

7. That the Zulu military system be discontinued, and other military regulations adopted, to be decided upon after consultation with the Great Council and British Representatives.

8. That every man, when he comes to man's estate, shall be free to marry.

9. All missionaries and their converts, who until 1877 lived in Zululand, shall be allowed to return and re-occupy their stations.

10. All such missionaries shall be allowed to teach, and any Zulu, if he chooses, shall be free to listen to their teaching.¹

11. A British Agent shall be allowed to reside in Zululand, who will see that the above provisions are carried out.

12. All disputes in which a missionary or European (*e.g.* trader or traveller) is concerned, shall be heard by the king in public, and in presence of the Resident.

13. No sentence of expulsion from Zululand shall be carried out until it has been approved by the Resident.

N.B.—Ten days more were allowed for compliance with the above demands (4-13).

The Natal Colonist, August 21st, 1879, condenses the opinions of Sir B. Pine upon the ultimatum—from his article in the *Contemporary Review*, June, 1879—thus:

“He thinks the depriving Messrs. Smith and Deighton of their handkerchiefs and pipes hardly a matter deserving of a place in such a document; that the Sihayo and Umbilini affairs were more serious, but that full ‘reparation . . . might have been obtained by friendly negotiations.’ He does not attach to the promises alleged to have been made by Cetshwayo ‘the force of a treaty which we were bound to see executed.’ And while approving of a British Resident being placed in the Zulu country, he frankly recalls the fact that ‘Cetshwayo has himself, on more than one occasion, requested such an arrangement.’ ‘At the same time,’ he adds, ‘I think that the powers proposed to be invested in this officer are more than are necessary or expedient, and I would especially refer to those relating to the

¹ Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1861, p. 60): “I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to understand distinctly that Her Majesty's Government cannot undertake to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an ultimatum, the alternative of which is war.

protection of missionaries. Christianity ought not to be enforced at the point of the sword.' In reference to Cetshwayo's alleged coronation promises, we may note in passing that Sir B. Pine is careful to point out that one chief reason for his sanctioning that expedition was 'out of deference to Mr. Shepstone's judgment;' and that it was expressly stipulated by the High Commissioner that no British troops should accompany Mr. Shepstone, 'so that Her Majesty's Government might not be compromised in the matter.' With such a stipulation it is amazing that any one should still contend that Cetshwayo entered into engagements so solemn as to call for invasion of his country to punish the breach of them."

And the Special Correspondent of the *Cape Argus* writes: "As regards the alleged coronation engagements, Dunn affirms that no undertaking was made by, or even asked from, Cetshwayo. In the act of coronation, Mr. (now Sir T.) Shepstone gave to the king a piece of paternal counsel, and the conditions were in reality nothing more than recommendations urged upon his acceptance by the Special Commissioner."

Lord Kimberley, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time of Sir T. Shepstone's installation of Cetshwayo, spoke upon this subject in the House of Lords, and the *Daily News*, March 26th, 1879, reports his words as follows:

"With respect to the so-called coronation promises, nothing had more astonished him in these papers than to learn that these promises were supposed to constitute an engagement between us and the Zulu nation. He happened to have had some concern in that matter; and if he had supposed that Sir T. Shepstone, in asking for these promises from Cetshwayo, had rendered us responsible to the Zulu nation to see that they were enforced, he would not have lost a mail in disavowing any such responsibility. He was supported in the view which he took by the late Colonial Secretary (Lord Carnarvon). The fact was that these were friendly assurances, given in response to friendly advice, and constituted no engagement. But Sir

Bartle Frere put these 'coronation promises' in the foreground." Sir M. Hicks-Beach, also, says (2144, p. 1): "It is obvious that the position of Sir T. Shepstone in this matter was that of a friendly counsellor, giving advice to the king as to the good government of the country."

The demands which we have recorded were delivered to the Zulu envoys, who were not allowed to discuss or comment upon them, on the ground that the Commission had no authority for that purpose. The envoys, indeed, appeared seriously concerned by their import. They denied that the coronation stipulations had ever been disregarded, and said that they could not understand why the Zulu army should be disbanded; the army was a national custom with them as with the English. They also asked for an extension of time, and considered that on such important matters no specified time should have been fixed; the reply to which request was that the time was considered ample.

Sir B. Frere, in his covering despatch to the Secretary of State, remarks that the "inclosed extracts from demi-official letters," from the Hon. Mr. Brownlee and the Hon. Mr. Littleton, "give an outline of the proceedings, and show that the messages were *carefully delivered, well explained, and thoroughly understood*, copies of the English text with Zulu translations being given to the Zulu envoys." On turning to "the inclosed extracts," however, we do not find in them a single word of the sort from either gentleman, while the extract from Mr. Littleton's letter consists of not a dozen lines, describing the spot where the meeting took place, and in which the writer's opinions are limited to these: "they (the Zulus) seemed to take the award very quietly," but "were evidently disturbed" by the ultimatum, and "Mr. Shepstone seemed to me to manage very well." The young gentleman could not well say any more, as he did not know a word of Zulu; but one is puzzled to know how Sir B. Frere draws his deductions from either extract. How far the opinions of the other honourable gentleman are to be depended upon may be gathered from the following assertion made by

him some months after the Boundary Commissioners had deliberately decided that the Boers had no claim whatever to the disputed territory, but that it would be expedient to allow them to retain the Utrecht district.

"The falsehood of the Zulu king with regard to the Utrecht land question," says Mr. Brownlee, "is quite on a par with his other actions. After misleading the Natal Government upon the merits of the case, it is now discovered on the clearest and most incontrovertible proof,¹ that a formal cession was made of this disputed land to the Transvaal Republic."

The special correspondent of the *Cape Argus*, however, writes about this time as follows: "Dunn states that Cetshwayo does not, even now, know fully the contents of the ultimatum, and still less of the subsequent memorandum.² The document was read over once, and its length was such (2222, pp. 203-9)—six pages of the Blue Book—that the messengers could not possibly fix the whole of it in their memory. True, a copy was given to Dunn himself; but, for sufficient reasons of his own, he did not make known the contents of the document in person, but sent word to the king by his own messengers, between whom and the indunas there was a considerable discrepancy. According to Dunn, Cetshwayo was in a great fury upon hearing the word of the High Commissioner (? as to the maintenance of Boer "private rights" over his land). He reproached his adviser with having thwarted his purpose to exact satisfaction at the hands of the Dutch, and doubly blamed him for having represented the English as just in their intercourse and friendly in their intentions. Until this time he had thought, as Dunn himself had, that the congregation of troops upon his borders represented nothing but an idle scare. But he saw at length that the English

¹ Sir T. Shepstone's incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners.

² Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57), that Cetshwayo "could have known nothing of the memorandum," although (ibid. p. 6) he himself asserts that "it was intended to explain for Cetshwayo's benefit what was the nature of the cession to him," and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by the king.

had thrown the bullock's skin over his head, while they had been devouring the titbits of the carcass."

The three causes alleged in the ultimatum for war—the raid of Sihayo's sons, the assault on Messrs. Smith and Deighton, and the proceedings of Umbilini—occurred long after Sir B. Frere had been preparing for war, in the full expectation that the Border Commission would decide against the Zulu claims, and that Cetshwayo would not acquiesce peacefully in such a decision. It would seem, indeed, from his remarks on the subject (Correspondence, Letters II. and IV.), that he would have even set aside the decision of the Commissioners if he had found it possible to do so. Although he failed in doing this, he sought to attain practically the same end by means of a remarkable "memorandum," prepared and signed by himself—not submitted to Sir Henry Bulwer, but "*prematurely*" published in the Natal newspapers.

The memorandum in question was on the appointment of a Resident in Zululand, and, as Sir Bartle Frere himself says, "it was intended to explain for Cetshwayo's benefit what was the nature of the cession to him of the ceded territory," and it contained the following clause: "It is intended that in that district (the late disputed territory) individual rights of property, which were obtained under the Transvaal Government, shall be respected and maintained, so that any Transvaal farmers who obtained rights from the Government of the Republic, and who may now elect to remain on the territory, may possess under British guarantee the same rights they would have possessed had they been grantees holding from the Zulu king under the guarantee of the great Zulu council."

The *whole* of the disputed territory had been apportioned in farms to Transvaal subjects, and without doubt every one of these farms would immediately be claimed, since their value would be immensely raised by the fact that in future they would be held "under British guarantee." Therefore, to thus maintain the farmers upon them without regard to the wishes of the Zulu

king and nation was simply to take away piecemeal with one hand what had just been given as a whole with the other.

This "memorandum" was hailed with triumph by some of the colonial papers, and the news that, after all, the Zulus were to get no solid satisfaction from the award soon circulated amongst all classes, not excluding the Zulus themselves.

It was upon this subject that the "Correspondence" between Sir Bartle Frere and the Bishop of Natal, already referred to, commenced. In December, 1878, the High Commissioner was good enough to invite the Bishop, both by message and personally, to "criticise" his policy towards the Zulus. The invitation, indeed, came far too late for any arguments or information, which the Bishop might be able to afford, to be of the very slightest use. However, the High Commissioner desired criticism, and received it in series of letters, which—except the last two, withheld for some reason best known to himself—were published, with Sir Bartle Frere's replies, in the Blue Books.

The Bishop pointed out that, under the interpretation of this memorandum, "the award gives back the land in name only to the Zulus, whereas in reality Ketschwayo will have no control over it; he will not be able to exercise authority over his own people living on it, without coming into collision immediately with their Boer masters, who would fiercely resent any intrusion on his part on their farms; he will not be able to send any of his people to live on it, or any of his cattle to graze on it, or even to assign places in it to such of his people as may elect to move from the Boer to the Zulu side of the new boundry.¹ To which Sir Bartle replies, that he had "a strong impression² that, if Cetshwayo were simply told the disputed land was assigned to him, he would at once conclude that it was his in full Zulu sovereignty;" which he assumed to be impossible with regard to any land which had once been under the British flag, while to

¹ Correspondence, p. 3.

² *Ibid.* p. 6.

eject a settler who had bought the land from the Transvaal Government, in the belief that it could maintain him upon it, he regarded as an "unjust and immoral act." In point of fact, the land in question could only have been looked upon as "under the British flag," in trust for the rightful possessors, and the farmers had settled upon it in the full knowledge that the title to it was in dispute; while, even had it been otherwise as to the latter point, the only just claim that could be raised would be against the Boer Government, or its representative, and certainly not against the right of the Zulu people to be restored to actual occupation of the land.

But that from the first, and long before he left Cape-town for Natal, the High Commissioner was preparing for war with the Zulus, is evident from his despatch and telegram of January 26th, 1878 (quoted from at page 153), in the former of which he speaks of the delay caused by the border inquiry being no disadvantage, as, besides other reasons, it "will increase our means of defending whatever we may find to be our unquestionable rights;" and in the latter he says again: "I hope the delay caused will not be great, and whatever there is will have compensating advantages, for I have some hopes of being able to strengthen your hands."

These phrases, indeed, might merely refer to Sir Bartle Frere's desire to be "ready to defend ourselves against further aggressions;" but certain statements made by Commodore Sullivan show that he had already in view the invasion of Zululand.

Extracts from these statements run as follows:

"I am informed by the Governor (Sir B. Frere) that there is every chance of hostility in the debateable land between the Transvaal, Zululand, and Natal."—December 16th, 1877 (2000, p. 45).

"His Excellency (Sir B. Frere) pointed out to me that, as it appeared almost certain that serious complications must shortly arise with the Zulu tribe of Kafirs on the borders of Natal and the Transvaal, which will necessitate active operations, he considered it better that the *Active*

should remain here, in order to render such assistance by sea and land as may be practicable."—April 12th, 1878 (2144, p. 32).

"The object of my visit here was to make myself acquainted with such points on the (Zulu) coast as might be available for co-operating with Her Majesty's land forces by landing troops or stores.¹

"It had been my intention (abandoned by Sir H. Bulwer's desire) to have examined the north of the Tugela River both by land and sea, also a reported landing-place situated almost thirty miles eastward of the Tugela by sea."—August 12th, 1878 (2220, p. 136).

The High Commissioner was plainly determined not to allow the Zulus the slightest *law*, which, indeed, was wise in the interests of war, as there was considerable fear that, in spite of all grievances and vexations, Cetshwayo, knowing full well, as he certainly did, that collision with the English must eventually result in his destruction, might prefer half a loaf to no bread, and submit to our exactions with what grace he could. And so probably he would; for, from all accounts, every effort was made by the king to collect the fines of cattle, to propitiate the Government.

Sir Bartle Frere, accordingly, was very particular in requesting Sir Henry Bulwer to give Cetshwayo notice (C. 2222, p. 222) that "*rigid punctuality with regard to time will be insisted on, and unless observed, such steps as may appear necessary will be immediately taken to ensure compliance,*" which Sir H. Bulwer notifies to the Zulu king upon the same day, December 16th (C. 2308, p. 31).

Two days later Mr. John Dunn wrote to say that he had received a message from the king (2222, p. 227), requesting him "to write and say that he agrees to the demands of giving up Sihayo's sons and brother, and the fines of cattle;

¹ Compare with Sir Bartle Frere's suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the *Active* and her fellows were for the most part English merchant vessels, but that the war-vessels of the English Government are quite sufficient to *protect his coast* from any descent by any other power." (C. 2220 p. 307.)

but begs that, should the number of days (twenty) have expired before the arrival of the cattle, His Excellency will take no immediate action, as, owing to the many heavy rains¹ we have had since the meeting of His Excellency's Commissioners and his indunas, they have not been able to reach him yet; and Sihayo's sons being at their kraals, which are some way from him, it will take some days to send for them."

"On the other demands he will give his answer on consulting his indunas."

Yet Sir Bartle Frere declares (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 136) that Cetshwayo "was resolved on war rather than on compliance with any demand of ours."

Bishop Schreuder's opinion, reported through Mr. Fannin on December 22nd (2308, p. 31), was that all the demands would be agreed to except that of the disbandment of the army and the abolition of the military system: "The king and nation will consider it a humiliation, and a descent from their proud position as independent Zulus to the lower and degrading position of Natal Kafirs, to agree to this demand. I asked," says Mr. Fannin, "if the announcement that the restriction on marriage would be removed would not reconcile the young men to the change. He (Bishop Schreuder) thinks not; they will stand by their king, and fight for the old institutions of their country."

The king's request for some indulgence as to time was peremptorily refused, and was looked upon as "a pitiful evasion," on the ground that he had already had four months to consider the question of Sihayo's sons. In point of fact, however, the first "demand" had only been made a week before, and, until then, the word "request" having been used, the king was at liberty to offer atonement for the offence other than the surrender of the offenders, as Sir Henry Bulwer himself suggested (2222, p. 173), by paying a fine of five thousand head of cattle from the Zulu nation.

Sir B. Frere's answer to Cetshwayo through Mr. Dunn

¹ Our own troops' experience showed that this was no idle excuse.

(2222, p. 227) was, "that the word of the Government as already given cannot now be altered.

"Unless the prisoners and cattle are given up within the term specified, Her Majesty's troops will advance. But in consideration of the disposition expressed in Mr. Dunn's letter to comply with the demands of Government, the troops will be halted at convenient posts within the Zulu border, and will there await the expiration of the term of thirty days, without, in the meantime, taking any hostile action unless it is provoked by the Zulus."

And John Dunn adds on his own account (2308, p. 34), that the king evidently does not attach sufficient importance to the time stipulated. The cattle, he said, "are still being collected, and it will be impossible now for them to be up in time." John Dunn in the same letter put in a petition on behalf of his own cattle and people, saying that the latter would be willing to join in with any force should they be required.

Meanwhile, from accounts given by Mr. Fannin (2308, pp. 35 and 37), by Mr. Robson (2242, pp. 11, 12) (2308, p. 35), by Mr. Fynney (2308, p. 36), and from other sources, it is plain that Cetshwayo was doing his utmost to collect the required cattle in time, though hampered in doing so by the extreme difficulty of complying in a hurry with the other demands implying such radical changes in the administration of the country, and exceedingly distressed at the turn affairs were taking. Every report shows plainly enough that, far from desiring war, and looking out for an opportunity to try their strength with the English, the Zulu king, and people, or the major part of them, were thrown into utmost consternation by the menacing appearance of their hitherto friendly neighbours. But all explanations were disregarded, all requests for time treated as impudent pretexts; preparations on our part for an invasion of Zululand were hurried on, while every sign of agitation (the natural consequences of our own attitude) on the other side of the border was construed into an intention on the part of the Zulu king to attack Natal, and urged as an added reason for our beginning hostilities. There were, at that

time, no grounds whatsoever for this supposition. It is plain enough that, when it became apparent that war would be forced upon him by us, the Zulu king contemplated nothing but self-defence, and that, during these preliminaries to the unhappy campaign of 1879, there were numerous occasions on which, by the exercise of a little patience, justice, and moderation, any ruler less bent on conquering Zululand than was Sir Bartle Frere could have brought matters to a peaceful issue, without the loss of honour, men, and money, which England has since sustained.

Lord Chelmsford (then Lieutenant-General the Hon. F. Theisiger) arrived in Natal in August, 1878, and at once began his preparations for the expected campaign. One of the measures upon which great stress was laid was that of forming a native contingent to act with the British troops. The original scheme for the organisation of this contingent in case of necessity had been prepared and carefully worked out by Colonel Durnford, R.E., and was based on his thorough knowledge of the natives. During the eight years of his life in South Africa he had had ample opportunity of learning, by experience, how utterly and mischievously useless was the plan, hitherto invariably followed, of employing disorganised, untrained bodies of natives as troops under their own leaders, without any proper discipline or control. The bravest men in the world would be apt to fail under such circumstances; while mere bands of untaught savages, unaccustomed to fighting and half-armed, had repeatedly proved themselves excellent for running away, but otherwise useless except as messengers, servants, and camp-followers. Added to which there was no possibility of preventing such "troops" as these committing every sort of lawless violence upon the wounded or captured enemy.

Colonel Durnford's scheme¹ was intended to meet both

¹ This scheme provided for a force of 5,500 fighting men, of whom 500 should be cavalry, all armed with rifles. Their organisation, dress, equipment, arms and accoutrements, discipline, drill, recruiting, medical arrangements, and cost were carefully considered. The contingent would

difficulties, and, when laid before the General on his arrival in Natal, met with his unqualified approval. So much was he struck with it that he was at first disposed to intrust the organisation and chief command of the entire contingent to one who, by the ability and completeness with which he had worked out the scheme, proved himself the fittest person to carry it out, and take command of the whole force. But the General changed his mind, and decided to divide the native contingent amongst the various columns, the details of its distribution being as follows :

The 1st Regiment Natal Native Contingent of three battalions (Commandant Montgomery, Major Bengough, and Captain Cherry), and five troops mounted natives, formed No. 2 Column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford.

The 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under Major Graves) was attached to No. 1 Column, commanded by Colonel Pearson.

The 3rd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (two battalions, under Commandant Lonsdale) was attached to No. 3 Column, commanded by Colonel Glyn, and about two hundred Natal Native Contingent were attached to No. 4 Column, commanded by Colonel Wood.

Each battalion of Native Contingent was to consist of five staff and 90 officers and non-commissioned officers (white), and 110 officers and non-commissioned officers and 900 privates (natives); the native non-commissioned officer being armed with a gun, and being a section-leader of nine men armed with assegai and shield.

Lord Chelmsford speaks in various despatches (C. 2234) of this Native Contingent in the following terms :

“The Lieut.-Governor, I am happy to say, has acceded

act as “light troops” with main columns, and would, it was hoped, be self-supporting in an enemy’s country. The transport arrangements were simple, being provided for by eleven pack-horses per troop, each horse led by a mounted lad, and, per company of 100 men, sixteen well-grown lads as “carriers” and twelve young men as “ammunition carriers,” the reserve ammunition being sewn up in raw hide. Thus, on active service, all *impedimenta* would be dispensed with.

to the request I made some little time ago for the services of six thousand Natal natives. I hope to be in a position to equip and officer them very shortly" (p. 25).

"At the time of my arrival in the colony, three months ago, these natives possessed no military organisation, nor had any arms been provided for them by Government."

"The Natal Government have within the last fourteen days allowed me to raise and organise seven thousand natives for service within or without the border" (p. 26).

"The arrival of these officers (special service officers from England) has also enabled me to place Imperial officers in command of some of the battalions of native levies."

"The Natal Contingent consists of three regiments, two of two battalions and one of three" (p. 39).

"There are in addition five troops of mounted natives and three companies of pioneers."

"The pioneers have been raised, officered, and equipped under the orders of the Natal Government, and are now placed at my disposal. The remainder of the Contingent has been raised at the cost and under the orders of the Imperial authorities" (p. 40).

In none of his despatches is there mention of any special officer in connection with this native force, but the following officers were responsible for the organisation of the various regiments: No. 1 Regiment and mounted Contingent, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E; No. 2 Regiment, Major Graves; No. 3 Regiment, Commandant Lonsdale. Great difficulties appear to have been thrown in the way of the proper equipment, &c., of the native levies; but by untiring effort and personal determination, better arrangements for pay, clothing, and discipline were made for (at all events, a portion of) the levy than had been known amongst South African troops. The indiscriminate appointment of officers caused considerable trouble, illustrative of which we may mention an anecdote. Men were repeatedly sent to Lieut.-Colonel Durnford with orders from the military secretary that they were to receive commissions, some of these unfitted by

disposition and education for the duties required of them. A friend has lately furnished an instance very much to the point: "A young fellow came one day to Colonel Durnford from Colonel Crealock, who said he had served in the old colony, and boasted that *he* knew how to make Kafirs fight. 'How is that?' was the inquiry made. 'Oh!' replied the youth, 'just to get behind them with a sjambok (*i.e.* whip)—that's the way to do it!' 'All right,' replied the Colonel quietly; 'I have just one piece of advice to give you though—*make your will* before you start! If you are not stabbed by your own men, you will deserve it.'"

How successful was the training of the men of the 2nd Column may be judged by the behaviour of the "Natal Native Horse," a body of mounted men (Basuto, Edendale, and Zikali natives) who fought at Isandhlwana; and did right good service throughout the campaign.¹ He also raised, equipped, and trained the three companies of Native Pioneers, organising two field-parks, and providing complete bridge equipment for crossing the Tugela; besides preparing, mainly from his own personal observations (having been at Ulundi in 1873, and in Zululand on many occasions) the map of Zululand in universal use during the campaign, and mentioned in despatches as "Durnford's map."

In reply to Sir Bartle Frere's inquiries as to proposed movements of troops up to Natal, Sir H. Bulwer writes, July 18th, 1878, that in his opinion "it is desirable under the present circumstances, and pending the final decision in the matter of the boundary dispute, to avoid as much as possible any military demonstration, as liable to be misunderstood and to be interpreted as showing our intention to settle the question by force. The delay, too, that has occurred since the sitting of the Commission might be attributed by the Zulu king to our desire to

¹ One of Colonel Durnford's officers writes, January 26th, that "he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his mounted men, three hundred men, that he called 'The Natal Native Horse.'"

make preparations, and it might be thought that we were playing false."—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 395).

And here we may appropriately refer to the opinion expressed by the Home Government at a later date.

Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes to Sir B. Frere, 21st November, 1878: "I trust that . . . Cetywayo may have been informed that a decision regarding the disputed boundary would speedily be communicated to him. His complaint that the Lieut.-Governor of Natal 'is hiding from him the answer that has come from across the sea, about the land boundary question, and is only making an excuse for taking time, so as to surprise him,' is not altogether an unnatural one for a native chief situated in his circumstances, who is necessarily ignorant of much that has passed on this subject, and of many of the causes to which the delay is attributable. But it is a misunderstanding which it should be the earnest endeavour of the Government to remove, and I am confident that there is no need to impress upon you the importance of losing no time in dealing with this question or the beneficial effect which its satisfactory settlement may be expected to have upon the strained relations which you describe as now existing between the colony of Natal and the Zulu nation."—(P. P. [C. 2220] p. 322.)

We must now briefly run through the principal points in despatches bearing on the question of increasing the military strength of Natal.

Sir B. Frere, writing from Cape Town on September 10th, says: "I have consulted General Thesiger on the subject. He is very unwilling to ask for reinforcements on the Natal border without the full concurrence of the Government of that colony, and I understand that His Excellency Sir H. Bulwer is specially anxious that nothing should be done in Natal which could possibly justify to the Zulu chief the belief that we were preparing for active hostilities against him. I confess that, as at present informed, I very imperfectly comprehend the grounds on which the objections of His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor, as I understand them, to strengthening

the Natal frontier are based.¹ They will doubtless be more fully explained when I have the advantage of personal communication with him. In the meantime I feel quite certain that the preservation or speedy restoration of peace will be rendered much more certain if General Thesiger has two more battalions of Her Majesty's army within his reach."—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 282, 283.)

On September 14th, referring to the above despatch, Sir B. Frere says he has "since received a telegraphic communication from General Thesiger, in which he expresses his views in regard to his military requirements in the event of hostilities breaking out with the Zulus." The General asks for six more special duty officers, and fifteen captains or subalterns for transport duties. "General Thesiger considers that an addition of two regiments would be essential, and that the presence of a cavalry regiment would be of enormous advantage" (*ibid.* p. 254).

From Durban Sir B. Frere telegraphs on September 23rd to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: "I find that the urgency of supporting General Thesiger's request is much greater even than I supposed. I trust there will be no delay in complying with his request to its fullest extent" (*ibid.* p. 255).

There had been serious and disturbing reports of a Zulu force being assembled on the Tugela River, for the ostensible purpose of hunting, with reference to which Sir H. Bulwer writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, 14th September, "on the subject of the gathering of a Zulu force within a short distance of our border across the Tugela. You will learn from these papers that the gathering has broken up, and the Zulus returned home" (*ibid.* p. 270).

Sir M. Hicks-Beach, on October 17th, replies to Sir B. Frere's despatches of 14th and 23rd September, that "arrangements will be made for the early despatch of some additional officers for special duty. Her Majesty's Government are, however, not prepared to comply with

¹ These words deserve special remark.

the request for a reinforcement of troops. All the information that has hitherto reached them with respect to the position of affairs in Zululand appears to them to justify a confident hope that, by the exercise of prudence, and by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance and reasonable compromise, it will be possible to avert the very serious evil of a war with Cetywayo; and they cannot but think that the forces now at your disposal in South Africa, together with the additional officers about to be sent, should suffice to meet any other emergency that may arise, without a further increase of Imperial troops" (*ibid.* p. 273).

On September 30th, Sir B. Frere writes from Pietermaritzburg: "I regret that I find the position of affairs in this colony far more critical even than I expected;" and, after a very exaggerated description of the state of affairs, he says: "An attempt of native tribes to combine to resist the white man and drive him back has been long foreseen. There can be no doubt that this design is now in process of attempted execution" (*ibid.* pp. 278-82).

Of the truth of this startling assertion, let Sir H. Bulwer's despatches, as well as after events, speak.

Inclosed in this despatch of Sir B. Frere is General Thesiger's memorandum on the military requirements, and his sketch for a defensive scheme for Natal, for which he requires "6,000 natives, 600 mounted men, six guns, and three battalions of British infantry;" but he remarks: "I cannot, however, conceal from myself that security from invasion depends almost entirely upon the forbearance of Cetywayo;" and says, "for defensive purposes alone, therefore, Natal and Transvaal colonies require three battalions of infantry in addition to what they have already got" (*ibid.* pp. 285, 286).

In reply, Sir M. Hicks-Beach writes, 21st November: "The several circumstances which you have reported as tending to cause an open rupture do not appear, in themselves, to present any difficulties which are not capable of a peaceful solution. . . . On a full review, therefore, of

all the circumstances reported by you, and influenced by the strong representations made by Lord Chelmsford as to the insufficiency of his present force to insure the safety of the European residents in Natal and the Transvaal, Her Majesty's Government have felt themselves justified in directing that further reinforcements of troops, as well as the additional officers recently placed under orders for special service, should be sent out to Natal, and the necessary steps will at once be taken for this purpose. But in conveying to you the decision at which, in compliance with your urgent representations, Her Majesty's Government have arrived, it is my duty to impress upon you that in supplying these reinforcements it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government not to furnish means for a campaign of invasion and conquest, but to afford such protection as may be necessary at this juncture to the lives and property of the colonists. Though the present aspect of affairs is menacing in a high degree, I can by no means arrive at the conclusion that war with the Zulus should be unavoidable, and I am confident that you, in concert with Sir H. Bulwer, will use every effort to overcome the existing difficulties by judgment and forbearance, and to avoid an evil so much to be deprecated as a Zulu war" (*ibid.* pp. 320, 321).

On November 11th, the Lieut.-General says that he has just been permitted by the Natal Government to raise and organise 7,000 natives, and ventures "to express an opinion that the demand for two extra battalions cannot be considered unreasonable even for purely defensive purposes;" but he goes on to say: "a defensive plan, however, cannot be considered as satisfactory unless there is the possibility of taking the offensive at the right moment. This I am doing my best to prepare for; and, so soon as my native contingent is mobilised, I shall be ready, so far as my limited means will allow, to enter Zululand, should such a measure become necessary."—(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 19.)

On December 18th, Sir M. Hicks-Beach says: "I take this occasion, however, of reminding you that it is the

desire of Her Majesty's Government, in sending these reinforcements, to assist the local Government as far as possible in providing for the protection of the settlers in the present emergency, and not to furnish the means for any aggressive operations not directly connected with the defence of Her Majesty's possessions and subjects" (*ibid.* p. 21).

On December 2nd, Sir B. Frere forwards copies of memoranda by Sir T. Shepstone and Mr. Brownlee, in which the former proposes measures which "involve the extinction of the Zulu power as it now is, and the attempt to adopt them must, if decided upon, be made with the knowledge that the Zulu chief will oppose them, whatever course the headmen and common people may adopt" (*ibid.* p. 134).

Mr. Brownlee says plainly: "The time has arrived for decisive action; we will never again have so favourable an opportunity as the present; if it is lost, sooner or later we will be taken at a disadvantage" (*ibid.* p. 138).

On December 10th, Sir B. Frere writes to Sir M. Hicks-Beach: "The chance of avoiding war under such circumstances by any exercise of prudence, or by meeting the Zulus in a spirit of forbearance or reasonable compromise, may depend upon ourselves or upon the Zulus, or upon the nature of the issues pending between us. . . . Can we then rest on an armed truce? . . . After the most anxious consideration, I can arrive at no other conclusion than that it is impossible to evade the necessity for now settling this Zulu question thoroughly and finally . . . there is clearly no possibility of now evading bringing matters to an issue with the Zulus" (*ibid.* pp. 183-85).

On the 23rd January, 1879, Sir M. Hicks-Beach acknowledges the receipt of Sir B. Frere's despatches containing "the demands with which Cetwayo has been called upon to comply, together with your own descriptions of the situation with which you have to deal, as well as other very important memoranda by Sir H. Bulwer, Sir T. Shepstone, and Mr. Brownlee," and says, "I may

observe that the communications which had previously been received from you had not entirely prepared them" (Her Majesty's Government) "for the course which you have deemed it necessary to take. The representations made by Lord Chelmsford and yourself last autumn as to the urgent need of strengthening Her Majesty's forces in South Africa were based upon the imminent danger of an invasion of Natal by the Zulus, and the inadequate means at that time at your disposal for meeting it. In order to afford protection to the lives and property of the colonists, the reinforcements asked for were supplied, and, in informing you of the decision of Her Majesty's Government, I took the opportunity of impressing upon you the importance of using every effort to avoid war. But the terms which you have dictated to the Zulu king, however necessary to relieve the colony in future from an impending and increasing danger, are evidently such as he may not improbably refuse, even at the risk of war; and I regret that the necessity for immediate action should have appeared to you so imperative as to preclude you from incurring the delay which would have been involved in consulting Her Majesty's Government upon a subject of so much importance as the terms which Cetuyayo should be required to accept before those terms were actually presented to the Zulu king" (*ibid.* pp. 187, 188).

The preliminary arrangements for the campaign were the formation of four columns, with sufficient transport, &c., to enter Zululand at different points, and concentrate on Ulundi.

No. 1 Column, Colonel Pearson, to assemble on the Lower Tugela, garrison Fort Pearson, and cross and encamp on the Zulu side, under the protection of the guns of the fort.

This Column at first was composed of 2 guns Royal Artillery, 1 company Royal Engineers, 2nd Battalion "The Buffs," 99th Regiment, Naval Brigade (2 guns and 1 Gatling), 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 2nd Regiment Natal Native Contingent (2 battalions), and 1 company Natal Native Pioneers.

No. 2 Column, Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, R.E., to cover the Tugela, and co-operate with Colonel Pearson was almost entirely composed of natives. Its strength, a rocket battery, 1st Regiment (three battalions) Natal Native Contingent, 315 "Natal Native Horse," and one company Natal Native Pioneers.

No. 3 Column, Colonel Glyn, C.B., to Cross at Rorke's Drift, when the time granted the Zulu king had expired. "On the advance being ordered," it would "require two days for this column to reach a good military position;" and it was to keep up communications "with the columns on the left and right." Strength of column, six guns Royal Artillery, 1 squadron Mounted Infantry, 1-24th Regiment, 2-24th Regiment, about 200 Natal Volunteers, 150 Mounted Police, and 3rd Regiment (2nd Battalion) Natal Native Contingent, also one company Natal Native Pioneers. A company of Royal Engineers was ordered to join this column.

No. 4 Column, Colonel Wood, V.C., C.B., to advance to the Blood River. Strength, six guns Royal Artillery, 1-13th Regiment, 90th Regiment, Frontier Light Horse, some 200 Native Contingent; and a small Dutch force was expected to join this column.

A 5th Column (which had been operating against Sekukuni) was under the command of Colonel Rowlands, V.C., C.B., composed of the 80th Regiment, three guns, and mounted Irregulars.

The strength of the columns is given as :

	Imperial and Colonial Troops.	Native Con- tingent.	Conductors and Drivers.	Waggons and Carts.
No. 1 Column ...	1872	...	2256	... 238 ... 266 (144 hired)
" 2 "	5	...	3488	... 84 ... 30
" 3 "	1747	...	2566	... 293 ... 233 (82 ")
" 4 "	1843	...	387	... 162 ... 102 (21 ")
" 5 "	1202	...	338	... 25 ... 62 (50 ")

Forming a grand total of

Imperial and Colonial Troops.	Native Con- tingent.	Conductors, etc.	Waggons, etc.
6669 ...	9035 ...	802 ...	693 (of which 297 were hired)

with about 1,200 horses belonging to cavalry, &c., and 691 horses, 361 mules, and 5,231 oxen. In addition there were the conductors, drivers, &c., and 4,572 oxen of the hired waggons.

The columns to operate on the following bases and lines :

- No. 1. Durban—Lower Tugela.
- ” 2. Pietermaritzburg, Greytown—Middle Drift (Tugela).
- ” 3. Ladysmith—Rorke’s Drift (Buffalo River).
- ” 4. Newcastle—Utrecht—Blood River.
- ” 5. Middleberg—Derby—Pongolo River.

Ulundi being the objective point of the force.

In place of any urgent necessity for commencing the war, putting political questions on one side, there were strong military reasons for postponing it.

Sir Bartle Frere, in his despatch of 30th June, 1879, (P. P. [C. 2454] p. 137), seeks to prove that the time of moving across the border was “well chosen,” and accorded with information received, yet the fact remains that advice *was* given that the most favourable time for military operations in Zululand was between the periods of summer rains and winter grass-fires—*i.e.* the months of March, April, and May. In spite of Sir Bartle Frere’s pleas, we must hold that no competent “military critic” would recommend invading an enemy’s country during the rainy season, when rivers are in flood, plains in many cases marshes, and roads almost impassable; especially if the invading forces were required to move with a ponderous waggon-train.

Lord Chelmsford himself proves the case: he writes (January 12th) on the day after crossing the border: “The country is in a terrible state from the rain, and I do not know how we shall manage to get our waggons across the valley near Sirayo’s kraals.”—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 43.)

And again on January 14th, from the headquarter camp, Zululand, near Rorke’s Drift, he writes: “Between this camp and Greytown alone, a distance of some seventy miles, three rivers are now impassable, and waggons have

to cross by ferries, a laborious operation requiring more skilled labour than we at present have available.

"The road at various points requires the most constant supervision, and in some parts the heavy rain frequently dislodges huge boulders from the hill-sides overhanging the roadway, and in many places watercourses become torrents after an hour's rain.

"Beyond this camp towards the Izipezi Hill (my first objective point) the road will require great labour to make it passable; but strong working-parties have already been at work. The transport difficulties are augmented by the great mortality in oxen; this is inevitable, but it will probably decrease in a few weeks' time" (*ibid.* p. 47).

It is believed that the first project of operations was to advance in three lines on Ulundi—from the Lower Tugela, Rorke's Drift, and Blood River—the columns to move forward by short marches, entrenching strongly at each halting-place, doing no injury to the Zulu people, and thus inducing them to submit quietly. This wise and consistent idea was unfortunately never even attempted.

On the 8th January, 1879, Lord Chelmsford writes: "All the reports which reach me tend to show that the Zulus intend, if possible, to make raids into Natal¹ when the several columns move forward. The strength of the three columns, Nos. 1, 3, and 4, is only just sufficient to enable them to advance."—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 26.)

The directions for the various columns were, briefly—
No. 1. To cross the Tugela at Fort Pearson and encamp on the Zulu side; when ordered to advance, to move on Etshowe, and there, or in its neighbourhood, to form a depôt, well entrenched.

No. 2. To form a portion of No. 1 Column, but act separately, reporting to Colonel Pearson; to remain on the Middle Tugela frontier till an advance is ordered, and Colonel Pearson has reached Etshowe.

The defence of the frontier was to rest with the Colonial

¹ After-events proved the fallacy of these "reports." Even when the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained.

Government; but on the 8th January the General altered the instructions for No. 2 Column, and directed two-thirds of it to move up to the Sand Spruit Valley for the protection of the Umsinga border, and to operate in conjunction with No. 3 Column. The third battalion and one troop of Native Horse were to remain at Middle Drift.

No. 3 Column to cross at Rorke's Drift when the thirty days expired; to move forward and form an advanced depôt, strongly entrenched, as found advisable from the nature of the country, &c. To assist in clearing the border south-east of Rorke's Drift, and to keep up communication with the columns on left and right.

No. 4 Column to advance to the Blood River. "The civil authorities on the border will take every care to warn the Zulus that our first advance need not be deemed hostile, but that no collection of armed natives in the vicinity of our forces can be permitted; no act on our part to unnecessarily bring on hostilities should be permitted."—(P. P. [C. 2222] p. 223.)

In the event of a further advance, the advanced depôt of this column to be near the intersection of the roads from Utrecht to Ulundi, and Rorke's Drift to Swaziland; but "to delay its advance toward the Umvolosi River until the border is cleared, and to move in a southerly direction towards Colonel Glyn's column to assist it against Sirayo."—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 27, 28).

On January 11th, the General met Colonel Wood, and arranged with him that he should "occupy himself with the tribes in his front and left flank," till the General was "ready to advance to Izipezi Hill" (*ibid.* p. 42).

By this unfortunate change of plan, the left of No. 3 Column was exposed, of which the Zulus took fatal advantage.

We must now return to Sir Bartle Frere, who, considering that he had "exhausted all peaceable means for obtaining redress for the past, and security for the future," "by a notification dated the 4th of January 1879,

placed in the hands of Lieut.-General Lord Chelmsford, K.C.B., commanding Her Majesty's forces in South Africa, the further enforcement of all demands;" and remarks, "it only remains for us to await the issue with perfect confidence in the justice of our cause. The contest has not been provoked by the British Government. That Government has done its best to avoid war by every means consistent with honour"—an absolute truth as regards the Home Government—"That" Government, as Sir B. Frere cleverly remarks, "*had* done its best to avoid war," and did not see the necessity, or, at all events, the immediate necessity, of that war into which its servant, contrary to its instructions, plunged it.

The period allowed to Cetshwayo having expired, on the 11th January, 1879, the following notification was published in both English and Zulu :

NOTIFICATION.

January 11th, 1879.

The British forces are crossing into Zululand to exact from Cetshwayo reparation for violations of British territory committed by the sons of Sirayo and others, and to enforce compliance with the promises, made by Cetshwayo at his coronation, for the better government of his people.

The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people. All Zulus who come in unarmed, or who lay down their arms, will be provided for till the troubles of their country are over, and will then, if they please, be allowed to return to their own land; but all who do not so submit will be dealt with as enemies.

When the war is finished, the British Government will make the best arrangements in its power for the future good government of the Zulus in their own country, in peace and quietness, and will not permit the killing and oppression they have suffered from Cetshwayo to continue.

H. B. E. FRERE,
High Commissioner.

(This is followed by a translation in the Zulu language, —or rather in Mr. Brownlee's Frontier Kafir).

"This," Sir B. Frere says, "is a message to the Zulu population which the General will make as widely known as possible."—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 24.)

On December 29th, Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, writes at the request of the Lieut.-General Commanding to the Lieut.-Governor of Natal that the General "has taken the opportunity offered by the return of Sintwangu and Umpepa to send the following message to the Zulu king:

"That, in the event of the cattle demanded as a fine, together with Sirayo's sons and brother, not being delivered before the expiration of the time allowed, Her Majesty's troops will occupy Zulu territory without delay.

"2. That no forward movement into Zululand will be made till the expiration of the thirty days; but at the end of that time, if all the demands are not complied with, the troops will advance.

"3. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the king, who has broken the promises he made at his coronation. So that in the event of hostilities, all Zulu subjects willing to lay down their arms, and wishing to take refuge in British territory, will be fed and protected till such time as peace is restored, when they will be at liberty to return to their homes; but that all who remain in Zululand will be considered as enemies.

"5. That these are His Excellency's instructions, which he intends to carry out to the best of his ability."

—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39.)

On the 11th January, Lord Chelmsford, with No. 3 Column, crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke's Drift, the infantry crossed on a barrel-raft, a punt, and a small boat; the cavalry and natives by a ford lower down the river. The force encamped in the Zulu country where it crossed.

The General, with the cavalry, rode to the left to meet Colonel Wood—commanding No. 4 Column—which was at Bemba's Kop, about thirty-five miles. They met as previously arranged. Colonel Wood, on his return, commenced operations against the Zulus by seizing some 2,000 cattle belonging to Inkomi and Sihayo, the Zulus only making "a show of resistance." In addition to this,

Colonel Wood reports, on the 13th January, that he had also captured 2,000 or 3,000 head of cattle from the Sondolosi (Tondolozzi) tribe, and on the same day an attack was made on a petty chief, Mbuna, whose men refused to disarm, and seven Zulus were killed.—(P. P. [C. 2242] p. 45.)

Colonel Wood crossed the Blood River on the 6th January, and here we must leave No. 4 Column for the present.

No. 1 Column had some difficulty in effecting the passage of the Tugela, the river being in flood. The fortunes of this column will be followed in a future chapter.

Colonel Durnford, No. 2 Column, rode in to the General's camp on the afternoon of the 11th, and reported that the country in his front was quiet, and that the fighting Zulus had gone away from the border to the king's kraal. Lord Chelmsford writes, 14th January: "I directed this officer to move one of his three battalions to watch, and eventually cross at the gates of Natal between Rorke's Drift and the Umsinga Mountain, while he and the mounted men and rocket-battery were to join me with No. 3 Column. I directed the remaining two battalions to cross at Middeldrift as soon as Colonel Pearson with No. 1 Column had reached Ekowe." (*Ibid.* p. 47.)

And on the 19th January he writes: "One of Colonel Durnford's regiments will cross the river from the Sand-spruit Valley, whilst his mounted natives will co-operate with us from Rorke's Drift, where they will be to-morrow (20th)." (P. P. [C. 2260] p. 16.)

On the 11th, the General writes: "Both Colonel Wood and Major Russell took a good number of Sirayo's cattle this morning, which we found quietly grazing along our line of advance." And again: "Several hundred head of cattle, &c., were taken by Nos. 3 and 4 Columns on the 11th. This I considered desirable on political grounds, as they all belonged to Usirayo, as well as from military necessities" (*ibid.* pp. 43-46). It is rather difficult to reconcile this commencement of operations with the words

"The British Government has no quarrel with the Zulu people ;" or with the General's message to the Zulu king (through Mr. Fynney, Border Agent, and the Zulu messengers Sintwangu and Umpepa, December 29th, 1878) "if all the demands are not complied with the troops will advance. That such advance will not be directed against the Zulu nation, but against the King"—(P. P. [C. 2308] p. 39.)

On the 12th January, No. 3 Column first came into contact with the Zulus. The General made a reconnaissance in the Bashi Valley and towards Izipezi Hill. Sihayo's people were seen driving the cattle to the shelter of the hills: "as, however," the General says, "it is well known that we had made a distinct demand for the punishment of the sons of this chief, and that his clan was one of the bravest and most warlike of the Zulu nation, I considered it very desirable to punish them at once by capturing their cattle."

The Ingqutu Mountain was occupied by infantry, when "a fire was opened upon them by the Zulus, who were occupying very strong positions in the caves and rocks above." An officer present states that the actual first shot was from the side of the British, but this is not of great importance, as it is impossible to imagine the Zulus could have been expected to look calmly on, whilst their cattle were being captured. After about half-an-hour's fight the cattle and horses were taken. The mounted force was likewise engaged higher up the mountain. Our loss, 2 Native Contingent killed and 12 wounded. The loss inflicted on the enemy, 30 killed, 4 wounded, and 10 prisoners; the cattle, &c., taken, 13 horses, 413 cattle, 332 goats, and 235 sheep.—(P. P. [C. 2242] pp. 47, 48.)

These first steps in Zululand have been given in considerable detail, as they afford much food for reflection on the contrast between "words" and "deeds."

CHAPTER XIII.

ISANDELWANA.

HAVING crossed into Zululand, the "difficulties . . . in the way of those who are endeavouring to move forward into an enemy's country, over tracts which have never been traversed, except by a very few traders' waggons,"¹ began to declare themselves; and Lord Chelmsford remarks, January 16th: "No. 3 Column at Rorke's Drift cannot possibly move forward even eight miles until two swamps, into which our waggons sank up to the body, have been made passable. This work will occupy us for at least four days, and we shall find similar obstacles in front of us in every march we are anxious to make."

We find Lord Chelmsford, on January 27th, stating: "The country is far more difficult than I had been led to expect, and the labour of advancing with a long train of waggons is enormous. It took seven days' hard work, by one half of No. 3 Column, to make the ten miles of road between Rorke's Drift and Insalwana Hill practicable, and even then had it rained hard I feel sure that the convoy could not have gone on. The line of communication is very much exposed, and would require a party of mounted men always patrolling, and fixed intrenched posts of infantry at intervals of about ten miles."—(P. P.—C. 2252.)

Under these circumstances we can only wonder that

¹ Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.)

the advance with cumbersome trains of waggons was undertaken, and the apparent want of knowledge of the invaded country is almost equally surprising. All previous experience goes to prove that a general, moving in an enemy's country *with* his "impedimenta," should form a defensible camp at every halt; and this Lord Chelmsford apparently recognised when he promulgated the *Regulations for Field Forces in South Africa*;¹ but we shall find how fatally he neglected the most ordinary precautions.

A hint for the advance might well have been taken from Sir Garnet Wolseley's campaign in Ashantee, and the various columns moved on Ulundi—about eighty miles—in the lightest possible order, and without a ponderous waggon train. Rapid movement was the more imperatively necessary, the enemy being in force, and able to make most rapid concentrations. Guns (7-pounders) could have been moved over very difficult ground with comparative ease, and even carried along piecemeal if necessary.

The strangeness of the situation is shown plainly in Lord Chelmsford's despatch of the 16th January, written at Rorke's Drift—on the very borders of Zululand—at the very outset of the war. Having spoken of "difficulties" (as already quoted), he says: "Accepting the situation, therefore, it remains for me to determine what modification

¹ These Regulations (November, 1878) contain the following instructions:—"The camp should be formed in such a manner that the troops can be rapidly placed in a good position for action in the event of a night attack."

"By night, horses should be picketed, and oxen placed in waggon laager, the camp guarded by outlying picquets of infantry thrown at short distances to the front, flanks, and rear, with small parties of natives—ten men in each—interspersed and placed in situations where they could give timely warning of the approach of an enemy."

"The camp should be partially entrenched on all sides."

The "Regulations" of February, 1879, in addition, direct that, in the enemy's country, troops "when halting, though but for a few hours," will "invariably form a waggon laager," and that this laager is not to interfere with the construction of other defences, "but is intended to act as a citadel for the troops to retire into in the event of their being hard pressed or outnumbered."

of the plan of campaign at first laid down will be necessary." His idea still is to drive, "as far as possible, all the Zulus forward towards the north-east part of their country," and "with Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Columns, to thoroughly clear or subjugate the country, between the Buffalo and Tugela Rivers, and the Umhlatsoi River, by means of expeditions made by those columns from certain fixed positions," and this, he hopes, will "have the effect of removing any dangerously large body from the Natal borders." Colonel Wood, with No. 4 Column, was to act independently about the head waters of the white Umveloosi River. "By these movements," he continues, "I hope to be able to clear that portion of Zululand which is situated south of the Umhlatsoi River;" and remarks that Cetshwayo will be obliged "to keep his army mobilised, and it is certain that his troops will have difficulty in finding sufficient food. If kept inactive, they will become dangerous to himself; if ordered to attack us, they will be playing our game."

How these plans answered, one week sufficed to show.

The first step in advance from Rorke's Drift was to push forward four companies of the 2-24th Regiment, a battalion of Natal Native Contingent, and a detachment of Natal Native Pioneers into the Bashi Valley on the 14th January, for the purpose of repairing the road. This detachment remained encamped there until the 20th, five miles from the remainder of the column at Rorke's Drift, and with no attempt at "laager" or other defence. Lord Chelmsford did not see the need of precaution, and his instructions to the officer in command were, "Use the bayonet" if a night attack took place.

On the 17th the General made a reconnaissance as far as Isandhlwana; and on January 20th No. 3 Column moved from Rorke's Drift and Bashi Valley, to the spot selected for the camp to the east of Isandhlwana Hill. The post at Rorke's Drift (where the Buffalo was crossed)—of vital importance to the safety of the column—was left with a garrison of one company of 1-24th Regiment, but without any attempt whatever at entrenchment; nor

were any defensive precautions taken at Helpmakaar, the store depôt in Natal, twelve miles from Rorke's Drift. The march to Isandhlwana was accomplished "without much difficulty," but "half a battalion, 2-24th, was obliged to halt short of this camp owing to the oxen being fatigued." They bivouacked for the night in the open.

The position of the camp is thus described: "At the spot where our road crossed . . . we had a small kopje on the right, and then about fifty yards to our left rises abruptly the Isandhlwana Mountain . . . entirely unapproachable from the three sides nearest us, but on the farther, viz. that to the north, it slopes more gradually down, and it is there connected with a large range of hills on our left with another broad neck of land. We just crossed over the bend, then turned sharp to the left, and placed our camp facing the valley, with the eastern precipitous side of the mountain behind us, leaving about a mile of open country between our left flank and the hills on our left, the right of the camp extending across the neck of land we had just come over, and resting on the base of the small kopje described beforehand."

The camp was formed in the following order from left to right: 2-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 1-3rd Natal Native Contingent, 2-24th Regiment, Royal Artillery, mounted troops, and 1-24th Regiment. "The waggons were all placed between the camp and the hill at the back, and behind them, immediately against its base, the head-quarters' tents were pitched with their waggons beside them." . . . "Not a single step was taken in any way to defend our new position in case of a night or day attack from the enemy."¹

On reaching Isandhlwana, the officer commanding the advanced guard was ordered out to post vedettes, and on his return to camp pointed out where they were—those to the left being visible on the crests of the Ingqutu range. He was told that they were "far too far away, and were of no use there," and that the left vedettes on the range

¹ Captain N. Newman.

were "so far to the left that they were in rear of the camp." The officer explained that it was of no use placing men on the near side of the range, and that his reason for posting vedettes so far to the left was that "it was nasty broken country there, and that the Zulus might get around there." A staff officer replied, "My dear fellow, those vedettes are useless there; the rear always protects itself;" and then ordered the vedettes to be drawn in closer.

"I went off (writes the officer), but felt I was going on a fool's errand. I went off to those on the right-front first, being unwilling to withdraw those along the Ingqutu range until the last moment."

Whilst engaged on this duty on the right front, a man was seen running away in the distance; he was chased and brought back to the outposts, when he turned out to be a very old Zulu, who said, "Why are you looking for the Zulus this way? The big Impi is coming from that direction" (pointing to the Ingqutu range). This was at once reported in camp.

The same officer describes the position of the camp:— "The 1-24th Regiment had their camp pitched right under Black's Koppie, and from the top of the Koppie to the nearest tents was certainly considerably less than 100 yards. Mind you, I am certain of my distances. The Koppie was a rough stony place, looking right down into the camp, and giving excellent cover to anybody occupying it. This Koppie was not even occupied by a picquet during the two nights the camp was occupied. From the shoulder of the hill, the distances to the central camps varied from 200 to 300 yards at most, and the shoulder of the hill was covered with stones and boulders, affording excellent cover, and thoroughly commanding the camp. Neither was this place occupied even by a picquet at night. The theory again of the rear protecting itself. The moment the horns of the Zulu army got round, both these places were seized by them. . . . The only part of the hill that is inaccessible is just the ledge of rocks at the very top. All the base of the hill is a great grassy, stony mound that men can run all over,

affording excellent shelter, and thoroughly commanding the camp."

"On the same day (20th) the General reconnoitred on the waggon-track, which skirts Inhlazatye Mountain, as far as a place called 'Matyana's Stronghold,' at a distance of about twelve miles, but saw nothing of the enemy." "Not having time to properly examine the country round this peculiar stronghold," the General ordered that next day two separate parties should move out from the camp at an early hour; one of mounted men under Major Dartnell to reconnoitre on the road he had taken, whilst two battalions of Native Contingent, under Commandant Lonsdale, worked round the Malakata Mountain: the orders being that these officers were to effect a communication on the Inhlazatye range, and then return to camp.—(P. P. [C. 2252] pp. 74, 75.)

On the 21st some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the camp, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.¹ A patrol of the mounted infantry saw a small body of the enemy in front; and the General, from the high land to the left of the camp, saw several mounted Zulus to the left front, and had decided, on the evening of the 21st, to make a reconnaissance to the left front.²

At about ten o'clock the Zulus were found in force by the mounted men; the Contingent being on a range of hills distant about five miles. The enemy appeared anxious to fight, but Major Dartnell did not think it prudent to engage without supports. The Zulus occupied a large kloof, and whenever the mounted men approached they came out in large numbers. A small body was sent up close, under

¹ P. P. [C. 2454] p. 182.

² [C. 2260] p. 99.

Lieut. Milne, R.N., A.D.C., says:—"We then rode up to the high land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distant of about four miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had reported the fact. . . . We then returned to camp, the General having determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day."—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 183.)

Mr. Mansel, to try and make the Zulus show their force, when they advanced throwing out the "horns," and tried to surround the party, following them down into the open, where Major Dartnell and the remainder of the mounted troops were. The whole then retired, and joined the Contingent, about three miles from the kloof.

"In the evening," says Major Clery, "a message arrived from Major Dartnell that the enemy was in considerable force in his neighbourhood, and that he and Commandant Lonsdale would bivouac out the night," which they were permitted to do.

The wisdom of this may be doubted, as the Native Contingent seemed particularly liable to alarm; twice they "were seized with panic, rushing about everywhere, the night being very dark. They knocked us down," writes an officer, "and stampeded our horses, causing the greatest confusion. If the Zulus had come on we should all have been cut to pieces."

"That night Major Dartnell sent off messengers to Lord Chelmsford that he had marked the Zulus down in a kloof, and asked for two companies of infantry to be sent out as a support, and that he would attack the Zulus in the morning."

Major Clery says:¹ "About 1.30 A.M. on the 22nd, a messenger brought me a note from Major Dartnell to say that the enemy was in greater numbers than when he last reported, and that he did not think it prudent to attack unless reinforced by two or three companies of the 24th Regiment."² The General ordered the 2nd Battalion 24th

¹ P. P. [C. 2260] p. 81.

² Lord Chelmsford's version of this is—"At 2.30 A.M. on the 22nd January, Colonel Glyn, having received a despatch from Major Dartnell, saying that the enemy was in great force in front of him, sent his senior staff officer to inquire what I would wish done." And he continues: "Feeling that the position was rather critical, I ordered Colonel Glyn to move to his assistance." P. P. [C. 2252] p. 75.

Lord Chelmsford's exaggerated description of the situation is evidently designed to account for his actions: but *had* the position been "rather critical," it would be impossible to condemn Lord Chelmsford too strongly for dividing his force as he did, and leaving his camp unprotected by laager or entrenchment.

Regiment, the Mounted Infantry, and four guns, to be under arms at once to march." The Natal Native Pioneers, about 50 strong, accompanied the force, which "marched out from the camp as soon as there was light enough to see the road." Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, 1-24th Regiment, was instructed to take "command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn"—the force left with him consisting of 5 companies 1-24th and 1 company 2-24th Regiment; 2 guns Royal Artillery; about 20 Mounted Infantry and Volunteers; 30 Natal Carbineers, 31 Mounted Police, and 4 companies Natal Native Contingent. An order was also despatched to Colonel Durnford (at Rorke's Drift) to move up to Isandhlwana. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine's instructions for the defence of the camp were, briefly, to draw in his "line of defence," and his line of "infantry outposts accordingly," but to keep his cavalry vedettes "still far advanced."¹ We may here note that the only country searched was that direct to the front and right front—the direction of the waggon-track—although it is stated "the Lieut.-General had himself noticed mounted men in one direction (our left front) on the 21st, and in this direction he had *intended* to make a reconnaissance."—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99.)

After the departure of the advance column nothing unusual occurred in camp until between seven and eight o'clock, when it was reported from the advanced picquet (on the Ingqutu range of hills, about 1,500 yards to the north) that a body of the enemy could be seen approaching from the north-east: and various small bodies were afterwards seen. Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine got his men under arms, and sent a written message off to head-quarters that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left front. This was received "between 9.30 and 10 A.M."

The position Colonel Pulleine occupied was a rising ground on the left front of the camp, level to the rear (towards the camp), but sloping downwards to the front, right, and left. Boulders and stones here afforded some shelter. This position covered the camp from an attack

¹ Major Clery.

from the left front; and on this spot, later in the day, the action was fought.

Colonel Durnford received the General's order when on an expedition into Natal to obtain waggons, but at once returned to Rorke's Drift, and marched for Isandhlwana. Lieutenant Chard, R.E., who had ridden to camp for orders, "met Colonel Durnford about a quarter of a mile from the camp at the head of his mounted men" about 10.30 A.M., and told him the troops were in column outside the camp, and Zulus showing "on the crest of the distant hills," "several parties" working round so far to the left that he "was afraid they might be going to make a dash at the Drift." He took orders to Major Russell to hurry up with the rocket battery, to detach a company of Sikali men to protect the baggage, and for all to "look out to the left."

Colonel Durnford reached the camp, and received all the information Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine could afford, finding the situation to be:—Lonsdale's natives on outpost duty on the hills to the left, the guns in position on the left of the camp, and the infantry under arms. The oxen were driven into camp and—Mr. Brickhill says—tied to the yokes, but not inspanned. Constant reports were coming in from the hills to the left—"The enemy are in force behind the hills." "The enemy are in three columns." "One column is moving to the left rear, and one towards the General." "The enemy are retiring in every direction." The enemy's force was given at 400 to 600.

On hearing these reports, Colonel Durnford sent one troop Natal Native Horse to reinforce his baggage guard; two troops to the hills to the left (under Captains G. Shepstone and Barton)—one to move along the crest of the range, one to search the valley beyond—and determined himself to go out to the front "and prevent the one column joining the 'impi,' which was supposed at that time to be engaged with the troops under the General;" he asked Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine for two companies of the 24th, to which Colonel Pulleine replied, "that two companies could ill be spared, but that if Colonel Durnford ordered

them, of course they should go." On consideration, Colonel Durnford decided only to take his own men,¹ and moved out with his remaining two troops Natal Native Horse, followed by Major Russell's rocket battery, with its escort of a company of Native Contingent, under Captain Nourse.

A company 1-24th, under Lieutenant Cavaye, was sent out as a picquet to the hills about 1,200 yards north of the camp, and the remainder of the troops dismissed to their private parades, where the men were to lie down in readiness to turn out if required. At this time there was no expectation of an attack during the day, and no idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy.²

The two troops sent on the hills to the left "to ascertain the enemy's movements," had proceeded three or four miles from the camp, when they saw a party of the enemy driving some cattle away. No. 1 Troop was ordered to capture them, and advanced a few hundred yards when "the whole Zulu army showed up, advancing straight towards ourselves and the camp . . . for a few minutes not a shot was fired." Captain Shepstone ordered a retreat on the camp, and rode away saying "he was going to report to the camp that the whole Zulu army was advancing to attack it."³ Captain Shepstone met Captain Gardner on reaching the camp, and both officers then went to Colonel Pulleine, but, says Captain Gardner, the enemy were "already on the hill on our left in large numbers."

¹ The suggestion has been thrown out that there was a difference of opinion between Colonels Durnford and Pulleine; but Lieutenant Cochrane says "there were no high words" of any kind between them; and he says, "I think no one lives who was present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said contradictory to my statement is *invented*." It is evident that Colonel Durnford did not interfere with the force under Colonel Pulleine; this was in accordance with his own position as commanding officer of another column, and also with Colonel Pulleine's orders to take "command of the camp during the absence of Colonel Glyn." And further, in the conversation between the colonels, Colonel Durnford told Colonel Pulleine that he should not interfere with his command.

² Captain Essex, 75th Regiment.

³ Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse.

Colonel Durnford, having despatched his two troops to the left, had moved out to the front at a canter, followed at a foot's pace by the rocket battery, etc. About five miles out, a trooper rode down from the hills on the left, and reported an immense "impi," behind the hills, and almost immediately the Zulus appeared in force in front and on the left, in skirmishing order, ten or twelve deep, with supports close behind. They opened fire at about 800 yards, and advanced very rapidly, Colonel Durnford retired a little way—to a donga—and extended his men, then fell back, keeping up a steady fire, for about two miles,¹ when he came upon the remains of the rocket battery, which (it appeared) had turned to the left on hearing firing on the hills, been cut off, and broken up. Fighting was still going on here, but the Zulus were speedily driven back.

Colonel Durnford retired slowly on the camp, disputing every yard of ground, until he reached a donga about 800 yards in front of the right of the camp; there, reinforced by between thirty and forty mounted men under Captain Bradstreet, a stand was made.

"This gully," Mr. Brickhill, interpreter to No. 3 Column, says, "the mounted force held most tenaciously, every shot appearing to take effect," and with the havoc caused by the guns, "a thousand Zulu dead must have lain between the conical hill and the gully. They lay just like peppercorns upon the plain."

The two troops of native horse sent to reconnoitre the Ingqutu Hills retired fighting before the enemy in good order "to a crest in the neck which joins Sandhswana to Ingqutu. Leaving their horses well sheltered here, they held this crest splendidly, keeping up a steady galling fire."² They were eventually compelled to retire, with the loss of Captain G. Shepstone.³

¹ Lieutenant Cochrane, 82nd Regiment.

² Mr. Brickhill.

³ Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: "I must go and see where my Chief is," and rode in again. His devotion cost him his life.

We must now consider what had taken place at the camp. All was quiet till about twelve o'clock, when firing was heard on the hill where the company on picquet was stationed; the troops were immediately turned out and formed on the left front of the camp.¹ About this time Captain Gardner, 14th Hussars, arrived with an order from the General, addressed to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, "to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain himself at his present camp and entrench it."² Captain G. Shepstone reached the camp with his warning about the same time. Colonel Pulleine decided it was impossible to carry out the General's order, as the enemy were already in great force on the hills to the left. Captain Gardner sent off a message to head-quarters, saying that "our left was attacked by about ten thousand of the enemy. A message was also sent by Colonel Pulleine."

One company (Captain Mostyn's) was moved up to support the picquet; the enemy, distant about 800 yards, moving "towards our left." Orders to retire were received almost immediately, and the whole retired to the foot of the slope, the enemy rushing forward to the crest of the hill as our men disappeared. Captain Younghusband's company was at this time in echelon on the left.³

The guns came into action about 400 yards on the left front of the camp, "where they were able to throw shells into a large mass of the enemy that remained almost stationary about 3400 yards off."⁴

¹ That the camp was *surprised* may be gathered from the fact that up to about 12 o'clock the camp force had no further knowledge of the enemy beyond that forwarded to the General, and "no idea had been formed regarding the probable strength of the enemy's force."

Captain Essex writes, 25th January, [1879]—"I had been present all this time, but wishing to write some letters and thinking everything was now quiet, I went to my tent and sat down, and was soon busy with my papers. About noon, a sergeant came into my tent and told me that firing was to be heard behind the hill where the company of the 1st Battalion, 24th, had been sent. I had my glasses over my shoulder, and thought I might as well take my revolver; but did not trouble to put on my sword, as I thought nothing of the matter and expected to be back in half an hour to complete my letters."

² Captain Gardner.

³ Captain Essex.

⁴ Lieutenant Curling, R. A.

The three advanced companies of the 24th retired on the main body, when the situation was this: The two guns and the whole of the 24th in line, about 300 yards from the left front of the camp; the natives took post on the right of the 24th; then came Durnford's Basutos; and the extreme right was formed by about forty mounted Europeans¹—the force holding the only position that afforded any shelter, viz. broken ground and a "donga" in front of the camp; the infantry "in good position among the stones and boulders to the left and left centre of the camp, and who stood their ground most gallantly."² The enemy approached to within about 400 yards, the two guns firing case. The heavy fire from the line told so upon the Zulus that they wavered and lay down; they are said to have covered the valley in detached groups to the depth of about three-quarters of a mile.³ During this period the right "horn" of the Zulu army was swinging round the hills to the rear of Isandhlwana; the "chest" was engaged with the camp force under Colonel Pulleine; and the left "horn" was being held in check by the mounted troops under Colonel Durnford.

The enemy now began to work round the rear (which they could do with impunity, owing to the formation of the ground), and Captain Essex says: "I rode up to Lieut.-Colonel Durnford, who was near the right, and pointed this out to him. He requested me to take men to that part of the field, and endeavour to hold the enemy in check;" but at this moment, he says, "those of the Native Contingent who had remained in action rushed past us in the utmost disorder, thus laying open the right and rear of the 24th, the enemy dashing forward in the most rapid manner." The ammunition of the mounted troops failing (supplies had been repeatedly sent for, but none came), Colonel Durnford retired them towards the right of the camp (where the waggons and the ammunition of the Native Horse were), and himself galloped off to the 24th, having previously told Captain Gardner that

¹ Captain Essex.

² Lieutenant Cochrane.

³ Mr. Bricknell.

the position was too extended, and he desired to concentrate the force. Colonel Durnford's intention undoubtedly was to withdraw all the troops to the rising ground on the right of the camp, to which point he had retired his Native Horse.

The Zulus rushed on the left in overwhelming numbers, completely surrounding the 24th. The guns limbered up, and made for the Rorke's Drift Road, but found it blocked by the enemy; they therefore "followed a crowd of natives and camp-followers, who were running down a ravine; the Zulus were all among them, stabbing men as they ran." Down this ravine the fugitives hastened, the enemy round and among them, the assegai doing its deadly work.

Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine was said by Lieutenant Coghill to have been killed,¹ and during the flight Major Stuart Smith, R.A. (who had been wounded), Surgeon-Major Shepherd, and many a man, mounted and on foot, were killed.² The Buffalo was gained at a point about five miles below Rorke's Drift, and numbers of the fugitives were either shot, or carried away by the stream and drowned. Lieutenants Melville and Coghill rode from the camp, on its being carried by the Zulus, the former with the Queen's colours of his regiment. These he bore into the river, but lost his horse, and was left struggling in the swift current; Lieutenant Coghill, who had safely crossed, rode in to his assistance, when his horse was shot. These brave young officers succeeding in gaining the Natal shore, but were soon overtaken by the enemy, and died fighting to the last. The Natal Native Horse escaped with little loss; they assisted many in the retreat, which they covered as well as they could, especially under Captain Barton on the banks of the Buffalo. Captain Essex puts the time of the retreat from the camp at "about 1.30 P.M."³

¹ Lieutenant Curling.

² Major Stuart Smith was killed under the cliffs of the Buffalo.

Surgeon Major Shepherd dismounted to aid a wounded man, and fell in the performance of this humane and noble act.

³ Lieutenant Chard says "about 3.15 P.M. on that day I was at the

After this period no one living escaped from Isandhlwana, and it was supposed that the troops had broken, and, falling into confusion, that all had perished after a brief struggle.

Nothing was known of the after-events of that fatal day for months, till, on the 21st May, the scene of the disaster was revisited, and the truth of the gallant stand made was established. This will be treated of in another chapter.

We must now turn to the movements of the column under Colonel Glyn, with the General; and it will be most convenient to take the occurrences of the day as described by Lord Chelmsford and his military secretary (Lieut.-Colonel Crealock).

Leaving camp at daybreak,¹ the General "reached Major Dartnell about 6.30 A.M., and at once ordered him to send out his mounted men to gain intelligence of the enemy, whose whereabouts did not appear to be very certain."—(P. P. [C. 2252] p. 75.) The enemy shortly after showed in considerable strength at some distance, but retired without firing as the troops advanced. Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says: "Between 9.30 and 10 A.M. we were off-saddled some twelve miles from camp. During the three previous hours we had been advancing with Colonel Glyn's column against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill as we advanced, giving up, without a shot, most commanding positions."—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 99.) It was at this time ("about 9 A.M.," the General says) that the message was received from Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine, that a Zulu force had appeared on the hills on his left

points, when two men came riding from Zululand at a gallop, and shouted to be taken across the river. I was informed by one of them . . . of the disaster."

These men had ridden for their lives a distance of about nine miles, and must have been out of the fight before the Zulus had blocked the Rorke's Drift road; one hour, under the circumstances, would more than cover the distance, so we may fairly consider the Zulu rush, and falling back of the troops to have taken place about 2 o'clock.

¹ Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of the staff.

front. The General says he at once sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Milne, R.N., to the top of a high hill, from which the camp could be seen.¹ He had "a very powerful telescope, but could detect nothing unusual."² Lieut.-Colonel Crealock says that all the news he gave "was that the cattle had been driven into camp," and he acknowledges "our own attention was chiefly bent on the enemy's force retiring from the hills in our front, and a party being pursued by Lieut.-Colonel Russell three miles off."

The kloof where the enemy had been was found deserted, but a large body of Zulus were seen beyond it, and a portion of the mounted force sent after them, Major Dartnell and the rest of his men moving off to the right in the direction of another body of Zulus. These turned out to be Matshana's people, with the chief himself present: they were engaged, their retreat cut off, and then driven back on the Native Contingent. Of this party Matshana and one or two of his people alone escaped.

"Having no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of the camp" (!), the General ordered the mounted infantry to sweep round "to the main waggon-track, whilst a portion of the infantry went over the hill-top to the same point, and the guns, with an escort, retraced their steps," with instructions to join Colonel

¹ Lieutenant Milne says: "On reaching the summit I could see the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I could see nothing of the enemy on the left" (C. 2454, p. 184).

"We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may possibly have been the Zulu 'impi'" (*ibid.* p. 187).

² It is quite impossible to comprehend the extraordinary infatuation of the General and (apparently) his staff in seeing "nothing unusual" in this. The General says he had "no cause, therefore, to feel any anxiety about the safety of the camp." His Military Secretary says "not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in any danger;" and yet a written message told that a Zulu force had appeared on the left front of the camp—unreconnoitred ground, where the General himself on the previous afternoon had seen several Zulu horsemen: and now his A.D.C. reports what is one of the *first* and *surest* signs of danger in South African warfare:—"that the cattle had been driven into camp."

Glyn near the Mangane Valley, where the General proceeded with Colonel Glyn to fix upon a site for a new camp. Captain Gardener, 14th Hussars, was sent back to camp "with the order to Lieut.-Colonel Pulleine to send on the camp equipage and supplies of the troops camping out, and to remain at his present camp, and entrench it."—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 101.)

The 1st Battalion Native Contingent was ordered to march back to camp across country, and examine dongas, etc., *en route*.

"Not a sign of the enemy was now seen near us," says Colonel Crealock. "Not a suspicion had crossed my mind that the camp was in any danger, neither did anything occur to make me think of such a thing until about 1.15," when it was fancied firing was heard (the natives were certain of it). "We were then moving back to choose a camp for the night about twelve miles from Isandula." About 1.45 P.M., a native reported "heavy firing had been going on round the camp. We galloped up to a high spot, whence we could see the camp, perhaps 10 or 11 miles distant. None of us could detect anything amiss; all looked quiet. This must have been 2 P.M. The General, however, probably thought it would be well to ascertain what had happened himself, but not thinking anything was wrong, ordered Colonel Glyn to bivouac for the night where we stood; and taking with him some 40 mounted volunteers, proceeded to ride into camp. Lieut.-Colonel Cecil Russell, 12th Lancers, now joined us, and informed me that an officer of the Natal Native Contingent had come to him (about 12 noon, I think) when he was off-saddled, and asked where the General was, as he had instructions to tell him that heavy firing had been going on close to the camp. . . . This officer, however, did not come to us.

"This information from Colonel Russell was immediately followed by a message from Commandant Brown, commanding the 1st Battalion Natal Native Contingent, which had been ordered back to camp at 9.30 A.M.—(the battalion was halted a mile from us, and probably eight

miles from camp)—to the effect that large bodies of Zulus were between him and the camp, and that his men could not advance without support. The General ordered an immediate advance of the battalion, the mounted volunteers and mounted infantry supporting it.

"I am not aware what messages had been sent from¹ the camp and received by Colonel Glyn or his staff; but I know that neither the General nor myself had up to this time received any information but that I have mentioned.

"At 3.15 the General appeared to think that he would be able to brush through any parties of Zulus that might be in his road to the camp without any force further than that referred to, viz. 1st Battalion Native Contingent and some eighty mounted white men.

"At 4 P.M.,² however, the native battalion again halted," when within about six miles of the camp, "and shortly after—the General says—Commander Lonsdale rode up to report that he had ridden into camp and found it in possession of the Zulus." The General at once sent word to Colonel Glyn to bring back all the troops, and advanced about two miles, sending Lieut.-Colonel Russell forward to reconnoitre;—he fully confirmed Commandant Lonsdale's report. Colonel Glyn rejoined the General about 6 P.M., when the troops were formed in "fighting order," and advanced across the plain; "but could not reach the neighbourhood of our camp until after dark."

It may properly be here remarked that from the outskirts of the force firing had been seen at the camp as late as nearly four o'clock; and about six, large bodies of the enemy were seen retiring from the camp, through openings in the Ingqutu range.

When a move was first made by the General in the direction of the camp, an officer who was in advance

¹ One message only is mentioned by the General or his military secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer (of rank) *who had seen them*, says that five or six messages were received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff; and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.

² About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared.

narrates what he saw when he came to a rising ground from which the camp was first seen, about 3 P.M.

"There certainly were some tents standing then, but seemed very few, and away to the left front of the camp there was some smoke, though not much, and it was high up, just as if there had been musketry fire and the smoke had floated away; but there was certainly no musketry fire going on then. A few seconds afterwards a sergeant . . . said: 'There go the guns, sir.' I could see the smoke, but we could hear nothing. In a few seconds we distinctly saw the guns fired again, one after the other, sharp. This was done several times—a pause, and then a flash—flash! The sun was shining on the camp at the time, and then the camp looked dark, just as if a shadow was passing over it. The guns did not fire after that, and in a few minutes all the tents had disappeared. The sergeant said, 'It's all over now, sir.' I said, 'Yes, and I hope it is the right way.' We could see there was fighting going on, but of course did not know which way it had gone. The men all thought the Zulus had retired, but I felt doubtful in my own mind, but had no idea really of the catastrophe that had taken place."¹

"Within two miles of camp," Lieutenant Milne says, "four men were seen slowly advancing in front of us; a few mounted men were sent out; the men in front previously seen then took cover behind some rocks, but were fired upon by our men; one fell, the remainder ran out in the open, throwing up their hands to show they were unarmed. On being taken prisoners, they were found to be Native Contingent, escaped from the massacre."—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 185.)

On nearing the camp it was nearly dark, but it was

¹ Another officer (who was posted nearest to the camp whilst the General awaited the arrival of the remainder of the troops) considers that the firing heard and seen about 3 o'clock was "the stand made on the neck;" he says "on the whole I fancy the fighting lasted till about 3.30, but I believe we had as a body been defeated long before that."

This hour is further corroborated by Colonel Durnford's watch—taken from his body next morning—which had stopped at 3.40, and *must* have stopped when he received his death wound or immediately afterwards.

observed that waggons were drawn up across the neck ; the guns were therefore brought into action and shelled them. Then, no sound being heard, Major Black, with a wing of his regiment, moved forward to occupy the small hill close to Isandhlwana. No enemy was seen, and the camp was found tenanted by those who were taking their last long sleep.

A halt was made for the night amidst the *débris* of (the proper right of) the camp, on the "neck ;" the infantry covering the west, and the mounted troops and guns the east side. During the night there were one or two false alarms, and the whole force, at early dawn, moved off towards Rorke's Drift, as the General was anxious about the safety of that important post ; also the troops had no spare ammunition,¹ but little food, and "it was certain that daylight would reveal a sight which could not but have a demoralising effect upon the whole force."—(P. P. [C. 2252] p. 76.)

In Lord Chelmsford's despatch of 27th January, he gives a narrative of the attack on the camp, but remarks "the absolute accuracy of which, however, I cannot vouch for" (pp. 76, 77). On comparing his "narrative" with the *facts*, it will be found to be *absolutely inaccurate*. But Lord Chelmsford makes some remarks which cannot be passed over in silence. He says : "Had the force in question but taken up a defensive position in the camp itself, and utilised there the materials for a hasty entrenchment ;" but he does not point out how the "force in question" was to know of the near approach of the Zulu army, he himself having neglected to search the country where that army lay. He had prepared no "defensive position ;" but he had selected a fatal spot for his camp, which, covering a front of about half a mile, was utterly indefensible as it stood ; and he had "pooh-poohed" the suggestion of taking defensive precautions when made by Colonel Glyn ; and, further, it does not appear that there was *any time whatever* for the "force in question" to do anything but fight. Lord Chelmsford then says : "It appears that the oxen

¹ No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General.

were yoked to the waggons¹ three hours before the attack took place, so that there was ample time to construct that waggon-laager which the Dutch in former days understood so well."² This remark comes with peculiar ill-grace from Lord Chelmsford, who not only had not taken any precautions, but had not permitted any laager or other defence to be made; and whose reply to a suggestion of a laager at Isandhlwana was, "It would take a week to make." Also it must not be forgotten that the attack on Isandhlwana was *without warning*.

He next says: "Had, however, the tents been struck, and the British troops placed with their backs to the precipitous Isalwana Hill, I feel sure that they could have made a successful resistance." Here again he would blame the dead to cover the faults of the living! But even had the troops been thus placed (as some eventually appear to have been), how long could they keep at bay, when ammunition failed,³ an enemy armed with weapons they could, and did, use with fatal effect out of reach of the bayonet?

And lastly, Lord Chelmsford speaks of rumours "that the troops were deceived by a simulated retreat," and thus "drawn away from the line of defence." The *facts* prove the exact contrary. The only person deceived by a "simulated retreat" was Lord Chelmsford himself, whose

¹ Mr. Brickhill, the interpreter, says: "Between 9 and 10 o'clock I ordered all waggoners to collect their oxen, which were then scattered all around the camps and might impede the action of the troops, and tie them to the yokes, but not inspan them."

² As to Lord Chelmsford's valuation of Dutch experience, Mr. J. J. Uys—a Dutchman with lifelong experience of Zulu warfare—writes, on the 22nd May, 1879, that he was in the General's camp at Rorke's Drift on the 16th of January. "I said to the General, 'Be on your guard and be careful. I have knowledge of the deceit and treachery of the Zulu nation. Trek into Zululand with two laagers close to each other. Place your spies far out, and form your waggons into a round laager. The Zulus are more dangerous than you think. I lost my father and my brother through them, because we held them too cheaply. Afterwards we went with Andries Pretorius, but then we were careful, and have always closed our waggons well up, sent our spies far out, and we have beaten the Zulus. The first time 3,600 of their number fell.' The General smiled and said that he thought it was not necessary."

³ The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons, which were then filled up with stores.

troops *during three hours* had advanced "against a Zulu force that fell back from hill to hill . . . giving up without a shot most commanding positions." We do not find one word of Lord Chelmsford's own want of the most ordinary precautions—his want of "intelligence," and neglect to obtain it—of his seeing the enemy's mounted scouts on the left front, and intending (but not making) a reconnaissance in that direction—his fixed belief that the enemy *could* only be in force in his front—the transparent way in which he was drawn off farther from the camp—the absence of any attention to the signs that something *was* wrong at the camp—the prevention of assistance reaching the beleaguered camp when one of his officers *had* recognised the emergency, etc.; to which must be added that we do not find one word of regret for the untimely fate of the gallant men who fell doing *their* duty. In justice to Colonel Glyn, commanding No. 3 Column, it must be remarked that the General himself gave the orders for the various movements, etc. And in justice to Lord Chelmsford also, we note it is asserted that the shock he experienced told severely upon him at the time; and he may not have very carefully studied the despatch, which is said to have been the work of his military secretary.¹

But this memorable despatch requires further notice, for it contains the commencement of a theory—which is carried on by Lord Chelmsford's military secretary, and energetically adopted by his friend, Sir Bartle Frere—that some one else was to blame.

It is said that Colonel Glyn was at first selected; but, as he was alive and inclined to be troublesome, a dead man was chosen.

The *theory* of blame has been insinuated, until, on August 19th, 1880, in the House of Lords, Lord Chelmsford publicly charged Colonel Durnford, Royal Engineers—

¹ The authority for this statement is an officer who heard the military secretary remark that the *Illustrated London News* praised his sketch of Isandhlwana and blamed Lord Chelmsford's despatch, little thinking that both were from the same hand.