

said, 'What more do I wait for? they have touched my father.'"¹

But all doubt upon the subject of Sir T. Shepstone's intention was quickly and suddenly set at rest—the silken glove of friendly counsel and disinterested advice was thrown aside, and the mailed hand beneath it seized the reins of government from the slackened fingers of the President of the Transvaal. On the 22nd January, 1877, Sir Theophilus Shepstone entered Pretoria, the capital of the country, where he was received with all kindness and attention by the president, Mr. Burgers, and other important men, to whom he spoke of his mission in general terms, as one the object of which was "to confer with the Government and people of the Transvaal, with the object of initiating a new state of things which would guarantee security for the future."²

On April 9th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone informed President Burgers that "the extension over the Transvaal of Her Majesty's authority and rule," was imminent.

The following protest was officially read and handed in to Sir T. Shepstone on the 11th April:

"Whereas I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the South African Republic, have received a despatch, dated the 9th instant, from Her British Majesty's Special Commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, informing me that His Excellency has resolved, in the name of Her Majesty's Government, to bring the South African Republic, by annexation, under the authority of the British Crown:

"And whereas I have not the power to draw the sword with good success for the defence of the independence of the State against a superior power like that of England, and in consideration of the welfare of the whole of South Africa, moreover, feel totally disinclined to involve its white inhabitants in a disastrous war, without having

¹ Although a portion of the Zulu army assembled, it was not regularly called up; but the Indunas were ordered to be on the watch, and prepared for an immediate assembly if required.

² P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.

employed beforehand all means to secure the rights of the people in a peaceable way :

“So, I, in the name and by the authority of the Government and the people of the South African Republic, do hereby solemnly protest against the intended annexation.

“Given under my hand and under the Seal of the State at the Government Office at Pretoria, on this the 11th day of April, in the year 1877.

(Signed)

“THOMAS BURGERS,
“*State President.*”

A strong protest was handed in on the same date by the Executive Council, in which it was stated that “the people, by memorials or otherwise, have, by a large majority, plainly stated that they are averse to it” (annexation).

On April 17th, 1877, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon : “On Thursday last, the 12th instant, I found myself in a position to issue the proclamations necessary for annexing¹ the South African Republic, commonly known as the Transvaal, to Her Majesty’s dominions, and for assuming the administration thereof”—P. P. [C. 1776] pp. 152–56.

His intentions had been so carefully concealed, the proclamation took the people so completely by surprise, that it was received in what might be called a dead silence, which silence was taken to be of that nature which “gives consent.”

It has been amply shown since that the real feeling of the country was exceedingly averse to English interference with its liberties, and that the congratulatory addresses presented, and demonstrations made in favour of what had been done, were but expressions of feeling from the foreign element in the Transvaal, and got up by a few people personally interested on the side of English authority. But at the time they were made to appear as genuine expressions of Boer opinions favourable to

¹ It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission,”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.

the annexation, which was looked upon as a master-stroke of policy and a singular success. The troops assembled at Newcastle were at once ordered up, and made a formal entry into Pretoria on the 4th May.

It was some time before the Transvaalers recovered from the stunning effects of the blow by which they had been deprived of their liberties, and meanwhile the new Government made rapid advances, and vigorous attempts at winning popularity amongst the people. Sir T. Shepstone hastened to fill up every office under him with his own men, although there were great flourishes of trumpets concerning preserving the rights of the people to the greatest extent possible, and keeping the original men in office wherever practicable. The first stroke by which popularity was aimed at was that of remitting the war taxes levied upon the white population (though unpaid) to meet the expenses of the war with Sikukuni. It became apparent at this point what an empty sham was our proposed protection of Sikukuni, and how little the oppression under which he and his people suffered had really called forth our interference. Sir T. Shepstone, while remitting, as stated, the tax upon the Boers, insisted upon the payment in full of the fine in cattle levied by them upon Sikukuni's people. So sternly did he carry out the very oppressions which he came to put an end to, that a portion of the cattle paid towards the fine (two thousand head, a large number in the reduced and impoverished state of the people) were sent back, by his orders, on the ground that they were too small and in poor condition, with the accompanying message that better ones must be sent in their place. A commission (composed of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Osborne) was sent, before the annexation, by Sir T. Shepstone, to inquire into a treaty pressed by the Boers upon Sikukuni, and rejected by him, as it contained a condition by which he was to pay taxes, and thereby come under the Transvaal Government.¹ To these gentlemen "Sikukuni stated

¹ The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to him by the Boers, on the ground that he could not tell what it might contain beyond

that the English were great and he was little [C. 1776, p. 147], that he wanted them to save him from the Boers, who hunted him to and fro, and shot his people down like wild game. He had lost two thousand men" (this included those who submitted to the Boers) "by the war, ten brothers, and four sons. . . . He could not trust the Boers, as they were always deceiving him." After saying that "he wished to be like Moshesh" (a British subject), and be "happy and at peace," he "asked whether he ought to pay the two thousand head of cattle, seeing that the war was not of his making."

"To this we replied," say the Commissioners, "that it was the custom of us English, when we made an engagement, to fulfil it, cost what it might; that our word was our bond."

Small wonder if the oppressed and persecuted people and their chief at last resented such treatment, or that some of them should have shown that resentment in a manner decided enough to call for military proceedings on the part of the new Government of the Transvaal. In point of fact, however, it was not Sikukuni, but his sister—a chieftainess herself—whose people, by a quarrel with and raid upon natives living under our protection, brought on the second or English "Sikukuni war."

Turning to the other chief pretext for the annexation of the Transvaal, the disturbed condition of the Zulu border, we find precisely the same policy carried out. When it was first announced that the English had taken possession of the country of their enemies, the Zulus, figuratively speaking, threw up their caps, and rejoiced greatly. They thought that now at last, after years of patient waiting, and painful repression of angry feelings at the desire of the Natal Government, they were to receive their reward in a just acknowledgment of the claims which Sir T. Shepstone had so long supported, and which he was now in a position to confirm.

the points explained to him, to which he might afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.

But the quiet submission of the Boers would not have lasted, even upon the surface, had their new Governor shown the slightest sign of leaning to the Zulu side on the bitter boundary question; and as Sir T. Shepstone fancied that the power of his word was great enough with the Zulus to make them submit, however unwillingly, there was small chance of their receiving a rood of land at his hands. He had lost sight of, or never comprehended the fact, that that power was built upon the strong belief which existed in the minds of the Zulu king and people with regard to the justice and honesty of the English Government. This feeling is amply illustrated by the messages from the Zulu king, quoted in our chapter upon the Disputed Territory, and elsewhere in this volume, and need therefore only be alluded to here.

But this belief, so far as Sir T. Shepstone is concerned, was destroyed when the Zulus found that, far from acting according to his often-repeated words, their quondam friend had turned against them, and espoused the cause of their enemies, whom, at his desire, they had refrained these many years from attacking, when they could have done so without coming into collision with the English.

The Zulus, indeed, still believed in the English, and in the Natal Government; but they considered that Sir T. Shepstone, in undertaking the government of the Boers, had become a Boer himself, or, as Cetshwayo himself said, his old friend and father's back, which had carried him so long, had become too rough for him—if he could carry him no longer he would get down, and go to a man his equal in Pietermaritzburg (meaning Sir Henry Bulwer, Lieut.-Governor of Natal), who would be willing and able to take him up.

It is a curious fact, and one worthy of note, that Sir T. Shepstone, who for so many years had held and expressed an opinion favourable to the Zulus on this most important boundary question, should yet have studied it so little that, when he had been for six months Administrator of the Transvaal, with all evidence, written or oral, official or otherwise, at his command, he could say, speaking of a

conversation which he held with some Dutch farmers at Utrecht—P. P. (2079, p. 51-4): "I then learned for the first time, what has since been proved by evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear, that this boundary line¹ had been formally and mutually agreed upon, and had been formally ratified by the giving and receiving of tokens of thanks, and that the beacons had been built up in the presence of the President and members of the Executive Council of the Republic, in presence of Commissioners from both Panda and Cetshwayo, and that the spot on which every beacon was to stand was indicated by the Zulu Commissioners themselves placing the first stones on it.

"I shall shortly transmit to your Lordship" (the Secretary of State for the Colonies) "the further evidence on the subject that has been furnished to me." This "further evidence," if forwarded, does not appear in the Blue Book. It is plain that the Border Commissioners of 1878 found both the "evidence the most incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear," and the "further evidence" promised, utterly worthless for the purpose of proving the case of the Boers; but, even had it been otherwise, Sir T. Shepstone's confession of ignorance up to so late a date on this most vital question is singularly self-condemnatory.

"When I approached the question,"² he says, "I did so supposing that the rights of the Transvaal to land on the Zulu border had very slender foundation. I believed, from the representations which had been systematically made by the Zulus to the Natal Government on the subject, of which I was fully aware from the position I held in Natal, that the beacons along the boundary line had been erected by the Republican Government, in opposition to the wishes, and in spite of protests, of the Zulu authorities."³

"I, therefore, made no claims or demands whatever for land. I invited Cetshwayo to give me his views regarding a boundary, when I informed him from Pretoria that I

¹ That claimed by the Boers.

² P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).

³ The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all producible evidence, by the Rorke's Drift Commission in 1878.

should visit Utrecht on the tour I then contemplated making. When I met the Zulu prime minister and the indunas on the 18th October last"—(six weeks before he discovered, in conversation with some Boers, the "evidence incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear")—"on the Blood River, I was fully prepared, if it should be insisted on by the Zulus, as I then thought it might justly be, to give up a tract of country which had from thirteen to sixteen years been occupied by Transvaal farmers, and to whose farms title-deeds had been issued by the late Government; and I contemplated making compensation to those farmers in some way or another for their loss. I intended, however, first to offer to purchase at a fair price from the Zulu king all his claims to land which had for so many years been occupied and built upon by the subjects of the Transvaal, to whom the Government of the country was distinctly liable."¹

Sir T. Shepstone, when he met the Zulu indunas at the Blood River, was prepared to abandon the line of 1861 (claimed by the Boers), for that of the Blood River and the Old Hunting Road ("if it should be insisted on by the Zulus," as he "then thought it might justly be"), which, in point of fact, would have satisfied neither party; but he does not say by what right he proposed to stop short of the old line of 1856-7—viz. the Blood River—and insist upon the "Old Hunting Road." If the half-concession was just, so was the whole—or neither.

To these half-measures, however, the Zulus would not submit, and the conference failed of its object.

"Fortunately, therefore, for the interest of the Transvaal," says Sir T. Shepstone, "I was prevented by the conduct of the Zulus themselves from surrendering to them at that meeting what my information on the subject then had led me to think was after all due to them, and this I was prepared to do at any sacrifice to the Transvaal, seeing, as it then appeared to me, that justice to the Zulus demanded it."

¹ A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal.

In spite, however, of the concession to the Boers, made in Sir T. Shepstone's altered opinion on the border question, they were by no means reconciled to the loss of their independence, although Captain Clarke says (C. 2316, p. 28), in speaking of the Boers in Lydenburg district, that "they, in the majority of cases, would forget fancied wrongs if they thought they had security for their lives and property, education for their children, and good roads for the transport of their produce."¹

The following "Agreement, signed by a large number of farmers at the meeting held at Wonderfontein," and translated from a Dutch newspaper, the *Zuid Afrikaan*, published at Capetown on the 15th February, 1879 (C. 2316, p. 1), gives a different impression of the state of feeling amongst the Boers:—

"In the presence of Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, and prayerfully waiting on His gracious help and pity, we, burghers of the South African Republic, have solemnly agreed, and we do hereby agree, to make a holy covenant for us, and for our children, which we confirm with a solemn oath.

"Fully forty years ago our fathers fled from the Cape Colony in order to become a free and independent people. Those forty years were forty years of pain and suffering.

"We established Natal, the Orange Free State, and the South African Republic, and three times the English Government has trampled our liberty, and dragged to the ground our flag, which our fathers had baptized with their blood and tears.

"As by a thief in the night has our Republic been stolen from us. We may nor can endure this. It is God's will, and is required of us by the unity of our fathers, and by love to our children, that we should hand over intact to our children the legacy of the fathers. For that purpose it is that we here come together and give each other the right hand as men and brethren, solemnly promising to remain faithful to our country and

¹ That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties.

our people, and with our eye fixed on God, to co-operate until death for the restoration of the freedom of our Republic.

“So help us Almighty God.”

These pious words, side by side with the horrible accounts of the use made by the Boers of their liberty while they had it, strike one as incredibly profane; yet they are hardly more so than part of the speech made by Sir T. Shepstone to the burghers of the Transvaal on the occasion of the annexation.

“Do you know,” he asks them, “what has recently happened in Turkey? Because no civilised government was carried on there, the Great Powers interfered and said, ‘Thus far and no farther.’ And if this is done to an Empire, will a little Republic be excused when it misbehaves? Complain to other powers and seek justice there? Yes, thank God! justice is still to be found even for the most insignificant, but it is precisely this justice which will convict us. If we want justice we must be in a position to ask it with unsullied hands.”¹

Our first quotation was from the words of ignorant Boers, our second from those of a man South African born and bred, South African in character and education. But perhaps both are surpassed by words lately written by an English statesman of rank. Let us turn to a “minute” of Sir Bartle Frere’s, forwarded on November 16th, 1878 (2222, p. 45), and see what he says in defence of Boer conquests and encroachments. “The Boers had force of their own, and every right of conquest; but they *had also what they seriously believed to be a higher title, in the old commands they found in parts of their Bible to exterminate the Gentiles, and take their land in possession.*”² We may freely admit that they misinterpreted the text, and were utterly mistaken in its application. But *they had at least a sincere belief in the Divine authority for what*

¹ Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and “we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable?

² Italics are not Sir B. Frere’s.

*they did, and therefore a far higher title than the Zulus could claim for all they acquired.*¹ (P. P. [C. 2222] p. 45.)

If the worship of the Boers for their sanguinary deity is to be pleaded in their behalf, where shall we pause in finding excuses for any action committed by insane humanity in the name of their many gods? But the passage hardly needs our comments, and we leave it to the consideration of the Christian world.

However the foreign element in the Transvaal may have welcomed the annexation, the Boers, as a body, held aloof. The Executive Council of the Republic, on the 11th April, 1877, resolved that: "Whereas the Government is convinced not to be in a position to defend the rights and independence of the people against Great Britain with arms, and further wishes to take no step whereby the white settlers of South Africa, in the face of the common enemy, should be divided against each other, or be brought to a conflict, to the great detriment of all Christian people in South Africa, before the very last means have been tried to assure the rights of the people by peaceful and amicable means. So it is that the Government most strongly protests against the action of Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, resolving further to despatch immediately a Commission of Representatives to Europe and America, . . . to try in the first instance to appeal to Her Majesty's Government, and if this should have no result, which the Government should regret and can as yet not believe, then to try and invoke the friendly help and assistance of other powers, foremost of those who have acknowledged the independence of this country."

The members appointed to serve on this Commission were Mr. S. J. P. Kruger, Vice-President of the South African Republic; and Dr. E. J. P. Jorrisen, the State Attorney.

The following Proclamation was issued:—

"Whereas Her British Majesty's Special Commissioner, Sir Theo. Shepstone, notwithstanding my solemn protest of yesterday, entered against his purposes, communicated

¹ Italics are not Sir B. Frere's.

to me by his letter of the 9th April, has been pleased to execute his designs, and has this day proclaimed Her British Majesty's government over the South African Republic; and whereas the Government has decided to acquiesce for the present 'under a protest for the purpose of despatching meanwhile a deputation to Europe and America, in the person of Messrs. S. J. P. Kruger and E. P. Jorissen, for the purpose there to defend the rights of the people, and to try and obtain a *peaceful* solution of the case:

"So it is that I, Thomas François Burgers, State President of the South African Republic, proclaim and make hereby known with consent and advice of the Executive Council, to all officials, citizens, and inhabitants, to abstain from every word or deed calculated to frustrate the work of the mission.

"And I admonish all burghers and inhabitants to help carrying out this decision of the Government for the preservation of order and the avoidance of bloodshed.

" THOS. BURGERS,

" GOVERNMENT OFFICE, PRETORIA,
12th April, 1877."

" State President.

The Commission proceeded to London, but obtained no satisfaction from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In 1878 a second deputation was sent with a memorial, said to have been "signed by thousands upon thousands," but with a like result.

A considerable feeling of unrest prevailed, and early in 1879 a large number of Boers assembled in anticipation of Sir Bartle Frere's arrival in the Transvaal. Their camp, or laager, was formed near Pretoria; their numbers being variously estimated at from 2,000 to 4,000 men.

The position of affairs was reported by Colonel W. Owen Lanyon, the Administrator, to be serious (March 18th, 1879), and arrangements were made for the defence of Pretoria.

Sir Bartle Frere arrived at Pretoria on April 10th, 1879, and visited the Boer camp. On the 12th he had a conference with "The People's Committee," when "Mr.

Pretorius stated that 'the people had charged Messrs. Kruger, Robertson, and Joubert, to express their wishes;' whereupon these three gentlemen in different terms, but in the briefest possible manner, intimated that 'the people' desired nothing more than the restoration of their independence, and would accept nothing less."¹

Sir Bartle Frere "reminded them that their representatives had twice heard from the lips of Her Majesty's Secretary of State that the British Government and Parliament had finally resolved that the act of annexation could not be undone, but that they should receive in due course, as soon as circumstances rendered it practicable, as large a measure of self-government as was enjoyed by any colony in South Africa."

On the 16th April a deputation from the Boers waited on Sir Bartle Frere, and reminded him of his promise to forward, with the notes of proceedings, any memorial they might wish to submit to Her Majesty. This memorial, dated April 16th, 1879, complains bitterly of the annexation, and of the manner in which it was carried out. The petitioners lay their petition at Her Majesty's feet "with all the earnestness of men who for two years have fought for their rights with weapons of order and passive resistance, and who still persevere therein."

"What else can we do? Must we draw the sword? Your Majesty, we cannot conceal from you what is happening at the present moment in Pretoria, the old capital of our Republic. It is an open town, full of families, women and children. A handful of your Majesty's troops is there. Your representatives there have given orders or permission that in the open streets barricades and breastworks should be erected; private residences are pierced with loopholes. Why? and against what enemy? Against us, the true people of the South African Republic. Is there any clearer evidence needed that the annexation is contrary to the will of the people, if, after two years, the capital of the country must be protected in such a way against the people? It would seem as if men would

¹ P. P. [C. 2367] p. 54.

mislead us into bringing about a massacre; and we are sure that just as much as this grieves us, it will also call forth your Majesty's displeasure. Must it then, your Majesty, come to war? It cannot be your will, just as it is not our wish.

"Your Majesty cannot desire to rule over unwilling subjects. Unwilling subjects, but faithful neighbours we will be. We beseech you, put an end to this unbearable state of things, and charge your High Commissioner in South Africa to give us back our state."¹

The memorial was forwarded to the Secretary of State on the 17th of April by Sir Bartle Frere, together with a report of the meeting with the Boer Committee, who, Sir Bartle Frere says, "are men of position in the country and respected, and leaders who have since the earliest establishment of the Republic taken a prominent part in the government of the country, I think I may say that their representations are worthy of your earnest consideration."²

On the 29th of September Sir Garnet Wolseley assumed the office of Governor of the Transvaal, and "the Committee of the People" at once addressed a letter to him asking whether the answer of Her Majesty the Queen to their memorial had come into his possession.

The reply referred them to the Proclamation issued by Sir Garnet, on the day of his assuming office, to the effect that it was "the will and determination of Her Majesty's Government that this Transvaal territory shall be and shall continue to be for ever an integral portion of Her Majesty's dominions of South Africa."³

In October a somewhat serious disturbance occurred at Middleberg. A Boer named Jacobs was brought before the local court, charged with having ill-treated one of his Kaffir servants, by tying him "by his wrists to a beam, so that his feet could not touch the ground." "The sun was up," says the man, "but not very high, when I was suspended to the beam. It was after mid-day when I was released."

A large number of Boers attended from *sympathy with*

¹ P. P. [C. 2367] pp. 97-99.

² Ibid. p. 84.

³ P. P. [C. 2482] p. 343.

the defendant, and (it is said) as anxious to *resist any interference between themselves and their Kaffirs*. The Landrost took the opportunity to read out Sir Garnet's proclamation declaring the permanency of the annexation of the Transvaal; but the attitude of the Boers appeared to be so threatening that he thought it advisable to adjourn the case for a couple of hours. Shortly before the court re-opened the Landrost was informed that the Boers had taken by force from two stores all their stock of ammunition.

Raids were afterwards made upon other stores, and the Landrost at once reported that he feared "from this demonstration that the Boers are now ripe for an armed opposition to Government." The Administrator hurried down to Middleberg, and ordered summonses to be served on all persons implicated, and that the trial of Jacobs should be resumed.

The Boers who were found guilty of seizing ammunition were fined £5 each, which was paid. Jacobs appeared two days after the expiration of his bail, pleading a misunderstanding, and was then bound over to appear at a future date.

A Boer meeting was convened for the 10th of December; and the country generally was in an excited state.

On the 12th December there were 6,305 men present at Wonderfontein, and Mr. Paul Kruger read the resolutions which had been adopted by the foremen in consultation with the people.

On the 15th, the following resolutions were passed:

"The people of the South African Republic have expressed their will on Friday December 12, and now proceed further to complete the same by resolutions.

"The time for petitions to the English Government is passed; no deliverance may be expected in that respect.

"The officials of Her Majesty the Queen of England have, by their untrue and false representations, closed the way to Her Majesty and to the Parliament. The responsibility of this rests with them. The people have done what they could again, and once more they would appeal to the

Queen of England, for the people believe, as certain as the sun shines, that if the Queen and the English nation knew that a free people is oppressed here, they would never allow it; England has been the protector of liberty everywhere, and would also protect our liberty, which is now being suppressed.

“But Her Majesty’s officials in South Africa who continue to defend the necessity of the annexation conceal the truth and smother our voice. We cannot therefore address ourselves to England, there is nobody in that country to reply to us. It is therefore that we, the people of the South African Republic, proceed to resolve, viz. :—

“1st. That the people of the South African Republic have never been, and never wish to be, Her Majesty’s subjects, and that every one who speaks of us as rebels is a slanderer.

“2nd. The people desire that the Government of the South African Republic, whose functions have been stopped, shall resume the same as soon as possible.

“3rd. The people desire that the Volksraad shall be convened as soon as possible.

“4th. The people desire to show to friend and foe, that they wish to avoid everything in the way of bloodshed and violence, and therefore expect from their Volksraad to take such steps as will make possible a peaceable solution of the difficulties with the English Government.

“5th. The people expect from the Volksraad, in furtherance of that object, in the first place a proclamation or law on the following points :

“(a.) That all rights of the present inhabitants of the Transvaal shall be under the protection of the laws of the country.

“(b.) That the right of the English Government to nominate a Consul, or other diplomatic person, to look after the interests of British subjects, continue to be recognised.

“(c.) That the lawful expenditure legally made by the interregnum for the expenses of our country shall be recognised.

“(d.) That the differences as to the boundary lines with natives shall be submitted to arbitration.

“(e.) That for their native policy the Government be prepared to adopt general rules in consultation with the colonies and states of South Africa.

“(f.) That the Republic is prepared, in consultation and concurrence with the colonies and states of South Africa, to enter into a confederation.

“6th. The people declare that they will be forgiving towards all burghers of the South African Republic who through circumstances had been brought to temporarily leave the side of the people, but they cannot promise to extend this forgiveness to those burghers of the South African Republic who come forward as open enemies of the people, and continue to deceive the English Government by their false representations.

“7th. The people further declare that, until the time that the Republic is restored, they will not, except under coercion, appear in the law courts of the country, and that they will have all differences amongst themselves decided by arbitrators.

“8th. The people also direct a public warning to some directors of banks in the country not further to interfere with politics, and thus become instruments in the hands of the enemies of the Republic.

“9th. The people of the South African Republic expect from the interregnum, and from its higher and lower officials, that a stop shall be put to all needless annoyances of the burgher such as have lately been but too frequently resorted to, which can have no other effect than inciting collision; and, lastly,

“10th. The people declare that, by God's help, they desire to have a strong Government for the South African Republic, respect for the law, the development and advancement of the country; and they promise man for man to co-operate for that purpose, and to defend their Government till death, so help us God Almighty.

“Thus done by us, the foremen elected by the people, in the name of the people of the South African Republic,

at Wonderfontein, on this the 15th day of December, 1879." ¹

These resolutions were forwarded to Sir Garnet Wolseley by the chairman and secretary—Messrs. M. W. Pretorius and F. E. Bok—and the meeting then peaceably dispersed; having resolved to assemble on the 6th of April, 1880, on the farm of Mr. Pretorius.

After taking the opinion of the Attorney-General and consulting the leading executive officers of the Government, Sir Garnet Wolseley "determined to prosecute Messrs. Pretorius and Bok for the crime of treason," and gave orders that the necessary proceedings should be at once instituted.

Mr. Bok was arrested at Pretoria on the 3rd of January, 1880, and admitted to bail. Mr. Pretorius was arrested at Potchefstroom on the 5th, and, after a short time, was also admitted to bail.

Eventually, proceedings against these gentlemen were dropped.

Sir Garnet Wolseley reports from Pretoria, January 16th, 1880: "A party of Boers with about thirty waggons and possibly 300 horses gathered about nine miles from Potchefstroom on the Pretoria road, and were visited, I am informed, on the 10th instant by Mr. Paul Kruger, who is said to have pointed out to them that they were foolish in attempting to thus collect and contend against the English Government, and that they had better return to their homes. On the 12th the meeting broke up.

"There is complete quiet in Potchefstroom, and the 80th Regiment, which had halted there, is on its march to Heidelberg, whence it will proceed to Durban to embark for England."

The views of the Home Government were that "it would not be possible, and if possible, it would be injurious to the country, to re-establish the form of government which existed before the 12th April, 1877." And the Secretary of State writes, 20th November, 1879: "It is obvious that as a member of a South African Confederation

¹ P. P. [C. 2505] pp. 128-9.

the country might receive a constitution which would confer upon the people, under the paramount authority of the British Crown, the fullest independence compatible with that thorough unity of action which the common welfare demands."¹

In accordance with instructions from the Home Government "for the establishment of an Executive Council and a Legislative Assembly for the Transvaal Province and Territory," the following gentlemen were offered and accepted appointments:

Executive Council: P. J. Marais, J. C. Holtshauzen, J. S. Joubert.

Legislative Council: C. K. White, O. W. A. Forssman, J. A. Esterhuyse, F. A. R. Johnston, A. H. Stander, J. H. Nel.

The first meeting of the Executive Council took place on the 23rd February, 1880, and the Legislative Assembly was summoned for the 10th of March.²

On the 10th March the first Legislative Assembly under Her Majesty's rule was duly opened at Pretoria by the Administrator, Colonel Owen Lanyon.

The Boer Committee assembled at Wonderfontein in March, and postponed indefinitely the mass meeting originally proclaimed for the 6th of April.

The excitement that had prevailed was not now so manifest, and the Home Government was assured that the agitation amongst the Boers in the Transvaal was dying out, and that the country was settling down into tranquillity.

The first symptom of the storm that succeeded this calm was at Potchefstroom when some "disaffected Boers" assembled on the 11th November, and forcibly stopped a Government execution sale for non-payment of taxes.

The immediate cause of the outbreak is thus stated by the Boer leaders:

"Meantime, the peace observed by the people has been continually and purposely misrepresented. The people

¹ P. P. [C. 2482] pp. 378-9.

² P. P. [C. 2584] p. 192.

had decreed to pay its taxes only under protest or by force, whilst the Government for the time being has thought well to write to England that the people were satisfied and paid their taxes. Upon these statements the English Parliament, in September last, has allowed the matter of the annexation to pass unchallenged, because Her Majesty's Government declared that the Administrator reported the opposition of the people abating, and that they paid their taxes."

Deceived by such reports from Pretoria, His Excellency Sir Pomeroy Colley, Her Majesty's Governor at Natal, no later than the 19th October, 1880, declared at the opening of the Legislative Council in that colony, that the movement in the Transvaal was apparently settling, that everywhere law and order reigned, and that the taxes were paid by natives as well as the white inhabitants.

Indescribable was the anger of the people when they saw that, purposely and wilfully, the truth was obscured by the authorities in Pretoria, and that the unwilling and extorted payment of taxes was used as a weapon against the people.

Immediately the people gathered, and from all sides declarations were signed by the burghers, that they should either no longer pay taxes, or alone under protest, exercising thereby their rights as an independent people that may be silent for a time but reserves its rights.

This declaration was printed in the newspapers, and the Government in Pretoria, afraid, doubtlessly, that now the untruth of its information should come to light, has crowned its work of tyranny by prosecuting criminally for the publication of seditious writing the editor of the paper which published those declarations. The liberty of the press was a thorn in the sides of the Government *pro tem.*

The unwillingness of the people to pay taxes led to small collisions. Yet everything was still done by the leaders of the people to prevent a public disturbance of the peace.¹

¹ P. P. [C. 2794] pp. 7-8.

Sir Owen Lanyon ordered up troops to Potchefstroom, and on the 19th November reported the agitation to Lord Kimberley, remarking, "the term 'people' in reality only represents an excited, clamouring crowd, which is not even a constituted part of an organised whole, and the Government would be strangely wrong were it to mistake their clamour for public opinion. It cannot admit that the dictum of a few agitators can be regarded as the organically evolved opinion of the people. There is no '*vox populi*,' for the phrase here means nothing but the despotic power of insinuating leaders. . . . I do not think there is much, if any, cause for anxiety regarding the ultimate issue of the measures now being taken by the Government."¹ On the application of Sir Owen Lanyon, Sir G. Pomeroy Colley ordered a wing of the 58th Regiment up from Natal.

The Boers were now assembling in considerable numbers at Kaalfontein, near Potchefstroom; and on the 29th of November Mr. Kruger informed the Colonial Secretary that a general meeting of the people would be held on the 8th of December, and that he hoped that the Government would place no obstacle in the way by summonses, writs of execution, or any military movements; and, if movements were taken, that he could not be responsible for the consequences.

Sir Owen Lanyon, on December 6th, published a notice "to warn agitators of the danger they were running into, and also to strengthen the loyally disposed people."

The authorities were strangely blind to the signs of the coming storm. Sir G. Pomeroy Colley writes on December 13th from Pietermaritzburg, "There is little news from the Transvaal. The present agitation seems principally connected with the annual tax notices. Protests have been made by armed deputations of Boers at various points against the payment of taxes, but no overt act of resistance to the law appears to have occurred except at Potchefstroom. . . . Although large armed gatherings have

¹ P. P. [C. 2740] pp. 116-119.

taken place, and a good deal of violent language has been used by the Boers, I still trust that we shall be able to avoid any collision; and that a patient but firm enforcement of the law will ultimately tire out these spasmodic efforts of disaffection."¹

Sir Owen Lanyon writes in the same style on the 5th December: he states that "threats and intimidation are freely used to force the people to attend" the mass meeting on the 8th, and says: "I still do not think there is much cause for anxiety, but the position of affairs is one which requires careful attention and watching."²

The President of the Orange Free State appeared to recognise the danger of the situation, and sent the following telegram to the Administrator, Cape Town (Sir G. C. Strahan):

"I read with very deep concern the account of the very serious aspect of affairs in the Transvaal. The gravity of the situation will, I hope, be accepted by your Excellency as an excuse for the liberty of asking your Excellency whether your Excellency will not devise some means by which a collision, which seems imminent, may be averted, a collision which will have the most disastrous results and seriously imperil the prestige of the white man with the native tribes."

This appeal was forwarded to the Colonial Office *by post*.

The meeting of the people of the Transvaal was short and decisive. On the 13th of December, 1880, after two days' conference, the Government of the South African Republic was declared to be re-established; and the Volksraad recommenced its sitting.

Messrs. S. J. P. Kruger, M. W. Pretorius, and P. Joubert were appointed a Triumvirate "to execute the government of the country," which was "declared to be in a state of siege, and under the provisions of martial law."

¹ P. P. [C. 2783] p. 54.

² *Ibid.* p. 20.

On the 15th the Boer Commando moved on to Heidelberg, and next day established the government there, and hoisted the flag of the Republic.

The first shot in anger was fired at Potchefstroom on the 16th of December, and England again commences to reap the bitter fruit of the disastrous policy that of late years has so marred South Africa.

CHAPTER IX.

THE DISPUTED TERRITORY.

WE must now look back and gather up the threads—hitherto interwoven with accounts of other matters—connected with what has been rightly called the “burning question” of the disputed territory, which led eventually to the Zulu War.

The disputes between the Boers and Zulus concerning the boundary line of their respective countries had existed for many years, its origin and growth being entirely attributable to the well-known and usually successful process by which the Dutch Boers, as we have already said, have gradually possessed themselves of the land belonging to their unlettered neighbours. This process is described by Mr. Osborn, formerly resident magistrate at Newcastle, now Colonial Secretary of the Transvaal Government, September 22nd, 1876 (1748, p. 196) :

“I would point out here that this war (with Sikukuni) arose solely out of disputes about land. The Boers—as they have done in other cases, and are still doing—encroached by degrees upon native territory ; commencing by obtaining permission to graze stock upon portions of it at certain seasons of the year, followed by individual graziers obtaining from native headmen a sort of licence to squat upon certain defined portions, ostensibly in order to keep other Boer squatters away from the same land. These licences, temporarily extended, as friendly or neighbourly acts, by unauthorised headmen, after a few seasons of occu-

pation by the Boer, are construed by him as title, and his permanent occupation ensues. Damage for trespass is levied by him upon the very men from whom he obtained right to squat, to which the natives submit out of fear of the matter reaching the ears of the paramount Chief, who would in all probability severely punish them for opening the door of encroachment to the Boer. After a while, however, the matter comes to a crisis, in consequence of the incessant disputes between the Boers and the natives; one or other of the disputants lays the case before the paramount Chief, who, upon hearing both parties, is literally frightened with violence and threats by the Boer into granting him the land. Upon this, the usual plan followed by the Boer is at once to collect a few neighbouring Boers, including an Acting Field Cornet, or even an Acting Provisional Field Cornet, appointed by the Field Cornet or Provisional Cornet, the latter to represent the Government, although without instructions authorising him to act in the matter. A few cattle are collected among themselves, which the party takes to the Chief, and his signature is obtained to a written instrument, alienating to the Republican Boers a large slice of, or all, his territory. The contents of this document are, so far as I can make out, never clearly or intelligibly explained to the Chief, who signs it and accepts of the cattle, under the impression that it is all in settlement of hire for the grazing licences granted by his headmen."

"This, I have no hesitation in saying, is the usual method by which the Boers obtain what they call cessions of territories to them by native Chiefs. In Sikukuni's case, they say that his father, Sikwata, ceded to them the whole of his territory (hundreds of square miles) for one hundred head of cattle."

Also Sir H. Barkly, late Governor of the Cape, writes as follows, October 2nd, 1876 (1748, p. 140):

"The following graphic description of this process (of Boer encroachment) is extracted from a letter in the *Transvaal Advocate* of a few weeks ago: 'Frontiers are laid down, the claim to which is very doubtful. These frontiers

are not occupied, but farms are inspected ("guessed at" would be nearer the mark), title-deeds for the same are issued, and, when the unlucky purchaser wishes to take possession, he finds his farm (if he can find it) occupied by tribes of Kafirs, over whom the Government has never attempted to exercise any jurisdiction.' 'Their Chief,' it adds, 'is rather bewildered at first to find out that he has for years been a subject of the Transvaal.' 'The Chief in question is one Lechude, living on the north-west of the Republic. But the account is equally applicable to the case of Sikukuni, or Umswazi, or half-a-dozen others, the entire circuit of the Republic, from the Barolongs and Batlapins on the west, to the Zulus on the east, being bordered by a *series of encroachments disputed by the natives.*'"

A memorandum from Captain Clarke, R.A., Special Commissioner at Lydenburg, dated April 23rd, 1879 (C. 2367, p. 152), also gives an account of the way in which the Boers took possession of the Transvaal itself, highly illustrative of their usual practice, and of which the greater part may be quoted here, with a key to the real meaning of phrases which require some study to interpret:

"On the entrance of the Fou Trekkers into the Transvaal, they were compelled against their hereditary instincts to combine for self-defence against a common foe." (That is to say, that, having forced themselves into a strange country, they necessarily combined to oust those they found there.) "External pressure was removed by success, and the diffusive instinct asserted itself"—which being translated into ordinary English simply signifies that, having conquered certain native tribes, they settled themselves upon their lands, and returned to their natural disunited condition. "Isolated families, whose ambition was to be out of sight of their neighbours' smoke, pushed forward into Kafir-land" (as yet unconquered).

"Boundaries were laid down either arbitrarily or by unsatisfactorily recorded treaty with savage neighbours. The natives, forced back, acquired the powers of coalition

lost by the Boers, and in their turn brought pressure to bear on their invaders and whilom conquerors; farm after farm had to be abandoned, and many of the Boers who remained acknowledged by paying tribute that they retained their lands by the permission of neighbouring chiefs. The full importance of this retrograde movement was not at once felt, as a natural safety-valve was found.

"A considerable portion of the east of the Transvaal is called the High Veldt, and consists of tableland at a considerable elevation, overlying coal-measures; this district appears bleak and inhospitable, overrun by large herds of game and watered by a series of apparently stagnant ponds which take the place of watercourses. . . . From various sources, within the last six years, it has been discovered that the High Veldt is most valuable for the grazing of sheep, horses, and cattle; and farms which possess the advantage of water are worth from 1,000*l.* to 1,200*l.*, where formerly they could have been bought for as many pence.

"This discovery has opened a door of escape for many of the *native-pressed borderers*. *The pressure* on those that remain increases, and on the north-east and west of the Transvaal is a fringe of farmers who live by the suffrance or in fear of the interlacing natives."

The phrases which I have italicised seem to indicate that the writer has lost sight of the fact that, if the border farmers are "native-pressed," it is because they have intruded themselves amongst the natives, from which position a just and wise government would seek to withdraw them, instead of endeavouring to establish and maintain them in it by force. This latter course, however, is the one which Captain Clarke recommends. The remainder of his memorandum is a series of suggestions for this purpose, one of which runs as follows: "To take away the immediate strain on the border farmer, and the risk of collision which the present state of affairs involves, I would suggest the establishment of Government Agents, who should reside *on or beyond the border now occupied by*

*the farmers.*¹ . . . Each Residency should be a fortress, built of stone, and prepared for defence against any native force.

Sir Bartle Frere's version of Captain Clarke's account, given to the Secretary of State in a despatch inclosing the above, runs as follows: "Most of the native chiefs now there have gradually crept in, under pressure from the northward, and finding no representatives of the Transvaal Government able to exercise authority on the spot, have gradually set up some sort of government for themselves, before which many of the Boers have retired, leaving only those who were willing to pay a sort of tribute for protection, or to avoid being robbed of their cattle."

With whatever oblique vision Sir Bartle Frere may have perused the inclosure from which he gathers his facts, no unbiassed mind can fail to detect the singular discrepancy between the account given by Captain Clarke and that drawn from it by the High Commissioner in his inclosing letter.

He makes no mention of the *driving out* of the natives which preceded their *creeping in*, and which figures so largely in Captain Clarke's memorandum, of which he professes to give a sketch. And he introduces, entirely on his own account, the accusation against the natives implied in the phrase "or to avoid being robbed of their cattle," of which not a single word appears in the memorandum itself.

Properly speaking, there were two disputed boundary lines up to 1879, the one being that between Zululand and the Transvaal, to the south of the Pongolo River: the other that between the Zulus and the Swazis, to the north of, and parallel to, that stream.² The Swazis are the hereditary enemies of the Zulus, and there has always been a bitter feeling between the two races; nevertheless the acquisitiveness of the Transvaal Boers was at the bottom of both disputes. They profess to have obtained,

¹ Author's italics.

² "Ama-Swazi" for the plural correctly, as also "Ama-Zulu."

by cession from the Swazi king in 1855, a strip of land to the north-east of the Pongolo River and down to the Lebombo Mountains, in order that they might form a barrier between them and the Zulus ; but the Swazis deny having ever made such cession.

In addition to the doubt thrown upon the transaction by this denial, and the well-known Boer encroachments already described, it remains considerably open to question whether the Swazis had the power to dispose of the land, which is claimed by the Zulus as their own. The Commission which sat upon the southern border question was not permitted to enter upon that to the north of the Pongolo, which therefore remains uncertain. The one fact generally known, however, is undoubtedly favourable to the Zulu claim. The territory in question was occupied until 1848 by two Zulu chiefs, Putini of the Ama-Ngwe, and Langalibalele of the Ama-Hlubi tribe, under the rule of the Zulu king Umpande. These chiefs, having fallen into disgrace with the king, were attacked by him, and fled into Natal. They were ultimately settled in their late locations under the Drakensberg, leaving their former places in Zululand, north and south of the Pongolo, the inNgcaka (Mountain), and inNgcuba (River) vacant.

Sir Henry Bulwer remarks on this point—(P. P. [C. 2220] pp. 400–2) :

“Sir T. Shepstone says indeed, that there is no dispute between the Transvaal and the Ama-Swazi ; but, as he adds, that, should question arise between them, they may be settled on their own merits, it is not impossible that questions may arise ; and I am certainly informed that the Ama-Swazi used formerly to deny that they had ever ceded land to the *extent* claimed by the Republic.” But that the western portion, at all events, of the land in dispute was at that time under Zulu rule, is apparent from an account given by members of the house of Masobuza, principal wife of Langalibalele, and sister to the Swazi king, who was sheltered at Bishopstowe after the destruction of the Hlubi tribe, and died there in 1877.

“In Chaka’s time, Mate, father of Madhlangampisi, who

had lived from of old on his land north of the Pongolo, as an *independent* chief, not under Swazi rule, gave, without fighting, his allegiance to Chaka; and from that time to this the district in question has been under Zulu rule, the Swazi king having never at any time exercised any authority over it." The same statement applies to several other tribes living north and on either side of the Pongolo, amongst them those of Langalibalele and Putini.

"Madhlangampisi's land was transferred by the Boer Government as late as January 17th, 1877, to the executors of the late Mr. M'Corkindale, and now goes by the name of 'Londina,' in which is the hamlet of 'Derby.' . . . We are perfectly aware that the southern portion of the block is held by command of the Zulu chief, and the executor's surveyors have been obstructed in prosecuting the survey." —*Natal Mercury*, July 23rd, 1878.

In 1856 a number of Boers claimed *Natal* territory *west* of the Buffalo, as far as the Biggarsberg range, now the south-west boundary of the Newcastle County, and some of them were in occupation of it; and, a Commission being sent to trace the northern border of the colony along the line of the Buffalo, these latter opposed and protested against the mission of the Commissioners; but their opposition spent itself in threats, and ended in the withdrawal from Natal of the leaders of the party.

Other Boers had settled *east* of the Buffalo, in the location vacated by the tribe of Langalibalele, as to whom the aforesaid Commissioners write:

"During our stay among the farmers it was brought to our notice by them that they had obtained from Panda the cession of the tract of country beyond the Buffalo, extending from the Blood River (inNcome) towards the north-west; they had subscribed among themselves one hundred head of cattle for this land, which had been accepted by Panda."

And Sir T. Shepstone says:

"Panda never denied this grant (N.B. in respect of what lay *west* of the Drakensberg), but repudiated the idea that he had sold the land. His account was that, when

the farmers were defeated by Her Majesty's troops in Natal, some of them asked him for land to live upon outside the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that he gave them this tract 'only to live in, as part of Zululand under Zulu law,' (P. P. 1961, p. 28). "The cattle they say they paid for it, Panda looked upon as a thankoffering, made in accordance with Zulu custom" (1961, pp. 1-5).

In reply to messages sent by the Zulu king to the Natal Government, complaining of the encroachments of the Boers on the *north* as well as the west of Zululand, and begging the friendly intervention and arbitration of the English, the advice of the Natal authorities was always to "sit still," and use no force, for England would see justice done in the end.¹

From all this it would appear that the claim of Cetshwayo to land north of the Pongolo was not an "aggressive act," without any real foundation in right, and merely a defiant challenge intended to provoke war; but was a just claim, according to the tests applied by Sir Bartle Frere—(P. P. 2222, p. 29—viz. "actual occupation and exercise of sovereign rights."

The subject is fully gone into, and further evidence produced, in the Bishop of Natal's pamphlet, *Extracts from the Blue Books*; but the main facts are as here stated.

On turning to the subject of the better known border dispute, between the Zulus and the Transvaal Boers on the east, we are confronted at once by the fact that the

¹ Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally, writes as follows: "The Zulu king had always, in deference very much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at any moment."—SIR H. BULWER, June 29th, 1876 (C. 1961, p. 1).

decision of the Commissioners, chosen by Sir H. Bulwer to investigate the matter, was decidedly favourable to the Zulu claim; which, after careful consideration of all the evidence on either side, they found to be a just and good one. This decision should, in itself, have been sufficient to relieve the Zulu king from the accusation of making insolent demands for territory with aggressive and warlike intentions. But as, up to July, 1878, the above charge was the sole one brought against him, and on account of which troops were sent for and preparations made for war; and as, also, Sir Bartle Frere has thought fit to cast a doubt upon the judgment of the Commissioners by the various expressions of dissatisfaction which appear in his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal; it will be necessary for us to enter fully into the matter, in order to understand the extent to which the question bore fruit in the Zulu War.

In 1861 Cetshwayo demanded from the Transvaal Government the persons of four fugitives, who had escaped at the time of the Civil War of 1856, and had taken refuge amongst the Boers. One of these fugitives was a younger son of Umpande, by name Umtonga, who took refuge at first in Natal; from whence, however, he carried on political intrigues in Zululand, with the assistance of his mother, which resulted in the death of the latter and in a message from Cetshwayo to the Natal Government, complaining of Umtonga's conduct, and requesting that he should be placed in his hands. This was refused, but the Government undertook to place the young man under the supervision of an old and trusted colonial Chief, Zatshuke, living in the centre of the colony. Umtonga professed to accept and to be grateful for this arrangement; but, upon the first step being taken to carry it out, he fired twice at the policeman who was sent to conduct him to Zatshuke, but missed him, and then escaped to the Transvaal territory.

From thence he, with another brother, and two indunas (captains) were given up to Cetshwayo by the Boers, who required, in return for their surrender, the cession of land

east of the Blood River, and a pledge that the young princes should not be killed. Cetshwayo is said by the Boers to have agreed to both conditions, and he certainly acted up to the latter, three of the four being still alive, and the fourth having died a natural death.¹ It is this alleged bargain with Cetshwayo (in 1861) on which the Boers found their claim to the main portion of the disputed territory—a “bargain in itself base and immoral; the selling of the persons of men for a grant of land, and which no Christian Government, like that of England, could recognise for a moment as valid and binding,” even if it were ever made. *But it is persistently denied by the Zulus that such a bargain was ever consented to by them or by their prince.* On this point Cetshwayo himself says: “I have never given or sold any land to the Boers of the Transvaal. They wished me to do so when I was as yet an umtwana (child prince). They tried to get me to sign a paper, but I threw the pen down, and never would do so, telling them that it was out of my power to either grant or sell land, as it belonged to the king, my father, and the nation. I know the Boers say I signed a paper, and that my brothers Hamu and Ziwedu did also. I never did, and if they say I held the pen or made a mark, giving or selling land, it is a lie!” The Prince Dabulamanzi, and chiefs sitting round, bore out the king in this statement.—(From Report of Mr. Fynney on July 4th, 1877—P. P. 1961, p. 45.)

And so says Sir T. Shepstone (1961, p. 5): “Panda, who is still living, repudiated the bargain, and Cetshwayo denied it. The Emigrant Farmers, however, insisted on its validity, and proceeded to occupy. The Zulus have never ceased to threaten and protest. And the Government of Natal, to whom these protests and threats have been continually made, has frequently, during a course of fifteen years, found it very difficult to impress the Zulus with the hope and belief that an amicable solution of the

¹ Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga's kraal, at the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to any of the four.

difficulty would some day be found, provided that they refrained from reprisals or the use of force."

The first message from the Zulus on the subject of the disputed territory was received on September 5th, 1861, in the very year in which (according to the Boers) the cession in question was made (1961, p. 7). The Bishop of Natal, in his *Extracts* already mentioned, records eighteen messages on the same subject, commencing with the above and concluding with one brought on April 20th, 1876 (1748, p. 49), showing that for a period of fifteen years the Zulu king (whether represented by Umpande or by Cetshwayo) had never ceased to entreat "the friendly intervention and arbitration of this Government between them and the Boer Government" (1961, p. 9). These eighteen messages acknowledged the virtual supremacy of the English, and the confidence which the Zulus feel in English justice and honour, and they request their protection, or, failing that, their permission to protect themselves by force of arms; they suggest that a Commission sent from Natal should settle the boundary, and that a Resident or Agent of the British Government should be stationed on the border between them and the Boers, to see that justice was done on both sides. They report the various aggressions and encroachments by which the Zulus were suffering at the hands of their neighbours, but to which they submitted because the question was in the hands of the Government of Natal; and they repeatedly beg that the English will themselves take possession of the disputed country, or some part of it, rather than allow the unsettled state of things to continue. "They (the Zulus) beg that the Governor will take a strip of country, the length and breadth of which is to be agreed upon between the Zulus and the Commissioners (for whom they are asking) sent from Natal, the strip to abut on the Colony of Natal, and to run to the northward and eastward in such a manner, in a line parallel to the sea-coast, as to interpose in all its length between the Boers and the Zulus, and to be governed by the Colony of Natal, and form a portion of it if thought desirable.

"The Zulu people earnestly pray that this arrangement may be carried out immediately, because they have been neighbours of Natal for so many years, separated only by a stream of water, and no question has arisen between them and the Government of Natal; they know that where the boundary is fixed by agreement with the English there it will remain.

"Panda, Cetshwayo, and all the heads of the Zulu people assembled, directed us to urge in the most earnest manner upon the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the prayer we have stated."

This is the concluding portion of the fourth message, received on June the 5th, 1869 (1961, p. 9). The fifth, reporting fresh Boer aggressions, was received on the 6th December, 1869.

In the course of the same year Lieutenant-Governor Keate addressed the President of the South African Republic on the subject, and suggested arbitration, which suggestion was accepted by the President, provided that the expenses should be paid by the losing party; and during the following two years repeated messages were sent by Mr. Keate reminding the President that being "already in possession of what the Zulu authorities put forward as justifying their claims," he only awaits the like information from the other side before "visiting the locality and hearing the respective parties."—(P. P. 1961, p. 24).

On August 16th, 1871, the Government Secretary of the South African Republic replies that he has "been instructed to forward to the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal the necessary documents bearing on the Zulu question, together with a statement of the case, and hopes to do so by next post; but that, as the session of the Volksraad had been postponed from May to September, it would be extremely difficult to settle the matter in 1871;" he therefore proposed January, 1872, as a convenient time for the purpose.

Nearly eight weeks later (October 9th) Lieutenant-Governor Keate informs the President that the documents

promised, upon the Zulu-border question, have not yet reached him; but sees nothing, at present, likely to prevent his "proceeding, in January next, to the Zulu-border for the purpose of settling the matter at issue."

But the promised papers appear never to have been sent. The arbitration never took place. Lieutenant-Governor Keate was relieved from the government of Natal in 1872; and the next stage of the question is marked by the issue on May 25th, 1875, of a proclamation by Acting-President Joubert, annexing to the dominion of the South African Republic the territory, the right to which was to have been decided by this arbitration.

In this proclamation no reference is made to the (alleged) Treaty of 1861 (see p. 151), by which "what is now and was then disputed territory had been ceded to the South African Republic," though it certainly annexes to the Republic all the country included in the Treaty, and seems to annex more. But no ground of claim is set forth or alluded to upon which the right to annex is founded, "with reservation of all further claims and rights of the said Republic," nor any reason assigned for the act, except to "prevent disagreement" between the Boers and the Zulus. And Sir T. Shepstone goes on to say (1961, p. 5):

"The officers of the South African Republic proceeded to exercise in this annexed territory the ordinary functions of government, and among these, the levying taxes on natives. The Zulus, who had been persistent in repudiating the cession, and who have continued to occupy the territory as theirs, resisted the demand by Cetshwayo's directions, and a collision appeared imminent, when the difficulty was avoided by the officers withdrawing the order they had issued."

Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated disappointments with which they met, the Zulus continued to send complaints and entreaties to the Government of Natal; which messages, although they never varied in their respectful and friendly tone towards the English, show plainly how

deeply they felt the neglect with which they were treated. The English "promises" are spoken of again and again, and the thirteenth message contains a sentence worth recording, in its simple dignity. "Cetshwayo desired us," say the messengers, "to urge upon the Governor of Natal to interfere, to save the destruction of perhaps both countries—Zululand and the Transvaal. He requests us to state that he cannot and will not submit to be turned out of his own houses. It may be that he will be vanquished; but, as he is not the aggressor, death will not be so hard to meet" (1748, p. 14).

Sir Henry Bulwer's answers to these messages contain passages which sufficiently prove that up to this time the Government of Natal had no complaints to make against the Zulu king. "This is the first opportunity the Lieutenant-Governor has had," he says, "of communicating with Cetshwayo since his (Sir H. Bulwer's) arrival in the Colony. He therefore takes the opportunity of sending him a friendly greeting, and of expressing the pleasure with which he has heard of the satisfactory relations that have existed between this Colony and the Zulus," November 25th, 1875 (1748, p. 15).

"This Government trusts that Cetshwayo will maintain that moderation and forbearance which he has hitherto shown, and which the Government has great pleasure in bringing to the notice of the councillors of the great Queen, and that nothing will be done which will hinder the peaceful solution of the Disputed Territory question," July 25th, 1876 (1748, p. 97).

Meanwhile repeated acts of violence and brutality on the part of the Boers are reported, and in the Blue Books before us the Zulu complaints are confirmed from various official sources, by Mr. Fynn, Resident Magistrate of the Umsinga Division (1748, p. 10), by Sir Henry Bulwer (1748, pp. 8, 11, 12, 25), by Sir T. Shepstone himself (1748, pp. 10, 24, 29, 52, 56), by Mr. Osborn (1748, p. 82), and by Sir Henry Barkly (1748, p. 25). No attempt at settlement, however, had been made in answer to these appeals up to the time of the annexation of the Transvaal, in 1877, by Sir T.

Shepstone; after which so great a change took place in the tone of the latter upon the subject of the disputed territory.

Upon this question we may quote again from Mr. Fynney's report of the king's answer to him upon the announcement of the annexation of the Transvaal. "I hear what you have said about past disputes with the Boers, and about the settlement of them," said the king; "the land question is one of them, and a great one. I was in hopes, when I heard it was you who visited me, that you had brought me some final word about the land, as Somtseu had sent from Newcastle by Umgabana to say that his son would come with the word respecting the land so long in dispute, and I felt sure it had come to-day, for you are his son. Now the Transvaal is English ground, I want Somtseu to send the Boers away from the lower parts of the Transvaal, that near my country. The Boers are a nation of liars; they are a bad people, bad altogether; I do not want them near my people; they lie, and claim what is not theirs, and ill-use my people. Where is Thomas (Mr. Burgers)?"

"I informed him," says Mr. Fynney, "that Mr. Burgers had left the Transvaal."

"Then let them pack up and follow Thomas," said he, "let them go. The Queen does not want such people as those about her land. What can the Queen make of them or do with them? Their evil ways puzzled both Thomas and Rudolph (Landrost of Utrecht); they will not be quiet. They have laid claim to my land, and even down to *Ntabankulu* (you saw the line), burned it with fire, and my people have no rest."

"Umnyamana (Prime Minister) here remarked," continues Mr. Fynney, "we want to know what is going to be done about this land; it has stood over as an open question for so many years. Somtseu took all the papers to England with him to show the great men there, and we have not heard since." To which Mr. Fynney, of course, had no reply to make.

Within a fortnight of the annexation the Boers on the

Zulu border presented Sir T. Shepstone with an address, stating that during the last ten or twelve years (*i.e.* from 1861, when this encroachment was begun by the Boers) they had "suffered greatly in consequence of the hostile behaviour of the Zulu nation, but more so for the last two years" (*i.e.* from 1875, when the Boer Government proclaimed the disputed territory to belong to the Transvaal, and proceeded to levy taxes upon its Zulu inhabitants), so that, they said, their lives and goods were in danger (1814, p. 14).

Accordingly Sir T. Shepstone writes to Lord Carnarvon as follows: "I shall be forced to take some action with regard to the Disputed Territory, of which your lordship has heard so much, but I shall be careful to avoid any direct issue."¹

"It is of the utmost importance," he continues, "that all questions involving disturbance outside of this territory should be, if possible, postponed until the Government of the Transvaal is consolidated, and the numerous tribes within its boundaries have begun to feel and recognise the hand of the new administration."

These remarks already show the change in sentiment, on Sir T. Shepstone's part, which was more markedly displayed at the Blood River meeting between him and the Zulu indunas. The conference proved an utter failure, as also did several other attempts on Sir T. Shepstone's part to persuade the Zulus to relinquish to him, on behalf of the Transvaal, the claims upon which they had so long insisted.

On December 5th, 1877, two indunas came from Cetshwayo to the Bishop of Natal with a request that he would put the Zulu claim in writing, to be sent to Sir H. Bulwer and the Queen. The same indunas, a few days later, with Umfunzi and Nkisimane—messengers from Cetshwayo—appointed, before a notary public, Dr. Walter

¹ Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): "But messages from the Zulu king are becoming more frequent and urgent, and *the replies he receives seem to him to be both temporising and evasive.*" (Author's italics).

Smith and Mr. F. E. Colenso to be "diplomatic agents" for Cetshwayo, "who should communicate on his behalf in the English language, and, when needful, in writing," and especially to "treat with the British Government on the boundary question" (2000, p. 58):¹ which appointment, however, Sir H. Bulwer and Sir T. Shepstone refused to recognise; and the former, having proposed the Border Commission before receiving notice of this appointment—though the Commissioners had not yet started from 'Maritzburg—did not feel it advisable, as "no such appointment had been made by the Zulu king,"² to communicate to Messrs. Smith and Colenso Lord Carnarvon's despatch (January 21st, 1878), which said:

"I request that you will inform Mr. Smith and Mr. Colenso that the desire of Her Majesty's Government in this matter is that the boundary question shall be fully and fairly discussed, and a just arrangement arrived at, and that you will refer them to Sir T. Shepstone, to whom has been committed the duty of negotiating on the subject."³

¹ Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs. Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2220 p. 317) which mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done.

² Mfunzi and Nkisimane were sent down again to 'Maritzburg by Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger, who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them and their king by making this appointment: and John Dunn also, after receiving letters from 'Maritzburg, told them that they had committed a great fault, and that he saw that they would never *all* come home again.

³ Messrs. Smith and Colenso's explanatory letter to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows:—

"This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo. We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire, nor had a savage prince any

Meanwhile, however, Sir T. Shepstone's "negotiations" had proved unsuccessful, and Sir Henry Bulwer writes to Sir Bartle Frere (2000, p. 68): "It seems but too clear, from all that has now happened, that the prospect of a settlement of the question by direct negotiations between the Government of the Transvaal and the Zulu king is at an end. The feeling against the Boers on the part of the Zulu king and people is too bitter, and they are now scarcely less angry against the new Government of the Transvaal than they were against the old Government." He then suggests arbitration as a way by which the Zulu king "can escape the alternative of war, by which he can obtain justice, and by which, at the same time, he can avoid direct negotiations with the Government of a people whom he dislikes and distrusts." The diplomatic agents were never recognised by the colonial authorities, or allowed

means of conferring it. The duty thus undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret.

"Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects.

"The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight with England, *i.e.* Natal.

"If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only fear is, that the English will come with an army 'to make them pay taxes.' They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schröder, who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop. They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country.

"Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between England and the Zulus."—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216.)

to exercise their functions ; but a visit which Mr. Colenso paid to the Zulu king in connection with the appointment is worth recording for the sake of the glimpse it gives of Cetshwayo's habits and daily life, as told by a disinterested eye-witness.

The king, it appears, whom so many have delighted to represent as a corpulent unwieldy savage, to whom movement must be a painful exertion, was in the habit of taking a daily constitutional of about six miles out and back. Mr. Colenso observed that this was his regular habit, and during his stay at the royal kraal he daily saw Cetshwayo start, and could trace his course over the hills by the great white shield carried before him as the emblem of kingship.

On his return the king regularly underwent a process of ablution at the hands of his attendants, who poured vessels of water over him, and rubbed the royal person down with a species of soft stone. This performance over, Cetshwayo ascended his throne or chair of state, upon which he remained, hearing causes, and trying cases amongst his people, until the shades of evening fell, before which time he did not break his fast.

This description, of the accuracy of which there can be no question, gives a picture of a simple, moderate, and useful kingly existence, very different from the idea commonly received of a savage monarch, wallowing in sloth and coarse luxury, and using the power which he holds over his fellow-creatures only for the gratification of every evil or selfish human passion. Cetshwayo ruled his people well according to his lights : let us hope that, now we have wrested his kingdom from him, our government may prove a *more* beneficent one.

CHAPTER X.

THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION.

SIR HENRY BULWER'S message proposing arbitration was sent to Cetshwayo on December 8th, 1877 (2000, p. 67).

In this message he makes it plain to the king that "the Governments of Natal and the Transvaal are now brothers, and what touches one touches the other." "Therefore," he continues, "the Lieut.-Governor of Natal sends these words to Cetshwayo that he may know what is in his mind, and that Cetshwayo may do nothing that will interrupt the peaceful and friendly relations that have existed for so many years between the English and the Zulus." He then proposes that he should write to "the Ministers of the great Queen in England, and also to the Queen's High Commissioner who resides at Capetown, in order that they may send fit and proper persons, who will come to the country with fresh minds, and who will hear all that the Zulus have to say on the question, and all that the Transvaal Government has to say, and examine and consider all the rights of the question, and then give their decision in such manner that all concerned may receive and abide by that decision, and the question be finally set at rest.

"Meanwhile," he says, "no action should be taken to interfere with the existing state of things or to disturb the peace. But the disputed territory should be considered and treated as *neutral* between the two countries for the time being."

Before this communication reached him Cetshwayo had already sent messengers to the Bishop of Natal, asking advice how to act in his present difficulties. And they had carried back "a word," which would reach the king about November 19th, to the effect that he must on no account think of fighting the Transvaal Government, and that he had better send down some great indunas to propose arbitration to Sir Henry Bulwer, in whose hands he might leave himself with perfect confidence that the right and just thing would be done by him. The Bishop knew nothing of Sir Henry's intentions when he sent this reply; and, in point of fact, the two had separately come to the same conclusion as to what would be the wisest course to follow.

Cetshwayo therefore was prepared to receive Sir Henry's proposition, which he did, not only with respect, but with delight and relief (2000, p. 138). His answer to the message contained the following passages: "Cetshwayo hears what the Governor of Natal says . . . and thanks him for these words, for they are all good words that have been sent to Cetshwayo by the Governor of Natal; they show that the Natal Government still wishes Cetshwayo to drink water and live." He suggests, however, that before sending for people from across the sea to settle the boundary, he should be glad if the Governor would send his own representatives to hear both sides of the dispute, and if they cannot come to a decision, "a letter can be sent beyond the sea" for others to come. The message continues: "Cetshwayo thanks the Governor for the words which say the ground in dispute should not be occupied while the matter is talked over."

"Cetshwayo says he hears it said that he intends to make war upon the Transvaal. He wishes the Natal Government to watch well and see when he will do such a thing. For, if he attended to the wish of the English Government in Natal when it said he must not make war on the Transvaal *Boers*, why should he wish to do so upon those who are now of the same Great House as Natal, to whose voice he has listened?"

“Cetshwayo is informed that he is to be attacked by the Transvaal people. If so, and if he is not taken by surprise, he will, as soon as he hears of the approach of such a force, send men who will report it to the Natal Government before he takes any action.”

“Cetshwayo says he cannot trust the Transvaal Boers any longer; they have killed his people, they have robbed them of their cattle on the slightest grounds. He had hoped Somtseu would have settled all these matters. But he has not done so; he wishes to cast Cetshwayo off; he is no more a father, but a firebrand. If he is tired of carrying Cetshwayo now, as he did while he was with the Natal Government, then why does he not put him down, and allow the Natal Government to look after him, as it has always done?”

Sir Henry Bulwer expressed his satisfaction at this reply, speaking of it as a far more satisfactory one than they had been led to expect (2000, p. 138), and he writes to Sir T. Shepstone thus: “You will see by the king’s reply that he has met my representations in a very proper spirit. . . . I have no reason to think that what the king says is said otherwise than in good faith; and, if this be so, there seems to me to be no reason why this dispute should not be settled in a peaceable manner” (2097, p. 26); and he says to Cetshwayo himself, “The Lieut.-Governor has heard the words of Cetshwayo. He is glad that the words which he lately sent to Cetshwayo were welcome. They were words sent in a friendly spirit, and Cetshwayo received them in a friendly spirit. This is as it should be,” and he agrees to the king’s proposal concerning Commissioners from Natal, provided that the Transvaal Government agree also.

The following is the account given by the Government messengers, who carried Sir H. Bulwer’s message to Cetshwayo, of the manner in which it was received by the king and his indunas (2079, p. 25):—

“While we spoke to Cetshwayo we saw that what we were saying lifted a great weight from his heart, that they were words which he was glad to hear; and what he said

to us as we finished showed us we were right in this belief. . . .

“We could see, when we arrived at the great kraal, that the indunas, and even the king, were not easy in their hearts, and from all we could see and gather, the chief men under the king did not wish for war. After the message was delivered, all of them appeared like men who had been carrying a very heavy burden, and who had only then been told that they could put it down and rest.”

It is best known to himself how, in the face of these words, and with nothing to support his statement, Sir Bartle Frere could venture to assert in his fourth letter to the Bishop, “The offers to arbitrate originated with the Natal Government, and were by no means willingly accepted by Cetshwayo;” Cetshwayo having, in point of fact, earnestly asked for arbitration again and again, as we have already shown, and rejoicing greatly when at last it was offered him. Mr. J. Shepstone’s observation also (2144, p. 184), that “To this suggestion Cetshwayo replied ‘that he had no objection,’” hardly gives a fair view of the state of the case.

But, before this satisfactory agreement had been arrived at, Sir T. Shepstone had managed still further to exasperate the feelings of the Zulus against the new Government of the Transvaal, while the fact that Natal and the Transvaal were one, and that to touch one was to touch the other, and to touch England also, had not been brought home to the king’s mind until he received Sir H. Bulwer’s message.

Before the receipt of that message, Cetshwayo had every reason to believe that the negotiations concerning the disputed territory were broken off. Sir T. Shepstone’s tone on the subject had altered; he had parted with the king’s indunas at the Blood River in anger, and the messenger whom he had promised to send to the king himself had never appeared. Meanwhile, the Boers had gone into laager, by direction, they say, of Sir T. Shepstone himself, and with the full expectation that he was about

to make war upon the Zulus. No offer of arbitration had yet been made. Cetshwayo had been played with and baffled by the English Government for sixteen years, and to all appearance nothing whatever was done, or would be done, to settle in a friendly manner this troubled question, unless he took steps himself to *assert* his rights, and he seems to have taken the mildest possible way of so doing under the circumstances. According to the official reports at the time, he sent a large force of armed men to build a military kraal near Lüneburg, north of the Pongolo, on land which was also disputed with the Transvaal Government, but formed no part of the (so-called) disputed territory to the south of that river, or as Lord Carnarvon said to a deputation of South African merchants (*Guardian*, January 9th, 1878); "He (the Zulu king) had proceeded to construct, in opposition to Sir T. Shepstone's warnings, a fortified kraal in a disputed territory abutting upon English soil."

But this was a very exaggerated way of describing a comparatively trifling circumstance. The erection of a kraal—not, as so frequently asserted, a military one, but merely an ordinary Zulu kraal for the residence of a headman, to keep order among the 15,000 Zulus who lived in that district—had long been contemplated, and had once, during Umpande's lifetime, been attempted, though the Boers had driven away the Zulu officer sent for the purpose, and destroyed the work he had commenced.

Cetshwayo himself explains his reasons for sending so large a force for the purpose, on the grounds that he wished the kraal to be built in one day, and his men not to be obliged to remain over a night; while, as Colonel Durnford, R.E., says (2144, p. 237), "the fact that the men at work are armed is of no significance, because every Zulu is an armed man, and never moves without his weapon."

Sir T. Shepstone, however, was greatly alarmed when he first heard of the building of this kraal, and writes concerning it—November 16th, 1877 (1961 p. 224): "I feel,

therefore (because of the irritating effect of it upon the Transvaal), that the building of this kraal must be prevented at all hazards." The "hazards" do not appear to have proved very serious, as a simple representation on the part of Captain Clarke, R.A., and Mr. Rudolph sent to the spot by Sir T. Shepstone, resulted in the Zulu force retiring, *having made only a small cattle kraal and chopped and collected some poles*, which they left on the ground, to be used for the building of the huts hereafter, but which were very soon carried off and used as firewood by the Lüneburg farmers.

But this did not satisfy Sir T. Shepstone, who sent messengers to Cetshwayo, complaining of what had been done, and of "finding," as he says, "a Zulu force in the rear of where he was staying;"¹ and saying that, in consequence, and in order to restore confidence amongst those Boers living on the Blood River border, he (Sir T. Shepstone) had decided to send a military force down to the waggon-drift on the Blood River, to encamp there on our side of the river. Cetshwayo replies that he did not send to have the kraal built that trouble might arise, but because his people were already living on the ground in dispute. He admits that of course the Administrator could do as he pleased about sending an armed force to encamp on his own borders; but he urges him to think better of it, saying that the Zulus would be frightened and run away, and, if he in his turn should send an armed force to encamp just opposite Sir T. Shepstone's encampment, to put confidence into *his* people's hearts, he asks, somewhat quaintly, "would it be possible for the two forces to be looking at one another for two days without a row?"

Many expressions are scattered through the Blue Books at this period concerning "Zulu aggressions;" and Sir T. Shepstone makes frequent, though vague and unproven,

¹ This is apparently a figure of speech, since Lüneburg, near which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map *not* to lie "to the rear"—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T. Shepstone was staying.

accusations concerning Cetshwayo's "mischievous humour," and the terror of the Boer frontier farmers.

But, so far as these remarks allude to the border squabbles inseparable from the state of affairs, the score is so heavily against the Boers that the counter-charges are hardly worth considering. The only acts chargeable upon the king himself are, first, the building of this kraal, which really amounted to no more than a practical assertion of the Zulu claim to land north of the Pongolo; and, secondly, the execution of a (supposed) Zulu criminal there, which was an exercise of Cetshwayo's authority over his own people living in the district.

For the acts of violence committed by the robber chief, Umbilini, the Zulu king could not justly be considered responsible; but of this matter, and of the raid committed by the sons of Sihayo, we will treat in a later chapter.

Sir T. Shepstone himself allows that Cetshwayo's frame of mind was a better one after the reception of Sir Henry Bulwer's message offering arbitration (2079, pp. 51-54); and says that his (Sir T. Shepstone's) messengers "describe Cetshwayo as being in a very different temper to that which he had on former occasions exhibited; to use their own expression, "it was Cetshwayo, but it was Cetshwayo born again." . . . "They gleaned from the Zulus . . . that a message from the Governor of Natal had been delivered, and they concluded that the change which they had noticed as so marked in the king's tone must have been produced by that message."

The fact that Cetshwayo joyfully and thankfully accepted Sir Henry Bulwer's promise—not to give him the land he claimed, but to have the matter investigated and justice done—is sufficiently established; but from the Boers the proposal met with a very different reception.

Sir T. Shepstone acknowledged the receipt of Sir H. Bulwer's despatch of December 11th, "transmitting copy of a message" which he "had thought fit to send to the Zulu king," and then summoned a few leading men in the

district, and laid the proposition before them. He reports that after some pretty speeches about the "Christian, humane, and admirable proposal," which they should have "no excuse for hesitating to accept, if Cetshwayo were a civilised king and the Zulu Government a civilised Government," &c. &c., they proceeded to state their objections. They had, they said, no misgiving regarding the justice of the claim of the State; and they believed that the more it was investigated, the more impartial the minds of the investigators, the clearer and more rightful would that claim prove itself to be. Nevertheless, they professed to fear the delay that must necessarily be caused by such an investigation¹ (the dispute having already lasted fifteen years!) and to doubt Cetshwayo's abiding by any promise he might make to observe a temporary boundary line.

To place the two parties to the dispute on equal terms, they said, the land in question should be evacuated by both, or occupied by both under the control of Sir Henry Bulwer, who, they proposed, as an indispensable condition of the proposed arbitration, should take possession of the land in dispute or of some part of it. And Sir T. Shepstone remarks:

"My view is that the considerations above set forth are both weighty and serious.

"I do not anticipate that, under the circumstances, Cetshwayo would venture to make or to authorise any overt attack. I do fear, however, the consequences of the lawless condition into which the population all along the border is rapidly falling. Cetshwayo, I fear, rather encourages than attempts to repress this tendency; and, although he will not go to war, he may allow that to go on which he knows will produce war."

The condition of the border seems, as we have already shown, to have been "lawless" for many years, though the fault lay rather with the Boers—whose many acts of violence are recorded in the Blue Books—than with the

¹ Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p. 134.

Zulus, and Sir T. Shepstone has apparently overlooked the fact that he himself had just summarily put a stop to an attempt on Cetshwayo's part to "repress" any lawless "tendency" amongst his own people (of which the Administrator complains) by placing a headman, or responsible person, amongst them to keep order.

Under the above-mentioned conditions Sir T. Shepstone accepts Sir Henry Bulwer's proposal, and informs him that, under the circumstances, he shall not carry out his expressed intention of placing a military post in the neighbourhood of the Blood River.

And again he writes—January 17th, 1878 (2079, p. 58) :

"It was, however, necessary to point out to Sir H. Bulwer the difficulties and dangers, as well as the loss of property, which the white people (Boers ?) feel that they will be subjected to by the acceptance of His Excellency's proposal, unless he can devise some means by which their safety and interests can be protected during the pending of the investigation, *which under existing circumstances it is Cetshwayo's interest to prolong indefinitely.*"

The words that I have italicised show that Sir T. Shepstone took for granted beforehand that the decision of the Commissioners would be unfavourable to the Zulus.

Sir Henry Bulwer, however, did not see his way to falling in with the conditions of the Boers, and replies as follows (2079, p. 128) :

"I do not see that I am in a position, or that, as the Lieutenant-Governor of this colony, I should have the power, to take actual possession of the country in dispute. And if to take over the country, and hold possession of it, is considered by your Government an indispensable condition for the acceptance of the mediating course I have proposed, I feel that my proposal falls short of the requirements of the case."

On January 29th, Sir T. Shepstone writes to Sir Henry again, saying that "It was felt that, in consequence of