

CHAPTER V.

THE PUTINI TRIBE.

To assist in paying the expenses of the expedition, "Government" had "eaten up" the small tribe commonly known as the "Putini," but properly called the "Amangwe" tribe, "Putini" being, in reality, the name of their late chief, who died shortly before the disturbances, leaving the sole custody of their infant son and heir to his young widow, who accordingly held the position and dignity of chieftainness in the tribe.

To say that the "eating up" of these people was an utter mistake is to say no more than can honestly be said concerning Langalibalele's tribe, the Ama-Hlubi; but, in the case of the Putini people, the mistake was a more flagrant one, and, when all was said and done, there was no possibility of making out a charge against them at all. Finally the fact stared the Government (both at home and in Natal) in the face that a tribe had been attacked, members of it killed, the people taken prisoners and stripped of all their possessions, without even the shadow of a reason for such treatment being forthcoming.

Major (by this time Lieutenant-Colonel) Durnford specially took up the cause of this injured and innocent people. It was plain enough that the Government at home would never ratify the action taken against the Amangwe tribe by the Government in Natal; and that sooner or later the latter would be forced, in this instance, to undo their work as far as possible—to restore the people to their location,

and to disgorge at least part of their plunder :—and it was evident to Colonel Durnford that the sooner this was done the better for all parties. The Natal Government would put itself in a more dignified position by voluntarily and speedily making full amends for the wrong done, and doing of its own accord what eventually it would be obliged to do at the command of the home Government. It was also of special importance to the people themselves that they should be allowed to return to their homes in time to plant their crops for the following year.

About May, 1874, it had been decided by the Government that Lieutenant-Colonel Durnford, in his capacity of Colonial Engineer, should take a working party to the Draakensberg Mountains, and blow up, or otherwise destroy, all the passes by which ingress or egress could be obtained. The chief object of this demolition was that of giving confidence to the up-country districts, the inhabitants of which were in perpetual fear of inroads from the scattered members of the outlawed tribe. They had indeed certain grounds for such apprehensions, as one or two attacks had been made upon farmhouses since the expedition. Even these demonstrations were not evidence of organised resistance, but mere individual acts of vengeance committed by single men or small parties, in return for brutalities inflicted upon the women and children belonging to them. They were, however, sufficient to keep the country in perpetual alarm, which it was highly advisable should be checked.

The demolition of the passes being decided upon, Colonel Durnford applied for the services of the male Putini prisoners, some eighty in number, and induced the Government to promise the men their liberty, with that of the rest of the tribe, if, on their return, when the work should be finished, the Colonel could give them a good character.

He left Pietermaritzburg with his party of pioneers and a company of the 75th Regiment, under Captain Boyes and Lieutenant Trower, in May, and spent some months in the complete destruction of the Draakensberg passes, returning to the capital in September. The movement at

first raised violent though unavailing opposition amongst the colonists, who persisted in looking upon the Putini men as bloodthirsty rebels, who might at any moment break loose upon them and ravage the country. But when the whole party returned from the mountains, without a single case of misconduct or desertion amongst them—although they had had hard work and undergone great hardships (shared to the full by Colonel Durnford, who suffered to the end of his life from the effects of intense cold upon his wounded arm)—the colonists ceased to look upon them as desperate ruffians, and soon forgot their fears. Meanwhile the Colonel found considerable difficulty in obtaining the actual freedom of the tribe, for which he and his eighty pioneers had worked so hard and suffered so much. Any less resolute spirit would have been beaten in the contest, for "Government" was determined not to give way an inch more than could possibly be helped.

However, the matter was carried through at last, and the whole tribe returned to their devastated homes—including the eighty pioneers, to whom the Colonel had paid the full wages of free labourers for the time during which they had worked—in good time to plant their crops for the coming year. Eventually they also received some small compensation for the property of which they had been robbed, though nothing even approaching to an equivalent for all that had been taken from them or destroyed by the Government force in 1873.¹

The same party of mounted Basutos who were with Colonel Durnford at the Bushman's River Pass affair, accompanied him throughout this second more peaceful expedition, and remained his devoted followers for the rest of his life.

The colony was tranquil again, and gradually the immediate consequences of the expedition vanished below the surface of everyday life, except in the minds of those

¹ From this tribe were taken "7,400 head of cattle, 1,000 calves, besides horses, sheep, and goats," valued at about 25,000*l*.

who had suffered by it. But one important result was obtained. England was once more convinced that the time for withdrawing her troops from the colony and leaving it to protect itself had not yet arrived. Some such project had been entertained during the previous year, and its speedy accomplishment was frequently foretold; but such a proceeding would have been fatal to the plans of the empire-making politicians. The impossibility of withdrawing the troops was clearly established by turning a molehill into a mountain—by proving how critical the condition of the native mind within the colony was considered to be by those who should be the best judges—so that it was thought necessary to turn out the whole available European force, regular and irregular, upon the slightest sign of disturbance; and most of all by creating such a panic in the colonial mind as had not existed since the early days of Natal.

It is doubtful how soon the Secretary of State for the Colonies himself knew the extent to which the operations of 1873-4 could be made subservient to his great confederation scheme; or rather, to speak more correctly, how seriously the latter must be injured by any attempt to set right the injustice done to the Hlubi tribe. When the Bishop went to England¹ and pleaded in person the cause of the injured people, there can be no doubt that Lord Carnarvon was fully impressed by the facts then made known to him. None of the despatches sent home could in the least justify the proceedings of his subordinates in Natal. Lord Carnarvon's own words, expressing his disapproval of the action taken against the two tribes, and requiring that all possible restitution should be made to them, show plainly enough that at the period of the Bishop's visit to him, with all the facts of the case before him, his judgment in the matter coincided with that of the Bishop himself. The latter returned to Natal, satisfied that substantial justice would now be done, or at all events that the suffering already inflicted upon the innocent

¹ Reaching home early in October, 1874.

Hlubi and Amangwe tribes, by the rash and mistaken action of the Government, would be alleviated to the utmost extent considered possible without lowering that Government in the eyes of the people.

Certain steps, indeed, were immediately taken. Orders were sent out for the release of the Putini people, which order Colonel Durnford had already induced the Natal Government to anticipate; and a further order was notified that the tribe should be compensated for the losses sustained by them during the late expedition. In the case of Langalibalele and his tribe, although it was not thought advisable to reinstate them in their old position, every effort was to be made to mitigate the severity with which they had been treated. A few extracts from the Earl of Carnarvon's despatch on the subject will best show the tone in which he wrote, and that the Bishop might reasonably feel satisfied that mercy and consideration would be shown to the oppressed people.

The Earl of Carnarvon, after reviewing the whole proceeding, comments somewhat severely upon the manner in which the trial had been conducted. On this point he says: "I feel bound to express my opinion that there are several points open to grave observation and regret." He speaks of the "peculiar and anomalous" constitution of the court, the equally "peculiar" law by which the prisoner was tried, and of "the confusion and unsatisfactory result to which such an anomalous blending of civilised and savage terms and procedure must lead." He remarks that it was in his judgment "a grave mistake to treat the plea of the prisoner as one of guilty;" and he says, "still more serious, because it involved practical consequences of a very grave nature to the prisoner, was the absence of counsel on his behalf." Entering into the various charges brought against the prisoner, and the evidence produced to support them, he dismisses the magistrate's accusation of "general indications, of which, however, it is difficult to give special instance, of impatience of control," and the comments of the Governor and Secretary for Native Affairs on the same as unimportant, with the words, "I am bound

to say that the evidence does not appear to me fully to support these statements."¹

Reviewing the circumstances and evidence concerning the unregistered guns, he says: "I am brought to the conclusion that, though there was probably negligence—it may be more or less culpable—in complying with the law, there was no sufficient justification for the charge in the indictment that Langalibalele did encourage and conspire with the people under him to procure firearms and retain them, as he and they well knew contrary to law, for the purpose and with the intention of, by means of such firearms, resisting the authority of the Supreme Chief." Of the extent to which the chief's disobedience, in not appearing when summoned by Government, was due to a "deliberately-planned scheme of resistance in concert with others, or the mere effect of an unfounded panic," the Earl remarks: "Unfortunately this was not made clear." And, finally, referring to the charge of insulting the Government messengers, he says: "I am obliged, with great regret, to conclude that this very important portion of the evidence given against the prisoner at the trial was so far untrustworthy as to leave it an open question whether the indignities of which the witness complained may not have amounted to no more than being obliged to take off his coat, which might be a precaution dictated by fear, and nothing else."

Having thus censured the proceedings of his subordinates on every point, he says:

"That the Amahlubi tribe should be removed from its location may have been a political necessity which, after all that had occurred, was forced upon you, and I fear² it is out of the question to reinstate them in the position, whether of land or property, which they occupied previously. The relations of the colony with the natives, both within and without its boundaries, render this im-

¹ Acts of "defiance" and "resistance," too vague for any special instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a slightly imaginary character.

² Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.

possible. But every care should be taken to obviate the hardships and to mitigate the severities which, assuming the offence of the chief and his tribe to be *even greater than I have estimated it, have far exceeded the limits of justice.*¹ Not only should the terms of the amnesty of the 2nd May last be scrupulously observed, but as far as possible means should be provided by which the members of the tribe may be enabled to re-establish themselves in settled occupations."² Lord Carnarvon further says: "With respect to the Putini tribe, I have in their case also expressed my opinion that no sufficient cause has been shown for removing them from their location. I can discover no indication of their conspiracy or combination with Langelibalele, beyond the vague and wholly uncorroborated apprehension of some movement on their part in connection with the supposed tendencies of his tribe; and therefore I can see no good reason for any punishment on this ground."

The proclamation to the native population inclosed in this despatch contained the following sentences:

"Langelibalele we release from imprisonment on the island in the sea, but he shall not return to Natal. The Amahlubi may, if they choose, when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him, but he will not be allowed to go to the Amahlubi."

In all that Lord Carnarvon thought fit to say on this occasion he does not express the slightest approval of any person concerned, or action taken, except of the "conduct of Colonel Durnford, whose forbearance and humanity towards the natives" (he says) "has attracted my attention." A despatch of the same date (3rd December, 1874) recalls Sir Benjamin Pine from the government of Natal.

Anything more thoroughly condemnatory could hardly be imagined, although it may be reasonably questioned how far justice was done to Sir Benjamin Pine³ by the

¹ Author's italics.

² No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.

³ It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of K.C.M.G., and styles

whole weight of mismanagement being placed upon his shoulders, while his coadjutor and adviser, Mr. Shepstone, on whose opinion he had acted throughout, and whose word, by his supposed knowledge of native ways and character, was law throughout the affair, was promoted and rewarded.

After perusing Lord Carnarvon's remarks and directions, my readers may imagine that some very good result would be produced on the fortunes of both tribes, but in this supposition they would be greatly mistaken. Nor, unless they had been in the habit of perusing South African despatches with attention, would it occur to them how easily the proclamation quoted from, drawn up by Mr. Shepstone, could be evaded. The proclamation itself is almost childish in its foolish way of informing the people that they had behaved very badly, and deserved all they had got, but would be relieved of their punishment by the mercy of the Queen, and must behave very well and gratefully in future. Such exhortations to people who were perfectly aware that they had been treated with the utmost injustice were rather likely to raise secret contempt than respect in the minds of an intelligent people, who would have far better understood an honest declaration that "we have punished you, under the impression that you had done what we find you did not do, and will therefore make it up to you as much as possible."

The two important sentences of the proclamation (already quoted at p. 56), however, were capable of being adapted to an extent of which Lord Carnarvon probably did not dream. His lordship can hardly have intended the first sentence by which Langalibalele was released "from imprisonment on the island in the sea," simply to mean that he was to be conveyed to the nearest (most dreary) mainland, and imprisoned there, within the limits of a small and barren farm, where every irritating restriction and

himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for all that happened; but "the right man to annex the Transvaal" could not well be spared, and a scape-goat was found for him in Sir Benjamin Pine.

annoying regulation were still imposed five years after. The words "he shall not return to Natal," certainly do not imply rigid confinement to a small extent of land, where friends, white or black, are not allowed to visit him, or send the most innocent presents without tedious delay and official permission. The second sentence is an admirable specimen of South African art. The people might go to their chief if they chose, "*when that is prepared which is to be prepared*"—but which never has been yet.

We give Lord Carnarvon full credit for not having the slightest notion that this clause would have no result whatever, as nothing ever would be "prepared." Year after year has dragged on—one or two women¹ and a couple of boys being allowed, as a great favour, to join the old chief during that time. \ But every difficulty has always been raised about it, and not the slightest attempt has been made to enable or permit the tribe or any part of it to follow.

When the chief and his son were first removed from Robben Island to Uitvlugt, a desolate and unfruitful piece of ground on the adjoining mainland, at a considerable distance from the nearest dwelling-place of any description, it was understood that the family would live in comparative liberty, being merely "under surveillance;" that is to say, that some suitable person or persons would be appointed by the Cape Government to live within reach of them, and to be answerable for their general good behaviour, for their gratification in every reasonable wish or request, and for their making no attempt to escape from the Cape Colony and return to their homes in Natal.

Strict justice would have required that the chief and his people—those that were left of them—should be restored to their location, as was done in the case of the other tribe, and that both should be repaid the full ascertainable value of the property taken from them or destroyed; but politicians in these our days place "expediency" so far above justice and truth, that men who

¹ Three at last.

are fighting for the latter out-of-date objects may well be thankful for the smallest concession to their side.

The Bishop accordingly was satisfied that the new arrangement proposed for the captive chief's comfort was as good a one as he could expect from Lord Carnarvon, although not what he might have done himself had the power lain with him. But when he signified his satisfaction in the matter, it was certainly on the assumption that Langalibalele was to be made to feel his captivity as little as possible upon the mainland—in fact that it was to consist *merely* in his inability to leave the colony, or, without permission, the land assigned to him in it. But that such reasonable permission should be easily obtainable—that as many of his family and tribe as desired to do so should be allowed to join him there—that no galling restraints (such as still exist) should be imposed upon him, were certainly conditions proposed by Lord Carnarvon and accepted by the Bishop.

When the Bishop returned to Natal, however, he was preceded by one who undid much of the work which the other had done, and who before very long returned again to England, and became Lord Carnarvon's adviser in respect of affairs in Natal, Transvaal, and Zululand. Mr. Shepstone could have brought no new light to bear upon the subject—he could have given Lord Carnarvon no fresh facts which had not appeared already in the despatches, through which the Natal Government had been in constant communication with him. It was not likely that Mr. Shepstone should possess information hitherto unknown to the rest of the world, including Lord Carnarvon himself, which should have the power of entirely altering the latter's deliberately-formed judgment upon the subject under consideration. But had this been so, Lord Carnarvon would assuredly have communicated the fact to the Bishop, with whom he had parted in complete unanimity of opinion, and to whom, and through whom to the unhappy chief, promises had been made and hopes held out, destined, apparently, never to be fulfilled.

It is needless to conjecture what may have passed

between Lord Carnarvon and the man who reached England somewhat under a cloud, with certain errors to answer for to a chief who was well up in facts beforehand, but who, in 1876, appears as Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., with a commission as administrator of the Transvaal hidden in the depths of his pocket. The facts speak for themselves. The desire of the Secretary of State to achieve confederation in South Africa (the South African Empire!), the peculiar capabilities of Mr. Shepstone for dealing with the native and Dutch races of the country, and the considerable check which "strict justice" to the injured tribes would be to the great confederation scheme, are sufficient grounds for believing that absolution for the past, and immunity from the consequences of his acts were purchased by the engagement, on Mr. Shepstone's part, to carry out in quiet and successful manner the first decided step towards the great project of confederation and empire, namely, the annexation of the Transvaal. In the light cast by succeeding events, it is plain that nothing would have been much more inconvenient in the scheme of South African politics than any measure which would be a censure upon Mr. Shepstone, or prevent his promotion to a higher office in the State.

That no such alteration in the opinion of the Secretary of State ever really took place may be gathered from his very decided though courteous replies to the appeals made to him from the colony, to the addresses from the Legislative Council and other colonists, containing protests against Lord Carnarvon's decisions, and professing to give additional evidence against the tribes in question which would completely justify the proceedings of the colonial Government, and the severities of their punishment.

To all that could be thus alleged Lord Carnarvon replies: "I did not form my opinion until I had received and considered the fullest explanation which the Government whose acts are questioned desired to place before me, and in considering the case I had the advantage of personal communication with an officer who was specially deputed to represent the Government of Natal before me, and who,

from his knowledge, ability, and experience, was perhaps better qualified than any other to discharge the duty which was confided to him. I fail to find in the present documents the explanations which are promised in the address to Her Majesty, or indeed any evidence so specific or conclusive as to affect the opinion which, after the most anxious consideration, Her Majesty's Government formed upon this case."—(P. P. [C. 1342-1] p. 45.)

In another despatch of the same date (July 27, 1875, [C. 1342-1] p. 46), addressed to the officer administering the Government, Natal, he concludes: "As there is apparently no prospect of arriving at an agreement of opinion on several points, there is, perhaps, no advantage in continuing the discussion of them." Nevertheless, although holding so clear and decided a judgment, Lord Carnarvon permitted his just and humane directions for the treatment of the injured tribes to be practically set aside by those in authority under him.¹

¹ It would be an injustice to an association, called into existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.

CHAPTER VI.

SIR GARNET WOLSELEY.

WHAT HE CAME FOR, WHAT HE DID, AND WHAT HE DID NOT DO.

ENGLAND, however, was beginning to feel that her South African possessions were in an unsettled condition, although in point of fact they were quiet enough until she meddled with them in the blundering well-meaning fashion in which she has handled them ever since. It was patent, indeed, that some interference was required, when innocent tribes were liable to such cruel injustice as that inflicted upon the Ama-Hlubi and Amangwe in 1873, and, if her interference was honestly intended on their behalf, she has at least the credit of the "well-meaning" attributed to her above. Whatever her intentions may have been, however, the result has been a progress from bad to worse, culminating at last in the late unhappy Zulu War.

It is believed by many that England possesses but one man upon whom she can place any reliance in times of difficulty and danger, and accordingly Natal shortly received notice that Sir Garnet Wolseley was coming to "settle her affairs;" and the Natalians, with feelings varying from humble and delighted respect to bitter and suspicious contempt, prepared themselves to be set straight—or not—according to their different sentiments.

The great man and his "brilliant staff," as it was soon popularly called by the colonists—not without a touch of humour—arrived in Natal upon the last day of March,

1875, and on the 1st of April he took the oaths as Administrator of the Government at Pietermaritzburg.

He immediately commenced a series of entertainments, calculated by their unusual number and brilliancy to dazzle the eyes of young Natalian damsels. These latter, accustomed as they were to very occasional and comparatively quiet festivities, and balls at which a few of the subalterns of the small garrison at Fort Napier were their most valued partners, found themselves in a new world of a most fascinating description, all ablaze with gold and scarlet, V.C.'s, C.B.'s, titles, and clever authors. And, what was more, all these striking personages paid them the most gracious attentions—attentions which varied according to the importance of the young ladies' male relatives to the political scheme afoot. Meanwhile dinner after dinner was given to the said relatives; Sir Garnet Wolseley entertained the whole world, great and small, and the different members of his staff had each his separate duty to perform—his list of people to be "fascinated" in one way or another. For a short time, perhaps, the popularity desired was achieved in consequence of their united and persevering efforts, although from the very first there were voices to be heard casting suspicion upon those who were "drowning the conscience of the colony in sherry and champagne;" and there were others, more far-sighted still, who grimly pointed out to the gratified and flattered recipients of this "princely hospitality" the very reasonable consideration: "You will have to pay for the sherry and champagne yourselves in the end."

Undoubtedly the conviction that the colony would pay dear for its unwonted gaiety—that it was being "humbugged" and befooled—soon stole upon the people. While the daughters enjoyed their balls, their fathers had to buy their ball-dresses; and while the legislative councillors and all their families were perpetually and graciously entertained at Government House, the question began to arise: "What is the object of it all?"

All unusual treatment calls forth special scrutiny, and

it is to be doubted whether Sir Garnet's lavish hospitality and (almost) universally dropped honey, with all the painful labours of his brilliant staff combined, did more than awaken the suspicions which a course of proceedings involving less effort would have failed to evoke. Even the most ignorant of Dutch councillors would be wise enough to know that when a magnate of the land treated him and his family as bosom friends and equals of his own, the said magnate must want to "get something out of him"—even the most untaught and ingenuous of colonial maidens would soon rate at their true value the pretty speeches of the "men of note," who would have had them believe that, after frequenting all the gayest and most fashionable scenes of the great world, they had come to Natal and found their true ideal upon its distant shores.

A vast amount of trouble and of energy was thrown away by all concerned, while the few whose eyes were open from the first stood by and watched to see what would come of it. The question remains unanswered to this day. That the annexation of the Transvaal by Sir Garnet Wolseley did *not* come of it, is to that discreet general's great credit. And had his decision—that the work which he was specially sent out to do¹ was one for which the country was not ripe, and would not be for many years—been accepted and acted upon by England, the expense of his six months' progress through Natal would have been well worth incurring indeed, for in that case there would have been no Zulu War. But this, unfortunately for all parties, was not the case.

The popular answer in Natal to the question, "What did Sir Garnet Wolseley do for you?" is, "He got us up an hour earlier in the morning;" an excellent thing truly, but a costly hour, the history of which is as follows: For many years the city of Pietermaritzburg, known as "Sleepy Hollow" to its rivals of another and, in its own opinion, a busier town, had set all its clocks and watches, and regulated all its business hours by the sound of a gun, fired

¹ The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own staff.

daily from Fort Napier at nine o'clock A.M., the signal for which came from the town itself. The gun was frequently credited with being too fast or slow by a few seconds or even minutes, and on one occasion was known to have been wrong by half an hour; a mistake which was remedied in the most original fashion, by setting the gun back a minute and a half daily till it should have returned to the proper time; to the utter confusion of all the chronometers in the neighbourhood. But, right or wrong, the nine-o'clock gun was the regulator of city time, including that of all country places within reach of its report. The natives understood it, and "gun-fire" was their universal hour of call; the shops were opened at its sound, and but little business done before it. But during Sir Garnet Wolseley's reign in Natal it occurred, not without reason, to the member of his staff whom he placed in temporary authority over the postal and other arrangements of the colony, that nine o'clock was too late for a struggling community to begin its day, and he therefore altered the original hour of gun-fire to that of eight A.M. How far the alteration really changed the habits of the people it is hard to say, or how many of them may now let the eight-o'clock gun wake them instead of sending them to work, but the change remains an actual public proof of the fact that in 1875 Sir Garnet Wolseley visited Natal.

A more important measure was the bill which he carried through the Legislative Assembly for the introduction of eight nominee members to be chosen by the Government, thereby throwing the balance of power into the hands of the executive, unless, indeed, nominee members should be chosen independent enough to take their own course. Whether this measure was looked upon as very important by those who proposed it, or whether the energy displayed was for the purpose of convincing the public mind that such really was Sir Garnet's great object in Natal, it is not so easy to decide. But looking back through the events of the last few years one is strongly tempted to suspect that the whole visit to Natal, and all the display made there, was nothing but a pretence, a blind to hide our

designs upon the Transvaal, for which Sir Garnet wisely considered that the country was not ripe.

But if in this instance we are bound to admire Sir Garnet Wolseley's good sense, we must, on the other hand, greatly deprecate his behaviour towards the two unfortunate tribes whose sorrows have been recorded, and towards those who took an interest in their welfare and just treatment—more especially towards the Bishop of Natal¹

From the very first Sir Garnet's tone upon native matters, and towards the Bishop, were entirely opposed to that used by Lord Carnarvon. Every attempt made by the Bishop to place matters upon a friendly footing, which would enable the new Governor to take advantage of his thorough acquaintance with the natives, was checked; nor through the whole of his governorship did he ever invite the Bishop's confidence or meet him in the spirit in which he was himself prepared to act; a course of proceeding most unfortunately imitated by some of his successors, especially Sir Bartle Frere, who only "invited criticism of his policy"—and received it—when too late to be of any avail except to expose its fallacies.

It is impossible to rise from a perusal of the despatches written by Sir Garnet after his arrival in Natal, in answer or with reference to matters in which the Bishop was

¹ It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal or "unofficial" interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done, would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To a Government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his earnest support.

concerned, without coming to the conclusion that from the very beginning his mind was prejudiced against the Bishop's course, and that he had no sympathy with him or the people in whom he was interested. Far from attempting to carry out Lord Carnarvon's instructions in the spirit in which they were undoubtedly given, he set aside some, and gave an interpretation of his own to others, which considerably altered their effect; while his two despatches, dated May 12th and 17th, show plainly enough the bias of his mind.

The first is on the subject of the return of Langalibalele, which the Bishop had recommended, offering to receive him upon his own land at Bishopstowe, and to make himself responsible, within reasonable limits, for the chief's good behaviour. Sir Garnet "would deprecate in the strongest terms" such return. "Langalibalele," he says, "as I am informed by all classes here, official and non-official (a very small knot of men of extreme views excepted), is regarded by the native population at large as a chief who, having defied the authorities, and in doing so occasioned the murder of some white men, is now suffering for that conduct." While thus avoiding the direct responsibility of sitting "in judgment upon past events," by *quoting* from "all classes here," he practically confirms their opinion by speaking of those who differ from them as "a very small knot of men of extreme views;" and he further commits himself to the very unsoldierlike expression of "murder" as applied to the death of the five men at the Bushman's River Pass, speaking in the same paragraph of the punishment of the chief as "a serious warning to all other Kafir chiefs to avoid imitating his example." Without mentioning the Bishop by name, he makes repeated allusions to him in a tone calculated to give an utterly false impression of his action and character. "To secure these objects" (the future safety of the colony and the true interests of white and black) "it is essential that a good feeling should exist between the two races; and I am bound to say that in my opinion those who, by the line of conduct they adopt, keep alive the recollection

of past events,"¹ etc. etc. "I have no wish to attribute to those who adopt this policy any interested motives. I am sure that they are actuated by feelings of high philanthropy," (? simple justice and honesty,) "and nothing is further from my mind than a wish to cast any slur upon them. Yet I must say that from the manner in which they refuse to believe all evidence that does not coincide with their own peculiar views, and from the fact of their regarding the condition of affairs in Natal from one standpoint alone, I am forced to consider them impractical (*sic*), and not to be relied on as advisers by those who are responsible for the good government of all classes." In the following paragraphs he speaks of "sensational narratives oftentimes based upon unsifted evidence," "highly-coloured accounts," and "one-sided, highly-coloured, and, in some instances, incorrect statements that have been made public in a sensational manner," all which could refer to the Bishop alone. If by regarding the condition of affairs in Natal from one standpoint alone, Sir Garnet Wolseley means the standpoint of British honour and justice, and looks upon those who hold it as "impractical," there is little more to say. But Sir Garnet can never have given his attention to the Bishop's printed pamphlets, and could therefore have no right to an opinion as to his reception or treatment of evidence, or he would not venture to use the expressions just quoted of one who had never made an assertion without the most careful and patient sifting of the grounds for it, whose only object was to establish the truth, *whatever that might be*, and who was only too glad whenever his investigations threw discredit upon a tale of wrong or oppression. That principles of strict honour and justice should in these our days be characterised as "peculiar views," is neither to the credit of the English nation nor of its "only man."

¹ "The recollection of past events"—that is to say, of the slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes, and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said to be *kept alive* by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How "a good feeling" was to be restored between the victims and their conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.

In the second despatch mentioned Sir Garnet makes the following singular remark: "In the meantime I take the liberty of informing your lordship that the words 'the Amahlubi may, if they choose, when that is prepared which is to be prepared, go to him,' are interpreted, by those who have taken an active part in favour of the tribe, as binding the Government to convey all members of the Ama-Hlubi tribe who may wish to join Langalibalele, to whatever place may be finally selected for his location. I do not conceive that any such meaning is intended, and should not recommend that such an interpretation should be recognised. I think, however, it may fairly be matter for consideration whether Langalibalele's wives and children, who have lost all their property,¹ might not be assisted with passages by sea to join Langalibalele."²

It is difficult to imagine what other interpretation can be placed on the words of the proclamation, or how, after it had once been delivered, any narrower measures could be fairly considered, or require further "instructions."

In subsequent letters Sir Garnet scouts altogether representations made by the Bishop of the destitute condition of members of the Hlubi tribe, replying to Lord Carnarvon on the subject by enclosing letters from various magistrates in different parts of the country denying that destitution existed; saying that the people were "in sufficiently good circumstances;" and most of them suggesting that, should anything like starvation ensue, the people have only to hire themselves out as labourers to the white people. The Bishop would certainly never have made representations unsupported by facts; but in any case it is a question whether we had not some further duties towards a large number of innocent people whom we had stripped of all their possessions, and whose homes and crops we had destroyed, than that of allowing them to labour for us at a low rate of wages; or whether the mere

¹ In common only with the rest of the tribe.

² Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.

fact of its being thus possible for all to keep body and soul together relieved us of the responsibility of having robbed and stripped them.

These facts in themselves prove how different from Lord Carnarvon's feelings and intentions were those of his subordinate, and how real Sir Garnet's antagonism. It is not therefore surprising that the commands of the former were not, and have never been, carried out.

CHAPTER VII.

THE MATSHANA INQUIRY AND COLONEL COLLEY.

IN consequence of the threatened action for libel against the Bishop of Natal on account of statements made in his defence of Langalibalele, which Mr. John Shepstone considered to be "of a most libellous and malicious nature," the Bishop had laid the matter before the Lieut.-Governor, Sir B. Pine, requesting him to direct an inquiry to be made into the truth of the said statements. This was refused by His Excellency through the acting Colonial Secretary in the following terms: "Your lordship has thought it right to make the most serious charges against an important and long-tried officer of this Government—charges, too, relating to a matter which occurred sixteen years ago.¹ That officer has, in His Excellency's opinion, very properly called upon your lordship to retract those charges. Instead of doing this, you have appealed to the Lieut.-Governor to institute an inquiry as to the truth of the charges you have made. This the Lieut.-Governor has no hesitation in declining to do." Thereby prejudging the case without inquiry.

The Bishop's next action was to address a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,² which he requested the Lieutenant-Governor to forward with a copy of the

¹ Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the statements were made.

² See note, p. 44.

correspondence which had already taken place on the subject, in order that His Excellency might be fully aware of what steps he was taking.

This letter contained a short account of the facts which had led to his making the statements complained of—the trial of Langalibalele, and the “fear of treachery” repeatedly pleaded in excuse of the chief’s conduct, but treated with contempt both by the court below and the Executive Council (Court of Appeal), each including the Secretary for Native Affairs, and presided over by His Excellency. The statements made by the Bishop—not mere “charges” unsupported by evidence, but the deposition of four eye-witnesses who might be cross-examined at will—would, if proved to be true, greatly tend to palliate the offences imputed to the chief, and should therefore not have been suppressed by the officer concerned, who had kept silence when a word from his mouth would have cleared a prisoner on trial for his life from a very serious part of the charge against him. The Bishop therefore submitted that the fact of the events in question having taken place sixteen years before was no reason why they should not be brought to light when required for the prisoner’s defence.

As to the correspondence which ensued, it is sufficient for our present purpose to remark that on the 22nd of April, 1875, Lord Carnarvon directed Sir Garnet Wolseley to institute a careful inquiry into the matter, and suggested that under all the circumstances this inquiry might be best conducted by one or more of the senior officers of Sir Garnet’s staff, who had accompanied him on special service to Natal. The correspondence which followed between the parties concerned, with arrangements for the summoning of witnesses and for the management of the trial, are also all to be found in the Bishop’s pamphlet. The inquiry was to be of a private nature, no reporters to be admitted, nor counsel on either side permitted.¹ The Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were each to

¹ Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J. Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop *ex parte*, without the *safety of public* J

be allowed the presence of one friend during the inquiry, who, however, was not to speak to the witnesses, or to address the officer holding the inquiry. In addition the Bishop asked, and received, permission to bring with him the native interpreter, through whom he was in the habit of conducting important conversations with natives, as his own Zulu, although sufficient for ordinary purposes, was not, in his opinion, equal to the requirements of the case, while Mr. J. Shepstone was familiar from childhood with colloquial Kafir.

In the Bishop's pamphlet he points out that the course which Lord Carnarvon had thought proper to adopt in this case was wholly his own, and proceeds as follows: a passage which we will quote entire:—

“And I apprehend that this inquiry, though of necessity directed mainly to the question whether Mr. John Shepstone fired at Matshana or not, is not chiefly concerned with the character of the act imputed to him, described by the Secretary for Native Affairs as of a treacherous murderous nature, but involves the far more serious question whether that act, if really committed, was suppressed by Mr. John Shepstone at the time in his official report, was further suppressed by him when he appeared last year as Government prosecutor against a prisoner on trial for his life—who pleaded it as a very important part of his defence, but found his plea treated by the court, through Mr. John Shepstone's silence, as a mere impudent ‘pretext’—and has been finally denied by him to the Secretary of State himself, and is still denied down to the present moment. Such an act as that ascribed to him, if duly reported at the time, might, I am well aware, have been justified by some, or at least excused, on grounds of public policy under the circumstances; though I, for my part, should utterly dissent from such a view. In that case, however, it would have been unfair and unwarrantable to have reproached Mr. Shepstone at the present time for an

and the opportunity of cross-examination. Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching cross-examination by experienced advocates.

act which had been brought properly under the cognizance of his superiors. But the present inquiry, as I conceive, has chiefly in view the question whether the facts really occurred as Mr. John Shepstone reported at first officially, and has since re-affirmed officially, or not."

Colonel Colley, C.B., was the officer appointed to conduct the inquiry, the commencement of which was fixed for August 2nd, 1875.

The intervening period granted for the purpose was employed by the Bishop in summoning witnesses from all parts of the land; from Zululand, from the Free State, and distant parts of the colony. Matshana himself was summoned as a witness under an offer of safe-conduct from the Government. He, however, did not find it convenient, or was afraid, to trust himself in person; but Cetshwayo sent some of his men in his place. The Bishop's object was to summon "indunas," or messengers, or otherwise prominent persons in the affair of 1858; men who were thoroughly trustworthy, and "had a backbone," and would not be afraid to speak the truth; his desire being to get at that truth, whatever it might be. Thirty-one men responded to his call, of whom, however, only twenty were examined in court, the Bishop giving way to Colonel Colley's wish in the matter, and to save the court's time. Four other witnesses summoned by *both* the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone were examined, and nine more on Mr. Shepstone's behalf, called by him. The Bishop had considerable difficulty in procuring the attendance of the witnesses he required. The simple order of Mr. John Shepstone would suffice, by the mere lifting up of his finger, to bring down to Pietermaritzburg at once any natives whom he desired as witnesses, invested as he was in the native mind with all the weight and all the terrors of the magisterial office; and with the additional influence derived from the fact of his having only recently filled, during his brother's absence in England, the office of Secretary for Native Affairs, with such great—almost despotic—authority over all the natives in the colony. The Bishop, on the contrary, had no such influence. He

had no power at all to insist upon the attendance of witnesses. He could only *ask* them to come, and if they came at his request, they would know that they were coming, as it were, with a rope around their necks; and if they were proved to have borne false witness, calumniating foully so high an official, they had every reason to fear that their punishment would be severe, from which the Bishop would have had no power—even if, in such a case, he had the will—to save them.

When, upon the 2nd August, the inquiry began, out of the many witnesses called by the Bishop, upon whom lay the *onus probandi*, only three were at hand; and two of these, as will be seen, were present merely through the wise forethought of *the* intelligent Zulu, William Ngidi. But for this last, the inquiry would have begun, and—as the Commissioner was pressed for time, having other important duties on his hands in consequence of Sir Garnet Wolseley and staff being about immediately to leave the colony—might even (as it seemed) have ended, with only a single witness being heard in support of the Bishop's story. No others were seen or even heard of for some days, and then by accident only. The Secretary for Native Affairs, it is true, by direction of Sir Garnet Wolseley, had desired Cetshwayo to send down Matshana, and the Bishop fully expected that this intervention of the Government with a promise of safe-conduct for him, would have sufficed to bring him. But Mr. John Dunn, "Immigration Agent" of the Government in Zululand, and Cetshwayo's confidential adviser, whom the Bishop met in Durban on July 8th, told him at once that he did not think there was the least chance of Matshana's coming, as the Secretary for Native Affairs' words in 1873, when he went up to crown Cetshwayo (who asked very earnestly that Matshana might be forgiven and allowed to return to Natal) were so severe—"He had injured the Secretary for Native Affairs' own body;" that is, one of his men had wounded his brother (Mr. John Shepstone) fifteen years previously, when thirty or forty of Matshana's men had been killed—that he would be afraid to come at a mere

summons like this, notwithstanding the promise of safety, the value of which he would naturally appreciate by his own experience in former days. Mr. Dunn promised to do his best to persuade him to go down, but did not expect to succeed. And, in point of fact, he never came, alleging the usual "pain in the leg;" and the discussion in Zululand about his coming had only the result of delaying for some days the starting of the other witnesses whom the Bishop had asked Cetshwayo to send. On August 4th, however, Zulu messengers arrived, reporting to the Secretary for Native Affairs the sickness of Matshana, and to the Bishop the fact that six witnesses from Zululand were on the way, and they themselves had pushed on ahead to announce their coming, as they knew they were wanted for August 2nd. Accordingly five of them arrived on August 8th, and the sixth, Maboyi, on August 5th, under somewhat singular circumstances, as will presently appear. Meanwhile most important witnesses in support of the Bishop's story were expected by him from Matshana's old location—Kwa' Jobe (at the place of "Jobe")—partly in consequence of a letter written by Magera to William Ngidi, partly in compliance with the Bishop's request sent through Cetshwayo to Matshana himself in Zululand. William Ngidi replied to Magera, as follows: "Your letter reached me all right, and just in the very nick of time, for it came on Saturday, and the day before Mr. John arrived here (Kwa' Jobe), and called the men to come to him on Monday, that they might talk together about Matshana's affair. On Sunday my friend Mlingane came, and we took counsel together; for by this time it was well known that Mr. John had come to speak with the people about that matter of Matshana. So we put our heads together, and I got up very early on Monday morning and hurried off to Deke, and told him that he was called by Sobantu (the Bishop) to go before the Governor. He readily agreed to go, and went down at once, on the very day when Matshana's people came together to Mr. John, so that he never went to him; but, when I arrived, there had just come already

the messenger to call him to go to Mr. John, and another came just as he was about to set off for Maritzburg. I told him to call for Mpupuma on his way, and take him on with him. I see that you have done well and wisely in sending that letter without delay to me."

Accordingly these two men, Deke and Mpupuma, reached Bishopstowe safely in good time. Also Ntambama, Langalibalele's brother, of whom the Bishop had heard as having been present on the occasion, readily came at his summons, though he was not asked to give his evidence, nor did the Bishop know what it would be before he made his statement in court. But for the prudent action of William Ngidi, Ntambama would have been the only witness whose testimony would have sustained the Bishop's statements during the first days of the inquiry; and his evidence, unsupported, might have been suspected, as that of Langalibalele's brother, of not being disinterested, and would have been contradicted at once (see below) by Ncamane's.

On Saturday, July 31st, the inquiry being about to begin on the Monday, Magera received a doleful letter from William Ngidi to the effect that the 'Inkos Sobantu must take care what he was about, for that all the people were afraid, and would not venture to come forward and give evidence against a high Government official. He spoke, however, of one man "whom I trust most of all the people here," and who had the scar upon his neck of a wound received upon the day of Matshana's arrest.

Discouraging, indeed, as it was to find on the very eve of the inquiry that all his efforts through William Ngidi had failed to procure witnesses, except the two sent down by him at the first, the Bishop was utterly at a loss to understand how his message to Cetshwayo had, to all appearance, also entirely failed with respect to those men of Matshana still living Kwa' Jobe, as well as (it seemed) those living in Zululand.

On August 5th the mystery with respect to the witnesses Kwa' Jobe was explained. Deke, Mpupuma, Ntambama, and Njuba, who had come from Zululand,

had all been examined, as well as Ncamane, who, when called by the Bishop, had replied that he would only come if called by the Government; and when summoned through the Secretary for Native Affairs, at the Bishop's request, withdrew or modified important parts of his printed statement. The Bishop had actually no other witness to call, and all his efforts to obtain a number of well-informed and trustworthy eye-witnesses from Zululand, Kwa' Jobe, and Basutoland, seemed likely to end in a complete fiasco. But on the evening of Thursday, August 5th, a native came to him in the street and said that his name was Maboyi, son of Tole (Matshana's chief induna, who was killed on the occasion in question), and that he had been sent by Matshana to Mr. Fynn, the superintendent, and Luntshungu, son of Ngoza, the present chief, of the remnant of his former tribe living Kwa' Jobe, to ask to be allowed to take down to 'Maritzburg as witnesses those men of his who were present on the day of the attempt to seize Matshana. Mr. Fynn said that "He did not refuse the men, but wished to hear a word by a letter coming from the Secretary for Native Affairs—it was not proper that he should hear it from a man of Matshana coming from Zululand," and sent him off under charge of a policeman to 'Maritzburg, where he was taken to the Secretary for Native Affairs, who said to him: "If Matshana himself had come, this matter might have been properly settled; it won't be without him!" But the Secretary for Native Affairs said nothing to Maboyi about his going to call the witnesses Kwa' Jobe; he only asked by whom he had been sent, and when informed, he told him to go home to Zululand, as he had not been summoned and had nothing to do with this affair. Maboyi had reached 'Maritzburg on Monday, August 2nd, the day on which the inquiry began. He saw the Secretary for Native Affairs on Tuesday, and on that day was dismissed as above. Not a word was said to the Bishop about his being brought down in this way under arrest, which fully explained the non-arrival of his witnesses from the location; since, first, their fear of giving witness against a

Government official, and now the arrest of Maboyi, had spread a kind of panic among them all, and deterred them from coming to give evidence against Mr. John Shepstone—himself a resident magistrate, only lately acting as Secretary for Native Affairs, and the brother of the Secretary for Native Affairs himself—merely in answer to the Bishop's unofficial summons. Hearing, however, on Thursday from natives that the case was then going on at Government House, Maboyi went up to speak with the Bishop, but arrived when the court had adjourned. He found him out in town, however, just as he was on the point of leaving for Bishopstowe, and was, of course, told to wait and give his evidence. Accordingly, he went to Bishopstowe, and Magema was charged to bring him in for examination on Saturday, the next day of the inquiry. On the way into town for that purpose, Mr. Fynn's policeman most positively refused to let him stay, and went off ultimately in great wrath, as Maboyi and Magema insisted that he must give his evidence before leaving town to return to Zululand.

On that day, Saturday, August 7th, the Bishop explained the whole affair to the Commissioner, and, having obtained a list of names from Maboyi, requested that a Government messenger might be sent for the men at once, and the Secretary for Native Affairs was instructed to summon them. On Monday, August 9th, the Secretary for Native Affairs replied that he had summoned all these men, except seven, who were already in town, having been called by Mr. John Shepstone, and having been, in fact, under his hands—in charge of his induna Nozitshina—from the very first day of the inquiry. It seemed as if William Ngidi's statement was really to be verified, and that these men had all succumbed to their fears. On the other hand, among these seven was Matendeyeka, whom William Ngidi "trusted most of all;" and there might be amongst them some who would have the courage to speak out and to describe the facts connected with the arrest of Matshana to the best of their ability. At all events the Bishop resolved to call them, and do his best to bring the truth

out of them; and Magera afterwards whispered that he had heard from one of Mr. John's men, who was present when he spoke with the people (Kwa' Jobe), that the men there had said: "It was of no use to discuss it beforehand; they would say nothing about what they remembered now; but before the Governor they would speak the plain truth as they knew it." Accordingly the Bishop called four of these men—Matendeyeka, Faku (son of Tole), Magwaza, Gwazizulu—and they all confirmed the story as told by his other witnesses. He left the other three to be called by Mr. John Shepstone, but he never called them. That these witnesses should have been called by Mr. John Shepstone, as well as by the Bishop, was satisfactory, showing that they were witnesses to whom no objection could be made on the score of character or position in the tribe, or as having been in any way, directly or indirectly, influenced by the Bishop.

But the result was that, as these men were in the hands of the other side from the time they reached until they left Maritzburg, the Bishop had never even seen them, or had any communication with them, until they appeared to give their evidence. He was wholly ignorant beforehand of what they *would* say or what they *could* say; he knew not whether they would confirm or contradict the story told by his other witnesses; and he knew not on what particular points, if any, they could give special evidence, and was therefore unable to ask the questions which might have elicited such evidence.

By this time (August 8th) the witnesses from Zululand had arrived, from whom the Bishop learned the names of other important witnesses living Kwa' Jobe, and at his request these also were sent for by Government messengers. Unfortunately, through Maboyi's arrest, some of the Bishop's witnesses summoned by the Secretary for Native Affairs arrived too late on the very day (August 21st) on which the evidence was closed, and others a day or two afterwards—twelve altogether—of whom only one could be heard, whom the Bishop had expressly named as a

man whose testimony he especially desired to take. Upon the whole, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who began by "leaving entirely in the Bishop's hands" the difficult and not inexpensive business of "obtaining his witnesses," summoned ultimately twenty-two of them, of whom, however, four only could be heard by the Commissioner; two (Matshana and Ngijimi) did not come at all; and three, including a most important witness, were called too late to be able to arrive till all was over; while four more out of the seven who had been called by Mr. John Shepstone gave their evidence in support of the Bishop, as doubtless the three others would have done, if Mr. John Shepstone had called them.

In the despatch to the Earl of Carnarvon, already quoted from (note to p. 72), Sir B. Pine remarks: "I think it further my duty to point out to your lordship that much of the evidence adduced by the Bishop in this case has been taken in this way (*ex parte*, without the safety of publicity, and the opportunity of cross-examination); evidence so taken is peculiarly untrustworthy, for every one moderately acquainted with the native character is aware that when a question is put to a native, he will intuitively perceive what answer is required, and answer accordingly." The above is a common but insufficiently supported accusation against the natives, denied by many who are more than "moderately acquainted" with their character; although of course it is the natural tendency of a subservient race in its dealings with its masters, and possible tyrants. But granting for the nonce its truth, it would, in the case of the Matshana inquiry, tell heavily on the Bishop's side. Sir B. Pine was not present at the private investigation made by the Bishop, to which he alludes in the above sentence, and therefore can be no judge of the "cross-examination," which the four original witnesses underwent; and they, if they did "intuitively perceive" what answer was required, and "answer accordingly," must merely have spoken the truth; a truth which, at that early period of his investigations, the Bishop was *most reluctantly* receiving, and would gladly have had disproved.

The evidence before the court, however, was given under circumstances which, if Sir B. Pine's account of native witnesses be correct, adds enormously to the value of the fact that out of these twenty-four witnesses, summoned from various quarters, many of them without opportunity of communicating either with the Bishop or with each other, but one¹ failed when it came to the point; and he, a feeble old man, just released from prison (one of the captured tribe), was manifestly in a state of abject alarm at finding himself brought up to witness against the Government whose tender mercies he had so lately experienced, and contradicted before Colonel Colley the greater part of the story which he had originally told the Bishop. This poor creature had been intimidated and threatened by a certain man named Adam, under whose surveillance he lived after being released from gaol, and who actually turned him and his family out at night as a punishment for his having obeyed a summons to Bishopstowe. He was manifestly ready to say anything which would relieve him from the fear of the gaol, which he pleaded to Mr. Shepstone a day or two later; on which occasion he unsaid all he had previously said, having, as he afterwards confessed, been warned by Mr. Shepstone's policeman Ratsha, who asked him for what purpose he had been summoned by the Bishop, *not to speak a word about* "Mr. John's" treatment of Matshana. But, with the best intentions, the man did not succeed in making his story tally entirely with that of Mr. Shepstone's other witnesses, nor with Mr. Shepstone's own.

With this one exception the Bishop's witnesses told the same story in all essential respects. They were men arriving from many different and distant parts of the colony, from Zululand, and from the Free State, who could not possibly have combined to tell the same story in all its details, which, if false, would have been torn to pieces when so many men of different ages and characters were cross-examined by one so thoroughly acquainted with all the real facts of the case as Mr. Shepstone—men who had nothing to expect from the Bishop, but had everything to dread from

¹ One of the original four.

the Government if proved to have brought a false and foul charge against an officer so highly placed and so powerfully protected; *yet not the least impression was made upon the strength of their united evidence.*

The case, however, is very different when we turn to Mr. Shepstone's witnesses. Of these, nine in number (besides the four natives called by both the Bishop and Mr. Shepstone), seven were natives; the other two being the Secretary for Native Affairs and Mr. John Taylor—a son of Mr. John Shepstone's first wife by her former husband. Mr. Taylor was a lad of nine at the time, but, having been present with his mother and little sister on the occasion of the attack upon Matshana, was summoned as a witness by Mr. Shepstone. His evidence was chiefly important as helping to prove that Matshana's party had not the concealed weapons which Mr. Shepstone's chief native witness Nozitshina said were left by them in immense numbers upon the ground; as he stated that he and his sister went over the ground, after the affair was over, and picked up the assegais, "about eight or nine" in number.

But it is important to remark that the very fact of the presence at this meeting of Mrs. Shepstone with her two children, goes far to disprove the account given by Mr. Shepstone in his second "statement," prepared by him on the occasion of this trial, but which is greatly at variance on some vital points with the narrative written by him on the day after the event, dated March 17th, 1858, for the information of His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor. It seems almost incredible that Mr. John Shepstone should have, as he says in his second statement, "made up his mind to face almost certain" death, not only for himself and all his men, but for *his wife and her two young children*, on the grounds that it was "too late to withdraw at this stage" (same report), when at any time since the "day or two previous" (*ibid.*), when the information in question¹ reached him, according to his account he might

¹ Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to the effect that

have put off the meeting, or at all events have sent his wife and her children to a place of safety. The Secretary for Native Affairs' evidence could of course be of a merely official character, as he was not present on the occasion. He stated that Mr. John Shepstone's letters of February 16th and 24th, 1858, asked for by the Bishop, on the subject of the approaching interview with Matshana, could not be found, although they "must have been recently mislaid," as he himself (the Secretary for Native Affairs) had quoted from one of them in his minute for the Secretary of State in June, 1874. Of Mr. Shepstone's native witnesses it can only be said that, amongst the seven called by him only, six contradicted themselves and each other to so great an extent as to make their evidence of no value, while the evidence of the seventh was unimportant, and the four witnesses called by both Mr. Shepstone and the Bishop told the same story as did the witnesses of the latter, most unexpectedly to him.

Nevertheless Colonel Colley's judgment, although convicting Mr. John Shepstone of having enticed the chief Matshana to an interview with the intention of seizing him, was received and acted upon in Natal as an acquittal of that officer. So far was this the case, that, although Lord Carnarvon directed that the Bishop's costs should be placed upon the colonial estimates, the Legislative Council of the colony refused to pay them on the ground that they were the costs of the losing party. In his report Colonel Colley gives his opinions as follows:—

"That Matyana was enticed to an interview, as stated by the Bishop, and was induced to come unarmed, under the belief that it was a friendly meeting, such as he had already had with Mr. Shepstone, for the purpose of discussing the accusations against him and the question of his return to his location.

the chief's intentions were to put him and his people to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr. Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous intentions of Matshana, and, secondly, that *nevertheless* Mr. Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon the people.

"That Matyana, though very suspicious and unwilling, came there in good faith ; and that the accusations against him—of meditating the assassination of Mr. Shepstone and his party, of a pre-arranged plan and signal for the purpose, and of carrying concealed arms to the meeting—which are made in Mr. J. Shepstone's statements, are entirely without foundation.

"That Mr. Shepstone at that time held no magisterial position, but was simply the commander of a small armed force charged with the execution of a warrant ; and that the manner in which he proposed to effect the seizure, viz., at a supposed friendly meeting, was known to and sanctioned by, if not the Government, at least the immediate representative of the Government and Mr. Shepstone's superior, Dr. Kelly, the resident magistrate of the district.

"That Mr. Shepstone did not attempt to shoot Matyana, as described by the Bishop, but fired into the air after the attempt to seize Matyana had failed, and in consequence of the attempt made almost simultaneously by some of Matyana's men to reach the huts and seize the arms of Mr. Shepstone's men.

"The concealment of the gun," he continues, "and the fact that a number of Matyana's men were killed in the pursuit, is not disputed by Mr. Shepstone.

"I confess that I have had the greatest difficulty in forming my opinion on this latter point, and especially as to whether Mr. Shepstone fired into the air as he states. *The weight of direct evidence adduced at the inquiry lay altogether on the other side.*"¹

Colonel Colley then proceeds to give the considerations by which he has been influenced in coming to a conclusion directly opposed to the side on which, as he himself says, lay the weight of direct evidence. These considerations were threefold. The first is an opinion of his own, considerably at variance with most people's experience, namely, that a story handed down by oral tradition, "crystallises into an accepted form," by which he explains

¹ Author's italics.

away the fact that so many witnesses told the same story, and one which stood the test of cross-examination, without any important variations.

The second consideration was even more singular, namely, that allowance must be made on Mr. John Shepstone's side for the greater ability with which the Bishop conducted his case; and the third lay in the statement that "Mr. J. W. Shepstone is a man of known courage, and a noted sportsman and shot," and "was not likely to have missed" Matyana if he had fired at him; "and, if driven to fire into the crowd in self-defence, it is more probable that he would have shot one of the men on the right." The Bishop's opponents from the very first persistently put forward the notion that he had "brought a charge against Mr. J. W. Shepstone," and this was countenanced by the Government when they threw upon him the serious task of prosecuting before a Court of Inquiry, whereas in point of fact the real question at issue was not whether or no a certain shot was actually fired, but whether, on a certain occasion, a Government official had acted in a treacherous manner towards a native chief, thereby giving reason for the excuse of fear on the part of Langalibalele, treated as a false pretence by the court, some members of which were fully aware of the facts, and the prosecutor himself the official concerned. And, further, whether the said facts had been concealed by high Government officers, and denied by them repeatedly to their superiors in England.

On the former question Colonel Colley's report leaves no doubt, and Lord Carnarvon's comments upon it are of a very decided nature. After signifying his acceptance of the decision as a "sound and just conclusion," and complimenting Colonel Colley on the "able and conscientious manner in which" he "has acquitted himself of an arduous and delicate task," he continues: "On the other hand, I must, even after the lapse of so many years, record my disapprobation of the artifices by which it is admitted Matyana was entrapped into the meeting with a view to his forcible arrest. Such underhand manœuvres are

opposed to the morality of a civilised administration; they lower English rule in the eyes of the natives; and they even defeat their own object, as is abundantly illustrated by the present case."

Mr. J. W. Shepstone, however, was a subordinate officer, and if his mode of executing the warrant was approved by the superior authorities in the colony, the blame which may attach to the transaction must be borne by them at least in equal proportion.

The gist of Colonel Colley's decision is altogether condemnatory of Mr. J. Shepstone, some of whose statements, he says, "are entirely without foundation," and, by implication, also of his brother, the Secretary for Native Affairs; yet virtually, and in the eyes of the world, the decision was in their favour. To quote from *The Natal Mercury* of November 2nd, 1875: "It is still understood that Mr. Shepstone, in the minds of impartial judges, stands more than exonerated from the Bishop's charges." Mr. John Shepstone was retained in his responsible position, and received further promotion; and his brother was immediately appointed to the high office of Administrator of Government, and sent out with power to annex the Transvaal if he thought proper.

We have dwelt at some length upon the inquiry into the Matshana case; for, since the annexation of the Transvaal was one of the direct and immediate causes of the Zulu War, and since it seems improbable that any other man than Sir Theophilus Shepstone could at the moment have been found equally able to undertake the task, it becomes a serious question to what extent an inquiry which had no practical effect whatsoever upon the position of men whose conduct had been stigmatised by the Secretary of State himself as "underhand manœuvres, opposed to the morality of a civilised administration," may not be considered chargeable with the disastrous results. And, further, we must protest against the spirit of the last sentence of Lord Carnarvon's despatch on the subject, in which he expresses his "earnest hope that his (Colonel Colley's) report will be received by all parties to

this controversy in the spirit which is to be desired, and be accepted as a final settlement of a dispute which cannot be prolonged without serious prejudice to public interests, and without a renewal of those resentments which, for the good of the community—English as well as native—had best be put to rest.”

A dislocated joint must be replaced, or the limb cannot otherwise be pressed down into shape and “put to rest;” a thorn must be extracted, not skinned over and left in the flesh; and as, with the dislocation unreduced or the thorn unextracted, the human frame can never recover its healthful condition, so it is with the state with an unrighted wrong, an unexposed injustice.

The act of treason towards Matshana, hidden for many years, looked upon by its perpetrators as a matter past and gone, has tainted all our native policy since—unknown to most English people in Natal or at home—and has finally borne bitter fruit in the present unhappy condition of native affairs.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ANNEXATION OF THE TRANSVAAL.

ON the 5th of October, 1876, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., was appointed "to be a Special Commissioner to inquire respecting certain disturbances which have taken place in the territories adjoining the colony of Natal, and empowering him, in certain events, to exercise the power and jurisdiction of Her Majesty over such territories, or some of them." (P. P. [C. 1776] p. 1.)

The commission stated: "Whereas grievous disturbances have broken out in the territories adjacent to our colonies in South Africa, with war between the white inhabitants and the native races, to the great peril of the peace and safety of our said colonies . . . and, if the emergency should seem to you to be such as to render it necessary, in order to secure the peace and safety of our said colonies and of our subjects elsewhere, that the said territories, or any portion or portions of the same, should provisionally, and pending the announcement of our pleasure, be administered in our name and on our behalf; then, and in such case only, we do further authorise you, the said Sir Theophilus Shepstone, by proclamation under your hand, to declare that, from and after a day to be therein named, so much of any such territories as aforesaid, as to you after due consideration shall seem fit, shall be annexed to and form part of our dominions. . . . Provided first, that no such proclamation shall be issued by you with respect to any district, territory, or state unless you shall be satisfied

that the inhabitants thereof, or a sufficient number of them, or the Legislature thereof, desire to become our subjects, nor if any conditions unduly limiting our power and authority therein are sought to be imposed."

Such was the tenor of the commission which, unknown to the world at large, Sir Theophilus Shepstone brought with him when he returned to Natal in November, 1876. The sudden annexation which followed was a stroke which took all by surprise except the few already in the secret; many declaring to the last that such an action on the part of the English Government was impossible—because, they thought, unjust. It is true that the Republic had for long been going from bad to worse in the management of its own affairs; its Government had no longer the power to enforce laws or to collect taxes; and the country was generally believed to be fast approaching a condition of absolute anarchy. Nevertheless it was thought by some that, except by the request of those concerned, we had no right to intrude our authority for the better control of Transvaal affairs so long as their bad management did not affect us.

On one point, however, we undoubtedly had a right to interfere, as the stronger, the juster, and more merciful nation—namely, the attitude of the Transvaal Boers towards, and their treatment of, the native tribes who were their neighbours, or who came under their control. On behalf of the latter unfortunates (Transvaal subjects), we did not even profess to interfere; but one of the chief causes alleged by us for our taking possession of the country was a long and desultory war which was taking place between the Boers and Sikukuni, the chief of the Bapedi tribe living upon their northern borders, and in the course of which the Boers were behaving towards the unhappy natives with treachery, and, when they fell into their power, with great brutality. The sickening accounts of cruelties inflicted upon helpless men, women, and children by the Boers, which are to be found on official record in the pages of the Blue Book (C. 1776), should be ample justification in the eyes of a civilised world for

English interference, and forcible protection of the sufferers; and it is rather with the manner in which the annexation was carried out, and the policy which followed it, than with the intervention of English power in itself, that an objection can be raised.

The war between the Boers and the Bapedi arose out of similar encroachments on the part of the former, which led, as we shall presently show, to their border disputes with the Zulus. Boer farmers had gradually deprived of their land the native possessors of the soil by a simple process peculiarly their own. They first rented lands from the chiefs for grazing purposes, then built upon it, still paying a tax or tribute to the chief; finally, having well established themselves, they professed to have purchased the land for the sum already paid as rent, announced themselves the owners of it, and were shortly themselves levying taxes on the very men whom they had dispossessed. In this manner Sikukuni was declared by the Boers to have ceded to them the whole of his territory—that is to say, hundreds of square miles, for the paltry price of a hundred head of cattle.

An officer of the English Government, indeed (His Excellency's Commissioner at Lydenburg, Captain Clarke, R.A.), was of opinion [C. 2316, p. 29] that, "had only the Boer element in the Lydenburg district been consulted, it is doubtful if there would have been war with Sikukuni," as the Boers, he said, might have continued to pay taxes to the native chiefs. And the officer in question appears to censure the people who were "willing to submit to such humiliating conditions, and ambitious of the position of prime adviser to a native chief." It is difficult to understand why there should be anything humiliating in paying rent for land, whether to white or black owners, and the position of prime adviser to a powerful native chief might be made a very honourable and useful one in the hands of a wise and Christian man.

Captain Clarke continues thus: "It was the foreign element under the late President which forced matters

to a crisis. Since the annexation the farmers have, with few exceptions, ceased to pay tribute to the chiefs; their relations with the natives are otherwise unchanged. Culture and contact with civilisation will doubtless have the effect of re-establishing the self-respect of these people, and teaching them the obligation and benefits imposed and conferred on them by their new position." That is to say, apparently, teaching them that it is beneath their dignity to pay taxes to native landowners, but an "obligation imposed" upon them to rob the latter altogether of their land, the future possession of which is one of the "benefits conferred on them by their new position" (*i.e.* as subjects of the British Crown).

"The Bapedi branch of the Basuto family," says Captain Clarke, in the same despatch, "essentially agricultural and peaceful in its habits and tastes, even now irrigate the land, and would, if possible, cultivate in excess of their food requirements. The friendly natives assure me that their great wish is to live peacefully on their lands, and provide themselves with ploughs, waggons, etc. The experience of the Berlin missionaries confirms this view. Relieved of their present anomalous position, into which they have been forced by the ambition of their rulers,¹ and distrust of the Boers, encouraged to follow their natural bent, the Basutos would become a peaceful agricultural people, capable of a certain civilisation." How well founded was this "distrust of the Boers," may be gathered from the accounts given in the Blue Book already mentioned.

Between the British Government and the Boers, a Treaty, called "The Sand River Convention," was made on the 16th January, 1852, as follows:—

"1. The Assistant Commissioners guarantee in the fullest manner, on the part of the British Government, to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves according to their own laws, without any interference on the

¹ Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their land from Boer encroachments.

part of the British Government; and that no encroachment shall be made by the said Government on the territory beyond, to the north of the Vaal River, with the further assurance that the warmest wish of the British Government is to promote peace, free trade, and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers now inhabiting, or who hereafter may inhabit, that country; it being understood that this system of non-interference is binding upon both parties.

“ 2. Should any misunderstanding hereafter arise as to the true meaning of the words ‘The Vaal River,’ this question, in so far as it regards the line from the source of that river over the Drakensberg, shall be settled and adjusted by commissioners chosen by both parties.

“ 3. Her Majesty’s Assistant Commissioners hereby disclaim all alliances whatever and with whomsoever of the coloured nations to the north of the Vaal River.

“ 4. It is agreed that no slavery is or shall be permitted or practised in the country to the north of the Vaal River by the emigrant farmers.

“ 5. Mutual facilities and liberty shall be afforded to traders and travellers on both sides of the Vaal River; it being understood that every waggon containing fire-arms, coming from the south side of the Vaal River, shall produce a certificate signed by a British magistrate, or other functionary duly authorised, to grant such, and which shall state the quantities of such articles contained in the said waggon, to the nearest magistrate north of the Vaal River, who shall act in the case as the regulations of the emigrant farmers direct. It is agreed that no objection shall be made by any British authority against the emigrant Boers purchasing their supplies of ammunition in any of the British colonies and possessions of South Africa; it being mutually understood that all trade in ammunition with the native tribes is prohibited, both by the British Government and the emigrant farmers, on both sides of the Vaal River.

“ 6. It is agreed that, so far as possible, all criminals and other guilty parties who may fly from justice either way

across the Vaal River shall be mutually delivered up, if such should be required; and that the British courts, as well as those of the emigrant farmers, shall be mutually open to each other for all legitimate processes, and that summonses for witnesses sent either way across the Vaal River shall be backed by the magistrates on each side of the same respectively, to compel the attendance of such witnesses when required.

"7. It is agreed that certificates of marriage issued by the proper authorities of the emigrant farmers shall be held valid and sufficient to entitle children of such marriage to receive portions accruing to them in any British colony or possession in South Africa.

"8. It is agreed that any and every person now in possession of land, and residing in British territory, shall have free right and power to sell his said property and remove unmolested across the Vaal River and *vice versa*, it being distinctly understood that this arrangement does not comprehend criminals or debtors without providing for the payment of their just and lawful debts."

The object of the Boers in their attacks upon their native neighbours appears to have been twofold—the acquisition of territory, and that of children to be brought up as slaves.

The Cape Argus of December 12th, 1876, remarks: "Through the whole course of this Republic's existence, it has acted in contravention of the Sand River Treaty;¹

¹ SAND RIVER TREATY.—"Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing, buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children, called by the cant name of 'black ivory,' murdering the fathers, and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented and carried farther by

and slavery has occurred not only here and there in isolated cases, but as an unbroken practice has been one of the peculiar institutions of the country, mixed up with all its social and political life. It has been at the root of most of its wars. . . . The Boers have not only fallen upon unsuspecting kraals simply for the purpose of obtaining the women and children and cattle, but they have carried on a traffic through natives, who have kidnapped the children of their weaker neighbours, and sold them to the white man. Again, the Boers have sold and exchanged their victims amongst themselves. Waggon-loads of slaves have been conveyed from one end of the country to the other for sale, and that with the cognizance and for the direct advantage of the highest officials of the land. The writer has himself seen in a town situated in the south of the Republic the children who had been brought down from a remote northern district. . . . The circumstances connected with some of these kidnapping excursions are appalling, and the barbarities practised by cruel masters upon some of these defenceless creatures during the course of their servitude are scarcely less horrible than those reported from Turkey, although they are spread over a course of years instead of being compressed within a few weeks."

This passage is taken from a letter to *The Argus* (enclosed in a despatch from Sir Henry Barkly to the Earl of Carnarvon, December 13th, 1876), which, with other accompanying letters from the same source, gives an account of Boer atrocities too horrible for repetition [C. 1776]. A single instance may be mentioned which, however shocking, is less appalling than others, but perhaps shows more plainly than anything else could do what the natives knew the life of a slave in the Transvaal would be. The information is given by a Boer. "In 1864," he says, "the Swazies accompanied the Boers against Males.¹ The Boers did nothing but stand by and witness the fearful massacre.

the evidence of natives as to their own sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety which used to be called *publica fama*."—From an article by Lord Balfour in *The Nineteenth Century Review*, August 1879, p. 265.

¹ A native chief.

The men and women were also murdered. One poor woman sat clutching her baby of eight days old. The Swazies stabbed her through the body; and when she found that she could not live, she wrung her baby's neck with her own hands, to save it from future misery. On the return of that commando the children who became too weary to continue the journey were killed on the road. The survivors were sold as slaves to the farmers."

Out of this state of things eventually proceeded the war between the Boers and Sikukuni, the result of which was a very ambiguous one indeed; for although Sikukuni was driven out of the low-lying districts of the country, he took refuge in his stronghold, which affords an almost impregnable position in a thickly-populated range of mountains.

Another important reason alleged at the time for taking possession of the Transvaal was that the border troubles between it and Zululand were becoming more serious every day; that, sooner or later, unless we interposed our authority, a war would break out between the Boers and the Zulus, into which we should inevitably be drawn. The Zulus, having continually entreated our protection, while at our desire they refrained from defending themselves by force of arms, were naturally rejoiced at an action on our part which looked like an answer to their oft-repeated prayer, and eagerly expected the reward of their long and patient waiting.

But, however strongly we may feel that it was the duty of the more powerful nation to put a stop to the doings of the Transvaal Boers, even at considerable expense to ourselves, the manner in which we have acted, and the consequences which followed, have been such as to cause many sensible people to feel that we should have done better to withdraw our prohibition from Cetshwayo, and allow him and the Boers "to fight it out between them."¹

¹ Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: "The citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but blasphemous that combination of

We might have honestly and openly interfered and insisted upon putting a stop to the atrocities of the Boers, annexing their country if necessary to that end, but then we ourselves should have done justice to the natives on whose behalf we professed to interfere, instead of taking over with the country and carrying on those very quarrels and aggressions which we alleged as a sufficient reason for the annexation.

When Sir Theophilus Shepstone went up to Pretoria it was, ostensibly, merely to advise the President and Volksraad of the Transvaal Republic as to the best means of extricating themselves and the country from the difficulties into which they were plunged, and with the expressed intention of endeavouring to produce a peaceful settlement with Sikukuni, which should protect him and his people for the future from the tyranny of the Boers. Up to the last the notion that there was any intention of forcibly annexing the country was indignantly repudiated by the members of the expedition, although their chief meanwhile was in possession of his commission as Administrator of the British

gain with godliness which is part of their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus.” (Once for all rather, through the course of many years, during which we have restrained the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory, by promises that we would see justice done.—*Author*.) “But it is neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness, and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners, but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity. I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences, or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements with us and endanger our security.”

Government in the Transvaal. There were some who suspected that there was more in the movement than was confessed to by those concerned. It was argued that, were Sir Theophilus Shepstone's visit of a purely friendly nature, no armed force would have been sent to escort him, as he was going, not into a savage country, but into one which, at all events, professed to have a civilised government and an educated class. The unsettled state of feeling amongst the Boers was pleaded in answer to this argument, but was commonly met by the suggestion that if, under the circumstances, the armed force of mounted police which accompanied the important visitor might be looked upon as a justifiable precaution, yet the possible danger to strangers from the violence of a few lawless men in a country in which the government was not strong enough to keep them in check, was not great enough to account for the fact that a regiment of British infantry was hastily moved up to Newcastle, from whence they could speedily be summoned into the Transvaal. The presence of a Zulu army upon the other border, where it lay quiet and inoffensive for weeks during Sir Theophilus Shepstone's proceedings in the Transvaal, was naturally looked upon as a suspicious circumstance. There can be little doubt that—whether or no Cetshwayo obeyed a hint from his old friend the Secretary for Native Affairs, and sent his army to support him, and to overawe the Boers by a warlike demonstration—the Zulus were present in a spirit, however inimical to the Boers, entirely friendly to the English. The mere fact that the army lay there so long in harmless repose, and dispersed promptly and quietly *immediately* upon receiving orders to do so from Sir Theophilus Shepstone, proves that, at all events, they and their king thought that they were carrying out his wishes. The feeling expressed at the time by a British officer,¹ in speaking of this Zulu army, and recommending that it should be dispersed, that "it were better the little band of Englishmen (including, of course, himself) should fall

¹ Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at the time.

by the hand of the Boers than that ought should be done by the former to bring about a war of races," can hardly have been shared by Sir Theophilus Shepstone himself, or the message to the Zulu king to withdraw his army would have been despatched some weeks earlier.

In face of these facts it strikes one as strange that the temporary presence of this Zulu army on the Transvaal borders, manifestly in our support (whether by request or not), and which retired without giving the least offence, or even committing such acts of theft or violence as might be expected as necessary evils in the neighbourhood of a large European garrison, should have been regarded, later, as a sign of Cetshwayo's inimical feeling towards *the English*.¹

Mr. Pretorius, member of the Dutch Executive Council, and other influential Transvaalers, assert that Sir T. Shepstone threatened to let loose the Zulus upon them, in order to reduce them to submission; but the accusation is denied on behalf of the Administrator of the Transvaal. And Mr. Fynney (in the report of his mission to Cetshwayo from Sir T. Shepstone, upon the annexation of the Transvaal, dated July 4, 1877) gives the king's words to him, as follows: "I am pleased that Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone) has sent you to let me know that the land of the Transvaal Boers has now become part of the lands of the Queen of England. I began to wonder why he did not tell me something of what he was doing. I received one message from him, sent by Unkabana, from Newcastle, and I heard the Boers were not treating him properly, and that they intended to put him into a corner. If they had done so, I should not have waited for anything more. Had one shot been fired, I should have

¹ Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special Correspondent of *The Cape Argus*, and to have since re-affirmed his statement, that Sir T. Shepstone "sent word to Cetshwayo that he was being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to come to his assistance." This assertion has also been denied by Sir T. Shepstone's supporters. There is not, however, the slightest doubt that Sir T. Shepstone did give Cetshwayo a hint to be on the alert.