


sion, Pondoland, the Solemn Promise, and competition between powers seeking ownership of Delagoa Bay and its railway.

Swaziland was a very sore point with Kruger. He had expected the Cape and Natal to have been more influential with Whitehall during the Anglo-Boer Swaziland negotiations. When Kruger failed to achieve a settlement satisfactory to the Transvaal, he responded accordingly to both colonies. To the Cape it meant another blow to her deteriorating relationship with the Transvaal as the Sivewright Agreement approached expiration. To Natal



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it had the effect of postponing Transvaal approval of the Charlestown extension. By the time Natal had her Durban/Johannesburg trunk line in October 1895, the Transvaal boom had peaked, leaving Natal out of much of the best trading period South Africa had ever experienced. Natal's isolation from the Cape-Orange Free State Customs Union became all the more pronounced when the Transvaal refused to implement Natal's view that the Charlestown Convention guaranteed free trade in local produce. What revenue the Charlestown line would earn was not worth the sacrifices made by the misplaced judgment of Natal's maritime faction.

Neither the schemes of Rhodes nor those of Kruger could gain Delagoa Bay from Portugal. When the advantages of the Sivewright Agreement and Rotschild Loan did not bear fruit because of the Cape premier's failure to procure Delagoa Bay, find a second rand in Rhodesia, and gain Swaziland for the Transvaal on Kruger's terms, Rhodes found his goal of a united South Africa under the British flag far from fulfilment. Enlisting Natal might prove just the support Rhodes now needed.

If there had been any hope in luring Natal into a political union with the Cape or into an alternative economic railway and customs union with Cape Town and Bloemfontein, Pondoland symbolised its destruction. The attempts by Loch and Rhodes at a *rapprochement* between the Cape and Natal using Pondoland as a salve failed. When the day finally arrived for a Cape decision within the joint framework of the Anglo-Cape Pondoland Agreement, Natal found herself out in the cold due to her uncompromising stand on customs and railway issues with Cape Town.

Yet the Cape was just as unbending. Throughout Cape-Transvaal railway negotiations to succeed the Sivewright Agreement, the spirit of confrontation was paramount. Cape negotiators, upset at their loss of economic and political power to the Transvaal, argued strongly in Cape interests to maintain the lion's share of the Transvaal import trade. Rhodes supported this sectional approach not only in Cape interests, but also in his larger scheme to reassert British hegemony. He was conspiring six months before the Sivewright Agreement's expiration hoping to create some kind of spark out of the increasingly serious railway and Uitlander imbroglios. From within such spirit evolved the Drifts Crisis.

Kruger's closure of the Vaal River Drifts on 1 October 1895 to kurveyors carrying overseas imports into the Transvaal gave Rhodes the catalyst for which he had been so desperately searching. Kruger's action eliminated the Cape's Vaal River/Johannesburg kurveying service which had been set up to circumvent the high railway rates Kruger had allowed implemented on the 51 mile Vaal River/Johannesburg section soon after the Sivewright Agreement's expiration. Although the kurveying service never carried more than 13% of the Cape's Transvaal import trade, it at least symbolically opposed Transvaal power, and served the Cape's confrontation policy well. While in the process of obtaining Imperial support on the grounds that Kruger's action had violated the London Convention, Rhodes began logistical arrangements west of the Transvaal at Pitsani according to his blueprint - the earlier Loch Plan, accelerated the process of transferring Bechuanaland Protectorate

¹ conveyors (ed.)

to British South Africa Company control, and further conspired with his revolutionary partners on the Rand. Although the somewhat contrived tension mounted to quite a pitch, Kruger reopened the drifts before Rhodes was completely prepared. The clogged condition of the railway lines, blamed by the supporters of the Cape view on the drifts closure, was much more the result of overwhelming trade. Off balance from having Kruger pull the drifts rug out from under him, Rhodes fell flat into the contemporaneous Jameson Raid. This dissertation argues that current historiography has placed too much emphasis on the effects of the Jameson Raid and Milner's hard-lone policies as primary causes of the Second Anglo-Boer War. Rather the struggle for Imperial supremacy began in 1894 during unsuccessful railway diplomacy which led first to the Drifts Crisis and then to the coetaneous Jameson Raid.

In the aftermath of the Raid Kruger implemented mechanisms to ruin the only advantage the long Cape line still possessed: expedition. A final blow to Cape pretensions at dominating the Transvaal transit trade was the destruction by rinderpest of the reinstated Cape/Vaal River/Johannesburg kurveying service. Natal finally traded empty Transvaal promises for a new customs union with the Cape and Orange Free State. These events seemed to justify Selborne's prediction in 1896. It was soon adopted by Whitehall as a premise upon which to formulate policy towards the Transvaal, that due to the shift in economic and political power to the Transvaal, that Republic would soon turn the Cape, Natal, and the Orange Free State into satellite states. But railway statistics throughout 1891-1899 suggest alternatively that colonial economies and railways were reasonably healthy. In 1899 the onset of South African depression with a concomitant volume decline in Transvaal imports appeared more baneful than any Transvaal threat of forcing bankruptcy on the colonies by diverting transit trade traffic from one trunk line to another. Nevertheless, Rhodes fought his war and Kruger saw the Imperial turtle come out of its shell at last. Neither statesman would live to see the consequences of his actions.

¹ in all senses (ed.)

THE RAILWAY STRUGGLE IN SOUTH AFRICA 1886-1910

Review of Kenneth C. Wilburn, *The climax of railway competition in South Africa 1886-1899*, doctoral thesis New College, Oxford (U.K.), Michaelmass 1982, 302 pp.

by C. de Jong

The history of railways in South Africa before Union in 1910, particularly of the railway race first to Kimberley and then to the Witwatersrand, has attracted more historians than the quiet period after Union. Severe competition between South African states for transport between the ports and the mining areas of Kimberley and the Witwatersrand contributed much to economic and political frictions between the British coastal colonies and the landlocked Boer republics and to the endeavours of the Imperial government to end the quarrels by incorporating all states in a railway and customs union. Transvaal resisted and the second Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902 was the consequence. It led to the elimination of the Boer republics in 1902.

Jean van der Poel (1932), J.P. van Winter (1937-38), D.J. Coetzee (1940), J.H. van Helten (1976), A.J. Purkis (1978), D.H. Heydenrych (1982) and recently K.C. Wilburn (1982) wrote on the railway controversy before Union from different points of view. Wilburn did research in South Africa and Europe and is well acquainted with Afrikaans and Dutch. He is at present associate professor of history in the East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA.

He describes in detail the struggle over railway tariffs from 1886 to 1899 and the aftermath from 1902 to 1910. He emphasizes the good personal relations and cooperation between the railway managers of the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State and between those of Transvaal and Natal. Only in 1897 did Natal side with the Cape Colony and sever her intimate railway relationship with Transvaal, as a result of the growing tension between the Imperial government and Transvaal.

Wilburn discusses extensively the Sivewright Agreement of 1891, concluded by the Cape minister of railways, James Sivewright, and the managing director of the Nederlandsche Zuid-Afrikaansche Spoorweg-Maatschappij (NZASM), G.A.A. Middelberg. This agreement gave the Cape railways a dominant position in the traffic to the Rand until the completion of the Eastern line from Delagoa Bay to the Rand in early 1895. It allowed for a Cape loan to the NZASM for the completion of a line from Vereeniging to Johannesburg, to be operated temporarily by the Cape. This loan and the loan by Rothschild for completion of the Eastern line were due to Cecil Rhodes, prime minister of the Cape Colony. Wilburn remarks that Jean van der Poel gives no explanation for Rhodes' support to the competing NZASM. Wilburn's explanation is that Rhodes hoped to bring the Eastern line under British influence by these loans and by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay and the Portuguese railway from there to Transvaal. Rhodes' hope was thwarted, however.

Wilburn states that from 1886 to 1894 the Free State held the political and economic key to a railway and customs union in South Africa because of its central geographical situation and its political influence on the Afrikaners in the Cape Colony and Transvaal. The Free State failed in this role when after 1894 the economic centre moved from the coastal states to Transvaal because of the success of deep-level goldmining and the completion of the Eastern line.

Wilburn sides with Edward McMurdo in his longdrawn negotiations with Portugal and the NZASM, denies that he was merely an adventurer and speculator (a kind of John Law) and calls him a victim of Bad faith, particularly on the part of the Portuguese government. He states that Rhodes' disappointment from his failure to find a great goldreef in Rhodesia and to acquire Delagoa Bay and the railway to Transvaal drove him to the drifts crisis. This was his conflict with the Transvaal government and the NZASM. At his instigation the Cape railways lowered the rates on the line to Vereeniging and subsequently organized oxwagon transport across the Vaal drifts to circumvent railway transport from Vereeniging to Johannesburg when the NZASM raised the tariffs for that transport. The drifts crisis started when the Transvaal government closed the Vaal drifts. Kruger's yielding to British pressure to reopen the drifts deprived Rhodes of a useful pretext for Jameson's raid to overthrow Kruger and for the planned revolt of the Johannesburg foreigners in 1895/96, which both failed. The reopening of the Vaal drifts was nullified by the end of the congestion at the Johannesburg goods station and the rinderpest which killed most oxen.

Wilburn gives a good survey of the complicated game of chess from 1886 to 1899 in the railway race to the Rand, summarized by C.W. de Kiewiet in his *History of South Africa* as "a railway for a railway and a tariff for a tariff". Wilburn argues that historians have placed too much emphasis on the effects of the Jameson Raid and Milner's hard-line policy as primary causes of the second Anglo-Boer War. He stresses the failure to solve the railway problems as a cause of war. This may be true, but to me the Uitlander question, particularly the franchise for foreigners, and Milner's policy in this question were mainly responsible for the outbreak of the war in October 1899.

NABESKOUIING OOR DR. T.S. VAN ROOYEN

deur C. de Jong

Thomas Stephanus van Rooyen is gebore in Pietersburg, Transvaal, in 1922 en oorlede te Durban in 1967. Hy was joernalis, onderwyser en seniorlektor in geskiedenis en lid van verskeie verenigingsbesture en redaksies van historiese tydskrifte. Vir die Pretoriase Historiese Vereniging is hy van veel betekenis. Hy was in 1952-56 bestuurslid, in 1962-64 ondervoorsitter, in 1964-65 voorsitter en in 1952-56 en 1964-65 redakteur van *Pretoriana*. Hy het verskeie bydraes van betekenis daarin gepubliseer, soos "Die kroniek van Wallmannsthal", 'n Berlyanse sendingstasie by Pretoria (*Pretoriana*, deel 3, Nos. 2 en 3, Desember 1953 en April 1954), 'n pleidooi vir 'n opelugmuseum by Pretoria (*Pretoriana*, No. 22, Desember 1956) en "Dieper waardes uit ons verlede: faktore wat die geskiedenis bepaal", (*Pretoriana*, Nos. 42 & 43, Aug.-Des. 1963), 'n histories-filosofiese beskouing.

Hy is op 14 Desember 1967 tydens vakansie te Durban plotseling aan 'n hartaanval oorlede. "In memoriams" of nekrologieë oor hom het verskyn in *Pretoriana* No. 55, Desember 1967, en *Historia* No. 1, Mei 1968, van J.L. Hattingsh en J.W. Kew. Vir die meeste persone eindig dan die publisiteit oor hulle. Maar oor T.S. van Rooyen het onlangs 'n biografie en beskouing verskyn uit die pen van Mnr. Albert van Jaarsveld, seun van prof. F.A. van Jaarsveld en seniorlektor in geskiedenis aan die Universiteit van Zoeloeland, in *Historia*, jaargang 30 No. 1, Pretoria, Mei 1985, p. 50-61. Hierdie artikel verdien natuurlik die aandag van lede van ons vereniging.

Mnr. van Jaarsveld begin sy beskouing aldus: "Hoewel T.S. van Rooyen slegs 'n beskeie bydrae tot die Suid-Afrikaanse geskiedskrywing gelewer het, was sy vroeë dood nogtans 'n gevoelige slag". Volgens sy artikel p. 52 was Van Rooyen 'n verdienstelike dosent in die Universiteit van Pretoria en aktief in talle organisasies - waaronder ons vereniging.

Nekrologieë bevat gewoonlik slegs lof. Mnr. van Jaarsveld se beskouing is geen nekrologie nie, maar krities: hy som verdienstes en tekortkomings van Van Rooyen se werk en geaardheid op. Hy bespreek sy publikasies en die polemieke wat hy gevoer het, onder andere met prof. F.A. van Jaarsveld. Een van Van Rooyen se verdienstes was sy pleidooi vir deegliker studie van volkekunde deur Suid-Afrikaanse historici wat oor die Gekleurdes skryf. Hy is die stigter en redakteur van die maandblad *BANTU* wat nou *Informa* heet, en uitgegee word deur die Staatsdepartement vir die belange van Swartes. Hy het dan ook minder nadruk gelê op die wortels van blank Suid-Afrika in Europa as Suid-Afrikaners wat wel in Europa gestudeer het, en meer dikwels gepleit vir nouer kontakte tussen Suid-Afrika en orige Afrika.

Mnr. Albert van Jaarsveld se gevolgtrekking op p. 61 lui:

"As 'n mens terugkyk op dr. van Rooyen se bydrae tot die historiese geleerdheid kom jy tot die gevolgtrekking dat hy geen groot navorsers in die ware sin van die woord was nie. Slegs twee keer het hy werk gelewer wat op argivale

navorsing gebaseer was - sy MA en D.Phil dissertasies. Met sy opstelle het hy geen wesenlike bydrae tot die geskiedskrywing van Suid-Afrika gelewer nie, behalwe vir die stuk waarin hy 'n nuwe benadering tot die begrip van die kontaksituasie tussen Wit en Swart bepleit het. Hy was een van die eerste persone wat die belangrikheid daarvan ingesien het dat die historikus wat daarvoor wil werk, ook volkekundige kennis moet besit. Hy moet nl. die "siel" van die Swartman verstaan en hom nie net verlaat op dokumente wat eensydig deur Blankes opgestel is nie. 'n Mens vind dit jammer dat dr. van Rooyen nie die daad by die woord gevoeg het en self met 'n omvattende werk oor hierdie tema begin het nie. Met sy besondere kennis oor die Swartman sou hy so 'n tipe werk met sukses kon aangepak het".

Ek merk hierby op dat doseerwerk en verenigingswerk Suid-Afrikaanse universiteitsdosente, onder wie T.S. van Rooyen, dikwels te min tyd vir langdurige navorsing en publikasie van uitgebreide werk toelaat. Soos ander geleerdes met joefnalistieke aanleg het Van Rooyen aan publikasie van artikels en ander kort bydraes voorkeur bo boeke gegee. Hy kon op hierdie wyse talryker onderwerpe behandel. As ons besef hoeveel jare gemoeid is nie slegs met die skryf van boeke nie maar ook met die soek na 'n uitgewer en subsidies en die tydsverloop van die druk en bind van 'n boek, verstaan ons veel beter waarom talle geleerdes - onder wie historici soos Van Rooyen - verkies om kort bydraes te skryf: hulle is veel gemakliker om te publiseer.

Die Pretoriase Historiese Vereniging sal Dr. T.S. van Rooyen altyd in dankbare herinnering hou.

DIE BROERS ALARIK EN MAGNUS FORSSMAN IN TRANSVAAL

deur C. de Jong

In die ou begraafplaas aan Kerkstraat-Wes in Pretoria staan die groot grafmonument van die broers Forssman, waarop 'n engel 'n kruis wat groter as hyself is, orent hou. Hier volg 'n kort lewensberig oor die broers. Hulle behoort tot die buitelanders wat gedurende die 19de eeu as pioniers Transvaal se ekonomiese ontwikkeling aangevoer het deur grond te koop en daarop gevorderde landboumetodes toe te pas, delfstowwe te soek, vervoerdienste in te stel en ander gevarieerde bedrywighede te beoefen. Voorbeelde is die Duitser Carl Mauch, die Skot Alexander MacCorkindale, die Nederlander H.J. Bührmann en die Swede Alarik en Magnus Forssman. Hulle was Europese verteenwoordigers van die moderne kapitalisme in die vroeg- en voor-kapitalistiese Transvaal.

Die Swede is een van die Skandinawiese nasies in Noord-Europa. Hierdie volke bewoon lande waar vrugbare grond skaars is, behalwe op die Deense eilande, en die winters lank en straf is. Daarom is hulle vanouds vissers en seevaarders, avontuurlustig en bereid om te emigreer. Hulle is klein nasies, maar goed opgelei en energiek. Ook Suid-Afrika het veel aan hulle te danke. Die Skandinawiese lande mag onder die stamlande van Suid-Afrikers nie vergeet word nie.

Alarik Forssman, 1822-1889

Die broers Forssman se vader, Jonas Samuel (1783-1835), het behoort tot die beampte-adel van Swede. Hy was advokaat, lid van die koninklike krygsraad en advokaat-generaal van die Sweedse leër. Sy tweede seun, Oscar Wilhelm Alarik, is gebore in die hawestad Kalmar in Suid-Swede in 1822. Sy vader is oorlede toe die seun 13 jaar was, maar tog het Alarik 'n tegniese opleiding ontvang en later is hy ingenieur genoem. Hy het om onbekende redes in 1844 na Suid-Afrika geëmigreer en in Durban aan wal gegaan. Hy het twee jaar in die opkomende Natalse suikerindustrie gewerk, vermoedelik as tegnikus.

Gedurende hierdie jare was 'n groot trek uit Natal na die binneland, veral Transvaal, aan die gang. Daar was wild nog volop en grond goedkoop. Talle Afrikaners in Natal was ontevrede oor die Britse bewind wat in 1843 gevestig is, en het na die binneland getrek. Ondernemende nie-Afrikaners het hulle gevolg. Onder hulle was die jong Alarik Forssman. Hy het met 'n ossewa vol handelsware gelaai in 1846 in Potchefstroom, die toenmalige hoofstad van Wes- en Midde-Transvaal, aangekom. Daar het hy hom gevestig en in 1852 as algemene handelaar sake begin doen. Hy het in alle denkbare goedere, van massagoed soos messelkalk, hawer en timmerhout, tot luukse ware, en in die klein aantal uitvoerprodukte van Transvaal, soos wol, volstruisvere en ivoor, handel gedryf. Onder sy belangrike ingevoerde artikels was vuurwapens, lood en kruit. Daarvan het hy heelwat aan die Goe-

wernement verkoop, maar die betaling was dikwels stadig, want die Staatsin-komste het traag gevloei omdat die meeste boere onwillig was om belasting te betaal.

Grond was destyds goedkoop en gewild om daarmee te spekuleer. Forssman het spoedig begin om baie daarvan te koop en reeds omstreeks 1860 was hy een van die grootste grondeienaars in Transvaal. Hy het probeer om beter landboumetodes toe te pas, die graanopbrengs te verhoog en nuwe gewasse soos koffie te verbou. Hy het daarvoor onder meer ploë uit die Verenigde State ingevoer omdat hulle beter as Europese ploë by die plaaslike toestande gepas het. Hy het na nuwe gewasse, bruikbare timmerhout en delfstowwe gesoek en monsters daarvan versamel. Op die eerste landboutentoonstelling in Potchefstroom in 1867 het hy onder meer koffie van een van sy plase en inheemse timmerhout uitgestal. Kortom, hy het hom ingespan om die ekonomiese ontwikkeling van Transvaal in eie belang, maar ook in algemene belang te bevorder. Dié ontwikkeling was egter stadig weens gebrek aan vervoer en afsetmarkte. Eers in 1876 is die tweede landelike tentoonstelling gehou. Forssman was die voorsitter van die tentoonstellingskomitee en het onder meer steenkool uitgestal. Natuurlik was hy baie geïnteresseerd in goudvondse wat in hierdie jare gevolg het, eers by Tati, daarna by Lydenburg en toe op die plaas Eersteling by Potgietersrus.

Hy het in die buiteland reklame vir investering in Transvaal gemaak, onder meer deur in Oktober 1871 'n lang brief met illustrasies in die Sweedse tydskrif *Ny Illustrerad Tidning* te publiseer en in 1872 in Kaapstad 'n brosjure in Engels met die titel *A guide for agriculturalists and capitalists, speculators, miners etc. wishing to invest money profitably in the Transvaal Republic, South Africa* (41 pp.) uit te gee.¹ Hy vestig hierin die aandag op die, volgens hom aansienlike, natuurlike hulpbronne in Transvaal, noem die baie plase waarvan hy eienaar is en wat hy te koop aanbied, en gee 'n beknopte beskrywing van 64 van hulle.¹ Hy het die ekonomiese vooruitsigte vir Transvaal baie belowend genoem, maar hulle was tot die ontdekking van die Groot Goudrif aan die Witwatersrad in 1886 maar skraal.

Hy het probeer om in Transvaal 'n Sweedse boerekolonie te stig, omdat in Swede ernstige armoede gely is terwyl Transvaal volgens hom behoefte aan bekwame boere en ambagslui gehad het. Met hierdie doel het hy in 1863 Kalmar besoek om Sweedse emigrante vir sy plaas Scandinavia by Potchefstroom aan die Vaalrivier te werf. Hy het die seilskip 'Octavia' gehuur, 30 Sweedse emigrante van verskillende beroepe aan boord geneem en 'n lading handelsware, vir Suid-Afrika bestem, ingeskeep. Onder die emigrante was sy ouer broer, Magnus, met vrou en vyf dogters. Een van dié meisies, Anna, het later haar jeugherinneringe aan haar reis met die 'Octavia' en haar verbyf in Potchefstroom gepubliseer.²

Die landbou-onderneming op Scandinavia het, soos talle landbouprojekte van buitelanders in Suid-Afrika, spoedig heeltemal misluk. Die klimaat en gebrek aan vervoer en/of afset was meestal die oorsake van mislukking. Op Scandinavia sou besproeiing die Sweedse boere help, maar droogte het

dit verydel en die meeste Swede het hulle elders in Suid-Afrika gevestig of na Swede teruggekeer. Tans herinner die naam Skandinawiëdrif nog aan die vroeëre Sweedse kolonie.

'n Ander mislukte onderneming van Alarik Forssman was die gereëldde passasierskoetsdiens wat hy in 1872 tussen die nuwe diamantvelde by die Vaalrivier en Potchefstroom, en vandaar na die nuwe goudvelde by Lydenburg ingestel het. Die vraag na die vervoerdiens was groot, maar die natuur het die diens só belemmer dat Alarik dit na 'n paar jaar gestaak het.

Hy het altyd vriendskaplike betrekkinge onderhou met die regeringsleiers, onder wie die Staatspresident M.W. Pretorius en T.F. Burgers, en met buitelandse navorsers en prospekteurs soos Carl Mauch en Thomas Baines. Hy het hulle graag gasvryheid in sy huis aangebied en dit het die ontmoetingsplek geword waar oor ekonomiese sake, wetenskap en kultuur gesels is. Hy het in 1851 getrou met Emilia von Landsberg, dogter van E. von Landsberg van Duitse herkoms op Slangkop in die Kaapkolonie. Hulle het elf kinders gehad en daarom is daar nog talle Forssmans in Suid-Afrika woonagtig.

Die regering van Portugal het Alarik Forssman in 1862 as konsul-generaal in die Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) benoem en hom die titel 'Chevalier' (ridder) toegeken. Hy het hom daarna in 'n pragtige diplomate-uniform saam met sy vrou en ook alleen laat fotografeer.

Hy het weer op 'n sakereis gegaan en in 1870 Brittanje besoek om belangstelling en kapitaal vir Transvaal te werf. Die Royal Geographical Society in Londen het hom in 1875 as lid gekies wat hy as 'n groot eer beskou het. In 1872 het hy Portugal besoek om oor die aanlê van 'n spoorlyn van Delagoabaai na Transvaal te onderhandel. President Burgers het in 1875 Forssman se onderhandelinge in Lissabon voortgesit. Forssman het by sy terugkeer in Suid-Afrika 'n tydjie in Kaapstad gewoon en daar sy brosjure *A Guide* uitgee. Hy en sy vrou het later na Potchefstroom teruggekeer.

Hy was een van die eerstes wat 'n spoorweg van Delagoabaai na Transvaal aanbeveel het. Dit blyk uit die *Gedenkboek uitgegeven ter gelegenheid der Feestelijke opening van den Delagoabaaispoorweg*, J.H. de Bussy, Amsterdam, 1895, p. 3:

"Den Heeren O.W.A. Forssman en A.J. Munnick komt de eer toe, reeds in het begin van 1870 eene concessie te hebben aangevraagd, tot het maken van een weg, geschikt voor stoom- en andere trek machines, van de Portugeesche grenzen tot een of andere plek in de Republiek (Transvaal).

Het blijkt niet dat ger.oemde heeren voldaan hebben aan het door den E(del) A(chtbaren) Volksraad tot hen gericht verzoek, om de voorwaarden der gevraagde concessie op te geven".

Miskien is Munnick dieselfde as A.L. Munnich, attorney-at-law, general agent and conveyancer, Potchefstroom, vermeld op p. 84 van *Transvaal Book Almanac and Directory for 1877*, by Fred Jeppe, printed at Pietermaritzburg, 1877.