

## CHAPTER 2

# REVISITING AND RECONSTRUCTING THE HABITUS OF ROMAN SLAVEHOLDING: THE MANAGEMENT OF SLAVE-BODIES IN HELLENISTIC, ROMAN, JUDAISTIC AND CHRISTIAN ANTIQUITY

### 1 INTRODUCTION

The first and most important context of slave-bodies is the context of domesticity; that is, slave-bodies are essentially active within a household. There may be exceptions to this, but in the context of John Chrysostom, and his advice to slaves and slaveholders, most of the advice is directed at how Christian slaves and slaveholders should behave within the household. The household could be urban or agricultural, but in Chrysostom's case, most of the households would be urban households.

The role of the slave within the household was shaped through centuries of discourse. This discourse was effectively known as *oikonomia*. In this chapter we will examine how the Roman habitus of slaveholding as a discourse of ancient *oikonomia* was shaped by giving attention to authors writing on the topic of *oikonomia* and slave-management. We will look at how this habitus was constructed and negotiated throughout antiquity. This chapter will therefore provide the basis of the social and cultural background of slavery in the ancient Mediterranean that will also be utilized in the following chapters. In the next chapter, Chrysostom's own comments in the light of this complex habitus will be examined. This chapter not only provides the larger social and cultural background of the discourse of domestic slavery, but also lays some important methodological and theoretical foundations. As mentioned in the introduction of this

study, the secondary aim of the dissertation is to redescribe ancient slavery. In order to accomplish this, the old evidence needs to be re-evaluated in the light of the new, redescriptive approach followed in this dissertation.

## 2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF THE ROMAN HOUSEHOLD

In antiquity household management, also known as *oikonomia*,<sup>82</sup> was a discourse - a complex knowledge- and practice-matrix with very clear sets of behavioural boundaries and socio-cultural role-expectations that are especially dependent on gender and status.<sup>83</sup> By approaching *oikonomia* as a discourse, the discursivity of managing domestic bodies becomes apparent, and the various power-concerns and regulatory strategies can be laid bare. Moreover, this chapter approaches *oikonomia* as a complex, strategic discourse. Its complexity is the result of the ambiguity of the household in the period this dissertation examines. Several studies on ancient *oikonomia* have grappled with the issue of the Christianization of the late ancient Roman household.<sup>84</sup> More importantly, since the late 1970's scholarship has become more aware of the

---

<sup>82</sup> This study will use the word *oikonomia* in the sense of household management. It is transliterated from the Greek word 'οἰκονομία'; Latin adopted the same term as *oeconomia*, although Meyer and Sessa also include the Latin words *ordo*, *ordinatio*, *dispensatio*, *cura*, *procuratio*, and *administratio*; cf. Ulrich Meyer, *Soziales Handeln im Zeichen des 'Hauses': Zur Ökonomik in der Spätantike und im Früheren Mittelalter* (Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte 140; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 54–59; Kristina Sessa, *The Formation of Papal Authority in Late Antique Italy: Roman Bishops and the Domestic Sphere* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1–34; cf. also: Friedrich Ohly, "Haus III (Metapher)," *RAC* 13 (1986): 905–1063.

<sup>83</sup> Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 2.

<sup>84</sup> Besides the studies that will be mentioned below, the following are also of importance for understanding the late ancient Roman family and household: Simon P. Ellis, "The End of the Roman House," *AJA* 92, no. 565–576 (1988); Keith Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family: Studies in Roman Social History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Suzanne Dixon, *The Roman Family* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1992); Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Houses and Society in Pompeii and Herculaneum* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Judith Evans Grubbs, *Law and Family in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Dale B. Martin, "The Construction of the Ancient Family: Methodological Considerations," *JRS* 86 (1996): 40–60; L. Michael White, *The Social Origins of Christian Architecture Volume 2: Texts and Monuments for the Christian Domus Ecclesiae in Its Environment* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press, 1997); Carolyn Osiek and David Balch, *Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997); Geoffrey Nathan, *The Family in Late Antiquity: The Rise of Christianity and the Endurance of Tradition* (London: Routledge, 1999); Julia Hillner,

importance of writing a cultural history of the late ancient household and its dynamics. One of the groundbreaking studies in this regard is that of Paul Veyne published in 1978.<sup>85</sup> When one reads Veyne's article it becomes clear that it was in fact Michel Foucault's first volume of the *History of Sexuality* that ignited scholarly interest in the late ancient family and household, since Foucault masterfully demonstrated that sexuality cannot be approached without examining its occurrence in antiquity, as well as the discursive links between sexuality, household and society.<sup>86</sup> Thus, from the inception of scholarly interest in the ancient household, there has been an accompanying emphasis on issues of power, knowledge and the body. Another important advance in the study of the Roman household was pointed out by Brent Shaw nearly a decade later in a 1987 publication, which points out that the Roman family or household seemed to assume a rather wide range of persons and relations, and not simply a nucleus based on biological kinship, and that the interpersonal networking between kin and non-kin is still obviated as household matters.<sup>87</sup> This observation is very important for the study of slaves as participants in the household. Since all dynamics in the household are not based on biological kinship, especially not as understood in the modern sense, issues of gender and status were immensely important in the functioning of the household. The problem with this is that gender and status were equally ambiguous. For instance, Richard Saller has illustrated that a *pater familias* did not necessarily have to be the biological father of the household.<sup>88</sup> The *pater*

---

*Jedes Haus ist eine Stadt: Privatimmobilien im Spätantiken Rom* (Bonn: Habelt, 2004); Michele George, *The Roman Family in the Empire: Rome, Italy and Beyond* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Kristina Milnor, *Gender, Domesticity, and the Age of Augustus: Inventing Private Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Philip Rousseau, "The Pious Household and the Virgin Chorus: Reflections on Gregory of Nyssa's *Life of Macrina*," *J ECS* 13 (2005): 165–86; D. Brendan Nagle, *The Household as the Foundation of Aristotle's Polis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>85</sup> Paul Veyne, "La famille et l'amour sous le Haut-Empire Romain," *Annales* 33 (1978): 35–63.

<sup>86</sup> Cf. Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction* (Robert Hurley (trans.); New York: Random House, 1978). For an excellent discussion of the influence of Foucault on the study of patristics and sexuality, cf. Elizabeth A. Clark, "Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex," *JAAR* 56, no. 4 (1988): 619–41; the classic work of Peter Brown is also relevant in this regard; cf. Peter R. L. Brown, *The Body and Society: Men, Women & Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

<sup>87</sup> Brent D. Shaw, "The Family in Late Antiquity: The Experience of Augustine," *P&P* 115 (1987): 3–51.

<sup>88</sup> Richard Saller, "*Pater Familias, Mater Familias*, and the Gendered Semantics of the Roman Household," *CP* 94 (1999): 184–99.

*familias* was, on the one hand, the person who wielded the highest authority (*auctoritas*) in the family, and on the other, the person who has primary ownership of the property of the family (*patrimonium*), including the slaves. Thus strictly speaking, a woman could also be a *pater familias*. Since the dominion of the *pater familias* was primarily based on economic grounds, the household was also the central unit in the Roman economy.<sup>89</sup>

As mentioned earlier, Christianization did not simplify the issue of the late ancient household either. Although many studies have concluded that the ancient Roman household did not change much after the advent of Christianity, others have pointed out that there were, nevertheless, crucial yet subtle social and rhetorical shifts present during this period. Kate Cooper's *The Fall of the Roman Household* (2007) is an important contribution on this very issue.<sup>90</sup> Although her study is more concerned with the role of women (rather than slaves) in the Roman household during the period of Christianization, it is nevertheless valuable in that it addresses Edward Gibbon's long-held view that Christian asceticism and pacifist values led to the erosion of traditional Roman civic values, and thus greatly contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire.<sup>91</sup> Gibbon was especially critical of Christian asceticism regarding views on marriage, and asserted that Christian asceticism led to citizens abandoning two very important Roman institutions, namely marriage and military service.<sup>92</sup> In her study, Cooper convincingly shows that despite anti-conjugal views present in Christian asceticism, the Christianization of the household also led to a strengthening of the household in its strong prohibition of divorce.

---

<sup>89</sup> For more on this complex issue, cf. Richard Saller, *Patriarchy, Property and Death in the Roman Family* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 71–153; Richard Saller, “Symbols of Gender and Status in the Roman Household,” in *Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations* (Sandra R. Joshel and Sheila Murnaghan (eds); London: Routledge, 1998), 85–92; Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 4–17, 46–79.

<sup>90</sup> Kate Cooper, *The Fall of the Roman Household* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>91</sup> Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* (7 Vols; London: Penguin, 1902).

<sup>92</sup> Even before Cooper's publication, the complexity of aristocratic responses to Christian asceticism has been duly noted; cf. Peter R. L. Brown, “Aspects of the Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy,” *JRS* 51 (1961): 1–11; Richard Bartlett, “Aristocracy and Asceticism: The Letters of Ennodius and the Gallic and Italian Churches,” in *Society and Culture in Late Antique Gaul: Revisiting the Sources* (Ralph Mathisen and Danuta Shanzer (eds); Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 201–16; Michele R. Salzman, *The Making of a Christian Aristocracy: Social and Religious Change in the Western Roman Empire* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2002). Cooper's earlier publication is also relevant for this discussion: Kate Cooper, “The Insinuation of Womanly Influence: An Aspect of the Christianization of the Roman Aristocracy,” *JRS* 82 (1992): 150–64.

Cooper goes so far as to show that many Christian authors of the time included marriage and family life in the ascetic life. Where Cooper's study becomes important for the current investigation is when she examines how the woman's position in the household in terms of *auctoritas* was transformed. After referring to the very influential study of Martha C. Howell, concerning the decline of the household in the late medieval period, Cooper would conclude that 'women played a central role [in the household] and that their share of ownership was surprisingly high'.<sup>93</sup> If we take into consideration the view of Saller noted above regarding the identity of the *pater familias*, we can see that the interplay between gender, *auctoritas* and property ownership (slaves were considered property) is more complex than one would imagine. A question raised by Judith Butler now becomes apparent also here: 'Can gender complexity and dissonance be accounted for by the multiplication and convergence of a variety of culturally dissonant identifications?'<sup>94</sup> Although Butler's immensely relevant question was directed primarily at the gender-premises of Lacan, Riviere and Freud, this study recognizes its importance for a critical approach to scholarly constructions of gender, and by implication, *auctoritas*, in late antiquity. Both Saller and Cooper's observations are directly relevant to the study of slavery in the late ancient household since the issue of gender/*auctoritas* interplays will continue to surface in the investigation.

The other study that is of equal importance is that of Kristina Sessa entitled, *The Formation of Papal Authority in Late Antique Italy: Roman Bishops and the Domestic Sphere* (2012). Both Cooper and Sessa approach the household and domesticity as a discourse, but the study of Sessa differs from Cooper's in that it specifically examines how Roman bishops exercised their own authority within the household. This chapter and the one following would follow the proposition of Sessa that late ancient bishops in general can be viewed as domestic advisors or managers. In essence, Sessa is concerned with the same issues as Cooper; that is, how emergent Christian values and traditional Roman civic values influenced each other. But Sessa is unique in that she also investigates how the church, as a symbolic household, was shaped by this discourse.

The problem with both Cooper and Sessa, in light of the current study, is that both focus on the elite Roman households of the Western Empire, especially Italy, which is not the concern

---

<sup>93</sup> Cooper, *Fall of the Roman Household*, 97.

<sup>94</sup> Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1990), 89.

of this dissertation. A study on the same level as Cooper or Sessa on the nature of the Roman household in the Eastern Empire, not including Egypt, is somewhat lacking.<sup>95</sup> Although this dissertation and this chapter in particular will attempt to elucidate some issues of the Eastern Roman household, the limited scope of this study will not be able to address the issue completely. It is also very problematic to apply the conclusions of Cooper and Sessa, based on analyses of the West, since the East differed from the West in one very significant aspect: the majority of illustrious (*illustres*) and elite (*spectabiles/clarissimi*) households, during the time of Chrysostom, were located in the West, with very few illustrious households in the East, and ‘western elites far outclassed their eastern peers in terms of wealth’.<sup>96</sup> This is directly relevant to the discussion of slavery in the Chrysostomic context. It is further problematized from the view of studies on late ancient Roman aristocracies by the expansive area of properties often owned by illustrious and elite citizens. The East was growing stronger but it is only in the fifth and sixth centuries that we see the extreme economic, social and military fortification of the East due to the growing conflict with barbarian armies outside on the fringes of the Empire.<sup>97</sup> Illustrious, elite and bourgeois households experienced different problems with regard to *oikonomia* and slaveholding, which

---

<sup>95</sup> Most studies on this issue focus on the Byzantine Empire; cf. John P. Thomas, *Private Religious Foundations in the Byzantine Empire* (Dumbarton Oaks Studies; Washington DC.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1987); Joëlle Beaucamp, *Le statut de la femme à Byzance (4e-7e siècle)* (Paris: Boccard, 1990); Jean Durliat, *De la ville antique à la ville Byzantine: Le problème des subsistances* (Rome: Ecole Française de Rome, 1990); Youval Rotman, *Byzantine Slavery and the Mediterranean World* (Jane M. Todd (trans.); London: Harvard University Press, 2009). Other helpful studies on Chrysostom specifically include: Blake Leyerle, *Theatrical Shows and Ascetic Lives: John Chrysostom’s Attack on Spiritual Marriage* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 100-182; Aideen M. Hartney, *John Chrysostom and the Transformation of the City* (London: Duckworth, 2004), 117-32; Isabella Sandwell, *Religious Identity in Late Antiquity: Jews, Greeks and Christians in Antioch* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 181-240.

<sup>96</sup> Kyle Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World AD 275-425* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 163. Cf. also: Chris Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages: Europe and the Mediterranean, 400-800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 161-68.

<sup>97</sup> The study of Haldon has shown how the Roman senatorial elite had to change and adapt during the crisis-period of the Empire; cf. John Haldon, “The Fate of the Late Roman Senatorial Elite: Extinction or Transformation?” in *The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East Volume 6: Elites Old and New in the Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East*. (John Haldon and Lawrence I. Conrad (eds.); Aldershot: Darwin, 2004), 179-234.

means that certain issues in the East may have merited more attention than in the West and vice versa.

But the shape of the Roman household in late antiquity, whether in the Western or Eastern parts of the Empire, is a product of a formative process from the early Hellenistic and nascent Roman periods. In the course of this chapter, the most important oeconomic discourses from the early Hellenistic and Roman periods will be re-read from a cultural-historical perspective, since the households in the time of Chrysostom were products of this formative process, and the views on slaves in the households, or the habitus of slaveholding, was produced from these earlier discourses. The development of *oikonomia* as discourse, along with slaveholding, will provide the necessary basis from which various continuities and discontinuities may be delineated when approaching the Chrysostomic sources. The first section, as a diachronic investigation, will therefore discuss these sources since they shaped the households of those people in Chrysostom's audience. After discussing the most important Hellenistic and Roman sources, the early Judaistic and Christian views, particularly from the New Testament, on *oikonomia* and slaveholding will be examined, since these discourses represent the point of departure that Chrysostom uses in his homilies. Finally, the evidence from late ancient authors will also be evaluate as to provide a synchronic context for the reading of Chrysostom's sources. From this diachronic and synchronic analysis the main attributes of the habitus of Roman slaveholding would become clear.

### **3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF *OIKONOMIA* AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN HELLENISTIC AND EARLY ROMAN ANTIQUITY**

This section will examine the historical development of the discourse of *oikonomia* in Hellenistic and early Roman antiquity. Attention will especially be given to writings of this early period focusing on household- and slave-management, namely Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus, Philodemus, Columella, Cato and Varro. Although these are not the only sources, they serve as a popular and representative sample to indicate the continuities and discontinuities in the historical development of *oikonomia*. We will also examine Stoic formulations of *oikonomia* since they were very influential in the early Christian movement. These sources are also selected because they specifically wrote on the topic of *oikonomia* and slave-management. Furthermore, although it is difficult to assess whether Chrysostom read the

following writings or not, having studied under Libanius, we can speculate at the very least that he was very aware of the concepts from the writings. It must also be noted that Hellenistic and Roman *oikonomia* and slave-management differed from each other. We will now commence by viewing the Hellenistic sources.

### 3.1 Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*

One of the earliest treatises on *oikonomia* is Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*; but some advice is also provided in his *Memorabilia*. The *Oeconomicus* comes in the form and style of a dialogue with various participants, including Socrates, and was probably written after 362 BCE. The fact that the source is presented as a dialogue is curious. Although most philosophical treatises of this period came as dialogues, it makes it a bit more difficult to deduce what Xenophon thought about the topic. Xenophon obviously shapes and controls the development of the dialogue to fit into his own views; the document is also presented as being highly pedagogical.<sup>98</sup> But this exactly demonstrates the point this chapter wants to make - *oikonomia* was a discourse, and one that was constantly negotiated and debated.<sup>99</sup> In this dialogue, Xenophon is arguing with himself and his peers. Both the *Oeconomicus* and *Memorabilia* are laced with discursivities regarding the topic. Dialogical and argumentative tensions exhibit the nature of negotiation typical of discourse and discursive formations. It also exhibits the pedagogical nature of the document. The dialogue aims to display the process of reasoning and on a passive level the reader or hearer is also involved in the dialogue. What are the characteristics of Xenophon's rhetoric of domesticity (or perhaps, oeconomic rhetorical) specifically regarding the management of slaves?

---

<sup>98</sup> Leah Kronenberg, *Allegories of Farming from Greece and Rome: Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro, and Virgil* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 57–60.

<sup>99</sup> Some other Hellenistic Neopythagorean authors (including some women authors) writing on the topic *oikonomia* include: Bryson, *Oeconomia*; Callicratidas, *De Domi Felicitate*; Perictione, *De Mulieris Harmonia*, Phintys, *De Mulieris Modestia*; cf. Friedrich Wilhelm, "Die Oeconomia der Neupythagorener Bryson, Kallikratidas, Periktione, Phintys," *RMP* 70 (1915): 163–64; David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981), 4–15; Carlo Natali, "Oikonomia in Hellenistic Political Thought," in *Justice and Generosity: Studies in Hellenistic Social and Political Philosophy* (André Laks and Malcolm Schofield (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 95–128; Karl H. Fleckenstein, *Questo Mistero è Grande: Il Matrimonio in Ef. 5, 21–33* (Rome: Città Nuova Editrice, 1996), 46.



To begin, it is evident from these writings that Xenophon, as with many classical authors, regards *oikonomia* as the cornerstone of civic leadership; what we could call a holistic view of *oikonomia*.<sup>100</sup> It is not simply about managing a household. McKeown correctly emphasizes: ‘Xenophon’s aim, however, is neither reportage nor even managerial advice; nor is his primary focus slavery. He wants his audience to become better leaders of people. Both the *Memorabilia* and the *Oeconomicus* equate managing a household (an *oikos*) and other forms of power, notably military and political (*Mem.* 3.4.6; *Oec.* 5.14-17, 21.2, 21.12).’<sup>101</sup> Xenophon, like most ancient authors, considers *oikonomia* as a microcosm representing the dynamics of a larger socio-symbolic reality.<sup>102</sup> He sees a considerable resemblance between slave-management in particular, and warfare. From this very early date in classical antiquity, there is a close relationship, almost symbiotic, between slavery and polemology. Rule and mastery have a military basis since both slavery and warfare require the same principles of governmentality. This has especially been illustrated by Hunt, who links Xenophon’s thoughts on slaveholding with his thoughts on the relationship between generals and their soldiers.<sup>103</sup> Xenophon, of course, did not believe that slaves belonged in the army, which was a hot topic at the time in Athenian and Spartan debates, especially regarding the role of helots. Rulers, like slaveholders, needed to properly assert their authority. We therefore see, as early as Xenophon (and the same could be said of Thucydides<sup>104</sup>), that slavery, as a social system, was interwoven and dependent on a larger social subset that was,

---

<sup>100</sup> This was a common phenomenon in Hellenistic thinking; cf. especially: Barry Gordon, *Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius* (London: Barnes & Noble, 1975); S. Todd Lowry, *The Archaeology of Economic Ideas: The Classical Greek Tradition* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987); Natali, “*Oikonomia* in Hellenistic Political Thought,” 97–109; Page DuBois, “Slavery,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Hellenic Studies* (George Boys-Stones, Barbara Graziosi, and Phiroze Vasunia (eds); Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 316–27; James E. Alvey, *A Short History of Ethics and Economic: The Greeks* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 15–21.

<sup>101</sup> Niall McKeown, “Resistance Among Chattel Slaves in the Classical Greek World,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 166.

<sup>102</sup> This reality is structured within a strict hierarchical system, with very specific rules of engagement between subjects and rulers; cf. Hans Klees, *Herren und Sklaven: Die Sklaverei im oikonomischen und politischen Schrifttum der griechen in klassischer Zeit* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1975), 56–93.

<sup>103</sup> Peter Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 144–46.

<sup>104</sup> For Thucydides’ and Herodotus’ views on the topic, cf. Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology*, 26–144.

within its structure, holistic. Social systems and institutions in the ancient context were all related and mutually influenced each other, unlike a more independent and fragmented modern system. Military philosophy shaped ideas of slaveholding, but the notion of *oikonomia* is equally important, since it also influences political and military institutions. This is why authors like Xenophon and Thucydides could so easily relate these subjects. The result of this phenomenon, on a socio-linguistic and psychosocial level, is that the language of violence permeated all slave discourse. According to Xenophon, slaves should not be included in the army not only because he accepted the common ancient stereotype that all slaves are distrustful, cowardly and weak, but also, on a somatic level, slave-bodies are more akin to those of women, slaves and barbarians (*Oec.* 5.14-17).<sup>105</sup> And in Xenophon's high-aristocratic view of the army, with a strong bias in favour of hoplites and other infantry (instead of naval forces), weak slave-bodies just did not belong. This inferiority, however, is not based on the natural order as seen with Aristotle. It seems to be based on their interests and social positioning with regard to the household. Pomeroy provides a convincing view on this: 'At first all three [wife, housekeeper and farm foremen] are outsiders, who must be transformed into insiders so that they will be concerned as he is about the success of the *oikos*.'<sup>106</sup> This, among other things, leads Pomeroy to conclude that Xenophon is liberal in his views on slavery.<sup>107</sup> Although one would certainly agree that in some instances, Xenophon's views are moderate, it should also be noted that these views are given in order to laud the slaveholder Ischomachus probably as a type of neo-aristocratic ideal against the Athenian conservatives. The rhetoric becomes patronizing, and slaves are still treated very much like human animals.

We now move from Xenophon's potent polemological rhetoric to his somatological rhetoric, that is, his discourse on the management of slaves as bodies. The advice that is consistent with Xenophon is that the householder must view slaves with suspicion, and that very

---

<sup>105</sup> The relationship between the construction of the barbarian image and the image of the slave in ancient Greek thought was quite close, as demonstrated by Geoffrey E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World: From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989), 133–79.

<sup>106</sup> Sarah B. Pomeroy (ed. & trans.), *Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 65; cf. also: Sarah B. Pomeroy, "Slavery in the Greek Domestic Economy in the Light of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*," *Index* 17 (1989): 11–18.

<sup>107</sup> Pomeroy, *Oeconomicus*, 65. This view has also been accepted by Vivienne J. Gray, *Xenophon* (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 19–20.

strict bodily control and regulation is necessary (*Oec.* 5.14-17, 21.2, 21.12). The control and regulation of the slave-body is done via the passions, on a reward/punishment basis. Thus, the discourse of mastery is present. An important aspect of *oikonomia* for Xenophon is knowing how to regulate the bodily passions of the slave. For instance, in *Oeconomicus* 9.5, sexual intercourse, or perhaps temporary co-habitual affection may be used as a reward, or its deprivation as punishment. Ischomachus is describing the layout of his house, and describes the slaves' quarters (*Oec.* 9.5):

Then I pointed out to her the [slave-] women's apartments, separated from the men's by a bolted door, so that nothing may be taken out that shouldn't be and so that the slaves may not produce offspring without our knowledge. For the useful ones, for the most part, feel even better once they have had children, but when wicked ones are paired together, they become only more resourceful in their bad behaviour.<sup>108</sup>

Ischomachus is also described as a good *oikonomos* in that he allows slaves to have families and does not ever utter a word of manumission and splitting up the families.<sup>109</sup> Xenophon does praise Ischomachus for not forcing the slaves to have sex with him, but rather nurturing his relationship with his wife (*Oec.* 10.12).<sup>110</sup> To Ischomachus, both praise and verbal and physical punishments serve as tactics for successful mastery. Good mastery thus means the ability to read and utilize the passions of the slave to the greatest profit of the slaveholder, and

---

<sup>108</sup> Translation: Leo Strauss, *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 45; Greek text: Marchant: 56: ἔδειξα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναικωνίτιν αὐτῆ, θύρα βαλανωτῆ ὠρισμένην ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρωνίτιδος, ἵνα μήτε ἐκφέρηται ἔνδοθεν ὅ τι μὴ δεῖ μήτε τεκνοποιῶνται οἱ οἰκέται ἄνευ τῆς ἡμετέρας γνώμης. οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρηστοὶ παιδοποιησάμενοι εὐνοῦστεροι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, οἱ δὲ πονηροὶ συζυγέντες εὐπορώτεροι πρὸς τὸ κακουργεῖν γίγνονται.

<sup>109</sup> For a more detailed discussion of slave families, cf. Dale B. Martin, "Slave Families and Slaves in Families," in *Early Christian Families in Context* (David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (eds); Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 207–30.

<sup>110</sup> Sexual intercourse was a common duty for slaves toward their masters; cf. Marilyn B. Skinner, *Sexuality in Greek and Roman Culture* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 144–45.

not simply about cracking a whip. Reasonable control of the slave-body occurs when the slaveholder controls the passions of the slave. Having an aristocratic heritage, Xenophon would be accustomed to dealing with large numbers slaves. The reward for the slaveholder is that the slaves will be able to work without chains and the temptation of fleeing (*Oec.* 3.3). If properly ‘trained’, they will also not steal (*Mem.* 2.1.9), but the greatest obstacle to overcome is laziness (*Oec.* 21.10-11). The polarization of slave-bodies into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ slaves makes this type of rhetoric sustainable. It is evident from both the *Oeconomicus* and the *Memorabilia* that the management of slave-bodies is a frustrating task.

The instance where Xenophon is probably the most ‘liberal’, if that term would be valid (Pomeroy calls him ‘radical’<sup>111</sup>), is in his views on labour. It is true that Ischomachus treats his slaves generously and even with honour, while his wife is responsible for their health. But behind this, along with the allowance of slave-families on Ischomachus’ estate, lies the principles of productivity. A slave may be treated well since this boosts productivity and profits - this leads to the growth of the estate and inheritance, the main aim of any *pater familias*.

Two very important aspects of Xenophon’s rhetoric of domesticity have been delineated. In the first instance, *oikonomia*, especially slave-management, is a polemological discourse. This is the result of a holistic view of ancient social systems and their interdependence. Good slaveholders are inevitably good citizens, good soldiers and good rulers. In the same way barbarians need to be subjugated by Greek male soldiers, slaves must be mastered by their owners.<sup>112</sup> Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* is permeated with the discourse of masculinity and power.<sup>113</sup> This could also be a reason for the seemingly liberal nature of the writing at first glance, but in fact, Xenophon raises the bar for women and slaves by subverting them to the

---

<sup>111</sup> Pomeroy, *Oeconomicus*, 65.

<sup>112</sup> This type of thinking would also find its place in Roman formulations on *oikonomia*, where the notion of penetration and subjugation would go hand in hand; cf. Jonathan Walters, “Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought,” in *Roman Sexualities* (Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner (eds); Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 29–46.

<sup>113</sup> Baragwanath has argued that Xenophon has a view that some women, specifically foreign wives, should not be viewed as being incapable and inferior, since they mediate friendships between men, and exhibit some qualities of leadership. Although this is true, the problem is that these women become the embodiment of masculine virtues, and it is still Hellenistic masculine virtues that are proliferated via this view of ‘special and capable wives;’ Emily Baragwanath, “Xenophon’s Foreign Wives,” *Prudentia* 34 (2002): 125–58.

same standards of ancient Greek masculinity rather than gender and status equality or promotion. Women need to become more ‘manly’ in the dialogue.<sup>114</sup> The language of violence permeates the discourse - good men are men of violence and mastery. *Oikonomia* is also a somatic discourse - one that involves the control and regulation of bodies to the greatest profit of the slaveholder. This implies that the master should have a sound knowledge of the passions, how to control, negotiate and manipulate them to exert some type of action from the slave that is optimal to productivity and slave/slaveholder relationships. Finally, Xenophon’s writings exhibit the dialogical and discursive nature of *oikonomia*. *Oikonomia* is a conversation - one that influences all other spheres of human life. The problem we have with Xenophon’s version of *oikonomia* is that it is very idealistic and probably not normal practice. It is true that if Xenophon implies that an *oikonomos* ‘should’ do these things, he indeed ‘could’ - but to which extent this was applied is quite difficult to determine. The other problem is that this document was written for a very select and limited audience - pro-Xenophonian aristocracy. Whether the bourgeois, and other classes below, actually followed the advice is again quite difficult to determine.

### **3.2 Plato, Aristotle, and Pseudo-Aristotle’s *Oeconomica***

The pseudonymous work *Oeconomica*, bearing the name of Aristotle (although Philodemus attributes the work to the Aristotelian philosopher Theophrastus), provides advice on *oikonomia* in the form of a synthesis between Xenophon’s work above, but also from Plato and Aristotle’s authentic works, most notably Aristotle’s *Politica*. It must be noted however that although this document connects many themes from Xenophon, Plato and Aristotle, these three authors were not univocal in their comments on *oikonomia* and slave-management. A short summary of Plato and Aristotle’s views on slaves in the context of *oikonomia* will be provided in order to frame the pseudo-Aristotelian work.

---

<sup>114</sup>Sheila Murnaghan, “How a Woman Can Be More Like a Man: Ischomachus and His Wife in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*,” *Helios* 15, no. 1 (1988): 9–22. There are also several excellent articles on this topic in the following volume: Lin Foxhall and John B. Salmon (eds), *When Men Were Men: Masculinity, Power and Identity in Classical Antiquity* (London: Routledge, 1998).

Plato's discussions on slavery must be understood in the light of his comments on the ideal government; the issue features prominently in his *Leges*, but also in the *Respublica*.<sup>115</sup> In both these documents one finds a holistic approach to social systems - they in fact mirror each other in terms of mastery and governmentality. As with Xenophon, the principles followed by the householder and the statesman are not very different. But what does Plato say about slave-management?

The discussions on slave-management particularly in the *Respublica* also come in the genre of a dialogue, and it is equally ambiguous at times as with Xenophon's philosophical dialogues. But the statements in Plato's *Leges* are clearer, and this genre exhibits a different dimension of slave-management present in antiquity. Statements of law have two important dimensions to them: they are socio-somatic discourses, but also politico-ethical at the same time.<sup>116</sup> In the first instance, juridical statements, according to De Certeau, are inevitably written on the social body, but also on individual bodies within society at large (that is, the social body).<sup>117</sup> This was also the basis of Michel Foucault's work *Discipline and Punish* (1977), which examined the production, control and regulation of docile bodies.<sup>118</sup> This same discourse is also illusively present in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*; less explicit than with Plato, and with different aims. Plato probably exhibits a more negative view of slaves than Xenophon, but Plato's context is also different. The *Leges* are especially concerned with the criminality of slaves. Interestingly enough, many of the laws assume the context of *oikonomia*. Punishments are harsh for slaves

---

<sup>115</sup> Early in the previous century, Vlastos has made some important observations about Plato's view of slaves. Most importantly, Plato understands that slaves do not have the ability to reason (λόγος). While they may possess empirical belief (δόξα), they cannot know the truth behind this belief (Vlastos uses Plato's comments on the difference between free physicians and slave-physicians; cf. Gregory Vlastos, "Slavery in Plato's Republic," *PhR* 50 (1941): 289; Gregory Vlastos, "Does Slavery Exist in Plato's Republic?" *CP* 63, no. 4 (1968): 291–95; cf. also: Page DuBois, *Slaves and Other Objects* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), 153–69).

<sup>116</sup> Cf. Klees, *Herren und Sklaven*, 142–80; David B. Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 90.

<sup>117</sup> Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (Steven Rendall (trans.); Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 139.

<sup>118</sup> Michel Foucault, *Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Alan Sheridan (trans.); New York: Random House, 1977), 135–69.

killing their masters in cold-blood; the punishments are very public, made to be a spectacle.<sup>119</sup> But what manner of somatography (that is, the writing of law on a body in the Certeauian sense) lies behind this? This question is very important, and will serve as a backdrop for further discussion in this chapter. In the above-mentioned work of Foucault, the disappearance of torture as a public spectacle is examined. Foucault starts by examining, in vivid detail, an instance of public execution in France 1757; that of Damiens the regicide. His execution is brutal, and Foucault concludes that one reason for the disappearance of public punishment is that the shame attributed to the perpetrator now also spreads to the executioner, and with the rise of the popularity of disciplines like psychology and psychiatry, punishment became corrective rather than punitive in itself - it became hidden and

...marks a slackening of the hold on the body...the body now serves as an instrument or intermediary...From being an art of unbearable sensations punishment has become an economy of suspended rights...Recourse to psycho-pharmacology and to various physiological ‘disconnectors’, even if it is temporary, is a logical consequence of this ‘non-corporal’ penalty.<sup>120</sup>

For Plato, the purpose of punishing slaves who committed the greatest crime of *oikonomia*, murdering the *pater familias*, is to serve as an exemplum and a deterrent, dissuading other slaves from doing the same. It is also interesting that Plato wants such a slave to be whipped in view of the victim’s tomb (*Leg.* 872b), adding an element of violent memory to the process. If the slave survives the whipping, a public execution must then take place. Whipping in itself is a discourse of mastery, domination and violation. Glancy states: ‘Flogging was the most common form of corporal punishment. The ability to order a whipping signalled a person’s dominance over another, the inability to resist a whipping, the dishonour of the person whipped.’<sup>121</sup> The master is still ‘present’ for the punishment of the slave. Harrill attributes such

---

<sup>119</sup> McKeown, “Resistance Among Chattel Slaves,” 168–72.

<sup>120</sup> Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 11.

<sup>121</sup> Jennifer A. Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge: Early Christian Bodies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 31.

occurrences of ‘mastercide’ to the popular literary type of the slave as ‘domestic enemy’.<sup>122</sup> Should a free citizen commit the same crime, however, the punishment is less severe (*Leg.* 869d-e, 880b-c) due to their position in the larger social body.<sup>123</sup> Plato’s comments may perhaps shed some light on aspects mentioned earlier in Xenophon. The reason for the severe and public punishment of the slave is related to the Xenophonian proposal that slaves are not worthy to serve as soldiers (this excludes helotage, which is a more complex issue not directly relevant for the current discussion<sup>124</sup>). Slaves are not only social zombies, taken from Orlando Patterson’s notion of slavery as social death,<sup>125</sup> but more so, slaves are social outsiders. This statement seems to capture the continuity between Xenophon and Plato regarding slave-management and *oikonomia*. Their punishment is educational, reminding the slaves and the free who are insiders and who are outsiders;<sup>126</sup> Plato also believed in natural slavery, which reinforces this discrimination.<sup>127</sup> Punishment, in this instance, ramifies group-boundaries and social status-markers. Plato, thus, also assumes that slaves are corrupt in their nature, and forces upon all slaves the same dichotomy found in Xenophon: there are good slaves and bad slaves, but the majority are bad (*Leg.* 914a, 936b), and thus their regulation is important, and strategies for ensuring docility, a reward/punishment scheme similar to Xenophon, are of crucial importance for the art of *oikonomia*.

While Plato’s views discussed above are based mostly on socio-political foundations, Aristotle proposes a different framework for understanding slavery and *oikonomia*. Aristotle mostly relies on an argument of naturalization when it comes to *oikonomia* and slaveholding.<sup>128</sup>

---

<sup>122</sup> J. Albert Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social and Moral Dimensions* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 147–52; cf. also: J. Albert Harrill, “The Domestic Enemy: A Moral Polarity of Household Slaves in Early Christian Apologies and Martyrdoms,” in *Early Christian Families in Context* (David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (eds); Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 231–54.

<sup>123</sup> McKeown, “Resistance Among Chattel Slaves,” 168–70.

<sup>124</sup> An excellent discussion on this issue is provided by Nino Luraghi, “Helotic Slavery Reconsidered,” in *Sparta Beyond the Mirage* (Anton Powell and Hodkinson, Stephen (eds); London: Classical Press of Wales, 2000), 227–48.

<sup>125</sup> Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (London: Harvard University Press, 1982).

<sup>126</sup> Nick Fisher, “Citizens, Foreigners and Slaves in Greek Society,” in *A Companion to the Classical Greek World* (Konrad H. Kinzl (ed.); Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World; Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 327–49.

<sup>127</sup> Moses I. Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology* (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1998), 120.

<sup>128</sup> Nicholas D. Smith, “Aristotle’s Theory of Natural Slavery,” *Phoenix* 37, no. 2 (1983): 109–22.



In fact, Aristotle's whole politicology is based on observations from nature. His view of social institutions is, like that of most ancient authors including Xenophon and Plato, holistic in nature.<sup>129</sup> But Aristotle's holism differs from that of Xenophon and Plato in that Aristotle approaches the interdependence of social institutions by means of taxonomical classification rather than microcosmic representation, that is, the notion that one institution is simply a micro-duplication of the other. The state is made up of households, and within households there are various classes; but these are not necessarily the same because governance is complex.<sup>130</sup> Plato, for instance, would view the *oikonomos* as a type for the ruler of the state, but for Aristotle, oeconomical governance differs from civic governance. The same was seen with Thucydides and Xenophon when discussing the similarities between military commanders and householders. Aristotle's views in fact critique this conventional holism. He states (*Pol.* 1252a.7-1252b.5):

Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state...But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to anyone who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one of them. He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the

---

<sup>129</sup> Peter Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 107–8.

<sup>130</sup> Klees, *Herren und Sklaven*, 181–219.

clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses.<sup>131</sup>

---

<sup>131</sup> Translation: Benjamin Jowett, *Politics by Aristotle* (Digireads.com: Stilwell, 2005), 3; Greek text: Ross: 67: ὅσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικὸν καὶ βασιλικὸν καὶ οἰκονομικὸν καὶ δεσποτικὸν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν (πλήθει γὰρ καὶ ὀλιγότητι νομίζουσι διαφέρειν ἀλλ' οὐκ εἶδει τούτων ἕκαστον, οἷον ἂν μὲν ὀλίγων, δεσπότην, ἂν δὲ πλειόνων, οἰκονόμον, ἂν δ' ἔτι πλειόνων, πολιτικὸν ἢ βασιλικὸν, ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρουσιν μεγάλην οἰκίαν ἢ μικρὰν πόλιν... ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆ)· δῆλον δ' ἔσται τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοποῦσι κατὰ τὴν ὑψηλὴν μέθοδον. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγκη διαίρειν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἐλάχιστα μέρη τοῦ παντός), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν ἐξ ὧν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὀψόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τι τεχνικὸν ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ῥηθέντων. Εἰ δὲ τις ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέπειεν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ ἐν τούτοις κάλλιστ' ἂν οὕτω θεωρήσειεν. ἀνάγκη δὲ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἀνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γεννήσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον αὐτὸ, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπότην φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον [ταῦτα] τῷ σώματι πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλω ταῦτο συμφέρει. φύσει μὲν οὖν διώριστα τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δούλον (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἢ φύσις ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἷον οἱ

The opening arguments of his *Politica* show a strong reliance on the rhetoric of naturalization. This aids in placing Aristotle's views on natural slavery into perspective; slaves are naturally and biologically inferior according to Aristotle.<sup>132</sup> Women are designed for childbearing and slaves for service. Schofield queries and critiques Aristotle's views on natural slavery as 'an anomaly within his philosophical system; certainly inconsistent with his general theory of human psychology, and perhaps even internally inconsistent.'<sup>133</sup> Schofield then attributes this to a type of false consciousness, probably influenced by the views of Athenian aristocracy. The problem is that one cannot attempt to understand Aristotle's views on 'natural slavery' outside of his wider understanding of the nature of the state.<sup>134</sup> Natural slavery with Aristotle is merely consequential. Rather, mastery in itself is explained by means of naturalization, and in the first book of *Politica* one finds, unlike Plato, a naturalistic governmentality. Natural slavery is simply one of the parts of a larger whole, a simple element in a more complex politicological taxonomy.<sup>135</sup> When one comprehends the characteristics of the holism, natural slavery no longer appears to be an anomaly. In Aristotle's eyes, nature exhibits its own *oikonomia*. As seen above, he starts by disagreeing with the conventional Platonic view of *oikonomia*, in that social systems mirror each other and share mutual principles of mastery and governance.<sup>136</sup> Aristotle appreciates the complexity of political systems, and thus such a simplistic proposition found in Plato would not be adequate. The foundation of Aristotle's argument lies in the necessity of natural reproduction. Plants and animals need to reproduce for the survival of the species and this, according to Aristotle, is based on the dynamics between pairs. Thus, nature exhibits a binarism at its core. Males need to mate with females to reproduce. He then continues to highlight other pairs, namely husband and wife (or at least, man and

---

χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν, πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν πρὸς ἓν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀποτελοῖτο κάλλιστα τῶν ὀργάνων ἕκαστον, μὴ πολλοῖς ἔργοις ἀλλ' ἐνὶ δουλεῦον.

<sup>132</sup> Eugene Garver, "Aristotle's Natural Slaves: Incomplete *Praxeis* and Incomplete Human Beings," *JHPH* 32 (1994): 173–95.

<sup>133</sup> Malcolm Schofield, "Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery," in *Aristoteles' 'Politik': Akten des XI. Symposium Aristotelicum* (Günter Patzig (ed.); Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 4.

<sup>134</sup> Cf. also: Malcolm Heath, "Aristotle on Natural Slavery," *Phronesis* 53 (2008): 243–70.

<sup>135</sup> Wayne Ambler, "Aristotle on Nature and Politics: The Case of Slavery," *PolTh* 15, no. 3 (1987): 390–410.

<sup>136</sup> McKeown, "Resistance Among Chattel Slaves," 172.

woman), slave and master, and Greek and barbarian. All pairs within nature, however, work according to a dynamic of domination and subjugation.<sup>137</sup> When breeding, the male dominates the female, and the female must submit to the male's domination if reproduction is to occur. Thus, all the pairs need to work according to the domination-subjugation dynamic as seen in the natural household. This is perhaps the weakness in Aristotle's argument - his presupposition that no pair can work outside of the domination-subjugation dynamic. The state works in the same way; there are rulers and subjects. Aristotle's authorizes his version of proper *oikonomia* on the principles of nature. One could again here critique Aristotle in noting that a phenomenon called 'nature' does not actually exist. There are 'natures,' and their inter-relational dynamics are complex. Nevertheless, Aristotle's argument of simplistic naturalization regarding *oikonomia* is a very powerful rhetorical strategy. Aristotle's simplistic conjecture of nature shows consistency and stability, and therefore to maintain order, the principle of domination-subjugation should be maintained in the science of *oikonomia*. Thus, if the householder wants to effectively manage slaves, he needs to inspect nature, and he will see a dynamic of domination-subjugation. Thus, as Aristotle states, 'For that some should rule and others be ruled is a thing not only necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule' (*Pol.* 1254a.21-24).<sup>138</sup> One could replace 'hour of birth' with 'according to nature', since birth is a biological and natural event. Aristotle provides a taxonomy of the household: master and slave, husband and wife, and father and children. It is also this Aristotelian taxonomy of the household that is used in the so-called *haustafeln* found in the New Testament (cf. especially Col. 3:18-4:1; Eph. 5:21-6:9; 1 Tim. 5:1-6:2; Tit. 2:1-10; 1 Pet. 2:18-3:7), which would serve as a basis for Chrysostom's discussions of *oikonomia*. The slave-slaveholder dynamic should then be modelled according to nature. What lies behind this elaborate classificatory logic of domestic arrangement? For the following section I rely heavily on the insights of Bruce Lincoln on how

---

<sup>137</sup> Skinner, *Sexuality in Greek and Roman Culture*, 13–14; Michael Levin, "Aristotle on Natural Subordination," *Philosophy* 72 (1997): 241–57; cf. also: William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle on Slaves and Women," in *Articles on Aristotle Volume 2* (Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji (eds); London: Duckworth, 1975–79), 135–39.

<sup>138</sup> Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 6; Greek Text: Ross: 54: τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστὶ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἕνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχειν.

general domestic taxonomies, as discourses themselves, shaped and influenced society.<sup>139</sup> The Aristotelian domestic taxonomy exhibits a patricentric bisection based on gender, age and social status; a social map that marks cultural and social boundaries, all based on observations from nature. Aristotle's taxonomic tree in fact encodes the rules of engagement for interpersonal relations in the *oikos*. Lincoln remarks: '...age and gender [and here, one could include free or enslaved status] function as taxonomizers, that is, each one establishes the basis for an act of discrimination through which all members of a given class are assigned to one of two subclasses: those who possess the trait or property in question, and those who do not.'<sup>140</sup> By authorizing these taxonomizers on the basis of naturalization, the argument is further strengthened.

Where and how does the enslaved person fit into Aristotle's domestic taxonomy? Aristotle affirms that *oikonomia* and slave-management in his time was a multivocal discourse. He states: 'For some are of opinion that the rule of a master is a science, and that the management of a household, and the mastership of slaves, and the political and royal rule, as I was saying at the outset, are all the same. Others affirm that the rule of a master over slaves is contrary to nature, and that the distinction between slave and freeman exists by law only, and not by nature; and being an interference with nature is therefore unjust' (*Pol.* 1253b.18-23).<sup>141</sup> He then continues to argue for natural slavery, as it is commonly known. In the longer section quoted above, we see that Aristotle sees natural slavery as a bodily discourse: 'For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest' (*Pol.* 1252a.32-34).<sup>142</sup> The slave-body is then described by

<sup>139</sup> Bruce Lincoln, *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myth, Ritual and Classification* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 131–41.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, 133.

<sup>141</sup> Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 5; Greek text: Ross: 61: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη τέ τις εἶναι ἡ δεσποτεία, καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομία καὶ δεσποτεία καὶ πολιτικὴ καὶ βασιλική, καθάπερ εἶπομεν ἀρχόμενοι· τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν (νόμῳ γὰρ τὸν μὲν δούλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δ' οὐθὲν διαφέρειν)· διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον.

<sup>142</sup> Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 3; Greek Text: Ross: 67: τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον [ταῦτα] τῷ σώματι πονεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δούλον· διὸ δεσπότη καὶ δούλῳ ταῦτό συμφέρει.

Aristotle as an animate tool, a common description of slave-bodies in antiquity. Just as the female body is, according to Aristotle, inferior to the male body, the body of the slave is inferior to the slaveholder. It logically implies that one could be a slave, according to Aristotle, by nature and by law. Not all slaves by nature are slaves by law; such persons seem to exhibit a naturally slavish disposition, but they have not been legally declared slaves. But the slave-body, to Aristotle, is not simply an animate tool or naturally inferior body; it is also part of the slaveholder's body, referred to by Glancy as a surrogate body.<sup>143</sup> This becomes relevant when understanding the discipline and punishment of a slave. Although the slaveholder has a natural authority over the slave, Aristotle states: 'The abuse of this authority is injurious to both; for the interests of part and whole, of body and soul, are the same, and the slave is a part of the master, a living but separated part of his bodily frame' (*Pol.* 1255b.9-12).<sup>144</sup> A slaveholder who punishes and harms his or her slave unjustly, in essence, injures him- or herself, since, as in nature, there is a symbiotic relationship between the binary opposites. Like Xenophon, Aristotle then also believes that the good householder should treat a slave justly, although it is for selfish purposes. Thus, even the just treatment of slaves is seen in the symbiotic relationships in nature.

The pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica* shares some of the rhetoric of naturalization found in Aristotle's *Politica*, especially in the discussions of the relationship between husband and wife. It was a very popular handbook for oeconomics. The elaborations on slavery, however, are limited. The *Oeconomica* does not say anything about natural slavery, but especially approaches slaves as human, animate tools.<sup>145</sup> The author wants the *oikonomos* to purchase slaves with care, and especially encourages the acquisition of young slaves, since they can be trained to be placed in positions of trust and responsibility. Regarding the treatment of slaves, the *Oeconomica* also advises the slaveholder to treat the slave with strictness, not allowing insolence (ὑβρις), but also not to be cruel to slaves. He also advises against rewarding slaves with wine. Slave-management

---

<sup>143</sup> Jennifer A. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 21–24.

<sup>144</sup> Translation: Jowett, *Politics*, 8; Greek text: Ross: 71: τὸ δὲ κακῶς ἀσυμφόρως ἔστιν ἀμφοῖν (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ συμφέρει τῷ μέρει καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ, καὶ σώματι καὶ ψυχῇ, ὁ δὲ δοῦλος μέρος τι τοῦ δεσπότητος, οἷον ἔμψυχόν τι τοῦ σώματος κεχωρισμένον δὲ μέρος).

<sup>145</sup> McKeown, "Resistance Among Chattel Slaves," 172–73.

is a delicate art according to this account. The *Oeconomica* states that a good slaveholder should know how to balance a slave's work, punishment and food. It reads (*Oec.* 1344a.35):<sup>146</sup>

We may apportion to our slaves (1) work, (2) chastisement, and (3) food. If men are given food, but no chastisement nor any work, they become insolent. If they are made to work, and are chastised, but stinted of their food, such treatment is oppressive, and saps their strength. The remaining alternative, therefore, is to give them work, and a sufficiency of food. Unless we pay men, we cannot control them; and food is a slave's pay.<sup>147</sup>

The effective control of slave-bodies is crucial to pseudo-Aristotle. As with Xenophon, pseudo-Aristotle acknowledges that the ability to control slave-bodies lies in controlling their passions, most importantly, their hunger. Food is used to control and manipulate the slave-body to be optimally productive. Punishment is not always an ideal. Pseudo-Aristotle uses a medical metaphor by likening the *oikonomos* with a physician, who dispenses food and other necessities with good judgement as a physician dispenses medicine. A diligent *oikonomos* is someone who keeps the slaves under surveillance in order to determine their needs (*Oec.* 1344b.1): 'Accordingly we must keep watch over our workers, suiting our dispensations and indulgences to their desert; whether it be food or clothing, leisure or chastisement that we are apportioning.' The *Oeconomica* differs somewhat with Xenophon's account in that pseudo-Aristotle makes mention of manumission as a reward for slaves. Allowing slaves to have families is also a strategy in the *Oeconomica* - slaves are allowed to have children and families for the sake of their own personal

---

<sup>146</sup> For an interesting discussion on how texts like these were used in modern slavery, cf. Rafael de Bivar Marquese and Fábio Duarte Joly, "Panis, Disciplina, et Opus Servo: The Jesuit Ideology in Portuguese America and Greco-Roman Ideas of Slavery," in *Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern* (Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 214–30.

<sup>147</sup> Translation & Greek text: LCL: 336-37: ὄντων δὲ τριῶν, ἔργου καὶ κολάσεως καὶ τροφῆς, τὸ μὲν μήτε κολάζεσθαι, μήτ' ἐργάζεσθαι, τροφήν δ' ἔχειν ὕβριν ἐμποιεῖ· τὸ δὲ ἔργα μὲν ἔχειν καὶ κολάσεις, τροφήν δὲ μὴ βίαιον καὶ ἀδυναμίαν ποιεῖ. Λείπεται δὴ ἔργα παρέχειν καὶ τροφήν ἱκανήν· ἀμισθῶν γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἄρχειν, δούλω δὲ μισθὸς τροφή.

fulfillment, but also for the *oikonomos* to have hostages (the children) by which to threaten slaves. Like Xenophon, pseudo-Aristotle is well aware of the usefulness of threatening the breaking up of a slave family. It reads (*Oec.* 1344b.15-19):

To set the prize of freedom before him is both just and expedient; since having a prize to work for, and a time defined for its attainment, he will put his heart into his labours. We should, moreover, take hostages [for our slaves' fidelity] by allowing them to beget children; and avoid the practice of purchasing many slaves of the same nationality, as men avoid doing in towns.<sup>148</sup>

The proper control of slave-bodies, in this instance, aids in maximising productivity with few incidents of disobedience and punishment. Not much is mentioned about the natural state of slavery, although in other respects the *Oeconomica* exhibits similarities with the *Politica*. The *Oeconomica* also exhibits a strategic domestic taxonomy, as with the *Politica*. The domestic taxonomy is an important facet of Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian *oikonomia*, since it now provides a logical classification for the use of authority and domination. It is crucial in understanding the New Testament *haustafeln* as well as late ancient Christian expositions on *oikonomia*. The taxonomy serves as a discourse in itself that shapes society and civil governmentality. This is especially the case in late ancient ecclesiarchal dynamics. The next discussion will centre on the work of Philodemus, which represents a reaction against the works discussed thus far.

### 3.3 Philodemus' *De Oeconomia*

The fact that *oikonomia* was a complex, multifaceted discourse becomes very clear when reading the Epicurean philosopher from Herculaneum, Philodemus' *De oeconomia*.<sup>149</sup> In this unique

---

<sup>148</sup> Translation & Greek text: LCL: 338-39: Χρηὶ δὲ καὶ τέλος ὠρίσθαι πᾶσι· δίκαιον γὰρ καὶ συμφέρον τὴν ἐλευθερίαν κεῖσθαι ἄθλον. Βούλονται γὰρ πονεῖν, ὅταν ἢ ἄθλον καὶ ὁ χρόνος ὠρισμένος. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐξομηγεύειν ταῖς τεκνοποιΐαις· καὶ μὴ κτᾶσθαι ὁμοεθνεῖς πολλούς, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν.

<sup>149</sup> One of the most important biographical studies on Philodemus remains that of Marcello Gigante, *Philodemus in Italy: The Books from Herculaneum* (The Body, In Theory: Histories of Cultural Materialism; Dirk Obbink (trans.);



treatise, Philodemus especially highlights the ethical aspects of *oikonomia*, and provides a scolding critique on the works of Xenophon and pseudo-Aristotle/Theophrastus (according to Philodemus, the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Oeconomica* was written by Theophrastus, so for this section, we will refer to Theophrastus when discussing the pseudo-Aristotelian *De Oeconomica*). Philodemus' book forms part of a larger work on nature of vice, and it is interesting to see how Philodemus incorporates a discussion on *oikonomia* in an expansive virtue-discourse. Representing the ninth book of a larger ethical treatise on vices and virtues, probably written after 50 BCE, *De oeconomia* is especially marketed by the author as the ethical guide for *oikonomia*.

Philodemus prides himself by stating that his handbook on the topic represents the way a philosopher, a person of virtue, would conduct *oikonomia*. Tsouna remarks: 'The authors dealing with *oikonomia* assume that the activities involved in the administration of property make manifest one's qualities and virtues or, alternatively, reveal one's shortcomings and vices. Philodemus shares that assumption, and also the idea that unless *oikonomia* becomes subordinated to ethics, it must be perceived as its competitor on the same ground.'<sup>150</sup> This is a very important observation, and it makes Philodemus' viewpoint unique in that he does not assume the sole purpose of an *oikonomos* is to assure maximum productivity and profitability.<sup>151</sup> This implies several consequences for how slave-management is viewed within the scope of *oikonomia*, and it is interesting to see that Philodemus does not hesitate to critique Xenophon and Theophrastus' views on slave-management.

One of Philodemus' major criticisms of Xenophon and Theophrastus is their apparent assumption that there is no limit on the amount of wealth necessary to lead a virtuous life.<sup>152</sup> One of Philodemus' attacks on Xenophon's Socratic discourse involves Socrates' use of a slave-metaphor when describing the inadequate *oikonomos* (Philodemus, *Oec.* 1.19-23). By calling masters slaves, Socrates causes confusion. Xenophon's purpose was most likely irony, but

---

Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002); as well as that of Voula Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). All translations from the works of Philodemus are taken from Tsouna's work. Unfortunately the Greek text of Philodemus' *De Oeconomica* was not available to the author at the time of writing.

<sup>150</sup> Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 164.

<sup>151</sup> Elizabeth Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," in *Philodemus and the New Testament World* (John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland (eds); Leiden: Brill, 2004), 150–52.

<sup>152</sup> Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 165.

Philodemus does not accept this literary device. In general, Philodemus is bothered by Socrates' claim to teach the ignorant Critoboulos everything about *oikonomia* in one lesson - Philodemus appreciates the complexity of *oikonomia* and does very well to highlight other possibilities for understanding this important art. But what does Philodemus have to say about real-life slave-management?

Philodemus is especially concerned with the governmentality of the *oikonomos*, rather than his or her productivity (*Oec.* 1.6). We also find that Philodemus denies the relation between politics and *oikonomia*, especially present in Theophrastus - Philodemus does not subscribe to a holistic view of *oikonomia* found in the previous authors (*Oec.* 7.45-8.24). The point here is that the most important aim should not be profit but happiness.<sup>153</sup> Philodemus, in turn, is then irritated by banal discussions on slave-management present in Xenophon and Theophrastus' writings. Regarding Theophrastus, Philodemus states (*Oec.* 9.44-10.7):

The instructions concerning their [tasks], nourishment, and punishment are commonplace, observed even by rather ordinary persons, and they are not within the province of the philosopher. As to the precept that one should not use brutal methods of punishment, this does equally concern both theory and practice, but it should not have been taken up here in connection with the treatment of servants. Otherwise, why should only this point be raised?<sup>154</sup>

In his criticism of Xenophon, Philodemus is equally bothered by the fact that Xenophon does not dwell on how an *oikonomos* could teach his or her slaves virtue. This is a very important discursive shift in ancient teachings on slave-management. With Philodemus, the notion of the *oikonomos* as teacher of virtue, and the slave as being capable of virtue is extensively hypothesized. He is also troubled by foreign methods of slave-management, Spartan,

---

<sup>153</sup> Cf. Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 169–70; David L. Balch, “Philodemus, ‘On Wealth’ and ‘On Household Management:’ Naturally Wealthy Epicureans Against Poor Cynics,” in *Philodemus and the New Testament World* (John T. Fitzgerald, Dirk Obbink, and Glenn Stanfield Holland (eds); Leiden: Brill, 2004), 177–96.

<sup>154</sup> Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 172.

Persian and Libyan, promoted by the said authors.<sup>155</sup> Tsouna makes the following important observation on one of Philodemus' statements (*Oec.* 7.16-26):

Ischomachus does not make clear how one can teach servants 'to keep their hands off the master's property and not to steal, even if he exaggerates in a manner befitting tragedy when he speaks on deriving these principles from the laws of both Dracon and Solon and from royal decrees. But if, further, he thought it possible to teach the property manager the capacity to make people just, then I consider him to be saying things similar to the visions we have in our dreams.'<sup>156</sup>

The importance of this shift found with Philodemus cannot be underemphasized. We find with Philodemus a different impetus regarding slave-management. Although he still shares in the common stereotype that most slaves are unjust, it is his view of the *oikonomos* as virtuoso that deserves attention, since this motif becomes more prevalent especially in early Christianity and late antiquity. Whether Philodemus is correct in stating that his opponents' discourses are not ethical is another matter. In the following section when discussing Cato, I would in fact argue that treatises like those Philodemus despises were actually quite ethical, and only veiled in the garb of economic discourse. Since Philodemus proposes an alternative governmentality when it comes to slave-management, the technologies for surveillance and treatment of slaves also change. In fact, Philodemus considers the views of Xenophon and Theophrastus quite harsh (*Oec.* 9.26-44):

The claims [sc. of Theophrastus] that one should not allow the slaves to run riot and one should not press them and should give responsibility to the more trustworthy among them, but more food to the industrious is more or less correct. However, it is a hard thing to maintain that a drink of wine in general, not just in larger

---

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., 173.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

quantities, makes even free men insolent (and that this is why many nations abstain from it), and that for these very reasons it is obvious to propose that one should distribute wine to the slaves either not at all or very seldom, whereas the obvious thing is rather that a certain quantity of wine gives strength by making one cheerful and is to be allowed to those who work most.<sup>157</sup>

For the Epicurean Philodemus, the minimal happiness of the slaves also adds to the happiness of the slaveholder. Rather than focussing specifically on profit and in essence, greed, the philosopher-*oikonomos* must focus on virtuous governmentality.<sup>158</sup> The vices of traditional householding include greed, inhumanity, harshness and stupidity.<sup>159</sup> Greed drives people to treat slaves badly, like having them work under harsh circumstances in the mines (*Oec.* 23.1-22). Rather than using slaves in such inhumane ways, the good *oikonomos* could profit and exercise virtue by focusing on the honourable and decent skills of slaves, and to develop them (*Oec.* 23.18-22).

But does Philodemus represent a typical Epicurean stance on slave-management? The problem faced here is that Epicureanism, as with all philosophical and socio-religious movements of antiquity, including early Christianity, was not monolithic in itself. For the part of Epicureanism, there are many views with subtle nuanced differences, often related to the social and geographical location of the author, the time period, or simply just the literary context of the source material. A cautioned approach is therefore necessary. Philodemus admits that he relies on the views of Epicurus and Metrodorus as a basis for his own work. In the traditional literature of Epicureanism, from Epicurus specifically, the view of ‘natural wealth’ becomes very important. Natural wealth refers to the amount of material possessions necessary to live naturally and pleasantly.<sup>160</sup> For Epicurus, there was a limit on natural wealth. It is not part of the Epicurean way to collect wealth *ad infinitum*. Epicurus states (in Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.* 10.144-146 (*KD* 15)): ‘Natural wealth is both limited and easy to obtain. But the wealth (that is the object) of

---

<sup>157</sup> Ibid., 175.

<sup>158</sup> Balch, “Naturally Wealthy Epicureans.”

<sup>159</sup> Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 186.

<sup>160</sup> Cf. Asmis, “Epicurean Economics”; Balch, “Naturally Wealthy Epicureans”.

empty opinions goes on to infinity.<sup>161</sup> Unnatural and unnecessary wealth is thus difficult to obtain, and this desire can never be satisfied. Sufficiency here means enough to live naturally without any bodily or mental pain. This view is important for Epicurus' understanding of freedom. Excessive wealth is, according to Epicurus, always accompanied by various political obligations to one's patrons and friends - this wealth truly enslaves the one who has it.<sup>162</sup> On the other hand, however, Epicurus is not content with leading a mendicant life resembling that of the Cynics. He also attacks Cynic views on wealth by emphasizing that a certain amount of wealth and possessions are very necessary for living a natural and happy life.<sup>163</sup> Epicurus also stresses the importance of sharing these possessions among friends.

Philodemus, however, has his own strategy when interpreting the works of Epicurus. Living in Herculaneum among the Roman aristocrats, Philodemus had to reimagine an Epicureanism suited to the Roman high-life. During the final years of the Roman Republic we see the rise of large villa-estates with large numbers of slaves maintaining the production of the estates.<sup>164</sup> The main purpose of such estates, it was believed, was to generate profits for the owners.<sup>165</sup> Philodemus may have these aristocrats, who owned medium and large landholdings, in mind when writing his treatise on *oikonomia*. In the light of this, Philodemus incorporates some very tricky and complicated reasoning when expounding his version of Epicurean property-management. Wealth is not wicked in itself. According to Philodemus, it is all dependent on the person that manages the wealth. If seeking wealth causes pain, it is not beneficial for a happy life. But if the acquisition of wealth comes 'naturally' and does not cause

---

<sup>161</sup> Translation & Greek text: Asmis, "Epicurean Economics," 145: 'Ο τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὄρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν· ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid., 133–38.

<sup>163</sup> Balch, "Naturally Wealthy Epicureans," 186–89.

<sup>164</sup> As will be seen in the next section, the nature of slave-labour on Roman villa-estates remains ambiguous and uncertain; cf. Mario Torelli, "La Formazione della Villa," in *Storia Di Roma Volume 2* (Arnaldo Momigliano and Aldo Schiavone (eds); Torino: Einaudi, 1990), 123–32; Andrea Carandini, "La Villa Romana e la Piantagione Schiavistica," in *Storia Di Roma Volume 4* (Aldo Schiavone and Andrea Giardina (eds); Torino: Einaudi, 1990), 101–200; Elizabeth Fentress, "Spinning a Model: Female Slaves in Roman Villas," *JRA* 21 (2008): 419–22; Roger J. A. Wilson, "Vivere in Villa: Rural Residences of the Roman Rich in Italy," *JRA* 21 (2008): 479–88; Annalisa Marazano, *Roman Villas in Central Italy: A Social and Economic History* (Leiden: Brill, 2007).

<sup>165</sup> Marazano, *Roman Villas in Central Italy*, 224.

pain, it is not anathema for the Epicurean. Even if the acquisition and management of this wealth causes some toil it is still acceptable, since the natural way of life also requires some labour. It must not, however, cause great anxiety and effort, since this would be unnatural.<sup>166</sup> The Epicurean virtuoso is not a moneymaker *per se*; rather than rushing to collect as much wealth as possible as fast as possible, the Epicurean virtuoso acquires wealth at a natural pace, and, very importantly, shares it.<sup>167</sup>

We therefore find with Philodemus an alternative type of *oikonomos*, and with this, an alternative type of slave-management. It is someone who places the ethical impetus of household-management first, and is not someone who is a profit-hungry moneymaker. The house of the Epicurean *oikonomos* should be a happy house with sufficient funds derived from admirable practices,<sup>168</sup> but not necessarily a profit-driven entity. But it is a type of *oikonomia* that should be acceptable to those wealthy Roman aristocratic landowners with whom Philodemus associates. The greatest vice here is the love of money (φιλοχρηματία). It almost transforms the manager into an automaton only focussed on acquiring more. Such a manager ‘is indifferent to the calls of society and to the sufferings of other human beings. He resists paying visits to people and does not mind making money from “his slaves’ forced labour in mines.”’<sup>169</sup> In terms of slave-management, the happiness of slaves is important so long as it does not interfere with the happiness of the manager. Harsh treatment of slaves is frowned upon and using slaves for indecent purposes attracts the wrong type of social attention (*Oec.* 23.1-22):

Earning an income ‘from the art of mining with slaves doing the labour’ is unfortunate, and as to securing income ‘from both these sources by means of one’s own labour’, is a mad thing to do. ‘Cultivating the land oneself in a manner involving work with one’s own hands’ is also hard, while (cultivating it) ‘using other workers if one is a landowner’ is appropriate for the good man. For

---

<sup>166</sup> Balch, “Naturally Wealthy Epicureans,” 186–88.

<sup>167</sup> Asmis, “Epicurean Economics,” 133.

<sup>168</sup> Clarence E. Glad, *Paul and Philodemus: Adaptability in Epicurean and Early Christian Psychagogy* (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 103.

<sup>169</sup> Tsouna, *The Ethics of Philodemus*, 17.

it brings the least possible involvement with men from whom many disagreeable things follow, and a pleasant life, a leisurely retreat with one's friends, and a most dignified income to the (wise). Nor is it disgraceful to earn an income both from accepting tenants into one's house and from slaves who have knacks or even arts which are in no way indecent.<sup>170</sup>

This section from Philodemus shows that the wealthy aristocratic landowner is not excluded from the virtuous life. Wealth in itself is not evil, but the administration of this wealth is what makes the difference. Owning slaves is an important part of leading the good life, since they will do tasks that the manager or landowner need not do. But the management of the slaves should be ethical. If the manager is simply set on making profits, the nature of the tasks performed by the slaves would not matter as long as profit-making is optimal. But for Philodemus, the type of work the slaves do is also important. It seems that having slaves do extremely difficult and inhumane work, like labouring in the mines, is not acceptable. Allowing slaves to do 'indecent' work, possibly referring to prostitution, is also prohibited, since this would possibly place the manager in a situation where he or she has to deal with unsavoury characters of society.

Thus, Philodemus challenges the traditional views of Xenophon and Theophrastus/pseudo-Aristotle regarding *oikonomia* and slave-management. The governmentality Philodemus aspires to is not holistic, in other words, not of such a nature that it is applicable to all spheres of life including politics and the military. Philodemus' advice aims to be specifically tailored for householding. He is also irritated by some 'obvious' observations from Xenophon and Theophrastus, and rather wants his exposition to be specific and specialised. Most importantly, *oikonomia* is supposed to be an ethical art, and not simply an economic enterprise. Wealth should be acquired naturally and it should be in the service of leading a pleasant and natural lifestyle. Treating slaves justly and leniently is acceptable, and one should manage slaves in an ethical way by not having them perform harsh inhumane tasks like mining, nor indecent and shameful work. In order to achieve this, he has to strategically reinterpret the works of Epicurus and Metrodorus for an affluent audience in the Italian countryside, so that his

---

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., 189.

alternative form of *oikonomia* and slave-management would be acceptable, one his audience could relate to. We can now proceed to the Roman sources for *oikonomia* and slave-management.

### 3.4 Cato's De Agricultura

The Roman Republic's period of expansion, especially after the Hannibalic War, had a massive effect on the composition of slaves on landholdings,<sup>171</sup> with direct consequences on the ethos of slave-management throughout the whole Mediterranean area. The second century of the Republic, with its accompanying crises, saw numerous changes in terms of demography. This period exhibits the rise of the so-called 'villa system' of householding.<sup>172</sup> This system primarily refers to very large agricultural landholdings, specifically on the Italian mainland, which relied on the production of cash crops like olives and grapes to survive and thrive. The illustrious Roman citizens mostly owned such estates.<sup>173</sup> It was also prevalent because this period of warfare required from owners of small landholdings to join the Roman army in order to strengthen the programme of expansion, on the one hand, and on the other, rapid urbanization, especially in and around Rome, also saw many peasants leave their lands to seek a better life in the city. Bradley has shown, however, that this was not a sudden and rapid consolidation of small landholdings into large villa-estates, with the sudden appearance of a large slave-based labour-force model.<sup>174</sup> It was more likely a gradual process. In whichever form we consider this phenomenon, whether sudden and rapid or gradual, the use of slave labour for production became popular both on small landholdings as well as on the larger villa-estates. What is quite evident, then, is that the appearance of huge landholdings, mostly with absentee owners, was on the rise in final years of the Republic, and large contingents of slave labourers slowly became the

---

<sup>171</sup> Arnold J. Toynbee, *Hannibal's Legacy: Rome and Her Neighbours After Hannibal's Exit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 167–70.

<sup>172</sup> Cf. Carandini, "La Villa Romana"; Torelli, "La Formazione della Villa"; Marazano, *Roman Villas in Central Italy*; Wilson, "Vivere in Villa". Cf. also several essays in the three-volume work by Andrea Giardina and Aldo Schiavone (eds), *Società Romana e Produzione Schiavistica* (Rome: Laterza, 1981). For earlier scholarly elaborations, cf. William L. Westermann, "Industrial Slavery in Roman Italy," *JEH* 2, no. 2 (1942): 149–63.

<sup>173</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 178–79, 195–96.

<sup>174</sup> Keith Bradley, "Slavery in the Roman Republic," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 241–64.



norm on these estates; the rise of the so-called slave-mode of production. The development of agricultural slavery, as we will see, had direct consequences for urban slaveholding. Furthermore, these estates were meant to be profitable to the owners. If we again take account of the previous discussion related to Philodemus, a Greek writer within Italy (Herculaneum), we see that Philodemus reacts harshly to the conventional wisdom that these large villa-estates simply had to be profitable. The slaves were not only for farming. Since many of these landowners were part of the illustrious of the Roman Republic, many had escorts of slaves and freedmen for security and show.<sup>175</sup>

This context serves as the backdrop for the Roman statesman Cato the Elder's work *De agricultura*. Unlike Philodemus, Cato's advice on slave-management had in mind the generation of maximum profit with a minimum cost to the owner of the estate. Slaves were considered along with the tools and animals on the farm, as he states (*Agr.* 2.7): 'Sell worn-out oxen, blemished cattle, blemished sheep, wool, hides, a wagon, old tools, and old slave, a sickly slave, and whatever else is superfluous.'<sup>176</sup> Sick and old slaves are liabilities. When Cato gives guidelines for agricultural building projects, the slave quarters are mentioned along with the ox-sheds and pigsties.<sup>177</sup> Moreover, Plutarch gives an account of Cato loaning money to his slaves to purchase their own slaves, which they would train and sell at a profit.<sup>178</sup> Accordingly, care and punishment of slaves should always be in the service of ensuring an environment that will provide maximum profit.<sup>179</sup> We see here some very potent discourses of the objectification and commodification of the slave-body, an issue we will return to in chapter 6 of the dissertation.

---

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 252–53.

<sup>176</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 8-9: *Boves vetulos, armenta delicula, oves deliculas, lanam, pelles, plostrum vetus, ferramenta vetera, servum senem, servum morbosum, et siquid aliud supersit, vendat*; cf. also: Kenneth D. White, *Farm Equipment of the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 221.

<sup>177</sup> The archaeological data from sites like Settefinestre shows that slave-quarters had very particular specifications; cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 147. This was also seen with Xenophon in which the slave-cells were separated according to gender.

<sup>178</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Cat. mai.* 21; cf. Jonathan Edmondson, "Slavery and the Roman Family," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 344; Sandra R. Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 105.

<sup>179</sup> Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World*, 56.

Most importantly for this study and understanding slavery in the early Christian period, we see the rise and development of the persona of the *vilicus*. The rules of conduct for the *vilicus* are spelled out clearly (*Agr.* 5.1-3):

The following are the duties of the overseer: He must show good management. The feast days must be observed. He must withhold his hands from another's goods and diligently preserve his own. He must settle disputes among the slaves; and if anyone commits an offence he must punish him properly in proportion to the fault. He must see that the servants are well provided for, and that they do not suffer from cold or hunger. Let him keep them busy with their work - he will more easily keep them from wrongdoing and meddling. If the overseer sets his face against wrongdoing, they will not do it; if he allows it, the master must not let him go unpunished. He must express his appreciation of good work, so that others may take pleasure in well-doing. The overseer must not be a gadabout, he must always be sober, and must not go out to dine. He must keep servants busy, and see that the master's orders are carried out. He must not assume that he knows more than the master.<sup>180</sup>

---

<sup>180</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 8-11: *Haec erunt vilici officia. Disciplina bona utatur. Feriae servantur. Alieno manum absteineat, sua servet diligenter. Litibus familia supersedeat; siquis quid deliquerit, pro noxa bono modo vindicet. Familiae male ne sit, ne algeat, ne esuriat; opere bene exerceat, facilius malo et alieno prohibebit. Vilicus si nolet male facere, non faciet. Si passus erit, dominus inpune ne sinat esse. Pro beneficio gratiam referat, ut aliis recte facere libeat. Vilicus ne sit ambulator, sobrius siet semper, ad cenam nequo eat. Familiam exerceat, consideret, quae dominus imperaverit fiant. Ne plus censeat sapere se quam dominum;* cf. also: John Bodel, "Slave Labour and Roman Society," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 333–34.

The *vilicus* plays a very important role when it comes to slave-management.<sup>181</sup> Since most of the estate-owners were absent from the supervision of daily activities, the *vilicus* became an increasingly important office, and the model *vilicus* may be considered as a key construct in Roman *oikonomia*.<sup>182</sup> It was often possible that the *vilicus* was a slave.<sup>183</sup> The Latin word *actor* may be used as a substitute, with the Greek words ἐπίτροπος, πραγματευτής and πιστικός as possible equivalents.<sup>184</sup> Most importantly, the *vilicus* is represented as a surrogate body for the owner.<sup>185</sup> The construction of the Roman *vilicus* was, in the first instance, one related to economy. The sole purpose of the *vilicus* was to ensure profit for the estate,<sup>186</sup> but there were also several very important additional duties.<sup>187</sup> As seen above, his conduct in relation to slaves should be productive. Cato even explains the punishment of the slaves by the *vilicus* in terms of scales and measures - the punishment should be equal to the fault. It is not so much a matter of fairness than it is one of balancing the socio-economic books. All relations with slaves should be directed at optimum productivity. But the *vilicus* was also a very important ethical construct. Despite the criticisms of Philodemus against authors like Cato (he does not attack Cato directly, but the ideologies of Xenophon and Theophrastus, which are also shared by Cato), stating that their type of *oikonomia* was simply economical and not ethical, the arguments of Cato (and those of Xenophon and Theophrastus/Pseudo-Aristotle), in my opinion, are quite ethical, but in a very subtle manner. Perhaps the problem lies with Philodemus' conjecture that there exists some kind of dichotomy (even a contrast) between economy and ethics. In reality, especially in antiquity, they are very much interwoven. It is true that the treatises and handbooks Philodemus rejects as

---

<sup>181</sup> Jesper Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers Until AD 284* (Analecta Romana Instituti Danici Supplementum; Bretschneider, 1995), 27–56.

<sup>182</sup> Egon Maróti, “The *Vilicus* and the Villa System in Ancient Italy,” *Oikumene* 1 (1976): 109–24.

<sup>183</sup> The office is a complex one; often they were slaves, but it also happened that *vilici* were free-born or manumitted slaves; cf. Walter Scheidel, “Free-Born and Manumitted Bailiffs in the Graeco-Roman World,” *CQ* 40, no. 2 (1990): 591–93. There were also *subvilici* present on estates; cf. Jesper Carlsen, “Subvilicus: Subagent or Assistant Bailiff?” *ZPE* 132 (2000): 312–16.

<sup>184</sup> Cf. Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 123–24; Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 122–23.

<sup>185</sup> Cf. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 11–12; Brendon Reay, “Agriculture, Writing and Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning,” *ClAnt* 24, no. 2 (2005): 335.

<sup>186</sup> Roberta Steward, *Plautus and Roman Slavery* (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 51–56.

<sup>187</sup> Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 57–102.

unethical are not always written in the conventional style of virtue-discourse (Xenophon's account is especially an exception here), but this hardly makes them unethical. It simply implies a different focus and emphasis. Philodemus' ploy to 'sell' his own views as those tailored for the philosopher and Epicurean virtuoso, ironically enough, seems to be nothing more than a marketing strategy, an advertisement that would appeal to a different aspect of the human psyche - old *oikonomia* in a new package, with a new focus. To illustrate this point further, I will dwell on the second characteristic of Cato's construction of the *vilicus*, namely that of the *vilicus* as the ethical body double of the owner, or the duplication of the body of the owner. It is seen in the end of the section in that the knowledge of the *vilicus* should equal (and especially not supersede) that of the master, which would be equal to arrogance. In the section after the above quoted pericope, Cato states that the friends of the master should be the friends of the *vilicus*, and he provides an elongated list of guidelines for the *vilicus*, which most evidently presses the point that the *vilicus* should never act on his own accord, whether it is a question of lending money, making purchases or even consulting agents of divination (*Agr.* 5.3-5). Nothing may be done without the approval of the *dominus*. As mentioned earlier, this socio-symbolic duplication of the owner was the result of necessity, since most owners were absent from the estates.<sup>188</sup> Thus an ethic of mirroring is necessary in the context of this discourse. The *vilicus* as model for ethical behaviour still has an economic end, since Cato assumes disciplined behaviour would lead to high productivity. The *vilicus* becomes a model for the slaves - they are expected to mirror his behaviour. The danger of an immoral *vilicus* is that bad behaviour would be contagious. It also implies very strict regulation of the body of the *vilicus*. If productivity is inadequate, Cato warns, the *vilicus* may come up with a myriad excuses, like ill slaves, or slaves who have run away, etc. He then provides the owner with several responses to the excuses of the *vilicus*. Sick slaves, for instance, should not receive large rations (*Agr.* 2.1-4) . The early date of Cato's work also exhibits a sentimental value on tradition and Roman religion, and the *vilicus*, as the surrogate for the master, had to ensure that the Roman feast days were observed (*Agr.* 5.1), even though slaves had to work on these days (*Agr.* 2.4).

One therefore sees the dynamic of such elaborate slave hierarchies found on agricultural estates. Cato has several categories of slaves in his handbook. Harper rightly states: 'There was

---

<sup>188</sup> Reay, "Cato's Aristocratic Self-Fashioning," 335.

probably a whole universe of lower-level overseers who are hard to detect in our sources...'<sup>189</sup> Without a doubt, these intricate hierarchies function both with an economic and ethical impetus. The essential element in a hierarchy is authority, and power, which is inevitably linked to ethics. The taxonomy of the arrangement of slaves on an agricultural estate acts in the interest of discrimination, which not only creates sub-categories (which may only appear functional), but also sub-classes (which is based more on social status than function). Most importantly, the taxonomy also serves the catalytic purpose of reflecting and norming the values that the owner wants to instill. With Cato, for instance, one gets the *vilicus*, roughly translated as the 'overseer', but there are also, for instance, *custodes* (guards/keepers/overseers) and *salictarii* (osier managers); not to mention the very subtle difference between the *vilicus* (an overseer of one estate) and the *actor* (who oversees multiple estates). The highly specialized nature of slaves' tasks on an agricultural estate assumes a very complex and specialized hierarchy to manage it. The other problem is that this phenomenon is distinctly Roman, and finding Greek or especially English equivalents proves to be very difficult. Along with the development and proliferation of villa-estates in the Italian rustic, one also finds a very particular set of language parameters being created which most effectively 'speaks itself' in the language of the Republic, namely Latin. Many of the words Cato and other Latin authors like Varro may list for slaves, should not only be seen as labour-signifiers, but there may be subtle nuances present in the words that would be common knowledge to ancient readers, yet not so common to the modern eye. Hierarchic and taxonomic categories and terms inevitably have connotations and denotations related to power and authority, and especially to social status. These complexities are best demonstrated when attempting to 'translate' some of these terms and categories into Greek, as Harper demonstrates:<sup>190</sup> 'The hazy boundaries between these managerial categories, and the discordant semantic range of the Greek and Latin terminology, are reflected in an artful letter of Ausonius, whose pretentious *vilicus* preferred to be called *epitropos*.'<sup>191</sup> Another example is the specifics

---

<sup>189</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 123.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid.

<sup>191</sup> It leads one to speculate as to why Philodemus prefers to direct his critique against Greek authors and not authors like Cato. Perhaps Philodemus realizes that his audience had favourable views, perhaps even social and biological ties, to someone like Cato or Varro, which would make for targeting Xenophon and Theophrastus more convenient and 'safe'. On the other hand, was it this complexity of the language of Roman villa-based landholding, aggressively Latin, along with its cultural nuances, that led Philodemus to take the easier path and remain within the Greek

spelled out by Cato regarding participation in religious feasts and rituals. While the *vilicus* needs to ensure the observance of the feast days, while balancing productivity by having slaves work on these days, some religious activities are taboo for the *vilicus*;<sup>192</sup> for instance, he may not consult a practitioner of divination nor is he allowed to perform any religious rites except the Compitalia honouring the Lares Compitales (*Agr.* 5.3), while any person, slave or free (except a woman) is allowed to bring the offering dedicated to Mars and Silvanus for the health of the oxen (*Agr.* 83).<sup>193</sup> Even superstitions are catered for, such as stinting the seed for sowing, which Cato considers bad luck (*Agr.* 5.4). Finally, the taxonomic and hierarchic nuances are clearly and most obviously stated in Cato's precise guidelines regarding the distribution of rations (*Agr.* 56-59).

Cato's model *vilicus* therefore is only the tip of a very complex authority-based ethical framework, highly specialized and highly contextual. The same would be true for the authors in the following discussions, namely Varro and Columella. The focus, however, remains economical and profit-driven. Cato's remarks on the treatment of slaves deserve some attention. The treatment of slaves, whether punishment or reward, should serve in the interest of

---

context? To speculate even further, perhaps Philodemus merely had a preferential, even biased, ethnocultural grammar for Greek rather than Latin. This issue, however, requires more study than the scope of the present study allows.

<sup>192</sup> For a discussion of the religious duties of the *vilicus*; cf. Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 80–84.

<sup>193</sup> In a rather curious passage written centuries later in the anonymous *Origo gentis Romanae*, a short treatise which aims to explain the origins of the Roman people, the following instance is narrated: 'In truth, afterwards, Appius Claudius enticed the Potitii with money they received to instruct public slaves in the management of the rites of Hercules and furthermore to admit women as well. They say that within thirty days from this being done the whole family of the Potitii, which had earlier been responsible for the rites, died out, and that the rites therefore came into the hands of the Pinarii, and that they, instructed by their reverence as much as their feelings of duty, faithfully preserved the mysteries of this sort.' (*Orig. gent. Rom.* 8.5-6; Translation Roger Pearse, *The Origin of the Roman People* (Cited 12 April 2012. Online: [http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/origo\\_00\\_intro.htm](http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/origo_00_intro.htm), 2004), n.p.; Latin text: Teubner: 10: *Verum postea Appius Claudius accepta pecunia Potitios illexit, ut administrationem sacrorum Herculis servos publicos edocerent nes non etiam mulieresmitterent. Quo facto aiunt intra dies triginta omnem familiam Potitiorum, quae prior in sacris habebatur, extinctam atque ita sacra penes Pinarios resedissee eosque tam religione quam etiam pietate edoctos mysteria eiusmodi fideliter custodisse.*) We see here that the family of the Potitii were punished not only with death, but the erasure of their historical legacy, for permitting slaves and women to perform certain religious rites only to be performed by free men. The importance of status in religious activities and ceremonies was therefore something that endured from Republican to late Imperial times.

productivity. On the one hand, Cato's advice on mastery and the treatment of slaves does not differ much from that found in Xenophon. He also believes in manipulating the bodily desires and passions to make slaves productive.<sup>194</sup> Sick slaves should have their rations limited (*Agr.* 2.4), and if it rained slaves could have done numerous other tasks, even if it is simply mending their own apparel (*Agr.* 2.3). As mentioned above, when discussing rationing, Cato is again painfully specific and detailed regarding their diet, which is a high-carbohydrate diet with little protein, fruits and vegetables (*Agr.* 56-59).<sup>195</sup> For instance, the chained gangs of slaves working in the fields receive specific rations which are dependent on the season and types of field-work they perform: 'The chain-gang should have a ration of four pounds of bread through the winter, increasing to five when they begin to work the vines, and dropping back to four when the figs ripen' (*Agr.* 56).<sup>196</sup> Similar specifics are given regarding wine, even regarding feasts such as the Saturnalia and Compitalia (*Agr.* 57). Clothing and blankets are also strictly regulated (*Agr.* 59). These precise guidelines for rationing not only shows the importance and intricacy of accounting on these estates, but the exact regulations regarding the provision for bodily needs also ramify the authority-based hierarchical taxonomy, and illustrate its complexity. According to his biographer Plutarch, Cato was also a bit eccentric by having his wife, Licinia, breastfeed not only their own children, but also the slaves' children in order to strengthen their bond of faith to their owner and his offspring: 'For the mother nursed it (Cato's son) herself, and often gave suck also to the infants of her slaves, that they might come to cherish a brotherly affection for her son (*Cat. mai.* 20.3).<sup>197</sup> Some scholars suggest, quite plausibly in my opinion, that mastery began during early infancy, when the freeborn and slaves played together. Edmondson hypothesizes: 'It is difficult to reconstruct the precise nature of their play, but it is quite likely that it was through

---

<sup>194</sup> Sandra R. Joshel, "Slavery and the Roman Literary Culture," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 223–24.

<sup>195</sup> Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World*, 131–32. For a more detailed discussion of Cato's diet for slaves; cf. Phyllis P. Bober, *Art, Culture, and Cuisine: Ancient and Medieval Gastronomy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 183.

<sup>196</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 70-71: ...*compeditis per hiemem panis P.III, ubi vineam fodere coeperint, panis P. V, usque adeo dum ficos esse coeperint, deinde ad P. IIII redito*; cf. Bober, *Art, Culture, and Cuisine*, 183–84.

<sup>197</sup> Translation & Greek text: LCL: 360-61: αὐτὴ γὰρ ἔτρεφεν ἰδίῳ γάλακτι· πολλάκις δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν δούλων παιδάρια τῷ μαστῷ προσιεμένα, κατεσκευάζεν εὐνοίαν ἐκ τῆς συντροφίας πρὸς τὸν υἱόν.

play that children began to learn how to give orders to their slave playmates.<sup>198</sup> This shows how extremely pervasive the practice of slavery was, that even during infancy and the development of early childhood behaviour, master/slave discourses were active and shaping individuals to rule or be ruled. Plutarch also points to a second eccentricity of Cato (*Cat. mai.* 20.3-4):

As soon as the boy [Cato's son] showed signs of understanding, his father took him under his own charge and taught him to read, although he had an accomplished slave, Chilo by name, who was a school-teacher and taught many boys. Still, Cato thought it not right, as he tells us himself, that his son should be scolded by a slave, or have his ears tweaked when he was slow to learn, still less that he should be indebted to his slave for such a priceless thing as education...<sup>199</sup>

This was unusual indeed, since it was commonplace for slaves, called *educatores* or *paedagogi*, to serve as teachers.<sup>200</sup> In Cato we therefore find a voice from the second century Republic. He is highly traditional and sentimental, going even to eccentric lengths to ensure successful mastery. He writes to a new class of Romans who were extremely wealthy and powerful, but also absent from their estates. In order to bridge the challenges posed by such a scenario, Cato produces a highly complex and precise guide to *oikonomia*, including slave-management, on such estates. Most notable for this study is his construction of the typical Roman *vilicus*, a construction that is permeated by a subtle interweaving of economic and ethical

---

<sup>198</sup> Edmondson, "Slavery and the Roman Family," 358.

<sup>199</sup> Translation & Greek Text: LCL: 360-361: ἐπεὶ δ' ἤρξατο συνιέναι, παραλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐδίδασκε γράμματα. καίτοι χαρίεντα δούλον εἶχε γραμματιστὴν ὄνομα Χίλωνα, πολλοὺς διδάσκοντα παῖδας· οὐκ ἤξιον δὲ τὸν υἱόν, ὡς φησιν αὐτός, ὑπὸ δούλου κακῶς ἀκούειν ἢ τοῦ ὠτὸς ἀνατείνεσθαι μανθάνοντα βράδιον, οὐδέ γε μαθήματος τηλικούτου [τῷ] δούλῳ χάριν ὀφείλειν,...

<sup>200</sup> For the role of men in the care of children in the Roman family in general; cf. Bradley, *Discovering the Roman Family*, 37–75, esp. 37-41, on the *paedagogi*; on the role of female slaves and childcare on agricultural estates; cf. Ulrike Roth, *Thinking Tools: Agricultural Slavery Between Evidence and Models* (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement; London: University of London, Institute of Classical Studies, 2007), 15–16.



discusivities, one that becomes a mirror and surrogate for the owner. He also presents the reader with a very precise and complex taxonomy that reiterates and ramifies all levels of authority, whether it concerns rationing or punishment. Behind this lies a subtle and nuanced hierarchy, almost ineffable and difficult to translate into any language other than Latin. While his context prodded him to devise these unique features, there is also much continuity between Cato and someone like Xenophon and even Pseudo-Aristotle. He also advocates the regulation and manipulation via the bodily passions. To the discomfort of someone like Philodemus, Cato's main emphasis and focus is to maximize profit and productivity, with ethical behaviour always directed at promoting this primary economic impetus of acquiring wealth and expanding the estate. We now turn to the works of Varro.

### 3.5 Varro's *Rerum Rusticarum*

Varro's handbook on farming and agriculture was written more than a century after Cato's handbook, and by this time, despite the political instability in Rome at the time, the villa-estate system of landholding was more common and established. In very much the same manner as Cato and the Hellenistic authors discussed above, slaves are discussed within an economic context. He also refers to Cato on several occasions in his opus. A century of large-scale slave labour has passed, and Varro provides many guidelines for using large numbers of slaves on the estates. It is interesting to see how Varro regards slaves in the agricultural estate (*Rust.* 1.17.1-2):

Now I turn to the means by which the land is tilled. Some divide these into two parts: men, and those aids to men without which they cannot cultivate; others into three: the class of instruments which is articulate, the inarticulate, and the mute; the articulate comprising the slaves, the inarticulate comprising the cattle, and the mute comprising the vehicles. All agriculture is carried on by men - slaves, or freemen, or both...<sup>201</sup>

---

<sup>201</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 224-25: *Nunc dicam, agri quibus rebus colantur. Quas res alii dividunt in duas partes, in homines et adminicula hominum, sine quibus rebus colere non possunt; alii in tres partes, instrumenti genus vocale est semivocale et mutum, vocale, in quo sunt servi, semivocale, in quo sunt boves, mutum, in quo sunt plaustra. Omnes agricoluntur hominibus servis aut liberis aut utrisque...*

Varro uses the distinction of speech to classify and discern slaves (and free labourers). The term ‘articulate tools’ (*instrumentum vocale*) is another difficult Latinism to interpret. Carlsen states that it may have had a legal sense to it, but also notes its ambiguity.<sup>202</sup> The term seems general and although it may seem derogatory to speak of human beings as tools, this term may not have had much of a shameful connotation to it, since it is used for both slaves and the free. It simply distinguishes humans from animals and non-living farm equipment. Joshel explores the ‘literary culture’ of this term thus:

The conjunction of ‘tool’ and ‘speaking’, object and subject, raises the question of the agency attributed by slaves in literature...I shall argue that this practice was founded on the very definition of the chattel slave as fungible. I refer to the term in the modern sense, though the notion applies to the condition of the slave in Rome: as a fungible thing, the slave was exchangeable, replaceable, substitutable.<sup>203</sup>

Although Joshel is correct in her general premise that a slave is fungible, using this phrase from Varro to support it seems, in my opinion, implausible. The passage from Varro should be carefully examined. It should be noted that Varro’s taxonomy here seems to be more classificatory than hierarchical (unlike most of Cato’s taxonomies). The classification is material or biological (or the lack of biology), simply to discern between humans, animals and basic tools. It does not appear to be based on social status at all, since he includes all human beings under the classification. It is possible that the term may have been somewhat condescending, especially when one examines his elaborations on which type of free persons are included here: the poor (*pauperculi*), hirelings (*mercenarii*), and debt-labourers (*obaerarii*). It is obviously clear that these people are not part of the upper echelons of the social classes, but they are not exactly

---

<sup>202</sup> Jesper Carlsen, “Varro, Marcus Terentius,” in *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery: Volume 2: L-Z* (Junius P. Rodriguez (ed.); Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 669.

<sup>203</sup> Joshel, “Slavery and the Roman Literary Culture,” 214–16; cf. also: William Fitzgerald, *Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 6.

equal to slaves in the Roman sense. Although it can be quite tempting, one should not read too much into this term used by Varro.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, Varro lists this as simply one of many views on how to classify those ‘things’ that till the land - it is not even mentioned first by Varro. This does not mean that he considers slaves in a positive and humane manner. The contrary is true - Varro is no different from any of the other authors discussed thus far regarding the social status of slaves. Taking cognisance of the caveats mentioned above in the discussion on Cato pertaining to substituting Latin phrases with Greek ones, it does seem to me, in this instance, that it would be safe to say that *instrumentum vocale* cannot possibly be as derogatory as the Greek ἀνδράποδον, which may better support an argument for the fungible character of the slave. Rather than being a word that particularly describes the state of slavery, the term *instrumentum vocale* appears to form part of the specialised agricultural terminology, which has developed alongside Roman farming practices, a stereotype showing the contempt of the Roman upper classes for the servile classes. A term found in Varro’s work that could better support Joshel’s argument is that of *venalium greges*, normally translated as ‘slave-gangs’ (*Rust.* 1.2.20-21). The term *venalium* here may act as a synonym for *servus*, while *grex* refers to a crowd or herd. *Venalium* speaks of something that is liable to be sold. But even this phrase is ambiguous. Roth has provided sound argumentation for translating the term *venalium greges* in this pericope from Varro not as ‘slave-gangs’, but simply as herds of animals; it further illustrates the complexity of the language we find in these Roman treatises on agricultural management.<sup>205</sup>

But what does Varro have to say about slaves and slave-management? Like most ancient authors, Varro believes in careful and strategic regulation and manipulation of slaves to extract optimal productivity. He also believes that the selection of quality overseers for slaves is of crucial importance (*Rust.* 1.17.4-5). The overseer (Varro uses the word *praefectus* in this instance, and not *vilicus*, most likely indicating a lower rank than that of the *vilicus*; the *praefectus* would possibly also be a slave, it could also simply be a synonym for *vilicus*) needs to be an older, literate person, with experience in farming. The *vilicus* should be able to apply

---

<sup>204</sup> Carlsen issues this same warning; Carlsen, “Varro”.

<sup>205</sup> Ulrike Roth, “No More Slave-Gangs: Varro, *De re rustica* 1.2.20–1,” *CQ* 55 (2005): 310–15. Human beings are sometimes referred to as being collected in ‘herds’; cf. Kronenberg, *Allegories of Farming*, 118.

punitive discipline.<sup>206</sup> Although he is not necessarily referring to a *vilicus*, many of the same qualities are present, and the *praefectus* should serve as an example to the slaves under him (*Rust.* 1.17.4-5):

For the foreman must not only give orders but also take part in the work, so that his subordinates may follow his example, and also understand that there is a reason for his being over them - the fact that he is superior to them in knowledge. They are not to be allowed to control their men with whips rather than with words, if only you can achieve the same result.<sup>207</sup>

As with Cato, we see here that the highly hierarchical Roman social systems exhibit a subtle ethical undertone. The *praefectus* must lead by example, and the status marker here is knowledge (probably the fact that he is literate) and his past experience in farming. The *praefectus* is also constructed as someone who is temperate, and not violent. Varro certainly appears to be less harsh than Cato regarding the status and treatment of slaves (*Rust.* 1.17.6-7):

The goodwill of the foremen should be won by treating them with some degree of consideration; and those of the hands who excel the others should also be consulted as to the work to be done. When this is done they are less inclined to think that they are looked down upon, or rather think that they are held in some esteem by the master. They are made to take more interest in their work by being treated more liberally in respect either of food, or of more clothing, or of exemption from work, or permission to graze

---

<sup>206</sup> Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari, "Ideal Models of Slave-Management in the Roman World and in the Ante-Bellum American South," in *Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern* (Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 196. In this same article the authors demonstrate how widely principles from Cato, Varro and Columella were used in American slavery.

<sup>207</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 226-27: *Non solum enim debere imperare, sed etiam facere, ut facientem imitetur et ut animadvertat eum cum causa sibi praeesse, quod scientia praestet. Neque illis concedendum ita imperare, ut verberibus coerceant potius quam verbis, si modo idem efficere possis.*

some cattle of their own on the farm, or other things of this kind; so that, if some unusually heavy task is imposed, or punishment inflicted on them in some way, their loyalty and kindly feeling to the master may be restored by the consolation derived from such measures.<sup>208</sup>

Here again it is clear that Varro prefers consultation and cooperation in winning the loyalty of the *praefectus* and the slave. Whereas Cato would not even allow a slave to teach his son, Varro places a high value on reasoning with slaves and overseers. He understands that the owner should employ subtle psychological manipulation to ensure relationships remain favourable even when there is punishment or very hard tasks required.<sup>209</sup> Once again, the importance of manipulating the slaves' bodily passions is emphasized. Varro is more liberal than Cato though when it comes to rationing. Whereas Cato provided very precise guidelines for rationing, Varro recognizes the value of rationing in winning the favour of slaves. Varro also displays a stereotypical cultural discrimination in his elaborations - he advises against having too many slaves of the same nationality, since 'this is a fertile source of domestic quarrels' (*Rust.* 1.17.5).<sup>210</sup> Like Xenophon, Varro also comprehends the value of allowing slaves to own property and to have sex and offspring, since it will cause them to be more attached to the estate and they become more stable. Incidentally, Varro seems to whisper, this also pushes up their value (*Rust.* 1.17.5-6).

---

<sup>208</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 226-29: *Inliciendam voluntatem praefectorum honore aliquo habendo, et de operariis qui praestabunt alios, communicandum quoque cum his, quae facienda sint opera, quod, ita cum fit, minus se putant despici atque aliquo numero haberi a domino. Studiosiores ad opus fieri liberalius tractando aut cibariis aut vestitu largiore aut remissione operis concessioneve, ut peculiare aliquid in fundo pascere liceat, huiusce modi rerum aliis, ut quibus quid gravius sit imperatum aut animadversum qui, consolando eorum restituat voluntatem ac benevolentiam in dominum.*

<sup>209</sup> Bodel, "Slave Labour and Roman Society," 324.

<sup>210</sup> It should be remembered that Varro's comments on the nationality of slaves were made to avoid possible insurrection, especially in the light of the Sicilian slave-revolts about 70 years earlier. Bradley states: 'His prescriptions were not idle words prompted by generic convention, but practical directions from a public figure with experience of farming that reflected the real difficulty of how to control a servile population and prevent insurrection among its members'; Bradley, "Slavery in the Roman Republic," 247.

In terms of the amount of slaves necessary for an estate, Varro notes that none of his predecessors, including Cato, left clear guidelines. Varro's best advice here to the owner is to look at the surrounding estates, and the type of fields and farming being conducted, and on this basis, determine the best number of slaves (*Rust.* 1.18.6-8).

Although Varro often refers to Cato's work, he can be described as having an opinion more liberal and moderate when it comes to slave-management. Since the villa-system of landholding and large-scale slave-labour models have matured in the century between Cato and Varro, Varro often advises his readers to follow the examples of established villa-estates regarding the numbers of slaves and their management. Varro shares the same views of most ancient authors in that the bodily passions of slaves need to be regulated and manipulated in order to ensure optimal productivity. He also understands the importance of having firm hierarchies in place in order to govern the behaviour of slaves, and also to mirror the values of the absentee owner. Overseers need to embody the values of the owner, and lead by example. The owner is expected to be a good communicator, and someone who can strategically reason with slaves, gain their favour and loyalty, and use various technologies to psychologically manipulate their behaviour and opinions. Varro also places much value on employing educated *praefecti* to closely supervise and manage slave labour. It is becoming more and more evident that mastery is a highly complex issue. Most of the authors discussed thus far are not in favour of violent compulsion as a first resort. Even Cato, most likely the strictest advisor thus far, prefers psychological manipulation of bodily passions over and above physical violence. Punitive violence is mostly seen as a last resort. As mentioned early in this chapter, the regulation and manipulation of the bodily passions complicate the phenomenon of slave-management, since issues like slave-families, manumission and freed-status become ethically and socially ambiguous. Some advise against mention of manumission while others consider it advantageous. The issue of rationing is also complex when it comes to mastery, since rationing mostly serves as technologies for forcing submission and obedience, yet, as Cato seems to hint, it is also an economic issue. If one has an estate with a few thousand slaves, rationing becomes a real problem. In order to overcome these complexities, the Roman system of slave-management has become highly hierarchical and based on the designation of the owner's authority and its duplication in the form of the *vilicus*. The channels of mastery become complex and the specialized and highly nuanced Latinisms do not help the modern historian either. The ethical

basis of this type of mastery requires that the values and dispositions of the owner be mirrored on every level of authority, whether it is an important figure like the *vilicus* or the more hands-on *praefectus*. The extent of influence of these principles of mastery from the agricultural treatises in the urban areas is not clear, but they would have most certainly had some effect on the opinions of slaveholders in the city. We will now examine Columella, the final author we have of an agricultural treatise in the early Roman period.

### 3.6 Columella's *De Re Rustica*

Columella's treatise on the management of an agricultural estate is the most comprehensive we have on the subject. He is also unique in that he writes firmly during the Roman Imperial period. His work illustrates the diversity of farming on these estates, with each book treating an aspect of farming, whether it is crops and vineyards (books 3 to five), poultry and fish (book 8), and even bees (book 9). He also has a whole discourse on veterinary medicine in book 6. Books 10 to 12 mostly deal with labour issues.<sup>211</sup> The reason for this encyclopedic treatise is given in its very first lines. He believes that the state of farming in the Empire is dire.<sup>212</sup> But the reason for the poor quality of farming, according to Columella, is not divine, but due to human error and ignorance, and he states (*Rust.* 1. Preface, 3):

I do not believe that such misfortunes (bad crops, the decline in fertile soil, and the general state of farming) come upon us as a result of the fury of the elements, but rather because of our own fault; for the matter of husbandry, which all the best of our

---

<sup>211</sup> Craige Champion, "Columella's *De re rustica*," in *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery: Volume 1: A-K* (Junius P. Rodriguez (ed.); Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 174–75.

<sup>212</sup> Neville Morley, "Slavery Under the Principate," in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 274–77.

ancestors had treated with the best of care, we have delivered over to all the worst of our slaves, as if to a hangman for punishment.<sup>213</sup>

The reason for the poor state of farming is, according to Columella, the absenteeism of the landowners, who have left farming for slaves to do - and by implication, Columella believes that they have ruined it. Later he also mentions that there are no teachers in the ‘art’ of husbandry as there is in rhetoric or masonry. Thus, his exhaustive work on how to farm is written for a generation of landowners not accustomed to farming and, to the benefit of the modern scholar, Columella almost assumes that his reader knows nothing of the art. By restoring the primacy of the presence of the *pater familias* on the estates, Columella hopes to revive the olden ways of husbandry.<sup>214</sup>

With Columella we therefore have an abundance of evidence regarding slave-management on villa-estates during the Imperial period. Columella’s influence on slave-management in the later Roman Empire is often understated. Columella’s work is most important for this study in that it shows us something of Roman attitudes on mastery and slave-management in the Imperial period, which would be influential during the later centuries, particularly the time of Chrysostom.

Columella exhibits many similarities with the work of Varro, but he is possibly not as harsh as Cato. Yet he still understands that very strict and strategic manipulation of slave-bodies is needed for the optimal functioning of a large agricultural estate.<sup>215</sup> More than any of the previous writers (with the exception of Xenophon), Columella promulgates a culture of intense surveillance when it comes to slave-management. Two very important and lengthy pericopes merit thorough examination and read thus (*Rust.* 1.1.20 - 2.1):

For men who purchase lands at a distance, not to mention estates across the seas, are making over their inheritances to their slaves, as to their heirs and, worse yet, while they themselves are still

---

<sup>213</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 4-5: *Nec post haec reor violentia caeli nobis ista, sed nostro potius accidere vitio, qui rem rusticam pessimo cuique servorum velut carnifici noxae dedimus, quam maiorum nostrorum optimus quisque optime tractaverat.*

<sup>214</sup> For the background on the issue of the absentee *pater familias*, cf. Reay, “Cato’s Aristocratic Self-Fashioning”.

<sup>215</sup> Joshel, “Slavery and the Roman Literary Culture,” 223–24.



alive; for it is certain that slaves are corrupted by reason of the great remoteness of their masters and, being once corrupted and in expectation of others to take their places after the shameful acts which they have committed, they are intent more on pillage than on farming. I am of the opinion, therefore, that land should be purchased nearby, so that the owner may visit it often and announce that his visits will be more frequent than he really intends them to be; for this apprehension both overseer and labourers will be at their duties.<sup>216</sup>

And (*Rust.* 1.8.16-19):

Again, it is established custom of all men of caution to inspect the inmates of the workhouse, to find out whether they are carefully chained, whether the places of confinement are quite safe and properly guarded, whether the overseer has put anyone in fetters or removed his shackles without the master's knowledge. For the overseer should be most observant of both points - not to release from shackles anyone whom the head of the house has subjected to that kind of punishment, except by his leave, and not to free one whom he himself has chained on his own initiative until the master knows the circumstances; and the investigation of the householder should be more painstaking in the interest of slaves of this sort, that they may not be treated unjustly in the matter of clothing or other allowances, inasmuch as, being liable to a greater number of people, such as overseers, taskmasters, and jailers, they are more

---

<sup>216</sup>Translation & Latin text: LCL: 38-39: *Nam qui longinqua, ne dicam transmarina rura mercantur, velut heredibus patrimonio suo et, quod gravius est, vivi cedunt servis suis, quoniam quidem et illi tam longa dominorum distantia corrumpuntur et corrupti post flagitia, quae commiserunt, sub exspectatione successorum rapinis magnis quam culturae student. Censeo igitur in propinquo agrum mercari, quo et frequenter dominus veniat et frequentius venturum se, quam sit venturus, denuntiet. Sub hoc enim metu cum familia vilicus erit in officio.*

liable to unjust punishment, and again, when smarting under cruelty and greed, they are more to be feared. Accordingly, a careful master inquires not only of them, but also of those who are not in bonds, as being more worthy of belief, whether they are receiving what is due to them under his instructions; he also tests the quality of their food and drink by tasting it himself, and examines their clothing, their mittens, and their foot-covering. In addition, he should give them frequent opportunities for making complaint against those persons who treat them cruelly or dishonestly. In fact, I now and then avenge those who incite the slaves to revolt, or who slander their taskmasters; and, on the other hand, I reward those who conduct themselves with energy and diligence. To women, too, who are unusually prolific, and who ought to be rewarded for the bearing of a certain number of offspring, I have granted exemption from work and sometimes even freedom after they had reared many children. For to a mother of three sons exemption from work was granted; to a mother of more her freedom as well. Such justice and consideration on the part of the master contributes greatly to the increase of his estate.<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>217</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 92-95: *Nam illa sollemnia sunt omnibus circumspectis, ut ergastuli mancipia recognoscant, ut explorent an diligenter vinciti sint, an ipsae sedes custodiae satis tutae munitaeque sint, num vilicus aut alligaverit quempiam domino nesciente aut revinxerit. Nam utrumque maxime servare debet, ut et quem pater familiae tali poena multaverit, vilicus nisi eiusdem permissu compedibus non eximat et quem ipse sua sponte vinxerit, antequam sciat dominus, non resolvat; tantoque curiosior inquisitio patris familiae debet esse pro tali genere servorum, ne aut in vestiariis aut in ceteris praebitis iniuriose tractentur, quanto et pluribus subiecti, ut vilicis, ut operum magistris, ut ergastulariis, magis obnoxii perpetiendis iniuriis, et rursus saevitia atque avaritia laesi magis timendi sunt. Itaque diligens dominus cum et ab ipsis tum et ab solutis, quibus maior est fides, quaerit, an exsua constitutione iusta percipiant, atque ipse panis potionisque probitatem gustu suo explorat, vestem manicas pedumque tegumina recognoscit. Saepe etiam querendi potestatem faciat de iis, qui aut crudeliter eos aut fraudulenter infestent. Nos quidem aliquando iuste dolentes tam vindicamus, quam animadvertimus in eos, qui seditionibus familiam concitant, qui calumniantur magistros suos; ac rursus praemio prosequimur eos, qui strenue atque industrie se gerunt. Feminis quoque fecundioribus, quarum in subole certus numerus honorari debet, otium,*

In this exposition, Columella creatively incorporates old views on slave-management with new discourses common to the Roman Imperial period. Like Xenophon, slaves are rewarded for ‘breeding’, and motherhood is considered synonymous with manumission in the thinking of Columella.<sup>218</sup> But let us commence from the beginning of this pericope. As mentioned above, Columella’s new culture of surveillance is something that truly stands out as unique in his treatise. Although this is obviously present in the treatises of Cato and Varro, Columella’s version is much more striking.<sup>219</sup> It must be understood that Columella is writing during a period when the villa-system was not only quite established, but also more open to critique. Columella seems uncomfortable with the absenteeism of the landowner or *pater familias*. While Cato and Varro established and reinforced the complex hierarchical systems of slave-management in the villa-estates, Columella subtly informs the reader of the fissures in the hierarchies. Although we saw the ethic of mirroring and modelling of the *pater familias* by the *vilicus* and other subordinates promoted by Cato and Varro, Columella is all too aware of the unrealistic idealism accompanying these constructions of subordinates in the hierarchy. Cato and Varro described the ideal, but the reality was all too clear for Columella - if a landowner truly desires high productivity on the estate, he should be present and involved in its workings. This pericope in Columella’s treatise therefore represents a critique on the construction of the *vilicus* and other subordinates provided by authors like Cato and Varro; it is done in almost juridical terms.<sup>220</sup> There is therefore something that could be called a rigid panopticism present in Columella’s guidelines to slave-management. It is also possible that he is attempting to rescue the role of the *pater familias* of the villa-estate in the Roman social imagination. He wants to replace the stereotype of the absentee *pater familias* with that of one who is concerned about the welfare of slaves and most importantly, he must be the personification of justice and fairness. On a rather low level of abstraction, we can trace the evolution of the Roman landowner or *pater*

---

*nonnumquam et libertatem dedimus, cum complures natos educassent. Nam cui tres erant filii, vacatio, cui plures, libertas quoque contingebat. Haec et iustitia et cura patris familiae multum confert augendo patrimonio.*

<sup>218</sup> Walter Scheidel, “The Roman Slave Supply,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 306.

<sup>219</sup> Stefano Fenoaltea, “Slavery and Supervision in Comparative Perspective: A Model,” *JEH* 44, no. 3 (1984): 640.

<sup>220</sup> Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 109–10.

*familias* of the villa-estate from Cato, who provides us with the strict conservative, to Varro, showcasing the liberal master of social relations, to Columella, introducing the active and involved *pater familias*. These constructions are very likely based on the very personalities of the authors who construct them, but they nevertheless aim to appeal to the audience of the time and their needs and preferences. During the time of Columella, there has also been time to reflect on the causes and possible preventive measures of the three great Roman servile wars or slave-revolts, which plagued the later Roman Republic. Like Varro, Columella also promotes a friendliness and frankness in the relationship between the *pater familias* and the slaves (*Rust.* 1.8.12), but Columella goes much further in emphasizing that the *pater familias* should truly be concerned about the living conditions and justice of slaves in his care. By making the *pater familias* someone who is present at the estate and involved in its dynamics, the *pater familias* is restored to a favourable position in the eyes of peers and subordinates. What are the characteristics of the Columellan *pater familias*?

He remains a master of psychological manipulation. The favour of slaves is still a very important aspect in successful mastery.<sup>221</sup> But the technologies to do this are different and a bit more complex. The regulation and manipulation of bodily needs remain a central strategy here, but an element of *care* is added with a culture of involvement and surveillance.<sup>222</sup> The gaze of the *pater familias* should be one that guarantees justice, a concept repeated several times in the pericope quoted above. Justice does not imply leniency, it implies an attitude set against double standards. Columella gives much detail on this aspect when speaking about punishment. Although authors like Cato and Varro presented the ideal *vilicus*, for instance, as the mirror image of the landowner, and someone who is fair, civilized and educated, it seems that during the time of Columella in the high Empire, a different stereotype of the *vilicus* was more popular, one denoting ideas of favouritism, greed, cruelty and injustice, one that Columella distinctly mentions (*Rust.* 1.8.17). The management of punishment receives a central place in the treatise, and is a common *topos* in Columella's discussions on slave-management. The question is not so much the type of punishment anymore, as with Cato and Varro, but the fair and correct administration thereof. It calls the master to be informed about the conditions of slaves in the

---

<sup>221</sup> Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 28.

<sup>222</sup> Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World*, 123–24.

workhouse, and to ensure consistency in the implementation of punishment. Columella seems to anticipate the response of some of his readers that this type of involvement bears a high price on the landowner. He often switches to the first person and recounts his own behaviour as a *pater familias*. He professes to ‘walk the talk’ as it were.<sup>223</sup>

Most importantly, the Columellan *paterfamilias* is someone who is aware of the living conditions of the slaves. Columella goes so far as to advise the landowner to even taste the food of the slaves, and closely inspect the quality of their clothing.<sup>224</sup> In a different instance he states that slaves should have an array of clothing that would enable them to labour in any type of weather (*Rust.* 1.8.9). He must even be open to receive complaints against superiors, and to punish them accordingly - an effective measure for preventing revolts. Neither does he forget to praise fertile slave-mothers, who by means of childbearing are either absolved from their duties or even set free. This same reasoning was seen with Xenophon.<sup>225</sup> Columella finally admits that if the *pater familias* assumes this role, the estate (*patrimonium*) will increase.

Columella also provides his own version of what the *vilicus* should represent. (*Rust.* 8.1-15). He gives some very interesting guidelines (*Rust.* 1.8.1-16; 11.1.1-32).<sup>226</sup> In Columella’s first book he describes the duties of the *vilicus*, and then repeats it again later in his eleventh book, when he discusses the duties of the *vilicus* in relation to the husbandman (*rusticus*). Regarding the age and appearance, as well as physiognomy, of the *vilicus*, he is in accordance with Cato and Varro in that the man should be middle-aged and physically strong and fit for hard farm labour, with no physical disabilities; someone who is willing to teach those slaves under his care (*Rust.* 1.8.1-2; 11.1.3-5). It is curious that Columella, unlike Cato and Varro, does not consider literacy a prerequisite for the *vilicus*. The only prerequisite is practical experience and the ability to lead and show underlings how the work should be done (*Rust.* 1.8.3-4):

---

<sup>223</sup> Columella did receive some critique on his proposition that the estate should be closely monitored by the *vilicus* since it was not practical for the *pater familias* to always be on the estate. While Columella also wants the *pater familias* present, he needs to address the reality of the situation accordingly, and give practical advice despite the absence of the *pater familias*. Pliny is especially known to have criticized Columella in this instance (*Hist. Nat.* 18.38); cf. Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 20.

<sup>224</sup> Bober, *Art, Culture, and Cuisine*, 14–16.

<sup>225</sup> Scheidel, “The Roman Slave Supply,” 306.

<sup>226</sup> Carlsen, *Vilici and Roman Estate Managers*, 58, 103–4.

For it is not in keeping with this business of ours for one man to give orders and another to give instructions, nor can a man properly exact work when he is being tutored by an underling as to what is to be done and in what way. Even an illiterate person, if only he has a retentive mind, can manage affairs well enough.<sup>227</sup>

Columella understands the works of authority and like the other Roman authors he acknowledges that authority is only effective when it is based on knowledge - but this need not be literacy, but rather experience. Literacy, according to a friend of Columella, can even be a stumbling block (*Rust.* 1.8.4):

Cornelius Celsus says that an overseer of this sort [illiterate] brings money to his master oftener than he does his book, because, not knowing his letters, he is either less able to falsify accounts or is afraid to do so through a second party because that would make another aware of the deception.<sup>228</sup>

With Columella we do not see the idealistic descriptions of the *vilicus* present with Cato. Columella assumes the worst from the *vilicus*, and therefore we have this type of advice. The danger of literacy is that it opens the channels for corruption. This feature is unique to Columella, and shows some development of the genre since the late Republican days. Columella is also very aware of the fact that age and experience play an important part in the hierarchical dynamics so crucial to the labour system present on the large agricultural estates. He admits that it is very difficult to balance the necessary skills of a *vilicus*. He must be adept at farming, but also at commanding and the use of authority.

---

<sup>227</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 84-85: *Nam non est nostri negotii alterum imperare et alterum docere; neque enim recte opus exigere valet, qui quid aut qualiter faciendum sit ab subiecto discit. Potest etiam inlitteratus, dum modo tenacissimae memoriae, rem satis commode administrare.*

<sup>228</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 84-87: *Eius modi vilicum Cornelius Celsus ait, saepius nummos domino quam librum adferre, quia nescius litterarum vel ipse minus possit rationes confingere vel per alium propter conscientiam fraudis timeat.*

Another unexpected guideline Columella gives is that the *vilicus* should not be physically attractive, and especially not from the class of urban slaves. Columella then provides a scolding critique of urban slaves. Such slaves have been made soft and lazy due to the pleasures of the city such as the Circus, the Campus, theatres and gambling dens. Employing such a person, according to Columella, could cause a serious loss to the estate, not to mention the waste of buying a slave. This polarization between the city and the countryside shows that Columella understands agricultural slaves to be more disciplined and hard working than urban slaves. In fact, the best slaves for the agricultural estate are those who were born and raised by the hard labour of farm work (*Rust.* 1.8.2).

Columella leaves nothing open to the imagination of the reader. He even provides advice on the types of relationships the *vilicus* may have and those that are forbidden (*Rust.* 1.8. 5). He should have a female companion, and refrain from any relationships with workers in the household. He should also be wary of outsiders and not show any special favours to other slaves. His mobility is also limited in that he is not allowed to stray away from the farm, or even create new pathways on the land (*Rust.* 1.8.7). This same view was present with Cato, who is quoted here, in saying that the *vilicus* should not be a ‘gadabout’ or wanderer (*ambulator*). This is related to the special carceral conditions of the *vilicus*, which will be discussed in chapter 5 on carcerality. The *vilicus* also needs to restrict and control the mobility of the slaves in his care (*Rust.* 1.8.12-13). His own personal business dealings are also restricted in this regard.

In terms of religious observances and superstitions, we find Columella once again in agreement with Cato in that the *vilicus* should not perform any rituals without the approval of the master, and not consult any practitioners of divination (*Rust.* 1.8.6).

As with the *pater familias*, the *vilicus* is also expected to maintain strict technologies of surveillance, and also administer care to those slaves under his supervision (*Rust.* 1.8.9-11; 11.1.18). In terms of clothing, he needs to ensure and inspect that all attire is fitting for work in diverse weather conditions, and clothing should be practical and not cosmetic and decorative. In terms of punishment and regulation of subordinate slave bodies, Columella remains conventional. The *vilicus* should not be neither too lax nor too cruel, but fair, as with the case of the *pater familias*. There is thus still a trend of ethical mirroring present with Columella despite his suspicious attitude regarding *vilici*. The surveillance-mentality promoted by Columella is supported again by the issue of being present and keeping watch. Idle slaves are prone to cause

trouble, and therefore the *vilicus* should always ensure that slaves are kept busy with work. In his eleventh book, Columella makes it very clear that the best *vilicus* is the one trained by the *pater familias* himself (*Rust.* 11.1.4-6). He bases this argument on both Cato and, interestingly enough, Xenophon's advice. Columella does concede that both Cato and Xenophon's advice are idealistic, mainly because during those earlier years, most people knew how to farm. He is therefore hinting at a problem faced in Roman agriculture during the Imperial age that many a *pater familias* did not even know how to farm, and is therefore incapable of teaching the *vilicus*. The problem now is that the *vilicus* may know more about farming than the *pater familias*. This could be one of the reasons Columella's advice is so encyclopedic in nature - it could almost be considered an 'idiot's guide' to farming in the Imperial age, suited for those landowners not accustomed to the *vita rustica*. Columella accepts that this is a wider social crisis. Since many people are no longer taught by their fathers how to farm, Columella believes that there should be teachers in the 'rustic arts', perhaps something to which he aspires. This is one of his greatest frustrations when discussing the role of the *vilicus*. He states (*Rust.* 11.1.9-10):

Therefore I wish to say what I said before, namely, that the future bailiff must be taught his job just like the future potter or mechanic. I could not readily state whether these trades are more quickly learnt because they have a narrower scope; but certainly the subject-matter of agriculture is extensive and widespread and, if we wished to reckon up its various parts, we should have difficulty in enumerating them. I cannot, therefore, sufficiently express my surprise as I justly complained at the beginning of my treatise, at the fact that, while instructors can be found in the other arts which are less necessary for life, for agriculture neither pupils nor teachers have been discovered.<sup>229</sup>

---

<sup>229</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 54-55: *Libenter igitur eadem loquor tam docendus est futurus vilicus, quam futurus figulus aut faber. Et haud facile dixerim, num illa tanto expeditiora sint discentibus artificia, quanto minus ampla sunt. Rusticationis autem magna et diffusa materia est, partesque si velimus eius percensere, vix numero comprehendamus. Quare satis admirari nequeo, quod primo scriptorum meorum exordio iure conquestus sum,*



Columella exhibits uneasiness at the effects of the massive urbanization during the Imperial period. The rapid expansion of the Roman Empire, and the ensuing *pax Romana*, led to people leaving the country for better opportunities in the cities, even more so than in the late Republican period, when the villa-system was emerging. There was also much nationalization occurring in terms farming. And despite these events, Columella complains, there are no teachers in the arts of farming and agriculture. This is what makes it so difficult to find a good *vilicus*, because there are so few of them left.

He also gives guidelines regarding the diet and dining customs of the *vilicus*. Here Columella attempts to give authority to his argument by stating that it is based on old precepts, which are no longer in use during his time, which he is now reinstating. The *vilicus* must only dine with the rest of the household, and not on his own, nor may he consume food other than that prepared for the rest, since this will guarantee the good quality of the food. As with Xenophon, Columella's *vilicus* is someone who should abstain from wine. This is yet again a measure of limitation regarding the mobility and carcerality of the *vilicus* (*Rust.* 1.8.12). The sexuality of the *vilicus* is also regulated, as Columella states (*Rust.* 11.1.14):

Further, he should also have an aversion to sexual indulgence; for, if he gives himself up to it, he will not be able to think of anything else than the object of his affection; for his mind being effused by vices of this kind thinks that there is no reward more agreeable than the gratification of his lust and no punishment more heavy than the frustration of his desire.<sup>230</sup>

---

*ceterarum artium minus vitae necessariorum repertos antistites, agriculturae neque discipulos neque praeceptores inventos.*

<sup>230</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 56-57: *Tum etiam sit a venereis amoribus aversus: quibus si se dederit, non aliud quidquam possit cogitare quam illud quod diligit. Nam vitiis eiusmodi pellectus animus nec praemium iucundius quam fructum libidinis nec supplicium gravius quam frustrationem cupiditatis existimat.*

This point was mentioned in most of the ancient authors discussed. The regulation of sexuality becomes a powerful strategy in controlling human behaviour.<sup>231</sup> For the menial slaves, it was used as a reward, but here, with the *vilicus*, the issue is different. Abstinence is Columella's advice, since it draws the attention of the *vilicus* away from work. It seems to be somewhat contradictory to the advice Columella gave earlier. Although he stated that the *vilicus* should avoid domestic relationships, he was still allowed to have a female companion. The advice is conflicting - the *vilicus* may have a female companion (*contubernalis mulier*), a term that does have some sexual connotations to it (*Rust.* 1.8.5). Perhaps the advice is to have the *vilicus* direct his sexual desire to this companion, rather than other domestics, implying that sexual abstinence is not general, but specific to others working in the household. This concept is repeated just before the pericope quoted above, and seems to be the sense Columella implies. Perhaps the female companion allowed by Columella is simply a necessary evil - he does seem to hint that the best *vilicus* is one who is not concerned about sex. This is again conflicting since the *vilicus*, according to Columella must be strong and masculine (at least not attractive). At least it could be said that Columella's *vilicus* is someone who can control his bodily desires, as he would control his subordinates, a notion especially popular during the Augustan period.

Another effective means of social control of slave-bodies is the use of fear. This was a very common motif in discussions of mastery. This fear is especially articulated by Columella when he states that estate-owners should make it clear that they intend to visit their estates frequently (*Rust.* 1.2.1). The presence and possible surprise visit of the *pater familias* serve as a deterrent against any ill doings.

Along with the dietary and sexual regulations of the *vilicus*, Columella also provides guidelines on when the *vilicus* should wake up. Each second should be spent productively, and the *vilicus* must not be lazy or loiter, since other slaves are liable to follow this example. He should be the first in line for work and the last one to close off the working day.<sup>232</sup> Columella

---

<sup>231</sup> Sexuality was a very important discourse in farming treatises, especially since fertility was so directly linked to farming. Columella had some interesting views on this, for instance, he states that one of the best ways to rid the garden of pests like caterpillars and such is to let a menstruating virgin walk around in the garden (*Rust.* 10.357-368, 11.3.64); cf. Amy Richlin, "Pliny's Brassiere," in *Roman Sexualities* (Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner (eds); Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 202-3.

<sup>232</sup> Richard Saller, "Women, Slaves, and the Economy of the Roman Household," in *Early Christian Families in Context* (David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (eds); Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 199-200.

uses the metaphor of a shepherd - the *vilicus* should be like a shepherd to the flock of slaves under him, and never leave anyone behind.

Columella's construction of the *vilicus* is based on suspicion. He seems to want to popularize his arguments by referring to his advice as being 'authentically' agricultural, and not urban. He also intimates on several occasions that his model is one that reaches back to older traditions, especially those of Cato, even though he is often on the opposite side of Cato's advice. The carcerality and mobility of the *vilicus* is strictly controlled, and the type of lifestyle he is supposed to lead is described in the minutest of details; hence his advice that the estate should be easy to visit by the *pater familias* (*Rust.* 1.2.20-2.2). Columella's language also exhibits the contempt the Roman Imperial aristocrats had for the servile classes. This is exhibited in his suspicion of the *vilicus*, as well as his belief that farming in the Roman Empire was in a bad state due to it being entrusted to slaves.<sup>233</sup> In the light of this, Columella also states (*Rust.* 1.7.6):

On far distant estates, however, which is not easy for the owner to visit, it is better for every kind of land to be under free farmers than under slave overseers, but this is particularly true of grain land. To such land a tenant farmer can do no great harm, as he can to plantations of vines and trees, while slaves do it tremendous damage...<sup>234</sup>

Columella's preference for tenant farmers (*coloni*) to work on estates where it is likely that the *pater familias* will not frequent further demonstrates his contempt for slaves. He commonly subscribes to the Roman stereotype of slaves being lazy, greedy and prone to trickery; hence the strict surveillance and regulation of slave-bodies on the estate.

An important feature in Columella's work is the problematisation of the teaching of *oikonomia* (in his case, it includes basic farming techniques). Columella writes his extensive work as an attempt to transform the art of agricultural *oikonomia* into something that can be

---

<sup>233</sup> Champion, "Columella."

<sup>234</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 82-83: *In longinquis tamen fundis, in quos non est facilis excursus patris familiae, cum omne genus agri tolerabilius sit sub liberis colonis quam sub vilicis servis habere, tum praecipue frumentarium, quem et minime, sicut vineas aut arbustum, colonus evertere potest et maxime vexant servi...*

taught. The problem he recognizes is that, due to the absenteeism of the *pater familias*, farming and estate management has become the work of slaves. This he believes is why it is in such a bad state. His typical aristocratic tone shows much contempt for the servile classes, especially slaves. His view of slaves, especially slaves in important managerial positions like the *vilicus*, is one of suspicion. He conforms to the view that slaves should be controlled via the regulation of their bodily passions, and he gives detailed expositions of how this should be done, again with special emphasis on the identity and behaviour of the *vilicus*. The most effective strategy, according to Columella, is to have the *pater familias* present on the estate, and to exhibit a strict culture of surveillance. Something that is also very evident in Columella's work is his special distaste of urban slaves. The dichotomy between urban slaves (*familia urbana*) and rural slaves (*familia rustica*) is common in Roman literature on slaveholding.<sup>235</sup> Columella advises the *pater familias* to avoid placing urban slaves on agricultural estates. Most estate-owners in the Imperial period would also have had properties in the city, where they would have had their own selection of urban slaves. He seems to intimate that urban slaves have more needs and are stereotypically more prone to laziness and participation in the vices of the city. Behind all this lies a greater dichotomy between urban life and life in the country. Not only does he scold urban slaves but, in a more respectful way, admonishes the new generation *pater familias* to become very knowledgeable in the science of agriculture, so that it is the owner who can teach the slaves how to farm and not *vice versa*. Columella adopts and adapts many principles from Xenophon and Cato, but also gives many of his own, unique advice. The complexity of slave-management between the city and the rural estate is very clear here. Although the phenomena of rural *oikonomia* and urban *oikonomia* differed, the lines are often blurred in that these constructions of *oikonomia* influenced each other. Columella is quite important for the understanding of slavery in the later Roman Empire, as we will see when discussing the work of Palladius.

As we have said, something that has emerged in this reading of Columella is to what extent *oikonomia* was taught in antiquity. It seems to be assumed that it was taught to people via their kin and the example of their parents, but how this was done is ambiguous. Although there probably existed some type of 'conventional wisdom' gained mostly by observation and the experience of everyday life, Columella is adamant in stating that there are no experts in the art of *oikonomia*. His concern is directly addressed to agricultural *oikonomia*, but this is not less true

---

<sup>235</sup> Joshel, *Slavery in the Roman World*, 163, 185.

for urban areas. What is apparent is that one aspect of *oikonomia*, that is master and masculinity, was taught indirectly via the other arts. Gleason has convincingly illustrated how masculinity was shaped via the art of rhetoric.<sup>236</sup> This is what makes the study of *oikonomia* and slave-management so complex. Although several ancient theorists call it an art, it is learned via other arts and, as it were, the school of life experience. It is likely that technologies of mastery were taught as early as infancy, as we saw with Cato. Furthermore, discourses of masculinity were very apparent in all these ancient writings. The indirect pedagogy of *oikonomia* was therefore, in particular, a topic for the philosophers. This was already seen especially with the Hellenistic authors, especially pseudo-Aristotle and Philodemus; it will also be very evident in the examination of Stoicism. We will now discuss the final author from the Roman Empire who wrote a treatise on agricultural management, namely Palladius.

### 3.7 Palladius' *Opus agriculturae*

Palladius (Rutilius Taurus Aemilianus) is one of the very few sources from the later Roman Empire who wrote on household management in an agricultural context. The problem we find here with Palladius, especially for the present study, is that he dates rather late; probably mid- to late fifth century.<sup>237</sup> His relevance is therefore limited for understanding slave-management and *oikonomia* in the time of Chrysostom. What is important is that Palladius gives us a glimpse into estate-management during a period much later than, for instance, that of Columella. Another problem with Palladius' treatise is that it gives surprisingly little information about slave-management itself. Palladius states that the lack of information about labour is due to the diversity in the types of landholdings (*Op. agr.* 1.6.3).<sup>238</sup> Harper's cautious approach to Palladius is quite justified, not only taking into account the limits mentioned above, but, more importantly, that Palladius' 'primary objective was to describe an efficient use of time, not of land or labour.'<sup>239</sup> Hence we find the entire structure of the *Opus* being organized on the basis of the calendar. Palladius also approaches estate-management with the opinion that it should be as

---

<sup>236</sup> Maude Gleason, *Making Men: Sophists and Self-Presentation in Ancient Rome* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

<sup>237</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 189–90.

<sup>238</sup> Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages*, 268–69.

<sup>239</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 190.

productive as possible, and that it requires strict and direct control. As with Columella, Palladius provides a very detailed account of agricultural practices, from the breeding of pigs, to the keeping of bees, to the growing of roses; thus, a glimpse into rural life during the later Empire.<sup>240</sup> The treatise exhibits a very strict philosophy of control and supervision and again, as with Columella, functions best if the owner of the estate is actively involved. Unfortunately there is not much said about this issue, or about the management of slaves. This does not necessarily point to a decline of slave labour in favour of tenancy on agricultural estates - Palladius also refers very little to tenants on the estate.<sup>241</sup> The aim of his writing is a detailed explanation of agricultural issues related to botany, horticulture and animal husbandry. What is very evident in Palladius' treatise, despite whether he is writing to slaves or *coloni*, he still promulgates a strong culture of surveillance over labourers,<sup>242</sup> and even 'uses the term *praetorium* rather than *villa* with its implicit military (structural) connotations.'<sup>243</sup>

What does Palladius say about slave-management? We see especially an attitude of ensuring maximum productivity with the personnel on the estate. He states that both women and children are able to work on the farm, especially referring to chicken breeding. Both women and

---

<sup>240</sup> Cf. Edmond Frézouls, "La vie rurale au Bas-Empire d'après l'oeuvre de *Palladius*," *Ktema* 5 (1980): 193–210; David J. Mattingly, "Regional Variation in Roman Oleoculture: Some Problems of Comparability," in *Landuse in the Roman Empire* (Jesper Carlsen, Peter Ørsted, and Jens E. Skydsgaard (eds); Rome: Bretschneider, 1994), 93–97.

<sup>241</sup> Bodel believes that Palladius writes mostly about *coloni*, while Harper is more cautious about accepting such an approach; cf. Bodel, "Slave Labour and Roman Society," 320; Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 189. Contrary to this, Giardina, Vera, as well as Wickham, believe that if the slave mode of production was still important in Palladius' day, he would have most certainly discussed it; cf. Andrea Giardina, "Le Due Italie nella Forma Tarda dell'impero," in *Società Romana e Impero Tardoantico 1: Istituzioni, Ceti, Economie* (Andrea Giardina (ed.); Rome: Laterza, 1986), 30–36; Domenico Vera, "Dalla 'Villa Perfecta' Alla Villa Di Palladio," *Athenaeum* 83 (1995): 342–50; Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages*, 269.

<sup>242</sup> Wickham, *Framing the Early Middle Ages*, 269.

<sup>243</sup> Neil Christie, *Landscapes of Change: Rural Evolutions in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 18; cf. also: Gisela Ripoll and Javier Arce, "The Transformation and End of the Roman Villae in the West (Fourth-Seventh Centuries): Problems and Perspectives," in *Towns and Their Territories Between Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages* (Gian P. Brogiolo, Nancy Gauthier, and Neil Christie (eds); Leiden: Brill, 2000), 64–65.

child slaves were often started out by looking after animals like chickens (*Op. agr.* 1.27.1).<sup>244</sup> He does let something slip about the interaction between slaves and masters, but not in the form of agricultural advice, but when referring to himself and the completion of his work. In book 14 of the *Opus*, addressed to a certain Pasiphilus, at its very beginning, he apologetically explains why it has taken him some time to complete this book. He compares himself to a slave, and states that he prefers a slave to work diligently yet with quality, rather than pressing them for quick work, which is of inferior quality. Thus he states his own work, like that of a slave, may have taken longer than expected, but it is of a high standard. This, however, is simply a comment mentioned in passing, and its relevance is also limited due to its personal and general nature. He does seem to hint that slaves should be treated with respect. Another late ancient author, yet much earlier than Palladius, Porphyry gives the following advice to his wife Marcella, advice almost identical to that of Varro and Columella (*Ep. Mar.* 35):

Strive neither to wrong your slaves nor to correct them when you are angry. And before correcting them, prove to them that you do this for their good, and give them an opportunity for excuse. When purchasing slaves, avoid the stubborn ones. Accustom yourself to do many things yourself, for our own labour is simple and easy. And men should use each limb for the purpose for which nature intended it to be used. Nature needs no more. They who do not use their own bodies, but make excessive use of others, commit a twofold wrong, and are ungrateful to nature that has given them these parts. Never use your bodily parts merely for the sake of pleasure, for it is far better to die than to obscure your soul by intemperance...correct the vice of your nature....If you give

---

<sup>244</sup>Cf. Gwyn Campbell, Suzanne Miers, and Joseph Miller, “Women in Western Systems of Slavery: Introduction,” *S&A* 26 (2005): 161–79; Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 190; Christian Laes, “Child Slaves at Work in Roman Antiquity,” *ASoc* 38 (2008): 235–83; Christian Laes, *Children in the Roman Empire: Outsiders Within* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 155–66.

something to your slaves, distinguish the better ones by a share of honour...<sup>245</sup>

The preference of moderate treatment of slaves in late ancient sources seems to mimic those earlier ones, exhibiting some continuity in the sources from Columella to Palladius. Porphyry also seems to believe that if one wants a job done right, one should do it oneself (this thinking is also very common with Chrysostom). Not that harsh punishment was less prevalent. Ammianus Marcellinus, for instance, states that a slave who was lazy and slow to perform his duties was given three hundred lashes (*Res. gest.* 28.4.16). In an almost Christian fashion, Ammianus also criticized the Roman elite of late antiquity who ‘each take fifty slave attendants into the bath - and still yell menacingly, “where, where is my help”’ (*Res. gest.* 28.4.8-9).<sup>246</sup>

Regarding the appointment of the *vilicus*, there is also very little said by Palladius, only: ‘Do not appoint the head of the farm from among the beloved slaves, since trusting in previous affection, he will think he is unpunishable for his present faults’ (*Op. agr.* 1.6.18).<sup>247</sup>

As mentioned above, the lack of reference to slave-management in this treatise should be approached with caution. It seems to simply indicate that the author did not regard this as very important in his *Opus*, and that he was more concerned with the details of agricultural labours themselves, rather than those performing the labour. It does tell us that estates in the fifth century

---

<sup>245</sup> Translation: Alice Zimmern, *Porphyry's Letter to His Wife, Marcella: Concerning the Life of Philosophy and Ascent to the Gods* (Grand Rapids: Phanes, 1994), 59; Greek text: Pötscher: 38: οικήτας πειρῶ μὴ ἀδικεῖν μηδὲ ὀργιζομένη κολάσης. κολάζειν δὲ μέλλουσα πείθε προτέρων, ὅτι ἐπὶ συμφέροντι κολάζεις, διδοῦσα αὐτοῖς καιρὸν ἀπολογίας. παραιτοῦ εἰς τὴν κτήσιν τοὺς αὐθάδεις. τὰ πολλὰ ἄσκει αὐτουργεῖν. λιτὸν γὰρ καὶ εὐπορον τὸ τῆς αὐτουργίας, καὶ δεῖ ἐκάστῳ τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ὃ ἡ φύσις κατεσκεύασε χρῆσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τῆς φύσεως ἄλλου μὴ δεομένης· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ χρωμένοις τοῖς ἰδίοις, καταχρωμένοις δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις διπλοῦν τὸ φορτίον καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐδωκυῖαν τὰ μέρη φύσιν ἀχάριστον. ψιλῆς δὲ ἔνεκα ἡδονῆς μηδέποτε χρῆσι τοῖς μέρεσι· πολλῶ γὰρ κρεῖττον τεθνάναι ἢ δι' ἀκρασίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμαυρῶσαι ...κακίαν ἐνδιωρθουμένη τῆς φύσεως...οἷα δὲ οἰκέταις κοινωνοῦσα τιμῆς μεταδίδου τοῖς βελτίοισιν. οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως γὰρ οὖν ἀνθρωπον ἀδικοῦντα σέβειν θεόν.

<sup>246</sup> Translation & Latin text: Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 106: *comitantibus singulos quinquaginta ministries tholos introierint balnearum, 'ubi ubi sunt nostrae?' minaciter clamant.*

<sup>247</sup> Translation: Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 190; Latin text: Martin: 13: *Agri praesulem non ex dilectis tenere servulis ponas, quia fiducia praeteriti amoris ad inopinitatem culpae praesentis spectat.*



still placed an important emphasis on productivity and profit, and the direct involvement and supervision of the estate-owner. Perhaps Palladius builds on the work of Columella but amends it with an emphasis on temporal issues. The treatise is designed to be read during certain periods of the year, and resembles a typical ‘how-to’ manual in terms of horticulture and husbandry. The silence of issues regarding slave-management therefore does not imply their absence on the estate, but simply, in my opinion, shows that the author had other concerns in mind.

To proceed, the one philosophical school with much influence on ancient Christianity, including Chrysostom, was the Stoics. We will now examine some Stoic formulations (in the context of some other Greek philosophical schools) of *oikonomia* with specific reference to its implications on views regarding slave-management.

### **3.8 Stoic Formulations of Divine *Oikonomia* and the Implications for Slave-Management: The Case of Seneca’s *Epistula* 47**

Late ancient Christian authors were very much influenced not only by the mainstream Roman habitus of slaveholding, but also by Greek philosophical formulations of divine *oikonomia*. The following section will elaborate on Greek philosophical formulations of divine *oikonomia*, which is mostly represented in Stoic thought, although displaying influence from several precursors of Stoicism.<sup>248</sup> Stoicism will also feature prominently in chapter 4 of the present study when the heteronomy of the body is discussed, but the following remarks will serve as a basis for Stoic thought on slavery and slave-management.

We have already seen that several of the writers discussed above understood *oikonomia* in a very wide sense. An author like Xenophon or Plato would bring household management in relation to politics and the military, while Aristotle pointed to an *oikonomia* present in nature. Others, like Philodemus, rejected this holistic view of *oikonomia*. The Stoics would apply the concept of *oikonomia* to an even larger entity - namely the universe and theology.

---

<sup>248</sup>For a fuller discussion on Stoic *oikonomia* and their cosmology and theology, cf. John Reumann, “The Use of *Oikonomia* and Related Terms in Greek Sources to About A.D. 100 as a Background for Patristic Applications,” Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1957), 391–486; Gerhard Richter, *Oikonomia: Der Gebrauch des Wortes Oikonomia im Neuen Testament, bei den Kirchenvätern und in der theologischen Literatur bis ins 20. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005), 1–25.

Stoic physics, as is evident from the earliest authors, centred on two interrelated concepts, namely nature (φύσις) and reason (λόγος). The nature of the kosmos or universe is rational; i.e. guided by the divine *logos*, which orders everything. Nature in itself is therefore rational and logical. These two conceptualisations would serve as very effective strategies in Stoic reasoning, especially regarding *oikonomia*.<sup>249</sup>

Since the concept of nature plays such an important role in Stoic thinking regarding divine administration, it stands to reason that their notion of *oikonomia* is based on natural principles. We have already seen that Aristotelian philosophy was very dependent on arguments of naturalization when it comes to slave-management and *oikonomia*. In several of Aristotle's writings, he not only refers to natural slavery, but also speaks of nature as an administrator or housekeeper (*Gen. an.* 744b). There was much agreement among philosophers of the Hellenistic period that there was some type of order or arrangement (διοίκησις) in nature.<sup>250</sup> A popular exception to this was the Epicureans, who exhibited more of a chaotic atomism when discussing nature; they believed that nature was not ordered or prearranged. They also did not believe that any deity could rule over a human being. This may also account for Philodemus' aversion for holistic *oikonomia*.

Naturalization immediately gives authority and structure to a concept. If one bases a concept on nature, it implies that there already exists a predetermined order, which is sufficient, even good, for copying. Aristotle would base his theory of natural slavery on this principle. The Stoics, however, used arguments from nature and the problem of slavery in a very different way.<sup>251</sup> In fact, nowhere does any Stoic author agree with the notion of natural slavery, although we also have no evidence of any Stoic directly opposing Aristotle's views on natural slavery.<sup>252</sup> The best word to describe Stoic views on slavery is indifference, and it will especially be shown in the chapter on the heteronomous body that the Stoics were very much responsible for the

---

<sup>249</sup> Reumann, "Use of *Oikonomia*," 391–402.

<sup>250</sup> Troels Engberg-Pedersen, *The Stoic Theory of Oikeosis: Moral Development and Social Interaction in Early Stoic Philosophy* (Studies in Hellenistic Civilization; Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1990).

<sup>251</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 128–29.

<sup>252</sup> Peter Garnsey, "The Middle Stoics and Slavery," in *Hellenistic Constructs: Essays in Culture, History, and Historiography* (Paul Cartledge, Peter Garnsey, and Erich S. Gruen (eds); Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 161–62.

metaphorization of slavery, at the cost of giving attention to the social problem of institutional slavery. They rather promoted a view of moral slavery, and did not say much about institutional slavery. Since slavery is not a natural phenomenon, but rather a legal phenomenon, it makes no difference to one's ability to live a good and virtuous life - it is merely a title.<sup>253</sup> But the Stoics did own slaves, and there is no sign of them advancing an abolitionist view. How did the Stoics then treat and manage slaves within the naturalistic view of *oikonomia*?

Although we have no treatise from the Greek Stoic authors on slavery *per se* (not that the Greek Stoic authors did not speak about slavery sporadically in their treatises), the Roman Stoics did seem to have much to say on the topic. One of the most important sources for Stoic thinking on slave-management is Seneca's *Epistula* 47,<sup>254</sup> and I will use this source as a framework for discussing Stoic natural *oikonomia* and slave-management.<sup>255</sup> In this letter, Seneca generally calls for the humane treatment of slaves.<sup>256</sup> But the recognition of the humanity of slaves and their humane treatment is also highly problematic. This will be discussed in chapter 4 on the heteronomy of the body.

The reason for the humane treatment of slaves is based on his Stoic understanding on the naturalization of divine *oikonomia* (*Ep.* 47.10-12):

Kindly remember that he whom you call your slave sprang from the same stock, is smiled upon by the same skies, and on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies. It is just as possible for you to see in him a free-born man as for him to see in you a slave...I do not wish to involve myself in too large a question, and to discuss the treatment of slaves, towards whom we Romans are excessively haughty, cruel, and insulting. But this is the kernel of

---

<sup>253</sup> John T. Fitzgerald, "The Stoics and the Early Christians on the Treatment of Slaves," in *Stoicism in Early Christianity* (Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg (eds); Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 154–62.

<sup>254</sup> William O. Stephens, "Seneca, Lucius Annaeus," in *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery: Volume 2: L-Z* (Junius P. Rodriguez (ed.); Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1997), 573–74.

<sup>255</sup> Seneca's discussion on slavery in *De beneficiis* 3.18-28 will also be taken into account.

<sup>256</sup> Cf. Fitzgerald, "Treatment of Slaves," 153; Miriam T. Griffin, *Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 256–85.

my advice: Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your betters. And as often as you reflect how much power you have over a slave, remember that your master has just as much power over you. ‘But I have no master,’ you say. You are still young; perhaps you will have one.<sup>257</sup>

Seneca’s advice on slave-management is that masters should treat their slaves humanely since they are mutually part of nature, that is, part of the same divine source.<sup>258</sup> Seneca specifically states that slaves come from the same stock or seed (*semen*) as the master. The Greek sense here is that of the λόγος σπερματικός, the universal principle from which all things come forth, and to which all things return; there are also universal principles present in all human beings. This imagery can be traced back to the very founder of Stoicism, Zeno of Citium. The notion of ‘seed’ is in fact not the only metaphor found in Stoic theology and ethics. Even before the use of the seed metaphor, it was said that all human beings spring from the same fountain.<sup>259</sup> Other metaphors used are those of the vine and of olive trees - all taken as examples from nature. Seneca’s use of the seed here is typical, however, of a later, more developed notion of the spermafuction of the universal reason of λόγος.<sup>260</sup> Most importantly, the same seed is

---

<sup>257</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 306-8: *Vis tu cogitare istum quem servum tuum vocas ex isdem seminibus ortum eodem frui caelo, aequae spirare, aequae vivere, aequae mori! tam tu illum videre ingenuum potes quam ille te servum... Nolo in ingentem me locum immittere et de usu servorum disputare, in quos superbissimi, crudelissimi, contumeliosissimi sumus. Haec tamen praecepti mei summa est: sic cum inferiore vivas quemadmodum tecum superiorem velis vivere. Quotiens in mentem venerit quantum tibi in servum tuum liceat, veniat in mentem tantundem in te domino tuo licere. ‘At ego’ inquis ‘nullum habeo dominum.’ Bona aetas est: forsitan habebis.*

<sup>258</sup> Paul Veyne, *Seneca: The Life of a Stoic* (David Sullivan (trans.); New York: Routledge, 2003), 139–43; cf. also: Will Richter, “Seneca und die Sklaven,” *Gymnasium* 65 (1958): 196–218; Guillaume Rocca-Serra, “Le stoïcisme pré-imperial et l’esclavage,” *CRDAC* 8 (1976–77): 205–22; Niall McKeown, “The Sound of John Henderson Laughing: Pliny 3.14 and Roman Slaveowners’ Fear of Their Slaves,” in *Fear of Slaves - Fear of Enslavement in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Actes du XXIXe colloque international du groupe international de recherches sur l’esclavage dans l’antiquité; Anastasia Serghidou (ed.); Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007), 268.

<sup>259</sup> Piet A. Meijer, *Stoic Theology: Proofs for the Existence of the Cosmic God and of the Traditional Gods (Including a Commentary on Cleanthes’ Hymn on Zeus)* (Delft: Eburon, 2008), 3–7.

<sup>260</sup> *Ibid.*, 7–8.

present in both slave and master. This type of thinking would become very influential in the household codes of the New Testament, which are the primary sources for Chrysostom's advice on *oikonomia*. Seneca's second admonition is based on the Stoic notion of the cyclical character of nature. Since divine *oikonomia* functions logically, there is also a cyclical character to it. Seneca's reference to life cycles in the beginning of his statement makes this apparent - both masters and slaves are born, live and die. But nature also exhibits another feature that in one breath, the master could become the slave. The same reasoning is present with Epictetus, who calls all human beings kin (*Diss.* 1.13.3-4)<sup>261</sup> and Cicero, referring to all human beings and the offspring of the gods (*Leg.* 1.24).<sup>262</sup> The language and metaphors of kinship are also part of the nature of the divine *oikonomia*, which binds people with ties greater than that of social status or even biology.

Seneca's statement regarding the power of the master over the slave also bears significance. He is not here simply referring to the power of the master over a slave, which is conferred upon him by society. In Stoic thinking, the notion of power has a central role, and is again related to the divine *oikonomia*. It was believed that the universal *logos* had a *hegemonikon* (ἡγεμονικόν), 'a soul center from which the powers go into the body'.<sup>263</sup> They also understood the divine *logos* to have a great, individual *hegemonikon*, which governs power in the cosmos. In Seneca's reasoning, the proud and cruel master of a slave, hungry with power, forgets that while he may have the power that governs a slave, there is also the *hegemonikon* of the *logos* that governs him. The early Christians, including Chrysostom, would provide nearly identical substitutes for these in their Christology.

We see here then that a very different understanding of what 'nature' is can directly influence daily relationships between slaves and slaveholders. Aristotle's understanding of what 'nature' was led him to different conclusions. It illustrates that there is no objective reality that can be called nature - nature is complex, and always used in rhetoric and argumentation as a strategy to regulate and understand authoritative relationships and hierarchies. The Stoic concept of divine *oikonomia* is highly hierarchical, but here it is a metaphysical hierarchy. This hegemony/heteronomy of bodies, as mentioned, will be discussed in a next chapter. The basic

---

<sup>261</sup> Jackson P. Hershbell, "Epictetus: A Freedman on Slavery," *ASoc* 26 (1995): 185–204.

<sup>262</sup> Fitzgerald, "Treatment of Slaves," 156.

<sup>263</sup> Meijer, *Stoic Theology*, 5.

premise, however, is that all bodies are made to be ruled, and hence masters ought to control their power over slaves.

Seneca then provides some advice, which was, as we have seen in the authors above, quite conventional. Masters should treat their slaves in a friendly manner so as to ensure their loyalty. But he goes even further, in a masterful diatribe, and professes that his advice would shock the average person (*Ep.* 47.13-14):

Associate with your slave on kindly, even on affable, terms; let him talk with you, plan with you, live with you. I know that at this point all the exquisites will cry out against me in a body; they will say: ‘There is nothing more debasing, more disgraceful, than this.’ But these are the very persons whom I sometimes surprise kissing the hands of other men's slaves. Do you not see even this, how our ancestors removed from masters everything invidious, and from slaves everything insulting? They called the master ‘father of the household,’ and the slaves ‘members of the household,’ a custom which still holds in the main. They established a holiday on which masters and slaves should eat together, - not as the only day for this custom, but as obligatory on that day in any case. They allowed the slaves to attain honours in the household and to pronounce judgment; they held that a household was a miniature commonwealth.<sup>264</sup>

---

<sup>264</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 308-9: *Vive cum servo clementer, comiter quoque, et in sermonem illum admitte et in consilium et in convictum. Hoc loco acclamabit mihi tota manus delicatorum 'nihil hac re humilium, nihil turpius'. Hos ego eosdem deprehendam alienorum servorum osculantes manum. Ne illud quidem videtis, quam omnem invidiam maiores nostri dominis, omnem contumeliam servis detraxerint? Dominum patrem familiae appellaverunt, servos - quod etiam in mimis adhuc durat - familiares; instituerunt diem festum, non quo solo cum servis domini vescerentur, sed quo utique; honores illis in domo gerere, ius dicere permiserunt et domum pusillam rem publicam esse iudicaverunt.*

In this instance, Seneca takes the conventional wisdom of being kind to slaves to a different level. Slaves were to be included in the household. The common term used for the household in which slaves would be included is the Latin term *familia*. Although the English derivative of this word today refers to the biological or nuclear family unit, it had a broader sense in the Roman world. Slaves would have many duties in the household, but there was always a social grammar of separation and subordination present. Seneca inverts this grammar to the utmost by opening the possibility for slaves to dine with masters. This he traces back to older traditions, specifically the Saturnalia. The late ancient author Macrobius, famous for his accounts on the Saturnalia, writes (*Sat.* 1.24.22–23):

Meanwhile the head of the slave household, whose responsibility it was to offer sacrifice to the Penates, to manage the provisions and to direct the activities of the domestic servants, came to tell his master that the household had feasted according to the annual ritual custom. For at this festival, in houses that keep to proper religious usage, they first of all honor the slaves with a dinner prepared as if for the master; and only afterwards is the table set again for the head of the household. So, then, the chief slave came in to announce the time of dinner and to summon the masters to the table.<sup>265</sup>

Another late ancient writer, Porphyry, also remarks (*Nym.* 23.7-13):

For the Romans celebrate their Saturnalia when the Sun is in Capricorn, and during this festivity, slaves wear the shoes of those

---

<sup>265</sup> Translation: Mary Beard and John A. North (eds), *Religions of Rome: A Sourcebook* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 124; Latin text: Teubner: 213-14: *Inter haec servilis moderator obsequii, cui cura vel adolendi Penates vel struendi penum et domesticorum actuum ministros regendi, ammonet dominum familiam pro sollemnitate annui moris epulatam. Hoc enim festo religiosae domus prius famulos instructis tamquam ad usum domini dapibus honorant: et ita demum patribus familias mensae apparatus novatur. Insinuat igitur praesul famulitii coenae tempus et dominos iam vocare.*

that are free, and all things are distributed among them in common; the legislator obscurely signifying by this ceremony that through this gate of the heavens, those who are now born slaves will be liberated through the Saturnian festival, and the house attributed to Saturn, i.e., Capricorn, when they live again and return to the fountain of life.<sup>266</sup>

Porphry, like Seneca, also seems to hint that the Saturnalia celebrates the common origin and destination of all human beings.<sup>267</sup> Although the Saturnalia was celebrated well into the fourth century CE, it seems that Seneca feels it has lost its past radicalness. He refers to a social reality where slaves call their owner *pater*, and were treated with dignity. Seneca aims to apply these principles even outside the Saturnalia, by stating that slaves should be treated with dignity and respect because of the mutual links in the divine *oikonomia*. This should even be done regardless of the rank of the slave (*Ep.* 47.12-16). The social status of the slave should not matter. This was especially evident in the writings of the Stoic philosopher Epictetus, who places little relevance on the status of a slave, since this slave, if he or she is wise, can still be free.<sup>268</sup> Seneca refers to the social status of the slave as being like the saddle of a horse, or simply imaginary garments. One does not judge a horse by the quality of its saddle, and therefore a person should not be devalued simply because of their status as enslaved (*Ep.* 47.16).

The final important section on how a slave should be treated, according to Seneca, reads thus (*Ep.* 47.17-18):

---

<sup>266</sup> Translation: Thomas Taylor, *Porphry: On the Cave of the Nymphs in the Thirteenth Book of the Odyssey* (London: J. M. Watkins, 1917), 28; Greek text: Seminar Classics: 609: Ῥωμαίους μὲν γὰρ τὰ Κρόνια ἑορτάζειν Ἡλίου κατ' αἰγόκερων γενομένου, ἑορτάζειν δὲ τοὺς δούλους ἐλευθέρων σχήματα περιβάλλοντας καὶ πάντων ἀλλήλοις κοινωνούντων· αἰνιξαμένου τοῦ νομοθέτου ὅτι κατὰ ταύτην τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὴν πύλην οἱ νῦν ὄντες διὰ τὴν γένεσιν δούλοι διὰ τῆς Κρονικῆς ἑορτῆς καὶ τοῦ ἀνακειμένου Κρόνω οἴκου ἐλευθεροῦνται, ἀναβιωσκόμενοι καὶ εἰς ἀπογένεσιν ἀπερχόμενοι.

<sup>267</sup> For a discussion of slavery and the Saturnalia, cf. McKeown, "Resistance Among Chattel Slaves," 381–82.

<sup>268</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 156.



‘He is a slave.’ His soul, however, may be that of a freeman. ‘He is a slave.’ But shall that stand in his way? Show me a man who is not a slave; one is a slave to lust, another to greed, another to ambition, and all men are slaves to fear...You should therefore not be deterred by these finicky persons from showing yourself to your slaves as an affable person and not proudly superior to them; they ought to respect you rather than fear you. Some may maintain that I am now offering the liberty-cap to slaves in general and toppling down lords from their high estate, because I bid slaves respect their masters instead of fearing them. They say: ‘This is what he plainly means: slaves are to pay respect as if they were clients or early-morning callers!’ Anyone who holds this opinion forgets that what is enough for a god cannot be too little for a master. Respect means love, and love and fear cannot be mingled.<sup>269</sup>

Here again we see Seneca incorporating a type of language regarding slaves, which was very uncommon in the Roman social hierarchy.<sup>270</sup> We have seen that most ancient authors advised that successful mastery is based on fear. Seneca uses terms like respect and not fear (*‘colant potius te quam timeant’*). This is one of the few instances in antiquity where fear is not recommended in terms of slave-management.<sup>271</sup> Behind these statements lies a larger conceptual

---

<sup>269</sup> Translation & Latin text: LCL: 310-11: *‘Servus est.’ Sed fortasse liber animo. ‘Servus est.’ Hoc illi nocebit? Ostende quis non sit: alius libidini servit, alius avaritiae, alius ambitioni, omnes timori...Quare non est quod fastidiosi isti te deterreant quominus servis tuis hilarem te praestes et non superbe superiorem: colant potius te quam timeant. Dicet aliquis nunc me vocare ad pilleum servos et dominos de fastigio suo deicere, quod dixi, ‘colant potius dominum quam timeant.’ ‘Ita’ inquit ‘prorsus? colant tamquam clientes, tamquam salutatores?’ Hoc qui dixerit obliviscetur id dominis parum non esse quod deo sat est. Qui colitur, et amatur: non potest amor cum timore misceri; cf. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 66.*

<sup>270</sup> Joshel, “Slavery and the Roman Literary Culture,” 226–32.

<sup>271</sup> It should also be remembered that there was also fear from the side of slaveholders toward slaves; cf. Page DuBois, “The Coarsest Demand: Utopia and the Fear of Slaves,” in *Fear of Slaves - Fear of Enslavement in the Ancient Mediterranean* (Actes du XXIXe colloque international du groupe international de recherches sur

reality to Seneca. Since all bodies are subject to rule by the *hegemonikon* of the universal *logos*, social status is merely coincidental. The body, to Seneca, may be enslaved, but the soul (*animus*) of the slave could be free; slavery is a corporeal condition and nothing more.<sup>272</sup> When is the *animus* free? When the person is not enslaved to bodily desires. Whereas the previous authors regulated slave-bodies by means of the control and manipulation of the bodily passions, Seneca states that the slave should not be controlled by these passions. Since the two main technologies of corporeal control are now denied, new technologies must be put in place. These technologies, however, are based on love and mutual respect. Rule and domination should not be present in the virtuous life of the Stoic (cf. Stobaeus, *Ecl.* 2.99).<sup>273</sup> A new symbolic economy is present with all these Stoic authors, who elevate moral slavery over and above social status. In *De beneficiis*, Seneca even goes so far as to imply that a slave is capable of performing a *beneficium*, a kindness or favour, toward the master and not simply a *ministerium*, referring to a service (*Ben.* 3.18.1).<sup>274</sup> This type of virtue reasoning would certainly be considered radical and liberal by Roman standards. Thus, slavery now becomes a metaphor, and the coincidental institution of slavery is downplayed, save for admonitions to treat slaves fairly and with love. Dio Chrysostom, for instance, speculates that moral slavery may have even existed before institutional slavery (*2 Serv. lib.* 15.29.1-8):

---

l'esclavage dans l'antiquité; Anastasia Serghidou (ed.); Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007), 435–44; Morley, “Slavery Under the Principate,” 285.

<sup>272</sup> Keith R. Bradley, “Seneca and Slavery,” in *Seneca* (Oxford Readings in Classical Studies; John G. Fitch (ed.); Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 338.

<sup>273</sup> Cf. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 56–58, 133.

<sup>274</sup> Seneca states: ‘Yet men do bestow benefits upon their kings and their generals; therefore slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters. A slave can be just, brave, magnanimous; he can therefore bestow a benefit, for this is also the part of a virtuous man. So true is it that slaves can bestow benefits upon their masters, that the masters have often owed their lives to them.’ (*Ben.* 3.18.1; Latin text: Basore [online: 4 April 2012]: *Atqui dant regibus suis, dant imperatoribus beneficia: ergo et dominis. Potest servus iustus esse, potest fortis, potest magni animi: ergo et beneficium dare potest; nam et hoc virtutis est. Adeo quidem dominis servi beneficia possunt dare, ut ipsos saepe beneficii sui fecerint.*); and also: ‘As long as we only receive what is generally demanded from a slave, that is mere service; when more is given than a slave need afford us, it is a benefit; as soon as what he does begins to partake of the affection of a friend, it can no longer be called service’ (*Ben.* 3.21.1; Latin text: Basore [online: 4 April 2012]: *Quam diu praestatur, quod a servo exigi solet, ministerium est; ubi plus, quam quod servo necesse est, beneficium est; ubi in adfectum amici transit, desinit vocari ministerium.*); cf. Keith R. Bradley, “Seneca and Slavery,” 336.

But perhaps it was not in this way [institutional slavery] that the term ‘slave’ was originally applied - that is, to a person for whose body someone paid money, or as the majority think, to one who was sprung from persons who were called slaves, but rather to the man who lacked a free man’s spirit and was of a servile nature. For of those who are called slaves we will, I presume, admit that many have the spirit of free men, and that among free men there are many who are altogether servile. The case is the same with those known as ‘noble’ and ‘well-born’.<sup>275</sup>

These statements from the Stoics against slavery are certainly admirable. It would have an increasing influence on the thinking of Christian authors. By emphasizing a higher, divine *oikonomia*, a new utilization of the strategy of naturalization is seen. It is quite remarkable that two authors, Aristotle and Seneca for instance, can use the same concept, namely that of nature, and arrive at such different conclusions. What is important to realize is that these formulations were not simply theoretical. They had very real social effects. Seneca and the Stoics in general scold slaveholders who cannot control their passions, stating that such people are truly slaves. Zeno, according to Diogenes Laertius, is famous for criticizing the lack of anger-control among certain slaveholders.<sup>276</sup> The irony is displayed in the fact that although they are able to control and manipulate their slaves and their bodily passions, they are unable to control their own lusts and therefore live shameful lives. In the beginning of his letter, Seneca graphically depicts the typical Roman dinner parties or *symposia* where some slaveholders would gorge themselves with food, basting in their gluttony to such an extent that they have to vomit up the food since they have overeaten (*Ep.* 47.1-3). All of this takes place while the slaves are not even allowed to

---

<sup>275</sup> Translation: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 66; Greek text: Von Arnim: 61: ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως ἢ λεγόμενος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ δούλος, ὑπὲρ οὗτος ἀργύριον τις τοῦ σώματος κατέβαλεν ἢ ὅς ἂν ἐκ δούλων λεγομένων ἢ γεγονώς, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ὅσπερ ἀνελεύθερος καὶ δουλοπρεπής. τῶν μὲν γὰρ λεγομένων δούλων πολλοὺς ὁμολογήσομεν δήπου εἶναι ἐλευθερίους, τῶν δὲ γε ἐλευθέρων πολλοὺς πάνυ δουλοπρεπεῖς. ἔστι δὲ ὡς περὶ τοὺς γενναίους καὶ τοὺς εὐγενεῖς.

<sup>276</sup> Fitzgerald, “Treatment of Slaves,” 158–59.

talk or partake in a morsel of food. Seneca mocks this false *oikonomia* and use of power. It is the divine *oikonomia* of nature and the universal *logos* that binds all living things together, and Seneca prefers to seek discourses of unity and mutuality rather than discrimination. In doing this, he negates traditional technologies of slave-management via the control of their bodily passions, and states that true mastery starts with the control of one's own passions and showing respect to all other human beings who share in the divine *oikonomia* since they have the same origin, contain the same seed that is, and is governed by the same master of the universe, the *hegemonikon* of the universal *logos*. Yet, slavery to Seneca is not an evil in itself, and he still accepts institutional slavery as a basic social phenomenon.<sup>277</sup>

While it is justified to praise authors like Seneca and other Stoic authors, the chapter on the heteronomy of the body will show that although the Stoics promoted respect and love toward slaves, their general view of indifference toward institutional slavery becomes quite problematic. It leads to the popularization of the slavery metaphor in antiquity and the proliferation of moral slavery. The cost of this is that attention is drawn away from the actual problem of institutional slavery. These views would inevitably influence the early Christian concepts of slave-management, and especially promote the use of slave-metaphors with late ancient Christian authors, who also seem to show some indifference towards slavery. We will now analyze ancient Judaistic and early Christian conceptualisations of *oikonomia*.

#### 4 *OIKONOMIA* AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN EARLY JUDAISM

When looking at the division of discussion points in this chapter, from Hellenistic, Roman and now Judaistic-Christian sources, it may seem as if one can neatly divide these 'groups' into separate, socio-cultural and religious divisions. This however is not the case for the world of the ancient Mediterranean. The cultures of this world, be it Roman, Greek, Egyptian, Judaistic<sup>278</sup> etc, were not exempt from inter-cultural influence. Thus, I want to make it clear that I do not consider these movements or cultures as being separate entities - they are intermeshed in a very complex manner. Early Christianity has been redescribed, correctly in my opinion, also as a

---

<sup>277</sup> Bradley, "Seneca and Slavery," 343–44.

<sup>278</sup> In this section I prefer to use the term 'Judaistic' and not 'Jewish' in order to promote some kind of discernment between ancient and modern Jewish practice notwithstanding the obvious continuities.

Graeco-Roman religion despite its undeniable links with early Judaism.<sup>279</sup> Boyarin has argued that early Christianity and Judaism were in fact ‘twins’, with much trans-cultural and trans-religious influence from both sides.<sup>280</sup> He argues that one can only really speak of a Christianity separated remotely from Judaism from the fourth century onwards, with the appearance of Constantinian Christianity. Moreover, Judaistic authors like Philo and Josephus, writing and often ‘thinking’ in Greek within the Roman Empire are difficult to categorize. Even the conventional and oft-utilized term ‘Hellenism’ has recently come under scrutiny. Ehrensperger highlights the complexities of someone like Paul, who speaks Greek, under the Roman Empire, even using a Roman name.<sup>281</sup> She convincingly demonstrates, in line with the work of Wallace-Hadrill,<sup>282</sup> that many of the terms and models for understanding the ancient world, since the work of Hengel<sup>283</sup> up to contemporary cultural and postcolonial criticism of biblical literature, leave many questions unanswered and more importantly have been responsible for creating several misconceptions regarding ancient Mediterranean culture. It is with these caveats in mind that this study now moves to the discussion of early Judaism and Christianity. It also assumes that these movements were not monolithic within themselves, and that it is much more appropriate to speak of early Judaisms and Christianities. So how do these movements conceive and profess to practise slave-management?

The Judaistic household (בית) was no different from any of the households of the ancient Mediterranean in terms of the possession of slaves. These households also owned slaves and were confronted with the same challenges of managing them. It is especially true for the larger, wealthy ‘houses’ of the rabbis, who were, according to Hezser, more concerned with mundane, servile tasks like ‘the baking of bread, the washing of clothes, the soaking of lentils, and the

---

<sup>279</sup> Gerhard van den Heever, “Redescribing Graeco-Roman Antiquity: On Religion and History of Religion,” *R&T* 12, no. 3–4 (2006): 211–38.

<sup>280</sup> Daniel Boyarin, *Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity* (Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 5–6.

<sup>281</sup> Kathy Ehrensperger, “Speaking Greek Under Rome: Paul, the Power of Language and the Language of Power,” paper presented at the annual New Testament Society of South Africa Conference, North-West University, September 2011.

<sup>282</sup> Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, *Rome’s Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>283</sup> Martin Hengel, *Judaism and Hellenism Volume I* (London: SCM, 1974).

setting up of candlesticks'.<sup>284</sup> Sometimes such houses were organized like a kibbutz, which combined the study of the Torah with physical labour like working in the fields.<sup>285</sup> As with the previous Roman authors who wrote on issues of slave-management on agricultural estates, the first order of the Mishnah, called *Zeraim* or 'Seeds', also concerns issues of agriculture, with slave-management receiving ample attention. Slaves were considered part of these households, as is evident from several discussions in the Mishnah, where they are often grouped with women and children: 'Women, slaves or minors [who ate together with adult Israelite males] - they may not invite others [to bless] on their account.' (*Ber.* 7.2[a]).<sup>286</sup> Hezser also points to the following section in the Mishnah (*Šabb.* 23.2):

[When passover coincides with the Sabbath] one may count the number of one's guests and the savoury portions [of the Passover lamb] orally, but not in writing. And one casts lots with one's children and the members of one's house [עם בניו ועם בני ביתו] at the table [to decide who gets which portion of the lamb].<sup>287</sup>

The term used in these instances for slaves, namely *בן ביתו*, discern slaves from free labourers and guests, and is often used with other members of the house like the women and children. The technologies for corporeal control and regulation are very clear and strict for slaves, as with all other members of the household. The management of slaves is included in the larger religious management of bodies in the household.<sup>288</sup> This was also true for the Roman authors Cato, Varro and Columella, who set out very clearly to which extent slaves may participate in the domestic religious activities and festivals. It must also be noted in this instance that the texts from the Mishnah, like the Socratic dialogues of Xenophon, are written in the form of statement

<sup>284</sup> Catherine Hezser, *Jewish Slavery in Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 126.

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.*, 127–28.

<sup>286</sup> Translation: Jacob Neusner, *The Mishnah: A New Translation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 11; Hebrew text: Blackman:

נשים ועבדים קטנים אין מזמנין עליהם :

<sup>287</sup> Translation: Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 127; Hebrew text: Blackman:

מונה אדם את אורחיו ואת פרפרותיו מפיר אבל לא מן הכתב : ומפיס עם בניו ועם בני ביתו על השלחן :

<sup>288</sup> *Ibid.*, 127–29.

and responses. Like most other facets of Judaistic life, slave-management is also here presented as a discourse, a dialogue, somewhat fluid and open to scrutiny. For instance (*Ber.* 2.7[a-c]):

And when Tabi, his servant, died, [Gamaliel] received condolences on his account. Said to him [his students]: ‘Did not [our master] teach us that one does not receive condolences for [the loss of] slaves.’ He said to them, ‘Tabi, my slave, was not like other slaves. He was exacting.’<sup>289</sup>

In the Palestinian Talmud, as Hezser shows, contrasting advice is given:

It has been taught: A story according to which a female slave of R. Eliezer died. And his students entered to console him, but he did not accept [their condolences]...[He said:] And have they not said: One does not accept condolences on behalf of slaves because slaves are like cattle?...To one whose slave or animal had died one says: May God restore your loss (y. *Ber.* 2: 8, 5b).<sup>290</sup>

In the typical style of the verses of the Mishnah, a context or event is provided, with a challenge-riposte scheme following. We also see here above, when comparing the two texts, how the issue of the humanity of the slave and the notion of the slave as property (which is lost in this instance) do not exhibit clear, distinguishing lines. I am inclined to believe that slave-management on the agricultural estates of wealthier Judaistic families were not much different, practically, from those of their Roman counterparts. The contents of the discursivities may differ, but in terms of its conceptual discourses operating in the background, there appears to be much continuity. It is however problematic to determine to which extent these texts found in the Mishnah represent an actual account of slave-management in early Judaism. What can be said

<sup>289</sup> Translation: Neusner, *The Mishnah*, 6; Hebrew text: Blackman:

וכשמת טבי עבדו קבל עלייו תנחומין אמרו לו תלמידיו למדתנו רבינו שאין מקבלין תנחומין על העבדים אמר להם אין טבי עבדי כשאר כל העבדים כשר היה :

<sup>290</sup> Translation: Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 158.

with much certainty is that slavery was very present in the ancient Judaistic family, and that issues of slave-management from Rabbinic sources mirror Roman sources to a great extent.

The point to which this is true for urban Judaistic families is a more complex matter. Both Peskowitz<sup>291</sup> and Hezser<sup>292</sup> agree that the character of the living conditions of families housed in the typical *insulae* in Roman Palestine and beyond, result in such families rather resembling ‘working groups’ with the boundaries between slave and free, in terms of tasks and daily engagement, also blurred. There would no doubt still be the social stigma of being a slave, but within these families, slaves lived ‘closer’ in what we could call the ‘private’ sphere of the household.

One of the main issues in the *status quaestionis* of research on ancient Judaistic slavery has not so much been the difference between agricultural and domestic slaves in Judaistic families as the difference between slaves in terms of ethnicity - so called Hebrew slaves and slaves from other nationalities.<sup>293</sup> Were different technologies of control and management in place for Hebrew slaves as opposed to non-Hebrew slaves in the Graeco-Roman period? The *loci classici* for this problem are Exodus 21:2-11 and Leviticus 25:44-45, in which the technologies for managing Hebrew and non-Hebrew slaves are quite different.<sup>294</sup> Flesher interprets this distinction: ‘Hebrew servants are Israelites who have become indentured servants. They are not permanent slaves.’<sup>295</sup> Non-Hebrew slaves, on the other hand, are considered human chattel. While such a distinction may have been present at some point in Israel’s history, it seems that during the Hellenistic and early Roman period, according to both Flesher and Martin, such a distinction was not really present.<sup>296</sup> The Mishnah rarely makes the common distinction between

---

<sup>291</sup> Miriam Peskowitz, “‘Family/ies’ in Antiquity: Evidence from Tannaitic Literature and Roman Galilean Architecture,” in *The Jewish Family in Antiquity* (Shaye D. Cohen (ed.); BJS 289; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 17.

<sup>292</sup> Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 127–29.

<sup>293</sup> Dale B. Martin, “Slavery and the Ancient Jewish Family,” in *The Jewish Family in Antiquity* (Shaye D. Cohen (ed.); BJS 289; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993), 113–17.

<sup>294</sup> Niels P. Lemche, “The ‘Hebrew Slave’: Comments on the Slave Law Ex. xxi 2–11,” *VT* 25 (1975): 129–44.

<sup>295</sup> Paul V. M. Flesher, *Oxen, Women, or Citizens? Slaves in the System of the Mishnah* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 54; cf. also: Martin, “Slavery and the Ancient Jewish Family,” 115.

<sup>296</sup> Cf. Paul V. M. Flesher, “Slaves, Israelites and the System of the Mishnah,” in *The Literature of Early Rabbinic Judaism: Issues in Talmudic Redaction and Interpretation* (New Perspectives on Ancient Judaism 4; Alan J. Avery-



Hebrew and ‘Canaanite’ slaves. Ethnic discrimination, however, was present in Greek, Roman and Judaistic texts regarding slave-management. Philodemus criticized Xenophon for his acceptance of foreign, non-Athenian, managerial practices for slaves, and Columella advises the *pater familias* not to group too many slaves of the same nationality, since it causes domestic quarrels. An interesting account found in the Mishnah that does seem to point at some fundamental suspicion of outsiders possibly relating to slavery. It is found in the sixth order of the Mishnah, called *Tehorot* or ‘Purities’, where ethnic separation holds a prominent place (*Makš. 2.7*):

[If] one found in it an abandoned child, if the majority is deemed gentile, it is deemed a gentile. And if the majority is Israelite, it is deemed an Israelite. Half and half - it is deemed an Israelite. R. Judah says, ‘They follow the status of the majority of those who abandon babies.’<sup>297</sup>

Here the issue of finding abandoned children, which in almost all cases lead to slavery, is discussed in ethnic matters. The ethnic identity of the child is important in determining its fate. Hezser notes that some other Rabbi’s, like R. Yehudah, considered all exposed infants as gentiles, which would make it easier to legitimize their status as slaves.<sup>298</sup> Does it then imply that an Israelite foundling (אסופי or sometimes מושלך) would not be considered a slave, but rather a foster child or *θηροπτόζ/alumnus*? The text above may or may not assume that if such a child is a gentile, it should be treated and raised as human chattel. It rather seems that the text is concerned with the management of such a body within the Judaistic purity/defilement maps, with its status being a secondary issue. Although there are instances of Judaistic families adopting children and raising them, the instance of raising a foundling as an adopted child appears to be the exception rather than the rule, and as Hezser concludes, Judaistic families were probably not

---

Peck (ed.); Lanham: University Press of America, 1989), 101–9; Flesher, *Slaves in the System of the Mishnah*, 53–60; Martin, “Slavery and the Ancient Jewish Family”.

<sup>297</sup> Translation: Neusner, *The Mishnah*, 1098; Hebrew text: Blackman:

מצא בה תינוק מושלך אם רוב עובדי גלולים עובד גלולים ואם רוב ישראל : רבי יהודה אומר הולכין אחר רוב המשליכין :

<sup>298</sup> Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 129–39.

much different from their Graeco-Roman counterparts in raising exposed and abandoned children as slaves.<sup>299</sup> But this ethnic discernment should also not be understood in the modern sense to refer to race. This has become quite a problem in the study of ancient slavery, since race was a key factor in the Atlantic slave trade. These two phenomena, however, were quite different. As Gruen illustrates, there is no evidence from the Roman world that associates slavery, for instance, with blackness. The majority of slaves in the Roman world were white.<sup>300</sup>

But if Judaistic households of the Roman period did not manage slaves according to their ethnicity as seen in some Old Testament passages, which discursivities were in particular present in their understandings of slave-management? As in the Greek and Roman sources, almost all sources from ancient Judaism assume that mastery is a necessary enforcement in slave-management. Negative stereotyping of slaves is present in several Old Testament passages, especially in the Wisdom literature and sources from Second Temple Judaism. Proverbs 29:19 infamously declares: ‘Slaves cannot be corrected by mere words; though they understand, they will not respond.’<sup>301</sup> The passage affirms the common thought in the ancient Near East that slaves were, on the one hand, intellectually inferior to the free, and on the other, that physical violence is the primary language understood by slaves. Several other proverbs also promote an attitude of suspicion when it comes to slaves (cf. Prov. 17:2, 19:10, 30:21-23). The author of the apocryphal Wisdom of Sirach states that although the wise man needs to exhibit an attitude of humility, which brings respect in the eyes of his peers, there are also instances when an attitude of strictness is quite necessary, and that the opposite is considered a sin (cf. Sir. 42:1-5). The advice comes in the garb of an economic discourse in which the author states that the wise man should deal fairly and diligently, in equal weights and measures, when doing business, but also when disciplining one’s children and ‘whipping wicked household slaves until they bleed.’ (Sir. 42:5).<sup>302</sup> Here the language of fairness and strictness, seen with all the previous authors, is quite compatible with extreme physical violence. Here the focus is not so much on the control of anger, as in most wisdom literature of antiquity, but in the administration of justice and fairness against

---

<sup>299</sup> Ibid., 139.

<sup>300</sup> Erich S. Gruen, *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 202–6.

<sup>301</sup> Translation: NIV; Hebrew text: BHS:

בְּדָבָרָם לֹא יוֹסֵר עֶבֶד כִּי יִבִּין וְאִין מְעַנָּה :

<sup>302</sup> Translation: CEB; Greek text: Rahlfs-Hanhart: καὶ οἰκέτη πονηρῶ πλευρὰν αἰμάξαι.

the stereotypically immoral slave. As Hezser illustrates, Mishnahic sources also exhibit a strong attitude of suspicion regarding slaves.<sup>303</sup>

On the other hand, again resembling the Greek and Roman authors already discussed, some of these Judaistic sources promote non-violent treatment of slaves to ensure loyalty and quality of labour. In the same Wisdom of Sirach quoted above, the following advice is given: ‘Do not mistreat slaves who do their work well, or hirelings who do their best for you. Show the same love to wise slaves that you would show to yourself, and let them have their freedom’ (Sir. 7:20).<sup>304</sup> There are no such equivalents in the Mishnah, but this does not imply that Judaistic slaveholders of antiquity did not practice it. Hezser points to common Rabbinic interpretations of the narrative of Abraham, Sarah and Hagar which often advise readers to treat slaves moderately.<sup>305</sup> This advice conforms to the advice of the Graeco-Roman sources that mastery is psychological manipulation *par excellence*, and that physical violence is not always the best resort when it comes to slave-management.

In Mishnahic literature, the management of female slave bodies receives ample attention. The very common grouping of women, slaves, children and outsiders over and against the free, Judaistic male is extremely prevalent in the Mishnah, and exhibits an aggressive androcentrism and patriarchalism from the outset.<sup>306</sup> It was also true for the Hellenistic and Roman sources, but this former genre provides an additional discourse, namely that of purity and defilement, to the discussion. In a section of the Mishnah that elaborates on agricultural practice, a division is made between the purchase of male and female slaves (*Ma‘as. Š. 1.7[A]*). When it comes to the offering of the firstfruits, slaves are grouped with women, persons of doubtful sex, and androgynous persons who are not allowed to recite Deuteronomy 26:10 during the offering of the first fruits. This not only illustrates the importance of discriminating against gender, but also promotes an androcentric view of religious participation and almost criminalizes (at least,

---

<sup>303</sup> Hezser, *Jewish Slavery*, 151.

<sup>304</sup> Translation: CEB; Greek text: Rahlfs-Hanhart: μη κακώσης οικέτην ἐργαζόμενον ἐν ἀληθείᾳ μηδὲ μίσθιον δίδοντα τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. οικέτην συνετὸν ἀγάπω σου ἢ ψυψή μη στερήσης αὐτὸν ἐλευθερίας.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, 154–55.

<sup>306</sup> Judith R. Wegner, *Chattel or Person? The Status of Women in the Mishnah* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 40–69.

abnormalizes) all those outside the sphere of the dominant, free Judaistic male. The mapping of purity/defilement lines is also very evident in this instance. These groups mentioned above are also mentioned alongside executors and agents, people of ill social repute. Similar divisions were seen with Cato and Varro when it came to gender and religious participation. In another section, where participation of slaves, women and people of uncertain gender is prohibited from religious practice, they are also grouped with children and people with physical disabilities (*Hag.* 1.1). The offspring of slaves are also excluded from participation in or benefit from levirate marriages (*Yebam.* 2.5, 2.8, 7.5), and regulations regarding virginity are specific and strict (*Ketub.* 1.2, 4). Similar jurisdiction is present in Roman laws on inheritance.<sup>307</sup> This manner of discourse serves to protect the inheritance of the free, Roman/Judaistic male population from those outside that grouping, especially slaves. The complexity of the regulations regarding gender and sex in the Mishnah cannot be understated. In general, sexual intercourse with slave women is prohibited, except for those whose penis is cut off or who have maimed testicles (*Yebam.* 8.2). This again shows the centrality of offspring and inheritance in conceptualizations of slave sexuality in the Mishnah. Not only are such men, who are types of eunuchs, allowed to have sexual intercourse with slaves, but they are also allowed to have sex with female converts. The issue of ethnicity arises again here,<sup>308</sup> along with complex classifications of male normativity and normality linked with purity and defilement. Such males, with maimed genitalia, are not considered men in the dominant, androcentric sense due to their inability to produce legitimate, Judaistic offspring. Uncircumcised men are also grouped in this category. Conversion of women, slave or free, does not serve as a pass into participating in levirate marriages (*Yebam.* 11.2).<sup>309</sup> Sexual misconduct is often treated in economic terms. Converts and slave women who were seduced by men are exempt from receiving a fine (*Ketub.* 3.2). In the case of rape, one sees that the social grammar of honour and shame is also translated and transformed into an economic dialect. A rape victim

---

<sup>307</sup> For a more elaborate discussion of this issue in the context of the Mishnah, cf. Wegner, *Status of Women in the Mishnah*, 101–3; for the Roman context, cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 216.

<sup>308</sup> In the sections of the Mishnah where the distinction between Hebrew and ‘Canaanite’ slaves are made, female Hebrew slaves are considered to have a higher worth and more benefits than male non-Hebrew slaves (*Qidd.* 1.2). Offspring of slave women and gentile women often receive the same treatment (*Qidd.* 3.13–4.1). Damaging slave-bodies, as property, however, receives more or less the same punishment despite their nationality (injuring a Hebrew slave does not require compensation for lost time) (*B. Qamm.* 8.3).

<sup>309</sup> Wegner, *Status of Women in the Mishnah*, 97–113.

is re-valued after the incident, and most attention is given regarding the nature of the fine by the perpetrator (*Ketub.* 3.7). Being a female slave or an old male slave also reduces value, and women who possess such people are advised to sell them and rather buy land with the proceeds (*Ketub.* 8.5). This advice has almost exact parallels in Cato (*Agr.* 2.7). Furthermore, the Mishnah often affirms the connotations between slave girls and prostitutes (*'Abot* 2.7). There is a very strong discourse of commodification of the slave-body in the Mishnah, and we will return to this issue in chapter 6.

The management of slave-sexuality is therefore a very prominent yet complex matter in the Mishnah, and something all freeborn, Judaistic males need to take account of and administer with great care.<sup>310</sup> Several discursivities from the sources mentioned above come to the fore, which become useful when comparing slave-management in early Judaism with that in Hellenistic and Roman sources. There are many similarities and continuities. The Mishnah affirms the androcentrism and patriarchalism foundational to slave-management. The management and mastery of slaves shaped male Judaistic masculinity in both the social and the legal sense. In social terms, those outside the norm of the free, Judaistic male receive a measure of value, inextricably tied to monetary terms, which can be protected or damaged by means of sexual behaviour. The regulation and control of slave-sexuality (and especially female sexuality) become important since these determine also the status of the free male. In the center of this discourse lies the issue of the protection of patrimony and production of legitimate offspring.<sup>311</sup> Besides being a highly gendered discourse, modalities of ethnicity run rampant, with both sex and ethnicity being markers for social and economic value. What stands out is that all bodies outside that of the sphere of the dominant, free Judaistic male body is commodified. More on this will be said in chapter 6 discussing the commodification of the body. It is also evident that slave-management here must be done in view of protecting the household and especially the patrimony of the *pater familias*. Although the statements supporting these discursivities are quite different between the Judaistic and Roman contexts, their aims are identical. The patrimony should be protected from outsiders by marginalising and commodifying those bodies falling outside the sphere of honour held by the free, male body of the corresponding ethnicity. Discourses of

---

<sup>310</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the issue, cf. Shaye D. Cohen, *The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties* (Hellenistic Culture and Society; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 243–60.

<sup>311</sup>Wegner, *Status of Women in the Mishnah*, 125.

normalising and abnormalising the discursive ‘other’ by means of gender and ethnicity serve in protecting the dominant hegemony, but also promote the construction of sub-categories of deviants, such as the eunuch, the ‘Canaanite slave’, and the prostitute/slave-girl.

Judaistic elaborations on slavery and slave-management also show much variety, and sources were certainly not univocal. Discourses of *oikonomia* and slave-management in ancient Judaism bear distinct continuity and similarity with its Graeco-Roman counterpart. But as in the Greek and Roman sources discussed above, there is also much diversity when it comes to the sources of ancient Judaism. While Rabbinic sources aid greatly in establishing some type of picture of slave-management in early Judaism, it is also evident that other sources exhibit somewhat varied and different opinions, and introduce new or amended discursivities to the practice of slave-management in Judaism. One such source is Philo, whose writings were quite influential in early Judaism. Philo was not opposed to slavery, although, in a fashion similar to the Stoics, Philo preferred to approach slavery from the perspective of moral, metaphorical slavery. His tractate *Quod omnis probus liber sit* is one of the key Philonic texts elaborating on moral slavery *versus* institutional slavery. Philo views the human body as being heteronomous, that is, prone to being ruled by forces outside of it, and especially developed the notion of people as being slaves to God. Moreover, Philo’s remarks on slave-management almost mirror those of Stoic proponents. He also opposes natural slavery like the Stoics, and prefers to focus on moral slavery at the cost of being indifferent to institutional slavery. There are some sections where Philo does contradict himself when referring to φύσις, as Garnsey has shown.<sup>312</sup> Philo, however, will be discussed at length in chapter 4 that concerns the heteronomy of the body.

It is important at this stage, in the light of this discussion, as well as those preceding it, to take stock of an important phenomenon being exhibited in these discourses on slave-management. Many scholars have been focussing on how discourses similar to slavery, and indeed slavery itself, have contributed to the understanding of otherness in antiquity. The key study in this instance is Erich S. Gruen’s *Rethinking the Other in Antiquity* (2011). Although the formation of this conceptual category deserves much scholarly attention, it is another, different yet related conceptual category that I have an interest in, namely that of abnormality and constructions of degeneration. Michel Foucault, in a series of lectures from 1974 to 1975, later

---

<sup>312</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 157–72.

published as a collection, has examined this issue and its development with much finesse. The back matter of the collection of essays displays a striking quote from Foucault regarding the category of the abnormal:

The large, ill-defined, and confused family of ‘abnormal individuals,’ the fear of which haunts the end of the nineteenth century, does not merely mark a phase of uncertainty or a somewhat unfortunate episode in the history of psychopathology. It was formed in correlation with a set of institutions of control and a series of mechanisms of surveillance and distribution, and, when it is almost entirely taken over by the category of ‘degeneration,’ it gives rise to laughable theoretical constructions that nonetheless have harshly real effects.<sup>313</sup>

We have stated from the discussions above that slavery and the accompanying mastery and domination were important in the formation of masculinity in antiquity, and especially affirmed androcentric and patriarchal modes of social organization in these ancient Mediterranean societies, whether Greek, Roman or Judaistic. But at the same time another, even more illusive yet pervasive contra-category was being formed - namely that of the ‘abnormals’. Although antiquity certainly predates the common psychopathological elaborations of the concept, and does not really have equivalents for the words ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’, the same phenomena are present only with different appellations and descriptions. One could add to Foucault’s statement above that the category of abnormalcy is one produced over centuries of abnormalising discourses. The Mishnah, for instance, groups all those not belonging to the dominant, freeborn male stereotype into their own ‘family of abnormals,’ as Foucault calls it. Foucault’s focus was especially centred on the rise of psychiatry as a discipline in the Western world, but it should be remembered, as he also points out, that antiquity already provided social

---

<sup>313</sup> Michel Foucault, *Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975* (Valerio Marchetti and Antonella Salomoni (eds); Graham Burchell (trans.); London: Penguin, 2003), back matter.

blueprints of such obscure *familiae*.<sup>314</sup> I will argue here that slavery played a leading role in the definition of the category of abnormality in antiquity, which would have a very potent influence even in modern discourses on the topic. An example from a more modern context could be that of the infamous Saartjie Baartman (died 29 December 1815), the so-called ‘Hottentot Venus,’ who was a slave, social outcast and ‘freak’ attraction due to what was considered by Western standards, abnormal physical characteristics.<sup>315</sup> The focus of this offensive and inhumane exhibition was especially her steatopygia (enlarged buttocks) and elongated vaginal labia. Although she was never ‘exhibited’ in the nude to reveal these traits, she was made to wear very tight clothing that would accentuate these features.<sup>316</sup> When she was sold to a man in France, she became an ‘object’ of study by many French naturalists, most notably Georges Cuvier of the Muséum national d’histoire naturelle. After her death in 1815, her remains, specifically her skeleton, genitals and brain were displayed in Paris in the Musée de l’homme until 1974, when they were removed from public view.<sup>317</sup> After a formal request from the previous president of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, that her remains should be returned to South Africa, she was finally laid to rest in August 2002.<sup>318</sup> Although the tragic story of Saartjie Baartman is a modern one, the discursivities that form its foundation are quite ancient. The grouping of slaves, along with women, and other social invalids and sexual ‘deviants,’ appear to have created an ever-lingering category of abnormals which bears influence on modern conceptualizations of criminality, psychological illness, medical nosography, social perversity,<sup>319</sup> and especially,

---

<sup>314</sup> Ibid., 31–54.

<sup>315</sup> For a bibliographic overview, cf. Clifton Crais and Pamela Scully, *Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus: A Ghost Story and a Biography* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

<sup>316</sup> Cf. Rosemary Wiss, “Lipreading: Remembering Saartjie Baartman,” *AusJAnth* 5, no. 3 (1994): 11–40; Sheila Smith McKoy, “Placing and Replacing ‘The Venus Hottentot’: An Archeology of Pornography, Race, and Power,” in *Representation and Black Womanhood: The Legacy of Sarah Baartman* (Natasha Gordon-Chipembere (ed.); New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 85–100.

<sup>317</sup> Andrew Bank, “Of ‘Native Skulls’ and ‘Noble Caucasians’: Phrenology in Colonial South Africa,” *JSAS* 22, no. 3 (1996): 387–403.

<sup>318</sup> Lydie Moudileno, “Returning Remains: Saartjie Baartman, or the ‘Hottentot Venus’ as Transnational Postcolonial Icon,” *FMLS* 45, no. 2 (2009): 200–12.

<sup>319</sup> Cf. especially: Michel Foucault, *Abnormal*, 167–200.



Christian formulations of hamartiology.<sup>320</sup> With this in mind, let us continue with the cultural-historical survey at hand. We will now move on to early Christian elaborations on slave-management.

## 5 THE PAULINE *HAUSTAFELN*: EARLY CHRISTIAN *OIKONOMIA*, PASTORAL GOVERNMENTALITY AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT

As mentioned earlier, in its nascent years Christianity was seen as nothing more than a sect of Judaism. The earliest witnesses we have from Christian sources are the letters of Paul, the corpus whose interpretation by Chrysostom in his homilies is the main concern of this entire study. The key scriptures that have been identified for discussion are 1 Corinthians 7:21, the topic of chapter 4, the entire Epistle to Philemon, the topic of chapter 5 on the carceral body, and finally, the early Christian household codes from Ephesians, Colossians, 1 Timothy and Titus, the topic of the next chapter on the domesticity of the slave-body. Although we acknowledge that all the texts just mentioned concern issues of *oikonomia* and slave-management, in this chapter we will now focus in the remainder of this chapter primarily on the household codes or *haustafeln*, and their interpretation by late ancient Christian authors other than John Chrysostom. Reference will also be made to non-Christian historians of late antiquity.

The *haustafeln* of the New Testament are grouped within the documents of known as deuterio-Pauline writings.<sup>321</sup> These writings do not seem to display the characteristics of authentic Pauline authorship, although they bear the name of Paul and show much continuity with the Pauline theology seen in the authentic Pauline epistles. The Epistles to the Ephesians, Colossians, 1 Timothy and Titus all contain advice to Christians on how to manage their households. In the non-Pauline First Epistle of Peter, a similar set of instructions is provided. There are also very similar tables in the *Doctrina Apostolorum* 4.10-11, the *Didache* 4.10-11 and in the *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.7.<sup>322</sup> The instructions show a recurring pattern. The advice is clearly directed

---

<sup>320</sup> An excellent study illustrating this phenomenon is that of Jennifer W. Knust, *Abandoned to Lust: Sexual Slander & Ancient Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006).

<sup>321</sup> Cf. Dieter Lührmann, "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und Antike Ökonomie," *NTS* 27, no. 1 (1980): 83–97; John T. Fitzgerald, "Haustafeln," in *ABD* 3:80–81; John T. Fitzgerald, "Haustafeln," in *RGG* 3:1485–86; Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 85–97; Dieter Lührmann, "Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und Antike Ökonomie," *NTS* 27, no. 1 (1980): 83–97.

<sup>322</sup> Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 87–96.

towards the Christian *pater familias* in relation to those falling within his sphere of domination. The different manifestations of the *pater familias* are discussed, namely as a husband, father and slaveholder. The instructions to slaveholders read in the documents above read thus:

	Greek (UBS <sup>4</sup> )	Translation (NIV)
Eph. 6:5-9	<p>Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου ἐν ἀπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ, μὴ κατ' ὀφθαλμοδουλίαν ὡς ἀνθρωπάρεσκοι ἀλλ' ὡς δοῦλοι Χριστοῦ ποιοῦντες τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκ ψυχῆς, μετ' εὐνοίας δουλεύοντες, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις, εἰδότες ὅτι ἕκαστος, ἐάν τι ποιήσῃ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο κομίσεται παρὰ κυρίου, εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε ἐλεύθερος. Καὶ οἱ κύριοι, τὰ αὐτὰ ποιεῖτε πρὸς αὐτούς, ἀνιέντες τὴν ἀπειλήν, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῶν ὁ κύριός ἐστιν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ προσωποληψία οὐκ ἔστιν παρ' αὐτῷ.</p>	<p>Slaves, obey your earthly masters with respect and fear, and with sincerity of heart, just as you would obey Christ. Obey them not only to win their favor when their eye is on you, but as slaves of Christ, doing the will of God from your heart. Serve wholeheartedly, as if you were serving the Lord, not people, because you know that the Lord will reward each one for whatever good they do, whether they are slave or free. And masters, treat your slaves in the same way. Do not threaten them, since you know that he who is both their Master and yours is in heaven, and there is no favoritism with him.</p>

<p>Col. 3:22-4:1</p>	<p>Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε κατὰ πάντα τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις, μὴ ἐν ὀφθαλμοδουλίᾳ ὡς ἀνθρωπάρεσκοι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀπλότῃ καρδίᾳ, φοβούμενοι τὸν κύριον. ὃ ἐὰν ποιῆτε, ἐκ ψυχῆς ἐργάζεσθε, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώποις, εἰδότες ὅτι ἀπὸ κυρίου ἀπολήμψετε τὴν ἀνταπόδοσιν τῆς κληρονομίας. τῷ κυρίῳ Χριστῷ δουλεύετε· ὁ γὰρ ἀδικῶν κομίζεται ὃ ἠδίκησεν, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν προσωποληψία. Οἱ κύριοι, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα τοῖς δούλοις παρέχεσθε, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετε κύριον ἐν οὐρανῷ.</p>	<p>Slaves, obey your earthly masters in everything; and do it, not only when their eye is on you and to curry their favor, but with sincerity of heart and reverence for the Lord. Whatever you do, work at it with all your heart, as working for the Lord, not for human masters, since you know that you will receive an inheritance from the Lord as a reward. It is the Lord Christ you are serving. Anyone who does wrong will be repaid for their wrongs, and there is no favoritism. Masters, provide your slaves with what is right and fair, because you know that you also have a Master in heaven.</p>
<p>1 Tim. 6:1-2</p>	<p>Ὅσοι εἰσὶν ὑπὸ ζυγὸν δοῦλοι, τοὺς ἰδίους δεσπότας πάσης τιμῆς ἀξίους ἠγείσθωσαν, ἵνα μὴ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ διδασκαλία βλασφημῆται. οἱ δὲ πιστοὺς ἔχοντες δεσπότας μὴ καταφρονεῖτωσαν, ὅτι ἀδελφοί εἰσιν· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον δουλευέτωσαν, ὅτι πιστοὶ εἰσιν καὶ ἀγαπητοὶ οἱ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι.</p>	<p>All who are under the yoke of slavery should consider their masters worthy of full respect, so that God's name and our teaching may not be slandered. Those who have believing masters should not show them disrespect just because they are fellow believers. Instead, they should serve them even better because their masters are dear to them as fellow believers and are devoted to the welfare of their slaves.</p>



Tit. 2:9-10	δούλους ἰδίοις δεσπόταις ὑποτάσσεσθαι ἐν πᾶσιν, εὐαρέστους εἶναι, μὴ ἀντιλέγοντας, μὴ νοσφιζομένους, ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν πίστιν ἐνδεικνυμένους ἀγαθὴν, ἵνα τὴν διδασκαλίαν τὴν τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ κοσμῶσιν ἐν πᾶσιν.	Teach slaves to be subject to their masters in everything, to try to please them, not to talk back to them, and not to steal from them, but to show that they can be fully trusted, so that in every way they will make the teaching about God our Savior attractive.
1 Pet. 2:18-25	Οἱ οἰκέται ὑποτασσόμενοι ἐν παντὶ φόβῳ τοῖς δεσπόταις, οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς σκολιοῖς. τοῦτο γὰρ χάρις εἶ διὰ συνείδησιν θεοῦ ὑποφέρει τις λύπας πάσχων ἀδίκως. ποῖον γὰρ κλέος εἶ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ κολαφιζόμενοι ὑπομενεῖτε; ἀλλ' εἰ ἀγαθοποιοῦντες καὶ πάσχοντες ὑπομενεῖτε, τοῦτο χάρις παρὰ θεῶ. εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ἐκλήθητε, ὅτι καὶ Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ὑμῖν ὑπολιμπάνων ὑπογραμμὸν ἵνα ἐπακολουθήσητε τοῖς ἴχνεσιν αὐτοῦ· ὃς ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ εὐρέθη δόλος ἐν τῷ στόματι αὐτοῦ· ὃς λοιδορούμενος οὐκ ἀντελοιδόρει, πάσχων οὐκ ἠπειλεῖ, παρεδίδου δὲ	Slaves, in reverent fear of God submit yourselves to your masters, not only to those who are good and considerate, but also to those who are harsh. For it is commendable if someone bears up under the pain of unjust suffering because they are conscious of God. But how is it to your credit if you receive a beating for doing wrong and endure it? But if you suffer for doing good and you endure it, this is commendable before God. To this you were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an example, that you should follow in his steps. “He committed no sin, and no deceit was found in his mouth.”When they hurled their insults at him, he did not retaliate; when he suffered, he made no threats. Instead, he entrusted himself to him who judges justly. “He himself bore our sins” in his body on the cross, so that we might die to sins and live for righteousness; “by his wounds you have been healed.” For “you were like sheep

<p>τῷ κρίνοντι δικαίως· ὅς τὰς ἀμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον, ἵνα ταῖς ἀμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν· οὗ τῷ μώλωπι ιάθητε. ἦτε γὰρ ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ ἐπεστράφητε νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν.</p>	<p>going astray,” but now you have returned to the Shepherd and Overseer of your souls.</p>
---	---

These passages from the New Testament bear remarkable resemblance, and it gives a glimpse into early Christian understandings of *oikonomia*.<sup>323</sup> They are not at all as elaborative as some of the other sources examined here. I will start by examining the sections in Ephesians and Colossians. Harrill has made an important observation regarding these two passages. They are compared to the classical agricultural handbooks, and Harrill claims that the Christian master resembles the *vilicus* figure from these classical writings, with God as the absent *pater familias*.<sup>324</sup> Harrill is correct in this observation since the sections regarding slaves and master indicate a type of delegated authority. Just as the slave is ruled by the earthly master, so too the earthly master is ruled by God by being a slave of God. As mentioned several times, the discourse functioning in the background of these statements is that of the body being heteronomous. But what do these sections say about early Christian *oikonomia* and slave-management? We will look at the passages both synchronically and diachronically, examining their interpretation in the early church up to the end of the fourth century.

<sup>323</sup> John Reumann, “Oikonomia-Terms in Paul in Comparison with Lucan *Heilsgeschichte*,” *NTS* 13 (1967): 147–67.

<sup>324</sup> Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 113–14.

## 5.1 Slave-Management in Ephesians 6:5-9 and Colossians 3:22-41: The Beginnings of Christian Social Contracts and Christic Panopticism

The pericope in Ephesians is a very descriptive account of slave-management in the context of the *haustafeln*, and it is important to view the advice given to slaves and slaveholders in the context of not only the other statements, but also in the wider context of the letter. Harrill is again right in noting that the section in Ephesians 5:15-20, just before the *haustafeln* are encountered and even after (the section on the armour of God in Eph. 6:10-20), other ‘codes’ are given that are meant to bind the Christians together in one collective family.<sup>325</sup> The section in Ephesians 5:15-20 is therefore a virtue-discourse. In these verses, the author promotes the lifestyle of a wise person, and specifically refers to the abuse of wine. Thereafter it is stated that believers need to participate in the singing of songs and hymns. Behind all this is the basic assumption that after baptism, the believers are unified into one family, assuming a fictive kinship structure (Eph. 4:22-24). Then follows the statement that serves as a basis for the *haustafeln* (Eph 5:21): ‘Submit to one another out of reverence for Christ’. This statement implies that a hierarchy is about to follow, one that is only functional if there is submission from the relevant participants. I have already mentioned that the statements in the *haustafeln* are highly patriarchal and androcentric. God is represented as the absent *pater familias*, who occupies the top level of the hierarchy. Power is then designated to other participants, or rather duplicated as seen in the case of the *vilicus* and *pater familias* in the Roman agricultural handbooks. As a moral and metaphorical *vilicus* of God, the earthly *pater familias* becomes the duplicate of Christ and his authority. This Christic duplication then serves as the major marker of authority and status, and is the basis for submission from all other participants. I do not wish to raise general issues here, issues easily discussed, often quite satisfactorily, in commentaries and specialist New Testament studies. Since our discussion of the *haustafeln* here would eventually lead to exploring how John Chrysostom would understand and apply its principles, particularly with regard to slave-management in the late fourth century, I would like to focus on the underlying governmentality of the passage, since this, I believe, lies at the core of our investigation. Governmentality is a common notion in the political philosophy of Michel

---

<sup>325</sup> Ibid., 113–14.

Foucault.<sup>326</sup> The term specifically relates to the idea of being governed and the mechanisms or technologies of that governance. In the Ephesian *haustafeln*, we see a typical early Christian attempt at implementing ideas and practices of governmentality, as well as a negotiation of this form of governance within the wider context of ancient Mediterranean society and culture.

While acknowledging and agreeing with Harrill that the *haustafeln* in both Ephesians and Colossians (and even to greater degree, the entire epistles themselves), resemble and represent a primitive Christian ‘handbook’ of *oikonomia*, I want to take a step further and argue that the *haustafeln* exhibit the typical features of a social contract. The use of the social contract model,<sup>327</sup> common to Foucault’s method, implies that a system or hierarchy of governance comes into being when participants in this system ‘agree’ to give up certain freedoms for the sake of group cohesion and identity. Social contracts are rarely novel; they are in most instances based on existing models of power relations with slight amendments or simply a new language to garb old concepts.<sup>328</sup> One social contract can be quite contrary to another in order to signify that the characteristics of the group are determined by its opposing values against other groups. Social theorists of the New Testament highlight the fact that societies from the New Testament

---

<sup>326</sup> Cf. especially: Michel Foucault, *The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982–1983* (Frédéric Gros (ed.); Graham Burchell (trans.); Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); and several essays in the edited work by Graham Burchell and Colin Gordon, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

<sup>327</sup> Social contract theory developed early in the seventeenth century with the influence of critical thinkers like Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. It was further developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and in the twentieth century most notably by Rawls, Gauthier and Pettit. Foucault uses the social contract model to demonstrate how macro- and micro-systems of government come into existence. The alternative to the social contract model is the social warfare model in which groups seize power without negotiation as such. Although Foucault agrees that governments often exploit people and violently seize power, he prefers to characterize the power of governance as a network that is complex and circulatory in terms of power dynamics; cf. Celeste Friend, “Social Contract Theory,” *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2004): n.p. Cited 29 April 2012. Online: <http://www.iep.utm.edu/soc-cont/>; Geoff Danaher, Tony Schirato, and Jen Webb, *Understanding Foucault* (London: Sage, 2000), 82–89.

<sup>328</sup> Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality,” in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality* (Graham Burchell and Colin Gordon (eds); Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 37–45.

times are quite collectivistic. Group-oriented personalities, according to Bruce Malina, are one of the defining characters of the historical anthropology of the New Testament.<sup>329</sup>

What are the characteristics of these microcosmic social contracts called the *haustafeln*? In the first instance, the notion of sovereignty is based on the concept of God as ruler of all human bodies.<sup>330</sup> Since these bodies are heteronomous, that is, always prone to be ruled and governed by a higher participant in the hierarchy, the first level of submission implies submission to God, better translated as submission to the early Christian pastoral governance, which is highly patriarchal.<sup>331</sup> This will especially become evident in the interpretation of the *haustafeln* in later centuries. What these contracts indicate is that this form of *oikonomia* is the ‘Christian’ way. In the Ephesian *haustafeln* this is especially evident in the very first statements, where the submission of the wife to the husband is compared to the submission of the church to Christ. The discourse of ecclesiastical submission to Christ serves the purpose of authorizing the social contract being proposed. As mentioned, this is done by duplicating Christ in the earthly *pater familias* just as the *vilicus* was duplicated in the early Roman agricultural handbooks. The author of Ephesians implies that the social contract the *haustafeln* represent is based on a larger, authoritative contract - namely that between Christ and the church. There is little practical sense in the Christ/church contract except its use as model for duplication and asserting authority. Ephesians depicts the authority and submission discourses in somatographic terms - the church is seen as the body of Christ, and Christ the soul or the reason, conforming to the Stoic concept that the body, and its desires are to be disciplined and ruled over. But the relationship of power is not simply top-down, but in a complex interchanging flux. The stipulation of the social contract of the wife to submit to her husband is complemented by the concept that the husband ought to love his wife as he does his own body.<sup>332</sup> The concept of ‘love’ here should be understood in the

---

<sup>329</sup> Bruce Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 58–80.

<sup>330</sup> Klaus Berger, *Identity and Experience in the New Testament* (Charles Muenchow (trans.); Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 64–66.

<sup>331</sup> Andrew T. Lincoln and Alexander J. M. Wedderburn, *The Theology of the Later Pauline Letters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 124.

<sup>332</sup> For a detailed discussion of the background of this concept in the Ephesian *haustafeln*, cf. J. Paul Sampley, “*And the Two Shall Become One Flesh*”: *A Study of Traditions in Ephesians 5:21–33* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 1–76.



curative sense. The husband should care for the wife as he does for his own body. This is supported by the statement in Ephesians 5:25b-33. The language of nurturing, purification and preservation is present here. The religious and political lines in this early Christian view of marriage are very much blurred. The care of the husband toward his wife is also a key feature in Xenophon's work discussed above.<sup>333</sup> In the honour-based culture of the ancient Mediterranean, purity was an important virtue for a woman and as Christ has kept the church, his wife, pure, so too the main curative role of the husband is to keep his wife pure. It must be remembered in this instance that early Christianity was a sect of Judaism, and that purity maps played a key role in the identity of the group. This was already seen in the discussions of the texts from the Mishnah.<sup>334</sup> Foucault's notion of the care of the self now transcends the body of the husband, which he must also keep pure, and the responsibility is extended to the body of the wife. In this manner, the wife's body becomes an extension of that of the husband, a symbolic appendage or body-part. The believers are then also called members of Christ's body. This premise and the premise from Genesis 2:24, that husband and wife will become one flesh, serve as points of argumentation.<sup>335</sup> In this social contract, then, the wife submits to the authority of the husband, and by doing this, she becomes an extension of his body - she is not autonomous. The stipulation for the husband is that he needs to care for his wife since she is part of his own body and flesh. This discussion has shown how complex the power-relations of the social contracts of the *haustafeln* can be, and we can now see the trend and shape of the hierarchy. It is not linear - in the sense that God is at the top, then the husband, wife, children and slaves. It may appear so from the literary structure, but the hierarchy is cyclical – it all revolves around the *pater familias* as the Christ-duplicate.

But how does this social contract play out for the slaves, and how does it shape early Christian discourses of slave-management? The dynamics of the contractuality between slaves and masters function in a somewhat different manner to the contractuality between husband and wife. The advice is not based on love (as in the case of Seneca in *Epistula* 47) but on benign

---

<sup>333</sup> Cf. Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken, 1975), 133; Michel Foucault, *History of Sexuality Volume 3: The Care of the Self* (Robert Hurley (trans.); New York: Vintage, 1986), 72–80.

<sup>334</sup> Knust, *Abandoned to Lust*, 94–96.

<sup>335</sup> Sampley, *Traditions in Ephesians 5:21–33*, 51–60.

treatment.<sup>336</sup> For the author of the Ephesian *haustafeln*, the most important facet of the slave/slaveholder relationship is that of appearance and representation. In the case of slaves and slaveholders, the social contract is almost identical, as Harrill has suggested, to those found in Roman agricultural and Greek oeconomic handbooks.<sup>337</sup> Christ is symbolized as the absent *pater familias*, and the Christian slaveholder as the duplicated steward or *vilicus* of Christ. The notion of stewardship would become very important in late ancient Christian discourses of *oikonomia*.<sup>338</sup> The slave is reminded that the true master of all is Christ. They are advised not to become ‘slaves to the eyes of people’ (ὀφθαλμοδουλεία), since they are not out to please people but to please Christ, whose eyes are constantly directed at the heart of the slave. An interesting dynamic of surveillance is present here. Being slaves to human eyes seems to indicate that the slave’s behaviour should not be determined by ‘human’ technologies of surveillance, but rather by Christ’s surveillance, which is, ironically, a cryptic and veiled form of human surveillance in itself. The author clearly understands the limited usefulness of the surveillance of slaves by the *vilicus*, and thus introduces the omnipotent panopticism of Christ, that not only surveys the deeds and actions, the quality of the work of the slave but also the attitude and heart of the slave. This powerful strategy of manipulation aims to ameliorate the problem of slaves doing mischief in secrecy, a problem that is especially highlighted by Cato, Varro and Columella. The main aim of the slave is to acquire the approval and satisfaction of the slaveholder, in this case, Christ, the ‘absentee’ *pater familias*, but also indirectly, the earthly Christian slaveholder. The author also knows of the importance of reward and punishment in terms of slaveholding. Now Christ is seen as the one who will ultimately reward or punish the slave (and, in fact, all slaves of God). This is a typical Stoic-Philonic notion, where the focus is on the moral slavery. The verse, in fact, says very little about the practicalities of slave-management. Emphasis is placed on the notion of institutional slaves considering their enslavement to God as a higher priority than their enslavement to human beings. The result is that early Christian slaveholding resembles a type of creolization between Stoic, Philonic and Roman principles of slave-management. As in all of the oeconomic and agricultural handbooks, Christian slaveholders receive the conventional wisdom that they should treat their slaves kindly and not with threats,

---

<sup>336</sup> Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 144–45.

<sup>337</sup> Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 113–16.

<sup>338</sup> Sessa, *Formation of Papal Authority*, 1–31.

since the slaveholders too are ruled by a heavenly slaveholder. Christ is portrayed as the typical just and fair *pater familias*. There is no favouritism with him, and all are treated fairly. Furthermore, the advice on the treatment of children and slaves bear remarkable resemblance. Fear is still a common strategy in the disciplining of slaves (Eph. 6:5). Slaves need to fear their masters in the same way as they fear God. This same advice is repeated by the authors of the *Didache* 4.11 and the *Epistle of Barnabas* 19:7, showing its continuity in the didactics of the early Christians.

What are the characteristics of the Colossian *haustafeln*? As in Ephesians, the Colossian *haustafeln* are also preceded by a detailed virtue-discourse. Most notably, it contains an amended duplication of the baptismal formula in Galatians 3:28,<sup>339</sup> which reads (Col. 3:10): ‘Here there is no Gentile or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave or free, but Christ is all, and is in all.’<sup>340</sup> The thrust of this statement, as well as Galatians 3:28, is again the Stoic notion that one’s earthly status or ethnicity is not the determinative factor when seeking virtue.<sup>341</sup> Like the arguments of Seneca, who reasoned that the same *logoi spermatikoi* or *semen* exists in both slave and free, the author of Colossians substitutes this metaphysical seed with the presence of Christ. This statement is framed in a chiasmic argument for virtuosity - it is preceded by a vice list (Col. 3:8-10) and followed by a list of virtues (Col. 3:12-14). It also indicates, as in Ephesians, that Christian *oikonomia* is discussed in the context of virtue discourse - the same ‘selling point’ used by Philodemus.<sup>342</sup>

---

<sup>339</sup> Galatians 3:28 (NIV): ‘There is neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.’ Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): οὐκ ἔνι Ἰουδαῖος οὐδὲ Ἕλληνας, οὐκ ἔνι δούλος οὐδὲ ἐλεύθερος, οὐκ ἔνι ἄρσεν καὶ θήλυ· πάντες γὰρ ὑμεῖς εἰς ἓστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.

<sup>340</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): ὅπου οὐκ ἔνι Ἕλληνας καὶ Ἰουδαῖος, περιτομή καὶ ἀκροβυστία, βάρβαρος, Σκύθης, δούλος, ἐλεύθερος, ἀλλὰ [τὰ] πάντα καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν Χριστός.

<sup>341</sup> Stephen Motyer, ‘The Relationship Between Paul’s Gospel of ‘All One in Christ Jesus’ (Gal. 3:28) and the ‘Household Codes,’ *VE* 19 (1989): 33–48.

<sup>342</sup> Some scholars assert that the *haustafeln* Christianize the subordination of women, children and slaves (for example, Mary R. D’Angelo, ‘Colossians,’ in *Searching the Scriptures Volume 2: A Feminist Commentary* [Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza; New York: Crossroad, 1994], 313–24), while others, rightly in my opinion, assert that these codes are very much derived from similar social and cultural codes from the ancient Mediterranean and not exactly a form of Christianization (for example, Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, *Families in the New*

We now find simpler *haustafeln* in Colossians than in Ephesians when it comes to the relationship between husband and wife, but an equally elaborative code or contract when it comes to slaves. It should also be noted that these household codes are somewhat exceptional in that they address slaves directly, unlike the previous documents discussed.<sup>343</sup> They also seem to assume that slaves need more motivation than slaveholders, since the codes for the behaviour of slaves are much longer than those directed at the masters in both Ephesians and Colossians. What are the social contractualities of slaves and slaveholders in Colossians then, and what can they tell us about early Christian slave-management? The exact same Christic panopticism is also present in the Colossian *haustafeln*. Slaves are again reminded that Christ, their heavenly slaveholder, is watching them.<sup>344</sup> At this point I want to emphasize again that the purpose of panoptic surveillance is to ensure discipline and pacification.<sup>345</sup> Since the *haustafeln* are located within the context of virtue-discourse, the virtuous slave is the disciplined slave. Foucault's understanding of Bentham's Panopticon is neatly summarized: 'Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.'<sup>346</sup> This statement is also applicable to the Christic panopticon introduced to Christian slaves. It is to a certain extent more effective than any technologies of surveillance in the Greek and Roman handbooks of *oikonomia* due to its key feature - its permanence and thoroughness.<sup>347</sup> The cyclical hierarchy that is the *haustafeln* now exhibits one of its most potent features of authority - it serves not only as a practical system of manipulation, domination and submission, but also serves as a symbolic apparatus that can alter behaviour and train or correct abnormal individuals. Since slaves are mostly viewed with suspicion in the ancient Mediterranean, the ever-present Christic gaze becomes corrective - it shapes the bodies of slaves into docile bodies that are loyal to their superiors, especially Christ, whose representative/*vilicus* on earth is the slaveholder. The Christic panopticism, despite its inherent

---

*Testament World: Households and House Churches* [Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1997], 189); for a more detailed discussion of this issue, cf. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 142–43.

<sup>343</sup> Osiek and Balch, *Families in the New Testament World*, 189.

<sup>344</sup> Andrew T. Lincoln, "The Household Code and Wisdom Mode of Colossians," *JSNT* 74 (1999): 93–112.

<sup>345</sup> Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 142.

<sup>346</sup> Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 201.

<sup>347</sup> For an excellent discussion of slaveholding and supervision/surveillance, cf. Fenoaltea, "Slavery and Supervision".

metaphysical and Stoic-Philonic nature, is quite practical. The Stoic effect of de-institutionalizing physical slavery means that not only is the behaviour of the slaves regulated,<sup>348</sup> but of all those taking part in the social contract. Hence we find the social contractuality directed at the Christian slaveholder (Col. 4:1): ‘Masters, provide your slaves with what is right and fair, because you know that you also have a master in heaven.’<sup>349</sup> The slaveholder is reminded, almost tongue-in-cheek, that he also has a master, i.e. he is also under the gaze of the Christic panopticon. Whereas the slaves are here also reminded of their rewards and possible punishments, the slaveholders are reminded that they should provide fairness and justice to slaves. Both the Ephesian and Colossian contractuality directed at the slaveholder exhibit a secondary nuance of care. It is not like that displayed in Ephesians regarding the relationship between husband and wife. Here, the curative measure accorded to slaves should be fairness and justice.

## 5.2 Power and the Pastorals: The Development of Christian Pastoral Governmentality and Psychagogy related to Slave-Management

The Christic panopticism and curativity embedded in the *haustafeln* are also in line with the rise of pastoralism, and pastoral power in the Christian communities, which would have a profound effect on Western conceptualizations of governmentality.<sup>350</sup> The Epistles to Timothy and Titus, which will be discussed in the following paragraphs, are known as the ‘pastoral epistles’. In this regard, Foucault makes a crucial observation in his elaboration of the *pasteur*:<sup>351</sup>

[T]he form it [pastoral power] takes is not first of all the striking display of strength and superiority...The shepherd is someone who keeps watch. He ‘keeps watch’ in the sense, of course, of keeping

<sup>348</sup> Margaret Y. MacDonald, *Colossians and Ephesians* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2000), 164–65.

<sup>349</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): Οἱ κύριοι, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἰσότητα τοῖς δούλοις παρέχεσθε, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ὑμεῖς ἔχετε κύριον ἐν οὐρανῶ. Abusive masters would not be tolerated: Osiek and Balch, *Families in the New Testament World*, 189.

<sup>350</sup> The following section is especially based upon Foucault’s discussion on the development of Christian pastoral power as a form of governance, cf. Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 115–90.

<sup>351</sup> Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 127.

an eye out for possible evils, but above all in the sense of vigilance with regard to any possible misfortune.

It is evident that this type of governmentality, already present in the earliest Christian discourses, promotes a pastoral power whose main mechanism for exercising power is by keeping watch, or surveillance (Foucault uses the French word *surveiller*, while Bentham used ‘inspect’). In the following discussion from the Epistle to Titus, it will be shown that this type of surveillance always has the correction and regulation of bodies in mind, whether they were free or enslaved.

Moreover, by placing the free, Christian male in the centre of all these social contracts, the proliferation of androcentrism in early Christian household practice becomes quite evident. As with the elaborations in the Mishnah, the free Christian male body is responsible for issues of purity, obedience and quality service. The everyday life of the wife, children and slaves are all determined by their relations with the Christian *pater familias*, the *vilicus* of Christ on earth. This androcentrism is a crucial element in ancient slave-management.

The guidelines given to slaves in the Pastoral Epistles will now be discussed. We find discussions on slave-management in 1 Timothy 6:1-2 and Titus 2:9-10. These discourses, like all the others, are very much interwoven within the virtue-teaching of the entire letter. Both confirm the view that Christian slaves should work harder, and that proper submissive slave-behaviour is necessary for social acceptance. We also find no guidelines to slaveholders; only slaves are addressed. Slaves ought to show their owners respect despite their status of being Christian or not, and the author also emphasizes the mutual fictive kinship between slave and slaveholder. Whereas Colossians and Ephesians exhibit remarkable resemblance and similarities in terms of their *haustafeln*, Titus 2 stands out as being quite unique. As with Ephesians and Colossians, the entire Epistle to Titus can be described as an oeconomic exhortation. The language used in Titus has different emphases in contrast to Ephesians and Colossians. It also differs from the account in 1 Timothy. One of the reasons for this is because the letter, allegedly written by Paul to a younger co-worker named Titus, who is to manage a congregation of Christians in Crete, comes in the form of individual exhortations and duties.<sup>352</sup> It gives us a glimpse from a different angle into the early Christian oeconomic *imaginaire*. Titus, as shepherd or pastor, is guided in

---

<sup>352</sup> Martin Dibelius and Hans Conzelmann, *The Pastoral Epistles* (Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1972), 139–41.

pastoral governance. Chapter 2 of Titus, which forms the far equivalent of the Ephesian and Colossian *haustafeln*, is also framed by moral exhortation and virtue discourse (Tit. 1:10-16). But the nature of this is more specific in Titus - Titus is advised to present the Cretans with sound, or morally pure teaching.<sup>353</sup> The motifs of teaching and discipline, related to submission and obedience regarding slaves, are rife in the letter.<sup>354</sup> Sound doctrine is equivalent to good *oikonomia*. Again, I do not want to raise introductory issues relative to commentaries in this discussion. Rather, I am curious as to how Titus is presented as a teacher of *oikonomia*. This letter, quite appropriately grouped with the epistles called the ‘pastorals,’ represents some of the earliest direct instances of the rise of pastoral governmentality. As we mentioned earlier, the *pasteur* is someone who ‘keeps watch’. But in Titus the pastoral surveillance assumes teaching and correcting delinquent (often called heretical) behaviour. This would be central to Chrysostom’s thoughts on slave-management. In this epistle, the church itself becomes the *domus* where correction takes place. This correction should also be duplicated in the real households, and hence guidelines for household management are given. The *pasteur* therefore also becomes the domestic advisor. This will become even more prevalent in the later centuries with the rise of the episcopacy and papacy. In this sense, the *ecclesia-oikos* becomes both an observatory and reformatory (this will be discussed in more detail when examining Chrysostom’s views). Discipline occupies a key role here. We have already spoken about the importance of surveillance here, but the *pasteur* or domestic advisor should not merely ‘keep watch,’ but also correct delinquent behaviour. The ability to apply corrective measure for the production of docile bodies assumes that the surveillance and correction is hierarchized. It assumes an authoritative power-knowledge (in this case, the healthy doctrine) that serves as measuring stick to determine proper behaviour - it therefore has the function of normalizing bodies within the group. Although Titus is said to have the sound doctrine, when it comes to slave-management, the power-knowledge matrix is quite conventional, and one almost suspects the author is cribbing lines from Cato. Slaves are to be taught not be submissive in everything, aim to please their masters, not to talk back at them, nor to steal from them (Tit. 2:9-10).

---

<sup>353</sup> David C. Verner, *The Household of God: The Social World of the Pastoral Epistles* (SBLDS; Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 112–26.

<sup>354</sup> Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 148.

Austerity is a fitting description of the teacher and the institution, church or household, in this regard. There is a rhetoric of strictness in the pericope.<sup>355</sup> Titus 1:7-9 is very reminiscent of this:

Since an overseer manages God's household, he must be blameless - not overbearing, not quick tempered, not given to drunkenness, not violent, not pursuing dishonest gain. Rather, he must be hospitable, one who loves what is good, who is self-controlled, upright, holy and disciplined.<sup>356</sup>

These guidelines for the overseer again resemble the qualities of the *vilicus* promoted by authors like Xenophon, Cato and Columella.<sup>357</sup> The overseer here must be a worthy example, a mirror image, a duplication of the absent, but ever-watchful heavenly *pater familias*. The overseer must be a Christian virtuoso. From the wider context of the epistle, specifically its emphasis of viruosity, this teaching is presented in what could be called psychagogy, that is, the instruction of 'souls'. The discourse of psychagogy is a very potent and strategic discourse. The soul, here, is more than a mere ideology. The soul should be understood as a technology of power of the body.<sup>358</sup> In this manner, psychagogy is also somatography, since the soul as a somatic technology writes itself on bodies in a very real manner, and its presence is well attested in early Christianity.<sup>359</sup> Here, the correction of the 'soul' is in fact the correction of the body via

---

<sup>355</sup> Philip H. Towner, *The Letters to Timothy and Titus* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 733–34.

<sup>356</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ἀνέγκλητον εἶναι ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμον, μὴ αὐθάδη, μὴ ὀργίλον, μὴ πάροινον, μὴ πλήκτην, μὴ αἰσχροκερδῆ, ἀλλὰ φιλόξενον, φιλάγαθον, σώφρονα, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, ἐγκρατῆ...

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, 737.

<sup>358</sup> Foucault, *Birth of the Prison*, 29.

<sup>359</sup> A very interesting discussion on this topic is found in Lactantius. In his discussion of people who worship false gods, he refers to these people as being slaves to their passions, but he does this in a very unique manner. In typical invective rhetoric, he states that such people have made their soul a slave to the body, while the inverse is the more desirable condition. He states: 'And since they have turned away once for all from the contemplation of the heaven, and have made that heavenly faculty the slave of the body, they give the reins to their lusts, as though they were about to bear away pleasure with themselves, which they hasten to enjoy at every moment; whereas the soul ought to employ the service of the body, and not the body to make use of the service of the soul' (*Inst.* 6.1.2); Translation:



the technology of ‘soul’ - probably the closest ancient equivalent to what we call psychology today. Foucault has argued that the excess power exercised on the body has led to somatic duplication - the soul is a duplication of the dominated body; he states: ‘Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body.’<sup>360</sup> The corrected slave-body in Titus 2 is the body that is docile and obedient to the earthly master. The idea of Christ as heavenly master may be assumed, but is not explicitly mentioned. Here contrary advice is given from that of the Ephesian and Colossian *haustafeln*. Slaves here should act in a pleasing manner to their masters. They may be ‘slaves to the eyes’ here, that is, exhibit behaviour corresponding to what is expected from slaves in the conventional sense. Typical slave stereotypes are present - the thief, the untrustworthy slave, and the slave with the loose tongue.<sup>361</sup> Thus, the psychagogy directed at the slave-bodies should be directed at correcting the delinquencies displayed in the stereotypes. The soul, and accompanying notion of psychagogy, with its roots in Stoic and Philonic thinking, influenced Christian approaches to slave-management to a great extent. The concept of ‘soul’ as a corollary to virtue, served as a somatographic technology for producing and regulating docile slave-bodies, and functions quite well in the Christian pastoral governmentality of surveillance and correction.

### 5.3 Pastoral Technologies and the Petrine *Haustafeln*: Slavery, Suffering and Early Christian Discourses of Normalization

The Petrine *haustafeln* (1 Pet. 2:13-3:7), which probably comes from a very different context compared to Titus,<sup>362</sup> nevertheless also display several overlapping discourses. The pastoral governmentality is much more pronounced in this document. At the end of the exhortation to the

---

*NPNF*; Latin text: CSEL 19.479-480: *Et quoniam se semel a caeli contemplatione averterunt sensum que illum caelestem corpori mancipaverunt, libidinibus frena permittunt tamquam se cum ablaturi voluptatem, quam momentis omnibus capere festinant, cum animus ministerio corporis, non corpus ministerio animi uti debeat.* Here we already see an understanding of the interplay between soul and body, where the soul is characterised as a slave of the body in those who are slaves of the passions and idols.

<sup>360</sup> Foucault, *Discipline & Punish*, 29.

<sup>361</sup> Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 148.

<sup>362</sup> Peter H. Davids, *The First Epistle of Peter* (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 1–44.

slaves Christ is directly referred to as both shepherd and overseer (1 Pet. 2:25): ‘For “you were like sheep going astray,” but now you have returned to the shepherd and overseer of your souls.’<sup>363</sup> So what does the author of 1 Peter have to say about slave-management? The author only gives advice to slaves, and nothing is said to the owners.<sup>364</sup> One can consider his advice to be quite radical and even shocking. Slaves are advised to not only submit to those slaveholders that are fair and just, but also to harsh slaveholders. The discourse here is even more laden with Philonic notions of being slaves of God, as the author explicitly states (1 Pet. 2:16): ‘Live as free people, but do not use your freedom as a cover-up for evil; live as God’s slaves.’<sup>365</sup> The centrality of suffering is what makes the Petrine advice to slaves unique.<sup>366</sup> It should not necessarily be assumed here that the suffering slaves are Christian and the slaveholders are non-Christian. We have already seen that Christian principles and techniques of slave-management were not much different from Greek, Roman and Judaistic equivalents. The construction of the suffering slave as the innocent victim is important in this instance. Suffering, Judith Perkins has shown, was central to the development of early Christian identity, and it seems in this instance that symbolic links are drawn between the suffering death of Christ, the suffering loyal slave and the martyr. Perkins states:<sup>367</sup>

The production of this subjectivity, the recognition and acceptance of a self-definition of sufferer, was essential for the growth of Christianity as an institution. Christianity offered itself as a community of sufferers and could not have developed had it lacked

---

<sup>363</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): ἦτε γὰρ ὡς πρόβατα πλανώμενοι, ἀλλὰ ἐπεστράφητε νῦν ἐπὶ τὸν ποιμένα καὶ ἐπίσκοπον τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν.

<sup>364</sup> David L. Balch, *Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1981), 96.

<sup>365</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): ὡς ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐπικάλυμμα ἔχοντες τῆς κακίας τὴν ἐλευθερίαν, ἀλλ’ ὡς θεοῦ δοῦλοι.

<sup>366</sup> Suffering is one of the central motifs in the entire letter, and is here inextricably connected to formulations of community and also the author’s Christology. The intersection of these three motifs will also be seen in this discussion on slaves; cf. Steven R. Bechtler, *Following in His Steps: Suffering, Community and Christology in 1 Peter* (SBLDS; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998).

<sup>367</sup> Judith Perkins, *The Suffering Self: Pain and Narrative Representation in the Early Christian Era* (London: Routledge, 1995), 214.

subjects present to respond to its call...Christianity did not produce its suffering subject alone...this subjectivity was under construction and emanated from a number of different locations in the Graeco-Roman world.

This is a very important observation made by Perkins. Here I want to argue that one such influential subjectivity to the notion of Christian self-definition as sufferers was the notion of the suffering but loyal slave. This literary *topos* of the slave who suffered unjustly is especially prevalent in the Roman agricultural handbooks, and especially with Columella. The author of 1 Peter, however, does not advise the slaves who are suffering unjustly to rebel or resist. They are to remain docile, passive bodies, both slaves and women.<sup>368</sup> Two important essays on Roman sexualities, those of Jonathan Walters<sup>369</sup> and Holt Parker,<sup>370</sup> both suggest that the concepts of penetrability and impenetrability were crucial in constructing manliness and normality. Parker provides a teratogenic grid in which the sexual roles of men and women are placed into perspective and relation to each other.<sup>371</sup> The male (*vir*) is normal when he occupies an active, penetrating role, as Parker elaborates: ‘There is the *vir*, the normal/active/male, who has open to him three possible sexual activities: to fuck someone in the vagina, the anus, or the mouth.’<sup>372</sup> Unlike modern conceptions of sexuality, which often centres on gender (hetero-/homo-/bisexuality, etc.), Roman concepts of sexuality were about penetration and passivity.<sup>373</sup> Furthermore, regarding the role of the woman, Parker states.<sup>374</sup>

The opposite of the *vir* is the *femina*. However, the Roman writers reserve a special term for a woman in her sexual role, and this is

---

<sup>368</sup> John J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 207–8.

<sup>369</sup> Walters, “Invading the Roman Body.”

<sup>370</sup> Holt N. Parker, “The Teratogenic Grid,” in *Roman Sexualities* (Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner (eds); Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 47–65.

<sup>371</sup> *Ibid.*, 48–49.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

<sup>373</sup> Walters, “Invading the Roman Body,” 39–42.

<sup>374</sup> Parker, “Teratogenic Grid,” 49.

*puella*, which denotes not merely youth of beauty, but the specific status of ‘sexual object.’ As the opposite of *vir*, the *puella* or *femina* (i.e., the normal/passive/female) has open to her exactly three possible sexual passivities: to be fucked in the vagina, the anus, or the mouth. She can be a *futata* (vaginal insertee), a *pathica/pedicata* (anal insertee), or a *fellatrix/irrumata* (oral insertee). The fact that there is no separate noun corresponding to *futata* is in itself significant: the word for a woman who is fucked vaginally is simply *femina/puella*. A woman is defined as ‘one who is fucked in the vagina.’

Why this elaboration on Roman sexuality at this point of the study? It was mentioned earlier that by creating an androcentric system as found in the *haustafeln*, not only is the category of the normal, free male constructed; a category of ‘abnormals’ and subordinates is also constructed, and their part in the social contract is always related to their behaviour toward the free male. Furthermore, this society has been termed not only androcentric, but also phallogocentric.<sup>375</sup> The male slave is not a norm since, as Glancy has illustrated, he was not considered as having a phallus, that is, no legal right to *patrimonium*. A penis is not equal to a phallus; a male slave has the former, but not the latter.<sup>376</sup> Mastery does not only define masculinity, but it also defines its opposite; not exactly femininity, but rather, as Parker has stated, passivity. Kartzow correctly states: ‘In a phallogocentric system, the male has the power to define what the world consists of, what is right and what is wrong, and the female is naturally subsumed under the male.’<sup>377</sup> Moreover, penetration then serves as a strategy of normalization. It must be understood that the suffering the author of 1 Peter refers to, in most instances, is not only unfair punishment, but also sexual abuse. Jennifer Glancy has problematized this issue in the context of 1 Corinthians 5-7, but the same issues are found in this section, and for that matter, in

---

<sup>375</sup> Cf. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 25–26; Marianne B. Kartzow, *Gossip and Gender: Othering of Speech in the Pastoral Epistles* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2009), 24–25.

<sup>376</sup> Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 25.

<sup>377</sup> Kartzow, *Gossip and Gender*, 25.

the other sections of the *haustafeln*.<sup>378</sup> Strong Christian reactions against *porneia* do indicate that the use of slaves for sexual purposes would be taboo for Christian slaveholders; but this does not mean that it did not happen. The unjust suffering the slave experiences relating to penetration in the form of punishment perhaps or sexual abuse is here accepted by the author of 1 Peter, a notion that we find well represented in the Christian authors.<sup>379</sup> Suffering and being penetrated unjustly become a virtue.<sup>380</sup> Brent Shaw has shown this in his study of early Christian martyrdom.<sup>381</sup> A tension in the virtuosity of the early Christians therefore becomes clear - on the one hand, we see a strong promotion of masculine values, androcentrality and andronormativity, yet there is also the proliferation of feminine values, notions of suffering and also, as Shaw has indicated, endurance (*ὑπομονή*).<sup>382</sup> The verb ‘endure’ (*ὑπομένω*) is found in 1 Peter 2:20: ‘But how is it to your credit if you receive a beating for doing wrong and endure (*ὑπομενεῖτε*) it? But if you suffer for doing good and you endure (*ὑπομενεῖτε*) it, this is commendable before God.’<sup>383</sup> A value we have not yet seen before now becomes prominent - the passive suffering and endurance of wronged slaves is a ‘gift’ (*χάρις*). As seen in Columella, the unjust *vilicus*, who punishes and ill-treats slaves, must be strictly regulated, and punished if necessary, if he is unfair and disobedient. But here, slaves should rejoice when this occurs. This advice is justified with a very potent rhetorical strategy - namely Christomorphism. When slaves suffer, it is a gift and a virtue because Christ has also suffered, and by suffering, they become more like their master.

<sup>378</sup> Jennifer A. Glancy, “Obstacles to Slaves’ Participation in the Corinthian Church,” *JBL* 117 (1998): 481–501. For a discussion of this problem in a more wider context, cf. Carolyn Osiek, “Female Slaves, *Porneia*, and the Limits of Obedience,” in *Early Christian Families in Context* (David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (eds); Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 255–74.

<sup>379</sup> Clark, “Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex,” 630–35.

<sup>380</sup> While Walters and Parker focus on the Roman world, the same was also true for the ancient Greek world, where these passive, feminine ‘virtues’ would never be understood as being acceptable for a free, male citizen to embody; cf. Winkler, *Constraints of Desire*, 1–129; David M. Halperin, *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality: And Other Essays on Greek Love* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 41–74, 88–112.

<sup>381</sup> Brent D. Shaw, “Body/Power/Identity: Passions of the Martyrs,” *J ECS* 4, no. 3 (1996): 269–312.

<sup>382</sup> Shaw, “Passions of the Martyrs,” 278–82; cf. also: Ceslas Spicq, “Ἐπομονή, Patientia,” *RevScPh* 19 (1930): 95–106.

<sup>383</sup> Greek text (UBS<sup>4</sup>): ποῖον γὰρ κλέος εἰ ἁμαρτάνοντες καὶ κολαφιζόμενοι ὑπομενεῖτε; ἀλλ’ εἰ ἀγαθοποιούντες καὶ πάσχοντες ὑπομενεῖτε, τοῦτο χάρις παρὰ θεῶ.

Here, Christ is not the absentee *pater familias*, but inexplicitly, Christ becomes a suffering slave. It is supported in 1 Peter 2:22, 25, where the author quotes sections from Isaiah 53 from the Septuagint. Isaiah 53 speaks of the suffering servant of God, and suits the context of this section, which is addressed to suffering slaves of Christ. The third century church historian Eusebius of Caesarea would also not hesitate to make this same connection (*Comm. Isa.* 1.76).

Slave-behaviour is still strictly controlled. Suffering is only just when the punishment is unjust. It stands to reason that by suffering for disobedience, the slave is not special. Punishment and control of delinquent slave-bodies are still very much promulgated. First Peter does not give any advice to Christian slaveholders, simply to slaves, husbands and wives. We therefore see how the image of the slave suffering unjustly was used to promote passive values in the early church. It should also be noted that by promoting values of passivity, masculinity is also complemented. Encouraging those in the social hierarchy for whom it is normal to be penetrated to endure suffering, makes strategies for producing and affirming masculinities more efficient and facile. The normal slave-body is one that should be penetrated. Punishment could also be sexual. Furthermore, it should again be stressed the close links between slavery (of males or females) and prostitution. Aulus Gellius (*Noct. att.* 9.12.7) refers to Cato's view that the bodies of male prostitutes, like slaves, can be violated. This is also what defined the status of the free male, according to Walters, namely bodily inviolability and impenetrability.<sup>384</sup> This is why Roman citizens were not supposed to be beaten or raped (Parker has pointed out that rape was a common yet feared punishment for adultery; cf. Martial, *Epig.* 2.47, 3.73, 3.83).<sup>385</sup> The problem of the heteronomy of the slave-body also contributes to this issue. The ease with which the slave-body could be penetrated and violated is exactly what defined the status of the slave-body. Walters rightly states: 'To allow oneself to be beaten, or sexually penetrated, was to put oneself in the position of the slave, that archetypal passive body.'<sup>386</sup> Many early Christian authors identified with the archetype of the suffering slave-body - Paul, in fact, uses the same archetype to make sense of Christ's suffering in the Christological hymn of Philippians 2:5. According to this pericope, by taking on the nature of a slave, Christ embodied the values of obedience and suffering. The idea that Christ is restored to his former glory also supports the notion that slaves

---

<sup>384</sup> Walters, "Invading the Roman Body," 38–40.

<sup>385</sup> Parker, "Teratogenic Grid," 50–51.

<sup>386</sup> Walters, "Invading the Roman Body," 40.

who were suffering unjustly would be rewarded. Paul constantly refers to himself, in the opening formulae of his epistles, as a ‘slave of Christ.’ We will now move to our discussion of the late ancient authors.

## 6 *OIKONOMIA* AND SLAVE-MANAGEMENT IN LATE ANTIQUITY

How were these texts read and understood by the Christian authors of late antiquity? Due to the scope of this study, the focus will now specifically be on the deuterio-Pauline *haustafeln*, and not the Petrine *haustafeln*, although the concepts developed from its reading will apply. Authors commenting on these passages will be discussed, and it will also be examined how these discussions fit into the authors’ wider understanding of slavery. Many of the concepts highlighted in the discussions above are developed and reimagined by many of these authors. We will now briefly look at some interpretations in late antiquity. This analysis will highlight how these Christian authors understood slave-management.

Before looking at each author, including Chrysostom, an important observation made by Jennifer Glancy should be noted. In her study of Christian slavery in late antiquity, Glancy argues that slavery in everyday life was not so much experienced in the juridical sense, but rather as *habitus*.<sup>387</sup> This is also the main impetus of this dissertation. Many of the Christian authors we will examine below were directly influenced by and ‘in-*habit*-ed’ this *habitus* of Roman slaveholding. They did, however, corporeally negotiate and sometimes even resist this *habitus*, as Glancy states:

...[S]ome Christians used their bodies symbolically to challenge, or at least outrage, the *habitus* of slavery, thus attempting to disrupt, albeit fleetingly, the practice of Christian slaveholding. In these few exceptional moments, ancient Christians evinced some awareness of moral problems intrinsic to the institution of slavery, moments where they brought to consciousness moral discomfort with the *habitus* that shaped them. These moments of resistance

---

<sup>387</sup> Jennifer A. Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” in *Human Bondage in the Cultural Contact Zone: Transdisciplinary Perspectives on Slavery and Its Discourses* (Raphael Hörmann and Gesa Mackenthun (eds); Münster: Waxmann, 2010), 70.

were, in fact, futile, church hierarchies being receptive neither to the efforts nor to the Christians who made them. Ultimately these examples of embodied and enacted resistance illustrate precisely the conservative social effects of corporal habituation to particular social locations.<sup>388</sup>

This statement is exceedingly important. In some instances, we will notice no such embodied resistance, while in others it will become quite evident. Their resistance to this habituation, or lack of resistance sometimes, is also embodied in their interpretations and commentaries on the New Testament texts that already constructed a slightly different, Christian view of slaveholding, most notably via the *haustafeln*-texts.

Origen, for instance, finds the use of the word ‘fear’ problematic in the Ephesian *haustafeln*. He states that fear should not be something that is present in the life of the Christian, and that there seems to be a contradiction here (*Comm. Eph.* 32). He does not elaborate much on the problem of slave-management. He is more concerned with the metaphor of being a slave to Christ than with practical matters pertaining to slaveholding.<sup>389</sup> He concludes that fear, however, is necessary for the slave to serve Christ and the earthly master effectively. The fear of slaves should be directed to Christ especially in the sense of reverence. He never rejects institutional slavery, and is simply more concerned with moral slavery.<sup>390</sup> Heine has compared the commentaries of Origen and Jerome on Ephesians, and one notices much continuity in their comments.<sup>391</sup> As with Origen and Jerome, Lactantius also builds on the concept of fear in his discussion of the metaphorical slavery between God and humanity (*Epit.* 59). He also believed that punitive violence against slaves was necessary at times.<sup>392</sup>

Cyprian simply states that when both slaveholders and slaves become Christians, they need to be better at their respective roles; i.e. slaves should work harder and serve their masters

---

<sup>388</sup> Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” 73.

<sup>389</sup> Georg Kontoulis, *Zum Problem der Sklaverei (ΔΟΥΛΕΙΑ) bei den kappadokischen Kirchenvatern und Johannes Chrysostomus* (Bonn: Habelt, 1993), 73–80.

<sup>390</sup> Cf. Ronald E. Heine, *The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 249–51.

<sup>391</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>392</sup> Glancy, “Christian Slavery in Late Antiquity,” 63–64.



to the best of their ability, and masters, according to Cyprian, should be more gentle (*Test.* 3.72). This especially shows the pervasiveness of the Roman *habitus* of slaveholding. The inherent moral problem of slavery is not noticed - the problem that is noticed, according to Cyprian it seems, is that slaves who do not work hard enough and slaveholders tend to be too violent. The problem becomes one of labour-relations. He quotes Ephesians 6:5 in this instance as a proof. Since the authoritative, canonical text of Ephesians approves of slavery, there is no need to critique it. Being a Christian should therefore be an advantage when it comes to slave-management, since Christian slaves (ought to) work harder. Cyprian is however critical of slaveholders who abuse their slaves, slaves that share in the same humanity as the slaveholder (*Demetr.* 8).<sup>393</sup> Glancy, however, rightly states: ‘Beyond an implicit critique of slaveholders who wielded excessive force against their slaves, Cyprian sketched no practical consequences from his strongly worded statement of equality...’<sup>394</sup>

Ambrosiaster presents an interesting view on slavery and problematizes the notion of submission and domination in the light of Christian hamartiology (*Comm. I Cor.* 7.21-22; *Comm. Col.* 4.1). He provides a simple, classificatory system for domination and submission. He states that the submission of wife to husband is natural and pre-lapsarian.<sup>395</sup> The submission of slave to master, however, as will be seen with many Christian authors including Chrysostom, is post-lapsarian and a result of sin. He specifically refers to the curse of Ham (Gen. 9:25-27), which is understood as the logical inference of original sin. Slavery is not natural for Ambrosiaster and it represents unnatural submission. In his interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21-23, Ambrosiaster accepts the institution of slavery in typical Stoic fashion. Slaves are to remain in submission to their masters, and rather focus on being morally free. As with Cyprian, Ambrosiaster also wants to see that Christian slaves behave better and work harder than their non-Christian counterparts (*Comm. I Cor.* 7: 21):

---

<sup>393</sup> Cf. Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 58–59; Jennifer A. Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith R. Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 465.

<sup>394</sup> Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” 473.

<sup>395</sup> Cf. David G. Hunter, “The Paradise of Patriarchy: Ambrosiaster on Women as (not) God’s Image,” *JTS* 43, no. 2 (1992): 447–69; Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe, *Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology* (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 97–98.

What [Paul] is urging is that, by serving his earthly master in the fear of God, a person should make himself worthy of being free; in case perhaps, on hearing the words, ‘You were called while a slave: do not let this bother you’, he should become more negligent about the good works of his earthly master, and the teaching of Christ should get a bad name, and the person in question should not find favour with God, whereas, if he performs his service well in these earthly affairs, he deposits his merit with God as an investment for himself, for the Lord has said: ‘He who is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much.’<sup>396</sup>

God is still seen as the great slaveholder, and he alludes to the *haustafeln* here to suggest that slaves should work so as to find favour under the surveillance of God. Ambrosiaster also subscribes to the heteronomy of the body. Ambrosiaster states that through his death, Christ purchased humanity from the slavery to sin, and made them slaves of Christ. The metaphor of slavery and institutional slavery does not show clear, distinctive lines of separation in this type of thought. Ambrosiaster fully subscribes to the Stoic concept that being a moral slave is more detrimental than being an institutional slave.<sup>397</sup>

Basil of Caesarea gives much information on Christian attitudes toward slave-management in the late Roman world. Basil is highly critical of the wealth wrought by slavery on agricultural holdings.<sup>398</sup> But he was not altogether against slaveholding, and he even used the principles from the Ephesian *haustafeln* in his virtue-discourse, believing that slaves were to be obedient and, like most of the authors above, believed that Christian slaves should be better labourers (*Reg. mor.* 75). His views on slaveholding were very much influenced by his ascetic

---

<sup>396</sup> Translation & Latin text: Lunn-Rockliffe, *Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology*, 103: *hortatur, ut bene serviens de dei timore carnali domino dignum se faciat libertate, ne audiens forte “servus vocatus es? non sit tibi curae”, neglegentior esset circa bonos actus carnalis domini et doctrina Christi blasphemaretur et nec ille deum promereretur, qui in his terrenis bene serviens meritum sibi conlocat apud deum, quia dixit dominus: “qui in minimo fidelis est, et in magno [fidelis est]?”.*

<sup>397</sup> Lunn-Rockliffe, *Ambrosiaster’s Political Theology*, 100–102.

<sup>398</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 176–78.

tendencies, and he constantly links slavery with sin and the fall.<sup>399</sup> Although he does not condemn slaveholding, he states that there are slaves necessary for life, that is basic productive tasks, and then there are slaves who are a luxury. His criticism is directed to the lavishness of having hundreds of slaves for each and every minute task (cf. *Hom. div.* 2.2-6; *Attend.* 5) and he also condemns the harsh punishments of the wealthy on their slaves (*Hom. div.* 2.6).<sup>400</sup> In another writing of his, Basil mourns the father who has to sell his children as slaves due to poverty (*Dest. horr.* 4).<sup>401</sup> In chapter 6 we will see that Chrysostom has similar criticisms against the wealthy. Basil also denies the concept of natural slavery, and states: ‘...no one is a slave by nature? Men are brought under the yoke of slavery either because they are captured in battle or else they sell themselves into slavery owing to poverty...’ (*Spir.* 20.51).<sup>402</sup> Basil also exhibits strong Stoic views on institutional slavery.<sup>403</sup> His view on child-exposure, which is related to slavery, is quite interesting (*Ep.* 217.52). According to Basil, exposing a child is not an offence in itself, but depends on the motive of the mother. If it was because of neglect or due to promiscuity, the mother should be judged as a murderer. A mother forced to abandon her child out of poverty or need is pardoned.<sup>404</sup> In the same manner, a slave-woman who is forced into prostitution is also pardoned (*Psalms.* 32.5).<sup>405</sup> Basil found it quite necessary to give detailed regulations on issues related to slave-management and sexuality, showing the extent of the problem.<sup>406</sup> The apparent conceptual links between slavery, sex and sin are very evident in the

<sup>399</sup> Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 132–53, 186–91.

<sup>400</sup> Cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 46, 120–21; Cam Grey, “Slavery in the Late Roman World,” in *The Cambridge World History of Slavery Volume 1: The Ancient Mediterranean World* (Keith Bradley and Paul Cartledge (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 498; Richard Klein, *Die Haltung der kappadokischen Bischöfe Basilius von Caesarea, Gregor von Nazianz und Gregor von Nyssa Zur Sklaverei* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2000), 35–41.

<sup>401</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 410–11.

<sup>402</sup> Translation: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 45–47; Greek text: SC: 253: ...παρὰ μὲν ἀνθρώποις τῇ φύσει δοῦλος οὐδεὶς. Ἡ γὰρ καταδυναστευθέντες ὑπὸ ζυγὸν δουλείας ἤχθησαν, ὡς ἐν αἰχμαλωσίαις· ἢ διὰ πενίαν κατεδουλώθησαν...

<sup>403</sup> Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” 472–73.

<sup>404</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 419.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, 309.

<sup>406</sup> For a general discussion of this issue in antiquity, cf. Osiek, “Limits of Obedience”.

works of Basil.<sup>407</sup> He does not allow slaves to enter into secret marriages either, and thereby still affirms the authority of the slaveholder over the slave: ‘It is a grave fault even on the part of a slave to give herself away in secret wedlock and fill the house with impurity, and, by her wicked life, to wrong her owner...’ (*Ep.* 199.18.21-23).<sup>408</sup> If the owner approves of the marriage, however, it is not a sin: ‘The woman who yields to a man against her master's will commits fornication; but if afterwards she accepts free marriage, she marries. The former case is fornication; the latter marriage. The covenants of persons who are not independent have no validity’ (*Ep.* 199.40.1-5).<sup>409</sup> The word of the slaveholder is therefore the determining factor in whether slaves commit fornication or not.<sup>410</sup> These comments of Basil especially illustrate how Christian formulations and regulations on sexuality influenced slave-management. Clement of Alexandria, in his aptly titled *Paedagogus*, criticizes aristocratic women who are not embarrassed to appear naked before their slaves, and even letting them rub their bodies and enticing slaves to lust (*Paed.* 3.5). Ambrose would also utilize the metaphor of slavery and the *haustafeln* in his discussions on virginity (*Ex. virg.* 1.3).<sup>411</sup> Virgins are here also interpreted as slaves of God, and the strict corporeal control of virgins is also compared with the strict corporeal control of slave-bodies. Furthermore, the sexual history of slaves, especially slave-women, was of great importance to the slaveholder. In a letter written to Synagrius, the bishop of Verona, Ambrose refers to an instance where a master was concerned about the virginity of his slave-girl, and called in an experienced midwife to examine her, with the question of her virginity still being uncertain after the examination (*Ep.* 56).<sup>412</sup> Interestingly, Ambrose compares

<sup>407</sup> Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 160–91.

<sup>408</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Greek text: Courtonne 162: Μέγα μὲν ἀμάρτημα καὶ δούλην λαθραίοις γάμοις ἑαυτὴν ἐπιιδουσαν φθορᾶς ἀναπλήσαι τὸν οἶκον καὶ καθυβρίζειν διὰ τοῦ πονηροῦ βίου τὸν κεκτημένον.

<sup>409</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 273.

<sup>410</sup> Nathan, *Family in Late Antiquity*, 173.

<sup>411</sup> For a full discussion of Ambrose’s use of the metaphor of slavery, as well as the origins of institutional slavery, cf. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 191–205.

<sup>412</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Greek text: Courtonne: 162: Ἡ παρὰ γνώμην τοῦ δεσπότητος ἀνδρὶ ἑαυτὴν ἐκιδουσα ἐπόρνευσεν, ἢ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα πεπαρρησιασμένῳ γάμῳ χρησαμένη ἐγήματο. Ὡστε ἐκεῖνο μὲν πορνεία, τοῦτο δὲ γάμος. Αἱ γὰρ συνθηκαὶ τῶν ὑπεξουσίῳ οὐδὲν ἔχουσι βέβαιον. Cf. also: Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 295.

marriage (from the perspective of the woman), to being auctioned and sold as a slave. He states (*Virg.* 1.10.56):

But how wretched a position, that she who is marriageable is in a species of sale put up as it were to auction to be bid for, so that he who offers the highest price purchases her. Slaves are sold on more tolerable conditions, for they often choose their masters; if a maiden chooses it is an offense, if not it is an insult. And she, though she be beautiful and comely, both fears and wishes to be seen; she wishes it that she may sell herself for a better price; she fears lest the fact of her being seen should itself be unbecoming.<sup>413</sup>

It is interesting that Ambrose states that slaves can choose their masters, but not the woman put up in marriage, demonstrating the micro-political complexities of marriage in the later Roman Empire. Ambrose also advises husbands to exhibit a strict culture of surveillance on their wives as on their slaves (*Ios.* 5.22).<sup>414</sup> Using the example of Abraham and Hagar, he advises the free person against marrying someone of inferior social status, especially a slave, since it compromises the social status of the free person, and would also lead to the creation of illegitimate heirs (*Abr.* 1.4.22-25).<sup>415</sup> As in the pre-Christian Roman Empire, the Christian Roman Empire was very much concerned with keeping the *patrimonium* in the hands of legitimate heirs. It illustrates that the control of social status was directly related to the control of property rights.

Such issues were not only related to sexual matters. Slave-management in religious ceremonial and ritual matters was also an important issue, which is evident in the work of Peter of Alexandria. The canons of Peter deal mainly with the issue of the *lapsi*, Christians who left

---

<sup>413</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Latin text: PL 16.286: *Quomodo induam illam? Vide anima deo devota, quid dicat. Sic se actus corporis et terrenos exiit mores, ut nesciat quomodo, etiamsi uelit, rursus possit induere. Quomodo induam illam? Hoc est: qua uerecundia, quo pudore, qua postremo memoria? Consuetudo enim boni usum ueteris prauitatis amisit.*

<sup>414</sup> Cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 287; Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” 468; Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 241–42.

<sup>415</sup> Cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 425; Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” 467–68.

the faith. Fourteen (or in some manuscripts, fifteen) canons are preserved in his *Epistula Canonica*, with twelfth-century commentaries from Theodore Balsamon and John Zonaras. If Christian slaves, who were forced by their masters, participated in offering sacrifices to non-Christian deities, they had to perform penance for an entire year in order to ‘learn’ that they are slaves of Christ (quoting the Ephesian *haustafeln*), and should therefore keep the will of their heavenly master in mind rather than that of their earthly masters (*Ep. can. 6*):

In the case of those who have sent Christian slaves to offer sacrifice for them, the slaves indeed as being in their master's hands, and in a manner themselves also in the custody of their masters, and being threatened by them, and from their fear having come to this pass and having lapsed, shall during the year show forth the works of penitence, learning for the future, as the slaves of Christ, to do the will of Christ and to fear Him, listening to this especially, that whatsoever good thing any man does, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free.<sup>416</sup>

Here we see how the *haustafeln* serve as authoritative scriptural apparatus in pastoral governmentality and polity. Slaves are punished for not defying their masters when being asked to offer sacrifices to other deities. Only a section of the *haustafeln* is quoted, and (conveniently), not the section that slaves should be submissive to their owners in everything. Balsamon refers to this punishment of a year's penance as being ‘moderate.’ In the next canon, the punishment on the slaveholding *lapsi* is harsher, and they are especially admonished for compelling their slaves to partake in the sin of idolatry (*Ep. can. 7*):

But the freemen shall be tried by penance for three years, both for their dissimulation, and for having compelled their fellow-servants to offer sacrifice, inasmuch as they have not obeyed the apostle, who would have the masters do the same things unto the servant,

---

<sup>416</sup> Translation: *ANF*; primary Latin text not available at the time of writing.

forbearing threatening; knowing, says he, that our and their Master is in heaven; and that there is no respect of persons with Him. Now, if we all have one Master, with whom is no respect of persons, since Christ is all and in all, in barbarian, Scythian, bond or free, they ought to consider what they have done, wishing to preserve their own lives. They have drawn their fellow-servants to idolatry who would have been able to escape, had they given to them that which is just and equal, as again says the apostle.<sup>417</sup>

We see in both these canons that the *haustafeln* function as policy and polity in the early church. The notion of God as the slaveholder, and the heteronomy of the body, serves as the main premise for the punishment. Both slaves and slaveholders need to structure their behaviour around this. Slavery was a lively issue in church polity.<sup>418</sup> This is an instance in which the consequences of moral and metaphorical slavery have direct implications for slave-management and *oikonomia*.

The other Cappadocian father, Gregory of Nazianzus, is moved by the fact that Paul even speaks to slaves in the *haustafeln* (*Apol.* 2.54), and of all the early Christian authors, he is probably the most sober and realistic when confronted with the injustice of slavery, and the vices it leads to among slaves and slaveholders (*Carm.* 2.1.1):

To be a master over slaves is a fatal net! Harsh masters always become hateful, but slaves will trample a pious master without shame, the bad slaves cannot be made mild, the good ones cannot be made docile. They breathe sharp bile against both types of master beyond all reasoning.<sup>419</sup>

---

<sup>417</sup> Translation: *ANF*; primary Latin text not available at the time of writing.

<sup>418</sup> Nathan, *Family in Late Antiquity*, 174–75.

<sup>419</sup> Translation: Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 212; Greek text: PG 37:980-81: Πρωτον μὲν δμώεσιν ἀνασσέμεν οἷον ὀλέθρου δίκτιον! οἱ πικροὺς μὲν αἰεὶ στυγέουσιν ἀνακτας, τοὺς δ' ἱερούς πατέουσιν ἀναιδέες, οὔτε κακοῖσιν ἤπιοι, οὔτ' ἀγαθοῖς εὐπειθέες. ἀμφοτέροις δὲ κέντρα χόλου πνείνοντες ὑπὲρ νόον.

According to Gregory, the attitude of the master, and all the psychological strategies of manipulation we have examined from Xenophon to sources in the Roman Republic and Empire, is not really effective in slave-management. He is disillusioned by the fact that slavery, no matter how one manages it, is inevitably related to sin and vice.<sup>420</sup> Like Basil, Gregory also critiques the lavish lifestyle of wealthy agricultural landlords (*Carm.* 1.2.8). The most famous description of slavery by Gregory is found, in fact, in his will. Regarding the will, Harper states:

Gregory's testament is one of the most complete to survive from antiquity. It offers a still-shot of an ascetic, most of whose property was presumably already given to the church. It illustrates the complicated but precise apportionment of human property and human labour between multiple generations. It exemplifies the perils of manumission and testation.<sup>421</sup>

Most importantly, the document indicates that despite his discomfort with slavery, Gregory himself owned slaves, and knew how important it was to also manage one's slaves after death. It seems that after the bad experience of having to administer the estate of his late brother Caesarius, Gregory realized that one of the most important areas where slaves are to be managed is in one's testament.<sup>422</sup> Basil of Caesarea attests to the difficulties Gregory experienced after his brother's death, when he had to deal with slaves whom his brother neglected to manage in his testament (*Ep.* 32.1): 'The matter rather is that those who have so freely distributed all the effects of Caesarius that were worth anything, after really getting very little, because his property was in the hands of slaves, and of men of no better character than slaves, did not leave much for the executors.'<sup>423</sup> It is then also understandable why, as seen in Gregory's will, he appointed slaves

---

<sup>420</sup> Cf. Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 288–300; Klein, *Haltung der kappadokischen Bischöfe*, 52–55.

<sup>421</sup> Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 482.

<sup>422</sup> Raymond van Dam, "Self-Representation in the Will of Gregory of Nazianzus," *JTS* 46 (1995): 118–27.

<sup>423</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Greek text: Courtonne: 37: ...ἐπηρεάζουσιν αὐτῷ ὡς χρήματα Καισαρίου παρ' αὐτῶν εἰληφότος. Καὶ οὐ τὸ τῆς ζημίας βαρῦ· πάλαι γὰρ ἔμαθε χρημάτων ὑπερορᾶν, ἀλλ' ὅτι, μικρὰ παντελῶς δεξάμενοι τῶν ἐκείνου, διὰ τὸ ἐπὶ οἰκέταις αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τὸν βίον καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲν



who were also monks to administer his property after his death. These slaves were also close members of Gregory's household. As according to ancient practice, after his death, Gregory manumitted most of his slaves, while others were returned to the ownership of the church (*Diath.* 32-35, 52-55).<sup>424</sup> The case of Gregory's will exhibits the characteristics of the relationship between a clerical slaveholder and his slaves. We still find potent discourses of control and careful slave-management.

Gregory of Nyssa, when writing on the life of Gregory Thaumaturgus, also compares him to the faithful Christian slave of God using the Ephesian *haustafeln* (*Vit. Greg. Th.* 27.19).<sup>425</sup> He is described as a slave of God who did nothing without the order of his heavenly master. More importantly however, the one Christian author of late antiquity who probably made the most significant comments against the institution of slavery is Gregory of Nyssa. In Gregory's fourth homily on the Old Testament book of Ecclesiastes, he gives a remarkable exposition of Ecclesiastes 2:7, which reads: 'I bought male and female slaves and had other slaves who were born in my house.'<sup>426</sup> While he does not directly refer to the *haustafeln* here, the text is crucial since it represents, in my opinion, one of the most potent late Roman treatises against slavery. Like many late ancient Christian homilies, this homily is a virtue-discourse. For Gregory, the vice of pride stands out when it comes to slaveholding and slave-management. It is the main premise on which the former phenomena rest; it is only through pride that mastery is functional.<sup>427</sup> Traces of this type of thinking were especially seen with Stoic philosophers like Seneca, but Gregory does not exhibit the same Stoic indifference to slaveholding. He vehemently opposes slaveholding in the homily. Gregory states (*Hom. Eccl.* 4.1-2):

---

οἰκετῶν αἰρετωτέροις τὸν τρόπον, οἳ, κατὰ πολλὴν ἄδειαν τὰ πλείστου ἄξια διανειμάμενοι, ἐλάχιστα παντελῶς ἀπέσωσαν...

<sup>424</sup> Cf. Harper, *Slavery in the Late Roman World*, 481; Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 281–82.

<sup>425</sup> Raymond van Dam, "Hagiography and History: The Life of Gregory Thaumaturgus," *CIAnt* 1, no. 2 (1982): 272–308.

<sup>426</sup> Translation: NIV; Greek text (Gregory used the LXX): Rahlfs-Hanhart: ἐκτησάμην δούλους καὶ παιδίσκας, καὶ οἰκογενεῖς ἐγένοντό μοι...

<sup>427</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 84.

So, when someone turns the property of God into his own property and arrogates dominion to his own kind, so as to think himself the owner of men and women, what is he doing but overstepping his own nature through pride, regarding himself as something different from his subordinates? ‘I got me slaves and slave-girls’. What do you mean? You condemn man to slavery, when his nature is free and he possesses free will, and you legislate in competition with God, overturning his law for the human species. The one made on the specific terms that he should be the owner of the earth, and appointed to government of the Creator - him you bring under the yoke of slavery, as though defying and fighting against the divine decree.<sup>428</sup>

We see the normal Stoic and Philonic reasoning here: Gregory agrees that God is the only valid owner, and that slavery is by no means natural. The pride he identifies here is that human beings have become so greedy, in their lust to own all things, they have even started to rob God of his property, namely human beings. He quotes several Old Testament verses that, according to Gregory, state the limits of human dominion; all these verses state that humans must rule over the plants and animals of creation, but never humans (he refers to Gen. 1:26; Ps. 8:7-8; 104/103:16).<sup>429</sup> Slavery implies a reversal of divine order for Gregory. The true master (over the

---

<sup>428</sup> Translation: Robert J. Wright, *Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon* (ACCS 9; Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2005), 210; Greek text: Alexander: 335: ἐξουσίας παρὰ τῆς ὁ οὖν κτῆμα ἑαυτοῦ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ κτῆμα ποιούμενος ἐπιμερίζων τε τῷ γένει τὴν δυναστείαν, ὡς ἀνδρῶν τε ἄμα καὶ γυναικῶν ἑαυτὸν κύριον οἶεσθαι, τί ἄλλο καὶ οὐχὶ διαβαίνει τῇ ὑπερηφανίᾳ τὴν φύσιν, ἄλλο τι ἑαυτὸν παρὰ τοὺς ἀρχομένους βλέπων; Ἐκτησάμην δούλους καὶ παιδίσκας. τί λέγεις; δουλεία καταδικάζεις τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐ ἐλευθέρα ἢ φύσις καὶ αὐτεξούσιος, καὶ ἀντινομοθετεῖς τῷ θεῷ, ἀνατρέπων αὐτοῦ τὸν ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει νόμον. τὸν γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γενόμενον, ἐφ' ᾧ τε κύριον εἶναι τῆς γῆς καὶ εἰς ἀρχὴν τεταγμένον παρὰ τοῦ πλάσαντος, τοῦτον ὑπάγεις τῷ τῆς δουλείας ζυγῷ, ὥσπερ ἀντιβαίνων τε καὶ μαχόμενος τῷ θεῷ προστάγματι.

<sup>429</sup> Cf. Maria M. Bergadá, “La condamnation de l’esclavage dans l’homélie IV,” in *Gregory of Nyssa Homilies on Ecclesiastes: An English Version with Supporting Studies* (Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on

earth) now becomes enslaved. He also argues from the perspective that all human beings are created in the image of God. For Gregory, the fact that human beings are created in the image of God makes them priceless, hence the terrible and sinful character of slavery.<sup>430</sup>

Gregory uses the principle of the heteronomy of bodies in a different way. All bodies are heteronomous, but the ability to rule over a human body rests with God alone, and by being a slaveholder, the greatest hubris is found - human beings taking up the role of God. Like Seneca, Gregory also emphasizes the shared humanity that exists between slaveholders and slaves, and the futility of legal contracts binding people into slavery.<sup>431</sup> He states (*Hom. Eccl. 4.6*):

Your origin is from the same ancestors, your life is of the same kind, sufferings of soul and body prevail alike over you who own him and the one who is the subject of your ownership - pains and pleasures, merriment and distress, sorrows and delights, rages and terrors, sickness and death. Is there any difference in these things between the slave and his owner?<sup>432</sup>

---

Gregory of Nyssa (St. Andrews, 5–10 September 1990); Stuart G. Hall (ed.); Berlin: De Gruyter, 1994), 185–96; Steven Epstein, *Speaking of Slavery: Color, Ethnicity, and Human Bondage in Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 140.

<sup>430</sup> Hart has also argued that Gregory’s critique on slavery is reliant on his eschatology and concepts of eternal reward and punishment, in which all human beings are equal. This is a very valid point and the same type of thinking is also present with other Christian authors of late antiquity; cf. David B. Hart, “The ‘Whole Humanity’: Gregory of Nyssa’s Critique of Slavery in the Light of His Eschatology,” *SJTh* 54, no. 1 (2001): 51–69.

<sup>431</sup> Cf. Trevor J. Dennis, “The Relation Between Gregory of Nyssa’s Attack on Slavery in His Fourth Homily on Ecclesiastes and His Treatise *De Hominis Opificio*,” *StPatr* 17 (1982): 1065–72; Trevor J. Dennis, “Man Beyond Price: Gregory of Nyssa and Slavery,” in *Heaven and Earth: Essex Essays in Theology and Ethics* (Andrew Linzey and Peter J. Wexler (eds); Worthing: Churchman, 1986), 129–45; Rachel Moriarty, “Human Owners, Human Slaves: Gregory of Nyssa, *Hom. Eccl. 4*,” *StPatr* 27 (1993): 62–69.

<sup>432</sup> Translation: Stuart G. Hall and Rachel Moriarty, “Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa: Homilies on Ecclesiastes” in *Gregory of Nyssa Homilies on Ecclesiastes: An English Version with Supporting Studies* (Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (St. Andrews, 5–10 September 1990); Stuart G. Hall (ed.); Berlin: De Gruyter, 1994), 73; Greek text: Alexander: 338: ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν σοι ἡ γένεσις, ὁμοιότροπος ἡ ζωὴ, κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐπικρατεῖ τὰ τε τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη σοῦ τε τοῦ κυριεύοντος κακείνου τοῦ



slaveholding authority, and the notion that the human body can be commodified. He illustrates that one can maintain Stoic and Philonic views without becoming indifferent to institutional slavery. He is one of the few authors who links the very act of owning a slave to partaking in vice. Stoic (especially Senecan) arguments of the shared experience of life and death, and origin, are widely used in the homily. Its Stoic and Philonic elements may be its only limit - Gregory still creates a space for the concept of God being a slaveholder, something that is also problematic. In order to fully abolish, or at least, reject slavery, one would have to reject the Philonic and later Pauline notion that God, too, is a slaveholder. This Gregory unfortunately does not do, but at least he is not indifferent to institutional slavery. Moreover, not only does he oppose the notion of natural slavery, but also highlights the pride found in Ecclesiastes 2:7 by mentioning slaves and animals in the same verse. It has been seen that slaves were often equated with animals, and Gregory directly rejects this notion (*Hom. Eccl. 4.7*). Gregory of Nyssa's homily here is one of the earliest accounts of the outright rejection of slavery.<sup>435</sup> It is true, his arguments are especially directed against the concept of mastery, and the problem of pride that is associated with it, and it is certainly not an abolitionist manifesto, but it is still proof that ancient authors *were* able to think outside the 'normality' and 'banality' of slaveholding. The argument that ancient authors could not think outside this box, outside this 'background' or 'social context' that is the ancient Mediterranean slaveholding culture, becomes more difficult to maintain in the light of writings like this homily. The limits of Gregory's homily still being acknowledged (the proliferation of the God-as-slaveholder metaphor and the heteronomy of the body), it must still be appreciated for its immense value as an ancient source that outright rejects slaveholding, the concept of mastery and the commodification of the body. Gregory does not give principles of slave-management - there are none for him, slave-management, and slaveholding, are in themselves vices and sins. *Oikonomia* and domination have their limits.<sup>436</sup>

In Theodoret's interpretation of the *haustafeln* in Ephesians, he remarks on the prevalence of slaves in the early church, a very important observation (*Int. Eph. 6.5*). Like most

---

<sup>435</sup> Cf. Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 83–84; Glancy, "Slavery and the Rise of Christianity," 474; Klein, *Haltung der kappadokischen Bischöfe*, 8.

<sup>436</sup> For a full discussion on the concept of *oikonomia* in the works of Gregory of Nyssa, cf. Reinhard J. Kees, *Die Lehre von der Oikonomia Gottes in der Oratio Catechetica Gregors von Nyssa* (Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae; Leiden: Brill, 1995), esp. 36-37, 110.

of the authors above, except Gregory of Nyssa, Theodoret does not address the problem of slavery per se, but also notes that Christian slaves ought to work better because they are not working for earthly masters, but for the heavenly master. In fact, Theodoret remarks that slaves have ‘better’ lives than masters, exactly due to the curative nature of mastery (*Prov.* 7.677b-680). Masters have more cares and worries than slaves, and slaves may sleep better than master because of this. The argument seems ridiculous, but the argument seems to have been popular in antiquity. Libanius, Chrysostom and Theodoret are quoted in using this argument:

Libanius (*Or.* 2.5.66-67): Menander, son of Diopeithes, was not lacking in shrewdness. He very often found himself in thrall to his own slaves, and thus felt able to say: ‘There is only one slave in the house: the master.’ And certainly, keeping a slave, in good seasons and in bad, is a real worry. All the slave has to do is cast his eyes towards his master’s hands, whereas the master is obliged to hold out his hands to the slave. He may well complain about the weather, the anger of Zeus, the failure of the winds to blow, and all that hinders the ripening of the crop. But none of these things release him from his performance of his duty to the slave. On the contrary, the land always provides the slave with something, even when it provides nothing. As for clothes and shoes, the cloth is woven and the leather stitched up while he sleeps. If the slave falls ill, he has nothing to be anxious about except his illness; to another falls the worry of seeing to remedies, doctors, incantations. And at the moment of death, there is no need for fear on the subject of burial; the burden of that will fall on the man who, for all that he appears to be a master, is in actual fact a slave.<sup>437</sup>

---

<sup>437</sup> Translation: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 50; Greek text: Teubner: 170: νοῦν δὲ εἶχε Μένανδρος ὁ Διοπείθους καὶ πλεῖστα τοῖς οἰκέταις ἄρα τοῖς αὐτοῦ δεδουλευκῶς οὗτος ἔσχεν εἰπεῖν τό· εἷς ἐστὶ δούλος οἰκίας ὁ δεσπότης. καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς πολὺς ὁ τῶν φροντίδων ἔσμός, ὡς οἰκέτην θρέψη ἐν εὐπραξίᾳ τε καὶ κακοπραγίᾳ. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνου χειρᾶς ἰδεῖν, τῷ δὲ ὀρέγειν ἀνάγκη. καιρὸν δὲ αἰτιάσασθαι καὶ Διὸς ὀργὴν καὶ πνευμάτων ἀπουσίαν καὶ ὅσα καρπογονίαν ἴσχει, τούτων οὐδὲν

Chrysostom (*Hom. I Cor. 6*): So, tell me, what use is it when, though not enslaved to a person, you bow in subjection to your passions? Since people often know how to spare; but those masters are never satisfied with your destruction. Are you enslaved to a person? Think about it: your master is also a slave to you, in providing you with food, in taking care of your health and in looking after your shoes and all the other things. And you do not fear so much less you should offend your master; but the master, in the same way, worries if you do not have any of those necessities. But the master sits down, while you stand. So what? Since this may be said of you as well as of the master. Often, at least, when you are lying down and sleeping peacefully, the master is not only standing, but experiencing countless problems in the marketplace; and the master tosses and turns more painfully than you.<sup>438</sup>

---

ἀπολογία πρὸς δοῦλον. ἀλλ' ἐκείνω γε ἡ γῆ καὶ μὴ φέρουσα φέρει, ἐσθῆς δὲ καὶ ὑποδήματα ἢ μὲν ἐξυφαίνεται, τὰ δὲ ῥάπτεται καθεύδοντι, γαμοῦσι δὲ οὐδὲν προνοήσαντες, ἀλλ' ἢ μὲν πρόνοια τοῦ δεσπότη, τοῦ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐρῶσθαι πρὸς τὴν εὐνήν. ἀσθενοῦντι δὲ οἰκέτη μία φροντίς τὸ ἀρρώστημα, φαρμάκων δὲ καὶ ἰατρῶν καὶ ἐπωδῶν ἄλλω μελήσει. καὶ ἀποθνήσκοντί γε φόβος οὐδεὶς ταφῆς πέρι. ταφέα γὰρ αὐτὸν ἔχει τὸν δοκοῦντα μὲν δεσπότην, ὄντα δὲ δοῦλον.

<sup>438</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Greek text: PG 61.157.61-158.16: Τί γὰρ ὄφελος, εἰπέ μοι, ὅταν ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν μὴ δουλεύῃς, τοῖς δὲ πάθει σεαυτὸν ὑποκατακλίνῃς; Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ φείσασθαι ἐπίστανται πολλάκις, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ οἱ δεσπῶται οὐδέποτε κορέννυνταί σου τῆς ἀπωλείας. Δουλεύεις ἀνθρώπῳ; Ἄλλὰ καὶ ὁ Δεσπότης σοὶ δουλεύει, διοικούμενός σοι τὰ τῆς τροφῆς, ἐπιμελούμενός σου τῆς ὑγείας καὶ ἐνδυμάτων καὶ ὑποδημάτων, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων φροντίζων. Καὶ οὐχ οὕτω σὺ δέδοικας, μὴ προσκρούσης τῷ Δεσπότη, ὡς ἐκεῖνος δέδοικε μὴ τί σοι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐπιλίπη. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνος κατάκειται, σὺ δὲ ἔστηκας. Καὶ τί τοῦτο; οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο παρ' αὐτῷ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ σοί. Πολλάκις γοῦν σοῦ κατακειμένου καὶ ὑπνοῦντος ἡδέως, ἐκεῖνος οὐχ ἔστηκε μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ μυρίας ὑπομένει βίας ἐπὶ τῆς ἀγορᾶς, καὶ ἀγρυπνεῖ σοῦ χαλεπώτερον.

Theodoret (*Prov.* 7.677b-680): The master of the house, beset by many worries, considers how to provide for the needs of the slaves, how to pay the state taxes, how to sell his surplus produce and buy what he needs. If the land is unkind to farmers, imitating in this the ingratitude of men to the Creator, the master is distressed, looks around his creditors, pays his accounts, and goes into voluntary slavery...The slave, on the other hand, though a slave in body, enjoys freedom of soul and has none of these worries...He takes his food, rationed no doubt, but he has no anxieties. He lies down to sleep on the pavement, but worry does not banish sleep: on the contrary, its sweetness on his eyelids keeps him from feeling the hardness of the ground. Wisdom, speaking in accordance with nature, said: ‘Sleep is sweet to the slave.’ [Eccl. 5:12]...His master is constantly bothered by indigestion: he takes more than enough, bolts his food, and forces it down. The slave consumes only what he needs, takes what is given to him with moderation, enjoys what he receives, digests it slowly, and it fortifies him for his work. You consider only the slavery of this man; you do not consider his health. You see the work, but not the recompense involved; you complain of toil, but forget the happiness of a carefree life...<sup>439</sup>

---

<sup>439</sup> Translation: Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 51; PG 83.665-685: Ο μὲν γὰρ τῆς οἰκίας δεσπότης, πολλαῖς πολιορκεῖται φροντίσι, σκοπούμενος ὅπως τοῖς οικείοις πορίσῃ τὰς χρείας, ὅπως βασιλευσὶ τὴν τεταγμένην εἰσφορὰν εἰσενέγκῃ, ὅπως ἀποδῶται μὲν τῶν προσόδων τὰ περιττὰ, ὠνήσῃται δὲ τὰ ἐνδέοντα. Ἄγνώμων ἢ γῆ περὶ τοὺς γηπόνους ἐγένετο, τὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὸν Ποιητὴν ἀγνωμοσύνην οὕτω πως μιμουμένη· ὁ δὲ ἀνιᾶται, καὶ δανειστὰς περισκοπεῖ, καὶ γραμματεῖα διαγράφει, καὶ τὴν αὐθαίρετον ἐπισπᾶται δουλείαν... Ὁ δὲ οἰκέτης τῷ σώματι δουλεύων, ἐλευθέρων ἔχει τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ἀπηλλαγμένην. Οὐ γὰρ ὀδύρεται γῆς ἀκαρπίαν, οὐδὲ ὠνίων ἀπρασίαν ὀλοφύρεται...μέτρῳ λαμβάνει τὸ σιτηρέσιον, ἀλλὰ φροντίδος ἀπηλλαγμένον. Ἐπ’ ἐδάφους καθεύδει, ἀλλ’ οὐ μέριμνα τὸν ὕπνον ἐξελαύνει, ἀλλὰ γλυκὺς αὐτοῦ τοῖς βλεφάρους ἐπιχεόμενος οὐκ ἔῃ τῆς τοῦ ἐδάφους ἀντιτυπίας αισθάνεσθαι. Καὶ τοῦτο φυσιολογῶν ὁ Σοφὸς ἔλεγε· «Γλυκὺς ὁ ὕπνος τῷ δούλῳ»... Ἄρτον ἐσθίει πιτυρίαν, οὐδὲ μικροῦ προσοψήματος ἀπολαύων·



Behind these statements functions the notion of the heteronomous body. What is important to see here, specifically from Chrysostom and Theodoret, is that earthly cares and administrations, *oikonomia* that is, is in themselves something that enslaves the *pater familias*. The argument functions well in Theodoret and Chrysostom's ascetic moralisms. But we also see the influence from non-Christian Greek authors like Libanius, who taught Chrysostom. It is linked with the Stoic idea that one can be ruled by the passions, only in this instance one is ruled by the responsibilities and general causalities of life. Both Theodoret and Chrysostom's strategy with this argument is to promote the ascetic life. Shenoute of Atripe, when discussing the hierarchical dynamics of the monastery, makes an almost identical observation, as Krawiec remarks:

[H]e [Shenoute] makes clear that monastic rank was not to mimic the economic rank that existed outside the monastery. 'Therefore let us not say blasphemously, "Those who rule us are our masters and we are beneath them like servants." Those who rule us are not over us, but we are over them and they are beneath us; indeed, they are our servants because they take care of us, with God's help, in everything.'<sup>440</sup>

Slave-management then becomes a strategy for promoting asceticism. Chrysostom and Theodoret imply here that the administration of material possessions, including slaves, is an act that enslaves. The point the argument wants to make is that it is not that terrible to occupy the

---

ἀλλ' ἥδιον τοῦ δεσπότητος τῆς τροφῆς ἀπολαύει. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ διηνεκῶς γαστριζόμενος, καὶ τοῦ κόρου τοὺς ὄρους ὑπερβαίνων, ὡθεῖ τὰ σιτία, καὶ κατ' ἀνάγκην τῇ γαστρὶ παραπέμπει· ὁ δὲ τῇ χρεῖα μετρῶν τὴν μετάληψιν, καὶ τὸν χοίνικα τὸν διδόμενον οἰκονομικῶς διαιρῶν, ὀρεγόμενος τὴν τροφήν ὑποδέχεται, καὶ πέττει ῥαδίως, συνεργὸν λαβὼν τὸν πόνον. Σὺ δὲ τὴν μὲν δουλείαν βλέπεις, τὴν δὲ ὑγίαν οὐ βλέπεις· καὶ τὴν μὲν διακονίαν ὀρᾷς, τὴν δὲ θυμηδίαν οὐ θεωρεῖς· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πόνου κατηγορεῖς, τὸν δὲ ἀφρόντιδα βίον οὐ μακαρίζεις·

<sup>440</sup> Rebecca Krawiec, *Shenoute and the Women of the White Monastery: Egyptian Monasticism in Late Antiquity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 140.

position of an institutional slave - it is better to be a slave than a master, since the slave is in this way more 'free' than the slaveholder. The ascetic life, with its renunciation of wealth, should not be seen as an inferior life. The renunciation of wealth is what makes one free. Although this argument bears resemblance to Stoic moral slavery, the use of the metaphor in this manner is more problematic. While the Stoic use led to indifference regarding institutional slavery, this argument is not indifferent at all. Institutional slavery is favoured and promoted by such an argument.<sup>441</sup> Institutional slavery, by implication, offers a type of socio-economic protection that seems more favourable than the risks and threats evident in the life of the free person.

*Oikonomia*, for Theodoret, as well as Libanius and Chrysostom, is therefore considered a life permeated with peril and anxiety, while the life of the slave, which resembles the life of the ascetic, is in fact a 'better' and more free life. Institutional slavery is therefore used here in more than a Stoic metaphorical manner. It is used in a shock-argument to promote the simple life of the slave of God, the ascetic. In this case, while the ascetic is morally free, his or her physical existence of simplicity, service and discipline does resemble the life of the institutional slave. In this typically Christian ascetic philosophy we find a conglomeration of elements from Stoicism, Epicureanism, and especially Cynicism. The Stoic elements have already been mentioned. It was also seen earlier in this chapter that Epicurus believed that the desire for unnatural wealth enslaves the person seeking it. The argumentation is very similar here. Epicurus, however, would never ascribe to denouncing all one's possessions and wealth. He did believe that a measure of wealth is necessary to lead a naturally happy life. The preference in Christian asceticism to live a poor, simple life is more a representation of the Cynic life, one that Epicurus abhorred. The ideological lines of Christian asceticism and Cynicism are quite similar, especially in the notion that rulers are people who are supposed to serve others.<sup>442</sup> Garnsey notes that metaphorical and moral slavery, before entering Stoicism, passed through a Cynic 'filter.'<sup>443</sup> This is evident in Diogenes of Sinope's self-description as a *κοσμοπολίτης*, a 'citizen of the world, which implied a rejection of the conventional city and its institutions' (Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.*

---

<sup>441</sup> Grey, "Slavery in the Late Roman World," 493.

<sup>442</sup> Cf. David Seeley, "Rulership and Service in Mark 10:41-45," *NovT* 35 (1993): 234-50; Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 106.

<sup>443</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 128-33.

6.2).<sup>444</sup> Diogenes himself was a slave. Diogenes famously, while being displayed at a slave-auction, said to his auctioneers that they should sell him to a rich Corinthian who apparently needed a ‘master.’ With the rise of Christian asceticism, the close philosophical interplays between Stoicism and Cynicism were reimagined, and with the discourses of renouncing wealth and material possessions, also came the renunciation of slaveholding and slave-management. It may have started with early Christian ‘policy’ that there is no longer slave or free (cf. Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). As Downing notes, these statements were very much influenced by Cynic and Stoic precepts.<sup>445</sup> The early Christians never abolished slavery, but rather, they implied that the labels ‘slave’ and ‘free’ have no more significance in ecclesiastical structures. I refer to this as ‘policy,’ since these statements were most likely early baptismal formulae, and had ceremonial and liturgical function. In early Christian households slaves still had to be managed as the *haustafeln* imply. It implies that these Christian authors still considered slaves as property, commodified bodies that are part of one’s wealth. Unlike Gregory of Nyssa, who argues from quasi-humanitarian reasons for the rejection of slaveholding, these ascetic authors argue against the possession of slaves within the larger framework of greed and superfluous wealth.

In another commentary on Ecclesiastes, Didymus the Blind also emphasizes the futility of slaveholding, but not in the same way as Gregory (*Comm. Eccl.* 166.9, 223.3). Didymus, in typical ascetic fashion, groups slaves with wealth that should preferably be avoided. Didymus, however, does allow for the keeping of slaves and quotes the Ephesian *haustafeln* regarding slave-management. While Didymus is uncomfortable with the idea of having many slaves, it is also moral slavery that is the greatest obstacle to true freedom.<sup>446</sup> He does admit that someone can be the lord of their wealth without having it rule them, but the contrary seems to be more common. He states (*Comm. Eccl.* 155.11-17):

Of what use is wealth that belongs to someone? He is obviously lord over his wealth. The wealth somebody owns is his amenity and he himself is lord over his wealth. As he himself can use wealth well by being lord over it and not its slave, so also wealth

---

<sup>444</sup> Ibid., 132.

<sup>445</sup> F. Gerald Downing, *Cynics, Paul and the Pauline Churches* (Routledge: London, 1988), 1-25.

<sup>446</sup> Kontoulis, *Problem der Sklaverei*, 97–99.

can become lord over him who owns it. Woe to that person. That is the case if he is greedy and becomes a slave of mammon.<sup>447</sup>

We see here, as with most of the late ancient Christian authors, that moral mastery is considered an important trait of the Christian, especially in the ascetic sense. Didymus' statement above is somewhat unique in that it is not overly negative about wealth. Most of the Christian authors, especially Chrysostom, exhibit a much more suspicious attitude when it comes to riches. Clement of Alexandria, for instance, states (*Paed.* 3.6): 'Take away, then, directly the ornaments from women, and domestics from masters, and you will find masters in no respect different from bought slaves in step, or look, or voice, so like are they to their slaves. But they differ in that they are feebler than their slaves, and have a more sickly upbringing.'<sup>448</sup> He hints here that it is not only power, but the possession of wealth that discerns slaveholders from slaves, but again in typical Stoic fashion, if all these elements of wealth are removed, there is no difference between the slaveholder and the slave.

In the discussion above, we have seen how many of the ancient Christian commentators on the *haustafeln* reimagined and transformed the principles found in these texts to suit the needs of a Christianity that has developed much since the New Testament *haustafeln* were written. It is important to note that despite the clear continuities among many of the late ancient Christian authors discussed above, each should also be read on his own if the more subtle discourses are to be understood. Some, like Gregory of Nyssa, differ quite dramatically from the views of others,

---

<sup>447</sup> Translation: Wright, *Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Solomon*, 244; Greek text: Kramer: 155: πρὸς τί ἐστὶν ὁ πλοῦτός τινος; ἔστιν δηλονότι κάκειν[ος] | τοῦ πλούτου κ[ύριος. οὗ]τος οὖν ὁ παρὰ τινι γλυκασμὸς αὐτοῦ ἐστὶν, καὶ αὐτὸς [κύριός] | ἐστὶν τοῦ πλ[ούτου]: ὥσπερ αὐτὸς δύναται χρῆσασθαι καλῶς τῷ πλούτῳ, | κρατῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ μὴ δουλεύων αὐτῷ, τουτέστιν τῷ μαμωνᾶ, τούτῳ καὶ πλοῦτος δύναται [κ]ρ[ατ]ῆσαι τοῦ ἔχοντος· καὶ οὐαὶ ἐκείνῳ· ἔστιν ὅταν φιλάργυρος γένηται, ὅταν δοῦλος μαμωνᾶ.

<sup>448</sup> Translation: *NPNF*; Greek text: SC 3.177: Αὐτίκα γοῦν περιέλε τὸν κόσμον τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τοὺς οἰκέτας τῶν δεσποτῶν, οὐδὲν διαφέροντας τῶν ἀργυρωνήτων εὐρήσεις τοὺς δεσπότας, οὐκ ἐν βαδίσματι, οὐκ ἐν βλέμματι, οὐκ ἐν φθέγματι· οὕτως τοίνυν τοῖς ἀνδραπόδοις εἰκόασιν. Ἄλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἀσθενέστεροι εἶναι τῶν οἰκετῶν διακρίνονται καὶ τῷ νοσηλότερον ἀνατεθράφθαι.

for instance, Theodoret. The continuities, however, for the purpose of this study is very important. Several discursive continuities have come to the fore in the above readings:

Firstly, all of the authors mentioned above utilized the Stoic/Philonian slave-master metaphor in their own virtue-discourse. The heteronomy of the body is assumed in all these metaphors, and priority was always placed on serving the heavenly master, especially if the commands of the earthly master were in conflict with Christian theological principles. This would have a very physical effect on the management and governing of slave-bodies in the early church. With the development of Christian tradition, various issues not addressed in biblical texts had to be articulated. One of the most important issues in this instance was the regulation regarding slaveholding and sexuality. While the New Testament is quite cryptic in most instances about this issue, many late ancient Christian authors directly addressed the issue. It was especially evident in the writings of Basil the Great. The control of slave-sexuality was not only an issue of household mastery, but was now directly addressed through church polity. The slaveholder, if a Christian, had to ensure chaste behaviour of slaves, and shameful actions of slaves would reflect onto the slaveholder; hence the importance of knowing the sexual history of one's slaves. The regulation of slave-sexuality, as a subset of slave-management and *oikonomia*, not only concerns issues of Christian sexual ethics but were inextricably connected with socio-political matters. The preservation of the Roman *patrimonium* was still of absolute importance to the Christian authors, and sexual relationships between slaves and owners were forbidden to ensure the *patrimonium* remained in the hands of legitimate heirs. Even Christian regulations on child-exposure, similar to Midrashic texts, were based on the protection of Christian-Roman identity and inheritance. Marriages between slaves were also closely monitored, and any marriage outside the knowledge of the slaveholder was considered illegal. The slaveholder, therefore, still had absolute authority in slave familial matters. The governance of conjugality among slaves also represents a discourse of othering and abnormalizing. By creating the category of abnormality that includes slaves, by creating a type of sub-humanity, even half-human half-animal, the juridical discourses that govern and shape society are brought into disturbance.<sup>449</sup> The matter above is not simply one of protecting the Roman *patrimonium* nor ensuring the bounds of mastery stay intact; the laws are applied to slaves in a very different manner than to

---

<sup>449</sup>For a discussion of this ethical matter, cf. Michel Foucault, "The Abnormals," in *The Essential Works of Foucault 1954–1984 Volume 1: Ethics* (Paul Rabinow (ed.); London: Penguin, 1994), 51–52.

free persons - this was evident from as early as the examinations of Xenophon and Plato. Once one subscribes to arguments based on nature and naturalization (even, as with the Christian authors above, the recognition that slavery is ‘unnatural’), the juridical effects of transgressions from people who deviate from ‘nature’ and the ‘natural’ are altered. Both slaves and women, as is evident from the works of Ambrose, are objectified in the realm of conjugal matters, and similar marriage laws were applicable between Romans and non-Romans or barbarians.<sup>450</sup> These discursivities are also present in the non-Christian authors of late antiquity. The Syrian Neoplatonist Iamblichus states: ‘For by education merely men differ from wild beasts, the Greeks from the barbarians, those that are free from slaves, and the philosophers from the vulgar’ (*Pyth. vit.* 8).<sup>451</sup> As objects, they receive a certain value and are measured by certain traits, they become commodified and by implication, especially in the case of slave, disposable. The juridical boundaries serve to enforce the carcerality of such bodies, and the special juridical circumstances and measures symbolically confine them to the category of unnaturals and abnormal. The juridical regulation of the abnormal has yet another function - it serves as a technology for the punishment of extreme crimes committed by those grouped among the normals. The punishment for the crimes of free, Greek/Roman men were harsh, but they seldomly received the punishments reserved for slaves. When they do receive such punishments, it serves as technology for prevention of similar, heinous crimes and the previously labelled ‘normal’ person now also becomes a human monster, since he or she is punished like other abnormal and monsters of society. It is a volatile resort by the governing authorities since it tends to also stain the reputation of those in power who apply the punishment. The fourth century Roman imperial biographer Aurelius Victor, for instance, after praising the emperor Constantine the Great as one who was merciful to his enemies and treated them with honour, leading to

---

<sup>450</sup> Cf. Thomas E.C. Wiedemann, “Between Men and Beasts: Barbarians in Ammianus Marcellinus,” in *Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and Roman Historical Writing* (I. S. Moxon, J. D. Smart, and A. J. Woodman (eds); Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 135–54; Peter Heather, “The Barbarian in Late Antiquity: Image, Reality, and Transformation,” in *Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity* (Richard Miles (ed.); London: Routledge, 1999), 234–58.

<sup>451</sup> Translation: Thomas Taylor, *Iamblichus’ Life of Pythagoras Or Pythagoric Life* (London: John M. Watkins, 1965), 28; Greek text: Teubner: 58: [ἀλλ’ ἐκ παιδείας]. σχεδὸν γὰρ ταῖς ἀγωγαῖς διαφέρειν τοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπους τῶν θηρίων, τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας τῶν βαρβάρων, τοὺς δὲ ἐλευθέρους τῶν οἰκετῶν, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους τῶν τυχόντων...

Constantine's divinization, he defames Constantine's rival Licinius by stating: 'Licinius performed tortures applicable to slaves in unlimited numbers even on innocent philosophers of nobility' (*Caes.* 41).<sup>452</sup> In the thinking of Aurelius Victor, the shame of the juridical procedure is now reflected back on Licinius, who becomes the human monster and outcast, while the opposite behaviour of Constantine made him divine. To continue, the bodies of slaves were also governed when it came to religious matters, and here the material effects of metaphorical and moral slavery become the most apparent. Slaves who served in non-Christian rituals in behalf of *lapsi*-slaveholders were punished with a year's penance in some cases, and that is only if they were forced by their owners. The original policies found in the *haustafeln* now become more complex, and those original codes serve only the interest of authorizing, that is, granting authority to, more specialized and recent juridical sub-codes; they are no longer practical as such. The rise and popularisation of asceticism also complicated the matter. Issues like the management of virginity had to be specifically articulated within the context of slave-management. The inclusion of slaves in monasteries is even more complex. This issue will also be discussed in chapter 4, but what may be noted now is that even though monasteries claimed to nullify social hierarchical models, the extent to which this was practised remains ambiguous. Some sources, Chrysostom included, profess that monasteries know no difference between slave and master; others, like Shenoute of Atripe, even said that the monastic setting reversed the roles. No doubt then that proponents of asceticism consciously utilized the slave-metaphor to construct their view of the ascetic life. Often, the lifestyles of institutional slaves were lauded as a good life since it so closely represented the ascetic and monastic life. Moreover, since the use of the slave-metaphor was so effective in constructing otherness and abnormality, it was used extensively in Christian and non-Christian invective rhetoric. The abnormal other is not only constructed, but also shamed with the use of the slave-metaphor. This type of othering, or heterography, promotes the values embodied by the heterographer, and vilifies those of the opposing group of abnormal. Heterologies,<sup>453</sup> or discourses on the other, are therefore crucial to the conceptualisation of the self. The notions of difference and discontinuity, even disorientation, allow for the existence of

---

<sup>452</sup> Translation: De Wet; Latin text: Teubner: 125; *Licinio ne insontium quidem ac nobilium philosophorum servili more cruciatus adhibiti modum fecere.*

<sup>453</sup> For a full discussion of heterology, cf. Michel de Certeau, *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other* (Brian Massumi (trans.); Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).

their opposites. It is also true however, as Foucault has noted, that heterological dichotomies are in many instances merely illusions and fictions, but their manifestations in the spheres of history and society are still active and influential.<sup>454</sup> Such heterological formations serve, in the context of late antiquity, as boundary markers that promote and enforce social group-cohesion. It should also be acknowledged that the temptation for the historian of heterologies explicitly lies in the dangers of parallelism. It would be quite easy to start examining the other by drawing parallels of its opposites, but conceptually it proves to be problematic and futile. Rather, many post-colonial studies have shown that there is an explicit conflation of identities when competing groups and cultures encounter one another, often resulting in operations of transculturation and in the translation of subtle underlying grammars of difference; thus identity is invented and negotiated.<sup>455</sup> Rather than fishing for strict parallels or rigid opposites, the historian of heterologies would do better to make a case based on shared conceptual, rhetorical and behavioural patterns. This is very important for understanding the nature of the habitus, which is in essence a dynamic process of negotiation and reimagination in itself. The use of the slave-metaphor as a subset of the habitus of Roman slaveholding is one such shared pattern. While Christian authors were slandering their opponents by calling them slaves of the belly and, as Knust has illustrated, slaves of lust and sexual desire, opponents of Christianity often utilised the same rhetoric.<sup>456</sup> Porphyry,<sup>457</sup> for instance, states that the author of the Gospel according to

---

<sup>454</sup> Foucault, “The Abnormals,” 53–55.

<sup>455</sup> The works that have most influenced my own opinion on this matter are: Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage, 1994); Ania Loomba, *Colonialism/Postcolonialism* (The New Critical Idiom; Abingdon: Routledge, 1998); Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 2004).

<sup>456</sup> Knust, *Abandoned to Lust*, 15–50.

<sup>457</sup> Porphyry, being a Neoplatonist, also fully subscribed to notions of moral slavery. In writing on abstinence, he states (*Abst.* 3.27.74-81): ‘But those who are liberated from slavery obtain for themselves what they before procured for their masters. In like manner, also, do you, when liberated from the servitude of the body, and a slavish attention to the passions produced through the body, as, prior to this, you nourished them in an all-various manner with externals, so now nourish yourself all-variously with internal good, justly assuming things which are [properly] your own, and no longer by violence taking away things which are foreign [to your true nature and real good].’ Translation: Taylor, *Porphyry*, 130; Greek text: Teubner: 211: οἱ δὲ γε ἐλευθερωθέντες ἅ πάλαι τοῖς δεσπόταις ὑπηρετοῦντες ἐπόριζον, ταῦτα ἑαυτοῖς πορίζουσιν. οὐκ ἄλλως καὶ σὺ τοίνυν ἀπαλλαγείς τῆς τοῦ σώματος [δουλείας] καὶ τῆς τοῖς πάθεσι τοῖς διὰ τὸ σῶμα λατρείας, ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἔτρεφες



Matthew had the mind of a slave (*Contr. Chr.* 1(fr.).13; from Macarius, *Apoc.* 4.3) and when speaking of Paul the apostle's comment that he mimicked those people he preached to in order to convert them, Porphyry states (*Contr. Chr.* 1(fr.).27.1-12; from Macarius, *Apoc.* 3.30):

Tell me how it was that Paul said: 'Although I have made myself a slave for all that I could gain' (1 Cor. 9:19), and how he called circumcision mutilation, and then circumcised a certain Timothy as taught in the Acts of the Apostles (Acts 16:3). The absolute stupidity of it all! Is it a means of provoking laughter that such a stage, such theatre scenes are portrayed. Indeed this is the show jugglers give. For how could he be free if he made himself a slave of all? And how can a man gain them all who is serving all? For he is without law for those who are without law, as he says. And he was a Jew to the Jews, and spoke with them all in similar fashion. He was truly the slave of manifold evil, and totally a stranger to freedom. Truly he is a servant and minister of other evil people, and an unseemingly zealot to unworthy causes if he offers diatribes against the wickedness of those without the law, nevertheless making their activities his own.<sup>458</sup>

---

παντοίως τοῖς ἕξωθεν, οὕτως αὐτὸν θρέψεις παντοίως τοῖς ἔνδοθεν, δικαίως ἀπολαμβάνων τὰ ἴδια καὶ οὐκέτι τὰ ἀλλότρια βία ἀφαιρούμενος.

<sup>458</sup> Translation: Robert M. Berchman, *Porphyry Against the Christians* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 206; Greek Text: Von Harnack: 59: Πῶς ὁ Παῦλος, Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν, λέγει, πᾶσιν ἑμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα πάντας κερδήσω; πῶς δὲ καὶ τὴν περιτομὴν λέγων κατατομὴν αὐτὸς ἐν Λύστροις περιτέμνει τινά, Τιμόθεον, ὡς αἱ Πράξεις τῶν ἀποστόλων διδάσκουσιν; εὗ γε τῆς ὄντως ὧδε βλακειᾶς τῶν ῥημάτων· τοιοῦτον ὀκρίβαντα, γελοίου μηχανήματα, αἱ τῶν θεάτρων σκηναὶ ζωγραφοῦσι· τοιοῦτον θαυματοποιῶν ὄντως τὸ παραπαίγιον. πῶς γὰρ ἐλεύθερος ὁ [παρὰ] πᾶσι δουλούμενος; πῶς δὲ πάντας κερδαίνει ὁ πάντας καθικετεύων; εἰ γὰρ τοῖς ἀνόμοις ἄνομος, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, καὶ τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις Ἰουδαῖος καὶ τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως συνήρχετο, ὄντως πολυτρόπου κακίας ἀνδράποδον, καὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας ξένον καὶ

Here, we see a criticism against Paul for being a slave to the opinions of other people. By mimicking other people, Paul, according to Porphyry, inadvertently became their slave. In a very revealing yet emotional passage, another late ancient opponent of Christianity, Eunapius vehemently tirades against the reverence of monks and the cult of the martyrs (*Vit. Eust.*):

They settled these monks at Canobus also, and thus they fettered the human race to the worship of slaves, and those not even honest slaves, instead of the true gods. For they collected the bones and skulls of criminals who had been put to death for numerous crimes, men whom the law courts of the city had condemned to punishment, made them out to be gods, haunted their sepulchres, and thought that they became better by defiling themselves at their graves. “Martyrs” the dead men were called, and “ministers” of a sort, and “ambassadors” from the gods to carry men's prayers, - these slaves in vilest servitude, who had been consumed by stripes and carried on their phantom forms the scars of their villainy.<sup>459</sup>

The Christian monks and the cult of the veneration of the Christian martyrs, which they promoted, are vilified by Eunapius as being slave-like. The martyrs are not true gods, but in fact

---

ἀλλότριον, ὄντως ἀλλοτρίων κακῶν ὑπουργὸς καὶ διάκονος καὶ ζηλωτῆς πραγμάτων ἀσέμνων ἐπίσημος, ὁ τῇ κακίᾳ τῶν ἀνόμων συνδιατρίβων ἐκάστοτε καὶ τὰς πράξεις αὐτῶν ἰδιοποιούμενος.

<sup>459</sup>Translation: Wilmer C. F. Wright, *Philostratus and Eunapius: The Lives of the Sophists* (London: W. Heinemann, 1922), 425; Greek text: Giangrande: 38: τοὺς δὲ μοναχοὺς τούτους καὶ εἰς τὸν Κάνωβον καθίδρυσαν, ἀντὶ τῶν νοητῶν θεῶν εἰς ἀνδραπόδων θεραπείας, καὶ οὐδὲ χρηστῶν, καταδήσαντες τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. ὅστέα γὰρ καὶ κεφαλὰς τῶν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν ἐαλωκότων συναλίζοντες, οὐς τὸ πολιτικὸν ἐκόλαζε δικαστήριον, θεοὺς τε ἀπεδείκνυσαν, καὶ προσεκαλινδοῦντο τοῖς ὅστοις καὶ κρείττους ὑπελάμβανον εἶναι μολυνόμενοι πρὸς τοῖς τάφοις. μάρτυρες γοῦν ἐκαλοῦντο καὶ διάκονοί τινες καὶ πρέσβεις τῶν αἰτήσεων παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ἀνδράποδα δεδουλευκότα κακῶς, καὶ μάστιγι καταδεδαπανημένα, καὶ τὰς τῆς μοχθηρίας ὠτειλὰς ἐν τοῖς εἰδώλοις φέροντα·

slaves and these base people worship them. The use of the slave-metaphor in Christian and non-Christian invective was quite prevalent in late ancient sources.

Secondly, many late ancient Christian authors also approach slavery as a labour-issue. Some stated that by becoming Christian, the slave should become a better slave. Christian slaves ought to work better and harder than non-Christian slaves. We have seen the negative slave-stereotypes present in the habitus of Roman slaveholding, and this argument seems to be a strategy that aims to invert the stereotypes in favour of promoting the Christian faith. This strategy comes at a high cost for the slaves, but these arguments aim to construct a new stereotype, or even a literary type, namely that of the faithful and hardworking Christian slave. To many, this is an ideal, one that is achievable, since *ought* implies *can*, but most of the late ancient Christian authors reserved their suspicious and stereotypical views of slaves.

Thirdly, the phenomenon of slavery was directly associated with the development of Christian hamartiology. Christian authors of late antiquity linked slavery and sin, noted by Davis: ‘...[A]s early Christians repeatedly conceived of sin and salvation in terms of slavery and freedom, the words acquired complex layers of meaning that necessarily affected men’s response to the institution of slavery.’<sup>460</sup> It tied in very closely with concepts of nature and naturalness, and thus also with notions of normality and abnormality. Christian and non-Christian myths of origins come into play here, and we have seen that some Christian authors like Ambrosiaster saw complex interrelational links between authority/mastery, and pre- or postlapsarian states of existence. The hierarchy between male and female was seen as being prelapsarian, but that between slave and owner postlapsarian. Slavery was so embedded in the ancient worldview that it would occupy an integral role in the cosmologies and theories of politics of Christian and non-Christian thinkers alike. Plato is an excellent example here. Davis states that Plato ‘saw the relation of slave to master as a kind of microcosm of the hierarchical pattern that pervaded society and the entire universe.’<sup>461</sup> We have already discussed Aristotle’s notion of natural slavery, which is also interwoven in natural constructions of the universe. The prevalence of slavery-discourses in cosmologies and other archetypical and foundation myths of the Graeco-Roman world also became quite prominent in Christian conceptualisations of the myth of origins. Even though most Christian authors did not consider slavery as a natural phenomenon (with the

---

<sup>460</sup> Davis, *Problem of Slavery*, 84.

<sup>461</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

exception, interestingly enough, of Athanasius (*C. Ar.* 2.51.253c)),<sup>462</sup> it was still active and functional in nature, despite its unnaturalness. The same was believed of sin. The function of myths of origins and cosmogonies is not to explain how things came into being as such, but rather to justify why and how things are the way they are in present times. It therefore provides an explanation for various social institutions. Most prominent here is the institution of the household and the relationships between husband and wife, parents and children and, of course, slaves and masters. The close relationship between the institution of the household and *oikonomia* are seen already in the *haustafeln*, with their numerous references to texts in Genesis, and in Gregory of Nyssa's rejection of institutional slavery, he constantly refers to Christian myths of origins. The institution of slavery is therefore also explained in terms of the origins of existence. Davis remarks: 'In the eyes of Christians the independent, natural man, idealized by primitivists in all ages, was a sinner who, lacking the essential capacity for virtue, bore a certain resemblance to Aristotle's natural slave.'<sup>463</sup> While Christian authors denied the notion of the slave by nature, authors like Basil believed that slavery came into being as the result of wars, poverty and child-exposure. All these are important hamartiological formations. The other problem is that the concept of 'nature' in late ancient Christian thinking is quite complex. Clark states that nature can serve as a synonym for several other concepts like 'God' and 'humanity'. The so-called 'order of God' (*ordo dei*) and the order of nature (*ordo naturalis*) are very much intertwined in ancient Christian thinking.<sup>464</sup> Here we also see the complexities of the animalization of slaves so common in ancient authors. In ancient virtue-discourse, slaves are often grouped with animals. Moreover, Jacoby has argued that slavery is in fact the domestication of the human being, since many of the same technologies used to domesticate animals were also used on slaves.<sup>465</sup> The move from the 'naturalness' of slavery to its psychotheological link with sin is certainly an interesting shift in thinking between the classical and late ancient period. As shown above in the first point of summary here, these

---

<sup>462</sup> Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery*, 14.

<sup>463</sup> Davis, *Problem of Slavery*, 85.

<sup>464</sup> Cf. Elizabeth A. Clark, "Ideology, History and the Construction of 'Woman' in Late Ancient Christianity," in *A Feminist Companion to Patristic Literature* (Amy-Jill Levine and Maria M. Robbins (eds); London: T&T Clark, 2008), 111; Winkler, *Constraints of Desire*, 17–18; Knust, *Abandoned to Lust*, 94–98.

<sup>465</sup> Karl Jacoby, "Slaves by Nature? Domestic Animals and Human Slaves," *S&A* 15 (1994): 89–97.

conceptualisations of difference, otherness, abnormality and sinfulness spill over into the juridical domain. Several of the legal codices of late antiquity state that slavery is the result of the *ius gentium* and not the *ius naturale*.<sup>466</sup> Although the contents of the argument changed, the material manifestations of slaveholding in Christian and non-Christian times were not very different. The issue of domination is also important in this discussion. Although he writes in a slightly later period, Augustine has elaborated on the word *dominetur*, and believed that it dictated that human beings should have had control over creation, especially over non-human creatures (cf. *C. Jul.* 4.12.61).<sup>467</sup> As Gregory of Nyssa has written, it was not supposed to be dominion over other human beings. Slavery therefore represents a reversal in the ‘original’ (or, myth of origins) motif of domination. Human beings are now dominated by sin, and so the concept of the heteronomous body becomes more evident. It will be shown in chapter 4 how central the issue of sin is when it comes to the notion of the heteronomy of the body. The text in Genesis 1:26 becomes the key to this hermeneutic. The unnatural now becomes the natural, and so all people accept unnatural institutions like slavery. Institutional slavery became a banal phenomenon,<sup>468</sup> and the popularization of Stoic moral slavery in this period did not aid the situation. Conceptualizations of slavery and hamartiology also then defined ancient Christian views of freedom and agency, and here again Genesis 1:26 plays a pivotal role. In some of the earlier Christian authors, the prelapsarian picture of Adam and Eve before the fall was articulated in terms of infantility - they were seen as being innocent children before the fall. Irenaeus illustrates this concept (*Epid.* 14):

---

<sup>466</sup> Ulpian, *Dig.* 1.1.1.4; cf. Jill Harries, *Law and Empire in Late Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 10.

<sup>467</sup> In his exegesis on the same pericope, John Chrysostom shares this view later propagated by Augustine; cf. *Hom. Genes.* 8.

<sup>468</sup> Banality, here, is based on Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil, which understands evil as being mostly ordinary and depersonalized; cf. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin, 1979); Tsvetan Todorov, *Facing the Extreme: Moral Life in the Concentration Camps* (London: Phoenix, 1996). The notion of the depersonalization of slaves is common in antiquity; a slave was often referred to as a ‘body’ (σῶμα), that is, human chattel; cf. Glancy, *Slavery in Early Christianity*, 10–12. Although not always desired by Graeco-Roman standards, slaves were sometimes seen as simple automatons, cf. Harrill, *Slaves in the New Testament*, 21–25.

[T]houghts were innocent and childlike, and they had no conception or imagination of the sort that is engendered in the soul by evil, through concupiscence, and by lust...They were in their integrity, preserving their natural state, for what had been breathed into their frame was the spirit of life.<sup>469</sup>

The problem in Irenaeus' eyes was that Adam did not have sound judgement, and therefore he was misled by the devil. Clement of Alexandria (*Protrep.* 11) also calls the prelapsarian Adam 'free as a child at play.' He elaborates by saying that the 'freedom' offered by the devil resulted in the enslavement of all human beings.<sup>470</sup> In early Christian art, the same motif is present, such as the case of a fourth-century Christian sarcophagus in the Musée de l'Arles Antique that depicts God creating two small, nude, childlike figures representing Adam and Eve.<sup>471</sup> It is therefore becoming quite evident that the shape of Christian theology as we have it today, which was moulded through centuries of theologizing, is directly related to and even the result of various views on and utilizations of ancient institutional slavery. Slavery was one of the main elements that made Christian theology what it is today.

## 7 CONCLUSION

To conclude, this chapter had the twofold aim of, firstly, revisiting and reconstructing key contexts related to the Roman habitus of slaveholding. These were especially the oeconomical writings of the Hellenistic and early Roman authors. Secondly, it also had the purpose of evaluating the most important texts and traditions that would serve as the basis of John Chrysostom's homilies, namely the documents of early Judeo-Christianity. What results has this chapter displayed?

One of the key discourses in the habitus of Roman slaveholding is that of *oikonomia*. Slave-management was seen as a subset of this highly masculine discourse. The early Hellenistic authors had much to say about *oikonomia* and slave-management, and views were especially

---

<sup>469</sup> Translation: Boniface Ramsey, *Beginning to Read the Fathers* (New Jersey: Paulist, 1985), 56; original Armenian text not available to author at the time of writing.

<sup>470</sup> Ramsey, *Beginning to Read the Fathers*, 57.

<sup>471</sup> Robin M. Jensen, *Understanding Early Christian Art* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 179.

divided between notions of slaves as outsiders, from Xenophon, and Aristotle's natural slaves. From the early Roman sources, it seems as if Xenophon's views were more influential than Aristotle's, except for Philodemus who refers to the pseudo-Aristotelian *Oeconomica*, although the concept of natural slavery is practically absent in this document. Notwithstanding Aristotle's famous decree that slaves are inferior by nature, his influence on the formation of the Roman habitus of slaveholding may be limited, since the library of Theophrastus was lost and only recovered some years later while Xenophon's work was being translated into Latin by Cicero and cited by Cato and Varro.<sup>472</sup> Not that Aristotle had no influence, but when reading the writings of the Roman agricultural authors like Cato, Varro and Columella, it is clear that Xenophonian ideas were more dominant.<sup>473</sup> While Aristotle focused on nature as a larger framework for understanding systems of domination, Xenophon was more concerned about the control of slaves as social outsiders. Furthermore, both Xenophon and Plato subscribed to holistic *oikonomia*, that is, that the management of the household represented a microcosm for state governance. Aristotle and Philodemus problematized this issue and did not accept it at face value. The notion that *oikonomia* is holistic, specifically deriving from Xenophon and Plato, would serve as the foundation for later formulations of domination, household governance and slaveholding. Most importantly for this study, it set the scene for the Stoic philosophers' notions of divine *oikonomia*, the belief that the great divine householder governs the universe. It would result in an author like Seneca especially emphasising the mutual origins of and governing *hegemonikon* over both the institutional slave and his or her master. The Stoics, as well as Philo, represent a bridge between the Hellenistic authors and the early Christian authors of the *haustafeln* and Pastoral Epistles. It would provide the conceptual continuity necessary for the development of Christian pastoral governmentality.

Since *oikonomia* is holistic, and slaveholding simply another manifestation of a more universal dynamic of domination, some crucial measures of social control among slaves were present. Both the Hellenistic and early Roman authors emphasized the importance of controlling

---

<sup>472</sup> Carnes Lord, "On the Early History of the Aristotelian Corpus," *AJP* 107, no. 2 (1986): 137–61.

<sup>473</sup> Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* was translated into Latin by Cicero around 85 BCE, and both Cato and Varro were very much influenced by Xenophon; cf. Jesper Carlsen, "Estate Managers in Ancient Greek Agriculture," in *Ancient History Matters: Studies Presented to Jens Erik Skydsgaard on His Seventieth Birthday* (Karen Ascani (ed.); Rome: L'Erma di Bretschneider, 2002), 122.

the passions of the slave if he or she were to function optimally. This would imply regulations on food, sexual intercourse and religious participation. With the rise of the Roman Republic and the development of large villa-estates, the control of slaves would become more important yet more difficult, as is evident from the writings of Cato, Varro and Columella. From this crisis the *vilicus* figure was introduced, a slave that would control other slaves. The *vilicus* would ideally be a mirror of the absent *pater familias*. As the discourse of rural slave-management developed, so too would urban slaveholding be influenced. The *vilicus* concept, with its accompanying dynamic of mirroring or duplicating the absentee *pater familias*, would also be highly influential in the development of Christian slave-management in the context of a holistic and divine *oikonomia*. The notion of control, mastery and domination would, however, experience another transformation, again from the Stoic, who now introduced the concept of moral slavery, and the control of one's own passions as the cornerstone of self-mastery. The slave, as a surrogate for the master, would now also have to master his or her own passions. Moral and metaphorical slavery would gain preference in both Stoic and Christian authors, at the cost of ignoring the problem of institutional slavery. It would however now become important for slaves to be loved by their masters and taught virtue.

With these important developments of the habitus of Roman slaveholding in mind, what were the main characteristics of those traditions and sources that would influence Chrysostom? The most important influences in this case would be that of Xenophon and the Stoics. Xenophon's notions of slaves as outsiders rather than natural slaves would become widespread, and Xenophon and Plato's notions of a holistic *oikonomia*, along with the Stoic divine *oikonomia*, would serve as the foundation for the Christian pastoral model of governance, which is also holistic and based on divine *oikonomia*. In its early stages, Christian *oikonomia* and slave-management could be understood as social contracts, and in the case of slaveholding, would give rise to a complex hierarchy based on both Christic panopticism and duplication. The same Hellenistic and Roman concepts of normalization via masculinization would take place, while at the same time, a culture of passivity and suffering would be promoted, and slaves encouraged to be morally free despite institutional repression. The Christic panopticism would utilize the *vilicus* and absentee *pater familias* concept in a theological-ethical sense, to show that all humans, slave and free, are like *vilici*, and Christ the all-seeing slaveholder. The Christic duplication is based on the notion that all slaves are degenerate and in need of normalization by



means of psychagogy. These concepts abound in ancient Judaism, as seen especially in the Mishnah, and hence the strict rules of governance of slaves by the Christian *pater familias* in the *haustafeln*. The notion of the church as a place of normalization is common in this instance, and is again a preset of early Christian pastoralism.

These discourses are also found frequently in late antiquity, among both Christian and non-Christian authors. The most important issues here are the development of pastoral governmentality as well as late ancient Christian theology and ethics. Resembling a clear influence from both the Graeco-Roman and early Judeo-Christian traditions, the late ancient Christian authors had to deal with the issue of slaveholding. The only author that shows clear resistance to slavery is Gregory of Nyssa, although he does accept moral slavery and the notion of God as a slaveholder. All the others accept slavery as a consequence of sin, and hence something to be managed and strictly controlled using various technologies of pastoral governance. These late ancient authors all advised the humane and fair treatment of slaves, also seen in the Hellenistic and Roman authors. The humanity of the slave, however, simply functions as another technology for oppressing the slave (see chapter 4). They were especially concerned with managing slave-sexuality and labour, and the figure of the ideal Christian slave was always expected to do better work, or be a better slave, than a non-Christian. Stoic-Philonian notions of moral slavery are common to all, and slave-metaphors were used to formulate doctrine and ethics and also served as invective to slander opponents. In this way, group-identity and cohesion was maintained, and the slave-metaphor within invective rhetoric occupied a central role in the formation of ‘others’ or heterographies. Slaves were also considered property in the early Judeo-Christian tradition, an issue that late ancient authors would constantly grapple with in their writings.

Up to this point, we have discussed the main authors writing on *oikonomia* and slave-management in antiquity. This chapter also served as a foundation to understanding how the Roman habitus of slaveholding came into being, how it worked and how it was transformed during the early period of Judeo-Christian tradition. The rest of this dissertation will now build on this and focus specifically on John Chrysostom. Both the diachronic and synchronic developments were evaluated. It is important to remember that this chapter was not primarily directed at showing how these ancient authors ‘influenced’ John Chrysostom’s writings. This is difficult to prove. While it is quite likely that Chrysostom read texts like those of Xenophon and

Aristotle, some may have never received his gaze. What is important is that these texts represent the complex Roman habitus of slaveholding, a habitus in which Chrysostom also found himself. The ideologically discursive tides programmed over the centuries by the authors mentioned above, wash over the words and arguments of Chrysostom, inevitably leaving their mark on his words and thoughts. We will now move on to examine how John Chrysostom understood *oikonomia* and slave-management, specifically by looking at his own commentaries on the deutero-Pauline *haustafeln*.