Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Assata Shakur's Self-writing: Torture, Authorisation and Liberation

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that: "Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Assata Shakur's Self-writing: Torture, Authorisation and Liberation" is my work, that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged using complete references, and that this thesis was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another university.

Student name: Lebohang Motsomotso

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To my closest friends Zanele Hlatshwayo and Nonhlakanipo Busakwe, I am grateful for the many years of this growing sisterhood and always checking on my progress.

DEDICATION

For the Decolonial Movement.

Mahla! Ke a Rona!

ABSTRACT

The study conceptualises self-writing through the lived experiences of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Assata Shakur. The specific focus is on three themes, namely: torture, authorisation, and liberation. These themes are discussed through narrative and thematic analysis that aims at emphasising how the text can be analysed through meaning, symbols and patterns. It is through torture, authorisation, and liberation that the significance of self-writing as a mode of writing engages and facilitates the narrative accounts of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. This thesis provides a background of the concept of self-writing and it sets a context of how the concept evolved based on different interpretations by scholars. Foucault (1997) as a key scholar who developed the concept of self-writing highlights that it is about writing the self to freedom and it is an act of being self-intimate. Mbembe (2001) builds on Foucault but presents a different mode of writing. He proposes self-writing through African modes of writing, which he then theorises as African subjectivity. The conceptions and observations of Foucault and Mbembe are fundamental as a point of departure in how self-writing is conceptualised in this thesis. The underpinning similarity of both conceptualisations is centred on how self-writing advocates for the self-attaining a sense of being. Thus, in this, thesis the notion of attaining being emerges as a point of departure in how self-writing is analysed in this thesis. Self-writing justifies as to why the narratives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela cannot only be reduced to autobiographical works, but rather expand into texts that have political significance. It also explains the position of *the hold,* simply defined it is a position in which the black body exists within confinement. It is a captured space that is both in and out of prison which the black body finds itself within. The concept derives from the work of Sharpe (2016). The discussions in this thesis reveal the interconnectedness of the experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela encounters. Moreover, they illustrate how self-writing is illuminated through political resistance. Self-writing in this thesis is re-imagined as a concept that propagates a political imaginary that is not only for the individual self to attain consciousness, but it is a communal political imaginary. Ultimately, this thesis illustrates how self-writing is a mode of writing that not only occurs through textual evidence but it transcends to a way of life. Additionally, self-writing is a continuous process that awakens one's consciousness and consequently that of others.

ABBREVIATIONS

ANC – African National Congress

BLA – Black Liberation Army

BPP – Black Panther Party

COINTELPRO – Counter Intelligence Program

FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation

MK – uMkhonto we Sizwe

NP – National Party

NYPD – New York Police Department

PSA – Punitive Segregation Area

SSC – State Security Council

STRATCOM – Strategic Communication

UDF – United Democratic Front

USA – United States of America

US – United States

PREFACE

Self-writing and the autobiography are literary genres. Autobiographies are often written as a reflection of a lived life. As though an individual has completed life and is giving an offering to others of the life that was lived. James Olney (1980) describes the autobiography as an impulse of life that is transformed by being lived through the unique medium of the individual and the individual's special, peculiar psychic configuration. In so doing it reduces the notion of being for others—it is a notion that is understood as a conscious that refers to no objects outside of itself, to no events and no other lives. How Michel Foucault (1997) explains self-writing suggests that it is an ongoing process that never truly has an ultimate end that it even exceeds death. Since self-writing and the autobiography are both literary genres they can be used as tools of analysis. But, in the context of interpreting being and coming to being in different modes of writing—self-writing provides the impetus to this philosophical journey to self. Particularly because it places the notion of self on an ongoing process that requires re-reading and reading to reach self. In reading and re-reading the notion of meditation is transmitted and, it projects having intramural conversations with the self. By so doing it gives gravitas to not be a single self. It for this reason that Foucault emphasises conversing with oneself and others. The concept of self-writing in this study is used as a conceptual lens for examining Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur under the three specific themes: torture, authorisation, and liberation. To reiterate, self-writing involves various modes of writing oneself to freedom and being, it is a continuous process, whereas the autobiography is an account of oneself through written text.

To examine self-writing the key primary narrative texts of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are used to provide biographical information. Rather, their texts exemplify self-writing, not only self-writing that is reduced to text but as a mode of writing that is embodied in lived experiences. This study provides a nuanced examination of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's life experiences embody self-writing in various modes using the aforementioned themes as conceptual guides. These three themes expose how the oppressive systems of apartheid and segregation functioned to dehumanise and disembody the black body. This study illustrates how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were cemented in the construct of the black body and they attracted acts of dehumanisation that annihilated their being. The work of Christina Sharpe, Sylvia Wynter, Saidiya Hartman, and Hortense Spillers amongst many others contextualises how the black body is positioned in an anti-

black world that celebrates and maintains an anti-black culture through racially oppressive laws and systems of rule like slavery, apartheid[1] in South Africa, and segregation administered through the Jim Crow laws[2].

In South Africa the early development of apartheid was met with defiance by the African National Congress (ANC). The National Party (NP) won the elections in 1948 and introduced the policy of apartheid. The ANC reacted against the racist and repressive laws that were introduced by the by apartheid government. In the early 1950s the ANC gained support across South Africa from blacks, Indians, and a few coloureds and whites. The ANC launched its Defiance Campaign in 1952, the purpose of the campaign was to against the apartheid laws, and it would result in large numbers of people being arrested. The jails would become too full and the police service would collapse. In the years to follow the apartheid system was met with strong resistance (South African History Online 2019). The Defiance Campaign encouraged other campaigns against apartheid laws, such as the Group Areas Act and Bantu Education Act. The apartheid government tried to stop the Defiance Campaign by banning its leaders and passing new laws preventing public protests (African National Congress 2019). The struggle against the apartheid laws in the 1950s brought black, Indian, coloured and, white people together.

So when Madikizela-Mandela moved to Johannesburg in 1953, it was during a time were the ANC was gaining prominence. She as admitted to study at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work in Johannesburg. It was in Johannesburg that she saw the effects of apartheid on the lives of black people. Madikizela-Mandela's interest in nation politics grew, during her time living in the hostel at Jan Hofmeyr she was introduced to the ANC's slogans and literature. The ANC held protest meetings and it was the star player during a time of political resistance against apartheid laws. Madikizela-Mandela attended began to attend meetings (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 45, 47). Her

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[1] Apartheid is "translated from the Afrikaans meaning 'apartness', apartheid was the ideology supported by the National Party (NP) government and was introduced in South Africa in 1948. Apartheid called for the separate development of the different racial groups in South Africa. Apartheid enforced laws that forced different racial groups to live separately and unequally" (South African History Online 23 July 2019).

[2] The Jim Crow laws "were a collection of state and local statutes that legalised racial segregation, the laws began as early as 1865, immediately following the ratification of the 13th Amendment, which abolished slavery in the United States" (History 23 June 2020).

political convictions against apartheid grew larger as she dedicated her life in the fight against apartheid.

During the same period in the United States of America (USA), black people were being confronted with oppressive laws known as the Jim Crow laws. In the 1960s segregation laws were implemented during the Civil Rights movement in 1960s. Through segregation—racial mistrust, and prejudice created the foundations of racial inequality (Seitles 1998: 89-90). Segregation laws were aimed at marginalising black people—they were denied the right to vote, have jobs, and get an education or any other opportunity that would enhance their livelihood. If any individual showed resistance against the oppressive laws they would be arrested, fined, imprisoned or killed (History 23 June 2020). The segregation laws were met with resistance, black people organised themselves in a mass struggle against the oppression, they had sit-ins, freedom rides and legal suits defying the white majority and the oppressive state system (Saba 1974). Organised resistance emerged in the US against the segregation laws. Between 1966–1982 the Black Panther Party (BPP) become one of the most significant radical movements in the US. It was the largest revolutionary nationalist organisation advocating for black liberation between the 1960s and 1970s. The BPP emphasised armed resistance as a means to achieve political and social change. In 1971 the BPP moved away from its revolutionary, pro-armed resistance agenda and pursued a reformist agenda. The reformist agenda was not in accordance with all members of the BPP. A faction of the BPP, which was opposed to the reformist agenda re-committed themselves to support a military resistance called the Black Liberation Army (BLA). The BLA's membership grew as a result of the repression within the BPP (Umoja 1999: 131-132). The BLA emerged with the aim of confronting the conditions encountered by black communities; conditions such as poverty, indecent housing, massive unemployment, poor medical care and inferior education.

When Shakur joined the BPP, she had realised the importance of organised resistance as critical in achieving freedom. She valued the importance of uniting revolutionaries in order to fight against a common enemy (Shakur 2004: 216, 192). She wanted to be part of a movement that was concerned with the liberation of the black people. Although in the years to follow she left the BPP and joined the BLA.

The abovementioned contexts explain the position which both women existed in. Thus, it is of importance to note that in this thesis the events and moments discussed and interpreted concerning

the lived of experiences of both women will not be presented in the chronological order which they occurred.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, their positions and reasons for joining their respective movements leads to questions of how black people can attain a status of being. Their political commitment of striving for liberation can be reflected through the following questions: how does one self-write from the position whereby one's humanity and body are annihilated from the self? What does it mean to self-write in the position of the black body? What does it mean to experience the world through systematic structural violence? How does one shape resistance and rebellion in a world where the power of oppression is without limit? These are the questions that drive their self-writing. They understand the need of establishing other ways of existing and the need to re-install the Black Subject within humanity. In their self-writing there is a radical refusal of the Black Subject rejecting dehumanisation, hence their modes of self-writing fashion humanity that transcends the oppression experienced by the black body. They arrive at moments of coming to themselves through their self-writing. They ascribe to Steve Biko's (2004: 101) philosophy of Black Consciousness, in that they "express group pride and determination of the black to rise and attain the envisaged self".

The manner in which self-writing reveals its distinctions through Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur calls for a political debate. The politics that emerge in their lives are a result of the political landscapes in their respective countries and their affiliations to political movements. Their engagement with politics made them political fugitives in their countries because they were detained, tortured, and dehumanised by the virtue of the politics they were advocating for. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were detained, tortured, and dehumanised because of racial prejudice that propagated by oppressive systems of apartheid and segregation. They were both seen as political delinquents in their respective countries because they challenged the highest order of political command, they challenged these systems' law and order. In their political conduct, they questioned the established political climate in their countries. Both women were advocating for a particular political inventive that was based on nonracial and non-prejudice principles and it is for that reason there being was depoliticised. They engaged with politics fighting through their bodies since they were subjected to torture and imprisonment. By this virtue, they are political subjects.

Yet, on the other hand, it is important to note that both women are written outside of the discipline of politics. This means through their racialisation their lived experiences, actions of resistance and defiance are seen as threatening the status quo of the oppressive systems of rule. They are seen as disruptions to political order and for that reason politics rejects them. If they were to invest themselves in the discipline of politics—they would be creating a scandalous paradigm to their texts. Mainstream politics rejected their actions of resistance and their defiance against oppression. The notion that when one thinks of politics as a discipline the white male theorists come to mind ostracises them. The paternal figure informs politics through this very notion of the founding fathers in politics, thus inevitably it determines who is inside and outside of politics. It is for that reason that their texts alone cannot just be reducible to political text but their bodies too are political, they write through their bodies, by that meaning they write through their experiences. Henceforth, the interlocutory lines, are blurred these lines distinguish disciplinary categories by demonstrating how self-writing is revealed in the lives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The lives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur become a practice in the default of political action because they experience an absence of rights, they have no legible claims, nameable injuries and as well cannot claim any harm done to them because they are written and exist outside of the political world.

So since the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is rejected by politics and its constructs it means their writing moves to a space of misconduct, it becomes writing that is illegitimate. It is therefore a kind of writing of which at its core cannot be contended with politics as it stands vis-à-vis the oppressive state systems. The kind of self-writing they engage in enters within a space that is not precisely captured within politics, but rather a self-writing that finds solace in black thought. Kameron Carter (2019) considers black thought as a tool for thinking that opens up sacred alternate imaginaries as well as other worlds. It is within these alternate imaginaries that self-writing occupies thought. Through Carter's understanding, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur thus, enter a sacred space without having sovereignty and being, in that space they activate other modes of writing, being and existing.

The notion of individuation is suspended in this analysis of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's text. They self-write based on a communal fight against oppression. The writing which both women in immerse themselves within does not dwell into an individual struggle, rather both

women embrace that their fight against oppression does not end with them or should and when their lives end—it is something that goes on beyond their lives. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's engagement with politics emerges as a struggle that is embedded in the collective attainment of liberation. Their commitment to fighting oppression is indicated in their rejection of the anti-black world and blackness. Through their political experiences, they are subsequently and significantly positioned as agents that are part of a collective in establishing and recognising their being and that of others within and against the spectra of oppression.

Feminist theories will often be assumed or come to surface when two prolific female political figures, are known for stretching the political and social boundaries. But that should not be the assumption here. It is important to dispel a preconception of feminist frameworks as the influence and foregrounding of analysis. It is critical to clarify that feminist theories will not be utilised or referred to illuminate or strengthen the depth of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are deliberated. The position of analysis of both women cannot be reduced to feminist theories. A presumption can easily occur that because both women are formidable political figures and a study of this nature can be assumed to appeal and support feminist theories. But their engagement with self-writing cannot be limited to a feminist perspective because both women employ self-writing from the perspective of the dehumanised subject. Nonetheless, feminist perspectives(s) are a legitimate analytical framework for engaging and interpreting both women. But the concern in this study is not their womanhood, rather it is their mode of self-writing as black bodies. The manner in which Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are engaged with is not to be reduced to a feminist perspective but rather should be engaged with more as a human project concerned with attaining the self through rejecting constructs of the anti-black world.

There is a significant manner in which self-writing unfolds through existential politics. It is a kind of politics that engages in writing that is asserting existence. Meaning it is writing that precedes the actual act of writing, it is concerned with how lived experiences translate into meaningful action thus an unconventional mode of writing becomes illuminated. It is a mode of writing that is embedded in more than the literal action of writing rather it is embedded in the action, specifically political action. It is driven by political will and resistance towards oppression.

The idea of propagating and acknowledging unconventional modes of writing emerges in how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur demonstrate that they do not request acceptance or approval

towards the pioneers of oppression. They occupy themselves within a political imaginative that progresses into creation. Through fighting against the oppression they enter into a mode of self-creation because the practices of action they are involved in were not just about preserving life but rather, necessitating life. Thus, at whatever means the stakes were high, life had to persist and prevail. Meaning the actions which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela undertook indefinitely had to result in self-creation, in being that has agency and rationality. Their actions become the foreground of their self-creation and that of others.

Because of this intersection of self-creation and that of others a decolonial reading is thus required for the reason that this discussion is written based on cultural, political, and social experiences that are divided by oppressive systems of rule such as apartheid and segregation. Decolonial thinking makes efforts in deliberating on debates of dehumanisation, various conceptions of the body, histories, and claims to space and time also emerge as part of the discussion on decolonial discourse. A decolonial reading thus requires decolonial thinking—"it is thinking that de-links and opens to the possibilities hidden by modern rationality" (Mignolo 46: 2011). It is through this kind of reading that formation and realisation of decolonial practice emerge in the themes discussed below. Through a decolonial lens, the imperial imaginary and rhetoric are thus dispelled.

Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur should be analysed and understood as belonging in the realm of philosophical thinkers, by that meaning in the acts of self-writing that they undergo surpass and are implacable in the autobiographical writing. They participate in philosophical cultivation of the self through lived experiences. Their texts should be read and analysed in a polemic manner that refutes biographical and autobiographical writings. Thus, self-writing is understood as the constitutive element of African consciousness— it affirms the notion of the black subject coming to themselves. Hence as an entry point in understanding how self-writing occurs— a seminal article by Achille Mbembe (2003) foregrounds how this concept inaugurates the African subject and it modes of self-writing. Through self-writing, self-consciousness becomes a hallmark that encompasses a self of others and. Mbembe articulates African consciousness in explaining African modes of self-writing, it is through his work that the juncture of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's narratives are articulated as self-writing.

Lastly, how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur depict their philosophical cultivation is inextricably persistent with a philosophical technique that is discursive and generative. They occupy a realm

of thought in which they are thinking beings. They depict an epistemic sense of generating ways of knowing and coming to being in various modes of writing. They enter into a sealed and defended territory of the intellectual edifice. The experiences of both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur should be read and understood as moments that are grounded in facilitating a dialogue that opens philosophical and political imaginations.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

This study explores the concept of self-writing as a mode of writing about being in the world. The study aims to explain and account for the self through individual analysis using the concept of self-writing. This study is centred on two female political activists, Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and Assata Shakur. The study is based on self-writing as a mode of writing and as a form of political protest. According to Foucault (1997), self-writing is about the aesthetics of existence. Self-writing is about writing the self to freedom; it is an act of being self-intimate, it is also about exploring and searching deep within multiple selves. It is a journey to self-discovery. Moreover, self-writing is the creation of the self. Foucault describes self-writing as *hupomnemata*. By this term, it refers to writings in notebooks and journals to capture life as it happens which is a process that is not separate from the writer. Through *hupomnemata,* the writer assimilates what he or she has learned and the process becomes a creation of a new self.

The study engages with theoretical perspectives of self-writing that are relevant to unpack the various elements of self-writing. It further focuses on the debates of self-writing as a theoretical underpinning for political expression and activism. Thus, the modes self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are examined concerning intersectional structures of oppression formed by colonial perspectives and racist systems.

Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur share striking similarities as female political figures who resisted the oppressive political systems they existed in by making major political statements through their actions. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela originate from different geographical points. However, the political systems that imprisoned them in their respective countries of origin appear similar. Both South Africa and the United States progressed from slavery into racial segregation which entrenched inequality in both countries. It was through labeling and discrimination of black people as violent and innately inferior concerning Western superiority, which provided the basis of slavery, colonialism, segregation, and apartheid (De Gobineau 1853; Goldberg 2001). Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, fundamentally opposed political systems that were oppressing the black societies they respectively came from. Madikizela-Mandela and

Shakur may have been arrested for different reasons and geographically separated but what appears to unite them was their resilience towards the political systems that attempted to redefine their purpose of defying oppression. These two women survived solitary confinement under excruciating conditions such as being held in an icy prison cell, with an electric light burning day and night, cold cement floor as a bed, awfully rotten food, being deprived of sleep and adequate medical attention as well as torture (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 140; Shakur 2014: 205).

Madikizela-Mandela was detained under Section 6 of the Terrorism Act which was passed in 1967. This Act was designed by the apartheid regime to hold people in prison and interrogate them for as long as they pleased (Madikizela-Mandela 2013). Shakur was charged under various complaints but was mainly arrested for unlawfully and illegally resisting arrest as well as allegedly shooting and killing a New Jersey State trooper and fleeing the scene of the incident (Shakur 2014). Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were members of profound liberation movements in their respective countries—Madikizela-Mandela, a member of the African National Congress (ANC), and Shakur, a member of the Black Liberation Army (BLA) and the Black Panther Party (BPP). Members of the BPP were targeted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) through an orchestrated systematic surveillance known as the counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) (Shakur 2014). With regard to Madikizela-Mandela, the security police recognised the strength and ability Madikizela-Mandela had as an activist against the apartheid system, as a member of the ANC and her strong ability to lead and thus they feared her influence. That is what was at the centre of their efforts to crush her (du Preez Bezdrob 2003).

This current study examines the angle of self-writing as the formulation of writing the self into freedom. The study aims to contribute to the analysis of speech and thought that is in combat with oppressive colonial systems of power, it focuses on what it means to struggle against structures of domination from the perspective of the two activists. Thus, the intention is to focus on Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to trace their journeys to the rediscovery of the self. And, this shows how these women self-created themselves through their political experiences. Their biographical and reflective analysis explains how they shape political activity and society broadly. Therefore, this analysis interprets power, politics, and being in the context of self-writing through the political experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

1.2 Literature Overview

The literature overview is divided into two sections. The first section is a discussion on the existing knowledge and general interpretation of the concept of prison writing as a form self-writing. This section, therefore, attempts to illustrate how self-writing emerges through prison writing. The second section is a discussion on the scholarly debates on the characteristics and relevance of self-writing as a form of political protest.

1.2.1 Prison Writing as Self-writing

There are various debates regarding prison writing as self-writing. Some of these debates are reflected in the discussion that follows. Prison writing is a literary genre that is characterised by its cultural form that emerged in early modern England. According to Freeman (2009), prison writing's popularity was triggered by the increased number of prisoners who were imprisoned for political, religious, and debt reasons. Freeman acknowledges that prison writing is rooted in classical, patristic, and medieval antecedents. These influenced prison writing but social changes transformed prison writing and gave it visibility in contemporary culture. Moreover, Freeman notes that prisons were sites of cultural production.

Jacobs (1986) explains the varying degrees of prison writing. The critic mentions that prison writing presents all the aspects of the prison process namely: pre-trial detention, modes of interrogation, methods of torture, the ritual pattern of the security trial, the routines, rhythms and myriad humiliations of prison life, conditions of the prison, the hierarchy of prison officialdom and the relationship between the interrogator and detainee. Jacobs further notes that prison literature takes the reader into the darker chamber of interrogation, torture, and confession. Moreover, the experience of confession by the prison writer suggests a mode of literary distancing hence the self-definition of the prison writer. The prisoner engages in the fictionalisation of the self and the prison writer does this to fully experience and grasp the self. The experience of the prison writer becomes significant because it is understood beyond the author's confessions (Jacobs 1986). Cover (1995) explains the position of the prison writer even further when he claims that in their act of writing, they return to themselves through language and text, and by returning to themselves, they seek to identify themselves separately from the labels imposed on them.

Harlow (1992), has traced the development of prison writing and examined its effectiveness outside of prison. She notes that prison writing is political because it demonstrates the relations and mechanisms of power between the interrogator and detainee. Moreover, prison writing exists to challenge and oppose various structures that are state-controlled. Davies (1990) states that violence is at the center of prison writing and as such, views prison writing as a form of struggle. Toron (2011) acknowledges that prison writing explores the situation between the disciplinary institution and society through the individual's experiences inside the prison. She further notes that prison writing does not confine itself to one style, it is rather a hybrid form of writing that considers various subjects and different goals. Prison writing also has a mimetic function, since it aims to provide a realistic portrayal of what prison is like. Yet, at the same time prison writing reveals the links that exist between opposing structures of elements inside and outside of the prison. Rymhs and Rimstead (2011) support Toron's (2011) view which is that prison writing has a significant role in exposing state mechanisms of control and in unraveling the practices of punishment. Furthermore, the critics observe that through prison writing the place of incarceration the prison in itself becomes a space that dissolves political geographies as they are conventionally understood. This means that when imprisoned the prison writer is expected to behave in a certain manner to conform to state power and political boundaries. However, through prison writing, those political conventions are contested and but are rarely abolished.

The abovementioned scholars acknowledge that prison writing involves the relations of power between the prisoner and the disciplinary institutional settings (Freeman 2009; Jacobs 1986; Davies 1990; Toron 2011; Rymhs and Rimstead 2011). These scholars resonate with Foucault's (1991) work, who had an immense influence in this explaining and shaping the genre of prison writing. His conception of a subject who comes into being through incarceration created various ways in which prison writing texts were informed. Through Foucault (1977a) the prison writer can resist the regime by writing and thus publicising the conditions of their incarceration. His conceptualisation of discipline as a multidimensional process indicates that the prison writer finds him or herself subject to many restraints. Foucault (1991) describes how bodies are disciplined through methods such as surveillance, homogenisation, and record keeping. However, some borders such as the spirit and the mind appear to not have been subdued in the case of some prisoners which explains why some prisoners like Biko might have used to survive to a point where he was physically eliminated. Yet, other prisoners crack, to use the language of giving in to the

pressures of the prison war. Overall, the above discussion captures some important aspects of what prison writing might be at both a theoretical and practical level. Also, it is worth noting that prison writing is rooted in self-definitions, whether by external forces which can be institutional structures or internal forces being the self. It is this multifaceted nature of prison writing that makes scholars such as Rodriguez (2002) reject limiting it to political confinements.

Rodriguez rejects the epistemological and political confines of "prison writing" as a literary genre. He takes his stance from St. John, a prisoner housed in Eastern New York Correctional Facility who criticised the phrase in his award-winning 1994 essay *Behind the Mirrors Face.* According to St. John (2000), prison writing as a literary genre that is for incarcerated cultural production legitimises and reproduces conversational material of imprisonment. The prison becomes a standardised place for writing the prison becomes the location of the writer's labour. This makes the location of writing (the prison) appear equal to other spatial sites of writing. Naturally, these spatial sites of writing are not equal, since the writer that is in prison is not simply free to write. On one hand, one might argue that the very experience of prison is the condition of the possibility of prison writing. On the other hand, the drudgery of prison experience might annihilate the will to write. This is why Rodriguez (2002) states that prisoners need to negotiate the space they write in because writing is a dangerous act when incarcerated. He notes that texts that incite rebellion against legal protocol or create insurgent solidarities are often encountered with some of the punishment. Thus, it is a clear indication that imprisonment is a tool of state power, it is the mobilisation of resources, bodies, and physical force on the imprisoned. It is a political and intellectual state apparatus wielding enormous pressure on the prisoner. With this in mind, it would be counterproductive to romanticise and give extraordinary powers to prisoners and their writings. At the same time, it would amount to an intellectual crime of non-disclosure to not manifest the creative ways through which prisoners surface their subjectivities.

Rodriguez (2002) echoed the work of Schalkwyk (1994) who stated that prison writing should not be merely understood from a singular perspective of an autobiographical encounter experienced by the incarcerated from an individual perspective. Rather, he proposes that prison writing is shaped by empirical terms, which means that it is about the prisoner's identity. The prisoner becomes excluded, is rendered an "outsider" from fellow prisoners, warders, and interrogators as well as from family and friends. Schalkwyk (1994) then expands his idea, which is that prisoners

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that are engaged in prison writing further become "outsiders" because they are also excluded in their social relations and conflicts that make up their singularity. Schalkwyk's (1994) viewpoint stems from a critique of, what he refers to, as an empiricist claim made by Roberts (1985) who states that there is a homogeneity of substance, tone, and mood involved in prison writing. Roberts claims that prison writing is rooted in the physical condition in which the writing occurs. According to him, it makes no difference whether the "writer" is a murderer or political revolutionist—"a prison is a prison". This essentialising discourse suggests, that where prison writing occurs, all prison writers have a homogeneous nature in their writing. Schalkwyk (1994) modifies Roberts's (1985) view by comparing Breyten Breytenbach and Jeremy Cronin. Both men are white males who spent seven years in South African prisons from 1975 to 1983. Both men were arrested for their active opposition to apartheid. Yet, there are differences in their writings and Schalkwyk notes that the differences are based on their convictions as writers.

Gready (1993) states, that prison writing possesses an absolute power against the confines of imprisonment. He directly refers to power, and what prison writing posed against the apartheid system. He notes, that prison writing differs from the normalised prison experience. When prison writing occurs, the writers (prisoners) record the violence which they experience subjectively, thus, it is written from their truth. At the center of the narrative is the prisoner. The prisoner recreates, restores, and constructs a sense of the self and the world (Gready 1993). Foucault (1977a: 138) interpreted this means of writing as the prisoner forming an oppositional "power of writing"—prison writing becomes a means of self-empowerment.

Thus, Rodriguez (2002), Schalkwyk (1994), and Gready (1993) emphasise that prison writing is primarily concerned with the self. It is a process that is experienced at a personal level through relations with institutional structures. These scholars discuss the importance of the self, emerging through prison writing. Thus, prison writing advocates an association with the concept of self-writing, simply because both modes of writing arrive at the self-emerging. The importance of the self-emerging through prison writing reverberates self-empowerment of the prisoner—it is a means of achieving a sense of self.

One cannot mention self-writing without mentioning Foucault (1977a), who can be regarded as the founding father of the concept in Europe. Foucault argues that the creation of modern institutions increased state intervention in people's lives. He explains this intervention as

imprinting human bodies and behaviour through means of punishment and productiveness. The prison theory shifted from corporal punishment to psyche manipulation. Although psyche manipulation does not involve physical violence, Foucault (1977a) argues that spiritual control is part of a larger system of power and control. Prisons represent a symbol of power and enforce relations and mechanisms of power towards prisoners (writers). As already mentioned above, the prisoner (writer) then engages in prison writing.

Foucault (1997) interprets self-writing as meditating through writing. By this he means bringing light to one's thoughts, it needs to be done constantly because it is a continuous exercise. Foucault further notes that there is no professional skill that can be acquired without exercise, which he considers as training of the self by oneself. He notes that there are various forms of training which include "abstinences, memorisations, self-examinations, meditations, silence, and listening to others" (Foucault 1997: 208). In essence, Foucault describes self-writing as self-training through writing. Foucault does not proclaim self-writing as a gendered experience, he explains it as a "self-experience" meaning it is the "self" that writes whether male or female.

Mbembe (2001) provides a different interpretation and context from that of Foucault (1997). Mbembe (2001) interprets a different mode of self-writing, by placing it in the position of the African subject. He explains that African modes of self-writing constitute the emergence of African subjectivities. According to Mbembe (2002), African subjectivity is a mode of writing from the perspective of the African subject. It is writing that engages the subject from the point of view of coloniality of knowledge. Mbembe further explains that self-writing is not possible without the mastery of time. The critic turns to Deleuze (2013), who emphasises, that time is a condition of subjectivity. Hence, the self cannot be shaped without having mastery of time. Both European and African conceptions of time may be present in the consciousness of the prison writer.

But, Jewsiewicki (2002) proposes that the self should be organised or shaped according to the category of space rather than of time. Identity should be conceived as transactional, meaning that is should be conceived in terms of its relational and transverse enactments in the world. However, Foucault (1997) considers self-writing as guided by self-experience, Mbembe (2002) interprets self-writing as guided by (African) subjectivity. Both scholars theorised the concept of self-writing to its optimum level. Most of the scholars cited in the above discussion refer to the argument Foucault makes. It is clear, Mbembe's conception of self-writing stretches further than that of

Foucault. It proposes the unthinkable, although is it not truly unthinkable because the capacity to propose the unthinkable suggests that it is thinkable after all. Drawing from the above discussion both scholars interpret self-writing in a parallel approach. Foucault interprets self-experience as a critical element in molding the subject. Mbembe too, is concerned with self-experiences, but his focus considers the African subject emerging in a different transgression towards self-writing that is guided by revealing how the African subject shapes itself in the backdrop of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid. But even so, Mbembe (2001) pronounces that African subjectivity cannot constitute a collective destiny forged by a history of oppression—thus, suggesting that different histories constitute different articulations of the African subject. Hence, it is worth noting that both scholars place self-writing as guided by the specific *self*-experience. By this interpretation, prison writing occurs in the prison experience and self-writing occurs through self-experience. Fundamentally, prison writing is concerned with the self, although in a different context it still captures the experience of writing the self through embodying the concept of self-writing.

1.2.2 *Political Protest as an Instrument of Self-writing*

This section seeks to expand self-writing not only a form of self-definition and expression but as influencing political protest. In doing so, it is critical to understand the fundamental definition of political protest to be able to engage with how it proliferates self-writing. Various theories explain political protest and make different predictions about the causality of protest. According to Gurr (1969: 238), the relative deprivation theory notes that "imposed sanctions are deprivations, the threat of sanctions is equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, the innate emotional response to both is anger". The general prediction of this theory is that repression of political action increases the possibility of political protest. According to Olson (1965), Hardin (2015), and Oliver (1980), the theory of collective action states that domination is a negative option for those dominating. This, is because an increase in punishment results in deterrent behaviour, if those who are punished do not change their behaviour. These theories are an indication that repression leads to protests.

Opp and Roehl (1990) expand on the type of incentives protest can result in social incentives (refer to expectations from people such as education, health, and security), moral incentives (refer to protest norms and norms of violence) and public good incentives (refer to political order and

perceived influence by legal and illegal political action). The focus here is on moral incentives, which refer to protest norms and norms of violence. These are the moral obligations one has to protest. Protest norms are "the extent to which persons think they can participate in protest" and norms of violence are those that "denote the extent to which the persons consider themselves violent" (Opp and Roehl 1990: 524). Opp and Roehl further note that acting following moral obligation, which is linked with a good conscience as compared to inaction is a sign of a bad conscience. They explain that these moral obligations emerge when there is dissatisfaction with a society's political institutions which, in turn, leads to more protest if people believe it will bring change to their existing conditions through protest.

White (1989) supports the view that political institutions that are oppressive increase the perceived need to use violence to achieve political objectives. This is because oppression deters and radicalises those participating in political protest. Thus, Opp and Roehl (1990) suggest that it is critical to understand how oppression deters from the fundamental reason for political protest and instead it focuses on the violent and illegitimate effect of political protest.

Wilson (1961) considers protest activity as a problem of bargaining in which marginalised groups lack political resources to exchange. He refers to this as "the problem of the powerless" (Wilson 1961: 291). Although Wilson's insight is valid, Lipsky (1968) notes his approach as limited to applicability because it defines protest in terms of mass action or response and as a form of utilising negative inducements. Wilson (1961: 291) defines negative inducements as "inducements which are not preferred but are preferred over alternative possibilities". By this Wilson means it is protest action, which occurs through the use of threats and unlawful behaviour, although it does not mean it is behaviour which is precisely desired by those engaging in protest. Rather, it expresses the desperate need for change through protest action. Therefore, the political protest should be understood as the only option or mode for the powerless to express their objection to one or more policies or conditions, characterised by showmanship or display of unconventional nature and undertaken to obtain rewards from political or economic systems while working within the systems.

Overall, the above-mentioned scholars acknowledge that political protest is a conscientious action against oppressive political or state institutions. This study aims to postulate self-writing as a tool of political protest. This is so because all the elements that capture self-writing, reflect political

protest as a tool in shaping the self. Although Self-writing as a tool for attaining the self is not about being non-political or de-politicised. Rather, it is about achieving the conscious self, but that consciousness comes about through a political landscape. The reason for such a landscape is because the black body and race are politicised thus, the self naturally emerges as a result of its political conditions.

The literature reviewed above, indicates the association and intrinsic nature self-writing has with prison writing. Arguably, in the literature reviewed, prison writing appears to have a recognisable difference in comparison to self-writing. Since prison writing occurs in the confinements of prison, this study aims at examining the kind of writing that occurs outside of conventional confinements such as prison—particularly self-writing. Hence, the study unpacks how self-writing emerges in various modes of writing. It is for that reason that this study attempts to conceptually unriddle the underlying modes of self-writing that are found in experiences shaping the self. This study attempts to reveal how modes of self-writing can be recognised as shaping the self.

1.3 Problem Statement and Research Questions

The study examines the political thought of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur using the concept of self-writing as engaged by Foucault (1997) and Mbembe (2001). In so doing the study examines how various moments of political protest emerge as self-writing and it heightens political engagement that proposes a multifaceted understanding of the notion of writing in its conventional nature as understood in autobiographical writing. The study aims at using self-writing as a mode writing, as well as a tool in explaining the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. This study engages Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur based on their interactions with the oppressive political systems they existed within. Furthermore, it aims to interpret how these personal accounts became major political statements of resistance against the oppressive political systems they existed in. Thus, it is the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur that shapes their political thought.

Self-writing as a mode of writing is expanded upon and it is not only understood and interpreted as a literary genre that captures the prison process through the prison writer. In this study, it goes beyond its cultural form as a literary genre as it attempts to interpret the concept of self-writing as a political protest that is embodied through the narrative of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

The study is centered on Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's lived experiences of being racialised in an anti-black world. To provide a broader and deeper understanding of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's self-writing, the study examines how these women are narrating their lived experiences. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's lived experiences are exemplified in their prison writing, which in fact, describes self-writing as a form of political critique. The importance of examining the concept of self-writing in this respect is that it speaks to an existential commentary. It is self-writing in the context of prison.

The significance of the study is that at the conceptual level, it foregrounds the importance of decolonisation as a political intervention to use against conventional Eurocentric methodologies. It contributes to the ongoing debates on decolonising the analysis of political narratives at a national level as well as at an individual level. It specifically focuses on how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur can position their political experiences as a way of self-writing in the context they existed in. It also breaks down the notion and practice of self-writing into its various manifestations in ways that should help those wishing to study how other revolutionaries have acted against oppressive systems.

The purpose of the study is to analyse how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as key black female political activists use self-writing to display political persona that influences the political spheres of their respective countries. Therefore, through the process of their self-writing, this study illustrates how self-writing has shaped the discussions and debates of their political struggles against intersectional structures of oppression. Their self-writing demonstrates disapproval of the racial political systems in which they existed and reveals how their political protest emerges through self-writing. It appears no study has focused on Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Furthermore, prison writing has the potential to overlook the external conditions outside of the prison context that can encourage writing as a form of protest. Moreover, it makes the writing process as an individual journey. Hence, this study attempts to reveal how the act self-writing can manifest on individual subjectivities and simultaneously indicate subjugation of the marginalised.

This leads to the key research question: How did the lived experiences of torture, authorisation and liberation shape the discourse of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's self-writing? The secondary research questions are as follows: How does the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur critique the intersectional structures of the political, societal, economic, and racial

oppression they both existed within? How does self-writing become a form of political protest through a narrative?

1.4 A Note on Method

This study uses a combination of narrative and thematic analysis as a method within qualitative research design. The following texts of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are referred to as key primary sources for biographical evidence, *Parts of My Soul Went With Him, Winnie Mandela: A Life, 491 Days: Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, The Resurrection of Winnie Mandela, Assata: The FBI's most wanted woman* and *Open Letter From Assata Shakur.* The use of biographical evidence as key primary sources gives a first-person narrative account of the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Biographical facts are used to interpret the concept of self-writing through the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The study is organised thematically focusing on three themes: torture, authorisation, and liberation. Therefore, the literature is engaged thematically to have a structured approach and narrative analysis provides an interpretation of the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

Narrative analysis is concerned with how stories and lived experiences of individuals are interpreted—it is an analytic frame that considers self-narrations both as to constructions and claims of identity. The narrative analysis examines how people construct self-accounts (Burck 2005). Narratives are understood contextually; they are influenced by the circumstances under which they are obtained, with consideration of the intended audience and the motives the narrator may have had when structuring the narrative (Josselson 2011). Mishler (2004) reiterates that narrative analysis emphasises content and its meanings, narrative telling is not imitative, it is not an exact representation of what happened, but a particular construction of events created in a particular setting, for a particular audience, for particular purposes, to create a certain point of view. But, Hyvärinen (2008) notes, that it is critical to be mindful that although sincere and truthful, the narrator always provides comments based on deviations from the scripted courses of events. Nonetheless, Mishler (2004) captures the core purpose of using narrative analysis in this study as a research method. This research method allows analysis from the narrator as well as the audiences' perspective on contextually understanding the content and its meaning. Therefore, it is from that perspective of analysis the lives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are being examined. The narrative analysis provides the ordinary, marginalised, and muted to respond, reintegrate, and

disintegrate of the master narratives. This is done through interpretation as Riessman (2: 2005) notes, that "narratives do not speak for themselves or have unanalysed merit they require interpretation when used as data in social research". Thus, narrative analysis is useful in social research such as political science as it extracts the "truths" of narrative accounts. Furthermore, Riessman (2005) notes, that these narrative accounts are not faithful representations of a past world, but they forge shifting connections among the past, present, and future. Wright Mills (1970[1959]) attests that narrative analysis can forge connections between personal biography and social structure—this connection is understood as the personal and the political. It is for this reason that narrative analysis is best suited for this study because it places both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur in a form that allows their narratives to be extracted and interpreted.

Narrative analysis is used to reflect the significance of the events and moments discussed about Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Oliver (1998: 244) notes that "narrative analysis uses stories to describe human experience and action. Because people give meaning to their lives through the stories they tell". Narrative analysis captures how people interpret the meanings of life experiences (Oliver 1998: 244). By applying Oliver's understanding of narrative analysis—the biographical texts of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are read to find and interpret meaning in their actions.

Using narrative analysis in this study requires critical engagement with the content when reading. Through careful reading the life experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are interpreted as more than just lived experiences, rather as moments that are significant in explaining how self-writing can emerge. This is done through a style of reading that searches for meaning and symbols in the text and it simultaneously necessitates a continuous awareness of how their texts have substantial data that is related to the three themes of torture, authorisation, and liberation. Narrative analysis is then contextualised through thematic analysis.

Thematic analysis is another research method this study uses. Thematic analysis places emphasises on the content of a text "what" is said, more than "how" it was said. It is a method for identifying and analysing patterns of the themes (Riessman 2005). According to Braun and Clarke (2014: 6626), "thematic analyses is a method for identifying and interpreting patterns of meaning across qualitative data". Thematic analysis is often used to identify key themes and patterns of meaning, it can also be used to interrogate the hidden meanings, assumptions, and implications. It provides an interpretive and conceptual analysis of data (Braun and Clarke 2006). It is an accessible and

flexible method because it is not tied to a particular theoretical or epistemological framework. It indicates which themes are important in the description of the phenomenon under study (Dayl et al, 1997). Thematic analysis is significant because it organises the content based on context. The three themes selected for this study are crucial because they connect Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Moreover, three themes were selected because they were the most prominent in connecting the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The order in which the themes are orgainsed is critical because it explains how self-writing unfolds in the lives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The data (experiences) of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur was sorted into themes based on an inductive approach. This is because in this study the analysis of the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are founded on philosophical interpretation, hence this means the available data can be reinterpreted in different ways. Since inductive approach consists of the following three steps; the first is observation: to condense the information that is varied, the second is establish the pattern and link in the data, and the last is develop a theory or model of the underlying experiences that are evident in data (Thomas 2006: 238). This approach was suitable to examine the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur because it required observation through reading the material, then followed by observing a pattern and link of their experiences and lastly developing a theory. Although, in this study a theory was not completely developed rather, the concept of self-writing is reinterpreted as a possible basis of a theory. Through the inductive approach three themes are discussed in this study. The first theme, which is torture, sets the context of which both women had to resist and defy to self-write. The second theme, which is authorisation, places both women in the context of having agency. Under this theme, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur illustrate their ability to attain and maintain the self. In the last theme which is liberation, both women illustrate the importance of how self-writing manifests as coming to know the self through various modes of articulating liberation and freedom.

The ultimate result of thematic analysis is to highlight the most significant patterns of meanings in the writing. The patterns revealed can be cognitive and symbolic. Thus, the themes selected in this study attempt to highlight the significant patterns of how self-writing is examined in this study. Under the aforementioned themes, significant moments will be highlighted, interpreted, and analysed to portray symbolism and meaning of self-writing. Through thematic analysis, semantic and philosophical codes emerge demonstrating how modes of writing are present in the lives and words of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Furthermore, because this study reflects on

philosophical and political interpretations the use of thematic analysis is useful in expressing meanings embedded in and beyond the surface in the narratives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

This study uses two research methods because they are in compliance with one another and are suitable for this study. Both of the research methods used are conversational, narrative analysis is significant for this study because it provides a first-person account, it indicates moments of agency within the subject and these moments of agency are organised based on thematic analysis of which overall the content is analysed based on context. By using narrative and thematic analysis in this study facilitates engagement with the primary texts of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur in a manner that highlights specific encounters and moments in their narratives.

The study is based on the epistemic orientation called self-writing, meaning that it aims at validating and explaining how lived experiences of the two figures at the centre of the study are accounted for as self-writing based on their actions and own reflections. It should be noted that this study marks ways of knowing, doing, and thinking alternatively about Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The epistemic location of this study is therefore about the two figures' practices of everyday life and how these practices become and express modes of self-writing in ways that self-writing then becomes an ordinary affair.

The following contentions need to be clarified, this study is concerned with understanding how self-writing emerges in different modes of writing and the fact that writing can be interpreted as more than just a textual experience. This study deals with issues of identity, agency, and meaning that is conveyed through the process of self-writing. The quest for existing and attaining the self is critical in self-writing, thus, making it a process that is highly involved in the quest of existence. According to More (2005), black existential phenomenology is concerned with the lived experience of being-in-the-world—this means it deals with immediacy, environment, and embodiment. In More's thinking, black existential phenomenology becomes a useful perspective to examine the concept of self-writing in this study. This is because black, existential phenomenology as More explains, is established through the lived experience of the body existing in the world. Experiencing the world through the body is the perspective that places forward a critical position on the method of approach in this study.

1.5 Limitations of the Study

The limitations of the study include the fact that some of the documented primary sources were difficult to find since both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were detained under oppressive political systems. Since evidence relied upon was produced while these two figures were incarceration or exile, portions of evidence may have been deliberately distorted or removed as was common practice in both oppressive systems. A detailed account of their detention is limited largely to their biographical evidence. This leads to the second limitation, the study primarily focuses on the following key biographical texts: *Parts of My Soul Went With Him, Winnie Mandela: A Life, 491 Days: Winnie Madikizela-Mandela, The Resurrection of Winnie Mandela, Assata: The FBI's most wanted woman* and *Open Letter From Assata Shakur* to provide evidence for explaining the ways in which the two figures used self-writing as a form of political protest. The third limitation is that the study focuses only on three themes namely; torture, authorisation, and liberation—these themes are discussed concerning self-writing and Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's experiences. It is also worth noting that other themes can be studied such as justice, security, and policing institutions, the struggle of social classes, and institutional racism. Nonetheless, the aforementioned three themes provided this study with the best conceptual and narrational tools to explaining the modes of self-writing as a political agency that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engaged in. This goes beyond comparison to accounting for a connection and a conversation between both women as is evident in the analysis presented by this study. More themes would have made this study too large in scope to allow for in-depth analysis. Both women had critical roles in their respective political movements, they suffered a detrimental fracture in their roles as mothers, wives, and as female combatants in their respective political movements as well as within their family structures and their political convictions were almost destabilised by oppressive systems of rule. But this study does not focus on the maternal, gendered, and female political dimension of both women—it is limited to the political activism of both women. The study is designated and committed to a radical task that examines both women in three themes to locate self-writing in its modes of existence.

1.6 Chapter Outline

Chapter one provides an outline of what the study entails. It identifies the research theme of the study by discussing the background of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur began their political

aspirations. The literature overview explains the importance of self-writing about the context of prison, political activity, and political resistance. The problem statement problematises how political protest and the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur can account for self-writing. Then the methodology and limitations of the study are outlined.

Chapter two discusses self-writing as a theory. In this chapter, the distinction between autobiographical writing and self-writing is made. The difference between autobiographical writing and self-writing is identified as the basis for presenting self-writing as a form of political protest but more specifically, as the theoretical foundation of this study. In this way, a definitive difference between autobiographical writing and self-writing sets the point of departure in understanding how the concept of self-writing can be theoretically interpreted.

Chapter three discusses the concept of the hold concerning the self, writing, and prison. It focuses on interpreting the position in which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were self-writing through political experiences. The chapter discusses how the concept of the hold is the position of the black body. This chapter highlights how the concept of self-writing is depicted through the figurative and literal meaning of the hold. Ultimately, the context is set on the condition of the black body.

Chapter four discusses torture and self-writing. It focuses on the torture Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced in and out of prison. It also discusses how the torture that both women experience has formed a critical part of their self-writing. This chapter examines the first theme of the study, it provides foundation of where and how the black body exists within the oppressive state systems of apartheid and segregation. In this chapter, various methods of torture such as solitary confinement and the power dynamics in prison are discussed in juncture with the thought of how black bodies can exist through self-writing.

Chapter five discusses the authorisation of self-writing. The focus of this chapter is on how the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is reflected through authorisation. This chapter dissects how the various elements of authorisation have a signified part in the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. It provides an interpretation of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur through self-writing position themselves against the oppressive authoritative figures and institutions that inflict authority upon both of them. But, as a form of embodying their self-authority, both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela can resist the oppressive state authorities. It is through this resistance they can incite self-determination.

Chapter six discusses liberation and self-writing. In this chapter, the concept of liberation is analysed about the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. This chapter dissects how liberation is perceived by "the rebel" and the types of connotations that are associated with the concept of liberation and how self-writing is illustrated through various connotations of freedom and liberation. Thus, the modes of freedom and liberation are expressed through the experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela.

Chapter seven is the conclusion, it describes the contribution which the study has made about the concept of self-writing and how it is embodied through torture, authorisation, and liberation in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. It also discusses further research to be done for forthcoming research purposes.

CHAPTER 2

Theorising Self-writing

2.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to explain the concept of self-writing beyond its general interpretation, to understand the nuances that may assist us analyse such complex radical political figures as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. The ultimate aim is to revisit self-writing as a concept to establish theorems which are supported by the critique of self-writing as more than just writing the self to freedom. It also aims at stretching self-writing into a theory. It problematises theoretical trends that limit the notion of self-writing to autobiographical means. The focal point, therefore, is to consider self-writing as the writing of the lived experience of being black, racialised, and existing in politically oppressive systems. It is through probing this concept of self-writing that cultivates an understanding of its meaning. In basic terms self-writing is a subjugated writing, meaning it is the writing of the self—asserting itself in the world. However, this chapter aims to elaborate the concept of self-writing beyond basic terms to reveal its utility as an analytical framework for interpreting the political agency of two complex radical figures at the centre of this study. It critiques the concept of autobiographical writing to dispel the notion that autobiographical writing is equivalent to self-writing.

The chapter also examines Foucault's (1977a) and Mbembe's (2001) interpretation of the concept of self-writing. Both Foucault and Mbembe locate self-writing in different yet similar dispositions. This chapter is based on explaining their interpretation of self-writing, to establish the fundamentals of how we can theorise about self-writing that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engaged in. Moreover, in understanding how self-writing is theorised assists in distinguishing a framework of how to interpret the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

This chapter is significant because it provides a detailed understanding of the term self-writing and how as a concept it is capable of being operative independently. The nature of its operative function derives from the criticism of the autobiography. At the centre of this study are two black radical political figures namely: Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Thus, it would be expected to refer to feminist theories and even more so black feminist theories. This expectation is because the two are political figures who are both black and female thus "naturally" black feminist theories are

regarded as the "relevant" the theoretical basis of this study. However, this study is proposing a different approach, one that provides a detailed and theorised conception of self-writing to account for the complex lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Thus, this chapter provides the theoretical basis from which to critically explain the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as self-writing is theorised in this chapter.

2.2 The Critique of the Autobiography

Autobiographical writing as a literary genre has various dimensions to it which have shaped the genre of writing into a dynamic category of writing. Autobiographical writing can be seen as equal to self-writing in the sense that they both focus on the lived experience of the writer or autobiographer, although the latter does not simply evoke a form of writing the self in reductionist terms as the former. An account of the components of autobiographical writing is critical for this discussion to distinguish the fundamentals of autobiographical writing. The autobiographical concept emerges as the critique of self-writing in its current widely acknowledged definition. Thus, the critique provided of the autobiography assists in devising a redefined understanding of how self-writing can be used as a theory. Moreover, it provides an account of how autobiographical writing is distinct from self-writing.

According to Smith and Watson (2010: 3), an autobiography is a "term for a particular practice of life narrative that emerged in the Enlightenment and which has become canonical in the West". Autobiographical writing involves a personal memory, the autobiographical writer relies on memory as the primary source of the narrative and further relies on the lived experiences in a particular time and place. The autobiographical writer is always the center of his or her narrative. Smith and Watson (2010: 14) define an autobiography as "historically situated, the highly subjective practice of self-presentation".

Lejeune (1989) refers to what he calls the "autobiographical pact", which is a fundamental set of requirements that all autobiography must-have. He defines an autobiographical pact as a "retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning his personality" (Lejeune 1989: 4). But, he admits, that this definition creates a fusion of criteria including language, subject matter, and situation of the author. He considers these as defining properties of autobiographical writing.

Elbaz (1983), has two prevalent definitions of the autobiography—the typological and dynamic. The typological definition mentions that autobiography creates a rupture in the historical process, separating itself from the past. It collapses the past into the present, it is a temporal sequence that is retrospective. The autobiographer tells a story of the past within the past, in a linear development of one's existence. Elbaz (1983: 188) further explains that the author alone is translating his/her "own history" into the "history of his/her personality". Moreover, the details of the "history of his/her personality" are essentially separate from other lives—it is an independent existence apart from a communal setting. Such a definition prioritises and individualises the autobiographer. The autobiographer is thus a separate entity from those he writes for—he writes for an audience. An autobiography then becomes an individual process concerned with the self alone.

According to Pinar (1985: 217), an autobiography focuses on "self-formation, deformation, learning and unlearning". Through these formations, learning and unlearning autobiographies can shape landscapes and provide new formations. Lasch (1984), mentions, that autobiographies have a nature of minimalising the self into political passivity, meaning they focus on a mystical-read imagined self—a self that has receded from the world. Autobiographies in their textual form thus act a loss of relation to the public since the extension of private to public life implies mediation. The autobiographical writer extends their private life to the public. As such, the actual autobiographical text is the intermediary. It is, in fact, the "secondariness of writing" that makes autobiographical writing a way of expanding and occupying a space of mediation.

As part of understanding the textual form of autobiographies, Bruner (1995) writes about the autobiographical process as principally concerned with formulating an autobiography rather than engaging in a broader struggle per se. He explains that an autobiography has authorial intentions embodied in its conventional style and there are more or less uncontested ways of shaping autobiographies. The commonly attested include: "the selfless seeker after the public interest, the sacrificing family man, the *Bildungsroman* with its assurance of learning from experience, the ironic and detached observer of the absurdities of the contemporary human condition (in any age), the guardian mother shielding the young, the seeker after spontaneous self-expression, the forgiving victim of society's outrages, the apologia of the misunderstood public man and so on" (Bruner 1995: 163). Each conventional style of autobiographical writing includes a sense of human agency, a narrated account of how the protagonist managed to transcend from there and then from

here to now. It should be noted though, that the writing skills of the autobiographer shape how the autobiography is narrated. That is why the ability to shape life as a narrative is the ability of an autobiographer.

Concerning the textual interpretation of an autobiography, it is essential to reflect on how it can be interpreted by its readers. Contemporary feminists view autobiographical writing as male-defined because they marginalise women in society. Smith (1987) and Weintraub (1978) assert that the marginalising of women in autobiographical writing is an unconscious and generic "non-intentionality" of their predecessors. Predecessors of the marginalisation of women in autobiographical writing include Gusdorf (1980), who claims that autobiography as a genre of writing does not include the works of women, ethnic minorities, non-Christians and heterosexuals, those who do not live in northern America and western Europe. He attests that manhood is the driving force of autobiographies. Gusdorf acknowledges, that all the above mentioned groups of people do write, their writings are marginalised, and therefore do not qualify to be labelled as "autobiographies". But, of course, his argument can be contended, since this study does account for narratives written by women.

It should be noted, that in this study and particularly in this chapter in efforts to theorising self-writing the issue of the marginalisation of writings from certain groups such as those that Gusdorf (1980), Smith (1987) and Weintraub (1978) mention will not be part of the focus of the critique of autobiographical writing. Specifically because, the idea of a female autobiographical writer, creates a gendered category of writing thus making writing a gender-specific activity and simultaneously perpetuating the ideas of Gusdorf (1980), Smith (1987), and Weintraub (1978). It is thus key to be mindful that the critique of autobiographical writing is an attempt to qualify self-writing as a theory of writing that goes beyond the commonly acknowledged textual definition. Thus, in theorising self-writing, the purpose is to expose the unconventional modes of writing that can emerge.

Benstock (1991) opposes Gusdorf's (1980) idea that an autobiography has a hegemonic generic term of which he defines as "self-sameness". Essentially, Gusdorf states that an autobiography is based on a particular set of theory and this theory is synonymous throughout all autobiographies, he acknowledges that even the marginalised groups he discussed above adhere to that theory— they too have the ability to write. He claims that autobiographical writing rests on "theoretical

margins", which he explains as theory that is based on "systematic statement of principles or rules to be followed" (Benstock 1991: 7). But, Benstock (1991) rejects the notion of theoretical margins because they create a sense of essentialism and have a nature of being concrete and static. She considers terms such as "woman" and "self" to be subject to essentialism. Such theoretical margins create a theoretical trap which has now become the bedrock of the criticism of autobiographical writing. It has created a gesture that theory is more important than practice, suggesting that theory and practice are distinct, each has defined interests and borders. When theory and practice come together—theory always takes the preference. Within autobiographical writing, its theoretical underpinning can only be taken seriously when it is theoretical.

Benstock further suggests that theory and practice are not separate from each other and are neither opposed to each other. She emphasises an interrelation between theory and practice noting that autobiographical writing mediates the space between "self" and life". One of the many definitions of an autobiography is that it is an effort to recapture the self. According to Hegel (1998), it is the claim to know the self through consciousness. This description assumes that there is such a thing as the "self" and it is "knowable". This suggests that the act of the autobiography leads one to come-to-know-the-self. The autobiography is "the mirror in which the individual reflects his own image" (Gusdorf 1980: 33). Gusdorf's definition overlooks the most interesting aspect of autobiographical writing which is that "self" and "self-image" might not correspond. Since there is a possibility that over time, how the world perceives one (self-image) and how one perceives themselves (self) changes. He further claims that the true test of an autobiography is not whether it expresses a truth or not, rather, its significance lies in its aesthetic criteria based on the informed definitions of the self and self-expression.

Eakin (2005) investigates the autobiography and the ideas of Damasio (1999), which claim that the self and narrative are deeply rooted in our lives in and as bodies. He explores this idea through understanding self-interpretation in the autobiography. Eakin (2005) notes that the autobiographical writer embodies a doubleness in the sense that there is the first-person perspective in the use of "I" and the narrator's perspective who tells the stories from an "I" account. Essentially, this explains that in an autobiography selfhood cannot be separated, the "I" telling the story and the "I" narrating the story is located in the same level of consciousness. There is no disjunction between the reality (first-person perspective) and the testimony of the experience (narrator's

perspective). Eakin considers the autobiography as a direct description of something out there-the brain-with something in here an experience. It is our individual experience occurring to us as consciousness.

There is a nature of selfhood in the autobiography—selfhood that engages with the self on a level of consciousness. This selfhood is distributed between the "I's"—the "I" of the first-person perspective and the "I" of the narrator. This conscious self differs from the self of self-writing. It has a nature of self-awareness. Bruss (1976) emphasises and reiterates this notion that the autobiographer takes up two roles: he/she is the source of the subject matter and the source for the structure to be found in his/her text. The author claims the responsibility for creating and arranging the text and at the same time is exemplified in the organisation of the text where they share their identity. There are two dependent processes evoked by the autobiographer when writing—it is a self-awareness of the present "I" and a self-awareness of the past "I".

The definitions of autobiography stress the importance of self-disclosure, it places the self as an authority to "his" own being, that has a dual position of the present I and past I—it is a "recapitulation and recall" (Besntock 1991; Olney 1980). The narrative of the autobiography forces the autobiographer to repeat the lived experiences textually and present themselves as the "I" in the present and to recall, use their memory and narrate as the "I" of the past. Autobiographical writing entails an intentional split, the "I" becoming "he/she"—the autobiographer's private life becoming public through the act of writing. It is a separation between the person and persona, an "I" writing the narrative through which the veto of the imagination is the "he/she". This creates a tension between "I" and "he/she" (Olney 1980).

Renza (1977: 7), explains the tension between "I" and "he/she", which result in the complexity of classifying the autobiography because it is only the autobiographer that knows facts about themselves—hence, it is a textual account of the self. Thus, outside of the self cannot prove or disprove. This creates the possibility of the autobiography as neither fiction nor non-fiction. Rather, it should be viewed as a unique self-defining mode of self-referential expression, allows self-personification. Renza's definition echoes self-awareness as an essential factor when writing an autobiography. The definition of an autobiography stresses the importance of the self. Starobinski (1980) supports this notion of autobiographies as works of self-interpretation, they focus on representative events in the autobiographer's life and confer some kind of exemplary

order. Autobiographies are based on carefully chosen stories creating a comprehensive way of seeing and conceiving the world.

In textual terms, autobiographical writing deals with self-presentation. The autobiographical writer is concerned with disclosure and confession. Self-writing is asserted here as not being about mediation, but about, political protest and the political body acting against oppressive political systems. Thus, the writings of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur cannot be reduced to autobiographical writings because their writings are political protest. The autobiography relies on autobiographical memory, thus it is concerned with selfhood whereas self-writing, as it is understood in this study, is concerned with the "self of others". As mentioned above, some scholars argue that the autobiography has evolved into a sub-genre of the feminist autobiography. At the core of both the autobiography and the feminist autobiography is the "self". Ultimately, both locate a self that is not communal, by constantly relying on accounting for the self on an individual basis instead of self that includes, represents and is for others.

Nonetheless, with the reference to the abovementioned, some scholars have endeavored to advance autobiographical theory into developing feminist autobiographical theory as a subsequent genre of the autobiography. Mason (1980) has argued that women write autobiographies differently from men. Female autobiographical writing is less-ego focused; it locates the self within a network of others and its ability to do this derives from women's experiences within patriarchal societies. This view has become the foundation of scholars such as Benstock (1991), Marcus (1987), and Friedman (1988) that expand on the research of Mason (1980) that celebrates and explores the distinctive form of women's autobiographical writing.

Supporting the ideas of Mason is Heilbrun (1985) who argues that female autobiographies are radically different from men's and that female autobiographies have unmistakably found their true form. Heilbrun notes that there were absences in the early works of female autobiographies, they did not include the representation of love between women, anger, ambition, and authority. The defining moment for Heilbrun (1973) is the publication of May Sarton's *Journal of a Solitude.* It is about women's hidden stories of pain, personal struggle, anger, and despair. She considers this moment as the full awakening of feminist consciousness. Heilbrun further describes this moment as self-realisation for women that reveals a new and revolutionary form of writing.

Stanley (1990) argues that Mason's (1980) argument seems idealised, because some women's autobiographies are as highly ego-centered and preoccupied as any man's. Stanley acknowledges that there are biographies written by "confessed feminists", however, such texts are feminist authored or about a feminist subject. She questions whether it is sufficient to define it as feminist autobiographies. Stanley refers to the form or structure of what is considered as feminist autobiography, with specific reference not on who the writer/autobiographer maybe but on whether the form or structure has a significant difference if written by a male or a female. Essentially, she reflects on whether there is an actual significant difference between "feminist autobiographies" and "autobiographies". She proposes that active reading that engages with writings is necessary. Although she does not mention what she considers as active reading, she further explains it is critical to identify which modes of writing form feminist autobiographies. Additionally, she notes that a distinct feminist autobiography is in the process of construction and it is characterised by "a self-conscious and increasingly self-confident traversing of the conventional boundaries between different genres of writing" (Stanley 1990: 65).

Hoffman and Culley (1985) provide a general rubric that describes how an autobiography by a woman can be categorised. They establish a category under the heading "women's literature of the self". They both stress the importance of reading texts by women because writing is the use of language to give shape and meaning to experiences. Each text recreates a self and tells a story. Hoffman and Culley highlight that the construction of the self is an important part of the personal narrative project. Additionally, this narrative project establishes a relationship between the narrator and the reader. This type of description of a feminist autobiography still resonates with the notion of the autobiography as a project of self-formation and continues to view the self (the narrator) as separate from the reader and the text but only considered with the self.

Marcus (1987) notes that the discussions on autobiographical writings deploying a "feminist" account and claiming that there is a new and revolutionary form emerging are not adequate. In a way, she calls for further probing into this matter. Also, she argues that autobiographical writings have the nature of employing the roles of "mentor and model" to the writers. It projects the idea of an exemplary life—the autobiographical writer becomes a representation of the text. Marcus (1987: 104) notes that "the model (of the) text is thus returned upon the model (of a) life". She concludes that autobiographical writings do not necessarily advocate a new feminist awakening

within autobiographical writing. However, these feminist awakenings within texts are written from a feminist perspective and need to be critically understood to place their contribution to autobiographical writing (Marcus 1987).

Mason (1980), Heilbrun (1985), and Stanley (1990) are arguing that feminist autobiographical writing emerged in the 19th century and became a form of writing. It is different from the male-centred form of the autobiography. Although Stanley mentions that female autobiographical writing needs to articulate itself into a better-structured genre of writing, it can stand alone as a genre of writing. These scholars claim that this form of writing emerges from female writers who have reached a point of self-realisation and self-awareness. It is a moment of being able to understand the "self" enough to articulate the "self" textually. The feminist autobiographical self is different from the male autobiographer because it is self-affirmed, ambitious, has authority, it has reached self-realisation and achievement and has the connotation of "women who have made it". Such terms model the basics of feminism in autobiography, but are debated and critiqued in this context and study. Of critical importance for this study is the fact that feminist autobiography goes beyond self-reflection based on self-awareness to self-realisation, which creates a possibility for an autobiography to be a tool for the political agency in cases where the person is imbricated with the political. This is a useful possibility, but which is not sufficient for our attempt to understand the different modes by which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela engage in openly revolutionary, rebellious, insurrectional political practice in the manner in which they tell their life stories.

About this study, a feminist autobiography as an analytical framework is not adequately designed to provide for a holistic analysis of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's use of writing, voice, and recollection to engage in revolutionary action. While the texts used in this study are centred on the "self"; they are not centred on an isolated self. The self of self-writing is one that includes others, that stretches to a constituency and that is designed to epitomise collectives engaged in shared struggles for justice and freedom. It is the self that occurs with and amongst others. It is the self that writes in solidarity with the oppressed others. It is the self for others. It is undoubtedly the self that writes against its position of incarceration but it writes to propel political imagination outside of its incarceration.

2.3 The Selfhood of the Autobiography

Olney (1980) approached the definition of the autobiography with the focus on the link between self and form. He deconstructed the term autobiography into three parts. Who do we mean by the self, or himself/herself (*autos*)? What do we mean by life (*bios*)? What significance do we impute to the act of writing (*graphe*)—what are the significance and the effect of transforming life or life into a text? These three questions that Olney presents are of course critical in how he theorises the autobiography. Ultimately, how he expresses the *auto* and *bios* gives the impression that the autobiography as presented in in-text is only about the self, expressing themselves in text. It a process of self-expression involving a single subject.

De Man (1979) approaches the autobiography as a process involving the reader and the text. How he posits his interpretation is that process of reading involves the reader and the text. Therefore, it is through reading that the two determine a mutual reflexive substitution—the reader engages with the text it is the reader that determines the *autos* of the autobiography.

Gooze (1992) like Olney (1980) mentions that self and form are critical in understanding autobiographical writing. She notes that in traditional social, intellectual, and literary historians the questions of self and autobiographical form are usually overlooked. Autobiographical texts are read to "find out" and gain knowledge about specific individuals whose importance is certain even before reading the text. On the other hand, Gooze mentions that there are scholars that are more concerned with the aesthetics of the autobiography and no longer consider autobiographical writings as supportive material in literary studies. Rather, they consider the autobiographical text as an artistic work. Hence, the distinction between the autobiographer as a writer/narrator and as the subject of the text is not important for such scholars. The narrator and narrated subject are a focal point in the autobiographical analysis.

Lloyd (1986) explains that the autobiography aims to provide the truth of a self as grasped by itself. It presents the self as an object described from its perspective. The autobiography creates an interconnection between subjective and objective dimensions by uniting the narrator and protagonist. There is also a perplexity of relations between self as subject and as object because the autobiography is an expression of a present self and is a representation of a past self. Lloyd (1986: 170) emphasises that "the narrator is the creator of the protagonist, although it is also true that the protagonist is the model to which that creation is supposed to conform". The narrator and

protagonist are one and for that reason, questions about the relations of truth, time, and selfhood emerge.

As a manner of probing further into explaining how the autobiography is a search for selfhood, a brief interpretation of the autobiographies of three philosophers namely; Sartre, Augustine, and Rousseau who was explicitly concerned with understanding the self and their work focuses on the significant themes of temporality, selfhood, and truth. The work of these three philosophers focused on the importance of selfhood. For Sartre (1967) writing is a manner of attaining selfhood and freedom, but it is also an attempt to attain a temporal being. Sartre as a writer avoids death by appropriating it. He attempts to save his life by writing in a retrospective view and assuming a complete life in his writings. His act of writing claims death, then making the self into an object rather a subject. It creates a mode of past existence over the present. Through his reflections, he assumes the role of mortality he positions himself at a future with a complete life. Those who do not write are threatened with death and most likely extinction. Sartre (1967) notes that they are more concerned with the present and acquiring a quality of life that is precious and unique. Sartre (1967: 125), examines his life through future eyes as he writes: "I set about this with genuine fervor: I chose for a future the past of a famous dead man, and I tried to live backward. Between the ages of nine and ten, I became posthumous".

According to Sartre, the position of the narrator is an illusion of the protagonist's conception of writing and selfhood. He claims that it creates an idea of a retrospective—meaning it is based on the notion that the behaviour of a dead person can provide information on which he/she was living. His idea is to see the future more complete than the present. This idea that Sartre puts forth examines life through its death—simply meaning the self can have retrospective behaviour that is to write and a sense of completeness which maybe death but not death in its true literal form. Rather, autobiographical writing can provide a sense of selfhood that makes living subjects feel complete as though they are dead but they can project themselves back into life becomes they are still alive. In essence, autobiographical writing can establish selfhood in the writer where the writer can continuously renew or re-live themselves. This is an indication that autobiographical writing is centred on the self and self-experiences.

According to Augustine (1961), the notion of the self, achieving completeness is not elusive, and attaining it is not found beyond death. Augustine makes reference to memory and the soul being

able to extract memory is both an imitation of completeness as well as intimation. He mentions there is pleasure in being able to recapture the true self through the process of narrating it—it becomes a true representation of the self. Augustine (1961) claims that he writes for others—not for them to know him better but to help them know themselves.

For Rousseau (1953), the true self is expressed through reliving what has already been experienced. Is not so much as to say writing provides an account of an already lived experience but rather it constructs one. Memory is crucial in Rousseau's notion of the self—remembering is an end in itself. He claims that freedom does not rest in the completeness of an objective being rather it lies in the movement of subjectivity. The process of reflecting on one's feelings is a manner of knowing and expressing the true self. The rationale in Rousseau's (1961) writing is to make himself known to others. He desires to be known by others and his focus is on his individuality. By going back into his memory and writing—he makes himself transparent to others.

The autobiographies of Sartre, Augustine, and Rousseau express the significance of selfhood in autobiographies. These three philosophers attempt to provide an account of the living self to make an object of the self. This is not unusual for the autobiographical genre to adopt such a stance. Making the living self an object of itself it to be the narrator and protagonist in the autobiography. It is in essence to project the self into an object. All three philosophers are highly concerned with the self-being understood by others and of importance is the language in which they use to express the importance of the self. The idea of self-knowledge is central to these philosophers and when one has self-knowledge they are then able to share it with others. The act of sharing occurs through writing autobiographers and the act of writing is done only by the writer (autobiographer) who has an understanding of the self. It is at this point where it is clear that autobiographical writing in its nature is centred on selfhood. It is restricted within an idea of singularity and has no communal dimension—it stresses a single self. Their thinking supports the idea that the subject is privileged over objects. They are the subjects, the objects are those who receive and read autobiographies. They are complete subjects imparting their knowledge onto others. The manner in which Sartre, Augustine, and Rousseau interpret the significance of the self, regarding autobiographies creates the image of an individualised condition of writing, one in which the communal dissipates (Sartre 1967, Augustine 1961 and Rousseau 1953, 1961).

However, Haines and Grattan (2017: 25) note the precarious nature of writing as a utopian subject. They consider the problematic nature of writers that introduce themselves as protagonists, which then gives this disposition toward a solitary attachment. The normative disposition toward the communal dissipates (Haines and Grattan 2017). What prevails is the disposition of solitary attachment and, more significantly this propagates the idea of individuation. Additionally, Fivush (2011: 560) speaks of autobiographical memory, she defines it as "that unique human form of memory that moves beyond recall of experienced events to integrate perspective, interpretation, and evaluation across self, other and time to create a personal history". She seems to echo the ideas of Rousseau (1961) on the use of memory. According to Fivush, autobiographical memory engages self-interacting with others and defines our being and purpose in the world. Autobiographical memory includes a memory of the self as the experience of the event, it links past events together into a personal history by relating the self through past, present, and future. Autobiographical memory goes beyond guiding current and future behaviour to serve social and emotional functions such as self-definition and self-regulation (Fivush 2011). It does so by linking past events together into a personal history that relates through past, present, and future essentially forming a life narrative. This life narrative according to Fivush integrates specific autobiographical memories that are based on a specific personal timeline. Essentially, it focuses on how humans create meaning out of their lives through the intersection of their memory and how they perceive themselves. Autobiographical memory is constructed through a personal timeline of the self. Conway and Pleydell-Pearce (2000) speak of the conceptual self, which is made up of units that are knowledge structures existing independently from specific incidents that are connected to autobiographical knowledge. These units are socially-constructed schemas and categories that help to define the self. Autobiographical memory is concerned with the conceptual self and how the world will perceive the self. This conceptual self is devised from memories of specific experiences. It is a moment of individual experience. Autobiographical memory suggests that an individual's link remembered and imagined experiences through personally significant themes (Thorne, Cutting and Skaw 1998). It is the individual living and experiencing the "self", it is the individual self-defining their memories to form the self. It is personal and "self" exercise.

It is worth noting that the focus on the self that emanates in autobiographies can emerge on based on a particular goal. The work of Lewis (1999: 42), on South African autobiographies, interprets how in some texts, emphasising "I" is not only important in explaining the personal experience

but it reveals the history of a community. It coincides with the notion of expressing solidarity against oppression. Therefore, the "I" can represent a communal position, however it gives the perception that in such interpretations of autobiographical texts, the essence was on only national liberation and sharing a common experience. Lewis (1999: 42) writes "it is a tacit acceptance of the need to confirm an organic national or racial solidarity in the face of white racism". The manner in which Lewis (1999) explains the use of "I" does extend beyond personal experience, and includes others but at the core of that is creating solidarity against oppression. The use of "I" then arises as a representation of communal resistance against oppression and achieving liberation only.

Even Unterhalter (2000), focuses on South African autobiographies of political activists. In her work she considers how of the autobiographical texts can be used as political texts providing a political voice to assert the self that has been denied by the injustices of apartheid. Other autobiographies highlight the importance of repression while emphasising the need for new societies to avoid returning to repression. She also notes other autobiographies aim at setting the record straight about particular events. Others are about heroic achievements against political oppression (Unterhalter 2000: 159-160). In essence, Unterhalter (2000) recognises the different ways in which South African autobiographies have established techniques that explain how reform, social transformation and social constructs emerges through text. The interpretation she provides occurs as an aftermath of apartheid, the majority of texts analysed were released or written in post-apartheid South Africa. Therefore, it can be argued that these texts, were written and read based on particular objectives.

Hiralal (2015: 43) notes that in analysing the narratives of women detainees during the fight against apartheid—women represented a negotiated space, in which they shared the belief of resistance and liberation for South Africa. Her interpretation focuses on the contributions women made toward the liberation struggle. Thus, autobiographical texts of women detainees are an account of these contributions. Hiralal echoes Unterhalter (2000) in that they both affirm that at the centre of autobiographical texts that focus of apartheid is the quest of national liberation. Thus, the autobiographical texts that focus on the dimensions of national liberation are not entirely based on the self, but instead they relive and create memorabilia of past events. For this reason such interpretation of texts can be considered to function as conveying specific messages about national liberation.

The same can be said in the American context, there are texts that function to offer reflection about slavery and segregation as oppressive state systems. Morrison (1995[1987]: 86) too considers how various autobiographical texts written based on oppression narratives about slavery can convey specific messages. She first notes that autobiographical writings explain one's life and personal experiences, and secondly they are written to convince the reader that the writer is human and worthy humanity.

Morrison (1995[1987]), Lewis (1999), Unterhalter (2000), and Hiralal (2015) provide an analysis of autobiographical writings as texts which convey messages about the pursuit for national liberation against oppressive political systems. It should be noted their interpretation of these texts can be re-examined, there is a critical need to re-read and analyse autobiographical texts as more than just autobiographical accounts. The manner in which Morrison (1995[1987]), Lewis (1999), Unterhalter (2000), and Hiralal (2015) explain the function of autobiographical writings is founded on a particular objective of liberation. Although this objective is not far off from how self-writing is captured by Foucault (1997) and Mbembe (2001), however there is a complexity.

The complexity is that how does one distinguish texts between autobiographical writings and self-writing. Autobiographical writing cannot be classified as identical to self-writing, because for the former the emphasis is on the individuated selfhood. The theoretical framework of the autobiography is founded on the subject's psychological dynamics and how those dynamics unfold as the self which then influences the formulating of the autobiography. Following this interpretation of the autobiography resulted in the emergence of other sub-genres such as feminist autobiographies. But, at the centre of understanding the theory of the autobiography is the notion of "self"—it runs like a golden thread throughout the theorising and critique of the autobiography. The autobiography establishes selfhood that is different from what self-writing advocates. In the section to follow—the distinctive nature of self-writing is interpreted in detail.

2.4 Uncovering Self-writing

Autobiographical writing and self-writing in basic terms can be easily understood as capturing the same process of writing. Self-writing is defined differently compared to autobiographical writing. It has specified theoretical elements outlined by Foucault (1997). It is distinct from how autobiographical writing emphasises the self in that, autobiographical writing is concerned with a self that is subjective and has an individualistic nature. Self-writing differs from autobiographical

writing because it captures a self that is concerned with more than just the individual self. Self-writing also differs from feminist autobiographies because as a sub-genre of autobiographical writing it too captures writing based on an individual sense of self. Hence, in this section the fundamentals of how self-writing emerges as a theoretical framework that emphasises writing as a mode of shaping the self as well as the importance of how a communal self emerges are discussed. Moreover, self-writing represents a tool of interpreting texts.

Foucault (1997: 209) defines self-writing as *hupomnemata* according to his definition it is in the technical sense, "account books, public registers, or individual notebooks serving as memory aids". According to Foucault, writing is a task that brings into light or brings forth one's inner thoughts from the soul. For that reason, he equates this type of writing as a confession of a kind. Writing brings forth good thoughts dispels immoral thoughts. Foucault explains that there is no professional skill that can be acquired perfectly without daily training of that particular skill and so is living. He defines living as an art that needs daily practice and so daily through living one is training the self by oneself. The art of living has various forms of daily training which include memorisations, self-examinations, meditations, silence, and listening to others. Writing as an act of living only emerged long after other forms. The role of writing is a personal exercise that encourages one to, meditate *(meletan)*, write *(graphein)*, and train oneself *(gumnazein)*.

Foucault's text focuses on diverse elements in the letters of various Greek philosophers including Senaca (1945) and Epictetus (1963). He analysed the role of writing as a philosophical cultivation of the self. Foucault (1997: 209) notes that in Epictetus' text—writing is interlinked with meditation because meditation is "the exercise of thought on itself that reactivates what it knows, calls to mind a principle, a rule or an example, reflects on them, assimilates them, and in this manner prepares itself to face reality". Writing in this tradition is a meditative act that reactivates thought. It is a process of training the conscious rational thinking of the self. Writing is an element of self-training has an *ethopoietic* function—according to Foucault (1997: 209) writing is "an agent of transformation of truth into *ethos*". Foucault defines this type of writing as ethopoietic writing and it has been used for two common purposes: the *hupomnemata* and the *correspondence*. It is critical to note that Foucault understood writing as an act that is fundamental in shaping an individual's life—according to him writing had a particular function in one's life. Therefore his theorisation of writing becomes significant for interpreting and understanding how writing shapes

one's life. Hence, writing can be understood beyond its textual merit, through writing meditation emerges. Writing evokes a consciousness within one.

Personal diaries, public registers, or individual notebooks serving as memory aids should not be simply classified as memory support that is consulted on occasion from time to time. They need to be material that is consulted time after time that requires frequent reading, re-reading, meditating, and conversing with oneself and with others. These writings must be taken seriously and became immensely embedded to oneself not only at a level of recalling consciously but for one to be able to use them when necessary. Such writings equip oneself with helpful discourses, they need to be deeply internalised by the soul "planted in it" and must form part of ourselves. The soul must not take these writings as part of it, rather these writings should create the soul itself. Foucault (1997: 2010) describes the writing of *hupomnemata* as "an important relay of subjectivation of discourse".

Although the writings of *hupomnemata* are personal they should not be understood to constitute a "narrative of oneself", they are not autobiographies as they do not aim to share lived experiences through oral or written confession as autobiographies do. They do not simply account for one's self-awareness, self-expression, and self-identification through written confession in the form of an autobiography. *Hupomnemata* seeks to bring the opposite of what autobiographies aim to do— they intend to capture what has already been said, to collect what has been heard or read to shape the self. This difference indicates that the writings of *hupomnemata* are concerned with establishing how one comes to know the self. The essence of *hupomnemata* is to convey how the process and act of writing itself cultivates the self—hence engaging in *hupomnemata* results in an active pursuit of creating the self. Unlike the function of the autobiography which has the potential to explain one's life and particular events for various objective. *Hupomnemata* transcends the actuality of achieving a goal such as national liberation, rather it considers a continuous act of discovering meaning in the actual process of writing and reading. It as though there is no ending establishing the self—it is an ongoing process as one's life unfolds.

In the autobiography, the idea of shaping the self appears to be a process that occurs before the autobiographer writes. Shaping the self in autobiographical writing occurs before the writer engages in writing. Thus, autobiographical writing appears to capture the writer that is already shaped—in autobiographical writing the writer is recalling the process of how they came to be the

"self". The writer revisits their memory to explain their shaping. In autobiographical writing the writer has reached their full potential—they seem to have attained a complete sense of self and it here where the distinction lies between autobiographical writing and *hupomnemata* writing.

Hupomnemata advocates for one to withdraw into oneself, to get in touch with oneself, to rely on oneself, benefiting, and enjoying oneself. It aims to make one recollect memory through teaching, listening, or reading to establish a relationship of oneself with oneself. Foucault (1997: 211) describes this relationship to be as "adequate and accomplished as possible". Since *hupomnemata* contributes to the formation of the self it appears that as part of this formation of the self, associating writing and reading should be regular practice in the writing of *hupomnemata.* The practice of the self involves reading because one cannot draw everything from oneself. Reading and writing are closely linked—one has to draw from alternative sources to blend and create the self. Although Foucault cautions against reading endlessly without stopping—reflecting and taking notes on what has been read is critical because writing is an exercise of the gathering of what was read, as well as collecting one's thoughts. The process of collecting one's thoughts is what aids self-writing. The significance of this is that it is an exercise of reason, because if one reads endlessly then they are liable for retaining nothing. Thus, the act of writing is a method of recalling what has been read (Foucault 1997).

Associating reading and writing avoids *stultitia,* which is "mental agitation, distraction, change of opinions and wishes and consequently weakness in the face of all the events that may occur" (Seneca 1945: 41-42). *Stultitia* can make the mind become fixated on idealistic thoughts and prevent one from acquiring truth. The writing of *hupomnemata* resists *stultitia* by considering the past as a point of reference to which oneself can turn back to and draw something from it. *Hupomnemata* enables one to "detach the soul from concern for the future and redirect it toward the contemplation of the past" (Foucault 1997: 212). Thus, *hupomnemata* allows one to know oneself through their memory and to not only rely on their memory but to read and revisit what they read to collect one's thoughts. This is how the act of writing extends beyond a literal action, instead, it can account for a process that allows philosophical cultivation of the self and that becomes the essence of writing. One can have introspected and had an exclusive observation of their lived experiences as an exercise of knowing and recollecting the self.

Foucault (1997: 212) notes that "writing is a personal exercise done by and for oneself is an art of disparate truth—or, more exactly, a purposeful way of combing the traditional authority of the already said with the singularity of the truth that is affirmed therein and the particularity of the circumstances that determine its use". Writing is an exercise that evokes a distinct truth but its true purpose is found in how it is associated with reading because it is in that exercise a singularity of oneself emerges. Seneca (1945) stresses that through reading one must acquire an element that will help one to fight against poverty, death, or any other misfortunes. Seneca stresses that it is his custom to claim something from what he has read to make it his own and part of him. Writing and reading aim to acquire characteristics that will ensure a better self. Thus, through writing and reading inevitably self-writing is facilitated because both acts are exercises of how the self emerges. Hence, it can be noted that the establishment of the self requires writing and reading because both are personal exercises that require introspective from an individual.

Seneca continues to highlight the importance of reading and writing as interlinked tasks of oneself—he acknowledges the role of reading and writing as a process of making the body. This body should not be understood merely as a body of doctrine, rather it is a body in the metaphorical sense meaning it is a body that evokes digestion. It is a body that transcribes and appropriates what it has read into its truth. According to Foucault (1997: 213), "writing transforms the thing seen or heard into tissue and blood". Writing becomes a principle of rational action in the writer himself. It is in this particular description and understanding of writing that the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engaged in.

The writing and reading form part of a body of doctrine, already mentioned in the metaphorical sense. Yet, at the same time, it transforms itself as tissue and blood—the body in itself is made of tissue and blood. These women were engaging in a form of writing that was forming and shaping their tissue and blood both in the literal and figurative sense. In the chapters to follow deeper explanations of how their writings were both literal and figurative are provided. But at this level, it is critical to understand and be mindful that the role of writing and reading shapes the body both literally in that it transforms the thing that is heard into tissue and blood and figuratively it transcribes reading and writing into the principle of rational action. It is critical to understand this notion for this study because forms part of the key theoretical underpinnings of the study.

Foucault (1997) mentions that one should also remain true to their soul and still be recognised by others, as their true self. One should be able to form an identity through which the spiritual genealogy can be recognisable. *Hupomnemata* constitutes personal writing exercises but they are text that is meant for others. Personal writing exercises have a dual function because the one who narrates through the act of writing also reads what they are writing and the one who receives it is reading and re-reading.

Correspondence is another purpose of ethopoietic writing, but it should not be regarded as an extension of the practice of *hupomnemata*. It goes beyond training oneself through means of writing, through providing advice and opinions one gives to others it manifests oneself to oneself and others (Foucault 1997). This process makes the writer present to the one reading and receiving—somehow the writer is addressing the one reading the text. To write is to make oneself visible to others—it is to show one's face in the others' presence. It is a gaze offered to others by the writer it is also a gaze that the writer receives by offering oneself to through projecting the self to others.

Correspondence offers reciprocity, reciprocity of the gaze does not simply provide counsel and aid. As an exercise, it provides subjectivation of a true discourse, its assimilation, and transformation as a personal asset result in the objectification of the soul (Foucault 1997). In basic understanding correspondence is an exercise that makes the self, become a subject of the gaze and through its subjectivation the self transforms into an object.

Foucault notes a critical point about the development of the narrative of the self when he attests that *hupomnemata* enables the formation of the self through a collection of a discourse of others but it is correspondence with others and the exchange of soul service that is essential in the entire process of shaping the self. This is a significant point that Foucault makes, as it refers to the role of others as part of the *hupomnemata* and correspondence—it indicates that others are an integral part of shaping the self, the self is not exclusively responsible for its formation. The ordinary day to day account of oneself also has a critical role. Seneca (1945) notes that reviewing the activities of one's day is a form of self-examination, it is a mental exercise that is linked to memorisation and makes oneself an inspector of oneself. Thus, forcing oneself to encounter and reactivate the rules of behaviour. Foucault (1997) mentions this activity is not necessarily articulated in the form

of a written text. It is done to place oneself under the other's gaze—ultimately it is an account of correct and incorrect actions.

Foucault (1997: 221) concludes that *hupomnemata* and correspondence are "a collection of things read and heard and support of exercises of thought". He defines *hupomnemata* as a manner of establishing oneself as a subject of rational action through appropriating certain elements that are selected from reading and re-reading and it is about removing the inner impulses of the soul, enabling oneself to be free of them. In terms of the textual it is bringing together the gaze of the other and the gaze which one aims to be measured at on their everyday actions—essentially, that is what constitutes self-writing. Within the *hupomnemata* there are specific rules—like the reading and recording of other author's texts, like the incorporation of them into the writer's work. These practices function as the subject-on-the-page notion. The writer practices these practices, but of course, these do not transcendent as the origin of these practices. Rather, it is that in these practices, the self emerges (Allen 2010: 375).

Foucault captures self-writing as an exercise that involves others, although it begins with the self, he highlights that for the self to form an identity, the self needs to read and through reading texts it exercises the self, moves it closer to self-identification. Lastly, correspondence is key, the self needs to position itself as an object of the others to engage with others. In essence, he captures self-writing through *huponmemata* and correspondence.

Foucault (1997: 228) further traces the two contrasting imperatives the obligation to take "care of the self" and the obligation to "know the self". He notes that as there are different forms in the care of the self and there are also different forms knowing the self—both forms are equally important. Foucault's work disrupts the nature of the autobiography by tracing a split in its conceptual definition. He traces the two contrasting imperatives of the self through an inversion claiming that "knowledge of oneself appeared as the as a consequence of the care of the self" and that "knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle" (Foucault 1997: 228). Writing the self, shifted from an ethic that Foucault calls "knowing the self" to a confessional mode of speaking the self. Meaning each person must know who they are, what is happening inside of them, acknowledge their faults, recognise their temptations, to locate their desires and is obliged to share these things with others in a public or private sphere. Foucault notes that the imperative to writing oneself is to "know thyself" it means to be a witness against oneself by disclosing "hidden secrets"

and "self-illusions". This process he explains as a manner of finding healing through writing and sharing. Moreover, it provides a rational self-knowing of the self. The essence of writing is, therefore, knowing the self. In the process of writing and reading that is how an individual comes to know the self—that is how self-writing is embodied.

Mbembe (2001) expanded on Foucault's notion of self-writing by providing an account of African modes of writing the self and explaining the connectedness of the problems of self-constitution and the modern philosophy of the subject. Mbembe begins his argument by stating that certain factors have caused a delay in the full development of concepts that could explain the meaning of the African present and past by reference to the future (Mbembe 2001). Mbembe notes the conditions under which the African subject could attain full self-hood and self-consciousness and how these conditions led to a dead end because of two reasons of historicism: "firstly economicism and its baggage of instrumentalism and political opportunism and second, the burden of metaphysics of difference" (Mbembe 2001: 2). Mbembe notes that both forms of historicism have led to a myth of utopia and emerging ideologies that are inflexible and static. Such ideologies have reinforced the misfortune of *African sign* in modernity and have resulted in imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, dependency more recently globalisation. Ideologies that support religious dogmas imposed a "common sense" a generalised yet oppressive Africa discourse. At the centre of this discourse is identity in both political and cultural dimensions.

According to Mbembe, the identity of Modern African reflection is based on the construction of rituals and incantations instead of historical criticism. The rituals constructed can be summed into three. The first "contradicts and refutes Western definitions of Africa and Africans by pointing out the falsehoods and bad faith they presuppose", the second "denounces what the West has done (and continues to do) to Africa in the name of these definitions" and the third "provides so-called proof disqualifying the West's fictional representations of Africa and refuting its claim to have a monopoly on the expression of the human in general, are supposed to open up a space in which Africans can finally narrate their fables (self-definition) in a voice that cannot be imitated because it is authentically their own" (Mbembe 2001: 2-3). These three rituals constitute what African *doxa* represents and as a result has been haunted by slavery, colonialism, and apartheid.

Mbembe (2001) notes that three rituals which he highlights are constructed based on three elements namely; race, geography, and tradition. The first is that there has to be a separation from

oneself—this separation is meant to cause a loss of familiarity with oneself to an extent to which the subject is so estranged and alienated and eventually it becomes a lifeless form of identity. Therefore, the "being with oneself" which the African should experience is replaced with an alternative in which the self no longer recognises itself. The self which is known to the self is mutilated. The second is "disappropriation", which is a process in which juridical and economic procedures are used to expropriate and dispossess. This process is consequently followed by subjection characterised by the Other's falsification of the self. It results in estrangement and isolation. The third is the idea of degradation, enslavement caused the African subject humiliation, debasement, and nameless suffering. It was further characterised by the denial of dignity and dispersion (Mbembe 2001). In all three explanations, the fundamental elements of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid instigated the desire of African's to know themselves and to belong to themselves in the world.

Mbembe provides a contextual understanding of the African subject and its need to develop an African identity—he explains the idea of African identity through the African mode of self-writing. He emphasises the elements that instigated the need for the African subject to attain full self-hood and self-consciousness. To understand how African identity develops, Mbembe provides two ideological thoughts that claim to speak "in the name" of Africa as a whole—the intention of so doing is to capture the African mode of self-writing and consequently the self. The first ideological thought presents itself as radical and progressive, it uses Marxist and nationalist classifications to develop ideas on culture and politics. Claims that it is through resistance and emancipation that authentic African discourse can be determined. This ideological thought has four main characteristics. The first refers to the joint use of science and knowledge, neither are recognised independently. They are useful only when the outcome is to serve a prejudiced objective to oppose revolutionary forces. The second characteristic is a metaphysical vision of history which persists the idea that the future is open and cannot be predicted as a challenge thus virtually perpetuating the idea that anything is possible. Mbembe rejects this metaphysical understanding by stating that causality is real and prevalent, it is not invisible and nothing occurs in a separate dimension—ultimately, the subject's life, work, and way of speaking are all interconnected. The history of Africa does not exist loosely in its paradigm concerning other continents—it exists within a series of phenomena of subjection that has seamless continuity. The African subject has difficulty in attaining free will and liberation from domination because of

Africa's long history of subjugation. The third characteristic is aimed at destroying tradition and the notion that identity is influenced by the division of labour which has given rise to social classes and has created an unequal and divided society. The final characteristic highlights the nature of irresponsibility in the quest for sovereignty and autonomy. The African identity is determined by forces that prevent it from developing its uniqueness thus, the African historical self is not responsible for catastrophes is has faced. The main idea in this characteristic is that Africa needs to make autonomous choices from the legacy it has been imposed with and it is not responsible for catastrophes it has suffered (Mbembe 2001: 5).

The main idea of this ideological thought is that it conveys the message that resistance and emancipation can result in the formation of legitimate African discourse. However, Mbembe is against this ideological thought and it is evident in the manner in which he presents the four main characteristics of his theory. He presents a counter-opinion that is somewhat opposing to the main characteristic. Mbembe appears to have no confidence in this ideological thought because it defines African discourse finding its foundation in resistance and emancipation this is a flawed and highly prejudice stance. Firstly, it assumes that the emancipation is an ultimate goal for the African discourse, therefore if the African subject is emancipated it will easily be able to devise a revived African *doxa*. But, this ideological thought fails to interpret the depth of this emancipation as well as the resistance it supposedly roots from. It reduces African identity to resistance and emancipation.

The second ideological thought developed out of the emphasis on difference and the native condition. According to Mbembe (2001: 4), the native condition "promotes the idea of a unique African identity whose foundation is membership in the black race". Mbembe refers to the colonial period in which the discourse on the emancipation of the natives and their right to self-determination emerged. This period emerged to Africans as a process of African's transforming from barbarism to becoming civilised. In the surge for self-determination and right to sovereignty by Africa two categories were mobilised: the first was the African as a victimised subject and the second was the assertion of the African's cultural uniqueness.

The African as a victimised subject is brutally victimised through multiple causalities, different forms of terror and violence, over extended periods—slavery, colonialism, and apartheid. During slavery, colonialism, and apartheid African societies were divided against themselves and Africans

participated in victimising their people. At the centre of this victimisation is defining the self, but since the African is in a position where it is governed by forces beyond its control, that authoritarian it cannot define the self. Thus, resulting in the African as merely a castrated subject, that is passive and in the instrument of the Other's enjoyment. This created a dreadful combination of a tormentor (the enemy) and his (innocent) victim. According to Mbembe (2001: 11), "the course of African history is said to be determined by the combined action of this couple". The tormentor (the enemy) created the notion of "race", its status and the procedure of reorganising human attributes. The human subject and racial subject were distinguished and the human subject was to be understood from the prism of race. The race is understood as a set of visible physiological properties and discernible moral characteristics. These properties and characteristics distinguish human species from each other, they also make it possible to classify to identify violent actions that take place in the political and cultural spheres. It is through such classifications that African's were excluded from the circle of humanity and positioned an inferior status in the hierarchy of race. This denial of humanity and status of inferiority forced the African discourse to express the redundant discourse "we are human beings like any others" (Mbembe 2001: 12).

This is problematic for the African discourse because it is caught in a dilemma and of whether to participate in a generic human identity or insist on defining its uniqueness with the possibility of diverse cultural forms within single humanity. Mbembe then mentions that race is often the justification of the existence of a nation and in the history of being African—the race is the moral subject and premises of one's consciousness. The consciousness of those who are African has been questioned based on their race. Moreover, oppressive systems such as colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid are founded on racial prejudice. For this reason, Mbembe asserts that African identity suffers racialisation. Mbembe concludes by stating, "There is no African identity that could be designated by a single term or that could be named by a single word or that could be subsumed under a single category. African identity exists only as a substance. It is constituted in varying forms, through a series of practices, notably practices of power and practices of the self, what Michel Foucault called the games of truth" (Mbembe 2001: 33).

Mbembe acknowledges that African identity cannot be reduced to a specific meaning that is self-identifiable and unique because meaning changes, it is reversible and unstable and flexible. Thus, he refutes the idea of reducing African identity to purely tradition, race, and geography, moreover,

since customs in tradition constantly change. Thus, Mbembe (2000) rejects the notion that one's geographical location cannot be the only determining factor of assuming an Africa identity, therefore, an African American individual can announce or renounce a difference in understanding African identity, particularly because attaining identity is an unstable and flexible affair. Mbembe acknowledges that the desire for authenticity is not over, the impulse is taking place within the gaps that exist in history and they cannot occur without violence. Therefore, the debates on African identity are becoming more critical and meanings assigned to Africa as discussed above in the two ideological thoughts are not a true reflection of Africa (Mbembe 2000).

Thus, Mbembe (2000) considers African subjectivity as a notion that transgresses temporal and spatial dimensions experiences. It can be established on a universal understanding, because the fundamentals of shaping the self through one's experiences is not guided by a specific criteria. Essentially, African modes of self-writing means attaining the self and ultimately humanity. It portrays a quest of acknowledging and the attainment of humanity and being for the African subject. So Mbembe (2001) builds on the work on Foucault (1997) in manner that through life experiences the self is shaped. Therefore, the manner which life experiences unfold is does not have to be concerned with a comparison of how an individual experiences was either lived through better or worse conditions. Instead, self-writing culminates an individual experience as the foundation of establishing the self. But in this study, an oppressive and repressive context has a critical role in how certain subjugated individuals shape the self because, such a context denies the humanity subjugated individuals. For this reason, Mbembe then advocates for African subjectivity as mode in which the subjugated can self-write. African subjectivity as not restricted to geographical location rather is about transnational black experiences, and self-actualisation through writing.

Mbembe (2001), further acknowledges that it is critical to consider the implications of these debates—he refers to the era of the Enlightenment. It is defined as the period in which "humanity is defined by its possession of a generic identity that is universal in essence and from which derive rights and values that can be shared by all" (Mbembe 2001: 6). It is a point in which humanity realises there is a common nature that unites all human beings. This common nature is identical in all human beings because reason is at the centre and thus supposedly all human beings have a reason. The ability to exercise reason leads to liberty and autonomy and it enables one to live

guided by moral principles. However, it is only those that have a reason which can be included in the circle of the Enlightenment and is human beings. Those who are distinct from human beings are on the darker side of the Enlightenment both literally and figuratively. It is the black body that is on the darker side of the Enlightenment—it does not contain any level of consciousness, reason, or beauty. The black body cannot be considered as made of the same flesh as human beings since its function is of material use, it is an object doomed to death and destruction. This era justified the exclusion of the black body by claiming that it developed unique conceptions of society and the world therefore they do not share the same conceptions as human beings. Moreover, these conceptions from which the black body had developed did not manifest the power of invention or reason. The representations, life, work, language, acts, or death cannot be justified or provided with authority by the black body—the black body cannot justify and authorise itself. It is for that reason for this radical difference it is legitimate to exclude the black body both *de facto* and *de jure* from being considered as complete human—they have nothing to contribute to the work of the universal (Mbembe 2001: 6-7). The term "black body" is used throughout the study for purposes of consistency and continuity in the terminology of this chapter and the chapters to follow. The term "black body" is used referring to the inferior subject that is the oppressed being. It is critical to be mindful that the black body is associated with the lack of rationality, it is a racialised, dehumanised body. The term black body captures the derogatorily and inferiority of names and labels associated with black people as an inferior group regardless of the temporality, content, and context.

Nonetheless, it is historical convictions of this nature that encourage the African discourse to develop an identity that resembles and recognises its form. Both ideological thoughts provide an elusive understanding as to how African identity should be and perhaps how it was developed. Thus, this study goes deeper into explaining how identity is developed through the experiences of a subject. Therefore, providing a detailed prescription of self-writing by gripping onto the significant attributes which Foucault (1997) and Mbembe (2001) highlight in their conceptions of the self is how a theoretical understanding of self-writing is devised in this chapter. It should be noted that the theorising of self-writing in this theory chapter is one that resembles the resurgence of a political struggle. Political struggles such as those underpinning the two ideological thoughts presented and critiqued above by Mbembe.

Through uncovering Foucault and Mbembe's understanding of the self—both scholars emphasise the idea of explaining the self, concerning others but in the sense that it is a self that develops through interaction with others. But, they define the interaction in a unique form—it is an interaction that places the self together with others. How they explain how the self develops is through relations with others. They ultimately define a self that does not distinguish itself against others. Foucault emphasises the importance of attaining the self through *huponmemata* and correspondence. He notes that one can only know and come to their true self by engaging with others. Mbembe emphasises African subjectivity as a mode in which writing occurs from the perspective of the African subject. It is writing that occurs from practices of power and practices of self. The abovementioned elements highlighted by Foucault and Mbembe are critical in drawing the parameters of understanding self-writing. The process of the self "becoming" occurs as a result of relations with others. This process occurs through writing, writing according to both scholars is associated with developing the ethical self. Rabinow (1997) asserts that the art of living as a free subject was not possible for women and men in the Greco-Roman tradition thus writing become an exercise to release oneself from oneself. The exercise of writing thus transforms into more than just an exercise of pen and paper. In this study, the exercise of writing manifests into a political protest that occurs on different dimensions—which Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur articulate.

The self-writing that is being advocated in this study is a self-writing that constitutes an understanding of more than just the self. It captures a self that is inclusive of others in its definitive moments. Self-writing commands a different authority from that of autobiographical writing. Self-writing projects itself by becoming about the self of others—the self in others. It is more than just the self in its singular form. But, it is the self of other-selves. It is a communal self. That is where Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were writing from. They were just the embodiment of the self (the self of others). It is a self that is about others and the struggles of others in this study the principal struggle is articulated as a political struggle. The self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is the resurrection of the struggle, they become the political project of liberation within the confinements they find themselves in. They become the representatives of the struggle, they are the manifestos of the struggle, thus, they cannot only be reduced to the self—they are more than the self in a singular sense.

2.5 Self-writing to Pronounce a Genre of Being

Self-writing as understood in this chapter is an act qualifying particular actions as meaningful not only to the self that is projecting the actions but also to a larger broader genre. Self-writing is an exercise that consists of actions that are aimed at being—while these actions are persistently denied the position of *being*. The genre of being is articulated, through interpreting what it means to self-write as non-being, thus, it is a genre that arises from self-writing a non-being. It is worth noting how the genre of non-being is described and understood to form the genre of being. It should be noted though that those who write do not particularly think of themselves as non-being, rather, it is a critic that creates this category to demonstrate its oppressive nature. The very act of writing self is a confirmation that there is no zone of total non-being.

Fanon's (2004) work is critical and indispensable in postcolonial criticism. His work considers the existential reflection on the torment of living in the colonial abyss. Yountae (2017) notes that Fanon (2004) uses psychoanalytic and phenomenological approaches to scrutinise the embodied experience of living in a colonial order with a particular body. Through this approach, he can build a convincing account of how the colonial subject's consciousness is formulated through its interaction with the lived experience of the black body. Fanon elaborates on the painful reflections of the lived experiences of the "existence" of the colonised and racialised body. He draws on the colonial experience and the dimensions of the psychic, sociocultural, and economic and particularly the political struggles of the colonial subject. Fanon points out successfully the deathlike experience of the being existing within the colonial abyss (Yountae 2017).

Senghor's (1964[2013]) work focuses on black essentialism and it proposes the "black soul". In Senghor's conception of the black soul, he writes on culture as emanating from the reciprocal action of race, tradition, and milieu, therefore the notion of the black soul is rooted in the black experience. The conception of the black soul drives the philosophy of black humanity and ultimately that of negritude (Jacques 2011). Negritude has been defined by Senghor as "the sum of the cultural values of the black world as they are expressed in the life, the institutions, and the works of black men; the sum of values of the civilisation of the black world" (Bâ 2015: 44). Senghor's work makes an important contribution to how personal and social experience is key in understanding the "black soul". But, Fanon (2004) rejects this idea attesting that the "black soul" is a white man's artefact. According to Fanon (2004), if the black man accepts negritude they are

burying themselves into a deeper grave of the black abyss. Fanon's major dissatisfaction with negritude is the manner it is referred to—it has a temporal nature. Negritude accounts for the black man in the past, Fanon (2008[1967]) refutes this, he holds that the future should begin in the present, thus the self makes itself known from the onset. Ultimately, Fanon considers the colonial abyss as a context where life for the native and colonised "is already living death" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 187). Fanon's conversation with negritude finds inroads in developing the genre being for the black body. In that, he cautions the disposition of developing is based on the notion of inclusion of acknowledge of Western culture. Fanon cautions on the danger of injecting the black body through negritude in the cultural subjectivity.

Fanon's (2004) intellectual thought begins with negritude. He provides a critical account of negritude. His account marks the beginning of a distinctive Fanonian thought. He presents a counter colonial discourse that appears to overcome the limitations of negritude. Fanon acknowledges that negritude is abstract and backward. Colonialism claims that the nigger was a savage—colonialists view the continent (Africa) as "infested with superstitions and fanaticism, destined to be despised, cursed by God, a land of cannibals, a land of niggers" (Fanon 2004: 150). Colonialism further claims that the pre-colonial period was overshadowed with the darkness of the human soul. The colonised (the nigger, the black body) attempts to recover himself and escape colonialism—but he does so through the same rules that govern colonialism. The colonised uses Western culture to prove the existence of his own culture. The colonised attempt to affirm their African culture through Western culture. Mbembe (2001) refers to this notion—as that African culture is devised from a Western logic and its search for an African identity seeks validation from Western culture and this is prevalent in statements such as "we are human beings like any others". Even more profound is that the nigger (the black body) has never related to himself as the nigger (the black body) until Western culture (logic) forced him to prove his culture and act as a cultivated person. But even so, the life of a nigger (the black body) is already predetermined as Western culture sets out the existence of the nigger. The existence and identity of the nigger lie within the racialisation of thought—Western culture positions itself as the superior, blueprint, and the opposition to other noncultures (Fanon 2004).

Fanon's (2008[1967]) critical reflections are based on the simple fact that the black body is existing in a white world infused with colonial ideology. Thus, the basic recognition of the black body is a

recognition of one's humanity. "All I wanted was to be a man among other men" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 112). This is because through colonialism the black man is not a man. Fanon describes the existential imposition of the black man—the black man exists in the "zone of nonbeing". However, it is only in the movement for decolonisation that the radical leap occurs in which various modes of existence unfold (Parry 1994). Fanon (1968: 225) writes that "the truths of a national are in the first place its realities" by pluralising "truths" and "realities" Fanon concedes that there are multiple subjectivities. Fanon attests that in a colonial context black people live in a "zone of occult instability where the people dwell… that fluctuating movement which they are given shape to" (Fanon 1968: 227). It is an acknowledgment that there is no single movement but multiple temporalities given and they are shaped by "fluctuating movements"—again, suggesting that there is no one wave of movement or signifiers that define blackness. Fanon further describes this condition as an ongoing curse of which the broken subject finds itself in. It is a condition in which the black body yearns for recognition but is denied. The black body is in a fixed condition of the white gaze, it is hated, despised, and detested by an entire race (Fanon 2008[1967]).

The black body is forced to define the self on three levels of consciousness. Firstly, as self-conscious which is split into consciousness or image of the self-mirrored through the eyes of the other. Secondly, is the encounter with the colonial gaze which interprets into the moment of inferiority that is inscribed in the psyche and the body, then it enters into the third level of consciousness, which is the realisation of oneself as an object. Fanon (2008[1967]) captures the three levels of consciousness in his own traumatic experience of being encountered with the racialised gaze. "Look, a Negro!... Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 91). He describes this moment as the fatal point of his being, he is defined through a racialised schema and it is through this his being and existence have succumbed to a racialised being.

Maldonado-Torres (2007) explores Fanon's work brilliantly in his formulation of the "coloniality of being". Maldonado-Torres states that an encounter with death is not an extraordinary situation rather it is an inescapable reality for the colonised. In the colonised context death is not only an individual experience, it is a collective experience that surrounds the colonial subjects in their everyday life. Yountae (2017: 97), states "for people who live with death and are considered nonbeing, the way of achieving authenticity is different". This is because the colonised subject is confronted with a death in various ways other than those that constitute the self. The realisation

that death near comes too late and at that point, nothing can be done to escape it. Thus, it is for this reason that Maldonado-Torres advocates that decolonisation, deracialisation and *des-generaccion* (decoloniality) should occur not from a point of morality but from the need of avoiding death not only of the self but of others. He emphasises that the need to decolonise is more than just about the self, it is about a collective—it is removing death from others. It is in actual understanding (self) writing to restore a particular need which is a need for life, moreover a need to evade death. The act of (self) writing is more than just about the self that is writing—the self is merely a representation of others.

Furthermore, the self is writing to evade death since life is at stake—the self is writing against conditions of impossibility, which are conditions of colonialism, apartheid, and segregation. These conditions—condition the death of self, the death of the collective. Death in the colonial world threatens the collective thus one cannot escape that defying death needs to be a communal objective. This is done through self-writing. Additionally, self-writing emerges from trauma, it is a traumatic experience to be faced with death since, for the colonised, trauma is woven into the very existence of the colonised being. Trauma is a continuous state for the colonised and others— being colonised is a permanent state of trauma. The key argument in this study is that self-writing emerges as writing that insists on life, it denies the permanent state of trauma. It is writing that denies and protests against the disastrous position created by an oppressive order. Moreover, colonialism, apartheid, and racial segregation were thought as to conditions of impossibility where dismantled. But what remains is that they were not worked to logical conclusions and this further reveals how powerful they were, but that they continue to be negotiated.

Gordon (2007) explains the state of living in a traumatic condition and he expands on Fanon's (2008[1967]) conception of non-being. According to Gordon, the status of non-being is equivalent to appearing meaning to over appear and to appear becomes disastrous. To be disastrous is the black existence. Maldonado-Torres (2007) defines such existence as the reality of the colonised subjects, he describes it as the coloniality of being: the miserable situation of a denied existence. The reality of the colonised is that "life is not flowering or development of an essential productiveness, but as a permanent struggle against an omnipresent death" (Fanon 1994: 128).

Underlying Maldonado-Torres' coloniality of being is the emphasis he makes on the colonial difference as the foundation of the coloniailty of being. He notes the Cartesian epistemology and

Heideggerian ontology and that Eurocentric thought does not acknowledge both forms of thought. The latter, the Cartesian formulation focuses on an epistemology that does not reveal the coloniality of knowledge and coloniality of being. The Cartesian formulation roots from Descartes' philosophy of *Corgnito, ergo sum* "I think, therefore I am" led to a complex philosophical and historical expression. That "I think (others do not think, or do not think properly), therefore I am (others are-not, lack being, should not exist or are dispensable)." In turn this philosophy advocate for a difference those that think and those that do not, it perpetuates the idea that there is a difference between others and it is visible in the capacity of thinking. The being which is whom that can think and the other is nonbeing hence they cannot think. The overall implication is others do not think, others are not being—"others" are those that are nonbeing and are colonised beings. The Heideggerian ontology requires a reflection on the notion of being and *Dasein's* comportment and existentialia. *Dasein* marks the aspects of the coloniality of Being, which the problem of blackness is a starting point of coloniality of Being which are the condemned or the *damne*. The *damne* are those who are "not there" they are those who lack being and cannot think. Maldonado-Torres (2007) concludes by reflecting that *Dasein* and Being are unaware of colonial differences that mark the different aspects of *damne* and *Dasein* thus it is that unawareness which preserves the coloniality of Being (Maldonado-Torres 2007: 252-254).

The damned lack intellectual capacity, thus they cannot think, Wynter (1979) explains the relationship between the Sambo and Minstrels. It is a construction that further permeates and is justified upon the colonial principle. At the centre of the idea is the "atomistic individual as a *responsible agent*… the slave master legitimated his own role" this the sambo and in contrast is the *irresponsible* minstrel (Wynter 1979: 151). This stereotype created a paternalism ideology whereby the slave becomes dependent on the minstrel and they have no decision making power, the sambo is presented as a rebel that is oppressed by the slave master and the minstrel is the obedient slave, that accepts and takes orders from the master with no question. The relation between the two roots from the contradiction and justification of the coloniser, to create "the dual psyche of the white as a settler and as a bearer of the egalitarian creed" (Wynter 1979: 150). The Sambo is the prototype of the slave and the disobedient slave. The sambo and minstrel relations reflect the same relational structure which Fanon (2008[1967]) and Maldonado-Torres (2007) analyse. The sambo exists (writes) for self-affirmation and the minstrel exists (writes) for affirmation from the slave master.

The Sambo is much like the Subaltern that Spivak (1988) speaks of when she refers to Guha's (1982) classification of groups whereby he constructs a definition of people (the place of that essence) that can only be an identity-in-differential. Guha proposes the following stratification grid describing colonial social production in the following order. 1. Dominant foreign groups, 2. Dominant indigenous groups in the all-India level, 3. Dominant indigenous groups at the regional and local levels and 4. The terms "people" and "subaltern classes" [are] used as synonymous throughout [Guha's definition]. The social groups and elements included in this category represent the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the "elite". The third group on the list is the buffer group, it is between the people and the great macro structural dominant groups. It is defined as a place of in-betweenness. The purpose of this buffer zone, of this third group, is to create a space and a deviation from an ideal space marks the difference. Therefore, according to Spivak (1988), the true identity of the subaltern is in its difference. No subaltern can represent itself and have the ability to know and speak independently. The problem is not about representation, Spivak argues that the problem is the subaltern subject has not been acknowledged and understood thus, it does not have a history of its intellectual representation. These interpretations of how black bodies are excluded from the genre of being, as well as how they are considered as lacking agency and rational, illuminate the position in which self-writing in this context establishes a genre of being. Essentially, engaging self-writing is about establishing the self, those who do not have a sense of self are regarded by dominant and oppressive systems as lacking the ability to attain self. Hence, the discussion above illustrates the conditions in which the black body exists. It is conditions that do not permit the black body to attain self. The black body exists outside of the parameters of writing according to oppressive systems, but it is through resistance and defiance that black bodies can define a genre of being through self-writing.

Therefore, it is vital to consider the position of the subjugated, their voice and position are always is suppressed by categorisation based on racial prejudice. Even, Fanon (2008[1967]) too highlighted the importance of examining whether the *negro* can speak or not. It is critical to consider the *negro* and *subaltern* in the same position concerning the coloniser and elite because invariably they assume similar inferiority. This is that of lacking consciousness. Fanon (2008[1967]: 1-2) suggests that "to speak" does not mean only "to be in a position to use a certain syntax, to grasp the morphology of this or that language". Essentially, it means "to assume a

culture, to support the weight of a civilisation". Fanon notes that the *negro* of the Caribbean finds himself in this position because the language he speaks will make him partially white thereby making him closer to being a real human being. Consequently, the *negro* of the Caribbean speaks with an Afro-English language—which is still not good enough, the *negro* will always have a problem of language. The *negro* finds himself in a *damne* position of inferiority which results in death and oppression of cultural originality (Wynter 2001). This renounces his blackness, attempting to speak to assimilate into whiteness, to become a human being. He renounces his blackness to be acknowledged by the *Other* and to experience himself as *more human.* Most importantly as a rational human being.

It is mindful to remember that the subaltern is much like the Sambo, the *negro,* and the *damne*—the subaltern subject lacks rationality. Since the subaltern lacks rationality—it consequently lacks consciousness and it is for that reason it cannot speak. Therefore, the project which emerges is to rewrite the development of the subaltern, because as it stands it is written based on the dominant groups with a planned agenda of continuous categorised prejudices. Foucault (1980) suggests that the nature in which the dominant groups defined the subaltern is "to make visible the unseen can also mean a change of level, addressing oneself to a layer of material which had hitherto had no pertinence for history and which had not been recognised as having any moral, aesthetic or historical value". In essence, this means that the subaltern is recognised on a level lacking any moral, aesthetic or historical value because the subaltern lacks rationality.

It appears that there is a certain criterion that marks rationality and consciousness. The negro, sambo, *damne,* the black body and subaltern does not meet these criteria. Gordon (2007: 7), notes that "to prove that black people were as human as white people presupposed white people as the human standard". Gordon (2007) mentions that considering the injustices unleashed against black people by white people the human standard must very low since the standard of being human is set by the white people who are the perpetrators of injustice. Furthermore, Gordon notes Fanon's argument on posing white people as the human standard because it reduces black humanity to a fatal position and the only solution is to become white. It is for this reason that the humanity of black people requires deep meditation on what it means to be human—to set their criteria, their being. Mbembe (2001) advocates for this level of meditation. As already discussed, he highlights

the importance of the African subject determining conditions that will assist in attaining full consciousness. This chapter indicates self-writing as a form of achieving full consciousness.

As a result of being racialised, Fanon (2008[1967]: xiv) notes that "the black man implies a brutal awareness of the social and economic realities". For the black man, an inferiority complex is ascribed to him it is a double process that involves economic inferiority and internalisation of inferiority it is a "double consciousness" which Fanon labels as the *sociogeny*. Double consciousness emanates from the work of Du Bois (1994), he explains that the negro is born with no true self-consciousness, the negro is in a peculiar position. He sees himself through the eyes of others and measures his soul through the world that pities. There is a two-ness that unfolds in the negro—he has two souls, two identities, two warring ideals, he is an American and he is a Negro. He has no self-consciousness because he has two unreconciled strivings. Spillers (2003) alludes to Du Bois (1994) that his revelation of double consciousness cannot be resolved so simplistically. Because firstly, how the one is perceived is partially perpetuated by how one receives such perceptions. Secondly, to change such perceptions depends on a change of mind that has imagined beyond its external perceptions. Essentially, Spillers (2003) is highlighting that the black community had to initiate the political solution to this double consciousness. Spillers emphasises that although one may appear as a racialised subject, it does not mean defying these perceptions is impossible. Fanon (2008[1967]) extends on double consciousness through the concept of sociogeny. The concept of the *sociogeny* explains the third person's response to his first-person questioning. Fanon explains that man exists in society, societies are shaped by human influence "man is what brings society into being". He asserts that those who want to predict and shape that society needs to be willing to examine the foundations of that society. But, according to Fanon, the black man encounters a deeper struggle. It is a struggle on two levels of which historically these levels are mutually dependent, therefore a unilateral liberation would be impossible. Fanon's concept of the *sociogeny* posits an exploration of the "lived experience of the black" by providing insight through the lived subjective experience of the human and non-human and this relation results in an interrelated phenomenon of identity and/or consciousness.

Wynter (2001) adapts her term *the sociogenetic principle,* and the aim is to both relate and contrast it with the genomic principle defining the species-identity of purely organic life. According to Wynter *sociogeny* is not an attempt proposed by Fanon (2008[1967]) to rethink the relation

between symptom and culture, but rather it is about the human *qua* human comes to be structured as such. Wynter (2001) refers to Nagel's (1974: 436) work where he proposes that "if and only if there is something that it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism". Nagel uses the analogy of bats to explain the distinction between subjective and objective concepts. He notes that bats are mammals, thus, they exist in conscious experience, they navigate and perceive objects by use of echolocation. If a human being would imagine themselves as a bat and possibly metamorphose into a bat they would only be able to experience life as a bat but essentially their brains are not wired as that of a bat. Thus, they would experience life and behaviours of a bat rather than the mindset.

Nagel (1979) notes, the experience of living the life or behaviour of another is merely limited only to experience—it does not forge or mimic the mindset of that which experience which it imitates. Nagel refers to this understanding as to the difference between the subjective and objective perspectives. He states that "our mental activity is the only unquestionable fact of our existence." This might mean that, essentially, each individual only knows and understands what it means to be them, each individual knows how to be subjectivism on the other hand objectivism requires one to be unbiased and have a non-subjective perspective. But, an objective perspective is not possible since humans are limited to their subjective experience. Nagel's understanding of the objective and subjective perspectives provides an unusual and cunning position which Wynter (2001) uses to elaborate on Fanon's (2008[1967]) s*ociogeny* concept. Since objectivism seems impossible thus the lived subjective experience is what shapes the phenomenon of identity and consciousness. Evidently, from the above discussion, this provides further reason and interpretation as to how the black body is forced to devise its mode of identity because the black body much *like* the white body only knows a subjective consciousness therefore it demands and devises a new mode of being human. Referring back to Nagel's interpretation of subjective and objective perspective but using a different analogy, consider the black body thinking and believing that it is human, therefore it is a white body, the black body can attempt to mimic the behaviours the white body but it will never have the mindset of the white body. It can replicate the same behaviour as that of the white body but it will never be white. The black body only knows its true subjective experience which is the "lived experience of the black" as Fanon captures it. This lived experience of the black body calls for devising a new mode of being human since the black body has been denied this level of consciousness. Fanon and Wynter articulate a new genre of being.

Wynter's (2001) work finds an entry point in Fanon's (2008[1967]) concept of the *sociogeny,* Wynter claims that Fanon's work created a rupture of knowledge system calling into question "our present culture's purely biological definition of what it is to *be* and therefore of what it is *like to be* human". According to Wynter, this rupture is necessary for creating the move out of Western/European bio-economic, of the conception of being human. Whereby the *self* requires an *Other* to be recognised, Wynter calls for a conception of the *Self* that does not need validation from the *Other.* Wynter, stresses the idea of human needs to be saved against the European version of *man.* The idea of inventing and devising a new mode of being human gives the impression of an invention that is another of form humanism which in opposition to history and domination (Marriott 2011). Fanon (2008[1967]) asserts, that it cannot be oppositional because such a stance cannot be sustained since the future cannot be known thus affirming an invention cannot be easy without knowing its teleology.

Marriott (2011) notes that at the point of invention, the critical moment of inventing or rather naming an invention and identifying it is where Fanon (2008[1967]) and Wynter (2001) diverge. Wynter considers an invention "an event of epistemic breakthrough, at any rate, a kind of rupture to be reinserted into a new narrative of the human, the coding of which can be gasped, in turn, as contrary to the disciplinary narrations of the West" (Wynter 2001: 199). This breakthrough that Wynter describes is a monumental event that can only appear indifferent and disruptive to the narratives it interrupts. This breakthrough is meaningful it asserts itself as a critical point of indifference from dominant narratives of the West and simultaneously is a moment of self-naming. Indeed a breakthrough is critical it marks two essential points resistance with the aim of self-naming. These two points are closely linked to self-writing as understood in this study, the breakthrough captures self-writing because the moment of a breakthrough is a moment of resistance followed by self-naming and asserting oneself. It becomes a moment of devising and inventing oneself in a space of resistance. Through the breakthrough the black body asserts itself, it resists the position it is placed in—the position of inferiority and lack of consciousness, therefore, devising a new genre of being human.

Wynter (2001) notes that this genre of being forces the black body to challenge this idea—to resist and to write from a position that denies the black body's existence. Wynter's argument emanates from a discursive code it speaks in the same language as that of Fanon (2000) which calls for a

socio-genic principle. *The sociogenetic principle* insists on self-writing that questions existence because existence for the black subject is not a given. Since the black subject lacks rationality and exists in otherness—self-writing propels existence, it engages being *for* becoming. Meaning it neglects the technologies of racial subjection which are those that perpetuate the erasure of being and are written outside of the genre of humans. Instead, it proposes its mode of articulation, it does not look upon the being *in* becoming because that is not adequate in defining the black body. Being *for* becoming constructs a grammar of being for the black subject. It is self-writing that is in pursuit relentlessly, consistently for existence. It describes a *for* in their way not *in,* which suggests a wanting to become and to be included in the genre of human. Rather *for,* which suggests a future, a forwardness, a making, a projection, and imagination. It is based on the assertion of the self, the naming of the self. Self-naming thus becomes a process of self-writing which leads to re-imagined ways of being consequently rejecting any discursive codes of blackness. Self-writing presents a rigorous address towards a philosophical production to the self. It does so in ways that are concerned with the fundamental human experience of existing. Self-writing does not find its essence with how it resists oppression, and how the mechanics of oppression enforce a denial or failure to attaining being for the black being. Instead, it seeks to cause an essential disruption. Santner (2006: 12), states that this disruption is "distinctly political—or better: biopolitical aspect, [that] names the threshold where life becomes a matter of politics and politics comes to inform the very matter and materiality of life". This disruption emerges as the core of human existence (Moten 2018b). Henceforth self-writing appears as a disruption because it is concerned with an understanding of the self that is invested in self-consciousness.

The self which emanates from self-writing, the self finds its existence as a result of rejecting racial constructs and the racial condition which it finds itself within. It is because of a racialised conception of the black body that drives modes of writing the self to being. Self-writing thus is situated within black solidarity which is founded on defying racial dehumanisation. As argued in this chapter, the idea of self-writing is a process of knowing the self, self-identification. In a colonised world the self wants to be recognised as human. Moreover, in a colonised world where the black body is damned, condemned to death as Maldonodo-Torres (2007) attests and as Fanon (2008[1967]) stipulates, that black body is in a continuous condition of existing in the zone of nonbeing. The black body, the damned, the colonised, (self) writes in conditions that convict them as nonbeing, as those who cannot think. The damned resists this position of nonbeing. The black

body finds itself in this condition created by the coloniser, but it is through processes such as self-writing that it persists to define itself as more than just a "negro", "kaffir", "nigger". The black body resurrects through self-writing defining a genre of being.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter argued that autobiographical writing offers a different account of the self, it is more concerned with how the autobiographer self-identifies and how that self-identification is articulated through text. Autobiographical writing places the protagonist at the centre of the narrative, the protagonist has a dual responsibility they have a role of the first person perspective and the narrator's perspective. However, both roles are based on the autobiographer having a distinct attribute of self-awareness and identification with the sole aim of writing to communicate the self to others. Other sub-genres of autobiographies that are discussed above namely, feminist autobiographies and autobiographies on national liberation are distinguished from self-writing. The former is concerned about the self and writing as a means of informing others of the self-experience. The latter differs because it indicates the intimate connection that can occur among individuals hence creating a sense of communal action arising in writing. Particularly during times of political struggle toward national liberation the narratives written shared a common experience and most importantly shared a common goal, which was national liberation. Thus, these were writings that had a pre-existing purpose which was to convey a defiance against oppressive systems. But, the manner in which self-writing is engaged presumes that writing becomes a continuous act, because even after one has written, by re-reading self-writing occurs. Hence in the case of autobiographies, their sub-genres and those focusing on national liberation, they appear to have an end goal or an achieved objective. Which is either to explain the self to others or achieve a goal which can be national liberation. Evidently, autobiographical writing is an exercise that is primarily about the self, communicating through text with others. It is this critical feature of autobiographical writing that distinguishes it from self-writing.

The key assumption that Foucault (1997) and Mbembe (2001) emphasise is the subjectivity of self-writing. Both theorists express that daily practices and experiences in which the writer participates in cultivating the self and that is how self-writing emerges. Another assumption that emanates from how self-writing is theorised is that the essence of the writer culminates in the art of living—meaning individuals train the self to become the self. Essentially, only an individual's

experiences formulate how one becomes the self. In understanding self-writing as a theory it must be noted that the self is not a substance, it is not fixed or imposed by an individual onto another. Rather, in the act of writing and caring for the self—the self is formulated. Moreover, this process is not just about words on a page but it is about the daily practices one engages in that form part of self-writing. Mbembe (2001) uses Foucault's notion of the art of living to articulate an African subjectivity. He posits that modes of thinking for the African subject lack a philosophical understanding of the African subject. Mbembe demonstrates that to understand the agency of the African subject the realities of slavery, colonialism, and apartheid need to interrogate. He too acknowledges that the daily experiences of individuals are profound for existential phenomenology to conceptualising African subjectivity. The fundamental assumption underpinning self-writing is the quest and form of existential phenomenology. Self-writing advocates something that is not bounded by a particular objective rather, it is a continuous process that occurs in the writing, re-writing, reading and re-reading of texts. It is a philosophical understanding of the self beyond the moment of writing and reading, therefore it is not bounded by temporal and spatial dimensions. Therefore, one's text can be regarded as self-writing even after death.

Self-writing defines the self differently from autobiographical writing. Although both exercises place significant importance in the self (the protagonist in the narrative) how the self is shaped and articulated differ. Self-writing advocates a level of resistance and rebellion in efforts of shaping the self. Self-writing communicates (writes) from a communal language perspective. Meaning the self is positioned as a representative for others. Thus, it is not an individual experience in the sense that autobiographical writing communicates it to be. As discussed above Fanon (2008[1967]), Wynter (1979), Maldonando-Torres (2007) as well as Gordon (2007) explain that the black body is denied existence, it is only acknowledged concerning the white body. Although they use different conceptions of explaining the position of the black body concerning the white— ultimately it is critical to understand that they are all referring to an inferior black body with the white. Additionally, these scholars urge for a critical need to devise a self-named existence from the black body—to invite its genre of being so to say to invite its existence. But most importantly to invite a self-conscious being. Thus, self-writing is an invention of existence. Moreover, this chapter aimed at disassociating self-writing with autobiographical writing to devise a theoretical framework for this study. Above all, self-writing thus is a mode of inventing existence for the

black body that is denied existence—thus, it articulates the practice of inventing existence for the black body. Self-writing in this study is then used as a conceptual tool for understanding how the black being comes to being through the existential quest.

CHAPTER 3

In the Hold: The Self, Prison, and Writing

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to examine the concept of "the hold" with a specific focus on its relation to the self, writing, and prison. It sets a pretext of the conditions of existence for the black body within the context of "the hold". It also outlines how writing occurs in and out of prison. The hold is the state in which the black body exists within the prison. It is a captured space that is both in and out of prison which the black body finds itself in. It engages in writing that not only occurs within the confinements of prison but writing that occurs in the position of the hold. Moreover, as already stated and interpreted in chapter two—this mode of writing is self-writing. This chapter seeks to explain and interpret the position of "the hold" which both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur exist within as the oppressed.

This chapter, firstly, explains how the self is defined and positioned in the hold through the process of erasure. The self is interpreted based on its acquisitions imposed by racial and oppressive judgements. The position of the self is probed concerning the two dynamics it exists in, that is, the inferior and superior. Secondly, the chapter discusses writing as a critical part of the hold. This section explores writing regarding how it is interpreted as a bodily inscription rather than only as a textual inscription. The chapter explains writing as a figurative and literal experience. Thirdly, the chapter discusses prisons as more than just spaces of confinement. Prisons are part of a social order that is so difficult to imagine a society without prisons—they are relied on as designated dreadful institutions that house and separate offenders of justice from their communities and families. The prison has become so "naturalised" that it is extremely hard to imagine life without it. This chapter explores the deeper meaning of a "prison". The prison is understood as a place of confinement, being confined means one is unable to move freely, thus they are held without the freedom of movement. Prisoners find themselves in the position of "the hold." This chapter aims at interpreting this position as both a figurative and literal position of confinement. The hold is a status of making life static, fixed and ultimately it is a place of confinement. It is a place of stillness. Those that impose the hold attempt to restrict life and movement. Thus, placing the black body in the context of being in the hold, becomes more than physical confinement, but is also abstract. The actual act of incarceration is the physical hold and the abstract hold is one that attempts to diminish

the soul. The purpose of this chapter is to explore what it means to be in the hold with a specific focus on the self, writing, and prison. About particularly how the black body experiences being in the hold.

3.2 Erasure of the Black Body

The concept of erasure is highly associated with dehumanisation. The concept of erasure as understood in this study is linked with notions influenced by a racist logic (Gani 2017). Erasure is the removal of something or its traces, if not all. The erasure of the black body calls for removing the black body of existence. This is based on racial classification of oppressive systems such as colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid which provided the manifestation of erasure of the black body. Erasure suggests and promotes a racial hierarchy by asserting that it has a higher moral possession because it promotes Eurocentric self-interests rather than human equality.

Madikizela-Mandela (2013) and Shakur (2014) experienced moments of erasure in their lives, these are crucial moments that marked their blackness as individuals and most importantly, that shaped their self-writing. Both were arrested in abrupt moments and their arrests seem well planned as a way of seizing them from existence. As though the purpose was for nobody to notice they had been arrested. This was to remove them from existence, to erase them. Although they were arrested in two different geographical locations—Madikizela-Mandela in South Africa and Shakur in the US, they were both enemies of their states respectively. There is a striking similarity, in the mode of arrest and most important the ideological and purposeful act of arrest. The purpose of their arrests was to erase and to hold these black bodies because these two women were criminals that had offended the state. The purpose of their arrests was to place their black bodies in the hold because they threatened whiteness in its form of oppressive state systems, namely: apartheid and segregation.

Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 7) describes her arrest by the first thing she remembered which was the banging and shouting outside of her house, as she opened the door and the police flung in searching every part of her house. After searching the house Major Johannes Viktor asked her to pack a bag because she was being detained and would not be coming back for a very long time. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) remembers that moment of arrest as being dragged out of her home at dawn, with her children screaming and clinging to her clothes. Her daughters Zenani and Zindziswa were home for school holidays—they were terrified, crying, she pleaded with the police

that she could not leave her children without anybody to look after them, she could not comfort her children.

> On the night of the Security Branch raid and my arrest, I was reading the biography of Trotsky which I fetched the previous night from Mrs. Betty Miya's house together with some documents... When the police kicked the door open I had just taken it out of the kitchen units, I put it in my pocket gown. They started raiding the bedroom for almost two hours (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 7).

A closer analysis of the arrest of Madikizela-Mandela is critical because it marks the act of erasure in various contexts of existing in an oppressive system whereby erasure occurs daily, even to a point where it is subconsciously occurring. The implementation of the Natives Act of 1952, which made it compulsory for all black South Africans over the age of 16 to carry "the passbook" and the Group Areas Act of 1950, this act enforced the segregation of different races to specific areas to confine black bodies in particular spaces are amongst the apartheid laws that forced black bodies to be confined in blackness (South African History Online 2011). These laws aimed to confine the black body into a particular space to restrict the movement of the black body. By restricting movement, of the black body it is thus positioned in the hold. The black body is erased from white spaces and confined into black spaces. Thus, when Madikizela-Mandela was arrested it was to erase her from the political struggle against apartheid. The actual arrest was a moment of erasure. She was physically removed, erased from political struggle. Her arrest was abrupt, in the middle of the night, it created a sense of attempting to remove her from existence. It was aimed at creating a loss in her entitlement of existence.

Shakur's (2014), arrest was much like Madikizela-Mandela's arrest. Shakur (2014: 3) recalls: "Suddenly, the door flew open and I felt myself being dragged out onto the pavement. Pushed and punched, a foot upside my head, a kick in the stomach. Police were everywhere. One gun to my head". Shakur woke up in a scene of agony, she was dragged out of the car by state police and harassed. In seconds of her being dragged out of the car, she realised her arm was shot. Shakur describes the brutal nature in which the state police manhandled her out of the car onto the pavement. Shakur describes arriving at the hospital and being surround by white bodies only. It felt like she was all at once, ambushed by white bodies. She was then confronted by a bunch of

doctors, then followed by a black nurse who proceeded to ask her questions. Shakur refused to answer any of the questions when she says:

> I can see an outline. Something in plastic. Something—my mind slowly realises that it is a man in a plastic bag. And that man is Zayd. My body stiffens. My mind spins. One of the troopers says that's what's gonna happen to you before the night is over if you don't tell us what we want to know (Shakur 2014: 9).

Shakur mentions how scared she was throughout as the night nurses, doctors and troopers came in and out of her hospital room. The purpose of all that was to threaten and plead with her by offering her an official pardon. Her first night in the hospital was a crucial night for both her and the oppressive political system represented by the state troopers. Because she was in a volatile moment, isolated and vulnerable, in her position she could have easily been coerced to any accusation the state had conjured against her. But she resisted, she refused to answer any of the questions the detectives posed to her. The pivotal moment of her arrest was when she was questioned and threatened to admit that she shot a state trooper. At that moment had she admitted to shooting the state trooper that would have been her moment of erasure, she would have fallen into the state's trap. In admitting to the crime she would have submitted to the erasure of the black body. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's moments of arrest marked an entry point of how whiteness insisted in erasing the black body. It was racist oppressive structures that declared wars on black bodies through state systems, laws, and institutions.

Kumanyika (2016) writes about the war on black bodies, he refers to two of the United States (US) Policies that are parallel to the notion of war on black bodies. The first is the War on Drugs Policy that was introduced by President Richard Nixon in 1969, which was part of his special message to the Congress on Control of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in which he suggested that drug users should be the prime concern of the drug policy—the arrest rates were disproportionately targeted at African Americans. The second is the War on Terror, which was subsequently initiated after the terrorist attacks that occurred in the US on 9 September 2011 when the planes-turned-missiles crashed into the World Trade Center and damaged the Pentagon (Shah 2013). Both policies are US policing policy, the former identifies drug users as public enemies. A public enemy refers to a dangerous criminal. The latter was an overt domestic Islamophobia policy. In both policies, the use of the word "war" has an ideological intent and informed interpretation. Through

interpretation, the war on drugs and war on terror becomes metaphorical wars because of the vague identification of the enemy compared to a formally declared war that has a specific enemy. This vague nature of these metaphorical wars suggests a denial of who and where the aggression is directed at and intended for. According to Kumanyika (2016: 256), metaphorical wars "make it possible to deny the ugly intent of the violent repression of specific groups, while unleashing the mindsets, mechanisms and literal machinery of war".

Metaphorical wars become a constitutive material of violence against black bodies while creating the logical impression of denying that war truly does exist against black bodies. Consequently, the use of the word "war" supports the justification of war. In the context of war, violence and aggression of humans and civil rights are legitimate between warring parties. There is a sense of legitimacy in the act and language of war that is applied to the black body, it is unjust and denies human, civil, political, and cultural rights (Kumanyika 2016). These metaphorical wars enter into an illegal imagination that supports the possibility of erasure. By extension, these "wars" are wars on black bodies. To take it further, Shakur is currently still labelled as "the most wanted woman" by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). She is currently considered a terrorist by the US government. Madikizela-Mandela was arrested under section 6 of the Terrorism Act. This should indicate that these wars against black bodies can be traced back in history, their legacy is that of oppression onto black bodies. In the same nature as the war on terror initiated by the US in 2011 in principle replicates the same principles of erasure and oppression directed towards a certain kind of people.

By way of elaborating the metaphorical analysis on wars on black bodies, Foucault (1977a: 11) speaks of how "the body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or make it work, it is to deprive the individual of liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property". Moreover, as a result of being restrained "a whole army of technicians took over from the executioner…" (Foucault 1977a: 11). By the army, he refers to medical doctors, interrogators, psychologists, psychiatrists, and wardens in prison. An army is the personnel of war, an army is those that physically engage in war. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) recalls that was taken for an examination to the doctor she was restricted to speak to anybody and the hospital was cleared of all the patients and she has locked up alone in the prison hospital. She is placed in a position to be in combat alone, she stands alone against the army, isolated from her comrades (prisoners).

Shakur (2014: 206) recalls that "they sent the psychiatrist, who had the nerve to ask if I was depressed". Madikizela-Mandela had to endure the same confrontation Shakur had with the psychiatrists. She was bought two psychiatrists who carried an interview. Madikizela-Mandela notes how they asked her absurd questions about her children and problems. Both the psychiatrists claimed they wanted to help Madikizela-Mandela. During that interview, she was asked whether she is depressed. Both gestures of bringing in psychiatrists and making assumptions on depression and questioning Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela sanity were purely based on efforts of making both appear unstable. The experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela described above can be summed as a gesture of war, claiming these as women as unfit. The doctors, wardens, and psychiatrists are a manifestation of war, they are the personnel of war—of war that is against Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, by extension, the war against black bodies.

The act of war against black bodies is placed in the context of "the hold" (Sharpe 2016). Sharpe explains that when in prison the black is constantly living in the hold. The prison is a contemporary version of the hold, the hold is a slave ship, where slaves inhabit and are inhabited. Sharpe makes reference to Delbo (1995) who mentions that in the slave ship there are arrivals and departures. Delbo explains what happens in the hold and prison. When arrested and being taken into prison and arriving there ultimately makes no difference for the slave because whether the slave is in or outside of the prison the conditions are the same. The slave who becomes a prisoner is encountered with the same violence they experience outside of prison. It is violence that propagates war against black bodies. It utilises brutality through the use of guns, harassment, banning orders, and arrests. Black bodies are in a constant position of the hold, this is illustrated by the conditions they exist in, because whether in prison where one is presumed to be restricted the same ultimately applies for those who are not in prison—who are presumed to be free. But that is not evident for the black body—the black body is constantly in the hold. Since erasure aims at invalidating the black body –the hold thus becomes a patent and constant place that the black has to be confined to, moreover, this position is maintained by declaring wars on black bodies. For Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur being in and out of prison made no difference to them as long as what fundamentally remained was the oppressive systems they still considered themselves as still imprisoned. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) explains that the hold exists both inside and outside of prison. "The whole country is a prison for a black man—and when you are inside, you know why you are there and the people

who put you there also know", she says (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 97). She understood that the hold was the position of the black body whether in or out of prison.

These wars were just reconfigurations of how black bodies are criminalised, they are part of an underlying strategy imbued crime with race. To a certain degree, it depoliticises the racial struggle. For instance, in the US a backlash of opponents of the civil rights movement put forward crime legislation that acted as a panacea to racial unrest. It made the face of criminality black (Loury 2008). These are the sort of undertones of racial profiling that made black bodies criminals, whether in and out of prison the crime problem is associated with the black body.

Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were harassed in and out of prison. Madikizela-Mandela (2003) notes how the police would come in now and then with no permits and raid her home. The same tactic was used when she was in prison—the wardens would come in her cell at any time to search. Madikizela-Mandela remembers a day after returning to her cell from consulting with her legal team, she found all clothes on the floor covered with face cream and mud. Shakur (2014) explains a similar invasion of space although hers is less physically invasive. As soon as she revoked her membership from the Black Panther Party (BPP) she started being followed everywhere she went. Her every move was monitored. "Everywhere I went it seemed like I would turn around to find two detectives following behind me" (Shakur 2014: 355). Shakur's home was bugged with listening devices, she received a tip from a friend that told her the police were waiting for her outside of her home. "Your place is crawling with pigs they are waiting for you" (Shakur 2014: 336). This is the subjugation Shakur had to encounter, the constant surveillance of her life. While Shakur (2014) was in her prison cell she recalls how it was raided. "The guards came and tore my cell apart. It was clear they were looking for something, standing on chairs, kneeling on all fours" (Shakur 2014: 233). These are the conditions of the hold, the black body is observed frequently and with no warning.

The black body is denied anything that is associated with orderliness, privacy, and conduct. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's private spaces are raided to create disorder but ultimately to disrupt their black bodies. The lives of black bodies thus are cheap and dispensable. Sharpe (2016) notes that in the hold there are keepers, they control and have power. It is through their exertion of the power that they actively participate in erasure of the black body. The keepers of the hold use the

language of violence, this language can be conveyed in various ways. Some of these ways include arrest, hunger, torture, solitary confinement, banning orders, and much inhumane treatment.

By extension and interpretation, the prison is structured based on the model of the hold. In prison, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are communicated through the language of violence by the prison wardens. But in the act of easing their defiance, they ask and appeal to the wardens for better conditions in prison. Shakur (2014) asks for treatment for her gunshot wound and Madikizela-Mandela (2003) asks for reading material. However, their appeals fall on deaf ears, because in the hold and prison Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur can ask and appeal to the wardens but nothing changes. In the same manner, as the slaves on the ship are thirsty and they ask for water but no water is given to them. Instead, the slaves are thrown overboard. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are merely a contemporary account of the hold. Fundamentally, they too are thirsty and are not given any water by the wardens by appealing to the wardens they risk being thrown overboard. It is however mindful to note that even in being thrown overboard they still cannot escape the hold. Black bodies cannot escape death it is inevitable. In fact, to some extent the black body experiences "thirst" and "death" numerous times, the black body re-lives only to die again several times. Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 18) was re-detained on 24 February 1970. She remembers a prison guard who told her and the other detainees that they were re-detained because they had violated the prison conditions by writing letters to each other while in prison.

> "I said I thought we were detained in terms of the Terrorism Act and I asked if the letters were acts of terrorism. He said it was no use cracking my head over that because in any case we would be kept at least for the next eight years, that I could be sure of" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 18).

The above indicates that even when already detained the black body is still at the odds of being re-detained, of being subjugated even more than it is already is. Already, it is confined in prison, but that is still not enough for the wardens more oppression is enforced onto the black body. In the long run, the black body becomes a resident of prison and in essence a resident of the hold.

The constant effort of the wardens, the keepers to maintain the prisoners, and the black bodies in the hold is not by accident. To re-detain them even when they are already detained is not something that is occurring by chance. It is a deliberate act of oppression to erase and eliminate the black body. The keepers and the wardens promote an anti-black world, in this world, black bodies are

without faces and identity. They are not fully human and Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela understood what it meant to exist in an anti-black world that does not recognise them. In prison and the hold they are only identified by their prison numbers. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur undergo an identification process in prison, this process displaces them as others and as prisoners. It creates a separation between the self and the other. The other being prisoner is identified through parameters of sameness and it disallows difference. Thus, as prisoners, they exist and are only acknowledged as a number and not a human being. A critical question arises from Gordon (2008) linked to understanding the position of the black body. Gordon (2008: 87) asks "what should one do when the place of discursive opposition has been barred to some people?" Gordon is asking how do black bodies engage with white bodies, with the keepers and the wardens. He is asking how can black bodies participate and have an opportunity to express an agency or particularly any political agency. The only possible way to do this is to establish a political activity, however, that political activity will always be considered as illegitimate and violent. This is exactly the case when referring to how the political activity and agendas of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were perceived by the US government and the apartheid regime. Both women were regarded as political threats to state systems, they were seen as individuals inciting violence and illegitimate political activity, they threatened the status quo of the oppressive state systems. Thus, their political activity was responded to with hostility and benevolence. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's political activity could never be understood on the same level as that of the oppressive state systems, and by extension, the political movements they belonged to could never be acknowledged as legitimate organisations. In fact, in 1970 Edgar Hoover the director of the FBI made a public statement that the BPP was a terrorist organisation and a hate group (Aron 2017). The apartheid regime also labelled the ANC as a terrorist organisation (Madikizela-Mandela 2013). These decisions by both states revert to the idea of erasure. By labelling these organisations as terrorist organisations they are simply then identified as threats and need to be erased.

Erasure is about removing the black body from the hierarchy of being and making it less. It is a process of suppressing and confining the black body. It also produces the cultural production of whiteness that requires the prolonged active denial of the black body. While strengthening white identity as successive and presuming whiteness as racially pure (Mullen 1994). Mullen (1994: 72) writes "the white-skinned African-American becomes white through a process of silencing and suppression, by denying, "forgetting", ignoring or erasing evidence of African ancestry, so does

the "pure white" family constitute itself by denying kinship with its non-white members as the racially diverse nation claims a white European identity by marginalising its non-European heritages". In essence, any association with blackness is denied, Mullen notes few whites will openly identify and acknowledge African ancestry themselves white Americans that descend from African-Americans who identify themselves as white will not acknowledge their African ancestry. Therefore, this indicates that what is white cannot come from blackness. Whiteness is pure it cannot be associated with blackness. To maintain this purity the position of the hold is devised and maintained through penial systems such as the prison, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are thus kept in the hold. To a certain extent, the hold and the prison are made to be normalised for black bodies and indirectly leads to the nature of arrests and re-detaining of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

The naturalised and literal location of the hold is a prison, however, other spaces are less obvious spaces of the hold in which the black body exists within such as townships, ghettos, and the apartheid devised Bantustans. These spaces are best interpreted as metaphorical prisons. The house black bodies just as prisons house their prisoners. They are the source of tutelage, where the black body is to be disciplined and subjected. It is the location of where objectification and silencing of the black body occur (Bogues 2015). The site of erasure is where black bodies become invisible, they are reduced to numbers, routined, and conditioned to blackness. Ultimately, the black body in the space of erasure loses individuality and becomes compartmentalised into existing as a collective of blackness.

In the space of prison, the black body is criminalised in the sense that it represents wrongness, impurity. In prison, black bodies are represented by a blackness that has forged a universal exchange which makes blackness entrenched in historical forms of racial prejudice (Moten 2018a). By this understanding, oppressive systems of rule such as colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid seem to ideologically succeed upon one another thus, creating somewhat an ordinary trace of the condition of blackness. Moten (2018a: 21) defines blackness as, "the existence of the impossibility of existing… brutal imposition". It is a position that confines the black body to an impossibility. The belief is that the black body needs to be contained in the hold away from purity, separated from whiteness. Criminality becomes so increasingly tied to race, that it is only the black body that is capable of crime. The hold separates the black body and white body. The black body

needs to be contained away from whiteness so that does not contaminate whiteness with its criminality. Marriott (2000: 15) describes the production of blackness as based on white imagination that positions the black body in "a fatal way of being alive". It is a deadly way of being alive, it is being reduced to a life of captivity and mutilation, it is a position of not looking human and it is saturated in violence and white supremacy. Sexton (2015: 173) considers blackness "as an affected, fetal way of being alive, both unborn and undead: blackness is unbearable and unburiable". Blackness portrays itself as inescapable. Marriott (2007: 226) describes blackness as "a right to death that sees in death its most essential property". But Sexton (2015) warns that this pursuit of death should not be confused with a willingness to die based on ethical grounds such as when Fanon (2008[1967]: 1999) asserts "and I believe that a man who takes a stand against this living death is in a way a revolutionary". Rather the kind of death that emanates from blackness is death that affirms a dehumanised black body. Blackness is met with a peculiar existential force that reconfigures its formations. According to Sexton (2012: 1) "blackness is theory itself, anti-blackness the resistance to the theory". By this Sexton means that anti-blackness affirms itself through the negation of self.

Gordon (1995) notes that blackness emerges as a consequence of white identity. He uses the example of the word "nigger"—he writes "blacks who appropriate 'nigger' into their language have declared a state of war on blacks by way of magically appropriating a white foundational ego based on an anti-black superego" (Gordon 1995: 115). Then, on the other hand, some blacks engage in collective actions of whiteness such as lynching blacks. This act can be regarded as an effort to escape their blackness, it is an effort to appropriate whiteness. The logic behind such acts is to punish blacks to deny their desire to be white (Gordon 1995). Gordon asserts that this form of anti-blackness encourages an absolute negation of whiteness, thus blacks are regarded as the opposite of whites. Whites and blacks are placed on opposite ends; whites are good and blacks are bad. Gordon problematises this comparison by noting that blackness is always the derivative of whiteness. Blackness is dependent upon whiteness. The role of blacks among blacks becomes about putting others in 'their place'. It is aggressive behaviour that makes efforts to submerge other blacks into their facticity. Consequently, this results in shifting anti-blackness away from the white body and giving the illusion that it is an autonomous notion that is self-functioning. Gordon's understanding of anti-blackness suggests that some black people immerse themselves in blackness so that they can evade the responsibility of making choices in the anti-black world (Gordon 1995).

It is the black body that perpetuates anti-blackness because it negates it's being to the white body. Gordon explains that the world is separated based on the perception of absence between the black and white body—this absence leads to fate. On the other hand, is a presence that leads to freedom. The black bodies live based on fate—meaning they are absent beings waiting for events to occur while having no agency. The white bodies live based on the freedom they live as present subjects. The black bodies are mere "being-among-beings" (Gordon 1995: 101). It is within this juncture that the being of the black body is erased from humanity.

In the purpose of containing whiteness in the prison, the hold is the space in which colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid presuppose the fate of the black body. Imprisonment thus becomes the fate destined for the black body, it is the abstract site of where the undesirable are deposited. It is critical to consider the documentation process of imprisonment during segregation in the US and apartheid in South Africa. Both oppressive systems utilised a strategic system of documenting prisoners. Prisoners were documented through a numbering system whereby a prisoner was to be referred to by their prison number. Prisoners themselves were also forced to refer to themselves by their prison number, if they refused they would not be acknowledged. In closely assessing this numbering system the identity of a prisoner is dissolved in a prison number. Through this process of documentation, archives are developed in terms of bodies and days. Foucault (1977a) mentions that this creates the procedures of examination as part of a system of intense documentation. He notes a "power of writing" that becomes essential for mechanisms of discipline. But yet, it should be noted that "the power of writing" can manifest in a different form. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela illustrate this different through self-writing. But, in this case, it becomes a disciplinary measure of documenting, translating into the notion that there is a partipacular criterion used to document a prisoner—the registers, the circulation during visits and regular meetings with doctors centralises the body into data (Foucault 1977a). It reduces Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur into analytical objects of data. This is a clear indication of erasing the identity of an individual. The purpose is to create a loss on individuality, to create a sense of conformity in a space on confinement. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's existence threatened the existence of whiteness, it threatened the legitimacy and just nature of whiteness. Thus, both women had to be criminalised to contain whiteness.

The Western narrative supports the idea of the body as the centrality of relation—the body is the site and cause of differences. For the black female who is incarcerated in this context Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, they find themselves in the position where their bodies are sites of endless possibilities. Anything can happen to their bodies with the justification that they exist within bodily experiences. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were arrested in a brutal nature that exemplifies the act of almost being erased out of existence both in the literal and figurative form. Being erased out of existence in the literal form refers to the actual act and moment of arrest and the figurative refers to the deeper meaning of what the arrest symbolises for both these women and as well the oppressive systems responsible for their arrests. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur find themselves in the category of being black and female. They are already labelled under a category that reduces them to a non-human. In the hold, these women exist as racialised beings by being black and female thus the conditions and relationships that unfold in the space of the hold are justified by the oppressive state systems that assert them.

3.3 The Dual Curse: Black and Female

The relational structure between the coloniser and colonised is dictated by positions of power. The coloniser must establish and maintain the role of superior biology as a way of affirming their privilege and dominance over "Others". As a result of this relational structure between the coloniser and colonised those who are different genetically are inferior and consequently have disadvantaged social positions. According to Oyewumi (2005: 3), "the notion of society that emerges from this conception is that society is constituted by bodies and as bodies—male bodies, female bodies, Jewish bodies, Aryan bodies, black bodies, white bodies, rich bodies, poor bodies". She states that the use of the word "body" in two ways. Firstly, as the metonymy for biology and secondly to draw attention to the sheer physicality that seems to attach being in Western culture (Oyewumi 2005). Hence, the notion of being is only ascribed to those who belong to the superior biology and society of Western culture. Franklin (2017) points to the historical use of the black female body as the "sheer physicality" which Oyewumi mentions he notes its use for sexual satisfaction and profit. Franklin (2017: 19) writes "they have suckled their own infants with one breast and their mistress's with the other; endured the sexual attentions of any men who felt entitled to their bodies; and bore children they knew would live out their days as pieces of property—if they would live out their days at all". Franklin (2017: 20) further notes that "black women have

been abused emotionally, sexually, spiritually, physically, and psychologically. They have been damaged". By being black and female this renders an inescapable position of "Otherness" and "non-human". Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur fit into the category of "otherness" and "non-human" by existing in oppressive state systems. Although it is not a category they have consent to, it is executed upon them. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experience this in the hold, in prison. It translates to what Lugones (2007) describes as a colonially imposed new gender system that created very different arrangements for colonised males and females concerning white colonisers. The starting point is the hierarchical dichotomy created the notion that the colonised were non-human—thus, there were non-human males, and women were judged on two critical bases that mark a dual prejudice on them they were non-human and non-male thus they lacked on two levels. Colonised men were not regarded as incomplete because they are not women-like (Lugones 2010). Colonised women were reduced through dehumanisation, which is an attempt to categorise them as less than human. Lugones (2010: 745) notes that category of the "colonised women" is an empty category, since "no women are colonised; no colonised females are women". Black females find themselves in this position—they are colonised, therefore, they cannot be human beings and they are even less than the colonised male (Lugones 2010).

The underlying fact is that the black female is situated within two subordinated groups which frequently pursue conflicting political agendas. This position of the black female feeds into debates about intersectionality. Intersectionality is revealed in the racial and gender power dynamics (Cho, Crenshaw, and McCall 2013). It emerged as a product of judicial erasure of black women's subjectivity. It was a manner of judicial structures to erase women. Crenshaw (1990) explains the black female experiences a racial and gendered existence because racism as experienced by a black man sets the parameters of antiracist strategies just as sexism experienced by white women grounds women's movements. It is as though the black female's existence is outside of both categories—issues of race and patriarchy are not articulated in their full dimension in interrogating racism and sexism. According to Crenshaw (1990: 1232), "women of colour experience racism in ways not always the same as those experienced by men of colour and sexism in ways not always parallel to experiences of white women, antiracism and feminism are limited even on their terms". This is the position that creates a dual curse for black women. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur found themselves in this position, they were denied humanity based on their race and gender.

Smith (1987: 30) notes that in Western societies "a man's body gives credibility to his utterance, whereas a woman's body takes it away from hers". There is a difference in hierarchy enshrined on bodies and it is a function of ascribed social roles and not the biological reality of maleness and femaleness. Laqueur (1990: 54) writes "A woman is a female who is free; a man is a male who is a citizen". Thus, women are categorised as living and existing in bodily experience. There is nothing more to their existence than their bodies—their existence is confined only to their bodies. Their existence cannot be beyond bodily experience. Women are excluded from the category of citizenship because they lack "penis possession" and that is the qualifying measure of citizenship. Both black men and women did not have citizenship under apartheid—they were excluded from the genre of being. They were not regarded as human and rational beings. This how women were excluded from the genre of being—because of being a black female.

This understanding of the body gives it a logic of its own. Thus, it is believed by looking at the body one can tell a person's beliefs and social position or lack thereof. The body then becomes the bedrock on which social order is based on—the body is always *in* view and *on* view. Therefore, the body invites the gaze. Oyewumi (2005), defines this gaze as a gaze of differentiation or a gendered gaze. By this she means, the body invites the gaze because it is primarily perceived by sight and the differentiation of human bodies occurs based on sex, skin colour, and cranium size— these are the parameters of the gaze. Western culture considers the body as the site of difference. Western discourse developed a binary opposition between body and mind. The body was seen as a trap from which any rational person had to escape. The physical site of the body was denied existence, thus "bodylessness" became the precondition of rational thought. Therefore, women, primitives, Jews, Africans, and the poor are considered to be dominated by instinct and impulsive behaviour and lack reason. In contrast, men were guided by reason thus they were rational. This created a distinct difference between the two; women were useful only through the use of their bodies and men were useful by the use of their minds. Thus, creating two social categories "man of reason" (the thinker) and "woman of the body" which are constructed as oppositional to one another (Oyewumi 2005). Such constructions indicate how women are subjugated. This was the position that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were existing within because they were black females.

This is the position that instigates self-writing in response. It suggests the bodily inscription and it is a position in which those deemed as "non-human" exercise defiance. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur resist the label of the non-human by self-writing. The "non-human" write in conditions that do not allow them to write. They write through the body that is not supposed to write. They write in an imprisoned condition and a "bodylessness" condition. Their writing becomes a form of rebellion and revolt against the coloniser. It is writing that occurs because life is at stake and writing against the impossibility of writing. By the imposition of being female, they embody femininity and femininity extends the degree of violence towards those who are regarded as feminine. But for the black female body—it is not considered feminine enough it is outside the standards and norms of the feminine therefore, the black female body is not recognised as female. It results in further dehumanisation and it extends to what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to experience in prison. They were denied basic human needs such as showering and adequate toiletries (Madikizela-Mandela 2003, Shakur 2014).

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur both had to endure the power that was exerted by the prison wardens. For both women had to be trapped in the dual curse of being black and female they carried an innate struggle of their bodies being sites of resistance (Griffin 1996). Mullen (1994) notes that in the US racial difference is an instrument of dividing and categorising people. Furthermore, the black female is the furthest from all advantages that whiteness has to offer. This is because as explained above the black female has no citizenship in an oppressive state, due to being black and female. The black female remains in the last place in a racist-sexist hierarchy of privilege and oppression (Mullen 1994). The black female endures multi-layered oppressive forces. The language of race is one of the oppressive forces both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to encounter while detained

According to Lazreg (2005: 69), "the language of race belongs to the history of social segregation". The purpose in the language of race is to create command, command by its nature is not reciprocal it is instructive and dictates. It further creates a relational power between the person giving commands and the one receiving commands. In the context of prison naturally, the wardens give commands to the prisoners. It is a vertical relationship that runs across the racial lines, it is interpreted as the superior to inferior relationship and it is articulated through the language of race

which is the language of power. It is expressed in a descending tone to carry the weight of authority.

Shakur (2014) experienced this descending tone and the use of the language race through her encounter with Mrs. Butterworth on her first day in prison. Mrs. Butterworth was the prison warden in the women's section. Mrs. Butterworth understands the power she had over the prisoners—this was evident in her tone and in the manner she referred to her prisoners. Her first encounter with Shakur seemed patronising and demeaning.

> "Well, JoAnne, is there anything I can do for you?"
>
> "When can I be unlocked from this cell and go outside in the big room with other women?"
>
> "Well I do not know JoAnne. Why do you want to go out there?"
>
> "Well I do not want to stay in here all day, locked up by myself."
>
> "Why, JoAnne, don't you like your room? It's a very nice room we had it painted just for you."…. Well, JoAnne, I don't know when you'll be able to come out. You see we have to keep you in here for your own safety because there are threats on your life."
>
> "Well, JoAnne, the important thing is for you to behave and cooperate with us so that well be able to send a good report to the judge. It's important for our girls to behave like ladies." (Shakur 2014: 67).

Shakur and Mrs. Butterworth's first encounter illustrates the power dynamics between the two of them. Mrs. Butterworth addresses Shakur in a condensing tone. She attempts to show Shakur that she holds the power in prison and that she is in charge. Shakur ought to submit to her command. Her words to Shakur insinuate that she should be happy that she is in prison because they have tried to make her feel as comfortable and safe as possible to accommodate her and therefore she should "behave and cooperate". Mrs. Butterworth mentions to Shakur that her "girls" respect her and they refer to her as Mrs. Butterworth and she refers to them in their first names. She commands Shakur that she ought to do the same. Mrs. Butterworth is aware that she carries the commanding power and Shakur ought to be submissive (Shakur 2014).

In the space of the hold the power dynamics are evident, whiteness is superior, hence it holds power and authority and blackness is inferior. Therefore, it is expected to be submissive at all times

in fact to adopt a naturalised form of submissiveness. Moreover, Smith (1987), Lugones (2010), and Laqueur (1990) as already mentioned above speak of how the black female is at the lowest in the hierarchy of being. The black female is subject to a lower and worse position compared to the black male in the context of oppression although both are colonised subjects. The black female is barred by patriarchal structures thus, she experiences a racist-sexist hierarchy of privilege and oppression because she is black and female. Patriarchal structures are an explanation of female subordination, in the case of Madikizela-Mandela patriarchal oppression was far more adverse because she had male interrogators. Patriarchy gives absolute power and priority to men, thus limiting women's rights (Sultana 2010). Sultana (2010: 3) emphasises that "the patriarchal system is characterised by power, dominance, hierarchy, and competition". How Madikizela-Mandela's interrogators bestow their power derives from patriarchal grounds. Patriarchy reinforces norms and practices which define women as inferior, resulting in men being able to dominate women—it ultimately creates superior and inferior relations between men and women. Although Shakur experience's a gendered nature of oppression in a different light, but ultimately, she is disrespected not only because she us black, but being female makes her less respected by Mrs. Butterworth, because Mrs. Butterworth is aware that being black is reason enough to justify oppression but black female have less physical power to even defy that oppression. Mrs. Butterworth recognises weakness in Shakur because she is female.

Madikizela-Mandela was subjected to the power dynamics of superior to inferior relations of a detainee. She described her first two weeks of being detained as the "softening up" period. Because, in those two weeks many prisoners would have already had a mental breakdown, end up submitting to the domination and accusations the state-imposed to one. But, Madikizela-Mandela was considered a special case, thus, she had to be dealt with extraordinarily. After two weeks of being detained in solitary confinement, she was taken for interrogation. The chief interrogator was Major Theunis Jacobus Swanepoel, then there was Major Gert Coetzee that Madikizela-Mandela considered to be "good cop". Major Swanepoel appeared to use personal insults to try to get information out Madikizela-Mandela, whereas Major Coetzee would feign compassion and offer to help her. Major Coetzee does not differ much from Mrs. Butterworth—their use of language and tone is aimed at patronising the detainee to submit to their allegations (du Preez Bezdrob 2003).

The "good cop" Major Coetzee would use words such as "cooperate" which is a very violent word that is quiet sanitised its import. The "good cop" used words that implied that Madikizela-Mandela was acting rebellious unnecessarily and that if she would "cooperate" and act accordingly she would be pardoned. The "good cop" always had food to offer and promised to get her a doctor. He asked: "why go through this hardship?" She was young and beautiful, and she owed it to Zenani and Zindziswa (Madikizela-Mandela's daughters) to live a normal life, he said (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 144-145).

Ultimately, at the centre of how Mrs. Butterworth and Major Coetzee communicate with their detainees indicates a tone of attempting to create a false relationship with both these black bodies. But they are not acknowledged, they appear as bodies that are to be disciplined and disembodied. They are labelled faceless and numbers in prison but the warden's attempt in making them feel as though they are acknowledged for who they are. But, of course, it is critical to remain mindful of how Mrs. Butterworth and Major Coetzee define these black females in terms of the power dynamics. Mrs. Butterworth and Major Coetzee are well aware that they are superior to these black females and this superiority is indicated in the manner they communicate and utilise the language of race and power. But, there is this element of dependency in the power dynamic. Major Coetzee and Mrs. Butterworth cannot be superior without the space of prison, they depend on this extralegal space that justifies their authority. They depend on the prison system to be prison wardens and to be proved with prisoners. Because without this prison space they have no authority to the degree they have in prison. Major Coetzee and Mrs. Butterworth rely on a fictionalised power created by racist oppressive systems. Overall, the structures and systems of power in prison preserve both the black body and the white body in that for the white body to dominate and exercise its power it needs the black body. Without the black body, the white body has no site to exercise its power, and consequently without the white body and its exercise of power and domination the notion of the black body can cease to exist because the black body is a construct of subjugation created by the white body. For Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur the dual curse is revealed in their lives by existing as black females—firstly by being black they belong to an inferior racial cast, there being is already denied by being black. Secondly, as females, they are subjugated by patriarchal and oppressive structures that insist on placing them in an inferior position.

3.4 The Site of a Paradox: The Body

In the position of the hold, the black body exists in a paradox. In basic terms, a paradox suggests a contradictory statement. A paradox insinuates an action or situation that seems impossible but in actuality it is true. Existing in the paradox is to exist in a place that one is not meant to be in or existing against what is expected. It is a contradictory position—the black body exists in such a condition. The black body is located in the site of a paradox that is created by the relational power dynamics between the superior and inferior. The superior is represented by oppressive systems such as apartheid, colonialism, segregation, and slavery and the inferior which are the recipients of these oppressive systems. Through this relational structure, how the black body responds to these oppressive systems creates a paradox. Since the black body is meant to be submissive, obedient, and inferior to the oppressive systems, by rejecting and resisting this position a paradox is created. The black body becomes a site of a paradox. The black body becomes the power matrix of which it proclaims its resistance, it becomes a site of existence by rejecting what oppressive systems impose on it. The black body becomes a nexus of being through resisting what whiteness imposes onto it. Whiteness attempts to socialise and discipline black bodies into living in a world that is organised by lines of differentiation. These lines of differentiation are defined by structures and symbols that refer to indigeneity and blackness as markers of damnation and animality. In essence, the black body is thus subject to exist in damnation (Maldonado Torres 2018). However, it resists this position and through resistance, the paradox emerges suggesting that the black body denies damnation.

In understanding the site of paradox a phenomenology of the black body is required. Cleaver (1968) assumes this phenomenology as based on a division between the bodily and mental experiences of blacks and whites, which obscurely supports an ethical dualism of white as "good" and black as "evil" that has been reinforced for over long centuries. Cleaver focuses on the psychophysical aspect of which the black body is understood only as existing through the bodily experience thus making the mental capacity of the black body non-existent. Cleaver assigns names to the two types of bodies, the black body is "The Supermasculine Menial" this black body is "tropical, warm, hot, soft, pleasing to touch, luscious to the kiss". Whites are the "The Omnipotent Administrator" they are characterised by "weakness, frailty, cowardice, efficacy, decay and impotence" (Cleaver 1968: 191-193). Although he explains and assigns a difference between the

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white and black body he does note that the "for man can take two divergent and non-reconcilable perspectives upon himself because within man there is a non-coincidence" (Cleaver 1968: 191).

According to Cleaver, the main issue within the phenomenology of the black body is consciousness and the body. He notes that it is critical to understand how blacks experience their bodies within a world of racial restriction. Cleaver suggests a broader consideration of experience, the body, and consciousness. In the field of modern philosophy, the idea of man is not identical to his physical being man is often presented as a mixture of mind and matter, consciousness, and body. How modern philosophy presents man is exactly what Cleaver is trying to consider in understanding the phenomenology of the black body. Cleaver (1968: 191) notes that "consciousness is experienced as being identical with, yet curiously distinct from, the body". If what Cleaver states are accurate then modern philosophy could either be categorised as concerned with consciousness or the body or reconciling the two together. Merleau-Ponty (1996: 198) considers a simple formulation to rectify this false ethical dualism that marks the division between "The Supermasculine Menial" and "The Omnipotent Administrator"—he corrects this line of differentiation by proclaiming "I am my body". He notes the body is what roots the subject to the world, it anchors one to history, it individualises one and it makes perception and meaning possible. It is a point of reference to the universe. "I, as subject, am often at 'one' with it, yet my relation as a human self to my body is also that of radical otherness. I am my body while I am also not my body" (Merleau-Ponty 1996: 82).

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur resonate with this because they were not acknowledged as human, they are seen as just objects to be moved around whenever it satisfies the wardens. They do not acknowledge their concerns and cries. They are just simply bodies housed in prison. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur both describe prison cells that are dirty and unhygienic conditions. Shakur (2014) could only change her prison uniform once a week. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) was only permitted shower on certain days and often it would be on very cold days and the water was cold so she would have to keep her body clean using her sanitary bucket and drinking water by pouring it into her hands to wash her face and mouth. In addition, to unhygienic prison conditions, their black bodies had to endure innutritious food.

In essence, Merleau-Ponty notes that he experiences consciousness through his body, he is aware of his body through his mind, therefore without his body, his mind would not be able to experience

consciousness because his body is the site and place of where consciousness occurs. Consequently, without his mind, he would not be aware of his body and physicality, thus itis through his mind that he is aware of the body and the world. That is how "embodied consciousness" occurs –I am conscious of the world through the medium of my body. The body becomes a site where consciousness occurs, it is the nexus of thinking therefore the body is the anchorage to the world. With that noted "intentionality" should be considered since it is the structure that gives meaning to experience (Johnson 1993). Johnson notes that intentions are at the centre of consciousness, they are the *noesis*-pole they determine how we perceive the world. Intentions give form to consciousness and act, the mind is not passive it is a participant of each act of knowing, thus consciousness is embodied—consciousness occurs with intention.

Johnson (1993: 604) suggests, that although one can be conscious of one's body "I know that I cannot see myself as others see me, white and black, as if the secret of my body and the objectivity of its "outside" belongs, not to me, but to everyone else". Johnson is alluding that consciousness of the self is also subject to those outside of the self to make the judgement of acknowledging your presence and conscious self. Therefore, one does not have control over how the world perceives you. He notes "I am black. I do not see what the white other sees in my skin" (Johnson 1993: 604). "My body gives me the world, but, as that world is given, it is one in which I can be unseen" (Johnson 1993: 604). The black body is unseen regardless of that black body being self-conscious. Being unseen means not being recognised and acknowledged as a being. Johnson notes an incident while walking down a hallway at the university he passes a professor he knows, the professor glances up quickly and does not acknowledge that he knows him. Johnson (1993: 604) writes, "a black, a body, that remains for him always in the background, seldom figured forth save as maid, taxi driver, or janitor…he sees me as he sees the fire extinguisher to my left, that chair outside the door. I have been seen, yet not seen: acknowledged as present to him, but in a peculiar way". This moment highlights how black bodies are seen but yet unseen. To the white body, a black body is merely an object as it is seen in the same manner as the fire extinguisher and chair are seen—they are objects. Johnson then calls to the professor to greet him, the professor offers his hand to shake. He mentions that he sees what the professor sees the darkness of his body suggests a "stain" for both him and the professor. In essence, the stain of the black body darkens consciousness because it overrides existing as subject and yields existing as an object. Johnson refers to such an experience as "black-as-body" this is the condition in which the black body experiences life. This

experience is intensified by the body's appearance as black and as "stained", it lacks interiority and Johnson refers to the work of Fanon (1967: 87) where he writes "I am overdetermined from without. I am a slave not of the 'idea' that others have of me but of my own appearance". This explains that the black body is visible or seen through the perspective of the white lenses. It is through the perspective that "sees" a body and not within the body. It "sees" and recognises the physicality, but yet it recognises it in a peculiar physicality that Johnson notes as a physicality equivalent to that of an object such as fire extinguisher. An object when "seen" is recognised through its "stained" nature. This position then obscures from the "embodied consciousness" which relates to experiencing the mind through the awareness of the body it deviates from this logic creating the problem of a "stained body". Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced the feeling of being stained bodies while they were in prison.

The carceral experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were devised in such a manner as to redefine and redirect their self-identity that shapes their being. Johnson (1993) speaks of the notion of being "stained" as a black body. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced the awareness of being "stained" in the figurative and literal sense because these women were incarcerated under prison conditions that were unsanitary and degrading to their health. Madikizela-Mandela explains her daily routine she begins in the morning by cleaning her cell. She would wash her face and hands into the sanitary bucket with drinking water from her mug. She had trained her stomach to only relieve herself once a day in the morning after washing her mouth, face, and hands because her sanitary bucket would only be cleaned once a day. When it is changed in the morning she is given a "clean" one that is not even disinfected. To add to the unhygienic conditions she had to endure in prison, she was given three filthy blankets that had a strong stench and stains of urine, the blankets were covered with bugs. Madikizela-Mandela (2003) had high standards of cleanliness but she had to endure the revolting conditions of prison. She notes that her obsession with hygiene was the most difficult obstacle to overcome. She spent many days without bathing or showering. Her food would be placed on a bucket that was not cleaned and disinfected. These conditions illustrate the reality of the black body as "stained". The black body in this case is proof that it does not require to be seen, it is stained just like the blankets that are stained with urine. It is not deserving of cleanliness, it is only what is pure—which is the white body that deserves cleanliness. Thus, suggesting that a "stained" body in its nature cannot distinguish between hygienic and unhygienic conditions. The unhygienic conditions it is forced to

exist in are suitable for the black body. These conditions suggest that the black body should remain "stained" both figuratively and literally.

The idea of the paradox emerges once again when the two women refuse to accept the "stained" condition. They do not adopt the "stained" nature of their bodies that is imposed by whiteness. They resisted this "stained" nature. For both women the oppressive political systems that orchestrated their arrests and attempted to label them as "stained" represented a force of whiteness solely aimed at "unseeing" them. But, the force of resistance these women carried created the paradox. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur defied the repressive and domineering actions of Mrs. Butterworth, Major Coetzee, and Major Swanepoel by resisting. By being resistant their bodies become sites of a paradox, because of the oppressive acts they faced and the physical damage done to their bodies—their bodies resisted. Both these women were mindful that all the physical acts imposed by the oppressive political state systems were aimed at breaking their sites, being their bodies. However, the idea of the paradox emerges within both women, their actions are contradictions of what is imposed onto them. They exist against what is expected of them, they become a contradiction to nature. They persist against this "stained" nature of their bodies. Their black bodies which are presumed "stained, racialised, unseen and unconscious" reject these labels. It is that rejection that makes the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur sites of a paradox. Their black bodies resemble a paradox. The black body experiences and internalises beyond its bodily experience, it inscribes the bodily experiences into mental experiences. This distinct "thereness" and symbolic nature of the body is apparent with both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. When both women are incarcerated the warden represents the order, the innocence and purity, and they are "stained" they represent darkness and disorder.

Yancy (2005: 216) describes the body as "symbolic, its meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs and presupposes certain norms, the body is a battlefield, one that is fought over again and again across particular historical moments and within particular social spaces". This means the body provides the impression of self-evidence, it is the "thereness" it is the empirical evidence of the self. It is not the "black body" that serves as a symbolic presentation of the self. The episteme of whiteness captures the "thereness" of the white body (Yancy 2005). The white is also fundamentally symbolic, it is interpreted as the paragon of beauty, order innocence, purity, and nobility.

Yancy further argues that in theorising the black body a "phenomenological return" can occur vis-à-vis a white embodiment. He notes that—the body's meaning whether it be white or black its physical aesthetics that its "racialised appearance" and its hermeneutics, which is how the body is "seen" are a result of historical and ideological construction. Yancy mentions that the body is located through historical practices and discourses. The body is further classified by meanings that are sanctioned and are embedded within social processes. The body thus has historical plasticity, it becomes a site of contested meanings. Yancy (2005: 216) advocates for interrogating the idea of the black body as "fixed and material truth" that is based on pre-existing assumptions of relations with the world and others. He notes a critical point that the black body exists in relation to the white body that is through the episteme of whiteness, the white body just as the black body has a symbolic nature. The white body represents the paragon of beauty, purity, and nobility. Yancy refers to the white gaze, this gaze has the same meaning as that of Oyewumi (2005), which is aimed at making the black body to feel invaded, it distorts the being of the black body. It creates an anti-black experience. The gaze has power implication, it implies power upon others. Hooks (1992), explains that when a child is being punished by their parents they are asked to look into their eyes, but the child is afraid to look. This is something Hooks believes is closely related to how slaves were punished by their owners if they looked into their eyes. Slavery as founded on racial domination that denied slaves their right to gaze. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are initially denied the right to "gaze", to look by virtue of being black bodies. They are expected and forced to adopt racial invisibility. But both women reject it, their rejection is seen in the moments whereby they confront the wardens and reject oppression. They reject oppression and the gaze because if one does not do that from the onset then it becomes easy to tolerate the gaze and think it is normal. But Shakur (2014: 375) attests that "I reminded myself that Black people in amerika are oppressed… The less you think about your oppression, the more your tolerance for it grows". This is what Shakur refused to do, she refused to think less about her oppression and about the gaze she encountered with instead she looked back at that dominated her. Shakur "gazed" back at the wardens, the prosecutors in the courtroom, and the police.

The gaze is propagated in various ways, Yancy (2005) notes an incident that occurred to author and writer Ossie Davis. Yancy (2005: 217) writes "at the age of six or seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the precinct. They kept him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane syrup over his head. This only created the

opportunity for more laughter, as they *looked* upon the "silly" little black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that moment, the little black boy would be returned to himself with the statement: *I am* an object of white laughter, a buffoon. The white officers perceived Davis in a manner which they approved, they *looked* at him in a manner which they perceived as suitable for both the little black boy and themselves. They could *see* him according to their perceptions, according to the white lens, the gaze. Davis was *seen* as an object, in the same manner as Johnson (1993) was seen as an object by his professor—acknowledged peculiarly just like a fire extinguisher or a chair *seen* but not seen. Davis notes that he "went along with the game of black emasculation, it seemed natural". The black body of Davis had become a site of black buffoonery. Sartwell (1998: 11) attests that "the [white] oppressor seeks to constrain the oppressed [blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has created". At the centre of this moment of "buffoonery" that Davis experienced is that it illustrates how whiteness inflicts this notion of fixity of blackness. The gaze of the white body makes the black body inferior, it is a gaze that acknowledges a site but does not internalise the black subject as being.

To be a black body is to experience oneself as a site, as merely a body that is only seen by its physicality. Since whiteness has deemed the white body as superior it has created a racial dualism that positions the black body as inferior. The black body experiences itself as alienated, as existing only in the bodily form. Gordon (2000b: 76) writes, "*Here* is where I am located. That place, if you will, is an embodied one: it is conscious in the flesh. In the flesh, I am not only a point of view, but I am also a point that is viewed". Gordon's words are critical they further explain how the white body *sees* the black body. The black body is located in the flesh, the black body experiences the world through its flesh. Thus, it is conscious through its flesh. In considering how the black body experiences the world through its flesh it makes the existence of the black body only rendered through exteriority.

Spillers (1987) focuses on the process through which the black body is transformed into flesh then subjected to the bodily experience of only experiencing the world through exteriority, through a bodied subject. She makes the distinction between "flesh" and "body" and it is by that distinction that reveals between captive and liberated subject-positions. This meaning before the body there is flesh, the flesh is the "zero degree of social conceptualisation" (Spillers, 1987: 67). The "flesh"

has a temporal element to it, it is the conceptual cause to the body. Weheliye (2014) attests that the body is not a biological occurrence he supports Spillers (1987: 67) when she refers to it as "it is created through an elaborate apparatus consisting of the calculated work of iron, whips chains, knives, the canine patrol, the bullet and including the courts of law". Since the body represents self-possession, the flesh thus represents the dimensions that shape human life. However, for the flesh to be granted the body, to be transformed into an illusion it needs to experience the "hieroglyphics of the flesh". The captive subject, the flesh undergoes severe disjunctures that inevitably are to form a liberated subject, "a liberated body" (Spillers 1987: 67). It is at that moment of experiencing the hieroglyphics of flesh, of shaping the flesh that the "body" emerges, the black body is moulded. According to Spillers, this body thus becomes a concentration of "ethnicity" and "cultural text" and it is in that form that the black body experiences the world.

The black body experiences the world within a context that is against its existence. Shakur (2014) was subjected to experience the world through the US government's terms of identification. She was made to appear by the US government as somebody who somehow did not exist only until she was arrested she had an existence. It suggests that she has only existed as a crime and nothing else. Her birth record as documented by the US government is filed under the records of "not substantiated by birth record". Her record of existence and presence in the world is marked by her criminal record. It puts forward the idea that she only exists as a criminal and before that there is no record of her. But Shakur rejects this racially flawed reasoning and acknowledges that she was born anyway, whether there is a record of it or not it is not possible for her to simply suddenly exist as a criminal only. The US government had clear intentions on why they wanted to deny Shakur her record of birth, because of its foundation as racist oppressive state the black bodies of this state had to be denied the inception of their lives. Since black bodies lack an inner life, they were merely objects of criminality therefore, it was not necessary to acknowledge their beginnings and their birth as a monumental point. Fanon (1967) notes how the experiences of the world have denied him his inner life. He notes that there is an absence from his inner life "I arrived in the world anxious to make sense of things, my spirit filled with desire to be at the origin of the world, and here I discovered myself an object among other objects" (Fanon 1987: 82). Fanon explains that in the world he existed in he was a mere object among other objects. By stating he is an object his referring to his body as flesh—that is how the world experiences his body. This is exactly what

Shakur was experiencing in her birth record being undocumented and unacknowledged by the US government.

Gordon (2015) explains Fanon's thoughts as, "the paradox of black experience" meaning that black bodies cannot have *experiences,* they cannot be *seen* because black bodies do not have a point of view, they do not have a conscious or inner life. Gordon explains that the black *experience* is meant not to exist because the black body should not be able to transcend itself to intersubjective, to acknowledge and experience itself on a conscious level. Accordingly, "black experience suffers from a failure to bridge the gap between subjective life and the world…it is an experience that is not an experience" (Gordon 2015: 48). This means the existence of the black body is reduced to that which is noticed by white bodies—noticed in the sense of only acknowledging the exterior and nothing else. Noticed in the sense of being *seen* and yet *unseen* simultaneously in the same gaze.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are familiar with this gaze. This gaze is the same gaze that occurred in their moments of arrest. As discussed above, their moments of arrest marked the moment of erasure. How they were arrested also marks how they were *seen* and *unseen* simultaneously at the moment. Both women are labelled terrorists and rebels against oppressive state political systems. When arrested they are both physically handled in an unruly manner, their bodies are seen as objects to solicit information from and nothing else. This is because whiteness acknowledges the black body as only to exist and experience the world in the flesh. It is for that reason that they are both imprisoned in horrific conditions. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 141) attests that "the food was clearly not meant to sustain, but literally just to keep the prisoners alive". This indicates the value placed on the black body, the black body in oppressive state systems is only to be used when required thereafter it can be disposed of. When Madikizela-Mandela was imprisoned she was given food just to keep her alive until the apartheid police could get the information they needed from her. Her body was a mere object to obtain information from this, they needed her to stay alive to accomplish their objectives. Her prison diet included the following "Breakfast was porridge, often not properly cooked, and without sugar or milk. Lunch consisted of whole maize cobs, and super was porridge again, sometimes with a small helping of spinach, slimy and unwashed… On Sundays, a small piece of pork, with more fat than meat was added to

the porridge" (Madikizela-Mandela 2003: 141). Madikizela-Mandela attests that the food in prison was merely a source to keep prisoners alive.

The same applies to Shakur, regarding food in prison she notes "The food in the workhouse was terrible, was horrible. It was disgusting. The food there is worse than the food in any jail that I have been in since… I would sit there waiting for lunch or dinner hungry as hell, and they would bring me some greenish-brown iridescent chunks floating around in a watery liquid" (Shakur 2014: 80). Shakur had to endure the same struggle Madikizela-Mandela went through regarding the food they were given in prison. Using food as a way of attempting to break their bodies was one of the strategies embraced by apartheid and segregation laws in prison. But both these women did not succumb to be broken by the lack of nutritious food in prison. They persisted, for instance, Shakur wrote a petition which all the prisoners signed and it was sent to the warden's office. She described the food as better for a few days, but it reverted to the same innutritious food. But this is to illustrate that both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were not willing to submit and accept the conditions of which whiteness was bestowing upon—again the notion of the paradox arises. By refusing to easily accept the innutritious food Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur indicate that they are aware and conscious of their bodies and their bodies deserve healthy food.

Both women are a paradox personified, their bodies were subjugated to be unseen, but they defy this "stained, inferior, exteriority" that is bestowed upon by whiteness, by Mrs. Butterworth, Major Coetzee, and Swanepoel. They contradicted the blackness that was imposed by whiteness. They understood that their bodies were the representations of a larger political struggle that was beyond the physicality. It for that reason that the bodies were sites of a paradox. Their bodies become the nexus of thinking. Their bodies become and embody what Fanon (1967: 181) phrases as "recognising the open door of every consciousness". They recognise the agency to exist, they interrogate the gaze of Mrs. Butterworth, Major Coetzee, and Swanepoel. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela look back. In looking back they are aware that the gaze is a site of resistance but in their looking they oppose and confront the gaze (Hooks 1992).

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur exemplified what Maldonado-Torres (2016: 25) outlined as the damned, "stained", the black body asking critical questions that are based on the lived experience of the open body. The open body refers to the black body, it is the body that which anything can be done to—there is no justification for anything that happens to this body, it is a body, a site, a

flesh that does not have to be accounted for. It exists as what Hartman (1997) refers to as "property of enjoyment", the black body, the slave becomes the enjoyment of the white body. That means if the white enjoys lynching, arresting, beating, and raping black bodies then white enjoyment becomes the misery of black bodies. Enjoyment for white bodies was manifested onto their properties, which were the slave bodies, the black bodies. These are bodies of which anything can happen to, Mbembe (2015) describes them as "the object to whom anything can be done, whose life can be squandered with impunity". The black body is an object characterised by its exteriority. It is through this black body that Maldonado-Torres (2016: 25) explains that emergence of "an-other speech and an-other way of thinking" occurs. By this he means, a critique emerges opposing colonial and imperial based ideologies such as segregation and apartheid. But, individuals such as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur ask critical questions that are based on their lived experiences as open-bodies. Open bodies that have had to be subject to dehumanising prison conditions. But, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur write as a form of reconstructing oneself as a way of opposing the effects of the hold and the prison. This act of questioning that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engage in disturb the fundamentals of apartheid and segregation. Questioning is critical for black bodies such as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur because as a black body that is inferior and stained it has to break away from that position inferiority to reach out to an *Other*. It is at this point an "other-speech and thinking" emerges, through public speeches that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela made. One of the most renowned public statements that Shakur made was in 1973 on July 4. It signified an emergence of an other-speech Shakur was acknowledging the struggle of black people against the oppressive political, economic, and social systems of the US. She was calling for solidarity among black people to not give up fighting for their freedom. Madikizela-Mandela extends Shakur in the same thoughts, she delivered a speech after the June 1976 Soweto student Uprising. "On this occasion, it is necessary from the onset to state that we are gathered here as fellow blacks in a black atmosphere in the black community which has been designed for us without consulting us and against our wishes" (Madikizela-Mandela, 1978: 7). From the beginning of the speech, it is clear that Madikizela-Mandela opposes the subjugation that is accompanied by the gaze. The gaze attempts to impose a certain life and living standard for black bodies without their consultation. But, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur reject the standards of the gaze. Through their speeches, they encourage an other-thinking. Thinking that projects the black

person as liberated. They call for a re-examination of the dominant structures and propose and an other thinking.

This "other speech and thinking" that Maldonado-Torres (2016) mentions is the resistance that is emerging from the black body against the white body. It is in those moments when Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur refuse to submit and give in to the conditions of the oppressive systems they exist in. This "other speech and thinking" is within the moments when Madikizela-Mandela is interrogated by Major Swanepoel and Coetzee to provide information on the African National Congress (ANC) activities and she refuses. At that moment her body becomes a site of thinking, she is mindful of the information she withholds from the Majors. By withholding that information she is questioning the oppressive apartheid system. She is questioning it on behalf of the movement against the political struggle, she is a self that is not a self by itself but rather an extension of others—it is an extension of others with regards to the struggle. Gordon (2008: 84) articulates this notion of the "self cannot be a self by itself". Therefore, the self that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experience in prison is not a self that is complete and isolated, it is fragmented, incomplete, and isolated. In the sense that, it is a self that is a representation of the *other*-selves. These *other*-selves are fellow inmates, those outside of the prison supporting and actively involved in political struggle. Therefore, it explains the fragmented nature of the self, that it is only a portion, a fragment part of a larger movement. A larger movement against oppressive state systems. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are portions and fragments part of the unfolding struggle against domination.

Both women are resisting and questioning the oppressive systems they exist as a form of desiring life—wanting to live. They are a paradox because it is an unusual spectrum for a black body to desire to live. Butler (2015) acknowledges that the desire to live and self-preserve is not the same thing although both can be understood as interpretations of a person's desire—to persevere its being. Spinoza (1994) notes that self-preservation is often associated with individuality, there is another basis for this ethical association which has implications for social solidarity and a critique of individualism. According to Spinoza, the self that aims at preserving its being is not always a singular self, neither does it when mean it succeeds it immediately enhances the lives of others around it. Spinoza notes that a conscious being does not preserve in a singular form purely for its being and exclusive survival, this being is fundamentally responsive, the very practice of preserving itself is a referential movement towards preserving others. A self-preserving being is

one that desires to live among self-preserved beings, it is a being that desires a world that will further the possibility of preservation. Such preservation resembles the decisions that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to make. Both women had to make decisions that were not only for their preservation but for the preservation of the liberation movements they belonged to because they were aware of the implications of their decisions to the solidarity of their movements.

Both women had to do the unthinkable, they had to absorb themselves into Fanon's (1967) prayer of asking their bodies to question, to ask critical questions, questioning their decisions and meaning of their lives. Questions propelling a desire to live. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had engaged in a form of meditation, a form of praying to their bodies. When Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 25) decided to commit suicide she had a plan "I decided I would commit suicide but would do so gradually so that I should die of natural causes to spare Nelson and the children the pains of knowing I had taken my life". Not only did she think through the implications of her suicide to her family, she also thought of fellow detainees. There was no sign that they would be interrogated again and Madikizela-Mandela thought if she would commit suicide there would be no trial and other detainees would be saved from experiencing what she considered the tortuous mental agony of solitary confinement. On 6 May 1970 Madikizela-Mandela managed to whisper to her neighbour in next cell through the peephole of the door that she is taken to hospital and that she should tell the others not to worry because she had aggravated her health condition deliberately to force the warden's to decide on the group of detainees she was detained with. The decision of whether to re-interrogate or go on trial. Madikizela-Mandela soon realised that the security branch involved in her case would be forced to make a statement about her arrest since students at the University of Witwatersrand were protesting against her detention and the others that were detained with her. A statement was issued by Minister of Justice, Petrus Cornelius Pelser that they would be charged or released soon. After she was aware of what the security branch had planned she abandoned her plans of suicide. Ultimately, the plan of suicide indicates that Madikizela-Mandela (2013) wanted to take a selfless decision for the greater good of others, her suicide would not be a symbol of vanity but rather it would be a symbol of sacrifice. It would be an action for furthering the possibility of the preservation of others, those in and out of prison.

Shakur (2014) notes that in the first month at Middlesex county workhouse she was writing. Prisoners write to restore a sense of truth and to reclaim themselves from what oppressive systems

impose on them. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur write from an oppositional mode by writing against the official text of what prison institution identifies them as. They seek empowerment by writing official text such as the public statement that Shakur wrote while in prison. There is a critical function that Gready (1993) notes, which is that writing has no monopoly over its political function this is evident in the writing of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela hence it emanates as self-writing. It serves a variety of functions it is open to interpretation, manipulation, and appropriation.

Nonetheless, at the core of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's self-writing is their testimony against the oppressive state systems. Shakur's (2014) actions are parallel to those of Madikizela-Mandela (2013). Shakur (2014) decides to write a public statement to the people outside of jail and those in involved in the liberation struggle. The statement titled "To My People" was recorded while she was in jail on 4 July 1973 and broadcasted on many radio stations. A part of the statement reads "I am Black revolutionary, and, as such, i am a victim of all wrath, hatred, and slander that amerika is capable of. Like all other Black revolutionaries, amerika is trying to lynch me" (Shakur 2014: 71). Shakur attests that the political system in America labels the black bodies as thieves and murders and yet they are thieves. In her statement she calls for unity among the black community. "It is our duty to fight for our freedom. It is our duty to win. We must love each other and support each other. We have nothing to lose but our chains" (Shakur 2014: 75). Shakur's statement resembles a mantra, a prayer to herself, the black community, and revolutionaries. She is calling for solidarity for the liberation struggle. Moreover, her use of words such as "our" and "we" indicates that Shakur is writing from the perspective of representing more than just herself, but her statement carries no monopoly. Her words are not just hers alone; she in fact by writing the statement was self-writing. She was engaging in conversation with those she is in the struggle with. She was in dialogue with those that share the same sentiments with her against the oppressive system. Her statement marked a declaration that was beyond her individual self. Through writing and uttering the words of her statement she becomes the subject of representing the demands of liberation and rejecting oppression. By extension and further analysis her statement personifies praying to her body so that her body can ask the fundamental questions which Fanon (1967) advocates for. She is engaging in what is assumed to be the unimaginable for the black body—that is, she is resisting submission to whiteness through this mantra, this prayer. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are existing as a paradox from the perspective of questioning what they

encounter while in prison and responding to it as a way of reviving the liberation struggle while in prison.

The paradox arises when it is considered that both these women are black bodies, open bodies defined by their exteriority thus they are expected to lack the capacity to think, to be conscious. However, they defy this idea of blackness that whiteness imposes upon the black body. The question through their acts, they are conscious through their acts their bodies become the nexus of thinking. Their bodies become sites of thinking and it is through action they become the unthinkable, the paradox. They contradict what the black body ought to resemble according to whiteness. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur reclaim themselves through their bodies they become the bodily inscription of resistance. They find a voice through their bodies, they are engaged in self-writing through their bodies. Their writing and existence occur as an anomaly thus, it creates a paradox. Their bodies resemble text in that they "writing is a form of reconstituting oneself" (Maldonado-Torres 2016: 25). That is to acknowledge that their writing is occurring in a forbidden place, it is not supposed to happen. They are meant to lack this ability to write because of their blackness but that is not the case, they write, they embody their experience, they become the paradox.

3.5 Embodiment: Still and Steel

To embody is to represent or express something in a tangible or visible form. The notion of embodiment can be represented through symbols. In this study, symbols are critical they provide a deeper meaning and understanding in the significant moments of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Both women experience pivotal moments in and out of prison, these moments are those that shape their self-writing. As already mentioned above, in the introduction of this chapter, one of the aims of this chapter is to set a context and position where Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were self-writing from. In setting the context of the self-writing that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are engaged in, the idea of being still is perpetuated by the security authorities of the oppressive state systems, apartheid in the case of Madikizela-Mandela and segregation for Shakur. Both women are forced to experience being "still" that is to be without movement, they further experience stillness within steel that is to be in the confinements of a prison. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur embodied being still although in some instances it was not their intention to be still. To be still for both women at first glance means to be imprisoned. Nonetheless, both concepts of

still and steel give the impression of confining the black body to be immobile. Both women were forced into stillness conventionally and unconventional. Conventionally, it is through the modern penal system that directly affects the body which is imprisonment and unconventionally it is through house arrests and the use of "the passbook" for black bodies to enter certain areas with permission essentially forcefully restricting black bodies to specific geographic areas, which only they could live in. The passbooks were used during the apartheid regime in South Africa. The direct Afrikaans translation of the "the passbook" is verdomdepass literally meaning a "damned pass" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 125). The "damned pass" was a way of further condemning black bodies. In the words of Fanon (2004) the colonial subject was damned and made motionless. These passbooks were a material manifestation of making the colonial subject damned, of making black bodies such as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela motionless. The passbooks symbolised the damnation that Fanon reverts to when he mentions how the black body becomes immobile.

Another important element that requires consideration is the function of prison with its association to stillness and motionlessness. Gilmore (2007) considers the justification for putting people in prison when she notes the relationship between prison and deprivation. When people are taken to prison the premise is that they have done something illegal, thus the consequence is that people should lose some fundamental freedom. Often what occurs is the natural connection between crime and prison, but what counts as a crime often changes and how people are punished for crimes does not change. A crime is a violation of the law, laws change depending on the social order. For instance, the political activism that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were engaged during the political upheavals and tensions in their respective countries they were charged and convicted on terrorist acts. Although, their charges were based on racially biased and oppressive laws, at the crux of their imprisonment was to make them motionless. To create an inability for them to partake in any political activity. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were confined to stillness by virtue of being black bodies, this asserts what Gilmore (2007) acknowledges which is that the nature of the crime can change but the face of criminality remains racialised in an oppressive political system.

Oppressive political systems use metaphorical interpretations such as the War on Terror and War on Drugs which were discussed earlier in this chapter. These metaphors give them impression and consequently perpetuate the logical racist impression that the black body is responsible for the violence. Kumanyika's metaphors should be considered together with what Davis' (2003: 16)

states, "we thus think about imprisonment as a fate reserved for others, a fate reserved for the 'evildoers'… because of the persistent power of racism, 'criminals' and 'evildoers' are, in the collective imagination, fantasised as people of color". Davis thus, notes that the prison functions as an abstract site of which undesirables are confined. Of course in the collective racist logic the 'undesirables', 'criminals', 'evildoers' are the black bodies. Davis (2003: 26), then continues to ask a critical question, "Are prisons racist institutions?" Considering the underpinnings of racist ideologies such as apartheid, slavery, segregation, and colonialism and disciplinary and corrective measures of prisons there is a profound link. Davis discusses the link between slavery and the early years of the United States (US) penitentiary system. She notes that free people could legally be sentenced to punishment by hard labour, the same sentence is assumed to a slave would make no difference because a slave is already experiencing hard labour. Thus, the slave, the black body is already existing and born into a state of eternal punishment. Even after the abolition of slavery in 1865 in the US, the black body was still presumed as criminalised by a penitentiary system which has created legislation aiming at regulating the behaviour of "free" black bodies. The 13th Amendment to the US Constitution prescribed a range of actions of misconduct including "vagrancy, absence from work, breach of job contracts, the possession of firearms and insulting gestures or acts" and above all these actions were only criminalised if the perpetrator is black (Davis 2003).

In fact, the 13th Amendment affected Shakur (2014) directly when she was in prison. Although slavery was outlawed—in prisons it was legal, as prisoners had to work for no pay. Shakur was among those who were forced to work. A majority of prisons grew their vegetables and prisoners would work the fields with no pay. Shakur (2014: 92) describes how the US government made decisions that were always in its favour "they put people into jail for rioting. And when it suits their interests, they let them out of jail for the same thing". The 13th Amendment was another decision in favour of the US government because it made it easy for the US government to use black bodies as they pleased. Shakur notes that it was one of the reasons why there was such a high number of black people in prisons—they could not find jobs on the streets and the only way they could "survive" was in prison because there were plenty of jobs. Shakur's sentiment seems to pose an answer to the question Davis (2003) asks whether prisons are racist institutions or not. Davis too responds to the question she poses—are prisons racist institutions? In light of the link between slavery and the 13th Amendment, the history of the prison systems seems racist, referring

to the present the majority of prisons throughout the world are packed with black bodies. With that noted one cannot dispel the link between racist ideologies and the punishment systems. It is through such thought that justifies criminalising the black body and asserting that it requires discipline because it is unruly.

To further understand the depth of the link between racist ideologies and prisons Hartman's (1997) text highlights a critical argument. Hartman notes, that society only recognises the slave as "being" only when the slave violates the law or is violated. Recognition by violating the law thus, renders the slave to be punished, therefore, criminalising the slave and recognition by violation suggests a muted pained body, an extremely wounded flesh (Hartman 1997). Essentially, this qualifies the black body to exist between two morbid extremes—criminal or mortified flesh. Since the black body embodies criminality, it, therefore, is an agent of criminality—it commits a crime against the law. Hence, the law is the victim, the law is represented by the oppressive state systems, the law is represented by apartheid, segregation, and slavery. The black body, the criminal—Madikizela-Mandela commits crimes against the law, against apartheid thus she is, arrested. She is confined to stillness in prison confined to a small town away from her home because she is banned under "preventive detention". Shakur—the black body, the criminal commits a crime against the law, against the state trooper which she supposedly killed and shot. This is the position both women are forced to accept as their fate, as their status which is that of criminality.

Just as the slave whose reasoning is only recognised as rational, liable, and with intent in the context of criminality, the slave's will is acknowledged only when it is prohibited or punished. Hartman (1996) notes it was only the slaves that went on trial, not the white offenders. The white offenders were enshrined as legitimate thereby, making them the victims. The black body is positioned as the criminal, the state represents and embodies law—it is authority. By being in the position of authority it is thus, instrumental in taking the role of "projecting terror and all culpability and wrongdoing onto the enslaved" (Hartman 1996: 540). She (1996: 540) describes the black body as a site on which "crimes of the dominant class and the state are externalised in the form of a threat (Hartman 1996: 540). Criminality is associated with the black body, white violence is a necessary means and response to the threatening agency of blackness (Hartman 1996). White culpability, the actions of wardens, the state, the slave master, or any institution or person acting in the capacity of whiteness displaces the black body as criminality. It thus, makes violence

legitimated as the ruling principle of social relations between the black body and white being. It advocates for maintaining black submission under whiteness.

It is only the black body that commits a crime. It is only the black body that is punishable therefore, it is deserving of imprisonment. The black body needs to be made "still", confined of movement, and imprisoned because in its true form it is criminalised. The black body needs to be detained and made still. According to the racist logic of apartheid, concerning Madikizela-Mandela—she ought to be banished because she incites violence. Shakur ought to be detained because she is a black body and by that virtue, she is deemed a criminal and unruly. Both women threaten the authority, the structure of racist ideologies therefore, confining them is the only resolute.

From 1962 Madikizela-Mandela had to continuously endure a series of banning orders instigated by the apartheid security structure. These banning orders prevented her from living, working, and socialising like any ordinary person. According to Twala (2008: 70), "she was prohibited from publishing or addressing more than one person at a time and also subjected to house arrest". Madikizela-Mandela was detained in August 1976 by the apartheid security police, she was arrested and charged under "preventative detention" and was only released in December 1976. After her release in December 1976, the apartheid regime implicated her in organising and inciting students in the Soweto Uprising of 1976. She was then banished to Brandfort on 15 May 1977. Brandfort was an Afrikaner dominated town in the province of Free State. This was a desperate attempt by the apartheid regime to prevent her from continuing with any political activities. Madikizela-Mandela was considered highly dangerous, while in Brandfort she was under continual police surveillance. Her isolation to Brandfort was well premeditated by the apartheid regime, the intention was to make her political life still, motionless, to frustrate her and deny her any contact to engage politically. Additionally, the local spoken language in by Brandfort was South Sotho and she was mainly Xhosa speaking so this was supposedly aimed at creating a language and communication barrier to make it difficult for her to organise people politically (Twala 2008; du Preez Bezdrob 2003).

The sole aim of the apartheid regime in banishing Madikizela-Mandela was to paralyse her politically, to make it difficult for to incite any political activity. The apartheid regime had already criminalised, they had investigated her and made claims that she motivated and planned the violence of the 1976 Soweto Uprising. According to the apartheid regime, Madikizela-Mandela,

this black body was a criminal and like any other black body, she had to endure punishment for her criminal acts. Her punishment was banishment to an unfamiliar township where she was to be isolated. To be isolated to make her still, both figuratively and literally. Figuratively, in the sense that she is not really in the setting of prison but she has to feel confined although she is in a house, her every movement in and out of that house she is being monitored and policed. The feeling of being "still" should be felt and known by her—that was the aim of the apartheid regime. These invisible steel bars had to be felt and known by her. In the literal sense, she was away from her political arena, exiled to Brandfort where the apartheid regime expected her to have a challenge in mobilising any political activity. She was isolated. In a similar setting, Shakur (2014) was also made to feel that sense of being still, being without movement, and confined by steel in prison. On her first day in prison, she asked the guards when she would be unlocked to spend time with other women in the prison. She was locked in an isolated prison away from other female prisoners. Shakur was not permitted to read newspapers or magazines, to watch television and listen to the radio. All this was in efforts of making her still—that is to deny her information from the outside world to disable her from thinking outside of the prison space. The primary purpose was to make her feel that she was indeed confined, separated from the world, separated from any political activity, and most importantly to keep her mind still. That is to make her mind inactive, to exhaust her mind with being preoccupied with nothing –it was ultimately to arrest her body and mind. Here is another interrogation of Shakur conducted by Mrs. Butterworth:

> "We hear that you are running around your cell… you will have to stop this activity at once"

> "What? Why?"

> "Because you are disturbing the people downstairs."

> "What people?"

> "There is an office underneath you and you are disturbing the workers."

> "Are you crazy? They'll have to be disturbed. I don't run for that long anyhow. If you let me go into the yard to exercise with the other women, I'll stop running around my cell" (Shakur 2014: 80).

Because, Shakur was not permitted to go out of her cell she had to create means to keep herself moving, to be in motion because had she accepted that fate of stillness and confinement although that did not mean she had given up on her political convictions against the oppressive structures and systems of the US government. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were regarded as criminals they had to be kept still to restrict to them from spreading and inciting any political activity because by virtue of their blackness their political beliefs were deemed as criminal acts against oppressive governments responsible for their arrests.

In the space of stillness, in prison Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur could not know the time. "The lights were turned off every night at ten" (Shakur 2014: 81)—the lights are turned off to signal to the prisoners that they ought to sleep. Time is dictated in prison, prisoners are told when to eat, sleep, exercise, bath—prisoners are told how to exist, to "live". Time is only known by the authority, by its keeper, by guards, by the wardens; Mrs. Butterworth, Major Coetzee, and Swanepoel. Time is only known by those who determine when it stops and starts, time is known by its keeper. In prison, those who have authority decide the duration of any activity whether it is interrogation, torture, meal, and bath time. The prisoner, the black body is doing "time" based on the dictation of the wardens. The wardens devise the technologies of command, the prisoners are to dwell in stillness. They are confined in stillness and they do not know when it will end. Simultaneously, they are within the steel, behind prison bars. Even though they may have moved, it is still restricted because that movement is within the vicinity of a prison. But, they seek refuge in their consciousness—it requires an elevated state of mind. The elevated state of mind is what creates the moments of self-writing that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engage in.

Madikizela-Mandela (2003) notes how she dreaded the sound of the cell door opening, even though it was the only time she would see somebody. She explains how there were three locks on her door and each had a different set of keys. "Then the locks were turned again, one after the other, mocking her, sealing her fate again and again" (Madikizela-Mandela 2003: 141). In the true sense, she had to feel confined, not only by keeping her away from other prisoners in solitary. But the locks, bars, the steel. She was made to feel her fate and know that she is in prison, locked away from the world and there is no way out for her. The stillness and steel served the same purpose. To make the prisoner, the black body know that it has no escape. The only way Madikizela-Mandela was able to mark time and measure days was by keeping track of the number of meals

she received. "Winnie scratched the dates on her cell wall, but in complete isolation and utter silence made it difficult to keep track of time" (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 141). Sometimes she got confused by meals, uncertain whether the meal was or lunch and supper—she started marking every day as soon as she got breakfast. To dictate the time to prisoners is based on intent, it further illustrates and asserts the position of power. In the space of steel, in prison, the notion of still creating a backdrop of diffusing violence and the everyday routines of domination that characterise the black body in prison. It becomes an obscure normalised everydayness of prison for the black body. In fact, by confining Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur in prison to be still it further clarifies that it is the wardens that have the mechanisms of subjection. They utilise a certain technique of power. Foucault (1982: 781) explains it as "a form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorises the individual, marks him by his own individuality… imposes a law of truth on him". The apartheid regime in South Africa and segregation in the US used such a form of power to confine Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Since both oppressive systems are legitimated and have power—they define the relationship of power.

Foucault (1982: 789) defines the above relationship as "a mode of action which does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action". Therefore, the action to confine, to make Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur still was based on their political activities. Both women posed political threats to the oppressive authority structures in their respective countries and action had to be taken. The apartheid regime in the case of Madikizela-Mandela and the US government in the case of Shakur made actions of arrest against both women because these women were inciting actions of opposing the laws of each ruling system respectively. According to Foucault (1982: 788), "Power exists only when it is put into action". Both the apartheid regime and the US government were mindful that the action of arresting both women would restrict their political capacity and influence.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to set a context and position of where Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur would be self-writing. This chapter interprets the various techniques in which the hold reveals itself in the life of Madikizela-Mandela-Shakur. The key argument presented in this chapter was to conceptualise prisons both figuratively and literally. Since it is a space that unfolds in a highly symbolic manner for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. It shapes the departure in how self-writing

does not have to be confined to the prison space, hence it is through this conceptual analysis that the self, prison, and writing are connected to illustrate the intricacy of how the hold as understood in this chapter and becomes the enabling site self-writing. This chapter sets a backdrop of the conditions the black body is subject to by being black. Black bodies are violated and made objects of criminality by oppressive political systems. In essence, whiteness purports itself as dominant and pure through oppressive systems such as those that imprisoned Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Both women carry a dual curse they are black and female—this makes them even more susceptible to oppression, it places them on a higher continuum to be violated because being a black body deems them as u*nseen*. They exist as black females, firstly their blackness denies them humanity, moreover oppressive state systems do not consider them as being and rational. Secondly, as females, they exist within the patriarchal system that dictates power and dominance. As black females both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur suffered subjugation because they were black and female. Both women are arrested, because of the political activities they are involved in. They are arrested because they pose a threat to the oppressive systems that arrest them. Arresting both women is an act of restricting them to continue with any political activity that will destabilise the authority of the apartheid regime in South Africa in the case of Madikizela-Mandela and segregation in the US in the case of Shakur. Moreover, the conditions in which they were imprisoned under were to confine them in such a way that would paralyse their thoughts. However, both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur defy the position which whiteness imposes upon them. They personify a paradox, they go against the powers of whiteness. The context and content of prison become their motivation for how their resistance emerges.

The key finding of this chapter points toward the fact that black bodies are excluded from humanity, agency, and rational, for that reason they are denied a voice and ability to write. But through defiance and resistance in different forms black bodies have been able to reconstruct their being away from positions such as the hold and reclaim the ability to write and in essence exist. This chapter provided the context that indicated the positions in which both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur existed within. This is indicated in the above discussion, regardless of all that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur faced they were able to defy the position of the hold. It is mindful to be aware that the position of the hold is both a figurative and literal status, it is through this status that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur self-write. This chapter aimed at setting the context of

where these women where self-writing from, the chapters to follow focus on the three core themes selected for this study in explaining how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur self-write.

CHAPTER 4

Torture and Self-writing

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on torture which is the first key theme of the study. The aim is to discuss torture concerning self-writing. The chapter discusses how the tortured experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are narrated in the form of self-writing. Torture is an integral tool in achieving coercive behaviour and oppressive systems have utilised torture to extract information from prisoners. One of the main aims of torture is to capture the body and inflict pain—the pain can either be physical, mental, or both. There are various dimensions to torture and they are used differently. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were both placed in solitary confinement for long periods. Both women were identified as sources of mobilising resistant forces against the oppressive state systems. This means existing in a permanent denial of parole and fair trials, solitary confinement, and torture. This chapter argues and demonstrates the abilities that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela possess in reaffirming themselves as more than just tortured beings and existing for the tortured experience of black bodies.

Firstly, this chapter discusses solitary confinement and how it creates isolation for Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. This section demonstrates how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are alienated from others and eventually alienated from their political convictions which form a critical apart of their selfhood. Secondly, the chapter discusses how solitary confinement places the bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela in a realm of uncertainty. This section is based on writing for the tortured existence and it is closely linked with the former because it outlines how torture functions as a mode of writing for Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. The third section of this chapter is on the power of prison, in that section power is discussed as embodied and bestowed upon by the wardens and the overall oppressive state security systems. The power that is expressed upon Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur through subjugation and racially justified dominance is revealed. The fourth and final section of this chapter discusses psychic breakdown as an operative result of solitary confinement, torture, and power. Psychic breakdown becomes the ultimate objective of torture—it produces black bodies that are complaint. By extension, a psychic breakdown is what leads Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to become the living dead under the domination of oppressive state systems.

4.2 Solitary Confinement

Incarceration involves a variety of techniques that can be used on the prisoner to extort information, discipline, and punish. Madikizela-Mandela (2003) was arrested on 12 May 1969, she spent 491 days in detention and the first 200 days she spent in solitary confinement with no contact with any other person. She spoke to nobody. Madikizela-Mandela described the first few days as the worst days of her life. She only had her thoughts for company, she was overwhelmed by excruciating uncertainty and insecurity, a sense of hopelessness, the feeling that this was the end (Madikizela-Mandela 2003). Shakur (2014) was arrested on 2 May 1973 and spent over 20 months in punitive segregation area: solitary (PSA) at two separate men's prisons. Solitary confinement is a long-standing practice that is cruel and unusual punishment, it violates the prisoner both mentally and physically. It has inhumane effects of psychological abuse although physical injury is very difficult to measure (Lobel 2008). Lobel provides a list of possible effects of solitary confinement, such as insomnia, confusion, hallucinations, and insanity. Initially, solitary confinement was designed by Quakers in 1892 to encourage self-reflection and repentance for criminals. But, it was quickly abandoned after observations were made and it was realised that it leads to a mental breakdown and creates prolonged solitude (Vasiliades 2005; Shaylor 1998). Meaning it results in enduring mental effects.

Nevertheless, solitary confinement persisted as a practice in prisons all over the world. Vasiliades (2005: 73-74), notes that solitary confinement is typically referred to as "segregation" which comes in a variety of forms "as standard operating procedure, as a protective measure arising from situational prison incidents, for punishment and even to ensure mental stability". This definition of solitary confinement is critical on multiple levels that speak to the importance of the possibilities of why Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were placed in solitary confinement. By referring to solitary confinement as segregation means ultimately it is a separation, it is critical to dissect what is implied and meant by this separation. In the US, segregation in public schools and certain neighbourhoods was permitted. Segregation in public schools legally ended in 1954 and with regards to housing it ended in 1968. Although segregation legally ended during these times it persists very strongly to date. This concept of segregation firstly implies social, racial, and educational isolation and it creates marginalisation within society (Massey and Hajnal 1995). By marginalising groups within a society, it conforms to the standard procedure of separating just as

solitary confinement does. Secondly, it is a "protective measure"—this insinuates that there is something that is either threatened that requires protection, maybe from itself or a criminal element. When Shakur (2014: 67) asked why she was kept in solitary confinement the response was that "cop killers are not very popular in correctional institutions". Thus, the assumption is that Shakur is kept in solitary confinement as a "protective measure". Arguably, the same can be claimed with Madikizela-Mandela (2003) with her being placed in solitary confinement although, in her case, she would be granted protection if she would provide a confession, the police told her they had 80 witnesses against her and they named her close friends and confidants. Both women were placed in solitary confinement to be segregated, to be forced into confession and subjugation. Foucault (1977) states that solitary confinement leaves the prisoner forced to reflect on the "crimes" they committed to aid confession.

The level of oppression that emerges is that of an isolationist model within and outside of the prison (Shalyor 1998). The prison within the prison develops, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are already in prison but they, seem to be re-arrested when they are placed in solitary confinement. They do not know the duration of their time in solitary confinement. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 140) explains how time dragged and she had no idea how long she had been in the interrogating room. They are both forced to do strip searches when they return to their cells. Shakur (2014: 205) refused to do one of these searches when she returned to the Women's House of Detention after giving birth to her daughter Kakuya Amala Olugbala Shakur at Elmhurst Hospital. When they took her to the examination room for a routine examination she refused. These examinations are of technologies of subordination and have high humiliation effects. Shakur was against the examination because it would reduce her to an unbearable humiliation. Also, these physical examinations that were experienced by both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, there was the constant awareness of knowing that they are not watched by the wardens the whole time. Both women were given no privacy while in solitary confinement. Shakur (2014: 206) explains how her cell was designed in such a way that her wardens would see every move she made and they stood outside her cell the whole time she was in solitary confinement.

Solitary confinement is a form of social control for prisoners, even Madikizela-Mandela notes in apartheid South Africa solitary confinement was one of the primary forms of social controlling to bring intimidation. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are dictated to, as to when to communicate

with others. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 140) notes that after two weeks of being in solitary confinement they came to fetch her to begin interrogation and she was ironically relieved because it meant she would be around people, hear voices and escape the endless hours alone in her cell. Solitary confinement perpetuates the violence of prison, the "prisoner's body is symbolically inscribed as commodity" (Davidson 1997: 36-39). This means that for Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, their black bodies are constantly regulated by being watched all the time while in solitary confinement. This regulation over their bodies drives the notion that they belong to a sub-human status where they lack agency. It is for that reason that dehumanising tactics, such as solitary confinement, torture, and sleep deprivation executed onto the bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. This discourse of sub-humanity suggests connections to inhumane acts such as slavery whereby dehumanising is in order. The black bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are reduced to properties of the state.

Naturally, solitary confinement leads to ill effects on the mental health of any individual because isolating a human being whether, for a couple of days, years or months is an unnatural state of being. It deprives contact with others. The prisoner is only left alone with their thoughts and nothing else. This is exactly what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were left with when they were placed in solitary confinement. Madikizela-Mandela explains that she had only her thoughts for company and it was an overwhelming feeling. This is because it requires one to think and rethink repeatedly but with no physical action occurring. Because she is confined in a small cell that is 4.5 x 1.5 metres, she walked miles in her cell, round and round, backward and forwards in desperate need to kill time."To kill the empty long, lonely minutes, hours, weeks, months which drag by at a snail's pace gnawing at the inner cores of my soul, corroding it, scarring it, battering it about tearing it to pieces" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 9). She had nothing to keep her mind occupied, she would get up, sit down, get up again repeatedly doing the same thing in her cell. She would pace up and down (Madikizela-Mandela 2003). To remain rational is critical when placed in such conditions because a slight moment of falling into despair, may have dire and permanent effects. And so, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to devise mechanisms to maintain their sanity. They both had to try and remain normal, analyse their situation objectively, and above all, not to succumb to the anxiety they were feeling. They both knew they would be kept in solitary confinement indefinitely and denied any contact with anyone.

When Madikizela-Mandela (2013) was detained on 12 May 1969 all her belongings were taken away from her. The same thing that was done to Shakur (2014) who had no reading material, nothing to keep her company. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela similarly describe solitary confinement. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 140) explains it as "deathly quiet, and the silence became another instrument of torture". Shakur (2014) describes similar conditions of her solitary confinement, she explains how she was going crazy in her small cell. She was also not allowed visitors, the only time she could see anybody would be to see her doctor. "I had always been an active and restless person, being in that little cage all day drove me wild. I needed to stretch my legs. I started to run around the cell" (Shakur 2014: 79). The only way both women could try to keep themselves sane was to move around their cells. This ensured that their bodies were physically active and this would at least tire them physically making them exhausted enough to sleep at night.

Solitary confinement constitutes torture because the circumstances that the body is placed under in solitary confinement are degrading and damage a person's psychic and moral integrity (Lobel 2008). The United Nations (UN) defines torture as "aggravated and deliberate forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 139). This definition extends to suggest that torture can take many forms such as sleep deprivation, beatings, solitary confinement, starvation, and more. Thus, from this definition, it is clear that the conditions that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced were forms of torture. Solitary confinement meditates against socialisation, communication, affection, and against the self. It results in a deterioration of mental faculties and social abilities. For instance, Shakur explained how solitary confinement had affected her ability to communicate with people when she was finally out of solitary confinement. She had closed up inside, had become withdrawn, and had forgotten how to relate and open up to people. Solitary confinement breeds alienation and causes one to be withdrawn. The structure of prison also feeds into this notion of isolation, because only the wardens can see what the prisoner is doing by a view of windows and doors only they can open and close as they please—thus, it further maximises sensory deprivation (Dirsuweit 1999).

Solitary confinement can be described as a slow mental death that takes away one's inner soul in a very slow traumatic manner. Because the effects are not physical they may somehow be understated. But, Foucault (1977a) explains it is taking away life, preventing the prisoner from all

rights, but no pain is inflicted on the prisoner. And it is here where lies the complexity because by "no pain inflicted" Foucault (1977a: 11) is referring to no physical pain, but there is of course another type of pain inflicted. He describes it as "modern rituals of execution". These "modern rituals" of dehumanisation are what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to encounter in prison. At first glance they order the disappearance of pain thus, the execution then no longer bears a specific mark in the physical site of the body—it is no longer marked by a single moment of pain or death. It requires no additional action to be done to the body. Rather, it is extended and advanced to a level that affects life. By affecting life it means Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela cannot relate and speak openly to others after being placed in solitary confinement for so long. The effects of solitary confinement create a struggle with conversing since prison is a sight of social control—it limits their socialising activities. It determines how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur should communicate with others.

Ultimately, when Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are placed in solitary confinement their lives are regulated according to the wardens and largely the oppressive state systems. They are exposed to the repressive nature of the prison by being isolated. Being isolated is the attempt to deprive them of any sensory stimulation. To keep them in a static position, to withhold them from thinking. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 140) attests, that while in solitary confinement she was stuck in an infinite vacuum of nothingness. Madikizela-Mandela recalls that she could no longer handle solitary confinement. The long-empty hours tore the inner cores of her soul. She describes moments when she got fed up and would bang her head against the cell. This is because physical pain was more tolerable in such circumstances. When she was getting beaten and kicked she knew the type of pain to expect, she could anticipate when it would stop. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur would perhaps be able to measure the duration and severity of the pain inflicted on them. But, because they are in solitary confinement the pain is psychological, which can be deemed most detrimental. They are trapped in that space of nothingness. Such a space creates psychological effects. Punishment in prison is often hidden in the penal process and being in prison on its own seems like enough of a punishment, however, there are forms of punishment that prevail in prison such as solitary confinement. When solitary confinement was introduced it took a whole new "morality" it was no longer about the retarded and multiple series of attacks onto the body instead the physically tortured body was avoided, "the theatrical representation of pain was excluded from punishment" (Foucault 1977a: 16). The type of punishment that emerged was the type that had a

bodiless reality, the apparatus of punishment was to strike the soul instead of the body. By displacing punishment onto the soul, it, therefore, reigns onto the thoughts, the will, and inclinations of individual. This is the type of punishment Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to endure, it was a sober type of punishment that assumed the key principle of attacking the mind.

Madikizela-Mandela (2013) could not handle solitary confinement anymore and so she decided she would commit suicide. Her plan would occur gradually, she would die of natural causes and in her mind, this was the best way because she would be sparing her children and husband the pain of knowing she had taken her own life. The decision to commit suicide was based on the horrific experience of solitary confinement. It breaks the soul, it is radically destructive to the prisoner. It is not reformative or redemptive as it is claimed to be. It is a sensory deprivation that disables the prisoners' capacity for civic duty (Guenther 2013). This means Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela could not actively fulfil their political duties when in solitary confinement. When Moten (2018a: 21) speaks of "being and nothingness converge, here in this hellish river of thwarted intersubjectivity", he explains the condition of blackness—solitary confinement is a condition of blackness. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela exist in this hellish river. Solitary confinement decreases the active capacity of any human being to engage and interrelate with others, it creates interrelating against itself. This means it pulls the human being apart, it unbalances and deranges the human being. Hence, they both attested that they felt like they were going crazy and losing their minds in solitary confinement—which was probably apparent for both women. It seemed like the experience of solitary confinement killed the will to live within Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur and rekindled the desire to physically die.

The deprivation of reciprocal interaction causes mental dysfunction—it isolates one's ability, functioning, and intention to be among others. Guenther (2013: 15) notes that "the very structure of their Being-in-the-world is turned against them and used to exploit their fundamental relationality". This means Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's interaction with anybody outside of themselves is destabilised by denying them any relationality. Shakur was refused to have any reading or writing material when she was in PSS. One of the main functions of solitary confinement is to break down the political conviction of political prisoners. This is done through isolation because they are left alone and have nobody to share their thoughts with. The self is made

to be isolated from its self (self of others), made to be separated from the struggle and the movement. The self is forced to be dislocated from the political struggle.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are led to suffering what Patterson (1982) refers to as social death. He describes it as a defining feature of slavery in all civilisations. When a black body is captured and enslaved; this process takes away the personality and self-worthiness of the individual, the individual who is a slave tries to be anything they possibly can be either than being a slave. The slave ends up being socially dead—this death has both psychological and physical consequences. The physical consequence is that the slave loses personal belongings and sometimes even stamped or branded on their skin as the property of the slave master. The psychological consequence occurs as the slave is rejected by any heritage or sense of humanity that might give him an identity. The slave-master who owns the slave consumes the identity of the slave (Patterson 1982). Essentially, the slave has no identity, just like the slave that Patterson speaks of— Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur suffer the same fundamental conditions. They are both isolated from their personal belongings, everything they own has been taken away by the security police and they have been branded with prison numbers thus, they experience the physical consequence of social death. They are both rejected and left in isolation with no human contact—through these consequences they suffer social death. Black bodies are forced to surfer social death because of the rationale that they do not have the authority and capacity to express their existence. The black bodies' existence is not its own but is embedded in the master's prerogative (Hartman and Wilderson 2003). Hartman (1997: 65) writes: "everyday practices… occur in the default of the political, in the absence of the rights of man or the assurances of the self-possessed individual, and perhaps even without a person in the usual meaning of the term". Hartman emphasises that social death is embedded in the everyday routines of black bodies. Moreover, according to whiteness black bodies do not have the will to engage in political actions, they have an absence of rights and even more so, they lack self-assurance. Hartman notes that this is the imposed position of the enslaved and consequently of the black body because "they are not systematic in their ideology, analysis, or intent, and most importantly, the slave is neither civic man nor free worker" (Hartman 1997: 65). The enslaved and black bodies such as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are excluded from the "imaginary sovereignty of the state" meaning in acts such as solitary confinement Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are enacted upon because they lack systematic ideology, analysis, and intent. The oppressive states in which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela existed, in and the security

apparatus that placed both women in solitary confinement, enforced social death upon them. Social death is reinforced in spaces such as solitary confinement because when placed in solitary confinement one's selfhood is not allowed to engage in full capacity with self and others because of isolation. Wilderson (2015) also expands on the notion of social death in which he explains as a condition in which black bodies and referring to prisoners, slaves, sub-humans are dishonoured and violated by virtue of their being and through that process of dishonouring they suffer social death. In such a state, they have no right to themselves, their status of being is socially dead (Wilderson 2014). The critic further alludes to a comparison of what social life depicts, it is the recognition of one's kinship structure and in contrast, social death is a genealogical isolate.

In other words, when Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were placed in solitary confinement they had no access to their selves [self], they had no access to their "conscious community of memory" meaning they were isolated and denied social relations with their kinship structures. They were physically isolated—Madikizela-Mandela (2003) sat in solitary confinement, while her mind was physically occupied by thoughts of her children Zenani and Zindziswa, but she tried to remain rational, to analyse her situation and not give in to the panic. She was well aware that if she acknowledged the indefinite choice of being denied contact with anyone it would drive her over the edge. The purpose of solitary confinement is to drive individuals over the edge and it is not just about isolation. It is about the ontological corruption of the self. It attempts to exploit every weakness, and remove all signs of individuality from a human being. For Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur their weaknesses can be labelled among many others as their political convictions and their commitment to political freedom. Shakur (2014: 75) writes, "We must defend ourselves and let no one disrespect us. We must gain our liberation by any means necessary". This is the commitment she has to the political struggle regardless of any position she is placed in Shakur attests, that liberation is key whether in solitary confinement or not. Regardless, of the multiple tactics that are used to destroy both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's sense of self.

Solitary confinement is a defamiliarisation which breeds alienation to the self and creates the notion of the self against itself. This is so because one is only left with their thoughts. In solitary confinement, the body is placed in the realm of uncertainty. Madikizela-Mandela notes how she had no idea how long she would be in that room, how long will she be in solitary confinement? Will she leave solitary confinement alive or not? But something occurs in solitary confinement, it

has the potency to make Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur write and have conversations with the self. Writing and conversing with the self is done peculiarly, it is writing that claims back sociality, communication, the fight against oppressive struggle. It is the type of writing that is intentional and declarative but above all, it is the type of writing that occurs through action.

Writing through and by action means "women do resist: they speak up; fight back; participate in individual and class action lawsuits, which represent individual and collective challenges to the conditions of their confinement" (Shaylor 1998: 390). To speak up for Shakur (2014: 66) means to ask the wardens, "When are you going to unlock me? Let me go out there?" for Madikizela-Mandela (2003) it is to ask, Where are my children? What happened to them? Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur did not accept the conditions of solitary confinement without question. They did not want to accept the indefinite traumatic isolation of solitary confinement. Both women questioned and advocated for better conditions in prison, not only for themselves but for all those who were imprisoned because of their political convictions were guided by achieving a collective sense of overcoming oppression for all. Their experiences in solitary confinement become a tangible experience in that their writing is embodied through the experiences of solitary confinement, living through solitary confinement becomes a form of writing. The moments of living through solitary confinement are in themselves self-writing because they shaped the self of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela.

4.3 Writing for the Tortured Existence

Torture is a language built on a negative agency. It is important to determine whose agency torture is built on. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are black bodies and as represented in their experiences they did not possess the agency to torture. They are tortured. Torture contains specific *human* words and sounds, it acts out itself in a disciplined fashion. It is in itself a language (Scarry 2003). This understanding of torture dictated that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur could not be human. They were lesser than humans, they existed in the realm of the sub-human and it is, for this reason, they could not possess the ability to torture, they did not have the specific *human* words and sounds because they were sub-human. The primary goal of torture is pain, pain is inflicted through torture. Torture involves severe pain and mental pain that is intentionally inflicted to obtain confessions or information (United Nations 1975). For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, the tortured experience becomes a prolonged action of writing. The type of writing transcends to

a more than textual experience, it subscribes to the fundamental concept of self-writing. Self-writing in the sense of defining oneself through the lived experience. Thus, explaining the notion of how the tortured existence becomes the writing experience for both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to *write* through the tortured existence.

Torture is primarily understood as a physical act and as a verbal act of interrogation. The infliction of pain during torture is rarely without interrogation. Thus, during torture, pain and interrogation are often paired. A vital connection lies between the physical act and verbal act and this connection is often understated. The connection is between the body and the voice (Scarry 2003). The body is acted upon through verbal action. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are dictated upon while in prison and told how to live and exist. Their bodies are subjected to verbal abuse and they have to perform the physical action. The action is solicited through extracting information from the body—information is extracted through interrogation. Interrogation requires questioning and threatening the prisoner. The verbal action is used to ask the question, verbal action is self-extension—by this, it means when one is speaking the self extends out through the voice. The voice goes beyond the boundaries of the body—by extension, it occupies a space outside of the body. There is a verbal power emanating from the interrogator because he has audible objectification over the prisoner. Major Swanepoel and Coetzee had an audible power over Madikizela-Mandela it is for this reason that interrogation becomes a crucial part of extracting information. Through questioning the extraction of information can be done excessively. For both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur, they had to endure days of interrogation without sleeping. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) notes that she was interrogated for days continuously—even after long hours of interrogation she only started answering questions on the fifth day. The excessiveness arises when the interrogation does not stop—moreover, the excessive nature of interrogation is clear when Madikizela-Mandela (2003) has to endure interrogation that is accompanied by fatigue from staying awake for five days and six nights. The excessive nature of the torture Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experienced alludes to Mbembe's (2015) expression of the commandment—he notes the body as the principal locale of depicting power. Through domination and subjection, commandment occurs. According to Mbembe (2051: 108), the commandment "ultimately seeks to compel submission and force people into dissimulation". It defines itself as demanding power and seeking to maintain a close relationship with those who carry it. Its agents of power are the policeman, soldiers, and officials.

This notion of commandment can be said to be the driving force of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's interrogators because they exercised raw power during interrogation.

The verbal subjugation and objectification of Major Swanepoel's interrogation was expressed when he stood over Madikizela-Mandela. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 147) recalls a moment during her interrogation, "She felt herself floating into unconsciousness and thought she would die. Her eyelids drooped, her head slumped forward. Swanepoel thumped on the table and shouted: For God's sake, give us something! You can't die with all that information! Not before you have told us everything!" Major Petrus Ferreira reminded her that she was a detainee, this meant she is at their disposal. They could do anything to her, therefore, she had to confess, if not, she would be detained for as long as they pleased (Madikizela-Mandela 2013). The verbal subjugation aimed to force information out of Madikizela-Mandela, to make her confess so she could be held accountable and above all to confirm that she is a black body that represents criminality against a just oppressive apartheid regime. Moreover, the aim was to subjugate, alienate, and traumatise her. The verbal subjugation demeans the black body, it reminds the black body that it is not worthy of life. Hence, Major Swanepoel uttered that Madikizela-Mandela should not die, but if she has to die it had to be at least after providing him with the information he needed. She was only useful for the information they required—thereafter, she could die. At this point, Madikizela-Mandela felt so close to death. Madikizela-Mandela explained solitary confinement as a form of killing violently and in return, it made people violent (Hassim 2014).

The type of interrogation and torture Madikizela-Mandela encountered was severe. It was an extraction process to withdraw information from her and simultaneously it withdrew life out of her. In this instance, the experience of torture then becomes a one-person gain because of another's subjective experience. Torture is then equated to "the larger the prisoner's pain, the larger the torturer's power" (Scarry 2003: 320). As Madikizela-Mandela (2013) began to feel physically weaker and had less life in her Major Swanepoel continued to extract even further. But, he was extracting with the purpose of a result—which was to produce a confession. The torturer, Major Swanepoel, used the aliveness of the prisoner to commit atrocities onto the prisoner, onto Madikizela-Mandela. The "aliveness" of Madikizela-Mandela was the reality of her children, her husband, and the political struggle. The torturer used all the things that were important to the prisoner to crush the prisoner, "to crush the thing [s]he lives for" (Scarry 2003: 320). The entire

process of the interrogation is simply to destroy the prisoner's world, to destroy a sense of meaning, consciousness, and self-worth to the prisoner's life (Wren 1986). By seeking to destroy her consciousness it ultimately means she is absent in the world, this obscures her. Madikizela-Mandela notes that after being tortured for so long her pain reached a threshold where she could no longer feel the pain anymore. Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 233) explains the sound of the key as they open the door of her cell and she writes: "You had been all by yourself with dead silence for hours and hours and hours suddenly there would be this K-AT-LA, K-A-T-L-A sound. That alone would drive you beserk; that alone was meant to emphasise the fact that 'we are in control, not only of your being but your soul as well and we can destroy it". It was not just the sound of the keys, the number of doors they had to open to get to Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 62), "open that door, those doors, those three doors; burglar-proof—the first one, your door, the cell door, the third one" This indicates that isolated and extremely confined nature of solitary confinement. There are so many doors locking up one individual—it intensifies the position of criminal that they are locked up. The criminal is made to feel imprisoned in every sense possible. Madikizela-Mandela knew her fate was in the hands of Major Swanepoel, Coetzee, and Ferreira—she could not escape their plans for her, she knew when they opened all those doors they were coming for her alone.

Shakur (2014: 205), also knew this when she was chained on her arms and legs after being horrendously beaten by a "goon squad of large female officers". She refused physical examination after returning from Elmhurst Hospital. After beating her up they dragged her to PSA (punitive segregation area: solitary confinement) and she was left there handcuffed. She had no sanitary napkins and no means to wash. Being handcuffed while in solitary confinement adds to the torture of solitary confinement. Because already the body is confined, it cannot go anywhere outside of that prison cell and to further restrict its movement by handcuffing her was an act of further domination upon her black body. On 8 April 1978, Shakur was moved to a maximum-security prison for women—that was designed to hold "the most dangerous women in the country". Shakur (2014: 364) describes the prison as "it was a prison within a prison. This place had a stillness to it like some kind of bizarre death row. Everything was sterile and dead". The significance of this was to further coagulate the idea that she is not going anywhere and that the oppressive system is in charge. It also instilled a sense of death and fear in her—she thought this is where she might die. As the cell doors opened in the different contexts of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela—both

women knew that they were coming for them—there was nobody else there but them. Their black bodies waiting to be subdued and defeated. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) recalls that even knowing that they were coming for her, it was just as frightening. The pain of solitary confinement was so severe and numbing to her body it created emptiness. This makes the prisoner assume the role of existing violently—this is to say she exists as a black body with no consciousness. Each moment of interrogation is a build-up, to create the space within the prisoner to demonstrate a lack of consciousness and eventually confession.

Confession is closely linked to torture since one of the prime objectives of torture is confession. Through the act of confessing Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela would be echoing the words and justification of the oppressive systems and everything they represent. Confession becomes an act of internalising the prison experience, it is portrayed as the only option in accepting the position of the prisoner. Often there is a "bargain" involved and presented to the prisoner. As such Madikizela-Mandela was offered a plea bargain. Major Coetzee asked her why she was putting herself under such hardships. That she was young and beautiful, owed to it her daughters to be there for them, thus, why she could not admit to the crimes against her and confess to them. It was even suggested that if she would provide a broadcast statement against the communists there would be no trial and they would all be freed. Major Coetzee had even promised he wanted to show goodwill by releasing all the women involved in the trial (Madikizela-Mandela 2003; 2013). This was all done to get the prisoner to confess. Preferential treatment is given to those who confess. Forced confessions had become a critical part of oppressive state systems. Pilisuk and Ober (1976) agree that confession is a key result in torture but more often—confession occurs as a result of fear and destruction of will. Since torture cripples the mind, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were systematically attacked and became victims of terror, humiliation, and powerlessness (Whittaker 1988). The powerlessness that is forged through the process of torture and interrogation makes Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to be coerced into a confession. Madikizela-Mandela's prison cell was next to the assault chamber she writes: "I am next to the assault chamber. As long as I live I shall never forget the nightmares I have suffered as a result of the daily prisoners' piercing screams as the brutal corporal punishment is inflicted on them… It's hard to imagine women inflicting so much punishment" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 10). Madikizela-Mandela notes how all day she would hear women being beaten in the torture chamber by the guards (Msimango 2018). Even during her interrogation when she was not giving in to the threats and torture inflicted on her

by Majors Swanepoel, Coetzee, and Ferreira. They began torturing somebody else in the interrogation room next to hers to make her give in and confess. Madikizela-Mandela finally broke—she said the words they wanted to hear. She admitted that she was guilty of everything she was accused of. The interrogators and policemen rushed her into the interrogation room to celebrate her humiliation. They read to her all the details of her charges and she said "yes, it was me, yes it is true" (Madikizela-Mandela 2003: 149). Many conclusions were made by the police—they asked her to confirm the details, after all, that she was taken back to her cell.

Victims of solitary confinement suffer substantial psychopathological effects such as perceptual changes and they have difficulty in adjusting to external stimuli, they have hallucinations, difficulty in thinking, concentration, and memory (Whittaker 1988; Grassian 1983). This is one of the reasons it took days for Madikizela-Mandela to regain mental equilibrium. She was severely traumatised. She could not remember her interrogation clearly, she could not even remember how and when she returned to her cell. When tortured, all the elements that make one human are removed, extracted excessively to create this complaint unconscious being. Information is mined out of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur in a sadistic and cleansing sort of manner to almost remove what makes them who they are. The weight of torture and interrogation is put on the body. The tactile nature of interrogation emerges as writing. Writing through the tortured existence emerges. For Madikizela-Mandela it emerges in her prison diary that she managed to keep secret while writing her thoughts, writing the traumatic experience on paper. She kept a diary while in solitary confinement wrote notes explaining her state of mind during the first two weeks of her detention (Lebdai 2015).

491 Days: Prisoner number 1323/69 by Madikizela-Mandela includes letters written by herself and Nelson Mandela.These letters and the prison diary form part of an impressive account of her horrific experience in solitary confinement. But above all, these letters serve as a form of her self-writing*,* it was a manner of distressing her imprisonment. Her writing was an act of restoration and reclaiming her life back, the writing saved her from despair. How she accounts for the tortured experiences indicates her sharp political consciousness. She knew that her suffering was not only hers alone but it was connected to the larger masses and her political beliefs against an oppressive apartheid regime (Lebdai 2015). Madikizela-Mandela writes through the tortured existence by emerging out of torture "unshaken and proud" (Kathrada 2013: x). Madikizela-Mandela goes

beyond herself and considers the importance of continuing the struggle against the oppressive enemy—the apartheid regime.

Torture can be understood and described as falling into three separate and sequential steps, which would occur in the following order. Firstly, pain is inflicted on the person; the pain is continuously intensified, it is also amplified to a level where it objectifies and subjugates. Secondly, the objectified pain is denied as pain and translated as power. Thirdly, this translation occurs through obsessive means of agency (Scarry 2003). The nature of this threefold sequential step indicates how the black bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela could not escape the violent nature of torture, their bodies become ravaged with a reproduction of horror, the repression that somehow seems inescapable for the black body.

These threefold sequential steps are lived by Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur not only in prison but outside of prison as well. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) was confined in a small cell where the lights were kept on night and day. Even Shakur (2014) attests, that they kept her under blinding lights for days and she felt like she was seeing everything in doubles and triples. The blinding lights that these women had to endure invaded every corner of their prison cells. There was no way they could sleep. This is the first level of torture, they are deprived of sleep. Then the pain intensifies. But it does not end there, it is only the beginning of the physical pain that will further be subjugated to. The interrogation that Madikizela-Mandela encountered switched from polite to gentle and brutal. Her first interrogator Major Swanepoel could not get the information he wanted from her and so they switched to another interrogator—Major Coetzee. He did not talk when addressing Madikizela-Mandela he shouted at all times. He's shouting at times would be highly evasive as though he would end up assaulting her—but of course, if he wanted to he would have. His shouting was a way to intimidate Madikizela-Mandela. Major Coetzee was shouting at Madikizela-Mandela demanding that she cooperates, and he said to her she was not special and she should not have to protect anyone. Major Coetzee told her that everything had been recorded, the apartheid police had all the information they needed. These were all threats because if he did have the information required to expose and destruct the plans of the African National Congress (ANC) he would not need Madikizela-Mandela's confession. To confess is to self-incriminate and it might provide further evidence for malignant political forces to further apply systematic torture on one's body. Shakur (2014) extends Madikizela-Mandela's experiences in that she went through

physical assaults as part of a tool of interrogation and subjugation. Solitary confinement was also driving her "crazy". In efforts of trying to lessen the despair that came with solitary confinement, she would walk out of her cell as soon as the guards opened the door to bring her food. Shakur would walk to the "day room". Which is where all the other prisoners would eat and watch TV, then she would return to her cell. This happened numerous times until one day—one of the guards yelled at her to get back into her cell. When Shakur refused, her arm was grabbed by one of the guards and the whole room started moving. Chairs and tables were flying all over the room, Shakur was hitting, fighting, punching, and biting back (Shakur 2014). This is what the second level appeals to—it subjugates the black body further, Shakur is already in prison but yet she still gets beaten and assaulted, the guards reinforce their power by inflicting more pain onto her.

It attempts to degrade the self. This is exactly what Majors Coetzee and Swanepoel and the guards in Shakur's assault encounter were trying to achieve. After spending days in interrogation Madikizela-Mandela was in fatigue, "she felt close to death, as if she was floating, and wondered if she were dead" (Madikizela-Mandela 2003: 146). This death-like experience she describes suggests an accomplishment in the use of torture. The objectification of pain and interrogation Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's encounters are translated and justified as power. The "excesses" of torture are directed by where power is invested (Foucault 1977a).

4.4 The Power of Prison

The conceptualisation of power has a distinguished discourse. Aside from the alternative views widely shared, the common definition of power is "the ability of one party to determine the behaviour of another party" (Hepburn 1985: 145). In the penal system, the prison wardens have the institutional power bestowed upon them by authorities which can either be a state, government or organisation. Prison wardens (as seen by the prisoners) are the "zoo-keepers" and they have the power of authority and the prisoners (as seen as the prison wardens) are no better than animals hence, they do not have proper sanitation and are confined in an animal like position, caged in their prison (McDermott and King 1988). Institutional power is similar to legitimate power. The warden has the formal authority of power. They have the right to exercise control over prisoners under their extent and capacity (Hepburn 1985). Prison wardens implement and represent institutional power although Crewe (2011), argues that it is questionable whether they embody it or not. Evidently, in the cases of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, their prison wardens embodied

this institutional power. When entering prison Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to always be mindful of the space they were going to occupy with their bodies. Because, when their bodies enter prison they entered "a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it" (Foucault 1977a: 138). It was entering the mechanics of the body, where the political anatomy is defined in the manner of having a hold and control over others to control how they operate by use of particular techniques that determine speed and efficiency. The prime objective with the mechanics of power that operates in prison is to create docile bodies through, discipline that occurs using regulation, surveillance, and isolation (Dirsuweit 1999). Regulation, surveillance, and isolation are exactly what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experience in prison. Their movements are put under surveillance through the hold of prison and they are isolated in solitary confinement.

Foucault (1977a) uses the panopticon analogy to interpret how the technology of control over the body occurs. In the panoptic device, the prisoner cannot see the warden, but the warden can see the prisoners every move in their cell. The prisoner is thus, viewed from the position of power by the warden. Privacy is further invaded as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela also attested to what Dirsuweit (1999: 73) acknowledges that "the use of light in the cell to illuminate the individual, giving her the sense of being on display". This means the prisoner is at the mercy and disposal of the warden—the warden can do whatever they please to do with the prisoner. This also translates into wardens using their power in a variety of ways.

Crewe (2011) explains that wardens have soft and hard power. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur understood how these power dynamics manifested while they were incarcerated. Madikizela-Mandela explains this manifestation of hard and soft power through the "good and bad cop" metaphor. Soft power as described by Nye (2004: 256) is "the ability to achieve one's ends through the persuasion and attraction as opposed to coercion or payment which is hard power". There are parallels in Nye's definition and the formulation and application of power in prison. A clear indication is in Madikizela-Mandela's (2003) experience. She explains the "good cop" as Major Coetzee because when it was his turn to interrogate her he bought food, although she could not eat it. He would speak to her as opposed to shout at her. He tried as much as he could to persuade her into admitting into her "crimes" and providing a confession. He would plea to her to think of her children and ask why she was subjecting herself under so much distress. Major Swanepoel was much harsher compared to Coetzee. His words where malicious, he insinuated that she was a cheap

opportunist who used people to get whatever she wanted from them (Madikizela-Mandela 2003). Nye's definition of soft power fits well with the actions of "good cop." The power that is exerted is less physically brutal and hostile compared to "bad cop" who reflects hard power that is more aggressive and possibly considered more efficient. Neither is more legitimate than the other—the core purpose is the exercise of power and ability to produce the results required. Yet, it remains that soft power through psychological torture has damaging effects.

The power of the prison wardens translates into time. In prison, power is articulated into time—it is the measure of power. Time for a prisoner is often empty because of the routine and isolated nature of prison (Hardt 1997). This was indicated in Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's account of their time spent in prison. Prison wastes and destroys time but the difficulty for the prisoner is that they cannot control their time. This means "prison time is devoid of chance" (Hardt 1997: 65). Nothing occurs unplanned—it is all planned by the higher power. The prison wardens create the fate of the prisoners, time for the prisoners is reduced to being shuffled and moved around between the prison corridors from the cell to the prison hospital to the interrogation room and back to the cell.

The prison is where legitimate power lies in the hands of the wardens, the wardens not only control the prisoners but they enforce a new identity upon them. Through control, the prisoner's conception of his self is squashed and trampled upon (Johnson 1975). Criminals are regarded as human rubbish, they are dehumanised through power. The kind of dehumanisation that occurs in prison Johnson considers to be similar to that of the people living in ghettos. Authority and control come from outside, by outside it refers to those who are not in the same position, those who have higher authority and by that consider and place themselves in a higher status of humanity. These "outsiders" are prison wardens—they consider that inside of the prison as lowly and sub-human. The "outsider" criminalises the "insider" because of power and control, it embodies. The "insider" becomes conscious of their position in the power dynamic and order. The "insider" by extension who is Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela politicise their position in the power dynamic in prison because their imprisonment is a result of political deprivation (Chrisman 1971). Their position in prison is politicised because they are denied to be politically free both in and out of prison by the oppressive systems of rule.

Often as a result of political deprivation, legitimate power is not adhered to by prisoners. Therefore, it exists only to the extent which prisoners view the wardens as having legitimate right to give orders and obey orders. For instance, both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had encountered were they were given instructions by wardens but, they did not adhere to the instructions. Prisoners can accept the wardens' authority but, that does not mean they are obliged to obey. This is where the difficulty arises. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur did not willingly adhere to the authority of the wardens. Therefore, different use of power has to be applied—coercive power which is based on "the prisoners' perception that the guards can punish" (Hepburn 1985: 146-147). The basis of this compliance from prisoners is fear of punishment. Madikizela-Mandela (2003) attests that she feared Major Swanepoel the most after all she had labelled him "bad cop," she had even speculated he possibly could have trained at a torturers college in an advanced course on torture –this is because he was so good at it. Fear is created by those who have power over others because in some instances they are unable to yield respect then fear becomes the next option. Shakur (2014) never really found any of the police officers she encountered any better. She referred to all of them as "pigs" although not out of fear but, based on the idea of disrespect and insulting them. They treated her with disrespect thus, she felt no obligation to respect them.

Since prisons are sites of power, it is natural for them to yield inequalities and hierarchies. Prisons consist of relationships of domination and subordination between the prison staff and prisoners—although, these relationships are not fixed (Bosworth and Carrrabine 2001). A prison is a place of power dynamics that unfold daily, it is a place of frequent tension and negotiation. This is something constant that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do while in prison—they negotiate for better food, health services, and living conditions while in prison. The nexus of the power relations thus arises because power is not absolute—it has alternative interpretations and arrangements. For instance, the interrogations that Madikizela-Mandela had to endure placed her in the ability to use her resistance as a power tactic. She has the information the police need but, in her refusing, the power arrangement changes—and it is in her favour. In a similar context of resistance, Shakur refuses to confess to the state charges she has alleged committed. Resistance thus becomes an instrument of challenging the power of the wardens, the court systems, and the overall oppressive systems.

Although the repressive apparatus compels agency within Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur—the legitimate power of the wardens persists and can gain compliance moreover, it requires stabilisation, consistency, and nurture because it has to apply multiple forms of power to control. Therefore, legitimate power remains a solid source for the wardens. The fate of the prisoners, of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is sealed, by the power of the wardens. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are directly confronted with power in the encounters with the wardens. The power is unswerving and perverse. It is violent, it is a separation that, does not bring one to the self. Selfhood is violated because of this legitimate power functions for producing docile bodies (Moran, Pallot, and Piacentini 2013). This is the type of power that challenges the selfhood and agency of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

In prison, the grammar of violence is inevitable. It is interpreted as aggression and hegemonic masculinity because it is an unconcealed display of power against a defenceless group. The role and negotiation of power in prison should be considered because it is black bodies that are imprisoned and are guarded by white guards and it is female black bodies that are guarded by white male guards (Useem and Kimball 1989). For that reason, it makes prison a site of racial and gender complexities guided by power relations. These power relations require a nuanced understanding (Miller 2000).

The significance of power is portrayed in the derogative nature of how prison wardens apply force and spectacle violence to prisoners. Shakur was beaten senselessly for refusing a body search. These body searches are evasive and demeaning to the body. Moreover, they become an exercise of humiliation to the prisoner—because, prisoners are forced to strip naked and are searched (Abu-Jamal 1996). Madikizela-Mandela (1985) explains how they would be searched every day in prison. Two wardresses would walk in and order them to take off their clothes and start inspecting their shoes, go through their clothes, their hair and they would even inspect their vagina. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 100) notes "nothing is more humiliating". There is a huge loss of self-authority in this act. It promotes a masculine subculture that portrays the impulses of female subordination. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur have no authority over their bodies the wardens search their cells and bodies at any time. These actions are further justified by a hierarchical system of authority in prison.

The hierarchical system enables the wardens to have the voice of authority and above all to supervise prisoners with less conflict and greater efficiency. Prisons have high-security levels, the more severe the security measures in the facility—the more rigid and strict the power relations become (Miller 2000). Even though prisoners outnumber the wardens, because of this hierarchy and power relations the wardens can control prisoners—thus, the hierarchy is an essential component of the prison structure. The corrective ranking system resembles the military ranking system in terms of authority being established through ranks—each successive rank has greater authority than those of lesser ranks. Men have long dominated leadership roles in penal and military institutions thus, the history of leadership in such institutions is male-dominated and masculinity is celebrated and promoted (Zimmer 1986). Thus, the hierarchy of the corrective system is maintained through a hypermasculine ideal. Therefore, the socialisation process of the wardens reinforces "toughness". The wardens use obscene language and they shout vulgar words. Major Swanepoel never spoke in a low toned voice when interrogating Madikizela-Mandela—he always shouted and Mrs. Butterworth always spoke to Shakur in a condescending tone. Mrs. Butterworth as a female warden has to alter her behaviour to fit into the hyper-masculine environment that prison reinforces. Often when women enter jobs that are traditionally held by men they cannot change or alter the roles of that occupation. Essentially what occurs to female wardens is that they "to a large degree organisations make their workers into who they are. Adults change to fit the system" (Kanter 1977: 263). Female wardens use different control techniques to maintain control through regulation. But female wardens are usually evaluated based on how closely their performance approximates that of men (Zimmer 1987). This is because these hyper-masculine positions such as being a prison warden were originally designed for men so women were expected to fit into these pre-existing models—to further assert and use power based on the inferior and superior relational mode. Moreover, Gross (1981) and Berg and Budnick (1986) speak of defeminised women officers displaying 'pseudo-masculinity' the purpose of this is to make more successful. For instance, Shakur (1978) notes how the wardens always reinforced the inferior to the superior relationship between themselves and the prisoners. The wardens call the women by their first names and the women ought to address them either as Officer or Miss. The wardens constantly reprimand the prisoners and would often say to them "grow up", "act like ladies", "be good girls" (Shakur 1978: 10). If any of the "girls" would break minor rules such as locking in a few minutes late the wardens would jokingly say "don't let me have to come down there and beat

your butt". Beneath this veneer is the idea of establishing were authority lies and the constant reminder for the prisoners that the wardens are superior to them. Female wardens too expressed a strong sense of authority over prisoners. In the case of Shakur (2014), the interactions discussed are those only with female prison wardens, although there is limited information regarding extensive nature of the power that was utilised by the female wardens. But Shakur (2014) does reiterate that the manner the female wardens treated prisoners was based on the notion of exerting power over the prisoners. In the case of Madikizela-Mandela (2013) the interactions accounted for are mainly those with the male wardens.

The purpose of such language is to create an offensive and belligerent social distance between the prisoner and warden. An authoritarian nature emerges from the wardens perhaps because, of the hierarchical structure the wardens are at a lower ranking, they do not have the decision-making authority they simply act on decisions made by their seniors. As a way of reclaiming their autonomy, they are harsher and crueler to prisoners. Exaggerated masculinity transpires to discourage fear and encourage aggressiveness among wardens. But in fact, when re-examining the situation it is fear that guides the wardens. "They are petrified of the black man, so much so that they become the prisoners" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 103). "Hoover and other rabid defenders of the status quo were right to be afraid of the Black Panther Party" (Timeline News, 9 February 2017). The wardens, the security structures of the oppressive state, and by extension the racist leadership of oppressive states govern by fear despite their immense power. As a result, of living with this mortal fear they resort to an aggressive nature that becomes an attempt of showing strength. Thus, the power of the wardens derives from the force and not from intelligence.

Shakur (2014: 299) recalls how she was told she is the "property of the state" and inevitably this means the state has the power to decide what happens to her—those who hold power can make decisions. The voice of authority is within the power of the state—this is clear when she is told: "now you are the property of the state" it is a way asserting the power of the wardens and reminding that she has no power. Madikizela-Mandela is confronted with the same hostility. As a way of asserting power over her the wardens give her a bible and say to her "ask your God to release you from jail" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 103). It is as though the male dominance and power of the wardens are above the God that Madikizela-Mandela prays to—that even if she prayed to him there is no way she could be released. Oddly, the wardens are asserting that their God is different

from which Madikizela-Mandela prays to, their God placed them in the rightful position of power. God "predestined them to be the rulers of this country" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 103). Thus, they remain in the highest position in the hierarchy of power because God placed them in authority, and seemingly they are legitimate to rule over Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur and inevitably black bodies. This is how power asserts itself, "white men find their social status as full members with higher standing than 'other' groups" (Dilts 2014: 203). Hence, self-understanding for the white man and the wardens comes into existence through excluding, punishing, confining, monitoring, and managing *others—others'* such as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Through such existence techniques of power are erected for the white man and are based on plausible deniability.

4.5 Psychic Pain to Psychic Breakdown

Psychic pain is an omnipresent feeling that is sometimes unavoidable from existence and it is not easy to describe precisely what it involves. Psychic pain is a result of the psychic apparatus being flooded by a vast amount of stimuli (Freud 1950). Psychic pain has an existential connotation to it, this means it is closely linked to how one defines their existence and meaning of life. Thus, psychic pain is described as suffering from life itself being painful. It comes from affecting the deep layers of one's consciousness that form an integral part of one's personalities. "It is a direct threat to the coherence of the self or even to one's psychic existence as a whole" (Wille 2011: 24). Psychic pain is an immediate response to trauma, and the failure and unwillingness to consciously acknowledge psychic pain results in a psychic breakdown.

Psychic pain and psychic breakdown are closely linked. Psychic pain is what Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experience at first glance being in solitary confinement. The psychic breakdown is long-standing and has a more detrimental and lasting effect on the psyche. du Preez Bezdrob's (2003) notes when she was compiling Madikizela-Mandela's *Winnie Mandela: A Life,* she was constantly confronted by "why" did Madikizela-Mandela make the choices she did. She could not understand why Madikizela-Mandela made some of the choices she did particularly with the absence of empirical evidence. du Preez Bezdrob emphasises that the human psyche possess an important frontier of exploration, because "nothing and no one has yet been able to dissect the soul, that unique and ephemeral core that not only makes us who we are but governs the 'why' and 'how' of our actions" (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 142-143). du Preez Bezdrob's statement stems from a deeper examination and a close account of Madikizela-Mandela's experiences. She

explains that she found it impossible not to wonder and imagine the fears Madikizela-Mandela went through. She tried to place herself in Madikizela-Mandela's position—and by so doing it invoked fear in her. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) notes how her interrogation changed from gentle to brutal, depending on who was interrogating her. To overcome the feeling of fear, rage, and disrupt Madikizela-Mandela had to imprint the words in her mind "I am the captain of my soul" it came from the poem 'Invictus'. Madikizela-Mandela knew what they were trying to do—being placed in solitary confinement, the being interrogated and tortured was all part of crushing her soul. Even Shakur sought comfort in the same poem Madikizela-Mandela found strength in 'Invictus'. While Shakur was in the prison hospital, one of her nurses bought her books, among these books, were poetry books. She thought these books were purposely selected in efforts of restoring her hope and political commitments against oppression. One of the books was on black poetry and she found herself drawn to reading out loud 'Invictus'–she read it over and over again. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to instil the words of the poem into themselves and they understood that by reading, re-reading and reciting the poetry it meant acknowledging the struggle but, despite the oppression, they were in communion and solidarity with the revolutionary forces they belonged to and they would overcome the political struggle.

Apartheid and segregation were primarily based on the promotion and maintaining of white political, social, and economic well-being and it was done by disorganising black bodies and their aspirations. Of course, it means disorganising the leadership of revolutionary forces such as the ANC (African National Congress) and the BLA (Black Liberation Army). Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur respectively belonging to these organisations are subject to perpetual suppression through isolation, inferiority, and self-doubt. The intention was really to establish how far can the image, the emotion of the prisoner, the black body be battered (Onwuzurike 1987). The core idea was to justify oppression through psychological functioning. This is that the black body has a small brain, thus, it is responsible for inadequate behaviour. The black body carries the mind of a child, it is primitive and the idea of psyche breakdown is to keep it where it belongs which is in its primitive form (Pillay 1983).

Everything Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur encountered was a build-up to making them feel physical pain, psychic pain, and ultimately break their psyche. Major Swanepoel and Coetzee's interrogation style was solely aimed at shattering Madikizela-Mandela, by reminding her of

daughters, demeaning her values and position in the struggle against apartheid. It was a strategy to create "object loss". Object loss in an injury or consequence to the body, whereby the injured body and lost object are cathected. Meaning, the physical body suffers a mental or emotional disconnection or degeneration. The body suffers psychic pain and it manifests physically. It creates this unthinkable anxiety of having no relationship to the body and having no orientation (Winnicott 1965). Object loss paralyses the body because the mind is unable to orientate itself. This creates a sense of mental illness whereby the body is traumatised, creating guilt, lack of confidence, and worthlessness. Madikizela-Mandela (2003) felt guilty when they were torturing one of her brave men as Major Swanepoel told her. Screams were coming from the interrogation room next to hers. She could not handle that—so she confessed. But, she confessed out of guilt. When a psychological breakdown occurs a sense of worthlessness is evident. Shakur (2014) notes, how accepting worthlessness is a form of psyche breakdown. It is, accepting the conditions that oppress the black body, and over time the black body tolerates these oppressive conditions to becoming comfortable with the oppression and normalise it.

Shakur could not accept these conditions. This is not to say that, Madikizela-Mandela willingly accepts dehumanisation. Rather, it is to note the context in which these two women find themselves and how these conditions shaped their responses. Shakur explains, how psyche breakdown can occur in an elusive form. How you dress and how you look makes a statement about yourself. Thus, for Shakur, it is important to constantly claim and for black people. "It is necessary for black revolutionaries to come together, analyse our history, our present condition and define ourselves and our struggle" (Shakur 2014: 276). In a different context from that of Madikizela-Mandela—Shakur does not give in. She acknowledges that the appearance of a person in terms of how they dress and relate to themselves can strongly indicate how that person's psyche has been captured and broken down by oppressive conditions. Shakur (2014) demands that the desire to be free should manifest in everything one does in their life. It is only when everybody is free and equal it won't matter how one dresses or wears their hair.

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were placed in solitary confinement and tortured to breakdown their political consciousness, the element of individuality, and exploiting their weaknesses and political convictions. The sole purpose was to breakdown their psyches, their minds. To create the experience of nothingness that would limit them to black existence defined by white racist logic.

The aim was to restrict Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur into what Moten (2013) defines as the black abyss (Adusei-Poku 2017). The abyss is the *ohnmacht* or a position of powerlessness whereby being is overpowered by forces outside of one's body and it is a process of detaching of the self from the body (Adusei-Poku 2017). Nothingness then emerges, when the body is detached from the self, it is a lived experience that is outside of the self and falls outside of the parameters of what is determined and understood as human. The experience and position of nothingness unavoidably define itself by challenging the idea of the human. It is much like psyche breakdown because it creates a mental collapse that results in a state of nothingness, it makes anxiety emerge. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 140) describes that she was trapped in a "vacuum of nothingness". She was stuck with a daily routine full of nothing (Msimang 2018). This is when psyche breakdown emerges, but she later then asserts that she was relieved when the wardens came to fetch her after two weeks of being arrested, she was taken for interrogation. At least, interrogation and torture meant she could be around people, experience has physical pain inflicted on her body, which was more tolerable compared to psychic pain of solitary confinement. The psychic pain was caused by the insults from the wardens, depression from wondering whether her children are looked after. "The avoidance of psychic breakdown coincides with the avoidance of psychic pain" (Wille 2011: 24). And even though Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur tried to avoid psychic breakdown they were also attempting to avoid psychic pain. Although, it does not mean they survived their attempts completely. Both women confess to the trauma and depression they felt when imprisoned and more so, in solitary confinement. Being in solitary confinement placed them in a position that questioned and tested their sanity. This is one of the reasons they constantly had to do things that could keep them sane because they both knew and felt that their sanity and emotions were being challenged. Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 62) writes "they destroyed your being; you were made to feel like a nobody" and as a way of rejecting this feeling. She had to find alternatives to preserve her sanity; she found two aunts in her cell and played with them, she used a blanket to polish floor cell and she shredded one of her blankets and weaved the threads together (Madikizela-Mandela 2013; 2003).

Madikizela-Mandela notes that the only way prisoners in solitary confinement could find emotional solace would be by writing on the wall, she made a calendar on the wall of the time she spent in solitary confinement. These are among many ways in which prisoners revive themselves and rebel against the surge of psyche breakdown. Above all, it is also a way of validating the

concept of self-writing by physically writing on the prison walls, the prisoners are confirming to themselves that they exist and that through writing they affirm their existence. Thus, the action of writing on the wall is defiance against insanity. For Shakur, it is an act of resistance that becomes synonymous with self-affirmation (James 2004). It explicitly represents the continuity of the struggle in a different element that enables both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela to retain their commitment against the oppressive state systems that imprisoned them.

Madikizela-Mandela recalls how she frequently fainted during a nonstop interrogation that took five days and six nights with no sleep. She considered it as nature's defence against the unendurable pain. She was in a state of fatigue, she describes it as feeling close to death, as is she was floating in and out of death. She felt as though exhaustion would engulf her—she could hear sounds and voices that were far away. She was in pain and drained. Madikizela-Mandela was feeling what Fanon (2008[1967]: 119) describes as being at "crossroads between Nothingness and Infinity". It is a state of not knowing whether one is alive or not, not knowing when it will end or if it will end at all. It is an embodied feeling of powerlessness and paralysis both physically and mentally. It is a void, in which Moten (2013) notes as being placed in a social and ontological construction that refuses the black body to awaken from *ohnmacht* and recall its being. In Fanon (2008[1967]: 119) it is a soul that has the power to be more and fulfil its convictions, but it cannot because "*they* prescribe for me the humility of the cripple… I tried to get up but eviscerated silence surged toward me with the paralysed wings". Fanon describes that he cannot get up and Madikizela-Mandela (2013) explains that she is floating in and out of consciousness. This is the position of psyche breakdown—the mind is unstable, in a state of nothingness. This notion of nothingness is a consistent tool for denying black bodies' existence. It becomes a standpoint of prescribing blackness to black bodies. Blackness is recoded as nothingness and inevitably nothingness is recoded as psyche breakdown—thus, placing blackness-nothingness-psyche breakdown in the same realm of destruction. This realm places Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as lacking agency and immobile of which Adusei-Poku (2017: 6) considers as the "unimaginability and endlessness of space and time". Meaning, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do not know when and where this position of blackness-nothingness-psyche breakdown will end. This connotation of understanding nothingness and psyche breakdown in Fanon (2008[1967]) and Morten (2013) is rich with the knowledge it is expanded through the metaphors and personifications of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela.

Arguably, nothingness can be more than just absence of agency, it can be defined as a foundation of opposition to oppressive structures such as the apartheid, segregation, and penal systems. It is a platform to negate the void of psyche breakdown. Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 146) does this by acknowledging the pain and exhaustion, yet declaring to herself that "they could forget about it— she was getting out of there, even if only in her mind". By her declaring these words it triggered a slow process of coping with the impossible feeling of being trapped in nothingness in the same manner as Fanon (2008[1967]) begins to weep when he finds himself at a crossroads of nothingness and infinity. The weeping and declaring, are mechanisms that exhibit a rebellious spirit—a spirit that advocates for the fullness of life outside of blackness.

This is the spirit that refuses to accept the living death condition of psychic breakdown and chooses to tragically find a gap and draw strength from this gap. Moten (2013: 749) describes it as "the indiscernible gap between capacity and incapacity". This "gap" establishes the functionality of yes and no. Moten considers this "gap" as a moment of turning the conditions of nothingness into the possibility of black thought and, it drives an absolute overturning against oppressive systems. In essence, this translates to refusing the damnation of social death and psyche breakdown.

Thus, the black bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do what Shakur (2014: 242) refers to as the duty to the struggle, "where there is oppression, there will be resistance" and to her, this means that the BLA (Black Liberation Army) will strongly remain part of the resistance and by extension is means she will remain part of the struggle regardless of where she is placed. Shakur (2014) explains how in the US black people are constantly reminded that they are nothing, their culture is worth nothing thus, black people need to constantly make positive statements about themselves. It is this nature of self-affirmation that makes both women exude the ability to transcend above the constraints of psyche breakdown.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to discuss the relationship between torture, solitary confinement, and power and its complexity. Prison is a space where this complexity unfolds for Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur but above all, prison becomes a space that shapes an integral part of the political commitments these women have. The findings of this chapter postulate that through the solitary confinement and the tortured experiences of both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur can write and exist through the prohibition that denies them to be human. The larger question that this chapter

aimed to dissect was the ability to write through the tortured experience and this is the ability both women have although in different contexts. Both women assume a status that places them in a gap between capacity and incapacity, but they authenticate themselves between and within this gap. It is in this gap that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela begin the self-writing practice of torture, they write through their bodily experience. This is to say, they write through the solitary confinement in that space of nothingness, they write through the subjugation and negation of the possibility of writing. Writing and existing is against the conviction placed onto the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. But through the gap, something incredible happens, something that is for life and that wants life emerges within Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela—a force that exceeds their conditions of torture encourages them to defamiliarise themselves with the tortured experience. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur surpass the tortured experience regardless of confessing to the trauma caused by solitary confinement and entire incarceration experience they hold onto their convictions and persist.

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were exposed to extreme conditions of torture under oppressive state systems that were controlled by power dynamics that are defined by racist and sexist logic. But, through their tortured experience the two women exist through writing. They exist through writing that occurs because of the torture. The torture and writing exist synonymously—torture in the sense of solitary confinement, power, psychic pain, and psychic breakdown; writing in the sense the actual act of textual inscription and writing in the sense of documenting, living the experience, through the experience in itself. Above all, torture and writing shape the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

CHAPTER 5

Authorisation of Self-writing

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the second key theme of the study, which is authorisation. In this chapter, authorisation is defined and analysed as an interruption and irruption in which self-writing occurs for both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. This chapter is closely linked with the former because it aims at illustrating how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur use the condition of being tortured and inferably criminalised as black bodies to authorise, meaning to approve and affirm their experiences as self-writing. The authorisation of self-writing by Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's political experiences is an interruption because it suggests a disturbance or a break within authority—particularly, the authority held by oppressive institutions. Simultaneously, it is an irruption of self-authorisation through their lived experiences for the reason that they forcibly act against oppression. In this chapter, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur illustrate how and why the self-authority they possess is continuously challenged and suppressed by authorities that are, political state systems, and institutions. Thus, it is through their self-writing that the interruption and irruption occurs. The core purpose of this chapter is to determine how authority shaped Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's self-writing not only the authority of the state but, the authority both women project as against oppression. This chapter illuminates what it means to exist in spaces that are anti-black.

This chapter begins by locating the politics of authorisation in the context of the *legitimate* authorities which are the states and institutions that imprison and most significantly, reject and oppress the humanity of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. Firstly, the chapter interprets how the oppressive states and institutions project their *illegitimate* authorities as a way of rejecting the agency and (self) authority of the black body. Secondly, the discussion focuses on how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur establish and are located in the politics of authorisation, the discussion reveals the narrative which Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur self-write from which is the mute and pained narrative. Thirdly, and building on the previous discussion, this chapter provides details of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur self-write in a world that is anti-black and dehumanising. The last section of this chapter discusses self-determination and outlines how both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur exude self-confidence despite their position in the anti-black

world. Their self-determination and will to attain being becomes an act of reclaiming and restoring their identities.

5.2 The Politics of Authorisation

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as prisoners are confined beings and by virtue of being prisoners, their freedom is sanctioned. This position of sanctioning disallows them to be *self*. This means the women are captured non-beings, as they are not allowed to belong to themselves. Thus, not belonging to themselves is caused by the mechanics of power. The mechanics of power are held and controlled by those in the position of authority. As discussed in chapter 4, severe punishment and cruel treatment were used on Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as tools of repression and oppression. These tools create an illusion of security based on a racist system of legal and moral judgement (Kirchheimer and Rusche 2003). Fundamentally, these tools of power are based on a racial project of elimination and dehumanisation of the black body. It is through authorisation that elimination and dehumanisation occur—this is to say a certain level of acceptance and a certain manner of approval that the racial project exists and occurs. But, it is critical to provide an analysis of how this authorisation occurs and by whom. This requires a deep exploration of how the systems of legal and moral judgement work. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experience authorisation in the form of an interplay. In basic terms, authorisation is defined as accepting—in the context of this chapter it firstly means to accept racial domination and secondly through the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur it refers to reclaiming and accepting the self. Thus, it is reinterpreted as *self*-authorisation—meaning accepting the conditions which one is surrounded by, and inevitably those conditions shape the modes of self-writing.

The politics of authorisation in oppressive state systems manifest into systems of rule such as segregation and apartheid and they function based on mass social, political, and economic racial programs, by disproportionally discriminating black bodies. By observing the black body in this position it is forced to accept the conditions of alienation that correspond with a form of punishment and the imposition of a criminalised life. It extends to compelling Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to accept punishment as a rehabilitation mechanism of their crime. Their crime is that of existing, which is far more detrimental compared to unlawful actions. It is through this disposition that transparency diminishes between what is labelled as a crime, and the punishment or legal implication. Punishment no longer becomes a consequence of a crime, instead, it becomes

the condition in which black bodies have no option but, to accept and authorise. Punishment is then an authorised social phenomenon for black bodies. It no longer serves as a correctional measure rather, it becomes something which black bodies are forced to be accustomed to. Rusche and Kirchheimer (2003: 5) write "Punishment must be understood as a social phenomenon freed from its juristic concept and social ends". Thus, punishment adopts an unconventional meaning when imposed onto the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, punishment represents a phantom of actions and semiotic transfers. It exceeds beyond the jurisdictional form and always renders the black body in breach of the law (Hartman 1997). Knowingly, this means Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela as black bodies construe their agency through defiance, commitment, and resistance and against oppressive state systems— their agency is encoded as a crime. Any ability to show autonomy or appropriation of the self, the black body is criminalised. In a prejudiced way, the disciplinary codes and modes of punishment for white people are labelled reformative compared to that of black bodies which cannot be reformed (Heiner 2015). This notion, according to Heiner, requires a conceptual backtrack on the concept of how the black body is perceived by oppressive state systems.

The black body experiences life through its body, it has no consciousness, it has "no rights to respect, no civic virtue or character to restore, no freedom to abridge" (Henier 2015: 29). The black body can only be reached through the body. This means it cannot experience life on a conscious and rational level. For the black body—life is only experienced through the body, thus, it is not receptive to the reformative mechanism when imprisoned. The purpose of prison is to reform the mechanics of rationality since the black body lacks rationality there is no purpose for it to be imprisoned. It becomes a redundant action to imprison black bodies when in essence they cannot reform. De Beaumont and de Tocqueville (1833: 15) writes, "There are no prisons to shut up slaves: imprisonment would cost too much! Death, the whips, exile, cost nothing! Moreover, to exile slaves, they are sold, which yields profit". To imprison a slave is a waste, the idea of imprisonment for slaves did not make sense. Because, this was a waste of labour, thus, imprisonment seemed like a contradiction that would not bring any profit to the slave owner. In the same liking, the imprisoned black body is the slave. There is a genealogical tie that exists between the two—both are highly oppressed and dehumanised by virtue of racial prejudice that operates on the same principle. The black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are denied agency or rationality. The purpose of imprisonment for both women cannot be to reform them,

thus, logically the purpose is to break, damage, and harm them. They are tortured and suffer the damaging effects of solitary confinement. But, something occurs in those moments of torture, being beaten, whipped, and denied sleep. Their bodies become a medium of authorisation.

Spillers (1987: 67) states that "…whips, chains, knives, the canine patrol, the bullet. These undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose severe disjuncture come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color". Spillers acknowledges the whips, the tortured experience, and above all, the physical manifestations of punishment for black bodies, but she escalates this further. For Spillers, the physical implications of torture are transferred from one generation to another. Torture becomes a form of a symbolic inscription on the black body forced on the black bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. They are accepted as symbols and meanings that are deciphered through self-writing. So, when Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela authorise self-writing they are indeed accepting the markings on their flesh as self-authentication. It is a symbolic act that constitutes a bodily grammar, the type of grammar that is experienced physically and is internalised into the action of self-authentication. Spillers notes that the physical effects that are seen on the body become the cultural text that is turned from the inside to the outside.

Madikizela-Mandela's (2003: 159) inside is turned to the outside as she acknowledges that "once she had recovered from the physical ravages of her imprisonment, she seemed to be her old self: cheerful, tenacious… she seemed stronger and more resilient than before." Prison had rebirthed a new person in her, she explained it as an experience that liberated her inner self and purified her soul. There are a strong irony and odd feeling that emanates from her testimony of what the prison experience did for her. It is difficult to imagine a sense of goodness and positivity from experiencing prison in the manner Madikizela-Mandela did. Considering the torture and extreme psychological pain she felt. But, without reluctance Madikizela-Mandela reclaims that experience as a moment of purification and coming to now her inner soul. This description should qualify how the experience of prison awakened a high level of acceptance. But, what is fundamental is the kind of acceptance that emerges. It is not the kind of acceptance linked to confession and affirmation of the oppressive system of apartheid. But, it is the acceptance coming from a critical position, it is based on acknowledging the effects and consequences of her position and using these experiences as a way of reclaiming herself back to herself. Madikizela-Mandela considered her

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position as slightly easier to withstand, compared to that of all the oppressed South Africans that were faced with endless hardships and injustices in every aspect of their lives because of the apartheid regime. She had no choice but to accept her condition and be positive. This positive attitude she adopts results in a manifestation of intellectual activity. It means Madikizela-Mandela had to consider her political and prison experience into more than just oppression of her liberation. But, she had to think of these experiences in a deeper sense that would make the outcome of the experience to maintain the importance of her political convictions within her reality. Nemath (1980) acknowledges, that there is a struggle in the ways of viewing reality he attests, that there are various ways of perceiving reality. But, before deciding on how one views reality there already exists an "ideal" in the mind of those who are struggling for change. However, what is important he claims is to "emancipate oneself from political and social slavery is…. freeing the mind" (Ransome 1992: 180). Freeing the mind and having an ideal was critical for both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela because they had to have a driving force and goal in mind to achieve their political commitments.

Gramsci (1985) describes a process that is closely connected to what Madikizela-Mandela (2003) went through when she explains how she came out greater and stronger after her time spent in prison. It appears she reviewed her prison reality and transformed it into her mind into an approach to achieving her ideal. She did exactly what Gramsci pronounces. She had to free her mind of the political and social oppression to be reminded of her ideals. This requires engaging with her reality in a philosophical sense because she needs to be aware that her material and the existential situation is temporary and that even though it is favoured by the ruling oppressive state elites it is not the ultimate end. Shakur (2014) is not far off from the philosophical intervention that Madikizela-Mandela adopts. Shakur (2014: 181) proclaims the same sentiments as Gramsci regarding the prison experience. She considers prison as a condition for thinking authentically about living, it is about placing the real-world struggles in a principled way. The experience of prison thus becomes a moment of making philosophy come alive and relevant. The task for liberation is experienced in various battlefields—for instance, in prison and there are daily hardships black bodies experience under oppressive rule. These battles do not occur in an imaginary atmosphere—but, what is critical is how they manifest into a way of life and an ideology of kind (Nagel 2011).

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur do not derail from achieving their ideal and their persistence in the struggle for political change. They embody an "organic ideology"—Gramsci (1971) asserts, that these are belief-systems that are organic. Gramsci (1971: 376) describes them as "directly within actual social relations, and those which are superficial, arising without emotional commitment in the context of purely formal". These ideologies are important and motivating; they produce meaning and their function is critical in history. Gramsci (1971: 344) notes that an ideology can only be important if it can "change, correct or perfect the conceptions of the world and thus, change norms of conduct". This reflects the underlying and most important commitment that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela pursued; it was to correct the inhumane and unequal nature of the apartheid and segregation systems. But above correcting these oppressive systems, they both wanted a reality that would express into an ideal that recognises the humanity of black people. According to Gramsci (1971: 344), it would be an ideal that would "incorporate itself in reality as if it were originally an expression of it". Essentially, this would translate into Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's political convictions expressed as a reality that has always existed as the original reality.

Through the course of embodying an "organic ideology", Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are transformed into organic intellectuals. Their role becomes that of exposing hegemonic forces of oppressive systems. These hegemonic forces support the status quo of apartheid and segregation and eventually become an organising principle that is highly internalised across populations, ultimately becoming a natural order. However, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur do not accept this "natural order" and the institutions it creates such as prisons. They are political prisoners, they are convicted due to their resistance to oppression and they are socially displaced (Nagel 2011). They become political prisoners who cannot be reformed because they do not accept the legitimacy of apartheid and segregation. They do not participate in the function of prison, because to participate would entail admitting that "society is legitimate because of its exploitation of the oppressed" (Newton 2003: 82). By refusing to participate Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela go back into that space of philosophical activity—they scrutinise the function of their incarceration.

Shakur interpreted her position in prison as requiring her to build a new society which implied breaking off the oppressed masses from a hegemonic system. Shakur lived by the philosophy of a revolutionary, which meant she had to actively learn history through the oppressor/oppressed

dynamic. Shakur (2014: 74) writes, "We must create shields that protect us and spears that penetrate our enemies. Black people must learn how to struggle by struggling. We must learn from our mistakes". For Shakur, this meant accepting the prison condition by creating a shield and penetrating the enemy by maintaining a radical mindset. For both women, what was critical is that the struggle against oppression was more than just about themselves. In their writings, it is clear that they continuously refer to themselves in the collective element. In light of reiterating their philosophical position, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur place themselves within ideals and political goals that are for the people. They write and exist in the position of the masses. "The ideals, the political goals that I stand for, those are ideals and goals of people in this country. They cannot just forget their ideal. My private self doesn't exist" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 26).

Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela understood that their imprisoned bodies were a representation of the imprisoned societies they were coming from. Both women understood that they were symbols of the struggles against oppression and the liberation movements they belonged to. When Madikizela-Mandela (2013) was in prison during interrogation she endured pain and did not confess anything that would implicate any of the ANC members. Even when she was exiled to Brandfort, the apartheid security forces warned the black community against her (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 26). "They were told this a woman who is going to tell you that you must fight for your land, she is going to tell you all the wrong things" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 26). Madikizela-Mandela represented a threat—taking her Brandfort was to diminish her political convictions. Shakur (2014) recalls a moment when she was moved to a man's prison—she writes "White people's fear of Black people with guns will never cease to amaze me. Probably it's because they think about what they would do were they in our place" (Shakur 2014: 65). She was moved because she too posed a threat to the US segregation laws and what they imposed on black people. The idea was to move her away from other prisons that she could influence. But both women could internalise their experience into "organic ideology" is guided by understanding the importance of their individuality in the context of being unapologetically resistant against oppressive state systems. What remains vital is their ability to embrace the disorder and its incoherence to underwrite a desire to pursue their political convictions.

Wilderson (2003) suggests a reconfiguration of positionality, which requires the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to reclaim blackness in a positive value but, most essentially as

a politically enabling site. Fanon (1968) refers to "absolute dereliction", which is a battle of two racially opposing ideologies: one that is hegemonic and based on racist logic and another that is oppressed and resisting oppression. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are located in the latter of the two racially opposing ideologies. The latter also depicts Wilderson's (2003) suggestion of reconfiguring positionality. It is through reconfiguration that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela create a politically enabling site for authorising their self-writing. They are in the position of the unthought, in a black spectre waiting to make a crucial move that will not be satisfied with compensation but, has to be pursued till death. This is the proclamation that both women make which is their commitment to the struggle, it is so deeply entrenched in their lives that the struggle is their life. The political struggle becomes their life so much that it begins to resemble Mbembe's (2003: 15) words when he describes such politics as "death that lives a human life". In essence, it is this willingness to die for politics, death becomes a sacrificial mastery that somehow maintains the political convictions of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Shakur (2014: 347) writes that "there were sisters and brothers who had been so victimised by amerika that they were willing to fight to the death against their oppressors… But we were to find out quickly that courage and dedication were not enough. To win any struggle for liberation, you have to have the way as well as the will an overall ideology". Here, Shakur emphasises how she is part of the collection of those who are willing to die to achieve liberation, and again she reiterates the importance of ideology as a guiding factor. Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 26) too speaks in the same voice of a collection saying, "When they send me into exile, it's not me as an individual they are sending. They think that with me there they can also ban the political ideas. But that is a historical impossibility". Madikizela-Mandela mentions that the apartheid regime tried to suppress her voice and influence in the political struggle, but the commitment the people had was beyond her. The political ideas conveyed by the political movements against apartheid were much larger. She understood that she was more than just an individual, but she was a representation and symbol of perpetual war against oppression. Both women had unequivocally accepted their role and symbolism in the struggle against oppression. Through accepting this role they provided a voice for black bodies because within the system black bodies were mute and disembodied and they created a politically enabling site.

Fanon writes in a letter that "Death is always with us" (Geismar 1971: 185). Fanon emphasises in that letter that death is endless it is not a matter of working through it or accepting it, rather it is

about how one's ideas have been secured against an unjust and oppressing world. He expressed his concern and need for the "cause" which was something important in Fanon's philosophy. The cause of justice and liberty—were critical if one had to live a life that would manifest into a purpose. A life of purpose was key to Fanon and it is evident in his work and how he stressed the importance of coming to know ones' self. Death is an inevitable aspect but, what should be of importance is how one conducts a life that manifests encouraging political and ethical subjects (Geismar 1971). Marriott (2007) highlighted the importance that at a proper time and place death becomes an answerable and significant occurrence to what has been desired in life and thus becomes unavoidable in achieving ones' goals. Again, Fanon (2008[1967]) alludes to the importance of death and its association with a revolution. He writes, "a stand against this living death is in a way a revolutionary" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 199). Marriott (2007) and Fanon (2008[1967]) affirm the same reasoning for associating death and revolution which that they embody a willingness to die for the sake of the revolution. These ideas on death were highly embodied in how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were willing to confront death for revolutionary change to occur.

5.3 The Mute Narrative

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela create a politically enabling site through the language of grief and pain caused by the workings of oppressive political systems. They enter into a realm that requires new conceptual lenses in order to understand their position. Being-mute, renders them voiceless; being-mute is not a deliberate action for both women it is the position the oppressive systems place them within. It is a position of "silence as resistance and courage; silence as illusion of stability; and silence as a site for coping and the reconstitution of self" (Motsemme 2004: 910). Motsemme thus is advocating that there is a language, a form of communication that silence facilitates. It is a form of language that requires a humble experience of witnessing a textured lived experience of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur write and exist from the position of the voiceless, their inferiority as political prisoners against oppressive systems, as black bodies against dominant white bodies makes them languageless in the conventional sense. They are unable to communicate because they lack the verbal language. Verbal language is so highly esteemed that speech and the ability to articulate one's thoughts to others is conventionally regarded as the primary form of communication. It is speech that enables a person

to enter into a social and intellectual community and connect with others. Works of Levi-Strauss (1955) and Mead (1970) have supported this notion of linguistic communication as the key form of communication. This reverts to a conventional manner of communication as key to entering a space of acknowledgement of being and as a social subject. Here lies the failure of formulating languages of pain that are beyond verbal communication, in which bodies become sites of textual accounts where the pain is written (Cavell 1994).

Instead, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur become objects of subjection because the laws that govern language are not in their favour. They become those who are denied opportunities to affirm and speak their narratives, their bodies are violated and dehumanised. It is critical to reimagine and consider the possible limits of verbal language, as it can force verbal articulation to be associated with a feeling. Therefore, in such instances where the words available are inadequate to convey communication because the feeling is beyond the verbal language. The inability to vocalise trauma can be expressed as a moment of powerlessness, coupled with humiliation and a diminished self. Motsemme (2004) notes this as a result of encountering something too painful and frightening to vocalise. By entering the unspeakable space, it is in the struggle of longing to speak. It does not simply mean the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur cannot speak, rather, it means they speak through their silence. They are the textual bodies on which pain is written. The body as a text of pain experiences physical pain that is so severe that it destroys language. It leaves the body in pain and unable to participate in its full capacity as a human being (Scarry 1985). The body appears docile and permits domination. Such trauma to the body causes the world of speech to escape the body, words float, and fade away. But, the body through memory retains this trauma in efforts of expressing it, rather, it becomes the inscriptions of the inner life (Gordon 2000a: 166). Gordon asserts that the effort of retaining the memory leaves inscriptions on inner life ironically it leaves writings because it fails to communicate verbally. These inscriptions inform the self-writing of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's experience. But, feminists such as Gqola (2001), Lugones (2008) and Oyěwùmí (2016) among many others, acknowledge that it is critical that black women who find themselves in the position of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur break their silence and reclaim their voice as a gesture of defiance and affirming their selfhood.

How Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are examined in this study does not subscribe to feminist perspective(s) that advocates for the importance of voicing women's thoughts and struggles against oppression it should be noted though that this is without diminishing the critical feminist work on women's' agency. Rather, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur do not appeal to the feminist project that seeks to provide those who are silenced a voice to express their feelings and thoughts. Even Hooks (1993) cautions on this assumption that women are earthly mother goddesses who can deal with physical or mental hardships without breaking down. With that said, it does not imply that the feminist approach(es) are undermined in this context or that they do not explicitly provide a more profound commitment to the idea of a voiced resistance. Instead, it is critical to note how the silence of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur was reconstituting a new meaning of communicating resistance against oppression and this resistance was not particularly guided by a feminist approach. It was resistance guided by the significance of silence as a mode of resisting. Sasaki (1998) writes about the different types of silence, such as silence that can either arise from the inability to speak about a violent act that stems from the terror of having to relive a violent memory. Silence can also stem from an unwillingness to speak to protect others. It is also an unwillingness to submit and confess. Arguably, both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced an inability and unwillingness to speak. Shakur (2014: 252) writes about the inability to speak after she had spent most of her prison time in solitary confinement and then she was given permission to be among her fellow detainees. She could not talk openly to other prisoners. This is caused by the terror and violent memory of alienation. Shakur was also unwilling to have a voice because she wanted to protect her freedom fighters. She recalls "I was scared to death to talk in my own house. When I wanted to say something that was not public information. I turned the record player real loud so that the buggers would have a hard time hearing" (Shakur 2014: 335). Shakur knew that if the police hear any information it would jeopardise the security and safety of the Black Panther Party (BPP) and its members. Before the arrest that led to her conviction—she recalls how everywhere she went she was followed by two detectives this was before she was arrested and convicted in 1977. She would look out through the window of her apartment and there would always be two white men outside watching who comes in and out. Shakur was always watched and followed by the US government; they had to know what she was doing and planning to predict her next move. Just like Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela was watched constantly when exiled to Brandfort before she was arrested in 1969. "I was kept under surveillance by the Security

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Police" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 36). A special security policeman was assigned to watch all her movements. The main idea for both these security sectors was to police the movements of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur and to create a negative manifestation of silence and ultimately to create political repression. "My house was like an 'operational area', an extension of the police station, with the Security Police going in and out" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 36).

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were formidable forces in their respective political movements and communities. So one of the reactions to retaining their political convictions entailed silencing and coercion. These oppressive governments and their oppressive modes of operation used physical and emotional violence to silence Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. But, these women were not afraid—that silencing they were experiencing in their daily lives was becoming a way of constructing new meaning (Motsemme 2004). Silence in their context was creating a new meaning—silence became a means. They knew and they were determined to fight to the bitter end of the political struggle.

Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 125) writes: "We are determined to fight to the bitter end for the liberation of our people. I am afraid that the white regime will have to decide whether to give in when they realise they are fighting a futile battle". In the same sentiment, Shakur (2014: 232) writes, "We knew the state was out to get us and so we were more determined than ever not to let them". Here both women express the significance of how silence was a tool of self-writing. They were under extreme surveillance and violated emotionally and physically, nonetheless, their silencing and secrecy became an important basis for projecting revolutionary power and a source of anchoring defiance and resistance. Both women speak through their silence. Their mute narratives ascribe to a reimagined meaning of silence. Silence occurs in that space of self-writing— the silence becomes self-writing. Silence then embodies power, it enables Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela to have the power to shift the hegemonic paradigm that exists between the oppressive governments and themselves (Foucault 1977b). In a complex way silence shaped the cultures of liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC), Black Liberation Army (BLA), and Black Panther Party (BPP).

Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela and many other members of these movements understood that it was better and safer to be quiet in moments that required secrecy about the plans of their respective political movements, information about the plans of their movements had to be kept a secret

against oppressive state and its personnel such as the security police. On several occasions, while in solitary confinement Madikizela-Mandela (1985), was presented with statements that claimed she had been having underground meetings with men and she was further told she had no friends in the struggle. "What do you think you are resisting? You are politically naked" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 102). The security branch believed they had stripped off Madikizela-Mandela's political will and confidence. Their attempts to persuade her to work for them were unheeded. Shakur (2014) explains after she had left the Black Panther Party (BPP) the police were following her and they thought she would lead them to comrades that were forced into hiding. At that moment Shakur noted how maybe the police would interrogate her, beat her, and force her to sign and give a confession. "I decided one thing right then and there. I definitely wasn't going home, and I definitely wasn't answering anybody's questions about anything" (Shakur 2014: 336). There was an underlying interplay unfolding between silence and the culture of political movements. Members of political movements had strong ties of loyalty among one another. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela understood that they had to protect the members of their movements. Both women were certain that the only enemy to concur was the oppressive state and its institutions. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were members of political movements that had a critical role in fighting oppression. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, withholding information was an act of conscious resistance. They were fully aware that if they shared information with the security branch they were giving in to the pressures of oppression and so the only option was for them to be silent.

This conscious resistance that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engaged in had power—because, these women held critical positions in their respective movements. They were expected to have access to information that would help the security forces destabilise the plans of their political movements. Their silence then extends to something deeper. Their silence is a recognition that the oppressive state institutions that harass them are in fact repressing, creating, and re-creating dominated socio-political and economic situations. "The blacks know what their value is, they know their worth, even though there are no jobs. They have been so conscientious, they are no longer prepared to go work for starvation" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 28). This is an awareness that although the blacks are mute, it does not mean they do not have a voice. There are cathartic elements that occur, which enable black bodies to have a voice. Being mute can thus, be associated with both powerlessness and power. But, they have power in their mute position—black bodies

can remap their silence (Motsemme 2004). Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur remap through what MacNay (2000) refers to as accommodations or adaptions. MacNay conceptualises accommodations or adaptions as moments of living through embodied experiences of subjectivity and that is how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur live, through subjectivity.

MacNay notes that this opens up questions on what it means to author a resistance discourse in the context of apartheid. Her question can also be placed in Shakur's context of living under segregation in the US. Thus, the question MacNay asks is what does it mean for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela to live and exist through resistance under apartheid and segregation? Ultimately, it means to exist in a context where every day their sense of self is actively diminished by the state. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were able to live through this experience by stabilising violence of silence—silence then creates this illusion of stability. Although, this is not to say that for black bodies such as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were unaware of the stability of living through violence silently was an illusion and it was not a true reflection of reality.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur found themselves in a situation where they had to project and ensure a "normalised" condition of living. These efforts of finding stability within silence are meant to harness positive social and cultural meanings that are significant in maintaining continuity and sustainability in communities. This is done to protect the family and community from moral breakdown. It is evident in how Madikizela-Mandela deals with having to become a single parent after her husband (Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela) is hiding underground and eventually arrested and sentenced to life imprisoned. Madikizela-Mandela bravely soldiered on, meeting the many challenges of being a young mother, wife, and working woman, supporting her husband morally, politically, and financially. She was often alone (Madikizela-Mandela 2003). Madikizela-Mandela had to endure parenting alone and keeping her household together. She recalls how there were very few times where they felt like they had a normal life. Through her mute narrative, she had to create a stable environment for her children knowing that her husband was devoted to the political struggle against oppression. However, Shakur (2014) could not create that stability and try to normalise life for her daughter amid oppression. Shakur recalls a moment when she was in prison and her four year-old daughter came to visit her. There was a look of resignation in her daughter's face at the moment when she had to leave when visiting hours ended. Shakur felt like she failed to create a decent mother to daughter relationship. Shakur was incapable of creating a

sense of home for her daughter, there were uneasiness and strangeness in their relationship. "You're not my mother. She screams, the tears rolling down her face. You're not my mother and I hate you." (Shakur 2014: 370). In this position Shakur is mute, she cannot do anything. "I go back into my cage and cry until i vomit" (Shakur 2014: 370). There are no words to explain her pain and agony. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, oppression always seemed to intrude violently in their sacred spaces. These instances that require them to protect their loved ones indicate the perverse and intrusive nature of oppressive systems like apartheid and segregation.

An overlooked issue arises when closely examining the position of the mute in their home and prison. The oppressive state security forces, used terror to raid homes to violate and threaten those who are politically active against the state. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) explains how her home was raided numerous times, these raids are an entrance of violence into the home (Feldman 1991). The home then becomes a daily space of political action. Ultimately, it means Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur cannot rest, their homes and moral order is disrupted. It is an intrusion of the political [private family] space. They are again forced to become mute.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur use their mute narratives as strategies that function to deny and acknowledge the violence experienced. The two women suggest that it is critical and modest to be aware that their silence was not because they were unaware of their subaltern position. Rather, it is a manner of exposing their agency—their silence is an explanation of their agency. Their embodied sufferings transpired into agency that served to connect with the others suffering this inability to speak. Certainly, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur both came from communities that were arguably politically active. But, what was critical within these communities was not a matter of whether Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela existed as individuals but rather it was about a shared existence, they existed with and among *others*. Their mute narratives were regarded as shared narratives—their silence was a shared silence. It was a silence of the community, the inability to speak shadowed communities. This is because communities share the narrative of violence. Individuals experience violence but it manifests into a collective, because if a community consists of black bodies, and each black body experiences violence it then that violence transpires a social order.

Therefore, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur understood and spoke of oppression as a social systematic tool that economically and politically dominated the lives of black bodies. But both

women stressed the importance of "being-with-others". Das (2000) refers to how the concepts of isolation and community can weave into each other and explain how isolation can reflect on a community. Das's observation is well interpreted by Shakur (2014: 259) who writes: "The first thing the enemy tries to do is isolate revolutionaries from the masses of people, making us horrible and hideous monsters so that our people will hate us". Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 26) too mentions that when she arrived in Brandfort people were told "this is a woman who is going to tell you that you must fight for your land, she is going to tell you all the wrong things. And if you ever set foot in her house, we will promptly arrest you". Both moments describe the nature of isolation that these women had to withstand. The idea was to isolate them so that they no longer have a voice in communities and their political movements—they had to become mute. At the core of this isolation were the security forces who wanted to make these women invisible and voiceless. The goal for security forces was to break these symbolic figures of the political struggle—in this way, they would easily destabilise the objectives of the political struggle amongst communities. To destabilise and silence those who are in politics would eventually translate into creating an apolitical environment, in essence, it would result in division within a community. But, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela transcend beyond a fragmented community and negotiate a different sense of community using the language of silence as a currency of resistance and defiance. They began to understand as individuals they had no importance separate from the communities they belonged to. The process of silencing and detaining them as individuals symbolised the struggle they were fighting for as part of a collective. Their silence, the silence of the community becomes a site of coping and reconstitution of the self. Bishop Manas Buthelezi writes a tribute in Madikizela-Mandela's *Parts of My Soul went with Him* it reads; "nobody can stop the silenced ones from giving spiritual strength to the rest of us. Mrs. Mandela has been silenced during all these years. Yet her life had communicated more than all the speeches she could ever make if she had never been banned" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 21-22). The denial of speaking does not mean one is unable to speak, rather silence becomes a reflective mode of language. The mute narrative of the lived experience creates an alternative sanctuary where Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela, and other-mute black bodies can retreat and reclaim their sense of self (Motsemme 2004).

When the invention of the self occurs, self-writing happens. The self goes beyond the boundaries of forced silence and reconfigures it into a site of struggle that employs silence as a language of resistance (Palumbo-Liu 1996). Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reconfigured their identities

through silence by way of retreating and embodying the position of the mute. They reconfigure and enter into a language that expresses a reclaim of their humanity and voice—language that is beyond their present conditions. Both these women encounter an inner world that is governed by their validation, it is at this position that they engage in self-writing. They retreat from the silence that betrays their full humanity and places themselves in a space of a different validation process (Taussig 1987; Ricoeur 1991). This is a process that allows them to reimagine themselves beyond their current mute state, it is a position that requires them to engage the necessary psychic resources to be able to act consciously in the oppressive world they exist in. The imaginative space they enter into is an invisible work of defiance and resistance. Ultimately, it was a reformulation to navigate through a world that denied them their humanity.

5.4 In the Belly of an Anti-black World: COINTELPRO and Stratcom

To live in an anti-black world is to live in the centre of everything that actively denies one the instinct to be fully human through structures, institutions, mechanisms, and strategies founded on the notion of whiteness. This means to live in a world where the presence of black bodies signifies the absence of human presence and as stated above, it is to live without a voice (Haymes 2002). The anti-black world places the black body as an object that cannot *recognise* and be *recognised.* Fanon (1967) asserts, that this position does not allow the slave [black body] to be recognised by the master [white body] and does not allow the slave to recognise itself as being-for-itself. It denies the black body recognition by others and recognition for itself—the slave is denied humanity. Fanon (1967: 216-217) writes, "as long as he has not been effectively recognised by the other, that other will remain a theme of his actions. It is that other being that his human worth and reality depend. It is that other being in whom the meaning of his life is condensed".

The position that the black body finds itself within, appears not to have any meaning without recognition by the white body. By interpretation, the black body has no lived experience, no perspective, and no conscious existence (Haymas 2002). It is a body that is absent of a self or ego, it is without intention and incapable of becoming. A body without thought is a body that is incapable of representing itself as "I". This is to say it is a black body that is not conscious of itself and the world it exists in which rejects and refuses to validate it as human, such a world is the anti-black world. It has already been established in the previous chapters what it means for the black body to live in a world that constantly rejects its humanity. But, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur

account for a lived experience of the anti-black world through defiance and resistance of how this anti-black world is forged. Shakur (2014) recognises how the US government has refused to validate her as fully human. This recognition is indicated in how she refers to herself when [self] writing.

Shakur uses a lowercase "i" when referring to herself in the context of the anti-black world. This is the world that denies her humanity and does not allow and recognise her as conscious. Because in that anti-black world her being is not recognised she refers to [her] self in "i". By using "i" instead of "I" Shakur is simply indicating how the US government attempted to diminish their humanity and by extension showing the domination and hegemony created by a racist oppressive ideology that refuses to acknowledge her being. Shakur is aware that she is in an anti-black world as a black body and so she consciously indulges [her] self and the reader of referring to herself as "i". This is not to say she accepts this anti-black world but, rather, she is aware of her lack of humanity in the anti-black world. She is aware that this is a world that denies existence and in so doing it denies her a point of view in the world thus, she cannot write [exist] as "I". Shakur not only rejects the notion of referring to herself in "I", but she rejects the legitimacy of the justice system in America. Throughout her writing, she refers to the "court" and "America" as "kourt" and "amerika". Shakur does this deliberately—she is again consciously using the incorrect spelling to assert her conscious rejection of the racially ideological state apparatuses. It is a radical and unapologetic approach to oppression. She is demonstrating a critique to an unjust system. Shakur (2014) is making a political statement by rejecting what rejects her—the justice system in America labels her guilty of murder amongst other crimes. It rejects her humanity and the possibility of innocence. It labels her criminal and the most significant crime she commits is existing through her black body and for that reason, she is denied her being.

So, it is critical to examine what it means to write [exist] from this position that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are in. They are in the core and the belly of the anti-black world. The logic of the anti-black world asserts that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur cannot be political subjects, it denies them political freedom. They are made to be politically naked by discrediting their political will and freedom. For both women, to live in the anti-black world means to live in a world that actively aims at discrediting their being through racially state-crafted strategies and programmes such as strategic communication (Stratcom) which was utilised by South African

apartheid regime and counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) which was a US-FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) program.

COINTELPRO was set up in 1956 by the FBI targeting to demobilise suspicious activities relating to communism in the US. The FBI gained interest in the Black Panther Party when the party started making its mark of promoting Black Nationalism in America. The director of the FBI—J. Edgar Hoover was concerned with criminalising and politically repressing any political movement that threatened the status quo in America. He referred to the BPP as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country" and he vowed that he would destroy it and its leaders and activists (Shakur 1998). The FBI and the New York Police Department (NYPD) charged and accused Shakur of attacking law enforcement personnel and circulated the charges and accusations to police agencies and units. The FBI and NYPD charged her for being a leader of the BLA, which was described by the government as an organisation concerned with shooting police officers. Shakur became a hunted person with posters of her pasted on walls of police stations and banks; described as being involved in a series of criminal activities. Shakur became known as the FBI's most wanted woman. She was convicted through the news media before she even went to trial. She was never allowed to express her views publically through the media. In 1976, the Church Commission released a report on intelligence operations in the USA, which revealed that "the FBI has attempted covertly to influence the public's perception of persons and organisations by disseminating derogatory information to the press, either anonymously or through 'friendly' news contacts" (Shakur 1998). The main reason for COINTELPRO was to discredit Shakur. To make her less relevant amongst her fellow revolutionaries, but most significantly, to criminalise her and her political convictions. This is the objective of the anti-black word—it is to "live in the domain of non-existence, to inhabit an impossible time between life and death" (Sexton and Copeland 2003: 53). The anti-black world constitutes living while dead or already dead. It is the fatal way of being alive.

This is an unthought position because it is peculiar to live in a deadly way of living. Such a way of living is explained through the structural and ontological underpinnings of white supremacy. The centrality of the anti-black world is white domination (Mills 1998). But Sexton and Copeland (2003) consider that there is often a race obsession that supposedly forces a selection or binary existence between black and white. But, in the lives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur white supremacy did not advocate for a binary existence in an equal sense. It was a binary existence,

based on the inferiority of another being—the black body. The presence of a black body meant the advocacy of white domination. The black body always remains black and to be black is to be criminalised and exist in an anti-black world. For Shakur, living in such a world means experiencing racism in court and racist comments like "If she's black, she's guilty" (Shakur 1998: 3). This comment accords with what Gordon (1997) argues, which is that there are people who function as the "the blacks" in certain contexts. By this he means, black bodies remain as black bodies; he writes, "Negroes are the blacks of everywhere, the black blacks, the blackest blacks. Blackness… is the element that enters a room and frightens Reason out" (Gordon 1997: 57). The point that Gordon makes is to be black is to hear statements such as "if she's black, she's guilty" and to be black is to be racialised. To be racialised is to live in an anti-black world where there is only one race and that race is black. It means to be pushed down towards blackness and to be deracialised is to be pushed up towards whiteness. Willoughby-Herard (2015) explains how white bodies are deracialised through the anti-human status of black bodies. If a white worker/professional would fail to link their interests with white professional clerkship, it would mean they are failing to embrace their sovereignty and rulership qualities. The anti-black world creates the conditions of the anti-human status of black bodies.

In an anti-black world, Shakur is racialised, the courts select a jury that consists of white people. This is an obvious effort to prevent a fair trial. Shakur (1998: 4) notes that in a study that was done "92 percent of the registered voters said that they were familiar with the case through the news media, and 72 percent believed we were guilty based on pre-trial publicity". Again this asserts that being black is a crime, Shakur notes that black bodies are always suspects and an accusation is usually a conviction. To be denied justice is a reflection of the anti-black world. To live in the anti-black world is to live in the condition of unfreedom because only those who are free are human. Thus, in the anti-black world, there are no human beings, this is the negation of whiteness. Only human beings experience freedom, only whiteness experiences freedom (Woods 2007). Woods's interpretation of the condition of unfreedom in an anti-black world should be considered in the Fanonian perspective. Fanon (1967) notes that in the anti-black world two principles prevail. The first is that—it is best to be white and the second is—it is worse to be black. For the black body, the first principle will not prevail. Gordon (1997) explains that the only option is the second principle which entails embodying blackness, which is to be sub-human. The anti-black world then becomes a site of unfreedom, of absence and non-being—it is the site for formation of the black

body. But above all, the anti-black does not allow the black body to have any other option but that of blackness. The black body cannot be anything else in the anti-black world. The anti-black world is constructed in such a way that it does not allow any other position for the black body—only blackness is suitable for the black body. Blackness is a position of captivity, it generates the status of continuous ontological resistance. For Shakur to be targeted by COINTELPRO and have Colonel Carl Williams appointed just to ensure that her capture is a priority reveals the determination of the FBI to presume her as guilty. The objectives of the FBI, NYPD, and by large the US government was concerned with maintaining the ideals of the anti-black world. Through fraud and deliberately misinterpreting the truth with a clear attempt to discredit Shakur (Shakur 2014, Aron 2017).

Madikizela-Mandela too had to encounter similar experiences to those of Shakur. This is because the anti-black world is not limited to geographic confinements. It is a structural, systematic, and ontological positioning and ultimately, it exceeds geographic limits. In apartheid South Africa the anti-black world is symbolised by propaganda projects such as secret Strategic Communication (Stratcom) project. Stratcom was a major propaganda project approved by the State Security Council (SSC) in January 1985. In theory, it is as concerned with "the dissemination of information and disinformation, many involved blackmail, libel and manipulation" (Ellis 1998: 272-273). From the time the project was developed, there were continuous meetings that occurred of the SSC and new measures were designed to restore the government's control. On 18 March 1985 under the leadership of President PW Botha, the SSC approved a document that presented a plan to arrest the key leaders of the political movements against the apartheid regime. The key objective for the security forces and particularly Stratcom was to fight the revolutionary climate. During this era, the apartheid regime was encountering rebellious forces that were more serious than that of the 1976 Soweto Uprisings. The rebellion was better organised than before, it was supported by the armed guerrilla movement of the ANC known as *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (the Spear of the Nation). The apartheid regime was determined to restore control over the country, to restore its political initiative because it had believed that the political movements such as the ANC, UDF (United Democratic Front) and pro-ANC comrades were undermining it (Ellis 1998).

The main idea of Stratcom was to neutralise radicals such as Madikizela-Mandela that were against the apartheid regime. Politically, Stratcom aimed at creating divisions between her and the ANC

specifically to isolate Madikizela-Mandela from the movement. The core purpose was to demonise her as an imperfect and devious wife and political activist (Bridger 2015). Madikizela-Mandela had shown resilience and influence within the ANC and so the objective was to weaken the strong the members of the movement. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) refers to a moment before Stratcom was even initiated the state used the press to convey a distorted image of who she was. The press had reporters writing suggestive articles that presented her in the public as undignified—the headlines on newspapers would read "Finding a man in Mandela's house". Such articles would always end up in her husband's (Nelson Mandela) cell while he was in prison. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 85) writes "They thought that, as the years went by, they were going to break me and that I would throw in the towel and go back to my father". The purpose was to make her surrender and accept her position in the anti-black world—that was the manifestation of the anti-black world. Essentially, it is to make black bodies succumb to the anti-black world by making it the only place blackness belongs to.

Hartman (1997) notes that it is important to remember how blackness is defined. In this regard, defining blackness is critical because it recaps the importance of how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were forced into the anti-black world. It provides a context as to why the security forces both in the US and South Africa used a more or less similar type of tactic. Blackness is a social relationality. Blackness neglects the self within individuals, and instead, it incorporates subjects that are normatively defined as black, as well as the relations among blacks, whites, and others and the practices that produce a racial difference—that is how blackness is established (Hartman 1997). Blackness, in essence, marks social relations, it becomes the order of how relationships develop and are defined. An example of how blackness manifests is when Shakur (1998), is labelled guilty based on the fact that she is black. That is a signifier of how blackness operates. Blackness becomes a key function in the operations of Stratcom and COINTELPRO. Both of these state established programmes used operations that specifically labelled Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur as enemies of the state because, firstly, they were black bodies thus, they are criminalised and made into terrorists. Secondly, Stratcom and COINTELPRO used operations that required public dehumanising, this meant the use of media through interviews done by security state officials and newspaper articles published with distorted information.

In Shakur's case, Colonel C. Williams would do interviews providing the wrong information or distorting information Shakur had provided to the police department with the clear objective of discrediting Shakur (Shakur 2014). Madikizela-Mandela (2003) notes, how certain newspapers and journalists from profound newspapers targeted her as part of a state-backed plot to discredit her. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to be publically shamed, that was the goal of both Stratcom and COINTELPRO. To exist in the anti-black-world is to have strategies and programmes such as Stratcom and COINTELPRO fixated with discursively constituting blackness for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. Not only constituting blackness for these black bodies but, to be position them in an inescapable prison house of their flesh. Ultimately, to be stuck in their bodies while living in an anti-black world. To trap them in their bodies that deny them existence, being, and humanity. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's humanity is shaped in the anti-black world. The humanity of the colonised always requires justification (Woods 2007). This is because the colonised (black bodies) cannot be human thus, they cannot have any humanity within. Both women reconstitute and justify their being and self through the modalities of escapism. An insurgent critique emerges within them and insurgency results in rebellion and self-determination. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engage in a process of self-determination.

5.5 Self-determination as Ethical revolt

The human spirit can be diminished and sometimes it can reject growth. But, persistent, proactive, and positive tendencies can be invariantly present—that is how self-determination arises. Self-determination is based on human motivation and personality in social contexts that differentiates motivation in terms of being autonomous and controlled. Self-determination advocates that all individuals have natural tendencies to develop an elaborated and unified sense of self. Meaning that individuals have a primary propensity to establish interconnections among aspects of their psyches as well as with other individuals and groups (Deci and Ryan 2012). Deci and Ryan (2012) draw their interpretation based on three psychological needs namely, competence, autonomy, and relatedness. Competence enhances motivation and without it, there can be no autonomy (de Charms 1968). Angyal (1965) who notes that both autonomy (tending toward inner organisation and holistic self-regulation) and homonomy (tending toward integration of oneself with others) encompasses how self-determination is derived. Lastly is relatedness—the need to feel belongingness and connectedness with others is key (Deci and Ryan 2000). Thus, it is the

abovementioned psychological needs that drive the self-determination which Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur utilise. In the moments of imprisonment, torture, solitary confinement, psyche pain, and breakdown the black bodies of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are captured. Their black bodies are in the making, position, and epitome of the anti-black black world. But, their souls are in their possession. They place themselves in the position of a generative capability of which the aim is to construct their being. The apartheid security forces and the US segregation laws, COINTELPRO, Stratcom, and all the makings of the anti-black world place a weight on both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. It is the weight of imperial power that Fanon (1967) describes as creating the colonial condition. The colonial condition is much like the anti-black world, it is ultimately how social structures and colonial cultural forms are created (Maldonado-Torres 2008). Fanon (1967: 87) explains, that to understand and provide an adequate diagnosis on the pathology of subjects who hold colonial power it would require more than just psychoanalysis. He insists that every aspect of life is infected by colonial power. It is for that reason that proper recognition of the self is distorted—for instance, the anti-black world is such an example.

Maldonado-Torres (2008: 127) explains, that "the self are distorted by a social system and cultural forms that take blackness and other forms of sub-alterity as markers of the absence of values". The colonial condition creates a systematic and systemic reality of human failure. It results in a reality of dehumanisation that is characterised by disrespect and eventually becomes how the anti-black world identifies black bodies. This colonial condition is perpetuated as dominant culture and is relived through the apartheid security forces and US segregation laws. Above all, it is the power and ability of the dominant culture to attempt to deprive the colonised subjects, the black bodies— and in this case depriving Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur of what Maldonado-Torres (2008: 127) refers to as "their self-worth and ultimately of the very idea of having any rights". Maldonado-Torres explains, how this resembles the condition of slavery whereby the slave's humanity is categorised as property. The condition of the slave is the condition of the anti-black world, furthermore, it is the condition which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela exist in, however, they do not accept it as it's ascribed to them. Hence, it is critical to contextualise self-determination in the anti-black world it is for this reason that further clarification of the anti-black is provided in this subsection. Because it is from that perspective that self-determination occurs for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela.

Maldonado-Torres illuminates the meaning of crying in Fanon's narrative when he attempts to clarify why Fanon begins to write only when he is not able to cry or shout. Therefore, for Fanon crying, shouting and writing become a synonymous act. Maldonado-Torres interprets the phenomenology of the cry. The phenomenology of the cry provides an understanding of how self-determination emerges in the act of crying (Maldonado-Torres 2008). There is a deeper meaning evoked in the act of crying—"crying is a sound uttered as a call for attention, as demand for immediate action or remedy or as an expression of pain that points to an injustice committed or to something that is lacking" (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 133). Crying is an expression of someone that has been wronged or forgotten. Crying becomes a call for recognition, it is the "return of a living subject" who announces their presence through crying. Moreover, it is a manner of reclaiming presence and humanity by a subject that is denied both. It is a call for attention that "I am alive and human" and in essence, it is a call that claims interiority. It is an act of affirmation in the context of a subject that is denied humanity. Crying is the affirmation of the black body. Both Gordon's (2000b) analysis and Maldonado-Torres' phenomenology of the cry, perceive Fanon's narrative and his announcing of the cry as the realisation of "the absence of his interiority from the point of view of his interiority" (Gordon 2000a: 33). Essentially, Fanon (1967) recognises that his act of crying is based on a negation of his humanity and because his appearance renders him invisible within humanity. But, regardless of his cry his invisibility still condenses him to an absence of interiority. A paradoxical moment arises in Fanon, this paradox can be associated with the specific moments that unfold in the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. In Fanon's text, the association is well interpreted as he explains that his existence is narrated/lived based on his efforts of affirmation, but the context in which he seeks affirmation confines him to the status of an inanimate object. For Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur they self-write and narrate for affirmation of their political convictions. Shakur (2014: 370) writes "I go back to my cage and cry until I vomit. I decide that it is time to leave". In the first chapter of her biography –Shakur ends the chapter with a poem. She writes:

STORY

You died.

I cried.

And kept on getting up.

A little slower.

And a lot more deadly. (Shakur 2014: 24).

The above moments express the feeling of solitude as she returns to her cage where she is alone, she cries alone and again in the poem she cries and expresses how she keeps getting up. It indicates a spirit of resilience as she cries. Her crying just as Fanons' is a reclaim of her humanity and presence. By crying, Shakur (2014: 370) recognises that her interiority is absent and at that moment she reclaims it and states "I decide that is it time to leave" and she keeps getting up and is "a lot more deadly". She transforms her cry into a composure of a deadly spirit that refuses to accept the inanimate status ascribed to her by whiteness. In the same manner, as Fanon explains the interval between the knife and his body and Shakur experiences the same intervention between the moment she enters her cage and cries. It is in that moment that discourse is born—Fanon's discourse is to write with death and suffering and Shakur's discourse begins when she decides to leave (escape) prison. It is in these intervals that self-determination emerges. At this point, to cry is not enough because Shakur is aware of the paradoxical nature her cry carries. She is crying as an object and as a sub-human, thus, crying is reduced to being the expression of dissatisfaction. But, in that interval her cry becomes more—it is a cry that is an expression for existence. Nonetheless, it is a cry that is in a context of fundamental contradiction since it stems from not only an unsatisfied demand, but it is coming from what is considered as that, which cannot cry and demand. It is a cry coming from an object, not a subject, hence, it cannot be acknowledged.

Fanon (1967) transforms his cry into a textual affair—he writes *for others* (Maldonado-Torres 2008). His cry is not only for his individual self-recognition, but the cry represents a call for others. "Fanon not only lives against all odds, but as he lives his life in response to Others" (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 137). In Shakur's text, Fanon's (1967) sentiment resonates. There is an ethical implication in the cry—as Shakur asserts that when she cries she does not surrender, she keeps persisting and gaining strength, she revives herself from within. There is a fighting spirit in this moment. Shakur is fighting against a reality she encounters—when she realised that her arm was paralysed she asked one of the doctors attending to her whether she would be able to use it again and the response was "maybe, yes, maybe no". Nonetheless, she writes "Anyway, i was gonna live" (Shakur 2014: 24). Shakur was asserting, that she was fighting against a reality wherein other human beings are killed. Shakur's cry arises from the pain of being violated, but as expressed

above, it is more than just an outcry of pain, it is a defiance of oppression and demand for humanity. This defiance and demand is a call for attention to something that is outside of Shakur's black body—it is a violation that occurs because of the exteriority of the black body. The cry thus is a result of what is being done to the body externally. The realisation of the cry as a result of pain to the body transforms the cry into a moment in which the black body is aware of its interiority. It is a moment wherein the black body is *outside* of what is expected or known of it by whiteness. "…the cry would represent the expression of a subject who has been violated precisely in regard to the possibility of being outside of himself" (Maldonado-Torres 2008: 137). It is a subject that is aware of their interiority and expresses himself or herself through crying, this subject can recognised as self-determined. Crying becomes an ethical revolt, it is a protest against the unjust nature of whiteness to blackness.

Madikizela-Mandela (2003) recalls the day she was told about the death of her step-son—Thembi. After Major Swanepoel told her "she sank to the floor and, for the first time since she had been arrested, she wept, heart-rendingly and unashamedly" (du Preez Bezdrob 2003: 151). Madikizela-Mandela explains how this moment bought her so much despair and tears. The manner in which Major Swanepoel told her the terrible news was with no remorse or compassion. She considered the security police a special breed of people with disregard for human life, which enabled them to torture people to death for no particular reason. Madikizela-Mandela felt a strong sense of bitterness towards Major Swanepoel and his associates. The news about Thembi's death spread amongst the prison inmates—the inmates had innovative ways of communicating with one another when Madikizela-Mandela received her first correspondence it provided her with indescribable comfort. She was genuinely surprised at the sympathy of her fellow prisoners. It gave her a feeling of triumph and comfort. A new self was emerging within her, she could not allow the bitterness towards Major Swanepoel turn into hatred that would not make her any better than him. Like Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela had to transform her crying into an expression that would yield greater results. Madikizela-Mandela resonates with Fanon (1967), for Fanon realises that in the moment of crying and experiencing suffering he no longer cries for his life and his pain but decides to live and persist because he recognises that his pain is not his alone it is *for the Other.* It is a shared pain, thus, the resistance in the cry is more than just about the preservation of his self but the preservation of others. Madikizela-Mandela is inclined with similar actions in her political convictions. In 1986 in a public speech, Madikizela-Mandela is quoted by *The Sunday Star*, saying;

"we no longer come to the funerals of our young heroes to shed tears. The time for crying is over… The time has come where we must show that we are disciplined and trained warriors" (Bridger 2015: 449). As Madikizela-Mandela observes the situation around her she realises that crying cannot be the solution. Hence, she utters the words, "…the time of crying is over". This is a call for action with greater magnitude. It is only after she has cried that the ethical-rebellion discourse begins. It is then that she adopts the composure and enters the interval that forces her to turn her cry into self-determination. This requires deciding no longer to cry for the lives that have been ended by an oppressive government but instead, to continue living. This occurs through a generative capability it is the construction of the being for the black body. No matter how much weight is placed onto the black body the generative capacity insists.

Thus, for Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur crying creatively marks a moment of distinct and multiple elements that create a force of ever-renewed discovery and invention without a grand beginning or end. It is somewhat a continuous act that is marked by an interval of self-determination. It becomes an untraditional political engagement against oppression. It creates a moment of critical reflection in the form of personal confession (Liatsos 2006). Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela have moments of personal confession that are stimulated by understanding that their position as political prisoners hence they state that crying cannot be enough. This position transforms them into political symbols and in those moments of being voiceless and crying it marks an ethical revolt. This revolt arises from the very basic possibility of agency, resistance, and defiance within Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Another form of self-determination that is well highlighted in the works of Hartman (1997: 68) is "stealing away". Hartman (1997: 65) explains this concept in the context of slavery—"when the enslaved slipped away to have secret meetings, they would call it stealing the meeting". Stealing away designated a wide range of activities, from praise meetings, quilting parties, and dances to illicit visits with lovers and family on neighbouring plantations (Hartman 1997).

In essence, it was a range of *illegal* activities that contested the authority of the slave-owners. This phrase of stealing away alludes to a paradox because a slave is property and property does not have agency. Ultimately, property cannot steal property, is an empty container with no soul—the slave is merely a commodity and an object that can be exchanged. Thus, stealing away is an *unnatural act* by the slave, it seemed incomprehensible. But, on a deeper level stealing away was

synonymous with defiance because it directly involved seizing the master's property and asserting the self in transgression of the law (Hartman 1997). Stealing away was a contestation towards the relations of power that were prescribed by the dominant culture and it challenged these very relations. It disrupted the status quo of an oppressive system through the expression of a counter-discourse of freedom. Although, seemingly it was a simple exercise it was a challenge at the figuration of the black body. It "ironically encapsulated the impossibility of self-possession" (Hartman 1997: 69). Stealing away defied the slave owners' mastery and control over the captive body.

Placing the concept of stealing away in the context of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur offers a necessary and appropriate articulation of self-determination as rebellion. Moreover, there are evident continuities between slavery and imprisonment. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur participated in unlicensed movements and meetings. They transgressed against the oppressive laws proactively to achieve their political convictions. Similar to how the slave's movements were always policed by the master—in prison Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were also policed by the security forces. Monitoring their movements in prison was critical. But, the slaves just as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela found solace in stealing away as an appropriation of the self. Moreover, it is a disruption to the spatial organisation of dominance that confines the slaves as well as political prisoners like Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Apartheid laws in South Africa and segregation laws in the US had specific restrictions of movement that black people had to adhere to—black bodies are given licensed movements in specific areas. When Madikizela-Mandela was exiled to Brandfort in the Free State she was under house arrest which meant every night and at weekends she cannot be found outside of her house. She was forbidden to talk to more than one person because that would be considered as a political gathering. While in Brandfort she had no legal rights, according to apartheid laws she was a legal resident of Johannesburg—this meant that wherever she went the security police could arrest her whenever they pleased to (Madikizela-Mandela 1985).

Madikizela-Mandela described the situation in Brandfort as terrible "people are starving…Some families live in such destitute conditions, they have children and not a morsel of food in the house" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 30). But Madikizela-Mandela managed to do the unthinkable in Brandfort, she mobilised women there, embarked on a gardening project because the food was too

expensive to buy, she gave them seeds grow their vegetables. She helped open a crèche and set up a knitting and crocheting group. The people of Brandfort were mobilising themselves in efforts of becoming more viable and self-sufficient. Being self-sufficient was a huge achievement, these women were stealing away in that they were contesting against what the apartheid regime had imparted onto the black body—which were lives of inferiority, spatial confinement as well as social, political and economic oppression. These acts of opening a crèche and forming a sewing group were acts of stealing away—they were acts aimed at a redemptive path. These were acts of a reconfiguration of disposed individuals within a community transforming and investing in the body as a site of activity. Most importantly these acts were concerned with redressing the pained body. They were reclaiming their bodies from what the apartheid laws had done to them. In this act of stealing away Hartman (1997) explains, that freedom was the central most important issue. It was an ethical and political struggle waged against oppression. These acts created possibilities within spaces of domination and they transgress the policed space. It is in such acts that self-determination prevails. Madikizela-Mandela did everything she could ceaselessly and frenetically to uplift the community of Brandfort. Stealing away for Madikizela-Mandela represented restoring a sense of self within her commitment to proving the lives of others and defiance against oppression.

Spillers (1987: 67) describes stealing away as "the violent seizing of the captive body from its motive will, its desire". It is an act in which the captive body, the slave, and in essence, the black body engages in by defying the spatial confinement and the surveillance of slave [prison] life, it also ironically reconsiders the meaning of agency. When Shakur was in trial together with Kamau Sadiki they were placed in a separate room next to the courtroom. A loudspeaker was installed into the room so they could listen to the trial. They spent days talking to each other and each day they grew closer to one another. Shakur (2014: 133) writes: "It was growing physical. We began to touch and to hold each other and each of us was like an oasis to the other". For Shakur and Kamau these moments of physical contact were the only times they had physical contact with another human being. These were moments of stealing away and turning a simple exercise of human contact into a claim to the self. They were restricted to have any physical contact but they challenged that figuration of the black body as devoid of will and agency. In that space Shakur and Kamau found refuge in each other—they found comfort and restoration in each other and they also found a way of escaping prison. They rejected the configuration of the black body as a "defiled

container" and commodity. By stealing away the imprisoned make counterclaims about justice and freedom. Shakur and Kamau understood that they were not going to get a fair trial. They were denied sanctity and so in that room they had to create a definitive site of stealing away to reclaim their self-possession. This was their way of contesting domination against the oppressor. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela understood that being black bodies was more than just a racial category it had to embody being an oppositional force encountering situations of difficulty and defying domination.

When Shakur was a student at the Manhattan Community College one of her peers told her about The Golden Drums. This was a black organisation on campus that was concerned with spreading cultural awareness among black students and teachers both in and out of campus. When Shakur finally attended one of their meetings, it was only then she realised that black resistance dates back to the slavery period and that black people did make efforts in fighting for their freedom. Shakur explains, that when she was younger she had always believed slaves never fought back, there were no books that she was exposed to in school that mentioned how slaves had an active role in their emancipation. A majority of the books claimed that "White people had freed us [blacks]" (Shakur 2014: 250). In those meetings, Shakur found a place of asserting herself. These meetings provided Shakur with escaping the modalities of having to mimic the oppressors, she explains it as moments of learning and changing. The meetings held by The Golden Drums had the same consequence and purpose among black bodies as those moments of stealing away during slavery. It is to bring together black bodies that are labelled as lacking agency into a space of consciousness to awaken self-possession. In attending the meetings of The Golden Drums, Shakur met "brothers and sisters" who were highly conscious about black nationalism—a whole new world opened up to her and through these meetings, Shakur came to understand the history and struggle of black people. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela self-authorisation meant the necessary possession of the self and it required reconfiguring the modalities of escapism as they are commonly understood.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to depict how and explain why both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur *existed* in a world that deliberately targeted at diminishing their sense of being in every way possible as well as reducing them to inanimate objects as black bodies. This chapter explained how authorisation of self-writing encompasses accepting the conditions of punishment, the anti-black

world, and its mechanics such as COINTELPRO and Stratcom. But, accepting in the wisdom of rising above those conditions to self-write and self-authorise. The conditions to self-write emerge in a world that denies Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur being. A world that is based on racial reasoning to dominate. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur authorise their positions through defiance. They engage in modes of writing that are not textual, but rather are embodied in the sense that they occur on the site of the body and are for being. This chapter engaged with how the concept of self-writing can be expressed in the language of silence. This chapter accounted for how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engaged in self-writing through nonverbal communication. In this chapter, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur demonstrated how the language of silence is more than just nonverbal communication. Rather, it is a linguistic act of defining and inventing the self—it provides the mute a voice. It transcends verbal communication. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur express their self-writing through authorisation. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur use their mute narratives and the moments of stealing away as self-determination, they use these experiences as tools of affirming their authority against the authority of their oppressors. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur find solace in what is expected to crush their souls.

In this chapter, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are not only self-writing for their self, but their experience has a generational and communal implication. It is not only for the individual that is involved in that authorisation—it is for the larger purpose of authenticating the experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur into symbolising what other black bodies experience. Above all, the experiences discussed above of both these women emphasises how the modes of escapism and reconstituting the self requires an insurgent critique. This insurgency encourages an ethical practice within these women and that is where their authorisation emanates from. Finally, this chapter indicated how if oppression is met with formidable resistance it yields results that reconfigure the purpose of the oppression and it further reshapes forms of resistance. Thus, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reshaped resistance and pursued their (self) authority.

CHAPTER 6

Liberation in Self-writing

6.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the last key theme of the study, which is liberation. Liberation is discussed in reference to how it embodied in acts of self-writing in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. Liberation captures how both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur do not define or embody liberation in the sense of an end-goal or a final stage of political struggles. This chapter aims at illustrating how both women do not experience liberation as an emancipatory reaction. Rather, liberation for both women marks the beginning of the political insurgency. It marks the beginning of believing in something when there is nothing else to believe in. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embody liberation as an opening to their process of self-writing. It is an opening in the sense that liberation requires Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to enter into a mental and physical space in which their transgressions become a way of life. Essentially, their transgressions become an entry point to liberation more so, it is the continuation of their self-writing. Liberation thus becomes an ongoing process because it marks the opening and beginning of questioning for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. Both women confront the dominating actions of the oppressive state systems they exist within by immersing themselves in liberatory engagements. Additionally, in this chapter liberation and freedom are used synonymously because, both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela refer to these concepts interchangeably in their biographical narratives as if they embody an equivalent meaning. It is also critical to understand the context in which freedom is understood in this chapter. Because freedom often does not stand on its own, it is always concerned with being freed from something. Thus, in this chapter, it is critical to be mindful of what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were aiming to be freed from since freedom is always concerned with being freed from something. Hence, this chapter also builds on the latter chapter in how it unfolds liberation and rebellion as reactionary conceptual tools departing from the argument of how authorisation is represented in the previous chapter. Moreover, liberation and rebellion are interpreted through real action and rhetoric concerning how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embody self-writing in this chapter. Moments of liberation occur both literally and figuratively as well as those of rebellion. It is for this reason that both liberation and rebellion in the discussion

below unfold as openings, probing questions and they are interpreted and experienced on varied as well as similar levels respectively by Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela.

Firstly, this chapter begins by discussing rebellion in light of what it represents to be a rebel and how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela attest to this oppositional stance. This section discusses how both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are labelled rebels and how they re-appropriate the title and self-name as rebels. Secondly, this chapter examines how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela transition their political vision into an ontology. Thirdly, this chapter discusses the (un)making of the anti-black world, this sub-section builds from how black bodies exist in the anti-black world therefore, this discussion refers to how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reject the anti-black world. Finally, this chapter outlines how self-writing for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela is personified by consciously inciting liberation as moments of interrogating the oppressive political system. Moreover, taking these moments yields opportunities to self-write the world to come because both women demonstrate that liberation is a generational task that marks the beginning of questioning.

Ultimately, this chapter aims to illustrate how the very act of questioning is an act of self-writing and it marks the beginning of liberation. Furthermore, it begins the process of developing a radical social imaginary that is beyond oppression—which is what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela attempt to do in their self-writing. Additionally, by questioning the oppression they encounter it consequently evokes further questions of how to overcome oppression. This chapter represents a relationship between liberation and self-writing as a manner of empowering the collective to pursue significant political action. It also drives the critical questions regarding the racial circumstance of the black subject as inferior in relation to the white subject as superior.

6.2 The Rebellious

The rebel cannot be thought of outside of the external conditions under which it exists. This means the rebel becomes a rebel because of these external conditions. The rebel exists to question these conditions. To be a rebel is to come face to face with these conditions of imprisonment. The rebel wages an existential struggle against these external conditions. Camus (1956: 13) asks a pertinent question—"what is a rebel?" He then responds: "A man who says no, but whose refusal does not imply a renunciation. He is also a man who says yes, from the moment he makes his first gesture of rebellion". A rebel is a man who rejects certain conditions, but his rejection is a simple refusal

of what he is confronted with. Yet, he is also a man that has said "yes" until he makes his first gesture and says "no". The rebel is a slave that has taken orders all his life from his master and he suddenly decides that he cannot continue taking orders from his master. The slave says "this has been going on too long, up to this point yes, beyond it no, you are going too far… there is a limit beyond which you shall not go" (Camus 1956: 13). The slave is rejects what his master is inflicting upon him. The slave wages a war of refusal against his master. In so doing he affirms his existence with uttering the word "no". The slave acknowledges that there is a certain borderline in which he can say "yes", but beyond that point, he says "no". The manner in which Camus explains the encounter between the slave and his master accounts for how rebellion begins. When one stops accepting something that has been regarded as legitimate and resistance prevails.

Since, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela have endured as well as confronted conditions of oppression, racial prejudice, and domination just as the slave. In addition to that, Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela, and the slave share a fundamental similarity as dominated subjects. Therefore, when Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela say "no" they too say no based on the same borderline the slave affirms himself. They proclaim, that they have been oppressed, tortured, and violated by these external conditions. They can only accept such conditions to a certain point, but beyond that point—they say "no". The moment of saying "no" is founded on rejecting the intrusion they feel—it is an intrusion that they have accepted and tolerated but, they can no longer do so. By saying "no", they are affirming that there are limits to what they will accept and to say no – "preserves the existence of certain things on this side of the borderline" (Camus 1956: 13). The borderline then marks an important space, Mudimbe (2013: 28) asks an important question that is critical in understanding the association with and conceptual meaning of the borderline. "What is a line?" he explains that in simple terms it is easily explained and understood. It determines and organises spaces. But, as a metaphor, a line functions with high efficacy in that it organises spatial perception and determines how perceptions and assumptions are built. "A line determines space in the practice of everyday life… lines bring us in dialogue or separate us in confrontation" (Mudimbe 2013: 24). The line Mudimbe describes is the borderline that the rebel in Camus (1956) refers to. It is a borderline, which marks a separation between the master and the slave during a confrontation. Simultaneously, it is a line that brings the slave and the master in dialogue, in that it operates on racially-based identities. The line preserves and maintains the roles of the master and the slave. In the same manner, for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela the borderline preserves

life and it is a rebellious assertion of selfhood. Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 37) recalls, an interrogation when she responded to Major Swanepoel saying: "You kept me awake for five days and six nights to answer all your questions. In terms of the Terrorism Act you took me court after you satisfied yourselves that I had made a satisfactory statement, otherwise you would have not stopped interrogating me. I am not answering any questions". Madikizela-Mandela had been interrogated non-stop for five and six nights and now Major Swanepoel wanted more information, he seemed unsatisfied. But, Madikizela-Mandela (2013: 37) says to him, "I have told you already I am answering no questions and if you keep asking me the same thing I am going to keep quiet that's all".

When Madikizela-Mandela was refusing to accept Major Swanepoel's demands, she was simply affirming herself. Major Swanepoel was entering a space that Madikizela-Mandela considers sacred, it is a space that marks her existence and so when she said she will not answer any of his questions she is affirming her existence. Butler (1993) identifies resistance as the gap between speech acts and conduct. Speech acts are guided by a social reality in which language and gestures form part of a symbolic social sign. They are pronouncements that *do* something rather than *represent* something. Butler (1993: 13) defines speech acts as, "the practice that enacts or produces that which it names". The conduct entails the effect(s) of the words as their uttered. Thus, various implications emerge because of different speech acts, resistance develops when what is expected to occur does not occur through conduct. So, when Madikizela-Mandela is being instructed by Major Swanepoel that she will answer questions and she does not respond—it is at that moment her resistance is maintained. Her stillness and quietness preserved her resistance.

> I got more liberated in prison. The physical identification with your beliefs is far more satisfying than articulating them on a platform. I am not saying it is best to be in prison. But under the circumstances, where it is a question of which prison is better, prison outside or inside (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 97).

In the moments when she was in prison, directly refusing to answer questions during interrogation—these were moments that restored her liberation. The ability to say "no" to your oppressors in a space where they believe they have the power, gave her a sense of liberation. The moments of interrogation are a confrontation between the security police (the master) and herself (the slave) and so just like the slave she rebels—she too wages a war against the security police.

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"Prisons are repositories of rage, islands of socially acceptable hatreds, where worlds collide like subatomic particles seeking psychic release" (Abu-Jamal 1996: 37). The notion Abu-Jamal highlights here is that prison has a significant role in the prisoner, it incites a certain release. Prison can make prisoners comply or defy what they are encountered with. Being in prison can make one suppress their rage, but up to a certain point they can accept that suppression—thus, a psychic release occurs.

Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are in a similar dialogue with their oppressors. The same way the slave confronts the master that oppresses him beyond a limit he can tolerate—he rebels. So does Shakur (2014: 281) she proclaims, "I am beyond that. I want blood. The tanks are waiting to crush the resistance, squelch the disturbance… I want to win… Rebellion, Revolution. I like the word". Shakur is going further than Madikizela-Mandela and the slave. She is stating that she wants a revolution, the oppressive state which is represented by the "the tank" that is waiting to crush resistance she opposes it and says "I want to win". Shakur is affirming her existence, she does not want to accept that her political vision should be crushed—she wants to win through a revolution. "I am tired of watching us lose. They kill our leaders, then they kill us for protesting. Protest. Protest. Revolution. If it exists, I want to find it" (Shakur 2014: 281). Shakur marks her limit with protesting, beyond that she says "no" she would rather have a rebellion and a revolt. Thus, rebellion is a preservation to ones' values when those values are being threatened or undermined, rebellion goes beyond the individual it is a collective act. Just as the slave, when Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela say "no" it is the moment that the slave master, and similarly the oppressive state, go beyond the limit and begin to infringe on the rights of others. Thus, acts of rebellion are tacitly invoked by values. When Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela rebel it is because they had accepted the conditions and demands of their oppressors and they could no longer do so. Although they protested inwardly and remained silent they are no longer patient they reject oppression retaliate with resistance.

Resistance as a value declares that the oppressed self is not confined by the boundaries of oppression. Values are transitions from facts to rights. The moment resistance is a value it is understood as moving from "this must be" to "this is how I should like things to be". In conceptualising resistance as a value Hollander and Einwohmer (2004) explain that resistance confronts its target directly and openly and it might be open and easily recognised. Scott (1985)

supports this notion by adding that resistance can only come about through massive protest movements. He further adds, that powerless people rarely have the resources or opportunity to resist openly. This means the forms of resistance that come from "powerless" people are often seen as lacking collective outright defiance. This demeans the very idea of resistance and its core purpose because it reduces it to recognition and a collective. It suggests that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's moments of resistance should be questioned, moments such as resisting interrogation while in solitary confinement and resisting arrest cannot be equated to resistance because there is no collective protest involved or recognised. By this logic, resistance is based on recognition, hence the master is invalidated when the slave says "no". This idea of resistance that requires recognition by others is questionable and somewhat reduces individual acts of resistance as minimal. Rather, for resistance to be expressed as a value of rebellion it requires recognition of a different kind. It is a recognition that supports and personifies "this is how I should like things to be". Shakur (2014: 276) expresses that for a revolution to occur the following is significant "Black self-determination is a basic right, and if we do not have the right to determine our destinies, then who does? I believe that to gain our liberation we must come from of power and unity". She considers self-determination as a vital value in making transitions from facts to rights. Shakur is calling for transition yet again—essentially, rebellion leads to the basic right of black self-determination. Madikizela-Mandela represents another perspective as to how resistance can be recognised beyond mass protest movements. Instead, she notes how everyday acts of resistance are just as crucial as those of mass protest movements in that they locate the collective sentiments of the oppressed. Resistance supports a wide range of political action Madikizela-Mandela understood that alone she cannot possibly do enough, so she does what she can where she is—to contribute to liberation. "I am too small in this enormous liberation machine. Blacks are dying every day in this cause. Who am I to contribute my little life? The case before us is too great for me to even be thinking of what happens to me personally" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 14). She considers the importance of individual political action as contributing to collective political purpose. She does not single herself out as more important than the next person, rather, her contribution is part of a larger contribution. It is in these everyday acts of resistance that the collective political purpose will be achieved.

It can be difficult to distinguish whether resistance is progressive, particularly if the individual (slave, Shakur, or Madikizela-Mandela) who is resisting has specific intent behind their action,

and this intent might not be easily accepted by the master. But, Aggleton (1987) elaborates a distinction behind the intents of resisting, he notes that resisting can either result in effective or reproductive resistances. Resistance is *effective*— if the dominating forces are successfully challenged and it is *reproductive*—if it reproduces the status quo (Raby 2005). If this is so then, the resistance of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela should be further looked into. In most instances the resistance of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela was effective, it challenged the dominating oppressive state systems and its apparatus. On several occasions during interrogation Madikizela-Mandela challenged the security police. She did it in a setting that was designed to intimidate her— in an interrogation room surrounded by individuals waiting to crush her political, physical, and emotional essence. But, she did not concede to the interrogation led by Major Ferreira, he told Madikizela-Mandela explicitly that "we are going to use certain methods to induce information from you since your attitude is what it is. You are going to talk against your will for that matter" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 38). She responded and said, "We can go to the torture room now, I'm ready" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 38). This is the kind of fearless nature Madikizela-Mandela exuded towards her oppressors, she challenged them and she was successful in so doing. Her interrogation ended with her being sent back to her cell and she provided no new information to her interrogators. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela challenged their oppressors, their resistance was effective because in their respective states racially prejudice crafted strategies and programmes (Stratcom and COINTELPRO) were introduced as part of a response to their resistance. Their resistance resulted in *reproductive* behaviour by dominating forces. The oppressive state systems created ways to maintain the status quo as a reaction to the resistance they were confronted with. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were engaged in resistance that was both effective and reproductive.

Parry (1994) notes the importance of revisiting how resistance is administered. She highlights the significance of connotative informal sources of resistance. She explains that such sources are not preoccupied with victimhood or adopting a regressive stance. Through Parry's understanding, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela emerge as connotative informal sources of resistance. They confront oppression through various facets of resistance.

More (2017) expands on the notion of resistance as he refers to the work of Marcuse where he describes "The Great Refusal" as "the protest against unnecessary repression, the struggle for the

ultimate form of freedom" (Marcuse 1955: 149). Marcuse emphasises it is through the great refusal that the "I" refuses to be oppressed and intimidated by oppressive state systems and authorities. More (2017), theorises the meaning behind the "I" he notes that when referring to the self as "I" it is not an "I" that is disembodied. Rather, it represents an individual that is situated, concrete, embodied, and racialised. It is an "I" the refuses to be apprehensive by oppressive state systems and authorities and it is supported by a strong racist ideology that aims at dominating others. Accordingly, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela use "I" when they refuse to concede to the demands of their interrogators and when they express how they feel about oppression—by using "I" they are acknowledging that they are embodied and not racialised.

More (2017) describes it as a title that is "a NO to intimidation". It represents owing to one's actions and expressing one's beliefs as true and accurate to the self. Camus (1956) describes it as a title that carries an attitude of all or nothing. Shakur (2014: 281) writes "Revolution. If it exists, I want to find it. Bulletins. More bulletins. I'm tired of bulletins. I want bullets"—her words echo this attitude of "all or nothing" she either wants a revolution or bullets. A revolution insights and supports change and bullets envisage violence and fighting to take this interpretation further, it could mean a confrontation with death. Shakur either wants "all" which is revolution or "nothing" which is death. If Shakur is willing to take or use bullets she is accepting death as a consequence of her actions. This demonstrates her willingness to sacrifice herself. It proves that as an individual she is willing to die for the sake of the revolution, not only the revolution but the sake of others. She rebels for others to exist. Her rebellious spirit was against the inhumanity which was surrounding her. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela being rebellious represented believing in something so strongly even when there is nothing in which to believe. This means dedicating oneself to the revolution and humanity. For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela "death is a synonym for sanctuary" (Wilderson 2014: 3). Wilderson acknowledges, that a willingness to die indicates political engagement although, it is a paradoxical approach because the very act of death insinuates an end to one's life and thus no further engagement in politics. But, how Wilderson undertakes the willingness to die indicates that he considers this willingness as a confrontation and acceptance to death as an active engagement with politics because death becomes the only option of achieving political convictions. Although it is not to say death symbolises to accept or concede to oppression rather, it signifies a high commitment in willing to fight against oppression until what is desired is achieved.

Hegel (1998: 114) proclaims, it is solely by risking one's life that freedom is tried and proved. He notes that the individual who has not risked his own life may well be recognised as human but, he has not attained his freedom thus, his self-consciousness is not recognised. Thus, when the rebel says "I" he has attained his freedom, although Hegel considers freedom as essentially negative because it is gained only beyond the struggle. Freedom is attained by the ability to assign meaning to oneself. This is because, self-consciousness is not merely existing rather, it is pure self-existence. It demands recognition of self-consciousness, but most significantly it is being-for-self that refers to an individual that has agency and has assigned meaning to their self-consciousness. But Fanon (2008[1967]) considers the freedom and agency involved in being-for-self, he notes that it is granted by the master one day without conflict. The master says "…You are now free" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 195), when the master utters these words it is a command to the slave to accept freedom—it is an empty recognition because the slave wants to be recognised and be in control of how his recognition occurs. It is anchored in the conception of freedom as the master has no mastery over the enslaved and their sensory irrational nature, but, Wynter (2003) fundamentally recognises enslavement that is still apparent. Essentially, Fanon wants to be in control of the "what" in himself that is recognised. This self-recognition is what Hegel (1998) is referring to as self-consciousness. Thus, both Hegel and Fanon are concerned with an individual that identifies the self through understanding recognition as independent and self-conscious.

In a radical approach that proposes a logic of lawbreaking nature, a rebel that identifies themselves as "I" fundamentally is a criminal because of the attitude the rebel exerts toward the state and the people. But, Camus (1956: 65) provides a key thought when he notes that "we must recognise that to live is to transgress". This means there is no perfect human being unless one accepts death and is willing to kill to achieve a revolution. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embodied this willingness, according to the apartheid regime, and the segregation government, showing this willingness openly, meant they were criminals. However, following the logic of Camus, the state apparatus too is criminal because to live is to transgress. The security forces of the apartheid regime and the segregation government were living in pursuit of protecting the status quo of racial prejudice. And so, their way of life (living) too can be understood as a transgression as well—simply because to live is to transgress in the words of Camus (1956: 65). But, of course, both the apartheid regime and the segregation government would have never considered their way of life

in essence, their racial ideology as a transgression. Thus, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela consequently remain as rebels.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur took ownership of their resistance, it is evident in their actions. Although, some evidence proves that they too admit to remaining silent but, it does not mean their silence was an indication of satisfaction. Shakur recalls the difficulty of suffering silently while present in the courtroom during her trial. Shakur's lawyer (Evelyn A. Williams) agreed to her making an opening statement in court. In her statement, Shakur (2014: 242) says "where there is oppression, there will be resistance. The Black Liberation Army (BLA) is part of the resistance movement. The BLA stands for freedom and justice for all people." Shakur expressed the importance of resistance in the political ideology of the BLA and the greatest importance being the liberation of the people. In the moment of her reading her statement she has already involved herself in an act of rebellion it is *unjust* for a political convict to address the courtroom. Shakur (2014) was saying and doing the unthinkable in the courtroom. In her statement, she mentions how resistance is key because it is the only way to deal with oppression. Since the oppression black people are confronted with, derives from every direction of their lives, politically, economically, and socially. Therefore, the only way to address it—is to resist it. She affirms the position and role of the BLA within the black community. Her statement was a clear proclamation in the courtroom against the oppression of black people but, most importantly, her statement was a direct act of rebellion against the American justice system.

The critical thing to remember with both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is that they were ratifying the unthinkable—to rebel against the oppressor in spaces that were specifically designed to suppress and act against their political visions. They were rebelling in spaces that were anti-black. But, that did not hinder their political convictions—in an interview, Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 14) responds to a question "Were there no times where you lost all hope and courage? Of course not. How can I lose hope when I know in truth this country is ours and that we'll get it back! I know that all this is something I must bear in order to reach that goal". This is the commitment rebellion incites, she understood that there was no way out, except to achieve the goal of liberation. Madikizela-Mandela presumed that her position was to rebel and it was the only way to reach the goal that was most desirable which was to get the country back. By attesting the importance of getting the country back Madikizela-Mandela shared the same sentiment that Shakur

was promoting, which was fighting for a liveable life—a liveable life signified a liberated life. "Black people are not free or equal in this country" (Shakur 2014: 242). Returning to the statement Shakur made in court she says "this government has put everyone in jail who spoke up for freedom, who said give me liberty or give me death" (Shakur 2014: 239). Her entire statement is intentionally loaded with openly attesting against injustice. Shakur was trying to emphasise that liberty and freedom were essential in the political struggle, but the (in)justice system of America had suppressed true liberation and freedom so much that anybody who strived for either one would be criminalised and labelled a rebel. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to rebel there was no other option but to confront the oppressor with resistance in order to achieve the political ideals they yearned for in their respective countries.

6.3 The (in)Security of Combative Ontology

When Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela confronted the oppressor with resistance it is an act of fighting for living. It is a combat between the oppressor and the oppressed. It is combat to reverse the oppression that they are encountering. Thus, it is important to use the word combat to emphasise the explicit nature of resistance Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were ensuing against oppression. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela describe oppression as a near-death experience or death-like experience. This sub-section is closely linked to the former because it places Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela in a paradigm that is built on the notion of rebellion as interpreted above. In their political pursuit, rebellion becomes a key notion of resistance. It is resistance that is ultimately aimed at self-naming and in essence self-writing. But, what unfolds, is that Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur realise that as black bodies they embody rebellion and in addition to that their rebellion arises through fighting in the physical sense as part of their survival. Most importantly, it is an integral part of their political convictions. It is only then that they acknowledge that combat is key in a revolutionary struggle. But, combat, just like revolutionary action, occurs as a reaction of something which is initially imposed by an external factor. It then happens as "a conscious rejection of past transgressions, a determined negation of negations" (Mafeje 2000: 66). Strikingly, it requires one to have an active role in the revolution agenda.

Hence, Shakur (2014: 349) writes: "our people are shot down in cold blood, we felt a need, a desire to fight back. One of the hardest lessons we had to learn is that revolutionary struggle is scientific rather than emotional". It is important to be mindful that combat from revolutionary organisations

such as the BLA and the ANC (African National Congress) was a reactionary decision. These movements were faced with hostility from state security forces and so fighting back physically and ideologically was their way of sustaining life and surviving oppression. The need and desire to fight back was a reaction to oppression. The experiences of Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela, and those of black bodies are based on producing a status or relation that is guided by a racial logic perpetuating racial inequality. Hence, when the air of freedom does not reach those in the hold, it is insisting on indifference, it is existing in a space that creates what Jefferson (2010) refers to as ontological insecurity. It threatens the being of an individual. It disturbs a persons' sense of time, space, and continuity and creates an individual with no ontological status (Wilderson 2010).

Fanon (2008[1967]) considers the colonised subject as one that has impurity and a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation. Ontology does not exist when interpreting the being of a black man. The black man has no ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man. The black man Fanon speaks of, is the man that essentially, suffers ontological insecurity. It is a body that is contaminated and imperfect. Ficek (2011) alludes, that in the colonised world the black man is denied ontological existence and rendered the status of a "thing"—things like stones. Ficek elaborates on how the black body is denied dynamism and forced violently into an unfree and inhumane status. Warren (2018) expands on how a black body becomes a site of no ontological status. The black body is forced into what Fanon (2008[1967]: xii) describes as the "zone of non-being"—it is a zone where non-human objects exist within, objects such as stones. These are objects that Ficek (2011) interprets as having been petrified. In Ficek's analysis of Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* he mentions his preference of the word petrification to describe the status of the anti-colonial efforts. This term indicates a strong fundamentalist understanding of the immobility that occurs in the zone of nonbeing. Ficek, explains the origins of the word petrification and its significance. Petrification derives from the Latin verb *petrificare* which means to turn something into stone, petrification is a process of making the organic—inorganic, the dynamic become static. Through this process of petrification black bodies are sometimes unable to move. It creates a lack of agency, they become stationary in time. Black bodies become "petrified with fear", they cannot scream. Ficek's supports the notion of ontological terror that Warren (2018) centres his argument upon about the lack of ontology from the black body.

Warren (2018: 173) describes ontological terror as "designed to foreground not only the terror the human feels with lack of security, but also that this fear is predicated on a projection of ontological terror onto black bodies and the disavowal of this projection". Ontological terror is a condition in which the black body is made to feel less than human. It is a position of barred by oppression and it confines the black body to an inhuman condition. The black body is invented to serve the economic needs and interests of the oppressor and to fulfil the ontological needs of the human. In this regard, the black bodies, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, are made to appear human. Sharpe (2010) considers an important element to the position the black body finds itself within—which is the position of ontological terror. She considers the historically underpinning reasons that shape such a position. Sharpe (2010) notes that the legalised oppression of black bodies that occurred through colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid was central to the codification of rights and freedoms of black bodies. This codification was further constituted in how the white body produced their rights at the expense of the black body. Sharpe (2010: 15) writes "an other's body legally and otherwise being made to wear unfreedom and to serve as a placeholder for access to the freedoms that denied the black subject". In essence, Sharpe is describing how ontological terror emerges and how it is based on creating a legalised space of unfreedom for the black body. Spillers (1987) considers this space of unfreedom as a "living laboratory"—she conceptualises this laboratory as a source of availableness, in which a variety of instruments carrying ontological experimentation occur within. Essentially, black bodies become a source of availableness for experiments that construct the human.

Warren (2018) considers Heidegger's understanding of the human being as *Dasein* (being there) and thrown into the world, but the black body emerges as something different. The black body emerges as not being present—*Nicht Da Sein*. It emerges in the absence of ontology. It exists, but its existence is barred from never arriving as an ontological entity. This rational of an absence from ontology asserts that the black body is not of the world and it suggests that it is outside of the structures of meaning that make existence valuable. A black body without ontology according to Warren (2018: 47) "constitutes something inassimilable and radically other, straddling between nothing and infinity. The Negro is the execration of Being for the human; it is with the Negro that the terror of ontology, its emptiness, is projected and materialised. This is the Negro's function". It is an individual that cannot take the aliveness, autonomy, and identity of him/herself and others for granted. This individual has to become absorbed in contriving ways of trying to be real and of

keeping himself or others alive (Laing 1960). This means that the Negro is often—if not always is confined to a position in which asserting one's existence never materialises. The Negro never attains ontology that is regarded as rational—the ontology of the Negro is always considered lacking and insecure by those who are human.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur understood the danger of ontological insecurity—this is a position of never attaining ontology. It subjects the black body to an empty vessel—it perceives the black body as an object that cannot comprehend rational relations with others. It perceives the black body as lacking the domain to assert agency, meaning that black bodies are seen as unable to make decisions that assert their humanity. The humanity of the black body cannot only be affirmed by others. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur experienced ontological insecurity, they experienced it when in solitary confinement and during torture. Hence, they called for collective action among black people. "Every revolution in history has been accomplished by actions, although words are necessary. We must create shields that protect us and spears that penetrate our enemies. Black people must learn how to struggle by struggling" (Shakur 2014: 74). Shakur's words are profound in that they emphasise the importance of a revolution that is led by black people against the enemy—which is the state. Her statement reveals how learning to "struggle by struggling" is at the core of fighting ontological insecurity. This is because she asserts that black revolutionaries do not just emerge, they are created by the conditions in which they exist in and are shaped by the oppression they experience. Thus, black revolutionaries should be prepared and willing to fight to gain freedom (Shakur 2014). Most importantly, they should come together and have a unified voice. Oppression disturbed Shakur's sense of time, space, and continuity—she was a divided self because she was living in an "amerika" that enforced racism, oppression, and systematically murdering black people. To overcome this position, combat is key—Madikizela-Mandela understood this as well.

Madikizela-Mandela (2003: 220) was labelled as "the overt revolutionary, angry, defiant and controversial" by all those who did not understand the depth of her commitment against oppression, particularly against the apartheid regime. This was purely because her stance against oppression had reached a point where for her combat was necessary "together, hand in hand, with our boxes of matches and our necklaces, we shall liberate this country" (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 220). Just as Shakur, she was promoting physical combat as a way of attaining liberation

because it engaged in a recreation of resistance that was equivalent to the magnitude of the oppressive state security forces. Madikizela-Mandela's revolutionary and defiant nature influenced her actions. She was in favour of a socialist state, she wanted to solve the problems of poverty and starvation, she was aware that black people were living in a state of ontological insecurity. In efforts of keeping herself and others alive, she had to find ways of positioning her resistance. Black resistance emerged in direct relation to the level of fresh repression and the apartheid regime responded with the Stalinist approach. This made South Africa's apartheid regime reach an ungovernable position (Madikizela-Mandela 2013: 221).

Through combat Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela aim for ontological security. Laing (1960: 41) describes ontological security as the "individual who experience(s) his being as real, alive, whole… as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, genuineness and worth; as spatially co-extensive with the body". An individual that has a firm core of ontological security, is one who is secure in their primary experiences and can relate to others through gratifying rather, than preserving himself. This creates a conceptual predicament because the context in which Laing (1960) refers to preservation is different from how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela interpret and embody preserving themselves through combat and resistance. This is because both women consider preservation as something that entails more than just the self alone. Madikizela-Mandela (2013) and Shakur (2014) emphasise the importance of the struggle against oppression as a collective struggle. They both reiterate the significance of a collective fight against oppression because an inclusive sense of freedom is key for those whose humanity is denied. Collective action against oppression achieves preservation for the collective meaning ontological security can be acquired for black bodies. But, Laing deduces preservation as a negative alternative that occurs as a result of ontological insecurity. He then reveals an important perspective and states "if a position of primary ontological security has been reached, the ordinary circumstances of life do not afford a perpetual threat to one's existence" (Laing 1960: 42). Laing assumes that if an individual has basic needs such as food and shelter obtained then it means ontological security has been achieved. But Shakur (2014) and Madikizela-Mandela (2013) refute Laing's argument they assert combative ontology—meaning that even though they may have the basic needs it is still important to acquire freedom as the fundamental principle in attaining these needs.

Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur become political fugitives, they are in constant combat, and fighting becomes an ethical practice because the oppressive state systems are waging war on their political convictions. "A war between races would help nobody and free nobody and should be avoided at all costs. But a one-sided war with Black people as the targets and white people shooting the guns is worse" (Shakur 2014: 199). The act of engaging in combat is the last resort for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela because their initial stance against oppression was resistance through civil protests and less physically aggressive moments of defiance. Nonetheless, they acknowledge that fighting will not free black bodies, nor will it provide the liberation and freedom desired. But, if black people are constantly confronted with violence then they should retaliate with violence because if they do not. They will be "criminally negligent"—this is a dangerous position because it allows racism and racist violence to occur. In an interview on the 1976 Soweto Uprising Madikizela-Mandela (1985) affirmed the same sentiments of Shakur regarding fighting back as a last resort. She said, "you will have to fight back if you are met with police confrontation" (Pohlandt-McCormick 2000: 593). Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were suggesting that if oppression comes in the form of physical fighting then it should be responded to with physical fighting.

There is often an embedded complexity in combat as resistance because of the notion that using violence to fight violence has the potential to produce a universal norm that proposes violence should be endorsed and eventually the rule of law could diminish over time. Foucault (1977b: 85) argues that "humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination". Foucault (1977b) is asserting that using violence as a form of resistance recreates domination. However, it is critical to consider the Foucauldian perspective of violence because it allows an opportunity to open new sites of contestation concerning how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embody combat as resistance. Foucault (1977a) does not dispel revolutionary action—he notes the importance of disruption and resistance as a manner in which humanity can question the constraints and exclusions built around metanarratives that have been established as common practice. Such a narrative could be one of racial prejudice and inequality, which is what Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur contest. Foucault questions the apparent naturalness of incarceration as a social practice that reveals the violent nature of society. He is concerned with the critique of the unquestioned practice of incarceration and the politics of power that emerge in the prison system. In essence, Foucault seems to suggest that there exists a strong

relationship between power and resistance and that resistance eludes power. Resistance is a potential resource for power and it simultaneously threatens power. Foucault's work creates a potential conceptual trap because he considers how forms of resistance will lead to an entrapment of the very system one is trying to escape and rebel from (Pickett 1996: 446-447).

This conflicting position can be applicable in how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur present their combative ontology. Their existence is threatened, in the sense that their political convictions are being confronted by dominance in the form of combat. They retaliate by fighting back, only because they had reached a borderline, of which they could no longer accept and tolerate violence. Their existence is threatened on a level that threatens the existence of others. Above all, the moral appeal appeared to be non-existent and the moment of combat marked the beginning of the journey of affirmation. The moral appeal had no position to the oppressor—this is what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to come to realise. Madikizela-Mandela says: "I will tell why we are violent. It is because those who oppress us are violent. The Afrikaner knows only one language: the language of violence. The white man will not hand over power in talks around a table" (Holmes 1996: 95). Shakur (2014: 198) echoes the same sentiment with regard to how the oppressor values and protects their power, she writes "nobody in history has ever gotten their freedom by appealing to the moral sense of the people who were oppressing them". If the oppressor only understands the language of violence then it justifies why combat becomes the necessary alternative for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. It further justifies, questioning, opposing, and using combat against oppressive systems of rule that racially oppress others. But, it creates a conflicted position about combat because Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela supported combat because they are confronted by it—but, it regenerates further combat as Foucault acknowledges. Shakur (2014) and Madikizela-Mandela (2013) were not inventing a new form of resistance by engaging in combat instead they were drawing from a strong tradition of maternal militancy. Both women were separated from their children due to imprisonment and their roles within their respective political movements. But, they found ways to maintain their maternal instincts, regardless of being separated from their children. Their maternal militancy persisted because they were mothers who understood the severe effects of parting unwillingly with one's children. In addition to that, they were beginning to be more inclined to whatever means that were necessary in order to achieve liberation—even if those means were combat. Bridger (2015) describes this form of resistance as a tradition, that it is embedded in peacekeeping and nurturing roles, during times of conflict in

which women attain social sanction and participate in the protest, militant activity and emphasising their maternal duties to protect, support or avenge their children (Bridger 2015). Needless to say, Bridger's perspective suggests a gendered approach to the kind of combat which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were encouraging. But, it implies that the political engagement that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were involved in asserted combat because of their maternal instincts and not for liberation. However, it is not the case, their militant surge was founded on the fundamental idea of achieving liberation through combat and it is evident in how their combat goes beyond their maternal instincts. They supported physical combat against oppression because they thought nothing else could work unless if physical combat is met with the same from the oppressed.

Combat also requires negotiating power and using violence to achieve security for the black body and ultimately to reconfigure the stature of the black body. In the words of Marriott (2007: 234-235), it involves "reconfiguring a new humanism that emerges from the *tabula rasa* opened up by the colonised on the path toward revolution. Which ends up in neither an end nor a beginning but, an endless tension of opening". Thus, this opening that emerges, does not insistently mean that the liberation Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were aiming for, had a higher ethical law than the inhumane insecure nature of the oppressive governments. It also does not justify the pursuit of their freedom, rather, it attempts to account for the use of violence in the revolutionary pursuit of freedom. Hence, liberatory violence, in brief, becomes a possible way through unjust violences of the political world.

Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were members of political movements that pursued an armed struggle towards attaining liberation. In the early 1970s *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) was absorbing young black South Africans to join the armed wing—in order to equip them with military training to deal with the political volatility, the apartheid regime had created as a consequence of the repression of the student movement in the country (Simpson 2011). Madikizela-Mandela's home in Soweto became a safe house for MK militants. Weapons were stored in her home and her home became a transit camp for those who would be leaving for guerrilla training of the MK (Trewhela 1991). Madikizela-Mandela adopted a military stance towards the oppression of the apartheid regime, she was fierce in her advocacy of militant action, making townships ungovernable to overthrow the apartheid regime. At the core of her combative approach against oppression was revolutionary rhetoric. The ANC and its members as well as

black people in South Africa represented "the vanguard of the oppressed and patriotic forces" and the apartheid regime represented "an organ for the oppression of one class by another" (Simpson 2011: 104, 113-114). The armed struggle was more than just a classical class struggle, it was involving members of society that were oppressed by an apartheid regime, but were committed to liberation.

The founding principle of MK is similar to that of the BLA—a military agenda emerged as a key element in the political struggle to both movements. The name Black Liberation Army carries a strong sense in that the word "army" has an embedded association to a militant organisation. The BLA was portrayed in the media as a militant organisation. Shakur (2014: 241) explains that the BLA was not an organisation "it goes beyond that. It is a concept, a people's movement, an idea… emerged from conditions in Black communities: conditions of poverty, indecent housing, massive unemployment, poor medical care, and inferior education". The BLA emerged as a response to the oppression black bodies were experiencing. Black bodies were existing in a space of insecurity, they were not free and equal. They were living in ontological insecurity where the air of freedom does not reach the black body but, lingers around it.

Simpson (2011), mentions a key element in deciding to use combat as a necessary part of revolutionary action. He notes that it is the responsibility of the liberation movement to identify the correct moment within a revolutionary situation to call for an uprising. The responsibility of identifying the moment of an uprising is critical because it sets a timeous and calculative nature of a movement, moreover, the enemy does not know when to anticipate the uprising so it can occur at least expected time. The main idea of identifying a critical moment for an uprising is to prepare the ground for seizure of power which, would then be a final phase of the revolution. But, this notion of revolution differs from how Foucault (1982) describes revolutionary action would occur. He notes that a power struggle recreating domination would arise—meaning, those who are the oppressors in that particular time would be removed and replaced by the oppressed and the oppressed would become the oppressors. However, Simpson (2011) suggests that what Foucault (1982) proclaims would result in the seizure of power, meaning a power vacuum would develop and begin to dismantle the old, reactionary state apparatus and create a new, democratic form power instead. This would create a new political order guided by the peoples' power. This is the kind of political order Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were fighting for. They were fighting while

in an insecure position to achieve a particular status of *being* that was suppressed by structures and methods of ontological terror. As a result of the political movements they were affiliated to both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela knew they had to claim responsibility for the use of a military approach as part of their political struggle. The military approach was the last resort to meet the violence coming from the oppressive state systems. Fanon (2004: 44) writes "violence also allows those members of the group who have strayed or have been outlawed to come back, to retake their place and reintegrated… the colonised man liberalised himself in and through violence". Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, like Fanon, also acknowledge the importance of violence as a strategy to reclaim their ontology and by that virtue, they reclaim their humanity.

Shakur (2014), highlights the importance of an armed struggle combined with a political struggle as key for a revolution. She emphasises how the two must work together but, should have completely different structures. Black people need to be able to defend themselves against physical attacks but, maintaining a political agenda is key. Shakur criticised her party—the Black Panther Party (BPP) for not being able to differentiate between aboveground political struggle and underground military struggle. Shakur reiterates the significance of why an armed struggle by itself can never bring about a revolution. For her, "Revolutionary war is a people's war. And no people's war can be won without the support of the masses people. The armed struggle can never be successful by itself; it must part of an overall strategy for winning, and the strategy must be political as well as military" (Shakur 2014: 348). She understood the importance of how a political agenda needs to be the driving force for an armed struggle. Shakur explains how black people wanted to engage in a do-or-die battle against the power structure of America although, they were very weak and ill prepared. It is for this reason, that the decision to engage in an armed struggle needs to be made at the correct moment to ensure that it reflects a readiness for a revolutionary outcome. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) elaborates on the context in which MK was born. The MK was formed as a response to the violence of the apartheid system. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 125) quotes Chief Albert Luthuli "When a man attacks my kraal, I must take my spear and defend my family". This was the rationale influencing the armed struggle, the apartheid system was attacking black bodies. Hence, the MK emerged because "a non-violent organisation was forced to take up the spear and defend the honour of the black man against an enemy" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 125).

There seems to be a common rationale in the use of combat to overcome oppression. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela supported the notion of an armed struggle because they understood that they were confronted with destruction and oppression by state apparatus' and systems. This created a situation of insecurity for black bodies. But both women managed to foster a belief that combat would accelerate and command overcoming this sense of insecurity. Most significantly, the notion of the word combat emphasises the fighting spirit both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela invoked in their political struggle. They were not just going to give in. They knew that they had to adopt a fighting spirit in them to recreate a world that recognises the lived experience of the black body as its ontology defined from self-perspective.

6.4 The (un)Making of the Anti-black World

It is worth emphasising that, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela exist[write] within the context of the anti-black world. The mechanisms and structures of such a world need not be described in detail in this subsection because the previous chapter provides a detailed conceptual and contextual underpinning of the meaning(s) behind the anti-black world. The most significant component to be mindful of in the context of the anti-black world is the temporary and relational nature of this world. These two components create an unstable atmosphere in the anti-black world which influences the action Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur pursue in unmaking the anti-black world.

The temporary nature of the anti-black world suggests that it is an impermanent construct. It is can change because, it is guided by power relations and dynamics between the inferior and superior and as already discussed above—power relations change. This is illustrated by how both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela interact with the oppressive systems and structures surrounding them. The relational nature of the anti-black world is based on the idea that blackness exists as a construct in relation to whiteness. For blackness to thrive, the black body is placed in an inferior position compared to the white body. Certain practices produce and reproduce racial differences, which perpetuates the anti-black world through social relationships of dominance and abjection. It is important to note that different scholars explain these social relationships of dominance and abjection using different analogies and contexts. Some use the slave and master to explain the power dynamic in the relationship (Douglass 1997; Spillers 1987; Hartman 1997; Camus 1956). Some scholars use the prisoner and the warden relationship (Davis 2003; Jackson 1990; Alexander 2012; Wilderson 2003), some refer to the colonised and the coloniser and Madikizela-Mandela

and Shakur refer to the oppressed and the oppressor. But, the fundamental relations in these examples expose how the (re)production of racial meaning occurs. This is subjectivity and it portrays the nexus of racial difference. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are portrayed as equipment, objects, and tools and do not appeal to Being that is grounded in freedom or futurity. Particularly, for the reason, that freedom and futurity are a thing(s) for the human to understand ontological difference through using the black equipment (body). It is a way the human understands his/her there-ness within the world of objects. The human is the white body, it uses the equipment—which is the black body to assert its place in the world. The black body becomes equipment existing in the anti-black world based on its ontological difference.

Based on the temporary and relational constructs of the anti-black world Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reject the fundamentals of such a world and provide an antithesis. They make inexorable demands based on everything that denies them being. They make these demands upon the oppressive state structures, mechanisms, and systems. Their demands are best described as absurd in the anti-black world simply because they come from an anti-black position which is where Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are forced to exist in. Their requests are regarded as illogical because these are requests which come from those who are written outside and excluded from having the ability to make requests and demands. In unmaking the anti-black world they aim to unmask the oppressor and end the machinery that constructs the anti-black world. To unmask the oppressor, in essence, means to go against what the oppressor perceives as justice and reveal the illegitimacy of oppression. It is to go against the law of being because, being is anti-black thus, to unmake this construct of anti-black is to unmake the law in essence.

The previous subsection distinguishes ontological insecurity of the black body, the anti-black world is sustained through ontological insecurities. Ontological insecurities manifest through the law. It is the oppressive state systems such as the apartheid regime and the segregation government that distorts and excludes black bodies from law and justice. Warren (2018: 64) considers the essence of law not as a scientific thing, or an object knowledge rather, as "an unfolding of Being through law". This means Being which is represented by the white body acknowledges itself as human by virtue of law. Being (white body) further, understands itself through ontological difference that proclaims Being as greater than being (black body). This notion is interpreted as a (non)relation between Being and being in which being represents itself by forgetting, undermining,

or ignoring the predispositions of the greatness of Being. Being presents itself as against the (re)presentation of being as an object. This notion sustains and reveals how Being conceals its domination (Warren 2018). Because it appears as though Being is detached and has nothing to do with the (re)presentation of being as an object. Simply meaning, the white body disassociates itself with the position of the black body as inferior, almost claiming that it did not impose inferiority onto the black body.

This relation that Warren (2018) explains, between Being and being resembles how oppressive state systems such as the apartheid regime and the segregation government pronounce their relations with black bodies such as Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. The essence of this relation is that Being—is just and lawful and most human and being—is an object. Being represents itself as law and when it unfolds through the law, materialises into citizenship, justice, freedom, and political community. If this so then being is outside of the law, being is the status of denial of black humanity, being has no citizenship, justice, freedom and political community. However, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela realise this distortion—this distortion exists in how the apartheid and segregation laws concealed their essence. Shakur (2014) refers to how the segregation laws in the US reaffirmed their domination at the expense of black bodies. The US government only adhered to its laws and administrative procedures when it was convenient for it to do so. But, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela call for an outlawing of oppressive laws—they reject the law as it confronts them. This notion of outlawing is well elaborated in the work of Warren (2018). He explains it as "the demand not to see the nonarrival, Being parasitically relies upon for its own withdrawal" (Warren 2018: 70). This means Being refuses and denies seeing the there-ness of being. Outlawing is embedded in rejecting that being lacks a place from which it can arrive at and that it lacks a place from which an ethical imperative can emerge from the being. "Outlawing is the exception that determines our legal and ethical norms" (Warren 2018: 71). "Outlawing" goes against the ethical imperative in order to see the invisible to expose the injustice present, yet it also has an inverse function that indicates the conditions of how ethical norms should be established. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embodied this exception in their actions because they were working against the law. It is the legal and ethical norms that guided the spirit of rebellion within Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. Both women were outlaws, they were in a position of non-arrival, embedded and labelled as lacking an ethical imperative to emerge as Being.

When Madikizela-Mandela was banished to Brandfort she soon realised she was a living symbol of the white man's fear. She represented everything the white man despised—she was unruly and did everything in her power to disobey the apartheid laws. In Brandfort, the white population had never heard of the ANC and its political prospects. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 27) arrived in Brandfort and made people aware of the political struggle. She realised that the Afrikaner in the Free State—for him/her a black is something that sits on their tractor or plods behind their plough. What is most important to that farmer is his tractor, not the labourer; and if lighting strikes that man dead on that tractor, the first thing he'll run and check is the tractor (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 27). Madikizela-Mandela (1985) attests, that the black man is equipment to be used by the white man for his interests. So when she was banished to Brandfort she understood that the (political) movement was physically-symbolised by her presence in this place which was predominantly an Afrikaner community. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 27) created a "there-ness"— a presence that the anti-black world was trying to deny her. She deliberately aimed to unmake how the white people and security police in Brandfort expected her as a black body to behave. She aimed to unmake this position, the anti-black apartheid regime had created for black bodies. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 27) writes, "I went into the shops no black went into, at the police station I used the white entrance, I went into the white side of the post office—there was nothing they could do". She would go into the supermarket and all the white women doing their shopping would run out—wait outside until she finished doing her shopping. She would deliberately take long to do her shopping (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 27). The core purpose of her actions was to petition against what the black people of Brandfort had been denied and do things at the level of the white people. To conscientise the white people to the politics of the struggle. The way she could do this was to act against the restrictions the apartheid regime had made in attempts to perpetuating the constructs of the anti-black world.

"I find my work here very fulfiling. They have reached a stage now where they realise they no longer have any place for me in the country—they honestly don't know what to do with me" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 28). The anti-black constructs of the apartheid regime had reached a stage where it realised that Madikizela-Mandela was not going to accept the oppressive conditions of such a world. But, it was not only her alone that was no longer willing to accept the oppressive conditions of apartheid, her defiance had created a sense of confidence among the black community of Brandfort. "The blacks know what their value is, they know their worth, even

though there are no jobs. They have been conscientised, they no longer prepared to go work for starvation wages" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 28). The situation in Brandfort was an indication that acts of unmaking the anti-black world were persisting. These acts on unmaking are driven by legal and ethical norms. The essence of unmaking the anti-black world is to remove and banish grotesque things that are considered normal. When these inhumane restrictions are removed they are considered "political change" in the anti-black apartheid South Africa. Things that are most natural such as going to the toilet become part of discussions of political change. This was what Madikizela-Mandela was attempting to abolish—the everyday circumstance of the black body had (has) been reduced to constructs of blackness. Every action Madikizela-Mandela initiated against the security police and apartheid laws in Brandfort was to ensure and achieve the objective of unmaking the anti-black world.

Madikizela-Mandela (1985) realised that Brandfort represented a systematic, dehumanising, and politically suppressing environment for black people. It was an environment surrounded by degenerating conditions—poverty was rife, the health of the black people was deteriorating, malnutrition was high, there were no welfare agencies where black people could get assistance from. In efforts of rejecting the conditions of the anti-black world, Madikizela-Mandela embarked on a gardening project—black people could not afford food, so she gave them seeds to grow their vegetables in their yards. Her home was regarded as a sort of welfare station (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 30-33). The significance of what Madikizela-Mandela was doing in Brandfort was unmaking the conditions the anti-black apartheid regime had created for the black body. Madikizela-Mandela was also involved in conscientising the youth. Study groups and lectures on history and political thinking were organised and conducted (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 31-33). The purpose was to make the youth aware of the nuances of the political struggle. Shakur (2014: 222) too thought highly of the importance of a systematic program for political education, ranging from the simplest to the highest level in order to make the BPP successful. Both women cared immensely about the communities around them and so they were involved in activities that would assist in improving the livelihoods of people.

Shakur (2014) had a moment of realisation in the importance of black people taking control of their lives when she was introduced to the work of the Black Panther Party (BPP) in Oakland and after attending the funeral of a black revolutionary. She thought of how "black people need

someone to stand up for us or we will always be victims… If I stay a victim it will kill me, I thought… I wanted to be one of the people who stood up" (Shakur 2014: 397). Shakur realised that black bodies were becoming victims of oppression, she was witnessing the insecurity black bodies were living in and she made a conscious decision to be part of the liberation of unmaking the anti-black world. When she joined the BPP she was part of the team responsible for health care. They made medical appointments and taught basic first aid for helping people in emergencies. She worked with a group of black medical doctors and students to help set up a free clinic in Harlem. Shakur was also assigned to a breakfast programme for children that was run at three different churches. Shakur considered it her duty to work in the black community, because fascist governments do not permit revolutionary opposition groups to exist—instead, they manufacture anti-black conditions through programmes such as COINTELPRO.

In an anti-black world the black body is "a site of absolute dereliction" in the words of Wilderson (2003: 25) it functions as a site of violence. At a more symbolic level, it is a position and location of everything that is negative and represents complete disorder. Thus poverty, the lack of health and education facilities are the conditions, which the anti-black world has created for the black body. The anti-black world creates conditions that reject the humanity of the black body. Additionally, the black body as a site of dereliction means it can be forced into displacement, a sort of exile status. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experienced exile at different levels. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) was forced into exile by being removed from her home and taken to Brandfort. Shakur (2014) on the other hand, escaped from prison to go into exile in Cuba. But, the parameters of being exiled from the world encompasses both their terrains—they are displaced into the anti-black world. They are exiled into the anti-black world. Freire (2005) posits revolutionary principles that refer to exile. Freire notes that crossing into terrains of otherness, into exile situated him in his politics of location (Giroux 1992). Freire's (2005) position can be understood by Shakur as a way of situating her politics when she rejects her incarceration and decides to escape. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) also shared the same sentiment, she rejects being placed in an environment that threatens the life of the black community in Brandfort. Her rejection was evident in the efforts she undertook to help the community of Brandfort. Said (1990: 365) provides a different but, also important element to exile, that "borders and barriers, which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory can also become prisons". What Said (1990) warns against is important because both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela acknowledge how some black people

had tolerated oppression so much that they were in comfortable ghettos and townships which were a different manifestation of prisons. Nonetheless, it is important to note the differences between Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela's exile. Shakur escapes into exile and Madikizela-Mandela is taken into exile. But, Shakur went into exile in efforts of unmaking the anti-black world, when she escaped from prison she consciously had to remind herself that "I can, I can, yes I can" (Shakur 2014: 374). Shakur recognised how sometimes people can begin to tolerate oppression, they begin to think its normal but, she was aware that to become free you have to be aware that you are a slave and you have no freedom. Only then, you will yearn and be willing to fight for freedom. Shakur's escape into exile was a conscious moment of rejecting the anti-black world. Madikizela-Mandela, pursued her objective of unmaking the anti-black world when she was exiled to Brandfort in her efforts of empowering the community. Her conviction as a social worker naturally abetted to immediately set up structures that would support the black community.

Madikizela-Mandela (1985) confesses that because she was a social worker, her instinct to preserve human life could never escape her since her profession was the centre of her being. Social work has always centred itself on people's rights to the satisfaction of their basic needs[3]. Madikizela-Mandela had a strong commitment of solidarity, she had empathy and she could identify with others by their suffering as her suffering. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were concerned with unmaking these conditions the anti-black world had created for black bodies, they also both knew that political change had to emanate from them, the oppressed people, the black bodies—they had to be part of the political change. The demand underpinning the unmaking of the anti-black world requires Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to know what it means to suffer. Based on their observations of the trauma of the anti-black world they had to visualise freedom for the black body. They had to engage in a politics that would break through the impasse of resentment and enter into history.

Fanon (2008[1967]) suggests, that the task for the black body should be to leap into a space that probes the fundamentals of attaining freedom. The black body should move beyond colonialism as well as other oppressive systems like apartheid and segregation. Fanon attests, that the black body should take a radical position towards freedom. For the reason that, if the black body to

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[3] Hare (2004) acknowledges that social workers had a key role in the apartheid political struggle in South Africa and Madikizela-Mandela was among some social workers such as Helen Joseph, Ellen Kuzwayo and Leila Patel.

ignores the injustices executed on it, or to have no memory or realisation of struggling for liberty then it makes freedom in itself unavowable. It makes the struggle towards freedom unworthy or insignificant. Hence, Fanon acknowledges that when the white man challenges his humanity—he will respond by weighing down on his life with all the weight he has. Essentially, he will confront the challenge and take a radical leap because his humanity is placed in question. In taking this radical leap towards freedom it shows how ethics drive the actualisation of certain actions (Marriott 2007). Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were driven by the political ethics of unmaking the anti-black world. What occurs in unmaking the anti-black world results in an ethical encounter, because unmaking is confronted with the violence and structures of the anti-black world. This radical leap becomes an ethical practice, it is a way of life, based on an indeterminate negation—it is a negation that is always working towards creating ethical practices. In creating an ethical decree the unmasking, unmaking, and revealing the nature of the anti-black world occurs, and most significantly it requires rejecting bad faith. According to Gordon (2000b: 75), bad faith is "a lie to the self, one that involves an effort to hide from one's freedom". Essentially, to live in bad faith is to live a life of self-deception in efforts of emerging as living in good faith. This means adopting a lack of consciousness, it is a black body appearing as good but not critical. It is about not arriving and reaching the realisation of one's consciousness (Gordon 2000a). The realisation of freedom calls for rejecting bad faith and in essence the anti-black world. Bad faith is visible in the anti-black world in that it presents whiteness as the only ontology, it justifies the subjugation of the black body and it blinds political imagination (Sithole 2016). Bad faith creates accepting all forms of oppression, concealing the self from what makes the self and not having a desire for being. But, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reject the conception of bad faith as interpreted by Fanon (2008[1967]). Therefore, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are not prisoners of history, they look for meaning of their destiny in their direction.

There is something critical that Magubane (1987) highlights about the evolution of the black person and how they come to understand themselves. The continuity and meaning of the black man's self-hatred and lowered self-esteem are rooted in the historical understanding of the white man's assumptions about the black man. These assumptions have evoked complex emotional responses about the black man and how he/she relates to him/herself. Magubane (1987) asserts, that this has caused a constant self-discovery that has been part of the black experience. Therefore, the black man has to assert him/herself in his/her ways. Fanon (2008[1967]: 204) writes, "I

acknowledge one right for myself: the right to demand human behaviour from the other" he goes on to add "In the world I am heading for, I am endlessly creating myself". In the case of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, they understood that they had to demand human behaviour that would restore their humanity. They had to make demands that seemed impossible, they had to help their communities. They felt politically obligated to demand human behaviour from those who were oppressing them.

Shakur shared the same sentiments as those of Fanon (2008[1967]: 204) when he says "I acknowledge… the duty never to let my decisions renounce my freedom" and Shakur (2014: 75) says "It is our duty to fight for our freedom". The significance of what they both utter is that their freedom and the need to fight it are essential and, nobody can grant them freedom unless they fight for it. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 122-123) too proclaims the importance of fighting for freedom—"We are fighting for the total liberation of the black man in this country. It is a national struggle we are fighting… The black man does not want his chains changed into gold and polished…He is fighting for his total liberation". In essence, the black body should move to ethics that affirm the radical transformation of time (Marriott 2007). The black body should be the custodian of fighting for its freedom. Ultimately, it is a decision that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela take to change the deathliness of the black body and its position of insecurity. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were engaged in political action that was aimed at unmaking the anti-black world and its structures.

Also, Fanon (2008[1967]: 205) writes "I am my own foundation… I initiate my cycle of freedom". Shakur (2014) resonating with Fanon, acknowledges that black people should and inevitably must determine their destinies. Shakur (2014: 276) acknowledges that "it is necessary for Black revolutionaries to come together, analyse our history, our present condition, and to define ourselves and our struggle". This simply means in the same context both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela realised they had to write their freedom. Fanon (2008[1967]) had realised this too—to device, the freedom one wants to see manifest—the notion of initiating one's freedom is reproduced in how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela formulate their ideas on freedom. Hence, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur follow in Fanon's direction of initiating their own freedom. Initiating freedom requires one to visualise the kind of freedom one would like. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) noted that future South Africa will be one that is multiracial and it will

accommodate everyone. The future government of South Africa would be guided by the Freedom Charter as a blueprint for society. The Freedom Charter is a unique document in that for the first time, the people were actively involved in formulating their vision of an alternative society. The existing order of state oppression and exploitation which was prevalent in the 1950s (and earlier) was rejected (The Freedom Charter 1955). The essence of the charter was that it advocated for a socialist state because according to all those who drafted and supported the document there was no other way of sorting out starvation problems and the discrepancy between population groups. The founding principle of the charter was that everyone would have a fair share of the wealth of this country (South Africa). Madikizela-Mandela supported the principles of the charter because she fundamentally believed that through the execution of such a document the anti-black world can be abolished.

Shakur also had visualised freedom outside of the constructs of the anti-black world. She believed that to again liberation—it should come from a position of power and unity. "I believe in uniting with white revolutionaries to fight against a common enemy" (Shakur 2014: 276). The critical element of liberation according to Shakur was power and unity. This would result in a revolutionary change in America. But, most importantly Shakur believed that people had to come together and organise their structures and political parties—essentially, liberation for the black person had to come from a black person. Shaku and Madikizela-Mandela were echoing Fanon (2004) when he speaks of a new humanity, for itself and for others which inevitably defines a new humanism. Whereby, there is a fundamental redistribution of relations between the colonised and the coloniser and ultimately, a demise of colonialism. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were engaging in a type of politics that was going against the oppressor. It was a fugitive task because it is working against law. It is working against a political landscape that is against the oppressor but, it is driven by the ethical considerations they valued. At the core of their values is freedom and freedom will constantly require re-reading and re-interpretation based on the conditions of oppression.

6.5 Self-writing the World to Come

The significance of articulating how the black body visualises freedom arises from the fact that freedom has always been conceptualised based on oppression. Meaning, that freedom is often a reaction to oppression, like Castronovo (2000) asserts the struggle for freedom is concerned with

being freed from something—freedom does not stand on its own. Even Mamdani (2017) admits, that resistance is shaped by the nature of the power it confronts. This is how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela established a juncture in their resistance, it was to confront the power of oppressive state systems. But, Mbembe (2015) suggests that this should not be the only goal, freedom should not only be about political consciousness brought to being—it should be about being effective through that political awareness. He suggests the importance of going beyond the binary categories used to interpret relations of domination such as autonomy and subjection and resistance and passivity (Mbembe 2015). Mbembe notes that such interpretations of relations of power often cloud the understanding of human relations. He asserts that often what happens is that those who are in the position of autonomy and power seek to institutionalise their power through creating narratives that result in becoming symbols and meanings of power relations. Eventually, this results in a systematic application of power relations. Hence, Mbembe (2015: 103) argues that those who are considered as passive and subjugated should "examine; how the world of meanings thus produced is ordered; the types of institutions, the knowledges, norms, and practices structuring this new common sense". By examining these symbols and meanings that perpetuate binary categories of domination—does not mean it is an attempt by the oppressed to take the role of the oppressor rather it is a method to know how the modes of oppression function.

Freire (2005) posits that the only way the relationship between the oppressor and oppressed ends is when the oppressed gain equal rights and an equal voice in their lives—most significantly, to not become oppressors but rather, to restore the humanity of both (oppressors and oppressed). When this happens the oppressor feels they are now oppressed—they are familiar with oppressing others and when the domination and power is taken away they do not feel equal. Oppressors believe that *to be* equates to, *have*—in essence, oppressors dehumanise themselves through pursing *to have,* they feel they have a right to have while others do not *have* this right and do not deserve to *have*. It is based on the rationale that the oppressed do not *have* because they are not deserving enough and therefore, they do not deserve to *have*. This rationale gives the oppressor a good reason to criticise, condemn the oppressed, to dehumanise, and treat the oppressed like objects. But Freire (2005: 56) attests that the oppressed must claim their humanity by freeing themselves—"it is only the oppressed who, by freeing themselves, can free their oppressors". The oppressed are Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur who free themselves by beginning to 'self-write the world to come' through their modes of resistance. They begin to craft their world in their image.

This notion of 'self-writing the world to come' lends a futuristic approach to the experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. It incites the idea of how the future should be imagined in the background of self-writing as the guiding principle. But, there is a politically restricting racial discourse that emerges in efforts and claims of eliminating the aggravated positions of black and white. One of the arguments in this discourse is supported by the post human condition, which places forward the notion that humans become inseparable from the means and products of production of which these products range from information and language. This rationale interprets that the relation of objects constitutes subjects or forms of subjectivity and consciousness (Kordela 2017). In the context of this study, the post human condition translates that the object which is the black body is the tool of what is used to shape the subject, which is the white body. The black body is used at the expense of the white body—the notion of post human supports the existence of the white body as dominating the black body. Additionally, there is another discourse, which postulates that there should be no black or white identity but rather, a multiracial identity. In essence, it is interpreted into what Mills (1998) refers to as a multiracial coalition, which creates the risk of possibly forgetting the centrality of anti-blackness. This notion of multiracial identity supports the idea that race does not matter. But, this proposed identity allows a visible continuity of white supremacy, through the modes of subjection, tactics of coercion and rhetorics of representation are persistent (Sexton and Copeland 2003). This visible continuity of white supremacy is also seen in the myths of the "postcolonial" world. Grosfoguel (2007) dispels this notion that the elimination of colonial, oppressive power translates into the evaporation of the "colonial power matrix" and its methods of oppression. But, instead, the world is still fixed on forms of domination which present themselves in disguised forms. An example of such are the US policies on the War of Drugs, which resemble the War on black bodies. Thus, an important question remains: can a multiracial identity be the response to self-writing the world to come? Madikizela-Mandela (1985) refutes this disposition when she contends that the white man has used the black man's culture as a machine to oppress him because to destroy the black man as a proud human being with dignity, their identity has to be destroyed from the core of their culture.

Oppression imposes an identity of inferiority to the black body. It assumes that the black body has no identity. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 126) explains that being in prison helped her reshape her ideals. She began to embody self-writing while in prison even though the attempt was to destroy her being. She writes "What happened during my detention was quite extraordinary. Now if the

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man I'm dealing with appeared carrying a gun – in defence of my principles I know I would fire. That is what they taught me. I could never have achieved that alone" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 126). Madikizela-Mandela's self-writing originates from a position of being oppressed and responding to that oppression with renewed convictions of freedom.

According to Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 126), "The white man has raped the black man's culture and used it as a machine to oppress him". This means that the identity of a black body is used at the expense of the white body whenever it suites the white body. Thus, ideas such as multiracial identity are supported if it results in something positive and maintains white supremacy. Her argument on the use of culture to oppress black bodies is supported in what Fanon (2008[1967]: 153) writes when he states that, "the Negro is only in demand when he is needed by the master, he is made palatable in a certain way that his blackness is tolerable". The culture of the black body is used to modify him/her so that he/she appears less black but, the primary purpose is of demeaning his/her culture as vulgar. But, "the Negro knocks down the system and breaks the treaties" (Fanon 2008[1967]: 153). The Negro refuses to accept this condition and appropriation to self. The white man does not revolt, he comes to an arrangement, and such an arrangement is the notion of multiracial identity. But, according to Sexton and Copeland (2003), "things fall apart" in print and life. This is when self-writing and the quest for freedom begins.

To craft one's freedom, to self-write does not occur in a single moment. This process of becoming is complex and may not be confined to a single moment of being released from prison. Abu-Jamal (1996) notes, that even though one yearns for freedom, demanding freedom is not merely constituted by the action of being released from prison. Freedom should mean more, it should be about the liberation that is partially dependent on the collective fate of black people (Abu-Jamal 1996). Freedom is about the collective destiny for everybody around. Abu-Jamal (1996) suggests that one should construct an identity regardless of the circumstances they are in, he announces that the black body should assert itself in the world. He alludes to a critical point the Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela emphasise freedom which is that it cannot be individual attainment, it is a collective struggle—what he is, and who he can become is intertwined with the freedom of others. Particularly, because there are neo-slave narratives that function as a form of preserving the oppressor and oppressed relation, through such narratives allow the legacy of oppression to continue to be reconstituted and places the fate of the black body as the foreground of oppression.

The legacy of oppression reinforces the oppression of the status quo, the divisive categories of the world are not interrogated and they remain the same. It results in the idea of a collective fate to recede. But Abu-Jamal (1996) argues, that there is a possibility of breaking away from such barriers and transcending such conditions. It is through freedom that the status quo is challenged, but a freedom that is for the collective and has the capacity "to keep on keeping on" meaning it is an ongoing affirmation of freedom that requires a needed liberated collective of voices to reformulate the black bodies destiny. Thus, it cannot be defined through a single moment, again emphasising Abu-Jamal's argument, that freedom is not about being released from prison, freedom includes the collective and action from the collective. Abu-Jamal's understanding is linked to how self-writing the world to come unfolds in this sub-section. Self-writing occurs in a series of moments, it is not a particular moment that occurs as a once-off revelation. Therefore, self-writing encompasses lived experiences—as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur live there are particular moments of self-writing emerge in their lives.

The discourse of self-writing the world to come is similar to that of the notion of "the decolonial turn". Maldonado-Torres (2011: 2) explains the latter in the following way "the decolonial turn does not refer to a single theoretical school, but rather points to a family of diverse positions that share a view of coloniality as a fundamental problem in the modern age". At the essence of the decolonial turn, is that fundamental change does not occur in a single moment, but rather is influenced by a variety of moments. It is moments that emanate from individuals that are rendered to have a meaningless future, nonetheless, it does not mean that when these moments emerge they meet at a utopic point. There is an underlying falseness with utopia because it believes in arriving at a certain point with nowhere else to move to. To self-write, the world to come does not mean arriving at an ultimate end, because there are dehumanising forces, logics, and discourses that never seem to end and reproduce themselves under different terms yet fundamentally meaning the same thing. Such as the reoccurrence of the oppressor and oppressed relation throughout history has reappeared in different facets namely; colonialism, slavery, segregation, and apartheid. Hence, self-writing the world to come requires delinking the practice of self-writing with utopic notions. Because, if not—there is a danger of going against the imperative idea of what self-writing embodies—which is to define one's self through their experiences but, not forgetting that one's experiences are linked with those of others. Because if not—it makes the conception of experience closed to only an individual. Nonetheless, the significance of this *turn* is that it should create

conversations that will deepen the understanding of liberation. For both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela the moments of the decolonial turn occur through their defiance and resistance. When they resist that is how the decolonial turn operationalises. The experiences of resistance outlined in the previous chapters exemplify how they questioned the legitimacy of oppressive rule.

It is through such conversations that it invites conceptual frameworks and creative appropriations that can contribute to forging a less oppressive future. According to Maldonado-Torres (2011), liberation is central to decolonisation as such then liberation becomes central to self-writing. Because liberation and identity have an inherent tension and as already mentioned identity is shaped through self-writing. Liberation and identity have an inherent tension because racialised peoples, black bodies and to be precise Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela have identities that are contested, tied to a power structure, and an imaginary that militates against their very existence. But, self-writing when mixed within shaping identity cannot be translated into a quest for liberation or a claim to political action. Gordon (2000a) refers to an epistemological closure which asserts that if liberation and political action become the guiding rationale of liberation, the claim for liberation consequently is an identity claim. He rejects the combination of liberation as a quest for identity. Liberation is the beginning, the opening of understanding the self—it is not an end.

By this logic, liberation marks the beginning of self-writing and of shaping identity. Gordon argues that the liberatory question marks the beginning of a series of philosophical turns, through such *turns* the two meet—identity and liberation meet when the question of who is to be liberated arises. Gordon acknowledges the liberation discourse often directs value that transcends being, although not always essential. This means liberation is a teleological concern, it is concerned with purpose. Gordon asserts that there is a philosophical significance of separating liberation and identity and the significance of separating the two concepts to establish moments of self-writing. This is because this separation advocates for epistemological openness, which pertains to every individual as a separate being and not judged and associated with belonging to a particular group. According to Gordon (2000: 275), epistemological openness states "it is good practice to restrict judgements to the context and to the social role but not over the full biography of the individual who plays that role". This is what it means to self-write the world to come, it is having moments and turns of philosophical significance that interpret liberation as the beginning of shaping identity. In essence,

liberation begins a further quest in how self-writing can continuously emerge. Therefore, in the quest of liberation self-writing begins.

For Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela they appear to have moments of as interpreted by Gordon. Both women attest to the importance of liberation and how black people can only truly exist as being through liberation. Shakur (2014: 52) writes "We must defend ourselves and let no one disrespect us. We must gain liberation by any means necessary. It is our duty to fight for our freedom. It is our duty to win". Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 123) too attested that "The black man does not want his chains changed into gold and polished. He does not even want copper chains. He is fighting for his total liberation and total hacking off of those chains". This translates to mean that when black people are liberated only then, they exist—only then, they are being thus, only then they have an identity. It should be noted, that questions and debates on identity and freedom have a long trajectory of responses. The alleged link between identity and freedom forms part of the underlying argument in this study—which also explains how identity is shaped through various dialogues of self-writing. More specifically, the manner in which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela engage in forms of attaining freedom also relates to how their being unfolds it relates to their identity.

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela both suggest, insist, and support what Gordon (2000a) warns against, which is that centering liberation on ethical and moral efficacy should not occur. Gordon notes that there are ethical and political challenges that emerge in the struggle for liberation that turns oppressive. This is evident when Shakur (2014: 242) attests that there has been no revolution that has occurred by appealing to the moral sense of the oppressors. Shakur (2014: 225-227) notes that the commitment to liberation becomes sacrificial and in some instances can turn oppressive. She refers to how the structures and leaders of the BPP in New York had undertones of oppression and disrespect towards people. They spoke to people with an attitude of arrogance, they were flippant and disrespectful. Shakur preferred a polite and respectful manner. There was a high sense of bitterness within the BPP which was influenced by how unethical and immoral the oppressive state systems were operating. Madikizela-Mandela (1985) notes how the apartheid security forces created an immoral and violent culture among those fighting for freedom, because anti-apartheid activists were using methods of the oppressor as this was the language the oppressor understood. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 127) uses an analogy of the Afrikaner that builds a wall around

himself that he believes nobody will be able to penetrate it. To get through this wall he uses a gun, and when you (the black body) retaliate in the same way—that is when you are talking to him. When the black body retaliates and breaks that wall, it is in conversation with the oppressor. It is engaging in an unethical conversation. So it is in this quest for liberation that ethical challenges emerge. But, the mode(s) of writing that come into being for both women are not those that appeal to the moral being of the oppressor rather, they are present to achieve an authentic sense of liberation. When Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur engage in actions of striving for freedom, it is not to negotiate or be granted a confirmation of their humanity and that of others. Rather, it is about achieving a true sense of liberation.

Alcoff (2011) provides critical reasoning behind establishing epistemologies. She insists on the need for good epistemologies to bring about the revolution because without epistemology, a revolution can be halted or the problems the revolution seeks to overcome can re-emerge. Epistemology cannot be separated from ethics, politics, and other areas of human creation. It is for this reason that Shakur acknowledges that the US segregation policies and the oppressive government had taken away too much from black people—there was a need to reclaim all that was taken away. "We are robbed of our language, of our Gods, of our culture, of our human dignity, of our labour and of our lives… Black people should and, inevitably, must determine our destinies…" (Shakur 2014: 73-74). This is a testament that Shakur is making that although black people have been robbed they need to shape their liberation. Black people need to establish an authentic existence because without liberation they cannot live authentically. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 124-125) writes, "…the worker is the same man who has been removed physically from his roots, from his father's land, a so-called 'black spot', and has been placed by a white man in an arid, uninhabitable place…" she adds "we are interested in the preservation of human rights and human dignity, so we will continue reshaping our history of tomorrow". Achieving humanity and human dignity for black people was the most important thing for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela; and they understood why they had to achieve their humanity through a revolution.

There is something critical Alcoff (2011) believes about revolutions which is that not everything should be reduced to matters of power and strategy. For epistemology to work "for the next revolution" or perhaps even "for self-writing the world to come" it has to be seen differently. By this she means it requires re-creating new articulations of identities and knowledges, articulations

with greater historicist and contextual reflexivity that can reform and revise epistemology for the next revolution. When Alcoff refers to "the next revolution" it has a connotation of a new imaginary. But, what does it mean to have a new imaginary? What does it mean to self-write the world to come? These questions have been partially addressed above—as already stated in the context of liberation, it means an opening has been created; an opening that advocates for questioning. This questioning arises from the black body, the racialised body. To reiterate, it is a racialised body because it suffers prejudice and subjugation because of blackness. But, a sullen thing occurs to the black bodies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela—they realise similarly as Fanon (2008[1967]) does that they have a desire to attain the world and find meaning in things. But, they are mere objects among other objects. Then there arises the predicament—how are they able to be self (write) when they exist as objects among other objects? It is in the moments of rebellion and defiance of oppressive state systems that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela write in their register. By this, it means in every moment which they encounter oppression and they defy that oppression that is how self-writing occurs. They assert themselves through resistance.

Essentially, both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur exemplify Fanon's (2008[1967]: 206) final prayer stating "O my body, always make me a man who questions!" Fanon's prayer is a selfless order to his body to always question and not be accepting of things that question his humanity. He asserts that at certain moments the black body is locked in itself, the black body only acknowledges itself only as flesh. But, when praying to the body and asking the body to always question—that act of praying only occurs when consciousness has been achieved. Thus, the act of praying is in itself a consciousness of the self and body, it is a moment when the self and body achieve dialectic of subject and object (Fanon 2008[1967]). This is a key transition as it aids Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur to do what Fanon proclaims. They question the oppressive political systems which they exist within on Fanon's basis of consciousness. They wanted a fundamental change of which they believed would have to emanate from the self. Thus, they had to ask and to pray to their bodies to initiate the change required. To pray to their bodies meant to undertake conscious, direct, and perverse decisions towards attaining freedom. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 125) notes, "We were determined to fight to the bitter end for the liberation of our people. I am afraid that the white regime will have to decide whether to give in when they realise they are fighting a futile battle". She was asserting the extent of her political will and determination toward freedom. Shakur noted (2014) the importance that fighting for freedom should come from the oppressed. The unity in the

fight against oppression had to be pivotal for black people themselves. Shakur (2014: 267) asserted that "The victory of oppressed people anywhere in the world is a victory for Black people". Her statement affirms that conscious awareness of oppression epitomises praying to the body it involves the awareness of other peoples' oppression—essentially it is a concern about the freedom of others'.

When self-writing occurs in the terms exemplified by Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela it interprets writing as a critical part of political engagement. Most importantly it is about writing that becomes a generative task in response to oppressive state systems. Meaning it is writing that involves continuous attainment of freedom. Freedom does not become an end goal rather, it is the beginning of shaping the self, according to lived experiences. It is a mode of writing that resembles what Sharpe (2016) refers to as living in the wake. Sharpe provides various definitions of the "the wake" but, there is a common element in these definitions—they all encompass a moment in which something terrible, horrific has occurred, a disturbance in the ocean that has made swimming waters have a strong current, a death possibly. But ultimately, all the definitions she refers to give the impression that a *wake* is the aftermath of a difficult or horrific time. Sharpe then draws from all the definitions she refers to an argument that posits the black being in the wake as—consciousness. To be in the wake is to be a black body, it is to occupy and to be occupied by the continuous and changing presents of slavery that are unresolved and unfolding—these presents can be explained as living within the apartheid regime and segregation government as a conscious being. To place the wake in the context of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela means they occupy a space of black consciousness because both women find themselves occupied in a space that oppresses them, it is not a self-chosen space it is unfolding with subjugation. Simultaneously, they occupy the space—this is when consciousness arises, they occupy the grammar of consciousness. They do what Wilderson (2010: 2) defines as "staying in the hold of the ship" meaning they do not seek a resolution to the mechanics of the anti-black world instead they adopt a form of consciousness. They become aware that the mere act of abolishing oppressive systems of rule such as apartheid and segregation will not simply place the political climate at ease. What their consciousness does—is to illustrate to them that these oppressive state systems continue to have an unfolding and unresolved nature, they have a racial logic that has shaped the political arithmetic for years before they were both incarcerated and at the time of their incarcerations. Hence, when they are living in the wake, they are living in the aftermath of slavery, colonialism, segregation,

and apartheid. Madikizela-Mandela is living "the afterlife of colonialism and apartheid" and Shakur is "living the afterlife of slavery and segregation." Sharpe (2016: 15) proclaims that living in the wake, is living the afterlife of *partus sequitur ventrem*—translated it is that which is brought forth follows the womb. Thus, the children of those who occupy and are occupied in wake will inherit "living the afterlife" this is something apparent both in the context of South Africa and the US because in both countries there is ongoing criminalisation of black bodies. The apparent nature of living the afterlife in the US means black people represent 60 percent of the imprisoned population (Sharpe 2016). Prisons house a majority of black bodies and it is one of the effects of the inheritance on non/status and being. For Shakur (2014: 65) she experienced this while in prison. Prisons were profitable businesses and were perpetuating slavery because it was legal in prisons.

In South Africa living the afterlife means living in poverty in the midst of white monopoly, the economy is centred and controlled by the white population who are the minority. Madikizela-Mandela (1985: 124) writes "we are the wealth of this country. We dig the wealth of this land… the worker is the man who leaves Soweto[4] at one in the morning to be at the white man's factory at five". Living in the aftermath is the result of oppression. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were highlighting the disparity created by oppression.

Spillers (2018), mentions that the behaviour associated with a plethora of black responses originates from the afterlife of slavery and by extension oppression in itself. Like Sharpe (2016), Spillers (2018) acknowledges that a negative association of the black body which originates from an embedded structural and racial prejudice such as apartheid and segregation. Sharpe (2016: 15) describes such prejudice as living in the wake which means "living the history and present of terror… it is dis/continuous but always present and endlessly reinvigorated brutality in, and on our bodies, while even as that terror is visited on our bodies while even as that terror is visited on our bodies the realities of that terror are erased".

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[4] "Soweto is an urban settlement or 'township' in South Africa, southwest of Johannesburg.
Soweto was created in the 1930s when the White government started separating Blacks from Whites. Blacks were moved away from Johannesburg, to an area separated from White suburbs by a so-called *cordon sanitaire* (or sanitary corridor) this was usually a river, a railway track, an industrial area or a highway etc., they did this by using the infamous 'Urban Areas Act' in 1923" (SA History, 20 November 2019).

Thus, living in the wake is living with terror, black bodies become the carriers of terror and this is evident in how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were able to live through torture, they become what Sharpe (2016) refers to as "terror's embodiment". The most important element resonating with Sharpe's conception of the wake, which is associated with Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, is that to be in the wake is to recognise the ongoing locations the black being finds itself. These locations are as such the hold (discussed earlier in chapter three), prison, unfreedom the constructs of the anti-black world and to understand that it is through these locations that constitute how black beings construct themselves. They construct themselves by acknowledging that by living in the wake they are insisting to break through the walls of oppression and write to affirm themselves. Shakur (2014) acknowledges that black bodies have accepted too much negative culture and they have to act consciously to get rid of this negative influence. Shakur insists on consciousness to reject oppressive influence and come back to self-defining the self away from the negative constructs. "I feel and still feel that we have got to constantly make positive statements about ourselves" (Shakur 2014: 249). This is how reclaiming begins, it is an ongoing process, that even Shakur recognised it does not end at the moment of writing or of uttering the words, but it requires constantly making of positive statements. To make positive statements is not enough, Shakur mentions, that the white oppressive systems had brainwashed black people. "We accepted white value systems and white standards of beauty and, at times we accepted the white man's view of ourselves" (Shakur 2018: 45). Shakur insisted, that the black people need to reject these negative statements that they were affirming among each other such as "Niggers ain't shit" "You know how lazy niggers are" (Shakur 2014: 45). Shakur proclaims that positive statements are necessary, an example of such is the public statement she made on 4 July 1973. In its essence, this statement was a representation of a positive assertion that black people had to make. This is what consciousness reflects, it is about knowing that the revolution is about to bring change, and for Shakur, the first place the change begins, is in yourself. Hence, she maintains her stance for black people coming together affirming their value systems.

Madikizela-Mandela (1985) too considered the necessity of consciousness among black people. Because, racial laws in apartheid South Africa advocated that politically races should operate separately, that naturally gave the impetus for Black consciousness. It thus, became a historical necessity to conscientise black people, because the white man was proclaiming that "we will go at it alone and the black man's reaction was, we want to prove that we also can go at it alone, we

don't need him. We are who we are; we are going to develop separately. And that's what happened" (Madikizela-Mandela 1985: 121). This was the epitome of consciousness for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela it meant defining themselves based on their terms because white supremacy had created the image of the black body in a negative construct. In order to achieve this consciousness, what had to emerge was Black Consciousness—the consciousness emerging had to come from the agency the black body reclaimed. Shakur and Madikiela-Mandela's conception of consciousness resembled Biko's (2004) definition of black consciousness, it was about the black proclaiming their abilities and reasoning as adequate without having to meet or qualify to a standard that was set by the white body. Biko (2004: 101) defined black consciousness as,

> An attitude of mind and a way of life and the most positive call to emanate from the black world for a long time. Its essence is the realisation by the black man of the need to rally together with his brothers around the cause of their oppression.

Biko was advocating that black people had to define themselves in their register. They had to express themselves and be determined to rise and attain the envisaged self. Biko noted that the only way black consciousness could be achieved was through freedom because freedom is the ability to define oneself with one's possibilities not being held back by the power of other people. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reasoning for consciousness revealed a high resemblance to the work of Biko. The significance that arises is how both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela understood that the black body had to see itself as a complete being and should not tolerate any attempts to prohibit this completeness. It is exactly what Biko (2004: 102) was advocating for through black consciousness, he wanted the black man to begin to know that "you are okay as you are, begin to look upon yourself as a human being". This is what Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur were aiming for and with their self-writing—to reclaim humanity. They were echoing Fanon's (2008[1967]) work, they were calling for the end to subjugation and for man to never be instrumentalised. It is through (self) consciousness that ideal conditions of existence are achieved.

Self-writing thus, assumes the function of writing that happens in a moment, which does not permit one to write, such moments are those of bad faith, where there is a lack of consciousness and ontological value. Self-writing in the context of liberation functions as attaining consciousness when one is not expected to and is barred outside of the parameters of consciousness. The aim thus becomes political in the sense the very act of these moments of fighting for liberation and freedom

become everyday acts that are illuminated as political acts. Hence, there is living politics in self-writing. This means there is a generative force that self-writing creates. It further means, self-writing occurs in the moment(s) of existential struggle. Nonetheless, it is worth emphasising that these moments of self-writing do not end in the parameters of liberation. It is for that reason, that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela support an ongoing dialogue of attaining consciousness as an opening that facilitates and continues questioning of and to the self.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to illustrate how liberation is embodied in the mechanics of the self-writing which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela engage in. Liberation and freedom were used synonymously because the key scholarly works that focus on both freedom and liberation are highly associated and overlap in fundamental interpretations of both concepts. Moreover, the significance of how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experience liberation and rebellion explains the literal and figurative nature of both concepts. Additionally, this chapter positioned resistance in different forms, some overt, and others covert. Thus, the synonymous use of both concepts ensured that the arguments presented throughout the chapter cover the fundamental conceptual underpinning of freedom and liberation. In this chapter freedom and liberation infers black bodies attaining self. The purpose of this chapter was to interpret the conditions which facilitate liberation to occur in a context that has significantly disabled black bodies and has made them exist within insecurity, unfreedom, and overall created the anti-black world. The significant moments outlined in this chapter illustrated the link between liberation and rebellion in that for liberation to occur it can incite rebellion against oppression.

The key finding of this chapter illustrates on how Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur embodied different ways of pursuing liberation. They immersed themselves in methods that aimed at (un)making the anti-black world. This chapter indicated how various means of striving for liberation demonstrate ways of self-writing that is generative. Meaning the manner in which Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur pursue actions of resistance and defiance that are aimed at achieving liberation extend the quest of liberation to be about constantly questioning anything that threatens humanity. This chapter contextualised the subtle as well as the compelling nature of how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embodied forms of resistance. They used both physical and

figurative forms achieving certain freedoms. This chapter also illustrated the conscious declarations towards the political will that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embodied.

This chapter began by explaining who the rebel is by using the work of Camus (1956), to contextualise how and why Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are rebels. Because, the significance of knowing who the rebel is—informs knowing who incites a revolution for liberation. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela rebel because, there is nothing left to do, they have exhausted all their options of attaining liberation. The chapter outlined the basis of how rebellion for both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela evolved into a combative approach to the political struggle. The chapter provided accounts of the critical moments that marked the beginning and reasoning of why combat was used as a strategy of resistance. The combination of a military and political agenda was supported by the political movements that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are were affiliated to. Most significantly, the combination of a military and political agenda was to confront the strategy which the oppressive state systems were using against black communities. The military agenda was a stance to meet racist white oppression with the same intensity it was exerting on black bodies. On the other hand, they also understood how violence can create a double destiny—it can either restore or destruct. Thus, it is evident that the resistance and defiance Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were provoking is highly guided by achieving freedom—a freedom that is based on unmaking the anti-black world and all its structures and systems. In so doing by achieving this freedom they begin to embody a sense of self. To be precise, they attain self-consciousness of which they both attest that it is the beginning of freedom. Meaning, that freedom begins with self-consciousness, and once that has been attained black bodies can begin to know themselves. For Shakur, Madikizela-Mandela, and by extension black bodies it is the beginning of reclaiming their humanity and initiating the ongoing process of self-writing—which a continuous engagement of knowing the self through lived experiences.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

In this thesis the concept of self-writing was explored concerning how it is embodied as a process of defining the self, using the experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela to illustrate the argument. Self-writing in this thesis is captured as a mode of writing that is expressed as a mode of living. Foucault (1997) emphasises that self-writing as concerned with writing the self to freedom and he expresses that it is an act of being self-intimate. Foucault's conceptual grounding of the concept is highly centred on how the subject authorises itself. Mbembe's (2001) conception is built on Foucault's (1997), but he provides a different interpretation. Mbembe (2001) interprets self-writing as centred on the African subject and through that he explains African modes of self-writing. Mbembe then notes that African subjectivity is a mode of writing from the perspective of the African subject. Both conceptions are highly significant in how self-writing is used a conceptual tool in this thesis because their interpretations of self-writing are related, although they do not serve the same conceptual function. The kind of writing that occurs in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela unfolds on various levels, but in this thesis, the focus is on three particular themes namely; torture, authorisation, and liberation. These are the three themes that are used as the focal points to illustrate how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela self-write as a way of existing. The study examined the nature of torture, authorisation, and liberation in the context of self-writing through the political experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. It is through the thematically applicable moments in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela that examples of how self-writing is embodied as well as how it becomes more than just self-definition but it encompasses a communal definition of self.

This study examined the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur through answering the following research questions: how did the lived experiences of torture, authorisation, and liberation shape the discourse of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's self-writing? The secondary research questions are as follows: How does the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur critique the intersectional structures of the political, societal, economic, and racial oppression they both existed within? How does self-writing become a form of political protest through a narrative?

The lived experiences of torture, authorisation, and liberation interpreted how self-writing can shape the self of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur in the context they existed in. Both women demonstrated the importance of collective action against oppression. They personified the importance of striving for freedom regardless of the hardships imposed by oppressive state systems. This was illustrated in their actions of resistance. Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur questioned the oppressive state systems that oppressed black bodies through political, societal, and economic laws. The manner in which their narratives are interpreted is focused on conceptual understandings that explain the significance of decolonisation as a political intervention against conventional perspectives of political protest. They engage in political protest through actions that depict self-writing.

The underpinning interpretation that emerges in self-writing, is that it is not an end goal, it is a continuous process. It is a way of life. It is critical to note that the preceding chapters were organised to illustrate chronological themes in the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur. Additionally, this thesis provided a conversation between Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela in a present-continuous sense. By that, it means self-writing occurs simultaneously as Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur self-write through their experiences, as well as through a continuous sense in that the quest for attaining a true sense of self is one that never ends therefore self-writing never has any ultimate end. Furthermore, the self-writing of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur is not something to aspire to in the future but rather, they are responding to the oppression they encounter. It is in the hold that they experience the context of where their self-writing occurs. Torture served as the beginning of what happens in the political struggle, authorisation is the interlude, it is the calm in the storm. Finally, liberation explains the re-imagining of the world come, however it is not a conclusion but rather, the beginning of redefining, recreating. Thus, self-writing in this thesis is explored through its profound political, ideological, and intellectual implications.

7.2 Contributions

Chapters four to six provided the significant interpretations embodied and embedded in the narratives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. It is through these three chapters that self-writing is extracted as a philosophical phenomenon that interprets the self and consciousness. The three seminal chapters provide an analysis in both speech and thought that is in combat with oppressive

colonial systems of power, particularly regarding what this means to struggle against intersectional structures of domination. The self and consciousness unfold in this thesis through modes of writing that transcend beyond a textual analysis. As a point of figurative and literal conceptualising, "the hold" is interpreted in the context and content in which self-writing occurs. In this thesis, writing represents more than just a medium of human communication that is interpreted through language, emotions, signs, and symbols. Writing is understood in its textual capacity and as a figurative tool that aids self-writing.

7.2.1 Modes of Writing in Torture, Authorisation, and Liberation

In chapter four, torture was discussed concerning self-writing. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experienced torture as a tool used by oppressive state security structures to achieve coercive behaviour. Both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experienced torture at different levels of intensity, the primary motive of using torture was because they were both identified as resistant forces against the oppressive state systems. The harsh conditions, which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela had to be subjected to, demonstrate the abilities they possess in reaffirming themselves beyond the experiences of torture. One of the tools of torture used by both the apartheid regime of South Africa and by the US government's racial segregation laws was solitary confinement. Shakur was placed in what the segregation US government termed as punitive solitary confinement (PSA) for over twenty months in two separate men's prisons and subjected to unbefitting conditions of any prisoner. Madikizela-Mandela spent 200 days in solitary confinement. When in solitary confinement prisoners are forced to have nothing but themselves, they have no contact with anybody outside of their prison cell. Different reasons transpire as to why Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were placed in solitary confinement. But, what appears central to both their experiences of solitary confinement is the detrimental effect it had on both them, psychologically and emotionally they were broken down in prison. The purpose of solitary confinement was to break their souls and any inhibitions to pursue the political struggle against oppression. Essentially, South Africa's apartheid security forces as well as the US segregation security forces aimed at destabilising Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur's political convictions respectively. Through torture both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela modify and recreate modes of writing, they use writing as a figurative tool in dealing with their incarceration. Writing is figurative in the sense that it embodies asserting one's existence thus, the notion of writing in this thesis refers to an affirmation of living,

that both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela make. Torture functions as a mode of writing for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela because, they take their experiences as ways in which the oppressive state structures attempted to break them but, they reject torture in its true destructive form and gain self.

The use of power dynamics by the oppressive state systems was critical, the apartheid regime of South Africa and the segregation government of the US, had security forces, personnel, and apparatus that operated based on racist and sexist logic. Such reasoning was influenced by the idea that black bodies are inferior and should be dominated. The chapter (four) on torture revealed how the oppressive states actively pursued methods both in and out of prison in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela purely to control and suppress any sense of agency. But, self-writing emerges through the tortured experience, this experience begins the persistent nature of resistance and defiance which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela adopt and maintain throughout their lives. It further marks the realisation that their political convictions are highly tied to the larger political agenda that affects black bodies as a community. Hence, the self they assert is a communal self. This is evident in how both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela continuously refer to the political struggle as a struggle that is not just about them as individuals but, a struggle encompassing a community of others. It is through their experiences they acknowledge that they are writing and existing against a racially guiding principle in which their sense of self is threatened moreover, it transpires to the community of black bodies that are threatened. By this logic, their torture represents the torture of the black body and their self-writing—hence, it signifies affirming the existence of black bodies. Ultimately, writing becomes a way of proving existence through the torture which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela experience.

Another mode of writing revealed is through authorisation, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela use their experiences of torture and the conditions of inferiority and their sub-humanness that is created by the anti-black world to authorise themselves. The tools and methods of their oppression are significantly outlined in chapter four of this thesis, although other chapters do account for other moments of oppression and their significance. As discussed in chapter five through authorisation the political experiences of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela become an interruption and irruption. This means that the authorisation of self-writing by Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur occurs through political experiences. It becomes an interruption because their experiences suggest a

disturbance or a break within authority—particularly, the authority held by oppressive state institutions. It can also be an irruption of self-authorisation through their lived experiences. It is important to note what emerged as political experiences for the purpose of understating how both these women authorised themselves because Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela illustrated that their political agenda had become the centre of their lives. This is because the oppressive state systems they existed within shaped every aspect of their lives based on a power matrix that operated on whiteness as dominating and superior and blackness as dominated and inferior. It is through this power matrix that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela insisted on the notion that politics is their life, their souls, and the core of their being and it is bought to existence over the body. Since their bodies were subjugated to inferiority, they were imprisoned and violated in the bodily sense— their bodies were tools and equated to flesh that can be used and disposed of. Both Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur had to claim political autonomy through their souls because their souls functioned as the nexus of the body. Their bodies may have been physically confined but, their souls—their spirits were driving their political commitments. Their political commitments emanated from the ethical and moral determination they had for the struggle against oppression. Hence, their political agenda was evident in every aspect of their lives. Their political experiences thus, determined how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela authorised themselves through self-writing.

Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela locate their authority when they recognise the power of the oppressive state(s) and its institutions. But, their recognition is represented in the form of an interruption, they do not simply agree with the suppression that is exerted upon them. They break and disturb what the oppressive state(s) are enforcing upon them. By rejecting the oppressive state(s) and its institutions a self-authorisation arises. This self-authorisation is projected as self-writing in that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela accept the conditions of punishment, the anti-black world, and its mechanics as an opening to authorise their position of defiance. It is evident in how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela immerse themselves in modes of writing that are not textual but, are embodied because violence occurs on the site of their bodies. These non-textual modes of writing are expressed by devising mute narratives, moments of stealing away with the aim of self-determination. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela transcend to the non-textual modes of writing, it is yet again apparent in how they embody self-writing based on a communal consequence. It is not an act that involves the self alone but, propels a self that is inclusive of others. Shakur and

Madikizela-Mandela emphasise the modes of escapism through reconstituting the self, which requires an insurgent critique. It is from this critique they find solace in understanding that defining and inventing the self is necessary as a mode of affirming one's self. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela indicated that by confronting oppression with formidable resistance it can result in a reconfiguration of the purpose of oppression. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela reshaped the forms of resistance and pursed their (self) authority. It is through this (self) authority, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela become sensitised to the other—and begin to conceive a political ideal that is central to humanity.

The final mode of writing that also emerges is the ongoing production and reproduction of liberation. This is prevalent in how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela interpret liberation as a continuous process of questioning. Their questioning is probed by appealing through rebellion as an only option to attain freedom. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela re-appropriate and self-entitled themselves as rebels. They incite a rebellious spirit for self-authorisation and to exist on a consciousness level. A combative approach is adopted by both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela as a strategy of resistance, a combination of a military and political agenda is justified by both women because the oppressive state systems were exerting the same intensity towards black bodies. At the core of this combination was to unmake the anti-black world and its structures and systems. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela illustrate how liberation achieves consciousness, they move beyond self-determination and are inclined to a movement that is beyond their oppression and conquest. Liberation does not become about mere emancipation, instead, it is a gift of the self—it is about reclaiming the self, returning the subject to the self. By that, they advance to a distinct knowing of the very meaning of the human. This is what they both describe as the ultimate stage of an ethical orientation that will stimulate consciousness. They both attest that freedom begins with self-consciousness. But that does not mean it is the ultimate goal of being, Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur prove in their experiences of rebellion that it is reclaiming humanity and initiating the ongoing process that begins self-writing as knowing thy self—through the conscious awareness of experiences which shape the self. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela manage to bring together the practical and theoretical ontology of self-writing, by mapping the parallel and complementary notion of defining one's self through writing as a lived experience.

Above all, the three themes in the thesis displayed how self-writing as a form of self-definition as articulated by Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela provokes a political philosophy. It is for this reason, that self-writing cannot only be reduced to a moment shaping the self. Rather, it is a juncture that reconciles writing and humanity in an open progression. In these three themes, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela depicted that political protest does not have to be confined to simplistic ways of resistance and defiance. Instead, political protest can unfold in unconventional modes, this study utilised these three themes that shape the discourse of how self-writing can be interpreted in the lived experiences of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur.

7.2.2 Towards the Political as Self-writing

The self-writing that occurs in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela is highly linked to the notion of risk. This is because life and consciousness are at stake—consciousness and life are at risk because Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are participating in a self-writing that exceeds the expectation of the black body. Hence, they inform a self-writing that is radical and is not for the inferior. They engage in self-writing that pushes the boundaries of the anti-black world. Through the thematic and narrative analysis as well as the discussions of chapters three and four both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela (re)presented themselves in a less confrontational and rebellious manner. But, as their experiences unfold it becomes more apparent, why and how political revolution is necessary. They engage in freedom practices that are in confrontation with death, they portray a willingness to die for their political struggle. Consequently, for both women death became a synonym that symbolised the preservation of their political convictions. Their willingness to die for their political convictions demonstrated the importance of the political commitment to overcoming oppression. They were at the risk of death both in the literal and figurative sense. In the literal sense, they were both willing to be in the front lines and be in combat against oppressive security forces. In the figurative sense, they both survived mental torture in solitary confinement. Since their lives are at stake, self-writing becomes fundamental. For the reason that, both Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are political figures who are in the carceral structures but, they not only function as prisoners within the confinements of a cell, they are prisoners even outside of the cell. They engage in the politics of liberation which concerns those who are both in and out of prison, hence the conditions of writing are more than just apparent within incarceration only. The conditions of writing are more than those of prison writing—prison writing captures the experience

of incarceration, it is writing that occurs within the prison and interprets the effects of prison. Therefore, it is for this reason that self-writing cannot be equated to prison writing because the kind of writing that ensues in self-writing transcends beyond the prison. It transpires as writing that is for black bodies that do not have the ontological capacity. Firstly, for Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela it resembles writing that interprets the possibility of self-writing as political, because of how the acts of defiance support authorisation. Secondly, they take part in a declarative act of self-authorisation and finally they incite liberation as a call for political consciousness and possibly political imagination.

The capacity of being for the black body occurs through the inscriptions of self-writing. The self-writing that manifests in Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela is both figurative and literal. They are figurative in that they cannot be seen with the eye but, they are recorded and accounted for by Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela through the moments of erasure, solitary confinement, torture, stealing away, mute narratives and psyche breakdown. These aforementioned moments create inscriptions in the most inner parts of their lives, their souls. These inscriptions manifest in ethical and moral ideals. Such ideals shape the moral campus of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela which then guides the literal inscriptions of how self-writing persists in their lives. The figurative informs the literal inscriptions of the self-writing which Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela embody. Through the figuratively internalised inscriptions, literal action occurs—Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela prompt real political action. By rebelling and refusing to accept oppression, they initiate combative ontology, they insist on unmaking the anti-black world. Informal ways of writing generate in such a space, both women create a grammar that expresses their resistance and defiance. Both women express writing that is beyond the limit of words. They create something out of nothing because as black bodies they have been denied everything. But, it's important to note that their creation and the imagining of a political ideal was not concerned with replacing, but, was rather interested in eradicating the fundamentals that guided the oppressive state systems. Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela state and affirm in their writings that they were not calling for mere prison reform or a transformation in the governing systems and structures. They were calling for black people to be conscious, to be aware of the power matrix that is created by a racist logic, and most importantly, to be able to surface within this matrix as knowing that they are okay as they are, they need to acknowledge themselves as human. Black bodies have to find ontological value within themselves. These are acts that transcend writing as a political philosophy because as a black body to establish

ontological value one has to fight against structures that have imposed racially administrative laws that withhold political action. Hence, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were in engaging in political philosophy.

In essence, their retaliation of realising and affirming their consciousness becomes a normalised action that is illuminated as a political action. This captures the living politics in self-writing. It asserts exactly what Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do, which is that black bodies must come to know themselves, they should be aware of their existential conditions but, should infuse these conditions with life to make the world to come. Although, not forgetting that the world to come does not precisely mean a utopia where all is well and liberation is the ultimate response. Instead, it enters into a politics of being whereby, being is crafted through an attitude of mind and a way of life. Thus, that how Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are interpreted into entering self-writing as political action.

It is worth noting that the most significant contribution of this study is how the autobiographies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela are re-examined and re-interpreted as more than just personal (individual) life narratives. These narratives unfold in such a manner that interprets the role of writing in philosophical terms of cultivating the self. The role of writing in this study is symbolised by its significant ability in shaping the individual through a process of self-writing. Therefore, this study was concerned with revealing how self-writing is critical in shaping individual identity, as well as collective identity. The study explored how various modes of writing can develop and be expressed as way(s) of shaping of the self and consequently a self of others.

7.3 Lasting Thoughts

How self-writing has been interpreted in this thesis and how it is embodied by Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela encourages a necessary and on-going debate of the concept. In this thesis self-writing has emerged as a tool for political philosophy, it provokes political imagination. It is for this reason, that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do not uphold a definite understanding of how liberation should be conveyed but, they insist on a conscientised humanity. They are in support of humanity that recognises everybody as human. They are motivated by their experience of oppression, their fight was instigated by moments that threatened and suppressed their humanity. They had to learn how to affirm themselves beyond their oppression—to go beyond what they were imposed with. An analogy that best describes how they craft a way of interpreting

and concluding their struggle, although they do not conclude in a manner of finality and a complete end, but rather a conclusion that finds further inroads. It is the analogy of nightmares and daydreaming, the nightmares are the experiences that withheld agency from Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela. The nightmares constitute everything that denied them humanity and consciousness. Through daydreaming, a political imagination arises. By daydreaming they intentionally aim to rethink, re-appropriate meanings, reconfigure and expose properties and habits of oppression. Returning to the notion of stealing away discussed in chapter five, they in fact evoke the idea of stealing away—reconfiguring their reality of oppression. By refusing to accept the status quo of oppression they embody a rejection towards oppression. In this rejection, an interchange and transition between nightmares and daydreams occur, it marks self-writing as an ongoing process—because it happens both at a conscious and unconscious level. The conscious individual is not complete, it is an individual that is aware of themselves and those around. The idea of completeness is something that Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela do not explicitly support, perhaps because is asserts the rationale that they are complete and in a way insinuating that others may be incomplete. They do not strive for completeness, because that would contradict the notion of how they interpret consciousness. Instead, to be complete is to be conscious of which they consider as a beginning, not an end. Nonetheless, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela illustrated how self-writing occurs both consciously and subconsciously. Self-writing occurred consciously when they were resisting and defying directly and actively and it was subconscious in moments that were indirect resistance and defiance. Self-writing persisted even when Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were imprisoned, its vibrant nature continues despite the effort of the oppressive states to crush it, alienate, confine and discipline.

Lastly, the autobiographies of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela were used as the seminal texts of the thesis. But yet again, their autobiographies do not portray selfhood as the centre of their writings. Rather, through close reading and re-reading of their autobiographies, it reveals that they were more than just accounts of their lives. Instead, they were textual accounts of what could be described as self-writing with deeply embedded symbolic moments. The narratives of Madikizela-Mandela and Shakur are worthy of being noted as imaginations of social narratives that can be configured as new endings and responses. Their narratives can also be regarded as reconfigurations and moments of historical upheaval that can influence political and social repercussions and possibly resulting in reformulation(s) of political narratives. The analysis in this thesis projects a

renewed faith in the vocation of autobiographical writing and its possibilities. These possibilities in the emergence of new social normative ideals, re-reading of history, and autobiographies to aid alternatives of organising social relations. Fundamentally, this study has attempted to provide nuance understandings through modes of self-writing.

7.4 Areas for Further Research

This study focused on two political figures namely, Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela, regarding three themes namely; torture, authorisation, and liberation. With that said it means other areas can be explored in the lives of Shakur and Madikizela-Mandela such as the letters that Madikizela-Mandela wrote as well as the poetry written by Shakur. These texts have the potential to reveal other significant details of self-writing. Other political figures and their narratives should also be considered as the centre of more research to be done on interpreting self-writing. Precisely because various narratives can reveal other modes of writing, as well as other significant themes aside from those covered in this study. It is also critical to be mindful that in future research to be done to consider what is unsaid in textual accounts, deliberate on the moments and feelings that lack the grammar of expression hence, it is important to note how other modes of writing can emerge. Finally, autobiographies must be re-read to explore different modes of writing that are unconventional from textual forms of writing and consider how lived experiences have philosophical implications in shaping the self and particularly the self of others.

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