

**CHALLENGES OF THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR
AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD): A CASE
ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW
MECHANISM (APRM)**

By

RACHEL MUKAMUNANA

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree

Philosophiae Doctor, PhD, in Public Affairs

In the Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

Promoter: Professor Jerry O. KUYE

PRETORIA

March 2006

To my late parents, ANTOINE and ODETTE, your departure from this world diminished the meaning of life in me, but your desire of my success made me realise this dream.

And

To all whom, wholeheartedly, fight for a peaceful and prosperous Africa

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been done without the help and support of many people. I hereby wish to express my thanks and appreciation for the effort of all those who made this work possible. I would like to extend a special word of thanks to my study leader, Professor Jerry O. Kuye, for his tireless and diligent mentoring and advice. You encouraged me always to give of my best.

I would like also to thank all the personnel, professors and administrative staff at the School of Public Management and Administration (SPMA), University of Pretoria, for their collegiality and support. Thank you for providing me with the opportunity for professional and personal growth over the four-year period at the SPMA, both as a doctoral candidate and assistant lecturer.

Special thanks go to a number of people who enriched this work, either through the provision of information or through critical reading. I particularly think of Dr Nembot, coordinator of the Political Governance Review at the African Peer Review Mechanism Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, for providing me with valuable information on various aspects of the APRM process and operations. Special thanks also go to the officials in charge of the NEPAD/APRM in Rwanda, in particular, the Executive Director and the Communications Officer, for their warm welcome and for availing information on the peer review process in Rwanda. I sincerely thank my friends, Dr Himbara and Dr Nsingo, for the invaluable comments and advice on this work.

My heartfelt thanks go to my family, in particular my fiancé Tewodros, my sister Laetitia, my brother Norbert, and my aunt Janvière, for the unrestricted love, understanding and support. To all my friends, your love and support assisted me in the successful completion of this research project.

DECLARATION

I, Rachel Mukamunana, hereby declare that the thesis submitted for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor in Public Affairs at the University of Pretoria, apart from the help recognised, has been carried out independently and has not been formerly submitted to another University.

ABSTRACT

This study seeks to investigate the effectiveness of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in fostering good governance practices in Africa. The APRM was established in 2003 subsequent to the launch of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001, as an instrument to monitor the adoption and implementation of policies and practices that would lead to political stability, high economic growth and accelerated regional cooperation and integration as set out in the NEPAD document. The ultimate goal of the APRM is to instil good governance in Africa, which NEPAD considers the *sine qua non* for Africa's development.

The principal finding of this study is that the mechanism of peer review through the APRM has the potential to foster good governance in Africa, and thus, to pave the way to poverty alleviation and development. The peer review process provides an opportunity for participating countries to become aware of the strengths and shortcomings in their policy-making, governance institutions and practices and to share best practices of administrative, political and economic governance. It offers a forum for dialogue, peer learning, and regional and continental cooperation in which the challenges facing African countries, both individually and collectively, can be tackled. The APRM has initiated a process of dialogue between government and other societal actors (mainly civil society and business) about governance and development issues and how these can best be addressed. This is an important step towards the consolidation of democracy and better governance in Africa. It is for these benefits and for the potential for better governance that the APRM needs all the political and financial support it can get.

The APRM is, however fraught with many challenges, which are likely to impede the effectiveness of its contribution. These challenges include the voluntary nature of the APRM, its inability to enforce policy, the absence of adequate funding, poor and limited administrative resources for implementation. In addition, the weak civil society in most African states militates against meaningful participation in and contribution to the process of

peer review. Addressing these obstacles is imperative for the APRM to deliver its full potential. To this end, the study proffers a number of recommendations, which include the provision of strong political and financial support from African states, capacity building of national institutions that oversee government performance, such as the parliament and civil society, and the consistent financial support of donors and the international community. The study reveals that the road to a successful and effective APRM, and thus to a peaceful and prosperous Africa may lie in the future, but the foundation for Africa's political and economic renaissance must be laid now.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
DECLARATION	iv
ABSTRACT	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	xv
LIST OF FIGURES	xv
ACRONYMS	xvi
CLARIFICATION OF TERMS	xx
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICA' S DEVELOPMENT POLICY	3
THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION	3
THE AFRICAN-ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME	7
CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: SOME MAJOR OVERVIEWS	9
HISTORICAL FACTORS: SLAVERY AND COLONIALISM.....	9
THE COLD WAR AND DONOR POLICIES.....	11
LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES.....	12
IMPERATIVES FOR THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE: FORMATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION, NEPAD AND APRM.....	13
THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND ITS OBJECTIVES.....	14
NEPAD: ITS INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS	16

DEVELOPMENT OF NEPAD	18
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF NEPAD.....	19
OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF NEPAD	22
Preconditions for development: political and economic governance.....	24
Sectoral priorities	25
Mobilisation of resources and market access	26
NEPAD'S MONITORING MECHANISM: THE APRM.....	27
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM	30
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY	34
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY	34
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY.....	35
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS	37
CHAPTER 2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	40
INTRODUCTION.....	40
RESEARCH APPROACHES.....	41
QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH	42
BIOGRAPHY	44
PHENOMENOLOGY	44
GROUNDED THEORY	45
ETHNOGRAPHY	45
CASE STUDY	46
SYSTEMS APPROACH	48
RESEARCH DESIGN	49

DATA COLLECTION PROCESS	51
DOCUMENTARY SEARCH.....	54
ARCHIVAL RECORDS.....	55
INTERVIEWS	56
SAMPLING AND SELECTING INFORMANTS.....	57
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION.....	58
ETHICS, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY.....	59
ETHICS	60
VALIDITY	60
RELIABILITY	61
CONCLUSION	61
CHAPTER 3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNANCE AND NEPAD/APRM: A CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW.....	63
INTRODUCTION.....	63
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.....	64
THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH.....	65
THE POLITICAL APPROACH.....	67
THE LEGAL APPROACH.....	68
THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH (NPM)	69
GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES	71
Meanings of governance	74
Governance and International development institutions	78
Characteristics of good governance	80

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE: NEPAD AND APRM	83
PEER REVIEW MECHANISM.....	83
Defining peer review.....	84
The process of peer review	88
Functions of peer review	89
Requirements for successful peer review.....	90
Two models for compliance in international regimes.....	91
Implications of peer review mechanism.....	94
THEORIES OF REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION	95
Defining regionalism and regional integration.....	95
Approaches of regional integration.....	97
Regionalism in the globalisation era.....	105
Implications of regionalism on governance.....	108
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE, LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	110
THE RULE OF LAW	110
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY.....	113
IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY	115
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION	116
EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC SECTOR	121
DEMOCRACY: THE CONTROVERSY.....	123
GOVERNANCE – A DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK.....	130
CONCLUSION	131

CHAPTER 4 CASE STUDIES: GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP MODELS IN AFRICA	132
INTRODUCTION.....	132
MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD.....	133
LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS.....	135
EGALITARIAN-AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS	138
TRADITIONAL INEGALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS.....	139
POPULIST POLITICAL SYSTEMS.....	140
AUTHORITARIAN-INEGALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS.....	141
POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA	142
TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE.....	142
GOVERNANCE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD	145
INDEPENDENT AFRICA: NEOPATRIMONIAL REGIMES AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE.....	148
LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA	149
TYPES OF AFRICAN POLITICAL REGIMES UNTIL THE DEMOCRATISATION ERA (1990).....	150
Plebiscitary one-party system.....	151
Military oligarchy	151
Competitive one-party system.....	152
Multiparty system	152
INFLUENTIAL FACTORS FOR BAD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA	155
Colonialism and its political legacy	155
Ethnic factor	156

Policies of central planning.....	157
Foreign policies	159
BEYOND AUTOCRACY: DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA....	161
EXPERIENCES OF DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA.....	163
INSTITUTIONS AND THE SUSTAINING OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE	168
Legislative institutions	170
Judicial institutions	172
Political parties	174
Civil society	176
GOVERNANCE AND INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION	179
Bureaucracy and policy implementation.....	179
Public administration reforms	181
Challenges of administrative reforms in Africa.....	182
REGIONALISM AND POLITICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION IN AFRICA ...	184
Integration and interstate treaties in Africa	184
African efforts for peace and security	190
Africa and the new global order: strategies and challenges.....	195
CONCLUSION	200
CHAPTER 5 AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM: A CASE ANALYSIS	201
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.....	201
ANALYSIS OF APRM POLICIES AND STRUCTURES	203
MANDATE, PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF THE APRM.....	203

INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF THE APRM	205
The committee of participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum).....	205
The Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel)	206
The APRM Secretariat	209
The APRM team review	211
APRM structures at the national level.....	211
PERIODICITY AND TYPES OF PEER REVIEW	214
THE PROCESS OF THE APRM	214
Stage one.....	214
Stage two	215
Stage three.....	216
Stage four.....	216
Stage five	216
ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE APRM	221
THE PROGRESS OF PEER REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION.....	221
MERITS AND BENEFITS OF THE APRM POLICIES.....	225
IMPROVING LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE.....	225
OPEN SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION	229
NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES	232
PROMOTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT	234
CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM	236
INSTITUTIONAL PARALYSIS.....	236
Shared commitments or donor imposed agenda	237

Leadership authority of the NEPAD and the APRM.....	240
Voluntary participation.....	244
Absence of enforcement mechanisms.....	246
DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION.....	248
Content of the APRM: questionnaire, standards, criteria and indicators.....	249
Administrative capacity for implementation.....	250
Role of stakeholders in the APRM process.....	253
CONCLUSION.....	255
CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	256
INTRODUCTION.....	256
SUMMARY.....	258
CONCLUSIONS.....	260
THE APRM IN A NUTSHELL.....	260
MERITS AND POTENTIALS OF THE APRM.....	263
OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES OF THE APRM.....	266
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	271
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PROVISION OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS..	271
DONORS' SUPPORT AND MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY.....	274
PRESSURE FROM CIVIL SOCIETY.....	274
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING.....	275
DOMESTICATING THE APRM.....	276
TARGETING CRITICAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY ISSUES.....	277
SYSTEM OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATION.....	278

REFERENCES	281
BOOKS.....	281
REPORTS, JOURNALS, AND PRESENTATION PAPERS	290
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON THE NEPAD AND THE APRM.....	296
INTERNET SOURCES	297
NEWSPAPERS.....	302

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.1: NEPAD in comparison with previous African development plans.	29
Table 2.1: Types of Sources of Evidence.....	53
Table 3.1: Functional dimensions of governance and their institutional arenas	77
Table 3.2: Stages of the market integration approach	99
Table 4.1: Regime type of Sub-Saharan Africa until 1989	154
Table 4.2: Democracy and political freedom in Africa	164
Table 5.1: List of African states that have acceded to the APRM' MoU.....	222

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: NEPAD governing structures	21
Figure 2.1: A simplified systems model	48
Figure 5.1: APRM, AU and NEPAD Structures: A relational model configuration	218

ACRONYMS

AAF-SAP	African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme
ACJ	African Court of Justice
ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries
ADB	African Development Bank
AEC	African Economic Community
AHG	Assembly of Heads of State and Government
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APPER	Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery
APR	African Peer Review
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
APRM/O&P	African Peer Review Mechanism/Organisation and Process
APRM/OSCI	African Peer Review Mechanism/Objectives, Standards, Criteria, and Indicators
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
BWIs	Bretton Woods Institutions
CEWS	Continental Early Warning Systems
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States

CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOSOC	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G4	Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan
G8	United States of America, France, Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, Japan, and Canada
G8-AAP	G8 Africa Action Plan
GATT	General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
HSGIC	Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LPA	Lagos Plan of Action
MAP	Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery Plan
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MERCOSUR	Common Market of the Southern Cone
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

MP	Member of Parliament
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Area
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NPM	New Public Management
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PAP	Pan African Parliament
POA	Programme of Action
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PTA	Preferential Trade Area
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme
PSC	Peace and Security Council
REC	Regional Economic Community
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SAIIA	South African Institute of International Affairs
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
TNCs	Trans National Corporations

UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola/ National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UN-NADAF	United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UN-PAAERD	United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development
UNRISD	United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
USA	United States of America
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument for self-monitoring and evaluation voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union (AU). Its mandate is to ensure that the policies and practices of participating African states conform to the agreed political, economic and corporate governance values, codes and standards contained in the “Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance”.

Civil society is defined as a sphere of social interaction between the state and the economy composed of organisations arising out of voluntary association in a society (Cohen and Arato, 1992: ix). The organisations of civil society represent many diverse social interests, and include such organisations as trade unions, cooperatives, community-based organisations, youth groups, women associations, academic institutions, and human rights groups. Civil society does not however, include groups that are illegal with undemocratic agendas. Civil society is seen as a mechanism to protect citizens against unbridled political power and to ensure government accountability.

Clientelism is a term first used in anthropological studies of traditional peasant communities to describe exchange relationships in which landowners (patrons) provided services such as land, physical security or protection unavailable to recipients (clients), and in return received crops, labour, other services and gratitude (Scott and Kerkvliet, 1977:443-444). The term has been adopted by political scientists to refer to a form of social organization common in many developing regions. Political clientelism is defined as a more or less personalised, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions (Lemarchand and Legg, 1972:151). In clientelist systems, leaders, who are powerful and rich "patrons", promise to provide powerless and poor "clients" with jobs, protection, infrastructure, and other benefits in exchange for votes and other forms of loyalty. Often, leaders

employ coercion, intimidation, sabotage, and even violence to maintain control of the political regime. In Africa, clientelist politics is seen as the major obstacle to development.

Development is a multi dimensional process, which involves the reorganisation and reorientation of entire economic and social systems. Development is essentially measured in terms of acceleration of economic growth, reduction of inequality and eradication of absolute poverty. However, it also involves the radical change in institutional, social and administrative structures as well as in people's attitudes (Todaro, 1992:98). Development must have the following three main objectives:

- to increase the availability and widen the distribution of basic life-sustaining goods such as food, shelter, health and protection to all members of society;
- to raise levels of living, including higher incomes, the provision of more jobs, better education and more attention to cultural and humanistic values;
- to expand the range of economic and social choice to individuals and nations by freeing them from servitude and dependence not only in relation to other people and nation-states, but also to the forces of ignorance and human misery (Todaro, 1992:102).

Effectiveness refers to success in goal achievements. Hyden and Bratton (1992:2) define effectiveness as the extent to which the system satisfies the basic functions of the government. Thus, efficiency denotes the “how” of government action, in other words, the way in which the activities of government are carried out; and, effectiveness refers to the success in goal achievement.

Efficiency refers to the relationship between input and output. The goal of efficiency is to minimise cost or resources used to attain a goal. It is defined

as the ability to minimize the use and cost of resources when achieving organisational objectives and goals (Oxford, 1994:203). Therefore, an organisation is efficient when it achieves its goals using minimum resources or inputs.

Globalisation is conceived as the widening and intensification of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the financial to the political (Held, McGrew, Goldbatt, and Perraton, 1999:2). However, the basic and underlying component of globalisation is the economic dimension. Globalisation is the process of economic and technological expansion driving towards the opening up and integration of the entire world into one economic system in which liberalisation provides the policy lubricants to guide the implementation of the process (Keets, 1999:3).

Governance: the UNDP (1997:1) and the World Bank (1994:vii) define governance as the exercise of political, administrative and economic authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. In the 21st century and in the context of globalisation, governance is conceived as the art of governing multiple and complex institutions and systems which are operationally autonomous in relation to each other and are interdependent. In this thesis, governance is defined as an art of providing leadership and exercising authority in a manner to achieve shared societal goals in a complex institutional setting.

Leadership is generally conceptualised as a process of persuasion by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by the leader or shared with followers (Gardner, 1990:1). In other words, leadership can be defined as the provision of vision and direction and the setting up of goals to be achieved by a group of peoples. Therefore, leadership is important and largely influence and determine the performance of organisations or countries.

Neo-liberaliism is a school of thought, a political economic philosophy, which

advocates less state interference and control in economic activity. It focuses on free market methods and liberalisation of trade. The neoliberal doctrine is also a subset of the so-called "Washington consensus", a set of specific policy goals designed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) for developing Latin America and African countries.

Neo-patrimonialism is the term used to refer to a system of hybrid regime in which patrimonial practices coexist with modern rational-legal authority. Max Weber who coined the term "patrimonial authority" used the concept to distinguish it from the rational-legal authority. Patrimonial authority is defined as the form of authority used in the traditional political systems in which the Chief ruled by dint of prestige and power over ordinary citizens who had no rights or privileges other than those granted by the ruler. The Chief maintained authority through personal patronage and clientelism, rather than through law (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:52). In Africa, most regimes are said to be neo-patrimonial.

New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is the African socio-economic development plan based on a new partnership between African states and their development partners, especially the highly industrialised countries of the West. The "new" partnership involves, on the one hand, mutual commitment to the principles of democratic governance and market policies by African states and, on the other, an increase of trade, aid and investment flows, by the West. In principle, the new partnership strongly emphasises ownership, transparency and mutual accountability.

Partnership is defined as the dynamic relationship among diverse actors based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labour, based on the respective advantages of each partner. Partnership encompasses mutual influence with a careful balance of synergy and respective autonomy, which incorporates mutual respect, equal participation in decision-making, mutual accountability

and transparency (Brinkerhoff, 2002:21).

Peer review is defined as the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a country either by other countries (peers), or by designated institutions, or by a combination of the two. The goal is to help the country undergoing review to improve its policy-making; to adopt best practices; and to comply with established standards, principles, and other agreed commitments (OECD, 2003).

Public accountability refers to the obligation and responsibility from public office bearers to give information and explanation of their performance and use of delegated powers (Brinkerhoff, 2001:294). Accountability is a means of ensuring that political representatives and bureaucrats act in the best interests of citizens. Accountability implies the existence of sanctions, because answerability without sanctions is considered to be weak accountability (Brinkerhoff, 2001). In other words, accountability requires institutions and mechanisms of enforcement or control, which guarantee that public office holders are appropriately constrained.

Regional cooperation and integration is defined as a process whereby two or more countries in a particular area join together to pursue common policies and objectives in matters of general economic development or in a particular field of common interest to the mutual advantage of all the participating states (Asante, 1997:20). In today's globalised economy, regional cooperation and integration is approached as a strategy to cooperatively improve competitiveness, and increase negotiating capacities so that countries, as a regional collective, can participate effectively in the world economy and politics.



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Africa enters the 21st century with daunting challenges of poverty and underdevelopment, which stand in stark contrast with the unprecedented prosperity that other parts of the world enjoy in the new millennium. Since the first country to be granted independence in Africa, over forty years ago, Africa has lost opportunities for social development, industrial expansion and trade so that today it is the poorest continent in the world despite its immense natural and mineral resources. The reasons for this situation are numerous and include colonialism, political instability, poor and inappropriate policies, limited human capacity, and the workings of the international economic system (i.e. globalisation). However, bad governance, especially poor political governance has been identified as the most important factor that holds back Africa's development. African leaders themselves have recently acknowledged that indeed bad governance in many countries has hampered development efforts. Consequently, in 2001, African leaders launched a development programme, called the "New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)", whose overriding goal is to end Africa's poverty and underdevelopment. At the centre of this plan is the recognition that economic growth and sustainable development cannot happen in the absence of good governance. Following the formation of NEPAD, there was the creation, in 2003, of a mechanism called the "African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)" to monitor and evaluate the progress of African countries in complying with the principles and values of good political and economic governance and in achieving the objectives set out in the NEPAD. To evaluate governance performance, especially in the political domain, is a new and unique exercise in Africa. The process and dynamics of implementation of the APRM justifies the undertaking of this study. This study uses a "case study" approach and investigates the capacity of the APRM to address governance challenges that constitute the principal hindrance to the socio-economic transformation of



Africa.

The APRM evaluates four areas of governance, namely democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development. For the purpose of close analysis and interest in issues of public administration, the study focuses on a review of democracy and political governance. Furthermore, the study puts a strong emphasis on the issues which the literature review identifies as problematic in Africa's political governance. These include constitutional democracy, separation of powers, effective and accountable public service, and corruption. The purpose of the study is to probe the capacity of the APRM to address the above problems of governance through establishing its merits and potentials, but also through identifying its institutional limitations and shortcomings, and recommending remedies for its optimal use and contribution.

This introductory chapter provides a general historical background of the NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism, the latter being the unit of analysis for this study. The historical background of Africa's development is a description of the major development policies and efforts brought forward since the first country in Africa acquired its independence from colonial rule (circa 1960s). The discussion revolves around two main development frameworks, the Lagos Plan of Action and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes. These plans are selected because the first set the stage for development efforts and the second sought alternative ways to the dominant and devastating neo-liberal structural adjustment policies imposed on most African countries by international financial institutions in the 1980s. This review highlights the major factors that have obstructed development in Africa. Furthermore, this chapter introduces NEPAD, which is the latest in a series of Africa's development initiatives. It draws attention to the intellectual and philosophical roots of the NEPAD, its driving principles and the objectives it seeks to attain. In this context, a brief prologue of the African Peer Review Mechanism is also provided. Lastly, the chapter states the research problem and research questions, the rationale for



undertaking this particular study, the objectives to be achieved, the limitations to the study by taking into consideration reliability and ethical issues of the research process. It also outlines the structure of the thesis.

AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICA' S DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Since the early years of independence, that is since the 1960s, when the first African countries obtained their political freedom from European colonial masters, issues of poverty and development have become top priorities on the agendas of African leaders. At the time of independence, African leaders established institutions for continental cooperation and unity, and crafted various indigenous development plans. In 1963, the Organisation of the African Unity (OAU) was created. The main objectives of the organisation were, among others, to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa, to defend national sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, to promote unity and enhance cooperation among African states in order to ensure a better life for the peoples of Africa (Charter of the OAU, 1963).

On the economic front, several development strategies have been also developed. These include the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) adopted by the Assembly of African Heads of State and Government (AHG) in 1980. The LPA is considered the first effort of development policy by Africans. Since the LPA, there have been several other development programmes to review and adjust the plan to the changing needs and imperatives. They include the Africa's Priority Programmes for Economic Recovery (APPER), which was later transformed into the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa's Economic Recovery and Development (UN-PAAERD) (1986); the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment for Socio-Economic Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989); the African Charter for Popular Participation for Development (1990); and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) (1990).

THE LAGOS PLAN OF ACTION

The Lagos Plan of Action was initiated in 1980 in Lagos, Nigeria. The



development plan came after shocking findings of African economic performance from the reviews carried out by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA or ECA) from 1975 to 1979 (Adedeji, 2002:5). The evaluation of Africa's macro-economic performance over the period from 1960 to 1975 found that the macroeconomic aggregate performance was below the targets set by the UN Second Development Decade. The GDP annual growth rate was 4.5 per cent instead of the target of 6.0 per cent; the export was 2.8 per cent instead of 7.00 per cent; the agricultural growth rate was 1.6 per cent instead of the target rate of 4.00 per cent, while manufacturing grew at 6.0 per cent instead of the target of 8.00 per cent. The only macroeconomic aggregate the performance of which exceeded target was import, with an actual growth rate per annum being 10.0 per cent exceeding the target of 7.0 per cent (Adedeji, 2002:5).

The findings of the ECA' reviews raised questions about the effectiveness of development paradigms and strategies that independent African countries had pursued. Since independence, African countries had implemented state-led development models, which placed the state in the position of leading agency of national development. This model of development was characterized by central planning and the creation of local industries and their protection through "import substitution trade policies" (Ranis, 2004). The ECA's assessment revealed that the development strategies adopted failed to transform African economies or to improve the wellbeing of African peoples. The situation was so critical that of all the five United Nations regions, Africa's performance was the worst (Adedeji, 2002:5).

The adoption of the LPA in 1980 came as a resolve by African leaders to change the course of development in Africa as the following extract of the Lagos plan indicates:

We recognised the need to take urgent action to provide the political support necessary for the success of the measures to achieve the goals of rapid self-reliance and self-sustaining development and economic growth. (OAU/LPA, 1980)



The LPA was mainly informed by the dominant development paradigm of the time, namely the dependency school (Adesina, 2003). Therefore, the plan for the recovery of the African economy was an attempt to address the crisis of dependent capitalism, within the framework of a nationalist development model. Increasingly, leaders and intellectuals of the developing world realised that post-colonial development strategies advised by rich countries were exploitative and could not be to the advantage of poor nations economically. The LPA was aimed at changing this abnormal situation. African leaders were convinced that the poor development record was the result of exogenous development strategies that opened the continent to dependence and exploitation. This view was explicitly expressed in the LPA preamble in these terms:

The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies has been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents of the world. Indeed, rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialised countries. (LPA, 1980:1)

Consequently, African leaders committed individually and collectively to promote the economic and social development of Africa within the framework of “self-reliance” and “self-sustaining development” (OAU/LPA, 1980 para 3 (i)). The LPA was a comprehensive development programme covering issues that range from food and agriculture to industry, the utilisation of natural resources, the development of human resources, science and technology, transport and communications, trade and finance, technical cooperation for strengthening economic development, the environment and energy. The plan also addressed the issue of women and development, planning coordination, and mechanisms for implementation.

At the heart of the LPA was also the idea of collective economic development through regional integration. The ultimate goal of the LPA was to form a united African economic bloc with common tariffs, parliament, and eventually common currency. The rationale for regional integration in Africa was that



integrating national economies would provide larger markets and economies of scale for investment and production, with combined or complementary resources, and would provide effective frameworks within which to correct disarticulated and ineffective economic structures.

However, it should be noted that the LPA emerged during the time when the structural adjustment policies (SAP) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were imposed on poor countries, including Africa. The SAPs focused on production efficiency and market signals by paying attention to such elements as macro economic stability, balanced fiscal accounts, tax reforms and trade liberalization and deregulation (Williamson, 2000:252). Under structural adjustment, the core principles of increasing economic and technical efficiency were the guiding principles and objectives of the development process. They became the early priorities for economic reforms in Africa. Clearly, the development approach of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) under the structural adjustment policy was in conflict with the people-centred approach advocated by the Lagos Plan. Development scholars note the struggle for the development agenda between the BWIs and Africa policy makers. As Ake reasserts, development donors expressed their rejection of the plan by ignoring it and refusing to fund it. The African development agenda lost the battle to the western structural programmes, as only policies and reforms in line with SAPs were funded (Ake, 1996:25). Thus, given their weakness and dependent position, African leaders abandoned the LPA and started implementing structural adjustment reforms crafted by the BWIs.

After a decade of implementation, it was widely accepted that the results of the structural adjustment reforms were deleterious, impacting badly on social sector (Cheru, 2002:19). In March 1988, senior African officials convened in Khartoum, Sudan, to oppose adjustment policies. The “Khartoum Declaration Towards a Human-Focused Approach to Socio-Economic Recovery and Development in Africa” vehemently voiced Africa’s concerns over SAPs, for aggravating the human condition in Africa. The Declaration denounces the structural adjustment policies in the following notes:



The programmes are incomplete because they are often implemented as if fiscal, trade, and price balances are ends in themselves and are virtually complete sets of means to production increases. Human condition imbalances as related to employment, incomes, nutrition, health and education do not receive equal priority in attention to macroeconomic imbalances. (Ake, 1996:33)

Thus, the frustration and hardship resulting from the implementation of SAPs led African countries to design yet another development plan, which sought to provide an alternative framework to structural adjustment programmes.

THE AFRICAN-ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO THE STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME

The African-Alternative Framework to the Structural Adjustment Programme (AAF-SAP) emerged in 1989 as a reaction to the hardship resulting from SAPs and the persistent frustration of Africa's efforts to bring about fundamental socio-economic structural changes since the Lagos Plan of Action (Ake, 1996:31-41). The AAF-SAP was not only a critique of the IMF and World Bank structural adjustment but was also an alternative development agenda. It was the comprehensive plan covering issues from the root causes of poverty and development crisis in Africa to policy recommendations to solve the crisis. To overcome the development tragedy, AAF-SAP, like the LPA emphasized the principles of human-centred development, a self-sustaining process of economic growth and development, and integration of African economies through national and regional collective self-reliance. The strategy argued for the transformation of structural weaknesses of African economies which were evident in a human capital deficit, disarticulated production base with ill-adapted technology, fragmentation of the African economy, weak physical infrastructures, inadequate institutional capacities, and the excessive dependency of the African economies (AAF-SAP, 1989: 2-8). In addition, AAF-SAP elaborated on the imperatives of democratic governance, human rights and political freedom, the provisioning of basic human needs such as potable water, shelter, primary health-care and sanitation, education and public transport as public "goods" that should be met urgently (AAF-SAP, 1989, para 34-38).



Thus, the AAF-SAP reaffirmed the rationality and urgency of “welfarism” that the structural adjustment policies disapproved of.

Like the LPA and other previous development strategies, the AAF-SAP failed to produce the anticipated results. Adebayo Adedeji, who headed the UNECA for almost three decades, explains the challenges that African development strategies met:

African development plans were opposed, undermined and jettisoned by the Bretton Woods institutions; and, Africans were thus impeded from exercising the basic and fundamental right to make decisions about their future....lacking the resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly, they abandoned their own strategies. (Adedeji, 2002:4)

However, even though African countries followed the development paradigm advocated by the BWIs, successive programmes that have been implemented in Africa since independence have failed to boost economic growth and socio-economic development. The recent statistics from the United Nations Millennium Indicators Database (2004) indicate that in 2001, 46.4 per cent, or nearly half the population of Africa were living below the international poverty line of US \$1 per day. The mortality rate of children under five years of age is 174 per 1000 (the highest in the world), and life expectancy at birth is only 54 years. This is threatened by the scourge of HIV/Aids for which out of an estimated 40 million infected in the world, 28.2 million live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past forty years of independence, the continent has lost the opportunity for industrial expansion and trade. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 2003, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in world trade was estimated at 1.5 per cent falling from about 6 per cent in 1980. In comparison with other developing regions, Asia’s share of world trade is estimated at 24.3 per cent; and Latin America about 5.5 per cent (UNCTAD, 2003:3). Similarly, the foreign capital inflows to Africa have been very insignificant despite the continuing increase of foreign direct investments (FDI) to developing countries. In 2004, inflows to Africa were estimated at US \$20 billion. This compares to \$166 billion into Asia and the Pacific, and \$69 billion to Latin America and the Caribbean (UNCTAD, 2005:4). Clearly, Africa’s economic performance stands in stark contrast with



the unprecedented prosperity that the rest of the world is enjoying today. A question that strikes is the following: why has Africa failed to deliver in terms of socio-economic development? A number of challenging factors have been put forward. Below, some major impediments to Africa's development are discussed.

CHALLENGES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: SOME MAJOR OVERVIEWS

Several factors have contributed to the development quagmire in which Africa finds itself today. They include historical factors such as slavery and colonialism, the Cold War, poor and inappropriate development policies, and bad governance characterised by corruption, and a lack of accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs.

HISTORICAL FACTORS: SLAVERY AND COLONIALISM

Historians estimate that between 1650 and 1900, some 28 million Africans were forcibly removed from Central and West Africa as slaves. This human catastrophe has been referred to as the "black holocaust" (Venter and Neuland, 2005:65). Africans and the natural resources of their continent, including ivory and gold, were exploited and exported to develop the rest of the world, in particular, Europe and North America. African slaves were exported to work in the colonies of North America, Latin America and the West Indies. African slave trade labour transformed the world in many ways. In Africa, slave trade destroyed African communities leaving them impoverished as well as dispersed, because the strong men and women were taken for slavery, and coastal tribes fled from the slave raids made on their communities thus, migrating to many parts of Africa. In the Islamic world, in particular, in the Middle East, African slave labour expanded commerce and trade. This was particularly so in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. In the Americas, it was African slave labour that supported the booming capitalist economy of the 17th and 18th centuries (Venter and Neuland, 2005:65-66). Thus, the African slave trade contributed to the economic growth of other



parts of the world while impoverishing Africa.

Another factor that has contributed to the ruination of Africa's economy was colonialism. At the Congress of Berlin in 1885, European Powers partitioned Africa into territorial colonial units. Kingdoms, States and communities in Africa were arbitrarily divided; unrelated areas and peoples were just as arbitrarily joined together with no regard to former tribal allegiances. There is no better description of the phenomenon than that described in Venter and Neuland (2005:67):

Thirty new colonies and protectorates, 10 million square miles of new territory and 110 million dazed subjects, were acquired by one method or another. Africa was sliced up like a cake, the pieces swallowed by five rival nations – Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Britain (with Spain taking some scraps)... At the centre, exploiting the rivalry stood one enigmatic individual and self-styled philanthropist controlling the heart of the continent, Leopold II, King of the Belgians.

In Africa, colonial rule has not only meant the drainage of natural resources and the loss of opportunities for development, but has also contributed to the increase of social conflicts. The arbitrary colonial partition of Africa created states that comprised a multitude of competing tribes and ethnic groups. At independence, African states inherited a population characterised by sharp ethnic and tribal divisions. They also inherited a repressive state with autocratic laws and institutions. As the report of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan correctly points out, the challenge of achieving national unity for the newly independent African states was compounded by the fact that the framework of colonial laws and institutions had been designed to exploit local divisions, not overcome them (Annan, 1998:8). The new African leaders made use of existing repressive colonial system and institutions to maintain their unpopular rule. In the post-independence era, the multiple political parties that flourished because of the common struggle for independence were suppressed, and, in most of the countries abolished to give rise to and the supremacy of one ruling party.

In many African states, politics remained a zero-sum game: power was sought by all means and maintained by all means. This environment favoured



nepotism, corruption, and a general disrespect for laws and institutions, which have often resulted in coups d'états and social conflicts. In addition to slavery and colonialism that exploited Africa, other factors have contributed to poor governance and have weakened the economies of African states. These are the cold war and the economic policies adopted after independence.

THE COLD WAR AND DONOR POLICIES

The 'Cold War' (1947-1989) divided the world into two contending ideological politico-economic systems, namely capitalism (championed by the United States of America) and socialism (championed by the former Soviet Union). The Cold War gradually changed the political map of international relations with the European neo-colonial relationships being replaced with a new set of ties dominated by the Soviet Union and the United States. Developing countries, including Africa, became the battlefields for influence by these super-Powers (Annan, 1998:6). This has had devastating effects on Africa's governance and development. Americans strongly supported dictators, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo/DRC), or other authoritarian regimes, such as Somalia and Sudan, and non-democratic insurgency movements like Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), so long as they were avowedly anticommunist (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:135; Gordon, 2001:73).

At the end of the Cold War in 1989, only a few countries (regarded as important to the West global strategies) continued to receive substantial assistance (Annan, 1998:6). As a result, most regimes in Africa got poorer and weaker, and political crises and social conflicts spread. This period coincided with a paradigm shift in the donor community foreign policies towards supporting movements for human rights and democracy in Africa (Schraeder, 2001:164). The combination of these factors fuelled civil conflicts and wars. Development received limited attention as African leaders spent considerable effort and resources protecting their power.

Similarly, donor policies have, in general, failed development in Africa. As highlighted above, Africa's development agenda has been heavily controlled



by the BWIs and the donor community (in particular the former colonial masters). Tied to the metropolitan economies during the colonial era, it became difficult for the newly independent states to cut off the colonial umbilical cords and to pursue economic development independently. They thus fell into what has commonly been referred to as the “dependence syndrome”. The lack of local manpower with adequate expertise and skills, especially in economics, has aggravated the crisis as most African countries had to rely on expatriates for their development plans (Ake, 1996:19). This has put African states at the mercy of the whims and caprices of donors and their development institutions. Often, aid to Africa has been tied to conditionalities, such as the purchase of the donor’s goods and services and adopting economic policy reforms (van de Walle, 1996:4-5). Nevertheless, these foreign development policies have failed to bring about economic growth and development, because development must be generated from within. As Ake (1996:140) notes, the primary principle of development is that the people, who are the end of development, must be the agents and means of that development. These prerequisites for development have been systematically neglected.

LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Until recently, African leaders blamed exogenous factors for the poor performance of their countries in socio-economic development. Today, however, there is a growing recognition that Africa’s economic and political ills are in many respects self-inflicted. The culture of clientelism, lack of accountability, and absence of peaceful means for leadership change in most African states have been the major impediments to Africa’s development efforts (Ake, 1996; van de Walle, 2001). The 1998 report of the UN Secretary General on conflicts and sustainable development in Africa also points to the nature of politics to explain political instability and underdevelopment on the continent. The report notes that the nature of political power, which often assumes a “winner-takes-all” form with respect to wealth and resources patronage and prerogatives of office, is the principal source of political instability (Annan, 1998:12). This situation has led to many civil conflicts and



internecine wars which, since 1970, are estimated to number thirty. In 1996 alone, 14 of the 53 countries of Africa were afflicted by armed conflicts, accounting for more than half of all war-related deaths worldwide and resulting in more than 8 million refugees, returnees and displaced persons (Annan, 1998:7). These conflicts have seriously undermined Africa's efforts to ensure long-term stability, peace and development for its peoples.

African leaders too have acknowledged that poor leadership, corruption, and bad governance have worsened the already weak states and dysfunctional economies they inherited from colonial regimes (NEPAD, 2001:5). Indeed, clientelist politics that has dominated African governance has created a breeding environment for corruption, poor performance and other maladministration practices inimical to economic growth and development. It is also accepted that African leadership made bad choices in terms of economic policies. While it is true that Africa's position in the world system did not allow her economic independence, it is argued that African leadership has failed to follow the rigours of "self-reliance", an approach that was central to the indigenous development plans (Ake, 1996:140; Adedeji, 2002:4). Thus, self-reliance has remained an ideal written in documents and cherished in political pronouncements. In reality, foreign powers, through their financial allowances, have continued to dictate the path of Africa's development.

IMPERATIVES FOR THE AFRICAN RENAISSANCE: FORMATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION, NEPAD AND APRM

At the dawn of the 21st century, the challenges of globalisation, increasing poverty and marginalisation of Africa in the world politics and economics have made African leaders realize the need for sturdier frameworks, within which their most pressing problems and needs can be effectively handled. African leaders have initiated a number of new projects, including the creation of the African Union, NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism, which are considered to be fundamental institutions or instruments for the political and socio-economic transformation of Africa. Although this particular study focuses on the APRM, one of its objectives is to shed light on the issues of governance and leadership for social and economic renewal. The following



section provides a brief description of the AU, the NEPAD and the APRM, their objectives and strategies.

THE AFRICAN UNION (AU) AND ITS OBJECTIVES

In July 2002, African leaders gathered in Durban, South Africa, to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) by the African Union (AU). The following are the objectives of the African Union, to:

- achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa;
- defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member States;
- accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent;
- promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples;
- encourage international cooperation, taking due account of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- promote peace, security, and stability on the continent;
- promote democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance;
- promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments;
- establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations;
- promote sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels as well as the integration of African economies;



- promote cooperation in all fields of human activity to raise the living standards of African peoples;
- coordinate and harmonise policies between existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union;
- advance the development of the continent by promoting research in all fields, in particular in research and technology; and
- work with relevant international partners in the eradication of preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the continent. (Constitutive Act of the AU, Act of 2000)

From the Constitutive Act, one sees a clear articulation of the imperatives of good governance, in particular good political governance (promotion of peace, continental stability and democracy), and good economic management and regional economic integration as prerequisites for development. The good news also is that under the African Union, African leaders have decided to move away from the “non-interference” principle, which for a long time has protected dictators and bad leaders in Africa. Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Act of 2000, provides the right to intervene in a member state in cases of grave circumstances, such as war crimes, genocide, and crime against humanity. This clause is a major shift in the politics of the continent, which if implemented may contribute to the building of a peaceful and prosperous Africa. However, it does remain to be seen whether and how effective this strategy may be if implemented.

On the economic front, the African Union launched a new development plan called NEPAD at its first Summit in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The primary objective of NEPAD is to champion the challenge to eradicate poverty in Africa, to establish stable peace and security conditions, and to promote sustainable economic growth and development, and thus enhance Africa’s



effective participation in global political and economic affairs (AU Commission, 2004:6). NEPAD is claimed to be unique, an African-owned document for the rebirth of the continent. Of course, the crucial question to be answered given the history of African development plans is to know if this time around African leaders are determined to pursue a hard but necessary African development model, which breaks away from the dependence mentality. Does the NEPAD present a paradigm shift in development policy and strategy? These and many related questions are easier posed than answered. The following section describes the NEPAD, its origins, objectives and the strategies it employs to bring about socio-economic development.

NEPAD: ITS INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vision and a strategic framework for Africa's development. The NEPAD was born from a variety of ideas and imperatives of addressing the development crisis on the continent. The new development agenda comes directly from the idea of an "African Renaissance" which holds that Africans must become the masters of the destiny of their continent. The concept of renaissance is said to have been applied to an intellectual and cultural movement that began in Italy in the 14th century and spread to other western European countries, and which was used to mean the "revival" or "rebirth" of art and literature in contrast to the styles of the Dark Ages. In history, the period of the Renaissance coincides with an age of civilisation in which artistic, social, scientific, economic and political thought turned to new directions in various European countries (Venter and Neuland, 2005:26). The concept has been expanded by the academic community to refer to a new era, a revival of the economy and of art and politics, especially after a country has experienced stagnation or decline.

In Africa, the concept of an African renaissance was first used during the time of the struggle against colonial domination. The first generation of freedom fighters, including Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Patrice Lumumba of Zaire, Sekou Toure of Guinea Conakry, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and others, used the term in the context of the struggle against colonial rule, intending to



capture the dreams and aspirations of the people of Africa in their quest for self-determination (Cheru, 2002:xii). With the end of apartheid, the South African leadership resurrected the term. In his address to the World Economic Forum in 1999, in Geneva, former President Nelson Mandela talked about the “African Renaissance” when he said: “Africa is beyond bemoaning the past for its problems. The task of undoing that past is ours with the support of those willing to join us in a continental renewal” (Mandela, 1999). His successor, Thabo Mbeki is known for championing the “African Renaissance”. According to Mbeki, an African renaissance means the following:

The call for Africa's renewal, for an African Renaissance is a call to rebellion. We must rebel against the tyrants and the dictators, those who seek to corrupt our societies and steal the wealth that belongs to the people. We must rebel against the ordinary criminals who murder, rape and rob, and conduct war against poverty, ignorance and the backwardness of the children of Africa. (Mbeki, 1998)

Thus, unlike the 1960s which saw Africans fighting for political freedom, the new African renaissance seeks to achieve economic emancipation. It is about ensuring that Africans can move from their crippled conditions of poverty and enjoy prosperity, and that Africa’s resources are utilised for the benefit of the peoples of Africa. NEPAD is therefore intended to be a strategy to uplift African citizens from the misery of poverty, ignorance, and diseases. It is an empowerment scheme for Africans to participate effectively in the economy.

In addition to the aspirations of the African renaissance, NEPAD grew out of the necessity for Africa to deal effectively with the challenges of globalisation. Globalisation, which generally denotes the widening and intensification of international trade links and the free flows of trade, finance and investment, is said to have further marginalised Africa. This view is illustrated in the following extract from the NEPAD document:

In the absence of fair and just global rules, globalisation has increased the ability of the strong to advance their interests to the detriment of the weak, especially in the areas of trade, finance and technology. It has limited the space for developing countries to control their own development, as the system makes no provision for compensating the weak. The conditions of those marginalised in this process have worsened in real terms. A fissure between inclusion and exclusion has emerged within and among nations. (NEPAD, 2001:7)



NEPAD therefore identifies globalisation as one of the causes of Africa's marginalisation and underdevelopment. Despite this diagnosis, NEPAD does not seek to cut the continent off from the world economy. Instead, NEPAD holds that, globalisation, if effectively managed, presents the best economic prospects for future economic growth and poverty reduction.

NEPAD was also inspired by a worldwide trend in regionalisation, and the success of such groupings as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which have become the most powerful economic and trading blocs in the world. This regional trend is closely linked with globalisation, which calls for integration into the globalised economy through greater liberalization of markets and capital mobility. Thus, regional integration provides weak economies a framework within which to correct disarticulated and ineffective economic structures, improve competitiveness, and increase negotiating capacities by developing regional responses to the economic consequences of globalisation. It is hoped that through NEPAD, African countries can collectively improve their economies, and reposition themselves in the world economy and politics.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEPAD

NEPAD is the merger of two development plans for Africa; the Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) spearheaded by President Mbeki of South Africa, President Obasanjo of Nigeria, and President Bouteflika of Algeria; and the Omega Plan developed by President Wade of Senegal. In 1999 at the 35th OAU Summit, the OAU tasked Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki and Bouteflika to come up with a plan for Africa's development and the resolution of its external debt crisis (AHG/Decl.2 (XXXV)). At the time, Algerian President Bouteflika was chair of the OAU, Mbeki was chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, and Obasanjo was chairman of the Group of 77. This allowed them to hold multilateral debates and negotiations in pursuit of an agenda for the renewal of Africa. They thus came up with a plan then known as the "Millennium Partnership for Africa's Recovery Programme



(MAP)”.

The MAP was a comprehensive plan embracing virtually every aspect of development. It identified peace, security and governance as preconditions for Africa’s development. It also highlighted the pressing need for improving Africa’s production and exports and human capital development; and it stressed partnership with developed countries through aid, investment and debt relief to finance the plan. Around the same time, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal drafted what he called the “Omega plan” which he presented to the Franco-African Summit in Cameroon, in January 2001. The Omega plan identified four sectors, which it considered the most important areas of focus in order to bridge the gaps between Africa and the developed countries. These are infrastructures, education, health, and agriculture. According to the Omega plan, investment needs in the priority sectors would be evaluated and brought to the purview of a single international or continental authority. The identification of needs and implementation was to be entrusted to the five African economic regions, thus adding the regional integration to the project.

At the 37th OAU Summit held in July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia, the two plans, MAP and Omega were merged and gave birth to the New Africa Initiative (NAI). The NAI was renamed the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) in October 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, when the first meeting of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) met. Looking at the three documents: MAP, Omega and NEPAD, it becomes clear that NEPAD has kept the structure and content of MAP while adding the regional component of OMEGA for the implementation of the programme. At the inaugural Summit of the African Union in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, NEPAD was formally adopted as a development plan of the African Union.

GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF NEPAD

NEPAD is managed by a three-tier governing structure: the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), the Steering



Committee, and the NEPAD Secretariat (NEPAD Annual Report 2002:81).

The primary responsibilities and objectives of these structures are to:

- ensure effective political leadership of programme development and implementation;
- develop a deep commitment by African leaders to NEPAD;
- ensure capacity for technical analysis and programme development;
- accelerate economic integration at the sub-regional and continental level; and
- effectively engage development partners, the international community and multilateral organisations (NEPAD Annual Report 2002).

The HSGIC was established in terms of a Declaration of the OAU taken at the 2001 OAU Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, and amended by the Summit of the AU in 2002 in Durban, South Africa. Today, the HSGIC comprises 19 member states, representing all the five regions of AU. These countries are also affiliated to African Regional Economic Communities (RECs):

North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya

West Africa: Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, and Ghana

Central Africa: Rwanda, Cameroon, Gabon, and Republic of Congo

East Africa: Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Kenya

Southern Africa: South Africa, Botswana, Angola, and Mozambique.
(NEPAD Annual Report, 2002:81)

The HSGIC provides leadership to the NEPAD process. It sets policies and prioritises projects for implementation. It meets at least three times a year to review implementation progress and take decisions on strategic issues. It reports annually to the African Union Summit (NEPAD Annual Report, 2002:81).

The second structure is the “Steering Committee”. This is made up of Personal Representatives of the Heads of State and Government serving on the HSGIC. The Steering Committee is primarily responsible for developing the terms of reference for identified programmes and projects and for overseeing the work of the NEPAD Secretariat (NEPAD Annual Report, 2002:82).

The third organ is the Secretariat. The NEPAD Secretariat is located in South Africa. It is responsible for coordinating the preparation of NEPAD projects and programmes, mobilising technical and financial support, facilitating and supporting implementation, mobilising private sector participation, promoting NEPAD awareness in Africa and internationally, liaising with development partners, especially the multilateral development institutions and bilateral donors, and monitoring and reporting on progress (NEPAD Annual Report, 2002:82). Schematically, the organisational structure that governs NEPAD can be represented as follows.




Figure 1.1: NEPAD governing structures



OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF NEPAD

The first paragraph in the NEPAD document describes the principal goal of the NEPAD as follows:

This New Partnership for Africa's Development is a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and at the same time to participate actively in the world economy and body politic. The Programme is anchored on the determination of Africans to extricate themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world. (NEPAD, 2001:1)

Thus, the overriding goal of NEPAD is to end Africa's poverty and underdevelopment, and to place the continent on a path of durable growth and development. NEPAD also embraces the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted in September 2000 by all governments of the world as a blueprint for building a better world in the 21st century. These include the following:

- reduction by half of the proportion of Africans living in poverty by the year 2015;
- enrolment of all children of school age in primary schools by 2015;
- promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women by eliminating gender disparities in the enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2005;
- reduction of infant and child mortality ratios by two-thirds by 2015;
- reduction of maternity mortality ratios by three-quarters by 2015;
- access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015; and
- implementation of national strategies for sustainable development by 2005 in order to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015. (NEPAD, 2001:14)



More specifically, it appears that NEPAD seeks to achieve the following:

- ensuring African ownership, responsibility and leadership of her development;
- making Africa attractive to both domestic and foreign investors;
- unleashing the vast economic potential of the continent;
- achieving and sustaining an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of over 7% per annum for the next 15 years;
- ensuring that the continent achieves the agreed international MDGs;
- increasing development of human capital and promote science and technology;
- promoting the role of women in all activities;
- promoting sub-regional and continental economic integration;
- developing a new partnership with industrialised countries and multilateral organisations on the basis of mutual commitments, obligations, interest, contributions and benefits;
- modernising agriculture and promoting intra and inter regional trade; and
- strengthening Africa's capacity to mobilise additional external resources for its development. (NEPAD, 2001)

To achieve these goals and objectives, NEPAD has drawn up a strategic programme of action, which in fact comprises several initiatives to be implemented. These initiatives can be grouped into three categories: the first group embodies the preconditions for sustainable development; the second group identifies priority sectors for fast tracking development; and the third group put together initiatives for mobilization of resources. Below, these strategies are discussed in detail.



Preconditions for development: political and economic governance

The conditions for sustainable development include initiatives aiming at promoting peace and security, democracy, and good political, economic and corporate governance and regional cooperation and integration. According to NEPAD (2001:17), development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance. Under NEPAD, African leaders commit to respect the global standards of democracy, the main components of which include political pluralism in which people have the freedom to form political parties and unions, to express their opinions and to vote for their leaders. President Thabo Mbeki, one of the pioneers of NEPAD, in his address to the South African Parliament on October 31, 2001, explains this commitment of African leadership to good governance in the following words:

We are agreed that we must strengthen democracy on the continent, we must entrench a human rights culture, we must end existing conflicts and prevent new conflicts. We have to deal with corruption and be accountable to one another for all our actions. Clearly these measures of ensuring democracy, good governance and the absence of wars and conflicts, are important both for the wellbeing of the people of Africa and for the creation of positive conditions for investment, economic growth and development. (Mbeki, 2001)

Accordingly, the promotion of democracy and good governance in Africa is not only important for attracting investments, but it also creates a favourable environment that supports entrepreneurship, trade and economic growth. To ensure the establishment and consolidation of good political environment, a series of initiatives to be implemented have been designed, including peace-keeping and conflict prevention and resolution, institutional reforms in the areas of public administration, the judiciary, strengthening parliamentary oversights and putting in place effective mechanisms to fight corruption. In addition to good political and economic governance, regional development and economic integration of the continent are considered as vital in order to ensure African competitiveness in global markets and to strengthen its voice in international politics.



Sectoral priorities

The second set of strategies identifies various sectors that need to be prioritised, each of which having a variety of component goals. There are six sectors identified that need massive investments. These are:

Infrastructure sector: it concerns all infrastructure sectors, roads, railroads, airports, seaports, and energy, water and sanitation, and telecommunications facilities. Infrastructure is one of the basics for economic growth. With poor and, in some instances, lack of infrastructures, NEPAD aims to collectively engage on projects that develop infrastructures in Africa.

Human resource development: this initiative includes all activities dealing with poverty reduction, improving the quality of education, and increasing access of Africans, especially women to education. It also contains strategies to retain African brains and utilisation of African Diaspora for Africa's development, strengthening programmes, which control communicable diseases, with a particular focus on HIV/AIDS.

Agriculture: in this sector priorities are put on modernising African agriculture to increase food production and nutritional standards, addressing agricultural systems, and improve the institutional support in the form of effective agricultural policies, research institutes and other support services to boost agricultural productivity.

Environment: with the recognition that sustainable development incorporates effective management of the environment, the environment initiative has prioritised the following: combating desertification, wetland conservation, control of invasive alien species, coastal management, monitoring the impact of climate change, promoting cross-border conservation areas to boost conservation and tourism, and, providing environmental governance (institutions, training, and funding).

Culture: under this sector, the objective is to effectively utilise indigenous knowledge for developmental purposes, and to protect this knowledge through



appropriate legislations.

Science and technology platforms: the initiative aims to establish and promote cross-border cooperation and sharing of science and technology information to enhance development on the continent.

Mobilisation of resources and market access

The third set of strategies looks at ways of mobilizing resources to finance NEPAD projects. According to NEPAD, to reduce poverty and meet the millennium development goals, Africa needs to achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) of 7 per cent per annum. This requires enormous capital inflow, approximately US \$ 64 billion per annum, the bulk of which have to be obtained from outside the continent. NEPAD builds its resource mobilisation strategy around two initiatives, namely, capital flow and market access.

The capital flow strategy seeks to increase resources through four initiatives, namely, the increase of domestic resources, official development assistance (ODA) reforms, increased private capital flows, and debt relief (NEPAD, 2001:37-39). Domestically, resources will be mobilised through the rationalisation of government expenditures, improvements in the public revenue collection systems and increased domestic savings through the introduction of effective tax collection systems, and creation of an environment conducive for the retention of domestic investments given the high levels of African capital flight.

In terms of debt relief, NEPAD's leadership intends to negotiate with creditor governments and institutions for debt relief arrangements. Furthermore, a forum will be established in which African countries can share experiences and strategies for better management of debt. With regard to ODA flows, NEPAD's strategy is to negotiate with donors the increase of these flows in the medium term and the delivery system that needs to be reformed to ensure that donors abide by the commitments they make and allow recipients to effectively use these resources. NEPAD considers private capital flow as the



long-term resource base for its programmes. Initiatives to attract foreign capitals will focus on a number of areas including regulatory frameworks especially with regard to security of property rights in order to address the investors' perception of Africa as a high-risk continent. In addition, public-private partnership (PPP) programmes will be promoted and implemented along with the promotion of financial markets within and between countries.

The second major strategy to mobilize resources is market access. It comprises several initiatives that first seek to address the structural weaknesses of African production through initiatives that promote diversification of production and effective use of Africa's resource base. Improvements in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, tourism and services are considered strategically urgent. At the same time, the initiative focuses on activities, mechanisms and negotiations to increase the access of African exports in western markets (NEPAD, 2001:40-50).

NEPAD'S MONITORING MECHANISM: THE APRM

After the adoption of the NEPAD document, African leaders agreed to establish a mechanism of peer assessment, called the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). The principal purpose of the mechanism is to determine to what extent African countries are complying with agreed codes and standards of good governance and sustainable development as endorsed in the NEPAD (NEPAD, 2001:57). The APRM was established in 2003 as a tool to be voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union, to monitor their progress towards meeting the NEPAD objectives (APRM, 2003:1).

Peer assessment is a strategic alliance among African states that attempts to build the confidence of a continent the image of which is tarnished by civil wars and poor governance. This move is expected to attract investments and boost donors' funds. This passage from President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, whose country is among the signatories of the APRM, confirms this assertion.

The States, which support the APRM understand that for African countries to approach the 21st century with renewed momentum and confidence, we have to change Africa's image and accelerate performance through the rule of law and good governance practices. Besides, we believe that the APRM

process will hasten the process of harmonisation of standards and practices, which will in turn accelerate continental economic integration that we see as the key to our own emancipation and development. (NEPAD Rwanda Magazine, 2004:3)

Specific objectives, standards, criteria and indicators in accordance with the “Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 1) and the APRM base document (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex 2) have been developed to assess and monitor progress in four key areas. These are: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management, corporate governance, and socio-economic development.

According to the document outlining objectives, standards, criteria and indicators for the APRM (NEPAD/HSGIC-03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI), the overall objective for democracy and political governance is to consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society. In the area of economic governance and management, the key objective is to promote macro-economic policies that support sustainable development. This means the implementation of transparent, predictable, and credible economic policies, but also the acceleration of regional integration. Good corporate governance aims at increasing investor confidence in Africa, making it easier for corporations to raise equity capital and finance investment. And lastly, the socio-economic development area deals with issues such as self-reliance in development and policies for poverty eradication. The following table highlights the distinctiveness of NEPAD in comparison with previous development strategies.

Table 1.1: NEPAD in comparison with previous African development plans

	OAU and previous development plans: 1963- 2000	African Union and NEPAD: 2002-
Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eradicate all forms of colonialism in Africa • Defend sovereignty and territorial integrity • Promote economic cooperation and sustainable development 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Eradicate poverty and promote sustainable development • Facilitate effective participation in the world economy and body politic • Achieve a united and integrated Africa (AU vision 2030)
Principles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sovereignty of states • Non-interference in domestic affairs of states 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sovereignty of states • Interference in internal affairs in cases of grave violations
Development strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inward looking strategies: national self-reliance and self-sustenance • Structural adjustment programs of IMF and World Bank: market-led growth, retreat of the state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integration in the global economy (market access and attract investments) • Partnerships: state and non-state actors (Public-Private Partnerships “PPP”) • Partnerships with donor community • Developmental state: provide effective policies and institutions
Monitoring and accountability mechanisms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No specific instrument of monitoring and accountability of governance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to monitor the political, economic, and corporate governance, and regional integration progress.

Adapted by Mukamunana from various OAU, AU and NEPAD documents

As it emerges from the presentation on the history of Africa’s development policies, the APRM occupies a central place in the new pan-African development plan (NEPAD). It is this emphasis on democratic governance and economic growth and development as joint objectives, which makes NEPAD unique and distinct from previous development plans. The APRM,



which emphasises not merely economic governance but also political governance, is the most critical aspect that is likely to make a difference in Africa's development history. It is this instrument that gives the African peoples hope for a true African renaissance. Therefore, how the APRM operates, its functions, benefits and likely limitations, are of high significance for research. The statement of the research problem, objectives and the significance of the study follow.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is an African development plan and strategy to eradicate poverty and place the continent on a path of sustainable growth and development in the 21st century. NEPAD is based on the premise that sustainable development is impossible in situations of political instability and social conflicts, corruption and macroeconomic instability, which are prevalent in many African countries. NEPAD, which is endorsed by the African Union (AU), and thus by all African member states of the AU, makes good political, corporate and economic governance a prerequisite to sustainable development. Consequently, African leaders have pledged to work, both individually and collectively, to promote the principles of good governance. These include the promotion of democracy, peace and security, good administrative governance and sound economic management (NEPAD, 2001:19).

The requirements for good governance in Africa are also justified by the challenges of globalisation and partnerships' imperatives. Developed countries (donors) want Africa states to adopt democratic values, the rule of law, and market policies as fundamentals of development. The highly developed countries have made it clear in the "G8 Africa Action Plan" that they will support only the countries that demonstrate a political and financial commitment to good governance and the rule of law, invest in their people, and pursue policies that spur economic growth and alleviate poverty. From a globalisation perspective, Africa is perceived by investors (the main drivers of the globalisation process) as a "high-risk" continent. Thus, one of the main



imperatives of NEPAD is to create a stable environment, free of wars and conflicts, by addressing political governance problems, promoting democratic rule, and introducing policy reforms, which will boost donor and investor confidence, and, consequently, attract foreign financial flows. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) has been established as an instrument to help African countries achieve the abovementioned goals. Its mandate is to monitor the performance of African governments in all the areas of governance (political, corporate, economic and social development) in order to help them identify weaknesses, assess the needs for capacity building, and implement policies, which will assist African states to meet NEPAD objectives. In this context, the success of the APRM is vital for the success of NEPAD.

Despite the central role of the APRM in making NEPAD ideals a reality, there are serious problems and issues, which could dilute the potency of the APRM. The following issues are the most critical. First, access to the APRM is voluntary (APRM, base document, 2003:1). Voluntary access to peer review by African states however does negate the philosophical approach of the NEPAD, which makes good political and economic governance a prerequisite for high economic growth and sustainable development. Because the APRM's purpose is to monitor the performance of governments towards the attainment of the NEPAD goals, then logically all AU state members should be peer reviewed. Voluntary access clearly challenges the legitimacy and credibility of the APRM in the assembly of African nations. So far, only 23 of the 53 AU member states have signed the "Memorandum of Understanding" (MOU) on the APRM, thus submitting to the peer review process. The fact that fewer than half of the members of the AU have agreed to be peer reviewed demonstrates the institutional and legitimacy challenges the APRM is facing. Indeed, some African states criticise the APRM for being the puppet of the donor community, and hence, a mechanism to serve the donor's agenda. This raises the question of how the instrument will achieve its goals if it lacks the buy-in of all the stakeholders.

The second issue is about the capacity of the APRM to deal with political governance challenges on the continent given the fact that the APRM lacks



enforcement measures. The APRM is a cooperative, non-adversarial process, which will rely heavily for compliance on mutual trust and shared commitment to the values of the APRM among countries involved in the process. The political governance review of the APRM aims to address such issues as the unconstitutional rule, separation of powers, corruption, abuses of human rights, political accountability, and effectiveness of the public service (APRM, 2003:59). The question in this regard is to know how the APRM can address these problems if the necessary political will for change is not forthcoming. Furthermore, what happens if or when a country fails to comply with recommended measures proposed by the peer review?

The third problem relates to the role of civil society (national stakeholders) in the process of peer review. The role and importance of civil society (such as labour unions, media, business associations, women's groups, youth, and various non-governmental organisations) in the allocation of values for society are no longer disputable. The participation of these non-state actors in policy-making, setting standards and evaluation of government performance is important in promoting good governance and enhancing accountability. Although the MOU of the APRM explicitly states that there must be broad-based and inclusive participation of all stakeholders in the process of national peer review and the development of a "Program of Action" (PoA), there are no clear guidelines for their involvement. The extent of participation and significance of the input of civil society will depend on the space for participation each government opens. It also depends on the capacity of civil society actors to challenge policies and provide alternatives. On this aspect, this research project looks at the dynamics of participation and the engagement of civil society in the process of peer review. This study aims to investigate and to engage the guidelines agreed upon for the peer review process, and to highlight the implications for the effectiveness of APRM. Consequently, the principal research question is:

"To what extent can the African Peer Review Mechanism address the critical issues of political governance in Africa?"



The following sub-questions have been formulated to assist in answering the principal research question:

- Is the APRM, as currently framed, capable of addressing critical political governance issues, such as unconstitutional rule, corruption, and lack of accountability in Africa?
- Does the APRM have adequate human and financial capacities to conduct credible reviews?
- To what extent has the process been inclusive of African civil society?

To obtain answers to these questions, a comprehensive research project such as the present one is necessary. However, it is equally important to note that definitive answers to these questions are not possible, given that the NEPAD and, particularly the APRM, are barely three years old. Very little research information is available on these initiatives and only a small number of countries have begun the process of peer review. Nonetheless, a number of tentative assumptions have been made in the light of what has been done since their inception.

Unquestionably, the APRM is well intentioned in seeking to promote good governance in Africa, particularly when contrasted with the non-interference clause of the OAU that tolerated bad leaders and poor governance. However, a number of factors may undermine the institution of a robust and credible instrument, which is supposed to genuinely monitor, evaluate and foster good governance. They include the following:

- The APRM remains essentially voluntary without enforcement mechanisms for non-membership and non-compliance, which questions the political capacity of the APRM to address governance problems adequately and to drive political governance reforms effectively;
- Limited technical capacity and financial resources both at national

and Secretariat levels to carry out professional and credible reviews may delay the process of peer review and the attainment of its objectives;

- Weakness of civil society (such as media, trade unions, businesses, and human rights groups) is a reality in most African countries, with governments constituting the single powerful force. This may undermine the participatory character of the APRM, and hence its credibility.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to:

- determine the capacity of the APRM to address political governance problems and infuse good governance practices in Africa;
- identify the factors that constrain the effectiveness of the APRM; and
- proffer recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the APRM.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This research is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, the study will enrich the existing literature on governance and government' self-assessment and peer review, which is important for Public Administration research. While there is a body of literature on government performance and performance evaluation and monitoring, the peer review, particularly the peer review of Heads of State and Government is a new terrain. A body of literature on governance and implementation of extra-national policies has been generated, especially following the European Integration, which has expanded theories in Public Administration (see for example, *Managing Complex Networks Strategies for the Public Sector* by Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997). However, the scholarly debate has generally been limited to the EU. Secondly, this study expands knowledge and scholarship on new dynamics of



policy-making and implementation in the context of African peer review. This pioneering study on the “peer review in Africa” provides an opportunity to scholars and readers to explore this unique, contentious, yet promising instrument for good governance. It is hoped that the findings of this research will stimulate intellectual debates and therefore help to raise interest in future research on this critical instrument.

Thirdly, the research on the African Peer Review Mechanism is paramount considering the fact that for the first time in history African states are attempting to monitor one another performance in political and economic governance spheres. Considering the African poor track record in governance and the APRM’s purpose of procuring good governance, this research is of paramount importance in its attempt to determine the strengths of the mechanism, to identify the shortcomings and other impediments to the goals of the APRM of improving governance in Africa, and finally to proffer recommendations.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Every research has a closure point, which is defined in terms of time and space. This study was carried out from the inception of the APRM (2003) to December 2005. All developments related to the APRM which occurred beyond this timeframe are not covered.

In terms of space, this study focuses on the instrument of the APRM itself. No country was used as a specific reference for analysis for a number of reasons. First, the APRM is a new initiative (barely three years old) and does not provide substantial country review information for analysis. Second, the operational protocols of the APRM do not allow access to the information of reviewed countries until the final report is made public by the Committee of Participating Heads of State (the APR Forum). Making the country review report public occurs six months after the report has been considered by the APRM Forum. At the time of writing this thesis, only two country reports -



those of Rwanda and Ghana, which started the peer review process in June 2004 had been considered by the APRM Forum in June 2005. But these are not yet public. This study completed in December 2005, as already noted, did not therefore have the opportunity to analyse these country review reports.

This study was also constrained by the paucity of data on the APRM and the confidentiality principle generally surrounding governments operations, in particular, when they are about new institutions. From its inception, the African Peer Review Mechanism has been a highly political and elite driven initiative. Most of the materials (such as minutes of meetings, and reports) which could provide insight into the process and its implementation are classified.

Furthermore, the study confines its analysis to exploratory rather than evaluative research methods. It does not pretend to provide an evaluative account of the achievements or failures of the APRM because the instrument is still in its infancy and has not yet borne sufficiently significant results for evaluation. This limits the ability of the research to provide a fair picture of the capacity of the APRM to for instance influence the adoption of policies or governance norms in participating countries. This can only be accurately done through evaluative approaches. Furthermore, the case study approach, which is used in this study, does not lend itself to generalisation. This is a unique and distinct case and is analysed as such.

Finally, financial constraints and academic time requirements have also inhibited the researcher from enquiring into all the salient issues needed to fully understand the APRM. The study is limited to one aspect of the APRM, the “Democracy and political governance” review. The reason for focusing on this aspect is that it promises to address the issues of political governance in Africa. The overall objective of the political governance review is to consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers and effective, responsive public service are realised to ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society (APRM, 2003). The section on “democracy and political governance” contains nine objectives which correspond with the



issues to be addressed. This study however, focuses on only four. These are generally recognised as the most challenging in Africa's governance. They are:

- constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the Constitution to be firmly established in the constitution;
- separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective Parliament;
- accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants; and
- fighting corruption in the political sphere.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides a historical background to the study. It is an overview of Africa's history and her efforts to address development challenges. The chapter provides the intellectual roots of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), how it was formed, its governing structures, objectives and strategies. Further, the chapter discusses the institutional mechanism of NEPAD, the African Peer Review Mechanism, which is the case analysis for this study. Then the chapter proceeds to define the research problem, determine the objectives of the study, and the rationale for undertaking this particular study. This chapter also provides the limitations of the study and ends by providing the overall structure of the thesis.

Chapter 2 is an outline of the methodology and research design for this study. It describes major research methods in social science research and provides the reasoning behind the selection of a case study approach to analyse the chosen topic. The chapter describes in detail the methods and instruments that were used to collect data and how the information collected was



analysed. Finally, the chapter discusses the issues of ethics, validity and reliability for the research.

Chapter 3 is the theoretical framework of the study. It starts by circumscribing the topic in the field of Public Administration. This is done through a survey of the major theoretical paradigms in Public Administration, and their relationship with the case study analysis. The theoretical review defines all related concepts to the APRM, that is, governance, peer review and regionalism. The chapter provides a comprehensive review on conceptions of governance, mainly from two viewpoints: the academic standpoint and that of the multilateral development institutions. The chapter elaborates on the concept of peer review in some depth, drawing on experiences from the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The APRM, which is an instrument for performance and good governance, operates in the context of supranational jurisdiction and is designed for regional cooperation. In this context, the chapter presents various theoretical approaches to regional cooperation and integration, and the relationship between regionalism and globalisation, and their impact of on governance. Lastly, the author develops a framework of governance outlining the essential components needed for Africa, taking into account domestic realities and global challenges and imperatives.

Chapter 4 is a review of the literature on governance models in Africa. The chapter highlights governance models found in modern political systems. It also provides a chronology of governance systems in Africa from the pre-colonial period to the post independence era. This is important to show the patterns of governance during these different periods. The chapter surveys critical issues of political governance, focusing on the main objectives of the political review of the APRM including constitutional rule, separation of powers, fighting corruption, and effective public service. In addition, the chapter discusses African experience on regional cooperation and integration, and the challenges posed by globalisation. In summary, this chapter is a comprehensive account of core governance and leadership challenges and difficulties experienced in Africa. The outline of the problems of governance in



Africa enables the study to rationally analyse the APRM and to predict its likely successes and difficulties.

Chapter 5 is the case analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism. It is an in-depth analysis of the APRM. It presents its purpose, objectives and governance structure. The chapter critically analyses the APRM in relation to its design and operation. It presents the findings and answers to the research questions. The study concludes with Chapter 6, which summarises the main findings and proffers recommendations regarding shortcomings and other issues that need remediation. Topics for further research are also suggested.



CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

Any scientific research involves the application of various methods (also referred to as strategies or approaches) and procedures to create scientific knowledge (Welman and Kuger, 1999:2). The validity of this knowledge largely depends on the manner in which data has been collected, which is the research methodology. Thus, scientific knowledge is obtained through rigorous methods and techniques that in some controllable way correspond to the social world that is being described.

A variety of methods and techniques are available for social research. Some are quantitative, while others are of a qualitative nature. The selection of methods and their application depends on the aims and objectives of the study, the nature of the phenomena being investigated and the underlying theories or expectations of the research. Each strategy offers a particular and unique perspective that illuminates certain aspects of reality more easily; and, produces a type of result better suited for some applications than others. In Public Administration, research consists of a purposeful and systematic investigation of behaviour, processes and techniques in the administration of public institutions in order to describe, explain, and predict certain phenomena pertaining to particular behaviour patterns, processes, and techniques (Botes, 1995:26). Consequently, a qualitative approach, and more specifically a case study approach, was selected to describe and analyse the African Peer Review Mechanism. It is important to recall (as highlighted in chapter I) that the African Peer Review Mechanism is an instrument, the function of which is to monitor the performance of African governments in the areas of political, economic, corporate and socio-economic governance, and to propose remedial action to attain political stability, economic growth and sustainable development in Africa. Furthermore, the need for a comprehensive analysis of the rather complex and unique instrument of the APRM led to the adoption of



the “intrinsic case study” method. In this approach, the case is not selected because it is representative of a larger population; rather the case is studied simply because of its uniqueness (Stake, 1998:88). This chapter reviews the types of research approaches, it discusses in detail the selected research method, and outlines the research design followed to gather, analyse and interpret data for this study. The methodology followed is outlined, taking cognisance of the validity, reliability and ethics of the research process.

RESEARCH APPROACHES

Not all knowledge of the social world is scientific knowledge. Knowledge can be acquired through learning, experience, or self-reflection about phenomena. Mouton calls this “lay knowledge”, which is used to solve daily problems and to gain insight about certain phenomena in the world (Mouton, 2001:138). Knowledge becomes scientific when subjected to systematic and rigorous enquiry. The following are the core features of scientific knowledge:

- Scientific knowledge is obtained by means of systematic observation, which is clearly different from accidental/selective observation.
- Scientific knowledge is obtained in a controlled manner, that is scientific research adheres to a set of rules of inference on which its validity depends.
- The manner in which scientific knowledge is obtained is controlled and replicable. This means that the procedures (arguments, choice of data, collection and analysis of data, interpretation and conclusions, etc.) of scientific research are submitted to the careful and critical evaluation of other members of the scientific community for assessment of their reliability. (Huysamen, 1994:5-6)

Thus, it is the systematic application of the “method” that is central to scientific research. As noted in King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:9),



The field of science is unlimited; its material is endless; every group of natural phenomena, every phase of social life, every stage of past or present development is material for science. The unity of all science consists alone in its method not its material.

In social science research, the main criterion of distinction between research methods is their qualitative versus quantitative nature.

QUALITATIVE VERSUS QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH

The term *quantitative research* refers to those approaches that strive to formulate laws that apply to populations and which explain the causes of objectively observable and measurable behaviour (Welman and Kruger, 1999:7). *Quantitative* research emphasises the measurement and analysis of causal relationship between variables not processes. Quantitative researchers take a linear path, and are more likely to use explicit, standardised procedures and a causal explanation (Neuman, 2000:154).

In contrast, the term *qualitative research* is used to describe a set of non-statistical inquiry techniques and processes used to gather data about social phenomena. Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994:2). According to Creswell (1998:15), qualitative research is an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting. There is wide consensus from these definitions that qualitative research is a naturalistic and interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings that people attach to phenomena in their social worlds. Qualitative research is characterised by the following:

- Qualitative research aims at providing an in-depth and interpreted understanding of the meanings that people (research participants)



attach to their social worlds.

- Samples are small in scale and are selected purposively on the basis of salient criteria.
- Data collection methods usually involve close contact between the researcher and the participants, which allows for the emergent issues to be explored.
- Data is rich, extensive and detailed.
- Analysis is open to emergent concepts and ideas, which may produce detailed description, identify patterns of association or develop typologies and explanations.
- Results tend to focus on the interpretation of social meaning through representing the social world of research participants. (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003:5)

A researcher chooses the qualitative approach, either because the nature of the research questions can best be answered through an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon; or the variables cannot be easily identified. Similarly, qualitative research is appropriate in cases where theories are not available to explain the behaviour of participants or their population of study, or when the researcher needs to present a detailed view of the topic. Qualitative approaches recognise that the issue they are studying has many dimensions and layers, and so they try to portray the issue in its multifaceted form (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:8). Qualitative research encompasses several approaches that are, in some respects, quite different from one another. Yet, all qualitative methods have two things in common: they focus on understanding the phenomena that occur in natural settings; and, they involve studying those phenomena in all their complexity. The following have proved to be popular and frequently used: biography, phenomenology, grounded theory, ethnography and case study (Creswell, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Neuman, 2000; Mouton, 2001).



BIOGRAPHY

The term biography refers to the broad genre of biographical writings that includes individual biographies, autobiographies, life histories, and oral histories (Cresswell, 1998:47). This strategy is used to report on and document an individual's life and his or her experience as told to the researcher or found in documents and archival material. The methods of data collection in this strategy are primarily interviews and documents, with a detailed picture of an individual's life being the product of the research (Plummer, 1983:14). The weakness of this approach is that biographers cannot edit out their own biases and values; thus, biographies become gendered class productions reflecting the lives of the writers (Denzin, 1989). Biographical research may be valuable in Public Administration, especially in the area of leadership when, for example, the researcher is attempting to construct the life of a leader and record their leadership qualities and experience and their impact on public institutions processes. However, the biographical approach is limited to the construction of the life story of an individual; thus the method is not appropriate to describe and analyse the APRM.

PHENOMENOLOGY

Phenomenology is an approach that describes the meaning that lived experiences of a phenomenon or concept has for various individuals (Cresswell, 1998:51). Phenomenology studies conscious experience ranging from perception, memory, imagination, thought, emotion, desire, to bodily awareness, and social activity, as experienced from the subjective or first person point of view. In order to understand and interpret the meaning of lived experience of a phenomenon, the researcher must experience these phenomena as the people involved must have experienced them; in other words, the researcher must be able to enter the subject's "life world" or "life setting" and place him/her self in the shoes of the subject (Welman and Kruger, 1999:189). Phenomenological research relies on a variety of methods including participant observation, discussion and long interviews (up to ten



people), as methods of data collections (Cresswell, 1998:55). The objective is to gain rich descriptions of the experience being studied and to be as faithful as possible to the meanings attributed to the experience by the participants. As a social science research method, phenomenology is best suited for research in sociology, anthropology, psychology, and health sciences in general (Cresswell, 1998:52). Thus, this method was rejected. Phenomenology is inappropriate to analyse an instrument, such as the APRM, which humans cannot experience because the objective of this study is not to understand the meaning that individuals give to the APRM as a lived experience.

GROUNDED THEORY

A grounded theory approach is used to generate or discover a theory; an abstract analytical schema of a phenomenon, that is a theory that explains some action, interaction or process (Cresswell, 1998:56). The grounded theory is concerned exclusively with the generation, rather than the testing of theory (Mark, 1996:214). The major feature of grounded theory is that the researcher develops or generates a theory of the phenomenon being studied. Thus, the research begins with the data and these are used to develop a theory. The theory generated is articulated towards the end of the study, and can take the form of a narrative statement, a visual picture or a series of hypotheses (Cresswell, 1998:56). According to Babbie (2001:284), grounded theory allows the researcher to be scientific and creative at the same time, as long as the researcher follows three guidelines: first, he/she periodically steps back and reviews the data; second he/she maintains an attitude of scepticism; and third, he/she follows the research procedures. Again, this approach was not selected as the purpose of the study is not to develop a theory from the Africa peer review process.

ETHNOGRAPHY

Ethnography is a description and interpretation of a socio-cultural group or system based primarily on observations over a prolonged period of time spent by the researcher in the field. The ethnographer examines the group



observable and learned patterns of behaviour, customs, and ways of life (Creswell, 1998:58). The strategy is typically conducted through participant observation, in which the researcher is immersed in the day-to-day lives of the people, or through one-on-one interviews with members of the group. The researcher interprets the behaviour, language, and interactions of the cultural group. The final product is a descriptive, holistic cultural portrait of the group, which results in an empathetic view of the way of life as observed by the ethnographer (Rubi and Babbie, 2001:391). In Public Administration, ethnographic research can be used to answer such questions as those on public service delivery and issues of maintenance and sustainability of services that governments provide to communities. However, it was not deemed as suitable an approach for the present project as the case study approach.

CASE STUDY

The research method used to describe, analyse and interpret the APRM is a “case study”. Yin (1994:13) describes the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, and particularly when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not evident. According to Creswell (1998:61), a case study is an exploration of a “bounded system” (bounded by time or place) or a case (or multiple cases) over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context. Babbie (2001:285) notes that there is little consensus on what may constitute a case or a “bounded system”. Indeed, there is often a fine line between the case and its context.

Stake (1998:88-89) distinguishes three types of case study: the intrinsic case study, the instrumental case study, and the collective case study.

The *intrinsic case study* is undertaken when the researcher wants a better understanding of that particular case. It is not undertaken because the case represents other cases or because it illustrates a particular trait or problem, but because in all its particularity and ordinariness, the case itself is of interest. In the context of an *instrumental case study*, the case is of



secondary interest; it plays a supportive role facilitating the understanding of something else, such as an insight into a problem or refinement of a theory. An in-depth analysis of the case is carried out, its contexts scrutinised and its activities detailed. This is done because it helps the researcher to pursue the external interest. The choice of the case is made because it is expected to help understand the initial interest that prompted the research. Stake notes, however, that there is no line separating intrinsic from instrumental study because researchers have several interests that often keep on changing (Stake, 1998:88). Finally, there is the *collective case study*, which extends to the analysis of several cases. The researcher selects multiple cases to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon of inquiry, or to build or expand a theory. Therefore, a collective case study is not the study of a collective, but an instrumental study extended to many cases (Stake, 1998:89). The case under study may be a process, activity, event, a period of time, a programme, an individual or multiple individuals.

Despite variation in the methodological orientation to the case, case studies have one thing in common: they are “multi-perspectival” in approach. This means that the researcher analyses the case in its broader context, including aspects such as the historical background, physical setting (political, economic, social, cultural, ethical), and other cases through which the case is recognised (Stake, 1998:90). Case study researchers usually gather data on all these aspects. This is why case study is known as a triangulated research strategy (Stake, 1998).

According to Denzin (1984), triangulation may occur with data, investigators, theories and even methodologies. *Data source triangulation* is used when the researcher looks for similar data in different contexts or sources. *Investigator triangulation* refers to the use of several investigators to examine the same phenomenon. *Theory triangulation* denotes the interpretation of same results by investigators with different viewpoints; and *methodological triangulation* refers to the use of several research approaches, to increase confidence in the interpretation (in Tellis, 1997 at www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2).

[html#denzin/accessed, 10 December 2005](#)).

Furthermore, it is argued that a case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of object to be studied (Stake, 1998:86). This is consistent with the manner in which this study was conducted. This study explores, describes and analyses the African Peer Review Mechanism within the paradigm of a systems approach. The analysis of the APRM is done within its wider socio-political, economic, and cultural environment, which is explained below.

SYSTEMS APPROACH

Systems theory was developed during the 1940s by social scientists using systems analysis to analyse human behaviour in organizations. Systems theory views an organization as a complex set of dynamically intertwined and interconnected elements. The system includes inputs, processes, outputs, feedback loops, negative entropy, and equilibrium among the systemic components and the environment in which the system operates (Jones, and Olson, 1996:119).

In Public Administration, the systems approach is regarded as one of the most valuable tools for the purposes of policy analysis (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:39). Cloete and Wissink notes that the value of the systems model lies in the framework it provides, which describes the relationships between the demands, the political system and the outputs in terms of stabilizing the environment or triggering new demands (Cloete and Wissink, 2000). Below, a simplified figure of the systems model of analysis is illustrated.




Figure 2.1: A simplified systems model (Adapted from Easton 1965:32)

In policy analysis, the basic questions raised by a systems approach are: how do environmental factors affect the character of the political system? How do characteristics of the political system affect the process of policy-making and the content of public policies? How do environmental factors affect the outcome of the policy process? How effective is the feedback process? Thus, the systems approach allows an understanding of a phenomenon in its broader context.

The systems approach allowed this present study to examine the case of the African Peer Review Mechanism in its wider system, that is, in the African governance system and in the international system. Aspects such as the influence of the international environment (mainly donors and multilateral development agencies), the African (continental) perspectives and national views on the APRM were scrutinised. Furthermore, the systems approach was used to analyse the dynamics of interactions between the process of the APRM and its environment. Briefly, the systems approach helped to explore the APRM in its wider system, which is made up of many subsystems including regional, national and international as well as economic, social, cultural, and political influences and interactions with the mechanism. Using a systems approach, a clear description of the APRM emerged: how it operates, the responses from its environment and how they affect its effectiveness. Proposals for improving the APRM are also developed in a systems approach context.

RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design is defined as “a plan” or blueprint of how the researcher intends to conduct his/her research” (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:74). The researcher designs a frame of guidelines and instructions that show who is subject to research, how to get information from informants, and all procedures to collect and analyse data. Conventionally, the research design is made of these key components: research question, what data to collect, data collection methods, and data analysis (Yin, 1994). The research design is therefore a full proof of how one has conducted the research and arrived at

the conclusions.

The research design serves several purposes. First, it suggests the necessary information the researcher needs to gather to provide answers to the research question. Secondly, the research design outlines the analytical procedures one needs to use when analyzing the data. Thirdly, and most importantly, the research design helps the researcher to eliminate or at least minimise as much bias as possible (Guy, Edgley, Arafat and Allen, 1987:94). However, it should be noted that unlike in quantitative research where a mechanistic process must be followed, in qualitative research, the researcher has the flexibility to revise the research design appropriately for the purposes of the research. These revisions and reconsiderations must take place according to explicit procedures consistent with the rules of inference in the objective of ensuring validity (King, et al. 1994:12). Thus, the research design prevents both internal and external factors from interfering with research processes, and consequently ensures the validity and reliability of research findings and the acceptability of the research in the discipline in which it is rooted. This study closely follows the plan designed by Yin (1994) for case study's design. Yin proposed five main components of a case study research:

- A study's questions
- Its propositions (if any)
- Its unit(s) of analysis
- The logic linking the data to the propositions
- The criteria for interpreting the findings. (Yin, 1994:20)

This study attempts to respond to the question: "To what extent can the APRM address the political governance issues in Africa?" This research question can be best answered only through an in-depth exploration and analysis of the mechanism itself. Thus, this study is an intrinsic case study. The study focuses on the APRM as a unit of analysis because it is new and unique as an instrument of governance in Africa. Thus, the intrinsic value of

the APRM (expected contribution of the APRM to good governance in Africa) drew the researcher towards focusing on the instrument itself in order to determine its capacity and challenges. The propositions are detailed in Chapter 1 together with the logic linking the propositions and data collected during the literature review. The criteria for interpreting the findings are explained in the following steps, which outline data collection process and data analysis.

DATA COLLECTION PROCESS

Creswell (1998: 110) sees data collection as a circle of a series of interrelated activities aimed at gathering information to answer research questions. It involves locating the site or individual(s) to study, gaining access and establishing rapport so that participants will be willing to provide information, determining strategy for purposeful sampling of site or individual(s) and determining the rationale for the selected site or individual. After deciding on the site or people, the researcher needs to choose the appropriate data collection approaches, which range from e-mail messages to interviews, observations, documents and so on. Considering potentially difficult issues on the field is also important. The process ends with the storage data. However, the most important rule for all data collection is to report how the data was created and acquired (King, et al. 1994:51). This implies a detailed presentation of techniques and procedures of data collection.

As stated, this study seeks to understand the challenges of the new development plan for Africa (NEPAD) by focusing on the governance monitoring mechanism “APRM”. In a qualitative case study, the exploration and description of the case take place through detailed, in-depth data collection methods, which involve multiples sources of information such as observations, interviews, audio-visual materials, and documents and reports (Creswell, 1998:62) as the researcher attempts to build an in-depth picture of the case. This has been referred to as “triangulation”.

Stake (1998:96) defines triangulation as the process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or



interpretation. He further notes that given the fact that no observations or interpretations can be perfectly repeatable, triangulation serves to clarify the meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen. Through triangulation, the researcher minimises the limitations associated with one method or the specific application of it; thus, triangulation offers the prospect of enhanced confidence of findings. Yin (1994:80) identifies six sources of information:

- Documentation,
- Archival records,
- Interviews,
- Direct observation,
- Participant observation, and
- Physical artefacts.

All the sources have advantages and weaknesses as captured in the table below. Thus, a case study research should use as many sources as are relevant to the study.

Table 2.1: Types of Sources of Evidence

Source of data	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation	Stable/ repeated review Unobtrusive/ exist prior to case study Exact/ names etc. Broad coverage/ extended time span	Retrievability is difficult Biased selectivity Reporting bias/ reflects author bias Access/ may be blocked
Archival records	Same as above Precise and quantitative	Same as above Privacy might limit access
Interviews	Targeted/ focuses on case study topic Insightful/ provides perceived causal inferences	Bias due to poor questions Response bias Incomplete recollection Reflexivity/ interviewee expresses what interviewer wants to hear
Direct observation	Reality/ covers events in real time Contextual/ covers event context	Time-consuming Selectivity/ might miss facts Reflexivity/ observer's presence might cause change
Participant observation	Same as above Insightful into interpersonal behaviour	Same as above Bias due to investigator's actions
Physical artefacts	Insightful into cultural features Insightful into technical operations	Selectivity Availability

Source: Yin (1994:80)



To analyse the APRM and answer the research question, this study used documentation, archival records and interviews.

DOCUMENTARY SEARCH

Documentary information is important in a case study because it supports and argues evidence from other sources. This type of information can be obtained from various sources – letters, memoranda, and other communiqués, agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, administrative documents (proposals, progress reports, and other internal documents, formal studies done on the same case (cases), newspapers, and other articles appearing in the mass media (Yin, 1994).

The documentation search was used from primary and secondary sources. Primary data refers to new information collected by the researcher for the study, whereas, “secondary data” is the information from already published sources (McNabb, 2004:90). Primary data collection might mean conducting a survey with a questionnaire, personal interviews, content analysis of published documents or conducting an experiment. Secondary data can be found from various publications in libraries, on the Internet, or among other sources. Primary data was obtained from content analysis of official documents on the African Peer Review Mechanism.

1. Official documents on the African Peer Review Mechanism

- The New Partnership for Africa’s Development, October 2001
- Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I)
- African Peer Review Mechanism Base Document (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex II)
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU)
- Objectives, Standards, Criteria, and Indicators for the African Peer



Review Mechanism (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI)

- African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Process (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P)
- Memorandum of Understanding on Technical Assessments and the Country Review Visit (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/Outline).
- Guidelines for Countries to Prepare for and to Participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/APRM/Panel3/Guidelines/11-2003/Doc8)
- Country Self-Assessment for the African Peer Review Mechanism (Master Questionnaire) October, 2004.
- All communiqués issued by the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of NEPAD and the APR Forum in relation to the African Peer Review Mechanism
- Constitutive Act of the African Union, Act of 2000

2. Scholarly Literature and Newspapers

This consists of relevant published materials found in libraries and on the Internet on governance and leadership, and on African governance in particular. These sources specifically include scholarly published materials on the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), as well as information from newspapers and articles from the mass media about the above-mentioned institutions and their operations.

ARCHIVAL RECORDS

Archival records are useful in some case studies since they include service records, maps, charts, lists of names, survey data, and even personal records, such as diaries (Yin, 1994:81). Archival records are important in this



study. One of the assumptions of this study links the effectiveness of the APRM with the financial and human capacity of the APR Secretariats both at national and continental level. This implies reviewers with high expertise and adequate financial resources to carry out the peer review. This type of information was obtained from archival records: records of staff and experts engaged in the peer review process and records of financial resources involved. Any information in the archives of the APRM, relevant to an understanding of the operations of the mechanism have been used.

INTERVIEWS

Yin argues that the most important source of case study information is the interview, because most case studies are about human affairs, and human affairs should be reported and interpreted through the eyes of people (Yin, 1994:84). A qualitative interview is an interaction, a conversation between an interviewer and a respondent in which the interviewer has a general plan of inquiry but not a specific set of questions that must be asked in particular words and in a particular order (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:289). In a qualitative interview, the researcher/interviewer can pursue specific information, and dig it out; or he/she may decide to explore the many domains of the unknown terrain. In the latter perspective, the interviewer wanders along with the informants, and asks questions that lead the subjects to tell their own stories of their lived world (Babbie and Mouton, 2001).

There are different forms of interviews: structured, open-ended and semi-structured. However, interviews in case study are often of an “open ended nature”, in which respondents can provide facts about the case as well as their opinions. The following are steps that are generally used in interview design:

- identify interviewees based on the purposeful sampling;
- determine what type of interview is practical and will produce the most useful information to answer the research questions (focus group, one-

to one or telephone interviews);

- choose adequate recording procedures;
- design the interview protocol (an aid-memoir to help ask relevant questions and remain in the context of the topic being researched),
- determine the place for conducting the interview;
- Obtain consensus from the interviewee to participate in the study. (Yin, 1994:85)

SAMPLING AND SELECTING INFORMANTS

The most critical aspect in the interview process of data collection is to determine where the interview data is going to come from, that is to decide on who will provide the information needed to answer the research questions, which in research is referred to as *sampling*. The first step in sampling is to define clearly the “*population*”. The population refers to an ensemble of objects, phenomena, events, processes or individuals, which have similar characteristics of interest for the research. The second step consists of drawing the sample from the population. The sample must be representative, in other words, it must reflect the image of the population (Mouton, 1996:135). The vital objective of sampling is to obtain generalizations pertaining to a population.

However, as asserted by outstanding researchers in the field of qualitative case studies, case study research is not sampling research (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1998). Case study research is the study of the particular, which does not subscribe to “statistical generalization”. Rather, what is critical in the case study is the unit of analysis (Tellis, 1997) the examination of which must be holistic. Thus, the primary criterion for the researcher when selecting respondents is the opportunity to learn about the case as opposed to the generalization of the observations to a wider population (Stake, 1998:102).

Unstructured, informal interviews were used to increase the number of

sources of information, and thus expand the depth of data collection and the reliability of the findings. Interviews were not about collecting information from active players of the APRM, in particular the Eminent Personalities who provide the leadership to the mechanism, but about getting additional technical views from officials engaged in the APRM process. This approach to interview was chosen because of the newness of the mechanism and its political character which calls for confidentiality of most of its information.

As already mentioned, some of the key players were interviewed to provide operational information otherwise not found in official documentation used for this research. At the APR Secretariat in Midrand, South Africa, the Coordinator of the “Democracy and Political Governance” Review was, for instance, interviewed, because the thematic thrust coincides with the focus of this study, and to give insights about the APR Secretariat. Other interviewees include the Executive Director of NEPAD, the Head of APRM processes, and the Communication and Sensitisation Officer in the NEPAD/APRM in Rwanda in November 2004. It is important to recall that Rwanda and Ghana are the only countries that started the peer review process in June 2004. APRM’ officials in Rwanda were selected for interview simply because this was financially convenient. The interviews in Rwanda were carried out during November 2004. The three main research questions outlined in Chapter 1 were the guiding questions for interviews.

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin, 1994:90). The analysis and interpretation of qualitative data begins with bringing the raw data into some level of order, otherwise the researcher will be inundated with unrelated information that makes logical interpretation impossible. McNabb (2004:367) proposes a six-step procedure for analysing qualitative case study data.



Step 1: Organise the data

Step 2: Generate categories, themes and patterns

Step 3: Code the data

Step 4: Apply the ideas, themes, and categories to data

Step 5: Search for alternatives explanations

Step 6: Write and present the report.

McNabb (2004) notes that data analysis does not always follow the above logical sequence. Some activities may occur at the same time. In short, the researcher must organise data to make sense out of it. Because a case study involves an in-depth analysis using multiple sources of data collection, this may produce a lot of information that is unmanageable. Thus, it is important to organise data into a set of relevant categories, which may be based on key themes of the research. The next step is interpreting the patterns and connections that emerge after organising data. The final step in the process is that of producing a comprehensive narrative of the case, in which the connections between key concepts and study objectives are addressed (McNabb, 2004:367). This study follows the McNabb analytical procedure. The research questions constitute the major themes followed to analyse, organise and report all data collected on the African Peer Review Mechanism.

ETHICS, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

Issues of ethics, reliability and validity are important, because they provide the basis for assessing the objectivity and credibility of the research. In practice, enhancing objectivity and credibility is a concrete activity, which involves efforts to assure the accuracy and inclusiveness of recordings that the research is based on as well as efforts to test the truthfulness of the analytical claims that are being made about those recordings (Perakyla, 2004:283).



ETHICS

Research *ethics* refers to the application of moral standards to decisions made in planning, conducting and reporting the results of research studies (McNabb, 2004:55). The fundamental ethical standards involved are those that focus on what is right and what is wrong. The literature identifies four practical ethical principles that must be respected in research: *truthfulness, thoroughness, objectivity, and relevance* (McNabb, 2004:55-56). This study has tried to remain faithful to these principles.

The truthfulness principle means that it is unethical for researchers to purposefully lie, deceive or in any way employ fraud. Deliberately misrepresenting the purpose of the study, not informing the informants of possible dangers of participation are some examples of research that fails the truthfulness principle (McNabb, 2004:55).

The thoroughness principle means being methodologically thorough by following all the steps in a study. Furthermore, remaining methodologically thorough means that all the results and findings will be reported – good news and bad (Mitchell, 1998:312).

The objectivity principle refers to the need for the researcher to remain objective and impartial throughout all aspects of the study (McNabb, 2004:56). The researcher should never allow his or her personal feelings or biases to intrude into the design of the study, the selection of informants, asking questions, or interpreting the results.

The principle of relevance refers to the usefulness of the research. The research should never be frivolous, or done because the researcher wants to punish the people or groups involved in subject organisation (McNabb, 2004:56).

VALIDITY

In conventional usage, the term validity refers to the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under



consideration (Babbie and Mouton, 2001:122). The *validity* of research findings concerns the interpretation of observations: whether or not the researcher is calling what is measured by the right name (Kirk and Miller, 1986:69; Silverman, 2001:232). As already mentioned, to substantiate the validity of the findings, this study triangulated the sources of information, involving documentation, archival records, and interviews.

RELIABILITY

Kirk and Miller (1986:20) define *reliability* as the degree to which the finding is independent of accidental circumstances of the research. In qualitative case study, the objective of reliability of research findings is to make sure that if another investigator follows exactly the same procedures and conducts the same case study should arrive at the same findings and conclusions (Yin, 1994:36). Silverman (2001:227) points out that checking the reliability of qualitative research is also closely related to assuring the quality of field notes and guaranteeing the public access to the process of their production. Therefore, the types of instruments used to collect data are critical to ensure whether or not there was maximum inclusiveness of recorded data. To enhance the reliability of this study, a well-detailed research design was developed at the outset of the study, which contains, among other things, research questions and the methodology followed in collecting and analysing data.

CONCLUSION

This chapter reviews the various methods and techniques applicable for qualitative research in social science. Each of these approaches has its unique way of inquiry involving specific procedures, which makes it more appropriate for some issues than others. A case study strategy was used to develop an in-depth analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism. The holistic analysis of the APRM is done within its wider system, which is the African governance system, in particular, and the global environment, which affects it. Thus, the Easton's systems model was used as an analytic paradigm to guide the case study. Multiple sources of information, including



documentation, interviews and archival records were used to produce as much reliable research data as possible. The methodology followed proved to be adequate to answer the research questions and make scientifically relevant recommendations, which aim to improve the effectiveness of the APRM.



CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNANCE AND NEPAD/APRM: A CRITICAL LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Public administration dates from endeavours to separate public from private and to insist that public institutions should be devoted solely to advancing the general public interest. Its practice and theory have evolved through time to fit the needs and challenges of societies. From the early approach of the politics/administration dichotomy, which concerned itself with the rational implementation of legislative mandates, public administration has come to be seen as a broader domain including all those activities that deal with multiple institutions, actors and processes that characterise and affect policy formulation and implementation. Indeed, the reality is that today we are living in a highly interdependent world in which domestic affairs are continuously affected by many international cooperation agreements. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and its monitoring instrument the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) are examples of such international endeavours.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical background within which to explore and analyse the research case, the African Peer Review Mechanism. It comprises two major sections. The first section is an overview of the theories and approaches that have dominated the practice of public administration from the traditional managerial approach to the current governance approach. The values and principles characteristic of these approaches are highlighted. The second section reviews the literature related to the NEPAD and the APRM. NEPAD and APRM are regional programmes, the main objectives of which are to promote systems of governance that bring political stability, and economic growth and development in Africa. Thus, the concepts of governance, peer review and regionalism are central to this review. Given the various definitions and characteristic elements ascribed to

governance, the chapter concludes by providing a definitional framework within which to understand “governance” as used in this study.

THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The recognition of Public Administration as a scientific discipline has been highly contentious, as it does not have its own corpus of theories (Botes, Brynard, Fourie, and Roux, 1992:272). As Caiden (1982:205) argues, there are many theories in public administration but there are few general theories of public administration. Therefore, a common theoretical or applied meaning of public administration is difficult to come by. The following are some of the many definitions given to public administration. Public administration can be defined as the management of scarce resources to accomplish the goals of public policy. It involves the coordination of all organized activity having as its purpose the implementation of public policy. Public administration is also a cooperative effort in a public setting; it covers the executive, legislative and judicial, formulation of public policy and is thus part of the political process. It is different from private administration but works in partnership with private groups in providing services to the community (Stillman, 1984:2).

It follows, therefore, that public administration is about managing public resources, and involves some processes that are generally grouped into six functions: policy-making, organising, determining work procedures, financing, staffing, and control (Cloete, 1998). Public administration is also understood to be the key apparatus for the execution of the functions of the state. It is represented by the executive and its bureaucracy at the national, provincial and local levels together with the various statutory and parastatal bodies that perform a number of regulatory, monitoring, productive, and service delivery functions (Cloete, 1998:88-97).

Using a systems approach, Fox, Schwella and Wissink (1991:2) define public administration as “that system of structures and processes, operating within a particular society as environment, with the objective of facilitating the formulation of appropriate governmental policy, and the efficient execution of the formulated policy”. The commonalities of these definitions can be listed as

follows: public administration concerns itself with public functions as opposed to private business; it involves various processes and actors in the implementation and delivery of its constitutional mandate.

According to Rosenbloom and Kravchuk (2002:5), there are three main theoretical approaches, namely the managerial, the political and the legal, which have influenced the understanding and practice of public administration. For some people, public administration has been largely seen as a managerial endeavour; for others, primacy has been given to the publicness of public administration, thus emphasizing its political aspects; still others have seen it as a legal matter given the importance of constitutions and regulations in public administration. Below is a brief discussion of these different perspectives.

THE MANAGERIAL APPROACH

The argument for a self-conscious, professional field of study of public administration started from a managerial vantage point. It is widely acknowledged by public administration scholars that Woodrow Wilson (1887) set the tone for the study of public administration in his essay “The Study of Administration”. Wilson argued that administration should be separated from politics. It ought to be a science of the execution of public law, not the law itself, thus positing what became known as the “politics-administration dichotomy” (Caiden, 1982:33). According to Wilson, public administration ought to be a field of business, and therefore largely a managerial endeavour. Its core focus should be on what government can properly and successfully do; how it can do these proper things with maximum efficiency (Rosenbloom, 1992:510). Thus, according to the managerial approach, public administration should strive towards maximising efficiency, economy and effectiveness using practices similar to those prevalent in the private sector.

The politics-administration dichotomy resulted in the study of public administration being concerned with organisational and control issues to ensure both accountability and efficiency of the administrative apparatus (Shafritz and Hyde, 1992:40). Classical administrative theories, such as the



scientific management movement of Frederick W. Taylor (1856-1915), the administrative principles of Henry Fayol (1841-1925), and the bureaucratic model of Max Weber (1864-1920) have influenced the managerial public administration.

The scientific management movement of Taylor prescribed a set of principles to be followed for an organization to be effective and efficient. These are: (1) systematic scientific methods of measuring and managing individual work elements; (2) scientific selection of personnel; (3) financial incentives to obtain high performance of workers; and (4) specialization of function, that is establishing logical divisions within work roles and responsibilities between workers and management (Shafritz and Hyde, 1992:3).

In parallel with the work of Taylor, Henry Fayol (1841- 1925) came up with fourteen “principles of administration”, which he considered essential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of organisations. The 14 principles of administration developed by Fayol are: division of labour, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of particular to general interests, remuneration, centralization, hierarchy, order, equity, stability of personnel, initiative, and unity of personnel or *esprit de corps* (Roux, Brynard, Botes, and Fourie, 1997:21). Later, Luther Gulick and Lyndal Urwick reformulated and simplified these principles into the most popular acronym, POSDCORB, which stands for the seven major functions of management: planning, organising, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (Botes, et al., 1992:284).

A description of classical administrative theories would be incomplete if the bureaucratic model of Max Weber (1864-1920) is not mentioned. Like his contemporary, Weber’s work emphasised formal organisational structures as a requisite for effective and efficient organisations. Weber described an ideal type of bureaucracy as characterised by a high-degree of specialisation, impersonal relations, merit system of appointment and hierarchical authority structure (Roux et al., 1997:23). The Weberian bureaucracy has had a profound impact on the science and practice of public administration.



However, the rational model ignored the importance of individuals and their environment to the overall performance of the organisation.

It is the human relations and behavioural scientists, such as Elton Mayo, Abraham Maslow, Chester Barnard, George Hommans, and Rensis Likert who showed (through experiments) that the social contexts of employees, including motivation, leadership, status, communication, conflict, and social interaction were important management factors (Roux et al., 1997:25-32). Human relations theory brought to the fore the role and influence of informal relations on the productivity and development of an organisation. The managerial approach prevailed until World War II. After this war, however, managerial administration was challenged; this brought into existence the political approach.

THE POLITICAL APPROACH

After the World War II, changes in the socio-economic, technological and political environments led to changes in the practice of public administration. It was evident that public administration was much involved in the formulation as well as the implementation of policies. Therefore, the politics administration dichotomy that had prevailed was questioned. The main argument was that the study of public administration should be concerned with the process of social change; and the means for making such changes best serve the ends of a more truly democratic society (Caiden, 1982:41).

The political approach to public administration stressed the value of representativeness, political and administrative responsiveness, and accountability to the citizenry through elected officials (Rosenbloom and Kravchuk, 2002:18). These values, which promote transparency and participation in administrative decision-making, were seen as crucial for the maintenance of constitutional democracy. Thus, it was argued that incorporating them into all aspects of government, including public management was a necessity. Accordingly, public administration as a policy-making centre of government must be structured in a way that provides political representation to a comprehensive variety of the organized political,

economic, and social interests that are found in society at large (Rosenbloom, 1992:512). Another approach that has influenced the study and practice of public administration is the legal approach. Its values and principles are discussed below.

THE LEGAL APPROACH

The legal approach is said to have originated in Europe, especially in the strong statist France and Germany. Chevallier (1996) argues that the development of the French liberal state in the 19th century led to the predominance of law and lawyers emphasizing the guarantee of citizens' rights and limits on state power. Therefore, the promotion of the legally legitimate state meant that the administrative law was considered as the exclusive tool to understand administrative realities. In line with this approach, public administration plays the role of a driving force in social life and aims at constantly improving the appropriateness of its management policies and the quality of the results-conformity with the law (Chevalier, 1996).

According to Rosenbloom and Kravchuk (2002:35), the legal approach embodies three central values. The first is procedural due process, a term which stands for the value of fundamental fairness, requiring procedures designed to protect individuals from malicious, arbitrary, capricious, or unconstitutional harm at the hands of the government. The second value concerns individual substantive rights as embodied in the constitutions of many contemporary states. Thus, the maximisation of individual rights and liberties is viewed as a necessity within the political system in general and in public administration in particular. The third value is equity, which stands for the value of fairness in the result between private parties and government. It encompasses much of the constitutional requirement of equal protection.

Until the 1980s public administration in different parts of the world was dominated and influenced by the above three theoretical approaches, the managerial, political and legal approach. In some places, such as the USA, the focus of public administration was on developing management and professional capability, and applying organisational approaches that



emphasized rationality and efficiency in management. The influence of elite bureaucrats and professionals, and the use of organisational knowledge in policy-making were high (Caiden, 1982; Rosenbloom and Kravchuk, 2002). However, with the rapid developments in information and communication technologies, globalisation of world economy, and subsequent difficulties in public service delivery during the past few decades, the traditional practices of public administration, proved to be rather outmoded, unresponsive and ineffective in resolving societal problems. The centralised system of governance has raised many questions pertaining to democratic participation, equity, efficiency and effectiveness. Government and its public institutions being the central organiser and provider of public services produced undesirable consequences, such as inefficiency, corruption, and people dissatisfaction with service delivery. The discontent with the traditional bureaucratic administration has resulted in new approaches, the “new public management” and “governance” dominating the reform debate in public administration.

THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT APPROACH (NPM)

In the early 1980s, a new managerial approach to public administration, commonly dubbed the “New Public Management (NPM)” emerged (Pollitt, 2003). It is said that this approach corresponds with the coming to power of Mrs Thatcher of Britain in 1979, and her macroeconomic policy of reducing public expenditure through a series of public sector reforms (Pollitt, 1996:82). In the United States, the movement began with President Reagan’s call for a small-sized public sector. It received greater attention with the entrepreneurial management model outlined in Osborne and Gaebler’s popular book, *“Reinventing Government”* (1992) and later in the Gore’s National Performance Review set out in 1993 to make federal organisations more performance-based and customer-oriented (Moe, 1994:111). Many countries around the world (notably the OECD countries) have tried to implement its ideas and some influential organisations, such as the World Bank, promoted it (OECD, 1991).



The NPM is a combination of ideas derived from economics (public choice theory) and managerialism (Pollitt, 2003). From the public choice theory, individuals are considered as selfish utility maximisers. As a result, performance contracts and monitoring mechanisms have to be tight. Whereas the business organisation theory (managerialism) posits that individuals can be bound into organisational purposes by vision statements, good leadership and a supportive and creative organisational culture. In this perspective, staff can be trusted and become more innovative and productive (Pollitt, 2003:32).

Thus, the NPM is a new approach to public management, which advocates the reconfiguration of existing boundaries and responsibilities of the state, through a number of initiatives. These include the restructuring of public services (for instance by disaggregating large bureaucratic structures into quasi-autonomous agencies), the application of various private sector management techniques to improve efficiency; a greater use of non-state (private and/or community) actors to discharge public services (privatization) along with the introduction of market based mechanisms (Auriacombe, 1999:125-128). As such, the direct involvement of the state in the production and delivery of public goods and services is thereby abandoned or at least lessened to give primacy to market mechanisms. The post-bureaucratic reform thesis holds that public administration must become anticipatory, flexible, results-oriented, customer-driven, values-based and entrepreneurial (Kuye, 2002:20).

As a result, from the 1980s onwards, many countries (developed and developing) around the world have started reviewing the roles and responsibilities of government institutions. Many functions previously performed by the public sector have been privatised; those remaining within the state machine have been subjected to business-type disciplines, such as competitive tendering, performance measurements, and performance-related pay. The assumption appears to be that the best way to obtain better results from public sector organisations is to adopt some sort of market-based mechanisms, introduce tight performance measurements and embark on partnerships with private organisations in the production and delivery of goods

and services.

Despite the enthusiasm it has created, the new public management paradigm has been criticized for being narrow in scope, and for losing touch with the theoretical foundation of public administration, which is the public law (Moe, 1994:111-119). The general argument is that public management is not only about increasing efficiency and effectiveness; it is also a matter of the legality and legitimacy of actions performed by the government (Moe and Gilmore, 1995:135-143). Indeed, public administration exceeds more efficiency; it is about the interplay between the state and its people. Citizens are not simply consumers, as in the NPM, but are related to the state in terms of Locke's "social contract", which gives them the right to hold their governments to account for the actions they take or fail to take.

In addition to the NPM theoretical weaknesses, the results of its reforms have been mixed and, in some cases, wanting. Pollitt (2003:38) indicates how both the New Zealand and the UK stepped back from the NPM reforms in the health care sector because of their disappointing results. He also points to the fact that where evaluations of the NPM reforms have been conducted, they have not been conclusive about the efficiency gained that could be attributed to these reforms (Pollitt, 2003:38). This has led to the emergence of a new concept: "governance", which is discussed in detail in the next section. Debate about reform has been analysed beyond the new public managerialism, and has focused on the role and place of the state in the social system. The government is seen as one of the many social actors whose influence determines the means and ends of public policies.

GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The word "governance" originates from Greek, and means "steering", in other words, providing direction. Governance has become a dominant topic in development policy discourse as well as in social science scholarship. Despite the popularity of the concept among both theoreticians and practitioners, there is still a lack of conceptual consensus; hence, governance has multiple definitions. The review of the literature suggests that the concept derives its

meaning from three separate traditions, namely, the study of institutions, networks theory and corporate governance.

The perspective and tone of institutionalism were set in the 1990s after realising that the macroeconomic and fiscal policy reforms of the IMF and the World Bank as applied to poor/developing countries during the 1980s had failed to produce the anticipated economic changes. The key for the failure of free-market, the World Bank argues, is the neglected role of institutions, which form the foundation of effective private markets (World Bank, 2002:8). In the broadest sense, institutions refer to rules, which may be formal (as in constitutional rules), or informal (as in cultural norms) (Ostrom, 1999:37). Theorists argue that institutions are important for political governance, because they structure political and administrative behaviour. Institutions define who is able to participate in the particular political arena, shape the various political actors (political strategies), and influence the preferences of actors (possible and desirable actions) (Ostrom, 1999:41). Institutionalism sees governance as the exercise of authority and control. Thus, the purpose of a governance system is to regulate the exercise of authority by setting up incentive schemes and commitment mechanisms. Since a governance system is characterised by agency relationships, political actors must be given incentives to seek social welfare, as they, too, have their own objectives. For example, when government protects private property rights and enforces contracts, it achieves credible commitment among agents. On the other hand, wherever there are institutional weaknesses, there are "government failures" because incentive systems can be inappropriate (Ostrom, 1999:41-42, World Bank, 2002:6-8). Thus, the fact that institutional arrangements can create very different incentives that lead individuals to interact in either productive or non-productive ways, has put institutionalism at the centre stage of current governance debate.

A second vision of governance is that of networks theory. Governance in a network approach takes place in networks involving various actors and multiple institutions that need negotiation and cooperation for a positive outcome from the bargaining process. The network theory understands public



policy to be made and implemented in networks of interdependent actors (public agencies, individuals, private businesses, non profit organisations, etc.), often with conflicting rationalities, interests and strategies (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997:9). Networks include interagency cooperative ventures, intergovernmental programme management structures, complex contracts, and public-private partnerships. Formulation and implementation of policy, therefore, often require negotiation, bargaining and cooperation among various actors. Governance, according to this model takes place in networks, and consists of cooperation for successful realisation of policies. Such a perspective follows the utilitarian rationale, which places all actors around the negotiation table without establishing a hierarchy between them, without taking into account the phenomena of domination and exclusion of the weakest actors (Kickert et al., 1997:2-10). While the networks approach acknowledges the highly interactive nature of policy processes, which characterises modern governance, the theory has weaknesses that need attention. Lack of hierarchy among actors makes implementation in networks challenging. With different institutional “homes”, actors deal with each other as equals, and potential allies or adversaries, and this creates competition and bargaining, which can compromise the effectiveness of operations. Furthermore, networks theory raises the issues of public accountability as private actors are not subject to the same constitutional, statutory, and oversight controls as government actors.

The third perspective of governance is from the corporate governance point of view. Indeed, the term governance has been widely used in the corporate governance studies. The evolution of corporate governance has influenced analyses of political governance. Since the beginning of the nineties, the model of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance, based on the rule of the shareholder, has been submitted to violent criticism. Prominent academics in the field have bolstered the notion of the stakeholder business, whereby, rather than being purely responsible to the firm's shareholders, the board of directors is responsible to all of those who have a stake in the firm, that is, employees, consumers, suppliers, and society, at large (Kay and Silberston,



1996, <http://www.johnkay.com/industries/149>). It is argued that because the firm has borrowed resources from society, it becomes immediately responsible and accountable to all the participants in its production and distribution processes. In other terms, property confers not only rights but also responsibilities. The proponents of the corporate approach to political governance emphasize this aspect of enlarging accountability and participation. The state's legitimacy through governance can only be derived from a position of responsibility to and inclusion of its "stakeholders", that is, citizens, in the decision-making process, thereby forcing the state to engage in partnership governance.

Meanings of governance

Despite the multiplicity of meanings, it is possible to define governance according to two main groups of approaches, one that sees governance as concerned with the rules of conducting public affairs, and the other, which views governance as an activity of managing and controlling public affairs (Hyden and Court, 2002:14). Academics tend to adopt the former definition, whereas practitioners (mainly the international development institutions) promote the latter.

In Europe, the concept of governance has been debated in the context of European integration and the subsequent growth of new institutions and actors who became involved in public policy processes (Hyden and Court, 2002:15). Governance emerged as a comprehensive term for dealing with multiple institutions, multiple actors and multiple processes characteristic of policy formulation and implementation of an integrated Europe (Hyden and Court, 2002:15). In this context, governance is defined as "directed influence of social processes" (Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997:2). Accordingly, governance covers all kind of guidance mechanisms that are associated with public policy process. These guidance mechanisms are not restricted to deliberate forms of guidance, nor is governance restricted to public actors. Similarly, Kooiman (1993) argues that governance is about purposeful action, which is the outcome of the interacting efforts of all involved parties. He



argues that it is a process that takes time and that is not restricted to government but also involves other societal actors in an effort to achieve their objectives and interests (Kooiman, 1993:258). Scholars therefore view governance as a broader term than public administration that includes self-steering mechanisms and different actors other than public actors, who have a bearing on policy processes.

In the United States also, public administration scholars have spent a great deal of time debating how public sector organisations and programmes can be organised and managed to accomplish public purposes efficiently and effectively in a “disarticulated state”, that is, one with reduced capacity to resolve complex social and economic issues (Frederickson, 1999 <http://www.apsanet.org/PS/dec99/frederickson.cfm>). The impetus for governance has been the declining relationship between the conventional jurisdiction of public organisations (nation-states, provinces, municipalities, counties) and the scope of public activities. The changes in economics (increasing globalisation of investments, production, and consumption activities), the revolution in telecommunications, which have altered the importance of borders and boundaries, and the complexity of these relationships led to the conceptualisation of governance.

Thus in the US, governance is defined as the interplay between government and other societal actors in performing public duties (Heinrich and Lynn, 2000:2). The concept of governance implies a configuration of separate but interrelated elements, statutes, policy mandates, organizational, financial, and programmatic structures, administrative rules and guidelines, and institutionalized rules and norms, which in combination establish the means and ends of governmental activity (Heinrich and Lynn, 2000:4). The process of governance links the values and interests of citizens, legislative enactments, executive and organizational structures and roles, and judicial control in a manner that suggests interrelationships among them, and which have significant consequences for performance.



Therefore, the concept of governance transcends the conventional boundaries of public administration. According to Carmichael (2002:5), public administration is concerned with the formal institutions of government, whereas governance focuses upon wider processes through which public policy is effected. Governance refers to the development and implementation of public policy through a broader range of private and public agencies than those traditionally associated with government. Because government is increasingly characterized by diversity, power interdependence and policy networks, governance stresses the complexity of policy-making, implementation and accountability relationships between a variety of state and societal actors at various levels, globally and regionally, and at national government level, as well as in local administrations (Kickert et al., 1997 and Carmichael, 2002). In governance theory, the relationships between state and non-state actors become less hierarchical and more interactive. In this way, governance denotes a highly fluid institutional and policy matrix in which the powers and responsibilities of different actors and tiers of government are in flux.

Hyden and Court (2002:19) define governance as the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and social actors interact to make decisions. Here, governance refers to the quality of the political system rather than technical capacities or distributive aspects, which they argue are a function of policy. In the table below, Hyden and Court (2002) propose six dimensions of the political process: the socialising, aggregating, executive, managerial, regulatory, and adjudicatory, which they argue, are important in shaping policy processes and producing desired development outcomes.



Table 3.1: Functional dimensions of governance and their institutional arenas

Functional dimensions	Institutional arenas	Purpose of rules
Socialising	Civil society	Shape the way citizens become aware and raise public issues
Aggregating	Political society	Shape the way ideas and interests are combined into policy by political institutions
Executive	Government	Shape the way policies are made
Managerial	Bureaucracy	Shape the administration and implementation of policies
Regulatory	Economic society	Shape the way state and market interact to promote development
Adjudicatory	Judicial system	Shape the setting for resolution of disputes and conflicts

Source: Hyden and Court (2002:21)

Hyden and Court (2002) argue that governance is an aggregation of the above six dimensions and the way these dimensions are articulated and function should constitute the basic measures of governance.

The concept of governance has also been discussed in the context of global governance, particularly after the collapse of communism and the emergence of a new world order dominated by liberal philosophy and principles. In international relations, global governance calls for commonly accepted norms and rules that facilitate international cooperation. Scholarly debate argues that the current system of global governance has to be reformed as it is dominated by private agendas, the main concern of which is the promotion of free



movement of commodities and trade to the disadvantage of poor nations (Dervis and Ozer, 2005:43-72).

Governance and International development institutions

Governance has also been prominent in the development policy discourse. In fact, in developing countries, governance was mainly popularised by the BWIs. In Africa, the concept of governance emerged in the 1980s as a result of various factors. The most important include poor economic performance recorded under structural adjustment reforms and the emergence of a consensus by the international lending institutions on the relative efficacy of neo-liberal development strategies; the end of the cold war and the rise of pro-democracy movements across the developing world; and the growing discomfort with clientelist practices in Africa (Leftwich, 1994:366-370).

Popularized by the World Bank' study on Sub-Saharan Africa: "Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth" in 1989, governance emerged as a catch-all phrase for all the issues identified for poor economic performance in Africa, including maladministration, corruption, human rights abuses, arbitrary laws, ineffective economic policies, and unaccountable government. As Amuwo argues, governance became the cherished concept of the donor community. To qualify for aid, countries have to practise good governance, which has meant the implementation of orthodoxy economic policy reforms: trade liberalization, liberalization of inflows of foreign direct investment, a redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic returns, and privatization and retreat of the state from steering the economy (Amuwo, 2002, <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6/v6i3a4.htm>).

From various studies and publications of the World Bank, governance has been defined and analysed in three different ways: 1) the form of political regime; 2) the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development; and 3) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies and discharge functions. The World Bank report (1994:vii) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's



economic and social resources. In another World Bank report (2000:48) “Can Africa claim the 21st Century?”, governance is defined as the institutional capability of public organizations to provide the public and other goods demanded by a country’s citizens or their representatives in an effective, transparent, impartial, and accountable manner, subject to resource constraints.

A number of critics have pointed to the fact that the World Bank confines itself to the last two aspects of governance, and avoids the political aspect of governance regime (Olowu, 2002:4; Hyden and Court, 2002:18). Indeed, efficient government, more than democratic governance, appears to be the central feature of the World Bank’s definitions. Governance is defined as good, because it delivers economic and social development. This approach has been heavily criticized. For instance, Leftwich argues that state capability and character, which includes the competency of the administration to discharge goods and services, cannot be detached from its political environment, that is, the nature of politics, structure and purpose of the state (Leftwich, 1994:372). Thus, a comprehensive conception of governance must take cognizance of the role of politics and the state.

In a similar manner to the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It argues that governance is the complex mechanisms, processes, relationships and institutions, through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences (UNDP, 1997:9). Thus, the UNDP sees governance as composed of three dimensions: political, economic, and administrative (UNDP, 1997:10). Economic governance is about processes of decision-making, institutions and structures that directly or indirectly affect a country’s economic activities or its relationships with other economies. It is also concerned with empowering people to freely engage their initiative and energies to undertake economic activity (production, distribution, and consumption), expand their choices, and enjoy better economic livelihood.



Political governance refers to the decision-making and policy implementation of a legitimate and authoritative state. The state should consist of a separate legislative, executive and judicial branch, represent the interests of a pluralist polity, and allow citizens to freely elect their representatives, and to determine how they should be governed through their voices by influencing policies, decisions, and plans proposed by leaders. Administrative governance refers to the complex system of implementation of public policies, which ensures effective and efficient production and delivery of public goods and services (UNDP, 1997:10).

The African Development Bank (ADB), on the other hand, defines governance by taking globalisation into account whereby states are bound together through multilateral and bilateral agreements, which create mutual obligations that, in turn, have implications for governance. Thus, governance is defined as “a process referring to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the affairs of a nation, and its relations with other nations” (ADB, 1999, at www.afdb.org). According to this definition, governance at the national level is also shaped by rules and norms from the international arena. Thus, national governance cannot be understood in isolation from the international rules and activities that influence it.

Characteristics of good governance

The UNDP (1997) argues that governance embraces all the methods (good and bad) that societies use to distribute power and manage public resources and problems. Sound or bad governance are therefore subsets of governance, depending on whether public resources and problems are managed effectively, efficiently, and in response to the critical needs of all members of society. For the UNDP, a system of governance is good when it satisfies these conditions. It is participatory, meaning it allows both men and women a voice in decision-making, either directly or indirectly. It is legitimate and acceptable to the people; transparent and accountable; promotes equity and equality; operates by the rule of law, which means legal frameworks are fairly and impartially enforced; responsive to the needs of the people; and



efficient and effective in the use of resources (UNDP, 1997:19).

Similarly, the World Bank contends that a system of governance is good if it displays the following essential elements: legitimacy of government; accountability of political and official elements of government (through media freedom, transparent decision-making, accountability mechanisms, and the like); competence of government to formulate policies and deliver service; and respect for human rights and the rule of law (individual and group rights and security which form the framework for economic and social activity), and participation (World Bank, 1989).

The African Development Bank (ADB) has identified five basic elements of good governance, namely, accountability, transparency, participation, fighting corruption, and effective legal and judicial framework (ADB, 1999).

Accountability is defined as the imperative to hold public officials (elected or appointed), individuals and organizations charged with a public mandate, accountable to the public for actions and decisions from which they derive their authority. Accountability also means establishing criteria to measure the performance of public officials, as well as oversight mechanisms to ensure that the standards are met.

Transparency is defined as public access to knowledge of the policies and strategies of government. It requires among other things, that public accounts are verifiable, that provision is made for public participation in government policy-making and implementation, and that contestation over decisions impacting on the lives of citizens is allowed for.

Fighting corruption is seen by the ADB as a key indicator of commitment to good governance, a critical area for managing scarce resources.

Participation is a process whereby citizens exercise influence over public decisions. It should focus on the creation of an enabling regulatory framework and economic environment in which citizens and private institutions can participate in their own governance, generate legitimate demands and monitor



government policies and actions.

Legal and judicial framework in which laws, regulations, and policies that regulate society are clear, fair and consistently applied through an objective and independent judiciary. An effective legal framework promotes the rule of law, respects human rights and protects private capital flows (ADB, 1999 at www.afdb.org accessed 14 March 2005).

Other institutions have also attempted to come up with what would constitute a system of good governance. For instance, the Millennium Challenge Account, which was announced by the US government as a new foreign aid programme to assist the so-called “relatively well governed” countries, defines good governance as based on three broad categories: ruling justly, investing in people, and sound economic policies. Ruling justly is about rooting out corruption, upholding human rights and political freedoms, voice and accountability, and adherence to the rule of law. Investing in people is measured by public spending devoted to health and education, primary completion rates, and immunisation rates. Finally, sound economic policies refer to open markets, sustainable budget policies, and strong support for individual entrepreneurship, which unleash the enterprise and creativity for lasting growth and prosperity (Millennium Challenge Account, www.mca.gov accessed on 14 March 2005).

The UN Millennium Project 2005 entitled “Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals”, which is said to be a comprehensive strategy put forward to achieve the MDGs by 2015 as pledged by world leaders, has strongly argued that to achieve the MDGs, commitment to good governance is imperative. The report has identified six strategic areas that are vital components of governance and require urgent attention and investment: investing in public administration, strengthening the rule of law, promoting accountability and transparency, promoting human rights, promoting sound economic policies in support of the private sector, and partnering with civil society (UNDP, 2005:112-125).

As highlighted above, for the international development institutions and donor



community, good governance is measured in terms of sound management of public affairs for economic growth and development. Such a system of governance must be characterised by notably effective and quality regulatory systems (laws are fairly and impartially enforced, civil rights and freedoms are protected, and economic regulations supportive of the private sector growth), accountability and transparency of the government apparatus (free of corruption), and efficient and effective public management.

African leaders also agree that good governance is essential to eradicate poverty and foster socio-economic development. In an effort to improve governance, African leaders adopted in 2002 in Durban, South Africa a “Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance” and agreed on a monitoring mechanism, the “African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)”, as already argued. The APRM is a monitoring mechanism to be voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union with the aim of enhancing the quality of governance through fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, and sustainable development.

The following section reviews related literature to the NEPAD and the APRM. The section discusses in detail the concept of peer review and how it is used. Theoretical models put forward for ensuring compliance in international regimes are also reviewed. Furthermore, approaches to regional cooperation and integration are reviewed as the NEPAD and APRM are regional cooperation initiatives.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE: NEPAD AND APRM

PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

The global trends for more accountable, responsive and efficient government have reinforced the appeal for monitoring and evaluation systems, which subsequently became the central focus of governments’ efforts to improve governance. The increase in inter-state cooperation, especially in the area of trade and the spread of multinational corporations as leading agencies in



investments, has placed governments under greater scrutiny. Today, governments are not only required to ensure that their policies are in the best interest of their citizens, but also that these policies are in line with the best practices used globally. Numerous international conventions codify international standards of good governance and best practice. These instruments reflect the international political consensus on the elements of good governance. As such, they provide a framework for domestic governance reform. The challenges reside in ensuring that governments apply such best practices. One of the most important mechanisms that has been used to monitor compliance with these standards of good governance is the “peer review”.

Defining peer review

The literature on peer review in the context of international organizations is very limited. Most of the information on peer review is obtained from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). OECD is an international organisation created in 1961 replacing the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which was set up in 1947 to coordinate the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. Since its inauguration, the OECD has assessed the performance of its member countries through peer review. The OECD is made up of 30 countries, of which more than half are European: Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States of America (OECD, <http://www.oecd.org> accessed 10 April 2005)

Peer review is defined as the systematic examination and assessment of performance of a state by other states (referred to as peers), by designated institutions, or by a combination of both with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its policy-making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards, principles and other agreed commitments



(Pagani, 2002:9). A country peer review could relate to various subject areas, such as governance, economics, health, education, development assistance or environment. Within an area, the country will be assessed against a wide range of standards and criteria. The assessment of performance of a country in relation to the implementation of policy recommendations and guidelines is the most frequent form of peer review practised in the OECD. Many countries can be reviewed at the same time with respect to a particular theme. International legally binding principles and norms, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, can also form part of peer review. Peer review results in a report that spells out accomplishments, underperformance and makes recommendations for improvement (OECD, 2003).

Pagani (2002:9) distinguishes peer review from judicial proceedings, fact-finding missions, and reporting and data collection, which are other mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring compliance with internationally agreed policies. Peer review differs from judicial proceedings since the final outcome of peer review is not a binding act or a legal judgment by a supreme body. The fact-finding missions, the objective of which is to investigate specific events or establish facts, differ from peer review as the latter goes beyond fact-finding to assess the performance of a state. Finally, reporting and data collection can be useful components of a peer review, but these are not peer review per se.

In the OECD, the rationale for peer review is to ensure that the policies and practices of member states of the organization conform to the agreed values, principles and standards (OECD, 2003). Thus, peer review findings and recommendations help countries improve their policies and adopt best practices of good governance. Through research and evaluation findings countries are afforded the opportunity to compare policy experiences, and identify international best practices, which lead to the adoption of informed policies. The process allows the creation of shared knowledge base, which benefits all countries through the identification of best policies that work (Pagani, 2002:9).

Besides the OECD, peer review has also been used in many other international organisations. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides for what is called “country surveillance mechanism”. Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement holds that: “the Fund shall oversee the international monetary system in order to ensure its effective operation, and shall oversee the compliance of each member with its obligations”. Thus, the IMF holds bilateral discussions (surveillance) with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country's economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the officials prepare a report that forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. The concluding statement of the discussion is transmitted to the country's authorities (IMF, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm>).

In contrast to the OECD peer review, the IMF's peer review is more concerned with supervision and compliance. The fund reviews do not afford national policy officials the opportunity to participate in the discussions of the Fund's Board Executive, nor to approve (or modify) the final report's conclusions, which in the case of the OECD peer review gives some ownership to the reviewed country (Thygesen, 2002).

Research shows that, in the European Union, peer review is quite different from that of OECD and IMF surveillance. The aim of the peer review within the EU is one of integrating and harmonizing policies in order to obtain convergence across countries and ultimately to have a single policy process (Visco, 2002). Thus, in the EU, the regional policy review process is intensive based on elaborate, frequent procedures, or rules, but mostly on national commitments to which it is the task of the monitoring agencies, such as the European Commission, to ensure that countries adhere (Visco, 2002).

Noaksson and Jacobsson (2003) argue that the use of the peer review in the EU, which is a “political organisation”, differs markedly from that in OECD, which is an “expert organisation”. The difference is that the EU adopts a more pragmatic use of peer review knowledge, whereby political values are



considered and policy advices negotiated among different stakeholders. The OECD, on the other hand, adopts a more dogmatic approach to knowledge in the sense of seeking and telling the truth in their evaluations by putting aside political considerations and the values of the actors (Noaksoon and Jacobsson, 2003:10). Thus, the conducting of peer reviews may vary depending on the nature of the organisation. In political organisations, such as the EU, the peer review is characterised by political bargaining and negotiations in its process of achieving harmony and unification of policies. This should inform African states in their efforts to implement the African peer review mechanism.

Peer review assessments are conducted on a non-adversarial basis (Pagani, 2002:9). They rely heavily on mutual trust and understanding between the states to be reviewed and the reviewers as well as their shared confidence in the process. In the OECD, peer review never implies a punitive decision or sanctions. Thus, the question arises of ensuring that countries comply with commitments they have made. Pagani (2002:10) notes that the effectiveness of the peer review relies on the influence and persuasion exercised by the peers during the process, which is referred to as “peer pressure”.

Pagani (2002:10) notes that public scrutiny, dialogue with peer countries, comparisons and, in some cases, even ranking of countries, all exert pressure on the domestic public opinion, national administrations and policy makers. Additionally, the literature reveals that the impact of peer pressure will be greatest when there is access to the final report by the public and that the media is actively involved. Indeed, the role of the media is critical in the sense that it raises public interest and scrutiny. Thus, peer pressure can be defined as the influence and persuasion that the process induces, which may become a driving force to stimulate the country under review to change.

Peer pressure, however, does not imply legally binding acts, such as sanctions or other enforcement mechanisms; instead, compliance is sought through soft persuasion mechanisms (OECD, 2003:10). In the OECD, the quantitative assessments, which in some cases rank countries according to



their performance (example of the OECD Jobs Strategy, 1999), constitute some of the soft measures used to put pressure on countries to adopt the strategy. It can be argued that no country would wish to be seen in a bad light among its peers. As such, the peer review may be a powerful tool for promoting good governance.

The study proposes that peer review can be subsumed as with the following elements. It can be constituted to mean:

- Assessment of a nation by other nations
- Evaluation and surveillance of operations
- Perception or reality of Heads of state vis-à-vis each other.

The process of peer review

Although procedures may vary depending on the type of review, generally, the OECD' peer review follows three stages, which involve different actors (OECD, 2003:16-17), as discussed below.

The preparatory phase: this is the first phase of the review, and consists of background analysis and a self-evaluation by the country under peer review. This phase includes work on documentation and data as well as a questionnaire prepared by the OECD Secretariat.

The consultation phase: the examiners (normally officials from other countries "peers", chosen on the basis of a system of rotation among member states) and the Secretariat conduct the consultation. During this phase, the Secretariat and the examiners maintain close contact with the competent authorities of the reviewed country, and in some cases, they carry out on-site visits. When deemed necessary, the examiners and the Secretariat consult with interest groups, civil society and academics. At the end of this phase, the Secretariat prepares a draft of the final report, which analyses in details the performance of the country and provides conclusions and recommendations. Often this draft is shared with the reviewed country, which may suggest

adjustments it considers justified before the draft is submitted to the members of the body responsible for the review.

The assessment phase: this consists of the discussion of the draft report in the plenary meeting of the body responsible for the review. The examiners lead the evaluative discussion and the reviewed state representatives are also present. Following discussions and negotiations, the final report is adopted. Generally, approval of the final report is by consensus, unless the procedures of the particular peer review specify otherwise. In some cases, during this phase, non-governmental organisations have the opportunity to influence the discussion by submitting their views. The final report is then made public through a press release of the main issues of the report to the media, and other dissemination means to publicise the findings of the review.

Functions of peer review

Peer reviews in the context of international organizations can be seen to fulfil the same functions as evaluation activities at the level of national governments. Pagani (2002:17-18) identifies four functions of peer reviews: policy dialogue, transparency, capacity building, and compliance.

Policy dialogue: peer reviews allow countries to exchange information, views, and strategies on policy decisions and their implementation. It is through the interaction and exchange of ideas on policies and practices that the country under review may agree to adopt new policy guidelines, and implement recommendations.

Transparency: peer reviews enhance transparency because through the process countries are required to explain their policies and practices. At the end of the process, a report is made to which peer countries and the public have access.

Capacity building: participating in the review process, both as national delegates or expert reviewers, represents an important opportunity for learning in which skills and best practices are exchanged and learnt. The



process is therefore a learning experience, contributing to building the capacity of participants in various domains that have been reviewed.

Compliance: an important role of the peer review is to monitor the implementation of agreed commitments, be they international norms or policies of good governance. The ultimate aim of the review is to establish whether or not countries have complied with the commitments they have made, and help them to comply through “soft enforcement” measures of engagement, problem solving and persuasion.

Requirements for successful peer review

The fact that the peer review does not involve coercive measures to ensure compliance from countries makes it a contested instrument in terms of its ability to deliver on its mandate. However, the experience within the OECD suggests that a peer review can be an effective and successful mechanism of cooperation and learning among participating countries, when the following important elements are in place: value sharing, commitment, mutual trust, and credibility (Pagani, 2002: 19).

Value sharing: this means that countries participating in peer reviews must converge on values, standards and criteria that will be used to evaluate performance. This prevents conflicts that may arise during the process and increases the commitment of countries to the process.

Adequate level of commitment: evaluation is a costly exercise. Participating countries must be ready to commit sufficient human and financial resources for the peer review to be conducted in a professional and credible manner. In addition to material, financial and human resources, countries must be fully engaged in the process either as reviewers, or as subjects of evaluation or active members of the collective body.

Mutual trust: a peer review is by nature a cooperative, non-adversarial process, in which trust among participants is crucial for its success. From the beginning, a high degree of trust and value sharing must exist for a country to



be part of the peer review process. It is this trust that allows a country to disclose information, to ease access to documents and other relevant information, and importantly not to manipulate the process, all of which are essential for credible reviews.

Credibility: a credible review is decisive for effective peer review. To ensure credible and professional peer review, evaluators must be qualified, objective, fair and consistent. Incompetent examiners, bias stemming from national interests, or inadequate standards or criteria for performance evaluation may undermine the credibility of the process. Similarly, the Secretariat must guarantee independence, transparency and quality of work. But, most importantly, any attempt by a state to influence the outcome of the process will render the idea and objective of review futile.

Despite its claims for cooperation between countries, the peer review has been an issue of scholarly dispute, in particular in terms of the strategies that should be used to ensure compliance in the context of international regimes. Some analysts argue for management strategies while others think enforcement through sanctions is necessary to obtain compliance in international regimes (Chayes and Chayes, 1995; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom, 1996). Below the two proposed models for resolving compliance problems are now briefly discussed.

Two models for compliance in international regimes

In an increasingly interdependent world, a wide variety of instruments (conventions, treaties, and declarations) is negotiated and signed between countries to address complex economic, social, environmental, and political issues that require cooperative effort. These cooperative efforts take place within a frame of norms, rules and practices, referred to as “soft law” (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:2) to regulate and ensure the implementation of commitments made by countries. Although the signing of treaties or conventions reflects the international consensus and commitment on the issues of the treaty, this does not necessarily bring about their implementation. The challenge has been always to ensure that these

international norms and conventions are applied in practice. Thus, the scholarly debate in the domain of international regimes has focused on which approach to use to get compliance, some arguing for the management approach and others calling for coercive enforcement measures.

The managerial school contends that coercive power is not appropriate in today's international systems. Enforcement is costly (military sanctions often cost lives, and economic sanctions essentially affect the weakest and most vulnerable in the state sanctioned) and largely deficient in legitimacy (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:3). Retaliation for non-compliance often proves unlikely, because the costs of any individual violation may not warrant a response, in the sense that it cannot be targeted enough to change the behavior of the violator. Furthermore, enforcement (sanctions) is contested, because sanctions seem to work against economically vulnerable and political weak countries, whereas strong countries may easily get away with non-compliance. The unilateral decision of the United States and its allies to use military force in Iraq (2003) and the persistent refusal of the US to sign the Kyoto Protocol are informative of abuse of power by the strongest states. In addition, the fact that sanctions can only be imposed by major powers in the system to be effective, indicates that enforcement as a tool of compliance raises the issue of legitimacy (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:3-5).

To counter this situation, a managerial model for compliance, which relies on a cooperative and problem-solving approach, is instead proposed (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:3). It argues that high levels of compliance can be achieved with little attention to enforcement; and, where there are problems of compliance, these can be solved through management and cooperative efforts. This is based on the assumption that when a state enters into an international agreement, it does so knowing the constraints brought by the agreement and thus being committed to abide by them. Therefore, the problems of non-compliance that arise are issues to be solved not violations to be punished. Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes (1995:9-16) argue that the sources of non-compliance are to be found in the ambiguity or indeterminacy of international agreements (treaties), capacity limitations of



states, and uncontrollable social, political or economic changes. If a country fails to comply, because of some financial constraints or political difficulties, sanctions are unlikely to change the situation. It follows, therefore, that managerial strategies are appropriate to solve these problems and to ensure compliance.

Chayes and Chayes (1995:9) argue that what ensures compliance is not the threat of punishment but “a plastic process of interaction among the parties concerned in which the effort is to re-establish, in the micro context of the particular dispute, the balance of advantage that brought the agreement into existence”. Among the strategies necessary to induce compliance and maintain cooperation, they cite: improving dispute resolution procedures, technical and financial assistance and increasing transparency.

In contrast, other scholars have argued for the necessity of “enforcement” in international regimes to obtain compliance, in particular in regimes where substantial incentive to defect exists. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996:379-399) use various examples from international arms, trade and environmental regimes when non-compliance problems have occurred. Noting the relevance of ambiguity, a state’s capacity limitations and social/economic changes as sources of non-compliance, Downs and his colleagues argue that these are not in most of the cases the major determinants of non-compliance. Instead, as it is often in the case of violations of GATT’s rules and norms (e.g. agricultural subsidies and other protectionism measures), developed states are the major violators. This argues both against the proposal that capacity of the state is a source of non-compliance and the strategy therefore of increasing technical and financial assistance to get compliance. In fact, the most conspicuous cause of GATT violation is the demands/forces of domestic interest groups and the significant political benefits often associated with non-compliance (Downs et al., 1996:394). Indeed, political leaders are likely to breach international agreements when the pressure from interest groups (especially from which their political survival depends) is high. Therefore, the strategies for compliance proposed by the managerial school are not relevant



in this case.

The enforcement model contends that enforcement plays a greater role in successes and its absence is conspicuous in some notable failures. Enforcement measures have been credited as being an important element in the process of GATT legal reforms. Another strategy to ensure compliance is to restrict regime membership to states that will not have to defect often (Downs, et al., 1996:399).

What emerges from the above debate, is that both enforcement and management models seek strategies of ensuring that countries comply with international agreements. In some cases, dialogue, persuasion and engagements may be appropriate to bring countries to comply with the principles and norms of treaties and other agreements. However, sanctions may be necessary, especially when incentives to breach the rules are high. On the other hand, the value of sanctions remains superficial in the sense that sanctions themselves do not guarantee compliance.

Implications of peer review mechanism

Undoubtedly, the peer review mechanism is an important tool for cooperation between countries. It allows participating countries to become aware of the performance of their policies and strategies in relation to best practice or accepted regional and international standards. As such, peer reviews can contribute to good governance, cooperation and development. However, this exercise, where it has been practised, has proven to be costly, requiring enormous financial input and highly competent evaluators. Furthermore, peer review, although based on the concept of “soft-law” or soft persuasion, implies some form of intrusion on the internal affairs of states, and therefore on their sovereignty. This makes it political and inherently conflictual; success hinges upon the political will of involved states. This implies that countries must be politically committed to the vision, purpose, and objectives of the peer review, and be willing to cede some form of sovereignty to the collective body which evaluates and recommends policy options to be implemented. Furthermore, it can be argued that the returns from peer reviews must offset the costs,



otherwise the sustainability of the peer review process may be in jeopardy; in other words, there must be some incentives, short or long term, for countries to be truly committed to the peer review principle. A detailed analysis of the peer review process in Africa is provided in Chapter Five. The next section reviews approaches of regional cooperation and integration, which further clarify the regional cooperation aspect of the APRM.

THEORIES OF REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION

One of the most significant features of the world economy and politics from the second half of the 20th century has been the widespread creation of regional groupings. Regional integration has taken various forms from the more formal and deep integration that covers a wide range of policies, such as the European Union, to purely trade driven cooperation as it is for instance in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Thus, the literature on regionalism uses many terms, such as regional cooperation, market integration, development integration, or regional integration depending on the form and depth of regional integration. This section provides in brief the theoretical perspectives on regionalism and regional integration and the principal varieties of regional integration. As will be indicated, the new trend in regionalism is driven by globalisation; and this has made regional integration to be seen as the most effective method for individual countries to increase their economic strength and preparing to the requirements of the global economy.

Defining regionalism and regional integration

The literature on regionalism is vast and, as Hurrell (1995:38) argues, the concept is ambiguous and debate as to what precisely regionalism means has produced little consensus. This confusion applies also to related concepts of regionalism, such as regional integration and regional cooperation. In some studies, they are even used interchangeably, to refer to regional integration agreements whether these are purely economic or political in nature. Thus, definitions range from strictly economic perspectives to any project that groups countries in a given region. Wyatt-Walter (1995:78) defines



regionalism as a process consisting of a group of countries that implement a set of preferential policies designed to enhance the exchange of goods and/or factors among themselves.

Bach (1999:152) identifies two types of regionalism. The first is formal regionalism, which is represented by institutional forms of cooperation or integration, and is defined as the aggregation and fusion into broader units of existing territories or fields of intervention. The second is network regionalism, which is represented by trans-state actors and results in the exploitation of dysfunctions and disparities generated by existing boundaries, with debilitating effects on state territorial control. Therefore, regionalism may be formal, adopted and driven by formal institutions of states, or informal resulting from a spontaneous process led by non-state actors, such as trans-frontier traders. Lee (2003:8) espouses the formal approach and defines regionalism as the adoption of a regional project by a formal regional economic organisation designed to enhance the political, economic, social, cultural, and security integration and/or cooperation of member states.

Regional integration refers to the process through which a group of nation states voluntarily in various degrees share each other's markets and establish mechanisms and techniques that minimize conflicts and maximize internal and external economic, political, social and cultural benefits of their interaction (Harloov, 1997:15). Similarly, Asante (1997:20) defines regional integration as a process whereby two or more countries in a particular area join together to pursue common policies and objectives in matters of general economic development or in a particular economic field of common interest to the mutual advantage of all the participating states. It follows from the definitions that any regional integration scheme must be voluntary with individual countries committing to pursue policies or projects in line with regional agreements. Furthermore, the pooling of resources and efforts to implement projects of common interest implies that countries must cede some level of their sovereignty to regional institutions that must be established to manage the integration process.



Another important concept is regional cooperation. Asante (1997:20) argues that regional cooperation is a vague term that is used to define any interstate activity designed to meet some common needs. What is distinctive is the flexibility of regional cooperation, allowing countries to cooperate in areas of particular interest without being forced to liberalise their trade regimes as happens in regional integration. Some regional integration scholars see regional cooperation as a process that could lead to regional integration (Ravenhill, 1985:210; McCarthy, 1996:229; Lee 2003:22).

From these definitions, it can be argued that regional cooperation and regional integration are forms of regionalism. Regionalism is the umbrella concept referring to all efforts by a group of countries to advance their political, economic, social or cultural cooperation and/or integration to solve or respond to common problems and interests. It should therefore be emphasized that the ultimate aim of regionalism is not integration itself but the serving of higher goals, which may be economic or political.

Approaches of regional integration

A survey of the literature on regionalism and regional integration suggests three main approaches of regional integration. These are economic or market integration, regional cooperation, and development integration.

Economic or market integration

It is generally accepted that the work of Jacob Viner “*The Customs Union Issue*” in 1950 set the tone for regional integration scholarship and debate (Harloov 1997: 23). According to Viner (1950:5), a customs union must meet three conditions: (1) complete elimination of tariffs between member countries; (2) the establishment of a common tariff on imports from outside the union; and (3) the distribution of customs benefits between members according to an agreed formula. Thus, initially, regional integration was understood in economic perspectives using economic theories.

Later in the 1960s, Balassa devised the concept of economic integration,



which he defined as “a process and a state of affairs” (Balassa, 1961:1). As a process, economic integration encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states; and viewed as a state of affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of discrimination between national economies (Balassa, 1961:1). According to Balassa (1961:2), the market integration approach follows different degrees or stages of integration. These stages are: free trade area, customs union, common markets, economic union, and total economic integration.

The first stage of integration is a free trade area (FTA). At this stage, tariffs and quantitative restrictions to trade are removed among member countries, but countries maintain their own tariffs against non-member countries. The second stage is a customs union, which operates like a free trade area, but in which trade with non-members is governed by a common external tariff. From successful customs union, the region develops into a common market, which allows not only free movement of products (goods and services) but also a free movement of factors of production (capital and labour). The final stage of economic integration would be the formation of an economic union, in which there is a high degree of coordination and unification of monetary, fiscal, and countercyclical policies along with the creation of a supranational authority that has the power to enforce decisions, which are binding for member states (Balassa, 1961:2). The case illustrating this higher degree of integration is the European Union (EU), in which policies related to trade and economy, such as market regulation, competition, monetary policies, are coordinated and administered at the EU level. The table below presents the stages of the market integration approach.



Table 3.2: Stages of the market integration approach

	Free movement of goods	Common external tariffs	Free flow of capital and labour	Harmonisation of macro economic policies	Supranational institutions
Free trade area	implemented	N/A*	N/A	N/A	N/A
Customs union	implemented	implemented	N/A	N/A	N/A
Common Market	implemented	implemented	implemented	N/A	N/A
Economic Union	implemented	implemented	implemented	implemented	N/A
Total economic integration	implemented	implemented	implemented	implemented	implemented

* N/A means not applicable

Adapted from Balassa (1961:2)

Economic integration theory as outlined by Balassa emphasizes the fusion of national markets without directly addressing issues of sovereignty. In accordance with this, the union of national markets may function satisfactorily with policy integration but without necessarily a unification of the institutional structure that requires political unification (Balassa 1961:272), which was thought difficult to achieve. Today, integration theorists present the formation of a political union (where all aspects of economic and political policy are jointly managed by the supranational authority) as the last stage of market integration (Harloov, 1997:25).



The literature on market/economic integration indicates that there are some prerequisites that need to be in place for a viable economic integration. Viner, whose seminal work led to the development of regional integration, put a note of caution about the use of customs union, in these terms: “customs unions... are unlikely to yield more economic benefit than harm, unless they are between sizeable countries which practise substantial protection of substantially similar industries” (Viner, 1950:135). Thus, competition among similar industries in different countries of the customs union is essential for successful market integration.

In addition to the condition of similar levels of industrial development among member countries, other elements have been added on the list of requisites for successful market integration. These include,

- Harmonisation of national macro economic policies;
- Regional macroeconomic stability;
- High levels of intra-regional trade;
- Competitive and complementary industrial development;
- Effective mechanisms for distribution of integration benefits;
- Willingness to cede some level of state’s sovereignty to a supra national body that has enforcement authority; and
- Economic and political stability of the region. (Collier and Gunning, 1999:94; Mwase and Maasdorp, 1999:200)

In the light of these requirements, several scholars and experts have warned about the application of this model in developing nations. For instance, analysts, such as Ravenhill (1985), McCarty (1996) and Lee (2003), argue that the above conditions do not exist in Africa, and that is why market integration efforts have so far failed on the continent. They present different obstacles for African countries to pursue a market integration approach. These include different levels of industrial development, a small percentage of



intra-regional trade in comparison to total trade, and macroeconomic instability. Furthermore, most countries have similar factor endowments, member countries are not willing to cede some level of sovereignty to a supra national body and most regions are not politically stable (Lee, 2003:21).

On a similar note, Asante (1997:64) argues that, in Africa, the market integration approach is not appropriate at present because of lack of its requirements, such as economic homogeneity, sustained sound economic performance, and political commitment that is legally binding. He, therefore, suggests that regional integration must start, first, by creating the conditions for integration. Thus, the theoretical precepts of market integration seem difficult to apply in the context of developing countries, simply because the realities of developing economies and the nature of the socio-political problems differ markedly from those of the developed world, in particular Western Europe, from which this model was developed.

Regional cooperation

Regional cooperation has been seen as a sub-category of regional integration and a process that may lead to regional integration (Asante, 1997:20; Lee, 2003:22). Regional cooperation has been defined as a process whereby countries with common or comparable problems solve these and create improved conditions in order to maximise economic, political, social, and cultural benefits for each participating country (Harloov, 1997:16). Such cooperative efforts can take various forms, ranging from a systematic framework of cooperation on a continuous basis to deal with problems of common concern, to a sporadic kind of cooperation. Regional cooperation may involve such aspects as the execution of joint projects; technical sector cooperation; common running of services and policy harmonisation; joint development of common natural resources; a joint stance towards the rest of the world; and joint promotion of production.

Some analysts suggest that regional cooperation is a more realistic approach to be pursued by African countries than market integration (Ravenhill,



1985:213; McCarty, 1996:229; Lee, 2003:27). The argument is that regional cooperation allows countries the flexibility to simultaneously develop the region and enhance economic interaction without being forced to liberalise individual trade regimes at a pace that will be counterproductive to enhanced economic growth and development. As McCarthy notes:

Regional cooperation broadly defined as cooperation between independent countries on identified projects or schemes could be a more appropriate means to address Africa's problems....The advantages of this approach are in its flexibility and pragmatism in circumventing the problems posed by nationalism and equity in the distribution of costs and benefits. (McCarthy, 1996:229)

Ravenhill has made similar comments.

An incremental approach to regionalism in Africa based on the identification and implementation of limited functional projects appears to avoid many of the problems that have beset the more grandiose schemes based on an integration of markets. (Ravenhill, 1985:213)

However, this narrow prescription to cooperative arrangements is hardly convincing as several schemes based on projects cooperation introduced since the time of independence have failed to produce concrete results. By 1977, there were over 100 intergovernmental multisectoral organisations that were meant to promote technical and economic cooperation. However, their performance has in most of cases been disappointing (Asante, 1997:35). The problem with regional cooperation is that it takes key issues of regional integration such as policy coordination and harmonisation lightly. The fact that trade issues are not central to regional cooperation makes it a weak approach to achieve the objectives sought by African states of enhancing their trade and economic situation.

Development integration

Development integration theory was developed as a response to the problems and dysfunctions of the market integration approach. The approach seeks to address the problems in three areas: the objective of integration, the timing and level of binding interstate commitments, and the distribution of costs and benefits of cooperation (Haarlov, 1997:30).



According to this approach, the objective of integration is to accelerate the economic and social development of member countries. State intervention in the market mechanisms is imperative, and is contingent upon how the state perceives that its social and economic objectives would be best served.

With regard to timing and political commitment, the development approach places emphasis on state intervention at the beginning of the integration venture. It assumes that a high degree of political commitment will facilitate the implementation of the integration process. While in the market integration approach, political commitment comes at a later stage of the integration process, in the development integration approach political commitment is seen as the backbone since countries need first to coordinate their policies to avoid, among other things, the unequal inter-country distribution of costs and benefits of the integration process.

The third key characteristic element of development integration is the distribution of costs and benefits resulting from integration. The development integration approach promotes the implementation of redistributive mechanisms that are compensatory and corrective in nature. Harloov (1997:32) groups these mechanisms into four categories:

- Pure fiscal compensation, such as financial transfer mechanisms from the countries that gain from the integration to the member states that bear the costs;
- Improvement of conditions for development, such as roads, railways, telecommunications, human capital development, which give the poor areas the competitive edge and increase opportunities for investments;
- Incentives to motivate economic agents to locate economic activities in lesser developed areas (e.g. loans with favourable conditions, favourable investment incentives, slower pace of tariff reduction, and use of certain internal tariffs favouring industry in lesser developed countries); and



- Planning of new industries and agreements on distribution of production.

Although designed to correct the problems of market integration in developing countries, development integration has also proven more difficult to implement because of the difficulties in implementing compensatory and corrective measures to adequately solve the problem of distribution of costs and benefits. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU), which is composed of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland, often serves as example to analysts. It is said that compensation measures such as financial transfers that are used by South Africa (the regional economic powerhouse), to compensate members of SACU still do not adequately address inequity created by trade diversion and investment polarization (Ostergaard, 1993:335). The other problem is that such compensatory measures have not received domestic political support in privileged countries (Lee, 2003:24).

In addition to compensatory and distributive mechanisms that are difficult to implement, the following obstacles and challenges have been identified to obstruct the regional integration agenda:

- Often politicians negotiate for national interests overlooking regional interests;
- Institutions responsible for implementing plans are not geared toward regional goals;
- Lack of technical capacity to implement regional plans;
- Red tape and inefficiency;
- Internal resistance from powerful economies of the region to regional plans; and
- Strategies of multinationals that may not support development integration strategies (e.g. industrial planning) when they have no profits from it. (Ostergaard, 1993:37-38)



While the road to regional integration has been difficult to travel, Africa is still optimistic about the approach in order to lift its people out of poverty and achieve the socio-economic development objectives. Indeed, given the small size of African economies, and the current bargaining strengths of the more powerful economic and trading blocs, such as the European Union (EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), regional integration remains the only viable strategy for African countries to participate meaningfully in the global economy. It is important, though, that the approach to integration in Africa takes into account the particularities and the various limitations to regional integration for African states. This means recognizing that in Africa the issues of welfare benefits and development are the goals of regional integration, instead of being the means of cooperation as is the case in developed countries. To understand this would lead to the design of an appropriate regional integration strategy.

Regionalism in the globalisation era

Since the mid-1980s, a new form of regionalism has emerged. The new regionalism is defined as the multidimensional form of integration, which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects (Lee, 2003:28). It goes far beyond the goal of creating regional free-trade regimes or security alliances, which were characteristic of the first wave of regionalism (Hettne et al., 2000: xix). The first wave of regional integration that spread across the world in the 1960s was boosted by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1947. In Europe, the process was largely motivated by intra-European security, political stability, and economic reconstruction concerns after World War II (Wallace, 1995:201). In Africa, regional cooperation appealed as an instrument for safeguarding the acquired political freedom and a strategy for economic independence (Mazzeo, 1984:2). The new regionalism emerged owing to a number of factors. These include the end of the cold war; the shifting balance of world economic power with the decline of unilateral US economic hegemony relative to the East Asia technological ascent; and major transformations in the world economy

resulting in enhanced globalisation (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:83-96; Lee: 2003:28-30).

The end of the cold war is a major factor behind the shifting patterns of the global political economy (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:92). In fact, during the cold war the world was divided according to two contending ideological politico-economic systems, namely, capitalism supported by the United States of America and its allies, mainly the Western Europe and Japan; and socialism championed by the former Soviet Union. With the end of the cold war, several issues, such as differences in the forms of capitalism, security threats arising from political and economic instability within regions, mass migration, and increasing poverty resurfaced on the agenda. This led to renewed interest in regionalism.

Furthermore, the rise of Japan and East Asia in gaining the leading edge in certain chip technologies in the 1980s became a major economic threat for both North America and Europe. This competitive threat was one of the main reasons for European IT (information technology) firms to push governments to create the Single Market and put in place policies and measures to increase their competitiveness and market access. Thus, with the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, the USA, which has so far been the champion of multilateralism and trade liberalisation under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), began to shift strategies. Americans realised that competitive regional blocs were necessary as countervailing blocs to the single EU market (Lee, 2003:30). In addition, regionalism could be a more useful framework within which to achieve common positions on trade terms, investment norms, environmental and other issues than those in multilateral negotiations. As a result, Americans pushed for the creation of the NAFTA (between the USA, Canada and Mexico), which came into force in 1994. Similar renewed interest in market integration in Asia, Latin America and Africa gradually set in.

The motivating factors for developing countries to shift trade and regional integration strategies relate to the bargaining strengths of the EU and the



NAFTA, the failure of import-substitution policies and the success of outward-oriented policies of East Asia (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:94). The growing pressure for protectionist measures in the West and the competition for market access for Eastern European countries have also pushed developing countries for increased regional integration, which is seen as the only effective way to enhance their bargaining power. In Africa, interest in regional integration has taken centre stage. As the African Union has noted, the process of globalisation and intense regionalisation in the North (EU) and in the South (such as the Association of South East Asian Nations “ASEAN”) dictates that “regional integration should be elevated to the level of strategic model for the transformation and modernisation of African economies” (AU Commission, 2004:17).

The new regionalism is viewed as a strategy to position oneself within global markets, improve competitiveness and increase negotiating capacities so that, as a regional collective, countries can participate effectively in the world economy and politics. The new regionalism is seen as a conduit to globalisation or multilateralism, which is often referred to as “open regionalism” (van Klaveren, 2000:145; Lee, 2003:31). The proponents of globalisation argue that regional groupings should only entail short-term measures to create intermediate free trade areas as stepping-stones to allow member countries to liberalize their trade regimes. In this context, the EU, NAFTA and the United States have pursued negotiating FTAs with other regional economic groupings from the South, such as the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and ASEAN.

The motivation for the EU and the US in pursuing these free trade arrangements has been described as predatory and pre-emptive strategies (Keet, 1999). Any possibility of groupings, such as MERCOSUR and ASEAN becoming protective bases for their own emerging companies or, in worst-case scenarios, ‘closed blocks’ against US and EU multinational companies (MNCs), has to be prevented. The US hostility to the idea of establishing the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) into a formalized regionalism that would include Japan but not the USA, Canada, Australia or New Zealand is a case in

point. The EAEC concept was initiated by Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia in 1990, with the objective of increasing economic cooperation between only East Asian nations (Wyatt-Walter, 1995:91; Leong, 2000:75).

Similarly, the EU has been negotiating economic partnership agreements with its 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) partners, within the Cotonou Partnership Agreement signed on 23 June of 2000. According to articles One and Two of the Cotonou Agreement, “regional and sub-regional processes which foster the integration of the ACP countries into the world economy in terms of trade and private investment shall be encouraged and supported (The Cotonou Agreement of 2000, <http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101.htm>). Thus, the EU support for regional integration amongst ACP countries is premised upon the proviso that such groupings be rapidly translated into free trade regions, in order to preserve the trade and development relationship between the EU and the ACP countries.

Implications of regionalism on governance

As has emerged from the preceding literature review, regionalism and regional integration are topical issues worldwide. Countries around the world are involved in regional arrangements to better deal with the challenges of the global economy and enhance their trading and negotiation capacities. This may involve cooperation in projects of infrastructure development (such as railways, roads, telecommunication systems etc), harmonisation of macro economic policies, and even devise some political strategies. A logical question that comes to mind is to ask what implications regionalism has on governance. This question has attracted the attention of many scholars, who often discuss the matter in the context of the European integration (Kooiman, 1993; Carmichael, 2002, Demmke, 2002).

Scholars who study European integration argue that the EU policy is produced by a complex web of interconnected institutions at the supranational, national, and sub-national levels of government. The locus of political control within states has shifted with no clear-cut separation of domestic and international



policies (Kickert, et al., 1997:1-5; Carmichael, 2002: i). The complexity and multiplicity of actors in policy formulation and implementation in member states of the EU led to the emergence of the concept “multi-level governance” (Carmichael, 2002). Multi-level governance stresses the complexity of policy-making, implementation and accountability relationships between a variety of state and societal actors at the levels of supranational activity (EU), central government, devolved administration and local authorities (Carmichael, 2002:6). Governance therefore becomes the art of governing multiple and complex institutions and systems which are both operationally autonomous in relation to each other and structurally connected through different forms of mutual dependence.

In the context of regionalism, governance is an interactive, cooperative decision-making process that opens up a wide space of autonomous action to other actors than the state. Indeed, the increase of inter-states’ cooperation, especially in the area of trade and the spread of multinational corporations as leading agencies in investments, has led to profound structural and functional changes to the traditional organisation of the state. This has led some analysts to argue that under the new regionalism and globalisation, the sovereignty of the nation-state is crumbling (Veggeland, 2000:4).

Sovereignty is an ancient concept built upon an idea of how political power can and should be connected to delimited territories to protect the inhabitants of the area. Sovereignty means the independence of a state and total control over its own territory (Veggeland, 2000:4). It is the principle of sovereignty that has organized the world into a fixed pattern of nation states, which were fragmented into tribes, clans, and cities. Today, however, growing regionalism and global economic interdependence appear to be threatening the principle of national sovereignty in decision-making. In the context of the EU, Carmichael (2002:8) argues that the sovereignty of member States has been diluted by both collective decision-making in the EU as well as the autonomous decisions of supranational EU institutions.

It is argued that the level of delegation of sovereignty to regional institutions



depends on how deep the regional integration is (Asante, 1997:21). However, one could argue that any level of regional arrangement implies giving up some level of state sovereignty in those areas of cooperative endeavour. Thus, regionalism implies a change in the concept of governance, which implies the surrender of some degree of national sovereignty or decision-making powers to supra-national or regional institutions. After a detailed review of the main concepts related to the APRM, the next section critically examines some of the elements, which are often cited by scholars as essential and determinants for good governance and economic development.

DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE, LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Scholars, practitioners and international development institutions concur that good governance is central to creating and sustaining an environment that fosters strong economic growth and development. However, a universally agreed position on what constitutes good governance has been hard to come by. The literature is replete with elements identified as essential for good governance. As already noted, these include the rule of law, legitimacy of the government, human and property rights, equity and equality, accountable and transparent government, public participation, effective and efficient public service, democratic decision-making, combating corruption, and responsive government (World Bank, 1991; UNDP, 1997; ADB, 2001; Kauzya, 2003). Some of these are selected for elaboration.

THE RULE OF LAW

The Rule of Law is an ancient ideal. Early philosophers, such as Aristotle saw the law as essential to constrain the powers of the ruler; and good leaders were those that upheld the law. As an ideal of governance, the “rule of law” has recently become prominent in the development discourse, identified as an important element of good governance. Jurists and philosophers define the rule of law according to two main theoretical formulations: the “formal” or “procedural”, which defines the formal institutional elements required for a system of law, and the “substantive”. The latter is defined as rule according to



some particular set of laws that are valued for their content, such as guarantees of basic human rights (Craig, 1997:1).

Formal definitions of the rule of law look to the presence or absence of specific, observable criteria of the law or the legal system. Common criteria include: a formally independent and impartial judiciary; the clarity of laws; the absence of laws that apply only to particular individuals or classes; and provisions for judicial review of government action. There is no definitive list of formal criteria, and different formal definitions may use different standards. What formal definitions have in common, is that the rule of law is measured by the conformity of the legal system to these explicit standards (Craig, 1997).

An alternative to the formal approach to the rule of law is one that looks to substantive outcomes such as "justice" or "fairness" (Craig, 1997:2). This approach is not concerned with the formal rules, except inasmuch as they contribute to the achievement of a particular substantive goal of the legal system. Unlike the formal approach, which avoids value judgements, the substantive approach is driven by a moral vision of a good legal system. The substantive approach measures the rule of law in terms of how well the system being assessed approximates this ideal by incorporating such elements as rules securing minimum welfare, rules protecting at least some basic human rights, rules securing some variety of the market economy, and rules institutionalizing democratic governance. Thus, formal theories focus exclusively on the form of legality, while substantive theories also include requirements that the content of the law be just in certain fundamental respects.

Such a complex concept therefore always requires careful definition. For example, Raz (1979:212) argues that a non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on racial segregation, and sexual inequalities may in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law, if it is understood in the context of the state rules through law. Raz recalled the fact that South Africa abided by the rule of law even when the majority of its citizens had no right to vote. This is to say that the formal version of the rule of

law does not incorporate any separate criteria of the good or the just.

The rule of law could also produce some undesirable outcomes, such as economic inequality. Raz (1979:212) contends that to produce the same result for different people, "it is necessary to treat them differently". Therefore, the application of affirmative action policies, which generally aim at uplifting the marginalised or previously disadvantaged (such as in South Africa), may appear to be a breach to the rule of law. These are some of the examples of tension that may arise from the rule of law, and which should be handled carefully when countries, in this case developing countries, devise strategies of change towards greater political and economic liberalisation.

Despite its controversial conceptions, there is general agreement that the rule of law is an important element of good governance and a requirement for economic growth and development (UNDP, 1997; World Bank, 2000; NEPAD, 2001). The rule of law provides the minimum basis for creating rule-bound states, governments, private sectors, and civil societies. It is therefore essential for reducing official arbitrariness, uncertainty in transactions with governments and individuals. Economists and development scholars also concur that the free market and economic benefits, including growth, depend on certain institutions and the enforcement of certain rules, such as the freedom to contract, contract enforcement, property rights, and investor protection (Levchenko, 2004 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04231.pdf).

Where legal systems are weak and the application of law is uncertain and/or enforcement is arbitrary, they tend to distort economic transactions, foster rent-seeking activities, and discourage private capital flows, all of which undermine national development. Where adherence to the rule of law is weak, security of private property is also weak, and investment prospects are low. The 1996 World Development Report supports this assertion and identifies the institution of a system of law and policies as an important first step for a dynamic economy and sound investment climate. Good laws and effective means for enforcement, the report notes, are critical because these establish



and apply the rules of the game, lower transaction costs, increase commercial certainty, create incentives for efficiency, and control crime and corruption so that business can focus on productive activities (WDR, 2005:36-54).

Effective legal and regulatory frameworks are crucial for additional reasons. They underpin the creation, empowerment and sustenance of “agencies of restraint” or agencies of “horizontal accountability” (O’Donnell 1999:38). Such agencies: independent central banks, audit agencies, ombudsman’s offices, parliaments, and anticorruption agencies are essential for protecting public assets from depletion and mismanagement, and socially vulnerable groups from exploitation. Therefore, the rule of law, which refers to the system of laws and legal structures, as well as to their quality, is an important element of good governance and an important factor for economic development.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

The concepts of accountability and transparency can be traced back to ancient times, when philosophers theorized about the relationship between government and the governed, arguing for procedures, mechanisms that would keep power under control, and protect the treasury from depletion (Aristotle in Everson, 1988). Today, accountability and transparency are fashionable words, which express the continuing concern for checks and balances on the exercise of power by government. All over the world, democracy activists, international financial institutions, academics, and grassroots movements, call for accountability and transparency in the management of public affairs. Increased transparency and accountability are seen as much-needed antidotes to the corruption that otherwise undermines governance and management.

Transparency is broadly defined as making available to the public accurate, relevant, and timely information on issues impacting on the lives of citizens. The Second African Governance Forum (AGF II) held in Accra in Ghana (1998) defined transparency in two ways. First, transparency refers to the ready, unobstructed access to, and availability of data and information from public as well as private sources, that is accurate, timely, relevant and



comprehensive. Second, transparency is defined as tolerance for public debate, public scrutiny and public questioning of political, economic and social policy choices. Accordingly, transparency means the provision to the public of accurate and timely information as well as the possibility for public scrutiny of policy choices.

Transparency refers to openness in the process of governance, in the election process, policy and decision-making, implementation and evaluation, at all levels of government (central and local) and in all branches of government (executive, legislature and judiciary). To be more transparent in this manner requires a radical change of work culture for many. Almost everywhere in government service there has been a preoccupation with confidentiality, and the private sector is no exception. The traditional confidentiality work culture requires public servants to tell nothing to anybody except what is absolutely necessary and what they are authorized to tell. Today, faced with the common threat of corruption, governments and private businesses are required to implement transparency policies.

Transparency is important because it strengthens the legitimacy of government, public officials and their policies and decisions in the eyes of the people (Fagence, 1977:340). Furthermore, transparency helps to counteract the tendency for public agencies and officials to trespass, violate and bend the rules. Without information about the rights, entitlements and responsibilities, the relationships between rulers and the ruled as well as between providers of services and the consumers would be conflictual.

Accountability is a concept that is often associated with transparency. Schedler (1999:14) holds that the concept of accountability carries two basic connotations: answerability, the obligation of public officials to inform about and to explain what they are doing; and enforcement, the capacity of accounting agencies to impose sanctions on power-holders who violate the law. In terms of answerability, accountability implies the obligation from public officials to provide information about their actions and performance. However, it also involves the rationale for this: the duty to provide justifications and



explanations to overseeing bodies (Brinkerhoff, 2001:294).

The second dimension of accountability refers to enforcement, thus encompassing the entire field of institutional design, which would apply sanctions (Schedler, 1999). Building appropriate structures of accountability implies building institutions and mechanisms that will effectively control the use of public resources. O'Donnell (1999:38) introduces "horizontal accountability" and "vertical accountability" agencies. Horizontal accountability agencies are the state institutions that are legally empowered, and factually willing to take action that ranges from routine monitoring to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other agents or agencies of the state that may qualify as unlawful. In this context, institutions of accountability include all state institutions that aim at controlling government power and authority, such as the legislature, the judiciary, electoral commissions, and statutory bodies, such as the ombudsman, the auditor office, and administrative tribunals.

Vertical accountability refers to structures situated outside the state and in an unequal relationship with regard to state power (Peters, 1995:300-302). These include civil society groups (interest and pressure groups, mass media, competitive markets, women and youth movements), which constitute another countervailing force to the power of the state, and consequently contribute to the nexus of checks and balances that is important to the functioning of accountability.

IMPORTANCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

The benefits of accountability and transparency in governance cannot be overemphasised. They reinforce the trust and confidence of citizens. Accountability and transparency are not just about making administrative agencies efficient and effective; but also about establishing and sustaining a genuine democratic and rule-bound society that is conducive to business development and attractive to investments. Accountability and transparency help to counteract corruption. In Africa, many people see corruption as a grave problem involving bribery, embezzlement or other appropriation of

state property, nepotism and the granting of favours to personal acquaintances, as well as the abuse of public authority and position to obtain payments and privileges (Harsch, 1993:33).

Corruption leads to economic inefficiencies; distorts development; inhibits long-term foreign and domestic investments; and weakens the state as bureaucrats and politicians are involved in rent-seeking activities. It also undermines state effectiveness in the delivery of services, and the protection of the vulnerable. Corruption promotes economic decay and social and political instability, perverts the ability of the state to foster the rule of law, and eventually erodes trust and undermines legitimacy (Mbaku, 1996). Given the cost of corruption, there are now, numerous national anti-corruption strategies, and international conventions, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the Inter-American Convention against Corruption. An effective institutional framework to counter corruption must be all-inclusive involving all societal actors: government, the private sector, civil society and international community. Addressing corruption means increasing accountability in government and having a responsive citizenry. Placing a high premium on the rule of law, which is equally applicable to citizens, business people and government officials, and strengthening the role of the media can significantly minimize opportunities for corruption.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Traditionally, public participation has been related to political participation, through which citizens engage in forms of political involvement, such as voting, political parties and lobbying. Such participation has been regarded as crucial for the well functioning of democracy. De Tocqueville in his essay "Democracy in America"(1835) indicates how the involvement of various interest groups and associations to deliberate among themselves, discover their common needs, and resolve their differences without relying on some central authority was important for the consolidation of democracy. Thus, Citizen participation in political life has been seen as necessary for curbing



unbridled political power, in that it provides checks and balances for state political machinery (Keanne, 1988:50). Public participation is also said to contribute to developing better citizens who are more aware of the preferences of others, more-self confident in their actions, and more civic-minded in resolving problems for the common good (Schmitter and Karl, 1993).

In recent years, public participation has emerged as a mechanism for promoting good governance in developing nations. It is now being related to the rights of citizens in democratic governance and to best practices of governance. The Manila Declaration on Peoples' Participation and Sustainable Development (1989) states that citizen participation is a tool to promote democracy; it empowers citizens and builds citizenship, balances the power of the elites and the poor, and facilitates local, regional, national, continental and global dialogue on issues of concern. Thus, governments particularly those of poor countries have made participatory governance, one of their priorities. In public administration, public participation has been seen as an effective tool to ensure responsiveness of government policies and programmes to the needs of the citizens. In this context, participation is defined as the involvement of citizens, to a greater or lesser degree, in the making, implementation, monitoring, review and termination of policies and decisions that affect their lives (Masango, 2002:53).

Within development discourse, the dominant concern with participation has been related to community or social actors, whose involvement has been seen as a means of strengthening the relevance, quality and sustainability of development projects. Participation, in this context, is defined as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources, which affect them (World Bank, 1995). The international development agencies claim that participation in development projects and programmes contributes to greater efficiency and effectiveness of development projects, enhances processes of democratisation, empowers the marginalised groups and the poor who are involved, and ensures the sustainability of development interventions. For

instance, the 2004 Human Development Report strongly argues that in order to reach the Millennium Development Goals, and ultimately eradicate poverty, people, especially those who are poor and marginalised, should be allowed the opportunity to influence political action at local and national levels (UNDP, 2004:49). Governments are required to identify mechanisms and opportunities to allowing people to participate in political decision-making.

The 1990 Arusha International Conference on Popular Participation in the Recovery and Development Process in Africa marked the beginning of a concerted effort among all Africa's development actors (African governments, African people's organisations, NGOs and United Nations agencies) to understand the role of people's participation in Africa's development and to identify mechanisms for its implementation. The conference defined the process of participation as one that empowers people to involve themselves effectively in creating the structures and in designing policies and programmes that serve the interests of all. Participatory governance enables people to contribute effectively to the development process and to share equitably in nation-building and crisis resolution. The process of public participation includes the opening up of political space for consensus-building, and creating the necessary conditions for the empowerment of people.

The emphasis on participatory governance has brought one of the most popular state reforms in developing countries, the decentralisation of decision-making. Decentralisation seeks to open space for a wider and deeper participation of citizens at local levels. Paralleling decentralisation are various legal frameworks and institutional channels for citizen participation that have been developed in many of these countries (Kauzya, 2003:3-4). There has also been an unprecedented growth of civil society organisations including NGOs, trade unions, cultural and religious groups, charities, professional associations, social and sports groups, and community groups covering cooperatives and community development organizations, around which society voluntarily organizes to participate in the political and socio-economic development process.



Despite significant claims for participation, criticism has been levelled at participation, the most significant of which is limited capacity of participants, and political manipulation of participation. First, it is argued that participation is unrealistic about the capacity, and even the interest of citizens to participate in public affairs (Schmitter, 1995:20; Brynard, 1998:7). According to Schmitter (1995:20), while individuals have preferences and are aware of the need for collective action to defend them, they also have a restricted capacity to explore their interest situation and a strong temptation to free ride on the actions of others.

The experience in several developing nations has shown that the low level of education hampers the ability of citizens to articulate their needs or to challenge government policies. The study on the role of civil society in policy-making in Rwanda found that civil society actors tend to be reactive rather than proactive when dealing with state action. One of the reasons is their limited capacity to critique policy issues (Mukamunana, 2002:50). Furthermore, the voluntary nature and absence of incentives/remuneration for councillors who organise public meetings is another factor hampering public participation (Golooba-Mutebi, 2004:295). Therefore, without the appropriate skills, knowledge, experience, leadership or managerial capabilities, participation may be reduced to mere public gatherings without meaningful contributions from those for whom participation is intended. In this context, public participation may be a time-consuming and ineffective tool for both the government and local people to achieve local development goals.

Secondly, public participation has been attacked on the grounds of its tendency to depoliticize the participation process by the way it treats individuals and communities as singular and apolitical in their spatial boundaries (Cleaver, 1999; Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999). Critics contend that public participation is about the exercise of power (Gaventa and Valderrama, 1999:7). The fact that communities are multiple, socially diverse in terms of language, culture, gender, ethnicity, religion, profession, and political preferences, means that issues, such as who determines who

participates, who sets the agenda, what kind of people are most influential in decision-making, are important in order to understand what kind of participation is taking place.

Empirical studies suggest that in most of the cases the state manipulates the process of participation. As Gaventa and Valderrama (1999:7) argue the control of the structures and processes (defining spaces, actors, agendas, and procedures) for participation is usually in the hands of governmental institutions. Although traditional structures and authority still exist, in many African countries, decentralisation statutes ignore them or subordinate their authority to government control (Golooba-Mutebi, 2004:296). This raises conflicts and undermines effective participation and local governance. This view is supported by the UNDP, which argues that for many years states have used policies of assimilation and integration, which try to erode cultural differences between groups to enhance the political legitimacy of governments (UNDP, 2004:48). The UNDP further notes that failure to provide avenues for various social and cultural groups to articulate their needs and interests has led to social tensions and conflicts, especially in multicultural societies, such as Africa. The 2004 Human Development Report calls for a more inclusive governance, which recognizes socio-cultural diversity (UNDP, 2004:47-72).

Despite its flaws, public participation is claimed to be an important feature of democratic states, because it provides people with the opportunity to contribute to the progress and wellbeing of their communities. The current global democratisation has made people more conscious of their cultural identity, and they want to participate in making decisions that affect their lives. Thus, the great challenge for the leaders is to ensure inclusive, participative governance, which recognizes cultural diversities without jeopardizing state cohesion. Furthermore, while taking on board diverse societal values and needs, the government must also balance with the requirements of efficiency and effectiveness in the policy-making process.

EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT PUBLIC SECTOR

Globalisation and the information age have markedly transformed the way government does business and, in particular, the way it delivers services to the public. Additionally, the collapse of planning economies in the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, the important role of the State in the 'miracle' economies of East Asia, and the weakening of the State in many developing countries have given a particular impetus to the role of government and its administration.

There is a widely accepted view among scholars, government officials and multilateral institutions that an effective State, which is central to economic and social development, is not the one acting as the exclusive and direct provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst, and facilitator (Kickert, et al. 1997:3; World Bank, 1997:1; Jun, 2002:5). This has meant a move away from traditional central planning methodologies to the introduction of strategic planning, which is more proactive. It has also called for a paradigm shift from the historically dominant Weberian model of bureaucracy to the New Public Management (NPM), which advocates more flexible, dynamic, and responsive public sector organisations. Thus, many public sector management interventions have been directed at civil service reforms through programmes of privatisation, downsizing, performance management and appraisals, restructuring of government departments, and improvements in management skills and knowledge through training (Nunberg, 1990:3).

In developing countries, weak and ineffective public sector institutions have been seen to be the major constraints of economic growth and sustainable development (World Bank, 1997; World Bank, 2000; Olowu and Saka, 2002; Sachs, 2005). It follows, therefore, that building effective, efficient and accountable public institutions is essential for developing countries to meet the challenges of poverty reduction and to adapt to the demands of today's globalised economy.

The 1997 World Development Report sees the role of the State in a rapidly

changing environment as a vital necessity for development (World Bank, 1997:15). Although there is no one-size-fits-all formula for an effective State, the report argues that in a modern world the role and functions of the State must be redefined and its capabilities strengthened by reinvigorating public institutions. The report suggests a two-part strategy. First, the primary role of the State should be that of laying down the following fundamentals, without which durable development is impossible:

- establishing a foundation of law,
- maintaining a non-distortionary policy environment including macro economic stability,
- investing in basic social service and infrastructure,
- protecting the vulnerable, and
- protecting the environment (World Bank, 1997:4).

The second part of the strategy for building effective states consists of strengthening the institutional capacity by providing incentives for better performance while maintaining mechanisms of checks and restraint. These are believed to counteract the numerous problems, such as corruption, and other political interests that hinder the development of a competent and effective public sector. According to the World Bank (1997), effective rules, partnerships and competition can provide adequate incentives for a better government.

Effective rules and restraints: these are formal mechanisms of control that provide checks and balances of government institutions and ensure effective performance and accountability. They include rules, separation of powers that ensure the independence of the judiciary, rules governing the ombudsman and other watchdog bodies that report to parliament, accounting and auditing systems, independence of the central bank, civil service rules and budgeting rules.

Voice and partnership: This means allowing the voice of the people, and especially the most vulnerable, to be heard and their opinions and needs reflected in the policy. Decentralisation of decision-making to local communities not only empowers communities but also facilitates the implementation of effective and responsive policies. Through partnerships with business and communities, governments become effective and efficient in discharging their functions.

Competition: a competitive, merit-based system of recruitment and promotion, competitive social service delivery, private participation in infrastructure, and privatization of certain market-driven activities are effective to counter bureaucratic malpractices, such as political appointments and bribes in procurements allocations. Subjecting the State to competition can therefore improve its capability and effectiveness in the delivery of goods and services to the people (World Bank, 1997:4-11).

DEMOCRACY: THE CONTROVERSY

Democracy is widely advocated and sought, but its meaning is widely contested. Originating from the Greek concept of “demos”, or - the many -, democracy means the “rule by the people” (Crick, 1998: 255). Ancient Athens, the world's first democracy, practised direct democracy in which all citizens, without the intermediary of elected or appointed officials participated in decision-making. Then, western societies (Western Europe and North America) took the concept and moulded it into their cultures and aspirations. Democracy in these societies has been, ideally, a fusion of the idea of power by the people and the idea of legally guaranteed individual rights (Crick, 1998:256).

Today, the most common form of democracy is representative democracy, in which citizens elect officials to make political decisions, formulate laws, and administer programmes for the public good. Different polities, however, have applied representative democracy, differently. Thus, the literature distinguishes two major forms of democracy: liberal democracy and social



democracy (Diamond and Plattner, 1993; Mengisteab, 1999). The liberal democracy is predominant in the industrialised world. Following the collapse of socialist regimes in the late 1980s, liberal democracy became the only viable form. The following comment of Sartori (1991:437) highlights this point:

As we enter the last decade of our century liberal democracy suddenly finds itself without an enemy. Whatever else had laid claim on the word democracy, or had been acclaimed as 'real democracy' has fizzled out almost overnight.

Liberal democracy advocates a narrow public realm, which encompasses the making of collective norms and choices that are binding on the society and backed by state coercion. According to the liberal view, democracy has the function of bundling together and bringing to bear private social interests against a state apparatus that specializes in the administrative employment of political power for collective goals (Diamond and Plattner, 1993). One of the most important and contested characteristics of liberal democracy is the principle of "limited government and a separation between the public and private sectors" (Mengisteab, 1999:24). The supporters of limited government (also called minimalists) argue that only market economies create conditions for sustainable democracy and economic development. Thus, according to this view, state intervention in the economic sphere should be limited.

There are three main reasons for restricting the role of the state. First, private property is viewed as embodied in the individuals' rights and freedoms that cannot be infringed upon by the State. Secondly, proponents of liberalism argue that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Thirdly, liberals view market allocation of resources as non-coercive, which can offset the state's coercive allocation (Sartori, 1991:437-448). The view of a laissez-faire market system has been criticised as being incompatible with democracy, particularly in poor countries of the developing world with deep societal divisions and less diversified economies. The major concern is how can the state correct massive poverty of its people when deprived of its resource-distributive power. Thus, at the other extreme, social democracy promotes state intervention in economic activity and the welfare state (Mengisteab, 1999:24). This form of democracy, which is prevalent in



Scandinavian countries, seeks to extend the public realm through regulation, subsidization, and in some cases collective ownership of property (Mengisteab, 1999).

Despite its different forms, modern democracy is defined as a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives (Schmitter and Karl, 1993:40). Modern democracy is increasingly measured in terms of the respect and protection of freedoms and human rights (political, civil, as well as economic and cultural), accountability of public officials (elected as well as appointed), transparency in governance, the rule of law, and the promotion of a market economy. Thus, the modern democracy that is promoted around the world bends nicely with liberal democracy principles.

As already highlighted, in Africa, democracy emerged in a series of reforms for good governance pushed by the BWIs and donors. By pushing for democracy, the reformers hoped that free political competition would reduce many problems of governance and that incompetent and corrupt public office bearers would be expelled even prosecuted. Further, it was expected that free political debate through independent national parliaments would help to evolve policies, notably economic policies that would promote the growth of market economies. The political democratisation was thus one element of the structural adjustment programmes the overall aim of which was, arguably, to boost economic growth and produce an efficient public administration, which would, therefore, attract private investment, reduce aid dependency, and bolster economic development (Williamson, 2000:251).

However, the substantial economic turnaround that was expected of these reforms did not materialize; neither did democratic governance. Instead, many African countries experienced severe economic setbacks, with intensified social conflicts (Ake, 1996; Uvin, 1998; Cheru, 2002). Indeed, the 1990s became the bloodiest decade in Africa: from civil wars in Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, to genocide in



Rwanda. The failure of democracy to deliver on its expectations has led many scholars to question and revisit the assumption that links democracy to economic development.

The early study linking democracy to development is Lipset's essay: "*Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy*" (1959). Lipset used a quantitative cross-national study to test the relationship between democracy and the economic prosperity of a country. His hypothesis was that: "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy" (Lipset, 1959:69). He compared European and Latin American countries using four indicators of economic development: wealth, industrialization, education, and urbanization. The study concluded that European stable democracies scored higher in these dimensions than Latin America, thus confirming his hypothesis.

Lipset explains that education broadens one's outlook, increases tolerant attitudes, restrains people from adopting extremist doctrines, and increases their capacity for rational electoral choice. This is made possible by industrialisation, which leads to increases in wealth (a larger middle class), education, communication and equality, which in turn increase the probability of stable democratic forms of politics (Lipset, 1959). Although the study did not specify the form of relationship between variables, that is, democracy and economic development, his findings led to the conclusion that economic development led to democratic governance in western democracies, and not vice versa (French, 2004:2).

In view of this, some scholars have argued that full democracy must wait until considerable economic development has taken place and that premature democracy is dangerous to economic growth (Marsh, Blondel, and Inogushi, 1999:2). One could argue that the spectacular economic development of East Asian countries (including China, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Malaysia) mostly under authoritarian rule has reinforced this view.



Quibria's (2002: 62-3) argument is a case in point:

The one characteristic common to the political regimes of the miracle economies was their authoritarian nature. When this experience is juxtaposed against that of India, it appears that whereas democracies have been slow in grappling with poverty the authoritarian regimes in the miracle economies achieved spectacular success.

The experience of the rapid economic growth of East Asian countries tends to support authoritarian rule as the form of leadership most conducive to economic development. However, empirical studies dealing with Latin America have come to contradictory conclusions that authoritarianism did not contribute to economic growth (Feng, 1997:395). In Africa also, it is during decades of authoritarian rule (circa the 1980s and 1990s) that indicators of development fell steadily, and its share of world trade and industrial output declined (van de Walle, 2001:1-14). The explanation to this conundrum might be found in the following.

A number of studies that have attempted to understand the rapid economic development of East Asian countries point specifically to the nature and character of the state. Myrdal's (1970) work on South Asia drew attention to the concepts of "soft" and "strong" states in the third world. He argued that the Indian state was weak, paralysed by the grip of special interests. Thus, for India to overcome poverty, a strong state that could control the influence of special interests was essential (in Leftwich, 1994:375). By contrast, the strong authoritarian regimes, such as the Indonesian State under General Suharto were seen as successful in achieving their development agenda (Leftwich, 1994:375). Former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir bin Mohamad argued for what he called good authoritarianism.

Developing countries cannot function without strong authority on the part of government. Unstable and weak governments will result in chaos, and chaos cannot contribute to the development and wellbeing of developing countries. Divisive politics will occupy the time and minds of everyone, as we can witness in many developing countries today. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahathir_bin_Mohamad)

Yet, the neo-liberal proponents do not clearly indicate the role of the state when explaining the so-called "Asian economic miracle". The World Bank in



its 1993 report “*The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*” argues that the rapid growth in East Asia reflects the prudent policy choices by governments that have been in line with sound macro economic management. Some scholars find this view too simplistic to explain the East Asian growth. Unlike the neoliberal approach, which advocates a minimal State role and reliance upon the market to lead the economic growth, it is argued that the State in East Asia has played a prominent role through extensive interventions in the economy (Christensen and Siamwala, 1994:1). Rapid economic growth in Asia has been achieved because governments have prudently applied the market policies advocated by the BWIs and intervened in the economy in order to channel resources into targeted sectors, industries, and firms and to ensure compliance with national development policy objectives (Christensen and Siamwalla, 1994:1). Two key concepts from this analysis require special attention: “prudence” in the application of neo-liberal policies and “state intervention” in the economy.

Central to the debate of the East Asian economic miracle is therefore the role of the State in the economy. Some scholars refer to these states as “developmental states”, which means the State plays the major role in directing and promoting development (Leftwich, 1994:373). The driving principles of developmental states differ markedly from the current norms and standards set up by the BWIs and donors for good governance. The following are some of the key common features that have characterised developmental states:

- A concentration of political power at the top, which has resulted in enhanced political stability and continuity in policy.
- Domination by purposeful and determined developmental elites, which have also been relatively uncorrupt.
- Relative autonomy of developmental elites and state institutions with real power, technical competence, and insulation in shaping development policy.



- Very powerful, highly competent and insulated economic bureaucratic units in key ministries with authority in directing and managing economic and social development. Examples are the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Japan, Economic Planning Board in Korea, and Economic Development Board in Singapore.
- The weakness of civil society. The institutions of civil society in developmental states have been smashed, penetrated, dominated or financed by the state. The state has used various security measures to suppress or eliminate the opposition. This has enabled the state to plan for long term in pursuing development goals.
- The power and autonomy of these states were established at an early stage of their developmental history before national interests or foreign capital became significantly influential. This has allowed the state the time to strengthen its capacities vis-à-vis private economic interests. (Leftwich, 1994:378-381)

The above characteristics indicate that developmental states are led by an authoritarian, but visionary and purposeful developmental leadership, which is supported by a competent bureaucracy with real power in shaping development policy. This significantly contributed to their development successes. Thus, authoritarianism in a weak state or what Hyden and Bratton (1992) calls the “soft state” in Africa, where client politics rule explains, at least in part, why the African state has been unable to get out of the grip of poverty and underdevelopment.

The conclusion is that liberal democracy, while essential for market development, is not at present an appropriate model to overcome the development predicament of Africa. The creation of a market-friendly environment is paramount for economic growth, but the African state still needs to be at the top of the development agenda. For that, it needs control of its allocative powers to correct economic distortions, direct resources in targeted economic sectors, and implement policies that uplift the majority of its



poor population. At the same time, this requires the process of state building and of democratisation as development cannot happen under autocratic and corrupt leadership. Hence, some form of democracy is necessary. Democratic governance in Africa is challenging, as it requires striking a balance between the imperatives of economic development and attending to the needs and interests of different groups. After this analysis, a working definition of governance and its essential elements within the boundaries of this study are provided.

GOVERNANCE – A DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis is interested in governance as it applies more specifically to the African context. This study espouses the view that governance is an action and a process. Governance is the exercise of state authority and the provision of leadership in the process of achieving common societal objectives and interests. A system of governance is good when it assists members of society to achieve what they consider the common purpose (generally a secure, peaceful, and prosperous society). In this process, the role of the state and other supportive systems and structures is pivotal. The factors below are considered the most essential for good governance in Africa:

Effective leadership is the most critical element of good governance. In all human undertakings, leadership provides enlightenment, insight and vision. It is the vehicle to bring about social and economic development. To face the challenges of the African continent, including political insecurity, diseases such as the HIV and AIDS, massive poverty, and globalisation, there is a need for visionary leadership, leadership that is proactive, accountable, capable of anticipating changes in the global environment and responding timeously and effectively.

Effective regulatory framework refers to laws, regulations, and policies to regulate relationships between the state, market and society. African states need rational regulatory systems, which bolster public sector performance and promote private sector enterprises under an effective system of transparency



and accountability.

Competent and professional public service refers to a competent public service, which is up to the challenges of the new millennium. The public service must be a strategically proactive, innovative, and performance-based institution.

Participatory governance, in the context of African diversity, should mean inclusive governance. To overcome conflicts, governance must be inclusive of all national socio-cultural and ethnic diversities. Furthermore, given malfunctioning economies and the limited capacity of the state to discharge development functions, the active partnership of non-state actors (private sector and civil society) in the economy is imperative. This implies empowering citizens, who should be seen as the means and ends of development. Participatory governance also requires a state supported by competent institutions, capable of providing the right direction to the society.

CONCLUSION

To conclude, public administration, as a field of study and practice, has been influenced by many approaches, all of them with the aim of improving the functioning of public institutions and increasing their efficiency and effectiveness. The challenges of the modern state and complexity of policy-making processes have necessitated administrative reforms and behavioural change from the government to embrace cooperative governance. Governance is a process, which is highly interactive involving all societal stakeholders in order to achieve common objectives and interests. Various mechanisms have emerged to assist states to achieve their development goals, and these include peer review mechanisms and regional cooperation strategies. This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of these mechanisms. Finally, the chapter ends with a working definition of governance for this study.



CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES: GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP MODELS IN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Africa, like other developing regions, has experienced and continues to experience political changes of enormous proportions, especially in terms of governance systems. Since the 1980s, the models of governance and leadership have become the centre of debate for academics, decision-makers, civil society and, in particular, the international development agencies owing mainly to political instability and poor economic performance that have been recorded in most African countries since their political independence. Governance and leadership determine the rules and behaviour of actors in a polity, in particular political and administrative actors. As such, these have been viewed as key factors that may promote or inhibit the development process of a country. Developed countries and the multilateral lending agencies (the World Bank and IMF) have suggested that Africa's inability to develop economically is principally the consequence of bad governance and poor leadership. As a result, a series of reforms has been sought, and in some places introduced. These include democratization, decentralization, popular participation in policy-making, and public sector reforms. All of these have the objective of achieving an effective and efficient government that can facilitate sustainable development.

This chapter aims to present different major systems of governance that have been applied in Africa. Leadership and institutions of governance, and how these have interacted are explored. The study focuses on the post-independence era. However, pre-independence governance is also highlighted given its strong resonance on current leadership and governance systems. The purpose of the chapter is also to appraise the state of governance by highlighting key features that are said to impede the social and economic development in Africa. This information is used to determine the



obstacles or challenges the APRM is facing in addressing governance issues in Africa; hence, its significance in answering the research question.

The chapter begins by providing a general framework of political systems that exist in the world and how institutions and groups interact in each one. Then, the chapter presents and discusses political systems found on the African continent. The concept of political system defined as the model of how politics determines public policy is seen as a framework needed to understand the functioning and behaviour of governments. Thus, although a public administration research would be interested on those aspects of policy implementation and the organisation of government activities, the dynamics of the political system, which affect the bureaucratic machine and its workings, need to be understood. Furthermore, governance in Africa is analysed in the context of the globalised economy. The African response to globalisation and the challenges for governance and leadership are also highlighted.

MAJOR POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD

David Easton (1965:21) defines a political system as a set of interactions through which values and policies are authoritatively allocated for a society. Broadly, the political system is an open system subjected to influences from the external or international environment of which it forms a part. Narrowly, the political system is viewed as an intra-societal system, which encompasses institutions, structures, processes, and actors – such as the executives, the parliaments, courts, political parties, policy mandates, organizational structures, administrative rules and guidelines, and institutionalized rules and norms – which are interconnected in a process through which policies are initiated, decided and implemented. It is through understanding the dynamics among the various components of a political system that one can come to grasp the concept of leadership and governance and their relationship to public decisions.

There are various models of government in the world. These include liberal democracies, authoritarian models and communist systems. To compare and



classify the political systems across the world, political scientists have used various criteria, such as the mode of decision-making (for example consensual versus majoritarian decision-making), and economic organization (communism as opposed to capitalism) (Lijphart, 1984; Blondel, 1995). Blondel suggests five types of political systems which were classified in terms of the answers given to three sets of normative questions: “*who rules, in what way, and for what purpose*” (1995:29). The first question is concerned with the numbers and proportions of people who participate in the decision-making process. For this question, the focus is on who is entitled to take and who effectively takes decisions. In a democracy, as it was practised in ancient Athens, all the members of the polity participate in taking public decisions. Today, this form of democracy is impossible. Another extreme concerns monarchies in which only one person rules. It is also impossible to find this in any polity. Thus, in the real world, there exist various types of intermediate positions, which correspond to different types of “oligarchy” (Blondel, 1995:30).

The second question refers to how decisions are taken. What is being investigated here, is the levels of openness of the decision-making process. Are there restrictions on the discussion of alternatives with respect to policies and governance? To what extent do these restrictions exist? Answering these questions determines the extent to which a political system is liberal or authoritarian. Again, within this continuum, liberal to authoritarian, there is a series of political systems, which are hybrid or moderate.

Finally, the third normative principle concerns the purpose of public decisions that political systems pursue. All societies have a certain vision of what is the “good society”, which is promoted through policies that advance more or less equality in the society (Blondel, 1995:31). Here, the classification focuses on the substantive goals of policies that are being developed and implemented. Consequently, one may find two liberal democracies, which may differ in terms of actions taken with respect to property, social welfare, and education. For example, the liberal capitalist, on the one hand, advocates a limited government, and promotes individual and property rights, which leads the



capitalist class to draw the biggest share of benefits in comparison to the rest of society. The liberal socialist, on the other hand, intervenes in the public arena including the economic sphere, while protecting fundamental individual rights. This bargains for more equality in the society.

Thus, answers to these normative questions determine the type of political system that can be located at different points in the three-dimensional continuum defined by the norms. Furthermore, a cluster of political systems provides an image of structures (institutions and groups), which exist in these systems and within their relationships. Below are the five clusters of political systems proposed by Blondel namely, the liberal democratic, the egalitarian-authoritarian, traditional-inegalitarian, populist, and authoritarian-inegalitarian (Blondel, 1995). The structures, institutions and groups that make up these systems and the working relationships between them are also highlighted.

LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Liberal democratic political systems apply principally to the modern democracies of Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Israel (Blondel, 1995:36). Ancient Athens is the classic example of a direct democracy, in which citizens made decisions themselves without representative institutions. The essence of direct democracy was a “self-government” in which all adult citizens participated in shaping collective decisions in a context of equality and open deliberation (Hague, Harrop, and Breslin, 1998:20). In the modern state, however, the most common form of democracy is “representative democracy” in which the people elect their representatives, who make decisions on their behalf. These elected leaders operate within formal limits, often set out in the constitution. Such limits reflect the liberal goals of preserving individual rights and maximizing freedom of choice (Hague et al., 1998:21).

Diamond (1999:11) provides a list of characteristics and conditions that a regime has to meet to be considered a “liberal democracy”:

- Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies with



elected officials, in particular, the military is subordinate to the elected authority.

- Executive power is constrained by the autonomous power of other government institutions such as an independent judiciary and parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability.
- Electoral outcomes are uncertain with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government, and no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections.
- Cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups are not prohibited from expressing their political interests, speaking their language or practicing their culture.
- Beyond parties and elections, citizens have multiple ongoing channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, i.e. they can form and join diverse, independent associations and movements.
- There are alternative sources of information, including independent media, to which citizens have free access.
- Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration and petition.
- Citizens are politically equal under the law.
- An independent, non-discriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power, effectively protects individual and group liberties.
- The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized non-state or anti-state forces.



Thus, a liberal democracy is a system in which political authority is subjected to constitutional and legal limits; the rule of law is assured; and individual and minority rights are protected. Power, although acquired through elections, is constrained by various mechanisms of checks and balances. All liberal democracies are based on the principle of representative and limited government.

However, the weight given to these principles varies, which explains the variations that exist within liberal democratic political systems. Lijphart in his book "*Democracies*" built a typology of nine democratic political systems using two dimensions: "majoritarian" and "consensual" models of government. The majoritarian model is based on the principle of concentrating as much power as possible in the hands of the majority; and consensual type is based on the principle of sharing, dispersing, and limiting power in various ways (in Lijphart, 1990:71).

With respect to the three normative dimensions, liberal democracies are democratic and liberal, and their policies tend to be a compromise between the extremes of full equality and clumsy inequality (Blondel, 1995:36). This situation has been attributed to the liberal democratic formula, which allows people or groups to express themselves (freedom of expression) and to seek protection or support especially during elections, thus, allowing a certain balance to be reached in terms of purpose of policies. The system has proven to be a successful framework for the development of the market economy (Hague, et al., 1998:21).

In liberal democratic political systems, the configuration of institutions and groups is based mainly on constitutional arrangements deliberately designed to implement the norms of the political system (Blondel, 1995:41). Thus, the constitution clearly defines key institutions, the actors within them, and their relationships. This is the case for parliaments, courts, the executive and its bureaucracy, and other institutions, such as the Auditor General and ombudsman. Political parties, although not always mentioned in constitutions of liberal democratic political systems, play a primordial role in decision-



making. In these polities, political parties tend to dominate the executive and the parliament mainly because the elections occur along party lines and the vision of the government of the day will correspond to the decisions of the ruling party. Blondel (1995:42) argues that parties and groups are most influential in decision-making in liberal democratic regimes. Parties occupy the front stage and provide the direction in which the system moves, whereas the groups, although less visible in the day-to-day governance of the system, organize for definite purposes (cases of trade unions, women organisations, business associations, youth groups) and normally exercise pressure on and influence the parties.

Theoretically, the level of public participation in policy-making is high. However, in practice, only a small group of people happens to be actively involved in and to shape decisions for the society while the majority free ride on the actions of others. Hague and his colleagues argue that often voting in national elections is the only form of political participation, which involves a majority of the people. Anything beyond that, in most democratic systems, is the domain of the minority of activists (Hague, et al., 1998:81). Nonetheless, the system provides to citizens the political space to express their concerns, needs and wants, which is the cornerstone of liberal democracy.

EGALITARIAN-AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The countries of this group fall within the communist system. Hence, some scholars refer to these countries as communist political systems (White and Nelson, 1986) or socialist political systems (Topornin, 1990). Based on the Marxist-Leninist ideology of socialist economy, socialism has been adopted by various countries around the world, including the former Soviet Union (USSR), the Eastern European countries (such as the former Yugoslavia, Czech Republic and Hungary), Asian countries such as China, North Korea, Mongolia, and Vietnam as well as Cuba, Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia (Blondel, 1995:37). It is important to note that the fall of communism in the former Soviet bloc in the late 1980s led to the collapse of the system in many other polities. Now communism remains in few countries, such as North Korea,



Cuba, and China, which are now reforming.

The socialist political system is mainly characterized by the fact that political power is exercised, and the public affairs of the society as a whole are managed by the working class, through various political devices in the form of state power. All political systems under socialism have in common, at least in theory, a socialist system of economy and public ownership of the means of production. It is widely accepted that in communist constitutions, elections, legislative bodies, and other public institutions have generally played a minor if not negligible role in politics, and have remained subordinate to the directives and detailed guidance of the ruling communist party (Topornin, 1990:129).

The state in these systems appears as the main and most important instrument of social transformation. It is through the state that the working people headed by the communist party regulate social relations and ensure the accomplishment of building and improving socialism (Topornin, 1990:125). The communist party guides and coordinates the activities of all the structures of the political system and ensures that each element in the system fulfils its functions completely. Other groups and institutions, such as public organisations, trade unions, women's associations, youth leagues, and cooperatives, work under the leadership of the communist party.

TRADITIONAL INEGALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Traditional inegalitarian political systems operate in countries that are absolutist; in which the head of state, usually a monarch, rules the nation by counting on the loyal support of the large majority of the population (Blondel, 1995:43). This type of regime is rare and is now confined to countries found in few areas of the world such as the Arabian Peninsula, the Himalayas and the kingdom of Swaziland in Southern Africa. The norms of these systems are traditional. They preserve social inequalities. Power and wealth are concentrated in fewer hands, and there is limited movement towards opening the political space. Many monarchs have been able to maintain their regimes through the introduction of some of the features of constitutional regimes and



developing the economy. This is the case in the Arabian Peninsula (Blondel, 1995).

Structural configurations in these systems contrast sharply with those of liberal democracies and communist systems, because they do not result from deliberate decisions, neither from imposition on existing structures. Traditional institutional configurations correspond more closely to the social structure. What is important in these systems, are the traditional groupings or tribes and the hierarchical positions which exist within and between these groupings whose unwavering support is the determinant for the maintenance of the regime. The political arena is not vibrant given the insignificant role of key institutions such as the parliament and political parties (Blondel, 1995:43). However, the globalisation of democracy has led to calls for more representative and responsive political systems. Opposition forces, civil society especially, human rights and labour unions are at the forefront, campaigning for change in these polities.

POPULIST POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Populist political systems refer to the newly independent African states of the 1950s and 1960s. The term “populism” was used in the late nineteenth century in America to refer to emancipation movements of black Americans against their political and social masters (Blondel, 1995:39). After World War II, this term has been applied to those newly independent regimes and leaders in the Third World who championed the slogan that “people shall govern”, while not giving the people the political power to govern. These systems have been characterized as being halfway between democracy and monarchy, between egalitarian and inegalitarian, and between liberalism and authoritarianism (Blondel, 1995:39). Despite the populist ideology of these systems, they converted into authoritarian regimes soon after independence (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:21-32).

The structural configuration of populist political systems is hybrid, often characterized by a profound opposition between traditional institutions that were losing power and the new institutions of the modern state, such as



political parties, the bureaucracy and trade union organizations, between which uneasy compromises had to be ironed out (Blondel, 1995:44). In most of these societies, the friction led to the adoption of a single-party system in which powers were concentrated in a small group of elites accompanied by the removal of competitive elections and intolerance towards opposition. Given the challenging task for the leaders to unify the factions, only popular and charismatic leaders, such as Mwarimu Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, have been able to sustain such regimes (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:80). Elsewhere, in the absence of these leaders, it has been difficult to maintain the system and this has led in many cases to the emergence of authoritarian-inegalitarian systems, such as in Ghana, Nigeria, and Kenya. This is a significant system for Africa, as most regimes remain populists with autocratic characteristics although they claim to be democracies.

AUTHORITARIAN-INEGALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Authoritarian regimes are mostly oppressive, often characterized by a single hegemonic party-system or military regime, for which the population must express full support and obedience to the leader and the regime. Linz (1964) cited in Morlino (1990:91) defines authoritarian regime as follows:

A political system with limited, non-responsible political pluralism without an elaborated and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or, occasionally, a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined, but actually quite predictable limits.

These systems have, in most cases, emerged as a reaction to the failure of or difficulties in the democratic political system. This has been the case in many of the liberal democracies of Central and Eastern Europe after World War I, especially in those countries that had been most affected by the war. Fascism and Nazism are examples of such a reaction. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, democratic populist regimes have been replaced by authoritarian-inegalitarian regimes often in the form of military rule (Blondel, 1995:39). Military leaders argued that the democratic



system failed to bring social cohesion, order and economic growth; thus some form of authoritarianism was crucial to restore discipline and security (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:80). Policies in these political systems promote inequality in the society, because they are designed to defend the interests of the small ruling elite. Furthermore, these regimes have proven to be highly volatile given the social, economic and political imbalances they create in society (Blondel, 1995:45).

Today, of all the political systems discussed above, the liberal democracy has passed the test of time and achieved an international acclaim of being the model of governance generally acceptable. This is principally attributed to the triumph of the market economy and the imperatives of globalisation. Countries around the world, including former communist countries, are adopting reforms that aim to implement liberal democratic principles along with its market policies. African states, at varying degrees, are also adopting the system. These reforms are in line with the prevalent system of governance in the new global order. The section below reviews governance models applied in Africa from the pre-colonial to the post-independence period. The purpose is to highlight key features of governance and leadership in Africa and their relationship to Africa's development.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE

Pre-colonial African societies were organized in kingdoms based on lineage/kinship, a social system in which the exercise of power and authority did not rely on bureaucratic arrangements to carry out the political and social requirements of the communities. The analysis of the political structure and stability of pre-colonial African kingdoms reveals a combination of administrative configurations and leadership strategies, including the important role of democratic processes in traditional governance. For example, Godfrey Tangwa argues that traditional African leadership and authority systems might be understood somewhat paradoxically as the "harmonious marriage between autocratic dictatorship and popular



democracy” (1998:2). Specific formal practices (which varied between cultures) positioned the citizenry to authorize, critique, and sanction the ascension of their ruler, his/her continued reign and the selection and ascension of his/her successor.

These practices (rituals and procedures) are also described by Michael Tabuwe Aletum as “the exercise of democracy in traditional institutions, through checks and balances imposed by citizenry participation in the transition and maintenance of leadership” (Aletum, 2001:209). As an example, Aletum describes the Bafut kingdom of Bamenda in Cameroon, where, when the new ruler was installed, he had to be presented to the Bafut population for stoning. The ceremonial stoning may consist of tiny, harmless pebbles in the case of an approved and respected new leader, or of large, injurious rocks hurled to maim, chase off or kill the undesired incumbent. In either case, it reminds the new ruler what could happen if his rule became illegitimate (Aletum, 2001).

The choice of a leader was politically charged and if contestation arose, many traditional African cultures employed rituals of checks and balances for resolving conflicts, especially those relating to succession issues. The transfer of power had to follow the customs and traditions dictated by the ancestors. Some offices had categorical requirements of gender or age that narrowed the competition. In some cases, certain responsibilities fell to the eldest male or youngest female, or choices could be made between several people of approximately the same age. A prescribed inheritance pattern that connected certain classes or families was sometimes required.

Tangwa describes a particular strategy where the leader was chosen from a committee comprised of distinct gender and class representatives. There were also checks and balances among traditional administrators. While some top positions were lifetime appointments, other titles were graded whereby one could enter the kingdom in one administrative capacity but might hope, with time and good assessments, to be promoted. Chieftaincies could be graded according to status and population size. These grades were also politically



important and, dependent on their level of rank and popularity, chiefs could have lesser or greater influence on community life and resources. Noble status in pre-colonial African society thus often depended upon both, the fact of birth and some form of community approval (Tangwa, 1998).

The above descriptions point to the important place that people held in these societies. In fact, through the ritual acts, the king and chiefs swore allegiance to the people. The reign of a particular king, however loved or despised, was never more significant than the endurance of the kingdom itself. In this regard, Tangwa observes that when the ruler was perceived to be a political liability, in some traditional African kingdoms the King/Queen could even be quietly executed or asked to voluntarily drink poison if his/her continued reign was considered dangerous for the survival and/or well-being of the kingdom (Tangwa, 1998:3). Supportive institutions and authorities, often of a highly respected religious and/or elder status, such as the Queen-Mother, traditional councils, healers, shamans and secret societies, bestowed and/or removed kingship and continually advised the King in roles that mediated the rule of the kingdom.

Although the King or Queen generally appeared very powerful, because his/her word could frequently condemn anyone to death, there were nevertheless institutions and instruments of checks and balances of power that subjected the rule to very strict control. These include taboos, and also institutions and personalities of very high moral authority and integrity whose main preoccupation was the protection and safeguarding of the kingdom as distinguished from the King, the interests of the ordinary person, the land, the ancestors and the unborn (Tangwa, 1998:4). Thus, traditional African governance and leadership was characterised by a balance of authority and democracy. Several scholars of African politics argue that it is the various colonial administrations, which introduced pure dictatorships, that is, dictatorships without any checks and balances (Tangwa, 1998; Aletum, 2001; Gordon, 2001). Indeed, it is with the new authoritarian demands of colonisers, such as the widespread seizure of land and forced manual labour, as elaborated in the following section, that African people came into contact with



dictatorial rule.

GOVERNANCE DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Colonial rule started with the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference in 1885. However, European contact with Africa through traders, missionaries and explorers, long preceded the establishment of European rule on the continent. The Portuguese began trading with the West Africa's coast in the fifteen century. Other Europeans (Dutch, French and British) had established a number of coastal points from which they conducted profitable trade in gold, ivory, and slaves since the seventeenth century (Tordoff, 2001:25). The partition of Africa was precipitated by imperial plans of King Leopold II of the Belgium to annex the whole of the Congo basin into a personal empire and the appropriation by Germany in 1883 of the Cameroons, East Africa, South West Africa and Togoland. This pushed other European powers especially France and Britain, which were already established in the areas of West Africa (France then occupied Senegal, whereas Britain ruled over areas of Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast [now Ghana], and Nigeria), to extend their rule and influence in other regions (Tordoff, 2001:25).

Consequently, in 1885 at the Berlin Conference, the leaders of the various European powers (France, Britain, Belgium, Italy, Germany, Portugal and Spain) came together and agreed on the rules for splitting up Africa. This division of Africa into territorial colonies was done arbitrarily, based largely on the economic and political strategies of European colonisers. Unrelated areas and peoples were just joined together with no regard to traditional allegiance and belongingness. Thus, tribes and ethnic groups found themselves separated and joined with other tribes and groups into colonial-set boundaries, a situation which today continues to create conflicts in Africa. Africans did not surrender without resistance. This is indicated by various fights and opposition throughout Africa, such as the Maji Maji (people of Tanzania) resistance against the Germans in 1905-1906; the Herero and Nama (of Namibia) warfare against Germany in 1904-1907; the Maninka, Tokolor, and Dahomey (of West Africa)'s resistance against the French in the



1890s, and the Asante people (of Ghana)'s fight against the British (O'Toole, 2001:47). In the end, however, the military superiority, logistics and resources of Europeans won the war.

Colonial rule was highly authoritarian with centralised administrative structures (Wunsch, 1990:5). However, given the vastness of the areas occupied and the diversity of African communities, the colonial rulers used Africans as intermediaries to assist them. Colonial rule has been classified into two types, the indirect and direct rule, with the British portrayed as indirect rulers and the French as direct rulers (O'Toole, 2001:48-49, Tordoff, 2001:27-36). In theory, indirect rule meant "little interference" so that Africans could advance along their own lines (O'Toole, 2001:49). For Britain, ruling through the traditional tribal chiefs was the most efficient and effective way to govern and extract revenues from its colonies. While the system allowed the maintenance of indigenous political and cultural values and structures, however, the powers of tribal authorities were decidedly circumscribed and whenever these local chiefs were not acceptable to the colonial power, they were removed and replaced by British appointees. The consequence was the absence of stable and long-term structures to institutionalise local development efforts (Wunsch, 1990:26).

The French, by contrast, imposed direct rule even though they also utilized the traditional authorities when it was necessary and advantageous. Direct and centralised rule was part and parcel of the policy of "assimilation", which sought to spread French culture in their colonies and thus make the citizens of the colonies an integral part of France (O'Toole, 2001:49). In this process, they attempted to reproduce in the colony the same institutions as existed at home to ensure the smooth functioning of a colonial administration dominated at senior levels by Frenchmen. More specifically, the French established administrative units that cut across traditional boundaries. They created trans-ethnic administrative elite and used the French language at all levels of administration (Tordoff, 2001:28). Ironically, the policy of assimilation could not work, because the French faced the dilemma of how to reconcile liberty that stresses equality for all French citizens regardless of origin and colour



with their imperialist ideology, which was the basis for colonising Africa. The consequence of assimilation was a disintegration of indigenous systems and values.

In other colonies mainly administered by Belgians and Portuguese, colonial rule was extremely centralized and brutal. For instance, the vast Congo basin was a colony under the personal control of King Leopold II of Belgium, who ruled the region with tyranny to extract the maximum resources. Similarly, Portugal's overseas possessions were not colonies but overseas provinces indissolubly linked with the metropole (Tordoff, 2001:32). Portugal held strongly onto its colonies because being an underdeveloped economy itself, it needed a cheap supply of raw materials to make its manufactured goods competitive in European market. Munslow (1983) quoted in Tordoff (2001:32) argues that Portugal took no steps to decolonise because unlike other European powers, it could not neocolonise; that is, Portugal an economically backward country could not be certain that it could exploit its ex-colonies economically after granting them political independence. This explains why it took time for Portuguese colonies (Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola) to obtain independence, which came later in the mid-1970s.

In any case, colonial rule was highly centralized and dictatorial. Not only did colonisation partition Africa into artificial boundaries separating peoples who were linked by the same culture, values and trade but it also exploited the continent leaving it impoverished. Africans were subjected to compulsory labour on which all the colonial powers relied for the extraction of minerals, construction and maintenance of roads and railways for the purposes of transport and trade with the metropolises. Governmental activity was minimal and the social and economic development of the colonies was almost ignored. Agricultural activities concentrated on cash crops destined for the European markets and not to develop local economies. Improvements in education and health services were mostly left to the missionaries. All these conditions created discontent among the people, especially among the growing number of unemployed young men educated by missionaries, farmers and traders,



nationalist leaders who resented the limitations on their civil rights.

INDEPENDENT AFRICA: NEOPATRIMONIAL REGIMES AND AUTHORITARIAN RULE

African states began to achieve independence in the early 1960s. For some however, freedom is more recent. The former Portuguese colonies of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola achieved independence in 1974-1975; the former French colony of Djibouti in 1977; Zimbabwe in 1980; and Namibia gained its independence in 1990 after years of fighting the colonialist South Africa (Gordon, 2001:61). South Africa, although not a colony, ended minority white rule and achieved political freedom in 1994. Thus, it can be argued that African states are very young and in the process of state building.

Political analysts have described the politics of postcolonial Africa as essentially authoritarian and neopatrimonial (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Jackson and Rosberg, 1998; Joseph, 1998; Lewis, 1998). Max Weber who coined the term “patrimonial authority” used the concept to distinguish it from rational-legal authority. The basis of rational-legal authority is that individuals in public positions exercise state power in accordance with a legally defined structure in which the public sphere is carefully distinguished from the private sphere, with written laws and bureaucratic institutions to determine the exercise of authority and protect individuals and their property from the abuses of officials (Weber in Gerth and Mills, 1946:78). In contrast to rational authority, patrimonial authority is found in those traditional political systems in which the chief rules, by dint of prestige and power, over ordinary citizens who have no rights or privileges other than those granted by the ruler. The chief maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:61-62).

Thus, the concept of neo-patrimonialism was used to capture the system of hybrid regimes in which patrimonial practices coexist with modern bureaucratic institutions (Van de Walle, 2001:52). On the outside, these systems display the Weberian institutional configurations of legal-rationality with written laws and constitutional order. However, this official order is



frequently undermined by a patrimonial logic, by which office holders misuse public authority to achieve their own ends. Below is a brief revisit of African leadership after independence with the objective to determine its characteristics and the major factors that have contributed to the consolidation of authoritarian leadership and bad governance.

LEADERSHIP, POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

The essence of leadership is the ability to persuade others to comply voluntarily with one's wishes (Cartwright, 1983:19). In Africa, the appeals to struggle for independence from colonial rule by freedom fighters, such as Kwame Nkrumah, Nelson Mandela and others, illustrate the phenomenon of leadership. However, leadership does not only confine itself to heroic acts or special traits of individuals. It generally refers to the ability of the leader to obtain non-coerced compliance, which enables members of an organisation or citizens in society to achieve the goals that represent their shared values and aspirations. As Maxwell (1998:205) suggests leadership is about partnership between leaders and followers. Partnership happens when leaders, who ought to make decisions, shift their power towards shared decision-making. This enables leaders and followers to rally behind common strategic vision and collective goals.

Leadership is dynamic and subject to ideological, political and socio-economic changes (Mohiddin, 1998:10). Therefore, successful organisations are those whose leaders have the ability to anticipate these changes and pressures and to respond to them timeously and effectively. The phenomenon of globalisation has made leadership even more important for the survival of organisations and countries. The challenges of the globalised world economy require leaders worldwide to provide new styles of leadership that would protect and promote the welfare of their countrymen. Thus, effective leadership is connected not only with personality make-up but also with managerial competence based upon cognitive capability, values and knowledge and wisdom, which are all used with requisite procedures to



achieve predetermined goals.

Critics agree that African leadership has largely failed to respond to changes, challenges and opportunities in the domestic and global environments. The power structures and exercise of authority in Africa have led numerous analysts to conclude that the neo-patrimonial and clientelist character of African leadership has hindered the African state in operating as a neutral and impersonal arena for the resolution of social problems and the sustenance of the socio-economic development (Ake, 1996; Mohiddin, 1998; NEPAD, 2001; Van de Walle, 2001).

The first generation of African leaders were autocratic and restrictive, and were generally not accountable to their citizens (Lewis, 1998:13). The real norms that affect political and administrative leadership and action were not rooted in state institutions and organisations but in friendship, kinship, ethnic fellowship, and other similar norms that undermine state rules and regulations. Public officials occupied bureaucratic positions less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status (Jackson and Rosberg, 1998:21; van de Walle, 2001:115-128). This has resulted in inefficient and ineffective states and increased poverty. The resultant destitution and frustration of the masses have in many instances led to several civil conflicts and wars claiming millions of lives and displacing others. Despite the neo-patrimonial commonality, there have been significant variations in ways the political leadership and institutions have interacted with the citizenry, which are worth noting. Below are the political systems of post-independence Africa. These systems changed when the process of democratisation began in the 1990s.

TYPES OF AFRICAN POLITICAL REGIMES UNTIL THE DEMOCRATISATION ERA (1990)

Bratton and van de Walle (1997) provide a five modal classification of regimes that have evolved in different states of Africa since independence and up until 1989. The classification is based on two elements. First is the extent of political competition, which refers to the extent to which members of the political system were allowed to compete over elected positions; and second,



the degree of political participation, which is defined as the extent to which the population is allowed to or consulted in the making of public policies/decisions. Accordingly, there have been five types of regimes, namely, the plebiscitary one-party system, the military oligarchy, the competitive one-party system, the multiparty system, and the settler oligarchy (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997:68:82). The settler oligarchy falls outside the timeframe of this discussion as it relates to the territories of Namibia and South Africa that were still under white settler domination until 1990 and 1994 respectively.

Plebiscitary one-party system

This form of regime precluded political competition but encouraged a high degree of political participation (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997:78). In this system, the people were mobilized and controlled through the single ruling party, often headed by the first-generation leader who brought independence or the military ruler who seized power during the first round of coups in the 1960s, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of former Zaire. The people were not given the opportunity to select their leader as the opposition parties were not allowed and only one individual from the official party appeared on the voting ballot. The electoral turnout rates and supportive votes for the president always exceeded 90 per cent of the votes, which indicated high popular participation. The countries that were plebiscitary one-party systems include Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Benin, Gabon, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Ethiopia and Congo.

Military oligarchy

First used as the guardian of national sovereignty and independence, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the military became a politically powerful entity. Between 1952, the date King Farouk of Egypt was overthrown by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, and 1984, seventy successful coups took place in thirty African countries (Gordon, 2001:77). Indeed, by the 1980s military rule had become the norm for most independent African countries. The military oligarchy was an exclusionary form of neopatrimonial rule with all



public decisions made by an elite clique of military officers, which often included civilian advisers and technocrats. The implementation of policies was carried out by a relatively professional civil service or military hierarchy (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:80). The military leaders often espoused a populist ideology. However, political participation was severely restricted given the banning of elections, political parties and most civic associations that characterised military regimes. The well-known military oligarchies include Nigeria, Sudan, Chad, Liberia, Algeria, Uganda, and Mauritania. The democratisation process of the 1990s ousted military regimes and crowned civilians. However, the military remains a powerful influential force of the political dynamics of several African countries, such as Nigeria and Algeria (Hammerstad, 2004:10).

Competitive one-party system

This system differs from the plebiscitary and military regime in the sense that it allowed some political competition in parliamentary elections. Voters were given electoral choice (although limited) among candidates of the ruling party with an established policy platform (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:80). This allowed a certain degree of parliamentary accountability to voter concerns as contenders struggled to demonstrate to their constituencies their ability to bring home state resources. Barkan argues that, in Kenya, local elections amounted to deliberations on the ability of individual incumbents to secure state resources for their home areas. Incumbents were held accountable for their activities and forced to be attentive to the concerns of their constituents (Barkan, 1992:172). These political systems were regarded as relatively participative and stable. Countries, such as Cameroon, Rwanda, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Tanzania, Togo, Zambia, and Malawi were regarded as competitive one-party systems.

Multiparty system

Multiparty regimes have allowed some degree of political participation and competition. In these regimes, people have enjoyed guarantees of universal rights, equality before the law, and a political pluralism that largely allows free



and open elections. Until 1989, only Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe were categorized as multiparty systems. Although these systems have often been criticized for tampering with democratisation processes through for example, the intimidation of opposition supporters, multiparty democracies enjoyed a high degree of political stability compared to the rest (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:82).

Below is a table in which African countries are classified according to the dominant governance model that has characterized a particular country until 1989. It should be noted that countries have often shifted from one regime type to another. Furthermore, the classification provided has significantly changed since 1990, as many African states embarked on the process of democratisation.

Table 4.1: Regime type of Sub-Saharan Africa until 1989

Plebiscitary One-party systems	Military Oligarchies	Competitive One-party systems	Multiparty systems
Angola	Burkina Faso	Cameroon	Botswana
Benin	Burundi	Central African Republic	Gambia
Cape Verde	Chad	Cote d'Ivoire	Mauritius
Comoros	Guinea	Madagascar	Senegal
Congo	Lesotho	Mali	Zimbabwe
Djibouti	Liberia	Malawi	
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritania	Rwanda	
Ethiopia	Nigeria	Sao Tome	
Gabon	Sudan	Seychelles	
Guinea-Bissau	Uganda	Sierra Leone	
Kenya		Tanzania	
Mozambique		Togo	
Niger		Zambia	
Somalia			
Swaziland			
Zaire			

Source: Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:79)

Notwithstanding the diversity of political systems, the political governance of African states since independence has been characterized by strikingly similar patterns. Most of African states have had dictatorial rule, and have suppressed the voices of the opposition and civil society in general, thus inhibiting the development of effective political leadership and the framing of policy alternatives essential for sustainable development. The following are key characteristics of the post-colonial African state:

- replacement of competitive politics by one or no-party systems



allegedly dedicated to national unity;

- reliance upon unified bureaucratic structures exclusively accountable to the central government to define, organize, and manage the production of public goods and services along lines determined at all levels by a national plan;
- no legitimate significant role allowed for local government, including traditional, ethnically related groups as well as modern institutions of true local government;
- supremacy of the executive authority at the expense of such other institutions as the legislature, judiciary and regional governments;
- the national budget regarded as the primary source of funding for the development agenda, and to be raised out of the largest economic sectors, either agriculture or mineral extraction. (Wunsch and Olowu 1990:45)

But, what are the factors that have contributed to the development and consolidation of authoritarian, unaccountable and ineffective leadership and governance? Identification of these factors is clearly imperative to chart new ways for effective governance and to avoid the mistakes of the past.

INFLUENTIAL FACTORS FOR BAD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Colonialism and its political legacy

Today, scholars widely concur that colonialism has contributed to the emergence of the authoritarian state in post-independence Africa (Wunsch, 1990:43-68; Gordon, 2001:58-80). On philosophical grounds, the leadership and policy-making process of colonial regimes were essentially elitist, centrist, and absolutist (Crowder, 1968:165). In practice, the colonial state used force to control every aspect of the colonial economy to maintain its power and achieve the objectives of colonisation. This was clearly evident in forced labour policies and land evictions (Mbaku, 1998:73).



At independence, African states inherited an institutional apparatus that was designed to exploit the colonies and ill-equipped structures (manpower shortages and ineffective systems). The new leaders maintained these colonial institutions and systems. Centralisation and coercion became the weapon to obtain compliance and to legitimize their otherwise highly contested rule. Rubin and Weinstein (1974) quoted in Wunsch (1990:29) described governance of the newly independent African states as follows:

Statutes governing the civil service have rarely been altered significantly; the same salary scales and codes of behaviour have continued; administrative law books have not changed. The same elitist attitudes are absorbed, including a general disdain for elected officials and technicians, in spite of egalitarian socialist ideology.

The same observation is still applicable: African leaders have failed to adopt appropriate political, social and economic reforms that would build state institutions, maintain political stability and ensure economic development. Instead, they have kept the coercive state and its institutions, which promised to protect their rule. Civic movements, which were vibrant during the time of independence, were suppressed, thus depriving the society of a significant force of control and social emancipation.

Ethnic factor

The partition of Africa in colonial artificial boundaries and the “divide and rule” strategy of the colonialists heightened ethnic awareness and competition. Ethnic and tribal divisions and conflicts continued to characterise post-colonial politics because nationalist leaders, like European colonisers, used ethnic and tribal divisions as a method of winning support and legitimising their power. Political parties that assumed leadership were created along ethnic, tribal or regional lines (Gordon, 2001:67). For instance in Nigeria, there were three parties sharply divided along ethnic and regional lines: the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) in the predominantly Hausa-Fulani north, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, (NCNC) in the heavily Igbo east, and the Action Group in the mainly Yoruba west (Diamond, 1988:33-39).



At the same time, ethnicity/tribalism was also used to destroy multipartism in the newly independent African states. For the new leaders, what was needed, was the national unity which could only be achieved through a strong central government led by a single party. These leaders argued that political pluralism and competition would worsen ethnic and regional divisions, which had to be avoided in order to bring much needed social cohesion and unity. Thus, by the late 1960s, almost all independent states (with the exception of Botswana, Mauritius and Gambia) had moved away from the multiparty system they had at independence towards the single-party with power and wealth centralized in the hands of the party leader, who was also the president of the state. This strategy led to corruption and mismanagement of public resources. It also inhibited the development of competent, committed and visionary future leaders, as those outside the tribe of the ruling elite were kept at bay from politics and leadership. This situation has often led to coups and civil conflicts, which have haunted African states.

Ethnic divisions and conflicts in Africa are often debated as a legacy of colonialism to explain the immediate post-independence politics. However, ethnicity is still a very important factor in African governance, which impacts both on democracy and development. As Mohiddin (1998:22) correctly argues, in Africa the tendency to vote according to one's ethnic preference rather than policy options is still strong. And so is the allocation of economic and other social resources. The challenge for good governance and development is to have a leadership that transcends ethnic fellowship and acts in the interests of all the people.

Policies of central planning

The "central planning approach" to political order and development adopted in the early post-independence era has also contributed to the consolidation of a centralized and authoritarian state in Africa. The centralisation approach accords the state exclusive control of social organisation and planning and makes it the sole actor in the national socio-economic development (Wunsch and Oluwu, 1990:6). At independence, many African leaders argued that in



order to unify the various ethnic and social cleavages and provide rapid economic growth and development, single party and centralised government were imperative. These words echoed by President Julius Nyerere (1970) of Tanzania point to the strategic orientation for a strong central government.

To build and maintain socialism it is essential that all the major means of production and exchange in the nation are controlled and owned by peasants through the machinery of their Government. Further, it is essential that the ruling party should be a Party of peasants and workers. (in Wunsch and Olowu, 1990:44)

Former colonial powers also advocated a centralised approach to political governance and development. This approach offered the advantage of controlling the ruling group to serve and protect their neocolonial interests (Tangri, 1985:20-23; Ake, 1996:8). As a result, in virtually all African countries, centrist and coercive politics were used to weaken the opposition and bring parliamentarians, judicial authorities and senior public officials into the ruling party. Local institutions of self-governing states were supplanted with functional administrative agencies that were an extension of the ministries in the capital (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990:5). The pattern of concentration of power extended too in the area of civil society in general including private organizations, churches, cooperatives, universities, youth groups, unions, and the like, which had come in most of countries under government control (Haberson, 1990:180). The consequence of centralisation has been the shift of power from provinces to the capital, and the destitution of human and financial capacity in local institutions. Similarly, civic capacity, that is, the capacity of the population to engage in various collective activities that protect their rights and promote their welfare was severely strained by red tape and restrictive governments.

The problems of a centralised state were exacerbated by weak inherited state institutions, such as the parliament and the shortage of trained and experienced public officials, to control the development agenda and effectively plan and administer from the center (Wunsch and Olowu, 1990:16; Ake, 1996:18). Thus, a centralised approach to political order and policy-making resulted in the emergence of corrupt officials and wastage of resources on



poorly planned development projects.

Foreign policies

A close look at African international relations in the postcolonial period suggests dependent ties between African countries and their colonial masters, with the latter having greater control and influence on African governance systems. Since independence, it has been argued that the demise of colonialism did not mean the end of foreign domination, especially in the economic sphere, as independent African states largely remained controlled by their former colonial masters. The new form of relationships, the economic domination to which new independent states became subjected, has been referred to as “neo-colonialism”. As Nkrumah (1974:ix) argued:

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.

Thus, the post-colonial period ushered in a new ideology based on neo-colonial relationships that permitted the continued external domination of the political life in Africa. The basis of neo-colonialism’s success was on its strategy of transferring power to an indigenous class created and supported by former colonial authorities. African leaders have maintained close ties with their colonial masters, and often look to them for survival and regime protection (Obasanjo, 1996:19). This has deepened Africa’s political and economic dependence and strengthened undemocratic rule on the continent.

Since the 1990s, however, (which corresponds to the end of the cold war), a new international order has led to dramatic changes about the involvement of Great Powers in Africa. One of the most notable changes in western foreign policy was the decline in military and economic aid (which some African states had enjoyed during the cold war) and a strong focus on democracy and human rights protection (Schraeder, 2001:163). By 1990, the US policy was aggressively promoting democratization and human rights protection. The address of the US Vice President, Dan Quayle, before the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva signalled the beginning of a new era in the relations



between the West and Africa. In his address, he stated: “The days when a government charged with human rights abuses could cite ‘sovereignty’ or ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ as a defence are gone (Quayle, 1992).

The French also followed the American move by emphasising political liberalisation as the new condition for aid. President Francois Mitterrand at the Franco-African Summit at La Baule, France in June 1990 warned his Afro-francophone counterparts that future aid will be conditional on the openness to genuine democratic change (Schraeder, 2001:167). This declaration by French authorities, which had so far supported autocratic regimes, could only be interpreted as a new direction in the relations between France and her Francophone protégés.

Despite the western call for democratization and good governance, the policies of the two powerful influential countries on the continent, France and the United States, have been inconsistent, and in most of the cases detrimental to the consolidation of democracy. In fact, as Schraeder aptly argues, foreign policies were designed to pursue more an economic agenda than to promote democracy.

The post-cold war era has contributed to the rise of Great Power economic competition throughout Africa, particularly in the highly lucrative petroleum, telecommunications, and transport industries. In the eyes of French policy makers, the penetration of the US and other Western companies constituted at best an intrusion and at worst an aggression into France’s *chasse gardée*. (Schraeder, 2001:166).

Thus, following the Baule speech on democracy, the French government instead increased their financial support to authoritarian regimes in Cameroon, Zaire and Togo, while Benin, which was the leading country in embracing democracy, saw a decline in aid (Gordon, 2001:92). Similarly, the US refused to impose comprehensive economic sanctions against the military coup of Sani Abacha, which would have affected the US access to Nigerian oil (Schraeder, 2001:169). The moves by President Museveni of Uganda for constitutional changes allowing him to remain in power have met little criticism from Washington, which sees Uganda as a success story for economic liberalization (Young, 1999:28). All the above examples point to double



standards from Western masters, which have only encouraged manipulative practices of authoritarian rulers to sustain their regimes and halt the democratisation process.

BEYOND AUTOCRACY: DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

Since the beginning of the 90s, a wind of change, what Diamond (1998:263) called the “second African independence” blew across the continent. African people took to the streets to express discontent with political repression, corruption and mismanagement of public resources that have characterised African leadership and to demand democratic reforms. In the beginning, mass discontent was driven by the hardship of economic reforms (the structural adjustment programmes – SAP) introduced in the 1980s (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:100). SAP forced African governments to cut expenditures in key public services, especially in education, health and security in order to redress the fiscal imbalances and achieve macro economic stability (Ake, 1996:92-97). Thus, 1990 saw popular protests exploding across the continent spearheaded by students, workers, urban dwellers over policy measures that directly affected their wellbeing. For instance, in Gabon in January 1990, students demonstrated over poor educational facilities and shortage of instructors. In Zambia, from 1985 onwards, administrative and parastatal employees joined by nurses and doctors embarked on a wave of strikes in the public sector. In Guinea in early 1990, teachers struck over complaints of inadequate pay and bad working conditions. In Cote d’Ivoire in February 1990, university lecturers and public employees joined students in a strike against cuts in the public sector pay (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:101-107).

Gradually, the protests spread across Africa and demonstrations started to take a political tune. Between 1990 and 1993, a major breakthrough occurred especially in Francophone Africa (Benin, Chad, Comoros, former Zaire, Togo, Mali, Niger, Gabon and Congo) under what was known as the “national conference”. National conferences were national forums representing a wide range of groups and actors in civil society and often presided over by a church



leader, whose mandate was to debate and find solutions to the political and socio-economic crisis (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:111). The large size and broad representation of critical segments of the population gave the national conferences the advantage to declare their sovereignty. However, some leaders, such as Paul Biya of Cameroon, Andre Kolingba of Central African Republic, resisted the reformist national conferences; and others tried to twist the process to their advantage (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:112).

Nonetheless, the national conference waves set the stage for constitutional reforms in many African states. The constitutional reforms introduced two main elements in African politics: the reinstatement of competitive multiparty politics and the introduction of fixed terms for the president (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). Consequently, the number of registered political parties in sub-Saharan Africa rose from the single party to an average of 15.6 in 1993. Furthermore, the new constitutions attempted to formally limit the powers of the executive branch by establishing the constitutional separation of powers and introducing fixed terms for the office of the president. As a result, out of the 37 new constitutions that were in force by 1994, only four did not contain provisions for limited presidential terms (Bratton and Van de walle, 1997:113).

The movement for political liberalization was also pushed by donors and multilateral lending agencies, which pointed to the nature of politics for the poor economic performance in Africa. As the report of the World Bank “Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth” (1989) asserted, the prevalence of personalised politics, unaccountable government, arbitrary rule, and human rights abuses were responsible for creating an environment incapable of supporting a dynamic economy (1989:60). Since then, the donor community and international lending agencies made their development assistance conditional on competitive democracy and good governance by recipient countries. The combination of internal and external pressure gave African leaders little choice but to accept and embark on a path of political and economic reforms.



EXPERIENCES OF DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA

Democratisation is defined as a process of building participatory and competitive political institutions through political struggles over liberalization, and whose outcome is a freely elected government (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:194). A country becomes a democracy when democratic rules that entrench political and civil rights are firmly institutionalized and valued by all political actors. Democracy can be a source of political tension as its historical experience in Africa demonstrates. However, its benefits are said to be greater than its disadvantages, so that democratic governance has won a worldwide acclaim as the best form of governance. The former President of Botswana, Ketumile Masire explained the need for democratic governance in Africa as follows:

The establishment of multiparty governance in Africa is the best cure for the growing cancer of corruption which could destroy the expectation of a sustainable economic renaissance. We have ample proof that where multiparty governance is applied the supreme authority of the law is maintained, human rights are respected and social-economic growth is stimulated. (*Die Beeld*, 4 May 1998, in Malan and Smit, 2001:118).

The response to the call for democratic governance in Africa since 1990 has been impressive. While in the late 1980s many sub-Saharan African countries were military regimes or restrictive single-party states, and only three states were regarded as democracies, today the picture has changed significantly. The 2005 report of the Freedom House (which monitors and rates political rights and civil liberties in the world) rates 11 African countries namely, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, and South Africa as free, and 21 states as partly free (Freedom House, 2005:1-5). In these new democracies, not only political and civil rights are increasingly observed but also the idea of peaceful succession to the presidency is taking root. There has been successful and peaceful change of leadership in Mozambique and Namibia, among others, and even in countries from conflicts and civil wars, such as Rwanda, Burundi, and Liberia, citizens have peacefully chosen their leaders in what have been declared “free and fair” elections.



Thus, despite its tenuous status, competitive multiparty system has become, in Africa, the rule rather than the exception. Multiparty politics is only seriously challenged in a few war-torn countries, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Sudan, and Eritrea. However, although African states have embraced multiparty politics, this does not necessarily translate into democratic and good governance. Democracy in these countries tends to mean holding regular multiparty elections. The basic principles of democratic governance, which include the rule of law, respect and protection of freedoms and human rights against arbitrary state action, accountability of public officials, and transparency in governance are still constrained in many countries (Afrobarometer, 2002; Freedom House, 2005). Thus, while most African countries have held their multiparty elections, many of them are still rated as not free. The Freedom House classifies African states into three groups according to the degree of political freedom and civil rights afforded to citizens. The classification is provided:

Table 4.2: Democracy and political freedom in Africa

Free countries	Partly-free countries	Not free
Benin, Botswana	Burundi, Congo, Ethiopia,	Algeria, Angola, Cameroon
Cape Verde	Gabon, Gambia, Guinea Bissau,	Central Africa Republic
Ghana, Lesotho	Kenya, Liberia,	Chad, Cote d'Ivoire,
Mali, Mauritius	Madagascar, Malawi,	Democratic Republic of Congo,
Namibia	Morocco, Mozambique, Niger,	Egypt
Sao Tome and Principe	Nigeria, Seychelles	Equatorial Guinea
Senegal	Sierra Leone, Tanzania	Eritrea, Guinea, Libya
South Africa	Uganda and Zambia	Rwanda, Sudan, Swaziland
		Togo, Tunisia, Zimbabwe

Source: Freedom House, 2005

The road towards democracy has not been and is not a smooth one. Since their independence, only two countries (Botswana and Mauritius) have maintained liberal democratic systems uninterrupted; and Gambia did so until



a military coup in 1994 (Diamond, 1999:264). It was in the 1990s that several African states reintroduced multiparty democracies. Scholars indicate that by 1994, there was not a single *de jure* one-party state remaining in Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:8). However, the transition to competitive politics led in many instances to an escalation of tensions between the incumbent elites, making half concessions in a struggle to preserve their privileges, and the dissatisfied opposition. These few cases are illustrative. In Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida cancelled the country's transition to democracy by declaring the June 1993 presidential elections illegal, when it became apparent that Chief Moshood Abiola had won the elections (Ihonvbere, 1999:115). Progress towards democracy in Angola fell apart when Jonas Savimbi took his UNITA forces back to the bush, following his defeat from September 1992 polls as national president. In Burundi, the first democratically elected Hutu President was gunned down in 1993 by Tutsi military officers unwilling to cede power to a Hutu dominated government. This plunged the country into a civil war that lasted for 12 years. Similarly, in 1994 in Rwanda, scoundrel units from Habyarimana's presidential guard, joined by other Hutu from the army and the youth militia, sparked an anti-Tutsi carnage when it became evident that an ethnically integrated democratic regime was agreed on under the Arusha accord (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:212-216; Diamond, 1999:264). In many parts of Africa, the transition to democracy has been marked by abuses and severe infringements of political freedom and civil liberties that led, in some cases, to the most violent and destructive wars ever seen. Clearly, Africans have paid a heavy price for democracy and, in some countries the struggle is far from over.

In other countries, the dynamics of democratic transition have been relatively peaceful. Incumbents used all the tactics to divide the opposition, win donor support and grant half-hearted concessions by retaining the political rules that would protect their hold on power. In such countries, including Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Egypt, and Togo, the introduction of competitive politics did not bring substantial changes in terms of political power-sharing as elections have been consistently manipulated to keep incumbents in power



(Young, 1999:20). While the incumbent president may legitimately return to office in a “free and fair” election, the challenge lies in their ability to reform their regime and to apply the rules of good governance, which include participation, transparency and accountability. The experience of clientelist politics in Africa gives little hope but to doubt the ability of the leader to reform the rules that would disadvantage his supporters, on whom regime protection depends. This is why, for the reformists, the defeat of the incumbent is the ultimate sign of regime change.

The problem in Africa is that leaders exhibit a desire to rule in perpetuity. While the constitutional reforms introduced in the 1990s sought to limit the presidency office to two terms, later most leaders amended these provisions to allow themselves to remain in power. This is the case of Uganda, which has recently attracted a high level of attention among critics. Museveni, whose National Resistance Army (NRA) assumed power from Milton Obote in 1986, ending a long, violent civil war, was until recently the model of good governance in the West (Tindifa, 2001:6-7). Uganda has introduced a series of economic reforms and the country was hailed a success model in governance through its market policies and mechanisms to fight HIV and AIDS. However, since the 2001 presidential elections, criticism from donors, media and NGOs started mounting following Museveni’s statements showing little respect for the Ugandan Constitution. For example, Museveni has been quoted as stating:

I am not ready to hand over power to people or groups of people who have no ability to run a nation....why should I sentence Uganda to suicide by handing over power to people we fought and defeated? It is dangerous despite the fact that the constitution allows them to run against me.... At times the constitution may not be the best tool to direct us politically for it allows wrong and doubtful people to contest for power. (*Human Rights Watch*, March 2001, www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uganda/uganda0301.pdf).

President Museveni who has had 18 years rule, with two constitutional legitimate terms of five years, decided to run for re-election during the 2006 presidential elections (<http://www.ugandacan.org/item/714>). The 1995 Uganda Constitution stipulates two-term five-year limits for the President. Museveni’s attempts to amend the constitution are a common problem that afflicts many



African leaders, that is their unwillingness to uphold constitutional norms and to relinquish power. Uganda is not a case in isolation. In Gabon also, the President instigated the 2003 constitutional amendment to remove presidential term limits. The re-election of Omar Bongo in the November 2005 polls allowed yet another seven-year term, extending Bongo's reign to 45 years. Often these leaders justify their desire to remain in office as nothing other than the will of voters who are the masters of deciding regime change. In an interview with Radio France Internationale, President Bongo argues this point in this statement:

Africa's Western partners have inscribed alternance of power on their 'Tables of the Law of Democratization'. First of all, I have to underline that only the voters within the framework of an open pluralistic system as in Gabon, can be the masters of alternance (<http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3109>).

However, the argument that African peoples support the unlimited rule of their leaders is defective, because the constitutions, which express the will of the people, have explicitly limited the position of the president to two terms, as was the case in Gabon before the 2003 amendment. Oftentimes, the will of the people is ignored to suit the ruler's wishes. In countries where the ruling party holds the majority of seats in the parliament, as is the case in most African states, it becomes easy to amend the constitution. Given the history of political instability on the continent, Africans should hold debates on bold proposals for an effective system of governance that would stand the test of time. The idea of inscribing limited terms for the president in the constitution derives from the need to prevent the holder of that office from trespassing the boundaries of the law. Constitutional governance sets the rules, which limit the power and tenure of leaders in the public office. Holding power for too long, as experienced in Africa, runs the risk of the leader becoming a dogmatic, absolute ruler. History has shown that an extended term of office for the president has led to extreme arrogance and inflexibility to reforms.

While democratisation in Africa reveals a generally fraught process, not everything has been doom and gloom. On balance, there have been more benefits from the democratisation process than setbacks. In most of the



countries, basic freedoms, such as freedom of association, freedom of speech and political rights, have become more readily available since moves towards democratisation. Ordinary citizens are more engaged in political activities and less fearful of state power when this breaches their civil rights (Freedom House, 2005b:4). On the economic front, there have been attempts through policy reforms to break out of the vicious circle of poverty. Today, virtually all African countries have in place the “Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme” (PRSP), which outlines a series of policy objectives aimed at, among other things, improving governance, building infrastructure, promoting economic growth, and providing better education and health care.

Many countries have engaged in far-reaching policy and governance reforms, including tougher laws and mechanisms to curb corruption in a way that even the elites are not immune from prosecution if they are suspected of being involved in corrupt activities. For instance, on 14 June 2005, the South African President Thabo Mbeki released the Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, from his functions on the allegations of corruption (Government Information Communication System, June 2005). In a similar move, on 14 July 2005, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo sacked ten ministers and six special advisers from his cabinet on corruption charges (The Vanguard, 14 July, 2005 at www.allafrica.com). However, these positive political and economic experiments need to be deeply rooted in strong institutions to prevent reversal in the gains of democracy and ensure sustainability in good governance. Institution building is therefore imperative.

INSTITUTIONS AND THE SUSTAINING OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

There is no doubt that institutions are one of the cornerstones for democratic governance. Effective and legitimate institutions contribute to effective governance by performing important functions necessary to sustain democracy in modern, complex and diverse societies. Institutions such as the legislature, the judiciary, political parties, human rights institutions, and civil society in general, act as control mechanisms to improve the legality and fairness of government administration thereby ensuring public accountability.



They ensure that citizens' rights are protected, including the rights to peace and security, rights to better life and sustainable development. In a democracy, institutions ensure appropriate checks and balances in the governance system, thus preventing possible abuses of powers by the executive arm of government (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2000:3). This is referred to as the principle of "separation of powers" or the "*Trias Politica*" principle (Botes, 1997:268).

The principle of separation of powers was first introduced by Charles Louis Secondat, also known as Baron de Montesquieu, in his book "*L'Esprit de Lois*" (1748). He believed that total power corrupts absolutely (Hutchins, 1971:10). Montesquieu advocated the separation of the functions of the state into "legislative, executive and judicial" functions which, he believed, would create a balance between the three tiers of the state and hence limit the abuse of power by the ruler (the executive). Montesquieu argued:

To prevent the abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power. A government may be so constituted, as no man shall be compelled to do things to which the law does not oblige him nor forced to abstain from things, which the laws permit. (in Botes, 1997:269)

Therefore, the separation of powers protects the freedoms and rights of the people and ensures public accountability. Most constitutions in the world have espoused this principle and state power is distributed among the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. In Africa, the challenge of "separation of powers" has been the tradition of concentration of power in the hands of a single person, the president, which resulted in the supremacy of the executive over the legislature and the judiciary (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:248). This has not only undermined the independence of these institutions vis-à-vis political pressures and executive orders, but it has weakened their capacity to drive a dynamic democratic process. The result has been various forms of power abuse, corruption and mismanagement of public resources. Thus, institutional development and strengthening are essential for consolidating democracy and development in Africa. Below is the review of key institutions, their functions and challenges.



Legislative institutions

Democracy and good governance presuppose the existence of an independent legislature capable of channelling and articulating the demands of the citizenry. Through its law-making and supervisory functions, the legislature ensures that the nation has at its disposal coherent and consistent laws that answer compelling problems, such as poverty, education and health. The legislature also has a cardinal function to decide and oversee public spending through the budget processes.

While there is considerable variation among legislatures and the powers they exercise in democratic states, the legislature performs three core functions, namely, representing the public, making laws, and exercising “oversight” (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999:4). In its first core function, the legislature is that branch of government to which complaints and demands of citizens are first articulated. This is so, because they are known to be the voice of the people, which explains why parliaments are diverse in their memberships designed to represent the diversity of constituencies and interests in society. Secondly, representing the public means more than articulating citizens’ preferences; it also involves having a say in translating preferences into policy through enacting legislation. The coexistence of the two functions, representation and law-making, is not easy, as it requires reconciling differences articulated on one hand, and environmental realities and pressures, on the other. The third function of the legislature is to monitor and exercise its supervisory role over the executive activities to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, and consistency with policy intentions (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999: 4-10).

The degree to which legislatures perform their law-making and “oversight” functions depends on a number of factors. These are: the extent of its formal powers; the adequacy of the capacity provided by structural support; the amount of political space and discretion afforded by other power holders (executive and parties); and the political will of the members of the legislative bodies themselves (Johnson and Nakamura, 1999:10).



In Africa, the capacity of the legislature to perform its functions is severely constrained. This forms part of the elements that emerged during the Parliamentarians' Forum for good governance in Africa held in Berlin, in October 2004 (Terlinden, 2004 http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/africa/rep_h.htm). Legislative institutions in most African countries lack the lubricants necessary to effectively perform law-making and supervisory functions. As African MPs who participated in the Parliamentarians' Forum in Berlin revealed, African legislatures face enormous challenges, the most pressing being capacity and political space or independence. Premnath Ramnah, Speaker of the National Assembly of Mauritius, explained that parliamentarians in his country had no offices, no assistants and no researchers at all. Norbert Mao member of Public Accounts Committee of the Ugandan Parliament, painted a similar picture. The conference also noted that insufficient funds inhibit the independence and freedom of expression of legislative bodies.

African parliaments face still tougher challenges when it comes to their "oversight" role. Special reference was made to the secrecy that often surrounds military spending. More often than not, information on military spending is classified, which prevents parliaments from playing an informed "oversight" role. According to Catherine Namugala, MP from Zambia, supervisory limitations result from flaws in many African constitutions, which she found not to provide for effective parliamentary supervision (Terlinden, 2004 http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/africa/rep_h.htm). In addition, one could argue that the small representation of the opposition in the parliament hinders the effectiveness of parliamentary work. Indeed, in many African countries, the ruling party holds the majority of seats, as already stated, which makes it difficult for minority parties to pass their views. In this situation, the parliament becomes the rubber-stamp of government decisions.

Clearly, African legislative institutions need to be capacitated to be able to effectively perform their functions. Like other organizations, the parliament needs to be equipped with effective systems of human resources, financial management, and adequate information systems. Empowering legislative institutions includes reinforcing the whole legislative system from national to



local levels, including parliaments, local government councils, electoral institutions, and advocacy groups from civil society (UNECOSOC, 2002:5). These institutions are essential to the well functioning of parliaments and the sustaining of democracy for their contribution to civic education, independent and free electoral processes, and policy debates. In addition, the effectiveness of legislative institutions will depend on the political space and independence received from the executive. The African state must address the challenge of balance of power to achieve sustainable democratic governance.

Judicial institutions

The judiciary is essential for the survival and promotion of the civil and political rights guaranteed by democratic governance. Modern constitutions have been premised on the principle of separation of powers of the three arms of government (the legislature, executive and judiciary), so that each operates independently of the others (Stevens, 1999:3). In democratic states, judicial institutions are entrusted with the maintenance of the rule of law and the promotion of transparency and accountability of government. An effective and independent legal system is crucial to minimize the abuse of public power, which often leads to insecurity, distorts economic transactions, fosters rent-seeking activities, and discourages private capital investment, all of which undermine democracy and sustainable development (UNDP, 1997:10).

African constitutions derive their existence from the legal systems of their colonial masters, notably France and Britain. An extensive analysis of judicial institutions in Africa reveals that, as with Western constitutions, many constitutions proclaim the independence of the judiciary based on the principles of separation of powers and the rule of law (Akiwumi, 2004 at http://www.uneca.org/adf/documents/speeches_and_presentations/speech_a_kiwumi.htm). However, while constitutional provisions for an autonomous judiciary are essential, they are not in themselves sufficient to ensure an independent and effective judiciary. The experience of authoritarian rule in Africa has undermined the development of an independent and effective



judiciary, because the political regime has tended to co-opt the legal system and to subordinate it to the executive power. For example, in former Zaire, the court system was unambiguously subordinated to the Executive, and judges were handpicked for their loyalty to the regime and President Mobutu Sese Seko himself (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:248). Indeed, as long as judges are appointed, paid, promoted, or removed from office by persons or institutions controlled directly or indirectly by the Executive, the judiciary's independence may be more rhetoric than real.

Some constitutions, such as those in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, make provision for such structures as Chief Justices, Presidents of Constitutional Courts, and the Judicial Service Commission to strengthen and enforce the independence of the judiciary. These positions, however, require someone who is eminently independent and who can put his/her mark on the image of the judiciary and the legal system (Akiwumi, 2004). Furthermore, the Judicial Service Commission, which recommends or nominates those to be appointed as judges by the executive, is intended to be impartial and free from the executive interference and influence. The problem is that this institution is not only composed of judges and members of the legal profession but there are also appointees from the executive (Akiwumi, 2004). This does not make such a body entirely free from political influence. Therefore, for judicial institutions to be effective guarantors of the rule of law, their independence must be respected and a professional ethical conduct promoted.

It should be borne in mind, however, that the challenge with the judiciary is not only about its independence. Many African countries have weak judicial systems: laws are outdated and out of tune with international norms and changing cultural, political and economic demands. The other challenge is the coexistence of formal legal systems with customary laws. In many cases, there is no legal connection between formal and customary systems of jurisprudence (UNECOSOC, 2002:6). In addition, judicial institutions in many African countries suffer from poor financial and human resources (Hammerstad, 200:9). An effective judicial system requires more than



ensuring its independence. African countries need a competent, efficient and hands-on judiciary. This requires law and judicial reforms that produce relevant regulations, well-trained judges, and modern technological support systems. Furthermore, building a healthy relationship and cooperation between the formal judicial systems and customary laws and institutions is essential for an effective judiciary and good governance.

Political parties

Political parties express the very *raison d'être* of democracy. Political parties are platforms that give voice to people's needs and concerns and channel these political demands to the legislature which, in essence, is the purpose of democracy. Political parties play an important role in political life. They are major vehicles for the recruitment of political leadership, the structuring of electoral choice and political competition, the framing of policy alternatives, and the monitoring of the performance of elected representatives (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:251). Therefore, political parties communicate and legitimate the system's political processes. A multiparty political system offers people the opportunity to choose among a variety of leaders and their policies from various political parties. This also ensures the accountability of those holding public office by informing their constituencies and the public in general of their performance. As such, political parties play a watchdog role in the governance system of a democratic country. However, the mere existence of political parties does not in itself ensure the institutionalization and sustainability of democratic politics. Sustainable democracy will depend on the ability of parties to discharge these functions. To be able to do so, two factors are critical: first, organizational and financial capacity, and, second, the nature and dynamics of the party system (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:251).

An analysis of political parties in Africa suggests that, apart from the ruling party, parties have generally been weak in terms of ideological stand, financial and organisational capacity (Ihonvbere, 1998). Political parties in Africa have remained fragile, because they have no structural connection with the people. Ideologically and politically, they are abstracted from the larger society



(Ihonvbere, 1998:228). Opposition parties have generally gathered a few frustrated notables held together more by aspirations to access state resources and less by desires to represent peoples (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:251). Even today when the continent is freer than it was a decade ago, new political parties are failing to effectively and decisively challenge autocratic patterns of politics (Ihonvbere and Mbaku, 1998:16). It can be argued that this failure has to do (at least in part) with lack of finances and the hunger for power and material benefits. The ruling party has used this weakness to manipulate the opposition through political and financial favours in an effort to prevent the development of strong opposition. In Kenya, for instance, President Daniel Arap Moi manipulated opposition elements preventing their coalition force to oust his regime (Ihonvbere and Mbaku, 1998:19). Generally, the ruling party in Africa has controlled the opposition, and has rigged electoral processes in the struggle to prolong its rule and legitimate its authority (Ihonvbere, 1999:106; Joseph, 1999:60-61; Young, 1999:35). Thus, multiparty politics, one of the tools of public accountability, has not in many cases served as the best tool of public control and accountability of politicians.

Another factor, which may promote or impede democratic governance, is the dynamics of the party system. This refers to the value system, which includes such values as probity, respect, tolerance, solidarity, and shared commitment to democratic development (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997:235). A cohesive value environment is essential in supporting governance systems and institutions to fulfil their ultimate role of sustaining democracy. Thus, the behaviour of political actors is equally important in the institutionalisation of sustainable democracy. Di Palma (1990:134) demonstrates how the support of the elites is crucial to promote and sustain democratic governance. He contends that if political elites are wedded to democracy insofar as it advances their power and interests, then the institutionalisation and legitimation of democracy becomes hardly possible. As a result, institutions and mechanisms of accountability and transparency continue to be thwarted, while widespread corruption and patronage undermine citizens' confidence in



democratic institutions leading to instability and possible return to authoritarian rule (Di Palma, 1990:134).

Recent political turmoil in Kenya supports Di Palma argument and reminds the fragility of democracy in Africa. Indeed, political players can promote or stall the democratic process. Since he ascended to power in 2002, the coalition government of Kenya led by President Kibaki has been fragmented and wracked by internal political disputes. This culminated in cabinet dissolution on 23 November 2005, after an overwhelming “no” vote of Kenyans to a Kibaki government-backed Constitution in the 21 November 2005 referendum (<http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke>). Democracy involves essential virtues of negotiation and consensus among various political actors; and these must be respected and fostered if the process is to be sustainable.

Civil society

Over the past two decades, the role of civil society in democratic governance and development has achieved prominence owing to successive waves of democratisation that begun in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and spread across Asia and Africa. Civil society has been defined as the arena of social interaction between the state and the economy composed of organized social movements (Cohen and Arato, 1992: ix). It represents many diverse and sometimes contradictory social interests, and includes such organisations as church groups, women and youth associations, media, labour unions, human rights activists, community-based organisations, and disabled and minority groups. For civil society activists, civil society participation in governance should be seen as a democratic end in itself (Verwey, 2005:20). Salamon and Anheier (1997:60) believe that successful democratic government is only possible with a mutually supportive relationship among the civil society, the state, and the business community.

The role of civil society in sustaining democratic governance cannot be overemphasised. Civic movements, such as women’s organisations, bring together people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds through democratic values, such as toleration, respect, trust, and credible commitment



for the advancement of the common purpose (for instance, woman rights) (Mukamunana, 2002:40). Civil organisations can also improve transparency, much needed in promoting public accountability by disseminating information about policies within civil society. Furthermore, CSOs – human rights groups, in particular – can play a significant role in promoting social justice and the rule of law in the governance of a country. They do so by either pressing for the implementation of existing laws, or, advocating fresh legislative initiatives and institutional reforms to improve the functioning and accountability of state organs (Manor, 1999:9-11).

In many parts of the world, civil society groups have played a critical role in bringing their countries to democracy. In Africa and countries in democratic transition, civil society organisations have been involved in various political activities ranging from protesting authoritarian regimes and what they consider unjust or unwise policies, to public voter education and monitoring elections, protecting citizens from actions of repressive regimes, to opposing or even overthrowing dictatorial regimes (such as recently seen in the Ukraine) (Mukamunana and Brynard, 2005:5). For instance, the Oasis Forum, an influential civil society movement comprising church bodies and the Law Association of Zambia, played a pivotal role in destroying plans by certain sections in the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy to remove the two-term limitation on the presidency enshrined in the 1996 Zambian Constitution (Mulikita, 2003:110). In South Africa, labour movements, such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), played a key role in the mobilization against the apartheid regime, and provided strong leadership during the negotiations that led to the establishment of a democratic South Africa in 1994 (<http://www.cosatu.org.za/aboutcos.htm>).

However, the concept of civil society and its role in Africa have met tough criticism from some analysts. Mule (2001:75-76) argues that civil society in the African context has meant non-governmental organizations, which are an amalgam of institutions with pressure from outside; and such organisations can never work, can never be sustainable. As originally theorized by Antonio Gramsci, it is true that civil society is a potential battleground (Bratton,



1994:54). Civil society in Africa is an arena in which not only powerful international donors attempt to influence the political and economic agendas of a particular country, but also the state uses it to diffuse the opposition (Hearn, 2001:43). Indeed, it is well documented how the state in Africa has controlled the media and other organised groups of civil society either to stifle freedom of expression or to make these groups instruments of protection of state elite interests (Alabi, 2001:16; Tettey, 2003:88-100).

Today, the triad partnership between the state, civil society and the market has become the required condition for the new development assistance approach. The UNDP (2005:110) argues that for effective implementation of the new MDG strategies, governments need dynamic civil society and private sector to ensure representation of diverse views and interests, and partnership in design, implementation and monitoring of these goals. Civil society can be a powerful tool to foster democracy and development in Africa. However, for civil society to play a meaningful role in these processes, conditions, including domestic and local legitimacy, transparency, adequate financial resources, and political independence must obtain (Ndegwa, 1996:1). Unfortunately, civil society in many African countries lacks most of these cardinal requisites. As Uvin (1998:174) argues, civil society organisations are all part of the society they exist in and, as such, they reflect its divisions, attitudes and ideologies. With the exception of a few countries, such as South Africa where the civil society is multi-faceted and solid, African civil society is weak for many reasons. First, civil society in many African countries is still caught up in the struggle of ethnic divisions, which undermines its ability to exercise control on the political power and advance democratic governance (Munro, 1997:138; Mukamunana, 2002:50). Secondly, civil society organisations have few resources (organisational, financial and personnel) at their disposal, a problem compounded by the fact that those operating in urban areas monopolise the small funding and information while very little percolates to the grassroots organisations (Mukamunana, 2002:50-51). Thus, the need for a civil society capable of dealing proactively with state action and sustaining democracy is evident. Civil society must realign its



ideology and action with the objectives of the development agenda in Africa, based on the promotion of peace, good governance and economic growth. Other institutions, such as the bureaucracy, are also crucial in the promotion of good governance and development, in particular, in ensuring effective and efficient policy implementation.

GOVERNANCE AND INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Bureaucracy and policy implementation

The bureaucracy or public service is the principal instrument of the state, used to implement public policies formulated by politicians and law-makers. Public administration plays a crucial role in the furtherance of principles and practices of good governance by strengthening the rule of law, establishing impartial bureaucratic processes, and ensuring efficiency and effectiveness in executing and managing government activities. To discharge these functions, there is a need for professional, effective and efficient bureaucratic institutions. Empirical evidence confirms that better bureaucratic performance is associated with greater power and the autonomy of public institutions to formulate policies, good career opportunities in the public sector, good pay of public servants and little shifting between public and private employment (Court, Kristen and Weder, 1999:1).

In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is a long-standing argument that bureaucratic institutions are weak, that is, they are unable to effectively and efficiently deliver public services and to drive socio-economic development (World Bank, 2000; Olowu and Saka, 2002; Sachs, 2005). A number of scholarly works have linked this weakness to the nature of the political regime, which has restrained sound governance and development in Africa. As Mutahaba (1989:117) notes, in the post-independence Africa, the bureaucracy has increasingly become the instrument for carrying out the policies of the chief executive and for supporting the system of clientelism of which it has become an important component. Political and/or ethnic affiliation has become the main criteria for the recruitment and appointment of civil servants. This has undermined the development and institutionalization of a competent,



professional and neutral civil service, based on legal-rational authority capable of devising effective policies for service delivery and development.

Poor bureaucratic performance in Africa is also attributed to lack of autonomy in the formulation of economic policies (Court, et al. 1999:8; Olukoshi, 2002:9). In Africa, the design of economic policies has been the exclusive domain of multilateral institutions (mainly the World Bank and IMF), in an effort to promote development of backward African economies. However, policy studies demonstrate that successful and effective policy implementation depends, to a certain extent, on the shared vision and goals of policy by implementers, which increases their commitment (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:94). Thus, it can be argued that lack of participation of African bureaucrats in the design of economic policies has contributed to the failure of their implementation.

In brief, the pervasive use of ethnic and political criteria for recruitment, coupled with poor control mechanisms and irrational decision-making processes, have generated inefficiency, lack of accountability and widespread corruption often associated with public service in Africa. Corruption in many African countries is perceived to be the major problem affecting all sectors of society, in particular, the business sector. The survey by Court, Kristen and Weder (1999:11-12) conducted on African bureaucratic performance found that it was common practice in Africa for private firms to pay some “irregular additional payments” (bribes) to get things done. Bribery has become endemic in many African countries, especially in Kenya, Togo and Nigeria, and it now is perceived to almost double bureaucrats’ salaries.

Similarly, the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) deems most African countries highly corrupt, with a CPI rating of less than 3. The CPI reflects the perceptions of the degree of corruption in a country by business people and country analysts, and ranges these between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). The highly corrupt are: Benin, Gabon, Mali, Tanzania, Algeria, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Gambia, Swaziland, Eritrea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Libya, Uganda, Niger, Sierra Leone,



Burundi, Congo, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Liberia, Congo Democratic Republic, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria and Chad. It is important to note, however, that not all African countries are corrupt. Some administrations are considered "clean" or least corrupt and these include Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and Tunisia (Transparency International, 2005 at <http://www.transparency.org>). To curb corruption and other administrative dysfunctions, a series of public service reforms have been launched.

Public administration reforms

The pursuit and implementation of structural adjustment programmes that began in the 1980s have been accompanied by the call for civil service reforms. Administrative reforms have covered a range of issues, including downsizing, meritocratic recruitment, pay reform, performance management systems, capacity building, and decentralisation (Mutahaba, 1989:45-65). The main objective of these reforms is to build efficient organisations, which would be characterised by professionalism, impartiality, honesty, and accountability. Consequently, many African governments have embarked on decentralisation policies and various bureaucratic reforms.

Decentralisation generally refers to the transfer of political, administrative and fiscal authority from the central government to local or subordinate units of government (Mutahaba, 1989:69). Political decentralisation transfers legal and political authority to directly elected local governments, thereby making elected officials accountable to citizens. Administrative decentralisation empowers local government to take administrative decisions, such as managing personnel without any reference to central government, which makes local staff accountable to local elected authorities. Fiscal decentralisation entrusts these governments with fiscal autonomy in their spheres of taxing and spending responsibilities (Gurgur and Shah, 2005:1).

Governments have applied decentralisation for its many benefits, which include organisational effectiveness and efficiency, accountability, responsiveness of public administration to citizens' needs, and promotion of



democracy and local development (Mutahaba, 1989:72; World Bank, 1989b:71). A decentralisation system allows authorities to locate services and facilities more effectively within communities. A decentralised bureaucracy adapts more easily to local realities and norms, which may increase the effectiveness and responsiveness of service delivery. In addition, decentralisation promotes public participation and, hence promotes democratic governance and accountability. Close interaction between government and the citizenry increases the transparency of the political process, and in this context, it may counteract corruption. It is also argued that a decentralised system affords political parties and minority groups the opportunity to influence politics (UNDP, 2004:47-72). This is particularly important in ethnically divided societies, where political exclusion can have seriously polarizing effects

However, the impact of decentralisation in mitigating the dysfunctions of public administration, such as corruption, inefficiency and abuse of power, has been a controversial debate. Gellar (1990:131) argues that decentralisation does not necessarily foster good “self-governance” if it simply creates smaller scale central authorities dominated by local elites or places more state agents with greater decision-making powers at the local level. In the same vein, Tanzi (1995:295-316) argues that decentralisation increases opportunities for corruption owing to greater increase of discretion available to local officials and closer contact with local citizens, which increases patronage. Despite efforts to increase public accountability and efficient public service, several impeding factors need to be addressed.

Challenges of administrative reforms in Africa

Studies of the impact of administrative reforms in Africa point to their dismal performance. The reasons attributed for the poor performance of these reforms are diverse. For example, decentralisation programmes have met the following challenges. According to multilateral development institutions, such as the World Bank and United Nations agencies, decentralisation has failed because of poor implementation of decentralisation programmes by the



central government. For this group, managerial fundamentals, such as organisational format, division of responsibilities, the levels of competence of local staff, and the level of resources available, have been poorly designed and inadequate for the decentralised administration to work effectively (Rondinelli, Nellis and Cheema, 1983). According to this group, managerial and technical reasons have largely contributed to the dismal performance of decentralisation in Africa.

Other analysts link the failure of decentralisation reforms to three main factors: the political factor, meaning the effect of interferences from the central government, socio-economic factors, such as the differing resource bases of different regions of the country, and the elite/class factor (Mutahaba, 1989:74). The class approach argues that in developing countries, elites have used public office to strengthen their rule; hence, it becomes difficult to surrender the source of their dominance to local institutions (Olowu, 1990:86).

Similarly, bureaucratic reforms, which include downsizing, outsourcing and privatisation, have had a negative impact on public administration and its performance. Downsizing and market-like practices have affected the morale of employees, led to retrenchments and disruption in public service. The minimalist public administration has a drastic deterioration in service delivery, especially in those services where budget cuts were directed, such as in education and health, which in return have reduced human capital formation and depressed economies in general (Cheru, 2002:18). The problem is that within this context of minimalist and efficient government, the private sector, which was expected to provide goods and services, including those previously rendered by the state, failed in its new responsibilities. The UNCTAD highlights the issue in the agriculture sector as follows:

Policies aimed at reducing the role of the state in the commodity sector within the context of agricultural trade liberalization have not had the desired outcomes, and markets have not been able to fill the resulting institutional void. The public sector's role and capacity would need to be built up in African countries in order to meet the development challenges of commodity dependence, including the establishment of appropriate institutions. (UNCTAD, 2003:47-49)



In Africa, the challenge of accountability and efficiency is evident. African governments face the challenge of promoting managerial efficiency without compromising the principal role of the state, which is to protect the public and to ensure a better life for all its citizens. Nonetheless, building accountable, effective and efficient public service is imperative for African states to meet the challenges of poverty reduction and to effectively respond to the demands of a globalised economy. In this regard, regional cooperation and integration is pursued all over the world as a strategic tool to overcome various political, administrative and economic problems and challenges of states. How African states have used these tools constitutes the object of the section below.

REGIONALISM AND POLITICAL/ADMINISTRATIVE COOPERATION IN AFRICA

Regionalism began to take root in the early years of independence (circa 1960s) and was perceived largely as both an instrument to protect the newly acquired political freedom, and a strategy to facilitate economic development. The advocates of regionalism have argued that regional cooperation and integration provide many benefits to their members. In the economic arena, where such regional initiatives have often occurred, the proponents argue that integration provides larger markets and economies of scale and that the coordination of national economic policies enables more rational mobilisation and utilisation of factors of production and lead to an accelerated economic growth (Nye, 1968:288). Regionalism has been also used as a framework to enhance common administrative and socio-political interests and to manage conflicts among African states (Lee, 2003:9).

Integration and interstate treaties in Africa

The creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 marked the first attempt at regional cooperation and integration. However, despite the common heritage of colonialism and the desire for unity and economic development, African leaders could not agree on what form of cooperation to embrace and how it was to be achieved. Their major differences were whether the pan African organization, to which they all

aspired should be a political union of all African states, with significant implications for the economic and political sovereignty of individual African countries, or whether it should be a body based on cooperation and the voluntary participation of states. Three groups, the Casablanca, the Brazzaville and the Monrovia groups, emerged each with its own belief as to the nature and form of unity that was best suited to Africa (Gomes, 1996:37).

The Casablanca group, which was composed of Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Libya and Algeria, met in January 1961. It supported a United States of Africa based on the federal model of government. The group recommended the creation of an African political union, a joint African High Command and an African Common Market (Mathews, 1984:53). Kwame Nkrumah, the greatest advocate of pan-Africanism captured this ideal goal:

In my view, a united Africa, that is, the political and economic unification of the African continent, should seek three objectives. Firstly, we should have an overall economic planning on a continental basis, which would increase the industrial and economic power of Africa. So long as we remain disunited, so long as we remain balkanized regionally or territorially we shall be at the mercy of colonialism and imperialism... (in Anyang' Nyongo, 1990:4)

In contrast, the Brazzaville Conference (consisting of former French colonies) advocated a loose association of African states. The meeting which had been initially convened in Cote d'Ivoire in October 1960 wanted an approach that will ensure that individual countries within this group could continue their relations with France, on which its members depended for economic and military support. The third group, the Monrovia group was born from a conference in Monrovia in May 1961 that brought together the Brazzaville group members plus Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Togo and Ethiopia. The Monrovia group rejected any form of political integration stressing the principles of state sovereignty and political identity (Mathews, 1984:53).

The foundation of the OAU in 1963 was a compromise between the three groups, in favour of a weak and loose organisation. The Charter of the OAU was signed by 30 Heads of State and Government of the 32 then independent



African states. The remaining two, Morocco and Togo signed the treaty later in that year. Morocco withdrew its membership to the OAU in 1985 after admission of the Western Sahara. The member states agreed to adhere to the principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, which put an end to the prospects for a pan-African integrated political and economic unity.

The first attempts at regional cooperation and integration started at sub-regional level in the form of economic cooperation. It is said that by 1977, there were over 20 intergovernmental multisectoral economic cooperation organisations in Africa. These regional economic organisations were regarded as the stepping-stones towards African unity. However, many regional communities established in the 1960s, such as the Customs Union of West African States (UDEAO – Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest) created in June 1966 and the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC – Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale) founded in January 1964, failed a decade later (Asante, 1997:35).

Several factors, internal as well as historical, contributed to the failure of these early regional initiatives. Internally, the new leaders were faced with the major task of building national unity among the various conflicting tribes. Thus, national issues had to be accorded higher priority often at the expense of regional cooperation. Furthermore, the political and economic heterogeneity of these states did not facilitate regional integration. Ideological differences and economic disparities were the major impediments to early integrationist efforts. As Asante (1997:37) observes, African countries entered into regional agreement only when integrative objectives were not in conflict with considerations of national security, prestige or economic advantage.

Since the mid 70s, however, there has been a renewed interest in regional integration owing mainly to the disappointing economic performance of African states in comparison to the rest of the Third World and the growing trend in regionalism (Asante, 1997:10; Adedeji, 2002:4). African states realised that they had to foster regional cooperation and integration as the only path



towards economic development. The first serious attempt at regional integration was the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975, which comprises 16 states. After the setting up of ECOWAS, other regions followed suit. In Southern Africa, the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was founded in 1980 and changed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992. Also the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) for Eastern and Southern African states was established in 1981, and later was expanded into the Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA) in 1994. In 1983, countries in Central Africa established the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). And in 1989, Arab states in the North created the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU).

In addition to establishing regional communities, African leaders continued to strive for continental cooperation and development. In their efforts to integrate, several treaties and plans for continental development were adopted. They include the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) adopted by the extraordinary Summit of the OAU in 1980. Its purpose was to form, within 20 years, a united African economic bloc with common tariffs, parliament, and eventually a common currency. A decade later, in 1991, the plan was changed into the Abuja Treaty to form the African Economic Community (AEC). The Abuja Treaty, which came into force in 1994, provides for a gradual integration process, which would be achieved through coordination, harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of existing regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa over a period of 34 years. In July 2000, in Togo, African leaders decided to dissolve the old OAU into a dynamic, effective and responsible organisation, the African Union. The African Union represents the ultimate quest for a pan-African renaissance as its member states recognise the need to do away with the 1963 compromise. By virtue of the Constitutive Act of 2000 of the AU, African leaders explicitly committed to strive for the creation of "A united and integrated Africa" (see also Vision of the AU, 2004:18). The New Partnership for Africa's Development, and the African Peer Review Mechanism, established in 2001 and 2003 respectively, demonstrate the



renewed interest of African states in regional integration, political stability and development.

But to what extent are African countries committed to implement these objectives of cooperation and integration? A survey of the literature on regional integration in Africa reveals that regional schemes have achieved disappointing results (Asante, 1997; Ojo, 1999; Cheru, 2002; Lee, 2003). In general, African economic regions have failed to meet the objectives of achieving faster economic growth and development as expressed in most of their founding treaties. Specifically, member states committed, in the treaties establishing these regional communities, to the following including:

- developing infrastructures that promote intra-regional trade;
- harmonising political and socio-economic policies and plans of member states;
- developing policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to free movement of capital and labour, goods and services, and of the peoples of the region among member states; and
- creating appropriate institutions and mechanisms for the mobilisation of requisite resources for the implementation of programmes and operations. (extract of the SADC' Treaty of 1992)

It is evident, however, that few of these commitments and objectives have been achieved. As development indicators show, unlike other regional groupings in the world, African regions are characterised by poor economic growth and low levels of intra-regional and global trade. For instance, ECOWAS member states showed a 2.5 per cent real GDP growth rate in 1999 (ECOWAS, 2000). In the COMESA region the average real GDP growth rate was 3.1 per cent in 2001 (COMESA, 2002). This growth performance falls far short of the estimated 7 per cent annual growth rate, which is required for Africa to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG), in particular, the goal of reducing by half the proportion of Africans living in



poverty by 2015. Similar poor performance in other areas, such as trade has been recorded. The participation of sub-Saharan African countries in world trade remains negligible. In 2002, Sub-Saharan Africa's share in world trade was estimated at 1.5 per cent. This compares to developing Asia's share of world trade of 24.3 per cent, and Latin America's 5.5 per cent (UNCTAD, 2003:3). This poor performance begs the higher order question. Why has regional integration failed in Africa? Several experts in economic integration argue that African regions have failed to reap the economic benefits of regional integration because they have adopted the European model of market integration without having the necessary conditions for its success (McCarthy, 1996; Asante, 1997; Harloov, 1997; Lee, 2003).

In addition to claims that African countries have pursued the wrong approach to regional integration, other factors have also contributed to the disappointing results of African regional schemes. The major impediments include a lack of political commitment to regional integration; lack of potential products to trade, political instability; weak infrastructures; and problems of distribution of costs and benefits of integration (Mukamunana and Moeti, 2005:95-98). Indeed, regional integration in Africa has been a matter of signing treaties, the business of politicians, ministers and top bureaucrats. Key stakeholders, in particular the business sector – formal as well as informal – have been left out which makes regional integration merely rhetorical. Furthermore, experience from advanced regional communities, such as the European Union, suggests that successful regional integration requires strong political commitment in a legally binding way that ensures the irreversibility of regional agreements (Asante, 1997:63). Unfortunately, African leaders have shown unwillingness to provide that kind of political commitment and, sacrifice perceived national political and economic interests over long-term regional benefits. Furthermore, political instability due to frequent civil conflicts and wars, and weak infrastructures, including roads, railways, air and shipping, and telecommunications have hindered regional integration efforts.



African efforts for peace and security

African leaders have since independence recognised that peace, security, and political stability constitute the preconditions and basis for the economic progress of their countries and their cooperation agenda. This concern is clear in the Charter, as one of the main objectives of the OAU was the defence of members' sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence (article II(C) of the charter of the OAU, 1963). Thus, the OAU was to assume the role of conflict management and resolution among its members. However, the OAU Charter did not contain any provision on mechanisms and instruments to effect this clause of collective security and protection. The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration envisaged as one of the principal organs of the OAU for peaceful solution of intra African conflicts never materialised. In practice, it is the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers that has assumed the role of conflicts mediation and conciliation among member states of the OAU (Imobighe, 1980: 241-250).

Faced with a proliferation of armed and civil conflicts on the continent in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the 26th OAU Summit expressed its determination to work together to end the scourge of conflicts in Africa. In 1993, the 29th Summit of the OAU adopted the Declaration for the establishment within the OAU of a "Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution" in Cairo, Egypt. The main objective of the Mechanism, as its name suggests, was to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. Specifically, the Mechanism was responsible to the following:

- anticipating and preventing situations of potential conflict from developing into full-blown conflicts;
- undertaking peacemaking and peace-building efforts if full-blown conflicts arise; and
- undertaking peacemaking and peace building activities in post-conflict situations. (Article 15 of the AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX) at www.africa-



union.org)

The performance of the OAU in attempting to be the custodian of continental peace and security during its existence is mixed. On the positive side, the OAU can be applauded for having managed and resolved numerous border disputes that erupted in the immediate post-independence period. In the 1960s and 1970s, for example, the OAU was successful in resolving a number of border disputes, including those between Algeria and Morocco, Mali and Burkina Faso, Somalia and Kenya, Kenya and Uganda, and Ethiopia and Somalia (Mathews, 1984:68-69). In addition, the OAU should be commended for its assiduous diplomatic efforts to help the countries of Southern Africa that were under white rule, namely Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, to achieve their independence in 1980, 1990, and 1994 respectively.

Despite these successes, however, the OAU failed to use the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In general, OAU failed to stop civil wars in many countries, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict. It is estimated that by 1993, there were 6.1 million refugees and 2 million internally displaced persons in Africa (UNHCR, 1994:4), plus an unknown figure of millions of deaths. Numerous factors, including the lack of political will, the non-interference clause that severely crippled the OAU, and the unwillingness to commit sufficient financial resources, account for the failure of the OAU to guarantee human security and peace in Africa (Mathews, 1983, 67-72).

With no financial resources, it became all but impossible for the OAU to carry out its peacekeeping mandate. For instance, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was estimated at an annual cost of \$121 million. Of the countries that sent the troops to Burundi, namely South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique, only South Africa could fund its own participation. Thus, donors (mainly the USA, UK, and EU) had to step in to provide financial and logistical support (Boshoff and Francis, 2003:4). At the Maputo Summit, in 2003, the Heads of



State and Government of the AU and the EU came up with an innovative initiative of creating an “African Peace Facility”. The Peace Facility is an EU-funded African peacekeeping venture worth €250 million. This money is from funds allocated to African countries through the EU – Africa development cooperation agreements (European Commission, 2004 www.europa.eu.int). The Peace Facility, however, has a life span of three years, from 2004 its entry into force to 2006. Thereafter, new financial resources to fund peace support and enforcement operations in Africa must be found.

The AU is undertaking massive structural changes to meet the objectives of a stable and prosperous Africa, and thus be responsive to the aspirations of African peoples. Several institutions and mechanisms have been created in the architecture of the AU, and the most vital for peace and good governance include the Peace and Security Council, the Pan African Parliament, the African Court of Justice and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council.

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts in Africa. Article 2 (2) of the Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council within the AU stipulates that the Council be supported by a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an Africa Standby Force, and a special Peace Fund. According to Article 5 of the same protocol, the PSC is composed of 15 members elected on the basis of equal rights. Five members are elected for a term of three years and ten others for a term of two years. The first serving team on the PSC is composed as follows: the five members are: South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Gabon. The rest of the group is Lesotho, Mozambique, Cameroon, Congo, Kenya, Sudan, Libya, Ghana, Senegal, and Togo. The PSC meets at least twice a month at the level of Permanent Representatives, and once a year at the level of Ministers and Heads of State and Government (African Union, 2005 www.africa-union.org).

The Pan African Parliament (PAP) is established by the protocol of the treaty establishing the AEC of 1991. The Protocol establishing the PAP came into force on 14 December 2003. The Parliament was inaugurated in Addis



Ababa where it held its first parliamentary session from 18-20 March 2004. The President of the PAP is Ms Gertrude Mongella from Tanzania. The PAP is a consultative body and has advisory powers only, but it is expected to evolve into an institution with full legislative and “oversight” powers, whose members are elected by universal adult suffrage (Article 2 (3) of the Protocol to the AEC Treaty). Furthermore, the Protocol to the PAP provides for an equal representation of five MPs per member state, at least one of whom must be a woman. In addition, the representation to the PAP must reflect the diversity of political opinions in each National Parliament. The PAP was inaugurated in 2004 and sits in Midrand, South Africa.

The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) was established under the provision of Article 5 and 22 of the Constitutive Act of the AU to give effect to the African Charter on Popular Participation in Development and Transformation of 1990. According to the draft Statute for ECOSOCC, the Council will be composed of 150 Civil Society Organizations representing various social groups, such as women, the youth, the elderly and disabled persons. It will also include professional groups, such as doctors, lawyers, media and business organisations; NGOs and community-based organisations; organisations of workers and employers; and traditional leaders, academia, religious and cultural associations from Africa and the African Diaspora. Although the ECOSOCC is an advisory organ, it gives forum for the African civil society to influence the policies and evaluate the implementation of AU programmes.

The African Court of Justice (ACJ) is an integrated Court of the previous African Court on Human and People’s Rights and the Court of Justice of the AU. The Assembly of Heads of State of the AU decided to integrate the two Courts based on concerns for efficiency and for having an effective continental judicial system to uphold the rule of law and protect human dignity and human rights. The merging, however, has raised criticism, mainly, on issues of jurisdictional competences, who should stand before the Court, and the rules of procedures (http://www.interights.org/doc/integration1_doc).



As it stands, the Protocol to the ACJ allows only African governments and other organs of the AU authorized by the Assembly of Heads of State to bring cases before the Court. Initially, however, Article 5 (3) of the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the Court on Human and People's Rights allowed NGOs and individuals to be heard by the Court. As an adjustment to the issue, Article 18 (d) of the African Court of Justice provides for an additional declaration to be signed by a state party when it ratifies the Protocol, accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases from NGOs and individuals. To date, only Burkina Faso has made the declaration allowing individuals and NGOs direct access to the Court (Amnesty International/USA, 2005). The protocol to the African Court on Human and People's Rights entered into force on the 25 January 2004 after receiving 22 ratifications of the 15 required, while the Court of Justice of the AU is yet to enter into force. So far, only eight states out of the 15 needed have ratified the protocol. Addressing the issues raised above is imperative to ensure that the supreme goal of securing peace and human rights to the African people is achieved.

While these are excellent structures for the promotion of good governance, peace and stability in Africa, they require strong political leadership and financial support to operate to their full potential. In this regard, regional communities such as ECOWAS and some African states have played pivotal roles in supplementing OAU/AU efforts in ensuring peace and stability in Africa. ECOWAS has been instrumental in peace-making in West Africa, since the eruption of the Liberian civil war in December 1989. The community has helped restore order and peace in war-torn countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone. Since 1990, ECOWAS mediation has led to the signing of nearly two dozen peace agreements to end destructive wars in West Africa (ECOWAS, 2005).

African states, especially Nigeria and South Africa, have provided sustained leadership and financial, military and logistical assistance in support of numerous peace deals and new African initiatives. For example, it is estimated that, in addition to losing over 1000 of its soldiers on peace-keeping duties in Liberia and Sierra Leone, Nigeria has also spent over US\$12 billion



on peace-keeping efforts in both countries (Bah, 2005:78). South Africa, especially under President Thabo Mbeki, who has led the country since its second democratic elections in 1999, has articulated a powerful commitment to assist the continent in its renaissance endeavours. Besides a number of AU institutions, such as the Pan African Parliament, the NEPAD and APRM secretariats hosted by South Africa, the South African government is playing a leading role in the restoration and maintenance of peace on the continent. It has, for instance, brokered a number of peace deals and helped to restore peace and security in countries, such as Burundi and Congo (DRC). In 2004, there were over 3000 South African troops deployed under the auspices of the UN, AU and SADC, in various African countries, including Eritrea and Ethiopia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan (South African Department of Defence Annual Report, 2004/05:xvi). These examples demonstrate the dynamics of regionalism and leadership in Africa.

Africa and the new global order: strategies and challenges

Globalisation is perhaps one of the most prominent phenomenon of the 21st century. While the term has no precise definition, it generally refers to processes that are worldwide in scope. Some writers define it as a complex and dynamic process, which entails the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural, the financial to the political (Held, McGrew, Goldbatt, and Perratton, 1999:2). The UNDP (2000:1) notes that globalisation is a process that integrates not only the economy, but also culture, technology and governance. However, the basic and underlying component of globalisation is the economic dimension. Economic globalisation denotes the intensification of international links and the free flows of trade, finance and direct investment, under conditions of overwhelming transnational corporate power underpinned by a system of world institutions, mainly the IMF, World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Bond, 2001:135).

This ever-increasing integration of the economy, finance, trade and other affairs among the nations has brought all sorts of changes and challenges.



Economically, globalisation has expanded the world capitalist system to the global level with growing roles of transnational corporations and supranational economic areas (Newman and Kliot, 2000:6). Indeed, by opening up to global operations of such industrial, financial and technological agencies, countries have been required to remove all sorts of impediments, especially regulatory terms and conditions, identified as distortions to free market business. These laws of market forces, called liberalism, are at the centre of the new global order. As Keet (1999:3) aptly puts it, globalisation is the substantive process of economic and technological expansion driving towards the opening up and integration of the entire world into one economic system; and liberalization provides the policy lubricants to guide the implementation of the process.

Analyses of the globalisation thesis point to its unequal distribution of benefits and losses (Keet, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). Globalisation has led to polarisation between the few countries and groups that gain, and the many countries and groups in society that lose out. Investment resources, growth and modern technology are focused on a few countries (mainly North America, Europe, Japan, and the newly industrialised East Asia). Many developing countries are excluded from the process, or are participating in marginal ways that are often detrimental to their interests. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) captures the devastating effects of globalisation as follows:

Globalisation is splintering many societies and is doing little to eradicate poverty. Grudgingly, the international financial institutions have conceded that the neo-liberal model has harmful consequences. But, they prefer to mask the damage rather than to shift to more humane and more productive forms of development. (UNRISD, 2002:2)

Of all the regions of the world, Africa has been the worst hit by globalisation. While trade has been the key driver of economic growth and development over the last five decades, heavily commodity-dependent Africa has seen its share in world trade and global production of commodities declining during the past 20 years. Africa's share in world exports fell from about 6 per cent in 1980 to 2 per cent in 2002 (UNCTAD, 2003:1). Trade liberalisation policies imposed on African states since the 1980s have had a devastating impact on



African economies. Multilateral institutions (IMF, the World Bank and WTO) and Western countries that drive globalisation have pushed poor countries to liberalise their trade regimes arguing that this would bring unprecedented prosperity. Yet, rich countries kept their own barriers and other protectionist measures, preventing developing countries' products from getting access to developed markets (Stiglitz, 2002:6). This situation is evident from the most contested provisions of the GATT relating to agriculture and subsidies. Since the seven-year long Uruguay Round of trade talks, developed countries, the US, Europe and Japan have fought for and established special terms and timeframes for their economically vulnerable (e.g., textiles) or politically influential (e.g., agriculture) domestic sectors in the new global agreements now under the WTO. Such barriers have included escalating tariffs against commodity exports, manufactured or even processed commodity exports of developing countries. Quotas and voluntary export restrictions (VERs) are among the non-tariff barriers (NTBs) enforced on developing countries, especially in areas where their exports are competitive (Keet, 1999:7; Bond, 2001:137).

The Doha Round of trade negotiations launched in 2001 promised to put development at its centre and come up with agreements that would reduce distortions in global trade. Of special concern for developing countries is agriculture, in particular, the need to cut agricultural subsidies by developed countries (UNECA, 2005:2). However, at the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong-Kong, 13-18 December 2005, rich countries managed to advance only modestly towards a trade package that is beneficial to the poorest countries. "Overall, the outcome is disappointing. While it was good that talks did not break down, it is fair to say we wanted much more progress than we achieved," said the UK Trade and industry Secretary (*Guardian Unlimited*, 21 December 2005 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/wto/article/0,2763,1671813,00.html>).

In Africa, the Economic Commission for Africa presages few benefits for African countries under the current Doha proposals (UNECA, 2005:7). For UNECA, a successful Doha Round for Africa requires ambitious reforms in



agricultural trade, in particular with regard to sensitive products (e.g. cotton), and the need for the special and differential treatment of Africa, which will allow African countries to intensify the development of their agricultural sector while giving them better market access to developed markets (UNECA, 2005:9-10).

African governments are responding to the challenges and inequities posed by the world trading system through a number of strategies, which underlie the New Partnership for Africa's Development. In NEPAD, African leaders have recognized the commodity-dependence of African economies as a critical problem that requires urgent attention. Modernise agriculture, diversify into more market-dynamic sectors (such as manufacturing, tourism, services, and mining), and promote regional integration are some of the strategies envisaged in NEPAD to improve market access and trade performance (NEPAD, 2001:40-46). Other strategies include public-private partnerships (PPP), regulatory reforms and diplomatic engagements for more development assistance, debt relief, and foreign investment flows. NEPAD, however, is challenged for its heavy reliance on foreign assistance to achieve its goals, its position on the debt crisis, and its uncritical endorsement of WTO rules (Adedeji, 2002:4; Adejumobi, 2003:9). It is argued that NEPAD should insist on debt cancellation and trade policies reforms, whereby developing countries should be provided fair opportunities with regard to trade. While trade reform is decisive to the success of Africa's development agenda, it is also argued that without "external financial aid" many African countries will not have the necessary infrastructure and institutions to effectively participate in the global market (World Bank, 2005: viii). Thus, the new global system poses Africa with greater challenges, which require technical expertise, especially in the area of trade, and caution in policy decisions to ensure that Africa does not lose out in the globalisation process.

Politically, globalisation has increased the importance of worldwide governance regimes, with its contested effects of "hollowing out" of the nation state (Ohmae, 1995). A number of integrationist analysts argue that the creation of regional communities, such as the EU and the NAFTA, has



weakened the sovereignty of the nation-state (Ohmae, 1995; Vegeland, 2002; Demmke, 2002). In the context of European integration, Demmke (2002:1) argues that through the transposition of European law into national law, national legal systems have been Europeanised; this applies to national public law, administrative law, planning law, coordination obligations, as well as to information management systems and reporting obligations, to which all authorities at national level are subject. Indeed, the state, which used to be the most important macro unit of politico-economic organization, is no longer the only actor in the global system. Globalisation has opened the door to new actors in the global governance system. These include multilateral organisations, such as the WTO, with authority and strong enforcement mechanisms over economic activities of national governments; the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) with more economic powers than many states; and the global network of civil society organizations that transcend national boundaries.

In the face of the decreasing capacity to maximise the economic regulation functions, African states have put in place various strategies and mechanisms to deal with the effects of globalisation. The ratification (in order of 48 ratifications) of the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), the NEPAD and the provision of good governance under the APRM underscore the determination of Africa to reposition itself and participate actively in the world economy and body politic. Already discussions are underway on how to reform the UN Security Council. The impetus for the UN Council reforms emerged out of the need to have global institutions that are democratic and largely representative of UN members. The AU proposes 26 members for the Council, with two permanent seats for African countries with all powers that the five permanent members of the Council (USA, UK, France, China, and Russia) enjoy. The long-awaited reforms of the UN, if passed, will indeed give the South, and, in particular, Africa, the necessary powers to influence the global agenda in favour of the poor.



CONCLUSION

This chapter has reviewed governance and leadership models and practices in Africa. It has been noted that colonial rule introduced autocracy and unaccountable leadership in Africa. The political independence of African states in the 1960s did not bring much change to the nature of the state. It remained centrist, coercive and largely clientelist. The politics of patronage and self-aggrandisement characteristic of post-independence Africa has impoverished African people and has led in many countries to civil conflicts and wars, which have claimed millions of human lives and displaced several others. Since the 1990s, African countries have embraced democracy. However, democratic governance is still fragile, and must contend with the political legacy of four decades of authoritarian rule, corruption, and lack of accountability. Collective efforts in the form of regional treaties and protocols are being initiated for political stability and the social and economic development of Africa. These include the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the African Peer Review Mechanism. The next chapter analyses the APRM, its challenges and opportunities in its mandate to promote democratic rule and peace, and to bolster economic development.



CHAPTER 5

AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM: A CASE ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As already stated, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument to monitor and evaluate the performance of African states in areas of political, economic and corporate governance. The idea of establishing an African monitoring mechanism came as a response to governance challenges and problems that the continent has experienced since the first phase of independence in the 1960s, and the subsequent political instability and poor economic performance. For many years, African states have relied on the outside world – bilateral, multilateral donors and development partners – to solve their governance issues. This approach has had limited impact, as political turmoil, poverty and underdevelopment continue to plague the continent. Faced with these challenges, African leaders initiated their own vision, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001. NEPAD is a development plan to lever the continent out of the cycle of poverty, political instability and marginalisation in world affairs. Philosophically, the new development strategy takes its roots on a new thinking that Africans should own and drive their countries to recovery. This means that Africans must be empowered to become active participants in the political and economic transformation of their own countries in particular, and the continent, in general.

A key element of the NEPAD is the recognition that good governance is a prerequisite for Africa's development. At the first meeting of the Heads of States and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC) of NEPAD in Abuja, Nigeria, 2001, African leaders agreed to set up parameters of good governance, which would guide their political and economic operations in order to achieve the objectives that were set in the NEPAD programme (NEPAD, 2001:57). In June 2002, in Italy, the third meeting of the HSGIC



approved a code of good governance, the “Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance” and the APRM as instruments that contain codes and standards of good governance to lead African countries to good governance and economic development (Communiqué of the HISC issued in Rome, 2002:5).

The concept of the African peer review, which is somewhat similar to the peer review used in the OECD countries, refers to the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states (peers) in the four areas of governance – political, economic, corporate, and socio-economic development – under the leadership and supervision of the Panel of African Eminent Persons. The ultimate objective of the peer review is to help the country being reviewed improve its policies, comply with established codes and standards of governance and adopt best practices. In Africa, the mechanism of peer review is expected to advance the practice of good governance by promoting among other things, the rule of law, human and property rights, and efficient management of public resources, which will lead to political stability and high economic growth (APRM base document, 2003:1).

Participation in the APRM is, as already stated, voluntary and open to all member states of the African Union. Voluntary participation departs from the principle of sovereignty of states and recognizes that a state cannot be compelled to follow any prescribed model of governance. Instead, the APRM seeks to help willing countries improve governance as a precondition for social and economic development. At the same time, the review mechanism acknowledges that each African country is unique in terms of the socio-political, economic and cultural environment and that these individual characteristics should inform recommendations for governance improvement (APRM Objectives, Standards, Criteria and Indicators, 2003:2).

Furthermore, this peer review is by nature a cooperative, non-adversarial and non-punitive process, in which trust among participating countries is crucial for its success. It rests for compliance on the mutual understanding and



commitment to the values, and acceptance of standards and criteria that are used to evaluate performance (OECD, 2003; APRM, 2003). In this sense, the APRM is not a police mechanism. Instead, the assessments seek to help participating countries be aware of their performance in relation to principles and standards of good governance, and embark on a remedial path where there are shortcomings.

Chapter Four of this study has brought to the fore various governance and leadership challenges and problems facing Africa. This chapter (Five) is a critical analysis of the APRM as an instrument to address these governance problems. It seeks to determine its abilities to deliver on its mandate, which is to ensure political stability and economic development on the continent. Some of the questions addressed are: can the APRM address African governance problems? What are the challenges facing the mechanism and its implementation? The chapter begins by introducing the APRM, its governance structures and the process of peer review. Critical analyses of the mechanism follow by looking at its merits, investigating the implementation progress of the APRM, and the challenges to be overcome for effective implementation.

ANALYSIS OF APRM POLICIES AND STRUCTURES

MANDATE, PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES OF THE APRM

The mandate of the APRM is to ensure that policies and practices of the participating states conform to the agreed values and standards of good governance as contained in the “Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance”, which is a code of conduct that spells out political, economic and corporate principles, values and standards that have to guide policy and action of African states in the pursuit of poverty eradication and socio-economic development objectives. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration reads as follows:

We the participating heads of State and Government of the member states of the African Union have agreed to work together in policy and action in pursuit of the following objectives: democracy and good political governance; economic and corporate governance, socio-economic development, and the African Peer Review Mechanism”. (Declaration on

Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, 2002: para 6)

In the area of democracy and good political governance (the focus of this study), African leaders reaffirmed their commitments to the promotion of democracy and its core values through enforcing the following:

- the rule of law;
- the equality of all citizens before the law and the liberty of individual;
- individual and collective freedoms, including the right to form and join political parties and trade unions, in conformity with the constitution;
- equality of opportunity for all;
- inalienable right of the individual to participate by means of free, credible and democratic political process in periodically electing their leaders for a fixed term of office; and
- adherence to the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of effective parliaments. (Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, 2002:para 7)

The APRM was established as an instrument to ensure that governments adhere to and fulfil these commitments contained in the Declaration. According to the base document of the APRM, its primary purpose is to:

foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and reinforcement of successful and best practice, including identifying deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building. (APRM base document, 2003:1)

To achieve these objectives, African leaders undertake to carry out peer reviews, which are technically competent, credible and free of political manipulation (APRM base document, 2003:1). These are the core principles, which guide the African peer review.



INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES OF THE APRM

The founding document of the APRM envisages four institutional structures of leadership and management of the process of peer review. These are the Committee of participating Heads of State (APR Forum), the Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel), the APRM Secretariat, and the adhoc Country Review Team (APR Team) (APRM base document, 2003:2). In addition to these structures, the first Summit of the Heads of State and Government participating in the APRM held in Kigali, in February 2004, endorsed the proposition of creating the APRM national structures in each participating country. These are the APR focal point and the National Coordinating Mechanism (Communiqué of first APR Forum, 2004:6).

The committee of participating Heads of State and Government (APR Forum)

The APR Forum is made up of Heads of State and Government of African countries participating in the peer review process. It has the overall responsibility for overseeing APRM operations and processes and for exercising the constructive peer-dialogue and persuasion required to make the APRM effective. It is at this level that “peer pressure” is expected to be exercised once the final review report for a country is tabled before this forum. The mandate of the APR Forum is to:

- appoint the APR Panel and its Chairperson and approves its rules of procedure;
- consider, adopt, and take ownership of country review reports submitted by the APR Panel;
- communicate the recommendations of the APR Forum to the Head of State or Government of the reviewed country immediately after the review meeting;
- exercise constructive peer dialogue and persuasion, through offering assistance or applying appropriate measures, to effect changes in



country practice where recommended;

- persuade development partners to support the recommendations approved by the APR Forum by providing technical and financial assistance;
- transmit APRM Reports to the appropriate African Union (AU) structures in a timely manner;
- make public, through the APR Secretariat, the country review reports;
- establish and approve rules of procedure for the APR Forum;
- approve a code of conduct for all components of the APRM organisation; and
- ensure that the APR process is fully funded by participating countries. (APRM Organisation and Processes, 2003: 2-3)

APR Forum is chaired by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, who is also chairperson of the NEPAD HSGIC. He was unanimously elected as chair at the first APR Forum held in Kigali, Rwanda, in February 2004. However, the term of office of the Chairperson of the Forum is not mentioned. According to the communiqué issued at the end of the APR Forum in Kigali, the election of President Obasanjo “will reinforce the APRM as an integral part of the NEPAD process” (Communiqué of the 1st APRM Forum, 2004:3). Indeed this dual appointment may facilitate coordination and leadership of the NEPAD and the APRM activities. However, given the importance of the responsibilities of the Forum and the NEPAD HSGIC, it can also create an organisational crisis, even overburdening the Chairperson. It is important to have clear organisational arrangements, with clearly articulated responsibilities and defined timeframes in order for this structure to effectively perform its duties.

The Panel of Eminent Persons (APR Panel)

The APR Panel is composed of seven distinguished Africans selected on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to APRM work, their high moral

stature and commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism. The APR Forum appoints the members of the Panel taking into consideration the regional, gender and cultural representativity. The members serve for a period of up to four years, with the exception of the chairperson who serves for a maximum period of up to five years (APRM base document, 2003:2). The APR Panel is composed of the following members: Ms Marie-Angelique Savane from Senegal, Professor Adebayo Adedeji from Nigeria, Dr Graca Machel from Mozambique, Dr Dorothy Njeuma from Cameroon, Dr Chris Stals from South Africa, Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat from Kenya, and Mr Mohammed Seghir Babes who replaced Mourad Medelci from Algeria (Communiqué of first APR Forum, 2004:3).

At present, the Panel is chaired by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat who was appointed by the APR Forum at its 3rd Summit held on 19 June 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria. He replaces Mrs Marie-Angelique Savanne who served as the first chairperson of the Panel for a period of one year since 14 November 2003 (Press release of 13th meeting of APR Panel of 12-13 August 2005 <http://www.nepad.org/2005/news/wmview.php?ArtID=38>).

According to the APRM base document (2003:2), candidates for the APR Panel are nominated by participating countries, then short-listed by a Committee of Ministers and appointed by the APR Forum. The composition of the current APR Panel indicates a balanced gender representation, whereby three out of seven members are women. All the five regions of Africa are also represented in order of two representatives for Southern Africa and West Africa; and for East, Central and North Africa one representative each.

The mandate of the panel is as follows:

- exercise 'oversight' of the APRM process with a view to ensuring the independence, professionalism, and credibility of the process;
- oversee the selection of the APR Teams and appoint them to conduct country reviews;



- recommend appropriate African institutions or individuals to conduct technical assessments;
- meet when required to review and make objective assessments of and recommendations on the country review reports submitted to it by the APR Secretariat;
- consider recommendations contained in the country review reports and make recommendations to the APR Forum; and
- submit to the APR Forum all country review reports with recommendations on measures that could be taken to assist the country in the improvement of its governance and socio-economic development performance.

Some critics have raised concerns about the independence of the members who serve on the Panel (Bekoe, 2002:248; Kanbur, 2004:10). It is argued that these eminent persons may have strong ties with their state, which may undermine their objectivity and independence in carrying out the peer review. While these worries may be well founded, any judgment of the impartiality of eminent persons can only be made after the publication of a country's peer review report. It is too early to make such arguments as no single report has yet been published. The selection process for eminent persons emphasises ethical integrity as an important criterion to ensure the credibility of the African peer review process. Thus, eminent persons are expected to perform their duties with honesty, professionalism and in the best interests of the public and countries under review. The profiles of selected personalities indicate that indeed distinguished Africans with extensive experience and expertise in the areas of the APRM have been chosen for the APR Panel. However, it is important that control and accountability mechanisms be established to ensure that indeed this eminent Panel carries its responsibilities with integrity and professionalism.



The APRM Secretariat

The APRM Secretariat is based in Midrand, South Africa. It provides the secretarial, administrative, technical and coordinating support services for the APRM. The APRM Secretariat operates on a continuous basis and is supervised directly by the Chairperson of the APR Panel at the policy level, and in the day-to-day management and administration by an Executive Officer/Director (APRM Organisation and Processes, 2003:5-6). The APR Panel through a competitive selection process appoints the Executive Director for a period of one year renewable upon satisfactory performance. At present, the APR Secretariat is a small organisation staffed by the Executive Director assisted by three coordinators selected for their expertise in the four areas of the peer review, three research analysts, and supportive administrative personnel (APRM Secretariat, 2005). The main functions of the APRM Secretariat include:

- maintaining extensive database and information on the four areas of focus of the APRM and database of the political and economic situations of all participating countries;
- preparing background documents for the teams conducting reviews;
- facilitating technical assistance to participating countries;
- proposing performance indicators and tracking the performance of each participating countries;
- liaising with participating countries and partner institutions to follow progress of technical assessments;
- planning and organising the country review visits;
- recommending to the APR Panel on the composition of APR Teams and recruit the experts required for research and analysis;
- liaising with interested external partners and support participating



countries in resource mobilization for capacity building;

- organising regional networks in the various areas of focus of the APRM and convene workshops for the sharing of experience and best practices and to address constraints experienced in the implementation of country programmes of action;
- liaising with the institutions issuing the standards and codes listed in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (AHG/235(XXXVIII) Annex 2); and
- ensuring full documentation of the APR processes at country, sub-regional and continental levels to facilitate learning (APRM/O&P, 2003).

Clearly, the APR Secretariat (in its current composition) has no capacity to deliver on this wide mandate. To strengthen the capacity of the Secretariat, the APR Forum approved a number of partner institutions to support the APRM process. Four institutions were designated strategic partners for the APRM: the African Development Bank (ADB); the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); the UN Development Programme Regional Bureau for Africa. On matters relating to human rights, democracy, and political governance, some organs of the AU, including the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), the Peace and Security Council (PSC), and the Pan-African Parliament are listed as potential resource institutions (APRM Organisation and Processes, 2003:7-10; APR Secretariat, 2005).

- The ADB has provided assistance in developing the assessment tools in banking and finance; it is engaged in technical capacity enhancement of the Secretariat, it provides background information on countries; and participates in country review missions.
- The ECA has provided assistance in the development of tools for the APRM in economic governance and management; it also provides background information on countries and technical expertise for

country review missions.

- The UNDP has provided preparatory assistance to the APR Panel and the Secretariat; it also participates in country review missions.
- The African Union has contributed to the development of the tools and documents of the APRM, particularly in the area of human rights, democracy and political governance.
- Lastly, there is a pool of experts/consultants (mostly from Africa), who are occasionally used to conduct technical assessments on countries under peer review (NEPAD Annual Report 2003/2004:38-39).

With this additional technical expertise that assists in carrying out African peer reviews, the APR Secretariat appears to be well equipped with the required expertise to handle the technical evaluations. However, as the list of responsibilities shows, the Secretariat work does not end with technical assessments. To be able to perform its numerous functions, it is important to equip the Secretariat with competent permanent staff. This is not only essential for having technically competent reviews but also for building institutional knowledge.

The APRM team review

The APRM Teams are constituted only for the period of the country review visit. The composition of the APRM Teams is carefully designed to enable an integrated, balanced, technically competent and professional assessment of the reviewed country and is approved by the APR Panel. The APR Panel also approves the terms of reference for each country review visit (APRM/ O&P, 2003:7).

APRM structures at the national level

At the first APR Forum summit in Kigali, in February 2004, participating Heads of State in the peer review approved the recommendations by the APR Panel to establish national APR structures. These are the APR Focal Point and the



APR National Coordinating Mechanism/Commission. It is recommended that the APR Focal Point be established at the high level office, either at ministerial level or in the presidency to facilitate direct access and reporting to the Head of State and access to all national stakeholders (APRM Guidelines, 2003:11). The APR Focal Point plays a pivotal communication and coordination role linking up APR national structures and activities with continental ones, such as the APR Secretariat and the APR Panel. The second structure is the APRM National Commission. This structure is expected to be broad-based including all stakeholders from government, business and civil society, to ensure that the peer review process is inclusive and credible. The exact form and nature of responsibilities of these national institutions are not clearly defined in the APRM documents, a task left to the discretion of the particular country.

Thus, the character of these institutions may vary depending on the socio-political and economic make-up of the country. For instance, Ghana has a dedicated Ministry for regional cooperation and NEPAD. The country institutional set up for the African peer review process looks like this:

- Independent National APRM Governing Council (NAPRM-GC) to represent the voice of civil society stakeholders chaired by an independent academic (Prof S.K. Adjepong);
- National APR Secretariat (APR Focal Point) to provide support to the Governing Council; and
- Four independent, non-governmental technical advisory bodies commissioned by the NAPRM-GC to assist with the assessment in the four thematic areas of the APRM. The leading institutions are the Centre for Democratic Development, for Democracy and Good Political Governance; Centre for Policy Economic Analysis, for Economic Governance and Management; Private Enterprise Foundation, for Corporate Governance; and Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research, for Socio-Economic Development. (Communiqué of the APRM Support Mission to Ghana, of 29 May 2004

<http://www.nepad.org>).

Rwanda has taken a different approach, and has established the NEPAD and the APRM structures within the President's office. Two institutions, namely the APR Focal Point and the APR National Commission, drive the national peer review process. The APR Focal Point provides the coordination and secretarial service. The National Commission, which is the coordinating mechanism, brings together all national stakeholders and, among its 50 members, 17 are representatives of various civil society organisations and the business community (*NEPAD Rwanda Magazine*, 2004:14-15). In Rwanda, the APR National Commission unlike that in Ghana, which is chaired by an independent member of civil society, is chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning. This structuring raises concerns of the independence of the APR National Commission from government influence.

In general, at the national level, participating countries are expected to perform functions, which include the following:

- define in collaboration with key stakeholders a roadmap on participation in the APRM;
- publicise the process of APRM, and provide information on roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders (government, non-governmental organisations, private sector, and international development partners) in particular national coordinating structures; and the process of the APRM;
- coordinate the national review process;
- elaborate (in collaboration with all stakeholders) the National Programme of Action;
- establish and publicise feedback mechanism between different levels of government and various stakeholders; and
- make annual progress reports to APR Secretariat on the

implementation of the Programme of Action. (APRM Guidelines, 2003:11-12)

PERIODICITY AND TYPES OF PEER REVIEW

The APRM provides for four types of review. The first review is carried out within eighteen months of a country becoming a member of the APRM. The second review is periodic and will take place every two to four years. The third type of review is not part of periodic reviews; it is about a country for its own reasons asking for being reviewed. The fourth may be instituted in cases where there are signs of impending economic or political crisis in a country. This will be done in a spirit of helpfulness to the participating government (APRM base document, 2003:3). If one considers that in March 2004 some 18 countries had already joined (see table of accession to the APRM), then according to this periodicity, by September 2005 all 18 countries should have received their peer review assessment. Given the pace at which the APRM is being implemented, it is unlikely that the time frames proposed may be achieved.

THE PROCESS OF THE APRM

The APRM base document (2003:3-4) identifies five stages of the peer review process. Once a country has acceded to the APRM, the APR Secretariat arranges a “support mission” visit to that country. The purpose of the support mission is to ascertain the extent of preparedness and the capacity of the country to participate in the peer review process and to conclude negotiations and sign the Memorandum of Understanding on the Technical Assessment Missions and the Country Review Visit (APRM/ O&P, 2003:10-11). The APRM process starts thereafter.

Stage one

The first phase involves a study of the political, economic and corporate governance and development environment in the country to be reviewed. This information is sourced from up-to-date background documentation prepared



by the APR Secretariat and material provided by national, sub-regional, regional and international institutions. During this phase, the APR Secretariat sends to the country a questionnaire (standard for all participating countries) on the four areas of review of the APRM. The country conducts a self-assessment on the basis of the questionnaire, and then develops a preliminary “Programme of Action (PoA)” to respond to possible shortcomings identified in existing policies and projects. The Programme of Action includes specific time-bound commitments detailing how the country will bring itself into line with NEPAD objectives and a wide range of commitments that African states have made through various international treaties, including the Millennium Development Goals (APRM/Guidelines, 2003:11). The self-assessment report and the PoA are sent to the APR Secretariat, which on the basis of these documents and the background document on the country, draws up an “Issues Paper” setting out the apparent main challenges in the political, economic and corporate governance that need to be addressed by the country.

Stage two

Stage Two entails a visit by the APR Review Team (under the leadership of the Panel) to the country. It involves carrying out the widest possible range of consultations and interviews with key stakeholders including government officials, political parties, parliamentarians, representatives of civil society organisations (including the media, academia, the business community, professional bodies, women and youth groups) rural communities and representatives of international organisations. The purpose of these consultations is to gauge the perspectives of various stakeholders on the level of political, economic, and corporate governance in that particular country. Furthermore, the country visit provides an opportunity for the APR Team to discuss the draft Programme of Action that the country has drawn up to improve its governance and socio-economic development and to build consensus on how identified issues could be addressed.



Stage three

Stage Three involves the preparation of the APR Team's report. The report is prepared, in part on the basis, of the findings of the Country Review Visit as well as on the findings of the research studies of the APR Secretariat before the visit. The recommendations of the Team's report should take into account the commitments made in the preliminary Programme of Action of the country, and should identify remaining weaknesses and recommend further actions that should be included in the final Programme of Action. The report should be clear and specific on measures the country has to include in its Programme of Action, including estimates of capacity, resource requirements and timeframes. The draft report is first discussed with the Government of the concerned country to ensure the accuracy of the information and to provide the Government with an opportunity both to react to the substance of the draft report and put forward its own views and measures to be undertaken to address the shortcomings. These responses are appended to the report.

Stage four

Stage Four involves the submission of the APR Team's country review report and the final Programme of Action to the APR Panel, and finally to the APR Forum. The APR Panel meets to review the report in accordance with its mandate and submits its recommendations on the report to the APR Forum. The APR Forum considers the report and the recommendations of the APR Panel and decides on actions to take in accordance with its mandate.


Stage five

This stage, which is the final phase in the first cycle of the APR process for a country, involves making public the APRM Report on the country reviewed. It takes six months after the report has been considered by the APR Forum to be formally and publicly tabled in key governance structures of the African Union. These include the Pan-African Parliament, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Peace and Security Council, and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOC) of the African Union, as



well as the Regional Economic Community of the region of which the country reviewed is a member.

While procedurally well detailed, the APRM process has not envisaged the time frames for different stages. Paragraph 26 of the APRM base document stipulates that “the review process per country should not be longer than six months” from the date of the beginning of the process (Stage One) up to the date when the report is submitted to the APR Forum for consideration (Stage Four) (APRM base document, 2003:5). It is only at the last stage of the process, which provides six months for the final report to be made public, that time has been specifically allotted. However, any programme/project requires clear time frame targets for all the phases of the project to allow the monitoring and assessment of the implementation progress. To recapitulate, below is the schematic diagram, which indicates the structures of the APRM and their relationships with the NEPAD and the AU.



Source: Mukamunana, 2005

Figure 5.1: APRM, AU and NEPAD Structures: A relational model configuration

——> Single arrow: relationship of hierarchical authority and provision of directives

↔ Dual arrow: cooperative relationship, sharing of data and information



The above figure captures the key aspects and elements of the relationships between the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM. The AU is the supreme organ in this set of relationships. African leaders have agreed that the NEPAD and APRM activities and procedures shall be consistent with the decisions and procedures of the African Union (MoU on the APRM, 2003:6) and their implementation progress reported annually to the AU Summit (Communiqué of the 1st APR Forum, 2004:6). It is also important to note that African leaders are still debating on approaches to integrating these structures for effective and efficient working relationships towards the common goals of poverty eradication and Africa's development.

The point of departure for analysis of the relationships among AU/NEPAD/APRM is that NEPAD is a development plan of the African Union, and the APRM a voluntary mechanism, to monitor the performance of participating African states and thereby improve their governance and policies.

The Assembly of the AU, made up of 53 African Heads of State and Government is the supreme decision-making authority on matters concerning the operationalisation and implementation of the NEPAD. However, it has delegated its powers and functions of providing leadership for the implementation of the NEPAD to the HSGIC. As already noted, the HSGIC is a committee of 20 Heads of State and Government representing the five African regions defined as North, West, East, Central and South. The HSGIC is assisted in its functions by the Steering Committee composed of personal representatives of Heads of State and Government serving on the HSGIC and a Secretariat which is based in South Africa. This configuration poses the problem of coordination. In principle, NEPAD projects are to be developed, studied, and implemented by the Regional economic communities (RECs) of the AU, which are the pillars of regional integration and development in Africa. Therefore, to facilitate communication, coordination and implementation of NEPAD projects, those countries sitting on the HSGIC should represent the RECs and not the North, West, East, Central and South whose membership



and authority are not clearly determined.

The Assembly of the AU is serviced by a Secretariat called the Commission of the AU, which is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Commission represents the AU and defends its interests, and assists member states to implement the AU policies and programmes. Thus, in relation to NEPAD, the Commission ought to play a coordinating role, mobilising technical and financial support, and monitoring the implementation of NEPAD projects by various countries and African regions. These functions are currently performed by the NEPAD Secretariat based in South Africa, although the AU Commission participates in all meetings of the Steering Committee, which oversees the work of NEPAD Secretariat. While the two structures should complement each other to achieve the goals of the AU and NEPAD, in practice, there is the danger that they may compete and undermine each other. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication, waste of resources and lack of focus, integration and clear division of responsibilities is imperative.

The APRM is the instrument to monitor the governance performance of African states. Although participation in the APRM process is voluntary, African states participating in the APRM have decided to report to the Assembly of the AU on the processes, implementation progress and activities of the APRM on an annual basis. The Panel of 7 African Eminent Persons oversees the implementation of the APRM and it is assisted by a Secretariat located in South Africa. The APR Panel reports to the APR Forum.

The APR Secretariat is expected to work in cooperation with a number of regional bodies, in particular, the NEPAD Secretariat and the AU Commission in sourcing and sharing information to develop background information papers on member states of the African Union participating in the APRM. Similarly, the founding documents of the APRM stipulate that the APR Secretariat should collaborate with various secretariats of the Regional Economic Communities such as the ECOWAS, ECCAS, AMU, COMESA, and SADC. However, there is no formal institutional relationship envisaged between the NEPAD Steering Committee and the APR Panel. These two structures are

key in providing leadership and monitoring the implementation of NEPAD and the APRM. Although participation in the APRM is voluntary, collaboration between the two can facilitate the performance of their respective responsibilities.

At the bottom of the model in Figure 5.1 is the country with national NEPAD and/or APRM structures. National NEPAD/APRM institutions are likewise required to interact with relevant REC secretariats, the APRM Secretariat and the NEPAD Secretariat. Countries participating in the APRM are specifically required to have national structures for the implementation of the peer review. The model (Figure 5.1) shows the complex networks of interactions among various structures and actors within the African Union and its organs and member states. So far, the reports of activities of these structures suggest a vertical working relationship. Coordination, in particular, horizontal coordination is lacking and appears to be the major challenge for this structural set up. Integration of some functions and structures of the AU, NEPAD and the APRM for better delivery and to avoid duplication is a matter that requires urgent attention.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE APRM

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is now three years old. An analysis of the APRM performance opens up a number of questions in terms of knowing what has been achieved so far. Has the initiative induced change in the manner in which African governments manage their affairs? Has the nature and content of the relationship and dialogue with the developed countries and multilateral institutions changed? Clear-cut answers are difficult to come by given the fact that the APRM is new and a very young initiative. Achievements are discussed in the context of the progress made in implementing the mechanism in Africa.

THE PROGRESS OF PEER REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION

To date, 23 African countries out of the 53 member states of the African Union have signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the APRM, thus

acceding to the peer review process (NEPAD Annual Report, 2003/2004:37). The table below represents African countries participating in the voluntary peer performance assessments and the dates of accession to the APRM.

Table 5.1: List of African states that have acceded to the APRM' MoU

No.	Country	Date of Signature of MoU
1	Algeria	09 March 2003
2	Burkina Faso	09 March 2003
3	Republic of Congo	09 March 2003
4	Ethiopia	09 March 2003
5	Ghana	09 March 2003
6	Kenya	09 March 2003
7	Cameroon	03 April 2003
8	Gabon	14 April 2003
9	Mali	28 May 2003
10	Mauritius	09 March 2004
11	Mozambique	09 March 2004
12	Nigeria	09 March 2004
13	Rwanda	09 March 2004
14	Senegal	09 March 2004
15	South Africa	09 March 2004
16	Uganda	09 March 2004
17	Egypt	09 March 2004
18	Benin	31 March 2004
19	Malawi	08 July 2004
20	Lesotho	08 July 2004
21	Tanzania	08 July 2004
22	Angola	08 July 2004
23	Sierra Leone	08 July 2004

Source: The APRM Secretariat, November 2005

The process of peer review started with four countries, namely Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and Mauritius that volunteered to begin the process. All the



four countries received the APRM support mission, almost at the same time. Ghana received its APRM support mission from the 24- 29 May 2004, Rwanda from the 21- 24 June 2004, Kenya from the 26- 27 July 2004, and Mauritius from the 28 - 30 June 2004 (Press release of 18 June 2004, the APR Secretariat, www.nepad.org). At the time of writing this thesis (December 2005), only two of the four countries under review, namely Ghana and Rwanda have reached the completion stage and their final reports submitted in June 2005 to the APR Forum (which met in Abuja, Nigeria) for consideration and adoption. According to the rules of the APRM process, these reports will be available for public consumption, six months after their deliberation by the APR Forum. Kenya and Mauritius are still in the process of peer review. In Kenya, dispute over the Constitution is reported to have derailed the process of the APRM (*The East African Standard*, 26 March 2004). In addition to these countries, Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa, and Uganda have this year of 2005 received the first APRM support missions and have started their self-assessment and to draft the Programme of Action.

Initially, two country reviews were planned to be undertaken quarterly. According to the proposed calendar, from April 2004/March 2005 to April 2005/March 2006, 16 countries were expected to be at some stage of the peer review process (NEPAD Annual Report, 2003/2004:39). Furthermore, paragraph 26 of the APRM base document (APRM, 2003:5) provides six months as the maximum period for the review process for a country. Therefore, according to these provisions, by December 2005, at least 10 countries would complete the process of peer review and six would be in the process. However, as the progress of the peer review shows, these targets are far from being achieved. By December 2005, only two countries have reached the completion stage and six are in the process of peer review. Addressing the third Summit of the APR Forum on 19 June 2005 in Abuja, Nigeria, President Obasanjo, who as noted heads the NEPAD HSGIC and the APR Forum, justified the sluggishness of the APRM process in the following terms:



Many had doubted whether we could go so far with this process while some of our detractors, without sympathy for the difficulties often encountered in starting up such a far-reaching initiative, and the need to get it right and to ensure quality, fairness, credibility and integrity for the process, complained that we were slow. We all know that any new venture needs a reasonable amount of time and space to move from inception to completion. The APRM process, in many cases, called for the setting up of new national institutions to fully address the type of in-depth and broad-based consultations with all stakeholders, which is a prerequisite of the process. (Obasanjo, 2005:1)

Indeed, getting the APRM off the ground is a colossal task, because the process involves numerous activities, such as the creation of new institutions, the APR Focal Point and the APR Coordinating Mechanism. But, the most important and challenging task is to start up a process of dialogue and negotiation among all stakeholders about national issues and policies, a culture foreign to many African countries. In addition, the process requires the country to put aside a budget for the operation of these national institutions, including conducting workshops, surveys and self-assessment reports, which may not be readily available. Thus, one must admit that, despite its humble beginnings, the progress made by the APRM after only two years of operation is commendable.

Besides a significant number of countries that have already committed to abide by the principles and standards of good governance contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, it is argued that the advent of the NEPAD and APRM in Africa has induced positive change in leadership and governance (Nkhulu, 2005; UNECA, 2005a). Since the inception of the NEPAD and the APRM, a process of transformation in good governance is on the increase in Africa. The ECA report notes successful elections and peaceful changes of leadership in Mozambique, Rwanda, Malawi and Namibia among others, something that was exceptional a decade ago (UNECA, 2005a:3). In Burundi, people have peacefully ended the transition and elected their president after 12 years of civil unrest. The report further notes that legislatures and judiciaries are gradually reasserting their independence, and governance is becoming more inclusive reflecting the profile of all ethnic, regional, racial and religious groups (UNECA, 2005a:8). On the economic front, improved macroeconomic



management has also been recorded, making it possible to improve economic aggregates. The average economic growth rate for the continent in 2004 was 5.1 per cent (the highest in eight years) and the IMF projects economic growth of over 5.3 per cent for 2005, and average inflation of 9.9 per cent compared with 41 per cent over 20 years ago (Nkhulu, 2005:3-4). The noticeable improvement in political stability and macroeconomic performance cannot, however, be solely attributed to the NEPAD and the APRM initiatives. There are numerous contributing factors including internal political dynamics and economic reforms, which compel developing countries to rigorous financial and economic management discipline.

Notwithstanding the tangible achievements, it should be underlined that to assess the performance of the APRM in such a short period of its existence is not an easy exercise, nor a fair account of the process. The peer review process which aims to instil good governance practices in African countries for sustainable development and continental integration is a long process of transformation of governance systems, institutions, and other essential elements, which cannot be achieved in just three years. Experience from other parts of the world, such as the European Union reveals that transformation of this nature is a complex and difficult endeavour and can take many years. Bearing this in mind, the analysis focuses on the merits of the values and principles of the APRM and on the challenges and problems facing the mechanism in the way it seeks to achieve its mandate.

MERITS AND BENEFITS OF THE APRM POLICIES

IMPROVING LEADERSHIP AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The African Peer Review Mechanism reflects the ultimate commitment of African leaders to the tenets of democracy and good governance. Given the fact that political governance has been singled out as the major factor undermining sustainable social and economic development on the continent, the APRM is potentially a decisive element to attain the objectives set forth for the new socio-economic revival of Africa. Since the mid-90s, good leadership and democratic governance have received special attention by both African



leaders and their development partners. In this regard, numerous policies have been adopted. These include the African Charter for Popular Participation (1990), the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action for the promotion and protection of human rights (1999), the Declaration on the framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government (2000), and the Maputo Convention on preventing and combating corruption (2003).

In addition, the Constitutive Act of the new African Union (AU) adopted in Lomé in July 2000, which replaced the old Organisation for African Unity (OAU) came as a strong promoter of democracy and good governance. This Act includes the promotion of “democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance” as an objective of the AU. Furthermore, the founding principles of the AU include condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. Article 30 of the Act is clear about the principle: “governments which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union”.

All these underline the increasing political will to the principles of good leadership and governance and the primacy of the rule of law. Through the APRM, African leaders have for the first time, taken a firm decision to openly monitor the implementation of these commitments. The APRM is an implementation mechanism, a tool to encourage African states to adopt all the above policies and practices of good governance, which are expected to bring political stability on the continent, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional and continental economic integration.

On the political front, the democracy and political area of the APRM aims at “consolidating a constitutional order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and effective, responsive public service are realized to ensure sustainable development and a peaceful and stable society” (APRM/OSCI, 2003:5). Specifically, there are nine objectives under “democracy and political governance” of the APRM.



- prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-country conflicts;
- promotion of constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the Constitution firmly established in the constitution;
- promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments;
- upholding the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective Parliament;
- ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants;
- fighting corruption in the political sphere;
- promotion and protection of the rights of women;
- promotion and protection of the rights of the child and young persons;
and
- promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and refugees. (APRM-OSCI, 2003: 5-6)

The importance of these principles of good political governance, which include the rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution, effective and efficient public institutions, and the protection of social, economic and cultural rights cannot be overemphasized. The rule of law provides the minimum basis for creating rule-bound states. Effective legal systems protect citizens and commercial activities against state arbitrariness. They ensure accountable and transparent government, which in turn enhances social trust, increases commercial certainty, creates incentives for efficiency and higher productivity, and controls corruption all of which are essential to boost social and economic



development.

It is evident that the APRM objectives and policies afford Africa's leadership the opportunity to re-chart the destiny of the continent by fostering good governance and sound economic management. The APRM provides a framework for dialogue and sharing experiences between participating African states. This will enable them to identify their weaknesses and find effective solutions. Thus, the APRM is a socializing instrument that encourages states to learn from, and emulate each other's best practices in political and economic governance in their fight against poverty and underdevelopment.

The welcome reaction of leaders of Rwanda and Ghana of their country reports bears out the non-confrontational character of the APRM and the learning commitment of participating countries. For instance, Ghana was criticized for lacking institutional capacity. In addition, Ghana's economy was assessed as being "relatively weak and highly vulnerable to external shocks, especially the vagaries of world trade and sub-regional political instability" (*Mail & Guardian*, South Africa, 24 June 2005). While Rwanda was praised for having 48 per cent of women in its Parliament, it was criticized on reconciliation policies and the local government electoral process (*Daily Trust*, 12 August 2005).

In light of these comments, instead of discarding the reports as speculative, the leaders whose governments were assessed appreciated the remarks saying that the reports would help their governments work harder on identified weaknesses. According to President Kufuor, "the country will continue to implement the Programme of Action and be submitted to regular reviews on its performance" (*BuaNews*, 23 June 2005). He was also credited as saying: "We are not before this forum as people in the dock. We are here as brothers to see our reflection so we can correct the path we make in terms of governance and good leadership for economic development and upholding human rights" (*The Mail & Guardian*, 24 June 2005).

The President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, also welcomed the APRM report saying that Rwandans are looking "forward to working with" other African



nations as they “carry out the corrective measures where weaknesses have been identified” (*The New Times*, 22 June 2005). These statements suggest a change in leadership style, a leadership that is ready to accept mistakes and weaknesses in their governance systems, and is willing to learn the best practices of governing public affairs. It can be argued that the APRM has set a stage for visionary leadership and better governance on the African continent. The challenge remains, however, in the translation of these statements into concrete implementation. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether Rwanda and Ghana will correct the identified shortcomings.

OPEN SPACE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

For the NEPAD and the APRM to effectively achieve their goals, the role of civil society is crucial. The current discourse on civil society in Africa, by academics and donors, often presents civil society as the locus *sine qua non* for progressive politics, the arena in which people strive to improve their lives, but also, one for political resistance (Chazan, 1994; Kasfir, 1998). Civil society is regarded as a dynamic mechanism and crucial safeguard that will make African states more democratic, more transparent and more accountable. Consequently, since the 1980s, civil society participation in public policy has been part of the package of reforms pushed by development agencies, donor countries, and pro-democracy movements. In February 1990 in Arusha during a conference that brought together African governments, United Nations agencies, and African civil society groups, African governments formally endorsed the idea of the participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) in governance and development. The “African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation” affirmed that the development process should be fundamentally reoriented towards greater, broad-based participation on the part of Africa’s people and their organisations to allow them to contribute effectively to the development process and share equitably in governance and nation building (<http://www.africaaction.org/african-initiatives/chartall.htm>).

The principles and practices for good governance and development contained



in the NEPAD and the APRM refer to popular participation, and actually open a space for civil society and business, calling for partnership in the new vision of Africa's development. Even though these initiatives were developed without the input of African society, their implementation is based on participation and makes the participation of all stakeholders – government agencies, private sector and civil society organisations – a must. Subsequently, the African peer review process requires each participating country in the APRM to establish a national coordinating structure that embraces all stakeholders, including government officials, parliamentarians, opposition representatives, business community, media, NGOs, community-based organisations, women's associations, and youth groups. The APRM process provides African society with opportunities not only to evaluate the performance of their governments but also to be part of the policy-making process, through the development of a Programme of Action to address the identified shortcomings in governance and socio-economic development.

For instance, the media – print, audio and visual media – is heavily involved in gathering and reporting information relating to the APRM. This has increased the availability, in the public arena, of information on the processes and progress of the peer review. Other organized civil society groups have held several conferences and seminars to debate these new frameworks for governance and development in Africa, and to determine their role in these processes. An example is the African Social Forum created in 2002 as a continental space for social movements, organisations and institutions from across the continent to debate and formulate proposals that promote democratic governance and sustainable development. This gathering brings together, each year, civil society activists and experts from all African countries (<http://www.africansocialforum.org/english/fsa2004.htm>).

In all the countries undergoing the peer review, the process has opened up a space for civil society participation and critique. As already mentioned, Ghana has commissioned four independent, non-government technical advisory bodies to assist with the assessment process in the focal areas of the APRM (Botwe, 2005:3). In Rwanda, among the 50 members of the APR National



Commission, 17 are representatives of various civil society organisations and business community (*NEPAD Rwanda Magazine*, 2005:14-15). In Kenya, it was reported that the experts drawn from various organisations, including public universities, rejected the draft National Self-Assessment Report, saying it did not reflect the voice of Kenyans, and questioning its softness on corruption. This has led to a meeting between APR Focal Point and stakeholders to rework the country review report (*Business News*, 2 September 2005 http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=28248).

It is important to note, however, that participation of organised civil society groups in the processes of the African peer review does not ensure that the voice of the rural poor is heard. One of the strongest criticisms at the APRM is its lack of mobilisation of local communities in the process of evaluating their country's governance (Verwey, 2005:11-12). Indeed, a number of barriers such as the fact that the APRM documents are written in non-mother tongue languages (English and French) hinder participation. This makes participation in the APRM process an elite affair. There is an urgent need to translate the APRM documents into local languages.

Despite its shortcomings, the APRM has set in motion a process of dialogue among government institutions, civil society and the business sector about governance and development issues and how they can be addressed. Furthermore, the APRM guidelines make it clear that all the stakeholders should be involved in the implementation and monitoring of the Programme of Action that derives from the peer review process. Thus, in the long run, the APRM process will build and strengthen the culture of popular participation in decision-making, which is essential for the consolidation of democracy and better governance in Africa. The organisations of civil society must, therefore, get together and strengthen their responses to the openings that the APRM offers.



NEW PARTNERSHIP WITH DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The new partnership for Africa's development is principally based on the African leaders' commitment to reforms ensuring democracy and sound economic and corporate governance, in exchange of a renegotiated financial partnership with the developed world. Two strategies are proposed in the NEPAD plan to be pursued with the group of eight highly industrialised countries (G8) to raise resources for Africa's development. The first strategy concerns increasing capital flows to Africa, and the second, improving market access. The capital flows initiative aims to mobilise domestic resources through improvements in the public revenue collection systems and increased domestic savings. However, the bulk of resources are expected to come from debt relief, increased overseas development assistance and foreign direct investments. The market access seeks to increase financial flows by improving and diversifying agricultural products, negotiating better terms of trade, and promoting mining, manufacturing, tourism and services (NEPAD, 2001:37-47).

African leaders have demonstrated their commitment to good governance and to the economic renewal of the continent through the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, and the establishment of the APRM. The G8 countries on their side responded by releasing in June 2002 the G8-Africa Action Plan (AAP). Through this plan rich nations have promised "enhanced partnerships" if African countries can hold themselves to the principles of democratic and economic reforms through the self-monitoring instrument of the APRM. Paragraph 7 of the AAP is informative in this regard: "The peer review process will inform our considerations of eligibility for enhanced partnerships" (*G8-Africa Action Plan*, 2002:2). Thus, the APRM occupies a critical position in the new partnership between Africa and the G8.

Since the Africa Action Plan agreed to at Kananaskis, Canada, in 2002, developed countries have made significant strides in support of the NEPAD/APRM programmes and objectives. In areas, such as conflict



resolution and management on the continent, the AU has received a sizeable amount of support from the G8. The G8 members have also provided substantial support to the AU Peace and Security institutions and operations in the form of expertise, equipment, training, logistics, and finance (NEPAD Annual Report 2003/04:47). In addition to this, development assistance and debt relief have received a special attention. At the G8 Summit at Gleneagles in Scotland, the G8 leaders agreed to increase aid to Africa by \$25 billion per annum by 2010. Moreover, G8 countries have individually committed to meet commitments to earmark 0.7 per cent of their national income “GNI” to aid by 2015 (*G8 Gleneagles Report*, 2005:16).

Developed nations have now acknowledged that their aid policies have failed to address poverty in recipient countries, because they were often designed to support the political and economic interest of donor countries (*Commission for Africa*, 2005:22). Initiatives, such as the Paris Declaration of March 2005 on aid effectiveness, aim at improving relationships between the G8 countries and Africa. In the Paris Declaration, donors resolved to take far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform aid delivery and management, including:

- respect and ensure that the recipients exercise leadership over their development policies, and strategies, and coordinate development actions;
- align aid policies with national development strategies of recipient countries;
- harmonise donors actions in order to reduce duplication, and cumbersome procedures and promote aid effectiveness;
- implement aid in a way that focuses on desired results; and
- mutual accountability and transparency in the use of development resources. (Paris Declaration, 2005: 3-8)

On the area of debt relief, the G8 has agreed to a proposal to cancel 100 per cent of outstanding debts of poor countries to the IMF, World Bank and



African Development Fund under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative (*G8 Gleneagles Report*, 2005: 12-13). In 2002, sub-Saharan Africa's total debt stock was estimated at \$210 billion, and that of the whole continent at \$300 billion (UNCTAD, 2004:5-6). Eligibility for debt relief under the HIPC is conditional upon good governance and political stability (www.worldbank.org/hipc). In June 2005, the Ministers of Finance of G8 countries ahead of their Heads of State Summit in Gleneagles struck a deal to cancel \$40 billion worth of debts owed by 18 HIPC. The following 14 African countries benefited from the June HIPC decision: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Negotiations for total debt cancellation are still ongoing.

In the area of trade, much needs to be done. Although African countries have preferential market access under different schemes, such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Everything-But-Arms (EBA) initiative, and the Cotonou preferences, high tariffs and tariff peaks still limit African exports (UNECA, 2005b:4). It is estimated that trade barriers imposed by rich countries cost developing nations approximately US \$100 billion a year (Oxfam, 2002:5). The United States and the European Union have agreed to negotiate an end date for the elimination of all forms of agricultural subsidies as well as to achieve substantial reduction in trade distorting domestic support and substantial improvements in market access (*G8 Gleneagles*, 2005:16). However, the Doha round of trade talks held in December 2005 in Hong Kong failed to offer significant concessions that would benefit poor countries. Although there is still a long way to go, the financial support already earmarked and the pledges made by developed countries to help Africa in its development efforts signal that the new partnership and the policies of good governance that underpin the APRM will ultimately bear fruit.

PROMOTING REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT

In Africa, as already stated, the idea of regional integration started in the early years of independence, in the 1960s, perceived largely as an instrument for



safeguarding the recently acquired political freedom and a strategy towards economic development. This vision was consistent with academic evidence, which argues that regional cooperation and integration enable individual countries to achieve greater economic benefits (Balassa, 1961; Nye, 1968; Asante, 1997).

However, regional attempts in Africa have failed to yield expected results as evidenced by, among other things, poor economic growth, low levels of intra-regional trade and inability to attract investments. As indicated in the previous chapter, one of the major impediments to Africa's regional integration and development has been the widespread unrest, which makes it difficult to have fruitful regional trade and effective economic integration. The APRM as a mechanism that helps subscribed countries to adopt good policies and best practices of governance can contribute towards the achievement of regional goals in various ways.

First, the political governance review of the APRM seeks to foster the adoption of policies and mechanisms to prevent and reduce all types of intra- and inter-country conflicts (APRM/OSCI, 2003:6). Thus, it is reasonable to expect that, through its recommendations and monitoring, the peer review will reduce civil conflicts and wars, which have claimed millions of African lives, displaced people and destroyed economies. The setbacks in regional cooperation and integration resulting from wars and social strife will be significantly reduced, thus paving the way for fruitful regional cooperation and effective economic integration, as already intimated.

Secondly, the economic and corporate policy reforms suggested in the NEPAD and the APRM are not only important for attracting foreign investments but they are also essential to improve the macroeconomic environment, boosting economic growth and intra-regional trade and economic integration. Specifically, the African peer review seeks, in the area of economic governance, to accelerate regional integration by encouraging the harmonisation of monetary, trade, and investment policies among participating states (APRM/OSCI, 2003:16). President Paul Kagame of



Rwanda in his address to the ninth COMESA Summit held in Kampala on 7 June 2004 underscored the role of the APRM to expedite the process of regional integration. He said, “the APRM process will hasten the process of harmonisation of standards and practices, which will in turn accelerate continental economic integration that we see as the key to our own emancipation and development”.

Thirdly, the fact that the NEPAD and the APRM are internationally recognised as the formal frameworks of engagement with African states implies a shift and the development of a new intellectual framework in understanding and resolving African problems. Through the NEPAD/APRM, donors and development agencies can assist in accelerating the process of regional integration by using some of their aid packages to promote alternatives and projects that really advance African countries as integrated regions instead of single units.

CHALLENGES OF THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM

The creation of the NEPAD and the APRM as a means of achieving good political governance and sound economic management, and hence alleviating poverty in Africa has been widely welcomed. However, the initiatives have also, especially in Africa, created ideological differences among the states, business people, academia and civil societies. This section discusses some of the most critical challenges of an institutional and implementation nature that may impede the attainment of APRM objectives.

INSTITUTIONAL PARALYSIS

The term “institution” has been used by scholars in two different ways, first to refer to an organisation, such as the African Union, and second to mean the rules used to structure patterns of interaction within and across organisations. In this study, the concept adopts latter meaning. By rules, as Ostrom defines the concept, one should understand shared prescriptions (must, must not, may) that are mutually understood and predictably enforced in particular situations by agents responsible for monitoring conduct and for imposing



sanctions (Ostrom, 1999:37). Ostrom further argues that the stability of rule-ordered actions depends essentially upon two things: the shared meaning of values and commitments as expressed in words used to formulate a set of rules; and the existence of an institutional system to monitor compliance with rules and to impose sanctions (Ostrom, 1999:37).

Because rules are mutual understandings among those involved, which refer to enforced prescriptions about what actions are required, prohibited or permitted, the shared understanding of rules is a key factor in ensuring compliance. The institutional system regulates the exercise of authority and ensures compliance by setting up incentive schemes and commitment mechanisms (Ostrom, 1999). Thus, the design of institutional arrangements is crucial, because it can create very different incentives, which lead members to interact in either compliant or non-compliant ways. Therefore, an institutional analysis of the APRM involves the examination of the above-mentioned issues. First, one needs to interrogate whether there has been or has not been a shared understanding of the rules, which form the basis of the African peer review initiative. This is thought to ensure the acceptability and credibility of the peer review mechanism. Secondly, the analysis focuses on the configuration of the institutional system to determine its effectiveness in bringing African states into compliance with agreed commitments.

Shared commitments or donor imposed agenda

The new initiatives for good governance and development in Africa, NEPAD and the APRM, have met tough local criticism. Several African scholars have criticized the new strategies for Africa's development for having been developed behind closed doors, without the input of African citizenry (Herbert, 2002:109; Olukoshi, 2002:9; Tandon, 2002:1). African civil society organisations accuse leaders championing NEPAD of having disregarded democratic principles by failing to consult and explain their vision of African recovery to their citizens before they could table it in front of the G-8 countries (see the Bamako Declaration passed by the African Social Forum in 2002).

Some critics go further in discrediting the NEPAD initiative as a donor imposed development plan repackaged under the alleged African ownership (Olukushi, 2002:9). Olukushi is not alone in denouncing the new partnership. According to the Group for Research and Initiatives for the Liberation of Africa (GRILA), NEPAD is a "...self-declared continental development plan" sought to expand the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which is the "hard pill many African countries have been forced to swallow since the 80s..." (www.grila.org/nepad_body.htm). Critics debunk the paradigm basis of NEPAD, according to which the market, through massive injection of capital, in particular private capital flows, will spur African development, because the free market approach to development has lamentably failed in Africa since the structural adjustment in the 1980s (Adedeji, 2002:4). Adebayo Adedeji, one of the eminent Africans on the APRM, a man who has been at the centre of Africa's development strategies since the Lagos Plan (1980) cautioned NEPAD architects against liberal policies, which focus on foreign capital to spur the development process.

Adedeji (2002:8) notes:

Quite understandably the NEPAD song is at present more soothing to the ears of the West than that of the LPA. The development merchant system (DMS) and its marabous appear to have been re-energised and the two-gap model of economic growth, which drew African countries into the debt trap, has been reactivated and rejuvenated. The protagonists of NEPAD should never forget that it was this model that exacerbated the dependency syndrome of the African economies and at the same time led to mass pauperisation and deprivation of the African people.

Here, the architects of NEPAD undertake to adopt the "new partnership" based on the neo-liberal model without questioning whether this type is best suited for Africa in terms of economic realities and the quest for sustainable human development. This is an approach that forces policy makers to follow the dictates of the global free market and makes issues of democracy and human rights (such as equality and a better life for all) secondary. By limiting the scope of government, the neo-liberal approach favours the market economy, which promotes the interests of the already financially strong, particularly the investors and businesses, at the expense of the poor. The

experience of the implementation of SAPs in Africa has shown that key sectors of the national economy, including health and education, with no high returns to investors suffer a great deal when neo-liberal policies are applied (Ake, 1996:33).

The contention on values and principles of the NEPAD is even fiercer when it comes to its political governance aspect. In fact, the partnership is premised on the reasoning that Africa upholds the tenets of good governance, and in exchange, the developed countries (mostly the G8 countries and the BWI) give more aid, debt relief, and open up their markets. When the highly industrialised nations released the G8-Africa Action Plan, at Kananaskis in Canada, 2002, they made it clear that they will support the partnership with those countries pursuing democratic governance and market policies and submit to peer reviews (G8-Africa Action Plan, 2002: para 4, and 7). Therefore, the African peer review mechanism is one of the conditions for the new partnership deal.

In the NEPAD document, African leaders have committed to respect the “global standards of democracy”, the core components of which include political pluralism, which allows for the existence of multiple political parties and workers unions, and fair, open and democratic elections periodically organised to enable people to choose their leaders (NEPAD, 2001: para 79). The choice of “global standards of democracy” begs the question of whether there are other values of democracy, such as African values, which could guide African communities in their development endeavours. Today, it is increasingly accepted that no “standard model of democracy” exists, and that each country should find its own path to it. These are some of the elements that emerged during the Parliamentarians’ Forum on “Good Governance in Africa” convened on 21-22 October 2004 in Berlin, Germany (Terlinden, 2004 at http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/africa/rep_htm).

The emphasis on liberal western democracy by NEPAD casts doubts on the good faith of embracing principles of good governance and peer review. As Olukoshi (2002:5) notes,



The democracy and governance initiative of the NEPAD raises more questions than it answers and, on a more critical examination, seems designed more to pander to a donor audience than responding to, or representing the concerns of the domestic forces in the vanguard of the struggle for the reform of the political space and developmental agenda.

There appears to be general scepticism about the idea of the peer review mechanism. On the one hand, the above comments of Olukoshi point to fears that commitments by African leaders to political reforms may be superficial as they appear to respond to pressures from donors and the international lending agencies, thus leading to “convenient democracies”, which do not address the concerns of Africans for genuine political reform. On the other hand, many African leaders have adopted the “wait and see” approach. Some 30 African countries have not yet joined the APRM. Although there may be various reasons for non-participation, it appears that African leaders see the APRM as a scorecard, and fear that the review mechanism could threaten state sovereignty by allowing outsiders to impose governance or have an “invisible hand” in their governance. Thus, despite the imperatives for good governance in Africa, the APRM suffers from lack of broad buy-in. Collective acceptance and efforts are necessary for the African peer review to root out the ills of governance, such as corruption, clientelism and lack of accountability.

Leadership authority of the NEPAD and the APRM

Leadership authority of the NEPAD and APRM is another contentious area. Despite the objectives of the NEPAD and the APRM to improve governance and spur Africa’s development, some sceptical analyses consider these initiatives as furtive tools of the South African foreign policy for economic nationalism and quicker integration in the globalised economy (Bond, 2002; Keet, 2003; Naidu, 2003). The question arises as what has triggered these rejectionist theories? Below are some reasons that might have led to the understanding (or misinterpretation) of the NEPAD and the APRM as clandestine strategies of the South African economic expansionism.

The first reason is related to the emerging conditions of the NEPAD programme. As already mentioned, NEPAD was born out of two main



documents: the Millennium Partnership for Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) put forward by President Mbeki of South Africa, Obasanjo of Nigeria and Bouteflika of Algeria, and the Omega plan of President Wade of Senegal. Although the three Presidents participated in the drafting of the MAP, the international and local media has widely portrayed President Mbeki as its principal architect and most passionate promoter (Herbert, 2002:96). Furthermore, the perception of South African domination was fuelled by the fact that the final document of the NEPAD adopted in October 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, kept the MAP structure and most of its phraseology.

Secondly, and perhaps the most important reason, relates to the content of the NEPAD, mainly its economic policies and their implications for many African countries. NEPAD, in different paragraphs, demonstrates the role the international economic system has played in impoverishing the continent. Paragraph 3 of the NEPAD document outlines the following:

Historically, accession to the institutions of the international community, the credit and aid binomial has underlined the logic of African development. Credit has led to the debt deadlock, which from instalments to rescheduling still exists and hinders the growth of African countries. ... Globalisation has increased the cost of Africa's ability to compete....(NEPAD, 2001: para 3 and 28)

From this diagnosis, one would expect a development strategy that deals with this exploitation and dependence position, which Africa has been a victim for centuries. Paradoxically, however, the NEPAD strategy appears to legitimise and reinforce this situation by putting the market ideology at the centre of financing and driving Africa's development. According to NEPAD, to halt the underdevelopment and meet the millennium development goals, in particular the goal of reducing by half by 2015 the proportion of people living in poverty, Africa needs massive and sustained resources, estimated at US \$64 billion annually, the bulk of which need to be obtained essentially from private capitals (NEPAD, 2001: para 144). The architects of the NEPAD hope that this time around the West will keep their promises and that greater integration in the global economy and liberalization will save Africa as illustrated in this passage: "We hold that the advantages of an effectively managed integration



present the best prospects for future economic prosperity and poverty reduction...” (NEPAD, 2001: para 28).

The market/liberal approach to development in Africa has cast doubt on the real motives of the NEPAD’s architects. For some critics, the NEPAD represents the South African strategy for closer integration into the dominant structures of the world economy (Keet, 2003:26; Naidu, 2003:1). Indeed, emerging economies, of which South Africa is part, in their efforts to join the West must prove serious in the implementation of the international liberal order (Grant and Nijman, 1998:188). In this context, South Africa’s relations with Africa and the promotion of the NEPAD and the APRM can be simply understood as about “making the continent safe to do business” (Le Pere and Van Nieuwkerk, 2002:179).

Indeed, deeper analysis of the market strategy of NEPAD raises several questions. How the profit-oriented transnational corporate can assist in poverty reduction in small, poor, landlocked and non-endowed countries, such as Burundi, Rwanda, Lesotho, Swaziland, Niger, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, and many other sub-Saharan poor African nations burdened by bad geographic position, and other development problems? How can poor countries with virtually no private sector (entrepreneurial contenders) benefit from a highly competitive and unfettered liberalised global economy?

The experience of rapid economic growth of East Asian countries which has been attributed to massive private capital flows, in particular foreign direct investments, has fuelled the general belief that the development financing needs of all developing countries could be met by the normal working of the market. A closer look at the trend of these flows to developing countries challenges this assumption, as the large flows have been concentrated in a handful of countries, namely, the so-called emerging market economies (UNCTAD, 2005:2). Africa has been able to attract an insignificant amount of these resources. In 2004, from a very low base, FDI flows to Africa increased to US \$20 billion. This compares to \$166 billion into Asia and the Pacific, and \$69 billion to Latin America and the Caribbean. Most importantly, however,



nearly all of these private capital flows go to a few countries, rich in natural resources (oil, diamonds, gold, platinum and palladium): Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia, with the biggest share to South Africa (UNCTAD, 2005:4).

Thus, poor and non-endowed African economies will find it hard to attract foreign investments, and it is illusory to build their development strategy on these resources. At present, South Africa and Nigeria (to a lesser extent) stand as the only sub-Saharan African countries that can substantially benefit from rapid integration into the world economy via “liberalisation” and “market-led growth” strategies adopted in the NEPAD. Indeed, South Africa has a developed industrial market economy, a substantial technological base, an indigenous business class, all of which are essential to benefit in the highly competitive free market. Research demonstrates that globalisation works with and for the already strong and well endowed; and its radical liberalisation and unfettered competition deepen the disadvantages of the weak (Keet, 1999:3; Adejumobi, 2002:1). Similar conclusions were made by recent analyses of a group of USA Intelligence experts on sub-Saharan Africa. They say,

NEPAD consumes a significant portion of current African discussions on development and, critically, is a substantial part of South Africa and Nigeria's foreign policies. It is hardly exceptional for the weak to put their faith in international institutions that they will influence by fiat, or—as in the case of NEPAD—create outright, rather than in markets that will be dominated by the strong. (US National Intelligence Council, May, 2005)

The above arguments about the NEPAD and APRM highlight the perceptions that prevail among policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and civil society actors. However, they are difficult to justify. The fact that specific countries provide leadership for these initiatives does not mean that they are after their interests at the expense of others. Examples elsewhere suggest similar leadership behaviour. France and Germany are known to have provided strong leadership to the establishment and consolidation of what is known as the European Union.



Voluntary participation

The founding document of the African Peer Review Mechanism defines APRM as an African self-monitoring mechanism voluntarily acceded to by member states of the African Union (APRM base document, 2003:1). This institutional configuration is, however, problematic. Making accession to the peer review voluntary while the APRM is an integral part of the new blueprint for Africa's development and is considered the most critical aspect for the success of the plan negates the holistic approach of the NEPAD. African leaders agreed in the new plan that good political, corporate and economic governance are prerequisites for Africa's development. Paragraph 71 of NEPAD states:

African leaders have learned from their own experiences that peace, security, democracy, good governance, human rights and sound economic management are conditions for sustainable development. They are making a pledge to work, both individually and collectively, to promote these principles in their countries and sub-regions and on the continent.

Through the above statement, African leaders make a collective pledge to create an institutional and policy environment conducive to the success of NEPAD. One wonders why, therefore, with all the commitments and political will that African leaders have shown in the NEPAD, have they made the APRM a voluntary mechanism. This question is more easily posed than answered.

There are a number of issues that need to be evoked when analysing voluntary participation. First, the issue of national sovereignty, which is enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU, must be respected. However, this sovereignty has, for many years, protected dictators in Africa under the banner of the "non-interference" of states in the internal affairs of other states. Although the new Constitutive Act gives the AU the right to intervene in internal affairs, this can only happen in cases of grave circumstances, namely, war crimes, genocide, and crime against humanity (Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU of 2000). For some African leaders, the idea of external evaluators coming to analyse and criticise the way a country



manages its affairs is absurd. This is illustrated by these comments of President Wade of Senegal: "It is unrealistic," Wade said, "How do you think I can tell a president in a country that his election or his treatment of the press was not regular... I do not believe in it" (Reuters, July 8, 2002). While the government of Senegal has signed the MoU on the APRM and thereby accepted to be peer reviewed, the above comments underscore the uneasiness of some Heads of State about the peer review.

Indeed, the practice of peer review, which allows countries to assess other countries' governance (in all areas), is new in Africa. Developed countries have accepted the intrusive regular peer reviews for many years under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), but these have been primarily economic. No doubt, the APRM is a sensitive political process that will take time and means of engagement for African leaders to accept the idea of external review, particularly in the political domain.

The ideals of democracy that the APRM seeks to induce in countries force the mechanism to exemplify these democratic values. Thus, to be legitimate and democratic, participation in the APRM cannot be forced upon countries. Voluntary participation is thus the best way, which gives assurance that those countries that have freely agreed to enter into peer review agreements are aware of the requirements and constraints brought by the APRM and would do what it takes to abide by the commitments made.

However, the voluntary nature of the APRM constitutes a serious impediment to the attainment of the NEPAD goals. Indeed, NEPAD's viability if measured in terms of creating a better environment of governance (including political stability, and effective laws and institutions) for greater investment flows and trade, then voluntary participation is a high risk approach since it undermines collective efforts to address the obstacles to Africa's development, including negative perceptions of the continent. Experience in Africa has demonstrated that poor governance in one country can have far-reaching negative implications for the whole region. More than not, companies make investment



decisions based on perceptions rather than objective criteria. Research indicates that investors discount African economies more than other economies (Humphreys and Bates, 2002:3). More importantly, however, with voluntary participation, many of the projects under the NEPAD and the AU which require harmonisation of policies and sanitisation of institutions are unlikely to be attained. These include the regional integration project of the AU with its concomitant sectoral projects.

For the promoters of the NEPAD and the APRM, adherence to the principles and norms of good governance and opening up for the APRM reviews should be compulsory for all African states wanting to benefit from the NEPAD. South African Finance Minister, Trevor Manuel, addressing the Africa Investment Forum said that if he had his way signing up to peer review would be a prerequisite for countries to reap benefits from the NEPAD. According to Manuel, it is not acceptable for “misbehaving governments” to expect sharing equally in the benefits of the NEPAD (*Business Day*, 15 September 2004). Indeed, it is ironic that countries, such as Libya, Tunisia and Botswana, sit on the NEPAD implementation committee (which oversees and coordinates the implementation of NEPAD projects) but have not yet acceded to the NEPAD code of conduct and peer review.

Nonetheless, voluntary participation is currently the only legitimate, practical and effective way available to the APRM to champion the tenets of good governance. The APRM’s primary mission is to help willing states improve their governance as a precondition for national and regional development and integration. These ideals cannot be forced on sovereign states, especially in the context of the founding provisions of the AU. Instead, strategic incentive schemes and commitment mechanisms are required to motivate countries to accede to the peer review mechanism. There is a detailed discussion on incentives in Chapter six.

Absence of enforcement mechanisms

The Memorandum of Understanding on the African Peer Review Mechanism is a political affirmation of commitments and not a binding document. As a



result, the APRM has been lampooned by critics for lacking teeth (Cilliers, 2003:14; Herbert, 2003:9; Kajee, 2004:12). As already stated, the APRM is a non-punitive, non-adversarial process. It assumes, like the managerial school on international regimes (Chayes and Chayes, 1995:9), that participating countries will act in good faith, and that problems of non-compliance that may arise are to be found in financial constraints or political difficulties, which need to be solved through dialogue and cooperative efforts and not sanctions. President Obasanjo, at the third Summit of the APR Forum in Abuja Nigeria, in June 2005, reiterated this character of the APRM: “the APRM, in case anyone is still in doubt, is not an instrument for punishment or exclusion, but rather it is a mechanism to identify our strong points, share experiences, and help rectify our weak areas” (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/communiques/speech_19605abuja.pdf).

Thus, from an African viewpoint, the peer review process is more a peer learning process, a framework allowing set objectives to be met over time, rather than an instrument for benchmarking and punishing poor performers. However, the fact that the APRM is a non-binding mechanism raises questions as to how to ensure implementation and compliance by countries. It is important to highlight the protocols of engagement in a situation where a country fails to comply with its commitments. The APRM base document states:

If the Government of the country in question shows a demonstrable will to rectify the shortcomings, then it will be incumbent upon participating Governments to provide what assistance they can, as well as to urge donor governments and agencies also to come to the assistance of the country reviewed. However, if the political will is not forthcoming from the Government, the participating states should first do everything practicable to engage it in constructive dialogue, offering in the process technical and other appropriate assistance. If dialogue proves unavailing, the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date. The interval should concentrate the mind of the Government and provide a further opportunity for addressing the identified shortcomings under a process of constructive dialogue. All considered, such measures should always be utilised as a last resort. (APRM, 2003:5)

From the above statement, it is clear that measures to be taken against failing countries are not specified. Understandably, taking some measures against



failing states may be a source of international discord and contention, which may jeopardize all cooperative undertakings in Africa. However, the assumption that countries will act in good faith is also defective. In Chapter Four of this study, it emerged that poor governance and its consequences have in many cases been the result of bad choices by power-holders/leaders, whose main concern has been the consolidation of their power and political control. Thus, the non-enforcement approach of the African peer review is likely to reinforce the incentive for non-compliance.

The challenge facing the APRM and African leaders championing the principles of good governance is that, while in politics the soft approach might be the correct *modus operandi*, this arrangement will do little to change the behaviour of bad leaders or to bring them to implement policies that are in line with the APRM values and principles. In addition, this model is unlikely to convince donors and capital markets that fundamental changes are taking place, which may harm the financing strategies of the NEPAD. Thus, to gain credibility and respect, the APRM should find ways and incentives to encourage and sustain good governance practices in Africa. (These will be further discussed under Recommendations).

DIFFICULTIES OF IMPLEMENTATION

Research on the implementation of policies and programmes is very informative on the difficulties and challenges that occur once values have been authoritatively proclaimed. It has been discovered that implementation is more a complex political process, which involves a number of variables that have to be controlled and satisfied for successful implementation than a mechanical administrative one (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Implementation becomes even more complex and difficult in the context of international regimes. This is so because the implementation of international agreements depends largely on the willingness of individual countries. As sovereign states, they cannot be compelled to implement commitments by force, instead in most of the cases, as Pagani (2002:6) argues, compliance



with international commitments is sought through “soft law”, that is, mechanisms of dialogue and persuasion. The foregoing discussion pointed to institutional challenges, such as the voluntary participation and lack of enforcement mechanisms as key obstacles for the implementation of the peer review. The focus here is on other factors, more of an operational nature, which are equally essential for the successful implementation of the African peer review.

Content of the APRM: questionnaire, standards, criteria and indicators

The content of the policy defined as the ensemble of goals the policy sets out to achieve and the specific methods it uses to reach its objectives are crucial for successful implementation (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). The African peer review is a comprehensive assessment of four areas of governance: democracy and political governance, economic, corporate, and socio-economic development. The APRM document defines 24 major objectives to be achieved, and which are to be judged against major international treaties, declarations, and standards relevant to the work of the APRM. In addition, the document encompasses some 78 criteria and 93 examples of indicators that must be evaluated (APRM/OSCI, 2003:5-29). It has been argued that this scope for the African peer review is too broad and too detailed to be sensibly handled (Kanbur, 2004:9). While this concern is valid, this would depend, however, on the number of experts and time frames to carry out the job. Most of the work (developing background papers) is contracted out to various consultants and experts according to the areas of review. Furthermore, various partner institutions, such as the UNDP Africa Bureau, the ECA and the ADB provide human expertise assistance to the APRM Secretariat, which gives assurance that the technical assessments can be professionally handled.

Botswana presented similar arguments explaining a reluctance to join the APRM process. Botswana has indicated that it would not participate in the review process because of the nature of its operation. The Permanent Secretary for Development in Botswana, Modise Modise, has indicated that



Botswana feels that the focus of the APRM should be on political issues. The minister declared:

On some issues that the APRM is concerned with, such as economic matters, there may already be institutions that African countries belong to, such as the African Development Bank, Economic Commission for Africa, World Bank, IMF, UN whose reports could be utilised to avoid unnecessary duplication (*Tautona Times*, 2004 [http://www.sarpn.org.za /documents /d0000725/index.php](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000725/index.php))

It is true that the African peer review is wide, embracing all the issues from political, to economic, social development and corporate governance. However, the argument of risk of duplication with other reviews conducted by international organisations, such as the IMF as advanced by the government of Botswana, is tenuous. The purpose of the African peer review is principally to open up dialogue and debate on policy decisions and their implementation for the country under review. Thus, the APRM assessments need to be all-inclusive of political, social and economic issues. Furthermore, APRM reviews will work best if they are part of a wide range of evaluations, in which case, their findings can be challenged, or they can provide a counterweight to donor and other external assessments. However, this study also supports the streamlining of the content of the peer review but for another purpose: to focus on those policies and issues that are critical for the success of the NEPAD goals. It is suggested that the questionnaire, that is, objectives, standards, criteria and indicators, be aligned with NEPAD objectives and priorities. How this can be done is explained in the Recommendations.

Administrative capacity for implementation

Scholarship on implementation concurs that administrative capacity is a requisite for effective implementation of any policy or project (O'Toole, 1986:189). The administrative capacity refers to the availability of resources (financial and human), to carry out the changes desired by policies or programmes. Indeed, the credibility and sustainability of the APRM does not only depend on the political will of African leaders to open up their governments to scrutiny, but also on the competence and capacity of the APRM Secretariat and National APRM structures to effect a credible peer



review process. The APRM base document states it clearly that “every review carried out under the authority of the Mechanism must be technically competent, credible, and free of political manipulation” (APRM, 2003:1). Thus, for credible and professional peer review, the Secretariat must guarantee competence and independence. This means that evaluators must be qualified in the areas of assessment, objective, and fair in their judgement, and that countries under scrutiny should not influence the process in any way. Furthermore, competent review will be a function of human, material and financial resources made available for the process of self-assessment in the country.

In terms of human resources, the APRM Secretariat is staffed by a small team of personnel. The team comprises the Executive Director of the APRM Secretariat, three coordinators in charge of the political governance, corporate governance and socio-economic development, two researchers and an administrative secretarial staff. The APRM Secretariat also uses the expertise of partner institutions (such as the Africa Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa, and the United Nations for Development Programme) and consultants who do most of the technical work, that is, developing background papers, conducting field reviews and compiling reports. Given the sluggishness in the implementation of the APRM, it can be argued that the situation is caused (at least in part) by a shortage of personnel at the Secretariat to professionally carry out the reviews within the required time.

Administrative and technical challenges for carrying out the peer review process are also found at the country level. In many African countries, the capacity to analyse policies is weak among government agencies, academia, and civil society organisations. In most African countries, when evaluations are carried out, they deal more with compliance with rules than with impacts of policies. Furthermore, there are relatively few systematic and accurate data available for analysis, which results from either poor systems or shortage of qualified statisticians (Koranteng, 2000:78; Odhiambo, 2000:71). The problem of shortage of qualified practitioners/professionals in Africa is exacerbated by



the misplacement of human resources often for political considerations.

Moreover, the concept of capacity is not only limited to administrative resources. Capacity refers equally to institutional development and the ability of the state to govern and influence society (OECD, 2003:19). As highlighted in Chapter 4, institutions of governance, such as the parliament, judiciary and bureaucracies are, in many African countries, too weak to ensure effective governance. Therefore, to start up a process of dialogue about national policies and governance issues as required by the APRM is challenging, especially because popular participation is foreign to many African countries. Thus, political commitment at the highest level of government is imperative to drive the process and bring about the necessary changes demanded by the APRM. The process is likely to be stalled if at the national level this commitment is not available.

In terms of finance, the African peer review process is funded by contributions from participating countries and financial support from donors. At the first Summit of the APR Forum in Kigali, in February 2004, African Heads of State and Government participating in the APRM unanimously approved that each participating country must avail a minimum of US \$100000 for the operationalisation of the APRM. This amount, however, does not include funding the APR processes at the country level. Furthermore, an “APRM Trust Fund”, to be managed by the UNDP, was established into which donors and African countries can put their financial support. So far contributions to the Trust Fund are as follows: the UNDP has contributed \$ 2.7 million, Algeria \$1 million, Canada \$560000, Spain \$150000 and the UK Department for International Development has pledged \$2 million (APRM Secretariat, 2005).

Funding the process from African coffers would ensure African ownership and leadership of the APRM. According to the study conducted by the South African Institute of International Affairs, the set contribution is relatively low, as a comprehensive peer review is estimated to cost about US \$400000 for each country (Herbert, 2003:10). However, even with the amount to which they commonly agree, African leaders are failing to pay their contributions.



President Obasanjo, the chair of the APR Forum and the HISGC at the third Summit of the APR Forum in Abuja, in June 2005, noted the disappointing financial contributions of African countries to the APRM operations (www.nepad.org/2005/communiqués/speech_19605abuja.pdf). There have been claims that APRM operations are largely maintained by funds from donors and the South African government (Kajee, 2004:9). If these claims are true, then the sustainability of the APRM is in jeopardy, because there is no guarantee that the unwavering support from South Africa will remain; especially once President Mbeki, “the African Renaissance man”, as he is affectionately referred to, is out of office.

While for some poor countries depending on aid and struggling to provide services to their citizens, allocating US \$100000 to the APR Secretariat for the peer review may be challenging, there appears to be a habit among African states of not paying their dues. For instance in 2004, the member states paid only \$13 million of the AU's \$43 million annual budget. Seven countries face AU sanctions, including Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Guinea Bissau, for non-payment of AU dues, thereby losing their voting rights (<http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=42108>). The process of peer review is a costly exercise and countries must be ready to commit sufficient financial resources not only for a professional process but also for the sustainability and ownership of the APRM. Permitting free riders discourages willing and bona fide members. African leaders would, therefore, have to develop some formula, which would look at how every participating country can contribute according to its financial capacity. The formula needs to be in line with AU provisions, in particular the principle of sovereign equality, to avoid problems that might arise from “big brother” attitude. It is imperative to have a regulated source of funding. Ignoring this would be signing a death warrant of the APRM.

Role of stakeholders in the APRM process

The APRM has acknowledged the critical role of all stakeholders, including the civil society and the private sector in governance and development, and



opened up space for participation through the establishment of national coordinating structures. However, the effectiveness of participation depends on many factors, chief among them being the space opened up, the independence allowed, and the capacity of stakeholders for meaningful contribution to the whole process, from the review to the implementation and monitoring of the Programme of Action. The literature on African civil society reveals the weakness of civil society organisations to effectively engage the state in policy dialogue (Kasfir 1998:6; Mukamunana, 2002:54). Thompson (1997:5) argues that the political problems in most African countries are the result of how the state and civil society have failed to engage one another productively. Therefore, the dynamics of relationships between the state and the civil society are determinant for the outcome of peer review.

Where civil society is weak, policy dialogue and provision of alternatives are likely to be poor. Yet, powerful interest groups, including bureaucracies, politicians, business groups, and labour unions may stall or sabotage the process, especially when policies of transformation, which affect their interests, are at the centre of debate. Recently in Kenya, political actors, including ministers and senior officials sabotaged anti-corruption policies that the government of Mwai Kibaki attempted to implement after mounting donor pressure to cut off aid (BBC News, 23 February 2005, <http://secure.uk.imrworldwide.com/v51js>). It is important, therefore, for those responsible for the peer review to understand these factors in order to devise mechanisms for the fruitful participation of stakeholders.

The rollout of the APRM in the first peer reviewed countries has raised questions about the capacity and independence of civil society, hence its contribution to the whole peer review process. According to the South African Institute for International Affairs (SAIIA), which conducted seminars on civil society and the APRM in the first four countries which underwent the peer review, namely, Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and Mauritius, actors of civil society were not aware of either their role or the opportunities for engagement with the process. SAIIA also raised concerns that representation in the national



APRM structures was undemocratic (Kajee, 2004:10).

The problem is in fact that the APRM does not provide clear guidelines for the composition of the National Governing Council, nor for the selection of the national stakeholders. This loophole gives the government wide discretionary powers on deciding who should participate in the peer review process. Consequently, in some countries, the NGC was dominated by government representatives. This raises the danger of cooptation of civil society by the government to the extent that critical voices from civil society are deliberately excluded, or controlled, which would undermine the effective participation and contribution of the civil society to the APRM process.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the African peer review mechanism (APRM) reveals that the mechanism is potentially a decisive tool of cooperation between AU Member States for the achievement of NEPAD goals. Peer assessments afford African countries the opportunity to exchange ideas and share their experiences and international best practices in relation to governance and policy matters. It presents a forum of peer learning and regional and continental cooperation in which the challenges facing African countries, both individually and collectively, can be tackled. However, the mechanism is fraught with challenges. Voluntary participation and lack of enforcement measures are likely to hold back the process of procuring better governance and policy reforms on the continent. Furthermore, issues of administrative capacity, funding and participation of civil society need to be addressed for the peer review to be credible, effective and sustainable. Effective participation calls for capacity building of all stakeholders, and particularly the “oversight” institutions, such as the parliament, political parties, and civil society groups, to ensure that the APRM findings are translated into binding political commitments to be implemented. The next chapter summarises the main findings of this study and discusses the recommendations proposed to enhance the effectiveness of the APRM.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Since African states first began to obtain their political independence in the 1960s, the leadership has tried to build governance systems that would work for the people and bring development. Successive administrative reforms and development strategies were initiated to achieve this purpose. Today, however, Africa is still grappling with autocratic rule, bad governance and the plight of underdevelopment. The African Union, reformed from the old OAU, inaugurated in 2002 a new plan for economic growth and poverty reduction in Africa, the “New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (NEPAD). Philosophically, NEPAD takes its roots in the thinking that Africans should own and drive their countries to recovery. At the core of the NEPAD is the recognition that bad leadership and governance on the continent are the fundamental factors for Africa’s predicament, and therefore addressing them is a *sine qua none* condition to achieve sustainable development. Subsequently, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) was established in 2003 as a cooperation effort between African states and an indication of African leaders’ commitment to tackle bad governance. The APRM is a mechanism to assess government performance and encourage the implementation of policies and practices of good political, economic and corporate governance in Africa, which would lead to political stability and socio-economic development.

This research has sought to answer the following question: to what extent can the African Peer Review Mechanism address the critical issues of political governance in Africa? In the area of political governance, the APRM seeks to consolidate a constitutional political order in which democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, and effective, responsive public service are realized to ensure sustainable development and

a peaceful and stable society. Specifically, the key objectives to be achieved are:

- prevent and reduce intra- and inter-country conflicts;
- constitutional democracy, including periodic political competition and opportunity for choice, the rule of law, a Bill of Rights and the supremacy of the Constitution are firmly established in the constitution;
- promotion and protection of economic, social, cultural, civil, and political rights as enshrined in all African and international human rights instruments;
- upholding the separation of powers, including the protection of the independence of the judiciary and of an effective Parliament;
- ensure accountable, efficient and effective public office holders and civil servants;
- fighting corruption in the political sphere;
- promotion and protection of the rights of women;
- promotion and protection of the rights of the child and young persons; and
- promotion and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons and refugees.

To respond to the research question, the study has examined the state of political governance in Africa by focusing on areas considered most contentious and challenging among those that the APRM seeks to address. These are:

- constitutional democracy, which entails among other things, periodic political competition and opportunity for choice;
- separation of powers between the executive, legislature and the

judiciary;

- accountable and effective public service; and
- fighting corruption.

To determine the ability of the APRM to address these problems of political governance, the study also analysed the protocols of engagement, that is, the rules and procedures of the APRM, which are likely to facilitate or impede the attainment of the APRM objectives. Before outlining the main conclusions, a summary of the chapters that constitute this thesis is provided.

SUMMARY

Chapter One introduces and provides the background of the study. Specifically, the chapter narrates the history of Africa's development policies since independence time in the 1960s up to date. It highlights the main policies adopted by African leaders to lever Africa out of the plight of poverty and underdevelopment and why these policies have failed to achieve these objectives. The chapter pays specific attention to three main development policies. The first is the Lagos Plan of Action adopted in 1980 by African leaders. It is the first indigenous plan to be put forward by Africans themselves in an attempt to solve development problems and challenges of the continent. The second is the African-Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programme adopted in 1989 as an African response to the hardships of IMF and World Bank' structural adjustment policies imposed on poor countries of Latin America and Africa in the beginning of 1980s. Finally, the chapter elaborates on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which is the latest in a series of Africa's development plans (adopted in 2002). The chapter highlights the NEPAD's objectives, its governing structures, and the strategies for achieving its goals. The chapter also introduces the African Peer Review Mechanism, the mandate of which is to monitor the political and economic governance of African states in order to achieve the ultimate goals of NEPAD. Finally, Chapter One delineates the research problem, determines the objectives, significance and the limitations of the study.



Chapter Two outlines the research methodology used in collecting, analysing and interpreting data for the study. It explains the rationale of choosing the qualitative case study method as opposed to other research strategies. The depth and multiperspective approach of the case study lends itself well to the analysis of the new and unique African Peer Review Mechanism. Here, the case study approach was used to obtain a holistic examination of the APRM, rather than the generalisation of the findings. The chapter also indicates the sources used to gather information on the APRM. These are documentation, archival records and interviews. It details techniques used for data analysis and interpretation. Finally, the chapter discusses the issues of ethics, validity and reliability and how they were addressed to ensure that the study is ethical, valid and reliable.

Chapter Three provides the theoretical framework of the study. The first section of this chapter starts by providing an overview of the main theories that have influenced the study and practice of public administration, from the managerial approach to the current governance approach. The second section reviews the literature on the NEPAD and the APRM. Since the NEPAD and the APRM are about good governance and regional economic integration, the concepts of governance, peer review, regionalism and globalisation are examined in some detail. The section critically analyses the elements identified in the literature for good governance and the relationships between these elements and development. The chapter concludes by proposing a definitional framework within which to understand governance as used in this study. Governance in this research is used to mean the exercise of state authority and provision of leadership in the process of achieving common societal objectives and interests. Good governance, which is a subset of governance, requires effective leadership, appropriate regulatory frameworks, competent and professional public service, and public participation in decision-making.

Chapter Four is a comprehensive analysis of leadership and governance systems in Africa. Although, the focus is on the post-independence era, the chapter describes governance and leadership models that have been used in

pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa. The chapter elaborates on factors that have influenced bad governance in Africa. These include colonialism, foreign policies, ethnicity and corrupt leadership. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the experiences of the democratisation process in different African countries. At the centre of this review stands the role and state of institutions, such as the judiciary, parliament, political parties, and civil society in the sustenance of democratic governance. This chapter also reviews the key instrument of policy implementation, namely, the bureaucracy. It looks at administrative reforms and the extent to which they have performed. Finally, the chapter reviews regionalism in Africa. The emphasis is on regional political, economic, and administrative cooperative initiatives, which have been taken since independence for the peace and stability of African states and economic development. The challenges in this regard are also highlighted.

Chapter Five is the case analysis of the African Peer Review Mechanism. This chapter critically analyses the APRM in relation to its purpose, its institutional design and operations. The merits and potentials of the mechanism are determined, and its challenges and obstacles are exposed and analysed.

Chapter Six finally puts together the findings of the research, and proposes recommendations to problems and challenges identified. It starts by providing a brief but concise description of the APRM: the purpose, the areas for review, the structures of governance, and the process of peer review in the APRM. This is followed by an outline of the findings of this research. The study does not pretend to be exhaustive; therefore, suggestions for further research on the APRM are also provided.

CONCLUSIONS

THE APRM IN A NUTSHELL

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is an instrument established in 2003 by African leaders to monitor and evaluate the political, economic and corporate governance of African states. Its main purpose is to foster the



adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated continental economic integration.

The idea of establishing an African monitoring mechanism came as a response to governance challenges and problems that the continent has experienced since independence and the consequent political instability and poor economic performance. It is hoped that the peer review exercise will enable African states to objectively assess their performance and adopt effective policies and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth and sustainable development. The process of peer review also provides participating countries a framework to exchange ideas and strategies on how to deal with effects of globalisation.

Participation in the APRM is voluntary and open to all member states of the African Union. Furthermore, the mechanism of peer review is non-adversarial, which means it does not imply sanctions to poor or non-performers. The success for compliance with the APRM principles and objectives rests on the mutual understanding and commitment to the values, and acceptance of standards and criteria set to assess government performance.

The African peer review process is led and managed by four institutional structures. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government participating in the APRM is the ultimate decision-making body on the APRM operations and decisions. It is aided by the APR Panel composed of seven Eminent Africans, who have distinguished themselves in the areas related to the APRM work, their high moral stature and commitment to the ideals of Pan Africanism. Under the supervision of the APR Panel, the APR Secretariat carries out peer reviews. It provides the technical and managerial support services for the APRM. A number of partner institutions have been designated by the Forum of African Heads of State and Government participating in the APRM to assist the APRM Secretariat conducting technical reviews. These are the appropriate organs or units of the African Union, the African Development Bank, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and the United

Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Africa. A pool of experts, mostly from Africa, is occasionally used to conduct technical assessments.

Every country undergoing the peer review is requested to establish the APR Focal Point and the APR National Coordinating Mechanism. The APR Focal Point acts as the coordinator of APRM activities at the national level, and the liaison office between the government and the APRM Secretariat in South Africa. The APR National Coordinating Mechanism oversees the peer review process at the national level. It is broad-based and inclusive of all stakeholders: government, business and civil society, to ensure objective and credible peer review.

The process of the African peer review is carried in five stages. The first phase consists of background analysis by the APRM Secretariat and a self-evaluation by the country under peer review. The APR Secretariat documents the political, economic and corporate governance and development environment in the country to be reviewed from various sources, national, regional as well as international bodies. At the same time, the country conducts a self-assessment based on the APRM standard questionnaire, and then develops a preliminary “Programme of Action” to respond to identified shortcomings. On the basis of the background document and the preliminary Programme of Action developed by the country under review, the APR Secretariat develops an “Issues Paper”, which highlights identified challenges in the areas of the APRM.

The second phase involves the country visit by a team of examiners of the APRM, which carries wide interviews with all stakeholders to get hands on information and perspectives of various stakeholders on the level of political and economic governance and development of the country. This phase involves also the discussion with governments and other stakeholders of the two documents, the preliminary Programme of Action and the Issues Paper.

The third phase entails the preparation of the APR Team report, which is based on the findings from the country review visit and the desktop research



undertaken by the APR Secretariat before the visit. The draft report is first discussed with the Government of the concerned country to ensure the accuracy of the information and to provide the Government with an opportunity both to react to the substance of the draft report.

At the fourth stage, the APR Secretariat submits the country review report to the APR Panel, which reviews the report, makes recommendations on the report, and submits it to the APR Forum. The Assembly of Participating Heads of State (APR Forum) considers the report and accompanying recommendations and submits its decisions to the Head of State or Government of the reviewed country.

The last phase entails making public the final APRM report of the assessed country in key regional and continental structures, such as the Summit of the AU, the PAP, PSC and ECOSOCC.

MERITS AND POTENTIALS OF THE APRM

The APRM is a decisive instrument in promoting good political and economic governance in Africa. First, the African peer review allows participating countries to objectively self-assess their governance and policies in relation to regional and international standards and best practices. In this context, the APRM is a learning tool, through which participating countries can discuss, negotiate and strategise with their peers about governance and policy orientations.

Secondly, the peer review process gives the African civil society, the business as well as non-profit civic organisations, the opportunity to evaluate the performance of their governments but also to be part of the policy-making process, through the development of a Programme of Action. In all countries undergoing the peer review, the APRM has set off a process of dialogue between government institutions and civil society and business actors over governance and development issues and how these can be addressed. This is essential for the consolidation of democratic governance in Africa.



Thirdly, the APRM can contribute towards the achievement of regional goals. The APRM has the potential to reduce several impeding factors to regionalisation, thus pave the way for a successful regional cooperation and integration. Progress in the area of peace and conflicts resolution, would consequently lead to a peaceful and stable continent. Peace and political stability are essential to boost intra-regional trade, improve domestic savings as locals have more confidence in the stability of their countries and region, and attract foreign investments. Controlling corruption, establishing effective legal frameworks and harmonising economic and trade policies not only boost investors' confidence but also improve the macroeconomic environment, all of which have a positive impact on economic growth, intra-regional trade and economic integration.

Finally, the APRM provides a regional framework for policy cooperation and development between African governments and their development partners. Donors and other multilateral development agencies through various initiatives, such as, the G8-Africa Action Plan made commitments for "enhanced partnerships" for countries that would adhere to the principles of the APRM. Technically, participating in the African peer review is expected to increase financial flows, through increased development assistance (ODA flows) and private capital flows, to countries that open up their governance to scrutiny.

The main objective of the study has been to determine the capacity of the APRM to address critical issues of political governance in Africa. The driving research question has been "To what extent can the APRM address issues of political governance in Africa?" The study found that the African peer review is, indeed, taken seriously in Africa. Since its inception in 2003 until the time of writing (December 2005), twenty-three African states have signed the MOU on the APRM, thus voluntarily submitting to the peer review process. These are: Angola, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa,



Tanzania and Uganda.

The process of peer review started with four countries, namely Ghana, Rwanda, Kenya, and Mauritius that volunteered to begin the process. Rwanda and Ghana have reached the completion stage, and their final reports submitted to the highest authority on the African peer review process, the APR Forum, for consideration and adoption. In addition to these countries, a number of others have started their self-assessment process. These include South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria and Algeria. The fact that these countries have voluntarily accepted to be peer reviewed is an indication of their commitment to the principles of the APRM.

The study has found that the APRM is an important tool of cooperation, learning, and improving governance among involved African countries. The peer review process assists reviewed countries to be aware of weaknesses in their governance systems and practices. These countries also receive recommendations on best practices and standards of good political, economic and corporate governance. Most importantly however, the process of peer review sets off a process of dialogue between government and other societal actors, such as civil society organisations and the business sector on governance and policy issues. It is this dialogue that will lead to good political and economic governance. The peer review also facilitates negotiations and partnerships between involved governments and development partners as it increases confidence in the reviewed government. As such, the APRM is a powerful catalyst for good governance and development.

However, while the APRM is a decisive instrument to promote good political governance, it has no powers of enforcing its principles and values. The responsibility is upon individual governments to introduce and implement policy changes that are in line with good governance and development objectives. As evidenced in recent elections such as the 2005 presidential elections in Uganda, constitutional provisions have been changed to allow the President to run a third term. While fixed-term of office for leaders is one of the objectives for good political governance endorsed in the Declaration on



Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance, there is nothing the APRM can do to change this course of action. Similarly, if a government fails to curb corruption among its ranks, the APRM has no mechanisms to address that issue other than the mere exposure of issues and proposal of recommendations. However, it is hoped that the peer review will educate the public about their rights, broaden their understanding of governance, and exert pressure on public administrations and politicians to adopt policies and practices of good governance. Political and economic transformation, the ultimate purpose of the APRM is a long-term process. However, under certain circumstances, which are elaborated in the recommendations, the APRM can indeed achieve its goal.

Despite the benefits that the APRM promises to deliver, there are obstacles and challenges that may thwart its operations and effectiveness. The following are the most prominent challenges that the study has identified, and which need to be addressed for the peer review to be effective and sustainable.

OBSTACLES AND CHALLENGES OF THE APRM

The APRM faces numerous obstacles and challenges. Some are of institutional nature, others are operational and technical. Institutional obstacles concern the voluntary nature of the APRM, lack of enforcement mechanisms, and leadership in Africa.

Voluntary participation

The APRM is a voluntary process. Making the APRM voluntary comes from the principle of respect of nation-state sovereignty, which is enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the AU. Participation in the APRM cannot be forced upon sovereign countries. Indeed, voluntary participation is the best way, which gives assurance that those countries that have freely agreed to enter into peer review agreements, are aware of the requirements and constraints brought by the APRM and would do what it takes to abide by the commitments they have made. However, voluntary participation to the APRM raises the question of the commitment of African leaders to the principles of good governance as

outlined in the NEPAD. It is absurd that African leaders make a collective commitment and pledge to good political and economic governance to promote the socio-economic development, yet oppose the instrument, which is supposed to help them improve governance. Voluntary participation undermines collective efforts to improve governance. It further undermines the authority and credibility of the APRM activities and objectives in Africa. Voluntary participation means that countries, which are willing and committed to good governance, may still be pulled back by neighbouring countries that are not reforming. For instance, political instability in one country may destabilise the whole bordering region politically as well as economically. Therefore, voluntary participation constitutes a serious impediment to the objectives of political stability, economic growth and regional integration that African leaders seek to achieve through the NEPAD and the APRM.

Absence of enforcement measures

Lack of enforcement measures is another impediment to the work of the APRM. The APRM assumes that participating countries will act in good faith, and that problems of non-compliance that may arise are to be found in financial constraints or political difficulties, which need to be solved through dialogue and capacity enhancing and not sanctions. Indeed, taking some measures against failing states may be a source of international discord and contention, which may jeopardize all cooperative undertakings in Africa. However, it is also naïve to assume that countries will act in good faith and implement policies, which are in line with APR reviews and recommendations. Various imperatives, internal as well as external have a bearing on decisions governments make. Governments may not comply simply because of lack of political will and support to the reforms. Some powerful interest groups may oppose, jettison the reforms. Thus, incentives that will lead countries to comply with the APRM are necessary to be built in the mechanism. Studies on incentives are very enlightening on how incentive schemes can lead members to behave in either compliant or non-compliant ways. Enforcement measures are those incentives that compel countries to comply with the commitments they made. They are essential in ensuring that the rules and objectives, to



which all countries commonly agreed are observed and achieved.

African leadership

African leadership has largely failed to provide strategic vision and effective governance needed for political stability and socio-economic development. Instead, African leaders have exercised public authority and used public resources for their own personal ends. The practice has led to the development of behavioural leadership that undermines state capacity to deliver its basic functions, such as security, food, shelter, and health care to the people. As a result, Africans suffer from all sorts of ills, including hunger, wars, diseases, and pervasive poverty despite the continent's wealth in natural resources.

Continental institutions and mechanisms, such as the old OAU, have done very little to change this situation. The OAU was more a club of solidarity and protection of autocratic and corrupt African leadership than a forum for collective and constructive responses to the socio-political and economic challenges the continent and African peoples have faced since independence. The nature of political leadership in Africa suggests that the mere institutionalisation of the APRM is not a guarantee of adherence to the principles of good governance as outlined in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate governance. Despite the general acceptance of the principles and values of good governance contained in the Declaration, many African leaders continue to manipulate their constitutions and political processes in manners that undermine good governance, peace and economic development. They show little commitment to institutions of governance they have created, including the APRM. The fact that less than half of member states of the AU have so far agreed to be peer reviewed is a testimony to this behaviour.

Indeed, the longstanding culture of non-interference in domestic affairs is the big challenge to the APRM and the peer pressure, which is expected to be exercised between peers. Breaking with this past is the ultimate test put before African leaders in order to drive their countries to political and

economic revival. Thus, political commitment and leadership are vital for effective peer reviews and good governance. Without it, any statements and public policy documents on good governance initiatives remain merely rhetorical.

Financial problems

The African Peer Review Mechanism faces the challenges of financial constraints. The APRM is supposed to be funded by contributions from participating countries. Financial support from donors while sought is not considered the main source of funding. Each participating country is required to avail a minimum of US \$100, 000 for the operationalisation of the APRM. This amount however does not include funding the APR processes at the country level. This means that at the national level the concerned country must fund the peer review activities and processes.

While funding the process from African coffers would ensure African ownership and leadership of the APRM, many African countries have failed to pay their contributions. Counting on foreign financial support also is not sustainable, and it may jeopardise the independence and credibility of the APRM as donors may attempt to influence the process. Funding limitations may explain the reluctance of some African countries, especially those that are well off, as they consider their participation a waste of resources and an unnecessary burden. African leaders should, therefore, develop some objective formula, which would look at how every participating country can contribute according to its financial capacity. The formula needs to be in line with AU provisions, in particular, the principle of sovereign equality, to avoid problems that might arise from “big brother” attitude. It is imperative to have a stable source of funding. Ignoring this would be signing a death warrant of the APRM.

Operational and administrative obstacles

These include various problems resulting from technical aspects of the APRM and implementation challenges. First, the evaluation content developed for the



APRM is too broad and too detailed to be professionally handled given the limited human and financial resources both at the APRM Secretariat and country level. The APRM is a comprehensive assessment of four areas of governance, the democracy and political governance, economic, corporate and socio-economic development. It defines 24 major objectives to be achieved, some 78 criteria and 93 examples of indicators that must be evaluated. The APR Secretariat has few experts in the political, corporate and socio-economic governance, who provide research and analysis, coordinate the work and compile the reports. Although the Secretariat is assisted by partner institutions (UNDP Bureau for Africa, UNECA, ADB, and some units of the AU) and consultants in conducting the technical assessments, these are not full-time dedicated to the work of the APRM. In comparison with 2000 permanent staff of the OECD Secretariat, the APRM Secretariat is indeed understaffed. It is suggested that the Secretariat be strengthened and the content of the APRM questionnaire be revised to make it more focused by narrowing it to those priority areas, which are essential and sine qua none to attain the socio-economic development objectives as outlined in NEPAD.

The other problem is that the APRM Secretariat has no financial management authority, which hinders its operations and affects its ability to effectively perform its responsibilities. Currently, funds for the operations of the APRM are managed by the UNDP (Trust Fund) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). This means lengthy administrative processing of financial demands of the APRM, which obviously delays its activities. This arrangement requires excellent coordination and communication between these three institutions, which is problematic in most bureaucratic settings because of the red tape.

Secondly, the credibility and effectiveness of the APRM does not only depend on the political will of African leaders to open up their governments to scrutiny, but also on the competence and administrative capacity of national institutions to carry out the peer review process. These include the public service, the legislature, the judiciary, political parties, human rights institutions, and civil society, which in their various capacities act as policy makers, implementers

or “oversight” bodies in the exercise of the peer review. Independence and competence of the legislature, judiciary, civil society, and the bureaucracy, are critical to conduct objective self-assessments. The challenge for the APRM is that these institutions in many African countries are weak or at best reasserting their roles. Addressing all the above-identified obstacles and challenges holds the key for successful and effective APRM.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the APRM faces many institutional and implementation hurdles, these can be overcome and allow willing states to improve their governance capabilities. Below are some recommendations, which outline what should be done to make the instrument of the African peer review successful and effective.

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND PROVISION OF ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

The NEPAD and the APRM are ambitious initiatives designed by Africans to respond to uniquely African challenges. They derive their legitimacy from African ownership and their success to a large measure hinges on Africans assuming leadership of the processes with the international community joining in partnership to support these efforts. It should be stressed that the *raison d'être* of peer review is to ensure that the policies and practices of member states of the AU conform to the agreed values, principles and standards contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance. Thus, peer review findings and recommendations help countries improve their policies and share best practices of good governance. Therefore, the APRM should not be seen as a mechanism of interference or control, but as an instrument of cooperation which affords African states the opportunity to compare policy experiences, exchange ideas on the best practices to adopt in order to improve their governance and achieve development objectives.

The political will pledged by African leaders is an essential but not sufficient



element to ensure the promotion of policies and practices of good governance and sustainable development. The principle of voluntary accession to the peer review is acknowledged as a sign of respect of state sovereignty, and indeed an expression of the democratic order of the APRM. However, voluntary participation undermines the collective efforts of addressing issues of governance and development in Africa.

Similarly, lack of clear enforcement measures highlights the weaknesses of the APRM. In any governance system, enforcement mechanisms are essential to ensure that role-players comply with the rules, and the objectives set are achieved. Enforcement measures are incentives (rewards or sanctions) that motivate countries to abide by the rules and implement the commitments they made, especially in the final Programme of Action. The danger of overlooking the issue of “enforcement mechanism” is that the peer review process may fall into the same trap of mere talk show as previous initiatives while little gets off the ground. Paragraph 24 of the APRM base document shows that African leaders have considered this issue as it states: “if the political will is not forthcoming from the Government, the participating states should first do everything practicable to engage it in constructive dialogue, offering in the process technical and other appropriate assistance. If dialogue proves unavailing, the participating Heads of State and Government may wish to put the Government on notice of their collective intention to proceed with appropriate measures by a given date”. However, they have failed to be clear about what measures they would take if the political will is not forthcoming. African leaders should demonstrate their determination to achieve the political and economic transformation of the continent. Many countries appear to show interest in the NEPAD vision and projects, but reject the APRM as an unnecessary instrument. NEPAD and APRM initiatives would stand a better chance of success if they lay down clear protocols and guidelines of engagement. To this end the following is recommended:

First, a common understanding of what these initiatives are and what they seek to achieve must be reached among African states (leaders). Secondly, a funding formula based on country financial

capacity must be negotiated and determined. African leaders cannot keep on depending on donors to implement their initiatives. It is imperative that they commit financial resources to support these initiatives. Thirdly, measures of enforcement should be explored. A series of measures exist, which may motivate countries to participate in the APRM:

- *Regionalising the APRM: the peer review may be more acceptable to African countries and effective if instituted at the level of RECs. All African states belong to one or two RECs and there seems to be more of a sentiment of belongingness and allegiance to these regional structures than continental ones. The RECs may be more effective in ensuring that all member states go through the peer review, because they have the power to impose sanctions on recalcitrants, if necessary. However, regionalising the APRM can be expensive, as it requires building the capacity (human, finance, technical) for the RECs to undertake this new mandate.*
- *Making access to and benefit from the NEPAD projects conditional upon accession to the APRM. This will require a country that wants to participate in a particular NEPAD project to accept the peer review. In fact, the peer review is necessary, because harmonisation of standards and practices may be required for some collective projects.*
- *Providing substantial aid packages through debt relief, preferential trade schemes and development assistance to countries, which accept to undergo the peer review. Not only would the aid package facilitate the implementation of the Programme of Action developed from the peer review process, but it would also act as an incentive for countries to join the APRM.*



DONORS' SUPPORT AND MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

Domestic political commitments alone cannot tackle governance issues. The thesis argues that national governance cannot be understood in isolation from the international environment, which influences it to a great deal. Thus, consolidation of good governance in Africa will greatly depend on the support and consistency of the international community in its aid and development policies. The history of governance and development in Africa reveals how foreign policies have been inconsistent in relation to democracy and good governance, which has encouraged manipulative practices of authoritarian leaders and allow them to sustain repressive regimes. The G8-Africa Action Plan has pledged to support African countries, which uphold the principles and practices of good governance through the instrument of the APRM. Developed countries and their institutions must therefore be held accountable for meeting these financial commitments and their consistency in support of democracy and good governance on the continent. Countries that agree to undergo the peer review process should be financially supported, in particular to implement the Plan of Action, which is the result of the peer review process. Financial incentives through debt relief, preferential trade schemes and greater aid flows are high motivating factors that would compel African countries to join the APRM and rigorously undertake and sustain political and economic reforms. Therefore, in this regard the following is recommended:

A mechanism that would monitor and evaluate donors' performance in relation to financial commitments they made for instance in the G8-Africa Action Plan, and the UN Resolution (57/7 of 2002) in support of the NEPAD/APRM should be established. The mechanism would be an effective enforcement measure for all role players involved in Africa's governance and development.

PRESSURE FROM CIVIL SOCIETY

Interest groups and other organisations of civil society are powerful instruments that will make African governments more democratic, transparent, accountable and effective. Although the APRM insists on the involvement of

all stakeholders including civil society organisations and businesses in the self-assessment process, there are no clear guidelines on how these stakeholders should participate. The reality is that civil society and the general public have a little knowledge of the APRM, its objectives and processes. It is important to publicise the APRM and its work through the media and other communication tools and to ensure that the population can access the information on the APRM easily. The APRM process must be inclusive of all the voices of communities, especially the marginalised. To achieve, this there must be clear guidelines about participating in the APRM process at the country level. There is also the need to translate these documents into African languages to make the message of APRM accessible to the average person. It is recommended that:

The APRM sets clear guidelines of participation of national stakeholders. These should include issues, such as the size and composition of the APR National Commission, population diversity representation, and country geographic representation. The APRM questionnaire should be translated into local languages to facilitate the participation of national stakeholders. Care should be taken to ensure that the voices of all segments of the population are heard and represented in the APRM evaluation.

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING

Strong and effective institutions are essential to the success of the peer review process and to the building of good governing states. Institutions, which are the catalyst and custodian of good governance, such as the legislature, the judiciary, the ombudsman, the auditor of accounts, and civil society, must be strengthened and their independence promoted. The findings from the peer review will be effectively implemented if there are institutions with sufficient power and integrity to ensure that policies and recommendations contained in the Programme of Action are translated into binding political commitments for implementation. Similarly, the bureaucracy, which is the principal implementing agent of public policies, requires

continuous capacity building to be on top of its challenging duties. However, institutions will not alone change the status quo in political governance if people are still suffering from ignorance and the forces of human misery. Poverty is closely linked to political processes in Africa. Institutions are often weak, because people running them are deprived; and so they are manipulated by self-centred leaders for their personal ends. The same applies to the public. Leaders often manipulate the electorate, the ultimate power holder in a democracy, through poverty relief promises to obtain votes. Only when Africans are free from hunger, illiteracy and the other ills of poverty, can democracy take root and institutions work effectively, as they cannot sell their conscience and choice to corrupt leaders. To this end, the following is recommended:

Build and strengthen the institutional, human and financial capacity of institutions of governance, such as the parliament, the judiciary, and other public “oversight” bodies, and promote their independence so that they can effectively perform their functions. Furthermore, programmes of poverty reduction must take centre stage in the whole process of the African peer review. Thus, integration of the final Programme of Action from the peer review with other national development plans, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategic Programme, is imperative.

DOMESTICATING THE APRM

The APRM in its search to foster policies and practices of good governance must avoid the one-fits-all model to governance. While the values and principles of good governance are universal, the cultural and socio-political differences that characterise African polities must be recognised and taken into consideration. The socio-political and economic realities of post-war countries such as Rwanda, Liberia and Burundi, are not similar to those of stable and peaceful countries, for instance. The ethnic, racial, regional and cultural cleavages, where they exist, must be handled with care when policy changes are proposed considering that countries' histories are different. The

APRM is about Africans finding effective solutions to African problems. For instance, Rwanda came up with a unique traditional legal system “Gacaca” to provide a speedy trial for the more than 150000 detainees presumed guilty of genocide crimes. This is a local response to a specific problem. It may not subscribe to the conventional form of justice, but may provide effective and sustainable solutions for Rwandans. Therefore, domesticating the APRM is essential as circumstances differ from country to country. This does not mean compromising universal principles of good governance. However, a balance must be struck between international standards and best practices of governance and local realities in order to reach sustainable solutions to governance and development. Therefore, the following is recommended:

The APRM should strike a balance between the promotion of international standards and best practices of good governance and the consideration of socio-political, cultural and economic specificities of African countries.

TARGETING CRITICAL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY ISSUES

Another problem with the APRM is that it is overly ambitious, covering a broad range of issues, with insufficient resources to address them. Targeting calls for a more focused instrument: an APRM aligned with NEPAD governance and policy priorities and issues. The reasons for initiating the NEPAD and the APRM should guide the targeting. Targeting offers the necessary means to meet the challenges of an efficient and effective African peer review.

This study proposes that the APRM be narrowed to two focal areas, the political and economic governance, packing together similar important themes and avoiding duplication of objectives in the process. Political reviews are imperative to deal with political governance issues and to make political and administrative actors accountable. Similarly, an African dialogue on economic policies is essential despite the IMF and World Bank reviews.

The experience and research of economic policies in Africa (for instance the structural adjustment policies) has shown that African leaders have generally

had limited choice over their economic policy decisions. Economic reviews by Africans themselves provide opportunities to Africans to chart new paths for economic development and can counterbalance the reviews and recommendations of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The argument is that the APRM should focus on those issues that are essential for the achievement of key NEPAD objectives: peace and political security, high economic growth and economic integration. Other issues of governance can be left to the care of national governments and civil society organisations, and other international organisations, which are generally involved in social affairs. It is, therefore, recommended that the APRM questionnaire be streamlined along the above lines. Further research is necessary as the proposal below is a mere illustration of how the streamlining can be done.

The APRM should be narrowed to the political and economic governance reviews. The political governance review aims to ensure peace and political stability. It should cover critical issues, such as intra- and inter-country conflicts; constitutional democracy and the rule of law; separation of powers and the independence of institutions; accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of the public service; and fight corruption. The economic governance review should focus on those areas essential to boost economic growth and economic regional integration. Critical to this review are issues of ensuring macro-economic stability; promoting sound public finance; trade and investment policies; effective and sustainable use of resources; and policies and strategies for faster regionalisation.

SYSTEM OF INFORMATION DISSEMINATION

The APRM is said to be a mechanism and a process of learning and sharing policy experiences and best practices among participating countries. However, the process of the APRM is silent on how this will be done. African leaders may exchange ideas on key points during the APR Forum. However, the APRM covers technical aspects of governance and policy that the APR

Forum is not appropriate for lengthy discussions and exchange of best practices. It is, therefore, important to create mechanisms allowing technical institutions such as ministries and other public institutions to share and to learn from each others' experiences and best practices. This can be done through regional seminars and workshops involving participating countries in the APRM to exchange their experiences of the peer review and lessons they have learned. Equally important is to create media of dissemination, such as the APRM annual reports, and electronic database, which will capture the experiences of countries in the process of peer review, the best practices and success stories to be emulated. This will assist other countries to be peer reviewed to understand the process and other technical requirements (such as how to involve national stakeholders). An electronic database offers an efficient mechanism for countries to access APRM related data and information. A regional network of stakeholders from various participating countries should also be envisaged. It would provide participants the opportunity to share experiences over political and economic governance, policy initiations, progress and difficulties in the implementation of the PoA.

It is recommended that mechanisms for sharing and disseminating best practices and lessons learned during the peer review process be established. The mechanisms may include regional workshops and seminars, an electronic database system, which captures the peer review process, evaluation findings and recommendations. Also regional networks of various stakeholders, such as the civil society network where these participants exchange information on the progress and difficulties in the implementation of their Programme of Action are needed.

In conclusion, this study has analysed the ability of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) to address critical issues of political governance in Africa. The analyses and suggestions positioned in this research project have illuminated the major impediments to the APRM. These include the voluntary nature of the APRM, and lack of both sufficient funding and strong political commitment to support the peer review. The APRM is a decisive instrument to



infuse good governance in Africa. The uniqueness of the APRM lies in its wide participatory process, thus giving the citizens the opportunity to partake in the governance of their country and the monitoring of public affairs.

However, the challenges identified by this study must be addressed to allow the APRM to achieve its ultimate purpose which is to create a continent that is politically stable and economically developed. Judging by past experience, Africa is renowned for the grandeur of its rhetoric in policy initiatives and lack of political will and commitment when it comes to implementation. There is no doubt that the road to a successful and effective APRM, and thus to a peaceful and prosperous Africa, lies in the future; but the foundation for Africa's political and economic renaissance is the present. It is therefore recommended that African leadership strongly supports the APRM through political commitment and provision of financial resources. National governance cannot be understood in isolation from international rules and activities that influence it. Thus, sustained support from donors and other multilateral development agencies to the APRM is paramount to the sustainability of good governance and APRM activities in Africa.

This study does not pretend to be exhaustive in its analysis of the APRM. Further research on a number of issues is necessary to further elucidate the various challenges facing the NEPAD and the APRM in their attempt to bring political stability and economic development in Africa. The aspects that require further investigation include the financing of the APRM to make it effective and sustainable; the design of a mechanism to monitor donors' performance in relation to NEPAD and APRM; cost-benefit analysis of the APRM; and evaluation of the impact of the APRM on peer reviewed countries.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- Adejumobi, S. 2002. "Economic globalisation, market reforms and the delivery of social welfare services in Africa" in Aina, T. and Chachage, C.S.L. (eds.). *Globalisation and Social Policy in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA.
- Ake, C. 1996. *Democracy and development in Africa*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
- Aletum, T.M. 2001. *Political Sociology*. Yaounde: Patch Publishers.
- Allen, H.J.B. 1990. *Cultivating the Grassroots: Why Local Matters*. Bombay: All-India Institute of Local Self-Government.
- Anyang' Nyong'o, P. 1990. (ed.). 1990. *Regional Integration in Africa: Unfinished Agenda*. Nairobi: African Academy of Sciences.
- Asante, S.K.B. 1997. *Regionalism and Africa's Development: Expectations, Reality and Challenges*. New York: St Martin Press
- Babbie, E. and Mouton, J. 2001. *The Practice of Social Research*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- Bach, D.C. (ed.) 1999. *Regionalism in Africa: Integration and Disintegration*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Bailey, K.D. 1994. *Methods of Social Research*. 4th ed. New York: The Free Press.
- Balassa, B. 1961. *The Theory of Economic Integration*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Bass, M.B. 1997. *The Ethics of Transformational Leadership*. Academy of Leadership Press.
- Bates, R. 1999. "The Economics Bases of Democratization" in Joseph, R. (ed.). *State, Conflict, and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Bayart, J.F., Ellis, S. & Hibou, B. 1999. *The Criminalisation of the State in Africa*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Beetham, D. (ed.). 1994. *Defining and Measuring Democracy*. London: Sage.
- Blondel, J. 1995. *Comparative Government: An Introduction*. 2nd ed. London: Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- Botes, P.S., Brynard, P.A., Fourie, D.J. & Roux, N.L. 1992. *Public Administration and Management: A guide to Central, Regional and Municipal*

Administration and Management. Pretoria: Kagiso Tertiary.

Bratton, M. 1994. "Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa" in Harbeson, J.W., Rothchild, D., & Chazan, N. (eds.). *Civil Society and the State in Africa*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.

Bratton, M. and Van de Walle, N. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brinkerhoff, D.W. 2001. "Accountability and Governance Outcomes: Concepts and Connections" in Van der Molen, K., Van Rooyen, A. & Van Wyk, B. (eds.) *Outcomes-based Governance: Assessing the Results*. Sandown: Heinemann.

Brinkerhoff, J.M. 2002. *Partnership for International Development: Rhetoric or Results?* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Caiden, E. G. 1982. *Public Administration*. 2nd edition. California: Palisades.

Cheru, F. 2002. *African Renaissance: Roadmaps to the Challenge of Globalisation*. London: Zed Books.

Clapham, C. (ed.). 1982. *Private Patronage and Public Power*. London: Frances Pinter.

Cloete, J.J.N. 1998. *South African Public Administration and Management*. Pretoria: Van Schaik

Cloete, F. and Wissink, H. (eds.). 2000. *Improving Public Policy*. Pretoria: Van Schaik

Cohen, J.L. and Arato, A. 1992. *Civil Society and Political Theory*. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.

Cresswell, J.W. 1998. *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions*. California: Sage.

Crowder, M. 1968. *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*. London: Hutchinson.

Dahl, R.A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davis, R. 1997. "Promoting Regional Integration in Southern Africa: An Analysis of Prospects and Problems from a South African Perspective" in Swatuk, L.A. and Black, D.R. (eds.). *Bridging the Rift: The New South Africa in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Decalo, S. 1991. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Denzin, N.K. 1989. *Interpretive Biography*. California: Sage.

- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.). 1998. *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*. California: Sage.
- Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds.). 2000. *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed. California: Sage.
- Dervis, K. and Ozer, C. 2005. *A better globalisation: Legitimacy, Governance and Reform*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Di Palma, G. 1990. *To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Diamond, L. and Plattner, M.F. 1993. *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, L. (ed.). 1994. *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Diamond, L. 1998. Africa: "The second wind of change" in Lewis, P. (ed.). *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Diamond, L. 1999. *Developing Democracy Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Dlamini, K. 2003. "Is quiet diplomacy an effective conflict resolution strategy?" *South African Yearbook of International Affairs 2002/03*. South African Institute of International Affairs: Johannesburg.
- Dror, Y. 2001. *The Capacity to Govern: A Report to the Club of Rome*. London: Fran Cass.
- Easton, D. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: Wiley
- Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.). 1995. *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Flanz, G.H. 1995. *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana.
- Francis, J.D. 2001. *The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Frederickson, H.G. 1997. *The Spirit of Public Administration*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Gardner, J.W. 1990. *On Leadership*. New York: The Free Press.
- Hague, R., Harrop, M., & Breslin, S. 1998. *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction*. 4th ed. Hampshire: Macmillan Press.
- Harbeson, J.W., Rothchild, D., & Chazan, N. (eds.). 1994. *Civil Society and*

- the State in Africa*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner.
- Harloov, J. 1997. *Regional Cooperation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa: General approaches, SADCC and the World Bank*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Heinrich, C.J. and Lynn, L.E. (eds.). 2000. *Governance and Performance: New Perspectives*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- Henry, N. 1975. *Public administration and Public affairs*. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs.
- Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (eds.). 2000. *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South*. Volume 3. London: Macmillan Press.
- Huntington, S. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Huysamen, G.K. 1994. *Methodology for the Social and Behavioural Sciences*. Halfway House: Southern Book.
- Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (eds.). 1992. *Governance and Politics in Africa*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Ihonvbere, JO. 1998. "How not to consolidate democracy: the experience of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia" in Mbaku, J.M. and Ihonvbere, J.O. *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratisation in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Ihonvbere, JO. 1999. "Militarisation and Democratisation: Nigeria's Stalled March to Democracy" in Mengisteab, K. and Daddieh, C. (eds.). *State Building in Africa: Faith, Hope and Realities*. Westport: Praeger.
- Jackson, H.R. and Rosberg, C.G. 1998. "Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa" in Lewis, P. (ed.). *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Jackson, H.R. and Rosberg, C.G. 1982. *Personal rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Jun, S.J. (ed.). 2002. *Rethinking Administrative Theory: The Challenge of the New Century*. Westport: Praeger.
- Kajee, A. 2004. "Nepad's APRM: A Progress Report – Practical Limitations and Challenges" in *SA Yearbook of International Affairs 2003/04*. SAILA: Johannesburg South Africa.
- Kasfir, N. (ed.). 1998. *Civil Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives*. London and Oregon: Frank Cass.
- Keanne, J. 1988. *Democracy and Civil Society*. London: Verso.

- Kickert, W.J.M., Klijn, E.H., & Koppenjan, J.F.M. 1997. *Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector*. London: SAGE.
- Kickert, W.J.M. (ed.). 1997. *Public Management and Administrative Reform in Western Europe*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- King, G., Keahane, R.O., & Verba, S. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Kirk, J. and Miller, M.L. 1986. *Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE.
- Kuye, J.O., Thornhill, C., Fourie, D.J., Brynard, P.A., Roux, N.L., van Rooyen, E.J., Mafunisa, J., Van Dijk, H.G., & Crous, M. 2002. *Critical Perspectives on Public Administration: Issues for consideration*. Sandwon: Heinmann.
- Lee, M.C. 2003. *The Political Economy of Regionalism in Southern Africa*. Lansdowne: University of Cape Town Press.
- Lewis, P. (ed.). 1998. *Africa: Dilemmas of Development and Change*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Lijphart, A. 1990. "Democratic Political Systems" in Bebler, A. and Seroka, J. *Contemporary Political Systems*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Linz, J. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
- Manor, J. and Crook, R. 1998. *Democracy and Decentralization in South Asia and West Africa: Participation, Accountability and Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malan, F. and Smit, B. 2001. *Ethics and Leadership in Business and Politics*. Lansdowne: Juta.
- March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press.
- Marsh, I., Blondel, J., & Inoguchi, T. 1999. *Democracy, Governance and Economic Performance: East and South East Asia*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Mazmanian, D.A. and Sabatier, P.A. 1981. *Effective policy implementation*. Lexington: Heath.
- Mazzeo, D. 1984. *African Regional Organisations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mbaku, J.M. (ed). 1999. *Preparing Africa for the Twenty-First Century: Strategies for Peaceful coexistence and sustainable development*. Aldershot:

Ashgate.

Mbaku, J.M. 1998. "Bureaucratic Corruption and the Crisis of Political Reforms in Africa" in Mbaku J.M. and Ihonvbere, J.O. (eds.). *Multiparty Democracy and Political Change: Constraints to Democratisation in Africa*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

McCarthy, C. 1999. "Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past, Present and Future" in Oyejide, A., Ndulu, B., & Greenway, D. (eds.). *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Volume 4: Synthesis and Review. London: Macmillan.

McNabb, D.E. 2004. *Research Methods for Political Science. Quantitative and Qualitative methods*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Mengisteab, K. 1999. "Democratisation and State building in Africa: How Compatible Are They?" In Mengisteab, K. and Daddieh, C. *State Building and Democratisation in Africa: Faith, Hope and Realities*. Westport: Praeger.

Minogue, M., Polidano, C., & Hulme, D. 1998. *Beyond the New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Mkandawire, T. 1995. "Fiscal Structure, State Contraction and Political Responses in Africa". in Mkandawire, T. and Olukoshi, A. (eds.). *Between Liberalisation and Oppression: The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Africa*, Dakar: CODESRIA.

Morlino, L. 1990. "Authoritarianism" in Bebler, A. and Seroka, J. *Contemporary Political Systems*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.

Mouton, J. 1996. *Understanding Social Research*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Mouton, J. (2001). *How to succeed in your Master's and Doctoral Studies: A South African Guide and Resource Book*. Pretoria: Van Schaik.

Mutahaba, G. 1989. *Reforming Public Administration for Development: Experiences from Eastern Africa*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Mutahaba, G. and Balogun, J. 1992. *Enhancing Policy Management Capacity in Africa*. West Hartford: Kumarian Press.

Mwase, N. and Maasdorp, G. 1999. "The Southern African Customs Union", in Oyejide, A. Elbadawi, I., & Yeo, S. (eds.). *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa*. Volume 3: Regional Case Studies. London: Macmillan.

Ndegwa, N.S. 1996. *The Two Faces of Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.

Neuman, W.L. 2000. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative*

- Approaches*. 4th ed. Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.
- Nye, J.S. 1968. *International Regionalism: Readings*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
- O'Donnell, G. 1999. "Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies" in Schedler, A., Diamond, L., & Plattner, M.F. (eds.). *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Obasanjo, O. 1996. "A Balance Sheet of the African Region and the Cold War" in Keller, E.J. and Rothchild, D. (eds.). *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- OECD. 1991. *Public management developments*. Paris: PUMA/OECD.
- OECD. 1995. *Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System: Synergy and Divergence*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD. 2003. *Peer Review: An OECD Tool for Cooperation and Change*. Paris: OECD.
- Ohmae, K. 1995. *The End of the Nation State*. London: Harper and Collins.
- Ojo, O. J. 1999. "Integration in ECOWAS: Success and Difficulties" in Bach, D. (ed.) *Regionalism in Africa: Integration and Disintegration*. Oxford: James Currey.
- Olowu, D. and Soumana, S. (eds.). 2002. *Better governance and Public policy: Capacity Building for Democratic Renewal in Africa*. Bloomfield: Kumarian Press.
- Osborne, D. and Gaebler. T. 1992. *Reinventing Government*. Reading, M.A.: Addison-Wesley.
- Ostergaard, T. 1993. "Classical models of regional integration-what relevance for Southern Africa?" in Oden, B. (ed.). *Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources*. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute.
- Ostrom, E. 1999. "Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework" in Sabatier, P.A. (ed.). *Public Policy Theories*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Peters, B.G. 1995. *The Politics of Bureaucracy*. New York: Longman.
- Peters, B.G. 1996. *The future of governance: four emerging models*. Lawrence: University of Kansa Press.
- Picciotto R. 1995. *Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to Governance*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

- Plummer, K. 1983. *Documents of Life: An Introduction to the problems and literature of humanistic method*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Pollitt, C. 2003. *The Essential Public Manager: Public Policy and Management*. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
- Pressman, J.L. and Wildavsky, A. 1973. *Implementation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Przeworski, A. Stokes, S. and Manin, B. (eds.). 1999. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przerworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Chibub, J.A. & Limongi, F. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, R.D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Raz, J. 1979. "The Rule of Law and Its Virtue" in *The Authority of Law*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Reddy, P.S. (ed.). 1996. *Readings in Local Government, Management and Development: A Southern African Perspective*. Kenwyn: Juta.
- Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (eds.). 2003. *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*. London: SAGE.
- Robbins, S.P. 1980. *The Administrative process*. 2nd edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
- Rosenau, J.N. and Cziempel, E.O. (eds.). 1992. *Governance without government: Order and change in world Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenbloom, D.H. and Kravchuk, R.S. 2002. *Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics, and Law in the Public Sector*. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Roux, N., Brynard, P., Botes, P., & Fourie, D. 1997. *Critical issues in public management and administration in South Africa*. Pretoria: Kagiso.
- Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E.H. & Stephens, J.D. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Schedler, A., Diamond, L., & Plattner, M.F. 1999. *The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Shafritz, J.M. and Hyde, A.C. 1992. *Classics of Public Administration*. California: Brooks/Cole.

- Silverman, D. 2001. *Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text, and Interaction*. 2nd edition. London: SAGE.
- Silverman, D. 2004. (ed.). *Qualitative Research: Theory, Method and Practice*. London: SAGE.
- Stevens, R. 1993. *The independence of the judiciary: the view from the Lord Chancellor's Office*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Strange, S. 1996. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tangwa, G.B. 1998. *Road Companion to Democracy and Meritocracy*. Bellingham: Kola Tree Press.
- Tettey, W.J. 2003. "The Mass Media, Political Expression and Democratic Transition" in Tettey, W.J., Pupilampu, K.P. & Berman, B.J. (eds.). *Critical Perspectives on Politics and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Thompson, A. 2000. *An Introduction of African Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Todaro, M.P. 1992. *Economics for a Developing World: An introduction to principles, problems, and policies for development*. 3rd ed. London: Longman.
- Todaro, M.P. 2000. *Economic Development*. Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley.
- Topornin, B.N. 1990. "On the Classification of Socialist Political Systems" in Bebler, A. and Seroka, J. *Contemporary Political Systems*. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Tordoff, W. 2002. *Government and Politics in Africa*. 4th ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- UNDP. 2005. *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*. New York: UNDP.
- Uvin, P. 1998. *AIDING VIOLENCE: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
- Van de Walle, N. 1994. "Neopatrimonialism and Democracy in Africa". In Widner, J.A. (ed.). *Economic Change and Political Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.
- Van de Walle, N. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis 1979 – 1999*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Klaveren, A. 2000. "Chile: The Search for Open Regionalism" in Hettne, B., Inotal, A., & Sunkel, O. (eds.). *National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South*. Volume 3. London: Macmillan Press.

- Viner, J. 1950. *The Customs Union Issue*. London: Stevens & Sons
- Wallace, W. 1995. "Regionalism in Europe: Model or Exception?" in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.). *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisations and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Welman, J.C. and Kruger, S.J. (1999). *Research Methodology for the Business and Administrative Sciences*. Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
- White, S. and Nelson, D.E. 1986. (eds.). *Communist Politics*. Hampshire: Macmillan Education.
- Wiseman, J.A. (ed.). 1995. *Democracy and Political Change in Sub-Saharan Africa*. London: Routledge.
- Wunsch, J.S. and Olowu, D. (eds.). 1990. *The Failure of the Centralised State: Institutions and Self-Governance in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Wyatt-Walter, A. 1995. "Regionalism, Globalisation, and World Economic Order" in Fawcett, L. and Hurrell, A. (eds.). *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organisation and International Order*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Yin, R.K. 1994. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Young, C. 1999. "The Third Wave of Democratisation in Africa" in Joseph, R. (ed.). *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

REPORTS, JOURNALS, AND PRESENTATION PAPERS

- ADB. 2001. *African Development Report 2001: Fostering Good Governance in Africa*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Adedeji, A. 2002a. "From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for African Development and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Wither Africa?" Address at the African Forum For Envisioning Africa. Kenya, 26-29 April 2002.
- Adedeji, A. 2002b. "NEPAD: A view from the African Trenches". Address at the International Peace Academy's Policy Forum on the New Partnership for African Development. New York, 16 July 2002.
- Adesina, J. 2002. "Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, post-Washington Consensus and Beyond". Paper presented at the CODESRIA's Conference on Africa and the Development Challenges of the New Millennium. Ghana, 23-26 April 2002.
- Ake, C. 1993. "The unique case of African Democracy" *International Affairs*. Vol. 69, 239-244.

- Allen, C. 1992. "Benin: The Democratic Model". *Review of African Political Economy*. Vol. 54, 43-58
- Annan, K. 1998. *Report of the Secretary-General: The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa*. New York: United Nations.
- Assogba, Y. 1996. "Problematique de la Gouvernance en Afrique au Sud du Sahara". *Revue Canadienne d' Etudes du Development*, Special Issue. 57-73
- Auriacombe, C. 1999. "Reflections on the New Public Management". *Journal of Public Administration*. Vol. 34, 124-136.
- Bah, A.M.S. 2005. "West Africa: From a Security Complex to a Security Community". *African Security Review*. Vol. 14, No 2.
- Beausang, F. 2001. "Democratising Global Governance: The challenges of the World Social Forum". *Management of Social Transformations*. Discussion paper No 59.
- Bekoe, D.A. 2002. "NEPAD and its Achilles Heels". *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 1, No 4, 232- 253.
- Boshoff, H. and Francis, D. 2003. "The AU Mission in Burundi: Technical and Operational Dimensions". *African Security Review*. Vol. 12, No 3.
- Botwe, K.S. 2005. "African Peer Review Mechanism: the experience of Ghana". Paper presented at the Institute of Security Studies "ISS" seminar, 8 September 2005. Pretoria, South Africa.
- Celliers, J. 2003. "Peace and Security through Good Governance. A Guide to the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism". ISS paper 70.
- Chevallier, J. 1996. "Public administration in statist France". *Public Administration Review*. Jan/Feb, Vol. 56, No 1.
- Christensen, S.R. and Siamwalla, A. 1994. "Muddling toward a miracle: Thailand and East Asian Growth". *TDR Quarterly Review*, Vol. 9 No 2, 13-19
- Cleaver, F. 1999. "Paradoxes of participation: Questioning participatory approaches to development". *Journal of International Development*. Vol. 11, 597-612
- Collier, P. and Gunning, J.W. 1999. "Explaining African Economic Performance". *Journal of Economic Literature* Vol. 37, 64-111.
- Craig, P. 1997 "Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework" *Public Law*, 467-487.
- Davies, R. 1994. "Approaches to regional integration in the Southern African Context". *Africa Insight*, Vol. 24, No 1.

Deng, L. 2002. "A Reflection Paper on the Sectoral Priorities of NEPAD". Paper presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa held in Nairobi Kenya, 26-29 April 2002.

Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). 2004. *Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa's Trade Potential*. Addis Ababa: ECA.

Feng, Y. 1997. "Democracy, Political stability, and Economic growth". *British Journal of Political Science* Vol. 27, 391-418.

Gaventa, J. and Valderrama, C. 1999. "*Participation, Citizenship and Local Governance*". Note prepared for workshop on strengthening participation in local governance. Institute of Development Studies.

Harsch, E. 1993. "Accumulators and Democrats: Challenging State Corruption in Africa". *Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 31, No 1, 31-48.

Herbert, R. 2003. "Becoming my brother's keeper". *eAfrica: The Electronic Journal of Governance and Innovation*. Johannesburg: SALLA.

Inotai, A. 1991. "Regional Integration among Developing Countries". *World Bank Working Paper*, World Bank.

Kasfir, N. 1998. "No Party Democracy in Uganda". *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 9, No. 2.

Kauzya, J.M. 2003. *Local Governance Capacity Building for Full-range Participation: Concepts, Frameworks and Experiences in African Countries*. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Keet, D. 1999. *Globalisation and regionalization: Contradictory tendencies? Counteractive tactics? Or Strategic Possibilities?* Occasional paper, Foundation for Global Dialogue. Johannesburg.

Keet, D. 2003. "South Africa: the bully boy?" *South African Labour Bulletin*, Vol. 27, No 3, 26-29.

Knack, S. and Keefer, P. 1995. "Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures". *Economics and Politics* Vol. 7, 207-227.

Koranteng, A. 2000. "Evaluation capacity development in Ghana". Paper presented at the workshop organized by the Development Bank of Southern

Africa, the African Development Bank and the World Bank 25-29 September 2000, Johannesburg.

Lall, S. 1997. "Attracting Foreign Investment: New Trends, Sources and Policies" *Commonwealth Secretariat. Economic Paper No 31*.

Laurance, E.J., Wagenmakers, H. & Wulf, H. 2005. "Managing the Global Problems Created by the Conventional Arms Trade: An Assessment of the UN Register of Conventional Arms". *Global Governance* Vol. 11, No. 2.

Lemarchand, R. 1972. "Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: competing solidarities in nation-building" *American Political Science Review*. Vol.66, No 1, 68-90.

Lijphart, A. 1991. "Majority Rule in Theory and Practice: The Tenacity of a Flawed Paradigm". *International Social Science Journal*. Vol. 129, 483-93.

Lipset, S.M. 1959. "Some Social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy". *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 53, 69-105.

Manuel Trevor, 2004. *Global Economic Governance Lecture*. Inaugural lecture at the Oxford University. 08 March 2004.

March, J.G. and. Olsen, J.P. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organisational Factors in Political Life." *American Political Science Review*. Vol.78, 734-49.

Masango, R. 2002. "Public Participation A Critical Ingredient for Good Governance. *Politeia*. Vol. 21, No 2, 52-65.

Mbaku, J.M. 1996. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The futility of Cleanups". *Cato Journal*, Vol. 16, No.1.

Moe, R.C. 1994. "The Reinventing Government Exercise: Misinterpreting the Problem, Misjudging the Consequences". *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 54, 111-120.

Moe, R.C. and Gilmour, R.S. 1995. "Rediscovering Principles of Public Administration: The Neglected Foundation of Public Law". *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 55, 135-145.

Mukamunana, R. 2002. The Role and capacity of Civil Society Organisations in Public Policy-making with Reference to Rwanda. Unpublished Master's Dissertation. School of Public Administration and Management. University of Pretoria.

Mukamunana, R and Moeti K. 2005. "Challenges of Regional Integration in Africa: Policy and Administrative Implications". In *Journal of Public Administration*, Conference Proceedings. 90-101.

Mule, H. 2001. "Challenges to African Governance and Civil Society". *Public Administration and Development*. Vol. 21, 71-76.

Mulikita, N.M. 2003. "False Dawn? Africa's Post –1990 Democratisation Waves". *African Security Review*. Vol. 12, No 4.

Naidu, S. 2003. "Unmasking South Africa's Corporate Expansion Under NEPAD: Partnership or Economic Colonisation of African Markets". Paper prepared for "*Africa: Partnership or Imperialism*". Conference co-hosted by The Review of African Political Economy and the Centre for West African Studies, University of Birmingham, 5-7 September 2003.

National Intelligence Council. 2005. Mapping Sub-Saharan Africa's future. Conference Report. March 2005

NEPAD Rwanda Magazine. *Rwanda hosts NEPAD Summit*. Issue No 001, May-July 2004

Nunberg, B. 1990. *Public Sector Management Issues in Structural Adjustment Lending*. Discussion Papers. Washington: World Bank.

Odhiambo, K. 2000. "Evaluation capacity development in Kenya". Paper presented at the workshop organized by the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the African Development Bank and the World Bank. Johannesburg, 25–29 September 2000.

Olukoshi, A. 2002. "Governing the African Political Space for Sustainable Development. A Reflection on NEPAD". Paper presented at the African Forum for Envisioning Africa. Kenya, 26-29 April 2002.

O'Toole, L. J. 1997. "Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in Public Administration". *Public Administration Review*. Vol.57, 45-52.

Oxfam, 2002. *Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalisation and the fight against poverty*. Oxfam.

Pagani, F. 2002. *Peer Review: A tool for cooperation and change: An analysis of OECD working method*. Paris: OECD.

Plattner, M.F. 2002. "Globalisation and Self-government". *Journal of Democracy*. Vol. 13, No 3, 54- 67.

Pollitt, C.1996. "Anti-statist Reforms and New Administrative Directions: Public Administration in the United Kingdom". *Public Administration Review*. Vol. 56, 81-87

Quayle, D. 1992. "Human Rights: An International Responsibility". Address before the UN Human rights Commission. Geneva: Switzerland, February 10. *US Department of State Dispatch*. Vol. 3, No 7, 103 -104.

Ranis, G. 2004. "The Evolution of Development Thinking: Theory and Policy". Paper prepared for the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., 3 - 4 May 2004.

Romzek, B.S. and Dubnick, M.L. 1987. "Accountability in the public Sector: Lessons from the Challenger Tragedy". *Public Administration Review*. Vol.

47, 227-238.

Rondinelli, D.A., Nellis, J., & Cheema, S. 1983. "Decentralisation in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience". *World Bank Staff Working Papers*. No 581.

Salamon, L.M. and Anheier, HK. 1997. "The Civil Society Sector." *Society*. Vol. 34, No 2, 60-65.

Sartori, G. 1991. "Rethinking Democracy: Bad Polity and Bad Politics" *International Social Science Journal*. Vol.129.

Tandon, Y. 2002. "NEPAD and FDIs: Symmetries and Contradictions". Paper presented at the African Scholars' Forum on the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), Nairobi, 26-29 April, 2002.

Tanzi, V. 1995. "Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects". *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics*, 295-316.

Tellis, W. 1997. "Application of a Case Study Methodology". *The Qualitative Report*, Vol. 3, No. 3.

Tetzlaff, R. 1997. "Democratisation in Africa: Progress and Setbacks on a Difficult Road". *Development and Cooperation*. No 4, 8-13

UNCTAD, 2002. *World Investment Report 2002: Transnational Corporations and Export Competitiveness*. New York and Geneva: UNCTAD

UNCTAD. 2004. *Economic Development in Africa. Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage?* New York and Geneva: UNCTAD

UNDP. 1997. *Reconceptualising Governance. Discussion Paper 2*. New York: UNDP/ Division of Public Affairs.

UNDP. 2000. *Human Development Report 1999: Globalisation with a Human Face*. New York: UNDP

UNDP. 2004. *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*. New York: UNDP

UNESCO. 1998. *World Culture Report: Culture, Creativity and Markets*. Paris: UNESCO

UNECOSOC. 2002. *The critical role of public administration and good governance in implementing the United Nations Millennium Declaration: Institutional capacity development*. Report of Experts on Public Administration New York: UN

UNRISD. 2000. *Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development*. Geneva: UNRISD

Venter, D. 2003. "Democracy and Multiparty Politics in Africa: Recent Elections in Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho". *Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) Journal*. Vol. XIX, No.1.

Van de Walle, N. (1996). "The future of aid to Africa". Testimony before the subcommittee on African affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Williamson, J. 2000. "What should the World Bank think about the Washington Consensus". *The World Bank Researcher Observer*. Vol. 15, No. 2, 251- 264.

World Bank. 1981. *Towards Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington D.C.: World Bank.

World Bank. 1989a. *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank, 1989b. *Strengthening Local Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa*. EDI Seminar Report No 21. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 1991. *Governance and Development*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 1993. *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press.

World Bank, 1994. *Adjustment in Africa: Reform, Results, and the Road Ahead*. Washington, D.C: The World Bank

World Bank. 1995. *World Bank Participation Sourcebook*. Environment Department Papers Participation Series. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 1997. *The World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 2000a. *Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?* Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 2000b. *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

World Bank. 2004. *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone*. New York: Oxford University Press.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS ON THE NEPAD AND THE APRM

APRM. 2003. African Peer Review Mechanism Base Document (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex II)

APRM. 2003. Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/MOU)

APRM, 2003. Objectives, Standards, Criteria, and Indicators for the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/OSCI)

APRM, 2003. African Peer Review Mechanism Organisation and Process (NEPAD/HSGIC/03-2003/APRM/Guideline/O&P)

APRM, 2003. Guidelines for Countries to Prepare for and to Participate in the African Peer Review Mechanism (NEPAD/APRM/Panel3/Guidelines/11-2003/Doc8)

APRM, 2004. Country Self-Assessment for the African peer Review Mechanism (Master Questionnaire) October, 2004.

AU, 2000. Constitutive Act of the African Union, Act of 2000

AU, 2002. Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance (AHG/235 (XXXVIII) Annex I)

NEPAD, 2001. The New Partnership for Africa's Development. Abuja, Nigeria.

Olusegun, Obasanjo. 2005. Address by Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria and Chairperson of the AU, the NEPAD HSGIC and the APR Forum at the 3rd Summit of the APRM Forum, 19 June 2005. Abuja, Nigeria.
http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/communiques/speech_19605abuja.pdf

INTERNET SOURCES

Adesina, J. Africa's Experience with Regional Development Frameworks: Beyond Silence, Closure and Forgetting. www.interaction.nu.ac.za/SASA2003/Adesina.htm/ accessed on the 20 January 2005

African Development Bank. 1999 "Bank Group policy on good governance"

www.afdb.org/pls/portal/url/ITEM/132318C28D980E36EE040C00A0C3D482A
accessed 14 March 2005

African Union, Article 15 of the AHG/DECL.3 (XXIX) www.africa-union.org/
accessed 14 September 2004

Alabi, N. 2001. The Windhoek Seminar: Ten Years On: Assessment, Challenges and Prospects. Paper on Behalf of the West African Journalists Association.
www.unesco.org/webworld/com_media/wpfd/2001_docs_en.html/ accessed on 20 August 2005

Amuwo, K. 2002. Globalisation, NEPAD, and the governance question in Africa. In *African Studies Quarterly* 6, no. 3
<http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6/v6i3a4.htm>

Asian Development Bank, "Elements of good governance"

http://www.adb.org/Governance/gov_elements.asp/ accessed 14 March 2005

Assane F. Diop. "Interview with President Omar Bongo"

<http://www.african-geopolitics.org/show.aspx?ArticleId=3109/> accessed 25 November 2005

Bond, P. 2002. 'Thabo Mbeki's New Partnership for Africa's Development. Breaking or Shining the Chains of Global Apartheid?' *Foreign Policy in Focus, Discussion Paper*. http://www.fpif.org/papers/nepad/index_body.html/ accessed 2 August 2004

Bond, P. 2002. "Zimbabwe, South Africa, and the power politics of bourgeois democracy". *Monthly Review*, May, 2002. Vol. 54, No1.
<http://www.monthlyreview.org/0502bond.htm/> accessed 2 August 2004

Brynard, D.J. 1998. Public Participation in Local Government and Administration: Bridging the Gap.
<http://www.unisa.aczdept/press/politeia/152/brynard.html/> accessed 2 August 2004

BuaNews: Government hails peer review of Ghana, Rwanda.
<http://www.buanews.gov.za/view.php?ID=05062311151004&coll=buanew05/> accessed 23 June 2005

Commission for Africa. 2005. Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa.

<http://www.commissionforafrica.org/> / accessed 20 December 2005

Court, J., Kristen, P. & Weden, B. 1999. Bureaucratic structure and Performance: First Africa Survey.
www.unu.edu/hq/academic/Pg_area4/pdf/unu.research.pdf/ accessed 4 March 2005

Daily Trust (Abuja). Rwanda Under African Peer Review's Surgery. August 12, 2005. <http://allafrica.com/stories/200508120414.html/> accessed on the 12 August 2005.

De Tocqueville, A. 1835. Democracy in America.

http://xroads.virginia.edu/~Hyper/DETOC/toc_indx.html/ accessed 20 March 2005

ECA. 2005a. Striving for Good Governance in Africa. Synopsis of the 2005 African Governance Report prepared for the African Development Forum IV. <http://www.uneca.org/> accessed 20 December 2005

ECA. 2005b. Is Africa Going to Benefit in Hong Kong?

<http://www.uneca.org/> accessed on 20 December 2005.

European Commission, 2004 "African Peace Facility" www.europa.eu.int/ accessed 10 December 2005

Freedom House, 2005. Freedom in the World 2005. Table of Independent Countries: Comparative Measures of Freedom. www.freedomhouse.org/ accessed 20 December 2005

French, K.J. 2004. Democracy: More than Economic Development. http://departments.oxy.edu/.../fall04/pol101c/Statistical_Analysis_Paper.doc Accessed on May 31, 2005

G8 Summit 2002. G8 Africa Action Plan. Document from the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, June 26-27. www.g8.gc.ca/kanan-docs/afraction-e.asp accessed 4 August 2004

G8 Summit 2005. Progress report by the G8 Africa Personal Representatives on implementation of the Africa Action Plan. <http://www.g8.gov.uk/> accessed 2 August 2005

Group for Research and Initiatives for the Liberation of Africa (GRILA) www.grila.org/nepad_body.htm/ accessed 10 October 2005

Human Rights Watch. "Uganda: Not a level playing field. Government violations in the lead-up to the Election" March 2001 Vol. 13, No. 19(A) www.hrw.org/reports/2001/uganda/uganda0301.pdf/ accessed 25 November 2005

Humphreys, M and Bates, R. 2002. "Political Institutions and Economic Policies: Lessons from Africa". CID Working Paper, no. 94, Center for International Development, Harvard University, September 2002 <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/pdf/094.pdf> accessed 23 August 2004

Kagame, P. "Building Business Confidence through Corporate Governance and African Peer Review " Remarks by Paul Kagame, President of the Republic of Rwanda at the ninth COMESA Summit. Kampala, 7th June 2004. <http://www.nepadrwanda.gov.rw/nep17.html/> accessed 9 June 2004

IMF, "Country surveillance mechanism" <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm/> accessed 10 April 2005

Kanbur, R. 2004. The African Peer Review Mechanism: An Assessment of Concept and Design. <http://www.cornell.people.edu/pages/sk145/> accessed 10 February 2005

Kay, J and Silberston, A. 1996. "Corporate Governance" *Perspectives on Company Law*. Vol. 231 August 1996 <http://www.johnkay.com/industries/149/> accessed 2 April 2005

Levchenko, A. 2004. Institutional Quality and International Trade. *IMF Working Paper*. WP/04/231 www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04231.pdf/ Accessed on 2 April 2005

Mahathir bin Mohamad

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahathir_bin_Mohamad/ accessed 20 March 2005

Mandela, N. 1999. Mandela address to the World Economic Forum. Davos, 29 January 1999 <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1999/nm0129.htm/> accessed 2 June 2004

Mbeki, T. 1998. The African Renaissance: Statement of Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki, Gallagher Estate, 13 August 1998 <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mbeki/1998/tm0813.htm/> accessed

2 June 2004

Mbeki, T. 2002. "Africa is poised to begin a new day" in ANC Today Vol.2 No.21 (24-30 May). <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at21.htm/> accessed 2 June 2004

Millennium Challenge Account,

www.mca.gov/ accessed on 14 March 2005.

NEPAD Rwanda Magazine. Composition of the APR National Commission. <http://www.nepadrwanda.gov.rw/NepMag.html> Accessed on the 4/4/2005

Nkhulu, W. 2005. The New Partnership for Africa's Development: The Journey So Far. NEPAD Secretariat. <http://www.nepad.org/> accessed 12 June 2005

Noaksson, N. and Jacobsson, K. 2003. The production of ideas and expert knowledge in the OECD: the OECD Jobs strategy in contrast with the EU employment strategy

www.score.su.se/pdfs/2003-7.pdf accessed 10 April 2005

OECD, Member states of the OECD

<http://www.oecd.org/> accessed 10 April 2005

Quibria, M. G., 2002. Growth and Poverty: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle Revisited. ADBI Research Paper 33. Tokyo, Japan. <http://www.adbi.org/publications/> accessed 4 June 2005

- State House of Kenya. "President Kibaki dissolves the Cabinet"
<http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke> accessed November 25, 2005.
- Tellis, W. 1997. "Triangulation"
www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR3-3/tellis2.html#denzin/accessed, 20 June 2004
- Terlinden, U. 2004. "Good governance in Africa – a Parliamentarians' Forum on Realistic Policies in North and South"
http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/africa/rep_hm/accessed 10 August 2005
- The Cotonou Agreement of 2000
<http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r12101.htm/> accessed on 11 March 2005
- Transparency International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2005"
<http://www.transparency.org> accessed 10 December, 2005.
- Uganda Conflict Action Network. "President Yoweri Museveni to run for third term". <http://www.ugandacan.org/item/714/> accessed 25 November 2005
- UNHCR. 1994. Global Refugee Trends
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/taxis/vtx/statistics/ accessed 12 June 2004
- Veggeland, N. 2000. Neo-Regionalism: Planning for Devolution, Democracy and Development. Forskningsrapport, No 52.
<http://www.hil.no/biblioteket/forskning/forsk52/52ut.htm> /Accessed on 11 May 2005
- Visco, I. 2002. "Peer pressure as part of surveillance by international institutions"
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/30/1935112.pdf/ accessed 10 April 2005
- Williams, Al-Yash. 2003. "On the subject of Kings and Queens: Traditional African Leadership and the Diasporal Imagination". *African Studies Quarterly* 6(4):1 <http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v6/v6i3a1.htm/> accessed 20 June 2004
- World Bank. 2002. *The Role and Effectiveness of Development Assistance: Lessons from the World Bank Experience*. Paper presented at the United Nations International Conference Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 18–22, 2002. Washington, D.C.: World Bank
http://www.gm-unccd.org/FIELD/Multi/WB/WB_lessons.pdf/ accessed 20 June 2004

NEWSPAPERS

BuaNews, 23 June 2005

Business Day, 3 March 2004

Business Day, 2 September 2005

Business Day, 15 September 2004

City Press, 9 June 2003

Pretoria News, 24 March 2004

Sowetan Business, 1 April 2004

The Mail & Guardian, 24 June 2005

The East African Standard, 26 March 2004

Daily Trust, 12 August 2005

The Vanguard, 14 July 2005

Guardian Unlimited, 21 December 2005

Reuters, 8 July 2002