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From War Economies to Peace Economies: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Sierra Leone

by

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ABSTRACT

The difficulty of transforming war economies into peace economies has become increasingly problematic in the search for long-term peace and stability in Africa. In many African countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, conflict actors have created distinct war economies in order to maintain the conflict in these countries. The enduring nature of the war economies presents a unique challenge to actors involved in ensuring that peace returns to a country by applying a peacebuilding strategy. The economic environment during a conflict has a vast influence on a post-conflict economy and a post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Although post-war rebuilding occurred during the reconstruction of Europe and Japan after the Second World War, the terms "post-conflict peacebuilding" and "post-conflict reconstruction" have only came to prominence during the mid-1990s.

Using the case study of Sierra Leone, this study explores the challenge of war economies and its impact on post-conflict reconstruction. Sierra Leone presents an appealing case study as the country experienced a very profitable war economy during the armed conflict in the country between 1991 and 2002, and continues to struggle to transform this war economy into a peace economy. The case study of Sierra Leone is well researched, however, most studies focus on the conflict period, and only briefly look at the post-conflict period. In addition, discussions of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone have failed to adequately address the challenges presented by the war economy. This study uses existing analyses about the war economy in Sierra Leone, and links these to the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy, focusing specifically on the economic dimension. Therefore, this study represents a departure from traditional approaches to exploring war economies because it considers the direct impact these economic systems have on the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

Key Concepts: African Union, Conflict, Combat economy, Coping economy, Corruption, DDR, Diamonds, Economic agendas, Formal markets, Informal markets, NEPAD, Peace, Peacebuilding, Peace economy, Post-conflict reconstruction, Shadow Economy, Shadow State, Sierra Leone, United Nations, War, War economy, Youth.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABU	Agriculture Business Units
APC	All People's Congress
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AU	African Union
CMRRD	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources National Reconstruction and Development
CDF	Civil Defence Force
CSIS	Center for Strategic and International Studies
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EO	Economic Outcomes
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KPCS	Kimberley Process Certification Scheme
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
NCP	National Commission for Privatization
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMJD	Network Movement for Justice and Development
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council

NRA	National Revenue Authority
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAC	Partnership Africa Canada
PCR	Post-conflict Reconstruction
PCRD	Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development
PMC	Private Military Companies
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
RUF/SL	Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
SAIS	School of Advanced International Studies
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SLAF	Sierra Leone Armed Forces
SLEDIC	Sierra Leone Export Development and Investment Corporation
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
SLST	Sierra Leone Selection Trust
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
YES	Youth Employment Scheme

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN SIERRA LEONE

1961	Sierra Leone becomes independent.
1967	Military coup deposes Premier Siaka Stevens' government.
1968	Siaka Stevens returns to power at the head of a civilian government following another military coup.
1971	Sierra Leone declared a republic, Stevens becomes executive president.
1978	New constitution proclaims Sierra Leone a one-party state with the All People's Congress as the sole legal party.
1985	Major-General Joseph Saidu Momoh becomes president following Stevens' retirement.
1987	Momoh declares state of economic emergency.
1991	Start of civil war. Former army corporal Foday Sankoh and his Revolutionary United Front (RUF) begin campaign against President Momoh, capturing towns on border with Liberia.
	September: New constitution providing for a multiparty system adopted.
1992	President Joseph Momoh ousted in military coup led by Captain Valentine Strasser, apparently frustrated by failure to deal with rebels. Under international pressure, Strasser announces plans for the first multi-party elections since 1967.

1996	January: Strasser ousted in military coup led by his defence minister, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio.
	February: Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected president
	November: Kabbah signs peace accord with Sankoh's rebels
1997	May: Peace deal unravels. President Kabbah deposed by army. Major Johnny Paul Koroma, in prison awaiting the outcome of a treason trial, leads the military junta - the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). Koroma suspends the constitution, bans demonstrations and abolishes political parties. Kabbah flees to Guinea to mobilise international support.
	July: The Commonwealth suspends Sierra Leone.
	October: The UN Security Council imposes sanctions against Sierra Leone, barring the supply of arms and petroleum products. A British company, Sandline, nonetheless supplies "logistical support", including rifles, to Kabbah allies.
1998	February: Nigerian-led West African intervention force ECOMOG storms Freetown and drives rebels out.
	March: Kabbah makes a triumphant return to Freetown amid scenes of public rejoicing.
1999	January: Rebels backing Revolutionary United Front leader Foday Sankoh seize parts of Freetown from ECOMOG. After weeks of bitter fighting, they are driven out, leaving behind 5,000 dead and a devastated city.

	May: A ceasefire is greeted with cautious optimism in Freetown amid hopes that eight years of civil war may soon be over.
	July: Six weeks of talks in the Togolese capital, Lomé, result in a peace agreement, under which the rebels receive posts in government and assurances they will not be prosecuted for war crimes.
	November/December: UN troops arrive to police the peace agreement - but one rebel leader, Sam Bokari, says they are not welcome. Meanwhile, ECOMOG troops are attacked outside Freetown.
2000	April/May: UN forces come under attack in the east of the country, but far worse is in store when first 50, then several hundred UN troops are abducted.
	May: Rebels close in on Freetown; 800 British paratroopers sent to Freetown to evacuate British citizens and to help secure the airport for UN peacekeepers; rebel leader Foday Sankoh captured.
	August: Eleven British soldiers taken hostage by a renegade militia group called the West Side Boys.
	September: British forces mount operation to rescue remaining UK hostages.
2001	January: Government postpones presidential and parliamentary elections - set for February and March - because of continuing insecurity.
	March: UN troops for the first time begin to deploy peacefully in rebel-held

	territory.
	May: Disarmament of rebels begins, and British-trained Sierra Leone army starts deploying in rebel-held areas.
2002	January: War declared over. UN mission says disarmament of 45,000 fighters is complete. Government and UN agree to set up war crimes court.
	May: Kabbah wins a landslide victory in elections. His Sierra Leone People's Party secures a majority in parliament.
	July: British troops leave Sierra Leone after their two-year mission to help end the civil war.
2003	July: Rebel leader Foday Sankoh dies of natural causes while waiting to be tried for war crimes.
	August: President Kabbah tells truth and reconciliation commission that he had no say over operations of pro-government militias during war.
2004	February: Disarmament and rehabilitation of more than 70,000 civil war combatants officially completed.
	March: UN-backed war crimes tribunal opens courthouse to try senior militia leaders from both sides of civil war.
	May: First local elections in more than three decades.
	June: War crimes trials begin.

	September: UN hands control of security in capital over to local forces.
2005	August: UN Security Council authorises opening of a UN assistance mission in Sierra Leone from 2006, to follow departure of peacekeepers in December.
	December: The last UN peacekeeping troops leave Sierra Leone, marking the end of a five-year mission to restore order.
2006	March: Liberian ex-president Charles Taylor is arrested in Nigeria and handed over to the war crimes court in Sierra Leone, which indicted him.
	August: Date for elections set for July 2007.
	December: President Kabbah says 90% of the country's $1.6bn (£815m) debt has been written off after negotiations with international creditors.
2007	June: Start of former Liberian president Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague, where he stands accused of instigating atrocities in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone's special war crimes court in Freetown delivers its first verdicts, finding three militia leaders guilty.
	August: Presidential and parliamentary polls. Ernest Bai Koroma wins the presidency and his All People's Congress, formerly in opposition, wins a majority in parliament.
2008	January: Former Liberian president Charles Taylor's war crimes trial in The Hague resumes after a six-month delay.
	August: Local elections are marred by violence between the supporters of

	the two main parties.

(BBC News 2009)

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1 Research theme of the study

The emergence of economic agendas during times of conflict is not a new phenomenon; rather, it represents an integral part of warfare throughout history. For example, during the Thirty Years War in Europe from 1618 to 1648, war became an important source of profit (Berdal and Malone 2000: 1). Since 1945, conventional interstate wars have occurred less frequently, and intrastate wars have become the prevailing form of conflict in the world. Studies of intrastate conflicts have traditionally focused on the political dimensions, with discussion of the economic dimension often limited to “the role played by economic deprivation or resource scarcity in the eruption of violent conflict” (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 1). However, the last decade has seen a steady appearance of literature exploring the economic dimensions of armed conflict in more detail. The significance of economic agendas in armed conflict has been frequently debated; nevertheless, there is certainly a need to take into consideration the economic dimension to understand “the causes and the persistence of conflict” (Berdal and Malone 2000: 1).

During the early to mid-1990s, studies of economic agendas during armed conflicts attempted to address the issue of endurance by focusing on the costs of conflict through three main approaches. The first approach viewed conflict “as a temporary "interruption" to an ongoing process of development” (Berdal and Malone 2000: 4). The second approach, traditionally associated with peace and conflict studies, highlighted the influence of miscommunication on the occurrence and endurance of conflict. The third approach concentrated on the potential recurrence of “ancient hatreds” and “long-suppressed animosities” between conflicting parties (Berdal and Malone 2000: 4).

Since the late 1990s, an increasing number of policy and academic studies have explored the economic dimension of conflict in more detail, moving away from the traditional conceptions of the role played by economics during conflict. This includes a greater focus on issues such as the role of resource abundance and scarcity on conflict, or the so-called "greed versus grievance" argument, made popular by Collier (1999) and discussed in detail by authors such as Berdal and Malone (2000) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Related to the greed versus grievance debate is the emergence of war economies in countries experiencing civil conflict. The war economies that emerge from civil conflict are very different from the traditional war economies of interstate wars. According to Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 2-3), civil war economies are "parasitic", "illicit" and "predatory" and they "rarely contribute to state capacity or economic development". Although several authors have included discussions of the economic dimension of conflict in their studies, "comparatively little *systematic* attention has been given to the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts" (Berdal and Malone 2000: 1).

In many African countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo, conflict actors create a distinct war economy in order to maintain the conflict in that country. The development of war economies "challenge[s] the core assumptions that have informed thinking and guided policy with respect of civil wars and internal conflict in the 1990s" (Berdal and Malone 2000: 2). The traditional military objective of defeating an enemy is "replaced by economically driven interests in continued fighting and the institutionalisation of violence at what is for some clearly a profitable level of intensity" (Berdal and Malone 2000: 2). The end goal is not to win the war; rather, it is to make a profit from the instability created by the conflict. Consequently, the longer a conflict endures, the more money and resources these "war profiteers" accumulate. Reno (1998) describes the appearance of "warlords" in areas such as West Africa, who dominated the political and economic arena in order to serve their own business interests.

The increase in self-reliant economic activity by combatants is an indication of the changing nature of world political and economic trends since the end of the Cold War. Traditional sources of funding, such as foreign state patronage, were no longer available to conflict parties, and consequently they had to rely on other means of financing, such as looting, smuggling and extortion. In addition, “rapid economic globalization and the replacement of state-led development by market-driven free trade have created new and abundant opportunities for more systematic forms of combatant self-financing” (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 2).

As mentioned above, the enduring nature of the war economies presents a unique challenge to actors involved in ensuring peace returns to a country through a peacebuilding strategy. Although post-war rebuilding occurred during the reconstruction of Europe and Japan after the Second World War, the terms "post-conflict peacebuilding" and "post-conflict reconstruction" only came to prominence during the mid-1990s. The two terms are often used interchangeably, however, this study uses "post-conflict reconstruction" to describe the complex process of transforming a country from war to peace, as the term focuses on the technical aspects of rebuilding after conflict. A detailed definition and discussion of post-conflict reconstruction follows later in this chapter.

Post-conflict reconstruction strategies encompass several areas that are affected by conflict, including the political, social and economic spheres. However, only certain aspects of political economy are targeted by current post-conflict reconstruction policies and specific features of war economies are often neglected. According to Pugh, Cooper and Goodhand (2004: 3), the consequences of this neglect may include an underestimation of the challenges in achieving peace agreements, the possibility of a relapse into conflict, and the problem that “economic criminals” may still have access to resources after a conflict has ended.

The difficulty of transforming war economies into peace economies has become increasingly problematic in the search for long-term peace and stability in Africa. Using the case study of Sierra Leone, this study explores the challenge of war economies and its impact on post-conflict reconstruction. Sierra Leone presents an appealing case study as the country experienced a very profitable war economy during the armed conflict in the country between 1991 and 2002, and continues to struggle to transform this war economy into a peace economy. The case study of Sierra Leone is well researched by many authors, including Clapham (2003), Richards (2003) and Keen (2005). However, most studies focus on the conflict period, and only briefly look at the post-conflict period. In addition, discussions of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone have failed to adequately address the challenges presented by the war economy. This study uses existing analyses about the war economy in Sierra Leone, and links these to the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy, focusing specifically on the economic dimension. Therefore, this study represents a departure from traditional approaches to exploring war economies because it considers the direct impact these economic systems have on the process of post-conflict reconstruction.

In order to provide a context for the war economy in Sierra Leone, this study employs the Shadow State theory developed by William Reno (1995 and 2000a). The theory of the Shadow State is of particular relevance as it forms a basis for understanding why it is so difficult to transform war economies. The Shadow State, as defined by Reno (2000a), is a concept that describes the relationship between corruption and politics. The theory, developed with Sierra Leone as its primary case study, is very useful for any in-depth discussion about Sierra Leone.

The theoretical aspects of the Sierra Leone case study are examined in detail in Chapter 2. The following section provides a comprehensive discussion of the research themes of this study, namely economic agendas during armed conflict,

which includes the Shadow State theory and war economies, and post-conflict peacebuilding, which includes post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies. In order to understand the research problem of this study, the two main research themes are discussed in terms of their background, rationale and relevance for the overall study.

1.2 Economic agendas during armed conflict

The theme of economic agendas during armed conflict that is discussed in this study emerged during the late 1990s. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, earlier conceptions of the theme focused on the political dimensions of conflict, however, studies have since started to focus increasingly on the role of economics during conflict.

It is important to break down the theme of economic agendas during armed conflict into its main concepts, "economic agendas" and "armed conflict". An economic agenda is “a plan or intention to derive financial benefits from a particular situation” (Nathan and Lamb 2000: 9). According to Nathan and Lamb (2000: 9), during conflict, two categories of economic agendas can exist. The first category includes “economic agendas that are related to the causes of war”, which describes many of the national liberation wars against colonialism in Africa, where access to economic resources is limited and these grievances form part of the motivation to go to war. The second category is comprised of “economic agendas that contribute to the perpetuation of war”, where conflict is maintained by “key individuals or groups who derive economic benefits from the war that would be negatively affected should the war be peacefully resolved”. These two categories highlight the main arguments of the “greed versus grievance” debate. The first category argues that conflict will occur if it is deemed profitable, and the second category claims that conflict occurs because of one or more grievances. This study supports the move beyond the “greed versus grievance” debate, and adopts a more nuanced approach, as authors

such as Berdal and Malone (2000), and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) have done.

Although several understandings of the concept "conflict" are found in literature, the term "conflict" can broadly be defined as “the pursuit of incompatible goals by different groups” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 2005: 27). According to Ramsbotham et al (2005: 28), "armed conflict" is a narrower term, which describes conflicts where “parties on both sides resort to the use of force”. Authors such as Sollenberg (1996) and Marshall and Gurr (2005) argue that an armed conflict exists when more than 1,000 battle-related deaths have occurred during a specific year. This statistical approach is important. However, calculating an exact death toll figure is extremely difficult in chaotic conflict situations. Therefore, the battle-related death figure is only a starting point, which should be supplemented with additional information. For the purpose of this study, the simple definition of armed conflict as proposed by Ramsbotham et al (2005) is used to describe the situation in Sierra Leone.

The first sub-theme of economic agendas during armed conflict is the theory of the Shadow State. This theory is relevant to the theme of economic agendas because it enables the war economy to arise. The Shadow State in Sierra Leone developed before the conflict started in 1991; however, it created a system that allowed a privileged group of actors to benefit economically from that conflict. Therefore, the Shadow State theory is relevant to this study because it explains how the war economy developed in Sierra Leone. The theory of the Shadow State is defined in the next section.

The second sub-theme is the emergence of war economies during times of armed conflict. As previously mentioned, economics has always played an important role in war-making, however, modern war economies differ fundamentally from traditional war economies in respect to their focus and their duration. A brief definition of war economies follows in the next section, and a detailed discussion of war economies follows in Chapter 2.

1.2.1 Shadow State

William Reno created the Shadow State theory to explain the relationship that had developed between corruption and politics in Sierra Leone. He introduced this link in his 1995 book *Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone* and continued to explore the theory in later journal articles and books. Reno explains that the Shadow State is a "form of personal rule" where a leader gains power not by the rule of law, but from personal decisions (Reno 2000a: 434).

At its core, the Shadow State is a situation where rulers draw influence "from their abilities to control markets and their material rewards" (Reno 1995: 3). In addition, rulers use their positions to "manipulate external actors' access to markets, both formal and clandestine in such a way as to enhance their power" (Reno 2000a: 434). The system that is created by these types of interactions is ideal for corruptive economic behaviour. Leaders essentially control their access to resources, such as diamonds and timber, through manipulation of political institutions.

Clapham (1996) notes how the Shadow State theory analyses the connection between politics and corruption. He also points out "that the idea is an attempt to extend the analysis of informal markets to understanding the operation of at least some African political systems, and emphasizes that one important way in which rulers used informal markets to bolster their control took the form of private deals with external companies" (Clapham 1996 in Kawabata 2006: 25).

In terms of other African state theories, the Shadow State theory is most useful for this thesis because it was developed with Sierra Leone as its primary case study. In addition, it explains how an environment was created in which a war economy could emerge, and shows the relationship between corruption, economics and politics. The literature survey that follows later in this chapter

describes the development of African state theories, and argues why the Shadow State theory was selected in this case.

1.2.2 War economy

According to Naidoo (2000: 25), “the term ‘war economy’ has been used to conceptualise the sustainability of an intractable conflict through the expropriation and exploitation of a country’s resources by warring parties”. Political elites and rebel movements are generally the custodians of war economies; the former use national armies to advance business projects (often for private financial gain), while the latter take control of strategic locations with definite commercial profitability.

Pugh et al (2004: 8) use a simpler definition, stating that the term is used to include all economic activities carried out during wartime. However, Goodhand (2004: 157) breaks the term "war economy" into three categories, namely the combat economy, shadow economy and coping economy, in order to differentiate between the actors involved, and activities carried out during a conflict. These concepts are discussed in detail in Chapter 2.

According to Fekete (2004), war economy refers to "a set of economic structures that arise from armed conflicts and that may continue to exist even after the violence has ended". A war economy "has to do with making money out of a war system rather than out of a peaceful situation" (Fekete 2004). Berdal (2003: 477) expands this definition by mentioning the relationship that develops between actors involved in the development of a war economy. He states that “elites, ordinary people caught up in war, and external actors that stand to gain from a conflict have vested interests in continuing a specific conflict. As time passes, such interests will crystallise into a distinctive war economy, usually forming part of a regional pattern of informal economic activity”. War economies are costly and catastrophic for societies as a whole; however, they may be highly profitable and lucrative for individuals, groups

within society and outside actors (Berdal 2003: 477). Any valuable discussion about war economies must include an investigation of the role that natural resources play in perpetuating these economic systems.

1.3 Post-conflict peacebuilding

The theme of "peacebuilding" was popularised by Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace* (1992). According to the document, the objective of peacebuilding is broad and includes removing "underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems" and facilitating "the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 55-59). In addition, conflict is considered a linear process, linking peacebuilding with the post-conflict period, and including the processes of conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Therefore, peacebuilding is understood as "post-conflict peacebuilding", as the peacebuilding process would only be implemented after all the other conflict processes had been executed (Cousens 2001: 6).

In 1995, Boutros-Ghali presented the *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. The document acknowledged the problematic conception of peacebuilding as set out in *An Agenda for Peace*. Consequently, Boutros-Ghali expanded the function of peacebuilding and combined it with conflict prevention and conflict management. The focus of peacebuilding thus included the entire conflict spectrum, and not post-conflict settings exclusively (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 49).

This expanded understanding of peacebuilding only contributed to increased perplexity, so in 2001, the UN Security Council attempted to clarify the broad definition of peacebuilding, stating that the process would foster activities such as "sustainable development", "transparent and accountable governance" and the "promotion of democracy" (United Nations Security Council 2001). This again created a certain level of uncertainty as to the scope of peacebuilding, as

many activities that were now considered under the peacebuilding umbrella could actually be considered part of development strategies and the support for democratisation. It is important to note, however, that the focus of peacebuilding remained on conflict, thus separating itself from other non-conflict processes (Hänggi 2005: 11).

The broad usage of the term "peacebuilding" has resulted in the term becoming vague and it is often unnecessarily contested, which results in inconsistencies in analysis, policy and practice. The definition of the concept is adapted according to the institutional needs of the actors involved. Hänggi (2005: 11) distinguishes between the broader concept of peacebuilding, which extends beyond post-conflict societies to include activities that occur during conflict and in the absence thereof, and the narrower understanding, which is limited to post-conflict environments. Therefore, Hänggi uses the term "peacebuilding" to describe the broad understanding of the process, and adds "post-conflict" to "peacebuilding" in order to denote the narrow definition of the concept.

For the purpose of this study, the narrower understanding of the concept is used, as the focus of the study in on the post-conflict environment. It is necessary to explain why the term "post-conflict reconstruction" is preferred over the term "post-conflict peacebuilding". A perusal of the literature reveals that, generally, the terms are defined and used interchangeably. Taking into consideration the disagreement on a precise definition of peacebuilding, as the discussion above reveals, it would be to the benefit of the study to move away from this environment. In addition, because the study deals specifically with the transformation of war economies, the term post-conflict reconstruction more adequately reflects this practice. This is not to conclude that the term only refers to the economic dimensions of rebuilding a country after conflict, as has sometimes been incorrectly assumed. Rather, it reinforces the notion that one of the key areas of post-conflict reconstruction is the socio-economic rehabilitation of a country, a process that must be executed in direct coordination with other dimensions of post-conflict rebuilding. The preference of

the use of the term "post-conflict reconstruction" also takes into account the trends of African Union (AU) and New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Secretariat documents. As this is a study about Africa, it is only logical to use terms that are being promoted by African institutions, and would be much more accessible to African scholars.

The following section outlines the first sub-theme under the broader post-conflict peacebuilding theme namely, post-conflict reconstruction. The term "post-conflict reconstruction" was selected because of its economic connotations, especially by international financial institutions, as well as its inclusion of socio-economic recovery as a key reconstruction area. Post-conflict reconstruction is defined in further detail in the section below.

The second sub-theme is the goal of a peace economy by pursuing an effective post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Apart from very econometric analyses done by researchers such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998, 2004) of the World Bank, few authors have described in detail what peace economies should look like. Moreover, most definitions of the term focus exclusively on its relation to war economies. A brief definition of the term follows in the next section on post-conflict reconstruction. However, an exploration of term appears in Chapter 2.

1.3.1 Post-conflict reconstruction

The concept of post-conflict reconstruction has steadily broadened in scope since the 1990s. Depending on the institution or actor involved, the term will have a different meaning. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2001: 2), reconstruction takes place between cessation of violent conflict and return to "normalisation". The economy forms part of one of the "four pillars" identified in the CSIS framework, which includes security, justice and reconciliation, social and economic well being, and governance and participation. This framework was used as a model for the New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Secretariat's 2005 *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, which forms the basis of the post-conflict reconstruction framework described in this thesis. In addition, this study will draw from the work of the CSIS (2001), Ballentine and Sherman (2003), Pugh, et al (2004) and the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Conflict Management Toolkit (School of Advanced International Studies 2006).

Post-conflict reconstruction is a holistic strategy that includes several dimensions. According to the 2005 NEPAD Secretariat policy framework, these dimensions should include security, political transition, socio-economic development, human rights and resource mobilisation (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iv–v). Since this study is focused on the transition from war economy to peace economy, the economic component of post-conflict reconstruction will be discussed in depth. This is not to say that the other aspects are less important or that this study will ignore them, this only serves to make the study more specialised, and thus more useful.

According to a World Bank definition, post-conflict reconstruction is a process that "supports the transition from conflict to peace in an affected country through the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of the society" (World Bank 1998: 24). Reconstruction provides a good base for a country in order to reach the stage of sustainable development. Post-conflict reconstruction does not solely refer to the reconstruction of actual physical infrastructure; it also includes all plans to rebuild a society – politically, socially, militarily and economically, and attempts to address the root causes of conflict. Reconstruction is a lengthy, non-linear, and uncertain process (Cheru 2002: 210).

According to the SAIS, "peacebuilding or post-conflict reconstruction is a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict

through reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation" (School of Advanced International Studies 2006). Plans for post-conflict reconstruction should ideally be included in negotiated peace agreements in order to create an environment where sustainable reconstruction can be possible. Post-conflict reconstruction is mostly recognised as a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral activity. The complex nature of post-conflict reconstruction renders results only in the medium to long term and evaluation of the success or failure of efforts is particularly difficult (School of Advanced International Studies 2006).

1.3.2 Peace economy

A peace economy can very simply be defined as the opposite of a war economy. Although it may utilise a similar economic structure and the same means, for example trade, the result of peace economies is more even growth (Collier, Elliott, Hegre, Hoeffler, Reynal-Queral and Sambanis 2003: 13). Peace economies also operate in a completely different environment, that of peace, where insecurities are not linked to violence.

These economies are able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), where war economies cannot, at least not in a positive or legal fashion (Mallampally and Sauvant 1999). The profits made out of a peace economy are ideally used towards development projects, overall income, and economic growth. War economy profits go towards funding the conflict or enriching elites (Collier 1999). A peace economy will be a situation where all war economy challenges have been adequately addressed.

1.4 Literature survey of the study

The aim of this literature survey is to discuss the relevant available scholarship on the main research themes relating to economic agendas during civil conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, namely the Shadow State, war economy, post-

conflict reconstruction and peace economy. The literature study first provides a brief overview of African state theory and follows with a survey of literature related to the Shadow State and war economies. A discussion of post-conflict peacebuilding precedes a review of the literature relevant for both post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies. Each section includes both primary and secondary sources, however these are not discussed in separate sections as they are categorised by theme.

1.4.1 African state theory

There are several interpretations of the African state available in literature. For the purpose of this study, only a brief synopsis of the African state debate is provided. In order to understand the modern conceptions of the African state, it is necessary to discuss the two main approaches to the modern state namely, “state-centred” and “society-centred”. Following this introduction, a synopsis of the African state debate highlights the motivation for selecting Reno’s Shadow State theory to analyse the case study of Sierra Leone.

Eriksen (2004) provides a well-researched theoretical overview of the African state debate. According to Eriksen (2004: 5), modern state theories are generally classified as either “state-centred” or “society-centred”. Society-centred theories “explain the character of the state by reference to society”, which analyses the state as an institutional structure and includes the theories of modernisation, civil society and social capital. State-centred theories “seek to understand the state by reference to properties of the state itself” (Eriksen 2004: 6). According to state-centred theorists, “the state cannot be reduced to characteristics of society” and society exists as an object of state actions (Eriksen 2004: 6). However, Eriksen argues that both approaches have their limitations. State-centred theories focus predominantly on the state as the primary independent actor dominating over society; and society-centred theories view the state as only an institutional framework in which social activities are reconciled (Eriksen 2004: 13).

Eriksen proposes a third model, which provides a "relational perspective" that firstly recognises "the constitutive character of [a] state's relations to society", secondly, rejects "the oppositional model of state-society relations" and thirdly, addresses "the boundary problem" between the state and society (Eriksen 2004: 13). This approach combines in-depth studies of "everyday state making" and "macro-level relations" because the state is seen both as an object, which is "externally related to society", but also "constituted through its relations" (Eriksen 2004: 15). A thorough analysis of the state should consider the nature and constitution of the boundaries between the state and society. This approach is examined in closer detail in Chapter 2 as part of the discussion of the Shadow State.

Kawabata (2006) also provides a comprehensive overview of the debate on the African state. He argues that it is difficult to define the concept of an African state, as there are various conceptions of the term "state", and there are different understandings of what makes a state "African" (Kawabata 2006: 1). Most contemporary studies about the African state tended to follow certain themes or were case study specific. At the end of the 1990s, new approaches to the African state emerged, which focused more on the structure and function of the African state (Kawabata 2006: 2-3).

The African state theory that is most appropriate for the case study discussed in this thesis is the Shadow State theory developed by William Reno in the mid-1990s, which he uses to describe the situation in Sierra Leone. This theory is introduced in this chapter and is expanded on in further chapters of this study.

1.4.2 Shadow State and other theories relevant for this study

The main source on the theory of the Shadow State is *Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone* by William Reno (1995). In his book, Reno provides a detailed account of how several leaders in Sierra Leone were able to gain

access to resources by manipulating the actors and institutions around them. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Reno defines the Shadow State as "the emergence of rulers drawing authority from their abilities to control markets and their material rewards" (1995: 3). It is a "product of personal rule, usually constructed behind the façade of de jure state sovereignty" (Reno 2000b: 45). The façade of state sovereignty enables rulers to attract foreign investment and, at the same time, increase their personal wealth through diversion of government funds.

In addition to Reno (1995), additional primary sources on the Shadow State include Reno (2000a), where Reno expands on his initial theory by linking the Shadow State to clandestine economies, the decline of the formal state, and the privatisation of state sovereignty. In addition, Reno explores the role of the youth in the Shadow State, which is very relevant for the case of Sierra Leone. Reno (2000b) explores the political economy of violence in the Shadow State and the important role that natural resources play in the creation and maintenance of the Shadow State.

As mentioned earlier, Reno developed the Shadow State theory using Sierra Leone as his primary case study; therefore, it is useful when discussing the politics of Sierra Leone to use this theory as the dominant analytical tool. This is not to say that other African state theories do not apply here, rather, that this study uses the Shadow State "lens" to investigate the case of Sierra Leone. This study will also refer to other African state theories in order to place the case study in context. The emergence of the "warlord state", as proposed by Reno (1998), where warlords pursued private interests and formed a new mode of wealth creation in both Sierra Leone and its neighbour, Liberia, is also referred to later in this study.

Notable secondary sources on the Shadow State include Funke and Solomon (2002), Chabal and Daloz (1999), Bayart (1993), Richards (1998) and Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999). A number of sources refer to the Shadow State,

especially in context of economic agendas during armed conflict, including Cater (2003) and Clapham (2003).

In their discussion of Reno's Shadow State, Funke and Solomon (2002) note that although Reno's theory is very useful in assessing African case studies, he completely overlooks the important role that civil society plays within the Shadow State. This study includes an examination of civil society's role not only in the Shadow State, but also in the war economy and during the post-conflict reconstruction period.

According to Richards (1998), Reno's Shadow State theory is far more controversial than a first glance might suggest. He argues that the theory proposes the creation of "some alternative but concrete institutional form (the ramifying networks of patrimonial alliance)" on the one hand, and a far less structured form, where patrimonialism is perceived as a mere "pyramid selling game", on the other (Richards 1998: 302). His critique actually identifies the dual nature of the Shadow State, as it is both a structured system, using the façade of formal statehood to act as that structure, and at the same time, it is a network of informal and formal relationships, where actors use the informal market to further their political and economic livelihoods.

Linked to Reno's study of the Shadow State is the work by Chabal and Daloz (1999) entitled *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument*, in which the authors explore the political intricacies of Africa's economic struggles. Specifically, the authors focus on how Africa's economies actually function, in contrast to traditional development theory (which is the Western understanding of how economic development should occur). The authors argue that the informal sector in Africa, as well as the exploitation of natural resources "engendered by disorder" do not actually form part of a different economic system than traditionally understood. Within this system, corruption is viewed not from a normative perspective, but rather from the viewpoint that takes into account cultural, social and psychological foundations as well as its impact on

the “micro and macro-levels of society” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 96). The impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and dependence on the economies of Africa are also discussed to show the relationship between political factors and economic reforms put forth by Western donors (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 94).

The last section of Chabal and Daloz (1999) that is relevant to this study is the “instrumentalization of political disorder”, a distinct analysis which “attempts to show how the political, social and economic “logics” of contemporary Africa came together in a process of modernization which does not fit with the Western experience of development” (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 143). Therefore, Africa is developing differently from the Western understanding of the concept, which links directly to the important role that informal markets play in the creation of the Shadow State (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 144).

The themes uncovered by Chabal and Daloz are expanded in *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*, edited by Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999). In her discussion on economic criminalisation, Hibou (1999) focuses on the degree to which African economies have absorbed reforms proposed by Western agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In addition, she explores how the administration of the state is privatised through the development of the Shadow State, and how “la politique du ventre” (“politics of the belly”), a theory explored by Bayart (1993) in *The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly*, is becoming increasingly prominent.

“La politique du ventre” is a term used by Bayart (1993) to “describe the politics of the Postcolonial State” in Africa. According to Bayart, the term has no normative association, it both explains and criticises the term “corruption”. “La politique du ventre” “is not an overriding factor…rather it is a system of historic action” (Bayart 1993: ix).

It is interesting to note that although Reno uses a similar approach to Bayart, he does not arrive at the same conclusions. In addition, Reno discards both state-centred and society-centred approaches to informal markets, and rather focuses on the understanding between local chiefs in Sierra Leone and the state itself (Englebert 1997: 772).

A number of other sources on the Shadow State are referred to in this study, including Clapham (1996), who utilises the theory to describe a number of examples in Africa, and Forrest (1998), who explores the process of "state inversion". During state inversion, state power declines steadily over time, and government institutions become ineffective and shift focus from society to themselves, resulting in the eventual implosion of these institutions (Forrest 1998: 48). The study of state inversion is important because it supports the Shadow State theory, especially concerning the privatisation of the state.

Overall, the literature on the Shadow State supports use of the theory to discuss the case of Sierra Leone. There is only a limited amount of critique of the theory, by authors such as Richards (1998), but the contribution made by Reno's work far outweighs this criticism.

1.4.3 War economy

Since the late 1990s, a variety of academic and research institutions and bodies such as the World Bank and the United Nations have published work on the role of economic agendas during armed conflict. The literature used in this study focuses on the challenges posed by war economies especially for post-conflict reconstruction strategies. This study also supports the move away from regarding the economic aspect of conflict only in terms of cost, which was prevalent in early studies done by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (1998 and 2004) and other experts at the World Bank, and looks at other economic factors that impact on conflict.

A book entitled *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* edited by Berdal and Malone (2000) contains a number of chapters on various aspects of the role of economics during times of conflict. In addition to the chapter by Reno (2000b) on the Shadow State discussed above, there are several notable chapters in this volume. This includes an introduction by Berdal and Malone (2000: 1), where the authors argue that little methodical research has been on the role of economic decisions in creating and sustaining armed conflict, a chapter by David Keen on the incentives and disincentives for violence, and an investigation of globalisation, transborder trade and war economies by Mark Duffield. Also included here is a chapter by Paul Collier of the World Bank looking at economic agendas as causes of conflict, written from an economic perspective.

The *Greed and Grievance* book by Berdal and Malone was the first in a number of books and papers published by the International Peace Academy (IPA). A follow-up book edited by Ballentine and Sherman (2003), *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*, used the initial research done by Berdal, Malone and others, and expanded on their ideas. In the introductory chapter by Ballentine and Sherman, the authors identify the key characteristics of war economies and explain why these are so difficult to overcome. The contribution by Cater (2003: 20-26), links war economies to the theory of the Shadow State, by firstly discussing the economic and political causes of civil war, and secondly by identifying Reno's Shadow State theory as an appropriate explanation for the political economy of state failure.

Complementary to the work by the IPA, the Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management included a section on transforming war economies as part of their *Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series*, edited by Fischer and Schmelzle (2005). A section by Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005: 12-14) argues that there are three main approaches to discussing the role of economic factors during times of armed conflict. These include the economic functions of violence, "greed or grievance", and the role of resources. Each

approach has its own advantages and disadvantages, many of which will be explored in this study.

A prominent book on the regional aspects of war economies by Pugh et al (2004) entitled *War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges of Transformation* outlines a number of case studies, including Sierra Leone. Their analysis of war economies within the West African region is very important, as the war economy in Sierra Leone did not occur in a vacuum. The conflict in Sierra Leone formed an integral part of the West African regional conflict system, as it involved actors from the region, and because natural resources were smuggled out of the country into other countries, in the region, such as Liberia and Guinea.

Working papers that explore the war economy in Sierra Leone include Clapham (2003) and Richards (2003) who both look at the political economy of internal conflict in Sierra Leone. Clapham approaches the case study from a distinct historical perspective, whereas Richards (2003) focuses on the actors involved in the conflict.

It is important to note that most of the sources mentioned above look at the issue of war economies from a theoretical perspective, as very little empirical analysis has been done so far. Although econometric studies, such as the work by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Collier et al (2003) make a valuable contribution, these types of studies are often constrained by the lack of up-to-date and accurate data. Therefore, this study will use statistics as far as they are useful, but will not rely heavily on econometric models.

Generally, the literature on war economies emphasises the economic dimensions of armed conflict, focusing specifically on the challenge posed by war economies to post-conflict reconstruction. The theoretical nature of the literature could be viewed as a possible weakness. However, in the absence of thorough empirical studies, they form the basis for future in-depth studies. This

thesis attempts to bring together theoretical analysis with empirical evidence regarding war economies and post-conflict reconstruction.

1.4.4 Post-conflict reconstruction

As previously mentioned under the "post-conflict peacebuilding" section of this chapter, the term "post-conflict reconstruction" is used in this study because it lends itself to describing political, security, social and economic reconstruction, and is utilised by organisations such as the African Union and in documents published by NEPAD.

An important source on post-conflict reconstruction is the *African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework* drafted by the NEPAD Secretariat in 2005, which sets out an African strategy for post-conflict reconstruction. The document outlines and defines several terms including "peacebuilding" and "reconstruction". Peacebuilding is defined as an "action to identify and support measures and structures that will strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict". Reconstruction signifies "a long term process of rebuilding the political, security, social and economic dimensions of a society emerging from conflict by addressing the root causes of the conflict" (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iii).

Overall, the NEPAD framework for post-conflict reconstruction is comprehensive, however Murithi (2006: 19) identifies a few shortcomings, including the lack of gender mainstreaming in the document, as well as an unclear position on the role of civil society in the post-conflict reconstruction process. Other challenges for the framework are discussed in Chapter 2. The NEPAD framework is very closely linked to the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework,* published by the CSIS in 2002. Of particular relevance to this study is the social and economic well-being pillar of the framework, identified earlier in this chapter.

Also included in this study is the AU framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), which is geared towards developing policy and implementation guidelines for actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction. The AU PCRD makes use of six elements, one of which is socio-economic reconstruction and development (African Union 2006: 3 – 4).
Most importantly for this study is the UN Peacebuilding Commission's country-specific framework for Sierra Leone. The *Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework* includes a focus on the challenges and risks associated with peacebuilding, mutual commitments, and a review and tracking of progress of the reconstruction process (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 2-3).

General discussions of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone include Ayissi and Poulton (2006), who edited a volume titled *Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, as well as Malan, Meek, Thusi, Ginifer and Coker (2003), who authored *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*. Both books provide a good overview of activities that fall under the key areas identified under the NEPAD post-conflict reconstruction framework, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and justice and reconciliation, but do not focus on the economic dimension. In their assessment of post-conflict peacebuilding in Sierra Leone, Albrecht and Malan (2006) make particular mention of economic development in the country, as well as the costs of certain reform activities, including security sector reform (SSR). Grant (2005) explores the prospect of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone in terms of the role of diamonds and foreign aid. Baker and May (2004) identify indicators of reconstruction, including youth alienation (also identified by Clapham (2003) as an important factor), state corruption (linked to Reno's Shadow State theory) and reconciliation.

Although the literature mentioned above explores the process of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone in a great amount of detail, no study has really focused on the economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra

Leone. In addition, no study has linked this to the problem of the war economy that developed in the country. Therefore, this thesis contributes to existing literature on post-conflict reconstruction as it attempts to explain the process from a different perspective.

1.4.5 Peace economy

There are currently few sources dedicated exclusively to the study of peace economies. Rather, the term "peace economy" is seen as an end-result of a successful post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Therefore, the literature covering the theme of peace economies is the same or similar as that for post-conflict reconstruction and, to a certain degree, on literature discussing war economies. This study is one of the first to discuss what such an economy will look like, because it moves beyond the idea that a peace economy is simply the opposite of a war economy. This notion can be linked to Collier et al (2003) who argue that civil conflict is development in reverse. In reality, peace economies should represent the outcome of addressing the root causes of conflict, in addition to being the goal of a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

Literature on the concept of "peace" reveals that there are several conceptions of the term, including the idea of "liberal peace". The main components of liberal peace include democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and neo-liberal development. Critiques of the liberal peace project have often concentrated on the incompatibility of some phases of democratisation and economic reform with the goal of building liberal peace.

Authors such as Richmond (2006) and Pugh (2005) have analysed the liberal peace idea in detail. These discussions are revealed in more detail in Chapter 2. What is useful from their critiques is that post-conflict reconstruction strategies should consider what type of peace should be created. To take this

one step further, post-conflict reconstruction strategies should take into account the kind of peace economy that is produced.

In addition, works by authors such as Johan Galtung on the difference between negative and positive peace is important for a discussion about post-conflict reconstruction because it determines whether a broad or narrow approach to peacebuilding should be used. According to Galtung (2002: xvi), peacebuilding encompasses "the practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development". Galtung also includes peacebuilding under a "third generation" of peace approaches that have emerged in the post-Cold War era. This "third generation" recognises the deep-rooted nature of conflict and its impact on development (Galtung 2002: xvi). Although the initial work of Galtung on positive and negative peace has become less prominent, what has emerged is a focus on the link between positive peace and the notion of justice. Overall, "positive" post-war peacebuilding should not only include plans for socio-economic and political reconstruction, but also promote social justice and reconciliation (Llamazares 2005: 5-6).

According to Spear (2006: 168), "focusing on political economies for peace is a relatively new research agenda for those working on post-conflict peace building [sic] and takes as a point of departure the work done on war economies". She also argues that a peace economy has to be more attractive for actors that were involved in the war economy. Nitschke and Studdard (2005) make a number of policy recommendations in order to transform war economies to peace economies, including that socio-economic support should not be neglected in processes such as DDR.

This study will use existing literature on war economies in order to determine the type of peace economy that should be created by the post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone. By analysing the economic factors that would affect the peace process in the country, this study can identify the

economic policies that would effectively transform the war economy into a peace economy.

1.5 Research problem of the study

The central research problem of the study focuses on whether the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone can successfully transform the war economy into a peace economy.

The research problem above is assessed by exploring the development of the Shadow State and the subsequent war economy in Sierra Leone, and by highlighting challenges that the Shadow State and war economy pose for post-conflict reconstruction and the creation of a peace economy. Identifying the most important challenges to the creation of a peace economy and assessing whether the current post-conflict strategy is addressing these challenges create the assessment criteria. In addition, a discussion of the root causes of conflict is included within this framework, as political stability has a direct effect on economic stability in a country.

In this thesis, it is argued that the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy is not adequately addressing the challenges posed by the war economy and the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and therefore that a successful peace economy cannot be created at present.

The purpose of this study is to firstly expand on the existing research on war economies by exploring a case study, namely Sierra Leone, and secondly, to assess whether the post-conflict reconstruction strategy employed in Sierra Leone adequately addresses the specific challenges posed by the war economy. The case study is analysed using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 of this study. The framework comprises of two main themes – economic agendas during armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. The first key theme is broken down into the sub-themes of the

Shadow State and the war economy of Sierra Leone. The second sub-theme is divided into post-conflict reconstruction and the peace economy. The theoretical framework used in this study combines key theories that are applicable to the case study in order to assess whether the central research question can be answered.

Important questions that will be asked in this study include: what economic (and other) measures can be implemented to facilitate the transition from the war economy to a peace economy in Sierra Leone? Which actors, both political and economic, are best equipped to guarantee this transition? How can economic structures contribute in creating a peaceful economic and political environment?

1.6 Methodological aspects of the study

A qualitative research method has been selected for this study, as accurate quantitative data is not available for this specific case study. However, quantitative data is used to support the qualitative arguments presented in this study. The main aim of this qualitative study is to ascertain whether the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone successfully transformed the war economy into a peace economy. The study achieves this through the exploration of two main themes, namely economic agendas during civil conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding.

The literature survey revealed that this study relies mainly on information found in primary and secondary literature sources and data released by academics and researchers interested in the fields of economic agendas during armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as international financial and development institutions such as the African Union and NEPAD, the World Bank and the United Nations. Important secondary literature sources consist of books and chapters written by researchers at academic and research institutes, including the International Peace Academy, the Clingendael Institute, the Berghof Institute and the Institute for Security Studies. Secondary sources also

include journal articles, discussion papers and documents available on the Internet.

1.7 Structure of the study

Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the study and includes the research theme, literature survey, research problem, methodological aspects and the structure of the thesis. An outline of the study follows below.

Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical background of the thesis. Firstly, descriptions of the main concepts of the study, namely “Shadow State”, “war economy”, “post-conflict reconstruction” and “peace economy” are provided. Secondly, the theoretical section provides an overview of the key theme of economic agendas during armed conflict, including investigations of the Shadow State theory and the challenge of war economies; and the key theme of post-conflict peacebuilding, which includes the sub-themes of post-conflict reconstruction and the peace economies. In addition, a motivation for using Sierra Leone as a case study to explore the themes above is included.

Chapter 3 provides a brief chronological background to the conflict and immediate post-conflict situation in Sierra Leone. The historical roots of the conflict, the development of the Shadow State, and the emergence of the war economy are also briefly examined. In addition, a discussion of the key economic and political issues that led to the existence of the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone is included.

Chapter 4 makes use of the framework developed in Chapter 2 in order to analyse the war economy of Sierra Leone. The Shadow State theory is presented as one perspective on the emergence and sustainability of the war economy in this case study. This chapter thus provides the background to the current situation of post-conflict reconstruction, discussed in Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 firstly sets out a specific framework, using the post-conflict reconstruction theory explored in Chapter 2. This framework is then utilised to assess the current transformation attempts in Sierra Leone, with a particular focus on the economic dimensions of the process towards a peace economy.

Chapter 6 concludes the study with an overall discussion of the findings, revealing whether the central question of the study has been answered: has the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone successfully transformed the war economy into a peace economy? Concluding arguments are made regarding the use of the Shadow State theory, war economies, post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies to analyse the case study. Recommendations concerning future analyses of war and peace economies are also provided.

1.8 Conclusion

The challenge of transforming war economies to economies of peace is becoming an increasingly important topic that needs to be researched in more detail, especially on the African continent. The economic environment during a conflict has a vast influence on a post-conflict economy and a post-conflict reconstruction strategy. Therefore, this study provides a thorough investigation of how a Shadow State can facilitate the creation of a war economy, and how this combination can be tackled by a post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

This chapter provided an overview of the two main themes that make up this study. The first theme, economic agendas during armed conflict, was discussed in terms of the Shadow State theory and war economies. The second theme, post-conflict peacebuilding, was evaluated by exploring post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies. A survey of the literature revealed that although theoretical information on the themes above exists, little empirical work has been done to date.

The aim of this study is to contribute to the existing body of literature by investigating a specific case study, Sierra Leone, and assessing whether the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in the country will transform the war economy into a peace economy. The overview provided in this chapter is used in Chapter 2 to develop a framework of analyses for the case study of Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER 2

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 introduced the broad research themes of economic agendas during armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding. These broad themes were then broken down into four sub-themes, including the theory of the Shadow State and war economies, which fall under the economic agendas during armed conflict theme; and post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies, which are included under the post-conflict peacebuilding theme. Each term was defined briefly and then discussed in greater detail in order to show its importance to the study.

The literature survey provided in Chapter 1 investigated some of the primary and secondary sources that are used in this study, noting that most sources available on the subject of economic agendas and post-conflict peacebuilding focus predominantly on the theoretical aspects of the themes, and that little empirical work has been done to date. Therefore, this study contributes to the existing body of literature by assessing the case study of Sierra Leone, utilising a specific framework of analysis to identify and evaluate the war economy, and determining whether the present post-conflict reconstruction strategy is adequately addressing the challenges presented by such an economic system.

The research problem of this study investigates the development of the Shadow State and the subsequent war economy in Sierra Leone, and highlights the challenges posed by the Shadow State and war economy for post-conflict reconstruction and the creation of a peace economy.

The research problem is analysed using a theoretical framework introduced and explained in this chapter. This theoretical framework is formed from the sub-themes mentioned above. Each sub-theme is discussed under its main theme,

by identifying its main characteristics, how it relates to other sub-themes of the study, and how it relates to the case study of Sierra Leone. This framework forms the basis of an analysis of the case study provided in Chapters 4 and 5. Therefore, this chapter includes only a brief examination of how the sub-themes relate to the case study.

This chapter commences with an exploration of economic agendas during armed conflict, by firstly discussing the Shadow State theory as proposed by Reno, and secondly by investigating the challenge of war economies. The Shadow State theory is used specifically as an explanatory theory of war economies. The examination of war economies focuses on the development of this type of economic system, the role of shadow networks, and the relevance of war economies to the maintenance of a Shadow State. However, this study represents a departure from the traditional discussion of the transition from war economies to peace economies because it explores the results of post-conflict reconstruction efforts in a specific case study.

The second section of this chapter focuses on the post-conflict peacebuilding theme, by firstly examining the process of post-conflict reconstruction, and secondly by considering peace economies as a goal of economic reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction is discussed by looking at the development of a framework of analysis, overcoming the challenge of Shadow States and war economies, and the link to peace economies. The sub-theme of peace economies is considered in terms of its relationship with conflict infrastructure, and peace economies as an aim of post-conflict reconstruction.

Lastly, concluding remarks are made with regards to the overall theoretical framework and the applicability thereof to the case study of Sierra Leone. The importance of the theory for Chapters 4 and 5 is highlighted, in addition to setting the scene for Chapter 3, the background to the current situation in Sierra Leone.

2.2 Economic agendas during armed conflict

Chapter 1 introduced the theme of economic agendas during armed conflict by providing a brief historical overview of this research area. The development of economic agendas during armed conflict is certainly not a new phenomenon; however, only recently have studies been undertaken to explore the impact these economic agendas have on conflict. As mentioned previously, early research on the economic dimensions of conflict focused primarily on the costs of conflict through three main approaches. The first approach, predominantly found in reports by the United Nations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), views conflict as a temporary disruption to the process of development, or as an obstacle to achieving developmental goals. Researchers such as Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler at the World Bank describe armed conflict as "development in reverse" (Collier et al 2003: 2). The second approach focuses on the irrational nature of conflict through miscommunication and misunderstanding between parties. The third approach looks at conflict as the recurrence of "ancient hatreds". Duffield (2000: 74) argues that this approach sees conflict as being "backward".

All the approaches above view conflict as an interruption to "normal" political, social and economic life. However, studies conducted during the late 1990s moved away from the focus on the costs of conflict and viewing conflict as "temporary, irrational and backward" (Duffield 2000: 74). In addition, many studies have also included the role that natural resources play in determining the length and endurance of conflict. The impact of resource abundance or resource scarcity can be summed up as the "greed versus grievance" or "resource curse" debate.

There are two predominant schools of thought in the debate surrounding the role of natural resources in conflict. The first views natural resources as a catalyst for conflict, as actors will fight to gain access to resources such as timber and diamonds. The second school of thought argues that the scarcity of

resources drives actors to go to war and that violence results from want (de Soysa 2000: 114). In his statistical approach to the greed versus grievance debate, de Soysa finds that it is an abundance of resources rather than a scarcity of resources that fuels armed conflict (de Soysa 2000: 127). However, Ballentine and Sherman (2003: 5) argue that this conclusion is the result of quantitative statistical analysis and, therefore, should be seen as "probabilistic statements of conflict risk, rather than factual descriptions of actual conflict dynamics in the specific real-world instances that preoccupy policymakers". Statistics certainly have a role to play in determining how economic factors contribute to conflict; however, they only reveal certain aspects of the problem.

This study proposes a move away from the resource curse debate, by pursuing an empirical examination of the role of economic factors in influencing the motivation for and endurance of conflict. This is achieved through the identification of the primary actors who profit during times of conflict, as well as an investigation of the factors that bring about an environment in which armed conflict arises. Moreover, this study examines the economic motivations of actors involved in conflict, whether directly or indirectly because "just as the costs and benefits of war are borne differently by different participants in war economies, so too are the costs and benefits of peace" (Ballentine and Sherman 2003: 5-6).

The following section discusses the first sub-theme of economic agendas during armed conflict, the Shadow State theory, in terms of its main characteristics. These include the role of informal markets, the importance of external actors, the presence of state and institutional collapse, the impact of corruption, and the role of civil society. In addition, the Shadow State theory is linked to war economies, and more specifically, the Shadow State in Sierra Leone is linked to the war economy in that country.

2.2.1 Shadow State theory

The theory of the Shadow State is important for the main theme of economic agendas during civil conflict because it explains the context in which the war economy developed in Sierra Leone. This study argues that the formation of a Shadow State enabled a war economy to materialise during the civil conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002. The section below describes the Shadow State in terms of its main characteristics, how it relates to the sub-theme of war economies, and its relevance for the case study of Sierra Leone.

Chapter 1 provided a brief examination of the African state debate and made an argument for why the Shadow State theory was chosen to explore the case study of Sierra Leone. William Reno developed the theory of the Shadow State as he observed first-hand what was happening in Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s. He documented these observations in *Corruption in state politics in Sierra Leone* in 1995. In successive articles and books, Reno expanded on his initial theory by exploring the link between the Shadow State and clandestine economies, as well as the decline of the formal state, and the privatisation of state sovereignty. In addition, Reno (2000b) explores the role of the youth in the Shadow State, an issue that is also investigated by authors such as Clapham (2003), and considers the political economy of violence in the Shadow State as well as the important role that natural resources play in the creation and maintenance of the Shadow State, which has been mentioned earlier in this chapter through reference to the greed versus grievance debate.

As outlined in Chapter 1, Reno developed his Shadow State theory to describe situations where rulers use informal markets as a way to construct political authority, thereby undermining government institutions (Reno 1995: 1). The Shadow State theory explores the relationship between corruption and politics, as the system created by the Shadow State is ideal for corruptive economic activity by rulers and their associates.

The Shadow State "is a form of personal rule", where an individual ruler makes decisions that do not subscribe to a set of written laws of a state, even though these might exist. The foundations of the Shadow State are formed by a ruler's capacity to control external actors' access to formal and informal markets (Reno 2000a: 434). Shadow State rulers rely on the global recognition of state sovereignty to conceal their manipulation of formal government institutions in order to increase their personal power. Rulers use the façade of formal statehood in order to gain political and economic power, and therefore are able to create "informally commercially oriented networks", which function alongside government bureaucracies that still exist (Funke and Solomon 2002: 1). The formal institutions of government are undermined by such a system, and in many cases, rulers fear that these institutions may undermine their own quest for power. Therefore, rulers will only grant government institutions enough power in order to generate the appearance that these institutions are actually functioning.

Funke and Solomon (2002) expand on Reno's definition of the Shadow State by concentrating on three areas closely related to the term. These areas include the role played by external actors in Shadow State activities, the "presence of symptoms of or actual state collapse in regimes with strong indications of Shadow State elements" and the important role played by civil society in the Shadow State (Funke and Solomon 2002: 2). The third factor is especially relevant because Reno did not include the role of civil society in his early study, and is discussed in greater detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

According to Clapham (1996: 249), Reno devised the Shadow State theory in order to analyse the peculiar relationship between politics and corruption in Sierra Leone. Clapham believes it is an attempt to extend the analysis of informal markets. A Shadow State is founded on a ruler's ability to control markets, and not on legitimate political and economic power or control of government institutions. Control over a Shadow State is done only as a matter of convenience rather than a necessity, as greedy individuals in governmental

positions capture foreign aid channelled through formal state institutions in order to construct patrimonial networks. Foreign aid can also be captured by insurgent groups and used as an advantage for rebel leaders.

There are external as well as domestic elements to how Shadow States operate. Leaders need a certain degree of local support, usually maintained through a system of coercion, but they are far more reliant on external financial support. Under the guise of formal statehood, these leaders will gain access to foreign exchange, and as formal markets slowly disintegrate, so the opportunity to extract resources from the informal sector becomes vital (Clapham 1996: 251).

Linked to the Shadow State theory is "state inversion". Forrest (1998) defines state inversion as a process where “government institutions become increasingly dysfunctional and end up turning inward toward themselves rather than outward toward society” (Forrest 1998: 46). Although inverted states retain their relationships with societies, these relationships are often limited to illicit trade networks. In addition, inverted states “provide international actors with a relatively familiar pretend-administrative structure and a pretend-set of bureaucratic rules and offices” (Forrest 1998: 46). Forrest (1998: 47) argues that there are four main factors that have led to the development of inverted states. These include the transformation of the international state system, the privatisation of the African state, and the decline in the reliability of African armed forces and an increase in non-traditional challenges to the state.

Particularly valuable to this study is the privatisation of the African state as this phenomenon impacts on the ability of African governments to “respond to the challenges of economic decline, with its component parts increasingly captured by informal social and economic networks” (Forrest 1998: 48). The government's focus turns away from drafting sound economic policy towards gaining access to more profitable markets. Forrest’s idea of state inversion complements Reno’s Shadow State theory as the two concepts describe similar processes.

Reno's Shadow State theory presents an alternative framework to traditional understandings of the African state by recognising the sustainability of informal markets in Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular, and why so many of Africa's politicians and businessmen are drawn to the informal market. The informal market attracts a lot of attention from foreign investors, which in turn motivates politicians to harness better control over informal markets, often at the expense of state economic interests (Reno 1995: 9).

Reno explores two approaches to informal markets. The first is a state-centred approach that views informal markets as operating outside the control of the state. This approach relies on the idea that informal markets are symptoms of bad economic and political policies. Although the state-centred approach highlights the importance of state structures, the problem with this approach is that informal markets are only viewed as a reaction to state failure, rather than as "networks of informal economic exchange" (Reno 1995: 2). Therefore, informal markets are not seen as legitimate economic systems.

In contrast, the second approach is the society-centred approach, where informal markets are viewed as survival strategies for citizens who trade outside the reach of government authorities. This approach also includes individuals who switch between formal and informal markets in order to seize economic opportunities (Reno 1995: 11). The society-centred approach views the informal market as a legitimate economic system as it provides basic goods to the citizens of a country.

However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Reno actually discards both approaches described above in favour of a more holistic approach, and in the case of Sierra Leone, Reno focused on the relationship between local chiefs and the state itself (Englebert 1997: 772). Eriksen (2004) utilises a similar approach with regards to modern state theory, citing problems with both the state- and society-centred approaches to the state. As examined in Chapter 1, Eriksen proposes a

third model, which provides a "relational perspective", which considers the relationship between state and society. In his study, he argues that the state should be understood both in terms of its structure, through everyday state making, and how it relates to society, because a society also influences the state (Eriksen 2004: 13-15).

The relational perspective proposed by Eriksen is also valid for the discussion of the informal economy in Sierra Leone. Traditional analyses of African economies reveal a distinction between the formal state-controlled economy and the state-eluding informal economy. However, the Shadow State phenomenon sees this distinction often falling away and being replaced with a system where government officials willingly participate in the informal economy in order to take advantage of entrepreneurial opportunities or evade taxation (Clapham 1996: 251). Therefore, the boundaries between the formal and informal economy become blurred, and are defined by the relationships between actors, rather than on the actual structure of each economy.

Although Reno focused much of his primary study on the politics of informal markets, he included other aspects of informal markets in order to present a more holistic approach. The advantage of such an approach is that it exposes clandestine activity in circumstances where qualitative data is not available (Reno 1995: 5). Reno's study also includes Jean François Bayart's identification of political authority, the "politique du ventre" ("politics of the belly"), where economic accumulation and political authority meet to form the basis of the Shadow State (Bayart 1989: 257). Bayart also refers to the "state hegemonic project", where a ruler of a country will accommodate a chosen group of elites in order to create an environment that can enhance the ruler's power. This can be done via legal or illegal methods, as long as the ruler has the most control (Bayart 1989: 257). An example of the "state hegemonic project" in Sierra Leone is illicit mining and smuggling, because it can simultaneously be considered a form of economic sabotage and a ruler's political survival strategy.

While Bayart does not focus specifically on the shortcomings of the "state hegemonic project", it is important for Reno's analysis that these be included. A ruler will not necessarily have complete control over the informal market or the elites selected to uphold the "state hegemonic project". The role of outside actors and international markets cannot be ignored. In addition, rulers remain bound to the rules and regulations of state institutions, even if they manipulate these institutions (Reno 1995: 23).

As already discussed in Chapter 1, the works of Chabal and Daloz (1999), and Bayart et al (1999) contribute to an exploration of the Shadow State because the authors provide alternative views of state dysfunction in Africa. Chabal and Daloz include a thorough investigation of how corruption is perceived on the African continent. Their discussion links to the theory of the Shadow State, which explores the relationship between corruption and politics, because it highlights how a seemingly dysfunctional economic and political system actually works (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 101).

In their discussion of the criminalisation of the African state, Bayart et al (1999) argue that traditional economic measures, such as trade liberalisation and deregulation, do not always produce the desired effects of increased economic development in countries "where economic relations are dominated not by markets but by specific networks of operators" (Bayart et al 1999: 90). In these countries, economic regulation is increasingly influenced by the personal preferences of those in power, rather than on a system of rules and regulations. In addition, competition for resources between the dominant economic groups within society could lead to conflict in the long term.

The development of a Shadow State does not, in all cases, necessarily produce violence. However, Reno believes that in the absence of an authority that is "willing or capable of providing a public good, entrepreneurs manage their own economic environments through means of violence" (Reno 2000b: 54-55). Groups often find it in their best interest to challenge each other rather than to

cooperate for resources. In this respect, control over natural resources can greatly increase the power and influence a group can have over other groups and even the government of a country. Initial violence can develop into a full-scale conflict if political, social and economic conditions deteriorate to such a large extent that the state no longer has control over its citizens. In the case of Sierra Leone, the Shadow State became violent and a war economy emerged as civil conflict began in 1991. The economic system created by the Shadow State forms the foundation of the war economy, as actors continue to pursue the same economic control, but with the addition of violence as a means to achieve this goal.

The following section provides a detailed discussion of the main characteristics of a war economy, how it links to the Shadow State, and how it relates to the case study of Sierra Leone. The relationship between the two concepts forms the basis of the main theme of economic agendas during civil conflict.

2.2.2 War economy

The second sub-theme of economic agendas during armed conflict is the challenge of war economies. Chapter 1 provided a definition of the term and reviewed prominent literature on the topic. It was argued that the term "war economy" not only includes all economic activity that occurs during times of conflict, but actually conceptualises the enduring nature of conflicts, especially where natural resources play a dominant role. In addition, reference was made to the importance of the regional dimension of war economies, as these economic systems rarely operate in a vacuum.

While the emergence of war economies is not a new phenomenon, as was revealed in Chapter 1, the “specific configuration of localized wars, shadow economies and the globalization of illegal economies” has developed into a new kind of political economy with strong links to conflict (Douma 2005: 10). War

economies have the remarkable ability to evade national governments and international law by challenging domestic and international financial regulations. To summarise, war economies "refer to the economic mechanisms that allow actors, including all types of state and non-state actors, to conduct wars or to participate in violent conflict" (Douma 2005: 20).

In his discussion of war economies, Duffield (2000: 73) offers a different view on the concepts or "war" and "peace", stating that both are state-centred terms, and are appropriate for a time when only nation-states had the power to start and end wars. War economies, therefore, "not only have similar transnational and networked characteristics to the conventional global economy, at national level, they have a good deal in common with the relations and structures that constitute the peace economies of the regions in which they operate" (Duffield 2000: 73). In many parts of the world, war and peace have become relational terms, and due to similar internal structures and interactions with the outside world, the terms are only distinguishable by the presence of sustained violence. Given the problems with using a state-centric approach when analysing war economies, Duffield (2000: 74) proposes the use of the "post-nation-state" conflict. This concept overcomes the traditional view of conflict as being "temporary", "irrational" and "backward" and reflects the shift towards a broadened understanding of conflict and the impact of war economies.

Although war economies have distinct features, they often become so entrenched in the everyday operating economy that they become difficult to identify. Most war economies operate parallel to the economy of a country but can also merge, overlap and distort that economy.

According to Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005: 12), the distinctive features of war economies are the following:

- They involve the destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines between the formal, informal, and criminal sectors and activities;
- Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against civilians is used by combatants to acquire control over lucrative assets, capture trade networks and diaspora remittances, and exploit labour;
- War economies are highly decentralised and privatised, both in the means of coercion and in the means of production and exchange;
- Combatants increasingly rely on the licit or illicit exploitation of/trade in lucrative natural resources where these assets are available, and;
- They thrive on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict and instability.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Goodhand (2004: 257) divides the concept "war economy" into three categories: the combat economy, the shadow economy and the coping economy. These three economies will overlap, but this categorisation process simplifies matters by separating the different actors, motives and activities during armed conflict. In a combat economy, the key actors include commanders, "conflict entrepreneurs", fighters, and suppliers of weapons. Military objectives will ensure a conflict is sustained in order to maintain power, status or wealth. Peace can only really be an option if an alternative plan includes viable livelihood strategies. The activities that fall under the combat economy include the taxation of legal or illegal combat equipment and arms, as well as asset stripping and looting and the manipulation of aid.

The shadow economy focuses more on economic actors such as businessmen, drug traffickers and profiteers, especially in the field of diamond smuggling and

illegal commodity sales. The shadow economy operates on the margins of the conflict (thus bringing in regional and international networks). In order for peace to be obtained here, a direct attack has to be made on the illicit networks created by this specific system; otherwise, a criminalised peace economy will be created. The shadow economy has strong links with the Shadow State, because Shadow State actors create the shadow economy. In their analysis of Sierra Leone's war economy, Pugh et al (2004: 99) argue that the war economy utilised existing shadow trade networks within the West African region. A detailed discussion of this process is provided in Chapters 3 and 4.

The coping economy focuses on the poor communities who rely on subsistence or basic services in order to survive. Any successful reconstruction strategy would have to focus on job creation, humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance, and overall access to socio-economic rights. This strategy would also have to take into account what these groups have done for themselves. A detailed analysis of how the post-reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone tackles this challenge is included in Chapter 5.

Civil war has an inevitable impact on those not directly involved in the immediate fighting. The people living in an area where rebels or government soldiers may be fighting often find themselves victims of looting. These people lose cattle, houses and other belongings due to pillaging. In order to prevent further losses, people often shift their movable assets abroad. Studies have shown that before conflict, the typical civil war country holds 9 percent of its private wealth abroad, and by the end of a civil war, 20 percent of this wealth will be held abroad. The average overall capital flight numbers are most likely far higher than recorded (Goodhand 2004: 257-258).

Economic losses due to civil war are not just created by the diversion of resources from production, but also the damage caused by these resources when they are used to aid violence. The infrastructure of a country can be completely devastated by both government and rebel groups, as ports, airports,

roads, bridges and telecommunication lines are strategic targets. Rebel and government soldiers also often loot and destroy housing, schools and health facilities.

During civil war, governments increase military expenditure and this would certainly reduce spending on development projects and on promoting economic growth. Collier et al (2003: 13) define a developing country as one with less than USD 3,000 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at 1995 USD rates. Such a developing country spends an average of 2.8 per cent GDP on the military during peacetime. A sharp decrease in public expenditure, such as on infrastructure or health, will have negative consequences for incomes and social indicators. In this view, civil war disrupts the normal investment time horizons, and families and community links are often severed (Collier et al 2003: 13-14).

War has both positive and negative effects on a country's economy; however, war generally obstructs legitimate economic development and undermines overall prosperity. Traditionally, the most consistent short-term economic effect of war is to push up commodity prices and consequently the standard of living is reduced. Present day wars, especially civil wars, continue to fuel inflation and drive currencies towards worthlessness. Another negative effect of war is severe capital depletion. Usually during war, capital such as farms, factories and cities are destroyed and thus economic output is severely depressed (Goldstein 2003).

Civil wars are very costly to an economy. However, civil conflict creates opportunities for profit that are not usually available during peacetime. This distinguishes the profit made during wartime to that made in a peace economy. It is important to note that both peace and war economies utilise the existing structures and networks available. The positive and negative effects come into play when actors abuse the system, by trading illegal goods to buy arms, for example.

Collier (1999) mentions five specific civil war profit opportunities. Firstly, he argues that life during civil war becomes increasingly less predictable. The result is that people who would have sought long-term business opportunities shorten their time horizons. This is logical, as it does not make good business sense to invest in an area that is expected to become unstable. Secondly, civil war brings with it increased criminal activity, as governments spend money on the military rather than police services. This means that the risks of punishment for crime decrease, resulting in an increase of crimes such as theft. Thirdly, markets are always disrupted by instability during civil war. Fourthly, trade becomes more monopolistic as competition decreases. Finally, rent-seeking predation on trade increases for rebels, and may even increase for government officials, as their actions become less open to scrutiny.

Primary commodities play an enormous role in war economies. The reason for this is because primary commodity exports are the most lootable of all economic activities. These commodities are heavily taxed and exports of such commodities are vulnerable because their production relies heavily on long-lasting and immobile assets (Collier 2001: 160). In the case of Sierra Leone, legal and illegal trade in diamonds had a great impact on determining the intensity and endurance of the conflict in that country.

In modern war economies, the informal economy usually dominates because the formal government economy is not functional or simply does not exist. This is seen, for example, in civil wars. This ties in directly with the Shadow State, as the informal market plays a key role in the maintenance of a Shadow State system, which was certainly the case in Sierra Leone. Therefore, the informal economy is where the Shadow State and war economy are entrenched.

War is very often, especially by "development" literature, portrayed as an interruption in a process of (positive) development and a major disruption to the economy as a whole. However, war is not always purely destructive and

political scientists and economists often only see the chaos created by contemporary civil wars rather than exploring the new system of profit, power and protection (Keen 2000: 21-22).

Warring sides need to sustain themselves financially; the important question arises of how they accomplish this exactly. The economic theory of conflict thus does not focus on the motives for the start of a conflict, but rather on how long it can remain financially viable. Several economic characteristics of a country could potentially contribute to creating a conflict situation. One of these characteristics is the dependence of a country's GDP on primary commodities. The reason for this is because primary commodity exports are the most lootable of all economic activities due to their enduring and fixed nature. However, characteristics such as this do not act in isolation, and are supplemented by political, cultural and religious factors.

The civil war and civil war economy of a state do not solely affect that state. Civil war has a severe impact on the economies of surrounding countries as well as economic regions. Throughout these regions, economic growth tends to decline and investment flows, especially foreign investment, diminish or disappear altogether (Collier 2003: 42). However, in some regions, such as West Africa, shadow or illegal trading networks continue to operate even during times of conflict.

Conflicts have been protracted by the use of transnational economic links; these rely mostly on the smuggling of a state's natural resources for the supply of military hardware required for sustaining a war. Contemporary access to global markets has been based on transcontinental smuggling networks for the sale of highly valued commodities, including precious minerals, hardwoods, contraband drugs, arms, fuel, equipment and food (Naidoo 2000: 25-26).

An investigation of the importance of regional networks is provided in Chapter 3, in terms of how the regional trading network helped shape the Shadow State in

Sierra Leone, and in Chapter 4, which provides a discussion of regional shadow trade helped sustain the war economy in that country. The next section examines the theme of post-conflict peacebuilding by investigating the two key sub-themes – post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies.

2.3 Post-conflict peacebuilding

As already indicated in Chapter 1, the theme of "peacebuilding" was popularised by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace.* The understanding of peacebuilding proposed in *An Agenda for Peace* generally treated conflict as a linear process, and therefore linked peacebuilding with the post-conflict period, which includes conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacekeeping.

This study uses the narrower definition as proposed by Hänggi (2005: 11), who adds "post-conflict" to "peacebuilding" in order to denote the narrow definition of the concept. Chapter 1 also outlined the argument for using the term "post-conflict reconstruction" over peacebuilding, because this study focuses primarily on the socio-economic dimensions of the process. This is not to conclude that the term only refers to the economic dimensions of reconstruction of a country after conflict. Rather, it promotes the idea that different dimensions within post-conflict reconstruction must be coordinated. It also reflects the terminology of institutions such as the African Union and, therefore, reflects a continental understanding of "post-conflict reconstruction".

2.3.1 Post-conflict reconstruction

Chapter 1 provided a comprehensive outline of post-conflict reconstruction, stating that post-conflict reconstruction is a holistic strategy that includes several dimensions, including promoting socio-economic reconstruction and development. A post-conflict reconstruction strategy should also aim at addressing the root causes of conflict, creating sustainable peace, promoting

social justice, and renewing participatory governance within a country (African Union 2006: 4).

Developing a framework for post-conflict reconstruction is quite a challenging undertaking, not only because of the lack of accurate data and information concerning the process, but also because of the broad scope of post-conflict reconstruction as a strategy.

Post-conflict reconstruction is an intricate multi-dimensional process of transformation from war to peace that supplies synchronised short-, medium- and long-term programmes. The process is aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict, and paves the way for sustainable peace. According to the NEPAD framework, post-conflict reconstruction moves through three variable phases: the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development phase. These phases should not be seen in a specific linear fashion, as they can overlap and intersect. The process starts once hostilities in a country have ended, usually indicated through the signing of a peace agreement or cease-fire agreement (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iv-v).

According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), post-conflict reconstruction incorporates three equally important key focus areas, namely the security dimension, the political dimension, and the socio-economic dimension (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2005). The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs utilises a similar framework in its approach to post-conflict reconstruction. This is important to note as it gives an indication of donor approaches to post-conflict reconstruction (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004: 5). The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) utilises a similar approach as that of the OECD, but adds a fourth "pillar" of justice and reconciliation (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2002).

The NEPAD Secretariat makes use of five dimensions: security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and coordination, management and resource mobilisation (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iv). The last dimension is particularly relevant for Africa due to the occurrence of resources-based conflicts.

More recently, the African Union (AU) developed a framework for post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD), which is much more focused on developing policy and implementation guidelines for post-conflict reconstruction practitioners. The AU PCRD makes use of six elements: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender (African Union 2006: 3-4).

In 2005, United Nations Resolution 60/180 and Security Council Resolution 1645 established the Peacebuilding Commission. The Commission was mandated to perform three key tasks, firstly to “bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on the proposed integrated strategies for post conflict peacebuilding and recovery”, secondly to “help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained financial investment over the medium to long-term”, and lastly to “develop best practices on issues in collaboration with political, security, humanitarian and development actors”.

In June 2006, the UN Peacebuilding Commission selected Sierra Leone as one of its first case studies, and developed a Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework, which included a focus on the challenges and risks associated with peacebuilding, mutual commitments, and a review and tracking of progress of the reconstruction process. At a preliminary country-specific meeting in 2006, the Government of Sierra Leone outlined a number of challenges for achieving sustainable peace including, “social and youth empowerment and employment”, “consolidating democracy and good governance, justice and security sector reform”, and “capacity building” (United

Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2006: 1). A detailed analysis of the Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework for Sierra Leone follows in Chapter 5.

There are a number of practical issues attached to the post-conflict reconstruction frameworks discussed above. Firstly, it should be understood that the key areas mentioned in each framework do not operate in isolation, and must be put into practice simultaneously in order to develop an acceptable level of momentum for development. Secondly, any post-conflict reconstruction strategy must take into account the conflict system in a country by creating a unique strategy for that country. Thirdly, post-conflict reconstruction strategies should also incorporate regional issues, as no country operates in isolation and it is important to coordinate strategies in order to avoid unnecessary conflict in the future. Finally, there must be a sense of local ownership if any post-conflict reconstruction strategy is to succeed. This is not limited to informing and educating the local population about the plans that will be implemented, it means consulting these actors during the development of the strategy, as well as its execution (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iv-v). As post-conflict reconstruction is largely an external actor driven process, this last issue can become very problematic. It is therefore vital that all the actors involved in the process of developing a post-conflict reconstruction framework are aware of the challenges involved.

This study will focus on the socio-economic dimensions of the post-conflict reconstruction strategies put forward by the NEPAD Secretariat, the AU, and the UN peacebuilding framework for Sierra Leone. The UN framework is particularly relevant because it is country specific, whereas the NEPAD Secretariat and AU strategies are more general, but also have an African focus. It is important to consider all three strategies, because each has distinct characteristics.

The socio-economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction can particularly tackle the problem of transforming war economies to peace economies.

According to Hänggi (2005: 13), the socio-economic dimension incorporates the following challenges:

- Repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
- Reconstruction of infrastructure and important public functions;
- Development of education and health, and;
- Private sector development, employment, trade and investment.

These challenges will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, where the post-conflict reconstruction framework is applied to the case study of Sierra Leone. At this stage, it is sufficient to be aware of the challenges and where they are situated in the broader framework of post-conflict reconstruction.

The NEPAD Secretariat devised a reconstruction system that incorporates the five sectors mentioned earlier. The reconstruction of a post-conflict country must include all spheres of society. Reconstruction activities will overlap both in terms of timing and focus. Post-conflict reconstruction is one “umbrella” strategy with several coordinated branches. Coordination is very important, otherwise resources may be squandered or groups may be ignored. In addition, a reconstruction strategy must take into account programmes that are already in place.

Socio-economic development incorporates five different aspects: humanitarian assistance, which includes food security, public health, shelter and the return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction; physical infrastructure, such as roads, ports, airports, electricity and telecommunications; social services like health and education; and the economy, where physical infrastructure needs to be rebuilt, employment should be generated, international trade should be better regulated, and positive foreign direct investment should be sought (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: 15).

The AU framework includes socio-economic development as one of its focus areas, which is defined as “a multidimensional process that contributes to improved living conditions, improved ability to meet basic needs (such as health, education, and food), the reduction of poverty and inequality and enhanced capacity of human beings to realise their potential” (African Union 2006: 4).

The socio-economic reconstruction and development section of the AU framework includes a number of objectives:

- Addressing the gap between relief and development;
- Formulating policies that address social inequity, during the transition, reconstruction and development phases;
- Undertaking comprehensive institution-building to enhance good economic governance;
- Building human resource capacity at local and national levels for policy development, needs assessment, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and activities;
- Building a technology base to support reconstruction and development, and;
- Developing physical infrastructure, including transport, communication, energy, water, health, and sanitation (African Union 2006: 4).

In addition, the PCRD framework includes a commitment to addressing the root causes of conflict, as well as a promoting national and local ownership. The last point is particularly important, as the success or failure of a reconstruction strategy often rests on how much involvement local communities had in developing their reconstruction process (African Union 2006: 4-5).

It is important to link post-conflict reconstruction to the transformation of war economies to peace economies. A post-conflict reconstruction strategy needs

to work both from a bottom-up and from a top-down perspective. Current approaches tend to focus on building state institutions, which are vital to any reconstruction strategy; however, these approaches tend to neglect the role that civil society has to play. The other problem with a state-centric approach is that civil society groups get lumped together; these often include economic actors who do not necessarily have the same purpose as social groups. In order to overcome the challenge of war economies, war economy actors need to be separated from other civil society actors.

Although most post-conflict reconstruction strategies include issues of political economy, the "economic agendas introduced on the coattails of international intervention have tended to disregard crucial aspects of war economies, especially their regional linkages and the functional aspects of shadow economy activity" (Pugh et al 2004: 3). Therefore, a reconstruction strategy must take into account the factors that created the war economy, and gear post-conflict reconstruction towards overcoming the root causes of conflict. In addition, the regional dimension of war economies should be considered, especially in regions where shadow trade networks formed the basis of the war economy. The UN Peacebuilding Framework for Sierra Leone specifically mentions the importance of the sub-regional dimension of peacebuilding, noting that conflict in one West African country often affects a neighbouring country in that region (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 8).

The following section discusses peace economies, which is the second sub-theme of peacebuilding and is closely related to the sub-theme of post-conflict reconstruction. As there is very little literature dedicated exclusively to peace economies, much of the examination of this sub-theme relies on sources that discuss war economies and post-conflict reconstruction.

2.3.2 Peace economy

A peace economy represents the end-result of post-conflict reconstruction strategies, and is certainly not limited to the early definition of being the opposite of a war economy. Chapter 1 explained that a discussion of peace economies should not only be limited to their relation with war economies, but that an overall understanding of the concept "peace", and especially "liberal peace" is required. Johan Galtung argues that peacebuilding includes the "practical aspects of implementing peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development", and that peacebuilding forms part of a "third generation" of peace processes, which identifies the root causes of conflict and how this impacts on long-term development (Galtung 2002: xvi).

Finding a precise definition of what is meant by "peace economy" is difficult because actors involved in the process will view "peace" differently. There is a growing debate amongst academics and peace practitioners around whether following the "liberal peace" model of post-conflict reconstruction is ultimately the most successful.

As described in Chapter 1, liberal peace reflects the Western understanding of the concept "peace", which includes the promotion of democratisation, the rule of law, and neo-liberal economic policies, amongst others (Turner and Pugh 2006: 474). Although the pursuit of these principles is important for building peace, the manner in which they are pursued usually reflects a top-down approach. It therefore indicates the beliefs of international actors (who traditionally drive the post-conflict reconstruction process) and does not the take into account the views of local populations. In addition, the "winners" of wars often determine what kind of peace will be built (Richmond 2006: 298).

A new understanding of the liberal peace is needed; one that incorporates the views of the local populations, and then the ideas of international actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction strategies. Moreover, post-conflict

reconstruction often fails to differentiate between civil society actors, grouping together all actors but the state. This means that some stronger or more influential civil society actors, such as businesses, may benefit more from reconstruction than others. More worryingly is the tendency of those implementing reconstruction strategies to talk about including local stakeholders in determining their own economic future, but not doing this in practice (Turner and Pugh 2006: 472-473).

According to Woodward (2002: 192), "[t]he war economies that must be transformed to peacetime economies in contemporary cases of civil war are not emergency adjustments to an otherwise normal economy but an entire transformation of social and political institutions". Therefore, international financial institutions and other aid donors involved in reconstruction processes must adjust their macroeconomic and fiscal policies in order to prevent war economy actors from gaining access to funds and diverting these away from rebuilding the state economy. It is also vital to understand how "local, microeconomic practices interlink with state, regional and global aspects of war economies" in order to build sustainable peace (Turner and Pugh 2006: 472).

In Sierra Leone, for example, the neo-liberal economic policies promoted by international financial institutions in the 1980s and 1990s actually undermined rather than rebuilt the state. During this time, the various leaders in Sierra Leone were able to use international financial institution demands for "reductions in state expenditure, privatization, and the use of foreign firms to weaken rivals and reward their own patrons" (Pugh et al 2004: 92). This practice aggravated tensions within the local society and hindered the peace process.

Overall, the pursuit of a peace economy should be reflected in the post-conflict reconstruction strategy for a country emerging from conflict. The economic dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction should complement the other

dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction, including the promotion of justice and human rights.

In terms of understanding the goal of attaining a peace economy, Sierra Leone presents an interesting case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, the current attempt at post-conflict reconstruction in the country has been informed by a better understanding of the role of economic agendas during times of armed conflict. Secondly, the country has had a number of failed peace agreements in the past, and it is intriguing to see whether lessons from these failures are being incorporated in the present reconstruction framework. Lastly, a better understanding of the war economy of Sierra Leone leads to an increased comprehension of the West African regional economic dynamics, and a better understanding of how a peace economy can be built (Pugh et al 2004: 91).

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework that will be applied in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this study. The first section explored the main theme of economic agendas during armed conflict in greater detail, based on the introduction to the theme in Chapter 1. The first sub-theme, namely, the theory of the Shadow State, was explained in great detail, outlining the main arguments made by Reno in the development of the theory, as well as how it relates to the case study of Sierra Leone. This section looked specifically at how the Shadow State in Sierra Leone laid the foundations for the war economy. The section that followed provided a discussion of war economies, which revealed their main characteristics and how they pose a challenge for post-conflict reconstruction strategies.

The second section of this chapter focused on the post-conflict peacebuilding theme, by firstly examining the process of post-conflict reconstruction, and secondly by considering peace economies as a goal of economic reconstruction. Post-conflict reconstruction was discussed by looking at the development of a

framework of analysis, overcoming the challenge of Shadow States and war economies, and the link to peace economies. The sub-theme of peace economies was considered in terms of its relationship with conflict infrastructure, and peace economies as an aim of post-conflict reconstruction.

Since the mid-1990s, several theories have been developed to analyse and explain African intra-state conflicts, such as the one in Sierra Leone. These include the greed versus grievance theory, presented by Collier (1999) and others, which was discussed earlier in this study. The greed versus grievance theory demonstrates the important role that statistics play in determining how economic factors contribute to conflict, however, this theory excludes the possibility that both greed and grievance may simultaneously contribute to a conflict. In addition, this theory has proven to be inadequate in providing a thorough understanding of the conflict dynamics in countries such as Sierra Leone. The four key themes discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 were selected because they recognise and understand the complexities of the case study.

The Shadow State theory was selected because the theory was initially developed by Reno (1995) using Sierra Leone as its primary case study. The evaluation of the war economy in Sierra Leone clearly considers the grievances that accumulated due to economic mismanagement, the widespread corruption that developed amongst elites, the impact of structural adjustment programmes of the 1990s, and the exclusion of the youth in the patronage system created by the Shadow State (Pugh et al 2004: 99).

The inclusion of a post-conflict analysis section sets this study apart from previous research done on Sierra Leone, which often only briefly mentions the post-conflict situation without proper in-depth analysis. The theory of post-conflict reconstruction utilised in this thesis is based on the current models used by bodies such as the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission and the African Union. This study represents a departure from similar studies because it

firstly explores the conflict period, and secondly, evaluates the current attempts at transforming the war economy to a peace economy in Sierra Leone.

The next chapter provides a background to how the development of the Shadow State contributed to the conflict in Sierra Leone, and investigates how the Shadow State provided a platform for the war economy in that country. Chapter 3, together with this chapter, provides the necessary background for a thorough analysis of the Shadow State and war economy, as well as post-conflict reconstruction and the pursuit of a peace economy in Sierra Leone in Chapters 4 and 5 of this study.

CHAPTER 3

Historical Background to the Conflict in Sierra Leone

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the development of the conflict in Sierra Leone with specific emphasis on the formation of the Shadow State and the creation of the war economy. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the necessary background to the conflict in order to contextualise the in-depth analysis of the key themes of this study in Chapters 4 and 5. The conflict overview used in this chapter identifies the key structures, actors and dynamics which have contributed to the conflict situation in Sierra Leone. Additionally, this chapter offers a better understanding of the historical and structural background of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The conflict analysis focuses primarily on the security, political, economic and social aspects that contributed to the development of the Shadow State and the subsequent war economy.

3.2 Overview of the pre-conflict period in Sierra Leone

Although there is a great deal of literature on the conflict in Sierra Leone, most sources merely skim through the historical background and proceed directly with an examination of the main issues and actors involved in the conflict. Fortunately, there are a few authors including Reno (1995) and Keen (2005), who offer a detailed discussion of the background to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Reno's (1995) historical analysis focuses on the creation of the Shadow State, through "a very detailed account of how formal state and political authorities drew support from or directly tapped into informal market networks, from the early part of the century through the military regime of the mid-1990s" (Harsch 1997: 674). Keen (2005) explores the actors and events in the pre-conflict period in terms of their political and economic relevance.

The following section summarises the detailed historical overview of the pre-conflict period, from the country's independence in 1961 to the start of the conflict in 1991.

Sierra Leone is a former British colony situated in West Africa. The country, which has a total area of 72,000 square kilometres, borders Guinea and Liberia and has a total estimated population of 5.6 million people (Clapham 2003: 7). Sierra Leone gained its independence from Britain in 1961, and was not an expected candidate for civil conflict given its multi-party political system and bright economic prospects. The country also had certain advantages over other African states: a comparatively small territory, abundant resources, good educational institutions and multi-party politics. "Sierra Leone may simply have been unlucky in its combination of proximity to Liberia and possession of very valuable – easily extractable resources – most notably in the form of alluvial diamonds" (Keen 2005: 8).

Although Sierra Leone's future looked optimistic, the country's complex pre-colonial and colonial history had a lasting impact on the events that lead up to the conflict in 1991. Notable aspects of colonial rule filtered into post-colonial Sierra Leone, including uneven development, mismanagement of resources and corruption. In addition, the people of Sierra Leone rarely benefitted from the sale of diamonds, one of the country's most valuable resources, and mining companies predominantly operated separately from the rest of the formal economy (Keen 2005: 8).

There are different interpretations of the post-colonial period in Sierra Leone. Some authors, such as Alie (2006), argue that after independence in 1961, Sierra Leone managed to briefly overcome the undemocratic form of government it had inherited from the colonial era, as the country had functioning parliamentary and judicial systems, and other government bodies were well-respected by Sierra Leoneans (Alie 2006: 17). However, other authors such as Reno (1995) contend that the construction of the Shadow State began during

the colonial period, and that the actions of leaders during the post-colonial period, such as Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh, only strengthened this system (Reno 1995: 24).

However, when Sierra Leone first gained independence, the country appeared to be politically stable with great economic potential. During the 1960s, the two dominant political parties, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) and the All People's Congress (APC), regularly engaged in lively political debate. After the death of Sierra Leone's first Prime Minister, Milton Margai of the SLPP in 1964, his brother Albert Margai took control of the country until 1967 (Clapham 2003: 7). The SLPP drew its supporters from all over Sierra Leone, although opposition parties often believed the SLPP represented the interests of the Mende, who dominate the southern and eastern regions of the country.

Although ethnicity was not a primary cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone, the differences between ethnic groups certainly had an impact on pre-conflict politics. There are 17 ethnic groups in Sierra Leone (see Appendix B for a map of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone in 1969). The two largest groups, the Temne, who occupy large sections of the Northern Province, and the Mende, who dominate the southern and eastern parts of the country, make up 60 per cent of the country's population. The Temne and Mende groups also played a central role in the political life of Sierra Leone, especially from 1961 to 1970. Other important actors in the national political arena have been the Krio (from the Western region), the Limba (sometimes dominant in the APC), and the Kono (from the diamond-rich Eastern region) (Alie 2006: 21).

The All People's Congress (APC) won the general elections of March 1967, becoming the "first opposition party in post-colonial Africa to oust a ruling party through the ballot box" (Alie 2006: 18). The head of the APC, Siaka Stevens garnered support from the Northern region of the country despite being from the South. At the time that the APC took power, there was a feeling, especially in the North of the country, that the SLPP had neglected their interests. Alie (2006:

23) argues that the socio-economic division between the Northern and Southern regions of the country was not a deliberate strategy of the SLPP, but rather a result of the colonial legacy.

During the colonial period, most of the government's economic activities had been concentrated in the South and East. This trend continued after independence in 1961. Although the Northern region lacked natural resources, Northerners controlled most of the retail industry in the country. In addition, the Mende and Temne groups would often unite in opposition to the Creoles – who were often well-educated, played a dominant role in the colonial civil service, and were based in Freetown, the capital of Sierra Leone (see Appendix C for a map of the economic activities of Sierra Leone in 1969). The ethnic divisions created a "weakened sense of national identity in the country", which would later have an impact on conflict dynamics in Sierra Leone (Keen 2005: 14).

When Siaka Stevens officially took power in 1968, after a coup interrupted the result of government elections in 1967, he formed a National Coalition government, which included four members of the SLPP and two Independent candidates (Gberie 2005: 28-29). According to Stevens', his motivation for forming the Coalition was to create a representative government. However, once Stevens felt comfortable in his position of power, he dissolved the Coalition and formed an all APC government. By 1970, Stevens revealed himself as an autocratic leader and in 1971, the APC-dominated Parliament made the controversial decision to turn the country into a republic with Stevens as the Executive President (Gberie 2005: 28). From the start of his presidency, Stevens exhibited the typical behaviour of a Shadow State leader, as he was formalising a personal style of rule whereby he could expand his political and economic power.

In 1973, the country became a de facto one-party state, and by 1978, Sierra Leone was a de jure one-party state. This move served to strengthen Stevens' control over the country and its resources. During his 17 years in power,

Stevens also managed to bring “trade unions, agricultural cooperatives, and business and professional organizations” under the government umbrella (Adebajo 2002: 81). However, some groups, such as the students of the Fourah Bay College in the capital Freetown, continued to oppose Stevens’ government (Keen 2005: 17).

The one-party government developed a problematic relationship with the extractive economy, especially the diamond mining sector, and was unable to “suppress illegal economic activity or to harness the country’s abundant resources for development” (Keen 2005: 8-9). Sierra Leone was receiving approximately US$200 million a year from the diamond trade in 1968, the year Stevens came to power. By the end of Stevens’ reign in 1985, the government was only receiving about US100,000 a year. During that same time, Stevens was able to increase his personal wealth to an estimated US$500 million, by creating a small group of “elites” who worked together to capture the country’s resources (Reno 1998: 116).

Stevens, together with carefully selected associates, managed to divert profits acquired through the sale of diamonds and other resources; including oil and rice; to increase their private fortunes. The diversion of profits from the sale of these resources was a clear indication that Stevens and his cronies were involved in Shadow State activity. The result of their actions was that state institutions became extensions of “private patronage networks” (Reno 1998: 116).

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Sierra Leone’s economy rapidly deteriorated. The Sierra Leone government’s inability to harness the country’s resources in order to develop the economy and political system, consequently created an environment in which resources, particularly diamonds, could be smuggled out of the country. The economic crisis was worsened because of the country’s reliance on exports of primary goods made Sierra Leone more “vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices and to the depletion of natural

resources" (Keen 2005: 25). For example, the international price of oil tripled in 1973 and then again in 1979, which coincided with a decrease in income received from the sale of Sierra Leone's main exports, including diamonds (Adebajo 2002: 81).

In 1980, Sierra Leone hosted the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit. Although a select few politicians and businessmen made a profit from the meeting, the country's finances did not benefit at all. "The cost of rice imports was increasing, and by the mid-1980s these imports accounted for more than half of all export earnings" (Sesay 1993 in Keen 2005: 26).

In addition, the weakness of the state made it easy for public officials to divert resources to enrich themselves, to the obvious detriment of the country's economy. As a result, Sierra Leone remained one of the poorest countries in the world, unable to benefit from its mineral and agricultural exports. "Coffee, cocoa, palm kernels, diamonds, bauxite and rutile" were exported in raw form, with little benefit to the Sierra Leone economy (Sesay 1993 in Keen 2005: 16). A worrying trend was the sale of minerals at below market cost. Diamond-rich areas were unable to benefit from sales of the valuable mineral, and people "continued to suffer from polluted water, inadequate health and educational services, and minimal or non-existent social welfare" (Zack-Williams 1995 in Keen 2005: 16). For example, between 1980 and 1987, "state spending on health and education fell by 60 percent" (Reno 1998: 116).

A major restructuring of the economy was needed, but the state seemed to lack the will, the resources and the international encouragement to embark on the necessary programme of public investment in transport, agriculture, education and health. Instead, under pressure from the IMF and the World Bank, Stevens and his successor, General Joseph Momoh both pursued a set of measures that tended to exacerbate the economic and social crisis. Measures included currency devaluation and cuts in state spending and a renewed drive against diamond smuggling. The devaluation of the Sierra Leone currency, the leone,

saw its value fall from UK 50 pence in 1978 to 1 penny in 1987. The devaluation of the currency led to rapid inflation, adding to the pressure on consumers. The devaluation was intended to boost export production, instead, exports continued to fall throughout the 1980s. Official diamond exports were badly hit by the growing incentive to obtain hard currency through smuggling to Liberia and Europe rather than obtaining undesirable leones through official channels (Keen 2005: 26).

Siaka Stevens retired in 1985 and was replaced by Joseph Momoh, who fared no better in alleviating the economic emergency in the country. As the economic crisis deepened in 1987, Momoh approved harsh measures to attract further IMF support. Stevens, with his strong instinct for staying in power, had always avoided this approach. The radical reduction in petrol and food subsidies worsened the inflationary effects of devaluation (Reno 1995: 161). The political importance of affordable basic goods was emphasised when the reductions provoked an unsuccessful coup aimed at ousting Momoh (Sesay 1995: 174). "Whilst a few privileged groups had special access to political patronage, ever larger numbers of people were forced to rely on an oligopolistic and inflationary 'free market', notably for the staple food, rice" (Keen 2005: 26).

Whilst the ordinary population was struggling, certain groups managed to live comfortably, at least for a while, during the economic crisis in Sierra Leone – particularly APC government officials and the security forces. It was important for Momoh and the survival of the Shadow State to maintain the loyalty of key members of government and soldiers in order to stay in power. The government neglected long-term development, educational facilities and health services in favour of preserving the allegiance of its security services. Underpaid civil servants, doctors and teachers often resorted to corruption and petty extortion just to get by. "By the late 1980s, Stevens' method of buying off the army with lavish allowances, good accommodation and other perks was becoming increasingly unaffordable" (Keen 2005: 32). Although some senior commanders continued to receive their benefits, many soldiers' salaries remained unpaid.

Momoh employed many of the same tactics that his predecessor had done, however, he did have to make a number of concessions due to increasing pressure from the IMF and the World Bank. In addition, Momoh was forced to attempt to control smuggling and corruption with a view to reviving the state's ability to tax its own economy whilst cutting the budget and trade deficits. In November 1987, Momoh declared a State of Economic Emergency, with new regulations banning all private business deals in foreign currency as well as the hoarding of any currency or commodity. Momoh also sent the army to the rural areas to enforce the emergency economic measures. The initiatives proved counterproductive, as the dramatic restrictions on foreign currency trading and hoarding money drove cash further towards the black market, encouraging smuggling and illegal currency transactions (Koroma 1996 in Keen 2005: 32).

The economic decline continued despite the State of Emergency as Sierra Leone's official diamond exports were at their lowest in 1988, bringing in only US$22,000, compared to other economic players like foreign firms, who were exporting diamonds worth approximately $250 million. The economy of Sierra Leone was "generating less than a billion dollars a year" (Reno 1998: 120).

"Meanwhile, the deployment of soldiers seems to have played a significant part in fostering the development of economic agendas within the army" (Keen 2005: 32). The army, as well as other employees of the state, took advantage of Momoh's emergency economic measures and charged the government for their services, including monitoring the country's borders. The army seemed to be gaining power and independence through their new role in the illicit economy. Army officers were being bribed by smugglers in return for safe passage in military vehicles. In addition, reports were circulating that a small military unit in the diamond-rich Kono district refused to return to Freetown as instructed (Chilson 1988).

Instability in Sierra Leone was exacerbated by the rivalry between state security officials, who were implementing Momoh's emergency measures, and Vice-

President Francis Minah and his Lebanese support base. Minah had implemented his own anti-smuggling strategy in an attempt to control the illegal diamond trade, however this plan backfired, and he was put to death because he failed to report incidents of smuggling to the government authorities (Fithen 1999: 158).

Momoh initiated 'Operation State Clean' in April 1990, which saw members of the security forces expelling a reported 10,000 diamond miners from the Kono area – further entrenching the role of the army in the diamond-mining sector. It was Momoh's goal to concentrate the diamond industry in the hands of a few foreign firms (Reno 1995: 155-157). Many established politicians had interests that were now under threat. Some dealers, threatened by Momoh's initiatives, reportedly traded directly with the rebels once the war broke out (Reno 1995: 166, 169).

Momoh failed to gain enough control over the diamond industry and thus, was unable to raise sufficient revenue to maintain power (Reno 1995: 162-163). Corrupt mining officials continued to allow extensive illicit mining. With his failure to stem smuggling or boost agricultural production, Momoh fell further behind in payments to the IMF and credit to the country was suspended in late 1990. The misuse of rice aid under the APC was making donors increasingly uncooperative. In addition, despite international momentum in support of democratic governments, the APC continued to view democracy as a threat to their personal wealth. It was during this time that the RUF entered Sierra Leone, and the conflict began in March 1991.

3.3 The conflict in Sierra Leone: 1991 – 2002

3.3.1 Cross-border war from Liberia to Sierra Leone

The conflict in Sierra Leone did not occur in a vacuum. The influence of the region, especially Liberia's President Charles Taylor involvement in the Sierra

Leone conflict, can be seen in terms of causes and perpetuation of the war. Although international players did not immediately perceive the importance of Taylor's involvement, it became abundantly clear that he was indeed a key contact who was directly linked to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) since the start of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Taylor and the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh trained in Libya in the late 1980s and were both involved in Blaise Compaore's seizure of power in Burkina Faso (Abdullah 1998: 220). The relationship between Taylor and Sankoh extended into the political sphere, with Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the RUF working closely together before and during the Sierra Leonean conflict (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 20-21).

Charles Taylor's involvement in the trafficking of arms and diamonds invariably links him to the conflict. Taylor became an integral part of the war economy in Sierra Leone, as it was in his best interest to help continue the war in the country. In addition, Taylor's political ambitions exercised through the boosting of the NPFL directly benefited from the instability in the neighbouring country. The Liberian war continued up until 1997, and Taylor needed to mobilise resources to maintain the resources of the NPLF. This became even more important during a renewed domestic rebellion against Taylor in 1999. It is also important to note that Taylor not only worked in Sierra Leone, but has also been involved in the domestic affairs of countries such as Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire (Smillie, Gberie and Hazelton 2000: 47-48).

The RUF rebellion offered significant political and economic benefits to many opposing the conflict. "The urge to exploit the rebellion was fuelled by the weakness of a nation state that had never fully harnessed the country's economic activity and was now offering minimal economic or physical security to most of its citizens" (Keen 2005: 34).

The most prolific rebel group in the conflict is certainly the RUF. Often described as mysterious, this movement did not truly present a specific political

or ideological agenda, despite the RUF leadership's claims to representing the oppressed masses. A former army corporal named Foday Sankoh created the movement, which supposedly wished to "liberate the people of Sierra Leone from a corrupt and oppressive government" (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 22). It never pursued this goal, and rather performed the opposite, terrorising, killing and often abducting the local citizens of Sierra Leone.

The RUF consisted mostly of very brutal, marginalised youths and former illegal diamond miners and fighters, predominantly from Liberia and Burkina Faso, but later included abductees, many of whom were children. The RUF used tactics such as brainwashing and drug use, and seemed to provide many directionless, unemployed Sierra Leonean youths with a purpose. The group remained very close to Charles Taylor and Liberia, given that Taylor provided them with resources (Hirsch 2001b: 150). In addition, the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, received "a constant flow of cash from the Libyans for the purchase of arms and other forms of logistical support" (Gberie 2005: 63). The RUF continued to receive Libyan support via the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF) throughout the conflict.

Despite having no real political direction, the RUF was included in peace negotiations and, predictably, proved reluctant to make good on the commitments agreed upon in the peace settlements. In addition to pressures from the outside; internal dynamics such as the execution of two of the 'founding fathers' of the movement, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray; the disagreements between Sankoh and others within the party between 1997 and 1999, and the loss of a former ally, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and its leader Johnny Paul Koroma, complicated the peace process (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 23).

The conflict in Sierra Leone began on 23 March 1991, when the RUF launched a rebel attack from Liberia claiming that it wanted to free the people of Sierra Leone from the Momoh government. The APC was unable to respond

adequately to the threat, and the RUF managed to gain some ground against the government. The failure of the government to address the RUF attack, as well as general dissatisfaction with the government, encouraged junior army officers to stage a coup in April 1992 (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 28).

The Sierra Leonean Army faced a number of threats, ranging from direct enemies such as the RUF, to the Sierra Leonean government and its leadership who constantly undermined the military and kept it ill-equipped and under-resourced at first, and then attempted the rapid recruitment of ill-qualified men once the RUF posed a real threat. The soldiers of the SLA were in many ways alike to the RUF recruits. This led to the "soldiers by day, rebels by night" or "sobels" phenomenon (Reno 2003: 86). Understandably, security matters in the country became rather confusing, and more often than not the local populations suffered the most. Diamonds played a key motivating role for many of the men who joined the army and became "sobels". Despite the rise in numbers from only 3,000 personnel in the late 1980s to 14,000 by 1994, the local population did not trust the army and there was no force protecting the state and its citizens, the army was also ineffective at combating the RUF (Hirsch 2001a: 36 – 37).

The SLA also became involved in politics, firstly through a coup in 1992, staged by a group of junior officers who overthrew Momoh, bringing hope to the Sierra Leonean population. However, they lost the elections in 1996 and unhappy with this result, staged another coup in May 1997, which brought to power a military junta between the very violent AFRC and RUF. The Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) managed to oust the junta in 1998, which only led to greater confusion as to the role that the SLA should play in Sierra Leone. The restored government planned to rebuild the army after the existing army had been disbanded, only leading to more insecurity as the former soldiers joined the ranks of the RUF and later fought against the UN peacekeepers and ECOMOG. The ineffectiveness of the SLA in combating the RUF was especially problematic when taking into account the

emergence of two other security groups, namely; the Civil Defence Force (CDF) and the private security company Executive Outcomes (EO) (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 24).

3.3.2 Military rule to the 1996 elections

The National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), led by Valentine Strasser, was established after the 1992 coup. The NPRC committed itself to combating corruption and resource mismanagement and received support from the local population. However, the RUF continued to fight against the NPRC as it fought against the APC. During the first few months of conflict, the NPRC initially managed to gain some ground against the RUF, especially once the RUF lost its support from Liberia, as opponents of Charles Taylor managed to take control of the border between Sierra Leone and Liberia. “After 1994, the revived RUF started to make important military gains and took control of an important part of the territory, including the diamond regions” (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 28). The situation in Sierra Leone continued to deteriorate and, in 1995, the RUF threatened to seize Freetown. In response, Strasser contracted Executive Outcomes, a South African a private security firm, to help defeat the RUF.

Executive Outcomes was a South African security company created in 1989. The company consisted of former South African soldiers who had fought for the apartheid regime and had been involved in the Angolan conflict. It was first contracted to Sierra Leone by the NPRC in April 1995. EO was not, however, the first private security force to be used in Sierra Leone, but it was the first player able to tip the balance of military power in the country.

An important partner for Executive Outcomes was the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), which was comprised of six local defence groups that banded together against the RUF and, in the absence of an army, was loyal to the local population. The Kamajors, considered the most important of the six groups, hailed from the south-eastern region of the country. The other groups included

in the CDF are the Tamaboros, the Donsos, and the Kapras. The groups consisted mainly of traditional hunters and rural youths. They were considerably more able than the army, not only because they were based in their chiefdoms and were familiar with the territory, but they also had local support. In addition, Executive Outcomes later trained the Kamajor fighters, and the groups proved they were the only real threat to the RUF (Reno 2003: 87).

However, the CDF fighters were not immune to illegal diamond smuggling and were accused of a number of human rights violations against their opponents, which often included civilian populations. The Kamajors were also often perceived as the private army of President Kabbah, elected in 1996. This created conflict within the SLA, as the President seemed loyal to more than one group of fighters and furthermore, it made peace brokering rather difficult as the Kamajors were not initially included in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. It is also interesting to note that the CDF represents the only truly ethnic dimension of the conflict, as the Kamajors consists mostly of Mende people, while northerners, the Limba and Temne people, mostly dominated the army (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 26).

Together with the CDF, the Kamajors managed to push back the RUF from Freetown and key diamond fields, and became very influential in convincing the RUF to negotiate a peace settlement in 1996. EO left Sierra Leone as was stipulated by the Lomé agreement in 1999, but also departed due to financial constraints. The significance of the role of EO is that the conflict in Sierra Leone continued for such a long time because there was no credible military force that could combat the RUF. In spite of their support to the CDF, EO also became involved in the diamond trade, again pointing to the powerful link between diamonds, security and conflict in Sierra Leone (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 26).

From 1995 to 1996, Executive Outcomes, working together with the Sierra Leone CDF, were able to drive the RUF away from Freetown and some diamond-rich areas. At the same time, the NPRC committed itself to a

democratisation process, which led to elections in February and March 1996. Although Strasser had been ousted through a coup in January 1996 and replaced by Julius Maada Bio, the NPRC continued to move the country towards becoming a democracy. Bio also engaged with the RUF and convinced the rebels to join in the process of democratisation (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 29).

The SLPP won the 1996 elections, bringing into power Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Throughout the peace talks, Executive Outcomes and the CDF continued to force the RUF out of Sierra Leone, which was already a sign that the quality of peace being negotiated was being compromised. The Abidjan peace agreement was finally reached in November 1996.

3.3.3 The Abidjan peace agreement

The reasons for drawing up the Abidjan peace agreement were very specific. Internal developments drove the negotiations and the main reasons for reaching an agreement on 30 November 1996 were contextual rather than political. Outside actors did not play a primary role in persuading parties to negotiate a peace settlement, however, the involvement of the non-governmental organisation International Alert was especially intriguing. The organisation seemed at first to act as a facilitator between the RUF and the other parties, but slowly started becoming far more involved, acting on behalf of the RUF and changing the perception of the rebel movement. This was problematic to the overall peace process, as the RUF gained far more strength at a time when their power should have receded, and through International Alert actually managed to put high demands on the government. One such demand was the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes, which did occur. The conditions for the Abidjan agreement appeared favourable, as the party with the most power at that stage, the government, wanted to avoid violence (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 35).

However, it can be argued that neither party was truly ready to commit to peace, and that each had a specific reason for negotiating an agreement in the first place. The RUF was compelled to sign the agreement given the strong military force of the combined Executive Outcomes and Kamajor forces. The government believed that with this strong military presence, the RUF could be defeated, and did not even ratify the Abidjan agreement in parliament (Francis 2000: 360).

In terms of combating the war economy and initiating a post-conflict reconstruction strategy, Articles 22, 23, 26 and 27 of the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) are relevant (see Annex D). Article 22 states that “the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone [is of] utmost priority”. In Article 23, the government of Sierra Leone pledges to mobilise resources, both internally and externally to fund post-conflict reconstruction and socio-economic development.

In Article 26, there is recognition of the socio-economic dimension of the conflict and an outline of principles is provided. These principles include a focus on grassroots participation in reconstruction and development strategies, and a commitment to making the distribution of resources more equitable between population groups. Article 27 calls for the creation of a Socio-Economic Forum, in which both the government and the RUF would participate.

The inclusion of these articles should be considered a step in the right direction concerning overcoming the challenges posed by the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone. The provision for a Socio-Economic Forum, and the acknowledgement of the socio-economic dimension of the conflict was a clear indication that the parties were aware that a conflict economic system had been created.

3.3.4 Failure of the Abidjan peace agreement

One of the only clauses of the agreement that was honoured was the departure of Executive Outcomes in January 1997. Due to the failure of proper implementation of the agreement, and the removal of Kabbah by the Sierra Leone military, it fell apart on 25 May 1997. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), headed up by Johnny Paul Koroma, took over from Kabbah. According to Abdullah (1998: 230-231), Koroma invited the RUF to join the AFRC in taking control of the country, which only proved to increase the violence against the Sierra Leone population.

Violence against the people of Sierra Leone was at its worst between May 1997 and March 1998. A new conflict actor emerged, namely the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its security arm, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). ECOMOG was the international force sent to Sierra Leone by the Economic Community of West African States. It comprised mostly of Nigerian soldiers, but also included troops from Ghana, Mali and Guinea. It was initially sent in 1997 to enforce ECOWAS sanctions and the embargo placed against the military junta. With the collapse of the Conakry agreement in February 1998, ECOMOG troops stationed in Sierra Leone in partnership with the CDF attempted to defeat the RUF all over Sierra Leone. ECOMOG helped restore a legitimate government to the country and managed to expel the AFRC and RUF a second time in 1999. However, the third attack proved too much for the depleted ECOMOG troops and the RUF captured Freetown in 2000 (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 27).

Like the other groups involved in the conflict, ECOMOG soldiers were also accused of human rights violations and natural resource exploitation. These two reasons were not the main causes of ECOMOG's departure in May 2000.

Rather, Nigeria's President Obasanjo felt that Nigeria was spending too many resources in Sierra Leone. A phasing-out process followed, where UNAMSIL, the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone, would replace ECOMOG (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 28). The involvement of ECOWAS led to the signing of the Conakry agreement in October 1997.

3.3.5 The Conakry peace agreement

Conakry presented an entirely different picture from the Abidjan agreement a few months prior. The Abidjan agreement failed, Kabbah and his government had been overthrown by the AFRC. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) condemned the coup in Sierra Leone and requested that ECOWAS find a solution in order to bring the government back into power. This marked the first sub-regional involvement in the conflict, and ECOWAS were divided on an appropriate strategy to follow. A three-pronged approach was eventually adopted: "the use of dialogue; the application of sanctions, including an embargo; and the use of force" (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 35). The four countries acting on behalf of ECOWAS were dubbed the Committee of Four, which included Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. The Committee of Four became the Committee of Five (with the inclusion of Liberia in 1997). ECOMOG was given the official mandate to enforce the sanctions adopted in August 1997, the UN Security Council endorsed these sanctions in October 1997.

The military junta of the AFRC and RUF accepted the proposed peace plan suggested by ECOWAS and in October 1997, the parties met to negotiate the Conakry agreement. Strangely, neither the government nor the RUF were represented at the negotiations. Furthermore, the inclusion of Liberia in the Committee of Five was rather peculiar, given that newly elected President Taylor had maintained connections to the RUF, although he denied this fact. In general, the negotiations were dubious, since all the parties had ulterior motives: the junta gained valuable time and credibility as a political actor; and

ECOWAS, especially Nigeria, could pursue a forceful solution to the crisis (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 36).

The Conakry agreement resembles an outline more than an actual peace agreement (see Annex E). With regards to the transition from a war economy to a peace economy, the only mention of reconstruction and rehabilitation appears in point seven of the elaborated ECOWAS Peace Plan as an appeal for donor funding from the United Nations and the Organisation for African Unity. Given the security context at the time of signing the agreement, and the dubious inclusion of Charles Taylor, it is to be expected that great focus was not placed on the socio-economic dimension of the conflict. In all likelihood, the parties probably felt that the Abidjan agreement had explained what was to be done to reconstruct the country, even though for all practical purposes the Abidjan agreement had been suppressed by the conflict.

In July 1998, the United Nations deployed a small mission called the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the stipulations of the Conakry agreement. However, during 1998 and 1999, the conflicting participants, including the AFRC and RUF, derailed the peace process. ECOMOG was eventually able to push the rebels away from Freetown, and the government of Sierra Leone was forced to negotiate a new peace agreement with the rebel on 7 July 1999 in Lomé.

3.3.6 The Lomé peace agreement

The Lomé agreement is often viewed as the opposite of the Abidjan agreement (see Annex F). The government again found itself in a weak position following the AFRC and RUF attack against Freetown in January 1999 (Francis 2000: 361). ECOMOG's position was changing, as Nigeria wanted to withdraw its troops. A distinct difference in this round of peace negotiations was the involvement of the United Kingdom and the United States. Although their motives were questionable, it seemed that the goal for the international

community was to broker an agreement at any cost, rather than bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone. Neither the UK nor the US wanted to commit military troops to ending the conflict, and thus opted to play brokers between the government and the RUF. Their biggest mistake was to allow the RUF to share power with the government, without considering the fact the government had been democratically elected. The brokering parties also neglected the fact that the RUF had never managed to commit to any of the past agreements (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 36).

The sense of urgency surrounding the 'peace at any price' agreement only placed the RUF in a better position than the government. The Lomé agreement posed several important questions regarding the way in which all three peace agreements had been negotiated. Firstly, the treatment of the negotiating parties influenced the entire process. There was difficulty in deciding how to treat a party accused of human rights violations, who did not enjoy popular support, and who was treated as a reliable partner each time during negotiations, even though the actions of the RUF proved the exact opposite. Secondly, the role of third party negotiators needed to remain as politically neutral as possible. This definitely did not occur during the Lomé agreement. Lastly, the timing of negotiations must take into account the military balance at the particular time, as the military would most likely be responsible for enforcing the stipulations made in the peace agreement (Francis 2000: 362-363).

Article VII of the Peace Agreement stated clearly that the government of Sierra Leone would be in charge of the exploitation of natural resources. Furthermore, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) would be created to oversee this process. A somewhat disturbing element of the CMRRD was that the Chairmanship would be given to Foday Sankoh, leader of the RUF, meaning that three members of the RUF would be part of the Commission, as opposed to the two from the government.

A very brief article appears later in the document stating that the government of Sierra Leone, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, and in cooperation with the International Community, would be responsible for providing financial and technical support for reconstruction and development. Again, very little practical guidance was given on how a reconstruction strategy would be implemented and who, other than the government, would be responsible for developing such a strategy.

A second note was made in this article about the inclusion of women in the reconstruction process, given the violence and trauma women had been exposed to during the conflict. Again, no guidelines are provided as to how women would be included in the reconstruction process.

Between 2000 and the end of the conflict in 2002, the UN mission was temporarily reinforced and transformed into a fully-fledged peacekeeping force called United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). However, this force suffered a number of challenges including staff shortages, deployment delays, an ill-suited mandate, and was unable to adequately implement the Lomé agreement. In May 2000, the RUF took 500 peacekeepers hostage, and the UK made the decision to send in military forces to deal with the crisis. This decision, along with other developments, including the denunciation of Liberian support for the RUF by the UN, led to the Abuja ceasefire in January 2002.

3.3.7 The Abuja ceasefire

The Abuja ceasefire agreement was signed in November 2000 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF (see Annex G). The ceasefire agreement was not lengthy or highly descriptive, however, it did include a number of groundbreaking characteristics. It firstly allowed UNAMSIL to monitor the ceasefire, and gave the body power to report violations. Secondly, it granted permission for UNAMSIL to be deployed all over Sierra Leone, including previously “off-limits” diamond zones. Lastly, it included a provision for a follow-

up meeting to be held 30 days after the initial signing of the agreement (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 54).

On 2 May 2001 in Abuja the implementation review meeting started, which was concluded on 15 May 2001 in Freetown. Three main decisions were taken at this review meeting; firstly, the fighting between the RUF and CDF in the northern part of the country should cease. Secondly, the DDR process should be restarted according to an agreed schedule. Finally, the CDF and RUF had to disarm simultaneously. The slow process of DDR was completed in 2002, and it marked the first of many steps needed to rebuild the country.

The Abuja ceasefire agreement was unique in that it did not entertain a discussion of a peace settlement. Rather, it was a direct plan to provide the government with legitimate power to run the country, and to offer the RUF an opportunity to reform into a genuine political party. The disarmament of the RUF, and the return of military strength to the government of Sierra Leone with the help of British troops who trained the SLA, was a clear difference between the Abuja agreement and the previously signed agreements (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 58).

The Sierra Leone conflict was officially declared over on 17 January 2002. Following the completion of a disarmament process, the country offered a beacon of hope in a region undergoing a great deal of uncertainty, especially Liberia and Guinea. The peace process in Sierra Leone is still considered fragile when one takes into consideration the level of violence that occurred during the conflict, as well as the challenges that lie ahead for reconstructing the country.

Several factors contributed to the official end of the conflict and the start of peace proceedings. These factors should be understood to form part of a holistic strategy that included the strengthening of UNAMSIL, the presence of British troops, key attacks against the RUF, the turning over of Foday Sankoh to

the government, and the preparations for the establishment of a special court to try Sankoh and other prominent members of the RUF for crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and capturing United Nations' peacekeepers.

In addition to the factors above, new economic pressures appeared on 5 July 2000 when the UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000**)** prohibited "the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone" and insisted on the establishment of a Certificate of Origin strategy. This policy would exclude the government of Sierra Leone from the sanctions resulting in the government's control over diamond exports (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 53). This move marked the first time in UN history that sanctions were directly applied to the trade of conflict diamonds. The UN Resolution 1306 encouraged "the International Diamond Manufacturers Association, the World Federation of Diamond Bourses, the Diamond High Council and all other representatives of the diamond industry to work with the Government of Sierra Leone and the Committee", established by United Nations Resolution 1132 (1997), to assist in the development of a "well-structured and well regulated diamond industry that provides for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds" (United Nations Security Council 2000: 3).

In 2003, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme replaced this initial process of Certification. Although there have been mixed reviews as to the success of the Kimberley Process, according to the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper of 2005, Sierra Leone's official diamond exports increased from US$10 million in 2000 to approximately US$125 million in 2004 (Government of Sierra Leone 2005: 90). However, in 2005, a Kimberley Process review visit revealed that between 15-20 percent of diamond trading in Sierra Leone remains illicit and 20 percent of diamond production is still smuggled to neighbouring countries in West Africa (Global Witness 2006: 3).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the conflict in Sierra Leone within the context of the Shadow State and war economy. Through a discussion of the historical context of the conflict and the conditions that led to the development of this particular conflict system, this chapter revealed that the conflict in Sierra Leone was highly complex and included many different role players. The primary conditions why the conflict began and why it lasted so long include; the creation of the Shadow State through the process of state failure, the development of the war economy and the impact of diamonds, and the regional dimension of the conflict. It was found that the Shadow State and the war economy are intimately linked in the case of Sierra Leone. Through a process of manipulation, corruption, and clandestine business transactions, the elite of Sierra Leone managed to create an entire economic system that benefited them, at the expense of the ordinary citizens of the country. Hiding behind the façade of formal statehood, and using the tools of state sovereignty and non-intervention, these officials extended the Shadow State into the global arena.

The legal and illegal transactions performed by Shadow State leaders and their international business associates inevitably became involved in the insecure environment they so desperately tried to control. The appearance of the RUF initiated the development of the war economy, as profit made from the sale of commodities such as diamonds had to be used to fund the war effort. The government was equally involved in creating the war economy along with the RUF and others.

Taking into account the violent nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone, any attempt at rebuilding the nation must address the impact of that violence on the local population that experienced it first hand. A holistic post-conflict reconstruction strategy is required in order to overcome the tragedies of the past and to build a future.

Sierra Leone has developed very slowly over the last seven years, and a large number of the population is unemployed and live in extreme poverty. A post-

conflict reconstruction strategy needs to assess the local needs of the population and must have popular buy-in to be sustainable.

The following two chapters will firstly, analyse in detail the development of the Shadow State and the war economy, and secondly, assess from past conflict experience and peace agreements the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy, and the economic reconstruction challenges that still remain in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER 4

The Shadow State and War Economy in Sierra Leone

4.1 Introduction

The development of the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone can be attributed to a combination of factors. In Chapter 3, a brief political and economic history was provided in order to describe the environment in which a Shadow State and subsequent war economy was created. This chapter will make use of the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, which linked the concept Shadow State to "war economy", and the concept "post-conflict reconstruction" to "peace economy". The first part of the theoretical framework, namely the emergence of Sierra Leone as a Shadow State and the development of the war economy, will be discussed in this chapter.

The concepts Shadow State and "war economy" are discussed together as a holistic framework, by focussing on four specific sections that present a clear picture of how the political and economic systems worked collaboratively to create and sustain the conflict in Sierra Leone. The first section discusses the problematic structure of the state in Sierra Leone, as well as the economic challenges the country faced from independence and throughout the conflict. The second section focuses on the political economy of the Shadow State, exploring the manipulation of formal and informal markets by various role players, as well as the impact of illicit diamond mining and sales on the economy. The third section looks specifically at the roles that the elite and the youth have played in shaping the Shadow State and the war economy. The last section investigates the regional dynamics involved in the creation of political and economic disorder in Sierra Leone.

4.2 Analysis of economic agendas during armed conflict

The historical context of the conflict was discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Therefore, the following sections do not focus on the conflict specifically, but rather, highlight some events that led to the concurrent strengthening of the Shadow State and the weakening of the formal state in Sierra Leone. The Shadow State does not replace the formal state, as Shadow State leaders need to maintain the appearance of a functioning, formal state. Therefore, the relationship between the Shadow State and the formal state exists in varying degrees; as the Shadow State gains strength, the formal state loses power, and vice versa. The move away from legal, formal and informal commercial networks to illicit, formal and informal trade is the most prominent sign of a strengthening Shadow State.

The diagram below shows the theoretical relationship between the state and the economy in Sierra Leone. Ideally, as the country moves from the conflict to peace by means of a post-conflict reconstruction (PCR) strategy, the war economy (WE) should move towards the peace economy (PE) and the Shadow State (SS) should become weaker as the formal state (FS) becomes stronger.

Diagram 1: Theoretical representation of the relationship between economy and state in Sierra Leone



The model above is an explanatory tool of the theoretical framework applied in this study and cannot represent the complexities of the actual conflict situation described in Chapter 3. The diagram does, however, show the relationship between the theoretical concepts used in this study.

In the case of Sierra Leone, the environment created by the strong Shadow State helped bring about conflict in 1991 and enabled a war economy to develop. The economic system of Sierra Leone was, at that time, so closely tied to the elite-run political system that once the RUF attacked, the elite of the country could continue to use the country's resources to protect and maintain themselves at the expense of thousands of ordinary citizens. The first section below outlines the structure of the Sierra Leonean state, which provides the context for further discussions about how the Shadow State manifested itself in the case of Sierra Leone.

4.2.1 Creation of the Shadow State

This section is divided into two parts, the first deals with the creation of the Shadow State in Sierra Leone by discussing how the case study of Sierra Leone conforms to the model of a Shadow State as explained by Reno (2000a). The second part of this section focuses on the failure of the state in Sierra Leone and how this led to full-scale conflict in the country.

The first characteristic of a Shadow State, as described by Reno (2000a), is that the Shadow State is a "form of personal rule", where a ruler will make decisions and take actions, not necessarily conforming to a set of written laws, even if these are still in place (Reno 2000a: 434). The actions by leaders such as Siaka Stevens certainly express this first characteristic of a Shadow State.

As mentioned in Chapter 3, Siaka Stevens ruled Sierra Leone from 1968 to 1985, and transformed the country into a "one-party dictatorship" from 1978 until 1992. He used his APC party as a tool for committing violent acts,

specifically luring youths with false promises of employment (Davies 2000: 352). In addition to fostering violence, Stevens "institutionalised corruption through a patrimonial system of rationed favours, theft of public funds, illicit payments and bribes, rent from economic distortions induced by price controls and administrative allocation of basic commodities – rice, fuel and foreign currency – allocation of access rights in the exploitation of diamonds and other natural resources, and individual exceptions to general rules" (Davies 2000: 353).

The conflict in Sierra Leone, although dominated by economic factors, cannot solely be understood in economic terms. The structure of the state and the society in Sierra Leone are inextricably linked to the economic dimensions. In addition to this, the deterioration of the state in Sierra Leone cannot be attributed to the failure of leadership alone, as the leaders in the country were not any more brutal than leaders in other African states. Stevens, for example, had broad political experience, starting from his apprenticeship in the trade union movement. He managed to establish a single-party system, as well as a "network of neo-patrimonial relations through which to manipulate the connections between state power, political factions, and market opportunities", as well as take advantage of the ethnic divisions between the North and South of the country (Clapham 2003: 10). Through his political position, he was able to build relationships that would enable him to manipulate the state, control the relevant people around him, and ensure maximum returns on his economic investments. He accomplished this with little use of force, although any resistance to his methods was dealt with ruthlessly.

Stevens' political system relied on patronage networks, benefiting a select group of insiders, whilst simultaneously intimidating people who disagreed with his rule. However, while Stevens was building his personal empire, Sierra Leone remained poor; as exports in commodities such as coffee, cocoa, palm kernels, diamonds, bauxite and rutile were sold in their unprocessed form,

fetching less on the international market than other processed goods, meaning less revenue for the people of Sierra Leone (Keen 2005: 16).

Despite facing numerous political and economic obstacles, such as the rising number of political factions, steady economic deterioration, and increased demands by citizens for a multi-party democracy, Stevens' successor, General Momoh, managed to stay in power until he was eventually overthrown by a military *coup d'état* in 1992 (Clapham 2003: 10).

Like Stevens, Momoh also operated along patronage networks, relying mainly on his inner-circle from his hometown of Binkolo. However, Momoh attempted to distinguish himself from Stevens through the development of a "New Order" of reforms in 1986. In addition, Momoh "used the reform conditions to remake his unruly inherited elite accommodation"(Reno 1995: 155).

Under international pressure from the World Bank and the IMF, Momoh attempted to control widespread smuggling and combat corruption by declaring a "State of Economic Emergency" and putting in place new regulations that banned local businesses from dealing in foreign currency. The initiatives were largely counterproductive, as illegal trading only increased, and even drew in the armed forces that had been sent out to monitor the new economic regulations (Koroma 1996: 74 – 76).

The second core element of the Shadow State is the abuse, by a ruler, of the global recognition of state sovereignty in order to control access by foreign investors to formal and informal markets. Closely linked to the second element, are the manipulation of markets and the weakening of bureaucratic structures. Through the manipulation of markets, a ruler can maintain control over others, such as the general population, and also reap the economic benefits; which, in the case of Sierra Leone, was predominantly revenue collected from diamond sales. A ruler strives to undermine formal government institutions, as these

institutions often stand in the way of a ruler acquiring and maintaining power (Reno 2000a: 435).

At independence, Sierra Leone reportedly had one of the best public services in West Africa. However, from the early 1970s, the country experienced a steady decline in service that only continued to deteriorate as the decades past. Various factors led to the cessation of public services, for example; “political interference and manipulation”, which resulted in “inefficiency, nepotism and huge-scale financial management” (Laggah, Allie and Wright 1999: 180).

In line with the Shadow State model, Sierra Leone became a fragmented political system, where access to diamond funds could be used as considerable leverage in a system where rulers had to rely on diamond merchants and local chiefs, and vice versa. Rulers continued to have power over the state, and had to maintain the façade of statehood in order to maintain a profitable relationship with outside elements and to retain a certain level of control over the local population, through mostly coercive methods. However, the maintenance of some level of state legitimacy came with consequences, as it was difficult to uphold legal norms and bureaucratic state structures and, at the same time, operate a successful illicit trade network (Clapham 2003: 12).

The Shadow State was created by the particular political management strategies adopted by leaders, especially Stevens, which weakened and simultaneously destabilised the state. Through the façade of statehood, leaders pursued “private forms of political management and wealth accumulation” (Clapham 2003: 12). For example, in 1980 the leadership of Sierra Leone accepted payment for the storage of toxic waste in order to for the country to host the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit the following year (Reno 1995: 137-138). Another example was that of the Governor of the State Bank of Sierra Leone, Sam Bangura, who lost his life for allegedly protesting the involvement of the government in questionable business deals. A third example

was the continued suppression of the military by the government in order to keep the forces weak and non-threatening (Clapham 2003: 13).

The disguise of statehood was important for rulers in order to ensure them the benefit of recognition from other states. This rendered leaders able to make deals with other states and foreign businessmen, as well as benefit from official aid and military assistance. This arrangement did, however, come with sacrifices, such as the responsibility to repay debts on time and a degree of observation by other states on the behaviour of the country according to international standards. These sacrifices could be tolerated because of the benefits received, however, the provision of public goods (considered one of the key factors that determine a functioning state) was considered highly counter-productive for Shadow State leaders. Similarly, the maintenance of the institutional structures of rule, which could be seen as an opportunity for an individual to gain more power at the top of the state hierarchy, also meant that state institutions had to sustain internal norms and correct behaviour, restricting the freedom of action of power-seeking leaders (Clapham 2003: 13).

The last characteristic exposes Shadow States as “informal commercially oriented networks” that operate parallel to existing government bureaucracies (Reno 2000a: 435). Outside the boundaries of Freetown, “rural Sierra Leone's potentially rich productive activities – agriculture, artisanal diamond and gold mining, and fisheries – were operated mainly for the benefit of 'Big Men' and their networks” (Reno 2000a: 435). The political process in Sierra Leone was controlled using violence, and the pursuit of personal business interests was monopolised by those in power and their supporters, leaving the citizens of Sierra Leone, especially the youth, to look for alternatives. Oftentimes, this came in the form of illicit economic activity. For example, the APC relied on gangs of youths to intimidate rivals and to perform the tasks necessary to stay in power (Lord 2000).

The area of illicit diamond mining in Sierra Leone was both economic sabotage and an integral part of the ruler's strategy of political survival. This practice was not new, however. During the colonial period, a British company, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), had sole rights to mine diamonds in Sierra Leone, prohibiting Sierra Leoneans access to their own resources (Keen 2005: 12). "Even non-political actions that occurred outside the state became a target of cooption and repression" (Reno 1995: 22). The borders of the Shadow State were determined by the struggle to understand political power that developed when the colonial state came into existence. These boundaries stretch outside the formal territorial boundaries of the colonial state. This enabled states bordering Sierra Leone to become involved in Shadow State activities, especially in the illegal diamond smuggling trade. This phenomenon is explained further in the section on the impact of diamonds, which appears later in this chapter.

A Shadow State leader is always under threat from other elites wishing to extend their power, greedy traders and a disgruntled local population. Rulers are limited by the rules of state sovereignty, regardless of their power. Where illicit traders and diamond dealers operate in international markets, "rulers are bound to international financial commitments incurred by decrepit institutions or earlier efforts at elite accommodation". Sierra Leone was not the most desired place to do business, regardless, rulers of Shadow States find ways to attract international linkages of illicit diamond traders (Reno 1995: 22 – 23).

In the case of Sierra Leone, powerful players involved in the informal markets, as well as diamond diggers made use of their contacts within Sierra Leone and the international community. Depending on which situation was to their advantage; traders would either work with a Shadow State leader, or against the leader. It is important to take note of the historical context of the role of leadership in Sierra Leone. Colonial rule had a significant impact on the development of the Shadow State as elements of the Shadow State emerged with the actions of British colonial officials. Colonial rulers struggled to balance

colonial rule and the changing legal constraints of decolonisation that threatened their authority. Diamonds also played a large role in helping to develop the Shadow State, as the commodity fetches a high price on the international market, and they are difficult to bring under state control (Reno 1995: 24-25).

Sierra Leone represents a case where conflict was created not through a traditional collapse of one system, but rather, through the creation of a system that only benefited certain actors; namely, “corrupt officials, wartime traders, combatants, and international opportunists” (Mitchell 2005: 3). During the 1990s, the West African region was considered “one of the most globalised criminal markets in the world”.

According to Mitchell (2005: 4), the conflict in Sierra Leone was a manifestation of political marginalisation and economic exclusion. Marginalisation was caused by the continued dominance of patrimonial rulers, and exclusion was a result of rulers’ desire for monopoly over the natural resource market, especially diamonds. In the presence of a Shadow State system, a power vacuum will appear as groups compete for state control in an insecure environment. Furthermore, an economic vacuum will develop because state infrastructure no longer supports its citizens. Those that participate in the newly created system control the Shadow State. Participation in the informal economy becomes a survival strategy, as rulers at the top attempt to maintain power, and ordinary citizens at the bottom just try to stay alive (Mitchell 2005: 8).

As was explained in Chapter 3, both Stevens and Momoh exhibited the behaviour of a Shadow State leader. Stevens successfully created a de jure one-party state in 1978. The one-party government developed a problematic relationship with the extractive economy, especially the diamond-mining sector. Stevens and his cronies continued to divert profits acquired through the sale of diamonds and other resources in order to increase their private fortunes. Momoh, although less successful than Stevens, also attempted to control state

resources using the model set up by Stevens, but the eventual economic collapse in Sierra Leone enabled the RUF invasion to be far more successful than anticipated.

4.2.2 Formal state failure

Sierra Leone is a small African country with a "favourable political geography, in terms of the distribution of its population, resources, and communications" (Herbst 2000: 154) and does not display the inherent challenges of governance as experienced by larger territories (Herbst 2000: 157). In addition, the country benefited from its dedication to Western education, the country is home to the oldest university-level institution in sub-Saharan Africa, by producing a large group of lawyers, academics, and other professionals. Sierra Leone also secured a supply of foreign exchange after the unearthing of large deposits of alluvial diamonds (Clapham 2003: 10). Nevertheless, the country deteriorated politically and economically, and became the site of brutal conflict that lasted just over a decade.

Sierra Leonean citizens were culturally and politically very insecure. This can possibly be attributed to the long period of British rule and a general sense by the Creoles that British culture was superior to their own. In fact, the country never developed a truly vibrant political culture and there were no active nationalist movements. Sierra Leone became independent because the British colonisers voluntarily withdrew from the country, not because of a mass uprising by the local citizens (Clapham 2003: 10).

According to Reno (2003: 71), Sierra Leone can be defined as a failed state "by virtue of its declining ability to provide order and security, much less social services". Sierra Leone represents a case study where rulers intentionally undermined state capacity to provide citizens with public goods. Historically, the country's bureaucracy was very weak, and the leaders of Sierra Leone were able to capitalise on this weakness in order to build up their own wealth.

The failure of the formal state in Sierra Leone did not suddenly occur in a power vacuum. Rather, it was a result of the systematic manipulation of state resources by the political leaders of Sierra Leone, especially Siaka Stevens. The state was already steadily weakening throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and failed in the 1990s. State failure in Sierra Leone made it possible for a group of rebels, in this case the RUF, to transform a few attacks "into a full-scale conflict" (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 16).

According to Ducasse-Rogier (2004: 17), the primary result of state failure was widespread insecurity. Leaders in Sierra Leone used disorder as a political tool to weaken the groups wanting to challenge the ruling authority (Chabal and Daloz 1999). For example, Stevens intentionally kept the Sierra Leone Army ill equipped and understaffed as a preventative measure against a possible coup. Although both Stevens and Momoh supplied senior military staff with subsidised rice and accommodation, lower ranking soldiers were often not paid, and by the late 1980s, this strategy became unaffordable as government resources decreased (Keen 2005: 32). A weakened army made it possible for the RUF to launch a successful first attack on Sierra Leone in 1991.

In addition to weakening the army, "Stevens also encouraged the development of a climate of disorder", by supporting the formation of militia groups and private security companies, comprised mainly of "marginalised youth". Through this strategy, Stevens was able to "maintain control of the country and to plunder its resources" and fostered a "culture of violence" (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 17).

A second result of state failure was "economic predation and misappropriation of state resources". Stevens and his cronies managed to control the country's formal and informal economy by taking advantage of "creditor's recommendations to reduce state participation in the economy and to privatize (to their own profit) many state-owned businesses". When General Momoh took power in 1985, the state was nearly bankrupt and he was unable to save the

economy from total collapse due to the lack of fiscal revenue. Ordinary citizens did not have access to the economy or social services (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 17).

All public sectors were affected by the actions of the leadership of Sierra Leone. State-controlled services such as education, health and electricity, were no longer available to ordinary citizens. Civil servants stopped receiving salaries and had to resort to looting their offices and charging people for services that were provided free in the past (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 17). As was described in Chapter 3, Stevens managed to transform Sierra Leone's fragile democracy into a one-party political system, which became a very difficult political challenge to overcome and even his successors struggled to take political control of the country (Hirsch 2001b: 147).

The failure of the formal Sierra Leonean state and the emergence of a Shadow State is a result of various factors; the problems of adopting a European state model, the regional West African dynamics, the lack of a strong political culture, and the over-reliance on one primary commodity to sustain the economy, just to name a few. In combination, these factors created the perfect environment for a Shadow State to emerge (Clapham 2003: 10).

4.2.3 Development of a war economy

This section provides an account of the political economy of the Shadow State by discussing the development of the war economy in Sierra Leone. The first section outlines the basic understanding of the war economy by firstly, placing the concept into a broader context and secondly, examines the war economy of Sierra Leone. The second part of this section considers how diamond mining and trading facilitated in the sustainability of the war economy.

War economies today differ fundamentally from war economies in the past in several respects. The most prominent difference is that traditional war

economies focused on using resources to defeat the enemy in battle. Therefore, the economy of the state was geared to building up a defence force capable of winning a war. Today's war economies do the opposite, "they involve the fragmentation and decentralization of the state" (Kaldor 2001: 90). In other words, the state cannot monopolise production and employment in order to fund their war cause. Instead, outside actors are brought in to support warring parties in their quest to win a conflict. Ordinary civilians become targets of violence and predation, and state resources are traded outside of the country to private companies who have no political interests, and only wish to make a profit (Kaldor 2001: 90).

A war economy can be defined as all economic activities carried out in wartime, and can be sub-divided into three categories, namely; the combat economy, shadow economy and coping economy. Combat economies include "the capture of control over production and economic resources to sustain a conflict" and "economic strategies of war aimed at the disempowerment of specific groups". The term "shadow economy" "refers to economic activities that are concluded outside state-regulated frameworks and are not audited by the state institutions". Lastly, the coping economy "refers to economic activity undertaken by population groups that are using their asset-base to more or less maintain basic living standards or surviving by utilising a dwindling asset-base to maintain minimum or below minimum living standards" (Pugh et al 2004: 8 – 9).

Taking into account the division of the concept "war economy" into the combat, shadow and coping economy, it is important to put this model into a broader understanding of African economies; the formal, informal and global economies. The informal economy includes both legal and 'illegal' activity and operates mostly through barter and subsistence transactions, but also includes monetised exchanges, despite a lack of regulatory framework.

The informal economy in Sierra Leone cannot be described as illegal. In the absence of an alternative, many people involved in this system have no choice

but to participate in activities, whether legal or not. For a large part of the population in Sierra Leone, the informal economy represents an essential livelihood, especially in the absence of government regulated economic activity. The line between entrepreneurship and illegal activity becomes blurred in a world where people are responsible for their own survival, because the social contract between the government and its citizens has dissolved. Thus, the informal economy truly represents a system where illicit economic activity represents a lifeline to all actors across the spectrum.

The formal economy is based on the idea of nation-state participation in and control over economic activity. This economy is referred to in World Bank and IMF data sets, as gross domestic product for example, and usually operates within specific guidelines and regulations. African participation in the global economy is a result of economic policy reform occurring within the formal economy, and includes “a gradually evolving regulatory environment, liberalisation of investment codes, government debt conversion schemes, political risk insurance, pan-African mutual funds and initial, if hesitant, discussion about sovereign credit ratings” (Freeman 2000: 10).

The three economies above have more often competed than complemented each other. However, there is little acknowledgement from any of the three economies that they have an impact on or relate to each other in some way. For example, rising unemployment levels force people into the informal economy and can lead to increased insecurity within a country. The government then places more funds into increasing security measures in a country instead of focusing on the formal economic decline (Freeman 2000: 11).

Actors involved in the Sierra Leone conflict used the pre-war economy shaped by the Shadow State, and transformed into a criminal war economy. This was achieved through diamond smuggling, arms deals, breaking of sanctions, money laundering and a number of other illicit activities. Most of the illicit

activities performed during the conflict, especially smuggling, were already present in the pre-war period (Mitchell 2005: 6).

There are three levels of actors directly involved in the war economy, namely the government, insurgent groups and the international community. Government officials were mostly involved in corrupt political and economic practices, and used their position of power to exploit diamond profits for personal gain. Insurgent groups, such as the RUF, were also involved in smuggling diamonds, mainly across the border to countries like Liberia and Guinea in exchange for weapons and supplies. Included in the insurgent groups were corrupt police officials and 'sobels' (soldiers by day rebels by night) from the Sierra Leone Armed Forces (SLAF).

The international actors involved in the war economy include international firms knowingly acting outside moral business practices, diamond firms acting as investors, who supported both the government and the RUF. In return for their assistance, these firms were promised major mining concessions and long-term contracts. Although these associations represented formal contracts, they often operated outside the legal and ethical business framework. Companies were given tax exemptions and were not morally obligated to inspect working conditions of workers or human rights violations. Also included in the international group are Charles Taylor of Liberia, as well as Russian money launderers, Lebanese smugglers (some of whom were linked to Hezbollah), and various arms dealers from other countries worldwide (Mitchell 2005: 7).

The beneficiaries of the conflict include a range of actors, from politicians, local and foreign businessmen, 'sobels', and peacekeepers. The actions of all these people and organisations, especially those with considerable economic influence, helped prolong the conflict. External patrons that benefited from the conflict include Charles Taylor and his son, Charles Taylor Jr, along with many of their business partners, including Talal El-Ndine (a Lebanese businessman), Fred Rindle (a retired South African army officer), and Gus Van Kouwenhoven

(a Dutch national interested in diamonds), to name a few. A few local businessmen also benefited from the insecurity in Sierra Leone, especially Lebanese traders and "Marakas" from Gambia and Mali (Kandeh 2005: 101-103). Even the Sierra Leone Army, especially 'sobels' managed to profit during the war, by selling rations of rice on the market at a considerable profit, and becoming so involved in diamond smuggling and mining that the army almost resembled a syndicate by the time the NPRC surrendered in 1996 (Kandeh 2005: 103). It is also important to mention the role of private military companies (PMCs) in the economic environment of Sierra Leone's conflict. The most active in this case, was Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African PMC, a group hired to by Valentine Strasser's NPRC in 1995 to force the RUF out of the diamond areas (Mitchell 2005: 8).

It is vital to understand the war economy of Sierra Leone in order to grasp the complexity of current post-conflict reconstruction attempts in the country. In general, the study of war economies exposes the motives of key actors, strategies developed by local populations to cope with crisis, economic mechanisms devised to perpetuate conflict and economic challenges for post conflict transformation. Although post-conflict reconstruction has not entirely ignored the challenges posed by political economy dynamics; crucial aspects of war economies, especially shadow economy activity, have not been assessed adequately.

Five key consequences emerge from this neglect. Firstly, the complexity of achieving peace through an agreement is often underestimated. Secondly, a relapse into conflict is a possibility and must be taken into account. Thirdly, peace spoilers gain strength from sources outside the reach of existing policies. Fourthly, peace builders often have to include those parties that were directly involved in illicit economic activities during conflict, and they could help perpetuate the war economy. Lastly, economic recovery does not occur in a vacuum, and thus, regional dynamics must be taken into account in order to promote economic development (Pugh et al 2004: 1-4).

According to Clapham (2003: 11), the relationship between domestic resources, political elites and the international market, shaped the Shadow State in Sierra Leone. The Shadow State is created by the brokering skills of the leader, given a substantial amount of natural resources available in both domestic and external arenas. Brokering is always more difficult for rulers of poorer states, but Sierra Leone is an extreme case of how things can go wrong.

When conflict in Sierra Leone began in 1991, there was no state, in the traditional understanding of the concept. Rather, "there were a set of private operators, using the mythology of statehood as one of a collection of resources, along with management of the diamond market and control over parts of a fragmented military, through which to achieve personal goals of survival, wealth and recognition". The Shadow State was exposed once conflict commenced in 1991 (Clapham 2003: 14).

Sierra Leone's political economy has been shaped by three main factors; "firstly, the role of diamonds remains key; secondly, top-down corruption and patrimonialisation; and thirdly, it is a product of pre-conflict regional economic dynamics that created structural incentives for shadow trade and facilitated the development of region-wide networks to engage in this trade" (Pugh et al 2004: 109). The combat economy developed out of already existing networks, and Charles Taylor took advantage of this situation, "adapting and refining the regional networks of the shadow economy, as well as more thoroughly integrating them into global shadow markets" (Pugh et al 2004: 109).

4.2.3.1 Impact of diamonds

Management of the diamond economy plays a large part in the steady demise of the state in Sierra Leone. As an industry, diamonds are difficult to bring under state control, especially in the case of Sierra Leone, because diamonds are derived from alluvial deposits scattered across the country rather than in kimberlite pipes such as in countries like Botswana. Diamonds are expensive

worldwide, however, in Sierra Leone they are relatively easy to mine, there is no expensive equipment required to mine them, and they are easily smuggled out of the country. The country's most valuable asset thus became its biggest liability (Clapham 2003: 11).

Sierra Leone's diamond industry faced three major challenges: firstly, because diamonds were derived from alluvial deposits, anyone with a spade and sieve could look for diamonds; the large number of illicit diamond miners, from inside and outside the country, along with diamond brokers and merchants, many of Lebanese origin, "who managed both the commercial linkages between miners and global markets, and the political linkages between the country's main source of ready cash and the networks of prominent politicians" (Clapham 2003: 12).

Differential economic and regulatory practices by legal and illicit diamond traders have persisted since the discovery of diamonds in the Sierra Leone in 1930. During the colonial period, an agreement existed between diamond group De Beers Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) and the local colonial authorities that ensured that the SLST would have monopoly over mining rights in the entire country for 99 years. Despite this contract, the level of illicit diamond mining increased rapidly, and by 1956, 75,000 illicit diamond miners were operating in the Kono District. An important economic impact of illicit diamond mining was the rapid decline of rice production; as young men were drawn to the diamond fields, Sierra Leone shifted from being a net exporter of rice to an importer (Pugh et al 2004: 101).

The high level of illicit diamond mining challenged the ability of the state to extract the resource to benefit the national economy. The government attempted to address this problem by buying off the illicit diamond miners through the Licenced Diamond Miners Scheme (LDMS). This scheme allowed miners to pan for diamonds in areas that were not allocated to the Sierra Leone

Selection Trust (SLST), and they were obligated to sell their diamonds to the Government Diamond Office (GDO) (Clapham 2003: 12).

Despite the adverse effect illicit diamond mining was having on the country, illicit miners were seen as heroes rather than lawbreakers, as they were undermining the progress of the oppressive SLST who were exporting the country's riches to the benefit of outsiders and not the local population. This trend continued even after independence, where then president Siaka Stevens used the practice to his advantage to gain political power and force the SLST to relinquish its holdings, as well as legitimise his own role in shadow diamond trading (Pugh et al 2004: 102).

It is important to highlight the various actors involved in diamond sales, as it explains how the regional network grew and eventually formed the combat economy. The most common buyers and smugglers of diamonds were the Mandingo traders from neighbouring West African states, as well as Lebanese traders who had been in Sierra Leone since the nineteenth century – who also represented a great asset to the British because they were seen as a more preferable trading partner than the local Krio traders. Comprising less than one percent of the population, the Lebanese had been economically active in the country even before it reached independence in 1961 (Reno 1995: 72–73). During Sierra Leone's diamond boom in 1955, a number of Lebanese traders emerged and became dealers in diamond towns such as Sefadu, Yengema, Nimikoro and Njaiama (Luke 1989: 137).

Although the Lebanese had never enjoyed the privileges of citizenship and had endured a period of anti-Lebanese and anti-market policies, in the 1970s, President Stevens made a decision to change his mildly socialist tendencies to capitalism. His primary reason for this was to create a Shadow State. Through the manipulation of a group of Lebanese diamond dealers, Stevens was able to outsmart his rivals, and benefit personally from the sale of diamonds. Naturally, his plan to rely on the Lebanese traders to gain access to international markets

had to be performed in relative secrecy. Stevens declared a state of emergency in 1971, eliminating any opposing political competition, and in 1978 officially turned the country into a one-party state (Reno 1995: 4).

The partnership between the President and the Lebanese traders proved very successful, and by the early 1980s, the Lebanese were using their well-established international trade connections in Europe and the United States to bring profit to Stevens and his cronies in return for political protection (Chua 2003: 149). However, the local populations did not look favourably on the relationship between Stevens and the Lebanese. In the late 1980s, early 1990s, the country suffered severe economic setbacks at the hands of the IMFs radical free market measures. As a result, subsidies to the population were phased out and many people blamed the Lebanese for their hardship (Reno 1995: 155-160).

The arrival of the RUF caused most Lebanese to flee the country, as their safety could no longer be guaranteed, and the rebels had taken over the diamond fields. It is important here to note that the initial period of economic success for the Lebanese was made possible by a combination of “markets, democracy and a market-dominant minority” (Chua 2003: 150). Essentially, a Shadow State system had already been created since 1973, and global markets generally glossed over the instability that the economic transactions in the region caused. Furthermore, the policies implemented by the IMF only served to exacerbate matters, local populations had to cope with being exploited on a domestic level, and marginalised on an international level (Chua 2003: 151). The conflict in 1991 was a culmination of systematic economic deterioration due to the Shadow State, “the actions of corrupt officials, the stresses associated with International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment, and the disaffection of junior officers excluded from the patronage system” (Pugh et al 2004: 99).

The main smuggling route for diamonds was through Freetown, where diamonds would then be sent to Beirut and on to European markets. However, Liberia became a popular option as security was tightened between Kono and Freetown. During the 1950s, Liberia established numerous fictitious diamond mines as a way to hide its role in diamond laundering. In the late 1970s, Liberia proved to be a better trading route as the price differential between the two countries meant that diamonds would fetch higher prices in Liberia. This was in direct contrast to reforms initiated in the late 1950s, which caused local prices, as well as diamonds passing through legal channels in Sierra Leone to increase. With the detachment of the leone from the British pound in 1978, the local currency steadily lost its value, thus encouraging shadow trading (Pugh et al 2004: 102).

The above factors all came together in 1987 when an emergency economic programme was put into place. The government imposed a requirement that all foreign exchange earnings should be deposited with the Bank of Sierra Leone and that all economic activity had to be conducted in leones. The Government Gold and Diamond office was given monopoly over diamond export pricing, which lowered the export price of diamonds and essentially destroyed the diamond export market. By the second half of 1988, the country reported that zero carats worth of legal diamonds were being traded, compared to 2 million carats in 1970 (Pugh et al 2004: 103).

The bottom-up economic drivers represented by both formal and informal regional economic networks made IDM possible. Added to this was the top-down system of “elite corruption and a neo-patrimonial system that frequently expressed itself in the allocation of diamond resources to key supporters” (Pugh et al 2004: 103). Sierra Leone was a Shadow State that was completely unprepared for a limited RUF attack, as the already established peace-time shadow and coping economies could be transformed into a combat economy.

The combat economy also functioned within the established regional network. Armed conflict began in 1991 with the appearance of Charles Taylor's Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Liberia. The conflict in Sierra Leone is often compared to a similar situation in its neighbour, Liberia. In both cases, the warring parties exploited natural resources to fund their respective war efforts. The incursion of RUF rebels into Sierra Leone was caused by a dispute between Taylor and the individual officials in Sierra Leone in relation to smuggling cars into that country (Berdal and Keen 1997: 801).

The RUF quickly gained control of the diamond fields in Sierra Leone, under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Kennedy, to form RUFP Mining Limited (Reno 1998: 124). At first, RUF fighter mined diamonds themselves or used forced labour, but later they included local diggers, who were promised a proportion of the diamonds discovered. Diamonds were moved out of Sierra Leone in numerous ways, using the adaptable regional networks already in existence; through countries like Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, Guinea, and Liberia, where incidentally, many Lebanese traders had fled when the conflict in Sierra Leone broke out. However, the main transfer point for diamonds was Liberia, through RUF connections such as "General" Ibrahim Bah, a Burkinabé, who moved the stones from Monrovia to Ouagadougou. According to Gberie (2002: 7), diamonds were traded for weapons, medical supplies and mining equipment from Lebanese merchants, including Aziz Nassour and Samih Ossarily, both linked to subsequent Al-Qaida purchases of US$20 million of RUF diamonds (The Observer 2002). Although the Al-Qaida connection in the case of Sierra Leone's political economy is relatively marginal, it is important to highlight the relationship of clandestine trading networks with several other groups, including terrorists.

It is also vital to highlight the RUF as a non-ideological movement, which sets it apart from many other revolutionary actors operating on the African continent. Motivated only by economic factors, and supported by a generous economic space, the RUF survived without the economic support of the local Sierra Leone

population. The regionalised combat economy in West Africa created the ideal opportunity for the RUF to successfully overtake a country and terrorise its people for their own economic gain (Musah 2000: 86). The exact amount of RUF illicit diamond exports is not known. De Beers estimated that sales equalled US$70 million in 1999; however, the World Bank total for that year is an estimated US$137 million (United Nations 2000: 14).

There are three main aspects of the relationship between conflict and diamonds according to Ducasse-Rogier (2004). From a political point of view, diamonds enabled leaders to enrich themselves and allowed for the creation of a system based on “corruption and patronage”. Economically, diamonds represented a useful source of fiscal revenue and foreign currency but also proved to be a great weakness, as it became the primary commodity in the clandestine market (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 18). Diamonds are also inextricably linked to the issue of security, as mining regions were the first to experience widespread violence. The illegal diamond mining business created a violent environment, which led to full-scale conflict in 1991. There is a great deal of discussion amongst researchers as to whether diamonds actually caused the war, however, there is little dispute that diamonds perpetuated the conflict.

4.2.3.2 Role of the youth

According to Powlick (2007), there were two main resources in Sierra Leone namely, diamonds and the youth. The role of diamonds was outlined in the section above; therefore, it is vital to now discuss the role of the youth in Sierra Leone. For the most part, the masses of Sierra Leone were left out of the political structure of the country. The environment in which youths in Sierra Leone existed was neither stable nor secure. Years of illicit diamond mining caused many youths to become involved in the practice themselves, most often in terrible conditions with little pay. These miners were essentially cut off from the political world, as they were not allowed to communicate via paramount chiefs to the government. This, coupled with an adoption of American movies

and rap music, created a resistance movement “against the repressive official structure” (Clapham 2003: 14).

However, it was not only the youths in rural areas that felt alienated, educated individuals in the capital, Freetown, also rebelled against the APC government as job opportunities vanished. This led to a shift in the political focus of young people, especially in eastern Freetown, from wanting to become part of the ruling elite, to a more popular common cause movement against the ruling government of the time. Their target became the post-colonial state, “in the corrupt and degenerative form that it had assumed”. The “combination of urban and rural, uneducated and intellectual youth, together with the extent and nature of their ideological base and organisational capacity is contested amongst scholars who have analysed the phenomenon, but it remains a relevant factor in the complexity of statehood in Sierra Leone” (Clapham 2003: 15).

The high rate of unemployment in Sierra Leone is partly responsible for the high rate of drug use amongst the youth. In addition, unemployed people have often been the main instigators of conflict as a means to ‘right the wrongs’ done to them by government officials (Laggah et al 1999: 181).

In the case of Sierra Leone, unemployed marginalised youth were drawn into the conflict, as a result of being brainwashed, under the influence of drugs, or due to a lack of alternatives. The most worrying situation was the abduction of children who were forced to “commit atrocities against members of their community or family and were tattooed with RUF letters” (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 22).

Sierra Leoneans were aware of the similarities between the rulers of the country and the RUF rebels. A Freetown journalist described the two groups as “town rebels” and “bush rebels”, where “town rebels” are neatly dressed government workers, and “bush rebels” are shabbily dressed and under the influence of

drugs. Each group manipulated the citizens of Sierra Leone through using violence, and corrupt political and economic strategies that only benefited themselves (Reno 2003: 87).

4.2.3.3 Regional dynamics

A discussion of the regional political dynamics is very important when analysing the case of Sierra Leone. The regional economic element will be discussed in the war economy section later in this chapter. Two key events led to the political environment that made the creation of a Shadow State possible in Sierra Leone. The first is the radicalising of West Africa by Colonel Gaddafi and the second is the civil war in neighbouring Liberia.

The training received by some key players in the Sierra Leone crisis, such as the RUF, was provided by Libya and Burkina Faso during the late 1980s. Among those trained in Benghazi was Foday Sankoh, who would later become the leader of the RUF. Together with his training, Sankoh also built up a good relationship with Charles Taylor, and through this association, Sankoh gained access to external resources. Although no Sierra Leoneans were trained in Burkina Faso, Burkinabes were present in the initial group that attacked Sierra Leone from Liberia in 1991 (Clapham 2003: 15-16).

The RUF could only enter Sierra Leone after the civil war had broken out in Liberia in late 1989. Charles Taylor was keen to spread the war across to Sierra Leone, given that Momoh was a prominent member of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group. At the time, ECOMOG was being used by leaders such as Samuel Doe of Liberia and subsequently by the leader of the Interim Government of National Unity, Amos Sawyer, to prevent Taylor from seizing Monrovia. In addition, “one of the Liberian armed factions promoted by ECOMOG as a counterweight to the NPLF, ULIMO, operated from Sierra Leonean territory back into Liberia”. Thus, it was natural

that Charles Taylor would send the RUF into Sierra Leone, as a political reaction, with economic benefits in the form of diamonds (Clapham 2003: 16).

The war economy in Sierra Leone cannot be discussed in isolation. West African regional dynamics must be taken into account in order to understand why Sierra Leone's conflict lasted as long as it did. The conflict in Sierra Leone should be understood as a "result of accumulated grievances with economic mismanagement, corrupt officials, the stresses associated with International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment, and the disaffection of junior officers excluded from the patronage system" (Pugh et al 2004: 99). In addition, "while the role of economic agendas may have become more pronounced as the conflict developed, it is also the case that the prosecution of the war has left a legacy of new grievances that further complicate the challenge of peacebuilding" (Spear 2002: 13).

The evolution of the war economy in Sierra Leone must include the influence of bottom-up structural incentives to engage in shadow trade, in addition to the traditional discussions of rebel greed and the role of corruption and patrimonialisation. Sierra Leone's war economy has its roots in long-existing shadow trade network "that took advantage of different economic and regulatory environments in the region" (Pugh et al 2004: 99).

The regionalised war economy of Sierra Leone "has its roots in a much longer tradition of shadow trade that can be traced back to the pre-colonial long-distance trading networks that operated across large areas of Africa, particularly East and West Africa" (Meagher 1997: 165-187). Throughout the colonial period, this type of trade continued, although the commodities traded changed according to international market changes. "The opportunities for shadow trade were created by differences in the fiscal, legal, and import regulations adopted in French and British colonies". Regional actors were thus able to exploit the shadow spaces created by both physical borders, but also differential economic and regulatory practices of the colonial powers. Therefore, currency zones,

which changed the structural direction of traditional trade, replaced ecological zones. “A major motive for shadow trade was provided by differences between economies with internationally convertible currencies, notably the franc-zone countries, and those with foreign exchange controls” (Meagher 1997: 167-187).

The development of the Shadow State and the subsequent emergence of a war economy did not happen in isolation. The regional dimension of the conflict in Sierra Leone is extremely important. Where Sierra Leone can be described as a Shadow State, Liberia represents a “warlord state”, a variant of the “weak state”. Charles Taylor created and controlled a commercial network, and through this type of economic control, became a “warlord” in the region. Where the Shadow State describes the relationship between the state and the economy, the “weak state” describes a crisis in state formation (Kawabata 2006: 25-26).

Charles Taylor has been widely acknowledged as a key actor in the Sierra Leone conflict. Of particularly importance is his relationship with the leader of the RUF, Foday Sankoh, which was highlighted in Chapter 3. Taylor had several strategic as well as personal reasons for supporting the RUF; General Momoh, arrested him in 1988 in Freetown, for plotting to overthrow Liberia’s president at that time, Samuel Doe (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 21). In addition, Momoh supported the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States’ Ceasefire Monitoring Group in 1991 against Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPLF). This angered Taylor, and he retaliated by increasing his support to the RUF by providing ammunition and weapons (Hirsch 2001b: 147). Diamonds also seemed a likely attraction for Taylor, as Liberia had been trading Sierra Leonean diamonds illegally for many years before the conflict had begun (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 21).

Taylor was also very active in Sierra Leone during the conflict, which may help explain why the conflict lasted so long. The trafficking of arms and diamonds to and from Sierra Leone allowed Taylor to build up Liberia’s military capacity.

This was important as Taylor was facing continuous rebellion in Liberia before he secured the election in 1997, but was challenged again in 1999. Taylor, however, was not only focussed on destabilising Sierra Leone, he managed to create unrest in other countries in the West African region, such as Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, in order for him to remain in power (Ducasse-Rogier 2004: 21).

The RUF was not the only outside party caught up in the conflict in Sierra Leone, a number of country's in the region became involved including, Libya, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Guinea. The first three countries remained allies of the RUF throughout the 10-year civil war, Guinea, however, remained on civil terms with Sierra Leone. Although the instability along the Guinea's borders only added to the pressures of maintaining peace in Sierra Leone after the conflict ended in 2002 (Wong 2003: 6).

Libya, and its leader Muammar Gaddafi, supported Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh based on the false premise that they were both "true revolutionaries, with sound ideological convictions and who shared [Muammar] Gaddafi's anti-imperialist views" (Wong 2003: 5-6). However, Gaddafi was mistaken, as neither Taylor, nor Sankoh truly believed that their actions were for the benefit of the citizens in Sierra Leone, or their own countries. Gaddafi delivered small arms and ammunition caches regularly in exchange for the promotion of his ideological revolution against the Western powers.

Burkina Faso's primary involvement in the conflict came in the form of mercenaries. The country also served as a transit route for men and weapons for Taylor and the RUF. Liberia's contribution to the civil war was far more direct than any other country, not only because the RUF originated in Liberia, but also because of the actions by its leader, Charles Taylor (Wong 2003: 6).

Together, Libya, Burkina Faso and Liberia formed a "revolutionary triangle" that supported the RUF throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone. This connection was

often ignored when peace agreements were signed, and subsequently became one of the reasons many of these agreements failed, as the peace agreements did not account for the regional dynamics that perpetuated the conflict (Wong 2003: 7).

4.3 Conclusion

The development of the Shadow State in Sierra Leone is a clear illustration of how a group of elites managed to take control over the political and economic dimensions of a state. The actions of leaders such as Stevens and Taylor, in combination with the manipulation of markets and resources, resulted in a violent conflict that lasted over a decade. Ordinary citizens were marginalised and had to find alternate ways to survive in an economic system that was geared to benefit only a small number of people in power. The economy that emerged as a result of Shadow State practices, transformed into a war economy when violence erupted in 1991. The war economy continued to serve those in power, leaving Sierra Leonean citizens few economic options.

This chapter discussed the Shadow State in Sierra Leone by highlighting the basic characteristics of a Shadow State and providing examples in the Sierra Leonean case. The process of state failure was also explored, as it is vital to understand how it led to the development of the Shadow State. The political economy of the Shadow State was investigated, with specific focus on the emergence of a war economy in Sierra Leone, and the role that diamonds played in sustaining the conflict in the country. The role of the youth in Sierra Leone was included because of the important role youths played in the maintenance of the war economy during the conflict. Lastly, the regional dimension was considered, as the conflict in Sierra Leone did not occur in a vacuum, but was fuelled by the decisions made by regional actors.

The next chapter examines attempts to address the challenges of overcoming the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone through a process of

post-conflict reconstruction. Chapter 5 also relies on the theoretical framework set out in Chapter 2, and serves as part two to the discussion of the Shadow State and war economy.

CHAPTER 5

Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Peace Economy in Sierra Leone

5.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored the Shadow State in Sierra Leone by describing the basic characteristics of a Shadow State and providing examples in the Sierra Leone case study. In addition to this, the political economy of the Shadow State was also discussed, focusing specifically on the emergence of a war economy in Sierra Leone.

This chapter examines and attempts to address the challenges of overcoming the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone through a process of post-conflict reconstruction from the end of the conflict in 2002 to December 2008. For the purpose of this study, the post-conflict strategies mentioned above are discussed within the framework set out in Chapter 2. Firstly, the post-conflict reconstruction strategies introduced in Chapter 2 are summarised, secondly, rebuilding the economy in Sierra Leone is examined, and lastly, the transformation of the war economy is explored by investigating the role of international financial institutions, the role of diamonds, the future of the youth in Sierra Leone, the role of the United Nations, the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process and the regional aspects of post-conflict reconstruction.

5.2 Summary of post-conflict reconstruction strategies

As discussed in Chapter 2, the NEPAD post-conflict reconstruction policy framework consists of five dimensions: security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic development; human rights, justice, and reconciliation; and coordination, management and resource mobilisation. As the focus of this study is on the transformation of war economies, only the socio-

economic development dimension is explored in detail. Although all the dimensions of the post-conflict reconstruction strategy employed in Sierra Leone are important, the socio-economic aspect has direct relevance for evaluating the process of transforming the war economy to a peace economy. Therefore, the socio-economic element of the post-conflict reconstruction plan remains the primary focus of this chapter. According to the NEPAD post-conflict reconstruction framework, the socio-economic dimension features as one vehicle to move from the transition phase of post-conflict reconstruction to the development path. The socio-economic dimension is divided up into five sections: humanitarian assistance; repatriation, rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction; physical infrastructure, social services and the economy (NEPAD Secretariat 2005: iv).

The African Union Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) framework makes use of six elements: security; humanitarian/emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender (African Union 2006: 3 – 4). According to the PCRD document (2006: 11), "socio-economic development is a multi dimensional process that contributes to improved living conditions, improved ability to meet basic needs, such as health, education, and food, and the reduction of poverty and inequality".

In order to promote peace and development in Sierra Leone, several national post-conflict reconstruction strategies and frameworks have been developed including the "Sierra Leone Vision 2025, the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the Peace Consolidation Strategy, the Improved Governance and Accountability Pact and the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 3). This chapter discusses aspects of the strategies mentioned above, however, the primary focus is on the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission's Cooperation Framework for Sierra Leone.

In December 2007, the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission developed the Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Cooperation Framework with the following basic principles:

- National ownership: the primary responsibility and ownership for peace consolidation and the development of a prosperous and democratic Sierra Leone rests with the Government and the people of Sierra Leone;
- Mutual accountability: sustainable peacebuilding requires a strong partnership on the basis of mutual respect and accountability between the Government and the people of Sierra Leone and their international partners, and;
- Sustained engagement: peacebuilding is a long-term process requiring sustained and predictable engagement from all stakeholders (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 2)

The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission argues that the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone have not been adequately addressed. These root causes include “widespread corruption, marginalization and disempowerment of the rural and some sectors of urban communities, lack of economic opportunities and inadequate State capacity to deliver basic services” (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 3). Unemployment and the marginalisation of the youth continue to pose a serious threat to lasting peace in Sierra Leone.

The framework was designed to be a flexible document, which can be modified by both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Peacebuilding Commission in order to meet the development needs of the country. Importantly, the framework was developed through a consultative process between the Sierra Leone Government and the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. In addition; the Government of Sierra Leone selected the priority areas identified in the framework, which included: “youth employment and empowerment, consolidation of democracy and good

governance, justice and security sector reform, capacity-building, and energy-sector development" (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 4).

5.3 Rebuilding the economy of Sierra Leone

According to Bornstein and Munro (2003: 221), "A central difficulty of war-torn societies is that the state is both an agent and an object of reconstruction". Therefore, a post-conflict reconstruction strategy needs to address the challenge of strengthening political authority. This is usually accomplished through holding elections, which was certainly the case of Sierra Leone who held elections four months after the conflict ended. The 2002 elections saw the re-election of Ahmed Tejan Kabbah and the governing SLPP (Grant 2005: 448).

In May 2002, the electorate were unsatisfied with the progress of the reconstruction strategy. "Local NGOs, such as the Campaign for Good Governance and the Network Movement for Justice and Development (NMJD), have a reputation for pressing Government for positive changes" (Grant 2005: 448). The systematic corruption linked to the Shadow State, however, remains a major challenge. Foreign donors and foreign investors are certainly aware of the challenge of corruption and its impact on the prospect for long-term economic reconstruction in Sierra Leone. However, according to Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Sierra Leone ranks 146th out of 180 countries, and has a CPI score of 2.2 out of 10 based on 13 independent surveys (Transparency International 2009). This confirms that the corruption entrenched by the Shadow State and the war economy in Sierra Leone has still not been adequately addressed.

Another challenge for the post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone is that development of the country is still largely dependant on donor funding. "From 1 July 2003 to 30 June 2004, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

budget was $543.49 million. UNAMSIL's approved budget for 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 is $291.6 million" (Grant 2005: 447). There is a fear that donor fatigue will set in, and therefore it is vital that Sierra Leone finds alternative sustainable methods of bolstering the economy and promoting development.

However, post-conflict reconstruction cannot solely rely on outside resources. Tax revenues from rough diamond exports, as well as other commodities need to be used. Before the conflict in 1991, agriculture accounted for just over half of Sierra Leone's GDP. Sierra Leone is currently suffering from "low export prices and from infrastructural impediments such as poor roads and slow (and corrupt) seaports" (Grant 2005: 451). Sierra Leone is a country that both imports food and receives food aid. Like many other countries, food aid often ends up being re-sold on the local market. In addition, the agricultural sector is suffering from a severe shortage of labour. Most potential workers are far more attracted to diamond mining (Grant 2005: 451).

The economic crisis in Sierra Leone was not solely created by widespread corruption formed by the Shadow State, but also by the deliberate actions of elites, who reinforced their power by undermining state services and replacing these with loyal private companies (Abrahamsen 2001: 89). The requirements set out by international financial institutions to optimise the functioning of the state, were used by elites to "justify eliminating or weakening alternative institutions and actors and that presented potential challenges" (Pugh et al 2004: 112). Privatisation was also used as a way to marginalise state functions to "politically non-threatening" independent companies (Pugh et al 2004: 112).

This phenomenon already existed in the country during the mid-1970s when Siaka Stevens ensured that the Government Diamond Office, which was responsible for diamond exports, no longer had a monopoly over the market. This was done so that Stevens and his cronies could have benefitted more from the trade of

diamonds in Sierra Leone. Examples of this include: the provision of export licences to businessman, such as Jamil Said Mohammed, who was closely linked to Stevens; the execution of false privatisation processes used by the Sierra Leone government in the areas of agriculture and oil refining (Reno 2002: 11); the abuse of state services, and the increasing levels of corruption was made possible by the network created by Stevens and his friends (Pugh et al 2004: 112). The Armed Forces were weakened by the constant budget cuts, and state spending on health and education fell by 60 percent between 1980 and 1987 (Adebajo 2002: 81). Real per capita GDP was at its peak in 1970 but had fallen by over a third by 1989 (World Bank 2003: 13).

After Stevens' retirement in 1985, Joseph Momoh continued in Stevens' footsteps. Momoh had certainly been chosen by Stevens because of Momoh's lack of strong political connections and therefore would not challenge Stevens' and his business partners. Momoh's strategy was to sell off state assets and provide private companies with work traditionally performed by state institutions. Momoh also empowered private firms in order to compete against Stevens and his business partners (Reno 2002: 13).

Momoh allowed foreign firms to take control over the informal diamond mines, sparking a coup in 1987 against Momoh by Stevens' supporters. As head of the armed forces, Momoh managed to replace civilian illicit diamond miners with soldiers who become part of the illicit diamond mining trade (Pugh et al 2004: 112-113). Momoh's actions, especially concerning the expulsion of illicit diamond miners, was in line with the agenda of external actors. Foreign companies argued that in order to restore control of the diamond industry, these firms should be given prime contracts, ensuring that illicit diamond mining would no longer occur (Pugh et al 2004: 113).

The structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the mid-1980s as pushed by the IMF and World Bank only worsened the social and development situation in the country. The SAP implemented in Sierra Leone included “cuts in the numbers of civil servants, removal of subsidies on food and petroleum, limits on public expenditures, and a reduction of the budget deficit” (Pugh et al 2004: 113). The country experienced a “brain drain” due to the lowering of civil service pay, which also led to weakening of state institutions. “Subsidies on rice and petrol were significantly reduced: prices for a fifty-kilogram bag of rice (imports of which had been privatized) were raised from 85 to 680 leones by 1988” (United Nations 1990 in Pugh et al 2004: 113).

A similar SAP surfaced in 1991, the same year that civil war began in the country, and by 1994, about 40 percent of government employees were discharged (Abrahamsen 2001: 89). According to World Bank policy at that time, the early 1990s represented a time of good economic progress in Sierra Leone, despite the ongoing conflict in the country (International Monetary Fund 1995). Although the World Bank result sounds peculiar, given that conflict is traditionally associated with destruction and regression, the war economy was strong enough to carry the SAP through the first few years of conflict. It is also important to note that the economy only appeared robust because of the success of the Shadow State system upheld by the elite in the country.

The war economy in Sierra Leone proved to be profitable to corrupt elites, who manipulated resources, and insurgents, who gained control over the diamond fields and managed to deceive the international financial institutions by creating the impression that the country’s economy was improving. The conditions of the international financial institutions represented the high level of control these institutions demand, as well as the their unreasonable expectations.

According to Ottaway (2002: 1008), the IMF drafted an “exhaustive” list after the Lomé Peace Agreement of activities which the government needed to complete including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, application of a national reconstruction programme, reduction in inflation, an overhaul of the tax system, and elections to be held in January 2001. The list could not possibly be completed according to the schedule set by the IMF.

It is clear that the IMF policies only helped exacerbate economic matters in the country. “Requirements to end subsidies for basic commodities, deregulate the economy, devalue the national currency, and reduce public expenditure” only further legitimised the corrupt practices of the ruling elites, as it enabled these actors to take control of the privatisation process (Cooper and Pugh 2002: 39).

The international financial reforms currently being implemented in Sierra Leone follow a similar pattern to the ones applied in the 1990s. The Sierra Leone government approved a plan in 2001 to create a national commission for privatisation in order to sell some state enterprises. Traditionally, creditors see privatisation together with anti-corruption initiatives, as a way to tackle corruption and improve economic performance. In the case of Sierra Leone, local elites continued to use this system to their advantage. The country is, at present, experiencing high levels of corruption in government. The Shadow State strategies are still in place in the country, as elites use their positions to further enrich themselves (Pugh et al 2004: 116).

Firms who were present in the country during conflict are now reappearing. Most notable is DiamondWorks, a Canadian mining firm, which was linked to mercenary companies, Sandline and Executive Outcomes (Campbell 2002: 207). “Thus the nexus of privatised security purchased on the back of the country’s natural resources has extended its legacy into the peace (Pugh et al 2004: 116).

Anti-corruption initiatives in the country have been rather unsuccessful, as government has moved too slowly in implementing the anti-corruption strategy created in 2000 with assistance from the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID). There is also a fundamental problem with the role of the attorney general as prosecutor. In 2002, the Attorney General was also the minister of justice, therefore creating an environment where conflict of interest may have affected decisions to prosecute. Former leaders, such as Strasser, used to prosecute certain people and not others in order to maintain their position in power (Pugh et al 2004: 116).

The ability of local actors to manipulate the strategies of international financial institutions to their best advantage continues today. The Shadow State system is so deeply entrenched in Sierra Leone's politics, that any attempt at overcoming the war economy needs to break down these patronage networks.

Rebuilding any state requires a tremendous amount of funding. A state-building system was put into place as soon as the fighting ceased in 2002. According to Albrecht and Malan (2006: 59), the state-building project in Sierra Leone was divided into three different stages. The first was the immediate post-conflict phase, which was largely external and donor-driven aimed at restoring safety and security and the provision of humanitarian assistance. The second phase, the transition phase, from 2005 to 2008, where the focus was on the "peace dividend" of decreasing spending on military expenditure and the implementation of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and a focus on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The last phase was the development phase, which requires a robust state budget, an effort to attract foreign investment, an "expansion of the private sector base for government finances and a general expansion of the tax base" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 59).

In 2006, the national budget of Sierra Leone was supplemented by extensive contributions from the international community, adding up to approximately 50 percent. However, Sierra Leone has the future potential to "generate more resources than all donors put together" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 59). The resources that can be used in the country can be separated into two categories. Internal resources include "human resources, financial resources for current expenditure and capital resources for investment" and external resources include "public sector and private investments" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 59-60). The National Revenue Authority (NRA) was set up in 2003 to ensure that state resources were used to the benefit of the state. The NRA's duties include administrating and collecting all "duties, taxes revenues and penalties as prescribed by the Laws of Sierra Leone" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 60).

Sierra Leone has an extremely small tax base and the country's economic elite cannot carry the bulk of the tax burden. The reluctance of Sierra Leoneans to pay tax is directly linked to their perceptions of the state. It has, therefore, been a priority to advertise the taxation system to citizens and politicians as an institution-building process. Through a process of decentralisation, tax collection can slowly increase. The UNDP instigated a programme to increase revenue generation through establishment of the Agriculture Business Units (ABUs), which help farmers to develop their communities. The goal of the ABUs is to ensure that certain commodities, like rice, are primarily exported from the country and not imported. ABUs have been set up in all but one district, Kailahun, in Sierra Leone (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 61-62).

The economic growth goals and the role of the private sector contribution in the economy of Sierra Leone is explained under Pillar 2 of the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper (PRSP) and government's policy document, *Vision 2025*. The main objectives of the macroeconomic stabilisation programmes set up by the IMF and World Bank and the Ministry of Trade and Industry include "the consolidation of

peace", "resettlement, reconstruction and reintegration", "improving governance", and "maintenance of a macroeconomic framework conducive to recovery" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 69). Naturally, the international community has supported the development of the private sector. The relationship between the private sector and the government should be developed during the post-conflict period.

Once a relative level of security has been established in a country, the focus turns to basic human security needs. Of particular relevance in the case of Sierra Leone, is the need to create employment opportunities for all citizens, including ex-combatants. In addition, the root causes of the conflict need to be addressed if the country wants to move towards a peace economy. The government has so far played an important role in promoting sound business practices, through creating a positive, investing environment. It has also been vital that the private sector create job prospects for the ordinary citizens of Sierra Leone.

A comprehensive private sector development strategy is still not present in the country; however, the government has made progress in this area through the creation of policy, development strategies and specifically in the strengthening of the Sierra Leone Export Development and Investment Corporation (SLEDIC) and the National Commission for Privatization (NCP), which manages public enterprises.

The Investment Promotion Act of 2004 is specifically designed to "…promote and attract private investment both domestic and foreign for the development of production and volume adding activities, to improve exports and provide employment opportunities; and generally to create an environment conducive to private investment and to provide for other related matters".

The SLEDIC is responsible for the implementation of the Act. SLEDIC is also responsible for the registration of businesses, assisting investors to obtain permits and clearance certificates, providing investment information, and identifying possible partnership opportunities. The Government of Sierra Leone, together with its development partners, has tried to provide businesses more capacity through business training, micro finance and technical assistance.

Sierra Leone's mineral production, including diamonds, rutile, bauxite and gold, is broad, however, "the structure of Sierra Leone's mining sector is highly complex and is built around artisanal mining which makes legislative regulation particularly difficult" (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 81). The country is highly dependant on the resources collected from diamond trading as it accounts for nearly 20 percent of the GDP. According to IMF figures, diamond exports totalled US$160 million in 2004. The lack of regulation surrounding marine resources is potentially robbing the country of US$90 million in exports (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 83).

According to the UN Human Development Report 2009, Sierra Leone ranks 180th out of 182 countries in terms of its development. Life expectancy is 47.3 years and 38.1% of the adult population over the age of 15 are literate (United Nations Development Programme 2009). The 2007 UN Peacebuilding Commission's cooperation framework for Sierra Leone identified five areas that remain particularly challenging for Sierra Leone:

- Youth unemployment and disempowerment;
- Justice and security sector reform;
- Democracy consolidation and good governance;
- Capacity-building, and;
- Development of the energy sector.

In addition, the sub-regional dimension of peacebuilding continues to determine whether the post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone will be successful. The conflict in Sierra Leone spilled over into neighbouring states, but the actions of states such as Liberia and Guinea also exacerbated the situation in Sierra Leone, especially in the Mano Basin region, which includes Guinea, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone (United Nations Peacebuilding Commission 2007: 4-8).

The peacebuilding process in Sierra Leone has definitely been driven by outside actors. The UN's Peacebuilding Commission and the UNIOSIL face great challenges in moving from a largely peacekeeping role to a peacebuilding role.

UNIOSIL is mandated to assist the government with peacebuilding measures and consists of nearly 300 people. There is a lot of faith placed on the ability of UNIOSIL to coordinate the peacebuilding effort in Sierra Leone. The Peacebuilding Commission was created to bring together all the relevant actors in order to execute an integrated post-conflict peacebuilding strategy.

Overall, the Peacebuilding Commission has only made modest progress. It is vital that a post-conflict reconstruction strategy is well coordinated. This coordination seems to be lacking in the case of Sierra Leone. This lack of coordination is most evident in the way the Peacebuilding Fund is being "used without a political agreement", known as the Compact (Curran and Woodhouse 2007: 1063). The governance aspect of peacebuilding is very important, and the absence of a political framework, although recognised by the Sierra Leone government, could result in the misallocation of funds meant for peacebuilding activities. The Peacebuilding Fund was designed to fund short-term projects, and therefore, there is a need for the Peacebuilding Commission to commit to longer-term projects.

The Peacebuilding Commission's involvement in Sierra Leone only happened after the conflict ended, and has sometimes confused matters more for donors because

of the overlap with existing financial arrangements (Curran and Woodhouse 2007: 1064). According to the Sierra Leone Priority Plan for the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, "the root causes of the conflict among which, bad governance, corruption, denial of basic human rights and political and economic exclusion still need to be fully addressed" (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 2007: 1).

Progress in terms of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone has been rather slow. The sluggish pace could be attributed to the large number of strategies being pursued simultaneously; "at one point Sierra Leone was graced with four distinct UN coordination structures", not one related to the other. Outside actors have also had a tendency to follow their own project targets independent of other actors, often to the detriment of other actors involved in the reconstruction process (Pugh et al 2004: 131).

The challenge of increased cooperation is not limited to state actors, some non-governmental organisations, such as Global Witness, have taken it upon themselves to monitor regional developments, especially in arms and diamond sales, and there is a greater need for these actors to work with the local governments to ensure that research is being conducted that will aid the local communities.

There is a perception in Sierra Leone that corruption is widespread. This perception even spreads to UNAMSIL and the Anti-Corruption Commission. Although foreign donors have put measures into place to deal with corruption, it has become so entrenched in the Sierra Leone way of life, and some government officials are still undermining the structures that have been put into place to combat corruption. The country currently lacks a consistent programme to "reduce corruption and to strengthen financial management and accountability within government" (Baker and May 2004: 47).

The management of the country's most precious commodity, diamonds "still allows a major diversion of the country's resources into private hands" (Baker and May 2004: 47). It is extremely difficult to keep the government accountable for their expenses because of a general lack of information (Baker and May 2004: 47).

It remains unclear whether the reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone can rely on the economic growth of the country. According to the National Recovery Strategy 2002-2003, "A growing economy will increase revenue to the state, which in turn will increase services to the people providing greater opportunities for more sustainable livelihoods". Despite these positive assurances, a large percentage of the government's budget, 60% in 2003, comes from outside sources (Baker and May 2004: 56).

The reconstruction process is much broader than just rebuilding the economy. Therefore, the over-emphasis on economic success may draw attention away from other critical challenges that have not been adequately addressed, such as corruption and youth employment (Baker and May 2004: 56).

5.4 Transformation of the war economy

As mentioned in the previous section, war economies, and the related problem of resource exploitation, can persist even after a conflict has ended. The enduring nature of war economies has proven to be a challenge to post-conflict reconstruction strategies. Although there is adequate research on the impact of natural resources on conflict, there has been less focus placed on the role of natural resources during post-conflict reconstruction.

Chapter 2 outlined the relationship between conflict and natural resources. The main conclusion that can be drawn from studies on the subject is that "economic

considerations are rarely the primary cause of conflict"; rather "the access to capital in the form of resources or other economic means, influence the nature and length of violence (Brown 2006: 7). There is certainly a link between the level of governance in a country and whether or not the state provides basic goods and services to its citizens including security.

5.4.1 The role of international financial institutions

The work of international financial institutions in Sierra Leone has often been detrimental to the economic development of the country. According to Pugh et al (2004: 129), the "emphasis on macroeconomic stability, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from economic management contributed to new forms of corruption and patrimonialism, an upsurge of popular discontent, and a corrosion of state legitimacy, while creating opportunities for the capture of economic life by local strongmen allied to networks of patronage". In addition, there has also been a fear that increasing the power of the state may lead to increased levels of corruption amongst ruling elites. At the same time, local ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process is crucial for success. Unfortunately, this does not often happen in practice, given that many reconstruction strategies are driven and funded by outside actors.

There is certainly a need for better coordination amongst internal and external actors involved in the reconstruction process. Pugh el al (2004: 129) suggest that a better approach to the one currently being practiced (where the international community is responsible for controlling the economic dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction and the state is responsible for ensuring security) involves external actors investing in long-term strategies to ensure the security of the state, and domestic actors gaining control of economic development. Greater emphasis should be placed on job creation and the building of infrastructure rather than the

current obsession with “controlling inflation and establishing macroeconomic stability” (Pugh et al 2004: 129).

It is important to note that the focus on job creation and development should not take the place of producing macroeconomic consistency, rather, economic policies should address the challenges faced by the local population. In the case of Sierra Leone, a focus on addressing unemployment and education, especially of the youth, as well as increasing parliamentary oversight and budget setting are issues that remain most important. Sierra Leone’s security sector reform strategy has certainly focused on the link between security and economic development.

SSR in Sierra Leone is a component of a national reform process that started in 1996. The democratically elected SLPP government, under the leadership of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, worked together with the international community, including the United Kingdom’s DFID, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank and the African Development Bank, to create a national good governance and public service reform programme. The programme was intended to address a range of issues from renewing local government institutions to strengthening the capacity of the public sector.

SSR in Sierra Leone is also part of a larger post-conflict reconstruction framework, as it was argued in the Sierra Leone vision 2025: ‘Sweet Salone’ strategy drawn-up by the development planning ministry of Sierra Leone (2003: 58) that developing a robust security sector would shield the country from relapsing into conflict, and would ensure the creation of a peaceful nation. The security concerns of Sierra Leone were complementary to DFID’s SSR interventions, especially regarding disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and military training (Gbla 2007: 17-18).

SSR has been a priority for various peace agreements and government policies including Articles 4 and 6 of the Abidjan Peace Accord of 1996, which called for disarmament of army units not responsible for formal security duties. However, an uncooperative Revolutionary United Front and its leader, Foday Sankoh, undermined the stipulations made in the 1996 Accord, especially regarding the military (Gbla 2007: 19). The Lomé Peace Accord of 1999 also placed emphasis on security by highlighting the importance of Government oversight of the armed forces, but the agreement did not outline a specific SSR strategy (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 114).

The Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) of 2005 revealed the link between security and poverty, as peaceful development can only occur in a secure and stable environment. The country's security sector review also places specific emphasis on the important role that well-trained and well-equipped security forces play in ensuring a reduction in poverty levels of the country. The state security sector took over the responsibility for security of the country when UNAMSIL withdrew at the end of December 2005 (Albrecht and Malan 2006: 113-114).

Two main challenges that are not often mentioned include the political economy of post-conflict reconstruction and the role of the youth in security sector reform. There is a great need to align post-conflict reconstruction, including the security sector, to the particular economy of the state. The capability of the economy will be severely hampered by over-ambitious reforms and, thus far, Sierra Leone's economy has been highly reliant on external funding. According to the country's PRSP (2005- 2007), 70% of people live in poverty and 66% of people live in rural areas. In order to tackle this issue, the government must start thinking of long-term sustainability (Government of Sierra Leone 2005: ix).

Alongside widespread poverty, youth unemployment rates are also generating unrest in country. Youth unemployment is creating an environment for violent

student and labour protests, in addition to an increase in the crime rate. The perception of the government as inefficient and corrupt does little to encourage development. Consequently, the Sierra Leone government will have to target these specific issues before the security of the country is threatened beyond breaking point (Ebo 2006: 491).

5.4.2 The role of diamonds

In Chapter 4, it was argued that although there is a still a debate on whether diamonds caused the conflict in Sierra Leone, the commodity certainly made it possible for the conflict to endure. The international community's focus on conflict diamonds in the late 1990s placed the diamonds of Sierra Leone in a broader context, which included countries like Angola. In 2000, a series of reports by the Partnership Africa Canada (PAC) and a UN Panel of Experts exposed the link between conflict and diamonds. In July 2000, "the UN finally imposed sanctions on the direct and indirect import of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone", excluding diamonds sold by the government that had a certificate of origin, a practice that started in October (Pugh et al 2004: 118).

In addition to diamonds, Sierra Leone also has "sizeable deposits of rutile, bauxite, gold, iron ore and other minerals". However, diamonds have always been the primary export commodities for the country, despite the challenges surrounding the export of diamonds. The diamond industry is the largest employer of unskilled labour.

The past corrupt history involving diamonds has meant that documents like the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), an initiative of the Kimberley Process which "has sought to end the trade of conflict diamonds through multilateral efforts aimed at imposing strict verification and trade controls on diamonds" promoting cooperation amongst both state and non-state actors (Grant

2005: 452). Although Kimberley Process represents a commitment on the part of the international community to tackle the challenge of illicit diamond sales, "some industry experts remain doubtful of whether all Sierra Leone's diamonds are passing through licit conduits" (Grant 2005: 452). The diamond industry in Sierra Leone is particularly vulnerable to terrorist groups, such as Al Qaida, and there is a danger that peacebuilding funding will be diverted to ensure the security of the donor, rather than to rebuild the local communities (Pugh et al 2004: 132).

5.4.3 The future of the youth in Sierra Leone

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that the exclusion of youth from political and economic processes was one of the primary causes of the conflict. Youth unemployment remains very high, at an estimated 70% of youths unemployed or underemployed. Youth between the ages of 15-24 are considered the poorest group in the population.

In order to tackle the problem of unemployment, the Sierra Leone Government and its partners not only need to bring in short-term strategies to deal specifically with the employment crisis, a long-term investment should be made to ensure sustainability through "infrastructure development, attract[ing] investment, ensur[ing] private sector development, and provid[ing] training" (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 2002: 2).

The "Ministry of Youth and the formulation of a national policy, the establishment of micro-farms, Agricultural Business Units (ABUs) and specific enterprises for 'Girls off the Street' in several districts and the launch of a Youth Employment Scheme (YES)", are a number of initiatives created to address the problem of unemployment in Sierra Leone (United Nations Peacebuilding Fund 2007: 2).

In 2003, 50% of Sierra Leone's population were under the age of 15. 7000 former child soldiers have been demobilised since May 2001. A large number of youths are uneducated, and employment rates are very low. Many youths, especially in the Kono district, have turned to diamond mining as a source of income (Baker and May 2004: 42-43).

Although the government has committed itself to provide for the education and employment needs of the youth in Sierra Leone, very little progress has been made to date. While there is a National Youth Policy, drafted by the Ministry of Youth, the National Youth Coalition have found that there wasn't adequate consultation with other youth groups resulting in the absence of issues surrounding information technology training (Baker and May 2004: 43).

5.4.4 The role of the United Nations (UN)

In 1999, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the government worked together on several activities including peacekeeping and peacebuilding, especially the DDR process, holding of national elections, and setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Brown 2006: 13).

UNAMSIL was partially successful in fulfilling its mandate. 70,000 ex-combatants have, to date, been disarmed; the real GDP of the country is steadily rising, and the Kimberley Process has been enforced, with diamond exports having risen from two million dollars in 1999 to $142 million in 2005 (Partnership Africa Canada 2006). The first UN mission focussed specifically on peacebuilding, the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone started working in 2006 (Brown 2006: 14).

UNAMSIL's achievements are limited because of the precarious nature of peace in the country. When UNIOSIL took over in 2006, two main issues continued to

plague the peacebuilding process, “the government’s inability to tackle ongoing illegal mining and smuggling of diamonds or to control the burgeoning unemployed population of former combatants” (Brown 2006: 14).

The control over the diamond fields in the country remains an area of contention. The UN was unable, given its limited resources and personnel, to deploy people to diamond rich areas and assist government with gaining control over the country’s most profitable resource. Seven years after UNAMSIL was created, “50% of [the] diamond mining remains unlicensed, unemployment is at 70%, and organised crime and corruption are on the rise” (Brown 2006: 14).

A stabilising force in the case of Sierra Leone was the DDR process, however, high levels of unemployment threatens to upset the relative peace in the country. Many ex-combatants who have become artisanal miners work for less than a dollar a day, despite the rise in the value of official diamond exports (Brown 2006: 14).

The lumpen youth have few economic options in the country and therefore, have turned to illicit mining (as they also did during the conflict). The key difference now is that there is no violence, however, the degree of economic insecurity remains the same.

The international community has provided a substantial amount of funding to Sierra Leone; however, this funding has not always been allocated suitably. The DDR process, for example, suffered constant funding delays. The fact that the shadow networks are still in operation proves their endurance and flexibility.

5.4.5 The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process

The study of the impact of a successful DDR process in the creation of a peace economy is relatively new. Spear (2006: 163) explains that the process of DDR is

the “first opportunity for putting down a ‘marker’ and establishing a new basis for the potential economy”. Reintegration of ex-combatants into the economy through the provision of appropriate skills can drastically improve the chances for sustainable peace.

War economies are difficult to transform, and the tendency of international actors to focus on stabilising security in the country and rebuilding the government means that economic issues remain on the sidelines.

According to Spear (2006: 169), a post-conflict reconstruction strategy should include a few main issues if a war economy is to be dismantled. These include; “bringing the economy back under licit control”, “ending governmental corruption”, and “ensuring that trade is legal, monitored and taxed” (Spear 2006: 169).

Particularly important is a DDR process that focuses not only on the reintegration of former combatants, but also gives attention to the licit economic opportunities that should be created. Naturally, there are difficulties to this strategy, but it remains vital that ex-combatants are incorporated into the licit economy (Spear 2006: 169).

Sierra Leone’s National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR) officially ended on 31 March 2004. 72,490 combatants were disarmed, 71,043 were demobilised (United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2004). Although these figures are significant, the DDR process meant that ex-combatants had to compete with ordinary citizens for employment (Grant 2005: 445).

Employment opportunities are scarce, particularly for those who do not have the technical expertise. Even those who perform casual labour only earn about 80,000 leones per month without receiving any benefits or paying taxes. It is apparent that

wealth is being created through “illicit diamond exports and other forms of corruption in government” (Grant 2005: 446).

5.4.6 The regional dimension

It is vital that countries within a region cooperate on post-conflict reconstruction matters. One of the most important lessons to be learned from the Sierra Leone experience is that foreign donors and international financial institutions should take into account regional conflict dynamics. Economic initiatives in Sierra Leone should not be constructed in such a way as to promote insecurity in neighbouring countries in the region (Pugh et al 2004: 129).

The end of the conflict in Sierra Leone had an impact on the regional shadow networks. The implementation of the certification process and a ban on Liberian diamond exports actually reversed the previous problem of RUF diamonds being smuggled through Liberia. Liberian diamonds were now laundered through Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. There have been claims by dealers that the certification process has made it easier to smuggle diamonds as it is no longer required to smuggle through other West African countries (United Nations 2001: 78).

The regional dynamics are highly important in the case of Sierra Leone. In 1998, the “ECOWAS states signed a moratorium on the export and import of light weapons and in 1999 adopted an ECOWAS security mechanism” (Pugh et al 2004: 127). “In addition, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone have agreed to restart the Mano River Union to facilitate cooperation on economic affairs and security, including the deployment of security units along common borders” (Pugh et al 2004: 127). There are, however, problems with the initiatives mentioned above. Firstly, there is a lack of sufficient implementation, both regionally and outside the region. Secondly, “in May 2003 the UN belatedly extended sanctions to incorporate the Liberian timber industry”, and this means that regional initiatives should

complement global initiatives on conflict timber trade. Even more pertinent is the need for a stronger certification system for the diamond industry (Pugh et al 2004: 128).

5.5 Conclusion

The post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone faces many challenges, which are not limited to addressing the root causes of the conflict. This discussion above attempted to assess whether the current strategy helped facilitate the transition from a war economy to a peace economy, whether the actors involved in this transition are committed to maintaining peace in the country, and how the economic structures in the country contributed to creating a peaceful economic and political environment in Sierra Leone.

Pugh et al (2004: 226), make several recommendations for overcoming the challenges of war economies. Their study focused on the regional dimension of war economies and their suggestions are certainly relevant for the case study of Sierra Leone. These recommendations include the need to focus on institution building strategies that take into account the historical and social context of the country and the need "to develop the state's capacity to protect its people and provide incentives to invest in social and economic development" (Pugh et al 2004: 229). In West African, there is also a need for a greater focus on regional economic development, not only to better coordinate economic activity amongst states, but also to protect states during the transformation from war to peace economies (Pugh et al 2004: 230).

In the case of Sierra Leone, the following practical steps could assist in fully transforming the war economy to a peace economy. Firstly, the transition to peace is a development-plus challenge, which means, "in addition to the normal challenge of socio-economic development, they must accommodate the extra burden of

economic rehabilitation and national reconciliation" (del Castillo 2008: 40). The country addressed these challenges with a truth and reconciliation commission, and the implementation of a DDR process.

Secondly, the political objective should prevail over the economic objective in all circumstances given that "peace is a precondition for sustainable development" (del Castillo 2008: 41). Del Castillo (2008: 41) also argues that all actors involved in the post-conflict reconstruction process should recognise and acknowledge, "political priorities will often constrain economic policymaking". This is especially relevant for ensuring the successful implementation of a DDR strategy. Economic conditions should not drive the DDR process; rather, priority should be determined by the importance of an activity in building peace in a country.

Thirdly, in the case of Sierra Leone, external actors, including the UK government and the UN, drove the post-conflict reconstruction process and therefore, these policy-makers lacked the legitimacy that is required to implement national economic measures. To remedy this, the Sierra Leone government did become more involved in the post-conflict reconstruction process through the development of the Poverty Reduction and Strategy Paper in 2005, which was discussed above.

Fourthly, the level of development in a country undergoing post-conflict reconstruction should be measured differently from a case of normal development. For example, the level of development in Sierra Leone should not be compared to the level of development in Botswana. The success of a post-conflict reconstruction strategy should be determined by the ability of reconstruction activities to actually building peace and not solely by traditional development indicators, such as poverty alleviation, economic growth and low inflation. This is not to say that these indicators are not important, however, the focus should remain on peacebuilding and then development.

Fifthly, development institutions are not the ideal leaders of post-conflict reconstruction because they cannot implement national policy and, therefore, the government of Sierra Leone should play the main role in reconstructing the country. Although this remains a challenge, given that the government was quite weak after the conflict ended in 2002, the role of government is becoming stronger through the activities and policies currently being implemented in the country. In addition, the country has held two successful elections since the end of the conflict.

Lastly, the future post-conflict reconstruction plans for Sierra Leone should be both simple and flexible (del Castillo 2008: 40-47). The UN Peacebuilding Commission has regular meetings about progress in Sierra Leone, and there is constant reassessment of the current peacebuilding plans being implemented. In addition, Sierra Leone's own post-conflict reconstruction initiatives are also discussed within this framework. It remains to be seen, however, whether this coordination will continue once the UN has eventually left Sierra Leone.

In conclusion, this chapter explored the current attempts at post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone by looking at the process of rebuilding the state. The transformation of the war economy into a peace economy was also discussed in terms of the role of international financial institutions in the reconstruction process, the impact that diamonds have on building the economy, the future role of the youth in Sierra Leone, the role of the United Nations in post-conflict reconstruction activities, the DDR process and the West African regional dimension.

The next chapter brings the whole study together with concluding remarks regarding the main themes covered by this study. These themes include economic agendas during armed conflict – with the Shadow State and the war economy as the main sub-themes, and post-conflict peacebuilding – which includes post-conflict reconstruction and peace economy. Chapter 6 also evaluates whether the key research questions of the study have been answered. In addition, the

concluding chapter of this study makes recommendations for future research studies.

CHAPTER 6
Evaluation and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This study explored the challenges presented by transforming the war economy to a peace economy through a process of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone. An overall discussion of the findings reveals whether the central question of the study has been answered: Has the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in Sierra Leone successfully transformed the war economy into a peace economy?

Important questions that were asked in this study include: what economic (and other) measures can be implemented to facilitate the transition from the war economy to a peace economy in Sierra Leone? Which actors, both political and economic, are most equipped to guarantee this transition? How can economic structures contribute in creating a peaceful economic and political environment?

This chapter firstly evaluates the applicability of the themes and sub-themes to the Sierra Leonean case study. Secondly, the contribution that this study makes to the research fields of war economies and post-conflict reconstruction is discussed. Thirdly, recommendations are made for future research in these fields of study. In conclusion, this chapter argues that the research questions set out at the beginning of the study have been satisfactorily addressed.

6.2 Evaluation of themes and sub-themes of this study

Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this study introduced the research theme, including the main concepts of the study – ‘Shadow State’, ‘war economy’, ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ and ‘peace economy’ and provided a motivation for using Sierra Leone as a case study to explore the these themes. An evaluation of the main

themes, namely, economic agendas during armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding appears in the sections below.

The discussion of economic agendas during armed conflict focused on two main concepts. The first is the Shadow State and the second is the war economy in Sierra Leone. This study established that the theory of the Shadow State is important for the main theme of economic agendas during civil conflict because it explains the context in which the war economy developed in Sierra Leone. This study also argued that the formation of a Shadow State enabled a war economy to materialise during the civil conflict in Sierra Leone between 1991 and 2002. Reno's Shadow State theory was valuable for this study because it offered a different view of the African state, as it acknowledges the sustainability of informal markets in Africa, and Sierra Leone in particular.

This study explored the three basic characteristics of a Shadow State, as described by Reno (1995 and 2000a). The Shadow State was shown to be a "form of personal rule", where a ruler will make decisions and take actions, not necessarily conforming to a set of written laws, even if these are still in place (Reno 2000a: 434). The actions of leaders such as Siaka Stevens and Joseph Momoh certainly demonstrate this first characteristic of a Shadow State. It was revealed that Shadow State rulers also abuse the global recognition of state sovereignty in order to control access by foreign investors to formal and informal markets (Reno 2000a: 435). In addition, the structure of the Shadow State was exposed as "informal commercially oriented networks" that operate parallel to existing government bureaucracies (Reno 2000a: 435). For example, on the outskirts of the capital, Freetown, "rural Sierra Leone's potentially rich productive activities – agriculture, artisanal diamond and gold mining, and fisheries – were operated mainly for the benefit of 'Big Men' and their networks" (Reno 2000a: 435).

The Shadow State sub-theme was then linked to the sub-theme of war economies. It was argued that the term not only includes all economic activity that occurs during times of conflict, but actually conceptualises the enduring nature of conflicts, especially where natural resources play a dominant role. The war economy that developed in Sierra Leone certainly fits this description, especially regarding the role that natural resources play in conflict. Through a discussion of the impact of the diamond mining industry, the role of the youth, and the regional dynamics on the development of a war economy in Sierra Leone, this study has shown that it was a combination of factors, in addition to the actions of leaders such as Siaka Stevens and Charles Taylor, which made it possible for violent conflict to erupt in 1991.

The theme of post-conflict peacebuilding was clearly defined in Chapters 1 and 2 of this study. It was argued that the term "post-conflict reconstruction" would be most appropriate to use when describing the process of transforming the war economy to a peace economy in Sierra Leone. The key post-conflict reconstruction strategies that are currently being implemented in Sierra Leone were discussed in Chapter 5. It was concluded that although progress has been made in certain areas, such as curbing illicit diamond mining, other areas, such as the high unemployment rate, remain a challenge. Another key lesson to be learned from the case study of Sierra Leone is that the actors involved in designing and implementing the post-conflict reconstruction strategy "should examine their accountability to the societies that they attempt to engineer into peace" (Pugh et al 2004: 237).

6.3 Contributions of the study

The aim of this study was to contribute to the existing body of literature on war economies and post-conflict reconstruction by investigating a specific case study,

Sierra Leone, and to assess whether the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy in the country would transform the war economy into a peace economy.

Using the case study of Sierra Leone, this study explored the challenge of war economies and its impact on post-conflict reconstruction. Sierra Leone still presents an appealing case study as the country experienced a very profitable war economy during the armed conflict between 1991 and 2002, and continues to struggle transforming this war economy into a peace economy.

As was mentioned in Chapter 1, Sierra Leone has been well researched by many authors including Reno (1995), Clapham (2003), Richards (2003) and Keen (2005). However, most studies focus on the conflict period, and only briefly look at the post-conflict period. In addition, discussions of post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone have failed to adequately address the challenges presented by the war economy.

What differentiates this study from similar studies is that it used existing analyses about the war economy in Sierra Leone, and linked it to the current post-conflict reconstruction strategy, focusing specifically on the economic dimension. This study represents a departure from traditional approaches to exploring war economies because it considered the impact these economic systems have on the process of post-conflict reconstruction. In addition, this study discussed the pre-conflict period, the conflict period and the post-conflict period in-depth, distinguishing it from the majority of works discussing the case study of Sierra Leone, which only seem to focus on one of these periods.

The conclusions drawn from this study indicate that post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone has addressed some of the main causes of the conflict, but some challenges remain, such as high levels of unemployment, and current attempts at post-conflict reconstruction urgently need to adapt in order to accomplish this goal.

Some authors such as del Castillo (2008: 260) argue that post-conflict economic reconstruction in Sierra Leone is proceeding "reasonably well with the strong support of the international community", and due to the commitment to the DDR process in the country. However, certain challenges remain, including the creation of sustainable employment for the population of Sierra Leone, especially the youth (del Castillo 2008: 260).

Through a reassessment of the models developed by the African Union, NEPAD and the UN, the government of Sierra Leone can adapt a framework for development that is appropriate for the country's unique situation. At present, all these strategies are being implemented simultaneously, creating confusion especially regarding priorities. Therefore, the government of Sierra Leone, together with the designers of these post-conflict reconstruction strategies, should consolidate the activities of these policies in order to optimally use the available resources.

Increasingly, researchers in the field of post-conflict peacebuilding have argued that the economic dimension of post-conflict reconstruction has not been adequately implemented in countries such as Sierra Leone. As was discussed in Chapter 5, del Castillo (2008: 40-47) suggests that post-conflict economic reconstruction strategies must be based on six premises:

- The transition to peace is a development-plus challenge;
- The political objective should prevail at all times;
- Lack of leadership legitimacy will limit policymaking choices;
- A different yardstick is necessary to measure success;
- Development institutions should not lead reconstruction, and;
- Post-conflict reconstruction strategies should be simple and flexible.

The greatest challenge in the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction strategies is to focus on national reconciliation and the establishment of peace, and not to place so much emphasis on immediately achieving development goals. If this balance is maintained, then a country like Sierra Leone will be able to completely transform the war economy into a peace economy.

6.4 Recommendations for further research

Although this study makes a unique contribution to the research fields of economic agendas during armed conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, the following research areas have yet to be fully exhausted.

More research on the actors involved in conflict, especially regarding their motivations and regional linkages, is required in order to determine the precise role of economically motivated actions and processes in generating and sustaining contemporary civil conflicts (Berdal and Malone 2000: 1). This would be particularly relevant for stakeholders involved in developing and implementing future post-conflict reconstruction frameworks.

The political, as well as economic role of the international private sector, which often becomes involved in countries experiencing conflict, should be considered. These types of actors are not included in peace negotiations and agreements, even though they frequently play a role in perpetuating conflict. In addition, it is difficult to include these types of actors in post-conflict reconstruction given that they operate outside of the state framework. Private sector actors, such as mining companies, could be brought into the post-conflict reconstruction discussions to see whether their activities could be used to move a post-conflict country towards peace.

Although this study did attempt to address the impact that war economies have on post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives, there is certainly a need to do further research in this area. The 'war on terror' is already challenging previous conceptions of war economies, as new economic networks are being developed in countries currently experiencing terrorism-related activity. The impact that terrorism may have on post-conflict reconstruction is also an area of research that should be expanded in the near future.

The regional dimension of conflict and its impact on post-conflict reconstruction is another area of further interest. Authors, such as Pugh et al (2004) have explored the regional dimension in detail; however, there is a need to expand this research from the three case studies, Central Asia, West Africa and Southeast Europe, to include other regions in the world. Comparative regional studies would also be useful in future in order to identify similarities and differences between regions and to identify lessons learned.

The domestication of internationally sponsored peacebuilding initiatives remains a challenge in many post-conflict countries and could be analysed more in-depth. Local ownership of the post-conflict reconstruction process remains a challenge given that international actors often develop and implement these strategies. As was mentioned in Chapter 5, development institutions are not the ideal leaders of post-conflict reconstruction because they cannot implement national policy and, therefore, the governments should become empowered to play the main role in reconstructing the country.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter firstly evaluated the themes and sub-themes of this study. Secondly, the contribution that this study makes to the research fields of war economies and post-conflict reconstruction was discussed. Thirdly, recommendations were made

for future research. In conclusion, this chapter argued that the research questions set out at the beginning of the study have been satisfactorily addressed.

This study argues that the themes of economic agendas during conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding remain interesting areas for analytical research. A thorough discussion of the two main themes above and the sub-themes of the Shadow State, war economies, post-conflict reconstruction and peace economies, this study provided a unique framework of analysis for the case study of Sierra Leone.

The context and background of the conflict in Sierra Leone identified the key factors that led to the political and economic crisis in that country. The development of Reno's Shadow State was instrumental in creating a situation where a war economy could emerge once conflict had started in Sierra Leone. This study also used a framework of analysis to determine the challenges presented by the war economy for the post-conflict reconstruction strategy. The focus of this study on the economic dimensions of the conflict sets it apart from typical conflict analyses, and therefore makes a distinct contribution to this field of research. The conclusion of this study is that more work can be done, especially on the African continent, to overcome the legacy of war economies by means of implementing a well-structured post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

Appendix A: Map of Sierra Leone

Map No. 3902 Rev. 5 UNITED NATIONS
January 2004

Department for Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section

Source: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section

Appendix B: Map of Ethnic Groups of Sierra Leone (1969)

Adapted from Department for Peacekeeping Operations USA and the University of Texas

Appendix C: Map of Economic Activity in Sierra Leone (1969)

Adapted from Department for Peacekeeping Operations USA and the University of Texas

Appendix D: Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL).

Moved by the imperative need for a just and durable peace in Sierra Leone;

Inspired by the equally imperative need for genuine national unity and reconciliation to end the fratricidal war in Sierra Leone;

Committed to promoting popular participation in governance and full respect for human rights and humanitarian laws;

Dedicated to the advancement of democratic development and to the maintenance of a socio-political order free of inequality, despotism and corruption;

Convinced that a sense of common purpose and patriotism is the need of the hour;

HEREBY AGREE as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two foes will ensure that a total cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE 2

The Government and the RUF/SL undertake that no effort shall be spared to effect the scrupulous respect and implementation of the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement to ensure that the establishment and consolidation of a just peace becomes a priority in Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE 3

A national body to be known as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established within two weeks of the signing of this Agreement. The Commission shall be a verification mechanism responsible for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with all the provisions contained in this Peace Agreement.

The Commission, in fulfilment of this task during the period of consolidating the peace, shall co-ordinate and facilitate the work of the following bodies which will proceed to establish:

(i) Socio-Economic Forum;
(ii) Citizen's Consultative Conferences;
(iii) Multi-partisan Council;
(iv) Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace;
(v) Demobilization and Resettlement Committee;
(vi) National Budget and Debt Committee.

The Commission shall comprise representatives of the Government and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, drawing on the resources of state and civic institutions as and when necessary.

The Commission shall have the power to recommend the preparation of enabling measures contained in this Peace Agreement. It shall have the power to issue publicly its conclusions. The parties undertake to comply with the conclusions of the Commission.

The Commission shall have the power to prepare preliminary legislative drafts necessary for the implementation and development of the provisions contained in the present Peace Agreement.
The Parties undertake to consult the Commission before taking decisions on measures relating to the present Peace Agreement.

The Commission may similarly consult the Parties at the highest level whenever it is appropriate.
The Commission shall have access to and may inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Peace Agreement. The Commission shall have full powers to organise its work in the manner in which it deems most appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it may deem useful in the discharge of its functions.

The Commission shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and adequate secretariat support staff.

A Trust Fund for the Consolidation of Peace shall be established to provide funding for the implementation of the present Peace Agreement.

ARTICLE 4

Citizens' Consultative Conferences shall be organised once a year the first of which shall be organised within one hundred and twenty days of the signing of the present Peace Agreement in order to encourage people's participation and to invite recommendations for the formulation of guidelines and their implementation that will ensure truly fair and representative political processes.

ARTICLE 5

The disarmament of combatants will be effected upon their entry into the designated assembly zones, and demobilization and reintegration as soon as practicable thereafter.

The upkeep and welfare of the encamped combatants shall be the primary responsibility of the Government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, assisted by the international community.

ARTICLE 6

The Parties commit themselves to a well planned national effort on encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement linked to national development objectives. To that end, a Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall be established within a month of the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

The Committee shall coordinate the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and resettlement of RUF/SL combatants. The Committee shall work in coordination with all the relevant institutions and agencies.

Both Parties shall consult on the nomination of the membership of the Committee which shall not exceed seven persons.

The Committee shall be provided with adequate funding.

ARTICLE 7

The Demobilization and Resettlement Committee shall identify assembly zones and camp areas for RUF/SL combatants where they shall be registered, encamped and disarmed. The movement into the Assembly Zones shall commence within once month of the signing of this Agreement and be completed as soon as practicable but no later than three months from this date.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties shall request the international community to help supervise and monitor the encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes. The Joint Monitoring Group shall have observers at any of these processes.

ARTICLE 9

The Commission shall, as a priority, make recommendations on the restructuring and re-orientation of the military as well as its leadership. In this context, members of the RUF/SL who may wish to be part of the country's military can become part of the new unified armed forces within a framework to be discussed and agreed upon by the Commission.

ARTICLE 10

The Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure the return to barracks of those units of the army not required for normal security duties and the downsizing of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (RSLMF), taking into account the security needs of the country.

ARTICLE 11

A Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG) from the international community shall be responsible for monitoring breaches provided under this Peace Agreement.

Both Parties upon signing this Agreement shall request the international community to provide neutral monitors.

Such monitors when deployed shall be in position for an initial period of three months.

The Neutral Monitoring Group shall report any violations of the ceasefire to its headquarters which shall in turn communicate the same to the headquarters of the Joint Monitoring Group comprising of representative of the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF based in Freetown.

ARTICLE 12

The Executive Outcomes shall be withdrawn five weeks after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group (NMG). As from the date of the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group, the Executive Outcomes shall be confined to barracks under the supervision of the Joint Monitoring Group and the Neutral Monitoring Group. Government shall use all its endeavours, consistent with its treaty obligations, to repatriate other foreign troops no later than three months after the deployment of the Neutral Monitoring Group or six months after the signing of the Peace Agreement, whichever is earlier.

ARTICLE 13

The Parties agree that immediately following the signing of the present Peace Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to function as a political movement with the rights, privileges and duties provided by law; and that within thirty days, following that, the necessary conditions shall be created to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political movement according to law.

ARTICLE 14

To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF/SL combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE 15

The mandate and membership of the existing National Unity and Reconciliation Commission shall be expanded in consultation with the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to enable it to undertake a sustained and effective campaign of civic education aimed at enhancing national unity and reconciliation, taking into account the imperative need to heal the wounds of the conflict.

ARTICLE 16

The Parties agree that the standards of accountability, integrity and probity in the public services of Sierra Leone shall be raised. To that end, immediate steps shall be taken to establish the office of Ombudsman to promote the implementation of a professional code of ethics, and the integrity and patriotism of all public servants. It shall also seek to eradicate all forms of corruption.

ARTICLE 17

The Parties shall approach the international community with a view to mobilizing resources which will be used to establish a trust fund to enable the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party.

ARTICLE 18

The Parties agree to the principle of reforming the present electoral process in Sierra Leone. There shall, in that regard, be the full participation of citizens and their organizations in formulating electoral reforms.

The independence and integrity of the National Electoral Commission shall be guaranteed to ensure fair and acceptable electoral exercise.

In reconstituting the National Electoral Commission, the President shall consult all political parties and movements including the RUF/SL to determine the membership and terms of reference of that Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nation's electoral politics.

Both the Government and the RUF/SL shall, together with other political parties, nominate men and women of professionalism, integrity and objectivity to the National Electoral Commission, not later than three months after the signing of the present Peace Agreement.

It is hereby agreed that no member of the National Electoral Commission shall be eligible for appointment to a political office by any government formed as a result of an election they were mandated to conduct.

ARTICLE 19

The Parties agree that the basic civil and political liberties which are recognised by the Sierra Leone legal system and are contained in the Declarations and Principles on Human Rights adopted by the UN and the OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, shall be fully guaranteed and promoted within Sierra Leone society.

These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture; the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of one's country.

To foster national reconciliation and ensure the full and unrestricted participation of the RUF/SL in the political process, the RUF/SL shall enjoy:
(i) freedom of the press and access to the media in order that they may be heard and informed.
(ii) freedom of association, expression, assembly and the right to mobilise and demonstrate

freely, and to communicate politically in order that they may organise effectively and set up appropriate infrastructure.
All political prisoners and prisoners of war, if any, shall be released.

ARTICLE 20

To monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement, as well as to promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including schools, the media, the police and the military, an independent National Commission on Human Rights shall be established.

In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN Special Commission on Human Rights, UN Centre for Human Rights, African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organisations.

The National Commission on Human Rights shall have the power to investigate human rights violations and to institute legal proceedings where appropriate.

Further, a consortium of local human rights groups shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE 21

The Parties undertake to respect the principles and rules of international humanitarian law.

ARTICLE 22

In the pursuit of the reconstruction, rehabilitation and socio-economic development of Sierra Leone as a matter of the utmost priority, special attention shall be given to rural and urban poor areas, war victims, disabled persons and other vulnerable groups. The Government in conjunction with the Committee for Demobilization and Resettlement shall co-operate with all political parties and movements, including the RUF/SL, to raise resources internationally for these objectives during the initial phase of the consolidation of peace.

ARTICLE 23

The Government shall do all in its power to mobilize resources internally and externally to meet the needs of the post-war reconstruction and socio-economic development.

ARTICLE 24

The Parties agree that the independence of the Judiciary shall be strengthened in accordance with its role of ensuring the fair and impartial dispensation of justice in a democratic order. The composition of the present Judicial and Legal Service Commission shall be determined so as to ensure the independence of the Judiciary from the other organs of state as well as the political parties. Its membership shall include, in addition to judges and representatives of the legal profession and public services, representatives of other sectors of society not directly connected with the administration of justice.

ARTICLE 25

The Police Force shall be strengthened to ensure that the rule of law is upheld throughout Sierra Leone. To that end, the present Police Force shall be vetted. Furthermore, the professional training of the Police Force shall henceforth assure a new orientation, bu emphasizing professionalism, the importance of human dignity and democratic values and respect and protection of human rights. It shall, further, emphasise that the conduct of members of the Police Force shall be free from all partisan considerations of politics, ideology and social position and that the Police Force shall avoid and combat corruption.

Nominations for the Police Council will come from wider sectors of society prior to their appointment so as to ensure their truly civilian and non-partisan character.

ARTICLE 26

It is recognised that there is a socio-economic dimension to the conflict which must also be addressed in order to consolidte the foundation of peace. Accordingly, the socio-economic policy of Sierra Leone shall be guided among other things, by the following principles, taking into account available resources:

i. Enhancement of the nation's productive capactiy through meaningful grassroots participation in the reconstruction and development of the country;

ii. The provision of equal opportunities to all Sierra Leoneans especially those in the countryside and the urban poor, with the aim of equitable distribution of the nation's resources thereby empowering them to contribute effectively to decisionmaking and implementation of policies which affect their lives;

iii. Improving the quality of life of the people through the provision of, inter alia,

a. primary health care in all villages and towns;

b. affordable and quality housing, especially in the countryside and poor urban areas;

c. improved educational services to enable all children of primary and junior-secondary school age to receive free and compulsory schooling as well as provide the opportunity for the youth and all other Sierra Leoneans to receive affordable quality education;

d. clean drinking water and sewerage system in every village and town;

e. provide job opportunities in a systematic and sustainable way for the people, especially the youth;

f. promote and sustain rural development and support agriculture in terms of technical, credit and marketing facilities;

g. provide support for production and provision of basic food and nutritional requirements of the people and food security in general;

h. protect the environment and regulate the exploitation of natural resources in the interest of the people, as well as prohibit monopolies;

i. provide the required infrastructure such as roads, transport and communications, energy and rural electrification, for improved living conditions, especially of the rural people;

j. seek to obtain debt relief in order to transfer funds from debt servicing to meet the urgent requirements of rebuilding a war-torn society.

ARTICLE 27

A broad-based Socio-Economic forum, in which the RUF/SL shall participate, shall be established with a few to enriching policy forumlation and execution in the socio-economic sector.

ARTICLE 28

The Government of Cote d'Ivoire, the United Nations, the OAU and the Commonwealth shall stand as moral guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

Annex to this Agreement:

A nationwide sensitization programme for the peace process shall be pursued by the Parties, using all available means of communication to impress upon their combatants and the nation at large:

- the fact that hostilities have ended;
- the reasons for demobilization;
- the opportunities for reintegration of combatants; and
- the need for reconciliation and lasting peace.

Done in Abidjan this 30 day of the month of November, 1996.

Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

Henri Konan Bedie
President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire

Berhanu Dinka
Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

Adwoa Coleman (M/S)
Representative of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

Moses Anafu (DR)
Representative of the Commonwealth Organization

Appendix E: ECOWAS Six-Month Peace Plan For Sierra Leone 23 October 1997 - 22 April 1998

(Schedule Of Implementation)

PREAMBLE:

Pursuant to the ECOWAS mandate to implement proposals for the resolution of the Sierra Leone crisis contained in the Final Communique of 26 June, 1997 in Conakry, a seven-point peace plan has been devised for the early return of constitutional governance to Sierra Leone. These are:

1. Cessation of hostilities throughout Sierra Leone
   i. With immediate effect
   ii. Establish monitoring and verification mechanism

Note: Process to be undertaken by ECOMOG, and the UN military observers. Participation of UN military observers needs the agreement of the UN Security Council.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants: 1 to 31 December, 1997

Note: ECOWAS Committee of Five Ministerial Assessment visit (20 November, 1997)

3. Commencement of Humanitarian Assistance: 14 November 1997
Note: ECOMOG to monitor the process

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons
Commencement date: 1 December, 1997
UNHCR assisted repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons

5. Restoration of the constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998.

6. Immunities and Guarantees: Takes effect from 22 May, 1998

ELABORATION OF ECOWAS PEACE PLAN

1. Cessation of Hostilities:

It is considered that cessation of hostilities should come into force immediately. However, this will have to be accompanied by a monitoring and verification regime. Leaders of the various combatant units will be expected to disseminate information concerning these measures and ensure compliance with them. These measures will be supervised by ECOMOG, assisted by UN military observation group. The verification process will continue right up to the termination of the peace plan, i.e. 22 April 1998.

2. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Combatants:

It is considered that a minimum of 30 days would be required to conduct an effective disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. This should take place from 1 to 31 December, 1997. Given the nation-wide dislocation of infrastructures and administration, a simple and uncomplicated procedure is envisaged. Combatants will be directed to report at designated centres in order to be engaged in the disarmament process. ECOMOG will supervise the entire process of disarmament and demobilisation. Where necessary, incentives may have to be provided to encourage the voluntary participation of combatants in all this process.

3. Humanitarian Assistance:

Considering that sanctions/embargoes will be strictly enforced throughout the period of the implementation of the Sierra Leone peace plan, the flows of humanitarian assistance beginning 14 November 1997 will continue to be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observers. To this effect, a mechanism will be established by ECOMOG to facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance. All this will be worked within the context of UN Security Council Resolution.

4. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons:

Recognising that refugees, particularly those in neighboring countries, may wish to voluntarily return following the cessation of hostilities, UNHCR assistance should begin from 1 December, 1997.

5. Restoration of Constitutional Government and Broadening of the Power Base:

The restoration of constitutional order to Sierra Leone is at the heart of the ECOWAS peace plan. Consequently, it is considered necessary that the Government of Tejan Kabbah should be enabled to exercise effective control once he is restored to office on 22 May 1998. Nevertheless, it is recognised that for an enduring peace to be restored which will enjoy the support of the majority of Sierra Leoneans and the confidence of the subregion, efforts should be made to ensure that an all-inclusive government is evolved. In this regard, the goodwill and assistance of the international community, both financial and material, would be necessary.

The interest of the various parties in Sierra Leone should be suitably accommodated. Accordingly, it is recommended that the new Cabinet should be a cabinet of inclusion.
Furthermore, in order to accommodate the aspirations of their supporters, Board and Senior Civil Service appointments are to reflect broad national character.
All the above power sharing formulas should come into effect 22 May 1998.

It is recognised that Corporal Foday Sankoh as a leader of RUF could continue to play an active role and participate in the peace process.
In the spirit of the Abidjan Accord and in the context of this Agreement, Corporal Foday Sankoh is expected to return to his country to make his contribution to the peace process.

6. Reintegration of Combatants:

All those who disarm as a result of the implementation of the peace process, should be provided with either job training to fit them for alternative employment or given scholarships and grants for further education. Access to education at all levels should be made available to all demobilised persons. Ex-combatants should be provided with assistance to facilitate their re-integration into their communities. We strongly appeal to the UN, OAU, ECOWAS and indeed the international community to render appropriate assistance to achieve this objective.

7. Donor Appeals for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation:

The United Nations and the OAU in cooperation with ECOWAS are requested to launch these appeals as soon as hostilities cease.

8. Immunities and Guarantees:

It is considered essential that unconditional immunities and guarantees from prosecution be extended to all involved in the unfortunate events of 25 May, 1997 with effect from 22 May 1998.

DONE AT CONAKRY, THIS 23RD DAY OF OCTOBER 1997
FOR THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE
OF ECOWAS ON SIERRA LEONE

Chief Tom Ikimi
Minister of Foreign Affairs

Federal Republic of Nigeria
Lamine Kamara

Minister of Foreign Affairs
Republic of Guinea

FOR THE DELEGATION REPRESENTING
MAJOR JOHNNY PAUL KOROMAH

Col Abdul Karim Sesay
Secretary General AFRC
Alimamy Pallo Bangura
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

WITNESSES

For U.N.
Prof. Ibrahima Fall
Asst. Secretary-General UN

For O.A.U.
Ms. Adwoa Coleman
OAU Representative

Appendix F: Peace Agreement Between The Government Of Sierra Leone and The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

Having met in Lome, Togo, from the 25 May 1999, to 7 July 1999 under the auspices of the Current Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema;

Recalling earlier initiatives undertaken by the countries of the sub-region and the International Community, aimed at bringing about a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and culminating in the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November, 1996 and the ECOWAS Peace Plan of 23 October, 1997;

Moved by the imperative need to meet the desire of the people of Sierra Leone for a definitive settlement of the fratricidal war in their country and for genuine national unity and reconciliation;

Committed to promoting full respect for human rights and humanitarian law;

Committed to promoting popular participation in the governance of the country and the advancement of democracy in a socio-political framework free of inequality, nepotism and corruption;

Concerned with the socio-economic well being of all the people of Sierra Leone;

Determined to foster mutual trust and confidence between themselves;

Determined to establish sustainable peace and security; to pledge forthwith, to settle all past, present and future differences and grievances by peaceful means; and to refrain from the threat and use of armed force to bring about any change in Sierra Leone;

Reaffirming the conviction that sovereignty belongs to the people, and that Government derives all its powers, authority and legitimacy from the people;

Recognising the imperative that the children of Sierra Leone, especially those affected by armed conflict, in view of their vulnerability, are entitled to special care and the protection of their inherent right to life, survival and development, in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child;

Guided by the Declaration in the Final Communiqué of the Meeting in Lome of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of ECOWAS of 25 May 1999, in which they stressed the importance of democracy as a factor of regional peace and security, and as essential to

the socio-economic development of ECOWAS Member States; and in which they pledged their commitment to the consolidation of democracy and respect of human rights while reaffirming the need for all Member States to consolidate their democratic base, observe the principles of good governance and good economic management in order to ensure the emergence and development of a democratic culture which takes into account the interests of the peoples of West Africa;

Recommitting themselves to the total observance and compliance with the Cease-fire Agreement signed in Lomé on 18 May 1999, and appended as Annex 1 until the signing of the present Peace Agreement;

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

PART ONE

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

ARTICLE 1

CEASE-FIRE

The armed conflict between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL is hereby ended with immediate effect. Accordingly, the two sides shall ensure that a total and permanent cessation of hostilities is observed forthwith.

ARTICLE II

CEASE-FIRE MONITORING

1. A Cease-fire Monitoring Committee (hereinafter termed the CMC) to be chaired by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (hereinafter termed UNOMSIL) with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, the Civil Defence Forces (hereinafter termed the CDF) and ECOMOG shall be established at provincial and district levels with immediate effect to monitor, verify and report all violations of the cease-fire.
2. A Joint Monitoring Commission (hereinafter termed the JMC) shall be established at the national level to be chaired by UNOMSIL with representatives of the Government of Sierra Leone, RUF/SL, CDF, and ECOMOG. The JMC shall receive, investigate and take appropriate action on reports of violations of the cease-fire from the CMC. The parties agree to the definition of cease-fire violations as contained in Annex 2 which constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

3. The parties shall seek the assistance of the International Community in providing funds and other logistics to enable the JMC to carry out its mandate.

PART TWO

GOVERNANCE

The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing the right of the people of Sierra Leone to live in peace, and desirous of finding a transitional mechanism to incorporate the RUF/SL into governance within the spirit and letter of the Constitution, agree to the following formulas for structuring the government for the duration of the period before the next elections, as prescribed by the Constitution, managing scarce public resources for the benefit of the development of the people of Sierra Leone and sharing the responsibility of implementing the peace. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in a separate Article of this Part of the present Agreement; and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to it.

ARTICLE III

TRANSFORMATION OF THE RUF/SL INTO A POLITICAL PARTY

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process. To that end:

2. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organize itself to function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all political parties in Sierra Leone. These include the freedom to publish, unhindered access to the media, freedom of association, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, and the right to mobilize and associate freely.

3. Within a period of thirty days, following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to enable the RUF/SL to register as a political party.

4. The Parties shall approach the International Community with a view to mobilizing resources for the purposes of enabling the RUF/SL to function as a political party. These resources may include but shall not be limited to:

(i) Setting up a trust fund;

(ii) Training for RUF/SL membership in party organization and functions; and
(iii) Providing any other assistance necessary for achieving the goals of this section.

ARTICLE IV

ENABLING MEMBERS OF THE RUF/SL TO HOLD PUBLIC OFFICE

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to enable those RUF/SL members nominated by the RUF/SL to hold public office, within the time-frames agreed and contained in the present Agreement for the integration of the various bodies named herein.
2. Accordingly, necessary legal steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone, within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, to amend relevant laws and regulations that may constitute an impediment or bar to RUF/SL and AFRC personnel holding public office.
3. Within seven days of the removal of any such legal impediments, both parties shall meet to discuss and agree on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions in parastatals, diplomacy and any other public sector.

ARTICLE V

ENABLING THE RUF/SL TO JOIN A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY THROUGH CABINET APPOINTMENTS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every opportunity to the RUF/SL to join a broad-based government of national unity through cabinet appointments. To that end:
2. The Chairmanship of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) as provided for in Article VII of the present Agreement shall be offered to the leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. For this purpose he shall enjoy the status of Vice President and shall therefore be answerable only to the President of Sierra Leone.
3. The Government of Sierra Leone shall give ministerial positions to the RUF/SL in a moderately expanded cabinet of 18, bearing in mind that the interests of other political parties and civil society organizations should also be taken into account, as follows:
(i) One of the senior cabinet appointments such as finance, foreign affairs and justice;
(ii) Three other cabinet positions.

4. In addition, the Government of Sierra Leone shall, in the same spirit, make available to the RUF/SL the following senior government positions: Four posts of Deputy Minister.
5. Within a period of fourteen days following the signing of the present Agreement, the necessary steps shall be taken by the Government of Sierra Leone to remove any legal impediments that may prevent RUF/SL members from holding cabinet and other positions.

ARTICLE VI

COMMISSION FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE

1. A Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (hereinafter termed the CCP), shall be established within two weeks of the signing of the present Agreement to implement a post-conflict programme that ensures reconciliation and the welfare of al parties to the conflict, especially the victims of war. The CCP shall have the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the present Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace.
2. The CCP shall ensure that all structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace already in existence and those provided for in the present Agreement are operational and given the necessary resources for realizing their respective mandates. These structures shall comprise:

(i) the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development;
(ii) the Joint Monitoring Commission;
(iii) the Provincial and District Cease-fire Monitoring Committees;
(iv) the Committee for the Release of Prisoners of War and Non-Combatants;
(v) the Committee for Humanitarian Assistance;
(vi) the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration;
(vii) the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
(viii) the Human Rights Commission; and
(ix) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

3. The CCP shall have the right to inspect any activity or site connected with the implementation of the present Agreement.
4. The CCP shall have full powers to organize its work in any manner it deems appropriate and to appoint any group or sub-committee which it deems necessary in the discharge of its functions.

5. The Commission shall be composed of the following members:

(i) Two representatives of the civil society;

(ii) One representative each named by the Government, the RUF/SL and the Parliament.

6. The CCP shall have its own offices, adequate communication facilities and secretarial support staff.

7. Recommendations for improvements or modifications shall be made to the President of sierra Leone for appropriate action. Likewise, failures of the structures to perform their assigned duties shall also be brought to the attention of the President.

8. Disputes arising out of the preceding paragraph shall be brought to the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders for resolution, as specified in Article VIII of the present Agreement.

9. Should Protocols be needed in furtherance of any provision in the present Agreement, the CCP shall have the responsibility for their preparation.

10. The mandate of the CCP shall terminate at the end of the next general elections.

ARTICLE VII
COMMISSION FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC RESOURCES, NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Given the emergency situation facing the country, the parties agree that the Government shall exercise full control over the exploitation of gold, diamonds and other resources, for the benefit of the people of Sierra Leone. Accordingly, a Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter termed the CMRRD) shall be established and charged with the responsibility of securing and monitoring the legitimate exploitation of Sierra Leoneâ€™s gold and diamonds, and other resources that are determined to be of strategic importance for national security and welfare as well as cater for post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction, as provided for under Article XXVIII of the present Agreement.

2. The Government shall take the necessary legal action within a period not exceeding two weeks from the signing of the present Agreement to the effect that all exploitation, sale, export, or any other transaction of gold and diamonds shall be forbidden except those sanctioned by the CMRRD. All previous concessions shall be null and void.

3. The CMRRD shall authorize licensing of artisanal production of diamonds and gold, in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. All gold and diamonds extracted or otherwise sources from any Sierra Leonean territory shall be sold to the Government.
4. The CMRRD shall ensure, through the appropriate authorities, the security of the areas covered under this Article, and shall take all necessary measures against unauthorized exploitation.
5. For the export or local resale of gold and diamonds by the Government, the CMRRD shall authorize a buying and selling agreement with one or more reputable international and specialized mineral companies. All exports of Sierra Leonean gold and diamonds shall be transacted by the Government, under these agreements.
6. The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.
7. The Government shall, if necessary, seek the assistance and cooperation of other governments and their instruments of law enforcement to detect and facilitate the prosecution of violations of this Article.
8. The management of other natural resources shall be reviewed by the CMRRD to determine if their regulation is a matter of national security and welfare, and recommend appropriate policy to the Government.
9. The functions of the Ministry of Mines shall continued to be carried out by the current authorized ministry. However, in respect of strategic mineral resources, the CMRRD shall be an autonomous body in carrying out its duties concerning the regulation of Sierra Leoneâ€™s strategic natural resources.
10. All agreements and transactions referred to in this Article shall be subject to full public disclosure and records of all correspondence, negotiations, business transactions and any other matters related to exploitation, management, local or international marketing, and any other matter shall be public documents.
11. The Commission shall issue monthly reports, including the details of all the transactions related to gold and diamonds, and other licenses or concessions of natural resources, and its own administrative costs.

12. The Commission shall be governed by a Board whose Chairmanship shall be offered to the Leader of the RUF/SL, Corporal Foday Sankoh. The Board shall also comprise:

(i) Two representatives of the Government appointed by the President;

(ii) Two representatives of the political party to be formed by the RUF/SL;

(iii) Three representatives of the civil society; and

(iv) Two representatives of other political parties appointed by Parliament.

13. The Government shall take the required administrative actions to implement the commitments made in the present Agreement; and in the case of enabling legislation, it shall draft and submit to Parliament within thirty days of the signature of the present Agreement, the relevant bills for their enactment into law.

14. The Government commits itself to propose and support an amendment to the Constitution to make the exploitation of gold and diamonds the legitimate domain of the people of Sierra Leone, and to determine that the proceeds be used for the development of Sierra Leone, particularly public education, public health, infrastructure development, and compensation of incapacitated war victims as well as post-war reconstruction and development.

ARTICLE VIII
COUNCIL OF ELDERS AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS

1. The signatories agree to refer any conflicting differences of interpretation of this Article or any other Article of the present Agreement or its protocols, to a Council of Elders and Religious Leaders comprised as follows:

(i) Two members appointed by the Inter-Religious Council;

(ii) One member each appointed by the Government and the RUF/SL; and

(iii) One member appointed by ECOWAS.

2. The Council shall designate its own chairperson from among its members. All of its decision shall be taken by the concurrence of at least four members, and shall be binding and public, provided that an aggrieved party may appeal to the Supreme Court.

PART THREE
OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

The Part of the present Agreement Consists of the following Articles

Article IX Pardon and Amnesty

ARTICLE IX
PARDON AND AMNESTY

1. In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take appropriate legal steps to grant Corporal Foday Sankoh absolute and free pardon.
2. After the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall also grant absolute and free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement.
3. To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF/SL, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of the signing of the present Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee immunity to former combatants, exiles and other persons, currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.

ARTICLE X
REVIEW OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

In order to ensure that the Constitution of Sierra Leone represents the needs and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone and that no constitutional or any other legal provision prevents the implementation of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall take the necessary steps to establish a Constitutional Review Committee to review the provisions of the present Constitution, and where deemed appropriate, recommend revisions and amendments, in accordance with Part V, Section 108 of the Constitution of 1991.

ARTICLE XI

DATE OF NEXT ELECTIONS

The next national elections in Sierra Leone shall beheld in accordance with the present Constitution of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION

1. A new independent National Electoral Commission (hereinafter termed the NEC) shall be set up by the Government, not later than three months after the signing of the present Agreement.
2. In setting up the new NEC the President shall consult all political parties, including the RUF/SL, to determine the membership and terms of reference of the Commission, paying particular attention to the need for a level playing field in the nationâ€™s elections.
3. No member of the NEC shall be eligible for appointment to political office by any government formed as a result of an election he or she was mandated to conduct.
4. The NEC shall request the assistance of the International Community, including the UN, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations, in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone.

PART FOUR

POST-CONFLICT MILITARY AND SECURITY ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL, recognizing that the maintenance of peace and security is of paramount importance for the achievement of lasting peace in Sierra Leone and for the welfare of its people, have agreed to the following formulas for dealing with post-conflict military and security matters. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement and may be further detailed in protocols annexed to the Agreement.

Article XIII Transformation and New Mandate of ECOMOG

Article XIV New Mandate of UNOMSIL

Article XV Security Guarantees for Peace Monitors

Article XVI Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Article XVII Restructuring and Training of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces

Article XVIII Withdrawal of Mercenaries

Article XIX Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission

Article Notification to Military Commands.

ARTICLE XIII

TRANSFORMATION AND NEW MANDATE OF ECOMOG

1. Immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, the parties shall request ECOWAS to revise the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone as follows:

(i) Peacekeeping;

(ii) Security of the State of Sierra Leone;

i. Protection of UNOMSIL.

i. Protection of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration personnel.

2. The Government shall, immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement, request ECOWAS for troop contributions from at least two additional countries. The additional contingents shall be deployed not later than 30 days from the date of signature of the present Agreement. The Security Council shall be requested to provide assistance in support of ECOMOG.

3. The Parties agree to develop a timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG, including measures for securing all of the territory of Sierra Leone by the restructured armed forces. The phased withdrawal of ECOMOG will be linked to the phased creation and deployment of the restructured armed forces.

ARTICLE XIV

NEW MANDATE OF UNOMSIL

1. The UN Security Council is requested to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XV

SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR PEACE MONITORS

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF/SL agree to guarantee the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNOMSIL Military Observers throughout Sierra Leone. This guarantee shall be monitored by the Joint Monitoring Commission.
2. The freedom of movement includes complete and unhindered access for UNOMSIL Military Observers in the conduct of their duties throughout Sierra Leone. Before and during the process of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, officers and escorts to be provided by both Parties shall be required to facilitate this access.
3. Such freedom of movement and security shall also be accorded to non-military UNOMSIL personnel such as Human Rights Officers in the conduct of their duties. These personnel shall, in most cases, be accompanied by UNOMSIL Military Observers.
4. The provision of security to be extended shall include United Nations aircraft, vehicles and other property.

ARTICLE XVI

ENCAMPMENT, DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION

1. A neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups. The encampment, disarmament and demobilization process shall commence within six weeks of the signing of the present Agreement in line with the deployment of the neutral peace keeping force.
2. The present SLA shall be restricted to the barracks and their arms in the armoury and their ammunitions in the magazines and placed under constant surveillance by the neutral peacekeeping force during the process of disarmament and demobilization.
3. UNOMSIL shall be present in all disarmament and demobilization locations to monitor the process and provide security guarantees to all ex-combatants.
4. Upon the signing of the present Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone shall immediately request the International Community to assist with the provision of the necessary financial and technical resources needed for the adaptation and extension of the existing Encampment, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programme in Sierra Leone, including payment of retirement benefits and other emoluments due to former members of the SLA.

ARTICLE XVII

RESTRUCTURING AND TRAINING OF THE SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES

1. The restructuring, composition and training of the new Sierra Leone armed forces will be carried out by the Government with a view to creating truly national armed forces, bearing loyalty solely to the State of Sierra Leone, and able and willing to perform their constitutional role.

2. Those ex-combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF and SLA who wish to be integrated into the new restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria.

3. Recruitment into the armed forces shall reflect the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established strength.

ARTICLE XVIII
WITHDRAWAL OF MERCENARIES

All mercenaries, in any guise, shall be withdrawn from Sierra Leone immediately upon the signing of the present Agreement. Their withdrawal shall be supervised by the Joint Monitoring Commission.

ARTICLE XIX
NOTIFICATION TO JOINT MONITORING COMMISSION

Immediately upon the establishment of the JMC provided for in Article II of the present Agreement, each party shall furnish to the JMC information regarding the strength and locations of all combatants as well as the positions and descriptions of all known unexploded bombs (UXBs), explosive ordnance devices (EODs), minefields, booby traps, wire entanglements, and all other physical or military hazards. The JMC shall seek all necessary technical assistance in mine clearance and the disposal or destruction of similar devices and weapons under the operational control of the neutral peacekeeping force. The parties shall keep the JMC updated on changes in this information so that it can notify the public as needed, to prevent injuries.

ARTICLE XX
NOTIFICATION TO MILITARY COMMANDS

Each party shall ensure that the terms of the present Agreement, and written orders requiring compliance, are immediately communicated to all of its forces.

PART FIVE

HUMANITARIAN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. The Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF\SL recognizing the importance of upholding, promoting and protecting the human rights of every Sierra Leonean as well as the enforcement of humanitarian law, agree to the following formulas for the achievement of these laudable objectives. Each of these formulas (not in priority order) is contained in separate Articles of this Part of the present Agreement

Article XXI Release of Prisoners and Abductees

Article XXII Refugees and Displaced Persons

Article XXIII Guarantee of the Security of Displaced Persons and Refugees

Article XXIV Guarantee and Promotion of Human Rights

Article XXV Human Rights Commission

Article XXVI Human Rights Violations

Article XXVII Humanitarian Relief

Article XXVIII Post War Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Article XXIX Special Fund for War Victims

Article XXX Child Combatants

Article XXXI Education and Health

ARTICLE XXI

RELEASE OF PRISONERS AND ABDUCTEES

All political prisoners of war as well as all non-combatants shall be released immediately and unconditionally by both parties, in accordance with the Statement of June 2, 1999, which is contained in Annex 3 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement.

ARTICLE XXII

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Parties through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction agree to seek funding from and the involvement of the UN and other agencies, including friendly countries, in order to design and implement a plan for voluntary repatriation and reintegration of Sierra Leonean refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in conformity with international conventions, norms and practices.

ARTICLE XXIII

GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF DISPLACED PERSONS AND REFUGEES

As a reaffirmation of their commitment to the observation of the conventions and principles of human rights and the status of refugees, the Parties shall take effective and appropriate measures to ensure that the right of Sierra Leoneans to asylum is fully respected and that no camps or dwellings of refugees or displaced persons are violated.

ARTICLE XXIV

GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peopleâ€™s Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.
2. These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of oneâ€™s country.

ARTICLE XXV

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

1. The Parties pledge to strengthen the existing machinery for addressing grievances of the people in respect of alleged violations of their basic human rights by the creation, as a matter of urgency and not later than 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement, of an autonomous quasi-judicial national Human Rights Commission.
2. The Parties further pledge to promote Human Rights education throughout the various sectors of Sierra Leonean society, including the schools, the media, the police, the military and the religious community.
3. In pursuance of the above, technical and material assistance may be sought from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights and other relevant international organisations.

4. A consortium of local human rights and civil society groups in Sierra Leone shall be encouraged to help monitor human rights observance.

ARTICLE XXVI

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.

2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991.
This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.

3. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community.
This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.

ARTICLE XXVII

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment to their Statement on the Delivery of Humanitarian Assistance in Sierra Leone of June 3, 1999 which is contained in Annex 4 and constitutes an integral part of the present Agreement. To this end, the Government shall request appropriate international humanitarian assistance for the people of Sierra Leone who are in need all over the country.

2. The Parties agree to guarantee safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian organizations throughout the country in order to facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms which govern humanitarian operations. In this respect, the parties agree to guarantee the security of the presence and movement of humanitarian personnel.

3. The Parties also agree to guarantee the security of all properties and goods transported, stocked or distributed by humanitarian organizations, as well as the security of their projects and beneficiaries.
4. The Government shall set up at various levels throughout the country, the appropriate and effective administrative or security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the implementation of these guarantees of safety for the personnel, goods and areas of operation of the humanitarian organizations.

ARTICLE XXVIII

POST - WAR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

1. The Government, through the National Commission for Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction and with the support of the International Community, shall provide appropriate financial and technical resources for post-war rehabilitation, reconstruction and development.
2. Given that women have been particularly victimized during the war, special attention shall be accorded to their needs and potentials in formulating and implementing national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development programmes, to enable them to play a central role in the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Sierra Leone.

ARTICLE XXIX

SPECIAL FUND FOR WAR VICTIMS

The Government, with the support of the International Community, shall design and implement a programme for the rehabilitation of war victims. For this purpose, a special fund shall be set up.

ARTICLE XXX

CHILD COMBATANTS

The Government shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources, both within the country and from the International Community, and especially through the Office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF and other agencies, to address the special needs of these children in the existing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes.

ARTICLE XXXI

EDUCATION AND HEALTH

The Government shall provide free compulsory education for the first nine years of schooling (Basic Education) and shall endeavour to provide free schooling for a further three years. The Government shall also endeavour to provide affordable primary health care throughout the country.

PART SIX

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT

ARTICLE XXXII

JOINT IMPLEMENTATION COMMITTEE

A Joint Implementation Committee consisting of members of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the Committee of Seven on Sierra Leone, as well as the Moral Guarantors, provided for in Article XXXIV of the present Agreement and other international supporters shall be established. Under the chairmanship of ECOWAS, the Joint Implementation Committee shall be responsible for reviewing and assessing the state of implementation of the Agreement, and shall meet at least once every three months. Without prejudice to the functions of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace as provided for in Article VI, the Joint Implementation Committee shall make recommendations deemed necessary to ensure effective implementation of the present Agreement according to the Schedule of Implementation, which appears as Annex 5.

ARTICLE XXXIII

REQUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT

The parties request that the provisions of the present Agreement affecting the United Nations shall enter into force upon the adoption by the UN Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the request made in this Agreement. Likewise, the decision-making bodies of the other international organisations concerned are requested to take similar action, where appropriate.

PART SEVEN

MORAL GUARANTORS AND INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

ARTICLE XXXIV

MORAL GUARANTORS

The Government of the Togolese Republic, the United Nations, the OAU, ECOWAS and the Commonwealth of Nations shall stand as Moral Guarantors that this Peace Agreement is implemented with integrity and in good faith by both parties.

ARTICLE XXXV

INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

Both parties call on the International Community to assist them in implementing the present Agreement with integrity and good faith. The international organisations mentioned in Article XXXIV and the Governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, CÃ´te d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, the United Kingdom and the United States of America are facilitating and supporting the conclusion of this Agreement. These States and organisations believe that this Agreement must protect the paramount interests of the people of Sierra Leone in peace and security.

PART EIGHT

FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE XXXVI

REGISTRATION AND PUBLICATION

The Sierra Leone Government shall register the signed Agreement not later than 15 days from the date of the signing of this Agreement. The signed Agreement shall also be published in the Sierra Leone Gazette not later than 48 (Forty - Eight) hours after the date of registration of this Agreement. This Agreement shall be laid before the Parliament of Sierra Leone not later than 21 (Twenty-One) days after the signing of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XXXVII

ENTRY INTO FORCE

The present Agreement shall enter into force immediately upon its signing by the Parties.

Done in Lomé this seven day of the month of July 1999 in twelve (12) original texts in English and French, each text being equally authentic.

Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh
Leader of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone

His Excellency Gnassingbe Eyadema
President of the Togolese Republic
Chairman of ECOWAS

His Excellency Blaise Compaore
President of Burkina Faso

His Excellency Dahkpanah Dr. Charles Ghankey Taylor
President of the Republic of Liberia

His Excellency Olusegun Obasanjo
President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

His Excellency Youssoufou Bamba
Secretary of State at the Foreign Mission in charge of
International Cooperation of Cote d'Ivoire

His Excellency Victor Gbeho
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Ghana

Mr. Roger Laloupo
Representative of the ECOWAS Special Representative

Ambassador Francis G. Okelo
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Secretary General

Ms. Adwoa Coleman
Representative Organization of African Unity

Dr. Moses K.Z. Anafu
Representative of the Commonwealth of Nations

ANNEX 1

AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE

IN SIERRA LEONE

President Ahmed Tejan KABBAH and Rev. Jesse Jackson met on 18 May 1999 with Corporal Foday Saybana SANKOH, under the auspices of President Gnassingbe EYADEMA. At that meeting, the question of the peace process for Sierra Leone was discussed.

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The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL),

- Desirous to promote the ongoing dialogue process with a view to establishing durable peace and stability in Sierra Leone; and
- Wishing to create an appropriate atmosphere conducive to the holding of peace talks in Lome, which began with the RUF internal consultations to be followed by dialogue between the Government and the RUF;
- Have jointly decided to:

1. Agree to ceasefire as from 24 May 1999, the day that President EYADEMA invited Foreign Ministers of ECOWAS to discuss problems pertaining to Sierra Leone. It was further agreed that the dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone and RUF would commence on 25 May 1999;
2. Maintain their present and respective positions in Sierra Leone as of the 24th of May 1999; and refrain from any hostile or aggressive act which could undermine the peace process;
3. Commit to start negotiations in good faith, involving all relevant parties in the discussions, not later than May 25 in Lome;
4. Guarantee safe and unhindered access by humanitarian organizations to all people in need; establish safe corridors for the provision of food and medical supplies to ECOMOG soldiers behind RUF lines, and to RUF combatants behind ECOMOG lines;
5. Immediate release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants;
6. Request the United Nations, subject to the Security Council's authorisation, to deploy military observers as soon as possible to observe compliance by the Government forces (ECOMOG and Civil Defence Forces) and the RUF, including former AFRC forces, with this ceasefire agreement.

This agreement is without prejudice to any other agreement or additional protocols which may be discussed during the dialogue between the Government and the RUF.
Signed in Lome (Togo) 18 May 1999, in six (6) originals in English and French

For the Government of Sierra Leone
ALHADJI Dr. Ahmad Tejan KABBAH
President Of The Republic Of Sierra Leone

For the Revolutionary United Front Of Sierra Leone
Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh, Leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)

WITNESSED BY:

For the Government of Togo and Current Chairman of ECOWAS
GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
President of the Republic of Togo

For the United Nations
Francis G. Okelo
Special Representative of the Secretary General

For the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)
Adwoa COLEMAN
Representative of the Organization of African Unity

US Presidential Special Envoy for the Promotion of Democracy in Africa
Rev. Jesse JACKSON

ANNEX 2

DEFINITION OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS

1. In accordance with Article II of the present Agreement, both parties agree that the following constitute cease-fire violations and a breach of the Cease-fire Agreement:

a. The use of weapons of any kind in any circumstance including: -

(i) Automatic and semi-automatic rifles, pistols, machine guns and any other small arms weapon systems.

(ii) Heavy machine guns and any other heavy weapon systems.

(iii) Grenades and rocket-propelled grenade weapon systems.

(iv) Artillery, rockets, mortars and any other indirect fire weapon systems.

(v) All types of mine, explosive devices and improvised booby traps.

(vi) Air Defence weapon systems of any nature.

(vii) Any other weapon not included in the above paragraphs.

b. Troop movements of any nature outside of the areas recognized as being under the control of respective fighting forces without prior notification to the Cease-fire Monitoring Committee of any movements at least 48 hours in advance.
c. The movement of arms and ammunition. To be considered in the context of Security Council Resolution 1171 (1998).
d. Troop movements of any nature;
e. The construction and/or the improvement of defensive works and positions within respective areas of control, but outside a geographical boundary of 500m from existing similar positions.
f. Reconnaissance of any nature outside of respective areas of control.
g. Any other offensive or aggressive action.
2. Any training or other military activities not provided for in Articles XIII to XIX of the present Agreement, constitute a cease-fire violation.
3. In the event of a hostile external force threatening the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Sierra Leone, military action may be undertaken by the Sierra Leone Government.

ANNEX 3
STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND NON-COMBATANTS

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL) have agreed to implement as soon as possible the provision of the Cease-fire Agreement which was signed on 18 May 1999 in Lome, relating to the immediate release of prisoners of war and non-combatants.
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of the implementation of this provision in the interest of the furtherance of the talks.
They therefore decided that an appropriate Committee is established to handle the release of all prisoners of war and non-combatants.
Both the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone decided that such a Committee be established by the UN and chaired by the UN Chief

Military Observer in Sierra Leone and comprising representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF and other relevant UN Agencies and NGOs. This Committee should begin its work immediately by contacting both parties to the conflict with a view to effecting the immediate release of these prisoners of war and non-combatants.

Lomé - 2 June 1999

ANNEX 4

STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE ON THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN SIERRA LEONE

The parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone meeting in Lome Togo on 3rd June 1999 in the context of the Dialogue between the Government of Sierra Leone (GSL) and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL):

Reaffirm their respect for international convention, principles and norms, which govern the right of people to receive humanitarian assistance and the effective delivery of such assistance.

Reiterate their commitment to the implementation of the Cease-fire Agreement signed by the two parties on 18th May 1999 in Lome.

Aware of the fact that the protracted civil strife in Sierra Leone has created a situation whereby the vast majority of Sierra Leoneans in need of humanitarian assistance cannot be reached.

Hereby agree as follows:

1. That all duly registered humanitarian agencies shall be guaranteed safe and unhindered access to all areas under the control of the respective parties in order that humanitarian assistance can be delivered safely and effectively, in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms govern humanitarian operations.

2. In this respect the two parties shall:

a. guarantee safe access and facilitate the fielding of independent assessment missions by duly registered humanitarian agencies.

b. identify, in collaboration with the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator in Sierra Leone and UNOMSIL, mutually agreed routes (road, air and waterways) by which humanitarian goods and personnel shall be transported to the beneficiaries to provide needed assistance.

c. allow duly registered humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance according to needs established through independent assessments.
d. guarantee the security of all properties and of and goods transported, stocked or distributed by the duly registered humanitarian agencies, as well as the security of their project areas and beneficiaries.
3. The two parties undertake to establish with immediate effect, and not later than seven days, an Implementation Committee formed by appropriately designated and mandated representatives from the Government of Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, the Civil Society, the NGO community, and the UNOMSIL; and chaired by the United Nations Humanitarian Co-ordinator, in co-ordination with the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Sierra Leone.
The Implementation Committee will be mandated to:
a. Ascertain and assess the security of proposed routes to be used by the humanitarian agencies, and disseminate information on routes to interested humanitarian agencies.
b. Receive and review complaints which may arise in the implementation of this arrangement, in order to re-establish full compliance.
4. The parties agree to set up at various levels in their areas of control, the appropriate and effective administrative and security bodies which will monitor and facilitate the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance in all approved points of delivery, and ensure the security of the personnel, goods and project areas of the humanitarian agencies as well as the safety of the beneficiaries.
Issued in Lomé
June 3 1999

ANNEX 5

DRAFT SCHEDULE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT

1. ACTIVITIES WITH SPECIFIC TIMING:

TIMING	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION
DAY 1	Signing of the Peace		

	Agreement		
	Amnesty Transformation and new mandate of ECOMOG	The Government to grant absolute and free pardon to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh through appropriate legal steps Request to ECOWAS by the parties for revision of the mandate of ECOMOG in Sierra Leone Request to the UN Security Council to amend the mandate of UNOMSIL to enable it to undertake the various provisions outlined in the present Agreement; Request to the international community to provide substantial financial and logistical assistance to facilitate implementation of the Peace Agreement. Request to ECOWAS by the parties for contributions of additional troops.	
	Transformation of the RUF into a political party	RUF/SL to commence to organize itself to function as a political party	
	Encampment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)	Request for international assistance in adapting and extending the existing DDR	

		programme	
	Withdrawal of mercenaries	Supervision by Joint Monitoring Commission	
	Notification to Joint Monitoring Commission	Communication by the parties of positions and description of all known warlike devices/materials	
	Notification to Military Commands	Communication by the parties of written orders requiring compliance	
DAY 15	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office, and to join a broad-based Government of National Unity through Cabinet appointments	Removal by the Government of all legal impediments	
	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)	Creation of the Commission to implement a post-conflict reconciliation and welfare programme	Mandate of the Commission to terminate at the end of next general elections Jan.-Feb. 2001
	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD)	Ban on all exploitation, sale, export, or any transaction of gold and diamonds except those sanctioned by the CMRDD	

DAY 22	Enabling members of the RUF/SL to hold public office	Discussion and agreement between both parties on the appointment of RUF/SL members to positions of parastatal, diplomacy and any other public sector	For a period of fourteen days
DAY 31	Transformation of the RUF into a political party Commission for the management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) Transformation, new mandate, and phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Necessary legal steps by the Government for the registration of the RUF as a political party Preparation and submission by Government to the Parliament of relevant bills for enabling legislation commitments made under the peace agreement Deployment of troops from at least two additional countries	
DAY 60	Completion of encampment, disarmament and demobilization	Restriction of SLA soldiers to the barracks and storage of their arms and ammunition under constant surveillance by the Neutral Peace-Keeping Force during the disarmament process Monitoring of disarmament and demobilization by UNOMSIL	
DAY 90	Human Rights Commission	Creation of an autonomous quasi judicial national Human Rights Commission	

		Request for technical and material assistance from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights and other relevant organizations Creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission	
	Elections	Establishment of a new independent National Electoral Commission (NEC) in consultation with all political parties including the RUF/SL Request for financial and logistical support for the operations of the NEC Request for assistance from the international community in monitoring the next presidential and parliamentary elections in Sierra Leone	
DAY 456	Human Rights Violations	Submission by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of its report and recommendation to the Government for immediate implementation	

II. ACTIVITIES WITHOUT SPECIFIC TIMING: (SHORT/MEDIUM/LONG TERM):

SERIAL NO.	ACTIVITIES	ACTION REQUIRED	FOLLOW-UP ACTION

1.	Ceasefire monitoring (Ceasefire Agreement signed on 18 May 1999)	Establishment of a Ceasefire Monitoring Committee at provincial and district levels Request for international assistance in providing funds and other logistics for the operations of the JMC	JMC already established and operational
2.	Review of the present Constitution	Establishment of a Constitutional Review Committee	
3.	Mediation by the Council of Elders and Religious Leaders	Appointment of members of the Council by the Interreligious Council, the Government, the RUF and ECOWAS	
4.	Timetable for the phased withdrawal of ECOMOG	Formulation of the timetable in connection with the phased creation and deployment of the restructured Armed Forces	
5.	Security guarantees for peace monitors	Communication, in writing, of security	

		guarantees to UNMILOBs	
6.	Restructuring and training of the SLA	Creation by the Government of truly national armed forces reflecting the geo-political structure of Sierra Leone within the established	

Appendix G: Abuja Ceasefire Agreement

THE GOVERNMENT OF SIERRA LEONE AND RUF,

Reaffirming their determination to establish sustainable peace, stability and security in Sierra Leone;

Also reaffirming their commitment to the Lome Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 as the framework for the restoration of genuine and lasting peace to the country;

Desirous of adopting effective confidence-building measures so as to create a conducive environment for fresh application of the Lome Peace Agreement which constitutes the most appropriate framework for the resolution of the conflict in Sierra Leone;

Welcoming the emergence of a new leadership within the RUF and noting its stated commitment to work towards the restoration of peace to Sierra Leone

HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

1. To declare and observe a cease-fire and to halt hostilities with effect from Friday 10th November 2000 starting at 23:59 hours.
2. The parties agree to refrain from committing any acts or carrying out any activities that might constitute or facilitate a violation of the cease-fire.
3. They agree that the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone shall supervise and monitor the cease-fire. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone shall also investigate and report on any acts of cease-fire violation.
4. Both parties agree that UNAMSIL shall have full liberty to deploy its troops and other personnel throughout Sierra Leone including the diamond producing areas in the discharge of its responsibilities.
5. The parties undertake, with a view to restoring the authority of the Government throughout the entire territory of Sierra Leone, to ensure free movement of persons and goods, unimpeded movement of humanitarian agencies, and of refugees and displaced persons.
6. The RUF commits itself to the immediate return of all weapons, ammunitions and other equipment seized by the RUF.

7. The two parties agree to recommence immediately the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.
8. The Government of Sierra Leone reaffirmed its commitment to accelerate the process of restructuring and training of the Sierra Leone armed forces open to all Sierra Leoneans eligible to enrol.
9. The following shall constitute a violation of this Agreement:
    i. all illegal importation of arms, ammunitions and other weapons of war;
    ii. any attack by one of the parties against the positions of the other party before, during or after the deployment of UNAMSIL troops;
    iii. laying of mines or incendiary devices after the entry into force of this Agreement, the refusal to disclose the existence of such mines or explosives and their location, and the deliberate refusal to cooperate by turning over the maps indicating such locations;
    iv. harassment or attacks, hostage taking, and seizure of arms and equipment belonging to troops serving under the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, or under the authority of the Government of Sierra Leone;
    v. obstructing the activities of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.
10. The ultimate objective the the present Agreement is to ensure a cease-fire and to bring an end to the hostilities. Consequently, the parties agree to undertake with the participation of the ECOWAS Committee of six of the Medication and Security Council on Sierra Leone and the United Nations, a review of the implementation of this Agreement, thirty (30) days after its entry into force, to evaluate the timeliness of commencing fresh application of the Lome Peace Agreement.

Done at Abuja this 10th Day of November, 2000

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