BEHIND THE VEIL: INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH *APARTHEID* SOUTH AFRICA*

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ABSTRACT

History remembers India as a vocal and consistent supporter of the anti-*apartheid* movement. The existing literature on relations between India and *apartheid* South Africa describes an antagonistic relationship defined by decades of sanctions. However, such literature only scratches the surface of India and South Africa's true relations. Archival research demonstrates that India's stance towards South Africa was much more ambiguous than expressed on the international stage. Evidence has surfaced that India considered re-establishing diplomatic relations with *apartheid* South Africa and exchanged military technology. Moreover, the reasons for publicly opposing the *apartheid* regime were not purely ethical but also strategic. These include establishing newly-independent India as a player on the world stage, seeking to play a role in the Commonwealth and maintaining manoeuvrability in a bi-polar world. Thus, this article analyses archival evidence within India's domestic and international context, including the

Indian foreign policy establishment, economic and security crises and caste issues. This article also serves a wider purpose by demonstrating the complexity of foreign policy making and the inability of a single theory to explain these complex processes.

1. INTRODUCTION

In his address to the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation in New Delhi in January 1995, former South African President Nelson Mandela eloquently stated: "I bring you greetings from the people of South Africa. In their multitude and diversity they extend their hands across the miles and oceans to profoundly thank the people of India for helping set them free" (Mandela 1995a). A day later addressing the Indian Parliament, President Mandela even more forcefully stated, "(o)ur two countries are united by strong bonds of history and geography. It is a history of shared commitment and tolerance, to social equity and the eradication of poverty. It is a history of common experience of oppression and struggle for independence and freedom. It is a history of independence in struggle and mutual support" (Mandela 1995b).

These two statements by anti-*apartheid* icon Nelson Mandela reinforce the dominant narrative of any study of Indo-South African relations: that New Delhi had played a vanguard role in the isolation of *apartheid* South Africa whilst simultaneously supporting the liberation movements, the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). Indeed a plethora of documentary evidence could be quoted in support of such a stance. As early as 26 October 1894 Mahatma Gandhi in a letter to the editor of *The Times of Natal* called for non-racialism and respect for human dignity (Mukherjee 1995: v) in South Africa. On the verge of achieving its own independence, Mr Ramaswami Mudaliar, the Leader of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly wrote a letter in June 1946, to UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie to place racial discrimination in South Africa on the UN agenda (Indian Delegation to the United Nations 1946). A month later, India was to be the first country to place a trade embargo against South Africa (Department of Commerce, Government of India 1946). With the coming to power of the National Party in 1948 and the intensification of systematic racial discrimination, Mrs Vijayalakshmi Pandit, the leader of the Indian Delegation strongly argued that the policy of *apartheid* was racial discrimination

(Pandit 1950). Once again Indian moves at the multilateral level focused on isolating the *apartheid* state, specifically at that stage at the UN, but later within the Commonwealth and the Non-Alignment Movement, were also occurring in conjunction with anti-*apartheid* moves at the bilateral level. By 1 July 1954, the government of India severed its diplomatic ties to the Union of South Africa (Government of India 1954). Diplomatic ties between the two countries were only re-established on 6 May 1994 (Government of India 1994) following South Africa's first democratic elections and the formal ending of *apartheid*. At the same time, whilst New Delhi was formally ostracising the *apartheid* state it consolidated its ties with the liberation movements in South Africa. On 14 November 1967, the ANC opened its first office for Asia in New Delhi (Gandhi 1967). Other steps to undermine the *apartheid* regime and lend support to the people of Southern Africa were also undertaken. In 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed the creation of an Africa Fund to assist the Frontline States and the liberation movements. The government of India made an initial contribution of over US$40 million to the Fund (Reddy 1995: 13). This then constitutes the current academic and official discourse of bilateral relations between South Africa and India between 1947 and 1994.

However, utilising other archival material including material from recently de-classified South African Defence Intelligence documents, a more nuanced picture emerges. These point to tensions inside the Indian foreign ministry establishment on whether to engage or ostracise Pretoria, they also point to uncertainty inside New Delhi in terms of how to prioritise racial discrimination in South Africa with the perceived global threat of Communism. More importantly, it also points to the fact that the Indian adoption of an anti-*apartheid* stance may not merely be the result of moral considerations, but very importantly, strategic ones as well — largely to expand Indian influence amongst the newly-independent states of Africa and Asia. This latter aspect, in turn, raises serious questions for foreign policy theorists and practitioners — the balance between moral considerations and material interests.

2. BEHIND THE VEIL...

Despite having recalled India's High Commissioner from South Africa in 1947 (Bawa 1982: 5), the newly independent India and the Union

of South Africa continued to conduct diplomatic relations through other channels, namely between their respective permanent representatives at the UN and High Commissions in London. This continued until the 1952 session of the General Assembly where the issue of *apartheid* was added to the question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa on the UN agenda. These, largely informal, talks between South African and Indian diplomats illustrate a more ambiguous picture regarding India's stance on racial discrimination in South Africa and a degree of tension within the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on how to handle the issue.

For example, in a letter addressed to the South African Secretary of External Affairs from South Africa's permanent delegation to the UN, a meeting with Sir Benegal Narsing Rau (India's permanent representative to the UN), is described. The contents of that meeting demonstrate this ambiguity and tension. In this informal meeting, which was authorised by the Indian government, Rau demonstrated concern over the situation in South Africa less as a concern over human rights and more as a concern over its influence on the Indian image. He went so far as to say that the "Indians who went to South Africa did not belong to the best type", being of a lower caste, and that "discrimination may be justified and that, in fact, India would not mind discrimination against [South Africa's] local Indian community if only it was not based on racial lines". Rather, it appears as though India opposed discrimination because it hampered acceptance of the Indian state as an equal and thus Rau presented solutions (for example, sending a select few Indians "of a higher calibre" to South Africa to be accepted as citizens) that would provide a token acceptance of India's racial equality (Jooste 1949: 4). This concern regarding international perception was reiterated in another conversation between the South African and Indian Ambassadors to Italy several years later in 1960, where the latter pointed out that in the contemporary climate of nationalism and freedom, it was "all about show" and how one is perceived from the outside, despite internal realities (South Africa Embassy in Italy 1960: 2).

Yet, the way in which this 'show' was conducted was a matter of some controversy amongst Indian diplomats. At the UN, relations between South African and Indian diplomats were relatively friendly, except with regards to Mrs Pandit, who had a close relationship with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as his sister (Jooste 1949: 4). Also,

in 1947, there was talk that Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Minister of External Affairs, was looking to replace Mrs Pandit as the special representative to the UN as he did not approve of her methods, a stance which the Deputy High Commissioner to London, M K Vellodi, agreed on, preferring to handle such disagreements behind closed doors instead of at the UN (Nicholls 1947a). This dissent within the ministry is further supported by evidence that Indian diplomats in London had told the British, who passed on the information to the South African High Commission, that the choice to sanction South Africa was 'a bad Indian break'. Yet, once the decision had been made, it could not easily be reversed due to the strong anti-*apartheid* domestic opinion that had formed within India (Nicholls 1947c).

The reason many Indian officials and diplomats sought to get this issue out of the UN and global arena was due to heightening tensions between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which fuelled fears of communism within India. Vellodi referred to the Natal Indian Congress as communist (Nicholls 1947a), meetings between Indian and South African representatives at the UN and in London indicated that India sought to cooperate with South Africa against Russia and its satellites (Nicholls 1947b) and India's position as the Eastern bastion against the communist threat was promoted to South Africa (Jooste 1949: 4). In addition, discussions took place in London between Indian and South African diplomats without the knowledge of Krishna Menon, the then High Commissioner to London, as he was viewed as being in Mrs Pandit's camp with the Russians (Nicholls 1947b), further indicating the severe rifts that were found in the Ministry for External Affairs.

However, once the question regarding the treatment of Indians had been placed on the agenda, it had to be dealt with. India, Pakistan and South Africa had agreed to hold a Roundtable Conference to address the issue. However, after preliminary talks, relations broke down in 1950 due to South Africa's refusal to postpone the implementation of the *Group Areas Act*, an act that angered the Indian public (Permanent Delegation of the Union of South Africa to the United Nations 1950). There were also questions regarding whether India should have lifted the trade ban on South Africa for goodwill before the talks, as Pakistan had done. However, India refused and expressed dissatisfaction at Pakistan's decision to do so (Department of Foreign Affairs 1950). It

should be noted that this took place while Indo-Pakistan relations were tense due to communal riots and the treatment of each other's respective minorities (Guha 2008: 174). Thus, India's attitude towards South Africa may have been influenced by its relations with other states, such as Pakistan but also the United Kingdom (UK) and the USA. In the case of the UK, newly independent India had a strained relationship with its former colonisers, which was reflected in India's willingness to condemn South Africa despite Britain being opposed to two of its former colonies being involved in an open dispute. In later years, as the Cold War progressed, India had trouble striking a balance between its firm stance against South Africa, which the USA did not support, and remaining in the good graces of the superpower for both economic and strategic reasons.

These sanctions against South Africa that India chose to maintain were extensive and largely of an economic nature, though political and cultural sanctions came into force in later years as well. This resulted in many crucial imports no longer entering South Africa, particularly jute (Department of Foreign Affairs 1957: 1). India, however, was less dependent on South Africa for imports, ensuring that a trade embargo would have little detrimental effects on the Asian country. However, South Africa managed to soften this blow by using other countries as transit ports, re-exporting the goods to South Africa, which India did not immediately prevent from happening (Raj 1964: 198, 200). Also, India allowed for exceptions to these sanctions. For example, goods meant to go to India for relief purposes were permitted (South African High Commission, London 1948). Also there was a case where Caltex petrol was allowed to be transported to South Africa through India (Department of Foreign Affairs 1957: 2). Finally, research related exchanges, such as a case in 1957 when India repeatedly requested cashew nuts for agricultural research from South Africa (which South Africa refused to do) were permitted by India (India and South Africa High Commissions, London 1957).

All this needs to be linked to the international context that India was facing at the time, aside from the Cold War that was developing referred to earlier. From the time of India's independence until the early 1960s, India sought to establish itself on the global stage as an important player largely through leading the charge in causes for freedom and racial equality (Kochanek 1980: 48). This was one of the few options available to India in achieving such a role, as its economic

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and military strength was relatively weak, thus it resorted to 'soft power' and used it rather effectively to create an image of a global leader. Condemning *apartheid* South Africa was thus a part of this overall strategy.

Following the termination of talks with South Africa in 1954 though, India appeared quieter on the issue of racism, while still maintaining diplomatic, economic and cultural sanctions against the country. This period of relative silence, though India still officially condemned *apartheid*, coincided with an overall shift in India's foreign policy, due to environmental changes. Political and economic instability, combined with disillusionment with the UN due to its stance on Kashmir, forced India to look inward and speak out only on those issues of direct interest to the country (Kochanek 1980: 52-54). Thus, as India was less concerned with its international image, as well as being less able to focus on humanitarian issues that had no direct impact on Indian interests, it became less vocal in its anti-*apartheid* campaign and rather simply maintained established sanctions against South Africa.

India's foreign policy fluctuated again in the mid-1970s, resulting in a return to global forums but from a more neo-realist and pragmatic perspective. Again, this was due to changes in both the domestic and external environment. Yet, while being less interested in simply scoring rhetorical points, India's foreign policy remained committed to decolonisation and opposed to racism (Kochanek 1980: 54, 56, 58). Thus, during the next two decades, India, particularly under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, revitalised the anti-*apartheid* campaign, vocalising condemnations against South Africa and increasing boycotts by, particularly, adding cultural and sport sanctions to the already existing economic and political ones.

Yet, India's more pragmatic approach was reflected in its relations to South Africa. For example, in 1984, a paper that was meant to be adopted at the World Conference on Religion and Peace that would have posed practical solutions to the *apartheid* problem, was derailed by objections from India regarding the use of the term 'untouchables' to refer to India's lowest caste in the same paper (*Pretoria News* 1984: 19). This demonstrates India's willingness to sacrifice a stronger stance against *apartheid* to avoid any damage to their international image.

In addition, there were several cases of violations of the imposed sanctions for economic and military purposes. With regards to

economic sanctions, loopholes were found in the diamond and spice trade that the Indian Ministry for External Affairs appeared unable or unwilling to curb. With regards to the Bombay, now Mumbai, diamond industry, most of their rough diamonds were bought from the Diamond Trading Corporation of London, which was the arm of the South African diamond monopoly — De Beers. Thus, a large proportion of diamonds that ended up in Bombay came from South African mines. In terms of the spice industry, the early 1980s witnessed a dramatic increase in spice exports to South Africa's neighbours. The Indian press then uncovered that Indian traders would mark crates destined for Durban as Maputo (D), indicating that it would be sent to Mozambique and then forwarded to Durban (*The Star* 1988: 15). Whether New Delhi purposefully facilitated such violations or whether it was merely passive in this regard is unclear, but the more pragmatic government may very well have been less concerned with enforcing sanctions and more concerned with tangible problems of the day.

In the 1980s, South Africa received several requests for military materials and technology from companies that provided weapons to the Indian Ministry of Defence. For example, South African Defence Intelligence documents have records of Narendra Explosives Ltd requesting the supply of materials to manufacture 20 million detonators per year, despite the fact that such detonators could be purchased worldwide (Defence Intelligence 1982a). This company was licensed by the Indian government to manufacture these detonators and was being held accountable according to governmental rules and regulations (Defence Intelligence 1982b: 1). Several other forms of military technology were sold to India, which was expressly kept classified by both parties (Defence Intelligence 1982a). It should be noted that this took place after India's low-profile period in the 1960s and 1970s where it became much more security conscious and strained relations with its neighbours continued into the 1980s.

Thus, India's relations with South Africa varied depending on the international and domestic context, the relations both within and between different ministries and the people involved in those relations. Thus, despite a consistent condemnation of *apartheid* on India's part, which did contribute to its demise, India's foreign policy actions were far more complex than a simple expression of solidarity towards South African Indians and the oppressed in general. The reasons for this complex relationship between these two countries vary but speak to

an overall need for India to forward its own interests while also propagating a moral foreign policy. It is to these reasons that we now turn.

3. REASONS FOR INDIA'S AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH *APARTHEID* SOUTH AFRICA

India's ambiguous relations with the *apartheid* pariah could be viewed as the result of a multiplicity of variables — domestic and foreign. On the domestic front, Indian public opinion was inflamed on the *apartheid* issue, and specifically the treatment of Indians in the then Union of South Africa and this constrained India's foreign policy-makers as some senior Indian diplomats noted in their discussions with South African officials (Nicholls 1947c). On the other hand, the impact of other domestic variables, specifically the caste issue, loomed large over some of India's policy-makers calculations. For instance, Mr Rau opposed the discriminatory treatment of South Africans of Indian descent on racial grounds. At the same time he pointed out to South African officials that these Indians in South Africa represented the lower castes in India and did not seem to find discriminatory legislation against them to be a problem in principle — only if such discrimination was based on race was it a problem. Mr Rau went on to point out that that India's efforts to eradicate all caste inequalities were resulting in discrimination against the erstwhile ruling castes such as the Brahmins, to which he belongs (Jooste 1949). Thus there were domestic considerations compelling India to adopt a hard-line stance against racial practices in South Africa and there were other domestic considerations which militated towards India softening its stance against the *apartheid* state.

Other domestic variables also loomed large in discussing the trajectory of bilateral relations between the two countries. For instance there were clearly tensions between Mr Rau who wanted to establish a more constructive dialogue with South Africa and Mrs Pandit who wished to isolate Pretoria on account of its racial policies (Jooste 1949: 5). Similarly whilst India's High Commissioner to the UK, Krishna Menon, shared Mrs Pandit's desire to isolate South Africa, his own officials, Mr Ghosh (Public Relations Officer at the Indian High Commission to London) and Vallodi (Deputy High Commissioner to

London) continued to engage members of the South African High Commission in London (Nicholls 1947b). One of the reasons, then determining the trajectory of bilateral relations was the ascendancy of which grouping of policy-makers in India's foreign policy establishment.

Foreign considerations also weighed heavily into the mix in understanding New Delhi's relations with Pretoria. Rau, Vallodi, Ghosh and it would seem Prime Minister Nehru himself all saw in Pretoria a common ally against Communism. For this reason, Nehru was in 1947 contemplating to take the question of South Africa's racial discriminatory policies outside of the UN. On the other hand both Mrs Pandit and Krishna Menon were seen as too close to Moscow. In addition, Nehru was of the opinion that if he played the South Africa card, he would antagonise Britain which in turn might negatively impact on India joining the ranks of the Commonwealth (Nicholls 1947b).

On the other hand, other foreign policy considerations compelled India to adopt a tougher stance towards *apartheid* South Africa. India saw itself playing the role of leader of newly independent countries following decolonisation. By mobilising these countries against Pretoria, India would essentially be mobilising public opinion for India's leadership of these countries (Department of Foreign Affairs 1957).

Taken together, these domestic and foreign considerations, which pushed New Delhi in different directions in relation to South Africa, resulted in the mixed signals emanating from India. More prosaically, these mixed signals reflect the wider problem in all foreign policy calculations — striking the right balance between human rights *versus* national interests.

4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

At first glance, the above evidence and reasoning appear to support the arguments of those sceptical of the place of morality in international relations. These sceptics and arguments vary, but realism, and its offshoot neo-realism, is one of the most common sources of opposition to normative theories. The fundamental basis of neo-realism is that international society has an anarchic structure and thus results in self-interest being the defining characteristic of that society. This falls under theories that discredit the idea of normative theories because the international structure is permanent and cannot be changed by

the development of norms (Frost 1996: 520). Despite the signing of the UN Charter and the establishment of the norms it espouses, India's primary concern was not South Africa's violation of human rights but setting itself up as a global player. Thus, realist ideas of self-interest seem to prevail. However, the relationship between theory and practice is far more complex.

If one were to look at the rise and fall of various theories in international relations, one may argue that dominant theories come and go as global environments change due to major events such as World War II and the end of the Cold War. However, practice and theory is a two-way street. India first raised the issue of South Africa's treatment of minorities during and immediately after the first great debate in International Relations Theory. After WWII, debate between idealism and realism dominated the discipline (Waever 1999: 150).

The essence of this debate, and many subsequent debates, was between morality and self-help in international relations. These debates, while appearing to be isolated to the white towers of academia, do filter down into the mentalities of practitioners. Thus, India's attempts to balance idealistic aims reflected in the UN Charter and its own realistic strategic needs were a manifestation of this debate. Yet, by the 1970s and 1980s, neo-realism temporarily won that debate as the Cold War focussed most discussions on international relations to issues of power and strategy. This was again reflected in India's foreign policy during this time.

Yet, while the neo-realist assumption serves as a good starting point to explain India's actions, one must be wary of oversimplification. Ethics cannot be entirely discredited. Rather, India presents a unique case in which ethics was used for strategic reasons. If one adheres to a consequentialist view, it does not matter how good was achieved but rather that it was achieved. Despite having had secret relations with South Africa, India's rhetoric, even if it was just that, did play a central role in the demise of the *apartheid* government. But whether this was worth the price paid by those who may have been harmed by economic and military trades between the two states is another question entirely. For example, during *apartheid*, the diamond industry was supported to a large degree by migrant workers whose rights were severely abused by, *inter alia*, pass laws, poor living conditions and only whites being permitted to hold skilled jobs. The purchase of diamonds that originated in South Africa from India, an

important link in the diamond industry, played a role in keeping this industry alive.

Also, there are aspects of India's relations with South Africa that cannot be explained by a neo-realist approach alone. Both bureaucratic and psychological models can shed some light on these aspects. Bureaucratic theory points out how competition between different ministries can result in foreign policy manifesting in compromise and sub-standard decision-making (Hill 2003: 86). This relates to the inability or unwillingness of trade and defence related ministries to implement the sanctions imposed by the Ministry of External Affairs on South Africa. The arms trade is particularly notorious for its difficulty to control even by central government. Yet, one of the weaknesses of bureaucratic theory is that it is unclear which bureaucratic units command loyalty from its members above other units and thus which line they will tow (Hill 2003: 88). In other words, it does not explain why there was infighting within the Ministry of External Affairs if one's loyalty is meant to be towards the ministry in which a person finds himself.

It is in this area that psychological aspects come to play. The preferences, beliefs and thought processes of leaders and officials have an influence on their decisions and actions. Nehru, having been particularly active in India's struggle for freedom, despised tyranny and created policies with a high moral tone (Nussbaum 2007: 110, 112, 116). Thus, Nehru, while being aware of strategic concerns, was likely concerned with the normative aspects of India's condemnation of South Africa. But no leader, even one such as Nehru who played a crucial role in foreign affairs, can conduct foreign policy without the aid of bureaucrats and diplomats. The beliefs, preferences and motivations of these officials were less clear. For example, there was much tension within India's High Commission to London, particularly between Mr Menon and Mr Ghosh, whose personalities clashed severely, which eventually led to a recall of Mr Ghosh back to India (Singh 1998: 21-22). This tension was reflected in Mr Ghosh's willingness to converse with the British and South Africans behind Mr Menon's back, resulting in disparate views being presented to the South Africans. In the case of Mr Rau, his Brahmin status likely influenced his perception of South African Indians and thus the importance he placed on the South African issue over the communist one.

Thus, while India chose its stance against *apartheid* South

Africa for strategic reasons, the paths that led to that decision and subsequent actions, were much more complex and involved clashes of various departments and personalities. Those who came out on top after these clashes, such as Mr Menon, played a significant role in the direction taken. In addition both these bureaucratic and psychological models influence each other, as the psychological nature of leaders of various ministries altered the tone of India's foreign policy. For example, Mr Bajpai and Mr Menon had different ideas on how the status of Indians in South Africa had to be approached. Also, the appointment of Jagat Mehta, a member of the post-independence generation, as Secretary of External Affairs in 1976 was one of the central reasons that India reviewed its foreign policy during this time and adopted a more neo-realist approach (Kochanek 1980: 55). Yet it is not only the bureaucracies or psychologies that are important but the relationship between various ministries and various people. The Nehru-Menon relationship, for example, was a unique and effective one (Kochanek 1980: 66) that was likely one of the determining factors in eventually taking such a strong stance against South Africa. Yet, once that relationship passed, and other prime ministers and secretaries took their place, India's position wavered.

The case of India's relations with *apartheid* South Africa, then, serves as a representative example of the complexities in foreign policy. These complexities require nuanced theories that will take into account the various influences on foreign policy decisions and implementation, while keeping in mind the fundamental debate between morality and national interest that has dominated the discourse of international relations.

5. CONCLUSION

Throughout this analysis one can see the complex nature of the foreign policy process. While India's stance on South Africa and *apartheid* remained clear and consistent in the public eye, what was going on in the background involved bargaining processes and contradictory actions and signals. This is shown in the various views within the Indian Ministry of External Affairs regarding in the importance of and how to deal with the South African issue, resulting in various diplomats sending different signals to South Africa. The exchanges that violated sanctions, whether through exploiting loopholes or out-right disregard of

the embargo, also serve to illustrate this.

This ambiguity and inconsistency, then, informs the study of foreign policy and international relations as a whole. It serves to show how a single theory cannot explain all aspects of even one case study, never mind all international relations. While neo-realism can be used to explain how India, while also having some moral concerns, was ultimately interested in strategic goals, it does not address everything. The main failing of neo-realism and realism as a whole is that it views the state as a unitary actor. The final, public stance that India took did appear cohesive and would support such a view. But the process taken to get to such a decision involved multiple actors with multiple preferences. Thus, different theories need to be used in tandem if one wishes to explain the entirety of international relations.

Also, while this may be a historical case study, it bears relevance to the future of Indo-South African relations. After the demise of *apartheid*, India made a dramatic scene of its opening of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations with South Africa. These relations are both bilateral and multilateral, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) being one of the most crucial forms. Both South Africa and India now claim themselves as a bridge between the north and the south, promoting the cause of the global south. Yet, if viewed through the prism that this analysis provides, one needs to be wary of accepting these claims of south-south solidarity. Thus, while India may publicly maintain the same non-alignment and Third World solidarity policies that it did immediately following independence, the processes behind and possible strategic reasons for India's current relations need to be analysed as well. Particularly, if strategic concerns take precedence, individual states within groups such as BRICS or other developing country groups (for example, IBSA and the G-77), may need to sacrifice the needs of the whole in order to preserve relations with the developed world or economic and strategic positions. In other words, the possibility of success of organisations such as BRICS in the future may be called into question by this analysis that suggests individual national interest will tend to take precedence over moral concerns.

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