

corresponding absolutely with His own. The perfect and satisfying sacrifice involves death, indeed ; but it is not that which we speak of as the death of the body : still less is it the death which is the penalty or wages of sin, the death of wilfulness, selfishness, and disobedience, the death from which we pray to be raised to the life of righteousness. It is (the necessity of the case compels the repetition<sup>1</sup>) the death *to* sin, the absolute rejection of all sin, the death which, in strictness and fulness, only One who is faultless and sinless can die. To this death and this life the whole Eucharistic terminology may be most truly and strictly applied. It is the full, perfect, sufficient sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction ; and He who offers it is "Himself the Victim, and Himself the Priest." The victim denotes the absolute submission of the will to the law of truth, of righteousness, and of love : the Priest is the Eternal Son who alone has offered and offers this absolute, unwavering, unswerving obedience to the law of truth and righteousness.

It is unnecessary to carry this train of thought further ; but from what has been said thus much at least is clear. We have here two, or three, or more terms—satisfaction, sacrifice, death, resurrection, life—the meaning of which has been drawn out with unmistakable clearness, and it is obvious that, if the definition here given be accepted, every other term used indefinitely, and, therefore, more or less misapprehended, by the Dean of Capetown and his fellow-accusers, may have its meaning brought out with equal clearness. As it is, we hear of redemption, atonement, justification, and many other terms, without being able to determine what precise conceptions they attach to them ; and perhaps we may be tempted to think that the conceptions attached to them are not precise at all. In truth, in the Dean's expositions we find confusion and indistinctness everywhere. The analogy drawn from

<sup>1</sup> See p. 141 *et seq.*, and 167.

the universal gift of air<sup>1</sup> (84) is, like many other supposed cases of analogy, fallacious. He would allow that the promise of forgiveness of sin on true repentance is universal and unfailing, as universal in the spiritual world as the air which sustains our mortal bodies. But if so, why in the daily office of the Church of England is this announcement made from generation to generation? Repetition is not supposed to render it unnecessary; and the experience of most people will convince them that it is a lesson which we are sadly slow and long in learning. It is, therefore, no argument against the Bishop of Natal's views of the sacrament of baptism to say that, on his theory, it becomes a superfluous ceremony. The charge is altogether untrue. But had the Dean of Capetown been pleading simply for freedom for his own views, no further reply would have been needed. There is enough, perhaps, in the language of the Baptismal Office in the Prayer Book to justify his theory: there is much more to justify the view of the Bishop of Natal, which is also that of Mr. Maurice. The latter declared

“that Dr. Pusey regarded ‘Baptismal Regeneration’ as a change of nature, while he [Mr. Maurice] regarded it as the coming out of the infant under the first influence of a light that had always been shining for it and all the world.”<sup>2</sup>

The condemnation of the Bishop of Natal would carry with it the condemnation of Mr. Maurice and, perhaps, of half the clergy of the Church of England; and this is a result which may be forced upon us by the recklessness of those who, if they had their way, would leave no room for any party but their own.

On the question of the punishment of sin here and

See p. 286.     <sup>2</sup> *Life of F. D. Maurice*, i. 214. See also ii. 242.

hereafter enough has been said already.<sup>1</sup> We may pass on to the surprising assertions by which the Dean of Capetown and his associates thought to uphold or strengthen the authority of the Bible. It is not easy to see what the awe which the Dean describes the Jews as feeling for the letter of their Scriptures can prove beyond the existence of an abject superstition : but it must be noted that even this superstition is one of very late growth. The people at large were certainly guiltless of it in the days of Manasseh and other idolatrous kings and not much influenced by it in the time even of such kings as Hezekiah and Josiah. But, indeed, it can scarcely be supposed that the Dean of Capetown meant his views on this subject to be intelligible. The writers of the Old Testament were men, not machines ; they were, therefore, liable to make mistakes, but the influence of the Divine inspiration prevented them from making any. There is in Scripture a Divine and human element ; but the Divinity runs throughout the least syllable (108).<sup>2</sup>

This reasoning may possibly be ingenious : it is certainly not novel. There is scarcely a single argument urged here on behalf of the Jewish or Christian Bible which has not been urged on behalf of the Rig Veda and other sacred books of the East, and the aggregate of believers in the Rig Veda form a body more numerous, it may be, than the whole population of western Christendom. But the least creditable portion of these accusing arguments is that which is directed against the Bishop for slandering the Divine Word and with it his Divine Master (p. 137). There is something monstrous in the alternatives to which the Dean and his associates seek to compel the great body of English Churchmen. Either the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are absolutely free from any the least admixture of error, or God Himself is

<sup>1</sup> See p. 147 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> See p. 289.

false. We have heard before of this "great dilemma," by which they who hesitate to use the language of the Athanasian formula are told that logically they are bound to look upon Jesus Christ as the basest and meanest and the most barefaced of all cheats and impostors.<sup>1</sup> But the very vehemence and extravagance of their language proves the extreme importance of the subject in their eyes. All that they say about it has the ring of genuine alarm ; but they merely work out at greater length and with greater recklessness of assertion the positions laid down by a Committee appointed in 1863 by the Convocation of the Province of Canterbury to examine and report upon the Bishop of Natal's criticism on the Pentateuch.

The three charges brought by this Committee against the Bishop cover the whole ground occupied by the Dean of Capetown and his fellow-accusers, and these charges were summarily dealt with by Dr. Thirlwall, Bishop of St. David's, in the same year with the Capetown trial. The Charge in which he demolishes the work of the Committee is a complete and unanswerable refutation of Bishop Gray and his supporters ; but his words deserve to be remembered everywhere as among the noblest and wisest ever spoken on behalf of the rightful freedom of all members, clerical or lay, of the Church of England.

Addressing himself first to the general question of Biblical research and criticism, Dr. Thirlwall determines that the field has been left open and free by the Church of England.

"The Church," he maintains, "has not attempted to fence the study of the Scripture, either for clergy or laity, with any restriction as to the subject of inquiry, but has rather taught them to consider every kind of information which throws light on any part of the Sacred Volume as precious either

<sup>1</sup> *The Great Dilemma*, Rev. H. B. Otley.

for present or possible use. . . . If the inquiry is to be free, it is impossible consistently to prescribe its results."

Passing on to the resolution by which the Convocation of Canterbury condemned the Bishop of Natal's criticisms on the Pentateuch, he asserts that it

"assumes a paternal authority which rather suits an earlier period in the education of the world ; and it presupposes a childlike docility and obedience, in those over whom it is exercised, which are now very rarely to be found. It also suggests the question, what practical purpose it was designed to answer. Two were indicated in the Committee's Report : 'the effectual vindication of the truth of God's Word before men,' and 'the warning and comfort of Christ's people.' But it is not easy to see how either of these objects could be attained by a declaration that 'the book involves errors of the grossest and most dangerous character.' Both seem to require that the censure should have pointed out the errors involved, or have stated the doctrine which the book had at least indirectly impugned, so as to make it clear that the alleged errors affected not merely prevalent opinions, but truths universally recognised as part of the Church's Creed."

The "Church" here is not the Catholic Christendom to which the Dean of Capetown appeals ; it is, strictly, the society to which the writer of the book under examination immediately belongs. In Bishop Thirlwall's view, the Committee at once overstepped the proper limits of synodical action in the cognisance of books.

"They were appointed to examine the Parts which had appeared of the Bishop's work, and to report whether any, and if any what, opinions, heretical or erroneous in doctrine, were contained in it. They extracted three propositions, which they have characterised as we have seen. . . . It may seem, indeed, as if the Committee, in their

mode of dealing with the first of these propositions which they cite or extract for censure, had shown that they were aware of the precise nature of the function they had to perform, and meant to confine themselves to it. That proposition is [the one which excited such strong indignation in the Bishop of Natal's accusers at Capetown], 'The Bible is not itself God's Word.' The author himself immediately adds, 'But assuredly God's Word will be heard in the Bible by all who will humbly and devoutly listen for it.' Of this qualification the Committee, in their remarks on the proposition, take no notice whatever. But they first observe that the proposition, as they cite it, 'is contrary to the faith of the universal Church, which has always taught that Holy Scripture is given by inspiration of the Holy Ghost.' They seem to have overlooked that this statement, however true, was irrelevant; but they then proceed to refer to the Articles and formularies of our own Church, which are, indeed, the only authority binding on her ministers. But, unfortunately, not one of the passages to which they refer applies to the proposition condemned. Many, indeed, among them do clearly describe the Bible as the Word of God; but not one affirms that 'the Bible is itself God's Word.' . . . No doubt the expression indicated that the author (Bishop Colenso) made a distinction between the Bible and the Word of God, and considered the two terms as not precisely equivalent or absolutely interchangeable. . . . And there is certainly high authority for the distinction. Among the numerous passages of the New Testament in which the phrase the '*Word of God*' occurs, there is not one in which it signifies the Bible, or in which that word could be substituted for it without manifest absurdity. But even in our Articles and formularies there are several in which the two terms do not seem to be treated as synonymous. . . . If the Word of God is to be found nowhere but in Holy Writ, not only would no other Christian literature be properly called sacred, but the Bible itself would be degraded to a dead and barren letter, and would not be a living spring of Divine Truth. On the whole, the Report

first attaches an arbitrary meaning to an ambiguous expression, and then charges it with contradicting authorities which are either wholly silent upon it or seem to countenance or warrant it. . . .

“But in their treatment of the next proposition [relating to the authorship of the Pentateuch], the Committee seem almost entirely to have lost sight of the principle which, although misapplied, appeared to guide them in their examination of the first. For, with a single insignificant exception, they confront it not with our Articles and formularies but with passages of Scripture. Quotations from Scripture may add great weight to a theological argument: they are essential for the establishment of any doctrine of a Church which professes to ground its teaching on Scripture; but they are entirely out of place, where the question is, not whether a doctrine is true or false, but whether it is the doctrine of the Church of England. . . . This is no legal refinement, but a plain dictate of common-sense; and it does not at all depend on the composition of the tribunal before which such questions are tried, so as to be less applicable if the court consisted entirely of ecclesiastics. . . .

“When I look at the Scriptural arguments adduced in the Report against the second proposition extracted for condemnation, they do not seem to me of such a quality as to deserve to form an exception, if any could be admitted, to the rule which would exclude them from such an investigation. . . . The Committee observe that ‘Moses is spoken of by our Blessed Lord in the Gospel as the writer of the Pentateuch.’ I suspect that even a layman, little acquainted with the manifold aspects of the question and the almost infinite number of surmises which have been or may be formed concerning it, would be somewhat disappointed, when he found that the proof of this statement consists of three passages in which our Lord speaks of ‘Moses and the prophets,’ of the ‘law of Moses,’ and of ‘writings of Moses.’ It is true that it would not be a fatal objection to the argument, that the word ‘Pentateuch’ does not occur in

the Bible. It might have been so described as to connect every part of its contents with the hand of Moses as distinctly as if the observation of the Committee had been literally true. But, in fact, this is not the case; and still less is any such distinct appropriation to be found in any of the passages cited by the Committee in support of their assertion that 'Moses is recognised as the writer of the Pentateuch in other passages of Holy Scripture.'<sup>1</sup> They are neither more nor less conclusive than the language of the

<sup>1</sup> This comparatively sober and passionless statement becomes, as we have seen, in the mouth of the Dean of Capetown an appeal to the authority of our Lord as taking the authorship of the Pentateuch under His protecting wing, and staking His own veracity and credibility on the accuracy of this fact (see p. 293). It is strange that the Dean should have been unable to see, not the falsehood, but the astounding absurdity of his position. According to the Gospel narratives, our Lord was speaking to the common folk gathered round Him on matters relating not to questions of literary history but to their spiritual life. He was speaking to people who were accustomed to a certain division of their Scriptures, speaking of them as the Law, the Law of Moses, the Prophets; and he wished to bring home to them in each case certain moral and spiritual lessons. Let us suppose for a moment that with Him historical accuracy as to dates or place of the composition of a book or the names of the writers was a matter of even small importance (and there is not a shred of evidence that it was of the least importance). Let us suppose further, for one moment only, that on all these points the conclusions of the Bishop of Natal and other modern critics really represent the facts. What would have been the consequence if our Lord had spoken in accordance with these conclusions? He must have begun by going into an historical disquisition—in other words, by diverting their thoughts into a channel for which they were totally unprepared, and to a task for which they were hopelessly unfitted, and even helpless; or He must have assumed the truth of these conclusions, and spoken to them of the Law of Samuel, or the Second Law of Jeremiah, or the Levitical Law of Ezekiel. In the former case He would have perplexed and bewildered His hearers; He would have wasted time needed for quite other things, and made the discharge of His own mission hopeless. In the latter case He would have been altogether unintelligible, and His utterances would have been received as those of a madman. Such is the miserable folly into which good men may be hurried when they will have it that the ark of God must fall, if they do not put out their hand to save it.



Seventh Article, to which the Committee confined all the references they have made to the judgement of the *Church* on the question, though this was the only matter into which it was their business to inquire. The Article alludes to 'the law given from God by Moses,' a slender foundation for any inference as to the record of that law, much more as to the authorship of other parts of the Pentateuch, especially as the name of Moses does not occur in the enumeration of the canonical books in the Sixth Article. If the question had been as to the authority of the Book of Psalms, few persons probably would think that it had been dogmatically decided by the Church, because in the Prayer Book the Psalter is described as the 'Psalms of David.'

"The third proposition, 'variously stated in the book,' relates to the historical truth of the Pentateuch, which the author denies, not in the sense that everything in it is pure fiction, but that all is not historically true. . . . But it is to be regretted that the Committee should again have lost sight of the object for which they were appointed, and have omitted to refer to any doctrine of the Church which the author has contradicted. This was the more incumbent on them, since a recent judgement has formally sanctioned a very wide latitude in this respect. It is clear that in such things there cannot be two weights and measures for different persons; and also that it does not belong to any but legal authority to draw the line by which the freedom, absolutely granted in theory, is to be limited in practice.

"These are the propositions which they extract as the 'main propositions' of the book, which, though not pretending to 'pronounce definitely whether they are or are not heretical,' they denounce as involving 'errors of the gravest and most dangerous character.' But they proceed to cite a further proposition, which the author states in the form of a question, to meet an objection which had been raised against his main conclusion, as virtually rejecting our Lord's authority, by which, as the Committee state, 'the genuineness and authenticity of the Pentateuch have been guaranteed to all men.' Whether the passages in which our

Lord quotes or alludes to the Pentateuch amount to such a guarantee, is a point which they do not discuss. They only observe that the proposition 'questions our Lord's Divine knowledge'; and with this remark they drop the subject.

"Considering that this proposition is incomparably the most important of all that they cite, . . . one is surprised that it should have been dismissed with so very cursory and imperfect a notice. For it is not even clear that it correctly expresses the author's meaning. The question which he raises does not properly concern our Lord's Divine knowledge—that is, the knowledge belonging to His Divine nature. It is whether His human knowledge was co-extensive with the Divine omniscience. It is obvious, at the first glance, what a vast field of speculation, theological and metaphysical, is opened by this suggestion. . . . Bishop Jeremy Taylor observes: 'Those that love to serve God in hard questions, use to dispute whether Christ did truly, or in appearance only, increase in wisdom. Others apprehend no inconvenience in affirming it to belong to the verity of human nature, to have degrees of understanding as well as of other perfections; and although the humanity of Christ made up the same person with His Divinity, yet they think the Divinity still to be free, even in those communications which were imparted to His inferior nature.' . . . It is clear to which side Taylor inclines. But I must own I should be sorry to see these hard questions revived. . . . Still more should I deprecate any attempt of the Church of England to promulgate a new dogma for the settlement of this controversy. But at least, as their remark indicated that the Bishop had in their judgement fallen into some grave error, it was due not only to him but to the readers of their Report, and to the Church at large, that they should have pointed out what the error was by a comparison with the doctrine of the Church, which it was supposed to contradict." <sup>1</sup>

Having thus demolished all the allegations of the Convo-

cation Committee, Bishop Thirlwall deals in conclusion a crushing blow on the whole theory of Bishop Colenso's self-styled judge and prosecutors at Capetown. That theory regards the Bible as an organic whole in the sense that every portion of it is of the like authority, that every sentence in it deserves to be treated with the same reverence, and that thus no distinction can be drawn between the Sermon on the Mount and the narrative of Samson's exploits at Ramathlehi with the thousand absurdities and impossibilities involved in it. The burden which these vehement partisans would impose on the minds and consciences of men is so huge and so utterly past all bearing, that the incisive words in which Bishop Thirlwall scatters this theory to the winds may be accepted with a feeling of the deepest thankfulness. No doubt the conclusion may have been as little welcome to Mr. Maurice as to Bishop Gray; but the fact remains, in Dr. Thirlwall's words, that

“a great part of the events related in the Old Testament has no more apparent connexion with our religion . . . than those of Greek and Roman history. The history, so far as it is a narrative of civil and political transactions, has no essential connexion with any religious truth; and if it had been lost, though we should have been left in ignorance of much that we desired to know, our treasure of Christian doctrine would have remained whole and unimpaired. The numbers, migrations, wars, battles, conquests, and reverses of Israel, have nothing in common with the teaching of Christ, with the way of salvation, with the fruits of the Spirit. They belong to a totally different order of subjects. They are not to be confounded with the spiritual revelation contained in the Old Testament, much less with that fulness of grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ. Whatever knowledge we may obtain of them is, in a religious point of view, a matter of absolute indifference to us; and if they were placed on a level with the saving truths of the Gospel,

they would gain nothing in intrinsic dignity, but would only degrade that with which they are thus associated. Such an association may, indeed, exist in the minds of pious and even learned men ; but it is only by means of an artificial chain of reasoning, which does not carry conviction to all beside. Such questions must be left to every man's judgement and feeling, which have the fullest right to decide for each, but not to impose their decisions, as the dictate of an infallible authority, on the consciences of others. Any attempt to erect such facts into articles of faith would be fraught with danger of irreparable evil to the Church, as well as with immediate hurt to numberless souls."<sup>1</sup>

The remarks of Dr. Thirlwall were evoked by the censures of the Committee of Convocation ; but they make of none effect the whole of the pleadings in the so-called trial at Capetown, and they also condemn by anticipation the whole string of propositions again affirmed by Bishop Gray's assessors, and promulgated finally by Bishop Gray himself with such authority as he could impart to his judgement. Thus far the ship which Bishop Gray had been steering had gone on its course with sails full spread. The prosecutors had spoken with a unanimity astonishing in thinking men. His assessors had given their solemn approval of every point laid down by the accusers. The condemnation was complete and unqualified ; and it remained only for the judge to enforce the law of the Church by an authoritative declaration which should not only deprive the defendant of all spiritual functions, but be binding on the whole of the Anglican communion, if it would not bind all Christendom. The accused was not present. He had by his agent entered a protest against the self-assumed jurisdiction of the judge and against all his proceedings. Although not called upon either in duty or in law to do so, he had asserted in his letter of protest that he had neither

<sup>1</sup> *Charge*, 1863, p. 123.

written nor published anything which offended against the law of the Church of England. But to the charges contained in the several schedules exhibited in the Metropolitan's court he made no reply. Some defence, however, seemed in the eyes of Bishop Gray to be called for. He, therefore, called on his Registrar to read a letter, written two years before, August 7, 1861, which, as he said, the Bishop had put in *in his defence*, and to which he had called the special attention of the court.<sup>1</sup> In the heat of this miserable controversy, provoked by his own extravagant notions of Metropolitan power, Bishop Gray could scarcely touch on any topic without misrepresenting it. The letter, to which reference was made was mentioned in the letter of protest. But the Bishop of Natal did not say that he put it in in defence, nor did he call to it the special attention of the court. He never named the court at all. He could not do so because he did not recognise its existence, and he was not even aware of the existence of the second court which pretended to try him. All that he did was to refer Bishop Gray to his earlier letter for an explanation of his meaning in some of the passages objected to in the *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, adding only, "I desire also to call your attention" (not that of the court) "to the preface to Part III., a copy of which I forward by this mail."<sup>2</sup> The letter, however, was read by way of a defence; and the Metropolitan then proceeded to deliver his judgement.

This judgement it is unnecessary to review at any length. Theologically, it is in complete agreement with the opinions of his assessors, and the pleadings of the prosecuting clergy. But something must be said about the position taken by Bishop Gray, and the method by which he justified his verdict.

He professed, in the first place, to sit as Metropolitan,

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 244.

<sup>2</sup> The earlier letter here referred to is given in Appendix A.

with full coercive and deposing powers, by virtue of the Royal letters patent to which he appealed. He did not indeed say that this claim was admitted by the defendant, but he had no doubt on the subject himself. This was a purely legal question, and it turned necessarily on the date of the patent. To judge the Bishop of Natal by virtue of powers conferred by a patent dated about a fortnight later than his own would have been an intolerable injustice. At the time of the Bishop of Natal's consecration Bishop Gray's letters patent were not in existence: and it was impossible therefore for the former to know what might be their tenor. No doubt by his own patent the Bishop of Natal admitted himself to stand in a certain relation to the Bishop of Capetown; and by the promises thus made he was bound. According to Bishop Gray, he had acknowledged that he stood in the relation of a Suffragan Bishop to the Metropolitan, who was invested with the powers and authority of that office. But not very long ago Bishop Gray had himself been in doubt as to the extent and nature of this power and authority. When in 1858 he administered a wise rebuke to the Dean of Maritzburg, he said that he could reply to him only through his Bishop.

"I am doubtful," he added, "as to the extent of Metropolitan jurisdiction in such a matter as you have submitted to me (a point not so easy to be determined as you may, perhaps, imagine). I cannot venture to give a judicial opinion upon the case laid before me. All that I can do is to give both you and the Bishop my views upon this unfortunate dispute which has arisen."

But nothing had occurred in the interval to solve and remove these doubts; and the Bishop of Natal was firmly and most rightly resolved that he would admit no obligations which he had not taken upon himself at the time of his

consecration. He had then taken the oath of canonical obedience to the Metropolitan. But it had been ruled by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council<sup>1</sup> that

“the oath of canonical obedience does not mean that the clergyman will obey all the commands of the Bishop against which there is no law, but that he will obey all such commands as the Bishop by law is authorised to impose.”

Having before him the principle thus laid down, it was impossible for him to recognise in Bishop Gray a power of sitting in judgement upon him, and, if need be, deposing him ; but his own letters patent placed the matter well-nigh beyond reach of question. In these it was merely provided that

“the said Bishop of Natal and his successors shall be subject and subordinate to the see of Capetown, and to the Bishop thereof and his successors, in the same manner as any Bishop of any see within the Province of Canterbury, in our Kingdom of England, is under the authority of the Archiepiscopal see of that Province and of the Archbishop of the same.”

This patent, it is obvious, did not convey, and could not convey, to the Metropolitan of Capetown a power not possessed by the Archbishop of Canterbury ; and certainly the latter had no power of summoning his suffragans before himself to undergo a trial and receive a sentence. The proceedings must take the legal form, which reserves for all the orders of the clergy an appeal in the last resort to the Crown.

This appeal, as we shall see, the Bishop of Capetown was resolved to bar ; and in spite of professions, at starting, to the contrary, he was not less resolved on trying the Bishop of Natal by a wider standard than the law would allow to a judge in England.

<sup>1</sup> In the case of *Long v. Bishop of Capetown*.

“In forming a decision,” he declared, “as to the soundness or unsoundness of the Bishop’s views, I shall be guided entirely by the language of the Articles and formularies, including, of course, the whole Book of Common Prayer.”<sup>1</sup>

But English practice confined the investigation virtually to the Articles of Religion, and to the interpretation of them in their plain, literal, and grammatical sense. In the sentence just cited, Bishop Gray does not mention the Church, and this seemingly was done of set purpose, for he at once goes on to say,

“I do not mean thereby to imply that these are the only tests by which the Bishops of this Church should try the teaching of its ministers.”

Here the word *Church* denotes not the Church of England, but the Church of South Africa ; and the term is used in a third sense when he goes on to speak of “the received faith of the Church in all ages.” Thus we have three senses in which the word may be taken, and the uses may be so interchanged as to make it by no means easy to ascertain the application in given instances. He was thus provided with an armoury of weapons, which, unless they should be very blunderingly used, must insure his victory. In the first place

“the decisions of those Councils which the Church of England regards as œcumenical are the very highest authorities by which” the Bishops of the Church of South Africa “could be guided.”

To these must be added “the received faith of the Church in all ages,” and the three creeds, as expressing “the mind and faith, not only of the Church of England, but also of the whole Catholic Church from the beginning.” In their

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 341.



application to a particular case, he must necessarily be the interpreter of all these authorities. But in this interpretation he would, whenever it was possible to do so, "decide by the literal and grammatical sense of the words." When the sense was not plain, he would "interpret them by a comparison of passages, . . . by the history of the controversies which gave rise to them, by the analogy of the faith," having regard always "to the *animus imponentis*, the intention of the Church in the wording of its documents."<sup>1</sup> It is clear that these analogies must be traced, and these intentions ascertained, by himself. Finally, when he came to the examination of certain of the schedules of accusation, Bishop Gray decided the question by a direct appeal to the Scriptures, and thus opened a still wider field, with larger opportunities for securing a conviction. So equipped, he had no difficulty in declaring that the Church of England, or, rather, the Church, held the doctrine of substitution in reference to the life and death of Christ, and affirmed that He suffered to appease and remove the Divine anger. He had no difficulty in laying it down that the Church did not regard the heathen as having before their conversion any part in Christ,<sup>2</sup> none in deciding that she denied that all men everywhere were accounted righteous before God,<sup>3</sup> none in determining that the Bishop of Natal's statements with reference to the sacrament of baptism were not covered by the final decision in the Gorham case.

"I am aware," he says, "that practically the discipline of the Church has been such that clergy have been allowed to express themselves on the subjective side of the sacraments very variously, chiefly, perhaps, because of the difficulty of defining exactly that which is in truth a mystery; and that the right to do so has been considered, so far as Holy Baptism is concerned, to be strengthened by a celebrated decision which, though not given by the Church, or by judges

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 343.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* p. 356.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* 360.

authorised by it, has not formally been set aside by it. But no such language or teaching as that which I consider the Bishop of Natal has been shown to have committed himself to, has ever, so far as I know, been sanctioned or tolerated within the Church."<sup>1</sup>

Even if the facts were as the Bishop of Capetown stated them, the only inference to be drawn from them would be that the new point thus raised should be referred by appeal to the same tribunal which had dealt with the Gorham case. But to this course Bishop Gray was resolved never to commit himself. It was enough that his own view of this matter was different, and it was enough too that he could not admit the ruling of the Judicial Committee in the case of Williams and Wilson. That ruling had declared that the Church of England had not pronounced authoritatively that the state of sinners after death was hopeless. Bishop Gray insisted that the Catholic Church had always maintained this hopelessness, and that the Church of South Africa was bound to maintain it also. Nay, he asserted further, that, in spite of the Williams-Wilson judgement, the Church of England maintained it likewise. Did not the Athanasian Creed say plainly that they that have done good shall go into life everlasting, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire? But the Bishop of Capetown had probably never paused to think what answer he would return to a questioner who might ask him whether God, the righteous Judge and loving Father, could ever make a compromise with sin; or to consider the consequences involved in the answering this question in the negative. If the idea of such a compromise was inconceivable, then all theories of partial salvation were shown to be untenable, and not only untenable but mischievous and utterly misleading,<sup>2</sup> and therefore

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 362.

<sup>2</sup> See the whole argument in the *Commentary on the Romans*, already given in Chap. IV.

all minor considerations become matters of no moment. But such minor considerations there were, and these, too, of no small consequence, if the conviction of St. Paul was not held to be decisive on the subject. One of the minor matters to be thus considered was the fact that the words of the Athanasian Creed could not bear the sense put upon them by Bishop Gray. This sense, in the words of a well-known clergyman still living, would be this :—

“ They that at the moment of death are in a state of peace with God through faith and repentance will at the Day of Judgement enter upon a state of immeasurable and endless felicity ; they that at the moment of death are in their natural state, and not reconciled to God, will at the Day of Judgement enter upon a state of fearful and endless misery. “ But the Creed makes no allusion to the state of the soul at the moment of death. Its two clauses are ‘ they that have done good,’ and ‘ they that have done evil.’ Is there any one so good as not to have done evil ? St. John and the universal human conscience reply : ‘ If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.’ On the other hand, where can we point to a brother-man of whom we can say that he is so evil as never to have done good ? If, then, human beings in general have done both good and evil, how are we to separate the two classes which are to inherit such different destinies ? The question is no easy one. It will be answered very differently. It may be said that God’s infinite wisdom is able to strike a balance between the good and the evil that a man has done, and that, according as the good or evil preponderates, he will be classed with the doers of good or the doers of evil. But who will be satisfied with such an account of God’s dealings with men ? Another view would be, that true faith with the forgiveness that follows it blots out previous evil works ; that one who has the true faith is considered as a righteous man, and therefore as a doer of good for Christ’s sake ; and that when a man dies a true believer these benefits accrue to him,

however recently he may have come to the state of faith. Let us suppose this to be sound theology ; but can it for a moment be said to be the literal grammatical interpretation of the Athanasian article? . . . It is common to lay down general propositions about the good man and the bad man, the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor. When we come to apply them to actual persons, we must speak of the man *so far as* he is good or bad, rich or poor. Very likely the same man may be in different ways or senses *both* good *and* bad, both rich and poor. . . . Similarly we may believe that it is the strictest possible law of God's judgement that they who have done good shall go into eternal life, and they that have done evil into everlasting fire ; . . . whilst it may well be true that the life and the fire, the praise and the wrath, may touch the same person, and that every sinner on the earth, *so far as* he has been a doer of good, shall be rewarded, and *so far as* he has been a doer of evil shall be punished."<sup>1</sup>

But having cited the Athanasian Creed in support of his own statements with regard to the punishment of sinners, Bishop Gray found himself called upon to deal with the fact

"that in the Articles of 1552 there was one, the 42nd, which expressly condemned those who held the opinion that all men shall be saved at last, but that that Article was omitted in the revision of the Articles in 1562."

This has been taken as evidence that the design of laying down any authoritative decision on this subject has been deliberately disclaimed by the Church of England ; but this the Bishop of Capetown could by no means admit. The real reason for the omission he believes to be

"that which is assigned by Hardwicke. The doctrines of the Anabaptists, against which that and some other Articles

<sup>1</sup> *Forgiveness after Death* ; London, Longmans, 1862.

were levelled, were no longer so menacing as they had been a few years before. There were, therefore, not the same urgent reasons for proscribing them.”<sup>1</sup>

For Bishop Gray this inference was a matter of no small importance. It involves the principle that the Articles generally are not to be regarded as anything like a definite statement of the doctrine of the Church of England, or as exhibiting the extent of obligation imposed upon the clergy of that Church. They are simply statements put forth by way of refuting or condemning errors which in greater or less degree were current in England ; but there was no warrant for the conclusion that nothing more was required from the English clergy.<sup>2</sup> How much more was required, the Articles did not state ; and this was a question which must be determined by the decisions of the spiritual courts of the English communion. If this principle be allowed, the Metropolitan might crush any one without difficulty. But this principle has not been admitted : it has been formally disallowed by the Arches Court of Canterbury and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. For the fact itself there is presumption simply ; but there is no conclusive evidence, when evidence of the most cogent kind is indispensable. That an error which destroys the foundations of at least the great Calvinistic school or party should have been so formidable in 1552 as to call for a special Article in condemnation of it, and have come to be of so little account in 1562 as to make it necessary and prudent to remove that Article, is an amazing fact indeed, if it be a fact at all. Is it conceivable that the Revisers of 1562 could have looked upon this so-called error as one which was certain to have no attraction for English minds, or that Englishmen of all schools were so thoroughly convinced of the truth of the Augustinian or Fulgentian theories as to need no sign-post to

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 369.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* p. 378.

warn them against thoughts which might lead them in a very different direction ?

On the subject of Bishop Colenso's criticisms on the Pentateuch Bishop Gray takes up precisely the position of the Committee of Convocation of the Province of Canterbury ; and of this position Bishop Thirlwall, as we have seen, has demonstrated the utter futility. With the Committee, Dr Gray appeals to the language of the Prayer Book, and to the authority of Christ Himself ; and he decides emphatically that

"language must altogether lose its meaning ; pledges, promises, declarations, must be regarded as so much waste paper, if the words of the Church in those formularies and Articles which speak of the Bible, and which are in accordance with, and must be interpreted by, the language of the Church on this great subject from the beginning, are not held to be violated by the Bishop in the passages which have been referred to, and which are but a specimen of the views propounded by him throughout his books,"<sup>1</sup>

But, according to Dr. Gray, Bishop Colenso had not only impugned the authority of the Bible as being "itself the Word of God."<sup>2</sup> He had put forth new views on the subject of the authorship of the canonical books. Great part of the Pentateuch was written, not by Moses, but probably by Samuel ; and Deuteronomy was the work of some one living in the time of Josiah, not improbably of the prophet Jeremiah. In so saying Dr. Gray held that the Bishop of Natal did "not contradict the express language of the Church of England."<sup>3</sup>

"But is it therefore," he asks, "lawful for the Bishop to teach that Samuel, and not Moses, was the author of the Pentateuch ? I think not. The case is widely different

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 382.  
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<sup>2</sup> See p. 290.

<sup>3</sup> *Trial*, p. 386.  
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from what it would have been had he questioned whether the Second Epistle of St. Peter, or the Epistle to the Hebrews, were written by those to whom they have been generally attributed. In this case the attributing the Pentateuch to Samuel is not only opposed to the stream of writers in all ages of the Church, and to express Canons—as the 85th of the Apostolical Canons—and to the internal evidence, and even the assertions of the Pentateuch itself. It goes beyond this. It involves the rejection of our Lord's authority, and of His words as delivered to us by the Church in the Gospels, as we have them, in which the Saviour is made to quote from each of the books of the Pentateuch; and this is one of those instances to which I have just referred, in which there may be an offence against the Church's teaching, while there is none against the express language of the Articles or formularies.”<sup>1</sup>

Here again we have Bishop Gray ruling question after question on the authority of the Church, or, in effect, on his own interpretations of statements supposed to be made by that Church. Here again we are left in uncertainty of the meaning in which the term *Church* is employed; and here again also documents (such as the Apostolical Canons) are referred to as authoritative, of which a clergyman in England would not be presumed of necessity to have any knowledge, and by which, therefore, he could not be tested. As to the allegations of “rejecting our Lord's authority,” we have seen<sup>2</sup> the absurdity of the dilemma into which an admission of the charge would lead us. We have seen further the emphatic declaration of Bishop Thirlwall that Bishop Colenso's language involves no such rejection, and that the words of our Lord have no bearing on the point in debate. The monstrousness of the issue becomes obvious when we find a Bishop tried, and condemned, and deposed in South Africa on charges which a

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 387.

<sup>2</sup> See p. 307, note.

Bishop in England pronounces to be groundless in fact, and wholly inadmissible,

But Bishop Gray was not to be deterred by any such considerations. Adhering obstinately to the sense put by himself upon documents and formularies, he declared that

“if Joshua (the man) be a myth, the Flood a fiction, the Exodus not a real fact, a large part of that Book which the Church declared to be ‘God’s Word’ cannot possibly be God’s Word, and the language of the preface to the Prayer Book . . . is entirely mistaken.”

Even if Joshua never lived, and the Flood never took place, the conclusion drawn by Dr. Gray about the Pentateuch generally does not necessarily follow ; and with the language of the preface to the Prayer Book no clergyman perhaps is required to be familiar, and most assuredly it is nowhere said that he is bound by it. But Dr. Gray was confronted by a recent decision in England. In the case of the Bishop of Salisbury *v.* Williams, Dr. Lushington had ruled in the Arches Court,

“that when the question in the Ordination Service for Deacons is put, ‘Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament?’ and to which the answer is given, ‘I do believe them,’ the pledge then given must be regarded as sufficiently fulfilled if there be a *bona fide* belief that the Holy Scriptures contain everything necessary to salvation ; and that to that extent they have the direct sanction of the Almighty, even apparently though the historical portion of Scripture should be disbelieved.”<sup>1</sup>

This last qualifying clause cannot with any strictness be applied to the Bishop of Natal. After all deductions made by his criticisms it could not be said that he disbelieved the

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 388.



historical portion of Scripture, because he held that there was a substantial truth in the narrative of the going down to Egypt, of the sojourn there, of the Exodus, of the conquest of Canaan, of the partial subjugation of the old inhabitants, of the influence exercised by them upon the Hebrew people, of the administration of the Judges, and the growth of the country under the early Kings. In short, Dr. Gray had not paused to consider what he meant by disbelief of Scripture history, and he at once set himself in opposition to Dr. Lushington's judgement.

"I cannot," he said, "concur in such a decision as this. It is a wrong to the Church thus to limit the meaning and diminish the force of its plain language. It has two distinct statements,—as to what the Bible is, it is God's word written; the other, as to what it contains with regard to the faith, it contains without the aid of tradition all things necessary to everlasting salvation."<sup>1</sup>

We are not, indeed, told in which of its three senses the word *Church* is used in this passage. But we are made to see that in every stage of this inquiry the Bishop of Capetown insisted on appealing to the Scriptures; for when he appealed to the "teaching of our Lord Himself," he was manifestly appealing not to the Prayer Book but to the Bible, although authoritative decisions had declared in England that such a course was altogether inadmissible. Both the Court of Arches and the Privy Council had decided that they were bound to look solely to the Articles and to the formularies, and had refused to take account of passages of Scripture, even when found in the Prayer Book.

"Were I once to be tempted," said Sir Stephen Lushington, "from the Articles and other formularies, the court could assign no limits to its investigations: it would inevitably

<sup>1</sup> *Trial*, p. 388.

be compelled to consider theological questions, not for the purpose of deciding whether they were conformable to a prescribed standard, but whether the positions maintained were reconcilable with the Scriptures or not. . . . I will not be tempted, in the trial of any accusation against any clergyman, to resort to Scripture as the standard by which the doctrine shall be measured."

Nor was this the only blow dealt by the judge of the Court of Arches against the principles laid down by the Metropolitan of Southern Africa. He had ruled

"that it is open for the clergy to maintain that *any* book in the Bible is the work of another author than him whose name it bears."

This ruling he proceeds to explain by asking—

"What is the true meaning of these words? I apprehend, it must mean this,—that the clergy are at liberty to reject parts of Scripture, upon their own opinion that the narrative is inherently incredible, to disregard precepts in Holy Writ, because they think them evidently wrong. Whatever I may think as to the danger of the liberty thus claimed, still, if the liberty do not extend to the impugning of the *Articles of Religion*, or the *formularies*, the matter is beyond my cognisance."

But nothing, it seems, could bring Bishop Gray to define his terms. He will not admit Sir S. Lushington's ruling, because he holds that in the Ordination Service the candidate is not asked whether the Scriptures contain all things necessary to salvation, but whether he believes them to be God's word,—whether he believes them to be true. The Bishop of Natal might reply that he did believe them to be God's word, that he did hold them to be true, in the sense that they taught men to seek after all things that are good, and holy, and lovely, and of good report. But this was not what Bishop Gray

meant by truth ; and therefore he felt bound to decide that the Bishop of Natal had contradicted the teaching of Christ Himself (395) ; and in spite of the language of Jeremy Taylor,<sup>1</sup> he persisted in maintaining that, by speaking of our Lord as limited in His human nature by the conditions of knowledge at the time of His ministry, he was denying that He is God and Man in one Person. Thus

“in imputing to our Blessed Lord ignorance and the possibility of error, the Bishop has committed himself to a most subtle heresy, destructive of the reality of the Incarnation, and he has departed from the Catholic faith, as held in the Church from the beginning, and as expressed in the Second Article and in the Creeds.” (395.)

Lastly, he held the Bishop of Natal to be justly charged with depraving the Prayer Book, and with inviting the clergy to disown their obligations and to disobey the law of the Church. He forgot that Archbishop Longley had tried to enforce on the clergy the same lesson. No power, he stated in the House of Lords, should induce him to read certain portions of the Office for Burial over those who had died in known sin ; and he advised his clergy to follow his example, promising them all the protection that he could afford them. But that which might be permitted to, and be laudable in, the Archbishop of Canterbury could not be tolerated in the Bishop of Natal. Nothing, therefore, was left but to pass sentence ; and in the exercise of a jurisdiction derived from the Queen's letters patent, and from these alone, the Bishop of Capetown decreed the Bishop of Natal

“to be deposed from the said office as such Bishop, and to be further prohibited from the exercise of any divine office within any part of the Metropolitan Province of Capetown.” (404.)

<sup>1</sup> See p. 309

This judgement and sentence Bishop Gray consented to forward to the Archbishop of Canterbury for his revision, if the Bishop of Natal should desire to make a formal appeal to the Primate. But this appeal he allowed, not of right, but as a personal favour under the peculiar circumstances of the case; and the appeal was to be made not to the Primate acting through his judge in the Court of Arches, from which a further appeal would lie to the Crown, but only to the Archbishop in his private and personal capacity, and beyond him it was not to go. The defiance to the Crown of England could scarcely be given in language less equivocal.

The Metropolitan having thus finished his work, Dr. Bleek, as acting for the Bishop of Natal, handed to him the following protest:—

- “On behalf of the Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Natal, I again protest against the legality of the present proceedings and the validity of this judgement; and, with all respect towards your Lordship personally, I, on the Bishop’s behalf, give you formal notice that the said proceedings and judgement are and will be regarded and treated by him as a nullity, void of all force and effect.
- “And I, in like manner, further give notice that the Bishop of Natal will, if the same shall be expedient or necessary, and if he shall be thereunto advised, appeal from, or otherwise contest the lawfulness of, these proceedings, and will, if need be, resist any attempt to enforce and carry out the execution of this judgement in such manner and by such lawful ways and process as he shall be advised to be proper.”

## CHAPTER VIII.

### CONSEQUENCES OF THE SO-CALLED TRIAL AT CAPETOWN.

THE opinion of Mr. Maurice on the Capetown trial and the issues involved in it is of importance, not because it is seemingly unlike the opinion of any one else, but because few had a truer and deeper insight than he into the nature of the Divine Kingdom. For him the presence and the present abiding and unceasing work of the Heavenly Father of all mankind were eternal realities ; and he shrunk therefore from anything which limited the good tidings of His love. If there was any one thing above another which the accusers of the Bishop of Natal denounced with unsparing vehemence, it was the conviction that the Divine purpose is to battle with and to overcome sin, in all, everywhere. They would have had nothing but an anathema for the words of Mr. Maurice when he says:—

“ God cares for every man whether or not that man cares for Him, is seeking after every man whether or not that man is seeking after Him. You must also suppose that there is a Son of man who is near to every man, who is his Lord and Brother, who died for him, and who lives for him. Yes! and you must believe also that if my Christianity, or your Christianity, or any man’s Christianity, stand between you

or me or him and God who is our Father, Christ who is our Brother, *He* will sweep that Christianity away.”<sup>1</sup>

It was inevitable, therefore, that when the Bishop of Capetown professed to judge from a tribunal not responsible to any tribunal in England, and to pronounce a sentence which should be none the less valid because it came into collision with English law, Mr. Maurice should without hesitation condemn his proceedings, and protest against their consequences. His belief, Colonel Maurice tells us,

“in the appeal to justice, and to fixed laws expounded by lawyers as an appeal to the judgement of God against the tyranny of ecclesiastical public opinion,”

made him feel very strongly on the subject.

“His belief that Protestantism is for each nation the claim that God is the King of its king, that God presides over the law courts of its king; his belief that every effort to arrive at right and justice is an effort to arrive at and submit to the will of the invisible King,—made him more and more hostile to those measures which it became each year more difficult to distinguish from intrigue and plotting; of which the Bishop of Oxford was the centre; of which the effect was to set up the supremacy of what might be the current theological opinions of the day. On October 4th he wrote to the *Times* a letter on ‘the Bishop of Capetown and spiritual jurisdiction,’ in which he maintained that the claim of the Bishop of Capetown to set up a ‘spiritual jurisdiction’ contra-distinguished to the rule of right and law was the one against which the very existence of our national Church was a protest, which touched the most sacred point of our Protestant national position.”<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Maurice was one of whom it could emphatically be said that he spoke English, and he wrote English; but in spite of

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Maurice*, ii. p. 478.

<sup>2</sup> *Ib.* ii. p. 487.

this it was not always that he succeeded in making his meaning plain, and it was often most difficult to understand him when he spoke or wrote chiefly in monosyllables. A clergyman in the diocese of Grahamstown, recognizing in the Capetown Synod no authority divine or human, had put to Mr. Maurice the seemingly superfluous question how he would advise him to treat the Bishop of Natal in the contingency of his presenting himself as a communicant in his church. Mr. Maurice might have told him that, if in his eyes the Capetown Synod had no authority, any act of that Synod must for him be nothing; or he might have referred him to his own conscience; or he might have said that nothing needed to be feared from the obsolete weapon of "excommunication." In fact, his answer was:—

"With your feeling you could not treat him as an excommunicated person. No presbyter, I suppose no Bishop in England, would dare to do so; I should think the act in a colony in which he has dwelt and ministered—though not a part of his diocese—more, not less, inexcusable."

On the point of his being allowed to preach, Mr. Maurice advised his correspondent to be guided by the judgement of the Bishop of Grahamstown. So far his meaning is clear. It is not less clear when he adds that his correspondent is not asked by English law to pay the least respect to the decrees of the South African Synod (which are declared to be null and void), and at the same time that he is not asked to recognize the Bishop of Natal in that character (*i. e.* as Bishop of Natal), being free to consider him as having no diocese at all. We can understand the words; but the answer is that Mr. Maurice is wrong in his facts, as was afterwards made plain by the judgement of Lord Romilly. Speaking in the House of Lords after the delivery of the so-called Capetown "judgement," Dr. Thirlwall declared that Dr. Colenso was as much and as really

Bishop of Natal as he himself was Bishop of St. David's. If Bishop Colenso had no longer a diocese, who had deprived him of it? To allow that Bishop Gray had done so would concede every point for which the Metropolitan of South Africa was contending. Mr. Maurice adds:—

“I should hope he would submit to one part of the decision whilst he claims the benefit of the other, and not go back to a country where he has not a *legal* status, and where his presence can breed only strife. He is safe till he raises the question in the colony. If it is raised, your experience of the feelings of the laity, and the positive expression of the feelings of the clergy, convince me that he would come off worst.”

This passage is partly obscure, and where it is not obscure is altogether unworthy of Mr. Maurice. Even Bishop Gray never maintained that Dr. Colenso might not after his sentence have a *legal* status in Natal. His contention was that a legal status did not extend necessarily beyond temporalities, and that his presence in Natal would breed strife not for lack of the legal status, but because he had been deprived of all spiritual authority. Mr. Maurice was wrong also in his estimate of the feeling of the laity, and he ought to have taken pains to ascertain whether the clergy had expressed what they really felt. When after the reversal of a portion of Dr. Lushington's judgement by the Privy Council on the appeal in the Williams-Wilson case, Dr. Pusey and others sent round to every clergyman in England a declaration of faith which they were entreated to sign “for the love of God,” Mr. Maurice rightly protested against the cruelty and the cowardice of the proceeding. He declared that it meant just this:—

“Young clergymen, poor curates, poor incumbents, sign, or we will turn the whole force of religious public opinion against



you. Sign, or we will starve you! Look at the Greek Professor,<sup>1</sup> you see we CAN take that vengeance on those whom we do not like. You see that we are willing to take it, and that no considerations of faithful and devoted services will hinder us. This," he adds indignantly, "is what is called signing for the love of God. I accept Dr. Pusey's own statement, tremendous as it is. I say that the God whom we are adjured to love under these penalties is not the God of whom I have read in 'the Canonical Scriptures,' not the God who declares that He abhors robbery for burnt-offering."<sup>2</sup>

But the clergy of Natal were even poorer and more helpless than the poorest curates and incumbents of the mother country. For the pittance on which they lived they depended absolutely on the good-will of the Society familiarly known as the S.P.G. Some, and even the majority, may have been as sacerdotally minded as the Metropolitan of South Africa, although this has not been proved, and is not likely; but if the pressure was exercised even in a single case, where the total number was so small, then there was a cruel exercise of power, with which the pressure put upon the English clergy could hardly be compared. It was proved afterwards, as it might have been suspected at the first, that the Natal clergy were not free agents in this matter. Colonel Maurice gives the particulars which show that the English declaration, which was designed to uphold faith in the endless and useless torturing of sinners, was for all practical purposes worthless.<sup>3</sup> The result of the methods applied in Natal was not a jot more creditable to Bishop Gray and his followers.

But the case becomes more perplexing when we find Mr. Maurice insisting, it would seem, that a truth which, if it be a

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Jowett, now Master of Balliol College, and lately Vice-Chancellor of the University of Oxford.

<sup>2</sup> *Life of Maurice*, i. p. 469.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.* ii. p. 470.

truth at all, must be an eternal verity, falls to the ground if the authority of some particular book is questioned or rejected. He had clung to what he called the Old Testament maxim that God Himself is the Deliverer, that His name is the ground of national liberty. But why this maxim should be convicted of falsehood if it should be shown that the Levitical legislation is the growth of an age subsequent to the Babylonish captivity, Mr. Maurice has not clearly shown ; and, in the absence of some explanation, disinterested men may be pardoned if they confess their inability to follow him. Why should this truth have been any the more doubtful, if the books of the Old Testament had never been gathered into one collection, or if they had never been written ? For some mysterious reason, however, he had convinced himself that no foundation was left for this spiritual belief if even the details of the narrative were proved to be inaccurate or wrong.

“To have a quantity of criticism about the dung in the Jewish camp, and the division of a hare’s foot, thrown in my face, when I was satisfied that the Jewish history had been the mightiest witness to the people for a living God against the dead dogmas of priests, was more shocking to me than I can describe.”<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Maurice continually repeated himself. It becomes necessary, therefore, to go over again and again ground already traversed. There can be no reason for disputing his dictum that the Old Testament is a witness for liberty. Yet we might know something of liberty even if we had never heard of the Old Testament ; nor need we dispute his conclusion that

“the Bishop of Capetown was waging a fiercer war against the *principle* of the Old Testament than Bishop Colenso has

<sup>1</sup> *Life of Maurice*, ii. p. 490.

done. A thing called a Church, consisting of a Metropolitan and a Synod, a poor imitation of a Popedom, is to set aside the glorious traditions of the *English nation*, which were grounded upon the Old Testament, which were the deliverance from priestly tribunals and a king-bishop."

The traditions may be thoroughly sound and wholesome, and the Old Testament may set forth with all clearness the Divine justice and righteousness ; but in spite of this it is conceivably possible that the former may not have been grounded upon the latter. This possibility, even as a conception, lay beyond Mr. Maurice's ken.

But when Mr. Maurice professed to be grieved and shocked by all and by anything that the Bishop had said about the Pentateuch, he forgot that there were others who might be pained and shocked by his own attitude ; and for some who were thus distressed it might have been supposed that he would wish to take some thought. It may be no breach of confidence to cite the following sentences from a letter written by Mrs. Colenso, February 1885 :—

"I have been reading with intensest interest the life of Mr. Maurice, which Mrs. Lyell sent me. I have no fault at all to find with the editor's account of his father's treatment of us ; and I suppose nothing else was to be expected ; but I did hope that one whom I had looked on as a prophet would have found us a standing-point for our faith quite distinct from historical beliefs. But no, I was present, and my blood ran cold when he whom I had always regarded as a saint, as nearer to God than any other, actually said that if he could not believe that Moses wrote the Pentateuch, he could not believe in God at all or in 'the powers of the world to come.' I was present, you know, almost all the time of that conference. . . . I was driven at last to exclaim in despair, 'O Mr. Maurice, it is too dreadful to hear such words from your lips.' For all the bitterness of

that time, the suffering of it, which we kept very much to ourselves, I still remember F. D. Maurice with reverence and affection. . . . I think he might have taken a little more pains with us, instead of casting us off at once with something like contempt. But I found, when not long afterwards we visited the Scotts at Manchester, who had been very intimate with him, that difference of opinion did sometimes meet with something like violence, and issue in estrangement."

In delivering judgement, the Bishop of Capetown had openly declared his refusal to acquiesce in decisions recently delivered by the judge of the Court of Arches, and by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. If no explanation of the fact were offered, the course taken by the Metropolitan of South Africa might be regarded as open defiance of the law of the Church of England. It became necessary, therefore, to take ground which would account for the use of this language. With the principles avowed by Bishop Gray, there was no alternative. On the day, therefore, before the delivery of the sentence, the Bishop of Capetown and his two episcopal assessors formed themselves into a "Synod," and laid down a number of resolutions, intended to bind all the members of the Church of England, lay and clerical, within the Province of Capetown, so including the clergy and laity of the diocese of Natal. In these resolutions they declared that the Church of the Province of Capetown receives the standards and formularies of the Church of England, but

"inasmuch as this Church is not, as the Church of England, 'by law established,' and inasmuch as the laws of England have by treaty no force in this colony, those laws which have been enacted by statute for the English Church as an Establishment, do not apply to, and are not binding upon, the Church in South Africa ;"

and again,

“This Synod considers that the final court of appeal, constituted by Act of Parliament for the Established Church of England, is not a court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes for the un-established Church in this colony; and therefore this Synod declares that, while the Church in this Province is bound by, and claims as its inheritance, the standards and formularies of the Church of England, it is not bound by any interpretation put upon those standards by existing ecclesiastical courts in England, or by the decisions of such courts in matters of faith.”

In other words, whether rightly or wrongly, whether the change was necessary, or justifiable, or not, there was to be one law for England, and another for South Africa. A clergyman, upheld by the law in the former, might find himself an excommunicated heretic in the latter. The power of interpretation might furnish an indefinitely elastic line; and a man might pass from one legal status to another, while he deluded himself with the idea that his condition remained unchanged. One question remained unanswered. Was this a keeping of faith with all who went out to the colony as members of the Church of England, and not of any other body? The state of things brought about by Bishop Gray was a state of war, affecting the interests of generations yet unborn. In the Bishop of Natal's words, the issue was

“no less than this—whether you and your children shall enjoy hereafter the laws and liberties, and with these the light of life, of the Church of England, to which you belong; or whether, among the clergy and laity of this diocese, all inquiry shall be checked and crushed, all thought repressed, and the aspirations of the age for a wider, more comprehensive, more enlightened Christianity exchanged for a return to Patristic theology and practice, the decrees of the ‘Council of Antioch, as confirmed by the Council of Chalcedon,’ and ‘what the Church held in the first thousand years of her history.’”

Into the purely legal questions connected with this Synod it is unnecessary to enter; but there can be little doubt, or none, that by holding this Synod between the so-called trial and the so-called judgement Dr. Gray was multiplying difficulties for himself. The two proceedings were entirely distinct. They were also not judicial. They were, in short, independent trials, and the proceedings in the Synod appear to have lacked the most elementary and essential characteristics of a trial. There was no citation of the accused, no accusers, no pleading, no evidence. There could therefore be no judgement and no sentence. It is not true, therefore, to say, as was often said subsequently, that the Bishop of Natal was *tried* by a Provincial Synod.<sup>1</sup> He was not summoned to it. The Synod was beyond doubt an afterthought. It professed, indeed, to go through certain forms of trial; but these forms were a mere mockery of justice. The so-called Synod chose to say that it had tried the Bishop. Its assertions could not convert assumption into right, or farce into sober fact.

Between the years 1858 and 1866 nothing had occurred to alter the complexion or significance of the theory of ecclesiastical ascendancy propounded by Bishop Gray as Metropolitan of South Africa. All that can be said is that before the latter year an occasion had arisen for the exercise of the powers claimed under this theory, which in 1858 the Bishop of Grahamstown had not looked for. Whatever danger for the rights and freedom of the clergy and laity had been involved in those claims in 1858, those dangers were neither lessened nor increased when the Metropolitan proceeded to judge, condemn, and depose his brother of Natal in 1863. But in the view taken of these claims by Bishop Cotterill change of circumstances had wrought a marvellous revolution. It is necessary here to note only how he had regarded the matter,

<sup>1</sup> J. Brunel, *Remarks on the Proceedings at Capetown in the Matter of the Bishop of Natal*, 1868.

while yet there was nothing to blind his eyes to dangers which might possibly affect himself. In 1858, Bishop Cotterill, writing to the Bishop of Natal, spoke of the patent of the Metropolitan as one reason which had made him hesitate in his acceptance of the see which he held.

“It shows,” he said, “how loosely these matters are managed, that both the Archbishop, and the Government, I mean the officials at the Colonial Office, knew nothing about that formidable visitation clause, until I called their attention to it. The Archbishop said that there was no court in which this Metropolitan jurisdiction could be enforced, and Mr. Labouchere and others at the Colonial Office told me that if the Metropolitan interfered I could simply upset all he had done, as soon as he left my diocese.

“But there is another important point connected with this question, and on which I confess it seems to me you have rather conceded too much, by your circulating the Metropolitan’s opinion on your doctrine. . . . It seems to me of the utmost consequence that we should not in any way admit the principle that the Metropolitan is *episcopus episcoporum*. If one of my clergy presented me to the Metropolitan, I should decline submitting to any irregular semi-official proceeding, and I should respectfully inform the Metropolitan that his opinion of my sermons or acts was no concern of mine unless he should proceed by a regular process, and issue a final sentence such as would form the ground for appeal to an ecclesiastical court at home. If our clergy are to be presenting us to the Metropolitan whenever we offend them, or they differ from our views and acts, and we admit the right of another Bishop, because he is the Metropolitan of the Province, to censure us according to the standard of his own private opinion, we are placed wholly in a false position. If he has not a legally constituted court to try us in, that is his business, not ours; but that we should be placed at the mercy of the individual opinion of a Metropolitan is contrary to all ecclesiastical law.

“It is difficult, perhaps, to say what a Metropolitan ought to do. Still, we must make him understand that, unless we ourselves break the ecclesiastical laws of England, and commit deeds or maintain doctrines that would be *legal offences* in England, he has no more right to give us his personal opinions as a judicial sentence upon us than we have to pass a sentence upon him. I wonder how the Bishops of Exeter and Oxford would treat an extra-judicial opinion of the Primate on their doctrine. I speak my mind to you freely, because I do not see where this interference is to end, if we admit it. . . . Closely connected with all these questions is that to which you refer—what is our proper title as a Church here? As you will observe, in our conference the description taken from the Capetown proceedings was proposed; but I objected to it, and it was altered. Most certainly we are here as Bishops of the Church of England; our clergy are clergymen of the United Church of England and Ireland, and take oaths both of allegiance and supremacy. If we were merely Bishops of the ‘Catholic Church,’ our ordination would (as in the case of the American and Scotch Bishops) not make men presbyters of the English Church. We are bound by ordination vows (as are all our clergy) to observe the laws and use the Liturgy of the Church of England.

“It is curious how some of these men, on points which fall in with their views, will insist on the most rigid adherence to Anglican customs; but in reality they are longing for *development*. A South African Church Catholic might (especially with the aid of three more Bishops who should be free from the fetters of the Queen’s supremacy, &c.) set an example to the whole Church of *restoration*. Who knows what ancient customs, vestments, and other Catholic practices (confession, *e.g.*, to which I hear there is a strong tendency in a neighbouring diocese) might not be revived, if only we could forget that we are an integral part of the Church of England? I have no doubt that the Tractarian party, feeling that in England the battle cannot be fought with success, have been for some time looking to the



colonies as the field where they might establish practices which would ultimately react on England. This has been my conviction for some years ; and it was this that made me feel so strongly the importance of a colonial bishopric at the present crisis, that I felt it would be a dereliction of duty to decline the office.

“Though I consider the influence of the Christian *λαὸς* should be co-extensive with the Church, I prefer, myself, voting by orders. But to say, as the Metropolitan does, that there is no representation of the Church because it is not as he thinks right, is merely to say that, if your Council assumes the powers which he does for his Capetown Synod, he will object. But the Church is represented in such manner as you think best suited for your guidance in the exercise of those functions which belong to you, and with which the Bishop of Capetown has no right to interfere, unless you overstep the bounds of English ecclesiastical law ; and this is all that concerns you. The obedience we owe to the Metropolitan is simply *canonical* obedience—‘all *due* obedience.’ It is so in the case of a clergyman and his Bishop, much more in that of a Bishop and his Metropolitan.”

It would not be possible to put into clearer words than these the indispensable need of maintaining the right of appeal from any ecclesiastical tribunal in Southern Africa to the Archbishop of Canterbury (not, as Bishop Gray afterwards professed to grant as a favour, in his private capacity, but) as presiding by his judge in the Court of Arches, from which an appeal lies directly to the Crown. The idea of a South African Church in which an appeal to the Sovereign in Council should be barred by any Bishop or priest is summarily and even indignantly cast aside. In the same spirit Bishop Cotterill writes, some months later :—

“With respect to the Bishop of Capetown's jurisdiction over your outlying parts, I feel certain (as far as I can feel

certain about a body so heterogeneous as the S.P.G.) that, if you protest, they must place the mission under you. They acknowledge—speaking in an under-whisper—the monstrous insolence (I cannot call it by a milder term) of the claims of the Bishop of Capetown. He has tried the same thing with myself and the Orange Free State, declaring it was on his *conscience* and I know not what besides. The S.P.G. have, however, put in my hands the appointment of a clergyman there, pending the question as to the appointment of a Bishop.

“His claim is most preposterous and absurd. On the ground of a patent derived from the Queen, he assumes a right over no one knows what amount of territory beyond the British dominions. We must, in a spirit of love and meekness, but with much firmness, resist his claims. He is Bishop of Capetown, and, as the Metropolitan, has certain precedence and due reverence and obedience according to law. But we must stand on the position that our episcopal rights and authority are as good as his. The new Bishop of St. Helena is not, I hope, any more disposed than we are to co-operate in such claims on his part. At all events, let us be firm, and we shall prevent evils of a most serious character.”

In spite of all this, at the time of the so-called trial of the Bishop of Natal, Dr. Cotterill had no hesitation in sitting as an assessor to the Bishop of Capetown along with the Bishop of the Orange Free State—in other words, with a Bishop who, if he had any see at all, had one which lay beyond the borders of British territory. On December 18, 1860, he had been of a very different mind, for on that day he thus writes :—

“That it is our duty to aid in the consecration of the new Bishop of the Zambesi Mission, I certainly think. . . . But the question as to his seat in a Provincial Synod is quite a different one. As at present advised, I am strongly of opinion that it is contrary to the most fundamental principles

of our Church system to recognise any right to form a province consisting of dioceses in different dominions."

We have seen that it was the deep longing to take part in missionary work, if he might be permitted to do so, which determined Dr. Colenso to accept the offer of the see of Natal. The same desire led him, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> to think seriously of devoting himself to the same work in regions where the ground was still altogether unbroken. To carry out this plan he had already taken the preliminary steps, when Bishop Cotterill, then in England, wrote the following letter, urging upon him the very consideration, for acting upon which, later on, the Bishop of Natal incurred his strong reprobation :—

"The Bishop of London informs me that you have sent to the Colonial Bishops' trustees a proposal that you should resign your present see, and become a missionary Bishop. He tells me that you have been informed in reply that nothing is settled respecting the missionary Bishops. He, with many others of the English Bishops, feels very strongly the importance of more consideration of the question before the English Church is committed to a course of action.

"But, independently of this, I sincerely trust that you will yourself consider well whether it is desirable for you to leave your present post. My own feeling is very strongly that the position you there occupy is one of great importance to the interests of the colonial Church ; and the fact that you have met with difficulties from your Tractarian clergy makes it all the more necessary that you should remain at your post. Besides this, you have, I trust, gained, after many struggles, the confidence of your laity ; and I have no doubt that, by God's blessing, all the difficulties you have to contend with will confirm their affection for you, and their reliance upon you.

"To leave them to such a Bishop as might be appointed your successor (especially by the present Colonial Minister)

<sup>1</sup> See p. 117.

would be a serious injury to your diocese ; and the results might be most serious. Suppose, for example, that your present Archdeacon should be appointed (and I suppose great exertions would be made by the Bishop of Oxford and others to obtain the appointment of him,—no doubt heaven and earth would be moved to have one like-minded with him appointed), consider what a discouragement it would be to the sound-minded laity. Do, my dear brother, consider this, and do not think of forsaking your post. As regards myself also I feel, so long as you are at Natal, we two can prevent any serious amount of mischief that might proceed from other sources. But if you go to native work, and are no longer at your present post, I may stand quite alone in all questions that affect the colonial part of our Church work, and with a strong body of clergy in my own diocese not sympathising with me I should have a harder battle than ever to fight. I can assure you that on more than one point your action (*e.g.* in your Conference and Council) has helped me.

“I earnestly trust that even since you sent in your proposal to the Colonial Bishops’ trustees you may have considered these things, and felt the importance of remaining.”

In another letter he expresses himself even more strongly on the pretensions of Bishop Gray to the possession of something like autocratic power.

“He declares that his conscience is burdened with those parts which formerly belonged to his diocese, and authority over which he received from the Church, not from the Crown. He forgets (1) that he resigned the see for subdivision ; (2) that if the Orange Free State, *e.g.*, had still been British dominion, it most assuredly would not have been in the diocese of Capetown ; (3) that from the Church he received consecration to the episcopal office of the see of Capetown, but that the territorial limits are fixed by the Crown.

“I acknowledge to you that his ambition (I can call it nothing else), and the very slight disguise with which he now thinks it necessary to conceal it, amazes me and makes me more

resolved than ever to withstand his assumptions. He has evidently a gigantic scheme for extending *his* province up to the equator, and creating a host of Bishops dependent on himself. He relies on you, I can see, to act with him. If you do so, he will be independent of me, as I imagine the Bishop of St. Helena has not strength of character enough to resist him."

In a later letter he again recurs to the same subject :—

"I think you will be quite right in insisting on independence of Capetown as soon as you are out of British dominions. The claims which some put forth of having a number of native Churches in other nations subordinate to a Metropolitan in British dominions, seems to me a most serious invasion of the liberties of particular and national Churches."

Lastly, he asserts that the metropolitanical claims of the Bishop of Capetown are altogether unsubstantial (1861).

"The metropolitanical power of the Bishop of Capetown, or of any Bishop on whom the title is conferred by the Queen's patent, may seem something on paper ; but in reality it is nothing. Such is the opinion of the best Church lawyers whom I consulted in England. . . . The supposition that he is under the Archbishop of Canterbury as Bishop, and not as Metropolitan, is ridiculous ; for what is the meaning of our having an appeal from Capetown to Canterbury, in case of his sitting in judgement upon us ? Would not his judgement on one of the Bishops of his so-called province be his act as Metropolitan ? . . . It is amusing enough. These High Churchmen are hot against Erastianism and the Queen's supremacy, when it is against them ; but when it makes a Metropolitan to their taste, it is a good card to play, for this metropolitanical power in the colonial Church rests on nothing but the Queen's patent. It is not like episcopal powers which come from the Church. Consistent High Churchmen in England do not like it. They had much rather that provincial synodical action should

regulate all these questions. As regards the oath, on which those lawyers, R. Palmer and Phillimore, with the Bishop of Capetown rely, you will see what O'Malley says; and *in foro conscientiæ*, in which alone, of course, such an oath is of any force, it is the very question at issue, what is *due* reverence and obedience.

“The Bishop of Capetown and his party are very fond of decrying the exercise of the Archbishop's authority, as a quasi-papal interference with the rights of Metropolitan. They forget that the real question is between arbitrary power, such as a colonial Metropolitan might think fit to exercise, and power limited and directed by English law, such as an English Archbishop's would be. We know that in going to Canterbury we go to England, and to the liberty of thought and of conscience which England represents and protects. We have no such assurance in going to Capetown. I do not speak of the individual Bishop, so much as of the fact that his court has no legal existence, and no law to guide it or control it.”

Yet, three years later, Bishop Cotterill took his seat in such an unsubstantial court; and then, in a tribunal which had no legal existence and no law to guide and control it, he took it on himself to pass sentence of condemnation on the Bishop of Natal, and to declare him, not merely deprived of spiritual authority, but deposed from the see of Natal. It is a melancholy history; but it shows us how differences in the point of view may modify or change the thoughts and conclusions of any man. If we think we stand, it will be well to take heed lest we fall.

It is thus plain that the working and the possible results of Bishop Gray's theory of the South African Church had not in 1858 much to commend them in the eyes of Bishop Cotterill. To him the claims of the Metropolitan seemed fraught with a danger, which would only increase as the limits of the Church of South Africa were gradually pushed forward to the

equator. To these fears he had given expression after the appearance of the Bishop of Natal's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*; and he had regretted what seemed to him an ill-judged concession, when Bishop Colenso allowed his work to be examined by Bishop Gray.

But subsequent events led him to change his tone and shift his ground altogether; and these events, it is unnecessary to say, arose solely out of the publication of the Bishop's criticisms on the Pentateuch. It is true that in his Charge delivered in the cathedral church of Grahamstown, in 1864, Bishop Cotterill speaks of his once honoured and loved brother as one who had "denied the Lord" (page 30); but these words manifestly resolve themselves into the statement made a few lines lower down, that the publication of his work on the Pentateuch was "the most daring attack on the authority of God's Word, and of our Divine Master, that has ever been made in ancient or modern times by one invested with the responsibilities of the episcopal office." If then Bishop Colenso had "denied the Lord" and "attacked His authority," it was only by questioning whether references to "Moses" or to "David" from the lips of our Lord implied and guaranteed the authenticity of the Pentateuch, or the Books of Kings, or the Psalms. Certainly he had done so in no other way; and the question thus raised was one which should have been referred on its merits in the usual course to the Sovereign in Council. But the Churchmanship of South Africa had, it seems, taken alarm; and from the judgement in the Williams-Wilson case the inference had been drawn that the Court of Final Appeal was prepared to strain every nerve so to interpret or to wrest the law as to insure impunity for doubters and heretics of every sort, to the confusion of all who remained true to the faith of what they spoke of as the Church. The issue was a plain one. The Bishop of Natal had beyond doubt declared his opinion that many of the narratives in the Pentateuch were

not records of historical facts ; that some, at least, of the laws bearing the name of Moses, and claiming to be imposed by Divine authority, were unjust ; that the Levitical system set forth in these books was of very much later growth, much of it belonging to the age of the Babylonian Captivity ; and therefore that the Pentateuch was an agglomerate of records, put together at various times by different annalists, and thus could not as a whole be regarded as a genuine contemporary history.

The only question calling for consideration was whether the avowal of these opinions contravened the declarations of the Church of England. These declarations could be found only in the sixth of the Thirty-nine Articles ; and of the *authority* of the Holy Scriptures it must be noted that this Article 'says nothing. It speaks only of their *sufficiency*, and this sufficiency is declared to rest on the fact that they contain all things necessary to salvation ; the only one inference drawn from this fact being that anything not found in those books, or capable of being proved (in what degree, or to whose satisfaction, it does not say) by them, is not to be imposed upon any one as an article of the faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation (this last term also being left undefined). But if salvation be, as undoubtedly it must be, taken to denote the process of healing from the wounds, and deliverance from the power, of sin, then this Article asserts nothing more and nothing less than that the Holy Scriptures (and by this term are meant the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments) contain all that is needful for the perfecting of this healing, strengthening, life-establishing process, and that no burden of propositions not found in them is to be imposed on the consciences of any, whether clergy or laymen. It may be most safely said that not only had the Bishop of Natal not impugned either of these declarations, but that he had not uttered a single word that implied even the remotest fancy of questioning either.



Nor would it have been possible for his opponents to take refuge in the plea that he had denied or doubted the canonicity of any of these books.

In truth this controversy on the subject of canonicity is now, and has been ever since the Canon was closed, a mere waste of breath and beating of the air. The term canonicity or canonical states nothing more than an historical fact. It states nothing more than that at a certain date the societies of Eastern and Western Christendom agreed to look upon certain books as "containing all things necessary to salvation," and on certain others as furnishing examples of life, and instruction of manners, but as not to be cited in support of propositions not found in the other books. The fact that certain other books had for a long or short time previously been regarded with grave doubts, and in many quarters rejected, ceased after the closing of the Canon to have any significance. It was strictly within the functions of Greek and Latin Christendom to set its seal on any set of writings as containing whatever might be most useful for the spiritual instruction, growth, and strength of Christian men; and most assuredly it never entered into the Bishop of Natal's thoughts to call this right into question. The one point was whether books containing, admittedly, all things necessary to salvation might not also contain much unhistorical matter, and much that might be of dubious character as ethical or spiritual philosophy, many expressions falling from the lips of men whose moral perceptions were more or less weak. The case might be drawn even more strongly; but it is, and was, absolutely certain that the Judicial Committee would refuse to listen to charges brought against any clergyman for doubting whether Jael was blessed in her murder of Sisera merely because in the excitement of victory Deborah is represented as declaring her so to be. It is not less certain that every one of the Bishop's criticisms falls under the same

category, and that for none of them could his opponents have obtained his condemnation. In fact from no part of his writings, probably, could a summary so trenchant and complete of the unnecessary and unimportant matter in the Pentateuch be drawn as that which has been already cited from the Charge of Bishop Thirlwall, of St. David's.<sup>1</sup>

This issue, the only one involved in his volumes on the Pentateuch, the Bishop would most gladly and thankfully have seen tried on its merits; and there is not the least doubt that he would have consented to its being submitted in the first instance to the Bishop of Capetown as Metropolitan, if Bishop Gray had told him at the outset that the trial should follow precisely the course which it would take if the suit had been instituted against any clergyman of the Church of England in England. But it was indispensable for the maintenance of the South African Church that the decision of the Metropolitan of Capetown should be final; and final he insisted that it must be, although he proposed to allow to the defendant, or even to encourage, a reference to the Archbishop of Canterbury personally, granting this strictly as of grace or favour under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and in no way as of right. In taking this course Bishop Gray was actuated by two motives; the one being the resolution not to accept, in cases which he deemed spiritual, the intervention of a non-ecclesiastical court; the other the fear, amounting morally to conviction, that the Sovereign in Council would give no judgement but one of acquittal. His position, therefore, could, it is obvious, be maintained only by insisting that the Church of South Africa must in South Africa hear and decide its own causes, whatever troubles might arise in consequence in reference to temporalities. The alarm felt for what was regarded as the merely negative and destructive criticism of the Bishop of Natal was, no

<sup>1</sup> See p. 310.