

**THE ENVIRONMENT DETERMINED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP  
MODEL: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GOWON, BABANGIDA  
AND ABACHA REGIMES**

by

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This dissertation is dedicated to the children of Africa, including my firstborn, Marco Hoogenraad-Vermaak.

"General Abacha wasn't the first of his kind, nor will he be last, until someone can answer the question of why Africa allows such men to emerge again and again and again".

**BBC News** 1998. Passing of a dictator leads to new hope. 1  
Jul 98.

**SUMMARY**

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The recent election victory of gen. Obasanjo highlights the fragile civil-military relations encountered in Nigeria. It also illustrates the impact environment has on the recruitment process of political leaders, as a changed environment paved the way for democratic elections in Nigeria. To shed light on the phenomenon of the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders, a model encompassing environment, recruitment and leadership elements was formulated and applied to the Nigerian situation as experienced under the Gowon, Babangida and Abacha regimes. The first step of the environment determined political leadership model is to perform a specific analysis of the historical situation to facilitate the description, explanation and clarification of undemocratic recruitment. In the next step, the dynamic interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment, as revealed in the previously assessed historical situation, is analysed and tabularised to facilitate prediction. The third step of the model is to test set linkages of statements, to formulate a theory for the prediction of undemocratic recruitment in general. This theory is as follows: The military leader (micro environment) will adopt a challenger

personality, when the macro - and global environment allow the micro environment to challenge them for political domination. If the micro environment is able to mobilise resources and the macro environment is unable to mobilise resources and the global environment remains neutral, the military leader can be recruited in an undemocratic manner as political leader. To remain in power, the military leader must either dominate the macro environment or adopt legitimacy.

In the application of this model, it was determined that a challenger personality developed in the micro environment due to a weakened macro environment pestered by the absence of nationalism and national political leadership, as well as constant psychological conditioning, but also because the global environment remained uninvolved in the recruitment process. Besides the colonial legacy of Nigeria, this background provided the opportunity for a strong supportive organisation to develop in favour of military regimes. This eased the mobilisation of military resources for attempting undemocratic recruitment actions and facilitated the institutionalisation of military regimes in Nigeria. These identified behavioural patterns confirmed the mentioned general theory on the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders.

In conclusion it was stated that undemocratic recruitment attempts in Nigeria can be prevented if a balance is kept between the micro -, macro - and global environment. To address this imbalance, political restructuring (including leadership, institutions and processes), and also economic - and social restructuring need to take place in order for Democracy to be institutionalised. This requires that the lack of nationalism and the attitude of the military be addressed immediately. It also necessitates the participation of the global environment in condemning undemocratic recruitment actions. Fact is, the environment has changed and in the process has begun to hinder Africa's military's self

imposed mission to redeem the continent from corrupt politicians. The more Africa reacts on the new social dimensions in the environment, such as education, Information Technology and accelerated time, the more difficulty the military will have in intervening in politics.

**Democratisation**

**Environment**

**Environment-recruitment interaction**

**Institutionalisation**

**Leadership**

**Military regime**

**Nigeria**

**Political Leadership**

**Recruitment**

**Social dimensions**

**Undemocratic recruitment methods**

**SAMEVATTING**

DIE OMGEWING GEDETERMINEERDE POLITIEKE LEIERSKAP MODEL:  
'N VERGELYKENDE ANALISE VAN DIE GOWON, BABANGIDA AND  
ABACHA REGIMES

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Die onlangse verkiesingsoorwinning van Genl. Obasanjo onderstreep die sensitiewe siviël-militêre verhoudings in Nigeria. Dit illustreer ook die impak wat die omgewing het op die rekruteringsproses van politieke leiers, omdat 'n veranderde omgewing in Nigerië die weg gebaan het vir demokratiese verkiesings. Om lig te werp op die verskynsel van die ondemokratiese rekrutering van militêre leiers as politieke leiers, is 'n model, wat omgewings-, rekruterings- en leierskapselemente bevat, geformuleer en toegepas op die Nigeriese situasie tydens die Gowon, Babangida en Abacha regimes. Die eerste stap van die omgewing gedetermineerde politieke leierskap model is 'n spesifieke analise van die historiese situasie ten einde die beskrywing, verduideliking en toeligting van ondemokratiese rekrutering te fasiliteer. In die volgende stap word die dinamiese interaksie tussen leierskap, omgewing en rekrutering, soos gevind in die vorige stap, geanaliseer en in tabelvorm verwerk ten einde voorspelling te fasiliteer. Die derde stap van die model het ten doel om die vasgestelde stelling skakels te toets, om sodoende 'n algemene teorie te vorm vir die voorspelling van ondemokratiese rekrutering. Hierdie teorie is soos volg: Die

militêre leier (mikro omgewing) sal 'n uitdagingspersoonlikheid aanneem, indien die makro - en globale omgewing hom/haar/hul toelaat om hul te daag vir politieke dominasie. Indien die mikro omgewing in staat is om bronne te mobiliseer, die makro omgewing nie bronne kan mobiliseer nie en die globale omgewing neutraal staan, kan die militêre leier as politieke leier gerekruteer word op 'n ondemokratiese wyse. Om die mag te behou, moet die militêre leier of die makro omgewing domineer of legitimititeit verwerf.

In die toepassing van hierdie model is vasgestel dat 'n uitdagingspersoonlikheid by die makro omgewing ontwikkel het, weens 'n verswakte makro omgewing, geteister deur 'n gebrek aan nasionalisme en nasionale politieke leierskap, asook voortdurende sielkundige kondisionering, maar ook omrede die globale omgewing onbetrokke gestaan het in die rekruteringsproses. Buiten vir die Koloniale nalatenskap, het hierdie genoemde agtergrond die geleentheid geskep vir 'n sterk ondersteunende organisasie, wat militêre regimes steun, om te ontwikkel. Dit het die mobilisering van militêre bronne vir ondemokratiese rekruteringsaksies vergemaklik en die institutionalisering van militêre regimes gefasiliteer. Hierdie geïdentifiseerde gedragspatrone bevestig die genoemde algemene teorie rakende die ondemokratiese rekrutering van militêre leiers.

Die gevolgtrekking is gemaak dat ondemokratiese rekruteringspogings in Nigerië voorkom kan word, indien 'n balans gehandhaaf word tussen die mikro -, makro - en globale omgewing. Dit impliseer politieke herstrukturering (insluitend leierskap, instellings en prosesse), asook ekonomiese - en sosiale herstrukturering. Nasionalisme moet gevestig word en die houding van die militêr moet aangespreek word. Die globale omgewing moet deelnemend word en ondemokratiese rekruteringsaksies verdoem. Feit is, die omgewing het verander en in die proses is Afrika se militêr se selfopgelegde missie om die kontinent te bevry van korrupte politici, gestuit. Hoe meer Afrika reageer op die nuwe



sosiale dimensies in die omgewing (soos geletterdheid, Informasie Tegnologie en versnelde tyd) hoe moeiliker gaan dit vir die militêr word om politiek te bedryf.

**Demokratisering**

**Institusionalisering**

**Leierskap**

**Militêre regime**

**Nigerië**

**Omgewing**

**Omgewing-rekrutering interaksie**

**Ondemokratiese rekruteringsmetodes**

**Politieke Leierskap**

**Rekrutering**

**Sosiale dimensies**

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABN	Association for a Better Nigeria
AFMC	Armed Forces Military Council
AFRC	Armed Forces Ruling Council
AG	Action Group
ASUU	Academic Staff Union of Universities
CCBN	Conference of Catholic Bishops of Nigeria
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MSC	Military Supreme Council
NADECO	National Democratic Coalition
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NANS	National Association of Nigerian Students
NBC	Nigerian Bar Council
NCNC	National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns
NDF	Nigerian Defence Force
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NEMG	National Electoral Monitoring Group
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NMA	Nigerian Medical Association
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	Northern Peoples Congress
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NRC	National Republican Convention
NSO	National Security Organisation
NUA	National Union of Students
NUNS	National Union of Nigerian Students
NUPENG	National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OUA	Organisation for Unity in Africa
PENGASSAN	Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
RERP	Realistic Exchange Rate Policy
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SFEM	Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market
SMC	Supreme Military Council
UN	United Nations
UPGA	United Peoples Grand Alliance
UPP	United Peoples Party
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

**CHAPTER 1: ENVIRONMENT DETERMINED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MODEL:  
INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION**

1. Introduction.

The study of Political Leadership is a relatively new field in the Political Sciences. As such, an abundance of new challenges arises for the student of the Political Sciences, in terms of broadening the scope of Political Leadership and expanding the scientific knowledge needed to understand this field. One important challenge concerning Political Leadership that still remains to be exhausted, is the impact the environment<sup>1</sup> has on the recruitment process of political leaders. This impact may have a positive or negative result on the quality of life of the citizens of a state as it influences the nature of government. The negative impact of the environment on the recruitment process of a political leader raises interest, as it usually promotes undemocratic behaviour, undemocratic recruitment attempts, etc., which causes a step backwards in obtaining or institutionalising Democracy. This mentioned behaviour is endemic to Africa and not only erodes political development, but also much needed socio - and economic development. Therefore, the negative impact of the environment on the recruitment process needs to be analysed and reflected in a model, in order to explain the influence of the environment in facilitating undemocratic recruitment behaviour and to identify measures aimed at preventing this type of behaviour. In this regard, the long history of military intervention and undemocratic recruitment

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1. The broad formulation of Paige (1977:124-125) concerning the term "Environment" is used in this dissertation. According to him the environment includes physical natural aspects, man made physical and technological aspects, economic aspects, social aspects, cultural aspects and patterns of associated events. This concept is elaborated on in chapter two.

behaviour as found in Nigeria, presents the student of Political Leadership with a case study for analysing the impact of the environment on the recruitment process of a political leader.

### 1.1. Identification of a research theme.

Political leadership is determined by the environment, but also shapes the environment. This interaction between political leadership and the environment impacts on the recruitment process of political leaders. History testifies to this argument's advantage. In the beginning of time, a person was recruited as the leader of a group due to the possession of certain social dimensions (i.e. social skills and traits) perceived by that group to be vital for their survival as determined by their environment, i.e. hunting and warfare skills. In the medieval period of Western Civilisation these social dimensions of leadership changed and increased in number as the environment changed and became more complex. A group was no longer dependant on one leader's input for their survival, as military power improved and pacts could be concluded between different leaders in order to strive for and obtain a common goal. This eventually affected the recruitment of leaders to change from hereditary leaders (medieval times) to that of chosen leaders (in democratic nation states), as the European renaissance facilitated the rise of military, political and religious leaders. With the rise of nation states, leadership changed to become more complex. The result thereof was the introduction of an economic dimension (Colonialism) to leadership as well as a drastic change in the military dimension already present in leadership (which explains the score of national wars, world wars and civil wars), as the nation state environment depended on these two dimensions for survival.

In the nation state, political leadership and social dimensions significantly influenced the environment (especially the military and economists in the environment) to demand more influence in government<sup>2</sup>. This interaction between political leadership and social dimensions provided the environment with the necessary equipment to change the method of recruitment of leaders<sup>3</sup>. This new complex interaction between leader and environment that emanated from the nation state proved to have a dramatic impact on the Third World, especially on Africa, as it resulted in what Huntington labelled the "Third Wave of Democratisation"<sup>4</sup>. It signalled a new era for Africa Leadership, in that it marked the shift of political decision making from the exclusive domain of the traditional/national politician (as characterised in the nation state and introduced to Africa -and other continents-

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2. According to Taylor & Rosenbach (1989:4): "The nature of leadership in modern society is constantly changing. Many people are still willing to serve as leaders, but we are more selective in choosing them now. Their past activities and present actions are subject to the closest scrutiny. Our performance expectations are high, and we do not react well to those who do not meet them".

3. Apart from exercising a recruitment choice during elections, civil unrest, economic sanctions or coups d'état are nowadays utilised as methods of recruiting political leaders or as instruments of persuasion in dictating the recruitment process.

4. Huntington (1991:13) argues that: "Modern democracy is not simply democracy of the village, the tribe, or the city-state; it is democracy of the nation-state and its emergence is associated with the development of the nation-state". The nation state did not only give birth to modern democracy, but the future evolution of democracy are influenced by the complex interaction between environment (the electorate who possess certain social dimensions) and leadership as encountered in the nation state. This complex interaction impacted on the nation state, as it was faced with new demands from the environment, demands which herald the end of the nation state. This explains the current situation where nation state politicians are being replaced by modernday politicians, as people are politically educated or possess the means to exercise political influence. The behaviour of this environment is observed by Huntington to be waves of democratisation.

by colonialism) to that of modern day political role players such as economists, environmentalists and militarists. This resulted in a new phase of politics where the traditional role of the politician is shared, replaced or performed, inter alia, by the community -, religious -, economic - and military leaders recruited by means other than that previously utilised in the nation state. In Africa, this traditional role was to be replaced more often than not, by the military.

1.1.1. Subject.

The environment determined political leadership model: a comparative analysis of the Gowon, Babangida and Abacha regimes.

1.1.2. Theme and research problem.

During the 1980's, democratisation in Africa was limited. Even so, some liberation had occurred in Senegal, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. The reason for this slow democratisation process, is the fact that Africa's new-found freedom was constantly jeopardised by undemocratic recruitment methods; such as coups d'état, exclusion of certain groups (Apartheid), one party elections and kingships (See Huntington 1991:21-25). Of the 17 young Africa democracies formed since 1960, four already fell victim to the military. The remainder was inclined to embrace one party domination, had less voter participation and their governments tended to remain in power for longer<sup>5</sup>. This illustrates the tension between the democratic ideal and the process of recruiting political leaders.


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5. See Bezuidenhout, N, *In baie Afrika-lande is jong demokrasieë nog 'kwesbaar'*. (In Beeld, 13 April 1999).



This new gained freedom (or the lack of it) as well as the end of the Cold War (the probable end of the nation state environment) creates a new Zeitgeist wherein the dynamic interplay between political leadership, environment and recruitment must be analysed to identify causes for undemocratic recruitment and to identify effective solutions to prevent the recurrence thereof. The aim of this dissertation will be to answer the question so frequently posed after the toppling or passing away of a dictator: Why does Africa (or any other continent) allow the undemocratic recruitment of military men as political leaders?

In achieving this aim, a unified model reflecting the interaction between the environment, leadership and recruitment is proposed<sup>6</sup>. The interaction in the environment determined political leadership model can be illustrated as follows:



In the first place it is argued that in the interaction between leadership and recruitment, leadership (including

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6. This model is based on Paige's philosophy of a multivariate, multi-dimensional linkage approach to describe, explain and predict behaviour. Therefore, similarity is to be found between the two models in terms of terminology and variables. However, these elements were adjusted to suit new demands and are therefore, unless otherwise indicated, not to be confused with one another.

collective leadership) is seen as a given in any environment, and as a result constant competition between leaders is facilitated, creating a dynamic recruitment cycle. Following this argument the recruitment process of the military leader was divided for analytical purposes into three phases:

- C Emergence of a challenger personality
- C Recruitment of a challenger personality
- C Institutionalisation of a new regime

These phases allow for leadership behaviour to concur with the recruitment action. This facilitates the comparison of leadership behaviour/recruitment action with the environment, as behaviour of leaders in the three environments will be directed at attempts to be recruited or to remain as recruited leader. This facilitates the use of the same variables (Personality, Organisation and Setting) for all three environments in order to assess an outcome. An outcome that will be the result of the presence of influenceable recruitment variables (social dimensions), present in both the environment and leader.

Secondly, if contributions of a variety of scholars<sup>7</sup> are to be taken as guideline, the concept environment<sup>8</sup> can be narrowed down to three major groups responsible for undemocratic behaviour: that is the micro<sup>9</sup>, macro<sup>10</sup> and global<sup>11</sup>

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7. Refer to chapter two for a discussion on the contribution of scholars of Political Development on the recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders.

8. Refer to chapter two, par 2.1.1.2. and par. 2.1.1.2.1

9. Scholars as Palmer, Finer, Decalo, Horowitz, Perlmutter and Bennet have speculated, theorised and hypothesised about the military factors underlying to the undemocratic recruitment of the soldier as political leader.

environment. In these environments certain recruitment variables are operating, causing the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders. These variables influence leaders to take recruitment action.

Thirdly, it is argued that the outcome of the interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment on favouring the undemocratic recruitment of a military leader as political leader, will be determined in toto by the presence of recruitment variables found in the environment and leader. In this study, the recruitment variables were taken from Paige (1977), as these identified variables address both environment and leader interaction, as well as recruitment methods<sup>12</sup>. In order to obtain a prediction quality, these recruitment variables were narrowed down to certain predictable variable options, as hinted by the recruitment process and concurrent leadership behaviour.

Finally, a hypothesis is formulated to predict any future undemocratic recruitment of the military. This can be indicated as follows:

C The military leader (micro environment) will adopt a challenger personality, when the macro and global

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10. The political development study of Palmer has shed light on the contribution of a population to the successful recruitment of the military as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion.

11. The influence of the international community in the success of establishing a military regime is mentioned by Palmer (1989).

12. Paige (1977) identified six variables: personality, role, organisation, task, values and setting that produce as a whole political leadership behavioral patterns, as it facilitates person dominant or environment dominant leadership. In this dissertation role, task and values are **(footnote 12 continues from p.6)** incorporated into one variable, namely personality, as behaviour in this case is directed towards recruitment.

environments allow the micro environment to challenge them for political domination.

C If the micro environment is able to mobilise resources and the macro environment is unable to mobilise resources and the global environment remains neutral, the military leader can be recruited in an undemocratic manner as political leader.

C To remain in power, the military leader must either dominate the macro environment or adopt legitimacy.

It is precisely this combination of environment, leadership and recruitment interaction, as reflected in the environment determined political leadership model, that the previous scholars<sup>13</sup> overlooked when addressing the recruitment of the military leader in the role of political leader.

### 1.1.3. Disciplinary context.

This dissertation forms part of the disciplinary context of political leadership. During the twentieth century, the study of political leadership was initially characterised by the analysis of individuals' characteristics, but during the 1950's, social scientists turned to the analysis of leadership situations and the influence of leaders on a given value context and political framework (Bekker 1994:263). Although this created the opportunity for scholars to study leadership from a variety of focuses, the one issue still neglected was a

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13. Paige (1977:56) indicated that Almond, Downton, Tsurutani, Dettman and Byars contributed in introducing Political Leadership to Political Development. This was not introduced to the debate on the recruitment of military regimes, as military leadership was not seen (at that time) as a negative influence to the political development of a state, and as such not studied.

study of the interplay between the environment and leadership, as well as the impact it had on recruitment. This dissertation analyses the Nigerian environment that facilitates the undemocratic recruitment of a military leader, in examining the interaction between the military leader and environment by applying a coherent model formulated to explain this phenomenon in practice<sup>14</sup>.

#### 1.1.4. Relevance.

The study of political leadership in Africa and the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders will enhance Political Science in that it stimulates interdisciplinary debate on recruitment and leadership and encourages theory building in this regard. Another advantage is that it promotes multidisciplinary debate on recruitment and leadership, as Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology and History need to be consulted in analysing leadership and recruitment in a holistic manner. An inter-disciplinary and multidisciplinary study of the interplay between the environment and political leadership will broaden and develop the study of political leadership as a relatively new field in Political Science. The study of the undemocratic recruitment of the Nigerian military, will provide an opportunity to describe this phenomenon, to predict behaviour, to determine the cause of behaviour and to explain that behaviour. The Zeitgeist of democratisation and the philosophy of an Africa Renaissance necessitates the applied study of the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders, as military regimes usually equal antidemocratic forms of

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14. See Horowitz (1980) and Palmer (1989). Both authors identify the root causes for the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders, but fail to unify it in a theory for the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leader.

government. The negative political, social and economic impact of a military regime is evident in those states which succumbed to military pressure.

#### 1.1.5. Contribution.

The contribution of this dissertation will be a scientific study of the interaction between environment and leadership and the way it facilitates the undemocratic recruitment of the military leader as political leader. It will further contribute to a broadening and extension of knowledge on this subject, as well as integrating and evaluating existing knowledge and theories on this subject.

#### 1.2. Methodology.

A comparative and situational political leadership analysis (in the context of political recruitment), focussing on three different military regimes in Nigeria in terms of Paiges' variables, are to be utilised as research methods<sup>15</sup>.

##### 1.2.1. Literature study.

In the study *Leadership* (1978), Burns became the first social scientist to effectively generalise the leadership process and he established the necessary philosophical and intellectual foundation for the study of leadership. Paige contributed enormously to provide the study of Political Leadership with a theoretical and philosophical focus in *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (1977). Paige argued that a multivariate, multidimensional linkage approach needs to be adopted in studying leadership; through accepting personality,

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15. See chapter two for a detailed discussion.

role, organisation, task, values and setting as leadership variables and by reflecting them in a dimensional setting. Blondel (1987) broadened and applied the ideas of Burns in *Political Leadership*. Horowitz (1980), Perlmutter & Bennett (1980), Perlmutter (1981), Finer (1988), Palmer (1989) and Decalo (1990) contributed by examining and isolating the root causes for undemocratic recruitment methods, utilised by military leaders to become political leaders. Palmer (1989) contributed to the understanding of military regimes in a Third World context. The same applies to Cartwright (1983) and Obasanjo & D'Orville (1990), though not to the same extent. In understanding leadership, the work of Taylor & Rosenbach (1984) is most useful as it focuses on loyalty, discipline and professionalism. The work of Danopoulos (1992) and Huntington (1991) indicates the Zeitgeist of democratisation and the approach to find solutions for the prevention of military rule. The NAIJANET chat line was utilised to test ideas and to gain access to Nigerian social scientists' insights of the Nigerian situation.

### 1.3. Scope of research.

In order to direct the focus of research, the research problem is defined as set out in the following discussion.

#### 1.3.1. Geographical.

The dissertation will analyse the contributions of the environment and leaders of Nigeria to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the roles of political leaders.

1.3.2. Time.

Three military regimes will be studied, namely that of Lt-Col Gowon (second Nigerian government: 29 July 1966 to 29 July 1975), Maj-Gen. Babangida (fifth Nigerian government: 27 August 1985 to 17 November 1993) and Maj-Gen. Abacha (sixth Nigerian government: 17 November 1993 to 9 June 1998).

The Gowon regime will be analysed from the formation of the coalition government between the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) and the NPC (Northern People's Congress) up until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967. The Babangida regime will be analysed from the decline in support for Buhari, up to a failed coup d'état against Babangida in December 1985. The Abacha regime will be analysed against the background of phase three of Babangida, up to rumours of a coup d'état in the spring of 1995.

1.3.3. Population.

The micro -, macro - and global environment will be studied. In the micro environment the focus will be on the personality, role, organisation, task, value and setting of Gowon, Babangida, Abacha and the Nigerian military. In the macro environment the focus is on the personality, role, organisation, task and value of the ruling political leaders (including ex-military leaders), the Nigerian community and the manifested setting (economy, political parties -including pressure groups- and where important, the civil service). In the global environment the focus is on the expressed attitudes (regarding the development of a challenger personality, the recruitment and institutionalisation of military governments) of the main global actors towards military regimes in Nigeria.



1.3.4. Motivation for selection of leaders.

These leaders were chosen as case studies to test the environment determined political leadership model, as they were military leaders who were recruited as political leaders, by means of undemocratic recruitment methods.

Gowon was a 31-year-old Christian from a minority group (Anga) in the North of Nigeria when he unintentionally became head of the second Nigerian regime (Ostheimer 1973:63 and Africa Report 1973:16). The micro environment is typified as postcolonial with a social -, economic - and political underdeveloped society in favour of a military government (See Feit 1968:180-182, Iwayemi 1979:52, Smythe 1985:216 and Hatch 1971:198-200,224). In the global environment, Britain played a major role in dominating Nigerian affairs. The Cold War influenced the United States of America (USA) to accept the notion that providing support to military elites could be beneficial to their aspirations of global security. In general, the replacement of a civilian government by a military government, was accepted by the global environment and thus legitimised (Ostheimer 1973:60 and Okpaku 1974:241).

Babangida was a 44-year-old Muslim from a minority group in the North of Nigeria when he launched a coup d'état against the Buhari military regime (Alabi 1985:8). The micro environment is characterised as a transitional society. Strikes during Babangida's regime indicated that the society still supported a military regime, but not wholeheartedly (Diamond 1985:55 and Diamond 1987:201). Babangida was supported in the global environment by the Western World because of his anti-communist stance.

Abacha was a 50-year-old Muslim from a minority group (Kanuri) in the North-eastern part of Nigeria when he dismissed the civilian leader (Ernest Shonekan) and seized political power for himself (Uwechue 1996a:1). The macro environment experienced a power vacuum due to the resignation of Babangida, and was therefore challenged by the micro environment. Due to democratisation actions of Babangida, the macro environment became more politicised and exercised more pressure on the micro environment to transform to a professional military, stripped of political power. The dismissal of Shonekan and the seizure of political power by the military was condemned by most states in the global environment and they gradually became more involved in the domestic politics of Nigeria (Butts & Metz 1996:10-12,15 and Olonisakin 1998:12).

#### 1.3.5. Conceptual.

The undermentioned concepts require clarification by means of definition before any effort can be made to develop a model that explains the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the roles of political leaders.

##### 1.3.5.1. Leadership.

Many definitions exist for the term leadership. Burns (1978:18) defined leadership as: "Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilise, in competition or conflict with others; institutional, political, psychological, and other resources as to arouse, engage and satisfy the motives of followers". According to this definition, leadership is an action structure that involves all persons (though to different degrees) irrespective of background or social strata. Only

the alienated and powerless are not involved in this process (Burns 1978:3). Arnold & Feldman (1986) (more so than Burns) emphasised that leadership is an influence process: "leadership involves the exercise of influence on the part of the leader over the behaviour of one or more other people". Bennis & Nanus (1985:15) argued that most of the definitions on leadership (including those mentioned) overlooked the issue of power. According to them (1985:17): "Power is the basic energy needed to initiate and sustain action or, to put it another way, the capacity to translate intention into reality and sustain it. Leadership is the wise use of this power: Transformative leadership". In this dissertation leadership is used according to the definition of Burns, but as leadership is analysed in the context of undemocratic recruitment it does not only include motives/purposes, mobilisation, competition/conflict or influence, but also the issue of power.

#### 1.3.5.2. Political leadership.

Depending on one's approach, quite a lot of definitions for political leadership were formulated. Currently it is generally accepted that political leadership comprises the interaction between an individual (with physical and psychological characteristics) that emerges as leader (recruitment) and the environment (that includes followers with their physical and psychological characteristics) (See Bekker 1994:184 and Blondel 1987:15). The most comprehensive definition for political leadership seems to be that of Paige (1977:1): "Political leadership is the behaviour of persons of political authority, their competitors, and these both in interaction with their members of society as manifested in the past, present, and probable future throughout the world". In this dissertation, the concept political leader is used

reflecting the viewpoints of Bekker and Blondel and the definition of Paige.

1.4. Other studies identified on this subject.

In general, the changing political role of the political leader due to a changing environment must receive academic attention. This suggests that the reciprocal impact of leadership on the environment and the environment on leadership need to be analysed. Furthermore, scientific studies need to be undertaken concerning the influence that global environments, macro environments and micro environments exert on the recruitment process. These studies need to be undertaken from a leadership perspective. This implies the analysis of the influence of personality, organisation and setting on the recruitment process.

Other specific topics on recruitment include the study of the impact of elite groups (including economic giants such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffet and George Soros) on the micro environment, macro environment and global environment and on the recruitment of political leaders. The impact of current social dimensions on the recruitment process also requires attention. In this regard, the impact of environmentalists, Information Technology, time and modern values on the recruitment process have to be analysed.

Furthermore, students of Political Leadership need to partake in multidisciplinary studies on this subject, as leadership does not only entail a political dimension. Conclusions reached in multidisciplinary studies on environment-leadership interaction need to be investigated, in order to be assimilated by Political Leadership.

**CHAPTER 2: ENVIRONMENT DETERMINED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MODEL:  
THEORY**

2. Introduction.

As indicated in chapter one, the emergence of nation states resulted in a new environment with new social dimensions influencing the recruitment of leaders, as the interplay between leadership, environment and recruitment became more complex. In this spirit, this century experienced the first undemocratic recruitment of military soldiers in the roles of political leaders and the subsequent replacement of civil governments with military governments. The reason for this being the fact that military leaders were provided with the technology and legitimacy (social dimensions) necessary to be recruited as political leaders.

This undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders created the opportunity for political analysts to reflect theoretically on the activities (constitutional and/or unconstitutional) of the soldier in politics. This debate was mainly dominated by scholars from Political Development. After initial debate on the military's political skills (with Latin American scholars as main exponents) and on the military's proposed political role; the undemocratic recruitment of soldiers (at first expressed in the form of coups d'état) was hailed by Western government officials and political students (mainly Johnson), as a stabilising factor. This stance was embraced by scholars from the Third World, like Odetola<sup>1</sup>. They considered undemocratic recruitment methods as an indigenous African solution to problems which stemmed from the colonisation of Africa by the

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1. For a detailed analysis of the military and political development, see Odetola (1982).

Western powers. With the main focus of debate centred around different interpretations of the concept and content of development and not recruitment per se, the interaction between leadership, recruitment and environment were not properly addressed. At the end of the 1980's not much had changed in the kind of reasoning and generation of conclusions in Political Development. Although sufficient progress was made on the isolation of root causes for the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders, no coherent theory was formulated to explain or dispel it in practise<sup>2</sup>. One explanation for this is to be found in the Zeitgeist and another in the reluctance of political study fields other than Political Development (or also called Political Sociology) to study the undemocratic recruitment of political leaders. The third reason for this is the lack of multidisciplinary study in the social sciences regarding this matter. This lack of attention to the interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment is addressed in the environment determined political leadership model.

### 2.1. Environment determined political leadership model.

The aim of this model, as stated in chapter one, is to supply answers to the question on the undemocratic recruitment of Nigerian military leaders in the role of political leaders, but also to explain this phenomenon in general. The model thus functions on a specific level, where Nigeria is concerned, but also on a general level, where solutions for this problem in general are concerned. In broad the function of this model is to describe, clarify, explain and predict the interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment.

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2. As mentioned in chapter one, Horowitz (1980) and Palmer (1989) both identified the root causes for coups d'état, but failed to unify them in a theory for the undemocratic recruitment of soldiers as political leaders.

The first step of the model is to perform a specific analysis of the historical situation, according to three identified recruitment phases; namely the emergence of a challenger personality, the recruitment phase and institutionalisation phase (see par 2.1.1.1). The aim of this analysis is to determine in what stage of recruitment the environments are in and what environments are involved in the recruitment cycle. The purpose is to identify their personality, organisation and setting characteristics (see par 2.1.1.2.2). If a case study presents itself as a phase one situation, the military personnel (micro environment) that oppose the current political leader (macro environment) must be identified. The stance the international political arena (global environment) took in against the micro and macro environment are also observed, as it has a decisive influence in the interaction between the leader, environment and possible recruitment. The support for the different environment leaders in the recruitment process is also taken into consideration, in order to determine the probability for a leadership change. When the case study coincides with the recruitment phase (this is indicated by the use of an undemocratic recruitment method(s)), the different environment personalities are ascertained and support for the different environment organisations' recruitment attempts or reactions on attempts is identified. In this way the setting is also analysed to determine the possibility for the recruitment attempt to succeed. In some instances the last phase of the recruitment cycle will coincide with the first phase, if a new leader usually negates institutionalisation attempts and in doing so, sows the seeds for future challenger personalities to appear. In this phase the institutionalisation attempts of the new political leader must be observed in relation to his/her/their and other environments' personality (role, task and values),

organisation, and settings. This step of the model facilitates description, explanation and clarification of the undemocratic recruitment of a soldier as political leader.

In the next step of this model, the dynamic interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment, as revealed in the previously assessed historical situation, is expressed in a tabular form (see Table 1.) in order to facilitate prediction. The environment (a) is represented by a micro -, macro - and global environment. The behaviour of the environment, in reaction to leadership and recruitment interaction, can be anticipated as variable options. Leadership is represented by personality, organisation and setting (b), as reflected during the historical analysis. Leadership behaviour, in reaction to environment and recruitment interaction, is anticipated as variable options. The recruitment outcome, as influenced by leadership and environment interaction, is anticipated in three variable options (c), reflecting possible future recruitment behaviour. This step can be tabularised as follows:



Table 1. Environment determined political leadership model.

a

b	<b>Micro Environment</b>	<b>Macro Environment</b>	<b>Global Environment</b>
<b>Personality</b> (Including role, values and task as it all is expressed in the personality that acts on the recruitment process)	Three possibilities exist (c): Challenger Non-challenger Compromiser	Three possibilities exist: Challenger Non-challenger Compromiser	Three possibilities exist: Challenger Non-challenger Compromiser
<b>Organisation</b> (as this will determine their support for deterring a recruitment threat of initiating a recruitment attempt)	Three possibilities exist: Supportive Uninvolved Non-supportive	Three possibilities exist: Supportive Uninvolved Non-supportive	Three possibilities exist: Supportive Uninvolved Non-supportive
<b>Setting</b> (to determine their ability to mobilise resources, in order to deter or initiate a recruitment attempt)	Three possibilities exist: Ideal Discontent Untouched	Three possibilities exist: Ideal Discontent Untouched	Three possibilities exist: Ideal Discontent Untouched

The model allows for the prediction of a possible undemocratic recruitment outcome, in analysing the combination of variable options as manifested in the historical situation. Depending on combination of variables, the following possible undemocratic recruitment outcome of this leadership, environment and recruitment interplay are anticipated:

- C Military intervention
- C Military democracy or enlightened military government
- C Diarchy (Civil-military government)
- C Military dictatorship

It can be illustrated as follows:

Table 2. Military intervention.

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality (Role, values and task)	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger /Challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved/ Supportive
Setting	Discontent	Ideal	Untouched/ Ideal

According to this model, military intervention will appear if the micro environment develops a challenger personality and the macro environment and global environment does not challenge the micro environment. Although the micro environment challenges the macro environment, the macro environment has a supportive organisation and can muster resources against the micro environment. The micro environment has a supportive organisation, but cannot mobilise resources (especially military resources) against the macro environment. The effect is a tendency of the micro environment to intervene in matters relating to military affairs, as more interference will create a challenger personality with the macro (and/or global) environment. This challenge of the micro environment will be eased if the global environment has a non-challenger personality, uninvolved organisation and untouched setting. If the global environment reflects a challenger personality, supportive organisation and ideal setting, military intervention can be expected on small scale.

Table 3. Military democracy or enlightened military government.

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality (Role, values and task)	Challenger	Challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

In this case the micro environment and macro environment both has a challenger personality, but the global environment a non-challenger personality. Although all environments are supported in their personalities (or are not involved, as is the case with the global environment), the ideal setting reflects the fact that the micro environment could be recruited as new political leader as it could mobilise resources (including military resources) for this purpose. The recruitment of the military will be eased if the global environment stays uninvolved during the mobilisation of military resources. Even though being recruited, the micro environment must deal with the macro environment's supportive organisation and challenger personality, in order to prevent their discontent setting from turning into an ideal setting. This combination of variables causes a military democracy or enlightened military government to be established.

Table 4. Diarchy (Civil-military government).

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality (Role, values and task)	Challenger/Compromiser	Challenger/Compromiser	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Discontent	Discontent	Ideal

In this case the micro environment and macro environment could have a challenger/or compromiser personality. A compromiser personality would be the result of serious challenges faced by an environment which is not in a situation to deter the onslaught of another environment, as it cannot mobilise the necessary resources. This is reflected in a discontent setting, found within the micro and macro environment, as both have difficulty in mobilising resources to achieve their aim, namely to keep onto political power or to gain political power. This power balance facilitates the possibility of a diarchy to be formed. This outcome is only possible when the power balance between the micro environment and macro environment is not influenced by the global environment during the recruitment process.

Table 5. Military dictatorship.

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality (Role, values and task)	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Non-supportive /Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

In this case the micro environment possesses a challenger personality (expressed in repressive ways) that cannot be deterred by the macro environment (non-challenger) or global environment (non-challenger) as the micro environment has organisational support and could mobilise resources in their environment. On the other hand, the macro environment has lost touch with its organisation (uninvolved) or lost support (non-supportive) and cannot mobilise resources against the micro environment (discontent). The situation is further worsened by the uninvolvedness of the global environment. The result is a military dictatorship.

The third step of this model is to test the set linkages of statements, in order to obtain a theory for the prediction of undemocratic recruitment in general. The set linkages of statements are:

- C The military leader (micro environment) will adopt a challenger personality, when the macro - and global environment allows the micro environment to challenge them for political domination.
  
- C If the micro environment can mobilise resources, the macro environment cannot mobilise resources (even if adopting a challenger personality) and the global environment stays neutral, the military leader can be recruited in an undemocratic way as political leader.
  
- C To remain in power, the military leader must either dominate the macro environment or adopt legitimacy.

2.1.1. Components.

This model is composed of two components: a concrete and an abstract component. The concrete component constitutes the undemocratic recruitment process and the abstract component the dynamic interplay between environment, leadership and recruitment.


2.1.1.1. Concrete component.

The recruitment process was introduced to the model, in order to operationalise the abstract component. This recruitment process is based on the conclusions of Burns (1978) and Blondel (1987), regarding leadership motives. This recruitment process made the prediction of variable options (based on the recruitment motive) possible, and thus facilitated the prediction of possible recruitment outcomes.

The recruitment process is divided into three phases, a phase where a challenger personality emerges, a phase where recruitment takes place and a phase where the new regime is institutionalised.

This recruitment process is dynamic and depends on interaction between leader and environment in order for recruitment to take place and to be successful. This process can be illustrated as follows:

Fig a. Recruitment process.



**Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality:** The factors contributing to the recruitment of a military leader are latent in the three environments. By the interplay between the environments (and leaders in the environments) the embedded factors stimulate a leader to develop a challenger personality. The reason for this is the fact that the leader analyses his/her/their personality, role, task, organisation, values and setting in the interplay of the environments intellectually and makes a diagnosis of what is perceived to be wrong. This perceived diagnosis presents the leader with a motive (solution), namely recruitment. The motive presents the leader with a new role, because he/she/they must indicate to their followers the direction to rectify the diagnosed defaults (See Blondel 1987:16). In this action the leader develops a challenger personality because the new role gives the leader a motive to mobilise support and hence the task to be recruited as political leader. This challenger personality

and role will also influence the other environment leaders to develop a personality to prevent this challenger from being recruited as new political leader, or to facilitate this challengers' recruitment.

**Phase 2, The recruitment phase:** In this phase the micro environment leader challenges the leaders of the macro - and global environment (with their own personality, role, task, organisation, value and setting) in mobilising resources for his/her/their recruitment in order to realise the predetermined motive. To be recruited, the military has two options: a constitutional or unconstitutional option. If the military follows the constitutional option he/she/they must partake in an election. If the last option is considered, he/she/they must mobilise<sup>3</sup> their distinctive resources: namely a superior organisation, emotionalised symbolical status and weapon monopoly in their own environment (Finer 1988:5), or seek support in other environments by combining these resources with certain constitutional elements (i.e. One party elections). This phase ends with the replacement of the existing government with that of the micro environment leader by means of an undemocratic recruitment method.

**Phase 3, Institutionalisation phase:** In this phase the new political leader (ex-military leader) performs institutionalisation actions as to ensure the support of the micro -, macro - and/or global environment<sup>4</sup>. Continuous and realistic

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3. Palmer (1989:237-238) indicated that the success of mobilisation will depend on planning for strategically placed mid-level commanders of infantry and tank units and the application of speed, surprise and coordination. The personality, role, organisation, task, value and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment can also be added to this list.

4. If the recruited political leader(s) used force, violence or unconstitutional means to succeed in his/her/their motive, special



institutio-nalisation actions tend to establish a regime and prevent other micro - and macro environment leaders from gaining a motive to be recruited as new political leaders. This concludes the recruitment process but also marks the beginning of a new phase one, because the interplay among the three environments is continuous and dynamic. This phase reaches an end with the acceptance of the new leader by all the important and influential environments. If pressure is used to obtain this phase, a new phase one is created.

#### 2.1.1.2. Abstract component.

The abstract component represents three arbitrary environments (micro environment, macro environment and global environment) and three recruitment variables (which reflect leadership behaviour; namely personality, organisation and setting), constructed for analytical purposes. The environments represent three groups involved in facilitating the undemocratic recruitment effort needed to bring about a military regime, and the three recruitment variables the behaviour instigated by the recruitment process. In reaction to the recruitment process, the environments' and leaders' possible behaviour can be anticipated. This is termed the variable options. They represent the dynamic relationship of environment, leadership and recruitment which can be compared to establish the outcome of a recruitment action.

The interplay between environment, leadership and recruitment is very complex. Each environment and leader is influenced by the other environments and leaders, while being influenced by the other two environments and leaders at the same time. Except for the influence reciprocally exerted by similar


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care must be taken to legitimise the new regime (See Finer, 1988:18).

variables, the different variables in each environment also influence each other reciprocally.

This complex interplay between each environment, the leaders of that environment and the different variables in it, is illustrated in the following figure:

Fig b. Environment interplay.



2.1.1.2.1. Environments.

Political leadership takes place in and is conditioned by the environment. This environment includes physical natural aspects, man made physical and technological aspects, economic aspects, social aspects, cultural aspects and patterns of associated events (Paige 1977:124-125). According to Bekker (1994:186) environment refers to values, attitudes, circumstances and issues present in the political system. This environment is determined by the structure, the

characteristics and attributes thereof, the relationship of the political system with other political systems, physical and psychological restrictions wherein the system functions and the perceptual observations of issues by politicians (Bekker 1994:186).

This universum is divided into three environments, the micro environment, macro environment and global environment. These three environments are in constant interaction<sup>5</sup> with each other and possess certain recruitment variables<sup>6</sup> that are conducive or restrictive to a military leader in attempting a political career.

a. MICRO ENVIRONMENT

This environment is represented by the military leader as an individual (biological, physiological and psychological) as well as his or her collective group (organisational and psychological).

b. MACRO ENVIRONMENT

This environment constitutes the social, economic and political spheres of a system in which a leader function and is part of. This environment is restricted to one geographical area.

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5. With interaction is meant the shaping, exchange and influencing of values, attitudes, circumstances and issues in the political system, as encountered in a specific environment with its specific physical aspects, man made physical and technological aspects, economic aspects, social aspects, cultural aspects and patterns of associated events. Thus the process of creating recruitment variables - or social dimensions.

6. These recruitment variables are indicators of interaction as they are shaped, triggered and/or established by the recruitment interaction between leader and environment.

c. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

This environment represents the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions, seen as part of their existence.

Due to the interaction between leadership and environment the variables contributing to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders, are embedded in the environments. In the micro environment some of the suggested factors conducive to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders are the following: ease of intervention (see Palmer 1989:236 and Luttwak & Koehl 1991:147,237), preservation of military autonomy (Palmer 1989:239-241), military factionalisation (Palmer 19889:243), lack of military professionalism (Palmer 1989:245 and Finer 1988:20,245) and military professionalism (Finer 1988:21). The following contributing reasons were identified that are to be found in both the micro - and macro environment: growing conflict of values (Palmer 1989:242-243 and Finer 1988:34,38, 41,49), intervention of the military in civilian political conflict (Palmer 1989:243) and the use of the military for internal control (Palmer 1989:244). The following reasons were indicated as factors contributing to the undemocratic recruitment of the military in the macro environment: continuous civilian dependency on the military (Finer 1988:64), low institutionalisation of political institutions (Palmer 1989:238-239), institutionalisation of the military (Palmer 1989:238-239), civilian incompetency and power vacuums (Palmer 1989:246 and Finer 1988:71) and the culture of the society (Palmer 1989:140-141,143). In the global environment the demonstration effect and external pressure were identified as possible factors contributing to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders (Palmer 1989:246). The indicators of

interaction are -in terms of the narrow focus of the model- restricted to undemocratic recruitment actions.

2.1.1.2.2. Variables.

Three recruitment variables (reflecting leadership patterns as suggested by Paige:1977) serve as recruitment stimuli for the environment and leader. The variables in the different environments and leaders will be conducive or restrictive to the recruitment effort of a military leader. They are as follows; personality (including role, task, values), organisation and setting. In this model role, task and values are treated as elements of personality, as the single aim of recruitment (or deterring recruitment) combines these mentioned variables and reflects it in personality. The aim of recruitment also directs behaviour, so that possible behaviour can be anticipated. This is reflected in variable options.

a. PERSONALITY

It is the conglomeration of characteristics that constitutes an individual. This includes biological, physiological and psychological traits. In case of the military we may speak of shared personality characteristics, or a collective personality (Paige 1977:106). In this model three personality types (variable options) are anticipated:

C **The challenger personality**, where an environment leader's recruitment motive constitutes a threat to the realisation of another environment leader's recruitment motives.

C **The non-challenger personality**, where an environment leader's motive to be recruited as political leader constitutes no threat to the realisation of another environment leader's recruitment motives.

C **The compromiser personality**, where an environment leader makes political concessions to neutralise or accommodate another environment leader's political motives.

b. ROLE<sup>7</sup>

A leader with a distinct personality (i.e. challenger personality) bears proportion to its environment. This is called role play (Bekker 1994:193). In this model the following three role plays, reflecting the aforementioned personalities (variable options), are anticipated:

C **The challenger role**, where an environment leader challenges another environment leader's recruitment attempts.

C **The non-challenger role**, where an environment leader does not challenge another environment leader's recruitment attempts.

C **The compromiser role**, where an environment leader plays a concessional role to neutralise another environment leader's recruitment attempts.

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7. Paige (1977:110) treated role and personality as separate variables. In this case it is treated as interdependant factors, as the environment determined political leadership model equates behaviour to the recruitment process.

c. TASK

This is a problem that must be solved, the opportunity for a decision or a discrepancy between the actual and desirable state of affairs as perceived by leaders or objectively given (Paige 1977:113). According to Bekker (1994:186) the task will influence the leadership and characteristics of a leader. The following types (variable options) of tasks are anticipated:

- C **Challenger tasks**, directed at promoting or achieving a motive to be recruited as political leader.
- C **Non-challenger tasks**, directed at maintaining a status quo situation or not to challenge challenger tasks.
- C **Compromiser tasks**, directed at promoting a balance between challenger personalities or tasks to create a situation which would not involve other roleplayers to intervene between challenger personalities.

d. VALUES

According to Paige (1977:120) values are "standards that influence choice among, and commitments to, 'modes of conduct' and 'end-states of existence' ". The following type of values (variable options) is anticipated:

- C **Challenger values**, values that promote a challenger personality to opt for recruitment.
- C **Non-challenger values**, values that promote a non-challenger personality to refrain from challenging

another environment leader.

C **Compromiser values**, values that foster compromise in the battle for recruitment as political leader.

e. ORGANISATION

According to Paige (1977:113) organisation refers to all "followers, opponents, and in fact all other members of a society whose **behaviour** influences or is significantly influenced by political leaders, either directly or indirectly"<sup>8</sup>. In this model three types of organisation (variable options) are proposed:

C **A supportive organisation**, where the environment leader (with or without recruitment motives) is supported in their challenger personality and role by the organisation, of which he/she/they forms part of.

C **An uninvolved organisation**, where the environment leader (with or without recruitment motives) is not concerned about support or alienated from his/her/their followers.

C **A non-supportive organisation**, where the environment leader (with or without recruitment motives) is not supported in the personality and role he/she/they reflects by the organisation of which he/she/they form part of.

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8. The author is responsible for the bolding of behaviour.



f. SETTING

In this model setting refers to the situation in which recruitment of a military leader as political leader took place. This includes economic -, social -, cultural -, and political aspects<sup>9</sup>. It also includes the viewpoints of Bekker (1994), that setting relates to values, attitudes, circumstances and issues that are present in the political system. Three settings (variable options) are anticipated:

- C **Ideal**, where the environment leader can mobilise the resources of that environment and other environments in challenging another environment leader for political leadership, or in deterring a threat from another environment leader and/or where another environment leader constitutes no challenge for the recruitment of a challenger environment leader.
  
- C **Discontent**, where the environment leader cannot mobilise the resources of that environment (or another environment) in challenging another environment leader for political leadership, or in deterring a threat from another environment leader in the recruitment process.
  
- C **Untouched**, where the mobilisation for recruitment of an environment leader raises no interest.

2.2. Characteristics of the environment determined political leadership model.

The model simplifies the dynamic and complex interplay between leader, environment and recruitment. This is obtained as the

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9. These assumptions correlate with that of Bekker (1994:186) and Paige (1977:125).

abstract component provides for the analysis of variables conducive to the recruitment of a military leader, and a concrete component operationalises the abstract component and favours the linkage of statements. According to the model the environments and leadership are in constant interaction with each other which stimulates certain variables that are individually or as a whole conducive or restrictive to the undemocratic recruitment of a military leader as political leader. The variables present in each environment are interrelated, influences each other and are in constant competition with each other. The combination of variables (variable options) will determine the way in which a military leader will be recruited and whether it will be successful. The variables will also determine the style of the new military regime; being a democratic military government, diarchy or a military dictatorship.

The environment determined political leadership model can be summarised as follows:


**Phase 1:** A challenger personality develops if an individual or group in an environment succeeds in indicating a political alternative and in effectively mobilising support among their own environment (and/or other environments) against another environment. This development of a challenger personality is made possible, as the variables in the different environments favours the development of a recruitment motive and mobilisation of support.

**Phase 2:** The mobilisation of distinctive resources is made possible as the variables in the different environments favours it. The combination of variables during the competition among the three environments, will determine the outcome of the conflict between the micro and macro environment.

**Phase 3:** When a military leader succeeded in adopting a political role, the leader strive to obtain legitimacy or use force in institutionalising the new regime, depending on the variables present in the environments.

The environment determined political leadership model can be illustrated as follows:

Fig c. Environment determined political leadership model.



In Fig c. the effect of Fig a. combined with Fig b. is illustrated in a holistic manner.

### 2.3. Application of the environment determined political leadership model.

In the exposition of the dissertation in the next three chapters, the environment determined political leadership model is going to be applied on the Nigerian situation.

Chapter three will be devoted to the study of the second Nigerian government, under the rule of Gowon (29 July 1966 until 29 July 1975) in terms of this model. The situation in the Nigerian history under Gowon is going to be analysed in terms of the three phases mentioned in the said model. The personality, role, organisation, task, values and setting present in each phase are going to be analysed, to apply it as the model suggests. The findings will be tabularised for each phase, as to obtain answers on the undemocratic recruitment of the military in the role of political leader.

In chapter four, the military government of Babangida (27 August 1985 until 17 November 1993) will be analysed in terms of the dynamics created by the interaction between environments and leadership, in the recruitment cycle. These findings will be tabled for each phase, so that the aim of the environment determined political leadership model can be reached.

In chapter five, Abacha's government (17 November 1993 until 9 June 1998) will be subjected to the prescripts of the environment determined political leadership model in order to tabularise findings in this regard, so that a solution for the undemocratic recruitment of military persons can be obtained.

Chapter six will be devoted to comparing the findings of the different chapters as to obtain scientific evidence for the

undemocratic recruitment of the military as political leaders. In this chapter the stated hypothesis for undemocratic recruitment will be tested. Attention will also be given to the aspect of avoiding future undemocratic military attempts. In this regard ways will be suggested in escaping this fate in future.

### CHAPTER 3: THE GOWON REGIME: 29 JULY 1966 - 29 JULY 1975

#### 3. Introduction.

In this chapter the second Nigerian government under the rule of Gowon will be studied, using the environment determined political leadership model as point of departure. This entails a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options in order to gain answers on the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders. Step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide the opportunity for the testing of the environment determined political leadership model, in order to indicate the effectiveness of this model in answering the research problem as stated in chapter one.

This particular time in the history of Nigeria presents the environment determined political leadership model with the opportunity to investigate the origin of undemocratic recruitment behaviour as presented by military personnel, as Nigeria at that time had no previous history of military intervention that constituted a threat to political leadership, nor was any indications present that Nigeria was going to be plagued in future by the military utilising undemocratic recruitment options (especially coups d'état). The opportunity lays in the fact that the environment variables exposed in this chapter, will be those forceful variables that ignite undemocratic recruitment behaviour. These variables can then be double checked with those exposed

in the other chapters, in order to assess their real contribution to the successful recruitment of military leaders as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion. Another interesting element embedded in this history is the fact that two different coups d'état were performed successfully by two military leaders with total different personalities and different support bases under totally different circumstances. These differences are crucial for the testing of the environment determined political leadership model, as for one it isolates the importance of the environment in the undemocratic recruitment action, but also poses a healthy challenge in accommodating differences in the model.

### 3.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase, in which the different emerging challenger personalities in the Nigerian setting will be examined, begins in 1959 with the formation of the coalition government between the NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons) and the NPC (Northern People's Congress), and ends before the failed January 1966 coup d'état (as example of an undemocratic recruitment attempt) of Maj. Nzeogwu.

#### 3.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the development of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate those factors that promote undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

3.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

These variables, taken from Paige, need to be analysed in order to assess what factors in the environment contributes to the emergence of a challenger personality that opts for an undemocratic recruitment action in order to assume a political role. It also presents the possibility to isolate those factors that inhibit undemocratic recruitment actions.

3.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Ironsi and Gowon as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be studied, in order to assess this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

The first coup d'état in Nigeria was not expected. By 1965 no undemocratic recruitment attempt took place in a former British colony; where British parliamentary institutions were followed and the Army received professional British training that highlighted discipline, order and obedience (See Schwarz 1968:192, Hatch 1971:235 and Okpaku 1974:241). In 1964 the Army showed its political neutrality by acting as impartial peacemakers during internal strife<sup>1</sup> and acted in this way again

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1. During the unrest of 1964 in the Northern state, wherein many Tiv were killed, the Tiv regarded the military's role as being impartial.



during the election crises of 1964-1965<sup>2</sup>. As part of the UN contingency in the Congo, they distinguished themselves as professional and disciplined soldiers (See Schwarz 1968:192 and Hatch 1971:235). Even the students of Armies in the new world, did not consider the political potential of this armies to be high (Feit 1968:179)

Despite professional values, the professionalism of the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) is to be questioned if other dimensions are taken in account, such as the level of technical expertise of the Nigerian soldier. This level could not be compared to those of soldiers in developed countries. Nigeria had to rely on Britain for training, and thus the number of officers to receive advance training overseas was limited. In January 1966 only 22 out of 507 commissioned officers received advanced training outside Nigeria. This had the effect that military socialization among the officers-corp was slight and that they were equipped with only basic military skills. Thus, eliminating them from comparison to Palmers ideal of the professional soldier (Ollawa 1976:25 and See Palmer 1989:251-252).

Soon after independence, the social - and political contexts of military involvement in politics eroded values of military professionalism, and created factions in the micro environment to the disadvantage of the development of a Acorporate self-interest@. This created a Astructural weakness@ in the military; leading to a lack of cohesiveness (due to the absence of a Anational identification element@), thus affecting military professionalism and organisational experience

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2. The military rejected the presidents plea for support, indicating that they can only accept orders from the prime minister. See par. 3.1.1.3.2 for a full account on the crisis.

furthermore<sup>3</sup>. This situation was worsened with the nigerianisation of the NDF in 1965. Nigerianisation led to the hastening of promotions, in an arbitrary fashion, in order to complete this process by 1966. It created jealousy as the newly appointed officers (mostly Ibo-s) were very young and educated (between 20 and 35), but had little chance for promotion in future. The older generation (mostly Hausa-Fulani) felt that the young soldiers were given an unfair advantage. To make matters worse, they were scorned by the younger soldiers; as they lacked professional or organisational experience, as well as the requisite educational qualifications. Due to the aforementioned problems, discipline and professionalism could not get institutionalised (See Oyediran 1979:23-24, Schwarz 1968:192-193, Hatch 1971:235-236 and Ollawa 1976:25-26).

As part of nigerianisation, Maj-Gen. Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi (an Ibo) was promoted as head of the Army. His appointment marked the beginning of the abuse of the military by the macro environment politicians, as the macro environment was engaged in a political battle between the Hausa-Fulani and Ibo for political dominance, and military power would have been handy to secure political power. This battle would soon contribute to the politicisation of the composition of the Army, as the Northern area (mostly Tiv and other middle belt ethnic groups that were against Hausa-Fulani dominance) dominated the rank and file in the general tasks area and the Sandhurst trained Ibo from the Western area the clerical and technical departments. With completion of the nigerianisation of the Army, the better educated and positioned Ibo dominated the officers-s corps. This arose ethnic suspicion, but was countered -in the beginning- by the rotation of service and

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3. See Finer (1962:40-58) and also Janowitz (1964).

the moving of brigades from area to area (See Schwarz 1968:192-193 and Hatch 1971:235-236).

The politicisation of the military eroded their integrity. Fear for Ibo dominance in the military caused Northerner politicians to debate on whether courage or educational qualifications must become the criteria for recruitment and promotions in the Army. The NPC, which formed a government coalition with the Ibo NCNC, succeeded in adopting courage as criteria and accepting government policy providing for a quota system whereby the Northern area received a quota to reserve 50% of the NDF posts for Northerners and the Eastern and Western areas each 25%. With the establishment of the Mid-Western area in 1962, they received 4% deducted from that of the Western area. This quota system (backed by Britain) gave the Northern militia an unfair advantage to the other (See Oyediran 1979:23-24 and Hatch 1971:236). The quota system institutionalised the ethnic and regional factor in the micro environment which further weakened a national identification element and the development of a corporate self interest among the military.

Politicisation of military issues caused a strengthening of regionalism among the military, causing some soldiers to support disgruntled regional political groupings. This was illustrated during the 1964 elections, when a few Lt-Cols. under leadership of Ojukwu (an Ibo) promised Pres. Azikiwe (an Ibo) their support, if he would declare a state of emergency and absconded the election. Their idea was to promote Ibo dominance in the micro - and macro environment and to halt Northern dominance of the military. In the Western Yoruba area, Akintola (a discredited political leader) used the stationed battalion to keep him in power. Part of this military was opposed to Akintola and began to support his

opposition, the UPGA (United Peoples Grand Alliance) who later joined the government coalition. Other soldiers began to build up a collective resentment against the manoeuvres of the politicians who abuse their political positions to gain access to the community chest. They also suspected the top officers in the military of this manoeuvring (See Hatch 1971:230-231,237, Niven 1967:100-101,113 and Oyediran 1979:18).

In short, colonialism, military involvement in internal politics, an unprofessional military service (due to nigerianisation) and the continuing politicisation of military issues (i.e. quota system and courage-as-recruitment debate) created the chance for the military to develop a challenger personality. This personality was spurred by the fact that major military groups shared a common ethnic and political background. Therefore, the military was abused by the different ethnic groups to obtain or sustain a dominant political position.

b. Role: Challenger

The involvement of the military in Nigerian domestic politics and their utilisation as political power multiplier by the different ethnic political groups, created various challenger personalities in the military. This can be seen in the different challenger roles that surfaced in the military during this phase. Some military members became aware of the fact that the military was the only viable alternative to the political organisations present in the macro environment. In realising that, they opposed the macro environment and developed a challenger role. This was true for some senior Ibo officers, who adopted a challenger role directed at promoting Ibo military dominance in the political field. The Hausa-Fulani military embraced a challenger role directed at

supporting and expanding their political power in the macro environment, backed by military resources. Some junior officers opposed the macro environment, because they were tired of the corruption and incompetence of politicians, as well as the greed and selfishness of political parties. They were upset with the politicians' acceptance that they will do their dirty work. They began envisioning a transformed Nigeria and believed that this could only happen by destroying the political class by means of an alliance of progressive forces. They saw the military as an alternative to corruption and incompetence (See Cohen 1974:217 and Niven 1967:113).

c. Task: Challenger

As indicated thus far, the military was far from professional, lacked integrity, organisational experience, training and was politicised. This structural weakness was reflected in the different tasks undertaken by the military, reflecting a challenger personality. One group wanted to get rid of corrupt politicians and their military puppets, and as such revealed a challenger personality. Another part wanted to pursue military involvement in support of regional political dominance (i.e. Ujukwe and Akintola) of their own ethnic group. This indicated that the micro environment was ready to undertake tasks to be recruited as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion, as to ensure their political dominance in the macro environment.

d. Values: Challenger

In general, according to Feit (1968:188), the military enjoys specific moral advantages: the moral force associated with self sacrifice, discipline, and courage; freedom from the taint of corruption; and the conception of representing

something over and above the passing regimes<sup>o</sup>. This notion of Feit is not true of Nigerian soldiers, including the group of young soldiers= who wanted to get rid of corruption, as their opposition to military intervention in politics were rooted in ethnic bias. In general, the Nigerian soldier cannot be considered professional, as their attitudes and behaviour patterns do not coincide with that of professionalism. This includes features which emphasised norms of nationalism and national service, as well as a tolerance to all community groups. The reason these values were not absorbed by the military, was the low frequency of study trips abroad, inadequate socialisation, the fact that promotions were not coupled to that of performance and that military efficiency and prestige were absent, as Nigerian soldiers did not utilise modern weapon systems (See Palmer 1989:251-252). Therefore, they embraced regionalism and ethnicity as values, as were commonly encountered among the African military at the beginning of decolonisation.

#### 3.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

This environment constitutes the social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be contemplated, in order to evaluate this environment=s contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

The macro environment lacked national political leadership<sup>4</sup>. The reason for this can be found in the history of the colonisation of Nigeria, where three different nations: the Yoruba, Ibo and Hausa-Fulani, were jostled into one state run by a colonial system<sup>5</sup>. These groups were at different stages of development (modernised South versus authoritarian North) and had mounting tension between them. They would have developed into different nation states had colonisation not taken place (See Hatch 1971:197, Legum 1966:19 and Smythe 1958:216)<sup>6</sup>. Each of these groups had its own charismatic political leader: Azikiwe (Ibo, East), Awolowo (Yoruba, West) and Alhaji Ahmadu, the Sardauna of Sokoto (Hausa-Fulani, North) (See Muffet 1968:140 and Smythe 1958:217). In a united Nigeria, no national leader came forward from the civil service<sup>7</sup>, intellectuals, educational world, female

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4. Smythe (1958:215-227) analyses the lack of coherent national leadership in Nigeria, in detail.

5. Feit (1968:180-182) suggested that the traditional African system joined the colonial system and by doing so not only preserved tribal authority, but legitimise both native authority and colonial rule. The outcome was a political system that was a combination of administrative and traditional rule (called the Aindirect rule®).

6. In 1900 the Northern and Southern states of Nigeria were declared as protectorates and Lagos as a colony. In 1906 Lagos and the Southern state united. In 1914 the three territories combined to form Nigeria under the indirect rule of Britain (Van Rensburg 1981:262 and Oyediran 1979:4).

7. Muffet (1968:138-140) claims that the civil services= role as an elite force in Nigeria is overrated and that its influence had declined by the time of the first coup d'état, as the civil service formed ethnic ethnic centres which contributed to interregional stress. This notion is supported by Feit (1968:185-186) who indicated that the civil service formed part of the corruption network partaking in nepotism, bribery etc. They frustrated the ethnic based politicians and this led to continuous **(footnote 7 continues from p.46)** tension between them and a downscale of the civil servants= political influence.

organisations, military, businessmen and the labour field to fulfill national aspirations and to challenge these three regional political leaders (See Smythe 1958:223-225)<sup>8</sup>. It was clear that one of the three would dominate the macro environment and subsequently strengthen the regionality of politics to weaken the macro environment. As the Sardauna had Britain's support due to the colonial system, he was in a better position to shape the macro environment.

The Yoruba had an advantage to the other groups in terms of organisation and wealth; due to their established state system and sound commercial position as well as an early association with Britain. Immigrants from Sierra Leone brought a European education to the Yoruba, teaching them techniques to consolidate their early economic lead and helping them in concentrating on self protection (Hatch 1971:200 and Legum 1966:19). Their constant wars with the Northern Muslim left them with an attitude of hostility towards the North (Legum 1966:19). The Hausa-Fulani in the most populous Northern area was no homogeneous group, differing from Kano to Katsina and Sokoto. Due to their Muslim Emirs, they formed holistically a traditional group supporting Islam. From early times they had been trying to impose their Muslim rule on the Southern part of Nigeria (both the Ibo and Yoruba parts). Since the creation of Nigeria, they were dependant on the Ibo and others for developing trade skills in their community (See Hatch 1971:200, Niven 1967:14,17 and Legum 1966:19). The Ibo had no centralised system of government and were utterly individualistic. They became migrate workers without sharing

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8. Smythe (1958:223-225) also included traditional chiefs to this list. According to Muffet (1968:129-133) the Native Authorities, which is represented by the traditional chiefs, must collectively be seen as a community leadership of first importance, and even a major factor in the collapse of the Ironsi regime. According to the author this group is represented by the Sardauna.



their knowledge and skills with the communities where they stayed. As such they formed separate elements in the community with little cultural contact and were generally considered to be imposters (Hatch 1971:198,200). The Ibo realised that education would prove to be their salvation and eagerly began to educate themselves. This educational process brought them nearer to each other as a group (but not as a Nigerian nation). This and the fact that they used a traditional expanded family structure for economic and social protection, created some community cohesion (See Hatch 1971:200 and Legum 1966:19). From the aforementioned it is evident that the macro environment was ethnic driven and as such revealed a challenger personality.

This ethnic alignment of Nigeria along with uneven economic growth in the different regions (especially in the poor Northern region) created deepening socio-economic inconsistencies. This would throughout the history of Nigeria highlight the differences between the ethnic groups, to keep ethnicity and regionalism alive. In the 1960's the economic policy of Nigeria led to a moderate but speedy industrialisation as well as an abyss between rural and urban regions and an even more uneven distribution of wealth. It created regional inequality forcing the Ibo in the East to migrate for economic survival and left the Yoruba in the West with most of the socio-economic fruits (See Iwayemi 1979:52, Smythe 1958:216 and Hatch 1971:198,200,224). This created tension between the Ibo and the Yoruba. The struggle for economic means changed regionalism into ethnicity and all of it into politics. This deepened the challenger personalities of the three groups.

A lack of nationalism spurred the establishment of political parties based on regionalism and ethnicity, unlike in the rest

of Africa (See Okpaku 1974:272, Oyediran 1979:6 and Hatch 1971:201,204-205). The first politicians were mostly notables, traditional leaders or their relatives. Their political activities were marginal, as they represented themselves and the conservative and traditional components of the macro environment. Thus, not posing a threat to Britain and therefore favoured by Britain in the political terrain (Feit 1968:182-183). It was up to the regional leaders, Azikiwe and Awolowo, to try and improve nationalism from a party (region) political perspective. Azikiwe even succeeded in creating a reputation as national leader, but it did not last long, as these new political entrepreneurs were supported by political machines (or personal ethnic machines) and not mass parties<sup>o</sup> (See Hatch 1971:205 and Smythe 1958:215). According to Feit (1968:184) a political machine differs from a political party, in that it exists solely to stay in power. It gave rewards and bribes to all that would contribute to its existence. This gave way for the latter development of the Nigerian system of political economy. Therefore regionalism dominated the political scene and was deepened because of conflict created by the accumulation of wealth. By 1963 these political machines set their aim at national domination, in order to broaden their corruption scope and in doing so endangered the federation. The Action Group (AG) and NCNC amalgamated into a Southern Ibo front and aroused Northern suspicions of a possible Ibo attempt to test Northern political dominance (Feit 1968:186-187). It hampered cooperation on national level and also robbed the macro environment of a solid leadership. These actions further fuelled the development of opposing challenger personalities.

Nationalism was further obstructed by the constitutional history of Nigeria, shaped by the colonial system. The Westminster style of democracy and constitutions did not

provide for the development of political parties and parliamentary opposition, and gave most of the power to the central government. It divided Nigeria according to Britain's 'divide-and-rule' strategy in three nations along political, administrative and economic lines (See Oyediran 1979:3-6, Hatch 1971:206, Niven 1967:90-91,94 and Van Rensburg 1981:263,265). Apart from the federal civil service and foreign service<sup>9</sup> the army seemed like the only national institution (Oyediran 1979:6). During the bargaining process for the MacPherson constitution, the North demanded 50% representation in the Central Legislative Assembly. They received it with the support of Britain (See Oyediran 1979:7 Hatch 1971:216 and Niven 1967:92). This shifted the tension between the Ibo and Yoruba to tension between the Ibo and the Hausa-Fulani. The ethnic tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani became politicised with calls from the Ibo and other minority groups for the creation of new states in order to balance the North's political power (See Oyediran 1979:10-12 and Hatch 1971:219-220). This gave way for numerous leaders to step forward and obstruct national leadership<sup>10</sup>.

Elections in Nigeria showed that parties were ethnic driven and determined to dominate their own region to the expense of cooperation at federal government level (See Van Rensburg 1981:263 and Hatch 1971:215-216). Mobilisation for elections took the shape of fierce wars because of politicians fighting

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9. Apart from the federal civil servants, the biggest part of the civil service operated on regional level leaving it impossible to embrace nationalism. The top civil servants were soon co-opted by corrupt regional politicians. Due to regionalism it could not present a balance to the military even though it shared bureaucracy similarities with the military (See Olugbemi 1970:97-98 and Asiodu 1979:75-78).

10. Smythe (1958:216) indicated that these leaders enjoyed no following, but: 'stands as another obstacle to be overcome in the drive for unification'.

to gain an opportunity to drink from the state's money well. These mobilisations ended in brutalities and caused the population to speak of 'Demo-crazy'. The population became cynical about Democracy and tired of politicians' abuse of power and squandering of huge sums of money on elections. The political class and Democracy became discredited. The election crises of December 1964 and October 1965<sup>11</sup>, the census dispute<sup>12</sup> and general strike of 1964<sup>13</sup> further eroded the legitimacy of the civilian government in the eyes of the macro environment. Minorities felt excluded from the power politics played by the majority and began to rebel against neglect of the regional governments<sup>14</sup>. The conflict between political parties<sup>15</sup> intensified ethnic conflict, deepened social tension, caused election manipulation, led to an increase in criminality and disillusioned the intelligentsia. It also increased trust in the state's oppression machinery in maintaining stability (See Ostheimer 1973:58-59, Oyediran

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11. See par. 3.1.1.3.2

12. Representation in the parlement were based on population numbers. As parties represented regions and ethnic groups, regions resorted to rigging census results. This happened in 1962 and 1963 resulting in unrest and tension between the Ibo (NCNC) and Hausa-Fulani (NPC) (See Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:16-17, Niven 1967:100 and Hatch 1971:229).

13. With encouragement of the Labour Party in Britain plenty of trade unions were formed from the cultural organisations. Regionalism and ethnicity barred them from uniting to oppose the government as culture protection was transformed into political separatism (Hatch 1971:201-202). See Niven (1967:89) and Hatch (1971:208,227,231) for discussion of general labour actions.

14. In 1964 the Tiv, from the middle belt in the Northern area rebelled whereupon 300 were killed and the Army was ordered to control the area (Hatch 1971:228-231). This rebellion was the result of general believe that the election system favoured the Northern Region.

15. Ostheimer (1973:59) called it 'power deflation', a term used by Chalmers Johnson (*Revolutionary Change*, London: University of London, 1970).

1979:9-10, Van Rensburg 1981:265, Hatch 1971:216,221,227, Kirk-Greene 1971a:9, Cohen 1974:216-217 and Niven 1967:93). Furthermore, it conditioned the population in accepting the use of state machinery by an ethnic group in order to enforce their political will. Democracy, or any other form of government, did not have the opportunity to develop in a political culture for Nigeria (Okpaku 1974:272). As Feit (1968:187) correctly noted, with the collapse of the central administrative grid that created an artificial unity, the Nigerian state was coming apart.

b. Role: Challenger

The Hausa-Fulani (supported by Britain) formed the strongest homogeneous power structure based on ethnic alliance. The Ibo and Yoruba also developed a challenger personality as this ethnic system fostered the development of challenger personalities in the absence of nationalism (See Muffet 1968:125-127). The effect of colonialism left the remainder of the macro environment with a non-challenger role on national level, due to the fact that Nigeria had no national structures other than the defence force and no national political role for small groups to play<sup>16</sup>. The three dominant groups had a regional role to play, namely to promote their own different and sometimes opposing interests<sup>17</sup>. This was extended to socio-economic matters, such as the development of a system of political economy. Regionalism caused the macro

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16. This agrees to Muffets= (1968:127) argument on an Available mass®, an expression borrowed from Kornhauser (*The Politics of Mass Society*, London, Routledge & Kegan, 1972).

17. This supports Muffets= (1968:127) theory that in an ethnic system the acceptance of government policies or modernisation are coupled to a leadership supported by the group(s) at which policies are aimed. This also illustrated why the Nzeogwu-Coup d'état would not have succeeded.

environment to involve the military in politics which lead to the abuse of the military to ensure political dominance of one ethnic group over another. The stage was set for a final confrontation for political domination.

c. Task: Challenger

The macro environment embraced tasks set at promoting regional interests. It negatively influenced the macro environment in that the resultant quota system, ban on creation of new states, census rigging, and courting of the global environment (especially Britain) alienated some groups in the macro environment, contributed to a negative perception of politicians, a distrust in Democracy and a lack of nationalism. This caused smaller groups to feel powerless.

d. Values: Challenger

The problem of unity and stability in Nigeria are correctly seen by Mahammadu and Haruna (in Oyediran 1979:25) as a lack of deeply rooted national shared values. In a community where there is a lack of deeply rooted central values that transcends ethnic boundaries, disputes are settled along ethnic lines and so the struggle for the political loot took an ethnical character. No effort was made by the Nigerian political elite to establish nationally shared values that could act as nucleus from where national unity could be built around. Due to this, the macro environment turned to values of own interest and ethnicity, usually expressed in corruption and greed with no consideration for honesty and accountability. The community came to accept these values and those who resisted, were conformed by use of the state apparatus (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:25-26). These values spread to the community as a whole and established ethnical

nepotism (Hatch 1971:234). In such circumstances Democracy has no chance to be institutionalised. This cancer was not even tempered by the Christian and Muslim religion. Although the Muslim religion (which accounted for 45% of the population) cannot be negated in the internal politics of Nigeria, they were more loyal to their ethnic group or family group than to the religion itself (Van Rensburg 1981:260-261).

#### 3.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

This environment represents the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined, in order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

##### a. Personality: Challenger

Since independence Nigeria, the showcase of Africa Democracy, courted the West- especially Britain. Although a member of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), it distanced itself from Communism and refused the Eastern Bloc's foreign assistance<sup>18</sup>. The leaders distanced themselves from radical African leaders, such as Nkhrumah and Sèkou Touré, and ignored the Apartheid problem in Southern Africa. In general they did not pursue an Africa focused foreign policy. The reason for this attitude was based on a dependance on the West for an export market and foreign assistance (See Olonisakin 1998a:2 and Ogunbadejo 1980:748). Britain adopted a challenger personality in the

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18. See Aluko,O (1981), Idang (1974) and Akinyemi (1978) for a detailed analysis of Nigerian foreign policy.

rush to get rid of her colonies and in protecting her interests. This rush started in response to the United States of America (USA) and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) dismay of colonialism and to court the USA in obtaining postwar financial support. It bequeathed Nigeria with no political structures, other than the existing administrative-traditional system, but left her with a strong developed army used to intimidate other colonial masters with (Okpaku 1974:241 and Feit 1968:183-184). Britain kept a concerned eye on her own interests as well as that of her conservative feudal allies from the Northern area and even promoted this areas interests to the disadvantage of the other areas (See Okpaku 1974:275, Oyediran 1979:5-7, Niven 1967:94 and Van Rensburg 1981:263). In Nigeria's demand for independence Britain scrutinised the situation to make sure that the majority of parties were not out to change Nigeria's economic dependance and orientation. They also made sure that the NPC's fear for political domination by the Southern schooled Ibos did not realise by enforcing a 50% representation for the Northern area in the Federal Legislative Assembly. The Ibo and minority ethnic groups demand for the creation of new states to counter this Northern political dominance were countered by threats to stall Nigerian independence (See Oyediran 1979:10-12, Kirk-Greene 1971a:11 and Hatch 1971:219-220)<sup>19</sup>. The Southerners hoped that the 1963 census would favour them to that of the Northern region. When Britain rejected the claims of the other regions that their population grew and those of the North remained constant, unrest broke loose. Balewa, the Hausa-Fulani prime minister, announced a new census for 1963. During this election the other regions

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19. Only by using a political crisis in 1963 in the Western area, the minority groups succeeded in creating the Midwestern region. This transformed the minority problem in an election issue which deepened ethnic strife.



results were acknowledged, but the Northern region's population grew 67%. This British interference and challenger personality fuelled tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani (See Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:16-17, Niven 1967:100 and Hatch 1971:229).

b. Role: Challenger

Britain had a challenger role regarding the protection of own interests and in promoting that of her allies in the Northern region. This of course fuelled the development of challenger personalities in the micro and macro environment and set the stage for the future recruitment confrontation as alternative political leaders.

c. Task: Challenger

Britain undertook tasks to safeguard her own interests and that of the Northern region, i.e. mediating that the North receives 50% of representation in the Central Legislative Assembly. This disturbed the other major ethnic groups and promoted the development of challenger personalities.

d. Values: Challenger

Britain supported Eurocentric Western values, like expressed in the Westminster state system, and enforced these values on Nigeria as to promote her own interest. With the dawn of the colonial era, it was considered improper for ex-colonial masters to openly meddle in the domestic affairs of erstwhile colonies. This was mainly voiced by the USA, and easily enforced as post-war aid depended on good relations with the USA. This change in affairs discouraged direct British

intervention, but the influence exerted by Britain still encouraged the development of challenger personalities.

#### 3.1.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to evaluate the contribution of organisation (in terms of the development of a challenger personality) to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

##### 3.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Okpaku (1974:241) justly observes that: Awhen the machinery of the state falls apart due to factionalism or failure to institute reforms, the army emerges as one of the country=s distinct and united castes@ (Also see Feit 1968:187). By virtue of its military arsenal, the military always constitutes a potential challenger personality, but is always a challenge to a weakened macro environment (as the Nigerian state clearly was at this stage). Niven (1967:111) argues justly that a military government was inevitable, because no other group were sufficiently organised to overthrow the government. The military had according to Feit (1968:188) everything structured for centralised control and co-ordination. In Nigeria the military lacked support of all of its members, due to regionalism, but the main role players in the military (at that stage the Northerners) gave their separate support to the different macro environment ethnic political representatives. This implies a supportive organisation. As the Northerners were in command of most of the military arsenal, as well as dominated the political arena, their supportive organisation posed the biggest threat to the macro environment.

3.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment had in toto a non-supportive organisation, due to the prevalence of regionalism which hampered nationalism. Political leaders only bargained for the support of the group which interests it guarded and in the process alienated other groups in the community. This caused a further fragmentation of the Nigerian community, which not only contributed to tension between the different groups, but seriously jeopardised any attempts to reach nationalism.

3.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

This environment-s organisation can be defined as uninvolved, due to the Cold War situation. Although Britain supported the traditional Northern leaders, the Cold War situation and the anticolonialism stance of the USA opted Britain to retreat from direct interference in Nigerian domestic situations, in fear of being isolated in the global environment.

3.1.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to establish how the setting contributes in terms of the development of a challenger personality to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

3.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The setting for a military takeover was ideal, because the military were politicised and formed the only alternative to the government (as only national organisation). This was due

to the resources they had to their disposal; namely a superior organisation, emotionalised symbolical status and a weapon monopoly (Finer 1962:5). They could easily mobilise support for a recruitment attempt in the micro and macro environment, as military survival was coupled to political survival. This pertains mainly to the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani military, as they emerged as the dominant challenger personalities.

3.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

During the federal elections all social powers and institutions became politicised. The result was a deepening of regionalism which created a setting of discontent within the macro environment. The president had to indicate a prime minister from the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). Azikiwe refused and threatened to resign while Balewa refused the president's advice to declare the election void. Four days of total confusion and no government followed. A negotiated settlement drafted by Sir Ademola (chief justice of the federation) and Sir Mbanefo (chief justice of the Eastern region) was accepted to establish a broad based national government after new elections were held in boycotted regions, grievances were taken to court and a commission was appointed to review the constitution. In March 1965 the re-election took place, with the AG once again losing most in the negotiations, by not being included in the broad national government (Hatch 1971:231).

After this election the Western region collapsed in anarchy and chaos, because the elections were fought for economic and political benefits. The United Peoples Grand Alliance (UPGA) saw the election as a chance to add the Western region to the Eastern and Midwestern regions already under their control. That would have ensured them a majority in the senate as well

as stronger bargaining power against the NPC and possible control over the federal parliament (Hatch 1971:232). The Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)<sup>20</sup> realised this and manipulated the process to their own advantage. The election ended in violence and the two parties both claimed to be the winners (Hatch 1971:233 and Oyediran 1979:19). The leader of the AG, Adegbenro, was jailed for suspected plotting against the government. This presented Akintola (the former political leader of the NNDP) with the opportunity to establish a new government in this region. This act caused an open rebellion against government power and authority wherein about 2 000 people lost their lives. Balewa, Bello (the political leader from the Northern region) and Akintola conspired to stop an AG-NCNC alliance to capture the Western region. There were even rumours of arresting pro-UPGA leaders in this area, dismantling army elements suspected of supporting the UPGA and forcing Gen. Ironsi to take leave. Nigeria began to hope for a coup d'état, but did not expect it to happen in a federal system (Van Rensburg 1981:264, Oyediran 1979:10,20-22, Hatch 1971:233 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:33). It was clear that the macro environment was severely weakened and could not unite support to deter a military onslaught on the political power of the macro environment.

#### 3.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment had an untouched setting, as Britain could muster support to promote her own interests (and that of her Northern ally) due to the demarcation of the world in influence spheres. Britain would not intervene in Nigerian affairs directly, as she knew such an action would cause her

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20. Akintola's party, the United Peoples Party (UPP)-formed after his expulsion from the AG, united with a splinter group of the NCNC, to form the NNDP.

to loose USA financial assistance. Britain and the rest of the global environment would pursue this untouched setting, as long as their interests were not endangered.

3.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger <sup>21</sup>	Challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Nonsupportive <sup>22</sup>	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

All three major personalities in the Nigerian micro - and macro environment revealed a challenger personality. The Hausa-Fulani and Ibo military had a supportive organisation, as it was utilised by the macro environment to secure their political domination or to obtain political domination and was supported by their own ethnic groups. The macro environment in toto is characterised by opposing regional factions. This weakened environment resembled a non-supportive organisation.

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21. The Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo formed challenger political actors, but the rest of the population can be described as Available masses@.

22. This fact supports Muffets (1968:125-140) conclusions that the failure to maintain contact with the masses have a detrimental affect on political leadership. In this case it created the opportunity for a coup d'état.

The global environment interfered (though not obviously) in Nigerian affairs, creating the opportunity for the Hausa-Fulani in the macro environment to dominate the political arena (macro environment). This interference spurred the Ibo military and their macro environment group to develop a challenger personality, as the political power balance between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani groups in the macro environment was disturbed. The setting for the micro environment to be recruited as political leaders was ideal, as their leaders had support, a weapon monopoly, a weakened macro environment and an untouched global environment setting to their favour. It was thus between the Ibo or Hausa-Fulani military to opt for recruitment as political leader. This option would only be successful for the group who controlled the weapon monopoly.

### 3.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase represents the 14-15 January 1966 coup d'état of Maj. Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and the 29 July 1966 coup d'état leaving Lt-Col Gowon as political leader. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of military leaders to assume a political role.

#### 3.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase in the recruitment stage will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, present in this phase, that contributes to the success of recruitment behaviour.

3.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of personality, role, task and values in this phase will indicate those factors in the micro -, macro - and global environment which will contribute to the actual successful recruitment of a military leader in an undemocratic fashion as political leader.

3.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are reflected on, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Challenger

As indicated in phase one, the military was factionalised due to structural weaknesses. The Ibo military was the first to show their challenger personality by heading an undemocratic recruitment attempt in January 1966 against the macro environment (NNA government). The aftermath of this undemocratic recruitment attempt left Ironsi as political leader<sup>23</sup>. The situation in the NDF worsened as Ironsi became politically inclined. His military leadership was ineffective, factionalised the military and arouse ethnic conflict. After the May 1966 killings, the Army became involved in a spiral of violence. Ibo officers with troops from other ethnic groups lived in fear for revenge (Cohen 1974:217,219). Later it became clear that the coup d'état of

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23. See *Nigeria*, (In Africa Digest Year, 13(5):117-119, April 1966) for detailed account of the first coup d'état.



Nzeogwu only got rid of dishonest and honest politicians (Hatch 1971:239).

In reaction to their lost political domination, the Northern region got rid of Southern domination on 29 July 1966 in a counter coup d'état. In planning to topple Ironsi, Gowon played no instrumental role. The biggest instigators were the Northern political leaders and traditional rulers, alienated by Ironsi, who according to Ollawa (1976:9) 'came to question and even to challenge the legitimacy of the military in changing the fundamental structures of the political system'<sup>24</sup>. Gowon became new High Commander of the Army and political leader, because he could unite the two opposing factions in the military. He was supported by the Northern region due to his acknowledgment that Nigeria must not become a union. He was accepted by the Southern region because he was a Christian from the Anga ethnic group in the Plato region of Northern Nigeria and not a Hausa-Fulani or Muslim (Ostheimer 1973:63 and Africa Report 1973:16). The apolitical military accepted him, because he was a professional soldier who did not head an undemocratic recruitment attempt in order to obtain political power. He joined the Army in 1954, underwent officers training at Teshie (Ghana), Eaton Hall, Sandhurst, Hythe and Warminster in Britain from 1955-1957. He partook in border patrols in Cameroon and served in the UN peace force in the Congo during the early 1960's. After he trained at the staff college in Camberly, he was promoted to the rank of Lt- Col (Uwechue 1996a:241 and Hatch 1971:240). He was known in the military for his leadership qualities such as initiative, insight and persuasiveness. As an intellectual he acted reasonably. Other qualities included: his youth and energy as

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24. This is understandable, as they lament their lost political power.

well as a reformative, honest, humble and shy disposition (Hatch 1971:240).

b. Role: Challenger

The challenger role of the military was evident in performing coups d'état. In both coups d'état the military presented themselves as a balance for ethnical majority domination, stated that they had a correctional role to play and to renew the society on political -, social - and economic level and redeem them from Agangster politicians@(Van Rensburg 1981:264). This correlates with Huntingtons= idea (1962:32-33) of a reform coup d'état. But, as Ollawa (1976:26-27) suggested, it cannot be termed reform coups d'état, as this correctional role was not expressed or supported by the military in general, because social background influenced the ideology and goal orientations of each respective military group. The structural weakness of the micro environment caused military groups to team up against the government, without having a predominant leader to head it. In both coups d'état the new leaders found themselves: Aat the head of a revolution not of [their] own making@ (Schwarz 1968:200). The reason for this was the use of soldiers collectively (as individual military leadership was absent) as a power tool by the macro environment to ensure political dominance of one ethnic group above another. This explains why the first coup d'état looked like an Ibo military effort to reform Nigeria, but ended in efforts to advantage the Ibo by expanding their power to the federal system<sup>25</sup>(See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:27, Okpaku 1974:272 and Ostheimer 1973:61.

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25. Even though historical evidence lacks to support this statement; the killing of traditional Ibo political rivals and ethnic groups other than Ibo=s and the majority Ibo leadership in the coup d'état indicated the Ibo military=s political aspirations.

The structural weakness of the military gave them a lack in ability to build supporting coalitions. This posed a problem as the partisanship that characterised both coups d'état alienated some segments of the micro and macro environment. It had an effect on later attempts to legitimise their role and to broaden their support base (See Ollawa 1976:23-28).

c. Task: Challenger

In both coups d'état the military indicated that they wanted far reaching changes in the structure and attitude of the Nigerian community (Van Rensburg 1981:264). This was hinted by the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani factions, but both were exercised to the detriment of other ethnical groups. The vision of regional power made them to mobilise against the macro environment in order to achieve political power on national level.

d. Values: Challenger

Ostheimer (1973:60) correctly noted that: Awhen officers conclude that civilian rule is contradictory to the country's development, the >disposition to intervene= appears@. This notion is also true for officers who conclude that civilian rule is contradictory to the military's own power position. In both coups d'état the leaders depicted themselves as reformists, but their desire to change the society was coloured with ethnicity and regionalism. This regionalism fostered conflict with the macro environment in both coups d'état.

3.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

In order to determine this environment's contribution to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase, the personality, role, task and values of this environment is analysed.

a. Personality: Challenger

The political leadership of Ironsi was met with more excitement than were shown for independence (Van Rensburg 1981:265). He immediately received the support of the intelligentsia, students (National Union of Nigerian Students-NUNS), Emirs, Chiefs and Trade Unions. The members of the civil service were overjoyed because they could fill the vacuum left after the dismissal of the ministers<sup>26</sup>. The NPC, NNDP, AG and NCNC sent messages of support to him (See Niven 1967:116 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:38-39,44). Even though he was an Ibo, the macro environment did not suspect him of partaking in plans to bring about Ibo political dominance. This was due to their perception of the NDF as a national institution and Ironsi's brave efforts to halt the coup d'état of Nzeogwu (Ostheimer 1973:61). For a while Nigeria united as a nation because Ironsi met their expectations. He appointed commissions of inquiry to analyse the previous constitution (that favoured the North) in order to find reasons for the lack of national unity, a weakened central government and the appearance of regionalism. A military government, federalism,

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26. Together with the local military, the civil service formed part of the regional cabinets in the place of executive councils (Niven 1967:116 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:38-39,44). Their previous prestige and power was thus restored, and they could once again exercise regional influence (Muffet 1968:140). This contributed to Ironsi's downfall as they were alienated in his quest to centralise the country (See Feit 1968:188-189).

one party and multiparty election systems, as well as party politics would have been investigated to find reasons for the prevalence of ethnicity, nepotism, and power abuse in order to avoid it in future (Okpaku 1974:184-185 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:43).

When Ironsi came to repeat the same mistakes as the politicians, he lost credibility and support. He made no effort to gain support from the macro environment, but sought for support amongst the Ibo in the civil service and militia<sup>27</sup>. His government became a desperate improvisation and he a child of circumstance (Cohen 1974:218). Rumours began to surface, accusing Ironsi and Nzeogwu for partaking in an Ibo conspiracy to topple the federation. This rumour fuelled the Northern population to an uprising, led by the NPC leadership and civil servants that could lose their jobs due to Ironsi's reforms (Cohen 1974:218 and Feit 1968:191). It became clear that the civil service, the traditional authorities and the mass of people developed a feeling of alienation and a challenger personality in response to Ibo domination (Muffet 1968:140 and Feit 1968:190). This anger was soon directed against the Ibos. This opened the door for Gowon to step in as new leader, as the macro environment knew that Ironsi could only be toppled by utilising military power.

b. Role: Challenger

In the beginning Ironsi (now leader of the macro environment) fought for nationalism and an apolitical military, as well as

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27. Ironsi did not wait for the results of one of his Commissions of Inquiry, but adopted measures to favour Ibo interests. This was shown in adopting Decree 34, that gave an unfair advantage for the appointment of Ibos in the civil service (Cohen 1974:218 and Feit 1968:190).

condemned corruption, nepotism, bribery and tribalism. His political position led him to assume a role to advance Ibo political interest. In this he enraged the macro environment, especially the Hausa-Fulani. The macro environment began to believe that his government was an Ibo effort to establish political dominance on national level. Further coups d'état were expected, but it was unsure from which region (North or South) it would come, as the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba in the macro environment both reflected challenger personalities (See Hatch 1971:239 and Feit 1968:189-190).

c. Task: Challenger

Due to a lack of macro environment leadership and the nearing rebel forces, the macro environment handed their political tasks to Ironsi on a silver plate. After Nzeogwu surrendered, Ironsi made national tasks his concern<sup>28</sup>: building a nation, trying to improve the economy, fighting to diminish corruption and dishonesty in the public sector, promising to call for referendums on all important matters, promising to keep ethnicity out of the government and announcing to hand back the government to civilians in three years time (See Hatch 1971:238, Niven 1967:118-120 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:42,47,51-52). After he became politicised, he made grave political mistakes. Cohen (1974:217) reasoned that Ironsi made political mistakes in trying to cover up his real intentions of Ibo dominance. The reason for this cover up was a fear for a counter coup d'état. In the eyes of the Hausa-Fulani

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28. He had no political or economic policy to implement, because he became the political leader by accident (Ofoegbu in Oyediran 1970:124). As soldier he also had difficulty in handling political problems. Both this facts accounts for his haphazardous way of governing.

military, Ironsi became part of the political struggle for Ibo rule.

He underplayed the existing regional/ethnic borders by trying to change Nigeria into a unitarian state. In an ethnic divided state like Nigeria, it was political suicide because fears of the Northern region for Ibo dominance could spark off a civil war (which happened later). This fear was fuelled by his insensitivity towards ethnic sentiments. He appointed an Ibo, Dr. Francis Nwokedi, in a one man commission to investigate the unification of the civil service<sup>29</sup>. He appointed, against the will of the Superior Military Council (SMC), 21 officers to the rank of Lt-Col, of which 18 were Ibos. He ignored pleas from the Northern region to execute the leaders of the January 1966 coup d'état and by doing so he strengthened the believe that he was a co-plotter to this coup d'état. The tension broke into violence when he announced Decree 34, Act 24 of 1966: the new unitary constitution, before any commission could hand in their reports on the matter (See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:28, Niven 1967:121, Kirk-Greene 1971a:48 and Hatch 1971:239).

In reaction to this, the Northern region demanded a referendum, or secession from Nigeria. Unrest broke loose and many Ibos died in ethnic violence. This indicates the prevalence of challenger personalities. This crisis once gave the Hausa-Fulani military the opportunity to step in, overthrow the Ibo dominated government and to install Hausa-Fulani dominance.

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29. The existing regional civil services were regarded by the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba as a front against Ibo domination.

d. Values: Challenger

The macro environment was dominated by ethnic and regional values. These values promoted a constant challenger personality and subsequently rivalry. This rivalry culminated during the second coup d'état, dividing Nigeria into two regionally opposing camps: the Northern Region and Eastern Region (where no coup d'état took place) (Schwarz 1968:209).

3.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied as to evaluate the factors present in this environment which contribute to the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The non-challenger personality of former colonial powers had a decisive role in the success of performing coups d'état<sup>30</sup>. The military was cognisant of the fact that France, Britain and Belgium would only react if they were invited by a strong civilian regime that was popular enough to resist the first onslaughts of an undemocratic recruitment attempt or revolution. The events of 1964 in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda were evident thereof. Events in Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Togo, Central African Republic, Zanzibar and

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30. Articles, such as that of Louchheim, D.H, *The Military's Economic Legacy*, (In Africa Report 11(3):18, March 1966), indicates the West's acceptance of military rule. In this specific article the military's economic legacy is praised for ridding the Nigerian economy of politics and regionalism. Even Brown-Peterside, G, *Nigeria in Perspective: Why Balewa Died*, (In Africa Report 11(3):17, March 1966) suggested that the military takeover came just in time, for the country Required stern measures.



Dahomey taught the military that coups d'état which were populist and/or unforeseen and irreversible, raised no eyebrows in Europe (Ostheimer 1973:60). The second undemocratic recruitment attempt was easier, because the Northern region had the support of Britain. After the coup d'état of January 1966, the foreign policy of the military remained what it had been since independence: pro-West with no involvement in African affairs (Ogunbadejo 1980:751).

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger role, because (as stated previously) it did not want to become involved in internal conflicts. The second coup d'état raised no concern, because it was led by the traditional allies of Britain.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment still had a non-challenger role as it took no challenger tasks upon them.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The values of the global environment did not challenge the micro environment in performing the two coups d'état, as coups d'état were hailed as a stabilising action.

3.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment is going to be examined, in order to evaluate the contribution of this variable to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

3.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Nzeogwu with the support of five Ibo-s (Majs. Onwuategu, Ifeajuna, Okafor, Chukukwa and Capt. Nwobosi) and a Yoruba (Maj. Ademoyega) instigated the first coup d'état on 14 January 1966<sup>31</sup>. In the aftermath of the coup d'état, Sir Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto and premier of the Northern region), Brig. Ademulegun (Akintola-s military ally), Sir Tafawa Balewa (the prime minister) and Akintola lost their lives. Ironsi escaped from an assassination attempt. Due to Ironsi-s and the remaining military-s efforts, the coup d'état was unsuccessful (See Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:27, Van Rensburg 1981:264, Ostheimer 1973:61, Hatch 1971:237 and Niven 1967:113-115). This undemocratic recruitment attempt was supported by the Ibo military, but because they didn't have absolute control over the military resources, the attempt was vigorously opposed from the Northerner military. Their aim however was reached, as Ironsi became the new political leader.

On 29 July 1966 the second coup d'état took place in reaction to Ironsi-s political mistakes. Ironsi, who toured Nigeria in an attempt to gain support from the alienating macro environment, was killed in Ibadan by Cols. from the Northern region, but his death only became known in January 1967. The Northern rebels demanded that the unification decree (Decree 34) be revoked or that the Northern region was allowed to secede, and demanded a return to the status quo before 15 January 1966. The military second in command, Brig-Gen. Ogundipe (a Yoruba) was left with the task to negotiate with the rebels and to suppress the coup d'état. He was unsure of support from the Northern military and asked Lt-Col Yakubu

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31. This coup d'état came a day after the Africa Summit in Lagos on the Rhodesian crisis and the Akintola-Bello-Balewa negotiations on the political crisis in the Western region.

Gowon (as a Northerner) on 31 July to negotiate with them (See Ostheimer 1973:63, Cohen 1974:219, Kirk-Greene 1971a:53-54 and Hatch 1971:239-240). After two days of complete chaos, Aa day of complete vacuum, with no one willing to take the lead@, Gowon was appointed on 1 August 1966 not only

as head of Army, but also as the new political leader of Nigeria (Schwarz 1968:209).

#### 3.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment faced some crises during the first undemocratic recruitment attempt. They could not appoint a vice prime minister to take command of the loyal troops of Ironsi because Pres. Azikiwe was in London and his substitute in Lagos, they did not know if Balewa was still alive, were not sure weather they could appoint a prime minister without Azikiwe and did not know who to appoint. This lack of leadership and power caused Ironsi to ask for control over the government to halt the nearing rebels. On 16 January, Ironsi was appointed as head of the federal government indicating that it would only be temporary. Maj. Nzeogwu surrendered immediately. This was a dream undemocratic recruitment attempt for Ironsi (See Ostheimer 1973:61, Okpaku 1974:271-272, Niven 1967:115-117, Kirk-Greene 1971a:35-38 and Hatch 1971:238).

During Ironsi=s rule ethnic tension between the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani escalated. This tension was volatile in the Northern region where the Ibo formed a rich political elite group dominating the civil service, commercial and industrial life. They were out to destroy all feudal structures in the North and resented the Alazy, backwards and feudal@ population (Van Rensburg 1981:265). The Northern region became determined to

take revenge on the Ibo for the massacres of the first coup d'état (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:28). In May, killings against the Ibo began. This increased after July so that by September almost 30 000 Ibo-s were killed in the Northern region and 600 000 had to flee to the Eastern area. The army partook in these killings (See Okpaku 1974:273, Niven 1967:123 and Hatch 1971:241). The killing of Ibo-s caused Lt-Col Ojukwu (the Ibo governor of the Eastern region) to deport all other ethnic groups from the Northern and Western region living in his area. This resulted in more attacks (Van Rensburg 1981:266).

#### 3.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

Organisations in the global environment did not oppose the coups d'état nor supported it. The press in Africa hailed the first undemocratic recruitment attempt, believing it would bring prosperity to Nigeria. This was due to their perception that a coup d'état is a viable African political solution (Kirk-Greene 1971a:39). The second coup d'état only became known to Britain after the rebels hijacked a British plane on its way to London to take family members of the Northern soldiers to Kano (Schwarz 1968:209).

#### 3.2.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is analysed, in order to establish how this factor contributes to the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

3.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

From the previous it is clear that the following factors led to an ideal situation that contributed to the downfall of the civilian - and Ironsi government:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of political/military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

3.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors were contributive to a situation that led to the downfall of the civilian - and Ironsi government:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

3.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The demonstration effect had an impact on the execution of the two coups d'état. Events in Dahomey, Central African Republic, Upper-Volta and Ghana held valuable lessons for the military which they could implement in successfully executing an undemocratic recruitment attempt, without fear for global interference (Ostheimer 1973:60). This indicated the untouched character of the global setting.

3.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment performed coups d'état, because they had the support of the micro - and macro environment. The micro environment was invited by the macro environment to take the political leadership role. When the new military leaders (seen as macro leaders) made the same mistakes as the previous civilian leaders, the macro environment challenged the micro environment once again. They could not get support or present a national alternative political leader, as the macro environment was weakened by regionalism and ethnicity. This meant they could not mobilise against the micro environment. The transition from military leader to political leader was eased by the uninvolvedness of the global environment.

3.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

After forming the new government, Gowon would stay in power as long as he had the power to establish his regime and were allowed to do so by the political elite (especially the military who hold the arms monopoly). In this phase, Gowon is addressed as part of the macro environment, and not as part of

the micro environment, as he was recruited to the macro environment and therefore challenged from within the micro environment for political dominance.

### 3.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be reflected on, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, encountered in this phase, that contributes to the success of establishing a military leader as political leader and ensures the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

#### 3.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of personality, role, task and values in this phase will indicate those factors in the micro -, macro - and global environment which contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

##### 3.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are contemplated, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

##### a. Personality: Challenger

The military was characterised by a challenger personality which culminated in two coups d'état directed at obtaining

political domination in the macro environment. This challenger personality was softened by the death of many officers in the course of the two coups d'état, which placed pressure on the remaining officers to handle the huge administration of Nigeria. This kept them busy enough not to be tempted by staging another coup d'état. This gave Gowon time to muster support to institutionalise his regime. Another softening action was the co-opting (only nominally) of civilians to supplement the military personnel. With these actions the military received a diarchic character, Gowon broadened his support base and streamlined the government (See Kirk-Greene 1971a:56).

b. Role: Challenger

With a military regime as a certainty for governing Nigeria, Gowon wanted to adopt a transformer role for the NDF. The visioned role of Gowon for the military was reflected in the tasks he adopted to institutionalise his regime.

c. Task: Challenger

The military had the task of governing Nigeria and to establish the military regime of Gowon. The task posed a challenge to the opponents of a military government. The civil war endangered this regime, but it created a chance for the military (and Gowon) to do what they know best (namely war) and at the same time to establish a military regime. The termination of the war brought an unknown feeling of nationalism to Nigeria and a feeling of peaceful reconciliation unknown to any previous civil war. The fierce critiques of federation were silenced. Gowon symbolised the atmosphere of reconciliation (Van Rensburg 1981:266).



d. Values: Challenger

Gowon wanted to establish discipline, nationalism and honesty as values to build a professional military force in the future. He therefore set the example by refusing to live in the State Palace, and choosing a two-storey house in Dodan Military Barracks in Lagos. These values opposed that of his opposition (Africa Report 1973:16 and Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:36-37).

3.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the macro environment are analysed, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Compromiser

Gowon had a reputation as a compassionate and humane leader. He stood aloof from ethnic animosities that divided Nigeria (Africa Report 1973:16-17). As Christian, he might have opted for a peaceful establishment of his regime and not by the use of force. He showed a compromiser personality that dictated the way in which he had to establish his regime and seek support for his efforts.

The challenger personalities in the macro environment (the Ibo and Hausa-Fulani political elites) also influenced him towards developing a compromiser personality, as the micro environment experienced structural weaknesses and a personnel shortage. Therefore, he needed support for the effort to institutionalise his military regime. He immediately found support from the Western and Midwestern regions and after

releasing the captured political leaders (amongst them Awolowo) in the Southern region, they too pledged their support to him. Only the Eastern part refused to do so (Kirk-Greene 1971a:55). Ojukwu considered Gowon to be a puppet of the Northern militia, determined to capture their lost political power. This region gradually began to distance them from Gowon and broke of all ties with Lagos. On 9 August 1966 Ojukwu began to arrange for secession (See Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:29, Van Rensburg 1981:266, Okpaku 1974:273 and Hatch 1971:242). This challenger personality of the macro environment had to be considered in establishing the new regime.

b. Role: Compromiser

Gowon had the immediate role to establish his regime; to attend to the problem of nation building and to restore professionalism and morale to the Army (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Okpaku 1974:273 Hatch 1971:242 and Africa Report 1973:16). In order to do so, he announced on 4 August 1966 that Decree 34 was going to be revoked, advice committees on national matters are going to be established and that there was going to be a return to civilian government (Kirk-Greene 1971a:56).

Despite the Ojukwu group, the broader macro environment available masses had no political role to play. They accepted Gowon's leadership, as the military was the most institutionalised and organised to govern. In this they contributed to the establishment of Gowon's regime. The challenger role of the Ojukwu group had to be reckoned with in institutionalising the Gowon regime. This shaped Gowon's compromiser personality.

c. Task: Compromiser

Gowon's primary task was to safeguard his own regime and to challenge the dissident micro environment that supported Ojukwu. In this attempt he followed a compromiser approach. He announced in his maiden speech that he did not support a union, and thus is going to revoke Decree 34, was going to move back to a federation and was going to appoint a commission headed by civilians to formulate new constitutional provisions. He was also going to establish advice committees on national matters, and was going to hand power to a civilian government in 1976 (See Africa Report 1973:17, Ostheimer 1973:63 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:54-56). On 27 May 1967 Gowon announced the creation of a 12-state structure for Nigeria, instead of four big areas, with military personnel as governors. His plan was to erode the structural base of regional strife in Nigerian politics. In this he gained support from the minority groups from the Eastern region (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Mahamadu and Haruna 1979:30). In order to stop the slaughtering of soldiers, he sent the Eastern officers and troops home and withdrew the Northern troops from the Southern region. He also released Awolowo and other prisoners from the Western region (See Ostheimer 1973:63 and Kirk-Greene 1971a:54-55).

d. Values: Compromiser

The established values of the macro environment, as indicated in phase one and two, eased the recruitment of a military leader as political leader, as the divided macro environment was no opposition for the micro environment. Even so, these values hampered Gowon in institutionalising his regime, as he needed broad national support in order to suppress Ojukwu.

This broad national support required the presence of national values. In Nigeria these values were still absent.

3.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be studied, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger personality and allowed Gowon to establish its regime. In Africa, Gowon and Mobutu Sese Seko maintained close relations as pro-Western allies, and failed to focus on African affairs (Africa Report 1973:16 and Ogunbadejo 1980:751).

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment identified no role to challenge the Gowon regime. They were content not to intervene in household affairs. Britain believed that the colonial system would take care of her affairs (See Feit 1968:185).

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment adopted tasks to safeguard their own interests by selling weapons to Ojukwu and handing them emergency food supplies. Despite this, they did not adopt tasks to challenge Gowon, as they refused diplomatic status to Biafra.

d. Values: Non-challenger

This environment supported Western values, such as democratic government but with the same breath hailed coups d'état as a stabilising influence. This signifies the double standards the West revealed when dealing with African matters.

3.3.1.3. Organisation.

The role of organisation in the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be examined, in order to evaluate this factor's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

3.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Supportive

In January 1967, several top officers from all Nigerian regions attended a meeting in Aburi (Ghana) under the chairmanship of Gen. Ankrah. During this meeting it was decided on a loose federal structure and regional autonomy for Nigeria. Gowon and Ojukwu interpreted the findings differently. Gowon saw it as weaker federation and Ojukwu as a confederation wherein Ibo's could be free to do as they please. Ojukwu declared the Eastern region as an independent republic, The Republic of Biafra. A civil war broke out that lasted 30 months and cost the life of one million people. This action of the Ojukwu military group indicated a supportive organisation and constituted a threat to the institutionalisation of Gowon's regime, as this element of the micro environment had military resources and a challenger personality (See Van Rensburg 1981:266, Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:30, Niven 1967:123-124, Africa Report 1973:17 and Hatch 1971:242).

3.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Supportive

Due to the compromiser personality of Gowon, he gained the support of most of the prominent groups in the macro environment, with the exception of Ojukwu's supporters, in institutionalising his regime.

3.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The war became internationalised<sup>32</sup> but Biafra was not given any diplomatic status by Europe due to pressure from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The USSR tried to use this crisis to alter Nigeria's non-aligned policy. They send trade and technical missions to each region, and promised to help with development programmes. The USA, France and Britain refused to help the federal government, because they did not want to meddle in Nigeria's internal affairs. This forced Gowon to turn to Moscow. This action, and the believe that the federal government would quickly deal with the Biafrans, let Britain to side with the federal government. Although the USSR and Britain became the major partners of the federal government, the USSR's influence passed its peak in 1969. Even though France sided with Biafra, economic relations between France and Lagos prospered during the civil war. The USA left Britain alone to defend their territorial supremacy, but was a major contributor to relief efforts. France, Portugal, China and overseas oil firms also backed Biafra (Ogunbadejo 1980:751-754 and Olonisakin 1998a:3).

Nigeria succeeded in influencing the OAU to accept their territorial integrity and to isolate Biafra diplomatically.

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32. The international community sold weapons to Ojukwu and donated emergency food to the starving population (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:33).

Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and Haiti supported Biafra because it feared a strong Nigeria that could dominate the West-African sub region (Mahammadu and Haruna 1979:35). The OAU's involvement limited the scale of international involvement and helped the federal government to succeed in suppressing Ibo secession (Ogunbadejo 1980:754).

#### 3.3.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment is analysed, in order to establish how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

##### 3.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The effective end of the civil war as well as the national feeling gained by it, created an ideal situation for the military to institutionalise their regime, as they were idolised by the macro environment.

##### 3.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Ideal

The macro environment supported the military for ending the civil war and obtained a sense of nationalism. In this, the ideal situation was created for Gowon to remain in power and to institutionalise his regime<sup>33</sup>.

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33. On 29 July 1975 while Gowon attended a meeting of the OAU in Kampala, Gen. Murtala Muhammed toppled his regime in a coup d'état (Van Rensburg 1981:267).

3.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Ideal

After the civil war ended, the global environment once again became untouched by the situation in Nigeria and Gowon's regime.

3.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Compromiser	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

Due to serious factionalisation of the military (wherein neither the Hausa-Fulani nor the Ibo could gain full control over the military resources), Gowon revealed a compromiser personality. This personality gave him the support of the macro environment to institutionalise his regime. This institutionalisation was threatened by the micro environment, who revealed a challenger personality, as the Ibo military opted for secession. This led to a national war. Due to the role of the military and Gowon, the war gave his regime the necessary legitimisation. His effort was smoothed, as the global environment did not want to dispose of him, as he was pro-West and pro-Britain.



### 3.4. Summary.

In this chapter it was appraised that the Nigerian military presented a challenger personality in the Hausa-Fulani -, Ibo - and a-Political military groups. From these groups only the Hausa-Fulani and Ibo presented a danger to the political leadership in the macro environment, as they were utilised by the politicians to ensure their regional political power. This action of the politicians strongly indicates the lack of national political leadership and support this environment experienced. This marked the beginning of the recruitment of the military in the role of political leaders, as they were involved in politics and thus became politicised. The Ibo were the first to seize the opportunity and succeeded, because the head of the military, Ironsi (who was an Ibo) merely had to ask for the political leadership. As his recruitment was neither undemocratic nor forceful and did not look like an attempt of the Ibo military at obtaining a political position, the weakened macro environment and uninvolved global environment accepted it unconditionally. When Ironsi came to demonstrate favouritism to the Ibo, the Hausa-Fulani military challenger personality opposed his political position. This Hausa-Fulani military had the support of Britain and with their help gained control over the military resources. This resource they turned against the macro environment (that still lacked political leadership) in order to topple Ironsi. The result was an undemocratic recruitment attempt against the Ironsi government, without an individual leader among the Hausa-Fulani military to lead the undemocratic action or to assume the vacated political position. The collective leadership of the Hausa-Fulani military ignited this recruitment attempt, as the Hausa-Fulani controlled the weapon monopoly. After the recruitment attempt was facilitated, a leader was chosen to assume the political role.

This leader, Gowon, was chosen by the Hausa-Fulani military because he conformed to the requirements set by the environment, namely a compromiser personality with a broad-based support. Gowon as the military's choice was important, as he succeeded in institutionalising a military regime because he had the macro environment's support and revealed a compromiser personality that accommodated the Ibo. His regime further gained legitimacy when he successfully managed Nigeria through a devastating civil war and gained respect as political leader from the macro - and global environment.

This chapter indicates that the environment has an effect on recruitment and can even cause a change in leadership style. This indicates a direct interaction between leadership and environment. Another aspect exposed in this chapter is the fact that a weakened environment creates the opportunity for a stronger environment to develop a challenger personality and to challenge that weakened environment. This challenger personality will react on a weakened macro environment if it found support and/or is backed by military resources. This is illustrated in the reaction of Ironsi on the power vacuum found in the macro environment. Therefore it became clear that a macro environment without support can hardly be challenging and must therefore be considered to be a weakened environment. On the other hand, a micro environment without support indicates a low probability for the successful undemocratic recruitment of the military in the role of political leader. It was further assessed that the micro environment needs control over the mobilisation of military resources in order to ensure their recruitment. The importance of the global environment on the recruitment process of military leaders in the role of political leaders was also exposed.

**CHAPTER 4: THE BABANGIDA REGIME: 27 AUGUST 1985 UNTIL 17 NOVEMBER 1993**

4. Introduction.

This chapter will be devoted to the sixth Nigerian government under the rule of Babangida. In order to assess the reason for the recruitment of Babangida, the Buhari regime prior to the recruitment of Babangida was included. This leadership study is done by using the environment determined political leadership model as point of reference. This model includes a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options. As in the previous chapter, step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide answers and solutions on the question of undemocratic recruitment behaviour, as stated in chapter one.

Nigeria under the rule of Babangida provides the environment determined political leadership model with the opportunity to investigate the impact of the population (as part of the environment) on the origin of undemocratic behaviour (as found among the military). This is made possible as Nigeria developed a transitional society, at the time Babangida took power. In contrary to the previous chapter, this implies that the population was no longer the puppets of the military. This is illustrated in regular strikes and protests held against the military regime. Besides this challenging behaviour exhibited by the population, they still accepted military rule, but it was no longer wholeheartedly and

unconditionally. The opportunity lays in the fact that the environment variables exposed in this chapter, will be those forceful variables that inhibit or temper undemocratic recruitment behaviour or at least tempers military rule. It also presents the opportunity to investigate the behaviour of the political leader (as an ex-military leader) against opposition, as well as the action taken by him/her/them against this opposing behaviour and to determine whether a political leader's actions influence the population's behaviour. These findings can be compared to those found in other chapters, in order to assess their real contribution to the successful undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the roles of political leaders. Another aspect that can be tested in this period of time, is the influence of the global environment on the undemocratic recruitment process, as Babangida's recruitment as political leader was unconditionally supported by the global environment. This was a result of the Cold War situation, which caused the Great Powers to accept almost all recruitment actions, as long as the leadership concurred with the prevailing power status.

#### 4.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase, representing the different emerging Nigerian challenger personalities, began with the decline in support for the military regime of Gen. Buhari. It ended just before the coup d'état that took place in August 1985.

##### 4.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the emergence of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The

aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate those factors that promote and / or deter undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

#### 4.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The analysis of these variables will expose those variables present in the environment, which contribute to the emergence of a challenger personality that threatens the existing political leader (s) and facilitates undemocratic recruitment attempts. Such an analysis also creates the opportunity to indicate those factors that prevent or strain undemocratic recruitment activities.

##### 4.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Babangida and Buhari as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be studied, in order to assess this environment-s contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

##### a. Personality: Challenger

Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida was born in August 1941 in Minna (the Niger Province), as one of two children for Mahamadu and Aishatu Babangida (Alabi 1985:8). Both his parents died before his fourteenth birthday so that he was raised by his

family<sup>1</sup>. He is married to Hajiya Mariya King and has four children<sup>2</sup>.

According to Palmers= definition, Babangida can be considered a professional soldier. In 1962, after completing school in Minna, he joined the army. He did his military training in Nigeria, but also in India (1966-1967) and the United States of America (USA) (1972-1973 and 1980) (Alabi 1985:8 and Uwechue 1996a:67). Apart from experiencing war first hand during the civil war, his speciality field was armoured warfare. In 1981 he was promoted to the rank of Brig., as Director of Staff and Planning. It was in this position and later as Head of Staff, that he came to build up a huge following among the military. In March 1983 Pres. Shagari promoted him to the rank of Maj-Gen. During the Buhari regime, he became head of Army Staff and an influential member of the Military Supreme Council (MSC) (Alabi 1985:8, West Africa 1985a:1790 and Uwechue 1996a:67). His influence was due to the fact that he was the only member in the MSC that served on all military councils since 1975. This gave him experience in military government, and made him a sure candidate for future utilisation as political leader. That probably explains why he was the only MSC-member without a pure political appointment<sup>3</sup> (West Africa 1985b:1949 and Uwechue 1996a:67).

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1. In this time he became friends with the former military turned political leader of Nigeria, Gen. Abubakar.

2. His wife can be seen as the Hillary Rodham-Clinton of Nigerian politics. In 1989 she was appointed as Women of the Year by the *New Nigerian* and was awarded the International Recognition Award by the Harlem Women Committee of the USA (Uwechue 1996a:67 and Macaulay 1990:39).

3. His knowledge of politics was illustrated in an academical document, drafted in 1979, namely *Civil-Military Relationships, the Nigerian experience*. This document reflected his refined political

Babangida was loved by those who knew him and according to them had strong views about the dehumanisation of the people in Africa -which reflected the big heartiness his surname suggests (Alabi 1985:8 and Jason 1986:24). He had leadership qualities such as prominence, initiative and interaction. He had self-confidence and reflected a modest personal ambition. He was popular among the soldiers. In 1976 he gained their admiration, when he walked unarmed to Lt-Col Buka Suka Dimka to persuade him not to perform a coup d'état (Jason 1986:24). He was perceived by the military as a professional soldier without political ambition. This was because he refused demands of his friends and advisors to take the leadership position, after the coup d'état against Pres. Shagari. He felt Buhari had more administrative experience and was therefore more fit for the position of political leader (See Le Roux 1985:327, Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/86:326, Taylor & Rosenbach 1984:200-208 and Finer 1988:9). As Head of Army Staff, Babangida travelled a lot and was exposed to the plurality of the Nigerian population. He communicated with all of his subordinates, relentless of parochial group or ethnic group. These actions made him a popular officer with a broad power base in the Army (Diamond 1985:56 and Diamond 1985/86:326). This broad support gave Babangida the opportunity to develop a challenger personality and to seize a chance at leadership when the situation arose.

The military had a challenger personality. This was due to the unitary and centralised character of the federal government, the history of military intervention, the fact that the armed forces and governing political party were one

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thoughts. This made him a sure candidate for future coups d'état attempts and therefore feared by those who held political power.

organisation and that the Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) was a professional permanent force. The legacy of unitary and centralised government structures of the Federation formed a power locus that sparked off constant struggles for political power and the use of military resources to safeguard regional political interests on national level (Lardner 1990:51). When the military was recruited as political leaders, they used the federal political arena to further their own regional and ethnical interests. In doing so the military further became digested by regionalism, ethnicity and factionalism. Even worse, a new dividing dimension arose to give the old North-South struggle a new angle, namely religion: Christianity vs Muslim (Lardner 1990:50,52).

Buhari's regime alienated his own support base in his use of the National Security Organisation (NSO) against Northerners whom he suspected of partaking in coups d'état plans. His biggest opposition came from the military that were opposed to Northern dominance. In his government's campaign to convict corrupt officials and politicians, it became obvious that Buhari applied double standards. The former leaders of the previous government (the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) under the Shagari leadership) were mostly from the Northern region and they were Muslim. They were not as harshly prosecuted as culprits from other regions. The perception was created that Buhari's regime, which also over represented the Northern Hausa-Fulani Muslims, was a military wing of the NPN (See Diamond 1985/86:328, Joseph 1987:86 and Diamond 1987:202). The political -, economic - and social circumstances coincided with the characteristics of a Praetorian state. This inspired opposition from the Yoruba, Ibo and other minority groups (Diamond 1985/86:329). The only alternative to Buhari was an undemocratic recruitment attempt, initiated by a dissident



group in the military, as the macro environment could not deliver an opponent (See Palmer 1989:250 and Finer 1988:75).

b. Role: Challenger

Due to regionalism and ethnicity, the military was factionalised in opposing challenger personalities. These challenger personalities smouldered as Buhari increasingly abused military resources to attain personal power. The MSC, which was mainly composed of soldiers from the Northern Hausa-Fulani Muslim region, suspected all other soldiers of possible counter coups d'état. Those who were part of the coup d'état against Shagari and other former leaders were closely observed. This atmosphere of suspicion caused Buhari to utilise the NSO as a private espionage organisation. Tension arose between senior leaders in the MSC and caused distress among the junior officers. Rumours of a counter coup d'état began to surface time and again. The general feeling (including that of the Northern militia) was that Buhari and Idiagbon (his second in command) were busy to monopolise power and showed paranoid intolerance to debate and critique on and in the MSC (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:236,329-330). The military under the leadership of Babangida analysed the situation, made a diagnosis and planned a solution: namely a coup d'état. It was their heads or that of Buhari.

c. Task: Challenger

The military set themselves the task to be recruited as political leaders. The Northern military would welcome any undemocratic recruitment attempt that would distribute political power to all the militia from the North and prevent other power groups in the militia (as the Ibo) from obtaining political power. The remainder of the militia opposed

Northern dominance and would therefore support any task aimed at toppling the Northern military. The junior officers were against the politicisation of the military and desired a return to civilian government. This led to talks by radical junior officers in July 1985 on performing a coup d'état (Diamond 1985:55).

d. Values: Challenger

In this stage of the Nigerian history, it was clear that the values of modernism did surface in the military, but it was still dominated by other values. The values of modernism<sup>4</sup> were secondary to the values of regionalism, ethnicity, factionalism and religious differences. The latter values contributed to the development of a challenger personality, especially with the structural weaknesses present in the military organisation (as indicated in chapter three).

4.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community, constitutes this environment. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be contemplated, in order to assess this environment's contribution to undemocratic recruitment attempts, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

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4. This is nationalism, a modern outlook, discipline, dedication and honesty (See Palmer 1989:251-252). These values were most likely to be found among the young soldiers, who had no political power or influence.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The three decades in Nigeria before the 1985 coup d'état were characterised by interethnic tension, economic maladministration, political instability, corruption, civil war and military coups d'état (Le Roux 1985:324 and Diamond 1985/86:327). This weakened the macro environment and strengthened the micro environment. Since independence Nigeria had eight governments, from which only two were democratic (10 years) and the rest (20 years) military dictatorships. The average term of each government was about three years and nine months (I.C. 1990:2566). This obstructed any democratic form of government to develop into an institutionalised political culture. Instead, military rule and government were adopted as political culture. This obstructed the weakened macro environment from uniting against the military to demand a civilian government and created a non-challenger personality.

When Gen. Buhari announced a coup d'état against Pres. Shagari, the population (especially those not from the North) rejoiced. They felt that a civilian government (as in the case of Shagari<sup>5</sup>) cannot deliver free and fair elections and therefore a political democracy. They believed that the military would be an improvement on civilian government. When it became clear that the Buhari regime was no improvement to the Shagari government, due to autocratic actions<sup>6</sup>, the monopolisation of

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5. Although the election of Shagari was an improvement to previous elections, Awolowo contested Shagari's victory. The understanding was that the candidate with 25% of votes in all regions would have become president and Shagari drew most of his support from the electorate in the North (See Van Rensburg 1981:269-270).

6. See Diamond (1985/86:328), Diamond (1987:201-202), Diamond (1985:54-55), Joseph (1987:86), Torimiro (1988:86-88) and (Legum 1987:B125).

power<sup>7</sup>, anti-democratic behaviour<sup>8</sup>, regionalism<sup>9</sup> and factionalism<sup>10</sup>, the macro environment turned against Buhari. They formed a challenger personality that would support a new military group against Buhari. In its turn this led to more abuse of power from Buhari and harsher decrees to follow in order for him to stay in power. It indicated that a military regime without legitimacy can only be maintained by the use of state violence and as such promote an autocratic regime (Diamond 1987:201-202). This suppression transformed their challenger personality into a non-challenger personality.

The acceptance of military rule did not mean that the Nigerian community was indifferent to politics. Lots of influential pressure groups were formed, like the Union for Pilots, the Nigerian Medical Association (NMA), the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the Nigerian Bar Council (NBC) (Joseph 1987:84). There was a sophisticated press system that did not hesitate to expose corruption (Diamond 1985:55 and Legum 1987:B131). These influence groups rose against Buhari, when alienation took place between him and the macro environment<sup>11</sup>.

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7. See Diamond (1985/86:326), Diamond (1987:202), Torimiro (1988:88) and Legum (1987:B125-126).

8. See Diamond (1985/86:327-328), Diamond (1987:202), Torimiro (1988:86-88) and Legum (1987:B125).

9. See Diamond (1985/86:327-329), Diamond (1987:202) and Diamond (1985:55).

10. See Diamond (1985/86:329) and Diamond (1985:55).

11. The NMA initiated a strike in February 1985, due to difference with the government on medical issues and the shortage of medication. All groups opposed to the government were banned, including NANS (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:328-329).

This acceptance of military rule was the result of the long term psychological conditioning of the macro environment that institutionalised military rule. The result was that the macro environment adopted measures to function in these regimes, which they consider to be a correctional system aimed at changing the state to the norm of a constitutional civilian government<sup>12</sup> (Joseph 1987:68). Of course, this acceptance of military rule also had to do with their resentment of corruption, violence and self importance, which were combined with party politics during election wars. Despite this tolerance of military rule, the macro environment in general had a deep philosophical attachment to Democracy (Diamond 1987:201). This contradictory support for both military and civilian rule, lead them to discourse on the viability of a diarchy. This indicated their support for the military to govern, but also their need to have a say in government (See Diamond 1987:223).

This say in government was even more demanded, in the wake of a dying economy. By 1983 Nigeria experienced harsh economic and political problems<sup>13</sup> which were worsened by the huge burden of a rapid growing population (Le Roux 1985:324). The final blow came with the collapse of the oil market<sup>14</sup>. The slightest

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12. This notion could have been strengthened by Gen. Obasanjo's voluntary handing of military political power to the elected civilian government of Pres. Shagari in October 1979. Still, the military regimes in Nigeria (up to Buhari) functioned from within an ethnic and regional bias.

13. See Holly (1991), Macgregor (1986:79), Van De Velde (1987:8-9), Torimiro (1988:87-88,102-104), Diamond (1985/86:327) and Legum (1987:B135).

14. The discovery of oil in the 1970's lead to urbanisation and created a relative high level of industrialisation. Due to the total reliance on oil for revenue, a decline in agricultural production took place. This created food shortages in times when oil revenues were too low for importing food products.

price drop had a chain reaction: causing the devaluation of the naira, strikes and labour unrest, inflation to soar above 40%, a growth rate of even 1% not to be reached, the adoption of recessive taxes and service fees as well as the accumulation of external debt to an amount of \$20 billion in 1984. The biggest problem was the decline in imports, causing lower productivity and the dismissal and pensioning of workers as well as a downsizing of the government (Diamond 1985/86:330, Diamond 1985:54 and Diamond 1987:202). This caused the macro environment to turn against Buhari and look for possible recruitment candidates in the micro environment.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The political role of Buhari was directed at acquiring personal power and to promote the political interests of the Northern militia. In pursuing this aim, he implemented draconian measures directed at retaining personal power and to suppress the opposition within the macro - and micro environment. These tasks clearly reflected his challenger personality and role.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Due to Buhari's use of power and the absence of political leaders in the macro environment, few tasks in the macro environment were directed at challenging Buhari. On the other hand, Buhari adopted tasks to safeguard his own environment as well as his personal power. He revoked all parts of the constitution of the Second Federal Republic referring to elections and judicial procedures on federal and state level. He revised the power of the executive part of government by creating a new governing body (the MSC), which executed legislation by means of decrees (Holly 1991). He

transformed the NSO into a private espionage organisation invested with powers to commit acts of atrocities and to eliminate opposition. He issued decree number two, giving the government absolute power to arrest any person deemed to be a danger to state security. This was soon to be used against political opponents and journalists (Diamond 1985/86:328, Diamond 1987:202 and Uwechue 1996a:67-68). Decree number three followed suit. It provided for the establishment of military tribunals to be used for prosecuting former corrupt officials. Although the population supported him in this at first, the sternness of the military actions shocked them<sup>15</sup>. Decree number four promised more suppression of the macro environment. The publication of deceitful articles that may ridicule or discredit the government were prohibited. This decree was further abused by the NSO to get rid of Buhari's opposition, included the banning of NANS and the NMA<sup>16</sup> (Diamond 1985/86:328-329, Diamond 1987:202). The macro environment accepted this suppression as Buhari used the state apparatus against dissidents of his regime.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The macro environment formed available masses, not willing or able to unite against dictators, keeping to the values of ethnicity and regionalism eagerly advocated by their

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15. The minimum sentence for corruption was 21 years in jail. The tribunals followed the military judicial procedures, whereby a person must prove his own innocence. There was no chance for appeal and all proceedings were held in camera. The Nigerian Bar boycotted these trials (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:237).

16. The NSO was frequently used to brake up conferences of the ASUU and NANS, as well as to arrest their leaders. The NMA was banned and its leaders arrested due to differences with the government leading to a general strike early 1985 (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:238-239).

respective political machines. These values contributed to the military's success in challenging the macro environment.

#### 4.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

The term global environment refers to the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. In order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, the personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

##### a. Personality: Non-challenger

The tatters that the Nigerian economy was in after the AOil Boom<sup>17</sup> had an adverse effect on Nigeria's grand foreign policy posture. They toned down on anti-Western pronouncements and repatriated the neighbours of bordering states that fled to Nigeria for a better life, but placed an additional burden on the economy. These pronouncements were necessary as the lack of stability caused by coups d'état<sup>18</sup> frightened foreign investors, and Nigeria was in desperate need for economic aid and imports from the West (Olonisakin 1998a:7). This direction in their foreign policy influenced the global environment not to intervene in Nigerian affairs. Reality also indicated that intervention could cause the intervener to end up with a sick patient in need of intensive care. The West wanted to avoid such a situation at all cost. This

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17. See Olonisakin (1998a:4-6) for a detailed account of this prosperous phase in the Nigerian economy.

18. Shagari, the first civilian leader, was toppled in 1983 by a coup d'état performed by Buhari. Buhari was replaced in 1985 by Babangida. This implies three governments in seven years.



reality provided the global environment with a non-challenger personality.

b. Role: Non-challenger

This non-challenger personality of the global environment resulted in a non-challenger role with this environment not intervening in military attempts to be recruited as political leaders. Military rule was seen as quite normal, as long as the interests of the global environment were not endangered.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Even though the global environment opposed Buhari's decrees, and Amnesty International condemned the arrest of journalists, this environment did not actively partake in tasks to oppose military rule in Nigeria (Diamond 1987:202 and Diamond 1985/86:328-329).

d. Values: Non-challenger

The global environment followed two opposing value systems: communism/socialism (Eastern Bloc) and capitalism/democracy (Western Bloc). Nigeria supported the values of the Western Bloc. As the two Blocs were opposing each other and both did not want a change in the status quo of global security, Nigerian values were not challenged. The result was that a non-challenger personality developed in the global environment.

4.1.1.2. Organisation.

4.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

The military despised Buhari's aspirations for more personal power. The Northern militia wanted a share of his power and was concerned over the possibility of Northern political power being lost to the South in a counter coup d'état. The remainder rejected the centralisation of power in the hands of a Northerner (Buhari). As a group, the military challenged Buhari's position and would support any recruitment action to replace him with a new political leader.

4.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Uninvolved

The institutionalisation of military rule as micro - and macro environment political culture, combined with prevailing regionalism, ethnicity and differences in religion, caused the deeply divided available masses in the macro environment not to unite against any dictator. Instead, they supported the no-nonsense approach of the military directed at diminishing political corruption, fostering discipline in the community, enforcing accountability and improving the economy (Diamond 1987:201 and Diamond 1985/86:327). Buhari moved swiftly against corruption, detaining politicians (including Shagari and Vice-Pres. Alex Ekwueme), most of the state governors, state and federal ministers as well as legislators. In doing so he received the support of students, trade unions, businessmen, professionals, intellectuals and the media.

After Buhari adopted tasks to promote and safeguard his own environment, the macro environment turned against him. His decrees and the use of the NSO deprived the macro environment of all political freedom, more severe than what prevailed

during Nigeria's colonial era (Diamond 1985/86:328 and Diamond 1987:202). The arrest of Shagari and Ekwueme as well as other politicians from the previous government, created a political power vacuum on macro environment level, making it impossible for the macro environment to oppose a military candidate in the process of recruiting a political leader<sup>19</sup>(Uwechue 1996a:67-68). Furthermore, his abuse of political power encouraged the formation of an uninvolved organisation in the macro environment.

#### 4.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment showed an uninvolved organisation, because they did not want to get involved in Nigerian domestic politics, and considered military governments and coups d'état to be accepted by the macro environment. Most important, the military governments sided with the Western Bloc and thus posed no threat to their interests.

#### 4.1.1.3. Setting.

##### 4.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation for Babangida was ideal to be recruited as political leader in an undemocratic fashion. He had a huge following in the military and could count on their support in the event of mobilising against Buhari, as he was considered to be apolitical and did not arouse opposition from the military of the other regions. The macro environment posed no threat to the possibility of mobilisation, as they formed an

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19. Most of them were detained, but not charged. Michael Ajasin, a respected politician, was twice found innocent on charges of corruption, but Buhari refused to set him free (See Diamond 1987:202).

uninvolved organisation, with a non-challenger personality. The probability for a successful recruitment attempt was great, as the military had first hand experience in planning and executing coups d'état.

The tension between Babangida and Idiagbon (Buhari's second in command) increased daily and provided a possible trigger for a hastened undemocratic recruitment attempt. Idiagbon distrusted Babangida due to his history of coup d'état participation (Le Roux 1985:326-327). If Babangida did not react quickly, he could have ended in jail. This also applied to other militia in the MSC, suspected of opposing Buhari. The military were all too eager to support Babangida in toppling Buhari.

#### 4.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The repressive actions of Buhari alienated him from the macro environment and by that forced the Nigerian population to look for other military redeemers, as they were too weakened by Buhari's measures to provide their own recruitment candidate.

#### 4.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

Events in Nigeria were observed from the sideline. The global environment would only intervene in internal affairs, if the new military leader would change alliance to the Soviet Bloc. Babangida made sure that the West knows he was on their side.

4.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro (Buhari) environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment developed a challenger personality in reaction to the repression tasks undertaken by Buhari (macro environment). In their resentment of Buhari and the subsequent decision to dispose of him, the military formed a supportive organisation. The situation for their recruitment aspirations was ideal, as the micro environment was strengthened due to the institutionalisation of military rule by the macro environment.

The macro environment had a non-challenger personality and role due to their lack of nationalism, the institutionalisation of military rule and repression of Buhari. This weakened the macro environment so that it could not pose a threat or counter to the micro environment. Because of Buhari's harsh measures to suppress macro environment opinion, they became uninvolved. The macro environment would approve of any other military regime, and in that reflected a setting of discontent. The swopping of one military regime to another was eased by the uninvolvedness of the global environment in Nigerian affairs.

#### 4.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase began with the execution of the 27 August 1985 coup d'état (as undemocratic recruitment attempt) and ended directly with the success of it. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of military leaders to assume a political role.

##### 4.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase in the recruitment stage will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, present in this phase, that contributes to the success of recruitment behaviour.

##### 4.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables in this phase will expose those factors in the different environments which will contribute to the actual success of the recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

##### 4.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In the following section, the personality, role, task and values of this environment are reflected on to determine the contribution this environment has on the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Challenger

Southern fears for continued Northern political dominance, the NSO-s use as a secret police and Buhari-s continuous accumulation of personal power made the possibility of counter coups d'état possible. The Northern military themselves was fearful, because of Buhari and Idiagbon-s use of the NSO against Northern dissidents. The Northern military had to react before a Southern undemocratic recruitment attempt would leave them without direct dominance or before the NSO would eliminate them. This atmosphere of distrust created enormous tension in the MSC (See Legum 1987:B125,131-132, Diamond 1985/86:328, Lardner 1990:50,52 and Joseph 1987:86).

Against this background, the sixth coup d'état in Nigeria was planned. Maj-Gen. Babangida was one of the masters involved in planning the coup d'état against Buhari. The undemocratic recruitment attempt was a success because he and the military had experience in the execution of coups d'état<sup>20</sup> and therefore kept the two most important aspects of a coup d'état in mind. That is the involvement of strategically placed mid-level commanders commanding infantry and tank units and the application of the main principles of warfare: speed, surprise and co-ordination (SAGD 1994:4-14 and Palmer 1989:237-238). The performance of a coup d'état reflected the challenger personality of the military.

b. Role: Challenger

The challenger role of the military became clear on performing an undemocratic recruitment attempt. In the aftermath of the

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20. Babangida was also a specialist in mechanised and tank warfare.

coup d'état, Babangida declared that he is not going to continue Buhari's miscarriage of justice against the macro environment. He promised to unite Nigeria as a nation and not to govern by means of power; but to respect civilian freedom and other fundamental rights (Lardner 1990:51). He restated the military's political role in presenting the coup d'état masters as the saviours of the Nigerian population and declared that they reacted by public demand (See Palmer 1989:236, Le Roux 1985:327 and Legum 1987:B124). This showed once again the reformist nature of the military, again coloured by regionalism. Only the Northern region and its military supporters would benefit from this coup d'état.

c. Task: Challenger

The military had one task: to be recruited as political leaders. Babangida and his military supporters therefore reacted swiftly to safeguard their own groups' recruitment as political leader and to prevent Buhari from further repressing them. The challenge of Buhari and Idiagbon was facilitated by Babangida's support in the micro environment, the uninvolved organisational nature of the macro environment and his knowledge of staging coups d'état (Diamond 1985/86:326 and Torimiro 1988:88).

d. Values: Challenger

The values of regionalism and ethnicity factionalised the military on ethnic and religious grounds. It promoted a challenger personality and thus contributed to the decision to stage an undemocratic recruitment attempt against Buhari.



4.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment are studied in order to determine the contribution of this environment to the success of undemocratic recruitment actions, in terms of the recruitment phase.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The autocratic government of Buhari, his monopolising of power and demonstration of antidemocratic behaviour testified to his challenger personality. Due to this behaviour of Buhari, but also regionalism, factionalism, corruption and the economic recession, the macro environment revealed a non-challenger personality. They would accept any other military leader as political leader, if only to get rid of Buhari.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The macro environment developed a non-challenger role, due to the challenger role of Buhari and consequent harsh measures to control unrest and opposition. This set the scene for any military group to pass themselves as the redeemers of Nigeria.

c. Task: Non-challenger

Buhari's task to advance his own personal power alienated the macro environment. They took no tasks upon themselves to challenge the military government, as they were weakened due to regionalism, ethnicity, religious differences and suppression.

d. Values: Non-challenger

As indicated in chapter three, the lack of central values or nationalism promoted a non-challenger personality in the macro environment.

4.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The identified variables present in the global environment need to be studied in order to establish what variables in specific contribute or inhibit the successful recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

Against the background of the Cold War, the Western Bloc would not have intervened in the domestic squabbles of a state, if that state or squabble did not present a threat to their interests. Because the Nigerian military sided with the Western Bloc, the Western Bloc would not develop a challenger personality against military government, as the military was not seen as a threat to their interests. Rather, in most cases military regimes were perceived to be more proficient in securing Western interests, than a civilian government.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment had a non-challenger role, as (in general) it contributed to the legitimisation of military regimes and approved the utilisation of undemocratic methods to obtain political leadership.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment did not undertake any tasks to challenge the Buhari government, as a military government was of no threat to them.

d. Values: Non-challenger

The conflicting values of the global environment (Western/Eurocentric/Democracy/Capitalism vs Eastern/Communist/Socialist) promoted a non-challenger personality as Nigeria openly supported the Western view. In doing so Babangida's undemocratic recruitment attempt escaped global condemnation.

4.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of all three mentioned environments needs to be identified, in order to determine what variables contribute and/or temper the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment action.

4.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

On 27 August 1985, Babangida (with the support of some military) took political power by means of a coup d'état, as it was the most common undemocratic recruitment method used in Nigeria and proved to be highly successful (See Joseph 1987:68, Diamond 1985:55 and Legum 1987:B124). The execution went smooth, with no loss of life. This was due to the military's knowledge of coups d'état, the fact that Buhari lost the macro environments support, that it was staged on a Muslim holiday and that Idiagbon visited Mecca (Legum 1987:B124 and West Africa 1985a:1789).

The typical pattern of coups d'état in Africa was followed. The most important government buildings and broadcasting corporations were taken over, after which the coup d'état was announced on radio (See Palmer 1989:236, Le Roux 1985:327 and Legum 1987:B124). After the announcement Babangida cited Buhari's abuse of power, violation of human rights by key persons in the MSC and the failure to address the economic problems as reason for the undemocratic recruitment attempt (Holly 1991).

#### 4.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Uninvolved

The macro environment was alienated from Buhari and thus developed an uninvolved organisation. The high frequency of military intervention and government in Nigeria robbed the civilian institutions from a chance to get accepted by the population. Due to this, the military was more institutionalised as civilian political institutions and the population regarded civilian institutions unfavourable (Palmer 1989:239). This explains why the population once again accepted a military regime with anticipation and confidence (Lardner 1990:50).

#### 4.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment did not organise against Babangida's undemocratic recruitment attempt. They formed an uninvolved organisation as coups d'état were common to Nigerians and the global environment.

#### 4.2.1.3. Setting.

Again the settings of the three identified environments are analysed, in order to determine how this factor contributes to

the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment attempt.

4.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation was ideal for Babangida to stage a coup d'état. He had the support of the micro environment and the noninvolvement of the macro environment to his favour. From the previous it is clear that the following factors also counted in his favour:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

4.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors contributed to the downfall of Buhari:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

4.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

Due to the Cold War, no serious pressure was put on Nigeria to diverge from a military regime to a democratically elected civilian government.

4.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment found support for their recruitment attempt, as the situation was ideal for such an attempt to succeed. This was due to the pressing resistance against Buhari's regime and the possibility of a loss in political power by the Northern military if another military faction performs an undemocratic recruitment attempt. The recruitment of Babangida as new political leader was eased, as Buhari lost support for his leadership in both the micro - and macro environment and because coups d'état were seen by the global environment as a natural event in Nigeria.

4.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

Babangida will remain the leader of Nigeria, as long as he controls the military resources and are supported by the micro environment. In this phase Babangida is treated as part of the micro environment, as he had no opposition in the military (due to the renewed control over the military resources) and no opposition to the institutionalisation of his regime would come from the macro environment, due to the lack of national

leadership. This phase concludes with the attempted coup d'état against his government in December 1985.

4.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

During this step, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be studied, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments, encountered in this phase, that contributes to or hinders the success of establishing a military leader as political leader and ensures or deters the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

4.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the personality, role, task and values as encountered in this phase, will indicate those variables in the micro -, macro - and global environment which contributes to or deters the eventual institutionalisation of a military leader in the role of political leader.

4.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In order to determine the environment's contribution to or hindrance of the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime, the personality, role, task and values of the identified environments are reflected on.

a. Personality: Compromiser

Due to the situation in the micro environment as described in phase two<sup>21</sup>, Babangida adopted a compromiser personality in order for his regime to be institutionalised. In doing so he proved to be intelligent, courageous and bold. For the first time in the Nigerian history, a truly modernising regime<sup>22</sup> took power (although only for a short while<sup>23</sup>).

He broadened his support base by revealing extraordinary sensitivity for socio-, political - and economic tendencies in the political system. He also anticipated development and changes in the population when formulating a policy or following a strategy. Furthermore, he revealed political ingenuity through his skill in compromise, by identifying alternative strategies and options, in effective group diplomacy and political diplomacy, in communicating individually with a variety of individuals with different interests, in effectively expressing the sentiments/interests of a broad group of people through the written and spoken word and in having the courage and conviction to follow a predetermined strategy (See Bekker 1994:184-185).

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21. This situation refers to fears for counter coups d'état due to regionalism, ethnicity and factionalism in the micro environment.

22. According to Palmer (1989:147-149) a modernising regime places emphasis on the mobilisation of material and human resources of the state to hasten social and economic reform. It is also characterised by legitimacy problems due to value conflicts and internal fragmentation. In a modernising regime, time becomes a crucial variable and excessive trust is placed on the military. These problems were all masterfully sidestepped by Babangida.

23. In 1987 he began the first postponement of civilian transition, by changing the election date from 1 October 1990 to 1992.



b. Role: Compromiser

In Babangida's maiden speech, he remarked: 'We do not intend to lead a country where individuals are under fear of expressing themselves.....We recognize that a government, be it civilian or military, needs the consent of the people if it is to govern effectively' (Diamond 1985:56). In this he indicated a compromising role in order to institutionalise his regime. This compromising role also consists of a reformist role (modernisation) as can be seen in his handling of political, social and economic issues<sup>24</sup>. This gave way for Nigeria's first affair with nationalism.

c. Task: Compromiser

The success of Babangida in institutionalising his regime, came from the tasks he adopted to safeguard his own environment and in not challenging other environments. He had three mutually dependent tasks (related to his reformist role), namely political -, social - and economic reform.

Babangida's political expertise came to the fore in his handling of crucial and possibly explosive political tasks. Well aware of the macro environments democratisation pursued, Babangida adopted the title of president and formed a presidential advice committee that acted as a cabinet (the Political Bureau) and dismantled the Federal Executive Council and National Council of States (See Diamond 1985/86:327, Diamond 1987:202-203 and Legum 1987:B124). The Political Bureau consisted out of 17 members, chosen from an array of disciplines, representing different political and ideological viewpoints and reflecting the federal character of Nigeria.

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24. This role was not prolonged.

They had to make arrangements to prepare the population for transition to a civilian government. After travelling Nigeria, they reported in 1987 that a socialist ideology was the political preference of the population (See Fadugba 1986:6-7, Adamu 1990:46, Lloegbunam 1990:2582, West Africa 1987a:1617 and Nwagboso 1989:1453). Babangida rejected it, noting that he did not want to impose ideology on the population. Due to the ethnic tension in the MSC, he reorganised it (and renamed it to the Armed Forces Military Council (AFMC)) to distribute power evenly and to enhance consensus (See Diamond 1987:203, West Africa 1985a:1789 and Legum 1987:B126). It consisted of 22 ministers, 12 officers and 10 civilians, all chosen on merit and representing Nigeria as a nation. The civilians were ardent Buhari enemies, had influence and popular support. This step brought technical knowledge to the government, which would help Babangida in obtaining certain goals. It also broadened his support base (See Finer 1988:12, Adeyanju 1985:14, Joseph 1987:86, Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/85:332, Diamond 1987:203 and Legum 1987:B127-128). He released the political activists, journalists, writers, editors and intellectuals jailed by Buhari and revoked decree number four and the ban on the National Union of Students (NUS) and the NMA. He exposed the NSO leadership and restructured it (See Joseph 1987:84, Diamond 1985/86:331, Diamond 1987:203, Diamond 1985:56, Torimiro 1988:88, Fadugba 1986:6 and Legum 1987:B125). In these political tasks, Babangida introduced a new concept to the Nigerian political terrain, namely military democracy (See Joseph 1987:87).

Babangida announced the handing of government to a democratically elected civilian government and initiated a transition programme aimed at fostering a democratic culture and the gradual transfer of power to an elected, civilian

government. By establishing forums<sup>25</sup> for population participation, he communicated his personal commitment to a responsive and liberal government to the macro environment and encouraged them to give inputs to government policy whereby a viable political system for the future could be established. He even involved them in important questions like accepting an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan (See West Africa 1986:332, Diamond 1987:203,223 and Legum 1987:126-127). He tried to bring about a new system of accountability in the public sector and to diminish corruption<sup>26</sup> (Torimiro 1988:89). This led Diamond (1987:222) to observe that Nigerians are: A proud and politically mobilised domestic public@.

His biggest task as reformist was to tackle the economic crises. The oil boom of the 1970's created a rich class, the Wabenzi, and established a culture of squandering and extravagance. By adopting the credo A service and repair@ as opposed to A discard@ and by stimulating productivity and self sufficiency outside the oil industry, Babangida set to change this culture. He also formulated government policy to counter it, for example the Realistic Exchange Rate Policy (RERP) and the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) (Diamond 1987:204). The adoption of the SFEM is seen by Diamond(1987:204) as: A one of the boldest domestic policy moves by any military government in Nigerian history@. He was bold in his approach and spared no one. Even soldiers= salaries were cut (See Joseph 1987:88, Diamond 1985/86:204 and Legum 1987:B127). His measures proved to be of value in 1986, when

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25. This includes the Constitutional Revision Committee, National Election Committee (NEC) and Population Bureau.

26. He abolished the practise of liscensing imports that opened doors for grave corruption (Diamond 1987:204 and Legum 1987:B129).

the oil price dropped against all expectation (See Diamond 1987:222).

The harsh socio -, economic - and political situation did not dilute the military's interventionist foreign policy. This can be seen in the Nigerian military intervention in Liberia (1990) and Sierra Leone (1991). This new direction was the result of the personal desire of Babangida to attain international prestige, to consolidate the domestic power base and to divert attention from home (See Olonisakin 1998a:8,10-11).

d. Values: Compromiser

Babangida possessed reformist values as well as a commitment to consensus government and nationalism. These values increased the possibility of his regime to be institutionalised.

4.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the macro environment are studied, in order to assess the contribution of this environment towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Non-challenger

The macro environment's personality also had an effect on Babangida's acceptance of a compromiser personality in establishing his regime. The non-challenger personality of the macro environment was the result of state oppression against them. Babangida had either to continue this oppression or to make compromises. Compromises would have been the most viable options as strikes and antigovernment

rallies against Buhari indicated that the macro environment had to be oppressed in order to be silenced. Diamond (1987:202-203) observed that the Nigerian macro environment was a proud nation that placed a high premium on their personal freedom. In this spirit the discourse on diarchy began.

b. Role: Non-challenger

The non-challenger role of the macro environment accepted Babangida as saviour. They still believed that the military had a place in politics, but as would be seen in the compromiser personality of Babangida, the Buhari regime changed their blind acceptance of military political involvement to include a demand for civilian inputs in government and even the right to form a civilian government.

c. Task: Non-challenger

The macro environment performed no tasks to prevent Babangida's regime from being institutionalised. The reason for this can be located in the legitimacy that Babangida acquired from the macro environment. This was due to his use of democratic legitimacy symbols; namely radiating central community values and political values, aligning his aims with the value system of the population, recruiting himself as president, symbolically representing the whole of Nigeria and following a consensus government style (See Bekker 1994:183,191-193).

d. Values: Non-challenger

The dominant values in the macro environment were still ethnicity and regionalism, but modernisation values became stronger and began to challenge these values. Babangida

succeeded in altering the Nigerian culture of accepting military rule. His planned transition programme underplayed the values of ethnicity, regionalism and factionalism. Although nationalism was still not present, a huge stride was taken in the direction of establishing a democratic culture. Ironically, this legacy of him contributed to his downfall later on.

#### 4.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied, in order to determine this environment's contribution to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

##### a. Personality: Non-challenger

The global environment continued their non-challenger personality, after the announcement of Babangida's maiden speech and his allegiance to the West (Diamond 1985:56).

##### b. Role: Non-challenger

The global environment continued with a non-challenger role.

##### c. Task: Non-challenger

The global environment did not adopt challenger tasks to prevent the Babangida regime from obtaining institutionalisation.

##### d. Values: Non-challenger

The global values concurred with those of Babangida, spurring him to establish his regime.

#### 4.3.1.3. Organisation.

In order to assess the contribution of organisation to the eventual institutionalisation of the military leader as political leader, the role of the organisation as present in the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be examined.

##### 4.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Supportive

The Babangida regime had a supportive organisation due to the effective co-optation of most members of the micro environment to the AFRC. This was done by correcting the ethnical imbalance of the MSC by appointing a majority of ethnic minority states from the Midnorth. He divided Idiagbon's superpost in two: Head General Staff (responsible for political administration) and Joint Head of Staff (responsible for military administration). He appointed an Ibo, Eko Ebitu Ukiwe to the post of Head General Staff. For all practical reasons this was the post of the second in command (See Diamond 1985:56, Diamond 1985/86:331-332, Alabi 1985:8 and Legum 1987:B127-128,132). This indicated his commitment to the federal character of Nigeria as well as a reasoned action not to endanger the federation.

He improved his support with the radical young military (suspected of planning undemocratic recruitment attempts against Buhari), by appointing six of them as military governors. This taught them the frustration of government and to accept the reality that changes took time (Diamond 1985:56 and Joseph 1987:87). The fact that the attempted counter coup d'état of December 1985 was warded off, showed the support that Babangida built up among all of the military in the micro

environment and the wisdom to co-opt the junior officers (See Finer 1988:17-18, Joseph 1987:87 and Legum 1987:B126)

4.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Supportive

Due to the footwork of this political Maradona, Babangida founded a supportive organisation in the macro - and micro environment. He adopted the low profile tactics of the Murtala and Obasanjo military regimes in order to gain the support of the macro environment<sup>27</sup>. His restructuring of regional politics (See tasks) also contributed to a broader support base in the macro environment.

4.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The Babangida regime was supported (though not openly) by the global environment, as Babangida was hailed as a democratically orientated leader. This contributed to the institutionalisation of his regime.

4.3.1.4. Setting.

The setting of the three identified environments is analysed, to establish how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

4.3.1.4.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The consensus government style created an ideal situation for the Babangida regime to be institutionalised. The

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27. He exchanged his presidential mercedes for a peugeot 504 and forced the government officials to do the same. He avoided unpopular policy because he listened to the population and acted on public debate (Diamond 1987:222 and Fadugba 1986:6).



undemocratic recruitment attempt cycle ended here, but it was also the beginning of phase one of the Abacha undemocratic recruitment attempt to take place.

4.3.1.4.2. Macro environment: Ideal

The support of the macro environment to Babangida's military regime made the situation ideal for his regime to be institutionalised.

4.3.1.4.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment welcomed the new democratic military regime, as it could help in promoting stability in the west African region. This implied that Western involvement in this area would be minimised. This was of course welcomed by a number of states in the global community.

4.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Compromiser	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
Organisation	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

The compromiser personality of Babangida gave him the support of the micro -, macro - and global environment and contributed to the legitimisation and institutionalisation of his regime.

#### 4.4. Summary

In this chapter it was assessed that the micro environment presented a strong challenger personality from the onset. This challenger personality was strongly supported by the rank and file in the military, as the Hausa-Fulani dominated the political field (macro environment) and gained full monopoly of the military resources. The existing apolitical military, were gradually eliminated as factor, by utilisation in external ECOMOG operations. This eliminated internal factionalisation of the military that could hinder a supportive organisation. Besides the challenger personality in the military, other challenger personalities existed. The macro environment developed growing resentment for those who govern, due to incidences of corruption, ethnical rivalry, regionalism, as well as a history of military intervention, religious differences and factionalism. As the macro environment was divided by ethnic division that eroded a supportive organisation, this challenger personality was turned against each other. The result was that the Nigerian political destination was left in the hands of the micro environment. The use of state violence and oppression to deal with the opposition of the military government further weakened the macro environment and resulted in a non-challenger personality and unsupportive organisation. The non-challenger personality of the global environment did the situation no good. The Great Powers, caught in the Cold War situation, did not want to become involved in Africa's domestic problems and trusted the military to stabilise the continent. This resulted in the legitimisation of military governments on an external level as a spin off effect. This background created the perfect setting for an undemocratic recruitment

action to be attempted, and if successful, to institutionalise a military government.

This chapter indicates the importance of a strong macro environment (which reflects a supportive organisation), in deterring undemocratic recruitment attempts and institutionalising military leaders in the role of political leaders. This strength can only be obtained, if the macro environment unites against common adversaries. The influence of the global - and macro environment on the recruitment of leaders, as well as leadership style, was also highlighted in this chapter. For one, the situation of military intervention in Nigeria continued and was accepted, as long as it suited the global environment. Furthermore, fears for a counter coup d'état by Southerners and alienation in the Northern military camp (due to Buhari's regime) not only forced Babangida to adopt a compromiser personality, but formed the foundation for the institutionalisation of his regime.

**CHAPTER 5: THE ABACHA REGIME: 17 NOVEMBER 1993 UNTIL 9 JUNE 1998**

5. Introduction.

In this chapter, the seventh Nigerian government will be studied against the background of the Babangida government in order to assess the reason for the recruitment of Abacha as political leader. In this leadership study, the environment determined political leadership model is used as research instrument. This includes a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options. As in the previous chapters, step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide answers and solutions on the question of undemocratic recruitment behaviour, as stated in chapter one.

The history of Nigeria under Abacha presents the opportunity to investigate the recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader, the reaction of a military leader on growing opposition, the effect that democratisation of the macro environment has on military leadership and also to analyse and isolate the factors that contribute to the downfall of a military leader in the role of political leader. An interesting element in this case study, is the effect democratisation - as initiated by Babangida - had on the institutionalisation of Abacha's military government. Other elements of importance is the resignation of Babangida (partly due to public pressure) and the subsequent continuance of

military rule under Abacha due to a power vacuum which existed in the macro environment. These events can be used to explain the influence the macro environment exert on a political leader, as well as to evaluate the importance of a supportive organisation for the macro environment in order to ensure the recruitment of a political leader from the macro environment.

#### 5.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase begins after the establishment and institutionalisation<sup>1</sup> of the Babangida regime and ends with the unexpected death of Abacha on 8 June 1998.

##### 5.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the development of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate the factors that promote undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

##### 5.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The abovementioned variables need to be analysed to determine which factors in the identified environments contribute to the emergence of a challenger personality that opts for undemocratic recruitment actions to assume a political role.

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1. In this regard the whole of chapter three must be seen as background to the development of challenger personalities in the micro - and macro environment.

It also presents the opportunity to isolate those factors that hinder the success of undemocratic recruitment attempts.

5.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Babangida and Abacha as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. In order to assess the development of a challenger personality, the identified variables are going to be analysed, as they (being embedded in the different environments) contribute to the development of such a personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

Sani Abacha was born on 20 September 1943 in Kano, a town in the Northern central part of Nigeria. His parents were from Kanuri-decent, an ethnic group from the Northeastern part of Nigeria. He attended school in Kano, whereafter he joined the Army on completion of high school. His professional military career started at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna, whereafter he received further training in Britain, the United States of America (USA) and Nigeria (Uwechue 1996a:1 and CNN 1998).

Abacha first became known outside the military sphere, on announcing the replacement of Pres. Shagari's government in 1983. In the military government of Gen. Buhari that followed, he received the post of General Commanding Officer of the 2nd Mechanised Division and became a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC). On 27 August 1985 Abacha again announced the replacement of a Nigerian leader, this time Buhari. With the change of government formed under Gen. Babangida, Abacha moved up higher in the military hierarchy. He retained his position in the SMC (now called the Armed Forces Ruling Council -AFRC) and was named the new head of

Army Staff. He openly boasted to be the political-second-in-command, much to the dismay of Comdr. Ebitu Ukiwe (the head of General Staff). His career culminated in 1992 when he became a full general, Minister of Defence and chairman of the Joint Heads of Staff (Uwechue 1996a:1 and CNN 1998). This political background gave him the opportunity to develop a challenger personality, if the situation should so arise.

The Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) formed the government for quite a substantial time. Even when the civilians were in control (i.e. Shagari), the military exercised influence over the political decision making process. This urge to govern was strengthened by the Biafran war, as it eroded the military's confidence in civilian leadership (Butts & Metz 1996:4-5). Apart from this psychological resistance to macro environment political leadership, British values invested during colonialism, became marshed to a point where Nigerian officers could no longer be called professional. The reason for this being the fact that they were utilised as political administrators. Despite that, Babangida dragged lots of officers into the corruption network: called the privilege system or system of political economy. This system developed over time where corrupt senior officers built networks of lower ranks for their personal use in corruption. The junior officers who were not part of this system, rejected it mostly out of jealousy. But another element was also present, compared to the situation of senior officers that of the junior officers were perilous. They felt the economic decline (Butts & Metz 1996:8). This caused a rift between the junior and senior officers that would have implications on the support base of the senior officers.

Therefore, it can be argued that the military possessed a dual challenger personality. Part of it opposed any change to the

status quo of their privileged position. They formed cliques in cliques with an interest in the existing system. Senior officers were not prepared to change this system. Another part of it came to resent the role of the military in Nigerian politics. Unfortunately, the effect of the latter was weakened by continuous shuffles, eliminations, suppression and co-optation of them by the military political leaders. The unsuccessful coup d'état of 1990 showed the cancerous situation which developed in Nigeria, wherein undemocratic recruitment methods were utilised by military personnel as the only means to change government. This situation contributed to further suspicion, fear and purges in the military (Butts & Metz 1996:8-9).

Despite the dividing effect of the system of political economy, growing ethnicity (due to institutionalised ethnic rule of the Northern military) was beginning to strain the military. Most of the army officers were Christians from the Southern or middle belt area. It was in contrast to the Northern Muslims who dominated the political arena of Nigeria since independence day. This situation caused resentment and ethnic hate from the non-Northern officers and civilians. This situation was to worsen, as both Christian and Muslim fundamentalism grew in reaction to the social collapse in Nigeria (Butts & Metz 1996:8).

b. Role: Challenger

Most of the military (including Babangida) favoured the political role of the military, as it kept the privilege system intact. This challenger role was ardently supported by the Northerner elements in the NDF who were afraid that their own privileged live and political dominance will halt to an end, if the system of political economy is dismantled under a



civilian government headed by Abiola. The annulment of the June 1993 election was partly the doing of senior officers who feared this, but also out of fear of prosecution for corruption and human rights violations (Butts & Metz 1996:10).

c. Task: Challenger

Babangida's task was to continue the privileged position of the Northern military political elites. All tasks taken upon him (and the military who supported him) were related in safeguarding Northerner interests in the micro - and macro environments. In this spirit, when he was confronted by large scale civil unrest (mainly Yoruba), Babangida announced that he was going to hand the political power to an all civilian interim national government that must replace the Transitional Council of Shonekan (Uwechue 1996b:1194). This structure was only an eye blinder, as it was compiled of all Babangida's friends and allies. Within this structure Abacha (under supervision of Babangida) could see to it that the privileged position of the military was maintained. The interim government promised new presidential elections for February 1994 and released human rights activists. They indicated that they were going to govern by means of military decrees and were not going to open the media groups that Babangida had closed. The Northern military (with Abacha as chairman) was clearly the real power behind the interim government (Butts & Metz 1996:12 & Uwechue 1996 p.1194).

d. Values: Challenger

Babangida and his supporters in the military all embraced the same values, namely: ethnicity and regionalism that ensured the political and economic dominance of the Northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani and the safeguarding of the system of political

economy (Butts & Metz 1996:7-8). These values were also present among those soldiers who opposed Northerner dominance. They were more appalled by the fact that they missed out on the Good life®, than the fact that they have missed out on Democracy. Those who truly supported a civilian democratic government were few, but they revealed the values characteristic of a professional soldier. These values were probably shaped by this group's participation in external peace missions, directed at establishing democratic regimes in the Western part of Africa. Most of them, however, felt left out of the system of privilege and therefore opposed Northern military rule.

#### 5.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The macro environment consists of the social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be analysed, in order to determine the contribution of this environment towards the development of a challenger personality at micro environment level.

##### a. Personality: Challenger

The result of the colonial system and institutionalisation of military rule was a non-challenger macro environment personality, as the available masses did not unite as nation against tyranny. The absence of national unity strengthened the military to justify military intervention, by presenting them as the only national power to unite Nigeria (See chapter four and Butts & Metz 1996:5).

This non-challenger personality evident in chapter four was beginning to change. This can be seen in the difficulty

Abacha had in institutionalising his regime. Some signs<sup>2</sup> showed that the Nigerians were not going to tolerate dictators any longer. This was the legacy of Babangida's political awareness programmes and the continuous failure of military government to produce the good life to the ordinary citizens in the macro environment. Unfortunately, this unfolding challenger personality was still rooted in ethnicity and regionalism. Because the macro environment was disillusioned with Democracy (after all the attempts to reach it), it was yet to be spiced with democratic values. Babangida promised a civilian government in 1990, but soon postponed the date four times (and eventually indefinitely). The military's obsession with control over the transformation process, Babangida's endless manipulation of the process and reluctance to step out of politics, blunted the macro environment. They justly concluded that elections had nothing to do with empowering the macro environment, but everything with the accumulation of wealth and political power for the Northern elites. Those who control the state control state contracts and that was the only way to riches in the economic torn Nigeria. Therefore the election between Moshood Abiola from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa from the middle right National Republican Convention (NRC) did not arouse public interest. The public deemed it as a farce, with Abiola and Tofa as Babangida's hand puppets (Butts & Metz 1996:9).

b. Role: Challenger

The role of the macro environment was divided along ethnic lines. The Northerners adopted a role set to safeguard their privileged position and in that supported the system of

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2. See par. 5.2.1.1.2. for more information on anti-government protests.

political economy and a military regime. During the general democratic election of June 1993, the privileged Northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani urged Babangida to keep on to political power and to halt the election. The Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN) launched a big campaign to beg Babangida to hold on to political power. They consisted out of rich businessmen, politicians and senior military officers, under leadership of Abimbola Davies. They aimed at nullifying the election on 12 June 1993 by means of a court injunction, but could only succeed in prohibiting the National Electoral Commission (NEC) by means of a court interdict in releasing the results of the election. After releasing results on the 14th of June, no further results were released because of ABN law suits against the NEC (Butts & Metz 1996:10 and Uwechue 1996b:1193-1194).

The other ethnic groups in Nigeria did not support the military government but were too divided (religious and ethnic diversity) to unite in a common challenger role against the military regime and its supporters. On the 12th of June 1993 less than 50% of the Nigerian macro environment turned up at the election polls. This was due to a lack of interest and confusion on if the election was going to take place (considering the law suits). When they made the results known the 14th, it came as a surprise that Abiola (the Yoruba Muslim SDP candidate) drew 4.3 million of the 6.6 million counted votes and 11 of the 15 declared states, including Abuja and Kano. International observers and the National Election Monitoring Group (NEMG) declared the election free and fair<sup>3</sup>. On 23 June, the same day that the NEC turned to the Court of

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3. Seen in the light of the Yoruba's political awareness and participation (and their geographic distribution), as well as the political apathy found among those Northerners who did not enjoy the fruits of government, this outcome was no surprise.

Appeal, the military government declared the election void in order to safeguard Northerner interests. All decrees that provided for a democratic transition to civilian rule, were revoked. In return Babangida promised that a civilian government will assume power on the 27th of August, after they held new elections with new candidates (Butts & Metz 1996:10 and Uwechue 1996b:1193-1194). The macro environment revolted and again resorted to their different ethnic groups to oppose Northern political and economic domination. Even though the macro environment did not unite as nation against this mentioned domination, for the first time the military had a difficult time to institutionalise and safeguard their regime.

c. Task: Challenger

Some elements in the macro environment took to tasks related in challenging the macro environment. The interim government was criticized as puppets of the military and/or as a stumbling block to effective democratic transition. The macro environment showed their discontent through the independent press and even by hijacking an aeroplane. By the beginning of November Shonekan's government was in shambles. Most Nigerians believed that the interim government had no say over state matters and that it did not have the macro environments mandate to govern. The declining economy contributed too further protest and strikes in the macro environment. The death of the interim government came when the higher court in Lagos found that it was illegal, as Babangida signed the decree that founded the interim government after his term lapsed. Abiola called on Shonekan to renounce his presidency. In this he was widely supported by opinion makers (Butts & Metz 1996:12 and Uwechue 1996b:1194-1195). The macro environment showed its teeth.

d. Values: Challenger

Essentially the macro environment values revolved around own ethnic and regional interests, but the chaos followed by the annulment of the election clearly showed that Nigerians were tired of a military rule. Harsh military rule united the Nigerians in their resentment of it, but this resentment was expressed in an ethnic setup. Interregional and interethnic organisations to oppose Northerner domination did not develop. Instead, ethnic groups like the Yoruba became a factor to be reckoned with. In the light of the aforementioned it is doubted whether a sense of Democracy had developed in Nigeria at this stage. Maybe in future, the domination of one group will only be replaced by the domination of another group. At least the actions of the Yoruba indicated that institutionalised military rule has lost its legitimacy. Yoruba pressure caused Babangida to resign.

5.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

This environment represents the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined, in order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Compromiser

The third wave of democratisation that swept over Latin America, other parts of the Asian pacific area and the previous Soviet Bloc reached Africa in 1991. Autocratic governments in Zambia, the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and

Principe, Benin, Madagascar, Lesotho and Burundi came to a fall. In more than thirty states pro-democracy uprisings occurred, of which plenty led to substantial changes if not full blown democracy (Butts & Metz 1996:1-2).

This change in the strategic landscape after the Cold War forced the USA to reexamine her relationship with Nigeria. The non-challenger personality of the global environment was transformed into a compromiser personality, wherein Nigerian military rule and interventionist policy<sup>4</sup> were accepted, as the USA viewed Nigeria as upholder of Democracy but expected her to manage and solve conflict in West Africa. The USA (and Clinton administration) reflected this vision in their foreign policy and determination of national security strategy (Butts & Metz 1996:2-3). This gave Babangida the necessary legitimacy, international prestige, consolidated his domestic power base, diverted attention from domestic problems and most important, kept the military busy in order to minimise the risk of counter coups d'état and prompted him to consider international reaction before undertaking actions that could destabilise West Africa (Olonisakin 1998a:8-11, also see Olonisakin 1998b:44).

b. Role: Compromiser

The global environment adopted a compromiser role by distancing them from any political attempts in Nigeria to democratise and by withholding criticism against the military government. They send international observers to Nigeria, but

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4. Nigeria reached a bilateral defence pact with Pres. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (1996), intervened in the attempt to overthrow Kabbah (1997) and used the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to reinstate Kabbah (1998) (Olonisakin 1998a:8-11, Olonisakin 1998c:147).

did not question, for example, the nullification of the election on international forums. This was mainly the result of the USA's acceptance of Nigeria as peacekeeper in Western Africa, because they were themselves reluctant to accept this role.

c. Task: Compromiser

The global environment undertook no task to solve the problem of Nigerian transition to democracy. The military was seen as an important aspect in stabilising the West African region and therefore not opposed on global forums, as long as the fragile power balance in the Cold War was not disturbed.

d. Values: Compromiser

By 1993 the international arena dramatically turned to the embracement of democratic values for Africa. Because of this stance and their own interest, the global environment pleaded for restricted sanctions against Nigeria. International pressure, based on the accept-but-complain attitude, resulted partly in the acceptance of the idea of an Interim government led by military allies. This was a compromise that looked as if civilian political aspirations had won.

5.1.1.2. Organisation.

It is necessary to evaluate the contribution of organisation (in terms of the development of a challenger personality) to the execution of undemocratic recruitment actions, as support ensures success.



5.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Non-supportive

Babangida faced a non-supportive organisation in the Northern military ranks, when he allowed the election for a democratically elected civilian government to continue. The possible replacement of the military government by that of Abiola spurred Abacha and his followers in the military into pressing Babangida to nullify the election. Babangida succumbed to pressure and annulled the election. The military moved swiftly during the resulting civil strife to close down five opposition media groups, including those of Abiola. They met unrest with violent confrontation using the state apparatus (Uwechue 1996b:1194). This use of organised state violence restored Northern political dominance, but also united the rest of the micro environment against Babangida.

The annulment of the election caused a stir among the non-Northerner military. Those military opposed to military government reacted by resigning from the NDF. Thirty Cols. and Brigs. resigned in protest. Col. Abubakar Umar (a beneficiary of the system of political economy) openly announced that the: ANigerian military as represented by our present leadership has become a stumbling block to the development of the nation-s democracy@ (in Butts & Metz 1996:11). This indicated the en masse opposition to Northern political and economic domination. It also signified a non-supportive organisation.

5.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment adopted a non-supportive organisational stance. With the annulment of the election the pro-democracy Nigerian community united around the SDP leadership and the Campaign for Democracy (an umbrella organisation for civil and

human rights bodies). This tempted all democratic organisations, non-governmental organisations and individuals, despite religion, sex, region or class to step forward and demand Democracy. In this, the press, professional associations, university faculties, students and labour movements supported them. The Ibo in the Eastern part of Nigeria accepted this annulment with cynical fatalism, but the Yoruba rallied openly against Babangida. It became clear to them that the Hausa-Fulani will not surrender political power because they regarded the military as a vehicle for ethnic dominance (Butts & Metz 1996:11). Though Babangida's forces brutally suppressed the protests, it was so successful that it led to his resignation on the 26th of August. He handed political power to an interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan (Uwechue 1996b:1194).

It is interesting that few of the civilian elite, even elected officials, gave their support to Abiola. This shows their interest in the corruption network and their fear for the security apparatus of Babangida. Another reason for this is the fact that they did not suffer under the military regime. Due to that, they were unable to see the use of fundamental reforms (Butts & Metz 1996:11-12).

#### 5.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment reflected an uninvolved organisational stance, by introducing restricted sanctions against Nigeria after taking cognisance of the annulment of the elections. The USA and Europe pushed for the quick restoration of the transition programme. Meanwhile they accepted Shonekan at the UN General Meeting and invited him to attend a meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Cyprus (Uwechue

1996b:1194-1195). This indicated their accept-but-complain-role and compromiser personality.

#### 5.1.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the different identified environments needs to be examined, in order to establish how the setting contributes, in terms of the development of a challenger personality, to the execution of undemocratic recruitment actions.

##### 5.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation for Abacha (as main challenger personality in the micro environment with access to military resources) to be recruited as new political leader was ideal. He was generally seen as the real force behind the interim government. He acted as political officer and as main actor in the coups d'état of 1983 and 1985, and in that capacity gained a vast knowledge in the planning and execution of coups d'état (Butts & Metz 1996:12). He had the support of the Northern military and the political elites from the Northern state. This created an ideal setting for his recruitment, as he only needed their support for a recruitment attempt to succeed, seeing that they control the weapon monopoly.

##### 5.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

Babangida as political leader lost the support of the macro environment when he began to challenge them. Due to this challenge, the macro environment (especially the Yoruba) united against Babangida and partly contributed to his resignation. Even though the Yoruba succeeded in this regard, they could not unite across ethnic boundaries to deliver a

national leader as alternative to military rule. This made it ideal for Abacha to fill the political vacuum. The result was the development of a discontent setting in the macro environment.

5.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment was content with the interim government and as such can be considered to have an untouched setting. The situation in the USSR and their former satellites attracted more of the global environment's attention. This situation allowed Abacha to challenge the macro environment and replace it again with a military government.

5.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
Organisation	Non-supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment developed a challenging personality when they realised that their privileged position was in danger, thus providing them with a motive. This explains why they did not support Babangida (macro environment) in his decision to continue with an election for a civilian president. The fact that the political power was still in the hands of the Northerners, made it an ideal situation for the micro environment to develop a challenger personality.

The macro environment was challenging Babangida's regime, as he struggled to obtain legitimacy. They began to openly protest against his government and forced him to resign. This was made possible, as he lost the support of the influential military political leaders in the macro environment (especially the Northerners). They feared a civilian government would charge them with corruption and human right abuses. It would also have meant the end of their privilege position.

The compromiser personality of the global environment influenced the Northerner military to once again secure their political power, by pressing for an interim government, as it would have the approval of the global environment as long as Nigeria partakes in stabilising the West Africa region.

## 5.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase began with the planning and execution of the coup d'état that toppled Babangida and ends directly thereafter. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of a military leader in the role of political leader.

### 5.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the three identified environments. The aim of this analysis is to expose those factors present in the phase, which contribute to the success of undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

5.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables is needed to isolate those environmental factors that promote the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of a political leader by means of undemocratic recruitment actions.

5.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In order to determine the contribution of this environment towards the success of undemocratic recruitment attempts, in terms of the recruitment phase, it is necessary to reflect on the personality, role, task and values of the micro environment.

a. Personality: Challenger

Abacha revealed his challenger personality by dismissing Shonekan and seizing power on 17 November 1993. In this his allies in the military and those political elites from the Northern state supported him. It was made possible due to the existing structural weakness in the micro environment and because Abacha positioned himself for this undemocratic recruitment attempt as minister of Defence and probable head of the interim government (Butts & Metz 1996:12). The dismissal of Shonekan can be described as a governmental coup d'état, as it was directed at securing the political power of the Northern military<sup>5</sup>.

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5. Huntington (1962:32-33) differentiates between a governmental, reform and revolutionary coup d'état. A governmental coup d'état takes place when a conflict situation brings about the violent overthrow of the state apparatus, without any apparent motive. A reform coup d'état occurs where the military intervention in the political environment is directed against the system and at eliminating political incumbents. The revolutionary coup d'état has

b. Role: Challenger

Abacha's immediate role (and that of his supporters in the military) was to challenge the macro environment, to broaden his political power and to safeguard the privileged position of the military and Northern political elite. This role spurred him to turn to military totalitarianism, as he was strongly opposed by the macro environment (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

c. Task: Challenger

Abacha and the military's tasks were all directed at safeguarding the privileged position of the military and Northern elite, as they wanted to conserve military autonomy (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

d. Values: Challenger

As indicated in the previous chapters, the military did not all share the same values. Those opposed to the system of political economy, said they favoured Democracy and those for it supported Northern military autonomy and dominance. This is but one aspect that created factions in the military: others were religion, ethnicity, regionalism, and ideology. The strongest group in the military was those who supported military dominance (especially groups from the North). Their values (as embroidered on in previous chapters) were of the kind that promoted a challenger personality and the use of

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the aim to overhaul or transform the political and social structures in total.

undemocratic methods in order to be recruited as political leaders.

5.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

In order to determine the contribution of the abovementioned environment towards the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase, the personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be analysed.

a. Personality: Challenger

The macro environment revealed a challenger personality towards the Shonekan government. The annulment of the 1994 election threw Nigeria into a crisis. The macro environment responded to this crisis by embracing regionalism for answers. This had the effect that vast parts in Nigeria became ungovernable due to anti-government protest. This was especially true for the Yoruba West. Shonekan also got the oil industry bureaucracy to turn against him, because of his attempts to disempower them. He gradually had difficulty in maintaining law and order (Williams 1998:8 and Butts & Metz 1996:12). The declining economy did not ease his situation. Inflation rose to 100%, the Nigerian currency was almost worthless and price hikes and shortages in basic products were commonly found. Nigeria was on the brink of economic collapse. This situation further alienated Shonekan from the macro environment (Butts & Metz 1996:12-13). His biggest blow came when the higher court in Lagos found his government to be illegal (Williams 1998:8).

This set the scene for Abacha to topple Shonekan, as Northerner political dominance was threatened. His coup d'état



was welcomed by most in the macro environment as a relief, even by some prominent pro-democracy activists. Most hoped that it would bring an end to the election crisis that was overshadowed by civil strife and regionalism. It also was to his favour that the macro environment regarded him as a stern, apolitical and professional soldier that was going to save Nigeria once again from faltering politicians and soldiers (CNN 1998 and Williams 1998:8). This notion of the macro environment was due to a lack in civilian political leadership, or rather total incompetence, and the creation of a political power vacuum. It is also characteristic of the Nigerian society's culture, in which a coup d'état is considered to be a solution for national problems.

b. Role: Challenger

The macro environment had a challenger personality, but failed to transform that into a national challenger role against the military. This is the result of their adoption of regionalism and the fact that they posed no organisational alternative to the military.

c. Task: Challenger

The macro environment took it upon them to render the Shonekan government ungovernable. However, they did not unite in a national party to present themselves as alternative to military rule.

d. Values: Challenger

The diverse ethnic and regional interests found in the macro environment fostered values that hampered nationalism. It

also promoted the development of a challenger personality that is stained with ethnicity and regionalism.

5.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied as to evaluate the factors present in this environment which contribute to the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

a. Personality: Compromiser

The global environment continued with their compromiser personality, as they did not want to be absorbed in Nigeria's domestic turmoil.

b. Role: Compromiser

Due to the fact that Nigeria presents the possibility to slip into a state of anarchy, the global environment maintained a compromiser role. This was because they were afraid to be involved in Nigerian and / or other African crises.

c. Task: Compromiser

The global environment maintained a compromiser role in order to avoid direct and costly involvement in African issues and problems.

d. Values: Compromiser

Due to global values that supported compromise, the international community was not involved in solving the

problem of military government in Nigeria. Instead, they paid symbolic respect to the dream of Democracy, by imposing restricted sanctions on Nigeria.

#### 5.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be analysed in order to evaluate the contribution of this environment towards the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

##### 5.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Due to the system of political economy, Abacha had the advantage of a supportive organisation. As he was the Minister of Defence and the real power behind the interim government (that consisted out of military allies), he could easily muster support for his decision to dismiss Shonekan. Abacha kept those opposed to the system of political economy busy in external ECOMOG missions, so that they could not intervene in his plans of securing Northerner political domination.

##### 5.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

Shonekan had a non-supportive organisation to his disadvantage, due to the economic decline, legitimacy problems and raising resistance of the macro environment.

##### 5.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment formed an uninvolved organisation because they adopted policy aimed at not involving them unnecessarily with Africa's problems which could upset the

prevailing power status between the Soviet Block and the Western Block.

#### 5.2.1.3. Setting.

The setting for Abacha to topple Shonekan was ideal, as he was in the right position to be recruited and had the support of the main political role players.

##### 5.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The following factors encountered in the micro environment contributed to the downfall of Shonekan:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

##### 5.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors contributed to the downfall of Shonekan:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

This environment was characterised by a discontent setting.

5.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The fact that the global environment did not wish to become involved in Africa's domestic affairs, smoothed the way for the military to establish a government by means of undemocratic recruitment methods.

5.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

The dynamic interaction encountered in step two is illustrated in the following table:

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
Organisation	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The recruitment of Abacha as political leader was easy, as he had the support of the most important political role players in the macro environment. The situation was ideal, as he was pressed to be recruited because Northerner political domination was under threat with the decline of their regimes= legitimacy and the increasing possibility for a counter coup d'état.

The macro environment challenged the Shonekan government. This opposition was grouped into regional pressure groups that made Nigeria ungovernable. This challenger personality created legitimacy problems for Shonekan, because he lacked

support of the macro environment. The fact that the macro environment could not unite against the micro environment (due to regionalism), indicated a discontent setting.

The dismissal of Shonekan was not opposed by the global environment, as they did not want to intervene in Nigerian affairs when their interests were not at directly under threat.

### 5.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

After Abacha assumed power, he had to expand his control over the micro -, macro - and global environment in order to stay in power. This implied the use of excessive force and the abuse of power, as he had little support of the macro environment - especially from the Yoruba (as indicated in phase two). In this phase Abacha is addressed as part of the macro environment, as he was recruited to the macro environment and therefore challenged from within the micro environment for political dominance.

#### 5.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step of the chapter, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be studied, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the three different environments. The aim with this analysis is to establish which factors in the different environments, as encountered in this phase, contribute to the success of establishing a military leader in the role of political leader and ensure the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables will isolate those factors present in the environment which contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values in this phase need to be contemplated, in order to establish which factors contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Challenger

Abacha displayed the worse type of challenger personality. One of his first declarations was: Any attempt to tempt our will will be decisively dealt with<sup>o</sup> (Uwechue 1996b:1195). This credo became his day to day task. At the time of his death it was said that he: Astood out as icy and unforgiving, willing to flout world opinion in his quest for absolute power<sup>o</sup> (CNN 1998). He was seen as a ruthless dictator who abused human rights and reacted fiercely against any opponents (including the military). During his regime the military locked up almost 7000 government critiques and dissidents, of which plenty died (Sullivan 1998 and Olonisakin 1998a:12). Most of them were charged after being tipped by government officials who were desperately in need for money (see BBC News 1998). This slaughtering of people affected Abacha himself: he became a recluse in his villa, travelled less due to fear for a counter coup d'état, gave no interviews and always appeared in public with dark glasses (CNN 1998). The last year of his reign was characterised by his personal debauchery, drunkenness, theft of almost ,3.6 billion government funds and

even the use of state aeroplanes to pick up Indian prostitutes for his dwindling clique at Abuja (The Times Foreign News 1998).

b. Role: Challenger

Abacha and his diminishing support group had the role of institutionalising the new regime. In this they had difficulty, as they lacked legitimacy and support. The dissidents in the micro environment (even some Northern political elites) opposed to Northerner military rule, contributed in making it difficult for him to institutionalise his regime. This can be seen in the resignation of a number of military officers from the NDF. These challenger actions from within the military were countered by regular purges of the NDF and the use of excessive force against critiques of the regime. The role of those opposing Abacha was therefore minimalised (Butts and Metz 1996:13,16 and Uwechue 1996b:1195).

c. Task: Challenger

The main task of Abacha was to safeguard his own regime and to challenge those who opposed his government. To achieve this, Abacha had to broaden or at least to keep his support base. In the political manoeuvring that followed, Abacha showed his true genius as political manipulator. He divided and suppressed his opponents by using confusion and contradictions to his own benefit; usually by combining reform with suppression. By revoking the national and state conferences, dismantling the two political parties, replacing all chosen state governors with appointees and banning political meetings and associations Abacha dismantled all democratic institutions established by Babangida (which took eight years to establish



and cost N 30 billion). The same time he undertook to launch a programme for the transition to a civilian government and revoked all Babangida's press restrictions. He promised to allow true parties with grassroots support to develop after completion of the work of the National Constitutional Conference, appointed a broad cabinet of military and eminent civilian members, promised a constitutional forum and economic reform programmes. He appointed Yorubas in two of the top four military posts to combat ethnicity in the military. He even visited Abiola (CNN 1998). This manoeuvring worked at first but soon, with the frequent postponement of general democratic elections, the public and military came to see through his plans (Williams 1998). Nigerians at last learned from history.

Abacha wanted legitimacy for his tenure as leader and focused himself on becoming the legitimate constitutional president. He allowed five of the 15 parties who applied to register for the August 1998 elections after which all of them voted for him as their sole presidential candidate (See Sullivan 1998 and Blunt 1998). This action barred the opposition from using the legal system to oust him as leader. When the opposition complained at the courts, they were silenced by a verdict in favour of Abacha. This caused the opposition to seek international support, although both opposition and global condemnation fell on his deaf ears. When the use of democratic symbolism seemed out of reach, Abacha was persuaded to use more force on civilian opposition (Blunt 1998:30).

To use force on the military was dangerous, as it could lead to a counter coup d'état. He knew that and therefore used the Cameroon border dispute in the beginning of 1994 as an opportunity to keep the military preoccupied until the end of

December of that year (Uwechue 1996b:1195). He would soon use the military as vehicle for his vision of Nigeria as a regional peacemaker and political powerhouse. At the same time he scored legitimacy in the eyes of the global environment. In 1996 he played a vital role in ending the seven-year civil war in Liberia by facilitating free democratic elections. After the coup d'état in Sierra Leone he again deployed troops to restore the democratic elected government (CNN 1998).

d. Values: Challenger

The values as exposed in the previous chapters, prompted a challenger personality in the micro environment (See Rupert 1998).

5.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be analysed in order to determine the contribution this environment has towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Challenger/Non-challenger

The macro environment developed a challenger personality, but this urged Abacha to use more power and force against them. He used the strategy of weakening, dividing and suppressing his opponents, even combining that to democratic reforms (Butts & Metz 1996:14-15). This changed the macro environment's challenger personality to that of a non-challenger one (see Blunt 1998:30-33). Economic demise, the collapse of public life and the threatening ethnic conflict/civil war, torn the macro environment apart and

ensured that it cannot unite against the military. Due to the suppression of minorities (like those in the oil producing South and Southeast Nigeria) ethnic tension rose rapidly. It took the form of regional clashes by which Christians (South) and Muslims (North) attacked each other and culminated in a jihad proclaimed against the Christians (Butts & Metz 1996:14).

b. Role: Challenger/Non-challenger

At first Abacha found support from some members of the press who launched an attack on the USA for criticizing the military government. Even the pro-democratic elements in the macro environment were initially glad that the military restored order. They quickly learned that Abacha had his mind set on prolonging military dominance and upheld a challenger personality. Due to Abacha's resentment in opposition, he stifled any opposition with harsh measures. The result was that most of the macro environment embraced (during his regime) an artificial non-challenger personality. Sport became more important than politics, as Nigeria won the Africa Nations Cup in April and partook in the World Cup Tournament (July) (Uwechue 1996b:1195, Williams 1998:8 and see BBC News 1998). This distracted the Nigerian macro environment from participating in politics.

Previous military leaders such as Obasanjo and Buhari announced that Abacha was the: 'biggest disciple, supporter and beneficiary' of the 'corrupt' government of Babangida. Abacha reacted by banning the Campaign for Democracy press conference in Lagos and in arresting Gen. Yar-Adua (Uwechue 1996b:1195). Organised national and international opposition to his government escalated. On 15 May 1994 the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was established by prominent politicians

with the aim to establish Abiola as president of a broad based national government. Although this organisation was declared illegal, the Roman Catholic Church pledged its support. The Conference of Catholic Bishops of Nigeria (CCBN) asked for the investigation into the annulment of the 1993 election. On 11 June 1994 Abiola declared himself president of Nigeria. On the 23rd of June he was arrested on grounds of treason (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14). On 1 October 1994, Gani Fawehinmi -a jurist, established a political party, well knowing that it was punishable. He was arrested on the spot. Other arrests followed suit, for instance that of Gen. Obasanjo and others accused of plotting a coup d'état against the government. After a secret trial they were sentenced, some even to life long imprisonment. Wole Soyinka (a Nobel laureate) escaped fate by fleeing to France. He was sentenced in absentia to death for high treason (CNN 1998, Olonisakin 1989:12 and Uwechue 1996b:1196).

At the labour front, workers grew quite intolerant with the government due to the annulment of the 1993 election. On 5 July 1994 the longest strike in the history of Nigeria began under leadership of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN). Their main demand was the inauguration of Abiola as President. This strike was very effective in the Southwestern states of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and the Delta. In a general mobilisation for a pro-Abiola campaign, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called for a national strike on the 3rd of August 1994. On the 18th the government reacted to this strike, by sacking leaders of NUPENG, PENGASSAN and the NLC as well as to close down magazines like the *Punch*, *Concord* and *Guardian*. Mass arrests of pro-democracy activists followed, including the arrest of Chief Anthony Enahoro. This suppression by the state and the

fact that strike actions were only successful in the Southwestern part of Nigeria lead to the ending of the strikes (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14). Once again Nigeria resorted to regionalism for solutions that should be sought in nationalism.

The Abacha regime did not terminate the macro environment's resentment of military government. With the government's application of phase one of transition to a civilian government a massive pro-democratic boycott resulted in less than 500 000 votes being counted on 28 May 1995 in the national election for a Constitutional Conference (of whom the government decided to nominate 24%) (Uwechue 1996b:1195-1196).

c. Task: Challenger/Non-challenger

The macro environment adopted labour related tasks to safeguard its own environment, such as launching strikes - for example that of NUPENG, PENGASSAN and NLC. In doing so it challenged Abacha's environment but was met with severe suppression.

d. Values: Challenger/Non-challenger

After Abacha assumed position as political leader, the macro environment had enough of a military regime, but it was also clear that they were dead tired and too impoverished to care to fight the military. They once again resorted to apathy and values that promoted a non-challenger personality (See Rupert 1998).

5.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be reflected on, in order to establish which factors in this environment contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Compromiser/Challenger

The post-Cold War international system was characterised by a diminishing great power interest in Africa, a reliance on regional powers to make and keep the power balance and a believe that military rule is not acceptable in the global environment. This system presented an inherent weakness: undemocratic recruitment actions to stabilise volatile regions in Africa were internationally approved (and thus legitimised) and used as excuse by the international community to pardon domestic state violence. In Nigeria's case the global environment was not too eager to impose an oil embargo, as it would have a widespread effect on the Nigerian economy, jeopardise ECOMOG activities and cause other unforeseen trickle down effects. Abacha was aware of this compromiser personality and used it to his advantage. This explains why Nigeria was condemned as 'Pariah state', but was also hailed as an important and useful player in the global environment arena (the accept-but-complain approach) (see Olonisakin 1998a:12-14, Olonisakin 1998b:44 and Olonisakin 1998c:146-147).

b. Role: Compromiser/Challenger

Since 1994 the USA began to indicate that they are not satisfied with a military government in Nigeria. American and British opposition to this military government flared after it became known that Nigerian government officials formed part of

the Nigerian swindlers who opted for international crime. It worsened after 419 rackets were discovered in which foreigners were targeted in fraudulent business transactions (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

After human rights atrocities were committed, the global environment turned to Nigeria's rescue in adopting a stronger stance against military rule. When Obasanjo was arrested in Abacha's 1995 counter coup d'état purges, the international community (especially Britain and the USA) reacted by putting external pressure on Abacha for Obasanjo's release. Jimmy Carter visited Abacha to secure the release of Obasanjo. Even Africa leaders, such as Mugabe, Museveni and Mandela intervened. International pressure against Abacha mounted in November 1995, after nine environmental and human rights activists, including Ken Saro-Wiwa were executed. The Commonwealth suspended Nigerian membership and the Organisation for Unity in Africa (OAU) condemned the executions. TransAfrica, an Afro-American anti-apartheid movement, began with a campaign against the military government in Nigeria and pleaded (as Mandela) for oil sanctions. Support for this plea escalated in the aftermath of Saro-Wiwa's execution in 1995, with even the USA considering it (Butts & Metz 1996:15, The Times Foreign News 1998, Olonisakin 1998a:12 and CNN 1998).

c. Task: Compromiser/Challenger

The global environment adopted tasks to safeguard the macro environment and to challenge the micro environment. These tasks were performed in such a way as to ensure the continuance of Nigeria's function as regional peacekeeper. In this opposing tasks the compromiser role and personality of the global environment were evident.

d. Values: Compromiser/Challenger

Some states in Africa praised and hailed Abacha as the restorer of democracy in West Africa, especially presidents Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Sierra Leone) and Charles Taylor (Liberia). This was not true with most of the Western countries. After Abacha's death on 8 June 1998 the White House spokes person, Mike McCurry, said that the Clinton administration hoped that Abubakar will hand power to a civilian government. The same calls came from Robin Cook (British Foreign Secretary), France, the European Union and the Commonwealth (Sullivan 1998). The global environment thus came to pressure the Nigerian military to adopt modernising values and to aspire for a democratic order in Nigeria.

5.3.1.3. Organisation.

The role of the organisation in the environment needs to be examined, in order to evaluate this factor's contribution towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Non-supportive

Abacha found a non-supportive organisation as he gradually lost the military's support in actions to broaden his personal power. Between August and October 1994 Abacha sacked or shuffled quite a number of senior government officials (due to fear of counter coups d'état). He frequently resorted to purges to get rid of would be coup d'état plotters. In the spring of 1995 150 officers were arrested and up to 400 were held and tortured in detention (Butts & Metz 1996:14-15). He dismissed the Army and Naval heads and took over absolute



power. In August the government announced decrees that further strengthened his position, even one that stipulates that his actions were beyond legal challenge of the courts. In an attempt to court the military he appointed an enlarged Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of 25 members in September, excluding all previous civilian members. In December he absconded the habeas corpus, ending a tradition of judicial independence (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14-15).

5.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive/Uninvolved

The macro environment was non-supportive of Abacha. In the beginning of his rule they showed this behaviour in frequent pro-democracy actions. The detaining of Abiola made this show of solidarity possible, which helped to unite different opinion groups trying to restore Democracy. At the end of 1996, national leaders such as Dr. N. Azikiwe and other elder statesmen appealed to the government to reach a compromise (Uwechue 1996b:1196).

Due to the brute force that Abacha turned against opponents of the military regime, the non-supportive organisation of the macro environment turned into an uninvolved organisation. By the end of 1995 the effective suppressing of anti-government viewpoints stifled the macro environment leaving them numb and apathetic. The leader of the National Democratic Coalition remarked: AIf you organize demonstrations here, [the] government will use any of its forces to kill the people. We are tired of bloodshed@ (Butts & Metz 1996:16).

5.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment began to form a more challenging organisational front against Abacha, by exercising pressure on

him for detaining Abiola. Mandela, Tutu, Jesse Jackson and Chief Emeka Anyaoku (secretary general of the Commonwealth) pressured Abacha to release Abiola (Uwechue 1996b:1196). The execution of Saro-Wiwa brought a turning point in Western attitude towards the Nigerian dilemma. This lead, according to the author, to the situation where Kofi Anan visited Abubakar to oversee the transition to a Democracy. Nigeria began to experience global pressure and felt isolated as pariah state. Still, effective action against military government was not implemented, due to fear that the global environment will be absorbed in Africa's domestic turmoil.

#### 5.3.1.4. Setting.

The setting of the different environments needs to be analysed, in order to assess how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

##### 5.3.1.4.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The suppression of micro - and macro environment opposition and the total domination of macro environment political leadership created an ideal situation for Abacha to remain in power.

##### 5.3.1.4.2. Macro environment: Ideal

Due to the suppression of opposition and the inability of the macro environment to unite against the military, Abacha was given the opportunity to establish his regime. By using the state apparatus as instrument of suppression, Abacha artificially created an ideal setting for him to remain in power.

5.3.1.4.3. Global environment: Untouched

Although the global environment became more involved in Nigeria's internal problems, by even propagating and enforcing sanctions, there was no direct plan to counter the acceptance of military regimes by the macro environment. They remained untouched.

5.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger/ Non-challenger	Compromiser/ Challenger
Organisation	Non-supportive	Non-supportive /Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

Abacha succeeded in establishing his regime, but not in legitimising or institutionalising it. He was challenged in this quest by the macro - and global environment. He dealt with this problem by suppressing the macro environment and in ignoring the global environment, well knowing that the structural problem present in the international system favours that option. The macro environment revealed an artificial challenger personality, as it was suppressed by Abacha's stern anti-opposition measures. The regionalisation of macro environment politics gave the macro environment a non-

supportive or uninvolved organisation. This contributed to the prolongation of Abacha's regime. The compromiser personality of the global environment contributed to the establishment of Abacha's regime, as they did not actively repudiate him, but indications were found that this personality varied to include a challenger personality. This challenger participation of the global environment to safeguard the macro environment political leadership is not a new dimension in the Nigerian situation, but the opposition of military government is new. This can make a big difference in the future institutionalisation of military regimes as form of government in Nigeria.

#### 5.4. Summary.

In this chapter it was assessed that the micro environment developed a challenger personality, when the military realised that their privileged position as political leaders was in danger due to Babangida's democratisation attempts and the effect it had on the population. This provided them with a recruitment motive and convinced them to withhold any support for Babangida. This lack of support among the military, as well as the macro environment, caused Babangida to lose legitimacy, endangered the institutionalisation of his regime and led to his eventual resignation. His resignation created havoc, as the macro environment experienced a national leadership vacuum which once again benefitted the micro environment leadership. Supported by a compromiser personality found in the global environment, the Northerner military once again secured their political power and dismissed Shonekan as head of the interim government. Abacha, as the newly recruited political leader, enjoyed the support of the most important political role players in the micro - and macro environment and could therefore emerge as new

political leader. Once again the macro environment could not unite against the military, as opposition against the Shonekan government was grouped into regional pressure groups aimed to make Nigeria ungovernable.

An interesting element of the Abacha era, is the fact that Abacha easily succeeded in establishing a military regime, but struggled his whole tenure long to obtain legitimacy. In this quest for legitimacy he was increasingly challenged by the macro - and global environment. The challenge posed by the macro environment was from the onset answered with suppression. After the end of the Cold War, the global environment noted this suppression of the macro environment with growing repugnance. It increasingly involved the global environment, though not actively, but was met with Abacha's silence. He knew well that the structural problem present in the international system favours this tactic. This situation clearly indicates that a military government can easily be established by means of an undemocratic recruitment attempt, especially if the macro environment is weakened and the global environment uninvolved, but if it lacks legitimacy, suppression must constantly be applied on opposition, in order to avoid global environment involvement and/or domestic instability. Another lesson learned is the fact that global environment involvement seriously influences leadership style. In the Nigerian case study, this involvement eventually contributed to the successful transformation of Nigeria from a military regime to a Democracy.

**CHAPTER 6: ENVIRONMENT DETERMINED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP MODEL:  
CONCLUSION**

6. Introduction.

Even though Africa began with its third wave of Democratisation in the 1990's, some military leaders still resorted to undemocratic recruitment methods, in order to be recruited as political leaders. This ignited the frequently asked question on African political leadership: "Why does Africa allow the undemocratic recruitment of military men as political leaders?". The aim of the environment determined political leadership model, as stated in chapter one and two, is to supply answers to this problem in Nigeria, but also to explain this phenomenon in general.

In this chapter, the application of the environment determined political leadership model (chapter 3, 4 and 5) on the Nigerian situation will be reviewed in comparison with each case study, in order to shed light on the question of the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders in general. Guidelines will also be provided for the prevention of undemocratic recruitment actions in future. In terms of the model, predictions will be made for the possibility for Democracy to be institutionalised in Nigeria.

6.1. The undemocratic recruitment of military men as political leaders in Africa.

In chapter one the question was posed on why Africa allows the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders to take place. The aim of this dissertation was to answer this question by means of applying the environment determined political leadership model on the

Nigerian situation under the leadership (military and political) of Gowon, Babangida and Abacha. In the following exposition, these results are compared in order to test the set linkages of statements and general theory as formulated and argued in chapter one.


6.1.2. Step 1: A specific three phase analysis of the historical situation.

During this step of the model, it was identified that the military in Nigeria continuously revealed a challenger personality (8 out of the 9 times<sup>1</sup>), the macro environment moved between a challenger (4-5 out of 9 times), compromiser (1 out of 9 times) and a non-challenger personality (3-4 out of 9 times). The global environment moved between a challenger (1-2 out of 9 times), non-challenger (5 out of 9 times) and a compromiser personality (2-3 out of 9 times). The micro environment had a supportive organisation (7 out of 9 times), the macro environment's organisation shifted between supportive (2 out of 9), non-supportive (4-5 out of 9) to uninvolved (2-3 out of 9) and the global environment stayed uninvolved. The setting for the military was ideal (9 out of 9), whereas the macro environment reflected a discontent setting (6 out of 9) and an ideal setting (3 out of 9) and the global environment setting stayed untouched (9 out of 9).


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1. These nine times refer to the three phases for each leader, who if calculated results to nine times.


Pie chart 1. Challenger personality.



Pie chart 2. Non-challenger personality.




Pie chart 3. Compromiser personality.







Pie chart 4. Supportive Organisation.




Pie chart 5. Non-supportive organisation.




Pie chart 6. Uninvolved Organisation.




Pie chart 7. Ideal Setting.



Pie chart 8. Discontent Setting.



Pie chart 9. Untouched Setting.



This clearly indicates that reaction sets in when a macro environment weakens and a micro environment strengthens as it has aspirations to be recruited as political leader. In examining the shifting personality and organisation of the macro environment (and global environment), the environment

determined political leadership model confirmed the factors contributing to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders, as suggested by Palmer and Finer, thus exposing the powerful role environment plays in the recruiting process of leaders in the role of political leaders. These existing results on society's culture and military professionalism were supplemented with the indication of more factors (as elaborated on in the paragraphs to follow), indicated by the model to contribute to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders.

Although the society's culture was identified by the students of Political Development as contributing factor to the undemocratic recruitment of the military, the following aspects addressing this aspect, were found to contribute immensely to the undemocratic recruitment of the military in the role of political leader:

C Lack of Nationalism. This factor facilitates the embracement of values such as regionalism, ethnicity and tribalism. Once these values are accepted as norm, inadequate political structures and processes are instituted, such as non-representative government, establishment of political machines and the implementation of policy directed at furthering the interests of a specific ethnic group.

C A general lack in macro environment leadership. A strong sense for political, economic and social leadership lacked in the micro environment. As can be expected, this weakened the macro environment in such a way that they abdicated their political power in favour of the military.

C The psychological conditioning of the macro environment.  
The macro environment was conditioned in accepting undemocratic recruitment methods as the only means to change government. Part of this conditioning was to manipulate the population in believing that it is acceptable for the government to use the state apparatus on dissidents and to institutionalise a military regime. The fact that the Nigerian population accepted this mistreatment reflects a lack in democratic culture (even cynicism in Democracy) and explains why national events (such as soccer matches and public holidays) keep the macro environment away from participating in political affairs that influence them personally (such as elections).

As mentioned, the lack of military professionalism was also identified as a decisive factor contributing to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders. During the course of the dissertation it became quite clear that this factor has a greater contribution towards the undemocratic recruitment of the military in a political position, when the military came to view them as a political alternative to civilian government, when they are constantly utilised in a political role/office and when they become politicised.

Other identified factors that definitely indicated an influence on the success rate of the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leaders in Nigeria, are the legacies of the colonial system, constant inadequate economic performance<sup>2</sup>, legitimacy problems facing

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2. This aspect contributed in Nigeria's case to the maintenance of the system of political economy.

the military rule due to a performance gap, fears of the military to lose political power as it was the only way to political -, economic - and social survival, the monopolisation of political power by one member of the military governing body and fears for the revenge of a powerful member in the military governing body. This resulted in quick recruitment reactions among those with political power, in fear for counter coups d'état that could diminish their political power.

This step of the model facilitated the description, explanation and clarification of the undemocratic recruitment process of a military leader.

#### 6.1.3. Step 2: Tabular comparison.

In the next step of the model, the interaction between leadership, environment and recruitment, as revealed in the historical situation of Nigeria, is expressed in a tabular form, in order to explain this phenomenon further and to provide an element of prediction to the model. In chapter one and two it was argued that a combination of variables (that is the environment-leadership-recruitment interaction) would be responsible for the triggering of an undemocratic recruitment action. This combination of variables was compartmentalised to personality, organisation and setting, as manifested in a micro -, macro - and global environment. The interplay between environment, leadership and recruitment were then expressed in probable variable options, which were compared to determine the possibility for undemocratic recruitment (in other words the effect on the environment and leadership) to take place.

6.1.3.1. Phase 1: The Emergence of a Challenger Personality.

In this phase the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment are compared to determine if the development of a challenger personality(s) indicated the possibility for a recruitment phase (phase two) to take place, when a motive for recruitment and an accompanying role were established. The model clearly showed that in the Nigerian case study, the micro environment was stronger than the macro - and global environment. The challenger micro environment personality combined with a supportive micro environment organisation and an ideal micro environment setting indicated a strong possibility for an undemocratic recruitment action to take place. The reason for the success of this recruitment action is to be found in the non-challenger personality, non-supportive organisation and discontent setting of the macro environment and the uninvolved of the global environment.

C3: Gowon	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Challenger	Challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

C4: Babangida	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

C5:Abacha	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
<b>Organisation</b>	Non-supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

a. Micro environment.

As indicated in the application of the environment determined political leadership model all three case studies indicated the presence of challenger personalities among the military, the different ethnic groups as well as the apolitical military. These challenger personalities developed in the first case as result of the politicisation of the military, i.e. by passing quotas, to support macro environment (Northern state politicians) political aims. In case two these challenger personalities were fuelled by a growing resentment for politicians (due to corruption), ethnic rivalry, regionalism, a history of military intervention, religious differences and factionalism (in short the structural weakness of the military). By the time Abacha took power, the challenger personality was maintained by the Northerner military because of the fear to retreat from the only way to survive the Nigeria economy: namely, with the aid of the system of political economy.

Two of the three case studies showed a supportive organisation for the micro environment. This was due to the fact that the Northerner military was in command of the military resources (due to political intervention, as was the case with the quota

system) and thus could mobilise these resources in order to be recruited as political leaders. In the first case the organisation can be seen as supportive, as the micro environment Northerner military had the back up of the Northerner macro environment political leaders, and of course Britain, in gaining control over military resources. Before they took control, the Ibo tried to be recruited as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion, by performing two coups d'état. This was unsuccessful, as they lacked exclusive control over military resources and had no backing from the major global environment role players. By the time Babangida took power, the Ibo was no longer a concern, as the Hausa-Fulani dominated the political field (macro environment) and gained full monopoly of the military resources. The apolitical military that existed, were gradually eliminated as factor, at first by replacement during nigerianisation, later by utilising them in external ECOMOG operations and at the end, by co-opting them in the system of political economy. This ensured that they pose no threat to the political dominance of the North. In the third case, the micro environment projects a non-supportive organisation. This does not mean that they had a change of heart, but this simply resulted due to the infusion of the micro - and macro environment, in which the micro environment rejected Babangida's (macro environment) proposed elections for a civilian democracy, as it would endanger the system of political economy.

In all three the cases the setting was ideal as the military supported the micro environment leaders in challenging the macro environment for political power and could mobilise resources to challenge the macro environment.



b. Macro environment.

The macro environment developed in two cases a challenger personality, but this challenger personality was turned against each other, with the result that the Nigerian political destination was left in the hands of the micro environment. This was due to a lack of Nationalism, a lack of national political parties or national political structures, a lack in Democratic culture, ethnic rivalry, regionalism, religious differences, economic maladministration, political instability, corruption, civil war, loss of control over military resources and the acceptance of military rule as a political alternative. Due to obstacles posed from this mentioned factors, the macro environment political machines turned to the micro environment, with its superior organisation, to ensure the political dominance of one ethnic group over another. This weakened the macro environment, as it invited the military to partake in the political process and in doing so, the macro environment lost control over the utilisation of military resources. After Gowon took power, with the exception of Shagari, the micro environment became infused with the macro environment.

For the Hausa-Fulani political elite, the support of the military would mean a sure political dominance, enforced by military power. This Hausa-Fulani military involvement in politics disturbed the other ethnic groups. They came to distrust the Hausa-Fulani biased military governments. This is reflected in the non-supportive and uninvolved organisation, as portrayed in the phase one table. In the Babangida case study, the Buhari regime created an uninvolved macro environment, because his government used state violence and oppression to deal with the opposition of the military government.

In all three case studies a discontent setting can be noticed. This is the result of the non-supportive macro environment organisation. They could not mobilise resources against the military leaders in the macro environment.

c. Global environment.

The personality of the global environment fluctuated from a challenger personality in case one, to a non-challenger personality in case two and a compromiser personality in case three. This personality had an impact on the dynamic interplay between the macro - and micro environments. In case one the challenger personality of Britain ensured that the Northern Hausa-Fulani received political and military dominance. This fused the micro - and macro environments, resulting in the weakening of the macro environment and clearing the way for undemocratic recruitment methods to be used. In phase two a non-challenger personality was projected, because Britain, caught in the Cold War situation, did not want to become involved in Africa's domestic problems. This resulted in a slight impact on the relationship between the macro - and micro environments, with the legitimisation of military governments on an external level as a spin off effect. In the third case study, the global environment adopted a compromiser personality as the USA and Britain supported a transition to civilian government, as they wanted a stable Nigeria, able to stabilise the West African region, without involving European powers. This stance, together with a discontent setting in the macro environment, caused Babangida to resign. This fact shows the impact that the global environment has on promoting or deterring the undemocratic recruitment of the military in politics.

All three case studies had an uninvolved organisation, because the problems of Nigeria did not attract the attention of the globe and did not unite the global environment against undemocratic recruitment attempts, as Nigeria did not pose a threat to the superpowers. In the third case study an uninvolved organisation was reflected, due to the structural problem present in the post Cold War international system. This caused, in all three cases, the micro environment to challenge the macro environment without obstruction or intervention from the global environment, as all three case studies are characterised by an untouched setting. This was once again the result of the Nigerian problem not posing a threat to the global environment, nor raising their interest.

Phase one indicated that all three environments either developed or already possessed a challenger personality, due to a weakened macro environment left without support. The implication is that in a situation where the military has a challenger personality, supportive organisation and ideal setting, problems can be predicted for the macro environment in terms of the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders to the macro environment. This is especially true if the global environment has a non-challenger personality, uninvolved organisation and untouched setting and the macro environment a non-supportive/uninvolved organisation with a discontent setting.

#### 6.1.3.2. Phase two: Recruitment of Challenger Personality

In this phase the successful completion of an undemocratic recruitment action is studied in order to assess the prediction made in the last paragraph.

C3:Gowon	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Challenger	Non-challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

C4:Babangida	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Uninvolved	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

C5:Abacha	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

a. Micro environment.

In phase two all three cases reflect a supportive organisation, which together with a challenger personality eased the success of utilising undemocratic recruitment methods. This success was achieved due to the Northern

military's effective domination of the micro - and macro environment. In case one the micro environment supported Gowon in order to obtain political power for the macro environment as it coincided with the political power base in the macro - and global environment. In case two the micro environment turned against Buhari and supported Babangida in order to escape a Southern recruitment attempt which would erode Northern political power. In the third case the support for Abacha once again came from the military who was afraid that their privileged position under the system of political economy would be eroded by a civilian government.

In all three case studies, the setting was ideal. This was due to the support that the micro environment (Northern militia) had, resulting from their domination of the micro - and macro environment. This domination of both environments gave the Northern military control of the military resources to be mobilised for undemocratic recruitment attempts. This domination was strengthened as the macro environment considered the change of military governments by undemocratic recruitment methods, as a "democratic" process.

b. Macro environment.

The first case study is characterised by a challenger personality. This was the result of ethnic rivalry and a lack of political leadership, leading to the assumption of a political role by Gowon and his subsequent failure to unite Nigeria in a nation and to meet the macro environments preset expectations of military government (the performance gap). The second case study had a non-challenger personality. This was the result of extreme measures from Buhari taken against the macro environment in order to silence their opposition. This made the non-challenger personality of the macro

environment artificial. In case study three the macro environment had once again a challenger personality. This was the result of Babangida's transformation process, the failure of the Shonekan government and a lack in political leadership. The macro environment came to the conclusion that they did not want a military regime, but could not vision any alternative to the military government. The result was that their challenger personality was directed against the incompetency of the civilian leaders, in not being able to unite against the military, and not the military as such.

The case studies all showed that the macro environment had no collective support from its population. Available masses formed, due to a lack of nationalism and political leadership, ethnic rivalry, regionalism, religious differences and acceptance of military rule. Their organisational support shifted between non-supportive and uninvolved in reaction to military rule. In case two the organisation was uninvolved, due to the harsh measures Buhari took to silence opposition in the macro environment. This lack of support weakened the macro environment and spurred the micro environment to challenge it.

In all three case studies the setting was discontent. The fragmentation of the macro environment due to a lack of nationalism, eroded their support base for a leadership role on national level.

c. Global environment.

In all three case studies the personality, organisation and setting of the global community indicated no threat towards the recruitment of the military as political leaders in an undemocratic fashion. This gave way for the military in

Nigeria to dominate the macro environment without fear for any global intervention.

6.1.3.3. Phase three: The Institutionalisation Phase

In this phase the institutionalisation of the new regime is studied. The personalities, organisations and settings of each environment are compared, in order to establish the reason for the success or failure in establishing the new regime, as this lays the foundation for further undemocratic recruitment attempts.

C3: Gowon	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Compromiser	Non-challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

C4: Babangida	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Compromiser	Non-challenger	Non-challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Supportive	Supportive	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

C5:Abacha	<b>Micro</b>	<b>Macro</b>	<b>Global</b>
<b>Personality</b>	Challenger	Challenger/ Non- challenger	Compromiser/ Challenger
<b>Organisation</b>	Non- supportive	Non- supportive /Uninvolved	Uninvolved
<b>Setting</b>	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

a. Micro environment.

In the second case study the fears for the recruitment of Southerners, by means of a counter coup d'état, and alienation in the Northern military camp (due to Buhari's regime) pushed Babangida in adopting a compromiser personality. He therefore openly rebuffed Buhari's oppression of the micro - and macro environment. This resulted in a democratic military regime (with diarchic features) at first. The first and last case studies were characterised by a challenger personality. In the first case study the micro environment revealed a challenger personality as the Ibo opted for secession by using military resources. In the last case study this personality was the result of a challenger macro environment personality (or an artificial non-challenger personality), but also due to Abacha's decision to use force to institutionalise his regime, in order to secure his personal power as well as Northerner domination.

In the first two case studies, a supportive organisation existed. In the first case the Northern military with control of military resources wanted to continue their political



dominance. In the second case study a supportive organisation existed, due to the political dominance of the Northern militia and their desire to get rid of Buhari. In the third case study Northern soldiers supported military rule and wanted to continue with the system of political economy, but more and more military came to openly question the military's political role and pleaded for a professional military permanent force. These pleas escalated as military purges headed by Abacha infested the military with fear.

The settings in all three case studies were ideal, as the micro environment had the necessary military resources to enforce military rule, but also made compromises to accommodate other important challenger personalities.

b. Macro environment.

In the first case study the macro environment reveals a compromiser personality. This was the result of regionalism and ethnicity, resulting from a lack of Nationalism, which would endanger his legitimisation efforts. This compromiser personality of the macro environment ensured the co-option of civilian leaders (also because of the loss of soldiers in the Biafran war) in the military government, giving it a democratic character. In the last two case studies the macro environment's personality was non-challenger (or artificially non-challenger), as a result of military oppression and the fact that the military already dominated the macro environment.

In the first two case studies a supportive organisation existed. This was the result of a compromiser personality. In case three a non-supportive/uninvolved organisation

developed as the challenger personality of Abacha's regime devoid the macro environment of a voice against oppression.

In all three instances the setting was ideal, as the macro environment presented no threat to the micro environment.

c. Global environment.

All three case studies portray a personality, organisation and setting not threatening the institutionalisation of a military regime.

This phase thus concludes the explanation and prediction element, in indicating the possibility for military intervention to occur, or even for a military democracy (enlightened military government), a diarchy or military dictatorship to be institutionalised after an undemocratic recruitment method was utilised to transform military leaders into political leaders.

6.1.4. Step 3: Set of linkages of statements tested.

In tabularising leadership, environment and recruitment interaction, the following patterns were noted from phase one, two and three. From phase one and two of the environment determined political leadership model, the following patterns were identified:

C A weakened macro environment creates an opportunity for a stronger (in terms of organisation and support) environment to develop a challenger personality and to challenge the macro environment.

- C A micro environment does not always need support from all of its population to be recruited in an undemocratic fashion, but after gaining power the macro environment evaluates the leaders for legitimacy on judging their performance.
- C A challenger personality in the micro environment reacts on a weakened macro environment. This reaction includes undemocratic recruitment attempts.
- C A macro environment without some supportive organisation presents no threat to other environments and can be seen as a weakened environment, in other words a macro environment without support cannot be challenging.
- C A micro environment without a supportive organisation indicates a low probability for the successful undemocratic recruitment of the military leader as political leader.
- C A micro environment or parts of it that want to be recruited as military leaders in using undemocratic recruitment methods, need control over the mobilisation of military resources.
- C Global involvement influences and changes the personality of an environment. This can contribute to the development of challenger personalities which facilitates the recruitment of military leaders in an undemocratic fashion, but also the development of a compromiser personality which hampers the performance of a successful coup d'état.

C An inactive global environment facilitates the possibility of environments to develop a challenger personality and to challenge each other.

From phase three it can be concluded that:

C A challenger personality in the macro environment can influence the personality of the micro environment, even democratise it.

C The organisation of the micro environment can influence its personality. If the micro environment does not have a supportive organisation, it will not support a personality that challenges the macro environment.

C The apathic attitude of the global environment contributes to the institutionalising of a military regime, be it democratic or dictatorial.

C Although it has military power, a military leader needs legitimacy to prolong his/her/their stay or must exercise military power.

From the above it can be concluded that a challenger personality must develop in the micro environment in order for the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders to take place. A weakened macro environment provides the micro environment with the opportunity to exercise their challenger personality. Global uninvolvedness facilitates the dominance of a macro environment by the micro environment and eases undemocratic recruitment attempts. With these patterns and conclusions established, the hypothesis stated in chapter two is confirmed. According to this hypothesis, the military leader will adopt a challenger personality, when the macro -

and global environment allows the micro environment to challenge them for political domination. If the micro environment can mobilise resources, the macro environment cannot mobilise resources (even if it adopts a challenger personality) and the global environment stays neutral, the military leader can be recruited in an undemocratic way. To remain in power, the military leader must either dominate the micro environment or adopt legitimacy.

#### 6.2. The prevention of future undemocratic recruitment attempts of military leaders in the role as political leaders.

The environment determined political leadership model indicated that in order to prevent the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders, the balance among the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be kept. In the researched Nigerian case studies it was revealed that the factors contributing most to the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders in the role of political leader were a weakened macro environment, a strengthened micro environment and the noninvolvement of the global environment. Despite the effort to reveal the reasons for undemocratic recruitment behaviour and success by means of the environment determined political leadership model, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary talks and research need to be held internationally to address this problem thoroughly. Paige reasoned in *The scientific study of political leadership* that political leadership lacks in focus due to the separate disciplinary attempts to study leadership. His conclusion was that political studies need to be examined in an interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary way.

6.2.1. Measures to end the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders in Nigeria.

First and foremost, the challenger personality of the micro environment must be countered. In order to suppress the military's will to use their challenger personality, it is suggested that their structural weaknesses be addressed to restore professionalism. A professional military involved with military matters will be less inclined to interfere in political matters. This entails the transformation of the composition of the military to reflect the composition of Nigeria's population, the rationalisation of the military to form a professional core force and that the military receive professional training and appropriate logistics to perform as a professional and efficient part of an international force<sup>3</sup>. Most important is that the military be withdrawn from all political activities. This personality need also be countered by improving the weakened macro environment on political -, economic - and social level, in order for Nigeria to succeed in the transition from military to civilian government. This restructuring cannot be implemented without support from the international community (including the UN and OAU), as the intrinsic will of all the military to hand power to an elected group will not be too strong, if a macro environment lacks nationalism and does not pose a threat to the military. Therefore the global environment needs to partake in the transition process and must answer the abuse of power by the military. In this regard pressure such as sanctions and the severance of diplomatic ties need to be applied to those leaders guilty of performing successful undemocratic recruitment attempts. The International Court in The Hague It

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3. See Olonisakin, F, *Nigerian Foreign Policy: Past Blunders and New Realities*. (In ISSUP Bulletin, 5/98:8 1998a).

can even consider to declare coups d'état and other undemocratic recruitment methods as an international threat and as an act against humanity. These actions require that the current structural problem present in the post Cold War international system be addressed on global level.

a. Political restructuring.

In this regard, care must be given to the transformation of Nigerian political leadership, political institutions and political processes. These mentioned factors need to be transformed to reflect the Democratic ideal. In order to address leadership, it is essential that politicians become national in outlook and are purged from corruption, regionalism, and religious bias. Furthermore, political responsibility and accountability need to be established among those involved in politics. This can be done by means of a truth and reconciliation programme, aimed at pursuing offenders of human rights. In general, it will be to the benefit of Nigeria if democratic values are fostered by its population and a democratic culture is established. Most important, politicians must hold and remain control over military resources. In addressing institutions, attention must be given to establish national political structures in which all of the population are represented. In this regard the system of political economy must also be discarded. To transform the processes of Nigerian politics, it is important that free and fair elections take place, a free and fair election process is established and that fair and representative constituencies are demarcated. To facilitate this transformation a centre for democratic leadership development can be established, with projects aimed at politicians, government officials (including soldiers) and the broad macro environment.

b. Economic restructuring.

In order for Nigeria to function as a proper democratic state, with economic policies directed at bettering the live of all of its inhabitants, it is of utmost importance that the system of political economy be absconded. This system forms the foundation of many coup d'état attempts, as politics are the only way to riches in Nigeria. It is also needed to look again at the debt burden of Nigeria on an international level.

c. Social restructuring.

The socio-psychological acceptance of suppression typical of Kornhausers' available masses needs to be transformed into a questioning and solution driven personality. This social restructuring will only be gained when the macro environment is involved in drafting policy directed at the benefit of all Nigerians and with the adoption of reconstruction and development plans aimed at empowering the disadvantaged, to better their education and revitalise the press system.

6.2.2. Measures to end the undemocratic recruitment of military leaders as political leaders in general.

According to this model, an undemocratic recruitment attempt will take place if the macro environment weakens to such a point that the micro environment poses a threat to it. The solution for preventing undemocratic recruitment attempts therefore lays in keeping a balance between the micro -, macro - and global environment: don't let the macro environment become weakened otherwise the micro environment (military or otherwise) will challenge the macro environment for political domination. The global environment (including the African



states) must accept responsibility in the process to stabilise relationships between the macro - and micro environment.

When is a micro environment strengthened and a macro environment weakened? The model depicted the following situation as a strengthening situation for the micro environment:

- C If a micro environment reflects a challenger personality (i.e. frequent military intervention).
- C Military rule which has become institutionalised (i.e. continuous military rule).
- C Global uninvolvedness in the presence of undemocratic recruitment actions.
- C Micro environment values that do not enhance or reflect professionalism.
- C Absolute micro environment control over military resources.

The model exposed the following factors as indicative of a weakened macro environment.

- C The lack of nationalism.
- C Racism, regionalism, ethnicity and tribalism.
- C The macro environment reflects a non-challenger personality.
- C The population has a distrust for Democracy.
- C Underdeveloped democratic political structures and processes.

The model also shows that a micro environment will challenge a macro environment and succeed, once it has support and control over military resources.

6.3. Prediction for Nigeria in terms of the environment determined political leadership model.

It is clear that a huge challenge is awaiting Nigeria in normalising her civil-military relationships. The macro environment still needs an effective political -, social - and economic transformation in order for the transitional process towards Democracy to succeed. Currently, the biggest challenge facing Nigeria on macro environment level is the absence of nationalism. This caused Nigerians not to unite as a nation against a threat challenging the political domination of the macro environment, but to resort to regionalism, ethnicity, religion and even to manipulate the military to obtain political power. This behaviour, together with the fact that Democracy is not institutionalised (or even trusted), brings the question in mind if Nigeria really can enforce a new Democracy, or if it is only going to replace Northern domination with the domination of another ethnic group. There are groups in Nigeria (like the Yoruba) that would like to seize political dominance from the Northern Region. Care must be taken that these groups do not receive control over military resources, or are backed by military personnel. On the other hand, Nigerians clearly showed under Babangida's rule and with Abacha's death, that they were (as a group) tired of military rule and were no longer going to stand it. This behaviour indicates the probability of an enormous protest (if not civil war), if a military ruler would once again attempt to be recruited as political leader. In this case, Nigeria would once again face a harsh military dictator.

The biggest threat to the stability of a Nigeria in transformation to Democracy comes from the military self.

With the death of Abacha, Abubakar presented himself as a revolutionary soldier, in declaring that he is going to hand power to an elected civilian government, which he did. The fact that he succeeded, indicates that some elements in the military supports a civilian government and resents the military's unprofessional character. The effect of year long participation in ECOMOG missions to restore democracy in the West of Africa may also have planted the seeds for democracy in the Nigerian soldiers. Alas, this democratic incline is only found among an element of the military. Another group still favours the system of political economy and Northern political dominance. They fear that a civilian government will charge them with corruption and human rights abuses. The biggest threat for Nigerian democracy comes from this group. The fact is, the future of Nigeria's Democracy is in the hands of the military. If they decide to enter politics once again, and the Nigerian macro environment does not unite against them, the democratic process will once again fail. In this regard, the participation of the global environment is vital for the success of the still weakened macro environment to challenge the micro environment, without being bias to certain groups.

#### 6.4. Conclusion.

It is very clear that the political role of the traditional political leader has changed after World War II. The reason being the fact that leaders, their social dimensions and the environment have changed.

Leaders became more democratic orientated, as their followers became more informed (some even educated) and begin to demand certain things from their leaders, i.e. a decrease in wars. To survive only was no longer important for the individual.

Man wanted the good life and government had to provide or enhance this life. This is reflected in the new social dimensions that surfaced in the recruitment process, i.e. visual communication and the physical appearance of political candidates. The political environment and recruitment process itself changed due to the application of Information Technology communication and Information Technology communication networks (such as the Internet). Due to this, time has become an important commodity, influencing environment and leadership.

Despite these changes, more encountered among the First World, military and economic dimensions (found from earlier times) were still playing a part in the recruitment process. Fact is, even these dimensions had changed. In the nation state it was directed at promoting the interests of one group (a nation state). Today, economic dimensions are used to benefit the world and military dimensions are used to promote world peace, i.e. UN, World Bank, European Union and the EURO. Thus, the economic and military dimension is still necessary for survival, but this is (in general) focused on the world as a collective group. The reason for this being the surfacing of new social dimensions (as television and Information Technology) in the environment. This influenced the typical nation state and the typical recruitment methods found in a nation state. In this regard, certain elite groups can exercise their influence on the recruitment process of political leaders, i.e. economic leaders (as Warren Buffet, and George Soros), Information Technology groups (as Bill Gates and Microsoft) and environmentalists (such as HRH, the Prince of Wales). This effect is not reflected in the traditional viewing of the political recruitment process (democratic or undemocratic).

Africa is currently in the third wave of Democratisation, as it reacts on change in the environment and adapts to the new dimensions in it. If Africa constantly reacts to this new environment and social dimensions (such as education, Information Technology and accelerated time), it can also experience a change in the recruitment process of its political leaders. This is already evident in the current events taking place in West Africa, where the population dictated the resignation of presidents-for-life.

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