In this article, following the work of Hannah Arendt, the author argues that thought should be
placed at the centre of the reflection on freedom of speech. For Arendt thinking is a necessary
condition for the existence of an active political sphere and democratic politics. The absence
of thought on the other hand is central to totalitarianism. Arendt, reflecting on the trial of Nazi
bureaucrat Adolf Eichman, noted how the absence of any activity of thinking and the rigid following
of rules and clichés resulted in evil – what she calls the banality of evil.
The author focuses on the limits of liberal legal approaches to respond adequately to the
issue of freedom of expression, mainly because of the absence of thought and the preference for
predictable applications of rules and interpretations of rights in these approaches. Firstly, the
author exposes the law’s preoccupation with fairness, legitimacy, functionalism and economic
benefi t to the detriment of ethical thought and justice. Thereafter, the author recalls the argument
by Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld related to the indeterminacy of rights, as discussed by Joseph Singer.
Hohfeld made a radical intervention in traditional liberal legal assumptions by formulating the
category of no-right, thereby exposing the situations in which an individual, although she suffered
damage, will have no recourse in law. In the context of freedom of speech the category of no-right
and the reality of damage without recourse in law can play out in many ways – someone could
suffer damage because of speech without recourse to law or someone’s right to speech could be
infringed without recourse to law. Thirdly, Jacgues Derrida’s deconstructive notion of justice as
aporia is discussed to link up with the urgency of thought and judgement in the face of instrumental
rule-following. Finally the author considers the application of Derrida’s notion of auto-immunity/
self-destruction to the law and particularly to the right to freedom of expression. If the legal right
to freedom of speech has the tendency to self destruct each attempt to protect one kind of speech
would always already also have destructed and prevented that same speech.
The author argues that thought should guide the allowance and limitation of freedom of speech
and not a predictable application of rules, dogma and jargon. She concludes with reference to
an application of Arendt’s insistence on the link between the activity of thinking and democratic
politics within the context of the politics that surrounded the proposed legislation on same sex
marriages, citing in this regard Jaco Barnard’s recent work, which persuasively shows how
thoughtless behaviour allowed moments of a totalitarian politics.
In hierdie artikel argumenteer die skrywer in navolging van Hannah Arendt dat denke sentraal
moet wees in besinning oor vryheid van spraak. Denke is vir Arendt onlosmaaklik gekoppel aan
’n aktiewe politieke sfeer en demokratiese politiek. Die afwesigheid van denke daarteenoor staan
sentraal tot totalitarisme. Die skrywer fokus op die beperktheid van liberale regsbenaderings om
bevredigend vryheid van spraak te hanteer.
Eerstens word die bemoeienis van die reg met billikheid, legitimiteit, funksionalisme en
ekonomiese wins in plaas van met etiese denke en geregtigheid uitgewys. Daarna word Wesley
Newcombe Hohfeld se argument oor die onbepaalbaarheid van regte soos uiteengesit deur Joseph
Singer bespreek. Derdens word Jacques Derrida se dekonstruktiewe siening van geregtigheid as
aporia voorgehou. Laastens pas die skrywer Derrida se siening van outo-immuniteit/selfvernietiging
toe op die reg en spesifi ek vryheid van spraak.
Die skrywer voer aan dat denke – en nie resepmatige toepassing van geykte reëls, dogma of
jargon nie – bepalend moet wees in regulering van vryheid van spraak. Sy sluit af met verwysing na Jaco Barnard se toepassing van Arendt se aandrang op die verband tussen denke en demokratiese
politiek op die aanvaarding van wetgewing oor eendersgeslagtelike huwelike in Suid-Afrika, wat
oortuigend aantoon hoe gedagtelose optrede totalitêre politiek toelaat.
