

this Zulu chief the High Commissioner had formed from the first an unfavourable opinion. The Bishop's observation of his actions for many years past, and his acquaintance with others who had some knowledge of him, led him to take a different view of his character. In his judgement the Zulu king was,

“for a savage, an able, intelligent, and well-meaning ruler—‘proud,’ no doubt, but as a European might be proud, who asserted manfully his people's rights, and resisted what he deemed to be oppression—who had had great difficulties, great ignorance in himself and superstition in his people to contend with—but who had done his best to govern them, and was gradually adopting a more lenient method in dealing with offenders, by fines, instead of, as of old, by massacres.”

The award asserted that the Zulu claims were substantially right: the memorandum, which served as a sequel to the award, reduced their compensation to a shadow. The Bishop had all along urgently advised Cetshwayo

“to trust to the uttermost in the good faith of England; and now,” he added, “as I see what has come of his so doing, I am deeply grieved, and, as an Englishman, ashamed, that I ever gave him such advice, though it was the only advice I could give him.”

Had the principles urged by the Bishop been acted upon by the High Commissioner, we should have been spared at least one great disaster, we should have saved a multitude of lives, and our national obligations would be less by some millions of money than they are. It is something that his voice was thus raised without respect to mistaken rulers and excited crowds.

“I am bound as an honest man,” he wrote (February 1, 1879), to Sir Bartle Frere “to say, that, while, of course, I approve of

the main objects aimed at, and consider that they are such as a powerful Christian nation like ours has a right and a duty to enforce, if need be, upon our Zulu neighbours, yet I cannot see how to justify the manner in which our demands have been made, or the steps by which it has been sought to enforce them, with the killing of many hundred Zulus and the plundering of thousands of their cattle, and, it must be feared, with still greater miseries to come both for them and for us—and all ‘for the safety and welfare of the Zulu people, to which the Queen’s Government wishes well.’ It seems to me that if we cannot enforce the changes we desire in a better way than this, we have no right to try and enforce them at all. But, above all, I mourn the loss of our character among the native tribes of South Africa, as an honourable nation, a just and truth-loving people, upon whose plighted word the Zulu king and people have been for so many years implicitly relying.”

A few months later (June, 1879), at the time when the Government was repeating its “wanton, unprovoked, and terrible attack,”¹ two messengers from Cetshwayo to the Natal Government reached Maritzburg. They were treated more like prisoners than as envoys; but, as with their escort of police they passed the bounds of the Bishopstowe estate, they managed to give to a native belonging to it the greeting of the Zulu king to the Bishop.

“Look you,” they said, “you must go to Magema,² and remember us very much to him, and tell him to say to Sobantu from Cetshwayo that he greets him very much, and hopes that he is well and that all things are well with him, and let him be sure too of this—that messengers will be sent to him by Cetshwayo, and they will manage to reach him without being seen and stopped before anything can happen. If the English army presses him hard, and he sees that he is about to die, or to be taken prisoner, he will send

¹ See p. 485.

² The Bishop’s native printer.

to report this to Sobantu, that, whether he lives or dies, it may be known to all in authority that he does not wish for war, and that it is the English who are pressing upon him to destroy him without a cause. Sobantu may rest sure that he will send before anything can happen."

The native to whom they had spoken now asked them, as envoys:—

"This coming of yours to ask for peace, and to say that you are ready to pay what is demanded, what does it mean? Is it that you are beaten, and can fight no more?"

Said they:—

"It is no such thing, we are not overcome in fighting; but Cetshwayo does not wish to fight, he wishes to make peace. These messages of his are sent to bear witness for him, that it may be known to all the world that it is not his fault, whatever may happen. He has done no wrong, and does not wish to fight, and it is the English who are driving him to it without a cause."

As they spoke, up came a man in a great hurry, bringing to Mfunzi and his companion (the envoys) a word from a friend (Mr. F. E. Colenso) that Cetshwayo should send back the sword of the young man, the chief (the Prince Imperial) who had been killed the other day. They said that they would be sure to tell this word to the king, and that the sword would surely be sent, for the word is a just one.

It was not for Cetshwayo alone that the Bishop had spoken and toiled. The letters relating to the time have told the story of Langalibalele's imprisonment, and of the circumstances which led to it. But Langalibalele was not an independent chief, and the Government thought that by way of punishing him for an offence which he had never committed, or, so far as appears, thought of committing, they were dealing him no harsh measure in trying him as a traitor, and sentencing him to life-long imprisonment.

“Here,” in the emphatic words of Mr. Froude,¹ “the matter might have rested, had it not been for the courage and honourable feeling of one man. To the disgraceful unanimity of Natal sentiment a single exception alone was found. . . . It was no light matter to stand alone against an infuriated population and tell them to their faces that they had been cowards and brutes: yet this Bishop Colenso dared to do. He not only spoke the truth in South Africa; he was determined that it should be known in England. He collected evidence; he printed it and sent it home; he followed it himself, amidst the curses of his colonial fellow-countrymen, to carry his complaint before the Imperial Government.”

The picture drawn by Mr. Froude may be in its general outlines sufficiently correct. Public feeling had, no doubt, been largely excited against him; but it is not to be supposed that he stood quite so entirely alone, if we look to the real convictions of many of the colonists.² It would have been well if they had felt it to be their duty to express their

¹ *Two Lectures on South Africa* (London, Longmans, 1880). Mr. Froude's testimony is welcome. It is to be regretted that in his volume *Oceana* we find no acknowledgement of the Bishop's protest against a policy which Mr. Froude denounces as severely as the Bishop himself.

² In a letter dated May 24, 1880, the late Bishop Merriman of Grahams-town, in sending his first subscription to the Aborigines Protection Society, explains why, having never “meddled in the least degree in politics” during a residence of thirty-two years in South Africa, he now joins the Society, and says:—“The tyranny by which the Zulu War was forced on, and the blackening of Cetshwayo's character and intentions, have been nobly testified against by Dr. Colenso. And though one of the clergy who presented him for trial, and who has ever since maintained the same repugnance to his heresies, and the same repudiation of his position as a minister and a member of the flock of Christ, I venture to hope that he is winning for himself the grace of repentance and enlightenment by his manly defence of the oppressed and maligned King of Zululand. Dr. Colenso happily engaged in this controversy not of his own choice . . . but was challenged to it by the Governor himself, and therefore he speaks now as by right when he denounces the high-handed injustice which has been, and still is, practised.”

agreement with him more loudly and more early; and it might have been well, too, if the Bishop's visit to England had not come at the same time with Mr. Froude's visit to Natal. The Bishop's errand was crowned with a greater success than some ventured to hope for, or than many wished; and he did not shrink when he was called upon to do the same work of truth and justice for the unfortunate Zulu king, who was smitten down, whose lands were ravaged, and whose people were slaughtered, to suit the schemes of the Confederation party—schemes disapproved and censured by the Colonial Secretary, but having their authoritative sanction from a higher quarter, like those of the Indian Viceroy at the same time in Afghanistan.

CHAPTER X.

CORRESPONDENCE AND WORK.

1879-80.

OF the letters, or extracts from letters, given in this chapter, some bring out in more full detail incidents briefly noticed or referred to in the preceding narrative. Others show that his interest in the tasks of former years was not abated, although more pressing cares had compelled him to turn his thoughts chiefly in other directions. The letters on the final scenes of the Zulu War and its sequel are invaluable as coming from one who with indefatigable patience scrutinised the evidence for every event as it took place, and who did so not to support any schemes of mere political expediency, but solely in the interests of justice and of the welfare of the Zulus, if mercy was not to be thought of. Of those who may now read these letters many will, probably, be struck with the sound judgement and sagacity of his suggestions, and be tempted to regret that they who were charged with the ordering of affairs failed to exhibit the same single-hearted zeal for the true honour and dignity of their country.

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

“ BISHOPSTOWE, *Tuesday, January 28, 1879.*

“ Our position remains still one of great anxiety, but it is not *worse* than when I wrote on Sunday last—that is to say,

Cetshwayo has not as yet made any raid into the colony ; and there is even reason to believe that it is not his *present* purpose to do so, if we may judge from the fact that four native waggon-drivers who escaped from the terrible scene of the 22nd passed by here and gave me an account of which I inclose a translation, and in that you will find at the end that the induna called back a Zulu force which was about to cross the Buffalo after them, shouting as they distinctly heard, 'The king has not said that you were to cross ; he is only defending his own land ; come back !' and they did so at once, and so the lives of these men were saved. I see that the *Pall Malls* just arrived are persistently representing that Cetshwayo has *threatened to invade the colony*, and *therefore* we must attack him. It is a most abominable falsehood, and is clearly meant to throw dust in the eyes of the English public, when this most unnecessary and unjust war has to be defended in Parliament. . . There is not—as far as I know—a shadow of ground for making such a statement. Cetshwayo has all along declared that he would *not* begin, but if he were attacked he should know how to defend himself, and he has done so in such a way that, in spite of our dreadful losses, no true Englishman surely can help admiring his skill and resolution. The papers here are talking of course of extermination for the Zulus. But I fear that, if that course is resolved on, we shall have to learn some more painful lessons ; and the worst is that—if Cetshwayo really means to hold his hand, and merely desires to clear his land of the invaders, without retaliating upon us the blows we have struck at him—he will surely cease from such forbearance when he finds that we are only preparing a mightier force with which to crush him and his people utterly. I seriously fear that within the next two months, before reinforcements can arrive from England . . . we shall be invaded and the colony ravaged and ruined, that is, if we are known to be still making preparations for renewing the war. It seems to me that an effort might be made—not immediately, but shortly, if we find that he really is acting merely on the defensive—to get our

differences settled without further bloodshed, by sending a Commission to whom he would listen. Of course it would be idle to suppose that Sir Bartle Frere's huge demands should be accepted. But I think it would be quite possible to get the consent of the king and nation to put a stop to killing without trial, and to admit a Resident, not clothed with all Sir Bartle Frere's extraordinary powers (which were, in fact, preposterous), but to exercise a reasonable influence upon the king, and be a witness of his proceedings. . . . Would it be possible to press the Government, in sending the troops, to suggest negotiations to be tried first? I need hardly say that, if asked to go, I would go willingly myself as one of the Commissioners, but, of course, I cannot make such a proposal. . . . I have no faith whatever in the genius or power of Lord Chelmsford to guard effectually such a frontier as ours, . . . if once Cetshwayo made up his mind to sweep the colony.

“It seems to me clear that the real blame for the late disaster must attach to Lord Chelmsford himself, who slept in the camp the night before—nay, the two nights previously—and left it at 4 A.M. without having made the slightest preparation for repelling an assault, though the *Witness* says positively—and apparently under ‘inspiration’—that he was well aware of a large Zulu force in the neighbourhood that intended to attack him, yet he had not thrown up intrenchments of any kind, nor parked his waggons; and he and his force lay down as if no Zulus were near. He had sent on part of his force the day before to reach Matshana's country, and that morning he sent away another large part of his force to support the first, and he set off himself to join them some hours before Colonel Durnford had arrived with his small reinforcement of two hundred and fifty native horsemen, who found the Zulus advancing near at hand, and were immediately engaged in deadly fight.

“As I hinted in my last, I perceive an ungenerous attempt on the part of Sir Bartle Frere to fix the eye on Colonel Durnford, as if *he* was the person principally concerned, instead of the General; . . . and I see that the *Witness*

to-day . . . tries to exculpate the General by saying that he could not possibly expect a body of troops left in charge of waggons to *attack* the enemy—they should have stood on their defence. And so no doubt they would have done if they had been properly prepared for defending themselves,—that is, if the General had not himself neglected, or allowed Colonel Pulleine to neglect¹ one of the rules laid down in a printed document published under his own authority, and which enabled Colonel Pearson to defend himself when attacked by a large body of Zulus. But what were the *mounted* men under Colonel Durnford intended for? It may be that when he arrived on the scene, at about 10.30 A.M., he became the senior in command. I don't know this as a fact, but assume it as possible, in order to throw on him all the responsibility involved in the attack; and he may have seen at once that, all due precautions having been neglected, a mere defence was hopeless against such numbers, and that the only chance of success was to be found in a bold attack on each wing, and he may have ordered such an attack. . . . But the blame of all this—if it is to be blamed—must rest with those who, knowing that the enemy was to be expected, and even not knowing it, left the camp wholly unprotected during those six or seven morning hours of daylight (it is our midsummer), and during the whole of the day previously, and the evening before that. Well! I suppose that military authorities here and at home will look into the matter. . . . I have heard to-day that an induna ordered a Zulu who was about to stab an unarmed (black) boy, one of the camp-followers, to abstain, as the king had not said that such should be killed, only the fighting men. Of course this would not prevent many such *unarmed* men, white and black, being killed in the excitement, when no induna was nigh; as the other 'word' would not prevent small bodies rushing across the stream, when no one was there to check them. But I see ground for hoping that the king's purpose is not so bloodthirsty as is generally supposed; and I think many English readers will be sickened and disgusted with the

¹ *A Soldier's Life and Work in South Africa*, p. 218, note, p. 220.

accounts in the papers of men killed, who were not fighting, but running away or hiding in caves, and of *small* herds of cattle, *e.g.* eight or ten, evidently the little property of individual kraals, being swept off by our gallant warriors, as well as hundreds and thousands, which are all assumed to belong to the king, or at all events to the fighting men. What Zulu can possibly believe that we seek only the good of the Zulu people ?

“ In fact, if it is desired in England to avoid if possible a long, costly, and bloody war, the best thing to be done would be to withdraw the present High Commissioner, who will never consent to give up his plans, and send in his place some one who will look at things from an unprejudiced point of view, whose promises can be trusted, instead of its being necessary to ‘read between the lines’ before their real meaning can be understood, and whose conduct shall be open and straightforward, instead of tortuous and sly and slippery.¹

“ Major Dartnell from the front has reported that the natives there say that the indunas had been heard calling out that the King had not ordered his men to cross our border (agreeing with the statement of the four waggon-drivers).

“ *Sunday, February 2.*

“ There is nothing new, except that Mr. Joubert has arrived with an ‘ultimatum’ from the Transvaal Boers to Sir Bartle Frere, insisting on their independence being recognised, and some offer has come from the Free State of 500 mounted men to be allowed to fight [against the Zulus] under their own officers, and take all the booty they can secure. It is very sad to see that such captures of cattle have been made, especially by Colonel Wood’s column, who have taken 8,000 or 10,000, I believe, and that from a people in whose interests this war is undertaken !

“ I send you a copy of my reply to Sir Bartle Frere’s last letter, and I think you will be astonished that he could

¹ So might have been avoided the needless and therefore iniquitous slaughter at Indhlobane, Kambula (on both sides), Gingindhlovu, and, most needless of all, Ulundi.

allow himself to write such a letter. It utterly destroys all confidence in his good faith as a politician, and in his wisdom as a statesman. I do not understand his object in writing it. Was it to go to England *without* a reply?"

TO GENERAL DURNFORD.

"February 1, 1879.

"Long before this letter can reach you, you will have heard by telegram and otherwise of the sad disaster which has befallen our troops in Zululand, and of the death of your noble son and our very dear friend. I will not expatiate on the events of that mournful day, which you will learn from published reports. I can only say that our grief for the loss of one whom we knew so well and so much admired and honoured, is very deep, as is also our feeling against this most unnecessary and iniquitous war. . . . You and his mother will rejoice, amidst all your sorrow, in knowing that he died a gallant soldier's death. But you may also have a special consolation in the fact that his last great act as a civilian was to do his part, amidst great difficulties, in securing the just rights of the Zulus, by whose hand, alas! one of their truest friends has fallen. . . . But your dear son, however much in his heart he may have condemned, as I believe he did, though he never said so, the course pursued towards the Zulu king, did his duty when the hour of trial came, and fell like a hero under the overwhelming numbers of the foe."

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

"BISHOPSTOWE, February 7, 1879.

"We remain still *in statu quo*. Cetshwayo has not, as yet, made any raid into the colony, though last Monday there was a great scare in Maritzburg at news, which came through Greytown, that a Zulu force had crossed the frontier. . . . Still, we are quite at the mercy of Cetshwayo. . . .

‘Colonel Pearson is still at Etshowe, in Zululand, about thirty-four miles inland; and it is a remarkable fact that the whole mission-station there (Mr. Oftebro’s) was found intact, the doors locked, and furniture all safe, just as it was left by the missionaries. . . . There can be no doubt that a large Zulu force is watching Colonel Pearson’s movements, and he has already lost (I have heard on good authority) twelve waggons of a convoy bringing up stores. . . . It is serious as diminishing his supply of food for his men, which was calculated to last six or eight weeks; but this must now be reduced to four. . . .

“Mr. Joubert was driven up by a friend yesterday to make a call on me, and told me that Sir B. Frere had not only rejected the prayer of the Boers for the restoration of their independence, but had added (so he says) insult to injury by telling him that Cetshwayo had sent messengers to Paul Kruger to ask him to join him and drive the English into the sea, and had warned him against heading, or taking part in, any seditious movements, &c. He says that he returns to Pretoria to-morrow, but with a heavy heart, and in great apprehension of what will now happen—more especially if it is true, as stated in the papers, that Sir Th. Shepstone has gone to try to force the Boers out on commando against the Zulus, by threatening them (under some obsolete law) with confiscation of their property if they do not obey the summons. If their independence was restored, he says, they would all go out readily against the Zulus, ‘providing they were able to see that the war was a just one, which they don’t see at present.’ He also confirms the story about the Zulu force having been called up [told to hold themselves in readiness] by Sir T. Shepstone to intimidate the Boers, not, however, from his own personal knowledge, but from information on which he relies. As he suspects that Sir B. Frere intends to use in England the story about Cetshwayo sending messengers to Paul Kruger, he has written to the *Cape Argus* on the subject. Joubert is certainly a man of some ability, and not wanting in quickness of wit. For instance, he illustrated the request made

by the English to the Boers to join in an attack upon the Zulus, by asking: 'If you saw a man with a club in his hand coming to murder you, and a dog had laid hold of his heels, would it be your duty to kill the dog and seal your own fate by setting the murderer free?' And again, 'If my horse has been stolen, would it be the right thing for the thief to come to me and say, "If you will help me crush my enemy, there may be a chance of my restoring to you your stolen property, or, at all events, the saddle and bridle."' "

"This is a very bad time for us all, you may well believe; and there is not a soul here, I fancy, except myself, who thinks of any possibility of making terms of peace with the Zulus on honourable conditions. 'Extermination!' is the cry. . . . This is mainly the product of *fear*, and no one seems to believe in an overruling Providence, which works on the side of the right and the just. I have still a faint hope that the voice of England will be against pushing matters to extremities with the Zulus."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *February 16, 1879.*

. . . "I had a visit on Tuesday last from Dr. Jorissen, who is very apprehensive of troubles being in store for the Transvaal, where Sir T. Shepstone is at this moment, trying (so says one of the Natal papers) to make the Boers understand what Sir B. Frere really meant by the award—viz. nothing that would really affect the Boers or benefit the Zulus. . . .

"Two Zulu spies have been seized on the frontier and sent down to Maritzburg, where they are kept in gaol. My son [Mr. F. E. Colenso], with the special reporter of the *Cape Argus*, has had an interview with them, in presence of the superintendent of the gaol, and a full report . . . will appear in the *Argus*. . . . These young men, you will see, declare that they were not spies. But in any case, their statement supports the view that Cetshwayo is only

standing on the defensive, and does not mean to invade the colony. And, if no invasion takes place before our reinforcements arrive, I cannot but think that there is an opening for peace to be made on honourable terms, as I suggested in a former letter, provided we have a new High Commissioner, as well as (I take for granted) a new General.

"I am occupied in digesting the Blue-books for the use of M.P.'s and other friends here and at home, who take a living interest in these affairs; for I will defy anyone to get a true idea of the case from the confused despatches in the Blue-books (where the affairs of the Cape Colony, Eastern Frontier, Griqualand East, Griqualand West, Basutoland, Pondoland, Transvaal, Natal, and Zululand, are all mixed up 'higgledy-piggledy,' without any attempt at arrangement), without an enormous amount of labour, which no public man can be expected to undertake. But whether I shall be able to complete my work, or to do so in time to be of any use before the Zulu question is settled some way or other, I am very doubtful."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *February 23, 1879.*

"Opinions are divided as to the reason for Cetshwayo's apparent inactivity. . . . For my own part, I still adhere to the hope—I can hardly call it belief—that he is only acting on the defensive, and does not wish to invade Natal unless driven to it by a renewed attempt to crush or 'exterminate' himself and his people. And I have a strong conviction that, if allowed to do so, I could get him to send a messenger *asking for peace* on terms which would be sufficiently honourable, though, of course, not such as Sir B. Frere set forth in his ultimatum and memorandum. I think it is not impossible that he might do this of his own accord. But, if he did, what would become of his messengers? According to the inclosed slip, which I send as a precious example of the way in which our Christian High

Commissioner and General are carrying on this war, they will be shot as soon as they are seen to be crossing the river. And in another cutting inclosed you will see that it is whispered that the king is 'now desirous of sending a message to Government,' against the arrival of which apparently effectual measures have been taken. Could not a question in the House with reference to the possibility of restoring peace be based on these facts?

"Sir H. Bulwer is going to call for a 'Day of Humiliation,' to confess our sins, and ask for victory! On the former point, at all events, there is much to be said."

TO THE SAME.

"*March 5, 1879.*

"It seems clear that all our panic, however natural under the circumstances, was wholly unnecessary, as Cetshwayo never intended to invade the colony. But it seems to me certain that Sir Bartle Frere does not mean to make peace if he can help it, his 'mission' being to found a great South African Province 'from Capetown to the Limpopo.'"

TO THE SAME.

"*BISHOPSTOWE, March 23, 1879.*

. . . "Yesterday Dr. Thrupp (a civilian from London, who came out as special surgeon for one year and is going home again) called here and brought a watch which he had taken from the body of an officer on the morning of January 23, to see if we could recognise it. It was Colonel Durnford's. The body was found lying within the camp, near to the hospital, with some two hundred others lying around him. It was *not* mutilated. . . . It is strange that two months have passed before this fact has reached us, though we have made all manner of inquiries. This has apparently arisen from Dr. Thrupp's want of personal acquaintance with Colonel Durnford, whom he had only seen once before.

"There is a very important question which ought to be taken

up about the natives, who have been forced out by the Government through their chiefs under threats of severe punishment. . . . Of course, if the Government can call natives out at pleasure for war purposes, they can also call them out for road-making, sugar-planting (as Sir B. Pine did), and other purposes, and all liberty of the subject is practically denied to them still."

TO THE SAME.

" March 30, 1879.

. . . "The more I read of the new Blue-books, the more am I sickened with the evidence it gives of Sir B. Frere's determination from the first to bring on this war and to crush Cetshwayo, who appears to me to have acted nobly throughout. I have now sent a letter to Sir H. Bulwer, in which I have set forth the evidence which has satisfied my own mind that Cetshwayo's claim of land north of the Pongolo was thoroughly well founded. . . . Next week I hope to send the proofs of this in my extracts from the Blue-books."

TO THE SAME.

" April 13, 1879.

. . . "I do not see that Sir H. Bulwer has anywhere expressed his approval of Sir B. Frere's *warlike proceedings*, though . . . he agrees in Sir B. Frere's 'decision to place the condition of affairs in the Zulu country and our relations with the Zulu king and people on a more satisfactory basis than that on which they now are,' and 'in the conditions which he has laid down' for that end in the ultimatum, in which nothing is said about enforcing these conditions by instantly waging war in the fiercest manner if they are not agreed to within thirty days. In fact, as far as I can see, Sir H. Bulwer says no more than I have said myself, . . . viz. that it is the right and duty of a great Christian people to press such reforms, and, if need be, to enforce them, on a people such as the Zulus. But I never meant that they might be enforced in this cruel and brutal fashion. . . . I

suppose bloody scenes will be repeated as this horrible war goes on, in which the work done by our force by means of Gatling guns, shells, and rockets (one killing thirteen!) is mere butchery, while the fighting of the Zulus is admitted to be wonderfully brave in the face of such deadly implements and the skilled firing of our men with first-class rifles. Will nothing be done by the Government at home to stop this frightful carnage? . . .

“The following is an extract from a newspaper dated March 30, 1879:—

“‘The Zulu king has sent in messages to say that he wants to surrender. If so, we have gained the victory. But we have not done with him yet; we must repay him a little more for his savage and brutal manners which he has shown to all white men here, and the General’s camp [Isandhlwana] was no pleasant sight to witness.’

“When they kill *us* by hundreds, you see, it is ‘savage and brutal.’ When *we* kill *them* by thousands, it is all right. You will not forget that Cetshwayo has allowed Colonel Pearson’s column to retire, with 106 waggons and 100 sick, without making any attack on them. . . . So now we are just where we began, only that about 10,000 human beings have been killed—say 2000 of ours, white and black, and 8000 Zulus.

“*April 20.*— . . . I am now certain of what I have always suspected, that the intention has been from the first to depose Cetshwayo, and perhaps carry him to Robben Island.”

TO THE REV. T. P. FERGUSON.

“BISHOPSTOWE, *April 13, 1879.*

“It was very pleasant to see your handwriting again, and to know that you remember us in all our troubles, which just now are indeed great, through the wicked policy of Sir Bartle Frere. . . . He came up from Capetown full of prejudices; he swallowed all the rubbish told him by worthless traders and hysterical missionaries. It was useless for Sir H. Bulwer to point out that the statements of the Zulu king

having built military kraals in the disputed territory, and having killed a large number of Zulu converts, were totally untrue. Sir B. Frere reasserts these falsehoods and a number of others just as unfounded. All these would go down with persons in England ignorant of the real facts, and seeing that they were backed up by some of our local journals, who glory in Sir B. Frere's policy, which, I need hardly say, will be an enormous pecuniary benefit to this little colony, besides (as they suppose) freeing them from all fear in future of a Zulu invasion.

"If you have seen the *Fortnightly* for March, you would have found in it an article from the editor (Morley), with which I most thoroughly agree from the first line to the last, except that (misled, I suppose, by the misleading statements of the *Natal Mercury*) he has assumed the loss of the English troops in that terrible disaster at Isandhlwana as only about three hundred. Cetshwayo did not *originate* the Zulu army: it came down to him, with the Zulu marriage laws, from his ancestors. And now that we see how strong and brave his force is, his conduct in restraining them from any attack upon his neighbours, the Swazis or Boers, for many years past (for since 1856 he has really had supreme authority in Zululand, though his father Panda did not die till 1872) is to my mind worthy of all praise. And there is every reason to believe that the desired reforms might have been gradually brought about in Zululand by judicious and peaceful measures on our part, instead of by this frightful war, which may end in the extermination of a noble people."

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

"April 19, 1879.

"On Wednesday last (April 16) I called on Sir H. Bulwer, and proposed that *I* should be allowed (so as not to commit the Government in any way) to send a message to Cetshwayo, and ask leave for me, with a party of working men (not *soldiers*), to go up and bury the dead at Isandhl-

wana, or bring back their bones for burial in English soil with military honours. Sir Henry received the proposal very kindly, and only objected on the score of my own safety, for which I should have no apprehension. . . . It would, I am sure, be a satisfaction and comfort to many friends of the dead, . . . and it would wipe off a great disgrace to our arms.

“Sir H. Bulwer’s despatches are admirable, except for his very strong prejudice against the king personally. . . . I cannot help thinking that Sir Henry Bulwer was much offended by that formidable ‘message,’¹ and that he cannot get over it, . . . and my fear is that he may have gone in with Sir Bartle Frere for the *deposition* of the king, which in my judgement would be as unwise and impolitic as it would be very unjust.”

TO THE SAME.

“April 27, 1879.

“My conviction is that the missionaries have done a great deal of mischief by their exaggerated statements, and have greatly helped on the war. In fact, Mr. Oftebro says

¹ This “formidable message” merits a little notice. The sole authorities for it are two Government natives who were employed by the Secretary for Native Affairs’ Office as emissaries to Cetshwayo in November 1876. One of these messengers was a Zulu refugee who had fled the country for a crime, and belonged moreover to a political party bitterly hostile to the king. (see p. 450 *supra*). The message expressed an intention to “kill” and to “wash spears,” notwithstanding representations from the Natal Government, and formed the solitary exception to a long series of unexceptionable messages. When questioned about it in captivity, Cetshwayo protested against the notion that he had dictated it. He indicated, as proof of its fictitious character, the allegation that it had been spoken at a private audience in the absence of any *induna*. The Bishop’s conclusion was that it was wicked in Natal officials to rely upon such hearsay evidence. There was absolutely no check upon the two natives, and they had every inducement to slander the king. Sir Bartle Frere made much use of this message, and it was even cited against the king in the House of Lords. What Cetshwayo said on this subject was in striking agreement with what had already been told by his chiefs to the Bishop.

[Imperial Blue Book, C. 2220, p. 17], 'So much horror I have for war, [yet] I cannot help wishing it to take place in this case, because I believe it to be the only thing that would settle the Zulu trouble, and be to the benefit of the Zulus themselves.' He little thought that 10,000 men would be killed, and yet the work not done!"

TO THE SAME.

" BISHOPSTOWE, *May 4, 1879.*

"Sir Bartle Frere has negatived my proposal to bury the dead at Isandhlwana, on the grounds that it might interfere with Lord Chelmsford's plans . . . in reference to the more important work he has in hand."

Speaking of the Boer "memorial to the Queen," the Bishop says (May 9):—

"You will see how Sir T. Shepstone is compromised in the memorial, as having threatened to take his hand off the Zulus, if they [the Boers] did not submit to annexation."

TO THE SAME.

" BISHOPSTOWE, *May 24, 1879.*

. . . "J. Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message is *bona fide*, and that Cetshwayo means to have peace *if possible*. I am quite sure that an honourable and safe peace might be made at once; but I am equally sure that nothing will satisfy Sir B. Frere, and therefore also Lord Chelmsford, but the deposition of Cetshwayo, which is what is meant by 'unconditional submission.' If this is insisted on, it is my firm belief that the war will still go on, or rather will be begun again, with further vast sacrifices of blood and treasure to the English, and horrible slaughter of the unfortunate Zulus. . . .

"I ought to have mentioned in my last that Bishop Schreuder, I believe, has all along acted a friendly part towards Cetshwayo; and also Dean Green and another

of Bishop Macrorie's clergy have spoken out manfully against Sir B. Frere's proceedings, and the injustice of this war.

"*May 25.*—I find to-day that Dean Green is very much annoyed that his words about the Zulu War, spoken in the Debating Society, have been *published*. However, the other clergyman (of Bishop Macrorie's) wrote a letter to one of the papers, signing his name, in opposition to Sir B. Frere's policy; and I know that one of my own clergy takes the same view. . . . You will see that I am not *quite alone* among the clergy."¹

Writing on May 31, 1879, of General Marshall's visit to the long-neglected battle-field of Isandhlwana, the Bishop says:—

"But one result has followed from this expedition, *viz.* the proof that Colonel Durnford must have rallied some of the carbineers and mounted police, and fought to the last, protecting as well as they could the retreat of the rest. . . . About thirty soldiers lay dead around the Colonel and his fourteen volunteers . . . and [twenty] mounted police; and to these belongs the honour of a gallant struggle with death on that terrible day.

"I hear (from good authority) that General Marshall had great difficulty in getting leave at all to go to Isandhlwana, all kinds of objections having been made to his going, and that he finally left before receiving Lord Chelmsford's formal letter of leave. . . . After this first visit, no further objection was made to General Marshall's repeating the visit."

TO THE SAME.

"*June 8, 1879.*

"It is now plainly stated that Cetshwayo must be brought in a prisoner to Maritzburg, and of course carried on to

¹ It must be added, however, that some months later Dean Green, in a letter addressed to Mr. Gladstone, which the latter had published in the *Guardian* newspaper, very effectively defended the Zulu king and people, and condemned Sir Bartle Frere's policy.

Robben Island, before peace can be made. And I am certain that Sir Bartle Frere will do his utmost to bring this about. . . . It would be an eternal shame to England if such a thing were done. . . . I do hope that the first step has been taken by Lord Chelmsford towards *peace* by replying to Cetshwayo that he must first send in the two captured cannon. I hear that a fine of 10,000 head of cattle is contemplated—for what? For defending his own land? Do not let such a mean thing be done, only worthy of a peddling nation.”

TO THE SAME.

“BISHOPSTOWE, *June 15, 1879.*

“We have just received telegraphic intelligence of Sir Garnet Wolseley's having left England, with power as High Commissioner in connection with the Transvaal and the seat of war. This is regarded here as a practical suppression of Sir B. Frere and Lord Chelmsford. If Sir G. Wolseley (as it is said) brings with him the conditions of peace, and if they are such as Cetshwayo can accept, of course we shall be very glad of this step on the part of the Home Government. But I must confess that, from our past experience of Sir G. Wolseley, I have no faith in him whatever, if left to himself.”

Writing of Sir Bartle Frere's triumphant return to Capetown, and of his speech at a banquet given to him, the Bishop says :—

“In that speech, as you will see, he complacently takes to himself and Lord Chelmsford the credit of having, by invading Zululand, saved Natal from a bloody raid; whereas he has done his utmost to provoke Cetshwayo to ravage the colony, and I can only marvel at the extraordinary forbearance of the Zulu king, and rejoice that he has *not* followed the example set him by Christians. While I read Sir Bartle Frere's despatches, I am utterly amazed that a religious man, as he is understood to be, could allow

himself to write such ignorant, unfounded, and often grossly untrue, statements about Cetshwayo and his doings."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *June 22, 1879.*

. . . "Now, if ever, is the time when the colony may be invaded. There was no real danger, even after Isandhlwana, . . . because it is now certain (as I have all along believed, and repeatedly stated in my letters to you) it was not Cetshwayo's plan to attack the colony: he had no desire to aggravate angry feelings on the part of the English authorities; his motto was 'Defence,' not 'Defiance.' But now that he finds his ten attempts to get terms of peace scouted and treated with contempt and evasion he may be driven to desperation, and what then may we expect?"

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *June 28, 1879.*

"During this week the Zulus have made a raid upon the border of the colony, . . . and have carried off their booty, without being injured or checked by the mighty English force sent out expressly for the *defence* of the colony, but which is almost entirely employed in making an offensive movement into Zululand. I called on Sir H. Bulwer two days ago, . . . and found that he took a most sensible view of it. It was simply, he said, a most natural retaliation for the miserable raids which we have been making—that is, which Lord Chelmsford has ordered in spite of Sir H. Bulwer's strong protestations and the loud-spoken universal condemnation of the colonists. . . .

"I can only hope that this may not be the beginning of sorrows. . . ."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *July 5, 1879.*

. . . "Sir G. Wolseley . . . reached Durban last Saturday morning, and Maritzburg that afternoon. On Monday he

addressed a large body of chiefs who had been summoned from all parts of the colony. . . . But though he did say something about *making peace*, the general impression made upon the natives was that he was going to *make war* more fiercely than ever, and finish off the campaign in two months. He has, you will see, cut the knot of dispute between Sir H. Bulwer and Lord Chelmsford, and ordered out 2000 natives as baggage-bearers in *Zululand*. . . . As to the legality of this requisition we shall be glad to know what is thought in England.

“Last evening the news reached Maritzburg that Lord Chelmsford had had a battle with 2000 Zulus, who were defeated with a loss of 800 ; and 1 officer killed, 2 wounded, and, I think, 10 men killed, 60 wounded, on our side ; after which our troops burnt Ulundi and other kraals. . . . I presume that now, our ‘military’ prestige having been restored, and 800 more Zulus killed, Sir G. Wolseley will make peace, or will honestly try to do so. But I confess I have a misgiving as to his intentions, and I think it quite possible that he may aim at dethroning and deporting Cetshwayo, in accordance with Sir B. Frere’s evident determination. . . . It is a fact that Cetshwayo sent in lately to Lord Chelmsford cattle and a *tusk* of *ivory*, the latter as a token of his desire to return to a state of amity with the English, and that the cattle were kept, but the ivory was sent back to him.”

TO THE HON. H. H. CLIFFORD.

“SIR,

“BISHOPSTOWE, *July 10, 1879.*

“You will remember that on the 13th of June I called upon you and requested that, if you found it to be consistent with your duty, you would allow me to speak with the Zulu messengers, Mfunzi and Nkisimane, then in Maritzburg, as I wished to send through them a message to the Zulu king, requesting him to send in the sword of the late Prince Imperial.

“You replied that, whatever your present feelings might be,

you were under orders which would not allow you to permit such an interview.

“I had previously, however, mentioned to my son, Mr. F. E. Colenso, my intention of calling upon you for the purpose of making this request.¹ And I found that, without any further communication with me on the subject, he had sent his native servant to speak with the Zulu messengers, and desire them to represent the matter to their king, which they promised to do on their return to him.

“The result is, as I gather from the public journals, that ‘on the last day of June’—four days before the late battle of Ulundi—‘messengers had been sent from Cetshwayo again to propose negotiations,’ and, ‘as if to prepare the way for a good understanding, the Prince Imperial’s sword, which was taken from his body on the fatal 1st of June, was sent back with a letter’—written by a Dutchman—‘stating that Cetshwayo had understood that it was the sword of an English Prince.’ And it is now, I presume, in the hands of Lord Chelmsford.

“I venture to believe that the recovery of this valued family relic, which was worn by the late gallant and much-lamented Prince, will afford some satisfaction to the Empress even in the midst of her present overwhelming bereavement.

“And I request that you will be so good as to communicate the facts, as above stated, to Sir Garnet Wolseley, in order that His Excellency, if he sees fit, may report them to the proper authorities in England, by whom they may be communicated to the Empress.

“I have, &c.,

“J. W. NATAL.

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

“BISHOPSTOWE, *July 12, 1879.*

“It is a very general belief here that Lord Chelmsford has received instructions from Sir G. Wolseley at Capetown that hostilities must be stopped, and has not chosen to obey them. I write this advisedly, and I hope that in England the facts will be brought to light. . . .

¹ See p. 502.

"July 13, 1879.

"I am now *satisfied* that Sir G. Wolseley means to get rid of Cetshwayo, if possible. I can only hope that something has been done in Parliament to prevent this great wrong being perpetrated. It would be a piece of egregious folly as well as a wrong. For, unless the English Government mean to annex Zululand, they cannot do better than make a friend of Cetshwayo, through whom they would easily settle Sikukuni and other difficulties; instead of trying to govern the people without a king, or appointing another king whom the people will never recognise as long as Cetshwayo is alive. But what malignant persecution is this of the unfortunate king, who had done nothing whatever to deserve Sir B. Frere's previous abuse and brutal treatment! I thank dear old Moffat for that word, 'a most brutal and unjust war.'

"What an amusing act on his [Cetshwayo's] part it was—if anything can be amusing in the midst of so much misery—to send down the copy of Sir Th. Shepstone's account of the installation, with the so-called coronation laws, and ask to be shown which of them he had broken!¹ His cry is always, 'What have I done? What wrong have I committed?'"

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, July 25, 1879.

"I suppose that you will know for certain in England, before we shall know it in Natal, whether it is really true that Lord Chelmsford fought this last battle in disregard of Sir G. Wolseley's orders to stay hostilities, shutting one eye as Nelson did, and not winking with the other. . . . If so, it may be doubted if he will be received on his return to England as heartily as at Maritzburg and at Durban. . . . If, indeed, they suppose in England that this affair of Ulundi has been a 'splendid success,' and has really brought the war and the *war-expenditure* to an end, he may be welcomed by the

¹ This book was sent down as far as the Border with a peace message immediately after the battle of Isandhlwana.

English multitude, in spite of his disobedience to or neglect of orders. But has it *been such a success*? As to *military triumph*, I should think that this would be considered very small, when the terrible advantages on our side . . . are reckoned against their mere numbers and bodily strength and courage, which were never once able to come into play amidst the horrible carnage, except when they moved on to grapple, if possible, with their foes, and were laid low by the murderous fire, or when in the pursuit they turned at bay and brought down a few of their pursuers. But was it a *political success*, or any more than a bloody but barren victory? That remains still to be seen. The burning of Ulundi and other kraals means nothing in Zulu eyes, as I hear from natives. And there is no clear evidence as yet that the loss of so many warriors—they are now reckoned at 2000 killed, but were probably more—has broken the spirit of the natives. . . . If Lord Chelmsford had followed up his victory, or had been able to do so, he might perhaps have brought the war to an end. As it is, I fear that Sir G. Wolseley will find much work lie still before him, unless he takes the straightforward course of making honourable and not oppressive terms with the *king himself*. But I am sadly sure of this, that not the claims of justice and righteousness, but simply his own difficulties and necessities, will prevent Sir G. Wolseley even now from practically 'annexing' Zululand, or the English Government from backing him up in the act, . . . and Sir Michael Hicks-Beach seems to be still deluding himself or the English people with the notion that three or four millions will cover the cost. . . .

"It seems almost certain to my own mind that the invasion of Zululand was contemplated of old by Lord Carnarvon, and was included in his plan of Confederation, and in the objects for which Sir B. Frere was sent out to the Cape; and that consequently (whatever may be the case with Sir M. Hicks-Beach, whom I would willingly believe innocent of such deceptions) the Zulu War did not take by surprise either Lord Carnarvon or Lord *Beaconsfield*, though doubt-

less they were not prepared for the disasters and expenses in treasure and blood by which it has been attended. . . . That is, probably, why they are letting him down so easily, and have been afraid to recall him, and do not mean (I fear) to prevent his iniquitous policy from being carried out as far as possible."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *August 1, 1879.*

. . . "It is perfectly plain that Sir B. Frere and Lord Chelmsford never wished to make peace, nor meant to do so, till by some bloody stroke they had wiped off the disgrace of Isandhlwana. And when I see how Lord Chelmsford can take to himself glory from the last butchery of Ulundi as 'the beginning of the end' of this campaign, and can even ascribe it to the Divine interference on his behalf in answer to prayer ('I have felt throughout the campaign that I have been sustained by your prayers and also those of the people at home'; 'and any success which has attended my efforts, I feel, whether it is generally acknowledged or not, is due to the prayers of the people and the kindly ordinations of Divine Providence'), the language appears to me shockingly presumptuous in the presence of the actual facts of the case—its crafty and dishonest initiation, its terrible disaster and loss of precious lives on our side, its awful massacres of 10,000 brave Zulus, fighting for their king and fatherland against the deadly weapons of their invaders, and the very great uncertainty as to what shall yet be the end of this miserable conflict, in which surely no true Englishman can find any comfort or glory. Is it true, I wonder, as I have heard it stated, that when, a few years ago, just after the Crimean War, Gatling guns were first invented, they were formally condemned by a Military Commission as too frightfully destructive of human life for purposes of war? Have *they ever been used before?*"

August 8, 1879.

“Sir G. Wolseley has told the Attorney-General that the reason for Cetshwayo’s suspicion of the English is the affair of Matshana.¹ Thus evil deeds of old come back upon us. And Mr. J. Shepstone is now with Sir G. Wolseley, and will represent him, and English good faith, to the Zulu people.”

TO THE SAME.

“BISHOPSTOWE, September 13, 1879.

. . . “The unfortunate king has been captured,² and, as I feared, deported as a prisoner of war to Capetown. . . . Sir G. Wolseley, then, as I predicted, has put the crowning act of infamy to this iniquitous war. And it appears to me to be plain that the present Government . . . has been merely duping the Parliament and the people of England by pretending to send him out to correct, to some extent, the unjust proceedings of Sir B. Frere. . . . Sir G. Wolseley has announced that Cetshwayo will *never*, under any circumstances, be allowed to return to his native land. What right has he to bind the English nation under this permanent disgrace, and to commit all future Governments to carry out his arrogant decree? . . .

“After Isandhlwana, J. Dunn sent a message to Cetshwayo . . . saying that if he wished to be king of the ‘whole country . . . now was the time for him to strike a blow, as there was only one column now to resist him.’³ And this double-dyed traitor has been just appointed by Sir G. Wolseley to be ruler of the largest of his thirteen provinces, where, with his native wives and concubines, to whom he may add at his pleasure, he will set a splendid example of morality. . . . However, Cetshwayo did not yield to Mr. J. Dunn’s advice, and refused all along to ravage the colony when he had it completely at his mercy. And now we see the reward he gets for such moderation.”

¹ See Chapter VIII.

² See p. 488.

³ See also *Cetshwayo’s Dutchman*, p. 30, note 1.

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *September 20, 1879.*

. . . "Mr. J. Dunn's first act . . . has been to refuse leave to any missionaries to settle in his territory. This excludes Robertson, Oftebro, and others, who have done so much to bring this great calamity on the Zulu people, and, as far as they are concerned, they richly deserve exclusion. But John Dunn's ukase extends to all. And indeed I do not see how he can well do otherwise, since any missionary who might think it right to deal gently with polygamy as found among heathens or converts from heathenism, must inevitably attack the polygamous practices of a white man like John Dunn. Surely the morality and Christianity of Englishmen will be shocked when it is found that we have spent many millions of money, and lost 2500 lives, and killed 10,000 Zulus, in order to *exclude* Christianity and civilisation from that part of Zululand which adjoins *Natal*. . . ."

At twelve o'clock upon the day of the Isandhlwana disaster, Colonel Harness, with four guns R.A., two companies of the 24th Regiment, and about fifty Natal sappers, halted upon a rising ground more than eight miles from the camp, heard the firing of cannon, and saw shells hissing against the hills to the left of it. One messenger from the camp reached him with the tidings that the camp was surrounded, and would be taken unless they were at once reinforced. Colonel Harness proposed instantly to march back, and, although Major Gossett ridiculed the idea, he started. Riding off to the General, Major Gossett returned with Lord Chelmsford's orders to Colonel Harness to turn back and march to the rendezvous.

TO THE SAME.

"*September 21, 1879.*

"I have heard from an officer, [—, 16th Lancers] that Colonel Harness himself told him the story of his recall at

Isandhlwana exactly as I described it to you in a former letter, adding that the recall came from Lord Chelmsford upon the representations of Major Gossett. In order to have this fact upon record, will not some M.P. take a note of it to ask whether the statement is correct, and why it was not included in the report of the Commission of Inquiry? . . . It has been suggested that the reason why the Zulus fell back after their first attack . . . was that they saw Colonel Harness's force making for the camp."¹

TO HIS SON FRANCIS

(*who, with his sister Frances, had passed through Capetown on his way to England*).

"BISHOPSTOWE, September 21, 1879.

- "When other people were allowed to see Cetshwayo at Capetown (especially a photographer, who will make a fortune if the king allows his photographs to be sold, for I suppose his consent is legally necessary), it is shameful that a paltry pretence was made for excluding you. . . .
- "Colonel Durnford's remains are to be brought down and buried in the Military Cemetery."

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

"September 26, 1879.

- "For the exhibition of the true attachment and devotion of his people to him [Cetshwayo] in his time of utter need and helplessness, it is well that he has been chased in this way, and not captured until just eight weeks after Ulundi; as it is also well for his *personal* appearance and character that he was not *killed* instead of captured, as I feel sure he would have been if Lord Gifford had carried out his contemplated *night* attack,² since, of course, he would have tried to

¹ This has since been confirmed by Zulus, who said that the resistance of the troops who held the "neck" was so determined that, when their enemies saw "*the other army coming back*," they began to draw off. But presently this "other army" stopped, and went away again, and "then we went in and finished them," *i.e.* Colonel Durnford and his men.

² See p. 484.

escape, and then we should not have had such a pleasant photograph taken of him at Capetown as gives the lie to all Sir Bartle Frere's descriptions.

"The simple fact that they have felt it necessary to *ship* the king off to Capetown is the best proof that they fear the devotion of his people to him. . . .

"It is a monstrous piece of impudence on the part of Sir G. Wolseley to appoint such a man [as J. Dunn] in the face of a civilised and Christian people, and actually in their name. Not only will it exclude Christian teaching certainly from the greater part, and probably from the whole, of Zululand, but it must also have a serious effect upon mission work in Natal. When our natives see a white man, with a black harem, set up by our Queen as the great authority in Zululand, will they not be quick to say, 'What harm can there possibly be in *our* being polygamists?'

"Even the *Times of Natal*, as you will see, does not think it possible that the English people will endure such things being done in its name, or allow the present arrangements to stand."

TO THE SAME.

"October 12, 1879.

"I have just returned from the burial of Colonel Durnford's remains, which have been laid to rest in the Military Cemetery. There was an immense attendance of people, and of course the troops of all kinds . . . joined in the procession. The ceremony was most solemn and impressive, and the respect paid to his memory by all classes was most touching, though only what I expected."

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, November 23, 1879.

. . . "I quite agree with Sir Fowell Buxton that nothing can be done at the present moment to disturb Sir G. Wolseley's (so-called) settlement of Zululand, except, I think, that some public expression should be made of its not being

satisfactory, though acquiesced in for the time, that it may have a trial. Only please remember that it means not *governing* or *improving* the Zulus, or doing anything for the real benefit of the nation which we have treated so cruelly—and which can only be done, as I believe, through Cetshwayo—but leaving them to lie weltering in savagery in a more debased condition than when he ruled them.

“But I must caution you against adopting the view, propagated very freely in England, . . . that the colonial outcry against Sir Garnet Wolseley’s doings is ‘based on self-interest.’ I assure you that this is a grave mistake, and, if persisted in, will injure *our* cause. . . . I must honestly say that I think the colonists have been harshly and unjustly judged in England in respect of this war. Speaking of them generally, I have no hesitation in saying that they never desired the war in the first instance. They never urged it on, or even dreamt of it, until Sir B. Frere came up here, and wheedled them into following his lead and supporting him in his undertaking to relieve them from the ‘standing menace’ of the Zulu power. For, of course, the Zulu military system was in some sense a ‘standing menace’ to the peace of Natal, and some accidental circumstance, either under Cetshwayo or under some other king, might have brought the Zulu army over our borders. . . . *To this extent alone*, I firmly believe, can the colonists be charged with ‘self-interest,’ either in their support of the war or their condemnation of Sir G. Wolseley’s doings.”

TO THE SAME.

“BISHOPSTOWE, *December 7, 1879.*

. . . “The news to-day is that Sikukuni¹ has ‘surrendered,’ and is to be sent as a prisoner to Pretoria. . . . But there are two ominous phrases in the telegrams, ‘caves blown up,’ ‘caves full of dead bodies’; and the question arises, How many of these were the bodies of women and children? who, of course, took refuge in the caves and would be there

¹ A chief on the farther side of the Transvaal. He was taken to Capetown, but sent home after the treaty with the Boers. See p. 469.

defended by some of their men. Is it possible that such practices will be passed by in England without censure, or even notice, as a military friend assures me will be the case? Has our civilisation and Christianity really come to this?"

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *December 21, 1879.*

. . . "Not a word has been said—or perhaps allowed to be said—about the killing of Sikukuni's women and children by dynamite. Only, where are they all? It is now stated that two hundred women and girls have been captured, but *no boys*. What does this mean? I think that this use of dynamite to blow up caves in which women and children are *known* to be hiding . . . is positively diabolical."¹

TO THE SAME.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *January 12, 1880.*

. . . "About matters in the Transvaal. My conviction is very strong that the Boers have been most shamefully treated, . . . that they have acted admirably, restrained by wise leaders, and (again like Cetshwayo) have done their utmost to avoid collision and bloodshed, although any Englishman could have told them that all their forbearance, and their appeals to English justice and equity, would be thrown away with the men now in power. As to their treatment of the natives, have the Boers done anything so horrible as killing hundreds of women and children by dynamite (or gun-cotton) in the caves at Intombe, and (I *fear*, but cannot assert) at Sikukuni's? . . . No doubt the Boers did formerly commit atrocities. I wish I could say none were committed by Englishmen in the late war. But I should not fear their committing them again if their land were given back to them *now* under such conditions as those on which their independence was originally recognised; and they are ready to pledge themselves to confederation, when the South African States are agreed to bind themselves together. I have never heard that 'the native tribes

¹ See p. 487 and Appendix E.

resident in the Transvaal' were oppressed by the Boers. It may have been the case; but my impression was that frontier Boers made up commandos and raided on outlying tribes, who were very probably troublesome because the Boers had 'annexed' more or less of their lands."

TO THE SAME.

" BISHOPSTOWE, *January 25, 1880.*

. . . "I have now *ascertained* that the women and children of Sikukuni *were* in the cave, and were known to be there, when the cave was blown up by Sir G. Wolseley's orders. How many women and children were killed in this horrible fashion no one knows; but I fear there were very many."

TO THE SAME.

" *March 21, 1880.*

"My son Robert [Dr. R. Colenso] and his bride reached Durban safely last Tuesday. He applied at Capetown to Mr. Sprigg for leave to see Cetshwayo, and was refused! The reply made to my son's friend, Mr. C. A. Fairbridge, . . . was as follows:—

" ' *Private.*

" ' COLONIAL SECRETARY'S OFFICE, CAPETOWN,

" ' *March 21, 1880.*

" ' DEAR MR. FAIRBRIDGE,

" ' Having spoken to Mr. Sprigg on the subject of your visit of this morning, he told me . . . that hitherto, in reply to the applications of friends and strangers alike, he has consistently declined¹ to allow anyone to have access to Cetshwayo, and he desires me to say that, while personally he would be happy to afford Dr. Colenso the opportunity he wishes, he fails to see any reason for departing now from the line of action which he has considered it necessary to adopt in this matter.'

¹ The Bishop gives a whole string of instances showing that no difficulties whatever were placed in the way of any person visiting Cetshwayo who was not known to be a friend of the ex-king.

"I may mention that Miss Lucy Lloyd, daughter of my Archdeacon Lloyd, who has long been in charge of the Grey Library, Capetown, having shared in the labours of her late brother-in-law, Dr. Bleek, the librarian, in the study of the Bushman's language, and was very intimate with the Freres, was allowed a *permanent* leave to visit Langalibalele. But, having taken my daughter Frances to see him as she passed through Capetown, she had her own leave taken from her the next day! . . . I came up to Maritzburg in company with — who had been shut up in Etshowe with Pearson, and was the very officer who brought in the two peace messengers, whom Pearson would have merely put in charge of the police, but *the Rev. Mr. Robertson advised that they should be ironed*. . . Their hands were chained together so that one could not move for the most ordinary purposes without the other. He was utterly disgusted."¹

TO THE REV. SIR G. W. COX.

"BISHOPSTOWE, April 3, 1880.

"We have just got hold of a copy of *Fraser's Magazine* for February, and have read with the greatest satisfaction your admirable article on the Zulu War. There is not a single line that I would alter in it, nor a single mistake from beginning to end—unless indeed you meant to say that Sir G. Wolseley accepted *in person* the tusk from Cetshwayo, which he really accepted through General Crealock.² Sir G. Wolseley sent it home to the Secretary of State, by

¹ From *Digest*, p. 555. "On March 23, two spies (!) from the king arrived with a white flag. They were seized and questioned outside, and then blindfolded and brought in, and *ironed* because of discrepancies in their statements. The one said that . . . the king had now sent them to us, and offered a free and unmolested passage to the Tugela, if we did not burn their kraals and destroy the gardens. . . The other Zulu . . . stated that he joined the messenger from the king by command of Dabulamanzi, who instructed him to tell the *impi* that had been lying in wait for us not to harm us if we agreed to the message."—*Natal Times*, April 14, 1879. Where are the "discrepancies"? There are *none*.

² See p. 488.

whom, it is said, it was sent to the Queen, instead of sending it back to Cetshwayo. By that act, of course, Sir G. Wolseley identified himself with the acceptance of the tusk, and with himself the English nation, who were thus pledged to make reasonable terms with Cetshwayo himself. I see that you have made no allusion either to the flogging by Lord Gifford's orders or the digging up of Panda's remains. I believe that both statements are substantially true. And I have *no doubt* as to the truth of the latter. I observe also that neither statement has been contradicted on authority, but only the flogging, by an anonymous writer, who says that he saw nothing of it, and would have seen it if it had happened. Why, then, does he not give his name, that we may know where he was at the time when the flogging is said to have taken place, and be satisfied that he *could* not have missed seeing it? And why write anonymously at all, if he was only relieving a brother officer from a disgraceful accusation? And what a farce it is haggling about these stripes, when there is no attempt to deny that the other abominable process of torture was applied by blindfolding two or three Zulus and threatening them with death if they did not betray their king, and then leading one of them away and firing a gun, and telling those remaining that he had been shot?¹ But the whole war has been full of sickening brutalities and treacheries, and there is too much reason to fear that this is nothing new in the history of our wars with natives in Africa and India."

On April 13, 1880, Dr. Jones, the Bishop of Capetown (of the Church of South Africa), addressed a letter to the *Times*, inveighing with some bitterness on the meanness of spirit shown by the Bishop of Natal. The futility of his pleadings has been pointed out already.² His contention turned on the alleged eagerness of the Bishop of Natal to avail himself of legal loop-holes in order to escape a deserved punishment. The Bishop's real mind may be learnt from the following letter:—

¹ See p. 484.

² Vol. I. p. 403 *et seq.*

TO JOHN WESTLAKE, ESQ., Q.C.

“ April 19, 1880.

“ I distinguish between a citation to appear before the *Synod* and one to appear before the *Metropolitan*, who would hear the charges and adjudicate ‘with the advice and assistance of such of his suffragans as can conveniently be called together.’ And the Privy Council, who had the citation before them, plainly did not consider that this clause modified at all the meaning of the summons, which was, to ‘appear before the Metropolitan.’ It seems to me that, if I had been cited to appear before the Synod, the Privy Council could hardly have interfered at all, for that would have been merely an ecclesiastical proceeding, not based upon the letters patent, and therefore not coming within the cognisance of the Crown, unless indeed Bishop Gray took steps to interfere with my income, or with my discharge of my duties as Bishop, as a consequence of his proceedings. . . . I do not apprehend the possibility of any suggestion being acted on by Bishop Jones—even if it be made by some zealous person in England—of trying me again before the Synod. I should, of course, refuse to be tried by any Bishops who do not acknowledge as binding on their Church the decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Church of England. And even if they abandoned their first principles, and agreed to be bound by those decisions (which would enable me to appeal to a court of law against any judgement of theirs which was not in accordance with those decisions), I should feel it to be my duty (having regard to the fact that I hold my office by letters patent *in trust* for others) to take advice as to the legality of any such proceeding, before I agreed to submit to it. But even now, as you know, under Lord Romilly’s judgement, there is nothing whatever to prevent their bringing the *merits* of the case before the Rolls Court, by a fresh application to stop payment of my income because of my alleged heresies.

“ It is quite possible that the present questions may be raised

in the action now pending between Bishop Merriman and his recalcitrant and excommunicated Dean (Williams, of Grahamstown), which was to have been heard in the Supreme Court of the Cape Colony last month, but has been postponed (on application from Bishop Merriman) to next month. Bishop Merriman having excommunicated Dean Williams applies to the court to expel him from the use of the Cathedral ; and the Dean will raise the question whether Bishop Merriman, being a Bishop of the Church of South Africa, has any right to force his way into a Cathedral of the Church of England ; and also the larger question whether the Bishops and clergy of the South African Church have any right to take possession (as they have done) of the lands and buildings belonging to the Church of England. My only fear is that Bishop Merriman at the last moment, and under advice from England, will shrink from the contest, and that some compromise will be resorted to."

The Bishop, as we have seen, was by this time not alone in his disapproval of the invasion, and in the closing months of the war he found a sympathising friend in Lieutenant-General Clifford, V.C., who was stationed for a time at Pietermaritzburg in charge of the lines of communication and base of the invading army, and with whom, in spite of the exigencies of this position, he was able to exchange counsel. General Clifford at the end of the war availed himself of the services of the Bishop's native printer to obtain, from the Zulus concerned, the details of the death of the Prince Imperial, which these might hesitate to give freely to the military, and even procured the sanction of Sir G. Wolseley for the transmission to Cetshwayo of the message

"Sobantu salutes Cetshwayo : he is grieved for him : he does not forget him,"

and the reply

"Cetshwayo thanks Sobantu for his message, and is glad to

learn that he does not forget him. He hopes Sobantu will speak well for him."

After the battle of Ulundi the Zulus were no doubt for the time being half-stunned and crushed. But that they were not regarded as completely subjugated may be gathered from the nature of Sir G. Wolseley's "settlement," which was openly described as a "Kilkenny cat" arrangement, by which the Zulus would be led to turn upon one another, and so complete the work begun among them. Not only was their whole national organization and existence declared at an end; but they were not even left under their own tribal chiefs, the thirteen districts having been for the most part cut up and allotted in direct defiance of such considerations. Two of the new chiefs were foreigners—a Basuto Hlubi who had taken part in the invasion, and the English J. Dunn.¹ The king's family and Chief Counsellor² were relegated to private life; and, with large portions of their tribes, the two most powerful in the country, were allotted to two chiefs of unenviable notoriety, Hamu and Zibebu. Of these, the first was a drunkard, and had earned the contempt of his fellow-countrymen by deserting to the English during the war; while the second was in evil repute, and was noted now by Sir G. Wolseley himself as "of a time-serving disposition."

By such means discord was rendered inevitable, sooner or later. But a national sentiment is not to be thus abolished, and for the bulk of the Zulus Sir G. Wolseley's arrangement, which was emphatically condemned by persons of very different opinions in the colony, existed at first only on paper. The devotion of chiefs and people to their deposed tyrant was exhibited in an unmistakable manner throughout the whole of the country.

The first Zulu petition on behalf of Cetshwayo was made to a Border official from whom it was ascertained that the

¹ See p. 528.

² Mnyamana.

king was at least alive ; and in February 1880, some four months after the withdrawal of the English forces, the Zulus sent well-known messengers

“to bring to Sobantu ‘Cetshwayo’s book,’ which was sent to him by the Queen, and to ask Sobantu to inquire for them and to point out in that book the words against which Cetshwayo had offended, as they knew of none—they did not know what fault he had committed.”

The book was a handsomely bound copy of Sir T. Shepstone’s report of the proceedings at Cetshwayo’s installation. The king, they said, had sent the book before to Sobantu during the war, with a similar request.¹ But when the messengers reached the Border, Bishop Schreuder told them that “it was of no use to take it to Sobantu, as he could not help them,”

and sent them back with it to the king. In the flight from Ulundi it had been dropped and lost in the grass ; and there it had lain until the “great chiefs,” wishing to bring it to Sobantu, had sent a large party of men, who had searched for it carefully until they found it.² The Bishop, replying to these messengers, told them briefly what were the principal charges brought against the king :

“the words of the Governor of Capetown which have weighed heavily upon Cetshwayo and have crushed him.”

They indignantly refuted these charges of their own knowledge,³ and concluded by saying that

“all Zululand would have come to inquire on behalf of

¹ See p. 525.

² This book, with one corner damaged by the exposure described, but otherwise in perfect order, having evidently been carefully preserved by Cetshwayo, is in the possession of the Bishop’s family. It was rescued with a few papers from the fire at Bishopstowe. See Vol. I. p. 78.

³ A detailed account of this interview is given in the Bishop’s *Digest*, vol. i. p. 690.

Cetshwayo and to intreat for him, only that their hearts were dead at first at his being taken over the sea; for people said, 'They have killed him and thrown him into the sea.' But now the great chiefs had determined to inquire, if they might be allowed to do so."

"Well," said the Bishop, "the Government has told you, through the Secretary for Native Affairs, that the President is appointed to hear all the complaints of the Zulus. If therefore, the great chiefs have complaints on this subject, they may take them to Mr. Osborn, and answer for Cetshwayo, if they are able, as to these crimes that are laid to his charge."

But he added the warning:

"Mind, you must not expect anything from what I say. That word still remains which was spoken at Ulundi—that the king should never come back."

Again the Bishop had given the same advice as the authorities, and again it was to be charged against him as an offence. For doubtless it did revive the drooping hearts of the Zulus to find that they had not been mistaken in believing in Sobantu's kindly feeling for them. Three months later there reached Maritzburg a deputation on Cetshwayo's behalf such as had never come down before.

The result of the elections, which in 1880 left Lord Beaconsfield no alternative to resignation, raised in the mind of the Bishop high hopes, which were, unhappily, not realised.

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

"BISHOPSTOWE, *April 24, 1880.*

. . . "Now that the Liberal majority is so magnificent, something will be done, I presume, to rectify the enormous wrongs of the Zulu War and (so-called) settlement. . . . The

election returns seem to show that we were all mistaken in supposing that the English people were drugged and dead to their principles of truth and justice. The heart of England, I trust, is still beating rightly, and will expect that now the Liberals are trusted with *predominant* power, they will do what can be done under existing circumstances to rectify the past.

“With respect to Zululand, then, I should say that Sir G. Wolseley’s settlement is universally condemned in South Africa, and that matters cannot possibly be left long as they are. The general desire here is, of course, for ‘annexation.’ But this, I suppose, is out of the question. . . . Setting aside, therefore, the notion of bringing the country directly under English rule, what appears to me the right course to adopt is as follows :—

“(1) The English Resident¹ should remain, as now appointed.
 (2) Cetshwayo should be restored as king; not, of course, in the independent position he once occupied—that is now impossible—but pledged under certain conditions: (a) He will be guided in all things by any advice given him by the Resident. . . . Of course, if he differs with the Resident on any point, he may appeal direct to the Natal Government, by whose decision he must abide. (b) He will receive appeals from the judgement of the thirteen kinglets, but will not otherwise disturb them or interfere with their territories. . . . (c) He must abandon the idea of a Zulu army, military kraals, &c., and should be required to insist on the surrender of all the fire-arms and ammunition now in possession of his people. And then he might be allowed a certain number of guns for his body-guard, say 500, which should be of such a quality—*e.g.* Martini-Henry or other breech-loaders—as to necessitate his receiving his supplies of ammunition from the English authorities. . . . (d) No sentence of death shall be carried into effect except by the king’s orders, countersigned by the Resident.”

¹ The Bishop threw his suggested conditions into a more detailed shape under eighteen heads.

TO THE SAME.

“BISHOPSTOWE, *May* 16, 1880.

. . . “I shall anxiously await your letter, telling me what hope there is of the present Government rectifying, as far as possible, the wrongs done to Cetshwayo and his people. At present Sir B. Frere and Mr. Sprigg seem to be cock-a-hoop in consequence of a telegram received from Lord Kimberley, expressing his approval of Sir B. Frere’s policy, and hoping that he will remain at the Cape. . . . I cannot believe it as yet, and shall be horribly disappointed if this is the result of the grand Liberal victory, and of all that we (you and I) have done, as I believe, in helping to produce the change of feeling in England which has led to it. . . .

“As to the Transvaal, you know what I think of the way in which it was annexed, and that I am also of opinion it might, and ought to, be given back to the Boers under certain conditions, to which they would willingly accede. But all these matters require the presence of a new High Commissioner of the right stamp.”

In the foregoing letter the Bishop also relates a conversation between Sir T. Shepstone and certain natives who saw him on his return from England. It bears out very strikingly the Bishop’s conviction as to the point at which Sir T. Shepstone’s influence turned against Cetshwayo. A reference has already been made to the Blood River meeting.¹ The attitude which Sir T. Shepstone assumed towards Cetshwayo after that meeting, evoked from the king the complaint, officially reported, that his old friend “wished to cast him off;” “was tired of carrying him;” and, again varying the same metaphor that his “shoulders had suddenly become prickly.” The Bishop’s informants, in May 1880, stated as follows:—

“Somtseu (Sir T. S.) told them that he . . . had seen Cetshwayo and spoken with him. Cetshwayo said: ‘That I am here

¹ See pp. 469, 470.

is your doing, my father.' Said Shepstone : ' Well, yes, you despised me, who was your father, and said that my shoulders were prickly.' Cetshwayo said : ' Yes, those words were mine ; I meant that, as, when a calf sucks, if it gets no milk, it keeps butting or nudging its mother, so I too was doing ; for I did not know what wrong I had done before my father, nor by whom I should now be carried.' Shepstone : ' Oh ! I did not know that was what you meant. So then the country has been ruined for so small a matter as that ! ' "

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

" BISHOPSTOWE, *May 23, 1880.*

. . . " I have heard on very good authority that Sir B. Frere's despatch requesting Sir H. Bulwer to sign the ultimatum remained for some days unanswered ; that at last, as the two Governors were hardly on speaking terms, our Colonial Secretary, Colonel Mitchell, urged Sir H. Bulwer to sign it for the sake of peace (!) ; and that Sir H. Bulwer, when he sat down to sign it, hesitated for a while, then signed and dashed it from him, saying, ' That's, I fear, the worst thing I ever did in my life.' "

In May 1880, the deputation already mentioned ¹ came down to beg for Cetshwayo's restoration. Among them were representatives from three of Sir G. Wolseley's appointed chiefs, one of whom sent down his letters patent, received from Sir G. Wolseley, as the credentials of his envoys. But, as the Natal Government were determined that Cetshwayo should not be restored, it became necessary to suppress the evidence which showed how earnestly Cetshwayo's people longed for his return. The admission of this fact would leave obviously not a shadow of excuse for the recent invasion of Zululand. The admission, therefore, must not be made. They professed to have delivered the Zulus who still survived from a cruel tyrant : the world therefore must not learn that these Zulus were clamorous to have the despot

¹ See p. 541.

brought back to them. It would never do to let the truth be known; and all needful measures, no matter what their character might be, were taken to hide it. The great hindrance to the easy and successful application of these measures was the Bishop of Natal, whose unflinching demand of justice for the Zulu chief and his people made ten evasions or falsehoods necessary when one might otherwise have sufficed. The Zulus, with the exception of Sir G. Wolseley's thirteen chiefs, were told that without a pass from the Resident they could not enter Natal. To Zulus who wished to enter Natal in order to urge the restoration of the king the Resident was ordered to refuse a pass. After repeated refusals, the Zulus came without it, and, having done this, were sent back unheard. The Bishop reported these facts to the Secretary of State. The officials calmly denied the existence of any deputation. None had come with the necessary pass, and therefore none had come at all. Against such an iron wall of false excuses the Zulus might dash their heads in vain.

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

" BISHOPSTOWE, *May 24, 1880.*

" The Zulu party has just arrived, the two princes and others on horseback. . . . I suppose the whole party will be at least one hundred in number. . . . We should have laid in a supply (of meat) had we known their number, and been quite sure of their coming that day to Bishopstowe, for it was quite on the cards that a policeman might have been sent from town to meet them and bring them on at once to the Governor instead of their being thrown on my hands . . . Of course, this night I had to do the best I could for them, and sent to them green mealies, mealie-bread, bread, coffee, and sugar, from our own store, and our own joint of beef (intended for our dinner) for the two princes; and this, with a good supply of oranges from the garden, sufficed as food for the night.

“Before going to their huts they came to the house, and the chief men came and sat down in my study, where we had a little pleasant chat by way of greeting ; but nothing was said on either side about the express object of their coming, as I did not wish to have any talk with them about Zulu matters until they had seen the officials. . . . But I was anxious to know if they had Mr. Osborn’s note, and there it was wrapped up in a brown paper parcel, and fastened to the stick by which it was carried, just like the standard of a Roman legion. . . . But they also carried, in the same conspicuous way, another small standard, and they brought to me the parcel it bore aloft, and asked what they should do with it. On examination it proved to be (what I may call) letters patent of Seketwayo, one of the most important northern chiefs, appointing him to be one of the thirteen kinglets, with the signature of Sir G. Wolseley and his officials. . . . This was sent to show that Seketwayo’s heart was in the embassy, and that he was present in his representative.

“After getting some coffee, raisins, and oranges, seeing the photos of Cetshwayo, over which at first they were very sad, and being allowed to pay a visit to the drawing-room, they went off at sundown.”

On the following day they went to Maritzburg, were told that they had come too late, and were again thrown, at some cost and more inconvenience, on the Bishop’s hands for another night. Their numbers turned out to be over two hundred.

“It is rather expensive, you see,” he wrote, “for a private person to provide for so many.”

“*May 26, 1880.*”

“We have just had an Aden telegram, informing us that the Aborigines Protection Society are to have an interview with Lord Kimberley to-morrow on South African affairs God grant that something may be then done, by getting a promise from the Secretary of State either to act directly in the matter, or to appoint a Commission towards preparing for the restoration of the king to Zululand.”

TO F. W. CHESSON, ESQ.

“ May 29.

“ Alas, another telegram has come, telling us of Mr. Gladstone's ‘ high praise ’ of Sir B. Frere, and his statement that he was indispensable for confederation. This last is mere rubbish, the fact being . . . that we are not a bit nearer to confederation at present than we were five years ago. . . . It is altogether an astounding and shocking phenomenon for us out here who have been fighting for the right to find that now, when we have helped to secure the victory for Mr. Gladstone, he should make such use of it, to stereotype the injustice and iniquity of the past. . . . I confess I feel at this moment very dejected, and cruelly disappointed with Mr. Gladstone's actions, while the Jingo journals all around are triumphant. Still, as we do believe in a Living God, we must not despair.”

Among the native tribes Sobantu's name was now spread far and wide. From the distant and more civilised part of the Cape Colony came native letters expressing sympathy with the Zulus and strong gratitude for the part which the Bishop had taken towards them ; while from the north, at a distance which made it needful to spend two months (“ see two moons die ”) on the road, came messengers from the Gaza chief Umzila, whose dominions are recently described by a traveller as “ enormous in extent,” reaching indeed to near the Zambezi ; “ his people composed of different tribes, all speaking different languages, and all differing from each other in many other respects, but all recognising him as king.” The messengers carried on their shoulders an elephant's tusk, as an offer of friendship on the chief's part, with a request that the Bishop would be his friend, as he was Cetshwayo's. Presents were given in return to the full value of the ivory, but with a careful warning that they were making no political alliance, Sobantu having nothing to do with the business of governing, but being appointed to teach the truth, to

“enlighten people.” They replied that Umzila asked only that Sobantu should take an interest in him, and throw a little light on the subject if he should hear Umzila’s affairs being discussed. With this he would be perfectly satisfied; and so, it would seem, he was; for the messengers were a month out from home bringing another tusk in token of Umzila’s gratitude, when they heard of the Bishop’s death. Umzila has since died, but his son still sends to Bishopstowe; and, unhappily, it seems only too likely that the affairs of the Gaza country will be soon under discussion in the present access of the gold fever in South Africa.

After the Zulu War a similar crusade was projected against the Pondo nation, which lies to the south, between Natal and the Cape Colony. The papers were full of the threatening aspect of affairs. The Pondo chiefs applied to the Bishop, praying him to plead their cause in England, on the condition that they should pay his expenses. He was compelled to refuse their request, but advised them to send a deputation to Capetown.

On June 24, 1882, and writing now to an Englishman whom the Pondo chiefs had enlisted as their secretary, he was obliged to warn them that if, as was then under consideration, such a deputation came to Maritzburg, they

“must not look to me for help. I would gladly render such help if I could. But in the present state of my relations with the Natal Government in respect of Zulu matters, *I could not help you*, because any appearance of intervention or co-operation on my part, should Sir Henry Bulwer grant you an interview, would do the Pondo cause more harm than good under existing circumstances. . . . I must warn you not to expect anything from Lord Kimberley and the English Government which you would not obtain from Sir Hercules Robinson and the Cape Government. I am myself persuaded that Sir H. Robinson, and, I believe, also

the present Cape Government, is kindly disposed towards Umqikela and the Pondos, and desirous to deal with them justly, and even generously, so far as is practicable under the circumstances which now exist, Sir B. Frere having formally taken possession of the St. John's River mouth in the name of the Queen, and having been allowed to do so without check or hindrance from the English Government or the English Parliament. Much as I condemn the act of Sir B. Frere—and I do condemn it utterly, as most unjust and iniquitous, like many other of his political actions—the thing is done, and Mr. Scanlén must be regarded as speaking the naked truth when he says, 'on grounds both of honour [I suppose, prestige] and policy it is now impossible to retreat from the unfortunate position entered upon by [our] predecessors, with the full knowledge and consent of Her Majesty's Government.'

"In short, my advice to the Pondo chiefs is this—and I give it with a deep sense of the wrongs they have suffered and a most hearty interest in the future welfare of themselves and their people—to give up the hopeless struggle against superior might, which can only *end*, as the struggle in Zululand did, with the utter ruin of the Pondo nation, and to leave themselves in the hands of Sir H. Robinson, who, I feel sure would *do everything in his power* (under the existing circumstances) to meet the just desires and secure the peace and welfare of the Pondo chiefs and people."