

Appendix A Pro forma rock mass and hazard rating system

A.1 Support capacity of hangingwall rock mass and installed support

The ability of the rock mass surrounding an excavation to remain stable depends on the capacity of the hangingwall rock mass AND the capacity of the support installed in the excavation to accommodate the imposed loading conditions.

A.1.1 Support capacity of hangingwall rock mass

The support capacity of the hangingwall rock mass could be affected by factors such as the geology of the rock mass, drilling and blasting, lateral confinement of the rock mass and beam geometry.

Effect of geology on strength of hangingwall rock

Main Category	Description			Possible Rating	Rating	
Intact strength of hangingwall	Competent host rock only			4		
	Weak geological intrusions			*1		
	Thin (less than 30 cm thick), disseminated plates/beams			*1		
Weathering of rock	No signs of weathering			4		
	Rock weathers with time			2		
Geological structure	Large geological structures	No major faults, dykes or shear zones present		4		
		Description of fault, dyke or shear zone	Dip of major structures	Steep dipping > 60°		3
				45° to 60°		2
				Flat dipping < 45°		*1
		Strike of major structure	Approx. ⊥ to pillars	4		
			Approx. 45° to pillars	2		
			Approx. to pillars	*1		
		Strength of structure	No infilling, tight			4
			Weak with infilling			2
	Parting planes in immediate hangingwall	No parting planes less than 2,0 m in hangingwall			4	
		Description of parting planes	Thickness of layers caused by parting planes	> 1,0 m	3	
				0,3 – 1,0 m	2	
				< 0,3 m	*1	
		Strength of parting planes	"Welded"		3	
			Tight, no infilling		2	
	Weak with infilling		*1			
	Jointing	Dip of joints	Only steep dipping joints (> 60°)		4	
			45° - 60°		2	
			Some flat dipping joints or domes (< 45°)		*1	
		Joint spacing	Joints spaced more than 1,0 m apart		3	
			Joints spaced less than 1,0 m apart		2	
Joint filling		None		4		
		Sheared infill material		2		
Joint surface		Stepped		4		
		Undulating		3		
		Smooth planer		2		
Groundwater conditions	No groundwater present or anticipated			4		
	Groundwater present or anticipated			*1		
TOTAL – EFFECT OF GEOLOGY ON CAPACITY OF HANGINGWALL ROCK						

Effect of drilling and blasting on capacity of hangingwall rock

Application of drilling and blasting	Drilling of blastholes	Length of shotholes	Optimum hole length being drilled	4	
			Shotholes drilled too long	2	
		Direction of shotholes	Optimum direction	4	
			Incorrect hole direction	2	
	Spacing of shotholes	Optimum borehole spacing	4		
		Holes spaced too far / too close apart	2		
	Charging of blastholes	Optimum charge length		4	
		Holes over / under charged		2	
	Timing of blastholes	Correct timing		4	
		Incorrect timing leading to out-of-sequence firing		2	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF DRILLING AND BLASTING ON CAPACITY OF HANGINGWALL ROCK					

Effect of boundary conditions on capacity of hangingwall rock

Horizon control	No brows or overhangs created	4	
	Brows or overhangs created	*1	
Depth below surface	More than 100 m deep	4	
	50 – 100 m deep	2	
	Less than 50 m deep	*1	
Width of excavation	Less than 15 m	4	
	15 – 20 m	3	
	20 – 25 m	2	
	More than 25 m	*1	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF CONFINEMENT ON CAPACITY OF HANGINGWALL ROCK			

Effect of beam geometry on capacity of hangingwall rock

Ratio of beam length to beam thickness	Less than 20:1	4	
	20:1 to 25:1	3	
	25:1 to 30:1	2	
	More than 30:1	*1	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF BEAM GEOMETRY ON CAPACITY OF HANGINGWALL ROCK			

Example: Beam length = 28 m and beam thickness = 0,8 m
 Ratio of beam length to beam thickness = $(28 \div 0,8):1 = 35:1$

All panels with sub-categories rated as *1 should be declared as “Special Areas”

All panels with sub-categories rated as 2 should be declared as “Moderate Areas”

All panels with sub-categories rated as 3 or 4 should be declared as “Good Areas”

A.1.2 Capacity of installed support

The capacity of installed support could be affected by factors such as the standard of support installation, the ability to assess ground conditions correctly, the removal / damage / loosening of support after installation and the engineering properties of the support elements.

Standard of support installation

Support installation procedure	Knowledge about support installation procedure	Description of support installation procedure	Procedure described in mine standards	4	
			Procedure not described in mine standards	*1	
		Communication of procedure	Procedure communicated to workers responsible for support installation	4	
			Procedure not properly communicated	*1	
		Competence of workers responsible for support installations	Workers properly trained and found to be competent in support installation	4	
			Workers incompetent to install support	*1	
	Support installation equipment	Supply of installation equipment (e.g. special airleg, impact wrench, etc.)	Necessary equipment available to install support correctly	4	
			Support installation equipment inadequate	*1	
		Application of support installation equipment	Equipment used correctly	4	
			Equipment not used correctly	*1	
	Supervision of support installations	Supervision during support installation of a high standard	4		
		Inadequate supervision	*1		
Support installation sequence	Permanent support	Permanent support installed less than 1,0 m from the face before shotholes are drilled	4		
		Permanent support installed less than 2,0 m from the face before shotholes are drilled	3		
		Permanent support installed more than 2,0 m from the face before shotholes are drilled	*1		
	Temporary support	At least 2 mechanical props installed not more than 1,0m on either side of machine operator during drilling operations	4		
		Temporary support not to standard during drilling operation	*1		
Support type	Support type being used is according to standard		4		
	Support type being used is not according to standard		*1		
Support pattern	Support pattern for normal ground conditions	Support installed according to mine standard	4		
		Support not installed according to mine standard	*1		
	Support pattern for abnormal conditions	Additional support installed as required by mine standard for abnormal ground conditions	4		
		Additional support not installed as required by mine standards for abnormal conditions	*1		
Quality of support material	Quality of support material being used adequate		4		
	Quality of support being used inadequate		*1		
Support length	Length of support being used is according to mine standard		4		
	Length of support being used not according to mine standard		*1		
Support inclination	Support installed approximately \perp with orientation of hangingwall or weakness plane (rock studs at least 60 degrees)		4		
	Inclination of support too flat (rockstuds less than 60 degrees)		*1		
Support diameter or strength	Diameter or strength of support being used according to mine standard		4		
	Diameter or strength of support being used not according to mine standard		*1		
TOTAL – STANDARD OF SUPPORT WORK AND THE EFFECT ON SUPPORT CAPACITY					

Assessment of ground conditions

Information regarding quality of hangingwall rock mass	Sufficient information available to assess quality of hangingwall rock mass	4	
	Lack of information regarding quality of hangingwall rock mass	2	
Supervision regarding assessment of ground conditions	Supervision regarding assessment of ground conditions generally of a high standard	4	
	Supervision not to standard	*1	
Competence of workers	Workers properly trained in the identification of hazardous rock conditions, and the support required for different ground conditions	4	
	Workers not properly trained in the identification of hazardous rock conditions – apply standard support to all rock conditions	*1	
Attitude of workers	Workers assess ground conditions continuously and install additional support where required	4	
	Workers tend to ignore changing ground conditions	*1	
TOTAL – ASSESSMENT OF GROUND CONDITIONS AND THE EFFECT ON SUPPORT CAPACITY			

Removal / damage / loosening of support after installation

Permanent support	Rockstud support	Rockstuds damaged / loosened by blasting	Rockstuds do not loosen during blasting - properly tensioned and thread not protruding more than 2 cm	4	
			Some rockstuds tend to loosen during blast	*1	
	Mine poles or elongates	Support removed by blasting	Support removed during blast	4	
			Some support removed during blasting	*1	
		Support removed by scraper	Support not removed by scraper	4	
			Some support removed by scraper	*1	
Temporary support	Support removed by means of a remote release tool and from a well supported and safe area		4		
	Support removed without using a remote release tool		1		
TOTAL – REMOVAL / DAMAGE / LOOSENING OF SUPPORT AFTER INSTALLATION AND THE EFFECT ON SUPPORT CAPACITY					

A.2 Loading of hangingwall rock mass and support units

Excessive loading of the hangingwall rock mass surrounding an underground excavation and installed support could lead to instability when the loading exceeds the capacity of the rock mass and installed support. It is therefore important to maximise the capacity (strength) of the hangingwall rock mass and installed support and to reduce the loading of these systems.

A.2.1 Loading of hangingwall rock mass

Loading of the hangingwall rock mass could adversely be affected by a reduction in stress causing potentially loose blocks of ground to dislodge. Potentially unstable blocks of ground could also dislodge due to mining induced disturbance of the hangingwall (e.g. during installation / removal of temporary support).

Loading of hangingwall rock mass due to abnormal hangingwall stress

Excavation span	Less than 15 m	4	
	15 – 20 m	3	
	20 – 25 m	2	
	More than 25 m	*1	
Proximity of excavation to surface	Excavation more than 100 m below surface	4	
	Excavation between 50 and 100 m below surface	2	
	Excavation less than 50 m below surface	*1	
Freedom of movement	Continuous beam with no brows or overhangs	4	
	Freedom of movement due to brows or overhangs	*1	
TOTAL – LOADING OF SUPPORT SYSTEM DUE TO DECREASE IN HANGINGWALL STRESS			

Loading of the hangingwall due to a mining induced disturbance

Installation / removal of temporary support	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of temporary support low .	4	
	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of temporary support high .	*1	
Installation of services	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of services low .	4	
	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of services high .	*1	
Installation of permanent support	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of permanent support low .	4	
	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall during installation of permanent support high .	*1	
Mechanical impact	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall due to mechanical impact from scraper low .	4	
	Probability of disturbing the hangingwall due to mechanical impact from scraper high .	*1	
TOTAL – LOADING OF HANGINGWALL DUE TO MINING INDUCED DISTURBANCE			

A.2.2 Loading of hangingwall support units

The loading of support units could adversely be affected by increasing the spacing between support units and the last row of permanent support and the face.

Loading of support units due to spacing between units

Spacing between support units	Support spaced closer than required by mine standard	4	
	Support spaced further apart than required by mine standard	*1	
Spacing between last row of permanent support and face	Permanent support to face distance less than 2,0 m after the blast	4	
	Permanent support to face distance less than 3,0 m after the blast	3	
	Permanent support to face distance less than 4,0 m after the blast	2	
	Permanent support to face distance more than 4,0 m after the blast	*1	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF SUPPORT SPACING ON LOADING OF SUPPORT UNITS			

Pillar stability

The stability of stope pillars depends on the capacity or strength of the pillar material to support the load imposed on the pillars. Pillar instability could occur if one or more of the factors discussed below changes significantly.

Pillar loading

Depth below surface	Pillar sizes and spacing being used correspond with the current depth of mining	4	
	Depth of mining has changed significantly without increasing the pillar sizes or reducing the pillar spacing accordingly. (possibly caused by rapid change in topography)	*1	
Spacing between pillars	Spacing between pillars are according to mine standard	4	
	Pillar spacing greater than permitted by mine standard	*1	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF PILLAR LOADING ON PILLAR STABILITY			

Pillar strength

Pillar material strength	Pillar strength not affected by adverse geology in seam, footwall or hangingwall rock mass	4	
	Pillar strength lower than normal due to adverse geology in pillar seam, footwall or hangingwall.	*1	
Pillar width and length	Pillar width and length in accordance with mine standard for the depth being mined at.	4	
	Pillar width and length less than required by mine standard (possibly caused by pillar scaling, pillar robbing, mining off-line, etc.)	*1	
Pillar height	Stoping width in accordance with mine standard	4	
	Stoping width more than described in mine standard	*1	
TOTAL – EFFECT OF PILLAR STRENGTH ON PILLAR STABILITY			

Appendix B Questionnaire

QUESTIONNAIRE**Investigation of Factors Governing the Stability of Stope Panels**

1. General Information:	
Name of Mine	Black Mountain Mineral and Development Co. (Pty) Ltd.
Postal address	Private Bag X01, Aggeneys, 8893
Tel No.	(054) 983 2571
Fax No.	(054) 983 2382
E-mail address.	
Date of SRK visit	30, 31 March 1998
Contact people: - Manager; - Production Manager; - Underground Manager; - Senior RM Eng.; - Chief Geologist; - Senior Planning Off.	LG van Biljon M (Mike) McLaren PS(Peter) Westcott R (Rocco) Human JE (Pottie) Potgieter Danie Grobler
Location of mine	The Broken Hill (Cu, Pb, Zn and Ag) deposit is situated on the farm Aggeneys, between Springbok and Pofadder in the Northern Cape Province.
Commodities mined	Copper, silver, lead, zinc.
Datum elevation	
Depth of mining activities: - opencast; - underground.	627m below shaft collar maximum (21 level). Current mining between 1 level (53m above shaft collar) and 21 level. Maximum exploration depth is 800m.
Describe access to the mine.	A vertical hoisting shaft, an access decline and a conveyor sub-decline below shaft bottom which derives the flatter part of the orebody.

2. Copies of Documents / Plans Required:	
Mine's COP to combat rockfall accidents.	
Mine standards.	
Stope plan (total mine)	
Plans and sections of mine's geology, including structure and stratigraphy.	
Contour plan and section of surface topography (natural and man-made).	
Copies of technical reports on rockmass description, geotechnical parameters, etc,	
Plan showing different geotechnical areas.	
FOG accident reports over last 10 years.	
Plan showing location of FOG accidents and incidents over last 10 years.	
Reports on instability problems in stopes such as pillar collapses, back breaks, etc.	

3. FOG Accident Statistics:	
No. of workers injured/year due to FOG accidents (minor, reportable and fatal) for last 10 years.	
Reportable Injury Frequency Rate for last 10 years.	
Fatal Injury Frequency Rate for last 10 years.	
Are accidents properly investigated and root causes identified?	
What are the major causes of FOG accidents?	
Describe typical dimensions of FOG's: - length; - width; - thickness.	
Is the mine's COP to reduce FOG accidents based on a baseline risk assessment?	Rockfall hazards are associated with rock types: - Competent Non-schist formations
Is the COP compiled such as to reduce the risk of rockfall accidents?	
What is the level of rockfall hazard awareness?	
Are PTO's , CTI's or other techniques being used as part of the mine's continuous rock-related risk assessment?	
What is the level of strata control and rock mechanics knowledge on the mine?	
What is being done to improve the current level of rock mechanics on the mine?	

4. Mining Method:	
<p>Short description of method/s</p>	<p><i>Blasthole open stoping (BHOS)</i> was employed in the early years in the steeply dipping, wide, high grade zone of the orebody. This low cost stoping method, combined with the higher grade of ore, favoured more rapid returns on capital.</p> <p>Stopes were 24m wide, leaving 20m wide pillars in between. These pillars were then extracted after backfilling of the adjacent stopes.</p> <p>Drill drives were spaced 35m vertically. Ore was blasted into collecting troughs.</p> <p><i>Cut and Fill (CAF)</i> stoping was initially employed in ore of reasonable width, with breast faces generally 10 to 20m wide. Lifts of 4m were advanced over a 1m undercut between the previous back and the fill floor. Access to the stopes was by ramp crosscuts, which were slashed down for each successive lift.</p> <p>CAF mining is very selective and breast faces were advanced under full geological control, the boundaries between ore and waste being marked off daily by the mine geologist.</p> <p>Stopes were silled on alternate main levels, thus at 70m vertical intervals.</p> <p>As mining progressed, the available ore became narrower and more severely affected by folding. Also, the footwall conditions had deteriorated in certain areas. These changing conditions necessitated various modifications to the original CAF layouts.</p>
	<p><i>Ramp in Stope (RIS)</i>: This is a variation on CAF. Waste development is largely eliminated. The access ramp is developed in the orebody itself as part of the stoping operation. A stoping block is extracted in 2 phases: the underhand phase during which the ramp is established, followed by the overhand phase.</p> <p>Initially, access to the orebody is via a development crosscut or drive on the sill elevation at one end of the proposed stope. A 5m high sill drive is developed along strike of the stope and then silled out to the full width of the orebody.</p> <p>Once the fill drainage system has been established, the ramp is started by building of a waste rock pile across the width of the stope to a height of 4m, and 20m from the proposed start point of the ramp to allow the required gradient of 1:5. Stopping of the next lift then starts on incline up the ramp until such time as the back is 4m above the previous lift back. Then, a 4m high breast is advanced horizontally through the remainder of the underhand lift.</p> <p>The sequence is repeated until the level above is reached, at which time a complete ramp is available within the stope. Stopping of the overhand side of the ramp can now start from the bottom upwards.</p> <p>With the ramp used as a lower access, the remainder of the lift at the sill elevation is silled out. After establishing a ventilation</p>

	<p>raise and drainage facilities as before, the lower access is closed off by backfilling. After the overhand sill has been filled, conventional breasting of the overhand section is conducted in 4m lifts.</p>
	<p><i>Crown Ramp in Stope (CRIS)</i>: Is employed where the orebody has a long strike length in poor host rock. This creates multiple stopes on strike, with access to all the stopes within the orebody itself. The continued access is provided by a crown drive protected by a crown pillar.</p> <p>The crown drive is developed along the footwall of the orebody on each main level elevation. A 4m thick crown pillar is left permanently above the crown drive. Short ramps are developed up to sill elevation for each individual stoping block.</p> <p><i>Bench and Fill (BAF)</i>: This method has been introduced into one of the zones where folding has created a thicker, flat dipping orebody. Ore was silled out at the top and bottom of a 20m strike block, 15m wide. Following the installation of 15m cable bolts in the back of the upper sill, a slot raise was bored and 165mm blastholes were employed to blast the ore as a bench. Cleaning is by remote controlled LHD (collecting cones could have been considered as well).</p> <p>Once the stope back has been mined out, the void will be filled with 20:1 cemented backfill, allowing the adjacent 20m block to be mined.</p>
	<p><i>Scraper Stopping</i>: This method was introduced in a flat dipping part of the orebody where the width is between 1 and 2m thick. This is too narrow for standard mechanized equipment and would cause excessive dilution.</p> <p>The layout consists of stopes extending 20m on strike, separated by 5m dip pillars. The stopes extended on dip between ore drives on successive levels 35m vertically apart. 5m wide strike pillars were also left to protect the ore drives.</p> <p>2 stope raises were developed on each side of alternate dip pillars, from which stope faces were advanced using hand drilling and scraper cleaning to the intermediate pillars. Holings were made at regular intervals along the lower drive pillar to allow the ore to be scraped into the drive, where the loading was done by LHD.</p> <p>The competency of the hangingwall is critical to the success of the stoping method.</p>
Reason for using this method/s	
Which other methods could be considered?	
Describe exploration drilling (intervals, spacing, etc.)	CAF: Initial stope layouts are based on diamond drilling at 25m intervals
Are these holes used for geotechnical purposes as well?	

Average % extraction of different methods	
Average % dilution of different methods	
Reasons for dilution	
Total tons produced per year over last 10 years.	1,5 Mt pa from Broken Hill.
Description of mining sequence/cycle:	
Drilling - equipment - methods used - length of holes - diameter - spacing	CAF: electro-hydraulic rigs BHOS: between drill drives spaced 35m vertically. BHOS: 165mm
Blasting - explosive types; - charge / hole; - initiation; - detonation; - average face advance per blast; - average tons produced per blast; - extent of damage.	CAF: 1000t /m of working face.
Cleaning - method - equipment	BHOS: Ore blasted into collecting troughs, from where it was transported by LHD's to the ore passes. CAF: LHD's into 25t trucks

5. Geology:	
Description of Stratigraphy.	At Broken Hill, the stratigraphy is reversed due to folding.
Description of structure.	<p>Four phases of deformation (F1 - F4) have been identified. The F2 fold phase often duplicates the ore horizons.</p> <p>The F3 phase of deformation resulted in a large open fold structure which is responsible for the change in the dip of the orebodies from 60 to 20 degrees. Sphering and pegmatite intrusions are often associated with the F3 deformation.</p> <p>Movement along F4 associated fractures and faults is right lateral with minor displacements.</p> <p>In the footwall (10 - 34m) of the LOB, a concordant 2-10m wide graphitic-clay schist, known as the Weak Zone, is present. This is an early thrust fault.</p>
Description of orebodies mined.	<p>Ore is mined from 2 superimposed mineralised horizons, known as the Upper and Lower Orebody (UOB and LOB) respectively. Both orebodies comprise a well mineralised massive sulphide core, enveloped by iron formation containing disseminated sulphides.</p> <p>The UOB varies from 2 - 30m in thickness and mineralisation may extend up to 5m into the adjacent iron formation. The LOB is 1 - 15m, but the surrounding iron formations are more extensively mineralised.</p> <p>The economic horizons of the UOB are predominantly massive sulphide, magnetic quartzite and magnetic amphibolite, with magnetic quartzite comprising the hangingwall and schist or massive magnetite the footwall.</p> <p>The economic horizons of the LOB are predominantly massive sulphide, magnetic quartzite, magnetite amphibolite, garnet magnetite and sulphidic quartzite, with schist, pegmatite or massive magnetite comprising the hangingwall.</p>
Main ore minerals.	Galena, sphalerite, chalcopyrite
Geometry of orebody: - dip length; - strike length; - thickness.	UOB: 1000m; LOB: 600m Strike length decreases with depth. Mineable width is 5 to 50m, but economic factors play an important role in defining the mineable width.
Dip / plunge: - angle; - direction.	20 - 60 degrees. The dip varies from almost vertical in well defined steeply folded zones to almost flat in some sections E-NE
Strike orientation	Generally striking E-W

<p>Description of ore deposit and host rock</p>	<p>Consists of 3 major mineralized zones namely Broken Hill, Black Mountain and....</p> <p>The Broken Hill ore resources are contained in 2 conformable orebodies separated by a 5 to 30m wide intermediate schist in the east and merging into one strongly folded zone in the west. Both orebodies comprise high grade, massive sulphide lenses close to a geologically defined schist footwall, and medium to low grade disseminated mineralization in magnetite rich rocks defined by an economic hangingwall.</p>
<p>Description of major geological structures. (show on plan)</p>	<p>No faulting has been encountered in the orebodies, but folding is fairly intense. The orebody is characterized by a weak schist footwall and a strong, magnetite rich hangingwall.</p>
<p>Principal ore minerals</p>	<p>Galena, sphalerite and chalcopryite, in order of decreasing abundance</p>

6. Geotechnical Information:	
Describe different geotechnical areas.	<p>Orebody very complex and very difficult to divide it into different geotechnical areas. Rock mechanics problems are largely encountered in flat dipping areas. Here a combination of the flat dipping foliation and F3 and F4 shears and fractures can result in roof collapse if the stope span is too wide.</p> <p>The Broken Hill deposit may however be sub-divided into 4 geological domains, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Domain A: < 60m, highly oxidised part of orebody. The weathered nature of the rocks causes unstable roof conditions. - Domain B: Part of orebody having steeper dips (50 - 80 degrees) and which have largely been mined out by blast hole stoping. Flat dipping areas also occur due to the folded nature of the orebody. - Domain C: Central flat dipping (20 - 50 degree) portion of orebody. Regular stability pillars have to be left due to flat dip and to prevent roof collapse. - Domain D: Complex folded area in western part of the orebodies. Here flat dips often cause poor roof conditions. <p>Variations in rock type, strength and competencies are encountered in both orebodies as well as the hangingwall and footwall. Rockwall hazards are associated with some of these rock types.</p>
<p>Young's Modulus:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $E_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - E_{footwall} ; - E_{reef} . 	
<p>Poissons's Ratio:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $\nu_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - ν_{footwall} ; - ν_{reef} . 	
<p>Rock density:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $\rho_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - ρ_{footwall} ; - ρ_{reef} . 	
<p>Uniaxial Compressive Strength:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $UCS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - $UCS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - $UCS_{\text{hangingwall}}$. 	
<p>Cohesion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $C_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - C_{footwall} ; - C_{reef} . 	
<p>Rock Quality Designation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $RQD_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - RQD_{footwall} ; - RQD_{reef} . 	

<p>Describe hydrology, geohydrology and influence on underground excavations.</p>	<p>Surface water may enter the shallower underground workings through continuous fractures from surface. Backfill water does drain through joints and fractures from stopes being filled, weakening the country rock and causing weathering along joints, faults and slips. This is more significant in formations where pyrite and pyrrhotite are prone to oxidation.</p>
<p>Describe different joint sets in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - strike orientation; - dip; - dip direction; - spacing/frequency; - continuity; - strength. 	
<p>Describe potential failure mechanisms.</p>	
<p>Rock Mass Rating:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $RMR_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - RMR_{reef} ; - $RMR_{\text{hangingwall}}$; 	
<p>Mining Rock Mass Rating:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $MRMR_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - $MRMR_{\text{reef}}$; - $MRMR_{\text{hangingwall}}$; 	
<p>Rock Mass Strength:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $RMS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - RMS_{reef} ; - $RMS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; 	
<p>Design Rock Mass Strength:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $DRMS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - $DRMS_{\text{reef}}$; - $DRMS_{\text{hangingwall}}$; 	
<p>Stability Index (plan area divided by the perimeter of the excavation):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $SI_{\text{hangingwall}}$; - SI_{reef} ; - $SI_{\text{hangingwall}}$ 	
<p>How does the mine ensure that structural features and mineralization zones, which could influence local/regional stability, are identified pro-actively?</p>	
<p>Describe significance of shear or weak zones, joint orientation, etc. and their effect on structural stability.</p>	
<p>In situ stresses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - principal stress directions; - principal stress magnitudes; - measured or estimated. 	

7. Pillars:	
Description of pillar types being used (e.g. crush pillars)	
Typical pillar dimensions: - pillar widths; - pillar lengths; - pillar heights.	
Typical pillar spacings: - dip spacings; - strike spacings.	
Description of pillar design methodology.	
Range of pillar stresses and how it is normally calculated.	
Range of pillar strengths and how it is normally calculated.	
Minimum allowed FOS	
Description of any other pillar design methods used in the past or planned for the future	
Does the mine use numerical analyses in the design process? - name of software; - input parameters.	
Has the mine experienced pillar failure in the past and why? - pillars design incorrect; - sub-standard pillars; - change in rock strength; - change in structure.	
Describe mode/s of failure.	
Actual FOS of failed pillars (back analyse)	
Describe failure in vicinity of pillar failure (e.g. footwall heave, roof spalling, etc.)	
Is pillar extraction being done or planned for the future?	
Describe physical interaction of opencast / other topographical features on underground workings.	

8. Stope Spans:	
Mine standard for stope spans: - dip; - strike.	
Description of design methodology (e.g. empirical method, RM classification method, beam theory, etc.)	
Does the mine use numerical analysis in the design process? - name of software; - input parameters.	
Design parameters (e.g. depth, thickness of stratification, etc.)	
Has the mine experienced hangingwall failure in the past and why? - design incorrect; - sub-standard spans; - change in rock strength; - change in rock structure.	
Description of any relevant instrumentation such as closure-ride meters, extensometers, etc.	

9. In-Stope Support:	
Description of support types being used: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - temporary/primary; - permanent/secondary; - additional/tertiary. 	<p><i>CAF:</i> According to ground conditions with friction rockbolts supplemented by 15m cable bolts where required. In certain wide areas, post pillars were left for regional support.</p> <p>A full lift of cemented hydraulic fill, reinforced with pinned cross cables and suspended weldmesh, was placed in each sill to facilitate mining from below. Thereafter, successive lifts were filled with 3m cycloned dune sand, supplemented with development waste, and topped with a 0,25m layer of 30:1 cemented backfill, followed by 0,75m of 8:1 cemented backfill. The cemented backfill consisted of mixtures of uncycloned mill tailings and Portland cement).</p> <p><i>BHOS:</i> Cemented backfill with a strength of around 0,7MPa in the stopes and low strength cemented backfill in the pillars.</p>
Design strength of support units: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - temporary/primary; - permanent/secondary; - additional/tertiary. 	
Area supported per unit: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - temporary/primary; - permanent/secondary; - additional/tertiary. 	
Describe design methodology.	

10. Underground Visit/s:	
Name/s of working places	
11. References:	
1. BRYANT, P.E., AYRES, J.B., DE BEER, A.R. AND ROSS-WATT, D.A..J. Base-Metal Mining Methods in the Gold Fields of South Africa Group. <i>XVth CMMI Congress</i> . Johannesburg, SAIMM. 1994.	
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4. BLAIR-HOOK, D.A. The Black Mountain Project. <i>Association of Mine Managers of South Africa: Papers and Discussions</i> , 1980 - 1981.	
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7. KINVER, P.J. Cut-and-Fill Mining of Base Metals at Black Mountain. <i>J. SAIMM</i> , vol. 85, No. 2 1985. pp. 41-49.	
8. KINVER, P.J. A Review of Backfilling at Black Mountain Mine. <i>Backfill in South African Mines</i> . Johannesburg, SAIMM, 1988. pp. 583-603.	
9. ROBBERSE, G.J. The Blast-Hole Stopping Method. <i>Association of Mine Managers of South Africa: Papers and Discussions</i> , 1980-1981.	
10. ROSS-WATT, D.A.J. Initial Experience in the Extraction of Blasthole Pillars between Backfilled Blasthole Stopes. <i>Int. Symposium on Mining with Backfill</i> . Sweden, 1983.	

**Appendix C Summary of mapping data at Mines
A, B and C**

Table with multiple columns and rows, likely a data table or spreadsheet. The table is mostly empty, with some faint text visible in the right-hand columns, possibly representing a header or footer area.

**Appendix D Fault-Event Tree methodology
approach to risk assessment**

Fault-Event Tree methodology approach to risk assessment

D.1 Introduction

The failure of any system, e.g. a fall of ground in an underground excavation, is seldom the result of a single **cause**, or **fault**. Failure usually results after a combination of faults occurs in such a way that the factor of safety of the system falls to below unity. A disciplined and systematic approach is therefore required to determine the correct logic that controls the failure of the system and to analyse the potential consequences of failure. One such approach, the **Fault-Event Tree Analysis**, is discussed in this appendix.

D.2 Cause/Fault Tree Analysis

Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a quantitative or qualitative technique by which conditions and factors that can contribute to a specified undesired incident (called the **top fault**) are deductively identified, organised in a logical manner, and presented pictorially. It can also be defined as a deductive failure analysis, which focuses on one particular undesired fault and which, provides a method for determining causes of the fault.

FTA affords a disciplined approach that is highly systematic, but at the same time sufficiently flexible to allow analysis of a variety of factors. The application of the top-down approach focuses attention on those effects of failure that are directly related to the top fault. FTA is especially useful for analysing systems with many interfaces and interactions.

Starting with the top fault, the possible causes or failure modes (**primary faults**) on the next lower system level are identified. Following the step-by-step identification of undesirable system operation to successively lower levels, **secondary faults**, **tertiary faults**, etc. are identified.

In order to determine the correct logic that controls the failure of the system, the

faults are not initially given probabilities of occurrence. In this form the “tree” is referred to as a “**cause tree**”. Once the cause tree is considered to correctly reflect the combinations of faults necessary to result in failure, probabilities are either calculated or assigned to the faults. In this form, the “tree” is referred to as a “**fault tree**”.

Thus, a fault tree represents a quantitative or qualitative evaluation of the probabilities of various faults leading to the calculation of the **top faults**, which result in failure of the system.

D.3 Probability evaluation in fault tree

The fault tree is a complex of entities known as **gates** which serve to permit or inhibit the passage of fault logic up the tree. The gates show the relationships of faults needed for the occurrence of a higher fault. **AND** gates and **OR** gates denote the type of relationship of the input events required for the output event.

- **AND** gates are used where faults are statistically dependent. If it is necessary for n secondary faults to occur in order for a primary fault to result, then the probability of occurrence, p , is represented by:
- $p[\text{primary fault}] = p[\text{secondary fault 1}] \times p[\text{secondary fault 2}] \times \dots \times p[\text{secondary fault } n]$
- **OR** gates are used where faults are statistically independent. If a primary fault can result as a consequence of the occurrence of any n secondary faults, then the probability of occurrence is determined from the calculation as follows:
- $p[\text{primary fault}] = 1 - (1 - p[\text{secondary fault 1}]) \times (1 - p[\text{secondary fault 2}]) \dots (1 - p[\text{secondary fault } n])$

D.4 Event tree analysis

The potential damaging consequences of a top fault are known as **events** and the systematic display of the events is referred to as an **event tree**. The probability of occurrence of a top fault together with relative weighting for the associated

potentially adverse events, enable their likely occurrence to be determined. The product of the probability of occurrence and severity of the damage of an event is defined as the **risk**.

The systematic nature of the Fault-Event Tree enables the sensitivities of the potentially adverse consequences to any of the causative hazards to be evaluated. This enables the most threatening causative hazards to be identified and eliminatory measures to be defined.

D.5 Allocation of probabilities of occurrence

Three measures are available for measuring reliability in engineering design, viz:

- the factor of safety;
- the reliability index, and;
- the probability of failure.

The factor of safety is a clearly understood and a numerically sensitive measure. It is, however, not a consistent measure and is not determined in terms of consistent processes. The reliability index is a consistent measure and is based on consistent processes for determining operational values. Its meaning is, however, not clearly understood. It is also not numerically sensitive, especially not with regard to higher orders of reliability.

The probability of failure is a consistent and numerically sensitive measure and is based on consistent processes for the determination of operational values. The numerical sensitivity of the probability of failure, however, detracts from the clarity of its meaning. The probabilities of various kinds of losses of life, property, etc. vary exponentially over many orders of magnitude between very large and very small values. The meaning of such a measure is often difficult to understand.

The difficulties that designers have in selecting acceptable thresholds for probability of failure can be resolved by using the norms and guidelines for selecting acceptable probabilities of failure for design, presented in a paper entitled: "Review of norms for probability of failure and risk in engineering design", (Kirsten, 1994). The acceptable lifetime probabilities of total loss of life described by Kirsten (1994) are summarised below.

Degree of risk	Acceptable lifetime probabilities (after Cole, 1993)
Very Risky	0,7
Risky	0,07
Some risk	0,007
Slight chance	0,000 7
Unlikely	0,000 07
Very unlikely	0,000 007
Practically impossible	0,000 000 7

In certain cases, probabilities of occurrence could also be determined more accurately by assigning probability density functions to primary faults. This is particularly important in geotechnical engineering designs where input parameters, especially those that are affected by geology, are often not known accurately and the influence of their variability should be accounted for. However, probabilistic analyses of multiple variables require sophisticated numerical techniques that are beyond the scope of this project.

A simplified approach is to assign probabilities based on engineering judgement and past experience with this type of work. Probabilities assigned to certain levels of risk as described in the above table could be used as a guideline. The final result will then show if a more accurate assessment of the probability of occurrence would be necessary. It is likely that the detailed assessment will only be required for key sensitive areas which will be revealed by sensitivity analysis.

It is important to note that probabilities of occurrence may not have unique or discreet values. It is possible for a probability of a particular fault (or event) to change in sympathy with another probability that it is coupled with. This is best illustrated by means of an example:

Take the example of a “wrong support installation procedure” being used in an underground excavation. The probability of a wrong support installation procedure being used depends upon the probability that:

- *the knowledge about the correct support installation procedure is lacking, or;*
- *the equipment being used for support installations is out of order, or;*
- *the discipline and supervision are poor.*

The probability that the knowledge about the correct support installation procedure is lacking in turn depends on the probability that:

- *the support installation procedure is not defined by the mine standards, or;*
- *the support installation procedure is not communicated to the workers, or;*
- *the workers are incompetent.*

The probability that the workers are incompetent depends on the probability that:

- *inadequate training is provided, or;*
- *the workers are untrainable.*

The probability of a wrong support installation procedure being used could be different for different parts or sections of the mine. For example, the equipment being used for support installation in one section could be more reliable than the equipment being used in another section.

The acceptability of probabilities of failure for particular design applications can be evaluated in terms of the magnitudes and distributions of actual frequencies of total losses of life, property and money. For example, the lifetime frequencies of fatalities due to unstable ground in gold and coal mines in South Africa in 1993 amounted to approximately 7,9% and 2,8% respectively (Kirsten, 1994). (These correspond with fatality rates/1000 at work of 0,76 and 0,37 respectively.) According to Cole (1993), an acceptable lifetime probability of loss of life in respect of voluntary employment in underground mines would be 0,7%.

Ground conditions are known to carry potentially high risks and uncertainty. According to Sowers (1993) a study of 500 geotechnical failures revealed that 88

percent of the failures were produced by human shortcomings and that 75 percent of the failures originated in the design process. It is for these reasons that Kirsten (1994) suggested that acceptable levels for probabilities of failure for which designs may be prepared should be significantly smaller than the actual probabilities of failure observed for similar situations.

Appendix E Fault-Event Tree Analysis – Risk of Panel Instability