In this paper, an attempt will be made to examine the concept ataraxia as it appears in the works of Pyrro of Elis, Sextus Empiricus and other philosophers belonging to the ancient sceptical tradition. This school of thought is primarily concerned with the avoidance of disturbance (ataraxia), and they do this by suspending judgment. But the suspension of judgment is only possible given the suspension of belief. They wish to avoid disturbances which arise not only in the act of disputing judgments, but also those which arise by virtue of believing the premises involved in the dispute. The sceptic says that ataraxia comes by chance where "chance" means that ataraxia is inexplicable and naturally so. Just as the sceptics will not engage in a language of essences because they question the possibility of presenting nature in such a language, neither will they engage in the pursuit of something which cannot, in principle, be pursued - absence from trouble. For exactly how does one pursue an "absence"? Whether we agree with the ancient sceptic's way or not, there is a degree of wisdom in their recommendations that we suspend judgment on what is, in principle, not judgeable. If human happiness is such a matter, we cannot fault the sceptics for questioning philosophical attempts to arbitrate what happiness is, especially if happiness stands over and against nature.