

**THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS AN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE IN
THE INFORMATION ERA**

by

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1. RESEARCH THEME

Two centuries ago, Immanuel Kant (1795), the German philosopher, anticipated that perpetual peace would come to exist among states with republican constitutions, that is democracies. Since then a *pax democratica* that resembles Kant's vision of a pacific union of free states has manifested itself so clearly that it is regarded by many as one of the main characteristics of contemporary world politics. It is so apparent that various scholars, for example Babst (1964), Levy (1989), Rummel (1976), Russett and Starr (1981) and Small and Singer (1976), have set out to test Kant's theory empirically.

Two decades ago the American futurists, Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1970, 1981), announced the dawn of a new era, namely the information era or the Third Wave, as they preferred to call it.¹ The information era is the result of the revolution in the development of information technology (IT), more specifically the electronics (and associated software) that made the design, production, and mass distribution of information devices possible. The past two decades have seen exponential increases in the number, speed and capacity of IT at lowered costs, making IT the fastest growing dimension of human affairs (Bankes & Builder 1991:4).

This study brings together these two phenomena, the democratic peace and the information revolution, by evaluating the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era. At the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars stand bewildered by the complexity of a world that does not conform to simple dichotomies as the Cold War world seemed to do. It is a world characterised by the competing trends of integration, fragmentation, localisation, globalisation, liberation and domination. IT and global communications have played no small part in bringing this world about. The global economic and cultural marketplace is made possible by IT that has provided the 'infostructure' of transborder data, news and image flows. On the one hand, it has greatly

¹ The First Wave being the agricultural era and the Second Wave the industrial era.

facilitated the expansion of capitalism, not least by raising the levels of demand through global advertising. On the other hand, it has also empowered those at the peripheries whose demand for self-determination and social justice often take the form of identity politics against the commodity politics of the centre (Tehrani 1999b:4).

Scholars of the post-Cold War era, when trying to explain the world complexities in simple terms, have come up with three types of scenarios, namely those of continuity, collapse and transformation. Continuity scenarios foresee more of the same: the world system will continue to grow with capitalism as the dominant economic system and liberal democracy the dominant political system (Fukuyama 1989). The information era provides favourable opportunities for the acceleration of both capitalism and liberal democracy as it facilitates transborder capital flows and empowers social forces in authoritarian countries.

The collapse scenarios also envision the expansion of capitalism, but focus on the inequality and violence that capitalism breeds. The economic and cultural gaps between countries are expected to intensify and to become more visible through global communications, producing tensions and conflicts. These tensions may either lead to a direct clash of civilisations (Huntington 1993) or assume more abstruse forms, such as terrorism and protracted conflicts. In these scenarios the explosion of multiple voices and views that IT makes possible serves to pit cultures against one another as resistance against capitalist and Western domination grows (Tehrani 1999a:159).

The transformation scenarios view neither continuity nor collapse as inevitable. They suppose intervention and education toward a preferred world order, whether it means the establishment of a world government to secure justice on the international terrain, or abolishing governments as the instruments of exploitation and domination.

This analysis adopts a transformation scenario approach, arguing that IT provides for the employment of the democratic peace in a reformist way. It adopts deliberately a discourse that emphasises the application of IT to achieve shared values (democratic norms), common interests and interdependence, in order to establish a world community that co-operates for peace, justice and development on all levels.

In evaluating the democratic peace in the information era, the study thus not only asks the question how plausible, feasible and viable the democratic peace is in practice, but goes beyond it to reinterpret the democratic peace in a way that will incorporate the complex realities of the information era. This poses a challenge to expand the theoretical boundaries within which the democratic peace has traditionally been moulded, a challenge that is intensified by the thematic nexus of international relations and international communications.

2. RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research theme provides the background for the research question, namely to what extent can the democratic peace be employed as a plausible, feasible and viable approach to world peace in the information era? The subsequent research problem is aimed at addressing this question by critically analysing causality and deductive structures associated with IT, democracy and world peace in International Relations and Communication literature.

In response, three specific research objectives can be postulated in order to address the research question, namely:

- to review the democratic peace as an approach to peace by contextualising it within the framework of other approaches to peace, tracing the theoretical origins of the democratic peace and outlining it as a phenomenon in world politics;
- to examine the claim that the developments in IT have brought about a new era, the information era; and
- to critically assess claims, by authors of seminal International Relations and Communication texts, that there are causal relations between IT and democracy and between democracy and world peace respectively, applying deductive logic to reach a conclusion about the correlation between IT and world peace.

In addition, the research problem also leads to a normative objective, namely to recommend ways in which IT should be employed to harness the information revolution and direct it toward democracy and world peace.

3. DEMARCATING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

It is necessary to draw the limits of inquiry so as to provide a comprehensive answer to the research question, yet an answer that is not so all-encompassing to be excessively complex and void of any meaning. In this regard the research problem can be demarcated conceptually, geographically and with respect to the time period to which the study pertains.

Conceptual delineation requires explaining and clarifying the central concepts in the study, namely:

The information era: The term is used to describe the contemporary period in the world's history. It depicts the fundamental structural change in power relationships in the world today attributable to the exploitation of IT. It is an era that Bankes and Builder (1992:4, 5) contend "is not so much defined by governments or alliances, as before, but increasingly by transnational markets, commerce, communities and communications. The change has been driven by the global mobility of people and commodities, but most of all by the nearly instantaneous mobility of information and ideas." In 1968, McLuhan and Fiore described the world of the information era as a 'global village'. Most human interactions in the information era can thus be compared to those associated with life in a small village. Consequently, the information era is not so much about IT, but about the implications of the mass distribution of these technologies and the conceptual changes brought about by the awareness of the role of information in human behaviour, organisation and society (Bankes & Builder 1992:159).

The democratic peace: The term was coined by Bruce Russett (1993), a leading contemporary scholar of the idea and phenomenon that democracies keep the peace among themselves. According to Russett (in Thompson 1996:141) "one of the strongest, nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations" is that democracies do not engage in war with one another. The democratic peace is also associated with Immanuel Kant's essay on "perpetual peace" as well as Woodrow Wilson's arguments during World War I regarding the pacifying effects of democracy on relationships among states.

World peace: In its most elementary sense, the concept world peace refers to the absence of war. The definition of war used in this study is firstly that of interstate hostility amounting to a minimum of 1 000 battle fatalities among all the system members involved (Ray 1997:52). However, the definition is expanded to include so-called post-modern wars. Post-modern wars also include 'little wars' or low intensity conflicts within and between states as well as between states and non-state actors (Tehrani 1999a:167-171). World peace goes beyond simply the absence of war (negative peace) and includes conditions of harmony and co-operation (positive peace) (Tehrani 1992:2).

The geographical focus of the study is global, following from the research problem that explores the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. World peace, as is evident from the conceptual delineation, encompasses all states as well as non-state actors in the world.

In respect of the time frame of the study, the information era delineates the period of concern. The antecedents of this era, namely the invention of the telephone and telegraph, can be traced to the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was followed by the invention of the radio, television and computer during the next 50 years and after that by the developments in electronics that enabled the mass production of practical devices. The information era is considered to have commenced during the 1950s. Banks and Builder (1992:4) explain this as follows: "The basis for the current information revolution is not in the advent of the radio or television or even computers, but in their magical transformation by the silicon chip in all of its manifestations. That is what sets the past 20 to 40 years apart from prior history." The inquiry will, therefore, not go back beyond the 1960s and, also considering that the information era manifested itself more clearly in the past 10 to 20 years, the last two decades of the twentieth century will be the main focus of attention.

A question relevant to the temporal delineation of the study, is what the duration of the information era will be? If the study is confined to the information era, the end of the era is also a parameter of the study. It is, however, difficult to predict the end of an era as illustrated by the abrupt end of the Cold War. To overcome the problem of prediction, the question of when the information era will end is rephrased into that of how the current

phase of the information era might be characterized. According to Rondfeldt (1992:253), the information revolution was still 10 years from the beginning of maturation in 1992 when he wrote: “The technology remains in an incipient stage of development, compared with what is on the drawing board and in the mind of visionaries. Although the information era has its roots in developments of the previous century the best and worst are yet to come in terms of the technology’s effect on society, and especially on its politics.” Thus, the information revolution has not yet spent itself completely. This is an important element of the temporal delineation as it impacts on the conclusions drawn from the study, namely that they can only be based on trends that can thus far be identified in the information era.

4. JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY

The study evolves around three concepts, namely world peace, democracy and the information era, which are individually as well as collectively regarded as contemporary, topical and relevant research issues. The study thus aims to contribute to both the theoretical and practical realms of international relations.

From a practical point of view, world peace has been a perennial research issue in contemporary International Relations since the inception of the discipline during the interwar period (1919 - 1939). The arrival of a new era (the information era) requires a reinterpretation of traditional concepts, including world peace.

The contemporary nature and relevance of the democratic peace as a research issue are informed by several factors, such as:

- the end of the Cold War and the apparent ideological victory of liberalism over communism;
- Huntington’s (1991) claim of a Third Wave of democratisation²;

² The Third Wave of democratisation, as proposed by Huntington (1991), refers to the transition of at least 29 previously authoritarian governments to democratic regimes during the period 1973 to 1990. (If the temporal delineation of his book, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century* is extended to 1994, several other democratic transitions can justifiably be regarded as Third Wave transitions, for example that of South Africa.) Although a reverse wave has followed, signalled by ethnic conflict in the Balkans and certain African states, the result has been a net increase in democratic governments.

- a growing trend in international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), to regard the promotion of democratic norms as a fundamental policy principle; and
- a movement toward empiricism in International Relations that favours the study of measurable phenomena.

These factors reignited interest in the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the post-Cold War era.

The information era, the third key concept, is becoming an increasingly topical social science research issue as the societal impact of IT becomes more evident. The Political Sciences, especially International Relations, are no exception. Many events of the past decade, such as the end of the Cold War, the increase in non-state actors on the world arena, the changing nature of national security and the globalisation of markets are attributed to the revolution in IT (Builder 1990:2).

There is, however, a stronger theoretical motivation for undertaking the study than its relevance and contemporary nature. The belief that “the world now taking shape is not only new, but new in entirely new ways” (Barnet, quoted in Bankes and Builder 1992:5) renders existing theories inadequate to fully describe, explain and predict phenomena and events in world politics. The lack of theory interpreting world politics explicitly in terms of the existence of the information era is an impediment to practical research (Bankes & Builder 1992:23). Moreover, inasmuch as theories are not only explanatory of reality, but also constitutive, it is important to propose ways in which democracy and world peace can be enhanced in the information era.

5. METHODOLOGICAL PREMISES

The methodological premises pertain to the approaches, methods of data gathering and interpretation, and level of analysis used in the study. The terms ‘approach’ and ‘method’ are often used interchangeably (Van Dyke 1960:113). In this study, the term approach implies the criteria used to propose research questions and select relevant data, while method refers to the activities that occur when data is gathered and interpreted. In this

study both a descriptive and prescriptive approach are used. The method of data gathering is a literature study and to analyse and interpret data the qualitative method and deduction are used.

Description comprises the process of providing an objective rendering of what is being studied. It is evident that descriptive statements amount to ‘alleged truths of reality’ (Van Dyke 1960:180). Prescription, on the other hand, involves making value statements about “the way the world should be ordered and the value choices decision makers *should* make” (Viotti and Kauppi 1993:5). In other words, description deals with ‘what is’ whereas prescription deals with what ‘ought to be’ or what ‘should be’ (Dyer 1997:14). However, the description-prescription dichotomy does not imply that these approaches are necessarily incompatible. On the contrary, according to Dyer (1997:15) “only when it is determined (descriptively) what is normal in a given context, may deviation or conformity be viewed as either a pejorative or commendatory basis for prescription”. In this study the relationship between the three key concepts, namely information technology, democracy and world peace, will firstly be approached descriptively. Upon this the study will embark on the more normative exercise of prescribing ways to improve the plausibility, viability and feasibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era.

With regard to method, data or information can be accumulated in various ways, for example by making use of direct observations, surveys, conducting interviews or studying documentary sources of other people’s observations and ideas. This study will be confined to the latter. In other words, it is based on a literature study of existing literature and primary documents (such as seminal philosophical works and also government reports) that relate to the subject matter. As a literature study it focuses on the causalities and deductions found in texts regarding the relationship between democracy and world peace, information technology and democracy, and information technology and world peace. These causalities and deductions are indicated, explained, assessed and used to answer the research question, concerning the plausibility, viability and feasibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era.

Regarding the interpretation of data, analysis is the “process by which the parts of a whole are identified”, but also involves an effort to find out how these parts are related or

connected to form the whole (Van Dyke 1960:180). This study adopts the qualitative method. In this context, Van Dyke (1960:181) emphasises that the qualitative method relies on the personal qualities of the scholar. These qualities include logic, judgement, insight, imagination, intuition and/or the ability to form accurate impressions and see relationships. Hence, the research problem is based on the interrelationship of world peace, democracy and IT. This relationship is not quantified or measured.³ Kluckhohn (in Van Dyke 1960:183) argues that “the pertinent fact is not the presence or absence of something in such and such quantity but rather the nature of the arrangement ...”. The study can therefore be considered to be qualitative.

Finally, the deductive method of data interpretation is employed. Deduction, according to Lin (1976:14), is “the process in which certain known propositions or premises make other unknown propositions and conclusions follow logically, empirically or both.” There are, subsequently, three types of deduction that can be used to explain social phenomena, namely:

- logical deduction;
- the empirical deductive system, where propositions relate theoretical or abstract terms or concepts to empirical (observable) terms or variables; and
- a combination of the logical and empirical deductive system, where the two systems are integrated in order to explain certain phenomena.

In this study the first type of deduction is employed, namely logical deduction.

Isaak (1975:108) elucidates the basic structure of the logical deductive explanatory model as follow. Logical deduction is divided into that which explains, the *explanans*, and into that which is explained, the *explanandum*. The *explanans* consists of two statements or postulates. Postulates are true statements from which other statements are deduced (Bailey 1994:45). Collectively these postulates imply the *explanandum*. The *explanans*, in other words, contains the premises from which the *explanandum* (conclusion, deduction) is

³ This study does, however, refer to quantitative studies correlating democracy and world peace, but does not itself employ the quantitative method.

deduced. Lin (1976:25) points out that there are two variations of the logical deductive model, namely the definitional and the propositional logical deductive systems.

In the definitional logical deductive system, both postulates as well as the deduction (in other words the *explanans* and the *explanandum*) contain definitions. The deduction (*explanandum*) connects the definitions. Since both postulates are by definition true statements, it follows that by deduction the *explanandum* is also true. A typical definitional logical deductive system looks as follows:

Explanans (postulates):

1. Humans are mortal.
2. Socrates is human.

Explanandum (deduction):

3. Thus, Socrates is mortal.

The postulates are stated in an either-or manner. Humans are either mortal or they are not and Socrates is either human or he is not. Thus, Socrates is either mortal or he is not.

The propositional logical deductive system, on the other hand, contains propositions. In this model the relationship between concepts are probabilistic rather than definitive as in the definitional logical deductive model. Hence, the postulates and the deduction merely describe the likelihood of the occurrence of a relationship than an unquestionable truth. A typical propositional logical deductive system looks as follows:

Explanans (postulates):

1. The more educated a person is, the more likely it is that he/she will get a high-ranking job.
2. The higher the rank of the job a person can secure, the more likely it is that he/she will amass wealth.

Explanandum (deduction):

3. Thus, the more educated a person is, the more likely it is that he/she will amass wealth.

In the example, it is only stated that a person with greater education is likely to secure a higher-ranking job. It is not stated that all people with greater educations will do so, as the definitional logical deductive system would have read.

The nature of deduction in this study is such that it subscribes to the latter variation of the logical deductive model, in other words, the propositional logical deductive system. The first postulate is based on the premise that democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another. Subsequently, an increase in democracy is likely to lead to an increase in world peace. The second postulate is that the information revolution is likely to enhance democracy worldwide. From these two postulates can be deduced that, as a result of the information era, world peace is likely to be enhanced. The propositional logical deductive model as used in the study can be illustrated as follow:

<i>Explanans</i>	Postulates 1	=	An increase in democracy is likely to lead to an increase in world peace (because democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another)
	Postulate 2	=	Progress in information technology is likely to enhance democracy
<i>Explanandum</i>	Deduction (Conclusion)	=	Thus, progress in information technology is likely to enhance world peace

It is evident that the three statements are propositional and not definitional inasmuch as they only state the likelihood of a relationship between democracy, the information revolution and world peace. In subsequent chapters the nature of these propositions is explored. In terms of the postulates contained in the *explanans*, the focus is on the conditions that will increase and decrease the likelihood of a relationship between democracy and world peace on the one hand, and information technology and democracy, on the other. In terms of the

deduced proposition, the study explores its soundness and usefulness to answer the research question.

Concerning the third methodological premise, namely the level of analysis, the study is not limited to a single level of analysis. Although the democratic peace is usually linked to the state level inasmuch as it involves regime types, the information revolution obscures the traditional distinction between sub-state, state and supra-state (or global) levels of analysis. For example, individuals and groups traditionally operating at the sub-state level are empowered by IT to act on the supra-state level. This necessitates an approach to analysis that is not only flexible enough to concentrate on actors and processes on different levels of analysis, but also on actors and processes that cross the levels of analysis with increasing frequency.

6. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature consulted in this study relate to three themes, namely:

World peace as a fundamental issue in International Relations: Inasmuch as the field of International Relations was conceived during the interwar period (1919 - 1939), war and peace were regarded as fundamental issues in International Relations and continued to be ever since. As a result, literature concerned with approaches to end war and maintain peace abound. In this respect, Claude's (1956) *Swords into plowshares*, Hinsley's (1963) *Power and the pursuit of peace*, Lovell's (1974) *The search for peace: An appraisal of alternative approaches* and Morgenthau's (1973, first published in 1948) *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace* are typical of writings that explore different approaches to peace. These approaches include among others collective security, the balance of power, world government and the democratic peace. Most of these writings relate the different approaches to peace to a particular theoretical perspective of International Relations, for example Doyle (1997) in *Ways of war and peace: realism, liberalism and socialism* distinguish between realist, liberalist and socialist views and approaches to war and peace. Other scholars go as far as to organise theories of International Relations in terms of the view that they take on war and peace most notably Waltz (1959). He distinguishes between theories that attribute the causes of war respectively to human nature, regime type and the

anarchical international system. Although earlier literature on war and peace defined these concepts in a statecentric way, there has been a movement to broaden them during the last two decades. This movement has paralleled the more general shift in International Relations literature from a statecentric to a multicentric image of world politics (Tehrani 1999b).

The democratic peace as an approach to world peace: Literature on the democratic peace dates back to Kant's (1795) article *Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch*. The article (translated by Beck [1963] in Betts [1994]) shows how giving those who suffer most in war a voice to effectively sanction war between states can contain the aggressive interests of political elites. This implies that states adopt republican constitutions and exercise restraint with respect to their relationships with one another to the extent that they establish a pacific union among themselves. Kant's article gained renewed interest when Babst (1972) published an article claiming that democracies have never waged war with one another. Doyle (1983a; 1983b), Thompson (1996), Benoit (1996), Kegley and Herman (1995) and Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1993) are only a few of the scholars that have debated both the empirical and normative plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace since the end of the Cold War. An important point made by Doyle in most of his articles on the subject is that democracies are not necessarily inherently peace-loving. On the contrary, they will still fight so-called liberal wars against non-democratic states (Doyle 1986:267).

The information era: Literature on the information era can be divided into sources that describe the technical aspects of the information revolution, such as Martin (1988) and Saxby (1990), and sources that concentrate on the societal, economical and political impact thereof, such as Kitchin (1998) and Haywood (1995). Although some scholars of International Relations, amongst others Rothkopf (1998) and Cowie (1989), have begun to explore the impact of the information revolution on world politics in particular, the fields of Philosophy and Communication Studies provide valuable supplementary sources. In terms of the former, Feenberg and Hannay (1995) and Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1994a) are examples of scholars who focus on understanding the relationship between society and technology, whereas Wasco and Mosco (1992), Sclove (2000) and Mohammadi (1997) are communications scholars who concentrate on the relationship between the media and politics.

Although there is a vast body of sources that explore the relationship between democracy and world peace on the one hand (for example Gleditsch and Hegre 1997) and between democracy and the information revolution on the other (for example Tsagarousianou, Tambini and Bryan 1998 and Coleman 1999), relatively few sources explore the interrelationship between the three concepts collectively. Alleyne (1994) in “a critical analysis of the assumptions about the relationship between communications, democracy and international peace”, comes close to this, but not in the same way that this study proposes. Alleyne concludes that expectations that the improved efficiency of international communications will contribute significantly to fostering liberal democracies, and in turn world peace, are misplaced and premature. His finding is based on the fact that theoretical contradictions exist inasmuch as liberal democratic norms were never exercised universally by Western states and new technologies of mass communications were from the start used as tools of international conflict. Although this perspective is considered, the study will go beyond the improvements in mass communications (one-to-many media) to include the developments in many-to-many media (for example the Internet) and the opportunities these channels, accessible to the average citizen, will provide for democracy and world peace.

7. STRUCTURE

The structure of the rest of this study, following this chapter that serves as an introduction, is outlined as follow.

Chapter two outlines the different approaches to world peace in International Relations as well as the worldviews or theoretical perspectives framing these approaches. This provides a brief overview of how world peace, as a fundamental issue in the discipline, is treated theoretically. Thus it serves as a reference point for introducing the democratic peace as an approach to world peace.

Chapter three is an intensive survey of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace, starting with the philosophical origins of the idea that democracies do not make war with one another. This is followed by examining the empirical evidence of the existence of a pacific union among democracies on three levels of analysis, namely the monadic level

(whether democracies are inherently more peaceful than other regime types); the dyadic level (whether democracies are only more peaceful in their relations with other democracies); and the system level (whether an increase in the democratic peace translates into an increase in world peace). The chapter also reviews the explanatory models that attribute the existence of peaceful relations among democracies to regime type.

Chapter four sketches the manifestations of the information era in society. It contextualises the information era by describing the eras preceding it and then briefly outlines the technological developments that led to the information revolution. To explain the different conclusions that scholars come to when they analyse the impact of IT on society, the chapter draws on the philosophy of technology. Theories such as utopianism, instrumentalism, social constructivism and the political economy of IT are examined. An integrated approach is used to explore the seemingly contradictory trends that characterise the world of the information era. Although people are virtually integrated into a global village through the globalisation of markets, transportation and media, there are trends of cultural and economical fragmentation. In exploring the impact of IT on space, hierarchy and the basis of wealth, the chapter provides the background and justification for an evaluation of the prospects for democracy, the democratic peace and world peace given the advent of the information era.

Chapter five explores the prospects for democracy in the information era. The extent to which IT can be employed to spread democratic norms and establish democratic institutions is examined to determine the impact of IT on democratisation and democratic consolidation. In this regard, the interaction between individuals across the globe made possible by IT and in turn creating a global citizenry, global public spheres and a global civil society becomes a central theme of the chapter. The aspects that can off-set the benefits for democracy, such as the use of IT by governments to oppress citizens and breach their rights to privacy and freedom of speech or by corporations for the sole purpose of maximising profits, are also explored. In terms of the latter, the chapter elucidates the debate between political economists and cyberlibertarians about the benefits of leaving control of the Internet to markets alone. This is in essence a question of Internet governance and the compromise contest among states, the private sector and civil society groups over control of the Internet.

Finally the chapter turns to the digital divide and the extent to which unequal access to IT inhibits democracy in the information era.

Chapter six evaluates the democratic peace, given the opportunities for democracy in the information era. It goes about doing this in two ways, first in a logical deductive way by arguing that the information revolution is likely to enhance democracy and because democracies do not make war with one another, world peace will be enhanced. This approach is however based on a definition of war as interstate conflict and world peace as the absence of interstate conflict. Thus defined, the relevance of the democratic peace is questioned, because war in the information era is no longer confined to interstate conflict. Hence, the chapter sets out to outline the changing nature of war in the information era (so-called post-modern war) and to reinterpret the democratic peace along reflectivist lines so as to provide an approach to prevent post-modern war.

Chapter seven presents the final analysis, conclusions and recommendations of the study by sketching a transformation scenario of the democratic peace in the information era. The realisation of the basic aim and objectives of the research efforts is assessed as well as the problem areas that may reduce the value of the study.

8. CONCLUSION

World peace has been a salient research issue since the inception of International Relations as a field of study. As the world changes, the prospects for world peace change and this means that approaches to world peace need to be re-evaluated from time to time. The advent of the information era provides a research opportunity for the re-evaluation of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. In this chapter the grounds and boundaries of such a research effort were outlined as well as the methodology that will be employed throughout the course of the study.

Based on the premise that IT impacts on democracy, the study aims to explore the likelihood of a *pax democratica* in the information era. This involves not only superimposing the democratic peace as it has hitherto been understood in International Relations on the new circumstances brought about by the information revolution, but going

beyond that. Inasmuch as theories are also constitutive of reality, it is argued that the new context in which the democratic peace is applied also demands a reinterpretation of the democratic peace as such. In the next chapter the theoretical perspectives underlying some of the most prominent approaches to peace are examined including the democratic peace. This serves not only to demarcate the democratic peace theoretically, but also lays the groundwork for theoretically expanding the idea of democratic peace to a more appropriate approach to peace in the information era later in the study.

CHAPTER 2

APPROACHES TO WORLD PEACE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

1. INTRODUCTION

War and peace have been central concepts in International Relations to the extent that the discipline is often organised around them. Waltz (1959) in *Man, the state and war: Perspective on the causes of war* categorises International Relations theories in terms of what he regards as the main cause of war: human nature, the character of the state or the structure of the world order. Gabriel (1994) distinguishes between realist and idealist theories where the former regards war between nations as the norm and the latter regards peace as the norm. Morgenthau (1973:379) explains this preoccupation with war and peace by stressing that the spiritual, moral, intellectual and political preoccupation with the creation of a peaceful world started to converge in the nineteenth century and culminated in theory and practice during the period between the two world wars. It is during this period that International Relations was born.

In International Relations war and peace are often regarded as two sides of the proverbial coin. Peace is 'nonwar' in its negative sense and in its positive sense, the conscious effort of engaging in processes of co-operation and integration between major human groups (or states) that will maintain the state of 'nonwar'. Preconditions for peace are thus preceded by a discussion of the causes of war. What are seen as the causes of war will inform the approach taken to reach world peace. This chapter aims to outline the different approaches toward world peace as well as the worldviews or theoretical perspectives framing these approaches. This is done to provide a cognitive map of International Relations theory, which will serve as a reference point for introducing the democratic peace, the main focus of this dissertation, as one of the approaches to world peace.

2. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND APPROACHES TO PEACE

For much of the 1970s and 1980s International Relations has been trapped in the so-called third great debate of International Relations theory, namely the interparadigm debate.

Whereas the first debate, that is idealism versus realism, was mainly philosophical and political in nature and the second debate, that is behavioralism versus traditionalism, was mainly methodological, the third debate can be defined as ontological. It is ontological inasmuch as it concerns the nature of the discipline and centres around three “incommensurable paradigms” – realism, liberalism (also referred to as pluralism or idealism) and radicalism (also referred to as Marxism/socialism). The third debate differed from the debates preceding it inasmuch as the three paradigms were not rival in the Kuhnian sense of paradigmatic revolutions. Instead of one paradigm becoming more popular than the other and persisting as the new dominant paradigm until it is replaced by another, the nature of the competition between realism, liberalism and radicalism can be describe as incommensurable. The idea of incommensurability is best explained by Wæver (1996:155), who writes: “In the first two debates, it was expected that one side would eventually win and International Relations would evolve as a coherent discipline in the winning camp. In the third debate, one increasingly got the self-conception that the discipline *was* the debate. ‘International relations’ was this disagreement, not a truth held by one of the positions. Each saw a side of reality that was important but could only be told from its perspective, not translated into the other two, nor subsumed in some grand synthesis.” In this sense the three schools of the interparadigm debate also inform different approaches to peace, which will be outlined here.

Realism, as forged by classic philosophers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau and built upon by Carr, Waltz and Morgenthau, holds the following view of the world. World politics is a ‘jungle’ reflecting a state of war. This state of war does not imply continuous or constant wars, but rather the constant possibility of war. The causes of war, whether attributable to human nature, the character of states, the international system or a mixture of all three, require ‘realpolitik’ (or power politics) from state behaviour. Thus, states should be self-interested, prepare for war and calculate balances of power (Doyle 1997:18). In the realist worldview, states are the pre-eminent actors and their sovereignty is second to none. Survival is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must yield. All other objectives, such as economic prosperity, are secondary. To survive, the state can only rely on itself. No other state or institution can guarantee survival (Dunne 1997:119). Although realists share these propositions, they are divided on a number of

issues, for example the level of analysis, which leads to differing conclusions about the causes of war, the prospects for war and peace and the approaches toward attaining peace.

Doyle (1997:44) distinguishes between four strands of realism on a level-of-analysis basis, namely complex realism (Thucydides), fundamentalism (Machiavelli), structuralism (Hobbes) and constitutionalism (Rousseau). Complex realism as promulgated by Thucydides attributes equal importance to human nature, domestic society (the state) and the international system in explaining the state of war that characterises the realists' world view. This is best illustrated in Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta where the character of individual leaders, the features of the city states and the balance of power existing between them contributed to the origin and eventually the end of the war (Thucydides 1986:22-26). Fundamentalist, structuralist and constitutionalist realism constitute the modern strands of realism and they each emphasise one level of analysis over the other.

Machiavelli bases his explanation for the state of war fundamentally on the leader, citizen or subject and the ambitions, fears and interests held by these individuals. It is thus inherent in human nature to be power-seeking and this is extended onto the state level and eventually onto the inter-state level. Leaders ('princes'), because they are ambitious and feel threatened by other individuals' power-seeking behaviour, will engage in aggrandisement and expansion and this will threaten other states' security, creating a security dilemma and threatening peace (Machiavelli 1986:30). Even republican states, for fear of enslavement and protection of civil liberties will choose to rule rather than be oppressed. Because other states are perceived to have similar preferences, states prepare for imperial expansion. The real cause of war is human nature and the way states deal with the state of war is a Darwinian 'survival of the fittest' approach. Although fundamentalists promote imperialism as an approach to peace, Machiavelli had some insights to spare on strategic balance of power, emphasising the role of statesmen in making strategic alliances that will enhance their prestige and may make the difference between victory and defeat in war (Machiavelli 1986:31; Doyle 1997:108).

Morgenthau (1973:9) too asserts that politics have their roots in human nature. Therefore the struggle for power, whether 'disciplined by moral ends and controlled by constitutional

safeguards as in Western democracies or untamed and barbaric', results in man dominating man (and state dominating state). But he also acknowledges that stability and peace can be achieved if the conditions for a balance of power are constructed, an approach most commonly found among structural realists.

Structural realism, which is the dominant contemporary strand of realism, has its roots in the work of Hobbes. Hobbes' assumptions about the nature of humans – being rational but also envious and egoist – and their behaviour under conditions of anarchy underlie his explanation of why people create sovereign states. Under conditions of international anarchy these states maintain a state of war because there is no effective international law or morality (Hobbes 1986:206). Sovereigns of states are in continual competition for goods, fear of attack and struggle for prestige and these factors, competition, fear and glory, are reasons for conflict and possibly war. By analogy the state of war is similar to the state of nature that individuals endure before they create the Leviathan, the state. But, because states are less vulnerable than individuals in the state of nature, states have less of an incentive to establish a global Leviathan to ensure global peace (Dunne 1997:113). International insecurity and thus the state of war continue. Moreover, because there is no global source of law and order, states have to provide their own security and because states are similar in this quest, they can be treated like rational unitary (sovereign) and homogenous actors. The approach to peace following from structuralism is the balance of power.

The balance of power approach to peace assumes four elements, namely:

- international anarchy where the security of states is interdependent inasmuch as they are affected by one another. In the absence of a world government, states have to opt for self-help to guarantee their own security;
- states are coherent units, functionally similar in their ends (rational egoist), albeit not in their capabilities;
- because of the system of self-help, security and estimations of power are relative; and
- a rational system of estimating power is possible, which means that statesmen can weigh the balance at any given time (Doyle 1997:135).

Given these elements, states will form balances of power. These balances of power are the sets of relationships that result from states' efforts to maximise their security in relation to other states' power. The balancing act includes methods such as divide and rule, compensations, acquiring arms, and making alliances and alignments. Whenever the balance of power is disturbed either by an external force or a change in one of the units composing it, the tendency is to re-establish the old equilibrium or create a new equilibrium (Morgenthau 1973:168, 178-181).

The balance of power as an approach to peace is embedded in what Gabriel (1994) refers to as an anarchical realist world view. Gabriel (1994:12-17) distinguishes between hierarchical and anarchical world views based on their orientation toward social organisation. Hierarchy and anarchy are structural terms juxtaposing vertical super- and subordination against horizontal co-ordination. Anarchic realism sees the anarchical system as a whole, which is the sum of its parts. Although power is all-important, the object is not to maximise it, but rather to prevent the maximisation of power by any one unit. Power has to be evenly distributed. In reality power hardly ever is evenly distributed and therefore it is up to great powers to discipline themselves for they can either challenge the equilibrium or they can preserve it and in choosing to do the latter preserve stability and peace (Gabriel 1994:161-162).

The development and use of nuclear weapons have changed the calculations of the balance of power in profound ways. The crude destructiveness of these weapons as demonstrated at the end of World War II has cultivated the realisation that nuclear war avoidance is the top priority. The 'value' of these weapons is not their use, but their threat potential. The concept of deterrence is thus introduced into the balance of power, which becomes a balance of terror. The fear of assured destruction that each nuclear weapon state poses for the other will prevent them from engaging in hostilities that may lead to nuclear exchange and mutual destruction (Lovell 1974:13). Deterrence, if it is to be successful in avoiding war, requires the successful mixture of seeming willingness and unwillingness to use nuclear weapons. If nuclear weapon states have an overly peaceful image, deterrence fails because their willingness to use nuclear weapons if under threat is not credible. If the state has an overly belligerent image, it may seem eager to use nuclear weapons and induce a pre-emptive

strike, resulting in a nuclear war (Gabriel 1994:96, 97). Attempting to find the exact mix for credible deterrence led to a nuclear arms race between the United States (US) and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War. A nuclear balance of power came to exist among the five states that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 (the so-called nuclear weapon states). This balance (and efforts to maintain it at lower levels of nuclear armament) is now jeopardized by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other states such as India and Pakistan (overtly) and probably Israel (covertly) as well as the US' intention to build a national missile defence system.

Constitutionalist realism as devised by Rousseau also assumes the state of war, but more than structuralist and fundamentalist realism, finds the roots for war in the constitution of states (Doyle 1997:140). When the poor are deceived into agreeing to a social contract that will secure the privileges of the rich, the product is a corrupt state. Abusing the power that state structures award, the domestically powerful will wage wars for their own interests such as territory, slaves, money, glory and religion. To overcome the corruption a democratic revolution has to occur. Citizens would swear allegiance to each other and make laws that will encompass the General Will (or the national interest). Wars would only be fought in the national interest and not for the whims of the political elite. Unfortunately this does not necessarily mean annihilation of the state of war, because states' national interests are not always compatible. Nationalism should therefore not be extreme, but purely rational and democratic. Even this kind of national reform may not be sufficient to prevent certain countries from going to war, but at least it does provide options to countries. Two of these options (and approaches to peace) are isolationism and non-provocative defence.

Neither isolationism nor autarky is a viable policy option in today's highly interdependent world. Non-provocative defence, as Rousseau proposed for Poland, implied cultivating patriotic participation in public life and a nationalism that would neither threaten other states, nor make Poland attractive. The militia army would not be able to engage in long-distant conquest, but would be able to defend Poland on homeground. Rousseau warned against interdependence. Transnational ties increase the political, social and economic foundations for a balance of power but exacerbate conflict, because they establish more points of contact (Doyle 1997:141-151). Constitutionalist realism thus emphasises domestic societies, the heterogeneity or homogeneity of states in the international system, their

societal strengths and weaknesses and the international system's toleration of transnational regimes as rules of order and sources of co-operation and conflict.

Gilpin's (1981) theory of hegemonic change is a modern-day version of constitutional realism. According to his theory the international system is governed by empires, hegemonies or great powers and the state of war is tamed by rules and regimes forming an underlying hierarchy that supports the dominating power. The US has typically played the role of a hegemon dominating the international system after the World Wars. This is best illustrated by the international economic system, established by the Bretton Woods Conference, which reflects the interests of the US and creates the hierarchy necessary for the US to fulfil its role. Stability in Gilpin's theory is thus not the result of balancing power in an anarchical setting, but the outcome of domination by a hegemon in a hierarchical order. The state of war is, however, not eliminated, because the cost for the hegemon to expand its rule over time yields diminishing returns and eventually subordinate states challenge the hegemon, resulting in hegemonic wars (Doyle 1997:154-156; Gabriel 1994:88-94). This is a cyclical process where great powers rise and fall and new phases are introduced by war.

Hegemony as an approach to peace is a realist hierarchical theory in terms of Gabriel's classification of International Relations theories. In other words, unlike anarchic realist theories, states are not seen as essentially equal. Some states are stronger than others and these states will emerge as the hegemons.

The end of the Cold War was initially seen as a refutation to realists who predicted the continuance of a bipolar system and the state of war. As war in the Balkans escalated though, the euphoria accompanying the end of the Cold War soon abated and realist claims that war is probable and normal gained renewed strength (Dunne 1997:119). In terms of a peace plan for the post-Cold War era, realists proposed theories of a "Global Policeman" (the US) in stride with global hegemonic strategies and alternatively the replacement of the bipolar system with a multipolar system. Domestic politics have, however, not allowed the US to play the role of world hegemon to the extent that peace can be guaranteed. Multipolarity, on the other hand, is widely considered a cause of World War I. Furthermore, constitutionally inspired realists such as Huntington (1993) warn against a

clash of civilisations where religions will again cause states to rise up against one another. For many scholars the end of the Cold War and the opportunities that technological progress have brought about open the door for more “ambitious” approaches to peace as suggested by liberalism (Doyle 1997:473).

The liberal approach to world politics is firmly rooted in an optimistic view of human nature. Although humans are not perfect, they are capable of being educated. In other words, humans have the potential of being reasonable, informed, non-violent and in control of their passions. The relationship between humans and the state is dictated by individuals’ superiority to states. Individuals are always more important than the collective, which they only form to serve their interests (Gabriel 1994:149). The essential principle in liberal thought is therefore individual freedom. This includes, on the one hand, freedom from the arbitrary use of force by the state, translated into freedoms such as the freedom of speech, of movement, of association and of conscience. On the other hand, it includes social rights such as equality in education and health care that will protect and expand the potential for freedoms to be exercised. The guarantee of these sets of rights and freedoms lies in democratic participation and representation (Doyle 1997:207).

The optimistic view of human nature is extended to the international realm. Unlike realist approaches to peace, which assume a state of war, liberalism concedes only to a heterogeneous state of war and peace, which may even become a state of peace alone. Liberal societies can co-exist in the international system without their relations being dominated by a security motive. When disagreement arises over an issue, this is resolved through international organisation and law, not through war. According to Doyle (1997:211) the liberal view of world politics is grounded in the following assumptions:

- despite existing under conditions of international anarchy, states do not experience a general state of war;
- states are not unitary actors, but can be distinguished on the basis of their orientation towards human rights. There are, thus, liberal and non-liberal, republican and totalitarian, capitalist and communist, fascist and corporatist states. The nature of states will be reflected in their international behaviour; and

- aims of states go beyond security to include the protection and promotion of individual rights.

As is the case with realism, the different liberal approaches to peace can be framed on the basis of their image of world politics. Dunne (1997:148) uses Waltz's distinction between the causes of war as they relate to man, the state and the international system as levels of analysis, to distinguish among liberal thinkers (see figure 2.1). This framework will be returned to as specific approaches to peace are linked to themes in liberal thought, in this study grouped together under the categories liberal internationalism, idealism and liberal institutionalism.⁴

Figure 2.1 Liberalism and the causes of war, determinants of peace

Images of Liberalism	Public figure/period	Causes of conflict	Determinants of peace
First image: Human nature	Richard Cobden (mid-19th Century)	Interventions by governments domestically and internationally disturbing the natural order	Individual liberty, free trade, prosperity, interdependence
Second image: The state	Woodrow Wilson (early 20th Century)	Undemocratic nature of international politics; especially foreign policy and the balance of power	National self-determination; open governments responsive to public opinion; collective security
Third image: The structure of the system	J. A. Hobson (early 20th Century)	The balance of power	A world government

Source: Dunne 1997:148

Liberal internationalism is what Burchill (1996:29) refers to as an 'inside-out' (or second image) approach to international relations. In other words, liberal internationalists explain

⁴ These categories are used by Dunne (1997) to distinguish between the varieties of liberalism. It should be noted that there is relatively little uniformity in the way the concepts liberal internationalism, idealism and liberal institutionalism are used with respect to the theorists and ideas incorporated under the headings. With respect to liberal internationalism for example, Burchill (1996), includes Wilson's ideas on collective security, which is precisely what Dunne (1997) uses to distinguish between idealism and liberal internationalism. While both Burchill and Dunne include the idea of free trade under liberal internationalism, Doyle (1997) addresses it as a separate strand of liberalism, namely commercial pacificism.

the exogenous behaviour of states by examining their endogenous political and economic dispositions. There is a natural order underpinning human society, but it is undermined by undemocratic leaders and consequently there exists between states a state of war. Instead of a balance of power that cannot guarantee a return to a state of peace, but merely reduces the risk of war, liberal internationalists propose that the principles underlying a democratic political system be internationalised. These principles include individual consciousness, republican constitutionalism and a federal contract between citizens. This will lead to a permanent peace treaty of sorts between states to abolish war. Unlike the social contract between the state and citizens this treaty will not establish a government, in this case a world government (Dunne 1997:151). Thus, liberal internationalism promotes anarchical means of maintaining peace. In the absence of hierarchical arrangements, liberal internationalists propose that peace will be cemented by two processes: democracy and free trade.

Democratic processes and institutions will prevent princes, statesmen, soldiers, arms dealers and others of the ruling elite from igniting war for gaining power, while free trade and commerce will break down the artificial barriers between individuals in different states. A familiar theme in liberal international thought is the incompatibility of war and commerce. The contact and communication that international commerce establishes between individuals in different states will unite them in a community and in turn rectify distorted perceptions, so often used in the pursuit of war. Moreover, economic interdependence will decrease the relevance of territorial conquest for states. Trade and co-operation outweigh military competition and territorial control when it comes to what determines the wealth of states. Aggressive behaviour is punished by economic means, which is made possible by interdependence (Burchill 1996: 34, 37).

Idealism, although similar to liberal internationalism in many respects, questions the extent to which peace is the latent order. World War I led liberals to believe that the conditions for peace and prosperity need to be constructed. Woodrow Wilson insisted that an international institution, which will resolve conflicts among states according to democratic processes, must be created to regulate international anarchy. A domestic analogy is thus followed where states become members of an international organisation and are bound by its rules and norms. The League of Nations was to become the first of these organisations,

functioning on the basis of collective security, a liberal approach to peace. Idealists, instead of relying on the natural harmony between the interests of states that will come about through democracy and free trade, favour a hierarchical approach. This approach is also normative inasmuch as it focuses not only on what is, but also on what ought to be (Dunne 1997:152).

Liberal institutionalism, responding to the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World War II, shifted the focus to other international institutions, most notably the United Nations (UN), and transnational co-operation to maintain peace and security. Integration theories, which presume the gradual expansion of transnational co-operation, were formulated as the faith in states' ability to maintain peace diminished. These theories underlie regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), and other international organisations. Liberal institutionalists also emphasise pluralism and the importance of other actors such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (among which transnational corporations (TNCs)), individuals and interest groups. Accompanying these new actors on the international scene are novel patterns of interaction that no longer reflect a billiard ball (statecentric) international system, but a cobweb (multicentric) system (Wæver 1996:152).

From the various strands of liberalism a number of approaches to peace can be deduced. As will be indicated some of the approaches lean toward a particular strand of liberalism, while others draw from all the strands discussed above. An approach that typically crosses the borders of strands of liberalism is the peaceful settlement of disputes. This approach assumes that though war is a tool to settle disputes, it is an inappropriate one that does not suit the moral quality of humans but of animals. Therefore institutions should be developed to make available a variety of other means of resolving conflict peaceably and parties to a dispute should be persuaded, if not forced, to use these substitutes for violent means of dispute resolution. The UN Charter lists these means in Article 33(1) as "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements". The UN has gone to great lengths to institutionalise these means through the pacifying efforts of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. The UN is, however, often discredited as a forum for resolving disputes for two reasons. Firstly, the five permanent members of the Security Council have been deeply entrenched in Cold War antagonism, which became their focus instead of conciliation. Secondly, the

members of the General Assembly often use this body as an amplifier for their disputes and a way to register their political victories rather than seeking conciliation (Claude 1956:245, 246).

Judicial means of pacifying relations between states are based on international law, which is codified in numerous treaties and in international and domestic judicial decisions. Although international law is generally observed, it does not provide a foolproof guarantee against war (Morgenthau 1973:272). Claude (1954:248) concludes that “the experience of the great international organizations of this century does not reveal the incapacity of collective agencies for the settlement of disputes, but rather the inadequacy of the settlement of disputes as a means to world peace.” Some disputes, being symptomatic of the irrationalities of power politics, are beyond settling through peaceful means.

In the absence of a complete commitment by all states to pacific settlement devices, liberals propose an alternative approach, namely collective security. In essence collective security presupposes a collective commitment from all members to defend any one member if attacked, no matter which state the aggressor may be (Doyle 1997:168). War will thus be prevented because would-be aggressors will be deterred from aggression by the assured reprisal of not only the victim and states traditionally hostile to them, but by all members of the international system, even allies (Lovell 1974:16). It is important not to confuse this approach with military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), where two or more states engage in joint military action in the case of a crisis. Collective security is also not an enforcement mechanism for the whole body of international law. It is a last resort when peaceful settlement fails or when a warning against violence from the international community is ignored and force is used in an arbitrary and aggressive manner. Collective security is similar to the balance of terror inasmuch as it is built upon deterrence. However, it differs from the balance of terror to the extent that it requires a positive commitment to the value of world peace by the majority of (if not all) states. Breaches of peace should be seen as affecting not only the victims, but the whole system. It also requires on the one hand power diffusion, which means that ideally no single state can grow so strong that the system cannot deter it from aggressive behaviour successfully. On the other hand, collective security requires organisational comprehensiveness, which means that all

states should be regarded as potential victims and aggressors and be assured of protection or collective reprisal (Claude 1954:255-265).

The theory of collective security has been compromised by the failure of the League of Nations. Its failure can mainly be attributed to three factors, namely a power distribution that favoured the victors of World War I, the US choosing not to be included in the system and states being unwilling to forego their own national interests on the grounds of principle. To this can be added the difficulty of identifying the ‘aggressor’ in a conflict, a difficulty surfacing during the Vietnam War (Lovell 1974:17). The UN also had to contend with Cold War fault lines, which paralysed collective security in the Security Council. It was hoped that the end of the Cold War would revive Wilsonian ideas, and for a brief moment the Gulf War was seen as precisely that. Closer analysis indicates, however, that the Gulf War was to a great extent an American effort (Dunne 1997:153). Furthermore, if peacekeeping – which is rooted in the philosophy of collective security – serves as a barometer of the UN’s ability to provide collective security, it can be said that collective security is in deep crisis.⁵

Unlike the head-on approaches to peace that have been discussed above, liberalism also grounds what Lovell (1974:18,19) refers to as a functional approach to peace. This approach involves the expansion of international linkages established for the reasons of mutual self-interest. Functional co-operation in spheres such as science, and telecommunication will eventually achieve a world community where the level of integration is so high that war is unthinkable. The EU, although regionally based, is an example of a manifestation of this approach. The conditions for inclusion in the EU are, however, indicative of the criticism of the functional approach, namely that economic disparities between states inhibit integration between states and instead promote cultural and economic domination. The role of TNCs in world politics is also considered more of a destabilising factor than a source of peace (an aspect that will subsequently be discussed). Lastly, the economic integration, which characterised Anglo-German relations before World War I, did not prevent these states from making war (Dunne 1997:151).

⁵ Since the end of the Cold War collective measures, including humanitarian intervention, have been taken in numerous cases. The success of these measures is questionable, most notably in cases such as Somalia and Rwanda. What has become of greater concern for collective security proponents, is the “notorious selectiveness” of the Security Council, which seems to suggest that Western powers, especially the US, is using the UN umbrella for its own interests (Malanczuk 1997:427).

Related to the idea of establishing a world community, is the notion of a pacific union of democratic states. This approach, traditionally underpinned by liberal internationalism, is based on the idea and observation that democratic countries do not go to war with one another because their politically similar institutions and norms are reciprocally perceived to favour peaceful resolution of disputes. It is therefore argued that if more states convert to democracy, more states will observe peaceful relations among themselves, thus expanding the pacific union. Although democracies keep the peace among themselves, they are just as war-prone as non-democracies when confronted with relations outside the pacific union (Doyle 1986:264). Furthermore, in the quest for a pacific union, democracies have at times engaged in war to make the world safe for democracy. Although the democratic peace is an anarchical approach to international organisation, it also draws from idealism, especially the work of Woodrow Wilson, whose ideas can be interpreted to go beyond creating a world community to creating a world government (Dunne 1997:152).

The idea of establishing a world government is based on similar arguments as establishing a world community, but propagates the creation of concrete political institutions on the international level. It is not left to functional co-operation to create a world community, but the formation of institutions that can override the sovereignty of states is necessary. A world government can take many forms, whether an empire, such as the Roman Empire or in the form of the UN Security Council. The cost of maintaining cultural diversities, individual rights and achieving the social change necessary to achieve world government seems to outweigh the plausibility of such an approach at least for the present (Lovell 1974:20, 21).

More recent idealist thought contends that democratisation of state structures should be accompanied by democratisation of international institutions. A 'cosmopolitan model democracy' should be constructed by creating regional parliaments (according to the EU model), entrenching human rights conventions in national parliaments and monitoring them through a new International Court of Justice and reforming the UN into or replacing it by a truly democratic and accountable global parliament. Also associated with idealism is the emancipatory role of global civil society that will become much greater in democratising institutions on the national and international levels (Dunne 1997:158).

The initial optimism for liberal approaches to peace that accompanied the end of the Cold War has been met by discrediting phenomena. Firstly, post-Cold War conflicts such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, Chechnya and the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, and the inability to resolve these conflicts in a timely manner, has led to a reassertion of realist claims. Secondly, liberalism is often interpreted as favouring modernisation in the Western sense. Western culture is thus universalised with no heed paid to ethnic, linguistic and religious differences between nations (Dunne 1997:162). Thirdly, the spread of free trade and liberal economic principles has not led to equality between nations. It seems as if the gap between the developed and developing worlds is growing and the social ills of poverty and environmental degradation are fertile ground for local conflicts with the potential of spilling across borders (Tehrani 1999b:8). It is especially the latter point that informs the third world view or paradigm of the interparadigm debate in International Relations, namely that of socialism discussed here under radical approaches to peace.

The third paradigm of the interparadigm debate is often labelled globalism to refer to the global capitalist world economy. Other designations such as structuralism, to indicate the structured super- and subordination of the world order, and Marxism or socialism are also widely used. Wæver (1996:154), however, labels it radicalism and in doing so leaves room for non-Marxist perspectives and residual writings of the 1970s and 1980s, for example post-modernism, feminism and critical theory. These theories do not resort under realism, liberalism or Marxism but take the same positions *vis-à-vis* realism and liberalism as Marxism does.

Marxist socialist approaches to war and peace are based on a perspective of world politics as interclass solidarities and interclass war both within and between countries. Although socialists agree with liberals that domestic interests determine the political character of states, in turn influencing the foreign policy of states (inside-out approach), they disagree that this is a result of any consensus on domestic political regime. Instead, they emphasise that a 'war' between classes within and across national boundaries exists. The evolution of socialism, inasmuch as it is a world revolution, demands that workers around the world unite in the struggle that will bring about socialism. Alternatively, when the bourgeoisie of

one country makes war against another, the proletariat should resist it in solidarity with the workers of the other country who can only suffer under a bourgeois war (Doyle 1997:334).

Marx held that countries with similar modes of production will maintain fraternal relations. The development of the bourgeoisie, free trade, uniformity of conditions of life and so forth may lead capitalist societies to peaceable relations among themselves, a familiar liberal internationalist assertion. War would prove too costly an enterprise for the bourgeoisie and the military may even revolt against a bourgeois war over competition for profits. This is, however, a tentative peace that cannot be guaranteed. The only true peace is the peace that will come to exist among socialists when the proletariat has been liberated in all countries. For Marx the source of war is thus class exploitation and his approach to peace is democratic revolution (Doyle 1997:336):

For Lenin, on the other hand, peace cannot come about without war. Because leading elements of the working class are bribed by the financial oligarchy, which dominates industry and the state in the final monopoly stage of the evolution of capitalism, Marx's democratic revolution is precluded. Furthermore, the uneven development between capitalist societies will drive them to war, in turn weakening the imperialist state to the extent that the vanguard of communists can lead the revolution and establish peaceful relations with other revolutionary states (Doyle 1997:366, 367). In other words, Lenin sees monopoly competition and uneven development between states as the sources of war. His strategy for peace entails both war and revolution.

Immanuel Wallerstein's (1974) world system theory finds its roots in Marxist thought. According to Wallerstein the world capitalist order incorporates three layers of states, namely core (industrialised, developed, rich) states, periphery (underdeveloped, poor) states and semi-periphery (intermediate) states. World system theory is based on the premise that the rich and the powerful prosper at the expense of the poor and the destitute. War and other international political events cannot be explained without reference to global capitalism. Core states have far greater military capability than periphery states and use this to maintain the structure of the world system, in other words, to make the world safe for capitalism. The most obvious example in this respect is the US intervention in Guatemala in 1954 to

oust the democratically elected government in favour of a military dictatorship so as to maintain US commercial interests (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:138).

The structure of the world capitalist system is maintained through the use of hegemonic leadership and military force, semi-peripheral states, the *comprador* class within peripheral states and geoculture. The stability of this structure is, however, still undermined by the following factors. Economically, the problem of recurrent depression that is associated with capitalism can no longer be overcome by capitalist expansion, because geographically the world economy has already expanded globally. Commodification and urbanisation, the two ways of intensifying capitalism, have also seen almost global completion. Thus, it is becoming more difficult to avert depression. A second economic source of instability is related to the environment and the devastating effect that centuries of capitalist accumulation has had on it. Environmental disasters and resource wars will become more wide-spread and the market does not provide an incentive to deal with this problem pro-actively. Politically, inequalities and environmental degradation due to world capitalism have fuelled opposition toward the world system. Opposition groups are termed anti-systemic movements. In the past it has been possible to co-opt these groups and incorporate them into the system through social welfare programmes, giving them enough of a stake to be dependent on the continuation of the world system. It is, however, becoming increasingly difficult for states to co-opt these groups, not only because it will undermine the process of capital accumulation, but also because the nature of these groups is changing. They realise that controlling state power is no longer sufficient to oppose the system and therefore do not organise as disciplined political parties within the political system, but as loosely organised, decentralised coalitions (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:140-141). These groups differ in their approach – some are violent and called international terrorist groups, others are less or non-violent such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in Seattle (1999) and International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank protesters in Washington (2000).

The world system is also facing instability as a result of the decline of liberalism, in Wallerstein's view the only ideology that provides for the continuous reinforcement of the state system. This is because liberalism sees the state as the only mechanism of creating a better society and does not appeal to any notion of society beyond the state system. Anti-systemic groups are cutting themselves loose from this notion. Scientism, the second aspect

of geoculture that Wallerstein emphasises as a stabilising force of the world system, is also being questioned. The manipulation of the material world that led to the discovery of universal laws impacted on production processes and became a re-enforcement for capital accumulation. The idea of absolute truths is challenged, most notably by natural scientists, and this contributes to the crisis of the world system (Hobden & Wyn Jones 1997:139, 142). Although Wallerstein's world system theory does not convert into specific approaches to world peace, it does provide an alternative world view that can be used to evaluate other approaches to peace. It highlights important factors, such as inequality, poverty, and the sometimes, ruthless nature of capitalist accumulation. Although often negated by approaches to peace, these factors intensify wars and endanger peace processes.

The challenge that is posed to scientism introduces a fourth debate in International Relations theory, namely that of rationalist versus reflectivist theories. This debate was initiated around 1980 when writers such as Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981), Cox (1981) and Ashley (1984) relaunched an attempt to achieve a more 'scientific' realism, which became known as neo-realism. The neo-realist shift entailed doing away with ethico-philosophical positions and imprecise statements on the nature of life and politics in general. It involved self-limitation to exact statements that can be tested through developing theory and engaging in empirical study. A similar process of minimising general interpretations to precise questions followed in liberalism. This resulted in the transformation of liberalism into neo-liberal institutionalism, which concentrated on answering the question 'how institutions affect incentives facing states'. Reducing liberalism to this question meant moving closer to neo-realism inasmuch as it accepted the state system and international anarchy as basic premises of international relations. The fact that both neo-realism and neo-liberalism now searched for more rational, anti-metaphysical approaches to research made them more compatible and less incommensurable. This process is commonly referred to as the neo-neo synthesis and it involves an opening of the debate between realism and liberalism to the extent that they can be compared and even tested against one another (Wæver 1996:162-164).

Theories that reject the positivism associated with the neo-neo synthesis are labelled reflectivist theories. These theories are constitutive as opposed to explanatory theories, because they do not see the world as external to theories. Reality is constructed through the

theories and language that are chosen to interpret world politics. Reflectivist theories are also anti-foundational, because they are premised on the idea that truth claims cannot be judged against any neutral or objective procedure. This epistemological position acknowledges that all knowledge has a measure of subjectivity and relativity to it. Theories resorting in this cadre are post-modernism, feminist theory, normative theory, critical theory and historical sociology (Smith 1997:167-168). Instead of outlining each of these theories some of the central themes of reflectivist theories and their value in providing an alternative view on war and peace, will be highlighted.

Reflectivist theories take a strong stance against the ‘certainty’ of rationalist theories and the belief that universal laws govern politics. They argue that international relations, especially power politics and institutions, such as states, that make up international relations are affected by *ideas*. In other words, states and anarchy are not given realities in world politics, but they are socially constructed. According to critical theory and historical sociology they are constructed through interpretations that are time and space bound and should not be elevated to universal truths. This critique is shared by post-modernists, illustrated in their challenge to the realist narrative of Thucydides’s Melian Dialogue. Thucydides is transformed into a caricatured precursor of conservative scientism by realists who present him as a scholar trying to invoke a universalised, a-historical truth about interstate conduct, instead of a classical scholar searching for “contextually appropriate practical-normative standards of just conduct and institutional worth” (Alker in George 1994:193).

Post-modernism sees ideas and discourse as the ‘software’ that informs actions. History is in this sense a series of interpretations imposed upon interpretations of the world. Realism for example, with its emphasis on power politics and the discourse about security dilemmas, encourages behaviour that focuses on security competition. This is clearly evident in the nuclear arms race where a discourse was started that involved “thinking about the unthinkable”,⁶ that is thermo-nuclear war. The perceptions based on the interpretation of what constituted security, as well as enemies and the threats they posed induced nuclear

⁶ *Thinking about the unthinkable* was the title of a book by Herman Kahn (1960, 1962) who also authored *On thermonuclear war*. Kahn’s analysis and his insistence on thinking through nuclear warfare is widely criticised as bordering on an intellectual game.

weapons stockpiling that in retrospect seems irrational. Replacing a discourse of power politics with a discourse of peace and harmony will be as good as a change of 'software'. The new discourse involves emphasising normative values and issues, such as human security that is not accounted for in military statistics and have been ignored by traditional approaches to peace (Baylis 1997:205, 206).

Standpoint feminist theory also emphasises a more contextual and multi-dynamic approach of national and international security. Moral command cannot be separated from political action. By focusing on order realism favours power and control as morally superior to justice and the satisfaction of basic needs, a typically masculine interpretation of power. This does not mean that power is an unimportant element of world politics, but the definition of power as domination needs to be replaced by a more dynamic interpretation of the concept, for example the possibility of collective empowerment. Although states do not ascribe to a universal morality, common moral elements should be found to de-escalate conflict and build an international community (Tickner 1988:430-431).

Rationalist and reflectivist theories have the same measure of incommensurability that characterised the interparadigm debate inasmuch as their versions of the key issues of world politics differ. Reflectivists reject not only the identities that rationalists accept as given, but also the very fact that they accept them as given. The epistemological and methodological gap between the two camps makes discourse between them difficult. It is argued that social constructivism can bridge the gap between rationalist and reflectivist theories. Social constructivists accept the centrality of states and anarchy in international relations on the premise that they are not a given, but constructed and can be made different. They believe that it is the interaction between states that causes states' identities and their behaviour. This self-perpetuating process of intersubjectivity is what leads to the self-help system that seems to be dominating the international system (Smith 1997:183-185). Whether this is a sufficiently intermediate position to allow a bridge between rationalist and reflectivist theories, is debatable, but it does underline an alternative approach to peace.

This approach agrees with reflectivist theories that greater international security can be achieved by changing the way scholars and policy makers think of international relations. The structure of self-help that realism takes as a given in world politics is nothing more than

a system of social relationships based on worst-case assumptions about the actors in the international system. However, the logic of reciprocity also provides a positive outcome. Mutual reassurance between states, such as the perception of the rule of law, co-operation and restraint creates a different set of understandings, expectations and knowledge about other actors, which can induce peaceful social change (Baylis 1997:204, 205). The end of the Cold War was induced by the ideas that Gorbachev introduced in the late 1980s and it stunned scholars to see how easily a change in shared knowledge could bring about the dissolution of a fifty year old institution.

Hence, the rationalist versus reflectivist debate differs from the second great debate in International Relations, namely the behavioralist versus traditionalist debate, in the sense that it is not so much a methodological debate as it is a philosophical debate. It questions the basic assumptions about objectivity, subjectivity, object/subject distinctions, the use of dichotomies, the domination of Western domination over other ways of thought, in short it involves “how one perceives basic articles in the world we live in: language, society, praxis, politics, individuals and such like” (Wæver 1996:157). As such, reflectivists hold that any approach to peace has to start with a change in these basic perceptions.

3. REPOSITIONING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE APPROACH

The positivist streamlining of liberalism that occurred under the auspices of the ‘neo’ movement in International Relations led to the democratic peace approach virtually dominating neo-liberal institutionalism (Dunne 1997:155). The approach lends itself to empirical testing and theory-guiding research. The occurrence of war between democratic dyads can be counted and compared with the number of times that non-democratic dyads, and democratic and non-democratic (mixed) dyads have made war. From this can be inferred whether a pacific union among democracies really exists and if so hypotheses about the reasons why this is the case can be made. These hypotheses can be tested through quantitative methods, such as correlation techniques and qualitative methods, such as case studies. Although the neo-liberal interpretation of the democratic peace approach provides valuable insights for understanding the democratic peace as a phenomenon it is too restrictive for the purposes of this study. This is the case for two reasons, namely:

Theoretical reductionism: The theoretical reductionism that accompanies neo-liberal internationalism undermines the philosophical premises that underlie democratic peace theory. It does not allow for the general Kantian interpretations of human nature as essentially good or universal cosmopolitan morality or normative statements that prescribe a code of conduct for states to establish peace among themselves. It also prohibits the idealism associated with the Wilsonian ideas of democratic peace. It confines the democratic peace to a second image approach to peace. In other words, the emphasis that is placed on the internal character of states assumes an international system where sovereign states are the main actors. It is doubtful whether such an interpretation of the democratic peace will offer the heuristic reach necessary to explain the implications of the globalisation of democracy in the information era.

Theoretical baggage: Liberal internationalism's emphasis on liberal economic values, such as privatisation and free trade, is theoretical baggage that clouds the usefulness of the democratic peace approach in the information era. Liberal internationalism is often interpreted as neo-imperialism, where liberalisation means nothing but the relentless expansion of capitalism. Illustrative of this interpretation of liberal internationalism in the information era is a critique by Venturelli (1998) against the contradictions between liberal internationalism and the democratisation of nation states in the information society. She writes (1998:81): "Liberalisation of the information infrastructure is one of the most important forces for advancing the political aims of liberal internationalism which predominantly favours the reconstitution of the world system on the basis of large-scale proprietary interests." The neo-neo synthesis is also part of this baggage as identified by Venturelli (1998:83): "The realist approach to foreign policy is the notion that among societies and states power is the predominant currency and self-interest the predominant motivation. In the late twentieth century it has fully merged with liberal internationalism because of the essential consistency with liberalism's postulates of competitive private self-interest and the preservation of existing conditions of social power as the basis for the organisation of society." Universal imperialism manifests itself in liberal international thought, which holds proprietary self-interest as a progressive force that should be exercised through a foreign policy rooted in realist bilateral and multilateral trade and economic arrangements.

Neo-liberalism's emphasis on science and truth, especially in terms of its view of IT, provides a second source of theoretical baggage. It is argued that the universal spread of IT devices will, by virtue of their technological components, transfer decision-making power to individuals. Technological innovation is value-free and thus applicable in all societies irrespective of political constitutions of power, proprietary conditions, culture, religion, or social development. This argument is technologically deterministic and is widely criticised by scholars as overly simplistic and unrealistic (Winner 1997:367).

The democratic peace, if it is to be taken as a viable approach to world peace in the information era, cannot be burdened with theoretical connotations of imperialism and technological determinism. A more appropriate theoretical positioning of the democratic peace approach is not only to acknowledge the philosophical origins of the approach as interparadigm liberal internationalism does, but to go beyond that. The new (and in many ways uncertain) circumstances brought about by the information era, probes a more radical or reflectivist theoretical interpretation of the democratic peace. Such an interpretation would recognise IT as more than just a way to develop "value-free" instruments that will have a liberalising effect regardless of the societal context in which it is deployed. To this extent the various radical theories have much to offer. Socialist theory, for example, may be employed to acknowledge the impact of IT on the global expansion of capitalism and the adverse effects this may have on social democracy and in turn, the pacific union. Social constructivism and its emphasis on shared knowledge, expectations and understandings can be called upon to explain why democracies keep the peace with each other. An historical sociological interpretation may be employed to describe the impact of IT in the history of humankind to the extent that a new era has come about and the implications this may have for the democratic peace. Feminist theory, on the other hand, provides a powerful analogy to evaluate the democratic peace in the information era. The same logic behind feminism's problematising of accepted constructs in international relations to expose its often, masculine foundations can be used to problematise the assumptions associated with democracy and democratic peace in the light of the information era.

A neo-liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace in the information era means introducing IT as an independent variable that influences democracy (the intermediate variable) and in turn world peace (the dependent variable). But the impact of

IT on world politics and daily lives requires a broader approach, namely viewing IT as constitutive of reality. IT transforms the reality of world politics and this process is tainted with ethical and moral considerations. As yet the information era has not spent itself and therefore the world that it makes possible holds contradictory potentials. In this respect the study will draw from normative theory, which allows for the study of both what is and what ought to be and facts and values in a descriptive and prescriptive way. The democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era will not only be studied objectively, but it will subjectively be argued that IT should be employed to enhance democracy and pursue world peace and that this approach is preferred to realist approaches to peace.

4. CONCLUSION

The evolution of International Relations theory is currently in its fourth phase if the discourse of 'great debates' as a way of organising International Relations theories is adhered to. The four debates have respectively focused on politics (idealism versus realism), methodology (behavioralism versus traditionalism), ontology (the interparadigm debate) and philosophy (rationalism versus reflectivism). Categorising theories in this way facilitates the construction of a framework of alternative approaches and contributions to thinking about world peace. For example, the interparadigm debate resulted in a triangular model of International Relations theory with the three corners of the triangle respectively labelled realism, liberalism and radicalism. The approaches to peace most commonly associated with realism are imperialism (realist fundamentalism), balance of power (realist structuralism) and isolation, defence and revolution (realist constitutionalism) (Doyle 1997:198). The approaches to peace most commonly associated with liberalism are peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security, functional interdependence, democratic peace, and world government. The approaches most commonly associated with radicalism, in particular socialism are revolution (Marxism) and imperialist war in association with democratic revolution (Leninism) that will lead to a socialist peace. Radicalism also provides theories such as the world system perspective that illuminates structural political-economic sources of war.

The positivist streamlining of realism and liberalism led to theoretical self-limitation, which filtered to the approaches to peace. Constructs such as statesmanship (in the case of realism) and ethics (in the case of liberalism) were replaced by theory-guiding and theory-testing constructs at the neo-neo interface such as regimes, hegemonic stability, alliance theory, co-operation under anarchy and broadened security analysis. Reflectivist theories have entered into the vacuum left by the neo-neo synthesis by emphasising the importance of values, ethics and subjectivity in International Relations. Reflectivist contributions to thinking about peace entail a conscious deconstruction of the discourse and history of institutions to understand the origin and possible solutions to war and maintenance of peace.

Positioning approaches to peace in such a theoretical framework is valuable inasmuch as it provides a cognitive map for comparing different approaches to peace with one another and in doing so identifies the theoretical position of the democratic peace as an approach to peace, the focus of this study. It may, however, also be limiting if it assumes that there are absolute boundaries between theoretical perspectives and their respective variants and that approaches to peace cannot be influenced by more than one theoretical perspective. This criticism is especially prevalent in the case of the democratic peace, traditionally positioned in the realm of liberal internationalism. Although the spread of democracy and free trade that grounds the liberal internationalist approach underlie democratic peace theory, the latter is also informed by Wilsonian ideas, often classified as idealism. Moreover, in the fourth debate the democratic peace approach would seem within the realm of rationalist theories and yet, in the information era reflectivist theories provide valuable ways of interpreting the democratic peace.

In the light of the research problem of this study, namely to evaluate the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era, the liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace will be used to introduce the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. Reflectivist theories will, however, be employed to enrich interpretations of the democratic peace as it applies to the temporal delineation, namely the information era.

CHAPTER 3

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

1. INTRODUCTION

The idea that a world with more democracies will be a more peaceful world is derived from democratic peace theory. According to democratic peace theory democracies will not go to war with one another because democratic forms of regimes have certain characteristics pacifying relations between them. This idea was proposed in 1795 by Immanuel Kant and it was reiterated by Woodrow Wilson during the period of World War I. It is, however, only recently that the theory resurfaced in literature, but this time not as a prescription for perpetual world peace, the sense in which Kant and Wilson intended it, but as an explanation for an empirical fact. In the early 1970s Dean Babst (1972:55) published an article in which he claims “no wars have been fought between nations with elective governments.” Michael Doyle (1983a; 1983b) explained this by drawing on the Kantian prediction that republican states (the equivalent of today’s liberal democratic states) do not make war with one another because their democratic institutions and democratic norms prevent them from doing so. The gradual acceptance of democratic norms by the international community since the end of the Cold War resulted in an abundance of research into “the democratic peace”, as Bruce Russett (1993) has come to call the idea and phenomenon of peace between democracies.

This chapter aims to introduce the democratic peace approach as it has been proposed in theory and has manifested itself in practice. To achieve this aim it will firstly trace the intellectual and philosophical precursors of the idea of a separate peace between democracies with specific reference to Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson. Secondly, it will examine the relationship between democracy and peace at three levels of analysis, namely the dyadic level, the monadic (nation) level and the system level.⁷ At the dyadic level the existence of a democratic peace is investigated by asking the question: do democracies usually keep the peace among themselves? At the monadic or nation level, the reasons why the democratic peace exists are explored by asking the question: are

⁷ Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) employ the three levels of analysis to study the democratic peace empirically.

democracies inherently more peaceful forms of government? At the system level the implications of the democratic peace for world peace are examined by asking the question: is an international system with a higher proportion of democratic states more peaceful? By answering these questions the plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace is explored.

2. THE INTELLECTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Although the idea that democracies and war are incompatible can be traced to various scholars, the work of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson offers the best guidance to an understanding of the democratic peace thesis in the sense it is used today.

In an article *Perpetual Peace: A philosophical sketch* (1795) Kant acknowledges that the international state of nature is one of war and that a state of peace needs to be consciously established. In this article, consisting of two main sections, he proposes how such a state of peace can be brought about. In the first section he sets out the preliminary articles for perpetual peace, namely (Kant 1996: 368-370):

- no conclusion of peace shall be considered valid if it was made with secret reservations for future war;
- no independently existing state, whether it be large or small, may be acquired by another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase or gift;
- standing armies should gradually be abolished;
- no national debt shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the state;
- no state shall forcibly interfere in the constitution and government of another; and
- no state at war with another shall permit such acts of hostility as would make mutual confidence impossible during a future time of peace.

In content, the preliminary articles are reminiscent of modern international norms such as open diplomacy, non-aggression, self-determination, non-intervention, the delineation of lawful means of making war and disarmament (Brown 1992:35). As such, these articles

are like a code of conduct, specifying how actors in the international arena should act in the absence of perpetual peace and if adhered to, this code can guide the international system in the direction of perpetual peace.

In the second section of *Perpetual Peace*, Kant turns his focus to determining the nature of agents (states) that will be law-abiding enough to comply with the preliminary articles. This section contains the three definitive articles for perpetual peace, namely that the civil constitution of every state shall be republican, the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states and cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality (Kant 1996:371-373).

A republic, as implied by the first definitive article, is a state founded on the rule of law, guaranteed by a constitution and the separation of legislative and executive power. It is further based upon the consent of the governed and represents their will. For this reason republican states can be treated as rational agents, capable of consistent and responsible action and deserving of respect. A republican nature is also desirable for achieving perpetual peace because states with such a nature are less inclined to go to war than despotic states. In this regard Kant (1996:370) states: “Under a constitution where the subject is not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in the world to go to war. For the head of state is not a fellow citizen, but the owner of the state, and war will not force him to make the slightest sacrifice so far as his banquets, hunts, pleasure palaces and court festivals are concerned.” Thus, republics are conducive to peace because their citizens, the ones carrying the costs of war, need to consent to war, which Kant believes they will not do without great hesitation.

The second definitive article proposes that states leave the international Hobbesian state of nature and war and voluntarily join a federation of free states. This is not a world-state. In fact, Kant emphasises that the member-states of the federation retain their sovereignty. Yet, sovereignty here does not imply sovereignty to make war with other states, since it must be compatible with “the establishment of a pacific federation based on the treaty to abolish war” (Brown 1992:37). The laws governing the states, which enter into the federation will be acknowledged and honoured voluntarily by the states. Among these laws, according to the third definitive article, will be “those guaranteeing the entitlements of individuals as

world citizens – the entitlement not to be treated as enemies, not to be enslaved or exploited by foreign governments” (Thompson 1992:48). It should, however, be clear that this is not a matter of philanthropy, but a right of strangers, as long as they are peaceful, not to be treated with hostility on foreign soil.

According to Brown (1992:35, 36) Kant clarifies the difference between the preliminary and definitive articles in a footnote to this section. Whereas the preliminary articles are a code of conduct for states still in the state of nature, the definitive articles set the stage for the formal institution of peace, which is more than just the absence of war. Instituting peace requires that the state of nature, where citizens of different states live in mutual hostility, will be overcome. This will be achieved by adhering to a constitution albeit a constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation, the international right of states in their relationship with one another or cosmopolitan right. In the latter case individuals may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind because individuals and states coexist in an external relationship of mutual influence.

In this footnote Kant reconciles the two states of nature, the national state of nature, composed of people and the international state of nature, composed of states. In this context Brown (1992:36) writes that “the requirement to establish a legal order, a constitution, applies to both people and states; people are enjoined to create a civil constitution, states a lawful international order and people and states together a system of cosmopolitan *Recht*.”⁸ This is then how Kant proposes to solve the inherent conflict between the person’s role as man and citizen and install perpetual peace.

Kant is not a revolutionary for at least two reasons. Firstly, he does not promote the replacement of the state system with a world republic, but wants to transform it in terms of international *Recht*. Secondly, this transformation is not to take place overnight, but is a gradual process (Brown 1992:39). He outlines this process in the first supplement to *Perpetual Peace*, stating that “Perpetual Peace is guaranteed by no less an authority than the great artist nature herself”. This supplement is better understood if read together with another of Kant’s work, *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose*. Kant

⁸ The concept *Recht* is a German term that can be interpreted to mean something similar to justice, legality and right.

regards the intentions of individuals as not reliably good. Thus, left to the individuals' own devices, the establishment of perpetual peace is not guaranteed. But, as a part of the natural order, humans learn from their historical experience. At first they formed societies for protection, but soon realised that it could be a source of benefit and eventually societies became moral wholes. In the course of time, states will also become republics as their experience will teach them that this is the best form of government to optimise their benefits and moral well-being. In promoting morality, individuals and states are progressing towards perpetual peace, "they now appreciate the incompatibility between morality and war, they are civilised enough to regard war as unacceptable, and moreover they are in the habit of obeying law" (Thompson 1992:52). Through the gradual development and exercise of being law-abiding, the pacific federation of free states will be able to establish and maintain perpetual peace.

Woodrow Wilson's idea of a "partnership of democratic nations" to create "a steadfast concert for peace" rests largely on the same premises as those of the Kantian pacific federation of republican states, namely that states should be democratic, that the maintenance of peace rests on a partnership between all democracies and that cosmopolitan right shall be observed. In his address to the US Congress asking for Declaration of War against Germany in 1917, he emphasises that the German people are not to blame for the war but their autocratic government that acts in its own selfish interest, using the German people as pawns and tools. Wars and other acts of aggression towards neighbouring countries are "happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs" (Wilson 1996:37). Thus, peace originates in states where people are free to govern themselves, that is in democracies. Democratic nations are then to form a league that will maintain the principles of peace and justice and do this as champions of the right of mankind. The cosmopolitan character of Wilson's reasoning is even more distinct in his Fourteen Points where he states: "All the peoples of the world are in effect partners in this interest [assuring justice and fair dealings against force and selfish aggression], and for our own part we see very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to us" (1996:39). The Fourteen Points form a programme for peace based on, among others, the following principles:

- open diplomacy;
- arms reduction to the lowest point that can still guarantee domestic safety;
- freedom of navigation in war and peace outside territorial waters;
- free and fair trade among nations consenting to peace;
- national sovereignty, autonomy, independence and self-determination especially with regard to the colonial and occupied territories of the time; and
- the formation of a general association of nations under specific covenants affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity for small and large states alike.

Similar to Kant's preliminary articles, Wilson's Fourteen Points reflect a code of conduct for nations and if adhered to world peace will be the reward. But, unlike Kant, Wilson does not leave the creation and expansion of the pacific federation and adherence to the code of conduct up to nature, but argues that the world should consciously be made safe for democracy even if it takes war against autocratic governments. These wars will not only be fought in protection of existing democracies and the peace among them, but also for "the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its people, the German people included" (Wilson 1996:38). This aggressive pursuit of a democratic peace as opposed to Kant's gradual approach has been dominating US foreign policy since World War I and therefore it is often argued that Wilson has had a greater impact on contemporary work on the democratic peace than Kant (Ray 1997:50).

In both Kant and Wilson's blueprints for world peace, three propositions can be delineated, namely firstly that democracies will foster peaceful relations among themselves; secondly that the separate peace which exists between democracies is a result of democratic norms and structures; and thirdly that an international system with a larger proportion of democracies will be more peaceful. These three propositions are also the principal propositions associated with the democratic peace thesis as it is used today. In the next section the first of these propositions is tested against empirical evidence.

3. PEACE BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES

The absence of war between democracies has since the early-1980s been regarded by some as “one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalisations that can be made about international relations” (Levy quoted in Brown, Lynn-Jones & Miller 1993:ix). Although there is considerable empirical evidence supporting the propositions that democracies do not go to war with one another, there has been growing criticism against the way in which this evidence is accumulated and the conclusions that are based on it. To establish whether peace between democracies is really typical in international relations it is not only important to explore the empirical evidence democratic peace proponents claim supports Kant and Wilson’s predictions, but also to evaluate the criticism levelled against this claim.

Empirical research designs usually start by identifying the proposition(s) that need(s) to be proven or disproven, and continue, by identifying the dependent and independent variables of the proposition(s) and then operationalising the variables in measurable terms. Two propositions are generally associated with the relationship between democracy and peace (or the absence of war), namely the democratic pacifism proposition and the democratic peace proposition.

The democratic pacifism proposition states that democracies are generally less war-prone than other regimes. This proposition is monadic in nature inasmuch as there need not be two democracies to make the proposition true; democracies are not only more peaceful in relation to other democracies, but in general. The democratic peace proposition, on the other hand, states that democracies keep the peace among themselves or alternatively, democracies do not go to war with one another. It clearly implies the dyadic nature of the democratic peace, namely that it takes two democracies to make peace.

In both these propositions the dependant variable is war and the independent variable is democracy and these two variables can be defined and operationalised as follow:

War: War is defined as “institutionally organized lethal violence” (Russett 1993:12) between sovereign states recognised as such by other states in the international community.

Intrastate wars (civil wars) are thus not included in this definition. The definition further excludes the colonial wars against “primitive” people in the nineteenth century and the liberation wars fought to liberate those people in the twentieth century, because these civilisations were not regarded as independent states.

To distinguish wars from violent events resulting from, for example, accidents, unauthorised actions by local commanders leading to border incidents or authorised military action undertaken as a bargaining move and not necessarily intended to develop into full-scale violent conflict, a threshold of 1 000 annual battle fatalities is used.

This definition of war also excludes covert action or support of violent actors to overthrow another government. The secrecy and denial of the government that engages in covert actions indicate that an official, public war is not undertaken (Russett 1993:12,13 and Small & Singer 1976:52).

Democracy: Although democracy is a highly contentious term, there are certain criteria generally accepted as indicators of the presence of democracy, namely the existence of “*competition* for government positions, citizen *participation* in the selection of political leaders and a number of civil and political *liberties* – or human rights in the narrow sense” (Martinussen 1997:195). Described in broader terms, the most powerful collective decision-makers must be selected through fair, honest and periodic elections. In these elections candidates must be able to compete freely for votes and virtually all the adult population must be enfranchised. To allow contested elections and free participation also implies civil freedoms such as the freedom of speech and association (Huntington 1991:7).

A state may, however, be more or less democratic and therefore it is evident that a simple dichotomy between democracy and autocracy will not accommodate mixed systems or different “shades” of democracy. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:285) combine indices of democracy and autocracy from the Polity III data set. This gives them an index ranging from –10 to 10 and combines assessments of the competitiveness of political participation, regulation of political participation, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The cut-off for regarding a state as democratic is set at three.

The nineteenth century understanding of democracy can also not be measured against modern day criteria and therefore most theorists progressively adapt their criteria for regarding a state as democratic. Russett (1993:15), for example, admits countries before the late-nineteenth century with 10 percent of all adults eligible to vote as democratic, but raises this criteria to a substantially universal franchise for the middle- to the late-twentieth century.

A democracy may also be more or less stable. Therefore, one further qualification is usually stipulated to determine which states should be included in a quantitative study about democracies and peace, namely stability or longevity of democracy. Huntington (1991:9) states that a country can only really be regarded as being democratic if a time period has elapsed from the time democracy was introduced during which democratic processes and institutions could become consolidated. Doyle sets this time period at three years, but it could be argued that any period giving the new democracy's citizens and adversaries a chance to acknowledge that the country is governed by democratic principles, will suffice (Russett 1993:16).

The quantitative studies that have correlated democracies and the absence of war on the monadic level yield mixed results at best. The first of these studies, conducted by Small and Singer (1976), concluded that democracies are just as war prone as non-democracies. Doyle (1983a; 1983b), Chan (1984) support this conclusion. Rummel (1983), on the other hand, concluded that democracies committed less acts of "official violence". His conclusions are supported by Ray (1993) and Benoit (1996). Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:307), noting this controversy, state: "At the national level, the evidence is mixed. Our own empirical evidence confirms most previous studies in suggesting that ... democratic states are about as prone to participate in war as other states. Democracies have fewer battle fatalities, but it is not obvious what this implies for their peacefulness. The war participation of democracies is inflated by their tendency to ally in war. Finally, the question of war initiation is marred by problems of interpretation; the possibility that democracies are less aggressive cannot be ruled out." The democratic pacifism proposition can thus not be considered proven.

Contrary to the democratic pacifism proposition, empirical studies that have correlated democracy and the absence of war on the dyadic level conclude that democracies hardly ever go to war with one another. Some theorists, such as Weede (1992), found a strong relationship between the variables, democracy and peace, at this level, whilst others, such as Rummel (1983) and Russett (1993), found virtually no exception to the democratic peace proposition. Gleditsch and Hegre's study (1997) for the period 1816 to 1994, found that democracies were at war with one another for 62 581 out of 549 374 dyad years (see table 3.1). Democracies and non-democracies were at war for 219 563 dyad years and non-democracies were at war for 227 537 dyad years. This means that the relative frequency of war between democracies is about two-fifths of the relative frequency for war between non-democracies, and mixed dyads (democracies and non-democracies) go to war about twice as many times as democratic dyads.

Table 3.1: Democracy and dyadic relationships at war, 1816-1994 (percentage of dyad years at war)

Type of relationship	Two democracies	One democracy	No democracy	Missing regime data or regime transition	All dyad years	Number of dyad years	2	p
At war with each other	.05	.17	.12	.61	.17	916	54.9	1.2*10 ⁻¹²
Allied in war	.51	.18	.12	.74	.23	1 268	396.9	4.2*10 ⁻⁸⁷
Other	99.44	99.65	99.76	98.65	98.60	547 094		
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00			
Number of dyad years	62 581	219 563	227 537	39 693		594 374		

Note: Interstate wars from the Correlates of War project, updated to 1994. Democracy defined as 3 or higher on the difference between the democracy and autocracy indices in the correlated Polity III data. Each dyad is counted separately for each year. The number of dyads in the system increases from 253 in 1816 to 19 020 in 1994. The 2 tests at the end of the first two rows refer to the 2 x 3 tables that emerge when the other rows are merged and the missing or transition column eliminated. Two possible objections to our use of chi-square tests are the following: (1) the observed counts of war are not independent because wars continuing over several years are counted as several observations. We admit the validity of this objection and discuss it in a later section. Figures are later presented where this dependency has been reduced and even eliminated. (2) The number of observations has been inflated by dividing time into short spans (years) and thus securing significant results. This objection, however, is not valid as long as there is no dependency between the units counted as in war. The number of onsets of dyadic conflict or war would not change if we had chosen the dyad month as the unit of measurement. Further, because $2=ij[(\text{observed count}_{ij} - \text{expected count}_{ij})/\text{expected count}_{ij}]$ and the expected counts for nonwar are much higher than those for war, the nonwar cells hardly contribute at all to the statistics.

^a Means that the two countries in the dyad are at war and on the same side of the war.

^b Includes all dyads where neither country is at war or where only one country is at war (with someone else).

Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:287

Although it is clear that a strong and statistically significant relationship exists between democracy and peace on the dyadic level, it is not a perfect relationship. Several exceptions to the general pattern are encountered (see table 3.2). These are, however, not the only exceptions mentioned in the literature on the democratic peace (see Appendix A for a complete list of alleged exceptions to the rule that democracies never fight wars against each other).

Table 3.2: Anomalous cases: war between democracies, 1816-1994

<i>Country 1</i>	<i>Country 2</i>	<i>War</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Anomalous Dyad Years</i>
Spain	United States	Spanish-American	1898	1
Lithuania	Poland	Lithuanian-Polish	1919	1
Finland	Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States		1941-1944	24
Israel	Syria	Palestine	1948	1
India	Pakistan	Second Kashmir	1965	1
India	Pakistan	Bangladesh	1971	1
Cyprus	Turkey	Turko-Cypriot	1974	1
Total				30

Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:288

According to democratic peace proponents it is possible to reclassify most of these exceptions by systematically reconsidering each case. The following aspects are most often identified as reasons why contested cases do not classify as wars between democracies (Ray 1993:261-271):

One of the warring parties is not an independent state: In the case of the American Civil War (1847) the Confederacy was not recognised as an independent state. The Second Philippines War (1899) is considered a colonial war, because the Philippine resistance that the US encountered when they attempted to strengthen their hold on this Spanish colony, was not on behalf of an independent government.

One of the warring parties is not democratic: In the case of the Anglo-Boer War the South African Republic (ZAR) at the time only allowed white males to vote and included a property right and long-term residence requirement for voting rights. Thus, it is argued that the ZAR was not a democracy. It is, however, a questionable argument because most states at the turn of the nineteenth century did not allow universal suffrage. A similar argument is made in the case of the Confederacy in the American Civil War. Not only were women excluded from the voting roll, but so was the 35 to 40 percent of the population that were slaves. Furthermore, the 1861 election is considered a one-party election, because only one ticket was provided, effectively resulting in the re-election of Jefferson Davis.

In the case of the Spanish-American War (1898) Spain's democratic nature is in question. It seems as if most national political leaders in Spain at the time were elected in competitive elections between opposing parties with at least half of the adult population enfranchised and that the Conservative-Liberals and Liberals alternated in power. Spain's political system was, however, characterised by what is referred to as the *turno pacifico*, the alternation of political parties in power arranged by the leaders of the major political parties and the monarch. Ray (1993:265) thus concludes that because "the electoral system in Spain was manipulated ... and half of the Senate, and a relatively powerful monarch were selected in clearly undemocratic ways" the Spanish-American War was not a war between democracies. In both the World Wars, Germany's democratic character is questioned and in the Israeli War of Independence (1948), during which Israel invaded Lebanon, it is argued that Israel had not yet had democratic elections and therefore did not qualify as a democracy.

The empirical evidence has led to the conclusion that "the phenomenon of war between democracies becomes impossible or almost impossible to find." (Russett 1993:20). The proposition is thus supported by empirical evidence and the existence of the democratic peace is confirmed. But, the results of the quantitative analyses and the case by case reclassification of alleged exceptions have not gone unchallenged.

Critics raise the following objections against the empirical evidence of the democratic peace proposition as suggested above:

A question of definition: The way in which proponents of the democratic peace define war and democracy is criticised on various accounts. Firstly, definitions are said to be too restricted. With respect to the definition of war, Spiro (1996:211) argues that by excluding civil wars one of the bloodiest wars in history, the American Civil War - in essence a war between democracies fighting over national identity - is excluded from analysis. The threshold of 1 000 battle fatalities is also seen as a way of undercounting wars between democracies. For example, this qualification exempts the case of Finland against the Allied Powers in World War I. If it is to be concluded that democracies maintain the peace among themselves and if policy decisions are to be based on this conclusion, lower-level militarised interstate disputes should also be considered (Farber & Gowa 1996:250).

With respect to the definition of democracy, it is especially criticised for being subjective. According to this argument “(d)emocratic peace is not about democracy *per se*; rather, it should be understood as a special case of an argument about peace among polities that are similar to some normative benchmarks. What is special about the benchmarks represented by the coding rules of ‘democracy’ is that they are American” (Oren 1996:266, 267). Democracy is thus defined according to prevalent American values and states are coded as such on the basis of US foreign relations with the state.

An interesting case in point is Russia. From 1917 to 1918, while Russia was allied with the US against Germany, Woodrow Wilson declared that “Russia was known by those who knew her best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all vital habits of her thought.” This perception of Russia alternated with “backward autocracy” as relations between the US and Russia deteriorated and improved respectively. During the 1941 alliance between the two countries, the former Soviet Union were even said to move in the direction of ideas that broadly can be called democratic.

The coding of Imperial Germany as autocratic during World War I is similarly a result of changing US values (Oren 1996:297, 298). Imperial Germany is usually not regarded as democratic because of the emperor’s interference in foreign policy decisions and the questionable relations between the legislature and the chancellor. However, it is argued that before World War I the most important strategic decisions by the United Kingdom (UK)

and France were made without any legislative control or oversight and therefore Germany should not be regarded as any less a democracy than these two states (Layne 1996:195). In fact, before foreign relations started to deteriorate between Germany and the US, Imperial Germany was indeed thought of as democratic and John Burgess, one of the fathers of the discipline of Political Science, maintained that view until he died in 1931. Hence, it is argued that the definition according to which states are coded, is not value-free, but biased to reflect American values and interests.

Proponents of the democratic peace are also charged with shifting definitions of democracy and war to “hide” anomalous and discrepant evidence. Exceptions to the democratic peace pattern, are explained away by showing that one of the participants to a war was not democratic or independent or that the conflict was not a war in the 1 000 battle fatalities threshold sense. The Israeli-Lebanon dyad in the 1948 war when Lebanon joined the Arab side against Israel is a case in point. The war is explained by saying that Israel had not previously been independent and had not had elections by that time. Consequently Israel’s democratic nature does not pass the criteria of stability and longevity. Researchers of the time agree, however, that Lebanon had 25 years (since the 1920s) to see Israel’s democracy at work and that there was no reason for Lebanon to think that Israel would abandon its democratic practices once independent (Elman 1997:22). Other cases in which critics contend that democratic peace proponents shift definitions of democracy and war to prove the democratic peace proposition include the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Philippines War (1899). Hence, it is argued that too restricted, subjective and shifting definitions spur statistics in favour of the democratic peace.

Insufficient data: A second point of criticism pertains to the data that exist to prove the democratic peace proposition. It is argued that existing data is not sufficient to prove decisively that it is typical for democracies to maintain peaceful relations among themselves, because democracy is a relatively new phenomenon and interstate war is in general rare. Spiro (1996:214) explains that zero wars is not statistically significant because “in statistical analysis, the measure of the significance of a relationship between variables is usually compared to the “null hypothesis” of random chance. If we cannot reject the null hypothesis of random chance, it does not mean we must accept random chance as explanation, but it does mean that we should reject the hypothesis being tested.” For zero

wars to be significant, it is necessary to prove that random chance is not an explanation for zero wars. In other words, if the distribution of wars between democracies is not statistically different than what random chance predicts then zero wars is not enough evidence for democratic peace theory. It is similar to a family that doesn't win the lottery. If the probability for that family to win the lottery is low, the fact that they are not winning it is not strange. To determine whether it is strange that democracies do not make war with one another, the probability of war between them should first be determined.

According to the probability analysis Spiro (1996:215) has done, the probability that democracies will go to war with one another is so low that it is not striking that they don't go to war with one another. For the year 1980, for example, "the 156 nations in the world made 12, 090 possible dyads, of which 780 were dyads of liberal democracies, and only 2 dyads were at war. Put this way, only 6 percent of the possible one-on-one pairings of nations were liberal, and the dyads at war were two hundredths of 1 percent of the total. It no longer seems so striking that democracies were not at war, because dyads at war were extremely rare in 1980." Spiro analyses the probability of war between democracies in the same way for the entire temporal domain and concludes that only during World War I is the zero wars fought different from what random chance predicts. In World War II, random chance predicts that democracies will fight, and Spiro argues that that was indeed the case between Finland and the Allied Powers.

Spiro's analysis is questioned by Russett (1996:343) in various respects. Firstly, the claim that zero wars between democracies are no different from what chance would predict does not disprove the democratic peace: it simply implies that evidence is so sparse that the proposition cannot be confirmed. Secondly, Spiro is said to be inconsistent in his use of data. Although he includes the Finland-Allied dyads during World War II, despite the fact that they do not satisfy the 1 000 casualties threshold, he excludes some of the non-democratic dyads during the Korean War for precisely this reason. Lastly, instead of counting each year of dyads at war as a separate year of analysis, Spiro only counts the year in which war commenced. According to Russett (1996:344) this is a "divide-and-conquer" approach, stating that "by splitting the data into small enough parts, (Spiro) has guaranteed a low rate of war outbreak in each year, so most of the tests he runs will have zero statistical power." The quantitative basis of Spiro's criticism is thus not void of suspicion itself.

It is, however, not only Spiro that questions the quantitative evidence of the democratic peace. Farber and Gowa (1996:239) attempted a similar exercise of probability analysis and although their findings confirm that wars occur at a significantly lower rate between democracies than between mixed dyads or autocratic dyads, they found that the democratic peace phenomenon is of very recent origin. They conclude that for the period prior to World War I the probability of democracies not going to war equals reality. Thus, zero wars in this period need not be explained. World War I and World War II are regarded as general wars that do not yield observations that can be used to determine whether democracies maintain peace between them. For the post-World War II period, though, the democratic peace phenomenon is statistically significant. The fact that the democratic peace is typical only for this period challenges the theory that it is really regime type, which resulted in peaceful relations between democracies or whether it is a result of Cold War defence pacts. In the next section the issue of alternative explanations for peace between democracies is discussed. What is important at this point, is that critics argue that it is not more typical for democracies to maintain peace between them, than for any other two states to maintain peace. This charge is not only based on a critique of empirical evidence of the democratic peace, but also by making use of the case study method.

Case studies: Case studies lay bare “the factors to which decision-makers respond, how those factors influence decisions, the actual course of events, and the possible effects of other variables on the outcome.” (Layne 1996:165). According to Elman (1997) and Layne (1996), who make use of case study analysis the validity of the democratic peace theory can be tested by examining a small number of cases intensively. The first step in case study analysis is the selection of politically relevant cases. For Elman and Layne only “states that have a potential for crisis and conflict” can be regarded as politically relevant. Peace between states that are too far apart to have conflicting interests is not a vindication for the democratic peace theory. As such Layne (1996:164-189) chooses four instances in which he argues that democratic major powers were on the verge of war, but resolved the crises peacefully, namely “the Trent affair” between the US and the UK in 1861, the Venezuela crises involving the US and the UK again in 1895-96, the Fashoda crisis between France and the UK in 1895-96 and the Ruhr crises involving Germany and France in 1923. The question is whether war was averted in these cases because factors that the democratic

peace theory proposes will lead to peaceful relations between democracies were present, or not. Among these factors are:

- public opinion in the two states is pacific;
- policy-making elites refrain from making military threats and preparing to carry out these threats; and
- democracies bend over backwards to accommodate each other in a crisis.

Layne (1996:190) argues that none of these factors were present in any of the four cases. On the contrary, he concludes that “(i)n each of the four crises, war was avoided not because of the ‘live and let live’ spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory’s core, but because of realist factors.” At this point the debate between proponents and critics of the democratic peace theory deepens to the underlying debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals. According to neo-realists states base their decisions about war and peace on the constraints and opportunities that the anarchic international system generate. Domestic regime type and shared democratic values have little to do with these decisions. Similar to all states, democracies are also driven by strategic considerations and the absence or occurrence of war between democracies is explained by power politics (Elman 1997:473). Thus, Elman and Layne come to the conclusion that democracies do not have any more or any less of an incentive to make or prevent war than any other states.

The findings of these case study analyses are questioned in various respects. Firstly, the democratic peace proposition is formulated in a probabilistic and not a deterministic way, which would have stated “democracies will never wage war against each other”. The examination of a limited number of cases cannot decisively disprove a probabilistic statement. Russett (1996:340) refers to this as the “logical fallacy of inducing a principle of universal non-existence merely by finding a few cases of non-existence”.

Secondly, by selecting only dyads that were in a crisis period of their relationship, conflicts between democracies that were settled amicably and without the threat of war, or as Russett refers to these cases, “the dogs that did not bark”, are excluded from analysis. The real relevance of the democratic peace may precisely be to moderate everyday relations between states and prevent a conflict in interest to escalate to crisis levels. Owen (1996), for

example, examined 12 case studies from the period 1794 to 1917 and several of them support democratic peace considerations.

Thirdly, qualitative analysis is not only subject to bias in the selection of cases, but also in the interpretation. Some interpreters seem to require, as a condition of a crisis between democracies being taken as evidence confirming the democratic peace proposition, that the decision-makers involved have been aware of the pacifying effect of democracy and made their awareness plain. This is problematic inasmuch as people are not always aware of, nor do they express factors that may have influenced their behaviour. Just because people, for example, do not account for their behaviour by referring to the way in which their parents socialised them, it does not mean that their parents had no impact on how they behave. In the same sense it is unwarranted to expect explicit statements attributing the resolution of a crisis between democracies to underlying values (Ray 1993:57).

Although the criticisms cited here raise a few important questions relating to the peace between democracies, they are not substantive enough to disprove the democratic peace proposition. On the contrary, the empirical correlation between democratic dyads and peace is so robust that it requires further investigation into the causal mechanisms underlying the phenomenon of peace between democracies

4. EXPLAINING PEACE BETWEEN DEMOCRACIES

In terms of Waltz's (1959) classification of the causes of war democratic peace theory explains the absence of war between democracies primarily from a second image perspective, thus attributing the existence of the democratic peace to the domestic structure and norms of democracies. Since the resurgence of the democratic peace theme in scholarly research, various explanatory factors for the phenomenon have been proposed in literature (see Appendix B). Some of these factors have been mentioned as supplements to the democratic peace explanation, such as the psychological factors and the communication factor, but others are mentioned in contrast to the democratic peace theory. In this sense the debate between proponents and critics of the democratic peace thesis is continued on a different level. It is now no longer whether the democratic peace exists or not, but whether it can be explained by regime factors or not.

The democratic peace theory offers the following explanatory models for the absence of war between democracies:

The normative/cultural model: Domestically democracies are characterised by the following central norms:

- disputes can be resolved peacefully through democratic political processes that in an equilibrium of sorts protects minority rights, while ensuring majority rule;
- equality exists both in voting equality but also in the egalitarian right to human dignity;
- the state is ruled by the consent of the governed, but justice prevails to the extent that consent is not abused; and
- dissent within broad limits from an opposition loyal to democratic practice is tolerated and even needed to ensure good policy-making.

The common assertion is that these norms produce a culture favouring the resolution of foreign policy disputes without violent conflict. The democratic processes produce restraint by the populace who have to foot war bills in terms of money and blood, thus making democracies inherently more peaceful (Russett 1993:30). But, as was stated previously the democratic pacifism proposition has not been proven convincingly and various empirical studies (Small & Singer 1976; Chan 1984; Maoz & Abdolali 1989; Geldtsch & Hegre 1997) have established findings contrary to this view. In fact, democratic states seem to be just as war-prone as other states when it comes to their relations with non-democracies. This raises a fundamental puzzle in the causal relationship between norms and the democratic peace, namely why democratic norms would lead to peace between democracies (the dyadic level), but not to general pacifism (the monadic level).

The answer to this puzzle seems to lie in the two assumptions of the normative/cultural explanatory model, namely (i) that states externalise, as far as possible, the norms and behaviour that are developed within and characterise their internal political processes and institutions; and (ii) that in the anarchic international system, a clash between democratic and non-democratic norms is dominated by the latter rather than the former (Maoz &

Russett 1993:625). The first of these assumptions suggests that democratic norms result in a “live and let live” atmosphere, which in turn creates domestic stability. Non-democratic norms, such as the winner takes all, violent and coercive conflict resolution mechanisms and denying the opposition the right of existence lead to mistrust, fear and the absence of stability in the presence of opposition. The second assumption suggests that when it comes to applying these norms internationally states will be limited by their perception of the environment in which they are applied. If they perceive their survival to be endangered by their application of domestic norms, they will adapt their behaviour to that of their rival. Because democratic norms are more likely to be exploited in an anarchic system, democratic states in a mixed dyad are more inclined to change their norms than non-democracies are to change to democratic norms (Maoz & Russett 1993:625).

The normative/cultural model explains democracies’ tendency to maintain a separate peace by referring to the sense of reciprocity experienced by democratic dyads. This is best explained by Russett (1993:31) who argues that “if people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous, self-governing people who share norms of live and let live, they will respect the right of others to self-determination if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite.” Democratic norms thus apply across borders to other democratic countries and in this transnational democratic culture democracies can prevent conflicts from escalating to war in the same way each state prevents domestic disputes from escalating into violent conflict. However, when confronted with a non-democratic state, a democracy will not expect that country to be restrained by democratic norms and therefore it will resort to non-democratic norms of conflict resolution, such as engaging in war. It is also now understandable that democratic peace theorists place emphasis on the longevity or stability of democracy in their definition and coding of democratic states. Images of political stability in a democracy communicate to the external environment that democratic norms are domestically at work and that these norms can be expected to govern the state’s external relations as well. Similarly, internal instability is an indication that norms of peaceful conflict resolution are either absent or not enshrined to the extent that it can be inferred that a state’s foreign policy will also be characterised by pacifism (Maoz & Russett 1993:625).

The structural/institutional model: Democracies are characterised by various structures and institutions which constrain government decision-making, such as the division of power, checks and balances, public opinion and the role of the bureaucracy and key interest groups in the system of government. When the existence of these structures and institutions is used to explain why democracies do not go to war with one another, two assumptions are made, namely (i) international threats compel political leaders to mobilise internal support for their policies from those groups that will provide the legitimacy that is needed for international action; and (ii) only emergency situations can justify short-cuts to political mobilisation of relevant political support (Maoz & Russett 1993:626).

This set of assumptions suggests that “(d)emocracies are constrained in going to war by the need to ensure broad popular support, manifested in various institutions of government.” (Russett 1993:38). Because of the complexity of the democratic process to obtain formal approval for a war, and the difficulty of justifying fighting a war, democratic structures and institutions often result in the structural delay of the decision to wage war. In non-democracies political leadership needs only secure the support of key elite groups without much regard for public opinion or due political processes. The preparation time for war is thus much shorter than is the case in democracies. In democratic dyads these structural delays provide time for non-military resolution, such as negotiations, to end the conflict before it erupts in all-out war.

This explanation again leaves the question why the democratic peace proposition prevails, but not the democratic pacifism proposition. Non-democracies are not constrained by democratic structures and institutions and this exacerbates existing conflicts between democracies and non-democracies. Leaders in non-democracies may exploit the reluctance of leaders in democracies to go to war and conversely, leaders in democracies may create an image of non-democracies as “ready and eager to fight” and respond by calling on their emergency powers. These powers enable democracies to mobilise support speedily and the decision to go to war is usually beyond the due political process normally followed in such situations.

A comparison of the two models shows that though the normative and structural models are not mutually exclusive, they do emphasise two different elements of democratic politics,

namely the norms of internal democratic behaviour on international politics, on the one hand and constitutional and legal constraints on executive action in international politics on the other. Maoz and Russett (1993:624-637) found that both these models are supported by data, but that the support for the normative model is more robust and consistent. They came to this conclusion by identifying two key differences in the predictions which these models make. Firstly, because norms take longer to develop, the normative model predicts that the older democracies are the less likely they would be to clash with one another. In terms of the structural model, on the other hand, the age of democracy should not matter as long as democratic constraints exist. Secondly, the structural model predicts that a democracy's conflict behaviour will be dependent on the constraints on its executive. A presidential system, for example will be less constrained than parliamentary systems and coalition governments or minority cabinets will be less constrained than dominant party systems. The normative model does not predict variation in a state's conflict behaviour based on the different executive structures, because all democracies operate in the same normative context. Based on these differences, two hypotheses are stated, namely:

- The more deeply rooted democratic norms are in the political processes operating in two states, the less likely it will be that conflict will break out or escalate between them.
- The higher the political constraints on the executives of two states, the less likely it will be that conflict will break out or escalate between them.

Moaz and Russett's (1993:636) statistical analysis proved both of these hypotheses, in other words, the level of democratic norms is inversely related to conflict and so is the level of political constraints. To determine which model withstands empirical testing to a greater extent, the scholars examined cases where high levels of democratic norms and low levels of political constraints and *vice versa* are present. They found that institutional constraints prevent the escalation of conflict into war, but they do not prevent the emergence of lower-level disputes. Normative restraints even prevent the emergence of conflict as such. Although both democratic norms and institutional constraints explain the phenomenon of peace between democracies, the normative model is thus empirically superior.

In both models, however, the explanation for peace between democracies is rooted in the nature of democracy itself. It is because two states share democratic norms and culture and

democratic structures and institutions that they refrain from engaging in war, not because they have similar regime forms. After all, if the explanation lay in identity of regime type, autocratic regimes would also maintain peace between themselves, which is not the case. There are, however, alternative explanations for the absence of war between democracies, which emphasise other factors that can be correlated with democracy and, it is argued, result in a spurious relationship between democracy and peace.

The following factors are often cited in contrast to the two explanatory models that the democratic peace theory propose for the phenomenon of peace between democracies:

Distance: It is argued that wars are mostly fought between adjacent states, because their physical proximity enlarges the threat they pose for one another (whether perceived or real). Because democracies have not populated the international system to the extent that many adjacent democratic dyads existed (Western Europe excluded), the distance between democracies, at least until 1945, explains the absence of war between democracies. Since Huntington's (1991) Third Wave of democratisation, however, the world map shows many contiguous democracies in the Western Hemisphere. Hence, distance is no longer an apt explanation for peace between them.

Institutional and economic interdependence: Transnational and international institutions as well as economic ties are often cited as alternative explanations for the democratic peace. Shared institutions become forums where conflicting interests are resolved and in terms of economic interdependence, it is arguable whether a state will declare war against its main trading partners. It is typically asked whether the peace among states of the EU is due to their being democratic or their being institutionally and economically interdependent to such a high degree.

Russett (1996:84), however, found that states sharing the same institutions are more likely to be involved in violent conflict. Oneal and Ray (1997:751) controlled for economic interdependence and still concluded that "democracies are unlikely to fight other democracies". Institutional and economic interdependence are thus not an independent explanation for the democratic peace, but it is possible that the individual autonomy and pluralism which allow individuals, private groups and government organisations to form

transnational networks among democratic states can contribute to establishing a transnational democratic culture and in turn maintaining peaceful relations. Democracy is, however, a prerequisite for this.

Alliance: It is assumed that military allies will not wage war against one another because of their common interests. Perhaps the fact that democracies were allied during both world wars and since then in NATO, rather than their democratic nature, explains the absence of war between these states. De Mesquita (in Russett 1993:27) found, however, that militarised allied states are generally more likely to fight one another than non-allies, a conclusion that Bremer confirmed, although he also found that democratic allies are less likely to engage in violent conflict than is the case with other non-democratic militarised allies.

Geopolitics: The geopolitical interpretation of the democratic peace holds that linking subsequent peaceful tendencies to antecedent types of regime (democracy) is like putting the cart before the horse. The settlement of regional primacy issues creates co-operative regional niches, which insulate states from extremely competitive regional and international politics. The zones of peace resulting from these niches have positive implications for democratisation inasmuch as a less hostile regional environment does not require the centralisation of power as is the case when a state is frequently exposed to national security threats. The geopolitical explanation does not necessarily exclude the possibility that there is a causal or reciprocal relationship between democracy and peace but it is argued that by focusing only on regime attributes, important historical explanations such as geopolitical context are negated (Thompson 1996:141-174).

Economic and political stability: Closely linked to the argument that economic interdependence makes peace is the argument that “for politically stable, economically advanced, and rapidly growing countries the cost/benefit ratio of any war fought on or near their home territories with another advanced state looks extraordinary unpromising” (Russett 1993:28). Not only is a war costly in terms of domestic damages, but interdependence with the adversary’s economy can also mean that damage to the adversary’s economy harms one’s own investments, export markets, and import sources.

A second variant of this explanation is that states may initiate conflicts with other states to divert public attention from domestic economic and political problems. For economically and politically stable states the incentive for externalising internal discontent is less and should an incentive nevertheless occur, it is very unlikely that a stable state will target another economically stable state whose population has legitimised their system and will be prepared to engage in conflict to protect their political system. Because democracies are often wealthy and stable, the peace between them may be attributed to these factors and not to democracy *per se*. Democratic peace proponents have, as explained, incorporated political stability in their definitions of democracy as well as their models of explaining the democratic peace. Political stability is thus more complementary than alternative to the normative/cultural and structural/institutional explanatory models.

Although these alternative explanations surely are plausible and can indeed be explanatory to some incidents of peaceful relations between democracies, various empirical studies (Maoz & Russett 1993; Bremer 1992; and Oneal & Ray 1997) have indicated the independent explanatory role of democracy through controlling for distance, interdependence, alliance, geopolitics, wealth and political stability (Russett 1993:30). It has thus been established that a separate peace exists between democracies, that this peace is the result of shared democratic norms and institutions, and that in the absence of these shared norms democracies may or may not be just as war-prone as non-democracies. What remains now is to establish what the effect of these findings is for world peace.

5. THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND WORLD PEACE

Once it is tested and proven that democracies do not make war with one another, it is often taken for granted that a world with more and better democracies will be a more peaceful world. Based on this inference from the dyadic to the system level, trends of democratisation such as the Third Wave identified by Huntington (1991) yield widespread enthusiasm about the prospects for world peace in the future. This inference is, however, too simplistic for at least two reasons. It negates the mixed results obtained at the monadic level and it does not reckon with the Wilsonian element in democratic peace theory.

Although there are those theorists who argue that democracies are generally less inclined to war than non-democracies (Benoit 1996), this argument cannot be maintained unequivocally. In fact, more democratic peace proponents acknowledge that “(e)ven though liberalism [read: democracy] has achieved striking success in creating a zone of peace ... and co-operation among states similar in character, liberalism has been equally striking as a failure in guiding foreign policy outside the liberal world.” (Doyle 1996:30). Democracies, for example, fail to negotiate the peaceful resolution of conflicting interests with stronger non-democracies and often raise these conflicts to battles and campaigns. The US policies towards Cuba and Iran are typical examples of such campaigns. In relation to weaker non-democracies, democracies have often engaged in imperial ventures. It is thus very likely that democracies outside the pacific federation, will act as realists predict all states will act – war-prone in an anarchic international system with its insecurities, scarce resources and prestige hungry state leaders.


The Wilsonian element refers to the task, which democracies have taken upon themselves to free the coerced citizens of non-democratic states and make the world safe for democracy even if it takes forceful means. The most recent example of the Wilsonian element is NATO’s attacks on Serbia in response to its oppression of the ethnic Albanians in the province Kosovo (1999), but the Gulf War after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq (1990-91) also serves as a case in point. This does not mean that democracies will engage in a crusade for democracy, fighting, beating and turning authoritarian regimes into democracies. For one reason, many authoritarian regimes are not aggressive and therefore do not pose a threat to their own citizens or to other states in the world. But, when authoritarian states become aggressive, democracies have shown that they will react violently whether in the name of human rights or eradicating a threat to democracy.

A return to Gleditsch and Hegre’s (1997:291-287) study shows the striking statistical evidence of the war-proneness of democracies outside the pacific federation. Like Small and Singer (1976), Doyle (1983a; 1983b) and Chan (1984), they found that there is no clear relationship between the war participation of democracies and non-democracies. They do, however, go further than the other theorists arguing that mixed dyads have a higher propensity for war than authoritarian dyads. Democracies and non-democracies are thus more likely to go to war with one another than non-democracies are to go to war with one

another. Taken together with the findings that democratic dyads do not engage in war the results propose that the relationship between democracy and the frequency of war at the system level will be parabolic. In other words, as the number of democracies increases world-wide, the number of mixed dyads with a higher probability of war increases as well. If all states in the international system become democratic, the result will of course be consistent with the direct inference from the dyadic to the system level, namely that an increase in democracy will result in a more peaceful world. But as long as democracies and consequently democratic dyads are in a minority, however, it is likely that the lack of war between democracies will be off-set by the higher incidence of war in mixed dyads. An increase in democracies will only have more peaceful returns, when democracies become the majority.


Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:305) tested their hypothesis by plotting the number of democracies in the world and the incidence of war (see figure 3.1. and 3.2) for the period 1816 to 1994. From these graphs they concluded that for the first 100 years the world became more democratic and more war prone. After the world wars the world still democratised, but became more peaceful. Although for the World War I period (1885-1918) there is too little war and for the Cold War period (1954-1986) (see figure 3.1) there is too little democracy to result in a pattern consistent with what is theoretically expected, as a whole the curve suggests that increasing democratisation is firstly associated with more war and then with less.

Figure 3.1 Relative number of democracies in the world and incidence of war, 1816 to 1994



Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:305

Figure 3.2 Degree of democratisation by war incidence at the system level, 1816 to 1994



Source: Gleditsch and Hegre 1997:306

So far democratisation has been viewed strictly in dichotomous terms, in other words, as authoritarian states that convert to democracy. Democratisation will thus quantitatively increase democracies in the international system. There is, however, another way of approaching democratisation, namely in continuous terms where democracy and autocracy are the two extreme poles of a continuum. Democratisation of a state means a qualitative increase in the level of democracy in the state, or alternatively, the state moves closer to the democracy pole on the continuum. Oneal and Ray (1997:751-775), using this approach to study the effects of democratisation on mixed dyads, conclude that “(t)he prospects for peace are influenced by the level of democracy in a dyad; but they are also significantly affected by the political distance separating the regimes along the democracy – autocracy continuum.” Hence, it is not enough to study the effects of one autocracy converting to democracy, but the political distance between states in the dyad on the democracy – autocracy continuum needs to be considered as well.

In this sense it can now be concluded that making the lesser democracy in a mixed dyad more democratic has unambiguously positive effects for peace between the countries, because it increases the level of democracy for the pair and it decreases the political distance between the states. Increasing the level of democracy for the more democratic state will increase the average level of democracy for the pair, but it will also increase the political distance, therefore increasing the possibility for conflict. What this implies is largely supportive of Gleditsch and Hegre’s findings, namely that in a world largely made up of autocracies, democratisation will lead to a larger incidence of war, but in a world consisting largely of democracies, democratisation will reduce the incidence of war.

This implies that there is a turning point where a system shift will occur and spreading democracy will then mean spreading peace. In terms of Gleditsch and Hegre's findings the end of the long European conflict (the two World Wars) or the end of the Cold War can plausibly be suggested as points where a system shift has occurred. This observation is related to the very high levels of democratisation in the world in general, but especially in certain regions such as Europe (Gleditsch & Hegre 1997:306).

The most prominent philosophical support for the postulate that a system shift has occurred towards the end of the Cold War comes from the influential article *The end of history?* by Francis Fukuyama (1989).⁹ He writes: "In watching the flow of events over the past decade or so, it is hard to avoid the feeling that something very fundamental has happened in world history. The past year has seen a flood of articles commemorating the end of the Cold War, and the fact that 'peace' seems to be breaking out in many regions of the world" (Fukuyama in Betts 1994:5). Fukuyama relates this "outbreak of peace" to the victory of liberalism over other ideologies resulting in the end of history. Although terrorism and wars of national liberation will continue, large-scale conflicts can only occur between states still caught up in history or between states still in history and those at the end of history. In both cases, the dyads satisfying these criteria are passing from the scene as more states liberalise (democratise).

If it is accepted that the end of the Cold War has brought about a system shift, there is reason to believe that future democratisation will indeed lead to a more peaceful world in general. This is dependent on whether democratisation will occur in the Kantian sense or in the Wilsonian sense. In other words, it can be left up to "nature" to bring about democratisation (the Kantian sense) or already democratised states can take it upon themselves to forcefully impose democracy on non-democracies (the Wilsonian sense).

Although a democratic crusade will probably establish a pacific federation composed of all states much faster than nature, there are various factors discouraging this approach. Firstly,

⁹ Fukuyama's article in particular and so-called endism in general have come under attack for being historically deterministic, most notably from Huntington (1989) in an article entitled *No exit - the errors of endism*. Historical analysis conducted by Huntington (1991) himself, however, concludes that the number of democracies have substantially increased since the mid-1970s and more than a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, there has not been a reverse wave towards communism.

the cost of imposing democracy is very high both in terms of forcefully instating democracy and in terms of consolidating the new democracy. This was true for the US in both the cases of Japan and Germany after World War I. It not only took the Marshall Plan, but also years of virtual occupation in the case of Japan to ensure democracy. Secondly, liberal imperialism, where democracies intervene and even take over countries to protect cosmopolitan rights, have shown to be ineffective, considering that most colonies have after independence resorted back to non-democracy. Thirdly, there is reason to believe that the technological progress witnessed in the past four decades is quickening the pace of democratisation in the Kantian sense.

6. CONCLUSION

Although the democratic peace, as it is referred to in this dissertation is confined to the relationship between democracy and peace on the dyadic level, the causes and consequences of the democratic peace phenomenon in world politics cannot be understood unless the monadic and system levels are taken into account. In terms of these three levels, the following conclusions can be made about the relationship between peace and democracy. Democracies do not go to war with one another (dyadic level). This is not because democracies are inherently peaceful, for then they would be less war-prone overall (the monadic level), but because they share democratic norms and institutions. The impact of the democratic peace on world peace in general (the system level) can be negative (reducing world peace) or positive (increasing world peace), depending on whether democratic dyads comprise a majority in the world system or not. It has been argued that, since the end of the Cold War, the pacific federation has enlarged to the extent that further democratisation will have a net positive effect on world peace.

Democratisation should, however, not only entail the quantitative increase in democracies world-wide, but also the qualitative increase of democracy within states. Since Huntington (1991) identified a global trend of democratisation termed the Third Wave several authors have expressed reserve about the nature of many of these newly democratised states. Fareed Zakaria (1997), for example, writes about the rise of illiberal democracies, that is, democracies satisfying the minimum prescription of democracy, namely elections. Schedler (1998) refers to these formal democracies as electoral democracies. Democracy, as defined

by democratic peace theory though, is essentially liberal. Democratisation that only involves the installation of electoral democracies will thus not necessarily have the impact on world peace that this chapter predicts.

The democratic peace as it has been treated in International Relations theory and discussed in this chapter, is by distinction a statecentric approach toward world peace. It defines war as lethal violence between states in an anarchic international system and democracy as a form of government of states. Unless domestic norms and structures dictate otherwise there is the potential for a Clausewitzian extension of politics to resolve conflicts of interests between states. This interpretation of the democratic peace may be restrictive in the light of the multiplication of non-state actors in the international arena and the increasingly complex patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors, especially in the realm of war and warfare. The globalisation of democratic norms may also have implications for the way democracy is defined in democratic peace theory. Both the rise of non-state actors and the globalisation of democracy have been facilitated by the information revolution. This revolution and the broader changes in circumstances that it gives rise to, will subsequently be discussed before turning to the impact it has on the relationship among democracy, the democratic peace and world peace.

CHAPTER 4

THE INFORMATION ERA: SETTING THE STAGE

1. INTRODUCTION

According to Gabriel (1994) the task of scholarship is not only to search for more knowledge but also to deal repeatedly with fundamental issues and to do so in the light of new circumstances. The past two decades have seen developments in the field of information and communication technology that are unequalled in any other sphere of human existence. The exploitation of these developments has led to such a changed environment that it is not described as merely “new circumstances”, but as a new era: the information era. The information era delineates the temporal boundaries for the study and as such the context that demands the re-evaluation of the fundamental issues, democracy and world peace. This chapter aims to explain the ways in which the information era is distinct from other eras in the world’s history. It traces the origin of the information era firstly to the idea that information yields power and secondly to the technological progress that makes it possible to exploit that idea to the extent that it comes to dominate human interaction. This process has been called the information revolution and its impact is explained by reviewing different theoretical approaches to the relationship between technology and society. An integrated approach is then developed and applied to describe the nature of the information era. In doing so the chapter sets the stage for examining democracy and world peace in the light of the new circumstances brought about by the information era.

2. HISTORIC CONTEXTUALISATION OF THE INFORMATION ERA

There are different ways to relate the information era to previous historical periods in the world’s history. According to Builder (1993:158) enthusiasm for an idea induces societal development and change in the form of a new era. An era lasts about 50 years before a new idea comes to dominate society. Although he argues that this is true for all open secular societies, he uses American society to explain the information era. The past 200 years of

American history have seen a series of ideas overtaking one another and introducing new eras. Around 1800 the dominant idea centred on the design of government as a way to create a more perfect society. Overtaking this idea by 1850 was the seemingly, unlimited growth and wealth opportunities offered through natural resources and as such shifting the focus to the land frontier. By 1900, however, enthusiasm for the idea of industrialisation had induced a new era where the production of goods and services changed society. The 1950s saw the industrial era being replaced by the technology era. This era was characterised by technological innovations of which the most striking occurred in the fields of nuclear and space technology. The most recent idea dominating American society (and the rest of the developed world) is that of exploiting information in ways that promise to transcend time, distance and human hierarchies heretofore characterising society. Although Builder's explanation focuses on enthusiasm for this idea in American society, he acknowledges that it is by no means confined to the United States. On the contrary, the implications of the information era are felt globally.

An alternative way of contextualising the information era historically is by making use of the metaphor of history as "waves" of change. According to Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1994a:27 & 1994b:8, 78) this metaphor is more dynamic and revealing in terms of the conflict that accommodates societal change. They employ the idea of waves to explain the current period in the world's history in a broader context than Builder who mainly does so in an American context. The information era, described in this way, is the third of three great waves of change. The First Wave of change was brought about by the agricultural revolution ten millennia ago. As it spread, humans who previously lived in small often migratory foraging, fishing, hunting or herding groups, founded settlements and villages and cultivated land.

Although the agricultural era had not exhausted itself by the end of the seventeenth century, the Second Wave of change started to spill across the world with the invention of the steam engine and the subsequent industrial revolution. As peasants urbanised, land was not only replaced by industry as the dominant economic preoccupation, but new ideas surfaced, changing the very structure of society. The nuclear family supplanted the large agrarian style household; mass production, mass consumption and mass education were the order of

the day, accompanied by the formation of specialised institutions such as schools, political parties and corporations.

Just as the First Wave had not entirely spent its force when the Second Wave caught up with it, the Third Wave of change is rapidly overtaking the Second Wave. The origin of the Third Wave can be traced to the decades just after World War II, the period during which the industrial era peaked. The Third Wave rise to dominance is “based on the new ways it creates and exploits knowledge” (Toffler & Toffler 1994a:31). Knowledge, generally understood, is at the apex of a rising hierarchy with data at the bottom and information in the middle. Data are raw facts and information is the organised patterns thereof while knowledge is a network of relationships connecting information (Rondfeldt 1992:245)¹⁰. The Third Wave is characterised by new knowledge networks, as businesses, governments and individuals link concepts together to create new hypotheses, theories and images.

For both Builder and the Tofflers the essence of the new era is enthusiasm for the idea that exploitation of information yields power. This is not at all a new idea, and neither is its implementation. In fact, the development of language and alphabet, printing and the telegraph and eventually the telephone, radio and video camera is an indication that the value of storing, processing, transmitting and accessing information in as accurate a form as possible, has been pursued through the ages. What distinguishes the last 20 to 25 years (and possibly the following 25 years) from the past to the extent that it can be labelled the information era, is the technological advancement that made it possible to exploit information like never before. This in turn led to “conceptual changes in the awareness of the role of information in human behaviour, organization and society” (Rondfeldt 1992:245). Collectively, these technological and conceptual changes brought about the information revolution.

¹⁰ A strict distinction is not always maintained between the concepts data, information and knowledge. The term “information” is often used to refer collectively to the hierarchy and depending on whether the context demands otherwise, the same will be done in this chapter.

3. THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

Information technology¹¹ (IT) “is a term broadly applied to the use of computer, electronics, and telecommunications equipment for processing and distributing information in a digital form. This distribution ranges from worldwide networking of industries to individualized services, including cable TV and email” (Business 2.0 2000:198). In other words, IT is “the acquisition, processing, storage, dissemination and use of vocal, pictorial, textual and numerical information by a microelectronics-based combination of computing and telecommunication.” (Martin 1988:24). The technological dimension of the information revolution is thus embedded in computing, telecommunications and micro-electronics technologies. So great has been the impact of these technologies that their capacity to affect change has awarded them the mantle of “enabling technologies”. To avoid a pitfall that Salter (1993:5) identifies, namely that information technologies are viewed as a package despite the differences between them, it serves to briefly outline the developments in each of the three areas (computing, telecommunications and micro-electronics).

Computing: In the last 50 years computing technology has gone through four generations of development. First generation computers were characteristically bulky, occupied a lot of floor space and were subject to frequent vacuum-tube burnout. Second generation computers used transistors, consumed less energy than first generation computers, were more reliable, less bulky and less expensive (Grill 2000:1). Third generation computing was initiated by the development of the integrated circuit and microprocessor that would transform the computer industry as well as any other industry producing machines that manipulated information or controlled a process, albeit washing machines, gas pumps or doorbells. The 1970s and 1980s saw commercial competition in the industry as chip technology improved and computers became smaller, faster and cheaper. The only aspect standing in the way of the computer’s success in the mass market was public acceptability. This was overcome by the developments in computer software, sometimes referred to as the driving force in computing, resulting in multi-user and multi-tasking systems. Fourth generation language was added to this and created a user-friendly computer (Saxby 1990:238). The range and sophistication of software packages and computer hardware

¹¹ The terms information technology (IT) and information and communication technology (ICT) are used interchangeably in literature, but for the sake of consistency the term IT will be used throughout the study.

(including the improvements in density and access time of electronic memory), is already in the fifth generation. This means that computing is characterised by expert-systems, intelligent knowledge-based systems and knowledge engineering, and unprecedented power in processing and human-computer interaction (Martin 1988:25, Grill 2000:2).

Telecommunications: Digitisation, that is, the encoding, transformation and transmission of information, whether voice, text, data or image in bit form, was the impetus for a world-wide communications infrastructure (Saxby 1990:263). Digital technologies are replacing analogue systems and the result is increased capacity as several independent channels can be combined into a single high-speed channel, making transmission more cost efficient. The second major technological development in this area is switching. Advanced switching technologies include the ability to store information if a line is occupied. It is then re-routed to the required destination or the message is broken up in segments and sent via different routes to be reassembled in the correct order. It also includes Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Loop (ADSL), which allows data to flow in both directions at high speeds (Bryan, Tsagarousianou & Tambini 1998:3).

Telecommunications were also enhanced by the discovery that information can be transmitted as ‘on-off’ pulses of light down a glass fibre. Less leakage and less susceptibility of interference have made it a preferred option especially for long-distance communication (Martin 1988:33). Recent developments in fibre optics involve Dense Wave Multiplexing (DWDM), which uses light of different colours or wavelengths to simultaneously carry separate streams of traffic over the same fibre. Along with advanced switching technologies, fibre optics greatly facilitated high-bandwidth to the extent that the influential business technology journal, *The Red Herring*, examined the scenario of an oversupply (or glut) of bandwidth (Bruno 2000).

Telecommunications has also been significantly furthered by improvements in satellite and cellular technology. By 1990, 2500 transponders had been in orbit around the earth. Transponders on a satellite receive transmissions from an earth station and then retransmit them to one or more other earth stations. It is used for telephone and broadcasting services, business communications, data processing in space and mobile communications to ships and land-based vehicles on the move. Cellular technology or wireless technology as it is

also called, makes mobile telephone and now also Internet facilities possible (Industry Trend or Event 1999:62). Cellular technology makes use of radio waves as opposed to surface-bound infrastructure to transmit signals that are received and converted into voice or text.

Micro-electronics: It has been the basis of much of the developments in both computing and in telecommunications as have been discussed above. According to Bankes and Builder (1992:4) “it was the developments in solid-state electronics, beginning in the 1950s, that brought all of these devices [telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and electronic computers] into practical form that could be mass produced and distributed to individuals throughout the world. Thus the basis for the current information revolution is not the advent of the radio or television or even computers, but their magical transformation by the silicon chip in all of its many manifestations.” A microchip is a “tiny complex of electronic components and their connections that is contained in or on a small, flat piece of material (usually silicon)” (Business 2.0 2000:198). Suffice it then to note that the impact of micro-electronics on computers and on telecommunication devices has been compactness, cheapness, reliability and disposability (Martin 1988:31).

It is clear that the developments in the three areas of enabling technologies did not occur separate from one another. In fact, digitisation meant that “all the media become translatable into each other” (Brand in Saxby 1990:3) and this has been fundamental to the information revolution. Convergence, that is, the ease of interaction between information technologies, occurs on different levels and in different directions. In this regard, Martin (1988:32) writes that convergence is not only the marriage of two technologies — telecommunications and computing — but also the erosion of functional barriers as between data processing and communications as well as the vertical integration of industries. As voice (traditionally the terrain of telecommunications), data (computing), text (publishing and library services) and video (broadcasting) are translatable into one another, service suppliers become more interrelated (Cowie 1989:22). The Time Warner (broadcasting)/America Online (Internet) merger in January 2000 is one of the best examples to illustrate this.

The information revolution, as was noted above, is not only about developing these technologies (the qualitative dimension), but the fact that it has been diffusible to large numbers of people all over the world (the quantitative dimension). The scope of personal electronic media, that is, information and communication media that are available for personal use and to an extent controllable by individuals, have expanded from television sets and citizen band radios in the 1940s to desktop and laptop computers, personal fax machines, handheld video cameras, cellular telephones, cable television and satellite uplinks in the 1990s (Ganley 1991:5, 6).

This expansion in personal electronic media along with the exploitation of computer-telecommunications convergence have paved the way for the creation of a world-wide web of networked computers. In the late 1960s the US Department of Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) embarked on a research project at the University of California that would be the precursor of the Internet as it is known today. A decentralised computer network was established not to maintain military communication in the event of a nuclear attack as is commonly suggested, but to link several of ARPA's research sites, universities and other institutions conducting experiments funded by ARPA. It is important to note here that the Internet was never linked to any critical military application or system. In this regard Chapman (1998:5) is of the opinion that "the Internet was not burdened with security classifications, black budgets, or secret technical specifications." In fact, it is precisely the research character of the Internet that explains why it was so easily absorbed by the civilian sector and commercial enterprises.

In 1983 the computer network which was established was split in two, ARPANET, for the research community and MILNET for non-classified military communications (Chapman 1998:2). Soon after, the US National Science Foundation (NSF) took charge of the administration and maintenance of lines and equipment. The NSF made the network available to their students, personnel and affiliated institutions. As other universities, research and development institutions and US government agencies connected their computers to the system it became an "anarchic global network of networks known, increasingly as the Internet" (Dery 1996:5). The 1990s saw the spread of modems and networked computing which brought the Internet to average citizens and commercial enterprises. This has led to tens of thousands of networks reaching across the globe. The

Internet is itself a part of a larger complex of interconnected networks, called the Matrix. Common communication protocols link the several networked spaces that in turn consist of thousands of individual networks and are collectively referred to as cyberspace (see Appendix D for a conceptual map of cyberspace).

A wide range of interactions are possible in cyberspace such as browsing information stored on other computers and searching databases, exchanging electronic mail, participating in discussion groups on a multitude of topics and increasingly engaging in e-business (Kitchin 1998:3). Observing the expansion of cyberspace into virtually all spheres of human activity and the growing number of Internet users world-wide (see Appendix C for an outline of Internet hosts, domains and websites growth as well as world-wide network growth and Appendix E for growth in number of users online), scholars agree that the information revolution has changed the world, whether directly or indirectly, in very substantial ways. The nature of these changes is, however, often contested. Conflicting explanations of the impact of the information revolution can be traced to different theoretical approaches towards the relationship between technology and society, which invariably underlie these explanations. In this respect it serves to briefly review the most important of these approaches.

4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY

The theoretical approaches most commonly employed to study the nature of the information era are utopianism and futurism, technological determinism and instrumentalism, social constructivism and political economy.

Utopianists and futurists try to forecast how technological progress will affect society. They usually do this by using a grand metaphor approach whereby Western society is *en masse* approaching a new stage in its development as some form of information society. There is a general optimism surrounding technological advancement in the sense that it will bring forth technical solutions to ethical, economic and political problems. A utopian future is conjured up where technology would be “framed within an organic and communitarian political context, be decentralised and humanly scaled, and be used to link community groupings” (Kitchin 1998:56-57). The Tofflers are often mentioned in this category.

Wright (1995:39) quotes the Tofflers as saying: “Today’s spectacular advances in communications technology open, for the first time, a mind-boggling array of possibilities for direct citizen participation in political decisionmaking”. The critique against this kind of futurist utopianism is that little regard is paid to the role of existing social and economic considerations in the re-appropriation of technologies. In other words, the way in which technologies fit into the social and economic landscape is ignored.

Technological determinists are criticised for similar reasons. They argue that social, economic, cultural and political aspects of life are determined by technology. Fitting technology into the social and economic framework does not matter because technology shapes that framework. Technology is independent and in that sense autonomous or “outside society” (Kitchin 1998:57). The question is not how IT is used and adapted to fit everyday needs, but how society adapts to accommodate IT. IT will lead to changes in business practices, it will change how democracy is practiced, and it will inevitably change culture. How it will change all these features of society depends on the deterministic assumptions made. Different scholars thus predict different trajectories of societal change as a result of technology (MacKenzie 1996:26). The main point of criticism against technological determinists is their simplified, linear models of cause and effect. For example, a paperless office was predicted in the era of computerised communication based on the assumption that people would want to save time and costs associated with paper. This prediction turned out to be wrong because it ignored the values and habits of readers as well as the difficulty of reading on a screen as opposed to paper. Penley and Ross (1991) deliver a particularly strong critique against technological determinism. They argue that technologies are not repressively foisted onto passive populations. On the contrary, technologies are developed at any one time and placed in accord with a complex set of existing rules or rational procedures, institutional histories, technical possibilities, and popular desires. Thus, technology does not have an incentive of its own.

On the other extreme is a purely instrumentalist perspective of technology. Instrumentalists argue that technology “simply supports the interests of its user; a tool has no intentions of its own, but is simply a formal device” (Trend 1997:106). Whatever the social context, technology is rational and neutral, and only extends the capacities of its users, which are embodied in the ‘goal’ of the technology. An instrumentalist approach would, for example,

deny that the car had a more profound impact on society and culture than simply serving the purpose of transport or that television became so ingrained in culture that it was more than simply a tool for informing and entertaining. The Internet and other forms of IT, in the same sense, do not lead to societal change because they do not have an incentive of their own. They are simply tools that serve users' interests. From a historical perspective, an instrumentalist approach will also not suffice as it ignores completely that technology can change society in unexpected ways without the "consent" or even knowledge of its users.

To fully understand the impact of the information revolution, it is important not to abstract IT from the values and belief systems in which it operates (which both determinist and instrumentalist approaches do), but to place greater emphasis on exploring the underlying processes of technical and social change. According to Feenberg and Hannay (1995:9) technical objects have two hermeneutic dimensions, namely social meaning and cultural horizon. By examining the social role of technology and the lifestyle it makes possible, its social meaning becomes apparent. It is only then that technology's contextual causes and consequences become clear.

Cultural horizon, on the other hand, is a concept denoting the unquestioned background to every aspect of life, some of which support the prevailing hegemony in society. Cultural norms emanating from economics, ideology, religion and tradition form this horizon and in turn the boundaries of technological development. The rationality underlying how a society functions is mirrored in technology and in that sense technological hegemony is established. Hegemony here means a form of domination so deeply rooted in social life that it seems natural to those it dominates. Marxist scholars explain how class relations are entrenched in the design of production technology. The assembly line de-skills workers and paces work, thus increasing control over workers and in turn, increasing productivity and profit. In a society where the dominant rationality is to impose discipline on workers from above, the assembly line will be seen as technological advancement. Thus, the hegemonic values that characterise society are incorporated in machines and remain unquestioned because it is "that aspect of the distribution of social power which has the force of culture behind it" (Feenberg & Hannay 1995:10).

Two approaches to the relationship between technology and society that aim to go beyond the determinist/instrumentalist dichotomy to appreciate the hermeneutic dimensions of technology are social constructivism and political economy. Constructivists argue that technology, society and nature are inherently intertwined to the extent that “contemporary technology is embraced, diverted and reappropriated by everyday life” (Lemos in Kitchin 1998:58). Constructivists often think in terms of systems instead of cause and effect and to this end “they concern themselves with relationships more than objects, with process more than structures, with networks more than hierarchies. In a system, a given effect not only radiates through the system, it also generates feedbacks which change the factor that caused it.” (Milbrath in Trend 1997:26). Social constructivism thus aims to understand how technology and its uses are ‘constructed’ through complex political and social processes, that is, institutional and individual interaction whereby many different actors and agencies interplay over periods of time (Kitchin 1998:59).

Political economists emphasise the interrelatedness of technology and society too, but do this in the context of the capitalist economic order. The broader dynamics of capitalism that shape society and the powers that underlie the capitalist order are key to understanding the developments in IT because technology is used to serve the interests of industrial and corporate profits. A neo-Marxist argument is often made by political economists that the information society is a myth created by government, the military establishment and TNCs who benefit from the information revolution (Kitchin 1998:60). Moreover, this argument is extended to include the global capitalist order by referring to North/South relations and how the comparative advantage that the former has over the latter in terms of trade is exacerbated by the information revolution. Drahos (1995:210, 211) writes: “High-tech industries were increasingly becoming a force to be reckoned with in Washington DC. Many of them, like Microsoft, Apple, and Lotus had hit the Washington lobby trail in a serious frame of mind. Industry associations like the Business Software Alliance and the International Intellectual Property Alliance were formed to articulate and protect the interests of these information giants. In the 1990s the United States reclaimed, if it had ever lost, its status of hegemonic leadership in the world.” The information era is sketched as an era where IT will be concentrated in the hands of massive multi-media conglomerations, an era of information feudalism where a digital divide exemplifies the already existing inequalities in and between countries.

The utopianist/futurist, determinist/instrumentalist, constructivist and political economy approaches explain the impact of the information revolution on society from a paradigm of modernism. Modernists are criticised for constructing unified, grand theories that seek to reveal universal truths but fail to account for differences between people and places. These theories are mutually exclusive and therefore criticised for a one-sided explanation of societal change that cannot be sustained in the face of disunity or conditions of difference (Kitchin 1998:61). In this respect it is useful to refer to the post-modern approach towards the relationship between technology and society. On one level, post-modernism suggests new attitudes towards knowledge, methods, theories and communication removed from objective science and its singular narratives, universal truths and causality. On another level, post-modernism emphasises that the modern society is undergoing substantial changes where individuals are not rational, autonomous, centred and stable but unstable, multiple and diffuse (Kitchin 1998:62). Rothkopf (1998:327), in explaining the impact of the information revolution on international relations, incorporates both these levels when he writes: “In an attempt to identify the key characteristics of this [information] revolution and their implications for international relations, we must begin with a recognition that revolutions, like wars, produce a fog of actions, distraction and other stimuli that make clear thinking a challenge and meaningful conclusions elusive. The nature of this revolution in particular demands a recognition that change has become one of the few constants and that we must accept that literally and figuratively we live in a metastate, a changing polity and a time of flux.” Post-modernism emphasises that the information era is an era of fragmentation, pluralism and individualism. It is an era characterised by what the Center for Strategic Studies/Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation calls “a new ontology of contradictions” with a list of contradictory phenomena, such as simultaneous global fragmentation and integration, rapid economic change and slow institutional change, stronger forces of anarchy and control.

When it comes to explaining the impact of the information revolution on society, it is useful to take a more integrated approach that incorporates social constructivism and political economy approaches, while sharing post-modern concerns.

5. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO THE IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION

The information revolution has led to a reconfiguration of traditional modernist notions of space, hierarchy and the basis of wealth. It has done this in the following ways:

Space: The reconfiguration of space (or geography) in the information era is described in at least three ways. Firstly, there are those (for example Bankes and Builder 1992:3) who argue that the interconnectivity made possible by IT is shrinking the globe. As individuals, institutions and communities become linked through computer networks, satellites and other public and private telecommunication infrastructure, geography and time are no longer boundaries (Kitchin 1998:15). A time-space compression is occurring and this has especially manifested itself on the global economic front. A domestic problem in Taiwan or Mexico can have instant effects on financial markets world-wide as was seen in 1998 with the Asian crisis and in January 1999 when the peso collapsed (Rothkopf 1998:334). On the political front, interconnectivity is also seen through the ability of people all over the world to mobilise around the issues that are important to them, whether they are geographically close to them or not.

Secondly, there are those (for example Gillepsie and Williams in Kitchin 1998:15) who argue that IT is not only shrinking distance, but is rendering it increasingly irrelevant. To this end IT goes beyond other transport and communication improvements that reduce the friction of distance by eliminating it completely because the cost and time it takes to communicate over 10 000 kilometres is indistinguishable from the cost and time it takes to communicate over one kilometre. Professional, economic, educational, political and even social relationships are thus possible without regard to geography (Bankes & Builder 1992:10). This is especially true for conducting business over cyberspace as transactions are effectively disconnected from a physical location. According to Rothkopf (1998:335) “(a)ssets can live permanently ‘offshore’ and can move instantaneously from one location to another. Indeed, in such a fluid environment, the idea of ‘location’ is more or less a legal fiction with most assets not backed by any hard commodity, existing instead as a stream of ones and zeros in the digital memories of a financial institution and, in theory, constantly moving from one market to another.”

Linked to the idea that the information revolution is not only compressing time and space, but converging it to devalue physical location, is the idea that cyberspace is providing a new social space. Cyberspace is described as free of the constraints of the body and devoid of any of the qualities of formal, real-world space. In fact, it is regarded as antispacial because “you cannot say where it is or describe its memorable shape and proportions or tell a stranger how to get there. The Net is ambient - nowhere in particular but everywhere at once. You do not go to it; you log in from wherever you physically happen to be ... the Net’s despacialization of interaction destroys the geocode’s key” (Mitchell quoted in Kitchin 1998:17). Cyberspace is then often thought of as that space which is behind the computer screen or the virtual “world in the wires”.

Although the information revolution fundamentally alters traditional notions of space, geography and time will continue to be significant for three reasons. Firstly, there is a visible inequality in the density of the global information network in and between countries. Cable News Network (CNN) International reaches only three percent of the world’s population of which only one-fifth have access to a television set and only a fraction of people (304 36 million) of the six billion people have access to Internet (Moisy 1997:79; NUA Analysis) (see Appendix D). Secondly, while information on-line may be dislocated, the value of information is often dependent on the locale within which the body resides. A person may, for example, be able to visit websites of travel destinations, but the question is whether it will ever replace physically visiting those places. Thirdly, cyberspace is made possible by real world spatial fixity: points of access, and the physicality and materiality of wires and other infrastructures that make a global information network possible. It does not annihilate other political, economic and social determinants that are dependent on geography such as face-to-face social networks, the physical needs of an electorate, a workforce and access to materials and markets (Kitchin 1998:16).

In fact, it is argued that the information revolution actually accentuates the differences between places inasmuch as it allows for producers and consumers to capitalise on it. IT makes it possible for producers to “slice up the value chain”, or complete different stages of the production process in places where their cost-benefits (cheap labour, reduced standards

of work conditions, lenient environmental laws) will be optimised while maintaining unity of organisation.

Whether the reconfiguration of space means accentuating geography or devaluing it, it implies vast implications for any form of government based on geography. In a federal system such as the US, state and county tax collection and laws differ, and this begs the question which state or county's tax system or laws will apply to cyberspace. This problem is mirrored on the international scale, exemplified by a case in which the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) blocked sales of home kits to test for AIDS and a South African company sold kits over the Internet, delivered them by mail and thwarted overseas regulators (Huber 1996:146). Analyses of this problematique have given rise to talk of the diffusion of state boundaries, the demise of the state system or simply the fact that because citizens can to some extent 'choose' the laws and tax system they want to adhere to when doing business over cyberspace, governments are now in competition with one another.

Hierarchy: The limits placed on communication between subordinates are seen as a way hierarchy in organisation is maintained, albeit in the business, political, religious, military or educational terrain. It is argued that the information revolution makes it increasingly easy for subordinates to communicate horizontally, outside of normal channels. In the business sector this can be seen in the decline in middle management and the empowerment of workers and in the political terrain in the ease with which dissidents can mobilise (Bankes & Builder 1992:11). The unravelling of structures is best illustrated, though, by the disaggregation, decentralisation and disintermediation of the world's financial markets. Power is no longer concentrated in the hands of a few central bankers, a few major banks and a few leading stock brokerages, but is held by all players that have sufficient capital and are plugged into the global system. The electronic marketplace is undermining the monopolies of clubs, previously defined by size and personal networks that would meet to discuss whose capital would back which deals. Just as individuals can become so called "on-line" stock traders, they can also avoid middlemen in every other sphere of business because the Internet makes it possible for buyers and sellers to find and deal with one another directly (Rothkopf 1998:335).

The decline in hierarchy does not mean that hierarchy will disappear completely. It may be replaced by other forms of hierarchy for example individual billionaire speculators in the financial markets, such as George Soros, controlling the state of affairs. Moreover, the decline of hierarchy has potentially destabilising or anarchical effects as more actors enter the system. Although the impact of the information revolution on hierarchy is often portrayed as dispersing power to individuals with democratic implications (Bankes & Builder 1992:13), Ganley (1991:7) warns that new personal media permit individuals to intrude upon and deceive other individuals or, as the countless hackers attacks have proven, to disrupt established institutions. There is also a school of thought that questions the decline of hierarchy, especially where governments are concerned. They argue that governments have more power than ever to intercept communications and survey citizens, breaching their right to privacy and creating a “big brother is watching you”¹² system (Wright 1999a:1-15).

The basis of wealth: Of all the conceptual changes that accompany the information revolution, the idea that knowledge (or information) is the central economic resource of the information era seems to be the least contested. It is noted that manufacturing, like agriculture during the industrial revolution, will not disappear during the information era, but is being eclipsed by information as the basis of wealth. The fact that material and fabrication cost is declining in relation to the cost of the information, which defines the product (such as money invested in skills of workers and data necessary to conduct business), is an example of this trend. Computer software is not only becoming relatively more expensive than computer hardware, but also more important to optimise the value of computers (Bankes & Builder 1992:12). Another way in which the reconfiguration of the basis of wealth is manifested is in the growth of jobs in the information sector, which is already outnumbering jobs manufacturing physical goods in Western countries. Rondfeldt (1992:247) contends that “information is treated increasingly as a valuable source of competitive advantage, and capital and information are becoming more interchangeable as factors of production.” For some business leaders, information is important as a source of capital, but for others it even succeeds capital as a source of economic and political power.

¹² The phrase ‘big brother is watching you’ originated from George Orwell’s novel *1984*. In the novel Orwell imagines two-way television surveillance (Barber 1998:577, 578).

In the light of such reconfigurations of traditional concepts as described above it is fashionable to speak of the establishment of an information society when describing the effects of the information revolution. The information society is then defined as “an advanced, postindustrial society of a type found most commonly in the West. It is characterised by computerisation and large volumes of electronic data transmission, and by an economic profile heavily influenced by the market and employment possibilities of information technology” (Martin 1988:37). Post-industrialism is the idea that services have replaced manufacturing as the dominant economic activity, just as the agrarian society evolved into the industrial society when focus shifted from agriculture to manufacturing. A key feature of the information society is then that knowledge and information are supplanting capital and labour as key production factors in the economy. Consequently, ownership of information means power for those who own it (Lyon 1988:3). An information society is further characterised by the following properties (following the criteria that Martin (1988:40) sets out for the development of an information society):


- Information technology as the key enabling force, that is, widespread diffusion of information technology in offices, factories, education and the home.
- On the societal front, widespread information consciousness and end-user access to high-quality information; thus, information as an enhancer of the quality of life.
- On the economic front, information is a key economic factor whether as a resource, service, commodity and/or a source of added value and employment.
- On the political front, freedom of information that leads to a political process of increased participation and consensus.
- On the cultural front, recognition of the cultural value of information through the promotion of information values in the interest of the development of the nation and individual.

In essence then, the information society is one in which the diffusion of information devices has brought about comprehensive implications for business methods, design and manufacturing techniques and the way in which people go about their everyday life, albeit interaction with others, travel, entertainment, doing business or obtaining information (Saxby 1990:3).

The concept ‘information society’ is problematic, however, in that it confines the effects of the information revolution to the so-called info-rich societies. The info-rich societies are those that have access to IT and the opportunities it provides, as opposed to the info-poor societies. In the info-rich societies there may be info-poor people who do not personally have access to information devices to the extent that other people have. But, the concept information society provides the scope to study the effects of the information revolution on those at the information periphery of the info-rich societies. It does not, however, provide the scope to study the effects of the information revolution on info-poor societies.

Info-poor societies are those societies “currently outside the wealth-creating countries of the northern hemisphere and the Pacific Rim” (Haywood 1995:ix). These societies are, to begin with, not in the post-industrial phase of development. In fact, some areas of these countries are not even in the industrial phase. One way of distinguishing info-poor societies from info-rich societies is to compare the number of Internet users by geographic location as is done in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1. Internet users by location, 1998



Source: www.nua.ie/graphs_and_charts (in Industry Trend or Event 1999:62).

It is clear that most Middle Eastern, African and South American countries show very little, if any, of the features characterising an information society. Despite this, the information

revolution has distinct implications for these countries. For example, the national security considerations of info-poor countries (like those of info-rich countries) have changed with the development of global positioning systems and satellite surveillance even though the info-poor do not make use of these technologies themselves. In the same sense the impact that IT has on the global economic system, increasing for example capital mobility to levels unprecedented, impacts profoundly on info-poor countries' economies. The broadcasting of images throughout the world instantaneously and the mobilisation of the international community on a much larger scale than ever before have also impacted on the info-poor societies even though they do not satisfy the criteria of information societies.

Because of the limitations of the concept 'information society', it is perhaps better to use the analogy of a global village when describing the nature of the information era. This analogy dates back to 1967 when McLuhan and Fiore first used it, predicting that the developments in IT will make a world possible where one can increasingly know things and do things that were previously only possible in a small village. The analogy allows for examination of the global effects of the information revolution, that is, how both info-rich and info-poor nations are affected by IT whether intended or unintended.

More importantly, the global village analogy does not make the modernist assumption that the info-rich and info-poor countries are at extreme poles of a development continuum and that the latter will imitate the development path of info-rich societies as they acquire IT and connect to the global information network. As the information revolution spreads to other parts of the globe, it is important not to extrapolate from Western experience, but to study how the hermeneutic dimensions of IT (that is, social meaning and cultural horizon) change or are changed in different societies. The global village is thus not homogenous, but can be thought of as consisting of different 'neighbourhoods'. Although these neighbourhoods are still part of the global village, their experience of the information revolution may differ from one another.

In this context, it is important to note that the West and especially the US has been at the forefront of the information technological revolution. IT has thus largely been developed under a cultural horizon where the values of political and economic liberalism dominate. The effect of this cultural horizon is particularly evident in the nature of the Internet, which

is largely free of government control whether in terms of content, taxation or other forms of regulation. There have also been successful movements to keep it that way in the United States. Re-routing, filtering and surveillance attempts by the US government have been countered by users of the Internet, keeping the values of freedom of speech and privacy intact in the technology. The question is whether IT is a vector for these values when it is exported to other countries or whether it is adapted to the cultural horizon of other societies. This will be one of the themes explored in the next chapter when the impact of the information revolution on democracy is examined.

6. CONCLUSION

The advent of the information era, brought about by the information revolution, has changed the context within which fundamental issues such as democracy and world peace exist. Keeping in mind that the information revolution is all but exhausted it will only be with hindsight that the nature of the information era can be sketched with any kind of certainty. Nevertheless, this chapter identifies some of the changes in society that have been experienced as a result of new IT. This has been done while taking cognisance of the different theories of technology, which inevitably inform discussions about the nature of the information era. Based on an integrated theoretical approach, the world of the information era is described as a global village consisting of info-poor and info-rich 'neighbourhoods'; where the notions of space, hierarchy and wealth need to be re-evaluated; and where IT affects people directly (to the extent that they have direct access to IT in their everyday lives) or indirectly (through the globalisation of financial markets and media).

With respect to international relations IT can be compared to nuclear weapons that changed the setting (or arena) of international relations after 6 August 1945¹³ to such an extent that theories had to be reviewed and adapted to a new reality. The difference is that IT arrived on the international arena more gradually and unlike nuclear weapons, which largely affected the security of states the implications of the information revolution have manifested themselves more explicitly on all the terrains of international relations. The actors, issues and processes that constitute the elements of International Relations theories are affected by IT. Democratic peace theory is no exception. To evaluate the plausibility of

the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era, the impact of IT on the core elements of democratic peace theory needs to be explored. Democracy is one such a core element. The direct and indirect implications of the information revolution for democracy will be the subsequent focus of the study.

¹³ On 6 August 1945 the first atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

CHAPTER 5

DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION ERA

1. INTRODUCTION

The impact of IT on democracy involves a complex interplay between its design, its use and the environment in which it is deployed. In terms of design the Internet in particular seems to have strong democratic proclivities. It reflects a vast forum that encourages many-to-many interaction around the world. It is decentralised and therefore individuals using it can bypass gatekeepers and control the flow of information and goods. In addition, the Internet's non-proprietary nature (in the sense that nobody owns the protocols that make up the Internet) suggests a degree of openness and public purpose (Shapiro 1999:14). It is not difficult to see the Internet as a vector of democratic values that can be used to liberate citizens in authoritarian governments, to improve democratic participation in existing democracies or to create a transnational democratic culture (three claims that will subsequently be analysed). However, design is not unchangeable, uniform or used in the same good faith. This makes it important to explore who controls IT and for what purpose (or stated differently: who does not control IT and which purposes are not privileged), a debate that has largely revolved around the state, the market and society's role in the global village. This debate also leads to a re-examination of the claims to democracy in the information era within the context of the digital divide.

2. ENHANCING DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION ERA

Democracy in the late twentieth century has been characterised by two trends. The first is a series of transitions to democracy that Huntington (1991) referred to as the Third Wave of democratisation. The second trend has been called the crisis of Western democracy and is related to the lack of political participation and the domination of democratic processes by special interests in Western political systems. IT, it is argued, impacts on both these trends in ways favourable to democracy. IT has also played a role beyond enhancing national

democracy by facilitating transnational networking to such an extent that scholars refer to a globalisation of democracy.

Huntington (1991:9) defines democratisation as the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Democratic transitions involve two processes. On the one hand, the non-democratic government abdicates or is overthrown and a democratic government is installed through free and fair elections. On the other hand, a broader transformation process takes place that involves creating a democratic political culture. The latter process commonly commences before a democratic government is installed, serving as a push factor for democratic transitions, and usually continues after the installation of a democratic government. The information revolution impacts on democratisation by facilitating both these processes and doing it in the following ways:

Facilitation of pro-democracy and dissident movements: Since the onset of the Third Wave of democratisation dissident movements have used IT to overthrow or counter non-democratic governments. Personal electronic media, such as fax machines and videocassettes, were used in the mid-1980s in the Philippine revolution to oust the Marcos regime and in Panama against the Noriega regime¹⁴ (Ganley 1991:9-11). However, the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China remains one of the best examples of how IT was used to counter non-democratic governments during the early stages of the information revolution. Students made extensive use of video and audio cassette recording, photo copying, faxing and telephoning, and for the first time, a vast computer network was employed to further their cause. BITNET, an academic network linking US, Canadian and Mexican universities, was connected to EARN (an academic network in Western Europe) and ASIANET (a network in Japan and the Pacific basin). It was on the bulletin boards of BITNET that Chinese students across the United States as well as students from Europe and Asia posted their outcries against the Chinese government. BITNET also served as an organisational platform where pro-democracy supporters set up telephone, fax and letter-writing brigades. These were used to supply and co-ordinate news and messages, exchange Chinese fax numbers, keep lists of the dead and wounded of Tiananmen Square, make arrangements to

¹⁴ In the case of the Philippines disguised Western and Japanese news content was spread through fax and copying machines. In the case of Panama, the Panamanian News Center in Washington D.C. used Apple computers to translate Western newspapers when President Noriega closed down independent radio stations and newspapers in 1987. These translated articles were laid out to look like news clips and faxed to businesses and corporations where they were photocopied and distributed by sympathetic distributors (Ganley 1991:9-11).



lobby Washington, mobilise international public opinion and arrange to get equipment for communication to protesters (Bumbaugh 1990:2, 3). The coverage of the Tiananmen Square events by television and radio both in China and abroad added to the effective mobilisation of public opinion and support for the pro-democracy movement.

Today, the Chinese pro-democracy movement is using the Internet¹⁵ in its full capacity to undermine what they refer to as the two pillars of an autocratic society, namely monopoly and suppression. Tunnel (www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Union/1761/tunnel.html), a Chinese-language journal of dissent is edited and maintained in China, but when it is ready to go online, it is secretly delivered to the United States and then emailed back to China from the anonymous noby@usa.net. The staff and contributors stay anonymous by writing under pseudonyms and being hidden in cyberspace. The Dalai Lama also uses the Internet from India to promote his case against Chinese occupation of Tibet (Dobson 1998:19).

Other cases of dissidents using the Internet to mobilise and organise their pro-democracy movements abound, for example the Free Burma Coalition (<http://www.freeburma.org>), Indonesian dissidents against Suharto (<http://www.indopubs.com>), the Free Vietnam Alliance (<http://www.fva.org>) and Sam Rainsy, the Cambodian pro-democracy leader (<http://kreative.net/knp>). In all of these cases, the Internet is used as a medium to discuss taboo subjects such as corruption and military (or government) misconduct, to inform and mobilise public opinion both domestically and abroad and to organise campaigns against the government (Eng 1998:20, 21). In some cases the Internet is not so much used as a tool for insurgency, but more to focus attention on low-intensity, regional conflicts between people and their government. In Chiapas (Mexico) the Zapatista movement does not have any hope of overthrowing the Mexican government, just as women whose human rights are grossly violated in Afghanistan cannot overthrow the Taliban even by mobilisation through the Internet. Their Internet activities can, however, draw attention to local conditions and problems and if they mount enough international pressure, their governments may be forced to address their problems (Lutz 1999:1).

¹⁵Although there is only reference to the Internet here and in the rest of this section it important to keep in mind that the Internet incorporates a broad range of information technologies (for example computing and telecommunications).

The Internet has several distinct characteristics that make it suitable for dissident purposes. Firstly, it is possible to hide the identity of the dissident. In the case of Kosovo, Anonymizer (a US IT company affiliated with human rights organisations) set up the Kosovo Privacy Project, which allowed Serbians, Kosovars and others reporting on the situation in Kosovo, to download tools to hide their identity when emailing, accessing information or joining discussion groups. Secondly, the Internet has all the audio-visual qualities of television, radio and newspapers combined. For example, in Belgrade an independent radio station's transmitter was linked to a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) satellite and transmissions were resent from there all over the world, including 35 other independent Serbian local radio stations. Thirdly, encryption technology, which can be downloaded for free from the Internet, makes it difficult for dissident messages to be intercepted. In the case of Belgrade tunnel encryption was used to hide the radio channel, making it invisible from the outside. Fourthly, key to the Internet's ability to further dissident causes is the fact that it is not mass media in the traditional sense of "one-to-many" like newspapers, television and radio, but "many-to-many". It allowed friends and family to report on their situation from Kosovo to relatives and acquaintances abroad. These means of communication are often seen as more credible information sources than Western media reports (Time International 1999:1).

Cumulatively these characteristics of the Internet make it a difficult medium to bring under government control. Governments can try to block access to certain sites for example, the Chinese government has blocked access to such sites as Human Rights Watch, the *New York Times* and *Playboy* or to require anybody who sign up with an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to register with government security agencies. In China unregistered Internet cafes are shut down and monitoring equipment is installed on all of China's major sites (Pomfret 2000:26). Similarly, in Burma (Myanmar) unauthorised possession of a computer with network capability is punishable by as many as 15 years imprisonment. These efforts are, however, not insurmountable challenges. It is for example, still possible to access prohibited sites periodically as the dozens to hundreds of 'hits' received from China each week indicate. Furthermore, Chinese Internet surfers reportedly get around the electronic barriers by linking up to computers outside of China (Dobson 1998:19).

The economic cost of stifling IT in an information era: Most authoritarian governments realise that they face a real dilemma in the information era, namely that blocking access to IT comes with economic costs. To deny free communications is to be excluded from the global economy. The more freely and widely available, the greater the effect of modern information systems on productivity and competitiveness (Builder 1993:163). This is best illustrated by Dobson (1998:19) who writes: “The only thing authoritarian Asian countries need to fear more than freedom of expression is further economic trouble, and Beijing must surely be aware that the countries that have best weathered the Asian financial crisis have been those with real-time access to news and financial data. And so, at the same time that it tries to limit citizens’ access to the Net, Beijing has designated information technology a “national pillar industry” and is spending tens of millions on Internet hubs across the country.”

The economic cost and unsuitability of a closed society to the “informationalism” that the present era requires are best illustrated by the extremity of electronic technological and economic backwardness that the former Soviet Union has experienced since the 1970s (Kaffka 1999:1). In a detailed analysis of the collapse of the Soviet Union from an information technological perspective, Castells and Kiselyova (1995) describe how the respective development paths of IT in the West and the Soviet Union split during the 1970s. The latter was placed on a trajectory of technological retardation precisely when the United States and Japan were experiencing accelerating technological innovation. This “distortion” in the up to then equal competitive nature of the technological race between East and West is attributed to the very nature and origin of the information revolution, which was inherently incompatible with the industrial-military complex and bureaucratic principles on which the Soviet system based technological policy. Military interests took precedence over other uses of computing. Inasmuch as the military feared that developing computer science in isolation from the rest of the world would endanger national security, it transferred computing technology from the West overtly and covertly, and by reverse engineering reproduced and adapted Western models (Castells & Kiselyova 1995:31, 31).

This led to large scale technological dependency and a 20 year lag exacerbated by the fact that Western firms were compelled to compete with their counterparts at home and abroad. The Soviet technological innovation rhythm, on the other hand, was dictated by military

procurement procedures and a command economy emphasising quantity over quality. The rigid separation between scientific research and industrial enterprises on the terrain of IT at a time when horizontal linkages between different technological fields, especially telecommunications and computing, resulted in an information revolution, set the Soviet Union further back.

Ultimately, ideological repression and information control led to a lack of scientific cross-fertilisation among researchers and between researchers and the outside world. The constant KGB (Soviet Intelligence Agency) presence in research centres, the filtering and controlling of the diffusion of research findings and the fact that the very idea of a *personal* computer was subversive to the system, were contrary to precisely that which led to the information revolution and affluence in the West (Castells & Kiselyova 1995:37, 38). Gorbachev was forced to employ his policy of *perestroika*, which eventually destroyed his regime precisely because “a closed society was bound to fall further and further behind in an information age” (Freeman 1993:2). In the case of Russia, this meant that IT indirectly facilitated democratisation as it forced the Russian government to open the system if it wanted to share in the benefits of an information society.

The cases elaborated on above are not definitive proof that there is a positive relationship between the information revolution and the number of democracies in the world, but it does seem to suggest that IT can be used to facilitate democratisation. This can be seen by both the direct use of IT by pro-democracy movements to further their cause as well as the indirect impact IT has on closed societies by offering access to abundant information. Once installed, democracy needs to be consolidated. In this regard valuable lessons can be drawn from the ways in which IT has been used to improve the quality of democracy in Western countries.

Western scholars have largely focused on the qualitative dimension of the relationship between IT and democracy, especially the ways in which IT can be employed to overcome the deterioration of Western democracy. This phenomenon, referred to as the crisis of Western democracy (Hacker 1996:215) or the failure of the modern democratic project (Simonds 1989:182), manifests itself in:

- voter apathy, which steadily increased after the World War II, indicated by citizen abstention from elections;
- a decline in party membership and active participation in fund-raising and political meetings; and
- an increasingly uninformed citizenry, detached or even hostile towards politics.

A crisis of democracy develops when the necessary conditions for a democracy are endangered and this has been happening for two reasons. Firstly, citizens neither have sufficient knowledge about political issues, institutions and processes to participate actively in politics, nor a significant input in government decision-making. Secondly, citizens feel disconnected from their governments in terms of meaningful communication and this leads to distrust of political leaders (Hacker 1996:215). The blame for this state of affairs is put on the lack of public space or public spheres where citizens can freely deliberate on and debate common issues. Existent public spheres are said to be “commercialised, spectacularised, trivialised and colonised” by the state, political parties and the media (Bryan, Tsagarousianou & Tambini 1998:4). The apathy that ordinary citizens feel is thus not so much a function of being uninterested in political affairs, but rather a feeling that they have no impact on important debates (political efficacy) in a public sphere dominated by a political elite of politicians, lobbyists and journalists. According to Hacker (1996:216) more information about real issues, open discussions and channels to political leaders, are fundamental in restoring the faith of the citizenry in their ability to influence debates, their sense of belonging to a community and their potential to act in their own interest. There is widespread optimism among scholars that the information revolution provides ways in which precisely this can be done.

The impact of the information revolution on the quality of democratic government can be understood in an economic-administrative way and/or a political-democratic way (Coleman 1999:18). In the former sense, the use of IT to deliver existing government services more efficiently is at stake. Many government agencies across the world create websites that offer easier ways for citizens and businesses to use local government, whether to renew drivers’

licenses or business permits. This is an example of so-called e-government.¹⁶ Another example of IT being used to improve democratic government is electronic or Internet voting. The first binding votes cast of this sort in the United States was done on 7 to 11 March 2000 in the Arizona Democratic primary. Registered Democrats were sent a personal identification number (PIN) in the mail and using any web browser they could access the website of the company managing the electronic election (Election.com) or the Arizona Democratic Party. By filling in the PIN and a number of other security checks such as date of birth and social security number, voters went to a web page with candidates names and after choosing one, received a confirmation number (Ledbetter 2000:116). The Internet Voting Technology Alliance, a group of 50 companies, election officials and individuals formed soon afterwards. It aims, by holding discussions and helping the government set standards for this new medium of voting, to stem fears that the technology for on-line voting is not secure enough (Wasserman & Perine 2000:122). There was a sudden sharp increase in interest in electronic voting as a disputed Bush presidency emerged from Florida. The presidents of the California Institute of Technology and Massachusetts Institute of Technology agreed to undertake a joint initiative to canvass voting methods, including electronic voting.

Although several other IT initiatives exist to increase the speed, accuracy and efficiency of public services, it is the political-democratic way of using IT to improve the quality of democracy that addresses the questions of most relevance to this chapter. A starting point for evaluating the political-democratic impact of the information revolution would be to clarify what is perceived as an improvement in the quality of democracy. Some have argued that an improvement would be a shift toward direct democracy. Others have argued that representative democracy should be improved and still others have proposed a middle way where direct and representative democracy will meet in a system of deliberative democracy (Barber 1998:584). These claims will subsequently be explored.

Direct democracy is viewed in the Athenian sense, a notion that dates back to the city-states of Athens and Sparta when eligible citizens (slaves and women excluded) came together in the city squares to debate and vote on issues of importance to the city-state's welfare.

¹⁶ E-government can be divided into three categories, namely government-to-government, government-to-citizen and government-to-business transactions (Wasserman & Perine 2000:120).

Aristotle already identified limitations of direct democracy, namely that it is only plausible in a political system small enough to allow all eligible citizens to gather in one place to hear a speaker. Therefore modern democracy subscribes to a system of representation where elected representatives administer government on behalf of the people (Snider 1994:15). The “distance-shrinking” and interactive nature of IT has the potential of making the size limitation to direct democracy obsolete. By using electronic media, an Athenian square can well be simulated in modern democracies and this has led to a re-consideration of notions of direct democracy (Wriston 1997:7).

One of the proponents of direct democracy is Ross Perot, who gleaned an unexpectedly large number of votes as a third-party presidential candidate in the United States in 1992. He made use of so called electronic town halls, where people used interactive television to participate and air their opinions on national issues. He promised to continue these electronic forums when he became president so as to keep his finger on the nation’s pulse (Rothkopf 1998:354; Wright 1995:39; Dutton 1992:505). A more recent experiment of the vision of direct democracy in the information era is vote.com, a website set up by a former political consultant for President Bill Clinton, Dick Morris. American citizens can express their views on the “referendum of the day”. Each day an issue is placed in the form of a question and visitors can click to agree or to disagree. The results of the referendum are sent as email to the White House (Williams 2000:94). For Morrison, democracy in the information era would mean citizens voting on a keypad ballot wherever they were, whenever a qualified issue was posed, rather than having to wait until election day to vote (Grossman 1996: 207).

Wright (1995), Fishkin (1992) and Grossman (1996) argue that the information era has in many ways already brought about a shift towards direct democracy in the United States and other Western democracies, manifested in the following ways:

- a 4 000 percent increase in the use of public opinion surveys and polls;
- the expanding use of direct primaries in the United States and the decline of political conventions;
- the increase in state and local ballot initiatives and referenda;

- the decline in traditional political intermediaries, such as the political party and the labour union;
- the devolution of power from central governments to more local tiers of government;
- the changing nature of leadership where the capacity to persuade the public is seen as an essential trait;
- the changing nature of courts which, once immune to public pressure, now allow cameras in the court room, enabling lawyers and prosecutors to try to influence public opinion; and
- the changing nature of the press, the influence of radio and television call-in shows, the use of the Internet and talk-back journalism inviting the public to “chat” about an issue.

This shift towards direct democracy is best illustrated by politicians’ hesitance to make moves on major issues without “first taking the public’s temperature” (Grossman 1996:207). This is done through the numerous faxes, phone calls and email that inundate legislative and party offices, opinion polling and the websites of political parties, representatives and governments. Scholars are cautious of this type of direct democracy in the information era, for several reasons, namely:

Techno-populism: Madison, one of the writers of the Federalist Papers on which the US Constitution is based, early warned against the danger of popular “passions” and fickle opinion. The fear exists that electronic democracy in its direct form would be “a democracy that embodies majority opinions assembled from the unconsidered prejudices of private persons voting private interests” (Barber 1998:585). A direct democracy as envisioned above will not afford enough checks and balances to avoid a tyranny of the majority or what Coleman (1999:18) calls “plebiscitary authoritarianism”. The judicial arm of government is the final and often the only check on majoritarianism in a direct democracy, and even the courts’ power to fulfil that function may be limited by cameras in courts and inflated public opinion (Grossman 1996:208). This can endanger minority rights and freedoms. A case in point was the passing of a ballot initiative that would prohibit any community in Colorado (US) from giving special privileges to gays and lesbians. The highest court of Colorado determined that the initiative was unconstitutional and thereby spoke directly against the

will of the majority, exposing the court to pressure, especially in Colorado where judges are elected and not appointed.

Single interests: There is also the peril of single interest politics displacing the ideal of the “common good”. The information era has loosened the concept of community from its geographical connotations. It is argued that individuals can now retreat from interaction with people whose ideas and attitudes are not similar to their own to create like-minded cybercommunities on a particular issue. Direct democracy in the information era may lead to individuals losing sight of the bigger picture, the needs of their geographic community and the value of deliberative decision-making, and vote only to satisfy their private interests (Grossman 1996:207, 208).

Immediacy: The near-instantaneous communication that IT makes possible puts pressure on decision-makers to act promptly, without second thoughts. Instant responses lack deliberation and could become outlets for emotional and ill-judged actions (Wriston 1997:7). According to Barber (1998:585) “in politics, fast is often bad, slow sometimes good”. Direct democracy in the information era runs the risk of having voters make instant “consumer-like” choices about complex issues. This is precisely the criticism that Dick Morris’s “vote.com” attracted.

Media control: Those who control the media may use it to manipulate public opinion. A case in point is when Italian media magnate, Silvio Berlusconi, decided to start his own political party, won the national election and became the Italian president. He had financial control of the three private television networks and many newspapers and magazines, as well as the biggest advertising agency (Grossman 1996:208).

Given these caveats, there is some scepticism that direct democracy would be improving democracy in the information era.

Representative democracy is democracy rooted in the election of accountable deputies who do the real work of governing. Representative democracy developed primarily because of the impracticality of direct democracy in a modern state (Hacker 1996:226). In its elitist form, representative democracy assumes that people, especially those at the lower end of

society, do not have enough knowledge and concern to be of relevance to everyday political decision-making. The average person does not have the time, ability or inclination to acquaint him-/herself with issues or candidates. Well-defined interest groups should, therefore, compete for power and advocate on behalf of the average person (Snider 1994:16). Interest groups are supposed to mediate the input of people in decision-making by seeking majority support for their particular and partial interests through bargaining, trade-offs, coalitions and compromises on the political terrain. It is precisely this kind of elitism that contributed to the crisis in Western democracy. IT is used in the following ways to make representatives more accountable to the people and facilitate communication of their needs to their representatives to ensure better representation (Bacard 1993:42,43):

Public access to government data: There is a general movement towards easing accessibility to information both in the news media and by governments. News agencies are increasing the speed and scale of their information provision, while giving citizens greater control over the information they want. In the United States, the National Information Infrastructure (NII) Agenda for Action makes provision for easy and equitable access to government information and in Italy a new law on the need for transparency underlay the creation of a civic network (Bryan Tsagarousianou & Tambini 1998:6). Government and the news media are often working together by broadcasting the deliberations of government bodies, such as the C-SPAN channel in the United States and Parliament On-line in South Africa (SA).

Grass roots networks: IT has made it easier for groups to organise on a local, national and global scale. Lobbying is more egalitarian because it is cheaper to mobilise support for a movement (Wright 1995:42). It is thus easier for those groups usually marginalised in the political process to convey their sentiments to their representatives.

Public feedback to government: Through faxes and email, citizens can contact their representatives. The Public Electronic Network (PEN) system of Santa Monica, California, for example, included a mailroom, which allowed citizens to send messages to all city departments (Doctor & Dutton 1998:129).

These measures may prove to be a step away from elitist representative democracy and more equitable access of interest groups to the system, but there are still inherent caveats, namely:

A lack of public deliberation: The access to government information and electronic feedback do not imply true political interactivity. Sending email to a representative who sends a standard letter back ‘saying it is good to hear from you’ is not interactive or deliberative (Hacker 1996:227).

A lack of communitarian decision-making: Interest group activity is by nature focused on private rather than common interest and though IT has provided a more equitable platform for organisation, interest politics still implies group warfare for scarce resources as opposed to reaching communitarian goals (Abramson 1993:30).

According to Abramson (1988:27), the moral case for democracy lies in the “sovereignty it bestows on the people, the freedom it gives to as many persons as possible to participate as directly as possible in the affairs of government”. The fact that political decision-making is increasingly complex and involves specialised issues does not mean that experts should monopolise the political terrain. It means that experts should be able to convince the ordinary citizen of their arguments in a lay person’s terms as a lawyer or prosecutor would convince a jury (Hacker 1996:226). A Jeffersonian argument can be made, namely that the inadequacies of democracy are best remedied by more democracy and civic incompetence is not a reason to disempower citizens, but empowerment a remedy to redress incompetence (Barber 1998:584). Bearing in mind the perils of a plebiscitary form of direct democracy in the information era, scholars such as Coleman (1999) and Barber (1998) suggest that the dichotomy between direct and representative democracy should be relaxed, to allow for deliberative (also referred to as communitarian or participatory) democracy. Any advancement to this kind of democracy that the information era can bring about is deemed an improvement in the quality of democracy.

Deliberative democracy brings the best of both direct and representative democracy together inasmuch as it allows for more participation but assumes more deliberation among citizens. Deliberative democracy goes beyond the direct and representative democracy that

is possible in the information era, because it “calls not only for votes but for good reasons: not only for an opinion but for rational argument on its behalf” (Barber 1998:586). It implies politically competent citizens who deliberate and make informed decisions and it allows more time to elapse, thus preventing decisions being made in haste. The following aspects are important when deliberative democracy is pursued:

Public sphere and civil society: The idea of a public sphere denotes a place where citizens can freely engage in deliberation and public debate, where they can formulate their political identity and express their political will (Tsagarousianou 1998:52). IT is widening and opening up 'publicness' through creating such public spaces, which are not dominated by the state or mass media. Politics depend on the existence of public spaces and forums to which everyone has access. It is here where conflicts and demands can be expressed in ways that the usual inflexible representative institutional framework of state institutions and political party systems does not allow. This increases the scope for communitarian action. Individuals do not only choose what is to their personal benefit, but through deliberation in the public space will come to know what is in the common good and make decisions to realise it (Hacker 1996:222).

Interactive communication: To achieve greater understanding there must be true interactiveness when humans communicate, in other words, a recursive type of message exchange. This is referred to as message dependency where messages are sent in direct and indirect responses to one another. In conditions of high interactivity, communication roles may be interchangeable and thus power is equalised. Interactive approaches to political communication expand the public sphere and decrease the elite sphere of power and influence. IT should thus be used to transform linear political communication into two-way upward-downward and lateral communication (Hacker 1996:227, 219).

User-control media: The mass media has been blamed for much of the undeliberative nature of Western democracy in the past. But the interactive nature of IT has helped to overcome the once “smokestack” model where citizens were merely bombarded with messages that they could choose to pay attention to or ignore. On-line versions of newspapers, for example, have ‘talk-back’ functions where readers can comment on an article and on comments by other readers in an interactive way. Neuman (1996:8) states that

the mass media is complemented by the fact that “new developments in horizontal, user-controlled media [allow] the user to amend, reformat, store, copy, forward to others, and comment on the flow of ideas”.

The following examples of electronic democracy projects highlight how IT is consciously employed to bring about deliberative democracy:

UK Citizens Online Democracy (UKCOD): In 1996 the UKCOD, a non-partisan service offering a virtual space for public information, deliberation and consultation was established. It was an experiment in electronic democracy, funded by charitable support and staffed mainly by volunteers. It includes projects such as on-line consultation with citizens about council tax, on-line conferencing on European monetary union with key UK players, an election forum where candidates were asked questions by the public, and a site established to inform and extract response about the UK government’s White Paper on the freedom of information bill (Coleman 1999:20, 21). The value of UKCOD is that it serves as a model for governments that want to use IT for interactive public deliberation and participation.

Neighbourhoods On-line: Neighbourhoods On-line is an Internet resource centre in the US jointly established by the Institute for the Study of Civic Values in Philadelphia (US), and a local community network called “LibertyNet”. The main goals of the project are:

- to maintain a website that informs citizens about programmes, issues, and political developments related to neighbourhood empowerment;
- to help civic organisations and service agencies to get access to the Internet, teach them how to use email and the World Wide Web (WWW); and
- to develop email lists with the aim of creating networks of neighbourhood activists who are motivated to work for common economic, social and political goals (Schwartz 1998:114).

The real value of projects such as Neighbourhoods On-line is that it uses the Internet for local projects. Fears that the Internet poses the danger of drawing citizens into global

communities while they neglect their local ones, are hereby addressed (Davidow 1997:S134).

The Digital Cities Project: In Amsterdam (The Netherlands) a project was launched in 1994 by an independent political-cultural centre, De Balie, and a group of former computer activists, the Hacktic Network Foundation (now called XS4ALL). It constructed a virtual city where information providers have different theme-based squares, for example an environmental square, a news square, a health square, a book square and a gay square. Each of these squares has eight buildings occupied by information providers and citizens can build “houses” (homepages containing personal or other information) between the squares. In the public spaces of the squares citizens can have discussions. The project aims to use the city metaphor, a true-life frame, to:

- initiate and stimulate public debate between citizens and between citizens and local government in electronic discussion groups;
- create a platform for distributing local government, public and administrative information;
- assist/support citizens and civic groups to post their information electronically;
- stimulate citizens rights and obligations on the Electronic Highway and to look after the interests of consumers;
- provide opportunities for and connection between projects and information providers both nationally and internationally;
- develop instruments which would enable users to obtain access to information services;
- and
- maintain and expand contact with international community networks (Francissen & Brants 1998:23).

The Amsterdam Digital City was such a success in terms of people registering as “inhabitants” and visitors, that there are today some 70 digital cities in the Netherlands. Despite the non-committal nature of discussion groups and the often, racist or other bigoted contribution, the digital cities have become an Athenian-style agora where people come to buy things as well as exchange ideas (Francissen & Brants 1998:39).

Network Pericles: Launched in 1992 in Greece and developed by researchers based at the Communication and Media Laboratorium of the National Technical University of Athens, Network Pericles is a communications network aimed at enabling citizens to participate directly in the political process of their local authority or region. This is done through:

- citizens' initiatives which are electronically submitted by citizens for debate and voting through a system of motions that need to be seconded by a predetermined percentage of citizens;
- binding or consultative referenda on issues submitted by other citizens or put to the electorate by government; and
- recall, removing elected officials.

Maintenance of the public sphere and marginalisation of the possible privatising/individualising effects of computer mediated communications (CMC) are also goals of the Network. These are attained through provision of information on issues and facilities for citizen conferencing. Users of the network are given equal space and time to argue their case and to respond to other arguments (Tsagarousianou 1998:42-47).

Similar projects have been erected in many other European and North American cities. These projects can only be successful in enhancing democracy if citizens in the area have universal access to it. In Bologna (Italy), the civic network project is moulded within the framework of connectivity being a universal right of all citizens (Tambini 1998:84). In the absence of universal access, most electronic democracy projects are not antagonistic to representative democracy, but strengthen the institutions of representative democracy through enabling those who govern on behalf of citizens to know public attitudes and opinions.

So far the concept democracy has been used to refer to a form of government within the boundaries of the state. The process of globalisation has, however, introduced questions of governance and democracy on a global scale. IT is said to provide many of the benefits it does for national democracies on a transnational scale. In fact, it is argued here that IT

advances two processes, which set the stage for the globalisation of democracy, namely the globalisation of civil society and citizenship and the globalisation of public spheres.

Some theorists emphasise the opportunity that globalisation provides for a “universal community of mankind”. The notion of an international society, starting with the creation of the UN, has been reinforced by the rise of issues that are global in nature (for example global climate change, human rights, refugees and international drug trafficking) and the increase in international governmental and non-governmental organisations. The role of information and communication technologies has been crucial in the development of global thinking and the transnationalisation of civil participation (Serra 1996:222). In this regard Giffard (1996:198) explains how the Association for Progressive Communications (APC)¹⁷ played an essential role in facilitating the exchange of information and ideas during the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. Environmental groups used the network to share information on the preparatory meetings, the Summit itself and the Global Forum. Moreover, the focus of the network was more co-operative in solving environmental problems than quarrelling about regional differences.

Networking is used to portray a synthetic view of those relevant actors who work nationally or internationally on an issue and are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchange of information and services (Clever 1999:2). The metaphor of networks to explain global civil society is sometimes interpreted too restrictively as referring to formal non-governmental organisations only. NGOs are but one part of a much more general and fluid civil society where organisation does not necessarily take the form of identifiable organisations, but of sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing points of contact. In this regard Cleaver (1999:13) prefers the metaphor of water, particularly the ocean with its ceaseless currents “... now moving faster, now slower, now warmer, now colder, now deeper, now on the surface” to refer to civil society. He asserts (1999:13) that “(a)t some points water does freeze, crystallizing into rigidity, but mostly it melts again, undoing one molecular form to return to a process of dynamic self-organization that refuses

¹⁷APC was set up in 1990 when several smaller nets (Econet, Peacenet, Conflictnet, Greenet and other Internet service providers) joined together. It has become a worldwide network of networks linking peace, environmental, human rights and social organisations and has been the centre of a number of global and regional campaigns (Ingram 1999:6).

crystallization yet whose directions and power can be observed and tracked. Thus too with ‘civil society’.”

Hence, the Internet goes beyond globalisation of NGOs and movements of solidarity, to facilitate grassroots democracy among a global public by creating a global public sphere where citizens, irrespective of their nationality, can communicate. Sreberny-Mohammadi (1996:12) writes: “The Internet, with its guestimated 60 million users, is as of yet the largest public global conversation. Topics include the prurient and the political, the religious and the racist, an open space for progressive and nondemocratic ideas alike”. The Internet provides a place where individuals and interest groups can freely express their views and where ideas can compete, which is an expression of democracy (Alleyne 1994:413).

Globalisation of democracy does not only revolve around creating spaces where a global citizenry can deliberate public issues, but also involves ways in which citizens can influence the outcomes of public issues. International financial institutions, which are largely regarded as being beyond public (and state) scrutiny, have come under public attack during the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO) trade negotiations round in Seattle in 1999. Protesters, organised by making extensive use of the Internet, raised their grievances about international trade. A similar movement was organised for the 2000 IMF and World Bank (Bank of Reconstruction and Development) summits in Washington. The World Bank subsequently held an Internet conference on globalisation where people could voice their ideas and grievances. Although this process does not imply any legal sanctions of IMF or World Bank actions and is often described as co-optation of civil society, it is a step towards greater public participation in the policies of international organisations previously beyond the public’s reach.

Serra (1996:223) voices an important view on the role of the mass media in globalising democracy. She states that “government policymakers still rely on the media, especially quality newspapers, as sources of information about world affairs, thermometers of international opinion, carriers of their messages to the general public, and means of communication between other elites.” This may be problematic for reasons of political-economics, namely corporate control of content or the so-called “deep profound crisis” of journalism (McChesney 1997:71), which will be returned to subsequently. In a study of the

coverage by four news agencies of the Rio Earth Summit, it was found that there was a disproportionate coverage of conflict relative to co-operation and the views of rich countries and their leaders. Nevertheless, it was concluded that in general the issue was well-covered, with material from a variety of perspectives (Giffard 1996:216). In the case of street children in Brazil being killed by death squads involving the police, judges and businessmen, the issue was globalised by international NGOs such as Amnesty International and the mass media (Serra 1996:227). In this sense NGOs and the media can play an important role to put an issue on the table for global deliberation and enrich the information being communicated among citizens in public spheres.

The mostly positive impact or potential impact of IT on democracy as has been sketched so far is based on the premise that the decentralised, interactive and non-proprietary qualities of the Internet could be maintained and extended. This is, however, not a given. As the Internet has expanded, it has become increasingly clear that certain forces may use the Internet for non-democratic purposes. This has spurred a debate surrounding control and governance of this global network.

3. STATE, MARKET AND SOCIETAL CONTROL OF THE INTERNET

The debate about control of the Internet is a complicated debate because cyberspace consists not only of hardware, but also of content. Although most writers do not distinguish between these aspects, the debate sometimes focuses on content control and at other times on design control and the impact the latter may have on content control. In the rest of the section the implications of state, market and societal control of IT for democracy will be examined, and where possible the distinction between design and content control will be made.

The state and IT: Since the inception of interactive television voting in the 1960s, the political debate surrounding it was primarily characterised by the fear of two-way surveillance where the state would use the available technology to profile citizens and violate their rights. These fears have continued in the information era. Wright (1999:3) argues that a period of pre-emptive policing has begun where law enforcement and intelligence agencies, instead of reacting to a crime, are increasingly tracking social classes,

ethnic groups, dissenting activists and others living in “red-lined zones”. In a report¹⁸ entitled “An appraisal of the technologies of political control” presented to the European Parliament’s Scientific and Technological Options panel (STOA), the ways in which governments can use IT for national and international surveillance are outlined. The two systems most famous for their global interception capabilities are:

- ECHELON: This is a UK/US system comprising US (National Security Agency/CIA), UK (GCHQ), Canadian, Australian and New Zealand intelligence activities. This network, created during the Cold War, has five centres in each of the aforementioned countries, which provide each other with keywords, phrases and names of people to tag. Analysts believe that all email, telephone and fax communication within the scope of this system could be routinely intercepted and transferred to the relevant centre. Criteria determining who is not a target of surveillance are unclear. As a result of this type of indiscriminate surveillance the legitimacy of the information gathered by the ECHELON system have come under scrutiny.
- EU-FBI system: The EU, along with five other countries, has been planning its own global surveillance system with FBI help. This system will link law enforcement agencies responsible for policing, customs, immigration and internal security. The plans for this system, Wright (1999:10) notes, have neither been referred to any European government for scrutiny, nor to the Civil Liberties Committee of the European Parliament, despite the civil liberties implications thereof.

Arbitrary targeting of individuals and groups, and breaches of privacy by the state as a result of a paradigm shift from human intelligence to communications intelligence, have been one concern about the potential harm to democracy from state activities in the information era (Whitaker 1999). A second major debate involves the measure to which the state can and should intervene to censor information in cyberspace. At first it was thought that it would be impossible to regulate the content (or intellectual property) in cyberspace. This has been proven to be untrue. Increasingly governments are finding ways to censor information through filtering software and protocols. Governments can route Internet

¹⁸ The IC2000 report on communication interception and ECHELON was approved as a working document by the Science and Technology Options Assessment Panel of the European Parliament (STOA) at their meeting in Strasbourg on 6 May 1999 (European Union 1999).

communication through electronic gateways known as proxy servers, that is powerful computers seeking out communication that is deemed subversive or offensive. In authoritarian governments, such as China, this has meant that a good deal of foreign content has been blocked, whereas other governments, such as Singapore, have primarily focused on pornographic sites. Not all government regulation of the Internet is malevolent to democracy, though. The EU has, for example, implemented a directive on information privacy that places limitations on the collection and use of private information (Shapiro 1999:18, 19). Moreover, cybercrime, such as hacking and spreading viruses, demands government interventions.

Corporations and IT: Fears about the state in the information era have been dwarfed by the debate on the potential impact of corporate control of the hardware and knowledge of cyberspace on democracy. The case for corporate (or market) control of cyberspace, so called cyberlibertarianism, is best outlined in a document entitled *Cyberspace and the American dream: a Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age* which was released in 1994 by the Progress and Freedom Foundation and co-authored by Esther Dyson, George Gilder, George Keyworth and Alvin Toffler. The essence of cyberlibertarianism is the idea that the market, not government, is the only viable mechanism to keep up with the pace of changes in a Third Wave society. Inasmuch as inexpensive knowledge destroys economies of scale, the marketplace of the information era is one that will allow greater scope for dynamic competition. Natural monopolies and large TNCs will give way to smaller entrepreneurs with flexible production structures that will use customised knowledge to provide consumers with a larger diversity of goods. In this sense, ownership of cyberspace is left with the people. Ownership here should be understood as private ownership. The role of a Third Wave government is fivefold:

- To create a path to interactive multi-media access by reducing regulatory barriers to collaboration between the cable industry and phone companies. In this respect the *Magna Carta* states: “forcing a competition between cable and phone industries is socially elitist” because it will lead to supplementary and duplicative networks.
- To promote dynamic competition by reducing price-and-entry regulations because these regulations lead to natural monopolies where the monopolists submit to price regulation in return for an exclusive franchise on the market.

- To define and assign property rights. In this respect it is argued that US economic success is based on the right to private property. In the information era clear and enforceable property rights should be extended from patent and copyright systems for software to the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
- To create pro-Third Wave tax and accounting rules which take into consideration the shortened capital life-cycles of the information era, making it possible for the computer industry to depreciate their products according to their real life span. Current tax laws in the US overvalue physical assets and undervalue intangible capital: thus human resources.
- To create a Third Wave government by redefining the relationship between government and society and here the emphasis is on smaller, dispersed and decentralised institutions.

Finally, cyberlibertarianists have distinct views on freedom and community. The notion of freedom in the information era, is one of individual freedom that even extends to hackers, whom the *Magna Carta* authors argue have become key to the economic growth and trade leadership of the US: “It is hard to imagine hackers surviving, let alone thriving, in the more formalised and regulated democracies of Europe and Japan.” As far as community is concerned, it is argued that cyberspace will open up minds by ‘demassifying’ communities. According to Salin (quoted in the *Magna Carta*) “(t)he global network is a connected ‘platform’ for a collection of diverse communities. Just as access to homes and offices, churches and department stores is controlled by their owners or managers, most virtual locations will exist as distinct places of private property”. In short, the keys to success in the Third Wave era are customisation, individuality and freedom.

The *Magna Carta* in particular and cyberlibertarianism in general are criticised for their right-wing interpretation of the concepts freedom, social life, economics and politics in the information era (Winner 1997:367). Chapman (in Roberts 1999:2) asks: “Was it an accident or just a misunderstanding that made the authors of the “Magna Carta” choose that phrase for their work? The original “Magna Carta” was a document that spelled out and enforced the rights of the nobility, not the rights of common people. The “Magna Carta” was a document of feudalism, not of democracy. Perhaps the feudal model is more appropriate to what the authors recommend”. Specific points of critique are levelled against the *Magna Carta*, namely:

Technological determinism: The *Magna Carta* presumes that the Third Wave “shapes new codes of behavior that move each organism and institution – family, neighborhood, church, group, company, nation...” and people who do not ride this wave will perish. There is thus an inherent sense of inevitability built into cyberlibertarianism as defined by the *Magna Carta*.

Radical individualism: It is argued that the unprecedented level of individual “exercise of personal power and self-realization” that *the Magna Carta* foresees in the information era will be at the expense of individual responsibility, altruism and social welfare.

Supply-side, free market capitalism: According to the *Magna Carta* dynamic competition will lead to the demise of large centralised structures and natural monopolies and bring decision-making closer to the people. Capitalism in the information era is thus sketched as an egalitarian process. In this sense, capitalism is equated with democracy. But this notion can be criticised in at least three respects. Firstly, markets maintain and strengthen class divisions in society because power is not neutral or premised on one person one vote, but on one dollar one vote, benefiting the prosperous relative to the not so well to do. Secondly, the market does not so much give people what they want as it “gives them what they want within the range of what is most profitable to produce”. The range from which people are constrained to choose is narrowed. Third, because markets are driven solely by profit considerations, long-term concerns and values, such as the environment and poverty issues, are downplayed (McChesney 1997:63; Sclove 2000:4).

Contradictions: The *Magna Carta* contains several contradictory points. On the one hand, it praises dynamic competition, but on the other, it argues that competition between cable and phone companies is unwelcome. Greater concentration of power over the conduits of information is supposed to lead to abundant bandwidth and universal access, but in practice this has the effect of content control. Instead of the collapse of natural monopolies as the document predicts recent corporate mergers, such as Time Warner, Turner Broadcasting and America Online, have created media giants. It is thus argued that the *Magna Carta* conflates the activities of freedom-seeking individuals with those of big profit-seeking business firms (Winner 1997:369; Sclove 2000:3).

Those who caution against corporate control and commercialisation of cyberspace, so called political economists, argue that the relationship between IT and democracy should be viewed firstly within historical context and secondly within the bigger realm of global capitalism.

Historical precedents for possible directions in control of the Internet can be found by examining the route radio and television followed. In the 1920s radio broadcasting, a radically new development then, was heralded for its public service potential, but soon its capacity to generate profits through network operation and commercial advertising became apparent. Governments could opt for public radio with popular participation that would reflect the level of democracy in society. In other words, in an open, democratic society, radio would portray such a culture, and in a closed, non-democratic society, radio would portray a non-democratic nature. In almost all countries, governments chose public radio except in the United States where the government chose private radio (Chomsky 1994:45). This decision effectively thwarted a radio reform movement in the United States that believed “if private interests controlled the medium and their goal was profit, no amount of regulation or self-regulation could overcome the bias build into the system. Commercial broadcasting would downplay controversial and provocative public affairs programming and emphasize whatever fare would sell the most products for advertisers.” (McChesney 1997:61). By claiming that the handing over of radio to private interests constituted democracy inasmuch as it was giving people choices in the marketplace, business won an ideological victory.

This victory became especially apparent when the same public/private battle for the soul of television was replayed in the rest of the world, except in the United States where it was immediately commercialised. Although there are some public channels on US television today, it is argued that they are under-funded and only exist because private channels found it to be an escape route for them not to fulfil the US Federal Communication Commission (FCC) criteria on programming to public interests (Chomsky 1994:47).

Commercialisation of the Internet in the United States poses a worse threat to the democratisation of this medium than was the case for radio and TV. This is because the US

is at the forefront of developments in IT and the cultural horizon (of corporate control) may be so embedded in the technology that it may well not leave other countries alternatives to a commercialised Internet.

Looking at IT and democracy within the broader context of global capitalism, it is argued that the desire of corporations to expand globally fuelled much of the innovation in the IT sector. IT occupies the position in the world economy that steel, railroads and cars did in earlier eras. According to McChesney (1997:68, 69) five points are of importance to understand the cautionary (sometimes Luddite) position against IT under corporate control:

- Governments are severely constrained to formulate economic policy favourable to any interests aside from transnational business, because the ease of transborder capital flows make it possible for investors to take their money elsewhere.
- This gives business more leverage when dealing with governments and with labour movements. Labour and environmental regulations are some of the first casualties of globalisation.
- Globalisation in essence places a damper on economic growth rates in most countries. Inasmuch as individual investors will seek out the lowest wages, there is a downward pressure on wages and therefore buying power. This in turn, leads to a decline in profitable investment possibilities.
- Investment in the IT sector destroys almost as many jobs as it creates. The global working class is faced with more unemployment as the shift from manufacturing to information-related jobs (biased to the educated) occurs.
- In the light of the growth of transnational global financial markets that are beyond the power of any national or international regulation, there is a growing element of instability in the global economy.

Global capitalism not only affects democracy adversely by exacerbating class stratification, but also leads to the demise of civic virtue by creating a global commercial culture. In this respect Sclove (2000:1) warns that a commercially driven Internet will lead to the disappearance of the neighbourhood economy as more and more people shop on-line. So-called 'downtown' businesses will shut down because of a reduction in clientele, and force

even those people who do not want to shop online to do so. This is referred to as the Cybernetic Wal-Mart effect and juxtaposes the role of people as citizens against their role as consumers. Furthermore, as the Internet becomes commercialised its use for any other purposes than buying goods diminishes. On-line newspaper versions, for example, already have a much higher advertising-to-content ratio than their printed counterparts (Sclove 2000:5). Thus, political economists fear that increasing market control of the Internet will lead to corporate empowerment replacing democratic empowerment.

Society and IT: There are two views regarding societal control of IT, namely the infoanarchy view and the civil society view. There is a large group of people who believe that the Internet should not be controlled at all: the Internet should be an anarchy. Info-anarchists often develop, buy or support software and computer systems that allow people to communicate and trade on the Internet under conditions of anonymity, making the targets of government enforcement action invisible and defeating market regulation of the Internet. Although infoanarchy poses a threat to society in terms of hackers, child pornographers, privacy invaders and other cybercriminals, the real concern is with the threat posed to intellectual property rights. Publishers and record companies have filed several lawsuits against companies, such as Napster and MP3, that provide software for music sharing by downloading digitised songs for free (Schenker 2000:42). In the case of Napster everybody who downloads a song also agrees to make his/her digitised songs available for others to download. The infoanarchy view, often said to be a way to counter the monopoly of large music and publishing companies and their profit-seeking behaviour, becomes especially contentious for two reasons. Firstly, it may damage the rights of artists and writers and lead to piracy, which places a disincentive on creativity. Secondly, those who do not have access to the right computer devices will not be able to share in the benefits of infoanarchy. Moreover, music companies and publishing houses may even recover lost profit by raising prices in the market.

A less contentious view of societal control of IT concerns civil society. Both state and corporate control of cyberspace for purposes that may be to the detriment of democracy have met a substantial response from the non-governmental, non-profit sector to expose and resist undemocratic trends (Wright 1999b; Roberts 1999:1). One organisation that deems to keep the nature of IT democratic is “Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility”

(CPSR). In a document “One Planet, One Net: Principles for the Internet Era” they outline principles to counter social, economic, political and technical forces that can result in the Internet being homogenised, commercialised, and regulated to the extent that it fails to serve as a medium for maximising human potential. These principles are (Roberts 1999:1, 2):

- the Internet links people together;
- the Internet must be open and available for all;
- Internet users have the right to communicate;
- Internet users have the right to privacy;
- people are the Internet’s stewards, not its owners (those who reap benefits from using the Internet must respect the rights of others who may use the Internet in different ways);
- administration of the Internet should be open and inclusive; and
- the Internet should reflect human diversity, not homogenise it.

Although there is no authoritative body to interpret, let alone ensure that these principles are honoured, the members of CPSR try to increase awareness about them and are in their individual capacities involved in numerous projects that incorporate and promote these principles.

Therefore, it seems that there is a delicate balance to be struck among the state, market and society. On the one hand, state control of IT could be invoked to ensure equal access to cyberspace and to guard against private interest dominating it, but absolute control will stifle development of IT and may even be used for citizen oppression. Although the market will be more efficient in developing IT, left to its own devices, the rights of non-participants to the market may be severely damaged and forms of justice such as those based on needs, ability and fairness, may be neglected. Despite the fears accompanying state- and market control of IT for the purposes of power and profit it is difficult to imagine a world (even a world in the wires) without state and market intervention. The answer is thus not so much to dispense with them, but to recognise that neither the state, nor the market was ever expected to operate without moral ties to civil society. In this regard Kurtland and Egan

(1996:400) write: “Civil society is a place that allows freedom by forcing people to recognize their interdependencies, in contrast with the capitalist market system, which only encourages pure self-seeking behavior and the state, which asserts coercive power.” Striking this balance is by no means a simple task, which is exemplified by the process of assigning domain names and numbers.

In 1998 the US government created a private, non-profit corporation called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to administer the Internet domain name system (DNS), previously monopolised by the company Network Solutions. Their main task is to administer the Internet’s names and numbers, the domain name system and the corresponding Internet Protocol addresses that identify servers connected to the Internet. Although this may sound technical, it has become increasingly political and economic as intellectual property and trademark ownership came into play (The Economist 2000:77-79). Furthermore, ICANN’s management of the DNS is equated to controlling the central nervous system of the Internet, which may give it leverage for future regulation. In exchange for a domain name, Internet users agree to rules that touch on free speech, taxation and anonymity. It is thus essential that ICANN is as democratic as possible. For this reason space was created on the Board of Directors of ICANN for elected representatives. Internet users over the age of 16 with a verifiable email address and physical address can sign up as members and can vote for nominees in their region (Cyberfederalist 2000:1). Civil society groups are actively involved in lobbying for candidates that they think will increase societal control of Internet governance. An ICANNwatch.org website has also been established by these groups to ensure that ICANN is not controlled by state or private interests. There seems to be a general recognition that the precedent set by ICANN will become future practice and will determine who controls the Internet and for what purposes.

A factor of equal importance to determine the impact of IT on democracy is the digital divide.

4. THE DIGITAL DIVIDE AND DEMOCRACY

Information cautionaries emphasise that the value to democracy that IT may have is severely compromised if people do not have universal access to it (McChesney 1997:70). Not only will those who do not have access to IT be excluded from the benefits that IT provides to democratic participation, but as more government–citizen relations become Internet-based, there is a real danger of excluding people from the system as a whole. Equal opportunity to participate in the political system is one of the cornerstones of democracy. The demographics of access to and use of IT suggest, as was mentioned previously, that the distribution of IT users both within and between countries is severely skewed.

It should, however, be kept in mind that the Internet only really expanded in most countries in the early 1990s. In fact, Hargittai (2000:128) writes that the Internet only started to grow at its current pace since the emergence of geographical browser software for the WWW in 1993. The Internet has since outgrown all other media at similar periods of their life cycle. Governments world-wide, from Nepal¹⁹ to Iraq²⁰, seem to acknowledge the urgency of bridging the digital divide and have not only adjusted their national policies accordingly, but co-operate in regional context in this respect. African ministers of communication for example have met in the past decade on a regular basis to discuss how Africa can be launched into the information era without succumbing to exploitation from large foreign telecommunication companies (South Africa 1998). Their initiatives include establishing centres of excellence (so-called African Connection Telecentres) in all 52 African countries to build technological capacity (Jensen 1999). The UN Secretary-General has also proposed a new programme that will create a new international voluntary corps, the UN Information Technology Service. This is part of a plan to bring advanced technology to poor countries to enable them to leapfrog over traditional stages of development at a lower cost (Crosette 2000:A4). There are also non-governmental programmes to address access issues, for example the Institute for Village Studies has a programme where they provide educational

¹⁹ Nepal's government is encouraging private investments in their telecom infrastructure due to financial shortages and hopes to get at least two telephone lines into every village after which Internet access will follow (Rojas 2000:64).

²⁰ Iraq only connected to the Internet in 1999 when it began opening Internet centres in government ministries and the first public centres were opened only in July of 2000. This late coming to the information era is due to the severe UN economic sanctions that were instituted against Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait (Reuters 2000a:6).

programmes along with information services, such as Internet access, to remote villages in Central America and India, but at the same time try to preserve their unique culture (www.villagestudies.org).

The digital divide is, however, marked not only by limits on access to hardware that makes up cyberspace (primarily an economic constraint), but also by educational and cultural barriers. The educational barrier exists as a result of people not having computer skills. This barrier is bound to diminish in info-rich countries as software to access the web becomes more user-friendly and younger generations that are more comfortable with computers, age. In low-literacy rate countries, this barrier may be more difficult to overcome. The cultural barrier to access concerns, on the one hand, the Western language and value domination of the Internet and on the other hand, the fact that the Internet models “a male epistemology of reason-ruled, impersonal, linear-communicated, monological, and non-face-to-face interaction” (Kurtland & Egan 1996:393). As the Internet spreads to non-Western countries, the hope is that they would enrich the Internet with their own cultures. With respect to male domination there are groups such as WELL and ECHO that have established programmes to encourage women to use the Internet and make it more representative. Recent surveys have shown that efforts to increase Internet access have proven fruitful to close the digital divide within countries, but the gap between developed and developing countries is still substantial. This does not mean that the Internet is not expanding to developing countries, but only that the growth in developed countries is much faster, an understandable fact if the economic, educational and cultural barriers to access are compared (Reuters 2000b:6).

5. CONCLUSION

Inasmuch as the information revolution is all but exhausted, any definitive claims, whether Utopianist or Luddite, about democracy in the information era can only succumb to technological determinism. Based on the evaluation of the relationship between IT and democracy, though, there is reason to believe that the information era provides favourable opportunities for democracy. There are two sides to this argument. Firstly, social movements and groups devoted to progressive issues and social change use IT to improve democracy. IT is not only used by pro-democracy movements in their fight against

authoritarian regimes, but also to facilitate democratic transitions by creating a more open political culture. Furthermore, IT is increasingly employed to overcome the crisis in democracy experienced by most Western countries primarily as a result of a lack of participation. This is done by creating public spheres where citizens can deliberate public issues and communicate with their representatives. The phenomenon of public spheres is replicated at a global level where the global public and civil society engage in deliberation and act to influence the outcome of global issues.

The second side of the argument is that new information technology can be distinguished from the media that preceded it as it is relatively cheap, easy to use, difficult to control and interactive. Inasmuch as every Internet user can be both a sender and receiver of information, the information era provides unprecedented opportunities for participatory media forms and democratic uses of IT. The threats posed by state and corporate control and use of IT are duly noted as challenges to democracy in the information era. However, there have been substantial societal movements to expose and counter this. Furthermore, severe state control of IT has proven to be a recipe for economic backwardness. The Internet also provides unique ways to inform and mobilise a global citizenry to hold TNCs accountable, which should be of some consolation for political economists concerned about the expansion of global capitalism in the information era. Another challenge to democracy in the information era is the extent to which the digital divide in and between countries can be closed. This is one of the key concerns for striking a balance among state, market and societal control of IT, where the state and society emphasise equality of access, while the market emphasise efficient development of technology and production.

The way in which IT impacts on democracy has direct bearing on the research problem of the study, inasmuch as the second postulate of the propositional logical deductive model states that the information revolution is likely to enhance democracy. Establishing the probability that IT will provide favourable opportunities for democratisation, the quality of democracy and the globalisation of democracy, is thus an essential step in inferring that the democratic peace is more likely to exist in the information era. But, the research problem also probes a normative objective, namely to propose ways in which IT should be employed to enhance world peace. In this respect the challenges for democracy in the information era

as identified here, should be key concerns if the democratic peace is to be an plausible, viable and feasible approach to world peace in the information era.

CHAPTER 6

THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AND WORLD PEACE IN THE INFORMATION ERA

1. INTRODUCTION

When peace is defined as the absence of war (as is mostly the case in International Relations), peace efforts and peace discourses presume a certain conception of what is to be understood as war and warfare. The traditional conception of war is that of institutionally organised, interstate lethal violence. This conception derives from a view of the international arena as composed of sovereign states that will engage in war whether for just or unjust reasons. It also informs the liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace. However, the end of the Cold War and the arrival of the information era have changed both actors and processes of international politics to the extent that traditional interpretations of war and peace need to be revisited. This does not mean that traditionally defined wars are no longer probable and ways to prevent them worthy of study, but it does acknowledge that traditional conceptions of war do not provide sufficient conceptual leeway to propose a comprehensive approach to peace in the information era.

In this chapter the impact of IT on the democratic peace will firstly be sketched, adhering to a neo-liberal internationalist interpretation of the democratic peace. Such an interpretation assumes an anarchical international system composed of sovereign states, defines democracy as a form of national government, and war as organised violence between states with battle fatalities amounting to 1 000 or more. It also suggests that the impact of IT on democracy and world peace can be studied, *ceteris paribus*, that is, while all other variables remain more or less unchanging. Secondly, the neo-liberal assumptions will be relaxed and more flexible definitions of democracy, war and peace are employed. A reflectivist approach is taken that sees IT not just as a variable, but as constitutive. As constitutive, the impact of IT on war and peace is not studied as a given or a universal truth (fact, what is), but in a normative way (what should be). Through ethically guided discourse the impact of IT can be directed towards democratic and peaceful outcomes.

2. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: *CETERIS PARIBUS*

When IT is incorporated into the democratic peace equation in a propositional logical deductive way, drawing a conclusion about world peace in the information era becomes an exercise in inference. In other words, the premise that IT provides favourable opportunities to enhance democracy in a qualitative and quantitative manner, given that democracies do not go to war with one another, leads to the inference that world peace will be enhanced in the information era. To substantiate this inference and ensure that it is not a spurious result, the extent to which IT will have a positive effect on the two explanatory models offered for the democratic peace, namely the cultural/normative and institutional/structural models, needs to be examined.

According to the normative/cultural model, democracies will not go to war because the norms underlying democratic governance make for peaceful resolution of conflict rather than war. Because democracy presumes the consent of the governed, political elites cannot make war for their own selfish interests. However, externalising these norms to the extent that they contribute to peaceful relations among states, depends on the principle of reciprocity, in other words, whether states perceive other states to be governed by the same norms. If states do not perceive other states to adhere to democratic norms internally and to project these norms onto their relations with other democratic states, then internal democratic norms cannot ensure externally peaceful behaviour.

IT contributes to the normative/cultural aspect of the democratic peace in the following ways. Human rights and pro-democracy groups use IT to put pressure on authoritarian governments to act in more democratic ways by exposing and resisting human rights violations. This is done through facilitating the mobilisation and organisation of dissident groups that focus their efforts on democratisation in the Huntingtonian sense, that is, overthrowing or forcing authoritarian governments to abdicate and installing democratic governments. These groups may be engaged in peaceful struggles as is the case of Aung San Suu Kyi in Burma or armed struggle in the case of Kurdish rebels in Turkey. The use of IT goes beyond a tool of organisation and mobilisation of dissidents; it also involves mobilisation of the international community and global public. This is done through the so-

called CNN effect, an effect that now includes many more channels of mass media than CNN and is probably better termed the CNN *et al* effect (Libicki 1998:411-428). The CNN *et al* effect refers to the reach and impact that news channels, such as CNN and BBC, have on global audiences when they feature a news story. For example, in September 2000 San Suu Kyi was prevented from making a political trip to another village by the Myanmar military regime. The news coverage by CNN and other networks combined with the efforts of the Free Burma Coalition induced widespread political pressure by the international community, including a letter from Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, to the military regime.

IT facilitates not only political pressure on authoritarian governments, but also economic pressure for democratisation. Firstly, authoritarian governments risk economic backwardness if they restrict access to IT. Secondly, the global public exerts pressure on TNCs not to invest in countries with bad human rights violations. This was best illustrated when PepsiCo lost a \$1 million contract at Harvard University in the United States because of a boycott by students who denounced PepsiCo's involvement in Myanmar. The company opted to withdraw from Myanmar. Although boycott campaigns are not new, the use of IT has made them more effective (Bray 1997:206).

The necessity of IT infrastructure for economic competitiveness means that authoritarian governments need to relinquish their restrictions on information. Although governments such as those in China and Myanmar can exert some limitations on the websites which people visit, the Internet still provides access to abundant information and ideas, one source being regular academic and social email interaction. There is reason to believe that the access to information and ideas can cultivate a democratic political culture that will facilitate transitions to democracy. In this respect Wriston (1997:175) writes: "The impact of global conversation, like that of village conversation, is enormous – and it is multiplied many times. A global village will have global customs. Denying people human rights or democratic freedoms no longer means denying them an abstraction they have never experienced, but violating the established customs of the village." This does not mean that culture in the global village is homogenous or that the customs Wriston mentions refer to liberally defined Western democratic practice *per se*. To illustrate this point reference can be made to Kuwait. Wheeler (1998:359) mentions that Kuwaitis use the Internet to have

encounters with the opposite sex, and that a *muhajibah*, a religious women who veils uses the Internet to pursue her job. Both of these examples, given the very closed nature of Islam as it is practised in Kuwait, are indicative of the use of cyberspace by Kuwaitis to act in unthinkably more open ways than their 'traditional' culture dictates that they should.

In established democracies IT is used to intensify democratic norms through providing more channels for public deliberation and participation. Political representatives are indeed obliged to consult more closely with an informed citizenry; they can explain their decisions and –if the explanations fail– be held accountable for their actions. This can be seen in the rise of civil society groups and grassroots movements and the direct effect they have on government policy²¹.

Democracies are characterised by various structures that institutionalise democratic norms of consent by the governed and protection of rights and freedoms against the arbitrary use of government power. Although these institutions may vary from one democracy to the other, they all provide a structural delay for political decisions in that these decisions are subject to broader public scrutiny. This can occur in many ways, for example, a representative body having to ratify a decision or a decision being tested against a form of constitution or law. Democratic institutions prevent war between democracies because internal consent needs to be mobilised, and even if this can be done, the structural delay may give leaders sufficient time to pursue peaceful means of resolving conflicts. This is, however, again subject to the reciprocity principle, which means that democracies will only let the due democratic course take its turn if they perceive the adversary having to do the same. If not, democracies may resort to emergency powers and portray exactly the behaviour that would be expected of non-democracies.

IT indirectly helps establish democratic structures and institutions by facilitating democratic struggles against authoritarian governments. The installation of a democratic government usually coincides with institutionalising democratic norms through the division of government power or other forms of structural constraints to executive power and

²¹ The protests over the high taxes levied on fuel in Europe during September 2000, is an example of these kinds of grassroots movements. IT played an essential part in the success of the protests through facilitating organisation of protests, making information about tax levels available, and facilitating a snowball effect through Europe.

protection of human and civil rights. Once established, IT is used to strengthen these institutions in an economic-administrative way, for example by employing IT in the election process, delivering services to citizens or disseminating information about government actions and decisions to citizens and enabling them to participate in the political process. The ease with which civil society can organise and mobilise also facilitates the institutionalisation of public watchdogs on government actions.

Both the explanatory models place emphasis on the mutuality of democratic norms and institutions to prevent war between democracies. Reciprocity in the anarchical international system is for the democratic peace what deterrence is for the balance of power. If a democracy does not perceive another state to be constrained by the same norms and structures, non-violent behaviour by the democracy cannot be guaranteed. An important aspect of the maintenance of the democratic peace is thus the communication of a country's democratic nature or the limitations placed on its behaviour towards other countries on the international terrain. This has traditionally been the role of diplomacy in foreign affairs. The dawn of the information era has generated three new types of diplomacy, expanding traditional intergovernmental diplomacy, that facilitate the projection of a state's democratic nature and peaceful intentions, namely public, private and virtual diplomacy (Tehranian 1999a:63-68).

Public diplomacy: The increased interaction between people from different countries, the CNN effect and global interdependence have created the need to go beyond “elite groups within national governments communicating about international problems only with each other, and largely behind closed doors” (Roberts 1991:113). It is increasingly seen as a matter of political necessity for governments to communicate with the public, not only in their own country, but also abroad. A state can no longer act without getting the support of foreign publics; if it alienates a foreign public, the government of that state may be less inclined to undertake joint efforts with it. This strengthens the democratic peace, because democracies then must justify their behaviour not only internally (to their own citizens), but also abroad. It adds institutional and normative constraints to government behaviour and joins them to communicate their democratic nature internationally in a consistent and credible fashion.

Popular diplomacy: Public diplomacy is top-down and rather than supplanting traditional diplomacy is more of an auxiliary instrument to governments to ensure support for their policies. Popular diplomacy, on the other hand, is bottom-up and involves ordinary citizens, eminent people, such as former US president, Jimmy Carter and groups such as Amnesty International, to engage in diplomatic efforts. Governments often find these efforts intrusive, but popular diplomacy does serve to overcome narrow or nationalist objectives.

Virtual diplomacy: IT has broadened and deepened the opportunities for diplomatic efforts through a diverse variety of channels. For example, global teleconferencing has allowed numerous official and unofficial contacts on a regular basis. American and Russian executives are linked through the 'hot line' (installed after the 1962 Cuban missile crisis) and a closed circuit video teleconferencing facility. The Internet has, however, been instrumental in allowing expert groups to act as intermediaries, advocates and advisers in international conflicts. Arbitration and conflict resolution networks have sprung up on the Internet. They are run by various institutes and research centres that identify parties in a conflict and try to engage them in dialogue. For example the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Co-operation (IGCC) embarked on a project called "Wired for Peace". The project involved linking social scientists and policy makers with science and technology experts to develop Internet applications for multi-lateral co-operation in the Middle East and Northern Asia. Track-two communications and co-operation between key players through access to multilingual document libraries, workgroup schedules and tools for collaborative document writing and data analysis were aimed at strengthening peace processes (Gormley 1999:19). This is also referred to as Virtual Track-Two diplomacy. The other side to virtual track-two diplomacy involves people-to-people interaction where citizens learn from their counterparts in other countries. The personal nature of this kind of diplomacy means that it is potentially powerful in mobilising public opinion and influencing government policy.

Given the impact of IT on democratic norms, institutions and communicating mutuality of constraints that bind democracies, it is clear that IT is likely to increase peaceful relations on the dyadic level, in other words, between two democracies. Whether the same can be said for peace on the monadic and system levels needs further examination.

The monadic level concerns the effect of IT on democratic pacifism, that is, whether democracies are inherently more peaceful and the translation of this into peaceful relations between mixed dyads (democracies and non-democracies). The Gulf War and the NATO bombing of Serbia, the most well-known post-Cold War instances where democracies were involved in conflict that bordered on full-scale war with non-democracies, suggest that democracies are just as warprone as they used to be. The role of global mass media (CNN *et al*) has been especially ambiguous in contributing to peace between mixed dyads. On the one hand, the global media can contribute to the constitution of an international public sphere where the international society participates in a common conversation or ‘global dialogue’ irrespective of regime type. This was the case during the US/Soviet summits in Italy near the end of the Cold War. The meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev were usually sketched as integrating events in which the whole of mankind had a stake (Hallin & Macini 1991:249-265).

On the other hand, the media’s role is severely inhibited by two factors. Firstly, the international public sphere created by the global media is often subject to hegemonic internationalism, that is, “the belief that the integration of the world is taking place but on asymmetrical, unequal terms, and that this is the only possible and desirable way for such an integration to take place” (Halliday 1988:193). Coverage devoted to different areas of the world and their responses to issues are skewed. Moreover, when these parts of the world are reported on it is done through culturally confined lenses. Kavoori (1997:104) writes that the narratives used by American (for example CNN) and British (for example BBC) journalists serve the foreign policy interests of their governments and manufacture consent in public opinion. The narratives often dichotomise, dramatise and distort the issue at stake resulting in a perception of ‘we’ (the good, lucky or prosperous ones) versus ‘them’ (the bad, unhappy or destitute ones).

Secondly, a symbiosis develops between government and media coverage of international affairs, because governments can enhance, restrict, and/or manipulate the media’s access to information and coverage (Tehranian 1999a:64). This was especially the case during the Gulf War, which is often referred to as the first government-managed television war in history. Eighty percent of the US public getting their information from television supported the war effort. However, when there are casualties involved, as was the case in Vietnam and

Somalia for the United States, the media is likely to turn against government war policy and accelerate policies favouring a peaceful approach toward a conflict. Thus, CNN *et al*, inasmuch as they are still nationally based institutions that are often initially uncritical and objective servants of national policy, are not likely to have any profound impact on democratic pacifism.

IT may, however, impact positively on mixed dyad relations by providing opportunities to monitor international agreements and treaties. In this respect, the impact of IT on the nuclear weapons issue, serves as an example. The network of portable, low-cost seismometers run by hundreds of digital stations around the world, monitors seismological events, including nuclear tests. This has not prevented states from testing nuclear weapons (clearly illustrated by Indian and Pakistan tests in 1998), but it does mean that no state can test covertly (Libicki 1998:411-428). IT also provides opportunities for individuals to disclose under anonymity, information about covert activity should their countries be involved in making chemical and biological or nuclear weapons (Larkin 1999:4).

Going a step further than arms control treaty enforcement, scholars have suggested that the age of information warfare provides favourable opportunities to help keep the peace between mixed dyads by 'illuminating the battlespace'. Battlespace illumination is usually perceived as a strategic advantage for advanced militaries using space-based sensors, specialised aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, radar and other IT related technology to scan the battlespace in fine detail and identify targets. The US' Joint Vision 2010 envisions a system of systems where different military divisions would contribute to battlespace knowledge in the same way the Internet functions: decentralised mutual accessibility. Libicki (1998:411-428) suggests that by spreading access to this network in times of peace, peace can be promoted. Countries will be able to monitor for signs of potential attack and the knowledge that states are being watched may reduce aggression. Global visibility may also reduce tensions that feed arms races. In this regard Libicki writes (1998:17): "If ... every nation could clearly see what is coming at them, their confidence in their defenses would be justified, thereby decreasing the incentive to acquire unnecessary arms. Stability might be further enhanced if all understood that access to such information favored those whose forces were designed for defense and were on good behavior." Although it may take time for confidence to develop in open systems like these, it is reciprocal inasmuch as both

democracies and non-democracies are required to disclose information about their forces and this will contribute to 'trust' (here defined as predictability of one another's behaviour) between states irrespective of regime type. It is not difficult to imagine the potential of open systems for improving relations in conflict areas such as the Middle East, Asia (China, India and Pakistan) and East Africa (Ethiopia and Eritrea).

On the system level, it was concluded that increased democratisation would translate into increased world peace when a system shift occurs, that is when democratic dyads outnumber mixed dyads. Ahead of a system shift, democratisation may actually decrease the likelihood of world peace because it would lead to more mixed dyads and mixed dyads, according to Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:306), are more likely to go to war than non-democratic dyads. Given the Cold War as the historical point where a system shift has occurred, democratisation would mean greater world peace provided that democracies do not follow a Wilsonian approach, that is using force to make the world safe for democracy. It was suggested that IT provides favourable opportunities for democratisation and in turn the expansion of the pacific union. Given that democratic dyads now outnumber mixed dyads, democratisation should result in increased world peace, leading to the conclusion that IT enhances world peace. The Gulf War and the Serbia bombings obligate a more cautious conclusion, though.

These conflicts raise the question whether democracies are more likely to take a Wilsonian approach to defend human rights in the information era. Certainly the emphasis that the world media has placed on human rights abuses along with the expansion of a global human rights movement have increased pressure on governments to intervene forcefully in cases where human rights abuses are committed. However, in the cases of Kuwait and Kosovo, intervention cannot readily be interpreted as intervention for the sake of democratisation. Former US president, Richard Nixon, remarked that the Gulf War was not about democracy or human rights, but about oil and hegemony and who the "boss" was going to in the post-Cold War era (Tehrani 1992:14). Hobsbawm (2000:17), on the other hand, makes the following comments regarding the Kosovo War: "Today, there undoubtedly is a genuine debate about the importance of human rights in order to ascertain to what extent their defense could be guaranteed by the use of military force. But I am still of the conviction that neither NATO nor the United States thought seriously about going to war entirely on

grounds of principle and ethics.” The bombing of Serbia, rather than being motivated by a moral imperative, is interpreted in realist terms as defending NATO’s credibility and to convince potential enemies outside the NATO alliance of NATO’s post-Cold War role.

IT does not so much induce a Wilsonian response from democracies, but rather impact in a Kantian way on non-democracies. The Kantian approach to democratisation sees democracy (note not necessarily defined in liberal Western terms) as the final form of government to which every state is progressing. IT, it is argued in this dissertation, is accelerating this process by facilitating the spread of democratic norms and the creation of democratic institutions. As long as the international system is composed of mixed dyads, even if they are in the minority, the democratic peace does not exclude war between them. The Gulf War and Kosovo interventions should therefore not be seen as refuting the inference that the information era provides favourable opportunities for world peace. The prospects for an accelerated democratisation process suggest that the pacific union is moving towards universal membership at a faster pace without Wilsonian wars and this increases the likelihood for increased world peace.

These conclusions are based on a neo-liberal interpretation of the democratic peace that firstly assumes particular definitions of democracy, war and the actors in world politics and secondly assumes that IT as a variable, which impacts on the democratic peace, can be studied while all other variables remain unchanging. Both of these neo-liberal assumptions will be relaxed while employing a reflectivist interpretation of the democratic peace in the information era. Inasmuch as approaches to peace presume an understanding of war, the new interpretation of the democratic peace will start by reconceptualising war.

3. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WAR IN THE INFORMATION ERA

Since the end of the Cold War, so-called ‘new security’ challenges or the broadening of the security concept have been on the agenda of scholars and policy-makers. This has involved the examination of issues ranging from civil and ethnic conflict to environmental degradation, resource scarcity, drug trafficking, organised crime and transnational terrorism and their impact on the security of states in a realm previously reserved for military concerns (Stares 1998:11). There is a danger of reconceptualising war in the information era

by taking the same approach, a national security approach, which focuses only on the impact that the advent of the information era has on the physical security of the state in the event of war. Such an approach was made fashionable by Heidi and Alvin Toffler (1994b) in their book *War and Antiwar* and employs the term information warfare to indicate the changing nature of war. In essence, the approach superimposes the implications of information technologies for conflict and the conduct of military operations on the emerging geostrategic environment of states. Information warfare on the one hand, involves the military application of IT to achieve strategic objectives and on the other, the targeting of information infrastructure to debilitate and/or defeat an enemy. In terms of the former, info-rich states have pursued information dominance, as the US military refers to the strength derived from having vastly more knowledge of conflict conditions than an enemy and the technologies to take advantage of information disparity (Rothkopf 1998:343). Policy-makers and strategists have predicted a revolution in military affairs (RMA), which is driven by the information revolution and will encompass “deep-strike dominated, stealthy air operations; land and space-based defense of the sea and submersible power projection; space warfare; and independent and integrated information warfare” (Vikers 1997:32). The Gulf War is seen as the first albeit incomplete manifestation of the RMA and US information dominance.

In terms of targeting civilian and military information infrastructure to debilitate an enemy, info-rich states have increasingly become concerned with their dependence on IT in everyday life and in military affairs, making them more vulnerable than states which are not as penetrated by IT (Pfaltzgraff & Schultz 1997:13). National security analysts in info-rich countries have subsequently been concerned about information asymmetry or the so-called David effect. It is argued that IT has the potential to empower small states that cannot otherwise afford a conventional army and/or hope to win a conventional war against a major power such as the United States. This is done by acquiring the right technology and building up a small army of so-called cyberwarriors (IT specialists and programmers that can hack into another states’ most important computers). It is cheap in monetary terms and casualties to enter an enemy’s computer-controlled infrastructure through public networks and disrupt critical services, create false information, manipulate information or launch malicious logic-based weapons against an information system (Rothkopf 1998:347).

Inasmuch as IT is readily available to non-state actors, the US military has identified substate and trans-state actors, such as ethnic factions, extreme ethno-nationalist movements, religious radicals, militias, international criminal organisations and terrorists as posing severe threats to US national security. Part of their concern over these groups and movements is that they contribute to state ungovernability and political fragmentation that could in the longer run increase regional and global instability. In this regard Pfaltzgraff and Schultz (1997:19) write: “While most substate and trans-state actors do not pose a direct strategic threat to US interests today, over time their cumulative impact could undermine regional stability in areas of vital US interest. Furthermore, such groups will be able to put at risk vulnerable aspects of post-industrial American society.” It is then no surprise that this approach to reconceptualise war in the information era emphasises negative approaches to peace in the information era, such as counter-netwar. The propensity of these approaches to give priority to stability, order and the survival of the state and not to distinguish between different types of struggles and social movements have often been at the cost of human rights and democracy. The Zapatista movement in Chiapas (Mexico) uses the Internet to mobilise and influence government policy on human rights and democracy while exposing military atrocities against them. Prominent national security researchers in the US have labelled this a netwar. They have advised the Mexican government “to improve its ability to wage counter-netwar” to ensure that netwars do not adversely affect Mexico’s stability and transformability (Rondfeldt & Martinez 1997:383).

The discourse framing the national security reconceptualisation of war in the information era is characterised by several biases, such as statecentrism, a bias for power politics and a bias for the security of info-rich states. These biases are typical of rationalist theories in International Relations.

A more reflectivist approach would be to begin a reconceptualisation of war in the information era with the concept human security. In the efforts to expand the security concept Mahbub ul-Haq, former adviser to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), promulgated the idea of human security. Human security focuses on the well-being of people “everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their communities, and in their environment” as opposed to the security of states (Ul-Haq 1999:79). Paralleling this expansion of the security concept to human security has been the

expansion of what is to be understood as peace. Not only is peace seen as a process across many levels - global, national, local and personal, but it also involves direct and indirect, intended and unintended and organised and unorganised human activity. The definition of peace used in the UN Declaration of the Preparation for Life in Peace is indicative of such a broadened conception. The UN University summarised this definition as follows: "The removal of institutional obstacles and the promotion of structural conditions facilitating the growth of socio-cultural, economic and political trends, aiming at and leading to Life in Peace understood as both subjective life styles and objective living conditions congruent with basic peace values such as security, non violence, identity, equity and well being as opposed to insecurity, violence, alienation, inequity and deprivation" (UN University 1986 in Smoker 1992:92).

Although a similar expansion of the war concept has been less forthcoming than the logical relationship between security, peace and war warrants, Tehranian (1999a: 167-171) distinguishes between pre-modern, modern and post-modern warfare. This distinction should not be viewed as historical stages of warfare inasmuch as most wars are a complex mix between all three pure types. However, it does provide the heuristic means to study the changing nature of warfare in the information era without the biases inherent in a national security approach.

The changing nature of war is studied in terms of time, space, identity, institutions, organisation and legitimisation. In the pre-modern world, war coincided with seasonal changes or migratory movements of populations, for example tribal wars and the Western encroachment of native populations. Warfare modernised as multinational, agrarian and bureaucratic empires, such as the Persian, Roman and Ottoman empires emerged. Wars became less sporadic and seasonal as they followed the *raison d'état*, involving territorial and sphere of influence conquests. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, creating the modern state system with its distinct and internationally agreed upon state borders, accelerated this process. War in this period –modern war– can be described as discrete, overt hostility across national borders accompanied by a declaration of war. The Cold War changed the nature of warfare, lending it an element of permanency manifesting in intense rivalry, proxy violence, undeclared wars, covert operations and low-intensity conflicts.

Spatially, pre-modern wars were fought at the tribal level or between feudal societies. Modern wars are fought at the national level where rules of national borders sanctified by international agreements apply. Post-modern war adheres to new rules informed by the transnationalisation of the world economy and the global reach of military technology and communication opening the space of war. Wars are conducted as if national borders do not exist, best exemplified by the shipments of arms and supplies to client states or guerrillas by the superpowers and their allies during the Cold War. Hobsbawm (2000:10) refers to this as the erosion between internal and international conflicts. The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which started out as the overthrow of Mobutu Sese Seko (intrastate war), has at times involved as many as nine African countries.

A similar shift in the identity of warfare is visible, namely from tribalist to nationalist struggles to clashes between globalist and a diversity of localist –religious, tribal or ethnic– forces. One of the fundamental characteristics of post-modern warfare is the relationship that emerges and links wars between states or organised movements with wars between private individuals or organisations. Combatants in pre-modern wars were usually *bona fide* members of the tribe that showed their manliness through battle. The citizen armies, where combatants show their identification with the state through patriotic acts of self-sacrifice, individualised war in the modern world. In post-modern warfare, combatants are professionalised, and as a result disembodied “as if wars were fought between two impersonal fighting machines” (Tehrani 1999a:169). Citizen armies are gradually being replaced by professional warriors and mercenaries for example, the South African and US military veterans fighting in Africa and Bosnia. But it is not only in disintegrating states that private armies are employed. Even in the most advanced countries private companies provide consultancy and operational services to governments about warfare and antiterrorism (Hobsbawm 2000:13). Post-modern warfare is commercialised and privatised. Again reference can be made to the DRC where diamonds have fuelled and prolonged the war and spurred the intervention of other countries and actors.

Another aspect of the identity of post-modern wars is the return of the ‘warlord’ as state power declines. Warlords are reminiscent of pre-modern wars where there were no governments except the armies of warlords. This phenomenon can also be linked to the growth of illegal businesses such as drug trafficking. It is widely believed that the Kosovo

Liberation Army is funded by the illegal trafficking activities of the Kosovar and Albanian Mafia. A similar situation is suspected in Chechnya. This does not mean that these are unjust causes, but the money thus spent has given political significance to subnational groups that have become actors on the international scene (Hobsbawm 2000:14,15).

In terms of organisation, pre-modern wars are existential inasmuch as they are based on a unity of spiritual and temporal authorities. Modern wars, on the other hand, portray the separation of church and state where civilian and military branches of government are divided and war is an extension of politics by other means. In the post-modern world, the military-industrial complex defines the enemy and devises global strategies and tactics to constantly harass and eventually defeat, the enemy. Warfare has thus shifted from being ritualised (pre-modern) to regularised (modern) to totalised (post-modern). Substantial segments of populations in the post-modern world have a stake in wars, not only because they are employed by military industries, but also because corporations in fields, such as chemicals and IT, assist in arms production (Tehrani 1999a:170).

The targets of violence in pre-modern war were the physical bodies of the enemy and the capture or decapitation of their leader. In modern warfare violence was directed toward mass populations and their economic resources. Post-modern warfare focuses on collateral damage, but also directs violence to cultural and environmental resources, for example, Saddam Hussein's ignitions of oil wells during the Gulf War. Advanced technology embodied in intelligent bombs, unmanned aviation vehicles and satellite intelligence has made destruction much more precise and discriminating. Although it is argued that this has made post-modern wars less bloody and devastating, it also means that states having these weapons may be more likely to engage in 'frequent and frivolous' destruction (Hobsbawm 2000:11). So-called 'collateral damage' inflicted when violence is aimed at military targets, as was the case in Serbia, does not account for the massive damage to infrastructure, the subsequent effect on economies and societies in whole regions or environmental damage.

Finally, a distinction can be drawn between the legitimisation of pre-modern, modern and post-modern wars. Pre-modern wars did not need legitimisation as it was a way of life, an ontological condition dictated by nature. Modern wars, however, were ideologised on nationalist (for example, making the world safe for democracy), imperialist (for example,



carrying out the white man's burden) or universalist (for example, advancing the cause of the international proletariat) basis to mobilise the masses. Post-modern warfare for the most part is permanent, routinised and professional in nature. Unless wars escalate to high-intensity war and become visible, such as the Gulf War and Kosovo, they need not be legitimised (Tehrani 1999a:171).

Although Tehrani does not refer to the role of the information revolution directly in the shift to post-modern warfare, IT contributes to the post-modern character of wars in several ways. For example, IT adds to the globality of wars by providing the means for 'lesser' actors on the international stage, such as terrorist groups, to challenge state actors. Global media has made some conflicts more visible, but there is still moral ambiguity when it comes to the timely, equal and unbiased coverage of wars. To this extent many wars are rendered invisible, because they are not covered by the global media. This is typical of protracted warfare where the global media becomes saturated of routinised human suffering. In the quest for entertainment value and ratings, commercial media prefer dichotomising conflict stories in terms of wrongs and rights and where this cannot be done, for example in the case of DRC conflict, coverage is limited. Most post-modern conflicts are deeply structural in origin. In other words, they persist for years in the form of malnutrition, chronic disease, poverty and other social circumstances that breed mobilisation around ethnic and identity lines. Only when something dramatic happens, the media reports on it and the international community is moved into belated action as were the case in Rwanda and Somalia (Tehrani 1999a:172).

The privatised, commercialised character of post-modern warfare is furthered by IT's facilitation of the global expansion of capitalism and the ease of transnational money flows. This has given big corporations disproportionate power and influence, especially, but not exclusively in countries where state structures and civil society are disintegrating. Furthermore, applying IT in warfare resembles a similar 'post-modern' outcome as nuclear weapons had on the Cold War, the first post-modern war. Information warfare is war by machines, war by remote control, automatic war, and war in new forms enabled by novel technology. It is in a sense unmoored from reality, because it is not face-to-face war of greed, territory or defence. Rather, it is institutionalised, rationalised and immune to critique. Yet, as was the case with the Cold War, it is a war 'in preparation', so terrible (and



unwinnable) that it is never undertaken to its full extent even as it consumes vast economic resources and causes deep fear (Larkin 2000).

4. THE GLOBALISATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

Wars in the information era portray post-modern elements and therefore oblige an approach to peace that is flexible enough to presume a conception of war as global, protracted, invisible, unwinnable, deeply structural, privatised, economised, routinised and often involving many more actors (state and private) than the immediate conflicting parties. This involves going beyond interstate wars to recognise that wars also occur on a substate level (intrastate wars) and on a global level (terrorist and economic wars) and that there is a complex interplay between the different types of wars. Implied in such an approach would be a relaxation of the statecentred view of world politics and the state as level of analysis (second image approach). It also necessitates acknowledgement of the often, contradictory processes that lie at the heart of post-modern wars, such as globalisation from above through state and market action and fragmentation along nationalistic and identity lines from below. The democratic peace, as the approach has hitherto been interpreted, cannot be employed to counter post-modern wars. However, the Kantian roots of this approach along with the opportunities made possible by IT to strengthen democratic institutions and norms on a global level, open the door for a reinterpretation of the democratic peace in a cosmopolitan way that transcends adherence to a statecentric, second image view.

A cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic peace is based on the notion that human beings have obligations to one another, which are prior to the formation of sovereign states. But the state system superimposes political obligations owed to fellow-citizens alone upon primordial moral ones to all of mankind. This results in “each one of us being in the civil state as regards our fellow-citizens, but in a state of nature as regards the rest of the world, we have taken all kinds of precautions against private wars only to kindle national wars a thousand times more terrible; and ... in joining a particular group of men, we have really declared ourselves the enemies of the whole race” (Rousseau in Linklater 1990:24). Loyalty to the state is thus problematic and becomes even more so when statehood and nationhood do not coincide. According to Tehranian (1999a:174) a total of 82 percent of protracted conflicts have involved nascent nations. When dominant nations are privileged at the

expense of minority ethnic groups within their boundaries, such as the Palestinians, the Kurds and the Tibetans, the state becomes a root cause of internal wars.

A cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic peace is embedded in Kant's belief "that just as we have within us the capacity to produce ideas such as 'causation' we have, within us, also the moral law, which he calls the 'categorical imperative'", an imperative to act in a particular way on the basis of moral principles and with moral motives (Brown 1992:30, 41). Kant formulates the categorical imperative in terms of three principles, namely:

- to act on a maxim that can at the same time be made a universal law. If a maxim is thus not universally applicable, it is not moral (Brown 1992:30);
- to act in such a way that you always treat humanity never simply as means, but always at the same time as ends (Linklater 1990:100,101). To live life according to universal maxims is to recognise rules that take the ends of all persons into consideration. To treat humanity as an end in itself is related to Kant's "Formula of Autonomy", which states that the will is subject to laws it makes itself, but every rational being is autonomous in this sense and may therefore not be treated in accordance with a principle he will not consent to as a rational being (Brown 1992:30,31); and
- to act as if you were, through your maxims, a law-making member of a kingdom of ends, recognising the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.

Inasmuch as Kant saw individuals, irrespective of their national/state identity as citizens of a universal state of mankind governed by universal morality, the democratic peace can be interpreted in a way that transcends the second image (or state level). This interpretation is uniquely suited to address wars in the information era for it grasps the interconnectedness and interdependencies of the global village without disregarding the diversity, difference and discrimination that inform the trends of fragmentation in the information era. Such an interpretation would emphasise that certain democratic values universally applied can enhance world peace. Tehranian (1992:10-13) identifies the following democratic values that provide the normative foundations upon which a world community can be built:

Security: Security as a democratic value is embedded in Rousseau's idea of a social contract where individuals in the state of nature accept a higher authority in return for



protection. Security has thus traditionally been defined in nationalistic and military terms. However, a broad range of security concerns affect ordinary people on a daily basis, for example environmental degradation, poverty, deteriorating health care and so forth. Moreover, security defined as national security does not recognise global security concerns (Smoker 1992:92). The distinction between a narrow and broad security concept is inextricably linked to the distinction between negative and positive peace. Negative peace, as was explained earlier, is the absence of war, and approaches toward negative peace focus on the immediate threat of war between nations. Positive peace, on the other hand, is the absence of war plus genuine human harmony and co-operation. Thus, approaches toward positive peace focus more on the overarching, long-term goal of establishing peace through a more nuanced understanding of the causes of conflict (Reed & Tehranian 1999:24, 25). A broad conception of security gives preference to the well-being of people as opposed to the physical security of states. It thus goes beyond such security arrangements as military alliances, disarmament efforts and peacekeeping to include the development of a sense of global community.

Freedom: Freedom as a norm of international community refers to freedom from coercion (in the negative sense) as well as the freedom to act autonomously (in the positive sense). Both these interpretations of freedom manifest themselves in human rights laws that are now in its third generation. First generation human rights laws focus on individual political rights as embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Second generation human rights legislation focuses on social and economic rights as embodied in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and third generation legislation focuses on the collective rights of communities as embodied in the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Tehranian 1992:11). Tehranian (1999a:185) adds two other generations of human rights, namely that associated with environmental issues and as yet to be developed and codified a generation of human rights grounded in human caring, compassion and love. Whereas the former recognises human beings and nature as interdependent, the latter sees the individual as an integral part of a larger human community. Instead of positioning the individual against society as libertarian rights do, these rights position the individual in society, more specifically in nodes of caring starting with the family, going onto school, the workplace and retirement.

Justice: Justice as a democratic norm is legally defined as the right to equal treatment and opportunity. As a norm of global democracy, justice takes on a different dimension, most notably in the light of a just world order. Inasmuch as communism proved unable to create incentives on the production side of the economy and fairness on the distribution side, it lost legitimacy as an ideology for ordering the world. On the other hand, capitalism is being questioned as an alternative ideology due to its inability to deliver social services to the poor amidst a growing gap between rich and poor within and between countries. It is thus clear that as a norm of international community, justice poses great ambiguities and controversies (Tehrani 1992:12).

Community: Community as a global democratic norm returns to the two additional generations of human rights that Tehranian mentions as preconditions for freedom. It emphasises the individual's interdependence with nature and with the community at all levels. Four conditions determine the strengths and weaknesses of a sense of community, namely the existence of core values that impart a common culture and meaning system, a communication system and media channels, commonly agreed upon systems of human agency and intervention, and generally accepted norms of conflict resolution (Tehrani 1992:12, 13). Moving from the local to the global level, these conditions usually decline.

Just as Kant did not propose a world government to establish perpetual peace, the cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic peace does not oblige the creation of a world government and the abolition of states. This is best explained by Reed and Tehranian's (1999:24) distinction between global governance and global democracy: "Global governance refers to the study of globally valid norms, rules, and international treaties and codes of conduct designed for, and generally observed by, states and transnational actors in the international public policy-making process. Global democracy, however, goes a step beyond this. It also refers to efforts to foster an ethic of world citizenship or enhancing and strengthening global civil society." A global civil society serves as an important vehicle to implement and strengthen the global democratic norms of security, freedom, justice and community and institutionalising them on the global arena as civil society does in national democracies.

Globalisation has, for example, created a gap between national democratic checks and balances and TNCs. This has been the case for two reasons, namely states are confined to territorial jurisdiction, while TNCs operate across national borders and secondly, in an era of mobile capital flows, states are subtly coerced into a lenient posture towards TNCs for fear of loosing investments. Global civil society groups can fill that gap because they operate transnationally and have less at stake when taking a position in opposition to big companies (Reed & Tehranian 1999:66). Furthermore, global networking between civil society groups has made it possible to mobilise the global public opinion around issues that invoke universal morality, such as human rights violations, environmental degradation, arms control and structural causes of war.

The globalisation of the democratic peace provided through the promotion of democratic norms by a global civil society, paves the way for addressing the post-modern elements of war in the information era. Examples already exist where precisely this has happened, namely:

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL): Although landmines are also used in modern wars, they contribute to the post-modern nature of wars in several respects. The indiscriminate nature of landmines often leads to civilian killing and maiming, more so because the cost and duration of removing landmines means that many of them are left in the ground during peacetime. This contributes to the protracted, low intensity nature of post-modern wars. Inasmuch as farmland is rendered unusable, landmines also have a structural element.

In 1992 the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) was launched. Co-ordinated by a committee of sixteen organisations, it brought together over 1 300 groups among which human rights, children, peace, disability, religious, environmental, women and development groups working locally, nationally, regionally and internationally to ban landmines (www.icbl.org/more.php3). The NGOs involved documented the extent of the problem, enlisted the media and mobilised popular support for the commonly referred to 1997 “Anti-landmine” treaty (Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines). During the negotiations of the treaty NGOs were given access and the right to comment, thus providing expert information used to

counteract government rhetoric. For example, when US officials argued that landmines protected American soldiers' lives during Vietnam, NGOs proved that one-third of American casualties were due to landmines. The ICBL was so successful that 135 countries signed the treaty and it became international law after 40 countries ratified it. It has since been ratified by an additional 41 countries. The ICBL is now focusing on getting rebel groups to abandon use of landmines. A working group of the ICBL has held negotiations with groups such as the Sudan People's Liberation Army, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka (Deen 2000:1). The ICBL recognises that an interstate ban on landmines would not be sufficient in an era of post-modern wars involving non-state, stateless or antistate actors.

Diamond trade and African conflicts: A similar campaign to the ICBL was launched in 1999 called Fatal Transactions to alert the public that diamonds often fund conflict in Africa. In Angola, Sierra Leone and the DRC conflicts, rebel forces have engaged in diamond mining to purchase weaponry and support their war efforts. Big diamond companies, such as De Beers, have been implicated in diamond trade that leads to the continuance of civil wars and the social consequences thereof (refugees, internal displacement, civilian casualties and so forth). The campaign has thus focused on transparency in diamond trading and "Global Witness", a UK based investigative human rights and environment NGO, has presented a report that outlines the problem and proposes ways in which diamond traders can be assured that diamonds are not related to these conflicts. De Beers have subsequently agreed not to buy diamonds from Angola and a certification process has been implemented in Antwerp's diamond trade market. Again global civil society has forced private actors that indirectly exacerbate wars to be more accountable.

Shell and the Ogoni human rights violations: One of the examples of post-modern war has been the involvement of TNCs in civil wars and/or oppression of minority groups to promote their interests. The Anglo-Dutch oil company, Shell, has been accused of such activities in Nigeria in particular orchestrating a series of raids by the Nigerian military on villages in the Ogoni region that left more than 1 000 people dead and 20 000 homeless. The company is also implicated in the torture and execution of the so-called Ogoni Nine, leaders of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (Mosop). Among them was the



writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. Mosop started a campaign in the early 1990s to protest environmental damage to their area as well as the appropriation of land for oil mining without appropriate compensation. Their struggle became increasingly violent and the military regime came to see them as a secessionist movement and a political threat. Whereas it would have been impossible for a minority group such as the Ogonis to seek legal retribution for human rights violations by a private company in the absence of state commitment to their cause, the information era provided unique opportunities for the Ogonis to take their plight elsewhere. In the Shell/Ogoni case, the Center for Constitutional Rights filed a suit against Shell on behalf of three Nigerian emigrants to the United States, among which Ken Saro-Wiwa's brother. The case will be tried by a full jury trial in New York. The judge awarded jurisdiction to the New York court because Shell has assets in the United States, the Nigerians emigrated to the United States, the United States has a stake in providing a forum for human rights claims and in the United States torture committed under the law of a foreign nation in violation of international law, is also a violation of US domestic law (McGregor 2000:1). A number of civil society groups are also spearheading a campaign to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) that may in the future serve as the forum where these cases will be heard (Scholte 1999:21).

The WTO, IMF and World Bank protests and the accompanying campaign waged to get Third World debt cancelled (Jubilee 2000), can be interpreted as efforts of civil society to alleviate the structural elements of post-modern warfare resulting from the unfair world economy. Aid agencies and their development and crisis alleviation efforts can be seen as promoting the democratic values of community or caring on a global scale. Voluntary associations are often an alternative to the state and market in the production and delivery of goods and services. In this way they provide a safety net of education, health, housing and other material needs for the vulnerable sectors of society. Beyond aid efforts, there are increasing numbers of NGOs directing their effort at fair trade (Scholte 1999:25). In some cases this involves microlending to the rural poor who are not credit worthy by commercial bank standards and providing them with higher (in many cases fairer) returns for their produce²².

²² Examples of such NGOs are 'AidplusTrade', a UK based organisation, which operates in South America and South Africa (www.aidplustrade.com) and Oxfam/ACTIONAID, also a UK based NGO.

According to Scholte (1999:25-27), civil society is a force for democracy in the following ways:

- providing material welfare to those adversely affected by globalisation;
- serving as a conduit for civic education;
- providing the supra-territorial channels through which citizens can reach each other. These channels are especially useful to give a voice to indigenous groups, smallholder farmers, the urban poor and those who would otherwise go unheard;
- fuelling debate by introducing alternative perspectives and methodologies and questioning accepted economic and environmental policies;
- increasing transparency and accountability of the workings of the global markets, international organisations, such as the UN and the EU and government institutions;
- promoting legitimisation through monitoring and consultation activities. Peacefulness in states is related to the extent to which citizens accept higher authority. NGOs, such as Amnesty and Greenpeace can influence the respect awarded to international organisations, transnational companies and governments; and
- enhancing social cohesion.

However, democratic norms are not automatically promoted by civil society. There are some instances where civil society can actually be damaging to democracy and peace. For example, some groups may have ill-intentioned motives. Neo-Nazi, fundamentalists and soccer hooligans also use the Internet to mobilise and co-ordinate their activities. Other civic organisations may suffer from flawed policy. Development and environmental groups are sometimes accused of handling information in a careless way or being culturally insensitive. In this regard Ostertag (in Smoker 1992:100) documented a case where a Greenpeace fund-raising activity with French actress Bridgette Bardot walking on the Arctic ice with seals, resulted in the collapse of Eskimo economies, which are dependent on the pelts market. Furthermore, civic groups may themselves suffer from undemocratic practices when it comes to their internal organisation. Members may, for example, have little opportunity for participation other than paying membership fees. Transparency and accountability are also not intrinsic to civic organisations. Inadequate representation because of biased access to civil society is one of the most common defects of global civic

groups. This result in culturally biased policies and activities and may even exacerbate structural inequalities connected to class, gender, race, nationality and so forth (Smoker 1992:101; Scholte 1999:30). There has been a trend in these organisations during the 1990s to be more representative by promoting women and people of colour as well as changing the mode of interaction between the North and South from a parent-child relationship to one of partnership and co-operation.

Thus, IT has contributed to the globalisation of democracy, especially democratic norms, such as security, freedom, justice and community. In the absence of a world government this is done through the global civil society that uses IT to mobilise and co-ordinate their efforts. As a result, these civil society groups can hold governments as well as transnational actors accountable and can facilitate the institutionalisation of democratic norms on the global arena. Global democratic norms and institutions play an important part in enhancing world peace, in particular those elements of world peace that is referred to as post-modern and are not covered by approaches to peace based on interstate war.

5. CONCLUSION

Any proposed approach to world peace in the information era needs to start with the recognition that creating the conditions that will allow states to maintain peaceful relations between themselves, although important, is not sufficient to eliminate war. This is because war can no longer be confined to the 'tidy' definition of interstate conflict in an era that has made war between states and non-state actors commonplace. Since the Cold War wars have increasingly taken on a post-modern nature. This involves, but is not excluded to local, national and transnational ethnic, religious, identity and economic conflicts, exploited for and fuelled by private interests, not least that of TNCs. It is argued in this chapter that the democratic peace by inference can promote peace between states because IT provides conditions promising to (second image) democracy. But, the democratic peace can also be expanded theoretically (via Kantian cosmopolitanism) and practically (because IT facilitates the globalisation of democratic norms through a global civil society) to address the elements of post-modern war in the information era.

This re-interpretation of the democratic peace does not assume the theoretical orderliness of the traditional neo-liberal internationalist interpretation. It can therefore be criticised for conceptual vagueness and empirical untestability. For example, the term global community is difficult to conceptualise. Does it refer to all individuals world-wide or only those that interact across state borders or have an interest in global issues? Does it include state actors, for example state representatives in international organisations or only non-state actors? Furthermore, unlike the quantifiability of interstate conflicts with a casualty rate higher than 1 000 soldiers, post-modern wars cannot be quantified, for the casualties also include those civilians that die of structural causes and consequences of war, such as malnutrition and disease. The invisibility or anonymity of many of the adversaries and their activities in post-modern wars would make measuring the extent to which the proposed approach actually reduce or eliminate post-modern elements of war even more difficult.

However, the theoretical caveats do not distract from the idea that the information era provides unique ways to foster global democratic norms such as security, freedom, justice and community on a world-wide scale. Global civil society has become a vehicle to promote these norms and to campaign for its institutionalisation in international organisations, such as an International Criminal Court. Eventually these institutions may provide more concrete and robust watchdogs over global processes and actors formerly immune to pressures of transparency and accountability and serve the cause of human security as opposed to national security. In light of the research problem of the study, in the final analysis it needs to be established whether this broadening of the democratic peace approach is sufficient to maintain that the democratic peace is a plausible, viable and feasible approach to peace in the information era.



CHAPTER 7

EVALUATION

1. INTRODUCTION

In final analysis, it is necessary to return to the initial research problem and research objectives as formulated. The aim of the study was to evaluate the plausibility, viability and feasibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era. This aim underpinned four research objectives, namely to review the democratic peace as an approach to peace in International Relations by contextualising it within the framework of other approaches to peace, tracing the theoretical origins of the democratic peace and outlining it as a phenomenon in world politics. Secondly, it aimed to examine the claim that developments in IT have brought about a new era, the information era. Thirdly, it endeavoured to assess claims, by authors of seminal International Relations and Communication texts, that there are causal relations between IT and democracy and between democracy and world peace respectively, applying deductive logic to reach a conclusion about the correlation between IT and world peace. Fourthly, the study aimed to recommend ways in which IT should be employed to harness the information revolution and direct it towards democracy and world peace. The latter objective is normative in nature inasmuch as it goes beyond an examination of what is likely to occur in the information era to prescribe concrete steps that would enhance the probability of the democratic peace to exist.

The democratic peace is one of several approaches to world peace in International Relations. These approaches can be categorised into realist, liberal and radical approaches to peace based on their theoretical premises. Realist approaches to peace regard states as the primary actors in an anarchical international system, national security as the primary objective of international relations and war between states as normal. Liberal approaches assume a heterogeneous state of war and peace, which may even become a state of peace alone. Liberal societies can co-exist in the international system without their relations being dominated by a security motive. When disagreement arises over an issue, this is resolved through international organisation and law, not through war. Radical approaches to peace

problematise notions such as security and power politics. Socialism, one of the prominent radical theories, views world politics as interclass solidarities and emphasise that a 'war' between classes within and across national boundaries exists. The shift in International Relations theory from the interparadigm debate to the debate between rationalist and reflectivist theories has also impacted on peace approaches. Whereas rationalism has involved the streamlining of theories and in turn approaches to peace toward greater empiricism, reflectivism has emphasised the constitutive nature of theories and therefore peace approaches.

The democratic peace as an approach to peace presumes that democracies do not wage war with one another and therefore an increase (quantitatively and qualitatively) in democracy will enhance world peace. The approach is traditionally regarded as a liberal, more specifically a liberal internationalist approach to peace. The rationalist interpretation of democratic peace theory employs certain conceptual limitations in terms of defining war and democracy that will allow for empirical testing of the approach. These tests have confirmed that democracies are unlikely to engage in war with one another and that this can be attributed to democratic norms and structures that place constraints on decision-makers' power to declare war. These constraints can, however, be circumvented should democracies face war with non-democracies. Democracies are thus not inherently more peaceful. They are only more peaceful when they perceive other states to be constrained by the same democratic norms and structures prevailing in their own systems. Although the democratic peace in its liberal internationalist form is a plausible approach to address interstate conflict, the dawn of the information era provides an incentive to re-evaluate the democratic peace.

The information revolution, that is, the exponential increase in speed, capacity and distribution of IT has resulted in a connected and interdependent world that resembles a global village. In this global village not everybody has equal access to IT, but the effects of the process of globalisation, accelerated by IT, are widely felt. Some of the theories explaining the impact of IT on society emphasise the inherent benefits for democracy, peace and prosperity, while others predict that IT can only exacerbate existing inequalities to the detriment of society. There are also theories that view IT as neutral and do not foresee any impact on society except that intended by the users of IT. It is, however, clear when examining democracy in the information era that IT (especially its culmination in the

Internet) is not completely neutral. The Internet's decentralised nature makes it hard (though not impossible) to control in the ways one-to-many media could be controlled. It also provides a new public space for deliberation among citizens from the local to the global level. These democratic proclivities can be exploited to bring about democratisation in authoritarian states by facilitating pro-democracy movements and strengthening democratic processes in established democracies. In the latter case this can be done in an administrative way (through better public services and Internet voting) or by creating more means for political education and deliberation. Moreover, because of the decrease in cost and difficulty to communicate across vast distances, IT can have the same benefits in the global arena. As more people communicate across state borders, scholars predict a growing sense of world citizenship. Deliberation occurs in global public spheres, whether in cyberspace or through satellite conferencing, and civil society groups organise and mobilise on a global scale to affect issues on a local, national or global level.

By inference it can be deduced that the democratic proclivities of IT will have a positive effect on world peace, defined as the absence of interstate lethal violence. IT helps to spread and intensify democratic norms and create and strengthen democratic institutions. In addition, IT facilitates old and new types of diplomacy that make it possible for states to project their democratic nature onto the international arena and thus promote the principle of reciprocity on which the democratic peace is built. Thus, assuming that all other variables remain unchanging (in this case, that war can be defined as interstate war with battle fatalities amounting to 1 000) the relationship between IT and world peace is positive. All other variables can, however, not be assumed unchanging because the conceptual limitations of a liberal internationalist approach, in particular with respect to war, cannot be sustained in the information era.

IT impacts on war in a national security way inasmuch as it makes information warfare more likely. More importantly though, IT has resulted in warfare assuming an increasingly post-modern character. Non-state actors play a greater role in wars that seem to be routinised, permanent, structural and beyond legitimisation unless they escalate to high-intensity conflict (as was the case in the Serbian/NATO conflict). Aspects such as poverty, ethnicity and the environment are increasingly elements of conflicts as opposed to the security of states. This means that the democratic peace needs to be expanded to provide

ways to combat post-modern warfare. Kantian cosmopolitanism, which underpins democratic peace theory, provides the theoretical leeway for such an expansion. In practice IT enables such an expansion, because it facilitates the globalisation of democratic norms and the creation of a global civil society intend on implementing these norms.

Given this brief overview of the research problem and objectives and the way in which the study attempts to address it, the key findings can now be reviewed. This will be done by framing the conclusions of the study in terms of three scenarios, namely continuity, collapse and transformation scenarios. The continuity and collapse scenarios are both reminiscent of rationalist scenarios in International Relations, whereas the transformation scenario, informed by the premise that theories and discourse are constitutive of reality, takes a more reflectivist approach.

2. CONTINUITY IN THE INFORMATION ERA

Continuity scenarios in International Relations, according to Reed and Tehranian (1999:68), adapt geopolitical categories and logic from the realist school of Cold War literature to changing international circumstances. The end of history scenario that Fukuyama (1989) sketched as the Cold War came to an end is typical of a continuity scenario and predicts the end of mankind's ideological evolution²³. Western liberal democracy is universalised as the final form of government and all states will inevitably adopt it. Because democracies do not make war with one another, the universal spread of democracy will lead to the expansion of the pacific union and the preservation of world peace. By connecting the latter with utopian determinist - and cyberlibertarian theories of the impact of IT on society, it is not difficult to perceive the information era as an era that will accelerate the end of history.

Cyberlibertarians base their argument on liberal economic principles, most notably the Smithsonian principle of the invisible hand of the market and the Ricardian principle of free trade. IT decentralises information and creates opportunities for individuals to bypass established hierarchies. Hence, governments can play an increasingly minimalist role, bringing decision-making power closer to citizens and therefore enhancing democracy. This

²³ Stating that the end of history scenario is a continuity scenario may seem to be a contradiction in terms, but the end of history suggests that liberalism will continue as the predominant ideology in the post-Cold War era.

is not only a positive trend in established democracies where domination of the public sphere by politicians, lobbyist and journalists has led to a crisis in democratic participation, but also in non-democratic countries. IT, having been developed essentially under a cultural horizon of liberal (mostly Western) economic and democratic norms serves as a vector for the spread of liberal values. This was best illustrated in the former Soviet Union where the closed nature of the system was ill-suited to the challenges of the information era. For fear of economic retardation, governments will liberalise their economies and political systems. Changes in domestic political regime will bring about changes in foreign policy behaviour, thus expanding the *pax democratica*.

A continuity scenario of the democratic peace in the information era could conceive of war in two instances. Firstly, war is 'normal' among states not yet at the end of history (thus non-democratic dyads) and between states at the end of history and those not at the end of history (thus mixed dyads). These wars will decrease as more states reach the end of history and this will happen faster in the information era, because IT provides favourable opportunities for democracy. Secondly, Wilsonian wars may occur when democracies fight to make the world safe for democracy. Inasmuch as the mass media and the Internet bring images of genocide and human rights violations to the doorstep of citizens in democracies, governments in these countries may be pressed to intervene for the sake of democracy more often and overtly in the information era than was previously the case. However, Wilsonian wars are in essence a means to increase the number of democracies and will therefore contribute to the gradual reduction in interstate war.

The continuity scenario can be criticised for its simplistic application of rationalist themes of International Relations to new circumstances. The democratic peace is seen as an approach to establish peace among states and therefore it adheres to a second image interpretation of the democratic peace. In the information era this statecentric view does not suffice to deal with increasingly complex interactions between states and non-state actors, specifically on the terrain of warfare. Moreover, the idea that IT will inevitably promote democratic values is technologically deterministic. Although the decentralised and open design of IT that culminates in the Internet implies a democratic proneness, authoritarian governments have managed to inhibit aspects thereof, and even more alarming, IT has been used by governments to breach privacy through indiscriminate information surveillance.

Another aspect of technological determinism concerns access to IT. The continuity scenario as sketched above assumes that IT will spread to all parts of the world and that individuals will have equal access to it. This has proven not to be the case, on the contrary the digital divide seems to be widening between countries. It is not only the digital gap, but also general economic disparities within and between states that inform the collapse scenario.

3. COLLAPSE IN THE INFORMATION ERA

Collapse scenarios of the post-Cold War world hold that the underlying forces of global capital and rapid industrialisation remain largely unaccountable to the needs of the majority of human beings in the world. Three aspects cause the alarmist tone in these scenarios namely, economic stagnation, the rise of nationalism and violent ethnic conflict and the increasing probability of some kind of global disaster albeit nuclear war or a global epidemic. The political economy view of IT and society can be drawn upon to sketch a collapse scenario of the relationship between IT, democracy and peace. Within the broader framework of capitalist expansion, it is argued that IT facilitates huge and instantaneous transfers of capital across borders and the ability of TNCs to operate where labour is cheapest and environmental laws most lenient. National governments, eager for corporate investments, will turn a blind eye to or even take part in the exploitation of labour and the environment. As has been shown by the UNDP's Development Reports over the past decade, the global expansion of capitalism has coincided with the widening gap between the haves and have-nots. Inequality will lead to greater frustration and alienation, and eventually conflict as the expectations of the poor meet harsh economic realities. The expectations of the poor are a function of the spread of democratic principles (among which equality) and a Western consumerist culture. Resentment will deepen as economic hardship continues, the perception of unfair economic practices grows and competition for scarce resources increases (Reed & Tehranian 1999:71, 72).

A collapse scenario of the relationship between IT, democracy, and peace also questions liberal democracy as a universal ideology. The Internet is seen as a tool of cultural homogenisation that will spur a violent response from local cultures, mobilised at the peripheries to counter the centres of power. The increase in religious fundamentalist, ethno-

nationalist and neo-conservative movements is a manifestation of this process. The Internet, inasmuch as it provides opportunities for groups to organise and mobilise their activities across borders, facilitates the process of local fragmentation. As a second image approach to world peace that focuses on the absence of interstate violence, the democratic peace is rendered inapplicable to address this type of conflict, because it disregards the importance of non-state actors as parties in war.

Finally, a collapse scenario can also be informed by the implications of IT on warfare between states that have 'information dominance' and states that don't. States that perceive their chances of winning a conventional war with an info-rich state, such as the United States, improbable may look for other ways of combat, for example nuclear or chemical and biological warfare (Rothkopf 1998:346). To deter these threats info-rich states have felt compelled to sustain their nuclear arsenals in the post-Cold War era. The nuclear threat is thus just as imminent in the information era.

The collapse scenario emphasises that IT benefits private interests and empowers corporations as opposed to 'the average world citizen'. The growing gap between rich and poor and the fertile ground that this provides for politicising culture and subsequent political fragmentation, are key aspects of this scenario. The prospects for democracy and peace have diminished in the information era, because IT is used by corporations, governments and non-state actors to the detriment of democratic principles such as freedom, equality and community. The collapse scenario is problematic since it does not proceed to concrete alternatives or solutions. Again the critique of technological determinism can be made, this time against a Luddite position that views the adverse implications of IT for democracy and world peace as inevitable. Despite this critique, the fact that the collapse scenario problematizes IT as a variable in international relations makes it a good starting point from where to embark on the more normative scholarly activity of sketching a transformation scenario.

4. TRANSFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION ERA

Although both continuity and collapse are possible in the information era, neither is inevitable. Whereas the collapse scenario highlights the caveats of assuming a continuity

scenario of the relationship between IT, democracy and world peace, the transformation scenario explores the possibilities for reform. This scenario accepts that the democratic peace is a plausible approach to peace between states, because democratic norms and institutions promote the peaceful resolution of disputes internally and when projected onto the international terrain, a perception of reciprocity results in peaceful relations between democracies. But, it also recognises that it is not sufficient to focus on interstate war and state actors alone. The current world order entertains a type of war that necessitates an approach to world peace that is flexible enough to be employed on different and mixed levels of analysis. The democratic peace can be such an approach if it assumes a cosmopolitan character. Citizens of different states should perceive themselves as citizens of a community of humankind and award the same respect and trust awarded to fellow citizens (at least to the extent that disputes are resolved amicably) to human beings around the globe. This does not mean that states should be abolished (anarchy) or that a world government (supra-nationalism) needs to be established, but when states fail to uphold the rights and freedoms of citizens or transnational actors become immune to scrutiny there should be a response forthcoming from the global citizenry. IT can facilitate such a response by providing opportunities to inform the global public about issues of concern to human security, making global dialogue between people and cultures possible and facilitating the organisation and mobilisation of a global civil society. However, IT can also fuel non-democratic trends, such as increasing economic disparities between rich and poor within and between states, cultural fragmentation and state and corporate uses of IT for power- and profit seeking that cause and exacerbate wars between states and non-state actors. A conscious effort is thus necessary to expose the adverse effects of IT and redirect it towards achieving (human) security, freedom, justice (equality) and community. Such an effort commences with the following dimensions of transformation:

Democratising Internet governance: Broadly defined Internet governance refers to all institutional mechanisms and structures, which have been put into place by technicians and politicians in order to co-ordinate and shape the working and use of the Internet. It thus involves issues of privacy, such as data security and encryption; e-commerce, such as online consumer protection and taxation; content regulation, such as censorship and filtering; Intellectual Property in Cyberspace, such as domain names and trademarks; and access and participation, such as Internet infrastructure policies. Not all of these issues can be dealt

with by the existing legislative, social, economic and political frameworks of the respective countries within which the Internet develops. The management of transnational technological interdependencies arising from the Internet demands international structures. The Internet is seen as such a unique space, developing in a very decentralised manner through a mix of technological self-co-ordination and public funding, that conventional international governance structures will not suffice. For certain issues, for example the domain name system, new structures have to be created outside of the realm of existing governments. Although this provides the opportunity to start from scratch and design the foundations for a fair and equitable governance system tailored to the nature of the Internet, the fear has been expressed that specific well-organised and well-endowed interest groups will try to steer this process to their benefit (http://intgov.apdip.net/apdip_new/issues.htm).

Although ICANN is so far the principal structure of Internet governance, two other bodies have also been identified as Internet governance structures. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) are Internet technical standards bodies that develop technical specifications, for example communication protocols that make it possible for computers to 'speak' to one another. Although they are involved with technical problems, these problems are entwined with political and economic issues. For example, the IETF's telecom equipment-makers had to decide whether or not to make it possible for governments to wiretap their products (as certain governments require). Although a technical decision, it potentially has implications for user privacy – in essence a socio-political issue. The IETF has subsequently opened up their decision-making processes to broader membership and has created an Internet Societal Task Force to deliberate the social and economic implications that these technical decisions may have (The Economist 2000:77, 78). The W3C, founded by Tim Berners-Lee (inventor of the WWW), consists of more than 400 companies that each pays \$50 000 (US) a year for membership. In light of the commercialisation of television especially in the United States, it is not difficult to see why some fear that these companies may further their own agendas without paying heed to broader societal concerns (The Economist 2000:78).

As a crucial global infrastructure resource with far-reaching economic and social implications, the Internet has turned not only Internet users, but also a much broader range of people into stakeholders when it comes to Internet governance. According to the Asia-

Pacific Development Information Programme's Internet governance information website (http://intgov.apdip.net/apdip_new/issues.htm) "active involvement from all stakeholders and the articulation and consideration of concerns of future and developing user communities in this formation period is crucial in order to pre-empt capture and ensure that the emerging governance system and the principles embodied in it are equitable and inclusive." Thus, participation and representation of stakeholders in bodies such as the IETF, W3C and ICANN need to be created and expanded. This should especially be the case for currently marginalised stakeholders, such as those in the Asia-Pacific and African regions. Where bodies are not open for public membership, civil society groups such as those established to watch over the ICANN process, should be established to scrutinise Internet governance activities and press for inclusive decision-making processes. Inasmuch as governments and companies also form part of the stakeholder community, they should be watchdogs over each other's role in Internet governance and the structures and bodies involved in it.

Bridging the digital divide: As was noted earlier, the democratic proclivities of IT are severely inhibited if the digital divide is not bridged. It is thus an important dimension of transformation in the information era. Issues regarding access do not only involve access to IT infrastructure, but also to the educational abilities to use it and membership of Internet governance bodies. Instead of empowering the marginalised, the information revolution runs the risk of exacerbating existing economic, social and political inequalities in and among states if the gap between info-rich and info-poor is not addressed.

Democratising civil society: IT has been instrumental in the rise of global civil society groups that serve as a vehicle for civic education, a check on government and corporate uses of power and various other activities that promote democracy, peace, ecological sustainability, poverty relief and so forth. In this sense civil society plays an important role in bringing about a cosmopolitan democratic peace by appealing to people to think beyond state borders and national security. However, the success of these groups is dependent on their ability and willingness to (Scholte 2000:33-34):

- enhance diversity, in other words, to be more representatives of demographics that include gender, race, urban/rural divides and culture;

- allow vigilance, that is, to address their own democratic deficits by allowing monitoring of their activities. This does not mean intrusive government surveillance, but rather programmes of evaluation by internal or external assessors;
- build capacity through staff training and thoroughly researching the dynamics of the environments that they get involved in; and
- expand involvement by directing campaign efforts to the general public and emphasising global citizenship. It is in this respect that the global media becomes an important ally in the information era.

Creating a peace-oriented media: The global media can play an important role in highlighting issues and gaining support for civil society movements to address these issues as was evident in the case of the killing of street children in Brazil (Serra 1996:219). The media can also facilitate dialogue and understanding between people and cultures and as such contribute to the creation of a global citizenry. In order to play such a role the media has to reorient itself toward peace. According to Galtung and Vincent (1992:126-139) data is reported in a context of theories and values. If peace is the desired value, then the following proposals can be made for a peace-oriented media:

- The media should report all sides. Media biases (usually connected to nationalism) in terms of covering a conflict can exacerbate tensions. If the 'other' side is not given a voice or a chance to explain their reasons and goals in a conflict the issue and dynamics cannot be fully understood. Moreover, the other side is dehumanised as a kind of phenomenon prone to sudden bursts of evil activity (action) and incapable of interaction. Peace-oriented media does not only have to break through these distortions, but also have to make peace dialogues public and thus raise public concern that will put pressure on governments to find a speedy resolve.
- The media should make explicit some theories, the intellectual frame of reference, and the discourse or paradigm within which a conflict is to be understood. The deeper historical and structural roots of a conflict need to be explained, again giving coverage to opposing opinions and evidence as well as the consequences of these opinions. A conflict is thus more than just its manifestations in terms of hostile attitudes and behaviour.

- The foregoing demands should also be directed to media owned by governmental or corporate interests. In terms of the former, the media is often forced to be the carriers of national myths and governmental messages. In terms of the latter, commercial interests' power over media channels and newspapers may manifest itself in bias coverage of conflicts revolving around capitalism.
- The media should not over-emphasise elite countries, elite persons, personalisation or negative events. These are the four tendencies of news reporting and are typically sensational and aimed at the proverbial tip of the iceberg of a conflict while ignoring the deeper structural and historical factors.
- The media should try to enhance the retention elements of news reporting and respect the willingness of audiences to learn about issues. In fear of boring audiences, journalists often talk down to them, instead of engaging in more complex analysis and interpretation. This limits the potential of the media to convey the realities of a situation and to create understanding among the public about it.
- The media should portray more clearly the benefits of peace. Peace is here to be understood not only as the absence of war, but also as economic justice, political freedom and cultural meaning. By reporting only on conflict and negative events, the media may contribute to global insecurity by conditioning people to violence.

Apart from these proposals, Galtung and Vincent (1992: 139-141) also propose that the media understand the reality of arms issues and the inner dynamics of arms races. In addition, special attention needs to be paid to North/South dynamics as opposed to focusing largely on conflict formation among industrialised countries.

The elements of transformation constitute the ways in which the information revolution and its effects can be directed toward attaining democratic peace in the information era. In the information era, the democratic peace is not only peace between states, it is cosmopolitan peace achieved through the promotion and institutionalisation of global democratic norms such as security, freedom, justice and community.

5. PROBLEM AREAS

At least two aspects can be highlighted as problem areas in the way the research problem has been addressed, namely:

Rationalist and reflectivist incommensurability: In the study it is proposed that the democratic peace approach in its neo-liberal internationalist form is a plausible, but not a comprehensive approach to world peace in the information era. To address more than interstate wars, the democratic peace needs to be expanded conceptually, not only to provide for a less statecentric view, but also to afford a more normative approach to world peace. It may be argued that the incommensurability between rationalist and reflectivist theories in International Relations makes such a reinterpretation theoretically awkward. However, there is a theoretical basis for such an expansion set by Brown (1992) and Dyer (1997) who explain the relationship between empirical and normative theory. They both argue that the distinction between empirical and normative theory in terms of dichotomies such as facts versus values, description versus prescription and is versus ought is too absolute. Values play an important role in much of what is traded as non-normative (thus descriptive, value-free) theory (Smith 1992:497), while normative theory by definition includes facts and descriptions of 'what is'. Inasmuch as norms are standards, measures, patterns or types considered representative of a group, they are descriptive 'of typical or customary behaviour' or 'reports of the average or median outcome of certain activities' – thus, 'what is' (Stroll in Dyer 1997:15). Deviation or conformity may only be viewed as a pejorative or commendatory basis for prescription, once it has been determined (descriptively) what is normal in a given context. Thus, empirical and normative theories are not as incommensurable as they are made out to be.

The expansion of the democratic peace approach to include both a rationalist and reflectivist interpretation is justified on this basis. The rationalist explanation of the 'fact' of a democratic peace between states and the 'fact' of new circumstances brought about by the information revolution provide the foundations for the theoretical expansion of the democratic peace and its prescribed application in the information era as an approach to peace.

US and Western bias: The study heavily relies on US and Western literature and examples and it may therefore be argued that the findings are inherently biased. The US and Western bias is partly explicable by referring to the research problem and objectives, namely to analyse the causality and deductive structures associated with democracy, IT and world peace in existing text. The fact that the United States and other Western countries are at the forefront of the information revolution and have therefore explored the implications of IT for democracy and peace to a greater extent than other parts of the world, means that US and Western literature dominate the subject. Although this may distract from the representativeness of the study, the findings are not necessarily biased. Pains have been taken to indicate that the democratic norms (security, freedom, justice and community), which underlie the idea of a global democratic peace, are not confined to Western liberal interpretations of democracy and peace, but globally applicable. Furthermore, the recommendations (elements of transformation) that the study proposes emphasise the need for more diversity in Internet governance structures, global civil society and the global media.

6. CONCLUSION

The past century has been one of the bloodiest centuries in the world's history. This can firstly be attributed to interstate wars, most notably World War I and World War II, secondly to intrastate wars, such as civil wars and state oppression of citizens and thirdly to the 'silent wars' that threaten human security, such as poverty and disease. On the other hand, this century has also been a period of unprecedented scientific discovery and technological development. It seems contradictory that amidst technological progress, overall human security has not improved more. In fact, technological progress has often exacerbated conflicts and human insecurity through advances in weaponry on the one hand and negative economic and environmental consequences on the other. The developments in IT of the past four decades have been heralded as revolutionary and are already fundamentally impacting on the everyday lives of most people whether directly or indirectly. It is argued that the prospects for world peace can greatly be enhanced by IT if its democratic proclivities are sustained and exploited. These proclivities involve the ease with which IT allows individuals and groups on a decentralised level to be informed and to communicate outside of normal hierarchies. To sustain this, those that design and regulate

IT (especially the Internet) need to do so in a democratic way. In other words, they must be representative of all the stakeholders and their activities must be open to scrutiny by the public. By exploiting these proclivities, democracy cannot only be enhanced qualitatively and quantitatively, but also be globalised. As a result, interstate wars are likely to decrease, because democracies hardly ever wage war with one another. On the other hand, wars of a post-modern nature (that goes beyond lethal, overt violence between states) can be addressed by the efforts of a global civil society that mobilise to promote and institutionalise democratic norms of security, liberty, justice and community. In both these instances the media can play an important intermediary role.

In terms of the research objectives as formulated, the causal structures associated with democracy, world peace and IT in literature propose that the probability of a causal relationship between democracy and world peace on the one hand, and IT and democracy on the other hand, exists. From this can be deduced that it is likely that IT will promote world peace and hence, that the democratic peace is a plausible approach to world peace in the information era. This conclusion is based on a neo-liberal interpretation of what constitutes peace, namely the absence of interstate war. In the information era, war is not confined to states and lethal violence between them. Therefore the neo-liberal interpretation of the democratic peace is not a comprehensive approach to world peace. An approach to peace that will remove institutional obstacles and promote structural conditions to facilitate the growth of socio-cultural, economic and political trends aimed at achieving living conditions congruent with such values as security, non violence, identity, equity and well-being is necessary.

In this respect, the study embarks on the normative research objective of prescribing the theoretical expansion of the democratic peace along Kantian cosmopolitan lines and formulate it in a reflectivist way. The expansion of the democratic peace construct in such a way is practically possible because the information revolution has created a global village in which global public spheres and a global civil society can be maintained. However, unlike the neo-liberal interpretation of the democratic peace that objectively studies the phenomenon of peace between democracies, the approach taken here is one of transformation. The democratic peace is not inevitable, but it is a probable outcome of circumstances in the information era if certain elements of transformation are promoted.

These elements of transformation are recommended to direct IT towards democracy and world peace. A democratic peace, based on global democratic norms of security, freedom, justice and community is not only a plausible, viable and feasible, but also a comprehensive approach to world peace in the information era.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ALLEGED EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE THAT DEMOCRATIC STATES NEVER FIGHT WARS AGAINST EACH OTHER

1. United Provinces versus England, 1780-1783
2. English versus the French during the French Revolutionary wars, 1792-1802
3. War of 1812
4. Belgium versus Holland, 1830
5. Swiss Civil War, 1847
6. Roman Republic (Papal States) versus France, 1849
7. American Civil War, 1861-1865
8. Spanish-American War, 1898
9. Second Philippines War 1899
10. Boer War, 1899-1902
11. World War I
12. World War II
13. Finland versus Great Britain and the other democratic allies, World War II
14. Israel versus Lebanon, 1848
15. India versus Pakistan, 1948
16. Israel versus Lebanon, 1967
17. Turkey versus Cyprus, 1974
18. Peru versus Ecuador, 1981
19. Various conflicts in the Post-Communist World. (Serbia versus Croatia, Serbia versus Bosnia-Herzegovina, Armenia versus Azerbaijan, etc.)

Source: Ray 1993:253

APPENDIX B: FACTORS POSTULATED AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE

<i>Contributing factors</i>	<i>Study</i>
<i>Systemic factors</i>	
International law and norms	Maoz & Russett (1993); Raymond (1994)
Mediators present in system	Dixon (1993,1994); Raymond (1994)
Numbers of democracies in dispute	Hewitt & Wilkenfield (1995)
Numbers of democracies in system	Moaz & Abdolali (1989); Parker (1994); Russett (1995); Starr (1991, 1995)
Presence of hegemon	Bremer (1993)
Power status	Bremer (1992, 1993) Dixon (1993); Morgan & Campbell (1991); Ostrom & Job (1986); Raymond (1994); Russett (1989); Weede (1984, 1992)
Power shifts	Ray (1995); Schweller (1992)
Trade interdependence	Dixon (1984); Dixon & Moon (1993); Oneal, Oneal, Maoz & Russett (1995)
<i>External factors</i>	
Absence of territorial conflict	Weede (1984, 1992)
Disputants in common alliance	Bremer (1992,1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Raymond (1995); Siverson & Emmons (1991)
Disputants members of same international organisations	Hewitt & Wilkenfield (1995)
Geographic distance	Bremer (1992,1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Gleditsch & Hegre (1995); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Raymond (1994); Rummel (1983); Small &



History of co-operation	Singer (1976); Weede (1984, 1992) Dixon (1994); Ostrom & Job (1986); Small & Singer (1976)
Relative military capabilities	Bremer (1992); Maoz & Russett (1993)
Treaty ties	Raymond (1995)
<i>Societal factors</i>	
Costs of conflict	Dixon (1993); Ostrom & Job (1986)
Economic prosperity	Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Russett (1989, 1990)
Electoral pressure	Ostrom & Job (1986); Russett (1989)
Independent domestic media	Van Belle (1995)
Internal stability	Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan & Bickers (1992); Russett (1989)
Level of economic development	Bremer (1992, 1993); Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Merritt & Zinnes (1991)
Norms/expectations of political culture	Dixon (1993, 1994); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan & Schwebach (1992); Ray (1995); Rummel (1979, 1983); Russett (1993)
Mass political participation	Ember, Ember & Russett (1992); Lake (1992)
Mobilised public opinion	Mintz & Geva (1993); Ostrom & Job (1986); Risse-Kappen (1991); Russett (1990, 1993)
<i>Governmental factors</i>	
Divided authority/separation of power	Lake (1992); Morgan & Campbell (1991); Morgan & Schwebach (1992)
Institutional constraints	Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992); Maoz & Russett (1992, 1993); Morgan



Limited government	& Campbell (1991); Morgan & Schwebach (1992); Russett (1993) Manica (1989); Rummel (1979, 1983) Waert (1994)
Political competition	Morgan & Campbell (1991); Morgan & Schwebach (1992)
Regularised elections	Babst (1972); Morgan & Campbell (1991); Morgan & Schwebach (1992); Small & Singer (1976)


Source: Kegley & Hermann 1995:513²⁴

²⁴ The references of the studies in the right-hand column correspond with the bibliography of the original source as referred to and not the bibliography of this dissertation.




APPENDIX C: INTERNET GROWTH: HOSTS, DOMAINS, NETWORKS AND WEBSITES

Hobbes' Internet Timeline Copyright ©1999 Robert H Zakon
<http://www.isoc.org/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html>




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




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


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Source: Zakon 1999


APPENDIX D: CONCEPTUAL MAP OF CYBERSPACE



Source: Kitchin 1998:4



APPENDIX E: NUMBER OF USERS ONLINE WORLD-WIDE



Source: www.nua.ie/survey/how_many_online/index.html



APPENDIX F: INTERNET USERS

World total	304, 36 million
Africa	2, 5 million
Asia/Pacific	68, 9 million
Europe	83, 35 million
Middle East	1, 90 million
South America	10, 74 million

Source: www.nua.ie/survey/how_many_online/index.html



SUMMARY

**THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE AS AN APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE IN THE
INFORMATION ERA**

by

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DEPARTMENT:

POLITICAL SCIENCES

DEGREE FOR WHICH THE

***MAGISTER ARTIUM* IN**

DISSERTATION WAS PRESENTED:

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The study explores the plausibility of the democratic peace as an approach to world peace in the information era by analysing causality and deductive structures associated with the variables world peace, democracy and information technology as found in text. It also pursues a normative objective, namely to propose ways in which information technology can be employed to further democracy and world peace.

The advent of the information era challenges scholars of International Relations to evaluate theories and concepts of International Relations within the framework of information technology. Traditionally placed within the realm of liberal internationalism, the democratic peace contends that democracies are unlikely to wage war with one another because they perceive one another to be constrained by norms and institutions unique to their democratic nature. The spread of democracy will thus enhance world peace. Information technology contributes to the spread and institutionalisation of democratic norms by providing access to abundant information through channels difficult to bring under government control, facilitating the mobilisation and organisation of pro-democracy movements and creating unprecedented opportunities for civil participation in the political process. Through deductive reasoning it can therefore be argued that the democratic peace and thus world peace, are likely to be enhanced in the information era.

This conclusion is based on a neo-liberal definition of world peace, that is, the absence of lethal violence between states amounting to battle fatalities of at least 1 000. In the information era, such a definition is too limited to underlie a comprehensive approach to peace. Most wars are no longer fought between states or at the state level. They are protracted, deeply structural conflicts that involve a mix of state and non-state actors, private interests, professional armies or mercenaries and ethnic or religious factions. World peace is thus better defined along human security as opposed to national security lines, namely to remove the institutional obstacles and promote the structural conditions that will facilitate the growth of socio-cultural, economic and political trends to achieve conditions congruent with peace values such as security, non-violence, identity, equity and well-being.

It is possible to expand the democratic peace approach theoretically to achieve world peace thus defined, by drawing on the Kantian origins of democratic peace theory. Kant emphasised that individuals are citizens of a universal state of mankind governed by universal morality. Such a cosmopolitan interpretation of the democratic peace grasps the interconnectedness and interdependencies of the information era, going beyond the state level and state actors. The approach is plausible because information technology enables global civil society through the help of the global media, to promote and institutionalise democratic norms such as security, freedom, justice and community. Civil society movements expose information about the often hidden interests or structural factors characteristic of wars. By mobilising public opinion and putting pressure on governments, international organisations and the private sector to act in ways congruent with democratic values, they promote global democracy and globalise the democratic peace. The plausibility of this approach to world peace is conditioned on the extent to which Internet governance and civil society are democratised, the digital divide bridged and the global media oriented towards promoting peace.



SAMEVATTING

**DIE DEMOKRATIESE VREDE AS 'N BENADERING TOT WêRELDVREDE IN
DIE INLIGTINGSERA**

deur

JOELIEN PRETORIUS

**STUDIELEIER:
DEPARTEMENT:
GRAAD WAARVOOR
VERHANDELING VOORGELê IS:**

**PROF. A. DU PLESSIS
POLITIEKE WETENSKAPPE
MAGISTER ARTIUM IN
INTERNASIONALE POLITIEK**

Die studie ondersoek die aanneemlikheid van die demokratiese vrede as 'n benadering tot wêreldvrede in die inligtingsera deur die oorsaaklikhede en deduktiewe strukture wat met die veranderlikes wêreldvrede, demokrasie en inligtingstegnologie in teks aangetref word, te analiseer. 'n Normatiewe navorsingsdoel word ook nagestreef, deur wyses voor te stel waarop inligtingstegnologie aangewend kan word om demokrasie en wêreldvrede te bevorder.

Die aanbreek van die inligtingsera daag navorsers in Internasionale Verhoudinge uit om teorieë en konsepte binne die konteks van inligtingstegnologie te evalueer. Die demokratiese vrede, tradisioneel 'n liberaal-internasionale benadering tot vrede, veronderstel dat dit onwaarskynlik is dat demokrasieë met mekaar oorlog sal voer, omdat die persepsie wedersyds bestaan dat hul gedrag deur norme en instellings, uniek aan demokrasie, beperk word. Wêreldvrede word dus bevorder deur die verspreiding van demokrasie. Inligtingstegnologie dra tot die verspreiding en institusionalisering van demokratiese norme by deur toegang tot inligting te verskaf langs kanale wat moeilik deur regerings beheer word, deur die mobilisering en organisering van pro-demokrasie bewegings te fasiliteer en deur ongeëwenaarde moontlikhede vir demokratiese deelname



aan die politieke proses te bied. Deur deduktiewe beredenering word afgelei dat die demokratiese vrede en dus werêldvrede, bevorder word in die inligtingsera.

Hierdie gevolgtrekking is gebaseer op 'n neo-liberale beskouing van wêreldvrede, as die afwesigheid van interstaatlike geweld wat minstens 1 000 oorlogsgesneuweldes tot gevolg het. In die inligtingera is hierdie definisie van wêreldvrede egter te beperkend as grondslag vir 'n omvattende benadering tot vrede. Die meeste oorloë vind nie meer tussen state of op die staatsvlak van analise plaas nie. Oorloë is langdurige, diep-strukturele konflikte wat 'n mengsel van staats- en nie-staatsrolspelers, privaatbelange, professionele weermagte, huursoldate en etniese of godsdienstige faksies betrek. Wêreldvrede kan dus beter in terme van menslike sekuriteit as in nasionale veiligheidsterme gedefinieer word. Hiervolgens is vrede die verwydering van institusionele hindernisse en die bevordering van strukturele omstandighede wat die groei van sosio-kulturele, ekonomiese en politieke tendense aanhelp ten einde omstandighede te skep wat die bereiking van vredeswaardes soos veiligheid, geweldloosheid, identiteit, gelykheid en welsyn moontlik maak.

Deur na die Kantiaanse oorsprong van die demokratiese vrede terug te keer is dit moontlik om die demokratiese vrede teoreties uit te brei om wêreldvrede soos gedefinieer, te bereik. Kant beklemtoon dat individue burgers van 'n universele staat van die mensdom is en regeer word deur 'n universele moraliteit. Hierdie kosmopolitaanse interpretasie van die demokratiese vrede weerspieël die verbindtenisse en interafhanklikheidsverhouding wat die inligtingsera kenmerk en strek verder as die staat as vlak en eenheid van analise. Die benadering is lewensvatbaar omdat inligtingtegnologie, met behulp van die globale media 'n globale burgergemeenskap bemagtig om demokratiese norme soos veiligheid, vryheid, gelykheid en gemeenskap wêreldwyd te bevorder en te institusionaliseer. Burgergemeenskapbewegings maak inligting oor die dikwels versteekte agendas en strukturele faktore wat oorloë kenmerk, bekend. Deur die openbare mening te mobiliseer en druk op regerings, internasionale instellings en die privaatsektor te plaas om hul gedrag te skik na vredeswaardes, bevorder die burgergemeenskap globale demokrasie en die globalisering van die demokratiese vrede. Die aanneemlikheid van hierdie benadering tot wêreldvrede is afhanklik van die mate waartoe Internetregering en die burgergemeenskap demokraties is, die digitale gaping oorbrug word en die globale media vredesgeoriënteerd is.