

CHAPTER 5: THE ABACHA REGIME: 17 NOVEMBER 1993 UNTIL 9 JUNE 1998

5. Introduction.

In this chapter, the seventh Nigerian government will be studied against the background of the Babangida government in order to assess the reason for the recruitment of Abacha as political leader. In this leadership study, the environment determined political leadership model is used as research instrument. This includes a two-step approach, with the first step being an analysis of the historical situation of Nigeria and the second step the tabularisation of possible variable options. As in the previous chapters, step one will include the three identified phases of recruitment, wherein the micro -, macro - and global environment will be analysed according to personality (which includes role, task and values), organisation and setting. The tabularisation of possible variable options will provide answers and solutions on the question of undemocratic recruitment behaviour, as stated in chapter one.

The history of Nigeria under Abacha presents the opportunity to investigate the recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader, the reaction of a military leader on growing opposition, the effect that democratisation of the macro environment has on military leadership and also to analyse and isolate the factors that contribute to the downfall of a military leader in the role of political leader. An interesting element in this case study, is the effect democratisation - as initiated by Babangida - had on the institutionalisation of Abacha's military government. Other elements of importance is the resignation of Babangida (partly due to public pressure) and the subsequent continuance of

military rule under Abacha due to a power vacuum which existed in the macro environment. These events can be used to explain the influence the macro environment exert on a political leader, as well as to evaluate the importance of a supportive organisation for the macro environment in order to ensure the recruitment of a political leader from the macro environment.

5.1. Phase 1, The emergence of a challenger personality.

This phase begins after the establishment and institutionalisation¹ of the Babangida regime and ends with the unexpected death of Abacha on 8 June 1998.

5.1.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the development of challenger personalities will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the micro -, macro - and global environment. The aim is to expose those determinants in the different environments as observed during this phase, in order to isolate the factors that promote undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

5.1.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

The abovementioned variables need to be analysed to determine which factors in the identified environments contribute to the emergence of a challenger personality that opts for undemocratic recruitment actions to assume a political role.

1. In this regard the whole of chapter three must be seen as background to the development of challenger personalities in the micro - and macro environment.

It also presents the opportunity to isolate those factors that hinder the success of undemocratic recruitment attempts.

5.1.1.1.1. Micro environment.

This environment includes Babangida and Abacha as individuals, but also the military as a collective group. In order to assess the development of a challenger personality, the identified variables are going to be analysed, as they (being embedded in the different environments) contribute to the development of such a personality.

a. Personality: Challenger

Sani Abacha was born on 20 September 1943 in Kano, a town in the Northern central part of Nigeria. His parents were from Kanuri-decent, an ethnic group from the Northeastern part of Nigeria. He attended school in Kano, whereafter he joined the Army on completion of high school. His professional military career started at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna, whereafter he received further training in Britain, the United States of America (USA) and Nigeria (Uwechue 1996a:1 and CNN 1998).

Abacha first became known outside the military sphere, on announcing the replacement of Pres. Shagari's government in 1983. In the military government of Gen. Buhari that followed, he received the post of General Commanding Officer of the 2nd Mechanised Division and became a member of the Supreme Military Council (SMC). On 27 August 1985 Abacha again announced the replacement of a Nigerian leader, this time Buhari. With the change of government formed under Gen. Babangida, Abacha moved up higher in the military hierarchy. He retained his position in the SMC (now called the Armed Forces Ruling Council -AFRC) and was named the new head of

Army Staff. He openly boasted to be the political-second-in-command, much to the dismay of Comdr. Ebitu Ukiwe (the head of General Staff). His career culminated in 1992 when he became a full general, Minister of Defence and chairman of the Joint Heads of Staff (Uwechue 1996a:1 and CNN 1998). This political background gave him the opportunity to develop a challenger personality, if the situation should so arise.

The Nigerian Defence Force (NDF) formed the government for quite a substantial time. Even when the civilians were in control (i.e. Shagari), the military exercised influence over the political decision making process. This urge to govern was strengthened by the Biafran war, as it eroded the military's confidence in civilian leadership (Butts & Metz 1996:4-5). Apart from this psychological resistance to macro environment political leadership, British values invested during colonialism, became marshed to a point where Nigerian officers could no longer be called professional. The reason for this being the fact that they were utilised as political administrators. Despite that, Babangida dragged lots of officers into the corruption network: called the privilege system or system of political economy. This system developed over time where corrupt senior officers built networks of lower ranks for their personal use in corruption. The junior officers who were not part of this system, rejected it mostly out of jealousy. But another element was also present, compared to the situation of senior officers that of the junior officers were perilous. They felt the economic decline (Butts & Metz 1996:8). This caused a rift between the junior and senior officers that would have implications on the support base of the senior officers.

Therefore, it can be argued that the military possessed a dual challenger personality. Part of it opposed any change to the

status quo of their privileged position. They formed cliques in cliques with an interest in the existing system. Senior officers were not prepared to change this system. Another part of it came to resent the role of the military in Nigerian politics. Unfortunately, the effect of the latter was weakened by continuous shuffles, eliminations, suppression and co-optation of them by the military political leaders. The unsuccessful coup d'état of 1990 showed the cancerous situation which developed in Nigeria, wherein undemocratic recruitment methods were utilised by military personnel as the only means to change government. This situation contributed to further suspicion, fear and purges in the military (Butts & Metz 1996:8-9).

Despite the dividing effect of the system of political economy, growing ethnicity (due to institutionalised ethnic rule of the Northern military) was beginning to strain the military. Most of the army officers were Christians from the Southern or middle belt area. It was in contrast to the Northern Muslims who dominated the political arena of Nigeria since independence day. This situation caused resentment and ethnic hate from the non-Northern officers and civilians. This situation was to worsen, as both Christian and Muslim fundamentalism grew in reaction to the social collapse in Nigeria (Butts & Metz 1996:8).

b. Role: Challenger

Most of the military (including Babangida) favoured the political role of the military, as it kept the privilege system intact. This challenger role was ardently supported by the Northerner elements in the NDF who were afraid that their own privileged live and political dominance will halt to an end, if the system of political economy is dismantled under a

civilian government headed by Abiola. The annulment of the June 1993 election was partly the doing of senior officers who feared this, but also out of fear of prosecution for corruption and human rights violations (Butts & Metz 1996:10).

c. Task: Challenger

Babangida's task was to continue the privileged position of the Northern military political elites. All tasks taken upon him (and the military who supported him) were related in safeguarding Northerner interests in the micro - and macro environments. In this spirit, when he was confronted by large scale civil unrest (mainly Yoruba), Babangida announced that he was going to hand the political power to an all civilian interim national government that must replace the Transitional Council of Shonekan (Uwechue 1996b:1194). This structure was only an eye blinder, as it was compiled of all Babangida's friends and allies. Within this structure Abacha (under supervision of Babangida) could see to it that the privileged position of the military was maintained. The interim government promised new presidential elections for February 1994 and released human rights activists. They indicated that they were going to govern by means of military decrees and were not going to open the media groups that Babangida had closed. The Northern military (with Abacha as chairman) was clearly the real power behind the interim government (Butts & Metz 1996:12 & Uwechue 1996 p.1194).

d. Values: Challenger

Babangida and his supporters in the military all embraced the same values, namely: ethnicity and regionalism that ensured the political and economic dominance of the Northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani and the safeguarding of the system of political

economy (Butts & Metz 1996:7-8). These values were also present among those soldiers who opposed Northerner dominance. They were more appalled by the fact that they missed out on the Good life®, than the fact that they have missed out on Democracy. Those who truly supported a civilian democratic government were few, but they revealed the values characteristic of a professional soldier. These values were probably shaped by this group's participation in external peace missions, directed at establishing democratic regimes in the Western part of Africa. Most of them, however, felt left out of the system of privilege and therefore opposed Northern military rule.

5.1.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The macro environment consists of the social, economic and political facets present in the Nigerian community. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be analysed, in order to determine the contribution of this environment towards the development of a challenger personality at micro environment level.

a. Personality: Challenger

The result of the colonial system and institutionalisation of military rule was a non-challenger macro environment personality, as the available masses did not unite as nation against tyranny. The absence of national unity strengthened the military to justify military intervention, by presenting them as the only national power to unite Nigeria (See chapter four and Butts & Metz 1996:5).

This non-challenger personality evident in chapter four was beginning to change. This can be seen in the difficulty

Abacha had in institutionalising his regime. Some signs² showed that the Nigerians were not going to tolerate dictators any longer. This was the legacy of Babangida's political awareness programmes and the continuous failure of military government to produce the good life to the ordinary citizens in the macro environment. Unfortunately, this unfolding challenger personality was still rooted in ethnicity and regionalism. Because the macro environment was disillusioned with Democracy (after all the attempts to reach it), it was yet to be spiced with democratic values. Babangida promised a civilian government in 1990, but soon postponed the date four times (and eventually indefinitely). The military's obsession with control over the transformation process, Babangida's endless manipulation of the process and reluctance to step out of politics, blunted the macro environment. They justly concluded that elections had nothing to do with empowering the macro environment, but everything with the accumulation of wealth and political power for the Northern elites. Those who control the state control state contracts and that was the only way to riches in the economic torn Nigeria. Therefore the election between Moshood Abiola from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Bashir Tofa from the middle right National Republican Convention (NRC) did not arouse public interest. The public deemed it as a farce, with Abiola and Tofa as Babangida's hand puppets (Butts & Metz 1996:9).

b. Role: Challenger

The role of the macro environment was divided along ethnic lines. The Northerners adopted a role set to safeguard their privileged position and in that supported the system of

2. See par. 5.2.1.1.2. for more information on anti-government protests.

political economy and a military regime. During the general democratic election of June 1993, the privileged Northern Muslim Hausa-Fulani urged Babangida to keep on to political power and to halt the election. The Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN) launched a big campaign to beg Babangida to hold on to political power. They consisted out of rich businessmen, politicians and senior military officers, under leadership of Abimbola Davies. They aimed at nullifying the election on 12 June 1993 by means of a court injunction, but could only succeed in prohibiting the National Electoral Commission (NEC) by means of a court interdict in releasing the results of the election. After releasing results on the 14th of June, no further results were released because of ABN law suits against the NEC (Butts & Metz 1996:10 and Uwechue 1996b:1193-1194).

The other ethnic groups in Nigeria did not support the military government but were too divided (religious and ethnic diversity) to unite in a common challenger role against the military regime and its supporters. On the 12th of June 1993 less than 50% of the Nigerian macro environment turned up at the election polls. This was due to a lack of interest and confusion on if the election was going to take place (considering the law suits). When they made the results known the 14th, it came as a surprise that Abiola (the Yoruba Muslim SDP candidate) drew 4.3 million of the 6.6 million counted votes and 11 of the 15 declared states, including Abuja and Kano. International observers and the National Election Monitoring Group (NEMG) declared the election free and fair³. On 23 June, the same day that the NEC turned to the Court of

3. Seen in the light of the Yoruba's political awareness and participation (and their geographic distribution), as well as the political apathy found among those Northerners who did not enjoy the fruits of government, this outcome was no surprise.

Appeal, the military government declared the election void in order to safeguard Northerner interests. All decrees that provided for a democratic transition to civilian rule, were revoked. In return Babangida promised that a civilian government will assume power on the 27th of August, after they held new elections with new candidates (Butts & Metz 1996:10 and Uwechue 1996b:1193-1194). The macro environment revolted and again resorted to their different ethnic groups to oppose Northern political and economic domination. Even though the macro environment did not unite as nation against this mentioned domination, for the first time the military had a difficult time to institutionalise and safeguard their regime.

c. Task: Challenger

Some elements in the macro environment took to tasks related in challenging the macro environment. The interim government was criticized as puppets of the military and/or as a stumbling block to effective democratic transition. The macro environment showed their discontent through the independent press and even by hijacking an aeroplane. By the beginning of November Shonekan's government was in shambles. Most Nigerians believed that the interim government had no say over state matters and that it did not have the macro environments mandate to govern. The declining economy contributed too further protest and strikes in the macro environment. The death of the interim government came when the higher court in Lagos found that it was illegal, as Babangida signed the decree that founded the interim government after his term lapsed. Abiola called on Shonekan to renounce his presidency. In this he was widely supported by opinion makers (Butts & Metz 1996:12 and Uwechue 1996b:1194-1195). The macro environment showed its teeth.

d. Values: Challenger

Essentially the macro environment values revolved around own ethnic and regional interests, but the chaos followed by the annulment of the election clearly showed that Nigerians were tired of a military rule. Harsh military rule united the Nigerians in their resentment of it, but this resentment was expressed in an ethnic setup. Interregional and interethnic organisations to oppose Northerner domination did not develop. Instead, ethnic groups like the Yoruba became a factor to be reckoned with. In the light of the aforementioned it is doubted whether a sense of Democracy had developed in Nigeria at this stage. Maybe in future, the domination of one group will only be replaced by the domination of another group. At least the actions of the Yoruba indicated that institutionalised military rule has lost its legitimacy. Yoruba pressure caused Babangida to resign.

5.1.1.1.3. Global environment.

This environment represents the leaders in the international arena and their social -, economic - and political actions. The personality, role, task and values of this environment are going to be examined, in order to evaluate this environment's contribution to the performance of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the development of a challenger personality.

a. Personality: Compromiser

The third wave of democratisation that swept over Latin America, other parts of the Asian pacific area and the previous Soviet Bloc reached Africa in 1991. Autocratic governments in Zambia, the Cape Verde Islands, Sao Tome and

Principe, Benin, Madagascar, Lesotho and Burundi came to a fall. In more than thirty states pro-democracy uprisings occurred, of which plenty led to substantial changes if not full blown democracy (Butts & Metz 1996:1-2).

This change in the strategic landscape after the Cold War forced the USA to reexamine her relationship with Nigeria. The non-challenger personality of the global environment was transformed into a compromiser personality, wherein Nigerian military rule and interventionist policy⁴ were accepted, as the USA viewed Nigeria as upholder of Democracy but expected her to manage and solve conflict in West Africa. The USA (and Clinton administration) reflected this vision in their foreign policy and determination of national security strategy (Butts & Metz 1996:2-3). This gave Babangida the necessary legitimacy, international prestige, consolidated his domestic power base, diverted attention from domestic problems and most important, kept the military busy in order to minimise the risk of counter coups d'état and prompted him to consider international reaction before undertaking actions that could destabilise West Africa (Olonisakin 1998a:8-11, also see Olonisakin 1998b:44).

b. Role: Compromiser

The global environment adopted a compromiser role by distancing them from any political attempts in Nigeria to democratise and by withholding criticism against the military government. They send international observers to Nigeria, but

4. Nigeria reached a bilateral defence pact with Pres. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (1996), intervened in the attempt to overthrow Kabbah (1997) and used the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to reinstate Kabbah (1998) (Olonisakin 1998a:8-11, Olonisakin 1998c:147).

did not question, for example, the nullification of the election on international forums. This was mainly the result of the USA's acceptance of Nigeria as peacekeeper in Western Africa, because they were themselves reluctant to accept this role.

c. Task: Compromiser

The global environment undertook no task to solve the problem of Nigerian transition to democracy. The military was seen as an important aspect in stabilising the West African region and therefore not opposed on global forums, as long as the fragile power balance in the Cold War was not disturbed.

d. Values: Compromiser

By 1993 the international arena dramatically turned to the embracement of democratic values for Africa. Because of this stance and their own interest, the global environment pleaded for restricted sanctions against Nigeria. International pressure, based on the accept-but-complain attitude, resulted partly in the acceptance of the idea of an Interim government led by military allies. This was a compromise that looked as if civilian political aspirations had won.

5.1.1.2. Organisation.

It is necessary to evaluate the contribution of organisation (in terms of the development of a challenger personality) to the execution of undemocratic recruitment actions, as support ensures success.

5.1.1.2.1. Micro environment: Non-supportive

Babangida faced a non-supportive organisation in the Northern military ranks, when he allowed the election for a democratically elected civilian government to continue. The possible replacement of the military government by that of Abiola spurred Abacha and his followers in the military into pressing Babangida to nullify the election. Babangida succumbed to pressure and annulled the election. The military moved swiftly during the resulting civil strife to close down five opposition media groups, including those of Abiola. They met unrest with violent confrontation using the state apparatus (Uwechue 1996b:1194). This use of organised state violence restored Northern political dominance, but also united the rest of the micro environment against Babangida.

The annulment of the election caused a stir among the non-Northerner military. Those military opposed to military government reacted by resigning from the NDF. Thirty Cols. and Brigs. resigned in protest. Col. Abubakar Umar (a beneficiary of the system of political economy) openly announced that the: ANigerian military as represented by our present leadership has become a stumbling block to the development of the nation-s democracy@ (in Butts & Metz 1996:11). This indicated the en masse opposition to Northern political and economic domination. It also signified a non-supportive organisation.

5.1.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

The macro environment adopted a non-supportive organisational stance. With the annulment of the election the pro-democracy Nigerian community united around the SDP leadership and the Campaign for Democracy (an umbrella organisation for civil and

human rights bodies). This tempted all democratic organisations, non-governmental organisations and individuals, despite religion, sex, region or class to step forward and demand Democracy. In this, the press, professional associations, university faculties, students and labour movements supported them. The Ibo in the Eastern part of Nigeria accepted this annulment with cynical fatalism, but the Yoruba rallied openly against Babangida. It became clear to them that the Hausa-Fulani will not surrender political power because they regarded the military as a vehicle for ethnic dominance (Butts & Metz 1996:11). Though Babangida's forces brutally suppressed the protests, it was so successful that it led to his resignation on the 26th of August. He handed political power to an interim government headed by Ernest Shonekan (Uwechue 1996b:1194).

It is interesting that few of the civilian elite, even elected officials, gave their support to Abiola. This shows their interest in the corruption network and their fear for the security apparatus of Babangida. Another reason for this is the fact that they did not suffer under the military regime. Due to that, they were unable to see the use of fundamental reforms (Butts & Metz 1996:11-12).

5.1.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment reflected an uninvolved organisational stance, by introducing restricted sanctions against Nigeria after taking cognisance of the annulment of the elections. The USA and Europe pushed for the quick restoration of the transition programme. Meanwhile they accepted Shonekan at the UN General Meeting and invited him to attend a meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government in Cyprus (Uwechue

1996b:1194-1195). This indicated their accept-but-complain-role and compromiser personality.

5.1.1.3. Setting.

The setting of the different identified environments needs to be examined, in order to establish how the setting contributes, in terms of the development of a challenger personality, to the execution of undemocratic recruitment actions.

5.1.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The situation for Abacha (as main challenger personality in the micro environment with access to military resources) to be recruited as new political leader was ideal. He was generally seen as the real force behind the interim government. He acted as political officer and as main actor in the coups d'état of 1983 and 1985, and in that capacity gained a vast knowledge in the planning and execution of coups d'état (Butts & Metz 1996:12). He had the support of the Northern military and the political elites from the Northern state. This created an ideal setting for his recruitment, as he only needed their support for a recruitment attempt to succeed, seeing that they control the weapon monopoly.

5.1.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

Babangida as political leader lost the support of the macro environment when he began to challenge them. Due to this challenge, the macro environment (especially the Yoruba) united against Babangida and partly contributed to his resignation. Even though the Yoruba succeeded in this regard, they could not unite across ethnic boundaries to deliver a

national leader as alternative to military rule. This made it ideal for Abacha to fill the political vacuum. The result was the development of a discontent setting in the macro environment.

5.1.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The global environment was content with the interim government and as such can be considered to have an untouched setting. The situation in the USSR and their former satellites attracted more of the global environment's attention. This situation allowed Abacha to challenge the macro environment and replace it again with a military government.

5.1.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
Organisation	Non-supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The micro environment developed a challenging personality when they realised that their privileged position was in danger, thus providing them with a motive. This explains why they did not support Babangida (macro environment) in his decision to continue with an election for a civilian president. The fact that the political power was still in the hands of the Northerners, made it an ideal situation for the micro environment to develop a challenger personality.

The macro environment was challenging Babangida's regime, as he struggled to obtain legitimacy. They began to openly protest against his government and forced him to resign. This was made possible, as he lost the support of the influential military political leaders in the macro environment (especially the Northerners). They feared a civilian government would charge them with corruption and human right abuses. It would also have meant the end of their privilege position.

The compromiser personality of the global environment influenced the Northerner military to once again secure their political power, by pressing for an interim government, as it would have the approval of the global environment as long as Nigeria partakes in stabilising the West Africa region.

5.2. Phase 2, The recruitment phase.

This phase began with the planning and execution of the coup d'état that toppled Babangida and ends directly thereafter. This constitutes the actual recruitment effort of a military leader in the role of political leader.

5.2.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step, the recruitment phase will be analysed, according to the personality, organisation and setting of the three identified environments. The aim of this analysis is to expose those factors present in the phase, which contribute to the success of undemocratic recruitment behaviour.

5.2.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables is needed to isolate those environmental factors that promote the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of a political leader by means of undemocratic recruitment actions.

5.2.1.1.1. Micro environment.

In order to determine the contribution of this environment towards the success of undemocratic recruitment attempts, in terms of the recruitment phase, it is necessary to reflect on the personality, role, task and values of the micro environment.

a. Personality: Challenger

Abacha revealed his challenger personality by dismissing Shonekan and seizing power on 17 November 1993. In this his allies in the military and those political elites from the Northern state supported him. It was made possible due to the existing structural weakness in the micro environment and because Abacha positioned himself for this undemocratic recruitment attempt as minister of Defence and probable head of the interim government (Butts & Metz 1996:12). The dismissal of Shonekan can be described as a governmental coup d'état, as it was directed at securing the political power of the Northern military⁵.

5. Huntington (1962:32-33) differentiates between a governmental, reform and revolutionary coup d'état. A governmental coup d'état takes place when a conflict situation brings about the violent overthrow of the state apparatus, without any apparent motive. A reform coup d'état occurs where the military intervention in the political environment is directed against the system and at eliminating political incumbents. The revolutionary coup d'état has

b. Role: Challenger

Abacha's immediate role (and that of his supporters in the military) was to challenge the macro environment, to broaden his political power and to safeguard the privileged position of the military and Northern political elite. This role spurred him to turn to military totalitarianism, as he was strongly opposed by the macro environment (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

c. Task: Challenger

Abacha and the military's tasks were all directed at safeguarding the privileged position of the military and Northern elite, as they wanted to conserve military autonomy (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

d. Values: Challenger

As indicated in the previous chapters, the military did not all share the same values. Those opposed to the system of political economy, said they favoured Democracy and those for it supported Northern military autonomy and dominance. This is but one aspect that created factions in the military: others were religion, ethnicity, regionalism, and ideology. The strongest group in the military was those who supported military dominance (especially groups from the North). Their values (as embroidered on in previous chapters) were of the kind that promoted a challenger personality and the use of

the aim to overhaul or transform the political and social structures in total.

undemocratic methods in order to be recruited as political leaders.

5.2.1.1.2. Macro environment.

In order to determine the contribution of the abovementioned environment towards the successful execution of an undemocratic recruitment action, in terms of the recruitment phase, the personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be analysed.

a. Personality: Challenger

The macro environment revealed a challenger personality towards the Shonekan government. The annulment of the 1994 election threw Nigeria into a crisis. The macro environment responded to this crisis by embracing regionalism for answers. This had the effect that vast parts in Nigeria became ungovernable due to anti-government protest. This was especially true for the Yoruba West. Shonekan also got the oil industry bureaucracy to turn against him, because of his attempts to disempower them. He gradually had difficulty in maintaining law and order (Williams 1998:8 and Butts & Metz 1996:12). The declining economy did not ease his situation. Inflation rose to 100%, the Nigerian currency was almost worthless and price hikes and shortages in basic products were commonly found. Nigeria was on the brink of economic collapse. This situation further alienated Shonekan from the macro environment (Butts & Metz 1996:12-13). His biggest blow came when the higher court in Lagos found his government to be illegal (Williams 1998:8).

This set the scene for Abacha to topple Shonekan, as Northerner political dominance was threatened. His coup d'état

was welcomed by most in the macro environment as a relief, even by some prominent pro-democracy activists. Most hoped that it would bring an end to the election crisis that was overshadowed by civil strife and regionalism. It also was to his favour that the macro environment regarded him as a stern, apolitical and professional soldier that was going to save Nigeria once again from faltering politicians and soldiers (CNN 1998 and Williams 1998:8). This notion of the macro environment was due to a lack in civilian political leadership, or rather total incompetence, and the creation of a political power vacuum. It is also characteristic of the Nigerian society's culture, in which a coup d'état is considered to be a solution for national problems.

b. Role: Challenger

The macro environment had a challenger personality, but failed to transform that into a national challenger role against the military. This is the result of their adoption of regionalism and the fact that they posed no organisational alternative to the military.

c. Task: Challenger

The macro environment took it upon them to render the Shonekan government ungovernable. However, they did not unite in a national party to present themselves as alternative to military rule.

d. Values: Challenger

The diverse ethnic and regional interests found in the macro environment fostered values that hampered nationalism. It

also promoted the development of a challenger personality that is stained with ethnicity and regionalism.

5.2.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of the global environment need to be studied as to evaluate the factors present in this environment which contribute to the successful recruitment of a military leader in the role of political leader.

a. Personality: Compromiser

The global environment continued with their compromiser personality, as they did not want to be absorbed in Nigeria's domestic turmoil.

b. Role: Compromiser

Due to the fact that Nigeria presents the possibility to slip into a state of anarchy, the global environment maintained a compromiser role. This was because they were afraid to be involved in Nigerian and / or other African crises.

c. Task: Compromiser

The global environment maintained a compromiser role in order to avoid direct and costly involvement in African issues and problems.

d. Values: Compromiser

Due to global values that supported compromise, the international community was not involved in solving the

problem of military government in Nigeria. Instead, they paid symbolic respect to the dream of Democracy, by imposing restricted sanctions on Nigeria.

5.2.1.2. Organisation.

The organisation of the micro -, macro - and global environment needs to be analysed in order to evaluate the contribution of this environment towards the successful performance of an undemocratic recruitment action.

5.2.1.2.1. Micro environment: Supportive

Due to the system of political economy, Abacha had the advantage of a supportive organisation. As he was the Minister of Defence and the real power behind the interim government (that consisted out of military allies), he could easily muster support for his decision to dismiss Shonekan. Abacha kept those opposed to the system of political economy busy in external ECOMOG missions, so that they could not intervene in his plans of securing Northerner political domination.

5.2.1.2.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive

Shonekan had a non-supportive organisation to his disadvantage, due to the economic decline, legitimacy problems and raising resistance of the macro environment.

5.2.1.2.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment formed an uninvolved organisation because they adopted policy aimed at not involving them unnecessarily with Africa's problems which could upset the

prevailing power status between the Soviet Block and the Western Block.

5.2.1.3. Setting.

The setting for Abacha to topple Shonekan was ideal, as he was in the right position to be recruited and had the support of the main political role players.

5.2.1.3.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The following factors encountered in the micro environment contributed to the downfall of Shonekan:

- # Ease of intervention.
- # Conservation of military autonomy.
- # Military factions.
- # Lack of military professionalism.
- # Conflicting values (also at macro environment level).
- # Intervention of the military in civil political conflicts (also at macro environment level).

5.2.1.3.2. Macro environment: Discontent

The following factors contributed to the downfall of Shonekan:

- # Low institutionalisation.
- # Civil incompetence and power vacuums.
- # The society's culture.

This environment was characterised by a discontent setting.

5.2.1.3.3. Global environment: Untouched

The fact that the global environment did not wish to become involved in Africa's domestic affairs, smoothed the way for the military to establish a government by means of undemocratic recruitment methods.

5.2.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

The dynamic interaction encountered in step two is illustrated in the following table:

	Micro Environment	Macro Environment	Global Environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger	Compromiser
Organisation	Supportive	Non-supportive	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Discontent	Untouched

The recruitment of Abacha as political leader was easy, as he had the support of the most important political role players in the macro environment. The situation was ideal, as he was pressed to be recruited because Northerner political domination was under threat with the decline of their regimes= legitimacy and the increasing possibility for a counter coup d'état.

The macro environment challenged the Shonekan government. This opposition was grouped into regional pressure groups that made Nigeria ungovernable. This challenger personality created legitimacy problems for Shonekan, because he lacked

support of the macro environment. The fact that the macro environment could not unite against the micro environment (due to regionalism), indicated a discontent setting.

The dismissal of Shonekan was not opposed by the global environment, as they did not want to intervene in Nigerian affairs when their interests were not at directly under threat.

5.3. Phase 3, The institutionalisation phase.

After Abacha assumed power, he had to expand his control over the micro -, macro - and global environment in order to stay in power. This implied the use of excessive force and the abuse of power, as he had little support of the macro environment - especially from the Yoruba (as indicated in phase two). In this phase Abacha is addressed as part of the macro environment, as he was recruited to the macro environment and therefore challenged from within the micro environment for political dominance.

5.3.1. Step 1: A specific analysis of the historical situation.

In this step of the chapter, the institutionalisation phase in the recruitment process will be studied, referring to the personality, organisation and setting of the three different environments. The aim with this analysis is to establish which factors in the different environments, as encountered in this phase, contribute to the success of establishing a military leader in the role of political leader and ensure the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.1. Personality, Role, Task and Values.

An analysis of the abovementioned variables will isolate those factors present in the environment which contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.1.1. Micro environment.

The personality, role, task and values in this phase need to be contemplated, in order to establish which factors contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Challenger

Abacha displayed the worse type of challenger personality. One of his first declarations was: Any attempt to tempt our will will be decisively dealt with^o (Uwechue 1996b:1195). This credo became his day to day task. At the time of his death it was said that he: Astood out as icy and unforgiving, willing to flout world opinion in his quest for absolute power^o (CNN 1998). He was seen as a ruthless dictator who abused human rights and reacted fiercely against any opponents (including the military). During his regime the military locked up almost 7000 government critiques and dissidents, of which plenty died (Sullivan 1998 and Olonisakin 1998a:12). Most of them were charged after being tipped by government officials who were desperately in need for money (see BBC News 1998). This slaughtering of people affected Abacha himself: he became a recluse in his villa, travelled less due to fear for a counter coup d'état, gave no interviews and always appeared in public with dark glasses (CNN 1998). The last year of his reign was characterised by his personal debauchery, drunkenness, theft of almost ,3.6 billion government funds and

even the use of state aeroplanes to pick up Indian prostitutes for his dwindling clique at Abuja (The Times Foreign News 1998).

b. Role: Challenger

Abacha and his diminishing support group had the role of institutionalising the new regime. In this they had difficulty, as they lacked legitimacy and support. The dissidents in the micro environment (even some Northern political elites) opposed to Northerner military rule, contributed in making it difficult for him to institutionalise his regime. This can be seen in the resignation of a number of military officers from the NDF. These challenger actions from within the military were countered by regular purges of the NDF and the use of excessive force against critiques of the regime. The role of those opposing Abacha was therefore minimalised (Butts and Metz 1996:13,16 and Uwechue 1996b:1195).

c. Task: Challenger

The main task of Abacha was to safeguard his own regime and to challenge those who opposed his government. To achieve this, Abacha had to broaden or at least to keep his support base. In the political manoeuvring that followed, Abacha showed his true genius as political manipulator. He divided and suppressed his opponents by using confusion and contradictions to his own benefit; usually by combining reform with suppression. By revoking the national and state conferences, dismantling the two political parties, replacing all chosen state governors with appointees and banning political meetings and associations Abacha dismantled all democratic institutions established by Babangida (which took eight years to establish

and cost N 30 billion). The same time he undertook to launch a programme for the transition to a civilian government and revoked all Babangida's press restrictions. He promised to allow true parties with grassroots support to develop after completion of the work of the National Constitutional Conference, appointed a broad cabinet of military and eminent civilian members, promised a constitutional forum and economic reform programmes. He appointed Yorubas in two of the top four military posts to combat ethnicity in the military. He even visited Abiola (CNN 1998). This manoeuvring worked at first but soon, with the frequent postponement of general democratic elections, the public and military came to see through his plans (Williams 1998). Nigerians at last learned from history.

Abacha wanted legitimacy for his tenure as leader and focused himself on becoming the legitimate constitutional president. He allowed five of the 15 parties who applied to register for the August 1998 elections after which all of them voted for him as their sole presidential candidate (See Sullivan 1998 and Blunt 1998). This action barred the opposition from using the legal system to oust him as leader. When the opposition complained at the courts, they were silenced by a verdict in favour of Abacha. This caused the opposition to seek international support, although both opposition and global condemnation fell on his deaf ears. When the use of democratic symbolism seemed out of reach, Abacha was persuaded to use more force on civilian opposition (Blunt 1998:30).

To use force on the military was dangerous, as it could lead to a counter coup d'état. He knew that and therefore used the Cameroon border dispute in the beginning of 1994 as an opportunity to keep the military preoccupied until the end of

December of that year (Uwechue 1996b:1195). He would soon use the military as vehicle for his vision of Nigeria as a regional peacemaker and political powerhouse. At the same time he scored legitimacy in the eyes of the global environment. In 1996 he played a vital role in ending the seven-year civil war in Liberia by facilitating free democratic elections. After the coup d'état in Sierra Leone he again deployed troops to restore the democratic elected government (CNN 1998).

d. Values: Challenger

The values as exposed in the previous chapters, prompted a challenger personality in the micro environment (See Rupert 1998).

5.3.1.1.2. Macro environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be analysed in order to determine the contribution this environment has towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Challenger/Non-challenger

The macro environment developed a challenger personality, but this urged Abacha to use more power and force against them. He used the strategy of weakening, dividing and suppressing his opponents, even combining that to democratic reforms (Butts & Metz 1996:14-15). This changed the macro environment's challenger personality to that of a non-challenger one (see Blunt 1998:30-33). Economic demise, the collapse of public life and the threatening ethnic conflict/civil war, torn the macro environment apart and

ensured that it cannot unite against the military. Due to the suppression of minorities (like those in the oil producing South and Southeast Nigeria) ethnic tension rose rapidly. It took the form of regional clashes by which Christians (South) and Muslims (North) attacked each other and culminated in a jihad proclaimed against the Christians (Butts & Metz 1996:14).

b. Role: Challenger/Non-challenger

At first Abacha found support from some members of the press who launched an attack on the USA for criticizing the military government. Even the pro-democratic elements in the macro environment were initially glad that the military restored order. They quickly learned that Abacha had his mind set on prolonging military dominance and upheld a challenger personality. Due to Abacha's resentment in opposition, he stifled any opposition with harsh measures. The result was that most of the macro environment embraced (during his regime) an artificial non-challenger personality. Sport became more important than politics, as Nigeria won the Africa Nations Cup in April and partook in the World Cup Tournament (July) (Uwechue 1996b:1195, Williams 1998:8 and see BBC News 1998). This distracted the Nigerian macro environment from participating in politics.

Previous military leaders such as Obasanjo and Buhari announced that Abacha was the: 'biggest disciple, supporter and beneficiary' of the 'corrupt' government of Babangida. Abacha reacted by banning the Campaign for Democracy press conference in Lagos and in arresting Gen. Yar-Adua (Uwechue 1996b:1195). Organised national and international opposition to his government escalated. On 15 May 1994 the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) was established by prominent politicians

with the aim to establish Abiola as president of a broad based national government. Although this organisation was declared illegal, the Roman Catholic Church pledged its support. The Conference of Catholic Bishops of Nigeria (CCBN) asked for the investigation into the annulment of the 1993 election. On 11 June 1994 Abiola declared himself president of Nigeria. On the 23rd of June he was arrested on grounds of treason (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14). On 1 October 1994, Gani Fawehinmi -a jurist, established a political party, well knowing that it was punishable. He was arrested on the spot. Other arrests followed suit, for instance that of Gen. Obasanjo and others accused of plotting a coup d'état against the government. After a secret trail they were sentenced, some even to life long imprisonment. Wole Soyinka (a Nobel laureate) escaped fate by fleeing to France. He was sentenced in absentia to death for high treason (CNN 1998, Olonisakin 1989:12 and Uwechue 1996b:1196).

At the labour front, workers grew quite intolerant with the government due to the annulment of the 1993 election. On 5 July 1994 the longest strike in the history of Nigeria began under leadership of the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria (PENGASSAN). Their main demand was the inauguration of Abiola as President. This strike was very effective in the Southwestern states of Lagos, Ogun, Oyo and the Delta. In a general mobilisation for a pro-Abiola campaign, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) called for a national strike on the 3rd of August 1994. On the 18th the government reacted to this strike, by sacking leaders of NUPENG, PENGASSAN and the NLC as well as to close down magazines like the *Punch*, *Concord* and *Guardian*. Mass arrests of pro-democracy activists followed, including the arrest of Chief Anthony Enahoro. This suppression by the state and the

fact that strike actions were only successful in the Southwestern part of Nigeria lead to the ending of the strikes (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14). Once again Nigeria resorted to regionalism for solutions that should be sought in nationalism.

The Abacha regime did not terminate the macro environment's resentment of military government. With the government's application of phase one of transition to a civilian government a massive pro-democratic boycott resulted in less than 500 000 votes being counted on 28 May 1995 in the national election for a Constitutional Conference (of whom the government decided to nominate 24%) (Uwechue 1996b:1195-1196).

c. Task: Challenger/Non-challenger

The macro environment adopted labour related tasks to safeguard its own environment, such as launching strikes - for example that of NUPENG, PENGASSAN and NLC. In doing so it challenged Abacha's environment but was met with severe suppression.

d. Values: Challenger/Non-challenger

After Abacha assumed position as political leader, the macro environment had enough of a military regime, but it was also clear that they were dead tired and too impoverished to care to fight the military. They once again resorted to apathy and values that promoted a non-challenger personality (See Rupert 1998).

5.3.1.1.3. Global environment.

The personality, role, task and values of this environment need to be reflected on, in order to establish which factors in this environment contribute to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

a. Personality: Compromiser/Challenger

The post-Cold War international system was characterised by a diminishing great power interest in Africa, a reliance on regional powers to make and keep the power balance and a believe that military rule is not acceptable in the global environment. This system presented an inherent weakness: undemocratic recruitment actions to stabilise volatile regions in Africa were internationally approved (and thus legitimised) and used as excuse by the international community to pardon domestic state violence. In Nigeria's case the global environment was not too eager to impose an oil embargo, as it would have a widespread effect on the Nigerian economy, jeopardise ECOMOG activities and cause other unforeseen trickle down effects. Abacha was aware of this compromiser personality and used it to his advantage. This explains why Nigeria was condemned as 'Pariah state', but was also hailed as an important and useful player in the global environment arena (the accept-but-complain approach) (see Olonisakin 1998a:12-14, Olonisakin 1998b:44 and Olonisakin 1998c:146-147).

b. Role: Compromiser/Challenger

Since 1994 the USA began to indicate that they are not satisfied with a military government in Nigeria. American and British opposition to this military government flared after it became known that Nigerian government officials formed part of

the Nigerian swindlers who opted for international crime. It worsened after 419 rackets were discovered in which foreigners were targeted in fraudulent business transactions (Uwechue 1996b:1195).

After human rights atrocities were committed, the global environment turned to Nigeria's rescue in adopting a stronger stance against military rule. When Obasanjo was arrested in Abacha's 1995 counter coup d'état purges, the international community (especially Britain and the USA) reacted by putting external pressure on Abacha for Obasanjo's release. Jimmy Carter visited Abacha to secure the release of Obasanjo. Even Africa leaders, such as Mugabe, Museveni and Mandela intervened. International pressure against Abacha mounted in November 1995, after nine environmental and human rights activists, including Ken Saro-Wiwa were executed. The Commonwealth suspended Nigerian membership and the Organisation for Unity in Africa (OAU) condemned the executions. TransAfrica, an Afro-American anti-apartheid movement, began with a campaign against the military government in Nigeria and pleaded (as Mandela) for oil sanctions. Support for this plea escalated in the aftermath of Saro-Wiwa's execution in 1995, with even the USA considering it (Butts & Metz 1996:15, The Times Foreign News 1998, Olonisakin 1998a:12 and CNN 1998).

c. Task: Compromiser/Challenger

The global environment adopted tasks to safeguard the macro environment and to challenge the micro environment. These tasks were performed in such a way as to ensure the continuance of Nigeria's function as regional peacekeeper. In this opposing tasks the compromiser role and personality of the global environment were evident.

d. Values: Compromiser/Challenger

Some states in Africa praised and hailed Abacha as the restorer of democracy in West Africa, especially presidents Ahmed Tejan Kabbah (Sierra Leone) and Charles Taylor (Liberia). This was not true with most of the Western countries. After Abacha's death on 8 June 1998 the White House spokes person, Mike McCurry, said that the Clinton administration hoped that Abubakar will hand power to a civilian government. The same calls came from Robin Cook (British Foreign Secretary), France, the European Union and the Commonwealth (Sullivan 1998). The global environment thus came to pressure the Nigerian military to adopt modernising values and to aspire for a democratic order in Nigeria.

5.3.1.3. Organisation.

The role of the organisation in the environment needs to be examined, in order to evaluate this factor's contribution towards the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.3.1. Micro environment: Non-supportive

Abacha found a non-supportive organisation as he gradually lost the military's support in actions to broaden his personal power. Between August and October 1994 Abacha sacked or shuffled quite a number of senior government officials (due to fear of counter coups d'état). He frequently resorted to purges to get rid of would be coup d'état plotters. In the spring of 1995 150 officers were arrested and up to 400 were held and tortured in detention (Butts & Metz 1996:14-15). He dismissed the Army and Naval heads and took over absolute

power. In August the government announced decrees that further strengthened his position, even one that stipulates that his actions were beyond legal challenge of the courts. In an attempt to court the military he appointed an enlarged Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) of 25 members in September, excluding all previous civilian members. In December he absconded the habeas corpus, ending a tradition of judicial independence (Uwechue 1996b:1196 and Butts & Metz 1996:14-15).

5.3.1.3.2. Macro environment: Non-supportive/Uninvolved

The macro environment was non-supportive of Abacha. In the beginning of his rule they showed this behaviour in frequent pro-democracy actions. The detaining of Abiola made this show of solidarity possible, which helped to unite different opinion groups trying to restore Democracy. At the end of 1996, national leaders such as Dr. N. Azikiwe and other elder statesmen appealed to the government to reach a compromise (Uwechue 1996b:1196).

Due to the brute force that Abacha turned against opponents of the military regime, the non-supportive organisation of the macro environment turned into an uninvolved organisation. By the end of 1995 the effective suppressing of anti-government viewpoints stifled the macro environment leaving them numb and apathetic. The leader of the National Democratic Coalition remarked: AIf you organize demonstrations here, [the] government will use any of its forces to kill the people. We are tired of bloodshed@ (Butts & Metz 1996:16).

5.3.1.3.3. Global environment: Uninvolved

The global environment began to form a more challenging organisational front against Abacha, by exercising pressure on

him for detaining Abiola. Mandela, Tutu, Jesse Jackson and Chief Emeka Anyaoku (secretary general of the Commonwealth) pressured Abacha to release Abiola (Uwechue 1996b:1196). The execution of Saro-Wiwa brought a turning point in Western attitude towards the Nigerian dilemma. This lead, according to the author, to the situation where Kofi Anan visited Abubakar to oversee the transition to a Democracy. Nigeria began to experience global pressure and felt isolated as pariah state. Still, effective action against military government was not implemented, due to fear that the global environment will be absorbed in Africa's domestic turmoil.

5.3.1.4. Setting.

The setting of the different environments needs to be analysed, in order to assess how this factor contributes to the eventual institutionalisation of a military regime.

5.3.1.4.1. Micro environment: Ideal

The suppression of micro - and macro environment opposition and the total domination of macro environment political leadership created an ideal situation for Abacha to remain in power.

5.3.1.4.2. Macro environment: Ideal

Due to the suppression of opposition and the inability of the macro environment to unite against the military, Abacha was given the opportunity to establish his regime. By using the state apparatus as instrument of suppression, Abacha artificially created an ideal setting for him to remain in power.

5.3.1.4.3. Global environment: Untouched

Although the global environment became more involved in Nigeria's internal problems, by even propagating and enforcing sanctions, there was no direct plan to counter the acceptance of military regimes by the macro environment. They remained untouched.

5.3.2. Step 2: Dynamic interaction tabularised.

This phase can be illustrated as follows:

	Micro environment	Macro environment	Global environment
Personality	Challenger	Challenger/ Non-challenger	Compromiser/ Challenger
Organisation	Non-supportive	Non-supportive /Uninvolved	Uninvolved
Setting	Ideal	Ideal	Untouched

Abacha succeeded in establishing his regime, but not in legitimising or institutionalising it. He was challenged in this quest by the macro - and global environment. He dealt with this problem by suppressing the macro environment and in ignoring the global environment, well knowing that the structural problem present in the international system favours that option. The macro environment revealed an artificial challenger personality, as it was suppressed by Abacha's stern anti-opposition measures. The regionalisation of macro environment politics gave the macro environment a non-

supportive or uninvolved organisation. This contributed to the prolongation of Abacha's regime. The compromiser personality of the global environment contributed to the establishment of Abacha's regime, as they did not actively repudiate him, but indications were found that this personality varied to include a challenger personality. This challenger participation of the global environment to safeguard the macro environment political leadership is not a new dimension in the Nigerian situation, but the opposition of military government is new. This can make a big difference in the future institutionalisation of military regimes as form of government in Nigeria.

5.4. Summary.

In this chapter it was assessed that the micro environment developed a challenger personality, when the military realised that their privileged position as political leaders was in danger due to Babangida's democratisation attempts and the effect it had on the population. This provided them with a recruitment motive and convinced them to withhold any support for Babangida. This lack of support among the military, as well as the macro environment, caused Babangida to lose legitimacy, endangered the institutionalisation of his regime and led to his eventual resignation. His resignation created havoc, as the macro environment experienced a national leadership vacuum which once again benefitted the micro environment leadership. Supported by a compromiser personality found in the global environment, the Northerner military once again secured their political power and dismissed Shonekan as head of the interim government. Abacha, as the newly recruited political leader, enjoyed the support of the most important political role players in the micro - and macro environment and could therefore emerge as new

political leader. Once again the macro environment could not unite against the military, as opposition against the Shonekan government was grouped into regional pressure groups aimed to make Nigeria ungovernable.

An interesting element of the Abacha era, is the fact that Abacha easily succeeded in establishing a military regime, but struggled his whole tenure long to obtain legitimacy. In this quest for legitimacy he was increasingly challenged by the macro - and global environment. The challenge posed by the macro environment was from the onset answered with suppression. After the end of the Cold War, the global environment noted this suppression of the macro environment with growing repugnance. It increasingly involved the global environment, though not actively, but was met with Abacha's silence. He knew well that the structural problem present in the international system favours this tactic. This situation clearly indicates that a military government can easily be established by means of an undemocratic recruitment attempt, especially if the macro environment is weakened and the global environment uninvolved, but if it lacks legitimacy, suppression must constantly be applied on opposition, in order to avoid global environment involvement and/or domestic instability. Another lesson learned is the fact that global environment involvement seriously influences leadership style. In the Nigerian case study, this involvement eventually contributed to the successful transformation of Nigeria from a military regime to a Democracy.