

CHAPTER 2

AN ALTERNATIVE FORM OF HISTORY— RE-PRESENTATION IN ‘THE VALLEY’ TRILOGY, THE PAST IN THE PRESENT

2.1 – INTRODUCTION

But, while the Leipoldt archives are intended to be major artefacts in our literature, for the historian it remains of interest that the haunting voices of our real past remain stored in them, ready for release in the always new present.¹ – Stephen Gray.

Chapter 1 introduced the topic that is covered by this thesis, to view *The Valley* as an alternative form of history, to standard histories, and, related to this, to view *The Valley* as a counter- or oppositional narrative to the Gustav Preller *volksgeskiedenis* developed over the course of the period 1905 to 1938 that emerged as the dominant Afrikaner-nationalist public history at the time. Leipoldt constructed his historical fiction, in a way that strikes a chord with the words of philosopher of history, Paul Ricoeur, when he says, ‘by opening us to the unreal, [fiction] leads us to what is essential in reality.’²

Chapter 2 discusses a selection of works on the theory of history, to see to what extent *The Valley* might serve as an alternative form of history to the conventional first-referenced, retrospective historical work. Hayden White is a leading philosopher of history in the field of narrative history and thus it seems appropriate to begin with a study of his works. The works of other philosophers of history F R Ankersmit, Eelco Runia, Jonas Grethlein and Paul Ricoeur are examined as a further investigation for historical meaning in fictional history texts. White describes the historical work as ‘a verbal structure in the form of a narrative prose discourse that purports to be a model, or icon, of past structures and processes in the interest of explaining what they were by representing them.’³ In addition, the works of Auerbach, Frye, Burke, Gombrich and Goodman can be seen as part of the debate on historical representation as they ‘have given rise to a general concept of the *fictional*

¹Stephen Gray, ‘Leipoldt’s Valley Community: The Novelist as Archivist’, *Social Dynamics*, 10(1), 1984, p. 51.

²Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, edited & translated by John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, first published 1981, reprinted 1982, p. 296.

³Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973, p. 2.

representation of reality, the horizon of which is sufficiently broad to encompass both the writing of history and fiction, whether the latter be literary, pictorial or plastic'.⁴

It can be argued that White's theory of representationalism does not cover re-presenting historical phenomena such as memory, remembrance and trauma. Topics for this that come to mind can include the effects on the South African War on society at the time, and more recently in South Africa's history, the testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Traumatic events in South Africa's past can present ruptures and discontinuities (distorted memories) and this in turn can affect how the history is represented. Eelco Runia's idea of 'presence' in history resulting from the notion of so-called 'parallel processes', provides an opportunity to re-create past experiences in the present. Whilst the prominent Dutch philosopher of history F R Ankersmit finds common ground with some of Runia's thoughts, he argues for presentism and myth (together) as a way of understanding the past. The classical scholar, Jonas Grethlein, combines the idea of narrativity with experientiality and the introduction of devices such as 'side-shadowing' to create meaning in literary texts. This chapter also looks at a combination of ideas from Paul Ricoeur, to create an understanding of the position of the historical work and the work of historical fiction, as in C Louis Leipoldt's *The Valley*.

As *The Valley* is narrative fiction (deconstructivist), the voices of serious criticism against postmodernism and deconstructivism need to be heard and a selection of history theorists in this field have been selected for this purpose, namely Eric Hobsbawm, Richard Evans *et al.* At the same time it is recognized that newer trends in the theory of the philosophy of history promoting aspects such as historical representation and the newer field in the theory of history, cultural memory, need to be examined, such as the theories of Astrid Erll, Anne Rigney and Aleida Assmann. An important notion for the thesis is Hobsbawm and Ranger's *The Invention of Tradition*, which examines existing as well as new traditions, through a series of case studies. Leipoldt's *The Valley* emphasizes the value of existing, deep, local tradition rather than turning one's back on it for something new, such as racism, as subtly and almost

⁴Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences, Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, edited & translated by John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, first published 1981, reprinted 1982, p. 290.

subliminally propagated by Gustav Preller who constructed his Voortrekker narrative around this notion (thus inventing a new tradition).⁵

2.2 – HAYDEN WHITE’S THEORY OF HISTORICAL REPRESENTATION

Hayden White is particularly known for the way he analysed the literary structures of the most significant works of nineteenth- and twentieth-century European historians and philosophers, to come up with certain deductions about the status of historical texts, and from this, to come to certain conclusions about the nature of historical representation. A study of White’s work, it is argued, can also throw light on the status of the historical-fictional texts as they share areas of common interest with history texts, such as the role of rhetoric, a development of historical consciousness, the narrative construct of the text, and figures of speech (tropes) – metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony. All of these play a role in organizing information into a larger whole (constructionism) which can mean that it might not necessarily just be the evidence that will determine a historian’s perspective and interpretation. In this way historical texts can be seen as creative, narrative constructs and rhetorical devices (this from Vico), open to interpretation. Whilst there will be mild to serious voices of protest to White’s method, he nevertheless remains an important part of the study of historical representation of the last forty years, even if it has only been to evoke a series of questions about historical writing.

White suggested that an objective form of historical writing was impossible and his great contribution to the field of the philosophy of history is that he dissembled the barriers between history, philosophy of history and historical representation. This notion of history that he defended as narrative, he termed ‘metahistory’ and asserted that modern history texts are not accurate representations of the past, because of the vague assumptions that are made

⁵One of the cultural media for propagating Preller’s ideas of a national Afrikaner consciousness was film-making – he was personally involved in the making of *De Voortrekkers* in 1916. The Department of Native Affairs objected to the film on the basis it would mimic armed conflict (A787 Preller Collection, Volume 266, I W Schlesinger in a letter to Preller, 8 July 1916). However, Preller enjoyed a close association with the Prime Minister General Louis Botha (whom he referred to as *Oubaas*) who had taken a personal interest in the film and used his influence to have the project go ahead (certain Transvaal Resident Magistrates had protested). He wrote how the script he had written was so realistic the film had a kind of wizardry that made people imagine they were seeing the event unfold in front of their eyes, as it happened in 1838. (A787 Preller Collection, Volume 267, in a letter from Preller to Bodenstein, 22 January 1917).

by the authors in arranging, selecting, and interpreting events. He is best known for his classic work *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (1973).⁶

White specifically chose nineteenth century historians, philosophers and social theorists because as a medievalist scholar he was closer to them (in knowledge) than more modern historians. At the time of the nineteenth century, “History” was considered to be a specific mode of existence, “historical consciousness” a distinctive mode of thought, and “historical knowledge” an autonomous domain in the spectrum of the human and physical sciences.⁷ The twentieth century saw a change come about in the status of history with modern thinkers casting doubts on ‘the value of a specifically “historical” consciousness’, according to White, ‘stressing the fictive character of historical reconstructions, and challenged history’s claims to a place among the sciences.’⁸ And in the same way that doubts are cast on the status of history as a rigorous science, the status of history excludes it being a genuine art.⁹ From this, White reaches the conclusion that ‘in short, it is possible to view historical consciousness as a specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated.’¹⁰

In this way, White comes up with his own analysis of the historical imagination of certain European nineteenth-century historians and philosophers of history, in order to throw new light on the current debate over the nature and function of historical knowledge. He does this on two levels of inquiry; firstly to examine the works of historians and then of philosophers of history, both from the same period (nineteenth century). Then he looks for the characteristics of different conceptions of the historical processes in the works of four historians (narrators); and then he aims to determine the possible theories which the philosophers used to justify historical thinking. White explains his method, as follows:

My method, in short, is formalist. I will not try to decide whether a given historian’s work is a better, or more correct, account of a specific set of events or segment of the historical process than some other historian’s account of them; rather, I will seek to identify the structural components of those accounts.¹¹

⁶Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 1.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 1 – 2.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁰*Ibid.*

¹¹*Ibid.*, pp. 3 – 4.

The selection of White is (historians) Michelet, Ranke, Tocqueville and Burckhardt and (philosophers of history) Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche and Croce. For White ‘their status as possible models of historical representation or conceptualization’ does not ‘depend upon the nature of the “data” they used to support their generalizations or the theories they invoked to explain them.’¹² According to White, ‘it depends rather upon the consistency, coherence and illuminative power of their respective visions of the historical field.’¹³ Therefore as models of history they cannot be ‘refuted’ or their generalizations ‘disconfirmed’, ‘either by appeal to new data that might be turned up in subsequent research or by the elaboration of a new theory for interpreting the sets of events that comprise their objects of representation or analysis.’¹⁴ White explains further, referring to these historians and philosophers that: ‘their status as models of historical narration and conceptualization depends, ultimately, on the pre-conceptual and specifically poetic nature of their perspectives on history and its processes.’¹⁵

White uses the ideas and thoughts as expressed above, ‘as a justification of a formalist approach to the study of historical thinking in the nineteenth century.’¹⁶ This, then, constitutes White’s notion of formalism. However, if we consider the histories produced by the master historians of the nineteenth century, then we see radically different conceptions of ‘what “the historical work” should consist of as formal verbal structures.’¹⁷ These ideas are obviously much more thoroughly explained by White, but for the moment it is sufficient to conclude that the differences that the historical thinkers of the period have, might arise from a difference in historical imagination which can lead to different styles of historical thinking.¹⁸

White’s model for historical texts as models of historical narration can be of significance to *The Valley* as it is in the form of historical narration which stays close to the main events that occurred in South African history for a period of hundred years — *Gallows Gecko* discusses the gradual settlement of Boer and British settlers from about 1820 to the time of representative government in the Cape Colony in 1845; *Stormwrack* discusses the way the

¹²Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 4.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 5.

South African War ‘recoils as an invasion back into Cape territory’¹⁹ and *The Mask* shows the community of ‘the Valley’ in its modern guise. History and historical fiction both use chronicle and story as their ‘stock in trade’ although postmodern fiction can jumble the time sequence (‘past present future’) whilst the historian arranges the events in the chronicle by organizing them all into a story through a ‘process of happenings’ (White refers to this as possessing a discernible beginning, middle and end).²⁰ Writing history, however, transforms the chronicle into story and is affected ‘by the characterization of some events in the chronicle in terms of inaugural motifs, of others in terms of terminating motifs, and yet of others in terms of transitional motifs.’²¹ This means that a given set of events has been ‘motifcally encoded.’²² Historical stories therefore ‘trace the sequences of events that lead from inaugurations to (provisional) terminations of social and cultural processes in a way that chronicles are not required to do.’²³

The latter ideas can in some cases also be applicable to historical fictional texts, such as *The Valley*, written for serialization, and as such, contextualized for Leipoldt’s readership. His work *Galgsalmander*, the forerunner to *Gallows Gecko*, was originally a bucolic comedy set in the Valley, that appeared in serialized form for in *Die Huisgenoot* from 30 August 1929 to 3 January 1930. Later, it was reworked into the more serious and far-reaching novel *Gallows Gecko*. But for the fictitious accounts to be binding, the version written for serialization would need to consist of a strong follow-able story to get the readers’ interest.

However, there are some clear differences between history and fiction according to the White model. White’s view is that ‘the aim of the historian is to explain the past by “finding”, “identifying”, or “uncovering” the “stories” that lie buried in the chronicles; and that the difference between “history” and “fiction” resides in the fact that the historian “finds” his stories, whereas the fiction writer “invents” his.’²⁴ Historians’ methodology therefore necessitates the connections between events ‘which make of them elements in a follow-able story’, to be distinguished from the structure of the entire set of events which make up the

¹⁹Stephen Gray, ‘Leipoldt’s Valley Community: The Novelist as Archivist’, *Social Dynamics*, 10(1), 1984, p. 50.

²⁰Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 5.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 5.

²²*Ibid.*, p. 6.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 6.

completed story; and this calls for a ‘synoptic judgement of the relationship between a given story and other stories that might be “found”, “identified” or “uncovered” in the chronicle.’²⁵

But it is not as straightforward as it may seem and neither does the White model have to be adhered to for novelists working with historical fiction. After all, as artists, their imagination is a strong feature of their writing. Admittedly, White concedes that the distinctions he makes among chronicle, story and plot probably have more value for the analysis for historical works, than for works of literary fiction.²⁶ This is because unlike literary fictions, historical works ‘are made up of events that exist outside the consciousness of the writer’²⁷ whereas ‘the events reported in a novel can be invented in a way that they cannot be (or are not supposed to be) in a history.’²⁸

It is therefore quite hard ‘to distinguish between the chronicle of events and the story being told in literary fiction’²⁹ because, for instance, in Mann’s *Buddenbrooks*, the ‘story’ being told is indistinguishable from the ‘chronicle’ of events ‘reported in the work’.³⁰ In his synopsis to *Stormwreck*, Leipoldt refers to it as ‘A Tale of the Valley’³¹ thus admitting it is a story. In the last three lines of his synopsis of *The Mask* Leipoldt writes about the ‘rounding off of the chronicle’³² so here we have story but with a time-line. So, for Leipoldt it might be difficult to distinguish between the chronicle of events and the story — however, there is a definite sequence: Great Trek, the establishment of Parliament, the Jameson Raid, the South African War, the Pact government’s policies — because the fiction and history are quite closely related. Like *Buddenbrooks*, *The Valley* as a whole might be categorized as ironic tragedy in terms of White’s model. This might be explained by the way the degeneration of a previously strong society based on good tradition and values, gives way to sectarian interests, and degradation, in social relations.

In White’s model of historical constructionism, after the chronicle-story, four sections follow. The first is the idea of emplotment as a way by which ‘a sequence of events fashioned into a

²⁵Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 7.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Ibid.*

³¹BC94 A7.8 (Jagger).

³²*Ibid.*

story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind.³³ Basically put, this category involves a level of conceptualization whereby the historian emplots the narrative account of what happened. Taking his line from the Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye,³⁴ White identified at least four different modes of emplotment — romance, tragedy, comedy and satire and acknowledges that there might be others such as epic. The four nineteenth century writers studied by White each had their own mode of emplotment; Michelet cast his stories in the romantic mode; Ranke in the comic; Toqueville in the tragic; and Burckhardt in the satirical. White explains that each of these plot structures ‘has its implications for the cognitive operations by which the historian seeks to “explain” what was “really happening” during the process of which it provides an image of its true form.’³⁵ These categories can be further explained – romance (good triumphs over evil); tragedy (a person resigns to the conditions of labour); comedy (temporary triumph over hardship or evil) and satire (a person is a captive of the world).³⁶ It is possible to explain the work more fully, by grafting the linguistic element (the choice of trope, whereby its own characteristic is going to determine the way pieces of information will be organized into the larger whole of the text) onto the notion of emplotment.³⁷ For instance, in *Gallows Gecko* you have ironic romance (things turn out differently to when they started, and all live happily ever after) and in *Stormwrack* ironic tragedy (the factors leading to catastrophe are slowly combining, without the characters knowing).

The second part of White’s model is made up of the different arguments³⁸; formalist (classifying or identifying objects or events), mechanist (events belong to specific classes/phenomena), organicist (events belong to parts of a greater/larger process), and contextualist (the relations of events to another event of the same time period to explain it).³⁹ Here White looks at what is the purpose of it all; what does it add up to; what is the point of it all? A detailed account of these four arguments is given by White (pp. 11 – 21 in

³³Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 7.

³⁴Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1957.

³⁵Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 11.

³⁶Alex Kaufman explains these concepts in more depth in http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~comitatu/PDF/Misc/misc_hayden_white.pdf.

³⁷Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences – Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, edited, translated and introduced by John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, reprinted 1982, p. 290.

³⁸Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, pp. 11 *et seq.*

³⁹Alex Kaufman, <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~comitatu/documents/Theory/HaydenWhite.pdf>.

Metahistory), and it is by no means an easy task to say how *The Valley* might fit into his model, especially as it is a trilogy, made up of different books. One possible way of applying the White model (in terms of explanation by formal argument), onto *The Valley*, is to look at combinations of arguments. In *The Valley*, for instance, it might be necessary first to classify or identify events; before revealing ‘the relations of any specific event to other events of the same time period in order to explain it.’⁴⁰ But these explanations by formal argument nevertheless tell us more about what it all adds up to; what is the point of it all, and possibly Leipoldt is explaining that when you throw all these factors into the mix, this is what you get, degeneration, change as with the third and fourth generations, like in the case of Santa in *The Mask*, where the conditions in the Valley have altered.

The third category of White’s theory consists of the different tropes used in language. This can be explained as ‘the use of poetic language by historians to imagine and construct a particular history.’⁴¹ These can also be referred to as rhetorical styles which White suggests are metaphor, synecdoche, metonymy and irony (tropes/imagery/literary devices).⁴² It is possible for tropes to be employed in fiction to cloak historical meaning, a good example of which is explained in a reading of Mario Vargas Llosa’s ‘Novels Disguised as History: The Chronicles of the Birth of Peru.’⁴³ For instance, Llosa’s ‘history’ might be used for comparing with the ‘formal’, Western *History of Peru* by William Hickling Prescott.⁴⁴ In the same way, in Leipoldt’s *The Valley* these ‘tropes permit the characterization of objects in different kinds of indirect, or figurative, discourse.’⁴⁵ For instance, any harsh criticism of certain politicians or the iniquitous policies of the Nationalists in the 1920s in South African history, is cloaked in the Leipoldt fiction, clear of any possible direct embarrassment or culpability, since he knew some of these politicians personally, and after all, he was a well-established author, well-known in a society of mostly the Afrikaans-speaking community but also in English circles, at the time.

⁴⁰Alex Kaufman, <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~comitatu/documents/Theory/HaydenWhite.pdf>.

⁴¹Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 31 *et seq.*

⁴²*Ibid.*

⁴³A review of Llosa’s work can be found on <http://www.complete-review.com/reviews/vargas/writers.htm>.

⁴⁴William Hickling Prescott, *History of the Conquest of Peru*, 1847; Mario Vargas Llosa’s lecture, ‘Novels Disguised as History: The Chronicles of the Birth of Peru’, was published in *A Writer’s Reality*, edited and with an Introduction by Myron I Lichtblau, 1991, based on lectures delivered (in English) at Syracuse University in 1988.

⁴⁵Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 31 and again p. 34.

In this sense, Leipoldt's writing is never objectively or empirically verifiable, yet it somehow comments on the reality of the situation, sometimes allegorically, or using the fiction to cloak reality. In the following passage we see Leipoldt take a swipe at the hypocrisy of politicians (who are thought to be clever/cunning and as such are worshipped as idols yet who mask their hypocrisy – hence the title of the book, *The Mask*, and also Leipoldt's preferred title, 'Idols') such as possibly even 'Slim Jannie' which was the nickname for General Smuts.⁴⁶ T J Haarhoff writes that Smuts 'did not appreciate the fresh genius of C. Louis Leipoldt, a member of his own party, and a candidate at one of his elections'.⁴⁷ A piece in *The Mask* demonstrates this aspect well, whereby there is real cleverness based on one's true wisdom, against a cleverness based on one's cunning and expedience (such as practised by hypocritical) politicians.⁴⁸

For White, the narrative construct brings together the imaginary (historical imagination) and the real such as in *The Valley* blending fiction with historical events. There is the imaginary detail made up from names and places derived from Leipoldt's historical memory which can be traced back to real people as in his jottings⁴⁹ as well as his reference to places that actually exist, and in this context White is important: 'They (tropes) are especially useful for understanding the operations by which the contents of experience which resist description in unambiguous prose representations can be pre-figuratively grasped and prepared for conscious apprehension.'⁵⁰

The fourth and final category in White's theory is the concept of ideology⁵¹ and there are four categories that make up this section: anarchist, a belief in the necessity of structural transformations, abolishing society and replacing it with a community; radical, the reconstitution of society on a new basis; conservative, historical evolution as a progressive

⁴⁶The notes in an interview with M P O Burgers reflect the view held by Leipoldt that Smuts possessed a diabetic temperament. Leipoldt makes the connection between Smuts and Leipoldt's mother who in Leipoldt's opinion was a bit crazy ('moeder altyd 'n bietjie mal'). These details are in BC94 E2.3 (Jagger).

⁴⁷T J Haarhoff, *Smuts the Humanist*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970, pp. 41 – 42. Leipoldt was nominated the South African Party candidate for Wonderboom South (SAP, the party led by J C Smuts). It lost the election in June 1924.

⁴⁸C Louis Leipoldt, *The Valley*, pp. 596 – 597.

⁴⁹BC 94 A5.1 – 5.9 (Jagger). These notebooks have not been dated and there is no order to the way they function, hence the term 'jottings'. But they contain a great deal of important information in the 'puzzle' of understanding detail about *The Valley*. Several of them are Leipoldt's medical journals/notebooks he used as far back as the time he was a doctor in London (1907 – 1914).

⁵⁰Hayden White, *Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-century Europe*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1973, p. 34.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, pp. 22 *et seq.*

elaboration basing itself on the current institutional structure; and lastly liberal, where people strive for a Utopian society.⁵² The following excerpt from T J Haarhoff places Leipoldt in this liberal context:

In the development of South Africanism, Leipoldt was more far-seeing than either the narrow Afrikaner Nationalist, or the single-cultured English South African. Even in this country people find it hard to understand the man of two languages and cultures.⁵³

In this sense the central character in *Stormwrack* Andrew Quakerley (because of his excellent breeding) comes to learn great tolerance, and looks to understand the position of both English and Afrikaans speakers in South Africa at the time once he abandons his own English-based nationalism at first loyal to his ingrained English ideals. Writing in retrospect, in *The Mask*, about Andrew Quakerley and his garden, Leipoldt comments on this character: ‘The Village still remembered that garden, as one remembers things of which legends speak, things not quite positively proved but so strongly stressed by tradition that belief in them was significant of a liberal toleration.’⁵⁴

Although White has been criticized by some circles for his use of nineteenth century texts as examples of specific historiographic tropes, his approach to historical representation nevertheless widens the possibilities for constructing historical meaning and extends the scope of historiography. The subjective fiction of a writer such as Louis Leipoldt surely also qualifies for scrutiny under the White model as has been shown. As the historian does, so does the writer of fiction use history and the events in the chronicle which he/she somehow arranges into a hierarchy of significance in emplotting a story. In the case of *The Valley* there are three stories (in the novels) that make up the ‘whole set of events considered a comprehensible process with a discernible beginning, middle and end’, to apply White’s words. The structure of the entire set of events that make up the completed story of *The Valley* is what we have in the fictional account of C Louis Leipoldt, which is the full thrust of the novels, informed by the Preller foundational, Afrikaner myth. There are differences between the methodologies with regards to the positivistic approach in referencing pursued by the historian, but the writer of historical fiction must also take historical development into account. But the writer of fiction can create her/his own new world and into it invent

⁵²Alex Kaufman in <http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~comitatu/documents/Theory/HaydenWhite.pdf>.

⁵³J J Haarhoff, *Smuts the Humanist*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1970, p. 89.

⁵⁴C Louis Leipoldt, *The Valley*, p. 608.

characters and places around the history as a form of allegory, as Dante Alighieri⁵⁵ does in his *Divine Comedy*. Leipoldt does this in *The Valley*. In his poem ‘In die Konsentrasiekamp’ (1901), Leipoldt prefaces his poem with Dante’s words: ‘O Paziienza, paziienza che tanto sostieni!’ (Oh patience, patience, how much you endure!).⁵⁶ Leipoldt read Dante and, it seems, knew what it meant to write allegorically.

2.2.1 – WHITE’S THEORY ASSESSED

White questions the notion of objectivity and in this context Alan Munslow’s views of him are important for this chapter: ‘If by implication, history, like science, is now under challenge today, it is presumed to be partly because of the traumatic events of the twentieth century which have meant a loss of confidence in our ability to relate the past or, as Keith Jenkins describes it, “the general failure ... of that experiment in social living which we call modernity”’.⁵⁷ As the traumatic events of the twentieth century, and particularly so after the war in Vietnam, and later, as Communism started to collapse in the Soviet Union, writers of historical theory began to question master-narratives and the status of historical knowledge and its ability to express ‘truth’ as scientific knowledge. So structuralism and historical writing were challenged especially by French philosophers of history like Michel Foucault who defined discourse in a new way and Jacques Derrida challenged rationality. The following words from University of Stellenbosch philosopher and academic, J J Degenaar, resonate strongly with this period: ‘In this historical context facts are not simply given; they are rather discursive constructions created in a specific paradigm.’⁵⁸ To this Alun Munslow would explain that what we get from the deconstructive consciousness is that the past is never fixed, ‘whether in terms of its epistemology, treatment of evidence, the construction of explanations or the precise nature of our explanatory narrative form.’⁵⁹

⁵⁵C Louis Leipoldt, *Jeugherinneringe*, p. 4, refers to his love for Dante.

⁵⁶C Louis Leipoldt, ‘In die Konsentrasiekamp’ in *Oom Gert Vertel en ander Gedigte*, with the Introduction by Johannes J Smith, HAUM, Cape Town, J H De Bussy, Pretoria, Johannesburg, 1911, pp. 35 – 36. These words are from Canto XXI of the Paradise of *The Divine Comedy* by Dante Alighieri.

⁵⁷Alun Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, Routledge, London, pp. 14 – 15; the reference is to Keith Jenkins, *On ‘what is History?’ from Carr and Elton to Rorty and White*, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 6.

⁵⁸J J Degenaar, in ‘Historical Discourse as Fact-bound Fiction’, in M C Doeser & J N Kraay (eds.), *Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections from Western and non-Western Perspectives*, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster, 1986, p. 65.

⁵⁹Alun Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, p. 16.

Munslow further explains that ‘as we deconstruct the past we deconstruct the history we write about’; and, ‘as we deconstruct the past we inevitably deconstruct the discipline’.⁶⁰ Munslow suggests that a study of White’s work ‘does not stop us from studying the content of the past, what the past was about, but it casts such a study in a radically different light.’⁶¹ And ‘It opens up a new vision of how to treat the past at its most basic cultural level, that is, at the level of narrative.’⁶² Thus: ‘Because the character of historical interpretation resides in its narrative structure, historical knowledge is generated by the constant debates between narratives (interpretations) rather than the primeval, unscripted and uncontextualized traces of the past.’⁶³

White’s formalism tells us that ‘history is a process of continuous intertextual reinscription composed and conducted by the historian — it is primarily an act of literary creation.’⁶⁴ And because there is this intertextuality within our own social and political environment ‘the past is never discovered in a world set aside from everyday life’⁶⁵ (Leipoldt was writing his historical fiction to convey immediacy for his readers, to relate to the past), and ‘Alongside the tropically prefigured epistemic model of cultural formation provided by Michel Foucault, White’s formalist theory of historical narrative offers a morphology for the study of the past.’⁶⁶ However, much criticism of White’s arguments exist, for instance from classic historians who claim that the value of the historical work depends on ‘hard archival research.’⁶⁷ Possibly one of the most powerful attacks on White comes from Carlo Ginzburg who holds White responsible for eliminating the research for truth as the main task of the historian; ‘the debate about truth is the most important intellectual issue.’⁶⁸ Whilst Nancy Partner shows much appreciation for White, she nevertheless understands the historian’s preference for ‘authorial intention in favour of textual

⁶⁰ Alun Munslow, *Deconstructing History*, p. 144.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 161.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

⁶⁷ Georg G Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century: from Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, University Press of New England, Hanover, NH, 1997, p. 140, in Paul Sutermeister, *Hayden White or History as Narrative: A Constructive Approach to Historiography*, ‘Scholarly Essay’, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Gene, 2004, in <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/109135/hayden-white-history-as-narrative-a-constructive-approach-to-historiography>.

⁶⁸ Carlo Ginzburg, *History, Rhetoric and Proof*, University Press of New England, Hanover, NH, 1999, p. 49, in Paul Sutermeister, *Hayden White or History as Narrative: A Constructive Approach to Historiography*, ‘Scholarly Essay’, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Gene, 2004. <http://www.grin.com/en/e-book/109135/hayden-white-history-as-narrative-a-constructive-approach-to-historiography>.

intention.⁶⁹ Even if not considered important in classic history establishments, one cannot deny that White's theory has widened the debate on how historical knowledge can be represented. As Richard T Vann has said, 'But nobody looking back at what was available to the "reflective historian" in 1973 can miss the great sea-change which White, more than anybody, has created.'⁷⁰ In a way Leipoldt is sketching the sea-change that was taking place in South African history by the way his historical consciousness is applied through historical imagination, in his fiction, with its sense of immediacy for the present, to read about the feelings and emotions of the inhabitants in the Valley at the time and identify with them, (as in *The Valley*).

2.3 – EELCO RUNIA

Whilst White's ideas in the field of historical representation, have undoubtedly challenged historians and philosophers of history, some such as philosopher of history Eelco Runia, argue that his theory lacks certain explanatory power for phenomena such as memory, *lieux de mémoire*, remembrance and trauma.⁷¹ For Runia, according to Ethan Kleinberg, it might be that in such cases the debate about the construction of narratives about the past lost touch with the past itself.⁷² Against White's theory of representationalism, is Runia's theory of historical reality (being in touch with reality) which he explains as travelling 'with historiography not as a paying passenger but as a stowaway', 'as what is absently and unintentionally present on the plane of time.'⁷³ In this respect, he introduces the idea or notion of metonymy as a 'metaphor for discontinuity, or, rather, for the entwining of continuity and discontinuity.'⁷⁴ The background behind this is Runia's notion of 'parallel processes', a term⁷⁵ used in psychoanalysis, which he now employs for explaining how 'presence' can define absence in history, or the 'unrepresented way the past is present in the

⁶⁹Nancy Partner, 'Hayden White: The Form of the Content', *History and Theory*, 37(2), 1998, p. 162. See also Nancy Partner, 'Hayden White (and the Content and the Form and Everyone Else) at the AHA', *History and Theory*, 36(4), Theme Issue, 1997, pp. 102 – 110. Partner confesses 'examining the impact and influence of his work on the historical discipline was an enlightening experience.' For a further appraisal of White, see Ewa Domanska, 'Hayden White: Beyond Irony', *History and Theory*, 37(2), 1998, pp. 173 – 181. Domanska is in favour of exploring the Collingwoodian idea of history as self-knowledge and knowledge about human nature.

⁷⁰Richard T Vann, 'The Reception of Hayden White', *History and Theory*, 37(2), 1998, p. 161.

⁷¹Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory*, 45(1), February 2006, p. 1.

⁷²Ethan Kleinberg, 'Presence in absentia', *Storia della Storiografia*, 55, 2009, p. 53.

⁷³Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory*, 45(1), February 2006, p. 1.

⁷⁴*Ibid.*

⁷⁵This term involves the 'transhistorical' and will be explained in more depth in the following section, because Frank Ankersmit takes it up, and Frank Ankersmit comes into consideration in this chapter.

present'⁷⁶, by the way 'the presence of the past ... does not reside primarily in the intended story or the manifest metaphorical content of the text, but in what story and text contain *in spite of* the intentions of the historian.'⁷⁷

Runia uses the example of the Scottish novelist Walter Scott to illustrate the problem of continuity and discontinuity by the way his character-hero Edward Waverley '...is transposed from the context of civilized England to find himself in a Scotland in which he is metonymically "out of place"' — a condition Scott called "romance".⁷⁸ Runia explains how 'Edward Waverley hits upon the history in the places he visits and the people he meets, and the bodily felt spatial relations make him realize that, for example, the abominations of a civil war are simultaneously very close and very far away.'⁷⁹ And Waverley finds that the deeds of violence he experiences in the civil war in Scotland in the mid-eighteenth century are not unfamiliar to the people who are exercising some sort of psychic memory (from similar events a century before).⁸⁰ In this way, Edward Waverley wanders through 'this present past.'⁸¹ Here presence defines absence⁸² and the reader can derive some knowledge of the past through reading what the historian/historical novelist is writing about. In this way Runia seeks 'to articulate one way that the past is literally present in the here and now by exploring the ways that historical accounts of past events parallel those very happenings.'⁸³

The above account in *Waverley* is an example of what Runia means by what is 'absently and unintentionally present in the plane of time';⁸⁴ and 'what story and text contain *in spite of* the intentions of the historian.'⁸⁵ Here we see the notion of 'parallel processing'⁸⁶ work, 'as the

⁷⁶Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory* 45(1), February 2006, p. 1.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*

⁷⁸*Ibid.* A point to consider is whether Leipoldt's Quakerley is a deliberate rendering of Scott's Waverley although this is speculation until proved. Whilst working in London, Leipoldt used to go for Christmas dinner to the Ford Sisters at Adel Grange, who were Quakers, much like Smuts was exposed to the Clark family of Quakers. As students, both Smuts and Leipoldt respectively met up with Quaker families during their studies. Quakers' rejection of violence might play a part in the name Andrew Quakerley, a peace-loving gentleman; Smuts was influenced by the Clark family in his policy of reconciliation when he returned to South Africa in 1906 after his meeting with Sir Henry Cambell-Bannerman.

⁷⁹Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory* 45(1), February 2006, p. 10.

⁸⁰*Ibid.*

⁸¹*Ibid.*

⁸²Ethan Kleinberg, 'Presence in absentia', *Storia della Storiografia*, 55, 2009, p. 52.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁸⁴Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory*, 45(1), February 2006, p. 1.

⁸⁵*Ibid.*

⁸⁶A term in psycho-analysis when the patient's psychological disorder is transferred onto the therapist, instead of the therapist recognizing and treating it, so that the information that reaches the psychologist's supervisor is unintended.

embodiment of the entwining of continuity and discontinuity that is exposed by metonymy as ‘presence.’⁸⁷ Whilst the discussion by Runia is meant to apply to historians and the way they work, it seems from the example of Walter Scott’s novel, that his theory might be equally applied to historical novelists and possibly even to writers of historical fiction, such as C Louis Leipoldt in *The Valley*. This is so because of the way novelists such as Scott and Leipoldt, *inter alia*, employ their literary imagination whereby ‘the problems of time have been transferred into, and treated as, problems of place.’⁸⁸ Scott likened his novels to ‘journeys’ and in his novel *Waverley* ‘the landscape of Scotland is not just a scenic backdrop, but the dense, laden and multifarious presence of what happened in Scottish history between the mid-seventeenth and mid-eighteenth centuries.’⁸⁹

In the same way, it can be argued, *The Valley* is not just a scenic backdrop with all its descriptions of nature and the Cederberg, but the ‘dense, laden and multifarious presence of what happened.’⁹⁰ Leipoldt was writing allegorically about the possible effects that political circumstances would have on South Africa, from the war and the new disposition (the assumption of power by the nationalists) employing the landscape of the mind. Runia’s theory of a metonymy as a ‘presence in absence’, what story and text contain in spite of the intentions of the historian/writer of historical fiction, can open up *The Valley* particularly the way Leipoldt translates time into place/space, to different possibilities for the way the readers will see it. In a similar way the work done in the field of remembering, by Astrid Erll, can throw further light on this complex area.

2.4 – ASTRID ERLI

From this perspective the article ‘Re-writing as re-visioning – modes of representing the ‘Indian Mutiny’ in British novels, 1857 to 2000’ is applicable to *The Valley*.⁹¹ Her paper is based on the way social communities recall (memorial history) or remember, which ‘effects changes in the shape and meaning of the past’ the literary form being a specific form of remembering. For *The Valley*, Leipoldt’s memory, through the characters (based on history), re-presents the past and this representation in his fiction, affects the changes in the shape and

⁸⁷Ethan Kleinberg, ‘Presence in absentia’, *Storia della Storiografia*, 55, 2009, p. 52.

⁸⁸Eelco Runia, ‘Presence’, *History and Theory*, 45(1), February 2006, p. 10.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*

⁹⁰*Ibid.*

⁹¹Astrid Erll, ‘Re-writing as Re-visioning – Modes of Representing the ‘Indian Nutiny’ in British Novels, 1857 to 2000’, *European Journal of English Studies*, 10(2), 2006, pp. 163 – 185.

the meaning of the past. It requires a strong reader-response and reader-ethics for this to happen. These ideas fall into the field of ‘cultural memory’ which can be used to describe complex ways for remembering, using different media, such as the fiction novel. Even if readers have no personal experience of Leipoldt’s past by reading what he writes, they can be exposed to a ‘product of accumulated exposure to a common reservoir of products, including ... histories and novels.’⁹² Readers can gauge their response to Leipoldt’s fiction, to identify with the historical past, some agreeing and others not with his treatment of the characters and the way he positions them in the history.

Of further importance is Astrid Erll’s article ‘Traumatic pasts, literary afterlives, and transcultural memory: new directions of literary and media memory studies.’⁹³ As for the representation of memory in literature, and so-called ‘traumatic pasts’ (such as the South African War) Erll argues that literature can portray both individual and collective memory by coding it into the form of the narrative, and its dynamic relationship to the past (history) [as with *The Valley*.] The fictional versions of memory (Leipoldt’s fictional novel) ‘are characterized by their dynamic relationship to memory concepts of other symbol systems, such as ... history ... and they are shaped by them and shape them in turn; they may perpetuate old or anticipated new images of remembering and forgetting.’⁹⁴ These images can trigger off memories of other events as a reader response, whereby they (the readers) recognize or experience events such as apartheid, racial tension, or the degradation in society, depending upon the age of the reader, and his/her experiences and observations at a point in time in history, such as the current youth’s perceptions/pessimism as an emotional manifestation towards the world’s current (uncertain) condition.

2.5 – F R ANKERSMIT

Leading scholar in the field of the philosophy of history F R Ankersmit in a paper⁹⁵ published eight months after Runia’s paper on ‘presence’ develops Runia’s model, and so further opens up possibilities for gaining access to the past in history. Ankersmit argues that because the meaning of the term ‘presence’ is not fixed, and as long as ‘it should maximally contribute to

⁹²Astrid Erll & Ann Rigney. ‘Literature and the Production of Cultural Memory’, *European Journal of English Studies*, 10(2), 2006, p. 112.

⁹³Astrid Erll, ‘Traumatic Pasts, Literary Afterlives, and Transcultural Memory: new Directions of Literary and Media Memory Studies’, *Journal of Aesthetics and Culture*, 3, 2011, p. 2.

⁹⁴*Ibid.*

⁹⁵F R Ankersmit, “‘Presence’ and Myth”, *History and Theory*, 45(30), October 2006, p. 328.

our understanding of the humanities’, he will use it by relating it to ‘representation’.⁹⁶ This is followed by an explanation of the focus he places on ‘a variant of representation in which the past is allowed to travel to the present as a kind of ‘stowaway’ (Runia), so that the past is literally ‘present’ in historical representation.’⁹⁷ Here Ankersmit diverges from Runia in the way he (Runia) holds onto ‘the unrepresented way the past is present in the present.’ Ankersmit ‘appeals to Runia’s notion of so-called “parallel processes” for his analysis of this variant of historical representation.’⁹⁸ And then he explains the objectifying of the past through what he calls myth. A further point to consider is that Runia’s model is designed to give explanatory power when faced specifically with phenomena such as memory and trauma whilst Ankersmit is not necessarily appending this meaning in his definition of the term, ‘presence’.

Ankersmit refers to a previous paper by Eelco Runia, entitled ‘Spots of Time’⁹⁹ in which the notion of so-called ‘parallel processes’ comes up. To illustrate this notion, Ankersmit turns to Runia’s discussion of the Srebrenica massacre in which 7,500 Muslims were slaughtered by the Serbs under the nose of a Dutch UN battalion (Dutchbat), in July 1995.¹⁰⁰ It is at this point that Ankersmit introduces his concept of myth which he concludes, is ‘not in the traditional sense of the word, but understood rather as what a civilization, nation, or institution never succeeds in properly objectifying when thinking about itself and its past.’¹⁰¹ So when the NIOD (Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies in the Netherlands) who investigated the incident, put out its report on what happened at the Srebrenica massacre, there was this notion of myth missing – yet the report failed to objectify when determining, what happened. The historians, according to Ankersmit, copied the way politicians work, instead of being true to their own methods as historians. To avoid something like this occurring, Ankersmit sees the notion of ‘presence’ (through the parallel process as described by Runia) and the concept of myth going together much like a picture and a frame (Meyer

⁹⁶F R Ankersmit, “‘Presence’ and Myth’, *History and Theory*, 45(30), October 2006, p. 328.

⁹⁷*Ibid.*

⁹⁸*Ibid.*

⁹⁹Eelco Runia, “Spots of Time”, *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 315, cited in F R Ankersmit, “‘Presence’ and Myth’, *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 329.

¹⁰⁰F R Ankersmit, “‘Presence’ and Myth’, *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 335.

¹⁰¹*Ibid.*

Schapiro's argument¹⁰²). The idea of presence (the stubborn persistence of the past) alone in history according to Ankersmit is therefore not sufficient.¹⁰³

What Ankersmit is trying to move away from is the paradigm that has prevailed in the philosophy of history for a while, namely the notion of lingualism, which according to him, 'has become by now an obstacle to, rather than a promoter of, useful and fruitful insights'.¹⁰⁴ Against this though, he argues that the 'notion of "presence"' may help us to enter a new phase in theoretical reflection about the humanities and to address a set of wholly new and fascinating questions.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, he argues, a knowledge of it (this notion of presence) may add to our understanding of how we represent the past, certainly no easy undertaking given the intricacies that accompany this field of investigation.¹⁰⁶ But it is not the notion of 'presence' alone that Ankersmit is fascinated by, but 'more specifically, of how basic myth really is to how we conceptualize the past.'¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, according to Ankersmit, myth should not be assigned to some primitive and ancient phase in the way we interact with the past, but it should exist 'also ... at the vanishing point of all contemporary professionalized historical writing.'¹⁰⁸

Myth and presence are explained like the picture and frame scenario in Schapiro's description where the picture and frame are one, even if the frame part is not reflecting nature (non-mimetic). It nevertheless contributes to the painting's meaning because it can enhance the image or do the opposite. With this example Ankersmit explains that we 'are ordinarily blind to the semantic role played by the picture in the frame; similarly, we tend to forget about the mythical framework enclosing historical representation.'¹⁰⁹ And if the frame were absent, we

¹⁰²Meyer Schapiro, 'On some problems in the Semiotics of Visual Art: Field and Vehicle in Image-Signs', *Semiotica*, 1, 1969, p. 225, cited in F R Ankersmit, "'Presence" and Myth', *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 332.

¹⁰³In Ankersmit's own words (p.334): 'In the NIOD Report the framework that ordinarily separates the past from its representation fell away, and myth could then freely invade the domain of representation. Myth now no longer merely *contributed* to historical meaning, it no longer was merely a framework *around* historical representation, but it *entered into the representation itself*. It did so by making the historians of the NIOD repeat the behavior of the responsible politicians, and in both cases this behaviour was inspired by a myth of what the Dutch and the Dutch nation fundamentally is like: decent, nice, cooperative, and without prejudice against Jews, Muslims, or whatever theological or racial denominations you may have. But, of course, the appalling indifference of Dutchbat to the fate of the Muslims of Srebrenica tells a quite different story. So – a myth it surely is!'

¹⁰⁴F R Ankersmit, "'Presence" and Myth', *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 336.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁰⁸*Ibid.*, p. 336.

¹⁰⁹*Ibid.*, p. 333.

recognize it is normally present, and the same can be said for myth in history. When we leave out the frame (the myth), it is because we show the limit to the way we have succeeded in historicizing.¹¹⁰ The problem for Ankersmit comes about when we historicize everything except the myth, which is, to repeat, as what is not objectified when thinking about a person's, nation's, institution's or civilization's own position in relation to its past. So, whereas in Runia's 'presence paradigm' we have the 'the un-represented way the past is present in the present' (because phenomena such as memory and trauma are difficult to re-present), and historical reality is there but as a stowaway (absently and unintentionally present on the plane of time – Runia), in Ankersmit 'the past is literally "present" in historical representation.'¹¹¹ This point enhances the notion of historical representation (compared to Runia) but does not place it back in the Hayden White camp.

In each of the three novels making up *The Valley*, a method Leipoldt adopts is to set up debates in the dialogue between characters in his fiction. These involve polemical topics such as the Great Trek, the language issue and the hypocritical role of politicians in society. Some examples are, in *Gallows Gecko*, between Everardus Nolte and Pastor Von Bergmann about race, between the moderates and loyalists over the topic of war coming to the Valley in *Stormwrack*, and between Santa and Mabuis over the question of nationhood, language and politics, in *The Mask*. In all three cases mentioned here, at the centre of the discussion are some of the very topics that caused the rift in the cordial relations that once existed between the two races, English and Afrikaans in South Africa. Leipoldt was correct in the way he objectified when commenting on the position of the nation and its past. At the time of the country's *post bella* periods Leipoldt was expecting more from the leaders in terms of steering the nation, but their policies seemed to him to be far more parochial than the universal qualities that he espoused, foremost being nationhood for all. Whilst it can be argued, of course, that Leipoldt was always somehow far from the action, it must nevertheless be said he understood what the nation needed to succeed in properly objectifying when thinking about itself and its past — a common, cultural, true South African nationalism (against the exclusive nationalism of Preller). By writing this in the way he did, the fiction in *The Valley* identified the nefarious path South Africa took in the ensuing years.

¹¹⁰F R Ankersmit, "Presence" and Myth', in *History and Theory*, 45 (October 2006), p. 334.

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 329.

2.6 – JONAS GRETHLEIN

Another philosopher of history is Jonas Grethlein, from Heidelberg University (Runia and Ankersmit are from Groningen). Grethlein explains the re-emergence of experience the immediacy of which ‘seems to offer the possibility of reaching beyond linguistic discourses.’¹¹² According to Grethlein, however, ‘in their attempt to overcome the “linguistic turn”, scholars such as Ankersmit, Gumbrecht, and Runia pit experience against narrative.’¹¹³ Grethlein does not altogether go along with this, and instead argues that narrative is cast into experience, at the same time acknowledging the relation between the two as being complex.¹¹⁴ Narratives represent and give experience their shape, and they are also ‘received in the form of a (reception) experience.’¹¹⁵ This invokes reader experience and reception ethics, an important dimension when reading Leipoldt’s historical fiction.

For Grethlein, classical historian Thucydides’ *History of the Peloponnesian War* serves as a good example of ‘side-shadowing’¹¹⁶ devices which restore history’s experientiality. This side-shadowing narrative restores ‘presentness’ to the past through relying strongly on fictional elements¹¹⁷ and thus can challenge the tendency toward teleologies inherent in merely retrospective histories and can re-create the openness intrinsic to the past when it still was a present.¹¹⁸

The term ‘side-shadowing’ derives from Gary Saul Morson. In a similar way to Morson who suggests that ‘there is another way to read and construct texts’, Leipoldt’s ‘intellectual pluralism’ opens up possibilities for the reading of texts. According to Morson most narratives are developed through foreshadowing and “backshadowing” (foreshadowing ascribed after the fact), which tend to reduce the multiplicity of possibilities in each moment and advocates understanding the event in terms of ‘what *else* might have happened’ where ‘time is not a line but a shifting set of fields of possibility.’ Morson argues that this view of

¹¹²Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(3), October 2010, p. 315.

¹¹³*Ibid.*

¹¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹¹⁶Attempts to re-create the presentness of the past in narrative.’ See Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(3), October 2010, p. 323, in footnote no. 45, referring to Morson.

¹¹⁷Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(3), October 2010, p. 315.

¹¹⁸*Ibid.*

time and narrative encourages intellectual pluralism, helps to liberate us from the false certainties of dogmatism, creates a healthy skepticism of present orthodoxies, and makes us aware that there are moral choices available to us.¹¹⁹

An example of ‘side-shadowing’ is the Sicilian expedition.¹²⁰ The story is that in 415 BCE a decision is made whereby the Athenians decided to afford the Segestans with assistance in their conflict with Syracuse. To this effect they sent a large fleet to Sicily but the final defeat at Syracuse in 413 BCE is just as disappointing as it is devastating for the Athenians and weakens the latter. As Grethlein explains, ‘the failure of a hubristic enterprise is a motif well-known from Herodotus’s *Histories*’; and explains that a case has been made that Thucydides draws on ‘the form of tragedy for his account of the Sicilian expedition.’¹²¹ There is nevertheless a difference between the narrative technique in Herodotus’s accounts for the event, and the way Thucydides writes. In Thucydides’ narrative technique there is ‘the virtual absence of prolepses’ which means that unlike the way Herodotus in his *Histories* prepares the reader for what is going to come, ‘Thucydides narrates his war year by year without foreshadowing.’¹²² In this way the readers are following the text and the historical events from the perspective and experience of the characters, as explained by Grethlein:

Instead, he closely reports on the expectations of the characters so as to make his readers follow the Sicilian expedition from the perspective of the characters.¹²³

In Thucydides’s account of the Sicilian expedition, the readers are privileged relative to the characters by being informed about events in both camps, the Sicilians and the Athenians, but he does not lead the readers with authorial comments or fore-shadowing of the disastrous ending, as Herodotus does in his text. In contradistinction to Herodotus, Thucydides forces his readers ‘to weigh carefully the positions of the characters.’¹²⁴ It might be said that Leipoldt creates a position in his *The Valley*, especially through the dialogue, to engage in its irony, by creating an element of expectation, for instance, the tension that builds up as the

¹¹⁹ Gary Saul Morson, *Narrative and Freedom, The Shadows of Time*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996.

¹²⁰This is a miniature war within the Peloponnesian War.

¹²¹For further references see F M Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus*, Routledge, London, 1907, in Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(1), October 2010, p. 324.

¹²²Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(1), October 2010, pp. 324 – 325. For a more extensive interpretation of the Sicilian expedition from this perspective, see Jonas Grethlein, *The Greeks and Their Past: Poetry, Oratory and History in the Fifth Century BCE*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 240 – 279.

¹²³Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(1), October 2010, p. 325.

¹²⁴*Ibid.*

(unlikely) war being waged in the republics, finally reaches the small, remote Village tucked away somewhere in the Cederberg environs.

The following excerpt from Grethlein explains the opening up of new possibilities for historical meaning, through the device called ‘side-shadowing’:

Narrating always remains posterior to experiences. To the same degree that narratives transform experiences, they cannot reproduce their openness. Nevertheless, *The History of the Peloponnesian War* illustrates how far the art of narrative can go in “re-presenting” past action and especially its openness. The strategies of “side-shadowing” employed by Thucydides allow him to re-create the experientiality of history.¹²⁵

Devices in the text such as introspection and speeches, as an attempt to restore openness to the past, take on a referential function at a second level (a second-order reference, not based on direct sources).¹²⁶ In this sense they are what Grethlein refers to as the concept of a ‘narrative reference’ in analogy with Paul Ricoeur’s notion of ‘metaphorical reference’. The sacrifice of literal truth ‘permits a reference to and “re-presentation” of the openness of the past.’¹²⁷ The question remains how, if at all, it might be best to illustrate Grethlein’s theory of ‘side-shadowing’ in Leipoldt’s *The Valley*. Leipoldt creates a sense of expectation by the grand way he sketches the character Elias Vantloo in *The Mask*, but does so as a slam-dunk, because he later exposes his hypocrisy. As in Thomas Mann’s *Buddenbrooks*, and Hardy’s *The Mayor of Casterbridge*, moral degradation through inter-marriage and other factors, is a theme in Leipoldt’s fiction, which evokes the idea of the degradation of society, to include political degeneration in South African history of the last half of the twentieth century (the weak link in Santa’s breeding is the wily, expedient, morally corrupt Vantloo).

The reader can formulate his/her ideas from a reading of the Leipoldt text and in the process might well find in it an ‘openness intrinsic to the past when it was still a present.’¹²⁸ He/she might even find what is there in spite of the text, or find a way to fill in the blank spaces. It is from Leipoldt’s past experiences that he is making certain observations as he documents and records what happened, and at the same time, invents his fiction. In this way, Leipoldt creates a form of alternative history, different to the teleologies in retrospective history texts. By looking at the Leipoldt text against some of Grethlein’s theory, one is making some

¹²⁵Jonas Grethlein, ‘Experientiality and “Narrative Reference,” with thanks to Thucydides’, *History and Theory*, 49(1), October 2010, p. 327.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 328.

¹²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 328.

¹²⁸*Ibid.*, p. 315.

attempt to see if there is not perhaps another way to gain access to the past, as theorists White, Runia and Ankersmit have done. To them, add Grethlein's call as in the following excerpt:

In a final step, the paper turns toward modern historians—most of whom are reluctant to use the means of fiction—to briefly survey their attempts at restoring the openness of the past.¹²⁹

2.7 – PAUL RICOEUR

Philosopher of history Paul Ricoeur is especially important for the debate on historical theory, for a reading with Ankersmit and Runia, and against Grethlein, especially for his work on hermeneutics.¹³⁰ Of importance for this chapter is the following view, that human action is 'a potential mode of human existence which can be unfolded through the process of interpretation.'¹³¹

The following points are important in a study of Ricoeur's ideas, in the methodological debate about the understanding of the interpretation of action.¹³² Aristotle explains that tragedy tries to imitate human action in a poetic way (we think here of Leipoldt's poetry) – the 'mythos' of tragedy (its fable and its plot), is the 'mimesis' (creative imitation) of human action.¹³³ Since as Ricoeur says '[W]e belong to history before telling stories or writing history'¹³⁴ the analysis of 'history as fiction and of fiction as mimesis', brings us to the proposition that 'the references of 'true history' (reference) and 'fictional history' (structure) 'cross upon the basic historicity of human experience.'¹³⁵

Ricoeur's words that 'the world of fiction leads us to the heart of the real world of action'¹³⁶ are important in this thesis, to consider, as are the following in this extract:

¹²⁹Jonas Grethlein, 'Experientiality and "Narrative Reference," with thanks to Thucydides', *History and Theory*, 49(3), October 2010, p. 315.

¹³⁰Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, edited, translated and introduced by John B. Thompson, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, First Published in 1981, reprinted 1982.

¹³¹*Ibid.*, p. 16.

¹³²Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber and others initiated this idea in the context of the social sciences. Reference to them is in Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, page 15.

¹³³In Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 16.

¹³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 294.

¹³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 293 – 294.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 296.

Could we not say, in conclusion, that by opening us to what is different, history opens us to the possible, whereas fiction, by opening us to the unreal, leads us to what is essential in reality?¹³⁷

Ricoeur suggests that our ultimate interest in ‘doing history’ is to ‘enlarge our sphere of communication’.¹³⁸ The statement by Paul Ricoeur that ‘the “true” histories of the past uncover the buried potentialities of the present’¹³⁹ is another way of looking at Leipoldt’s fiction, and can enhance the ideas put forward by White *et al.* about representation, presentism, myth, experience, narrative and action, in history, as we have been reading in the preceding pages. The ideas put forward by Ricoeur further open up for us possible ways to view history, not only by using the methodologies of positivism and first-referencing. This point is very obvious, based on what has been written thus far in this chapter, to provide support for *The Valley* to serve as a possible alternative account of the past.

2.8 - THE VOICES OF SERIOUS CRITICISM AGAINST THE POSTMODERNIST AND DECONSTRUCTIVIST PARADIGM

It is necessary to examine the voices of criticism against the deconstructionist paradigm. Chris Lorenz argues that the task of philosophy of history is ‘to elucidate the *practice* of history’; ‘to stick to the analysis of the debates of *historians*’. For Lorenz, ‘neither literary theory nor aesthetics can function as “models” for philosophy of history.’¹⁴⁰ The reason for this view, according to Lorenz, is because historians ‘present reconstructions primarily in terms of factual adequacy.’¹⁴¹ Lorenz further argues that the narrativism of the likes of White and Ankersmit can be viewed as an inversion of two brands of positivism, the first being an inversion of empiricism whereby narratives function as metaphors which do not possess a cognitive content, what he calls a ‘picture view’ of knowledge. This includes any non-cognitive aspects which are dependent on this picture theory of knowledge, and a picture theory of representation. According to Lorenz, ‘most of the epistemological characteristics that White and Ankersmit attribute to historical narratives therefore share the problems of this

¹³⁷Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 296.

¹³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 295.

¹³⁹Paul Ricoeur, see his essay on ‘The Narrative Function’, in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 295. The ambiguity of the word ‘history’ which is rich in the French word *histoire*, is according to Ricoeur, no accident. ‘Retelling the text of the past is part of the reality of the present – part, as Gadamer would say, of the ‘effective-historical consciousness.’’ This is in Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, p. 17.

¹⁴⁰Chris Lorenz, ‘Historical Knowledge and Historical Reality: A Plea for “Internal Realism”’ in *History and Theory*, Vol 33 No 3, October, 1994, p. 297.

¹⁴¹*Ibid.*

picture theory.¹⁴² The second is that the theories of narrative explanation can be analyzed as inversions of positivist covering-law theory. Lorenz explains Ankersmit's brand of narrativism as the most radical 'because it posits an opposition between narrative and causal modes of comprehension while simultaneously eliminating causality from narrativist historical understanding.'¹⁴³ Therefore White and Ankersmit, in their expositions on narrativism, pre-suppose positivism when they claim that historical narratives have a metaphorical structure and therefore no truth-value. Their theories therefore are problematic for historians when reconciling the factual information/representations with the historical debate, when trying to find out what happened, and are thus problematic for standard historians conducting historical research. In this sense, Lorenz's is a critical voice against narrative history.

Georg G Iggers¹⁴⁴ examines the changes in ideas about the nature of history and historiography and identifies the assumptions on which historical research and writing have been based describing how in the *post bellum* period (World War II) it was the social sciences that transformed historiography. More recently however, in the last two decades the ideas of postmodernism forced historians to re-evaluate their subject. The contemporary discipline for Iggers is a move away from the macrohistorical approach toward microhistory, cultural history, and the history of everyday life where social sciences and their approaches assign a greater role to cultural factors and to the problems of globalization.

Thus, certain of the assumptions made by Iggers can be of interest to narrative history, such as that history portrays people who really existed and actions that really took place.¹⁴⁵ This completely excludes Leipoldt's *The Valley* if one looks at Iggers's statement *de facto*, although if one bears in mind that Leipoldt based his characters on actual types that he knew, then one could say that the characters are semi-real and that is as good as it gets. As for another assumption viz. that human actions mirror the intentions of the actors and it is a task of the historian to comprehend these intentions in order to construct a coherent historical story,¹⁴⁶ it can be argued that Leipoldt's fiction in *The Valley* does just that as it is based on historical events and sequence. However, it does reflect certain thinking by the writer that is

¹⁴²Chris Lorenz, 'Can Histories Be True? Narrativism, Positivism, and the "MetaphoricalTurn"' *History and Theory*, Volume 37, Issue 3, October 1998, p. 309.

¹⁴³*Ibid.*

¹⁴⁴G G Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century, from Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Hanover NH: Wesleyan University Press of New England, 1997.

¹⁴⁵*Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁶*Ibid.*

not necessarily historical, such as moral and ethical factors, and as such, it can be argued the narrative veers away from strict, standard and traditional historical thinking. Iggers argues that the emphasis of postmodernism (on ‘the impact of language, rhetoric, and symbolic behaviour’), whilst it needs to be taken seriously, ‘lends itself more to literary criticism than history, with the more extreme “only language exists” position shared by a few historians.’¹⁴⁷

Iggers furthermore challenges aspects of microhistory (one could portray Leipoldt’s fictional *The Valley* as a micro-history of sorts), when it reduces history to anecdotal antiquarianism, romanticizes past cultures, and does not deal with the rapid change that the modern and contemporary world undergoes, and in connection with the last point, is incapable of dealing with politics.¹⁴⁸ However, Iggers acknowledges that micro-histories stress the discontinuities in history (Leipoldt’s treatment of the effects on the South African War on the local community), deducing that no grand narrative is possible (for this), although he argues that microhistorians can ‘operate with a largely negative evaluation of modernization’ regarding the passing of the premodern communities they study, ‘with a degree of nostalgia’¹⁴⁹ (Leipoldt’s nostalgia for a rooted past).¹⁵⁰ These are some of the points of criticism against postmodern history, from Iggers, although there are some areas where the criticism is not as harsh as from Lorenz.

Another voice of criticism against postmodern history is from Eric Hobsbawm, who in an interview, described the cultural turn as an ‘attempt to eliminate the social very largely from history’ and the linguistic turn as ‘a reflection of the provincialism of Great Britain.’¹⁵¹ His work on Marxist history has led to overcoming divergence and fragmentation in history, which the convergence of history with the social sciences is now producing¹⁵² and this has led to a general framework of the social sciences. Hobsbawm looked at history from the perspective of universal questions ‘challenging positivism’s narrow preoccupation with “scientism”, the inappropriate transfer of methods from the natural to the social sciences’, and then ‘drawing history into a fruitful dialogue with the social sciences.’¹⁵³

¹⁴⁷<http://dannyreviews.com/h/Historiography.html>.

¹⁴⁸G G Iggers, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century, from Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Hanover NH: Wesleyan University Press of New England, 1997, p. 113.

¹⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 112.

¹⁵⁰Peter Merrington, ‘C. Louis Leipoldt’s “Valley trilogy” and Contested South African Nationalisms in the Early Twentieth century’, *Current Writing*, 15(2), 2003, p. 44.

¹⁵¹From the Interview Transcript – the interview took place at the interviewee’s home, London, 17 June 2008, the interviewer being Danny Millum.

¹⁵²Eric Hobsbawm, *On History*, Butler & Tanner, Ltd., London, 1997, pp. 66 – 67.

¹⁵³<http://anystreetcorner.blogspot.com/2005/01/hobsbawm-on-history.html>.

As for history that is ‘contingent, fragmented and relative’ such as narrative or postmodern history, Hobsbawm sets himself against ‘the postmodern obsession with language games.’¹⁵⁴ Thus when history is concerned with ‘not what happened, but how it concerns the members of a particular group’ and thus relativizes history, it moves away from ‘total history’ – ‘not a “history of everything”, but history as an indivisible web in which all human activities are interconnected’.¹⁵⁵ Looking at these points vis-à-vis Leipoldt’s *The Valley*, as a form of historical fiction, constructed through narrative history, takes one closer to the history of a particular group, away from the totalizing history, although the values that Leipoldt espouses can be said to be universal in their application — being rooted in tradition and this as having value. However, this is more a moral point than historical, and so does not explain Hobsbawm’s point about totalizing history, interconnectedness and history on a large scale.

Certainly one of the classic examples of a voice of criticism against postmodernism comes from Richard Evans, in his *In Defence of History*. Evans aims to defend a mainstream notion of history-writing against ‘intellectual barbarians’ namely ‘the invading hordes of semioticians, post-structuralist, New Historicists, Foucauldians, Lacanians and the rest’.¹⁵⁶ Although Evans admits that more than one kind of postmodernism exists, (‘different varieties’), he nevertheless explains what he does not enjoy about postmodernism generally, without engaging much about it.¹⁵⁷ For instance, the discussion on Foucault’s account of history is not sustained in any way.¹⁵⁸ Evans calls for the historian’s obligations towards primary sources and a ‘return of scholarly humility’.¹⁵⁹ The above are some of the voices of criticism against deconstructivist history, and need to be seriously considered against the impact that postmodernism has had on the practical *métier* of historical research. The strongest argument against these critics may be that their policing of the disciplinary boundaries of history would have rendered a *The Valley* (not only as text but also as archive) off limits for historical investigation. As this thesis will hopefully illustrate, a moderate (and scholarly humble) deconstructionist historian’s approach to the Valley Trilogy may render an appreciation for Leipoldt’s project which augments and enhances that of scholars working directly from a literary theoretical background.

¹⁵⁴<http://anystreetcorner.blogspot.com/2005/01/hobsbawm-on-history.html>.

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶Richard Evans, *In Defence of History*, Granta, London, 1997, pp. 8 – 9.

¹⁵⁷*Ibid.*, p. 205.

¹⁵⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 195 – 196.

¹⁵⁹*Ibid.*, p. 201.

2.9 – NEWER TRENDS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY – ALEIDA ASSMANN, ANN RIGNEY AND ASTRID ERLI

There are newer trends in the theory of history promoting interest in aspects of historical representation, the social and cultural relevance of historical consciousness, and history and trauma. Examples of these theorists are Aleida Assman, Ann Rigney and Astrid Erll who adopt an inter-disciplinary approach in the intersections of memory and culture. Lionel Gossman describes cultural history as ‘the history of the elusive past’ which is ‘shown to be specially imperfect ...because of the special difficulties encountered by historians trying to represent a past that always extends beyond their grasp and because the forms and methods devised or borrowed to meet those difficulties — with varying degrees of success — always involve compromises.’¹⁶⁰ The following paragraphs will briefly examine aspects of each of the theories of Assmann, Rigney and Erll.

Since the 1990s Aleida Assmann has been focusing her research on cultural memory, remembering, and forgetting. Although her training is in English and Egyptology, her more recent work includes *The Long Shadow of the Past: Cultures of Memory and the Politics of History* (2006), showing how memory leads from an individual to a collective construction of the past. Her work examines the tensions between personal experience and official remembrance ‘giving memory a common space’ for expression.¹⁶¹ For Assmann, remembrance in a country’s history is when its citizens ‘can meet and combine the individual, separate memories from their experience to form a common vision for the future.’¹⁶² Here one might view remembrance in terms of Leipoldt’s world-view and the *topoi* that make it up, in the loyalist-unionist paradigm, for a South African national identity.

A further notion that Assmann identifies in the field of memory is that it is highly selective and this of course includes what we choose to remember and forget, both actively and passively.¹⁶³ The two are distinguished as the past as present (in the institutions of active memory) and the past as past (in the institutions of passive memory).¹⁶⁴ It is this tension in

¹⁶⁰Lionel Gossman in his book review of Ann Rigney, *Imperfect Histories: The Elusive Past and the Legacy of Romantic Historicism*, Cornell University press, Ithaca, 2001, p. 479.

¹⁶¹<https://www.goethe.de/ins/gb/lp/prj/mtg/men/tie/kul/en2873780.htm>.

¹⁶²*Ibid.*

¹⁶³Aleida Assman, ‘Canon and Archive’ in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 97.

¹⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 98.

the institutions of active memory, between the past-ness of the past and its presence that is the important key ‘to understanding the dynamics of cultural memory.’¹⁶⁵ The distinction is between the active memory (the showcased exhibits in the museum) referred to by Assmann as the canon, on the one hand, and on the other, the archive which is made up of the exhibits that are stored in the store-room of the museum.¹⁶⁶

Assmann refers to Jakob Burckardt’s division of former historical periods into ‘messages’ and ‘traces’, the former such as texts and monuments and the latter without address, and mistrusted the former as they were usually staged by those in power and in state institutions; but favoured the latter which countered the history propagated by the rulers.¹⁶⁷ The paradigm of Preller *versus* Leipoldt might serve as a good example for Burckardt’s model, also proven by the fact that Preller’s *volksgeskiedenis* had limited duration. On the other hand, the cultural memory that Leipoldt exercised contained a number of cultural messages ‘that are addressed to posterity and intended for continuous repetition and re-use.’¹⁶⁸ This is the canon, the kind of cultural memory that endures forever, outlives generations and is thus independent of historical change – the kind one imagines that Leipoldt was hoping to inculcate in people’s memories, and that would induce a national, South African consciousness albeit a highly idealistic one. The archive on the other hand is defined by Assmann as ‘a receptacle for documents that have fallen out of their framing institutions and can be reframed and interpreted in a new context.’¹⁶⁹ According to Assmann one needs to distinguish between political and historical archives, the difference being that whilst political archives can function as an important tool for power, ‘historical archives store information which is no longer of immediate use’ and thus now lies in the passive memory, an intermediate space, a *Zwischenspeicher*.¹⁷⁰

The thoughts that Assmann outlines, referred to in the above few paragraphs, relate to both the historian and literary writers as both employ cultural memory, but she makes a distinction. Historians have to adjust their research and questions, according to the extension

¹⁶⁵ Aleida Assman, ‘Canon and Archive’ in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 98.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 98 – 99.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

and range of the archives whilst literary writers can take the liberty of filling in the gaps.¹⁷¹ Thus, the literary writer can invent where there are gaps – but the gaps could also be the areas in memory caused by trauma, which then is not so much the filling of the gap, but the marking of it, as in Toni Morrison’s writing, an example being her book, *Beloved*.¹⁷² This gives to fiction a flexibility which is absent in other forms of remembrance, a notion that another philosopher of history, Ann Rigney, explores especially by the way writers can invent characters, design their stories and bring closure to events, which historians are not always able to do.¹⁷³

Ann Rigney has published widely in the fields of historical and narrative theory and cultural memory studies, showing the importance of the move from memory sites to memory dynamics, which allows for the inclusion of the role of art and literature in the formation of collective memory.¹⁷⁴ She confesses however that ‘more research needs to be done on the relation between memorability, aesthetic power, and cultural longevity’ as far as the interest and durability of narrative texts are concerned although she cites Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* (1865 – 1869) and Spielberg’s *Schindler’s List* (1993)¹⁷⁵ as examples of the durability of non-standard (history) texts that perpetuate the stories of the past. In her latest book Rigney describes how the writer of historical fiction, Sir Walter Scott (1771-1832), became an all-pervasive point of reference for cultural memory and collective identity in the nineteenth century, and why his work no longer has this role.¹⁷⁶ She discusses this point in the context of cultural remembrance and obsolescence in the age of mass media.

By doing this she is breaking new ground in memory studies and the study of literary reception by the way she examines ‘the dynamics of cultural memory and the “social life” of

¹⁷¹Aleida Assman, ‘Canon and Archive’ in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 106.

¹⁷²*Ibid.*

¹⁷³Ann Rigney, ‘The Dynamics of Remembrance: Texts Between Monumentality and Morphing’, in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 347.

¹⁷⁴Ann Rigney is best known for her book *Imperfect Histories: The Illusive Past and the Legacy of the Romantic Historicism*, Cornell University Press, 2001. See Lionell Gossman’s book review in *The American Historical Review*, 108(2), April 2003, pp. 479 – 480. Gossman ends his review: ‘As a study of a kind of cultural history focused on the “experience” of the past — and “experience” is a recurrent theme here — Rigney’s book is a work of subtle analysis and broad historical awareness.’ (p. 480).

¹⁷⁵Ann Rigney, ‘The Dynamics of Remembrance: Texts Between Monumentality and Morphing’, in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, pp. 347 – 348.

¹⁷⁶Ann Rigney, *The Afterlives of Walter Scott: Memory on the Move*, Oxford University Press, 2012.

literary texts across several generations and multiple media.¹⁷⁷ She employs a wide range of examples to show how Scott's Waverley novels 'travelled into painting, the theatre, and material culture, as well as to the role of "Scott" as a memory site in the public sphere for a century after his death.'¹⁷⁸ The memory of Scott's work 'helped shape national and transnational identities up to World War One, and contributed to the emergence of the idea of an English-speaking world encompassing Scotland, the British Empire and the United States.'¹⁷⁹

One might apply Rigney's example to the way Preller created a national consciousness through his characters and histories of the past, in his *Afrikaner volksgeskiedenis*, forging a 'potent alliance between memory, literature, and identity that was eminently suited to modernizing', and by the way he wrote up the histories of the Voortrekkers through his idealization of their history. Furthermore, Rigney explains that literature as with some of the other arts has a privileged voice and as such can carry out the role of the 'oppositional' memory, a 'counter-memorial' and thus a critical voice against hegemonic views of the past.¹⁸⁰ Here one might consider Leipoldt writing against the political history of the Nationalists in South African history of the 1920s. Furthermore, the novel can be seen as a memory site to cultural dynamics, whereby the emphasis is away from individual products to more cultural process such as counter-narratives, translations from other languages, adaptation to media and reception ethics. In this sense the cultural power of works 'can be located in the cultural activities it gives rise to, rather than what it is in itself.'¹⁸¹

Reference has already been made to Astrid Erll.¹⁸² Her work has become increasingly important as the relationship between culture and memory has emerged as a key issue in interdisciplinary research. However, as Erll admits, the field is still new and 'it is part of the effort to consolidate memory studies into a more coherent discipline.'¹⁸³ At the same time it can be seen as 'a first step on the road towards a conceptual foundation for the kind of

¹⁷⁷<http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/HistoryOther/CulturalHistory/?view=usa&ci=9780199644018>.

¹⁷⁸*Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰Ann Rigney, 'The Dynamics of Remembrance: Texts Between Monumentality and Morphing', in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 348.

¹⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 349.

¹⁸²Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008.

¹⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 1.

memory studies which assumes a decidedly cultural and social perspective.¹⁸⁴ But the field of cultural memory is not without its challenges. One of these potential challenges can arise when memory is transferred from the individual and individual psychology, to the level of the collective, social or national, which in turn, can lead to the creation of myth — going from ‘individual acts of remembering in a social context to group memory to national memory with its “invented traditions.”’¹⁸⁵ An example of such an invented tradition can be found in the way Isabel Hofmeyr explains Gustav Preller’s myth-making through the use of film to evoke national feeling, especially as he saw it as personal wizardry,¹⁸⁶ to influence his audience.

*The Invention of Tradition*¹⁸⁷ by Eric Hobsbawm¹⁸⁸ (in spite of his scepticism towards the postmodernist “language games”) and Terence Ranger can also be useful for examining the way traditions are invented although they make the distinction between tradition and invention. So one might see what Gustav Preller does to generate an Afrikaner consciousness around folk festivals as at Monument Kopje outside Pretoria, with the laying of the foundation stone of the Voortrekker Monument in 1938, more as the invention of an Afrikaner foundational myth by comparison to Leipoldt’s notion of local deep tradition and the value of being rooted, which goes back much further in South African history to the time it evolved in the early Dutch farming communities that were established in the Cederberg area in the middle of the eighteenth century. Far from Iggers’s suspected ‘incapability to deal with politics’, Leipoldt’s focus on the everyday at microlevel is very much a political act.

2.10 - CONCLUSION

Leipoldt’s historical fiction as in *The Valley* is a considerable project that covers approximately one hundred years of South African history, of a small town and its people. Yet the microcosmic story of the Village and the Valley can be applied allegorically for the broader story of South Africa; the issues are there — the Great Trek, the 1820 settlers,

¹⁸⁴Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Cultural Memory Studies: An International and Interdisciplinary Handbook*, in collaboration with Sara B Young, De Gruyter, Berlin & New York, 2008, p. 2.

¹⁸⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶Isabel Hofmeyr, ‘Popularizing History: Gustav Preller’, in *Journal of African History*, 29, 1988, p. 525.

¹⁸⁷Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983.

¹⁸⁸Hobsbawm died on Friday 5 October 2012 — see Modris Eksteins’s article/obituary on him at <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/books-and-media/my-favourite-marxist-remembering-eric-hobsbawm/article4591534/> Eksteins is professor emeritus of history at the University of Toronto.

slavery, the status of the coloured people, the South African War, the *post bellum* period in South Africa, the racial question, National Party policy of the 1920s ... the list is endless. As a work of fiction it makes sense to read it against works of philosophers of history, for instance, White, Runia, Ankersmit, Grethlein and Ricoeur. In addition Assmann, Rigney, and Erll greatly assist us to make sense of Leipoldt's *The Valley* as a cultural process, which only appeared in published form 69 years after completion of the manuscript.

White's theory reveals *The Valley* in the way Mann's *Buddenbrooks*¹⁸⁹ is ironic tragedy. It is ironic because of its subtle undertones of degeneration, degradation and decadence that begin to erode the once established society, after the second generation — therefore, this is not at first apparent. As the political circumstances in South Africa began to unfold, and the prospects for a national South African cultural identity grew dim, Leipoldt became progressively more distressed. This 'new wave'-political climate emerged from the ranks of young nationalists represented in *The Mask* through the character of Santa. White's theory is significant for the philosophy of history because of the way it greatly broadens the field of historical representation.

A study of White was followed by a look at Eelco Runia's theory of 'presence' and the notion of 'parallel processes' taken as a paradigm, from the field of psycho-analysis. What is 'absently and unintentionally present in the plane of time',¹⁹⁰ and 'what story and text contain *in spite of* the intentions of the historian'¹⁹¹ are seen in the notion of parallel processing 'as the embodiment of the entwining of continuity and discontinuity that is exposed by metonymy as 'presence.'¹⁹² Runia's example from literary fiction of Sir Walter Scott makes the past, present in the present.

Ankersmit's notion of 'presence and myth' can reveal the difference in the way politicians act, to historians, by identifying what a civilization, nation, or institution never succeeds in properly objectifying when thinking about itself and its past.¹⁹³ Leipoldt analyses human agency and action from his own experiences of how people behave, as opposed to how they make out to behave (he is critical of their hypocrisy). Such examples can be found in

¹⁸⁹In the year that *Buddenbrooks* won the Nobel Prize for Literature (1929) Leipoldt was writing his trilogy.

¹⁹⁰Eelco Runia, 'Presence', *History and Theory*, 45(1), February 2006, p. 1.

¹⁹¹*Ibid.*

¹⁹²Ethan Kleinberg, 'Presence in absentia', in *Storia della Storiografia*, 55, 2009, p. 52.

¹⁹³F R Ankersmit, "'Presence' and Myth", *History and Theory*, 45(3), October 2006, p. 335.

Gallows Gecko, (the loss of the good things about tradition), *Stormwrack* (the inequalities of martial law) and *The Mask* (the false pretences of people who are idolized).

The Valley can be read against Grethlein's notion of 'side-shadowing' to be found in the dialogue as a form of second-order reference (a referential function at a second level) as fictive speeches not based on direct sources.¹⁹⁴ The dialogue in Leipoldt's *The Mask* is a particularly good example of this, based on Leipoldt's own experiences of the past and the ingenious way he evokes the reader's response through the tense dialogue between the magistrate and Quakerley as the prospect of civil war becomes more of a reality for the District (*Stormwrack*).

Paul Ricoeur's point about understanding in the interpretation of action¹⁹⁵ enables narratives to make a referential claim, as *The Valley* does to a number of topics and therefore its historical references and its structure 'cross upon the basic historicity of human experience.'¹⁹⁶ Leipoldt's fictional prose unfolds as the way he relates the past uncovering the buried potentialities of the present¹⁹⁷ and ties up narrativity and historicity in the way a journalist is writing up the *acta diurna* (daily news).

The serious voices of criticism against narrative/postmodernist/deconstructivist history need to be heard such as those of Lorenz and Evans. The ideas of Hobsbawm *et al.* in the construction of identity and national identity need to be incorporated into the debate, to appreciate two kinds of tradition, the old, local, deep-rooted kind which Leipoldt sees as virtuous and that has value as in the Western European kind; as opposed to the narrower, newer *volks*-identity constructed under the aegis of Afrikaner nationalist Gustav Preller.

The argument can therefore be made that *The Valley* in terms of the selection of theoretical works made here serves as an alternative form to standard histories, and also as, in its full force, as an alternative, oppositional and counter-history to the one-sided, conservative history of Gustav S Preller.

¹⁹⁴Jonas Grethlein, *History and Theory*, 49(3), October 2010, p. 329.

¹⁹⁵Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, page 15.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p. 294.

¹⁹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 16.