CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE AND THE "THEORY-PRAXIS" PROBLEM: A PLATONIC APPROACH

D N Lambrellis

Panteion University of Athens

It would appear that the familiar "theory-praxis" problem may be set out in a dramatic way as follows: Should a theory be radically re-evaluated or even renounced when it does not lead to its implementation in practice, and not only this, but the practice to which it does lead is exactly the opposite of the theory concerned?

This statement is a forcible exposition of the "theory-praxis" problem as it presents theory, the evaluation of theory, from the perspective-criterion of praxis and ultimately postulates praxis as the highest value/final goal.

We propose to examine this problem and the question concerning the value of theory from the standpoint of praxis, within the framework of a philosophy that is acknowledged to be socially and politically important, that of Plato, and particularly in the context of the last phase of his philosophy. Our starting point will be the same as that of the philosopher's social and political thought in *Laws:* the moral problem, the discourse on virtue.

In *Laws,* the Athenian Stranger asks his interlocutor to what extent a number of statutes and laws in Lacedaimon were not aimed at promoting bravery; the reply he receives is that the purpose is indeed to attain bravery,[1] meaning from the point of view of the image of war, the predominant image in people's minds and imaginations at that time;[2] consequently bravery is meant in the sense of endurance, conflict and final triumph[3] "over fear and pain"[4] and suffering.[5] However, immediately afterwards, the Athenian Stranger makes a distinction and a reminder of another one. The distinction is this: bravery is also the conflict "with desire ... and pleasure"[6] and the reminder is that "defeat" applies not only to cities but also to people.[7] This distinction and reminder ultimately lead him to be able to ask whether the person who is defeated by pain is more, deserving of being considered bad or shameful than the one who is defeated by pleasure.[8] Yet, this means that if man's intimate and most difficult enemies are pain and pleasure,[9] then pleasure is the most difficult of the most difficult adversaries.[10] Be that as it may,

if the most difficult of man's difficult enemies is pleasure, triumph over it will indeed be the "primal" and "subtlest" triumph and the sense of bravery meant in relation to this will be the supreme virtue.[11] The immediate conclusion to be drawn is extremely important: traditional bravery, that which refers to "external" war, is not the most important virtue. According to what we have just said, the virtue or virtues that are capable of triumphing over pleasure are the most important ones.

However, it emerges from the discussion that the city-states which were founded on the image of war recognised only one virtue and allowed only one interpretation of this virtue; the virtue was bravery. Their interpretation was that bravery was a basic prerequisite for triumph over enemies, a triumph that was synonymous with the triumph over pain and fear in the intro-subjective field; their legislation was therefore drawn up in relation to this virtue and its specific content. The result of this, however, was not only that they failed to enact procedures which would have allowed them - in the beginning - the taste[12] of pleasure[13] and subsequently, through a specific approach,[14] triumph over it (in other words, something analogous[15] to the copious procedures involved in the taste of and triumph over pain and fear). They made laws aimed at the avoidance[16] of pleasure, although we might well have expected them to have the same attitude towards dealing with pleasure as they had concerning fear and pain;[17] namely, that the taste of them, based on certain procedures, could lead to triumph over them.[18]

So how are we to interpret the fact that the enactment concerning the taste of pleasure and procedures that could lead to triumph over it, is not analogous with the enactment concerning fear and pain, that is, the avoidance of and abstention from it? The presence of the epitactic[19] discourse is all-important to the reply to our question because the epitactic discourse can accept[20] that the difference *(qua* citizens) that commands can deal only with what is included in the order of itself. The city-states in the epitactic discourse are the city-states of fear and pain, that is, they command citizens to taste fear and pain to enable them to deal successfully with war and be triumphant in a war. The methodical 'taste' of reason and of pain does indeed lead to the attainment of this goal; pleasure, however, is *besides* (para)[21] the order of this discourse and therefore abstention from and avoidance of it is commanded and penalties are imposed on those who taste pleasure, those who disobey order and the epitactic discourse, the discourse of fear and

pain.[22] This, then, is how we interpret what is at first glance a paradox concerning the different approaches to the legislative discourse made by the city-states in question with regard to the forces in the intro-subjective field.

So much for virtue *qua* bravery. However, the Athenian Stranger had already announced, before the discussion on bravery, that the purpose was for this discourse (on bravery) to be a paradigm of all other parts of virtue;[23] after the discourse on bravery is over, he poses the question of whether the purpose is really achieved, and in order to reply he moves on to the discussion of prudence.[24] The discussion opens with formulation of the question as to how far the city-states of Lacedaimon and Crete, the city-states of military bravery, in other words the city-states of the epitactic way of doing and thinking, had supremacy over other city-states with regard to another part of virtue, prudence.[25] In the opinion of the interlocutor, it is a difficult question to answer, but he says that certain legislative enactments aimed at attaining bravery, such as common meals and physical exercise, were also aimed at attaining prudence.[26] The Athenian Stranger's reply to the same question consists of two observations drawn from experience, from praxis *qua* experience; what are these observations?

The first emphasises how difficult it is to ensure that the working of an institution shall be as unquestionable as its theory.[27] In other words, that praxis *qua* experience shows that the way a city-state functions in praxis, that the praxis *qua* the function of a city-state, is usually far removed from its theoretical foundation. In the particular case of the epitactic city-states, the legislative abstinence from and avoidance of pleasure leads in practice, not to avoidance of and abstinence from pleasure, but to surrender to the lust of pleasure.[28] The second observation confirms that legislative abstention from and avoidance of pleasure by these city-states does not lead, in praxis, to the total non-taste of pleasure; pleasure, in praxis, establishes itself as being stronger than the discourse of the epitactic way of doing and thinking and the laws contriving the abstinence from and avoidance of it. In fact, not only do citizens taste pleasure, but they surrender themselves to the lust of it and their doing so is an outrage on nature.[29]

There is also a statement which accompanies the foregoing observations, especially the second one: it appears once again that, in praxis, the pre-occupation with pleasure is in itself inevitable, and on the other, that, under certain conditions, it is a fundamental

prerequisite for happiness in the intro-subjective and inter-subjective field.[30]

Immediately thereafter follows the discourse on wine,[31] on wine-drinking, a discourse which will provide the Athenian Stranger with the opportunity to complete his discussion on prudence, since the discourse on wine-drinking (as we are explicitly told) leads us to it.[32] Despite what has been said, the Athenian Stranger's interlocutor insists that the command concerning the avoidance of pleasure[33] in Lacedaimon is correct[34] and he refers to the prohibition on wine drinking as a socially accepted activity for which legal provision has been made.[35] The Athenian Stranger replies that wine may be a positive thing if it leads to the taste of and ultimately reconciliation[36] with pleasure, rather than to the achievement of surrender to the lust of it. His interlocutor rejoins that the drinking of wine is a negative thing because it leads to defeat in war.[38] So to what do we attribute this different evaluation of wine drinking by the interlocutors and what, ultimately, is wine? Both the interlocutors are right as far as their reference to praxis *qua* experience is concerned. Defeat in war and other effects of wine-drinking such as mania[39] and madness[40] are palpable, verifiable phenomena and are a manifestation of the surrender to the lust of pleasure, they are a punishment.[41] They are the element that is 'besides' (para) the societies of the epitactic way of doing and thinking, the societies of fear and pain, such as Lacedaimon - and Crete. Thus wine, and in general, the taste of pleasure, *per se,* is not a negative thing for the individual and for society. Wine and in general the taste of pleasure is a negative thing for the individual in a society characterised by an epitactic way of doing and thinking. This being so, then wine and - therefore - the taste of pleasure, in a city-state which does not want to command the avoidance of pleasure in theory and procure in practice the surrender to the lust of it, could be the very means of overcoming the gap between theory and praxis. The double negative for the individual and the society of the epitactic way of doing and thinking - double negative because on the one hand it commands that the individual should not taste pleasure, and on the other, when he tastes it he does so by surrendering to the lust of it, thereby often creating problems for himself and/or society.

At the same time, we repeat that praxis *qua* experience confirms that man needs pleasure, that he tastes it despite what is commanded by discourse/theory and that when he is commanded to abstain from it he tastes it by surrendering to the lust of it. Recognition of this by the philosophical discourse means a re-

evaluation that has dramatic repercussions on both the content of the theory and on the very discourse which pronounces it. To begin with, the conditions of the praxis are taken into account and then, based only on these conditions, the theory is reversed. It is acknowledged that man needs pleasure and therefore avoidance of it is not commanded. This happens because the epitactic way of doing and thinking, the epitactic discourse, again based on the conditions of praxis *qua* experience, has been replaced by "mild reason" which - in contrast to the epitactic one - allows man to taste pleasure, to be reconciled with pleasure. As a result, however, it is possible for him to taste pleasure in a different way, one that does not involve surrender to the lust of it, to taste pleasure that is in turn reconciled with this reason. Finally, praxis - also *qua* experience - shows that pleasure and its hallmark, wine, is neither a good nor a bad thing, *per se;* as Plato so aptly says of wine, and the same applies to pleasure, wine is a "pharmakon",[42] that is, an ambiguity. It chastises the epitactic way of doing and thinking but is also a healing from it.

We can draw the following conclusions with regard to the parts of virtue that we have examined. To begin with, the discourse about bravery is really a paradigmatic discourse for at least one of the other parts of virtue, namely prudence. As we said, the discourse about bravery eventually led to the pursuit of bravery, that is beyond the traditional type of bravery, to the pursuit of bravery and, more broadly, of the virtue that could - the terminology used remains within the context of war-imagery - triumph over pleasure. To discover how such a form of bravery would be defined, there follows the discourse on prudence, which (apart from other important things) leads us to another context, as we could say it defines prudence as the reconciliation of reason with pleasure - and pain.[43] In this instance, bravery is no more than reason's prudent way of dealing with pleasure - and pain; in other words, after what has been said bravery will be the undertaking of the working of reason's reconciliation with pleasure - and pain. As far as the discourse on prudence *per se* is concerned, we could summarise what it contributes to the subject under discussion, which is mainly and ultimately the problem of the relationship between theory and praxis. In the form of the question posed in our opening paragraph: should a theory be radically re-evaluated or even renounced when it does not lead to its implementation in praxis, and not only this but the praxis to which it does lead is exactly the opposite of the theory concerned? After this reminder, let us now consider the issue; the

contribution of the discourse on prudence with regard to the content of the reminder; so what does the discourse on prudence give us?

(1) To begin with, that theory cannot be evaluated as a separate value on its own, but only in relation to praxis. This ultimately means that theory is, and must be, indissolubly linked with and perforce oriented towards praxis; put more simply, theory for its own sake is not accepted, but only theory for the sake of praxis.

(2) If this initial statement of evaluation is accepted, then it follows that the examination of theory in relation to praxis is a matter of immediate priority; why should this be? Because, as we are explicitly told:

(2.1) Praxis *qua* experience very often indicates that there is a gap between theory and praxis.

(2.2) More specifically, and certainly paradigmatically as far as the earlier statement is concerned, it is said that the theory/discourse of abstention from pleasure leads to the taste of it and moreover to surrender to the lust of pleasure.

Let us persist with the observation just made; what emerges from it?

(i) That, in praxis, the taste of pleasure is *more powerful* than abstention from it "in theory".

Further elaboration of this statement leads us to the following thought:

(i.) that, in praxis, pleasure is *essential* for man's survival.

Finally, from this it can be said:

(ii) that, in praxis, the abstention from pleasure "in theory" leads to the taste of pleasure and moreover *surrender to the lust* of pleasure.

Further elaboration of the earlier statement, bearing in mind both the other statements and the aforementioned discourse on wine-drinking, leads us to the following remarks:

(ii.) Pleasure in itself is not a negative thing.

Surrender to the lust of pleasure is a negative thing.

Surrender to the lust of pleasure results from the command to abstain from pleasure.

Thus, absence of the command to abstain from pleasure can overcome negativity regarding what is essential to life, that is to say, negativity with regard to pleasure.

The two preceding elaborations ([i.], [ii.]) lead to a very important conclusion:

(iii) The epitactic way of doing and thinking, and not pleasure, is a negative thing in itself, since:

(a) it deprives man of pleasure that is essential to his life

(b) it leads to surrender to the lust of pleasure

(c1) it leads to a dramatic splitting between theory and praxis, and specifically and ultimately:

(c2) it splits man's life into one part according to the order and another part besides the order of the epitactic discourse, it leads to a splitting which is merely the expression of a redoubling of the epitactic way of doing and thinking. Sometimes it commands abstention from pleasure and at others the object of the abstention, pleasure *qua* surrender to the lust of pleasure, commands abstention from reason.

Be that as it may, on the basis of the necessary co-evaluation of theory and praxis we mentioned earlier and of the evaluative priority of the latter in relation to praxis, a priority that allows it to be the fundamental criterion in assessing the former, the final result to emerge is the need to overcome the epitactic way of doing and thinking. Overcoming in the sense of its evaluative annihilation, and the need to adopt in its place the theory/reason of reconciliation.[44] In contrast to what happened earlier, the reason of reconciliation does not forbid, but rather permits the taste of pleasure, it is the reason/theory of reconciliation with pleasure; and pleasure may not, in praxis, be the pleasure of surrender to the lust of it, but the pleasure of reconciliation, reconciliation with reason.[45] According to this, however, something extremely important will have been achieved; the final issue. The overcoming of the gap between theory and praxis.

The final conclusion is as follows. The epitactic way of doing and thinking, the modality of the discourse/theory *qua* epitactic way of thinking, sets out the theory-praxis problem in a dramatic form. Conversely, without dispensing with the unstable and fickle relationship between theory and praxis, reconciliation, the modality of the discourse/theory *qua* reconciliation, takes care (it is a fundamental point of reference for the care) that the relationship between these two is not led to a relationship of opposites.

So what, after all that has been said, is the duty of philosophical thought?

Philosophical thought should not feel self-sufficiency through its revelation *qua* theory; it should examine its theory in relation to praxis.

Philosophical thought should be aware that the epitactic way of doing and thinking, irrespective of its content, is the mode of the discourse, which leads to dramatic results as far as the theory-praxis relationship is concerned.

After examination of the theory in relation to praxis, and if the praxis comes into conflict with the theory, philosophical thought should also renounce the theory, or fundamentally, the particular mode of the theory/discourse. Furthermore, it should take into account the conclusions emerging from the praxis and its opposition to the theory, in order to construct a new theory, or fundamentally, a new mode of theory/discourse. By doing so, it should prove that it is indeed firmly oriented to service of the praxis; in order to be successful in this attempt, we conclude that it will have to be the philosophical thought of reconciliation and not of the epitactic way of thinking.

Up to this point we have confirmed the relationship of virtue with the "theory-praxis" problem. However, what we have not yet confirmed is that which the title of our paper also promises we shall discuss, namely the relationship between citizenship, the virtue under discussion and the "theory-praxis" problem that is discussed with constant reference to it.

It could be said in the beginning, in analogy to the aforementioned relationship between bravery and prudence, that the prudence under discussion is the paradigm of the fundamental values which the citizen should have accepted and which will characterise the individual's citizenship. To summarise; the citizen

should not be distinguished by moral, political confinement to theory, he should not feel self-sufficient with theory (nor, of course, should he abandon himself to praxis-without theory). He should proceed to the examination of theory in relation to praxis, which (praxis) he will consequently set out in order of moral and political priority; just like theory, so also will its citizen-recipient have always have to be orientated towards the evaluative, moral and political priority of praxis. He will also have to have the moral strength to deal with the disagreeable but common situation in which praxis is at variance with theory. In this case, moreover, he will have to be able to proceed to a true critical analysis of the causes of the gap between theory and praxis. During this analysis he should not continue to accept the theory which is now at variance with the praxis, and consequently to hold the praxis responsible for the problem created. On the contrary, he should take into account the conclusions which stem from the praxis that is at variance with the theory. Citizenship will befit even more the one who is the most profound educated man/participant in virtue and prudence. In other words, the one who is led, thanks to the taste of this virtue, to another level of examination of the "theory-praxis" problem. In the context of this level we arrive at the conclusion that it is the *mode* of discourse/theory *qua* epitactic which is responsible for this dramatic intensity and variance between theory and praxis. As a way out it is proposed that the discourse of the epitactic way of doing and things be abandoned and the discourse of reconciliation adopted, thereby making it possible for the mode of discourse/theory to be such that the praxis is not a falsification of the theory.

Plato does not say which theory this will be nor, consequently, on the basis of which theoretical content the praxis will emerge. However, he does say that whatever the theory's thrilling content, however in opposition it may be to another theory, ultimately it will be rejected in praxis, as will its opposite if, despite their opposition with regard to content, they are both expressions of the discourse of the epitactic way of thinking, and not that of reconciliation.

The next question raised by this paper concerns how we should deal with this discourse, which gives prominence to the positivity of reconciliation and proposes it; put more specifically: Will this discourse/theory have to be imposed on praxis in order to obliterate the epitactic way of doing and thinking? In this case, Plato's answer is identical with probably one of the most important aspects of his political philosophy; the aforementioned conclusion which holds theory/discourse *qua* epitactic way of thinking

responsible for the variance between theory and praxis and gives prominence to the positivity of the discourse of reconciliation. This ultimately applies to the discourse of reconciliation as well; thus the attempt to impose and adopt the (in theory) positive reconciliation and obliterate the (in practice) negative epitactic way of doing and thinking,[46] merely leads to one more fresh revelation of the epitactic way of doing and thinking. Herein lies the paradox: the "in theory" reconciliation proves "in fact" to be another expression of the epitactic way of doing and thinking[47] and this results in a dramatic reappearance of the gap between theory and praxis.

What, finally, is Plato thinking of in relation to this problem, this paradox? He is thinking of the co-presence of reconciliation and the epitactic way of doing and thinking[48] that means the reconciliation allows the presence of the epitactic way of doing and thinking. In order to prevent itself from being falsified "in fact" and, consequently, to prevent the social and political horizon from being overwhelmed by the presence of the latter.

There is a new final question, a question related to this thought of Plato's: Does the fact that Plato thinks of reconciliation as allowing the presence of the epitactic way of doing and thinking mean that he proposes this thought to the citizen-reader of his philosophical discourse, that he proposes the citizen-reader should adopt reconciliation and in praxis follow an approach that would not end up as the epitactic way of doing of and thinking? Proposing such a thing theoretically ensures the reconciliation, but falsifies it "in fact" as far as it affects the recipients of the philosophical discourse, which has the intention of ensuring it. Consequently, such a proposal is merely one more revelation of the epitactic way of doing and thinking.

So once again, let us ask: What does Plato ultimately propose? Precisely because of what we have just said, Plato does not propose; in the beginning, he thinks of the "theory-praxis" problem, the responsibility of the epitactic way of doing and thinking with regard to this problem, and the ability of reconciliation to overcome it. He then goes on to narrate the adventures of reconciliation, that is to say, how it can become one more expression of the epitactic way of doing and thinking and thus instead of overcoming the "theory-praxis" problem be yet another dramatic version of it. So Plato thinks and narrates; therefore he leaves the choice to the will of the recipient of his discourse;[49] of course, with all the philosopher thinks and narrates the recipient's

choice cannot ignore its consequences; if he chooses the modality of discourse/theory *qua* epitactic way of thinking, the praxis will falsify the theory. If he chooses theory *qua* reconciliating and wills to impose it in praxis, then the praxis *qua* one more expression of the epitactic way of doing and thinking will again falsify the theory. If he chooses theory *qua* reconciliating and acts in such a way as to allow the epitactic way of doing and thinking to exist *qua* theory and *qua* doing, then he will be able to achieve reconciliation in praxis and hence the non-falsification of the theory by the praxis. In order to emphasise the extent and the significance of the "theory-praxis" problem according to Plato, we recapitulate. If the last of the aforementioned choices is indeed the only way, in accordance with the philosopher's theory, to achieve reconciliation so that the theory is not falsified by the praxis, the philosopher himself, not wanting his theory to be falsified by the praxis and having the praxis as the primal evaluative priority, will not *propose* that this theory of his, which seeks to resolve the "theory-praxis" problem, should become the praxis. Precisely because this very praxis of *proposing* the solution to the problem lays the foundations for yet another version of it.

The fact that he does not propose does not, of course, mean that he does not think. It is precisely because he thinks about the "theory-praxis" problem so deeply, as far as thought can go and with such courage - to the verge of despair, that he does not propose. Perhaps this is Plato's final political lesson; the philosophical political thought that *qua* theory raises the "theory-praxis" problem attempts to interpret the reasons for its existence, devises a way of overcoming this problem, but *finally* does not proceed to even the fundamental praxis of proposing the theoretical and/or practical adoption of this mode of overcoming the problem. If this is Plato's last lesson in political philosophy, then philosophical discourse, the citizen-philosopher and the virtue - that of prudence - which must distinguish him are not the only recipients of this lesson. It also concerns - is allowed to concern - the citizen-recipient of the lesson; according to Plato, citizenship is identified with the conquest of virtue, of prudence, and this conquest is ultimately synonymous with the ability of the citizen himself to shoulder the burden of choice in full knowledge of the consequences that, as we have seen, will ensue from each possible choice. There is not one person (philosopher, politician) who proposes and another one (citizen) who accepts or does not accept; there is a person who thinks and

another one who *also* thinks by attending this thought, or at least in his turn is allowed to think.

How many times in the history of political and social philosophy has philosophical discourse *qua* political discourse arrived at this point of thought and reflection concerning the "theory-praxis" problem? The question is certainly seen as compelling, but if our discourse is to remain consistent with all that we have finally stated about Plato, we shall not attempt to give a reply; it allows itself to be given by all those who wish, in principle, to register the other philosophical political discourses in the context of the question referred to earlier; and according to the answer which they then give, it will be possible to judge both the discourses and the answers; to judge them in relation to what? In relation to the subject of this paper; in other words, in relation to how they deal with citizenship, the virtue which distinguishes the citizen, and all of these with constant reference to the "theory-praxis" problem.

Notes

1. See Laws 633a4-c7.
2. See *ibid.* 626b7-627b2; see, more generally, K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 125, 208; M. Foucault, *Histoire de la sexualité,* v.ll: *L 'Usage des Plaisirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 76-83; J.J. Winkler, *The Constraints of Desire: The Anthropology of Sex and Gender in Ancient Greece* (New York and London: Routlcdge, 1990), 46-54.
3. Sec *Laws* 633b4-5, 633cl, 633c4, 633cl0, 634b4, 647c7-dl.
4. *Ibid.* 633d 1.
5. See *ibid.* 633b5, 634b3.
6. See *ibid.* 633d 1-2. Cf. *Laches* 191e4-7 and *Republic* 429b-430b, 442b4-c4.
7. See *Laws* 633d6- 7.
8. See *ibid.* 633el-6.
9. See *ibid.* 634b5-6
10. See *ibid.* 633dl-4, cf. 863b7-10.
11. See *ibid.* 630c4.
12. See *ibid.* 634a8, cf. 635c5-6
13. See *ibid.* 634b7-c4.
14. For the approach concerning pain, see *ibid.* 634a9-l 1.
15. See *ibid.* 634b3, 634a9.
16. See *ibid.* 633b4-6.
17. See *ibid.* 634al-5.
18. See *ibid.* 635b6-dl.
19. See *ibid.* 635b6, cf. 636a7,636e8.
20. See *Statesman* 294c2. Cf. *Laws* 634el.
21. See *Statesman* 294c2-3, 294 c4-5.
22. See *ibid.* 309a3: avoidance is the mild mode in which the epitactic way of doing and thinking functions: the penalties are increased, culminating in death (see Statesman 299c5-6 and Laws, for example, 637a8, 735a-735b, 854e, 855c, 856c, 862c, 862e-863a, 908e, 909a, 914b, 952c-d).
23. See *ibid.* 635d7, combined with 632e3-6.
24. See *ibid.* 635e4-6.
25. See *ibid.* 635e6-636al.
26. See *ibid.* 636a2-3.
27. See *ibid.* 636a3-5.
28. See *ibid.* 636bl-c7.
29. See *ibid.* 636c3-d4.
30. See *ibid.* 633a4-c7, 635b4-d6, 636d5-e4.
31. See *ibid.* 637b6 *et seq.*
32. See *ibid.* 647d4, 673e5.
33. See *ibid.* 636e8.
34. See *ibid.* 636e7-8.
35. See *ibid.* 637a-b.
36. See *ibid.* 627e5-628a2, 628c8-10.
37. *See ibid.* 637b6-cl.

38. See *ibid.* 638al-2.
39. See *ibid.* 672d6, cf. 672b5.
40. See *ibid.* 649d6-7.
41. See *ibid.* 672d6. Cf. 672b6.
42. See *ibid.* 649d2, 666b7, 672d7.
43. Most of those who have discussed the concept of prudence in *Laws* have dealt with it in the context of war-imagery (see, for example, E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory. Plato and his predecessors* [London: Methuen, [2]1960], 36, 54, 343; E.S. Belfiore "Wine and Catharsis of the Emotions in Plato's Laws" CQ 36 [1986], 428, 429, *and Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on plot and emotion* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992], 32, 33; R.W. Hall, *Plato and the Individual* [The Hague: M. Nijholf, 1963], 187-215, R.F. Stalley, *An Introduction to Plato's Laws* [Oxford: Blackwell, 1983], 50, 53, 54-56); only J. Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), 48-50, is particularly attentive.
44. See *Laws* 627dl l-628a5.
45. See *ibid.* 733e6-734a2.
46. See *ibid.* 664a4, 793b8, 793c2, 793c5, 793d2-3, 797a8-9.
47. *See ibid.* 799a4-803al.
48. For the presence of reconciliation, see, for example, *ibid.* 627dl 1-el (reconciliation), 628d5-e2 (peace), 666el-667a8 (people *qua* a family at variance with itself); for the presence of the epitactic way of doing and thinking, see, for example, *ibid.* 853a5-bl (punishment), 795b-796d (war), 735a8-c8 (people *qua* a pack); more generally see, on the same subject, D.N. Lambrellis, *Desire and Tragedy. The last Platonic anthropology* (Athens: Dodoni, 1995), 315-355.
49. See *Laws* 739b 1-8.