

CHAPTER 4: “DO NOT JUDGE!” (μὴ κρίνετε)

IN Q (6:37-38)

4.1 ~ RECONSTRUCTING THE Q TEXT

The Lukan and Matthean versions of Q 6:37-38 differ substantially. In fact, the only verbal agreements between the two are the admonition not to judge (μὴ κρίνετε), the motive clause that follows (μὴ κριθῆτε), and the concluding supportive maxim (ὧ μέρω μετρεῖτε [ἀντι]μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν). Luke adds to the initial prohibition not to judge three further admonitions, one warning against condemning others (καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε), another commanding people to forgive (ἀπολύετε), and yet another commanding people to give (δίδοτε) (cf. Piper 1989:37; Catchpole 1993:121). Each of these additional admonitions are then followed by a motive clause (μὴ καταδικασθῆτε, ἀπολυθήσεσθε, and δοθήσεται ὑμῖν, respectively), similar in grammatical form and rhetorical function to the initial motive clause (μὴ κριθῆτε).

These extra three admonitions and motive clauses should be seen as Lukan additions. The first means just about the same as μὴ κριθῆτε, and appears somewhat superfluous. The second takes further the theme of (apocalyptic) forgiveness, a prominent theme for Luke, but not really for Q (cf. Q 12:10; 17:3-4 vs. Luke 5:20-24; 7:47-49; 11:4; 12:10; 23:34; Acts 5:31; 13:38; 26:18; cf. Kloppenborg 2006 & Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90; see section 4.3.2 below). In adding this particular saying, Luke might have been motivated by a need to propose forgiveness as the positive flipside of judgment (cf. Piper 1989:38). The third addition latches onto the idea, already expressed in Luke (Q) 6:30, that you should give to others (cf. Tuckett 1996:432). The repetition (in both verses 30 and 38) of this admonition is unlikely to have been a product of such a compact and succinct document as Q, but not of a lengthy and elaborate gospel such as Luke (cf. Carruth 1992:89-90, in Youngquist 2011:81-82). Moreover, the directive to give to others betrays Luke's own interests here by expressing the trademark Lukan themes of

charity, wealth-redistribution and almsgiving (cf. Piper 1989:37-38; Kloppenborg 2006 & Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90, 91). Luke probably added these three admonitions to replicate a “list of four,” something he has an apparent affinity for (cf. Luke 6:22, 24-26, 27-28; cf. Marriott 1925:100, in Youngquist 2011:55; Piper 1989:38). In fact, Luke might have been responsible for elaborating other Q material in this way, notably Q 6:22 and Q 6:27-28 (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). None of these additional sayings are developed by the supportive argumentation that immediately follows in Q. Also, there are no real satisfactory explanations for why Matthew would have deleted these three admonitions if he had any knowledge of them (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:90-91).

There are a few reasons for rejecting the popular argument that these additional admonitions contain “un-Lukan terminology” (*unlukanische Ausdrücke*), and should therefore be accepted as part of Q (cf. e.g. Schweizer 1982:82, in Youngquist 2011:60). Firstly, even if both the vocabulary and style of these additions were “un-Lukan” – something denied by the current author – the thematic content of these additions are, as we have seen, genuinely and essentially Lukan. Secondly, although the stylistic form of these additional admonitions is not typically Lukan, the style is explicable as an attempt by Luke to create a fourfold parallelism by modelling his additions after the original admonition (Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ κριθῆτε). Thirdly, at least two of the words (ἀπολύω & δίδωμι) featured in these additional admonitions are well-known to Luke (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963 s.v. ἀπολύω & δίδωμι). Each of these words appear twice in the Lukan context – once in the active voice, and once in the passive voice. The verb in the remaining admonition (καταδικάζω) is indeed a hapax in Luke, but it is also unattested in Q, and very unpopular in the rest of the New Testament, where it appears only three additional times – twice in Matthew, and once in James (cf. Moulten & Geden 1963 s.v. καταδικάζω; cf. also Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). Luke was certainly not unfamiliar with the concept expressed by the verb καταδικάζω, seeing as he used the noun καταδίκη in Acts 25:15 – its only appearance in the New Testament (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:91). Fourthly, it makes sense why Luke would have used this uncommon verb in the current context. The verb καταδικάζω is more specific than the

verb κρίνω, and Luke probably wanted to clarify the exact application of the admonition not to judge (cf. Patton 1916:289, in Youngquist 2011:69). Also, Luke needed to find a word that was fairly close to, if not synonymous with, κρίνω, in order to create his fourfold parallelism, which consisted of two negative legs (Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ κριθῆτε· καὶ μὴ καταδικάζετε, καὶ οὐ μὴ καταδικασθῆτε), and two positive legs (ἀπολύετε, καὶ ἀπολυθήσεσθε· δίδοτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν) (cf. Drury 1976:136, in Youngquist 2011:73). Thus, Luke’s appendage of καταδικάζω both mimics and heightens the Q admonition against judgment (cf. Fleddermann 2005:295, in Youngquist 2011:84).

In Luke, the admonition to give is followed by a strange sentence: “A good measure, pressed down, shaken together and running over, will be poured into your lap” (μέτρον καλὸν πεπιεσμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερεκχυννόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν). This maxim recalls “the Palestinian custom of using the fold of a garment as a container for grain” (Catchpole 1986:124, in Youngquist 2011:60). Not only for this reason, but also because it rather looks like a traditional maxim, is it unlikely to have been created by Luke *ex nihilo*, and might even have formed part of the Jesus tradition at some stage (cf. Catchpole 1986:124, in Youngquist 2011:60; Tuckett 1996:430).

However, this sentence makes more sense in its Lukan position than it would in Q. Luke attempts to motivate the preceding admonition by arguing that if you give to others, you will receive *more* than the content of what you gave in the first place. The vocabulary and imagery of this statement (cf. esp. μέτρον) naturally links it to the subsequent Q saying: “For with the measure you measure, it will be measured to you” (ὥ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε ἀντιμετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν). However, despite this superficial correlation between the two, the Lukan saying actually contradicts the Q saying (cf. Blair 1896:100, in Youngquist 2011:67). The former claims that you will receive *more* than what you give out, while the latter claims that you will receive *exactly the same* as what you give out (cf. Fairchild 1989:106, in Youngquist 2011:61). Hence, Q 6:38 does not logically fit into its Lukan placement. It does not make sense as a motivation for the admonition to give (δίδοτε). If you only got back what you gave, what would be the motivating factor?

Luke's justification – that you would receive *more* than what you gave – makes much more sense as a motivating factor for the admonition to give (cf. Montefiore 1927:420 & Schweizer 1982:82, in Youngquist 2011:70, 75). Conversely, Q's motivation – that you will receive exactly what you give – makes much more sense in its Q position after the admonition not to judge than in its Lukan position (cf. Montefiore 1927:420, in Youngquist 2011:70). The knowledge that you will be judged just as harshly as your own judgment of others would be an excellent incentive not to cast judgment. Moreover, the occurrence in this passage of two words (σεσαλευμένον & κόλπον) that are Lukan favourites supports the notion that he added this saying to the Q context (cf. Marriott 1925:99, in Youngquist 2011:55). Finally, Mark (4:24) adds the phrase “and even more” (καὶ προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν) to *his* version of the “measurement” logion in Q 6:38. Luke was probably tempted by this parallel saying in Mark to add an extra motivating maxim - μέτρον καλὸν πεπεισμένον σεσαλευμένον ὑπερεκχυννόμενον δώσουσιν εἰς τὸν κόλπον ὑμῶν - to *his* version of the teaching (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:92). Both the Markan and Lukan variations have the effect of increasing the expected reward to “more than” what was “measured” in the first place. In light of all this, we have to conclude that only the verbal agreements with Matthew can be taken from Luke as part of Q.

Luke's elaboration of Q 6:37-38 was quite masterful. First he added a few extra admonitions. One of these (δίδοτε) allowed him to add a traditional maxim as a supporting maxim (cf. Tuckett 1996:432). The latter maxim not only had the same imagery as the original Q saying, but also produced the same effect as the Markan parallel. Adding this traditional maxim about measurements to the teaching in question then allowed Luke to affix the Q saying about measurements directly after it, without much difficulty (cf. Vaage 1986, in Youngquist 2011:77). In the process, however, Luke managed to (unintentionally) contradict himself. Luke's elaboration of the Q text was probably motivated by two factors: (1) He wanted to smooth out the (apparent) abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38. (2) He wanted to emphasise more than Q the *positive* side of apocalyptic judgment, which included “forgiveness” and “receiving more than what was given” (cf. Catchpole 1993:123).

Matthew has only one phrase added to the verbatim agreement between Luke and Matthew: “For in the same way you judge others, you will be judged” (ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε). The latter agrees syntactically, formally and grammatically with the maxim in Q 6:38, resulting in a strong parallelism between the two (cf. Marshall 1978:266, in Youngquist 2011:44; Piper 1989:38; Catchpole 1993:121). Both are introduced by a relative pronoun in the dative case (ᾧ), and the conjunction γὰρ, directly followed by a dative noun (κρίματι & μέτρῳ), a second-person, present, indicative, active verb (κρίνετε & μετρεῖτε), and a future, indicative, passive verb (κριθήσεσθε & μετρηθήσεται). Matthew’s general affinity for parallelisms, and his specific affinity for introducing or creating them when copying Jesus’ sayings, suggests that he probably added ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε here (cf. Luz 1985:51, in Youngquist 2011:45).

Matthew must have thought that the Q maxim (ὥ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν) was too vague, and too easy to misapply. His addition of ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε should be seen as an attempt to clarify the meaning and application of Q’s maxim. Matthew thereby spells out the intended meaning of Q (cf. Reiser 1990:251-252, in Youngquist 2011:46). In his Sermon on the Mount, Matthew shows great interest in the topics of “reciprocity” and “judgment” (cf. Carruth 1992:89, in Youngquist 2011:47; Youngquist 2011:52). In fact, Matthew shows a particular interest in the theme of “reciprocal judgment” elsewhere in his gospel (cf. Mat 5:21-26, 40; 23:32-33; see Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53-54). His need to clarify a saying that deals with *reciprocal judgment* is therefore understandable. This was quite unnecessary, however. The application of the Q maxim to the admonition not to judge invariably leads to the same interpretation. The Q text makes perfect sense without the addition of Matthew’s explanatory maxim. Additionally, Matthew’s need to add this explanatory line might have been motivated by the (seemingly) abrupt introduction of a new theme in Q 6:38 (cf. Piper 1989:38). Thus, Matthew attempted not only to explain the maxim in Q 6:38, but also to introduce a more seamless transition between the admonition in Q 6:37 and the maxim in Q 6:38 (cf. Piper 1989:38).

Luke might also have been attempting to introduce a more seamless transition, but went about it in a different way. Whereas Luke introduced three additional admonitions, and a supporting maxim that was thematically similar to Q 6:38, Matthew added an explanatory maxim that was formally and grammatically similar to Q 6:38 (cf. Davies & Allison 1988:669 & Becker 1996:308, in Youngquist 2011:46, 48; cf. also Catchpole 1993:121). The likelihood that both evangelists attempted to smooth out the transition between Q 6:37 and Q 6:38, as well as the fact that they employed two utterly different strategies to achieve this smooth transition, support the current proposition that Matthew added ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the Q text (cf. Piper 1989:38; Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53). It also validates our previous conclusion that Luke added three admonitions and a maxim to Q. In the end, ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε seems rather superfluous and redundant in a Q context, where pithy sayings are the norm, rather than the exception. Moreover, if the phrase ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε was indeed part of Q, why would Luke have left it behind (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:53)? Luke had no clear theological reasons for doing so. In fact, the mere absence of this Matthean addition in Luke should warn us against adding it to Q (cf. Reiser 1990:251, in Youngquist 2011:40; Catchpole 1993:121). The conclusion seems justified: The phrase ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε should be seen as a Matthean addition.

This leaves us with a few minor uncertainties. Luke begins the admonition not to judge with the conjunction καί, while Matthew has no conjunction. This admonition probably followed Q 6:36, another admonition about showing mercy. In the literary context of Q, the conjunction καί would have functioned to connect the two admonitions of verses 36 and 37, respectively (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:180). The need to link verses 36 and 37 is explicable on account of the thematic and formal similarities between them (see below). Moreover, Luke is highly unlikely to have introduced the ineloquent καί at this point, seeing as the use of a resumptive καί is not a trademark feature of Luke's own style (cf. Marriott 1925:92-93 & Carruth 1992:88, in Youngquist 2011:22). In fact, he frequently omits or replaces the resumptive καί in his redactional copying of other sources, especially Mark. Whenever the resumptive καί is present in Luke, it is routinely attributable to his source at that point. Matthew also tends to dispose of the resumptive

καί in his sources, which explains why it is not present in the Matthean version of this logion. Since Matthew had, in his gospel, already covered the theme of “mercy” comprehensively, and since he was introducing a new section in chapter 7, his omission here of καί coheres completely with his redactional activities (cf. Worden 1973:319 & Gundry 1982:120 & Carruth 1992:88, in Youngquist 2011:24-25). For these reasons, Luke’s καί should probably be accepted as stemming from Q.

As with his other motive clauses, Luke begins the one about judgment with another καί, and both negative particles: οὐ μή. There are text-critical issues and uncertainties with Luke’s use of καὶ οὐ here. A number of text variants prefer the conjunction ἵνα in its place. Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what Matthew has. Matthew’s text leads in the motive clause with the conjunction ἵνα. The different reading in Luke could be explained as an effort by copiers of Luke to align the third gospel more with the first. However, a genuine, alternative version of this verse in Luke could also explain the textual variation. This uncertainty in Luke gives precedence to the Matthean version, which introduces the motive clause with ἵνα μή. Seeing as both gospels use μή, and both gospels betray traditions of using ἵνα, the construct ἵνα μή should probably be preferred as the most original Q rendition. Against this conclusion, it could be stated (1) that Luke is not averse to the Matthean construction ἵνα μή, which features elsewhere in his gospel; (2) that Matthew tends to add the construction ἵνα μή to his sources, especially Mark; and (3) that Luke’s οὐ μή occurs frequently in all three gospels, most commonly in Jesus’ sayings (cf. Youngquist 2011:37). These observations are not determinative, however. Luke does in fact have a tendency to remove ἵνα [μή] from his sources, sometimes replacing it with an οὐ [μή]-type construction (cf. Luke 8:17; 18:18; 22:4; 23:25; cf. Cadbury 1920:137, in Youngquist 2011:34). He also has a habit of adding καὶ whenever it might help a sentence read more smoothly (cf. Harnack 1907:31, in Youngquist 2011:34). In my view, the text-critical difficulties with Luke’s οὐ μή should be decisive at this point. Moreover, the Lukan use of οὐ with μή looks very much like an attempt to (over)emphasise and dogmatise this motive clause (cf. Vaage 1986, in Youngquist 2011:34). In doing so, Luke transgresses beyond the borders of Q, which is simply interested in communicating morality and wisdom at this point.

Matthew begins the Q maxim in verse 38 with καὶ ἐν. The preposition ἐν is superfluous, and explicable in the Matthean context as a need to parallel the same preposition in the phrase ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε. It is somewhat probable that Matthew was copying Mark's (4:24) ἐν here, and not that of Q. He might have done the same thing when copying Q 3:16-17 (par. Mark 1:7-8) and Q 14:34 (par. Mark 9:50) (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:116). On the other hand, Luke has a tendency to drop the instrumental ἐν from his sources, and might have done so here, precisely because it is superfluous in its current Q context (cf. Cadbury 1920:204 & Carruth 1992:90 & Fleddermann 1995:85; 2005:115 & Youngquist 2006 & Kloppenborg 2006, in Youngquist 2011:113, 114, 115). However, Luke does not always avoid the instrumental use of ἐν (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:116). In fact, he retains it quite often when copying his sources. More significantly, he often produces it autonomously, not only in Sondergut material (cf. Luke 22:49), but also when he is rephrasing Mark (cf. e.g. Luke 4:32 // Mark 1:22; Luke 21:19 // Mark 13:13). Against most scholars, I believe that, in this instance, Matthew preferred Mark's ἐν over and above Q's lack thereof, because it enabled him to create an even better parallel with his ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε – a probability that is largely overlooked by scholars (see Youngquist 2011:113-116). The conjunction καὶ links the Matthean ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the Q maxim copied by him. Thus, once we accept that Matthew added the explanatory maxim ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to the original Q text, his use of καὶ ἐν before the authentic Q maxim also becomes explicable.

Luke introduces the Q maxim with the conjunction γὰρ, but Matthew does not. On the other hand, Matthew introduces *his* explanatory maxim with the very same conjunction (cf. Reiser 1990:250 & Fleddermann 1995:85, in Youngquist 2011:93, 94). One can understand why Matthew would move the conjunction back one phrase. When he added an additional maxim between Q's motive clause and Q's maxim, he was forced by the linguistic rules of Greek to move the conjunction γὰρ backwards, so that it would still follow the motive clause (cf. Carruth 1992:90 & Gundry 1982:120, in Youngquist 2011:93, 96). Hence, the earlier conclusion that Matthew added the phrase ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε to Q is currently substantiated, seeing as it provides the best

explanation of the differences between the two gospels, especially their respective usages of the conjunctions and prepositions they inherited from Q (cf. Fleddermann 1995:85, in Youngquist 2011:48). The likelihood that γάρ stood in Q is also substantiated by the agreement between Luke and Matthew in their act of reproducing this preposition against Mark (4:24), who lacks it (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:97).

Lastly, Matthew has μετρηθήσεται where Luke has ἀντιμετρηθήσεται. The latter verb represents a much better handling of the Greek language, since the verb, in and of itself, means to “measure out in return.” The former, however, produces much better poetic and sapiential rhythm with μέτρῳ and μετρεῖτε. For both these reasons, μετρηθήσεται should be preferred for Q. Poetic rhythm is far less important in a lengthy, narrative, gospel text than in a collection of pithy sayings. Luke probably changed the verb because of the unfortunate Greek. Luke has a familiar tendency to substitute his sources’ simple verbs for compound verbs, and probably did the same here (cf. Harnack 1907:31 & Cadbury 1920:166 & Marriott 1925:117 & Schulz 1972:146 & Carruth 1992:90, in Youngquist 2011:117, 118). Moreover, Luke seems to have a much greater affinity for the preposition ἀντί than any other New-Testament writer (cf. Worden 1973:341, in Youngquist 2011:117-118). Additionally, Luke loves lengthening future passive verbs (cf. Fleddermann 1995:85; 2005:295, in Youngquist 2011:119). Lastly, the introduction of ἀντί fits very well with Luke’s additional maxim, and its theme of “receiving more” than what was given in the first place (cf. Verheyden 2006, in Youngquist 2011:121). We are now ready to produce a reconstruction of the Q text:

37 Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε, ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε·
38 ὃ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.

37 And do not judge, so that you are not judged;
38 for with that measurement you measure with, it will be measured to you.

There are three formal indicators of the likelihood that verses 37 and 38 want to be read together. The first is the (semi)colon at the end of verse 37. The second is the use of the conjunction γάρ at the beginning of verse 38. The third is the fact that verse 38 begins with the relative pronoun ᾧ. Although this pronoun is in congruence with a noun (μέτρῳ) in verse 38 (as opposed to verse 37), the decision to place this pronoun *first* in the sentence structure signals a deliberate choice to link the two verses. As such, the relative pronoun ᾧ deliberately associates μέτρῳ with the implied “judgment” of verse 37. There is a poetic simplicity to the saying as we have constructed it. Verses 37 and 38 are in parallel. Both begin with an active verb (κρίνετε & μετρεῖτε), and is then followed by a passive verb (κριθῆτε & μετρηθήσεται). The two verbs of prohibition (or negative admonition) in verse 37 (μὴ κρίνετε & μὴ κριθῆτε) are followed by two indicative verbs in verse 38 (μετρεῖτε & μετρηθήσεται). The two verbs of verse 37 have the same stem (κρίνω). This is paralleled by the fact that the two verbs of verse 38 also have the same stem (μετρέω). Two of the features just identified are paralleled in verse 36. In verse 36, the same stem (οἰκτίρμων / τέλειος) is also reproduced. Furthermore, verse 36 also produces an imperative verb of (positive) admonition (Γίνεσθε in Luke), followed by an indicative verb (ἐστίν). Hence, there is a fair bit of formal agreement between the admonitions in verses 36 and 37-38, respectively. It follows that our reconstruction of Q 6:37-38 not only makes the best linguistic sense of the two applicable verses (internally), but also fits in perfectly with the immediate literary context of Q (externally).

Due to the slight stylistic agreement between verse 36 and verses 37-38, a case could be made for relating the maxim in verse 38 to *both* preceding admonitions. In that case, the maxim could be interpreted “either salvifically or judgmentally” (Catchpole 1993:121). Without disregarding such a possibility completely, our focus is rather on the logion in Q 6:37-38, and the internal relationship between its constituent forms. In any case, the text does seem to prefer and advocate a reading that puts most of its weight on the connection between verses 37 and 38. In the first place, there are a number of formal links between verses 37 and 38, but not one between verses 36 and 38. Secondly, the stylistic linkage between verses 36 and 38 is much weaker than that between verses 37 and 38. Thirdly, to state the obvious, verse 38 is sequentially closer to verse 37 than to verse 36. In the

fourth place, the maxim in verse 38 clarifies and substantiates the reciprocal theme of the motive clause in verse 37, not the *imitatio Dei* theme of the motive clause in verse 36. Lastly, Matthew understood the maxim in verse 38 as an exclusive reference to judgment. Although Luke added the positive values of “forgiveness” and “generosity” to the mix, these were not in reference to the Q maxim itself. Thus, our case for attaching the maxim in verse 38 directly to the preceding admonition, and only tentatively (and secondarily) to the mercy logion, is based on the form, style, order, rhetoric and subsequent interpretation of the literary text.

4.2 ~ MICRO-GENRE

It was argued in section 3.2.4 above that Q 6:20a introduces the inaugural sermon as a sapiential genre. The whole sermon should indeed be seen as a piece of wisdom teaching. Although some scholars question the sapiential nature of individual sayings in the inaugural sermon – most notably, Q 6:20-23 and Q 6:47-49 (cf. e.g. Sato 1988:4; Hoffmann 1995:188; Tuckett 1996:160-161, 337; Allison 1997:5) – they all admit to the obvious sapiential nature of the inaugural sermon as a whole (cf. Horsley 1999:88). The fact that Q 6:37-38 appears within the literary context of the inaugural sermon provides enough justification for classifying this individual logion as part of the wisdom genre. Nevertheless, the micro-genre of Q 6:37-38 must still be examined in its own right.

Regarding form, there are a number of good reasons for categorising Q 6:37-38 as a sapiential logion. The saying begins with a prohibition, and is immediately followed by a motive clause (cf. Edwards 1976:89; Kloppenborg 1987a:180; Piper 1989:36-37; cf. also Murphy 1981:6; Winton 1990:28; Ceresko 1999:35). The prohibition-and-motive-clause construction is then substantiated by the maxim in verse 38 (cf. Murphy 1981:4; Kirk 1998:91). Not only are there three traditional wisdom forms – i.e. the prohibition or negative admonition, the motive clause, and the maxim – but the last two clauses are also argumentative in nature. The first provides a rhetorical reason for obeying the initial prohibition. However, the reason provided is not self-evident. In other words, it is not obvious that people would be judged if they judge others. This claim needs to be

substantiated. As the conjunction γὰρ clearly shows, the maxim in verse 38 provides exactly this: additional justification that the claim the verse 37 is actually true (cf. Piper 1989:61-62). Particularly telling is that the maxim in verse 38 was a traditional wisdom saying of the time (cf. Mark 4:24; cf. Perdue 1986:10; Piper 1989:38). As such, verse 38 provides “gnomic authority to the opening admonition” (Kirk 1998:168). The whole logion is argumentative and rational in nature and form. Added to the sapiential small forms, and the argumentative nature of the logion, is the parallelism pointed out in section 4.1 above. These three formal characteristics, if considered together, leave little doubt that the logion should be classified under the category of “wisdom genre.” The use of a traditional wisdom saying in verse 38 puts this genre-classification entirely beyond doubt.

Could the same be said of the logion’s *thematic* content, however? After discussing the characteristic traits of wisdom literature, Crenshaw (2010:16) asserts: “It follows that wisdom is the reasoned search for specific ways to assure wellbeing and the implementation of those discoveries in daily existence.” Q 6:37 is undoubtedly concerned with the “wellbeing” of its hearers, as is evident from the phrase ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε. It is also concerned with the implementation of the saying in “daily existence,” seeing as the admonition μὴ κρίνετε attempts to direct behaviour towards other people (cf. Piper 1989:44). Crenshaw (2010:16) goes on to say: “Wisdom addresses natural, human and theological dimensions of reality, and constitutes an attitude towards life, a living tradition, and a literary corpus.” Q 6:37-38 undeniably addresses “human dimensions of reality.” Whether you are the subject or object of judgment, the act thereof formed as much a part of ancient everyday life as it does of modern everyday life. The saying also constitutes an “attitude towards life.” It’s goal is to *persuade* people to live without feelings of judgment in their hearts (cf. Piper 1989:44). Overall, the logion does seem to promote ideals comparable to other wisdom literature. This does not necessarily mean that we are here dealing with conventional wisdom. Such a conclusion can only be reached after comparing this piece of wisdom with other sapiential messages and texts.

It is something of an axiom that wisdom traditions tended to motivate and substantiate their individual wisdom sayings by drawing, above all else, on both nature and human conduct. Like most maxims, the one in verse 38 coheres to this general rule of thumb by substantiating the claim in verse 37 with an image from everyday human conduct (cf. Piper 1989:38). The image evoked by the maxim is, of course, that of barter exchanges, especially in the ancient marketplace, where common household goods, and everyday staple foods, were measured out to determine their cost (cf. Duling 1995:170-171, in Youngquist 2011:48). That the Q people were familiar with the marketplace is evidenced by Q 7:32 and Q 11:43. The bartering of goods was reliant upon the social value of reciprocity. People exchanged goods of the same or similar value. In order to ensure that this was indeed the case, goods were measured by means of scales, balances and weights. Thus, the measurement (or value) of goods a person gave up during a reciprocal exchange was similar, or the same, as the measurement (or value) of goods received in return. The saying in verse 38 is, therefore, a truism, observable everywhere, and all the time. Maxims like this one tended to be based on experience and observation (cf. Murphy 1981:4; Kirk 1998:91). In other words, the saying in verse 37 is substantiated by relating the abstract subject matter of moral judgment to the way in which reciprocity plays out in normal, daily, run-of-the-mill barter exchanges (cf. Duling 1995:170-171, in Youngquist 2011:48).

On a purely literal level, the relationship between the prohibition and the motive clause is one of reciprocity. The ancient social value of reciprocity ensured the equal distribution of goods within the village (see Malina 1993:99-103; cf. also Oakman 2008:137-138). However, reciprocity also regulated the distribution of abstract values in ancient societies, like honour, mercy, love, and the like. If someone showed kindness to you, you were obliged to return the favour. You remained indebted to that person, unless and until you were able to show the same measure of kindness in return. Reciprocity also applied to negative values, such as hate and envy, in which cases reciprocity encouraged, and translated into, retribution and the principle of *jus talionis* (or the “law of retribution”). According to the principle of *jus talionis*, a person will receive the same evil in return that he or she inflicts upon another person (cf. Piper 1989:38-39; Catchpole 1993:107).

The logion in Q 6:37-38 is, therefore, a piece of experiential wisdom that would have made perfect sense as a reference to the reciprocal principle of *jus talionis*, without the need for additional explanation (cf. Edwards 1976:89; Piper 1989:39). If you judge others, they will judge you. This was how society worked.

As a wisdom saying, there would also have been a cause-and-effect aspect to the argument. Wisdom kept itself busy with analysing the patterns in nature and in human life. In other words, the statement “If you judge others, they will judge you” is a social pattern observed by sages in the cause-and-effect schema of daily life (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:180 n. 45; Piper 1989:38). The implied truism on which the saying in verse 37 is based – i.e. if you judge others, they will judge you – is the result of *both* a sapiential analysis of human behaviour, *and* the social value of reciprocity. Thus, the prohibition not to judge is supported by a motive clause that appeals both to common wisdom, and to the ancient value of reciprocity. In turn, the abstract concept of moral judgment in the motive clause is supported in the subsequent maxim by the concrete idea of measuring goods. Thus, an abstract argument is substantiated by concrete evidence. Cumulatively, we have made a very strong argument for viewing Q 6:37-38 as a wisdom saying. Firstly, the saying appears within the inaugural sermon, which is deliberately introduced as a piece of “wisdom teaching.” Secondly, all the formal characteristics indisputably point to wisdom. Thirdly, the thematic content, read literally, are directly aligned with the genre conventions of wisdom material. There should be no doubt that, besides the sapiential nature of this logion, eschatological themes and images are also implied (see sections 4.3 & 4.4 below). However, the most obvious and literal rendering of this logion’s thematic content compels us to classify the saying as a sapiential logion.

The micro-genre of the wisdom saying in Q 6:37-38 is either that of an Instruction, or that of a *chreia*. In order for a wisdom saying (or action) to be a *chreia*, it needs to adhere to the following criteria (cf. Hock & O’Neil 1986:26; Robbins 1996:61): (1) The saying (or action) must be expressed concisely; (2) It must be introduced by a short story or anecdote; (3) The main character of the anecdote must be overtly mentioned, and must be a particular personage; (4) The function of the anecdote must be to contextualise the

particular wisdom saying; (5) There must be a causal and thematic link between the anecdote and the saying (or action); (6) The function of the anecdote must also be to provide a clearer understanding of the saying (or action) in question. Regarding the last criterion, the interpreter should ask herself the following: “If the anecdote is removed, does the saying (or action) lose some of its meaning or impact?” If the answer is “no,” then the logion in question is not a *chreia*.

Regarding the second criterion, the inaugural sermon is indeed introduced by a very short story in Q 6:20a. It is not clear, however, that this introduction should be seen as an anecdote. Nothing particularly out-of-the-ordinary happens. Regarding the third criterion, Jesus is indeed mentioned explicitly. It is the first, fourth, fifth and sixth criteria, however, that seem to halter any designations of the inaugural sermon as a *chreia*. Although each of the logia in the inaugural sermon is “expressed concisely,” the sermon as a whole is introduced by Q 6:20a. Thus, the saying introduced by the short story in verse 20a is not concise at all. With regards to the fourth criterion, one could argue that the short story of verse 20a in some sense contextualises that which follows. The function of the sermon’s introduction, however, is not primarily to contextualise the sayings that follow, but rather to introduce Jesus as a wisdom teacher at the beginning of his public career in Q. This becomes clear if one applies the sixth criterion to the inaugural sermon. None of these sayings would become any less obvious in meaning if you should remove the introduction in verse 20a. Neither would they sacrifice their rhetorical impact in any way. Lastly, although there might have been a *causal* link between the introduction and the sermon itself – in the sense that the sermon followed directly after Jesus raised his eyes – there is absolutely no *thematic* link between the introduction and the sermon itself. As such, neither the inaugural sermon, nor any constituent part thereof, should be classified under the heading “*chreia*.”

Does this then, by default, mean that Q 6:37-38 should be seen as an Instruction? I believe so. Admonitions – and imperatives as their form-critical indicators – abound in the inaugural sermon. Although not determinative, such a compounding of admonitions, as a feature, is most prominent within the wisdom genre of Instruction (cf. Kloppenborg

1987a:264, 317). Furthermore, attributing a saying to a particular sage was not only the territory of the *chreiai*, but also a distinctive feature of the Instructional genre (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:265, 277, 317). Regarding Q 6:37-38 in particular, the formal criteria identified above were trademark features, not only of wisdom material in general, but also of Instructional speeches, specifically (see Kirk 1998:167-168). Moreover, the thematic content and intention of Q 6:37-38 cohere with the content and intention of most Instructional speeches. Lastly, making use of a traditional piece of wisdom, like the maxim in verse 38, was more characteristic of Instructions than of *chreiai*.

Rhetorically, verse 37 acts as an enthymeme. Robbins (1998:191) defines an enthymeme as “...an assertion that is expressed as a syllogism.” Although one of the notable features of an enthymeme is the presence of a rationale, usually introduced by causal conjunctions, such as ἵνα, ὅτι or γάρ (cf. Robbins 1998:191), the absence of a rationale “may not mean that an enthymeme was not intended” (Vinson 1991:119). Furthermore, although it was characteristic of an enthymeme to leave a premise or conclusion unexpressed, being confident that the premise or conclusion was obvious enough to be inferred by the audience (Robbins 1998:191-192), this was not always the case (cf. Mack 1990:39; Robbins 1996:59). In other words, although the presence of a rationale and the suppression of a premise or conclusion are trademark characteristics of an enthymeme, these characteristics are not absolutely determinative when trying to decide whether a saying is an enthymeme or not. The saying in Q 6:37 is expressed syllogistically. The unexpressed major premise is that, if you judge other people, you will also be judged. If this saying is unpacked in terms of logical and deductive thinking, the argument looks something like this:

- (a) If you judge someone else, you will also be judged.
- (b) So do not judge other people,
- (c) in order that you may not be judged.

There is no inherent or apparent logic in the assumption that you will also be judged if you judge other people. It is only if (a) above is known, and perhaps taken for granted, that (c) is the logical result of (b). Matthew was probably concerned that his audience would not be able to infer the major premise, and added it (perhaps unnecessarily) to the Q text (cf. Henderson 1996:258 & Fleddermann 2005:294-295, in Youngquist 2011:49). The high probability that we are dealing with an enthymeme is supported by the following characteristics of Q 6:37: (1) The logion is syllogistic in nature. (2) It contains a rationale that is introduced by ἵνα. (3) The major premise is left unexpressed. A maxim is finally added to the enthymeme in order to clarify and support the unexpressed major premise. So far, the logion in Q 6:37-38 has been considered at face value, and on its own, as a wisdom Instruction. The literary context was ignored. Here is a diagrammed summary of our present results:

Logion	Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε	ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε
Small form	Prohibition	Motive clause
Type	Moral judgment	Moral judgment
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Other people in general
Object	Other people in general	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Influence moral behaviour	Support the prohibition

Logion	ὧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε	μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.
Small form	Maxim	
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Measurement
Object	Measurement	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Support the previous logion	

As will be discovered in section 4.3.1 below, the verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθήσεται are probably also examples of the divine passive, in which case the subject of both actions is God (cf. Robbins 1998:196; Kirk 1998:168). Although the divine passive was commonly used in apocalyptic and prophetic material, it was not exclusive to those writings. The divine passive was also used in wisdom literature. According to ancient wisdom, people were responsible for their own fate, because of the choices they made. Nevertheless, God was still in complete control of the whole system. As such, he managed and determined both the daily, and the ultimate, fate of each person on earth. In wisdom writings, the

divine passive expressed this role of God in the daily lives of people. It follows for our current saying that the use of two divine passives (κριθῆτε & μετρηθήσεται) does not necessarily indicate the presence of prophecy or apocalypticism. Instead, the current application of divine passives is in perfect harmony with the sapiential worldview. If κριθῆτε and μετρηθήσεται are indeed divine passives, it nonetheless has an impact on our understanding of the current logion. In this case, the subject of each of these verbs is no longer “other people in general,” but God. In other words, if you judge other people, God will judge you. Seen as a wisdom text, the emphasis is still on causality, and on *this* world. Hence, your judgment of others has an impact on God’s judgment of your fate in *this* world. Your judgment of others is the cause, and God’s judgment of you is the result. The foregoing table then changes to the following:

Logion	Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε	ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε
Small form	Prohibition	Motive clause
Type	Moral judgment	Moral judgment
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	God
Object	Other people in general	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Influence moral behaviour	Support the prohibition

Logion	ὧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε	μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.
Small form	Maxim	
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Measurement
Object	Measurement	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Support the previous logion	

Both levels of meaning are probably in mind here. In other words, the intended subject of κριθῆτε is simultaneously both other people and God. Hence, if you judge other people, you will be judged in return, not only by those same people, but also by God. For ancients, the concurrent and simultaneous implication of both subjects would not have caused a contradiction. For these ancients, if other people judge you, it is because God has willed it to be so. God’s this-worldly judgment of someone was at times indirectly accomplished through other people. Put differently, other people’s direct judgment of someone was the result of God’s indirect judgment of the person in question. God controlled the everyday fate of someone by controlling the reciprocal system. Thereby,

God ensured that a person got what she gave, whether it be positive or negative. Hence, if you are judged by someone, it is probably because God is punishing you for judging someone else. In so doing, God has enacted his judgment of you.

4.3 ~ THE LITERARY CONTEXT

4.3.1 The inaugural sermon

The synchronic literary context of Q 6:37-38 is the inaugural sermon in Q. Given the positioning of this logion by both Matthew and Luke in their respective sermons on the mount and plain, this placement of the logion in Q should be accepted as a matter of fact. Matthew and Luke do differ about exactly where this logion belongs in the sermon. We will follow the great majority of scholars on this issue, and accept the Lukan order and placement as most original (see Youngquist 2011:3-21). Although scholars disagree about the diachronic history of the inaugural sermon, they are in relative agreement that, as it stands, Q 6:20-49 represents a synchronic, compositional unity (cf. Kirk 1998:390). The inaugural sermon should be subdivided into four blocks: (1) the beatitudes in Q 6:20-23; (2) the command to love one's enemies, and supportive argumentation, in Q 6:27-35; (3) the commands to be merciful and not to judge, with supportive arguments, in Q 6:36-42; (4) the extended rhetoric to hear and obey Jesus' teachings in Q 6:43-49.¹³³

The themes in the beatitudes of persecution and eschatological reversal provide the foundation for the admonition in Q 6:27 to love one's enemies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:178; Catchpole 1993:16). The last beatitude claims that the persecuted are blessed, because their eschatological reward is great. This declaration naturally leads into the admonition to love one's enemies, and to pray for one's persecutors (cf. Allison

¹³³ This subdivision differs from that of Kloppenborg (1987a:172), but coheres largely with those of Piper (1989:36, 44, 78), Allison (1997:79-95) and Kirk (1998:158-159, 167-168, 173). However, the subdivision currently offered agrees with that of Kloppenborg against the others in connecting verse 36 more closely with verses 37-38 than verses 27-35. As such, my subdivision overlaps completely with that of Catchpole (1993:60-134).

1997:80). If the persecuted are blessed in the eyes of God, then they are in an excellent position to show love to their persecutors, and to pray for them (cf. Catchpole 1993:112).

The unorthodox command to love one's enemies is the programmatic admonition for everything that follows (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:177, 179; Kirk 1998:159). This admonition is followed by Q 6:29-30, which provides admonitory examples of how one could love an enemy in practice (cf. Piper 1989:111; see Kirk 1998:159-160). The next order of business is to substantiate the admonition rhetorically with three arguments. The first argument is that obedience to the love-of-enemies command will transform adherents into sons of God. But how does loving one's enemy translate into divine sonship? The first argument needs substantiation, which is subsequently provided by the claim that the heavenly Father brings good and bad weather to the righteous and the sinful alike (see Kirk 1998:161-162). This is indeed a subversive piece of wisdom. Traditional sapiential logic held that God would reward the righteous and punish sinners (see Catchpole 1993:105). The maxim of verse 35 argues a different theology – one in which God rewards and punishes everyone all the same, regardless of their individual virtues or vices. This is an *imitatio Dei* argument, but one that relies on an alternative image of God (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:176). Thus, imitating God by showing love to one's enemies translates for the author into sonship of the most high (cf. Ps 146:9; Sirach 4:10). The argument is that adherents of the admonition to love one's enemies will resultantly be or become (ἔσεσθε / γένησθε)¹³⁴ sons of God, mainly because, in doing so, they are imitating God (cf. Catchpole 1993:26).

The second argument is simply an appeal to the conventional logic and authority of the golden rule (cf. Catchpole 1993:115; see Kirk 1998:163-165). Besides its function to substantiate the initial admonition, the golden rule also describes the love to be shown to enemies as an *action*, not just an attitude (cf. Piper 1989:83; Catchpole 1993:28). The examples of verses 29-30 support this interpretation. The third argument is one of holiness, formulated by means of a series of rhetorical questions (cf. Kloppenborg

¹³⁴ If γένησθε is here preferred, this saying might provide yet another example of wisdom being substantiated by eschatology. Yet, Catchpole (1993:26) is probably correct in preferring both ἔσεσθε and a non-eschatological interpretation of this argument.

1987a:176; see Kirk 1998:161). That verses 32 and 34 should be read in conjunction with the opening admonition in verse 27 is lexically and grammatically indicated by the repetition of ἀγαπᾶτε, and thematically indicated by the repetition of the idea to love not only one's friends and family (cf. Allison 1997:83). The Judean people separated themselves from the Gentiles, and believed that they were morally superior to other nations – literally, “holier-than-thou.” In verses 32 and 34, Jesus argues that the Jews are not really morally superior to the Gentiles if they love only those who would love them in return, since the Gentiles do exactly the same thing. In other words, Jesus argues that the Jews should love their enemies, so that they can separate themselves from the Gentiles, and truly be holy (cf. Catchpole 1993:102). Jesus implies that this is the only way in which the Jews would in reality be able to illustrate their moral superiority to other nations. These rhetorical questions overtly describe “love of enemies” as something that must be done (ποιοῦσιν), thereby supporting the idea introduced by the practical examples of verses 29-30, and the golden rule, that the love in question is primarily understood as an *action* (cf. Piper 1989:84).

The admonition to be merciful and the commandment not to judge should be seen as a further development of the theme to love one's enemies (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:181; Catchpole 1993:124, 128). There are no less than six reasons for reading Q 6:36-38¹³⁵ in relation to the admonition to love one's enemies: (1) The admonition to show mercy is *rhetorically* similar to the admonition about loving one's enemies. Both use *imitatio Dei* arguments (Q 6:35c-d // Q 6:36b) to support their respective admonitions. (2) The prohibition against judging others is similar in *form* to the admonition about loving one's enemies. Both logia have an admonition (Q 6:27-28 // Q 6:37a), a motive clause (Q 6:35c // Q 6:37b), and a rationale (Q 6:35d // Q 6:38). (3) Q 6:27 and Q 6:36-38 are *thematically* similar. Both texts are concerned with promoting a morality where the wellbeing of the other party is primary. (4) There is a *causal* relationship between Q 6:27, on the one hand, and the two respective logia in Q 6:36 and Q 6:37-38, on the other. If you love indiscriminately, you will not only show mercy to everyone, but you will also refrain from judging others. (5) Whereas Q 6:29-30 provides *concrete examples* of how

¹³⁵ See below my reasons for joining verse 36 with verses 37-38.

one could love one's enemies in practice, Q 6:36-38 provides *more abstract examples* of how to do the same thing. (6) There is an *intertextual* relationship between Q 6:27 and Q 6:36-38. The idea that one's *enemies* deserved to be judged and punished – which is exactly what Q 6:37 prohibits – was widespread and commonplace in the ancient world (see Howes 2004). This traditional attitude is attested by a great number of contemporary Jewish texts (cf. e.g. Gen 14:20; Lev 26:7-8; 2 Sam 22:41; Ps 6:10; 7:6-9; 18:40; 25:18-20; Isa 1:24; Nah 1:2; Zeph 3:15; Wis. Sol. 11:8-9; 12:20-22; Sirach 51:8; Test. Jud. 23:5; Jub. 23:30-31; 30:22-23; Pseudo-Philo 31:2; 39:6; 3 Macc. 6:9-10; Qumran Scrolls 1QM XVIII:11-13; 4Q14 11:4; 1QpHab V:4-5; 4Q176 21:1-5; 4Q381 31:5, 8).

Reading Q 6:36-38 in light of the love-commandment illuminates these passages. It is rather obvious that one would show mercy to a family member or loved one, but this admonition has in mind those people who are nasty, malicious, spiteful and cruel. Q 6:36-38 can (and should) not be read separate from its context in the inaugural sermon. Showing mercy is held up as one of the ways in which the love-commandment of verse 27 must be enacted. The comparative clause in Q 6:36b represents another *imitatio Dei* argument, and refers back to the indiscriminate kindness of God in Q 6:35, which acts as its foundation (cf. Piper 1989:83, 86; cf. also Allison 1997:83). That verse 36 intentionally refers back to verse 35 is indicated by the repetition of the phrase “your Father” in both verses, as well as the *imitatio Dei* arguments in both (cf. Catchpole 1993:119, 120, 124; Kirk 1998:162).¹³⁶ Q 6:35 describes God's mercy, not in terms of eschatology, but as an attribute that determines the dealings of God in the daily lives of people (cf. Piper 1989:84). Thus, if verse 36b is read in conjunction with verse 35, as it should be, the admonition to be merciful is substantiated by a non-eschatological argument (*contra* Catchpole 1993:124). This argument could be paraphrased as follows: The fact that God indiscriminately shows mercy in the daily lives of all people obliges the audience of Q to do the same. Such a reading is substantiated by the present tense of the verb ἐστίν in verse 36. If the comparative clause in verse 36b were intended as eschatology, one would have expected to find this verb in the future tense. However, verse 36b might also be referring back to the kindness and compassion of God in the

¹³⁶ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν in Matthew's version of Q 6:35 and ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν in both versions of Q 6:36.

beatitudes. If so, the argument sounds a bit different: The fact that God will show mercy at the apocalyptic event obliges the recipients of that mercy to do the same in the present. Thus, if verse 36 is read in light of the beatitudes, we have yet another example of a wisdom admonition (Γίνεσθε / ἔσεσθε οἰκτίρμονες¹³⁷) being motivated by apocalyptic eschatology (ὥς ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν). In this case, the gnomic present ἐστίν would indicate that mercy is a timeless attribute of God. Hence, God is already merciful in the present, even though he will only effect the eschatological reversal described by the beatitudes in the future.

Relating verse 36 to the *beatitudes* has an impact on the prohibition not to judge in verses 37-38, which is both an explication and the flipside of the admonition to show mercy. “The effect of the juxtaposition of 6:37-38 [with 6:36] is twofold: to interpret the ethic of non-condemnation as an act of mercy, and to see this mercy as imitation of divine action” (Kloppenborg 1987a:181). Whereas verse 36 makes use of a positive admonition to connote apocalyptic salvation, verses 37-38 use a negative admonition to connote apocalyptic judgment. In both cases, however, the admonitions themselves are not apocalyptic, but their subsequent motive clauses are. In verse 36, it is the comparison clause (ὥς ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρμων ἐστίν) that must be read in juxtaposition with the beatitudes, turning it into an apocalyptic argument. In verse 37, it is the motive clause (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε) that must be read in combination with the beatitudes (and verse 36), turning it into an apocalyptic argument.

That Q 6:37-38 alludes to apocalyptic themes is further substantiated by two factors. (1) The verbs κριθῆτε and μετρηθήσεται are quite probably examples of the divine passive, in which case the subject of both actions is God (cf. Robbins 1998:196; Kirk 1998:168). It was noted in section 4.2 above that the divine passive is not necessarily an indication of the presence of apocalypticism. In spite of that, the possible hint at apocalypticism should not be *summarily* ignored. Edwards (1969:14) long ago discovered a possible prophetic-eschatological *Gattung* in the New Testament. This proposed *Gattung* is

¹³⁷ Matthew’s τέλειοι is almost certainly secondary. In the inaugural sermon, Jesus radically rewrote the Jewish Law. Matthew probably had a need to reconcile this logion with Leviticus 19:2.

typically made up of two parts containing the same verb. In the first part, the verb is usually in the active voice, and refers to human activity. In the second part, the verb is usually in the passive voice, and refers to the eschatological judgment of God. Q 6:37-38 has all these features in common with Edwards' eschatological *Gattung*. Moreover, the fact that μετρηθήσεται is not only in the passive voice, but also in the future tense, is highly suggestive of apocalyptic intent. (2) God is expressly mentioned in the preceding logion as the enactor of divine mercy (ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν οἰκτίρων ἐστίν), making it highly likely that God is also implied in verses 37-38 as the enactor of divine judgment (compare *m. Shab.* 127b; 151b; *t. Bab. Kam.* 9:30; *p. Bab. Kam.* 8:10; cf. Sanders 1977:133-134).

The two logia in Q 6:36-38 are wisdom texts. On the surface, they are concerned with little more than promoting a particular type of morality in the daily conduct of people. Moreover, if taken at face value, the supportive motive clauses of both admonitions are based exclusively on wisdom. However, if these motive clauses are read within the literary context of the inaugural sermon as a whole, including the beatitudes, they betray allusions to apocalypticism beneath the literal surface. In both admonitions, apocalypticism is then employed in the service of wisdom. The moral lifestyle advocated by Q 6:36-37 is reinforced and motivated by allusions to apocalyptic motifs. These conclusions about the presence of apocalyptic themes in Q 6:36-38 are only preliminary. The text neither overtly mentions apocalyptic images, nor explicitly employs apocalyptic language. If the connection between Q 6:36-38 and the beatitudes is denied, then an “unadulterated,” sapiential, non-eschatological rendering of Q 6:36-38 remains possible. This conundrum will receive attention in the subsequent section.

The admonition about mercy and the prohibition about judgment are rhetorically substantiated by three colourful arguments. Unlike Kloppenborg (1987a:187) and Kirk (1998:162), I do not see Q 6:36 merely as a transitional verse between Q 6:27-35 and Q 6:37-42. Unlike Edwards (1976:85-90), Piper (1989:78) and Allison (1997:79-95, esp. 84), I do not see Q 6:36 as forming an integral part of Q 6:27-36. Like Catchpole (1993:116-133), I perceive Q 6:36 to be an integral part of Q 6:36-42. The relation

between “mercy” and “judgment” was traditionally expressed in one of two ways. Mercy was either seen as the exact opposite of judgment (see Catchpole 1993:117-119, 123), or mercy was an adjective that described one of the attributes of judgment.

Despite the exact nature of their interrelationship, there is an astonishing number of Jewish texts – from the Old Testament,¹³⁸ the Dead Sea Scrolls,¹³⁹ other contemporary Jewish intertexts,¹⁴⁰ and the New Testament¹⁴¹ – that mention the words and/or concepts of “judgment” and “mercy” in the same breath. That Q also saw the concepts of mercy and judgment as inextricably linked is evidenced by Q 11:42. As such, the arguments that follow after Q 6:36-38 are intended to support *both* admonitions. It should be noted, though, that these supportive arguments are indeed *thematically* closer to the judgment logion than the mercy logion. Nonetheless, the theme of mercy is never entirely absent.

The first supporting argument is inferred by the two rhetorical questions in Q 6:39 (cf. Piper 1989:40; cf. also Horsley 1999:223). The very act of pointing out someone else’s mercilessness betrays that same trait in the one making the accusation. Likewise, the very act of passing judgment on someone else’s moral wrongdoings is morally wrong.

¹³⁸ Gen 19:15-25; Ex 15:12-13; 20:5-6; 34:5-9; Num 14:11-19; Deut 5:9-10; 7:2, 9-11, 12; 13:17; 21:6-9; 32:43; Jud 1:24-25; 2 Sam 7:14-15; 24:14-15; 1 Kings 3:6-9; 1 Chron 16:33-34; 21:13-14; 2 Chron 1:8-12; 20:21-22; 30:8-9; Ezra 9:7-9; Neh 1:5-11; 9:26-32; Pss 6:1-5; 9:11-20; 13:1-6; 18:20-25; 18:47-50; 21:7-13; 25:1-22; 30:9-10; 32:10; 36:5-6; 37:21-33; 51:1-4; 57:1; 59:1-17; 62:11-12; 67:1-4; 69:13-29; 77:7-10; 78:38; 85:1-7; 86:13; 89:14, 19-37; 94:12-23; 98:1-3; 101:1; 102:10-13; 103:1-18; 106:1-48; 109:1-31; 119:41-44, 57-64, 75-77, 121-125; 136:1-26; 143:12; Isa 9:17-21; 16:5; 27:11; 30:18; 47:6; 54:6-10; 60:10; Jer 3:12; 13:14; 16:5-6; 21:7; Lam 3:26-36; Ezek 39:23-29; Dan 2:18; 9:4-19; Hosea 1:6-7; 2:19; 12:6; Micah 6:8; 7:17-20; Hab 3:2; Zech 7:9.

¹³⁹ 1QS II:8-9, 14-15; IV:4-5; V:3-4; VIII:2; X:16, 20; XI:12-13; 4QS^b 4:1-2; 1, I:3; IV:1-3; 1 QM XVIII:11-13; 4QM^a 8-10, I:1-6; 1QpHab VII:16; 4Q176 19-20:1-4; 21:1-4; 11Q5 XVIII:16-18; XIX:3-5, 11; 11Q6 a:4-8; 4Q381 33:4-9; 4QH^a IV10-11; V:4-5, 11-12, 23; VI:1-7; VII:19-24; VIII:17; IX:29-33; X:24-25; XII:30-32, 36-40; XIII:1-4, 21-22; XIV:9; XV:26-30, 35; XVII:3, 8-10, 14-15, 30-31, 34; XVIII:5-9, 18, 29-32; XXI:10; 1QH^b 1:1-2, 11; 4QH^a 1:1-2; 7, I:21-23; II:12-15; 4Q511 III:1-4; 4Q418 81:7-8; 4Q521 2, II:9; 4Q403 I:18, 23-27; 4Q405 23, I:12; 4Q434 1, I:1-8; 4Q502 16:1-2.

¹⁴⁰ Tob. 3:2; Wis. Sol. 11:8-9; 12:22; Sirach 5:6; 16:11-14; 35:19-20; Song of the Three 1-27; 2 Macc. 1:24; 7:35-38; 8:5; 1 Enoch 50:1-5; 60:25; 61:11; Sib. Or. 1:81-82; 4 Ezra 2:27-32; 7:45 [115]; 14:27-36; 2 Baruch 48:17-18; 61:6-7; 84:10-11; Test. Lev. 15:2-4; Test. Jud. 23:1-5; Test. Zeb. 8:1-6; 9:1-9; Test. Naph. 4:1-5; Test. Gad 5:11; Test. Abr. [A] 10:13-14; 12:1-18; 13:9-14; 14:1-15; Test. Mos. 6:1-9; 11:17; Aristeas 207-209, 211-213; Jub. 1:20; 5:12-19; 10:1-6; 20:6-10; 23:22-23, 31; Life Adam 27:1-5; Pseudo-Philo 22:6; 51:5; 4 Macc. 8:14, 20-22; Ps. Sol. 2:6-10, 32-37; 4:24-25; 5:1-2; 8:23-34; 9:1-11; 10:1-8; 15:10-13; 17:3, 9-10; 18:1-9.

¹⁴¹ Mat 12:7, 37; 18:23-35; Luke 1:71-80; 18:13-14; Rom 9:13-29; 11:30-36; 1 Cor 7:25; Heb 2:14-18; 4:11-16; 10:26-31; James 2:13; 3:17; 5:9-11.

When you judge other people, you yourself are transgressing. By judging other people, you are in fact drawing attention to your own misgivings, and your own infallibility.

How can someone who is less than perfect judge another's imperfection? Or, as Romans 2:1 (NIV) puts it: "You, therefore, have no excuse, you who pass judgment on someone else, for at whatever point you judge the other, you are condemning yourself, because you who pass judgment do the same things" (cf. Allison 1997:86). The acts of judging and of withholding mercy induce unfavourable results for both parties, not just the hypothetical recipient of these actions. The second argument in favour of the two relevant admonitions is the statement in verse 40 that a disciple is not superior to his teacher. Although he does not say so directly, Jesus holds up himself as a rhetorical example. In other words, this is an *imitatio Jesu* argument (see Kirk 1998:169, 172, 391-393). The inaugural sermon commenced with an image of a sage called Jesus, who was instructing his disciples. In verse 40, Jesus indirectly asks his disciples that they follow *his* lead – a request that includes the morality proposed by the current sermon – and not the lead of "blind teachers." If Jesus showed mercy to others, and if he refrained from judging them, then his followers should do the same (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:184-185). Allison (1997:95) suggests that the sage of verse 40 should be seen as God, and not Jesus. The acceptance of this proposal would not change the essence of the current rhetoric, but simply change it from an *imitatio Jesu* argument to an *imitatio Dei* argument.

The vivid illustration of verses 41-42 constitutes the third argument (cf. Horsley 1999:223). This striking image from everyday, human experience latches on to the first argument's theme of impaired vision (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:182; see Kirk 1998:170-171). Apart from the theme of "blindness," the first and third arguments also share a certain vividness, as well as the use of rhetorical questions. Lastly, the two arguments share similar concepts (cf. Catchpole 1993:127).¹⁴² The crux of the argument is easy to extract, and very similar to that of the first argument (cf. Piper 1989:40). A merciless and judgmental attitude distorts moral and spiritual vision. People who display these qualities go around looking for transgression in others, but fail to even notice their own

¹⁴² Both are about a guide and a person being guided. Both imagine a scenario where not only the guide, but also the one being guided, are hindered by the same debilitating factor. Lastly, unlike other blind-leading-the-blind sayings, the focus is on the guide and not the one being guided.

shortcomings. In fact, these shortcomings are often far worse than the transgressions that were initially identified. Jesus likens the former to a wooden beam (δοκόν), and the latter to a tiny splinter (κάρφος). Thus, the argument is that by judging others, and by withholding mercy from them, people are actually committing far worse atrocities than whatever those people were guilty of in the first place. Ironically, it is only when people rid themselves of their judgmental attitudes, that they are, in fact, capable of judgment. Moreover, when people are in this perfect position to judge, they will no longer have the desire to judge. Mercy will replace judgment! If the prohibition against judgment is read in combination with its third supportive argument, it follows that the original prohibition of verse 37a (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) is about *moral* judgment, as opposed to apocalyptic or judicial judgment (cf. Piper 1989:37; Kirk 1998:171). It prohibits people from judging the moral behaviour of others.

Piper (1989:42-43) points out another way in which the third argument illuminates the initial prohibition (cf. also Catchpole 1993:128; Allison 1997:92). The judging act is here specifically applied to one's "brother" (τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ σου), implying that the object of the initial prohibition (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) is a person's "brother." As in the African-American community, the word "brother," in ancient Judaism, denoted not only a brother of kin, but also a fellow Jew (cf. Catchpole 1993:107, 125). However, Piper considers the cluster about judgment (Q 6:37-42) separate from its literary context in the inaugural sermon. As we saw, the prohibition against judgment should be seen as an application of the programmatic admonition to love one's enemies. This admonition represents the *most* important lens for interpreting *each* individual component of the sermon. Conversely, Q 6:41-42 is primarily a rhetorical argument in support of the prohibition against judgment. This is its most important function in the sermon. As such, the prohibition not to judge is first and foremost a directive about how to treat one's *enemies*, including fellow Jews. It is of course possible, perhaps even likely, that the prohibition against judgment particularly has *Jewish enemies* in mind (cf. Catchpole 1993:107), which would explain, and integrate, both the reference to enemies in verse 27, and the reference to brothers in verses 41-42. Such a view is substantiated by the mention of prophets (τοῖς προφήταις / τοὺς προφήτας), Gentiles (οἱ ἔθνικοὶ), and tax collectors (οἱ

τελώναι) in verses 32 and 34 (see Piper 1989:84-85).¹⁴³ It also makes the best sense of the golden rule in verse 31, as well as the allusion to Leviticus 19:18 in verse 27 (cf. Catchpole 1993:115).

The inaugural sermon is concluded in Q 6:43-49. This fourth block of material is linked to the previous one by similar images. Q 6:41-42 mentions a wooden beam or log (δοκόν). The subsequent pericope speaks not only of trees (δένδρον), where wooden beams and logs originate, but also of houses (οἰκίαν), where wooden beams and logs end up. Furthermore, Allison (1997:93) points out that the threefold use of καρπός in verses 43-46 mirrors the threefold use of κάρφος in verses 39-42. This last block of material should be further subdivided into two components, namely verses 43-46, on the one hand, and verses 47-49, on the other (see Edwards 1976:90-93; Allison 1997:93-95). Neither of these pericopes should be read as “parables” (cf. Piper 1989:47). They are, nonetheless, thoroughly sapiential (cf. Catchpole 1993:130).

Verses 43-45 use examples from agriculture to argue that one’s deeds reveal one’s heart (see Kirk 1998:173-175). Conversely, one’s heart instigates one’s deeds. Thus, a good person will do good deeds, and a bad person will do bad deeds (see Robinson 1997). That people’s *deeds* are being addressed is indicated, not only by the Q text itself, but also by the familiar metaphorical use of the word “fruit” (καρπός) as a traditional reference to deeds and their consequences (cf. e.g. Prov 31:16, 31; Ps 58:11; Jer 6:19; 17:10; Micah 7:13; Hosea 10:13; Wis. Sol. 3:13-15). It is wisdom that informs the nature of what exactly constitutes good deeds. This, in turn, is obvious from the well-known metaphorical use of the word “treasure” (θησαυρός), which customarily represents “the resources of wisdom made available through instruction” (Catchpole 1993:133; cf. e.g. Prov 2:4; Sirach 1:25; 20:30; 41:14; Wis. Sol. 7:14; Baruch 3:15; Q 12:33-34). The wisdom of verses 43-45 is followed by a rhetorical question in verse 46: “Why do you call me ‘master, master,’ but do not do what I say?” The point is that a student must *act* upon the teachings of her teacher (cf. Kloppenborg 1987a:185; Catchpole 1993:41, 99).

¹⁴³ Matthew’s mention of “Gentiles” and “tax-collectors” should in this case be preferred as deriving from Q (cf. Catchpole 1993:102).

This cluster of sayings can not be read separate from the rest of the inaugural sermon. If so interpreted, the pericope has two converging interpretations. (1) Love, mercy and non-judgment are primarily verbs, not nouns. The instruction is not to have a change of heart, but to *act* differently. However, such improved conduct is impossible without an initial change of heart, which is another point of the pericope (see Piper 1989:50-51; Robinson 2007). (2) People are disciples of Jesus only if and when they act in accordance with his moral message, which entails, above all else, the admonition to love one's enemy (cf. Edwards 1976:91; Catchpole 1993:41, 99; Kirk 1998:392). Two of the most basic and crucial ways in which a person can *do* this are to show mercy and to desist judging others (cf. Catchpole 1993:124, 128).

Verses 47-49 only confirm the exegesis of the foregoing pericope (cf. Edwards 1976:92; cf. also Allison 1997:94). These verses are introduced with the phrase: "Every one who hears (ἀκούων) my sayings and acts (ποιῶν) on them..." This phrase encapsulates the intent and objective of the foregoing pericope. Jesus is not mainly teaching pleasant ethical principles, but also moral directives, intended to radically alter and transform people's *conduct*. Only if and when people start *implementing* Jesus' moral message on a daily basis, will their lives be built on bedrock foundations (cf. Catchpole 1993:97). Yet, people will only be able to change their conduct, if they first change their attitude. The likelihood that the first argument is specifically interested in good or bad *speech* does not change our current interpretation thereof (e.g. λαλεῖ τὸ στόμα in verse 45; cf. Prov 13:2; 18:20-21; Sirach 27:6; 37:22-23; cf. Catchpole 1993:132). The *act* of judging someone else usually finds *expression* in verbal communication, as is clear from the question πῶς δύνασθαι λέγειν; in verse 42. In fact, the interest in speech as a demonstration of obedience to the love commandment is another feature that binds Q 6:43-45 to Q 6:41-42.

4.3.2 Apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q

The *theme of judgment* determines the broader literary context of Q 6:37-38 within the Sayings Gospel Q. Kloppenborg's main redaction is sometimes also referred to as the "judgment layer." One of the central themes of this layer, as we have seen in sections 2.2.2, 2.2.4, 2.4.4, 2.5.4 and 2.6.1 above, is the announcement of apocalyptic judgment against a host of rivals, including "this generation,"¹⁴⁴ Galilean towns,¹⁴⁵ sceptics,¹⁴⁶ and the twelve tribes of Israel.¹⁴⁷ Besides the vociferous announcement of *apocalyptic* judgment, *moral* judgment is also furnished upon the specific conduct of certain religious groups, including religious authorities in general,¹⁴⁸ and Pharisees and scribes in particular.¹⁴⁹ In *both* of Q's two main layers, people are judged if they do not accept the message of Jesus, whether they be family members or not.¹⁵⁰ Worse yet, the moral conduct of those who *do* accept the message of Jesus, but who are too afraid to proclaim it in public, is harshly judged. Not only that, they are also threatened with apocalyptic judgment.¹⁵¹ One can not help but wonder how the inaugural sermon and these announcements of judgment could possibly co-exist in the same document (see Robinson 2007:119-139). There are a very small number of passages that seem to persist with the moral message of the inaugural sermon. Q 17:3-4, for example, preaches the innumerable forgiveness of one's brother (see Catchpole 1993:135-150). Despite this similarity in theme, however, Q 7:3-4 does not once mention enemies or opponents as the recipients of forgiveness. Furthermore, Q 7:3 explicitly commands people to rebuke (ἐπιτίμησον) their brothers if they should sin, which directly contradicts the admonition not to judge (cf. Allison 2002:33). For the most part, the remainder of the Sayings Gospel consistently contradicts the core message of the inaugural sermon (see Robinson 2007:119-139). Whereas the inaugural sermon preaches against the judgment of others,

¹⁴⁴ Cf. esp. Q 7:31-35; Q 11:16, 29-32, 49-51; Q 13:28-29; Q 17:26-27, 30.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. esp. Q 10:13-15.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. esp. Q 11:14-15, 17-20.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. esp. Q 22:28, 30.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. esp. Q 7:30; Q 13:30, 34-35; Q 14:11.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. esp. Q 11:39b, 41-44, 46b-48, 52.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. esp. Q 7:9; Q 10:10-12; Q 11:19, 23; Q 12:49, 51, 53; Q 14:26; Q 17:34-35.

¹⁵¹ Cf. esp. Q 12:8-10.

the rest of Q announces the judgment of just about every group imaginable (cf. Wink 2002:180, 189-190). Gone is the mercy and compassion of Q 6:36!

There is another side to this coin, however. The judgmental nature of the rest of Q does indeed contradict the prohibition against judgment (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε), and the intention of the logion as a whole, but it is simultaneously in continuity and harmony with the motive clause (ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε). If the motive clause in Q 6:37b refers to God's apocalyptic judgment, it is in perfect continuity with the announcement of God's apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q. Conversely, the programmatic announcement of apocalyptic judgment in all of Q supports and corroborates our earlier intuition that the motive clause in Q 6:37b alludes to apocalyptic judgment. An apocalyptic understanding of Q 6:36-38 implies that the opponents of Q deserve the apocalyptic judgment of God, because, according to Q, these opponents are merciless and judgmental by their very nature. Moreover, an apocalyptic reading of Q 6:37-38 harmonises the wisdom of this logion with the apocalypticism of the rest of Q. Therefore, the probability that apocalyptic eschatology supports the sapiential prohibition in Q 6:37-38 is currently corroborated by both the *synchronic* literary context of the inaugural sermon and the *diachronic* literary context of the rest of Q. Here follows a graphic illustration of these results:

Logion	καὶ μὴ κρίνετε	ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε
Small form	Prohibition	Motive clause
Type	Moral judgment	Apocalyptic judgment
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	God
Object	Enemies in particular	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Influence moral behaviour	Support the prohibition

Logion	ὧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε	μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.
Small form	Maxim	
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Measurement
Object	Measurement	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Support the previous logion	

As this table clearly shows, the context of the inaugural sermon changes the object of the prohibition from “other people in general” to “enemies in particular.” Both of these readings could fit quite comfortably in a non-eschatological mould. The contexts of both the inaugural sermon and the rest of Q changes the subject of the motive clause from “other people in general” to “God.” Although it is possible that God is here implied as the enactor of non-eschatological, this-worldly justice, the prevalence of the theme of apocalyptic judgment in the rest of Q renders such a reading highly unlikely. In the rest of Q, apocalyptic judgment is meant wherever references to both God and judgment occur together in the same literary context.

4.3.3 Judicial judgment in the rest of Q

There is one last possibility for interpreting Q 6:37-38. Piper (1995a) made an important contribution to our understanding of Q by noticing, within Q’s aphoristic sayings, a thread of pessimism aimed at institutionalised violence and exploitation. More specifically, the institutionalised legal system was met with distrust, and courts were to be avoided at all costs (cf. Piper 1995a:60; cf. also Horsley 1995b:45). We do not have much information about judicial administration in Galilee. Josephus (*War* 2.570f.; *Life* 79, 128; *Ant.* 16.43) certainly claims that legal matters were decided in accordance with, and by appealing to, Judean law, as opposed to Roman law (cf. Horsley 1995a:232-233; Freyne 2000:79). Most likely, local elders (πρεσβύτεροι), magistrates (ἄρχοντες), village scribes (κωμογραμματεῖς), and specialists in Judean Law (νομοδιδάσκαλοι) would have dealt with village administration and minor misdemeanours, including, among other things, matters pertaining to boundary determination and burial arrangements (cf. Freyne 1988:152; Horsley 1996:150; cf. *Judith* 6:12-16; 8:10, 35; 10:6; 13:12; *Luke* 5:17).¹⁵² Hence, at village level, run-of-the-mill justice was overseen at village assemblies by local community leaders (cf. Horsley 1995a:232-233; 1996:120, 149-150; cf. *War* 2.570-571). Hasmonean rulers would probably have dealt with more serious crimes, and Herodian judges with major offences (cf. Freyne 1988:141-142).

¹⁵² In later Rabbinic times, local judicial leaders were referred to as *parnasim* and/or *hazzan* (cf. Horsley 1996:149-150).

Importantly, the Hasmonean rulers were likely assisted by the Pharisees, who acted as experts of Mosaic and Hasmonean law at court proceedings (see Horsley 1995a:149-151; cf. *Ant.* 13.295-298, 408-409). The same is probably true of the scribes mentioned in Q 11:46b. Besides being accused of assisting the aristocracy in oppressing the poor, there are hints in the woes against the Pharisees and scribes that the issue of justice in court proceedings is also at play, perhaps as a contributing factor. Q 11:42 specifically accuses the Pharisees of giving up “justice and mercy and faithfulness” – an indictment that makes all the more sense if read against a juridical background. Furthermore, the scribes mentioned in verse 46b are not just any scribes, but νομικοῖς (experts in the law). These scribes were responsible for recording the very laws that had severe consequences for the people. The verb δεσμεύουσιν, in verse 46b, might also indicate a court proceeding, through which the “burdens” were made official and “binding.”

Sepphoris and Tiberias were probably centres of Roman administration, including judicial administration, in Galilee (see Horsley 1995a:163-174; cf. *Life* 38). Given the fact that Galilee was no longer under the direct control of Jerusalem from the time of Antipas onwards, Galilean villagers who had committed serious offences might indeed have encountered Herodian judges and legal officials. However, the predominantly Judean ethnicity of both Sepphoris and Tiberias,¹⁵³ as well as Antipas’ policy of including Judean rulers in his administrative retinue (cf. Freyne 1988:142; Reed 2000:121-122; Chancey 2005:56), indicates that prominent Judean personalities, including perhaps Hasmonean aristocrats, Pharisees and experts in Judean law, must have participated in the court system at these two cities (cf. Freyne 1988:142; Horsley 1995a:173). Whether facing village-level or urban-level courts, therefore, peasants and rural artisans were much more likely to come into contact with Judean, than Herodian, judges. Nonetheless, the possibility of contact with Herodian judges should not be taken off the table.

¹⁵³ That Tiberias and Sepphoris were predominantly Judean is currently the consensus position among scholars (cf. esp. Hirschfeld & Galor 2007:209; see esp. Reed 2000:49-52, 84, 93-135; Chancey 2002:52, 62, 70-85, 91-94; 2004:107-108; 2005:85, 90, 179-220; cf. also Freyne 1988:138; Horsley 1999:59; see also Strange 1992:23-59; Jensen 2007:311-312; Cromhout 2007:248-249; Sigismund 2007).

The judicial issues raised by Q,¹⁵⁴ as well as the imagery it utilises in this regard,¹⁵⁵ are rather formal, and typical of courts at higher urban levels (cf. Reed 2000:193). Lower-level citizens were mostly suspicious of higher-level courts, and with good reason (cf. Horsley 1996:120). The interests of those from the lower levels of society would not have been protected by these judges and lawmakers (see Garnsey 1970). Urban courts were geared towards servicing the wealthy and “respected” citizens over and against the lower classes (cf. Horsley 1996:120). Being forced to appear in higher (urban) courts, or seeking legal redress from these courts, were considered extremely dishonourable by Mediterranean societies. Not only would an unfavourable outcome be shameful, but the act of appearing in court was shameful in and of itself, not least of all because it drew attention to the fact that an individual was incapable of dealing with his or her own problems and equals. Despite references to higher (urban) courts, Q (12:11-12) also has smaller (rural) courts or village assemblies (*συναγωγάς*) in mind. Based upon Q’s juxtaposition of sayings about legal matters and sayings concerned with sustenance,¹⁵⁶ Piper (1995a:61-62) further argues for a relationship between the subsistence levels of the Q people and judicial proceedings in general. The official judicial system, run by the city, probably offered very little assistance in terms of poverty alleviation. On the contrary, the courts probably played their part in maintaining the status quo. These results are affirmed by the fact that much of Q concerns itself with *local* judicial matters.¹⁵⁷ Not only were their specific judicial concerns indicative of ordinary village folk, but, conversely, they were also concerned with pressures from official courts, and matters such as *corvée*.

¹⁵⁴ These include: persecution (Q 6:28), physical assault (Q 6:29), and indebtedness (Q 6:30; Q 12:58-59).

¹⁵⁵ These include: magistrates, judges, rulers, law suits, and litigation.

¹⁵⁶ E.g.: 1. Q 12:4-7, 11-12 (concerned with the courts) appears directly before Q 12:22-31 (concerned with daily survival). 2. Q 11:3 (concerned with daily survival) appears directly before Q 11:4 (concerned with debt cancellation).

¹⁵⁷ These include managing conflict (Q 6:27-29; Q 12:2-7, 11-12; Q 17:3-4); lending and borrowing (Q 6:30); *corvée* (Q/Mat 5:41); maintaining sustenance (Q 11:2-4, 9-13; Q 12:22-31); divorce (Q 16:18); solidarity and reconciliation (Q 15:4-10; Q 17:1-4); attitudes toward wealth (Q 12:33-34; Q 16:13); and the “workers” (Q 9:57-62; Q 10:2-11, 16).

Piper (1995a:62-63) finds evidence in Q that the Q people had not only a lack of confidence in the legal system, but also anxiety for authorities, and suspicion over administrative procedures. The institutions of power were viewed with enough apprehension to render voluntary surrender the favoured alternative. Such concerns further indicate a rather low social level. Q 6:22-23 suggests that the Q people were persecuted, and Q 16:16 suggests that the Q people were subjected to some types of violence. That such violence and persecution came from the (Roman and Judean) elite might be implied by the reference to Gehenna in Q 12:5, which was a place that particularly connoted a brand of judgment that was reserved for *rulers* (cf. Horsley 1999:273). Reference to a heavenly courtroom, in Q 12:8-9, might also hint at oppression from the elite, since the apocalyptic metaphor of a heavenly courtroom developed specifically in response to the incidences of earthly injustice carried out by the powers that be (cf. Horsley 1999:273-274). Q 12:4 suggests that a meeting with judicial (and other) authorities might well end up being fatal (cf. Horsley 1999:272). The tone in which the whole discourse (Q 12:2-12) is delivered suggests that injustice, suppression and repression from above were realities with which the Q people were faced. It is further interesting that the only saying in this literary context taken over by either the Didache or the Gospel of Thomas is Q 12:10, about the sin against the Holy Spirit, indicating that similar threats of injustice and oppression were totally absent by the time these later documents came into being (cf. Horsley 1999:274).

If the reference to “wolves” in Q 10:3 is understood in terms of its traditional connotation of “rulers,” this passage confirms that Q people could meet their end when dealing with authorities. Q 14:27 also implies that opposing the Romans might have lead to (a particularly painful) death. The fact that, in the Lord’s Prayer, the petition “cancel our debts” (Q 11:4) follows directly after “give us bread” (Q 11:3), probably reflects a situation where indebtedness subjected the Q people to severe poverty and starvation (cf. Horsley 1999:278; Oakman 2008:104). Moreover, in Q 11:4b, the word *πειρασμόν* probably connotes judicial proceedings, suggesting that indebtedness was initiated, maintained and enforced by the legal system, possibly in the form of debt contracts (cf.

Oakman 2008:104).¹⁵⁸ A similar conclusion can be made from Q 12:58-59 (cf. Oakman 2008:225). Verse 59 puts the legal proceedings of verse 58 within the context of indebtedness. This passage advises not to go to court for the alleviation of debts, but to try and negotiate with the “legal opponent” (ἀντίδικος) before even getting to court. Within this context, the ἀντίδικος is most likely understood as a legal landowner, or some sort of creditor. The reason for such advice is simple: You will lose, be forced to pay your debt in full, and perhaps even go to prison! It is possible that Q 9:58 refers to the inevitable outcome of indebtedness that all peasants feared: losing house and home, and becoming “landless.” In general, Q betrays and endorses a negative attitude towards money (cf. Q 12:33-34; Q 16:13). It is at least possible that Q grasps and exposes the inevitable and detrimental link between monetisation and indebtedness (cf. Reed 2000:98). On the whole, Q seems concerned with the vulnerability of the underclass, in relation to both the Judean and the Roman elite. The conditions criticised by Q cohere with what is known of Galilean conditions in general, and Antipas in particular. Regarding the administration of territorial justice, Josephus (*Ant.* 18.106-108) compares Antipas unfavourably with Philip (cf. Freyne 2000:214). Rather than reaffirm the Judean and Roman political and judicial institutions by calling upon them, and trusting in them for justice, sustenance and the allocation of honour, Q advocates relying on God, and the social dynamic that is his kingdom, for those things. God is contrasted with such institutions as the real source of merciful justice, endless providence and limitless honour. Furthermore, the kingdom of God is the means through which these things are provided for his children. For Q, justice at local level supersedes justice at higher levels. Local reciprocity provides sustenance. Honour is transferred from the Father to his children. Apart from these views, apocalyptic hopes of justice, sustenance and honour are also anticipated.

Suffice it to say that Q betrays a gloomy attitude to the institutionalised judicial system, and that the Q people had valid reasons for fearing not only court appearances, but also the authoritative figures who were in charge of such proceedings. It is surely possible that this genuine concern lies behind the saying in Q 6:37-38. Such an appraisal is

¹⁵⁸ See tractate Shebi'it 10:3-7 in the Mishnah; tractate Gittin 37a in the Talmud and Murabba'at 18.

further confirmed by the inaugural sermon, especially the examples of *how* to love one's enemies in Q 6:29-30. The actions¹⁵⁹ described by Luke 6:29 and Matthew 5:39-41 require figures of authority as subjects. If the phrase καὶ τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι in Matthew 5:40 is accepted as part of Q, then we have an explicit reference to *judicial* judgment, as opposed to apocalyptic or moral judgment, in the inaugural sermon. This Matthean phrase is the only other instance where the verb κρίνω (of Q 6:37) is repeated in the rest of the inaugural sermon. It is really significant that the only other occurrence of the verb κρίνω in the inaugural sermon denotes *judicial* judgment, and not moral or apocalyptic judgment – that is, of course, if this Matthean phrase was part of Q.

The idea that there was a deliberate connection between these two texts from the inaugural sermon might be supported by the use of the passive verb κριθῆτε in Q 6:37b. The passive of κρίνω was mostly reserved for the judicial act of standing trial (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:555). If Q 6:37-38 is associated with the theme of juridical judgment – which appears both in Q 6:29-30 and throughout the Sayings Gospel as a whole – then this logion specifically exploits the existing fear of the institutionalised legal system to support its argument against judging other people. In such a case, the argument goes something like this: Do not act as judge and jury over other people, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure. In light of Matthew 5:40, a separate possible understanding of Q 6:37a remains open. In the literary context of the former text, the verb “judging” (κριθῆναι) is a shorthand for the act of “taking someone to court.” If this application is transferred to Q 6:37, *judicial* judgment is implied by both verbs. In such a case, the argument of Q 6:37 would look a bit different: *Do not take people to court, especially your enemies, or you yourself will inevitably face the terrifying situation of being judged in a court of law by an authoritative figure.*

¹⁵⁹ These are: τῷ τύποντί σε ἐπὶ τὴν σιαγόνα // ὅστις σε ῥαπίζει εἰς τὴν δεξιὰν σιαγόνα [σου]; τοῦ αἵροντός σου τὸ ἱμάτιον // τῷ θέλοντί σοι κριθῆναι καὶ τὸν χιτῶνά σου λαβεῖν; ὅστις σε ἀγγαρεύσει μίλιον ἕν (Matthew only).

There is no real indication in Q 6:37a of which meaning is to be preferred, but the literary context does seem to invite a more *general* application than the second possibility. Q 6:27 is a general admonition to love one’s enemies, and Q 6:36 implores people to show mercy in general. Neither of these two instructions references a specific act of Torah obedience. Neither of them is comparable to the saying against divorce in Q 16:18, for example. Moreover, the three arguments in support of Q 6:37a are of a general nature, not the type of arguments you would expect in support of a specific commandment like “Do not take people to court!” This is particularly true of the third argument (Q 6:41-42), which does indeed seem to be defending a prohibition against *moral* judgment in *general*, as opposed to a specific prohibition against taking people to court. Thus, we have to conclude that the prohibition in Q 6:37a is about moral judgment in general, not about the specific act of taking people to court. The motive clause in Q 6:37b, however, could still reference judicial judgment. Here is a schematic overview of such an interpretation of Q 6:37-38:

Logion	Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε	ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε
Small form	Prohibition	Motive clause
Type	Moral judgment	Judicial judgment
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Enemies in power, probably a human judge
Object	Enemies in particular	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Influence moral behaviour	Support the prohibition

Logion	ὧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε	μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν.
Small form	Maxim	
Subject	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience	Measurement
Object	Measurement	Jesus' and/or Q's Audience
Function	Support the previous logion	

Once again, the main difference between this interpretation and the previous two lies in the *subject* of the motive clause. “Other people in general” and “God” are substituted as subjects, and replaced by “enemies in power, probably a human judge.” This turns the motive clause into a statement about judicial judgment, as opposed to moral or apocalyptic judgment.

4.4 ~ THE INTERTEXTUAL CONTEXT

4.4.1 The Old Testament

The purpose of this intertextual investigation is to determine whether the passive verb in Q 6:37 has moral, judicial or apocalyptic judgment in mind. Investigating the theme of “judgment” in the Old Testament, or the use of the words “judgment” (κρίσις & κρίμα) and “judge” (δικαστής & κρίνω) in the Septuagint, will not aid much in our current goal with the investigation of Q 6:37-38. The Old Testament uses the word and concept of “judgment” in reference to all three types of judgment – moral,¹⁶⁰ apocalyptic¹⁶¹ and judicial.¹⁶² The same is true of the concept of “mercy.” This means that the audience of Q 6:37-38 had access to all three types of judgment in the tradition. A much more promising enterprise is to focus on the saying in verse 38, paying particular attention to the connotative meaning(s) behind the verb “measure” (μετρεῖτε / μετρηθήσεται), and the noun “measurement” (μέτρῳ). It was indicated in section 4.2 above that references to “measurements” called to mind the act of measuring goods during barter exchanges, and that such references were, therefore, very good illustrations to use in sapiential statements about reciprocity and retribution. What remains is to determine whether the concept of “measurements” also induced apocalyptic and/or judicial associations.

It is well-known that the concept of *psychostasia*¹⁶³ was an integral and widespread feature of Egyptian mythology (cf. Pearson 1976:249; see Brandon 1969:91-99, esp. 99). The Egyptian *Book of the Dead* (125) describes the final judgment as an act of weighing the hearts of the dead against justice on a pair of scales (cf. Wink 2002:178). The idea of *psychostasia* spread from Egypt to many other nations of the time (cf. Brandon 1969:99).

¹⁶⁰ Cf. e.g. Gen. 19:9; Ex. 2:14; Deut. 19:15.

¹⁶¹ Cf. e.g. Isa 51:5; Ezek 7:8; Joel 3:12; Zech 14:5.

¹⁶² Cf. e.g. Exod 18:26; Jos 23:2; Prov 31:9.

¹⁶³ “Psychostasia” is the academic term for the weighing-of-the-soul concept (cf. Brandon 1969:91). Although the “soul” is most frequently associated with this concept in ancient literature, other items might also be weighed, like the “heart” or the “spirit.” Regardless of the exact item being measured or weighed, it was always some or other symbol for a person’s inner being (cf. Brandon 1969:91). The purpose of the weighing action remains the same in ancient literature: It was an *impartial* means by which some or other divine or supernatural figure determined how people should be *judged*.

Early Greek literature, like the *Iliad*, made regular use of the expression “weighing of the souls” to describe judgment (cf. e.g. *Iliad* 22:179, 209; cf. Wink 2002:178). Other examples from the ancient world could be added. Islam, Zoroastrianism, Hinduism and Buddhism all use imagery from psychostasia to portray impartial, post-mortem, and divine judgment (see Brandon 1969:109-110). The crucial question for our intentions is whether or not this concept of psychostasia was a recognised and recognisable feature of Second Temple Judaism. Our starting point is the key intertext for Q 6:37-38.

Leviticus 19 is indisputably the most important intertext for the inaugural sermon as a whole (see Allison 2002:29-38). Q 6:36 is mirrored by Leviticus 19:2. The second-person imperative verb of Leviticus 19:2 (דָּרֹשׁ / ἔσεσθε) is replicated by a second-person imperative verb in Q 6:36 (ἔσεσθε / Γίνεσθε). Furthermore, both texts justify their imperatives with an *imitatio Dei* rationality. Yet, the Old-Testament text is significantly altered by the Q saying when it exchanges “holiness” (שׁוֹדֵק / ἅγιος) for “mercy” (οἰκτίρμονες). Thus, the *form* of the original statement (second-person imperative plus *imitatio Dei* justification) is kept intact, but the *meaning* is radically renovated with the substitution of ἅγιος for οἰκτίρμονες. Similar exegetical activities appear in rabbinical commentaries on Leviticus (cf. e.g. *Lev. Rab.* 308; *b. Shab.* 133b). Like Q 6:36, these rabbinical writings also substitute holiness for another virtue. Q 6:36 is an example of Q’s Jesus reconstructing established Mosaic Law. Q’s Jesus deliberately trades holiness for mercy (cf. Borg 1984:128). This trade-off is in continuity with the woes against the Pharisees and scribes (cf. esp. Q 11:42, 46b; see section 4.3.3 above).

The prohibition not to judge (καὶ μὴ κρίνετε) in Q 6:37a antithetically contradicts the commandment in Leviticus 19:15 to judge your neighbour (דָּרֹשׁ עַמִּיתְךָ / κρίνεῖς τὸν πλησίον σου). In Leviticus, the syntactical object of the judging act is one’s neighbour. This object is deliberately removed from the Q text. The removal of the syntactical object of judgment in Q is yet another indication that verse 37 should be read in combination with the admonition to love one’s enemies in Q 6:27. In other words, the prohibition against judgment does not only have family members, loved-ones or friends in mind, but all people happening to cross one’s path, including enemies. Just as with the

instruction to be merciful, Q 6:37 provocatively rewrites and reapplies conventional Mosaic Law. In the current case, however, the exact opposite of the Torah tradition is commanded. Hence, Q's Jesus advocates the following: "Regardless of what Leviticus teaches, you must not judge other people, not even enemies!" The reconstruction and modification of Leviticus 19 is a trademark tendency of the entire inaugural sermon (see Allison 2002:33-34). This tendency was not altogether unusual in Jewish tradition (see Allison 2002:34-37). Q 6:37 adds the qualification "so that you are not judged" (ὥνα μὴ κριθῆτε) to the Leviticus intertext, where it is entirely absent. The popularity and familiarity of Leviticus 19 in first-century Judaism *necessarily* indicates that Jewish audiences would have picked up on the relationship between the inaugural sermon and this favoured Old-Testament text (see Allison 2002:37-38). This applies not only to the general connection between these two texts, but also to the more subtle nuances and allusions to Leviticus 19 beneath the surface of the inaugural sermon.

Q supports the latter qualification by cleverly drawing upon and reapplying an entirely separate commandment in Leviticus (19:35-37). The latter text is a commandment not to be dishonest in day-to-day dealings, expressed by means of a negative admonition not to use fraudulent measuring implements, and a positive admonition to use measuring implements that are accurate. A literal translation of the Masoretic Text is quite revealing for our purposes: "You must not do injustice (עוֹל) in judging (בְּמִשְׁפָּט) length, weight or quantity. You must have balances / scales of justice (מֵאזְנֵי צֶדֶק), stones / weights of justice (אֲבָנֵי צֶדֶק), an *ephah* / grain measure of justice (אֵיפָה צֶדֶק) and a *hin* / oil measure of justice (וְהֵינ צֶדֶק)." There are three Hebrew words in the Leviticus text that occur within the semantic field of the concept "judgment." The first (עוֹל) denotes the type of injustice or wrongdoing that would typically be carried out by an evildoer or criminal (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. עוֹל & עוֹל; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. עוֹל & עוֹל). The second (בְּמִשְׁפָּט) denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. מִשְׁפָּט; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מִשְׁפָּט). The third (צֶדֶק) is repeated four times, and denotes that which is just and (legally) right (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. צֶדֶק; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. צֶדֶק).

In Leviticus 19:35-36, these words are used figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are being sold or bartered. Hence the NIV's paraphrase of Leviticus 19:35-36: "Do not use dishonest standards when measuring length, weight or quantity. Use honest scales and honest weights, an honest ephah and an honest hin." The Septuagint did not translate the denotations of judgment and justice away: "You will not do injustice / dishonesty (ἄδικον) in judgment (κρίσει) in measures (μέτροις), neither with weights (σταθμίαις) nor with balancing scales (ζυγοῖς). Just / fair / honest balancing scales (ζυγὰ δίκαια) and just / fair / honest weights (στάθμια δίκαια) and just / fair / honest dust (χοῦς δίκαιος) will be for you." As with the Masoretic text, the Septuagint's translation uses the concept of judgment or justice figuratively to connote unfair and dishonest dealings when goods are sold or bartered. The individual(s) responsible for Q 6:38 obviously noticed the references to judgment in the original Masoretic and/or Septuagint text(s) of Leviticus 19:35-36. These references to the concept of "judgment" in a text that deals with the idea of "measuring honestly" enabled Q's Jesus to link the admonition against judging others with a normal maxim about measurements. The saying in Q 6:37-38 has two crucial words in common with the Septuagint's version of Leviticus 19:35-36. The Q logion's κρίνετε and κριθῆτε parallel the Septuagint's κρίσει. Also, the Septuagint's μέτροις is repeated three times in Q 6:38 with the phrase μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται. The link between Q 6:37-38 and Leviticus 19:15, 35-36 is quite ingenious, and culminates in a total revision and inversion of the original Mosaic commandments.

The Torah commandment of Leviticus 19:35-36 was incorporated into the common wisdom of Israel. Proverbs 11:1 states: "A false balance is [an] abomination to the Lord: but a just weight is his delight" (KJV). Proverbs 20:23 simply repeats the same sentiment: "Divers weights are an abomination unto the Lord; and a false balance is not good" (KJV). A third Proverb (16:11) reiterates the same basic principle: "A just weight and balance are the Lord's: all the weights of the bag are his work" (KJV). The interesting aspect of this third saying is that it occurs in the midst of five sayings that instruct the king of Israel in particular. Proverbs 16:10, which immediately precedes the wisdom saying just quoted, states: "A divine decision (חֵן) is upon the king's lips; in

judgment (בְּמִשְׁפָּט), he does / must not act unfaithfully (לֹא יִמְעַל) with his lips.” The noun מִסָּק denotes specifically a decision or divination made with God’s assistance through the casting of lots (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. מִסָּק). As in Leviticus 19:35-37, the word בְּמִשְׁפָּט denotes a legal decision in a court case, lawsuit or arbitration (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. מִשְׁפָּט; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מִשְׁפָּט). When the two legs of this parallelism are taken together, the “divine decision” of the first leg signifies a legal decision made with God’s help. It follows that this wisdom saying has the king’s role as legal judge specifically in mind. Hence, the wisdom saying in verse 11, about just weights and balances, follows upon another wisdom saying about judicial judgment. It seems as though Q was not the first ancient writing to connect the commandment in Leviticus about measuring instruments with the concept of judgment. This connection was already part of Israel’s wisdom tradition. The Septuagint did not translate the references to legal judgment away, preferring to keep both the reference to the “king” (βασιλέως) and the reference to a “divine decision” (μαντεῖον). Like Q 6:37, the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10 employs the verb κρίσει when referring to “judgment.” In both the Masoretic text and the Septuagint’s translation of Proverbs 16:10-11, measuring instruments, like balancing scales and weights, are linked to legal judgment.

Earlier on in the same chapter, Proverbs (16:2) also makes mention of the measuring act, only this time it is not the king who acts as the subject of the action, but God: “All a man’s ways seem innocent to him, but motives (רִיחוֹת) are weighed (וְתִכָּן) by the Lord (יְהוָה)” (NIV). One of the more literal meanings of the Hebrew word translated here as “motives” (רִיחוֹת) is “spirit” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. רִיחַ; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. רִיחַ), which is how the King James Version translated the word. This lexical meaning denotes the essence of what it means to be human. In at least this respect, the Hebrew noun רִיחַ is not conceptually dissimilar to the Platonic “soul” of Hellenistic thought. In its Qal stem, the Hebrew verb וְתִכָּן literally means to “examine” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. תִּכַּן) or to “test” (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. תִּכַּן). However, the Pi’el and Pu’al stems of תִּכַּן mean to “measure” or “weigh” something.

This more than suggests that the Qal stem connoted “examination” by means of “measuring,” “weighing” or “counting” something. In light of all this, Proverbs 16:2 could just as well be paraphrased as such: “All man’s ways seem innocent to him, but his spirit is examined when it is weighed by the Lord.”

In all of the Old Testament, the Qal stem of the verb זָכַן occurs only in two other texts, both of which are from Proverbs (cf. Prov 21:2; 24:12). In all three texts, it appears in the participle, and in contexts where God is the implied or stated *subject* (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. זָכַן ; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. זָכַן). The two other occurrences of this verb take the noun “heart” or “inner being” as object, thereby supporting the likelihood that רוּחַ should in Proverbs 16:2 be translated as “spirit” (or even “inner being”). The reason for “weighing” man’s “spirit” is not overtly mentioned in Proverbs 16:2, but the immediate context surely suggests that it has everything to do with man’s fate, both in this world, and in the one to come. In verse 2, the word טָהוֹר (“innocent” or “pure”) implies that a man’s ways is sometimes not innocent, and therefore worthy of judgment. Verse 3 argues that God is in control of a person’s destiny in this world. If verses 2 and 3 are read together, they suggest that a person’s destiny *in this world* is determined by God’s act of measuring the weight of that person’s deeds (cf. Brandon 1969:99).

With the phrase “day of disaster” (לְיוֹם רָעָה), verse 4, on the other hand, correlates God’s act of weighing a person’s deeds with the apocalyptic event that will inaugurate *the world to come*. Thus, Proverbs 16:2-4 symbolically describes the judging act of God as a procedure of weighing people’s deeds. This judging act occurs not only at the final apocalyptic event, but also within this lifetime, where it is implemented indirectly by God via the inevitable consequences of unacceptable behaviour. This latter understanding of God’s involvement in people’s lives formed the basis of traditional wisdom, and the book of Proverbs. It is also the crux of what is criticised by both Job and Ecclesiastes, although Job (42:7-17) might be understood as ultimately reaffirming this sapiential schema. The Septuagint left out verse 2 in its translation of Proverbs 16.

The other two proverbs where the verb **תָּכַן** appears in its Qal stem are remarkably similar to Proverbs 16:2, and only seem to affirm the results above. Proverbs 21:2 states: “All a man’s ways seem right to him, but the Lord weighs the heart” (NIV). In the original Hebrew text, there are only three small differences between Proverbs 16:2 and Proverbs 21:2: (1) The latter text changes the singular of the word “way” (**דֶּרֶךְ**) to a plural (**דְּרָכַי**); (2) The word “pure” or “innocent” (**טָהוֹר**) is exchanged in the latter text for the word “smooth” or “right” (**יָשָׁר**); (3) As we have seen, the latter text prefers the word “heart” (**לִבָּוֶה**) instead of “spirit” (**רוּחַוָּה**). In all other respects, the two texts are exact copies of one another. Like the Jewish word “spirit,” the word “heart” also symbolised the essence of what it means to be human. Verse 1 of Proverbs 21 mentions the king, and states that even *his* heart is in God’s hands. Thus, although the king, as we saw, weighs the hearts of others, and determines their destinies, *God* weighs *his* heart, and ultimately determines *his* destiny. The focus of Proverbs 21:1-8 is on *this* world, not on apocalyptic judgment. This is especially obvious in verse 5, where the reward is monetary profit in this world, and the punishment is material poverty. For some reason or another, the Septuagint changed the verb “weigh” in verse 2 to “guide” or “direct” (**κατευθύνει**).

The last text of this nature, Proverbs 24:11-12, advises the wise to direct others in the ways of righteousness, in order to save them from apocalyptic death and slaughter. It is in this context that the following rhetorical question is asked of the wise: “If you say, ‘But we knew nothing about this,’ does not he who weighs the heart perceive it?” (NIV). That Proverbs 24:11-12 has the apocalyptic event in mind is not only indicated by the words “death” (**לַמָּוֶת**), “slaughter” (**לְהַדְרֹג**), and “life” or “soul” (**נַפְשֵׁךָ**), but also by the future tense and general effect of the rhetorical question at the end of verse 12: “Will he not repay each person according to what he has done?” (NIV). Although God is not overtly mentioned as the subject of the weighing action, there should be no doubt that God is the intended subject. As in the previous text, the Septuagint had exchanged the verb “weigh” for another verb – i.e. “know” (**γινώσκει**) in the case of Proverbs 24:12. At any rate, there are three occurrences in the Masoretic text of Proverbs (16:2; 21:2 & 24:12) that symbolically link God’s judgment of people’s deeds with the act of weighing their inner beings, which is either expressed as their “spirits,” “hearts,” or “souls.”

Proverbs 21:2 focuses on God's causal, this-worldly judgment, while Proverbs 24:12 focuses on God's apocalyptic, other-worldly judgment. Proverbs 16:2 elaborates on both. This indicates that these two types of judgment were neither contradictory nor mutually exclusive in contemporary Jewish thought. It also indicates that the symbolism of weighing someone's inner being was already an obvious metaphor for God's judgment when these proverbs were conceived.

Another wisdom text that deals with this theme is Job 31, where the protagonist is in the midst of defending himself and his own blamelessness against his friends. In verse 2, Job says that man's lot is determined by God. Verse 3 carries this forward by stating that God effects ruin for the wicked and disaster for those who transgress. In verse 4, Job admits that God sees his actions and counts his every step. In sum, Job argues that God determines the fate of each man on earth by counting his righteous and sinful deeds, and by then rewarding or punishing him accordingly (cf. Brandon 1969:99). In light of this, Job laments in verses 5-8 that, if he had transgressed in any way whatsoever, then others should be judged and punished just as harshly. In the midst of this lamentation (verse 6), Job makes the following assertion: "Let God weigh me (יִשְׁקֶלֵנִי) in honest scales (בְּמִזְאֵנֵי צָדִיק), and he will know that I am blameless" (NIV). Job 31:6 clearly associates the images of being "weighed" and of "honest scales" with God's this-worldly judgment (cf. Brandon 1969:100).

It should be noted that the *prophetic* tradition also reproduces the commandment of Leviticus 19:35-36. Ezekiel makes use of this commandment as part of his efforts to reorganise the Jewish cult after the Babylonian exile. The Leviticus mandate appears in Ezekiel 45:10, which is part of a whole passage about standardising the types of produce and measurements to be used during cultic sacrifices (cf. also Amos 8:4-6; Micah 6:11). In verses 11-12, Ezekiel spells out, in no uncertain terms, just how precise, accurate and consistent these measuring instruments are to be from now on. The intention behind this development was to protect the poor against exploitation by the cultic and regal leaders of Israel (cf. esp. Ezek 45:8-9). In this sense, the Ezekiel text is an attempt to incorporate the Leviticus command as part of a brand new piece of legislation. What is missing for

our purposes, however, is a connection between correct measurements and the act of (judicial) judging. Although not particularly useful for illuminating Q 6:38, this prophetic application of the Leviticus text to a post-exilic situation does attest to the popularity and prevalence of the commandment in Leviticus 19:35-36. This directive occurs in all three of the *Tanakh*'s major segments, namely the Torah (Deut 19:35-36; 25:14-16; Lev 19:35-37), the *Nevi'im* (Prov 11:1; 16:10-11; 20:10, 23), and the *Ketuvim* (Ezek 45:8-9; Amos 8:4-6; Micah 6:11).

The apocalyptic book Daniel (5:1-31) describes a scene where a human hand appeared out of nowhere, in the midst of a royal banquet, and wrote four Aramaic words on the palace walls. The king, Belshazzar, summoned Daniel to interpret the writing. The four words were “minay” (מִנְיָא) (appearing twice), “tekel” (תִּקְלָל), and “pharsin” (וּפְרָסִין). All three Aramaic words were units for measuring weight (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. מִנְיָא, תִּקְלָל & פְּרָס). The first unit (מִנְיָא) was usually used to measure the weight of precious metals, like gold and silver (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. Aramaic מִנְיָא). Daniel's interpretation of this word was that God had counted or weighed (מְנָה) Belshazzar's kingdom, and had brought it to an end. The second unit (תִּקְלָל) was also used to measure precious metals and luxury items (cf. e.g. Gen 24:22; Exod 30:23). Daniel's explanation of this word was that Belshazzar had been weighed (תִּקְלִילָהּ) in the balance (בְּמִזְאֵנִיא) by God, and found lacking. The third unit (וּפְרָסִין) constituted half a “minay,” and/or half a “tekel” (cf. Holladay 1971 s.v. Aramaic פְּרָס; Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. פְּרָס). Through clever wordplay (cf. פְּרָס & פְּרִיסָה), Daniel explains the third word as meaning that Belshazzar's kingdom was divided, and was given to the Medes and the Persians. Although the word “judgment” occurs nowhere in this pericope, God is indeed portrayed as judging Belshazzar and his reign (cf. esp. Dan 5:22-23). In Daniel's interpretation of the writings on the wall, measurements, balancing scales and weights are used to symbolise God's judgment of Belshazzar (cf. Brandon 1969:100).

The fulfilment of the prophecy that God will judge Belshazzar is accomplished that same night already, when Belshazzar is killed and his kingdom is taken over by Darius the Median (cf. Dan 5:30-31). In its literary context, this narrative is not an example of post-

mortem, other-worldly judgment, seeing as the judgment is furnished upon a single individual within the confines of history (cf. Brandon 1969:100). However, the apocalyptic nature of the book as an entity, as well as its apocalyptic application to the situation in Palestine after Alexander the Great, suggest that this passage could also be interpreted as a reference to post-mortem, other-worldly judgment. If this passage is viewed together with Daniel's visions in chapters 7 to 12, the death of the king symbolises the death of all the wicked at the apocalyptic end. Regardless of how we interpret Daniel 5:1-31, the king's judge in this pericope is God. Our examination of Proverbs 16:10-11 revealed that measurements of weight and balancing scales were symbolically linked to acts of *juridical* judgment by the king of Israel. In the current text, balancing scales and units of measurement are used to symbolise God's judgment of a foreign king. In this way, Daniel 5:1-31 is very similar in meaning to Proverbs 21:1-2. Thus, measurements and balancing scales came to symbolise *both* human *and* divine judgment. Although these references to units of measurement and balancing scales are translated away by the Old Greek version of the Septuagint, they are picked up again by the Theodotion version.

The idea that there was a connection between human and divine judgment was not an alien or inconceivable concept in Jewish thought. References to God's heavenly council or court are scattered throughout the Old Testament. These texts liken God's heavenly court to human courts. Not only is the heavenly court itself described with images and symbols of human courts, but the court proceedings are similar to that of earthly courts. Often, those partaking in the proceedings of the heavenly court use legal terminology. 1 Kings 22:19-22 paints a vivid picture of God on his throne, surrounded by the host of heaven. Job 1:6 has the sons of God "stand before the Lord" (לְהִתְיַצֵּב עַל־יְהוָה) in heaven (cf. also Job 2:1). The expression "stand before the Lord" (לְהִתְיַצֵּב עַל־יְהוָה) has legal connotations, and specifically calls to mind someone appearing before a judge.

The Septuagint retained this associative meaning, and even enhanced it, when it translated לְהִתְיַצֵּב עַל־יְהוָה with παραστῆναι ἐνώπιον τοῦ κυρίου. "Stand before" is one of the translation possibilities of παραστῆναι, but there are a number of alternative

possibilities (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. *παρίστημι* & *παριστάνω*). The Septuagint clears up this confusion by adding the preposition *ένώπιον* after *παραστήναι*. This preposition literally means “before” or “in front of,” but is often associated with the act of standing before someone in judgment (cf. Newman 1993 s.v. *ένώπιον*). Moreover, one of the semantic meanings for *παραστήναι* is “to hand over,” and could literally mean: “to deliver a person into the control of someone else, involving [...] the handing over of a presumably guilty person for punishment by authorities...” (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:485; 1993b s.v. *παρίστημι*). Another possible meaning of *παραστήναι* is to “show to be true,” denoting specifically the act of providing evidence in order to reveal the truth (cf. Louw & Nida 1993a:673; 1993b s.v. *παρίστημι*). The setting of Job 1:6 in heaven and the combination of *παραστήναι* with *ένώπιον* leave a clear image, difficult to overlook, of an accused standing before a judge during a courtroom trial. In this (legal) case, God is the judge, and the sons of God (*בְּנֵי הָאֱלֹהִים*), or the angels of God (*οἱ ἄγγελοι τοῦ θεοῦ*), including Satan, are the ones in the dock.

Daniel 7:1-28 is one of the best examples in the Old Testament of a heavenly court being described with the imagery of human courts. Verses 13-14 received attention in our discussion on the Son-of-Man figure (see chapter 3 above). Above all else, this pericope describes Daniel’s vision about God’s *apocalyptic* judgment. Verses 9-10 describe the preparation of the heavenly courtroom, in anticipation of the commencement of unspecified legal proceedings. This preparation included the placement of thrones, the assembling of numerous attendees, and the moment when God, referred to here as the Ancient of Days, took his seat (cf. Wink 2002:52). Although the vocabulary of the current text differs from that of Job 1:6, the attendees are likewise described as “standing before” (*קַדְמוֹתַי יִקְוּמוּן*) God. The Septuagint uses the same verb (*παρειστήκεισαν*) as in Job 6:1, but this time it appears without the preposition *ένώπιον*.

Then follows the phrase *בְּיָמֵי אֲדָמָה*. The noun used here (*אֲדָמָה*) can denote either “judgment” or “court” (cf. Bosman, Oosting & Postma 2009 s.v. *אֲדָמָה*). This explains why the respective translations by the King James Bible (“the judgment was set”) and the New International Version (“the court was seated”) are so different. Although both options are

possible, the latter should perhaps be preferred. This is how the Septuagint understood the noun, translating it with “court” (κριτήριον). Apocalyptic language and imagery permeates this whole pericope. It culminates in verse 26 with the court (κρίσις) of God judging the fourth beast, taking away his kingdom, and destroying it forever. In this case, the Septuagint translates κρίσις not with “court” (κριτήριον), but with “judgment” (κρίσις). In this verse, the apocalyptic judgment of God is clearly depicted as taking place via God’s heavenly court, which is described with images of an earthly court (cf. Wink 2002:52).

4.4.2 Other Jewish intertexts

Non-canonical literature of the Second-Temple period commonly, and frequently, used judicial courtroom language and imagery in descriptions of God’s this-worldly and other-worldly judgment.¹⁶⁴ The analysis of such texts falls beyond the scope of the current investigation, which will rather focus on the concept of psychostasia in non-canonical, Jewish intertexts. This endeavour will commence with apocryphal literature of the Second-Temple period. The aim is still to establish the relationship between judgment and psychostasia in contemporary Judaism.

In 2 Esdras 3:28-36,¹⁶⁵ the author laments the fact that gentile nations like Babylon prosper regardless of how sinful, godless and wicked they are. Conversely, Israelites keep God’s commandments, living virtuous lives, but still they suffer. This leads him to

¹⁶⁴ Some examples of such texts are: Wis. Sol. 4:20; 11:8-10; 12:1-27; Sirach 4:9; 5:5; 18:20; 41:2-3; Let. Jer. 6:53-54, 64; Song of the Three 3-5; 1 Enoch 40:7; 41:9; 45:6; 63:9-12; 65:6; 68:4; 69:29; 96:4; 97:4; 99:2; 100:11; 104:8-10; 2 Enoch 19:5; 34:1; 40:13; 41:2; 55:3; 62:3; 65:5-6; 66:2; 71:6, 8, 10; 72:4; Sib. Or. 1:274; 2:215-219, 233-251; Ap. Zeph. 8:5; 4 Ezra 16:65; 2 Baruch 13:8, 11; 19:1, 3; 31:6; 40:1; 44:4; 83:2-3; 84:1-2, 6-7; Ap. Abr. 24:7; 26:1-7; Ap. Adam 3:16; 5:2-3; Test. Abr. [A] 13:8; [B] 11:2, 5-8; Test. Mos. 3:12; Jub. 4:22-23; 10:17; 31:32; Jos. Asen. 21:11-21; Life Adam 32:2; 39:3; Pseudo-Philo 11:2, 12; 19:4, 11; 22:6; 23:7; 24:3; 29:4; 32:8-9, 14-18; 62:10; Pseudo-Phocylides 52; Manasseh 5, 10; Ps. Sol. 5:4; 10:4; 17:43; Qumran Scrolls 1 QM XI:16; XVII:2; 11Q13 II:13-14; 4Q157 1, ii:2; 1QpHab V:3-5; X:3-5; XII:5; 4Q171 IV:7-10; 4Q372 1:28; 4Q227 1:3; 4Q215 2, II:4—5; 4Q542 II:5, 12; 4Q381 31:5; 45:4; 76-77:8-13; 1QH XVII:14-15; XXV 5:10-13; 4Q511 1:4; 10:11; 18:8-10; III:3; 4Q418 126, II:3-4; 4Q504 VI:2-8.

¹⁶⁵ Within 2 Esdras, chapters 3-14 as an entity is sometimes also referred to as 4 Ezra. The very same text is therefore referenced by both of the following designations: 2 Esdras 3:28-36 and 4 Ezra 3:28-36. The current work conforms to the former referencing convention.

question the sapiential schema according to which God always rewards the righteous and punishes the sinful. Whereas the book of Job addresses the theodicy question by comparing the lives of individuals with that of Job, 2 Esdras 3:28-36 addresses the same question by comparing the lives of different nations with that of Israel. The pericope does not explicitly say so, but the obvious undercurrent is a wish for justice within the world, whereby people and nations are fairly and impartially judged by God according to their deeds (cf. 2 Esdras 4:18; cf. Brandon 1969:98, 99, 110). It is within this literary context that we find verse 34, and the following statement:¹⁶⁶ “So weigh our sins in the balance against the sins of the rest of the world; and it will be clear which way the scale tips.” In this text, the item being weighed is not the “heart,” “soul” or “spirit,” but the sins of the different nations. Nevertheless, the purpose remains the same, namely to ensure fair and impartial *judgment* by God (cf. 2 Esdras 4:18; cf. Brandon 1969:98, 99, 110).

In chapter four, the angel Uriel answers Ezra and explains that God will produce justice for Israel at the apocalyptic judgment. Although God’s judgment might seem unreasonable in this world, the future judgment will be wholly fair and impartial. Ezra is still not satisfied, and asks Uriel, in verse 33, how long Israel must wait and suffer in this world before God decides to introduce apocalyptic judgment. In verses 36-37, Uriel answers Ezra’s question about when the apocalyptic event will transpire by quoting the archangel Jeremiel: “As soon as the number of those like yourselves is complete. For the Lord has weighed the world in a balance, he has measured and numbered the ages.” Thus, God weighs not only the deeds and inner being of each individual, but He also measures the number of righteous individuals. According to this text, the exact number of people who will be rewarded at the final judgment has been pre-ordained by God. Before this number has not been achieved, the apocalyptic event will not take place. In 2 Esdras, God is the one who judges, and the symbolism of “weighing” and “measuring” is invoked in reference to both his this-worldly judgment (cf. 2 Esdras 3:34) and his apocalyptic judgment (cf. 2 Esdras 4:36-37).

¹⁶⁶ All translations of Jewish apocrypha are taken from *The New English Bible: The Apocrypha*, printed in 1970 by Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press.

The apocryphal writing *Wisdom of Solomon* is a prime example of how wisdom and apocalypticism became integrated genres during the Second-Temple period. In verses 15-20 of chapter 11, this writing describes how God, if He so wished, could have punished the Egyptians with more than ten plagues, and how God could have obliterated them with a single breath. Yet, God chose not to do these things, because it was not part of his plan. This latter idea is expressed in verse 20 with the statement: "...but thou hast ordered all things by measure and number and weight." In a word, the author expresses the belief that God's judgment against the Egyptians was *measured*. In verses 21-26, the author continues to explain that God is powerful, and that He is in full control of his judgment. If He shows mercy to a person or nation, it is because He loves his creation, and because He chooses to spare it. It is within this context that the author says in verse 22: "...for in thy sight the whole world is like a grain that just tips the scale." The idea that, to God, the whole world is merely a grain (of sand?) communicates his unfathomable strength and power (cf. verse 2). The phrase "that just tips the scale" is unnecessary for the communication of this analogy. It is highly likely that this phrase is introduced to the statement of verse 22 in order to allude to God's judgment. This understanding is reinforced by the conjunction $\delta\epsilon$, with which verse 23 begins. After saying that the world is to God like a grain that tips the scales, verse 23 states: "But ($\delta\epsilon$) thou art merciful..." The mercy of God is therefore described as the opposite of whatever is meant by "tipping the scale." The most obvious counterpart of God's mercy is his judgment (see section 4.3.1 above). The argument that the reference to a "scale" symbolises God's judgment is further supported by the literary context of chapter 11 as a whole, which deals, overtly and directly, with the subject matter of God's judgment and mercy (cf. esp. *Wis. Sol.* 11:8-10). The central point of verses 15-26 is that God has the power to exert judgment and/or show mercy whenever and however he pleases. The same symbolism is expressed in the *Wisdom of Solomon* 12:26; only, on this occasion in reference to God's judgment *in the world to come*: "...but those who do not take warning from such derisive correction will experience the full weight of divine judgment." Here, God's other-worldly *judgment* is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in term of *weight*. To be sure, this ancient Jewish text uses each of the images of

“measure,” weight” and “scale” as a shorthand-symbol for God’s judgment, not only in this world, but also the world to come.

We find a similar saying to the one in the Wisdom of Solomon (12:26) in the apocryphal writing called the (Wisdom of Jesus ben) Sirach¹⁶⁷ (5:6): “To him [meaning God] belong both mercy and wrath, and sinners feel the weight of his retribution.” Also here, God’s *judgment* is pertinently mentioned, and the degree thereof expressed in terms of *weight*. The present tense of this maxim implies that this-worldly judgment is meant. Another saying from Sirach (37:8) uses the same imagery in reference to God’s other-worldly judgment. After advising his audience to be wary of a man who offers advice, the author says: “His advice will be weighed in his favour and may tip the scales against you.” The future tense implies apocalyptic judgment in the next world. Ancient people saw the act of offering advice (with the right intention) as a virtue, which explains why this act will be weighed in someone’s favour when the future judgment takes place. However, if the one who received said advice ignores it, and, in doing so, transgresses against God, the scales will be tipped against that person when the future judgment takes place. The impact of the advice depends on the reaction of the person who receives it, which is why the text says that it may (or may not!) tip the scales against that person.

Sirach 47:23-25 explains the exile of Israel as the inevitable result of her sins against God. Verse 24 starts with the statement: “Their sins increased beyond measure, until they were driven into exile from their native land.” Verse 25 reiterates the same idea in different words: “...for they had explored every kind of wickedness, until retribution came upon them.” In this context, the retribution can be nothing other than the exile itself. The mention of the word “measure” implies that the sins of Israel were so numerous that no man could measure it. The twofold use of the word “until” implies that God *could* and *did* indeed measure Israel’s sins (cf. also 2 Macc. 6:14-16; 4 Macc. 5:19-25). The direct result of this measuring act was God’s this-worldly judgment in the form of an exile. As with the other apocryphal texts, Sirach uses the words “measure,” “weight” and “scale” to speak about God’s judgment. Also like the other apocryphal

¹⁶⁷ Also on rare occasions referred to as “Ecclesiasticus.”

works, the subject of the judging action is consistently God, and the judgment in question happens either within the confines of history, or thereafter.

There is one text in Sirach (9:14), however, that applies the language of psychostasia to the *moral* judgment of one human being upon another: “Take the measure of your neighbours as best you can, and accept advice from those who are wise.” Like Sirach 37:8, this text is about taking advice. Unlike the latter text, however, this text has a human being, and not God, as the subject of judgment. Although the word “judgment” is absent, to “take the measure of your neighbour” certainly here implies judging his moral integrity and sapiential expertise.

We will now turn to pseudepigrapha of the Second-Temple period. On more than one occasion, Pseudo-Philo (26:13; 36:1; 41:1; 47:9) speaks of people’s sins “reaching full measure (against them).”¹⁶⁸ Elsewhere, Pseudo-Philo (45:3) speaks of people’s sins being “multiplied against them.” These texts suggest that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum-total will at some stage be held against them (cf. also 2 Macc. 6:14-16; 4 Macc 5:19-25; Manasseh 9-10). These notions are supported by Pseudo-Philo 33:3, which describes the finality of death as a time or state during which “the measure and the time and the years have returned their deposit.” It is not absolutely certain what the word “measure” refers to in this text. It could have something to do with apocalyptic judgment, seeing as the subject matter of verse 2 is people’s earthly deeds. However, it could just as well refer to the measured time span of one’s life. The association in verse 3 of the word “measure” with the words “time” and “years” strongly suggests the latter interpretation. Nevertheless, the use here of the word “deposit” supports the deduction made above, that people’s sins are measured during their lives on earth, and that the sum-total will at some stage, whether it be in this world or the next, be held against them. The noun “deposit” is repeated twice more in verse 3, and used in a similar fashion.

¹⁶⁸ All current translations of Jewish pseudepigrapha come from Charlesworth’s two volumes entitled *The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha* (1985).

The idea that people “store up credit” with God, who measures and counts people’s daily (good and bad) deeds is also expressed elsewhere by Jewish texts, which tend to use words and terms like “account,” “credit,” “debt,” “store up,” “record,” “count,” “write down,” “treasure in heaven,” “heavenly tablets,” “heavenly book,” “preserved,” “kept” and “recompense” in apocalyptic contexts.¹⁶⁹ This idea is developed even further in some texts, which declare that God “tests” people in their daily lives on earth in order to provide a fair balance of good and bad deeds (cf. e.g. Wis. Sol. 11:8-9; Pseudo-Philo 40:5; Test. Abr. 12:14; 1QS V:24; 1QM XVI:15; XVII:1-2, 8-9; 4QM^a 11, II:12). Some light may further be cast by two other texts from the same pseudepigraphical document. In Pseudo-Philo 40:1, Jephthah asks the following rhetorical question to his daughter after returning home from a victorious battle: “And now who will put my heart in the balance and my soul on the scale?” Jephthah does not seem to associate this imagery with any kind of judgment. Instead, he seems to use it as a metaphor for measuring his own joy, as the rest of verse 1 suggests: “And I will stand by and see which will win out, whether it is the rejoicing that has occurred or the sadness that befalls me.” Be that as it may, this text still illustrates familiarity with the imagery of weighing one’s “heart” and “soul” with “balances” and “scales.” This imagery is indeed pertinently linked to God’s judgment in Pseudo-Philo 63:4, where David explains the consequences of killing Goliath: “And would the judgment of truth be placed in the balance so that the many prudent people might hear the decision.” Whereas the first cluster of texts from Pseudo-Philo made notion of a *future judgment*, during which measured sins will be held against their perpetrators, the current text overtly connects the imagery of “balances” with God’s this-worldly judgment.

The Sentences of Pseudo-Phocylides (9-21) exhorts the powers that be to judge fairly and impartially. Words like “justice,” “injustice,” “just,” “judge” and “judgment” permeate this pericope, occurring no less than 9 times, if combined. In the midst of this exhortation (verses 14-15), the following admonitions appear: “Give a just measure, and

¹⁶⁹ Examples of some such texts are: 2 Esdras 8:29-33; 16:64; Wis. Sol. 1:9; 3:10; 4:6; Sirach 3:14; 12:1; 27:16; 29:10-11; 1 Enoch 81:9; 96:4; 97:7; 98:5, 8; 100:7, 9, 10; 103:3; 104:7; 108:7; 2 Enoch 19:5; 40:13; 43:1; 45:2; 65:4; Sib. Or. 4:155; 2 Baruch 14:6-7; 48:14; 52:7; 59:2; 84:6; Jub. 5:15; 24:33; 30:20, 23; 31:32; 36:10-11; 39:6; Mar. Isa. 9:19-23; Jos. Asen. 11:10; 15:4; Qumran Scrolls CD IV:5-6; 4QD^b 18, V:16; 4QD^c 1, I:8; 1QH IX:25-26.

an extra full measure of all things is good. Do not make a balance unequal, but weigh honestly.” There is an outside chance that these admonitions are speaking of honesty during everyday barter exchanges, but given the subject matter of the literary context, this seems unlikely. It is much more likely that, in this text, the phrases “make a balance unequal” and “weigh honestly” symbolise, respectively, unjust and just acts of judgment by mortal judges. Likewise, the most natural reading of verse 14 is that a judge should be fair and merciful in his judgments. Thus, images of “measure,” “weight” and “balance” are used to symbolise the procedure of judicial judgment. Unlike the other texts in this section, the subject of judgment is not God, but a human judge.

One of the most direct and unambiguous references to psychostasia appears in the Psalms of Solomon. The first three verses of the fifth psalm praises God for his “righteous judgments” and mercy. Verse 4 continues with this statement: “For an individual and his fate [are] on the scales before you; he cannot add any increase contrary to your judgment, O God.” In this sapiential saying, images of psychostasia are straightforwardly, undeniably, and inextricably linked to God’s judgment. The phrase “before you” also reminds one of the courtroom. It is not clear from this quotation whether the reference is to this-worldly or other-worldly judgment, but verses 8-19 certainly suggest that the former is in view here (cf. Brandon 1969:99). Another pseudepigraphical writing that speaks just as openly and unequivocally about psychostasia is the apocalyptic work 1 Enoch (cf. Brandon 1969:100). In Enoch 41:1, which forms part of the Similitudes of Enoch, it says: “And after that, I saw all the secrets in heaven, and how the actions of the people are weighed in the balance.” Clearly, the *apocalyptic event*, during which *God* will *judge* the people of this world, is in view here. 1 Enoch 61:8-9 is just as unequivocal and deserves to be quoted in full:

He placed the Elect One on the throne of glory; and he shall judge all the works of the holy ones in heaven above, weighing in the balance their deeds. And when he shall lift up his countenance in order to judge the secret ways of theirs, by the word of the name of the Lord of Spirits, and their conduct, by the method of the righteous judgment of the Lord of Spirits, then they

shall all speak with one voice, blessing, glorifying, extolling, sanctifying the name of the Lord of the Spirits.

2 Enoch (44:5) continues in the same vane, and also deserves to be quoted in full. The following quotation comes from manuscript J:

Because on the day of the great judgment [*text missing*]. Every weight [*text missing*] and every measure and every set of scales will be just as they are in the market. That is to say, each will be weighed in the balance, and each will stand in the market, and each will find out his own measure and each shall receive his own reward.

Like the previous text from 1 Enoch, this text from 2 Enoch has the apocalyptic, future judgment of God in mind. What is interesting about this text is that an overt association is made between the measuring of goods in the marketplace and the event of being measured at the future judgment. This association implies that there was no contradiction in Jewish thought between the two points of referral. In fact, in this text, the two ways of understanding the imagery are deliberately combined in such a way that they compliment one another. 2 Enoch elaborates further in 49:2-3 and 52:15 (manuscript J):

And I make an oath to you – ‘Yes, Yes!’ – that even before any person was in his mother’s womb, individually a place I prepared for each soul, as well as a set of scales and a measurement of how long he intends him to live in this world, so that each person may be investigated with it. [...] For all these things [will be weighed] in the balances and exposed in the books on the great judgment day.

Like the books of Enoch, the Apocalypse of Zephaniah also describes an apocalyptic journey through heaven. In chapter 8, Zephaniah is surrounded by a host of angels (cf. Pearson 1976:250-251). Verse 5 has the following to say: “Now, moreover, my sons, this is the trial because it is necessary that the good and the evil be weighed in a balance.” Another work of this nature is the Book of the Apocalypse of Baruch, The Son of Neriah,

more commonly known as 2 Baruch. In chapter 41 of this work, Baruch asks about the ultimate fate of the proselytes, seeing as they lived in sin before converting to Judaism (cf. Klijn 1985:633 n. 41b, c). In verse 6, Baruch formulates the question like this: “Their time will surely not be weighed exactly, and they will certainly not be judged as the scale indicates?” In other words, Baruch is concerned that the proselyte Jews’ former sinful lifestyles will be counted and weighed against them at the final judgment. The use of the verb “judged” with the verb “weighed” and the noun “scale” indicates a deliberate and necessary relationship for the author between the final judgment and the imagery of psychostasia.

The most vivid and detailed description of psychostasia in Jewish literature of the Second-Temple period, reminding one of the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, comes from the Testament of Abraham (see Brandon 1969:104-105; Pearson 1976:251-252). The document describes the scene of the final judgment in chapters 12-14 (Recension A). Because of its elaborate description of psychostasia, as well as its testimony to how it was adopted, understood and transformed by contemporary Jews, it is worthwhile to quote significant portions from these chapters:

And between the two gates there stood a terrifying throne with the appearance of terrifying crystal, flashing like fire. And upon it sat a wondrous man, bright as the sun, like unto a son of God. Before him stood a table like crystal, all of gold and byssus. On the table lay a book whose thickness was six cubits, while its breadth was ten cubits. On its right and on its left stood two angels holding papyrus and ink and pen. In front of the table stood a light-bearing angel, holding a balance in his hand. [On his] left there sat a fiery angel, altogether merciless and relentless, holding a trumpet in his hand, which contained within it an all-consuming fire [for] testing the sinners. And the wondrous man who sat on the throne was the one who judged and sentenced the souls. The two angels on the right and left recorded. The one on the right recorded righteous deeds, while the one on the left [recorded] sins. And the one who was in front of the table, who was holding the balance, weighed the souls. And the fiery angel, who held the

fire, tested the souls. And Abraham asked the Commander-in-chief Michael, “What are these things which we see?” And the Commander-in-chief said: “These things which you see, pious Abraham, are judgment and recompense. And behold, the angel who held the soul in his hand brought it before the judge. And the judge told one of the angels who served him, “Open for me this book and find for me the sins of this soul.” [...] And the sunlike angel, who holds the balance in his hand, this is the archangel Dokiel, the righteous balance-bearer, and he weighs the righteous deeds and the sins with the righteousness of God. And the fiery and merciless angel, who holds the fire in his hand, this is the archangel Purouel, who has authority over fire, and he tests the work of men through fire. And if he burns up the work of anyone, immediately the angel of judgment takes him and carries him away to the place of sinners, a most bitter place of punishment. But if the fire tests the work of anyone and does not touch it, this person is justified and the angel of righteousness takes him and carries him up to be saved in the lot of the righteous. And thus, most righteous Abraham, all things in all people are tested by fire and balance.

(*Test. Abr.* 12:4-17; 13:10-14)

Despite all the obvious images of both the judicial courtroom and psychostasia, the idea that people build up credit with God during their daily lives is also expressed in this passage. Particularly noteworthy in this respect are words like “record,” “recompense” and “book.” Similarly, the idea that people are “tested” also finds expression here.

Our attention now turns to the Dead Sea Scrolls. Much of the rules and regulations of this sectarian Jewish community are expounded in a writing entitled *The Rule of the Community*. 1QS IX:12ff. deals particularly with the regulations for the so-called Instructor. One of the tasks of this individual was to judge and determine whether the Qumran priests – often in the Dead Sea Scrolls referred to as the sons of Zadok or the sons of justice – were righteous and virtuous enough for their duty. It is in this context that we find the following text from the Rule of the Community: “...he [the Instructor] should separate and weigh the sons of Zadok / justice according to their spirits; he should

keep hold of the chosen ones of the period according to his will, as he has commanded; he should carry out the judgment of each man in accordance with his spirit” (1QS IX:14-15; *idem.* 4QS^e III:10-12).¹⁷⁰ The last of the three instructions could be interpreted as referring either to all community members or to the priests in particular. Regardless, it is clear that this Qumran document understood the verb “weighing” as a shorthand for the concept of “judging.” This could be seen as evidence of psychostasia being applied to a process of *moral* judgment.

The sons of Zadok, in turn, formed part of the so-called Community Council, which oversaw a number of community matters, including the implementation of “truth, justice, judgment, compassionate love and unassuming behaviour” (1QS VIII:2) within the community. 1QS VIII:3-4 (*idem.* 4QS^e II:10-11) describes this practice and its purpose as follows: “...doing justice and undergoing trials in order to walk with everyone in the measure of truth and the regulation of time.” In this way, the implementation of justice and judgment filters down from the top of the social hierarchy to the bottom. According to this text, the most important goal of “doing justice” and “undergoing trials” is to ensure that the whole community “walks in the measure of truth.” In other words, “truth” is something that can be *measured*, and it is measured by means of a process of judicial judgment. Thus, it would seem as though the Qumran community had adopted images from psychostasia, and had applied them to their own internal juridical process. Hence, words like “measure” and “weigh” were employed to express the processes and acts of both *moral* and *judicial* judgment within the community. The rationale behind this association is expressed clearly in 4Q424 3:4: “Do not send the hard of hearing to investigate the judgment, for he will not weigh up the men’s dispute.”

The words “measure” and “judgment” (repeated three times) appear within the same literary context in 1QH^a IV:1-6. Unfortunately, the text is extremely damaged, making it impossible to determine either the larger literary context or the specific internal

¹⁷⁰ All translations of the Dead Sea Scrolls are from Martínez (1996).

relationship between the words in question.¹⁷¹ 1QH^a XI:27-29, on the other hand, has remained intact: “When the measuring line for judgment fails, [...] then the torrents of Belial will overflow their high banks...” Here, apocalyptic judgment is delivered with the assistance of a “measuring line.” The exact meaning of this metaphor is not entirely transparent. It could refer to a line of string or rope, used as a measuring implement during construction, and functioning to ensure that walls and rows of bricks were absolutely straight and level. It could just as easily refer to something else entirely. The exact purpose of a “measuring line” is not as important for our purposes as acknowledging the fact that a measuring implement of some kind is linked to apocalyptic judgment. That this poem deals with and expounds a future apocalypse should not be questioned. Hence, there is a slight notion in this apocalyptic poem that the final judgment would involve some or other measuring act.

These hints at the act of being measured at the final judgment find full expression in a fragment from Qumran’s poetic texts (4Q418 126, II:3-4): “And with the scales of justice God measures all [*text missing*] he separates them in truth. He positions them and examines their delights” (cf. also 4Q418 127:5-6). The verbs “position” and “examine” remind one of the judicial courtroom. Although this sentence is in the present tense, there should be no doubt that the future, apocalyptic judgment is in view. The present tense is probably due to the gnomic nature of the statement. That futuristic judgment is meant is made clear by verses 6-8, which continue to describe the apocalyptic judgment: “[*text missing*] judgment to carry out vengeance on all the evildoers and the visitation [*text missing*] to confine the wicked for ever and to lift up the head of the weak [*text missing*] with eternal glory and perpetual peace, and the spirit of life to separate [*text missing*].” The mention of “all” the evildoers, as well as the usage of words like “for ever,” “eternal glory” and “perpetual peace,” leave no question marks behind the exact meaning and intention of this passage. The description is of an apocalyptic and universal judgment – one that will result in a new and everlasting status quo. In verse 10, the text continues to describe this post-apocalyptic condition with future tense verbs: “They will

¹⁷¹ The same applies to 4Q434 1, I:5-11, where the words “judge” and “judgment” occur together with the words “measure” and “scales.” Although more of the text is available here, pieces of text crucial to our inquiry are missing.

bow down the whole day, they will always praise his name.” Thus, the Qumran community was familiar with symbols from psychostasia, and applied these symbols, specifically, to describe not only judicial judgment by men on earth, but also apocalyptic judgment by God in heaven.

The significance of these Jewish texts for our study depends largely on the date and provenance of each of them. It is therefore worth our time to briefly look at the date and provenance of each non-canonical Jewish text encountered in this section. The book of 4 Ezra, which constitutes chapters 3-14 of 2 Esdras, was probably written somewhere in Palestine, around 100 CE, in reaction to the fall of Jerusalem (cf. Metzger 1983:520). The Wisdom of Solomon was almost certainly written somewhere in Egypt, likely Alexandria, and could have been conceived at any stage between the second century BCE and 70 CE. The date and provenance of the Wisdom of Jesus ben Sirach (or Ecclesiasticus) have been determined with a greater degree of confidence. Although the Greek translation of this writing was made in Alexandria, the Semitic original was composed in Judea, most probably in Jerusalem, during the second century BCE. Even though some scholars have dated Pseudo-Philo to a time just after 70 CE, it seems much more likely that it was composed in Palestine before the Temple was destroyed, perhaps even as early as 135 BCE (cf. Harrington 1985:299-300). Proposed dates for the origin of Pseudo-Phocylides have varied widely, but the most probable dating seems to be between 30 BCE and 40 CE (cf. Van der Horst 1985:567-568). Conversely, there is widespread agreement that its place of origin was Alexandria. Internal evidence indicates that the individual Psalms of Solomon were most likely formulated for the first time in Jerusalem, during the first century BCE (see Wright 1985:640-642).

1 Enoch was familiar to the Qumran community, and was almost certainly composed in Judea (cf. Isaac 1983:7-8). The same provenance probably applies to the Similitudes of Enoch as well. It was indicated in section 1.3.2 above, however, that the Similitudes should be dated to a period after 70 CE, even if the rest of 1 Enoch predates the destruction of the Temple (*contra* Brandon 1969:100). No measure of agreement exists regarding either the date or the provenance of 2 Enoch (see Andersen 1983:94-97). It

could possibly predate 70 CE, and might have been written in Palestine, but neither of these claims can be made with any degree of certitude, or even probability. The Apocalypse of Zephaniah was probably written in Egypt, some time between 100 BCE and 175 CE, with slight internal evidence suggesting a date before 70 CE (cf. Pearson 1976 250 n. 66; Wintermute 1983:500-501). 2 Baruch can be dated fairly accurately to the beginning of the second century CE, and can be placed somewhat confidently in Palestine (cf. Klijn 1983:616-617). Recension A of the Testament of Abraham was likely written in Egypt around 100 CE (cf. Brandon 1969:104; see Sanders 1983:874-875). Lastly, it is widely accepted today that all the Dead Sea Scrolls were composed before 70 CE at Khirbet Qumran, which is on the north-western shore of the Dead Sea in Judea (see Martínez 1996:xliv-xlviii).

In order to establish that the concept of psychostasia existed in Palestine around the time when Q was written, it is necessary to carefully weigh in the balance, and narrow down, our list of non-canonical Jewish sources. Only those texts dating to a period before 70 CE should rightly be considered. Moreover, the probability of Egyptian influence on local Jewish traditions forces one to refrain from considering any texts that originated in Egypt, regardless of their date of conception. Despite this cutback, we are still left with four independent witnesses to a familiarity with the concept of psychostasia in Palestine before the destruction of the Temple by the Romans. These witnesses are Sirach, Pseudo-Philo, Psalms of Solomon, and the Dead Sea Scrolls. Although these witnesses most frequently describe God as the subject of judgment, the Rule of the Community also links images of psychostasia with both *moral* and *judicial* forms of judgment. Sirach 9:14 also associates the word “measure” with both *mortal* and *moral* judgment. Where God is the subject, the imagery and vocabulary of psychostasia are associated indiscriminately with either this-worldly or other-worldly judgment. Nevertheless, God’s apocalyptic role as judge at the final judgment seems to be the preferred application of the concept of psychostasia by these sources. If this evidence is combined with evidence from the Old Testament – especially the evidence presented by Proverbs 16:2, 21:2, 24:12, Job 31:6, and Daniel 5:27 – we are left with a very strong cumulative argument, emphatically confirming that the concept of psychostasia existed in Palestine before 70

CE. The Old-Testament evidence, in fact, strongly suggests that this concept was already a feature of Jewish mythology long before the birth of Jesus. Brandon (1969:99) believes that the Jewish expression of the idea can be traced back as far as the second century BCE.

The texts that provide proof of familiarity with the concept of psychostasia before 70 CE can all be placed either in Judea specifically or in Palestine generally. It follows that there is no direct evidence of familiarity with this concept in *Galilee* before 70 CE. This is to be expected, however, given the general and pervasive scarcity of extant literature from Galilee for the time before 70 CE. Two additional considerations support the likelihood that Galileans were also familiar with the concept of psychostasia. The first is the historical association of rabbinic Judaism with Galilee (cf. Horsley 1995a:94). Tannaitic literature, like the Mishnah and Tosefta, apply images of psychostasia, similar to the ones encountered above, to their descriptions of judgment scenes (cf. e.g. *t. Kidd.* 1:13-14; *t. Sanh.* 13:3; see Sanders 1977:128-147). Although these texts are from a much later period, they do provide evidence, slight as it may be, of Galilean familiarity with the concept of psychostasia. Granted, this evidence is not determinative, but it is, nonetheless, highly suggestive. The second consideration is more much more decisive. It was shown in section 2.5.3 above that Galilee was completely destroyed and depopulated during the Assyrian invasion, only to be repopulated by Judeans from the South during the Hasmonean period. Some Judeans were still uprooting themselves and moving to Galilee at the turn of the millennium. Now, seeing as the great majority of Galileans were ethnically and religiously Judean, it is extremely likely that inhabitants of Galilee shared religious and mythological customs and traditions with Judea, including the concept of psychostasia. If these Galileans were ignorant of certain Judean traditions, whether it be as a result of moving away or as a result of intentional disregard, they could easily re-familiarise themselves with such traditions during one of their pilgrimage visits to Jerusalem (see Freyne 1988:178-187; 2000:130, 154; Reed 2000:57-58; cf. Luke 2:41, 44; *Ant.* 2.280; 17.254-258; 20.118, 123; *War* 2.237). Hence, even though we have no *literary* proof that Galilee knew about psychostasia before 70 CE, the existence of such

knowledge *has* to be accepted, given the historical and archaeological information we have about the region.

In both the sapiential and the apocalyptic streams of Jewish tradition, psychostasia offered a means by which the judgment of God could be explained more vividly. The apocalyptic literature from Israel used images from psychostasia to describe either God's this-worldly or his other-worldly judgment. In the latter case, God was described as judging individuals or nations in *heaven* at the *end* of history, which correlates best with the original Egyptian descriptions of psychostasia (see Brandon 1969:91-99). In the former case, God was described as judging individuals or nations *on earth within the confines* of history. In both cases, however, the judgment of God was part and parcel of a universal apocalyptic event that brought finality, and that separated the old era from the new era. The sapiential literature from Israel also used images from psychostasia to describe either God's this-worldly or his other-worldly judgment. The latter usage was similar to the way in which apocalyptic literature applied this imagery. The former use, however, differed from apocalyptic literature in that it described God's judgment of the individual within the *causal* schema of day-to-day life. In other words, there was absolutely no indication that God's judgment (1) was part of a universal apocalyptic event (2) that brought any type of finality (3) and separated an old era from a new era. Rather, the causal consequences of daily choices was equated with the judgment of God (cf. Brandon 1969:99). In both its apocalyptic and its sapiential application, the this-worldly judgment of God was experienced only indirectly, as the consequences of something or someone else. Nevertheless, God ultimately directed and controlled this process behind the scenes (cf. e.g. Qumran Scroll 1QS X:17-18; cf. Casey 2010:289-290). Thus, there was no conceptual contradiction between God's judgment and man's judgment, seeing as the latter was a direct result of the former. Being wronged by another individual ultimately stemmed from God's judgment of the one being wronged. The differentiations between the sapiential and the apocalyptic applications of psychostasia became increasingly slimmer as these genres moved closer to one another, ultimately becoming almost indistinguishable around the time of Jesus.

4.4.3 Back to Q

That the author(s) and audience of *Q* were very familiar with courtroom images as metaphors for God's judgment should be accepted without question. Q 12:8-9 takes a very similar scenario to the one in Daniel 7:13 for granted (cf. Kirk 1998:209; cf. also Wink 2002:178; Casey 2009:181). Words like "judge," "court," "judgment," "courtroom" or "case" are all entirely absent from this Q pericope. Yet, a heavenly courtroom undeniably forms the interpretive background setting. The author(s) feel(s) no need to explain this. Rather, it is taken for granted that the audience would be able to infer such a setting from the little information given. The repeated use of the preposition ἔμπροσθεν ("[standing] before"), plus the references to the "Son of Man" and "angels," seem to provide sufficient clues that the image of an apocalyptic courtroom is being presupposed (cf. Kirk 1998:209). Also, the ease with which the sapiential parable in Q 12:58-59, about settling out of court, was transformed into a saying about apocalyptic eschatology points to familiarity with images of apocalyptic courtrooms. In fact, all that had to be done to award this parable an apocalyptic application was for the compilers of *Q* to place it within such a literary context. Even the exclamation in verse 59 need not point to apocalypticism. Yet, the compiler(s) had enough faith in their audience to recognise the allusions to apocalypticism without any need to add straightforward apocalyptic images. The mention of a "judge," the image of a courtroom, and the reference to "prison" were enough to indicate the thematic presence of apocalyptic eschatology.

Such familiarity with the concept of heavenly courtrooms would strongly suggest that the author(s) of *Q* also knew about the concept of psychostasia. It was argued that Galileans were, in all probability, familiar with the latter concept. As a sapiential document, the Sayings Gospel was sure to know formative wisdom sayings from renowned Jewish books, like Job and Proverbs, very well. The possibility that the authors of *Q* were not familiar with the sayings in Proverbs 16:2, 21:2, 24:12 or Job 31:6, where images from psychostasia are on the foreground, is slim enough to be omissible. Q 12:8-9 certainly

indicates that the Sayings Gospel knew the apocalyptic book of Daniel. It necessarily follows that the imagery of Daniel 5:27 *must* also have been known to the authors of Q.

There are a few additional clues suggesting that the Sayings Gospel had knowledge of psychostasia-imagery. In Q 11:4, the author petitions God to “cancel our debts,” and to “not put us to the test.” This choice of words reminds one not only of the tradition that God keeps score of good and bad deeds, but also of the tradition that God tests our commitment during our lives on earth.¹⁷² The phrase “settling of accounts” in Q 11:50, and the phrase “An accounting will be required” in Q 11:51, provide further evidence that the Q people imagined God keeping an account of our deeds on earth. The parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24 could also be read in a way that recalls this tradition. Whereas Q 11:4 provides evidence to the sapiential application of this tradition, Q 11:50-51 provides evidence of its apocalyptic and futuristic application. The parable in Q 19:12-13, 15-24 could be understood in terms of both applications (see section 3.2.11 above). As in other literature, the heavenly record of good deeds is symbolised in Q (12:33-34) as “treasure in heaven.” Also the idea that God counts the souls of the righteous and the sinful alike finds expression in the parables about the lost sheep (Q 15:4-5, 7) and the lost coin (Q 15:8-10). In light of all this, we have to accept that Q 6:37-38 used the term “measure(ment)” to evoke the concept of psychostasia. The combination in this Q text of the word “judge” (repeated twice) with the word “measure(ment)” (repeated thrice), would have made this association inevitable.

Given that the concept of psychostasia was most often, and most naturally, applied to the *apocalyptic* judgment of *God*, this type of judgment must have been foremost in the minds of the audience when they heard the admonition not to judge for the first time. This conclusion would only have been strengthened by the suggestive use of the divine passive for both the verbs in question (see section 4.3.1 above). However, the imagery, vocabulary and grammar employed in this saying did not exclude, or preclude, either

¹⁷² This reading of the text does not necessarily turn it into a text that deals with futuristic eschatology (cf. section 2.6.1 above). The focus is here on the account God keeps in the present and not the ultimate consequences of said account. The literary context (Q 11:9-13) indicates that we have to do here with the sapiential understanding of God’s causal, this-worldly judgment.

judicial judgment by an authoritative person, like a human judge, or moral judgment by a peer. Firstly, the concept of psychostasia was traditionally applied to all these forms of judgment. The current text, as it stands, could be understood as referring to any one these types of judgment. Secondly, the distinction between the three types of judgment was not definitively precise. If a person was judged by someone else, whether it be a peer or an elected official, that judgment was the inevitable result of God's own judgment. God was in control, and He directed everyone's life according to his will.

Thus, we end up at more or less the same place we started: The saying in Q 6:37-38 could justifiably refer to three different types of judgment (see section 4.3 above). The only difference between then and now is that this conclusion has subsequently been substantiated by intertextual literature from the relevant period. The sapiential nature of the saying itself, the inaugural sermon, and the document as a whole, as well as the "concreteness" and accessibility of imagery from the marketplace, would suggest moral judgment as the prevalent idea. Yet, the pervasive and thoroughgoing scepticism (and fear) of judicial judgment by authoritative figures in the Sayings Gospel as a whole, as well as the likely mentioning of judicial judgment in the inaugural sermon itself, suggest judicial judgment as the controlling idea of Q 6:37-38. Lastly, the imagery of psychostasia, together with the utilisation of a divine passive, and the apocalyptic content of the beatitudes, not to mention the rest of Q, suggest that apocalyptic judgment is the most prevalent idea behind Q 6:37-38. Hence, independent examinations of the saying itself, the inaugural sermon, the Sayings Gospel as a whole, and Jewish intertexts of the Second-Temple period, have all obliged the same result: The wisdom saying in Q 6:37-38 could imply three types of judgment, and there is no way of knowing which one is pervasive.

In my opinion, this deadlock was intentional. It made the saying general enough to be applicable to just about any situation. The power of the saying lies in its open-endedness, and its general applicability. The saying was most likely retold, committed to memory, and eventually written down, precisely because of its vagueness, elusiveness and equivocation. The creator of Q 6:37-38, whether it be the historical Jesus or a Q author,

was quite masterful in his use of imagery, vocabulary and grammar. With this short admonition, the creator was able to evoke imagery from the marketplace, pictures of an earthly courtroom, depictions of a heavenly courtroom, and mythological images from the ancient idea of psychostasia. This logion's multiple layers of application and meaning remind one of Jesus' parables. Blomberg (1999:32) might be on the right track when he says: "Perhaps one needs to recognize multiple lessons and multiple layers of meaning from many forms of Jesus' teaching, not only from the parables." Kirk (1998:168) has the following to say about Q 6:37-38: "The opening admonition is a wisdom admonition (prohibition) with motive clauses. Standing programmatically at the beginning, it remains, like most maxims, open-ended, general, and hence in need of specification and application." Piper (1989:37, 77) concurs in the following statement:

Once again one finds at the outset a remarkably simple and very general and unqualified exhortation [i.e. Καὶ μὴ κρίνετε]. No particular subject, object or situation is specified ... Again no agency is specified for the aorist passive subjunctive verbs [in ἵνα μὴ κριθῆτε]. No direct appeal to the Law or word of God or coming judgement of God strengthens or validates this statement of retribution. [...] In [Q 6:37-38], a remarkable ambiguity is maintained, which it is possible to view these opening sayings as referring either to cause and effect in ordinary life or to End-time events.

Yet, Piper (1989:43-44) continues to say the following:

There may be indirect allusions to eschatological judgment in the retributive maxims [i.e. ἐν ᾧ γὰρ κρίματι κρίνετε κριθήσεσθε and ᾧ γὰρ μέτρῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθήσεται ὑμῖν] or even in the metaphor of falling into a pit, but these remain little more than hints, which receive no elaboration and certainly no application to imminent events. On the contrary, argument rather than eschatological threat dominates the tone of the passage [i.e. Q 6:37-42]. [...] Therefore, one must take serious the fact that experiential wisdom itself dominates the thought of this collection of sayings [i.e. Q 6:37-42]. The direct threat of final judgment is avoided in favour of an approach which is

less polemical and less potentially divisive. It seeks to win assent, to encourage an attitude of self-examination, not to specify an offending party.

Piper is indeed correct that this saying is not really polemical, and that it attempts to “encourage an attitude of self-examination” through persuasive argumentation. Our own examination of the saying has found that it is indeed a piece of wisdom. However, Piper is mistaken in his view that the “indirect allusions to eschatological judgment” in this saying are “little more than hints,” and that the “threat of final judgment is avoided.” We have seen that there is a host of reasons to accept that the saying spoke of apocalyptic judgment. To suggest that the author of this saying had no knowledge of the apocalyptic significance of the words “measure(ment)” and “judgment,” or that he was unable to foresee the audience reaching this apocalyptic significance, seems absurd to me. This is particularly true for the time when the saying was conceived – a time when apocalypticism was “in the air” and all-invasive. It seems much more likely that the author knew what he was doing when he combined these words in the same saying. The purpose was undoubtedly to simultaneously evoke images of *both* the marketplace *and* psychostasia. These images recalled *both* sapiential *and* apocalyptic themes, thereby inviting both types of application.

A few intertexts, not considered thus far, support the conclusion that apocalyptic eschatology is very much an essential part of this logion. The first of these is 2 Samuel 22:26 (*idem.* Ps 18:25): “With the merciful thou wilt shew thyself merciful” (KJV). In a context that is very similar to Q 6:37, Sibylline Oracle 2:63 says: “If you judge badly, God will judge you later.” Pseudo-Phocylides 1:11 likewise states: “If you judge evilly, subsequently God will judge you.” A similar saying appears in rabbinic Judaism: “The one who judges his neighbour on the side of innocence is judged favourably by God.” Although apocalyptic motifs are not prevalent in these texts, God is, in all four texts, the subject of the judging action. In the first example, the future tense certainly suggests some type of futuristic judgment. In the next two texts, the words “later” and “subsequently” might also be insinuating futuristic judgment. The sayings of retribution in 2 Enoch [J] 44:3 provide perhaps the best examples of apocalyptic judgment by God in

such type sayings: “He who expresses anger to any person without provocation will reap anger in the great judgment. He who spits on any person’s face, insultingly, will reap the same at the Lord’s great judgment.” Moreover, that the *New-Testament* authors easily made the association between the word “measure(ment)” and futuristic judgment is clear from a number of texts. In a separate Q context, Matthew (23:32-33), for example, proclaims (NIV): “Fill up, then, the measure of the sin of your forefathers! You snakes! You brood of vipers! How will you escape being condemned to hell?” Another example is Mark (4:24-25), who combines the saying in Q 6:38 with the apocalyptic and futuristic saying in Q 19:26.

Piper’s need to circumscribe the apocalyptic imagery from this saying seems to be motivated both by an “either-or” mentality, and by the preconception that apocalypticism does not belong in sapiential material. This is illustrated by the following phrases from the quotation above: “argument *rather than* eschatological threat,” and “final judgment is avoided *in favour of*...” In the end, apocalyptic eschatology is an integral and important feature of the sapiential saying in Q 6:37-38. Any attempt to exorcise apocalypticism from this saying will be at one’s own peril. A non-eschatological reading of this logion will necessarily result in an incomplete and deficient comprehension of the text. The saying purposely invoked all three types of judgment – moral, judicial *and* apocalyptic.

4.5 ~ FINDINGS

Whereas chapter three focused on traditions (mostly from Q²) with apocalyptic content in order to illustrate that this content was in the service of wisdom, chapter four focused on a sapiential tradition in Q¹ to show that it contained apocalyptic eschatology (cf. Allison 2010:123; 136, esp. n. 469). In the process, and on the basis of this single logion, the same conclusion was reached: *The Q people remembered and described Jesus as a sage who made use of apocalyptic eschatology to motivate and support his moral message. As earlier, this chapter verified that Q used apocalyptic eschatology primarily to substantiate its wisdom. The qualification to this hypothesis was also demonstrated in the present chapter: Apocalyptic eschatology also formed an integral part of the sapiential message*

of Q's Jesus. Once again, this qualification does not invalidate Crossan's or Kloppenborg's understanding of Q's wisdom. The integrality of apocalypticism and wisdom in Q 6:37-38 should not lead one to assume that apocalyptic eschatology was used here to inform or direct moral imperatives or sapiential speculation. Rather, we have seen that apocalypticism functions in Q to buttress existing wisdom and morality (cf. Allison 2010:97). What remains now is to spell out the implications of these results for contemporary historical-Jesus research.