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# THE PARADOX OF MORALITY IN NIETZSCHE

*Yiorgo N. Maniatis*

*University of Athens*

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In this essay I would like to investigate the phenomenon of the paradox that one finds when is dealing with the thought of Nietzsche on morality.<sup>1</sup> Such a penetrating research into the realm of morality presupposes a tolerant body and mind, because the feeling after the wonder that one feels when is firstly confronted with the paradox of morality, is the greatest disgust<sup>2</sup> for whatever has been spread and dominated with the name of morality over humanity for the last two thousand years. Of course, the solution of the enigmatic phenomenon of the paradox of morality comes with the known Nietzschean perspective<sup>3</sup> of amorality, which comes as liberator from the moral illusion and its disgust, and as restorer of the unified healthy naturalness of things.<sup>4</sup>

Let us see the problem itself: how does morality present a paradoxical character par excellence in the thought of Nietzsche? What is the paradox, in other words, that Nietzsche finds in morality? The answer is: the paradoxical unified character of good-evil, their contradiction, the fact that good is also evil, while evil is also good. A being, a thing, a condition, a fact, a phenomenon, an action may be good for some people and some particular things and conjunctures, and simultaneously be also evil for some other people and some other conjunctures. This paradox seems at first contradictory and contravening the laws of logic and common sense – which one has learnt from force of habit to believe, to act, and to live dogmatically –, but with a more profound glance, more philosophical, beyond good and evil, it seems true.

In this essay I investigate the phenomenon of the moral paradox in the thought of Nietzsche in two levels: (i) in the first level, I investigate the paradox of morality itself as a paradoxical phenomenon par excellence in the history of humanity; (ii) in the second level, I investigate the apparent paradox that the two archetypal moralities present in-between them, the morality of the masters – ancient Hellenic and Roman world – and the morality of the slaves – Christianity and Christian Europe in the last two thousand years –, which dominated in all civilizations and all epochs of humanity.

***"My chief proposition: there are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these phenomena. This interpretation itself is of extra-moral."***

On this major proposition of Nietzsche it is based the discovery of the paradoxical phenomenon of morality, as well as the solution of its riddle by means of the new philosophizing of amorality. This declaration of Nietzsche, which we find slightly changed three times in his writings – (a) *Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 108, p. 275, (b) *Twilight of the Idols*, "The "Improvers" of Mankind," sec. 1, p. 501, and (c) in the above form, *The Will to Power*, sec. 258, p. 149 – functions: (i) as indicator of the moral paradox, and (ii) as amoral solver of its problem. This happens in the first case, because with this amoral insight in the phenomena of the world, the observation of the paradox is feasible, that is, it now becomes possible to see why the good of one is evil of another, and vice versa; because finally, they are moral interpretations – or rather misinterpretations, as Nietzsche mentions in *Twilight of the Idols* – and not factual moral phenomena which have dogmatically on them the seal only of good or only of evil. In the second case this happens, because with this amoral observation of Nietzsche, the riddle of the moral paradox is solved, that is, the riddle how this contradiction of the unification of good-evil is feasible; because in the amoral perspective things are both good and evil, or to be more precise, only beyond good and evil.

For Nietzsche, morality is an illusion. "There is an old illusion, which is called good and evil," he tells us in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, and he goes on, "and therefore there have been only illusions so far, not knowledge, about good and evil."<sup>6</sup> Nietzsche is the first philosopher who discerned the ancient illusion of morality and the ignorance in which all people were and are – including also the philosophers up to him – about good and evil. "Hitherto, the subject reflected on least adequately has been good and evil: it was too dangerous a subject."<sup>7</sup> With these words from *Daybreak* Nietzsche marks the outbreak of his campaign against morality,<sup>8</sup> and from *Daybreak* until his last writings, as is *The Will to Power*, he does not stop his wild polemic against morality, a polemic which in fact had started when he was thirteen years old, when he first thought of the origin of evil.<sup>9</sup>

According to Nietzsche, all philosophers and priests, all moralists, such as Plato, Manu, Confucius, the Jewish and Christian

teachers, used morality as a *pia fraus*, a "holy lie."<sup>10</sup> And in the name of this holy lie they believed – alas, they only believed – that they improved mankind. All the famous wise men believed that they served Truth; but in reality they had served only the populace and its superstitions – and for Nietzsche, they all remained populace, even with their virtues, without knowing truly what spirit means; "spirit is the life that itself cuts into life: with its own agony it increases its own knowledge."<sup>11</sup> But for this work, one needs to be lion in his spirit, to know how to destroy good and evil before he creates it. All the dogmatic philosophies, with Platonism, Christianity, and German Idealism in the West, and the Vedas, Hinduism, and all the rest eastern religions in the East, were for Nietzsche a calamitous illusion.<sup>12</sup>

The philosophers and the moralists up today, according to Nietzsche,<sup>13</sup> claimed that they founded morality, that they discovered the foundations of morality; but the only thing they had only done was to take morality in itself for granted; what they had called 'foundation of morality' was nothing but a wise form of their own good faith, which was not a result of any analytical critique, any examination, any research. And the reason for this was that all these "moral philosophers knew the facts of morality only very approximately in arbitrary extracts or in accidental epitomes – for example, as the morality of their environment, their class, their church, the spirit of their time, their climate and part of the world – just because they were poorly informed and not even very curious about different peoples, times, and past ages – they never laid eyes on the real problems of morality; for these emerge only when we compare many moralities."<sup>14</sup>

But let us see even closer the Nietzschean psychology of morality, which will facilitate us to understand better its paradox, as well. Morality is for Nietzsche the greatest power on earth: "And Zarathustra found no greater power on earth than good and evil. No people could live without first esteeming;...A tablet of the good hangs over every people...Verily, men gave themselves all their good and evil. Verily, they did not take it, they did not find it, nor did it come to them as a voice from heaven. Only man placed values in things to preserve himself –."<sup>15</sup> With these significant words from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche detects the natural, innate in man, necessity to create values and to evaluate them in order to be able to preserve himself. Morality is then rendered as a useful error, a necessary lie.<sup>16</sup> For what reason? Because with these moral valuations, according to Nietzsche, we command life – without them, "according to what would we measure then?...of what value would

be knowledge," truth, virtue, etc.?"<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, besides its necessity and usefulness, morality does not cease to be a lie, an error, "a contradiction into existence;"<sup>18</sup> it's true it is useful, but false.

Its lie and error lies in that in its name man calls and evaluates things as good and evil, taking them however for granted as having this moral value on them. He interprets the phenomena as moral in themselves, and he takes morality for granted; while in reality, "Through esteeming alone is there value: and without esteeming, the nut of existence would be hollow,"<sup>19</sup> as Zarathustra says. Things in themselves are empty of moral values. Things do not have values by nature, but man gives values to them, in order for him to be able to live this paradoxical, difficult life.

For Nietzsche, morality is a system of evaluations which coincides with the living conditions of the creature who creates them.<sup>20</sup> As he tells us in *The Will to Power*: "all evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the preservation of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture.— Because we forget that valuation is always from a perspective, a single individual contains within him a vast confusion of contradictory valuations and consequently of contradictory drives."<sup>21</sup> Every valuation then is made under a perspective with the scope of self-preservation. Thus, man goes against nature and logic, he invents morality, a tyranny against nature and logic,<sup>22</sup> and creates his moral valuations not in the name of truth, that is, how things are in reality – amoral and empty from evaluations and values on them – but for his usefulness, to enable the herd man to evade the fear and danger of life; because fear and danger is the mother of morality,<sup>23</sup> according to Nietzsche. Man is afraid and in danger, and thus he creates morality in order to save himself from the extra-moral empty character of life. He creates good and evil, but he makes the mistake to call it 'good for everyone' and 'evil for everyone' – and here lies the paradox of morality.

For their self-preservation people say: "Good for all, evil for all;" however, this is the spirit of gravity, the mole and the dwarf, Zarathustra, the creator of morality, who always says lies, who always lies against reality; for he who knows, according to Nietzsche, always says: "This is *my* good and evil."<sup>24</sup> He who knows the phenomenon of morality, knows that all the evaluations he makes are only his own, that they are not reality's, and of course, that they are not for everyone. He knows that they are necessary creations only of one perspective of things, his own, and not of all people or reality's. He interprets the phenomena as good and evil,

knowing though that these interpretations are only his own good and evil, and not of all people or reality's itself.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, people do not know. And for this reason, the paradox of morality is created: the good of one is presented as evil of the other, the evil of one as good of the other, the good of a people as evil of its neighbor, and so on. Thus, the paradox and the contradictory confusion and identification of good with evil has no end, as long as people remain captive of the moralities which they themselves invented, as long as they do not stand out of their moral creation, in the realm of amorality, to see that in reality no paradox exists, because good and evil as factual moral phenomena simply do not exist.

It is very natural then after such an ascertainment, my good to be your evil, and your evil to be my good, since they are merely human misinterpretations of the phenomena of life, which serve different perspectives of self-preservation for each one of us. Zarathustra says: "Much that was good to one people was scorn and infamy to another: thus I found it. Much I found called evil here, and decked out with purple honors there. Never did one neighbor understand the other: ever was his soul amazed at the neighbor's delusion and wickedness."<sup>26</sup> A particular action is misinterpreted to be finally both good and evil when judged by many different people. So, for example, Nietzsche says in *The Will to Power*: "One and the same "crime" can be in one case the greatest privilege, in another a stigma. In fact, it is the selfishness of the judges which interprets an action, or its performer, in relation to its utility or harmfulness to themselves (– or in relation to its similarity or unlikeness to them)." And he continues: "an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value: it all depends on *who* performs it;" this Nietzsche calls "restoration of "nature"."<sup>27</sup> The opposite, that is, "to believe there are actions that are good or bad in themselves," he calls "*denaturalization of morality*."<sup>28</sup> It is in this second case that the paradox appears, while on the contrary, in the first case, in the 'restoration of nature,' the paradox dis-solves, and lets things to be as they exactly are: amoral.

Conclusively, the paradox of good-evil is solved only when we see the 'why' of the paradox; only when we see that good and evil in itself, factual by nature, does not exist – and that it is natural that the human evaluations for good and evil sometimes to identify themselves, because of their different perspective and their different scope; therefore: the paradox. The paradox however does not exist in the new amoral perspective of the world, as world beyond good and evil. Because the paradox is founded over morality and exists only within it: it exists only when we consider things as factually good and evil, and thus we wonder how the identity of good with evil

is possible. Though, when we come out of the illusive realm of morality, which denaturalizes life, into the realm of amorality, which restores its naturalness, the paradox does not exist anymore, amorality dis-solves it, and thus it ceases existing; at least, for life itself. For us, the creators of good and evil, the paradox continues existing, and will continue existing as long as morality exists, since "life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values,"<sup>29</sup> and it forces us to posit them for our self-preservation.

Nietzsche is a great enemy of morality, and a great psychologist of its deceit. His psychological observations and the unmasking that they cause are intended for all those moralities which according to his opinion deceived humanity up today. Among them he distinguishes three moralities to which he attacks more. (a) The ancient Hellenic dogmatic morality of Socrates-Plato, that considers the good, virtue, god, as moral things in themselves, that is, it accepts the world with absolute goods and evils – this Platonic morality Nietzsche considers as the beginning of the dogmatic philosophizing and of the moral philosophical illusion<sup>30</sup> which reaches up to his age, and as the beginning of the decadent anti-natural morality – that is, morality up today – that turns with its dialectic against the instincts of life, with the scope of the negation and destruction of life.<sup>31</sup> (b) The religious morality of the Jewish and Christianity; this morality, generalized as slave morality, and the great paradox that it presents at its juxtaposition with the master morality of the Hellenic and Roman world, I investigate in the second part of my essay. (c) The morality of modern times and the morality of German idealism, which Nietzsche sees as the continuation of the Platonic and Christian morality – he attacks against the 'categorical imperative,' the duty, the virtue, the good in itself, and the great admiration of Kant's ethics, whom he considers as the theologian and decadent par excellence of German philosophy, as masked priest and corruptor of philosophy and nature in general with his theological blood;<sup>32</sup> also, he attacks against the altruistic morality of pity of Schopenhauer, because he considers it as the beginning of the end, and as the new disease that sickens even the philosophers;<sup>33</sup> and generally, he attacks idealism, which in the end he condemns, because it goes against the physiology of life and aims at its miserable destruction.<sup>34</sup>

"The two *opposing* values "good and bad," "good and evil" have been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of years...The symbol of this struggle, inscribed in letters legible across all human history, is "Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome".<sup>35</sup>

The paradox in morality, according to Nietzsche, is apparently perceived only if we wander "through the many subtler and coarser moralities which have so far been prevalent on earth, or still are prevalent," and see that they are not founded on reality, but that they are nothing but mere human moral misinterpretations of reality, particularly, of two archetypal moralities: "*master morality* and *slave morality*."<sup>36</sup> Master morality belongs to the ancient Hellenic and Roman world, as well as to all the aristocratic and noble minorities in history, while slave morality belongs to Christianity and to Christian humanity in the last two thousand years. These two archetypal moralities are detected by Nietzsche to coexist in every human civilization and age, and to give the greatest battle for which one will conquer. These two moralities and their in-between perpetual battle are rendered in the thought of Nietzsche as the greatest and most obvious example of paradox in morality; to this apparent example of moral paradox I am referring in the second part of my essay.

For the dual prehistory of good and evil, and the chaotic, abysmal contradiction – which leads to the paradox in question – Nietzsche talks obviously in *Beyond Good and Evil*, sec. 260, as well as in the First Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morals*, while for first time he touches on the theme in sec. 45 of *Human, All Too Human*, vol. I.

For the morality of the masters, of the powerful and dominant racial teams, Nietzsche tells us that the powerful distinguished people, who distinguish from the mass with their nobility, their position, and their high-mindedness, consider and call themselves "good" and their actions "good," and they establish them as such with pathos, in order to be in complete distance and opposition to "all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian" that belongs to the mass; this pathos of nobility and distance that the noble race of the masters feels for the lower race of the 'below', is for Nietzsche the origin of "good" and "bad."<sup>37</sup> The notional creation, then, of the terms "good" and "bad" is made, according to Nietzsche, by the caste of the powerful, with the scope of their complete distinction and distance from the weak man of the herd. The noble human being

defines the notion of "good" and makes it equivalent to all that is noble, high, superb, beautiful, nice, strong, powerful, aristocratic, healthy, natural, and opposes it to the notion of "bad" with which he defines all that is contemptible, cowardly, feared, petty, weak, degenerated, begging, flattering, humble, vulgar, lying; "the opposition of "good" and "bad" means approximately the same as "noble" and "contemptible".<sup>38</sup> The noble human being honors and glorifies in the evaluations of his values his own superior self: he honors the power that seeks to overflow, the feeling of fullness, the great happiness, the wealth that wants to bestow and give, the self-confidence, the self-pride, the hostility and irony against selflessness, the deep respect for age and classical tradition, the just, the ability for reciprocation of gratitude and revenge among one's peers, the friendship, and finally the necessity to have enemies as a means to give vent to passions such as envy, quarrelsomeness, exuberance, and true friendship.<sup>39</sup> Finally, Nietzsche tells us: "The knightly-aristocratic value judgements presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity."<sup>40</sup> All these human attitudes of life, virtues and actions, belong to the "good" of the morality of the masters; all their opposites, as I described above, that is, all that is weak, degenerated and contemptible, that must be kept in distance, belongs to the "bad" of the morality of the masters.

On the contrary, on the other hand, we have the morality of the slaves, with its own "good" and "evil." Nietzsche says that the slaves, by being violated, weak, oppressed, suffering, unfree, insecure and weary beings, are led as it is natural to moralization by a common feeling of resentment and envy towards the powerful, noble aristocrats, and make their revolution in morality saying a big No to all that does not resemble them, to all that does not belong and does not serve only them.<sup>41</sup> Their weakness gives birth within them to a monstrous, destructive and poisonous hatred, and this resentment of theirs is the sole creator – alas, only in this level they are creative<sup>42</sup> – of their resentful morality, which they marshal with the greatest subterranean revengeful mania against the morality of nobility.<sup>43</sup> Thus, in slave morality "good" is whatever eases the miserable life of the weak ones who suffer; with this measure of evaluation they honor values such as altruism, "pity, the complaisant and obliging hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, and friendliness," because these virtues are used for enduring and easing the miserable existence of the weak ones.<sup>44</sup> On the contrary,



"evil" in slave morality is whatever does not belong to them, that is, all the higher and powerful virtues and life positions of the nobles; these they always see with resentful, murderous eye, they envy and are afraid of them, they are scared by their power, and for this they consider them dangerous, "evil," and aim in every possible way at their destruction.<sup>45</sup>

According to Nietzsche, that slave people par excellence that systematized its morality and imposed it victoriously on humanity, passing it thus into the greatest decadence of corruption for the last two thousand years, were the Jews and the Christians. This priestly slave people started the revolution of the slaves in morality,<sup>46</sup> daring to reverse completely all the existing noble values of the ancient glorious Hellenic and Roman world, revenging thus in the most cowardly, subterranean, and dishonest way its superior and ruling enemies.<sup>47</sup> So, Nietzsche tells us in *On the Genealogy of Morals*: "It was the Jews who, with awe-inspiring consistency, dared to invert the aristocratic value-equation (good = noble = powerful = beautiful = happy = beloved of God) and to hang on to this inversion with their teeth, the teeth of the most abysmal hatred (the hatred of impotence), saying "the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, blessedness is for them alone – and you, the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel, the lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity; and you shall be in all eternity the unblessed, accursed, and damned!"<sup>48</sup>

This so much apparent paradoxical inversion of the ancient Hellenic and Roman noble values, which Christianity brought to humanity in the last two thousand years, Nietzsche considers as "more harmful than any vice,"<sup>49</sup> as "the crime *par excellence*...against life," and as "the real Circe of humanity."<sup>50</sup> And after calling Christianity "the one great curse, the one great innermost corruption, the one great instinct of revenge,...the one immortal blemish of mankind," and "the highest of all conceivable corruption," he condemns it as the worst and most destructive thing that existed up today.<sup>51</sup> And he condemns it so strictly and negatively, because with the invention of its values, such as "God," "soul," "eternal life," "the kingdom of God," "beyond," "redemption," "grace," "sin," "forgiveness of sins," "Holy Spirit," "the other world," "paradise and hell," "Devil," "temptation by the Devil," "the Last Judgement," "repentance," "pangs of conscience," "selflessness," "self-denial," "duty," "saintliness," "godliness," and "salvation of the soul,"<sup>52</sup> it denaturalized so dangerously reality and its naturalness,

that it destroyed with the worst resentful conspiracy "health, beauty, whatever has turned out well, courage, spirit, *graciousness* of the soul, *life itself*,"<sup>53</sup> power, self-affirmation, and the ascending tendency of life.<sup>54</sup> All the magnificent and grandiose work that the ancient Hellenes and Romans had constructed, and which was ready to be formed into the greatest, most beautiful and luminous civilization of the earth, a work which had been constructed for millennia over the great Yes and affirmation to life, health, beauty and power, it was *all in vain*, according to Nietzsche, and got destroyed by the revengeful resentment of the slaves and their morality, that appeared with Christianity and established the great No and negation to life, health, beauty and power.<sup>55</sup> And while humanity was indeed ahead in its evolution till the antiquity, with Christianity and slave morality it obviously retrogressed indescribably and painfully, even though it has not understood it yet. Hence, the cause of the Nietzschean hatred against Christianity and slave morality is apparent and justifiable, since the latter vanquished master morality in such a subterranean way, and continues still vanquishing it up to our days.

As we obviously saw from the identity of "good-evil" in the two different cases of master and slave morality, the paradox between them appears in all of its brightness: whatever is "good" for the masters is "evil" for the slaves, and whatever is "bad" for the masters is "good" for the slaves. This example of moral paradox is the most apparent in the history of humanity. The notions of "good" and "bad" of master morality are completely transformed and devalued by the notions of "good" and "evil" of slave morality, resulting in the appearance of the paradox between them as total inversion of values. Thus, for example, according to Nietzsche, while the nobles felt themselves being happy, and did not distinguish this from good action – hence, "εὖ πράττειν" – and from the complete, full of power and activity, cultivated character, the slaves, on the contrary, with their impotent, oppressed and poisonous feelings conceived happiness with their 'imagination' "as essentially narcotic, drug, rest, peace, "sabbath," slackening of tension and relaxing of limbs, in short *passively*."<sup>56</sup> Also, while the noble man lives as "γενναῖος" "of noble descent," full of trust and honesty about himself, "the man of *ressentiment*" who "is neither upright nor naïve nor honest and straightforward with himself," lives as subterranean, seeing low, with a squint-eyed soul, knowing "how to keep silent, how not to forget, how to wait, how to be provisionally self-deprecating and humble."<sup>57</sup> And finally, according to Nietzsche, all those words that in slave morality were heard as the "good" and blessed by God, were exactly

the words that the Hellenic nobility used in order to distinguish itself from the lower orders; the words "δεδειγμένος, δειλός, πονηρός, μοχθηρός...διζυρός, άνολβος, τλήμων, δυστυχής, εμφορά..." "low," "unhappy" have never ceased to sound to the Greek ear as one note with a tone-color in which "unhappy" preponderates.<sup>58</sup> The paradox then in all these examples between the two archetypal moralities of the nobles and the impotent, is apparent as complete inversion of values.

Nietzsche attacks against the old, dogmatic, and idealistic morality – which existed intensely after Socrates and Plato, in Christianity, in medieval times, in modern times, and in German idealism –, precipitates all its values, and attempts with a complete reevaluation of all values to establish over their paradox, as the first immoralist,<sup>59</sup> a new philosophizing, a new philosophical morality, the amorality of 'beyond good and evil.' In this new amorality of his, "good" is: "everything that heightens the feeling of power in man, the will to power, power itself;" "bad" is: "everything that is born of weakness;" and "happiness" is: "the feeling that power is *growing*, that resistance is overcome."<sup>60</sup> Nietzsche distinguishes two kinds of morality: (i) the *natural*, healthy morality, which is characterized by a 'yes' to the natural instincts of life – which for Nietzsche is the will to power – and a 'no' to every inhibition and hostile element for life; (ii) the *anti-natural* morality – the morality that dominated in humanity up today – which turns against the instincts of life and aims at their decadence and condemnation.<sup>61</sup> The new amorality of Nietzsche belongs to the first morality, the *natural*, healthy morality, which says 'yes' to the will to power and to life, and 'no' to the weakness and to the instinctive enmity towards life. His new amorality affirms life, while the old morality negates life.<sup>62</sup> Nietzsche puts his Zarathustra to live in action this new amorality of his, choosing deliberately the name of this Persian, because as he says, Zarathustra was the first one who created the "most calamitous error" of morality, considering the battle of good and evil in the metaphysical level, and "consequently, he must also be the first to recognize" his error.<sup>63</sup> Nevertheless, whether Nietzsche overcame indeed the moral error with his amorality, which his Superman lives – where his greatest evil is necessary to his greatest good, because as a pure creator, his greatest evil belongs to his greatest good<sup>64</sup> – is a new issue and question that is open to research and doubt.

In any case, the problem of the paradox that morality presents in the thought of Nietzsche, in all of its forms, but even more obviously in the two archetypal moralities of the masters and the slaves, is a problem that exists only in the realm of morality.

Because only in the moral perspective of things as dogmatic goods and evils in themselves, absolutely dissociated between them, the paradox exists and preoccupies us. On the contrary, in the amoral perspective things are not presented as moral in themselves, are free from a moral identity, and their moral interpretations are understood as human creations aiming at the human self-preservation, including within them the possibility of the unification-identification of good with evil. Here, the paradox is dis-solved and ceases to exist; at least, for life itself. For the humans, who create morality, it does not essentially ever cease to exist, bringing always enigmatic wonders in their minds. Simply, for those who really *know* the phenomenon of the moral paradox, it has the identity of the conscious moral error. And Nietzsche says:

"Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is itself a form of immorality. The great liberation this insight brings. Contradiction is removed from things, the homogeneity of all events is saved –<sup>65</sup>

## Notes

1. *The Will to Power (WP)*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Press, 1968), sec. 269, p. 153: "To get the whole of moralizing into focus as a phenomenon. Also as a riddle. The phenomena of morality have occupied me like riddles."
2. *On the Genealogy of Morals (GM)*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Modern Library Giant, 1968), First Essay, sec. 14, pp. 482-484; *The Antichrist (A)*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), sec. 6, p. 572.
3. *WP*, sec. 481, p. 267: "No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations. . . In so far as the word "knowledge" has any meaning, the world is knowable; but it is *interpretable* otherwise, it has no meaning behind it, but countless meanings. – "Perspectivism."; *ibid.*, sec. 258, p. 149: "*there are no moral phenomena, there is only a moral interpretation of these phenomena*"; *ibid.*, sec. 259, p. 149: "Insight: all evaluation is made from a definite perspective."
4. *WP*, sec. 292, p. 165: "Restoration of "nature": an action in itself is perfectly devoid of value"; *ibid.*, sec. 308, p. 172: "Morality is just as "immoral" as any other thing on earth; morality is itself a form of immorality. The great liberation this insight brings. Contradiction is removed from things, the homogeneity of all events is saved–"
5. *WP*, sec. 258, p. 149; *Beyond Good and Evil (BGE)*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Modern Library Giant, 1968), Part Four: "Epigrams and Interludes," sec. 108, p. 275: "There are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena–"; *Twilight of the Idols (TI)*, in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), "The "Improvers" of Mankind," sec. 1, p. 501: "My demand upon the philosopher is known, that he

- take his stand *beyond* good and evil and leave the illusion of moral judgement *beneath* himself. This demand follows from an insight which I was the first to formulate: that *there are altogether no moral facts*. Moral judgements agree with religious ones in believing in realities which are no realities. Morality is merely an interpretation of certain phenomena – more precisely, a misinterpretation.”
6. *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (Z), in *The Portable Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1954), III, “On Old and New Tablets,” sec. 9, pp. 313-314.
  7. *Daybreak* (D), trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), Preface, sec. 3, p. 2.
  8. *Ecce Homo* (EH), in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, trans. and ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, Modern Library Giant, 1968), “Dawn,” p. 746: “With this book my campaign against morality begins.”
  9. *GM*, Preface, p. 452: “... my curiosity as well as my suspicions were bound to halt quite soon at the question of where our good and evil really originated. In fact, the problem of the origin of evil pursued me even as a boy of thirteen.”
  10. *TI*, “The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind,” sec. 5, p. 505.
  11. Z, II, “On the Famous Wise Men,” p. 216.
  12. *BGE*, Preface, p. 193.
  13. *BGE*, Part Five: “Natural History of Morals,” sec. 186, pp. 287-289.
  14. *Ibid*.
  15. Z, I, “On the Thousand and One Goals,” pp. 170-171.
  16. *WP*, sec. 402, p. 218: “Morality a useful error;... a lie that is considered necessary.”
  17. *WP*, sec. 258, p. 149.
  18. *Ibid*.
  19. Z, I, “On the Thousand and One Goals,” p. 171.
  20. *WP*, sec. 256, p. 148: “I understand by ‘morality’ a system of evaluations that partially coincides with the conditions of a creature’s life.”
  21. *WP*, sec. 259, p. 149.
  22. *BGE*, Part Five: “Natural History of Morals,” sec. 188, p. 290: “Every morality is, as opposed to *laissez aller* (letting go), a bit of tyranny against ‘nature’; also against ‘reason’.”
  23. *BGE*, Part Five: “Natural History of Morals,” sec. 201, pp. 302-304: “fear is again the mother of morals.”
  24. Z, III, “On the Spirit of Gravity,” p. 306.
  25. *WP*, sec. 258, p. 149; *BGE*, Part Four: “Epigrams and Interludes,” sec. 108, p. 275; *TI*, “The ‘Improvers’ of Mankind,” sec. 1, p. 501.
  26. Z, I, “On the Thousand and One Goals,” p. 170.
  27. *WP*, sec. 292, p. 165.
  28. *Ibid*.
  29. *TI*, “Morality as Anti-Nature,” sec. 5, p. 490.
  30. *BGE*, Preface, p. 193: “... it must certainly be conceded that the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatist’s error – namely, Plato’s invention of the pure spirit and the good as such.”
  31. *TI*, “The Problem of Socrates,” pp. 473-479: “I recognized Socrates and Plato to be symptoms of degeneration, tools of the Greek dissolution, pseudo-Greek, anti-Greek... The most blinding daylight; rationality at any price; life, bright, cold, cautious, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts – all this too was a mere disease, another disease, and by no means a return to ‘virtue,’ to ‘health,’ to happiness. To have to fight the instincts – that is the

- formula of decadence: as long as life is *ascending*, happiness equals instinct"; *ibid.*, "Morality as Anti-Nature," sec. 4-5, pp. 489-491.
32. A, sec. 10-12, pp. 576-579: "Kant's success is merely a theologians' success... "Virtue," "duty," the "good in itself," the good which is impersonal and universally valid – chimeras and expressions of decline, of the final exhaustion of life, of the Chinese phase of Königsberg. The fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth demand the opposite – that everyone invent *his own* virtue, *his own* categorical imperative... How could one fail to feel how Kant's categorical imperative endangered life itself!... The instinct which errs without fail, *anti-nature* as instinct, German decadence as philosophy – *that is Kant!*"
33. GM, Preface, sec. 5, p. 455: "What was especially at stake was the value of the "unegoistic," the instincts of pity, self-abnegation, self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer had gilded, deified, and projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became for him "value-in-itself," on the basis of which he *said No* to life and to himself... I understood that ever spreading morality of pity that had seized even on philosophers and **made them** ill, as the most sinister symptom of a European culture that had itself **become** sinister, perhaps as its by-pass to a new Buddhism? to a Buddhism for Europeans? to – *nihilism?*"
34. EH, "Why I Am So Clever," p. 697: "– that damned "idealism" – that was the real calamity in my life... The consequences of this "idealism" provide my explanation of all blunders, all great instinctual aberrations and "modesties" that led me away from the *task* of my life."
35. GM, First Essay, sec. 16, p. 488.
36. BGE, sec. 260, p. 394.
37. GM, First Essay, sec. 2, pp. 461-462.
38. BGE, sec. 260, pp. 394-395.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 394-396; *Human, All Too Human (HH)*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. I, "On the History of the Moral Sensations," sec. 45, pp. 36-37.
40. GM, First Essay, sec. 7, pp. 469-470.
41. BGE, sec. 260, pp. 397-398; *HH*, vol. I, sec. 45, pp. 36-37; GM, First Essay, sec. 10, pp. 472-475.
42. GM, First Essay, sec. 10, pp. 472-475: "While every noble morality develops from a triumphant affirmation of itself, slave morality from the outset says No to what is "outside," what is "different," what is "not itself"; and *this* No is its creative deed."
43. GM, First Essay, sec. 7, pp. 469-470: "All that has been done on earth against "the noble," "the powerful," "the masters," "the rulers," fades into nothing compared with what the *Jews* have done against **them**."
44. BGE, sec. 260, pp. 397-398.
45. *Ibid.*
46. BGE, sec. 195, pp. 298; GM, First Essay, sec. 7, pp. 469-470.
47. GM, First Essay, sec. 7, pp. 469-470.
48. *Ibid.*
49. A, sec. 2, p. 570: "What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all the failures and all the weak: Christianity."
50. EH, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 7, p. 788: "Blindness to Christianity is the crime *par excellence* – the crime against life... Christian morality – the most malignant form of the will to lie, the real Circe of humanity – that which *corrupted* humanity."
51. A, sec. 62, pp. 655-656.

52. *Ibid.*, sec. 15, pp. 581-582; *EH*, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 8, pp. 789-791.
53. *A*, sec. 62, pp. 655-656.
54. *Ibid.*, sec. 24, pp. 592-594.
55. *Ibid.*, sec. 58-59, pp. 647-651. "Christianity was the vampire of the *imperium Romanum*: overnight it undid the tremendous deed of the Romans – who had won the ground for a great culture *that would have time*. Is it not understood yet?... The whole labor of the ancient world *in vain*: I have no word to express my feelings about something so tremendous. And considering that its labor was a preliminary labor, that only the foundation for the labors of thousands of years had just then been laid with granite self-confidence – the whole *meaning* of the ancient world in vain! Wherefore Greeks? Wherefore Romans?"
56. *GM*, First Essay, sec. 10, pp. 472-475.
57. *Ibid.*
58. *Ibid.*
59. *EH*, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 2, p. 783: "I am the first immoralist: that makes me the annihilator *par excellence*"; *ibid.*, sec. 6, p. 787.
60. *A*, sec. 2, p. 570.
61. *Ti*, "Morality as Anti-Nature," sec. 4, pp. 489-490.
62. *Ibid.*, sec. 6, pp. 491-492: "We others, we immoralists, have, conversely, made room in our hearts for every kind of understanding, comprehending, and approving. We do not easily negate; we make it a point of honor to be affirmers."
63. *EH*, "Why I Am a Destiny," sec. 3, pp. 783-784.
64. *Z*, IV, "On the Higher Man," sec. 5, p. 400: "Man must become better and more evil" – thus / teach. The greatest evil is necessary for the overman's best"; *ibid.*, II, "On Self-Overcoming," p. 228: "And whoever must be a creator in good and evil, verily, he must first be an annihilator and break values. Thus the highest evil belongs to the highest goodness: but this is creative."
65. *WP*, sec. 308, p. 172.