The International Response to State Failure: The Case of Somalia

by

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i Abstract

State failure impacts international relations through the spill-over effects it has beyond the failed state. The international response to state failure: The case of Somalia attempts to answer the research question "*Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)?* This question is answered through descriptive-analytical research approach using the Neo-Realist theory within a globalised world. Concepts of legitimacy, authority and sovereignty in relation to the international response are explored where response takes the form of Intervention and humanitarian intervention that could be informed by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) or go as far as nation building. Various annually published indices that examine and rank failed states are analysed which collectively and independently indicate that Somalia has been the number one failed state since 2008. Historically, the international response to Somalia prior to state collapse in 1991 forms the foundation to the response as well as accounting for the importance of complex internal clan politics. The background to how the international response has been, plays a key role in understanding where the international response's motives are positioned on scale of humanitarian versus security motives for intervention. The regional dynamics are explained through the Regional Security Complex (RSC). The security power political motives are seen through Anti-terror motives in a post 9/11 world and the various international responses to the different forms of attempts of interim governments and their opposition movements. Most notably, Al Shabaab, who formally merged with Al Qaeda in 2012, has been a focus point for the international response. The African Union (AU) mission in Somalia AMISOM is analysed from its humble beginnings to a force to be reckoned with. Due to the failure in Somalia for over 20 years, 14 per cent of its population form part of the influential Diaspora group. State building has emerged as one of the major international responses to state failure with the motive of avoiding nationwide humanitarian crisis. Yet the inaction of the past decade has lead to large spread famine in 2011. The security motive of regional and international players has overshadowed a pure humanitarian response in the past but the immensity of the crisis in 2011 has lead to a global humanitarian response. A new window of opportunity has presented itself with the appointment of the new president of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in September 2012. The international response to state failure has placed security first and has acted accordingly to limit the international economic and security effects of piracy, terrorism and refugee flows. Nation

building has come second although, there have been attempts at achieving a uniform response to the failure in Somalia, neo realist *real politik* reigns. The ideal of a golden mean, where a balance is achieved between security and humanitarian motives, could only be achieved if Somalia starts addressing its internal issues that have caused and resulted from the failure, which is far from straightforward.

Key Terms: Somalia; state failure; R2P; AMISOM; Al Shabaab; African Statehood; Piracy

ii Opsomming (Afrikaans)

’n Mislukte Staat het direkte impak op internasionale verhoudinge deur die oorloopgevolge uitwerking wat buite die mislukte staat plaasvind. Die gevalstudie van Somalië poog om die navorsingsvraag te beantwoord: *"Is die internasionale reaksie op die mislukte Somalië meer bemoeid met sekuriteit (dws die stryd teen terrorisme en seerowery) as met nasiebou / demokratisering of humanitêre hulp (vlugtelinge , armoede)?* Hierdie vraag is beantwoord deur middel van ‘n beskrywende-analitiese navorsings benadering en met behulp van Neo-Realistiese teorie binne 'n geglobaliseerde wêreld. Die konsepte van legitimiteit, gesag en soewereiniteit in verhouding tot die internasionale reaksie word ondersoek waar reaksie die vorm inneem van Intervensie en humanitêre ingryping wat weer ingelig kan word deur die Verantwoordelikheid om te Beskerm (VoB) of selfs nasiebou. Verskeie jaarliks gepubliseerde indekse wat mislukte state ondersoek en range bepaal word ontleed, wat weer gesamentlik en onafhanklik daarop aandui dat Somalië die nommer een mislukte staat was sedert 2008. Histories het die internasionale reaksie op Somalië voor staat ineenstorting in 1991 die grondslag gevorm vir die reaksie sowel as die grondslag gevorm vir die belangrikheid van komplekse interne stam politiek. Die agtergrond van hoe die internasionale reaksie plaasgevind het, speel 'n belangrike rol in die begrip waar die internasionale reaksie se motiewe op die skaal van humanitêre versus veiligheid motiewe vir intervensie geposisioneer is. Die streek dinamieka word verduidelik deur die Regionale Veiligheid Kompleks (RVK). Die sekuriteit magspolitieke motiewe word gesien in verband met anti-terreur motiewe in 'n post 9/11 wêreld en die verskillende internasionale reaksies op die verskillende pogings tot tussentydse regerings en hul opposisie bewegings. Veral Al-Shabaab, wat amptelik saamgesmelt het met Al-Qaeda in 2012, was 'n fokuspunt vir internasionale reaksie. Die Afrika-Unie (AU) missie in Somalië (AMISOM) word ontleed vanaf sy nederige begin tot 'n krag om mee rekening te hou. As gevolg van die mislukking in Somalië vir meer as 20 jaar, vorm 14 persent van die bevolking deel van ‘n invloedryke Diaspora-groep. Staatsbou het na vore gekom as een van die prominente internasionale antwoorde op staat mislukking met die motief om ‘n landswye humanitêre krisis te vermy. Tog het die gebrek aan optrede van die afgelope dekade gelei tot wyd verspreide hongersnood in 2011. Die sekuriteit motief van streeks-en internasionale rolspelers het 'n meer suiwer humanitêre reaksie in die verlede oorskadu, maar die ontsaglikheid van die krisis in 2011 het gelei tot 'n wêreldwye humanitêre reaksie. 'n Geleentheid het hom voorgedoen met die aanstelling van die nuwe president van die Nasionale Grondwetgewende Vergadering

(NGV) in September 2012. Die internasionale reaksie op die mislukte staat het veiligheid eerste geplaas en dienooreenkomstig opgetree om die internasionale ekonomiese en sekuriteits gevolge van seerowery, terrorisme en vloei van vlugtelinge te beperk. Nasiebou het tweede gekom, alhoewel daar pogings was om 'n eenvormige antwoord op die mislukking in Somalië te bereik, het neo-realistiese real-politik geregeer. Die ideaal van 'n goue middel, waar 'n balans bereik word tussen veiligheid en humanitêre motiewe, kan slegs bereik word as Somalië begin om sy interne dimensies, wat tot mislukking gelei het, aan te spreek.

Kernwoorde: Somalië, mislukte staat, VoB, AMISOM, Al Shabaab, die staat in Afrika, seerowery.

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iv List of Abbreviations

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AIFR	Audit Investigative Financial Report
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMYC	Ansar Muslim Youth Centre
ARPCT	Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism
ASF	Auxiliary Security Force
ASWJ	Ahl Sunna Wal Jama'a
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
AU	African Union
DFSS	Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia
DM	Deutsche Mark
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EEBC	Ethiopia–Eritrea Boundary Commission
EU	European Union
EU NAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EUTM	EU Training Mission for Somalia
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FSI	Failed State Index
FY	Financial Year
GCRG	Global Centre of Renewal and Guidance
GCR2P	Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
GCSP	Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOTG	Gift of the Givers
HRS	Humanitarian Relief Sector
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGADD	Inter-Governmental Agency on Drought and Development
IGO	International Governmental Organisations

ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IMF	International Financial Statistics
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KDF	Kenya Defence Force
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
MNC	Multi-National Corporations
MOD	Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCA	National Constituent Assembly
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations
OAG	Office of the Accountant General
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
REC	Regional Economic Cluster
RSC	Regional Security Complex
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SNA	Somali National Alliance
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNRC	Somalia National Reconciliation Conference
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SRG	Somali Revolutionary Guard
SRRC	Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSLF	Somali Salvation and Liberation Front
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TJ	Tablighi Jamaat
TNC	Trans-National Corporations
TNG	Transitional National Government
TSC	Technical Selection Committee
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	UN Children's Fund
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USAID	The United States Agency for International Development
USC	United Somali Congress
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WFP	World Food Programme

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Chapter 1

An introduction to the International Response to Failed States: The Case of Somalia

1.1 Introduction

Strategically located in the horn of Africa, Somalia has been in the international spotlight for the past few decades. The global attention was not due to great achievements in political or economic realms but rather due to its complete failure. This East African nation has faced many trials and tribulations. A mono-ethnic group colonised by different nations, subsequently split into different nation states, caused an aftermath of attempts to reunite the greater Somali nation after independence was granted. The re-unification attempts have caused further conflict within the region, particularly with Ethiopia. Although Somalia has one ethnic group and religion, its internal politics have long been complicated through clan factions. The clan dynamics play a central role in any understanding of the situation in Somalia as well as the difficulty to rule this state.

The problematic status quo culminated in civil war after a 21 year long dictatorship by Siad Barre. The various clan structures could not achieve consensus on a ruling government which made Somalia a leading example of state failure for more than 20 years. Over two decades the international response has varied from direct military intervention, humanitarian assistance to simply no acknowledgement. In many cases the symptoms of failure were addressed through treating famine, piracy or the terrorist threat rather than the root causes of failure.

The identification of the research theme will delve deeper into Somalia as an example of a failed state, and what this term encompasses. The Literature survey will highlight some key scholars in state failure as well as Somalia specifically. The demarcation of the research problem and methodology used will culminate in the structure of the research.

1.2 Identification of the research theme

The research theme can be viewed by determining the issues of: who is included in the international arena, whose response will be analysed; a definition of failed states; and a brief description of Somalia.

State failure as a field of study first emerged shortly after the end of the Cold War and was regarded to be the responsibility of the international community (Bilgin 2004:169). The withdrawal of superpower aid in Africa left a trail of instability and weakening of states. Issues that accompany state failure, such as the threats of refugee flows, arms trafficking, transnational crime, environmental destruction, regional instability, terrorism and the spreading of disease have highlighted the importance of state failure to the international community. The implications of state failure prove to be that *"breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder"* are created (Stephen Walt sited in Rotberg 2006:132). The initial post-Cold War attitudes towards failed states were positive, with a strong moral stance being taken. However, after the United States' (US) involvement in Somalia 1992 to1994 ended disastrously, policymaking was improvised. Only states with strategic significance were supported. The 'rogue states' phenomenon emerged to brand states that did not play according to the US's rules, and these diverted attention from failed states (Bilgin 2004:169). Yet the wheel has turned with the events of 9/11 and beyond.

Francis Fukuyama accentuates the fact that prior to the events of September 11 2001, many of the cases of state failure were seen as local problems that underwent a paradigm shift to strategic problems (Fukuyama 2004:xix). The US's security interest became apparent, for example, in the case of Afghanistan. Former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, reiterated Afghanistan as a failed state that harbours terrorists in speeches in 2006 (Call 2006:3). Due to Afghanistan's lack of control of its territory, it could not prevent Al Qaeda's activities, which lead to the US military interventions and state building. Current US President Obama has cautioned, '*if Al Shabaab gained strength, it would continue to export violent acts throughout Africa.*'(Solomon 2011). Al Shabaab translates into 'The Youth' from arabic was the military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) which became more radical with the fall of the UIC in 2006 (Barnes and Hassan 2007:154). Its Al Qaeda links will be elaborated on. Somalia and its extremist groups within the greater failed state are seen as threat to international peace and stability. Francis Fukuyama (2004:xivii) emphasises state

building to counter the negative effects of weak or failed states. However, research will not be limited to the US's response to state failure but the international response as a whole. The financial turmoil that has been experienced globally since 2008 has furthermore influenced the international response to state failure, especially in long lasting unrest and statelessness in Somalia has proven the international response to be a "non-response".

The international arena can be defined by exploring a definition of international relations. Holsti (1995:19) states, '*the term international relations may refer to all forms of interaction between the members of separate societies, whether government-sponsored or not.'* Therefore, the players in the international arena whose response to state failure will be analysed are: states; non-state actors such as Amnesty International; other international non-governmental organizations (INGOs); international governmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN); and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU).

The international response can be seen broadly as any actions taken by actors outside of the failed state, in response to its failed status. These include peacekeeping missions, aid, state building, the promotion of good governance and sanctions. Other states' involvement in Somalia can be seen in the Ethiopian omnipresence and US anti-terrorism measures that have implications for Somalia. The recent deployment of AU peacekeeping troops is a further example of the international response and whether the international response derives from a security or a humanitarian interest will be determined. The internal elements within Somalia will be incorporated as a case study.

Before the current situation in Somalia can be examined, a historical overview indicates where state collapse started and the consequential international response. The regional roleplayers and the broader international community interactions with Somalia prior to failure will be examined. Internal issues like the clan-dimension within the Somali situation needs to be addressed. The two major clans are the Hawiye and Darod which have been in opposing forms of attempts at forming governments over the past 20 years. Both groups have internal difficulties that they need to contend with and consequently cannot emerge as strong enough to lessen Somalia's failed status. Other smaller clans are also present which complicate the situation even more. The fact that different international actors support different clans, links the internal issues with the international response of these actors. The international

community's reaction to Northern 'Somaliland' secession attempts serve as a further example of the importance of the international response.

1.3 Literature survey

In the literature survey the response of some key authors on the international reaction to state failure or collapse is reviewed. Literature regarding the nature of the international response, state failure and the individual case of Somalia will be considered. Primary sources including UN Security Council declarations, and speeches by leaders from states and non-state actors will be incorporated. The literature survey further serves as a basis to identify the research problem and to formulate a concrete hypothesis.

Most international responses to state failure are a form of intervention, since they entail the international community getting involved in the domestic affairs of these 'states'. Ignatieff (2003:306) defines the central question of intervention as *"how does an external state best use violence or coercion to enable the population of another state to re-establish a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence?"*. Geldenhuys (1993:2) defines the international response in the form of international involvement that amongst others seeks to achieve the quest for democratic order through external coercion in the form of indirect military pressure or sanctions which are definite 'stick' actions. Yet non-coercive involvement including suasion through diplomatic pressure can be seen as 'carrot' initiatives. Financial assistance furthermore is often used to dictate terms during transition in order to achieve policy change. Donor countries, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank have used such assistance. The donor community specifically regards security, economical and political factors as points of support (Ottaway 2002:1001). Support from one perspective can be seen as intervention from another. Humanitarian state building could also be seen to have security and power political motives.

A range of motives exist for intervention and are based on geo-political interests, domestic considerations or sector policies including military intervention, peace support, humanitarian aid, development cooperation and the promotion of democracy (Winkler 2007:4). It is often not one motive but a culmination of these that explains the international response. Intervention in the case of state failure is acute and the concept of state failure needs to be understood.

Lyons and Samatar (1995:1) state that *"state collapse occurs when structure, authority, legitimate power, law, and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum."* The long term effects of state collapse can be seen in their description of it as a degenerative disease, a situation that slowly but surely erodes governmental institutions. Fewer and fewer services are provided as the state weakens. Global stability is endangered as the order that the state is supposed to provide, diminishes and makes way for anarchy (Rotberg 2006:134). Weak states are the opposite of strong states as can be seen in their inability or unwillingness to maintain order, politically and economically, and to provide basic services. Democracies are often unconsolidated or absent within weak states as legitimacy is problematic with a deficiency in unified national identity and institutional incapacity. Yet the weak/strong state scale for states is not binary, making it possible for weak states to become strong and strong states to become weak (Du Plessis 2004:11).

The Failed State Index (FSI) of Foreign Policy that rates states according to twelve indicators illustrate the 'non binary' nature of state failure. The indicators are: Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of Refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDP's); Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance; Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline; Criminalisation or Delegitimisation of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus as "State within a State"; Rise of Factionalised Elites; and Intervention of Other States or External Actors. The FSI demonstrates that Somalia's situation has worsened, ranking it as the number one failed state from 2008-2012. The FSI is compiled annually and these indicators can be used as guidelines to measure state failure. Other indexes that similarly indicate state failure are: *The Index of State Weakness in the Developing World* and the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance* (Tschirgi 2010:3). These two indexes alongside the FSI's results will indicate the common denominators within studies of state failure as well as identify gaps within the international response to state failure.

State failure furthermore is not homogeneous and varies in geographical, physical, historical and political circumstances (Rotberg 2006:132). Therefore, the international response is heterogeneous. MacKay (2006:60) argues that '*a failed state is a heterogeneous set of*

physically and culturally interrelated actors that has lost its capacity to coordinate itself, and has broken down into a set of cultural and material non-state actors. This set of 'non-state actors' is the local element of the case study and the international arena needs to acknowledge its importance. *"Development practitioners have come to recognise that without local ownership, institutions will simply not work on a long term basis"* (Fukuyama 2004:xiii). Cornwell (2004:1) states: "*Warlords remind us of the fragility of agreements struck by peacemakers who lack the will or the means to forcefully defend the peace"*. Unfortunately this has been the case repeatedly in Somalia.

The international response to the escalating tragedy in Somalia was until late 1992 *"itself a disaster of serious dimensions"* (Geldenhuys 1998:131). Accordingly Zartman (2005:77) describes Somali history as one of missed opportunities to change its fate regarding the period 1988-1993. Patman (2007:13) reiterates the failure of the UN to get involved. It was reported in March 2008 (Charbonneau 2008) that '*the world must stop ignoring Somalia*.' UN peacekeepers are still absent from Somalia. The initial 1600 AU troops that wer endorsed by the UN is a far cry from 27 000 UN troops called for by Deputy UN peacekeeping chief Edmond Mulet. The fact that, as quoted by Ouild-Abdallah,*"Somalia remains a prisoner of the past, never forgiven for the violent actions carried out against the international community in the 1990s"* does not assist in UN peacekeeping deployment. The UN Security Council's involvement is greatly influenced by the members' interest (Hawkins 2004:118). The urgency in which a conflict is resolved, is directly linked to peace enforcement's interests.

In the past, the international community's general response to state failure was for stronger states to have conquered the failed state. Ottaway (2002:1001) states that presently the international community's response is to assist the failed state in rebuilding itself within its existing borders as a strong institutional democracy. The question of existing borders of the failed state is contentious. Ignatieff (2003:306) asks, for example, *"if states have failed, should they be put back together with the same borders, the same populations, and the same basic prerogatives as states?"* The case of Somaliland in the north-western corner of Somalia, appears to have achieved some form of political and economic stability since 1996, consequently changing the borders of the failed state of Somalia in theory. In practice, however, Somaliland is not recognised internationally.

It is essential to scrutinise this region as to how it can function as 'a state within a failed state'. Spears (2004:16) defines 'state within a State' as imposing effective control over a territory within a larger state which includes institutional structures but lacking the juridical status that quasi-states possess. Bryden (2004:169) assesses Somaliland's Case for Independence regarding its prior existence as an independent state; the absence of *de jure* union between Somaliland and Somalia; the failure to achieve greater Somali Unity; as well as the legitimate rebellion against a repressive regime. Perhaps the relative peace that has ruled in Somaliland could spread throughout Somalia through state-building?

The fact that '*peace-building becomes virtually synonymous with state-building'* can be seen as states are viewed as essential for peace. New York University's Centre for International Cooperation's "Peacebuilding as Statebuilding" project re-emphasises this. Yet this 'synonymous' relationship does not necessarily enhance either state-building or peace-building. State-building can add to insecurity and group tensions by creating institutions that only serve the minority. Peace-building might necessitate no state-building in order to enhance peace (Call 2006:10-11). The golden mean needs to be found between state and peace-building since both are necessary in a collapsed state such as Somalia. The added element of the motive behind state-building will be analysed. The security power political motive can be found behind most humanitarian 'noble' causes.

The variety of international involvement is illustrated in the literature available from Islamic, Iranian and Sudanese involvement in Somalia (Shay 2005:73-78). The US' foreign policy towards the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular is reflected as Woodward (2006) considers the interest of the USA in the region and uses Somalia as a case study. The Canadian perspective is spelled out in Dawson's (2007) *Here is Hell: Canada's Engagement in Somalia*. Menkhaus (2007:357-390) describes the situation in Somalia as a "Tragedy in Five Acts*." Act I: the flawed creation of the TFG, Act II: the Mogadishu stabilization and security plan, Act III: the Alliance–Islamist war in Mogadishu, February–June 2006; Act IV: the radicalization of the UIC and finally, Act V: the Ethiopian occupation and the Mogadishu 'complex insurgency'*. Politorbis has published an edition intitled 'The Fragile States Debate: Considering ways and means to achieve stronger statehood' in 2007. State failure is seen by the contributors to the edition as a process, rather than being static (Winkler 2007:3). The above mentioned literature as well as an extended list of literature will be analysed from the perspective to establish the motive behind the international response. Since *"Moreover,*

where chaos and state collapse is the challenge, the test of successful intervention is no longer whether it defeats an enemy or stops a human rights abuse, but whether it sets in train the nation-building process that will prevent the area from becoming a security threat once more" (Ignatief 2003:306). The question of state/nation-building is at the centre of the research problem. Updated literature used throughout the thesis is referenced.

1.4 Demarcation of the research problem

In addressing the research problem, a balance needs to be found between oversimplifying and overcomplicating the issue at hand. The international response is not homogenous since different interests are involved. The following question can be seen as the essence of the research problem: Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)? A tentative response to the research question is that the international response is formostly mainly concerned with security, and to achieve comprehensive security the tools of nation building and democratisation are employed.

These issues are interrelated as the one can be seen as a guise for the other. The scope of the study utilises Somalia as a case study of the international response to state failure or collapse. The study entails going beyond mere description of failure. It aims at distinguishing the motives behind the international response, be it power political security motives or humanitarian nation building motives, or both. These three scenarios will be clearly indicated as the research unfolds. The historical overview plays an important part to demonstrate how the international response to state failure or collapse has progressed from 'pre-failed status to post failed status'.

The best indicator for future behaviour is past behaviour. The international response of the past will be compared with the present response resulting in an indication of what the future response might be. This approach additionally provides the opportunity to make recommendations as to how the international response to state failure can lessen the failed status, be it through humanitarian state-building motives or security driven power politics or a combination of these. The scenario most likely to respond to the research problem is that humanitarian motives of state-building are driven by security power political motives.

Although some of the international responses are likely to be pure cases of an 'either/or' scenario.

The demarcation of the research will keep historical involvement prior to state failure in mind and will continue consulting resources until the end of 2011. New major developments will be incorporated, such as the declaration of famine in 2011 and political developments in 2012. The relation between globalisation and state failure will be incorporated in the methodology used. The effect of globalisation cannot be divorced from the international response to Somalia's state failure.

1.5 Methodology

The research approach is descriptive-analytical since data in the form of books, journals and online publications will be consulted in a qualitative manner. The historical element underlines current events. Publications regarding the topic will be consulted until end of December 2011. Some primary sources will be consulted including UN and AU declarations and resolutions as well as speeches portraying the international response.

Initial consideration regarding the methodology of the international response to state failure, the classic approach of realism, with the state as the main actor and power politics underlining all actions seems to adapt well to the security motive behind the international response. Yet Milliken and Krause (2002:762) state '*One way to think about the contemporary anguish over state collapse is to note that what has collapsed is more the vision of the progressive, developmental state that sustained generations of academics, activists and policy-makers, than any real existing state.* Therefore a paradigm shift is needed to fully grasp the international response to state failure.

Neo-realist thought needs to incorporate the reality of globalisation. The marginalization effects of globalisation have affected Africa in diverse ways. The CNN-effect, defined as the effect that 24 hour news coverage had on foreign policy, can be seen to have promoted the humanitarian side of the international response. The power-political strategic response is more one of protecting national interest and a fight against terror and piracy. Globalisation can be seen to impact both the humanitarian as well as the strategic motives of the international arena towards state failure. The traditional realist theory will be challenged not

only by the concept of state failure but by the condition of globalisation. A critical approach will be incorporated including a combination of work by authors such as Zartman, Filatova, Reno and Ellis to entertain the various dimensions of the research question.

1.6 The structure of the research

As illustrated above the introductory chapter indicates the identification of the research theme, a literature survey, the demarcation of the research problem, the methodology used as well as the structure of the research. The second chapter can be seen as the the theoretical chapter which primarily needs to reflect on what the international response is to failed states. Theory on state failure will be secondary. How the collapsed state interacts with civil society will be elaborated on. The theory and methodology within this chapter will be used throughout the thesis. How globalisation has impacted on neo-realist thought will be analysed.

The third chapter provides a background overview to the international response to Somalia and in this section an action and reaction approach will be followed. The international response to each historical event will be considered while paying special attention to the research question namely: *Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)?* The background to how the international response has been plays a key role in understanding where the international response's motives are positioned on scale of humanitarian versus security motives for intervention. To highlight key events a timeline will be attached in the appendix with the international dimension clearly indicated.

The third and fourth chapters provide the the counter arguments to the research question from a power political and humanitarian motives for responses. The strategic motives of The AU, countries from the horn of Africa including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya as well as Uganda and Egypt will be analysed. One of the major motivators behind these regional players, namely the USA's response, which indicates the anti-terror move, will not be neglected. All the responses in the region and the world will be divided in an 'anti-terror, Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) support camp' and a 'pro-United Islamic Courts (UIC) camp'. The UN and AU's mediating responses as to promote global and regional security will be analysed.

State building has emerged as one of the major international responses to state failure. The chapter will build on the preceding chapter regarding the various international actors' initial response to the case of Somalia as well as the humanitarian interests within the power political motive. INGO's response will be focused on, since most other international actors have security motives behind their involvement in Somalia. The main motive of the international responses is to avoid a humanitarian crisis. Yet the inaction of the past decade has lead to large spread famine in 2011. The security motive has overshadowed a pure humanitarian response in the past but the immencity of the crisis in 2011 has lead to a global humanitarian response. The EU, working only through NGO's, is a good example of this. Economic responses are high risk, yet China can be seen to be ruthless in its resource mission.

The preceding chapters all build up to the concluding evaluation in which the international response is assessed from the State Building Humanitarian Motive for intervention as well as for the Power Political Security Motive. Recommendations as to how international involvement can be used to benefit Somalia will be made. Current developments will be incorporated with trends that have been identified throughout the research. The scenario in which Somalia finds itself will be critically analysed to conclude the study of the multifaceted international response to state failure.

Chapter 2

Theories of the international response to state failure and indicators of state failure

2.1 Introduction

The international response to state failure needs to be based on a clear understanding of the various theoretical aspects that are intrinsic to the topic. Understanding the various elements involved in the international response to state failure will be linked together to formulate a specific paradigm. This paradigm will be used as the theoretical foundation of the thesis to answer the following question that can be seen as the essence of the research problem: Is the international response to the failed Somali state more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (towards refugees and poverty, for example)? It can be both since there is always an element of self-interest in state actions which will be analysed in-depth.

The theoretical chapter primarily needs to reflect on what the international response to failed states is. Definitions of key concepts are the first building blocks. Firstly, differentiating between state failure, collapse and contraction, affirms the indicators of state failure. These three aspects can be seen on a continuum since the state's capabilities to govern, provide services and protect its population demises essential elements that are needed for a state not to fail, such as authority, legitimacy and resources. The various indicators of failure will provoke different responses from various international actors. Theory on state failure will be secondary. Once the failed state has been established, the key elements of sovereignty, authority, and governance all overlap in determining what theories exist on the international response to state failure. Marrying neo-realist theory with globalisation theories with the various aspects of intervention will create a unique concept of how the international community reacts towards state failure.

Neo-realism can be seen at the basis of the methodology of the international response to state failure, where the state is the main actor and power politics underlines all actions which bind well with the security motive behind the international response. Yet as previously quoted by Milliken and Krause (2002:762) it is rather the idea of the state that has collapsed than the

actual state. A paradigm shift is needed to fully grasp the international response to state failure. Consequently, an adaptation of a state-centric approach will be reformulated. This approach emphasises the wide variety of actors involved in the international response to state failure.

Neo-realist thought needs to incorporate the reality of globalisation. Globalisation includes marginalising effects which have affected Africa in diverse ways. The CNN-effect can be seen to have promoted the humanitarian side of the international response. How collapsed state interacts with civil society will be elaborated on. The power-political strategic response is more one of protecting national interest and a fight against terror. Globalisation can be seen to have effects on the humanitarian as well as the strategic motives of the international arena towards state failure. The traditional realist theory will be challenged not only by the concept of state failure but also by the condition of globalisation.

2.2 Background: statehood to state failure

Outlining the background of key elements to statehood is essential to establish state failure and the international response to state failure. Since Somalia is in Africa, considering the background of the African state is important before looking at state failure and its indicators. The foundation of these key elements facilitates achieving a theoretical structure to establish the international response to state failure.

2.2.1 Statehood in Africa

Africa is portrayed as having 'historical baggage' and still viewed as the 'dark continent' in many aspects (Shaw 2007:353). The African continent never had the opportunity to be independently comprised of sovereign states, with complete control over territory and borders (Howard 2008:129). Colonialism’s stamp is visible in the importance placed on borders and the African tradition of welcoming strangers was rejected in the independent state's connection of sovereignty to its borders (Herbst 2000:228). The Organisation of African Union (OAU), the forerunner of the AU, stated in its charter that although colonial borders were drawn indiscriminately, they had to be respected in order to prevent chaos (Weiss 2007:25). Yet within the region examples are prevelant where Eritrea split from Ethiopia and South Sudan from Sudan.

Most African states have the problem of low population densities which is problematic due to the costs involved in reaching the outskirts of the territory. Consequently, power is robust in the centre and feeble in remote areas. State formation in Africa occurred not on the battlefield as in Europe but on a drawing board with colonial powers drawing state borders with rulers and the colonial legacy of these boundaries still exist today (Herbst 2000:252) Still, the claim to sovereignty that these boundaries entail accordingly has preserved weak states (Herbst 2000:253).

Somalia is no exception as the ethnic Somali-people with one language, religion and culture were divided by colonial interests. Chapter 3 extensively elaborates on how the pre-colonial Somali culture had to adapt to the colonial rule as well as the post-colonial conflicts that erupted due to the pan-Somali ideal being pursued. Yet it must be noted that Somali society was not only divided by colonial interests but through the clan system for centuries prior to colonialism.

An interesting view is Bayart's analysis of the continuity in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial African societies. Low labour productivity and attempts by the colonial powers alter its position by utilising resources acquired through its external relation; the 'exit option' due to fragmentation within clans and the option to move due to the availability of land; the 'acephalous' nature of societies; and the importance of lineage structures that enforced a certain extent of restriction on leaders is exemplified (Filatova 2001:23). The golden thread of lineage structures in the form of clans in Somalia has been a fact for consideration throughout the different parts of its history. Clans cannot be ignored when considering Somalia’s history and current situation, particularly when the statehood and the lack thereof in Somalia is analysed. One example of Italian colonialism favouring the Mudug and Majerten clan to the extent of formation of local elites resulted in rivalry with other groups (Osman, 2007: 93).

Colonialism can be seen to have had a direct impact on the creation (and to some extent the failure) of African states. Contributing factors can be identified in the arbitrary boundaries that divided communities and caused ethnic competition and has irredentist movements as a result; the fact that the state's power was strategically focused and consequently not reaching its whole territory nor population; the formation of state elite and the corruption that is synonymous with this form of political power; economic inheritance of underdeveloped human resources and public services which is export orientated and specifically to European

markets; and weak political institutions since the creation of synthetic liberal democratic institutions (Thomson 2004:22). These aspects indicate that the formation of the state has an influence on the state's success or failure. In establishing a neo-realist approach, elements of authority, legitimacy and sovereignty impact on the state and state failure will be established. Yet civil-military relations and the undermining of democratic institutions will not be neglected due to its trajectory in post-colonial state.

African states have been identified to have different faces in relation to its post-colonial legacy. The neo-colonial elite continued the client-patron system (Filatova 2001:22). The Cold War therefore was an ideal opportunity for clientelism that existed in the colonial era to continue in the post-colonial era. Thomson (2004:119) quotes Christopher Clapham's definition of clientelism as *"a relation of exchange between unequals"*. Somalia can be associated with the client state facade. The post-colonial era coincided with the Cold War where superpowers provided support to African states. The end of the Cold War left these states with an abundance of weapons and people trained and willing to use them. The change that occurred was accelerated and of a hostile nature (Villalon 1998:12). Forrest (1998:48) describes the Cold War relationship as a 'safety net' that prevented a weak state from collapsing completely. Therefore, in the case of Somalia, when state frameworks disintegrated, the international response only occurred once the process had run its course in the post-Cold War era. The 'safety net' of the client relationship with weak states unravelled with the fall of the Berlin wall. The bi-polar world order splintered into a diversified, multi-polar and unstable system (Filatova 2001:31).

A chain of client-patron channels existed from the president to the peasant, with each patron handing over sufficient power to retain loyalty. However, with superpower withdrawal, the major patron ceased to provide resources and the client-patron chain was broken. The political stability that accompanied clientelism consequently erupted into violence. The violence can be attributed to the fact that the elite in charge gained greater rewards in acting in the interest of the international community than in putting their own population's needs first (Thomson 2004:258). Herbst (2000:260) reiterates it by describing Somalia's cause to downfall partially due to the ending of aid in return for siding with one of the superpowers. Yet it can furthermore be said that fundamental problems that the state faced, like political instability and non-democratic practices, were kept under wraps during the Cold War

(Filatova 2001:37). Specific examples illustrating how Somali was a patron during the Barre regime to both superpowers is elaborated on in Chapter 3.

The African elite has repositioned itself, in the post-Cold War era, which is evident in the democratisation of the states through an augmentation in multi-party elections; the internationalisation of conflicts with regional and global intervention growing; and the disintegration of states (Filatova 2001:32). These three elements coincide.

Violence and the threat of violence in turn offers enterprising local officials a ready means of integrating themselves into larger patronage networks; what Chabal and Daloz term *'disorder as political instrument'* (Reno 2005:150).

Refugees can be seen to take the exit option from the circumstances that they are subjected to in their home countries (Herbst 2000:229). Consequently, these displaced people vote with their feet although boundaries hinder them to do so (Herbst 230). Filatova (2001:26) contends that the exit option assisted in conflict resolution in the pre-colonial era and that the strict boundaries closed the 'safety valve' of the 'exit option'.

2.2.2 State Failure/Collapse/Contraction/Inversion

Although state failure is secondary, the international response can only be analysed once state failure has been defined extensively. According to some authors, state failure and state collapse are used interchangeably. The viability of an entity to be recognised as a state on juridical or international terms on the one hand, and on the other on empirical or local terms do not always coincide. The inconsistency, in one or both spheres, lead to the states being described as *"fictive, shadow and quasi-states"* (Villalon 1998:10). Forrest (1998:45) states that all of the terminology used can be understood under the multicausal process of *'"state inversion" in which states decay in varying stages over time'*. State inversion sees the state withdraw from the society which it is supposed to serve. State contraction regards the economic inadequacies of the state to stimulate growth to provide social services to the extent of losing control of the territory, which could lead to collapse (Filatova 2001:15). Therefore, power that prevails at the centre does not reach the full extent of the territory (Thomson 2004:211). Although there is no central government controlling Somalia, the citizens loyalty have been impacted accordingly. The Somali society have adapted, which is visible in the informal economy and their allegiances to their clan structures.

Zartman (1995:1), a renowned author on the topic of state failure, defines state collapse as: "*a deeper phenomenon than mere rebellion, coup, or riot. It refers to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), laws, and political order have fallen apart and must be constituted in some form, old or new."* Lyons and Samatar (1995:1) concur stating that "*State collapse occurs when structure, authority, legitimate power, law, and political order fall apart, leaving behind a civil society that lacks the ability to rebound to fill the vacuum."* They furthermore refer to the phenomenon as a process similar to a degenerative disease. The solution, therefore, is not short term, nor can the international response to it be such.

A fatal flaw in central authority is visible in failed states (Weiss 2007:65). The political void causes non-state actors to take over the role that the state once fulfilled, which leads to forced displacement of citizens (Weiss 2007:29). Failed states are seen as a seed of humanitarian problems and security difficulties locally, which can escalate from a regional level to a global level (Lamb 2005:4). The collapse in Somalia can be seen to have motivated scholars to *"discuss alternatives to the old, failed political order"* (Herbst 2000:269). The London School of Economics and Political Science's *A study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options 1995* exemplifies this. The external actors that fill the voids can be seen as "pseudo states" or "parallel states" that influence the existence of refugees to appeal to humanitarian resources to the ends of their own political agendas (Weiss 2007:67).

Once states fail, the institutional chaos tends to spread to all spheres. This includes the military, where fighting forces disintegrate (Herbst 2000:267). Gangsterism has caused state collapse in the past, but Filatova (2001:27) points out that in pre-colonial times as societal ties withered, people formed gangs of young warriors around a strong leader. Elites use democratisation to legitimise their position, internally and externally (Filatova 2001:35). "*In most failed states politicians have built systems of personal rule behind the façade of formal statehood. Their power is not founded on controlling effective state agencies or standard concepts of legitimacy. Instead they control markets and use their ability to regulate access to these resources through naked force and selective enforcement of the law to enhance their power"* (Reno 2005:128).

State failure is not homogeneous and varies in geographical, physical, historical and political circumstances (Rotberg 2006:132). If the external environment of a collapsed state is weak, there is no strong pillar to transfer sovereignty to (Ignatieff 2003:314). Howard (2008:131) states that if failure occurs in one state, its neighbours are at risk too. Change in one country

has a spill-over effect on its neighbours (Villalon 1998:22). Neighbouring states usually make inroads into the collapsing state's sovereignty, which extend the political sphere of the failed state beyond its borders.

Jean-Germain Gros (1996:458-461) identifies five types of failed states: anarchic, phantom, anaemic, captured and aborted. Firstly Anarchic states are described as having no form of government, with continuous fighting and intervention to rebuild has proven futile in the past. Secondly phantom states are closely related to anarchic states but have some resemblance of governance in certain sectors but complete failure in others. Thirdly, anaemic states exist due to their life force being drained by counter-insurgency groups seeking to replace the government in power or alternatively due to being stuck in out dated mechanisms of government not being able to face modern challenges or needs of its population. Fourthly, captured states, have a strong centralised government which is in the clasps of elites that have only their own interests at heart which does not reach the entire population of the state. Politics is therefore a zero-sum game to keep adversaries at bay. Fifthly, aborted states, failed to mature even before the process of state construction was secured.

Some states may fall into more than one of these types. Somalia is classified in the anarchic category. A singular solution that fits all approaches will not suffice due to the different shades of failure. Somalia needs special commitment in the form of financial resources and external political and military support due to the low level of governance that exists.

The fact that state failure is not a mere matter of undoing the past is obvious, since it is effortless to identify the reasons for decay. Finding solutions to the loss of authority due to infighting, that has a domino effect on civil society and the erstwhile protectors of authority in the form of police and army becoming gangs and brigades, is a challenge (Zartman 1995:10). Forrest (1998:48) illustrates the point since the military serves as a 'band-aid' to keep the state together. The fact that the legitimate means of violence is lost highlights human rights related indicators of failure. Coercion is defined as *'the use or threat of violence to achieve a political or social purpose*'. Military coups occur often as the balance of authority is broken between coercion and legitimacy. Overthrowing a government by means of a military coup is elementary, in comparison, to generating a substitution government (Thomson 2004:130). Ignatieff (2003:305) states that considering how to recreate stability, governance and monopoly over the means of violence, is the key challenge in developing new strategies for human rights protection.

Yet, understanding the causes of failure is instrumental in rebuilding the failed state, especially where intervention is considered (Deng 1996:207). These causes include: maladministration by indigenous elite, the colonial legacy or the influences of outside powers and then sudden withdrawal as in the case of the Cold War (von Einsiedel 2005:16). Ignatieff (2003:303) further adds the increasingly *"adverse terms of trade in a globalized economy"* as another cause of failure. During the process of collapse it is not only government that fails but societal infrastructure as well, which cannot be rebuilt speedily (Zartman 1995:7). Herbst (2000:262) traces reasons of state failure to *"the gap between how states govern territory and what the boundaries and state system suggest they should control."* Gros (1996:266) is quoted as stating, *"In addition, because the factors that `cause' states to fail are largely internal ones, ex-post external intervention of the military type is likely to provide only temporary relief from the harmful effects of state decay."* Again, this is because they who say failed states also say failed governance and institutions, which are essentially internal matters over which the international community may have some influence but not nearly the amount necessary to shape things from a distance. The international response therefore needs to consider internal factors when considering their response. The causes of state failure are illustrated in the indicators of state failure. Establishing the relevance of these indicators will assist in identifying the motives behind the international response.

2.2.3 Indicators of State Failure

The Failed State Index (FSI) of Foreign Policy rates states according to twelve indicators that illustrate the 'non binary' nature of state failure. The indicators are: Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of Refugees and IDP's; Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance; Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline; Criminalisation or Delegitimisation of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus as "State within a State"; Rise of Factionalised Elites; and Intervention of Other States or External Actors.

Table 2.1 Top 12 failed states on the FSI 2005-2012

Rank	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
1	Cote d'Ivoire	Sudan	Sudan	**Somalia**	**Somalia**	**Somalia**	**Somalia**	**Somalia**
2	DRC	DRC	Iraq	Sudan	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	DRC
3	Sudan	Cote d'Ivoire	**Somalia**	Zimbabwe	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan	Sudan
4	Iraq	Iraq	Zimbabwe	Chad	Chad	Zimbabwe	DRC	Chad
5	**Somalia**	Zimbabwe	Chad	Iraq	DRC	DRC	Haiti	Zimbabwe
6	Sierra Leone	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	DRC	Iraq	Afghanistan	Zimbabwe	Afghanistan
7	Chad	**Somalia**	DRC	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Iraq	Afghanistan	Haiti
8	Yemen	Haiti	Afghanistan	Cote d'Ivoire	Central African Rep.	Central African Rep.	Central African Republic	Yemen
9	Liberia	Pakistan	Guinea	Pakistan	Guinea	Guinea	Iraq	Iraq
10	Haiti	Afghanistan	Central African Rep.	Central African Rep.	Pakistan	Pakistan	Cote d'Ivoire	Central African Rep.
11	Afghanistan	Guinea	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire	Haiti	Guinea	Cote d'Ivoire
12	Rwanda	Liberia	Pakistan	Bangladesh/ Myanmar	Haiti	Cote d'Ivoire	Pakistan	Guinea

In the 2006 FSI Somalia was seventh on the FSI on par with Chad with a total of 105,9. Somalia scored high with ten out of ten and other high scores for Criminalisation or Delegitimisation of the State; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services; Widespread Violation of Human Rights; Security Apparatus as "State within a State" and Rise of Factionalised Elites. All the indicators need to be considered but these top scoring indicators are the biggest signs of failure in Somalia. Somalia's peers on the FSI 2006 are firstly Sudan, secondly Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), thirdly Cote d'Ivoire, fourthly Iraq, fifthly Zimbabwe and just before Somalia, Chad. To complete the top ten FSI list: Haiti, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The least failed state is Norway followed by Sweden and Finland.

The 2007 FSI has proven that Somalia's situation has worsened with it ranking as the third most failed state after Sudan and Iraq. The 2008 FSI has Somalia as the number one failed state, with a total of 114.2, leading Sudan, Zimbabwe, Chad and Iraq to make up the top five failed states. Somalia has maintained this top position since then, the top five have swapped positions but not to great effect. In 2012 Somalia's number one position totalled at a 114,9.

Brookings released an Index of State Weakness in the Developing World in 2008 that attempted to quantify the vulnerability of 141 developing countries. Critical spheres of economic, political, security and social welfare were used as catagories with 20 indicators to

further establish the weakness of these developing countries. (See table below indicating the description of the indicators (Rice & Patrick 2008:9).

Table 2.2: Description of the 20 Indicators

ECONOMIC	POLITICAL	SECURITY	SOCIAL WELFARE
1. GNI per capita, 2006 (World Bank, World Development Indicators) **2. GDP growth, 2002-2006** (World Bank, World Development Indicators) **3. Income Inequality, 2006** (World Bank, World Development Indicators) **4. Inflation, 2002-2006** (IMF, International Financial Statistics) **5. Regulatory Quality, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	**6. Government Effectiveness, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI) **7. Rule of Law, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI) **8. Voice and Accountability, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI) **9. Control of Corruption, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI)	**10. Freedom Ratings, 2006** (Freedom House) **11. Conflict Intensity, 1992-2006** (Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence) **12. Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 2006** (World Bank, Governance Matters VI) **13. Incidence of Coups, 1992-2006** (Archigos 2.8 and economist Intelligence Unit) **14. Gross Human Rights Abuses, 1992-2006** (Political Terror Scale) **15. Territory Affected by Conflict, 1991-2005** (Political Instability Task Force)	**16. Child Mortality, 2005** (UNICEF, State of the World's Children) **17. Primary School Completion, 2005** (World Bank, World Development Indicators) **18.Undernourishment, 2004** (Food and Agriculture Organization) **19. Percent Population with Access to Improved Water Sources, and with Access to Improved Sanitation Facilities, 2004** (World Bank, World Development Indicators) **20. Life Expectancy, 2005** (World Bank, World Development Indicators)

The similarities in the indicators used by the FSI and the Index of State Weakness in the Developing World furthermore results in Somalia being ranked number 1 in both (Rice & Patrick 2008:10). This index however has not been an annual publication like the FSI. Another Index that proves Somalia's dismal performance is the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance*. This Index has been published since 2007 and focussed on Sub-Saharan Africa only initially.

Somalia's ranked 53rd of 53 countries with overall score of 8/100, average scores in categories and sub-catogories are as follow:

Table 2.3 Somalia's scores on the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance*

Category	**Safety and Rule of Law 5/100**	**Participation in Human Rights 13/100**	**Sustainable Economic Opportunity 4/100**	**Human Development 10/100**
Sub-category	Rule of Law 0/100	Participation 13/100	Public Management 4/100	Welfare 4/100
	Accountability 3/100	Rights 9/100	Business Environment 3/100	Education 0/100
	Personal Safety 3/100	Gender 23/100	Infrastructure 4/100	Health 27/100
	National security 13/100			



Figure 2.1 Somalia Governance in comparison to the region and the continent according to the Ibrahim Index 2006-2010

Howard's (2008:142) variables to measure failure include: dissident behaviour; non-violent protest; democratic regime; autocratic regime; proximity to state in crisis; corrupt state authority; difficult history of state development; and economic decline. States were then divided into groupings of 'stable to failing'; 'stable to failed' and 'failing to failed'. The variables correlate to the FSI, to some extent, and clearly indicate that state failure occurs in the two phases of failing and failed.

A large variety of literature exists on possibilities available to the international community to develop early warning systems for fragile states. Carment et al. (2007:68) conclude that better analysis and greater cooperation between various governments and NGO's will lead to more

successful risk analysis. Since Somalia holds the first position in the FSI, it is too late for early warning systems to be effective. The miscalculations made in Somalia, such as the interventions in the 1990s and alignment with warlords during the first stages of failure, only to perpetuate it later will be discussed in the next chapter, as well as lessons that can be learnt for future signs of fragile states on the brink of failure. Some of the preventative principles used in the cases of failing states are true in the international response to failed states.

2.3 Neo Realist Theory

The state centric approach of realism will be used as a starting point to establish the international response to state failure. Elements of authority and legitimacy cannot be neglected when considering state failure. Nor can one neglect the lack of sovereignty that is implicit and consequently necessitates the international community to respond.

The "territorial trap" is described as the state centric approach that neo-realism represents in its billiard ball model, with the political authority belonging to the state. The stark distinction between internal and external relations distinguishes between anarchy on the outside, and the refuge of the state with hierarchy on the inside (Barnett 2001:49). International relations can furthermore be defined as a struggle for power and peace from a neo-realist perspective (Vasquez 1998:187). The struggle for power and peace can be seen at the centre of the research question: “Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (towards refugees and poverty, for example)?” since power and peace are evident in security elements as well as humanitarian elements. The use of neo-realism as a theoretical starting point has its critics, yet no theory has all the answers. The internal politics of Somalia will be considered to demonstrate the international response to state failure.

Although Weber (2005:15) states that neo-realism's anarchy is a 'myth' to explain conflict, from the perspective of state failure the absence of a world government extends to the fact that a state can fail in the first place. A supra-national power would be able to ensure internal and external peace, hypothetically speaking. The issue of power is embedded in anarchy. Telbami (2002:161) contemplates the relation between increased opportunity and state preferences. Neo-realism indicates that only the examination of the internal working of state preferences can reveal the state's motives and that there is no broad theory that states will act

similarly if given the same opportunities or more power. Telbami refers to Zakaria's argument that state power and not national power is of essence, since state strength accounts for the degree of expansion. The contraction of state power in the case of state failure is evident and creates room for other states to expand their power into the spheres of the failed state. The contraction of state power raises questions on legitimacy and authority not only for the failed state but also for the international community.

Prior to establishing the international response to state failure, components like authority, legitimacy and sovereignty will be discussed. Barnett (2001:49) indicates that a union exists between state, territory and authority in IR theory.

2.3.1 Legitimacy and authority

Legitimacy can be defined as *'a psychological relationship between the governed and their governor, which engenders a belief that the state's leaders and institutions have a right to exercise political authority over a society.*' (Thomson 2004:107). Thomson continues that legitimacy serves to *'rather convince than force'* obedience. Once institutional boundaries are distorted, political processes become one in the social and spatial sense, which has implications for political legitimacy. Legitimacy is closely linked to the reinforcement of weak, failing, failed or post-conflict states since a government that is deemed legitimate would not fear rebellion by its population (Lamb 2005:2).

Authority is closely conjoined to legitimacy since the implementation of authority entails a distinctive claim to legitimacy (Lund 2006:693). Thus legitimacy need not be present for an effective government as colonial rule exemplified (Kraxberger 2007:1056). Lamb (2005:4) states *"successful nation building and the prevention of state failure requires not only a fine-grained understanding of the concept of legitimacy but also a local understanding of the structures of political support and political opposition – and the strength of the support or opposition – within the places where the risks of failure are the greatest."*

Authority has elements of public nature as well as being a social construction (Cutler 1999:62). Friedman (1990:64) can be quoted to differentiate authority from coercion because it involves *"a recognition on the part of the subject that . . . another is entitled to obedience"*. The recognition is essential to political authority to have the *"the right to rule"* (Friedman, 1990:68). Yet political culture should not be neglected as it will largely influence political

authority that the citizens grant their government. Furthermore, the recognition needs a public element to it as affirmation. The element of social construction is illustrated as Friedman (1990:71) argues, the "*concept of authority can thus have application only within the context of certain socially accepted criteria which serve to identify person(s) whose utterances are to count as authoritative*." Therefore, authority involves the social sphere to yield private judgement and acknowledge the right to rule (Cutler 1999:63). In the case of state failure the recognition of authority is missing and it is a key element that the international response needs to address.

The FSI recognises the importance of authority in using Criminalisation or Delegitimisation of the State and Progressive Deterioration of Public Services as indicators of failure. The question of where the balance between persuasion and force lies is at the pinnacle of the authority question. Measuring legitimacy can assist the international response to identify the degree of state failure. Criteria for measuring legitimacy are: consent, law, tradition, leadership, effectiveness and norms (Lamb 2005:22). Although political support can be seen to assist legitimacy through attaining patronage, power and preference; legitimacy is more profound since *"it is a belief that a regime is worthy of support, that the regime is morally right to rule in the particular way it rules."* (Lamb 2005:24). Weiss (2007:28) links state capacity and authority to the protection of human rights. Therefore state failure proves that the lack of authority and lack of state capacity cause human rights violations to ensue.

Ramnesh Thakur is quoted as stating that *"the norm of nonintervention has softened as that of human rights have hardened"* (Weiss 2007:18). A closer inspection of sovereignty and the international response will illustrate how humanitarian motives influence the lines of sovereignty to soften.

2.3.2 Sovereignty and the international response

The international response to state failure is a form of intervention which infringes on the territory of a state, irrespective of how weak or failed the state is, within international sovereignty, which can be defined as *'the claim of supreme political authority within a territory'* (Thomson 2004:150). Kraxberger (2007:1064) denotes to Jackson's reference of empirical sovereignty which is synonymous with domestic sovereignty and judicial sovereignty, which is synonymous with external recognition. Both these types are present in functioning states, since empirical components include population and independence, as well

as juridical components of borders and independence (Weiss 2007:14). Domestic sovereignty is important since states tend to collapse internally when they do not provide security to the population within its borders. In some cases states still have external sovereignty. However, due to domestic sovereignty declining, it becomes a quasi-state (Ignatieff 2003:307).

Kraxberger (2007:1060) reiterates this view: states are 'dressed up as normal'. International actors are confronted with a 'pretend-administrative structure and a pretend-set of bureaucratic rules and offices'. Consequently, the political entities are interacted with on the same level as states, although sovereignty and an effective public policy do not truly exist (Forrest 1998:47). Herbst (2000:258) goes as far as saying that no other forms of legal concepts were considered, other than the state, and therefore the international community proceeded *"the fiction that Somalia was still a sovereign nation state."* One can also consider the analogy that the international community are acting like creditors after an investment has been lost, but continue to reinvest in the same company without any alterations. Territorially, Somalia has survived since it is still the "political-space-that-is-Somalia" (Thomson 2004:212). *"The structures of governance may have collapsed in the process, but the state as political entity survived"* (Filatova 2001:17).

Kraxberger (2007:1059) further states that the contemporary international regime of stateness is more focused on international legal recognition than on sovereignty itself. Yet Inter Governmental Organisations (IGOs), like the UN, are based on the sovereign equality of all its members, as UN Charter Article 2 (I) states. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) observed in 1949 *"between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential foundation of international relations"* and more recently the court concurred *"the fundamental principle of state sovereignty on which the whole of international law rests"* Weiss (2007:15). These quotes prove that territorial sovereignty is a hallmark of statehood and the basis of the international system. Sovereignty is crucial to the grouping together of state, territory and authority.

If the international response's aim is to reduce chaos and improve domestic governance and stability, Ignatieff (2003:309) questions whether the Westphalian state is the correct response to achieve this goal. Possibilities of protectorates, regimes of conditional independence and other forms of regimes are suggested, yet international recognition is crucial for the implementation of these alternatives. The development of an African alternative to the state system is a possibility, although for it to succeed the international community needs to

recognise it (Herbst 2000:262). By transferring sovereignty, governance is gained, as participation in security pacts and economic agreements benefit governance (Ignatieff 2003:313). Herbst (2000:263) indicates that a regional approach to specific issues is an alternative to consider. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an example of a regional organisation, yet statehood has not fallen away as all its members are still states and the international response is seldom towards the Regional Economic Cluster (REC) but rather towards a specific state. The case of the European Union (EU) exemplifies how far regionalisation can go, yet many criteria are stipulated for membership, crucially to be a functioning state.

The US' reaction to certain states is in the form of decertifying them for aid qualification in cases of non-compliance in the areas of barricading drug-related activities, since they do not oblige to their sovereign responsibilities of their own laws (Herbst 2000:264). Decertification of a country can be an option to the international community to indicate that without taking sovereignty with its responsibilities into account, a country will not be considered or treated sovereign (Herbst 2000:265). Consequently, it indicates that when states are no longer fully functioning and by only 'certifying' them, they once again have to adhere to certain criteria. This ‘certificiation’ is problematic since big powers certify states according to alignment and decertification occur with opposition. The role that these powers play within weak and failed states, are furthermore disastrous in many cases as illustrated by support of dictators, warlords and illegitimate governments.

The flip side of the coin is granting statehood and sovereignty to states. In this sense Herbst (2000:266) can be quoted as stating that *"political control has to be won, not instituted by administrative fiat"* and *"The inevitable disruption caused by state creation will also have to be balanced against the profound harm that existing states do to their population every day."* With the recognition of this, the international community has the possibility to have these groups respect human rights and be part of the international economy. One must also note the fact that no assistance is given to Somaliland by the World Bank or IMF due to the lack of recognition, even though the government is providing some services to its citizens (Herbst 2000:268). The right to self-determination; the broadened conception of international peace and security; and the collapse of state authority are three elements that emerged in the post-Cold War era. However, the centrality of the state in decision making and the deficiency of a central authority above the state remained constant (Weiss 2007:25).

"*A less dogmatic approach to sovereignty would allow the international community to adjust to reality and to begin to help a substantial number of people*" (Herbst 2000:268). The state has to take responsibility with sovereignty to protect its citizens and their property and not use it to conceal internal human rights violations (Weiss 2007:17). Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali can be quoted as saying "*the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed its theory was never matched to reality*" (Herbst 2000:259). Kofi Annan can similarly be quoted regarding "*two concepts of sovereignty*" the one is centred on people and the other around states. The tendency is that *"it is the people's sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty"* (Weiss 2007:22). International standards of governance including democracy and human rights are becoming the basis of sovereignty rather than the elitist view of state leaders (Weiss 2007:24). The fact that globalisation has played a role in the shift in sovereignty cannot be denied. Globalisation needs to be incorporated into the neo-realist paradigm to achieve a well-rounded theoretical basis to establish the international response to state failure.

2.4 Globalisation

2.4.1 Definition

Defining Globalisation has become a much debated subject. Proof of this lies in a document published by the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) titled *Definitions of Globalisation: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition*. Al-Rodhan & Stroudmann (2006:5) of the GCSP defined it as follows: *"Globalsation is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of the transnational and transcultural integration of all human and non-human activities"*. This is just a proposed definition, amongst hundreds of definitions of Globalisation which are cited. The complexity of globalisation lies in its variations, depending from which paradigm, field or position one considers it. Hence the developed world would consider it differently from the developing world, as differences will be apparent from economic, social, historical and political fields and globalisation's influence on it. Even a single aspect of globalisation has many dimensions. Yet, this is problematic as complexity is often approached by simplification and in the case of globalisation, homogenisation (Bhagwati 2004:26).

Globalisation can refer to four sets of processes namely: Internationalisation, Technical Revolution, Deterritorialisation and Liberalisation. Globalisation is internationalisation in the

sense of augmented transactions between states in trade, investment and capital facilitated by inter-state agreements. The technological revolution aspect of Globalisation has made geographical distance and location less important, as modern communication systems like the internet, satellite communications and computers assist in activities of not merely governments but Multi-National Corporations (MNC's)/Trans-National Corporations (TNC's) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's). The technological revolution further hastens the deterritorialisation aspect of globalisation. Individuals identify themselves less with territorial places which increases the expansion of a global civil society and global criminal or terrorist networks (Woods 2005:338). The fragility in weak states is compounded by globalisation since the technological revolution leads to deterritorialisation in political economic and social spheres (Weiss 2007:60).

The Liberalisation feature of Globalisation was visible as government policies diminished the role of the state in the economy through the dismantling of trade tariffs and barriers as well as deregulation and the opening of the financial sector to foreign investors and privatisation of state enterprises (Woods 2005:338). This rang true until the recent recession reverted to state regulatory control of markets.

The neo-liberal form of globalisation and capitalism, that the US portrays, is hard for many to accept (Stiglitz 2003:5). The promotion of free trade and free capital flows needs to be handled with caution, since capital flows freed without monitoring as regulatory systems and banking reforms could lead to an economic crisis, as short term capital funds are reversed (Bhagwati 2004:26). Taking all of globalisation's features into account, deterritorialisation is probably the most significant, when considering state failure and the internationalisation function in the international response to it. The question of sovereignty, although strong in legal and political discourse, has come under stress where territorial boundaries are concerned. The greater role that cultural, environmental and economic influences play disregards borders and the sovereignty entrenched in them to a certain extent (Weiss 2007:13). Somalia even in its failed status, is part of the globalised world, especially with 14 per cent of its population outside Somalia (Sheikh and Healy 2009:4) Through internet access the Somali diaspora are well informed of the situation at home. Even though the Somali diaspora are dispersed globally due to the failure in their state, their interest in their ‘motherland’ proves that its sovereignty still matters and their involvement will be discussed.

2.4.2 Globalisation and the international response to state failure

Although globalisation has some benefits of better health and living standards for some, and have had others feel less isolated with access to knowledge, its benefits have been very unbalanced. Globalisation as the integration of markets and goods, services and factors of production is stated to be irreversible (Wolf 2003:393). James Rosenau summarised the centripetal and centrifugal forces of globalisation by combining the integration and fragmentation aspects together into "*fragmeration*" (Weiss 2007:61). The question that needs to be answered is this: how does '*fragmeration*' influence a failed state in Africa and the international response to it?

Africa has been heavily influenced by global changes in economics, politics and society. Africa's role is further described as asymmetric in the global order (Filatova 2001:27). Bayart (1993:27) further indicates that this asymmetric part of the formation is seen an unequal entry into the international systems and part dynamic mode of African societies, without sustaining it. Africa's structure relates directly to the world economy. Africa has been part of history, and although not an equal player, a player nonetheless. The 'struggle syndrome' blames all societal problems on external elements (Filatova 2001:39). Establishing whether Africa suffers from the 'struggle syndrome' would lead to great generalisation which is unacceptable in the quest for objective research. Yet, the international community's perception of the failed state plays a role in their response. Shaw (2007:351) identifies these perceptions as historical frames, *"stereotypical representations based on events, issues and myths located in the past"*. Africa is often portrayed either as with 'historical baggage' in the sense of prehistoric exploration and through the slave trade; or through the lens of ethnic hatred or primitive and hopeless. Western media often use Africa to tell human interest stories to raise awareness for aid programmes which does not face human rights violations head-on.

The phenomenon referred to as the "CNN effect" is visible through the implications of *'Black Hawk Down'* and coverage of involvement in Somalia, which altered peacekeeping policies in general (Hardy 2007:489). Involvement due to moral reasons intensified with globalisation facilitating the pleas of the failed state. Although preventive measures are less costly than a 'headline-grabbing disaster', human psychology rules that, as Coady illustrates (2002:29), less effort is needed to obtain support for large scale military actions with low risks than less expensive preventative actions.

Telbami (2002:164) enquires whether morality can be a dominant factor in a state's foreign policy. Gros (1996:266) provides an answer, "*Thus, the dilemma for the international community in the post-Cold War is this: while it is neither moral, practical nor politically feasible to ignore the problems in failed states, there is a serious lack of knowledge of how best to help solve these problems. Furthermore, even when knowledge is available, the unwillingness of citizens in core countries to sacrifice their sons and daughters for causes whose immediate benefits are not readily apparent, even while they also demand that their governments take action, further reduces the range of policy instruments available to decision makers, with the margin of error being set at practically zero".* Although neo-realist theory will not indulge in morality as the sole reason for intervention and rather focuses on issues of national interest, the international community does get involved in failed states although it might be in a limited capacity, especially in contending with sovereignty. In the case of Somalia the international response has been urged by the need to avert humanitarian crisis but has failed multiple times and has been keener to address their own national security issues overflowing from Somalia, especially in the region.

Issues of sovereignty, globalisation and state failure are intertwined in the international response. Neo-realist theory, in essence, is altered by globalisation. Since the state has collapsed, civil society and external actors play a bigger role with their interests. Thomson (2004:5) defines civil society as *"the organisations that arise out of voluntary association within society, found between the extended family the state"*. Civil society and the African state are known to have a flaccid bond due to the colonial legacy of coercion instead of legitimate authority (Thomson 2004:15). A violent and indignant civil society has emerged as a result of the irregular nature of order in the state (Filatova 2001:39).The increase in violence is a common feature of state failure as surviving elements of the state's main aim is warfare and rebels are likely to have their share of support from civil society (Forrest 1998:52). The emergence of a global civil society is furthermore evident in that the state system needs to take responsibility as national civil society has sovereign states take liability for its citizens. Global responsibility leads to humanitarian intervention purely on the grounds of human interest. Global civil society has placed states under pressure to forego non-intervention and a strict following of the principles of sovereignty (Shaw 2007:356). Yet, if sovereignty is shared amongst parties, including the parties that have the authority on the ground, aid organisations can provide aid directly to those who represent the people that need it. Recognising real control over a territory, opposed to theoretical control, is essential

(Herbst 2000:271). Deterritorialisation is thus evident. Holsti can therefore (2004:318) be quoted: *"the major problem of the contemporary society of states is no longer aggression, conquest and the obliteration of states. It is, rather, the collapse of states, humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of local populations, civil wars of various types, and international terrorist organizations."* The collapse of states can therefore be seen to be mentioned within a group of areas that in many cases are the symptoms of state failure. These areas are treated although the bigger maladie of state collapse is rarely addressed head-on. With globalisation intervention in the form of armed conflict has changed. The international response in the form of intervention is therefore influenced.

Armed conflict has changed in four significant ways. Firstly, borders are no longer at the pinnacle of the conflict; secondly, non-state actors are playing an increasing role in conflicts; thirdly, illicit activities, aid and plundering support the conflict financially instead of revenue collected by the state; and fourthly, civilians pay the highest price in casualties and not combatants (Weiss 2007:63). Clausewitz stated that war is a continuation of politics but in the globalised status, David Keen can be quoted as stating that *"war may be the continuation of economics by other means"* The variety of societal modifications that take place affect the state on various levels (Villalon 1998:21). Globalisation has altered the focus of the state away from public functions through privatisation and non-formal sector activity. The ability of the state to formulate a consistent economic policy diminishes as the focus is shifted to appealing markets (Forrest 1998:48). The birth of the informal economy thus results (Weiss 2007:67). Neighbouring economies benefit from the economy opening up (Zartman 1995:9).The economic element can be seen in the FSI 'Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines and Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline'. Yet the informal economy is a way for some to survive where the state has failed them.

Reno (2005:128) indicates that armed groups are responsible for the creation and control of the informal economy. The neutrality that peacekeepers attempt to keep often causes conflict to escalate, since the aid becomes a commodity of power (Ignatieff 2003:316).The faction that dictates economic resources, inevitably has the power and it is seldom used to promote good governance (Howard 2008:131). Ignatieff (2003:303) indicates that although foreign aid, development assistance and debt relief would lessen the burden on failed states, it is far from being a panacea. Resource rich countries are often high conflict zones since these commodities are not used for nation building, but to fund war.

The influence of the international community is limited as direct infusions of aid into the informal economy have little effect in resurrecting a formal one (Forrest 1998:49).Weiss (2007:68) states that informal economies are full of opportunities whilst state are in a rebuilding or failing phase. Reno (2005:128) illustrates the fact as "*It is not that people in these places are passive. Instead, political systems in failed states are remarkably durable and operate in ways that choke off autonomous social space, even when large numbers of 'civil society' groups form. Even as these political systems fragment, those who fight them most effectively do so in organizations that incorporate the same political strategies"*. The increase of subnational movements is evident in the Horn of Africa, not only the case of Somaliland, but even more so in Eritrea and Sudan. These movements are focused on regional and territorial unification rather than ethnic nationalism (Forrest 1998:51). Longman (1998:90) indicates that the way civil society differentiates between favourable organisations towards the state and less complimentary organisations toward the state hold policy implications. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) exemplifies this, since their guidelines for supporting civil society necessitates a group to have an 'advocacy role' to enhance state building.

The link between the local and the global is in essence in the approach to understanding intervention. Globalisation has narrowed the gap significantly between the local and the global, and facilitates the process of intervention seemingly. Yet the gap between the 'haves' and the 'havenots' is increasingly evident, especially when dealing with failed states. The refugee flows, crime and drug trafficking that ensues as the failed state's citizens are in search of a better life, urges strong states to act and improve circumstances in the failed state (Ignatieff 2003:315). The refugees create the opportunity for kidnappings and recruitments to the ends of child soldiers (Forrest 1998:53), since mass migration will test the stronger states to the end. The spill over effects of state failure and the informal economy in a globalised world therefore urges an international response.

2.5 Intervention

The principal means of the international response can be seen through the question of intervention, formulated by Ignatieff (2003:306) as "*how does an external state best use violence or coercion to enable the population of another state to re-establish a legitimate monopoly on the means of violence?"*. Coady (2002:10) defines it as "*intentional act of one*

state or group of states or an international agency aimed at exercising overriding authority on what are normally the "internal" policies or practices of another state or group of states. Consent is crucial to distinguish between intervention and interference. Weiss (2007:20) states that consent should be seen as a continuum rather than an absolute concept, since "coercive inducement" can be classified as coerced consent. Intervention takes place when no request for assistance was given, yet there is interference which is not coercive in nature and therefore not intervention. Many forms of foreign policy can be seen in this light (Weiss 2007:19). The international response therefore will include all forms of interference as well as intervention with its more coercive nature.

Krasner (cited in Villalon 1998:6) indicates that states go through periods of creation and stasis in the state building process and calls it "punctuated equilibrium". The creation periods are associated with radical change which can be viewed as a crisis, the actions taken during this period is the foundation of new structures and dictates the direction of future actions. The international response to state failure needs to be evident during the crisis period. The analogy of clay can be used to illustrate the point. During a crisis period the state in question is easily influenced, and can be seen as soft clay. If international actors respond at this stage, their influence will be much greater than when the clay is hard. Once hard, additions can be made to structures but often deep cracks are visible and complete destruction is needed. Coady (2002:29) proves the analogy by stating that "*Both persuasion and certain non-violent coercive measures should be employed in the early stages of a crisis, or as a crisis looms, when opportunities for prevention or mitigation of humanitarian disasters may present themselves or can be constructed."* Yet, in Somalia Gros (1996:467) states that the international community intervened once anarchy had set in completely and state authority was truant. The international response during the 1990's in Somalia will be used as empirical evidence in Chapter 3. The theoretical foundation of what intervention constitutes and why the international community is driven to intervention will be focused on.

Gros (1996:466) is of the opinion that the international response to crises in failed states has fluctuated from denial, to unenthusiastic intervention, to a one size fits all approach by using the previous experiences as grounds for making policy decisions in complete opposite situations. He aptly calls it "*a Procrustean approach to failed states policy"*. Whether the international response can go beyond the hard bed that a failed state is faced with, without

amputating more limbs than necessary and cushion it with some humanitarian intervention is debatable.

Legitimacy once again makes its voice heard regarding intervention since the further intervention is shifted from the "*partial interests of particular states, especially powerful ones, the more likely it is to approximate justice, and the more likely it is to be perceived as legitimate by the parties in conflict and by the international comm*unity" (Coady 2002:26). At times the international response moves so far away that it can be seen as withdrawal.

The opposite of intervention is withdrawal. Filatova (2001:32) states that the withdrawal of world powers from Africa has been an inclination and not an accordant policy even though this withdrawal left the countries in a parlous position from institutional to social levels. The asymmetry, that is the norm of power, in the international system limits weaker states choice and these states might have objected more if their power position in military or economic terms were different (Weiss 2007:20). Withdrawal constitutes coercive interventions in domestic affairs by confinement of decision making of local authorities by narrowing existing support. Examples include matters of aid, trade status, and diplomatic recognition, or warnings of non-delivery on awaited economic or political aid. Economic sanctions is an utmost form of coercion, and could result into violent measures, even though they are seen as an "a clean alternative to violent intervention". Unfortunately sanctions take time to 'kick in', so to speak, and might harm those they intend to help (Coady 2002:29).

Intervention can only take place within fragile states without allies (Ignatieff 2003:319). During the Cold War non-intervention was practised in civil wars in Africa under the guise of sovereignty (Shaw 2007:353). Although the focus is on the international response to state failure, a non-response is a response to a certain extent. The lack of intervention from the international community is a point worth elaborating on as Woolf & Hulsizer (2005:118) state that *"Rationales for inaction include diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance. In times of crisis, individuals in crowds are less likely to intervene, as personal responsibility to help becomes diluted. Additionally, we tend to look to others for assistance in understanding a situation and may decide that if others appear unconcerned, then there is little reason for intervention. Once committed to non-action, it becomes increasingly difficult for intervention to occur due to cognitive dissonance and a belief in a just world."* They continue by adding that within the international arena bystander nations influence each other

and the reasons for inaction range from a deficiency in will, political and economic self-interest, sovereignty and prejudice.

Since the lack of the above mentioned elements cause inaction, their presence could be linked to why the international community does respond and intervention occurs. Reasons include crimes against humanity and human rights violations a that result into political pressure to be placed upon the responsible governments or quasi-governmental states that include boycotts and sanctions followed by armed intervention (Woolf & Hulsizer 2005:124). Yet intervention is not as simple as a three point plan from boycott to sanction to armed intervention. Measuring its effectiveness through a cost benefit analysis is problematic since it is a social-scientific question. The establishment of whether civilians benefited by intervention would require evaluating elements of displacement, suffering and the functioning of the local government prior to intervention as well as afterwards, yet the data available is far from reliable during a crisis (Weiss 2007:84).

Keohane (2003:276) indicates that there needs to be a direct link between pre and post intervention actions. The vision of what the intervention needs to achieve must be clearly indicated from decisions taken prior to intervention towards the implementation of institution building post-intervention. The distinction between preventive and reconstructive intervention can be made since the former retreats as soon as peace has been restored whereas the latter is more inclined to state/nation building (Gambari 1995:223). Humanitarian intervention and the notion of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) will be discussed before looking at state and nation building initiatives by the international community.

2.5.1 Humanitarian Intervention

Although neo-realist approach is used to analyse state failure and the norm of non-intervention is closely linked to the Westphalian order, in the case of human rights violations more liberal balance needs to be found (Shaw 2007:354). Adam Roberts defines humanitarian intervention as *"coercive action by one or more states involving the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its authorities, and with the purpose of preventing widespread suffering or death among the inhabitants"* (cited in Weiss 2007:5). The added element of the fact that it is unsolicited can be seen in the following definition, *'the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals*

other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied.' (Holzgrefe 2003:18).

All of the costs involved need to be taken into account before humanitarian intervention is attempted and it should be used as last resort to halt human rights violations since it is costly and harmful (Janssen 2008:293). Janssen (2008:294) furthermore states that two situations call for humanitarian intervention, namely circumstances of anarchy due to state failure, since the civilians suffer most as well as in cases of oppressive regimes where security forces of the state is used against its own citizens. Shaw (2007:355) elaborates that the form that humanitarian intervention takes could be aid programmes or military intervention to protect and promote human rights or both. Yet the motives vary for such involvement, ranging from ethical to legitimate calculations of national interest to pure self-interest camouflaged as 'humanitarian' (Weiss 2007:6). The ethical questions that arise from humanitarian intervention are numerous and classified in various ways including moral, legal, rule or consequence. The post 9/11 era implies intervention due to strategic interest in security or terrorist activities instead of being purely based on humanitarian needs for intervention (Ignatieff 2003:306). "*The Westphalian norm was premised on the argument that 'states will invoke humanitarian reasons while pursuing other objectives through military intervention'"*(Shaw 2007:353). Furthermore *'states rarely act out of altruism and contend that they will usually intervene to further their national interests rather than the fundamental rights of people abroad.'* (Benn and Peters 1953:361 cited in Caney 2000). Shaw (2007:357) concludes that writers like Chomsky and Hammond see the 'humanitarian label' as a 'smokescreen of the selfish pursuit of Western interests'. Some form of interest need to be present in order for states to be convinced to be involved. The alternative of lack of motivation is clear, with the US withdrawing from Somalia after losing 18 Rangers in October 1993 (Weiss 2007:7).

The United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter needs to authorise humanitarian intervention. Without such approval any humanitarian intervention is viewed as unauthorised (Keohane 2003:1). Traditional peacekeeping is authorised under Chapter VI of the UN Security Council and is different from Chapter VII that makes provision for "use of all necessary means" to attain peace through military force. Consent, neutrality and not using force except in the case of self-defence are the norms of peacekeeping (Weiss 2007:8). Humanitarian intervention finds itself in the middle between peacekeeping and war.

Terms like 'peace enforcement' and 'coercive protection' further explores the middle ground humanitarian intervention is faced with. The former can be seen as an across-the-board political resolution to sustainable peace through monitoring cease-fires to the extent of using fatal force, if called for, like demobilising soldiers, demolishing weapons and creating new armed and police forces. The latter is mainly seen in the sustainment of humanitarian corridors, defending aid convoys and developing safe havens (Weiss 2007:9). It is important for interventions to retain the balance regarding protection of human rights and not to do the opposite in the process of intervention (Coady 2002:27). Intervention troops' role of impartiality and mitigation is quickly lost as they become part of the dynamic of war (Duyvesteyn 2005:119).

In the case of state failure the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) have had various responses but their adaptation of intervention from the Cold War national security paradigm and institutional irrelevance, to a certain extent, has left humanitarian intervention under a shadow of doubt (Gros 1996:466). The concept of Responsibility to protect has smoothed out some of the curve balls that humanitarian intervention faced in the immediate Post-Cold War era.

2.5.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

After the Holocaust, the phrase "Never Again" was declared, yet these words seem empty in consultation with historical evidence of mass violence. *"In the face of repressive or weak states...international actors have a responsibility to come to the aid of populations at risk"* (Weiss 2007:23). Natural law advocates that humans have '*certain moral duties by virtue of their common humanity'* (Holzgrefe 2003:25). A multifarious approach to prevention must be created and followed through (Woolf & Hulsizer 2005:120).

Viewing sovereignty as a responsibility is the core of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) (Weiss 2007:89). R2P was developed through the Canadian sponsored expert panel: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which released the report "The Responsibility to Protect" (Janssen 2008:295). Nation building activities of good citizenship and human security are implied and provide a rationale for constructive engagement with sustained efforts (Ignatieff 2003:320). The importance of the responsibility that sovereignty entails can be seen through the safety and welfare functions governments

need to ensure; the responsibility within its borders to citizens and externally to the UN; and state agents need to be accountable for acts including commission and omission (Janssen 2008:295). The centrality of sovereignty remains within the paradigm of international relations even though globalisation has influenced the state's power and human rights delineate its authority to its population (Weiss 2007:95).

The international community accepted the R2P report in September 2005 during the UN World Summit declaration. R2P entails firstly the responsibility to prevent which addresses both the root causes and the direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk. Secondly the responsibility to react: to respond to situations compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention. Thirdly the responsibility to rebuild, to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction, and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert (Weiss 2007:101).

Many opinions exist on R2P which is exemplified in the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy 2003 report of 'Civil Society Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect' it is of the opinion that the R2P report is still at an infant stage. Other critics state that it is legally orientated while the states that are in the position to apply intervention gather support and that little alludes to how these states will implement the principle. The urgency of the R2P to be taken seriously can be seen as UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi states, that if such a responsibility was taken seriously immediate action would be required in Somalia and other crises (Janssen2008:296).

The UN report "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" states "*Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security Council failed to enforce them. Weak enforcement results from the strategic interests of powerful States; a lack of clarity about the purpose of sanctions; "sanctions fatigue" brought about by concern over their humanitarian impact; insufficient support from the respective sanctions committees; and insufficient State capacity to implement sanctions suggested that the "responsibility to protect" should be integrated into the system of collective security"* (UN 2004:32). In 2005 the General Assembly announced its acceptance of the responsibility to protect as a guiding principle:

"We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law".

Weiss (2007:103) summarise the important points of R2P by the following extracts from the report "*less intrusive and coercive measure be considered before more coercive and intrusive ones"* and "*prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect*". The importance of R2P will be elaborated on in Chapter 4 where humanitarian motives for the international response will be considered including that of the UN, and other groups and organisations that form global civil society.

2.5.3 State/Nation building

Humanitarian intervention or R2P does not end with the end of conflict but a longer term commitment regarding development including the promotion of democracy, the establishment of rule of law and the respect of human rights (Weiss 2007:82). Kraxberger (2007:1060) identifies four frameworks in responding to failed states: Revival and reconstruction of failed states; shared sovereignty; territorial restructuring of states; and stateless zones and uncertainty. These frameworks will critically be discussed in broad terms.

The fact that most African states were centralised states with power far from civil society's reach explains why in the reconstruction of a failed states should follow a decentralised model (Thomson 2004:109). *"New medievalism"* as referred to by Hedley Bull illustrates the idea of states in the post-Cold War power shifts which resemble that of the Middle Ages. The armed conflict was a key ingredient to state-making in the European case in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from this point of view developing states need to go through a similar process to achieve a strong state (Weiss 2007:66). The causes of failure can become the building blocks for new powerful states. Europe in the medieval times rose out of war and illegitimate trade (Forrest 1998:55). Whether Somalia is a phoenix to rise from the flames is

questionable. Perhaps Somalia is a phoenix but what should the international response be to regenerate the majestic creature?

Similarly Reno (2005:127) asks "*Is it possible to construct public authorities out of collapsed states in the twenty-first century, or do local predations and global conditions preclude indigenous state-building in these places?",* Forrest (1998:54) is of the opinion that completely collapsed states like Somalia have two options: continued disintegration or reconstruction of the state. He refers to the continued disintegration as 'nonstate politics' where authority is decentralised and based in civil society. The external perception of political anarchy could have 'order within the chaos' on the communal level. State consolidation needs to occur in Africa and although it is different from the European formation of state consolidation there are similarities in certain factors including political geography, domestic political calculations by leaders, the role of boundaries and the nature of the state system (Herbst 2000:256). Herbst (2000:257) continues by stating that "*state building cannot be considered a "merely academic" issue in Africa. Given how poor the record of state consolidation has been in Africa and the amount of human suffering that failed states cause, it is imperative to ask whether there are alternatives to the trajectory of state consolidation that began in Berlin in 1885."* State reconstruction will occur differently than during the colonial period since it will be decentralised and reinventing African polities through alliance building and be harmonious with local power structures (Forrest 1998:55). Evans (1995:3) however states *"until less hierarchical ways of avoiding a Hobbesian world are discovered, the state lies at the centre of solutions to the problem of order".* The issue of shared sovereignty or recognising non-sovereignty of a territory is an attempt to lower the battle stakes of political and economic power which lies at the roots of conflict (Duyvesteyn 2005:122). The restoration of sovereignty once the conflict is resolved has been explored a preceding in-depth section on sovereignty and the international response. Fukuyama (2005:162) states "*the post-September 11 period, the chief issue for global politics will not be how to cut back on stateness but how to build it up".* State building has increasingly become a tactic of US counter-terrorism, which existed prior to 9/11, yet was intensified with the war on terror (Quaranto 2008:12). Mallaby (2003:2) is of the opinion, *"The war on terrorism has focused attention on the chaotic states that provide profit and sanctuary to nihilist outlaws, from Sudan to Afghanistan to Sierra Leone and Somalia*".

The international response needs to determine whether it continues to disregard secessionist movements and placing them in the 'semi-criminal' category or assist in creating new state institutions (Herbst 2000:269). Duyvesteyn (2005:122) highlights the opportunities that intervening states possess. The transition to stabilisation in the country can be done through weakening or strengthening key actors politically and economically. Similarly in altering the identity of rebel forces could lead to these beligrants transformation to a transparent system. The international response to Somaliland and Puntland as states within failed states will be elaborated on in Chapter 3.

Equalling order to democracy has become a common element and symbiotic in many ways, the one a prerequisite for the other yet Villalon (1998:5) states that in African states the most substantial differences are '*...in terms of how effective state structures are in terms of maintaining a stable political and social order.*' State capacity is the key element for evaluation. The complete lack of state capacity in the case of state failure is evident. Therefore good governance became a prerequisite for aid and assistance in the post-Cold War era for most African countries (Thomson 2004:166). The importance of governance must be noted, yet if one only focuses on governance inadequate analysis and feeble intervention will result (Carment et al. 2007:48). Governance is not a synonym for government, although similarities are seen in the goal orientated actions, government has formal authority including policing powers to ensure enforcement of policies. The importance of government institutions cannot be denied yet governance goes beyond the institutions of the state (Lund 2006:265). "*Governance refers to activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities and that do not necessarily rely on police powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance. Governance, in other words, is a more encompassing phenomenon than government. It embraces governmental institutions, but it also subsumes informal, non-governmental mechanisms whereby those persons and organizations within its purview move ahead, satisfy needs, and fulfill their wants"* (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992:4).

The cooperation with local entities to ensure the enhancement of resources, empowerment of civilian leadership, administrative capacity and legitimacy is crucial for the international response to have a lasting effect (Ignatieff 2003:319). Institution building as part of nation building does not always have adequate funding to succeed (Kraxberger 2007:1061). Long term commitments are essential from an international response to succeed. The balance

between the international actors and the creation of local legitimacy cannot be emphasised enough. Therefore a sense of understanding of the local problems is necessary, from a local perspective and a paradigm shift is indispensable from global to local. Yet Gros (1996:470) state "*Countries can be nudged towards the promised land, but they cannot be forced by others to enter it at gunpoint; ultimately they have to do so on their own and, realistically, not all will.*"

2.6 Theories to Practice

The biggest obstacle to overcome is the discrepancy between theory and practice. Through the intricate process of regarding the international response to state failure theoretical elements of realism and globalisation have been considered. The various theoretical aspects that lay the foundation of the research question: Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (towards refugees and poverty, for example)? were considered. Yet an in-depth approach will elaborate on the practical side of these theories. Obtaining the goal of marrying theory and practice will be achieved firstly through the lens of past intervention in Somalia in Chapter 3 and furthermore through establishing humanitarian and security motives in Chapter 4 and 5 respectively to the international response to state failure.

The theoretical paradigm adopted for this research on Somalia can be summarised as Neo-Realist in principle since the struggle for power and peace is omnipresent in Somalia's state failure, and even in its complete failed status the international community still treats it as a state. It is fundamental to note that state failure in Somalia and the international response to the failure originate from internal problems, which external forces cannot address fully. The fact that the international response is more concerned with spill-over effects of state failure will be illustrated from a historical to present-day view. The legitimacy and sovereignty of the various attempts at governing Somalia will also be highlighted as the chapters unfold. Although prevention is better than cure, in the case of Somalia, any progress is welcomed with failure being in the anarchic type of failure for over two decades. Staying with Gros' (1996:458-461) typology, as the research develops the international response will also be evaluated to the extent to verify whether Somalia will develop into a phantom or a captured failed state with neighbouring states' vested interests.

Chapter 3:

Background overview to the international response to Somalia

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter an action and reaction approach will be followed. The international response to each historical event that led to Somalia's failure will be considered and special attention will be paid to the research question: '*Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with state security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)?'* in the post 1991 Somalia. The background to the international community's response to Somalia prior to failure is vital in understanding the recent international responses on a scale of humanitarian versus security motives for intervention. To highlight key events a timeline will be attached in the appendix with the international dimension clearly indicated. (See Annex 1)

The Somali territory is located in the Horn of Africa. State collapse and the irredentist nature of various parts render reference to Somalia as a functioning state problematic. International recognition of Somalia is contradictory since Somalia does not conform to the requirements of statehood. Kreijen (2004:357) makes a useful analogy regarding the continued recognition of Somalia and that of clinical death: "*Somalia's vital state organs have also stopped functioning autonomously. State extinction, however, has not occurred because of the uninterrupted recognition of Somalia's existence by the international community. The withdrawal of recognition, therefore, would switch off the machinery."* The question of why the international community still recognises the so-called Somali government and consequently interacts with it will be explored.

The various subsections that make up the territory known as Somalia will be analysed further, as well as the 'unrecognised' lines that certain groups have drawn within the territory in the case of Somaliland and Puntland. The clan dynamic will be briefly outlined before the different international responses and alliances with the clans will be illustrated in the various periods discussed.

Before analysing how the international community has reacted to Somalia, it is important to understand the functioning of Somali society before colonial intervention, during independence and the collapse of the state.

Firstly the colonial influences of the United Kingdom (UK) and Italy will be considered. The colonial influences cannot be ignored when considering Somalia's independence and state formation, as well as the lingering effect that these powers have. The post-independence phase of the country's history overlaps with the Cold War which will be elaborated on, focusing on the key international involvement during this era.

The fall of Siad Barre and the collapse of the Somali state coincide with the end of the Cold War. The post-Cold War reaction to state failure will be considered in detail. Although at first the lack of international response was evident, every international actor's response during Operation Restore Hope will be critically analysed.

The post-Operation Restore Hope era will be covered to have the background of the first decade of state failure and the international response thereto. The rise and fall of the Islamic Courts, areas of R2P and piracy will be elaborated on in chapters 4 and 5.

3.2 Somalia prior to international involvement

The lack of strict hierarchy within pre-colonial Somalia is visible since no chief had control over land or livestock. The household was the basic social unit, with free access to water and grazing resources, without elders interfering. Yet due to the arid climate, households cooperated in maintaining water wells and managing grazing. Samatar (1997:693-694) points out that, although the Somali's worked together three features of inequality were evident. Firstly in the allocation of livestock among the community, a family's managerial skills and location in the network of exchange played a role. Secondly women had less freedom of movement in the patriarchal society where thirdly older men were seen as the elders and consequently the political elite. Although their authority was democratic in nature their will was socially enforced in the absence of coercive tools.

The majority of Somalis' are pastoral nomads which entails them accumulating and protecting their livestock from neighbours. The principle of 'my enemy's enemy is my friend' is relevant and will be illustrated through the alliances within the region and

international response (Mayall 2005:48). Yet a distinction can be made between nomadic tribes and non-nomadic tribes since the Thanwein clans in northern Somalia were settled permanently with their crops in Northern Somalia which provided opportunity for trade or looting by the nomadic tribes (Shay 2005:64).

Samatar (1992:631) distinguishes between pastoralism according to historical conditions, where 'communitarian pastoralism' is a '*social system in which the production of use-values predominates'* while peripheral capitalist pastoralism includes the creation of exchange values. The pre-colonial Somali society fell into the communitarian category and although it had interaction with the mercantile world, Somali life continued almost uninfluenced.

A set of rules and norms, the *Xeer* balanced political and economic life in pre-colonial times by incorporating Islamic religious values. Kreijen (2004:66) describes this system as one of checks and balances and dispute settlement for a society in which resources are insufficient and centralisation of power to a minority would have been disastrous. Kinship can be seen to have maintained the moral order through the element of *Xeer* and that of genealogy, *tol*, or marriage, *Xidid*. Since intermarriage took place, the *Xeer* superseded that of *tol*, forming a sense of community under Islam (Samatar 1997:694). Exogamy was used to resolve disputes by extending kinship (Kapteijns 1995:247). The elders' role in dispute settling cannot be denied as elders from both sides assembled in a *shir* to investigate a feud (Drysdale 2000:146). The elders implemented the *Xeer* principles and held the keys to political authority. The clan dynamic came second to that of *Xeer* principles in pre-colonial times. The influences of external influences on the elders and *Xeer* will be elaborated on.

3.3 Colonial International Responses

Since Somalia was a 'stateless state' in pre-colonial times the impact of colonial rule can be seen to have had quantitative alterations in Somali society with new dynamics of social relations and transformations in the pastoral economy (Samatar 1992:627). The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw numerous political developments with Britain, France, Italy, Egypt and Ethiopia changing the structure of the Somali Peninsula.

The race to Fashoda proved the various motives of these powers involvement where Britain gained control of the northern coast in 1884 for livestock products for its naval port of Aden, located in Yemen. The strategic importance in light of the Red Sea and Aden in defence of

British India had British vice consuls installed in Berbera, Bullaxaar and Saylac. The French in opposition to the British Cape to Cairo vision aimed at having east to west expansion across Africa and got hold of the Afar coast (Fitzgerald 2002:32). The following quote by James Rennell Rodd exemplifies it *'...the issue which stood out above all others in the African problem was whether a line of cleavage in the great continent should run south to north, or from west to east.'* (Mohamed 2002:1178).

Italy focused on southern Somalia from 1888 and was the main coloniser yet the spread of Italian influence was slow due to the lack of parliamentary enthusiasm for overseas territory. As for regional colonisation Egypt brought Britain's attention to the Somali territory in evacuating Egyptian troops stranded in Sudan and on the Somali coast as a result of the Sudanese anti-Egyptian Mahdist revolt in 1884. Emperor Menlik II from Ethiopia was the greatest force in the Horn of Africa with Ethiopian influence extending over the Ogaden (Fitzgerald 2002:33). The strategic position of the Horn of Africa had significant effects on the Somali people.

Every Somali had to be a legitimate subject of chief and a hierarchical system of subject, tribe, chief and colonial administration ensued (Samatar 1997:695). The focus on clans within Somalia is directly linked to the colonial rulers. The five major clan groups in Somalia are Hawiye, Darod, Dir, Isaq and Rahanweyn (Dagne & Smith 2002:1). Periods of scarcity such as famine, drought and war have made Somali society more clan focused (Adam 1995:70). The Map (CIA 2002) below indicating the geographic location of the various clans is useful to illustrate the clan dynamics.



Figure 3 .1 Clan geographic location (CIA 2002)

Samatar (1992:631) emphasises that *"There are two major historical benchmarks in the evolution of contemporary Somalia:(i) the commercialisation of the subsistence economy, and particularly livestock, the material backbone of the traditional way of life; and (ii) the imposition of a colonial state on a decentralised social structure, and the creation of post-pastoral democratic nodes of power'* The colonial rule can be seen to have upset the decentralised system of the 'delicately balanced anarchical order' that was in place in Somali society. In some cases commercialism replaced the *Xeer* ethic of self-reliance and Western-educated elite emerged and gained power which went unchecked although the communal ethic remains strong throughout different sectors of Somali society (Kreijen 2004:66). Pan-Somali interest emerged through the relations within the elite and merchants.

The British and Italian influences differed considerably. The British indirect approach did not influence Somali social structures (Mayall 2005:50), although the strict hierarchy of the civil service was evident. The Italian Civil Service enabled political interference, through undefined hierarchical and bureaucratic positions (Samatar 1997:699). The Somali elite

emerged from the lack of hierarchy and bureaucracy. The merging of these two systems after independence evident in the North South divide will be elaborated on.

Italy did not have adequate knowledge, planning or resources to prepare Somalia economically for independence. Prior to independence the Italian community was estimated at 2000 people, controlling 70 percent of Somalia's economy with 75 percent of Somalia's agricultural production, almost the entire industrial output, and 50 percent of trade (Kapteijns 2001:19). The role that Italy played after independence and during the Cold War illustrates their economic interests in Somalia and is elaborated on in the next section.

Both powers consolidated their positions in Somalia through military force and established indigenous military units to maintain their influence (Fitzgerald 2002:62). The militarisation of Somalian society can be traced back to colonial times. The Cold War coinciding with its independence further entrenched military principles.

3.4 Independence, military and the Cold War era

3.4.1 Independence

Somalia has been represented as one of the 'few genuine nations in Africa' due to its unity in language, culture and religion (Mayall 2005:48). The strength of Somali nationalism was evident when the Somali Republic was established with the merging of Italian and British Somaliland on 1 July 1960 (Kreijen 2004:67). The independence and unification of 7 million people in the Horn of Africa can be seen as the beginning of a snowball effect (Dagne & Smith 2002:1). The belief of unification of all Somali territories is visible through the refusal to accept the *uti possidetis* principle, originating from the Latin "as you possess" which refers to African countries accepting their territories at independence as the former colonial powers drew the borders. Claims to Somali-occupied territories of north-east Kenya, the Ogaden in Ethiopia and Djibouti ensued (Mayall 2005:48). The promise of unification of all these Somali-inhabited areas had British Somaliland agree to unification. History proves that these promises or ideas remained unrealised and is at the core of the North-South divide.

The Somalis as pastoralists make passionate but unpredictable nationalists since they fall back on clan structures and unite in the face of a common enemy. Their egalitarian nature makes them intrinsically resistant towards central authority in the long run (Mayall 2005:49).

The emergence of the Somali elite that consisted of merchants, bureaucrats and politicians is described by Samatar (1997:698) as '*an unstable social stratum'*. The elite formed an important nodal point for international interaction.

The first few years of independence had President Aden Abdullah Osman and Prime Minister Abdirashied A Sharmarke in legitimate power with public support (Samatar 1997:698). Yet the North-South divide was evident at very early stages of the newly unified state. The former prime minister of the north, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was the minister of education in the new government that had southerners occupying most key posts in the government. Northern officers attempted a secessionist coup later in 1961 after receiving training in Sandhurst, Britain (Adam 1995:74).

Zartman (2005:77) correctly describes Somalia as a "*football of the Cold War, tossed from one side to the other in reaction to similar passes by its larger neighbour Ethiopia*." The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had the Republic of Somalia announce that it would accept $30 million in military aid during November 1963, achieving gains over arms packages that the Western consortium led by the United States had presented during 1962 and 1963, despite protests from a key Western ally, Ethiopian Emperor Haile-Selassi (Lefebvre 1998:612). USSR aid was later increased to US$55 million to modernise the Somali army and to expand its personnel, as an unconditional loan with a 20 year repayment schedule, to counter the US influence in the Horn of Africa (Fitzgerald 2002:63).

The arms were put to use in the war with Ethiopia from February to April 1964. Ethiopia and Kenya accused Somalia of aiding rebels at its borders in realisation of the Pan-Somali goal. Sudan mediated peace and a mutual defence pact between Kenya and Ethiopia as a form of mutual protection from Somalia was signed in response.

3.4.2 Military era

President Sharmarke was assassinated in October 1969 and a bloodless *coup d'etat* ensued under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre. The parliament was dismissed and political parties were banned in the 'Somali Democratic Republic' with President Barre at the helm of the Supreme Revolutionary Council (Kreijen 2004:67). The result was a centralised state developed along totalitarian lines. The contradiction of a totalitarian state existing whilst the society in which it existed was disaggregating. Once again the symbolism of the Somali flags

was used with Pan Somali ideology whilst the clan identity was placed above the totalitarian force.

Somalia was caught in the middle of the Cold War. Barre continued to follow the Socialist route with the Soviet Union as ally (Dagne & Smith 2002:1). Haile-Selassi of Ethiopia had military agreements with the US (Adam 1995:69). Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974 and benefited from Arab petrodollar assistance (Adam 1995:75). From 1973 Somalia became a labour exporter to Arabic oil-producing countries, estimated at between 150 000 to 200 000 Somali's, the majority of which believed to have been from the Isaaq clan (Gundel 2002:264).

During the 1970's, the military leaders fell short in establishing a stable state in three ways: firstly, in articulating the power relationship between state authorities and ordinary citizens; secondly, the bureaucracy was not professionalised with accountability and management veering away from personal gains; and finally, the relationship between civilian management of the state and the military regime was not clearly defined. Consequently unqualified political appointments were made in the public sector (Samatar 1997:702). Barre favoured the so-called MOD (Marehan, Ogaden, and Dulbahante) clans. MOD intellectuals and others who resisted this favouritism toward their groups were imprisoned. (Kapteijns 2001:13). Northern Somalia's local elders and politicians were never in Barre's patronage network since they supported the politicians that Barre overthrew in 1969. The North had less privileged access to rackets that thwarted the government's own exchange and import controls out of suspicion that they supported exiled rivals. Consequently kinship networks and local elders were used to protect and guarantee their own clandestine business operations with limited resources (Reno 2005:135).

The Pan-Somali goal was one of Barre's weapons to keep irredentist spirits at bay (Mayall 2005:49). The war between Ethiopia and Somalia over Ethiopia's Ogaden desert was critical since it began with Somali forces invading the Ogaden in support of ethnic Somali rebels operating in the region in 1976 (Sanjian 1999:663). The outcomes of the war shifted Somalia's loyalties from the Soviet to the US since the Ethiopian troops had reinforcement from Yemen and Cuba, while the US provided military and economic assistance to Somalia (Dagne & Smith 2002:1). The aid came at a price, not only did the US use the docking services at the strategic port of Berbera, but Barre had to liberalise policy allowing the safeguarding of human rights as well as moving in a democratic direction. The "Peoples

Parliament" served as a mouthpiece for Barre and his cronies (Shay 2005:66). This can be seen as part of the US desire to bolster its presence in the Indian Ocean Persian Gulf region after the removal of Mohammad Reza Pahlave as the Shah of Iran, a key US ally in 1979 (Fitzgerald 2002:65).

After the Ogaden War, the influx of refugees forced Somalia to economically depend on humanitarian-handouts (Fitzgerald 2002:35). Financial and humanitarian aid from Islamic charity and aid organisation, encouraged by Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, were transferred through the Somali Liaison, Muhamad Sheikh Othman (Shay 2005:73).

Barre had to resort to brute force to remain in power, as well as to buying the loyalty of his followers, mainly in the Marehan-Darod clan lineage. Consequently internal resistance movements emerged along clan lines. The Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) was formed in 1978 by Majerteen-Darod supporters who operated from north-eastern Somalia, while the Somali National Movement (SNM) was established by the Isaaq who operated from the north of the country (Kreijen 2004:67). Although the SNM was established in London in 1981 it moved its operations to Ethiopian towns, north of Somalia. It followed a decentralised method of fundraising and raised funds from the Somali diaspora of the Isaaq clan in Saudi Arabia. The Libyan leader Qadhafi disliked the SNM and did not provide funding (Adam 1995:76).

In mid-July 1982 the centre of Somalia was invaded and Balumbale and Galdogob were captured by Somali dissidents with Ethiopian air support. Barre called for Western support and the US responded with 80 million US Dollars in military and economic aid. The aid was used to keep domestic opponents at bay (Fitzgerald 2002:36). The role of clientelism cannot be denied. Regardless of neoliberal policies, the state continued to subsidise parastatal companies and foreign aid was controlled by the government, whereas private sector initiatives relied on patronage networks (Webersik 2006:1465). The subjugation of the Isaaq clan started in 1982 and worsened significantly with a curfew being enforced in 1987 (Zartman 3005:81).

During the 1980s foreign aid consisting of humanitarian and development assistance totalled above 60 percent of the government's resources (Webersik 2006:1467). US aid amounted to 34 million US Dollars in 1984, but was reduced to 8,7 million US Dollars by 1987 (Fitzgerald 2002:35). Although Italy's role in supporting Somalia had been trivial from

independence to 1975, the establishment of the Department of Cooperation and Development in 1979 and the Fondo Aiuto Italiani in 1985 demonstrated clear support of the Barre regime (Kapteijns 2001:19). Italy provided bilateral aid as well as being the channel for other European assistance. The Bari Region Project of 1 billion lira which is the equivalent of US$ 730 093.00 was later proven by Italian parliamentary investigations to have been depleted by Italian officials and Barre's family (Adam 1995:75). Italian exports to Somalia amounted to US$124 million in 1980 and a 40 million US Dollars aid package was agreed upon in 1981. A military assistance agreement was signed in 1985 (Fitzgerald 2002:66). Italian foreign policy "*did not have long-term objectives*" or "*a detailed strategy*;" since Barre was convinced to reform with little an extra bit of aid flow (Kapteijns 2001:19).

Other international interactions included an accord signed with Kenya, renouncing territorial claims permanently in December 1984. South Africa's promise of arms in exchange for landing rights for South African Airlines during a secret visit by the then foreign minister Roelof "Pik" Botha, becoming public knowledge jeopardised the positive diplomacy created through the Kenya agreement (Fitzgerald 2002:36). Chinese investments were evident in a north-south tarmac road; cigarettes and matches factory; recreational facilities including a sports and theatre complex; agricultural inputs in rice and tobacco farms; and last but not least light arms and spare parts (Adam 1995:75). West Germany specialised in aid to the Somali police and security services including training of Somali Army Special Forces in Bonn and through sponsoring vehicles and radio communications equipment valued at 68 million Deutsche Mark (DM), equivalent of 49,149,823.52 US Dollars. West German aid amounted to DM12 million, equivalent of 8,673,498.27 US$ from 1985 to 1987 (Fitzgerald 2002:66). The aid received and monopolised by Barre kept him in power. Yet by 1985 the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that the Somali's living in the Middle East earned $700 million dollars per annum of which 30% was remitted to their motherland (Gundel 2002:270). The contribution by the diaspora can be seen to have provided some relief to those who needed it most as Somalia's economy slipped into downfall by corruption.

In an attempt to recover from its diplomatic isolation that ensued Somalia resumed relations with Libya in April 1985 after withdrawn recognition in 1977 in response to Libyan support to Ethiopia during the Ogaden war (Fitzgerald 2002:37).

Menkhaus (2007:80) rightly states that by the mid-1980s Somalia was already a failed state. The Ogaden War took its toll and combined with government repression, high levels of

corruption, and low salaries in contributing to the state's decline. All civil services regressed, from the once esteemed public school system, to state-run arms factories production, regardless of the amount of aid received. Since the aid lined the pockets of civil servants rather than reaching the civil services or beyond. The collapse of the Somali Commercial and Savings Bank in 1989 is one example of the effect of corruption and mismanagement (Webersik 2006:1465).

The Inter-Governmental Agency on Drought and Development (IGADD) was formed in January 1986 and brought together the states of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia to coordinate member states' efforts in preventing drought and desertification (Bashir 2002:9). The SNM was in Ethiopia, just north of the Somali border until Mengistu and Barre agreed to peaceful relations facilitated by IGADD, now known as Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), in April 1988.

A revolt occurred upon their return to Northern Somalia (Zartman 2005:78). The city of Hargeysa was destroyed by government troops as the full-scale civil war erupted in 1988 (Kreijen 2004:67).

The US support of the 1980s was completely withdrawn in 1988 due to massive human rights violations by the Barre regime (Dagne & Smith 2002:2). This coincided with the adoption of structural adjustment policies and growing support for non-governmental organisations. (Webersik 2006:1467).

The 1,4 million US Dollars of small arms and ammunition that was given, before the US aid was withdrawn completely and used during the conflict dampens the 1.9 million US Dollars that was provided in disaster assistance to victims of the 1988 conflict, US$630 000 in assistance and 18 million US Dollars in food aid (Zartman 2005:81). The international community as a whole withdrew aid which left Barre incapable of buying support at the grass-root levels. The fall of a functioning Somali state preceded the ousting of Barre as administrative state institutions collapsed due to civil servants, judges and police reverting back to their clans without central revenue to compensate them (Mayall 2005:49).

In 1989, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) with Ogaden support (a Darrod subclan) and the United Somali Congress (USC) with Hawiye support emerged as resistance movements (Kreijen 2004:67). The Somali Salvation and Liberation Front (SSLF) was formed mainly by

the Mayerteen clan, whereas the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) included the Rahanwein clan from northern Somalia (Shay 2005:68). The predatory state was kept in power due to international military and economic development aid and dissuading it from committing to the collective good and keeping Barre's kleptocracy in the driving seat despite these opposition forces (Kapteijns 2001:28). Lederach (1997:17) states that the Cold War legacy is twofold: on the one hand institutionalising armed struggle as the mechanism to address differences, while on the other creating a surplus of small arms in circulation. The continued armed violence and civil war that raged in Somalia is proof of this.

Menkhaus (2007:81) describes the 1988–92 period of civil war as one with a profound legacy which is at the heart of why no government can survive in Somalia to this day. Some of the issues he raises include: unaddressed war crimes; deep interclan grievances over atrocities committed; massive levels of stolen property; unresolved property disputes and occupied territory; the rise of warlords and others with vested interests in continued lawlessness and impunity; the near-universal spread of armaments; the destruction of much of Mogadishu; the looting of nearly all public goods and state properties; the fight of as many as a million Somalis abroad; massive internal displacement; and an unresolved secession in the north. He emphasises that '*Addressing this level of destruction, displacement, and division is an enormous challenge to state building in Somalia. Revival of the Somali state must proceed from rubble*. '

The International community's ability to respond can be questioned, since no mechanisms existed to deal with the internal conflicts that the post-Cold War world faced. The symptoms of the internal conflict were treated through humanitarian intervention, but causes remained uncured and often ignored (Lederach 1997:18). The inability of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should be noted.

The international response to Somalia in pre-collapsed status was definitely driven by strategic motives. Whether its response to the profound legacy of state failure is any different in the first decade of collapse will be analysed in the next section of the chapter.

3.5 The fall of Barre and initial International response to the Somali-crisis

Aid indirectly fuelled the civil war, and the withdrawal of aid by the international community led to Barre's reign ending in January 1991 at the hands of the United Somali Congress (USC) (Dagne & Smith 2002:2).

The Italian ambassador in Mogadishu remained loyal to the Barre regime and continued attempts to save it. Consequently he was one of the last international players to leave Mogadishu and airlifted whilst violent street fighting took place on 12 January 1991, fifteen days before Barre himself was driven out (Kapteijns 2001:19). Australia had a shadow of a scandal with ministerial approval that was granted to export surplus military aircraft to Somalia, although the export never took place as Barre had been ousted (Hardy 2007:468). Other arms were however readily available since Ethiopia's Marxist regime was the second largest military regime in sub-Saharan Africa until the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebel movements defeated it in Spring 1991 (Natsios 1997:84). These arms subsequently easily found their way to Somalia.

The opposition forces had combined their forces and had succeeded, but this was never repeated as Somali society divided itself into different armed factions. General Muhammad Farah Aidid and Ali Mahdi Muhammad forces were strong in the southern port city of Chisimayu (Gros1996:467). Ali Mahdi Muhammad had the background of manager of the UN office in Mogadishu and used his financial resources to assist the USC's fight against the Barre regime (Shay 2005:69). The similarities between Ali Mahdi Muhammad and General Muhammad Farah Aidid begin and end at the Hawiye clan and their strong position in the USC. Aidid was an ambassador to India and director of Somalia's intelligence during Barre's reign, but he was incarcerated for six years. Aidid had the added support of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) formed by a variety of clans as well as political and military powerbrokers (Shay 2005:70). He had also been a defence minister for Barre from 1970–1991 and was in charge of clandestine acquisitions of arms from abroad, consequently shaping insurgencies and the organization of conflict (Reno 2005:135). Both leaders knew that to remain in power required an exercise in building cross-clan coalitions as well as military confrontation. Alliances with other clans were achieved by including clan representatives or other favourable `warlords' in their over-sized national `governments' in

their aim to develop national coalitions without compromising personal political ambitions (Spears 2000:109).

The USC swore in Ali Mahdi Mohammad as interim President, contested as fighting ensued in the south between the SPM and the USC (Kreijen 2004:68). Omar Arta Galib of the Isaaq clan got the position as temporary prime minister and a government with twenty-seven ministers and eight deputy ministers was established. The USC elections during June 1991 saw Aidid elected as chairman of the movement but Ali Mahdi Muhammad rejected all inclinations to abandon his presidency (Shay 2005:70). The internal struggle for power worsened the intensity of the violence.

Conventional diplomacy and mediation persisted as the first international response to state failure, yet by January 1991 most foreign representation withdrew from Somalia with only a few journalists and NGOs remaining, including MSF. The UN was inconspicuous at this stage (Clarke 1997:6).

Humanitarian aid and Islamic preaching was combined by Saudi Arabia and other gulf states to bring the Somali population closer to the religious worldview (Shay 2005:73). Shay (2005:73) further states that since the beginning of the civil war in Somalia four radical Islamic entities have acted there simultaneously and sometimes even in coordination:

- Iran – Directly and indirectly through its ally Sudan;and more recently through Eritrea;
- Sudan – Directly and through Somali powerbrokers that it supported;
- Bin Laden and Al Qaida – Independently, but in coordination with Sudan; and
- Radical Islamic entities from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in the Persian Gulf.

These interactions can be seen to be in direct response and opposition to the American involvement in Somalia. Sudan and Iran perceived this involvement as a threat against their interests and aspirations in Somalia and viewed the US used humanitarian intervention as another form of American Imperialism (Shay 2005:77). The UN and US lead intervention will be analysed, as well as the Islamic response to the Western involvement.

3.5.1 UNITED NATIONS (UN) Response

In January 1991, the UN withdrew completely from Somalia due to security concerns (Natsios 1997:80). The combination of civil war and a widespread drought and famine claimed the lives of 240 000 to 280 0000 Somali's during the 1991-1992 period (Gundel 2002:257). Consequently the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was created in April 1992 to oversee the cease-fire in Mogadishu, to provide security for UN personnel, and to deliver humanitarian assistance. UNOSOM was supposed to set an example for more muscular post–Cold War peace enforcement and nation building (Menkhaus 2007:83). However UNOSOM I could not provide the desired security and protection, since both factions looted and interfered with humanitarian aid and service delivery, each fearing that such assistance aided the other (Coyne 2006:349). The lessons learned from the early international responses to the Somali crisis will form part of the conclusion of Chapter 3.

3.5.2 Operation Restore Hope

On 25 November 1992, the US informed the UN Secretary-General of its willingness to lead a humanitarian assistance mission to Somalia. Consequently on 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 794, authorising the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia (Perito 2008:53). Natsios (1997:78) states that the US role, during this period in Somalia, was entirely based on humanitarian rather than geopolitical objectives.

The UN, with US support, was to provide humanitarian relief, disarm the various factions of the conflict and form a stable central government based on a Western Model (Shay 2005:71). Operation Restore Hope, also known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), was an unprecedented operation by the US, involving 25,000 troops which was the largest military force it had ever sent to Africa (Bah & Aning 2008:119). UNITAF was the first Chapter VII 'peace enforcement mission' authorised under the enforcement provisions of the UN Charter and Operation Restore Hope lasted from 9 December 1992 to 26 March 1993 (Perito 2008:53).

Aidid and Ali Mahdi Muhammad both demanded that the UN and the US recognise its faction as legitimate leadership through the allocation of aid (Shay 2005:73), proving that aid is an asset in the internal power struggle diminishing its intended development goals (Gundel

2002:277). However, Aidid made it clear that he '*resented foreign meddling in Somali affairs'* (Spears 2000:116).

It could be concluded that this accusation of foreign refered to the Western and American involvement, since other regional and Islamic interest was welcomed to a certain extent, as exemplified by Sudanese and Iranian involvement. On 28 November 1992 an Iranian delegation arrived in Khartoum to further boost Sudan's military capabilities to export the revolution. The Somali Revolutionary Guard (SRG) was established and funded by Iran and supported by the Somali Islamic Union Party (SIUP), who planned actions against the US presence (Shay 2005:75). A target attack was planned for Aden with Osama Bin Laden assigned to it. Al Quds forces were incorporated and Iran presented Sudan with Stinger anti-aircraft missiles for possible use in Somalia. By the end of 1992, Al-Quds fighters were dispatched from Sudan to Somalia and Ogaden to prepare infrastructure for the operation (Shay 2005:76). Iran viewed the Horn of Africa as an important target for exporting the Islamic Revolution and for controlling the coasts of the canal connecting the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Sudan became Iran's close ally in 1990, with their joint vision of the US and the West as standing in the way of the Islamic Revolution.

UNITAF troops consisted mainly of Pakistani's, with Australia's first military contribution being 30 soldiers arriving late in October 1992. Australian involvement essentially commenced with financial assistance to the relief effort of $11 million by the end of 1992 and further aid donations amounting to $8,5 million (Hardy 2007:469). Their involvement in Baidoa is also seen as one of the few successful operations in Somalia and will be elaborated on.

The interventions in Somalia in the early 1990s were interpreted by governments in certain ways to protect their own interests (Clark & Herbst 1997:240). The US' NATO allies Canada, Belgium, Germany and Italy, supported the UNITAF initiative in order to have continued protection by the hegemonic power. The motives varied from Italy's former corrupt political, arms and aid dealings with the Barre regime, to France wanting to maintain its reputation as main external actor on the continent, whereas Germany wanted to broaden its military operations from narrow NATO defined operations (Adebajo 2003:69). Canada, first committed to the UN mission and later to the US coalition to further the government's domestic political interests, thereby pursuing Canada's interest in multilateralism and human rights as well as aiding relations with its neighbour (Dawson 2007:3).

In February 1993 senior Iranian representative, SIUP representatives and delegates sent by Aidid, had a conference in Khartoum, to establish a combat strategy against the US. Consequently Aidid and several aides visited Iran, Yemen and Sudan to coordinate aid and forces offered to Somalia. Iran provided combat means, instructors and consultants via Sudan to Somalia who assisted Aidid's forces (Shay 2005:76).

3.5.3 Baidoa: Australian Success

The Australian mission to Baidoa Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) was part of the US-led UNITAF mission that commenced in January 1993. American and French forces had arrived several weeks earlier and distributed food, yet the area remained far from stable with MSF compound being looted and a Swiss International Red Cross employee was robbed and killed in a separate incident (Mersiades 2005:213). From the outset the Australian troops' mission would only last 17 weeks (Hardy 2007:472).

One of the key issues in Baidoa in disarmament was already recognised prior to UNITAF's involvement. In December 1992, Lockton Morrissey, head of CARE International, stated '*there is no way that the operation could be successful in the long term unless the guns are taken out of circulation'*. (Mersiades 2005:214). Consequently, Operation Restore Hope's broad objectives to establish a secure environment for urgent humanitarian assistance was broken into three key tasks: firstly, the securing of the Baidoa HRS's airports and key installations; secondly, securing the food storage and distribution points; and thirdly, providing mobile security for relief convoys operating within and transiting the HRS (Hardy 2007:474). The strategy to achieve these tasks can be seen in achieving legitimacy by providing security to the key points through rigorous patrolling regime. Ensuring continued security occurred through disarmament by confiscating and destroying all unauthorized weapons. Consequently during their four-month deployment, the Australians collected over 1,000 weapons, accounting for approximately half of the total weapons collected by all UNITAF forces (Mersiades 2005:214). The final key to the Australian success can be attributed to its re-establishment of civil law based on the 1962 Somali penal code, instead of foreign rule which increased its legitimacy and support significantly (Hardy 2007:476). Furthermore, the Australians established an Auxiliary Security Force (ASF) and consisted of 260 policemen who were chosen in consultations with the local population. The arrest of the bandit leader Gutaale, known as the 'Butcher of Baidoa', who was believed to be responsible

for multiple crimes against Humanity, prior to the arrival of UNITAF, was tried and convicted of over 30 counts of homicide. No Australians were involved in the arrest or execution of Gutaale by a Somali firing squat (Mersiades 2005:215). Consequently temporary stability returned to Baidoa as the rule of law set in, as the Australians handed over a secure Baidoa to UNOSOM II, which maintained security until its withdrawal in September 1995 (Mersiades 2005:217).

3.5.4 UNOSOM II

UNITAF withdrew, transferring operations to a weak UN mission, UNOSOM II, since relief supplies had curbed the famine. The total number of troops was reduced to 28,000 peacekeepers of which 4,000 were from the US (Perito 2008:54). The Clinton administration in 1993 expanded the original mandate to include policing and governance, contrary to the official policy of the US to avoid casualties. Yet, uncertainty of whether Somalia should be under UN trusteeship or negotiations with local authorities, including in some cases the warlords, should be fostered. Trusteeship was opposed by other African countries as it was viewed as reverting back to colonialism. The confusion in policies resulted in Mogadishu becoming a hunting field for warlords, which diminished prospects for a peaceful settlement in the critical time of summer of 1993 (Gizelis & Kosek, 2005:374). The irony of the situation is pointed out by Kapteijns (2001:31) which highlights the political implications of US limiting its involvement but increasing the UN involvement as it believed that all of the major Security Council resolutions on Somalia, including Resolution 814, were written by the Pentagon, and handed to the UN as a *fait accompli*.

UNOSOM IIs mandate in May 1993 included reconstruction efforts to democratize Somalia and the authority to seize weapons rehabilitate and construct political and economic institutions along Western lines, as well as attempt to foster national reconciliation and stability (Coyne 2006:349). Since the beginning of 1993 Sudanese and Iranian involvement in Islamic terror cells that acted against UN forces in neighbourhoods under Aidid's control were visible, through ambushes and the planting of explosive devices (Shay 2005:81).

Yet with UNITAF's departure Aidid ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani members of the UN peacekeeping force, which led to the Security Council condemning the attack and the head of the UN mission issued an arrest warrant for Aidid (Perito 2008:54). The US refused to recognize Aidid as a local leader, but instead tried to arrest him for his role in the death of 24

Pakistani UN peace-keepers which increased hostility towards all foreign troops (Gizelis & Kosek 2005:373). Italy criticised the US aggressive tactics in pursuing Aidid and urged a diplomatic approach whilst making secret arrangements with him (Adebajo 2003:70). Shortly after the incident of 5 June 1993, Aidid went to Khartoum to organise next steps against UN forces, consequently Bin Laden provided additional weapons and fighters to Mogadishu (Shay 2005:81). Therefore, Aidid supporters attacked a Nigerian UN force, killing seven members as well as Somali citizens identified as UN supporters. Fighting escalated and both UN and Aidid's headquarters came under attack in September 1993 (Shay 2005:83).

Spears (2000:116) views the international community's obsession with capturing Aidid deflected from facilitating reconciliation between adversaries. Consequently 3 October 1993 marked the turning point in the Somali intervention, as a failed attempt by US Army Rangers to seize Aidid's lieutenants caused two Black-hawk helicopters to crash, claiming the lives of 18 American soldiers (Perito 2008:54).

Hypocritical behaviour on the US side was evident by policy changes from attacking to appeasing the warlords illustrated by first placing a US$ 25 000 bounty on Aidid's head only to later in 1993 transporting him to peace conferences before the US withdrawal from Somalia (Adebajo 2003:71).

Human rights abuses entailed the killing of Somali civilians by UN peacekeepers, had the civilian population up in arms. The Somali civilians were often referred to as "targets" and it is estimated that 227 were killed by UN forces alone. Belgian troops admitted that the actual figures of civilian deaths in Kismayo were much higher than publicly stated. Canada's airborne regiment was disbanded when sadistic acts of torture were reported. A shooting at a truck in December 1992 at a checkpoint by French officers, left two Somalis dead and seven injured (Adebajo 2003:73). The fact that neutrality was lost and self preservation was at stake, weakens the humanitarian motives of the international actors in Somalia.

The so-called 'Nairobi syndrome' is often experienced when NGO relief staff become out-of-touch with the situation on the ground, since they are comfortably situated outside the crisis, yet controlling all the important operational and policy decisions on programme content and delivery leaving little to field-workers' discretion (Cliffe & White 2000:332). This term was coined in Somalia and proves that NGO staff is not always where they are needed most.

UNITAF was successful to a certain extent in delivering some humanitarian assistance to Somalis but the international involvement through UNOSOM II was a far cry from ending conflict or establishing political, social, and economic change (Coyne 2006:349). The fact that history is written by the victors rings clear when considering how the Somali incident is portrayed in 'Black Hawk Down' and Somali civilian deaths merely referred to as collateral damage (Adebajo 2003:74). Furthermore the humanitarian intervention not only exacerbated divisions among local factions, but due to the low level of local involvement in the peace building process, it removed legitimacy and the possibility to attain peace (Gizelis & Kosek 2005:373).

3.5.5 The Mogadishu line

The International response to the crisis in Somalia in 1992 had significant implications for humanitarian intervention since "crossing the Mogadishu line" was to be avoided by all means (Clarke 1997:3). The Mogadishu line can be seen as the fear of humanitarian intervention failing to the extent of losses to the international interveners. The ripple effect of this line can be seen as UNOSOM withdrew in early 1995, leaving Somalia in a state of war and state collapse (Menkhaus 2007:83).

President Clinton discontinued US involvement in Somalia due to pressures from Congress and public opinion. The principle of 'involvement without intervention' ensued which prevented US troops to be involved in any conflict where American interests were not directly served (Shay 2005:85). The principle was officially adopted in the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-25) and the restrictive approach was evident in the Rwandan genocide, which became victim to the shift in US policy (Bah & Aning 2008:119). The UN Secretary General, at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali reinforces this point *'Disillusion set in. Where peacekeepers were asked to deal with warfare, serious setbacks occurred. The first came in Somalia, and weakened the will of the world community to act against genocide in Rwanda'* (Bah & Aning 2008:120). Menkhaus (2007:84) furthermore reiterates that the revival of failed states is consequently seen as "fool's errand".

A corollary of state failure in Somalia is the lack of international representation, on a bilateral and multilateral level, as all foreign diplomatic missions in Mogadishu have been closed down, since Somalia does not have any embassies abroad. Somali representation at the

United Nations have been dismal, with no annual credential between 1991 and 2000 and the Somali *charge d'affairs* was invisible (Kreijen 2004:71).

3.5.6 Financial Prerogatives

The connection between the provision of humanitarian aid and the continuation of conflict will be explored, by indicating how the international humanitarian motives were warped by local warlords to fuel the conflict, and escalating the humanitarian crisis. Natsios (1997:82) states that food became a medium of exchange and principal source of wealth. Obtaining this 'wealth' was not done by legitimate means and rather by looting.

The international response to the interception of food aid was the employment of Somali 'entrepreneurs', which included guards escorting food convoys. In 1993 UNOSOM's annual budget amounted to US$1.5 billion, although only 4.5 percent was ploughed into the local economy (Webersik 2006:1467). The situation spun out of control with the unrestrained looting of convoys and warehouses, kidnappings of NGO staff for ransom, demands for higher wages by Somali staff who used their weapons as negotiating tools against their own employers, checkpoints on every road where protection money was demanded, and warlord demands for a share of the food stocks going into their areas (Kapteins 2001:31).

The 'private armies' that the NGO's hired, like the International Committee of the Red Cross who employed 15,000 to 20,000 young Somali men at the height of the crisis, caused them to be an integral part of the "social pathology" they were supposed to remedy. Consequently the militarization leads to anti-social behaviour (Kapteins 2001:31). Cliffe & White (2000:332) describes it as 'protection racket' since the agencies paid significant amounts to safeguard their supplies and staff. In an attempt to outwit the warlords, food markets were flooded but it proved that the agencies provided more relief to Mogadishu losing sight of the dire humanitarian needs elsewhere.

The warlords benefited, not merely financially but through their legitimisation as the UN/US negotiated with them and even paid for them to attend national reconciliation conferences (Kapteijns 2001:31).

The immediate consequences of the large amount of funds poured into the conflict prolonged the conflict and prevented peace, yet longer term benefits are evident in the employment and

contract opportunities which inadvertently helped to stimulate and strengthen legitimate businesses. Consequently, moving business activities of the economy away from a war economy toward construction, telecommunications, trade, and services with the possibility to reshape local interests in security and rule of law, and eventually local power relations (Menkhaus 2007:84). In certain areas pockets of peace have developed, although the international response has not always been favourable towards it.

3.6 Pockets of Peace

3.6.1 Early Islamic Courts

The first sharia court in South Mogadishu, Medina Islamic Court, was established in early 1993. Influential businessmen initiated the establishment of sharia courts in South Mogadishu and Lower Shabelle region in the 1990s (Webersik 2006:1471).

Some of the defining features were that local communities widely embraced and supported them as a means of restoring rule of law. The fact that they were created by and served a specific sub-clan proved their local nature, and subsequently their authority was bound to a specific neighbourhood and rule of law within a clan not between clans. Although inter-clan relations were occasionally facilitated the courts were formed and controlled within Somali customs by a coalition of local interests, including clan elders, businesspeople, and traditional *Su sheikhs* (Menkhaus 2007:85). The opposition of radical interpretations of Islam by the courts was supported widely and is illustrate by Hawiye traders and hotel owners who were relieved about the initiative, since warlords and faction leaders had failed to provide a secure environment for trading and investment, and weaker clans, including the Banadiri and the Gibil, who suffered during the civil war supported the establishment of the Islamic courts (Webersik 2006:1471-1472).

Yet success was not achieved through direct confrontation with a powerful warlord, but instead whence the militia's area of control was already on the decline (Menkhaus 2007:86). The international response to the early establishment of the courts is not as significant as to when they grew stronger, more radical and influential in the second decade after state collapse in Somalia. Chapters 4 and 5 will illustrate the humanitarian and strategic responses respectively.

3.6.2 The Republic of Somaliland and Puntland

Sub-national governance in Somalia is visible through formal, self-declared administrations which are established on the transregional, regional, district, and municipal levels that have come into existence since 1990. Menkhaus (2007:83) identifies Somaliland, as a separatist state in the northwest, and Puntland a nonsecessionist, autonomous state in the arid northeast corner of the country as functioning and therefore these two will be elaborated on. Yet others that functioned temporarily include the Rahanweyn Resistance Army's administration of Bay and Bakool regions in 1998–2002 and the Benadir Regional Authority in 1996. The former had Ethiopian support (Cliffe & White 2000:331).

Somaliland origin was preceded by the Isaaq clan who suffered heavily during the civil war of which 50 000 lost their lives and another 500 000 refugees (Dagne & Smith 2002:2). Barre's terror united the Isaaq clan and consequently they dominate the former British protectorate (Mayall 2005:50).

The Somali National Movement (SNM) proclaimed the Republic of Somaliland on 16 May 1990 in the north (Kreijen 2004:68). Irredentism was suppressed with Barre's Pan-Somali ideal. But since the centre could not hold and *utipo possidetis juris* was never accepted in Somalia secession from the failed state became a possible panacea. The fact that Eritrea successfully gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993, as well as international recognition proved that *utipo possidetis juris* could be breached (Mayall 2005:54). It is important to note that the independent state of Somaliland had formed before the UN occupation (Menkhaus 2004:18).

Ibrahim Egal lead the Republic of Somaliland and enjoyed relative success, which is evident through the introduction of its own currency the Somali Shilling in 1995, a new constitution which came into effect in 1997, and enrolling its clan militia into standing armed forces (Kreijen 2004:69). It is estimated that half of the budget is spent on the demobilization project. Somaliland can boast with the establishing of functional ministries, a public school system, a respected police force, and municipal governments (Menkhaus 2007:82).

Somaliland faces two problems that are interlinked, namely economic struggles as well as the lack of international recognition. The latter is needed for Somaliland to qualify for bilateral aid (Kreijen 2004:69). USAID reports estimated remittances at US$ 4 million in 1998

whereas the Somaliland Ministry of planning estimated that US$93 million was transferred in 1997 (Gundel 2002:270). The Somali diaspora can therefore be seen to have a significant impact on the furthering of Somaliland.

Economic recovery can be further seen though the thousands of migrant labourers and hundreds of business investors from both southern Somalia and Ethiopia. The national budget ranges from $20 and $30 million per annum originating from customs revenues collected at the seaport at Berbera, taxes on importation of the mild narcotic plant qat from Ethiopia, as well as landing fees (Menkhaus 2007:82).

Unfortunately due to the non-recognition the UN and some NGO circles treat Somalia and Somaliland uniformly chaotic and limit aid for rehabilitation and recovery to minimal operations geared mostly to facilitating relief delivery (Cliffe & White 2000:332).

The fact that Somaliland *"made the imperfect but successful transition from clan-based representation to multiparty democracy, holding local, presidential, and legislative elections; it resolved a disputed, extremely close presidential election without violence; and it executed a peaceful, constitutional transfer of power upon the death of President Mohamed Egal in 2002"* (Menkhaus 2007:91) problematises the international response of non-recognition to Somaliland.

The autonomous region of Puntland, is referred to as an island of stability, has been self-governing since 1998, and consists of the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and northern Mudug. Its economy is based on the export of livestock and other international trade through the port of Bossaso and fishing. It seeks a non-secessionist form of autonomy from the rest of Somalia, since its inhabitants are from the Majerteen sub-clan, originally from Mogadishu. The Majerteen and the Islamic theocratic opposition, Al-Itihaad relationship is apprehensive while the fishing grounds are being over-exploited through lack of control; and the capacity of the civil administration, controlled by the Majerteen-based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), to support rehabilitation and recovery is weak (Cliffe & White 2000:331). In 2001 Puntland's leader Abdullahi Yusuf decided to stay in office, although a clan conference chose another politician which turned Puntland into a 'clan dictatorship' (Hagmann & Hoehne 2009:50). Yusuf's role and international recognition changed which will be elaborated on in Chapter 4 and 5.

These pockets of peace are largely ignored by the international community, yet the question that remains to be answered is therefore, what the international response has been to the Somali-territory as a whole since the UN left in 1995.

3.7 Post Intervention era 1996-2000

3.7.1 Mediation processes

Aidid died on 1 August 1996 due to injuries sustained in a gun battle and his son Hussein Mohammed Aidid took up his father's gun. Yet ironically he was a naturalized American who landed with the US troops in December 1992 (Shay 2005:86). As the fighting continued, various third party intermediaries, including the Arab League, the IGAD, OAU and UN, attempted to halt the fire (Dagne & Smith 2002:5).Shay (2005:86) further includes European and Islamic countries as well as neighbouring countries like Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti.

The Egyptian and Ethiopian peace initiatives of 1996 and 1997 will be elaborated on. The Sodere initiative was sponsored by Ethiopia and had IGAD and OAU support by the end of November 1996. The National Salvation Council was created after three months of talks and the cooperation of 26 factions. The goal was to have a reconciliation conference for all the Somali factions in Bosasso in 1998, but Mohammed Egal refused to attend as well as Aidid, and consequently the IGAD talks were postponed continuously and only took place in March 1998 (Dagne & Smith 2002:5). The Egyptian government and the Arab League hosted talks in Cairo in December 1997 and was accused by Ethiopia to have weakened the Sodere process. Both these countries were vying for greater influence in the region as water politics of the Nile River has long proven. Yet the Arab contingent had the added element of Aidid participating. Both initiatives came to certain agreements with the Somali Declaration of Principles and its structure of a 13 person presidential council or the Arab equivalent of dividing the seats equally between the Ali Mahdi and Aidid groups with 80 seats each (Dagne & Smith 2002:6). Coyne (2006:350) explains the zero-sum game that exists in Somalia as follows: "*Indigenous actors view participating in peace talks as a key ingredient in securing a favourable position in any future government that may evolve from the talks. With positions of political power and the associated benefits up for grabs, individuals are willing to engage in high-cost activities, including violence*." Clientelism has proven to be a historically strong form of cooperation and simultaneously fragmentation in the recruitment of violent groups.

The possibility of positive outcomes is destroyed as the social sphere that should nurture solutions unravels more (Reno 2005:151).

The UN placed priority on the restoration of a centralised Somali state (Cliffe & White 2000:332). The obvious neglecting of the 'pockets of peace' mentioned earlier proves that top-down approaches failed time and again. The conference, hosted by Djibouti at Arta in mid-2000 once again attempted the balanced approach but might have brought in too many actors as even former Barre cronies were included, which once again alienated Puntland and Somaliland (Cliffe & White 2000:333). It seems like the islands of stability chose not to participate during peace talks in the greater Somalia in the first decade of collapse. Consequently, Coyne (2006:350) states that the centralist approach by the international community had the perverse outcome of inducing greater conflict and instability. A federal or building block approach might have yielded greater success, yet certain economic processes continued and will be discussed.

3.7.2 Economic Processes

Since the withdrawal of UNOSOM the influx of aid money has decreased with the possibility for a functioning competitive market involving more traders and wholesalers to emerge. Yet foreign aid is one of the only sources of foreign currency besides the influx of remittances from the Somali Diaspora (Webersik 2006:1467). The total annual remittance estimates from Somali Diaspora was US$115 million in 2000, which exceeded the value of exports and aid (Gundel 2002:270).

Development comes second if one takes into account the amount of remittance spent to import qat, which is estimated at US$50 million per annum (Gundel 2002:272). Webersik (2006:1473) explains how the usage of the narcotic drug increased significantly since the collapse of the state, as people use it as a coping device. Kenya's exportation of qat overcomes logistical problems of its short period of only 48 hours of potency. Grown and harvested in the Nyambene Hills east of Mount Kenya, it is transported by pick-up trucks mainly to Nairobi's Wilson Airport; from there it is flown to various destinations within Somalia. Bluebird aviation had up to 250 flights per month, from Kenya to Somalia in 2002. Kenya is said to make US$50 to US$300 million, whereas the same amount fills the distribution network. The qat planes bring in landing fees as well as a 'tax' per bag, whereas once the qat is unloaded the planes are filled with products ranging from electronics to illicit

drugs for Kenya's black market. The interesting area of the qat trade is that it does not merely have regional implications but international ones. Since international aid agencies, including the UN, the EU and NGOs became agents in laundering qat money due to the fact that local staff and local expenses are paid in Somali shillings, and US dollars are exchanged with Somali merchants in Nairobi. These same merchants pay for qat in US dollars (Webersik 2006:1474).

A clear example of how the aid and qat trade is linked, is personified by Mr Mohamed Deilaf who is not only the owner Bluebird aviation, but a sub-contractor of a number of NGOs, including ICRC and the World Food Programme (WFP) (Webersik 2006:1476). Consequently the strategic implications in the stateless society render humanitarian motivations into warlord profits and deepened crisis.

The lawlessness that rules in Somalia provides ample business opportunities as no taxes are paid on imports, and these products mysteriously find their way to neighbouring countries. Examples are ample including sugar, rice, manufactured goods, electronics, cigarettes and petroleum are imported tax-free. Looting was not out of the ordinary either, once looted property was exported, as The Chamber of Commerce in Dubai recorded significantly higher import figures for scrap metal, copper and machines (Webersik 2006:1469). Piracy can be seen to have flowed out of this state of mind, once nothing was left to loot inland the long coastline served as ample 'free for all' ground. The fact that the recent rise in piracy had a strong international response will be elaborated on. Yet at this stage, the inaction of the international community, as looting occurred in Somalia, stripping away anything of monetary value of the former state proves little strategic value to the international community as it was not their commodities being stripped away, should be noted.

3.8 Conclusion

Once collapse settled in the international response was firstly delayed as the world readjusted one super power and years of strategic investments in proxy wars to prevent nuclear annihilation caused tardy responses to the crisis in Somalia. Once involved the humanitarian causes were warped into strategic imperialistic paradigms by the Islamic world. The nation building effort never got off the ground and fell with the 18 US soldiers and the thousands of Somali deaths in 'collateral damage' and conflict.

The lessons learnt from the early international response to the Somali crisis are multiple and include aspects from legal, economic, military, and decision making during intervention. Some authors would argue that the international response to Somalia, once initial mistakes were made quickly turned into focussing on lessons learnt and neglecting the ongoing collapse in Somalia.

Clarke (1997:3) refers to the flawed paradigm of external force neutrality where state sovereignty is in shambles. Forces took care of the immediate humanitarian crisis without having a clear vision of the end result of their intervention in the form of political responsibility. Neglecting key internal dynamics and getting directly involved in the conflict with neutrality dissolving into war lord politics can be further seen in the failure of diplomacy and mediation. From the outset of the Algerian career diplomat, Mohamed Sahnoun's involvement it was clear "*if the international community had intervened earlier and more effectively in Somalia, much of the catastrophe that has unfolded could have been avoided*" (Clarke 1997:7). Zartman (2005:78) identifies six missed opportunities where the international response could have turned the dismal turn of events in Somalia, from the Hargeisa massacre in 1988; the lack of mediators demanding Siad Barre's resignation and establishing a transition government in 1990; the tardiness in the UNSC authorisation of UNOSOM I in 1991; the inaction of the UNSC to enforce the March 1992 ceasefire with humanitarian intervention; the inability of a smooth transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II in March 1992 and finally in October 1993 where the US forces did not take a strong standpoint but proved that the bandits had the upper hand. Prevention is better than cure but retrospect provides wisdom in the multiple lessons learnt.

As the latter part of the 1990s played out, the world had Kosovo and East Timor to test humanitarian intervention limits without crossing the Mogadishu line or in an attempt to prove that lessons were learnt from Somalia. Chapters 4 and 5 will analyse the new strategic spin that 9/11 brought and maritime piracy that only recently made headlines. The humanitarian motives with an in-depth analysis of R2P and NGO's motives will balance out the argument and provide answers to the research question.

Chapter 4
Security and Power Politics: decisive motives for the international response to the case of state failure in Somalia

4.1 Introduction

The initial post-Cold War interventionism in Somalia promoting state building was discussed in Chapter 3, yet 2001 turned the late 1990's inaction into a new set of imperatives anchored in the 'War on Terror', and the new paradigm of 'state-building-as-counterterrorism' (Elliot & Holzer 2009:218). Gettleman (2009:62) states that due to the unsuccessful interventions of the past, few actors want to get involved again. UNISOM I and II crashed down with Black Hawk dDown as the intervention to assist Somalia spiralled into lessons of inadequate knowledge of the clans, their alliances and circumstances on the ground. The internal problems that caused state failure were not addressed comprehensively by the international community. Whether these lessons were learnt and implemented within the next decade of failure will be analysed in this chapter.

Noam Chomsky (1999:69) quotes the Foreign Policy editor, Charles Williams Maine to have said in passing, '*CIA officials privately concede that the U.S. military killed from 7000 to 10 000 Somalis'*. The illustration of good intentions through the failed humanitarian intervention is illustrated as Pilgin (2002:124) points out how these Somali deaths were obscured and that the 18 American soldiers' deaths were focused on instead. The Somali paradigm of mistrusting foreigners was reinforced by the civilian casualties, whereas the American deaths led to total abandonment of Somalia in a time where assistance was needed most.

The motives for intervention can be seen in the foreign policy errors the US committed through contradictory actions of backing warlords and subsequently fighting them. Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue (2009:18) claims that the majority of external actors have dealt with the Somali crisis from the view of their own national security interests, which is specifically visible in Ethiopia's and Eritrea's responses. Bearing this in mind, the regional security complex will be addressed in evaluating these states motives for involvement in Somalia. The humanitarian motives for involvement will be discussed in

Chapter 5, as well as the international response to the various attempts to re-establishing governance. The strategic involvement has evolved into a predominantly war on terror lens during the Bush-era, whereas other strategic factors will be considered in the Obama era. Interaction with the TNG, TFG, UIC and Al Shabaab will also be analysed.

Particularly the strategic motives of the AU, countries from the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya as well as Uganda and Egypt will be considered. One of the major motivators behind these regional players, namely the response of the US, which indicates the anti-terror motive, will not be neglected. All the responses in the region and the world will be divided in an 'anti-terror, TFG support camp' and a 'pro-UIC camp' for the initial response which continuously evolves as loyalties sway and certain groups gain and lose support. The UN and AU's mediating responses will be analysed in order to promote global and regional security from initiation of AMISOM forces. As indicated in the second chapter's theoretical exposition, the neo-realist dynamics of power and peace will be incorporated when the various motives for the international response is analysed. The spill-over effects of state failure in Somalia has received the greatest response and is visible through the actions taken by the international community in response to maritime piracy. Yet these actions address symptoms of state failure and strengthen the argument of strategic motives being at the core of the international response.

4.2 Anti-Terror Motives: 9/11

The impact of 9/11 in the Western World cannot be denied. Verhoefen (2009:410) quotes Jack Straw, former British Secretary of Foreign Affairs in arguing that the events of 9/11 heralded one possible future:

'*A future in which unspeakable acts of evil are committed against us, coordinated from failed states in distant parts of the world. [Places like] Somalia, Liberia and Congo invoke the Hobbesian image of a ''state of nature'' without order, where continual fear and danger of violent death render life nasty, brutish and short. (. . .) As well as bringing mass murder to the heart of Manhattan, state-failure has brought terror and misery to large swathes of the African continent. And at home it has brought drugs, violence and crime to Britain's streets. (. . .) We need to remind ourselves that turning a blind eye to the breakdown of order in any part of the world, however distant, invites direct threats to our national security and well-being*'.

The quote clearly links state failure and the war against terror, reiterating that state failure in one country has direct terror and softer socio-political influences on other countries. The international response can only be one of a strategic nature in protecting its citizens from the 'state of nature' that exists in failed states. Verhoefen (2009:410) continues by indicating that the securitisation of the Global South has little humanitarian motives but rather forms part of the 'quasi-Manichean struggle' that promotes the western way of life, which is endangered by terrorism. Stevenson (2010:28) describes this phenomenon as the Western threat perception that has been heightened since 9/11. The international response is purely security driven and plays an important role in understanding the research question as the ripple effects of 9/11 was felt in far and failed corners of the world. The war on terror and its impact on responses to state failure will be discussed. Shay (2005:186) identifies the three phases of the war on terror conducted by the US. Stage one: Destruction of Al Qaeda's infrastructure in Afghanistan and removal of the Taliban, stage two: Iraq and Al Qaeda affiliated terror cells. Somalia corresponds to stage three: a movement against additional countries that support terror as well as the continued struggle against Al Qaeda cells and organisations is waged globally. The coalition against terror took on Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban regime, which sent a strong message to terror organisations as well as any regime supporting terror organisations. The war in Iraq dealt a harsh blow to the "Axis of Evil" identified by President Bush in 2003 as Iraq, Iran and North Korea as regimes who support terror (Shay 2005:190). Stage two was concluded as Saddam Hussein's regime toppled in 2003. The responses to Somalia through the war on terror third phase will be discussed.

In October 2001 the US and its allies did air and sea patrols on Somali shores in order to identify Al Qaeda activity in the area. The main two areas of possible Al Qaeda involvement were Al-Ittihad al-Islami, which was included on the US list of terror organisations, and al-Barkat, which was suspected to have commercial ties with Bin Laden's businesses and transfers or 'launders' money for him (Shay 2005:90). The alhawaliya money transfer system is informal due to the collapse of the state and banking sector. The Somali remittance system will be elaborated on later in this chapter where the Somali diaspora's response to the failure is analysed.

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Unity) was established in 1984, merging two Islamic groups Takfir al Whda and Ikhwan al Muslimiin, which were established in the 1960's and suppressed by Siad Barre. Al-Ittihad had a social component but focussed on the Islamisation

of Somali society and all Somali Muslims including neighbouring states like Ethiopia. This commitment to Islamisation across borders had violent repercussions (Abbink 2009:96). The organisation's purpose was narrow in the regional perspective countering Ethiopian rule in the Ogaden which lead to its demise when Ethiopian forces attacked Al-Ittihad camps in Somalia in 1996 (Elliot & Holzer 2009:227). The importance of the local focus is further elucidated through the fact that Somalis were not interested in the global dynamics of Al Qaeda but rather in ancient clan dynamics that resulted in the zero-sum game continuing to play itself out in Somali-politics. Al-Ittihad al-Islami's contact with Al Qaeda was limited to the 1990s. The importance of Al-Ittihad's extremist views to attain 'proper Islam' will be discussed later as this group gave rise to the UIC as well as Al-Shabaab.

The importance of the Islamic purity correlates the Al Qaeda vision with that of Al-Itthihad. The former had a global vision, whereas the latter focussed on the ethnic Somali region. Al Qaeda can be seen to have had a vision of a jihad to revive the former Islamic empire that stretched form the southern Soviet republics, Bosnia, the Philippines, Kashmir, Central Asia, Somalia, Eritrea and Spain (Wright 2006:130). Al Qaeda involvement in Somalia can be seen in opposition to the US involvement during Operation Restore Hope and the bomb explosion at the Movenpick Hotel in Aden, Yemen in December 1993 aimed at US soldiers en route to Somalia. The attack failed since the US soldiers stayed at a different hotel and Al Qaeda only later took responsibility for the attack (Wright 2006:174). But Somalia was not off the cards as it stood as a test for the 'American new world order'. Bin Laden claimed that he sent 250 men to Somalia where actual figures were much lower that attempted to blend into the anarchy (Wright 2006:188). As the situation worsened in Somalia and the US troops withdrew after the Black Hawk Down incident and although Al Qaeda also left briefly before the US did, Al Qaeda claimed that the "weakness, frailty and cowardice of US troops" were proven (Wright 2006:189). The US is referred to as a 'paper tiger' with no staying power by Al Qaeda leaders like Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri, using the US abandoning Somalia after 'Black Hawk Down' as an example (Stevenson 2010:27). Al Qaeda also later claimed that they were responsible for the American deaths that caused the US to withdraw (Wright 2006:246). The experience in Somalia furthermore gave birth to the initial reasoning behind the Nairobi US Embassy bombings in 1998 (Wright 2006:198). The international response from an Al Qaeda perspective to Somalia is therefore ideological whereas the US response of anti-terror and security impinged on the jihad.

Al-Ittihad was accused of enabling Al Qaeda to use its bases prior to attacks in 1998 in Kenya and Tanzania. The post 9/11 fear was that terrorists fleeing Afghanistan would find a safe haven in Somalia (Shay 2005:92). Elliot & Holzer (2009:226) furthermore state that some degree of Al Qaeda operatives have used Somalia as an operational base or transit point, but fewer cases than in other states, including Kenya and that the likelihood of more extensive Al Qaeda networks in western states exists.

The US response to the threat of terrorism in the region is visible through the East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative and the US military base in Djibouti (Ibrahim 2010:287). The idea that the Al Qaeda terrorists could plan attacks on neighbouring countries and even the US-homeland was feared (Bruton 2010:3). The realisation of these fears in Kenya in 2010 through Al Shabaab will be elaborated on once the various role players' affiliations and support regionally and internationally have been explored.

The US efforts to prevent an Al Qaeda stronghold in Somalia had a contrary aftermath, since the Muslim community became polarised in moderate and extremist factions (Bruton 2010:3). The moderate interpretation is Sufi Islam opposed to the strict Salafi and Wahabi format, which is referred to where extremist factions strive to achieve jihad and purity. Some moderates within the UIC only turned to join the extremist ranks of Al Shabaab after the Ethiopian invasion. These areas will be elaborated on briefly as the TNG, TFG and UIC's attempts at governing Somalia are elaborated on. The rise of the UIC and Al Shabaab reiterates the polarisation that manifested itself in Somalia in the post 9/11 era. Although the US did not intervene directly, their support of the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 against the UIC can be seen as a belated reaction (Elliot & Holzer 2009:217). The dismissal of real Al-Qaeda links in Somalia directly after 9/11 occurred still had ripple effects in the interplay of domestic, regional and international responses to the continued failure in Somalia in the new millennium.

Bah (2009:503) indicates the regional implications that the US accusations of Somali 'terrorism involvement' had in the on-going tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The comparison is further drawn between the aftermath of US peacekeeping in the 1990s and withdrawal since 'US cannot be the world's policeman'. This had grave implications in Rwanda, whereas the current situation once again presents the US and other international actors with the opportunity to influence peacekeeping and state-building of the future. Verhoefen (2009:409) reiterates the point referring to 'dangerous passivity' occurring during

the Clinton presidency. The security motives for involvement in Somalia overshadow the humanitarian responses which will be reiterated when the relationship between domestic, regional and international responses to continued failure is analysed.

4.3 The relationship between domestic, regional and international responses to continued failure

The past ten years in Somalia have produced a loosely woven rug of continued failure instead of a strong tightly woven carpet of governance and state building. The question of why a rug with holes of violence and continued failure exists can be found in the threads of domestic, regional and international role players that have separated into loose strands of cooperation in the name of self-interest. The power political Security Motive of these players will be explored in their interactions with the TNG, TFG, UIC and Al Shabaab. The zero-sum clan dynamics respective support from opposite ends of the regional battle between Ethiopia and Eritrea is furthermore interwoven with the greater US vs Islamic global strategic angle. The TNG consisted mainly of members of the Hawiye clan which again came into power with the UIC being aligned with Eritrea and opposed to Ethiopia. The TFG mainly consisted of Darod members when they came into power and had Ethiopian support to drive the UIC away. The clan dynamics within Somalia were discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 and will be further illustrated in this chapter. The finer details of these alliances that have not rendered any significant response to state failure will be mapped out to illustrate the power political security motives for intervention in Somalia.

The regional alliances clearly demarcate the regional response to state failure as well as the broader international response. The Ethiopian support to the TFG and the Eritrean support to the TNG and UIC will be expanded on when discussing the regional security complex that exists in Somalia.

4.3.1 Regional Security Complex (RSC)

Bah (2009:502) illustrates that the continuous conflict in Somalia displays the features of a Regional Security Complex (RSC) ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’. He continues, stating that the pinnacle of the RSC is the security relationships and the rudiments of interdependence that concern security with national

security being interwoven in international security dynamics. Although geographical location ascribes to an RSC membership, it is rather defined by the frequency in which the states participate in the complex as well as the importance the state places on the conflict. The Horn of Africa's inter-related issues include identity politics; religion; state formation and disintegration; intervention and use of proxies; alignment with global agendas; and resource issues (Healy 2008 quoted in Bah 2009:502). Ethiopia's goal of sub-Saharan hegemony in the region against Egyptian influence, especially concerning hydro-political control, concerning the Upper Nile, illustrates the role of security of resources in this RSG (IISS 2002:1-2). Kasaija (2010:276) states that the external actors to the Somali conflict have interests in its current status and the Ethiopian, Egyptian and Eritrean positions are testimonial.

The national symbolism of the Somali flag exemplifies how nationalistic pride has regional implications. The five pointed star, points to the five regions where ethnic Somalis are situated. Of the five areas only two are currently within Somalia's borders. The former British Somaliland is struggling for international recognition and has been described as a state within a failed state (See Chapter 3). The regionally contested three points of the star demarcate areas in Ethiopia's Ogaden district, Kenya's northern region, and Djibouti (Hesse 2010a:248). The mistrust that exists in interstate relations is exemplified by the support for dissident groups as Eritrea does for groups in Darfur, Ethiopia, Somalia and eastern Sudan. On the flip side of the coin, Ethiopia is supporting groups in Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. Ethnic identity is an underlying factor for the formation of alliances in the Horn of Africa, particularly where rebel groups are concerned in gaining support from their neighbours (Bah 2009:502).

Ethiopia and Somalia's relationship did not become any less complicated in the new millennium. Prior to 9/11, on 9 June 2001, the provisional Somali government accused Ethiopia of invading its territory. The rocky road between these neighbours deteriorated further when Ethiopia closed down offices of the Somali company, Al-Barakat, in reaction to the US freezing its assets due to purported relations with Al Qaeda. (Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:18).

During the past two decades of statelessness in Somalia, the building block approach with federal statelets and the unitary central government approach, have been explored at length; Ethiopia is a promoter of the former, whereas Kenya and Djibouti support the latter, since a strong Somalia would provide a counterbalance to Ethiopia's hegemonic intentions and

would furthermore keep Eritrea in line (Stevenson 2010:33). The building block approach is bottom-up and focuses on rectifying clan rivalry through peace and reconciliation conferences. This approach has been successful in Somaliland and Puntland but the rest of Somalia has not reacted positively to this model (Kasaija 2010:276). Additionally, the unitary central government has been attempted several times and did not succeed with its centralised top-down approach, in attempting to find a solution for the whole of Somalia and only dealing with the leaders of the different factions, neglecting the grass-roots (Hansen 2003:61).

The factions each had a turn in attempting to create a functioning state in Somalia. The TNG's interactions regionally and internationally will now be analysed followed by that of the TFG, UIC and Al Shabaab. A chronology of events for the respective establishments is as follows:

- Arta Process established the TNG in 1999
- Nairobi Process August and October 2004 established the TFG
- The rise and fall of the UIC 2006

4.3.2 Transitional National Government (TNG)

The Transitional National Government (TNG), formed at the Arta conference in Djibouti in 1999, was described as 'stillborn' by Elliot and Holzer (2009:218). After the Arta conference the TNG hoped for a 'Marshall Plan' to rebuild Somalia, yet the international response was merely 20 million US Dollars, of which the majority was provided by Saudi Arabia. Other countries placed conditions, eg: including proof that the TNG was in control of Somalia prior to providing the much needed funds (Shay 2005:88). The TNG's alliances included African and Arab states, particularly Egypt, whose assistance however was resisted by Ethiopia which is the strongest external thread in the Somali's tapestry of failure. The Arab support, which the TNG enjoyed, further exacerbated tensions with Ethiopia with its hegemonic ideals in the region for standing and authority. A 'war of emissaries' ensued as internal and external political dimensions surrounding the TNG collided. The TNG was externally supported by the Arab world, and faced internal opposition groups aligned with Ethiopia (Shay 2005:89). Recognition internally and internationally of the TNG was problematic since internal opposition referred to it as the 'Arta faction' and was not recognised internationally by the EU nor the US. Some recognition was found in representation at the UN in the Somalia seat

as well as participation at that stage in international organisations like the then Organisation of African Unity, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, IGAD, and the Arab League (International Crisis Group 2002:6).

Bah (2009:503) reiterates the terrorism paradigm which Somalia's changing politics were viewed from in the post 9/11 world as each faction used it to its advantage. Although these calls were mostly uncalled for, they did influence the international response to state failure in Somalia. Due to the lack of legitimacy of the central government, the US initiated separate contact with the various factions in Somalia. This increased the factions vouching for the war against terror and identifying the opposition as pro-Al Qaeda (Shay 2005:198). Elliot and Holzer (2009:228) indicate that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, declared Ethiopia '*at the epicentre of terrorism and a secular island in the sea of Islam*' in 2002. Ethiopia's alignment with the US on international terrorism issues proves predictable according to the pattern created by the US and its support of the Zenawi regime. The significant support, despite external criticism of Ethiopia's less than perfect Human Rights record, is visible in the US Department of State (2010) indication that the *total US government assistance, including food aid, between 1999 and 2009 was 4.7 billion US Dollars. The US government provided 862 million US Dollars in assistance in FY 2009, 345 million US Dollars of it for combating HIV/AIDS. In addition, the US government donated more than 374 million US Dollars in food assistance in 2009 to help the government cope with a severe drought.* On military levels, according to Elliot & Holzer (2009:228), US military support came through the US Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) programmes. Furthermore, training by American military instructors has been noted since 2002 for Ethiopian forces and pro-Ethiopian Somalis in Ethiopia. The fact that the US did not recognise the TNG as the legitimate government of Somalia and its preferred interaction with Ethiopia to wage the War on Terror against Somalia, is illustrated above and below with severe security motives as a response to state failure and the most recent attempt to overcome it in Somalia.

Yet by 2003 one of the pro-Al Qaeda links al-Ittihad amounted to *'little more than a transient shadow cast across the Horn by militant Wahhabism and Arab oil wealth'* (Bryden quoted in Elliot & Holzer 2009:227). The nature of this transient shadow can be analysed as to have it linked merely due to support received from Arab nations and not actual ties to Al Qaeda other than illustrated earlier in the 1990's.

Domestic clan threads have always found opposing support in the region. The TNG was mainly formed from the Hawiye clan which was opposed by Ethiopia who subsequently supported a group of 'wronged' factions to establish the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) (Elliot and Holzer 2009:218). The SRRC integrated all entities opposed to the TNG in 2001. The SRRC was headed by Hussein Aideed and supported by Ethiopia, and attempted to gain international recognition as Somalia's legitimate government including from the UN (Shay 2005:95). This constant competition and the zero sum clan dynamics can be related back to state formation as each clan struggles to lead the Somali state, although only a cohesive approach of governance could attain a Somali state beyond failure and ready for reformation.

The terrorism paradigm was effectively utilised by the SRRC in claiming that the TNG and its supporters had ties with 'extremist' groups such as Al-Ittihaad. The TNG's support internally waned as Somaliland, Puntland and the SRRC commenced contesting the TNG. Financially, the TNG was also weakened by financial manipulations, which resulted in hyper-inflation as well as corruption allegations and donor funds being stolen (Shay 2005:88). The fact that political leaders were implicated in these allegations resulted in the ousting of the Prime Minister in 2001 (Menkhaus 2003:418). The TNG's failure to ensure security in Somalia in light of the purportedly 2.5 million US Dollars received from Libya in February 2002, which was assigned for security forces, placing these forces at the brink of disrupting peace, even more so due to salaries not being paid, thus shaming the President with future Libyan aid being highly unlikely (International Crisis Group 2002:6). The insecurity during the TNG's reign can be linked to the fact that armed groups did not participate in its election during the Arta process (Kasaija 2010:264).

Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue (2009:15) indicates that Ethiopia and the SRRC further had a diplomatic upper hand by having Aweys placed on the UN list of having links with international terrorists, even though these concerns were used more to further their own interests in opposition to the TNG than real 'terror' linkages.

The longest peace conference, namely the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference (SNRC), held in the Kenyan towns of Eldoret and Mbagathi from 2002 to 2004 was led by IGAD. International involvement can be seen through Kenyan diplomats' presence, the UN's support, the EU and other Western donors' financial support (Interpeace/ Center for Research

and Dialogue 2009:16). Somalia's neighbours, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti worked toward a stabilisation process and was supported by Italy, Norway and the United Kingdom (Raffaelli 2007:123-124). Italy's involvement is ascribed to co-chairing with Norway the IGAD Partners forum, the group of donors to IGAD and its participation in the International Somalia Contact Group. The Italian position firmly supported a regionally-based peace process for Somalia and therefore was rather interested in the sustainability of the process than specific groups or actors. The strategic long term concerns that Somalia raises for Italy include immigration risks that refugees place, as well as links to the Middle East with its strategic position between the Arab and African worlds and the possibility of further radicalisation within the region. These are key factors in Italy's response to Somalia (Raffaelli 2007:126-127).

Ironically it was an IGAD-led peace initiative in Eldoret that contradicted the Arta process, since it enforced what was rejected at Arta in the form of the federal building block approach, which was backed by Ethiopia in 1999 but not accepted. Yet, it was recommended and reinforced in 2004 in the Transitional Federal Charter. The bottom-up approach that the building block approach recommends has been proposed numerously but not implemented to its full extent to bring the federal model to a functioning state. Peace has not been created locally to a significant extent through traditional clan leaders to have these units join up in a federal governed state (Hansen 2003:59).

The SNRC was directed by faction leaders although it brought together a mélange of political and military leaders, traditional elders, and civil society leaders. The three-phased approach had the following goals of achieving a declaration on a cessation of hostilities, an agreement on substantive conflict issues and a charter for government. The peace process was disrupted by violations of the weakly drafted 'ceasefire' on multiple occasions until parliamentarians were chosen in August 2004, which gave rise to the TFG (Interpeace/ Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:17).

Yet, the TNG's mandate elapsed before the end of the conference which gave birth to the TFG through the adoption of the Transitional Federal charter and the election of Abdullahi Yusuf as the president in October 2004 for a five year transitional period (Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:16). The negotiations were considered, as including a large variety of stakeholders, yet Somaliland did not participate (Ibrahim 2010:284). Somaliland's

participation in subsequent conferences and peace effort will be elaborated on when these events are analysed.

The rise of the TFG will be discussed briefly but the sentiment of the lost opportunities of the then TNG is widely reported on and will be elaborated on briefly. The TNG's Charter for Government did not define specific action plans for the duties of government which consequently turned the expectations created into undeliverable empty promises, which prevented it to obtain legitimacy with the local population. While it arrived in Somalia with a degree of goodwill and expectation from Somalis, it failed to build upon that and extend its authority in Mogadishu (Bah 2009:503). The fact that Barre dominated was mainly associated with the Darrod clan and the fact that the TNG represented Hawiye and its Arab backers, illustrates the turns of tides again as the TFG supported by Ethiopia and mainly consisting of Darod members, came back into power (Elliot & Holzer 2009:227).

4.3.3 The international reaction to the rise of the TFG versus the rise of the UIC

The birth of the TFG in October 2004 was the equivalent to the TNG in similar weaknesses, although its structure differed. Ethiopia was seen as a big brother and the TFG as a mere proxy with little Somali interest, although the Darod interests were favoured (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). The TFG thread was reinforced with the Ethiopian thread in the new pattern to achieve a functioning government in Somalia. It is also referred to as clientelism, which further points out how the most important difference between the TFG and the TNG at their equally unassuming beginnings, was that international recognition was granted to the TFG. Significant financial support was furthermore expected with the inauguration of a World Bank and UNDP Joint Needs Assessment of the country's rehabilitation and development requirements **(**Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:17).

The reliance on the external financial support did little to advance the national government, which could be related to its leader Abdullahi Yusuf's history as a vital figure of the SRRC who enjoyed Ethiopian support partially due to his committed anti-Islamist rhetoric (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). During Yusuf's presidency in Puntland, he played a role in unseating the TNG with Ethiopian support by channelling military assistance to the SRRC as arms and ammunition came from Yemen through Puntland ports into Somalia. He also remained longer in power in Puntland due to military support received from Ethiopia (International Crisis

Group 2004:4-5). Verhoefen (2009:411) refers to the TFG as 'Ethiopia's dog' who inspired American Special Forces to search for the TFG's opposition, which were conveniently labelled 'terrorists' but never convicted. Menkhaus (2009:224) furthermore indicates that critics called the TFG Ethiopia's puppet, tasked with being a government of national unity and administrating a five year political transformation. The TFG's commitment to the 'cause' against terror and stability in Somalia are linked to attract US funding for its own purposes, similar to Ethiopia's use of it (Elliot & Holzer 2009:229). These accusations of being Ethiopia's dog and Ethiopia's puppet are furthermore substantiated through the role that Mohamed Omar Habeeb, an associate of Yusuf in the SRRC and Ethiopian ally, played in Geedi's appointment as Prime Minister. The cabinet announced was under "disrepute" as a video was leaked illustrating how an Ethiopian diplomat dictates cabinet appointment to Yusuf and Geedi. Although a vote of no confidence was passed in December 2004 and Yusuf dissolved the government many of the original ministers maintained their positions under Geedi (International Crisis Group 2004:4-5).

The TFG was not a monolithic group, with divides visible by the beginning of 2005 with the 'Mogadishu Group' and 'Yusuf's supporters' (Menkhaus 2009:225). These internal obstacles did not prevent the former SRRC members from enjoying its new found recognition, yet their opposition that lost power without conflict, did not take the new structure lightly, which gave rise to the UIC (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). The continuous struggle for power between these groups boils down to the zero-sum clan dynamics mentioned earlier. The international and regional response in this regard also aligns itself with a specific group and influences the overall response to the Somali case of state failure and attempts of different role players to play a leading role.

The beginnings of the UIC are described by Menkhaus (2003:409), who states the outstanding feature of the courts was the restoration of rule of law in communities and were mostly controlled by moderate traditional elements with a local nature of authority. Their decentralised nature in the 1990s was beneficial, since their decisions had less opposition from militias and the population, with decisions made at a grass-roots level. Yet warlords' ambitions and inter-clan conflicts were not addressed through the Courts' lack of centralised authority. The emergence of the UIC and its coalition to form an umbrella structure in 2004 brought together the Hawiye, Islamic charities, fundamentalist groups and local militia and overcame the decentralised problems. The recognition of 'clan divisions as the main culprit

for Somalia's state collapse and humanitarian crisis' was strengthened by business and militant nationalism, enforced by Al Shabaab driven by Pan-Islamic unity (Verhoefen 2009:415). The key to overcoming clan divisions under pan-Islamic unity and bringing pockets of peace with it, gave rise to more support.

By 2005 the UIC was recognised as a functioning operational force since the business community in Mogadishu supported the UIC financially as the roadblocks manned by clan militias were coming to an end through the UIC's order being restored (Kasaija 2010:266). De Waal (2007) indicates that the UIC was able to 'organise the business sector into a political force capable of gaining control over state structures'.

Yet, the opposition formed the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) which temporarily had Southern Somali politics in a three way battle between the UIC, TFG and ARPCT (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). The TFG received the support of the International Contact Group on Somalia, which was formed in June 2006 in order to rethink international policy responses to Somalia in the wake of the UIC's control. The group included representatives of the UK, US, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Tanzania and EU, yet notably left out Kenya, the African Union and the League of Arab States during its formation (BBC 2006). The TFG functioned however without a budget, functioning civil service or security service but remained Somalia's 'legitimate' government with international recognition (Kaplan 2010:85).

The rise of the UIC was hastily compared to the Taliban in Afghanistan, since clans would be united on religious premises and the US sponsored the ARPCT, which Verhoefen (2009:416) describes as a grouping of Somalia's most corrupt politicians and militia-leaders. The international response to the UIC is said to have followed this thought process, as Gettleman is quoted in Verhoefen (2009:416) *'failed state = instability = terrorism = Taliban/UIC'*.

Elliot and Holzer (2009:229) state that the CIA channelled approximately 150 000 US Dollars to the ARPCT per month in 2006. A private American company, Select Armor, provided military equipment to the ARPCT. The US efforts to ensure terrorist suspects to be delivered, did not deliver many results since the ARPCT was more concerned with gaining control of Mogadishu than substantiating their anti-terror rhetoric that provided them the necessary resources.

The UIC gained strength and limited the ARPCT's existence to four months. In the beginning of 2006 the UIC had control over Mogadishu, Kismayo and much of southern Somalia (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). The nine Hawiye warlords and their militia that made up the ARPCT, dissolved into the UIC (Elliot & Holzer 2009:229).

The UNSC had an affirmative response to the AU's proposition to have a peace support mission in Somalia during July 2006 and furthermore to adjust the arms embargo to develop a security sector for the TFG (Kasaija 201:267). The resolution was issued six months later as the situation in Somalia changed radically.

The UIC's reign was impressive with the seaport and airport functioning, as well as basic government services being provided to the Southern Somalis for the first time in more than a decade. Unfortunately this period of law and order in the otherwise failed Somali state was short lived with a power struggle emerging in the UIC's midst between moderate and more strict followers of Islam in respect of traditional Sufi figures like Sheikh Sharif to strict Salafist in line with the Wahhabi branch of Islam like Hassan Aweys and the extreme of jihad in Al Shabaab (Menkhaus 2007:371). The latter caused anxiety in neighbouring Ethiopia and its superpower big brother, the USA. Eritrea saw the UIC as a handy tool to conduct a proxy war against Ethiopia (Menkhaus 2009:225). The strategic positions within the region therefore cannot be disregarded. Somalia and Lebanon are linked through purportedly Somali fighters assisting Hizbullah during the 2006 'summer war' in exchange for military training (Stevenson 2010:28). The arms race was on as Ethiopia backed the TFG and Eritrea and other Arab sponsors backed the UIC with military supplies (Elliot & Holzer 2009:219). The US did not assist Ethiopia directly on a military level, but permitted large arms transfers from other states. Another point in hand is the violation of US-led UN sanctions on arms sales from North Korea involving an arms shipment from Pyongyang to Addis Ababa via the Somaliland port of Berbera (Elliot & Holzer 2009:229). By September 2006 the AU decided to send a peacekeeping mission to Somalia, which was planned to be under the patronage of IGAD (Kasija 2010:266).

The EU recognised the strategic importance of the regional framework in which Somalia's continuous insecurity functions. The key strategic elements lie in Somalia's central location between African and Arab regions with state failure increasing cross border challenges of non-existing border control due to the lack of governance. Furthermore, refugee flows and religious fundamentalism affect both regions stability and security. The EU consequently

proposed a regional strategy in October 2006: *'EU partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa',* which provided a political framework for regional initiatives between countries and IGAD and proposed a regional programme for action with three pillars: 1) international organisations like the AU and IGAD to encourage regional political cooperation and integration; 2) country-level strategic political issues with regional implications to be addressed; and 3) the focus of addressing regional cross-cutting and cross-border challenges in governance, security and natural resources (Rafaelli 2007:125). This further supports the hypothesis that Somalia is part of a RSC as all the insecurities of the region feed into each other.

Hesse (2010a:253) indicates that the talks in Khartoum between the UIC and TFG had a general theme of mutual mistrust as the UIC saw the TFG as corrupt and the TFG was wary to lose control in a unity government. The moderate elements in the UIC were prepared for power-sharing in a united Somalia, had the international community played its hand right at the time. Yet, the humanitarian needs of the citizens of Somalia were once again put on the backburner as Ethiopia's anti-terror rhetoric chimed to the US' Global War against Terror beat, firstly considering its own hegemonic interests rather than a stable Somalia (Verhoefen 2009:416). UIC forces came in more frequent contact and in conflict with Ethiopian forces. These Ethiopian forces were there as Somali TFG military trainers, but these conflicts had extremists in the UIC refer to it as a 'holy war against Christian Ethiopia' with Ethiopia retaliating with UIC and Al-Qaeda links (Hesse 2010a:253). Intermittent assaults by the UIC on TFG positions in the Baidoa area by the end of 2006 caused the Ethiopian military to act (Elliot & Holzer 2009:220). The UIC had territorial control of seven of the ten regions in south-central Somalia for a period of six months in 2006 and had domestic support due to the controlling of war lords rather than a shared religious and ideological stance (Raffaelli 2007:122).

The UIC's popularity deteriorated as the Sharia system was strictly enforced. Ethiopia's onslaught in December 2006 with American support defeated the UIC within days (Menkhaus 2009:7). The international response therefore went over into concrete intervention in Somalia through support to the Ethiopian forces. The Ethiopian troops killed approximately 1000 UIC supporters (Elliot & Holzer 2009:220). Raffaelli (2007:122) ascribes the rapid Ethiopian victory to the internal support it received from the Somali population. The fact that the UIC was seen as competition by the militia leaders further

illustrates the Somali element in overthrowing the UIC (Elliot & Holzer 2009:220). As the Ethiopian troops entered Somalia, the UIC fled across the Kenyan border (Menkhaus 2009:225). The EU's strategy was stifled by the military clashes. The Ethiopian and US strategic response will be analysed as well as the uprising of Al Shabaab. Although AMISOM forces were deployed during this period, it will be discussed separately.

4.3.4 Post UIC: Ethiopian occupation and uprising of Al Shabaab

The US support to the TFG was visible in a 'down payment' of 40 million US Dollars in January 2007 (Kaplan 2010:86). This monetary contribution did little to restore the US' negative image in Somalia as the air strikes beginning on 6 January 2007 on suspected Al Qaeda militants commenced with innocent lives paying the price (Elliot & Holzer 2009:220). This first American involvement since the Black Hawk Down incident and subsequent withdrawal was aimed at Al Qaeda militants who were involved in the US embassy bombing in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. Somalia's interim President Abdullahi Yusuf backed the US action and was quoted: *'The US has a right to bombard terrorist suspects who attacked its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania*' (BBC 2007). In response Al Qaeda deputy, Ayman al-Zawahir's internet message encouraged the Courts to launch a campaign of suicide bombings against the Ethiopians (Elliot & Holzer 2009:220). The strikes did succeed in killing 10 Al Qaeda affiliates but not the three they specifically aiming for, namely Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Taha al-Sudan and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. 31 Civilians paid the price instead (Rice 2007).

Ethiopia assisted the US through the detention of 'terrorist suspects' as illustrated in April 2007 when approximately 200 FBI and CIA agents were based in the Sheraton Hotel in Addis Ababa. Most of these suspects provided by the Ethiopian government had little or no Al Qaeda ties and were fighters of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which proves that Ethiopia used the international strategic response of anti-terror to their own regional advantage and interest (Elliot & Holzer 2009:229). Ethiopia's strong anti-terror rhetoric played to its advantage in the greater RSC, and its nemesis Eritrea the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), established in 2000, was terminated in 2008. Eritrea withdrew its consent for the UNMEE presence since Ethiopia disrespected the Ethiopia–Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) ruling that it settled the disputed town of Badme to Eritrea's advantage. As Ethiopia continued to woe the US, Eritrea sensed the bias of Ethiopia's big brother as Eritrea was listed as a state sponsor of Terror (Bah 2009:503). Elliot

and Holzer (2009:229) illustrate the regional balance of power as follows, *'When President Ahmed met with his Ethiopian counterparts for the first time in 2009, the first question raised was- 'why the Islamic Courts had warm relationships with Asmara, not whether [the Courts] were Salafi or jihadist.''*

Clashes between the TFG and insurgency tallied up to thousands of deaths and displacement of approximately 700 000 civilians in Mogadishu during 2007 (Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:17)

Close to a year after the Ethiopian invasion, the disarray in the TFG and its opposition was visible with the more moderate opposition to the TFG from the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) which had the more radical opposition, namely Al Shabaab publicly breaking ties with its former UIC comrades. The TFG had its tainted Prime Minister Ghedi step down, allowing Hassan Hussein Nur 'Adde' to install a new cabinet (Menkhaus 2009:226). The underlying clan dynamics played a role in Yusuf's choice of this Hawiye seasoned humanitarian worker (Abdi 2007). Yet, this step was not sufficient, since the message of the TFG's over-reliance on Ethiopia for support had a negative influence on its legitimacy, domestically from its own citizens, although it still enjoyed recognition internationally (Elliot & Holzer 2009:230).

Al Shabaab fled to the interior of the country at the beginning of the Ethiopian occupation and started to undergo the transformation of a small militia taking commands from the UIC to an autonomous political movement with support from Eritrea, keen to use Somalia as a playground for a proxy war against Ethiopia (Menkhaus 2009:8). Al Shabaab is described as havingtransnational ambitions with the goal of forming a fundamentalist Islamist state across the Horn of Africa. Its origins can be traced back to al-Ittihaad al-Islamia (AIAI) headed by Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys with assistance in the form of training camps and other protection (Stevenson 2010:28).

The US designated Al Shabaab as a terrorist organisation in March 2008 and killed the Shabaab leader, Aden Hashi Ayro with a missile attack in May 2008 (Menkhaus 2009:8). Elliot and Holzer (2009:220) state that the 'War on Terror' jargon in the Horn presented validation for the militarisation of the US policy in the region, since 2008 had all African states but Liberia denying to host the United States African Command, or (AFRICOM). The

fact that the airstrikes coincided with Ethiopian occupation did not do the US image any favours in Somalia.

Stevenson (2010:32) analyses Ethiopian support to the TFG in ousting the UIC as having temporarily addressed the terrorism problem but re-emphasised the vote of no confidence from Somalis in their Ethiopian neighbours. US strikes from gunships in the region further enflamed anti-Americanism. This anti-Americanism can be translated into anti-westernisation and boils down to the Somali notion of not trusting foreigners due to their strong allegiance to their clans which makes any external intervention in the country extremely problematic. The anti-terror rhetoric was further echoed by Australia who followed in the US' tracks in 2009 by also placing Al Shabaab on its terrorist organisation list (Pham 2009:84).

Al Shabaab did not only reign in terror in southern Somalia but also in Somaliland and Puntland, who had been victims of Al Shabaab attacks during October 2008 when five coordinated explosions targeted local-government offices, a UN compound and Ethiopian consulate (Stevenson 2010:29). These attacks illustrate external actors being targeted by Al Shabaab fighters. The use of suicide attacks by Al Shabaab started in 2006 with fluctuating cases of four in 2007, two in 2008 and five in 2009 (Ibrahim 2010:286). These suicide attacks occurred prior to official alignment to Al Qaeda in February 2010, the use of foreign fighters will be elaborated on when the role of the Somali Diaspora will be evaluated briefly. The extremist nature of Al Shabaab had an effect on the international response to state failure and intensified the war on terror rhetoric. Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue (2009:18) states that the Ethiopian occupation supported the perception that certain external actors have a vested interest in the continuous state of war in Somalia, since a weak Somalia is incapable of pursuing its irredentist notions of the past. These vested interests are problematic for mediation processes as regional spoilers might be at play. The Ethiopian occupation of Somalia instigated Al Shabaab to use 'crusader' language towards the TFG to be wholly reliant on foreign 'infidels' (Ibrahim 2010:284). The unifying effect of the occupation can be seen in various armed groups and civilians since the presence was seen as an embarrassment (Bah 2009:505).

The Djibouti agreement of August 2008 and the follow-up agreement of November 2008 were the fruits of the international community's aim of achieving a centrist coalition of TFG which had six key elements: 1) an ending of hostilities, 2) a joint security force, 3) the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, 4) Ethiopian force withdrawal, 5) two year

extension of TFG mandate from August 2009 to August 2011, 6) an additional 275 seats in the parliament to allow the opposition entry and the formation of a unity government (Menkhaus 2009:226). The additional seats in parliament had 200 given to the ARS and 75 to civil society including women, business community and diaspora with the vision that this more inclusive parliament will vote for new leadership which alluded to President Yusuf, feeling that the process corroded presidential control, especially with the tensions existing between him and Adde. The stakeholders involved from the international community included representatives from countries such as Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan, UK and the US; international and regional organisations namely the AU, IGAD, League of Arab States, the UN and international NGO's like the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (Kasaija 2010:272). Unfortunately the agreement was signed by those who had little territorial control which proved problematic for implementation purposes (Kaplan 2010:87). The fact that international support for the implementation of the agreement was crucial cannot be neglected and the six elements of the agreement will be evaluated. The first point in ending hostilities with opposition groups to the TFG has not been reached, as hostilities escalated between the various opposition groups to the TFG namely Al Shabaab as well as pro-TFG groups like Ahl Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ).

The ASWJ came to existence in 1991 with Sufi leaders opposing the limitations enforced by reformist leaders. Their Sufi nature is opposed to militant/reformist Islam, like Wahhabi (Abbink 2009:96). Sufism, furthermore, focuses on peace and on delegitimising fundamentalist movements. It is therefore more moderate (International Crisis Group 2005:16). ASWJ, being Sufi is anti Salafist and Wahhabi. Wahhabi puritism and Salafi jihadism are linked, as Salafism evolved out of Wahhabism that was spread by Saudi Arabia in the 1970's and promoted with petro-dollars in religious schools (called 'madrasas') and other charities to enforce a 'conservative shield' for the Muslim world against communism (International Crisis Group 2010:2). Other sects of Islam are seen as 'deviants' including members of Sufi Islam who worship saints (awliyaa) due to their powers and spiritual closeness (taqqrrub) to God. The Salafist Al Shabaab has wreaked havoc in Sufi shrines (International Crisis Group 2010:3). Al Shabaab and its extremist nature will be discussed briefly when the renewed TFG and its opposition is analysed in respect of the international response, especially in the form of AMISOM forces, as well as the regional dynamics at play with Kenyan and Ethiopian involvement.

Their visibility was limited until mid-2008 when they actively fought against Al Shabaab with a man power of 2000, originating from Hawiye sub-clans and received military support from Ethiopia in December 2008 (International Crisis Group 2010:13). The role that ASWJ plays within the failed state environment with international actors including support from Ethiopia will be elaborated on briefly.

The inter-TFI disagreements escalated to such a level that they were seen as obstacles to peace in Somalia. Consequently, the IGAD Council of Ministers met in November 2008 and decided to freeze assets of these perpetrators as well as implement travel bans which were endorsed by the UN SC and AU PSC. Yet, the conflicts between Prime Minister Adde and President Yusuf continued and Kenya's targeted sanctions on the Somali leaders who were considered to be barriers to the peace further edged President Yusuf to his resignation. The final nail in the Yusuf's presidential career's coffin, however, can be seen in his meeting with the USA Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Jendayi Frazer, in Nairobi where Yusuf was forced to either cooperate with the Prime Minister or resign. His resignation was tendered on 29 December 2008 and he left Mogadishu for Puntland (Kasaija 2010:273).

Before exploring the international response to the new political landscape that ensued in 2009, the introduction of AMISOM will be discussed.

4.4 AMISOM

The introduction of the AMISOM forces occurred since the IGAD Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM) did not have the mandate to provide peace support in Somalia other than to provide security to enable the TFG to relocate to Mogadishu when the TFG was formed (Kasaija 2010:266). Kasaija (2010:267) furthermore indicates that IGAD did not have the human nor financial capacity to conduct peace support. The significant regional threads of the opposing positions of Ethiopia and Eritrea furthermore objected to deployment. The regional threads were tightened by the UNSC resolution 1725, issued on 6 December 2006, authorising IGAD and the AU to deploy forces in Somalia. AMISOM's deployment mandate was sanctioned for 6 months at the AU PSC in January 2007 and can be summarised in the provision of the following: technical support to TFI's to stabilise the country; humanitarian assistance and a foundation for the reconstruction of Somalia (AU 2007). The AMISOM mandate was made official by the UNSC on 20 February 2007 in resolution 1744 (UN 2007).

In its comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects the UN debates African ownership in African Peace and Security Architecture, '*Much has been said about the principle of African ownership over the development of the African Peace and Security Architecture. Yet it is difficult to achieve ownership by augmenting the African Union Commission with external support. Ownership will only be achieved through the development of home-grown structures and procedures supported by effective mechanisms for funding'* (UN 2008:14). AMISOM's dependence on foreign aid is illustrated by the fact that Germany provided 3.5 million Euros to the Burundi forces of AMISOM to buy equipment including water purification units, generators and motor vehicles, none of it subject to arms export controls (Abdi Hajji Hussein 2011). The total EU contribution to AMISOM is currently at 291 million US Dollars, as the EU pledged 92 million US Dollars in new funding for AMISOM, while the US promised an additional 45 million US Dollars worth of military equipment to AMISOM troops (Human Rights Watch 2011:10).

The lack of African ownership is furthermore seen in the response to the AU's calls for troops for AMISOM. Of all the AU members, only Burundi and Uganda provided troops. Burundi's involvement stemmed from the military training received from Somalia while it was a functioning state. The Ugandan motives were less noble but due to the extent of its membership in IGAD, the AU and UN, it wanted to stabilise the situation in Somalia whilst meals, remuneration and medical care were sponsored by the AU. Nigeria and Malawi also promised troops which, to date, have not been delivered on (Kasaija 2010:268). The AMISOM forces were greatly overshadowed by the Ethiopian occupation from end of 2006 to January 2009, which had estimated force strength of between 8 000 and 15 000 troops (Hesse 2010a:248). By early 2008 UN assessment missions decided against the enlargement of the UN peacekeeping involvement through AMISOM which was reinforced by the Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council in April 2009 (Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:17). The maximum required forces from AMISOM were 8000 troops but by May 2010 slightly over 5000 troops were deployed by Burundi and Uganda (Kasaija 2010:268-269).

Stevenson (2010:33) indicates that even though AMISOM's mandate increased, it still lacked size and equipment to be of significant use in peace enforcement. The fact that anti-terror rhetoric visible through the Bush administration's declaration highlights the danger that weak states present to global security, was not met with action in Somalia or support to AMISOM.

The complex case of state building was avoided in Somalia whilst an expansive reconstruction of Afghanistan was sponsored by the US (Bah 2009:505). The dire humanitarian and political crisis that existed in Somalia by late 2008 hardly achieved any attention (Interpeace/Center for Research and Dialogue 2009:17).

The shortfalls of AMISOM can be contributed to an ambiguous and perplexing mandate which limited valuable intervention. Paul Williams (2009) narrowed AMISOM's challenges down to five. Firstly, the legacy of Black Hawk Down is illustrated in US response to Somalia from a counterterrorism point of view. The strategic and narrow focus, therefore, did not enable a humanitarian foundation for the AMISOM forces to build on. Secondly, the shadow of Ethiopia's intervention can be seen through the difficulty that AMISOM had in breaking the mould of being merely more foreign invaders, protecting an internationally recognised TFG without domestic legitimacy and support. Thirdly, the AU's lack of capabilities was evident due to the little experience it had in the field. The allocation of the troops needed to deploy 8000 was not evident as by April 2009 AMISOM only had 4300 troops from Burundi and Uganda funded by the US, UN and EU to name but a few. Fourthly the conflict environment for a peacekeeping mission is contradictory from its outset since there is no peace to keep with the constant conflict environment. The Ethiopian troops' presence from 2007 to 2009 furthermore limited AMISOM's role. Yet, the Ethiopian presence also diverted Al Shabaab's line of fire, shielding AMISOM but with Ethiopia withdrawing. An Al Shabaab attack followed shortly killing 11 Burundian peacekeepers and injuring a further 28 in February 2009. Since the peacekeepers came under attack, their use of force increased, which lead to civilian casualties. Finally, Williams (2009) states that AMISOM will have difficulty in finding an exit or abandoning its mission.

Of the five challenges mentioned above, the fact that there is no peace to keep in the continuous conflict environment is reinforced by Bah (2009:504-505), who states *'AMISOM is a classic case of deploying peacekeepers in a theatre without a viable political framework or a peace to keep.'* Yet, these challenges have been accepted by AMISOM to a certain extent as progress was made, but as Solomon (2011) states, it is not as moribund as it is made out to be. AMISOM only controlled the airport, the State House, Villa Somalia and K-4 Junction initially in 2009, which gradually increased in 2010 and even more so in the beginning of 2011 to give the TFG control of 60% of Mogadishu. This progress came despite strong onslaughts from Al Shabaab and was assisted through the UN Security Council

extension of the AMISOM mandate to end September 2011, authorising the deployment of 4 000 more soldiers to Somalia to boost the number of peacekeepers supporting the transitional government in the country against Al Shabaab from 8 000 to 12 000 troops. 1000 Of the additional 4000 troops were deployed by Burundi in mid March 2011; the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon also supports the logistical support provided to AMISOM (Olupot 2011).

The increase in forces was largely caused by Al Shabaab's suicide attack in Uganda during July 2010 which killed more than 70 people. Al Shabaab has been adamant to force AMISOM to leave, by attacking AMISOM troops from civilian areas, forcing retaliation to cause civilian casualties. During May 2011, 50 percent of the 1590 injured admitted to hospital in Mogadishu were children under the age of five (Human Rights Watch 2011:15). Although there are many civilian casualties during the conflict, AMISOM has not admitted responsibility for many and an incident of troops opening fire on civilians on 23 November 2010 at a busy intersection near Aden Adde Aiport was the first where the Ugandan soldiers were sentenced to two years imprisonment (Human Rights Watch 2011:17). These examples cited indicate that responsibility for civilian casualties is not readily admitted and that the international response to the failure in Somalia does not always have the intended outcomes and antagonises Somali citizens.

The possibility of Ethiopia and Kenya getting actively involved in the fight against Al Shabaab in a multi-pronged assault is unlikely due to Security Council Resolutions 733 and 1725, which requested Somalia's immediate neighbours not to intervene, yet it cannot be ruled out completely (International Crisis Group 2011:18). Kenyan involvement which commenced in October 2011 and renewed Ethiopian troop presence will be elaborated on in Chapter 5 where the combination of humanitarian plight and strategic incentives urged a direct strategic response. AMISOM's action in Somalia will be further elaborated where necessary, with the international response to the renewed TFG and ongoing opposition being analysed briefly.

4.5 International response to renewed TFG 2009 and its opposition

The UN, US, EU and the International Contact group on Somalia cooperated with Djibouti to achieve changes in the TFG which included more equal clan presence through the expansion of parliament in January 2009, from 275 to 550 members (Stevenson 2010:33). Sharif Sheik

Ahmed consequently won the January 2009 presidential elections. In February 2009, Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was made Prime Minister as the '4,5 Formula' prescribed to promote clan cohesion within the government as he represented Darod (Hesse 2010a:253). The formula allocates an identical number of seats to the four focal clans namely Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digil Mirifle and the lesser number to the minority groups (Roque 2009:75).

Yet, Pham (2009:85) queries the process in which Sheik Sharif Ahmed was elected. The enlargement of the parliament positioned Sharif Sheik, who had decreasing support, to select half of the additional members. This action ensured that Sharif Sheik won the second round of voting since he was unsuccessful in the first. Had the parliament not been expanded Maslah Mohamed Siyad Barre, son of the former dictator would have been in the presidential seat. Yet Somalia has clan dynamics that go beyond the formal structures, as the *xeer* illustrates. This dispute resolution application of customary law within clan dynamics should not be neglected when state failure is addressed within Somalia (World Bank 2005:16)

The withdrawal of Ethiopian troops in the beginning of 2009 had Al Shabaab at cross-roads since ending Ethiopian occupation was a major source of propaganda and motive for support. Sharif Sheik's election as an Islamist leader further rocked Al Shabaab's rhetoric and their positions needed to be aligned. It was simply done by labelling Sharif as a western puppet with questionable Islamist credentials and depicting AMISOM as a continuation of Ethiopian occupation (International Crisis Group 2010:6). The simplicity of Al Shabaab's rhetoric did not have great appeal, but their reign of terror continued in large portions of Southern Somalia.

Hizbul Islam originated by consolidating opposition to the renewed TFG and consisted of four groupings: the Eritrean wing of the ARS, Anoole, Ras Kamboni and Jabatul Islam, with Eritrean support (International Crisis Group 2010:9-10). Sheik Aweys headed Hizbul Islam which was limited to certain areas driven by nationalistic vision and Aweys' lust for power (Stevenson 2010:29). The Djibouti process was seen as an elaborate Western "conspiracy" to further divide the Islamists which resulted in a tactical alliance between Hizbul Islam and Al Shabaab in May 2009. These attacks on the TFG were met with AMISOM retaliation (International Crisis Group 2010:10). These groups joining forces did not resolve continuing tensions due to confederal structure of Al Shabaab and its alliance with Al Qaeda.

On 21 June 2009, a declaration of a state of emergency was made and parliament called for an urgent intervention by the international community (Roque 2009:77). The lack of the TFG's independence and the key role that the international response is required to play, is once again illuminated. Foreign assistance is aimed at reinforcing policies which focus on security, reconciliation and governance but for these policies to be effectively implemented the TFG requires territory to administer (International Crisis Group 2010:16), which it is still lacking and leaves the international responses far from being felt on the ground. The lack of territory can be ascribed to the fact that Al Shabaab officially refused the presence of all foreign troops, including peacekeepers (Bah 2009:505).

During August 2009, an internal report of the US State Department's bureau of African Affairs rated Somalia as 'the hottest of my policy fires burning' (Stevenson 2010:31). Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, indicated that President Sharif was the 'best hope' for stability in Somalia and indicated that '*President Obama and I want to expand and extend our support for the TFG*' (Kaplan 2010:88). Yet, other international crises globally and regionally received priority including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Sudan and the DRC (Stevenson 2010:31). The aid, training and equipment promised on top of the 40 tons of munitions provided in May 2009 were means to a different end (Kaplan 2010:88). Gettlemen (2009) indicates that the American weapons provided ciphered through to Al Shabaab due to the porosity of the TFG's armed forces.

The international recognition of the TFG by the EU, UN, US and regional recognition including the AU, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti and direct opposition to Al Shabaab is evident, especially in reaffirmations by the US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton's meeting with Sheik Sharif in Kenya in August 2009 (Stevenson 2010:32). The president's support received from the West did not bear the same fruits during his Middle Eastern tour seeking Arab aid. The Arab financial aid was conditional on rapprochement with opposition groups which left the president flustered (International Crisis Group 2010:17).

The more representative TFG to date, have not succeeded to shake off their failed state image, with no taxes collected, nor successful establishment of social services or law enforcement. The TFG does not meet the requirements of a functioning recognized government and is fully reliant on AMISOM protection for its existence in certain parts of Mogadishu (Stevenson 2010:32). Direct support to TFG forces has been further provided by

Kenya, covertly training approximately 2500 militia to combat Al Shabaab in the South (International Crisis Group 2010:16).

During September 2009, Ethiopian and US special forces killed Al Qaeda operatives Abu Talha al-Sudani and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in Somalia which alludes to Al Shabaab and Hizbul Islam having assisted Al Qaeda with a safe haven and training camps (Stevenson 2010:29). Al Shabaab's declaration of loyalty to Al Qaeda early in 2010 lead to the US response of assistance to the amount of 5 million US Dollars to assist the TFG against the possible jihad (Samatar 2010:313). As Al Shabaab's jihad can be seen to have the support of Pakistan's Tablighi Jamaat (TJ) whose history ties it to Muslim communities from Somalia to Chechnya. TJ does not get involved in any physical act of terrorism but plays an important role in the ideological battle ground of winning over citizens to subscribe to Al Qaeda's mindset (Ibrahim 2010:285).

The EU Training Mission for Somalia (EUTM), in cooperation with AMISOM in support of the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement was approved on 25 January 2010 by the EU Council to set up a military mission to contribute to training of Somali security forces which was released by an activation order on 7 April 2010 (EU 2011). The EU commenced training of 2000 TFG troops in Uganda in May 2010 after France trained 500 troops in Djibouti in December 2009 (International Crisis Group 2010:16). The training is well coordinated with specialised skills provided by Ireland (infantry), Germany (communications), Portugal (urban warfare) and France (specialised training for a 12-member team). The US has furthermore assisted the training through financial assistance and logistical support (International Crisis Group 2011:15). This mission would seem to be humanitarian in nature in order to secure peace to Somalia through security forces, yet unfortunately these efforts pale in comparison to the EU's mission against piracy European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia (operation "Atlanta") which will be discussed briefly.

The UNDP furthermore assists in training and paying for 10 000 police forces, yet these international efforts have not been rewarded with peace and stability in Somalia as corruption is *en mode* with soldiers not being paid or defecting (International Crisis Group 2010:16).

Ibrahim (2010:292) states in no uncertain terms that Al Shabaab requires pragmatism to transform itself into a political party and to put the needs of the Somali population first if a certain implosion is to be prevented. The long term success of Al Shabaab is furthermore

questioned by more nationalistic than Islamist notions (Stevenson 2010:35). March 2010 furthermore had globally recognised Muslim scholars assembled by the Global Centre of Renewal and Guidance (GCRG) in Dubai to issue a comprehensive religious declaration categorically denouncing terrorism in Somalia (Ibrahim 2010:291). The talk shop international response to Somalia has not hailed great success in Somalia, actions and gains on the ground and implementation proved more powerful as in the case of ASWJ.

The ASWJ received support from Ethiopia in order to create a buffer to Al Shabaab. The ASWJ-TFG merger was officialised through a power-sharing agreement signed on 15 March 2010, largely endorsed by Ethiopia and the international community, yet not all ASWJ members recognised the deal (International Crisis Group 2010:14). The ASWJ has made large strides since then which will be elaborated on briefly.

Sharif is described as a figurehead with a lack of vision has caused the strength of a moderate Islamic voice to be wasted in a time where the extremist agenda was losing its popular support. The weak leadership has furthermore dissipated into corruption. Transparency International ranks Somalia 178th on its corruption perception index. Large businesses do not pay tax to the state but do pay *'non-statutory fees to senior TFG officials'* in order to obtain signatures for international business deals and government support. TFG official travels to western states furthermore accumulates to governance losing to corruption to the sum of 400 000 US Dollars for a one week tour. The accountability to the donor countries' taxpayer has led to the US and UK demanding action (International Crisis Group 2011:12-13). Calls of '*too many short-lived transitional governments'* resulted in a self-proclaimed extension in 2011, which was harshly judged by the international community as unilateral and unrepresentative. The reduction of the cabinet to 18 members furthermore received mixed responses, particularly accusations of sidestepping the 4,5 rule (International Crisis Group 2011:14). The final extension of the TFG in June 2011 will be discussed in Chapter 5, considering the dire humanitarian crisis Somalia faced in 2011 as well the international response to it.

The four main opposition groups to the TFG are Al Shabaab, Hizbul Islam, Rass Kaambooni and Anoole/al-Furqaan who still derive their militia-men and support according to clan and sub-clan affiliations (Hesse 2010a:254). The dynamics of allegiances between these groups are interest driven towards their common enemy the TFG who in return has no influence over the militia (Hesse 2010a:255). Eritrea's support to these TFG opposition groups resulted in

sanctions imposed by the UN SC in December 2009 (International Crisis Group 2010:16). See below maps illustrating areas of control and clan relations in Somalia



Fig 4.1 Clan relations geographic illustration (Source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17674996)



Map of south and central Somalia including estimated boundaries of local administrations

Figure 4.2 Map of south and central Somalia including estimated boundaries of local administrations Source:
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0811webwcover.pdf

http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.aspx?ID=1065966718

Al Shabaab started focusing on tracking down warlords that assisted Western counter-terrorism efforts as well as attacking international aid workers and peace activists. The recruitment for fighters reaches as far as Somali diaspora in North America, Europe and

Australia (Stevenson 2010:29). The international response therefore needs to consider a response that protects their citizens acting as aid workers and in a preventative way where the recruitment of Somali diaspora is concerned.

4.6 Somali diaspora and local political power play: from remittance to foreign Al Shabaab fighters

More than one million Somalis live outside Somalia with large contingencies of the Somali diaspora in African countries of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti; Middle Eastern countries of Yemen and UAE as well as smaller contingencies in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. In the EU, the UK hosts the most Somalis, whereas the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland also have a significant segment of the diaspora. The cities of Minneapolis in the US and Toronto in Canada have the largest Somali communities in North America (Hesse 2010a:248-249). See Figure below as Illustration of Somali diaspora.



Figure 4.3 Illustration of Somali Diaspora

The Somali diaspora's importance cannot be underestimated with remittances estimated between 700 million US Dollars to 1 billion US Dollars per annum (Stevenson 2010:28). Hesse (2010a:249) states that these funds are not in 'support of Somalia per se' but family and clan members, which is where true Somali loyalty lies. Samatar (2010:320-321) explains the importance of the 'segmentary lineage system' by paraphrasing an Arab Bedouin saying:

My uterine brother and I against my half brother, my brother and I against my father, my father's household against my uncle's household, our two households (my father's and uncle's) against the rest of the immediate kin, the immediate kin against non immediate members of my clan, my clan against others and, finally, my nation and I against the world.

The conclusion that can be made from the quoted saying is that ethnic allegiance outweighs even religion. Samatar (2010:321) further illustrates this point by referring to the Islamic groups competing for power from ASWJ, who is backed by Ethiopia, Hizbul-Islam and Al Shabaab all grouped together along clan lines. Authority is therefore related with the clans and not with any 'government' (Hesse 2010a:251). Fragmentation in Islamic groups is common, mainly along clan lines but reiterated by both ideological differences and income driven decisions (Kaplan 2010:87). Roque (2009:78) states that alliances are created and dispersed in the name of convenience and benefit although these groups have antagonistic interests.

It has been proposed that remittances are channelled into focused ground-level community-development programmes including micro credit schemes in order to create economic opportunities that would be lucrative to the youth and creating alternatives to piracy and Al Shabaab (Bronwyn Bruton cited by Stevenson 2010:35 as well as Hesse 2010b:349).

The increase in Islamic militancy coupled with piracy has captivated the European and American diplomatic communities. The fact that regional actors have used the fears of the international community has been indicated in the Eritrean and Ethiopian actions with various groups in Somalia. The former strategic imperative overshadowed humanitarian need as October 2009 exemplified with the US suspending Food Aid to Somalia in fear of it being rerouted to terrorists (Stevenson 2010:36). Chapter 5 will analyse the humanitarian responses which are underlined with strategic interests that directly affect the international response to Somalia. The extent of the international response to piracy will be elaborated on next.

4.7 Visible international responses to Somalia's state failure through Anti Piracy

In June 2009, President Farole was quoted by the BBC stating: '*From the international point of view, piracy may be considered the number1 issue. But from our point of view, it is a tiny part of the whole Somali problem −a phenomenon prompted by the collapse for the Somali state*' (Hesse 2010b:359). Scholar Theo Neethling indicates that piracy in Africa highlights

the significant roles that non-state actors play in national, regional and global issues and that its origin is in the lack of governance within states as primary actors (Neethling 2010:89).

The radical increase in attacks is exemplified in the 111 attacks in total in 2008 with 178 in October 2009 alone (Stevenson 2010:30). The increase is illustrated in figure below.



Figure 4.4 The increase in Somali Piracy

The increase in Somali piracy is seen as a threat to international security as the attacks take place against commercial ships transporting cargo including oil, food and weapons in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. The international response to piracy has been significant and is visible in the US Central Command patrolling the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean with coordinated efforts with NATO's Operation Open Shield, the EU's Operation Atlanta as well as navies of China, India, Japan, Malaysia, Turkey and Russia (Stevenson 2010:30).

The strategic importance of the Gulf of Aden lies in over 23 000 vessels passing through the area amounting to approximately seven percent of the globe's maritime transport. Additionally, a third of the world's oil is carried through this gateway. Interestingly, it is exactly this area that has been targeted by pirates since 2008 (Baniela 2010:193). The economic element behind piracy cannot be overlooked as an estimated 82 million US Dollars was recorded in ransom for 2009 (UN Security Council Somalia Monitoring Group 2010:35-

36). The implications for international trade are seen in the rise of insurance premiums as well as rerouting options which adds between ten and fourteen days in transit time, not to mention crews requesting higher wages in the form of danger pay (Neethling 2010:94-96). Stevenson (2010:31) further indicates that the private sector has been mainly relied on for protection and the only real response to piracy would be addressing the security malaise on the land. The possibility of cooperation between pirates and Islamic extremists is not far-fetched, considering the cooperation between elders and pirates. The high incidents rate of piracy from Puntland illustrates that piracy does not need a non-functioning government to succeed, but a corruptible one.

According to Ibrahim (2010:290) the relationship between pirates and Al Shabaab is of a business nature and symbiotic to a certain extent. Most pirates are Darod clan members, from central and northern Somalia, opposing Al Shabaab being greatly represented by Hawiyeh clan, mainly based in Mogadishu and Southern Somalia. The symbiotic nature of these two opposing groups in Somalia is seen through Al Shabaab's control of ports that the pirates use. The pirates pay for the use of the ports either in monetary value or in weapons. Al Shabaab furthermore uses the weapons to ensure protection while the pirates obtain ransom from captured crews and ships. Yemen is also implicated in providing weapons to the pirates.

Somali piracy is seen as a form of maritime kidnapping (Baniela 2010:198). The wealth of the pirate elite has grown to such measures that a "Pirate CEO" offered to assist Haitian earthquake victims in 2010 (Samatar 2010:318). For the desperate Somali citizen with an estimated annual per capita income of 650 US Dollars, a single pirate attack can earn as much as 10 000 US Dollars. The desperation on land therefore proves to have spill-over effects at sea which affects the region as Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique have lost more than a billion US dollars, not to mention the losses caused by tourism declining due to the risk of piracy (Neethling 2010:96). A working paper by the One Earth Future Foundation "*The Economic Cost of Somali Piracy 2011*" indicates that Somali piracy had an impact on Kenyan trade with reduced profit margin in key export items due to a lengthier transport of goods; the tourism industry which accounts for 12% of its GDP has faced estimated losses between 129 million US Dollars and 795 million US Dollars in 2011. Finally the humanitarian impact of piracy is felt as the World Food Program vessels that deliver humanitarian assistance are also at risk and the humanitarian organisations are based in Nairobi due to the danger within Somalia itself. If the humanitarian assistance and its foreign capital withdraws from Kenya

due to dangers of piracy in Somalia. Kenya's economy will suffer largely, as indicated by 70% of the 15 000 Americans in Kenya work in the humanitarian sector (Bowden and Basnet 2012:32-34). These strategic risks prove the overlap in humanitarian motives for the international response to state failure. The strong steps of military involvement Kenya took in 2011 will be elaborated in Chapter 5.

The Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NBIR) published a report entitled 'Piracy and the Greater Gulf of Aden: Myths, Misconceptions and Remedies'. This report was sponsored by the Ministry of Defence of Norway, as one of the least failed states on the 2011 FSI, Norway's conclusions on piracy are interesting. The fact that no single solution exists to the piracy problem is highlighted as well as the decentralised nature of piracy. Piracy is not purely ascribed to the absence of the state but more so due to the lack or decline of local institutions within the state. The building block approach, creating local institutions from the bottom up is once more sited as the most realistic approach to limit piracy and not total reliance on international intervention or support (Hansen 2009: 62-63). Interestingly, piracy was almost non-existent during the reign of the UIC, which clearly indicates the extent of their control for the six month period in 2006 (Baniela 2010:196). This shows the links between the presence of governance versus the decline in piracy.

In April 2009, the EU envisioned training 500 Somalis in Djibouti with its French and US military presence. These 500 Somalis would return to Somalia with the purpose to train 5000 more to serve as a coast guard which would cooperate with the 15 000 EU trained Somali Security apparatus on the land. Although the German government supported the initiative, concerns were raised regarding EU funds and weapons reaching the pirates instead of being used to stop them (Stevenson 201:35). The strong international response of the Counter-Piracy Organisation amounted to 21,3 million US Dollars in 2011 (Bowden and Basnet 2012:27). This amount of support will be placed in perspective when analysing what humanitarian assistance was provided in 2011, in Chapter 5.

4.8 Conclusion

The power political motives for the international response were clearly illustrated through the anti-terror motives, the regional security complex that exists with its intricate local, regional and international alignments with the TNG, UIC, TFG and Al Shabaab. This proves that the region addressed the spill-over effects of failure in Somalia. Yet, the overwhelming

international maritime response against piracy can be seen as power politics with economic implications overshadowing peace. The internal clan dynamics proved once again problematic for the international community to deal with and the importance of these intrinsic Somali issues, that in many cases the Somali nation themselves would need to solve. As the humanitarian issues become more and more pressing in Somalia with natural disasters and Al Shabaab extremism, the question that remains to be answered is does the international response in Somalia have any humanitarian motives? The over-arching power politics will be kept in mind as the humanitarian efforts are analysed.

Chapter 5

Responding to State Failure: State-building humanitarian initiatives

5.1 Introduction

State building has emerged as one of the major international responses to state failure. This chapter builds on the preceding chapter by examining the various international actors' initial response to the case of Somalia. INGO's responses will be focused on, with clear security motives allocated to the majority of other international actors and their involvement in Somalia. The overlap of security and humanitarian responses will not be neglected, especially pertaining to the famine Somalia experienced in 2011. Ironically a major motive of the international responses is to avoid a humanitarian crisis. Prevention is better than cure but in the case of Somalia with over 20 years of statelessness and an even longer period of political turmoil, prevention has been seen as too little too late and the panacea ever more evasive**.** The TFG's mandate will not be extended again after August 2012. Lastly the various international responses to facilitate the TFG in its final leg will be analysed as no formal election is envisioned for its successor. The selection process will be unpacked in detail as the Roadmap is discussed.

Firstly, the humanitarian crisis that exists in Somalia will be outlined. Secondly, the international response through its various actors will be analysed. Thirdly, the international response to the declared famine of 2011 will be analysed to tie together humanitarian and strategic objectives involved in the response to state failure. Although intervention with purely 'humanitarian' motives has not occurred in the past decade to the scale of the first years of state failure, the efforts of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance will be analysed. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), introduced in Chapter 2, will be evaluated from formation to implementation whilst, and in terms of whether it had an impact on Somalia. The extent to which nation building and improving governance have been a motive for international involvement further will be mapped out. The manner in which aid has been attributed and the relationship between donors and Somali's will be elaborated on, especially in light of the recent global financial crisis.

Samatar (2010:314) indicates that the international support to establish a police force of 10 000 with arms and logistical support whose training are facilitated in Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti is part of the greater international agenda to ensure a central functioning government in Somalia. The functionality of a central government in Somalia has been broken for two decades and 'fixing' Somalia is equated to a 'Fool's Errand'.

The international community has treated Somalia as a 'post-conflict' setting which it is evidently not. Aid programmes supporting rule of law and security sector reform therefore have little scope of succeeding (Menkhaus 2009:231). The focus on security, above all, has proven that rule of law does not follow in sequence in state building practices even though democratic governance is aimed at (Bendana 2012:2). The focus on state building instead of peace building is therefore flawed, as rebuilding institutions, where they are non-existent to begin with (Menkhaus 2003:411-412). Kaplan (2010:89) blames the international community due to its standardised approach to state building and repeated past failed behaviour. Pham (2009:86) calls the international peace processes in Somalia hubris since the notion of external involvement even with internal moderate support will not succeed. Bendana (2012:2) states "...He continues that the state itself becomes a primary resource and therefore part of the resource wars (Bendana 2012:2). The necessity of time and resources to have local partners achieve legitimacy from the grass roots up is provided as a possible solution in opposition to reinforcing the top down structure of the TFG financially, which has proved to be a bottomless pit. A former US ambassador who dealt with Somali issues reiterated the TFG's weakness since it '*is neither transitional, nor federal, nor a government'* (Pham 2009:86).

Pham (2010:88) underlines the importance of taxation which not only provides revenue but endorses greater unity between the state and stakeholders. Yet post-colonial Africa has not had a strong tax system in place, disengaging these states from its society. The fact that the TFG does not have a tax system or civil services in place and heavily relies on aid further elucidates the alienation of civil society by a menially internationally recognised attempt to governance. The fact that Somaliland has taxes in place, legitimises it to an extent but does not warrant international recognition.

Real politic in the form of the security motive overshadows a pure humanitarian response. Yet it is the humanitarian plight, that once again as it did in the 1990s, is getting international attention. The fact that a famine had to be declared in order for the international response to

warm up again to the dilemma in Somalia, illustrates this through a sense of déjà vu with humanitarian crises and droughts experienced. The inaction or low reaction will be closely analysed as well as the turning point towards a tangible international response with the increase of AMISOM forces, Kenyan involvement as well as international conferences held in London and Istanbul in February and June 2012 respectively. This outline of important areas will be greatly elaborated on, as the chapter develops.

5.2 Humanitarian crisis existing in Somalia culminating in the 2011 Famine

A humanitarian crisis does not occur due to a single factor but a culmination of factors. Somalia's statelessness is a major contributing factor to the lack of basic services and shocking statistics illustrate the extent of the humanitarian crisis and how it climaxed in 2011 in a stateless environment confronted with drought and famine officially declared by the United Nations.

Chapter 4 illustrated the harsh power political motives and actions of the international response. In a world of real-politic soft power naturally stands back for hard power to take over. This chapter will therefore strive to achieve a more balanced look at the international response and to identify state building and other humanitarian assistance provided beyond the security and strategic realm of national interest. The research question regarding the international response to state failure and the need to underline any humanitarian motives will be covered in this chapter.

The following FSI indicators were used to show the severity of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia: Mounting Demographic Pressures; Massive Movement of Refugees and IDP's; Chronic and Sustained Human Flight; Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines; Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline; Progressive Deterioration of Public Services and Widespread Violation of Human Rights. The 2012 FSI released in June once again had Somalia as the number one failed state in the world, although strides have been made with increased AMISOM forces and Al Shabaab losing ground on a daily basis, the deadline of TFG mandate to end on 20 August 2012 deemed non-negotiation andgradual escalation of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia achieved significant international response after years of inaction. The humanitarian plight will now be analysed.

The continuous conflict in Somalia has displaced approximately 2 million people since 1991 (The Fund for Peace 2011:4). The role of the Somali diaspora through remittance contributions was explored in chapter 4 but will be further elaborated on in the final chapter as it is mostly highly educated Somalis that form part of the diaspora and have the potential to play a leading role in rebuilding the state. Oxfam (2012) states Somalia is currently experiencing its worst humanitarian crisis for decades, with more than 325 000 children suffering from acute malnutrition, and 31% of the total population estimated to be in crisis. The 2011 drought affected up to 10 million people in the Horn of Africa with six regions in Southern Somalia severely affected. This spill-over effects of refugee camps overflowing in Ethiopia and Kenya (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:4). The two FSI indicators of Mounting Demographic Pressures and Massive Movement of Refugees and IDP's scores remain high in 2012 at 9,8 and 10 respectively. These humanitarian effects of a natural disaster have urged a more concerted effort from the international community. The region itself had to deal with drought in their own backyards but due to the dire situation in Somalia the added strain of refugees needed to be dealt with the international community at large taking cognisance of Somalia after ignoring humanitarian front for years and more strategic areas considered as illustrated in Chapter 4. Somalia as number one failed state for the past five years with significant international response faltering and only picking up on a humanitarian and strategic level in 2011 as the TFGs mandate was extended for a final time.

The Centre for American Progress published a joint report with the One Earth Foundation in 2011 entitled "*Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting: The Cost of Failure in Somali*a". The statistics listed in monetary and human costs since 1991 are as follows: Humanitarian and development aid, 13 billion US dollars; Remittances, 11,2 billion US dollars; Peacekeeping, military responses, military aid, counter terror and diplomacy, 7,3 billion US dollars; Piracy 22 billion US dollars; and International crime and illicit financial flows 2 billion US dollars. Human costs tally to 450 000 to 1,5 million deaths; more than 800 000 refugees and more than 1,5 million internally displaced people (Norris & Bruton 2011:1). Interestingly, the remittance and humanitarian and development aid costs combined only topple the cost of piracy. The focus on strategic motives for involvement analysed in Chapter 4 is once again reinforced although the humanitarian motives cannot be disregarded completely. In 2010, 3,2 million Somali's needed humanitarian assistance and the drought of 2011 increased this figure to 3,7 million (Tran 2011). Averages of 3500 refugees flee Somalia daily which has spill-over effects on its neighbours. As discussed in Chapter 4, Ethiopia's intervention in

2006 was not welcomed by the Somali population and was used by Al Shabaab to gain support. Kenya hosted most NGO's involved in Somalia until recently and has the largest number of Somali refugees. Kenya did not respond directly in Somalia for many years but October 2011 changed that significantly. Ethiopia too returned formally to Somalia in 2011 after their troops' departure in 2009. The more the humanitarian plight is attempted to be analysed the greater strategic motives are omnipresent. The interplay between humanitarian and security motives for the international response can be seen through interactions with Al Shabaab, Piracy and countries within the region including Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti's restive Somali population.

Humanitarian aid towards state building has not achieved much as two decades of continued state failure proves. The multiple peace processes which have failed since 1991 with various approaches to state failure did not have a lasting effect in Somalia. The latest of these rounds will be analysed in detail to establish if the drought of 2011 and the increased international response to the continued state failure in Somalia will achieve what the past two decades have deemed impossible, to go beyond a transitional government in Somalia and to achieve peace with a legitimate government that has authority and sovereignty. How the international response dealt with its responsibility to protect will be analysed.

5.2.1 Al Shabaab and humanitarian aid

The various aspects of obstruction of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, the number one failed state, in various indexes as illustrated, renders it to be the most difficult for aid workers with kidnappings and murders occurring continuously, yet simultaneously the number one spot where aid is needed. The so-called "cost of doing business" in Somalia with "protection" fees are the norm. Al Shabaab declared that aid agencies were unwelcome with offices raided and UN vehicles used as carriers for suicide bombs in 2010 (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 2010:59). NGO's were charged a protection fee. The largest humanitarian agency operating in Somalia is the WFP is not exempted from the "cost of doing business in Somalia. Especially with 60 per cent of total UN assistance budget in 2009, consequently transportation contracts are a great source of revenue in Somalia with the assistance budget of 485 million dollars (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 2010:60). The problematic factor that 80 per cent of these contracts allegedly went to three contractors provided plenty opportunities for diversion along the supply chain, as protected warehouses close to Somali

food markets proved (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 2010:60). The WFP disputed the figures stated in the damaging allegations by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and indicated that the three contractors named in the report are no longer used (Tran 2011). The 2011 UN Monitoring Group Report indicated that further clarification was awaited by the WFP. The 2012 report has not been officially published to date. The leaked 2012 report's content will be considered when the feasibility of the roadmap to reach its 20 August 2012 deadline will be discussed at the conclusion of this chapter.

The divergence of aid is furthermore seen as access to certain camps is controlled by armed groups who supervise food distribution in order to take credit for it, and even have their combatants registered as IDP's to receive additional rations (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia 2010:61).

Prior to famine being declared in Somalia and other areas in the Horn of Africa, Al Shabaab had a significant role in obstructing aid from reaching the Somali populations that needed it most. The year of 2010 started with the WFP withdrawing from several regions within Southern Somalia (Tran 2011). The temporary closure of offices in Wajid, Buuale, Garbahaarey, Afmadow, Jilib and Beletweyne due to threats, attacks and demands did not influence WFP work in Somaliland, Puntland, and parts of Mogadishu. Al Shabaab denied responsibility (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:59). Yet, the WFP lost 14 relief workers from 2008-2010 in Somalia (Francavilla 2012). The internal circumstances with the various factions and role-players in Somalia therefore had a domino effect on the few elements of assistance available to their plight, with increased violence and drought.

The decline in development assistance can be attributed to threats from Al Shabaab and feared violation of paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), United States Government Office of Foreign Assets Control regulations and other bilateral measures limiting their operations in Al Shabaab controlled areas. Finally, inadequate funding further hampered humanitarian assistance in Somalia (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:56). Yet there is a trade-off between security between security and humanitarian considerations which will be analysed.

Humanitarian assistance started having problems by mid-2010 with Al Shabaab as productive dialogue and well-established relationships with elders and Al Shabaab leaders shifted with

Al Shabaab shura being restructured beyond the cities of Mogadishu, Kismaayo and Baidoa and *zakaat* or "humanitarian coordinators" put in place to control humanitarian assistance. Enforced *zakaat* contributions were common as well as fines for "un-Islamic behaviour". These fines which were supposedly towards drought relief but no proof exists to indicate that it ever reached the people most in need. The exodus from Al Shabaab controlled areas and ever increasing number of IDP's further proves this. (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:58). At the end of July 2011, there were around 1,46 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), 6,900 asylum-seekers and 1,965 refugees in Somalia (UNHCR 2012). The overflow in neighbouring countries accounted to 725,000 in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:58). The influx of refugees definitely had an impact on the regional response to the state failure. The "state within a state" phenomenon is again visible as Puntland forcibly returned IDPs who crossed their border. Puntland's official response stated that these were not "*genuine internally displaced persons*", but "*economic migrants*" or "*security risks*" (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:64).

International aid organisations were also influenced by the *shura*'s directives issued required taxes of as much as $90,000 per six-month period per district per organization which is illustrated through reported Al Shabaab's taxation to be as follows:

- *$10,000 as an initial fee*
- *$10,000 for a one-time registration fee*
- *$6,000 every six months thereafter*
- *20 per cent of the value of supplies transported through Al Shabaab-held areas*
- *10 per cent duty on all vehicles* (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:61).

The extortion was not only conducted by Al Shabaab in 2010 but allegedly by TFG-affiliated militia manning roadblocks and checkpoints too. Somaliland contrarily had very few obstacles for humanitarian assistance to reach its needy population (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:64).

Horn Relief, Mercy Corps, Famine Ealry Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), World Vision, Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and Diakonia were humanitarian organisations that were subjected to Al Shabaab raids and expulsions in Kismaayo, the Shabelles, Hiraan and the Jubas during August and September 2010. The raids were due to

accusations of western affiliations including US funding as well as promoting Christianity (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:59). With humanitarian assistance facing so many difficulties to operate in Somalia, it is no wonder that a year later, the humanitarian crisis worsened as the drought, amongst other factors, lead to famine being declared. The hardest hit areas by famine were where Al Shabaab ruled and had few humanitarian organisations on the ground which included the Red Cross, multiple Islamic charities and a few Médecins sans Frontières workers as well as UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) contractors. The WFP's absence on the ground lead to staggering statistics during the beginning of the famine declared as a mere 20% of the 2.8 million southern Somalis in need were being reached (Perry 2011). From this perspective it could be deduced that Somalia with low levels of stability and security has hampered humanitarian assistance organisations to relocate to neighbouring countries. Therefore this situation has lead the international community to motivating to prioritise obtaining security prior to any long-term nation building efforts can be attempted (Graves & Udomsrirungruang 2012:12). This notion of security first will be elaborated on in the following section where the international response to famine and state failure will be elaborated on. Even though famine has humanitarian motives as obvious reasons for involvement, the security foundation lacking in this humanitarian crisis further underlines how many an organisation put safety first.

5.3 International response to escalated humanitarian crisis in Somalia 2011 Famine and beyond

20 July 2011 marked the date that famine was officially declared in Bakool and Lower Shabelle regions in Southern Somalia by the United Nations. This officially put Somalia back in the forefront of the international arena, demanding attention, as other regions were added in August 2011. The fact that famine warnings were issued nine months in advance and the international response did not heed until the humanitarian crisis reached famine proportions (Moseley 2012:17). Strategically this can be seen as an attempt to starve out Al Shabaab fighters and consequently weakening it. The UN's declaration was late as Europe and the US were focusing on their debt crises and by late August 2011 the UN had a mere 58 per cent of the 2.58 billion US dollars it required (Perry 2011). Staggering famine statistics of 63 per cent of the region's population at the brink of starvation, with 170 000 Somali children with severe acute malnutrition and 29,000 had already died by September 2011 were recorded. No

official figures for the famine in Somalia have been released to date by the United Nations but Iffthikar Mohamed, country director for Islamic Relief estimates the mortality and malnutrition rates double of the estimates captured above (Perry 2011).

The famine saw a rise of international interest globally, regionally and an intensified effort from the NGO side. These humanitarian motives weighed more heavily with "famine" in the headlines. The severe humanitarian situation that existed for decades in Somalia with little governance or effective state building initiatives to better it at its cause instead of the symptoms need to be considered when the renewed humanitarian motives for an international response to state failure is considered.

5.3.1 International Response: Developed and developing nations' response to Somali state failure

The US, as the "*largest government donor in Somalia since 2001*", has made a dent in the existinghumanitarian crisis by USAID providing approximately 362 million US Dollars in humanitarian and development assistance through USAID and State Department. The former has fed 94% malnourished children in Southern Somalia and vaccinated 1.2 million children. A further 1.9 million have access to sustainable water and another 1.1 million benefited from improved facilities, thanks to USAID efforts. Unfortunately, according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the limitations of humanitarian efforts in Somalia indicate that the international response has not been adequate regarding inlong-term funding, but has focused on the short-term interventions. Malnutrition rates in some parts of Somalia are still above emergency threshold which indicates that food aid can only be utilised to a certain point. It is inevitable that investments are in the areas of institution building and employment opportunities which will have long-term effects to a less failed Somalia (Udomsrirungruang and Valladares 2012:18-19). As the biggest donor, the US can also be seen to have obstructed humanitarian assistance through the Patriot Act, which was passed in 2001 in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Subsequently any material benefits, even unknowingly, to a designated terrorist group, could lead to dire consequences. Al Shabaab is one of these designated terrorist groups, as their association with Al Qaeda illustrated in Chapter 4. The impact on humanitarian assistance was visible through their inaction in Al Shabaab dominated areas, since an accusation of helping terrorists held a great reputational risk (Atarah 2012). The US, leading by example, withheld approximately 50 million dollars in food aid from Al Shabaab

territories (Perry 2011). This risk, combined with Al Shabaab obstructing aid, once again left the humanitarian crisis unattended to. The adverse paradox is described by Ken Menkhaus as: *"suspension of food aid into southern Somalia was the only thing that the U.S. government and Al-Shabaab could agree on, to the detriment of (millions) of Somalis"*. Sadly the US could have easily issued a waiver, safeguarding humanitarian organisations from counter-terrorism laws, as cases for humanitarian assistance in southern Lebanon and the West Bank territories during Hezbollah and Hamas operations, respectively. This situation can be summarised as "*politicisation of aid in Somalia*" resulting in humanitarian agenda playing second fiddle to the political agenda (Atarah 2012). Yet it is not only aid being politicised but local politics being advanced through the humanitarian crisis as the 2011 TFG Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali indicates. Internal politics was advanced through the famine since it "*is an opportunity to expand our reach*," and Commander General Yusuf Mohammed Siad says, "*We cannot take food to where they are. They have nothing, they cannot fight, and what we need to do now is clear them out*." (Perry 2011). The famine to a certain extent played into the TFG's favour and forced Al Shabaab to change its tactics. The political developments will be analysed to establish whether any longer term nation building initiatives can be identified with a humanitarian response in conclusion to this chapter. Firstly, however, an Islamic brotherly relationship between Somalia and Turkey will be analysed.

The Turkish response in the past few years has promoted longer term support. The arrangement of the meeting of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) on 17 August 2011 with the intentions to support Somalia's famine brought together 40 member states of the OIC who pledged to donate 350 million dollars to Somalia in humanitarian aid. This first initiative was promptly followed by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan visiting Mogadishu two days after the meeting on 19 August 2011, joined by his wife, children, businessmen and artists, briefly after Al Shabaab left the capital with security risks still abundant. This visit was not only important on a symbolic level as it was the first state visit to Somalia by a non-African leader but furthermore focused global attention on the need for increased humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Turkey succeeded in defying the Somali mistrust regarding foreign influence in the country by achieving the unique position of a *"reliable fellow Muslim nation that can create global awareness about Somalia's plight"*. This image is visible through the reopening of the Turkish embassy in Mogadishu and

various infrastructure projects including roads, hospitals, water systems, education and waste disposal (Mesfin 2012).

The Turkish response seemed unopposed until 4 October 2011 when 70 Somali's died in a terrorist blast. These victims were queuing for Turkish university scholarships. This setback did not deter the Turkish foreign policy objective of soft power evolving into a major economic and political player in Africa. Their observer status in the AU and goal to have 33 embassies in Africa by 2012 indeed bore fruit in 2009 with the 54 African members of the UN General Assembly aiding it to win a seat as a non-permanent member on the UN Security Council and its sights are set to repeat this feat in 2015. Yet Turkey's role as other emerging economies could be traced back to Africa's untapped natural resources which could aid Turkish industries as well as the rapidly growing African market (Mesfin 2012). Turkey can also be seen as attempting to be a counterweight to Iranian influence in the Horn of Africa and specifically Somalia. The second conference hosted by Turkey regarding Somalia in June 2012 will be discussed in the final section of this chapter.

5.3.2 NGO's

The catastrophe in Somalia dumbfounded many an aid agency as their role to prevent situations to escalate to crises *"We are still trying to work out how we ended up here, what we missed, what we did wrong,"* stated Peter Harris, senior nutrition manager at UNICEF (Perry 2011). In the first two months many false successes were also claimed as the WFP proclaimed on Twitter *"Airlifts launched to bring enough high-energy biscuits to Horn of Africa to feed 1.6 million people."* Yet it was later clarified that these biscuits would only feed 1.6 million people for one day and that the "airlifts" were from Nairobi to Mombasa, Kenya, not Mogadishu. Oxfam is also guilty by claiming successes of "*now reaching 880,000 people in Somalia.*" on 10 August 2010 whereas it was unfortunately an estimate including all Oxfam-funded beneficiaries including latrines, water projects and aid vouchers outside the famine. This left the Mogadishu Mayor Mahamud Nur questioning the actual assistance on the ground at the height of the crisis: "*The aid groups say they're here, but where? It's complete rubbish! Children are dying!"* (Perry 2011). As time passed the humanitarian assistance did reach the neediest, which was also facilitated by the withdrawal of Al Shabaab from Mogadishu in August 2011. Al Shabaab's withdrawal will be analysed when the most recent political developments are discussed in the final section of this chapter.

July 2012 signified one year after famine was declared in Somalia and the humanitarian crisis still seem far from over. Humanitarian NGOs and UN agencies are once again pleading for additional funding to the sum of $576 million to assist Somalia during the second half of 2012. OCHA appealed for $1,16 billion in total for the year of which 50% has been received. The circumstances once again are dire with "*2.51 million people in urgent need of aid and a further 1.29 million at risk of sliding back into crisis*" according to Mark Bowden, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (UNHCR & Gargale 2012). The urgency of not regressing is voiced by Semaot Gebregziabler, Somalia country director Oxfam, "*In 2011 the world didn't act until famine was declared, and the delay cost lives and money. Now, with the warning signs of a worsening crisis, lessons from last year must be learnt. Now is the time to invest in aid*" (Straziuso 2012).

South African NGO, Gift of the Givers (GOTG), got involved in Somalia on 18 July 2011 and has since then chartered 11 flights with approximately 175 tons of supplies and 2460 tons of aid in 132 containers on ships. Four hospitals also received medical support which totalled R80 million, since their involvement. GOTG is currently the largest NGO operational in Mogadishu with Iranian and Turkish Red Cresent ranking second and third largest respectively. GOTG efficiency on the ground in Mogadishu can be ascribed to good relations with the TFG and elders from various clans. The situation in Mogadishu with Al Shabaab's withdrawal on 19 August 2011 has increased the number of IDPs in the capital. With global financial circumstances uncertain, it is important to understand who is supporting the NGOs like GOTG, "*We thank all South Africans for their generous support of the Somalia project which is a shining example of Africans supporting Africa. The gratitude extends to the South African Government, media (local and international), corporates, professionals, family businesses, schools, religious institutions, sports groups, students, pensioners and everyone in between. A special thanks to the numerous international donors and especially Magnus from Mary's Meals in Scotland who contributed USD 660 000 towards nutrition"* (GOTG 2012). This NGO has proved that humanitarian motives and results are possible in a failed state like Somalia, but unfortunately, once again, the symptoms of state failure, in this case 'famine' are treated, and the crucial cause of failure remains brewing with more hunger and devastation in its wake.

Oxfam published: *A Shift in Focus: Putting the interests of Somali people first* prior to the London conference on Somalia in February 2012. Kemp and Murphy, Oxfam policy

advisors, compiled the report and importantly noted that although the responsibility for the situation in Somalia is fundamentally with Somali warring factions, the international community has not been an innocent bystander as policies are focused primarily on security and not the needs of the people. The actions taken by the international community escalated tensions and lessened the ability for existing humanitarian assistance to reach the people in crisis. With increased regional involvement militarily, the neutrality of NGOs could be jeopardised as the Somali paradigm of them being western proxies could be reinforced (Oxfam 2012).

Governance in its most basic form is still missing in swathes of Somalia, and the accusations of corruption against the TFG in the UN Monitoring Group report of 2012 on Somalia does not bode well for any progress NGOs and the larger international role players have made on a humanitarian front. Multiple NGOs have been involved in Somalia, especially since the 2011 famine, and still play a critical role today but the underlying issue of state building as an answer to state failure does not get dealt with effectively, since the desperation on the ground overwhelms NGOs.

5.3.3 Regional response (Horn of Africa)

The drought hit the East African region as a whole but famine was declared in only six regions of Somalia. The regional response therefore needs to consider the country's response to Somalia, over and above dealing with drought circumstances in their own backyards. Requirements for famine to be declared are in cases *"when acute malnutrition rates among children exceed 30 per cent, more than two people per every 10,000 die per day, and people are not able to access food and other basic necessities"*, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (UN 2011).

Refugees from Somalia famine stricken regions made painstaking journeys to their neighbours to seek access to food and water. These basic needs were not always easy to meet due to the vast number of Somalis seeking refuge. The on-going conflict furthermore increased numbers in refugee camps in the Dollo Ado area of Ethiopia and the Dadaab refugee complex in Kenya. Ethiopian military forces also returned to Somalia in 2011, but with less publicity than 2006 and the much publicised Kenyan operation.

The UNHRC (2012) reported that in July 2011 67 per cent of refugees in Ethiopia were from Somalia. The past five years have seen six new refugee camps opening. New arrivals increased significantly in 2011 with as many as 23 000 people arriving monthly due to famine and insecurity experienced in Somalia. These people are assisted mainly through NGO's based in Ethiopia due to difficulties experienced within Somali borders with Al Shabaab, as discussed earlier in this chapter. In July 2012, a year after famine was declared in Somalia, Ethiopia hosted more than 156 000 Somali refugees. In total, approximately one million Somali's are living as refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Uganda with 1,4 million IDPs within Somalia. The refugees and IDPs combined total 25 per cent of the Somali population (Straziuso 2012). This does not include the Somali Diaspora, previously discussed in Chapter 4. Kenya's response will be discussed next as the Dadaab refugee camp with a population of 520,000, is known as Kenya's third largest city, without any future sustainability (Atarah:2012).

Nairobi is often referred to as Somalia's "*capital in exile*" and has become a base for Somali political and business leaders to travel to and from Somalia (Graves & Udomsrirungruang 2012:11). Kenya has had a non-interventionist foreign policy since independence in 1963, and consequently its armed forces had limited actions domestically or regionally (The Economist: 2011). Yet, mid-October 2011 had Kenyan troops cross the Somali border for the first time with the commencement of Operation Linda Nchi. Somalia has been Kenya's failed neighbour for decades, without any military action considered while Ethiopia's involvement rolled back and forth. The motives for Kenya's sudden involvement in 2011 and inception into AMISOM in June 2012 after not participating in AMISOM activities will be analysed (Njoka 2012).

The mission by the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) involvement in Operation Linda Chi can be attributed to four factors, namely: the terrorist threat; the refugee crisis; the Jubaland project; and the kidnappings in Lamu and Dadaad (International Crisis Group 2012:1-3). Interestingly, only one of the four factors is motivated at first impression by humanitarian motives, yet as the refugee crisis implications for Kenya are analysed, the humanitarian needs of the Somali refugees are once again very far removed from Operation Linda Chi.

The terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa is well known with US embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 as well as Paradise Hotel attack in Kenya in 2002, and most recently the Kampala bombings of July 2010. For the last attack mentioned Al Shabaab

took responsibility and indicated it as revenge for the Ugandan troop contribution to AMISOM (International Crisis Group 2012:1). More recent attacks in Kenya can be seen as retaliation to Kenya intervening in Somalia and now forming part of AMISOM.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) country operations profile for Kenya, it hosts 500 000 Somali refugees (UNHCR 2012). The toll of these refugees on Kenya can be seen through the Dadaab refugee camps which are the third largest settlement in Kenya. The Somali refugees alongside the 2.9 million indigenous Somali population in Kenya have caused an anti-Somali sentiment. The corruption with Kenyan official documentation further problematises distinguishing between the refugees and ethnic Somalis who are Kenyan. Eastleigh a neighbourhood in Nairobi, is said to have a population of 100 000 Somalis, of which has political implications as an ethnic Somali, Yusuf Hassan won the parliamentary seat in Eastleigh. The refugees cannot be sent back forcefully since Kenya is a signatory of the UN refugee convention. The Kenyan approach is that the military involvement in Somalia will create "safe zones" for the refugees to relocate to (International Crisis Group 2012:2).

Another form of safe zone is the Jubaland Project in southern Somalia with a local administration to create a buffer zone between Al Shabaab controlled territory and Kenya. The administration had 2500 militia men trained and was headed by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed "Gandhi" former TFG defence minister and newly anointed president of "Azania" (International Crisis Group 2012:2). Azania was officially established on 3 April 2011 as a semi-autonomous regional state of Somalia (Africa Research Bulletin 2011:19282). This is only one of numerous mini-states that have mushroomed in Somalia. These statelets overlap and their longevity and functioning under a central government is doubtful. For a full list of the illustration of "Balkanizing Somalia", see excerpt from the Africa Research Bulletin attached as Annex 3. The map below (Fig.5.1) furthermore illustrates the statelets.



Figure 5.1 Political Situation in Somalia with "statelets" indicated. Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series Volume 49, Issue 5, pages 19280B–19283C, June 2012

Kenyan involvement in Azania was aired through Wikileaks cable which also indicated Chinese funding and that the invasion was already planned in 2010, although, at the time Kenyan trained Somalis would have executed the plan (Boswell 2011).

The final reason for Kenyan intervention can be seen as the last straw and acceleration factor, namely the kidnappings in Lamu and Dadaad. The tourism industry in Kenya and the UN presence in Nairobi's importance cannot be denied and kidnappings in both sectors resulted in a Kenyan intervention without prior consultation with the TFG (International Crisis Group 2012:3).

4664 Kenyan forces officially joined AMISOM troops on 6 July 2012 which increased AMISOM troops to slightly over 17 000 and closer to the authorized strength of 17731 (Hasni 2012). The AMISOM troop strength was increased in February by UN resolution 2036 until 31 October 2012 (UN 2012). The full contingent should be reached as Sierra Leone troops join AMISOM (Hasni 2012). The success that AMISOM has experienced since Al Shabaab forces left Mogadishu in August 2011 will be elaborated on shortly. The humanitarian plight of Somalia was clearly not the reason for Operation Linda Chi or the integration in to AMISOM. Their involvement in Somalia has not come cheaply as the Church attacks in Garissa, Northern Kenya of 1 July 2012 proved with 17 dead and 40 injured to add to the other attacks launched on Kenya (Karongo 2012). The internal problematic elements of Islamic extremism go beyond Al Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil as the Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) illustrates.

The MYC formed in 2008 in Majengo area of Nairobi, led by the charismatic Ahmed Imam Ali, who voiced opinions against the social and economic hardships in the area (Shepard 2012). In 2011 the MYC was identified as one of the largest support groups of Al Shabaab in Kenya, and members have even been found in Somalia fighting alongside Al Shabaab (UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 2011:143). Relations between Al Shabaab and the MYC were officialised as well as MYC's relations with Al Qaeda East Africa early 2012 (Jocelyn & Roggio 2012). Matt Bryden, head of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, indicated that the threat the MYC poses has increased and that the merger with Al Shabaab is taken seriously as "*they are more actively surveying targets and planning operations in Kenya than they were a year ago*" and that there are"*more joint operations between Somalis and non-Somalis*." The international response to the MYC can be seen in President Barack Obama signing an executive order early in July that blacklisted three Kenyan businessmen, including Aboud Rogo Mohammed, an Islamic cleric the UN report identified as the MYC's ideologue (Shepard 2012). The MYC renamed itself as Al-Hijra in 2012 and continued support is seen through funds and terror plans with operational elements at the border to Somalia (defenceWeb 2012).

Kenya's strategic motives are stacked high, whereas little evidence of state building or other humanitarian involvement is evident. The NGO motives to state failure and famine within Somalia are more humanitarian, yet the question of how much the NGOs are reactionary and

reliant on governmental and individual contributions in order to function continues to be posed.

In this regard the recent developments from a governance perspective need to be addressed in order to place the motives for the international response to state failure in a humanitarian or strategic realm, or alternatively to achieve the golden mean of the international response as a combination of strategic and humanitarian causes. Before the recent developments are evaluated, the concept of R2P will be evaluated in the light of Somalia.

5.3.4 R2P utilised as and when it serves the International Community, which does not necessarily include Somalia

The shift from the "The Responsibility to Protect" to "The Right to Intervene" was not an elementary process as humanitarian intervention made its appearance long before the 1990s. Bernard Koucher, the cofounder of Medecins Sans Frontieres, brought new life to humanitarian intervention through the "Right to Intervene" slogan, in the post-Cold War world (Evans 2008:32). Evans (2008:33) elucidates that the term was easier to use than 'humanitarian invasion' in Somalia in 1992 but the fact that it was seen by the global South as interference re-established the one-sidedness of the term. Human Security bridged the gap between the North and South as the Human Development Report 1994 by the UNDP illustrated the shift from state security to the individual's security within the state (Evans 2008:34). Francis Deng's "Sovereignty as Responsibility" as well as Kofi Annan's notion of 'Individual Sovereignty' contributed to the formation of R2P since "*Humanitarian intervention posed a false choice between two extremes: either standing by in the face of mounting civilian deaths or deploying coercive military force to protect the vulnerable and threatened populations*"(United Nations 2009:6).

As indicated in Chapter 2 the following two paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit Outcome commits the International Community to R2P: (sections highlighted for emphasis)

"*138.* ***Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.*** *This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international*

community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to ***use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means****, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take* ***collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter,*** *including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national* ***authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations*** *from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping* ***States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity*** *and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out."*

The General Assembly adopted the Summit Outcome in its resolution 60/1. In paragraph 4 of its resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In the second pre-ambular paragraph of its resolution 1706 (2006) on the crisis in Darfur, the Council recalled its earlier reaffirmation of those provisions (UN 2009: 4-5). Yet, politicians and states use existing doctrines to suit their own national interests, and these instances of humanitarian support need to be analysed more critically.

R2P implementation is of key concern, and the UN *Implementing the responsibility to protect Report of the Secretary-General* points out the three pillars namely, Pillar one: The protection responsibilities of the State; Pillar two: International assistance and capacity-building; and Pillar three: Timely and decisive response for successful implementation of R2P.

The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) was created in February 2008 to catalyse action to move the 2005 World Summit agreement on the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity from principle into practice (GCR2P 2012).

Somalia however, through its failed status, does not have the ability to protect its own citizens, which places the onus on the international community. The question of whether the AMISOM with the UN mandate has fulfilled the R2P to a certain extent or if it has been too little too late furthermore needs to be answered. R2P as a global norm is more likely to work in a developing crisis before a state weakens to complete failure. Yet, in recent conflicts, namely, the uprisings of the Arab Spring, Libya and Syria have proven that R2P is far from being an accepted and well implemented global norm. In all these instances the UN and the international community have proven that decisive and collective action pledged is unattainable. Contributing factors that prove that R2P is far from being a global norm being interpreted in a predictable similar manner is the polarisation within regional organisations or varying views regarding the same conflict by different organisations, one-sided tendencies that could even resort to bullying within the UNSC as veto power renders it even less predictable. In other situations the political will or lack of self-interest is clearly reason for R2P not being enforced by the international community at large. These notions fall in the realm of realism that state sovereignty is at the foundation of the implementation of R2P (Aboagye 2012). This discourse proves that in the case of Somalia, humanitarian motives are definitely the last priority as the key strategic considerations remain essential. An overview of recent political and security developments will reinforce the notion that the international community is reactionary to state failure in Somalia as humanitarian crises are far from the primary motive to respond to state failure.

5.4 Key political and security developments 2011-2012

The current political situation with the TFG's mandate ending on 20 August 2012 will be elaborated on. The UN monitoring group on Somalia's 2012 report has corruption allegations against the TFG will be elaborated on in the final chapter. The resource constraints, infrastructural obstacles and political dissonance during the TFG's five year reign cannot be ignored. The importance of Somalis shaping their own political future remains key (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:4). The international response therefore needs to be supportive of Somali

initiatives to ensure that the bottom up strategy succeeds. The lack of good governance remains a frightening crack in the foundation of a less failed Somali state. The withdrawal of Al Shabaab, the Roadmap, Garowe Principles, London and Istanbul conferences and a final tally of which deadlines of the Roadmap have been achieved by the 20 August 2012 deadline, will be summarised in this final section of Chapter 5.

The humanitarian motives have been overshadowed by strategic motives but the golden mean of both motives will be illustrated as the current developments to end the TFG's mandate are put into place.

The round table on Somalia at the Arusha meeting of the African Development Bank in 2012 highlighted that Somalia is at a "turning point" regarding the political and security developments and the commitments made by the international community, yet, the fragility of the situation cannot be over emphasised (AfDB 2012).

5.4.1 Al Shabaab withdraws from Mogadishu

As the drought escalated to famine proportions, Al Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu on 6 August 2011. The increased international attention to Somalia lead to Al Shabaab being scrutinised from economic and environmental perspective, especially the charcoal export industry which supported Al Shabaab financially (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:4). The environmental impact is seen through trees being used to make charcoal and economically being exported to UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman, the financial gains of which sponsors Al Shabaab in many fronts (Solomon 2012:95). The international community's response is seen in UNSC resolution 2036 passed in February 2012 banning the import of Somali charcoal. The implementation of the ban within the states mentioned above has not been very effective to date (defenceWeb 2012).

Al Shabaab's weakness is not related to the TFGs strength but political infighting, unpopular policies and military pressures from AMISOM and other regional forces. Regional governance systems from community initiatives have formed more stability in certain areas which, once again, cannot be attributed to the TFG (Menkhaus 2012:9). Ironically, international popularity of Al Shabaab is at a high with foreign fighters joining the Islamic insurgency from the US, UK, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf region. Kenya's Al-Hijra, formerly known as MYC, discussed above in 3.3, is not the only regional support seen to Al

Shabaab. Tanzania has Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) that raises funds and recruits for Al Shabaab. Al Shabaab furthermore merged formally with Al Qaeda in February 2012 (defenceWeb 2012).

Al Shabaab has lost a lot of territory since withdrawing from Mogadishu but cannot be written off completely, as large parts of Southern Somalia are still under its control. A-symmetrical warfare or guerrilla attacks are ongoing practices by Al Shabaab and historically they have come back stronger after setbacks (Solomon 2012:94). Some of Al Shabaab forces are said to have moved into the mountainous areas in the north of the country close to the border areas of Puntland, Ethiopia and Soamliland. Strategically this area is known for long established smuggling routes from Yemen and these ties are important for supplies and finances (Mosley 2012:5). The culmination of the increased AMISOM forces, Kenyan advances in South Western Somalia prior to joining AMISOM forces and Ethiopian troops supporting Somali militia, is indicated in the map below of the July 2012 standing of various forces within Somalia.

Figure 5.2 Who runs Somalia Courtesy of BBC July 2012 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19001644

The port city of Kismayo was initially set as one of the major goals of Kenyan forces and remains a strategic position to gain for AMISOM and TFG forces from Al Shabaab (defenceWeb 2012). As to when Kismayo will fall, still remains to be seen, and the importance of military advances are noted to ensure security, but cannot be sustained without political advances to enable stability and lasting peace. The regional dynamics in finding "African solutions for African problems" will be analysed (Solomon 2012:95). Whether the Roadmap and Garowe principles are strong enough to end the TFG mandate into a recognised government across Somalia will now be discussed.

5.4.2 Roadmap and Garowe Principles

The Djibouti process outlined requirements of a new constitution, disarmament of militia groups and the resettlement of refugees and IDPs. 2011 proved problematic for the Djibouti process requirements, as few advances, if not more failures were achieved and resulted in the Kampala Accord being signed in Uganda. The Transitional parliament's term was extended by three more years and the TFG's term by one year to 20 August 2012. September 2011 brought an action plan or roadmap to ensure that mandated tasks were reached by the 20 August 2012 deadline by which point a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) would be in place (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:5). The main goals of the roadmap can be summarised as the finalisation of the draft constitution and the creation of the NCA (Mosley 2012:3). The table below illustrates the final timeline for the roadmap.

Table 5.1 Roadmap final timeline (Mosley 2012:3)

20 June 2012	List of NCA member finalised and vetted
30 June 2012	NCA members receive draft constituion
2 July 2012	NCA convened
10 July 2012	Provisional constitution adopted
15 July 2012	Finalised fully vetted list of MPs published
20 July 2012	New MPs sworn in
4 August 2012	New Speaker and Deputy Speakers elected by MPs
20 August 2012	New President elected by MPs

The roadmap has been deemed as the best chance to end transition benchmarks with deliverables of security, constitution, reconciliation and good governance. These tasks are a

tall order for the TFG to implement as good governance is the last thing that comes to mind with the corruption riddled internationally supported TFG (Otto 2012).

Two constitutional conferences were held in Garowe, Puntland which further agreed on principles for delivering transitional milestones before the TFG's mandate expires. The key national stakeholders involved in the development of these documents included ASWJ, Galmudug and Puntland administrations. The international support for Somaliland and Puntland to form part of a one-state solution is made clear especially by the US who developed a "dual-track" process concerning Somaliland (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:5-6). The "scorecard" for the roadmap will be concluding this chapter and will provide the final brick making up the concluding chapter's foundation. The international community strictly enforced the Roadmap and even issued a joint statement by the UN special representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, the IGAD representative and AU representative for Somalia on 1 May 2012 warning any opposition to the Roadmap will be treated as spoilers and warned them with sanctions (Mosley 2012:4).

The international responses to the roadmap in the form of the London and Istanbul conferences will further illustrate how the international community has increased interest in Somalia. Although their motives are seldom purely humanitarian, these conferences could be viewed as nation building initiatives or at least supporting the end of the ineffective TFG. Whether a good governance phoenix will rise out of more than two decades of state failure ashes remains the burning question on many lips.

5.4.3 London conference on Somalia

The international response to Somalia's changing dynamics is visible through the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012 (See Annex 4 for the full text of the Communiqué). The UK was the third biggest donor during the famine in 2011 and a leading contributor to AMISOM funds. The UK is involved in Somalia since British interests are at stake through Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab links, kidnappings of UK citizens and the impact of piracy and illegal migration, not neglecting the 250 000 Somali diaspora in the UK (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:7). The conference was well attended with over 40 heads of state including representatives from the TFG, US, UK, and Turkey. The aim of the conference was to achieve a "Somali consensus" for international cooperation after the transition period had ended in August 2012. (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:7). Healy (2012:4) aptly indicates that

measuring success at diplomatic occasions is difficult but the analogy of big family gatherings indicates that presence/representation is important, especially if key discrepancies do not occur during the gathering. In this case all the key players in Somali politics were present. Importantly, representatives from other Somali states and statelets namely Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug also attended. Somaliland needs to be highlighted since it has not attended international conferences on Somalia in the past. Somaliland used the conference to advocate a bottom-up process to achieve peace and stability in Somalia derived from lessons learnt in Somaliland with a combination of Islam and traditional conflict resolution techniques (Healy 2012:5).

The seven key areas were agreed upon: security, piracy, terrorism, humanitarian assistance, local stability, political process and international cooperation (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:7). In the following areas broad agreement was reached prior to the conference namely: humanitarian assistance, action against piracy and counter terrorism (Healy 2012:7). Menkhaus (2012:1) classifies the three pivotal issues of the meeting as firstly, broadening external consensus on general Somalia policy, especially involving new players like Turkey and Qatar as well as other Middle Eastern countries; secondly, establishing political principles for the end of transition in August 2012 and thirdly; increasing AMISOMs power and funding. The London Conference Communiqué (2012) indicates "*Decisions on Somalia's future rest with the Somali people*" with the unified coordinated international role as facilitators. This is easier said than done as Menkhaus (2012:3) indicates "*Both the process of selecting a constituent assembly and the actual quality of representation in that assembly must be seen as legitimate in the eyes of most Somalis. That should be the yardstick by which international support is measured in coming months, not the meeting of arbitrary deadlines".*

The importance of the London conference on Somalia can be summarised as the first step of a multilateral political process in Somalia. Although "nation building" has been attempted in Somalia in the past 20 years, stability is still high on the priority list (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:7). The key of security issues above humanitarian issues was evident through a humanitarian side-meeting held separately from the Conference and co-chaired by the UN and UAE. Military quick fixes are not sustainable for lasting stability in Somalia (Dennys 2012). The fact that military gains need to be balanced with political gains cannot be over emphasized (Healy 2012:10). The conference confirmed the greater international interest in Somalia, beyond IGAD. The emphasis on stability furthermore highlighted the importance of

transparent communication channels and designation of power between local and national government for the future to avoid disintegration and conflict. Within the security section AMISOM's role was central, which still played according to international security needs rather than Somali security needs (Healy 2012:13). This once again proves security first and prevention of state failure over flow at any cost. The second round of multilateral talks on Somalia was held in Istanbul to further edge on the successful ending of the transitional phase in Somalia (Chitiyo and Rader 2012:7).

5.4.4 The Second Istanbul Conference (Istanbul II Conference on Somalia)

Turkey would like to assert itself in a 'leadership' role in Somalia and the fact that the London conference preceded Istanbul II Conference on Somalia that took place from 31 May to 1 June 2012 with the theme: *Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015* can be deemed an embarrassment within certain circles. Ankara therefore could be seen to have limited connections within Mogadishu, namely the outgoing TFG, but also indicate that a consensus on the international response to Somalia is far from being reached (Marchal 2012:2). Healy's final comment on the London conference rings true: "*Events of the coming months will show whether the mustering of effort in London really did help to build a sense of common purpose or whether the many competing stakeholders just took from it what they wanted to hear"*(Healy 2012:13).

The Concept note for the conference indicated that the following actors were involved for preparation of Partnership Forums, the agenda and review projects namely: Turkey, UNPOS and the United Nations Country Team for Somalia, in partnership with relevant TFG Ministries, the World Bank, Somali civil society and private sector representatives as well as regional and international development actors such as the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, and the ILO. The areas of politics, security and recovery were main agenda items whilst aiming at building a broad-based consensus on Somalia after August 2012 and agreeing on a long term approach to State building and economic development, including an enabling environment for private sector investment in the post-transition period were further priorities to establish (AfDB 2012).

The final declaration of Istanbul II is attached (see Annex 5). Turkey's unique role in Somalia was indicated earlier in this chapter. The multiplicity of the conference can be observed

through high level representatives from 57 countries and 11 international and regional organisations with TFG leadership, regional administrations and Somali society including segments of youth, women, business community, elders, religious leaders and Somali Diaspora. The timelines in the roadmap were emphasised to have the constitution approved and a Federal Parliament elected with a Speaker and President of a new government by 20 August 2012. The political as well as security sectors were therefore identified as crucial to achieve the deadlines set with broader support than the existing partners in the National Security and Stabilisation plan than the EU, US and Italy (Istanbul II Communique 2012). The importance of Somali ownership was indicated by the Somali Prime Minister at the time, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, *"Somalia's future is in the hands of Somalia"* (Greste 2012). Stability and security were once again placed in the foreground, since the humanitarian crisis cannot be addressed without stability in place. The longer term plans to achieve state building in the areas of Economic Development and Recovery were also addressed.

5.4.5 Implementation of the Roadmap

The better fortunes Somalia is experiencing are "*despite, not because of, the eight-year existence of the TFG*" (Menkhaus 2012:9). Menkhaus (2012:9) continues that the TFG security forces are weak and full of infighting, and have shown little cooperation with local governance systems. The severity of famine proved that the TFG was more of a hindrance than a help with corruption allegations being common. Yet, despite this dismal performance international assistance efforts revolve around the TFG, this problematic notion steers away from a tangible result. The end of the TFG has come but the question of whether its replacement will be able to succeed where so many others have failed, will be introduced in conclusion of this chapter and analysed with the international response in the final chapter.

The new constitution needs to restore trust in the government. The 1 April 2012 deadline was missed for the new constitution to be approved, yet it was approved on 2 August 2012 amid failed suicide attacks. The constitution is futuristic and ticks all boxes for setting a great example, whether it would be able to be implemented has been described as "*living in a parallel universe*". The major constitutional points include: *A bill of rights, with everyone declared to be equal, regardless of clan or religion; Islam is the only religion of the state, and no other religion can be propagated in the country - however, this was also the case previously; Female genital mutilation - a widespread practice - is outlawed ; Citizens have the right to be educated up to secondary level ; A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is to*

be established ; Territorial disputes should be settled peacefully - Somalia has gone to war with both Kenya and Ethiopia over its claims to their Somali-inhabited regions ; Somalia will have a federal system - however the status of Mogadishu, the borders and distribution of power and resources between the regions are yet to be decided (Harper 2012). Yet female representatives were not assured their 30% of the seats in the lower chamber, as indicated in earlier drafts of the constitution.

The 11th hour rung true as parliamentarians were elected and vetted on 18 August 2012 by a Technical Selection Committee after elders nominated them. The 275 parliamentarians of the lower house and the upper house of 54 members, who have not yet been elected at the time of writing, are tasked to elect a president, speaker and two deputy speakers. The checks and balances enforced by the Technical Selection Committee include that legislators need to be *Somali citizens of sound mind, have a high school education completed and be free of ties to warlords or links to atrocities committed during the country's civil war*. For most Somali politicians that is a very tall order and the Committee has received death threats as some names were rejected (Aljazeera 2012). The international response to the new government and president will be analysed in the final chapter. The final chapter will not merely reiterate the power political nature to the international response to state failure in Somalia, but, will analyse the way forward as the TFG mandate expired on 20 August 2012.

Chapter 6

Conclusion and recommendations regarding the international response to state failure in Somalia

6.1 Introduction

20 August 2012 came and went and so did the TFG mandate. The roadmap to end the transitional government's mandate was partially met with a new constitution adopted and a new parliament elected by 20 August 2012. The speaker and president were not elected prior to the TFG mandate ending. The end of Somalia's state failure should not be celebrated prematurely. The relative rebirth that has occurred in Mogadishu in 2012 has been reported on widely, as has the increased international response to Somalia in general. The presidential election of 10 September 2012 put President Hassan Sheikh Omar at the helm of Somalia's latest attempt at establishing a government, namely the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) (Solomon & Meleagrou-Hitchens 2012:7). The question of whether all these developments have made a change to Somalia's failed status and what impact the international response has had to it will be concluded with.

The preceding chapters lead up to this concluding evaluation in which the international response is assessed from the State Building Humanitarian Motive for intervention, as well as from the Power Political Security Motive. Recommendations as to how international involvement can be used to benefit Somalia will be made. Current developments will be incorporated with trends that have been identified throughout the research. The scenario in which Somalia finds itself will be critically analysed to conclude the study of the multifaceted international response to state failure.

6.2 End of Transitional Period

6.2.1 End of TFG and the beginning of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA)

The TFG mandate officially ended on 20 August 2012 with a new parliament being elected. This however does not comply with all the requirements set out in the roadmap as the speaker

Mohamed Osman Jawari was only elected on 28 August 2012 (SAPA 2012). The election of President Hassan Sheikh Omar on 10 September 2012 can furthermore be seen as the final element to the Roadmap, to have the NCA formally in place. The NCA needs to break most of the corrupt foundations that the TFG provided, not to mention the decades of attempts at breaking the failed state cycle that Somalia has been stuck in. Before the NCA will be further elaborated on, the UN Somalia Monitoring Group's findings of large scale corruption in the 2012 report will be outlined.

As one former TFG said: "*Nothing gets done in this government without someone asking the question 'Maxaa igu jiraa?'('What's in it for me?')"*(UN Monitoring Group 2012:13). This selfish question is illustrated in the attempts of the TFG at good governance as the Word Bank commissioned report in May 2012 found unaccounted revenue to the sum of 131 million US Dollars by the TFG for the period 2009-2010. This shocking figure becomes graver as some revenue goes unrecorded and the actual figures are therefore much higher than the 68 per cent recorded. The 2011 figures were not any better as the TFG expenditure indicated that 25 per cent of the budget went to the president, prime minister and speaker of parliament's offices which furthermore accounts 50 per cent of the TFG's domestic income. The corruption charges deepens concerning Somali passports with 1,7 million US Dollars of passport revenue going missing between 2010-2011 (UN Monitoring Group 2012:7) , not to mention diplomatic passports being issued to pirate kingpins.

The situation in Somalia has led to the international community development assistance funds on both a multilateral and bilateral level going astray through corruption. The amounts of 72 million US Dollars in 2009 and 39 million US Dollars in 2010 mentioned in the World Bank report, would have been adequate budget for civil servants, parliamentarians and security forces for both years but the TFG leaders chose to market the government's weakness for further assistance (World Bank 2012:ii) Shockingly, '*corruption, embezzlement and fraud are no longer symptoms of mismanagement, but have in fact become a system of management'* (UN Monitoring Group 2012:35).

The table below illustrates external assistance for the Financial Year (FY) 2011 by comparing the Approved Revenue with the Actual Revenue as well as the Office of the Accountant General (OAG) Revenue with the Audit Investigative Financial Report (AIFR). The discrepancies can be partially attributed to different methods of bookkeeping, the actual

revenue being calculated in November and therefore not including November and December 2011. It is stated that external assistance management was purposefully made vague by the TFG leaders with amounts differing from what was deposited and was received by the government (UN Monitoring Group 2012:42-43).

Description	**FY 2011 Approved Revenue Budget**	**FY 2011 Actual Revenue**	**FY 2011 OAG Revenue**	**FY 2011 AIFR Revenue**
External Assistance	32 700 000	4 838 000	31 380 137	34 900 864
Bilateral Assistance	23 413 000	45 219 000	31 380 137	34 900 864
Capital Grant		6 009 000	0	0
USA		1 440 000		
Denmark		1 831 000		
Spain		2 737 000		
Germany				
Security		12 410 000	0	0
Italy		4 068 000		
USA		8 342 000		
Programme Support		26 800 000	31 380 137	34 900 864
Sudan		800 000		800 000
Algeria		10 000 000	9 400 000	
China		1 000 000	940 000	
UAE		15 000 000	5 081 156	34 100 864
Iraq			3 051 281	
Unknown			12 907 700	
Multilateral	15 887 000	3 619 000	0	0
UNDP Administered Trust Fund for Police	9 287 000	3 619 000		
Multilateral EU and others	6 600 000			

Table 6.1 TFG Consolidated External Assistance Income Assessment in USD (Source UN Monitoring Group 2012:42-43).

The World Bank findings, which were re-emphasised in the UN Monitoring Group 2012 Report indicated how the above found its origins in the former Head of Public Finance

Management Unit of the TFG's, Abirazak Fartaag 'Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-2010'. Fartaag lost his job in January 2011 but has become a whistle blower and has published subsequent reports with private funding. His conclusions substantiate the following: '*Gross public financial mismanagement; Large scale misappropriations of donor funds; Unethical and unacceptable professional negligence; Financial intimidation at the Executive's office compromising transparency and accountability; Concealment of under collection of government budget revenue receipts and concealment of under payment of outstanding government expenditure receipt'* (Bahadur 2012).

The impact of these harsh corruption charges against the TFG further decreased any remaining legitimacy it had. It can be seen that former President Sharif Sheikh grappled at straws when he attempted to meddle in the final implementation of the Roadmap by illegally empowering the TFG Supreme Court to interfere with selection processes of the members of parliament by the Technical Selection Committee (TSC) (Garowe Online 2012a). 'Absolute power, corrupts absolutely,' rung true in this case. The parliamentarians elected were responsible for the election of the new president.

The criteria for candidates running for president by the electoral commission included: that the candidate must pay a 10,000 US Dollars registration fee before running for elections, be Muslim, aged 40 and over, without a criminal background, with 20 supporters in parliament before running for president (Garowe Online 2012b). The transparency of this process that lead to the election of President Hassan Sheikh Omar is problematic. Atta-Asamoah and Warries (2012) refer to a sense of referee/player syndrome as '*The selection of the 135 traditional leaders, the composition of the Constituent Assembly and nomination of candidates from the various clans for the new parliament, allegations of seat-buying, intimidation of elders, and the rejection of certain preferences and nominations by the TSC have all caused discontent among certain stakeholders. Apart from the tussle over replacing rejected nominees, ensuing attempts to seek redress by raising the issues in various corridors of power, including the courts, speak to the entrenched interests and emerging discontent that must be dealt with.* It is therefore crucial that the unsuccessful candidates in this process are addressed before the Somali state falls back into its most common trait of failure, due to spoilers.

Although the NCA has put an end to the TFG and the transitional period in principle, the NCA has a long road ahead of it. Al Shabaab has not disappeared completely from the Somali landscape and the return of some of the Somali Diaspora will further be discussed. Whether the NCA has legitimate authority and is recognised by the Somali people and not merely by the international community, is crucial.

6.2.2 Al Shabaab dwindling but not diminished

2012 Might have kicked off with Al Shabaab joining Al Qaeda formally in February 2012 after pledging allegiance in 2009. Yet the additional AMISOM force strength, propelled by Kenya, achieved the goals set in taking over control of Somalia's second largest city, Kismayo, at the end of September 2012. This city was Al Shabaab's economic hub with the financial gains made through export of charcoal. The sanctions on charcoal exports have not been lifted, but there have been reports that charcoal are still being exported (The Economist 2012:49). The map below indicates the November 2012 territorial situation. (Note Kenya is part of AMISOM forces although their presence is indicated separately).

Figure 6.1 Areas of control in Somalia November 2012 (Source The Economist 2012:49).

As indicated in Chapter 5 the Al Shabaab territorial control might have diminished, but a-symmetrical warfare has been ongoing, and will be for the foreseeable future. The impact of Al Shabaab could therefore make it very hard for the NCA to truly govern with Boko Haram-style or hit and run tactics (Atta-Asamoah & Warries 2012). Al Shabaab is still a threat to be reckoned with as the multiple attacks within Somalia and Kenya testify. The strong security driven response against Al Shabaab by the international community will need to be adaptable to these tactics. The political power will need to match the military power, as territories are regained from Al Shabaab control.

6.2.3 Diaspora returning

The Somali Diaspora accounts for 14 per cent of Somalia's population (Sheikh & Healy 2009:1). The important role that the Diaspora plays through remittance has been discussed. With the new window of opportunity of the NCA, the Diaspora is expected to play a significant role in rebuilding Somalia. Yet the Diaspora has been part of peace building and resistance movements in the past, as clan politics still remain a deciding factor (Lewela 2012:1).

The NCA will have to play a key role in ensuring that the Diaspora supports it. The newly elected President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud appointed a Prime Minister from the Diaspora, Abdi Farah Shirdon, and the Diaspora is furthermore well represented within parliament (Lewela 2012:2).

The way the international community treats their local contingent of the Somali Diaspora could therefore have an impact on Somalia's future, dependant on the manner in which the Diaspora returns to either form part of Al Shabaab or a promoter of peace.

The local and global elements are therefore closely integrated. The question of whether the international community can respond to the window of opportunity that NCA has and whether the NCA has the right tools to really be more than another interim government set up for failure in a long line of attempts to overcome anarchy remains to be answered.

6.3 Golden mean possibility / windows of opportunity

The NCA is the latest window of opportunity for Somalia. Within the research done, many a window has come and gone for the Somali nation. A state that persists in failure, even with pockets of peace and stability, mushrooming in the form of mini-states, the overall picture remains a classic example of anarchic state failure. The international community has proven time and again how power political motives are the bedrock for the response to failure in Somalia. Whether a golden mean can be achieved to place equal importance on humanitarian issues is doubtful. Classic, *real politik* cannot be escaped in Somalia. Yet the status quo as Dersso (2009:3) states '*The conflict is not a sudden inexplicable eruption. Rather, it is a result of the interplay of multiple historical, social and political processes that have shaped the political and socio-economic structure of Somalia.'*

Although from the outset the neo-realist theory's harsh reality of power politics and interest driven international responses in a state centric, yet globalised world were considered, the research question begged analysis of the possibility of the international community having humanitarian motives of nation building and R2P to answer the pleas of the Somali people, hit more harshly by famine due to its failed status. Yet the response put security first, which assisted in limiting territory controlled by Al Shabaab, through increased AMISOM troops.

6.4 Way forward / Recommendations

This window of opportunity of the NCA has is based on a Roadmap and a selection committee chosen President. The trimmed down parliament, a female Minister of Foreign Affairs, a decrease in pirate attacks in 2012 and a dwindling Al Shabaab could lead to the international community to believe that Somalia is on a road to recovery, and that the security first approach, with increased AMISOM troops have made breakthroughs as in Kismayo. Somalia can therefore be left to its own vices.

Is the international response to the failed Somalia more concerned with security (i.e. the fight against terrorism and piracy) than with nation building/democratization or humanitarian aid (refugees, poverty)? A popular Elvis Presley song will be used to summarise the international response to Somalia... *'Blue Suede Shoes'*. The lyrics and their relevance to Somalia will be

analysed to make recommendations for the future as well as propose further areas for research.

'Well, it's one for the money', primarily, economic interests are considered when responding to state failure. The cost of piracy, hosting of refugees and the terrorist attacks reiterates the strategic motives for the international response to Somalia.

'Two for the show', the humanitarian motives, clearly come second, as politically correctness of abiding to the R2P spectacular or providing famine relief. The London and Istanbul conferences attempted to achieve a consolidated approach from the international community, but had individual states hearing what they want to hear, with real consensus lacking.

'Three to get ready, now go, cat, go', after more than 20 years of state failure, the Somalis have to prepare themselves and address their internal issues. The international community will edge them on, with arm's length principles. But the message has been clear that Somali solutions need to be found to Somali problems.

'But don't you step on my blue suede shoes. You can do anything but lay off of my blue suede shoes', The international community to a large extent turns a blind eye to what happens within Somalia, as long as the spill-over effects do not cause too many ripples or have direct impact on their populations. This furthermore explains why the RSC plays an important role in understanding the international response to Somalia with key role players like Ethiopia and Kenya who share borders with Somalia providing the greatest response and others like Uganda wanting to play a bigger role in the 'AMISOM show'. Unfortunately the 2010 Kampala bombing, proved some stepping on 'shoes'.

Ultimately the international response needs to achieve a balance between 'the money' and 'the show' when responding to state failure in Somalia. With the ongoing financial crisis, national interest in the form of 'Blue Suede Shoes' comes first. Development assistance for the show is also decreasing, especially with the lack of good governance in Somalia. The message from the International community has been clear, through its intervention and non-intervention, its humanitarian action and inaction: '*But don't you step on my blue suede shoes. You can do anything but lay off of my blue suede shoes.'*

7 Annexures

7.1 Annex 1 A chronology of key events:

Somali capital: Mogadishu

- Emerged as Arab settlement in 10th century
- Bought by Italy in 1905
- Capital of independent Somalia from 1960
- Estimated population: 1 million

The Horn of Africa has been home to Somalis since ancient times.

1875 - Egypt occupies towns on Somali coast and parts of the interior.

1860s - France acquires foothold on the Somali coast, later to become Djibouti.

1887 - Britain proclaims protectorate over Somaliland.

1888 - Anglo-French agreement defines boundary between Somali possessions of the two countries.

1889 - Italy sets up a protectorate in central Somalia, later consolidated with territory in the south ceded by the sultan of Zanzibar.

1925 - Territory east of the Jubba river detached from Kenya to become the westernmost part of the Italian protectorate.

1936 - Italian Somaliland combined with Somali-speaking parts of Ethiopia to form a province of Italian East Africa.

1940 - Italians occupy British Somaliland.

1941 - British occupy Italian Somalia.

Independence

1950 - Italian Somaliland becomes a UN trust territory under Italian control.

1956 - Italian Somaliland renamed Somalia and granted internal autonomy.

1960 - British and Italian parts of Somalia become independent, merge and form the United Republic of Somalia; Aden Abdullah Osman Daar elected president.

1963 - Border dispute with Kenya; diplomatic relations with Britain broken until 1968.

1964 - Border dispute with Ethiopia erupts into hostilities.

1967 - Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke beats Aden Abdullah Osman Daar in elections for president.

Drought and war

1969 - Muhammad Siad Barre assumes power in coup after Shermarke is assassinated.

Leader Mohamed Siad Barre

- Backed 'Scientific Socialism'
- Led military coup in 1969; overthrown in 1991
- Died in Nigeria, 1995

1970 - Barre declares Somalia a socialist state and nationalises most of the economy.

1974 - Somalia joins the Arab League.

1974-75 - Severe drought causes widespread starvation.

1977 - Somalia invades the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

1978 - Somali forces pushed out of Ogaden with the help of Soviet advisers and Cuban troops. Barre expels Soviet advisers and gains support of United States.

1981 - Opposition to Barre's regime begins to emerge after he excludes members of the Mijertyn and Isaq clans from government positions, which are filled with people from his own Marehan clan.

1988 - Peace accord with Ethiopia.

1991 - Mohamed Siad Barre is ousted. Power struggle between clan warlords Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed kills or wounds thousands of civilians.

Somaliland breaks away

1991 - Former British protectorate of Somaliland declares unilateral independence.

1992 - US Marines land near Mogadishu ahead of a UN peacekeeping force sent to restore order and safeguard relief supplies.

1993 - US Army Rangers are killed when Somali militias shoot down two US helicopters in Mogadishu and a battle ensues. Hundreds of Somalis die in the battle depicted in the film "Black Hawk Down". US mission formally ends in March 1994.

1995 - UN peacekeepers leave, having failed to achieve their mission.

1996 August - Warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed dies of his wounds and is succeeded by his son, Hussein.

Puntland autonomy

1998 - Puntland region declares autonomy.

2000 August - Clan leaders and senior figures meeting in Djibouti elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia.

2000 October - Hassan and his newly-appointed prime minister, Ali Khalif Gelayadh, arrive in Mogadishu to heroes' welcomes. Gelayadh announces his government, the first in the country since 1991.

2001 April - Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, announce their intention to form a national government within six months, in direct opposition to the country's transitional administration.

2001 August - UN appeals for food aid for half a million people in the drought-hit south.

Islamic Courts Union

Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys - one of the leaders of the Islamists who seized much of southern and central Somalia in 2006

2004 August - In 14th attempt since 1991 to restore central government, a new transitional parliament inaugurated at ceremony in Kenya. In October the body elects Abdullahi Yusuf as president.

2004 December - Tsunami waves generated by an undersea earthquake off Indonesia hit the Somali coast and the island of Hafun. Hundreds of deaths are reported; tens of thousands of people are displaced.

2005 February - June - Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya, but there are bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit.

2005 November - Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi survives an assassination attempt in Mogadishu. Gunmen attack his convoy, killing six people.

Islamist advance

2006 February - Transitional parliament meets in Somalia - in the central town of Baidoa - for the first time since it was formed in Kenya in 2004.

2006 March and May - Scores of people are killed and hundreds are injured during fierce fighting between rival militias in Mogadishu. It is the worst violence in almost a decade.

2006 June-July - Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts take control of Mogadishu and other parts of the south after defeating clan warlords.

Ethiopian troops reported in Somalia.

2006 July-August - Mogadishu's air and seaports are re-opened for the first time since 1995.

2006 September - Transitional government and the Union of Islamic Courts begin peace talks in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.

Somalia's first known suicide bombing targets President Yusuf outside parliament in Baidoa.

2006 October - About 35,000 Somalis escaping drought, strict Islamist rule and the possibility of war have fled to Kenya refugee since the start of 2006, the UN reports.

War of words between Ethiopia and Somalia's Islamists. Premier Meles says Ethiopia is "technically" at war with the Islamists because they had declared jihad on his country.

Islamists retreat

2006 December - UN Security Council resolution endorses African peacekeepers, specifies that neighbouring states should not deploy troops. Islamist leaders react by saying they will tackle foreign forces as invaders.

Ethiopian and transitional government engage the Islamists in battle and soon put them to flight.

2006 December 27 - African Union, Arab League urge Ethiopia to pull out its troops. UN Security Council fails to agree on a statement calling on foreign forces to withdraw.

Ethiopia intervenes

Ethiopian troops, government forces routed the Islamic Courts Union's militias

2006 December 28 - Joint Ethiopian and Somali government force captures Mogadishu.

2007 January - Islamists abandon their last stronghold, the port town of Kismayo.

President Abdullahi Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004.

US carries out air strikes in southern Somalia which it says targeted al-Qaeda figures, and which reportedly kill an unknown number of civilians. It is the first known direct US military intervention in Somalia since 1993. The strikes are defended by President Yusuf. They are condemned for killing innocent civilians.

Interim government imposes three-month state of emergency.

2007 February - UN Security Council authorises a six-month African Union peacekeeping mission for Somalia.

2007 March - African Union peacekeepers land at Mogadishu amid pitched battles between insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops. The Red Cross says it is the worst fighting in 15 years.

Humanitarian crisis grows

2007 April - UN says more than 320,000 Somalis have fled fighting in Mogadishu since February.

Hundreds of people are reported killed after several days of fierce clashes in the capital.

2007 May - The World Food Programme says a resurgence of piracy is threatening food supplies.

2007 June - A US warship shells suspected Al-Qaeda targets in Puntland.

Prime Minister Ghedi escapes a suicide car bomb attack on his compound.

Ethiopian Premier Meles Zenawi visits Mogadishu, pledging to withdraw his troops once peace takes hold.

2007 July - National reconciliation conference opens in Mogadishu and comes under mortar attack. Islamist leaders stay away from the talks.

Refugee exodus grows amid an upsurge in violence.

2007 August - Human Rights Watch accuses Ethiopian, Somali and insurgent forces of war crimes, and the UN Security Council of indifference during the recent conflict.

New opposition alliance

2007 September - Opposition groups form a new alliance to campaign for a military and diplomatic solution to the Somali conflict. They meet in Asmara, Eritrea.

2007 October - Ethiopian forces fire on demonstrators in Mogadishu protesting at the presence of what they call foreign invaders.

Heaviest fighting in Mogadishu reported since April. Ethiopians move reinforcements into the city.

Prime Minister Ghedi resigns.

Aid agencies warn a catastrophe is unfolding in Somalia.

2007 November - Government shuts down Radio Shabelle, Radio Simba and Radio Banadir.

UN special envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah describes Somalia's humanitarian crisis the worst in Africa, suggests using international justice to curb the violence.

Nur Hassan Hussein, also known as Nur Adde, sworn in as new prime minister.

Number of Somali refugees hits one million, with nearly 200,000 fleeing the capital in the past two weeks, the UN reports.

2007 December - Ethiopian troops leave key central town of Guriel.

2008 January - Burundi becomes the second nation to contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping force, sending 440 soldiers to Mogadishu.

US strikes

2008 March - US launches missile strike on southern town of Dhoble targeting suspected al-Qaeda member wanted for 2002 bombing of Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya.

Piracy

Islamist-led insurgency continues to spread.

2008 April - EU calls for international efforts to tackle piracy off the Somali coast after a series of hijackings and attacks on vessels.

2008 April - US air strike kills Aden Hashi Ayro, a leader of the Al-Shabab insurgent group.

2008 May - Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi says he will keep troops inside Somalia until "jihadists" are defeated.

The UN Security Council unanimously votes to allow countries to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to tackle pirates.

2008 June - Government signs three-month ceasefire pact with opposition Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia.

The deal, which provides for Ethiopian troops to leave Somalia within 120 days, is rejected by Islamist leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, who says Union of Islamic Courts will not stop fighting until all foreign troops have left country.

2008 July - Head of the UN Development Programme in Somalia, Osman Ali Ahmed, killed by gunmen in Mogadishu.

Piracy concern

2008 September - Somali pirates' hijacking of a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 tanks prompts widespread international concern. The US and other countries deploy navy ships to Somali waters.

2008 October - Nato agrees to despatch a naval force to patrol to waters off Somalia by the end of 2008, in an effort to control piracy.

A wave of coordinated bombings across the self-governing and relatively peaceful regions of Somaliland and Puntland, in Somalia's north, kill at least 27 people.

2008 November - Somali pirates hijack an oil-laden Saudi super-tanker and demand a 25m dollar ransom for its return.

2008 December - Ethiopia announces plans to withdraw all forces by end of 2008.

President Abdullahi Yusuf tries to sack Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein over his attempts to draw moderate Islamists into the government. Parliament declares the dismissal unconstitutional and passes a vote of confidence in Mr Nur. Mr Yusuf resigns.

Al-Shabab advances

- "The Youth" in Arabic
- Controls large areas of Somalia
- Formed as a radical offshoot of the Union of Islamic Courts in 2006
- Said to include foreign jihadists
- Has launched cross-border raids into Kenya, Uganda
- Estimated to have 7,000 to 9,000 fighters
- Announced merger with al-Qaeda in 2012

2009 January - Ethiopia completes the withdrawal of its troops. Fighters from the radical Islamist al-Shabab militia take control of the town of Baidoa, formerly a key stronghold of the transitional government.

Meeting in neighbouring Djibouti, Somalia's parliament swears in 149 new members from the main opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. It elects a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, president, and extends the transitional government's mandate for another two years.

2009 February - President Ahmed selects Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister. Mr Sharmarke, a former diplomat, is widely seen as a bridge between Islamists within the Somali government and the international community.

2009 May - Islamist insurgents launch onslaught on Mogadishu.

2009 June - Somalia's security minister and more than 20 other people are killed in a suicide bombing at a hotel in Beledweyne, north of the capital Mogadishu.

President Ahmed declares a state of emergency as violence intensifies. Somali officials appeal to neighbouring countries to send troops to Somalia, as government forces continue to battle Islamist insurgents.

2009 September - Al-Shabab proclaims allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.

Islamist rivalry

2009 October - Al-Shabab wins control over the southern port city of Kismayo after defeating the rival Hizbul-Islam Islamist militia, which withdraws to villages to the west. At least 20 are killed and 70 injured in fighting that threatens to spread to the rest of the Islamist-controlled south.

2009 November - Pirates seize a supertanker carrying oil from Saudi Arabia to the US, one of the largest ships captured off Somalia. The Greek-owned Maran Centaurus was about 1,300km (800 miles) off Somalia when it was hijacked.

Kidnappers released journalists Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan after 15 months in captivity.

2009 December - Al-Shabab denies being behind suicide attack that killed 22 people in Mogadishu, including three ministers.

Aid workers threatened

2010 January - UN's World Food Programme (WFP) withdraws from Al-Shabab-controlled areas of southern Somalia after threats to lives of its staff.

2010 February - Al-Shabab formally declares alliance with al-Qaeda, begins to concentrate troops in southern Mogadishu for a major offensive to capture the capital.

2010 March - Up to half of food aid being diverted to contractors, militants and local UN staff, says UN's Monitoring Group on Somalia. President Sharif dismisses the allegations.

2010 May - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calls on world to support current Somalia government as best chance to stabilise the chaotic country.

2010 July - Al-Shabab says it was behind twin blasts which hit Ugandan capital Kampala, killing 74 people watching the World Cup football final on TV.

2010 September - Prime Minister Sharmarke quits. He is replaced by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed.

Piracy boom

2011 January - Pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit seven-year high in 2010, with Somali pirates accounting for 49 of 52 ships seized.

First government executions since 1991.

2011 February - Parliament votes to extend its mandate for another three years.

Kenya closes border to Somalia after nearby fighting between Al-Shabab rebels and government-backed forces.

2011 April - Aid agencies sound alarm after rains fail for second year running, leading to complete crop failure in southern Somalia and rising levels of malnutrition.

Famine declared

2011 July - UN formally declares famine in two regions of southern Somalia. Aid agencies warn that millions face starvation, after drought, conflict and poverty combine to produce the necessary conditions for famine.

Tens of thousands of Somalis flee to refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. The UN estimates that a quarter of the population is either internally displaced or living outside the country.

Al-Shabab partially lifts the ban it had imposed on foreign aid agencies in areas under its control.

2011 August - UN declares famine in three new areas of Somalia.

Al-Shabab pulls out of all its positions in Mogadishu. The Islamist group describes the move as a "change of military tactics".

First airlift of UN aid in five years arrives in Mogadishu.

Kenyan intervention

Kenya steps into the fray

Kenya entered Somalia in October 2011 to curb al-Shabab Islamist militants

- Airforce has hit al-Shabab bases
- Navy has blockaded Kismayu in the hope of starving militants of revenue from the port

2011 August-September - Suspected al-Shabab militants raid Kenyan coastal resorts, killing one foreigner and kidnapping two.

2011 October - Kenyan troops enter Somalia to attack rebels they accuse of being behind several kidnappings of foreigners on Kenyan soil.

Suicide bomb attack in Mogadishu kills more than 100 people.

The American military begins flying drone aircraft from a base in Ethiopia, as part of its fight against Islamist militants in Somalia.

2011 November - Ethiopian troops are spotted in the central town of Guriel.

2011 December - UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visits Mogadishu - one of the highest level visits to Somalia for years.

Djibouti sends 800 troops to Mogadishu to bolster African Union force AMISOM.

2012 January - Al-Shabab bans Red Cross - one of the few aid agencies still operating in southern and central Somalia - from providing famine relief in areas under Islamist control.

2012 February - Al-Shabab loses key southern town of Baidoa to Kenyan troops and Somali government forces, and announces its merger with al-Qaeda.

2012 May - African Union and Somali government forces capture Afgoye town south of Mogadishu, thereby cutting al-Shabab territory in half.

2012 June - Somaliland separatist leaders from the north of the country agree to talks with the Somali government in London to attempt to settle their differences. The meeting is held under British, European Union and Norwegian aegis.

2012 August - Somalia's first formal parliament in more than 20 years is sworn in at Mogadishu airport, in a heavily-secured area of the city. This marks the end of the eight-year transitional period.

Pro-government forces capture the port of Merca, 70km (45 miles) south of Mogadishu, from al-Shabab.

2012 September - MPs in Mogadishu elect academic and civic activist Hassan Sheikh Mohamud president in the first such vote on Somali soil since 1967. He beat the outgoing president, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, in a run-off vote. The following day a suicide bomber kills four security officers at President Mohamud's hotel in the capital.

2012 October - Kismayo, the last major city held by Al-Shabab and the country's second-largest port, falls to African Union and government forces, as does the town of Wanla Weyn 90 km northwest of Mogadishu.

President Mohamud appoints a fellow technocrat and ally, businessman Abdi Farah Shirdon Saaid, as prime minister with a mandate to promote national cohesion and fight nepotism.

Pirate attacks fall sharply in 2012, with only 70 reported so far compared with 233 in 2011.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632

7.2 ANNEX 2

Fund For Peace Failed States Index Indiactors

http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012


Mounting Demographic Pressures


Massive movement of Refugees and IDP's


Vengence Seeking Group Grievance


Chronic Sustained Human Flight


Uneven Economic Development


Poverty, Sharp or Severe Economic Decline


Legitimacy of the State


Progressive Deterioration of Public Services


Violation of Human Rights and Rule of Law


Security Apparatus


Rise of Factionalised Elites


Intervention of External Actors

2012

Rank	Country													Total
1	Somalia	9.8	10.0	9.6	8.6	8.1	9.7	9.9	9.8	9.9	10.0	9.8	9.8	114.9
2	Congo (D. R.)	9.9	9.7	9.3	7.4	8.9	8.8	9.5	9.2	9.7	9.7	9.5	9.6	111.2
3	Sudan	8.4	9.9	10.0	8.3	8.8	7.3	9.5	8.5	9.4	9.7	9.9	9.5	109.4
3n/r	South Sudan*	8.4	9.9	10.0	6.4	8.8	7.3	9.1	9.5	9.2	9.7	10.0	10.0	108.4
4	Chad	9.3	9.5	9.1	7.7	8.6	8.3	9.8	9.5	9.3	8.9	9.8	7.8	107.6
5	Zimbabwe	9.0	8.4	8.7	9.0	8.9	8.9	9.4	9.1	8.9	8.7	9.8	7.5	106.3
6	Afghanistan	8.9	9.0	9.4	7.4	8.1	7.7	9.5	8.5	8.5	9.7	9.4	10.0	106.0
7	Haiti	9.5	8.1	7.0	8.8	8.6	9.5	9.3	9.3	7.7	8.2	9.0	9.7	104.9
8	Yemen	8.8	8.7	9.0	7.0	8.4	8.7	9.1	9.0	8.4	9.7	9.8	8.3	104.8
9	Iraq	8.0	8.5	9.7	8.6	8.7	7.7	8.4	7.8	8.3	9.9	9.6	9.0	104.3
10	Central African Republic	8.8	9.7	8.5	5.6	8.7	8.0	8.9	9.1	8.5	9.6	9.1	9.3	103.8
11	Cote d'Ivoire	7.9	9.0	9.0	7.6	7.7	7.4	9.6	8.3	8.3	8.9	9.9	10.0	103.6

12	Guinea	8.3	8.0	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.9	9.5	8.6	8.7	9.4	9.2	7.3	101.9
13	Pakistan	8.5	9.0	9.6	7.2	8.2	7.2	8.3	7.0	8.6	9.3	9.1	9.4	101.6
14	Nigeria	8.4	6.5	9.7	7.6	8.9	7.5	9.1	9.1	8.6	9.2	9.8	6.6	101.1
15	Guinea Bissau	8.7	7.5	5.7	7.7	7.8	9.0	9.3	8.5	7.5	9.4	9.2	8.9	99.2
16	Kenya	8.9	8.4	8.9	7.7	8.2	7.3	8.6	8.1	7.4	7.6	9.0	8.4	98.4
17	Ethiopia	9.6	8.7	8.1	7.0	7.9	7.4	7.2	8.4	8.6	8.1	8.7	8.2	97.9
18	Burundi	8.8	8.9	8.0	5.9	7.9	8.8	8.3	8.5	8.1	7.4	7.9	9.0	97.5
18	Niger	9.3	6.9	7.7	6.0	7.6	8.6	8.4	9.2	7.9	8.2	8.6	8.4	96.9
20	Uganda	8.8	8.2	7.7	6.9	8.1	7.5	8.0	8.6	7.8	8.3	8.7	7.9	96.5
21	Myanmar	7.9	8.2	8.7	5.7	8.7	7.6	9.4	8.4	8.6	7.5	8.6	6.9	96.2
22	North Korea	7.9	5.3	6.6	4.4	8.6	9.3	9.9	9.4	9.6	8.1	7.7	8.7	95.5
23	Eritrea	8.6	7.1	6.4	7.1	6.9	8.6	8.4	8.2	8.7	7.8	8.1	8.5	94.5
23	Syria	5.5	9.0	9.2	6.0	7.5	6.3	9.5	7.0	9.4	8.5	8.7	7.9	94.5
25	Liberia	8.4	8.9	6.5	6.7	7.7	8.6	6.9	8.8	6.1	7.0	8.4	9.3	93.3
26	Cameroon	8.2	7.0	7.5	7.5	8.1	6.5	8.9	8.1	7.8	7.9	9.2	6.5	93.1
27	Nepal	7.9	7.7	9.0	5.6	8.4	7.6	8.0	7.4	8.2	7.5	8.2	7.4	93.0
28	Timor-Leste	8.4	7.7	6.8	6.1	7.0	8.0	8.5	8.4	6.3	8.3	8.3	8.9	92.7
29	Bangladesh	8.0	6.8	8.9	7.8	8.1	7.4	8.2	7.8	6.8	7.6	8.9	5.9	92.2
29	Sri Lanka	7.1	8.7	9.1	7.1	8.1	5.6	8.1	5.8	8.7	8.2	9.2	6.5	92.2
31	Sierra Leone	8.9	7.8	6.2	7.7	8.2	8.3	7.6	8.7	6.4	5.7	7.9	7.1	90.4
31	Egypt	7.1	6.4	8.8	5.7	7.4	7.1	9.2	5.9	9.0	7.0	8.8	8.0	90.4
33	Congo (Republic)	8.3	7.7	6.3	6.5	7.9	7.5	8.6	8.4	7.2	7.0	6.7	7.9	90.1
34	Iran	5.8	7.6	8.6	6.4	6.7	6.4	8.8	5.3	8.9	8.3	9.3	7.4	89.6
35	Rwanda	8.6	7.6	8.5	7.0	7.4	6.8	6.8	7.5	8.0	5.5	7.9	7.7	89.3
36	Malawi	8.8	6.2	5.7	7.8	7.7	8.5	8.0	7.9	7.1	5.1	7.6	8.4	88.8
37	Cambodia	7.5	5.9	7.3	7.7	7.1	6.9	8.2	8.3	7.7	6.5	8.0	7.7	88.7
38	Mauritania	8.0	6.5	7.5	5.4	6.3	7.6	7.6	7.9	7.3	7.7	8.1	7.6	87.6
39	Togo	8.1	6.8	5.1	6.9	7.6	7.7	8.2	8.2	7.4	7.3	7.5	6.8	87.5
39	Uzbekistan	7.0	5.7	7.7	6.0	7.9	7.1	8.7	5.7	9.1	8.2	8.7	5.7	87.5
41	Burkina Faso	8.9	5.9	5.2	6.0	8.2	7.7	8.0	8.4	7.0	7.1	7.3	7.7	87.4
41	Kyrgyzstan	6.5	5.3	8.4	6.7	7.3	7.9	8.7	5.4	7.8	7.4	8.3	7.6	87.4
43	Equatorial Guinea	8.2	3.0	6.6	6.9	8.8	4.8	9.4	7.8	9.1	7.8	8.2	5.7	86.3
44	Zambia	9.1	7.3	6.3	7.1	7.7	8.1	8.0	7.7	6.4	5.3	6.0	7.0	85.9
45	Lebanon	6.2	8.2	8.4	6.3	6.5	5.5	7.5	5.5	6.5	8.4	9.1	7.7	85.8
46	Tajikistan	7.3	5.6	6.9	5.7	6.5	7.7	8.8	6.6	8.5	7.1	8.3	6.7	85.7
47	Solomon Islands	7.6	4.8	6.8	5.4	8.3	7.9	7.6	7.8	6.2	6.7	8.0	8.5	85.6

48	Laos	7.8	5.5	6.3	7.1	5.8	6.7	8.3	7.4	8.2	6.9	8.6	6.9	85.5
48	Angola	8.9	6.9	6.5	5.6	9.1	4.8	8.2	8.3	7.6	5.9	7.0	6.4	85.1
50	Libya	5.8	5.1	7.0	3.9	7.0	5.5	8.1	7.6	9.0	9.0	8.0	9.0	84.9
51	Georgia	5.5	7.2	8.3	5.2	6.6	6.3	8.5	5.7	6.7	7.6	9.1	8.2	84.8
52	Colombia	6.4	8.4	7.2	7.6	8.4	4.0	7.4	5.9	7.0	7.0	7.7	7.4	84.4
53	Dijbouti	8.3	6.9	6.5	4.9	7.1	6.6	7.5	7.2	6.8	6.5	7.5	8.0	83.8
54	Papua New Guinea	7.4	4.8	6.9	7.2	8.8	6.6	7.6	8.6	6.1	6.3	7.1	6.1	83.7
55	Swaziland	8.9	4.6	3.6	5.8	7.0	8.3	8.6	7.7	8.3	6.3	7.0	7.4	83.5
56	Philippines	7.3	6.2	7.6	6.5	6.8	5.3	7.9	6.3	7.0	8.4	8.0	5.8	83.2
57	Comoros	7.3	4.2	5.3	6.9	6.1	7.9	7.7	7.9	6.3	7.5	7.5	8.4	83.0
58	Madagascar	8.0	4.4	5.2	5.2	7.6	7.9	7.3	8.3	6.0	6.9	7.8	8.0	82.5
59	Mozambique	8.9	4.3	4.9	7.5	7.7	7.9	7.3	8.3	6.7	6.8	5.6	6.5	82.4
59	Bhutan	6.7	6.6	7.6	6.5	7.8	6.6	6.3	6.6	7.3	5.9	7.5	7.0	82.4
61	Israel/West Bank	6.5	7.3	9.5	3.5	7.8	4.0	7.0	6.2	7.9	6.8	8.1	7.6	82.2
62	Bolivia	7.5	4.3	7.4	6.1	8.8	6.5	7.1	6.8	6.5	6.5	8.0	6.6	82.1
63	Indonesia	7.4	6.3	7.1	6.6	7.2	6.0	6.7	6.2	6.8	7.1	7.0	6.2	80.6
63	Gambia	7.8	6.1	3.7	6.8	6.5	7.4	7.8	7.2	7.5	5.8	6.8	7.2	80.6
65	Fiji	5.1	3.3	7.6	7.3	7.7	7.0	8.8	5.2	7.0	7.0	7.9	6.6	80.5
66	Tanzania	8.2	7.1	5.8	6.1	5.9	6.9	6.5	8.5	6.5	5.8	5.7	7.4	80.4
67	Ecuador	5.6	6.0	6.9	7.1	7.7	5.9	7.5	7.2	5.2	6.5	8.2	6.3	80.1
68	Azerbaijan	5.6	7.6	7.2	5.1	6.6	5.2	8.0	5.4	7.3	6.7	7.8	7.2	79.8
69	Nicaragua	6.5	4.3	6.2	7.5	8.2	6.9	7.4	7.0	5.7	5.9	6.8	7.0	79.6
70	Guatemala	7.0	5.9	7.1	6.8	7.6	6.1	6.8	6.7	6.7	7.3	6.0	5.4	79.4
71	Senegal	7.8	6.7	6.0	6.3	6.9	6.9	6.0	7.5	6.5	6.3	6.3	6.0	79.3
72	Lesotho	8.7	4.6	4.7	6.5	6.4	8.6	6.3	8.0	5.7	5.5	7.0	6.9	79.0
73	Moldova	5.8	4.7	6.3	7.2	6.2	6.2	7.4	6.0	6.2	7.5	8.0	7.2	78.7
74	Benin	8.0	6.8	3.6	6.3	6.9	7.6	6.4	8.3	5.4	6.0	6.4	7.0	78.6
75	Honduras	7.3	3.6	5.6	6.9	8.1	7.2	7.0	6.7	6.2	7.0	6.3	6.6	78.5
76	China	7.9	5.9	7.9	5.3	8.3	3.9	7.9	6.3	8.6	6.0	6.9	3.5	78.3
77	Algeria	6.1	6.5	8.1	5.4	6.5	5.5	7.2	5.9	7.4	7.1	6.8	5.5	78.1
78	India	7.3	5.5	7.9	5.9	8.4	5.5	5.5	6.9	5.8	7.5	6.8	5.0	78.0
79	Mali	8.8	5.5	6.0	7.3	6.4	7.5	5.3	8.0	4.6	7.1	4.5	7.0	77.9
79	Bosnia and Herzegovina	4.7	6.5	8.0	5.8	6.5	5.5	7.0	4.7	6.1	6.7	8.7	7.7	77.9
81	Turkmenistan	6.2	3.9	6.4	4.8	6.8	5.7	9.0	6.4	8.4	7.2	7.7	4.9	77.4
82	Venezuela	5.7	4.5	6.7	6.1	7.2	5.9	7.9	6.3	7.7	6.7	7.3	5.2	77.3

83	Russia	6.0	5.0	7.9	5.4	7.3	4.0	7.9	5.0	8.1	8.2	8.0	4.3	77.1
84	Thailand	8.2	6.7	7.8	4.0	6.9	4.0	6.5	4.7	7.2	7.3	8.8	4.9	77.0
85	Turkey	6.0	6.5	8.6	4.2	7.1	5.6	6.2	6.0	5.3	7.7	7.5	5.9	76.6
85	Belarus	6.0	3.3	6.5	4.2	6.0	6.5	9.0	5.5	8.3	6.0	8.0	7.3	76.6
87	Morocco	6.1	6.2	6.8	6.7	7.2	5.6	6.6	6.2	6.4	6.6	6.6	5.2	76.1
88	Maldives	5.7	5.6	4.9	6.5	4.7	6.4	7.9	6.6	7.5	5.7	7.6	6.1	75.1
89	Serbia	5.0	6.3	7.9	4.7	6.2	6.2	6.6	4.6	5.8	6.4	8.0	7.3	75.0
90	Jordan	6.5	7.3	7.0	4.4	6.8	6.4	6.3	4.6	7.1	5.7	6.3	6.5	74.8
91	Cape Verde	7.0	4.0	4.2	8.4	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	5.4	5.7	5.7	7.9	74.7
92	Gabon	6.5	5.9	3.3	5.8	7.6	5.7	7.8	6.9	6.8	5.7	7.1	5.5	74.6
93	El Salvador	7.7	5.2	6.0	7.2	7.3	6.0	6.2	6.6	6.4	6.7	4.3	4.8	74.4
94	Tunisia	5.2	4.0	5.6	5.2	6.3	5.5	7.8	5.0	8.3	7.5	7.8	6.0	74.2
95	Dominican Republic	6.5	5.2	5.8	7.6	7.2	5.8	5.7	6.5	6.0	5.5	6.5	5.9	74.1
96	Vietnam	6.1	4.4	6.0	6.0	5.9	6.1	7.5	6.1	7.4	5.7	6.9	5.9	74.0
97	Sao Tome	6.8	4.0	4.8	7.6	6.1	7.4	6.7	6.7	4.6	5.8	6.3	7.0	73.9
98	Mexico	6.0	4.2	5.8	6.2	7.5	5.7	6.6	6.1	6.2	7.7	5.2	6.4	73.6
99	Peru	6.1	4.4	7.1	6.4	8.0	4.6	7.1	6.6	4.9	6.9	6.6	4.8	73.5
100	Saudi Arabia	5.8	5.5	7.7	2.9	6.7	3.4	7.6	4.3	8.6	7.2	7.9	5.9	73.4
101	Cuba	6.0	5.0	4.8	6.6	5.9	5.5	6.4	5.0	7.4	6.6	6.9	7.0	73.1
102	Armenia	5.2	6.8	5.7	6.3	5.9	5.6	6.8	4.7	6.8	5.2	7.0	6.1	72.2
103	Micronesia	6.8	3.4	4.2	8.1	7.5	7.0	6.3	6.6	2.8	5.4	5.6	8.2	71.9
104	Guyana	6.1	3.5	6.2	8.6	7.1	6.1	6.5	5.7	4.7	6.1	5.1	5.7	71.4
105	Suriname	5.8	3.2	6.1	7.3	7.5	6.6	6.4	5.0	5.3	5.8	5.8	6.4	71.2
106	Namibia	7.1	5.3	5.6	6.8	8.5	6.4	4.4	6.6	5.2	5.2	3.5	6.3	71.0
107	Paraguay	6.0	2.2	6.2	5.2	8.3	5.6	7.6	5.8	6.1	6.1	7.7	4.2	70.9
107	Kazakhstan	5.6	3.5	6.5	3.5	5.6	6.5	7.5	5.4	7.1	6.3	7.7	5.6	70.9
109	Macedonia	4.2	4.9	7.6	6.4	6.5	5.9	6.4	4.2	4.6	5.7	6.7	5.9	69.1
110	Samoa	6.7	2.6	4.8	8.6	6.3	5.4	6.0	4.8	4.4	5.5	5.1	8.3	68.5
110	Malaysia	5.7	4.5	6.4	4.4	6.4	4.6	6.5	4.8	7.4	6.3	6.8	4.7	68.5
112	Ghana	6.7	5.2	5.2	7.6	6.2	6.0	4.8	7.6	4.5	3.3	4.7	5.7	67.5
113	Ukraine	5.0	2.9	6.2	6.0	5.6	5.7	7.7	3.9	5.4	4.3	8.0	6.5	67.2
113	Belize	6.8	5.1	4.4	7.0	6.9	5.4	6.0	5.9	3.9	5.5	4.3	6.0	67.2
115	South Africa	8.1	6.4	5.6	4.0	8.2	5.6	5.2	5.8	4.5	4.8	5.9	2.8	66.8
115	Cyprus	4.1	4.7	7.3	5.0	7.0	5.4	5.2	3.1	3.3	5.0	7.9	8.8	66.8
117	Botswana	8.6	6.1	4.8	5.3	7.7	6.5	4.7	5.9	4.7	3.8	3.3	5.1	66.5
118	Albania	5.0	2.8	5.1	6.8	5.1	5.6	7.3	4.9	5.5	5.4	6.6	6.0	66.1

119	Jamaica	5.9	3.1	4.0	7.0	6.2	6.6	6.4	5.6	5.2	6.2	3.7	6.0	65.8
120	Seychelles	5.5	3.6	4.8	5.2	6.9	4.9	6.3	3.8	5.5	6.1	5.7	6.8	65.1
121	Grenada	5.5	2.9	3.9	8.2	6.2	6.0	6.2	3.9	4.0	5.3	5.6	7.4	65.0
122	Trinidad	5.5	2.9	4.4	7.7	6.6	4.7	5.9	5.1	5.5	6.0	5.6	4.5	64.4
123	Brazil	7.0	3.9	6.2	4.2	8.4	3.6	5.6	5.5	5.0	6.2	4.9	3.6	64.1
123	Brunei	4.8	3.6	6.2	4.3	7.8	3.1	7.4	2.9	6.6	5.6	7.4	4.4	64.1
125	Bahrain	4.6	2.6	7.3	2.8	5.7	3.1	7.5	2.7	7.0	6.0	7.0	5.9	62.2
126	Romania	4.6	2.9	6.0	5.0	5.6	6.0	6.3	4.4	4.2	4.4	5.2	4.9	59.5
127	Antigua & Barbuda	4.9	2.7	4.1	7.9	5.6	4.8	5.8	4.3	4.8	4.9	3.7	5.5	58.9
128	Kuwait	4.9	3.5	4.6	4.0	5.6	3.7	6.5	2.9	6.5	4.7	7.2	4.7	58.8
129	Mongolia	5.8	1.9	3.7	2.2	6.0	5.2	5.6	5.6	5.7	4.7	5.5	6.8	58.7
130	Bulgaria	4.0	3.3	4.9	5.2	5.4	5.0	5.1	4.3	4.0	4.6	5.3	5.2	56.3
130	Croatia	4.0	5.2	5.6	4.7	4.7	5.4	4.2	3.2	4.6	4.7	4.7	5.3	56.3
132	Panama	5.8	3.6	4.9	4.8	7.5	4.3	4.6	5.1	4.4	5.4	2.5	3.3	56.1
133	Montenegro	4.2	4.2	6.5	2.7	3.8	4.9	4.5	3.9	4.7	4.9	6.2	5.0	55.5
134	Bahamas	6.1	2.5	4.4	5.9	5.9	4.5	4.9	4.4	3.1	4.3	4.5	4.6	55.1
135	Barbados	4.1	2.6	4.4	6.5	6.0	5.3	3.6	3.0	2.8	4.2	4.2	5.3	52.0
136	Latvia	3.9	3.6	5.2	4.5	5.4	5.3	4.8	3.7	3.5	3.6	4.3	4.1	51.9
137	Oman	5.1	1.8	2.7	1.5	3.3	4.3	6.2	4.7	7.2	5.6	6.6	2.7	51.7
138	Greece	3.8	2.3	4.8	4.7	4.6	5.9	5.4	4.2	3.3	4.0	2.5	4.8	50.4
139	Costa Rica	4.6	4.0	4.4	3.8	6.4	4.6	3.2	4.5	2.7	2.8	3.5	5.2	49.7
140	United Arab Emirates	4.1	2.8	4.3	2.7	5.1	3.9	6.4	3.1	5.9	3.2	3.6	3.8	48.9
141	Hungary	2.8	2.8	3.8	4.2	5.2	5.9	5.8	3.4	3.2	2.6	4.7	4.0	48.3
142	Qatar	4.2	2.4	4.9	2.8	4.8	3.2	5.9	2.3	5.3	2.8	5.0	4.3	48.0
143	Estonia	3.8	3.6	5.7	4.2	4.6	3.8	3.8	3.0	2.7	3.2	5.5	3.6	47.5
144	Slovakia	3.5	2.0	5.3	4.8	4.9	5.1	4.2	3.8	3.3	2.6	3.7	4.2	47.4
145	Argentina	4.4	2.3	4.7	3.3	6.3	4.1	4.3	3.8	3.8	3.0	3.0	3.5	46.5
145	Italy	3.3	3.6	5.0	2.9	3.8	4.6	5.0	2.7	3.2	4.9	4.8	2.0	45.8
147	Mauritius	3.6	1.9	3.5	3.3	5.1	4.2	4.4	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.2	4.3	44.7
148	Poland	3.8	3.0	3.8	5.3	4.4	4.0	3.7	3.1	3.2	2.8	3.6	3.6	44.3
149	Lithuania	3.8	2.9	4.0	4.4	5.4	5.0	3.5	3.1	2.9	2.8	2.8	3.5	44.2
150	Malta	3.1	5.1	4.0	4.4	3.8	3.8	4.0	2.6	3.2	3.7	2.0	4.1	43.8
151	Chile	4.6	2.7	3.8	3.1	5.5	4.6	3.7	4.5	3.2	2.8	1.4	3.5	43.5
151	Japan	8.3	4.0	3.8	2.1	2.0	4.0	2.5	5.0	3.2	2.0	2.6	4.0	43.5
153	Spain	3.1	2.6	5.7	2.3	4.4	5.0	2.6	2.9	2.5	4.4	5.6	1.7	42.8
154	Uruguay	4.1	1.8	2.7	5.0	4.6	3.8	2.2	3.4	2.6	4.0	2.7	3.7	40.5

155	Czech Republic	2.8	2.5	3.5	3.7	3.5	4.3	3.5	3.6	2.7	2.1	3.8	3.5	39.5
156	South Korea	3.0	2.5	3.4	4.2	2.6	2.3	3.2	2.2	2.8	2.0	3.6	5.7	37.6
157	Singapore	2.6	0.9	3.0	3.1	3.7	3.3	3.5	2.2	5.0	1.8	4.0	2.5	35.6
158	United Kingdom	2.8	3.0	4.7	2.4	3.9	3.7	1.9	2.6	2.1	3.0	3.6	1.6	35.3
159	United States	3.3	2.6	3.9	1.3	5.1	3.4	2.6	2.7	3.5	1.9	3.6	1.0	34.8
160	Portugal	3.1	1.8	2.3	2.9	3.7	5.3	2.0	3.8	3.0	1.9	1.4	3.0	34.2
161	Slovenia	2.8	1.5	3.3	3.5	4.4	3.5	2.7	2.4	2.8	2.8	1.6	2.6	34.0
162	France	3.0	2.5	5.6	1.8	4.6	3.9	1.9	1.8	2.7	2.2	1.9	1.7	33.6
163	Belgium	2.6	1.9	4.1	1.9	4.1	3.6	2.4	2.5	1.8	2.3	4.0	2.3	33.5
164	Germany	2.5	3.9	4.4	2.5	4.1	2.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.5	2.1	1.7	31.7
165	Australia	4.4	3.0	3.9	1.4	3.6	2.6	1.3	2.1	2.2	2.0	1.6	1.1	29.2
166	Iceland	1.9	1.3	1.0	3.1	1.9	5.7	1.7	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.8	5.7	29.1
167	Netherlands	2.9	2.7	4.1	2.5	2.6	3.3	1.0	1.8	1.3	1.7	2.4	1.8	28.1
168	Austria	2.6	2.3	4.0	1.9	4.1	2.0	1.3	1.8	1.8	1.4	2.4	1.9	27.5
169	Canada	2.7	2.2	3.0	2.4	3.8	2.1	1.0	2.2	1.9	1.8	2.5	1.1	26.8
170	Ireland	2.5	1.7	1.6	3.0	2.7	3.8	2.2	2.2	1.3	1.7	1.4	2.4	26.5
171	New Zealand	2.4	1.4	3.8	2.7	3.7	3.9	0.8	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.1	0.8	25.6
172	Luxembourg	2.0	2.1	2.8	1.8	1.8	1.8	2.2	1.6	1.3	2.3	3.4	2.3	25.5
173	Norway	2.3	1.8	3.6	1.5	1.8	2.4	0.8	1.7	2.2	3.0	1.2	1.6	23.9
174	Switzerland	2.4	1.8	3.2	2.2	2.6	2.2	0.9	1.7	2.0	1.7	1.0	1.7	23.3
175	Denmark	2.8	1.9	3.0	2.2	1.8	2.2	0.8	1.7	1.5	1.8	1.0	2.3	23.0
176	Sweden	2.6	2.6	1.0	1.8	1.9	1.6	0.8	1.8	1.6	2.5	1.8	1.3	21.3
177	Finland	2.2	1.9	1.4	2.6	1.3	2.9	0.8	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	20.0

Though South Sudan has been included for the first time as the Index's 178th country, it will not receive a formal rank for the 2012 Index as the data available since independence does not constitute a full year and thus cannot be accurately compared to the other 177 countries.

http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-grid2012

2011

Rank	Country													Total
1	Somalia	9.7	10.0	9.5	8.2	8.4	9.3	9.8	9.4	9.7	10.0	9.8	9.7	113.4
2	Chad	9.2	9.5	9.4	8.0	8.9	8.5	9.8	9.6	9.3	9.2	9.8	9.1	110.3
3	Sudan	8.5	9.6	9.9	8.2	9.1	6.4	9.4	9.0	9.7	9.6	9.9	9.5	108.7
4	Congo (D. R.)	9.7	9.6	8.3	7.7	9.2	8.7	9.0	8.9	9.2	9.6	8.8	9.5	108.2
5	Haiti	10.0	9.2	7.3	8.9	8.8	9.2	9.4	10.0	8.0	8.4	8.8	10.0	108.0

6	Zimbabwe	9.3	8.2	9.0	9.3	9.2	9.0	9.3	9.0	9.2	9.0	9.6	7.8	107.9
7	Afghanistan	9.1	9.3	9.3	7.2	8.4	8.0	9.7	8.5	8.8	9.8	9.4	10.0	107.5
8	Central African Republic	8.9	9.6	8.6	5.8	8.9	8.1	9.1	9.0	8.6	9.7	9.1	9.6	105.0
9	Iraq	8.3	9.0	9.0	8.9	9.0	7.0	8.7	8.0	8.6	9.5	9.6	9.3	104.8
10	Cote d'Ivoire	8.1	8.5	8.7	7.9	8.0	7.7	9.5	8.4	8.6	8.6	9.1	9.7	102.8
11	Guinea	8.2	7.7	7.9	8.3	8.4	8.6	9.4	8.7	9.2	9.3	9.2	7.6	102.5
12	Pakistan	8.8	9.2	9.3	7.5	8.5	6.6	8.6	7.3	8.7	9.4	9.1	9.3	102.3
13	Yemen	8.7	8.4	8.6	6.9	8.3	7.7	8.6	8.7	7.7	9.3	9.3	8.2	100.3
14	Nigeria	8.3	6.0	9.6	7.7	9.0	7.3	9.0	9.0	8.6	9.1	9.5	6.9	99.9
15	Niger	9.8	6.6	7.8	6.2	7.9	8.9	8.9	9.5	8.2	8.0	8.6	8.7	99.1
16	Kenya	8.8	8.5	8.7	7.6	8.5	7.0	8.9	7.8	7.7	7.9	8.8	8.5	98.7
17	Burundi	9.1	8.7	8.2	6.2	8.1	8.5	8.2	8.8	8.0	7.7	8.2	9.0	98.6
18	Myanmar	8.2	8.0	8.7	6.0	9.0	7.9	9.7	8.3	9.0	8.5	8.3	6.7	98.3
19	Guinea Bissau	8.7	7.2	5.4	7.4	8.1	8.7	9.2	8.4	7.8	9.3	9.2	8.8	98.3
20	Ethiopia	9.1	8.2	8.4	7.2	8.2	7.7	7.5	8.4	8.5	7.9	9.0	8.1	98.2
21	Uganda	8.8	8.0	8.0	6.6	8.4	7.5	7.7	8.3	7.5	8.6	8.6	8.2	96.3
22	North Korea	8.2	5.3	6.9	4.7	8.5	9.2	9.9	9.3	9.5	8.1	7.4	8.6	95.6
23	Timor-Leste	8.5	8.0	7.1	5.8	7.3	7.9	8.8	8.7	6.8	8.3	8.3	9.3	94.9
24	Cameroon	8.0	7.3	7.8	7.8	8.4	7.0	8.8	8.3	8.1	7.8	8.5	6.8	94.6
25	Bangladesh	8.3	6.5	9.2	8.1	8.4	7.7	8.0	8.0	7.1	7.9	8.9	6.2	94.4
26	Liberia	8.3	8.6	6.8	7.0	8.0	8.4	7.0	8.8	6.3	7.3	8.1	9.3	94.0
27	Nepal	7.8	7.4	9.0	5.9	8.7	7.9	7.9	7.7	8.5	7.8	8.0	7.1	93.7
28	Eritrea	8.3	6.8	6.1	7.4	6.5	8.3	8.5	8.4	8.9	7.7	8.1	8.5	93.6
29	Sri Lanka	7.0	8.6	9.4	6.9	8.4	5.3	8.5	6.1	8.6	8.0	9.5	6.8	93.1
30	Sierra Leone	8.9	7.5	6.5	8.0	8.5	8.0	7.7	8.8	6.7	6.0	7.9	7.6	92.1
31	Kyrgyzstan	7.6	6.5	8.3	7.0	7.6	7.6	9.0	6.0	8.0	8.0	8.3	7.9	91.8
32	Congo (Republic)	8.5	7.7	6.0	6.7	8.2	7.3	8.9	8.3	7.5	7.3	6.7	8.2	91.4
33	Malawi	9.1	6.5	6.0	8.1	8.0	8.8	7.9	8.2	7.0	5.2	7.6	8.7	91.2
34	Rwanda	8.9	7.3	8.2	6.8	7.4	7.0	7.1	7.8	8.2	5.8	8.4	8.0	91.0
35	Iran	6.1	7.9	8.5	6.7	7.0	5.4	9.1	5.6	9.0	8.6	9.2	7.0	90.2
36	Togo	8.1	6.5	5.4	7.0	7.9	8.0	8.0	8.5	7.7	7.3	7.8	7.1	89.4
37	Burkina Faso	8.9	6.2	5.5	6.3	8.5	8.0	7.7	8.7	6.4	7.0	7.3	8.0	88.6
38	Cambodia	7.7	5.6	7.2	7.6	6.8	7.2	8.5	8.4	8.0	6.2	8.0	7.4	88.5
39	Tajikistan	7.7	5.9	7.2	6.0	6.8	7.4	8.9	6.9	8.5	7.4	8.6	7.0	88.3
40	Uzbekistan	7.3	5.7	7.4	6.3	8.2	6.8	8.4	6.0	9.0	8.5	8.7	6.0	88.3

41	Equatorial Guinea	8.5	2.7	6.6	7.2	9.1	4.5	9.6	8.1	9.4	8.1	8.2	6.0	88.1
42	Mauritania	8.2	6.8	7.8	5.5	6.5	7.3	7.3	7.9	7.0	7.9	7.9	7.9	88.0
43	Lebanon	6.5	8.5	8.7	6.6	6.8	5.7	7.0	5.8	6.6	8.7	8.8	8.0	87.7
44	Colombia	6.7	8.7	7.5	7.9	8.6	4.1	7.5	5.6	7.2	7.5	8.0	7.7	87.0
45	Egypt	7.1	6.4	8.3	5.7	7.4	6.5	8.6	5.9	8.3	6.8	8.0	7.8	86.8
46	Laos	7.6	5.8	6.5	6.8	5.7	7.2	8.0	7.7	8.5	7.1	8.6	7.2	86.7
47	Georgia	5.8	7.5	8.0	5.5	6.9	6.0	8.4	6.0	6.9	7.9	9.0	8.5	86.4
48	Syria	5.6	8.5	8.7	6.3	7.4	5.8	8.3	5.8	8.6	7.5	7.9	5.5	85.9
49	Solomon Islands	7.9	4.5	6.8	5.1	8.0	7.6	7.9	8.1	6.5	6.7	8.0	8.8	85.9
50	Bhutan	6.6	6.9	7.8	6.8	8.2	6.9	6.6	6.9	7.6	6.2	7.5	7.0	85.0
51	Philippines	7.3	6.5	7.2	6.7	7.1	5.6	8.3	6.1	7.3	8.3	8.5	6.1	85.0
52	Angola	8.6	6.6	6.2	5.9	8.8	4.5	8.5	8.2	7.5	6.2	7.0	6.7	84.6
53	Israel/West Bank	6.8	7.6	9.6	3.8	7.8	4.3	7.3	6.5	7.9	7.0	8.1	7.8	84.4
54	Papua New Guinea	7.4	4.5	6.9	7.4	9.1	6.4	7.5	8.7	6.3	6.6	7.1	6.4	84.2
55	Zambia	8.9	7.6	5.7	6.8	7.3	7.7	7.6	7.8	6.1	5.3	5.8	7.3	83.8
56	Comoros	7.5	4.0	5.3	6.6	5.8	7.6	8.0	8.2	6.6	7.5	8.0	8.7	83.8
57	Mozambique	9.0	4.0	4.6	7.7	7.4	8.2	7.6	8.6	7.0	7.1	5.6	6.7	83.6
58	Madagascar	8.3	4.6	5.2	4.9	7.8	7.6	7.1	8.6	6.0	6.8	8.0	8.3	83.2
59	Bolivia	7.2	4.6	7.7	6.4	8.9	6.5	6.8	7.1	6.3	6.5	8.0	6.9	82.9
60	Dijbouti	7.8	7.2	6.2	5.2	6.8	6.0	7.2	7.2	7.0	6.2	7.5	8.3	82.6
61	Swaziland	9.2	4.6	3.9	5.9	6.5	7.8	8.5	7.5	8.2	6.6	7.0	6.9	82.5
62	Ecuador	5.9	6.4	6.9	7.1	7.7	6.3	7.5	7.2	5.7	7.0	8.2	6.3	82.2
63	Azerbaijan	5.8	7.9	7.5	5.4	6.9	5.5	7.7	5.7	7.2	7.0	7.8	7.5	81.9
64	Indonesia	7.4	6.6	6.6	6.9	7.5	6.4	6.7	6.5	6.3	7.1	7.0	6.5	81.6
65	Tanzania	8.1	7.4	6.1	5.8	6.3	7.4	6.5	8.6	6.2	5.5	6.0	7.4	81.3
66	Moldova	6.1	4.4	6.6	7.5	6.5	6.7	7.6	6.3	6.5	7.8	8.0	7.2	81.2
67	Nicaragua	6.9	4.9	6.0	7.2	8.2	7.3	7.3	7.3	6.0	6.2	6.8	7.1	81.2
68	Fiji	5.9	3.9	7.6	6.9	7.7	7.0	8.6	5.5	6.5	7.0	7.9	6.6	81.1
69	Gambia	7.9	6.4	4.0	6.5	6.6	7.1	7.5	7.0	7.5	6.1	6.8	7.5	80.9
70	Bosnia	5.0	6.8	8.4	5.9	6.8	5.2	7.6	5.0	6.1	7.0	9.2	8.0	80.9
71	Lesotho	9.0	4.6	5.0	6.8	6.1	8.1	6.9	8.2	6.0	5.5	7.0	7.2	80.4
72	China	8.2	6.2	7.9	5.6	8.6	4.4	7.9	6.6	8.8	5.7	6.9	3.3	80.1
73	Guatemala	7.3	5.6	6.9	6.5	7.7	6.5	6.8	6.9	6.9	7.6	6.0	5.3	80.1
74	Benin	8.1	7.1	3.9	6.6	7.2	7.9	6.7	8.5	5.7	6.0	5.0	7.3	80.0
75	Turkmenistan	6.5	4.2	6.6	5.1	7.1	6.0	8.4	6.7	8.7	7.5	7.7	5.2	79.7
76	India	8.0	5.0	8.2	6.2	8.5	5.4	5.8	7.2	5.9	7.8	6.8	4.5	79.3

77	Mali	8.8	5.3	6.0	7.3	6.7	7.8	5.5	8.2	4.9	7.1	4.5	7.2	79.3
78	Honduras	7.6	3.9	5.3	6.6	8.1	7.0	7.3	6.6	6.3	6.5	6.3	6.9	78.3
79	Thailand	6.4	6.6	8.0	4.4	7.2	4.0	8.4	5.0	7.3	7.6	8.5	4.9	78.3
80	Venezuela	6.0	4.8	7.0	6.4	7.3	6.1	7.5	5.8	7.4	7.0	7.3	5.5	78.2
81	Algeria	6.4	6.1	7.8	5.7	6.8	5.2	7.1	6.1	7.5	7.2	6.8	5.3	78.0
82	Russia	6.3	5.1	7.6	5.7	7.6	4.6	7.8	5.3	8.1	7.2	7.8	4.6	77.7
83	Belarus	6.3	3.6	6.8	4.5	6.3	6.2	8.8	5.8	8.0	6.3	8.0	7.0	77.6
84	Dominican Republic	6.5	5.5	6.1	7.9	7.5	5.6	5.8	6.8	6.3	5.8	6.8	6.2	76.9
85	Senegal	7.6	6.4	6.3	6.0	7.2	6.5	5.9	7.8	6.2	6.3	4.5	6.1	76.8
86	Cuba	6.3	5.4	5.1	6.9	6.3	6.0	6.6	5.3	7.4	6.9	6.9	7.5	76.6
87	Morocco	6.4	6.5	6.4	6.4	7.5	6.0	6.9	6.6	6.4	5.9	6.3	4.9	76.3
88	Vietnam	6.7	5.0	5.7	5.7	6.2	6.1	7.5	6.4	7.7	6.0	6.9	6.1	76.1
89	El Salvador	7.6	5.3	5.8	7.1	7.6	6.3	6.5	6.9	6.7	7.0	4.3	4.9	76.0
90	Cape Verde	7.3	4.3	4.2	8.3	6.3	6.3	6.9	6.9	5.7	5.7	5.7	8.2	75.8
91	Maldives	6.0	5.9	4.9	6.8	5.0	6.7	7.4	6.9	7.0	5.7	7.6	5.8	75.6
92	Gabon	6.8	6.2	3.3	6.1	7.9	5.5	7.5	6.7	6.7	5.7	7.1	5.8	75.3
93	Saudi Arabia	6.0	5.8	7.5	3.2	7.0	3.4	7.9	4.2	8.9	7.5	7.9	5.9	75.2
94	Mexico	6.5	4.2	6.1	6.5	7.7	6.0	6.6	5.8	5.9	7.9	5.2	6.7	75.1
95	Jordan	6.4	7.6	6.7	4.7	6.9	5.8	5.7	4.9	6.8	6.0	6.3	6.8	74.5
96	Sao Tome	7.1	4.3	4.8	7.3	6.2	6.9	6.9	7.0	4.9	5.8	6.3	6.9	74.5
97	Serbia	5.3	6.4	7.5	5.0	6.5	5.7	6.5	4.9	5.3	6.5	8.0	6.8	74.4
98	Peru	6.1	4.1	6.8	6.7	8.0	5.1	6.6	6.1	5.2	7.2	6.6	5.1	73.6
99	Guyana	6.4	3.6	5.9	8.4	7.4	6.4	6.5	5.5	5.0	6.3	5.1	6.0	72.6
100	Paraguay	5.9	1.9	6.5	5.5	8.3	5.9	7.9	5.5	6.4	6.4	7.7	4.5	72.4
101	Armenia	5.5	6.6	6.0	6.6	6.2	5.3	6.6	5.0	6.5	5.2	7.0	5.8	72.3
102	Micronesia	7.1	3.5	4.2	8.0	7.2	6.7	6.3	6.9	2.5	5.4	5.6	8.5	71.9
103	Namibia	7.2	5.6	5.3	7.1	8.5	6.3	4.4	6.7	5.5	5.5	3.5	6.2	71.7
104	Turkey	5.9	6.0	8.3	4.5	7.4	5.5	5.9	5.7	5.2	4.0	7.5	5.6	71.5
105	Suriname	6.0	3.5	6.1	7.0	7.5	6.1	6.1	4.9	5.6	5.8	5.8	6.7	71.1
106	Macedonia	4.5	4.6	7.4	6.7	6.8	6.2	6.7	4.2	5.0	6.0	6.7	6.2	71.0
107	Kazakhstan	5.5	3.8	6.0	3.8	5.9	6.2	7.2	5.1	6.9	6.2	7.7	5.9	70.2
108	Tunisia	5.5	3.4	5.6	5.2	6.6	5.0	7.2	5.3	7.7	7.0	6.8	4.8	70.1
109	Samoa	7.0	2.7	4.8	8.3	6.6	5.9	6.2	4.7	4.2	5.5	5.1	8.6	69.5
110	Ukraine	5.3	3.1	6.5	6.3	5.9	6.0	7.4	4.1	5.5	4.0	8.0	6.8	69.0
111	Libya	5.5	4.6	6.0	3.9	6.9	4.6	7.3	4.3	8.3	5.9	7.0	4.4	68.7
112	Malaysia	6.0	4.8	6.7	4.2	6.7	4.9	6.0	5.1	6.9	6.0	6.4	5.0	68.7

113	Botswana	8.9	6.4	4.5	5.6	7.4	6.3	5.0	6.0	5.0	4.1	3.3	5.4	67.9
114	Belize	6.7	5.4	4.4	7.0	6.8	5.7	6.0	5.8	3.8	5.5	4.3	6.3	67.7
115	Ghana	6.8	5.5	5.5	7.6	6.3	6.1	4.8	7.7	4.5	3.0	4.2	5.6	67.7
116	Cyprus	4.4	4.4	7.6	5.3	7.3	5.0	5.0	3.3	3.3	5.3	7.9	8.8	67.6
117	South Africa	8.4	6.7	5.9	4.1	8.2	5.3	5.5	5.5	4.6	4.5	5.9	3.0	67.6
118	Jamaica	6.2	3.4	4.3	6.7	6.2	6.3	6.5	5.9	5.3	6.3	3.7	6.3	67.1
119	Seychelles	5.8	3.9	4.8	4.9	6.6	5.4	6.8	4.1	5.8	6.1	5.7	7.1	67.0
120	Grenada	5.8	3.2	3.9	8.0	6.5	5.7	6.2	4.2	4.3	5.3	5.6	7.7	66.4
121	Albania	5.5	3.1	5.1	6.8	5.4	5.9	6.4	5.0	5.0	5.4	6.3	6.3	66.1
122	Brunei	5.1	3.9	6.2	4.1	7.8	3.4	7.7	3.2	6.7	5.6	7.4	4.7	65.8
123	Brazil	6.1	3.5	6.5	4.5	8.5	3.9	5.9	5.8	5.1	6.5	4.9	3.9	65.1
124	Trinidad	5.3	3.2	4.7	7.7	6.9	4.5	5.5	4.9	5.1	5.5	5.6	4.8	63.7
125	Antigua & Barbuda	5.2	3.0	4.1	7.6	5.9	5.1	5.8	4.3	4.5	4.9	3.7	5.8	59.9
126	Romania	5.1	3.2	6.0	5.0	5.8	5.8	5.9	4.5	4.0	4.1	5.2	5.2	59.8
127	Mongolia	5.5	1.6	4.0	1.9	6.2	5.3	5.9	5.6	6.0	5.0	5.5	7.1	59.6
128	Kuwait	5.1	3.8	4.9	4.3	5.9	4.0	5.7	2.9	6.2	4.5	7.2	5.0	59.5
129	Bahrain	4.5	2.9	6.8	3.1	6.0	3.4	6.9	2.7	5.9	4.8	6.6	5.3	59.0
130	Bulgaria	4.1	3.6	4.3	5.5	5.7	5.3	5.9	4.6	4.3	4.9	5.3	5.5	59.0
131	Panama	6.0	3.9	4.6	4.9	7.4	4.9	4.6	5.2	4.5	5.7	2.5	3.6	57.8
132	Croatia	4.3	5.5	5.5	4.9	5.0	5.9	4.4	3.4	4.3	4.4	4.7	5.0	57.3
133	Bahamas	5.8	2.8	4.4	6.2	6.2	4.8	5.2	4.2	3.2	4.3	4.5	4.9	56.5
134	Montenegro	4.5	4.5	6.4	2.4	4.1	5.2	4.3	3.6	5.0	4.8	6.2	5.3	56.3
135	Lativa	4.2	3.9	4.9	4.8	5.7	5.8	5.3	3.9	3.6	3.3	4.3	4.4	54.2
136	Barbados	4.3	2.9	4.4	6.8	6.3	5.0	3.9	2.9	2.5	4.2	4.2	5.4	52.8
137	Costa Rica	5.1	4.3	4.1	4.1	6.5	4.9	3.5	4.2	3.0	2.5	3.5	4.9	50.6
138	United Arab Emirates	4.1	2.8	4.6	3.0	5.4	4.2	6.5	3.3	5.7	3.0	3.6	4.1	50.4
139	Qatar	4.2	2.7	4.9	3.1	5.0	3.7	6.0	2.3	5.0	3.0	5.0	4.6	49.5
140	Estonia	4.1	3.9	5.4	4.5	4.9	4.3	4.1	2.9	3.0	2.9	5.5	3.9	49.3
141	Oman	5.1	1.5	3.0	1.5	3.0	3.8	5.9	4.4	6.9	5.3	6.3	2.4	49.3
142	Hungary	3.1	3.1	3.5	4.5	5.5	5.4	5.4	3.7	3.0	2.5	4.7	4.3	48.7
143	Greece	4.1	2.6	4.5	4.4	4.3	5.1	4.9	3.8	3.1	3.8	2.5	4.3	47.4
144	Slovakia	3.8	2.3	5.0	5.1	5.2	4.6	3.9	3.6	3.6	2.3	3.7	3.9	47.1
145	Argentina	4.4	2.6	4.9	3.5	6.0	4.4	4.0	3.5	4.0	2.7	3.0	3.8	46.8
146	Poland	4.3	3.5	3.5	5.6	4.7	4.3	4.2	3.3	3.5	2.5	3.6	3.9	46.8
147	Italy	3.6	3.5	5.3	3.2	4.1	4.2	4.7	2.8	3.1	4.9	4.4	2.0	45.8
148	Malta	3.4	5.4	4.0	4.4	4.1	4.1	3.7	2.9	3.4	3.7	2.0	4.4	45.4

149	Lithuania	4.1	3.2	3.7	4.6	5.7	5.3	3.6	2.9	3.1	2.5	2.8	3.8	45.3
150	Mauritius	3.3	1.6	3.5	3.0	5.4	4.5	4.7	3.9	3.5	3.6	3.2	4.0	44.2
151	Spain	3.3	2.9	6.0	1.9	4.7	4.5	2.1	2.4	2.6	4.9	5.6	2.2	43.1
152	Czech Republic	3.0	2.8	3.8	4.0	3.8	4.6	3.7	3.9	3.0	2.1	3.8	3.8	42.4
153	Chile	5.0	3.0	3.5	2.8	5.0	4.6	2.1	4.3	3.3	2.5	1.4	3.3	40.7
154	Uruguay	3.9	1.7	2.4	5.3	4.7	3.8	2.5	3.3	2.5	3.7	2.7	3.9	40.4
155	South Korea	3.3	3.0	3.7	4.5	2.3	2.2	3.7	2.2	2.6	1.7	3.6	6.0	38.8
156	Slovenia	3.1	1.7	3.1	3.6	4.7	3.7	3.0	2.8	2.8	3.0	1.1	2.9	35.5
157	Singapore	2.5	0.9	3.0	2.8	3.4	3.6	3.9	2.0	4.7	1.5	4.0	2.8	35.1
158	United States	3.4	2.9	3.6	1.1	5.4	3.7	2.2	2.7	3.3	1.6	3.6	1.3	34.8
159	United Kingdom	2.9	3.3	4.4	2.1	4.2	3.3	1.4	2.2	2.0	2.7	3.6	1.9	34.1
160	Belgium	2.5	2.1	4.4	1.6	4.4	3.6	2.7	2.5	1.6	2.0	4.0	2.6	34.1
161	France	3.3	2.8	5.9	1.8	4.9	3.5	1.6	1.9	2.5	1.9	1.9	2.0	34.0
162	Germany	2.9	4.2	4.7	2.6	4.4	2.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0	33.9
163	Portugal	3.3	2.0	2.5	2.5	3.6	4.8	1.6	3.3	3.3	1.6	1.4	2.5	32.3
164	Japan	3.6	1.1	3.9	1.8	2.3	3.5	2.0	1.7	3.0	2.0	2.6	3.5	31.0
165	Iceland	1.6	1.5	1.0	3.3	2.2	6.2	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.0	1.8	6.0	30.1
166	Netherlands	3.0	3.0	4.4	2.2	2.9	3.2	1.1	1.7	1.0	1.4	2.4	2.1	28.3
167	Australia	3.3	2.8	3.6	1.6	3.9	2.9	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4	28.1
168	Canada	2.9	2.5	3.3	2.4	4.1	2.4	1.2	1.9	1.6	1.5	2.5	1.4	27.7
169	Austria	2.6	2.6	3.8	1.6	4.4	2.3	1.2	1.6	1.5	1.1	2.4	2.2	27.3
170	Luxembourg	1.7	2.1	2.8	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5	1.9	1.0	2.3	3.4	2.6	26.1
171	Ireland	2.3	2.0	1.3	2.4	2.6	3.9	2.0	2.2	1.2	1.6	1.4	2.4	25.3
172	New Zealand	2.0	1.7	3.5	2.4	4.0	3.8	1.1	1.9	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.1	24.8
173	Denmark	2.9	2.1	3.3	2.1	1.7	2.5	1.2	1.6	1.3	1.5	1.0	2.6	23.8
174	Switzerland	2.1	1.9	3.5	2.1	2.8	2.4	1.0	1.6	2.0	1.4	1.0	1.4	23.2
175	Sweden	2.8	2.9	1.3	2.0	2.2	1.9	0.9	1.5	1.6	2.3	1.8	1.6	22.8
176	Norway	2.0	2.0	1.3	1.5	2.1	2.9	1.0	1.4	1.9	1.2	1.2	1.9	20.4
177	Finland	2.0	2.1	1.7	2.5	1.3	2.8	1.0	1.5	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.5	19.7

Rank	Country													Total
1	Somalia	9.6	10.0	9.7	8.3	8.0	9.6	10.0	9.6	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.6	114.3
2	Chad	9.4	9.5	9.8	8.3	9.3	8.5	9.9	9.6	9.6	9.9	9.8	9.7	113.3
3	Sudan	8.8	9.8	9.9	8.7	9.5	6.7	9.9	9.3	9.9	9.8	9.9	9.6	111.8
4	Zimbabwe	9.4	8.6	8.8	9.7	9.4	9.6	9.6	9.4	9.5	9.2	9.5	7.5	110.2
5	Congo (D. R.)	9.9	9.6	8.6	8.0	9.5	8.7	8.8	9.0	9.4	9.8	8.9	9.7	109.9
6	Afghanistan	9.5	9.2	9.7	7.2	8.2	8.3	10.0	8.9	9.2	9.7	9.4	10.0	109.3
7	Iraq	8.5	8.7	9.3	9.3	8.8	7.6	9.0	8.4	9.1	9.5	9.6	9.5	107.3
8	Central African Rep.	9.1	9.3	8.9	6.1	9.2	8.4	9.0	9.2	8.8	9.7	9.1	9.6	106.4
9	Guinea	8.3	7.5	8.2	8.6	8.7	8.9	9.8	9.0	9.5	9.4	9.3	7.8	105.0
10	Pakistan	8.1	8.9	9.4	7.9	8.4	6.2	8.9	7.3	8.9	9.7	9.5	9.3	102.5
11	Haiti	9.3	5.6	7.3	8.6	8.3	9.2	9.3	9.5	8.3	8.2	8.4	9.6	101.6
12	Cote d'Ivoire	8.4	8.0	8.9	8.2	7.9	8.0	9.0	8.3	8.3	8.2	8.5	9.5	101.2
13	Kenya	9.1	8.7	8.9	7.9	8.7	7.4	9.3	8.1	8.0	7.5	8.7	8.4	100.7
14	Nigeria	8.4	5.8	9.5	8.1	9.3	6.9	9.4	9.1	8.8	9.3	9.4	6.2	100.2
15	Yemen	8.6	8.3	8.2	7.2	8.6	7.9	8.7	8.6	8.0	8.9	9.2	7.8	100.0
16	Myanmar	8.5	8.3	8.7	6.3	9.3	8.2	9.6	8.5	9.1	8.2	8.2	6.5	99.4
17	Ethiopia	9.2	7.8	8.6	7.5	8.5	8.0	7.7	8.1	8.7	7.8	9.0	7.9	98.8
18	Timor-Leste	8.6	9.1	7.5	6.1	7.0	8.4	9.1	8.7	7.0	8.8	8.7	9.2	98.2
19	North Korea	8.5	5.6	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.9	9.6	9.5	8.1	7.8	8.2	97.8
19	Niger	9.6	6.5	8.0	6.5	7.8	9.2	8.9	9.7	8.5	7.3	7.6	8.2	97.8
21	Uganda	8.7	8.9	8.5	6.9	8.4	7.2	7.9	8.2	7.6	8.7	8.6	7.9	97.5
22	Guinea-Bissau	8.5	6.8	5.8	7.1	8.4	8.3	9.1	8.8	8.1	8.9	8.9	8.5	97.2
23	Burundi	9.4	8.4	7.8	6.5	8.4	8.2	7.6	9.0	7.7	7.1	7.9	8.7	96.7
24	Bangladesh	8.4	6.7	8.9	8.4	8.8	7.9	8.0	8.3	7.4	8.1	8.9	6.3	96.1
25	Sri Lanka	7.3	9.4	9.6	6.7	8.7	5.9	8.6	6.4	8.8	8.5	9.4	6.4	95.7
26	Nepal	8.1	7.0	9.2	6.2	9.0	8.3	8.1	7.6	8.7	7.7	8.5	7.0	95.4
26	Cameroon	8.2	7.6	7.5	8.1	8.7	7.0	9.0	8.0	7.8	7.8	8.7	7.0	95.4
28	Malawi	9.2	6.5	6.2	8.4	8.3	9.2	8.1	8.6	7.3	5.4	7.8	8.6	93.6
28	Sierra Leone	9.1	7.1	6.7	8.3	8.8	8.6	7.7	9.1	6.8	5.9	7.8	7.7	93.6
30	Eritrea	8.7	7.2	6.1	7.1	6.2	8.6	8.8	8.6	8.4	7.6	7.9	8.1	93.3
31	Congo (Rep.)	8.7	7.7	6.3	6.4	8.1	7.8	9.1	8.6	7.7	7.6	7.1	7.4	92.5
32	Iran	6.4	8.3	8.1	7.1	7.3	5.5	9.0	5.9	9.4	8.9	9.5	6.8	92.2
33	Liberia	8.4	8.2	6.3	6.7	8.3	8.0	7.1	8.5	6.5	6.7	8.1	8.9	91.7
34	Lebanon	6.8	8.9	9.0	7.0	7.2	6.1	7.3	6.0	6.8	8.9	8.8	8.1	90.9

35	Burkina Faso	9.3	6.2	5.9	6.6	8.8	8.0	7.7	8.8	6.6	7.3	7.6	7.9	90.7
36	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.1	7.4	6.6	8.5	7.0	8.5	6.4	9.3	8.8	9.0	6.2	90.5
37	Georgia	6.2	7.8	8.4	5.8	7.2	6.5	9.0	6.4	7.3	8.0	9.1	8.7	90.4
38	Tajikistan	8.0	6.2	6.9	6.3	7.1	7.5	8.9	7.3	8.7	7.3	8.4	6.6	89.2
39	Mauritania	8.5	6.4	8.0	5.2	6.8	7.7	7.5	8.3	7.3	7.9	7.9	7.6	89.1
40	Laos	7.9	5.9	6.8	6.7	5.8	7.3	8.3	8.1	8.7	7.4	8.5	7.3	88.7
40	Rwanda	9.1	7.0	8.5	7.0	7.2	7.0	7.5	7.4	7.5	5.0	8.0	7.5	88.7
40	Cambodia	8.0	5.3	6.9	7.9	7.1	7.7	8.7	8.3	7.7	6.4	7.7	7.0	88.7
43	Solomon Islands	8.3	4.8	7.0	5.4	7.9	8.0	8.1	8.2	6.8	7.0	8.0	9.1	88.6
44	Equatorial Guinea	8.4	2.3	6.8	7.4	8.8	4.7	9.6	8.4	9.4	8.4	8.4	5.9	88.5
45	Kyrgyzstan	7.8	5.2	7.4	7.3	7.9	7.9	8.4	6.3	7.6	7.6	7.4	7.6	88.4
46	Colombia	6.7	9.0	7.2	8.3	8.3	4.6	7.7	5.8	6.9	7.7	8.0	8.0	88.2
47	Togo	8.0	6.2	5.6	7.0	7.6	8.0	7.5	8.4	7.7	7.6	7.6	6.9	88.1
48	Syria	5.9	8.9	8.3	6.6	7.8	6.3	8.6	5.5	8.8	7.6	7.8	5.8	87.9
49	Egypt	7.4	6.7	8.2	6.0	7.4	6.8	8.4	6.1	8.2	6.5	8.1	7.8	87.6
50	Bhutan	7.0	7.3	7.7	7.1	8.5	7.5	6.9	7.3	7.9	5.8	7.7	6.6	87.3
51	Philippines	7.7	6.7	7.6	7.0	7.4	5.8	8.6	6.3	7.5	7.9	8.0	6.6	87.1
52	Comoros	7.5	3.9	5.6	6.4	6.1	7.6	8.2	8.5	6.8	7.5	8.0	9.0	85.1
53	Bolivia	7.6	4.7	7.7	6.7	8.7	6.8	7.1	7.5	6.6	6.5	8.3	6.7	84.9
54	Israel/West Bank	7.0	7.8	9.5	3.8	7.7	4.4	7.3	6.8	7.8	6.5	8.2	7.8	84.6
55	Azerbaijan	6.2	8.1	7.9	5.7	7.3	5.9	8.0	5.5	7.2	7.3	7.9	7.4	84.4
56	Zambia	9.0	7.3	5.4	7.1	7.3	8.0	7.5	8.0	5.9	5.0	6.1	7.3	83.9
56	Papua New Guinea	7.5	4.2	7.1	7.7	9.0	6.3	7.8	8.3	6.3	6.5	7.1	6.1	83.9
58	Moldova	6.4	4.3	6.9	7.8	6.8	7.0	7.9	6.7	6.8	7.8	8.0	7.4	83.8
59	Angola	8.4	6.9	5.9	5.6	9.1	5.0	8.1	8.0	7.3	5.9	6.8	6.7	83.7
60	Bosnia & Herz.	5.3	7.1	8.7	5.6	7.1	5.7	8.0	5.4	5.9	7.2	9.2	8.3	83.5
61	Indonesia	7.2	6.5	6.3	7.3	7.9	6.7	6.9	6.7	6.5	7.3	7.1	6.7	83.1
62	China	8.8	6.6	8.0	5.9	9.0	4.3	8.3	7.0	9.0	5.8	7.2	3.1	83.0
63	Swaziland	9.1	4.2	4.2	6.2	6.2	8.2	8.6	7.6	7.7	6.6	6.9	7.3	82.8
64	Madagascar	8.6	4.8	5.4	5.3	7.7	7.2	7.1	8.6	5.8	6.4	7.7	8.0	82.6
65	Turkmenistan	6.8	4.6	6.3	5.4	7.4	6.6	8.4	7.0	9.0	7.7	7.7	5.6	82.5
65	Nicaragua	6.8	5.0	6.3	6.9	7.9	7.9	7.6	7.6	6.2	6.5	7.0	6.8	82.5
67	Lesotho	9.2	4.8	5.2	6.7	5.7	8.7	7.2	8.5	6.3	5.9	7.2	6.8	82.2
68	Djibouti	7.9	6.8	5.9	5.5	6.5	6.4	7.2	7.3	6.6	6.0	7.1	8.7	81.9
69	Ecuador	6.3	6.1	6.4	7.5	8.0	6.7	7.4	7.0	5.8	6.6	7.8	6.1	81.7
69	Mozambique	8.8	3.5	4.8	7.8	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.9	7.3	6.2	5.4	6.2	81.7

71	Algeria	6.7	6.5	8.2	6.1	7.1	5.1	7.5	6.5	7.6	7.5	6.8	5.7	81.3
72	Tanzania	8.2	7.3	6.4	6.1	6.7	7.2	6.5	8.3	5.9	5.6	6.0	7.0	81.2
72	Guatemala	7.4	5.6	6.8	6.7	8.0	6.9	7.1	6.8	6.9	7.2	6.3	5.5	81.2
74	Fiji	5.9	4.2	7.4	6.6	7.5	6.7	8.9	5.5	6.7	6.8	8.2	6.1	80.5
75	Gambia	7.6	6.0	4.6	6.2	6.8	7.5	7.6	7.2	7.4	5.8	6.2	7.3	80.2
76	Honduras	7.6	4.1	5.0	6.5	8.3	7.5	7.5	6.9	6.3	7.0	6.8	6.5	80.0
77	Cuba	6.7	5.7	5.5	7.2	6.6	6.3	7.0	5.0	7.5	7.3	7.1	7.5	79.4
78	Mali	8.7	4.8	6.3	7.5	7.0	8.1	5.4	8.5	5.0	7.0	4.0	7.0	79.3
79	India	8.1	5.2	7.8	6.5	8.7	5.1	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.6	6.2	4.9	79.2
80	Russia	6.7	5.4	7.1	6.0	7.9	5.1	8.1	5.5	8.0	6.8	7.6	4.8	79.0
81	Thailand	6.7	6.7	7.8	4.7	7.5	4.3	8.0	5.4	7.0	7.4	8.0	5.3	78.8
82	Belarus	6.7	3.7	6.4	4.8	6.7	6.7	8.7	6.2	7.9	6.2	7.8	6.9	78.7
82	Venezuela	6.3	5.1	6.8	6.7	7.6	5.8	7.2	6.1	7.2	6.7	7.5	5.7	78.7
84	Maldives	6.3	6.4	5.2	7.1	5.3	7.0	7.3	7.1	7.3	6.1	7.4	5.8	78.3
85	El Salvador	8.1	5.7	5.9	7.1	7.9	6.6	6.8	7.0	6.7	6.7	4.5	5.1	78.1
86	Serbia/Kosovo	5.6	6.9	7.8	5.3	6.9	6.2	6.8	5.2	5.6	6.5	8.0	7.0	77.8
87	Saudi Arabia	6.3	6.2	7.8	3.5	7.3	3.1	8.2	4.1	9.1	7.8	7.8	6.3	77.5
88	Cape Verde	7.7	4.1	4.4	8.2	6.0	7.0	7.2	7.4	6.0	5.5	6.1	7.6	77.2
89	Turkey	6.3	6.3	8.0	4.8	7.8	5.8	6.0	5.4	5.5	7.4	7.8	6.0	77.1
90	Jordan	6.8	7.9	6.9	4.8	7.2	6.2	5.9	5.2	7.0	5.9	6.5	6.7	77.0
90	Morocco	6.8	6.6	6.6	6.4	7.6	6.5	7.2	6.6	6.8	5.4	6.2	4.3	77.0
92	Peru	6.4	4.5	6.7	7.0	8.0	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.5	7.4	6.9	5.5	76.9
93	Dominican Republic	6.5	5.1	5.8	8.3	7.8	5.9	5.6	6.9	6.5	5.6	6.8	6.0	76.8
93	Benin	7.7	6.7	4.2	6.7	7.4	7.4	6.4	8.4	5.5	5.3	4.1	7.0	76.8
95	Vietnam	6.9	5.2	5.3	5.9	6.5	6.6	7.3	6.4	7.3	6.0	7.0	6.2	76.6
96	Mexico	6.8	4.1	5.8	6.8	8.0	6.5	6.6	5.8	5.8	7.5	5.5	6.9	76.1
97	Sao Tome	7.5	4.1	5.1	7.0	5.9	7.3	7.3	7.3	5.1	6.0	6.7	6.5	75.8
98	Gabon	7.0	5.9	3.0	6.4	7.9	5.9	7.8	6.6	6.4	5.7	7.2	5.5	75.3
99	Senegal	7.6	6.2	6.1	5.8	7.0	6.2	5.9	7.4	6.0	6.3	4.2	5.9	74.6
100	Namibia	7.5	5.7	5.6	7.5	8.9	6.5	4.8	6.9	5.8	5.6	3.7	6.0	74.5
101	Armenia	5.7	6.9	6.0	7.0	6.5	5.8	6.6	5.3	6.4	5.1	7.0	5.8	74.1
102	Guyana	6.1	3.6	6.2	8.0	7.7	6.9	6.8	5.3	5.2	6.6	5.1	5.5	73.0
103	Macedonia	4.8	4.6	7.6	6.7	7.1	6.6	6.9	4.6	5.1	5.6	6.5	6.6	72.7
103	Kazakhstan	5.8	4.0	5.7	4.1	6.2	6.7	7.5	5.5	7.1	6.3	7.6	6.2	72.7
105	Suriname	6.0	3.7	6.4	6.7	7.7	6.6	6.5	5.1	5.8	6.0	5.8	6.2	72.5
106	Paraguay	6.2	1.5	6.3	5.8	8.0	6.2	8.3	5.8	6.7	5.9	7.5	3.9	72.1

107	Samoa	6.9	3.1	5.1	8.0	6.6	6.2	6.4	5.1	4.5	5.8	5.3	8.1	71.1
108	Micronesia	7.0	3.1	4.5	8.1	6.8	6.4	6.6	6.6	2.8	5.1	5.5	8.1	70.6
109	Ukraine	5.6	3.1	6.9	6.6	6.2	6.3	7.2	4.0	5.3	3.8	7.9	6.6	69.5
110	Malaysia	6.3	5.0	6.6	3.9	7.0	5.1	5.9	5.0	6.8	5.9	6.3	5.4	69.2
111	Libya	5.7	4.3	5.8	4.2	6.9	5.3	7.3	4.2	8.3	5.2	7.1	4.8	69.1
112	Belize	6.5	5.1	4.9	6.7	7.1	6.2	6.2	5.8	3.8	5.7	4.6	6.1	68.7
113	Botswana	9.0	6.6	4.1	5.9	7.7	6.1	5.3	6.4	4.8	4.0	2.9	5.8	68.6
114	Cyprus	4.8	4.5	7.6	5.0	7.6	4.3	5.2	3.4	3.6	5.3	7.9	8.8	68.0
115	Seychelles	6.1	4.3	5.0	4.5	6.9	5.8	7.0	4.5	5.9	5.6	6.0	6.3	67.9
115	South Africa	8.4	7.0	5.6	4.4	8.5	5.0	5.8	5.5	4.7	4.1	5.9	3.0	67.9
117	Brunei Darussalam	5.4	4.2	6.6	3.8	7.8	3.7	7.7	3.5	6.9	5.9	7.4	4.7	67.6
118	Tunisia	5.7	3.4	5.4	5.2	7.0	5.0	6.4	5.7	7.5	6.5	6.0	3.7	67.5
119	Brazil	6.3	3.7	6.2	4.8	8.8	4.0	6.2	6.0	5.4	6.7	5.1	4.2	67.4
119	Jamaica	6.0	2.8	4.5	6.4	6.5	6.8	6.8	6.2	5.5	5.8	4.0	6.1	67.4
121	Albania	5.9	2.8	4.9	7.1	5.7	6.1	6.8	5.6	5.3	5.4	6.0	5.5	67.1
122	Ghana	7.1	5.3	5.2	7.9	6.4	5.8	5.1	7.6	4.7	2.6	4.2	5.2	67.1
123	Grenada	5.8	2.9	4.2	7.6	6.7	6.1	6.4	3.9	4.6	5.4	5.8	7.6	67.0
124	Trinidad and Tobago	5.6	3.1	4.9	7.3	7.2	4.8	5.9	5.2	5.4	6.0	5.6	5.1	66.1
125	Kuwait	5.5	4.1	5.1	4.1	6.1	3.8	6.0	3.1	6.5	4.9	7.2	5.1	61.5
126	Bulgaria	4.5	3.9	4.5	5.8	6.1	5.3	6.0	5.0	4.6	5.1	4.6	5.8	61.2
127	Antigua and Barbuda	4.7	3.4	4.5	7.3	6.1	5.5	5.3	4.6	4.7	4.6	4.0	6.2	60.9
128	Romania	5.4	3.2	5.6	4.9	5.6	5.6	6.0	4.8	4.3	4.1	5.2	5.5	60.2
129	Mongolia	5.6	1.4	4.3	2.3	5.9	5.7	6.2	5.3	6.4	4.8	5.3	6.9	60.1
130	Panama	6.3	3.5	4.4	5.0	7.5	5.6	4.8	5.5	4.5	5.2	3.0	4.0	59.3
131	Croatia	4.7	5.9	5.2	4.6	5.3	6.2	4.8	3.7	4.5	4.4	4.3	5.4	59.0
132	Bahamas	6.2	3.2	4.7	5.8	6.4	5.0	5.5	4.4	2.8	4.8	4.8	5.3	58.9
133	Bahrain	4.5	2.6	6.5	3.5	6.0	4.0	6.7	3.1	5.4	4.7	6.1	5.7	58.8
134	Montenegro	4.9	4.2	6.6	2.7	4.4	4.9	4.5	3.8	5.3	4.5	5.9	5.6	57.3
135	Barbados	4.0	3.2	4.9	6.5	6.7	5.4	4.1	3.1	2.8	4.5	4.5	5.7	55.4
135	Latvia	4.3	4.3	4.6	5.0	6.0	6.3	5.4	4.2	3.5	3.0	4.3	4.5	55.4
137	United Arab Emirates	4.4	3.2	4.7	3.3	5.7	3.9	6.7	3.4	5.9	2.7	4.0	4.5	52.4
138	Costa Rica	5.5	4.6	3.9	4.5	6.5	5.4	3.9	4.1	3.3	2.5	3.2	4.6	52.0
139	Qatar	4.5	3.0	5.2	3.4	5.3	4.1	6.3	2.6	4.7	2.7	5.0	5.0	51.8
140	Estonia	4.5	4.2	5.0	4.1	5.2	5.0	4.5	3.3	3.3	2.6	5.5	3.5	50.7
141	Hungary	3.3	3.1	3.2	4.8	5.9	5.4	5.7	3.6	3.3	2.2	5.0	4.6	50.1
142	Poland	4.7	3.2	3.3	5.9	4.8	5.0	4.5	3.7	3.8	2.4	3.7	4.0	49.0

143	Slovakia	4.1	2.2	4.8	5.2	5.6	5.0	4.1	3.8	3.8	2.1	3.9	4.2	48.8
144	Oman	4.7	1.1	3.0	1.7	2.7	4.5	6.0	4.5	6.7	5.2	6.6	2.0	48.7
145	Malta	3.7	5.8	4.2	4.1	4.4	4.2	4.1	3.2	3.7	4.0	2.0	4.8	48.2
146	Lithuania	4.3	2.9	4.0	5.0	6.0	5.7	3.9	3.2	3.3	2.2	3.2	4.1	47.8
147	Greece	4.5	2.8	4.2	4.5	4.6	4.3	4.6	3.7	3.4	3.4	2.4	3.5	45.9
148	Argentina	4.6	2.2	4.5	3.8	5.8	5.1	3.6	3.7	3.8	2.4	3.2	3.1	45.8
149	Italy	4.0	3.9	4.8	2.8	4.5	4.7	4.5	3.1	3.0	4.2	4.0	2.2	45.7
150	Mauritius	3.7	1.2	3.5	2.6	5.7	4.1	5.1	4.2	3.7	3.7	3.3	3.6	44.4
151	Spain	3.7	2.8	6.3	1.8	5.0	4.4	1.6	2.4	2.5	5.3	5.7	2.0	43.5
152	Czech Republic	3.3	2.8	3.4	4.3	4.1	4.4	3.4	3.6	3.3	2.1	3.3	3.5	41.5
153	South Korea	3.6	3.3	3.9	4.8	2.5	2.8	3.9	2.3	2.8	1.5	3.6	6.3	41.3
153	Uruguay	4.3	1.3	2.0	5.6	5.0	4.0	2.6	3.4	2.5	3.4	3.0	4.2	41.3
155	Chile	4.1	2.6	3.4	2.5	4.5	4.6	1.8	4.0	3.4	2.3	1.5	3.3	38.0
156	Slovenia	3.4	1.4	3.4	3.3	5.0	4.0	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.8	1.3	2.6	36.0
157	Germany	3.3	4.0	4.7	2.6	4.7	3.6	2.1	1.7	2.3	2.2	2.0	2.2	35.4
158	United States	3.1	3.2	3.4	1.1	5.4	4.0	2.5	2.5	3.7	1.6	3.3	1.5	35.3
159	France	3.7	3.1	5.6	1.8	5.3	3.6	1.8	1.5	2.7	1.6	2.0	2.2	34.9
160	Singapore	2.8	0.9	2.9	2.5	3.1	3.7	4.2	1.7	4.4	1.5	4.1	3.0	34.8
161	United Kingdom	3.2	3.0	4.1	1.8	4.5	3.0	1.6	2.3	2.3	2.7	3.2	2.2	33.9
162	Portugal	3.7	1.8	2.6	2.2	3.7	4.7	1.9	3.6	3.5	1.4	1.2	2.8	33.1
163	Belgium	2.6	1.8	4.4	1.3	4.7	3.7	2.3	2.1	1.5	1.8	3.0	2.8	32.0
164	Japan	4.0	1.2	3.6	2.1	2.6	3.5	1.8	1.3	3.2	2.1	2.2	3.7	31.3
165	Iceland	0.8	1.1	1.0	3.0	2.3	7.2	2.0	1.5	1.9	1.1	2.0	5.9	29.8
166	Canada	3.2	2.5	3.1	2.1	4.5	2.5	1.5	1.5	1.9	1.2	2.4	1.5	27.9
166	Netherlands	2.7	3.2	4.7	1.9	3.2	3.0	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.7	2.4	27.9
168	Luxembourg	1.9	1.7	3.2	1.2	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.2	1.3	2.1	3.6	2.3	27.3
168	Australia	3.5	2.5	3.4	1.2	4.2	3.2	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.4	1.5	1.1	27.3
170	Austria	2.7	2.3	3.8	1.2	4.7	2.7	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.1	1.9	2.4	27.2
171	New Zealand	1.5	1.4	3.3	2.1	4.3	4.0	1.0	1.6	1.5	1.1	1.2	0.9	23.9
172	Denmark	2.8	1.7	3.0	1.8	2.0	3.1	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.5	1.0	2.3	22.9
173	Ireland	2.0	1.6	1.0	2.0	2.8	3.3	1.6	2.4	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	22.4
174	Switzerland	2.4	1.5	3.3	1.8	2.6	2.4	1.0	1.4	2.2	1.2	1.0	1.0	21.8
175	Sweden	2.7	2.7	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.2	0.8	1.3	1.8	1.3	1.3	1.6	20.9
176	Finland	2.3	1.7	1.2	2.2	1.7	3.0	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.8	19.3
177	Norway	1.7	1.6	1.3	1.2	2.4	2.6	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.2	1.1	2.1	18.7

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Rank	Country													Total
1	Somalia	9.8	9.9	9.7	8.5	7.7	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.9	10.0	10.0	9.8	114.7
2	Zimbabwe	9.8	9.1	9.1	10.0	9.7	10.0	9.8	9.8	9.9	9.7	9.5	7.6	114.0
3	Sudan	9.0	9.8	9.9	9.0	9.6	7.0	9.8	9.5	9.8	9.7	9.5	9.8	112.4
4	Chad	9.3	9.4	9.8	7.8	9.3	8.3	9.8	9.6	9.5	9.9	9.8	9.7	112.2
5	Congo (D. R.)	9.7	9.6	8.9	8.1	9.3	8.3	8.6	9.2	9.0	9.7	8.7	9.6	108.7
6	Iraq	8.7	8.9	9.7	9.1	8.6	7.6	9.0	8.4	9.3	9.7	9.6	10.0	108.6
7	Afghanistan	9.3	8.9	9.6	7.2	8.4	8.3	9.8	8.9	8.8	9.9	9.1	10.0	108.2
8	Central African Rep.	8.9	9.0	8.6	5.7	9.1	8.4	9.3	9.3	8.9	9.6	9.5	9.1	105.4
9	Guinea	8.5	7.1	8.2	8.6	8.9	8.7	9.8	9.2	9.0	9.4	9.2	8.0	104.6
10	Pakistan	8.3	8.6	9.6	8.3	8.8	6.4	9.1	7.5	8.9	9.5	9.6	9.5	104.1
11	Cote d'Ivoire	8.6	7.8	9.0	8.4	8.1	8.3	9.1	8.0	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.7	102.5
12	Haiti	9.3	5.8	7.3	8.6	8.2	8.9	9.2	9.5	8.5	8.4	8.3	9.8	101.8
13	Myanmar	9.0	8.8	8.9	6.0	9.5	8.2	9.5	9.0	9.0	8.4	8.7	6.5	101.5
14	Kenya	9.0	9.0	8.6	8.3	8.8	7.5	9.0	8.0	8.2	8.0	8.8	8.2	101.4
15	Nigeria	8.5	5.3	9.7	8.3	9.5	6.6	9.2	9.0	8.6	9.4	9.6	6.1	99.8
16	Ethiopia	9.4	8.0	8.2	7.7	8.8	8.3	7.9	8.2	8.5	7.5	8.8	7.6	98.9
17	North Korea	8.5	6.0	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.8	9.6	9.5	8.3	7.8	8.2	98.3
18	Yemen	8.8	7.9	7.7	7.4	8.9	8.2	8.3	8.5	7.7	8.4	9.0	7.3	98.1
19	Bangladesh	8.9	6.9	9.4	8.4	9.0	8.0	8.5	8.0	7.6	8.0	8.9	6.5	98.1
20	Timor-Leste	8.4	9.0	7.3	5.7	6.8	8.4	9.4	8.4	7.0	9.0	8.8	9.0	97.2
21	Uganda	8.7	9.3	8.0	6.5	8.7	7.6	8.0	8.0	7.7	8.2	8.2	8.0	96.9
22	Sri Lanka	7.5	9.3	9.8	6.9	8.5	6.1	9.0	6.6	8.5	9.2	9.2	6.1	96.7
23	Niger	9.5	6.4	8.5	6.3	7.6	9.2	8.7	9.5	8.2	7.4	7.1	8.1	96.5
24	Burundi	9.2	8.1	7.5	6.5	8.4	8.0	7.5	9.0	7.6	7.3	7.7	8.9	95.7
25	Nepal	8.3	6.8	8.7	6.0	9.3	8.5	8.0	7.4	8.7	8.1	8.4	7.2	95.4
26	Cameroon	8.0	7.5	7.2	8.0	8.9	6.9	9.2	8.0	8.0	7.8	8.7	7.1	95.3
27	Guinea-Bissau	8.6	6.5	5.8	7.0	8.5	8.5	8.6	8.7	8.0	8.5	8.0	8.1	94.8
28	Malawi	9.3	6.3	5.9	8.3	8.5	9.1	8.3	8.8	7.5	5.6	7.8	8.4	93.8
29	Lebanon	7.0	9.0	9.2	7.2	7.4	6.3	7.8	6.2	6.9	9.1	9.1	8.3	93.5
30	Congo (Republic)	8.9	7.8	6.5	6.1	8.0	8.0	8.6	8.8	7.9	7.8	7.1	7.6	93.1
31	Uzbekistan	7.9	5.3	7.4	7.0	8.7	7.2	9.0	6.6	9.2	9.0	9.0	6.5	92.8
32	Sierra Leone	8.9	6.9	6.6	8.5	8.4	8.6	7.4	8.7	7.0	6.1	7.7	7.3	92.1

33	Georgia	6.4	8.3	8.5	6.0	7.5	6.0	9.0	6.3	7.5	7.9	8.9	9.5	91.8
34	Liberia	8.6	8.0	6.1	6.8	8.5	8.2	7.0	8.5	6.7	6.9	7.9	8.6	91.8
35	Burkina Faso	9.0	6.0	6.1	6.5	9.0	8.2	7.9	9.0	6.5	7.5	7.6	8.0	91.3
36	Eritrea	8.6	7.0	5.8	6.5	6.0	8.6	8.6	8.6	7.9	7.4	7.7	7.6	90.3
37	Tajikistan	8.2	6.4	6.9	6.5	7.3	7.5	8.9	7.6	8.6	7.5	8.4	6.5	90.3
38	Iran	6.5	8.5	7.6	6.8	7.4	5.5	8.3	6.0	8.9	8.6	9.1	6.8	90.0
39	Syria	6.1	9.2	8.2	6.8	8.0	6.8	8.8	5.7	8.6	7.8	7.8	6.0	89.8
40	Solomon Islands	8.0	5.0	7.5	5.0	8.0	8.3	8.3	8.4	7.0	7.2	8.0	8.9	89.6
41	Colombia	6.9	9.2	7.2	8.5	8.5	4.3	7.9	6.0	7.2	7.5	8.0	8.0	89.2
42	Kyrgyzstan	8.0	5.3	7.2	7.5	8.3	7.6	8.3	6.5	7.6	7.7	7.3	7.8	89.1
43	Egypt	7.6	6.9	8.0	6.2	7.6	7.0	8.6	6.4	8.4	6.2	8.1	8.0	89.0
44	Laos	8.2	5.9	7.0	6.6	6.0	7.5	8.2	8.0	8.5	7.6	8.3	7.2	89.0
45	Rwanda	9.3	6.9	8.7	7.2	7.3	7.5	7.9	7.3	7.3	4.6	8.0	7.0	89.0
46	Mauritania	8.7	6.2	8.2	5.0	7.0	7.8	7.0	8.5	7.1	7.9	8.0	7.3	88.7
47	Equatorial Guinea	8.3	2.0	6.8	7.4	9.0	4.4	9.4	8.6	9.2	8.6	8.6	6.0	88.3
48	Bhutan	6.5	7.5	7.9	6.8	8.7	7.5	7.4	7.2	8.4	5.5	7.7	6.2	87.3
49	Cambodia	7.9	5.2	7.0	8.0	7.2	7.5	8.5	7.9	7.4	6.5	7.5	6.7	87.3
50	Togo	7.9	6.0	5.8	6.9	7.5	8.2	7.5	8.3	7.6	7.4	7.3	6.8	87.2
51	Bolivia	7.8	4.9	7.5	6.9	8.7	7.0	7.6	7.7	6.8	6.4	8.2	6.8	86.3
52	Comoros	7.4	3.7	5.5	6.0	6.3	7.8	8.7	8.7	7.0	7.5	7.9	9.8	86.3
53	Philippines	7.2	6.3	7.5	7.2	7.6	6.0	8.5	6.1	7.0	7.7	7.9	6.8	85.8
54	Moldova	6.6	4.2	7.1	8.0	7.0	6.8	8.1	6.7	7.0	8.0	8.0	7.6	85.1
55	Angola	8.6	7.0	6.1	5.5	9.4	4.5	8.0	8.0	7.2	6.2	7.3	7.2	85.0
56	Azerbaijan	6.4	8.2	7.9	5.7	7.4	6.1	8.2	5.5	7.0	7.3	7.9	7.0	84.6
57	China	9.0	6.8	7.9	6.1	9.2	4.5	8.5	7.2	8.9	6.0	7.2	3.3	84.6
58	Israel/West Bank	7.2	8.0	9.3	4.0	7.5	4.1	7.5	7.0	8.0	6.0	8.0	8.0	84.6
59	Turkmenistan	7.0	4.8	6.5	5.6	7.6	6.9	8.5	7.2	8.9	7.6	7.7	6.0	84.3
60	Zambia	9.0	7.1	5.3	7.0	7.1	8.5	7.8	8.4	5.6	5.2	5.7	7.5	84.2
61	Papua New Guinea	7.5	4.0	7.3	7.6	8.9	6.8	7.7	8.1	6.5	6.7	7.1	5.9	84.1
62	Indonesia	7.3	6.7	6.3	7.2	8.1	6.9	6.7	6.7	6.7	7.3	7.3	6.9	84.1
63	Bosnia & Herz.	5.5	7.2	8.2	5.8	7.3	5.5	8.2	5.6	5.4	7.4	8.7	8.5	83.3
64	Nicaragua	7.4	5.2	6.3	6.9	8.1	7.7	7.1	7.8	5.8	6.5	7.2	6.6	82.6
65	Swaziland	9.2	4.0	4.0	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.8	7.8	7.5	6.8	6.9	7.4	82.4
66	Belarus	7.2	4.1	6.9	5.0	7.2	6.6	8.9	6.6	8.0	6.6	8.1	7.1	82.3
67	Lesotho	9.4	4.7	5.2	6.5	5.6	8.4	7.4	8.7	6.5	5.5	6.9	7.0	81.8
68	Madagascar	8.9	5.0	5.6	5.0	7.6	7.4	6.6	8.8	5.9	5.9	7.1	7.8	81.6

69	Ecuador	6.5	6.3	6.3	7.3	8.0	6.4	7.0	6.8	6.0	6.8	7.8	6.0	81.2
70	Tanzania	8.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	6.9	7.5	6.7	8.0	5.8	5.4	6.3	6.8	81.1
71	Russia	7.0	5.9	7.5	6.2	8.1	4.6	8.0	5.7	8.3	6.9	8.0	4.6	80.8
72	Mozambique	8.7	3.2	4.8	7.6	7.4	8.0	7.3	8.9	7.2	6.0	5.6	6.0	80.7
73	Algeria	6.7	6.7	7.7	6.2	7.3	4.6	7.7	6.7	7.6	7.0	6.7	5.7	80.6
74	Djibouti	8.0	6.4	5.7	5.2	6.3	6.6	7.4	7.5	6.2	6.2	6.9	8.2	80.6
75	Guatemala	7.0	5.8	6.7	6.7	8.2	6.6	7.1	6.6	7.0	7.1	6.3	5.5	80.6
76	Cuba	6.9	5.9	5.5	7.2	6.8	6.3	7.5	5.0	7.4	7.5	7.1	7.5	80.6
77	Venezuela	6.8	5.0	7.0	6.9	8.0	5.3	7.2	5.9	7.3	6.9	7.7	5.5	79.5
78	Serbia	5.8	7.3	7.9	5.5	7.4	5.9	7.3	5.2	5.8	6.3	7.9	6.9	79.2
79	Thailand	6.9	6.5	8.0	4.5	7.7	3.8	8.2	5.4	6.9	7.5	8.0	5.8	79.2
80	Gambia	7.2	5.7	4.4	6.4	7.0	7.4	7.8	7.1	6.9	6.0	6.2	6.9	79.0
81	Maldives	6.5	6.5	5.2	7.0	5.2	6.7	7.2	7.3	7.5	6.3	7.4	6.0	78.8
82	Fiji	6.1	4.3	7.3	6.5	7.7	6.3	8.6	5.0	6.1	6.7	8.2	6.0	78.8
83	Mali	8.7	4.6	6.5	7.4	6.9	8.3	5.3	8.4	5.2	6.5	4.0	6.9	78.7
84	Cape Verde	7.9	4.0	4.4	8.2	6.2	7.2	7.4	7.6	6.2	5.7	6.1	7.6	78.5
85	Turkey	6.8	6.6	7.7	5.0	8.0	5.3	6.5	5.3	6.0	7.0	7.8	6.2	78.2
86	Jordan	6.7	7.9	6.8	5.0	7.4	6.5	6.0	5.4	6.9	6.0	6.5	6.8	77.9
87	India	8.3	4.9	7.3	6.7	8.9	5.0	5.5	7.0	6.0	7.1	6.0	5.1	77.8
88	Dominican Republic	6.7	5.3	6.0	8.5	8.0	5.6	5.8	6.7	6.7	5.8	6.8	5.8	77.7
89	Saudi Arabia	6.5	6.0	8.0	3.4	7.0	2.7	8.4	4.3	8.9	8.0	7.8	6.5	77.5
90	Honduras	7.8	4.0	5.0	6.3	8.5	7.2	7.0	7.1	6.3	6.0	6.1	5.9	77.2
91	El Salvador	7.6	5.7	6.2	6.9	7.8	6.3	7.0	6.6	6.9	6.4	4.5	5.3	77.2
92	Peru	6.6	4.5	6.4	7.3	8.2	5.6	6.9	6.3	5.5	7.2	6.9	5.7	77.1
93	Morocco	7.0	6.7	6.8	6.2	7.8	6.5	7.4	6.5	6.7	5.1	6.2	4.2	77.1
94	Vietnam	6.8	5.3	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.7	7.3	6.3	7.2	6.2	7.1	6.0	76.9
95	Sao Tome	8.0	4.0	5.0	7.3	6.1	7.9	7.3	7.5	5.3	5.6	6.3	6.4	76.7
96	Namibia	7.7	5.5	5.8	7.7	9.1	6.1	5.0	7.1	6.0	5.8	3.6	6.2	75.6
97	Benin	7.5	6.2	4.1	7.0	7.4	6.9	6.6	8.0	5.6	5.2	4.3	6.7	75.5
98	Mexico	7.0	4.3	5.9	7.0	8.2	6.1	6.8	6.0	5.5	7.0	5.0	6.6	75.4
99	Gabon	7.2	5.7	3.0	6.0	7.8	5.5	7.3	6.8	6.3	5.9	7.2	5.7	74.4
100	Macedonia	5.0	4.6	7.5	6.9	7.3	6.3	7.4	4.8	5.3	5.8	6.7	6.8	74.4
101	Armenia	5.9	7.2	6.0	6.7	6.5	5.3	7.1	5.4	6.1	5.3	6.9	5.9	74.3
102	Senegal	7.4	6.0	6.3	5.6	7.5	6.5	6.0	7.3	6.0	5.9	4.0	5.7	74.2
103	Suriname	6.2	3.9	6.2	6.9	7.9	6.3	6.7	5.0	6.0	6.2	5.8	6.1	73.2
104	Guyana	6.3	3.5	6.1	7.9	7.9	6.6	6.7	5.5	5.4	6.8	5.1	5.2	73.0

105	Kazakhstan	6.0	3.9	5.5	4.0	6.4	6.4	7.7	5.3	6.8	6.5	7.6	6.4	72.5
106	Paraguay	6.4	1.3	6.5	6.0	7.9	5.9	7.9	6.0	6.9	5.3	7.5	4.4	72.0
107	Micronesia	7.2	3.1	4.5	8.3	7.0	6.6	6.6	6.8	3.0	5.3	5.5	8.0	71.9
108	Samoa	6.5	3.0	5.2	8.2	6.8	5.8	6.6	5.0	4.7	6.0	5.5	8.1	71.4
109	Albania	6.4	2.6	5.4	7.2	5.9	6.5	7.3	5.8	5.8	5.5	5.9	5.7	70.0
110	Ukraine	6.1	3.0	6.9	7.1	6.4	5.5	7.2	4.2	5.5	3.3	7.9	6.6	69.7
111	Belize	7.0	5.0	4.9	6.9	7.3	6.0	6.2	5.7	4.0	5.9	4.6	6.0	69.5
112	Libya	5.9	4.2	5.8	4.0	7.1	5.5	7.1	4.2	8.1	5.4	7.1	5.0	69.4
113	Brazil	6.4	3.9	6.4	5.0	8.9	4.1	6.4	6.0	5.6	6.9	5.1	4.4	69.1
114	Cyprus	5.0	4.5	7.5	5.2	7.8	4.0	5.4	3.6	3.8	5.2	7.9	9.0	68.9
115	Malaysia	6.5	5.2	6.2	3.8	6.9	4.7	6.1	5.2	6.5	6.1	6.1	5.6	68.9
116	Botswana	9.2	6.7	4.3	6.0	7.2	5.6	5.8	6.4	5.0	4.0	2.8	5.8	68.8
117	Jamaica	6.4	2.7	4.5	6.3	6.7	6.6	7.0	6.4	5.7	6.0	4.0	6.3	68.6
118	Brunei Darussalam	5.4	4.4	6.6	4.0	7.8	3.4	7.9	3.6	6.8	6.1	7.4	4.7	68.1
119	Grenada	5.9	2.9	4.5	7.8	6.9	5.9	6.3	4.1	4.7	5.5	5.8	7.6	67.9
120	Seychelles	6.3	4.4	5.0	4.7	6.8	4.8	7.1	4.6	5.9	5.6	6.0	6.5	67.7
121	Tunisia	5.9	3.2	5.4	5.3	7.2	4.9	6.6	6.1	7.4	6.2	6.0	3.4	67.6
122	South Africa	8.4	7.4	5.3	4.3	8.5	4.6	5.5	5.7	4.5	4.3	5.9	3.0	67.4
123	Trinidad	5.8	3.1	4.9	7.1	7.6	4.5	6.1	5.4	5.6	5.7	5.6	5.3	66.7
124	Ghana	7.0	5.1	5.4	8.1	6.6	5.5	5.3	7.2	4.7	2.4	4.2	4.7	66.2
125	Kuwait	5.7	4.2	5.1	4.3	6.1	3.5	6.5	3.5	6.9	5.1	7.2	5.3	63.4
126	Antigua and Barbuda	4.7	3.6	4.3	7.8	6.5	4.8	5.8	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.4	5.9	62.8
127	Mongolia	5.8	1.2	4.3	2.3	5.8	5.9	6.7	5.5	6.6	5.0	5.7	7.1	61.9
128	Bulgaria	4.7	3.8	4.4	6.0	6.3	5.0	6.0	5.0	4.8	5.3	4.6	5.6	61.5
129	Romania	5.6	3.4	5.5	5.1	5.8	5.3	6.2	5.0	4.5	4.3	5.1	5.5	61.3
130	Bahamas	6.7	3.7	5.0	5.7	6.9	4.4	5.5	4.6	3.0	5.3	4.8	5.3	60.9
131	Croatia	4.9	6.1	5.4	4.8	5.5	5.9	4.5	3.9	4.7	4.3	4.3	5.8	60.1
132	Panama	6.6	3.4	4.6	5.0	7.3	5.6	4.7	5.5	4.7	5.1	3.0	4.2	59.7
133	Bahrain	5.0	3.1	6.4	3.7	5.9	3.5	6.9	3.1	5.0	4.4	6.1	5.9	59.0
134	Montenegro	5.1	4.1	6.4	2.5	4.6	4.6	4.7	4.0	5.5	4.7	6.0	5.8	58.0
135	Barbados	4.1	3.3	5.3	7.0	7.1	5.2	4.5	2.8	3.0	5.0	4.5	5.4	57.2
136	Latvia	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.0	6.2	5.5	5.1	4.4	3.7	2.9	4.3	4.0	54.6
137	Costa Rica	5.7	4.5	4.1	4.7	6.7	5.0	4.1	4.0	3.5	2.2	3.2	4.8	52.5
138	Qatar	4.7	3.2	5.2	3.3	5.3	4.4	6.5	2.6	4.5	2.5	5.0	4.7	51.9
139	United Arab Emirates	4.6	3.4	4.7	3.3	5.7	3.2	6.7	3.6	5.8	2.3	4.0	4.5	51.8
140	Estonia	4.7	4.4	4.9	4.0	5.4	4.4	4.7	3.5	3.5	2.5	5.5	3.7	51.2

141	Hungary	3.5	3.0	3.4	5.0	6.1	5.0	5.5	3.8	3.5	2.1	5.0	4.8	50.7
142	Poland	4.9	3.0	3.2	6.1	4.9	4.8	4.4	3.9	4.0	2.3	3.7	4.4	49.6
143	Malta	3.9	6.0	4.0	4.3	4.6	3.9	4.3	3.5	3.6	4.0	1.7	5.0	48.8
144	Slovakia	4.3	2.0	4.3	5.4	5.8	4.6	3.9	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.9	4.4	48.6
145	Lithuania	4.5	2.8	4.2	5.2	6.2	4.7	4.1	3.4	3.5	2.1	3.0	4.3	48.0
146	Oman	4.5	1.0	3.0	1.3	2.3	4.4	6.0	4.5	6.4	5.0	6.6	2.2	47.2
147	Greece	4.5	2.7	4.4	4.7	4.8	4.0	4.5	3.9	3.6	3.5	2.0	3.5	46.1
148	Mauritius	3.9	1.0	3.5	2.4	5.9	4.3	5.3	4.4	3.9	3.6	3.3	3.2	44.7
149	Argentina	4.1	2.0	4.5	4.0	5.5	4.8	3.4	4.2	4.0	2.1	3.1	3.0	44.7
150	Italy	3.8	3.7	4.5	3.0	4.7	4.4	4.3	2.8	2.6	4.0	3.7	2.4	43.9
151	Spain	3.9	2.6	6.2	1.7	5.2	4.0	1.3	2.6	2.7	5.2	5.7	2.2	43.3
152	Czech Republic	3.5	2.7	3.6	4.5	4.3	4.1	3.6	3.8	3.5	2.0	3.3	3.7	42.6
153	South Korea	4.0	3.5	4.1	5.0	2.4	2.1	4.1	2.2	2.7	1.4	3.6	6.5	41.6
154	Uruguay	4.7	1.0	2.0	5.8	5.2	4.1	2.8	3.6	2.5	3.3	2.5	3.7	41.2
155	Chile	4.0	2.5	3.6	2.1	4.4	4.3	2.0	4.2	3.6	2.0	1.5	3.3	37.5
156	Slovenia	3.6	1.3	3.4	3.5	5.2	3.6	3.0	3.2	3.2	2.7	1.3	2.3	36.3
157	Germany	3.5	3.9	4.9	2.8	4.9	3.2	2.3	1.9	2.5	2.1	1.8	2.4	36.2
158	France	3.9	3.0	5.8	2.0	5.5	3.3	1.8	1.5	2.9	1.2	2.0	2.4	35.3
159	United States	3.1	3.7	3.3	1.0	5.3	2.9	3.0	2.3	4.0	1.4	2.5	1.5	34.0
160	Singapore	3.0	1.1	3.1	2.7	3.0	3.2	4.0	1.5	4.3	1.0	4.1	2.8	33.8
161	United Kingdom	3.2	2.8	4.3	1.9	4.7	2.5	1.8	2.2	2.3	2.6	2.9	2.4	33.6
162	Belgium	2.8	1.7	4.9	1.3	4.9	3.2	2.8	2.0	1.7	1.7	3.5	3.0	33.5
163	Portugal	3.9	1.4	2.6	2.3	3.9	4.2	1.6	3.8	3.7	1.1	1.2	3.0	32.7
164	Japan	4.2	1.1	3.8	2.0	2.5	3.1	2.0	1.2	3.4	2.0	2.0	3.9	31.2
165	Iceland	1.0	0.9	1.0	3.2	2.5	6.7	2.2	1.4	2.1	1.0	2.0	5.0	29.0
166	Canada	3.3	2.4	3.0	2.1	4.7	2.0	1.7	1.2	2.1	1.1	2.4	1.7	27.7
167	Luxembourg	2.1	1.5	3.2	1.2	2.5	2.2	2.9	2.4	1.5	2.0	3.6	2.5	27.6
168	Austria	2.9	2.2	3.6	1.1	4.9	2.3	1.6	1.4	1.6	1.0	2.4	2.6	27.6
169	Netherlands	2.9	3.1	4.7	2.1	3.3	2.5	1.4	1.4	1.2	1.0	1.4	2.0	27.0
170	Australia	3.1	2.2	3.4	1.1	4.4	2.8	1.4	1.4	2.5	1.0	1.5	1.1	25.9
171	New Zealand	1.3	1.2	3.2	2.3	4.2	3.6	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.0	1.2	1.1	23.3
172	Denmark	3.0	1.6	3.0	2.0	2.2	2.7	1.3	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.0	2.1	23.2
173	Ireland	1.9	1.5	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.7	1.8	2.3	1.5	1.1	1.3	1.5	21.6
174	Switzerland	2.6	1.3	2.9	2.0	2.6	2.1	1.2	1.6	1.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	21.2
175	Sweden	2.8	2.6	1.3	2.0	2.3	1.6	1.0	1.2	1.6	1.1	1.3	1.8	20.6
176	Finland	2.5	1.6	1.2	2.1	1.9	2.4	0.9	1.1	1.7	0.9	0.9	2.0	19.2

177	Norway	1.9	1.6	1.3	1.1	2.2	2.3	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.9	18.3

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Country													Total
1	Somalia	9.8	9.8	9.5	8.3	7.5	9.4	10.0	10.0	9.9	10.0	10.0	10.0	114.2
2	Sudan	9.0	9.6	10.0	8.8	9.3	7.3	10.0	9.5	9.9	9.8	9.9	9.9	113.0
3	Zimbabwe	9.7	9.0	9.5	10.0	9.6	10.0	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.5	9.3	7.0	112.5
4	Chad	9.1	9.2	9.7	7.8	9.1	8.3	9.7	9.4	9.5	9.8	9.8	9.5	110.9
5	Iraq	9.0	9.0	9.8	9.3	8.5	7.8	9.4	8.5	9.6	9.9	9.8	10.0	110.6
6	Congo (D. R.)	9.6	9.2	8.8	7.9	9.0	8.3	8.3	9.1	8.9	9.6	8.6	9.4	106.7
7	Afghanistan	9.1	8.9	9.5	7.0	8.1	8.5	9.2	8.3	8.4	9.6	8.8	10.0	105.4
8	Cote d'Ivoire	8.4	8.3	9.5	8.4	8.0	8.5	8.9	7.8	9.0	9.2	8.9	9.7	104.6
9	Pakistan	8.0	8.6	9.5	8.1	8.8	6.2	9.5	7.1	9.5	9.6	9.8	9.1	103.8
10	Central African Rep.	9.0	8.8	8.9	5.5	8.8	8.4	9.2	8.6	8.7	9.4	9.4	9.0	103.7
11	Guinea	7.9	7.4	8.5	8.3	8.6	8.6	9.7	9.0	8.9	8.4	8.6	7.9	101.8
12	Bangladesh	9.8	7.1	9.7	8.4	9.0	7.1	9.1	7.8	8.0	8.3	9.6	6.4	100.3
12	Myanmar	8.5	8.5	9.5	6.0	9.0	7.6	9.5	8.3	9.9	9.3	8.7	5.5	100.3
14	Haiti	8.5	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.3	9.0	8.8	8.9	8.9	8.9	9.6	99.3
15	North Korea	8.2	6.0	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.8	9.6	9.7	8.3	7.6	7.9	97.7
16	Ethiopia	8.9	7.5	7.8	7.5	8.6	8.2	7.9	7.5	8.5	7.5	8.9	7.3	96.1
16	Uganda	8.7	9.3	8.3	6.0	8.5	7.6	8.3	7.9	7.9	8.1	7.8	7.7	96.1
18	Lebanon	7.2	9.0	9.4	7.1	7.4	6.3	8.0	6.7	7.0	9.3	9.4	8.9	95.7
18	Nigeria	8.2	5.1	9.4	8.2	9.2	5.9	8.9	8.7	7.5	9.2	9.3	6.1	95.7
20	Sri Lanka	7.0	9.0	9.8	6.9	8.2	6.0	9.2	6.6	8.0	9.3	9.5	6.1	95.6
21	Yemen	8.6	7.2	7.3	7.2	8.8	8.2	8.0	8.3	7.5	8.2	8.9	7.2	95.4
22	Niger	9.5	6.0	9.2	6.0	7.2	9.2	8.4	9.1	7.9	7.5	6.7	7.8	94.5
23	Nepal	8.1	5.5	9.0	6.1	9.2	8.2	8.3	7.0	8.8	8.5	8.3	7.2	94.2
24	Burundi	9.1	8.2	6.7	6.5	8.8	8.0	7.1	9.0	7.5	6.8	7.8	8.6	94.1
25	Timor-Leste	8.1	8.6	7.1	5.3	6.5	8.2	9.0	8.0	6.9	8.8	8.5	8.8	93.8
26	Kenya	8.7	8.5	7.6	8.0	8.1	6.9	8.2	7.4	7.2	7.1	8.4	7.3	93.4
26	Congo (Republic)	8.7	7.7	6.8	6.1	8.1	8.0	8.8	8.8	7.9	7.9	7.2	7.4	93.4
26	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.4	7.1	7.1	8.6	7.7	9.3	6.8	9.2	9.0	9.2	6.3	93.4
29	Malawi	9.0	6.2	6.0	8.2	8.8	9.1	8.0	9.0	7.8	5.4	7.6	7.8	92.9
30	Solomon Islands	8.7	4.8	8.0	5.1	8.0	8.0	8.7	8.5	7.1	7.7	8.8	9.0	92.4
31	Sierra Leone	8.6	7.4	6.9	8.4	8.2	8.7	7.7	8.2	7.0	6.4	7.5	7.3	92.3

32	Guinea Bissau	8.0	6.5	5.4	7.0	8.6	8.2	7.9	8.5	8.0	8.4	7.1	7.7	91.3
33	Cameroon	7.4	7.1	7.1	7.9	8.7	6.1	8.7	7.6	7.4	7.8	8.2	7.2	91.2
34	Liberia	8.1	8.4	6.0	6.5	8.3	8.3	7.0	8.5	6.7	6.7	7.9	8.6	91.0
35	Syria	6.5	9.0	8.0	6.8	8.1	6.8	8.8	5.7	8.8	7.6	7.7	6.3	90.1
36	Burkina Faso	8.6	5.6	6.4	6.6	8.9	8.1	7.6	8.9	6.6	7.6	7.7	7.3	89.9
37	Colombia	6.8	9.2	7.4	8.4	8.4	3.8	7.9	6.0	7.2	8.0	8.3	7.6	89.0
38	Tajikistan	7.9	6.1	6.5	6.4	7.3	7.0	9.2	7.1	8.8	7.8	8.6	6.2	88.9
39	Kyrgyzstan	7.5	5.8	6.8	7.4	8.0	7.5	8.4	6.5	7.9	8.1	7.5	7.4	88.8
40	Egypt	7.5	6.3	7.7	6.2	7.8	6.9	9.0	6.3	8.5	6.1	8.4	8.0	88.7
40	Laos	8.0	5.7	6.8	6.6	5.7	7.1	8.2	8.0	8.9	8.2	8.6	6.9	88.7
42	Equatorial Guinea	7.8	2.0	7.0	7.4	9.2	3.9	9.4	8.3	9.5	9.0	8.5	6.0	88.0
42	Rwanda	9.1	7.0	8.5	7.5	7.4	7.3	8.2	6.8	7.3	4.6	7.8	6.5	88.0
44	Eritrea	8.6	7.1	5.6	6.0	5.9	8.5	8.4	7.9	7.4	7.5	7.2	7.3	87.4
45	Togo	7.7	5.6	6.0	6.5	7.5	8.2	7.2	8.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	6.9	86.8
46	Turkmenistan	7.0	4.5	6.2	5.6	7.3	7.1	8.7	7.7	9.6	8.3	7.9	6.3	86.2
47	Mauritania	8.4	6.2	8.0	5.0	7.0	7.8	6.6	8.1	6.9	7.2	7.6	7.3	86.1
48	Cambodia	7.8	5.7	7.5	8.0	7.2	6.6	8.3	7.6	7.1	6.2	7.2	6.6	85.8
49	Iran	6.5	8.7	7.3	5.0	7.4	4.3	8.0	5.8	8.7	8.5	9.0	6.5	85.7
50	Moldova	7.0	4.7	7.3	8.4	7.2	7.2	8.3	7.0	7.1	6.5	7.7	7.3	85.7
50	Bhutan	6.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	8.7	7.8	7.7	6.7	8.3	4.6	7.7	6.2	85.4
52	Papua New Guinea	7.5	3.5	8.0	7.9	9.0	7.3	7.8	7.8	6.1	7.0	6.7	6.0	84.6
53	Belarus	7.7	4.3	6.7	5.0	7.2	6.7	9.3	6.6	8.8	6.5	8.5	7.1	84.4
54	Bosnia	6.1	8.0	8.5	6.0	7.2	5.5	7.9	5.4	5.3	7.3	8.6	8.5	84.3
55	Bolivia	7.7	4.2	7.3	7.0	8.5	6.4	7.4	7.6	7.0	6.2	8.5	6.4	84.2
56	Angola	8.6	6.9	5.9	5.0	9.0	4.0	8.4	7.6	7.5	6.2	7.5	7.2	83.8
56	Georgia	6.3	6.8	8.1	5.7	6.9	5.4	8.4	5.9	5.9	7.7	8.3	8.4	83.8
58	Israel/West Bank	7.2	8.1	9.0	3.8	7.5	3.9	7.5	7.2	7.9	5.5	8.0	8.0	83.6
59	Philippines	6.9	5.7	7.0	7.2	7.6	5.9	8.3	5.9	6.8	7.4	7.8	6.9	83.4
60	Indonesia	7.0	7.3	5.9	7.5	8.0	6.3	6.8	6.7	6.8	7.1	7.0	6.9	83.3
61	Lesotho	9.1	4.6	5.6	6.0	5.6	8.2	7.6	8.5	6.8	6.3	6.9	6.5	81.7
61	Nicaragua	7.5	5.7	6.5	6.8	8.4	7.5	6.3	7.5	5.4	6.5	7.1	6.5	81.7
63	Zambia	8.8	6.4	5.2	6.7	7.4	8.1	7.8	7.9	5.8	5.5	5.5	6.5	81.6
64	Azerbaijan	6.0	7.8	7.3	5.3	7.0	5.9	8.1	5.5	6.9	7.2	7.5	6.5	81.0
65	Cape Verde	7.9	4.8	4.8	8.2	6.2	7.8	7.3	7.2	6.4	5.8	6.4	7.9	80.7
66	Guatemala	6.8	6.0	6.9	6.7	8.0	6.7	7.2	6.6	7.1	7.3	6.0	5.3	80.6
67	Maldives	7.7	6.5	4.9	7.0	4.9	7.1	7.6	7.1	7.7	6.3	7.6	6.0	80.4

68	China	8.8	5.1	7.8	6.3	9.0	4.0	8.3	6.6	8.9	5.2	7.0	3.3	80.3
68	Ecuador	6.2	6.0	6.5	7.3	7.8	5.9	7.1	6.8	6.4	6.7	7.9	5.7	80.3
70	Serbia	6.0	7.3	7.9	5.5	7.5	6.5	7.4	5.0	6.1	6.3	8.0	6.6	80.1
71	Djibouti	7.7	6.4	5.5	5.2	6.2	7.1	7.4	7.3	6.2	6.5	6.9	7.6	80.0
72	Swaziland	8.8	4.0	4.0	5.5	6.1	7.8	8.5	7.5	7.5	6.5	6.9	6.9	80.0
72	Russia	7.0	5.4	7.5	6.5	7.9	3.7	7.9	5.9	8.7	7.0	8.0	4.2	79.7
74	Comoros	6.7	3.6	5.3	6.0	6.1	7.3	8.1	8.5	6.9	7.0	6.7	7.4	79.6
75	Tanzania	7.4	7.0	6.4	6.0	6.9	7.2	6.3	7.6	5.8	5.7	5.8	7.0	79.1
76	Cuba	6.5	4.7	5.5	6.8	7.2	6.1	7.6	4.0	7.8	7.7	7.0	7.7	78.6
77	Dominican Republic	6.5	5.4	6.1	8.3	8.1	5.6	5.8	6.9	7.0	6.1	7.0	5.6	78.4
78	Sao Tome	7.9	4.5	5.1	7.4	6.1	8.3	7.4	7.9	5.3	5.8	6.2	6.4	78.3
79	Venezuela	6.5	5.0	6.8	6.9	8.0	4.6	7.1	6.3	7.4	6.6	7.5	5.2	77.9
80	Algeria	6.1	6.8	7.2	5.9	7.3	4.0	7.5	6.8	7.6	6.7	6.2	5.7	77.8
81	Peru	6.9	4.2	6.9	7.5	8.1	5.7	6.4	6.4	5.5	7.4	7.0	5.5	77.5
82	Jordan	6.7	7.8	6.5	4.7	7.5	6.6	6.0	5.6	6.7	6.0	6.5	6.7	77.3
83	Gambia	6.9	5.8	4.2	6.0	7.0	7.5	7.9	6.6	6.8	5.8	5.9	6.5	76.9
84	Saudi Arabia	6.3	6.2	7.7	3.4	7.0	2.3	8.8	4.3	9.1	7.3	7.7	6.8	76.9
85	Mozambique	7.8	2.2	4.7	7.8	7.2	7.4	7.3	8.0	7.0	5.8	5.6	6.0	76.8
86	Madagascar	8.5	2.5	5.1	5.0	7.2	7.4	6.0	8.7	6.0	5.8	7.0	7.5	76.7
87	Fiji	5.9	4.0	7.5	6.0	7.5	5.9	8.7	4.4	5.9	7.0	8.2	5.6	76.6
88	Morocco	6.6	7.1	6.8	6.2	7.6	6.6	7.3	6.0	6.6	5.1	5.7	4.2	75.8
89	Mali	8.5	4.4	6.1	7.4	6.6	8.5	4.7	8.6	4.6	5.9	3.7	6.6	75.6
89	Thailand	6.8	6.0	7.7	4.4	7.5	3.6	7.7	5.5	6.2	7.0	7.7	5.5	75.6
91	El Salvador	7.4	5.6	6.0	7.0	7.6	6.0	7.0	6.5	7.0	6.3	3.9	5.2	75.5
92	Turkey	6.7	6.2	7.6	5.0	8.2	4.6	6.0	5.2	5.5	6.7	7.5	6.2	75.4
93	Gabon	6.9	6.2	3.0	6.0	8.1	5.2	7.5	7.0	6.5	5.6	7.2	5.8	75.0
94	Honduras	7.2	2.0	5.3	6.5	8.7	7.2	7.4	6.6	6.1	6.2	6.3	5.4	74.9
95	Macedonia	5.4	4.6	7.4	7.0	7.4	6.0	7.6	5.1	5.3	5.8	6.6	6.4	74.6
95	Vietnam	6.6	5.0	5.3	6.0	6.2	6.1	7.2	6.0	7.0	6.4	6.9	5.9	74.6
97	Micronesia	7.7	2.9	5.0	8.6	7.3	6.6	6.9	7.2	2.5	5.7	5.4	8.2	74.0
98	India	8.0	3.2	7.0	6.9	8.9	4.6	4.8	6.7	6.0	6.6	6.0	4.2	72.9
98	Namibia	7.2	5.0	5.4	7.6	8.9	6.0	4.7	7.1	6.0	5.5	3.2	6.3	72.9
100	Benin	6.9	5.2	4.0	6.7	7.4	7.0	6.7	8.1	5.2	5.2	3.8	6.6	72.8
101	Kazakhstan	6.2	3.6	5.2	4.0	6.5	6.0	7.7	5.5	6.8	6.5	7.8	6.6	72.4
101	Samoa	6.8	3.2	5.0	8.2	6.9	6.1	6.7	4.8	4.6	6.3	5.4	8.4	72.4
101	Suriname	6.5	3.9	6.1	6.7	8.3	6.2	6.4	4.9	6.0	6.0	5.4	6.0	72.4

104	Paraguay	6.6	1.3	6.2	6.0	7.7	6.2	8.3	6.0	7.1	5.0	7.7	4.2	72.3
105	Guyana	6.3	3.6	5.7	7.9	7.8	6.4	6.4	5.7	5.4	6.7	5.1	5.2	72.2
105	Mexico	7.0	4.0	5.8	7.0	8.4	6.0	6.1	5.7	5.1	5.8	4.8	6.5	72.2
107	Senegal	7.0	5.5	6.0	5.1	7.1	6.0	5.7	7.0	6.0	6.0	4.0	5.5	70.9
108	Ukraine	6.5	3.2	7.2	7.3	6.7	5.0	7.3	4.5	5.9	3.0	7.9	6.3	70.8
109	Armenia	5.8	7.5	5.0	6.7	6.0	5.6	6.5	6.0	5.5	4.5	6.0	5.6	70.7
110	Belize	6.8	5.5	5.2	6.9	7.6	5.8	6.5	5.7	3.8	5.7	5.0	5.7	70.2
111	Libya	6.2	4.0	5.6	4.0	7.3	5.3	7.4	4.5	8.1	5.6	7.0	5.0	70.0
112	Albania	6.2	2.7	5.4	7.5	6.1	6.3	7.2	5.9	5.4	5.5	5.7	5.8	69.7
112	Cyprus	4.9	4.2	8.3	5.2	7.5	4.2	5.5	3.8	3.5	5.0	8.4	9.2	69.7
114	Seychelles	6.7	4.8	5.4	4.7	6.8	3.9	7.6	4.1	6.3	6.0	6.5	6.7	69.5
115	Grenada	5.7	3.0	4.9	7.9	7.1	5.8	6.5	4.1	4.9	5.4	5.7	8.0	69.0
116	Brunei Darussalam	5.9	4.9	6.7	4.2	7.4	3.2	7.7	3.3	6.8	6.3	7.4	4.7	68.5
117	Brazil	6.3	3.3	6.1	5.0	8.8	3.7	6.2	6.0	5.6	7.1	4.9	4.6	67.6
118	Malaysia	6.3	5.0	5.9	3.6	6.9	4.2	5.9	5.1	6.5	6.3	5.7	5.8	67.2
119	Trinidad	5.5	3.6	5.2	6.7	7.7	4.0	6.4	5.5	5.4	5.7	5.9	5.4	67.0
120	Botswana	9.2	6.0	3.4	6.0	6.9	5.3	5.4	6.2	4.8	3.9	2.8	6.0	65.9
121	Jamaica	6.1	2.4	4.3	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.9	6.0	5.4	5.6	4.0	6.0	65.7
122	Tunisia	5.6	3.4	5.1	5.1	7.2	4.3	6.6	5.9	7.3	5.9	6.2	3.0	65.6
123	Ghana	6.8	5.0	5.1	8.0	6.8	5.0	5.5	6.9	4.5	2.4	3.9	4.7	64.6
124	Antigua and Barbuda	4.9	3.3	4.9	7.9	6.9	4.6	6.0	4.9	5.5	5.2	4.6	5.4	64.1
125	South Africa	8.4	7.0	4.9	4.0	8.5	4.2	5.0	5.7	4.2	3.9	4.4	2.5	62.7
126	Kuwait	5.5	4.4	4.7	4.1	6.1	2.9	6.7	3.3	7.0	5.1	6.9	5.3	62.0
127	Bahamas	6.2	3.6	5.3	5.4	7.2	3.7	5.9	4.3	3.0	5.4	5.3	5.2	60.5
128	Romania	5.3	3.5	5.2	5.2	6.1	5.2	5.9	5.2	4.8	3.4	4.7	5.4	59.9
129	Croatia	5.1	6.3	5.7	5.0	5.5	5.3	4.4	4.1	4.5	3.9	3.9	5.7	59.4
130	Panama	6.4	3.1	4.4	5.0	7.5	5.6	4.6	5.4	4.7	5.0	2.9	4.0	58.6
131	Barbados	4.1	3.3	5.5	6.9	7.0	5.0	5.9	2.6	3.0	5.3	4.8	5.1	58.5
131	Bulgaria	5.1	4.1	4.0	5.7	6.0	4.3	5.4	4.6	4.7	5.2	3.9	5.5	58.5
133	Mongolia	5.8	1.0	4.1	2.1	5.4	5.5	6.0	5.3	6.2	4.8	4.7	6.9	57.8
134	Bahrain	5.3	3.1	6.0	3.7	5.0	3.3	7.0	3.4	4.7	3.7	6.0	5.6	56.8
135	Montenegro	5.4	4.1	6.1	2.5	4.3	4.0	4.3	3.6	5.6	4.6	6.0	5.3	55.8
136	Latvia	4.9	4.9	4.6	5.0	6.0	5.0	4.7	4.2	3.8	3.0	4.4	4.0	54.5
137	Qatar	4.7	3.3	5.3	3.3	5.0	4.6	6.8	2.6	5.0	2.3	4.9	4.9	52.7
138	United Arab	5.0	3.6	4.3	3.4	5.5	2.6	7.0	3.9	5.9	1.9	3.8	4.3	51.2

	Emirates													
139	Estonia	4.8	4.8	5.1	4.0	4.9	3.7	4.8	3.8	3.5	2.6	5.7	3.3	51.0
140	Costa Rica	5.6	4.2	4.0	4.8	6.6	4.6	4.1	3.5	3.5	2.2	3.3	4.5	50.9
141	Hungary	3.7	3.4	3.4	5.0	6.1	4.3	5.7	3.8	4.0	1.9	5.3	4.3	50.9
142	Slovakia	4.3	1.8	4.2	5.3	6.2	4.2	4.0	4.1	4.3	2.0	4.2	4.2	48.8
143	Lithuania	4.9	3.1	3.9	5.4	6.2	4.5	4.4	3.5	3.5	2.0	3.0	4.3	48.7
144	Malta	3.8	6.1	3.9	4.6	4.5	3.5	4.3	3.4	3.5	4.3	1.6	4.8	48.3
145	Poland	4.8	3.0	3.2	6.4	4.8	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.8	2.0	3.3	4.0	47.6
146	Oman	4.6	1.3	3.0	1.1	2.0	3.9	6.3	4.4	6.6	5.3	6.9	2.0	47.4
147	Greece	4.9	2.6	4.3	5.0	5.0	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.9	3.1	1.6	3.7	45.4
148	Mauritius	3.6	1.1	3.5	2.1	5.9	3.8	5.1	4.1	3.9	3.5	3.0	2.8	42.4
149	Czech Republic	3.8	3.1	3.2	4.8	3.9	3.4	3.7	3.8	3.5	2.0	3.5	3.4	42.1
150	Spain	3.9	2.1	6.2	1.6	5.0	3.4	1.4	2.4	2.8	5.2	5.6	2.0	41.6
151	Argentina	3.8	1.5	4.0	4.0	5.2	4.5	3.4	3.9	3.7	1.9	2.7	2.8	41.4
151	Uruguay	5.1	1.1	2.0	5.9	5.1	3.7	2.9	4.0	2.5	3.0	2.3	3.8	41.4
153	South Korea	4.0	3.9	4.0	5.3	2.4	1.6	3.9	2.0	2.7	1.0	3.3	6.5	40.6
154	Italy	3.7	3.5	4.0	3.0	4.5	3.8	3.8	2.5	2.1	3.7	3.3	2.0	39.9
155	Germany	3.9	4.3	4.9	2.8	5.3	2.8	2.3	1.9	2.7	2.5	1.8	2.1	37.3
156	Slovenia	4.0	1.7	3.4	3.5	5.2	3.0	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.0	1.1	2.0	37.1
157	Chile	3.8	2.0	3.9	2.1	4.6	3.7	2.0	3.8	3.9	2.0	1.5	3.0	36.3
158	France	4.1	3.1	6.0	2.0	5.5	3.0	1.7	1.4	3.2	1.0	1.8	2.0	34.8
159	Singapore	2.9	1.1	3.0	2.7	2.9	3.1	4.0	1.5	4.3	1.0	4.0	2.8	33.3
160	United Kingdom	3.0	3.0	4.5	2.0	4.5	1.7	2.0	1.8	2.6	3.0	2.7	2.1	32.9
161	United States	3.5	4.0	3.2	1.0	5.5	2.3	3.0	1.8	4.2	1.3	2.0	1.0	32.8
162	Portugal	4.3	1.0	2.5	2.1	3.6	3.8	1.5	4.0	3.5	1.0	1.3	3.2	31.8
163	Japan	4.3	1.1	3.8	2.0	2.5	2.3	1.8	1.2	3.4	2.0	1.7	3.6	29.7
164	Belgium	3.2	1.6	4.7	1.1	4.6	2.5	1.8	1.4	1.5	1.6	3.0	2.0	29.0
165	Luxembourg	2.1	1.8	3.7	1.2	2.5	1.8	3.3	2.6	1.6	2.0	3.0	2.3	27.9
166	Netherlands	3.4	3.0	4.9	2.2	3.7	2.0	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.0	2.0	27.3
167	Canada	3.3	2.4	3.0	2.1	5.0	1.5	1.5	1.2	2.0	1.0	1.8	1.5	26.3
168	Austria	2.8	2.2	3.5	1.1	4.9	1.9	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.0	2.0	2.3	25.9
169	Australia	2.9	2.0	3.5	1.1	4.4	2.3	1.0	1.4	2.5	0.9	1.5	1.1	24.6
170	Denmark	3.2	1.9	2.5	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	21.5
171	New Zealand	1.1	1.2	2.9	2.1	4.0	3.0	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.1	21.4
172	Iceland	1.0	0.9	1.0	3.2	2.8	3.0	1.3	1.3	2.1	1.0	0.8	2.5	20.9
173	Switzerland	2.9	1.7	2.6	2.0	2.6	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.0	1.0	0.9	20.3

174	Ireland	1.9	1.5	1.0	2.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	19.9
175	Sweden	3.2	3.0	1.3	2.0	2.1	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.0	1.5	19.8
176	Finland	2.6	1.6	1.0	2.1	1.9	2.0	0.9	1.2	1.5	0.9	0.7	2.0	18.4
177	Norway	2.0	1.6	1.0	1.1	2.0	1.8	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	16.8

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Rank	Country													Total
1	Sudan	9.2	9.8	10.0	9.0	9.1	7.7	10.0	9.5	10.0	9.9	9.7	9.8	113.7
2	Iraq	9.0	9.0	10.0	9.5	8.5	8.0	9.4	8.5	9.7	10.0	9.8	10.0	111.4
3	Somalia	9.2	9.0	8.5	8.0	7.5	9.2	10.0	10.0	9.7	10.0	10.0	10.0	111.1
4	Zimbabwe	9.7	8.7	8.8	9.1	9.5	10.0	9.5	9.6	9.7	9.5	9.0	7.0	110.1
5	Chad	9.1	8.9	9.5	7.9	9.0	8.3	9.5	9.1	9.2	9.6	9.7	9.0	108.8
6	Cote d'Ivoire	8.6	8.3	9.8	8.4	8.0	8.9	9.5	7.9	9.2	9.6	9.3	9.8	107.3
7	Congo (D. R.)	9.4	8.9	8.8	7.6	9.1	8.0	8.3	8.7	8.9	9.6	8.6	9.6	105.5
8	Afghanistan	8.5	8.9	9.1	7.0	8.0	8.3	8.8	8.0	8.2	9.0	8.5	10.0	102.3
9	Guinea	7.8	7.4	8.1	8.3	8.5	8.5	9.6	8.9	8.6	8.1	9.0	8.5	101.3
10	Central African Rep.	8.9	8.4	8.8	5.5	8.6	8.4	9.0	8.0	8.2	8.9	9.3	9.0	101.0
11	Haiti	8.6	4.2	8.0	8.0	8.2	8.4	9.2	9.0	9.1	9.3	9.3	9.6	100.9
12	Pakistan	8.2	8.5	9.0	8.1	8.5	5.8	8.7	7.1	8.7	9.5	9.5	8.5	100.1
13	North Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	5.0	8.8	9.6	9.8	9.5	9.7	8.3	7.9	7.9	97.7
14	Myanmar	8.5	8.5	9.1	6.0	8.9	7.6	9.1	8.3	9.8	9.0	8.2	4.0	97.0
15	Uganda	8.1	9.4	8.5	6.0	8.5	7.5	8.5	8.2	8.2	8.3	7.8	7.4	96.4
16	Bangladesh	8.6	5.8	9.6	8.4	9.0	6.9	9.0	7.4	7.8	8.0	9.5	5.9	95.9
17	Nigeria	8.2	5.6	9.5	8.5	9.1	5.4	9.1	8.7	7.1	9.2	9.5	5.7	95.6
18	Ethiopia	9.0	7.9	7.8	7.5	8.6	8.0	7.9	7.0	8.5	7.5	8.9	6.7	95.3
19	Burundi	9.1	8.9	6.7	6.7	8.8	8.2	7.1	8.9	7.5	6.8	7.5	9.0	95.2
20	Timor-Leste	8.1	8.5	7.1	5.3	6.5	8.5	9.5	7.9	6.9	9.0	8.8	8.8	94.9
21	Nepal	8.1	5.2	8.9	6.1	9.2	8.2	8.5	6.6	8.8	8.3	8.5	7.2	93.6
22	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.4	7.1	7.1	8.6	7.5	9.2	6.8	9.0	8.9	9.2	7.0	93.5
23	Sierra Leone	8.6	7.4	7.1	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.0	8.0	7.0	6.5	7.7	7.0	93.4
24	Yemen	8.0	6.7	7.3	7.2	8.7	8.0	7.8	8.1	7.2	8.0	9.0	7.2	93.2
25	Sri Lanka	7.0	8.6	9.5	6.9	8.2	6.0	8.9	6.5	7.5	8.7	9.2	6.1	93.1
26	Congo (Republic)	8.7	7.3	6.8	6.1	8.1	8.3	8.5	8.8	7.9	7.9	7.2	7.4	93.0

27	Liberia	8.1	8.5	6.5	6.8	8.3	8.4	7.0	8.6	6.7	6.9	8.1	9.0	92.9
28	Lebanon	6.9	8.6	9.0	7.0	7.1	6.3	7.3	6.4	7.0	9.0	8.8	9.0	92.4
29	Malawi	9.0	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.8	9.2	7.9	9.0	8.0	5.4	7.5	7.4	92.2
30	Solomon Islands	8.5	4.8	8.0	5.1	8.0	8.0	8.5	8.5	7.1	7.7	8.8	9.0	92.0
31	Kenya	8.4	8.0	6.9	8.0	8.1	7.0	8.0	7.4	7.0	7.1	8.2	7.2	91.3
32	Niger	9.2	5.9	8.9	6.0	7.2	9.2	8.2	8.8	7.1	6.7	6.0	8.0	91.2
33	Colombia	6.8	9.5	7.4	8.4	8.4	3.8	8.2	6.0	7.4	8.3	8.5	7.0	89.7
33	Burkina Faso	8.6	5.6	6.4	6.6	8.9	8.2	7.6	8.9	6.6	7.6	7.7	7.0	89.7
35	Cameroon	7.0	6.8	7.0	7.9	8.7	6.1	8.5	7.5	7.2	7.7	8.0	7.0	89.4
36	Egypt	7.7	6.5	7.8	6.2	7.8	7.0	9.0	6.7	8.5	6.1	8.3	7.6	89.2
36	Rwanda	9.1	7.0	8.7	7.6	7.1	7.5	8.5	6.9	7.4	4.6	8.2	6.6	89.2
38	Guinea Bissau	7.6	6.5	5.4	7.0	8.6	8.0	7.2	8.5	8.0	8.0	6.8	7.2	88.8
39	Tajikistan	7.7	6.1	6.3	6.4	7.3	7.3	9.0	7.3	8.6	7.8	8.8	6.1	88.7
40	Syria	6.5	8.9	8.0	6.8	8.1	6.8	8.5	5.3	8.5	7.4	7.5	6.3	88.6
41	Equatorial Guinea	8.0	2.0	7.0	7.4	9.0	4.0	9.4	8.6	9.4	8.9	8.5	6.0	88.2
41	Kyrgyzstan	7.5	6.2	6.8	7.4	8.0	7.5	8.2	6.3	7.9	7.9	7.5	7.0	88.2
43	Turkmenistan	7.0	4.5	6.2	5.6	7.3	7.4	9.0	7.7	9.6	8.5	8.2	6.5	87.5
44	Laos	8.0	5.5	6.5	6.6	5.7	7.1	7.9	8.0	8.5	8.2	8.6	6.6	87.2
45	Mauritania	8.7	6.2	8.0	5.0	7.0	7.8	6.8	8.1	7.1	7.4	7.9	6.7	86.7
46	Togo	7.5	5.4	6.0	6.5	7.5	8.2	7.7	8.0	7.8	7.8	7.6	6.6	86.6
47	Bhutan	6.5	7.5	7.0	6.7	8.7	7.9	8.0	6.5	8.5	4.6	8.0	6.5	86.4
48	Cambodia	7.6	5.9	7.3	8.0	7.2	6.4	8.5	7.6	7.1	6.2	7.5	6.4	85.7
48	Moldova	7.0	4.7	7.3	8.4	7.5	7.5	7.9	7.1	6.8	6.3	7.5	7.7	85.7
50	Eritrea	8.1	7.1	5.4	6.0	5.9	8.4	8.3	7.7	7.4	7.5	7.2	6.5	85.5
51	Belarus	8.0	4.6	6.5	5.0	7.5	6.8	9.1	6.9	8.5	6.7	8.5	7.1	85.2
52	Papua New Guinea	7.5	3.5	8.0	7.9	9.0	7.3	7.8	7.8	6.1	7.0	6.7	6.5	85.1
53	Angola	8.5	7.5	5.9	5.0	8.7	4.2	8.6	7.7	7.5	6.2	7.5	7.6	84.9
54	Bosnia	6.1	8.0	8.3	6.0	7.2	6.0	7.6	5.6	5.3	7.3	8.3	8.8	84.5
55	Indonesia	7.0	7.5	6.0	7.5	8.0	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	7.3	7.2	6.9	84.4
56	Philippines	7.0	5.7	7.2	6.7	7.6	5.8	8.2	5.9	6.8	7.6	7.8	6.9	83.2
57	Iran	6.2	8.6	7.1	5.0	7.2	3.3	7.8	5.7	8.7	8.3	8.9	6.0	82.8
58	Georgia	6.3	6.8	7.6	5.7	7.0	5.7	7.9	6.1	5.4	7.8	7.8	8.2	82.3
59	Bolivia	7.4	3.7	7.0	7.0	8.5	6.4	7.2	7.4	7.0	6.2	8.3	5.9	82.0
60	Guatemala	7.0	6.0	7.1	6.7	8.0	7.0	7.4	6.6	7.1	7.3	5.9	5.3	81.4
61	Swaziland	8.7	4.0	4.0	5.3	6.0	7.7	8.8	8.1	7.5	7.1	7.1	7.0	81.3
62	Lesotho	9.0	4.5	5.5	5.4	5.5	9.1	7.5	8.9	6.7	6.2	6.7	6.2	81.2

62	Russia	7.5	5.9	7.7	6.5	8.2	3.9	7.6	6.2	8.5	6.8	8.5	3.9	81.2
62	Azerbaijan	6.0	7.5	7.3	5.3	7.4	6.3	7.8	6.0	6.4	7.2	7.5	6.5	81.2
62	China	8.7	5.1	8.0	6.5	9.0	4.0	8.5	6.5	9.0	5.3	7.5	3.1	81.2
66	Cape Verde	7.9	4.8	4.8	8.2	6.2	8.0	7.0	7.4	6.4	6.1	6.4	7.9	81.1
66	Maldives	8.0	7.0	4.9	7.0	4.9	7.3	7.9	7.1	7.7	6.1	7.2	6.0	81.1
66	Serbia	6.0	8.0	7.7	5.5	7.7	6.5	7.5	5.0	6.1	6.3	8.0	6.8	81.1
69	Dominican Republic	6.5	6.4	6.1	8.3	8.1	5.8	6.0	6.9	7.0	6.5	7.4	5.6	80.6
69	Zambia	9.1	6.2	5.2	6.7	7.4	7.9	7.6	7.9	5.8	5.5	5.2	6.1	80.6
71	Djibouti	7.9	6.5	5.5	5.0	6.1	6.9	7.4	7.5	6.0	7.0	6.9	7.6	80.3
72	Nicaragua	6.7	5.1	6.4	7.1	8.6	7.8	6.5	7.0	5.4	6.5	7.2	5.7	80.0
73	Ecuador	6.2	6.0	6.7	7.1	8.0	5.3	7.5	6.8	6.6	6.6	7.6	5.5	79.9
74	Venezuela	6.9	5.2	6.8	6.9	8.2	4.0	7.5	6.3	7.9	6.9	7.5	5.7	79.8
75	Israel	7.0	7.9	9.0	3.5	6.9	3.7	7.3	7.0	7.4	5.3	7.2	7.4	79.6
76	Tanzania	7.4	7.1	6.2	6.0	6.9	7.4	6.3	7.8	6.0	5.7	5.5	7.0	79.3
77	Sao Tome	7.9	4.8	5.1	7.4	6.1	8.5	7.3	8.1	5.3	5.8	5.9	6.4	78.6
77	Cuba	6.5	4.7	5.5	6.0	7.2	6.3	7.6	3.8	7.8	7.7	7.8	7.7	78.6
79	Vietnam	6.5	5.9	5.3	7.0	6.2	6.2	7.0	6.5	6.9	7.4	7.0	5.9	77.8
79	Comoros	6.2	3.6	5.3	5.7	6.1	7.6	7.9	8.7	6.6	6.7	6.5	6.9	77.8
81	Mozambique	7.5	2.2	4.7	8.0	7.2	7.5	7.4	8.0	7.0	5.9	5.6	5.9	76.9
82	Jordan	6.2	6.8	6.5	5.0	7.7	6.6	6.2	5.6	6.2	6.4	6.5	6.9	76.6
83	Madagascar	8.5	3.0	5.1	5.0	7.0	7.5	5.7	8.7	5.7	6.1	6.7	7.5	76.5
83	Saudi Arabia	5.9	7.2	7.7	3.6	6.5	2.3	8.8	4.3	8.8	7.3	7.6	6.5	76.5
85	Peru	6.6	4.0	6.9	7.5	8.1	5.6	6.6	6.2	5.2	7.7	7.0	5.0	76.4
86	Gambia	6.4	5.2	4.2	6.0	7.0	8.0	7.9	6.6	6.8	5.8	5.9	6.2	76.0
86	Morocco	6.6	7.5	6.8	6.2	7.3	6.6	7.8	6.0	6.6	5.2	5.4	4.0	76.0
86	Thailand	7.0	5.8	7.8	4.4	7.5	3.0	8.0	5.5	6.3	7.2	8.0	5.5	76.0
89	Algeria	6.1	6.7	7.0	5.6	7.3	3.5	7.3	7.0	7.4	6.4	5.9	5.7	75.9
90	Fiji	5.9	4.0	7.5	5.4	7.5	5.9	9.0	4.1	5.9	7.0	8.2	5.3	75.7
91	Mali	8.5	4.4	6.1	7.9	6.6	8.7	4.7	8.6	4.6	4.8	3.7	6.9	75.5
92	El Salvador	7.6	5.6	6.0	7.0	7.3	5.4	7.0	6.9	6.9	5.8	3.9	5.5	74.9
92	Turkey	6.9	5.8	7.4	5.0	8.7	4.7	6.1	5.4	5.1	6.7	7.1	6.0	74.9
94	Honduras	7.8	2.0	5.3	6.0	8.7	7.6	7.4	6.6	5.8	5.9	6.3	5.4	74.8
95	Macedonia	5.4	4.7	7.1	7.0	7.4	5.9	7.3	5.1	5.3	6.1	6.4	6.4	74.1
96	Suriname	7.1	4.2	6.1	6.7	8.3	6.9	6.4	4.9	5.7	6.2	5.1	6.3	73.9
97	Samoa	6.8	3.8	5.0	7.9	7.2	6.3	6.7	4.7	4.9	6.7	5.4	8.4	73.8
98	Micronesia	7.7	3.2	5.0	8.1	7.1	6.5	6.9	7.1	2.5	6.0	5.4	8.0	73.5

99	Gabon	6.6	5.7	3.0	6.0	7.8	4.9	7.3	7.0	6.7	5.3	7.2	5.8	73.3
99	Guyana	6.9	4.1	5.4	7.9	8.1	6.8	6.4	5.7	5.6	5.9	4.9	5.6	73.3
101	Paraguay	6.5	1.6	6.2	6.0	7.4	6.7	8.1	6.5	7.9	4.3	7.5	4.2	72.9
102	Mexico	6.9	4.0	6.1	7.0	8.4	6.2	6.1	5.7	5.1	6.1	4.8	6.2	72.6
103	Kazakhstan	5.7	3.0	5.2	4.0	6.2	6.6	7.5	6.1	7.0	6.7	7.7	6.6	72.3
104	Benin	6.5	5.2	4.0	6.9	7.4	7.1	6.4	8.1	4.8	5.2	3.8	6.6	72.0
105	Grenada	5.9	3.6	5.0	7.9	7.1	6.5	6.5	4.1	5.1	5.9	5.7	8.3	71.6
106	Ukraine	6.5	3.6	7.0	7.5	7.0	5.0	7.5	4.5	5.9	3.0	7.9	6.0	71.4
107	Seychelles	6.9	5.0	5.5	4.7	6.9	4.0	7.9	4.1	6.7	6.2	6.7	6.7	71.3
107	Namibia	6.5	5.1	5.4	7.9	8.2	5.9	4.4	7.5	5.7	5.5	3.2	6.0	71.3
109	Brunei Darussalam	6.3	5.6	7.4	4.2	7.9	3.2	7.7	3.3	6.6	6.9	7.4	4.7	71.2
110	India	8.3	3.2	7.0	7.1	8.9	4.6	4.8	6.7	5.4	5.0	5.6	4.2	70.8
111	Albania	6.5	2.7	5.4	7.5	6.1	6.8	7.4	6.2	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.6	70.5
112	Armenia	5.8	7.6	5.0	6.9	6.0	5.0	6.5	6.2	5.5	4.5	5.8	5.5	70.3
113	Cyprus	5.1	4.2	8.3	5.7	7.5	4.8	5.5	3.8	3.5	4.2	8.4	9.2	70.2
114	Belize	6.6	5.2	5.2	6.9	7.6	6.0	6.5	5.7	3.8	5.7	5.0	5.6	69.8
115	Libya	6.2	2.6	5.6	4.0	7.3	5.3	7.4	4.5	8.1	5.3	8.0	5.0	69.3
116	Trinidad and Tobago	5.9	3.8	5.2	6.4	8.1	3.8	6.4	5.8	5.4	5.7	5.7	5.4	67.6
117	Senegal	7.0	4.5	5.2	5.1	6.9	5.7	5.7	6.7	5.6	5.2	3.8	5.5	66.9
117	Brazil	6.6	3.4	6.1	5.0	8.8	3.2	6.2	6.3	5.3	6.9	4.5	4.6	66.9
119	Botswana	9.2	5.8	3.4	6.0	7.0	5.6	5.4	6.5	4.8	3.9	2.8	6.0	66.4
120	Malaysia	6.3	4.1	5.5	3.6	6.6	4.6	5.9	5.4	6.5	6.3	5.3	5.8	65.9
121	Antigua and Barbuda	5.2	3.6	5.2	7.9	7.1	4.8	6.3	4.9	5.5	5.2	4.6	5.4	65.7
122	Tunisia	5.6	3.4	5.1	5.1	7.4	4.3	6.4	5.9	7.3	5.9	6.2	3.0	65.6
123	Jamaica	6.1	2.4	4.3	6.7	6.7	5.4	7.0	5.8	5.4	5.6	3.7	6.0	65.1
124	Kuwait	5.9	4.8	4.5	4.1	6.1	3.1	6.9	3.3	6.5	5.3	7.6	4.0	62.1
125	Ghana	6.0	4.5	5.1	8.0	6.8	4.0	5.5	6.9	4.5	2.4	3.5	4.7	61.9
126	Romania	5.5	3.8	5.2	5.2	6.1	5.7	6.1	5.2	4.8	3.4	4.5	5.4	60.9
127	Croatia	5.3	6.5	6.0	5.0	5.7	5.7	4.2	4.1	4.5	3.9	3.9	5.7	60.5
128	Bulgaria	5.4	4.1	4.2	5.9	6.2	4.3	5.7	5.0	4.7	5.4	3.9	5.5	60.3
129	Bahamas	6.0	3.6	5.3	5.4	7.2	3.2	6.4	4.1	3.0	5.4	5.3	5.2	60.1
130	Barbados	4.1	3.6	5.8	6.9	7.6	5.0	6.1	2.6	3.0	5.3	4.8	5.1	59.9
131	Panama	6.6	3.1	4.4	5.0	7.5	5.8	4.8	5.6	4.7	5.0	2.9	4.0	59.4
132	Mongolia	6.0	1.0	4.1	2.1	5.4	5.2	6.0	5.3	6.7	4.8	4.9	6.9	58.4
133	South Africa	8.2	6.0	4.7	4.0	8.5	2.8	4.3	5.7	4.1	3.2	3.9	2.0	57.4
134	Bahrain	5.3	3.6	6.0	3.7	5.0	3.5	6.8	3.7	4.7	3.4	6.0	5.3	57.0

135	Latvia	5.2	5.7	4.6	5.0	7.0	5.8	4.7	4.0	3.8	2.2	4.4	4.3	56.7
136	Montenegro	5.4	4.1	5.8	2.5	4.3	4.0	4.5	3.6	5.6	4.8	6.0	5.0	55.6
137	Qatar	5.0	3.6	5.6	3.6	4.8	4.9	7.0	2.6	4.7	2.5	4.7	4.6	53.6
138	United Arab Emirates	5.6	3.6	4.0	3.7	5.2	2.6	7.0	4.1	6.1	2.1	3.6	4.0	51.6
139	Hungary	3.7	3.6	3.0	5.0	6.3	4.1	6.0	3.8	4.0	2.1	5.5	4.1	51.2
140	Costa Rica	5.6	4.4	4.0	5.0	6.6	4.8	3.9	2.9	3.5	2.0	3.3	4.5	50.5
140	Estonia	4.8	4.8	4.5	4.0	4.9	3.7	5.0	3.8	3.7	2.1	5.9	3.3	50.5
142	Slovakia	4.3	1.8	4.4	5.5	6.5	4.5	4.2	4.1	3.9	2.0	4.2	3.9	49.3
143	Lithuania	5.4	3.4	3.5	5.4	6.2	4.5	4.2	3.7	3.7	2.0	3.0	4.0	49.0
144	Malta	3.8	6.1	3.9	4.8	4.5	3.5	4.5	3.3	3.5	4.5	1.6	4.5	48.5
145	Poland	4.9	3.0	3.2	6.5	4.8	4.3	4.2	4.2	3.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	47.6
146	Oman	3.1	1.1	3.0	1.1	2.0	3.7	6.3	4.2	6.6	5.3	7.1	2.0	45.5
147	Greece	4.7	2.0	3.5	5.4	5.0	3.5	4.0	3.1	3.9	3.1	1.6	3.7	43.5
148	Mauritius	3.6	1.1	3.5	2.1	5.9	3.8	5.1	4.4	3.9	3.5	3.0	2.8	42.7
149	Czech Republic	4.0	3.3	3.2	5.0	3.9	2.8	3.7	3.8	3.5	2.0	3.5	3.4	42.1
150	Argentina	3.8	1.5	4.0	4.0	5.2	4.6	3.4	3.8	3.7	1.9	2.7	2.8	41.4
151	Uruguay	5.1	1.1	2.0	5.9	5.1	3.5	2.9	4.0	2.5	3.0	2.3	3.5	40.9
152	South Korea	4.0	3.9	3.5	5.5	2.4	1.4	3.9	2.0	2.7	1.0	2.9	6.5	39.7
153	Spain	3.7	1.8	5.7	1.6	5.0	3.4	1.4	1.9	2.8	4.3	5.6	2.0	39.2
154	Germany	3.9	4.8	4.9	3.0	5.5	3.0	2.3	1.7	2.9	2.5	1.8	2.1	38.4
155	Slovenia	4.0	1.7	3.4	3.5	5.4	3.2	3.2	3.5	3.5	3.0	1.1	2.0	37.5
156	Italy	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.0	4.5	3.8	3.7	2.0	1.8	2.5	3.2	2.0	37.1
157	United Kingdom	3.4	4.0	4.2	2.0	4.7	1.4	2.2	1.8	2.6	3.0	2.7	2.1	34.1
157	France	4.1	3.6	5.8	2.0	4.8	2.9	1.5	1.4	3.2	1.0	1.8	2.0	34.1
159	Chile	3.8	1.1	3.5	2.1	4.0	3.8	1.6	3.7	3.7	2.0	1.5	3.0	33.8
160	United States	3.5	5.5	3.2	1.0	5.8	1.8	2.8	1.4	4.6	1.3	1.7	1.0	33.6
161	Singapore	2.9	1.1	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.4	3.6	1.5	4.0	1.0	4.0	3.0	33.0
162	Portugal	4.8	1.1	2.5	2.1	3.9	3.7	1.5	3.7	3.3	1.0	1.3	3.5	32.4
163	Netherlands	3.2	4.0	4.8	2.5	4.0	2.0	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.0	1.0	2.0	28.6
164	Japan	4.1	1.1	3.8	2.0	2.5	2.6	1.8	1.2	3.5	1.0	1.3	3.6	28.5
165	Luxembourg	2.1	1.8	3.7	1.2	2.5	2.0	3.3	2.6	1.6	2.0	3.0	2.3	28.1
166	Austria	2.8	2.2	3.5	1.1	5.0	1.9	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.0	2.0	2.3	26.0
167	Belgium	3.2	1.6	4.0	1.1	4.0	2.1	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.5	2.0	25.5
168	Canada	3.3	2.4	2.0	2.1	5.0	1.5	1.5	1.2	2.0	1.0	1.6	1.5	25.1
169	Australia	2.9	1.6	3.0	1.1	4.4	1.8	1.0	1.4	2.5	0.9	1.5	1.1	23.2
170	Denmark	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.0	1.9	2.1	1.0	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	22.2

171	Iceland	1.0	0.9	1.0	3.2	2.5	3.5	1.3	1.3	2.1	1.0	0.8	2.5	21.1
172	New Zealand	1.1	1.2	2.0	2.1	4.0	3.0	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.1	20.5
173	Switzerland	3.3	1.7	2.1	2.0	2.6	1.5	1.0	1.4	1.7	1.0	1.0	0.9	20.2
174	Ireland	1.6	1.5	1.0	2.1	2.9	2.1	1.5	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	19.5
175	Sweden	3.2	2.8	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.3	1.0	1.2	1.4	0.9	1.0	1.5	19.3
176	Finland	2.5	1.6	1.0	2.1	1.9	2.2	0.9	1.2	1.5	0.9	0.7	2.0	18.5
177	Norway	2.0	1.6	1.0	1.1	2.0	2.1	1.0	1.3	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.5	17.1

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														Total
1	Sudan	9.6	9.7	9.7	9.1	9.2	7.5	9.5	9.5	9.8	9.8	9.1	9.8	112.3
2	Congo (D. R.)	9.5	9.5	9.1	8.0	9.0	8.1	9.0	9.0	9.5	9.8	9.6	10.0	110.1
3	Cote d'Ivoire	8.8	7.6	9.8	8.5	8.0	9.0	10.0	8.5	9.4	9.8	9.8	10.0	109.2
4	Iraq	8.9	8.3	9.8	9.1	8.7	8.2	8.5	8.3	9.7	9.8	9.7	10.0	109.0
5	Zimbabwe	9.7	8.9	8.5	9.0	9.2	9.8	8.9	9.5	9.5	9.4	8.5	8.0	108.9
6	Chad	9.0	9.0	8.5	8.0	9.0	7.9	9.5	9.0	9.1	9.4	9.5	8.0	105.9
7	Somalia	9.0	8.1	8.0	7.0	7.5	8.5	10.0	10.0	9.5	10.0	9.8	8.5	105.9
8	Haiti	8.8	5.0	8.8	8.0	8.3	8.4	9.4	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.6	10.0	104.6
9	Pakistan	9.3	9.3	8.6	8.1	8.9	7.0	8.5	7.5	8.5	9.1	9.1	9.2	103.1
10	Afghanistan	7.9	9.6	9.1	7.0	8.0	7.5	8.3	8.0	8.2	8.2	8.0	10.0	99.8
11	Guinea	7.5	7.2	8.1	8.4	8.0	8.0	9.1	9.0	8.1	8.1	9.0	8.5	99.0
12	Liberia	8.0	9.3	7.0	7.1	8.6	8.9	7.8	9.0	7.2	7.3	8.8	10.0	99.0
13	Central African Rep.	9.0	7.7	8.8	5.5	8.5	8.1	9.0	8.0	7.5	8.9	8.0	8.5	97.5
14	North Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	5.0	9.0	9.5	9.8	9.5	9.5	8.3	8.0	7.5	97.3
15	Burundi	9.0	9.1	7.0	6.7	8.8	7.8	7.2	8.5	7.5	7.3	7.8	10.0	96.7
16	Yemen	7.8	6.7	7.0	8.2	9.0	7.8	8.8	8.2	7.2	9.0	9.4	7.5	96.6
17	Sierra Leone	8.5	7.9	7.1	8.9	8.7	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.7	8.8	96.6
18	Myanmar	8.9	8.8	9.0	6.0	9.0	7.1	9.2	8.2	9.8	9.0	8.0	3.5	96.5
19	Bangladesh	9.0	5.8	9.5	8.5	9.0	7.0	9.0	7.5	7.8	8.3	8.9	6.0	96.3
20	Nepal	8.5	4.8	9.2	6.0	9.2	8.5	9.2	6.2	9.1	9.0	9.0	6.7	95.4
21	Uganda	8.0	9.2	7.8	5.7	8.4	7.5	8.0	8.0	8.0	8.5	7.9	7.5	94.5
22	Nigeria	8.0	5.9	9.1	8.5	9.0	5.4	9.0	8.3	7.1	9.2	9.0	5.9	94.4
23	Uzbekistan	7.7	5.8	7.5	7.5	8.1	7.0	9.3	7.0	9.3	9.1	9.1	7.0	94.4
24	Rwanda	9.5	7.0	9.0	8.2	7.2	8.0	8.7	6.9	7.7	5.0	8.9	6.8	92.9
25	Sri Lanka	8.0	8.2	9.1	6.7	8.0	5.7	8.6	7.0	7.2	8.5	8.9	6.5	92.4

26	Ethiopia	9.0	7.6	7.0	7.5	8.5	8.0	7.6	6.2	8.0	7.5	8.7	6.3	91.9
27	Colombia	7.0	9.1	7.4	8.5	8.5	3.2	8.7	6.5	7.6	9.0	9.2	7.1	91.8
28	Kyrgyzstan	8.0	6.6	7.0	7.5	8.0	7.5	8.3	7.3	7.9	8.3	7.9	6.0	90.3
29	Malawi	9.0	6.0	6.0	7.0	8.8	8.8	8.0	9.0	8.0	5.5	6.7	7.0	89.8
30	Burkina Faso	9.0	5.9	6.5	6.6	8.8	8.2	7.8	8.4	6.5	7.6	7.7	6.7	89.7
31	Egypt	8.0	6.0	8.5	6.0	8.0	7.0	9.0	7.3	8.0	6.5	7.7	7.5	89.5
32	Indonesia	7.5	8.2	6.3	8.3	8.0	6.8	6.7	7.2	7.5	7.5	7.9	7.3	89.2
33	Syria	7.0	7.1	8.0	6.8	8.9	6.5	9.0	5.5	9.0	7.5	7.1	6.2	88.6
34	Kenya	9.0	7.1	6.7	8.0	8.0	6.8	7.3	7.2	6.9	7.0	7.6	7.0	88.6
35	Bosnia & Herz.	6.5	8.5	8.6	6.0	7.3	6.2	8.1	5.8	5.3	7.5	8.7	10.0	88.5
36	Cameroon	6.5	6.8	6.5	8.0	8.7	6.0	8.5	8.0	7.2	7.6	7.9	6.7	88.4
37	Angola	8.0	8.5	6.3	5.0	9.0	4.9	8.8	7.6	7.8	6.8	8.0	7.6	88.3
38	Togo	7.0	5.8	6.0	6.5	7.5	8.0	8.7	8.1	8.1	8.1	7.8	6.7	88.3
39	Bhutan	6.0	8.1	7.0	6.7	9.0	8.0	8.4	6.0	8.6	5.0	8.4	6.7	87.9
40	Laos	8.0	5.9	6.3	6.6	5.9	6.5	7.9	8.0	8.2	9.0	8.9	6.7	87.9
41	Mauritania	9.0	5.9	8.5	5.0	7.0	7.8	7.1	8.2	7.1	7.6	7.9	6.7	87.8
42	Tajikistan	7.0	6.6	6.2	6.5	7.4	6.8	8.9	7.5	8.6	7.5	8.7	6.0	87.7
43	Russia	8.0	7.2	8.0	7.0	8.0	3.7	8.2	6.9	9.1	7.5	9.0	4.5	87.1
44	Niger	9.4	4.3	8.5	6.0	7.2	9.0	7.9	8.5	6.5	6.7	6.0	7.0	87.0
45	Turkmenistan	7.0	4.2	5.2	6.0	7.2	8.0	9.1	7.2	9.7	8.5	8.0	6.0	86.1
46	Guinea-Bissau	7.0	4.9	5.5	7.0	9.3	7.4	7.8	8.0	7.9	7.5	6.5	6.6	85.4
47	Cambodia	7.5	6.5	7.0	8.0	7.2	6.0	7.8	7.5	6.9	6.7	7.5	6.4	85.0
48	Dominican Republic	7.8	7.0	6.5	8.5	8.0	6.0	6.2	8.0	7.1	7.0	7.4	5.5	85.0
49	Papua New Guinea	8.0	2.5	8.0	8.0	9.0	7.0	7.8	8.0	6.1	7.0	6.7	6.5	84.6
50	Belarus	9.0	5.1	5.5	3.5	8.5	6.3	9.0	7.5	7.3	6.8	8.0	8.0	84.5
51	Guatemala	8.7	6.0	7.1	6.7	8.0	7.1	7.5	7.1	7.1	7.5	6.0	5.5	84.3
52	Equatorial Guinea	7.0	2.0	6.7	7.5	9.0	4.0	9.0	8.0	8.5	8.3	8.0	6.0	84.0
53	Iran	6.5	8.7	6.9	5.0	7.5	3.0	8.1	6.1	9.1	8.0	8.8	6.3	84.0
54	Eritrea	8.0	7.2	5.4	6.0	6.0	8.0	8.0	7.3	6.8	7.2	7.5	6.5	83.9
55	Serbia & Mont.	5.7	8.5	8.6	5.5	8.0	6.5	7.8	5.0	5.6	6.5	8.6	7.5	83.8
56	Bolivia	7.5	4.0	7.0	7.0	8.8	6.2	7.0	7.8	6.7	6.5	8.4	6.0	82.9
57	China	8.5	5.1	8.0	6.6	9.2	4.5	8.5	7.3	9.0	5.5	8.0	2.3	82.5
58	Moldova	7.0	4.7	7.3	8.0	7.5	7.5	7.4	7.0	6.8	5.5	6.8	7.0	82.5
59	Nicaragua	6.5	5.5	6.4	7.1	9.0	8.5	7.3	7.2	5.7	6.5	7.0	5.7	82.4
60	Georgia	6.0	6.8	7.4	6.1	7.0	5.5	7.7	6.3	5.6	8.1	7.1	8.6	82.2
61	Azerbaijan	6.0	8.1	7.3	5.0	7.5	5.9	8.1	6.5	6.0	7.0	7.5	7.0	81.9

62	Cuba	7.5	4.7	5.5	6.0	7.9	6.5	7.8	4.0	8.3	8.0	8.0	7.7	81.9
63	Ecuador	6.0	5.6	6.8	7.1	8.0	5.2	8.3	7.4	6.7	6.8	7.8	5.5	81.2
64	Venezuela	7.5	4.8	6.8	7.0	8.0	4.0	7.5	7.0	7.8	7.5	7.3	6.0	81.2
65	Lebanon	6.8	4.3	7.8	7.0	6.8	5.3	6.4	5.0	6.8	7.5	8.3	8.5	80.5
66	Zambia	9.2	5.2	5.2	6.7	7.3	7.6	7.5	7.8	5.8	6.0	5.2	6.1	79.6
67	Israel	7.0	8.5	9.0	3.5	7.0	3.8	7.3	7.0	7.0	4.8	7.5	7.0	79.4
68	Philippines	7.0	5.5	7.2	5.7	7.5	5.3	7.8	6.0	6.1	7.0	7.2	6.9	79.2
69	Peru	6.5	4.6	7.0	7.6	8.0	5.4	6.8	6.4	6.8	8.0	7.1	5.0	79.2
70	Vietnam	7.0	6.5	5.3	7.0	6.2	5.6	7.0	6.6	7.0	7.5	7.0	5.9	78.6
71	Tanzania	7.0	6.8	6.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	6.5	7.8	6.0	6.0	5.2	7.0	78.3
72	Algeria	6.0	6.6	7.1	5.6	7.4	3.5	7.5	7.6	7.5	6.8	6.4	5.8	77.8
73	Saudi Arabia	6.0	6.9	7.9	3.5	7.0	2.0	8.5	4.1	8.5	7.8	7.5	7.5	77.2
74	Jordan	6.0	6.8	6.0	5.0	7.6	6.5	6.8	5.8	6.1	6.8	6.6	7.0	77.0
75	Honduras	8.8	2.1	5.3	6.0	9.0	7.6	7.5	6.9	5.6	6.0	6.4	5.5	76.7
76	Morocco	6.5	8.0	6.9	6.2	7.0	6.5	8.0	5.7	6.6	5.6	5.5	4.0	76.5
77	El Salvador	8.5	6.1	6.0	7.0	7.0	5.0	7.0	7.4	6.7	6.0	3.9	5.5	76.1
78	Macedonia	5.7	5.1	7.1	7.0	7.5	6.0	7.2	5.6	5.3	6.1	6.2	6.3	75.1
79	Thailand	7.5	5.7	8.1	4.3	7.5	2.0	6.8	6.0	6.5	6.8	7.2	6.5	74.9
80	Mozambique	7.0	2.0	4.5	8.1	7.1	7.0	7.4	8.0	6.7	5.5	5.5	6.0	74.8
81	Mali	8.5	4.2	6.0	8.0	6.8	8.5	4.6	8.6	4.7	4.5	3.5	6.7	74.6
82	Turkey	7.2	6.1	7.3	5.0	8.6	4.1	6.1	5.7	5.0	6.4	6.9	6.0	74.4
83	Gambia	6.0	5.0	4.0	6.0	7.0	8.1	7.5	6.5	6.6	5.5	5.8	6.0	74.0
84	Gabon	6.0	5.4	3.0	6.0	7.9	5.0	7.9	7.5	6.2	5.5	7.5	5.7	73.6
85	Mexico	7.2	4.3	6.1	7.0	8.3	6.3	5.9	6.0	5.1	6.0	4.7	6.2	73.1
86	Ukraine	7.0	3.8	7.2	7.5	7.0	4.5	7.0	5.5	5.9	3.0	7.5	7.0	72.9
87	Paraguay	5.0	1.5	6.2	6.0	7.5	6.6	8.0	6.8	8.0	4.5	7.5	4.4	72.0
88	Kazakhstan	5.0	2.9	5.1	4.0	6.2	6.5	7.5	6.7	7.0	6.7	7.7	6.6	71.9
89	Armenia	6.0	7.1	5.0	7.0	6.0	5.1	7.0	6.5	6.0	4.5	5.8	5.5	71.5
90	Benin	6.0	5.1	4.0	6.9	7.3	6.5	6.5	7.8	4.8	5.5	3.8	6.7	70.9
91	Namibia	5.7	4.9	5.5	8.0	8.0	5.5	4.5	7.8	5.8	5.5	3.5	6.0	70.7
92	Cyprus	5.0	3.6	8.6	6.0	7.7	5.0	5.4	4.2	3.5	4.0	8.5	9.0	70.5
93	India	8.8	2.8	6.9	7.1	8.5	5.0	4.8	6.7	5.4	4.5	5.7	4.2	70.4
94	Albania	6.0	2.7	4.5	7.0	6.0	7.0	7.0	6.9	5.5	5.5	4.5	6.0	68.6
95	Libya	6.0	2.1	5.5	4.0	7.3	5.1	7.5	4.5	8.1	5.5	7.9	5.0	68.5
96	Botswana	9.3	6.0	3.5	6.0	6.9	5.0	5.5	6.8	4.9	4.0	3.0	6.0	66.9
97	Jamaica	6.5	2.5	4.5	6.7	6.5	5.0	7.0	6.5	5.6	6.0	3.9	6.1	66.8

98	Malaysia	6.5	4.1	5.5	3.5	6.6	4.3	5.9	5.8	6.5	6.2	5.5	5.7	66.1
99	Senegal	6.8	4.3	5.2	5.0	6.8	5.2	5.8	6.5	6.0	5.5	3.5	5.5	66.1
100	Tunisia	5.7	3.6	5.0	5.0	7.5	3.6	6.5	6.0	7.5	6.0	6.0	3.0	65.4
101	Brazil	6.5	3.6	5.7	5.0	8.5	2.7	5.5	6.7	5.3	5.7	3.2	4.7	63.1
102	Romania	6.5	3.9	5.4	5.5	6.0	5.9	6.2	5.3	4.8	3.5	4.1	5.5	62.6
103	Bulgaria	6.0	4.1	4.0	6.0	6.2	4.3	6.2	5.3	4.9	5.5	4.1	5.5	62.1
104	Croatia	5.7	6.6	6.5	5.0	5.7	5.8	4.2	4.1	4.6	4.0	3.9	5.8	61.9
105	Kuwait	5.7	4.5	4.5	4.0	6.0	2.8	6.8	3.0	6.5	5.5	7.5	4.0	60.8
106	Ghana	5.5	4.5	5.0	8.0	6.8	4.0	5.5	6.8	4.4	2.0	3.5	4.5	60.5
107	Panama	6.5	2.6	4.5	5.0	7.5	5.7	4.9	5.8	4.8	5.3	3.0	4.0	59.6
108	Mongolia	6.0	1.0	4.1	2.0	5.7	4.5	6.2	5.3	6.7	4.7	5.0	7.2	58.4
109	Latvia	5.7	5.9	4.5	5.0	7.0	5.5	4.8	4.0	3.7	2.0	4.1	4.0	56.2
110	South Africa	7.7	5.8	4.5	4.0	8.0	2.2	4.1	6.0	4.0	3.4	4.0	2.0	55.7
111	Estonia	5.0	5.1	4.5	4.0	5.0	3.5	5.0	4.0	3.7	2.0	5.9	3.3	51.0
112	Slovakia	4.5	1.8	4.4	5.5	6.5	4.5	3.8	4.3	4.6	2.0	4.0	4.0	49.9
113	Lithuania	5.7	3.5	3.5	5.5	6.1	4.5	4.1	4.1	3.7	2.0	3.0	4.0	49.7
114	Costa Rica	6.0	4.2	4.0	5.0	6.2	4.5	3.9	2.5	3.5	2.0	3.3	4.5	49.6
115	Poland	5.0	3.2	3.2	6.5	4.7	4.3	4.2	4.3	3.5	2.0	3.0	4.0	47.9
116	Hungary	3.7	3.6	3.0	5.0	6.4	4.0	3.8	4.2	4.0	2.0	3.0	4.0	46.7
117	Oman	2.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	3.5	6.3	3.5	6.5	5.5	7.5	2.0	43.8
118	Mauritius	3.0	1.0	3.5	2.0	6.0	3.1	5.1	4.5	4.7	4.0	3.0	2.0	41.9
119	Czech Republic	4.0	3.5	3.2	5.0	4.0	2.5	3.7	3.9	3.0	2.0	3.5	3.5	41.8
120	Uruguay	5.0	1.0	2.0	6.0	5.0	3.5	3.0	4.0	2.5	3.0	2.5	3.7	41.2
121	Greece	5.0	1.4	3.5	5.5	5.0	3.5	4.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	1.5	3.7	41.1
122	Argentina	3.0	1.4	4.0	4.0	5.2	4.2	3.5	4.0	3.7	2.0	2.8	3.0	40.8
123	South Korea	4.0	4.2	3.5	5.5	2.5	1.0	3.9	1.5	2.8	1.0	3.0	7.0	39.9
124	Germany	4.0	5.0	4.9	3.0	6.2	3.2	2.3	1.8	2.9	2.5	1.8	2.1	39.7
125	Spain	3.2	1.8	5.8	1.5	5.0	3.3	1.5	1.5	2.9	3.2	5.7	2.0	37.4
126	Slovenia	4.0	1.5	3.5	3.5	5.5	3.2	3.2	3.5	3.7	3.0	1.2	1.0	36.8
127	Italy	3.5	2.8	3.5	3.0	4.5	4.0	3.2	1.5	1.8	2.5	2.8	2.0	35.1
128	United States	5.0	6.0	3.0	1.0	6.0	1.5	2.5	1.0	5.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	34.5
129	France	4.0	3.8	6.0	2.0	5.0	3.0	1.5	1.0	3.2	1.0	1.8	2.0	34.3
130	United Kingdom	3.5	3.9	5.0	2.0	5.0	1.0	2.5	1.8	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.0	34.2
131	Portugal	5.0	1.0	2.5	2.0	4.0	3.7	1.5	3.8	3.3	1.0	1.4	3.5	32.7
132	Chile	3.0	1.0	3.5	2.0	4.0	3.4	1.5	3.5	3.6	2.0	1.5	3.0	32.0
133	Singapore	2.0	1.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.3	3.5	1.0	3.5	1.0	4.0	3.0	30.8

134	Netherlands	3.0	4.1	4.8	2.5	4.0	2.0	1.2	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	28.1
135	Japan	4.0	1.0	3.8	2.0	2.5	2.6	1.8	1.0	3.0	1.0	1.3	4.0	28.0
136	Austria	2.5	2.1	3.5	1.0	5.0	1.9	1.3	1.0	1.5	1.0	2.0	3.3	26.1
137	Denmark	3.0	2.5	4.5	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	3.3	24.8
138	Belgium	3.0	1.5	3.5	1.0	4.0	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.5	2.5	24.0
139	Canada	3.0	2.3	2.0	2.0	5.0	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.6	1.0	23.1
140	Australia	2.5	1.5	3.0	1.0	4.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.5	1.0	1.5	1.0	22.0
141	New Zealand	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.0	4.0	2.9	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	19.4
142	Switzerland	3.0	1.5	2.0	2.0	2.5	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	18.7
143	Ireland	2.0	1.4	1.0	2.0	3.0	1.9	1.5	1.3	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	18.6
144	Finland	3.0	1.5	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.2	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	18.2
145	Sweden	3.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	2.0	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	18.2
146	Norway	3.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	1.8	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	1.0	16.8

2005

Rank	Country													Total
1	Cote d'Ivoire	8.0	8.0	7.7	8.8	9.0	7.7	9.8	9.5	9.4	9.0	9.1	10.0	106.0
2	Congo (D. R.)	9.0	9.4	9.0	7.0	9.0	8.0	8.0	9.0	9.1	8.7	9.1	10.0	105.3
3	Sudan	8.6	9.4	7.8	9.1	9.0	8.5	9.2	8.7	8.0	9.8	8.7	7.3	104.1
4	Iraq	8.0	9.4	8.3	6.3	8.7	8.2	8.8	8.9	8.2	8.4	10.0	10.0	103.2
5	Somalia	9.0	8.0	7.4	6.3	9.0	8.3	9.8	10.0	7.8	10.0	8.7	8.0	102.3
6	Sierra Leone	9.0	8.0	7.5	8.9	8.7	10.0	7.5	9.1	8.7	6.3	8.6	9.8	102.1
7	Chad	8.0	9.1	7.1	8.3	9.0	8.0	8.9	9.0	9.1	7.0	9.4	8.0	100.9
8	Yemen	7.8	8.0	6.4	8.2	9.0	8.8	9.8	9.3	6.4	9.0	9.4	7.6	99.7
9	Liberia	9.0	7.8	7.3	8.1	9.0	10.0	7.5	8.2	8.2	6.5	7.9	10.0	99.5
10	Haiti	8.8	8.0	7.7	3.4	9.0	8.1	9.4	9.8	8.7	7.8	8.5	10.0	99.2
11	Afghanistan	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.4	8.8	7.5	8.1	8.1	7.9	8.2	8.0	10.0	99.0
12	Rwanda	9.0	7.8	8.0	8.6	9.0	9.2	9.5	5.0	8.3	5.0	8.9	8.2	96.5
13	North Korea	8.0	6.0	7.2	8.1	9.0	9.6	9.8	9.7	9.0	8.3	8.0	3.0	95.7
14	Colombia	9.0	8.0	6.9	9.2	9.0	7.1	9.8	4.2	8.2	5.4	9.2	9.0	95.0
15	Zimbabwe	9.0	8.0	6.4	7.7	9.0	7.3	7.9	8.5	7.5	9.0	7.9	6.7	94.9
16	Guinea	9.0	6.0	6.1	10.0	9.0	4.5	9.7	7.5	8.1	8.1	9.2	7.5	94.7
17	Bangladesh	8.4	7.0	7.6	6.0	9.0	7.4	9.5	8.2	8.5	8.0	8.7	6.0	94.3
18	Burundi	9.0	7.2	7.1	3.8	8.8	7.8	7.2	9.0	8.3	7.5	8.6	10.0	94.3
19	Dominican Republic	9.0	8.0	7.1	8.5	9.0	6.8	6.8	9.6	9.2	7.0	9.2	4.0	94.2

20	Central African Rep.	9.0	5.0	8.8	3.0	7.0	9.0	9.7	8.0	8.2	9.0	10.0	7.0	93.7
21	Venezuela	8.0	8.0	6.8	7.6	9.0	4.5	9.8	8.2	9.1	7.8	7.2	7.5	93.5
22	Bosnia & Herz.	7.0	8.0	8.6	5.7	9.0	5.7	8.5	6.0	7.3	9.0	8.7	10.0	93.5
23	Myanmar	8.9	8.0	6.3	8.0	9.0	6.9	9.2	8.0	9.6	9.0	7.5	3.0	93.4
24	Uzbekistan	6.5	8.0	6.8	6.8	9.0	6.0	9.1	5.0	9.6	9.0	9.4	8.0	93.2
25	Kenya	9.0	8.0	6.7	8.3	8.8	6.3	8.9	7.4	8.5	8.4	8.4	4.0	92.7
26	Bhutan	8.0	8.0	5.5	8.0	9.0	8.0	9.8	5.0	8.0	6.0	10.0	6.7	92.0
27	Uganda	9.0	7.6	6.9	5.7	8.4	6.0	8.0	8.4	8.3	8.0	8.1	7.3	91.7
28	Laos	9.0	6.7	6.3	8.8	9.0	6.5	7.9	2.5	9.4	9.0	9.7	6.7	91.5
29	Syria	9.0	8.0	7.5	6.8	9.0	5.0	9.0	5.0	7.6	9.0	8.2	7.4	91.5
30	Ethiopia	8.7	8.0	6.0	7.3	9.0	8.5	7.9	5.5	6.3	9.0	8.9	6.0	91.1
31	Guatemala	9.0	6.0	7.4	7.5	9.0	7.7	9.5	5.0	8.7	8.1	9.1	4.0	91.0
32	Tanzania	9.0	7.2	7.6	6.7	8.9	4.5	8.2	7.8	8.6	7.9	7.5	7.1	91.0
33	Equatorial Guinea	8.0	6.0	6.3	9.0	9.0	5.1	9.9	8.0	7.8	7.0	9.8	5.0	90.9
34	Pakistan	5.0	5.0	6.9	8.0	9.0	3.3	9.8	7.5	8.1	9.0	9.3	8.5	89.4
35	Nepal	9.0	8.0	5.6	4.0	9.0	7.1	8.9	6.0	9.1	7.6	8.0	6.7	89.0
36	Paraguay	4.0	5.0	6.9	8.3	9.0	7.8	9.9	7.0	8.3	8.0	8.7	6.0	88.9
37	Lebanon	8.0	8.0	7.5	7.1	7.0	4.7	8.7	4.3	7.3	8.1	9.2	9.0	88.9
38	Egypt	9.0	8.0	7.8	5.0	9.0	3.8	9.5	7.3	7.7	8.5	8.2	5.0	88.8
39	Ukraine	9.0	7.0	6.9	8.8	9.0	7.3	8.9	5.5	8.5	2	9.1	6.8	88.8
40	Peru	6.0	7.0	6.6	9.0	8.5	5.0	9.6	4.4	7.1	9.0	8.9	7.0	88.1
41	Honduras	9.0	6.0	5.3	9.7	9.0	5.4	9.9	3.0	7.2	8.0	9.1	6.0	87.6
42	Mozambique	9.0	8.0	5.7	9.0	8.8	7.8	8.1	6.7	7.4	3.8	8.2	5.0	87.5
43	Angola	7.9	8.6	6.3	3.8	9.0	4.4	7.9	7.2	8.3	7.0	8.1	8.8	87.3
44	Belarus	9.0	8.0	7.0	2.4	9.0	5.4	8.5	7.0	7.3	6.8	9.4	7.5	87.3
45	Saudi Arabia	7.6	6.3	7.8	8.8	9.0	2.2	9.8	4.3	8.6	9.0	8.3	5.4	87.1
46	Ecuador	9.0	6.0	5.6	6.9	9.0	5.0	9.5	7.5	7.9	8.0	8.6	4.0	87.0
47	Indonesia	8.6	7.0	6.3	8.9	9.0	4.0	9.2	4.0	8.6	7.6	8.8	5.0	87.0
48	Turkey	9.0	8.0	7.3	5.0	9.0	4.2	9.7	4.8	5.0	8.0	9.1	7.0	86.1
49	Tajikistan	9.0	5.0	6.2	6.7	9.0	5.3	8.6	5.0	9.4	8.0	9.5	5.0	86.7
50	Azerbaijan	8.0	6.0	6.0	5.8	9.0	4.1	9.7	5.0	8.5	7.0	9.6	7.0	85.7
51	Bahrain	6.0	5.0	6.7	9.0	9.0	1.7	9.7	4.0	8.4	9.0	9.6	7.5	85.6
52	Vietnam	8.6	8.0	5.6	8.5	8.9	3.4	7.6	4.3	8.4	8.0	6.4	7.2	84.9
53	Cameroon	9.0	7.0	5.1	8.6	9.0	4.2	6.4	7.5	6.6	8.0	8.2	5.0	84.6
54	Nigeria	7.2	3.0	6.5	8.7	8.9	5.8	8.8	6.9	6.7	9.0	8.3	4.5	84.3
55	Eritrea	8.0	8.0	5.4	4.0	9.0	8.8	9.0	7.0	5.7	5.0	9.2	5.0	84.1

56	Philippines	7.0	7.0	6.5	8.2	9.0	4.7	9.3	3.8	8.2	7.0	9.2	4.0	83.9
57	Iran	5.0	8.0	7.3	6.0	9.0	3.3	9.1	4.8	8.8	7.3	9.1	6.1	83.8
58	Cuba	5.0	8.0	6.3	5.4	8.8	5.7	7.8	3.8	9.0	9.0	8.6	6.3	83.7
59	Russia	9.0	6.0	7.5	2.3	9.0	3.8	9.4	6.7	9.0	7.6	9.2	4.0	83.5
60	Gambia	7.0	7.0	5.4	4.0	9.0	6.7	8.1	7.0	7.9	6.0	8.3	6.0	82.4
61	Algeria	5.0	9.0	6.4	6.0	9.0	3.0	9.0	5.0	6.6	8.0	9.2	5.0	81.2
62	Brazil	9.0	5.0	5.7	5.9	9.0	2	7.8	8.3	6.7	6.5	8.7	6.4	81.0
63	Libya	7.0	8.0	6.7	7.1	9.0	3.1	8.7	3.0	8.7	8.0	8.4	3.0	80.7
64	Togo	5.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	9.0	3.0	8.9	10.0	7.6	5.0	7.9	5.0	80.4
65	Kyrgyzstan	8.0	5.0	5.4	4.3	9.0	5.8	8.9	5.7	7.9	5.0	9.7	5.7	80.4
66	Serbia & Mont.	7.0	6.0	7.5	4.3	9.0	7.5	6.9	5.0	6.2	6.0	9.6	5.0	80.0
67	Morocco	6.0	8.0	5.9	8.0	9.0	5.7	8.5	1.8	6.3	9.0	8.2	2.5	78.9
68	Kazakhstan	9.0	5.0	7.2	3.8	9.0	2.5	9.1	5.0	8.1	6.0	9.6	4.0	78.3
69	Thailand	9.0	5.0	6.3	4.0	9.0	0.9	8.5	3.5	7.0	9.0	9.2	6.0	77.4
70	Turkmenistan	8.0	5.0	4.9	4.3	9.0	3.1	9.8	6.0	7.6	5.0	9.8	4.0	76.5
71	Tunisia	6.0	8.0	6.2	7.1	9.0	3.6	7.8	4.0	7.3	6.0	8.3	3.0	76.3
72	El Salvador	5.0	5.0	5.6	2.7	9.0	7.5	9.0	3.0	8.0	6.0	9.7	5.0	75.5
73	Mexico	7.1	5.0	6.8	9.2	8.9	2	7.7	7.9	7.3	2.3	8.4	2	74.6
74	Malaysia	7.0	5.0	5.9	5.0	9.0	1.3	8.0	7.7	8.6	6.0	8.3	1.8	73.6
75	China	6.8	5.0	7.4	6.0	9.0	0.5	8.6	2.9	8.9	7.0	8.4	1.8	72.3
76	India	8.0	6.2	5.4	6.7	9.0	5.8	4.0	5.1	5.9	2.4	6.8	4.2	69.5

7.3 Annex 3

Mushrooming Mini States (exerpt from Balkanizing Somalia Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series.,49(5):19280B–19283C, June 2012

The following list of some of the many mini-states gives an idea of the complications that await a government.

Galmudug, which claims to run a combination of the Mudug and Galguduud regions, was first to test this theory of mini-state in 2006. Since that time, it has become a kind of role model for many mini-states claiming to govern areas over which they actually have they have little or no control.

Ximan and Xeeb was established in 2008 and mainly covers parts of the Galguduud regions. One of the oldest of the regional states proclaimed in Somalia, it is dominated by the Saleeban sub clan of Habar Gidir.

Gal-Hiiraan and Xaradhere wants control of Galguduud region and parts of Hiiraan. Its supporters are mainly members of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a (ASWJ).

El-Bur State was created in London in June, 2011 to run the El-Bur district in the Galguduud region of Somalia. Abdullahi Ma'alin Asparo is president of El-Bur state, though Al-Shabab and ASWJ are currently fighting over El-Bur. It is located approximately 375km north of Mogadishu.

Mareeg is a region in Galguduud based on the Ajuuran sultanate in the Middle Ages. It was established in April 2011 and exists in the Galguduud and Mudug regions.

Somali Central state was established in 2011 and claims control over parts of Galguduud and Mudug regions and has links with Ximan and Xeeb. The centre of the regional state is Cabud Waaq and is dominated by the Mareehan clan. It does not yield much political power and has been overshadowed by disagreements with ASWJ, which is currently the most powerful force in Cabud Waaq. Muhammad Hashi Abdi is the president.

Galguduud state was formed in Dubai in April 2011. Its goal is to run the entire Galguduud region, despite the fact that the states of Galmudug, Ximan and Xeeb, Mareeg, El-Bur, Gal-Hiiran and Somali Central state all intend to run their own regions. Abdirashid Muhammad Dirir is the president of Galguduud state.

Waax and Waadi was established in Bristol, Britain in March 2011 to govern Xarardhere, Mareeg, El-Dheer, Masagawa and Galad in Galguduud and the Juba Valley, particularly Turdho and Kowsar. Nur Ali Omar akas Dubad is the president of this administration.

Dooxo state was reportedly established in 2011. Its goal is to govern parts of Galguduud and possibly the Mudug regions. Bashir Abdullahi Abshir is the president of Dooxo.

Bila Quban state was created in April 2011. It wants to govern the area from Fah, located 30km from Xaradhere district, north to the Hurow.

Azania or Jubba

Azania was established in March, 2011 in Kenya and is supported by Kenya, which is interested in helping develop a regional administration and establish a buffer zone against threats from Al-Shabaab. Azania state is led by **Muhammad Abdi Gandhi**, a former Somalia defence minister.

There are significant disagreements between Gandhi and **Ahmed Madobe**, leader of the **Ras Kamboni** group, a pro-government militia supported and trained by Kenya. Ethiopia, however, supports ASWJ and is unhappy about the Azania initiative. This is due to the possible threat from the Ras Kamboni group dominated by Ogaden fighters who could support Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) fighting against the Ethiopian government over the disputed Ogaden region.

Jubbaland (1) (Jubaland) was established in December, 2010 in Minnesota, USA. Its goal is to govern Bay, Bakool, Lower Jubba, Gedo and Middle Jubba regions. Muhammad Rashid Haji Ali is the president of this administration.

Jubbaland (2) (Jubaland) was established in January 2012 is considered a rival regional to the state of Azania. Jubbaland desires to rule Lower Jubba, Gedo and Middle Jubba. Muhammad Farah Du'aaleh is the president, but is not as well known as Muhammad Abdi Gandhi, the leader of Azania. Unlike Azania, Jubbaland has the support of the local people in the regions who are reportedly suspicious of Azania's links with Kenya.

Jubba and Shabelle was founded in July, 2011. It wants control of the Jubba regions in the south and parts of the Bay region. The supporters of this regional state are the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne community and those of Digil and Mirifle. Abdi Osman Omar is the president of this regional state.

Jubba-Ras was created in January, 2011 in Scandinavia. It claims to have a legitimate right to govern the Lower and Middle Jubba regions of Somalia. The supporters of this administration are the Biyo-maal community. Abdikadir Mahmud Yusuf is the president of Jubba-Ras.

Greenland state was founded in Kenya's little Mogadishu district of Eastliegh in Nairobi in November, 2010. Like Jubba-Jasiira, Greenland state wants to rule in Jubba regions of Somalia. Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim Afkule is the president of this administration.

Dooxada Cagaaran state was created in Mogadishu in May, 2011. Ali Muhammad Ibrahim is the president of this administration, which, like the two states described above, also wants to control Jubba regions of Somalia.

Udubland state was established in February, 2011 by President Ibrahim Abdullahi Addo. It claims to represent the communities of Lower Shabelle and the two Jubba regions and wants to govern these three combined regions.

Shabelle-Jubba state was formed in Columbus, Ohio on April 6, 2012 by Dr. Abdikadir Noor Awo. It appears this state wishes to govern more than six regions (Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Lower Jubba, Gedo, Bay and Bakool) though each of these already has its own mini-state.

South West state was initially formed in November 2002 in Baydhabo (capital of the South West state) to govern Bay and Bakool regions. It currently wants to control the Gedo, Bay,

Bakool, Middle Juba, Lower Juba and lower Shabelle regions in southwest Somalia. Sayid Ali Shaykh Muhammad is the president.

Koofur-Galbeed - during the course of this research, *Somalia Report* discovered another South West state, called Koofur-Galbeed also claiming to administer the same area of Shaykh Muhammad's South West state. The president of this administration is Dr. Ali Abdi Baab. It is unclear whether one replaced the other but it is possible they are independent.

Hiiraan

Hiiraan state was established in August, 2010 and seeks to rule the entire Hiiraan region. This region has a strategic significance as it links southern regions to central Somalia. It is also of strategic importance to Ethiopia, which wants to use the region as a buffer zone. Hiiraan state is led by Muhammad Abdi Gab and is set against Gal-Hiiraan state and Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) which also claim to be the legitimate states in the region.

Dooxada Shabelle or Shabelle Valley Administration (SVA) wants control of the central regions and Hiiraan and maintains an unspecified number of armed militia. It was founded in April, 2011, apparently in reaction to the establishment of Hiiraan state. Abdifitah Hasan Afrah is the president of SVA and recently rejected the TFG's plans for creating an administration in Beled Weyne after a bitter disagreement between ASWJ and SVA over the control of Hiiraan region. It should be noted that the Somali government nominated Abdifatah Hasan Afrah to be governor of Hiiran region.

Hiiraanland state was founded in September 2010. It maintains no armed militia and its influence has been overshadowed by armed conflict and the power struggle between the SVA and ASWJ. The group is led by diaspora including its president Mukhtar Shaykh Abdirisak.

Hiiraan and Midland state was established June 2010 in London. Abdiqadir Adan Abdi is the founder and the president of this administration.

Shabelle and Banaadir

Shabeelaha Dhexe state or Middle Shabelle state was formed in January 2009. It wants to manage the Middle Shabelle region in Somalia. Ali Madahey Jawle is the president of this mini-state.

Banaadir was established in 2011 and represents the minority Banaadir community, which is made up of mainly Arabs from Oman and Yemen. Abba Awow Haji is the president of Banaadir.

Ex-Banaadir state of Somalia was also created in Mogadishu in March 2012 to run the Banaadir, Middle Shabelle, and Lower Shabelle regions. Somalia government soldiers intervened and stopped the formation party of this administration but its president Muhammad Abdirahman Ali claims a legal right to manage the three regions of Somalia. The Banaadir region Mogadishu has already has a TFG-formed administration. Mogadishu will be the headquarters for the administration.

Jiin-webi was founded in October, 2011 and is supported by the Somali Bantu or Jareerweyne communities, a minority group that descended from tribes in East and central Africa. Muhammad Ahmed Hussein is its president.

Banaadirland was established in Nairobi, Kenya, in December 2011. It wants to run the Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle and Banaadir regions. Engineer Abdulle Hasan Nurrow is the president. Mogadishu will be headquarters for the administration.

Xamar iyo Xamar daye state wants to run Mogadishu's Banaadir region and middle Shabelle. This administration was established in Nairobi in May, 2011. Jibril Haji Mahmud is the president of this administration.

Wargaadhi State was formed May 2011 in Nairobi. It seeks to run the Middle Shabelle region. Yusuf Hundubay is the president.

Hir iyo Maanyo was established in 2011. It wants to administrate the Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Engineer Ahmed Bajuu is the president.

Abweyn State was formed in September 2011. Its goal is to rule the Banaadir, Lower and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia. Abdullahi Abdi Muhammad is the president.

Further mini-states exist in Somaliland and Puntland. *(SomaliaReport.com 12/5)*

7.4 Annex 4

London Conference on Somalia: Communique

23 February 2012

Full text of the Communique from the London Conference on Somalia at Lancaster House on 23 February.

1. The London Conference on Somalia took place at Lancaster House on 23rd February 2012, attended by fifty-five delegations from Somalia and the international community.

2. We met at a key moment in Somalia's history. Somalia is emerging from the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. African and Somali troops have pushed Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other areas. The transitional institutions come to an end in August 2012, and the people of Somalia want clarity on what will follow. The situation remains precarious, and in urgent need of support from the international community.

3. Decisions on Somalia's future rest with the Somali people. The Somali political leadership must be accountable to the people. The international community's role is to facilitate Somalia's progress and development: our strength is in unity and coordinated support to Somalia. We noted the importance of listening to and working with Somalis inside and outside Somalia, and welcomed their engagement in the run-up to this Conference.

4. The Conference focussed on the underlying causes of instability, as well as the symptoms (famine, refugees, piracy, and terrorism). We, the international community, agreed: to inject new momentum into the political process; to strengthen AMISOM and help Somalia develop its own security forces; to help build stability at local level; and to step up action to tackle pirates and terrorists.

Political

5. We agreed that the Transitional Federal Institutions' mandate ends in August 2012. There must be no further extensions. We welcomed the agreements that chart the way towards more representative government: the Transitional Federal Charter, the Djibouti Agreement, the Kampala Accord, and the Roadmap. We welcomed the progress represented by the Garowe Principles, endorsed the priority of convening a Constituent Assembly, and emphasised that the Assembly must be representative of the views of the Somali people of all regions and constituencies, and that women must be part of the political process. In line with Garowe II, we agreed to incentivise progress and act against spoilers to the peace process, and that we would consider proposals in this regard before the Istanbul Conference in June.

6. The Conference recognised the need for the international community to support any dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG or its replacement may agree to establish in order to clarify their future relations.

7. We condemned terrorism and violent extremism, whether perpetrated by Somalis or foreigners. We called on all those willing to reject violence to join the Djibouti peace process. We agreed to develop a defectors' programme to support those who leave armed groups.

8. We emphasised the urgency of Somalia funding its own public services, and using its assets for the benefit of the people, as well as tackling corruption. We welcomed the progress that has been made in establishing a Joint Financial Management Board to increase transparency and accountability in the collection and efficient use of public revenues, as well as international development aid, and which will help strengthen Somali public financial management institutions. A declaration by the initial members of the JFMB is at Annex A.

9. Respect for human rights must be at the heart of the peace process. We called for action to address in particular the grave human rights violations and abuses that women and children face. We emphasised that journalists must be able to operate freely and without fear. Civilians must be protected. We called on the Somali authorities to take measures to uphold human rights and end the culture of impunity. We agreed to step up international efforts including through the UN human rights architecture.

Security and Justice

10. We agreed that security and justice were essential both to a successful political process and to development. Better security could only be achieved sustainably in parallel with better justice and the rule of law.

11. We expressed gratitude to those countries whose troops had served as peacekeepers and paid tribute to the achievements and sacrifices of AMISOM and other forces. We welcomed joint planning by the UN and African Union and reiterated the importance of effective command and control. We welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2036, which expands AMISOM's mandate and raises the troop ceiling. We encouraged AMISOM to ensure the protection of civilians. We encouraged partners, especially new donors, to contribute to funding for AMISOM, including through the EU.

12. We agreed that, over time, Somalis should take over responsibility for providing their own security and develop their own justice systems to deal with the threats to their security and improve access to justice. We noted that Somalis themselves must decide what security and justice arrangements they need.

13. We acknowledged the good work underway in supporting the Somali security and justice sectors. We agreed that we would build an international framework of partners in order to bring much needed coordination and focus to those efforts, underpinned by a set of principles at annex B, and working closely with the UN's Joint Security Committee.

Piracy

14. We reiterated our determination to eradicate piracy, noting that the problem requires a comprehensive approach on land as well as at sea. We expressed our concern that hostages in Somalia are being held longer and with more use of violence. We welcomed the work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. We also welcomed the success of international military efforts, and remain committed to such efforts with robust rules of engagement and sufficient force generation. We agreed that piracy cannot be solved by military means alone, and reiterated the importance of supporting communities to tackle the underlying causes of piracy, and improving the effective use of Somali coastal waters through regional maritime capacity-building measures. We welcomed those initiatives underway and agreed to coordinate and support such initiatives better. We called for full implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the adoption of an Exclusive Economic Zone. We look forward to reviewing progress including at the Piracy Conference in the UAE in June.

15. We welcomed the efforts of partners in industry against piracy, and called for greater take-up of Best Management Practice on ships. We welcomed current work on international guidance on the use of private armed security companies.

16. There will be no impunity for piracy. We called for greater development of judicial capacity to prosecute and detain those behind piracy both in Somalia and in the wider region and recognised the need to strengthen capacity in regional states. We welcomed new arrangements, which enable some states and naval operations to transfer suspected pirates captured at sea for trial by partners across the Indian Ocean region, and if convicted, to transfer them to prisons in Puntland and Somaliland which meet international standards. We noted the intention to consider further the possibility of creating courts in Somalia specialised in dealing with piracy.

17. We reiterated our determination to prosecute the kingpins of piracy. Recognising work already undertaken, we agreed to enhance coordination on illegal financial flows and to coordinate intelligence gathering and investigations. We noted the establishment of a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre in the Seychelles.

Terrorism

18. Terrorism poses a serious threat to security in Somalia itself, to the region, and internationally. It has inflicted great suffering on the Somali population. We agreed to work

together with greater determination, and with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and international humanitarian law, to build capacity to disrupt terrorism in the region, and to address the root causes of terrorism. We agreed on the importance of disrupting terrorists' travel to and from Somalia, and on the importance of disrupting terrorist finances, and called on countries in the region to implement the Financial Action Task Force's recommendations on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism. We noted that effective intelligence gathering and investigation, and support to the Somali criminal justice system, were critical to the fight against terrorism. We agreed to work with the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and other international and regional bodies to deliver this important work.

Stability and Recovery

19. We welcomed the success in some areas of Somalia in establishing local areas of stability, and agreed to increase support to build legitimate and peaceful authorities, and improve services to people living in these areas. We acknowledged the importance of creating the conditions inside Somalia for durable solutions for the displaced, that respect international laws. We agreed that such efforts should promote local and regional cohesion, and converge with the national political process.

20. We considered the implementation of the Mogadishu Recovery and Stabilisation Plan important. We agreed to expand programmes to newly-recovered areas. We would focus support on enabling the delivery of immediate and sustainable benefits to ordinary Somali people: safety and security, economic opportunities and basic services. We would promote effective and accountable local administrations, and support the resolution of disputes.

21. We agreed that all support to local areas of stability should be in accordance with the New Deal for engagement in fragile states recently adopted in Busan, and build on the stabilisation strategies prepared by both IGAD and the Transitional Federal Government. We endorsed a set of principles to guide international support to local areas of stability in Somalia (Annex C). We agreed to continue funding local stability through existing programmes, and noted the establishment of a new Stability Fund to which a number of us will contribute.

22. We agreed that Somalia's long-term reconstruction and economic development depended on a vibrant private sector, and that both aid and diaspora finance could develop Somalia's considerable potential in livestock, fisheries and other sectors. We noted that stability was a prerequisite for most sustainable investments in infrastructure such as electricity, roads and water systems. We looked forward to further discussion on all these issues at the Istanbul Conference.

Humanitarian

23. The Conference was preceded by a separate meeting on humanitarian issues co-chaired by the United Nations and the United Arab Emirates. Notwithstanding the end of the famine, participants expressed concern at the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and committed to providing humanitarian aid based solely on need. They agreed a set of conclusions on humanitarian issues and linking relief with longer-term recovery.

International coordination

24. We agreed to carry forward work agreed at London through the International Contact Group on Somalia (ICG), and welcomed the ICG's decision in Djibouti to look at restructuring to become more effective. We recommended that the ICG establish working groups on the political process, security and justice, and stability and development. We noted that, within the ICG, a core group of engaged countries would drive progress in support of UN, AU and IGAD efforts.

25. We welcomed the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) in facilitating progress in Somalia. We also welcomed the role of IGAD and the African Union, and the support of the League of Arab States, the European Union, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. We encouraged effective coordination between UN entities working on Somalia. While recognising the still challenging security situation in Somalia, we welcomed UNPOS' relocation to Mogadishu and agreed that we would aim to spend more time on the ground in Somalia in order to work more closely with Somalis on the challenging tasks ahead.

Conclusion

26. We expressed the hope that a new era of Somali politics, supported by the international community, will bring peace to Somalia. We are determined to place the interests of the Somali people at the heart of all our actions. We looked forward to the day when the situation in Somalia would have made sufficient progress for an international conference to be held there. In the meantime, we will redouble our efforts to support the people of Somalia in their search for a better future for their country.

http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?id=727627582&view=PressS

7.4 Annex 5

SOMALI: The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, Final Declaration, June 01, 2012

The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia, under the theme "Preparing Somalia's Future: Goals for 2015," took place on 31st May and 1st June 2012.

Maintaining the multi-dimensional and multi-layered approach of the first Istanbul Conference in 2010 on Somalia, it was attended by high level representatives from 57 countries and 11 international and regional organizations, as well as by the TFG leadership, the regional administrations, and representatives from wide-ranging segments of Somali society, including youth, women, business community, elders, religious leaders and the Diaspora.

Introduction

2. The Conference reaffirmed its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia. It agreed that for genuine peace to take hold in Somalia, Somali people should seek dialogue, reconciliation and political cooperation including in establishing inclusive, accountable and legitimate governance. The Conference is grateful for the wide-scale and strong Somali participation, including women, in this Conference, and the powerful and meaningful messages they have pronounced.

3. The Conference noted that at this critical period in Somalia's history, the security, political, social and economic achievements of the past year have given Somalis and the international community a renewed hope for the future. Somalia has made considerable progress towards achieving stability, security and reconciliation: this opportunity should not be missed. The Conference emphasized that August 2012 is the beginning of a new phase of peace-building, in which all Somalis would contribute to peace and have their voices heard.

4. The Conference highlighted that primary responsibility for establishing a political solution in the country lies with Somalis. The role of the international community is to support Somalis to provide leadership and ownership in rebuilding a functioning state and local governments that can provide security, ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights, provide basic social services and create an enabling environment that allows for economic opportunity for all its citizens.

5. It reconfirmed the importance of the London Conference that constituted a milestone in gathering the international momentum on Somalia, and pledged to ensure a continued coherent and cooperative international approach. Political

6. The Conference reiterated that the transitional period will come to an end in August 2012 in accordance with the Kampala Accord, the Roadmap, the Garowe I and II Principles, the Galkayo Agreement and re-affirmed commitment made by the Signatories to the Roadmap through the Addis Ababa Communique. It called for the timely implementation of these

decisions and delivery of pledged funds. The Conference commended the convening of the Traditional Elders in Mogadishu who are carrying out their task of selecting the members of the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament. It welcomed their efforts to ensure that women meaningfully participate in the process and constitute 30% of the Constituent Assembly and the new Parliament and the role of women is enshrined in the constitution.

7. The Conference welcomed the intention that the Constituent Assembly adopts the provisional constitution of Somalia. It highlighted the importance of Somali ownership of the constitution through a public debate and future adoption through a referendum. The Conference also commended the ongoing public consultations and civic education process in order to allow the Somali people to have their voices heard and participate in the political process. The Conference urged the Roadmap signatories to expand this effort to include newly recovered areas.

8. The Conference expressed the firm expectation that the selection process of the leaner and more representative Federal Parliament is completed in a fair and transparent way without any hindrance and that the elections for the positions of Speaker (and Deputies), and President by the new Parliament are carried out smoothly by 20 August 2012.

9. The Participants reiterated their firmness in not allowing internal and external actors or groups to disrupt the smooth implementation of the end of the Transition. In this context, they commended the joint AU-IGAD-UN letter of May 2012 to such potential actors in Somalia. They agreed to consider appropriate follow-up action against those judged to be blocking progress in the political process.

10. The Conference reiterated the crucial need for the international community to support dialogue that Somaliland and the TFG have agreed to pursue.

11. The Participants looked forward to the beginning of a new political dispensation, with a new Parliament and Government, and emphasized the importance of those institutions coming to fruition through a more representative, transparent and legitimate process.

12. In keeping with the London Communique, the Conference reiterated that respect for human rights must be at the heart of the peace process. It welcomed the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Transitional Federal Government and the United Nations on 11 May 2012, and called on the Somali authorities to follow through with their commitment to uphold human rights and the rule of law, and put an end to the culture of violence and impunity, and bring about accountability. The Conference called for all parties to commit themselves to transitional justice mechanisms in the Post-Transition period.

13. The Conference emphasized that in the post-Transition period, the new political dispensation in Somalia must begin with a new program aimed at re-establishing of state and local institutions and administrative structures, based on and complementary to the current Roadmap including the newly recovered areas.

14. The Conference noted need to adjust international support to the political structures in Somalia and called on the UN to review the shape of its future engagement in Somalia. Security and Justice

15. The Conference agreed on the need to revitalize funding arrangements. The Conference took note of the proposal for the establishment of a new "Rebuilding and Restructuring Fund for the Somali Security Sector" initiated by Turkey to offer additional support to the Somali security forces.

16. The Conference recognized the need for the international community to continue to support the re-establishment of a professional, inclusive, disciplined and well-equipped security apparatus, including the Somali national army, police, navy, coastguard and intelligence agencies, as well as mechanisms to ensure civilian oversight of the security sector. The Conference emphasized the urgency to approve and implement the National Security and Stabilization Plan and the need to bring all Somali forces under a unified command. In this context, it recognized the significant contributions that the EU, including through the EU Training Mission, the US and Italy are providing in support of the Somali security sector institutions. The Conference encouraged broader support to these institutions.

17. The Conference commended the ongoing support of the international community for AMISOM, particularly by the United Nations, the European Union, IGAD member-states and the US and other bilateral partners. The Conference called on new donors to provide financial support to AMISOM troops including salaries, entitlements, reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment (COE), and enabling assets.

18. The Conference praised the efforts of the African Union through AMISOM and particularly those of Uganda and Burundi who have made troop contributions to AMISOM, and looking forward to the completion of troop deployments from Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Kenya. Today AMISOM, alongside its Somali Security Force allies is the main military instrument in ensuring security and stability in Somalia. We emphasized that the TFG and AMISOM have to be strongly supported by the international community at this critical juncture to meet objectives.

19. The Conference agreed that insecurity in Somalia, including sustained inter clan conflict, persistent violence, illegal charcoal trading, misappropriation of funds, piracy, kidnapping, terrorism and human rights abuses and violations, is exacerbated by the crisis emanating from the deficiency of the state structures and institutions in large parts of the country. It condemned all acts of violence against civilians, including journalists, and humanitarian workers in violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

20. The Conference reiterated its commitment to coordinate its efforts in support to the security and justice sectors through a re-invigorated Joint Security Committee and its technical working groups and looked forward to discussing proposals in this regard.

21. The Conference reiterated the need for effective rule of law institutions. The Conference stressed the importance of a broad consultative process in developing a plan to strengthen justice and correctional institutions and called for the establishment of a task force consisting of the TFG and international partners.

22. The Conference rejected all forms of terrorism, violations of human rights and violent extremism which endanger the lives of the Somali people, as well as regional and international peace. The Somali population has suffered a great deal at the hands of violent extremists and participants agreed to work together to help build capacity to confront the root causes of terrorism, tackle terrorism in the region, and disrupt their travel to and from

Somalia. It agreed to work with the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum and other international and regional bodies to deliver this important work.

23. It condemned the use of child soldiers and sexual violence by the combatant sides. The Conference also deplored the recent attacks against journalists. Those who are responsible must be held to account. The Conference called on all Somalis to renounce unlawful acts of violence, to operate within a constitutional framework and to support the ongoing political process. Those who refuse to do so, and instead engage in or support violence and crime, should be dissuaded, isolated, or otherwise prevented from derailing the Roadmap and the process of Somali reconciliation and state-building. The Conference resolved to develop further a programme to support those who renounce violence.

24. The Conference reiterated that the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia requires a comprehensive approach on land as well as at sea that addresses the root causes of the phenomenon and combines development, capacity-building, rule of law, deterrence and prosecution on the basis of UNSC Resolution 2020 (2011) and full compliance of international law. It called for the reinforcement of Somali-owned judicial capacities. The Conference looks forward to discussing the issue of piracy in depth and at length during the UAE's Second High Level Piracy Conference "A Regional Response to Maritime Piracy: Enhancing Public Private Partnership and strengthening global engagement to be held in Dubai on 27-28 June 2012 and the International Piracy Conference to be held in Perth, Australia on 15-17 July, 2012. The Conference further supports the ongoing work of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, including its forthcoming 12th Plenary Meeting to be held in New York on 25 July 2012.

Local stability

25. The Conference recognized that the Somali leaders with the support of the international community face a huge challenge in ensuring a stable and secure environment in the recovered areas as soon as possible. A power vacuum must not be allowed to develop in those areas.

26. We took note of the work undertaken by the TFG and local governance structures to promote stabilization and reconciliation in the newly recovered regions in Somalia. We welcomed the establishment of the National Policy for Reconciliation and Stabilization in these areas and noted the need for continued political cooperation, through a transparent and inclusive process that facilitates the development of effective governance and stability. The Conference further takes note of the TFG national reconciliation and stabilization plan for the newly recovered areas and urges regional and international partners, including AU, IGAD and the UN to support this comprehensive plan.

27. The Conference called upon the international community to consider further ways and means of stabilizing and securing emerging areas of stability and sustaining these through governance programs. The Stability Fund established at the London Conference shall serve this purpose and thus should be supported.

Economic Development and Recovery

28. The Conference recognized the continued fragility of the humanitarian situation. With international support in the summer of 2011, Somalia was able to overcome the famine and

avoid further exacerbation of the humanitarian crisis. However, more than 2.5 million Somalis remain in crisis and the risk of a further deterioration persists. The Conference called for immediate, unhindered access to all populations in need, respecting agreed humanitarian principles.

29. The Conference recognized the primary role of the Somali authorities as well as the important role of the international community in assisting Somalis in strengthening resilience. The Conference welcomed the Partnership Forum's efforts to build consensus on preventive and preemptive policies in this regard, and pledged to continue the dialogue.

30. The Conference underlined the importance of finding durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It stressed in particular that protection of civilians in accordance with international humanitarian and refugee law must be maintained at all times by all parties.

31. The Conference recognized the need for a new phase in the approach to Somalia's economic recovery.

32. The Conference underscored its belief that without special and equal emphasis on the reconstruction area, work in other spheres would be incomplete. Starting to rebuild Somalia's infrastructure in Mogadishu and other areas will contribute to Somalis' confidence in their future and constitute an incentive and encouragement for all segments of Somalia to reconcile.

33. Following the outcomes of the working groups on the first Istanbul Conference on Somalia, participants took note of the discussion of the four Partnership Forums on 31 May, attended by participants from Government, international organizations, donors, civil society and the private sector. It stressed that large-scale multi-year predictable financing was urgently needed both for infrastructure projects and to enhance the resilience of Somali communities. The Conference recognized the importance of harnessing the skills and capacity of the private sector and the Somali diaspora (Please see Annex 1.)

34. The Conference noted the importance of creating the right investment climate and agreed that offering conditional investment guarantees will provide a strong incentive for economic development with equity.

35. The Conference emphasized the importance of encouraging equitable growth to reduce poverty and deprivation in Somalia including through the promotion of inclusive business practices and service provision. Participants agreed on the need for capacity building in the public and private sectors. It was noted that institutional development was needed to ensure government can establish a socially responsible and business-friendly regulatory environment. They recognized the importance of diversification of energy sources, improvements in the quality and scope of the transport infrastructure in a way that supports economic development and investment in urban water supply, rural water supply, water resource management and water governance.

36. The Conference resolved to continue the discussion through further public-private dialogue, supported by the United Nations as well as the Istanbul International Centre for Private Sector in Development.

37. The Conference welcomed ongoing negotiations to establish a mutual accountability regime built around the proposed Joint Financial Management Board (JFMB). It urged the early conclusion of the negotiations establishing the JFMB and noted that the international community remains committed to helping Somalia better regulate its finances and development assistance.

38. The Conference welcomes the establishment of a multi-donor Trust Fund for post-Transition financing.

Conclusion

39. The Conference expected the ICG to be held in Rome on 2-3 July to take stock of the progress made here in Istanbul and give the final impetus to the very last part of the Transition.

40. The Conference commended the UN, the African Union, the IGAD, the EAC, the EU, the OIC and League of Arab States, and other bilateral partners for their relentless efforts in stabilizing Somalia. It welcomed the relocation of UNPOS and encouraged the UN to continue to relocate staff inside Somalia. Donors are encouraged to support this. The Conference also encouraged other organizations and countries to increase their presence in Somalia.

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