

approve ; therefore his kingdom was taken from him, and would now be divided amongst a number of chiefs, who would be expected to rule with justice. In future no life was to be taken without trial, and trivial offences were to be punished by fines ; no standing army would be allowed, nor the possession of guns and ammunition by any Zulu ; nor would any stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. The young men would be allowed to marry when and whom they pleased, provided they had sufficient for the support of a wife, and could obtain the consent of the girl's parents ; and "smelling out" for witchcraft was to be put down. Nevertheless, the Queen had no wish to force our laws and customs upon them. By their own rules of war and conquest, Zululand now belonged to her ; but she had already enough land in Africa, and had therefore no intention of depriving the Zulus of theirs. Finally, the missionaries were not to be forced upon them, and the Zulus were not encouraged to permit their settling amongst them ; and they were forbidden to give land to any white men.¹

To secure the fulfilment of all these commands, Sir G. Wolseley told the chiefs that he intended to leave an English officer as Resident, to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, and to see the laws observed and that the chiefs ruled with justice and equity. With what machinery the officer in question was to perform so wide a task does not appear. Whether his position is to be a real one, requiring several British regiments to support it, or whether it is to be a mere farce, a fine-sounding pretence, remains yet to be proved.

At the conclusion of the General's discourse he produced

¹ The following extract from the *Times of Natal*, October 27, 1879, shows the view which a Missionary took of the state of things in Zululand shortly after Sir Garnet Wolseley's "settlement" :

"If Sir Garnet Wolseley, the representative of a Christian Government, will concede to us the same rights and privileges as we had under the now deposed heathen king, and farther, through the British Resident in Zululand protect our lives and property from violence, as Cetshwayo did, we shall therewith be content."

a document, the purport of which, he said, he had now told them, and which was to be signed by all the chiefs whom he had chosen as rulers of the land, to each of whom a duplicate copy would be given, while he retained a similar one himself.

The first to sign his name was Mr. John Dunn, whose chieftainship was by far the largest; and after him the Zulu chiefs touched the pen while Mr. Shepstone made their crosses for them, in place of the signature which they could not form.

For once in the history of Natal, all classes, from whatever widely differing motives, were united in condemning the arrangement.

"The so-called settlement of Zululand," says the *Cape Times*, on September 16th, "is regarded with anything but satisfaction in Natal, if we may accept the press of that colony as representative of public opinion. Sir Garnet Wolseley was probably acting under instructions in making peace on a barbarian basis; such a peace, however, has no guarantee for continuance, but on the contrary an inherent weakness, forbidding any hope of permanence. A savage nation is now divided into a number of savage nations, each leaning to the other with all the force of common blood and common traditions, while to check the impulses of that force there is absolutely nothing beyond the influence of two or three British residents, unsupported by any armed retinue, and clothed with no more than a shadow of authority. And as the embodiment of British civilisation, and as Her Majesty the Queen's own representative in Zululand, is placed Mr. John Dunn But whatever John Dunn's merits may be, his appointment as Chief Resident in Zululand is a shock to civilisation. His ways are Zulu ways; his associations, Zulu associations; his very habits of thought imbued with the Zulu character. A white man who for twenty years or more has lived the Zulu life, wedded Zulu wives, and chosen their society in preference to that of such women as a white man should love and honour, is not the man to represent the Queen of England in a nation of savages.

The settlement of Zululand means simply the appointment of a dozen Cetywayos, with a white man to look after them, who is a Cetywayo in all but colour. And now Sir Garnet Wolseley skips off in his light and airy fashion to the Transvaal, flattering himself that he has made things pleasant in Zululand. It is a miserable delusion, and one fatal to the grand scheme which we would so gladly promote, that of South African union. For having thus dug up and planted a hot-bed of disaffection, the British Government requests us to combine for mutual defence, while keeping in its own hands the control of this prolific nursery. And when all the little Cetywayos begin to jump about, singly it may be, or in concert, the British Government will tell us that the volunteers of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth are charged with the duty of persuading the rogues to be quiet. We are earnest in our confederation belief; but with Sir Garnet Wolseley and John Dunn's Zulu settlement, confederation would be the dream of a madman."¹

The "engagements" into which the Zulu Chiefs entered are:

"1. I will observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated.

"2. I will not permit the existence of the Zulu military system, or the existence of any military system of organisation whatever, in my territory, and I will proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according to the good ancient customs of my people, known and followed in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the system known as the military system; and I will allow and encourage all men living within my territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work in Natal and the Transvaal and elsewhere for themselves or for hire.

¹ Forwarded by Sir Bartle Frere for the information of the Secretary of State for the Colonies as bearing "on the subject of confederation."—(P. P. [C. 2482] p. 273.)

" 3. I will not import, or allow to be imported into my territory by any person, upon any pretext or for any object whatever, any arms or ammunition from any part whatever, or any goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without the express sanction of the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated ; and I will not encourage or promote, or take part in, or countenance in any way whatever, the importation in any other part of Zululand of arms or ammunition from any part whatever, or goods or merchandise by the sea-coast of Zululand, without such sanction, and I will confiscate and hand over to the Natal Government all arms and ammunition, and goods and merchandise, so imported into my territory, and I will punish by fine or by other sufficient punishment any person guilty of or concerned in any such unsanctioned importation, and any person found possessing arms or ammunition, or goods or merchandise, knowingly obtained thereby.

" 4. I will not allow the life of any of my people to be taken for any cause, except after sentence passed in a council of the chief men of my territory, and after fair and impartial trial in my presence and after the hearing of witnesses ; and I will not tolerate the employment of witch-doctors, or the practice known as smelling-out, or any practices of witchcraft.

" 5. The surrender of persons fugitive in my territory from justice, when demanded by the government of any British colony, territory, or province, in the interests of justice, shall be readily and promptly made to such government ; and the escape into my territory of persons accused or convicted of offences against British laws shall be prevented by all possible means, and every exertion shall be made to seize and deliver up such persons to British authority.

" 6. I will not make war upon any chief or chiefs, or people, without the sanction of the British Government, through the Resident of the division in which my territory is situated.

" 7. The succession to the chieftainship of my territory

shall be according to the ancient laws and customs of my people, and the nomination of each successor shall be subject to the approval of the British Government.

"8. I will not sell, or in any way alienate, or permit, or countenance any sale or alienation of any part of the land in my territory.

"9. I will permit all people residing in my territory to there remain, upon the condition that they recognise my authority as chief, and any persons not wishing to recognise my authority and desiring to quit my territory I will permit to quit and to pass unmolested elsewhere.

"10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are involved I will appeal to and abide by the decision of the British Resident of the division in which my territory is situated. In all cases when accusations of offence or crime committed in my territory are brought against British subjects, or against my people in relation to British subjects, I will hold no trial and pass no sentence except with the approval of such British Resident.

"11. In all matters not included within these terms, conditions, and limitations, and in all cases provided for herein, and in all cases when there may be doubt or uncertainty as to the laws, rules, or stipulations applicable to matters to be dealt with, I will govern, order, or decide in accordance with the ancient laws and usage of my people."

The following letter, addressed to the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, and published in *The Guardian* of December 10th, 1879, by the Dean of 'Maritzburg, contains such valuable and important matter that we quote it verbatim :

THE DEANERY, 'MARITZBURG, NATAL,
September 27th, 1879.

SIR,—Though I have not the honour of being known to you, yet, as the affairs of South Africa must necessarily engage the attention of Parliament when it next meets, I venture to hope you will not consider it an intrusion if I lay before you some of the conclusions I have arrived at after thirty years' residence as a clergyman in Natal. I do so as I know from experience how extremely difficult it is for those who have passed their lives in the midst of a highly

organised society to realise the conditions of a colony, and especially of one which is brought into contact with the undeveloped races of South Africa. The first question that presents itself is, What is the meaning of the apparent antagonism of the native races, at the present time, to the white man? I attribute it immediately to the natives suddenly and unexpectedly finding themselves in the possession of fire-arms. When the Diamond Fields were first opened out, no restrictions were placed on the gun-trade by the Cape Government, and so soon as this became known the natives flocked there in thousands from all parts of South Africa, hiring themselves out to work, and stipulating to be paid in rifles. Young men everywhere will arm themselves if they can, and especially in a country in which there is abundant room for hunting, and still more so when the young men are savages, and know of no distinction except that which comes from exhibiting prowess in war. I do not myself think they were influenced by any feelings of hatred to the white man, or that there existed any deep-seated conspiracy amongst the chiefs or old men. But the young men suddenly discovered they could obtain fire-arms, so got them; and having got them, they then desired to use them. Everywhere they were armed, and so everywhere they began to talk of fighting; the heaven had been put in and the whole lump worked. The war which arose is now over, and the Cape Government is engaged in steadily disarming the natives under its rule; its loyal subjects, the Fingoes and the Basutos, as well as the recently conquered tribes. Sir Garnet Wolseley told the Zulus also to bring in their guns; but they have treated his order with contempt, and he has made no attempt to enforce it; the Zulus themselves, I am afraid, will soon adduce this as evidence that they were not beaten. I may say, also, the Natal Governor always placed restrictions on the natives possessing fire-arms, and, so far as he could, enforced those restrictions on his own natives returning from the Diamond Fields, and they have proved perfectly loyal. Whilst at the time I deprecated the reckless trade allowed by the Cape Government, still it seems to me rather hard, after having allowed the natives to purchase guns, to set to work to disarm them. The wisest course I consider would be to impose a tax on the possession of fire-arms generally, granting privileges to members of volunteer corps, &c. In that way, without drawing invidious distinctions between white and coloured, our own young men would be exempted from paying by serving as volunteers; and if the tax were a heavy one the natives would be deterred from keeping guns, and, further, the Government would know exactly to what extent they were armed.

To leave, however, the native races in general, and to confine ourselves to the Zulus. They never went to war with us, but we with them; they have always been excellent neighbours; for thirty years they have never been accused of stealing a sheep, or an ox, or a horse from the Natal side. Natal had no quarrel with them nor Cetywayo with us; it has been our misfortune that it has been

found convenient to carry on the war from Natal ; but Sir H. Bulwer, our Governor, has been true to the colony in insisting that it was no war of ours. If there was any justification of the war, it must be sought in the interests of Transvaal, and then it can only be accepted as a judgment. The Crown had not a shadow of right to annex the Transvaal. True, they were not governing themselves very well in that State ; neither, perhaps, is Germany, but we do not annex Germany. We did take over the Transvaal, however, in direct violation of engagements which had been entered into with the Dutch Boers. Shepstone, in his proclamation, was obliged to say that we must read between the lines of that engagement—*i.e.* the promises of the British Government were worth nothing. The simple fact was that the Cape and Transvaal merchants had been over-trading in that Republic ; it was bankrupt, so many of them were on the brink of insolvency. I cannot say more without mentioning names, but there was no difficulty in seeing what influences were brought to bear on Lord Carnarvon. The Republic was annexed ; farms were accepted at a nominal price in payment of debts, and re-sold again in London, say at sixpence per acre, which amply repaid the merchant, who thus saved himself, whilst the Boers were left without their independence, and poorer than ever. Had we stayed our hand, finding themselves hopelessly bankrupt, in a few months they might probably have sought our assistance, and then we could have annexed them without their having a grievance ; as it is they cannot forget it. I am sorry for them, for they are a simple people. Shepstone went up as Governor, and Cetywayo at once asked to have his old disputes with the Boers arranged—in former days both he and his father, whenever they had had any difference with the Transvaal, always sent messengers in to the Natal Government to advise with it—and Shepstone, the Secretary for Native Affairs, according to his wont, always temporised, admitting in a half-and-half way that they were right, but advising patience. When, however, he found himself at the Transvaal he suddenly sided with the Dutch, and Cetywayo became greatly incensed and declared himself betrayed. I believe he would at once have invaded the Transvaal, but from fear of us in Natal. He hesitated, however, and according to the old maxim, he who hesitates does not fight ; but before he had quieted down Sir B. Frere interfered with his *ultimatum*, and Cetywayo stood grandly on the defensive. He is a savage, and his ambition was to be a great savage ; I do not mean a cruel one, but a powerful, influential savage. He was ambitious, but disliked progress, and such men must fail ; so he has fallen, but with dignity. He has never attacked a neighbour, white or black : he has defended his country bravely, and has been guilty of no excesses. It has been our war, not his. Sir B. Frere says most truly that almost every one he spoke to encouraged him to go to war ; but I am afraid he avoided those who, he was told, were against war—and when will not Englishmen advise war ? No argument was used, except the one that Cetywayo might

overrun Natal at any moment ; but he had never shown a disposition to do so, and we were stronger than men would allow. Men who do not trust in the arm of God do not see the defences which surround them. The Tugela, the river which separates Natal from Zululand, was a great protection, as in summer-time, even if fordable, the Zulus would not cross it, lest it should rise in their rear ; and in the winter, our dry season, they cannot keep the field, as their naked bodies are quite unable to bear exposure to the cold nights. Moreover, though our own army will never acknowledge it, Cetywayo's force did not exceed 30,000 naked savages. Of course we are told they were 60,000 or 80,000 strong ; but if you casually inquire of any officer who has been in Zululand whether the kraals were thickly dotted over the country, he will tell you artlessly, "No, quite the contrary." I have again and again inquired of traders as to the density of the population relative to Natal. I have inquired of those who have lived at Ulundi, and have seen Cetywayo's regiments mustered, and I am confident that 30,000 is the very outside at which the Zulu force could be put. I may return to this. I mention it now to show why I do not agree with Sir Bartle in his view of our position ; and certainly I cannot admit, because a neighbour is powerful, that therefore we are justified in going to war with him.

But, now that we have been at war, on what terms is peace to be arranged ? In the Cape Colony the natives—as the Basutos, the Fingoes, and others—live in districts to themselves, not intermingled with the white man. The young men leave their homes, and go into the colony, and work for a time in the towns or on the farms ; but their home is in Basutoland, Fingoland, &c. The same holds good in the Transvaal. The natives there are on the border ; but Natal is the one exception to this rule ; in this colony we live intermingled ; and a few years ago we were regarded as living in the crater of a volcano. It was thought that the Natal natives, who outnumber the European settlers eighteenfold, might at any moment overwhelm us, so that Cape politicians and others refused to be connected with this colony. In 1876, however, before the rising of the natives on the frontier, I was bold enough to point out to my fellow-colonists that our supposed weakness was in reality our strength. And so it has proved. During the last two years Natal has been the oasis of South Africa ; everywhere else the natives have either been in arms, or shown themselves disaffected, if we except the Fingoes ; but the position in which they stand to the Kafir tribes around them compels them to be loyal, so they are scarcely to be taken into account.

Whilst, then, throughout South Africa the natives have been a source of uneasiness, the overwhelming native population of Natal (360,000, against 22,000 whites) has been perfectly true to the Government, and the grounds of their loyalty are now, I think, recognised in Natal. They are these:—1. The natives are not, like

Englishmen, self-reliant, but naturally dependent; consequently, they use the machinery of Government much more than we do. An Englishman dislikes appealing to a magistrate, as it implies a want of power to take care of himself or to govern his dependents. Not so the native; he habitually leans upon the magistrate. Thirty years ago in Natal the native leant upon his chief; now he has become familiar with the magistrate, who has become a necessity to him. I argue, therefore, that a people will not plot or even desire to throw off an authority which enters into their daily life.

2. Natives who have resided amongst white men feel the need of their presence. The native races cannot develop themselves—nor, when in some degree developed, can they stand by themselves—as their wills are weak, and intellectually they are lawyers, fond of argument, but without imagination; so they can neither plan nor construct. In their independent state they have no criminal law, no commercial code, no municipal one, no law of tenure of landed property; they possess only a few customs regulating marriage and the division of their cattle amongst the family; but, scattered amongst white men, they are able to expand. The effect is seen in many ways—amongst others, in the increase of their families.

3. They are naturally fond of trading. In many ways they may be compared to the Celtic race, as they cannot rise above the tribal organisation; but, unlike the Celt, they are not intellectual; and, unlike him, their natural bent is towards trading. They are good soldiers, but they prefer trading to everything; consequently, on this account, they are unwilling to separate from the white man.

4. The natives never go to war unless they can first send their cattle to the rear; but this they cannot do when distributed amongst the Europeans, and this operates alone as a great check. During the thirty years I have been in Natal we have only had three chiefs give the slightest trouble, and these three have all been on the borders, and so have been able to send their cattle away. I am convinced, therefore, that, if the Government wishes to maintain peace and to develop the native races, it should intermingle them with the Europeans. The Aborigines Society at home will probably object. It is easy to say the white man seeks only to dispossess the native, but whatever the individual motive, the white man is the benefactor by his presence. He may have hunted down the North American Indian and the Aborigines of Australia, but not so in South Africa. Here not only does the magistrate protect him, but the Kafir is a worker, which the North American Indian and the native of Australia is not. The white man wants the Kafir's labour, and to secure it has to be just and kind. A farm-servant in England is by no means so independent as a Kafir out here. Mix up the races, therefore, and to some extent at least the problem of governing and improving the native race is solved. After the defeat at Isandhlwana, new-comers like the military thought our natives might rise; but their wives, children, waggons, cattle, &c., were in the colony,

so they made common cause with us, and showed themselves zealously loyal. I consider it, therefore, to be most foolish to try and keep the races apart; we must intermingle them. It was Alexander's principle and the Roman rule; the present European families have been founded on this method—so we must go on mingling, not separating.

I send you a copy of Sir Garnet Wolseley's conditions of peace, as published in the *Natal Witness*. They are universally condemned here. 1. The chiefs are to be under British residents, and they must be supported by a force. But who is to pay? It is said the Zulus are not to be taxed, as that would amount to annexation; or, rather, it would test Sir Garnet's arrangements. If he is afraid to tax the Zulus the Residents will be afraid to control them. The test of defeat with Kafirs is the loss of cattle—they do not estimate the loss of life; but we have not taken cattle. Indeed, the balance is on their side: they have carried off more than we have.¹ The test of submission is obedience, and they have with one accord disobeyed the order to give up their guns. The test of the Queen's authority in South Africa is the payment of taxes. Even Cetewayo offered to pay a hut-tax; and if Sir Garnet does not impose one, all the young men in Zululand, before a year is over, will point to their cattle, their guns, and their immunity from taxes, and boast that they were not beaten. If the Zulus are to be controlled by British Residents they should pay a hut-tax. Our natives pay a hut-tax of 14s. per hut. I have understood that the Cape Government wishes it to be uniform throughout South Africa, and to be fixed at 1l. We estimate the population at three and a-half persons to a hut, and at 14s. it amounts to 4s. per head. Besides that the natives on farms pay rent to the farmer, and the more they adopt our habits the more do they pay through the Customs. The Zulus could readily pay 1l. per hut, or, say 36,000l. per annum. Cetewayo's Government was an expensive one. His commissariat alone was a heavy drain upon the resources of the people. Savages, as well as civilised persons, understand that they must support their Government; the Zulus, therefore, would recognise the justice of being taxed; and not to tax them is, I consider, to abandon one of the duties of Government. Moreover, it is said we are to be taxed to pay our quota of the recent expenditure. But our natives will hardly understand first fighting the Zulus, and then having to pay for it. It will seem to them as if they were the offending party, if they, and not the Zulus, are taxed. 2. The conditions discourage trade. It ought to be encouraged to the utmost. Instead of forbidding importation by sea, a Custom-house should be established at the one port or landing-place. 3. The alienation of land is forbidden, in order to keep out the white man; but he should be encouraged to enter, and so long

¹ We think this statement is hardly correct.

as the land is held in common by the whole tribe there will be no improvement in agriculture. Or, to take the conditions in order— 2 is impossible; the young men will be quarrelling with one another at weddings and other gatherings, tribal fights will ensue, and the chiefs must have a force at their command. 3 I have touched upon. 4 is nugatory; if a chief wishes to put to death he can give a man a mock trial and have done with it. 6 overlooks that wars often do not begin with the chiefs; the young men bring them about. 8 I have touched upon. The whole implies the active and constant superintendence of the Resident, and that will be resisted: some kraal or kraals will be disobedient to orders, the chief will be unable or unwilling to enforce obedience, and the Resident must call in other assistance at great expense; and at whose? There is nothing enduring, nothing practical in this settlement, if it deserves to be called such. It is not likely to last, and every one expects, after a short interval, more bloodshed and more reckless expenditure. The burden cannot be thrown on the colony, as the Government has not been consulted on the terms of peace. The whole thing is a cruelty to the Zulus, to the colonists, and to the suffering home population, for there will be another 3,000,000*l.* or more to be voted yet; but during the whole time meat was 8*d.* and bread 4*d.* per pound. 1*s.* 6*d.* per diem was consequently ample allowance for the keep of a soldier; of course I am aware there were numerous other sources of expenditure, but it is extreme folly to send an army out to a distant place, with power to draw upon the Treasury at will; it is too great a trial for human nature. As a blind, all sorts of things are said about the colonists; a great deal or even all may be true, but it does not explain half. That, however, is by the way; but I must mention, before concluding, that one of the newly-appointed chiefs is a white man named John Dunn. He left home when about fifteen or sixteen, and has since lived with the Zulus, taking to himself a number of wives. This appointment is looked upon as an outrage to public morals and as an insult to the colonists. I say nothing about the missionaries, as I do not wish that they should lean upon the civil power; the Church must do her proper work in her proper way. I simply write as an Englishman, to one who largely guides the councils of the nation, to lift up my voice against what has been done, and is being done, in this part of the empire. Trusting you will excuse my thus trespassing upon your time, believe me to remain yours most respectfully,

JAMES GREEN,
Dean of Maritzburg.

But at all events we had gained one definite result by all the blood and money spent in the Zulu war. The most important and earnestly insisted on immediate cause of our attack upon Zululand was the invasion of our soil, and the

violation of our sanctuary, committed by Mehlokazulu and his brother, sons of Sihayo, when they seized and carried off two women who had taken refuge in Natal. We "requested the Zulu king to deliver up the young men to us for judgment and for punishment, and he begged us to accept a fine in lieu of the persons of the offenders. We declined this proposal, and repeated our request, which suddenly became a "demand" when it appeared in the ultimatum, and as such remained.

It was said at the time that, had the young men been given up even after the troops had crossed the border, hostilities would have been suspended until the rest of the demands could be complied with. But they were not, so we went to war.

And now, at last, the war was over, one of Sihayo's sons had fallen in battle, and Mehlokazulu, the other, was in our hands. Here was what we had fought for, and obtained! What would be done with him? By the military authorities he could only be treated like any other prisoner of war, and released unarmed amongst the other Zulus. He was therefore handed over to the civil authorities at Pietermaritzburg to be tried by them, although he was denied the same advantages of counsel which are accorded by law to other civil prisoners.

This denial was commented upon unfavourably by those who desired justice to be done, but apparently, Mehlokazulu required no counsel, for he was not tried. He had committed no offence on British soil punishable in a Zulu subject by British law. His own king could have punished him by our request, but we had deposed and transported that king, and there was no law by which we could have inflicted anything beyond a trifling fine for trespass upon the man whom we had compassed heaven and earth, and shed so much of England's noblest blood, to seize. The magistrate declined to commit him for trial, and Mehlokazulu was permitted to return to his home. "Doubtless," remarks the *Natal Colonist* of the 27th October, "the legal adviser of the Crown was concerned in the case, and framed the charge which there

was the best chance of being substantiated. And this is the result—‘there was no evidence to maintain the charge.’ . . . It is a miserable conclusion to a most miserable affair. . . . The charge which, as we have seen, is almost made the chief occasion of the war which has desolated so many homes and cost millions of money, completely breaks down when brought to the test of legal trial, and the prisoner is, of necessity, set at liberty. We never believed much in the other pretexts for the war put forward by Sir Bartle Frere, but we confess that we always thought the outrage by Sihayo’s sons was one to be visited with condign punishment, whether it was one which would justify war or not, and even though we knew it was only a pretext, seeing that it took place long after war had been determined on, and preparations for it had been begun to be made.

“But the ultimatum and its demands are things of the past. Rivers of blood have flowed to enforce these demands, and now they are put on one side as utterly valueless, both by the settlement of Zululand and the release of Sihayo’s son.”¹

On the 24th of May, 1880, a large company of influential Zulus, including two of Cetshwayo’s brothers, two of his uncles, and other relatives, arrived at Bishopstowe, on their way to Pietermaritzburg, to make certain complaints as to the treatment they received in Zululand, and especially to ask for “their bone”—in other words, to ask for Cetshwayo’s restoration to Zululand, under any conditions the British Government might think fit to impose.

They were referred back to Mr. Osborn (the Resident), who would be instructed to hear all such complaints, and report them in writing to the Natal authorities.

Three of the thirteen chiefs were represented in this deputation, and seven of the thirteen concurred in the prayer.

These Zulu notables corroborated all that has been said of Cetshwayo’s clemency; and they made a remarkable statement when asked about his formidable reply to Sir

¹ *Daily News*, 30th October, 1879.

Henry Bulwer's message about the killing of girls (p. 193). They asked, "Was it on paper?" Being told "No! it was brought by messengers, by word of mouth," they asked "Who brought it?" They were told their names, Mantshonga and Bayeni, and were asked if they knew them. They replied, "We know a man named Mantshonga, who left Zululand for a crime, and is now living in Natal. But he could never have been sent with a message to the king. We never heard of it. When did they come? What indunas were in attendance? Who received them?" When told that they were said to have been received and answered by the king at a private audience, when none of the indunas were present, they ridiculed the idea, saying, "Who could possibly have got to the king by himself without being seen? They would first go through the indunas, and would then be taken by the Inncekus to the king. It is impossible. . . . No! if you ask us about that message, we say that to us it appears a pure invention, and that the people who carried it were, as it were, ploughing in winter, preparing the ground for the crop to be sown in the spring—preparing for *this!*"

Shingana, a brother of Cetshwayo, spoke the above words, the others merely reminding or agreeing with him, Ndabuko (the other brother) especially saying only a few words now and then, in a quiet, dignified way. But he now took up the word, speaking evidently under the influence of strong feeling, till his voice even shook with emotion. He said:

"No! we do not understand it. For there has never been known one like him among us Zulus before, so good, so kind, so merciful. Our fathers, who were old when we were born, all say so; and we, who have grown up with him till we are as old as you now see us—we have seen no one like him. For those three kings who were brothers, our fathers, they killed people, great and small, and for a little thing, a mere nothing—it was their custom. But he is of an entirely different nature; he shrank from shedding blood. And, if a wrong or insult were done to

himself, he would never kill for it; nay, if a man carried off one of the royal women, he would not kill him, but said, 'Let him marry her properly then!' Our fathers killed their relations too, they made nothing of them. But he—he collected us all who were the children of his father, and gave us all our head-rings, and told us to marry, even us lads, and he made marriages also for the girls, our sisters; whereas Mpande had forbidden them to marry, saying, 'If they marry we shall be having everybody belonging to the family of Senzangakona.' But he, our brother, took us all under his arm, saying, 'Let the children of my father be happy!' He never killed except for grave offences: the whole country swarms with people who owe their lives to him, and who fled to him, as the merciful prince who did not kill. He never attacked any one: he stayed quietly at home, as he was advised. He never wronged any one. There is none like him—none!"

Here he stopped, almost breaking down, and the others assented with a heavy sigh.

Traders in Zululand say that a great deal of dissatisfaction exists among the Zulus. They say that their present chiefs are greater tyrants than Cetshwayo ever was; that the white men have placed over them chiefs, with absolute power to treat them as dogs, and to deprive them of their cattle at will, by taxation or fines for pretended offences, without their having means to appeal to a great chief.

Mr. Osborn, the Resident in Zululand, reports, 5th November, 1880, that cases of "eating up" occur not unfrequently; and Sir G. Pomeroy Colley, forwarding Mr. Osborn's report, says: "The appointed chiefs have hardly yet realised their position as independent rulers, and still look upon themselves as the servants of the power that nominated them. They are consequently still amenable to the advice of the Resident, whose words carry almost the weight of commands. Whether this deference to his advice will continue when they feel themselves more firmly established in the chieftainships,

and realise more fully the independence conferred upon them by the settlement, is a question on which I feel some anxiety. Were the Zulu people under one chief, and the Resident living at the head-quarters of that chief, I should feel little doubt on the subject, for I think an able Resident should have no difficulty in establishing and maintaining a sufficient personal influence. But the personal influence of a Resident over thirteen different chiefs, living widely apart, and some of whom will probably only see him at intervals of years, cannot be very great; and I therefore fear that the tendency will be for our civilising influence to diminish, rather than increase, with time. . . . To save themselves from falling under our displeasure, and to aid them in governing their people according to what they understand to be our views, some of the chiefs have applied for British officers to be directly attached to them. Others have appointed white men, traders or others, as their agents and chief advisers. If we do not comply with the request of those who have asked for Government officers, they will probably follow the example of the others, and the system of white agents and advisers will become general. It is in this that I see one of the chief dangers to the stability of the present settlement. I have nothing to say against the individuals at present exercising these offices; but it is clear that they do not act under the same responsibilities, nor work altogether for the same ends, as Government officers. It is also clear that, not being subordinate to the Resident, there can be no unity in their system and police. Further than that, it is almost certain that their influence must be antagonistic rather than favourable to that of the Resident; for, not recognising the authority of the Resident, such irresponsible adviser will naturally seek to strengthen his own influence with the Chief at the expense of that of the Resident. And a chief who might be easily manageable if left to himself might become very difficult, and even dangerous to deal with, in the hands of an unscrupulous white adviser.

“It is then in the gradual weakening of the Resident’s

influence among the outlying chiefs, and in the substitution for it of that of irresponsible, and perhaps unscrupulous, white agents, that I see the most serious danger to the stability of the present settlement."—(P. P. [C. 2783] pp. 10, 11.)

In conclusion we may record the opinions of the Lieut.-Governor, and some of the members of the Legislative Council of Natal, which very plainly set forth the fact that the Zulu war was a part of Sir Bartle Frere's deliberate, settled policy, planned by him before he ever entered the colony of Natal, and in no manner called for by any emergency.

The following statements were made by members of the Natal Legislative Council, during its session in December, 1880, as reported in the colonial newspapers:

"He (Mr. Robinson) voted against the Bill (by which the colony was to contribute 250,000*l.* as war expenses) because the war was in no sense ours—because the whole of the operations were such as the representatives of the people were kept strictly in the dark about.

"During the whole session of 1878 not the smallest ray of light was given them on affairs in Zululand, although asked for. Neither the House nor the Country had any voice whatever in the conduct of the war. Throughout that war there were very few expressions of sympathy, or approval, or support, indulged in in connection with that war. There was instead a feeling of disapproval of the manner in which it was carried out. The settlement of Zululand was a settlement which would have no abiding effect on the affairs of South Africa. . . . They were asked to defray the cost of defending the colony from the consequences of a war that was not of our own seeking, and in the conduct of which we had no voice."—Mr. Robinson, M.L.C.

"The Hon. Member for the City (Mr. Theophilus Shepstone) said they all knew the Zulu war was coming on. He (Mr. Robinson) said that no member of that House was aware of what was going to take place when

Sir Bartle Frere arrived in the month of September.”—*Idem.*

“Reference had been made to the Boundary Commission, and the fact that it was summoned at the instance of Sir Bartle Frere. But that Commission was essentially one of the outcomes of the annexation of the Transvaal; and the necessity for it would never have arisen, and it could never have been held, but for the quarrel between the Transvaal and the Zulus. The Hon. Member for the City said that the Zulus got what they claimed. But it was from the very fact that the Zulus got what they claimed, and from the effect produced upon the mind of every man by the enormous concession which was made to them, that the Ultimatum went forth.”¹—*Idem.*

“After the award of the Boundary Commission there seems to be little done between the Transvaal and Zululand. We were then living in the profoundest peace, and there was nothing to lead us to suppose that any war would take place with that country. After the award, however, it seemed to be generally understood that war was imminent. Stores were sent up, and the *Active* was ordered to stay, instead of going away on her cruise.”²

“With all this the colony had nothing to do, except the nomination of the commissioners on the Border Commission. This Council was sitting, but all that could be gleaned was that possibly there might be war. It was known in August, 1878, that the General was coming up; and the troops came up, and all this without this colony being consulted at all. This he thought showed conclusively that the war was purely and solely an Imperial war.”—Mr. Walton, M.L.C.

¹ Thus Mr. Robinson, the Editor of the *Natal Mercury*, and a supporter of Sir Bartle Frere, admits that “the Ultimatum went forth” because the Commission, appointed by ourselves after the annexation of the Transvaal, recognised the justice of the Zulu claims! A more thorough condemnation of Sir Bartle Frere’s policy, in the eyes of Englishmen, lovers of justice and fair-dealing, could hardly have been penned by his severest censor.

² The *Active* was detained by Sir B. Frere on or before April 12th, 1878. (C. 2144. p. 32.)

"The colonists, almost to a man, would reject the war expenditure item. . . . It was all very well to talk of the motives of the Home Government in carrying on the war. It was not for the benefit of the colony; it was to defend the honour of England, to maintain the prestige of England. . . . It was a great injustice to urge that claim, because the colonists had no voice in the war. They were in no way consulted from its conception to its conclusion; they were kept scrupulously in the dark."—Mr. Sutton, M.L.C.

"It was an Imperial war with which we had nothing to do. It arose from the annexation of the Transvaal, and why no claim was made on that country for a contribution, and no demand on the Zulu nation, was incomprehensible."—Mr. Crowder, M.L.C.

"It all arose from the mistaken policy of the Imperial Government. Had that Government not taken over the Transvaal, in which matter Natal had no voice, there would have been no war."—Mr. Moor, M.L.C.

"He (Mr. Mellersh) denied *in toto* that the war was undertaken for the defence of Natal. It was the outcome of the Transvaal annexation, and to say it was for the defence of this colony was a mere chimera, a fancy. . . . The colonists from first to last had no voice in the matter, they were utterly ignored."—Hon. Mr. Mellersh, M.E.C., M.L.C.

"Either the claim was right and just, or wrong and unjust, and he emphatically maintained that it was both wrong and unjust."—Mr. Baker, M.L.C.

"He (Mr. Boshop) was strongly opposed to the war vote. He could not imagine why the Zulus should not be called upon to pay something. That nation ought to be taxed, the present chiefs (*i.e.* John Dunn, &c.) removed, and European Residents established, and, until it was done, civilization would never progress among them."—Mr. Boshop, M.L.C.

"They (the Government) had not called the Legislature together (with reference to the war), and he was committing no breach of confidence when he said that Sir Bartle

Frere, who had been spoken of so highly in that House, was himself a strong advocate of not calling the Legislature together."—Hon. Colonial Secretary (Major Mitchell, C.M.G.).

"There were people here who knew that the result of sending home Commissioners in connexion with confederation was the appointment of Sir Bartle Frere; and he (Sir Bartle Frere) considered it necessary that he should have removed from the border of Natal the power which had been threatening us for many years. The first outspoken statement was in the Ultimatum, which was the joint production of himself and Sir Bartle Frere, and the latter was, no doubt, the leading spirit, and he put forward amidst the acclamation (? of the colonists) the reason for his embarking in the Zulu War, which was to bring the Zulu nation into such a shape as was compatible with the safety of Natal and the Transvaal."¹—Hon. Attorney-General (M. H. Galwey, Esq.).

"The probability of war was talked of in the Cape Colony long before the General came up here in August."—Hon. Mr. Escombe, M.E.C., M.L.C.

Mr. Escombe also made the following statement at the Durban election, July 19th, 1880 :—

"That war was determined on in Capetown to my certain knowledge on the 9th July, 1878. I left here on the 2nd July, 1878, and I had at that time heard not a word about a Zulu war. But on the 9th July I heard from good sources, I heard on high military authority,² that the British army would be there in September. In July there was no knowledge here of hostilities; there might have been acts on the part of Cetshwayo which

¹ Thus the Attorney-General says the Zulu war was waged—not for the trumpety causes put forward by Sir Bartle Frere as *casus belli*—but for the purpose of remodelling the Zulu nation with a view to confederation.

It is said that Sir H. Bulwer signed the Ultimatum with very great reluctance, after keeping it three days in his possession, and under urgent pressure from the Colonial Secretary; and, when he had signed it, flung down his pen saying, "I am afraid that is the worst thing I ever did in my life!"

² The authority was Lord Chelmsford.

showed that he wanted watching. And, if the war was determined on at Capetown before we knew about it, I don't see how they can ask us to pay for the aggressive war."

It may be presumed that the Government of Natal was the best authority on Zulu matters, as *the whole of the intercourse* with the Zulus had been carried on with and through that Government.

In a despatch dated 10th March, 1880, Sir Henry Bulwer, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, addressed to the Secretary of State for the Colonies an able and clear summary of the entire situation leading up to the Zulu war.

We find that Sir Bartle Frere, on the 2nd of August, 1878, says that the *Transvaal* had been subjected to disquietude, and he hopes "*that the reinforcements of Her Majesty's troops, now on their way to that territory, will have the effect of restoring public tranquillity.*"

Commodore Sullivan, who brought up the head-quarter staff in H.M.S. *Active*, writes on the 12th of the same month that his object was "*to make himself acquainted with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for co-operating with Her Majesty's land forces by landing troops or stores.*"

And Lord Chelmsford, on the 24th of that month, furnished the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal (Sir H. Bulwer) with "a memorandum on the subject of an '*Invasion of Zululand or the defence of Natal and the Transvaal Colony (sic) from an invasion by Zulus.*'"

"Now," says Sir Henry Bulwer, "I venture to say that up to that time we, in this colony, had not so much as heard the word of war . . . the idea of a Zulu war had not yet occurred to any one. The idea was an imported idea. It was imported at the time of the arrival of the troops and the head-quarters staff from the Cape Colony. Once introduced under such circumstances, the idea spread fast enough."—(P. P. [C. 2584] p. 204.)

In a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 4th April, 1880, Sir Henry Bulwer says: "The views of His Excellency the Lieutenant-General, and also

of His Excellency the High Commissioner, were both based on the assumption of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus, a contingency which, though it was of course a *possibility*, as it had been a possibility for the last thirty years, was, in the opinion of this Government, in the highest degree improbable, unless indeed it should be brought about by compromising action on our own part.

“The annexation of the Transvaal had indeed, as I have always admitted and pointed out, essentially altered the relations between English authority in South Africa and the Zulus; and as by that annexation the English inherited questions and disputes which might bring them at any moment into collision with the Zulus, so the situation of Natal, as a neighbouring country and a British colony, became necessarily much affected thereby. But, so far as regards the chances of an invasion of Natal territory by the Zulus, I believed then, and I believe now, that such a movement had never so much as entered into the counsels of the Zulu king and chiefs, and that it would have been utterly repugnant to the views of the greater portion of the Zulu nation. I believed then, as I believe now, that unless we ourselves provoked a quarrel or otherwise greatly changed the temper of the Zulu nation towards Natal, or unless, on other accounts, British authority in South Africa went to war with the Zulus, an attack by them upon Natal was to the very last degree improbable.

“There was then this material difference between the views of His Excellency the High Commissioner (Sir Bartle Frere) and the Lieutenant-General (Lord Chelmsford) on the one side, and those of the Natal Government on the other side, which must be taken into account in considering the action of this Government up to that time.

“Not, indeed, that we had disregarded the signs of trouble of which the altered position between British authority in South Africa and the Zulu king, and the questions between them, arising out of the annexation of the Transvaal territory and inherited with that territory, had of late been giving indications, or omitted to take precautionary measures for the better defence of the colony

but having the opportunity as we had by the long experience of this Government of discerning and appreciating, as I believe, at their proper value, the signs of the times, we not only did not anticipate the danger of an invasion by the Zulus, but considered that any overt act committed by us in the way of military demonstration would be a mistake, as being far more likely to bring about war and trouble than to prevent them."—(P. P. [C. 2676] p. 19.)

With this we must close our record of the Zulu War. In doing so, we feel that too many of the circumstances which we have thus recorded reflect no credit on the name of England—that name which as English men and women we most desire should be honoured by the world at large; and we realise with pain that, so far as our work may be perused by dwellers upon other shores, so far have we lessened the glory of our motherland in their eyes. But, however much we may regret the necessity, we do not therefore think it a less imperative duty to bring to the light as much as possible whatever wrong and injustice has been committed and concealed by those to whom England has entrusted her power and her fame. That the light of publicity should be thrown upon them is the first step towards their cure, or at least towards the prevention of any further wrong, and it is with the truest loyalty to our Sovereign, and the deepest love and reverence for our country, that we have undertaken the task now completed.

APPENDIX.

I.

ISANDHLWANA.

LORD CHELMSFORD'S STATEMENTS COMPARED WITH EVIDENCE. BY LIEUT.-COL. E. DURNFORD.

LORD CHELMSFORD (in speeches in the House of Lords on August 19th and September 2nd, and in a letter which appeared in the *Times* of August 25th) has made an attack upon the memory of my brother, the late Colonel Durnford, R.E., in what he calls "the true history of that unfortunate day" at Isandhlwana—22nd January, 1879. As a matter of simple justice to my brother's memory, I comment upon Lord Chelmsford's remarks, which I assert do not contain "the true history."

Lord Chelmsford, in describing the position of the camp, states: "There was no ground that commanded it to the left within a distance of 1,200 yards, and there was no ground that commanded it on the right at a less distance than 600 yards. Taking, therefore, into consideration the nature of the weapons with which the Zulus were armed, it might practically be said that the camp was not commanded from any position whatever near it."

Now, the slope from the foot of Isandhlwana was covered by the camp, or rather, line of camps—six in number—the waggons in rear of each camp. The front of the camp extended for about half a mile, and considerably overlapped the hill. The right flank rested on the base of a small hill to the right of Isandhlwana, and in the immediate rear of this flank was the "neck" of land connecting Isandhlwana with the small hill, and over which "neck" the Rorke's Drift road passed. This "neck" and small hill (called Stony Kopje, and afterwards Black's Kopje) commanded the right of the camp within pistol shot. On a reconnaissance sketch of Isandhlwana, by Captain Heneage, R.E., the notation on this hill is "small hill fifty yards from near end and commanding camp."

The northern end of Isandhlwana was likewise open, so that, although the hill might practically be "a wall," its ends were open, and commanded the position selected for the camp; and these open, vulnerable, undefended points rendered the position untenable.

I have it from the lips of an officer who served in Zululand (and whose rank is little inferior to that of Lord Chelmsford), that in his opinion there could scarcely have been found a more fatal place for a camp—the facilities for surprise were so great; and he said that the field told its own tale, not only of the retreat to the commanding ground on the right, and gallant stand made there, but also of the widely-spread camp, so absolutely impossible to defend.

The forcible manner in which Mr. Forbes describes the position does not appear to be exaggerated one whit. The most complete evidence is found in the Military Surveys of the "Battlefield" and "Country around Isandhlwana," by Captain Anstey, R.E., and Lieut. Penrose, R.E., lithographed at the Intelligence Branch, Q.-M.-G.'s Dept., Horse Guards. The small hill on the *immediate* right of the camp is shown to have a command of at least 170 feet over any part of the ground on which the camp was pitched.

And this Military Survey shows that the selection of the camping ground was far from being a matter of necessity, as a mile and a quarter in front of Isandhlwana camp stood, in the plain, a solitary steep hill—good camping ground—abundant water—and, in January, plenty of grass. It is said that this hill would have afforded an almost impregnable position for one or two companies, whilst the main force encamped below secure from surprise.

With regard to the garrison of the camp, Lord Chelmsford puts it at 1,100 rifles, "including 400 or 450 Basutos, who came and joined the camp with Colonel Durnford." The troops, armed with rifles, who came up with Colonel Durnford, were "about 250 mounted natives, followed by a rocket battery." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

Lord Chelmsford proceeds to describe his "1,100 Martini-Henry rifles" (which he had not got) defending "a front of 250 yards"; but unless he is prepared to show that he selected such a position for defence and gave directions "for the defence of such a position," his argument has wandered from the region of fact, and is therefore misleading.

Lord Chelmsford's speech continues—"When he left the camp early on the morning of the 22nd of January, 1879, orders were given to Colonel Pulleine by Major Clery, staff officer to Colonel Glyn, who was commanding the column, 'You will be in command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn. Draw in, I speak from memory, 'your camp, or your line of defence,' I am not certain which, 'while the force is out; also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced.' . . . In addition to the written orders which he had just read, Major Clery had a personal interview with Colonel Pulleine, and explained the orders which had been given. It was

impressed vividly on Colonel Pulleine's mind that his orders were to defend the camp. With regard to the orders he might himself have given, it was curious that one of his aides-de-camp, whom he met yesterday, told him for the first time that in his note-book relating the facts concerning the unfortunate day at Isandhlwana he found that he (Lord Chelmsford) had an interview with Colonel Pulleine, and in reply to his question as to any orders he might have to give him, that he had said, 'Defend the camp and do not leave it.' That was written after the affair, and could not be quoted as evidence; but it expressed plainly what his views were."

That is to say, we are asked to believe that upwards of eighteen months after the disaster a mere chance brings to Lord Chelmsford's mind what he had to do with "the orders he might himself have given" on the most eventful day of his life.

In none of the evidence is there the slightest hint of any anxiety on the part of Lord Chelmsford, or of any interview with Colonel Pulleine. Major Clery speaks of Colonel Pulleine as being in his tent, and Colonel Crealock, the military secretary, says, with reference to orders given, "I subsequently heard Major Clery state that he had left precise instructions to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine 'to defend the camp.'" The reference to an aide-de-camp, his note-book, and the orders Lord Chelmsford *might have given* is very extraordinary; but with respect to it I can state that an officer, present with Lord Chelmsford's force on that day, distinctly says that neither Lord Chelmsford nor his head-quarter staff left any orders, but that, when miles away from the camp, Lord Chelmsford asked what orders had been left for Colonel Pulleine.

The orders, as already detailed, were issued in writing by Major Clery, Colonel Glyn's senior staff-officer, and appear in his evidence given before the Court of Inquiry assembled on 27th January, 1879 (C. 2260, pp. 80-81). This officer does not say a single word of impressing "vividly on Colonel Pulleine's mind that his orders were to defend the camp."

By way of proof, I presume, that Colonel Pulleine understood his orders to be *not to leave the camp*, Lord Chelmsford describes what took place when a body of the enemy was first seen from the camp about 8 A.M.: "Upon this Colonel Pulleine at once assembled all his men in the open space between the men's tents and his (Lord Chelmsford's) head-quarter tents—that was to say, in the centre of the hill and close underneath it. . . . In the account which he was giving every word would be found in the official Blue Books."

I do *not* find the above account in the Blue Books, but I do find that the officers who were present gave evidence before the Court of Inquiry as follows:

Captain Essex, 75th Regiment, states that at this period Colonel Pulleine "thereupon caused the whole of the troops available to assemble near the eastern side of the camp, facing towards the reported direction of the enemy's approach." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

The "eastern side" of the camp was its *front*.

Lieut. Curling, R.A., says: "We were ordered to turn out at once, and were formed up in front of the 2nd battalion 24th Regiment camp, where we remained until 11 o'clock, when we returned to camp with orders to remain harnessed up and ready to turn out at a minute's notice. The Zulus did not come within range, and we did not come into action. The infantry also remained in column of companies." (C. 2260, p. 84.)

This, the evidence in the Blue Books, is supplemented by Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 column, who says: "All the forces were drawn up in front of the 2-24th and Native Contingent camp." And Major Chard, V.C., R.E., writes (April 13th, 1879): "When I arrived at the camp, the troops (white men) were . . . out of camp. Before Durnford came up, there was scarcely anybody in camp."

If Colonel Pulleine, at the first intimation of an enemy's approach, drew up his force outside the camp, as he is proved to have done, what inference can be drawn but that he was there on his recognised "line of defence"? The "Military Survey" shows that this position was on the left front of the camp, level to the rear (towards the camp) but with a command of 60 feet over the ground to the front, right, and left, at a distance of about 250 yards, and a command of 160 feet at a distance of between 700 and 800 yards. Boulders and stones on this rising ground afforded shelter.

Colonel Durnford reached the camp shortly after 10.30 A.M. (Major Chard).

Lord Chelmsford hints at a difference between Colonels Durnford and Pulleine—but this is disproved by Lieut. Cochrane. Indeed the whole description of this part of the day's events is exceedingly strained; and if Lord Chelmsford's version were correct, it would tend to prove that Colonel Pulleine was the officer still in command of the camp. (*Vide* his written orders.)¹

Lord Chelmsford says that Colonel Durnford "took upon himself to alter the instructions which Colonel Pulleine had received to keep the infantry pickets in and only have the cavalry vedettes out, and directed him to send a company of the 24th Regiment to the crest of the hill on the left, 2,300 yards distant."

Now, Lord Chelmsford has himself quoted the text of the orders given—"Draw in . . . your camp or your line of defence . . . while the force is out, also draw in the line of your infantry outposts accordingly, but keep your cavalry vedettes still far advanced"—which certainly does not convey the same meaning as the wording he now introduces.

The plain English of the orders seems to be that the line of "infantry outposts" was to be drawn in, in accordance with the drawing in of the "line of defence": and that there were infantry outposts is evident from there being "a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant on a hill to the north of the camp"

¹ On this subject more could be said.

(C. 2260, p. 82); and Lieutenant Cochrane says that "the natives of Lonsdale's contingent (infantry) were on outpost duty on the hills to the left."

It was on this range of hills that the company of the 24th was afterwards posted "to the north of the camp at about 1,200 yards distant" (C. 2260 p. 83)—not "2,300 yards" as Lord Chelmsford says. With an enemy showing on the left front—numbers unknown—the posting of this company was an absolutely necessary precaution, to prevent the enemy passing behind the hills to the rear of Isandhlwana, and thus surprising the camp; "at this time, about 11 A.M., the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the day-time, but might possibly be expected to attack during the night. No idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

The light and airy way in which Lord Chelmsford describes Colonel Durnford's movements ("Colonel Durnford . . . cantered away with two troops of Basutos to a distance of five or six miles to the front, leaving the rocket-battery escort to follow as best it could") hardly accords with the precautions this officer took from the instant he heard of the vicinity of the enemy. About 10.30 A.M. he met Lieut. Chard, R.E. who told him "of the movements of the enemy he had seen from the camp, and by his order rode back to Captain Russell, who was about a mile behind, and gave him the message to hurry up at once with his rocket-battery, and detach a company of Sikali men to protect the baggage which was following, and I passed the word all along the line to look out to the left." (Lieut. Chard, R.E.)

After his arrival at the camp, Colonel Durnford sent back one troop of Native Horse to strengthen his baggage guard, sent two troops, under Captain G. Shepstone, to the hills on the left "to ascertain the enemy's movements," and moved out to the front with two troops, followed by the rocket-battery and its escort—not "to follow as best it could," but to follow in case its services should be required.* This rocket-battery, Lord Chelmsford says, was "cut up and destroyed" by the enemy who had "been lying in ambush somewhere along the left bank (? flank), and had taken advantage of the unprotected condition of the battery." But the rocket-battery, instead of following Colonel Durnford along the valley, had turned to the left and ascended the hills, and then came upon the Zulu army which was rapidly advancing and driving in Captain Shepstone's men. The Captain of the escort says: "On hearing heavy firing on our left, and learning that the enemy were in that direction, we changed our direction to the left. Before nearly reaching the crest of the hills on the left of the camp we were attacked on all sides. One rocket was sent off, and the enemy was on us." (C. 2260, p. 82).

Lord Chelmsford next seeks to establish that Captain Shepstone

came into camp to ask for reinforcements in Colonel Durnford's name, and that "Colonel Durnford instructed Captain Shepstone, that if he saw that he had got into difficulties he should go back to Colonel Pulleine, and, using his name, ask for reinforcements. But, be that as it may, Colonel Pulleine sent out a company, which came into action on the crest of the hill, and shortly after a third company was sent out."

Lord Chelmsford here wishes to convey an impression for which he has not the slightest warranty. The Blue Books clearly show (as we shall presently see) that the sending out of these companies had nothing to do with Captain Shepstone.

Lieut. Cochrane, who had been with Colonel Durnford, says that if Captain Shepstone asked for reinforcements in Colonel Durnford's name, "he asked for them without Colonel Durnford's authority."

The officer commanding the troop of Native Horse (which Captain Shepstone took along the hills) says that, when the Zulu army was discovered, Captain Shepstone ordered his men "to retire on to the camp, and he himself would go to camp and inform them that the whole Zulu army was advancing to attack it."

Captain Essex's evidence proves that Colonel Pulleine did not send the reinforcements to the mounted men, but did send them to reinforce the company on picquet. He says, "at about 12 o'clock, hearing firing on the hill where the company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, was stationed, I proceeded in that direction. On my way I passed a company, 1st Battalion 24th Regiment, under command of Captain Mostyn, who requested me, being mounted, to direct Lieut. Cavaye to take special care not to endanger the right of his company, and to inform that officer that he himself was moving up to the left. I also noticed a body of Lieut.-Colonel Durnford's Mounted Natives retiring down the hill, but did not see the enemy . . . Captain Mostyn moved his company into the space between the portions of that already on the hill, and his men then extended and entered into action." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

Within a few minutes these companies were ordered to retire towards the camp, Captain Younghusband's company "in echelon on the left"; and eventually they "retired to within 300 yards of that portion of the camp occupied by the Native Contingent."

Lord Chelmsford says that Colonel Pulleine "had drawn up the remaining force, placing two guns at right-angles in front of the camp, and about half a mile from it."

The position is described by Captain Gardner as "on the extreme left of our camp and facing towards the left, from which direction the enemy were advancing in great numbers." (*Ib.* p. 101.)

Lieut. Curling describes it as "about 400 yards beyond the left front of the Natal Contingent camp." (*Ib.* p. 84.)

The position is clearly shown in the "Military Survey," and in an official sketch map published in C. 2676, facing p. 72.

Lord Chelmsford does not seem to have grasped the fact that Colonel Durnford was engaged "down in the plain" with the mounted troops, keeping in check the left "horn" of the Zulu army, and slowly falling back before it; and that it was almost immediately after reaching "the spruit running across the front of the camp," that he told Captain Gardner "that he considered our position too extended"; and then evidently endeavoured to withdraw the troops, not into the camp, but to the commanding ground on the extreme right.

Lord Chelmsford says the troops "were extended in open line (? order) on a line 2,000 yards instead of on one of 250 yards long." Captain Gardner says the troops were "in line" (C. 2260, pp. 81, 101), and the official maps show that the position occupied by the artillery and infantry was of very limited extent (at the outside 500 yards) on the rising ground before mentioned—the infantry "in good position among the stones and boulders." The mounted troops were detached to the right front "to check the enemy's turning movement."

"Inside the camp," Lord Chelmsford says, "not a man, except a few servants and orderlies, was left to defend it." One would imagine he was speaking of a defensible post, instead of an array of tents, waggons, &c., scattered along a front of about half a mile.

Lord Chelmsford calls his statement a "true, plain, and unvarnished tale"; but such a tale would require a little more adherence to the text of the evidence, as well as the relation of all circumstances which had any bearing on the disaster. Lord Chelmsford omits all mention of many circumstances of the gravest importance—*e.g.* How 20,000 Zulus came to be lying hidden within a few miles of his camp on the 21st and 22nd without his having any knowledge of it, although we learn that on the afternoon of the 21st he rode up to the high land on the left of the camp and saw "fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four miles?" (C. 2454, p. 183). Lord Chelmsford "determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day" (*ib.*, see also C. 2260, p. 99), but instead of doing so, marched off with more than half his force in another direction.

What explanation is there of the absence of all defensive precautions? This is apparent in No. 3 Column alone; and, with regard to the camp at Isandhlwana, it is a fact that the officer commanding the column had suggested forming a laager; but, unfortunately, Lord Chelmsford had permitted no laagering or entrenchment since entering Zululand, and so he dismissed the suggestion with the remark, "Oh! it would take a week to make."

The circumstances which induced an officer to march to the

relief of the camp, and his recall, must be considered as having some connection with the disaster, yet they are not even hinted at.

The circumstances under which No. 3 Column came to be divided on the 22nd, with no efficient means of communication, have also an important bearing.

And with regard to the general circumstances surrounding No. 3 Column at this period, a certain correspondence with Colonel Glyn would, if produced, probably throw some light on the subject.

Lord Chelmsford sums up thus:—"Every one, he thought, must admit that the camp had not been lost through having an inefficient garrison, or because the position was an unfit one for the number of troops to defend, but because the strict orders for its defence which had been given had not been carried out."

To which I reply—

1. The troops, in a defensible post, would, no doubt, have proved both efficient and sufficient.
2. The proof is conclusive that the position at Isandhlwana was indefensible as it stood—open to attack at close quarters on both flanks—a trap—the right of the camp resting on the base of a small hill that flanked and commanded the position. The position of that open camp was most unfit for defence, and Lord Chelmsford is the man responsible for its selection, and who did not take or allow to be taken any defensive precautions whatever.
3. There is no evidence that "strict orders for its defence" were given or even thought of, or that any given orders were departed from. But there is evidence that the disaster was the result of other and very different circumstances.

If Lord Chelmsford claims that his intention was for all the troops to remain between his line of camps and the Isandhlwana Hill, under whatever circumstances might arise, he proves his own incompetency: for an enemy, passing unchecked round the adjacent hills, could at his leisure assemble behind Isandhlwana without once being seen by the camp defenders, and attack at close quarters on both flanks; whilst Isandhlwana itself could be ascended from the north—the hill on the right flanked and commanded the position—and the front would be covered by tents and waggons conveniently placed to mask a front attack.

Next I come to Lord Chelmsford's letter—*Times*, August 25th—in which he says: "The story of the Isandhlwana disaster which I told on the 19th inst. was a simple narrative of facts, taken from the evidence given before the Court of Inquiry, of which Colonel Hassard, Royal Engineers, was President. That evidence was published in the official Blue Books." I have shown that Lord Chelmsford's narrative not only does *not* accord with, but is to a great extent contradicted by, "the evidence given before

the Court of Inquiry," which "was published in the official Blue Books;" and therefore it has no claim to be considered a "narrative of facts."

Lord Chelmsford does not admit that "Colonel Durnford was justified in quitting the camp, the command of which he had just taken over;"—but, finding that no one knew anything of the ground on the left front beyond the immediate vicinity of the camp further than that Zulu horsemen had been seen there on the previous afternoon, and that detached bodies of Zulus were then hovering about (although it might have been in accordance with Lord Chelmsford's strategy to order up a body of native horse for the purpose of remaining within the lines of an open unentrenched camp); it certainly was Colonel Durnford's obvious duty to use his cavalry and feel the enemy. And, with regard to this, Lord Chelmsford himself, writing on April 18th, 1879, on the defence of the border, lays down a principle which is quite as applicable here:—"If a force placed on the defensive along a border river, which is fordable at numerous points (in this case read—in an open camp, surrounded on three sides by hills, and liable to surprise from numerous points) content itself with remaining on the passive defensive without endeavouring, by means of scouting in small bodies or by raiding in large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its immediate front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered." (C. 2318, p. 80.)

"Had Colonel Durnford," says Lord Chelmsford, "before riding away from the camp with two troops of mounted natives, taken steps to see that its garrison were properly placed in the best position for its defence, and had he left instructions as to the measures which should be taken to improve a naturally strong position, I should still consider that he had departed from the orders which he had received. The evidence, however, is absolutely silent on this point, and it must be assumed that Colonel Durnford felt no anxiety regarding the security of the camp he was ordered to defend, and that he did not consider any special precautions, such as entrenchments or laagers, were necessary."

One can only admire (!) Lord Chelmsford's argument—so calmly ascribing to Colonel Durnford the very points that depict *his own* neglected duties.

There is not one word in the orders proved to have been given to either Colonels Durnford or Pulleine to warrant Lord Chelmsford's statement; and it is quite impossible to see why Colonel Durnford, who had just come up, should have felt anxiety when Lord Chelmsford manifestly had none, or why he should have laagered at 10.30 A.M., in the face of Lord Chelmsford's refusal to allow laager to be formed.

Then Lord Chelmsford says: "It was found impossible to dig even a simple shelter trench near the hill of Isandhlwana, owing to the rock cropping up so close to the surface. This fact was clearly

established when the first efforts were made to bury those who fell in and about the camp."

One would naturally infer from Lord Chelmsford's remarks, that he *had* endeavoured to form shelter trenches, but the fact is "clearly established" that he had not. The "first efforts were made to bury those who fell" on the 21st May, 1879, by a force that was *without tools*: and, further, the state of the soil in the dry season, when it is like stone, does not establish that in January (wet season) shelter trenches could not have been formed. In C. 2676, p. 72, we read that in March, 1880, "a trench was dug on the upper side of the place where the Carbineers were buried"—this was on the right, where the 1-24th Regiment camp was pitched.

Lord Chelmsford makes some rather vague remarks on waggon laagers, but he fails to produce one single reason why a laager should have been formed after he had declined to allow one to be made. "One hour would certainly have completed the work," he now writes; *then* he said "it would take a week to make."

The Blue Book tells us that up to about twelve o'clock "no idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force," and "the impression in camp was that the enemy had no intention of advancing during the day-time." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

It is, therefore, clear that when the attack commenced "about twelve o'clock," there was a very formidable "emergency of attack," and no time whatever for the formation of waggon laager.

A propos to this, I may mention the forcible advice given to Lord Chelmsford on the 16th January, 1879, by Mr. J. J. Uys (brother of Petrus L. Uys, who was killed at Indhlobane), a man who had perhaps more experience in Zulu warfare than any one in South Africa.

In a letter dated 22nd May, 1879, published in South African papers, Mr. Uys writes that on the 16th January he was in the camp of the General at Rorke's Drift, and said to him: "Be on your guard and be careful. I have knowledge of the deceit and treachery of the Zulu nation. Trek into Zululand with two laagers close to each other. Place your spies far out, and form your waggons into a round laager. The Zulus are more dangerous than you think. I lost my father and my brother through them because we held them too cheaply. Afterwards we went with Andries Pretorius, but then we were careful, and have always closed our waggons well up, sent our spies far out, and we have beaten the Zulus. The first time 3,600 of their number fell." Mr. Uys continues: "The General smiled, and said that he thought it was not necessary."

Mr. Uys made the following remark to his brother on the 17th: "Why do they not trek the waggons together with one pole (disselboom) of one waggon under the other waggon, and close them up? I know the Zulus; if the waggons are open the Zulus will come in, be the soldiers never so brave and smart. Close up

the laager, and beware of mountainous country, broken ground, and long grass and bushes, with your few men."

How Lord Chelmsford estimated the advice of Mr. Uys and the representations of Colonel Glyn and others may be gathered from the fact that on the morning of the 22nd of January—the twelfth day of the invasion of Zululand—thirty-five waggons laden with ammunition were moving up to Helpmakaar without escort on a road close to the Zulu border. The main store depôt of the column at Helpmakaar (about twelve miles from Rorke's Drift) had no defensive work. Rorke's Drift, a post of vital importance to the safety of the column, had no entrenchment of any sort, and the head-quarter camp was in the same condition.

I pass on to Lord Chelmsford's speech in the House of Lords on the 2nd of September. Speaking of "the story related in reference to Colonel Harness," Lord Chelmsford says "Colonel Harness had himself referred to the incident in an article in *Fraser's Magazine*, and had given quite a different account, and, as a matter of fact, the statement that he was in a position to afford relief to the camp was quite incorrect. He (Lord Chelmsford) was on his way to the camp—it must have been between three and half-past, the whole affair being over at one o'clock—when he saw Colonel Harness about 500 yards from him, moving off in the direction of the camp being then ten miles distant from Isandhlwana. Major Gosset, his aide-de-camp, asked him if he should go and stop the battery, and he said 'Yes, he could not understand why they were moving,' and yet in the public prints there had been an accusation that Major (now Lieut.-Colonel) Gosset, prevented valuable reinforcements going on to the camp, and was almost accountable for the disaster. There was not a particle of truth in the story."

Lord Chelmsford's assertions are flatly contradicted by two of his own staff, and by an officer who was present with Colonel Harness; and, further, in Colonel Harness' article in *Fraser*, April 1880, *there is no allusion whatever to the episode in question.*

The facts appear to be as follows:

Lieut. Milne, A.D.C., says: "At this time, about 10 A.M., the infantry, guns, and field ambulances were about one mile in our rear, the Royal Artillery experiencing great difficulty in getting their guns over the watercourses. Orders were accordingly sent for half a battalion of the 24th to come to the neck on which we were, the remainder to escort the guns and ambulances back to the entrance of the Mongeni Valley, and there halt until further orders." (C. 2454, p. 183.) And Colonel Crealock says that about 11.0 A.M. Colonel Glyn "ordered back the four guns and two companies 2-24th to the waggon track, with instructions to join him near the Mangane Valley." (C. 2260, p. 99)

Colonel Harness had to move back to the waggon track to get his guns round to the rendezvous, and, after a short halt to let men and horses have a rest, moved back for a distance of about two miles,

halting on some rising ground about 12 o'clock to wait for Major Black, 2-24th Regiment, who was to direct the force to the rendezvous. Almost immediately after halting the fire of cannon was heard and shells were seen bursting against the hills to the left of the camp. Whilst wondering what this could mean, a body of about 1,000 natives appeared on the plain below, and were pronounced (by the Native Pioneers who accompanied Colonel Harness' force) to be Zulus. Captain Church, 2-24th, volunteered to ride forward and ascertain who they were. As he galloped towards them, a European officer rode out to meet him, and said, "The troops behind me are Commandant Browne's contingent, and I am sent to give you this message, 'Come in every man, for God's sake; the camp is surrounded and will be taken unless helped at once.'"

Captain Church delivered this message to Colonel Harness, who then was in conversation with Major Black and Major Gosset, A.D.C. Colonel Harness decided to march to camp. Major Gosset ridiculed the idea, and, advising him to carry out his orders, rode away in the direction of the General.

At 1.30 P.M. Colonel Harness was marching towards the camp, and had gone about two miles when he was overtaken by Major Gosset with orders to march back to the rendezvous. (Captain Church, 2-24th Regt.)

Lieut. Milne, A.D.C., states, "I then rejoined the General, and about 12.30 on-saddled and proceeded over the hills on our right, in the direction of the Mongeni Valley, and about half-past one arrived at Mongeni Valley, where we found Colonel Glyn and staff . . . we then went on to look for bivouacking ground for the night, and had not gone far when one of the mounted natives came and reported heavy firing at the camp. We immediately proceeded to the head of the Mongeni Valley, from where we could see the camp, but observed no firing. In the meantime news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing, and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and rejoin Colonel Glyn. The General now made up his mind to return to camp, and leave Colonel Glyn with the troops." (C. 2454, p. 184.)

"The whole affair" was not "over at one o'clock." Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat from Isandhlwana at "about 1.30 P.M." (C. 2260, p. 84.) Colonel Crealock speaks of "two cannon shots" having been heard "about 1.15," and says "about 1.45 P.M., however, a native appeared on a hill above us gesticulating and calling. He reported that heavy firing had been going on round the camp." (C. 2260, p. 100.)

Perhaps a more certain indication of the hour may be found in Lieutenant Chard's despatch of January 25th, 1879, in which he says (of January 22nd) "about 3.15 P.M. on that day I was at the ponds, when two men came riding from Zululand at a gallop, and

shouted to be taken across the river. I was informed by one of them of the disaster at Isandula camp." (C. 2260, p. 85.)

These men had ridden for their lives a distance of about nine miles, and must have been out of the fight before the Zulus had blocked the Rorke's Drift road: one hour, under the circumstances, would more than cover the distance, so we may fairly consider the Zulu rush and falling back of the troops to have taken place about two o'clock.

The troops fell back fighting—intermingled with the Zulus. A large body won their way to the extreme right of the camp, and there made a stand, until their ammunition failed; even then, a Zulu says, "we were quite unable to break their square until we had killed a great many of them, by throwing our assegais at short distances. We eventually overcame them in this way." All this would occupy a considerable time, and I have evidence from officers present with the force out of camp, that firing on the extreme right of the camp was seen up to about 3.30 p.m.

Another evidence of the duration of the struggle is Colonel Durnford's watch (taken from his body on the morning of the 23rd). He was amongst those who formed the last group that fought it out; his death-wound caused the stoppage of his watch—the time, 3.40.

Lord Chelmsford says, that "in point of fact, he only received one message from the camp in the course of that day, which was that mentioned in his despatch, which had been sent to him at eight o'clock in the morning, and which was received by him at 9.30, which merely gave the information that a body of the enemy had been noticed in a north-westerly direction. From half-past nine until he reached the camp on his return, not a single message, if any were despatched, had reached him. His statement on this point was fully corroborated by Lieut.-Colonel Crealock."

Now, Lord Chelmsford states in his despatch of January 27th, 1879, "Colonel Glyn received about 9.30 A.M., a short note from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, saying that firing was heard to the left front of the camp, but giving no further particulars." (C. 2252, p. 76.)

Lieut.-Colonel Crealock states "the first intimation that reached me on the 22nd of there being a force of Zulus in the neighbourhood of the camp, was between 9.30 and 10.0 A.M. We were then off-saddled on a neck facing the Isipise range, distant some twelve miles from camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up, without a shot, most commanding positions. Major Clery at this time received a half sheet of foolscap with a message from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine informing him (I think it ran) that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front." (C. 2260, p. 99.)

Lieut. Milne, R.N., A.D.C., states: "A slip of paper was received

by the General from Colonel Pulleine, saying that the enemy was collecting in large numbers on the high ground to the left of the camp." (C. 2454, p. 183.)

The *Natal Colonist* of 30th January, 1879, contains a narrative by Captain Newman—Special Correspondent of the *Times of Natal*—who says, "We had not gone far on the road when a mounted messenger came up with a note from Colonel Pulleine to the General, saying that the camp was attacked by large numbers of Kafirs, and asked him to return with all the help at his command. With this we halted, and awaited the upcoming of the General, who came along at once, and proceeded up the valley to reconnoitre."

This message corresponds in a marked manner with one mentioned by Captain Gardner, who says "a few minutes after my arrival in camp, I sent a message directed to the staff officer, 3rd column, saying that our left was attacked by about 10,000 of the enemy; a message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine." (C. 2260, p. 81.)

With regard to the "one message," Lord Chelmsford's statement on September 2nd, 1880, is hopelessly at variance with that in his despatch of January 27th, 1879; and the different aspect the messages in evidence present renders it impossible that they could refer to one and the same message.

Various officers speak of more than one message, and a response to the order conveyed by Captain Gardner to Colonel Pulleine must have been received, as an officer states "it was certainly sent off, and we of the reconnoitring column knew that there would be a delay in the arrival of our tents and food," and this message from Colonel Pulleine is said to have been to the effect that "he did not think that he would be able to comply with the order just at present as the enemy were showing themselves in great numbers on our left front. It should be done however as soon as possible." (Compare this with Lieutenant Milne's statement above.)

And here it may be proper to remark upon the limited scope of the Court of Inquiry. Colonel Glyn is mentioned by Lord Chelmsford, and Major Clery by Colonel Crealock, as recipients of a message from the camp; but Major Clery's evidence ends with his leaving camp, and Colonel Glyn, the commanding officer of the column, and who, doubtless, could have given valuable information, merely corroborates Major Clery's statements.

In fact there was no inquiry worthy of the name: and the scope of the inquiry as mentioned in official despatches does not accord with the instructions given to the Court. Lord Chelmsford writes (February 8th, 1879), "I have the honour to forward herewith the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to take evidence regarding the disastrous affair of Isandula." (C. 2260, p. 80.) Now, Colonel Harness, a member of the Court, writes in *Fraser*, April 1880: "Mr. Forbes is evidently not aware that instructions were

given to the Court to inquire into the 'loss of the camp on January 22,' and *not* 'into the circumstances of the disastrous affair of Isandhlwana.' To a careless or indifferent reader, there will not appear much difference between these two heads of instruction; but a little consideration will show that there is a wide distinction, and that the 'disastrous affair of Isandhlwana' offers a much wider field of investigation than the 'loss of the camp.' The duties of the Court were, I hold to be, to ascertain what orders were given for the defence of the camp, and how these orders were carried out."

Looking at the case with the light thrown upon it by Colonel Harness, Mr. Forbes does not seem far wrong in saying "This tribunal was a solemn mockery."

Lord Chelmsford denies "that the invading columns were too far apart to render each other mutual support."

At the first advance into Zululand No. 1 Column was at a distance of upwards of eighty miles from No. 3, and moved independently up to Etshowe.

No. 2 Column remained on the Natal border.

No. 4 Column was about thirty-five miles from No. 3. These distances being "as the crow flies."

As to the "mutual support" of Nos. 3 and 4 Columns, it appears that on January 14th, Lord Chelmsford—having met Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 Column, on the 11th, by previous arrangement—writes: "Colonel Wood returned to his camp the same day. I have not heard since from him, but I sent him an express yesterday, the 13th." (C. 2242, p. 46.)

On January 16th Lord Chelmsford writes, that having found that "at this season of the year a rapid advance into the heart of Zululand is absolutely impossible . . . accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine what modification of the plan of campaign at first laid down will be necessary. . . . Colonel Wood, commanding No. 4 Column, has been informed of these intended movements, and has been instructed to act together (*sic*) independently about the head waters of the White Umveloosi River. When Seketwayo has either surrendered or been defeated, which can only take a few more days to decide, Colonel Wood will take up a position covering Utrecht and the adjacent Transvaal border, wherever he considers his force can be most usefully employed." (C. 2252, p. 63.)

Before the 22nd January, No. 4 Column had moved up to Tinta's kraal, on the southern bank of the White Umveloosi, and there constructed a stone laager fort, at a distance of forty-three miles from Isandhlwana. On the 21st and 22nd January No. 4 Column moved some miles further north, and did not hear of the disaster to No. 3 Column till the 24th January.

Lord Chelmsford states that, "the ground occupied by the enemy on the day in question . . . had been carefully reconnoitred on

the day before, without the Zulus being discovered. Lieutenant Browne, 24th Regiment, and a party of mounted infantry, went out by his (Lord Chelmsford's) orders, in the direction from which the Zulus advanced, and he must have passed close to the spot where they bivouacked that night. He saw, however, no trace of a large force, simply because they were not there till after dark that evening."

But the ground reconnoitred by the mounted infantry was *not* to the left front where the Zulu army bivouacked. Colonel Crealocks says: "The Lieut.-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our left front) on the 21st. A patrol of the mounted infantry had found another small body of the enemy in our front, and Major Dartnell, we knew, had a strong force before him on our right front. It was evident to me that the Zulu forces were in our neighbourhood, and the General had decided, on the evening of the 21st, to make a reconnaissance to our left front." (C. 2260, p. 99.)

Lord Chelmsford finds it convenient to *assume* that the Zulu army did not bivouac behind the hills on the left front of the camp, so he says: "The enemy did not advance from the direction of the mountains to the north of Isandhlwana; but from the eastward two of their columns, however, moved along the top of these mountains, and came down upon the camp that way."

This assertion is entirely incorrect, and the fact remains that the ground on which the mounted Zulu scouts were seen was never reconnoitred at all. Lord Chelmsford allows that the Zulu army was on the night of the 21st within striking distance of his force, and, whatever he may say, *nothing* can justify either the neglect which permitted such an unknown and unsuspected movement of the enemy, or the subdivision of No. 3 Column, under the circumstance in which it was situated.

That the Zulus did bivouac behind the hills on the left front of the camp the following evidence shows. A statement taken from a Zulu deserter by Mr. Drummond, of the head-quarter staff, says: "On the 21st, keeping away to the eastward, we occupied a valley running north and south under the spurs of the Ngutu Hill, which concealed the Isandhlwana Hill, distant from us about four miles, and nearly due west of our encampment. Our scouts also reported to us that they had seen the vedettes of the English force at sunset on some hills west-south-west of us (Lord Chelmsford with some of his staff rode up in this direction, and about this time, and saw some of the mounted enemy)."—*Times*, March 22nd, 1879.

Another Zulu account says: "We arrived at Ingqutu eight regiments strong (20,000 to 25,000 men), and slept in the valley of a small stream which runs into the Nondweni River to the eastward of Sandhlana."

Evidence taken on the spot fixes the exact position occupied by the Zulu army on the night of the 21st behind the hills on the left

front of Lord Chelmsford's camp—the extreme right three miles N.N.E., and almost in direct prolongation of the line of the camps; the left about five miles to the left front, and E. of the camp. My informant is a distinguished officer who served throughout the campaign, and who, as an authority, is probably second to none.

When the Zulu army was discovered by Captain G. Shepstone, its advance was direct from the bivouacs, and hence the swiftness of the attack on the company on picquet and camp.

"On the morning of the attack," Lord Chelmsford says, "the vedette was placed, as usual, three miles in advance, and he gave notice of the approach of the enemy long before the actual attack took place, and which, therefore, could not be characterised as a surprise."

The Blue Book says nothing of a vedette "three miles in advance," but that about 8 A.M. "a report arrived from a picquet stationed at a point about 1,500 yards distant, on a hill to the north of the camp, that a body of the enemy's troops could be seen approaching from the north-east." (C. 2260, p. 82).:

Information was sent to Lord Chelmsford; and if he assumes that what was seen was a sure indication that the Zulu army was present, or approaching, and that therefore the attack on the camp "could not be characterised as a surprise," he places himself on the horns of a dilemma; as he himself between 9 and 10 A.M. received all the information known at the camp, and took no notice whatever of it. Up to about twelve o'clock the camp force had no further knowledge of the enemy, and "no idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force." (C. 2260, p. 83.)

A letter from Captain Essex, dated January 25th, 1879, shows how short was the "notice of the approach of the enemy"; he says: "I had been present all this time, but wishing to write some letters and thinking everything was now quiet, I went to my tent and sat down, and was soon busy with my papers. About noon, a sergeant came into my tent and told me that firing was to be heard behind the hill where the company of the 1st Battalion 24th had been sent. I had my glasses over my shoulder, and thought I might as well take my revolver; but did not trouble to put on my sword, as I thought nothing of the matter and expected to be back in half an hour to complete my letters."

The Zulu army was discovered by Captain G. Shepstone and his troop of Native Horse; and this officer rode straight back to camp with the tidings that the Zulu army was advancing to attack it—reaching camp about twelve o'clock—just before the Zulu attack upon it.

The camp therefore *was* surprised.

Lord Chelmsford says, "with regard to the assertion that on receiving the message that the camp was attacked, he should at once

have returned with his force to its assistance, he had already explained that, by some extraordinary fatality, he never received such a message, if it had been ever sent. All he could say . . . was, that neither he nor any of his staff received more than the one to which he had referred at half-past nine in the morning; and the fact that he immediately sent a messenger back to Colonel Pulleine was a refutation of the charge brought against him."

The question of messages *from the camp* has already been discussed, but the following evidence will hardly warrant Lord Chelmsford's plea that he had received no "message that the camp was attacked."

1. Information conveyed to him by his A.D.C., Major Gosset, when he reported Colonel Harness' march towards the camp on receipt of the message from Commandant Browne, "Come in every man, for God's sake, the camp is surrounded and will be taken unless helped at once."

2. Reports of an attack on the camp—Colonel Crealock says: "Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a thing until about 1.15, when Hon. Mr. Drummond said he fancied he had heard (and that natives were certain of it) two cannon shots. We were then moving back to choose a camp for the night, about twelve miles distant from Isandula. About 1.45 P.M., however, a native appeared on a hill above us, gesticulating and calling. He reported that heavy firing had been going on round the camp." (C. 2260, p. 100.)

Lieutenant Milne, A.D.C., says: "We then went on to look for bivouacking ground for the night, and had not gone far when one of the mounted natives came and reported heavy firing at the camp." (C. 2454 p. 184.)

How the charge against Lord Chelmsford is refuted by "the fact that he immediately sent a messenger back to Colonel Pulleine," on receipt of the message that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on the left front of the camp, is not quite apparent, as the message sent back simply ignored the Zulus, or any prospect of danger, altogether. Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, says: "I left the force with the General about 10.30 A.M., and rode back to Isandula camp, with the order to Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp, and entrench it." (C. 2260, p. 101.)

Lord Chelmsford says: "that the fact of his sending for Colonel Durnford was evidence that he wished to have him close at hand in order that his advice might be available on engineering questions."

Here again facts appear to contradict his lordship, for he was not destitute of Engineer officers; and Colonel Hassard, C.B., R.E., senior to Colonel Durnford, was upon Lord Chelmsford's staff, and

upon the 22nd of January was "close at hand," being between Helpmakaar and Rorke's Drift. (C. 2260 p. 88.)

Colonel Durnford's advance was arranged some days before the 22nd. On January 14th, Lord Chelmsford writes "Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, met me on my return to camp (11th January), as he wished personally to report on certain matters connected with his command. I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually to cross at the Gates of Natal, between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket-battery were to join me with No 3 Column. I directed the remaining two battalions to cross at Middledrift as soon as Colonel Pearson with No. 1 Column had reached Ekowe." (C. 2242, pp. 46-47.)

And again Lord Chelmsford writes, on the 19th of January, "One of Colonel Durnford's regiments will cross the river from the Sandspruit Valley, whilst his Mounted Natives will co-operate with us from Rorke's Drift, where they will be to-morrow (20th)." (C. 2260, p. 16.)

It is thus evident that Colonel Durnford's movements were arranged in his capacity as the officer commanding No. 2 Column.

Had Lord Chelmsford adhered to the "evidence . . . published in the official Blue Books" I should not have said a word; but when main facts are put on one side, and others distorted to suit the theory of grievous blame to the dead that Lord Chelmsford has wantonly laid down, it is incumbent on me to challenge his assertions.

In what I have written, I have as far as possible adhered to the evidence contained in the Blue Books. Wherever I have not named my authority, I can furnish the information privately if desired.

Lord Chelmsford bases his case on one theory alone, avoiding important issues demanding the first and principal consideration; how he has sought to establish his case, I have endeavoured to show; and I think, I may fairly say, that, under even a cursory examination of *facts*, his case breaks down.

A full and impartial inquiry into the whole of the circumstances attending the disaster at Isandhlwana is imperatively demanded; for it is evident, from Colonel Harness' statement, that neither a full nor an impartial inquiry has yet been made.

Some words lately spoken by a distinguished soldier may fittingly close my remarks.

On the 28th September, 1880, Brigadier-General Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., K.C.B., speaking to a Deputation from Natal (the occasion being the presentation of a handsome memorial), said: ". . . Yet surely no greater proof of devoted steadiness was ever given than that shown by the Natal Carbineers on the 22nd January, 1879.

"Imagine a gentle slope, up which is storming a resistless surging wave of encircling black bodies, which, though constantly smitten

with leaden hail, breaks but to sweep on again with renewed force. Imagine a crowd of terrified non-combatants and friendly natives flying through the already burning camp, and pressing on to the rapidly narrowing outlet over the fatal Nek.

"Then there comes on the scene a one-armed man, who having slowly fallen back before the ever-increasing foe, is now determined to die. 'Save yourself! as for me, I shall remain.' He thus dismisses a staff officer and Hlubi's black soldiers, who vainly urge the great chief to seek safety with them. Recognising his commanding courage, around him gather some twenty similar spirits, who, nobly disdaining death, resolve to cover the retreat of the guns, and die with him.

"That melancholy field of Isandhlwana has a record of what colonists did, in silence and death, none the less a living record, now and for ever.

"In the place where Durnford fell there was a heap of slain: the enemy lay thick about him; but your sons were as close, and the brave hearts of the best of your fighting men ceased to beat in the effort to shelter their elected heroic leader.

"He himself was fully worthy their devotion; and, History will narrate, the ring of dead white men that encircled him formed a halo round his and their renown."

EDWARD DURNFORD,
Lieut.-Colonel.

15th November, 1880.

COLONEL DURNFORD'S ORDERS.

As regards the supposed order to Colonel Durnford to "take command of" the camp of No. 3 Column, on the 22nd January, 1879, the following is noted as proof that such an order was *not* given :

1. Colonel Durnford was in command of another Column, No. 2.
2. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine received definite orders to take command of the camp "*during the absence of Colonel Glyn.*"
3. The orders sent back to camp (conveyed by Captain A. Gardner, 14th Hussars) *were addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine*, and reached camp about noon, showing that Colonel Pulleine was *then* considered to be in command. These orders arrived just as the action commenced, and were "to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp and entrench it." (C. 2260, p. 101.) This further proves the total absence of any idea of present emergency or danger.
4. Colonel Durnford's movements had been previously arranged. Lord Chelmsford writes—January 14th, 1879—"Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., commanding No. 2 Column, met me on my return to camp (January 11th) as he wished personally to report on certain matters connected with his command . . . I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually cross at the Gates of Natal between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket-battery were to join me with No. 3 Column. I directed the two remaining battalions to cross at Middledrift as soon as Colonel Pearson with No. 1 Column had reached Ekowe." (C. 2242, pp. 46, 47.)

And on January 19th, Lord Chelmsford writes—"One of Colonel Durnford's regiments will cross the river from the Sandspruit Valley, whilst his mounted natives will co-operate with us from Rorke's Drift, where they will be to-morrow (20th)." (C. 2260, p. 16.)

5. Lieut. Smith-Dorrien, who conveyed the order of the 22nd to Colonel Durnford's camp, said it was "to bring them up, as a battle was expected."
6. Colonel Durnford, when he received the order, said, "Ah! just what I expected. We are to go on at once." The General has gone out to attack an Impi" (Lieut. Cochrane) —showing plainly that the order referred to previous instructions; and such a remark would most certainly *not* have fallen from this high-spirited officer had the order been, "take command of" No. 3 Column camp.
7. Captain G. Shepstone, who received and opened the order at Colonel Durnford's camp, wrote as follows :—

"ROKKE'S DRIFT, 6 A.M.,
22 Jan. 1879.

"DEAR MR. HENDERSON,

"Colonel Durnford started an hour ago on a commanding expedition to obtain waggons—a despatch has just been handed in ordering us to advance *at once*, as the General is advancing to attack a Zulu force 10 miles distant from him. I have sent Alfred after the Colonel, and meanwhile am striking camp. More anon.

Y^{rs}. GEO. SHEPSTONE."

8. When Colonel Durnford reached Isandhlwana camp, Colonel Pulleine said it was hard lines he should come and keep him out of a brevet. Colonel Durnford replied that he need not put himself out about it, for he would not interfere with his command. (Lieut. Cochrane was present, and heard this said.)
9. And that Colonel Durnford did not consider himself commander of the camp force is further shown by his actions; and by Lieut. Cochrane, who writes that, during the engagement, "Colonel Durnford sent me into camp to ask the officer commanding Royal Artillery to put a few shells into a kraal where a very large number of Zulus were collecting. It was merely a request, not an order."
10. Colonel Durnford's previous career may be called in evidence—in it we find a very marked determination to carry out orders at all cost. Take for instance his behaviour at the Bushman's River Pass, in November 1873, where he was ordered to hold the pass against a native tribe in arms, but on no account to fire the first shot. The most imminent peril in which he and his small detachment were placed did not for one moment make him swerve from his orders.

It is quite clear that Colonel Durnford did not in any way interfere with the camp force; and this fact, together with what is

noted here, renders it absolutely impossible that he could have received such an order as "take command of" No. 3 Column camp.


I need not speculate as to how the words "take command of" appear in Lieut.-Colonel Crealock's statement,—the only evidence of the orders given,—but they complete *the theory of blame*, as to which the *Natal Witness* of May 29th, 1879, says, "It is notorious that certain members of Lord Chelmsford's staff—there is no need to mention any name or names—came down to Maritzburg after the disaster, prepared to make Colonel Durnford bear the whole responsibility." And the *Daily News* of April 8th, 1879, speaks of Colonel Crealock's statement as "palpably written to establish a preconceived theory."

EDWARD DURNFORD,
Lieut.-Colonel.

15th November, 1880.

THE END.

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