with a richness of layered symbolic meanings.”

The previously ‘good’ and ‘bad’ feeling-states regarding self and other of the paranoid-schizoid position are ambivalently held together by a bounded ‘ego’ or ‘I-ness’ emergent in the depressive position. Others are thus no longer experienced simply as “loved, hated, or feared forces or things that impinge on oneself,” but, rather, separate beings for which one can have *concern*, and therein enables empathy (Ogden, 1989, p. 23). The impact of the symbolic function becomes apparent, most noticeably perhaps in that it appears to give rise to the possibility of the child's use of the word “I”, and therein as already stated, the birth of self-awareness and consciousness as an autonomous being (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002; Ogden 1989).

Influenced by Bion (1962), who posits that the movement between the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive position* represents the basic mechanism of thinking in that it delineates the movement from a state of formless chaos to that of coherence (the operation of a selected fact, which will be discussed in the next section), Ogden (1992b, p. 616) realizes that, without

the "de-integrative pressure of the paranoid-schizoid pole," the depressive pole of experience "would reach closure, stagnation and 'arrogance'." Thus, the continuous tension between the de-integrative tendencies of the paranoid-schizoid position and the integrative tendencies of the depressive position allow for the creative emergence of new psychological possibilities without total fragmentation, on the one hand, or severe psychological rigidity, on the other (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002).

This thus also points to the notion of how one level of experience can inform the structures and functioning of another, such that Klein postulates that the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive perspectives* of the psyche appear to replicate the mother's initial transformative function of more physically based needs, whilst, according to Bion, both these levels of experience seem to inform processes of thinking, as will be explored next² (Eigen, 1996; Seinfeld, 1993; Symington & Symington, 1996). Suffice it to say, there thus seems to be a definite relationship between inner reality and bodily experience, such that Freud even posited that the ego, mostly considered a psychic or mental phenomenon, is first and *foremost* a bodily ego (Cameron & Rychlak, 1985; Von Rad, 1984). The relationship is perhaps more fundamental in our day-to-day functioning than is often supposed and will accordingly be addressed in the concluding section of this chapter concerned with the 'knowing' body, allowing for an exploration of its implications for therapeutic practice in the following chapter. As yet, however, the exploration into representations of the developing infant is incomplete, so that the discussion now turns to the somewhat unique approach of Bion's clinical thinking with regards to experience, its transformation and representation, and therein the emergence of *consciousness*.

2.4.4 *Thoughts on Thinking*

As alluded to above, Bion takes a more in-depth look at this *process of transformation* and *representation*, relating it to the *development of thoughts and thinking*, conceptualised within

² Bion (1967) elaborates, considering it likely that the mental apparatus for thinking reflects the bodily mechanisms concerned with respiratory, excretory, and alimentary systems, positing that experience needs to be *metabolised* or *digested* in as much as food does; the language we developed to think about mental processes is thus frequently based upon these bodily functions, applied to the mind in a metaphorical sense (Fletcher, 1979; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Symington & Symington, 1996).

his metatheoretical perspective of the existence of psychic truth, symbolized as O. As already stated, transformation and representation are assumed necessary for healthy functioning, and seem to enable *consciousness* to emerge in various forms of complexity (from the more obvious self-awareness or personal identity, in essence the distinguishing of *self* from *other*, to the intricacies around knowing *psychic truth*). With his emphasis on the notion that *being* is defined fundamentally by either an avoidance of or a bearing of psychic truth, and its impact particularly on the development and functioning of thoughts and thinking, Bion thus approaches the *phenomenon of transformation and representation* from somewhat different premises.

The complexity of thought around the interplay between perception, experience, and mental representation, which his contributions provide, enriches the foregone discussion regarding experience, transformation, representation and consciousness in expanding on notions regarding the realms of the *mental representation* and *cognition*, and their link to experience through the physical and bodily representation. His approach, equally born of the consideration of the infant/mother constellation, the acknowledgement of the inseparability of body and mind, thus focuses much more on the details of mental representation, thoughts and the nature of thinking, posited by some as the ultimate form of transformation and representation. The next section thus provides a brief overview of some aspects of his conceptualisation in this regard.

Bion postulates that *personal growth* or *healthy functioning* lies in the conscious bearing of this ‘ultimate reality’ or ‘thing-in-itself’. However, he suggests that this O can never be *fully* possessed or known (K), and rather than be observed (through the senses), can be experienced only through fleeting moments of ‘*intuition*’³ (Grinberg *et al*, 1977; Grotstein, 1996). The individual thus develops the capacity to think and therein *represent* only aspects of the essentially unknowable O. This ability originates in the mother-infant constellation (*thinking couple*), such that all knowledge has its origins in primitive emotional experience (Grotstein, 1979).

³ Bion therein alludes to a complexity regarding *knowing* of *truth*, and its relation to experience, transformation and representation that this discussion simply cannot do justice to. However, thoughts regarding this manner of differentiation will be briefly delved into in the concluding chapter.

Bion posits that various stages are involved in the development of thoughts from their primitive matrix through to their most abstract form. Briefly stated, the most primitive consist of the unprocessed and unthought data, named *beta elements*, which are emotionally meaningless. Through the *alpha function*, beta elements are transformed into basic elements of thoughts, named *alpha elements*. Complexity then extends to descriptive elements, considered to be anything expressible in terms of sensuous images (commonly visual) from which the abstraction increases to eventually include *pre-conception*. Pre-conception, thought of as having an unsaturated aspect, searches for completion, such that when it meets the appropriate *realization*, it becomes saturated and is referred to as *conception*, which allows for an understanding of emotional truth and meaning. The whole process is thus one of thoughts growing in complexity and depth, producing new ideas and greater richness, as well as increasing abstraction, enabling greater and greater overarching principles to be reached (Symington & Symington, 1996).

Bion proposed *two processes* as fundamental to this development of *thoughts* and *thinking*, namely, the process of *container-contained* (♀♂) and the dynamic interaction between the already mentioned *paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions* ($Ps \leftrightarrow D$) (Symington & Symington, 1996).

This is seen when in favourable conditions the infant develops the *apparatus* for the thinking of thoughts, which makes it possible for the individual to know *about* O. The way this thinking develops can be described in terms of the saturation of the infant's hunger by an attentive mother. This then forms the archetype for **container-contained** (♀♂) thinking – the interrelatedness of mother's breast and infant, much like Winnicott's unified entity of mother and infant, the *nursing couple* (Phillips, 1988). These two components are reflected not only in the structure of the personality, as internalised object relations, but also in the *functioning of thoughts*, so that once again it becomes apparent how the structure and functioning of representation, even creates the structure and functioning on another in the inseparability of the context of mind and body, experience and knowing.

This develops from the experience of when a baby is waiting for a breast that does not come, where the very *absence* of the breast is then experienced as the *presence* of something unpleasant; in other words, the 'no-breast' is seen to deprive the infant of what it wants, and

is therefore felt to be a cruel, 'bad breast', as seen in the *paranoid-schizoid position* described above (Segal, 1973). This 'presence' is however, not sensuously present in the sense of an external stimulus, but is in fact a thought leading to a resultant expectation of the 'good breast', a *pre-conception* that finds *realization* in the real mother's feeding/breast (Bion, 1962).

Through the experience of the 'real' mother in the external world feeding the infant with a 'real' breast, the mother provides the opportunity for the infant to expel in phantasy (through projective identification) the 'bad breast' (Gabbard, 1992). She therein modifies or transforms (by absorbing, detoxifying, or translating) the near-sensory and somatic experience and therein allows for the beginnings of more mental representation (Anderson, 1995). This process of transforming closely resembles what Bollas, as already referred to, termed the transformational object. Bion calls this transformational process *containing* (Hamilton, 1992).

This intuitive containing provided by the mother, otherwise referred to as *reverie*, along with the baby's own innate tolerance of frustration and doubt, thus allows for the development of thinking (Adler & Rhine, 1992). Reverie refers to the above-mentioned *alpha function* and the transformed experience, to *alpha elements*, which in their unsaturated nature allow for further thinking. As the infant matures *it eventually internalises this alpha function and manages its own containing*, forms and functioning of representation much like can be observed in the progression of the relationship between therapist and patient (Hamilton, 1992).

The foundation of thought thus lies in an absence, where thought itself is a *constructive function*; it forms the basic elements of experience into a meaningful pattern, reminding somewhat of the function of the *depressive position*. The notion of thoughts and thinking thus not only provides a further distinction of forms and functioning of representation as it is born of experience, but particularly also emphasises the child's ability to tolerate experience more, process and express it, and be able to think about it from the distance of a reflective space. This in turn reminds in some way of the psychogenesis of the self, where the initial *self/(m)other conflation*, leads to the separate *self – (m)other differentiation* and thus the opportunity for autonomous functioning.

When a mother, however, does *not* offer this containing reverie to transform the baby's experience, and an infant is not able to tolerate the unpleasant no-breast long enough for it to become a thought, showing envious and greedy reactions, this O (for instance the emotional experience of hunger) is returned to the baby as a *nameless dread*. This is then treated as *a thing to be got rid of*, a foreign body to be expelled, and therefore evacuated (unthought) as the thing-in-itself – either into action or into the body, where it might be expressed as a symptom, or merely continues to hover in what Farber (2000) describes as a 'borderland' between body and mind. Such unmodified experience consists of *beta elements*, untransformed in their original saturated form and therefore unable to be thought, once again reminiscent of the symbolic equation characteristic of the *paranoid-schizoid position* (Symington & Symington, 1996).

If evacuation of the painful experience takes place, blockage in mental development occurs. Of relevance is that this is not a process confined to severely disturbed individuals, but something that can be observed in any individual on a moment-to-moment basis. Rejection of painful feeling or refusal to think, blocks the development of thought and thus interferes with the transformation and representation of emotional experience resulting in a stultification of emotional growth. Thinking about the self remains stuck in a vicious circle (Symington & Symington, 1996).

Woodruff (1999) relates this to some individuals' seeming attacks on the creating of meaning. Some individuals cannot tolerate giving up the immediacy of experience in favour of tolerating grief and depression, common to the movement from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position. To do so is to live more in the mind and less in the body – this implies accepting that one cannot have what is so desperately wanted (such as fusion with the mother) and thus having to mourn and use language to give meaning to the loss. In doing this, using *words to stand in place of the thing signified*, one *destroys the immediacy and presence of the object they represent*. Bion similarly conceptualises this as attacks on the *alpha function*, stimulated by hate or envy, which thus destroys the patient's conscious contact either with him/herself or another individual as 'live objects'. "Accordingly we hear of inanimate objects, and even places, when we would normally expect to hear of people. These, though described verbally, are felt by the patient to be present materially and not merely to be represented by their names" (Bion, 1962, p. 9). This is reminiscent of the

difference between the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions* described in the previous section, and thus provides a clear example of the changing nature and function of representation and thus experience.

Although the seemingly *linear movement* from experience to a more removed representation is portrayed as pivotal to mature functioning and the realisation of psychic truth, Bion re-emphasises the necessity of the *circular movement* between *integration* and *disintegration* for any meaning to arise. He explores the dynamic interaction between Klein's **paranoid-schizoid** and **depressive positions** with a somewhat different emphasis, relating the movement or interaction between the oscillating processes of disintegration (and the creation of phantasy), followed by integration (and the creation of symbols as mental representations), and so forth, (Ps↔D), as essential to enabling the *naming* of an experience, called the *selected fact*. In other words, (Ps↔D) describes the move from a state of formless chaos to that of coherence, which suddenly develops through the operation of a selected fact (Grinberg *et al*, 1977; Symington & Symington, 1996). This reminds in turn of the continuous establishing of the boundaries and differences between inner and outer reality, discussed above, and creates interesting links to the notion of truth and reality and how these are aligned with individual experience. These thoughts will be addressed more thoroughly in the concluding chapter. At this stage of the discussion, the nature and processes of representations are relevant.

In this sense, representation functioning as *abstraction* is thus not just the extraction of certain more concrete qualities from a phenomenon but it is also the binding together of phenomena which are recognized as belonging together; in this way singling them out from the rest that do not belong. This is what happens when a *pre-conception* mates with its particular *realization*. The meaning of this junction then begins to emerge. This is, at least according to Bion, how thought develops: a matching-binding process followed by the accumulation of meaning (Symington & Symington, 1996).

This necessary unsaturated nature of any knowing however, implies frustration and doubt, and yet, in order to grow one must tolerate this and allow an intuitive *being in O*, where one is fully identified with experience and not standing apart, able to consider it from a comfortable distance afforded by the ordering capacities of pre-existing mental categories.

Bion refers to this as *transformations in O*, which implies actively entering the above-mentioned continuous cycle of integration and disintegration, where the manner in which one manages this movement becomes critical for the creation of meaning and the ability to bear psychic truth. As already pointed to, this movement hinges on the internalisation or representation of the primitive experience of (m)other and her involvement in the transforming of experience.

It seems that “transformation *in O* is something like ‘being what one is’, and this transformation is feared and therefore resisted” (Grinberg *et al*, 1977, p. 80). Feared as it may be, according to Bion, one needs to go beyond the safety of ‘*knowing about O*’, relating either by (K)nowing, (L)oving, or (H)ating it, in the implied distance from actual *being (in)* it. Bion claims, only interpretations that transform this ‘knowing about something’ into ‘*becoming that something*’ (K→O) enable change and mental growth (Grinberg *et al*, 1977). It seems that one needs to actively enter the chaos, where one is *at one* with the experience, so that from it, one can emerge with new truth or meaning.

In summary, when considering the phenomenon of experience, its transformation, representation, and the emergence of consciousness in healthy functioning, Bion provided some insight into the possible means in which the experience of *self* and (m)other relates to the birth of cognitive or mental representation, and in general the development of thoughts and thinking. The understanding and nature of representation and how it relates to experience was thus expanded, and will now be assimilated, along with all the foregone aspects of the discussion so far, into a *metaperspective*, in an attempt to distil or give form to some of its most important characteristics.

2.4.5 *Integrating Notions of Representation – A Metaperspective*

On returning to the analogy put forth at the outset of this chapter, namely the perpetual circularity and interdependence between experience, its transformation and representation, visually illustrated by Escher’s *Drawing Hands*, the following section will attempt to integrate this notion of circularity and enmeshment as it pertains to the elaborately discussed *object relational* punctuation of *representation*, and ultimately its intimate involvement with consciousness, knowing, and psychic truth emergent in this never-ending process.

What has made this exploration somewhat tricky, if not outright confusing, is the experience of this phenomenon appearing to consist, on the one hand, of elements which can be differentiated (i.e. experience, its transformation, and representation) explored and understood in a sequential or linear fashion, which however, in the very next instance, appear, on the other hand, to exist simultaneously and indistinguishably, as though they were conflated or collapsed into one. The attempt to thus verbally and linearly present such phenomena that appear mutually exclusive in one moment and inseparable or interdependent in the next, in itself thus illustrates the very experience of integration and disintegration (much like Bion described), in this attempt to know and represent the ‘both/and’ nature of experience.

Nonetheless, based on the very same premise that I purported as underlying the phenomena of this study, namely that experience, in its transformation *needs to be represented*, to enable healthy functioning and the seemingly integral emergence of consciousness or knowing, I have similarly attempted to give some form to my experience and understanding of current *object relational* literature concerned with these phenomena, in the attempt to know this process of transformation, and its relation to *health* and *being* more intimately. To enable this I chose to align my exploration with the linearity and punctuation inherent in development and the psychogenesis of the self, mirrored in the development of thought and thinking, to give some tentative structure to this elusive interrelationship. The relevance of this attempt lies not only in my personal expanding consciousness, but also as a contribution to the general scientific endeavour of gaining more understanding into our functioning so as to be able to fine-tune our therapeutic or healing practices based on it. This will be explored a little more closely in the following chapter, for which a thorough theoretical understanding is pivotal. In light of this, the integrative overview follows if only in the form of a somewhat rudimentary metaperspective:

Having alluded to the complexity of the interplay of the various phenomena, and at the risk of oversimplifying and therein distorting aspects in this representational attempt, I will nonetheless turn once again to the analogy of Escher’s *Drawing Hands*. However, having already repeatedly referred to the inseparability and interdependence symbolised in the circular enmeshment of its two- and three-dimensionality, encapsulating the notion of experience and its representation, I wish now to consider more closely the metaphoric

complexity implicit in its *title*. This seems to provide a suitable means of understanding the complexity regarding specifically the characteristics and functions of *representation*.

Although perhaps a digression, it seems useful to the discussion at this stage to explicate this complexity more elaborately: In essence it refers to the paradox of the *very same representation*, namely the words ‘*drawing hands*’, being able to imply or function as entirely different entities; either as process, as element, or as signifier. To illustrate, as an intended *verb* (process), the above representation could be understood in the sense of ‘I am *drawing hands* on a piece of paper’; as an *adjective* (element) however, the hands are described as being *drawing hands*; whilst in essence the most removed understanding, as the title of this drawing, the emphasis is on its function as a *noun* (signifier), the *drawing hands*.

Thus, when considering the *functions* and *characteristics* of the various forms of *representation* this theoretical exploration has referred to so far, they can be crudely differentiated as:

i) Taking on a *transformative function*, where the representation *equates to* the process of transformation, in that in its ordering, categorising, and differentiating, it is at one with the experience as it gives form to chaos, seen in the example of the *transformational object*. It thus functions fundamentally as a process or *verb* at this stage; however, in this very name, it implies somewhat of a *noun*, such that this process is also distinct from experience in that it leaves a memory trace of the process of changed experience of self. This, however, is assumed only to be known on a *bodily level*, and not transformed sufficiently enough to become a *mental representation*. Nonetheless, the process seems to remind in the mental realms of cognition, of the thinking process of *container-contained* (♀♂).

ii) Embodying a *symbolising function*, where representation functions primarily as an element (*adjective*), equally present in both mind and body, and distinct in that it is imbued with very basic meaning-value, as seen in the *transitional object* or phantasy of the *paranoid-schizoid position*. Although the infant is beginning to recognize autonomous objects, creating mental representations, which it can manipulate, it still feels mixed up with them. Such symbols or representations are thus ‘affectively-loaded’, directly impacting on experience, and not independently referring to experience as is seen in the final function in the use of a signifier

or name. The process seems to be one of constant oscillation between functioning as a signifier, representative of an object, and being a symbol, understood in this instance as embodying and evoking affect related to the object. This reminds also of the cognitive process Bion refers to as *paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions* ($Ps \leftrightarrow D$), a constant interplay between integration and disintegration, the emergence and disappearance of form from chaos. Of interest is how these representations thus directly shape the infant's experience of *self* and the *world*, as the child is seen to start manipulating them – the *transitional object*, for instance, as a defensive substitute to keep separation or annihilation anxieties at bay, or to evoke the partly internalised loving or holding presence of the mother when needed, all in the gradual realisation of the separation between *self* and *other*, as being independent or 'whole' individuals. Similarly, other defence-mechanisms such as *projection*, *projective identification*, or *sublimation* smack of a similar manipulation of representations, where, as discrete entities, parts or aspects of experience are 'moved' or 'shifted' in order to ease tension or keep the good untainted, and so forth – even if only on an *unconscious* level.

iii) The *conscious* level, often equated with mental representation and the use of language, implies the most independent notion of representation, as a signifier or name (*noun*), therein representative of something or pointing to it, but creating direct identification with it or the immediacy of its experience. This level of representation seems to coincide mostly with the *depressive position*, the emergence of the ability to say 'I', thus providing an interesting parallel between the realization of self as separate from (m)other, creating a reasonably permanent self-representation, as well as simultaneously developing the use of language or mental representation that enables a 'looking at', 'reflecting on', and 'thinking about' something, no longer overwhelmed by the experience of it. The very language of the italicised words indicates the needed distance from experience inherent in such a state. This mode or function of representation perhaps most clearly differentiates the individual's ability to distinguish *inner phantasy* from *outer reality*, as the more subjective and conceptual understanding emerges from the unconscious bodily realms of the 'unthought known', transformed to the more objective, perceptible perspectives of conscious reality of a cultural and linguistic context. Perhaps its through this continual transformative movement that *psychic truth* emerges: one needs to represent so as to be able to know, yet equally, Valéry (in Schiller, 1994, p. 176) states that "to see is to forget the name of the thing one sees",

reminding of Bion's transformative notions of having to be *in O* for meaningful change to occur.

The following figure thus attempts to delineate these complex representations, removed from the linearity of a developmental time-line, thus simply portraying their characteristics and complex interplay as they function in a matured individual.




Figure 1 - An integrative Metaperspective

The impact of this continued process of transformation of sensory-emotional experience, and its complexity as it relates to representation, and thus the experience of the self and the world is succinctly described by Winnicott (1971, p. 151) in the following quotation:

“I am proposing that there is a stage in the development of human beings that comes from before objectivity and perceptibility [...] a baby can be said to live in a subjective or conceptual world. The change from the primary state to one in which objectivity is possible is not only a matter of inherent or inherited growth processes, it needs in addition an environmental minimum. It belongs to the whole vast theme of the individual travelling from dependence to independence. This early stage of development is concerned with tentatively ambivalent feelings about merging and separation; about being confused as to the whereabouts of those boundaries, as to what is inside and what is outside, and the limits of containment. While the infant is beginning to recognise autonomous objects, he still feels mixed up with them. This reality confronts him *throughout his life*, requiring *constant resolution*.”⁴

This notion of perpetual striving towards individuation and differentiation, and thus the associated oscillation between the Kleinian *paranoid schizoid* and *depressive positions*, or in Bion’s conceptualisation, the continuous striving to digest as yet untransformed experience, often assumed to be lodged in the body or psyche as beta elements, leaves me wondering how it is that the role of the body in this regard appears somewhat less emphasised when considering therapeutic attempts of encouraging this process.

To clarify, literature on the pathological ‘use’ of the body is extensive and has only been fleetingly referred to within this paper. However, my wondering is more concerned with the possibilities inherent in *bodily knowing* when applied constructively in the therapeutic space. This will thus be explored in the following chapter, but rests on the assumption that in returning to states of being which seem conflated with the body, it is likely that what is known or perceived by the mind in such a position, is equally appropriated by the body. Furthermore, when assuming that the body exists as a primary organising mentality, prior to the sophistication of the later developed mental and psychic capacities, it may be interesting to explore the nature and characteristics of this mentality, in order to enable complete transformation of sensory-emotional experience.

The discussion so far, perhaps also reflective of current theoretical emphasis, was more centred on the emergence and unfolding of mental representation, with less attention paid to the meaning or possibility in bodily representation. Bion points to this realm, as in his *Brazilian Lectures* he refers to the possible relevance of *bodily knowing* in the *transitional*

⁴ Italics added for relevant emphasis.

area between beta and alpha elements by quoting from a poem written by John Donne, citing the following: ‘*the blood spoke in her cheek...as if her body thought*’ (Symington & Symington, 1996). He therein not only reminds of the body’s presence, but also alludes to the possibility of a certain *mentalism* associated with it.

The next section thus concerns itself with a slightly shifted emphasis from *consciousness* in the *mental realm*, to taking a closer look at the possible *consciousness* or *knowing* in the *bodily realms*, and therein its role or function in *transformation* and *representational processes*. The seeming presence of *consciousness* in the *bodily realms*, although linked, also seems somewhat distinct from *consciousness* in the *mental realms*, as the further exploration will reveal, poses tentative notions of *consciousness* perhaps being equally linked, but also distinct from *self-awareness* or the *realities of the external world* of social constructions in a cultural milieu, and thus suggestive of a *knowing* or *awareness* more concerned with a psychic truth, or as Bion states it, an intuiting of O. These very careful statement may become clearer once having considered the contributions and observed characteristics of bodily knowing presented in the next section, and may therein also create a certain amount of confusion regarding the manner in which to understand the function and purpose of *transformation* and *representation* in view of the now seeming discrepancy between the, on the one hand, necessary life-long process of the psychogenesis of the self, and on the other, psychic growth being linked to notions of truth, which appears to reside both in and yet beyond the external, mentally represented world, such that it can only be intuited, at least according to Bion. The final chapter attempts to address these concerns to some extent, although a thorough consideration of these questions and theoretical disjunctions requires further extensive research.

To enable a reorientation to this discussion, implicit so far has been the extent to which the physical body encourages, and even shapes, the processes and functioning of the mind. Furthermore, language, at least in its verbal form, has been posed as the ultimate manifestation of *transformation*, therein embedding the assumption that healing takes place in the form of verbal expression (Kruger, 1988). However, what will be explored in the next section concerns itself with the possible *reflective capacity* or *mentalism* of the body, other than that of the mind, emphasizing awareness in an individual, the existence of which may

challenge what might appear at times to be a premature emphasis on verbalization of unconscious material.

2.5 Reconsidering Representation in View of the ‘knowing’ Body

It appears often to be overlooked that our primary and most continuous experience is that of being fundamentally embodied beings (Siegelman, 1990). We seem not aware or perhaps take for granted the pivotal role that our body plays in shaping and enabling our day-to-day experiences, as we tend to be much more engrossed in the mental representations, the languaged realities of our cultural surrounds. The experience of our body thus mostly takes on the form of a kind of backdrop or background to our existence, perhaps necessary, in that we typically live *through* our body *to* the objects and challenges of the external world – where our body itself remains implicit or tacit (Shapiro, 1985).

Simply put, one needs only to think of having reached out to touch, perhaps the coolness of someone’s skin or the smoothness of a cat’s fur coat: what remains is a sense of the object, not so much an awareness of how this experience was informed by the body; one is generally not aware of one’s hand, the *knowing* implicit in its movements as it expresses the intention to touch, nor the manner in which such an experience is stored in and remembered at will by the body. It seems only in deliberate moments of self-searching or introspection that some individuals turn their attention inwards, to a ‘deeper’, or at least ‘older’, kind of knowing other than that of the linear logic of the reasoning mind.

This is a bodily *knowing* related to the ability, in the moment, to locate and feel the nature of one’s own experience inside one’s body and to be able to follow that experience, with conscious attention and respect, wherever it goes, ‘letting it happen’ without interfering (Lewis Bernstein, 1979; Fletcher, 1979; Siegel, 1979). This seemingly elusive knowing, embedded in the depths of the living body, resists easy research and analysis, and yet some epistemologies, such as phenomenology, have enabled science to gain a little more insight into it. The following section explores some of these postulations a little more closely.

In his contributions to phenomenological underpinnings, French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) claims that *every* moment we experience, every *thought* or *feeling*, has a physical correlate (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Any relationship, whether human or

non-human, is in part appreciated and *known* (not only enabled) bodily (Polkinghorne, 1994; Shapiro, 1985). Fletcher (1979) warns, however, that one must be careful to make simple mind/body equations, that is, assuming that what happens in a physical mode also happens *in an equivalent way* in the structures of an individual's psyche. She claims that this may only be the case in certain instances⁵. Important is to take note of this so-called 'correlate', which extends beyond the understanding of the 'body-as-physiology'⁶ to the 'body-as-lived', an entity implying the presence of embodied consciousness and meaning, born of interpersonal connections, which reside within the living body (Kruger, 1988). This is reminiscent of Bollas' notion of the 'unthought known' as described in the previous section.

Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 146) elaborates on this distinction by stating that, "the body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world: at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of the motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body's natural means; it must then build itself an instrument and projects thereby around itself a cultural world", as seen for instance in the emotional expressions of a musician playing the violin, or even Escher's toying with philosophical notions in the symbolism of his drawing; the toying continued in its title, '*Drawing Hands*'.

There is thus a complexity to being, which Merleau-Ponty approaches by creating some form of distinction between the 'functional' aspects of the body seen purely in terms of physiological survival (body-as-machine) and the more socially 'meaningful' (body-as-

⁵ Different physical expressions or body experiences do not always have a direct equivalent relation to a given perception, thought or feeling, in that they may be a response or reaction to the initial feeling; it may also function as a defence against the feeling or transformation of it (Siegel, 1979). Bion expands on this notion in his thoughts regarding possible attacks on *linking* (Symington & Symington, 1996).

⁶ For purposes of clarity, 'body-as-physiology' refers to a Cartesian-based perspective that views the body merely as a biological organism that needs to function effectively to ensure its purpose of being a largely uninvolved vehicle for the psyche (Kruger, 1988; Tarnas, 1999).

lived), viewed from a relational and interpersonal perspective, well knowing that these domains are intricately intermingled in actuality⁷.

This interrelationship may have already become apparent in the discussion so far, having explored the movement of experience and its transformation to *mental representation* in various complexities as it applies both to physical needs and emotional connection. What has not yet been explored in depth, however, is the manner and extent to which the *body* has a *representative* and even *reflective capacity*, a certain *mentalism*, which seems to parallel or even underlie, for instance, the above-mentioned artistic expressions. In this sense, as implied with the ‘unthought known’, bodily movement, expression, or sensation appears interpersonally relevant, meaningful in terms of a relationship.

Interesting to ponder is, on the one hand, in what way this may relate to the notion of bodily conflation with or differentiation from the representations of *self* and *other*, as was suggested from a Kleinian perspective, whilst on the other, in conceding an embodied existence, how a continuous bodily presence, and implied *knowing*, impacts or relates to *mental representations* in the moment-to-moment experience of being human. In having to set some limits, the following section explores a few significant contributions in light of this, indicating a certain progression in our understanding of these complexities in regard to the body-mind relationship.

2.5.1 *The Body-Mind Relationship*

Until recently, traditional psychological views were still under the profound influence of the contributions of the philosopher Descartes, who claimed that as human beings we exist as discrete individuals, alone in our skins and split from the world of others. Furthermore, he posited that we are composed of two substances, namely the thinking substance, *res cogitans*, and the body, *res extensa* – where, in essence, ‘pure reason’, or the psyche, is *attached* to a body (Diamond, 2001; Tarnas, 1999; Vaughan, 1997; Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

⁷ Much research points to the physical underpinnings of a relational orientation within the human being, as well as how emotional and relational realities impact on the functioning of the body, where, for instance, the quality of care received, influences functions such as homeostasis, sleeping, eating, excretion, skin reaction etc. or physical symptoms become interpersonally meaningful, and so forth (Diamond, 2001; Escoll, 1992; Farber, 2000; Griffith & Griffith, 1994; Vaughan, 1997; Vergote, 2002).

This perspective has, however, since been challenged by significant contributions made amongst others by the above-mentioned Merleau-Ponty, who proposed our existence to be fundamentally an embodied one in the sense that we interact bodily with the world, and through *this*, the world comes to have meaning for us. As already alluded to, he argues the position that meaning and understanding are originally bodily, in that they occur prelinguistically, before language, and before reflective conceptualisation, reminding, as already stated, of Bollas' 'unthought known' or Ogden's 'autistic-contiguous' position, but also alluding to the intimate relation between our consciously constructed existence and our bodily experience. Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 88) states that, "the union of soul and body is not an amalgamation between two mutually external [...] terms, subject and object, but is invariably enacted in every moment of existence. [...] Man taken as a concrete being is not a psyche joined to an organism".

Merleau-Ponty thus argued that the psyche or mind is not inside a body existing as a private cut-off space. In fact, he proposed that to posit the mind, as an actual entity located inside the body, is to posit an abstract and hypothetical construct. Similarly, *thinking* is not something that happens inside an isolated psyche but is an activity expressed as "a system of behaviour that aims at the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p.118). Mind and body thus appear to be indistinguishably linked (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Merleau-Ponty, 1962). Even our language is not *immaterial*, in that born of gestures it extends to words which however, "are trapped in corporeal images that captivate the subject" (Lacan, 1977, p.87 in Farber, 2000, p. 156).

In this sense, it seems that the infant does not start life in an interior mental space but is, from the first, situated 'outside' in its bodily behaviour and intentions that are orientated towards others. Diamond (2001) similarly posits that the infant and others do not coexist as disembodied psyches but share an embodied space, where *communication is formed primarily in bodily actions*, so that *physical* and *mental modes* appear not only intimately intertwined within the individual, but this interrelationship seems to extend even to the *interpersonal realm*. In this sense, particular emphasis is placed on the *body's knowing* (Diamond, 2001; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Merleau-Ponty describes this body connection between individuals as unmediated and direct, "I live in the facial expressions of the other" (1964, p. 146). From this perspective, babies and adults communicate primarily *non-verbally*

with one another, until the child begins to develop verbal language abilities, and begins to reside in its awareness more within the *mental realms of representation*.

There thus seems to exist a relation between *mental* and *physical modalities*, the focus of which appears to shift from the body to the mind in the maturing individual. Nonetheless, it appears that experiences in their *mental representation* are either functionally and/or symbolically related to *physical expressions* and *internal bodily events*, so that, according to Siegel (1979), *physical* and *mental modes* link up, interact, and trigger each other. In this sense, the expressions of the various, both *physical* and *mental*, modalities seem to reflect or suggest the identity and organization or psychic structure of an individual's total personality as it is formed in relationship.

Fletcher (1979, p. 136) states, “meanings are represented at both conscious and unconscious levels by a cross-referencing of the physical and mental modes. Sensations, impulses, and intentions toward action, functional movements, expressive motion, body images, etc., are cross-referenced in relation to present perceptions of internal and external objects. From infancy onward these experiences are linked together through unconscious phantasy into schematic units of meaning, which effect moment-to-moment experiencing. Because of this inherent link each mode triggers the other and refers to the deeper meaning and dynamics by which the whole personality is organized”. Fletcher thus seems to support the notion of a continued interrelatedness between these two organising mentalities, perceiving both to mutually influence and impact on one another.

To reiterate, *bodily experience* is thus not located in an independent, isolated, physical space. Instead, emotional and sensory experiences inhabit a shared interpersonal bodily situation. Based on this perspective, Diamond (2001, p. 51) criticises early *object relational* thinking, claiming that: “We no longer have to play at jumping over a gulf that separates two bodies, because they both inhabit a shared body space where emotions are expressed and communicated via bodily action. The space I am describing is primary and remains as a potential in interactions throughout life. The exchange of non-verbal messages continues in adult relationships. Although often less intense and attuned, it underlies all vocal exchanges”. An example of *object relations theory*, which Diamond may be critiquing is the notion of, for instance, *projective identification*, associated with the *paranoid schizoid*

position, as mentioned in a previous section. As already mentioned, in that this position implies a certain degree of symbolic equation, this elaboration on the implied continuation of bodily knowing in adult life, along with the conceptualisation of its representational capacity thus contributes to the attempt to understand such psychic and bodily conflation seemingly inherent to processes of transformation and representation. This thus also motivates further exploration into the characteristics of a bodily representative and possible reflective capacity, as the next section concerns itself with.

2.5.2 *Bodily Representation and the Realms of the Non-verbal*

Bollas (1987) claims that we somatically register a person; we ‘carry’ their effect on our psyche-soma, which constitutes according to him a form of *somatic knowledge*. This, however, is not ‘thought’ as such and therefore mentally represented and thus implies a certain *mentalism* of the body. Shapiro (1985) expands on this, stating that the lived body is the *bearer* of meaning. Of significance is how clearly he points out that the body does not enable meaning *in the way in which a signifier does*, namely by referring to or symbolizing some intended meaning, but that “it is *itself* the bearer of an intended meaning, a meaning present as to-be-understood, as to-be-explicated, in other words to be *reflected on* by the mind. It bears *equivalence* to the original for it was one moment of it” (Shapiro, 1985, p.41). When considering the complexities of representation as discussed before, the *body’s knowing* appears not to enable a *reflective distance* in that it can never be extricated from experience – it possibly constitutes, for instance the increasing progression of psychic structures through the differing types of *representations* enabling varying *degrees of conscious awareness* of *self* and *other* in the *autistic-contiguous*, *paranoid-schizoid*, and *depressive positions* in the same immediate representational way – what seems to vary is perhaps the degree and sophistication of *associated mental representation*. In this vein, Bion (1962) proposes *fundamental split* between what we think we know according to our mental representations and what we know but may never be able to think, in that some knowing resides only in bodily realms.

Merleau-Ponty (1964) positions this split in the emergence of the *symbolic capacity* of the *self*, the mental representations which he sees as causing a rift that alienates the ‘lived experience’ from the ‘symbolic experience’. Indeed, the impact of language on human development and experience is critical as in the associated psychological process of

separation and individuation enables increasing distinction between phantasy and reality (Roger, 1999). When conceptualised in this manner, it implies that the dialectic between the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive* poles is, in actuality, the dialectic between ‘lived’ and ‘symbolic’ experience, which in a different manner also echoes Bion’s distinction between *thinking about* and *being in O* (1962).

Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty claims that language does not belong to the lived body of the ‘**existential self**’ but, instead, belongs to the ‘**categorical self**’, also regarded as the *observing self*. Although this may remind of Bollas’ distinction between *existential* and *representational knowing*, it more clearly differentiates the notion of two seemingly independent *organising mentalities* – creating a complex interplay between seemingly *personal* and *social logic*. However, in that both ‘selves’ emanate from the same embodied being, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the inseparable fusion of *body* and *mind*, claiming that alongside the emergence of *mental representation* and with it, verbally-delineated social order, meaning is always also known and possibly fundamentally influenced by the *body’s knowing* – in *immediate* or *direct experience*, which can also be recalled at a later stage of reflection, in amongst the bodily correlate of *reflective states*. Thus implied once again is an intricate interplay between the mutual influence of distinct organising mentalities of *body* and *mind*.

When considering the importance and function of a possible *bodily organising mentality*, perhaps equivalent to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the ‘*existential self*’, Shapiro (1985) emphasizes that we *know* [also] in a way that does not [yet] invoke language or its structure – a way of knowing that, though meaningful and intelligible, does not intend to *speak* itself. He argues that:

“To take action in the world requires me to be present to it, embedded in it by taking part in it, by being a participant. Not only do I know the situation that I am in (and hence how to act in it) without disengaging from it, without reflectively explicating it, at any moment I know more than I can tell. For example, I recognize and distinguish more faces than I could describe. I am incredibly informed as to the gist and nuances of any ongoing situation in which I am engaged – well beyond any immediate or reflected reading of it. [...] This is possible because the primary vehicle of experience’s meaningfulness is not language or any structure that is intelligible as language. Rather, it is my body as I live it, my body as it is called to action and as it is actively situated. The ringing telephone interrupts my present activity and grips my

heart well before I posit that it is that long awaited call. In a conversation I have a sense of what I want to say before I have the words. What I intend to say I find lodged bodily in me. The implicit meanings of situations and, as well, my own intended meanings are felt; they are present bodily. Even in speech, I do not proceed in meaning or to mean by moving from signified to signifier. I must continually refer to an implicit sense of what was said and what I would say”.

Shapiro (1985) is thus able to articulate, at least partially, how the *body self* is sensitive to both the *atmosphere* and the *structure* of a situation and the how *bodily reflection*, understood in terms of a meaningful and appropriate estimation or response to the situation at hand, can grasp these aspects in that they are continuously appropriated by the body in its bearing, attitude, and potential for movement – which is thus known *immediately*, but can also be elicited to some extent from memory in a *moment of reflection*.

This is supported by the contributions including those of Gendlin (1997), who similarly proposes that every situation in the *external world* generates an experience or a *preconceptual* and *pre-reflective* understanding of the situation. He refers to this experiential dimension of a situation as the *felt meaning* or *felt sense*, a mode of awareness manifesting in an ‘inner aura’ representative of each moment, bodily anchored and thus difficult to grasp in a scientific or discursive sense (Gendlin, 1981).

Fletcher (1979) offers more detail in describing how every thought, perception, or bit of emotion elicits some specific neuromuscular pattern in the smooth or striated muscle, which is usually unobserved, but if desired *is available to conscious perception* as *bodily sensation*. The manner in which such sensation can be felt is through the complex combination of motor or visceral sensations, postural tension, kinaesthetic and joint sensations, which all contribute to awareness of shape, size, position and location in space; sensations of breathing; and various qualities of motion, amount of effort, and qualities of stillness and constriction. All of this would be represented in sensations arising from the posture, gait, gestures, quality of motion, tension and so forth, where these subliminal sensations can be used as internal information to help understand what is felt.

Fletcher (1979) claims that ideally this information is integrated as a *feeling or representation of self* in an ongoing process of *internal self-recognition, feedback* and *connection* between *physical* and *mental modes of experience*. Such sensation is thus one of the body’s ways of

telling individuals what is happening inside them in relation to *themselves*, to *others*, as well as to *events* (Keijzer, 2000).

The actual carrying out of this conscious process of representation Shapiro calls '*forming*', which he describes as a "mode of experience that answers the call to be done implicit in a sense of structure by doing it" [more tangibly visible in movement, gesture, image, sound, and so forth, reminiscent of the non-verbal bodily-oriented interpersonal space in preverbal stages of development] (1985, p.40). Thus *bodily reflection* by actively sensing or enacting an 'inner aura' can virtually enact the sense of a phenomenon or experience and grasp it – *all* experience, including from the more concrete experiences of, for instance, having felt trapped in a confined space, to the more intangible notions and dynamics of internalised object relations. This rests fundamentally on the conceptualisation of our being *embodied* and particularly meaningful in this to a large extent defining our interpersonal space.

Shapiro (1985) posits that the *body or existential self*, with its *representational processes*, is still an elusive phenomenon that resists easy research and analysis. However, he takes very seriously the 'wisdom' of the body, believing it to be a possible guide both to how we engage ourselves in action and to how we eventually explicate in language what we already have been meaningfully living, in terms of the above-mentioned notion that meaning is immanent in immediate experience before the mediation of language or the distance of reflection.

Although the nature and exact processes of the interaction between both bodily and mentally organised mentalities is as yet not apparent, the acknowledgement of both their presences, along with their mutual influence, offers new avenues of exploration and encourages a revisiting of the complexities regarding not only transformation and representation of experience, but also the associated concepts of meaning, consciousness, health, knowing and truth. This will only be briefly addressed in the concluding chapter in that its complexity falls beyond the scope of this paper.

Important remains that "as internal signals, *sensations* are a means *internally* of representing oneself to oneself both in relation to the *perceived external world* and in relation to the

*internally represented world*⁸ (Fletcher, 1979, p. 134). In this vein, Stelter (2000) claims that the pre-reflective dimension of body experience is a central source for understanding a person's 'internal dispositions' and the meaningfulness of the person's actions in his/her environment. Likewise, Shapiro (1985) posits that the interpretation of *bodily nuances* as *forms of reflection* can reveal the meaning of psychologically lived processes, and therein suggest new avenues for therapeutic approaches. Dosamantes-Beaudry (1999) posits that by adopting relevant clinical concepts, such as an *object relations* perspective, one is able during bodily-oriented expressive therapies to observe patients' enactment of traumatic or narcissistically wounding experiences that date back to early significant relationships, including specifically even the preverbal stages of emotional development. She claims the emotional meaning contained in these enactments is conveyed by patients through *somatic symptomatology* and *symbolic movement metaphors*. In the following section, these contentions will be explored to some extent with regards to the therapeutic context, exploring *bodily-oriented expressive approaches* and looking particularly at the process of *Philophonetics-Counselling*.

2.5.3 Reintegrating Notions of Representation – A reworked Metaperspective

To conclude, when we talk about body experience we have to focus mainly on the more or less 'quiet dialogue' between individuals and their environment, and therein realize that engagement with reality does not immediately give rise to reflection captured *only* in mental symbol or sign. Instead, it seems that we understand in multiple and varied ways – from the vague solicitation of any meaningful moment, to the incipient intention to grasp it more firmly, to the ways we begin to maintain access to it as lived, to moments in which it is first bodily felt and bodily re-enacted, to its objectification anew as a reflective product of this bodily understanding, and, finally, to its expression through metaphor and language (Shapiro, 1985). This multiple and varied way of understanding thus alludes again to differing *consciousness* or *mentalism*, seeming to reside in both *mental* and *physical realms*, although understanding or realization seems also to require a 'unified' or 'synchronised' state informed by both these organising mentalities, with an implied *progression* from conflation, or possibly the primarily *bodily known*, to an almost purely *mentally informed* or *represented*

⁸ Italics added for meaningful emphasis.

state enabling *reflection*. However, understanding may also imply something beyond or other than the aforementioned, as suggested by Bion, in the pursuit or avoidance of *psychic truth*.

Conceptualisation regarding the *process* and even *purpose* of *transformation* and *representation* is thus varied. In being such an amorphous phenomenon, it even becomes difficult to meaningfully correlate the various forms of punctuation or theoretical representation in attempting to explicate it more thoroughly. In this sense one is left wondering to what extent Bion's *beta elements* equate to or merely resemble, for instance, aspects of the *knowing* of the *body* or *existential self*, as posited by Merleau-Ponty, and similarly, to the *representations* formed in Ogden's *autistic-contiguous position*, or Klein's notion of the *paranoid-schizoid*.

To briefly illustrate, according to Bion, the emotional experience or reality of a therapy session is transformed into sense impressions⁹, known by the body, which are often evacuated by the mind, due to the unbearable nature of their inherent psychic truth. Bion describes these experiences as therein yielding pleasure or pain, but not meaning (at least not consciously known, as suggested by the foregone discussion). He claims the latter can only arise through tolerating frustration long enough for *recognition* and *naming* to take place – “even if the name is no more than a grunt or yell” (Bion, 1970, p. 10 in Symington & Symington, 1996).

Although Bion continues, by claiming that these seemingly *mental functions* and *representations* enable a *constant conjecture*¹⁰ to occur, a type of ordering of thoughts, which allows meaning to accrue, such ‘grunts’ or ‘yells’ might also be construed as prereflective *bodily responses* of pleasure or pain, moments that represent a *kind of knowing* not yet formulated by the mind and most certainly beyond words – but as yet involved with the creation of meaning (Symington & Symington, 1996). Thoughts on this matter are no doubt

⁹ Sensuous elements fall in the category of beta elements, which arise from the body, from the so-called ‘proto-mental system’ where the mental and physical, *are as yet undifferentiated*. They thus form the matrix of thought but are not yet thoughts (Symington & Symington, 1996).

¹⁰ The term *constant conjecture* applies when a number of facts or events are seen regularly to occur together – once observed, they can be named and established as psychological fact. If they are not named however, the individual is liable to lose track of them and their elements become dispersed (Symington & Symington, 1996).

more intricate and complex than I am able to represent them here; of relevance to me, however, is where such thinking may lead.

Perhaps *bodily-oriented expressive therapies* manage, in staying with Bion's conceptualisation, to enhance or support the *alpha function*, responsible for the transformation of beta to alpha elements, and therein their *digestion* and *symbolisation* which enables *thinking* or *mental representation*, allowing the creation of conscious meaning. This *transformation*, however, seems thus far to have been approached by inquiries concerned more with the *mental representations* and *constructions of knowing* and *meaning*, perhaps as this is where we presume it is intended.

In my understanding of his work so far, these postulations led Bion, as many others, to approach the processes of *transformation* and therein the assumed *threshold* between the *material* and *immaterial*, mostly from the *realms of the mind*, by exploring the *verbal domain* of the use and characteristics of *thoughts* and *thinking* in relation to the emergence of *psychic truth*. Indeed, he, as many others, has made invaluable contributions to our current understanding of this phenomenon of *transformation* and *representation*, as well as in his understanding greatly contributed to current therapeutic understanding and practice.

However, in revisiting *the body's representational abilities* and its seeming tendency to know in ways other than, but perhaps as significant as, the *mind*, it seems that there is a calling, in conceptualising therapeutic activity, to move also from the 'head' to the body, from the word to action and expressive motion, from at times a perhaps premature reliance on *discursive thought* and *verbal modes* to possibilities born of lingering effectively in the prelinguistic regions of the *body's knowing* (Shapiro, 1985).

In view of this, a revised version of Figure 1 of the previous section presents a more inclusive illustration of the intricacies and complexities of the phenomenon of *transformation* and *representation* of sensory-emotional experience.




Figure 2 - A reworked Metaperspective

2.6 Summary

This chapter was concerned with integrating and assimilating theoretical notions of the phenomenon of the *transformation* and *representation* of sensory-emotional experience, tracing its seeming involvement and dependence on a *progressive* development of *mentalism* from concrete bodily realms to the highly abstract levels of mental reflection. The discussion was grounded in *object relations theory* and was guided by the increasing complexity of representation in the *psychogenesis of the self*, therein implicitly illustrating the undeniable interrelatedness of the *material* and the *immaterial* in *being* and *meaning*.

In view of the rise in *bodily-oriented expressive therapies*, the discussion then more closely explored theory regarding the possibilities and characteristics of the *body's knowing* and particularly its possible *reflective* and *representational capacities*. This exploration thus, in considering *bodily experience* to be an important possibility in therapeutic processes, may have offered a deeper understanding of the *transformation* and *representation* of emotional experience as it enables psychic growth. Similarly, it may have opened avenues of being able

to access more directly unconscious material *in therapy*, which might otherwise be out of reach, or dependent on accidental evocation (Dalley, Case, Schaverien, Weir, Halliday, Nowell Hall, Waller, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; McLaughlin, 1992; Tagar, 1999; Wiener, 1999). The following chapter thus concerns itself firstly with the more conventional understanding of the *therapeutic space*, as defined from an *object relational* perspective, according to which the possible contributions and processes of *bodily-oriented expressive approaches* and particularly the process inherent in *Philophonetics-Counselling*, will be explored.

CHAPTER 3

THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS

3.1 Representations in a Therapeutic Space – An Introduction

From an *object relational* perspective it is assumed that *being*, and thus *health*, is concerned with the necessity and ability of *transforming* and *representing* direct sensory-emotional experience born of the continual presence of relationship. In this vein, Stolorow and Lachman (1980) claim that adults with self-pathology have been characterised by their experience of the absence of reliable emotionally attuned caregivers who were responsive to their affective lives and emotional needs while they were growing up. The *internalisation* of the ‘lost’ or ‘dead’ mother of infancy was mentioned earlier on and how it results in the individual’s inability to use fantasy, symbolism, or abstraction. Mendelsohn (1992), amongst others, claims that through such experience of ‘otherness’ in the various experiences of relationship throughout life, *disturbance of relational representations* occurs along with *the ability to create them*. The necessary *integration* of a patient’s *mental and physical impressions of self and object* is also affected (Robbins, 1984)¹¹.

Addressing such disturbances appears to be painful so that patients are often experienced as resistant to therapeutic process and seem to need to exclude from conscious experience those configurations of *self* and *object representations* that they associate consciously and/or unconsciously with emotional conflict and subjective danger (Atwood & Stolorow, 1987; Bion, 1959). To mediate between such resistance or defences and underlying representational realities thus forms one of the many challenges of therapeutic practice, which is managed in a variety of ways, dependent on the therapeutic paradigm. This chapter thus attempts not only to distil a basic conceptualisation of the manner in which *object relations theory* understands its therapeutic goals and practices, but also to consider how according to this paradigm and the foregone theoretical explorations *bodily-oriented expressive approaches*, and particularly *Philophonetics-Counselling*, can possibly contribute

¹¹ This points to the complexity of the body-mind relationship and the wide diversity and variation of the somatopsychic and psychosomatic spectrums, as Eigen (1992, p. xv) states “either mental or physical self can be used defensively against one another and each can be used defensively against itself. Mental and physical selves enrich and amplify one another in myriad ways. Their antagonism or alliance may be over- or underplayed”. This complexity, however, falls outside the scope of this paper.

to therapeutic endeavours. The following section thus concerns itself with the *therapeutic aims* and *practices* as understood from an *object relational* perspective.

3.2 Object Relational Aims and Practices

Most generally thus, Atwood and Stolorow (1984) describe *therapy* as a process consisting fundamentally of *differentiation* and *integration*. Blatt and Ford (1994) elaborate on this, stating that severely troubled individuals are more or less preoccupied with one, and only one, of the two major tasks of emotional development: either the attempt of coming close to another person or the necessary defining of oneself as separate from another person. This becomes more difficult as, in pathology, an individual's drive to utilize all his/her resources in pursuit of this, and therein also the creation of meaning, is subverted. *Psychic truth* is often painful, and when becoming unbearable, such individuals become dedicated, instead, to variously attacking or dismantling their *meaning*, along with their *creating capacity* (Bion, 1962; Robbins, 1984). This translates to various more tangible therapeutic processes, which will be briefly touched on according to the distinctions made above.

In terms of resolution and possible *integration* then, Robbins (1984) postulates that when an individual is forced by external or internal events to adapt to life in a manner that is constricting for him/her, there may be something in this experience that does not allow him/her to integrate or 'digest' the associated affect sufficiently. It seems as though such 'unfinished' tasks are remembered, uncomfortably lodged somewhere in the psyche or the body, whereas 'finished' tasks are forgotten and 'let go'¹². This may take the form of repressed, projected, or split-off fragments of thoughts and feelings, which cannot be reflected upon and thus need to be brought to consciousness so as to be transformed (Bion, 1962). Such fragments pertain to any of either *representations* of *self* or *others* in the inner reality of an individual, stemming from a developmental phase during which too much stress occurred, such that emotional growth was *partially* or *completely* interrupted. Inadequate internalisation of the transformation function, or related incomplete processes of *differentiation* and *separation* thus may force an individual to at times respond to daily life in

¹² According to Van der Kolk (1996), evidence indicates that traumatic experiences are stored or encoded differently to non-traumatic ones, in that trauma or crisis, as understood by Gilliland and James (1997, p. 3), is "a perception of an event or situation as an intolerable difficulty that exceeds the person's resources and coping mechanisms".

primitive ways of representing, reacting, and defending that are not in tune with the rest of his or her self (Robbins, 1984; Siegel, 1979).

Such a person thus seems unable to *transform* adequately enough raw emotional experience originating from such periods so as to be able to fully *represent* it. Although resistance to address these often-painful undigested experiences exists, Fairbairn (1966) posits that the *personality* harbours a primary, undefensive drive toward wholeness so that it supports aims of therapy as striving to fully *transform* such experience and therein begin to help heal splits often resultant of it.

Such affects must, however, be released and represented at some stage in order to ease functioning. Therapy thus not only offers an opportunity for the person to finally link the affect *cognitively* through *mental representations* and life experience, therein enabling closure and *integration*, but also facilitates patients in a manner in which they are able to listen for ingrained attitudes of, for instance, ‘*introjects*’ – those *internalised others* who had influenced a patient as a child and lived on in their being as an adult; *internalisations* from whom patients have not yet achieved satisfactory psychological *separation*, which often even requires the disentanglement or *differentiation* of *self* and *object* from the preverbal matrix (McWilliams, 1994; Siegel, 1979). Rycroft (in Robbins, 1984) thus posits *healing* to lie in the development from simple to more complex forms of representational organization, as differentiation and integration expand, which in turn illustrates once again the complexity of the levels, forms or types of representation and their interplay as addressed in the previous chapter.

In essence, it is thus assumed that such *transformative* processes result in patients eventually expressing the unspeakable, putting diffuse and amorphous feelings into *symbolic form* or *representation*. This process is assumed to be supported primarily by the therapeutic *holding environment* and a therapist’s attempts to give patients’ emotions back in more tolerable and contained forms, reminding once again of the primitive mother/infant constellation, and its function in encouraging the development of a child’s more fully differentiated self (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002; Robbins, 1984).

According to Ogden (1992a), early pathological experiences must therefore, be relived, understood, and repaired, so that therapy therein begins to assist patients in becoming conscious of *internal representations*, more aware of their ‘internal’ dramas and how they re-enact them repeatedly in the present (Seinfeld, 1993; Stadter, 1996).

Whilst Farber (2000) emphasizes the *therapeutic holding* and the necessity of its *internalisation*, claiming that therapy can only take on an increasingly *intrapsychic* and *insight-oriented focus* as a patient is able to use words symbolically in their function of expressing and regulating affect, reminiscent of Klein’s *depressive position* reviewed in the previous chapter. As during the course of therapy a patient thus begins to create symbols for emotional experience, their implicit suggestive associations can coax or propel him/her into more intense and meaningful contact with both him/herself and the world (Robbins, 1984).

This rests on the fundamental assumption that it is through *verbal thoughts* that individuals can fully appreciate the reality of their psychic world, expressed by Bion (1962) who claimed that it is when individuals begin to use words as symbols of experiences and memories that they begin to feel more real in the world (Symington & Symington, 1996).

In summary then, the aim of therapy, grounded in *object relational* thinking, is to develop patients’ ability to symbolise their experience of the world, so as to be able to manage affect states more efficiently, as well as create more benign identifications with both *self* and *others*, thus preventing severe distortions of their experience of the present (Gomez, 1997; Wiener, 1999). Important to note is that relationships are ongoing and development is not linear, in as much as developing the capacity for creating true symbols and creating meaning is not a linear process (Bion, 1962).

Processes thus range from evoking *abreaction* or *catharsis*, as un- or ill-transformed experience is finally represented in its expression or completion, to making unconscious, often preverbal object relations conscious, therein contributing to their reconstruction and thus effecting change. This occurs through encouraging the processes of *symbolisation* and *representation*. Through repeated experience, patients are able to *internalise* this function, which in turn affects the *integration* of both *physical* and *mental experiences* and *representations*. Therapy is thus a *potential space* for an individual to (re)tell his/her story in

a way that creates *meaning*, to construct his/her history through the intertwining of ‘the consciously symbolized past’ and ‘the unconscious living past’ (Ogden, 1992b).

Even though the origin of theoretical conceptualisations regarding therapy often stems from a keen observance during development of the interplay between both *mind* and *body* and in that, their dual involvement in the creation of meaning, with the emphasis on *insight* and *verbalisation*, traditional therapeutic practice appears to be characterised mostly by a reasonably *physically passive*, insight-oriented *conversation*, dwelling mostly within the realms of *verbal* or *mental representations* (St. Clair, 1994; Weiten, 1995; Wiener, 1999).

From the theoretical exploration of the previous chapter and its particular emphasis on the possibilities of *bodily knowing*, there seems, however, much to be learned with regards not only to the theoretical underpinnings informing therapeutic practice, but also the practical implementation of these assumptions in the therapeutic space. The following section thus concerns itself with *methods of treatment based on a bodily-orientation*, in view of striving to contribute to the easing of human suffering, or the actualising of their potential (Freudenthal Govine, 1979; Mendelsohn, 1992).

3.3 Methods of Treatment in View of a Bodily Orientation

For the human self, object relations appear to be *symbolically* mediated. As has already been suggested by the foregone discussion and illustrated by the metaphor of circularity and interdependence in Escher’s drawing, symbols and objects necessarily reflect, reinforce, stimulate and extend each other, such that incomplete or inappropriately represented experiences can dramatically impact on an individual’s functioning (Robbins, 1984). Equally, as already implied, such undigested experience, along with preverbal experience of the *unthought known*, may be encountered by a patient, in the form of *unconscious representations* or phantasy, as pre-symbolic experience which distorts or impairs experience of relationships or reality. This lack of *consciousness* and *differentiation* is suggested by Bollas (1987) to result in an inability to *think* and *express in words* that, which has only been *felt* but not yet *thought*, reminding in turn of Ogden’s *autistic-contiguous* and Klein’s *paranoid-schizoid position* (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002).

As mentioned in the previous chapter, there resides an inherent assumption in *traditional therapeutic approaches* that unconscious material can only become manageable or appropriately *transformed* when it is cognitively and consciously linked, represented such as, for instance, in the *depressive position* or Bion's notion of the development of thoughts as beta elements are transformed to alpha elements (Grinberg *et al.*, 1977; Ogden, 1992b). Until recently it was further assumed that our *only* means of articulating or punctuating these experiences is *language*, perhaps resting on the influence of Freud's establishing psychotherapy as a *verbal process* – the 'talking cure' – even though ritual, drama, dance, and even music, where the *physically active participation of a patient* is considered primary, had been used for healing purposes in Western society since antiquity. Thus, even though when considering that *self* and *object representations* are primarily complex *spatial, perceptual, and affective configurations* and therein not easily reduced to linear thought, the tradition of therapy became one of *conversation* leading to *insight* as unconscious experience was encouraged to become conscious (Wiener, 1999).

Although *insight* and *mental representations* may indeed be necessary for the eventual healthy functioning of an individual, of interest is that therapy attempted to approach undigested experience from this 'end goal' or *organising mentality* even though, especially in its untransformed state, sensory emotional experience is often conflated with *bodily experience* or *representation*, and thus perhaps more accessible to *bodily knowing*. Unlike most primal experience, language is *conscious*, presupposing a different, perhaps more sophisticated mind, which is characterised by its linear, discrete, and successive order. However, in attempting to address primitive or undifferentiated experience, which appears strangely symbolic and even chaotic in its seemingly timeless sense of reality, *verbal expression* perhaps brings with it an unavoidable baggage of structures, processes, and capacities thus ill fitting of primary experience. In much the same vein Gomez (1997) postulates that the most words can do is give an obscure sense of what phantasy or unconscious experience *could be* if it were *conscious* and able to be articulated. This seems reminiscent of the distinction made between the *experiential* and *categorical* or *representational selves*, the 'lived' and 'symbolic' experience, as suggested by Bollas (1987) and Merleau-Ponty (1964).

Thus, in attempting to *differentiate* and *punctuate* experience in aid of its *transformation* and eventual *conscious representation*, unconscious material or phantasy may be more akin to the subtleties and nuances of *bodily expressive modalities* such that recourse to the *bodily sense* of a situation becomes a more direct or effective strategy of attempting to recapture and explicate repressed or unconscious experience (Case & Dalley, 1992). Wiener (1999) echoes this, claiming that one can gauge emotional states, as well as sense the type of object relation patients may be constellating with *introjected others* as they move, gesture, or sound, and thus express the *spontaneous internal world* of sensations and images. This rests on the notion that the body seems to store the memory of every single interaction in that it is part of and thus in fact constitutes original moments (Shapiro, 1985). Similarly, Fletcher (1979) claimed that the body recalls such moments by reverting to its *internal representations of self* in relation to the *perceived external world* and in relation to the *internally represented world* in the form of sensations, images, ideas, but also more outwardly visible as postures, gestures, movements, and expressive sounds. Similarly, when considering Merleau-Ponty's (1964) emphasis on the *interpersonal bodily shared space*, assumed influential throughout life as discussed in the previous chapter, it is not surprising that *bodily modalities* may be used as a means of navigating the 'the unconsciously living past' (Ogden, 1992).

Furthermore, in this sense Gendlin (1981) posits that by allowing a *bodily felt sense* to form and be expressed in physically active bodily modalities, one can work with more than one can understand – by accessing to some extent that which is at the edges of intelligibility. This is possible by the conscious *identification with* and actively embodying or *enacting of* such sensations, therein creating a manner in which to *externalise* and give form to the otherwise inexpressible in such a manner so as to reveal and transform that which otherwise may have remained hidden in the unconscious, the mute knowing of the body (Freudenthal Govine, 1979; Robbins, 1984).

Milner (1955) (in Dalley *et al.*, 1987, p. 118) relates this to the *externalising process* inherent in art therapy, stating that “in drawing, the sight of the mark made on paper provokes new associations, the line, as it were, answers back and functions as a very primitive type of external object”. Similarly, when expressing a bodily felt sense and then stepping back and reflecting on it, the experience which was up until that point conflated in body and psyche is not only contained to some extent in its expression, even if not in words as supposed by Bion,

but has also become somewhat more removed from the patient, in that looking at the bodily representation allows the beginnings of a reflective space to emerge – a looking *at* and an attempting to think *about*. Thus, as unconscious material emerges it is subjectively experienced, identified, and made an object of reflection, thereby enabling it to be linked up to related associations to be integrated into present ongoing structure. Each new linkage and integration, therefore, brings about slightly new constellations.

Important is that this emphasis on *active involvement* should not be construed of as a *performance* or *act* on the part of the patient, but rather a means of *fully identifying* with internalised experience thus involving the whole person, both *body* and *mind*, in the therapeutic experience. This rests on the assumption expressed amongst others by Lewis Bernstein (1979b), namely that growth is more apt to take place if an individual is *involved in* the experience they are feeling rather than just to talk *about* it, reminding much of Bion's (1962) distinction between *being in O* and thinking about O. Important seems to *live* the experience *as if it were happening* in the *here-and-now*, and in fact, if the person allows this enactment to involve his/her total being, allowing for a more vivid and immediate experience; the 'as if' dissipates, and there is a *full identification* and *affective involvement* with the process (Bandler & Grinder, 1975). Therapy thus becomes a total experience in which perception, affect, and sensation join cognition at the same point in time and space, facilitating an integrated result closer to direct experience (Wiener, 1999).

In harnessing both bodily and mental representations in this manner, whilst considering that the one mode triggers the other as mentioned in the previous chapter, therapy manages to access the deeper meanings and more primitive often preverbal structures, which are otherwise not easily explicitly represented to consciousness, particularly not as complete understandings. In this sense, *bodily expressive work* can often help bring to conscious foreground a patient's subjective impulse toward action, informed by implied objects and related associations which are *only* unconsciously represented. In such a case a patient experiences an 'other' as largely unknown: "one lashes out *at*, yearns *for*, withdraws *from*, hungers *for*, thinks *about*, and feels *toward* 'something', even when one may not know what that something is" (Fletcher, 1979, p.135). Active bodily expression thus comes into play, when in daily life a person frequently lacks the *conscious thought* which would express the

whole intention or *meaning* of such an unknown ‘something’ (Lewis Bernstein, 1979a; Wiener, 1999).

Fletcher (1979, p. 137) similarly suggests that “by paying attention to the bits and pieces of experience as they present themselves to awareness through dynamic association, the deeper meanings will begin to become more evident and available to conscious experience, integration and change. The body expressions, sensations, postures, images or ideas may bring forward a clarifying dream, a burst of feeling or a memory of a particular event. Thus the very process of focusing on body experience tends to draw out the psychological content and the dynamic organization to which the body experiences are linked. Such is the basis of the use of body experience as a means toward intrapsychic reorganization”. Fletcher thus implicitly also refers to the intricacies of the *psychosomatic* and *somatopsychic* spectrum, in that undigested experience may literally be lodged in the body in underlying muscle tension or posture, which is then able to be transformed once released. Although this paper has deliberately avoided addressing these intricacies of this the *body/mind connection* in that limits must be set, it remains important when considering meaningful *bodily expressive practice*, to mention in this regard that bodily expression can equally function as a defence against becoming conscious of some experience. Determining the difference in use can become tricky in that there are occasions where powerful discharge, if accompanied by emotion, thought and memory in the context of a present experience *can* be used toward psychic reorganization and structural change, even though they may be perceived as a mere act of *getting rid of* or *evacuating* inner tension (Fletcher, 1979).

Thus, when certain that one is concerned with intrapsychic reorganisation, Fletcher (1979) warns that the therapeutic work is incomplete up until the *object* and the *relation to the object* are brought out in *full consciousness*. In this sense, much of the work of (bodily-oriented) therapy, therefore, has to do with uncovering and articulating this area of meaning from *unconscious (bodily) knowing*, that is – “the relations between the many parts of the self with their conflicting impulses to their many objects” (Fletcher, 1979, p. 135). Similarly, she claims that it is important in this vein to recognize that the sensations or motor patterns are not always explicitly expressed by *body language* or by *internal language of sensation* and *body image*. What the gestures, images and sensations refer to, what they are ‘all about’, must still be *interpreted* by patient and therapist. For *bodily expressive acts* to be

meaningful, at least according to Fletcher, the actions and impulses must be *mentally represented* and thus consciously related to their *object*. She bases this assumption on the already stated notion that meaning derives from a *relationship* between subject and object, whether the object is an internally represented one or an externally perceived one, or as usual, a combination of the two. The release and reliving of memory and unconscious phantasy must thus ultimately be correlated in actual detail with the manner in which it is acted out in the transference of daily living (Fletcher, 1979).

This is enabled by the ego's capacity of reality testing bringing intellect, reason, and reflection together with experience. In this way the *objective* and *subjective aspects* of the *self* are integrated, the 'lived' and 'symbolic' experience. Bit by bit experience can be broken down into observable, nameable events and reorganized in relation to the present context. Ultimately, verbalization becomes important at this point, in that it enables a person to observe, identify, locate and name (Fletcher, 1979). It is this processing of information and new experience that helps bring about a reorganizing of the existing patterns (Vaughan, 1997).

Similarly, Ogden (2001) posits that through such creation of verbal symbols, the self as object ('me') is 'substantiated' (given shape and emotional substance to), thereby creating symbols that serve as mirrors in which the self as subject ('I') recognizes/creates itself, and enables consciousness or self-awareness to evolve.

Of further interest is that Ogden (2001) further postulates that "the unconscious is not simply a kind of thinking and of organizing feelings regulated by a different mode of creating linkages; rather, it is a form of experiencing that by its nature cannot be brought directly into conscious awareness. When we say that an experience that had once been unconscious has 'become' conscious, we are not talking about moving something into view that had formerly been hidden behind the screen of the repression 'barrier'. Instead, we are talking about the creation of a qualitatively new experience, one that is not simply brought into the 'view' of conscious awareness." Similarly, he goes so far as to state that even a mother's *reverie* is a form of metaphor.

Postulations such as this one therein indicate that the phenomenon of transformation and representation requires even more detailed differentiation than even this study perhaps achieved, in that the exact interplay of its constituents occurs both in the mental and bodily organising mentalities, and therein in an individual as a whole remains elusive. According to Ogden (2001), however, *transformations* that create derivatives of *unconscious experience* are *not creating new forms of unconscious experience*, but are only creating *expressions* of what *unconscious experience is like* (as metaphor/symbol), which for him seems to result in the above mentioned ‘qualitatively new experience’. Questions thus include whether digestion or *transformation* involves only the encouragement of *conscious representation* of *unconscious experience*, enabled perhaps by initial *bodily representation* and therein encouraging cognitive linking as posited above, or whether, for instance, a focus on *bodily representation* and especially *identification with* and *enactment of* experience does in fact *directly* address the unconscious and *therein* trigger change in experience of self.

Whilst these questions remain unanswered, the exact nature of the structures of representation, their permanence or resilience, and the varying degrees of their mutual influence on one another and therein psychic structure and individual functioning remain vague, such that statements and observations regarding therapeutic processes and effectiveness remain equally intangible as mere appropriations. This does not, however, render meaningless the clinical and research efforts to date in that broad or general movements or tendencies have indeed been observed, however tentative in nature.

Based on this, it is considered that these *bodily-oriented therapeutic processes* thus equally involve dealing with resistances and defences, whilst repeatedly working through distorted patterns and conflicts. Over and over, in different versions, conflict and tension are thus restated, enacted and encountered and thereby mastered. Throughout the process the patient’s trust and confidence in him/herself and the therapist is developed (Fletcher, 1979). Expressive therapy, thereby, does not limit itself to the confines of direct linear communication, but travels to the genesis of an individual’s early imprinting experiences so that s/he is able, the containing relationship with the therapist, relive, in part, the development and struggles of his/her introjective phenomena. Concurrently, patients have the opportunity to see, feel, and hear the reverberations of a more fully dimensional and complete mirroring relationship (Robbins, 1984).

Depending on the nature of the concern with which a patient embarked on such therapy, they are therefore able to become aware of and have direct contact with parts of their being which they may have previously disowned or of which they have been totally unaware (Lewis Bernstein, 1979). Similarly, in some instances, therapist and patient may encounter part or split images requiring higher levels of perceptual integration. Other images require affective cathexis as well as elaboration and differentiation (Robbins, 1984). Through these processes, patient's perceptions can be far more objectified and therein attain a greater degree of specificity. Patients learn about their predilections to make massive perceptual generalizations and broad cognitive sweeps that are based on part-object representations. Furthermore, reflections then serve to repair an often-deficient internalisation process (both within the relationship to the therapist and through the creative act) that has been rediscovered throughout various processes (Robbins, 1984).

In essence, the patient is encouraged to make an *inner reality* find concrete expression in the outside world, an *externalisation for self and object representations*. In this light, the process of therapy seems to take place in a fluctuating energy field of positive and negative vectors associated with projected and introjected identifications. The nature of this ever-changing field is communicated through nonverbal imagery, physical sensation, and affect mood states, as well as verbal metaphor. "In treatment this complex field of energy ebbs and flows, going through a process of gestalt reorganizations" (Robbins, 1984, p. 19). However, finally being able to experience fully in personal relation to one's sense of identity is according to Fletcher (1979), sustaining and enriching to the total personality.

In having explored some of the intricacies and practices of *bodily-oriented expressive approaches*, of interest is that perhaps the difficulties with regards to *verbalising* and making material *conscious* may thus not *only* lie with patients' individual psychic structure and dynamics, as is mostly assumed, but also perhaps *in the means in which we attempt to address them*. *Bodily acts of symbolic expression*, as encouraged in a *bodily orientation*, may thus be a viable means to *summarise, distil, or carry the quality* of object relations forward, such that eventual *mental representation* and *verbalisation* are made more possible. Some have even gone so far as to state that accessing *bodily knowing* enables a person to move beyond intellectualised and congealed understandings, in essence saturated thoughts, to a fresh sense of his/her life situation (Shapiro, 1985). *Bodily expressive therapy* thus may have

something rather unique to offer, for it dares to concretise the nonverbal language of object relations into a non-linear frame that can nonetheless be *externalised* and *communicated*, and therein contribute to the *transforming* of experience (Robbins, 1984).

The manner in which this is achieved can take on various forms, and no doubt there exist innumerable dimensions of *body experience* and, accordingly, ways of working with the body (Fletcher, 1979). As already stated in the introduction to this paper, the working definition of **bodily-oriented expressive therapies** for the purposes of this exploration includes therapeutic approaches that use the *non-verbal body modalities* of *movement*, *gesture*, *visualization*, or *sound*, as well as forms of *artistic creation*, as expressive elements of a process, which furthers the physical and psychic integration of an individual. However, in order to gain a basic understanding and conceptual frame from which to deal with body phenomena relating to the human as a whole, this inquiry has limited itself to the example of the process of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, which is further specified in that it is only considered from an *object relational* perspective and not in terms of the paradigm, namely the Rudolf Steiner inspired Anthroposophy and Psychosophy, from with this approach understands itself. This would simply introduce too much complexity to this *descriptive dialogical* study, and thus adds to the *heuristic value* of this work in encouraging perhaps comparative studies with regards to the ability to develop adequate theoretical models to account for the phenomena observed. The discussion now thus takes a closer look at the process inherent to this approach.

3.3.1 *Philophonetics-Counselling*

As already mentioned, **Philophonetics-Counselling** is a method of personal development, counselling and healing, based on Rudolf Steiner's Anthroposophy and Psychosophy. It is conceptualised as an educational process designed to encourage individuals to take control of their lives, their healing and actualisation. *Philophonetics* began as a method of theatre performance and actors' training in the 1980's developed by Yehuda Tagar, who assigned this term, which literally means '*love of sounds*', because he developed a unique use of

specifically the sounds of speech to encourage conscious relationship to one's inner experience¹³ (Tagar, 1999).

In the early 1990's, the seemingly powerful therapeutic potential of *Philophonetics* led to the development of a counselling and psychotherapeutic application termed *Philophonetics-Counselling*. Along with the use of sound, Tagar developed a range of highly effective expressive processes, using also other *bodily modalities* of body-awareness or sensing, movement, gestures, spontaneous visualization, as well as products of artistic expression or creation, aimed at enhancing patients' self awareness, self management, care and development. Tagar claims that due to the highly individualized nature of these processes, patients are able to appropriate the outcome in such a way so as to develop a self-sufficient ability of self-care in a surprisingly short period of time. Through such an approach, personal states, conventionally conceptualised more frequently as 'problems', become opportunities for personal growth, journeys of inner discovery and expansion of awareness. *Philophonetics-Counselling* thus transforms personal experience into *self-knowledge* and *consciousness* (Tagar, 1999).

The actual structure of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session is an amalgamation of regarding conscious life conditions from both verbal and thus a *cognitive perspective*, combined with *non-verbal*, more *experientially-focused expressive processes*. Experience is always placed in a firm context of cognition in this modality, so as to ensure on-going fully conscious integration of newly accessed experiential content, which thereby guarantees the ability of the patient to be in charge of the process. Much faith is, therefore, put in the patient's inherent knowing of what is appropriate and needed, and accordingly plays a large part in actually determining the unfolding and content of an individual session. Stated generally, however, most *Philophonetics-Counselling* sessions move between a mostly verbal or *conversational*

¹³ The sounds of human speech, in the form of consonants and vowels, when spoken on their own (Faah; Ffff; Sss; Ng, Oooh; and so forth) transform in the surrounding air into forms of vibrations. These sounds are assumed to be able to echo or resemble the whole range of human experience, in that ultimately, it is proposed that experience is stored and resides in the body on a micro level as patterns of vibrations, which can be emulated and thus influenced by the sounds of speech. 'Translated' to *Philophonetics*, the correlation between the sounds of human speech and inner embodied experiences is deemed a major resource for exploration, confrontation, transformation, representation, and ultimately the healing of inner patterns. Clearly, these postulations may seem doubtful to most, but appear in their effect to warrant further research into such realms. They also seem noteworthy in postulating a further link between body and mind.

counselling phase, followed by a mostly non-verbal, active and expressive *action counselling phase*, within one to one and a half hours (Tagar, 1999).

During the *conversational phase* it is essential that therapist and patient reach a common picture with regards to what they are dealing with and what aspects of elements of this picture are as yet unknown to conscious thought. Once in agreement, the patient is then required to make a so-called *Wish* regarding this picture, which basically requires the patient to set a clear *intent*, which then guides the ensuing process into either further *exploration* through bodily access, leading to increased orientation, or the process may require an *encounter* leading to a form of *empowerment*, and finally, processes also take on the form of increasing *resourcefulness*, which seems to lead a patient to self nurturing and the invocation of inner strength. The nature of the therapeutic approach seems to guide all processes into either one or more of these categories (Tagar, 1999).

Whichever one is relevant to the patient becomes apparent after their *Wish* is spoken and the method in which both therapist and patient will attempt to achieve it. From the common picture and the nature of the *Wish*, a process design is then ‘plotted’, which requires both therapist and especially patient expertise, according to which the second phase of a session is then executed. This is deemed essential to enable the process to keep focus, particularly in view of the at times overwhelming and powerful responses to the full identification in bodily enactment that occurs. Naturally, as the process unfolds and more consciousness is possible, the *Wish* is amended, often refined according to the expressive symbolic richness inherent in this process (Tagar, 1999).

From having delineated this process, it seems as though *bodily-oriented expressive therapies* enable patients to venture into the territory of experience, which enriches especially the experience of patients “who have come to rely solely on the maps of verbalisation” (Wiener, 1999, p. xiii), as opposed to the territory they designate. These experiential methods seem to provide a means of discovery other than verbal approaches, providing material that can be juxtaposed with verbally encoded representations. Even so, recognition of the full potentiality of gestural expressiveness for therapeutic work has been slow (McLaughlin, 1992).

In summary then, through *nonverbal communication* it appears that a therapist is able to make contact with the most primary and basic core of his/her patient, thereby experiencing the subtle expressions of pain, loss, and loneliness that are unfolded in the patient's stunted capacity for relatedness. Within a therapeutic relationship of *play* and *bodily expression*, subtle *symbolic representations* of *self* and *object* move into a new world of *meaning*. The various *splits* and *part objects*, with their attending affects of love and hate, need to be touched, heard, and visualised. But most importantly, the therapist must him/herself first experience and make contact with their own early developmental field in order to reproduce a *transitional space* for reparation. In this *transitional space* there is room for resonance and dialogue and for complex affective and perceptual systems of the patient's to become increasingly integrated. According to Robbins (1984), such a process is *nonverbal* and demands the utmost on the part of the therapist in his/her ability to play, symbolize, and encourage a patient to employ a variety of sensory-spatial modalities.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter the intention was to delineate the more conventional understanding of the *therapeutic space*, as defined from an *object relational* perspective, thereby distilling a basic conceptualisation of the manner in which *object relations theory* understands its *therapeutic goals and practices*, but also to consider how according to this paradigm and the foregone theoretical explorations *bodily-oriented expressive approaches*, and particularly *Philophonetics-Counselling*, can possibly contribute to such *therapeutic endeavours*.

Thus, in realising the at times perhaps inappropriate overemphasis on encouraging often-premature *mental representations* in conventional talk therapy, renewed interest in the *body's knowing* and *expressive capacities* was stimulated. By revisiting the *body's representational* and *reflective abilities*, therapists began positing that the employment of these *bodily modalities* in fact evokes an awareness of hidden, anonymous workings of patients' psychic life, which an individual's self tries often to either run from or claim (Robbins, 1984).

It seems that *bodily-orientated expressive therapy* allows patients to move behind defences and thereby increase exchange between the conscious and the unconscious. Due to its implicit subtleties and allowance for ambiguities inherent of emotional expression, *bodily enactments* are thus able to reflect both a patient's *intrapersonal* and *interpersonal life*, thus

enabling him/her a means of accessing unexpected places and insights in aid of the process of healing (Wiener, 1999).

With such flexible interventions that flow with experience itself, as in the case of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, Fletcher (1979) proclaims that conflicts can be dealt with without any serious threat to the organization of the personality. Respect for such processes thus allows, however, for what was previously considered as threatening experience, repressed from *consciousness* and partially expressed through the *body* in *unconscious behaviour* and incipient action, to be linked to *awareness*, to *self-perception*, and/or *thought*.

Body experience is thus used as a tool to bring *pre-verbal* and *undifferentiated experiences* up to the level of *conscious feeling*, *insight* and *thought*, whereby newly discovered *body experiences* such as sensation, motion, posture, gesture and tension and so forth are a means of direct information and knowledge of the *inner self*. By being *consciously experienced* and *verbalised* they are brought into association with *thought*, *memory* and *intention*, such that, in essence, *meaning* is realized. The emphasis is thus on *intrapsychic reorganization* and a coherent, integrated connection between *mental* and *physical processes*. When emotion is released within a meaningful context, new perceptions, ideas, memories or images emerge into consciousness and become available to be fed back to *consciousness* for further *insight* and *integration*. Often when patients stumble onto a new experience, emotion and insight emerge together and are then followed by a feeling of relief, which comes with the new *integration* and emerging *self-knowledge*. Obviously, the less energy an individual has to spend on defending him/herself by getting rid of his/her experiences, the more s/he might have to develop for creative living (Fletcher, 1979).

What remains curious is whether this *unconscious experience* needs to become fully *conscious* or whether change that occurs on an *experiential level*, primarily with regards to *bodily knowing*, does not resolve some inner turmoil in and of itself. Such thoughts encourage renewed interest in the continuous debate regarding the nature of *consciousness* and *knowing*, particularly with regards to the threshold between the *material* and the *immaterial*, its relevance, and how it ties in with notions of *psychic truth*. This clearly requires further *differentiation* and possible research, and will be touched on in the concluding debates of the final chapter but in essence falls beyond the scope of this paper. It

perhaps ties in with thoughts on comparing various perceptual and explanatory paradigms, which must remain equally untouched and most definitely unresolved for the while.

From this expansive theoretical inquiry various motivations for the further *describing* and *exploring* of this elusory phenomenon of the *transformation* and *representation* of sensory-emotional experience may have become apparent. In order to ensure a meaningful contribution in this regard and in view of the *descriptive dialogical* aims of this study, the following chapter briefly delves into the *research epistemology* from which an appropriate *research methodology* was derived. Accordingly, this is thus presented in what follows.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH EPISTEMOLOGY & METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In view of the aims of this study, namely to describe the experiences of individuals who undergo the bodily-oriented therapeutic approach of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, and thereby to explore the possible role of the body in the transformation of experience and the eliciting of a patient's representational world, it appears crucial to the value of this study that these aims are addressed by the most appropriate research methodology (Mouton, 1998; Willig, 2001).

The methodological dimension explores the question of how researchers attain such knowledge or ensure that they reach their research goals (Neuman, 2000). The research tradition or paradigm, which this inquiry therefore aligns itself with, rests on an existential-phenomenological ontology and epistemology, which aims to distinguish human beings qualitatively from natural phenomena and thereby provides a foundation for the development of a science faithful to people's expressed meanings (Giorgi, 1992; Spinelli, 1989; Terre Blanche and Durrheim, 1999). This appears fitting for the study of this specific phenomenon, namely the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, in that its methods, particularly Giorgi's contributions to the Duquesne Phenomenological Research Method (DPRM)¹⁴, allow for the description and explication of these lived experiences in terms of their essential structure (Mouton, 1998; von Eckartsberg, 1998).

This phenomenological explication of the structure of experience, according the DPRM, takes the form of a description, as opposed to for instance an explanation or interpretation, generally more favoured by the natural sciences or hermeneutical research (Hergenhahn, 1992; Hughes, 1990; Kruger, 1988). Such a focus on description and understanding is a type of epistemological attitude which enables the in-depth qualitative explication of individual experiences without constraints by pre-determined categories of analysis, and instead forms what Edwards (1992) refers to as the descriptive dialogic phase, where the general structure

¹⁴ This abbreviation (DPRM) will be used throughout this discussion.

of the phenomenon, as gleaned from the material, is thereafter situated within existing theory, which in this study refers to object relations thinking.

By adopting such a descriptive qualitative research approach, which obtains amongst others its material from written protocols of individuals' subjective experience, this study is perhaps able to glean the closest approximation to the interrelationship of the non-verbal, bodily-felt elements with the more abstracted verbal elements so fundamental to the structure of this phenomenon – namely the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling* (McLeod, 2001; Patton, 1990).

This chapter thus provides a brief orientation of this chosen design, setting out the explicit research questions and the ensuing selection of subjects, the method, data explication and final integration with existing theory that occurred. It also lingers on notions of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability and their impact on the value and rigor of this study. In essence the appropriateness of this design will hopefully be elucidated through the brief exploration of phenomenological philosophy, followed by its contributions to the later developments of phenomenological psychology and therein this research method.

4.2 Phenomenological Philosophy

Phenomenology, like all Western philosophical systems, is concerned with the relationship between the reality which exists outside individuals' minds, often referred to as objective reality, and the variety of thoughts and ideas each person may have about reality, commonly thought of as subjectivity. The manner in which these two variables interact with each other is both a fundamental and of the oldest of philosophical issues (Spinelli, 1989).

Phenomenology's unique perspective on this matter argues that human beings experience the *phenomena* of this world, in other words, the *appearance* that it makes to one's consciousness rather than its reality – what it is in itself. Spinelli (1989, p. 10) expands on this notion, claiming, "there is a physical reality which remains separate from our consciousness, and which, in this sense, can be labelled objective reality. Equally, however, we do not have direct access to that reality, nor can we, in any sense, ever know it as it actually is. All we can do is acknowledge its existence and construct theories that might provide approximations of its nature and mechanics".

In light of this premise, it is not surprising that Edmund Husserl, the acknowledged founder of this philosophical school, considered our understanding of human consciousness as cardinal to any knowledge claims. This in mind, he invested much in investigating consciousness from the epistemological perspective of it being continually oriented ‘toward a world of emergent meaning’ in that it is always directed at a specific object (Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

Franz Brentano termed this notion *intentionality*, echoing the assumption that consciousness always intends an object – one does not just see, but rather sees some *thing* (Brennan, 1998; Kruger, 1988; Misiak & Sexton, 1973). He perceived consciousness as unable to exist in and for itself, and thus criticized the desire of wanting to analyse consciousness into elements. This to him seemed like a futile endeavour in that “consciousness is not a substance, immaterial or otherwise, that intends, but that being conscious means an *intentional act* through which man lets the world appear to him” (Kruger, 1988, p.28).

From a phenomenological perspective, consciousness is thus not something *to have*, but something *to be*; it is the human’s ordinary *mode of presence* in the world, underlining the previously mentioned basic invariant relationship between the real world and peoples’ conscious experience of it – one cannot extricate one from the other. Thus, “unable to bracket this relationship, we are forced to acknowledge through it the undeniable role of interpretation which lies at the heart of all our mental experience” (Spinelli, 1989, p.12). In this sense, all phenomena experienced by people are thus not real existents, but constructs, which must be understood in their given modalities, formed as a result of this invariant process of intentionality (Giorgi, 1997; Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

This fundamental premise of intentionality thus refers to the first, most basic interpretive mental act, namely that of ‘translating’ the unknown raw stimuli of the real world, which a person’s senses have responded to, into an object-based reality. Similarly, one may thus never be sure whether ‘things in themselves’ truly exist, but only that human beings seem to interpret or categorise according to an *object-based* or ‘*thing-based*’ world. Similarly, individuals’ earliest, most primitive *relations* and *interpretative interactions* rely upon the object distinctions they establish and build up over time (Kruger, 1988; Spinelli, 1989). The complexity of this and its relation to individuals’ understanding and experience of reality was

explored at length from a psychological perspective of *object relations* in the previous chapter, being pivotal to the phenomenon under exploration in this inquiry.

Be that as it may, from a philosophical perspective as Husserl posited it, this most basic of interpretative acts always contains *two* foci, namely the more generic, underlying *noematic focus*, which fundamentally directs people's experience towards some 'thing', but then also the referential, more individualised and circumstantially arisen *noetic focus*, which deals with how each individual's various cognitive and affective biases, forming throughout their development, adds further elements of meaning to the experience. Together, the two foci lead each person to interpret an experience in a different and unique manner, and, as a consequence, to react to it in their disparate ways (Spinelli, 1989).

Of interest is that each individual's experience of the world undoubtedly contains *commonly shared variables*. Being of the same species, people have innately determined biological mechanisms in common, such that define and enable consciousness, designed to allow specific interactions with the world. Furthermore, people are fundamentally exposed to similar socio-cultural influences, which may vary in their detail, but are more familiar in their general structuring nature of experience. This thus also contributes to the formation of individuals' mental frameworks, or schemata, which invariably *define the parameters of their experience*, and also ensure that each human being experiences a unique and solitary phenomenal reality (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Spinelli, 1989).

These notions were expanded on by the later development and contributions of the *existential-phenomenological approach*, informed mainly by Heidegger and Sartre. These theorists were influenced by the existentialist tradition of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, which led them to focus even more on the *human situated experience*, thus emphasizing the concrete, biographical, and embodied life of named persons who are characterized by uniqueness and irreplaceability. In this light, intentionality became redefined as a dialogic, relational, dynamic *self-other interaction*, a person's involvement in a situation within a world, *rather than a one-directional act*, much in unison with *object relational* presuppositions (Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

Heidegger's summarised this in his main contribution of *Dasein*, a 'being-in-the-world', where persons are not considered *as selves separated from a world* that is presumed to *exist completely independently of them*, but instead are personal involvements in a complex totality network of interdependent ongoing relationships that demand response and participation. The world thus comes into existence for people in and through their participation in it. In this way, he bridges the Cartesian subject-object split, defining *Dasein* ontologically as care, concerned presence, world-openness, and thus 'relational totality'. However, this 'being-in-the-world' involves more than human consciousness and encompasses the *total embodied human response* to a perceived situation (Kruger, 1988; Misiak & Sexton, 1973; Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

Merleau-Ponty, whose contributions were considered in the previous chapters, elaborated on this notion, claiming "we can never achieve total clarity even in our reflective and critical orientation because we cannot fully penetrate the darkness of our primordial awareness in which meaning is always already constituted. We cannot attend the birth of meaning in our life. Bodily existence itself is a giver of meanings. Our body has the power of expression; it gives rise to meaning" (Von Eckartsberg, 1998, p.12). Merleau-Ponty thus implicitly differentiates bodily awareness and meaning, from consciousness, which appears, at least in view of a phenomenological perspective, to equate it to mental reflection and awareness of self. Thus, much in the same vein as humankind is unable to know the world as 'it-is-in-itself', or even as it is defined by the relationship with human interaction – so too, can humankind not know its own body or existence, other than through the processes of intentionality and consciousness, which appear to emerge from it.

Merleau-Ponty's contribution thus widens the understanding of *intentionality* to include notions of preverbal thought (thinking that exists in action), in other words, the *pre-personal dimension of bodily intentions and meaning*. As explored at length in the previous chapters, he posited that the acting body always already understands its situation as well as its own possibilities long before an individual pays any explicit attention to it. *Intentionality* is thus *more than mere cognitive consciousness*, but instead includes the life of embodied existence and interactive communication that precedes and *forms the foundation* for explicit and thematic consciousness. "By virtue of our embodiment, we find ourselves always already

situated and capable of meaningful interaction...*a creature condemned to meaning*” (Von Eckartsberg, 1998, p.13).

From this perspective of perceiving human beings’ vital interests and existential involvement with each other and things in the world as fundamentally beyond the access of individual consciousness, Merleau-Ponty questioned the *reductionist* aims of *phenomenological research*, which, as posited by Husserl, aims to undercut this individual interpretation so as to arrive at the truth or essences of experiences in general. Although Merleau-Ponty doubted whether it is in fact possible to suspend all one’s presuppositions about a phenomenon, he nevertheless deemed it worthwhile to attempt to uncover presuppositions, and to investigate them in the hope of advancing the understanding of phenomena under consideration (Von Eckartsberg, 1998). Thus, much like in any philosophy or science, Merleau-Ponty, as much as Husserl, seemed motivated by an inherent search for truth or what is real, and having punctuated a difference between a *noematic* and *noetic focus* in an individual’s experience, the concern of wanting to obtain the ultimate truth of essences underlying experience lingered. The next section thus elaborates briefly on the phenomenological research methodology.

4.3 Phenomenological Research Methodology

Husserl had argued that since *experience* consists (also) of the explicit attention inherent in consciousness, it could therefore be rigorously and systematically researched *as it appears* to consciousness, in its *phenomenal nature*, namely with an appropriate method of reflection. Thus, besides the explication of individuals’ experiences, Husserl claimed it also to be possible to reflect upon and articulate the most essential structures of consciousness itself, that is, phenomena, such as intentionality, temporality, spatiality, corporeality, perception, cognition, and intersubjectivity. Based on this understanding, “as philosophy, phenomenology had thus become the reflective study and explication of the *operative and thematic structures of consciousness*, that is, primarily a philosophical method of explicating the meaning of the phenomena of consciousness” (Von Eckartsberg, 1998, p.5).

To achieve this, Husserl introduced the method of ‘*phenomenological reduction*’, as alluded to above, which differs to the empirical, elementaristic approach of reducing psychological events to component parts prior to their exploration. Instead, it is a way of grasping the

salient images of consciousness by penetrating the ‘layers’ of experience, whilst ‘bracketing’ any preconceptions, wishes, desires, motives, values, and other influences other than that of wanting to reach the essence of the experience. Having *bracketed* any knowledge about the phenomenon in as much as this is consciously possible, a researcher is able to describe it exactly as it presents itself to his/her awareness prior to his/her actively engaging in any conscious interpretation of it (whilst acknowledging as already discussed that this very awareness always already interprets in itself). Husserl’s motto was thus: ‘Back to the things themselves!’ (Brennan, 1998; Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

Important to reiterate is that these ‘things’ are no longer regarded as ‘objects’ in the sense of naïve realism, existing in and of themselves, but rather as their meanings, from a consciousness that perceives them, *given perceptually through a multiplicity of perspectival views and contexts* – pure appearance presenting itself to consciousness. In view of this concern of intuiting the essences underlying experience, phenomenology thus strives to separate the arbitrary and accidental from the necessary and the permanent (Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

To accomplish this, Husserl enhanced the above-mentioned process of *bracketing* with a method he termed *free imaginative variation*, which suggests that the researcher vary the noematic object in imagination, thus altering the constituents of that which consciousness is directed in order to test the limits within which it retained its identity. This enables the researcher to explore its variants, the possible alongside the actual, and therein discover the essential structure and constituents of a phenomenon (Von Eckartsberg, 1998).

In summary then, “at its most basic level, phenomenology presents itself as a science of experience. Experience, from a phenomenological perspective, includes within it all mental phenomena, such as wishes, memories, percepts, hypotheses, theories, etc. By employing a specific approach – the phenomenological method – phenomenologists attempt to arrive at increasingly adequate (though never complete or final) conclusions concerning our experience of the world. Similarly, through this approach, phenomenologists are able to describe and clarify the invariant structures and limitations that are imposed upon our experience” (Spinelli, 1989, p.29).

In view of this particular inquiry, it may seem curious to have chosen a methodology vested in gaining research material from conscious experience in that its exploration is primarily focused on the awareness or knowing that seems to contribute to but elude this very consciousness. However, as the foregone discussion posits, through the explication of descriptions regarding such conscious experience the more implicit, general structures of the essence of experiences, and thus also the experience of becoming conscious, may become visible.

Furthermore, since the emergence of consciousness is such a personalised experience of a rather fleeting nature, the most appropriate method of research seems to be gaining descriptions of subjects' lived experiences in this regard, since they seem closest to the experience in question. Having located the emergence of consciousness in the interplay between the material and the immaterial, the body and mind, as well as having dwelled on its relevance to healthy psychological functioning, the promise of this research epistemology and methodology seemed suitable for the aims of this study. This notion will be expanded on in the following section concerned with the research design of this study. However, this will be preceded by a brief interlude regarding the application of phenomenological premises to psychologically oriented research.

4.4 Phenomenological Perspective in Psychological Research

In reflecting on experience, a daily and general human activity, the implicit is made explicit and thus enables a systematic and 'proceduralizing' of phenomenological research. Such use of reflective explication enables a phenomenological perspective in psychology to provide the possibility of reconsidering various established psychological issues and concerns in ways, which are both original and illuminating (Spinelli, 1989).

Accordingly, existentially oriented psychologists have extended the natural or biological science model to a more *human* science. Whilst still making use of some empirical data and investigation, their starting point lies with human experience, rather than the inherent reductionism of moving from psychological processes to physiological bases. This development rests on the argument that the *progress of psychology* requires a more *fundamental investigation* of the *attitudes and assumptions* that *underlie psychological research*. Such explorations and the like may lead to a new paradigm for investigation,

enabling an *increasingly adequate, more holistic understanding of the human being*. An example of this is the inclusion of teleological notions in some psychological theories, visible in for instance Bion's contributions as discussed in the previous chapter, as opposed to the more explanatory approaches, such as Freud's drive-theory, which rest on the natural scientific premises of the medical-model (Brennan, 1998; Spinelli, 1989).

In view of this, Spinelli (1989, p. 185) situates phenomenology as an approach or orientation in psychology that considers subjective experience to be its primary concern, however, claims that its interest lies not with subjectivity per se but with the *central mechanism of intentionality* and its role in determining the 'reality' that individuals interpret and base their actions upon. "In this, phenomenological investigations lead to the discovery of a number of 'invariants of experience' that are universally shared by our species, and, just as importantly, exposes the many 'sedimented beliefs' that both cultural and individual biases impose and which serve to distort and diminish our understanding of ourselves and our world" (Spinelli, 1989, p. 185). This was explored in the previous section, along with the research methodology that enables it.

The intention of phenomenological psychological research is thus not to replace other psychological movements and orientations, but to complement them. This may become apparent in the unique nature of the contributions of the outcome of this study thereby illustrating the inherent value of a phenomenological research approach. Fundamental to establishing this, however, would be an exploration of the particular nature of the research design, which is thus what follows in the next section.

4.5 The Research Design

A research design functions as the framework, which guides the research activity particularly in its choice of the application of a variety of acknowledged research methods and techniques in the pursuit of trustworthy knowledge (Babbie, 1992; Durrheim, 1999; Neuman, 2000; Seale, 1999). It therein addresses the phenomenon and purpose of the study, as well as depicts the research procedure, in terms of its material gathering and explication methods.

4.5.1 *The Phenomenon*

The phenomenon is perhaps most central to the research design and it is therefore not surprising that Rosnow and Rosenthal (1996) therefore emphasize the need to thoroughly conceptualise it. This study intends to describe the experiences of individuals who undergo a therapeutic intervention, *Philophonetics-Counselling*, which makes use of a non-verbal, bodily-oriented expressive approach.

This phenomenon is further delineated to the specific focus on the transformation and representation of raw emotional experience through the use of bodily-felt and bodily expressed experiences within the *Philophonetics-Counselling* session, which will be gleaned from participant's written descriptions of their experience from whichever modality they choose to describe (including thoughts, feelings, sensations, images, movements, sounds, and so forth).

4.5.2 *Rationale*

The purpose or rationale of this study was already expanded on in the introduction to this paper, so that at this point it may perhaps be appropriate to merely linger on why it takes on a descriptive dialogic form, as opposed to for instance, an explanatory or experimental aim (Edwards, 1992; Neuman, 2000; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996).

Phenomenological research is primarily concerned with describing the essence of a phenomenon, in that through its rigorous descriptive approach it offers a method for accessing the difficult phenomena of human experience. According to Giorgi (1985, p. 14) it aligns itself with the "context of discovery" rather than the "context of verification", yet even so is recognizable as a human scientific knowledge in that it follows systematic, methodical, general and critical processes, which allow the researcher to arrive at the general structure and essence of a phenomenon as it presents itself, which in this case concerns itself with the interrelationship of the various elements of the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling* (Giorgi, 1983, 1994).

As already mentioned, by adopting a descriptive dialogic approach, the purpose of this description thus extends to finding a language or theoretical framework in which to make

sense of it. Edwards (1992) posits that this in fact occurs both implicitly and explicitly within this research approach. The former becomes apparent in the use of psychological language whilst constructing the situated structure, and the latter, more obvious instance, during the discussion of the general structure in relation to existing theoretical traditions, in this case *object relations theory*. Clearly, this holds implications for the value of the study, but will be discussed further on. At this stage we turn to the selecting of participants, otherwise referred to as co-researchers in phenomenological terms.

4.5.3 *Selecting Participants*

In order to operationalise this descriptive intent, the ‘object of inquiry’ (a unit of analysis consisting in this case of individuals) was purposefully chosen so as to obtain an information-rich sampling, which would provide in-depth and detailed descriptions of the phenomenon at hand (Mouton, 1998; Neuman, 2000; Patton, 1990).

Kruger (1988) similarly suggests that participants should be selected for participation based on (i) their having had experiences relating to the phenomenon to be researched; (ii) their verbal fluency and ability to communicate feelings, thoughts, and perceptions with regards to the researched phenomenon; (iii) sharing their home-language with the researcher so as to prevent the loss of subtle semantic nuances due to the need to translate from one language into another; (iv) and finally, expressing a willingness to be open to the researcher.

Clearly, such a sample would not necessarily be the most representative of the population of people that have experienced this phenomenon. However, the emphasis in qualitative methods is on depth and detail, rather than breadth and therein transferability or even generalisation, and is important when considering how this aligns itself with the focus and priorities of a study (Fife-Schaw, 1995; Neuman, 2000; Patton, 1990).

Thus, in view of the exploratory and descriptive nature of this inquiry, the material was provided by volunteers all participating in a *Philophonetics-Counselling* course conducted for the first time in South Africa during the year 2002. The founder of this modality, Mr. Yehuda Tagar, agreed to participate in this research and conducted the sessions with these participants. Written consent of the participants was obtained, along with a confidentiality agreement so as to ensure ethical practice throughout this research (Willig, 2001).

Furthermore, the participants were all obliged to have options for supportive therapy available, apart from the *Philophonetics-Counselling* sessions, should such a need have arisen.

4.5.4 Method

Having conceptualised the research in terms of the phenomenon and purpose of the research, to ensure an empirical study the ensuing operationalisation extends from the choice on a unit of analysis, to a means of choosing a method for collecting and analysing the research material, which allows it to be shareable and replicable (Mouton, 1998; Von Eckartsberg, 1998). This study will be guided by the DPRM, with a particular focus on Giorgi's empirical-phenomenological understanding thereof.

4.5.4.1 Collecting Material

Qualitative designs are *naturalistic* to the extent that the researcher attempts as little as possible to control the phenomena or the participants experiencing it for purposes of the study. In response to the high level of reactivity inherent in human beings as research objects and thus to ensure the credibility of the study, instead of exerting more control on the research situation, qualitative designs rather focus on the structures imposed on their methods of observation. Accordingly, they are particularly oriented toward reasonably non-intrusive exploration, discovery, and inductive logic even when as participant researchers they have direct and personal contact with the research participants in their *given* contexts. Researchers using qualitative methods thus strive to understand people and situations *as a whole*, giving detailed attention to nuance, setting, interdependencies, complexities, idiosyncrasies, and context (Patton, 1990, Mouton, 1998; Neuman, 2000).

In light of this material collection methods include, as just mentioned direct observation (participant and non-participant), as well as more indirect sources in the use of written protocols, open-ended written items on questionnaires, personal diaries, interviews, projective techniques, and also program records (Breakwell, 1995; Patton, 1990; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1996). Von Eckartsberg (1998) writes of this first linguistic step of expression and description of the participants' experienced flow of living, as expressing a particular experience that is specified and identified by their giving an account of it, by trying to bring it to as full and accurate an articulation as possible. Phenomena are thus not actively

manipulated, as for instance seen in the control of experimental designs and their concerns with external nuisance or confounding variables, but instead, although perhaps more reactive, are rather permitted to reveal themselves, such that the substance of phenomenology thus consists of the data of experience and their meaning for the experiencing individual (Brennan, 1998; Mouton, 1998).

The creation of protocols of such a nature requires rapport between the researcher and the participants, and it is important that the researcher creates a relationship in which the participants can feel relaxed and where anonymity and confidentiality can be guaranteed if so desired by the participants (Kruger, 1988; Neuman, 2000).

Having created good rapport, research participants of this particular study were asked to create a first-hand account, a detailed protocol or 'life-text', in response to their experience of the non-verbal, expressive interventions during a personal *Philophonetics-Counselling* session conducted by Yehuda Tagar. More specifically, they were asked to respond to the following three open-ended questions, which aimed to pinpoint and guide their recall and reflection, namely:

- 1. Describe your *experience* of whatever it was that brought you to therapy;**
- 2. Describe your *experience* of the actual process of the therapy, especially the manner in which you experienced the non-verbal, body-oriented expressive approach;**
- 3. Describe your *experience* of change (or lack thereof) after the intervention.**

Question one and three were added so as to illuminate the specific life-context of the participants' experience of a non-verbal, body-oriented expressive approach.

Written descriptions were used due to their time-saving advantage in that there is no need for transcription, but also because they form a basis upon which to formulate further enquiries regarding the experience grounded in the explicit descriptive material of the participants' written characterizations (Fisher, 1985). After perusing through the experiences of the participants that volunteered, the 3 most information-rich cases were selected, so as to enable an in-depth, in detail, in context, and holistic study of this phenomenon (Patton, 1990).

Much of psychological information is indeed communicated linguistically, and thus descriptions have and continue to pervade in psychology and thus provide a suitable approach to research. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of such descriptive research is assumed to be able to yield psychological insight of at least equal value as quantitative research may yield, yet simply differ in character and style (Giorgi, 1985b, Wolcott, 1994).

Such insight is deepened according to Patton (1990) if the researcher experiences the phenomena firsthand, sometimes even engaging personally, so as to become a ‘participant observer’. This was particularly useful in this study, having personally experienced *Philophonetics-Counselling* sessions with their bodily-oriented, action based focus, I was able to develop a more experiential understanding, along with developing a working relationship with the research participants. Although this may be viewed by some as problematic in terms of the dependability of the study (which will be discussed at length towards the end of this chapter), the trusting relationship formed and therein the openness to share intimate detail in the protocols may conversely have contributed to the credibility of the study.

Having dealt with the means of collecting appropriate research material, the following section will describe the DPRM’s approach to the explication of such material. According to Von Eckartsberg (1998), this process involves a dynamic dialogue between two levels of description: the day to day level referred to as narrative language, along with the more general and condensing result of reflective analysis, namely structural conceptual language. This will be explored in more detail according to Giorgi’s (1997) suggestions of breaking this process up into steps of collecting data, reading the data, dividing it into parts, organizing and expressing the raw data in disciplinary language and expressing the structure (essences and their relationships) of the phenomenon in some form of synthesis. These steps will be explained in more detail below.

4.5.4.2 Explication of Material

This section of the research design concerns itself with the process and phases of the empirical-phenomenological method of the DPRM as developed by Giorgi.

The focus of the explication of the chosen life-texts, also referred to as *naïve descriptions*, is aimed at “arriving at the *general structure* of a phenomenon in terms of a synchronic formulation of essential constituents or at a *process structure* of a phenomenon that delineates the diachronic unfolding of the phenomenon in terms of essential stages aligned sequentially” (Von Eckartsberg, 1998, p.18).

Edwards (1992) supports this view by stating that the defining of components of participants’ experience, as well as the relations between them, needs to consider both dynamic factors (i.e. processes of movement and change) and structural factors (i.e. the relatively enduring frameworks within which these processes occur).

This is enabled first and foremost by what Von Eckartsberg (1998) describes as the *reflective attitude*, that is, openness and listening to *being* in all its particular manifestations. Phenomenological research is not a technique that can be applied mechanically, but instead requires a certain psychological attitude (Giorgi, 1985b). “This constitutes a fundamental quality of insightfulness into the data, an articulate and differentiated understanding of human experience and command of the language in which it will be rendered” (Edwards, 1992, p.56).

This having been said, the method, reflexive in nature and intent, contains four essential steps to analyse the material and derive a general description and structure of the phenomenon (Edwards, 1992; Giorgi, 1985b; Kruger, 1988):

1. An intuitive and holistic grasp of the material:

On receiving the naïve descriptions, the researcher reads the material several times in order to obtain an intuitive and holistic grasp. In order to gain a general sense of the whole statement, it is imperative that the reader should bracket personal pre-conceptions and judgments so as to remain as faithful to the material as possible. This then serves as a foundation for the next step, namely the discrimination of meaning units.

2. Allowing the spontaneous emergence of Natural Meaning Units:

Having gained a notion of the whole, the researcher then re-reads the material so as to identify central themes and discriminate the essential ‘meaning units’ from within a psychological perspective and with a focus on the phenomenon being researched. This alludes to the conceptualised nature of the researcher, as described above, in that one can never stand outside of any perspective, and the transition from one nuance of meaning to another invariably occurs according to some overarching framework. However, this does not suggest any particular application of psychological theories at this stage, but rather acknowledges the presence of a psychological attitude. In fact, a fundamental imperative of phenomenological praxis is the describing of the phenomena as they are prior to establishing theories about them or prejudging them through any particular perspective merely because previous knowledge about the phenomena exists. In this vein, it is important that the meaning units evolve in the original language and thus exist as constituents as opposed to elements, which are deemed context free.

3. Rigorous Reflection and Transformation of Meaning Units:

Through the processes of reflection and imaginative variation, as suggested by Husserl, the material is transformed into psychological language with an emphasis on the phenomenon under investigation. Whilst discarding repetitive or natural meaning units that are deemed irrelevant to the phenomenon, the researcher attempts to make the subject’s perceptions and intentions thematic, so as to understand how the description can evolve into an example of the phenomenon. These transformations are necessary as the naïve descriptions of participants often implicitly express multiple realities, of which for instance the psychological aspects may need to be gleaned. A difficulty in this process appears to be the lack of an already established consensual psychological language, especially in that psychological languages in use often stem from opposing or contradicting theoretical positions. It therefore becomes necessary for the researcher to clearly stipulate the psychological orientation they ascribe to. For this particular study an *object relational* perspective was employed.

4. Synthesis and Descriptions:

Finally, the researcher synthesizes and integrates the insight conveyed by the transformed meaning units so as to arrive at a consistent description of the psychological structure of the phenomenon. The specific description of the situated structure thus reflects the structure of the participants' experience in their specific life-context, in that it retains the specifics of the situation in the description. However, when a researcher makes use of more than one respondent, the central themes and processes from the situated structures are reviewed and integrated into a coherent and organized general summary, which is context free, and is referred to as the general description. This allows for variations between the descriptions to emerge, enabling the researcher to get a greater notion of the essential structure of the phenomenon and therein improves the validity of the study. This study thus makes use of three protocols, and will move from the specific structures to deriving one general structure of the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling*. In essence “through faithful description, [one] thus strives to bring ‘the prereflective life-world [...] to the level of reflective awareness where it manifests itself as psychological meaning” (Kruger, 1988, p.143).

In conclusion of this section, Giorgi (1985b) adds that this last step in the method is rather challenging in that as opposed to more traditional research methods, the researcher has the freedom to express his/her findings in multiple ways. It is thus imperative that the intended audience is taken into account. This is also emphasized by Kruger (1988) who stated that the communicating of this psychological meaning/structure to fellow researchers and theorists is essential to allow for critical evaluation (Kruger, 1988).

In general, Von Eckartsberg (1998) claims that this DPRM process is guided by strict considerations of verifiability and replicability, which contributes to the value of this study. The following section takes a closer look at this.

4.6 The Value of the Study

The notion that valid solutions of conducted research hinge on the ontological, theoretical, and methodological commitments of a particular paradigm, makes it imperative due to variations in such paradigms that researchers portray, what Seale (1999, p. x) refers to as *methodological awareness*, which “involves a commitment to showing as much as possible to

the audience of research studies about the procedures and evidence that have led to particular conclusions, always remaining open to the possibility that conclusions may need to be revised in the light of new evidence”. This chapter was thus devoted to clearly presenting the rationale and respective procedure which were employed in view of the aims of this study, such that what remains is the presentation of its understanding and ensuring of a *valid* and *reliable* outcome. In this regard, being of a qualitative nature, it is important to note that qualitative research relies on a different science of design than the more traditional naturalistic or positivistic epistemologies and therefore has its own expectations for the production of quality, which will thus be expanded on throughout this section.

In light of this, instead of **reliability**, which in *quantitative research* refers to consistency or stability of observations over time tested by means of replicability, *qualitative research* speaks more of *dependability*, which refers to the degree with which the reader can be convinced that the findings did occur as portrayed. Furthermore, it is far less of a concern to qualitative research, which explores more particular, possibly even unique phenomena or experience in great detail (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 1999; Mouton, 1998; Willig, 2001). Thus, rich and detailed descriptions that acknowledge the contextual nature of all the essences and structures they derived, work towards such dependability, as is the case in this study. This is enhanced by what Lincoln and Guba (in Seale, 1999) refer to as auditing, which involves so-called peer auditors who assess the analysis and reduction made by the researcher. With regards to this study, this function was provided by the supervision of my study leader.

Dependability also extends to the researcher clearly stating his/her particular theoretical inclinations, as well as his/her attributes such as gender and status, which may contribute to what Breakwell (1995a) refers to as the *researcher effect*, and conceptualises as elements, which may impact on the research (Giorgi, 1985b). This is also deemed elemental to truly rigorous research by the phenomenological approach (Kruger, 1988). This was touched on earlier, when I mentioned being a participant of the *Philophonetics-Counselling* group from which I obtained volunteer participants.

Similarly, in place of **validity**, which often queries the accuracy with which some aspect of objective reality is reflected, the *credibility* of findings is determined by how convincing and

believable they are, in other words, to what extent does the research describe, measure, or explain what it intended to? Credibility also refers to the degree of confidence with which the researcher can claim that the research findings have truth-value for the participants in the context of the study (Neuman, 2000; Patton, 1990; Seale, 1999; Willig, 2001). This is enhanced by Glaser and Strauss's (in McLeod, 2001) proposition of a process of *constant comparison*. In essence, the researcher constantly attempts to find negative cases, or contradictory examples to his/her findings, so as to refine his/her explication. The researcher's integrity and responsibility, as well as methodological skill, sensitivity, and continued openness to the material, is thus vital to the research process (Moore, 2002; Patton, 1990).

With regards to *representativeness* and *generalisability*, they also do not concern qualitative methodologies that much. Whether a population sample needs to be representative depends largely upon the research question that the research is designed to address, such that in the instance of this study, the fact that the voluntary participants' consisted of one male and two females of a similar age bracket, and also originating from similar cultural and economic backgrounds, is of less consequence to the research goals and findings of this study (Willig, 2001). Instead, the findings based on the qualitative, descriptive experiences of the few purposively selected cases should be understood as that which they are, that is detailed, subjective illustrations of individuals' experiences.

Such qualitative findings should be *transferable*, however, in that the understandings that they offer can be transferred to new contexts, and other studies, where they can serve as frameworks for understanding new meanings (Durrheim & Wassenaar, 1999; Seale, 1999). Such transferability is promoted by the creation of rich descriptions that acknowledge in detail the original context and participant characteristics, therein enabling a researcher to judge the applicability to other contexts.

Particularly with regard to information-rich samples, as is the case in this study, Patton (1990) mentions *extrapolation*, a term which differentiates logical, problem oriented thinking around applications of the findings under similar (yet not identical) conditions, from a more probabilistic intonation amongst contemporary researchers. This seems important to note, however, falls beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, Seale (1999) mentions *confirmability* as contributing to the trustworthiness of qualitative research, the alternative to objectivity in a quantitative approach. As opposed to the tiresome arguments of objectivity versus subjectivity, this criterion posits a neutral researcher who is not predisposed to specific research outcomes, but instead allows for *discovery* (Patton, 1990; Spinelli, 1989). Once again, this is echoed in the phenomenological approach, which encourages openness and a bracketing of presuppositions or judgements (Giorgi, 1985a). As already alluded to above, such neutrality does not escape some form of interpretation or context, and the value of the research once again resides with the integrity and critical self-reflexive capacity of the researcher, as well as his/her disclosure thereof within the research report (McLeod, 2001). As already implied in the discussion of this study's method, I attempted to strive for such neutrality and have also acknowledged my characteristics and theoretical orientation. This openness is also echoed in the transparent manner in which the methodological procedures have been expressed, therein providing the reader with the opportunity to evaluate the value and credibility of the research (Seale, 1999).

4.7 Summary

This chapter concerned itself with assigning an appropriate research design for describing and exploring the experience of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session. Accordingly, Giorgi's understanding of the DPRM was chosen and discussed as it aligns itself with the *descriptive-dialogic* rationale underlying this study.

Beginning with a philosophical orientation, the setting out of this specific research design followed. This included a purposefully information rich sample, which provided the necessary material for the explication of the phenomenon of the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, a *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach*. The processes of data generation, collection and explication were also discussed, whilst taking note of researchers' responsibilities with regards to the possible impact they may have on the value of the study through their personal inclination and attitude in their unavoidable presence in the research process.

The chapter thus concluded with a brief exploration of the criteria of dependability, credibility, transferability, and confirmability, as they impact on the trustworthiness and thus the value of this study.

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Through its analysis of the written descriptions provided by the research participants Chapter Four will illustrate how phenomenology tries to discover and account for the presence of meanings in the stream of consciousness, trying to sort out and systematize meanings. It is important to emphasize that this method is not exclusive or exhaustive but merely one way in which phenomenological psychological research can be practiced (Giorgi, 1985a).

CHAPTER 5

EXPLICATION OF MATERIAL

5.1 Introduction

Phenomenological reflection allows a researcher to examine even of the ‘background’ prereflective structures that lie beneath our conscious experience, such that “the experience of the situation as described belongs to the subject, but the meaning transcends the subject and is available to others once it has been expressed” (Giorgi, 1970, p. 21). The ability to access such implicit structures of meaning will hopefully become more apparent in the explication of this study’s research material.

The previous chapter provided an extensive overview of the research method employed in this study, namely the DPRM. The first three phases of this method, namely moving from obtaining the *naïve descriptions*, to eliciting the *natural meaning units*, and finally arriving at *transformed meaning units*, have been included in the appendix, differentiated by the letters **A**, **B**, and **C**; substitutes for the participants’ identities so as to ensure the ethical practice of anonymity and confidentiality. These three phases thus enabled the fourth, which this chapter accordingly presents, namely the *specific descriptions* of the *situated structures* of each of the participants’ written protocols, which the discussion now turns to, which will then be followed by the *general description* of the *general structure* gleaned from an integrative synthesis of all three of these *situated structures*.

5.2 The Specific Description of the Situated Structures.

In view of synthesizing and integrating the insight conveyed by the *transformed meaning units*, the above-mentioned third phase of the DPRM method, the following section presents consistent descriptions of the *psychological structure* of the *phenomenon* of the experience of a bodily-oriented expressive therapy, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling*.

These **specific descriptions** of the respective **situated structures** of the participants’ experiences, as the term suggests, reflect the *specific life-context* of the particular participant being discussed. This structure is approached according to the previously stipulated punctuation of a *diachronic unfolding* of experience demarcated by essential stages,

sequentially aligned, thus resulting in a *process structure*. This process structure is roughly constituted by the *synchronic formulation* of *essential constituents*, which will be indicated by being italicised (Von Eckartsberg, 1998). Of these elements however, some consist of processes in themselves and are thus difficult to neatly or discretely delineate. This will become clearer in reading the following data, which constitutes the *specific descriptions* of the *situated structures* of participant A's, participant B's, and participant C's descriptions of their lived experience of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session, which are now presented consecutively, where the process for each respective participant is presented in an independent table for clarity and an easier overview.

5.2.1 Participant A's experience

<p>1. A initially presented with an awareness of a continual emotional pain that she associated with her previous relationship:</p>	<p>1.1 A proceeded to differentiate and clarify the presenting issue in a cognitive reflective verbal manner, elaborating on the contexts in which she became aware of this pain, how she attempted to avoid it, as well as that she experienced it as being unresolved and impeding her personal development.</p> <p>1.2 Following this, A associated a symbol (a wound)¹⁵ with this pain, expressing her associated feelings of embarrassment and rejection. She was then able to explore this symbol in more depth, gaining further clarity and specificity regarding her issue on this symbolic level.</p>	
<p>2. The next essential stage in this process entailed setting an intent, namely of transforming the pain in order to further her growth.</p>		
<p>3. This was followed by the third stage of actively engaging with the material of the session in a mostly non-verbal, physically expressive and exploratory manner:</p>	<p>3.1 A's experience varied between the functions of <i>bodily-felt sensing</i>, varying degrees of <i>identification with</i> and <i>enactment of</i>, and <i>reflection</i></p>	<p>3.1.1 <i>bodily-felt sensing</i>, aimed either at the entire bodily experience as a whole, or focused more specifically on an identified body part (such as A's heart).</p> <p>3.1.2 varying degrees of <i>identification with</i> and <i>enactment of</i> either the memory of the specific incident, as well as symbols or images that emerge throughout the process. This was enabled by calling the phenomenon into consciousness in order to either <i>sense</i> the bodily-felt correlating state, or <i>fully enacting it</i> thus, in effect, <i>externalising</i> it through expression in movement, gesture, and sound. Such externalisation allowed A to <i>know</i> the phenomenon more <i>specifically</i> and in a more <i>differentiated</i> manner – a 'knowing-by-doing', which in</p>

¹⁵ Specific examples from the respective *naïve descriptions* of the participants' experience will be *included in brackets* throughout the various participants' *specific descriptions*, so as to provide explanatory illustration of the emerging *situated structures*.

		<p><i>action</i> can be continuously sensed or reflected on, but in a manner which needs to be differentiated from these two functions in their regular more passive context as otherwise described in this paragraph. (In A's gesturing the nature of the wound, her awareness of it increased as she then was able to visualize it as consisting of three long, thin, sharp steel rods going right through her heart). <i>Identification</i> and <i>enactment</i> must be further defined as also having served the purpose of physically acting out a new response or the desired change to a situation, even if only on a symbolic level, thus allowing for the physical experience thereof, and not just mere thinking about it. (A, for instance, described physically climbing on a chair to reach up toward the sun to receive the heat and transmit it to the heart, as well as later physically enacting and sounding the removal of the molten steel rods).</p> <p>3.1.3 and <i>reflection</i>. This third function visible in A's experience, thus refers to creating and associating <i>mental representations</i> with the various experiences throughout the session; a process which is actively sought or spontaneously elicited. (In the spontaneous experience of compassion towards her ex-husband, and a new understanding of his having betrayed himself, A realized that she was able to let him go).</p>
	<p>3.2 These so-called 'functions' are assumed to have been employed to a large extent according to <i>Philophonetics-Counselling's</i> understanding of managing non-verbally expressive processes, but on exploring the research material, the process seemed almost primarily to be guided by an inherent logic emergent in the unfolding of the session, which the therapist seemed only to facilitate. This became visible in A's engaging with her symbols and their increasingly revealed implicit logic (such that A, on discovering her wound to in fact consist of her heart punctured by steel rods, realized that these needed to be removed, by what became apparent as nuclear heat, the kind that comes from the sun, in order to melt them down). The symbolic logic, which became increasingly apparent due to incessant exploration, thus implied a process of 'getting rid' of something intrusive (steel rods), which extended into nurturing and healing an</p>	<p>3.2.1 Sense of completion was thus sought, both in terms of the cognitively known presenting issue, but also in terms of the presenting symbolic logic and its implied processes.</p> <p>3.2.2 At the point of enacting the desired change, A took responsibility for the completion of this process. (When the steel rods needed to be removed in order for the wound to start healing, A claimed only she could help resolve this situation).</p>

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	injured part (healing the heart), as well as integrating a previously separated part (by allowing the porcelain lady out of the glass box).	
	3.3 These functions of sensing, enacting, or reflecting seemed characterized throughout the process by various forms of representation, including from mental representation of memory or cognition (visible in A's reflecting on her marriage, the manner and reasons for how and why it ran its course, to her realization of how this experience impacts her current interpersonal relationships), to symbolic expression (seen for instance in the above-mentioned punctured wound or porcelain lady), as well as even in the form of bodily enactments of movement and sound (where A reports on how she used a cushion to show how the rods went through her heart, and later made a "fff" sound to facilitate the removal of the molten steel rods, as well as, for instance, walking like the porcelain lady who only just managed to preserve her essence).	
	3.4 Of further interest was, how within this continuous interplay of sensing, enacting, or reflecting, A's session was marked by her moving between active states of creating and determining the process, in terms of consciously setting an intent, actively following the continuously revealed symbolic logic, or physically embodying and enacting the needed processes, as well as a experiencing a more allowing, less determining state of receiving what was spontaneously evoked or shifted, both in the form of increased awareness, as well as, for instance, her own nurturing and healing (applying warmth and the healing sound of "mmm" to the torn and wounded heart), along with that provided by the group.	
	3.5 Both these active and receptive states, as well as the alternating movement through the various functions, at the risk of overstating an emergent process, seemed thus to enable the spontaneous emergence of cognitive linking, where associations of daily life were made with the unfolding process and increasing symbolic logic (such that A realized how her experience of needed interpersonal distance was linked in a manner to the steel rods, which if touched resulted in intense pain, causing her to keep people at bay).	3.5.1 A was not only able to link these symbolic expressions meaningfully with conscious experience, but was able to gain a more general enhanced awareness and increased, differentiated understanding with regards to her sense of self and accordingly her relating to others, (seen for instance, her increased awareness of the intensity of her self-protective efforts and their ensuing impact on her relationships and self-expression). 3.5.2 This in turn seemed to coincide with an elaboration of

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		her knowledge and experience of the continuously transforming symbols of her process, (for instance, where A , from the mere notion of a wound, later established that it is in fact punctured by three long, thin, sharp steel rods going right through it, or, on considering her wounded heart, found a place inside it that was beyond pain, namely a small glass case which tightly enclosed a small porcelain lady) ¹⁶ .
	3.6 This increasing knowledge, insight, and understanding, becoming more conscious both cognitively and symbolically enabled A to:	<p>3.6.1 define her intent for the session more clearly, specifically in terms of the emerging symbolic logic and its association with her initial presenting issue of psychic pain;</p> <p>3.6.2 develop an awareness of what emotional and interpersonal qualities she would need so as to be able to complete the symbolic process in the hope of effecting change. (A mentioned nurturing and supportive qualities in herself and from others, including courage, trust, resilience, assurance, and connectedness).</p> <p>3.6.3 become aware of a resistance or inner hesitance to complete an aspect of the symbolic process, which she experienced as threatening or as yet unsafe. This was then addressed and enabled by the holding space of the group.</p>
4. Finally, the concluding stage of A 's experience included reflecting on the immediate and delayed, more residual experience of her sense of self and her experience with others in relation to the initial presenting issue:	<p>4.1 This included identifying an immediate intense bodily-felt sense of physiological change in her body, which was followed by a sense of feeling fragile and drained the following day, linked to a need for nurturance and protection.</p> <p>4.2 A integrated the experience of her session with her daily life, noting a significant change in her relationship with others, in terms of being more open, and trusting in individual and group contexts. In that she is not currently involved intimately, she was however, unable as yet, to comment on this realm.</p>	

¹⁶ Although the exact nature of this coinciding or this link is not apparent to the descriptive nature of this study, its presence seems to point to the opportunity of further, more specific research at a later stage, perhaps from a more interpretive perspective.

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<p>5. During this experience of a <i>Philophonetics-Counselling</i> session, B is thus seen to have engaged in various degrees of representation and complexity, from reflecting on specific mentally represented memory, to moving to bodily modes of representation in symbol or action, to reflecting on his experience of the session and its focus on the body as a whole. In this vein:</p>	<p>5.1 A reflected on and proceeded to report that non-verbal bodily enactments and the resultant identifications enabled her to access experience more directly, allowing her an increased sense of the experience, which helped her explore feelings she did not fully understand cognitively, and furthermore, enhanced her experience of the healing process.</p>	
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5.2.2 Participant B's experience

<p>1. B initially presented with an issue regarding the experience of extreme nervousness when feeling exposed in performance situations:</p>	<p>1.1 B proceeded to verbally explain his cognitive understanding of this nervousness, the contexts in which it occurs, as well as its workings as an involuntary response that sabotages his intentions.</p> <p>1.2 B further described the correlating bodily-felt sensations of physiological arousal, and the manner in which this interferes with his performance, which he then also illustrated in movement and gesture, locating the manner and location in which his body experiences this nervousness.</p> <p>1.3 B claimed that the current therapeutic setting evoked much the same experience.</p>	
<p>2. The next essential stage in this process entailed setting an intent, which B expressed as a wish to be free to function as an integrated individual especially when it matters most.</p>		
<p>3. This was followed by the third stage of actively engaging with the material of the session in a mostly non-verbal, physically expressive and exploratory manner:</p>	<p>3.1 B's experience, much like A's, also varied between the functions of:</p>	<p>3.1.1 <i>bodily-felt sensing</i>, aimed either at the entire bodily experience as a whole, or focused more specifically on an identified body part or region (such as B's initially locating sensation in his chest region, but most intensely in his solar plexus);</p> <p>3.1.2 varying degrees of <i>identification with an enactment of</i> either the memory of a specific recent incident (B chose to use the memory of playing a solo violin passage at an important function), as well as symbols or images, (B had an image of hovering over the performance, watching himself from above), that emerge throughout the process. This was enabled by calling the phenomenon into consciousness in order to either sense the bodily-felt correlating state, or fully enacting it thus. in effect. externalising it through expression</p>

		<p>in movement, gesture, and sound. Such externalisation allowed B to know the phenomenon more specifically and in a more differentiated manner – a knowing by doing, which in action can be continuously sensed or reflected on, but in a manner which needs to be differentiated from these two functions in their regular more passive context as otherwise described in this paragraph. (In B's holding the position of the protective younger part of his self, protecting the even younger part, B was able to get a sense of the threat coming from behind him, which, as he stayed in this enactment and sought to intensify it, revealed the threat to be a black empty space, behind him – a huge boundless void threatening to engulf and devour him). Identification and enactment must be further defined as also having served the purpose of physically acting out a new response or the desired change to a situation, even if only on a symbolic level, thus allowing for the physical experience thereof, and not just mere thinking about it (This was very apparent in B's enactment of the sequence which replaces his previous mode of defence, namely of the 6-year old attempting to hide the 3-year old, with his adult self facing the attack by slaying the rapacious beast with his invented nice big sword);</p> <p>3.1.3 and <i>reflection</i>. This third function visible in B's experience refers to creating and associating mental representations with the various experiences throughout the session; a process actively sought or spontaneously elicited. (For instance, on having enacted his body's initial protective response of not wanting to see and just to cover himself protectively, which then became a strong impulse to flee, B again reflected on the performance situation, and actively sought more insight into it. This can be compared to a later experience in his process, where he spontaneously became aware how his sabotaging response was in fact linked to an experience of his mother as having been impinging at times). With regards to reflection following an enactment involving full identification, an emphasis was made on first actively disassociating from this direct experience, (such that B reported 'letting go' of an enactment, or 'coming out' of it) before attempting to think about it.</p>
	<p>3.2 The employing of these so-called 'functions' seemed again almost primarily to be guided by an inherent logic emergent in the</p>	<p>3.2.1 A sense of completion was thus sought, both in terms of the cognitively known presenting issue and the set intent, but also in</p>

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	<p>unfolding of the session, only seemingly facilitated rather than directed by the therapist. This became visible in B's engaging with his representations, as well as his symbols and their increasingly revealed implicit logic. (The process established that in performance situations a young dissociated part of B's falls under the attack of a rapacious beast, which results in a slightly older dissociated part 'choking' the younger part in its protective hiding efforts. The process then unfolded in finding a more appropriate manner of defending against this sense of being attacked. Included were also two fragments related to process, which B could no longer situate properly; both involved the reintegration of dissociated parts of the self, one seemingly projected [mom holding heart] and the other repressed [leaving the body]). The symbolic logic, which became more apparent due to incessant exploration, thus implied a process of initial exploration and clarification of 'who or what was effecting what' (differentiating for instance, between the choking effect of the protective efforts and the engulfing and devouring threat of the black empty boundless void, later experienced as a rapacious beast in full attack), which extended into devising a new means of defence and negotiating with the various parts involved whether this was indeed possible, to finally enacting this in full bodily identification, repeatedly, until a sense of release was achieved. (B repeatedly slew the beast, by striking it on the head, with the help of an explosive "GAHHH" sound).</p>	<p>terms of the presenting symbolic logic and its implied processes.</p> <p>3.2.2 At the point of enacting the desired change, B took responsibility for the completion of this process. (On having obtained clarity regarding the corrective sequence that needed enacting, so as to experience they employing of a more appropriate defence, B realized that he needed to do this all by himself);</p> <p>3.2.3 Of interest is how the two fragments B was unable to place into the logic or sequence of the process were described by him as not being clearly represented, feeling unfinished and not integrated. (B speaks of still holding unresolved hurt and anger in the one instance, whilst the other episode is unclear and seems like unfinished business).</p>
	<p>3.3 These functions of sensing, enacting, or reflecting seemed characterized throughout the process by various forms of representation, including from mental representation of memory or cognition (B realizing, for instance, that his mother's attitude stemmed from her emptiness and need), to symbolic expression (seen for instance in the above-mentioned black empty space becoming a rapacious beast), as well as even in the form of bodily enactments of movement and sound (where B reports on how he used an imagined sword to strike the beast on the head, with the accompanying "GAHHH" sound).</p>	
	<p>3.4 Of further interest was, how within this continuous interplay of sensing, enacting, or reflecting, B's session was marked by his</p>	

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	<p>moving between active states of creating and determining the process, in terms of consciously setting an intent, actively following the continuously revealed (symbolic) logic, or physically embodying and enacting the needed processes, as well as a experiencing a more allowing, less determining state of receiving what was spontaneously evoked or shifted, both in the form of increased awareness, as well as, for instance, his vibrant sense of release of inner tension.</p>	
	<p>3.5 Both these active and receptive states, as well as the alternating movement through the various functions, at the risk of overstating an emergent process, seemed thus to enable the spontaneous emergence of cognitive linking, where associations of daily life were made with the unfolding process and increasing symbolic logic (such that B realized, as mentioned in a later attached fragment, how his notion of feeling detached, floating above the performance scene, was in fact a familiar feeling, remembering the repeatedly imagined notion throughout the week of glimpsing himself as a young child outside the window looking in).</p>	<p>3.5.1 B was not only able to link these symbolic expressions meaningfully with conscious experience, but was able to gain a more general, enhanced awareness and increased, differentiated understanding with regards to his sense of self (B established in detail what actually occurs in moments in which he has to perform, thus showing a more differentiated experience of self, also seen in the later changed state of being able to identify a resolution and faith in his ability to protect himself) and accordingly his relating to others, (after this process of developing improved defences and accordingly being able to stay more engaged, B expects that this will be tested in future in various contexts and their usual unfolding);</p> <p>3.5.2 This enhanced awareness and increased, differentiated understanding, in turn, seemed to coincide with an elaboration of his knowledge and experience of the continuously transforming symbols of his process, (as also already mentioned, the initial notion of a black empty space evolving into a rapacious beast).</p>
	<p>3.6 This increasing knowledge, insight, and understanding, becoming more conscious both cognitively and symbolically enabled B to:</p>	<p>3.6.1 define his intent for the session more clearly, specifically in terms of the emerging symbolic logic and its association with his initial presenting issue of psychic pain (on having distilled the relation to the beast, and having been able to reflect on it ‘from a distance’, B set a more refined intent of having to slay it);</p> <p>3.6.2 develop an awareness of what qualities he would need so as to be able to complete this symbolic process in his hope of effecting change. (B mentioned imagining a nice big sword to allow him to slay the beast);</p> <p>3.6.3 become aware of a resistance or inner hesitance to complete an aspect of the symbolic process, which he experienced as threatening or as yet unsafe (On attempting to initiate the embodied sequence of</p>

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		attempting a new form of defence, the youngest part of B hesitated, until reminded of B 's need to express himself musically).
<p>4. Finally, the concluding stage of B's experience included reflecting on the immediate and delayed, more residual experience of his sense of self and his experience with others in relation to the initial presenting issue:</p>	<p>4.1 B experienced the detailed memory of the process further fade with time, however could clearly recall the symbolic outcome.</p> <p>4.2 B also still felt aware of the physiological release and newfound sense of freedom.</p> <p>4.3 B expected that the outcome of this process, with its experienced sense of change, would be tested, both in the next performance situation, as well as in associated situations. Although slightly nervous, B felt assured by the newly established object relation and the restored sense of boundaries therein.</p>	
<p>5. During this experience of a <i>Philophonetics-Counselling</i> session, B is thus seen to have engaged in various degrees of representation and complexity, reflecting on specific mentally represented memory, to moving to bodily modes of representation in symbol or action, to reflecting on his experience of the session and its focus on the from body as a whole. In this vein:</p>	<p>5.1 B reflected on and proceeded to report that non-verbal bodily enactments and the resultant identifications of physically acting out and visualizing a scene enabled the feeling of the moment to be reconstructed in great detail.</p> <p>5.2 B also sensed, as already stated, that his recollection of the process as a whole, in retrospect, might not be complete or in sequence, and was aware of fragments, which he could recall but no longer situate correctly. B had named these fragments ('Taking my heart back from mom' and 'Leaving the body, returning').</p>	

5.2.3 *Participant C's experience*

<p>1. C named her process ('Cutting off') in which she initially presented with experiencing her sense of self as being diminished:</p>	<p>1.1 She verbally explained that this involved feeling out of control and indecisive in her actions, and that she is often fearful and uncertain as to how to go about making changes regarding this.</p> <p>1.2 C then expressed her experience of this issue symbolically (a veil separating herself from herself).</p> <p>1.3 C proceeded to verbally contextualise this issue, cognitively linking it with a specific incident she recalls and described in detail. C perceived this specific incident to have resulted in her feeling separated from an essential part of herself, which she felt was never reintegrated.</p> <p>1.4 On mentally reflecting on this incident, C became aware that she now makes different sense of the experience than she did then, but realizes that the severity of her experience and understanding then is still with her at present (She now deems the parental action as justifiable, but still feels the impact of her experience and its meaning then in her body).</p> <p>1.5 In recalling this incident to mind, C then proceeds to sense in a bodily-felt manner, as to how she relates to the memory of this trauma, and symbolizes it (her heart feels tightly squeezed as in a shiny metal sheath, which is cold and steel plated) and then expresses this in gesture, with only her hands. On breathing 'into' it, C finds a suitable sound, which results in intensifying and expanding her initial visual image (all the organic material of her body slides off and is cast aside to rot).</p> <p>1.6 On distancing herself from the identification and enactment, C's observing ego is able to reflect and a further differentiated symbol emerges (C sees what is left of her is a</p>	
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	ghost of a person with arms ‘splinted’ to the sides, crystal-like, brittle, a hollow shell, rigidly going about the world).	
2. The next essential stage in this process entailed setting an intent, which C defines as explorative in nature, with regards to finding a means in which to deal with this experience.		
3. This was followed by the third stage of actively engaging with the material of the session in a mostly non-verbal, physically expressive and exploratory manner:	3.1 C’s experience, much like that of the first two, also varied between the functions of:	<p>3.1.1 <i>bodily-felt sensing</i>, aimed either at the entire bodily experience as a whole, or focused more specifically on an identified body part or region, (such as C’s initially locating sensation in her heart, and later her diaphragm);</p> <p>3.1.2 varying degrees of <i>identification with an enactment of</i> either the memory of the specific traumatic incident (C had cognitively linked her presenting diminished experience of self with a specific traumatic incident during her adolescence, involving her father’s severe disapproval of her intimately lying next to her boyfriend at the time), as well as symbols or images, (C felt her heart was tightly squeezed as in a shiny metal sheath, cold and steel plated), that emerge throughout the process. This was enabled by calling the phenomenon into consciousness in order to either sense the bodily-felt correlating state, or fully enacting it thus, in effect, externalising it through expression in movement, gesture, and sound. Such externalisation allowed C to know the phenomenon more specifically and in a more differentiated manner – a knowing by doing, which in action can be continuously sensed or reflected on, but in a manner which needs to be differentiated from these two functions in their regular more passive context as otherwise described in this paragraph. (C’s image of her heart expanded into all the organic material of her body sliding off and being cast aside to rot, which on reflection, leaves her with an image of herself as a ghost of a person, with arms ‘splinted’ to the sides, crystal-like, brittle, a hollow shell, rigidly going about the world). Identification and enactment must be further defined as also having served the purpose of physically acting out a new response or the desired change to a situation, even if only on a symbolic level, thus allowing for the physical experience thereof, and not just mere thinking about it (This was apparent in C’s enactment, on finding a sign of life in her heart. to physically pick it up and putting it</p>

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		<p>back where it belongs, an action she experienced as painful in that her ribcage felt too tight, but also leading to the realization, following this enactment, that the girl is not dead);</p> <p>3.1.3 and <i>reflection</i>. This third function visible in B's experience refers to creating and associating mental representations with the various experiences throughout the session; a process actively sought or spontaneously elicited. (For instance, the above-mentioned spontaneous realization of the girl not being dead, as well as the later active cognitive integration of all the characters and pictures that emerged, pulling them into the broader life context). With regards to reflection following an enactment involving full identification, an emphasis was made on first actively disassociating from this direct experience, (such that C reported 'getting out' of an enactment) before attempting to think about it.</p>
	<p>3.2 The employing of these so-called 'functions' seemed again almost primarily to be guided by an inherent logic emergent in the unfolding of the session, only seemingly facilitated rather than directed by the therapist. This became visible in C's engaging with her representations, as well as her symbols and their increasingly revealed implicit logic. (The process established that in wanting to identify with the girl before the traumatic moment, C was resistant, finding herself to be bracing against a wind like cold fire. Yet, in then enacting this wind, she found no bad feelings towards it, but is able to become aware of the effect it had on her: she sees herself as a stick, a mineralised shell, not burned, just crystallized, with all life gone, except for some left in her heart. The process continues with her putting the heart back where it belongs, and therein realizing that the girl is not dead, but very thin and flat, sitting or lying on the upper surface of the diaphragm. C is left with the notion of having to retrieve all of her and to nurture her inside). The symbolic logic, which became more apparent due to incessant exploration, thus implied a process of initial exploration and clarification of what had happened on an emotional or psychic level during the traumatic incident as well as following it. Revealed was an inner response of dissociation in reaction to the specific instance of severe</p>	<p>3.2.1 A sense of completion was thus sought, both in terms of the cognitively known presenting issue and the set intent, but also in terms of the presenting symbolic logic and its implied processes. This also revealed the need for further continuation of the initiated process of reintegration.</p> <p>3.2.2 In realization of this further need, C took responsibility for its completion. (On having obtained clarity regarding the necessary continued process of reintegration, C cognitively reflected on practical means to be able to implement this in her daily life).</p>

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	<p>disapproval, which led to the first attempts of reintegration and an increased awareness of the further need to continue this process, specifically with a self-nurturing and accepting attitude.</p>	
	<p>3.3 These functions of sensing, enacting, or reflecting seemed characterized throughout the process by various forms of representation, including from mental representation of memory or cognition (C reflecting, for instance, on how the parental action was probably quite justifiable), to symbolic expression (already mentioned at length, such as her image of her heart or her ghost-like self), as well as even in the form of bodily enactments of movement and sound (where C reports on enacting the wind, with the accompanying sounds of “Swish Whoosh”).</p>	
	<p>3.4 Of further interest was, how within this continuous interplay of sensing, enacting, or reflecting, C’s session was marked by her moving between active states of creating and determining the process, in terms of consciously setting an intent, actively following the continuously revealed (symbolic) logic, or physically embodying and enacting the needed processes, as well as a experiencing a more allowing, less determining state of receiving what was spontaneously evoked or shifted, both in the form of increased awareness regarding her dissociated self, as well as, for instance, her experience of pain and a sense of her rib cage feeling too tight in response to placing the heart back.</p>	
	<p>3.5 Both these active and receptive states, as well as the alternating movement through the various functions, at the risk of overstating an emergent process, seemed thus to enable the spontaneous emergence of cognitive linking, where associations of daily life were made with the unfolding process and increasing symbolic logic (such that C realized, as already mentioned, that the girl was not dead but needed to be retrieved and nurtured).</p>	<p>3.5.1 C was not only able to link these symbolic expressions meaningfully with conscious experience, but was able to gain a more general, enhanced awareness and increased, differentiated understanding with regards to her sense of self (C established in detail what had actually occurred on an emotional or psychic level in this incident with her father, and was able to take corrective action in response to this, becoming more tolerant, understanding and compassionate towards herself) and accordingly in her relating to others, (she is able to no longer try to be outwardly what she isn’t, but instead is more able to express what she is);</p> <p>3.5.2 This enhanced awareness and increased, differentiated understanding,</p>

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		in turn, seemed to coincide with an elaboration of her knowledge and experience of the continuously transforming symbols of her process, (as also already mentioned, the initial notion of a tightly squeezed steel plated heart, extending into an elaborate visual image of herself as a ghost like person).
	3.6 This increasing knowledge, insight, and understanding, becoming more conscious both cognitively and symbolically enabled C to:	<p>3.6.1 define her intent for the session more clearly, specifically in terms of the emerging symbolic logic and its association with his initial presenting issue of psychic pain (on having distilled the nature of the heart, C realized that it needed to be put back in its proper place, which revealed further needed integration for a later stage);</p> <p>3.6.2 develop an awareness of what qualities he would need so as to be able to complete this symbolic process in his hope of effecting change. (C mentioned needing to nurture the dissociated part);</p> <p>3.6.3 become aware of a resistance or inner hesitance to complete an aspect of the symbolic process, which she experienced as threatening or as yet unsafe (On attempting to identify and fully enact the girl before the traumatic incident, C experienced resistance, sensing disallowance in response to the effect of the threatening wind).</p>
4. Finally, the concluding stage of C's experience included reflecting on the immediate and delayed, more residual experience of her sense of self and her experience with others in relation to the initial presenting issue:	<p>4.1 C reported experiencing a more positive sense of self, in that she has become more tolerant, understanding and compassionate towards herself – a change of state, which she claims to have a positive impact in every aspect of her life.</p> <p>4.2 C integrated this experience of self into her cognitive understanding and conceptualisation of her expression of self in daily life and particularly in relation to others. This leaves C with a greater sense of control in her life.</p>	
5. During this experience of a <i>Philophonetics-Counselling</i> session, C is thus seen to have engaged in various degrees of representation and complexity, from reflecting on specific mentally represented memory, to moving to bodily modes of		

<p>representation in symbol or action, to reflecting on her experience of the session and its focus on the body as a whole. In this vein:</p> <p>In view of her having in fact repeatedly experienced such therapeutic processes, C metaphorically and symbolically expresses how she is able to gain increased insight, self-knowledge and determination, which she claims not to have been able to access before.</p>		
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In now having presented all three of the participants' *specific descriptions* of their *situated structures*, thus reflecting the psychological structure of their individual experiences of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, the discussion now turns to the *general description* of the *general structure* in the hope of arriving at the core essence of the experience of a bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach.

5.3 The General Description of the General Structure

In a situation, as is the case in this specific study, where a researcher makes use of more than one respondent in gaining research material, according to Giorgi's Phenomenological Method of Analysis, the central themes and processes from the foregone situated structures are reviewed and integrated into a coherent and organized general summary, which is context free, and is referred to as the general description. As already stated in the previous chapter, this allows for variations between the descriptions to emerge, enabling the researcher to get a greater notion of the essential structure of the phenomenon, therein improving the validity of the study (Edwards, 1992; Giorgi, 1985b; Kruger, 1988).

In line with the *descriptive-dialogical* rationale of this study, this final description, its processes and elements, with particular emphasis on its inherent dynamic factors, will then, in the concluding chapter, be situated in the hitherto explored *object relations theory* and thoughts on bodily knowing of the previous chapter. But, as yet, the general structure needs to be presented, which has been organized in the format as established in the previous chapter.

Along these lines, having synthesized and integrated the insight conveyed by the transformed meaning units and ensuing situated structures, this material was reviewed once again, gleaning from it central themes and processes, which were then integrated into a coherent and organized summary. As was suggested by Von Eckartsberg (1998), as well as Edwards (1992), clarity emerges when ordering this material according to i) essential stages, ii) essential elements, iii) dynamic factors, and finally iv) structural factors, so as to arrive at the general structure, which is thus what follows.

5.3.1 *Essential Stages of the General Structure*

In having provided the explicit structure of three questions directed at the participants, as well as having chosen to explore the experience of a phenomenon with explicit structure in itself, namely the structured process of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session, it is not surprising that the general structure of the participants' written descriptions reflects these to some extent. However, these structures seemed necessary so as to be able to gain access to the more implicit structures, namely the dynamic processes within the created processes, which are of particular interest to this exploration.

The more explicit stages, thus included:

- a. The experience of a presenting issue, which was initially reported on in terms of its nature and the participants' understanding thereof. It was extensively explored, mostly in a cognitive, verbal manner, but also occasionally allowing for expression in bodily enactment or symbolic expression, which led, at times, to an even more clarified and differentiated understanding of the issue and its associated feelings. [This stage correlates both with Question 1, as well as with the conversational phase of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session.]
- b. In view of this explored presenting issue, the conscious setting of an intent or purpose for the session followed, concerned with a desired difference in the experience of *self*. [This corresponds to the so-called Wish.]
- c. Guided by this intent, further shaped by the emerging symbolic bodily logic in the session, which was revealed through incessant exploration through bodily-felt sensing, identification and bodily enactment, as well as reflection, the participants actively engaged with the material of the session in a mostly non-verbal, physically expressive and exploratory manner, experiencing spontaneous cognitive linking and increased consciousness, whilst effecting change through bodily enactment where it became apparent. [This stage correlates with the action phase.]

- d. This was followed by reflecting on the experience of self after the enacted process of stage three, both immediately, still within the session, as well as in retrospect, some time after having experienced the process. The more immediate experience of self was mostly reported to have shifted in a direct bodily-felt, often intense physiological sense, of for instance, a vibrant sense of release of inner tension or a shift in energy within the body. The next day a participant also reported feeling fragile and drained with a need for nurturing and healing; another spoke of memory fading, but the bodily-felt sense of release still very apparent. The more removed reflection moved from a direct focus on the body, to the interpersonal realm. Participants all reported a positive change in the experience of self and in relating to others. [This responds to Question 3.]
- e. With their reflecting on the nature of the bodily-oriented expressive process as a whole, [primarily in response to Question 2], one participant punctuated the sense that his recollection of the process as a whole might not be complete or in sequence, and was aware of fragments he could no longer situate correctly. However, in agreement with the other participants, the process was described as enabling access to experience more directly, in its detailed reconstruction allowing an increased sense of the experience, which helped one participant, for instance, to explore feelings not fully understood cognitively, which another described as enabling increased insight, self-knowledge and determination not accessible before. It was also stated to have enhanced the experience of the healing process.

The more implicit stages are apparent in the seeming effect or process of change – that which was not directly created but occurred of itself or in response to¹⁷ – that seem to coincide with the more apparent explicit structure as depicted above, namely:

- a. A move from an initial awareness and thoughts on a presenting issue, to a more clarified and differentiated understanding of the nature and workings of this issue, in the form of cognitive, as well as at times, symbolic knowing;

¹⁷ It is important to reiterate that this study aims to explore and describe and does not attempt to make any causal or explanatory claims.

- b. The clarity to set a conscious intent, with the increased awareness regarding the direction of desired change in self experience;
- c. An unfolding symbolic logic born of bodily knowing, including needed action in symbolic terms in response to experience which was either self-inflicted or (initially) experienced as inflicted by another/external source, by either getting rid of something, adding something needed, or reintegrating something that was previously separated.
- d. A physiological sense of change, as well as a positive change in the experience of self and in relating to others.
- e. An awareness of the possibilities and the nature of bodily-oriented expressive approaches as experienced in the form of *Philophonetics-Counselling*.

5.3.2 *Essential Constituents of the General Structure*

The complexity with regards to elements themselves entailing processes, actions, representations, and so forth, have made the organizing of this general structure quite challenging, especially in conceding once again that these elements and their interplay are not discrete, but instead flow into one another continuously effecting each other. With this in mind, the most apparent fundamental constituents have been distinguished, pertaining to the active involvement of directed focus and action on the part of the participants. In view of this punctuation, the essential constituents include:

1. *bodily-felt sensing*: aimed either at the entire bodily-felt experience as a whole, or focused more specifically on an identified region or part of the body.

2. varying degrees of *identification with* and possible *enactment of* either:

- the memory of a specific incident;

- or symbols and images that emerged, seeming to pertain to the self or the other.

This was enabled by calling the phenomenon into consciousness, and, in being identified with it, through continued sensing, to gain more specific and differentiated knowing. This knowing is furthered in the actual enactment of the identified state;

through movement, gesture, visualization, and sound it enabled a ‘knowing-by-doing’, as opposed to sensing or reflecting from a more distanced/disengaged position. Such enactment later extended into physically acting out a new response or the desired change to the situations defined in their symbolic logic, thus creating a new, holistic experience for the participant.

3. *cognitive reflection*: namely creating and associating mental representations with the various experiences throughout the session, a process seen to be actively sought but also spontaneously elicited.

5.3.3 *Dynamic Movements in the General Structure*

This aspect of the general structure is perhaps the most important in that it most clearly punctuates the implicit structure in terms of the processes of movement or change inherent in the essence of the experience of bodily-oriented expressive processes, as enabled in the chosen form of this study, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling* (Edwards, 1992). Having already alluded to the entwined nature of the constituents, existing as various processes and effects, and in view of the descriptive limitations of this study, the following section will attempt to underline seemingly noteworthy correlations between constituents, experience and the changing nature of representations. Fundamental is thus:

- a. Within the active interplay between the constituents, they seemed to enhance one another as, for instance, identification allowed enactment, and enactment created further identification, which seemed to contribute to bodily-felt sensing and expanded the possibility and extent of reflection, both in terms of bodily and mental representations.
- b. Greater and more differentiated knowing about the situation seemed to coincide with this continuous interplay, as through the active employment of the constituents, intermingled with the receptive experience of their effects, bodily representation in the form of the nature of symbols or images, their associations to one another or the further direction of movement needed in the session, became apparent, interspersed with spontaneous and active seeking of cognitive linking to representations in the mental realm. Furthermore, awareness both of particular points of resistance or

hesitance, as well as of having to employ character qualities so as to be able to complete the process, came to the fore, which highlighted the participants' taking responsibility for effecting change.

- c. There thus seemed to emerge a (symbolic) bodily logic in this continuous interplay between constituents, and the emanating bodily and mental representations, which appeared to reveal an agenda, coinciding with the initial set intent of the session.
- d. Furthermore, an interplay was visible between the immediate experience on a bodily level, (experiencing bodily-felt symbolic events (as though) in the 'here-and-now'), and a reflecting on these experiences as they linked to more sequential, generalized mental representations (in the form of memories of specific points in time; or generalized understandings of self and in relation to others).
- e. Throughout the process of this experience, various forms of representation were seen to change in their nature, either through increased differentiation and elaboration, or in linking with other emerging representations, or being created anew. Having already mentioned the transforming symbols and cognitive representations, what remains to be punctuated is the changed experience of self and therein the change experienced by participants in relating to others; more or less specifically linked to the original presenting issue.

5.3.4 Structural Factors of the General Structure

The final aspect to describing the general structure of this experience of a bodily-oriented expressive approach, involves structural factors in the sense of relatively enduring frameworks within which the above-mentioned processes occur, enabled by the foregone constituents and encouraged by the various stages of this experience (Edwards, 1992). These factors seem to range from being very explicit in nature to also being rather implicit. They include:

1) Participant Characteristics

- a) Participants are always in a relational context;
 - Accordingly have developed a certain internal world – psyche functioning according to a character structure formed by specific internalised object relations;
 - Which can be viewed in terms of experience of self and experience of other;
- b) Participants access mental and bodily realms of knowing.

2) Situational Conditions

- a) Experience is structured by the nature of the therapeutic approach and thus;
 - Involves interaction with and facilitation of a therapist;
 - Is limited to a certain time-frame;
 - And is shaped by the stages and employment of constituents as is characteristic of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* method.

These individual and contextual factors thus provide the basis according to which the *essential stages* and *constituents* can be understood and within which the *dynamic movements* of the process seem able to occur. The *structural factors* therein appear pivotal to understanding the nature of the general structure.

5.4 Summary

This chapter was devoted to the explication of the written descriptions provided by three participants, in response to their experience of a *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach*, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling*. It set out to present the initial specific descriptions of the situated structure for each of the participants of this experience, elaborately illustrated by the inclusion of specific examples from the original naïve descriptions attached in the appendix. This was followed by generating the general description of the general structure of such an experience, as gleaned from a summarising analysis of the three participants' protocols.

The general structure was approached and organized according to i) *essential stages*, ii) *essential elements*, iii) *dynamic factors*, and finally iv) *structural factors* as outlined by Edwards (1992) and Von Eckartsberg (1998) discussed in the previous chapter. In the following concluding chapter of this paper, this general structure of the experience of a *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approach*, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling* will be described and explored from the perspective of *object relations theory*, as well as thoughts on ‘bodily knowing’, as were presented in Chapter Two and Three.

CHAPTER 6

INTEGRATION

6.1 Introduction

Having adopted a *descriptive dialogic* approach, this inquiry is fundamentally concerned with finding a *language* or *theoretical framework* in which to make sense of its chosen phenomenon, namely the experience of a *Philophonetics-Counselling* session, as a tangible example of a *bodily-oriented expressive approach* and therein a more bodily-directed practical application of the inherent phenomenon of the *transformation and representation of raw emotional experience*, assumed fundamental to *healthy functioning* in which *consciousness* or *psychic truth* for a person emerges. In this regard, this study situated the phenomenon primarily in *object relations theory*, informed by an awareness of bodily-oriented thinkers. Thoughts and ideas regarding the structure or essence of the phenomenon were thus playfully and tentatively assimilated, integrated in a free-associative spirit in the hope of sensitising the reader and perhaps stimulating new ideas. Reflection on the nature of this study continued throughout, such that *limitations* and possible *heuristic value* of this research were explicitly made reference to. The chapter concludes with a delving into some *unsaturated thoughts* that emerged throughout this endeavour. However, the discussion first turns to the explication of the *general structure* of this phenomenon, which moves from *enduring frameworks*, through the *stages* and *constituents*, to the more abstracted *dynamic factors* of this *general description*.

6.2 Enduring Frameworks

The notion of wanting to find a language or theoretical framework, as Edwards (1992) rightly posits, seems to occur both *implicitly* and *explicitly* within such a research approach. Its *implicitness* occurs not only in the *use of psychological language* whilst constructing the *situated structures* as the method prescribes, but already in the very *choice and delineation* of the phenomenon itself. As was already alluded to during the explication of the *general structure* in the previous chapter, the very choice of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, and therein *bodily-oriented expressive approaches* rests on a notion that there are realms of *bodily knowing* which may as yet not have been expansively explored or defined, and that these modalities are a means of gaining access to it.

This study indeed aligns itself with this intent concerned with *bodily knowing*, whilst acknowledging that this chosen medium of *Philophonetics-Counselling* approaches the assumed implicit phenomenon of *transformation* and *representation* with an equally *implicit assumption* of the possible nature and functioning of these *elusive bodily elements*, which becomes apparent in the very rationale behind the explicit structuring of its therapeutic processes and defined constituents.

It thus proves challenging and may constitute a limitation to this study to attempt to describe or explain the emergent elements and movements or changes of the phenomenon of transformation and representation within this explicit structure, not only due the difficulty of establishing how much of what is observed, especially with regards to body phenomena, is *actively created* because of the existing constructed understanding or assumptions of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, and how much of its essence is *discovered* more in and of itself (this very dilemma reflects one of the pivotal notions of the theoretical exploration, namely that representation and experience are both indistinguishable, and yet also impact on one another as discrete entities).

Just so as to express this point more clearly, the phenomenon may be a created illusion, a misappropriation, or at least a distortion by the very assumption that a *bodily representative space* exists, along with theoretical construction and interpretation of its meaningful use to therapeutic endeavours in accordance with a further constructed understanding of this space's involvement in the processes of *transformation* and *representation*; but the phenomenon may also be *discovered* or *distilled* in the sense that it exists in reality in a manner which is reasonably independent of our manipulating it, and the essence of which we may thus be able to observe through phenomenological reductive methods. In this sense, contemporary psychotherapeutic understanding may hitherto have simply overlooked the spectrum of bodily representations' fundamental involvement in the processes of *development* and *being* – that is, until the rise of bodily-oriented therapies attempted to address it.

The constructions or representations of such *bodily-oriented expressive approaches* thus allow researchers, therapists, and patients, (perhaps more appropriately or representatively constructed) glimpses of *bodily knowing* and its possible contributions to *transformative processes*, within the descriptions of experience of, for instance, *Philophonetics-Counselling*.

The necessity of this medium may therein have become apparent, as it enables a different *container* for the *contained* process of movement or change in *transformation and representational processes*, and therein assumed *healthy functioning* and increasing *consciousness*.

In addition, this debate further reflects the notion that factors exist, which are innate to a phenomenon and can thus not be seen as apart from it – be it our unavoidable interpretation of the appearance of reality due to our fundamentally embodied nature, or the fact that therapeutic processes inherently rest on defining assumptions. This being said, the situating of the observed phenomenon, its elements and processes, will invariably be tainted or given form to by the medium which enables its observation, namely the premises of *Philophonetics-Counselling*.

This being said, the chapter continues with the *explicit* situating of the elements and processes of the phenomenon of *transformation and representation* in theory, by initially finding the relevant correlations between the presuppositions of *object relations theory*, and those emergent in the *general description* of the structured *stages and constituents* informed by the premises of *Philophonetics-Counselling*. This may then enable a perhaps more unbiased reflection and pondering on the implicit *dynamic movement* observed within these constructions. But underlying all of this and definitive in nature are most likely the *structural factors* of the *general structure*, which is what this section has already implicitly addressed. In that, as presented in the previous chapter, these factors are so self-explanatory and reminiscent of generalised assumptions applicable both to *Philophonetics* and *object relations theory*, which this section has adequately discussed, that it is not deemed necessary to go into their particularities any further. Instead, the discussion now turns its attention to the more *explicit aspects* of this intricate and multi-dimensional phenomenon, to enable a more enriched understanding of the *implicit dynamics*, which are of more concern to this inquiry.

Important to mention, before embarking on this reflective discussion, is that the ideas that will be put forward are of a tentative and creatively playful nature, in full awareness of the complexity not only inherent in this phenomenon, but also to the underlying difference of basic assumptions and understanding of the various *object relational* theories that are employed. This excursion is not intent on clarifying these differences to the finest detail as

they may pertain to the phenomenon, but instead engages on a less clearly defined meta-level, which through free association is concerned with opening new spaces, offering unsaturated thoughts, and stimulating new ideas in the hope of furthering scientific understanding. With this reflective attitude, attempting to be as void of interpretation or analysis as possible, the following section thus concerns itself with the explicit structure of the therapeutic stages and constituents.

6.3 Stages and Constituents ~ Creating a Process

Taking the **stages** or *process* of the *general description* of the *Philophonetics process* at a glance, it moves through 1) the initial, mostly cognitive and verbal exploration and presentation of the *presenting issue*, from which follows 2) a clearly defined *intent* and thus implicit expectation, to a stage of 3) *active engagement* with the material in a manner other than that of the initial stage, in that it is concerned with the assumed *bodily knowing* and makes use of its *expressive* and *representative*, and therein possible reflective, capacities. Following this stage of elaborated exploration and symbolically guided physical enactment, participants spoke of 4) a changed *experience of self* – in the immediate, on a more *physiological level*, and later, in *interpersonal context*.¹⁸

Thus, in considering the *general broad movement* of this *therapeutic process*, I am reminded of Bion's (1962) notion of a *preconception* in the infant (the presenting issue and expectation), followed by the *realisation* of the mother's feeding (the cognitive linking and bodily enacted change required according to the symbolic logic, in the holding environment), leading to the formation of a *conception* as a result (reworking representation and symbolisation, leading to a changed experience and understanding of self). This was enabled by the overall *containing* structure and atmosphere of confidentiality in the process – providing appropriate *reverie* and therein encouraging the *alpha function*, through which the experiences are transformed, digested and represented (Grinberg *et al.*, 1977). The therapeutic context and general structure thus seemed to encourage the *transformation* and *representation of previously undigested experience*.

¹⁸ In having to concede that the differentiation and ensuing categories of the *general description* are perhaps somewhat artificial, they will be more liberally worked with, such that for example the final stage listed in the *general description*, namely the participants' reflection on the bodily-oriented methods, will be included at a later stage.

This undigested experience seemed primarily concerned with *differentiating the self* from the *other*, reminding of Winnicott's (1971) *transitional space*, the in-between world of defining relational representations, also enabling an *internalisation* of this *ability to create* them (Bion's *alpha function*). The generating of this space, characteristic of the primal mother/infant constellation and its maternal holding, thus enabled a *revisiting of unprocessed object relations*, allowing different ways of reworking and representing or symbolising these 'internal dramas', with their various dissociated, repressed, projected or undifferentiated parts (Bion, 1962).

In this vein, when considering the content of the three therapeutic processes particularly as revealed by the symbolic logic, change or 'action' was needed with regards to experience that was either self-inflicted or (initially) experienced as inflicted by another/external source. This 'action' involved having to either *get rid of something*, having to *add something needed*, or having to *reintegrate something that was previously separated*¹⁹. These criteria again resemble the project of Winnicott's *transitional space*, but also remind of Kleinian notions of the *paranoid schizoid* and *depressive positions*, where the participant seems to move from a position of symbol and experience being merged such that *psyche and body may be conflated* in experience, to being able to separate and situate the representation more appropriately, allowing for a less 'distorted' experience (Segal, 1973; Solomon, 1995; Winnicott, 1971).

In view of the discussion regarding *therapeutic space* in Chapter Three, this thus resembles the notion suggested by Atwood and Stolorow (1984) of *differentiation* and *integration*, especially as the themes of participants A, B, and C seemed reminiscent of an experience or experiences where they were forced by an external event or object to adapt in a manner that, as Robbins (1984) conceptualises it, became apparent as being constricting to their general functioning. Not only was there thus a manifestation of perhaps inappropriate behaviour, or a distorted representation of self and invariably the other, but also the presence of un-integrated or ill-digested associated affect, which according to Bion (1962) and Siegel (1979) may be lodged in the psyche or body, the specifics of which extended into the psychosomatic and somatopsychic spectrums and therein beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁹ Of interest, and illustrative once again of the inseparability of body and mind, is how these supposed psychic 'actions' are described in bodily metaphor or logic.

In Bion's conceptualisation, the processing and transforming of these previously evacuated undigested beta elements, enabling an expressing of the unspeakable by putting amorphous feelings into some kind of symbolic form, may thus however be linked to the immediate *physiological changes* experienced by the participants. As these elements are thus *expressively released, represented*, and therein *integrated*, in accordance with the observed perpetual circularity and reflexive influence of experience and its representation, into the multi-dimensional representational world of the participants, their ensuing positively changed experience of their *interpersonal contexts* seems similarly somehow connected (Goicoechea & Robbins, 2002).

From a more Kleinian perspective, the progression through the various stages of this therapeutic process seemed to resemble an overall process of moving from *paranoid-schizoid* type representation of the presenting issue, characterised by a state of *symbolic equation*, to an enhanced sense of *differentiation* and movement towards more 'whole object' representation, along with the *reflective distance* of the *depressive position*. As mentioned above, the stages thus moved from body and psyche seeming conflated, and thus assumed primarily concerned with *inner phantasy*, to increasing cognitive linking and representing concerned with *external reality*.

Of interest is how the process moves from a *general orientation* and *clarification* in the *verbal realm* of *mental representation* to a direct attempt of accessing internalised object relations through *non-verbal bodily representations*. In attempting to situate this aspect in theory, I am reminded of how closely the *bodily realm* is linked with *object relational* representation in the *paranoid-schizoid* conflation, in that to the same extent as the experience of *self/other* is merged; similarly body and mental realms seem not as yet distinct. It thus does not seem altogether surprising to focus therapeutic activity primarily on the body. What appears to demand more attention, however, is the seeming *directness* of this focus in being able to recapture and explicate internalised experience. I am left wondering whether the described conflation does not need further refining, in considering the differentiation possible once the focus is directed on this so-called *bodily knowing*.

In essence, there seems to be a discrepancy between the extents of psychic awareness attributed to the presence of mental representation versus bodily representation in view of the

paranoid-schizoid, suggested by the specificity and unfolding of the bodily symbolic logic, as the processes revealed. This will thus be explored in more depth in the following section of *dynamic movement*. However, at this stage I would simply like to leave the suggestion of perhaps returning to a previous distinction, made by both Bollas and Merleau-Ponty in Chapter Two, namely the difference of and interaction between the so-called *experiential self* and the *representational* or *categorical self*, where the former relates primarily to the ‘unthought known’ of primal subjective ‘lived experience’, and the latter is more concerned with consciousness or self-awareness through ‘symbolic experience’, enabling the cognitive appreciation of social constructions and cultural explanatory paradigms (Bollas, 1987; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). I would like at this point, before continuing with general impressions regarding the stages of this process, to reiterate that these statements are really tentative in nature and thus constitute a deliberate probing of defining boundaries across theoretical models, in the belief that such playful thought may provide new options or open new spaces to enriching current theoretical understanding.

To continue, addressing representational and relational disturbances in therapeutic process can be painful so that patients are often experienced as *resistant* to therapeutic process, as was similarly seen in the *hesitance* of all three participants at critical stages in their sessions (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984). Nonetheless, the therapeutic holding environment appeared to encourage participants to dare to enter into the unknown. Indeed, the manner in which the participants appeared able to work with this *transitional space*, the edges of intelligibility pertinent to orientating the exploring of *bodily knowing*, suggests perhaps that they had sufficiently *internalised alpha functions*, due to adequate *reverie* or ‘good enough’ *mothering* in their infancy, so as to allow them to venture into such threatening terrain where the sense of ambiguity and incompleteness feeds the temptation to exclude from conscious experience configurations of self and object that are associated with emotional conflict or subjective danger (Atwood & Stolorow, 1987; Bion, 1962; Winnicott, 1964).

From this, it can be deduced that the participants had previously developed a sufficient capacity for ‘*whole object thinking*’ (reminiscent of the *depressive position*) and could thus in the process of transformation contain associated thoughts of losing the immediacy of being merged with the object and the related sense of omnipotence therein, as is more representative of the *paranoid-schizoid position*. This ability of generating this form of

representation or symbolisation may thus be crucial for participants to be able to experience the *realisation of meaning* or *psychic truth* with underlying primitive awareness rising to consciousness.

Similarly, with this in mind, it seems important to deliberate on the effect such bodily-oriented approaches may have on individuals who have inadequately internalised this transforming and representing function, and would thus likely not be able to manage primitive awareness or unconscious dynamics that may rise to the surface of consciousness. Instead, as elaborated on in Chapter Two, this may be experienced as a *nameless dread*, therein possibly leading to a situation of being ‘re-traumatised’ by the very same undigested experience. This may thus mark the distinction between forms of ‘*regression*’, loosely understood in the sense of dealing with primitive, often prelinguistic experience in a *transitional space*, as opposed to a form of *disintegration of self*.

It thus appears to be somewhat of a prerequisite that an adequate *alpha function* is established in patients’ psyche so that they are able to manage this *transitional space* of reworking and symbolising or representing whatever material emerges. Related to this, the nature of this *Philophonetics-Counselling* therapeutic process thus seems to require a certain *flexibility* of being able to move between the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions*.

With the overall aim of *physical and psychic integration* of the impressions of *self* and *other*, as stipulated by Robbins (1984), this notion thus correlates with the needed ability to be able to *use* and *move between* the three distilled **constituents** of this *bodily-oriented process*, as presented in the *general description* in the previous chapter. They entail the *active involvement* by *conscious focus* and *action* on the part of the participants, as they move through functions of either *bodily-felt sensing*, varying degrees of *identification with* and *enactment of* the memory of a specific incident, or the various symbols and images that emerge, as well as the function of *reflection*. Implicit in these ‘functions’ is thus an inherent assumption that alongside mental representation and the organizing mentality of the worded world, there exists a bodily knowing, which can be directly accessed.

In view of this shifted emphasis of *bodily-oriented expressive approaches*, the function of **bodily-felt sensing** can be understood, as a means of moving into the *representational realms*

of the *body*, and thus accessing *bodily knowing* and forms of *representation*. Of interest is that this seems possible through focusing on a general bodily-felt sense, first coined by Gendlin (1981; 1997) as elaborated on in Chapters Two and Three, but also seems often to be located in specific regions or body parts. Although this *direct relation* between psyche and body was not specifically explored in this study, hinting again at the broad spectrum of somatopsychic and psychosomatic phenomena, it is likely to be pivotal to a more in depth notion of the assumed threshold between *bodily* and *mental representations*, the interplay of the *material* and *immaterial* underlying this inquiry. Nonetheless, its observation definitely adds to the heuristic value of this work.

Of interest to the focus of this study is more the notion that through *bodily-felt sensing* recourse to the bodily sense of a situation is possible, enabling the accessing of *bodily representations*, which in turn encourage the functions of *identification with* or *enactment of* internalised experience, which is deemed an effective strategy of attempting to recapture and explicate experience more directly than is perhaps possible in purely verbally oriented therapies (Wiener, 1999). This was echoed in stage five of the process, where participants explicitly expressed that they were able to *access experience more directly*, in its *detailed reconstruction* allowing an *increased sense of the experience*, which helped, for instance, explore feelings not yet cognitively understood.

In this vein, with the possibility of various degrees of **identification with** and **enactment of** either the memory of a specific incident, or even symbols and images that emerged from the bodily focus, seeming to pertain to *self* and *other*, I am reminded of Lewis Bernstein's rather simplistic statement of identification with experience to the extent that one is no longer aware of the notion of 'as if' – the participant *lives* the experience *as if it were happening* in the *here-and-now* and it is therein assumed to become a whole affectively charged mind/body experience (Fletcher, 1979). Of interest is that this *identification* and *enactment* seems possible with regards to both *mental* and more *bodily-originated representations*, which poses questions to the relationship between these two representational realms. This will be explored in more depth in the following section. Thus, returning to the functions of *identification* and *enactment* it seems noteworthy to what extent these seem to resemble Bion's notion of *being in O*, and the associated necessity of transformations *in O* for personal growth and the emergence of meaning. Bion speaks of '*becoming something*', '*being it*', as

opposed to only residing in the safety of *knowing about* it, and relating either by (K)nowing, (L)oving, or (H)ating it (Bion, 1962; Grinberg *et al*, 1977).

However, he describes the mechanisms of thinking as taking after the motions of *integration* and *disintegration*, as seen in the movement between the Kleinian *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions* (Ps↔D), as well as his own concepts of *container-contained* (♀♂) (Symington & Symington, 1996). Gaining consciousness and bearing psychic truth thus seem to entail a movement between *experience* and *reflection* or *representation*, which thus echoes the necessity of the third function, namely *reflection*.

Cognitive reflection is considered the third function, and appears to consist at least overtly of the processes of creating and associating *mental representations* with the various experiences throughout the session; these are actively sought, but also spontaneously elicited (therein perhaps indicative of transformation occurring). This function thus seems more to echo Bion's notion of *thinking about O*, as described above, implying the encouragement of a more removed or dissociated state in relation to the experience at hand, through the presence of *an observing ego*, and thus more reminiscent of 'whole object' representation, possible in the *depressive position*.

This bodily-oriented expressive approach, with its deliberate punctuating of accessing the bodily known, therein perhaps most wittingly addresses Ogden's (1992b) notion of the intertwining of 'the consciously symbolised past' and 'the unconscious living past'. In the continued spirit of free association and the *playing* with thoughts, this notion will be elaborated on in the next section concerned with the *dynamic movement* observed in the *general description* suggestive of processes of *transformation* and *representation*.

6.4 Dynamic Movements ~ Observing Transformation and Representation

Having just discussed the three constituents above, it is their **continuous and actively employed interplay** that the *dynamic movements* of the *general structure* seem primarily enabled by. In having just described them on the one hand as creating a means of *actively entering* processes or states of *being in O* and also *knowing about O*, and on the other, enabling a means of accessing most directly the bodily realms of knowing, and often quite spontaneously linking(ed) cognitive or mental representations, I now wish to turn to some

theoretical notions regarding the relevance of such movement and directed focus in terms of the *transformation* and *representation* of experience.

Thus, when considering the *former* notion between *being in* and *knowing about* O, it seems important at this stage to reiterate how this replicates a continuous movement between *experience* and *reflecting on it*, which Bion equated to processes of continuing *integration* and *disintegration*, or *merging* and *separating*. This can be likened to both processes he used as structures to inform his understanding of the mechanisms of thinking, namely as described in Chapter Two, the transformative integration inherent in the *container-contained* function (reminding of the *autistic-contiguous*), along with the continuous merging and separating in the progression of psychic representation through the conflating *paranoid-schizoid position*, and the more disengaging or independent *depressive position*. It becomes tricky, however, when realising that although on the one hand these processes are used in a *metaphorical sense* so as to flesh out the difference between *experience* and *reflection*, they on the other hand, are in fact intimately involved with the *content* of this very *experience* and *reflection*. To delineate this in detail, however, calls for a theoretical study within itself, and thus falls outside of the aim of this paper. Regardless of this, due to this very entanglement I have just alluded to, and particularly its relevance to the interaction between bodily and mental representation, the following section unavoidably addresses this notion to some extent, although it will not for reasons just mentioned be deliberately conceptualised in terms of Bion's thinking around O.

This being said, when thus considering the *latter* notion, born of the continuous interplay between constituents, of enabling a means of accessing most directly the *bodily representations*, and often quite spontaneously linking(ed) *cognitive* or *mental realms of knowing*, a shift in focus seems possible, enabling a movement between these two seemingly distinct organising mentalities, therein, furthermore, being able to establish in greater detail and more conscious awareness of what is represented there. This perhaps coincides with Fletcher's (1979) proposition, as mentioned in Chapters Two and Three, where she states that meanings are represented at both *conscious* and *unconscious levels* by continuous correlating between *bodily* and *mental organizing mentalities*. Furthermore, because of this inherent link, existent in various forms since infancy, Fletcher claims that each mode triggers the other and can therein refer to the *deeper meaning and dynamics*, the *internalised object relations*,

by which the whole personality is organized. This thus primarily represents a *mode of discovery*, which may in itself allow for useful links and thus insight to emerge. When considering a *more direct transformative function*, however, as noted in the previous section, the notion of the movement from the *paranoid-schizoid representation* to that of the *depressive* comes to mind.

I thus return to Klein's notion of the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions* in the *psychogenesis of the self*, however, with particular emphasis on the degrees of *conflation* or *separation* between the dimensions of the *material* and the *immaterial*, of body and mind, in this development of consciousness. Thus, at the risk of oversimplification, in focusing particularly on the conflation of body and psyche in the *paranoid-schizoid*, it seems interesting to ponder the meaning of the possible *re-enactment* or *reconstruction* of internalised dynamics, not only in the sense that experience is always also known bodily, but rather with regards to the notion that in body being conflated with psyche at times, a non-verbal bodily representation may aid the process of differentiation more effectively than dwelling in the verbal mental representations. This seems apparent in the description of a '**knowing-by-doing**' through bodily enactment seeming to encourage increased **reflective knowing**. I am left with the notion that approaching this *paranoid-schizoid state* from the *bodily organising mentality* may indeed seem more informative, if only in that this *bodily knowing* is perhaps much more sophisticated than the mental representations of this particular state, being 'older' so to speak and therein more differentiated. By gaining increasing knowledge through the bodily logic, perhaps visible in the **unfolding symbolic (bodily) logic** of the sessions, it seems to enable the transformation and thus representation in a *mental capacity*, visible in the spontaneous cognitive linking.

This may be considered in view of Milner's (in Dalley *et al.*, 1987) contribution, as touched on in Chapter Three, namely that through the function of *bodily enactment*, this movement, gesture, visualisation, or sound becomes a tangible and explicit expression, a 'visible' if primitive *other*. This function thus brings to external reality, what is usually implicit and unknown, and even if the expression is only an extension of the self, it enables a form of dialogue or interaction, which encourages the further differentiation between *self* and *other*, and thus 'whole object' representation.

This previous paragraph addresses the notion of a *threshold* between the bodily and mental realms. When however, considering these mentalities as *parallel processes*, as suggested for instance by Ogden (1992), but also Ekstein and Wallerstein (in McWilliams, 1994) in Chapter Two, who claim that individuals draw on their early emotional and preverbal infantile knowledge in *all* the realms of making contact, therein both predating and transcending the formal, logical, interactions that are easily expressed in words, *enactment* becomes relevant in a completely new way.

At the risk of overstating what was already mentioned in the previous section, but seen from a slightly different perspective, if one concedes of the continuous functioning of a reasonably independent bodily logic, the experience of a *physical enactment* is likely to impact this logic more dramatically, especially when the action is determined by the very symbolic logic this bodily knowing put forth and thus responds on the same level of representation. This may in some way account for the **immediate sense of physiological change**, as by addressing the realms of the body, shifts in the manner in which experience is represented likened more to the ‘lived body’, may ripple into the ‘physiological body’, differentiated amongst others by Merleau-Ponty (1964) in Chapter Two. As was emphasised then, although this connection is complex in nature and beyond the scope of this paper, it remains noteworthy.

This complexity is echoed when considering how such physical and/or bodily representational transformations extend into the more enduring or seemingly stable mental representations, such as an understanding of self particularly in interaction with others. At this stage, it seems on a most superficial level to merely, once again, indicate the ultimately *indivisible nature of body and mind*, so that a rather specific process guided primarily by a *symbolic bodily logic*, although most definitely informed by *mental understanding and representation*, can result in more generalised **positive change in relating to self and others**.

However, important is that this seemed linked to the seeking of a **sense of completion**, supported by Fletcher’s (1979) contentions in Chapter Three, that the therapeutic process is not complete until the *object* and *relation to the object* are brought out in full consciousness. She states that for bodily expressive acts to be meaningful, the actions and impulses must be related to the object in a conscious manner, in that meaning, born of transformation, is derived from a *relationship*. She further claims that in this sense the ego’s capacity for

reality testing, attributable in Klein's view to reaching the *depressive position*, brings intellect, reason, and reflection together with experience, such that the objective (mental) and subjective (bodily) aspects of the self are integrated.

This being said, it is unavoidable to become aware of the contradicting notions of *transformation* and *representation* – considering the above-mentioned shift seemingly experienced most significantly after/through *physical enactment*, with for instance the just-mentioned assumed necessity of *conscious association* and possible *verbalisation*. On the one hand, this implies that productive change may be possible when only dealing with, for instance, the *bodily organising mentality*, and on the other, although such processes may contribute, experience is only adequately *transformed* or digested once tangible links are made across these *mentalities* and *therein*, *meaning* and *psychic truth* emerge. Due to a lack in this understanding, the participant's reflection on *his recollection of the process as a whole perhaps not being complete or in sequence*, as noted in stage five, could be indicative of either the former or the latter argument. Clearly, this demands further exploration and thus contributes to the heuristic value of this study. Suffice it to say, and thus in agreement with Eigen (1992, p. xv), “we simply do not know enough to declare either mental self or body self primary. We can see both as part of a larger reality, whether unknowable or not, but this does not add much except to profess our conviction or intimation that the divisible is ultimately indivisible [...]. Although many analysts acknowledge different contributions of mental and body self in a general way, this distinction is not usually used in a systematic clinical work. The evolution of body self, the evolution of mental self, and the evolution of their interplay is rarely charted”.

This *descriptive dialogical* study, with its particular focus on possible *bodily knowing*, was thus an attempt to further delineate this elusive interplay, attempting to trace the role of *mental* and *bodily representation* in relations to *processes of transformation and representation of raw sensory-emotional experience*. The degree to which this was possible also points to the extent to which *bodily-oriented expressive approaches* manage perhaps to deal more directly with this phenomenon, which thus motivates again for further research. This study was thus fraught with *recommendations*, as well as *limitations* that were pointed to throughout the discussion so far. However, along with the ensuing attempt to *evaluate* this study, the following section will also briefly present a concise version of these notions. The

following section thus concerns itself with *contributions, limitations* and *recommendations* regarding this study.

6.5 Contributions, Limitations, and Recommendations

This paper thus set out to explore the *body/mind relationship* as it pertains to the *transformation* and *representation* of raw sensory emotional experience throughout the development of the psyche. This was enabled by its *descriptive* focus on the *essence* of the *personal experiences* of a *bodily-oriented expressive* therapeutic session of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, which was then situated in a *dialogue* with some of the *theoretical underpinnings* regarding the *symbolising* and *representing* of emotional experience as understood mainly from an *object relational* perspective. Its purpose therein was *not* considered to be of a definitive nature, but instead, in its open and curious manner, it strove to enliven current *theoretical debates* and the contributions of their *practical implementation*. In view of this aim, the following section will thus provide an overview of its *contributions, limitations, and recommendations* in this regard.

With this study setting its focus on an *experiential level* by exploring the *experience* of a *bodily-oriented expressive approach*, but furthermore, in being intent on describing particularly the *prereflective structures* of this *phenomenon*, it seems that the employing of a phenomenological research approach in the form of the Duquesne Phenomenological Research Method proved to be an appropriate means for deriving this *general structure*. The explication of participants' written protocols, whilst bracketing as far as possible any pre-conceptions or psychological theory, allowed for the phenomenon to speak for itself, so that its extracted essence enabled meaningful *dialogue* with psychological theory. However, before considering the valuable contributions such descriptions of lived experience can provide a conceptual paradigm such as *object relations theory* with, it is important to be aware of some of the limitations implicit within such a research approach.

These include the very difficulty in the absence of a universal psychological language, such that when attempting, according to the chosen method, to transform the established meaning units into psychological language, the trustworthiness of the research resides primarily with the researcher. With this in mind, and in the spirit of ensuring the value of this study, I attempted to in various ways, as expanded on in Chapter Four, to exact dependability,

credibility, transferability, and confirmability. Nonetheless, limitations thus include the possibility of *researcher bias*, as alluded to above, along with difficulties regarding the *transferability* of the study, in that the *research sample* consisted of *voluntary participants* stemming from a *Philophonetics-Counselling* course, implying a specific community not only in terms of their demographics, but also in their reasonably informed understanding of this therapeutic process. This chapter expanded on these limitations, proposing that the participants seemed reasonably psychologically integrated, as was suggested by the manner in which they appeared able to *transform* their experiences, and creatively work with the various *representations* of the *transitional space*. A recommendation would thus be to expand such research to wider populations allowing for more diversity in culture and socio-economic classes, as well as exploring the essence of this phenomenon in the experience of individuals who exhibit more pathological psychic structures.

At this stage it seems important to reiterate, perhaps as a further limitation of this study, the intricacy related to the phenomenon of the *transformation* and *representation* of *sensory-emotional experience* being informed by, at least in this context, the structures and processes of a *bodily-oriented expressive* therapeutic approach, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling*. The complexity of this conflation, as discussed in Chapter Six, possibly impacts on the nature of the *general structure* of this phenomenon, which could possibly distort or at least prevent further differentiation, but may also, due to its very punctuation elicits elements of this phenomenon which were previously unattended. In this regard, the inquiry reflects meaningful *transferability value* by stimulating, through the description of its constituents and dynamic movements and the ensuing open-ended questions, renewed exploration in theoretical conceptual systems. This was elaborated on throughout the study.

An inquiry into such a *novel therapeutic mode*, albeit at this stage in a mere *descriptive* fashion, may thus prove beneficial in that it not only reveals the possibilities dormant within the *body's knowing* and its possible *reflective* and *representational capacity* and how these relate to the *transformation* and *representation* of *experience*, but also illustrates that if appropriately mobilized, perhaps enables *transformation* and *representation* in a manner that offers further options to *therapeutic practice* in its striving for *effectiveness*. The elements of the *general structure*, reflected in the findings of this study as presented in Chapter Five, thus provide a means and motivation to illuminate and further address previous limitations

experienced not only theoretically, but also in more conventional approaches to therapeutic practice, which may range from the more implicit notions of encouraging meaningful change, as this exploration was more intent on, but also to their very explicit, practical implications considering, for instance, the length and cost of therapy, or the difficulties around language and cultural difference.

Areas of further exploration thus seem vast, where this study was only able to focus on very limited aspects. The ensuing summary provides an assimilation of these aspects, leading to the final section, which is concerned with seemingly pivotal unsaturated thoughts that were not addressed throughout this study but could likely inform the nature and/or focus of future research endeavours.

6.6 Summary

This chapter concerned itself with situating the *general description* of the *general structure* of the phenomenon of this study, namely the *transformation* and *representation* of sensory-emotional experience, into a theoretical framework so as to attain some degree of understanding of this phenomenon through the experience of a *bodily-oriented expressive approach*, namely *Philophonetics-Counselling* – particularly in view of its *pre-reflective* structuring elements. In accordance with this, the *enduring frameworks* concerned themselves with the inseparability of this phenomenon from the assumptions of contexts such as the therapeutic space in which it is located or constitutive of. With this in mind, the situating in theory of the *stages* and *constituents*, as well as the inherent *dynamic movement* within this entangled description, seemed to explicate the essence of this phenomenon to some extent. For these purposes, the application of *object relations theory*, along with some contributions of *bodily-oriented* theorists, appeared appropriate.

From this explication then, it became apparent that the experience of *Philophonetics-Counselling*, and therein of a *bodily-oriented expressive approach*, seemed to resemble elements of *transformation* and *representation* as they are described in the above-mentioned theory. In this vein, the experience of the therapeutic process seemed to parallel Bion's notion of *preconceptions* evolving to *conceptions*, possibly enabled by the resemblance of *maternal holding* and Winnicott's notion of the *transitional space* throughout the therapeutic process. Similarly, participants appeared able to explore and rework the *representation of*

and *differentiation* between *self* and *other*. Differing complexity in representational function thus also seemed visible, ranging from *symbolic equation* to ‘*whole*’ *object representation*, and the manner in which these appeared to be transformed was suggestive of the notion that participants’ development had included *good enough mothering*, so as to enable them to differentiate the as yet undifferentiated, by being able to actively move in and out of, for instance, the *paranoid-schizoid* and *depressive positions*.

Furthermore, of particular interest became the notion that these varying degrees of complexity within the representations seemed distinguishable both in *mental realms*, more reminiscent of the *representational* or *categorical self*, and *bodily realms*, more in tune with the *experiential self*, as postulated by Bollas (1987) and Merleau-Ponty (1964). Noteworthy was the existence of a seemingly *mutually influential interplay*, although a margin of *distinction* and *independent functioning* could also be postulated.

This opened questions with regards to the direct link in this apparent interplay between these two otherwise seemingly distinct *organising mentalities* of *bodily* and *mental representations*, particularly with regards to the precise nature of this *parallel process*’ possible involvement or directing of *processes of transformation*, and therein the emergence of *consciousness* and *psychic truth*. This debate reaches further to notions concerned with the extent to which the *unconsciously known* needs to be transformed into *conscious material*, challenged perhaps in its seeming lack of specificity as observations of *physically enacted* change according to *bodily symbolic logic*, appeared in fact to elicit a *changed experience in self*, both *physiologically*, as well as *intra/interpersonally*. The nature of this study does not, however, allow for causative or explanatory statements such that these postulations merely add to the heuristic value in pointing to further needed research.

In the same vein, although not directly addressed or evaluated within this study, what remains interesting and in need of further inquiry, is the degree to which such *bodily-oriented expressive therapeutic approaches*, with contributions not only in their theoretical underpinnings but also in their understanding and use of structure, processes, and constituents in therapy, possibly enhance the *transformative* and *representational processes* seemingly fundamental to establishing therapeutic direction to address desired change in experience.

Thus, from the exploring of the *essential structure* of the phenomenon of *transformation* and *representation*, and the impact of *bodily knowing* in this regard, the discussion moved into a *brief reflection* on and *evaluation of* the study, particularly intent on its *limitations*, and *recommendations for* further research.

However, in conclusion, it remains elusive exactly *how* and *why* actual *transformation* and *representation* occurs, although through this type of study we are able to become more aware of its inherent constituents and complexity. Although we may lack specific knowledge, it may nonetheless have made us aware of the pivotal role that the *body's reflective capacity* seems to play in enabling *consciousness* or *psychic truth* to unfold. Thus, although we may be no closer to *defining* or *explaining* this phenomenon so fundamental to our *being* and *healing*, studies such as this one, in their uncovering and describing of crucial constituents and their interplay, as seen in the implications of the body's possible representational capacity, perhaps motivate the further direction we choose in continuing this pursuit.

In this vein, seemingly dated texts may become relevant in a renewed manner, which from this fresh understanding may provide further frameworks for thought and research. I am reminded of Nietzsche's (1978, p. 54) reflections regarding *bodily knowing* in his book, *Thus spoke Zarathustra*, in which he writes:

“‘I’, you say, and are proud of the word. But greater is that in which you do not wish to have faith – your body and its great reason: that does not say ‘I,’ but does ‘I’. What the sense [body] feels, what the spirit [mind] knows, never has its end in itself. But sense and spirit would persuade you that they are the end of all things: that is how vain they are. Instruments and toys are sense and spirit: behind them still lies the *self*. The *self* also seeks with eyes of the senses; it also listens with the ears of the spirit. Always the *self* listens and seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it is in control of the *ego* too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage - whose name is *self*. In your body he dwells; he is your body.”²⁰

What is of interest here is not only the seeming centrality of the *body's knowing*, but its link with his notion of the self through which Nietzsche addresses assumptions underlying perhaps even those of *transformation* and *representation*, namely the role of *consciousness* or

²⁰ Brackets and italics have been added in support of clarity.

knowing with regards to *being* and *healing*. These notions will be further delved into in the final section of this dissertation concerned with remaining unsaturated thoughts. Thus, in agreement with McWilliams (1994, p. 34), who states that “theory not only influences practice, it is also influenced by it”, I now wish to turn to the impact this experience of research has had on my theoretical understanding, and posit some integration and open-ended thoughts which I am left with.

6.7 Exploring the *neither flesh nor fleshless*

Although this dissertation is riddled with disparities and contradictions pertaining to the varying complexities associated with bodily and mental representations, which could therefore explain the choice of ambiguity in its title, it is the notion of their intriguing involvement with transformation and therein the emergence of consciousness that motivated its choice.

Throughout this paper I have attempted to emphasize various noteworthy contradictions in the realms of body and mind, or should I say mind/body, where something may appear differentiated and discrete in the one instance, just to seem collapsed or indistinguishable in the next. This is perhaps the most consistent theme throughout this paper, such that even the title reflects it: *neither flesh nor fleshless*, which on the one hand, may refer to something that is neither of the body (*flesh*), nor of the mind (*fleshless*), or, on the other hand, could refer to something that is neither body (*flesh*), nor entirely body-less (*fleshless*) – and in keeping with the theme, it became a matter of ‘both/and’. ‘It’ thus refers to my eventual understanding of psyche and its seemingly intimate relationship with consciousness understood partly conceived of as psychic truth or O.

In this sense, I am left with an understanding of psyche that is perhaps more in line with Nietzsche’s intimations of the self – a consciousness beyond mind and body. Throughout this study it appeared more and more that consciousness or knowing, my understanding of which is inspired by Bion, emerges from within an *interplay* between both bodily and mental knowing, and similarly between being in and knowing about O, to the extent that it appears, at least to me, to transcend them both.

Intimately connected to this interplay is a sense of time or immediacy, as opposed to a more removed timelessness. This notion is implicit throughout the discussion of this paper in, for instance, the difference between experience as bodily known and experience as mentally represented, or the changing nature of representations in the move from the paranoid-schizoid to the depressive position. I am however deliberately punctuating it at this stage, in that ensuing this exploration of transformation and representation through body and mind, it became increasingly relevant to my resultant understanding of being and healing in their relation to consciousness.

To illustrate, resembling once again the consistent theme of ambiguity, the relation of time to body and mind seems distinct at first, and yet, on closer perusal it appears to be more conflated. On the one hand, the body is associated with time, in that it seems to experience, always, the immediate, embodying in every moment everything that has ever come before. On the other hand, this can be construed as a form of timelessness or infinity, in that in an eternally present moment one cannot conceive of a timeline. The mind, in contrast, seems to exist apart from time whence reflecting on experience and thus removed from its immediacy, whilst being immersed in time in that it is aware of its fleeting nature, able to separate and conceive of a past and even a future.

Time and timelessness is relevant not only in that it seems a further example of the conflated and differentiated representation, and therein the manner in which an individual functions, but also in that the intimate interplay of the content of time, the life experience informing this process seems inherent the emergence of psychic truth. Being in time thus implies the specific context and unique characteristics of a person's life, more akin perhaps to physical (bodily) reality, whereas the being out of time, or rather somewhat removed from experience resembles notions of the mind. Clearly, this is an oversimplification in that both dimensions are assumed to exist simultaneously, both time and the timeless, as well as body and mind, such that this differentiation provides only an inkling of the complexity inherent in the nature of these differently organised mentalities, but particularly also of their interplay, and thus the notion of consciousness or psychic truth.

Such complexity is numbing, perhaps in that one cannot (as it implies) only think about it, but has to engage with it, such that Symington and Symington (1996, p. xi) similarly claim that

even “when we have demonstrated the pathway, we have not explained life itself. The pathway has an identity in virtue of a chain of causal connections, but these do not tell us about life itself. Life thrusts we know not where”. In this vein, this descriptive-dialogical study humbly attempts to contribute to the tracing of the pathway of transformations, representations, emergent consciousness and the unfolding of being, thus attempting to contribute to the emergent debates concerning health and healing practices.

A contribution of a different kind is reflected in the writing of T.S. Eliot, particularly in these poetic phrases from *Burnt Norton*, a section from the compilation *The Four Quartets*. These words have accompanied me on my journey of attempting to wrest form from chaos in dealing with this complex phenomenon throughout this dissertation; his artistic expression equally inspiring the title. Thus, in the spirit of the never-ending cycle of experience, its transformation and representation, and the ever-emerging consciousness, I thus quote:

*At the still point of the turning world. Neither flesh nor fleshless;
Neither from nor towards; at the still point, there the dance is,
But neither arrest nor movement. And do not call it fixity,
Where past and future are gathered. Neither movement from nor towards,
Neither ascent nor decline. Except for the point, the still point,
There would be no dance, and there is only the dance.
I can only say, there we have been: but I cannot say where.
And I cannot say, how long, for that is to place it in time.
The inner freedom from the practical desire,
The release from action and suffering, release from the inner
And the outer compulsion, yet surrounded
By a grace of sense, a white light still and moving,
Erhebung without motion, concentration
Without elimination, both a new world
And the old made explicit, understood
In the completion of its partial ecstasy,
The resolution of its partial horror.
Yet the enchainment of past and future
Woven in the weakness of the changing body,
Protects mankind from heaven and damnation*

*Which flesh cannot endure.
Time past and time future
Allow but a little consciousness.
To be conscious is not to be in time
But only in time can the moment in the rose-garden,
The moment in the arbour where the rain beat,
The moment in the draughty church at smokefall
Be remembered; involved with past and future.
Only through time time is conquered.*

(Eliot, 1974, p. 190)

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APPENDIX A

NAÏVE DESCRIPTIONS

Participant A

Experience that brought me to therapy:

I had an awareness of an emotional pain that was attached to my divorce of 7 years ago. It only came to the surface when I needed to speak about what's truly in my heart, or when people say complimentary things about me. I also found that I was pushing people away from me when they tried to get too close emotionally, but couldn't understand why I was doing this. I felt that I had released the person that I was married to but realized that there was a residue of unresolved pain which I didn't understand.

I wanted to address the pain as I realized that it was holding me back. I also wanted to work through it in order to transform it into a positive resource.

The therapy process and how I experienced the non-verbal techniques:

During the initial exploratory phase of the session (before the "wish"), the information that came to light was the following:

- At the time of the divorce my career was going better than my ex-husband's and he was looking for confirmation within himself.
- I filed for divorce. He had been seeing someone else for 6 months.
- I felt like I wanted to die inside. It was very embarrassing as we both worked in the same company.
- The marriage lasted for another 6 months before ending in divorce.
- Communication had decreased over time. There was lots of work related stress for us both during the last 2 years of the marriage.

- I was very involved with my work, enjoyed the intellectual challenge of building a company.
- We were married for 9 years and knew each other for 3 years before we got married.
- My psychologist said that I had grown to be too strong a person for my ex-husband and that he had a problem with my career.
- The nature of the wound was that I felt deeply embarrassed and rejected. The positive qualities that my ex-husband liked when we initially got married had become a problem for him. He ridiculed my self-development efforts and laughed at issues that were problematic for me.
- He appointed himself in a position of superiority and expected me to be a good wife and therefore to support his career primarily. He came from a traditional Afrikaans culture.
- Early years of the marriage involved much innocent love. Later on I realized that he supported my growth only until it threatened to surpass him.
- I felt that I gave him my heart during the early years of the marriage.

There were three betrayals:

- His love did not become respect and interest in my growing humanity.
 - My growth was seen as competition.
 - He broke the vows of marriage.
- The relationship was effectively a 12-year sacrifice. What kept me in the marriage was my love for him and the fact that I had given him my heart.
 - I experienced the divorce more intensely than two family deaths.

The session then started focusing on the nature of the wound and the facilitator explored whether the wounding was still happening. My most painful thoughts were when I needed to speak of myself, from my heart, which often resulted in tears. We established that there hadn't been any further wounds resulting from subsequent relationships.

There was something about how I opened up to my ex-husband that resulted in continued wounding. The wish made was for transforming the pain into growth. But the wound had to be addressed first as the pain was communicating the reality of the wound. Before the wound can become compassion it has to be treated as a wound otherwise it continues to cause damage. If the wound were physical, it would be fatal.

The wound was then described and expressed using non-verbal techniques of gesturing. The wound consisted of three long, thin, sharp steel rods going right through the heart. A cushion was used as the heart to show how the steel rods went through the heart. When the rods were touched pain was felt everywhere. A more articulated wish was then made about the wound: that the wound would heal and become something of the past so that the future could be allowed to happen.

It felt like the steel rods were being touched when people said good things about me. Then pain ricocheted throughout my body.

I gestured this with hands and arms shaking in all directions. The steel rods also resulted in it feeling dangerous for people to come close to me (emotionally). There was a lot invested in keeping people away from me so that the steel rods weren't touched.

We found a place inside the heart that was beyond pain: a small glass case. There was a small porcelain lady in the glass case with no room for expressive movement. I walked around to gesture how the porcelain figure walks. She only just managed to preserve her essence. She had to fit into the glass box. I did a full body gesture of being squashed into the glass box. There was blood and wounding all around the glass box due to the steel rods penetrating the heart.

How could the steel rods be removed in order for the wound to start healing? Only A²¹ could help to resolve this situation. It would take courage, trust, resilience, assurance and connectedness to remove the steel rods.

I felt that it would require nuclear heat to melt the rods down - a heat that would melt the rods but not destroy the heart - the kind of heat that comes from the sun.

I gestured standing on a chair and reaching up toward the sun to receive the heat and to

²¹ For purposes of confidentiality the participant's name was replaced by the letter A.

transmit it to the heart (cushion) with the steel rods on the floor. I made the sound of “mmm”.

We then turned to the one who stuck the steel rods into the heart. He betrayed himself first before he betrayed me. I felt compassion for him and, as before, I wished him well on his journey. I was no longer able to support his destiny in this life and so I asked his Angel to please release me. I received this releasing although it only applies to this life, not forever.

I said goodbye and allowed my ex-husband to fade away from the immediate surroundings of my heart.

We then turned to the steel rods that had been loosened by the heat of the sun. They were then removed one by one and I made a sound (“fff”) as they were pulled out of the heart. I held the space around the heart and applied warmth and the healing sound of “mmm” to the torn and wounded heart. The porcelain woman in the glass box was then invited to move into the heart but it didn’t feel safe enough to move beyond that. The rest of the group gathered around to form a reception committee for the woman that stepped out of the glass box. I asked for a heart filled with sunshine as a birthday gift from the group. The process came to an end with the group making the “mmm” sound and gesturing it with their hands.

The non-verbal techniques used throughout the session brought me closer to the experience by immersing me into the feeling. It helped me to explore feelings I didn’t fully understand. It also brought life and full expression to the feelings and the healing process.

Experience of change after the session:

Immediately after the session I felt a layer of something (energy?) move around my body. It was a very intense feeling. The next day I felt fragile and drained and would have preferred to stay in bed for the day, but it was not possible.

The significant change that I experienced following the session was more openness toward other people. There is also a greater sense of ease about talking about my innermost thoughts

and feelings.

This has been evidenced by greater participation in the Philophonetics group processing sessions and a more in-depth sharing of myself in other group situations. I have also found that I am more at ease with establishing friendships. As I am not currently in an intimate relationship I am not able to comment on the outcome of the healing in this area.

Participant B

Presenting Issue:

Extreme nervousness when feeling exposed, e.g. when playing a solo violin passage in a concert or when speaking about personal things such as what I stand for. Nervousness manifests as a pounding heart, muscular tension (seriously interfering with violin playing), shallow breathing, unsteady voice, and flushed face.

Process:

My recollection of the process may not be complete or in sequence (but a comparison of my recollections and the video could be informative too). I attach two fragments, which I can no longer situate properly.

Yehuda started by asking how I felt. I responded “extremely nervous” and stated that I thought that this would be the theme of the session. Yehuda asked me to describe it and I explained and showed how I felt it in my entire chest region, but most intensely in the solar plexus. I explained at some length what I knew about it – how it came in the moments that mattered most to me, when I wanted to / needed to give of myself, and how in these moments an involuntary response sabotaged me. Yehuda asked if this problem affected my relationships with women and I said very much so.

I formulated my wish as follows: I wish to have the inner freedom to be fully present when it matters most.

Yehuda asked for a specific recent example and I chose that of playing at an important function at Wits University where numerous dignitaries including Nelson Mandela were present. I explained how I was fine until my moment, my brief solo in Händel’s Water Music, came. I showed how my body (esp. my arms) instantly became so tense I could barely

coordinate my movements, having to improvise with movement from the shoulder joint instead of the locked elbow to keep the violin bow moving. I explained how this disappeared the moment the solo was over. The feeling of this moment was reconstructed in great detail by physically acting it out and visualizing the scene.

Yehuda then asked me to show how I felt inside during this moment. I followed my impulse to hide away by bending over, covering my head, then turning and dashing behind the curtain. What was interesting here was that what started as not wanting to see, just to cover myself protectively, became a strong impulse to flee, which in the actual context of the session (as opposed to the concert performance) I could.

Behind the curtain I was instantly free from the anxiety and tightness I had felt just before. I could breathe freely and deeply and felt tension evaporating instantly. I felt light-hearted, even cocky, and spoke to Yehuda from this situation.

I walked around in the space behind the curtain swinging my arms, breathing deeply, looking around and just generally enjoying the sudden total escape from an intolerable situation.

Yehuda proceeded to interview me while I was behind the curtain. How did I feel about what was happening on stage? How much of me was even there? I said 5%. Yehuda asked me how the person on the stage felt, how things were going. He encouraged me to look through the curtain to see. The poor guy on the stage wasn't doing too well on his 5% and when Yehuda asked if I had any suggestions I said that the rest of me should join me behind the curtain. "Who will play then?", he asked. "Get somebody else" was my cheerful response. "But nobody else can play your music", he said. He had a point.

He enquired about my state behind the curtain, esp. with regard to being able to make music, and I said it was fine – I was relaxed, present, and felt ease and coordination. Could I sing the piece? No, I said, that's why you have a violin. It's true I could never sing the particular passage I had in mind, but I also didn't want to sing as it would have re-exposed me and destroyed the safe place I was in.

Yehuda asked me to re-look at the performance situation by peeking through the curtain. I responded that I was fine to be back on my chair next to his and came out and sat down again.

We now proceeded to explore the force that was attacking me during the performance. Yehuda encouraged me to act it out on a pillow. In our group work one or two days prior to this I had seen identical behaviour typified as the “Inverted Guardian” and had immediately known that this was also my situation. Still, my taking the cushion, pushing in all its protruding corners and squeezing it into a tiny bundle while going into a crouching, foetal position around it, happened completely automatically. I just followed my body into the gesture.

Yehuda asked me to intensify it and I did, squeezing the pillow with all my might. He got me to let go (letting go seemed like a reflex response to his command, I couldn't tell if I had been waiting for his word to let go or whether his word just made me let go).

“Look at the pillow – that's what you do to yourself”. The squashed, crumpled pillow was indeed a good metaphor for the part of me receiving this treatment.

He then asked me to go back into the protective gesture and once again to feel it fully. While I was in there he asked me whether I could see the danger. I couldn't, as I sensed it was behind me. As I stayed there and he probed more I began to have a sense of a black empty space behind me coming up to engulf me – a huge boundless void. The fear started to become more concrete – the void was threatening to engulf and devour me.

At his request I came out of this. I'm not quite sure of the order of events here, but we did two things:

- established who was doing the protecting and who was being protected
- started exploring the nature of the attack by the void

The protector felt like he was six. I became the protected, curled up in the tightest possible position, face down on my knees, and realized the protected was about three.

Yehuda asked me to identify the attacker. It was clearly my mother. I explained how I had been a very gifted, expressive, precocious child. And how I had felt that my mom needed me to shine on her behalf. How her actions said to me “what you have done is very nice; it is mine. You are mine.” At Yehuda’s request I acted this out in sound and gesture, becoming a rapacious beast wanting to devour the cushion representing the 3 year-old. “Look at my son” was her game.

At this point Yehuda reminded the audience of the confidentiality of the session. We now had a clear picture of the beast, but clearly the 6 year-old’s response was not effective as it choked the life out of me and did nothing to counter the threat.

We walked into the far corner of the room, far away from the beast, to look at it. How do I feel about it? I said I felt robbed; that what was mine had been taken away. I saw my mom’s emptiness and need and felt compassion towards her. I also felt a little guilty about portraying her as a cannibalistic monster, but that feeling left me as I realized I was being both truthful and compassionate. But the inescapable conclusion was that the monster needed to be fought and defeated.

In preparing to battle the monster several steps were necessary. First, Yehuda used me as a proxy to negotiate with the 6 year-old guardian to get permission to let me fight the monster. I said that the 6 year-old didn’t trust my ability, but Yehuda negotiated with him for a chance. “Knock yourself out” was the sceptical response. Yehuda then directed me to negotiate with the 3 year-old through the 6 year-old. “Go for it” was the response.

Yehuda then said that we would do a whole sequence: the 3-year old would sing, the monster would come and I would slay it. For this purpose we had invented a nice big sword (which I had been holding all through the negotiations). He wanted me to do all this by myself.

At first the 3 year-old wouldn’t budge or respond (i.e. sing). Yehuda then reminded me of the music I loved, and the 3 year-old got up and felt it. I sensed this and I sensed the monster coming to attack; the 6 year-old watched. As the monster came I felt a surge of power in my chest and arms, and with an explosive “GAHHH” sound and a slaying gesture I struck it on

the head. Right the first time with full power, enough to kill it. But I felt unfulfilled and acted it out twice more, until my defensive energy was fully expended and the beast totally annihilated. I felt a vibrant sense of release.

Yehuda asked about the 6 year-old. He was happy, relieved and impressed. The 3 year-old? He loved it, grinning from ear to ear and clapping his hands excitedly. And I felt a strong relief, a resolution, and faith in my ability to protect myself, safe in the knowledge that the monster was slain. My breathing was free, my voice could resonate in my chest, and an inner tension had gone.

Fragment: Taking my heart back from Mom

Yehuda talked about the power I had given her when I came to earth – the power of my essence. How she had taken it away from me and kept it, and how I needed to take it back. He asked me to feel the most essential part of me and to act out entrusting it to her. I cupped my hands on my heart and symbolically gave it to her. Then he instructed me to take it back. At first I couldn't as I resisted hurting her feelings. Yehuda said it was mine to take back and encouraged me to do so. I then took it back from her and reunited it with myself.

I still have unresolved hurt and anger about this – definitely a point for future reference.

Fragment: Leaving the body, returning

When we were talking about how 95% of me was absent, Yehuda asked where I was in these moments. I had earlier that week repeatedly imagined a glimpse of myself as a young child outside the window looking in. For a time, wherever I looked, there I was the child, smiling happily outside in its safe world. We talked about the Wits Great Hall again and here there were no windows (just as in the counselling session room), and I could clearly imagine myself floating above the proceedings, untouched by what was going on. And in the present I could also imagine myself floating directly above, near the ceiling.

Yehuda suggested I physically go there to be with myself. I got a table, moved it to the right

spot and climbed up. Looking at the violinist from there seemed like looking at an empty shell, like a knight's armour minus the knight. But holding my violin up there was fine. This I brought down with me.

This episode seems a little unclear to me; like the taking my heart back episode, it seems like unfinished business.

Where I am after the session:

It's a day later and already the detailed memory is fading. The key outcome is not fading though – the monster is slain, I am steering clear of the black hole. The new freedom in my chest is still there. This will be tested: in my next performance, next time I am in an intimate situation, next time I see Mom. I feel slightly nervous about it. But I've already experienced my newfound ability to defend myself against (well-meaning) pressure to now "shine". I will do so in my own time, in my own way.

Participant C

Cutting Off

Presenting Issue:

I feel as if I am not able to take control over my own life. I cannot make decisions because I have no 'substance' on which to found them. I am not fully present. I am indecisive and fearful, not fully in touch with what I need to do or be, or how to go about making changes. It seems as if there is a 'veil' separating me from myself.

Process:

I felt fully in control of my life, my will, my aims and ideals until the age of 15, going on 16. At this age I had an experience, which seemed to change me and the course of my life. It was as if I cut off from myself at that moment, and have never recovered. It was an incident in which my father expressed disapproval regarding a boyfriend in a fairly severe way. It was not violent or abusive, just definite and involved the boyfriend and all other friends having to leave our home where they were visiting. It was probably quite a justifiable parental action, given the circumstances, but in that moment, I shut down.

When I recall the incident to mind, acutely reliving the moment, I look around my body inwardly to find out where it hurts and what is happening. I find my heart feels tightly squeezed as in a shiny metal sheath, which is cold, and steel plated. I gesture the feeling with cupped hands in front of the heart region, pressing in together tightly. I breathe into the gesture and through the breath I find a sound that suits what I am experiencing. I feel as if all the organic material of my body slides off and is cast aside to rot. On getting out of the subjective experience, and 'beholding', I see that what is left of me is a ghost of a person with arms 'splinted' to the sides, crystal-like, brittle, a hollow shell, rigidly going about the world.

The Wish:

C: To know why this happened to me, what the reason for this could have been.

Y: This is a karmic question and could take a lifetime of research. Make another wish.

C: I wish to understand what happened to me.

Y: Go into the incident in life. Describe the circumstances.

C: I was with some friends in a cottage behind the house on my parent's farm. I was lying on top of a bed in the arms of my boyfriend who was hugging my back. I could feel the warmth and life in his body, the heartbeat, the magic, excitement and comfort of being so close to someone.

Y: What sort of a girl are we talking about?

C: Fifteen years old, brave, a little rebellious, excellent at sports and academics, in complete control of her life at school, always spoke up against unfairness, determined, respectful, and inquisitive with a love of learning. Happy most of the time. Self-assured in the knowledge that everything is achievable if the mind and will are applied. An avid reader.

Y: What happened? Go into the moment.

C: As we were lying there, talking and laughing, my father walked into the room. I can't really remember what happened then, except that he told everyone to leave, he may have shouted. My friends all left. I don't remember if anyone said anything or not.

Y: Lie down and remember what you felt. I won't look. It is an intimate moment.

C: As my father entered the room and uttered whatever he uttered, it felt like the end of the world. I imploded, sucked myself into myself. It was as though life just disappeared inwardly. I was shocked and did not move from my position on the bed. Felt I never wanted to move again. I could hear buzzing, numbness, cold. It felt as though my heart stopped beating, my lungs stopped breathing. I didn't cry, just lay there rigid till long after dark, frozen. I felt as though my voice was gone forever.

Y: Do the lying down before the moment.

C: (Could lie down but braced against the moment. Could not go into the moment before the incident, when the girl is still alive.) I am not allowed to be there. I am bracing myself against the moment.

Y: What are you bracing yourself against?

C: A wind like a cold fire, that just sweeps everything away. Sounds: “Swish Whoosh”
Y: Do the sounds, and gesture this monster.
C: (Does this) I have no bad feelings towards this ‘monster’.
Y: Look at what is left. Describe it.
C: A stick. A mineralised shell, not burned, just crystallized, with all the life gone.
Y: Where to?
C: Away, out the door, with the friends, out the windows, everywhere.
Y: Look again. Is there any left behind?
C: Yes, there is some left in the heart.
Y: Fetch it.
C: (Crouches down and picks up the heart enclosed in a steel casing) What do I do with it?
Y: Put it back where it belongs.
C: (Has curious thoughts about this: does she swallow it, inhale it, and apply it to her breast? She applies it to her breast/heart area. This is painful and the rib cage feels too tight and stiff.) The girl is not dead.
Y: Where is she in your body?
C: Sitting, lying on the upper surface of the diaphragm. She is very thin and flat.
Y: What must you do now?
C: Must get more of her back from outside, from friends perhaps. I must nurture her inside.
Y: You must get to be able to be the girl before the moment. The blossoming, flowering young woman. You must exercise and heal the cut, the wound.

Remaining Question:

How do I do this? This is the next growing point: to find, and get to be, the girl before the cut-off moment.

Summary Picture:

This picture is summarized in the conversation following the end of the process. We look back at all the characters and pictures that emerged, pulling them into the broader life context. We see the potential meeting point of past and future. The girl child is just arriving

at the threshold of her astrality. The peach blossom pink, the sensuousness, the opening up, the membranous development, the fluids, the blossoming; all this is approaching the etheric identity of the maturing child, accompanied by the simultaneous descent of the ego consciousness which takes place around this time of adolescence. There is an abrupt cut off! The two are unable to meet and connect. They are left in limbo as the husk, the shell that continues into adulthood.

Work to be done:

Meditations on flowers in the light of the above (as metaphor of the blossoming of the human being). Acknowledging the wound. Nurturing and tending the young woman within, allowing her to become. Constant awareness of this growing, healing process.

Retrospective:

I am more tolerant, understanding and compassionate towards myself. This helps in every aspect of my life. I don't try to be what I am not, outwardly. Am more able to express what I am. The insights give me 'tools' and self-knowledge to work with in life situations. Since having undergone this process, I have experienced many others.

The more this happens, the more I realize that each is a gateway to the next, and that without the one, the following one would most probably never have been able to take place. They are a series of keys to inner chambers, each aiding in the unlocking of the next. Each throwing progressively more light into the dark recesses that limit my self-knowing, and self-determination.

APPENDIX B

NATURAL AND TRANSFORMED MEANING UNITS

Participant A

Natural Meaning Units	Transformed Meaning Units
<p>1. <i>Experience that brought A to therapy:</i></p> <p>A had an awareness of an emotional pain that was attached to her divorce of 7 years ago. It only came to the surface when A needed to speak about what's truly in her heart, or when people said complimentary things about her. A also found that she was pushing people away from her when they tried to get too close emotionally, but couldn't understand why she was doing this. A felt that she had released the person that she had been married to but realized that there was a residue of unresolved pain, which A didn't understand. A wanted to address the pain as she realized that it was holding her back. A also wanted to work through it in order to transform it into a positive resource.</p>	<p>1. A presented with an awareness of a continual emotional pain she associated with her previous relationship. A elaborated on contexts in which she became most aware of it, and how she would attempt to avoid experiencing the pain. A realized the matter was unresolved and impeding her personal development.</p>
<p>2. <i>The therapy process and how A experienced the non-verbal techniques:</i></p> <p>During the initial exploratory phase of the session (before the "wish"), the information that came to light was the following:</p> <p>At the time of the divorce A's career was</p>	<p>2. A verbally provided background information to her cognitive understanding of the succession of events, circumstances, and experiences that had led to her developing this emotional pain, which she then symbolized, expressing the associated deep feelings of</p>

going better than her ex-husband's and he was looking for confirmation within himself.

the associated deep feelings of embarrassment and rejection.

A filed for divorce. He had been seeing someone else for 6 months.

A felt like she wanted to die inside. It was very embarrassing as they both worked in the same company.

The marriage lasted for another 6 months before ending in divorce.

Communication had decreased over time. There was lots of work related stress for them both during the last 2 years of the marriage.

A was very involved with her work, enjoyed the intellectual challenge of building a company.

They were married for 9 years and knew each other for 3 years before they got married.

A's psychologist said that A had grown to be too strong a person for her ex-husband and that he had a problem with A's career.

The nature of the wound was that A felt deeply embarrassed and rejected. The positive qualities that A's ex-husband liked when they initially got married had become a problem for him. He ridiculed A's self-development efforts and laughed at issues

that were problematic for A.

He appointed himself in a position of superiority and expected A be a good wife and therefore to support his career primarily. He came from a traditional Afrikaans culture.

Early years of the marriage involved much innocent love. Later on A realized that he supported her growth only until it threatened to surpass him.

A felt that she gave him her heart during the early years of the marriage.

There were three betrayals: (1) His love did not become respect and interest in A's growing humanity; (2) A's growth was seen as competition; (3) He broke the vows of marriage.

The relationship was effectively a 12-year sacrifice. What kept A in the marriage was her love for him and the fact that A had given him her heart. A experienced the divorce more intensely than two family deaths.

3. The session then started focusing on the nature of the wound and the facilitator explored whether the wounding was still happening. A's most painful thoughts were when she needed to speak of herself, from her heart, which often resulted in tears. They established that there hadn't been any
3. A explored the symbol in more depth so as to gain increased clarity and specificity regarding its qualities.

further wounds resulting from subsequent relationships. There was something about how A opened up to her ex-husband that resulted in continued wounding.

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|---|--|
| <p>4. The wish made was for transforming the pain into growth.</p> | <p>4. A set an intent of transforming the pain in order to further her growth.</p> |
| <p>5. But the wound had to be addressed first as the pain was communicating the reality of the wound. Before the wound can become compassion it has to be treated as a wound otherwise it continues to cause damage. If the wound were physical, it would be fatal.</p> | <p>5. A realized that the pain she was experiencing was differentiated from but associated with her symbol. She further understood that she could not experience compassion until she addressed the significance of the presence of this symbol and attempted to transform it.</p> |
| <p>6. The wound was then described and expressed using non-verbal techniques of gesturing.</p> | <p>6. A then expressed the nature of this symbol in a bodily enactment of gesturing.</p> |
| <p>7. The wound consisted of three long, thin, sharp steel rods going right through the heart.</p> | <p>7. A described a more elaborate visual image of this symbol, further locating it in her body.</p> |
| <p>8. A cushion was used as the heart to show how the steel rods went through the heart.</p> | <p>8. A physically enacted the nature of this visual image.</p> |
| <p>9. When the rods were touched pain was felt everywhere.</p> | <p>9. In this enactment A gained an enhanced awareness of the pain she was experiencing.</p> |
| <p>10. A more articulated wish was then made about the wound: that the wound would heal and become something of the past so that the future could be allowed to happen.</p> | <p>10. A defined her intent more specifically in terms of changing the nature of the symbol.</p> |
| <p>11. It felt like the steel rods were being touched</p> | <p>11. A cognitively linked her expanded image</p> |

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- when people said good things about A. Then pain ricocheted throughout her body.
12. A gestured this with hands and arms shaking in all directions.
13. The steel rods also resulted in it feeling dangerous for people to come close to her (emotionally). There was a lot invested in keeping people away from her so that the steel rods weren't touched.
14. They found a place inside the heart that was beyond pain: a small glass case. There was a small porcelain lady in the glass case with no room for expressive movement.
15. A walked around to gesture how the porcelain figure walks.
16. She only just managed to preserve her essence. She had to fit into the glass box.
17. A did a full body gesture of being squashed into the glass box.
18. There was blood and wounding all around the glass box due to the steel rods penetrating the heart.
19. How could the steel rods be removed in order for the wound to start healing? Only A could help to resolve this situation.
- of the symbol with daily life experience in interpersonal relations.
12. A enacted this bodily, gesturing her experience.
13. A further linked the symbolic image to interpersonal situations, and gained increased understanding into the intensity of her self-protective efforts.
14. A explored the identified location in her body, and elaborated her bodily-felt awareness in a further symbol. A's experience of this symbol expanded and was associated with the ability to express herself.
15. A identified with this symbol and enacted it in bodily gesture and movement.
16. A gained increasing knowledge regarding this symbol and its conditions, becoming aware of associated affects of distress.
17. A identified and bodily enacted this increased awareness regarding the condition of this symbol.
18. A gained further detail in visual image, uniting both symbols.
19. A took responsibility for the united symbol's needed transformation, following its inherent logic.

20. It would take courage, trust, resilience, assurance and connectedness to remove the steel rods. A felt that it would require nuclear heat to melt the rods down - a heat that would melt the rods but not destroy the heart - the kind of heat that comes from the sun.
21. A gestured standing on a chair and reaching up toward to the sun to receive the heat and to transmit it to the heart (cushion) with the steel rods on the floor. A made the sound of “mmm”.
22. They then turned to the one who stuck the steel rods into the heart. He betrayed himself first before he betrayed A. A felt compassion for him and, as before, A wished him well on his journey. A was no longer able to support his destiny in this life and so A asked his Angel to please release her. A received this releasing although it only applies to this life, not forever. A said goodbye and allowed her ex-husband to fade away from the immediate surroundings of her heart.
23. They then turned to the steel rods that had been loosened by the heat of the sun. They were then removed one by one and A made a sound (“fff”) as they were pulled out of the heart.
24. A held the space around the heart and
20. A became aware of the nurturing and supportive qualities she would need to be in touch with, in order to attempt this. A further expressed in symbolic logic what this specifically described process of transformation would require.
21. A identified with this process and proceeded to bodily enact it in gesture, movement, visualization, and sound.
22. A then turned her attention to the relationship she had presented with, which she understood to have created her experience of pain. A cognitively reflected on her understanding and became aware of feeling compassion. A performed a ritual of release and was able to fully digest her experience.
23. A returned to the symbol and its incomplete transformative process. She then physically continued its differentiating enactment in movement, gesture, and sound.
24. A continued this process with an

- applied warmth and the healing sound of “mmm” to the torn and wounded heart.
- enactment of nurturing and healing.
25. The porcelain woman in the glass box was then invited to move into the heart but it didn't feel safe enough to move beyond that.
25. In the logic of the symbol an integrative enactment was encouraged, which A experienced as unsafe.
26. The rest of the group gathered around to form a reception committee for the woman that stepped out of the glass box. A asked for a heart filled with sunshine as a birthday gift from the group. The process came to an end with the group making the “mmm” sound and gesturing it with their hands.
26. In the holding space of the group and still within the logic of the symbol, A was able to continue this process of integration as well as receive the nurturance provided by the group.
27. The non-verbal techniques used throughout the session brought A closer to the experience by immersing herself into the feeling. It helped A to explore feelings she didn't fully understand. It also brought life and full expression to the feelings and the healing process.
27. A expressed that the non-verbal bodily enactments enabled her to access experience more directly. This helped A explore feelings she did not fully understand cognitively. It also enhanced her experience of the healing process.
28. *Experience of change after the session:* Immediately after the session A felt a layer of something (energy?) move around her body. It was a very intense feeling.
28. Immediately after the session, A had an intense bodily-felt sense of a physiological change her body.
29. The next day A felt fragile and drained and would have preferred to stay in bed for the day, but it was not possible.
29. A felt fragile and drained the next day and expressed a need for nurturing and protection.
30. The significant change that A experienced following the session was more openness toward other people. There is also a greater
30. Following the session, A experienced a significant change in relating to others. A experienced herself as more open, and

sense of ease about talking about her innermost thoughts and feelings. This has been evidenced by greater participation in the Philophonetics group processing sessions and a more in-depth sharing of herself in other group situations. A has also found that she is more at ease with establishing friendships. As A is not currently in an intimate relationship she is not able to comment on the outcome of the healing in this area.

trusting in personal interaction, even in a group context, but is not yet able to comment on an intimate relationship level, as she is not currently involved in such a manner.

Participant B

Natural Meaning Units	Transformed Meaning Units
<p>1. <i>Presenting Issue</i> – Extreme nervousness when feeling exposed, e.g. when playing a solo violin passage in a concert or when speaking about personal things such as what B stands for. Nervousness manifests as a pounding heart, muscular tension (seriously interfering with violin playing), shallow breathing, unsteady voice, and flushed face.</p>	<p>1. B presented with an issue of experiencing extreme nervousness when feeling exposed in performance situations and verbally described the correlating bodily-felt sensations of physiological arousal and the manner in which this interferes with his performance.</p>
<p>2. <i>Process</i> – B’s recollection of the process may not be complete or in sequence (but a comparison of his recollections and the video could be informative too). B attaches two fragments, which he can no longer situate properly.</p>	<p>2. B claimed his recollection of the therapeutic process may not be complete or in sequence, and attached two fragments he can no longer place.</p>
<p>3. Yehuda started by asking how B felt. B responded “extremely nervous” and stated that he thought that this would be the theme of the session. Yehuda asked B to describe it and B explained and showed how he felt it in his entire chest region, but most intensely in the solar plexus.</p>	<p>3. B first explained verbally, and then also enacted in movement and gesture, expressing how and where in his body he experiences this nervousness, including that of the current moment.</p>

4. B explained at some length what he knew about it – how it came in the moments that mattered most to him, when B wanted to / needed to give of himself, and how in these moments an involuntary response sabotaged him. Yehuda asked if this problem affected his relationships with women and B said very much so.
5. B formulated his wish as follows: B wishes to have the inner freedom to be fully present when it matters most.
6. Yehuda asked for a specific recent example and B chose that of playing at an important function at Wits University where numerous dignitaries including Nelson Mandela were present. B explained how he was fine until his moment; his brief solo in Händel's Water Music came. B showed how his body (esp. his arms) instantly became so tense B could barely coordinate his movements, having to improvise with movement from the shoulder joint instead of the locked elbow to keep the violin bow moving. B explained how this disappeared the moment the solo was over.
4. B continued to further verbally explain his cognitive understanding of this nervousness within the contexts it occurs, as well as its workings as an involuntary response that sabotages his intentions.
5. B wishes to be free to function as an integrated individual when it matters most.
6. B chose a specific recent incident to closely relate the manner in which this nervous affect manifests. B identified with the moment and therein enacted the sequence, showing how it impacts the movement of his body's expression during performance.

7. The feeling of this moment was reconstructed in great detail by physically acting it out and visualizing the scene.
 8. Yehuda then asked B to show how he felt inside during this moment. B followed his impulse to hide away by bending over, covering his head, then turning and dashing behind the curtain
 9. What was interesting here was that what started as not wanting to see, just to cover himself protectively, became a strong impulse to flee, which in the actual context of the session (as opposed to the concert performance) B could.
 10. Behind the curtain B was instantly free from the anxiety and tightness B had felt just before. B could breathe freely and deeply and felt tension evaporating instantly. B felt light-hearted, even cocky, and spoke to Yehuda from this situation. B walked around in the space behind the curtain swinging his arms, breathing deeply, looking around and just generally enjoying the sudden total escape from
7. B expressed that the full identification through bodily re-enactment (with movement and visualization) enabled the experience of this moment to be reconstructed in great detail.
 8. On focusing on the bodily-felt sense during the moment of performance, B became aware of a defensive response of wanting to hide away and eventually run away, which he acted out physically.
 9. B became aware of how the bodily-felt protective impulse or defences, once focused on in their enactment, then became further differentiated and expressed more fully. B became aware of how the acting out of this impulse is repressed in actual performance situations.
 10. Having followed the bodily-felt impulse, B experienced an altered physiological state. B felt more at ease and confident in having externalised and expressed, through the enactment, the body's protective impulse of defence against the intolerable situation.

an intolerable situation.

11. Yehuda proceeded to interview B while he was behind the curtain. How did B feel about what was happening on stage? How much of him was even there? B said 5%. Yehuda asked him how the person on the stage felt, how things were going. Yehuda encouraged B to look through the curtain to see.
 12. The poor guy on the stage wasn't doing too well on his 5% and when Yehuda asked if B had any suggestions B said that the rest of him should join him behind the curtain. "Who will play then?", Yehuda asked. "Get somebody else" was B's cheerful response. "But nobody else can play your music", Yehuda said. B claimed Yehuda had a point.
 13. Yehuda enquired about B's state behind the curtain, esp. with regard to being able to make music, and B said it was fine – B was relaxed, present, and felt ease and coordination. Could B sing the piece? No, B said, that's why you have a violin. It's true B could never sing the particular passage he had in mind, but b also didn't want to sing as it would have re-exposed him and destroyed the safe
11. In this defended state, B mentally reflected once more on the specific performance situation, finding himself to be dissociated, having separated an observing part of his self from the other needing to perform in the situation.
 12. In shifting his focus to the part that needed to perform, B realized that his enacted defence did not serve the performing part very well. B further realized that a more thorough enactment of the above defence would not enable him to fully express himself through music.
 13. B explored his response, in both body and mind, to performance from the defended position, the safe place, and found himself feeling capable.

place he was in.

14. Yehuda asked B to re-look at the performance situation by peeking through the curtain. B responded that he was fine to be back on his chair next to Yehuda and came out and sat down again.
15. They now proceeded to explore the force that was attacking B during the performance. Yehuda encouraged B to act it out on a pillow. In their group work one or two days prior to this B had seen identical behaviour typified as the “Inverted Guardian” and had immediately known that this was also his situation.
16. Still, B’s taking the cushion, pushing in all its protruding corners and squeezing it into a tiny bundle while going into a crouching, foetal position around it, happened completely automatically. B just followed his body into the gesture.
17. Yehuda asked B to intensify it and B did, squeezing the pillow with all his might. Yehuda got B to let go (letting go seemed like a reflex response to Yehuda’s command, B couldn’t tell if he had been waiting for Yehuda’s word to let go or whether Yehuda’s word just made him let go).
14. B moved from the enacting experiential context back to the reflective mental context.
15. B entered the bodily context of the performance situation again, so as to explore more closely what he experienced as attacking and was thus defending against in bodily expressive realities.
16. B experienced his bodily protective response of covering or hiding a part of himself as occurring automatically, so that he felt guided by the body’s intentions.
17. B intensified the bodily action, feeling a little uncertain as to what caused him to come out of it.

18. “Look at the pillow – that’s what you do to yourself”. The squashed, crumpled pillow was indeed a good metaphor for the part of B receiving this treatment.
19. Yehuda then asked B to go back into the protective gesture and once again to feel it fully. While B was in there Yehuda asked B whether he could see the danger. B couldn’t, as he sensed it was behind him.
20. As B stayed there and he probed more B began to have a sense of a black empty space behind him coming up to engulf him – a huge boundless void. The fear started to become more concrete – the void was threatening to engulf and devour B.
21. At Yehuda’s request B came out of this. B’s not quite sure of the order of events here, but they did two things:

Established who was doing the protecting and who was being protected;

Started exploring the nature of the attack by the void.
22. The protector felt like he was six. B became the protected, curled up in the tightest possible position, face down
18. B then mentally reviewed the bodily enactment and found that it was a good expression of his experience.
19. B then re-entered the bodily protective enactment, and sensed a danger behind him.
20. B remained in this state, and began to differentiate the sense of danger more clearly, adding the visual modality to the gesture and movement. B therein became more aware of the associated affect as a fear of being engulfed or devoured.
21. B came out of the bodily enactment and claims to be uncertain of the order of the ensuing explorative processes of the protective and attacking elements.
22. B felt a young part of his self to be protecting an even younger part of his self.

on his knees, and realized the protected was about three.

23. Yehuda asked B to identify the attacker. It was clearly B's mother. B explained how he had been a very gifted, expressive, precocious child. And how B had felt that his mom needed him to shine on her behalf. How her actions said to him "what you have done is very nice; it is mine. You are mine."
24. At Yehuda's request B acted this out in sound and gesture, becoming a rapacious beast wanting to devour the cushion representing the 3 year-old.
25. "Look at my son" was her game.
26. At this point Yehuda reminded the audience of the confidentiality of the session. They now had a clear picture of the beast, but clearly the 6 year-old's response was not effective as it choked the life out of B and did nothing to counter the threat.
27. They walked into the far corner of the room, far away from the beast, to look at it. How does B feel about it? B said he felt robbed; that what was his had been taken away. B saw his mom's
23. B felt the attacker to be his impinging mother and elaborated verbally on his understanding thereof.
24. B then enacted his visualized experience of her symbolized impingement on his younger dissociated part.
25. B then associated this with his mental understanding thereof.
26. In the safety of assured confidentiality, B gained a clear, and integrated understanding of the presenting issue as it resides on a bodily-known level. Furthermore, B realized the debilitating effects of the body's attempts at defence and its ineffectiveness when faced with this specific dilemma.
27. B gained distance from the bodily enactment, no longer being directly identified and thus experiencing the direct bodily response, and could then mentally reflect on the re-enacted

emptiness and need and felt experience.
compassion towards her.

B considered both his feelings and cognitive understanding thereof, as well as showed an awareness for his mother's emotional state and possible motivation for her behaviour and attitude.

- 28.** B also felt a little guilty about portraying her as a cannibalistic monster, but that feeling left him as B realized he was being both truthful and compassionate.
- 28.** B felt guilty due to the bodily representation and symbolization of his experience of his mother, but this feeling shifted as he sensed compassion for her, whilst still being able to allow himself to identify and connect with the reality of his feelings.
- 29.** But the inescapable conclusion was that the monster needed to be fought and defeated.
- 29.** B concluded that the bodily-known symbolization needed to be completed, and the experience thus altered.
- 30.** In preparing to battle the monster several steps were necessary. First, Yehuda used B as a proxy to negotiate with the 6 year-old guardian to get permission to let B fight the monster. B said that the 6 year-old didn't trust B's ability, but Yehuda negotiated with him for a chance. "Knock yourself out" was the sceptical response. Yehuda then directed B to negotiate with the 3 year-old through the 6 year-old. "Go for it" was the response.
- 30.** This required several steps. B described negotiating for and eventually receiving permission from the younger dissociated parts to alter the current protective process in response to the symbolized sense of attack.
- 31.** Yehuda then said that they would do a
- 31.** B acquainted himself mentally with the

whole sequence: the 3-year old would sing, the monster would come and B would slay it. For this purpose B had invented a nice big sword (which he had been holding all through the negotiations). Yehuda wanted B to do all this by himself.

sequence of the process he would enact and complete on his own, and imaginatively created a symbol of the necessary support to do this.

- 32.** At first the 3 year-old wouldn't budge or respond (i.e. sing). Yehuda then reminded B of the music B loved, and the 3 year-old got up and felt it. B sensed this and he sensed the monster coming to attack; the 6 year-old watched. As the monster came B felt a surge of power in his chest and arms, and with an explosive "GAHHH" sound and a slaying gesture B struck it on the head. Right the first time with full power, enough to kill it.
- 32.** B experienced some inner resistance in wanting to enact the necessary sequence, but in remembering his desire to express himself musically, B's youngest dissociated part initiated the process, whilst the younger dissociated part stayed uninvolved so as to allow B to take charge at the point of attack and enact with the bodily modalities of movement, visualization and sound a new form of defence.
- 33.** But B felt unfulfilled and acted it out twice more, until his defensive energy was fully expended and the beast totally annihilated.
- 33.** Feeling unfulfilled, B repeated this process until a sense of change occurred.
- 34.** B felt a vibrant sense of release.
- 34.** B felt a vibrant sense of release of inner tension.
- 35.** Yehuda asked about the 6 year-old. He was happy, relieved and impressed. The 3 year-old? He loved it, grinning from ear to ear and clapping his hands excitedly. And B
- 35.** Both dissociated parts shifted in their affect state, expressed in gesture. B felt aligned with these parts, experiencing strong relief, along with a resolution and newfound faith in his ability to protect

- felt a strong relief, a resolution, and faith in his ability to protect himself, safe in the knowledge that the monster was slain. B's breathing was free, his voice could resonate in his chest, and an inner tension had gone.
36. *Fragment: Taking my heart back from Mom*
37. Yehuda talked about the power B had given her when he came to earth – the power of his essence. How she had taken it away from B and kept it, and how B needed to take it back.
38. Yehuda asked B to feel the most essential part of him and to act out entrusting it to her. B cupped his hands on his heart and symbolically gave it to her. Then Yehuda instructed B to take it back. At first B couldn't as he resisted hurting her feelings. Yehuda said it was his to take back and encouraged B to do so. B then took it back from her and reunited it with himself.
39. B still has unresolved hurt and anger about this – definitely a point for future reference.
36. B named a fragment of the process [he can no longer place into the sequence of the session].
37. B mentally reflected on how he internalised the primary relationship with his mother and how B projected some of his energy into her. B also reflected on how this internalisation needed to be reconstructed.
38. B symbolically enacted this relationship and projection in a bodily manner, as well as the reversal and reuniting of this dissociated part and therein the changed nature of the object relation. B was aware of the possibility of creating pain for his mother in this.
39. B remains aware of unresolved feelings of hurt and anger, and realizes the catharsis is not complete.

40. *Fragment: Leaving the body, returning* 40. B named a further fragment of the process [he can no longer place into the sequence of the session].
41. When they were talking about how 95% of B was absent, Yehuda asked where B was in these moments. B had earlier that week repeatedly imagined a glimpse of himself as a young child outside the window looking in. For a time, wherever B looked, there he was the child, smiling happily outside in its safe world. 41. B reflected symbolically on the safety he found in dissociation.
42. We talked about the Wits Great Hall again and here there were no windows (just as in the counselling session room), and B could clearly imagine himself floating above the proceedings, untouched by what was going on. And in the present B could also imagine himself floating directly above, near the ceiling. 42. B focused on his dissociation in the specific performance situation, as well as the experience of its re-enactment, accessing the correlating bodily knowing and locating a dissociated part.
43. Yehuda suggested B physically go there to be with himself. B got a table, moved it to the right spot and climbed up. 43. B identified with this dissociated part and joined it in a bodily-enacted manner.
44. Looking at the violinist from there seemed like looking at an empty shell, like a knight's armour minus the knight. But holding his violin up there was fine. 44. From this position, he symbolized his impressions of the remaining part, and also explored performing whilst identified with the dissociated part, which he found agreeable.

45. This B brought down with him. 45. B attempted to integrate this ease of performance.
46. This episode seems a little unclear to B; like the taking his heart back episode, it seems like unfinished business. 46. This aspect is not clearly represented for B, much like the former ‘fragment’ and feels unfinished and not integrated.
47. *After the session* – It’s a day later and already the detailed memory is fading. 47. A day later B experienced detailed memory of the process fading.
48. The key outcome is not fading though – the monster is slain, B is steering clear of the black hole. The new freedom in B’s chest is still there. 48. B however clearly recalled the symbolic outcome, and still felt the physiological release and newfound sense of freedom.
49. This will be tested: in B’s next performance, next time B is in an intimate situation, next time B sees his mom. B feels slightly nervous about it. But B has already experienced his newfound ability to defend himself against (well-meaning) pressure to now “shine”. B will do so in his own time, in his own way. 49. B expected that the outcome of this process, with its experienced sense of change, would be tested, both in the next performance situation, as well as in associated situations. B felt slightly nervous, yet assured by the newly established object relation and restored boundaries therein.

Participant C

Natural Meaning Units	Transformed Meaning Units
1. Cutting Off	1. C named her process.
2. <i>Presenting Issue</i> – C feels as if she is not able to take control over her own life. C cannot make decisions because she has no ‘substance’ on which to found them. C is not fully ‘present’. C is indecisive and fearful, not fully in touch with what she needs to do or be, or how to go about making changes.	2. C presented with feeling out of control and indecisive in her actions. Experiencing her sense of self as diminished, she is fearful and uncertain as to how to go about making changes regarding this.
3. It seems as if there is a ‘veil’ separating C from herself.	3. C expressed this experience symbolically.
4. <i>Process</i> – C felt fully in control of her life, her will, her aims and ideals until the age of 15, going on 16. At this age C had an experience, which seemed to change her and the course of her life. It was as if C ‘cut off’ from herself at that moment, and has never recovered.	4. C verbally contextualised this experience by reflecting mentally on an incident which she perceives to have changed her sense of self, leaving her feeling separated from an essential part of herself, which she felt was never reintegrated.
5. It was an incident in which C’s father expressed disapproval regarding a boyfriend in a fairly severe way. It was not violent or abusive, just definite and involved the boyfriend and all other friends having to leave their home where they were visiting.	5. C described the nature of this specific experience in more detail.
6. It was probably quite a justifiable	6. On reflection, C was aware that the

- parental action, given the circumstances, but in that moment, C shut down.
7. When C recalls the incident to mind, acutely reliving the moment, she looks around her body inwardly to find out where it hurts and what is happening.
8. C finds her heart feels tightly squeezed as in a shiny metal sheath, which is cold, and steel plated.
9. C gestures the feeling with cupped hands in front of the heart region, pressing in together tightly.
10. C breathes into the gesture and through the breath she finds a sound that suits what she is experiencing. C feels as if all the organic material of her body slides off and is cast aside to rot.
11. On getting out of the subjective experience, and ‘beholding’, C sees that what is left of her is a ghost of a person with arms ‘splinted’ to the sides, crystal-like, brittle, a hollow shell, rigidly going about the world.
12. *The Wish* –
- C: To know why this happened to her, what the reason for this could have been.
- Y: This is a karmic question and could
- parental action may have been justifiable, but remembers her experience of the severity of the impact of that moment.
7. Whilst mentally identifying with her memory of this incident, C attempts to sense her current bodily-felt awareness or representation in response to it.
8. C symbolized in visual image, including tactile sensation, her initial bodily-felt sense.
9. C gestured this feeling with her hands.
10. C breathed into the gesture and found a suitable sound to express it, which results in her visual image intensifying and expanding.
11. On distancing herself from the identification and enactment, C’s observing ego reflected and therein visually symbolized her perception of the experience.
12. C set an explorative intent for the therapy session with regards to dealing with this experience.

take a lifetime of research. Make another wish.

C: C wishes to understand what happened to her.

- 13.** Y: Go into the incident in life. Describe the circumstances.

C: C was with some friends in a cottage behind the house on her parent's farm. C was lying on top of a bed in the arms of her boyfriend who was hugging my back. C could feel the warmth and life in his body, the heartbeat, the magic, excitement and comfort of being so close to someone.

- 13.** C accessed the memory of the incident in mind, recalling the specific circumstances, her feelings, as well as her bodily sensations of that moment.

- 14.** Y: What sort of a girl are we talking about?

C: Fifteen years old, brave, a little rebellious, excellent at sports and academics, in complete control of her life at school, always spoke up against unfairness, determined, respectful, and inquisitive with a love of learning. Happy most of the time. Self-assured in the knowledge that everything is achievable if the mind and will are applied. An avid reader.

- 14.** C verbally described her positive sense of self at the time.

- 15.** Y: What happened? Go into the moment.

C: As they were lying there, talking and

- 15.** C continued, describing her vague mental memory of the sequence of the traumatic incident.

laughing, C's father walked into the room. C can't really remember what happened then, except that he told everyone to leave, he may have shouted. C's friends all left. C doesn't remember if anyone said anything or not.

16. Y: Lie down and remember what you felt. I won't look. It is an intimate moment.

C: As C's father entered the room and uttered whatever he uttered, it felt like the end of the world. C imploded, sucked herself into herself. It was as though life just disappeared inwardly. C was shocked and did not move from her position on the bed. Felt she never wanted to move again. C could hear buzzing, numbness, cold. It felt as though her heart stopped beating, her lungs stopped breathing. C didn't cry, just lay there rigid till long after dark, frozen. C felt as though her voice was gone forever.

17. Y: Do the lying down before the moment.

C: (Could lie down but braced against the moment. Could not go into the moment before the incident, when the girl is still alive.) C feels she is not allowed to be there. She is bracing herself against the moment.

16. C fully identified with the moment by enacting the body position she was in at that time. C therein proceeded to recall her reaction to the traumatic incident as she had experienced it bodily in that moment. C described her physiological response, which metaphorically became emotionally significant for her.

17. When asked, C became hesitant or resistant and could not physically enact or identify with her self prior to this incident, and described her current bodily-felt sense as disallowing and defensive in response to this.

- 18.** Y: What are you bracing yourself against?
C: A wind like a cold fire, that just sweeps everything away. Sounds: “Swish Whoosh”
- 19.** Y: Do the sounds, and gesture this monster.
C: (Does this)
- 20.** C has no bad feelings towards this ‘monster’.
- 21.** Y: Look at what is left. Describe it.
C: A stick. A mineralised shell, not burned, just crystallized, with all the life gone.
- 22.** Y: Where to?
C: Away, out the door, with the friends, out the windows, everywhere.
Y: Look again. Is there any left behind?
C: Yes, there is some left in the heart.
- 23.** Y: Fetch it.
C: (Crouches down and picks up the heart enclosed in a steel casing) Asks what does she do with it?
- 24.** Y: Put it back where it belongs.
C: (Has curious thoughts about this:
- 18.** Exploring this defensive response, C symbolized in symbolic image and corresponding sound what she experienced herself to be bodily defending against.
- 19.** C bodily enacted this internalised object, by sounding and gesturing its nature.
- 20.** In doing this, C claimed to hold no negative feelings towards this introject.
- 21.** From this position, C reflected on herself as the other object of this constellation and symbolized her perception in visual image. C perceived herself to be absent.
- 22.** Exploring this more closely, C established that the greater part of herself had disappeared, whilst a little part was left, which, through her bodily-felt sensing, she located in a specific part of her body.
- 23.** C bodily enacted a retrieving of this remaining part, but questioned what to do with it.
- 24.** C was encouraged to reintegrate this part with her current self according to her bodily-felt sense expressing the inherent

does she swallow it, inhale it, and apply it to her breast? She applies it to her breast/heart area. This is painful and the rib cage feels too tight and stiff.)

bodily-felt sense expressing the inherent logic of her symbol, which she then did, having considered the various options that came to mind. She experienced this as painful and was left with a further bodily-felt sense of rigidity.

25. The girl is not dead.

25. C then realized that she no longer experienced her younger sense of self as dead, but was able to locate her in her body. C was left with a visual image expressing the condition of this part.

Y: Where is she in your body?

C: Sitting, lying on the upper surface of the diaphragm. She is very thin and flat.

26. Y: What must you do now?

26. C's bodily-felt sense left her with the notion that she has to strengthen and repeat this process of integration with self-directed nurturing, until she regains a complete sense of self.

C: Must get more of her back from outside, from friends perhaps. C must nurture her inside.

Y: You must get to be able to be the girl before the moment. The blossoming, flowering young woman. You must exercise and heal the cut, the wound.

27. *Remaining Question* – How does C do this? This is the next growing point: to find, and get to be, the girl before the cut-off moment.

27. C is left with some uncertainty with regards to how to accomplish this, but associates more clearly with the memory and desired state of a more complete sense of self.

28. *Summary Picture* – This picture is summarized in the conversation following the end of the process. They looked back at all the characters and pictures that emerged, pulling them into the broader life context. They see the

28. C then cognitively integrated the summarized understanding of the process and how it relates to her understanding of her broader life context and relationships.

potential meeting point of past and future. The girl child is just arriving at the threshold of her astrality. The peach blossom pink, the sensuousness, the opening up, the membranous development, the fluids, the blossoming; all this is approaching the etheric identity of the maturing child, accompanied by the simultaneous descent of the ego consciousness which takes place around this time of adolescence. There is an abrupt cut off! The two are unable to meet and connect. They are left in limbo as the husk, the shell that continues into adulthood.

- 29.** *Work to be done* – Meditations on flowers in the light of the above (as metaphor of the blossoming of the human being). Acknowledging the wound. Nurturing and tending the young woman within, allowing her to become. Constant awareness of this growing, healing process.
- 29.** C more concretely defined how she perceives it possible to support this process of integration of this dissociated part to therein enable a renewed sense of self.
- 30.** *Retrospective* – C is more tolerant, understanding and compassionate towards herself. This helps in every aspect of her life.
- 30.** In retrospect, C presented with a more positive sense of self, experiencing herself as more tolerant, understanding and compassionate towards herself. C claimed this to have a positive impact in every aspect of her life.
- 31.** C doesn't try to be what she isn't, outwardly. Is more able to express what
- 31.** C made cognitive sense of this newfound experience and expression of self in

- she is. accordance with how she understands herself interpersonally.
- 32.** The insights give C ‘tools’ and self-knowledge to work with in life situations. **32.** These insights give C a means to take more control of her life situations.
- 32.** Since having undergone this process, C has experienced many others. The more this happens, the more C realizes that each is a gateway to the next, and that without the one, the following one would most probably never have been able to take place. **32.** C reported having repeatedly experienced such therapeutic processes, and metaphorically expresses how she is able to gain access to deeper layers of her unconscious structuring experiences, from one to another, which were not accessible to her before.
- 33.** They are a series of keys to inner chambers, each aiding in the unlocking of the next. Each throwing progressively more light into the dark recesses that limit C’s self-knowing, and self-determination. **33.** C expressed symbolically how this process builds on itself, enabling her an experience of better self-knowledge and self-determination.