

Religious Diversity in Post-Colonial Multicultural Nigerian Society

by

Ganyi, Pamela Ayum

**A mini-dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree**

Masters in African European Cultural Relations

In the Department of Modern European Languages at the

UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES

Supervisor: Professor Alois S. Mlambo

August 2015.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY.....	5
1.2. SCOPE OF STUDY.....	7
1.3. RESEARCH PROBLEM	8
1.4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	10
1.5. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS	12

CHAPTER TWO

2. TERMINOLOGIES AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA.....	15
2.1. MULTICULTURALISM.....	15
2.2. NATIONALISM.....	17
2.2.1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM.....	20
2.2.2. NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA.....	26
2.3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA.....	27
2.4. COLONIALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA.....	36
2.5. NATIONALISM AND THE MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA.....	39
2.6. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA.....	44
2.7. THE RISE OF CULTURAL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA.....	48
2.8. MILITARY COUPS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE BIAFRAN WAR.....	49

CHAPTER THREE

3. IDENTITY POLITICS AND CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND OTHER.....	53
3.1. IDENTITY POLITICS.....	53
3.2. CULTURAL IDENTITY.....	61
3.3. CULTURALLY BASED CONFLICTS.....	63
3.3.1. RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE.....	65

3.3.2.	ORIGIN OF GLOBAL RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS.....	69
3.4.	A CLASH OF RELIGIONS – ISLAM VS CHRISTIANITY AND THE WEST.....	71
3.5.	THEORIES ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT.....	73

CHAPTER FOUR

4.	CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA.....	85
4.1.	MULTICULTURALISM AND THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY.....	85
4.2.	RELIGION AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN NIGERIA.....	88
4.3.	BACKGROUND TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NIGERIA.....	89
4.4.	RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA.....	96
4.4.1.	CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA.....	97
4.4.2.	BOKO HARAM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA.....	104
4.5.	EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN NIGERIA.....	110
4.6.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	112

CHAPTER FIVE

5.	CONCLUSION.....	118
5.1.	SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS.....	118
5.2.	CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY.....	124

SOURCES CONSULTED.....	126
------------------------	-----

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My profound gratitude goes to my supervisor and mentor, Professor Alois S. Mlambo for his guidance throughout this study. The many corrections after the first draft of my research proposal gave me a wakeup call to the extensive work I had ahead of me, working with a meticulous supervisor. Looking at what we achieved with the final work, I can say that this has been a successful project. I especially appreciate your patience and careful attention to the smallest details. Your knowledge of Nigerian politics and actualities made for interesting discussions and additions to the study.

To my family, I say thank you for your incredible support despite the many miles between us. Our frequent phone calls have been a source of tremendous strength. Thank you for your love and your unwavering commitment to my success.

I would also like to thank my fantastic duo, Itang Amissine and Uduak Ekpenyong whose continuous support have been a source of strength and drive. Your friendship has provided me with an unfailing support that I can always count on.

I say thank you to the program coordinators, Professors Stephan Muehr, Benda Hofmeyr and Lize Kriel. Our formative class discussions made for a very interesting first two years of study. Thank you for your guidance over the past years.

Finally, to my friends and classmates, never have I studied with a more remarkable group. Despite our many readings and our oftentimes depressing discussions on Africa's post-colonial "predicament", we always found the time to have some fun. I miss our many outings and our discussions (and sometimes arguments) on the cultural similarities and differences between our different countries.

This study was inspired by the conflicts which plague several countries and especially Nigeria, most frequently in recent times. I expect to have lent my voice to the discourse on religious conflicts and made a positive contribution to the dialogue on possible recommendations for managing these conflicts.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Culture is the whole way of life of a people, from birth to the grave, from morning to night and even in sleep (Eliot 1948: 31). As a normative term, culture refers to the general way of life of a people, and it embraces all aspects of the lives of different groups living in a society. This comprises, inter alia, the language, physical appearance, norms, beliefs, political and social ideologies, principles, behaviours, and cuisine of a people. As such, the peculiarities in the way a people behave are considered to be the culture of that group.

The importance of culture to human beings cannot be overemphasised. It is an intrinsic part of our existence, an aspect of our lives which we do not consciously or deliberately ascribe to ourselves. According to Eliot (1948: 27), culture may even be described simply as that which makes life worth living. Eliot suggests that culture is versatile. He refutes the idea of culture as delimiting, and argues that although cultures may sometimes have a common core, they must be diverse enough to attract attention and command admiration. Men require of their neighbours, something sufficiently akin to be understood, something sufficiently different to provoke attention, and something great enough to command admiration (Eliot 1948: 50). In other words, for Eliot, culture cannot be homogenous.

A multicultural society, as the term suggests, is one comprising of multi ethnic or cultural groups. It is a society where cultural diversity is inherent. Multi-ethnicity has been the mark of civilised states throughout history (Hopkins 2002: 197) and most of the independent nations of the world consist of multicultural societies. According to Kymlicka (1995: 1), in very few countries can the citizens be said to share the same language, or belong to the same ethno-national group. Kymlicka maintains that there are over 600 living language groups, and 5000 ethnic groups in the world's independent states.

From the definitions above, we can see that multicultural societies are not alien conceptions. Indeed there are some benefits of belonging to a multicultural society. When cultures exist alongside each other in a society, this sometimes allows for intermingling and the incorporation of aspects that differentiate one culture from the other. In this case, diversity gives rise to a cultural-blending which promotes respect and appreciation of different cultures, tolerance of diversity, and richness of cultural representation. In societies where

multiculturalism is embraced, diversity manifests itself in the freedom of people to practice whichever religion they choose to and to engage in cultural practices that define the groups with which they identify whether or not it is the culture of the dominant group in that society. However, most multicultural societies have not been able to embrace and tolerate difference. Most countries today are culturally diverse and this diversity gives rise to a series of important and potentially divisive questions. Minorities and majorities increasingly clash over such issues as language rights, regional autonomy, political representation, education curriculum, land claims, immigration and naturalisation policy, and national symbols (Kymlicka 1995: 1).

Nigeria is a nation consisting of several cultural groups. It is home to a diverse range of ethnic and religious groups. Amongst the several ethnic groups that exist in the country, the Igbo, the Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba are predominant, and these groups are found in the eastern, the northern and the western regions of the country, respectively. Each ethnic group in Nigeria has a religion which is common to its people. The Hausa Fulani, for example, are mostly Muslims, while the majority of the Igbos are Christian. This division has increasingly given rise to conflict and the nation has constantly been plagued by clashes between the different ethnic and religious groups. The religious tensions in the country have led to the emergence of several religious extremist groups advocating for the creation of a homogenous state where one religion, instead of several, is practiced. Conflicts have turned violent, leading to the death of several people mostly in the north eastern region of the country. According to Amnesty International, at least 17,000 people have been killed since Boko Haram¹, a religious extremist group launched its insurgency in Northern Nigeria in 2009 (Boko Haram Crisis... 2015: [sp]).

Religious extremism in Nigeria has, therefore, become a major deterrent to the advancement of national interest. In recent years, it is increasingly difficult for Nigerians to acknowledge themselves first of all as Nigerians before considering their different ethnicities. Long before Nigeria's independence, disunity had given rise to arguments on the authenticity of Nigeria as a nation. Awolowo (1947: 47-48) declared that Nigeria is not a

¹ The Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad. In Hausa, Boko Haram loosely translates as "western education is sinful". The group Boko Haram operates mainly in north eastern Nigeria, and its objective is to establish the country as an Islamic state ruled by Sharia law.

nation. According to him, it is a mere geographical expression, and the word Nigeria is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not.

After Nigeria's independence from Britain in 1960, a regional power struggle ensued. This led to persistent arguments on Nigeria's authenticity as a nation. Adichie (2012: [sp]) accentuates this with her statement that it is debatable whether, at independence, Nigeria was a nation at all. She argues that the amalgamation of Nigeria was an economic policy, as the British colonial government needed to subsidise the poorer North with income from the resource-rich South.

In order to develop this argument more, we consider several definitions of the nation and try to establish if Nigeria fits the description as posited by scholars of nationalism. For example, Smith (1991: 11) argues that in the Western model of national identity, nations were seen as cultural communities, whose members were united, if not homogenous, by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. We also examine in this study, if the several communities that make up present day Nigeria are, like Smith suggests, bound by a common history and by a collective sense of experience.

The amalgamation of Nigeria by Lord Lugard on behalf of the British Government in 1914 is believed to have played a major role in abetting conflict, by unifying societies which were undeniably culturally diverse, to create one nation. This is a position that many Nigerians agree with. When the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were unified, it was as if two different countries were created. Akinjide (2000: [sp]) describes the amalgamation of Nigeria as a "fraud". Like Adichie, he argues that the interest of the Europeans in Africa and, indeed, Nigeria was economic and is still economic and that Nigeria was created to aid the British sphere of interests for business.

The amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of what is today Nigeria resulted in a constant struggle for dominance. Prior to independence, both regions were administered separately under two different lieutenant governors. However, after independence and the creation of a unitary government, a vicious regional power struggle ensued. The 'fear of domination' of one region by another was everywhere. Elections were rigged. The government was unpopular (Adichie 2012: [sp]). As a result of this struggle,

there have been continuous regional conflicts in the country. Since the religious and ethnic groups in Nigeria vary regionally, intermingled in political conflict, is an underlying religious and ethnic struggle, with each region vying for superiority over the others.

As Nigeria marked the 100th anniversary of the amalgamation of the North and South in 2014, there continue to be arguments as to the practicability of remaining unified amidst the continuous strife in the country. This dissertation is, therefore, aimed at tracing the history and development of conflicts, with a major focus on religious crises as it deters the advancement of the national interest in Nigeria. Popular discussions on religious dissents in Nigeria focus mainly on apportioning blame. Muslims blame Christians and vice versa, and media reports fuel the divisions by sometimes providing conflicting reports on the number of victims involved in the frequent clashes. The root causes of the conflicts in Nigeria have not been fully explored, and although, indisputably, colonialism has been blamed for the divisions in Nigeria, what this dissertation seeks to do is to understand the basis of religious conflicts by establishing how boundaries are created, how identity is understood, and how difference is dealt with.

According to Sen (2007: 1-2), “a sense of identity can be a source not merely of pride and joy, but also of strength and confidence, and yet identity can also kill and kill with abandon”. A strong and exclusive sense of belonging to one group can, in many cases, carry with it the perception of distance and divergence from other groups. In his 2007 book, *Identity and Violence, the Illusion of Destiny*, Amartya Sen argues that societies consist of people with multiple identities. He defines multiple identities in the context of a person’s place of residence, ethnicity and country of origin, race and profession. So, for example, a Hutu labourer from Kigali is not only a Hutu, but also a Kigalian, a Rwandan, an African, a labourer and a human being. For Sen, it is only when these different identities are forced into contrary or conflicting identities that problems arise. He argues that difference is natural and that violent conflicts only arise when singular and belligerent identities are imposed on gullible people.

This five chapter dissertation will highlight the fact that underneath the basic visible differences amongst the various religious denominations in Nigeria, there are underlying factors that contribute to discrimination between them, and the reasons why Nigerians find

it increasingly difficult to espouse national, as opposed to ethnic interests. However, the conflicts in Nigeria span several aspects of the social lives of its people. There are today, communal, political, industrial, ethnic and religious conflicts in the country. Intermingled in one form of conflict, are usually elements of another form. For example, whilst a conflict may start as a result of ethnic differences, it almost always escalates into a religious, communal or political conflict. This is because of the regional organisation of the Nigerian society which classifies the north, where the Hausa/Fulani are predominant, as being primarily Muslim, and the east where the Igbo are predominant, as being mainly Christian. As such, any political or ethnic conflict is likely also to turn into a religious conflict. This phenomenon can be seen in how the Nigerian civil war of 1967 quickly escalated from a military coup to a religious and ethnic war between the Muslim north and the largely Christian east and, therefore, between the Hausa and the Igbo. This is a situation that has heightened regional and ethnic differences, and has often been the cause of clashes amongst Nigerians.

To limit the scope of this study, the major focus will be on religious conflicts as these have been the major causes of violent attacks in recent years and have been responsible for several deaths. Violence linked to Boko Haram insurgency has resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths between 2001 and 2013 (Allen Jr. 2013: 166–167).

To understand the reasons behind the persistent conflicts in Nigeria, it is necessary to have a preliminary knowledge of how Nigeria came to be and how present-day Nigeria is structured. This will be discussed in the second chapter of this study. In the layout below, the focus of each chapter and how each one will be developed in the course of this research will be outlined.

BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

In recent years, conflicts caused by differences in multicultural societies have plagued most of the countries of the world. In 2011, South Sudan seceded from Sudan due to political and cultural differences, mainly religious dissent caused by the introduction of Sharia law² by

² The moral code and religious law of a prophetic religion. In general, Sharia is understood to be an ensemble of the divine and infallible laws of God. It is often associated with Islam, and it addresses several topics in secular, religious as well as personal matters of those who adhere to it.

former President Jaafar Nimeiri's government. In Nigeria, the introduction of Sharia law in January 2000 also led to numerous riots in the northern region of the country, and executions under Sharia law have led to outrage in the rest of the country and even amongst the international community. In October 2001, over 100 people died in riots in Kano State over the implementation of Sharia Law. Boko Haram, in fact, advocates for the implementation of Sharia Law in Nigeria, seeking to establish a "pure" Islamic state where Sharia Law will be supreme. Liberal Muslims have therefore fallen victim to their attacks.

Ethnocultural conflicts have become inherently linked to political violence and, indeed, have been the major causes of political dissent in most countries today. Kymlicka (1995: 1) states that since the end of the cold war, ethno cultural conflicts have become the most common source of political violence in the world, and they show no sign of abating.

Nigeria is a multicultural society and is home to diverse ethnic and religious groups. Evidence of its ethnic diversity is the 250 different languages and dialects spoken within its boundaries, as well as the myriad religious practices, ranging from Islam to Christianity, to the traditional religions, which are commonly professed within its borders (Morris-Hale 1997: 191). Nevertheless, the exact number of ethnic groups in Nigeria is difficult to establish. There are varying statistics on the number of ethnic groups, ranging from 250 to 619. According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 9), different estimations have been given, including: 248 (Coleman 1958), 394 (Hoffman 1974), 62 (Murdock 1975), 161 (Gandonu 1978), 143 (Odetola 1978), 619 (Wente-Lukas 1985) and 371 (Otite 1990). The variations can be largely attributed to the specific standards applied by the authors in defining what attributes of a group qualifies it to be an ethnic group. For example, while language is a major criterion, there has been no agreement on whether to qualify dialects of languages as separate groups. According to the CIA world fact book (2001: [sp]), Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups, of which the three largest are the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba.

Apart from the numerous ethnic groups that exist in Nigeria, there are also various religious denominations. Although Christianity and Islam are the two major religions, there are several traditional religions and minority religious and spiritual groups practicing in the country. These religious denominations vary regionally. As a result of this, the country is

roughly split between a Muslim dominated north, where the Hausa/Fulani is the predominant ethnic group, a largely Christian south and east consisting of the Igbo, Edo, Urhobo, Efik, amongst other ethnic groups, and a Yoruba west with an almost equal number of Christians and Muslims, as well as a good number of adherents to traditional African religions. In the Middle belt regions, there are many minority ethnic groups, of which the Idoma and Tiv are the most well-known. In this region, there exists a small number of Muslim converts, a large Christian community and, like the Yoruba, several adherents to African traditional religions. This religious and ethnic separation heightens regional differences, and causes frequent factional clashes amongst Nigerians.

Mamdani (2001: 661) argues that the colonial system created laws and structures that made cultural identity the basis for political identity in Nigeria and this has inevitably turned ethnicity into a political identity. By this, he means that the colonial system of government adopted in Nigeria, systematised its political structures around ethnic affiliations, creating a society where ethnicity was the basis for appointment into political offices. In this study, we will support Mamdani's theory by arguing that this system may be the basis for the frequent escalation of cultural conflicts into political violence in Nigeria.

We address the question of multiculturalism in Nigeria by, first of all, establishing if multicultural societies are inherently conflictual and whether there is a way for people with differing ideologies to coexist without conflicting.

SCOPE OF STUDY

This research examines how deeply differentiation has been entrenched in Nigerian society by analysing the ethnic, political and religious differences that are prominent in the country. In order to limit the scope of study, however, the major focus will be on religious differentiation and its effect on national identity in Nigeria. We will analyse the activities of Boko Haram, an Islamist extremist group operating majorly in north-eastern Nigeria. Contrary to popular belief that Boko Haram attacks are targeted at Christians, the opposite is, in fact, the case. Farouk (2012: [sp]) posits that the members of the group do not interact with the local Muslim population and have assassinated anyone who criticises it, including Muslim clerics. On the 12th of March 2011, Imam Ibrahim Ahmed Abdullahi, a Muslim cleric,

was assassinated by the group for criticising its activities and members of the Boko Haram sect have been known to attack public places in Northern Nigeria where even Muslims are gathered. In recent times, Boko Haram has been known to attack tertiary and secondary educational institutions in the north-eastern region of the country where both Christian and Muslim students are enrolled. The adherents of Boko Haram insist that interaction with the western world is forbidden and they support opposition to the Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria (Bartolotta 2011: [sp]). Most of the other prominent extremist groups in Nigeria are either breakaway factions from Boko Haram, like The Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan), better known as Ansaru, which was founded in January 2012, and/or independent groups founded in reaction to attacks by Boko Haram like Akhwat Akwop, a Christian militant group. It should be noted that these factions and independent militant groups have also carried out reprisal attacks which have only served to increase the violence and escalate ethnic and religious conflicts in the country.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

This study seeks to address diversity in Nigeria and the effect that this has on nationalism. Morris-Hale (1997: 191) maintains that Nigeria's basic problem of political integration has been to create a nation out of its vast multiplicity of ethnic groups: to attain unity despite diversity. Hindering this task, however, is the failure of the country's leaders and its peoples to engender within themselves, a sense of national identity and national unity.

We will trace the history of religious clashes in Nigeria in a bid to understand where the conflicting identities stem from and to establish whether, underneath the visible differences, there may be other underlying factors like the "fear or misconception of the other"³ that contribute to the religious conflicts that are endemic in contemporary Nigerian society. This fear may be caused by several factors, including an unwillingness to have a shared space or anxiety that one's own identity may be eradicated or, at the least, over shadowed by the other. Indeed, the fact that many Muslims are converting to Christianity could perhaps, be

³ The fear of something or someone who is unknown. According to Derek Hook, in *The Racial Stereotype, Colonial Discourse and Racism*, an encounter with a significant "other" is characterised by anxiety on having discovered difference which in a way threatens one's identity.

one of the underlying issues behind religious extremism not just in Nigeria but in many other countries.

The decreasing Muslim population in Nigeria has been recorded in several surveys. In 2001, the CIA World Factbook (Nigeria 2001: [sp]) reported that about 50% of Nigeria's population was Muslim, 40% Christian and 10% adherents to local religions. A census conducted by the Association of Religion Data Archives (Nigeria 2010: [sp]) reported that 46.5% of the total population was Christian, 45.5% Muslim, and 7.7% members of other religious groups. This census indicated a rise in the number of the Christian population to slightly more than the Muslim population as compared to the 2001 report. In 2012 however, a report by the Pew Research Centre showed that in 2010, the Christian population of Nigeria was 49.3% while Muslim's made up 48.8% of the population, 1.9% were followers of Indigenous and other religions, or unaffiliated (Religious Composition by Country, in Percentages 2012: [sp]). From the reports, we see that the population of Christians has experienced a steady climb since 2001 while the Muslim population has fluctuated between a decrease by 2010, and a slight increase in 2011 although still less than the Christian population. We therefore argue in this study, that the dwindling number of the Muslim population may perhaps be one of the reasons for the escalation of religious conflicts in the country.

The following questions will be addressed in this study;

- Why do multicultural societies experience frequent conflicts?
- What are the historical origins and underlying causes of multi-cultural conflicts in Nigeria?
- How are religious clashes in Nigeria narrated?
- How does religion impact national identity in contemporary Nigerian society?

We will also examine how Nigerians identify themselves. For example, do people define themselves, first of all, based on their ethnicity and religion, or simply as Nigerians? In other words, we seek to investigate to what extent national interests are placed above the interests of individuals or religious groups with which people associate themselves.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The proposed study will be based on various primary and secondary sources, including reports, newspapers, public statements by Boko Haram and those opposed to them, theses, dissertations, published articles and books. These sources will be analysed and interpreted in the context of various theoretical approaches through a text analysis process of a number of seminal studies, and the analysis will be aimed at providing a basis for understanding the Nigerian situation. For instance, in *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel Huntington argues that cultural and religious identities will be the primary sources of post-Cold War world conflicts. He classifies the different nations according to distinct cultural and religious boundaries, and argues that the basis of conflict in the future will be along cultural and religious lines. Critics of Huntington's thesis, like Amartya Sen, have argued that distinct cultural boundaries do not exist. For Sen, Huntington's theory is reductionist as it uniquely categorises people into distinct civilisations. The people of the world, according to Sen (2007: 10), can be classified according to many other systems, each of which has some often far-reaching relevance in our lives: such as nationalities, locations, classes, occupations, social status, language, politics, and many others. With this, Sen argues that, although religious identities have been the subject of much focus in recent years, we cannot presume that they, therefore, eliminate other distinctions. While this study agrees with Sen's argument, it, nevertheless, uses Huntington's clash of civilisations paradigm as a starting point for citing the basis of religious clashes in contemporary societies. True to Huntington's thesis, many countries have experienced crises due to cultural and religious differences. As noted previously, Nigeria has been plagued by cultural and mostly religious conflicts since she gained independence in 1960 and at escalated levels since 1990.

In addition, apart from religious conflicts in Nigeria, cultural conflicts are also evident in the land disputes which have been a major cause of ethnic and communal clashes. In the Jos Plateau, Christian and Muslim tribes have consistently clashed over issues of land. In the middle belt and north central states, Fulani and Tiv tribes have fought over cattle grazing routes. Tiv farmers accuse Fulani herdsmen of grazing their cattle on the Tiv farmlands. In the South, the Ugep and Obubra people have frequently disagreed over invasion of farmland. All of these are evident that, indeed, cultural differences have in recent years been the basis of conflict, especially in Nigeria. Like Sen, however, we will argue that

difference is natural and that only when it creates conflicts in our identities does it become a problem.

In *Transculturality: The Puzzling Forms of Cultures Today*, Wolfgang Welsch challenges the traditional conceptualisation of cultures as islands or spheres. His thesis suggests a solution for cultural conflicts. Welsch maintains that the traditional concept of culture and, indeed, the more recent concepts of interculturality and multiculturalism have failed to solve the problem of cultural differentiation as they all conceive of cultures as homogenous and, therefore, delimiting. For him, these concepts encourage an inner homogenisation and outer separation. In other words, they encourage an acceptance of likeness, or an acceptance of whatever one considers to be known or knowable, and an exclusion of anything alien or different. The concept of transculturality, according to Welsch, is the solution to cultural differentiation, because it refutes homogenisation and allows for intertwinement and intermingling of cultures. It permits diversity which creates a transcultural blend and produces cultural hybrids. The transculturality theory supposes that migration has created a blend of cultures and, therefore, there is no culture which remains unique and homogenous. In Nigeria, migration of people to different states has created this cultural blend. The Igbo are known to have settled in almost every region of the country in pursuit of their business interests; hence the presence of large numbers of Igbo in the North when the Nigerian civil war broke out in 1967. Using this concept, this study attempts to establish if the transculturality paradigm could be a feasible solution to religious extremism in Nigeria, or if it has failed to address the problem of cultural differentiation in the country.

Like Derek Hook, Rudy Visker in *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology* argues that differentiation can be seen as a reaction to a significant “other” which one considers alien and therefore unknowable. He maintains that in order to subjugate the “other” or to reduce difference into something knowable, we tend to dehumanise it. This study maintains that this phenomenon can be seen in religious conflicts, where those considered to be different, either because of their lack of belief, or because their belief systems are different, become the object to be discriminated and in extreme cases, subjugated. This theory will be tested by arguing that in the Muslim Jihads, the infidel becomes an object through which a believer can attain paradise. As such, the infidel is not considered as another human being whose beliefs are worth any consideration.

To further accentuate the argument on multiculturalism as a deterrent to national interest, we consider Edward Said's ideas, proposed in two of his books, *Orientalism* (1978) and *Culture and Imperialism* (1993). Said argues that culture is oftentimes associated with the nation or the state and, therefore, it becomes a combative form of identity, which does not allow for hybridity or multiculturalism and produces varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism.

Similarly, in *Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism*" (2001: various), Mamdani, argues that ethnicity has become the basis for political identity in post-colonial nations. In contrast, however, he disagrees with the popular school of thought that maintains that the physical boundaries artificially drawn up by the colonial state in African countries are the causes of conflict. For Mamdani, the causes of conflicts in Africa go way beyond physical boundaries. He argues instead, that the institutional separations and the creation of races and ethnicities by the colonial state is where the problem lies.

While Mamdani's theory is acceptable, it can also be argued that the creation of races and ethnicities was in its own way a creation of physical and indeed psychological boundaries. It allowed for the emergence of a certain political elite, in the case of Nigeria, the Hausa. Prior to the coming of the British colonialists, Hausa kingdoms existed, and already had established centralised systems of government. The Sokoto Caliphate, for example, had vassal emirates which was proof of an advanced form of state organisation. In this system of government, the indigenous people were administered through their already existing institutions and rulers. Quite understandably, the British adopted the Hausa system as a model for British colonial policy of indirect rule in Nigeria. We will argue, therefore, that this situation also heightened political, and by this, ethnic and religious tensions in the country.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 outlines the objectives and the contribution that this study hopes to make to scholarship on differentiation in Nigeria. This chapter also discusses the methodology to be used in the study and provides a comprehensive literature review of studies on conflicts in Nigeria, especially those caused by religious differentiation. It will explore how religious

clashes have been responsible for the highest number of killings in Nigeria since the Nigerian Civil war in 1967 which also had religious under currents. It will also trace the origins and development of the Boko Haram sect since its inception in 2001 when it conducted operations, more or less, peacefully, at least during the first seven years of its existence (Cook 2011: [sp]).

Also examined in this chapter, will be the extent to which the different religions allow certain practices that fuel religious fundamentalism and conflicts in the country and how adherents of the two competing religions have tended to engage in a “blame game” which further polarises society. Finally, an attempt will be made to understand how difference is generated and construed in Nigerian society, by examining the colonial structures inherited by the post-colonial Nigerian government and how these structures have affected assimilation, by combining theories on the conceptions of self and other in a bid to understand the underlying issues that are the basis on which cultural, and to be specific, religious difference is founded.

Chapter 2 will deal with the definition of some key terms that will appear in this dissertation, some of which are outlined below.

- Multiculturalism
- Nationalism/National Identity
- Identity politics

To understand how diverse Nigerian society is, it is necessary to ascertain how the different ethnic and religious groups came to be unified under one nation. The major focus of the second chapter, therefore, will be to provide the historical background of pre-colonial, pre independent and post independent Nigeria and the structures and legacy of colonialism in Nigeria. This is important because, the inherited structures of colonialism greatly impacted the relationship between societies in African countries. Mamdani (2001: 654) postulates that colonialism aided segregation by creating races and ethnicities into which it categorised the several ethnic groups which the colonialists encountered in African countries. He argues that this colonial legacy, which was inherited upon independence, is at the root of our dilemma, and that dilemma, according to him, is the form of the state. To expatiate

however, we will briefly discuss some other conflicts that Nigerian societies have experienced, in a bid to highlight how deeply differences are rooted in the country.

Chapter 3 will focus on an analysis of the theories on conceptions of self and other. How we conceive of ourselves in relation to others is a form of differentiation, as it creates for itself, certain rules that emphasise difference. In this case, differentiation processes take on a negative inference. People distinguish themselves from others by focusing on characteristics that set them apart. These characteristics are generally referred to as their culture and are oftentimes defined by social precepts. A society detects what cultural elements, internal or external are relative to it, and when the people in that society recognise difference in others, there is a tendency to either exclude or try to forcibly assimilate them.

We will argue in this study that there are no simple answers to the problem of differentiation in multicultural societies. We can only try to identify the root causes of multicultural conflicts in a bid to find feasible ways of managing them. While every dispute has its own unique history and circumstance, there is always a link between conflicts, especially those caused by cultural differences. While the previous chapters will be dedicated to tracing and understanding the history of multicultural conflicts, and specifically, religious clashes in Nigeria, chapter 4 will draw conclusions on the nature and causes of conflicts in Nigeria and what they reveal about Nigerian post-colonial society and the challenges of defining political identities as distinct from cultural identities, without denying that they may be a significant overlap between the two.

The final chapter of this study links the major arguments that have been advanced in the previous chapters, examining how the arguments fit together. This concluding chapter will be aimed at summarising the findings of the study in order to reach a general conclusion about the problem of cultural diversity in Nigeria.

CHAPTER TWO

TERMINOLOGIES AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA

This chapter is important because it examines the concepts of multiculturalism and nationalism in relation to the Nigerian society. It provides a historical background of colonialism in Nigeria, the political systems adopted by the colonial administrators, and the influences which led to the creation of the Nigerian state. We will also discuss in this chapter, the different cultural societies that were unified to make up Nigeria, and highlight the ways in which diversity is perceived and dealt with in the country.

MULTICULTURALISM.

As discussed in the first chapter of this research, multicultural societies are not alien concepts. Many societies comprise of people from diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. A typical characteristic of a multicultural society is the existence of several cultural groups, each possessing a different cultural heritage, ranging from differences in religion, language, ethnicity and tradition amongst other identifying factors. Song (2014: 1) defines multiculturalism as a body of thought in political philosophy about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity.

Friedrich Heckmann argues that there is no precise definition of multiculturalism. For him, the concepts of multiculturalism and multicultural societies can be defined in several ways depending on their conceptual usage. This could either be in a descriptive-analytical sense or a politico-normative sense. However, according to Heckmann, none of the definitions wholly clarifies the discourse on multiculturalism and they, in fact, add to the confusing discourse on the concept.

Heckmann (1993: 245) proposes seven different definitions for multiculturalism and multicultural societies. In this research, however, we will only focus on some of the definitions that, in my view, truly portray the characteristics of present day multicultural societies. In a descriptive sense, Heckmann defines multiculturalism as an indicator of social change. This refers to the changing ethnic composition of a population, namely, an allegedly homogeneous population which has become heterogeneous. In this sense, multiculturalism refers simply to cultural diversity; to a society which previously comprised of only a single

cultural group, but which, through social change, cultural integration and migration, now consists of several different cultural groups.

As a normative term, Heckmann defines multiculturalism as tolerance toward others, friendly and supportive behaviour toward immigrants, and as a liberal and democratic attitude which is based (among other things) on learning from the errors and fatal consequences of nationalism, chauvinism, and ethnic intolerance. In this sense, a society is only truly multicultural where people of different cultural backgrounds live together in harmony with a mutual respect for each other's cultural representations. It refers to the celebration of communal diversity and the right that each group has to respect and recognition of its traditions. Multiculturalism as a normative term promotes ideologies that institutionalise diversity and respect it. Bloor (2010: 272) supports this description of multiculturalism with his definition of multicultural societies. For him, a multicultural society is one which is at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit.

Heckmann also defines multiculturalism as an interpretation of the concept of culture: there are no "pure," original cultures. Each culture has incorporated elements of other cultures; cultures are the result of interaction with one another; culture is continuous process and change. This definition of multiculturalism promotes the acceptance of migrants and minority ethnic groups as part of the cultural heritage of a society. It allows for the integration and acceptance of migrant traditions as an enrichment of one's own culture. This definition is supported by Wolfgang Welsch in his transculturality argument. According to Welsch (1999: 197), there is no culture which is absolutely authentic, and there is no culture which is foreign. As humans we are cultural hybrids, and we draw from a number of ways of life and cultures to create our cultural identity.

From the above, one major point which is shared by all definitions of culture is the fact that multiculturalism advocates for the peaceful co-existence of several different cultural groups. As such, a working definition of a multicultural society will be one in which several different cultural groups co-exist peacefully and where all groups, even the minority groups, are allowed to practice their traditions without fear of discrimination from other groups.

Multicultural societies are created through several different factors. Increased global interdependency, for example, has brought diverse cultures in contact with each other. Through migration, people have also settled in communities where, over the years, they become acculturated. Sen (2006: 149) posits that the demand for multiculturalism is strong in the contemporary world. For him, increased global contacts and interactions, and in particular extensive migrations, have placed diverse practices of different cultures next to each other. Sen summarises all the definitions of multiculturalism into two basically distinct approaches. One of the approaches, for him, promotes diversity as a value in itself and the other focuses on the freedom of reasoning and decision-making and celebrates cultural diversity as open to choice.

From the above, we see that multicultural societies, although consisting of different cultural groups, are not necessarily the same as culturally diverse societies. Although a society may be culturally diverse, multiculturalism may not fully be embraced in that society. This means that, though they may be several different cultural groups in a society, these groups do not necessarily embrace multiculturalism and the people do not always live harmoniously. Based on this, a culturally diverse society is one in which different cultural groups exist, while a multicultural society, on the other hand, is one where different cultural groups exist harmoniously. In this sense, multiculturalism aims to answer the question of how well different cultural groups interact, and how much diversity is embraced in heterogeneous societies.

NATIONALISM

Nationalism is a form of culture, whereby the nation is positioned at the core of social, political, and economic ideologies of a particular group of individuals. It is a political system that encourages identification with a nation. To better understand the concept of nationalism, it is pertinent to first of all define what the nation is.

Hroch (1996: 79) defines the nation as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, and historical) and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. He argues that the nation is not an eternal category, but was the product of a long and complicated process of historical development. According to Hroch, the

relationships that bind the citizens of a nation could be mutually substitutable - some playing a particularly important role in one nation-building process and no more than a subsidiary part in others. However, three of these relationships are most important. A 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group - or at least of its core constituents, a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it, and a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society.

The nation is also defined by Smith (2004: 183) as a named community of history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights. Smith maintains that the nation constitutes a population sharing a historic territory, people sharing common myths and historical memories, and a territory sharing a mass public culture. The citizens of a nation share a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. For Smith, shared memory is an essential part of the formation of nations. Nations are cultural communities, and although the citizens of a nation may not be homogenous, they are united by common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. As such, while nationalism promotes a sense of shared histories between the people that constitute societies in a nation, it does not necessarily mean that this shared history is valid. Furthermore, Smith (2004: 23) defines nationalism as an ideological movement that seeks to attain and maintain autonomy, unity and identity for a population, some of whose members believe it to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'. Smith argues that nationalism is not only an ideology, but also a political movement with clear goals of national autonomy unity and identity. This movement is rooted in the discovery of a shared authentic past and it inspires a consciousness that encourages devotion to its cultural heritage, as opposed to the culture or cultures of other nations. As such, the focal point of the concept of nationalism is an allegiance to one's nation.

There are several reasons why nations were formed. Some were created out of a necessity for security and protection against external domination, others from the unification of people with shared cultural practices like language and belief. In Classical and Medieval times, nations were created out of a need to conquer and dominate others. The Roman Empire, for example, was created as lands were conquered across Europe. In Africa, although people lived together in small autonomous communities, nations were only

officially created after the partitioning of Africa by Europe. During this period of the new imperialism, territories were partitioned, occupied and controlled by European countries. The partitioning of Africa was a tactic employed to prevent contention amongst European Nations over Africa and was, supposedly, required to develop African territories and to bring “civilization” to Africa. Before this period, Africans lived mostly in small ethnic communities where diverse systems of traditional government, cultures and beliefs prevailed. In Nigeria, for example, communities which existed prior to colonialism were administered separately under different political systems and rulers. Prominent amongst these, were the Oyo Kingdom ruled by the Alaafin, the Ife Kingdom where the Ooni was ruler, the Benin Kingdom and its Oba, and the Sokoto Caliphate where the Sultan was political and religious head. These groups existed independently and were politically distinct from each other even though trade relations were conducted between them. After the partitioning of Africa and the creation of what is today Nigeria, these diverse societies were unified to form a nation. People with varying ideologies and beliefs were put together under one political system and their conflicting ideologies and diverse beliefs often led, and still lead, to conflict. Morris Hale (1997: 191) maintains that Nigeria’s basic problem of political integration has (since its creation) been to create a nation out of its vast multiplicity of ethnic groups: to attain unity despite diversity.

Nationalism is a form of identification which encourages a collective sense of belonging to a nation and commitment to the beliefs, ideals and customs of that nation. Like all other forms of identification however, nationalism, in a superficial sense of the word, may seem like a wholly affirmative concept. However, if espoused in extreme, it may have negative implications, sometimes leading to a diplomatic power play and even military conflicts. According to Mihail (2012: [sp]), nationalism has had an enormously negative impact on the development of humanity and, virtually singlehandedly, has provided justification for some of the most senseless and bloodiest conflicts known in history.

Johann Gottfried Herder, a proponent of Primordialism,⁴ warns that national glory is a deceiving seducer. When it reaches a certain height, it clasps the head with an iron band. The enclosed sees nothing in the mist but his own picture; he is susceptible to no foreign

⁴ An ideology from which Nationalism is believed to have emerged. An argument which contends that Nations are ancient, natural phenomena (Hayward, Barry & Brown 2003: 330).

impressions (Herder cited by Gu 2013: 72). As such, whilst a patriotic affinity towards one's nation is an admirable trait, it can, if encouraged in extreme, easily allow for the exclusion or forceful assimilation of others who do not share the same customs. In addition, while nationalism can be a strong tool for the unification of societies in a nation and for the accomplishment of common goals, it can also lead people to commit violent acts in the name of their nation.

Any form of cultural identification is, indeed, a double edged sword and, like nationalism, religion and ethnicity have in recent times proven to have both negative and positive inferences.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF AFRICAN NATIONALISM

African nationalism is a Pan Africanist movement that arose out of a necessity for Africans to regain control of their territories and gain independence from European rule. After the partitioning of Africa in the late 19th century and the advent of colonialism, African territories were administered by European colonialists under assimilationist or indirect forms of government adopted in the respective territories by the European governments for their "civilizing mission". Foreign systems of government and policies were introduced, to which Africans were obliged to adapt, and some of these policies were considered by Africans as unfair. Some examples of policies which Africans objected to were taxation and forced labour. Naturally, there was resistance to them. Growing discontent amongst Africans and the desire to be liberated from foreign control, therefore, encouraged the African people to unite in the fight against European domination.

However, long before colonialism and the movement for the liberation of African territories, nationalism had begun as black consciousness movements which started in America and the Caribbean. Negritude and other Pan Africanist movements were, indeed, broader forms of African nationalism. Negritude, like nationalism, advocated for a collective identity. However, it did not only encourage the formation of a national identity, but also awakened the need for a "black identity" that surpassed national identities. It advocated for the unification of blacks in the fight against white domination. Negritude promoted the unification of blacks not only in America and the Caribbean, but also on the African

continent and in the diaspora. It was a movement that arose out of the desire of young black intellectuals to unite against racism and find a unique and common black identity. It became a solace for blacks to unite under an identity characterized by shared histories and experiences. A common black identity was believed to be the key element in the fight against French/white domination. The ultimate goal of the Negritude movement was to oppose racism and historicism, to reject Western domination, to awaken a sense of pride in blackness, and to validate blackness and African customs and beliefs which were previously considered as savage and barbaric. Nationalism, on the other hand, fuelled national self-determination amongst Africans and encouraged them to advocate for national identity as a way of uniting against external rule. Rather than seeing themselves as coming from distinct cultural groups, nationalism encouraged Africans to see themselves as a collective unit and to find strength in uniting all of Africa against European domination. Therefore, the collective movement for liberation in African territories gave rise or perhaps fuelled African nationalism which had hitherto existed, albeit in other forms.

Despite its call for a united black race, there was some criticism of the Negritude movement. One of the most ardent critics is Wole Soyinka, who in his concept of “Tigritude” openly criticized the Negritude writers. For him, their works were over labored with “blackness”, and he thought this to be unnecessary. Having come under heavy criticism by proponents of Negritude for his European Literary techniques, Soyinka responded by declaring that “A tiger does not proclaim his tigritude, he pounces”. In this statement, he cautioned his negritude critics to be careful of promoting a stereotypical opposition between Africa and the West. It should be noted, however, that Soyinka later accepted the necessity for Negritude in the fight against the unusual French assimilationist system of colonisation. Although favoured as inclusive, in that it allowed Francophone Africans to be educated, this system belittled “Africanness” and tried to create French people out of Africans. In other words, African customs and traditions were to be obliterated and French civilization was to take their place. On the other hand, unlike the French, the British colonial system allowed the Anglophone Africans to practice their culture. However, this was not because the British considered Africans equals, but because they felt that the African was not capable of comprehending European civilization and was better left to his own.

Negritude and, indeed, nationalism are thus problematic in that they both lay too much emphasis on differentiation, which is the foundation for political, ethnic and religious conflicts. Theories that encourage identity formation are undeniably deceptive. While associating with people with whom one feels a cultural link or a certain affiliation is good, it may also lead to the alienation of others whom one considers as different.

Another concept from which African nationalism is believed to have emerged is Pan Africanism. This movement originated in the later part of the 18th century in Europe, America and the Caribbean as an attack on slavery and racism. It promoted the historical, cultural, spiritual and artistic heritage of Africans. With the rising slave insurrections in these regions, Pan Africanism was the uniting force, integrating revolts to create a network of solidarity under which Africans could unite. Pan Africanism promoted the belief that unity was essential for not only economic but also social and political advancement. It therefore aimed to unify all Africans in the fight for freedom. It reflected a range of views and was a religious, political, ideological, cultural and intellectual movement that encompassed the complexities of blackness and what it meant to be black in a world of white domination. On the surface, Pan-Africanism was a belief that African people, both on the African continent and in the diaspora, share not merely a common history, but also a common destiny. As such, it created a certain sense of interconnected pasts, presents and futures. Proponents of Pan Africanism include Marcus Garvey, who is considered to be the father of Black Nationalism, W.E.B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Muammar Gaddafi.

After the partitioning of Africa in the later part of the 19th century, black consciousness movements were gradually integrated to become African nationalism. However, unlike the black consciousness movements which were race based and arose in response to slavery, African nationalism developed in response to imperialism. It came out of a necessity for Africans to regain control of their territories and become independent from Europe. This movement encouraged national self-determination amongst Africans, appealing to a sense of national identity as opposed to ethnic identities, as a way of uniting Africans against external rule. With colonialism came the need to educate Africans in western cultures and civilization. The African educated elite took interest in politics, which led to the creation of political parties that would later become the back bone in the fight against European domination.

One of the first political parties to be established in sub Saharan Africa was the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) founded in the Gold Coast in 1897 by traditional rulers and some educated African elite. Its main purpose, like many others after it, was to fight colonial rule. The ARPS became the key group that headed political action and opposition rallies against the British colonial government in the Gold Coast, starting what would eventually lead to Ghanaian independence in 1957, one of the first in Sub Saharan Africa.

In the early years of the 20th century, African nationalist movements gained even more grounds, leading to the formation of several political parties across Africa. In 1912, the South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later renamed the African National Congress (ANC), was founded in reaction to the injustice against black South Africans under the white dominated government. The oppressed black population of South Africa set aside their ethnic differences and united under the leadership of the SANNC to fight against the systematic oppression of the white government. This association led several campaigns against white policies, notably the 1913 Land act that forced non-white farmers from their farms, and the Pass Laws which severely restricted the movement of non-whites within South Africa.

In 1920, the National Congress of British West Africa was founded in the Gold Coast. Members consisted of several educated elite in the Gold Coast, and a few others of West African descent. The purpose of the congress was to establish a West African Court of Appeal, where the judges would only be nominated Africans.

By mid-20th century, they were African nationalist groups in nearly every African territory, and political movements demanding the emancipation of African territories had become increasingly aggressive, forcing the European colonial governments to relinquish control of their territories. As a result, in 1960, 17 Sub Saharan African nations gained independence, leading to it being dubbed the Year of Independence in Africa.

Nevertheless, apart from the growing political rallies, several other remarkable factors influenced African nationalism. After the 2nd World War, the weakening of the world powers, which were at the time the major colonial powers, and the emergence of other world powers like the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union was one of these

factors. The USA criticised colonialism and ardently encouraged self-government because she wanted to be free to pursue trading interests in Africa. Other factors which encouraged African nationalism were decolonisation in Asia, urbanisation in African territories, improved means of transport and communication, including the construction of railways to aid the movement of raw materials to the urban areas, and newspapers which were used to openly criticise colonial exploitation and mobilise nationalist struggles. All these factors greatly aided the growth of African nationalism.

In addition, the existence of the independent states of Liberia and Ethiopia also influenced African nationalism. These two independent nation-states were proof that Africans were capable of ruling themselves. Ethiopia was a symbol of African freedom and pride as it had never been colonised. However, in 1935, Mussolini's fascist government invaded and occupied Ethiopia. This occupation enraged people, mostly Blacks across the world, and the League of Nations was accused of not properly handling the situation. Both Italy and Ethiopia were member nations of the League, and Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations called for assistance for members that faced external aggression. Despite this, the League failed to prevent Italy from invading Ethiopia and, therefore, it was seen as a failure. Following 5 years of military occupation, Ethiopia regained its independence with the help of the Allied forces at the start of the 2nd World War and this significantly impacted African nationalism.

The involvement of Africans from British and French colonies in World War II also greatly impacted African nationalist consciousness. A large number of Africans were recruited as soldiers, porters and scouts in the army of the allied forces. At the end of the war, however, these soldiers returned to colonies where black inhabitants were still considered as inferior. Discontent grew amongst them and they began to question whether life as a colonial subject was any better than that under Fascist or Nazi governments which they had fought to overthrow. In addition, the Atlantic Charter of 1941 had stated that sovereign rights of self-government will be restored to those who had been forcibly deprived of them. The returning soldiers, especially those from British colonies, therefore, demanded the commitment of Great Britain to end colonial rule in their territories, basing their demands on the decree of the charter. When Churchill and Roosevelt subsequently issued a statement declaring that

the charter was not applicable to Africa, this greatly angered the returning soldiers, and helped to motivate the nationalist movements.

Another event that influenced African nationalism was decolonisation in India. During the 2nd World War, India greatly contributed to the army of the Allied Forces, sending a large volunteer army, the largest ever recorded in history according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission Report on India. Cohen (2002: 33) argues that at the end of the war, India emerged as the world's fourth largest industrial power, and its increased political, economic and military influence paved the way for its independence from the United Kingdom in 1947. The African soldiers who had fought in India witnessed how liberation movements developed there and this experience aided them in their anti-colonial struggle when they returned to their colonies.

While the war heightened African nationalist movements, it also made Europe appreciate the contribution from colonies to the war effort and to recognize the dignity and equality of all human beings. In addition, the devastation of the war had effectively impacted the world psychologically and the recognition that Nazi Germany's lust for European domination was a major catalyst for the war led the colonial powers to reflect on their position in Africa. In addition, Europe knew that the world could not afford another war and the fear that rebellions in the colonies may, indeed, culminate in a war led the UN to issue a declaration in 1960. The Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples acknowledged Europe's awareness of a threat to world peace.

As such, African demand for freedom, reinforced by Europe's acceptance of the ineffectiveness of colonialism, allowed for the eventual independence of European colonies in Africa, a movement which started from the mid to the late 20th century.

Each African Nation had a unique experience in its quest for independence. Most colonies obtained their independence without having to resort to the use of violence. The pressure from Africa and from other western countries compelled the colonial powers to eventually succumb to the demand for independence and, by 1970, most African people had regained control of their territories.

Due to the diversity of the African continent, African nationalism is denoted in several different facets. Nationalism in Southern Africa, for example, was considered to be the most inclusive form of African nationalism. The settlement of large numbers of Europeans and Asians in Southern Africa made the region a largely multi-racial one, and South Africa for instance, is home to Black, White, Colored and Asian ethnicities amongst others.

In pre-independent West Africa, nationalism had one major aim, namely, to unite the people in the fight against colonialism. The problem with nationalism, however, arose when there was no longer a common enemy to fight. After independence, it became increasingly difficult to forge a national identity, as the diverse people no longer had the common goal of regaining their territory from European control. In addition to this, the artificial boundaries and foreign administrative structures became a foundation for political, ethnic and even religious conflicts. As a result of this, Africans became their own enemies. Ethnic identities which were the norm prior to colonialism again replaced the national identities that were forged in response to European domination, and vicious cultural disputes were the result.

NATIONALISM IN NIGERIA

Nigerian Nationalism arose out of the need to curb the rising British influence which had increased with the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 in the region that is today Nigeria. Prior to this, European influence had been based on trade relations, both in raw materials and in human labour with the communities there. During the period of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, the larger part of the revenue for the indigenous kingdoms came from the sale of slaves. As a result, when this ended, many of them suffered losses. After the slave trade was abolished, Britain began to promote engagement in legitimate trade, mostly in palm oil which was abundant in the coastal regions of what is today Southern Nigeria. The primary actors pushing for greater involvement of Britain in the region were Christian missionaries, British trading interests and finally the British government which feared the impending threat from German and French traders and military expeditions who were moving closer to the region (Falola and Heaton 2008: 86). The Christian missionaries wanted the area to be converted to anti-slavery, “legitimate” commerce, and ultimately, to ideas of Christian “civilisation”, and trading interests were threatened by the increased competition amongst British firms and the great influence of the indigenous middlemen who acted as links

between the firms and the local people. As a result, they pushed for more direct British political involvement in the region (Falola and Heaton 2008: 86).

British influence also increased due to the political unrest amongst the indigenous societies. Some of the local rulers saw Britain as a good ally against their rivals and were therefore willing to give the British a foothold in their territories. In addition, these rulers welcomed the activities of the Christian missionaries who established schools where the local people were taught to speak, read and write English. This facilitated their trade with Europe, especially at a time when the slave trade was gradually fading off and being replaced with legitimate trade in raw materials. The indigenous chiefs saw this as a means of gaining favour with Britain, and by extension gaining their support in times of political instability.

Another factor that greatly aided the British in their spread of Christianity and trading interest in the interior parts of the coastal regions of Southern Nigeria was the discovery of the extent of the river Niger, and the advancement in medical science. Previously, the colonialist had relied on middlemen as they feared the complexities of the many inlets that made up the Niger Delta. In addition, many of them had been killed by malaria and so they feared to venture past the coasts, and left this to the Africans. The problem of malaria was however solved with the discovery of quinine⁵.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA

The annexation of what is today Nigeria began as a gradual process. After the abolition of the slave trade, and with the increase in European missionary and trading activities in the middle of the 19th century, the British established the Bight of Bonny⁶ as a colonial protectorate in 1849, overseen by a British consul. In 1852 another British protectorate was established, the Bight of Benin⁷ and in 1861, the two were merged to become a united British protectorate called the Bights of Benin and Biafra.

⁵ The first effective western treatment for Malaria.

⁶ A bight off the coast of West Africa, encompassing the eastern coast of Nigeria, Cameroon, Bioko Island in Equatorial Guinea and the northern coast of Gabon.

⁷ A bight off the coast of West Africa, bordered by south-eastern Ghana, Togo, Benin and south-western Nigeria. Scene of extensive slave trading between the 16th to the 19th century.

Meanwhile, in the western region, Britain had begun gaining influence in Lagos in 1851. At the time, the King of Lagos, Kosoko, had aggressively prevented British missionaries and traders from entering his region. Even with the abolition of slave trade, Kosoko made no efforts to end the illegitimate trade and the transportation of slaves from the ports in Lagos. As such, British missionaries persuaded the British consul for the Bights of Benin and Biafra to use his military power to unseat Kosoko (Falola and Heaton 2008: 93). The British consul ordered the bombardment of Lagos, and a naval expedition overcame all local resistance to depose Kosoko. Lagos was attacked and bombed, forcing the city into submission and causing Kosoko and his supporters to flee.

In the early years of the 19th century, the Yoruba kingdoms in what is today western Nigeria had been plagued by constant wars as a result of internal conflicts. Lagos was at the time allied with Dahomey⁸, and the Egba people, another neighbouring Yoruba kingdom felt threatened by this alliance. The Egba people therefore welcomed British troops and Christian missionary activities as they believed that this will provide them with protection against invasion from the other more powerful kingdoms. With the deposition of Kosoko, Akitoye, an Egba royal was imposed on the throne of Lagos by the British in the belief that he would create a more acceptable regime. A few months later a vice-consul from the Bight of Benin consulate was posted to the island, and in 1852 Lagos was upgraded to a full consulate (Smith 1979: 1-2). Akitoye and his successors were however, unsuccessful in bringing stability to the region as the British had hoped, and in 1853 Akitoye died, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Dosunmu. In August 1861, a British naval force entered Lagos Bay and seized the town in the name of Queen Victoria. King Dosunmu was exiled, and a Briton, William McCoskry became acting governor of Lagos (Sterling 1996: 223). In the same year, Lagos was annexed as a British colony under the direct political control of a British governor, and the city became the base for all colonial operations in Yorubaland (Falola and Heaton 2008: 93-95). As a colony, Lagos was now protected and governed directly from Britain (Falola and Salm 2004: 255).

In the Coastal regions of the south, British involvement gradually increased from the 1850s both in trade and in local politics, and this led to British direct control between 1861 and

⁸ African Kingdom in what is today the Republic of Benin. Dahomey was a tributary state to the Oyo Empire until 1823.

1885. At the time, the city of Akwa Akpa⁹ was a major port for slave ships even after the abolition of slavery. The British, however, began to promote trade in palm kernel and palm oil which were abundant in the region in a bid to legitimise trade, and in 1842, slave trade in the region finally ceased. However, it was only until 1884 that the chiefs of Akwa Akpa agreed to be placed under British protection. After the Berlin conference, in a bid to control trade along the coast of the river Niger, Britain established the Oil Rivers Protectorate¹⁰ in 1885, which included the Niger Delta and extended eastward to Calabar. Old Calabar was named as the headquarters of the protectorate.

In the western region, between 1886 and 1897, the British made their way from Lagos to the other Yoruba Kingdoms, either convincing or forcefully subjugating the communities there. The abolition of the slave trade had significantly crippled some of the kingdoms, especially the Oyo Empire which had gained most of its revenue from the trade, and the political crises in the region did little to help in their defence against the impending British occupation.

In the early years of the 19th century, most of the Yoruba kingdoms were already at war, and prominent amongst these were the Dahomey revolt and the Fulani Jihad which led to the demise of the Oyo Empire in 1836. Prior to this, in 1728, the Oyo Empire had invaded the Kingdom of Dahomey. The battle lasted four days, but the Yoruba were eventually victorious after reinforcements arrived (Thornton 1999: 79). Dahomey became a tributary state of Oyo and was finally subjugated in 1748. However, even with the abolition of the slave trade 16 years earlier, the demand for slaves was still quite high, and Dahomey was a thriving port for slave traders. The kingdom, despite being a tributary state to the Oyo Empire, raided and captured slaves from smaller states which were protectorates of the Empire, and in reprisal, Oyo attacked Dahomey. The Oyo army was decisively defeated, ending Oyo's hegemony over Dahomey in 1823 (Alpern 1998: 166). In 1835, Ilorin, supported by Muslims from the Hausa-Fulani in the northern regions also attacked Oyo. Still recovering from the defeat by Dahomey and torn by internal conflicts, Oyo was too weak to ward off the Fulani. Oyo-Ile was razed by the Fulani Empire in 1835 and the Oyo Empire collapsed in 1836 (Alpern 1998: 196).

⁹ Present day Calabar, Akwa Akpa or Old Calabar was a coastal city in what is today south-eastern Nigeria.

¹⁰ Protectorate of Southern Nigeria which remained under direct jurisdiction of the British foreign office

Because the Oyo Empire, like the Sokoto Caliphate in the North, acted as protector of the Yoruba Nation, with its collapse came a void that triggered off a period of instability in the region. This resulted in conflict amongst the communities of Yorubaland, tagged the Ekitiparapo wars¹¹. In 1886, Britain's intervention in the war effectively gave them full reign in the region. The treaty ending the war declared that all signatories would direct future disputes with each other to the British governor in Lagos for resolution (Falola and Heaton 2008: 95). Disillusionment from the effects of the war pressured the leaders of the combatant states to sign a treaty, giving Britain political reign over their territories and greater access to their markets which was one of the conditions of the treaty. The signing of the treaty was used as justification when Britain occupied Ijebuland¹² in 1892, and any resistance from the people of Ijebu was forcefully smothered by British troops. When British officials circulated a new treaty of protection to the Yoruba states in 1893, most of the Yoruba kings, for fear of British might, signed away their sovereignty, becoming part of the expanded Colony and Protectorate of Lagos (Falola and Heaton 2008: 95). The Oyo Empire was the only Yoruba state which initially resisted British annexation. However, the already escalating levels of political unrest in the empire led to its eventual demise. Oyo soon met the fate of Ijebu, and the New Oyo was bombarded on November 12 1894, and brought forcibly under British colonial rule (Falola and Heaton 2008: 95).

The Kingdom of Benin was one of the very resourceful empires in the coastal regions of the territories that make up present day Nigeria. With the development of trade in palm oil in the 19th century, the Oba of Benin was able to develop his kingdom economically, and resist attempts by the British to take over the region. Throughout the 1880s, Benin was able to ward off all attempts by the British to establish a treaty with them. However, in 1892, a visit by the Vice-Consul of the Oil Rivers Protectorate, Captain H.L. Gallwey set in motion, a series of events that would eventually lead to the demise of Ovonramwen, the Oba of Benin in 1888, and the decline and surrender of the Benin Kingdom. The treaty proposed by Gallwey and allegedly (It is important to note that there is some debate as to whether the Oba agreed to the terms of the treaty as claimed by the British, or if he was compelled into signing it) signed by Ovonramwen required the Benin Empire to abolish the Benin slave

¹¹ Political conflict amongst the Yoruba states of what is today southwestern Nigeria.

¹² One of several Yoruba kingdoms. The Ijebu kingdom rose to fame in the 18th and 19th century due to its strategic position on the slave trade route.

trade and human sacrifice (Hernon 2003: 409). However, the Oba remained in charge of all trade in the region until 1896, when a British expedition which had set out to visit him with the intention of convincing, or in the event that this failed, forcing him to surrender to British dominion, was ambushed and nearly all the men killed. This was Britain's excuse to take military action against Benin, and in 1897 the Benin Kingdom was attacked and burned to the ground, resulting in the death of many of its inhabitants. The Oba escaped, but with the destruction of his city and the loss of his subjects, he later surrendered and was exiled to Calabar where he met his demise in 1914.

In the meantime, in 1893, the Oil Rivers Protectorate was renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate, and in 1897, having been annexed by the British, the Benin Kingdom was forcibly brought into the Niger Coast protectorate, expanding its western boundary to reach the eastern limits of the Lagos Protectorate (Falola and Heaton 2008: 98). For most of the later part of the 19th century, European influence in the region grew steadily. According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 93), the activities of Sir George Goldie's chartered Royal Niger Company¹³ were instrumental in gaining ultimate control of the regions of the Niger and Benue for the British. Goldie had signed several political treaties with the chiefs of the lower Niger and the Hausa states. However, faced with the looming threat of the state-supported protectorates of France and Germany¹⁴ it was impossible for Goldie's chartered company to succeed. In 1900, subsequent to the revocation of its charter¹⁵, the territories of the Royal Niger Company were transferred to the British Government securing the regions of the Niger and the Benue, the coastal regions of the south and the Yorubalands for the British government. The Niger Coast Protectorate was merged with the chartered territories of the Royal Niger Company to form the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. In 1906, the colony of Lagos was added, and the territory was officially renamed the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos became the capital.

¹³ British trading company that operated along the coasts of the River Niger in West Africa. It was instrumental in aiding the spread of British influence in Nigeria.

¹⁴ At the time, France controlled the territory which is today, the republic of Niger, and they had begun to encroach on Northern Nigeria, approaching from the Sahara desert. Germany controlled the southern part of what is today Cameroon which shared boundaries with Southern Nigeria.

¹⁵ The charter authorised the Royal Niger Company to administer the regions on the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers.

Having accomplished this, British interest was turned towards the north. After the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, the area that would become the Northern Nigeria Protectorate was assigned to Britain. Goldie and his Royal Niger Company had signed several treaties with the emirs of the regions of the lower Niger, including the Caliph of Sokoto. When his territories were handed over to Britain in 1900, plans to expand northwards began taking shape. The northern territories of the Royal Niger Company were unified to form the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and Lord Frederick Lugard was appointed as the first high commissioner. He was charged with fending off the threats of the looming French and German forces, and suppressing local revolutions in the region.

Political and territorial wars in the region did little to help the declining state of the kingdoms that existed there, and by 1902, British military intervention began with the annexation of the Bornu Empire. The empire whose political and economic strength grew under the leadership of its Mai's¹⁶, especially during the reign of Mai Idris Alooma, had been resilient until the mid-17th century by which time its power began to decline. Several revolutions in the region, and the creation of new states led to the complete decline of the empire and the decrease in the powers of the Mai, leading to the loss of Bilma¹⁷ and as such, access to the Trans-Saharan trade in 1759. Cities which had previously paid tribute to the empire regained autonomy, and by 1780, there was a range of independent kingdoms and therefore independent political authorities in the region. These kingdoms engaged in regular warfare and slave raids against each other. To pay for the rehabilitation of the devastation caused by the internal wars, high taxation was imposed on the citizens.

The region was largely populated with several ethnic groups, amongst which the Hausa and the Fulani were predominant. Due to their engagement in trade with Islamic merchants from the Mediterranean, much of the population had become converts to Islam. However, traditional beliefs and paganism still persisted in many areas. By the end of the 18th century however, Islam began to gain prevalence in the region. Usman Dan Fodio, an Islamic scholar, led a Jihad, with the aim of spreading Islam and purifying the areas where Islam had not

¹⁶ The Mai's were the kings of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, a pre-colonial Fulani empire which existed in Tchad and Nigeria.

¹⁷ Oasis settlement in the Sahara desert, which served as a major slave route during the transatlantic slave trade. Bilma is currently situated in present day Niger Republic.

been accepted. In 1808, the Bornu Empire was attacked by the ravaging Fulani's led by Dan Fodio. Subsequent attacks in the following years by the Ouaddai Empire¹⁸ in 1846 and by an invading army from eastern Sudan in 1893 finally led to the collapse of the Bornu Empire. In 1902, Following the expulsion of Rabih az-Zubayr, the leader of the Sudanese troops, and the intervention of British forces led by Lord Lugard, the state was absorbed by Britain. In 1904, Bornu, which had always retained its independence from Sokoto even after the Fulani Jihad, was occupied by British forces and added to the regions that made up the Northern Protectorate (Falola and Heaton 2008: 105). However, the Bornu Empire was allowed to exist, subject to the British government at the time.

The Kano Empire was founded in 1805 after the conquest of the old Hausa Kingdom of Kano by the Fulanis. At the beginning of the 19th century, with the Fulani Jihad and the emergence of the Sokoto Caliphate, several empires became vassal states of the Caliphate. Kano was the largest and most affluent empire in the region, thriving on its engagement in slave trading long after the abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade. The wealth and power of the empire declined following a civil war from 1893 until 1895 involving two rival claimants for the throne. In 1903, while the emir of Kano was in Sokoto, British forces occupied and captured Kano, exiling the emir. Kano was incorporated into the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and became its administrative centre. Similar to the form of administration adopted in Bornu, the Kano Empire was retained, subject to the authority of the government, and although the powers of the Emir were limited, he continued and still continues to exert considerable authority on religious and political issues.

The Sokoto Caliphate was established in 1804 by Usman dan Fodio. It was created in response to the need for a central political and religious government for the multiple Hausa Kingdoms which were integrated as vassal states after their conquest by the Fulani troops in the Jihad which lasted from 1804 to 1808. The caliphate became one of the most significant empires in Africa in the 19th century, linking over 30 different territories in the region. It was also politically well-structured and thrived economically on slave trading. Chafe (1994: 99) maintains that during the Jihad, the states of Katsina, Daura and Kano were captured by the Fulani troops, and in 1809, Muhammad Bello, the son of Usman dan Fodio, founded the city

¹⁸ Previously non-Muslim kingdom which ruled present day Tchad from the 16th to the 19th century. The empire came under Islamic influence in the middle of the 18th century.

of Sokoto, which became the capital of the Sokoto Caliphate. By 1830, the Sokoto Caliphate had become one of the largest states in Africa stretching from modern day Burkina Faso to Cameroon and encompassing the largest part of Northern Nigeria and Niger Republic. Politically, the Sultan was the overall leader, presiding from his seat at the city of Sokoto. He was responsible for appointing the leaders of each empire who had a measure of independence and autonomy but who were ultimately answerable to the Caliphate. To enable the spread of Islam, the system of hereditary succession which had existed hitherto was abolished, and subsequent emirs were elected on the basis of their Islamic standing. Unfortunately, the measure of autonomy granted to the emirs eventually led to the decline in the strength of the Caliphate. Loose allegiances of the empires led to a series of revolutions which weakened its administrative structure. According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 105), the decentralised nature of the Caliphate worked against it in the ensuing campaign against British takeover. Britain would ultimately capitalise on this weakness during its invasion of the Caliphate in 1903, and the fact that the kingdoms were largely autonomous and left to their own defenses led to the success of the British strategy of conquering the smaller kingdoms before moving to the centre.

The Sokoto Caliphate gained most of its revenue through slave trade, both locally and internationally, and there was substantial economic growth throughout the region, recorded as a result of the significant trade over the Trans-Saharan routes. Even after the abolition of slavery, the Caliph allowed its practice as long as it included non-Muslims, which he claimed was a process adopted to eventually include the non-Muslims within the Muslim community (Chafe 1994: 109). The political unrest in the region, involving wars between emirs, notably the Emir of Argungu who was defeated by the Caliph in 1892, gave Britain the much needed drive to invade the region where they faced little defense from the already warring emirs. In 1903, the Sokoto Caliphate conceded to British rule and was integrated, along with its territories, into the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. Lord Lugard abolished the Caliphate, but retained the title Sultan as a symbolic position in the newly organized Northern Nigeria Protectorate (Falola 2009: [sp]). Again, like in the previous empires, the administrative structure was retained, although the emirs became answerable to the British government. By 1906, any resistance to British rule in the northern region had ended.

With the annexation of the Sokoto Caliphate, Britain had officially taken over the regions that would later be incorporated to form the Republic of Nigeria. However, they were still pockets of resistance in some hinterland areas. These movements were however quickly crushed as Britain had the military might which they did not hesitate to use. In addition, deposition of rulers and forced surrender was one of the many tactics used by the British to annex the kingdoms which existed prior to their coming. Like Kosoko in Lagos, most of the local community leaders who opposed British occupation of their territories or defied British treaties were either deposed and deported or killed by the British forces. This was the fate of many leaders including King's Pepple of Bonny, Jaja of Opobo and Nana of Itsekiri all rulers of coastal kingdoms in Southern Nigeria who refused British control of their hinterland markets. Jaja was deposed and deported to the West Indies in 1885. Caliph Attahiru of Sokoto who fled in 1903 when Britain occupied the caliphate, was pursued and killed by British forces who feared that the considerable influence he had in the region would prove to be problematic for their interests.

Following the formation of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate in 1903, and the unification of the Lagos Colony with the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906, plans to amalgamate both regions under one administrative structure began. This was fueled by the fact that there were serious economic disparities between the Southern and the Northern Protectorates of Nigeria. A peculiarity of the administrative structure employed in the protectorate of Northern Nigeria was the fact that the emirs and other local chiefs were included in the British administrative system as native authorities. This allowed them to make financial decisions on behalf of their people. As a result of this, taxation proved very difficult in the protectorate for the first years of British rule. The non-payment of taxes negatively impacted the budget of the protectorate, creating a huge deficit which meant that projects had to be funded by Britain. These administrative challenges also fueled the drive to amalgamate the protectorates of Nigeria into one colony. It was anticipated that with the creation of a central administration, revenue from the south could be used to fund projects in the north. Indeed, many Nigerians hold the position that the amalgamation of Nigeria was for economic reasons and to aid British interests in the region, and the cultural diversity of the people was not put into proper consideration. Prior to the amalgamation of Nigeria, Lord Lugard, in his dispatches sent to London, proposed the unification of both

protectorates in Nigeria because, according to him, the north was poor and had no resources to effectively run itself. Because there was no access to the sea, trade was also quite difficult, whereas the south had access to the sea and had adequate resources. It was therefore in the interest of Britain that both regions be unified. However, what the British amalgamated was solely the administration of the North and South. Although the people were now governed under one central administrative system, they had not been taught to forge a unique identity as one people. This has been and still continues to be one of the root causes of identity conflicts in Nigeria.

In 1912, Lord Lugard became the Governor General of both protectorates, and he officially established the system of indirect rule which he had previously used mostly in the Hausa states. He had a directive from Britain to unify Nigeria, and in 1914, the unified Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria was created. Lugard served as Governor General of the unified colony, supported by one lieutenant governor responsible for the territories of the south and another responsible for the territories of the north. Colonisation of Nigeria as a unified protectorate of Britain had officially begun.

Colonization brought under the sole rule of the United Kingdom previously independent territories that had been interconnected commercially and, to some extent, culturally over the previous centuries, but had not experienced political unification of any kind (Falola and Heaton 2008: 109). Establishing a government that was favored by everyone proved to be challenging as the different societies had varying systems of government. This resulted in political and cultural conflicts, which were reinforced due to the fact that culturally diverse societies were integrated to form one nation. When the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria were unified, it was as if two different countries were created. Akinjide (2000: [sp]) even goes as far as describing the amalgamation of Nigeria as a “fraud”, arguing that the interest of the Europeans in Africa and indeed Nigeria was economic, and Nigeria was created to aid the British sphere of interests for business.

COLONIALISM AND NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN NIGERIA

Nigeria remained under British colonial rule until 1960 when it gained independence. During this period, the country was almost completely restructured by Britain. Several

administrative, economic and social reforms were established with the aim of bringing “civilization” and progress to the region. Falola and Heaton (2008: 110) posit that the purpose of colonial rule (in Nigeria) was, theoretically, to alter those customs, traditions and institutions that the British “deemed” harmful to Nigerian progress, leaving existing political and social institutions intact to the greatest degree possible. Practically however, this was not the case. In order for Britain to firmly establish a system of government, some of the existing political structures, especially in Southern Nigeria had to be reorganized. In the North, it was easier for Britain to adopt the indirect rule system and maintain the existing structure as this already consisted of a central government to which the smaller states were answerable. All they had to do was replace the administration in Sokoto with a British duplicate. In the South however, the adoption of indirect rule was much more problematic as the British colonial officers had an extremely difficult time even identifying who the “traditional” rulers of the region were (Falola and Heaton 2008: 113). The communities in the south were so diverse that it was difficult to establish an administrative superstructure that was acceptable to everyone. As such, in response to these variations, councils of traditional rulers were established in Southern Nigeria, and the indirect rule system adopted in the region was directed through these councils. In principle, the people had to answer to the council of rulers who in turn were answerable to the British colonial officials. In the north however, the emir alone was responsible for authority in his region.

The difference in the indirect rule systems adopted in the north and in the south respectively had significant impacts on both regions. In the south, the colonial officials were more accommodating to western education, the development of a modern economy and modern social institutions. As a result of this, the south rapidly developed in direct contrast to the north where the traditional rulers were opposed to such western influences and explicitly favored the preservation of their already existing cultural structures.

Several other factors also contributed to the difference in the systems adopted in Northern and Southern Nigeria respectively. The fact that the south was richer in resources allowed it to independently fund development in the region. The north on the other hand had to rely on annual subsidies from the south or on grants from Britain to fund any sort of development in the region. In addition, the mandate of the indirect rule system was to maintain those customs that were valuable and effective. As such, Lugard favored the

preservation of traditional cultures in the north and restricted the access of Christian missionaries to the Muslim areas. As most of the schools in colonial Nigeria were built by Christian missionaries, this restriction inadvertently delayed the advent of European education in the north, and this meant that the growth of an educated elite was more in the south than in the north. Furthermore, the fact that most of the Europeans who came to Nigeria arrived by sea, meant that they would usually have first access to the south where the seaports were. As such, Southern Nigeria had more direct contact with Europe than their compatriots in the north. To bridge this gap, the decision to amalgamate both protectorates was reached, and this finally came into effect in 1914. However, the vast difference in development between the two regions had already left its mark, a consequence that is felt in the differences in social and political development in Nigeria even to this day.

With the Amalgamation of Nigeria, Lugard had a mandate to centralize the administrative pattern in the entire region. Finding the system employed in the north to be more acceptable, he adopted the same in the south. Falola and Heaton (2008: 117) maintain that Lugard believed the models (creation of a council of chiefs) which had been employed in Southern Nigeria amounted to little more than administrative chaos. For him, the British colonial officials had far too much influence on the council of traditional rulers. To develop the same kind of system as used in the north, he selected paramount rulers in the south who became the sole authorities in the region. As a result of the administrative reforms, the first three decades of the twentieth century saw the establishment and entrenchment of British colonial administration in Nigeria, and along with colonial rule came transformations to Nigerian economy and societies (Falola and Heaton 2008: 136).

In the early years of colonial rule, there was relative peace in Nigeria, either because the people were too afraid to react to the colonial impositions, or perhaps because they felt that their basic needs were met by the colonial system. In addition, any form of resistance was quickly repressed by the colonial government whose military might was considerably more advanced than that of the local people. Most of the traditional rulers who had resisted British rule had either been deposed and exiled, or in extreme cases killed by the British forces. These rulers were replaced by puppets, handpicked by the colonial officials and who by virtue of their appointment, owed their first allegiance to the colonial government. In the

following years after the entrenchment of colonial rule, these administrative changes created a rift between the rulers and their subjects. Loyalties were split, as certain chiefs, in order to gain Britain's approval, favored British interests over the interests of their own people. By the 1920's, the tensions between colonizer and colonized, between colonial officials and civil servants, between subjects and rulers became evident. Anti-colonial resistance, which until then had been mostly a local phenomenon, was poised to become a full-fledged nationalism movement (Falola and Heaton 2008: 111). These tensions fuelled nationalist movements which eventually led to the Nigerian independence in the year 1960.

NATIONALISM AND THE MOVE TOWARDS INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA

Apart from the tensions between the people and their leaders, several other factors led to the rise of nationalism in Nigeria. Changes to political and economic structures greatly impacted the social lives of the people, and with colonialism came urbanization which led to the emergence of cities. People began to move from the rural areas to the cities in search of jobs and better education. This mass movement resulted in the emergence of slums, and this raised questions on the validity of the colonial system which could hardly cater for the large number of people who had moved to urban areas in search of greener pastures.

In addition, to facilitate the movement of goods and services, improvements were made to the transportation and communication routes in Nigeria. Railways, newspaper and telegraph cables were built to aid the large scale commerce that colonialism had introduced in Nigeria. This, however, greatly aided the nationalist movements, as more people had access to urban areas, and newspapers were used to reach a wider audience in the denouncement of colonial policies.

Another phenomenon that led to the rise of Nigerian nationalism was the growth in the number of a European educated African elite. More and more Nigerians enrolled in European schools to be educated as Christians and as English speakers. Previously, the local people were taught to speak English for the sole purpose of interpreting and acting as middlemen between the slave traders during the period of the slave trade, and then for the colonial masters with the introduction of colonialism. The rise of a literate elite class meant that Nigerians were now able to question certain policies of the colonial government and demand more involvement in the making of policies which concerned them. This new class

of elites united themselves under several different banners to push for the replacement of the British government with an indigenous one. Those who studied in the United Kingdom formed an affinity with African subjects from other British African colonies, notably the Gold Coast and Sierra Leone. They banded together across colonial boundaries, arguing for a “west African” identity (Falola and Heaton 2008: 137). By the year 1920, the National Congress of British West Africa was founded in the Gold Coast, marking the beginning of an organised nationalist movement against colonial rule in West Africa. In the following years, political knowledge amongst the educated elite in British West Africa became prominent. Although self-government was their ultimate aim, the immediate goals were to ensure that they, rather than the traditional rulers were looked to by the colonial governments as the basis for future developments, and to increase the pace of Africanisation in government services so that there would be more openings for members in the administration of their countries (Crowder 1968: 454). In Nigeria, the push for increased representation in government by the growing elite, resulted in the implementation of the Clifford constitution in 1923, which replaced the Nigerian Council founded by Lord Lugard. This new constitution allowed for the election of Nigerians as representatives in the legislative council, and the new provision for elected members in the constitution led to the formation of a number of voters’ associations in Nigeria (Crowder 1968: 461). Prominent amongst these was the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) which was founded by Herbert Macaulay¹⁹ in 1923. With the growth of nationalism, the NNDP later become recognized as a political party. The NNDP rallied several interest groups which existed in Lagos at the time into one political entity which was able to compete and win a few seats in the Lagos Legislative Council during its elections of 1922. Herbert Macaulay and his NNDP, dominated politics in western Nigeria until 1938.

Another voters’ association which was prominent in Nigeria was the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM), founded in Lagos in 1933. The NYM was a Pan-Nigerian nationalist group which pushed for greater participation of Nigerians in the politics of Nigeria. Falola and Heaton (2008: 141) postulate that the NYM was pan-Nigerian in the sense that its explicit aim was to unite across ethnic boundaries in order to create a common voice with which to confront the colonial government. In October 1938 the NYM fought and won elections for

¹⁹ Nigerian politician, considered as the father of Nigerian nationalism.

the Lagos Town Council, ending the dominance of Herbert Macaulay and the National Democratic Party in the west (Coleman 1971: 225).

Meanwhile, prior to the formation of voters associations, political interest had gained grounds with the establishment of labour unions, some in the years preceding the amalgamation of Nigeria. The first recorded union was the Southern Nigerian Civil Service Union (SNCSU), founded in 1912. In 1925, the West African Students Union was founded by Ladipo Solanke in the United Kingdom. In Later years, unions in the railways, public works and marines were set up. In 1931, the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT) was founded, and it quickly became the largest trade union in the country (Falola and Heaton 2008: 139). In 1939, aided by the leader of the NUT, Rev I.A Ransome-Kuti, the Nigerian Union of Students (NUS) was founded.

According to the Department of Labour's annual reports, by the year 1941, there were 41 trade unions registered in Nigeria with a membership of 17,521 people. The early years of the 1940's are therefore renowned for the huge surge in nationalist movements in Nigeria.

In July 1941, several unions in the Nigerian public sector were integrated to form the African Civil Servants Technical Workers Union (ACSTW). Its main aim was to push for increased wages for workers in the public sector. Agitations by the new organisation forced the colonial government to grant a three pence per day interim increase in wages while waiting for a report from a committee founded by the government to look into the reasons for discontent amongst workers.

Meanwhile, in Europe, the 2nd World War was in full swing, and Britain was in dire straits caused by the devastation of the war and the ever rising cost of living. This high cost of living also greatly affected the workers in the British colonies who struggled to battle inflation by demanding even higher pay from the government. In addition, the nationalist movements were affected by internal strife and constant splits. The labour union leaders however, continued to emphasise the need for unity in order to successfully expel the British from Nigeria, and by the year 1942, in an effort to address the splits in the unions, the Nigeria Reconstruction Group (NRG) was founded. Amongst its founding members was Chief Nnamdi Azikiwe who would go on to become the first president of Nigeria when the country gained independence in 1960. The major reason for the formation of the NRG was to

research into the problems of the colonial government and to proffer solutions to these problems. The NRG established that, in order to fight the colonial government, unity amongst the people was paramount. To achieve this, it was necessary to incorporate an umbrella organisation that would spearhead all other sub nationalist groups. In 1943 therefore, a youth rally was organised by the NUS, and in collaboration with the NYM, a resolution was adopted for the formation of a national front. In 1944, after several campaigns, the National Council of Nigeria and the Camerouns (NCNC) was established as a political party. Herbert Macaulay was president of the new national front, and Nnamdi Azikiwe was elected as General Secretary. The NCNC was considered to be the most inclusive and truly nationalist political party in Nigeria as it consisted of religious, ethnic and trade groups. In the following years, the NCNC would become the driving force of the anti-colonial struggle in Nigeria.

Meanwhile, Nigerian women also played a major role in the anti-colonial struggle. Most prominent amongst the women movements in Nigeria was the Aba Women's riot of 1929. This riot was organised to protest against unfair taxes and policies restricting women from participating in the government. Many self-help groups for women were also founded to fight for women's rights, and perhaps the most prominent women leader at the time was Olufunmilayo Ransome-Kuti who organised the Abeokuta Ladies club in 1944. One of the many achievements of this club was a concession received from the colonial government to allow women to participate in the administration of Abeokuta.

Colonial rule did not only transform the social and political lives of the Nigerian society, but also impacted the economy of the country. To fulfill the demands of their mandate, which emphasised that there should be mutual benefits for both Britain and Nigeria, the colonial government promoted the exportation of raw materials from Nigeria and the importation of finished goods from Europe. This policy made Nigerians wholly dependent on an export economy, which favoured the growth of European firms in the region. This system negatively impacted the Nigerian economy, as Nigerian companies were ill equipped to compete with the foreign firms. In addition, the colonial government did nothing to develop the local infrastructure required to process raw materials. As such, Nigeria became overly dependent on importation, an effect which is still evident in the economy of modern day Nigerian

society. The production of crude oil, exportation for processing and importation as petrol which is sold at exorbitant prices to Nigerians who are mostly unable to afford it, is a typical example of this phenomenon.

During the Second World War, the global economic depression severely impacted the colonial export market which dominated the Nigerian economy. The value of exportation declined enormously, and this put a strain on the already insufficient income of the local labour force in the British colonies.

The beginning of the Second World War in 1939 resulted in changes to the Nigerian political economy, on a rapid scale and in ways that both benefitted and impaired the goals of the nationalists (Falola and Heaton 2008: 142). To control the Nigerian economy, the colonial government regulated importation to allow for purchase of only goods bought from the British Empire. Meanwhile, the prices of Nigerian goods on the export market were reduced to allow for European firms to easily purchase and divert them for the war effort. While these measures helped to check importation, they also reduced trade with the international market. This had a negative impact on the economy, and the lowered prices of export goods forced many Nigerian workers into severe poverty.

The conscription of young men from Nigeria to fight in the armies of the allied forces also greatly impacted the economic and social lives of the people. Since the war was fought overseas, their departure meant that labour supply became scarce, resulting in inflation of market prices for even the most basic goods.

On the other hand, the war brought a much required rapid development to the region. In order to divert resources from Nigeria to Europe for the war effort, the colonial government had to develop infrastructure and social services in the region. More harbours, railways, roads and airfields were built to allow easier transportation, communication networks were introduced, and military hospitals were constructed. The introduction of this new infrastructure meant that more professionals were required, and so centres were built for the training of soldiers, doctors, nurses and other professionals and technicians required to aid the war effort. The development of infrastructure and social services not only ameliorated the life of the people, it also served as an insight into what the role of a

government should be. Nigerians began to clamour for even more development, questioning the fact that the colonial government had only begun to develop infrastructure in the region when it was required for their own benefit.

After the war, the continuing poverty in the face of post war devastation, coupled with the fact that the Nigerian people had easier access to transport and communication networks, greatly fuelled the nationalist movement. In addition, the formation of labour unions which was discussed above meant that the people were better able to organize and unite in the fight for a common purpose: to do away with the colonial government which they believed was no longer beneficial to the Nigerian society.

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND INDEPENDENCE IN NIGERIA

In order to curb the organized and increasingly militant nationalist movements, the colonial government embarked on a development plan which involved the use of British and Nigerian revenue to develop infrastructure and social services. This development was aimed at finally achieving a gradual internal self-government for the region.

Development in Nigeria came in the form of social service reforms which impacted communication, transportation, agriculture, education, health and employment in Nigeria. The greatest impact on nationalist movements however, came from the reforms in governance and administration. Beginning in 1945, the colonial government began the “Nigerianisation” of the senior levels of the civil service. In 1939 there had been only 23 Nigerians in senior levels of service. By 1953 however, they were 786 (Coleman 1971: 313). The majority of those appointed to the civil service were nationalists, whom the colonial government hoped to appease. The growing number of Nigerians in the civil service instead gave Nigerians greater administrative influence, fuelling the desire to gain complete control of the government.

In addition to the growing administrative influence, there were also constitutional reforms enacted by the colonial government, which gave Nigerians greater access to legislative powers. From 1945 – 1954, three new constitutions were enacted. The Richards Constitution of 1946, while allowing legislative power to continue to be vested in the hands of the Governor-General and his elective council, for the first time sanctioned the

appointment of Nigerians in the central legislature. It also included the northern region in the central legislature for the first time, increasing the unity of Nigeria (Falola and Heaton 2008: 148). The Richards Constitution effectively began Nigeria's move towards a federated state by creating a unitary central legislative body and separate and regionalised legislative houses which were responsible for reaching the ordinary people.

Nevertheless, while this constitution promoted unity in Nigeria, it also cemented regional affiliations, as for the first time, regional houses of assembly were created, representing the west, the east and the north, respectively. Prior to this, regional identities had already begun to emerge with the nationalist movements and the formation of self-help groups in the 1930s. Although the common goal of the nationalist movement was to do away with the colonial government, this seemed to be the only uniting force of the movements. Falola and Heaton (2008: 137) argue that the most intractable divisions between nationalist movements were regional. The nationalist movements that had emerged in the 1930s devolved into regionally based political parties with memberships that were divided largely along ethnic lines by the 1950s. In addition, some social unions had begun to emerge, and membership was usually based on one's ethnicity or place of origin. Prominent amongst these were the Egbe Omo Oduduwa in the Yorubalands, The Ibo Federal Union in the East and the Bauchi General Improvement Union (BGIU) in the North. The BGIU later changed its name to the Northern People's Congress, one of the most prominent political parties in Nigeria. These groups were generally responsible for promoting ethnic interests and social development in their different regions.

By creating regional legislative houses, the new constitution therefore made the differences even more apparent. Apart from this however, the Richards Constitution was also criticized for having been imposed upon Nigerians without any consultation of Nigerians. Many nationalists argued that the constitution effectively undermined the cause of the nationalist movement which was intended to unite Nigerians as a single unit. As a result, many of them disapproved of it. Nevertheless, the nationalists in Northern Nigeria, for several reasons, fully supported the regional distinctions and even pushed for more autonomy for the regional assemblies. The most apparent of these reasons was the fact that the north was still much more underdeveloped than the other regions. The number of western educated northerners was very low as compared to those from the south, which meant that the civil

service even in the north was staffed mostly by elite from the south. In addition, the north was culturally distinct from the south, in that the dominant religion there was Islam, as opposed to Christianity in the south. The more conservative northerners feared that a southern dominated central legislature would force a secular state on the north, preventing northerners from governing via Islamic law or Shari'a (Falola and Heaton 2008: 150).

In response to the grievances of the nationalists, and the opposing demands from the regions, another constitution was enacted in 1951. The Macpherson Constitution, established two central councils, the central legislative and the central executive councils in the country. The central legislative council was the House of Representatives and the central executive council was known as the Council of Ministers. This constitution also established a bicameral legislature made up of the House of Chiefs and the House of Assembly in the north and in the west, while the regional legislative house in the east continued to be unicameral. Although the nationalists were included in the decision making process for the new constitution, this did not do much to help the cultural differences which, by the early years of the 1950s, had become full blown political distinctions. By granting greater legislative and financial powers to regional assemblies, the Macpherson Constitution cemented these distinctions, which were made even more apparent by the fact that the people no longer had a common cause. While the east and the west wanted full self-governance to be granted to their regional houses, the north argued against this, citing the fact that they were not ready for self-governance. Added to all of these, it was under this constitution that the first general elections in Nigeria were held. The elections awakened ethnic identities as cultural unions were restructured to form political parties that participated in the elections, vying for control of their regional houses. While the NCNC dominated in the east, the Action Group, a newly founded political party which consisted mostly of proponents of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, won the majority of the seats in the west, and the NPC took all the seats in the north (Falola and Heaton 2008: 153).

The disagreement over the internalization of self-government in the regional houses and the growing regionalization which the Macpherson Constitution had inadvertently created finally led to the ratification of another constitution. After two constitutional conferences held in 1953 and 1954 in London and Lagos respectively, the Macpherson Constitution was revised and the Lyttleton Constitution replaced it, coming into effect in 1954. This new

constitution, like the ones before it, promoted regionalisation. It however went even further to establish Nigeria formally as a federation of three regions; Northern, Western and Eastern, with Lagos as a Federal Territory administered by the central government. Under the Lyttleton Constitution, although Nigeria was to remain under British colonial rule, the regions were allowed the option to acquire full internal self-government. The desire of the NCNC for a strong central government was met, as the new constitution stipulated that, although the regional houses had jurisdiction over legislation which directly concerned its region, in cases of a legislative overlap, the federal law was to override regional law. By strengthening the powers of the regional houses, the constitution also met the demands of the NPC for a decentralized regional autonomy. In a sense, the constitution effectively brokered a deal between the different regions in Nigeria. However, although it created the foundation for the different regional political parties to work together to create a dominant national government, it also cemented the regionalization of political consciousness in Nigeria. During the elections, the regional political parties continued to dominate their region, and finally, in 1957, the western and eastern regions opted for self-governance. In the same year, Tafawa Balewa was named the first prime minister of Nigeria, and this effectively led Nigeria on the path towards independence from Britain. Although the north was initially sceptical about its ability to govern itself, in 1959, it finally joined the rest of Nigeria to attain self-governance. The Lyttleton Constitution therefore opened doors towards the realization of an independent Nigeria which finally came into effect on the 1st of October 1960.

At the time Nigeria gained independence, regionalization had become deeply entrenched in the politics of the country. Each region contended for more representation in government, and by extension, superiority over the other regions. By endorsing regionalisation, all the constitutions enacted prior to independence created an ethnic bias, which dominated and, indeed, still dominates the politics of Nigeria even to this day. Falola and Heaton (2008: 137) posit that, the independence achieved in 1960 was a fragile one, unified under a federal constitution in which politically conscious ethnic groups vied for control of the central government through ethnically based political parties.

THE RISE OF CULTURAL CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

On the 1st of October 1960, Nigeria was officially declared a sovereign state. However, Regionalism and ethnic identities continued to mar the prospect of a national identity. Although the people in the nation mapped out by the colonial government were known by the rest of the world as Nigerians, they continued to be defined by their ethnic affiliations and owed greater allegiance to their local communities than to the nation. In addition, the differences between majorities and minorities were greatly emphasized. For example, smaller ethnic groups in Nigeria became wary of the big three²⁰, whom they feared would try to dominate them, and working class people feared that they had simply traded an elite British leadership for a Nigerian bourgeoisie which, just like the British, could not relate to their most basic needs. This fear was not unfounded though, as the major ethnic groups dominated politics in their respective regions. There was very little representation for the minority ethnic groups in politics, and naturally, they oftentimes opposed the domination of the larger groups. This opposition fostered ethnic identities and weakened the cause for a unified Nigerian national identity. As such, the foundation of Nigerian independence in 1960 stood on very unsteady grounds.

In 1964, the continuing fear of impending domination led to a severely rigged election, where the political parties tried by all means available to them to win the majority seats in government. Because each region feared that they would be controlled by the other, there was a race to become the leading political party at the federal level. Nohlen, Krennerich, & Thibaut (1999: 707) state that the election was marked by manipulation and violence. Due to the irregularities of the 1964 election, it was boycotted in some constituencies in the east and west, most remarkably in Lagos. In 1965, the election was rescheduled in these districts, and widespread malpractices sparked off pre and post-election violence which were dubbed 'Operation Wetie'²¹.

The hostilities between the political parties and the resulting violent state of affairs in the west marked the beginning of the move towards the end of the first republic in Nigeria, and

²⁰ The three major tribes in Nigeria, the Igbo, the Hausa and the Yoruba.

²¹ A series of violent protests over the fraudulent 1964 election. During the crises, members of opposing political sides were sprayed with petrol and set on fire, leading to western Nigeria being dubbed the wild wild West.

in January 1966 the military intervened to supposedly “restore order to the country”. The civilian government of Tafawa Balewa and Nnamdi Azikiwe was overthrown in what was to become the first Nigerian military coup in a series of many to follow. This coup became the catalyst that ignited a string of events which culminated in the Nigerian civil war, termed the Biafran war that ravaged the still fledgling nation from 1967 to 1970.

MILITARY COUPS, POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE BIAFRAN WAR

On the 15th of January 1967, a group of rebel army officers led by Major Kaduna Nzeogu assassinated 11 top politicians and a number of soldiers. The majority of the victims of the coup were influential northerners, and amongst these were Tafawa Balewa who was prime minister at the time, and Ahmadu Bello who was the premier of the north and Sardauna of Sokoto. The premier of the western region, Samuel Akintola was also assassinated. Because the coup was led by army officials who were of predominantly eastern (Igbo) origin, and the victims were predominantly Hausa Fulani, it was termed the “Igbo coup,” a notion which was not unfounded. There were strong hints of a tribal inclination which was evident in the fact that the president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the army chief and the premier of the eastern region who were all of Igbo descent, were conspicuously left unharmed. The northerners who had previously dominated in politics were forced to relinquish power to Aguiyi Ironsi who was the military General Officer Commanding (GOC) at the time and who was of Igbo descent. This sparked off a bitter rivalry between the north and the east, and by extension, between the Hausa and the Igbo. Further grievances at the indulgent manner in which the January 1966 coup plotters were dealt with by the new government aggravated the northern elite, and in July of the same year a counter coup was effected. Garba (1982: [sp]) describes the counter coup as a mutiny by Northern Nigerian soldiers. In reaction to the killing of northern politicians and officers earlier in the year, the counter coup, led by Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed was targeted mostly at Igbo officers. This led to the overthrow and assassination of Aguiyi Ironsi and the appointment of Yakubu Gowon as Head of State.

At the time of the second coup, there was a large community of Igbos living in the north, who had relocated there in pursuit of business interests. The counter coup of 1966 sparked off a series of riots in which hundreds of military officials of eastern descent were murdered. The violence quickly spread throughout the northern region, and even civilians took to the

streets, killing and maiming Igbos living in the north. Thousands of Igbos were killed and over a million managed to escape and return to their communities in eastern Nigeria. The mass killing of Igbos in the north fostered tensions between the eastern region and the northern controlled government. Several efforts to curb the tension failed and, eventually, on the 30th of May 1967 the Governor General of Eastern Nigeria, Odumegwu Ojukwu, declared that the Nation of Biafra had seceded from Nigeria. This marked the beginning of the Nigerian civil war. The three year war was a result of Ojukwu's plan to lead the Eastern Region to form the Republic of Biafra.

According to Jacobs (1987: [sp]), about three million people, including civilians, were killed in the Biafran war. Most of the deaths were from starvation which was due to the fact that the Nigerian Navy and Air force effectively blocked all forms of aid from entering into Biafra. Many civilians died daily from kwashiorkor²², making this, one of the most ruthless civil rights breaches in world history.

Ever since the creation of the Nigerian state, political conflict has been marked by underlying ethnic and religious tensions. The regional rivalries, which played an intrinsic role in the recurrence of military coups, and which eventually led to the Biafran war, have even to present day, where Nigeria boasts of 15 years of civilian rule after a long 33 years of military rule, continued to cause religious and ethnic tensions in the country. Because the nation is largely divided between regions dominated by different ethnic and religious groups, regionalization created a medium for the spread of cultural conflicts. Prominent amongst these is the continuous religious dissent between the two major religions in the country; Islam and Christianity.

Religious extremism has resulted in a mutual distrust between the north and the south in Nigeria. There has been an unending series of attacks and counter attacks between Muslims and Christians. Many Christians in Nigeria are of the opinion that the introduction of Islam in Nigeria brought violence in its wake. Ever since the country's independence, some Muslims have called for the supremacy of Sharia law, a cause which Christians vehemently oppose. A resurgence of Islam in the late 1960s and early 1970s also brought with it a demand for the

²² Disease caused by starvation and by protein malnutrition. Due to the blockade by the Nigerian Navy and Air force, there was insufficient food and water for the refugees of the war. As a result many civilians suffered from malnutrition, especially protein deficiency.

implementation of Sharia law in the Nigerian constitution and this has led to a rise in the formation of several radical extremist groups. One of such groups, and perhaps the most radical, is the Boko Haram sect which in recent times has claimed responsibility for most of the attacks on Christian and, indeed, Muslim communities in the north and isolated attacks in the central part of the country.

The most recent series of violent attacks in the North-Eastern state of Borno has led to the death of several civilians, including women and children, the destruction of several villages, and a general state of fear, instability and insecurity in the northern part of the country.

In April 2014, approximately 300 female students were abducted from a high school in Borno state and Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping. Boko Haram has consistently spoken out against “western education” which they believe to be detrimental and against the teaching of Islam. Despite several appeals and even international intervention, at the time of writing, more than a year has gone by without these students being returned to their families. Apart from this, there have been several isolated incidents of kidnappings in remote villages of north eastern Nigeria which has now become a hub of Boko Haram influence.

Amidst international recognition for the impressive economic growth in Nigeria, the country’s achievement has been marred by political, religious and ethnic dissents. The concern that the civilian government is unable to contain the growing insecurity has led a number of people to yearn for the years of military rule, where, despite the despotic nature of the heads of state and their military, there was at least a certain sense of stability and security.

While nationalism in colonial Nigeria was beneficial as it encouraged the people in their fight for independence, the concept has been wholly ineffective in post-colonial Nigerian society. It has, in fact, been replaced by ethnicity and regionalism which, in turn, have been the major causes of conflict. Smith (1995: 57) postulates that, while Nationalism denotes a sense of shared histories between the people that constitute societies in a nation, it does not necessarily mean that this shared history is valid and the people in the societies that form a nation may not necessarily be alike. What is important is that they share a sense of solidarity for the interests of the nation. This sense of solidarity for a shared interest is what

Nigerians lack. Prior to independence, the fight for an independent Nigeria was a common cause uniting all the regions of the country despite their diversity. With the loss of this shared goal and the introduction of regionalism, cultural differences became more pronounced and, hence, have been a major deterrent to National unity since the early years of Nigerian independence.

CHAPTER THREE

IDENTITY POLITICS AND CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND OTHER

In this chapter, we undertake an empirical analysis of culture and identity by exploring several theories proposed by exponents of cultural studies. This analysis investigates the relationship that people have with those who share similar attributes with them, as compared to the relationship which they have with those of a different background. It also explores the origin of cultural conflicts, drawing from cultural theories to illustrate the fundamental basis on which these conflicts are founded.

IDENTITY POLITICS

Identity politics are ideologies and philosophical attitudes or positions that are developed in relation to the perspectives of social groups with which people identify themselves. The concept is defined by Heywood (2009: 5) as a style of politics that seeks to advance the interest of a particular group, in the face of actual or perceived injustice, oppression or marginalisation, by strengthening its members' awareness of their collective identity and common experience. As a political concept, Nom Ambe-Uva (2010: 44) defines identity politics as the political activity of various ethnic, religious and cultural groupings in demanding greater economic, social and political rights or self-determination.

People's ideologies are largely influenced by aspects of their identity in connection with social organisations. This is impacted mainly by gender, race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation. For example, religious identities are shaped by the specific religious groups with which people identify themselves, and the same goes for ethnic identities.

Identity politics is often used to describe a wide range of political and ideological trends. Some of these include feminism, gay rights movements, ethnic and cultural nationalism, religious fundamentalism and multiculturalism. According to Heywood (2009: 4-5), what all forms of identity politics have in common is that they tend to marginalise and demoralise subordinate groups and peoples. This means that although they sometimes pretend to promote universalism, the culture of identity politics and "liberal societies" more often than not, favours the interests of dominant groups. Minority groups and people are usually relegated to inferior status and are imposed with demeaning stereotypes, or they are

sometimes forced to identify with the values of the more dominant groups. This trend can be seen in colonial discourse, where non-western culture was considered to be barbaric. Edward Said highlights this in his argument that European colonialism belittled non-western people and culture with its notions about bringing civilisation to primitive or barbaric peoples...‘they’ were not like ‘us’, and for that reason deserved to be ruled (Said 1993: xi-xii). Rudy Visker also argues in the same way with his position on Europe’s misrepresentation of Africa. For him, in a bid to understand Africans, Europe fell into the trap of objectifying the African continent. He posits that to reduce the other to a content which can be known, to think that alterity is something one can learn to respect by gathering information about it is the reason why the world has been turned into one large European village (Visker 1999: 157).

Identity politics, however, do not always have negative inferences. Heywood (2009: 5) argues that identity politics also view culture as a source of liberation and empowerment. Social and political advancement can be achieved through a process of cultural self-assertion aimed at cultivating a “pure” or “authentic” sense of identity. This poses a problem though, as embracing such “authentic” identities is oftentimes a form of defiance, and it leads to the exclusion of difference. Identity politics, in principle, therefore, reject Universalist philosophies such as liberalism and socialism and favour the politics of difference by placing emphasis on factors such as gender, ethnicity, race, nationality, culture and religion.

The self-concept is a major feature in discourse on identity politics. In very broad terms, the self-concept is a person’s perception of himself. These perceptions are formed through his experience with his environment and are influenced especially by environmental reinforcements and significant others (Shavelson, Hubner & Stanton 1976: 411). Shavelson et al believe that one’s perceptions of himself are thought to influence the way in which he acts and his actions, in turn, influence the way he perceives himself. Our self-concept or self-perception is influenced by the image, belief and ideas that we have about ourselves. It is a cognitive component of our being, which defines who we are. The self-concept, in principle, is the question of “who am I?” When we become aware of our existential self, that is ourselves as a separate entity which is distinct from others, we develop a self-concept.

Our self-concept varies depending on our person. It encompasses a collection of beliefs about our individual selves which span several aspects of our lives, from the physical to the ideological. These could include physical descriptions like gender and sexuality, social roles and status, cultural identity, existential statements (I am a human being) and personal attributes, amongst others. According to Baumeister (1999: 13), it is the individual's belief about himself or herself, including the person's attributes (physical) and who and what the self is (ideological).

The way we see ourselves is, more often than not, different from how others see us. It is sometimes difficult to persuade people to see us in a certain way, even though we may be quite clear on how we see ourselves and how we want others to see us. We are oftentimes categorised by others, based on the visible attributes of a dominant group to which we associate ourselves. For example, a Christian in Nigeria or in Sudan will almost always be wary of a Muslim even though the said Muslim does not lean towards any fanatical views. In this research, we will focus broadly on cultural conceptions of the self in relation to the other, and our major focus will be on religious identities and their effect on nationalism.

In order to expatiate on the conceptions of self and other, we should first of all understand the process of identity formation. Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 5) define identity as any group attribute that provides recognition or definition, reference, affinity, coherence and meaning for individual members of the group, acting individually or collectively. A person's identity, just like the self-concept, relates to the question who am I? While the self-concept poses the question, a person's identity is the answer to this question. Our perception of ourselves, therefore, contributes to our formation of an identity.

Our identity is characterised by a discovery of ourselves as separate and unique from other people. It is determined by our cultural, social and ideological affiliations. These within-group affiliations, in addition to satisfying our need for membership, help us to define our distinct personalities in relation to ourselves and to others. Amartya Sen (2007: 1) posits that a sense of identity can be a source not merely of pride and joy, but also of strength and confidence. By this, Sen emphasises the famous saying by John Donne that "No man is an island entire of itself". As humans, we take pride in identifying ourselves with a larger group, and in a certain sense finding our roots, which means identifying ourselves with people who

share similar attributes with us. This sense of identity strengthens the relationships we have with people, usually those from the same community, or those of the same cultural background, and it takes us beyond the egocentric fascination with the world of “I”. Samuel Huntington (1996: 125) maintains that people and countries with similar cultures are coming together and peoples and countries with different cultures are coming apart. This means that people are constantly locating and forming alliances with those who share similar attributes with them. However, while identity may be a source of joy, it can in the same vein, be the cause of conflict. Over identifying with one group can cause us to exclude others on the basis of real or imagined differences. Amartya Sen argues that although identity may be a source of pride, it can also kill with abandon. A strong-and exclusive-sense of belonging to one group can, in many cases, carry with it the perception of distance and divergence from other groups. Within group solidarity can help to feed between-group discord. We may suddenly be informed that we are not just Rwandans but specifically Hutus (“we hate Tutsis”) Sen (2007: 2). The same community of people could be at the same time very accommodating to one group of persons whom they consider as sharing similar attributes with them, and very discriminatory towards another group whom they consider as different. This position is sustained in my argument for the basis of religious conflicts. Religious fundamentalism is fuelled by a strong devotion to one religious group and its ideologies, and this oftentimes incites a disregard for the tenets of other religions.

In recent years, human beings are increasingly being classified based on their cultural affiliations. These classifications determine who and what we are, and how we relate with others in our social society. The 1990s have seen the eruption of a global identity crisis. Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, “Who are we?” “Where do we belong?” and “Who is not us?” (Huntington 1996: 125). These questions are essential to the formation of new identities and new nation states, as was the case with Biafra in its secession from Nigeria, and as was the case with Northern and Southern Sudan which eventually separated to form two nation states. The answers to these questions are the cultural identity of a people or country, and this identity is what defines how they relate with others who do not share the same culture or beliefs as they do.

People distinguish themselves from others by focusing on characteristics that set them apart. In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and belief, faith and family. People rally to those with similar ancestry, religion, language, values and institutions and distance themselves from those with different ones (Huntington 1996: 126). As a result, we are more often than not, drawn to those with whom we share similar traits. While this is positive in a certain sense, it can sometimes take on a negative inference when it leads to discrimination. When people in a particular group who deem themselves to have similar attributes, recognise difference in other people, there is a tendency to either exclude or try to forcibly assimilate them. Herder, cited by Welsch (1999: 195), maintains that everything which is still the same as my nature, which can be assimilated therein, I envy, strive towards, make my own; beyond this, kind nature has armed me with insensibility, coldness and blindness; it can even become contempt and disgust. Herder who was a proponent of the concept of culture as homogenous, argued for the emphasis on the own and the exclusion of the foreign. His argument promotes the fascination with the world of “I” and the exclusion of the “other”.

The forceful assimilation of difference, more often than not, leads to conflict. Homi Bhabha argues, (although he speaks about this in reference to colonial discourse), that this conflict is caused by the anxiety connected to the encounter with difference, on the one hand, and the attempt through fantasy²³ to normalise the disturbance and hence to stabilise a precarious identity, on the other (Bhabha 1994: 74). By this, he means that the encounter with difference or with people of a different background, whether racial, religious, political or ethnic, poses in the mind of a person, or group of persons, a certain threat to their identity, and by extension, their existence. One’s identity becomes precarious when faced with the threat of an “other”²⁴ who does not conform to what they consider as standard norms. This person or groups of persons therefore create in their minds, a fetish,²⁵ as termed by Bhabha (1994) and Hook (2005), which allows them to justify the forceful assimilation of those

²³ Fantasy for Bhabha is the process of creating a stereotype which functions to normalise the multiple beliefs and split subjects that constitute colonial discourse. Through fantasy, the colonial subject attempts to normalise that difference.

²⁴ In relation to the self and the other. This is a concept of the identity of difference which depicts everyone or everything else as opposed to the self.

²⁵ The fetish is a creation in the mind of a subject, which acts as a substitute for difference. The fetish is an attempt to normalise difference and to make the other knowable.

whom they consider as different. This forceful assimilation is the basis on which conflicts are founded. The disavowal of difference is, therefore, caused by the threat which an “other” poses to a world in my own image, to the narcissistic universe of me and mine (Hook 2005: 722).

Derek Hook in “The Racial Stereotype, Colonial Discourse, Fetishism, and Racism” examines the ways in which people deal with difference which he terms a disturbing “other”. One of the ways which he illustrates is the dehumanisation process. He compares the encounter with difference to Sigmund Freud’s account of the psychosexual development of the male child²⁶ (Hook 2005: 712). Both encounters, according to Hook, are characterised by anxiety on having discovered the other who, in a way, threatens one’s identity. He terms this “the threat of loss”. The stakes of loss are seemingly catastrophic, at least from the perspective of the threatened subject, to whom the threat is that of the collapse of a narcissistic or solipsistic image of the world of me (Hook 2005: 713). This threat is the existence of a significant other which generates fear in the mind of the supposedly threatened subject. The threat does not necessarily have to be physical, but is more often than not a psychological process whereby the person who has encountered difference and does not understand it feels threatened by its existence. This fear is what leads to aggression. When a group feels that their Identity is being threatened by another group, the most likely response will be to try to eliminate the other group. For Hook, in order to justify violence and suppression, people focus on what is most objectionable about others. By doing this, they attempt to reduce the other into something knowable. He calls this attempt, the buttoning down of otherness (Hook 2005: 705), which he likens to Homi Bhabha’s notion of Fixity. Fixity marks off boundaries, hardening difference by creating stereotypes - like with colonialisms’ conceptualising subjects that needed civilising. Fixity creates a fetish which becomes the object or activity that makes the irrational defence of oneself tenable (Hook 2005: 714). The fetish may be an actual physical object or a concept, and it becomes a special device for managing co-present and yet opposed beliefs. In my view, the fetish can be compared to the unfounded belief that there are rewards for those who die in a “holy war”. This has been used as the justification for many religious wars. While the Koran does

²⁶ Freudian theory which stipulates that if a child experienced sexual frustration in relation to any psychosexual development stage, he or she would experience anxiety that would persist into adulthood as a neurosis, a functional mental disorder.

say in (4: 74) *“So let those fight in the cause of Allah who see the life of this world for the Hereafter. And he who fights in the cause of Allah and is killed or achieves victory- We will bestow upon him a great reward”*, I believe that the major problem is not that Islam condones violence, but that many people have misinterpreted what this statement by the Prophet stands for and have used this to justify their violent actions.

In his analysis of identity and difference, Sen (2006: 3) posits that the unrestrained power over the lives of suspected enemy combatants, or presumed miscreants, sharply bifurcates the prisoners and the custodians across a hardened line of divisive identities (“they are a separate breed from us”). It seems to crowd, often enough, any consideration of other, less confrontational features of the people on the opposite side of the breach, including, among other things, their shared membership of the human race.

In any attempt to resolve identity conflicts, it is important to emphasise the shared humanity of all people, as this most essential fact is oftentimes overlooked. After all, the Jew is a man whom other men look upon as a Jew; it is the anti-Semite who makes the Jew (Satre cited by Sen 2006: 7). Usually, in promoting differentiation, people tend to focus on only those aspects of their lives which separate them from others and which mark them off as unique or different. As humans however, we must understand that difference is a constituted concept and is defined by the social world of a community. In other words, our cultural groups define certain rules to which we are obliged to adhere. We, therefore, tend to look down on those who do not share the same beliefs as we do.

The cultural identity of a society is defined by the social network of people imitating the norms as set out by the dominant group in that society. In this case, the society determines what attributes, internal or external are relative to it. When the people in that society recognise difference in others, there is a tendency to exclude them. A person or group of persons who are perceived by another group as not belonging or as being different in some way become the “other”. The attributes of the larger group are set as the norm, and those who do not meet the standards of those norms are judged as being different. This is usually in a negative way, as the stranger or the other is perceived as lacking the essential characteristics required to make him part of the group. He is oftentimes regarded as

inferior, and is treated as such. Some societies even go as far as depriving the supposed other or the strangers of legal rights or allowing them only very few privileges in the society.

Anthony Smith postulates that in a unit of population aspiring to constitute a full nation, certain categories of the population may be excluded from the full exercise of the common legal rights, or they may not enjoy equal access to the common system of education, or equal mobility in the territorial economy (Smith 2004: 183). He argues that even in cases where they are allowed to enjoy all attributes and rights, they may still be treated by the majority as in some sense, cultural aliens, standing outside the sense of history and much of the culture of the majority. As an example of this situation, Smith uses the Asians in East Africa after decolonisation. In the early 1990s, during the constitutional review in Uganda, Asian settlers in the region demanded to be included in the new constitution as an ethnic group. This demand was seen by many Ugandans as a bid for indigeneity which was aimed at getting access to land, and ensuring legal protection against any form of expropriation in future. The request was unsurprisingly rejected.

Difference takes many forms, ranging from race, nationality, religion, social class, political ideology or sexual orientation. In this study, we will focus on difference in relation to culture, and to be more specific, religion, and the negative effects that religious conflicts have on a common national identity. Societal standards play a significant role in the formation of identities. Its structures and classifications impact the way that people conceive of or identify themselves. A general or popular conception of a particular group of people in a society tends to become the standard depiction or the norm of that society. Hence, our society determines how we view ourselves in relation to others around us, and it oftentimes determines how we relate with them.

Several exponents of identity politics argue that diversity is an essential part of culture, and that societies constitute inherent differences. Amartya Sen for example, espouses that societies consist of people with multiple identities, and only when these become conflicting identities, do clashes ensue. He argues that difference is natural and is not necessarily bad, and people who have different beliefs or ideologies do not always have to disagree. By accepting those who have different views, we do not have to compromise our own beliefs. Violence, according to Sen (2007: 2), is fomented by the imposition of singular and

belligerent identities on gullible people, championed by proficient artisans of terror. By this, he means that difference is normal and we strengthen relationships by associating ourselves with others, even though they are different from us. This in itself is not a bad thing. In fact, Sen argues that this strengthens bonds and makes us go beyond our self-centred lives. Conflicts, however, arise when people become so tangled with their immediate group that they fail to realise that difference is normal, people are multifaceted and culture is heterogeneous. Sen uses the Al Qaeda system as an example of this. According to him, Al Qaeda relies heavily on cultivating and exploiting a militant identity specifically aimed against Western people (Sen 2007: 3). The group focuses on the exhortation of radical Islam which is vehemently opposed to Western civilisation and influence. In relation to this study, we will apply Sen's theory to the Boko Haram system. Like Al Qaeda, Boko Haram targets Western education and ideologies and claims that these are bad. The meaning of the word Boko Haram translates in the Hausa language as "Western Education is Sin".

CULTURAL IDENTITY

Our identity, as discussed previously, is a collection of those traits and characteristics, both physical and conceptual that define our existence. This cuts across several different aspects, ranging from ideology, politics and economy to culture. Samuel Huntington argues that, prior to and during the Cold War period, identity was structured mainly along ideological, political and economic lines. However, it has, over the years, progressively become defined along cultural lines. People now classify themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities and nations. Culture and cultural identities, according to Huntington, are now at the forefront of post-Cold War world conflicts.

People align themselves to others for several reasons, some of which are, to achieve common goals, to share ideas, for identification and security, amongst other things. Human beings are constantly finding and aligning themselves to others in order to defend themselves against outside influence, and against the unknown.

Huntington maintains that the years after the Cold War witnessed the beginnings of dramatic changes in peoples' identities and the symbols of those identities. Global politics

began to be reconfigured along cultural lines (Huntington 1996: 19). By this, he means that our cultural identities have increasingly taken precedence over other forms of identification, because, as he puts it, “culture counts, and cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people”. Huntington goes ahead to explain the basis for cultural conflicts with his argument that, people are discovering new but often old identities and marching under new but often old flags which lead to wars with new but often old enemies (Huntington 1996: 20). In other words, people have always existed as different from each other. However, the post-Cold War period brought about a recognition of difference along cultural rather than political lines. Crosses, crescents and head coverings, all symbols of culture and, to be more specific, religion, replaced flags which were up till then, the major symbol of identity. This discovery of cultural distinctions brought with it a disregard for difference. Huntington (1996: 20-21) states that for peoples seeking identity and re-inventing ethnicity, enemies are essential. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are. We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against.

Huntington’s clash of civilisations theory is mainly applied on a broader level, pitching nations against nations. He uses the example of the on-going conflict between the West and Islam or China. However, his argument can also be applied on a much smaller scale, to conflicts between different cultural groups within a nation. According to Huntington (1996: 28), tribal wars and ethnic conflicts will occur within civilisations. If we replace civilisations with religions, we have Islam pitched against Christianity, two major religions which have been at odds over the years, giving rise to the emergence of several extremist groups on both sides.

One of Huntington’s positions which is most worthy of note is in his statement that local politics is the politics of ethnicity, and global politics is the politics of civilisations (Huntington 1996: 28). This is interesting not only because it puts forward an argument for the basis of intertribal conflicts which can be attributed to ethnic and religious differences, but it also explains the basis for international crises, mainly those along religious lines. Take for example, the Islamist extremist groups, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Boko Haram. Although the central ideology amongst them seems to be the creation of Islamic

Caliphates; nations and whole regions governed solely by Islamic laws, the common ideology seems to be a war against the West. To put this in Huntington's words, this is a "clash of civilisations", namely, the West pitched against Islam.

Huntington argues further that culture is both a divisive and a unifying force. Like many other forms of identity, our cultural identity is a double edged sword. Although ideologies may differ, sameness in culture tends to bring people together in the fight for a common goal. On the other hand, societies united by ideology or historical circumstance but divided by civilisation (culture), either come apart, as did the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Bosnia, or are subjected to intense strain, as is the case with Ukraine, Nigeria, Sudan, India, Sri Lanka and many others (Huntington 1996: 28). It should be noted that, presently, North and South Sudan have separated due to irreconcilable cultural differences between them.

CULTURALLY BASED CONFLICTS

In the years immediately following the Cold War period, cultural conflicts became more and more prominent. This does not mean that religious or ethnic wars did not exist prior to this time. It only means that they were very few major wars caused by cultural differentiation. The two World Wars, for example, started as a result of differences in political ideologies, although the 2nd World War did have some cultural undertones. The Holocaust which took place during World War II and which involved the killing of millions of people, mostly Jews, was a form of ethnic cleansing planned and executed by Nazi Germany against the Jews and other cultural groups and targeted people who were considered as inferior to Germans.

According to Huntington, it was assumed after the Cold War period that global conflicts had come to an end, and there was to emerge one relatively harmonious world. This, he argues, is undeniably an illusion. The world became different in the early 1990s but not necessarily more peaceful. Huntington's argument is that the basis for global conflicts shifted from politics to culture, but this did not make the world peaceful. On the contrary, it only changed the fault lines or causes of global conflicts from politically to culturally based conflicts, leading to an increase in ethnic conflicts, and the intensification of religious fundamentalism. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, for example, was one of the bloodiest ethnic conflicts in history. An estimated eight hundred thousand Rwandans were killed in

the space of a hundred days (Rwanda: How the... 2011: [sp]). The killings were carried out in the name of cultural purification, and most of the dead were Tutsis, while the perpetrators were Hutus. Neighbours became enemies and people killed others on behalf of their “own people”. The years after the Cold War have, indeed, witnessed severe ethnic cleansing that has led to a massive loss of human life and property.

In lending his voice to the paradigm of ‘us and them’, Huntington defines cultural differentiation as the creation of two worlds. People are always tempted to divide themselves into us and them, the in-group and the other, our civilisation and those barbarians (Huntington 1996: 32). This is clearly portrayed by the major ideologies of differentiation, colonialism and racism. Colonialism resulted from a need to “bring civilisation” to an “other”, a “them” who was considered as uncivilised. Europe’s “mission civilisatrice” in Africa was to acculturate Africans because, for Europeans, Africans were barbaric and in need of humanising, hence the notion of the White Man’s Burden as suggested in Rudyard Kipling’s poem of the same title²⁷. Racism, in addition, entrenched the paradigm of us and them by focusing on physical difference. The barbarian became the other who was unworthy of being integrated and who could only be rendered bearable by exclusion. While colonialism encouraged assimilation, racism entrenched difference and encouraged exclusion. Rudy Visker argues in *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology*, that Europe’s interaction with Africa through colonialism was to give herself recognition as a superior race, and to create a self out of the other. In other words, African cultures did not exist in the mind of Europeans as a civilisation which was worth accepting. Europe’s tactic was, therefore, to assimilate Africans into European culture, to teach Africans the ways of Europe, which to them was the civilised way. To achieve this, she objectified Africa and turned her into a barbaric other which was to be civilised.

One of Huntington’s arguments for the emergence of global conflicts based along religious lines is the fact that Western culture is fading off and no longer has as much influence as it did previously. For him, the end of European colonialism and the recession of American hegemony has led to the erosion of Western culture which, in turn, has been characterised by the reassertion of indigenous, historically rooted mores, languages, beliefs, and

²⁷ Kipling describes the white man’s burden as Europe’s “obligation” to “civilise” Africa

institutions (Huntington 1996: 91). Muslim societies in this new culturally savvy world, which is bent on rejecting Westernisation, are characterised, according to Huntington, by the resurgence of Islam and re-Islamisation. The aim is no longer to modernise Islam but to “Islamise modernity”. The decline of western culture and the resultant religious revival has, in part, involved expansion by some religions such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Orthodoxy, and in all of them, fundamentalist movements arose, which were committed to the militant purification of religious doctrines and institutions, and the reshaping of personal, social and public behaviour in accordance with religious tenets. The fundamentalist movements are dramatic and can have significant political impact (Huntington 1996: 96). We can see this trend in the insurgence of more Islamic fundamentalist groups calling for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Boko Haram, for example, has not only caused a religious crisis in Nigeria, but has also marred the political structure of the Nigerian society with its consistent acts of terrorism.

Finally, Huntington argues that the resurgence of religious identities in the latter part of the 20th century was due mainly to modernisation and the ensuing movement of people to urban areas. People interact with large numbers of strangers and are exposed to new sets of relationships by migrating. They need new sources of identity, new forms of stable community, and new sets of moral precepts to provide them with a sense of meaning and purpose. Religion, both mainstream and fundamentalist, meets these needs (Huntington 1996: 97).

RELIGIOUS RESURGENCE

As more countries become economically independent from the West, cultural assertion has become more prominent. People are interested in modernisation without necessarily being westernised. Previously, the two were essentially the same thing, and in order to be modern, one had to adopt Western values. Previously colonised countries, for example, thought that the only way to be recognised was to adopt Western political and social structures and norms. In the latter part of the 20th century, however, the politics of identity changed. Asians attributed their economic development to adherence to their culture not Western cultures. Muslim countries have turned to Islam not just as a religion, but as a civilization and a source of identity. Western law has been replaced by Islamic law in most

Muslim countries and in societies with large Muslim populations. In Nigeria, for example, Sharia law was instituted in the North as the main body of civil and criminal law in 1999. In recent years, the world has also witnessed the formation of several extremist groups advocating for the institution of a purer and more stringent form of Islam across the Middle East. Samuel Huntington (1996: 110) argues that the Islamic resurgence is the effort by Muslims to achieve this goal (of modernisation without being westernised). It is a broad intellectual, cultural, social and political movement prevalent throughout the Islamic world.

Huntington likens the Islamic resurgence to Marxism with scriptural texts. It supports the vision of a perfect society and encourages the commitment to fundamental change. This is characterised by the rejection of existing political or principal structures and the introduction of doctrines ranging from “moderate reformist to violent revolutionary”. Fundamentalist Islam advocates for a purer and more demanding form of religion, and it has taken hold in many societies because it appeals to generations across many political and social backgrounds and across all age ranges. Amongst these, are young middle-class people with the dynamism required to fight for what they believe or what they have been made to believe, gullible lower-class partisans who are happy to take part as long as they get food on the table, and as long as they get a sense of belonging, and upper-class politicians and elite who are the financial backbone responsible for funding these fundamentalist movements. In all, religious fundamentalism has become so entangled with political, social and economic issues that it has become difficult to distinguish them.

Religious resurgence in the post-Cold War period is quite comprehensive. It is not just a cultural phenomenon, but extends to politics, intellectual and individual aspects. To ignore the impact of the Islamic resurgence on Eastern Hemisphere politics in the late twentieth century is equivalent to ignoring the impact of the Protestant Reformation on European politics in the late sixteenth century (Huntington 196: 111). The only difference between the resurgence and the reformation, Huntington argues, is in their scope of reach. While the reformation was largely limited to Northern Europe, it made little progress in Eastern Europe and the rest of the world. The resurgence, however, from the 1970s, has spanned almost all Muslim societies. Islamic institutions have won increasing support and commitment amongst Muslims stretching from Morocco to Indonesia and from Nigeria to

Kazakhstan. Islamization tended to occur first in the cultural realm and then to move on to the social and political spheres (Huntington 196: 111). Again, **we** will make reference to the Boko Haram group in Nigeria whose motives were initially largely cultural. The group aims its policies at adopting a “purer” form of Islam and establishing an Islamic Caliphate across the nation. Whilst this still remains a main objective, Boko Haram members have been seen to target political structures and social institutions in a bid to undermine the political authority of the federal government of Nigeria.

At the end of the Cold War period, global conflicts did not automatically end. Instead, countries throughout the world began developing new and reinvigorating old identities and affiliations based on cultural connections. Huntington calls this the groping for groupings. In other words, people and nation states are looking to associate themselves with others of similar beliefs and ideologies. This gives them a greater sense of security as they can call on their “brothers” in time of conflict. He goes on to explain the reasons why cultural commonality facilitates cooperation, on the one hand, and why cultural difference promotes conflicts, on the other. First, everyone has multiple identities which may compete with or reinforce each other: kinship, occupational, cultural, institutional, territorial, educational, partisan, ideological, and others. Identifications along one dimension may clash with those along a different dimension (Huntington 1996: 128). In addition, identity conflict arises when more importance is attributed to one dimension of a person’s identity than to the others. When we allow our religious affiliations to take precedence over other aspects of our identity, we risk placing too much importance on discriminating others who do not share the same religious views as we do. In Nigeria, this emphasis on one aspect of identity is evident when people regard themselves as Muslims and Christians, rather than as Nigerians who share a common goal, to build a nation where peace and harmony prevails.

Additionally, Huntington (1996: 129) argues that identity at any level - personal, tribal, racial, civilizational – can only be defined in relation to an “other”, a different person, tribe, race or civilisation. Separate codes governed behaviour toward those who are “like us” and the “barbarians” who are not. The rules of the nations of Christendom for dealing with each other were different from those for dealing with the Turks and other “heathens”. Muslims

acted differently toward those of Dar al-Islam and those of Dar al-harb.²⁸ This statement sums up the relations between people with a common identity and people of a different one. For several reasons, our relationship with people of the same background has and will always differ from that with people of a different background. When relating with people of a different cultural or social background, our interactions are, more often than not, shrouded with wariness and, in extreme cases, violence due to an innate fear and lack of trust in them. Most importantly, differences in language always pose a physical communication problem, while differences in civil behaviour pose a mental communication problem. We sometimes find it difficult to relate with others because our moral standards are supposedly superior to theirs. This brings us to the other reason why our association with people of a separate background may be different, namely, feelings of superiority, on the one hand, and inferiority, on the other. We oftentimes find it hard to relate with people whose cultural background we consider to be inferior to ours. As discussed previously, this has been the basis for so many culturally oppressive systems over the years, like slavery, colonialism, racism, the holocaust, apartheid, the genocide in Rwanda, and intercultural conflicts in Nigeria and several other countries which have diverse cultural societies. Religious and ethnic conflicts have become so entrenched in multicultural societies that they have seemingly become the norm. Additionally, a lack of familiarity with the customs of other people affects our relationship with them, usually in a negative way. This adverse reaction is a resultant effect of the fear of the unknown, and is largely dependent on how open we are to accepting difference, and our willing to understand different customs and appreciate them. Furthermore, and as Huntington puts it, it is human to hate. For self-definition and motivation, people need enemies. They naturally distrust and see as threats those who are different and have the capability to harm them (Huntington 1996: 130).

Many countries today face cultural conflicts stemming from their heterogeneous nature. The existence of several ethnic, racial and religious groups in one society causes divisions along cultural and political lines. A pattern of political division based on race is in the case of South Africa, where there is a continuous struggle for superiority amongst the different racial groups. In Nigeria on the other hand, political divisions have mostly been caused by

²⁸ Literally meaning house of Islam or peace. Dar al-Islam is a philosophical division of the world by Muslim scholars. It denotes the area of the world under the rule of Islam. Dar al-harb on the other hand literally means house of war and denotes those areas of the world where Muslim law is not enforced.

the ethnic diversity which pitches the different ethnic groups against each other especially in the struggle for resource allocation. These divisions often lead to violence and have even threatened the unity of the country. Movements for autonomy have threatened quite a number of African countries, especially those where cultural conflicts are based on geographical location. This was the case with the separation of Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1993 due to religious differences, with Sudan's civil war between the Muslim north and the largely Christian south, which eventually led to the creation of two independent nation states, and with Nigerian politics which also led to a civil war and stimulated several coups, rioting, religious and ethnic violence and political conflicts. In multicultural countries where culture does not coincide with geographical location, conflicts have arisen through migration and genocide as was the case with Rwanda.

ORIGIN OF GLOBAL RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS

Religious conflicts did not just start after the Cold War period. They had existed long before then. The two major religions, Christianity and Islam have always had continuing deeply conflictual relations, oftentimes locked in a combat for power, land and converts to their religion. According to Huntington, each has been the other's other. At times peaceful co-existence has prevailed; more often the relation has been one of intense rivalry and varying degrees of hot war (Huntington 1996: 209).

The first Arab-Islamic movement started as far back as in the early seventh century and lasted until the mid-eighth century. This witnessed the institution of Muslim rule in North Africa, Iberia, the Middle East, Persia and Northern India. From October to December 630, the Prophet Mohamed and his army of 3000 or so Muslims marched on Tabouk a city in what is today Saudi Arabia, intending to fight the Byzantine army. On arriving in Tabouk, they found that the Byzantine army was not stationed there. Having no one to fight or threaten them, Mohamed launched a Jihad on the surrounding Christian and Jewish cities. He forced the smaller Christian tribes to either convert to Islam or pay tax imports otherwise known as Jizyah,²⁹ in exchange for being left at peace.

²⁹ A tax levied on non-Muslim subjects of an Islamic state. In return for paying the Jizyah, these subjects were entitled to the state's protection from outside aggression.

In the late eleventh century, Christians asserted control of the Western Mediterranean, and in 1095, Christendom launched its Crusades. Pope Urban II joined forces with Alexus I of Constantinople to wage a war, the first crusade, against Turkish Muslims who had occupied Jerusalem at the time. On 27 November of the same year, during a Synod in France, he declared: "...Let them go instead against the infidel and fight a righteous war. God himself will lead them, for they will be doing His work. There will be absolution and remission of sins for all who die in the service of Christ..." (The Christian Crusades 1095-1291).

From the above, we see that conquest has always been a major dynamic in religious wars and the same underlying forces have prevailed over the years, namely, the belief that the war is a "fight for God" and believers will be rewarded as long as they take part in the war. Huntington (1996: 210) argues, however, that the causes of the recent pattern of conflict lie not in transitory phenomena such as twelfth-century Christian passion or twentieth-century Muslim fundamentalism. They flow from the nature of the two religions. He attributes this to both the differences and the similarities between the two religions. The difference in the sense that, whilst Muslims consider Islam as not just a religion but a way of life which transcends religion and politics, Christians view their religion as separate from the state, the classic notion of "to Caesar what is his and to God what is his". He argues further that conflict also stems from the similarities between the two religions. Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones, cannot easily assimilate deities, and which see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions believing that their adherents have an obligation to convert non-believers to that one true faith (Huntington 1996: 211).

This study focuses on Huntington's theories because many of his arguments relate extensively to the basis of conflict in recent years. Although some critics of Huntington's theory like Amartya Sen, have argued that the world cannot be divided in such precise terms to civilizational fault lines as Huntington proposes, I find that the reasons which Huntington gives for his argument are worthy of note. For example, he suggests several reasons why religious conflict between Christianity and Islam has increased over the years, one of which is the Muslim population growth, which generated a large number of unemployed and disaffected young people who become willing recruits for fundamentalist causes. Take, for

instance, the crises in Northern Nigeria. Even though the country's political capital is currently situated in the north-central region of the country, Northern Nigeria has the largest number of uneducated and unemployed youth. These youth have become the most gullible targets for extremists who play on their ignorance and make promises to them of easy wealth. Additionally, he argues that interaction and intermingling also exacerbate differences over the rights of the members of one civilisation in a country dominated by members of the other civilisation.

A CLASH OF RELIGIONS – ISLAM VS CHRISTIANITY AND THE WEST

Within both Muslim and Christian societies, tolerance for the other declined sharply in the 1980s and 1990s (Huntington 1996: 211). The clashes between Islam and Christianity have, however, slowly shifted over the years into a broader form of conflict. Islam pitched not only against Christianity, but also against Western culture and politics. In Muslim eyes, Western secularism, irreligiosity and, hence, immorality, are worse evils than the Western Christianity that produced them (Huntington 1996: 212). Conflicts between both sides have intensified over the years, and these conflicts tend to strengthen their separate identities and result in even more pronounced differences between them. Secular values represented by the West are pitched against religious values in Islam. This trend can be seen in Nigeria with the Boko Haram group, in East Africa with Al Shabaab, and in the Middle East with the several Islamic extremist groups calling for attacks on the West. In the 1980s and 1990s, according to Huntington (1996: 213), the overall trend in Islam was in an anti-Western direction. He argues that Islamic resurgence against Western values is, for the most part, in reaction to Westernisation, what he calls “Westoxication” of Muslim societies. The reaffirmation of Islamic values challenges Western influence on local society and morals and Western intervention in local politics. On the other hand, the major problems which the West has with most Muslim dominated countries are based on issues such as the production of weapons, human rights breaches, control of oil, migration and terrorism. For many Muslims, Western values are decadent, materialistic and immoral, and in a similar way, many Westerners see Islam as a source of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and, in Europe, unwanted migrants (Huntington 1996: 215). For some Muslims, especially in the Middle East, the West is “militaristic” and “imperialistic” and has “traumatised” other nations through “colonial terror.” Speaking about western influence, Mernissi (1992: 3, 9,

146-147), states that “It crushes our potentialities and invades our lives with its imported products and televised movies that swamp the airwaves... it is a power that crushes us, besieges our markets, and controls our merest resources, initiatives and potentialities. That was how we perceived our situation, and the Gulf war turned our perception into certitude”. This is a sentiment which is shared by many Muslims. Most believe that their basic values are different from those of The West, and, yet, Western influence aims at making Muslims and, indeed, other less advanced societies, whose values and customs they do not understand, like them.

The shift in the relationship between Islam and the West is most noticeable in the growing antagonism of the governments in many Muslim dominated countries towards Western countries. Whilst the immediate postcolonial governments were more pro-Western in their policy making, these governments gradually gave way to more anti-Western ones like in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. It must be noted, however, that most of these countries have gone through revolutionary wars in which the West provided support in the fight against the government. This resulted in the replacement of the anti-Western governments with more liberal ones. This has been the case in Libya, Egypt, Iraq and Afghanistan.

While the conflict between Islam and the West has, in some cases, not degenerated into a full blown war, it has, to all intents and purposes, portrayed the same dynamics of a war. The perception which both sides have of each other has given rise to Islamist extremism which often results in a high number of casualties across several nations. Huntington calls the tension between the two sides a quasi-war. It is a quasi-war in the sense that Islam is not fighting all of The West, and while the conflict has been continuing, it has not been continuous (Huntington 1996: 216). He describes the conflict as a war of terrorism versus air power. For Huntington, the underlying problem for The West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam; a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defence. It is the West; a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining power, imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world (Huntington 1996: 217–218). I do not entirely agree with Huntington that the problem for

the West is Islam and not Islamic fundamentalism. The major conflicts between Muslim countries and the West and, indeed, between Islam and Christianity have been due mainly to Islamic fundamentalism. The conflict is not against religion in itself but against the fanatics who commit various atrocities in the name of religion.

THEORIES ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT

The existence of more than one cultural group in a society and the increased contact between these groups kindles in them a new sense of their identity and how it differs from the other. Interaction between them also raises an awareness of the differences in the privileges allowed to members of one culture group, especially in societies which are dominated by members of another culture group. This awareness oftentimes exacerbates cultural conflicts over constitutional rights and privileges. Several questions become pertinent. Who dominates and who submits? Who is entitled to a free education and who is not? Who should have a larger number of people employed in the civil service and in what region of the country? All of these questions apply to the Nigerian society and its struggles over what rights and privileges should be allocated to a particular ethnic or religious group. Mahmoud Mamdani calls this struggle the post-colonial dilemma. For him, the colonial state institutionalised two major identities, political and cultural, which were later adopted by the post-colonial state. The European colonialists at the time were classified as a race having a political identity which was to be governed by civil law, while the Africans were classified into ethnicities, having cultural identities which were to be governed by customary law. Races were entitled to civil rights, while ethnicities were entitled to customary rights. Nationalism, according to Mamdani, was, therefore, a struggle of “natives” to be recognised as a trans-ethnic identity, as “Africans,” and thus as a race to gain admission to the world of rights and to civil society, which was a short form for civilised society (Mamdani 2001: 654). The problem with this institutionalisation of rights for races and ethnicities, however, was that Europeans were not the only ones who were classified as races. Certain ethnic groups in African societies were privileged over their counterparts and were also classified under this category. These were referred to as subject races. Mamdani compares the subject races to the house Negro as opposed to the field Negro on plantations during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade. The Subject races were those who were favoured by colonialists and who acted as middlemen between Europeans and the local people. This division of people into races

and ethnicities created a problem of politicising indigeneity. A person's identity became his basis for rights and privileges, a legacy which was later adopted by the post-colonial state.

The notion of indigeneity as a basis for rights, according to Mamdani, is especially visible in Nigeria. An example of this is the requirement for admission to federal institutions in the country which is based on a quota system. The system favours indigenes over non-indigenes, and since Nigeria consists of several different ethnicities, those who find themselves outside their ancestral home are considered to be non-indigenous in the state where they reside and are, therefore, only eligible for certain privileges. Unlike Huntington, Mamdani argues that the basis for conflicts is not a clash of cultural identities, but a clash of cultural identity in opposition to political identity.

Cultural conflicts along tribal, religious and ethnic lines have been prevalent lately mostly because they are rooted in the identities of people. These sorts of conflicts tend to be violent as a result of the fundamental issues of identity at stake. Usually, they do not involve ideological or political issues, except in largely specific cases, like in Nigeria where culture and politics are intertwined. Although cultural conflicts sometimes occur between ethnic, religious and racial groups, religion being a major identifying factor in recent years has been the basis for most cultural conflicts especially in Nigeria. Nigerian politics has been dominated by the conflict between the Muslim Fulani-Hausa in the north and Christian tribes in the south, with frequent riots and coups and one major war (Huntington 1996: 256).

Apart from the factors which we have discussed previously, one interesting cause of cultural conflicts, especially those along religious lines, is a change in demographical balance. The numerical expansion of one group generates political, economic and social pressures on other groups and induces countervailing responses (Huntington 1996: 259). This also generates a fear of the "other" in a certain sense. It breeds fear that the more predominant group will threaten the identity of the minority group, and fear that the minority will "contaminate" the identity of the majority.

In Nigeria, a decreasing Muslim population has been recorded in several surveys since 2001. According to the CIA *World Factbook* and the Association of Religion Data Archives, the Nigerian Muslim population decreased from 50% in 2001 to 45.5% in 2010. Ali Sina, an Iranian ex-Muslim, calls this phenomenon "Islam in Fast Demise". In an article posted on the

Faith Freedom International Website, he claims that the number of Muslims in the world is in fast decline, quoting from an interview on Al Jazeera with a Muslim cleric, Ahmad Al Qataani. Al Qataani states that “In every hour, 667 Muslims convert to Christianity. Every day, 16,000 Muslims convert to Christianity. Every year, 6 million Muslims convert to Christianity (Sina 2003: [sp]).”

In addition to the above, because of the rising conflict between Islam and the West, many Muslim societies have witnessed a rise in the number of unemployed youth between the ages of fifteen and thirty. This means that the recruitment pool for extremists is growing as there are more people susceptible to the guiles of fundamentalism and willing to join extremist groups and cause instability and violence as long as they are provided with a means to support themselves.

Unfortunately, conflicts which are founded on differentiation hardly ever get resolved. People will always be different, and as long as difference exists, they will always be a clash of identities and ideologies. According to Huntington (1996: 266), a clash of identities goes through processes of intensification, expansion, containment, interruption, and, rarely, resolution. This means that, while conflicts may be contained sometimes, they never get resolved. Once started, they tend to develop in an action-reaction pattern and previously multiple identities become even more focused and hardened. Derek Hook supports this notion in his analysis of the relationship between anxiety and repetition. Hook (2005: 723) proposes that the anxiety of threatening difference may be alleviated after the fetishist act is carried out, but the act can never “undo” the realisation of difference. The relief from anxiety is only short-lived, hence the compulsion to repeat the action again and again. The anxiety of difference can never be definitely eliminated but can only be briefly assuaged before it must again be repeated. Once difference has been encountered, it is impossible to deny it. No matter how many times conflicts of cultures arise, differing identities will never be eradicated. The only way to deal with difference, therefore, is to accept and try to understand it. Derek Hook (2005: 724) argues that to normalise difference does not mean to eradicate it or to fully “repair” its damage. The discovery of difference has been made, and despite the physical reflex to deny this difference, the discovery once made cannot be undone. An example of this repetitive violence is the Hutu Tutsi war that ravaged most of east and central Africa in the latter part of the 20th century, leading not only to the Rwandan

genocide, but also causing the First and Second Congo Wars. Attacks by the Hutus and retaliation by the Tutsi or vice versa have resulted in tense relations between the two ethnic groups over the years. Presently, even though there has been a power shift in Rwanda and Congo, the tensions between the Hutus and the Tutsis continue unabated. This sort of dynamic, however, is not applicable only to the Hutu-Tutsi divide. This applies to almost all conflicts caused by differing identities and ideologies. Religious crises in Nigeria have also been characterised by a series of attacks and counter-attacks which have been contained sometimes, but which have remained lurking in the background, ready to resurface at the slightest provocation, because, as Sen (2006: 3) puts it, the cultivated violence associated with identity conflicts seems to repeat itself around the world with increasing persistence.

As violence increases, the initial causes tend to be forgotten and replaced or redefined by an ally against enemy divide, an “us” against “them” paradigm which enhances group cohesion. When this happens, mutual fears, distrust and hatred feed on each other, further enhancing conflicts based on differentiation.

Unfortunately, many politicians, community and religious leaders take advantage of conflict situations to advance their appeal to ethnic and religious loyalties. Politics in Nigeria, for example, is largely dependent on which ethnic or religious group a politician belongs to, and how well he or she can promise to advance their cause. A Christian candidate is more likely to win most votes in the largely Christian south of the country, while a Muslim candidate is more likely to take the lead in the north which is predominantly Muslim.

Religion, unfortunately, has become the strongest defining factor in identity conflicts. In the course of warring between societies with multiple cultural identities, differences usually fade away and the identity which is most meaningful to them becomes predominant. That identity almost always is defined by religion. Huntington (1996: 267) posits that psychologically, religion provides the most reassuring and supportive justification for struggle against “godless” forces which are seen as threatening. Practically, religion also provides a broader community, a civilizational kin and some sort of support group to which the local group can appeal for backing. For example, in a clash of religions between Muslim and Christian societies in Africa, the Muslim forces can hope to be supported by Islamists from surrounding countries and even as far off as the Middle East. The Christian forces, on

the other hand, can appeal to diplomatic support from Western governments. This tends to muddle the dynamics of religious conflicts, as religious identity becomes entangled with national and political identities, making religion the basis for political support.

Cultural conflicts are usually characterised by a dehumanisation of the other. In order for one side to justify its suppression of people from an opposing culture, it employs the tactics of portraying them as inhuman; this is the stereotyping or fetishist process, as Hook and Bhabha describe it, and this tactic goes as far back as the slave and colonial eras, and even to racial societies in past and present days, where black or a darker skin was considered as inferior and Africans were deemed unfit to be part of civilised society. Huntington (1996: 217) posits that, as wars intensify, each side demonises its opponents, often portraying them as subhuman, and thereby legitimating killing them. In the Rwandan genocide, for example, the Hutus referred to the Tutsis as cockroaches, making it easier for them to justify why the Tutsis should be eliminated. This can also be compared to the “Negro” in Fanon’s racial discourse; The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly (Fanon 1986: 80). This was justification for racial discrimination against black people.

The notion of the stereotype can also be compared to the discourse on the infidel in religious conflicts. In the past, adherents of the monotheistic religions, i.e. Christianity, Islam and Judaism, labelled those who had no religious affiliation or who did not ascribe to the central doctrines of their religion as infidels. This is a pejorative term literally meaning unfaithful, and attributed to early Christendom. It was used to describe those perceived as enemies of Christianity. Several Popes used this as justification for their invasion of non-Christian lands as they considered themselves responsible for “saving the souls of the infidels”. Presently, the term is still used by Islamic jihadists to describe anyone who does not adhere to the tenets of radical Islam. This oftentimes, not only includes Christians, but also moderate Muslims who are open to the co-existence of other beliefs.

Speaking about the stereotype and fetish, Homi Bhabha and Derek Hook attribute this process mainly to the discrimination of one race against another. However, this argument can also be applied to cultural discrimination. For example, Hook (2005: 729) posits that the stereotype is the focusing on certain supposed attributes of the “other,” like the Negro’s animality. This justifies why the Negro was to be treated as inferior. By continually affirming

the stereotype, it gradually becomes real in the mind of the so called believers. This means that in their minds, the stereotype slowly becomes the only knowledge that they have of the “other”, and the only knowledge they are willing to accept.

Stereotyping and other forms of discrimination arise from a nervousness on having discovered difference. They occur as a result of the acknowledgement of difference and the subsequent refusal to accept difference as normal. Discrimination is, therefore, continually stuck in an attempt to deny difference.

Having discussed the above, how do we then deal with the problem of identity based conflicts? Amartya Sen states that as human beings, we must stop classifying the world into specific civilisations or cultures, and placing ourselves specifically within each one. For him, all human beings have multiple identities which cut across several cultures. He argues that because identity is not only a source of violence and terror, but can also be a source of richness and warmth, it makes no sense to completely stifle the invoking of identity and treat it as a general evil (Sen 2007: 4). As a solution for a belligerent identity, therefore, Sen proposes an acceptance of our shared humanity. By this, he means that once we understand and agree that as humans we already share certain characteristics, the broad commonality of our shared humanity can act as a deterrent to identity conflicts. In addition, we must learn not to focus on the identity that sets us apart from others. As human beings, we simultaneously possess many identities which may not necessarily conflict. By acknowledging that we are multifaceted, we can refrain from the aggressive focus on one particular categorisation. For example, an extremist Nigerian Muslim may see himself only as extremist and spurred by his religious views to kill infidels. Yet, he is not only an extremist, but a Muslim, a Nigerian an African and, most importantly, a human being. When we begin to appreciate the plurality of our identities, we also learn that we all have a choice to determine the relevance of each one and to decide what level of importance to attach to a certain identity. In our normal lives, we see ourselves as members of a variety of groups – we belong to all of them and none of them can be taken to be a person’s only identity or singular membership category. In fact, we are all constantly making choices, if only implicitly, about the priorities to be attached to our different affiliations and associations (Sen 2006: 4-5). These plural identities can be defined by a lot of factors, ranging from citizenship, cultural affiliation, and gender, to class and ideologies, to mention a few. The assertion of

human commonality has been a part of resistance to degrading attributions in different cultures at different points in time (Sen 2006: 7).

Huntington, on the other hand, proposes that there is no apparent solution to cultural conflicts. Fault line violence may stop entirely for a period of time, but it rarely ends permanently (Huntington 1996: 291). He maintains that there are several factors that could lead to a temporary pause in conflicts. First is the exhaustion of the primary participants. The rising casualties and dwindling resources lead to an agreement on negotiations which could establish a temporary truce. This, however, is not a long term solution, as the conflicts tend to resurface when both sides have rested and replenished their resources.

Another factor, according to Huntington, that could lead to a temporary truce in fault line conflicts is mediation by secondary or tertiary parties. Direct negotiation between primary parties is usually unsuccessful because the cultural distance and hatred which festers over a period of time between them leads to a mutual distrust that is difficult to overcome. However, the mediators could be interested secondary or tertiary parties³⁰ who have rallied to the support of their kin and have the capability to negotiate agreements with their counterparts on the one hand, and to induce their kin to accept those agreements, on the other (Huntington 1996: 292).

In criticism of Huntington's theory, Sen argues that dividing the world into civilisations is a basic classificatory idea which foments differentiation. For him, the world cannot be divided into unique categorisations and human beings do not have singular identities. Human beings can be classified instead under many systems of partitioning based on nationalities, locations, class, occupations, languages, social status, and politics amongst other factors. While I agree with Sen that we all have multiple identities, we must also closely examine Huntington's theory in relation to the primary causes of conflict in recent years. In my view, Huntington does not refute the fact that other forms of identification exist. He argues, rather, that although we have multiple identities, our cultural identity has been the major focus of classification over the years, and religion has gradually taken precedence over other

³⁰ According to Huntington, the secondary or tertiary party is one who is not directly involved in the conflict, but who supports one of the primary parties involved, either because they share certain attributes or have the same cultural affiliation. For example, the Pope may be able to mediate in religious conflicts involving Muslims and Christians

forms of identification. However, religion does not completely obliterate other distinctions. Just like Sen's theory on multiple identities and the choice we have as humans to determine what level of importance to attribute to each one, Huntington's argument, in my view, depicts this choice, as importance is placed on religious identities. With the rise in the number of religious extremist groups and the incessant conflicts based along religious lines, one cannot help but agree with Huntington that religion has gradually become the basis on which conflict around the world seems more and more to be founded.

Like Sen, however, I agree that the first step towards ending or at least curtailing cultural conflict is to understand that we all have many affiliations and associations. We share commonalities with each other, if not based on religion, then perhaps on shared ideologies, language, politics, social status, nationality or race. In the unlikely event that we cannot find a basis on which we share a common identity with others, then the mere fact that we are all humans who share the same emotions and who are affected by the same things, should count as a point in favour of reconciliation.

Wolfgang Welsch recommends as a solution to conflict, the concept of transculturality. For him, the reason why cultural conflicts exist, in the first place, is because of our continuous focus on the traditional concept of culture as homogenous spheres. Welsch argues that this classical understanding of cultures as autonomous islands or spheres is separatory. By this, he means that it promotes a delimitation towards the outside world. The appeal to cultural identity as homogenous threatens to produce separatism and to pave the way for political conflicts and wars (Welsch 1999: 195). Like Sen, Welsch agrees that human beings have multiple identities and societies are inherently multicultural. Modern societies are differentiated within themselves to such a degree that uniformity is no longer constitutive to, or achievable for them (Welsch 1999: 194). The traditional concept of culture, therefore, proves to be inadequate as it does not portray the diversity of culture in modern societies. For Welsch, the most appropriate description of culture is the concept of "transculturality". This concept stems from the inner differentiation and complexity which are essential parts of modern cultures. The complexity encompasses a number of ways of life which do not just exist on their own, but which emerge from each other through intermingling. This new form of culture is due to several factors, ranging from migration, improvement in technology

which makes the same intellectual material identically available to people worldwide, and globalisation which promotes economic interdependencies and dependencies. Cultures today are extremely interconnected and entangled with each other. Lifestyles no longer end at the borders of national cultures, but go beyond these and are found in the same way in other cultures (Welsch 1999: 197). The concept of transculturality, therefore, advances that cultures today are characterised by hybridization. There is no culture which is absolutely authentic and there is no culture which is foreign. As humans we are cultural hybrids, and we draw from a number of ways of life and cultures to create our cultural identity. Berger et al, cited by Welsch (1999: 197), posit that modern lives are to be understood as a migration through different social worlds and as the successive realisation of a number of possible identities.

To summarise Welsch's argument, in order to avoid cultural conflict, we as humans must discard the fictional separatist idea of cultural homogeneity and embrace the more factual concept that cultures emanate from one another and are, therefore, innately linked. Only then can we begin to see difference as normal and to embrace those who have different characteristics as just another representation of ourselves.

In summary, many cultural theorists indeed agree that cultural identities have been the basis for conflict in recent years. Edward Said (1993: xiii) states that culture as a source of identity is rather combative. In time, it comes to be associated, often aggressively with the nation or the state; this differentiates 'us' from 'them', almost always with some degree of xenophobia. For Said, like many other cultural analysts, placing too much emphasis on one's culture and traditions opposes liberal philosophies such as multiculturalism and hybridity, and in many formerly colonised countries, the emphasis on culture has produced varieties of religious and nationalist fundamentalism. He argues that culture as a form of identity entails not only venerating one's own culture, but also thinking of it as somehow divorced from and transcending the everyday world (Said 1993: xiv). In this sense, culture can become a battleground on which causes contend with each other.

Samuel Huntington illustrates the argument for cultural identities as the basis for conflict in his in-depth explanation of the growing awareness by societies of their cultural identities. For him, the major problem, and the cause of civilizational or cultural clashes, is the

unwillingness of societies to interact with each other due to the high levels of cultural intolerance. Huntington divides the world into several civilizational groups which he argues, are distinct from each other because of their historical backgrounds. He postulates that these groups perceive life and culture in different ways, and each has its own cultural mores and taboos. However, increased interaction through modern technology has pitched each one against the other, resulting in a clash of cultures. For Huntington, the most evident cultural identity which has been a basis for conflict is religious identity. Religion has generated the most violent conflicts in recent years, and has also been at the centre of the fight against Western models of modernism. With the growing civilisation consciousness, comes a de-westernisation idea, where people reject Western values which they often associate with modernism, and prefer instead to promote their own cultural identities. Samuel Huntington's argument, therefore, is that culture and cultural identities will more frequently be at the centre of world conflicts in the post-Cold War period.

Amartya Sen, while accepting that cultural identities have indeed been the basis for conflict, refutes Huntington's theory on classification of different cultural groups into civilisations. He argues that no group of people can be precisely identified as a civilisation, and he also questions the authenticity of Huntington's definition of Western and Islamic civilisations. For Sen, our cultural identity does not necessarily have to be a basis for conflict, as we all have multiple identities and commitments, and no one identity in itself entirely defines who we are. He maintains that it is possible for diverse people to co-exist peacefully, and that human beings create conflicts when we make conscious decisions to emphasise one aspect of our identity over all the others.

In this study, we argue that, while Sen's idea of multiple identities is well founded, Huntington's position that cultural identities will be the basis for conflict in the post-Cold War period can also not be ignored. From the years of the religious crusades until present times, religion and ethnicity have continued to be potent triggers for violent conflicts, and there does not seem to be a near solution to the problem. Today, the misconstrued Pan-Islamic objective to reject westernisation and to islamise the middle-east and Europe is at the forefront of world conflicts. Unfortunately, European secularism does very little to prevent the expansion of radical Islam in Europe, as religious affiliations provide a sense of

belonging to young eager people who are very easily brainwashed into believing in the cause which the fundamentalist groups are promoting.

Some other cultural analysts argue in a different vein from Huntington and Sens' cultural identification theories. Wolfgang Welsch maintains that the problem with cultural identity is the fact that even the modern day concepts of culture continue to be based on the traditional premise of homogenisation. He argues that culture goes beyond a simple juxtaposition of the familiar and the foreign. While the notions of interculturality and multiculturalism have been proposed as better models for understanding culture, as opposed to the traditional concept of single cultures, Welsch argues that these two concepts are still problematic as they remain fixed in the paradigm of cultures as self-contained homogenous spheres. The problem with this is that by defining cultures as completely separate and independent of each other, we create cultural boundaries which remain rigid and which allow very minimal interaction with each other. In principle, cultures as homogenous entities allow a sharing of information between each other, but do not allow for any assimilation or change to take place. Welsch therefore proposes the concept of transculturality as a better model for comprehending the intrinsic complexities of culture. Transculturality proposes that cultures are all innately linked and draw from each other, and no one culture can exist without the other. The concept takes into account, the constant variations which are characteristic of every culture, and it cuts across all cultural boundaries, opening each one up to assimilating aspects of other cultures. According to Welsch, when we stop regarding cultures as separate entities, then cultural identities will no longer be a trigger for conflict.

Most multi-cultural societies have unfortunately failed to embrace multiculturalism, given that people continue to regard themselves based along distinct cultural lines. In Nigeria, many people continue to identify themselves based on their cultural affiliations. These groupings supposedly give them a sense of belonging and a within group similarity which they can relate with. It is therefore more common for people to identify themselves as Muslim or Christian, Hausa or Igbo instead of as Nigerians. Until we discard the singular categorisation of people based on cultural affiliations, conflicts will continue to persist. To avoid this, we must learn to see ourselves as people who share the same emotions and the

same national interests. Only when this happens can we state unquestionably that the nation and the concept of nationalism has succeeded, and the ideological concept of multiculturalism as the acceptance of cultural diversity has prevailed.

In the next chapter of this research, we will focus majorly on cultural differences, and in particular religious diversity in Nigeria. We will discuss the introduction and the spread of religion in Nigeria, how religious diversity has formed a basis for conflicts in the country, the effects that these have had on national interest and proposed ways of dealing with the problem.

CHAPTER FOUR

CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

This chapter provides a historical overview of religious diversity in Nigeria. It traces the introduction of religion by European missionaries into the societies which make up present day Nigeria, and how religion spread through the local societies. This chapter also highlights the major causes of religious conflicts in Nigeria, how these conflicts are managed and proposed recommendations on how to curtail them.

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY

As discussed in the previous chapters, multiculturalism is an ideology which upholds and promotes the diversity of cultures, and aims to give each one equal precedence in a society. In a truly multicultural society, no one culture is considered as superior to the other, and all cultural groups coexist without any one of them overshadowing the others.

Having described the concept above, do we then consider Nigerian society as a truly multicultural one? Nigeria is unquestionably, a culturally diverse country, consisting of more than 250 different ethnic groups, each comprising several different language and religious sub-groups. This chapter therefore examines the concept of multiculturalism in relation to Nigerian society, in order to determine whether Nigeria is only a culturally diverse society where multiculturalism is far from being embraced, or if it is a truly multicultural nation where people accept each other despite their cultural affiliations. The main focus of this chapter will be to determine if Nigerians have embraced multiculturalism, or if the concept has been at the root of the prevailing conflicts in the country.

The complexities of Nigeria's multi-ethnicity is summed up in a statement by Chief Obafemi Awolowo, a prominent statesman and Nigerian nationalist. Awolowo argues that Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no Nigerians in the same sense as there are English, Welsh, or French. The word Nigerian is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not (Awolowo, cited by Morris-Hale 1997: 191). Indeed, many political observers both in and outside Nigeria have argued that the country is a "historical accident". This is in the sense

that so many culturally diverse societies were brought together by the colonial government, with little consideration for how they were to manage their differences.

Prior to 1967, Nigeria was divided into three regions and four large ethnic groups. The north was said to be inhabited by the Hausa and the Fulani, the southwest by the Yoruba, and the southeast by the Igbo. This division however, was one of the major mistakes and false assumptions of the colonial government. According to Morris-Hale (1997: 203), we know now, as we should have known then, that this description was over-simplification and grossly misleading. By categorising the north as inhabited by the Hausa and the Fulani, the colonial government ignored the more than 100 other ethnic groups which existed in the region and which consistently resisted Hausa-Fulani control. In addition, in the southeast, the Ijaw, Ibibio and Efik were just a few of several large and distinct ethnic groups which resented Igbo hegemony. Although these four ethnic groups were the majority in Nigeria, they were far from being the only ethnic groups. The colonial government therefore ignored the considerable number of minorities who would clamour for recognition and power before and after independence. We must note, however, that cultural and political conflicts in Nigeria were not prominent during the colonial era. The regional division did not necessarily pose a problem at the time, as there was no internal struggle for power and resources. Political authority was controlled by Great Britain, through her governors and other administrators who had been delegated to the regions, and resources were distributed to all the regions as the colonial government saw fit. Problems arose when Nigeria gained independence and Nigerians were left to govern themselves. Indeed, just before the Nigerian civil war broke out in 1967, the struggle for political and economic control led to a review of the regional division in the country, and 12 new states were created out of the regions in a bid to allay the fears of the minority groups. However, due to the many minority groups which existed in the country, these new states were still not enough and, by 1976, 19 states had been created in Nigeria. Today, there are a total of 36 states excluding the federal capital territory, Abuja, and each state comprises a myriad of ethnic, language and religious groups which struggle for supremacy not only within their respective states, but also between cultural groups from neighbouring states.

Unfortunately, the irreconcilable cultural differences between all of these groups have deterred Nigeria's political integration and prevented the country from achieving

continental hegemony, a prospect that many Africans had expected of the country due to its population, size and considerable wealth. Morris-Hale (1997: 211) argues that Nigeria has had a long and bloody history of ethnic conflicts, emphasising tribal affiliation, going back at least to the months preceding the Biafran civil war. He maintains that in more recent times, the ethnic conflicts have centred on religious animosity. Religion, as we have previously established, while serving as an instrument of harmony, has also served in some cases as a motivation for violence. According to Sampson (2012: 104), religion sometimes plays significant roles in communal harmony; yet it is often instrumentalised for political and other established interests to the detriment of peace and social harmony.

The problem of religious intolerance is not limited to Nigeria alone. Morris-Hale (1997: 212) states that the Muslim-Christian cleavage in Sub-Saharan Africa has played an essential role in the continuing distrust of fellow citizens between northern Muslims and southern Christians in Chad as well as in Sudan. Furthermore, according to Reynal-Querol, cited by Sampson (2012: 104), a study conducted in Spain has found that societies which are divided along religious lines are more prone to intense and prolonged conflicts than those divided by political, territorial and ethnic differences. Nigeria, however, is unfortunate to not only be religiously diverse, but to also be divided along political, territorial and ethnic lines. All of these fault lines have led to conflict at one time or the other, but in recent times, conflicts caused by religious differences have taken precedence over the rest. The country's religious diversity which we will highlight in this chapter, therefore, explains the reason why religious violence has plagued Nigeria in recent times and undermined national security in the country more than any other security challenge.

Due to the nature of Nigeria's regional division, religious tensions between Muslims and Christians have often been at the core of regional affinity. Nigeria is divided between a north which is overwhelmingly Muslim, a southeast which is largely influenced by Christianity and a southwest which is almost equally divided between both Christians and Muslims. Religious conflicts in Nigeria usually take place in the northern region of the country with a few reprisal attacks occurring in the south. The animosity between the two sides has been continuous, and this has seriously threatened the country's territorial integration and sense of a common national identity. This continuing conflict, according to Morris-Hale (1997: 212), suggests that religious animosity may result in an eventual division

of a country that was stitched together, for the convenience of the British, along sectarian lines.

RELIGION AND NATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN NIGERIA

Religion is a collection of beliefs, a way of life, and a set of cultural systems through which we relate to a supernatural force. It is our belief in a supreme presence which is responsible for our existence and which holds authority over our being. Religion constructs symbols and histories that define human existence and the origin and meaning of life, and it proposes an organised definition of laws that constitute adherence or membership. This means that proponents are bound by laws which govern their membership, and to which they are required to adhere.

In this chapter, we discuss religion as a social or cultural phenomenon, and the concept as defined by sociologists, as this seems to be the most appropriate representation of religion in relation to this research and the impact it has on human beings generally. According to Giddens and Sutton (2013: [sp]), religion as defined by sociologists has three key elements: it is a form of culture; it involves beliefs that take the form of ritualised practice; it provides a sense of purpose. They argue that, sociologists do not concern themselves with the authenticity of religion, but with how religions are organised, whether religious beliefs constitute sources of social solidarity or conflict, and what social forces are at work which keep religions alive or lead to their decline.

Religion, notwithstanding the form, is a strong instrument of social solidarity. It embraces people from all walks of life, accommodating the wealthy and the powerful, and providing solace for the poor. The German theorist, Karl Marx, argues that religion is a “haven in a heartless world”, thus providing some comfort to the poor and relatively powerless. However, religion can equally serve as motivation for extreme violence. It has earned its appellation as a double edged sword as a result of the two extremes which religious affiliations often seem to represent. Whilst an affiliation to any one religious group is not in itself a bad thing, religious intolerance stems from a manifestation of extreme adherence to religious edicts. Religious intolerance is, therefore, the fanatical desire of an individual or a

group of people to forcefully persuade others to adopt their beliefs and systems. It stems from a disregard or disrespect for religious differences and cultural freedom.

This chapter will highlight the visible factors which have triggered religious conflicts in Nigeria and note some important cases of religious conflicts in the country. However, the research would make little impact by pinpointing religious violence without recommending strategies for dealing with it. The chapter will, therefore, conclude by drawing from previous literature to propose appropriate management strategies for dealing with religious conflicts in Nigeria.

BACKGROUND TO RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN NIGERIA

There are several religions in Nigeria, amongst which Christianity, Islam and Traditional religions are the most prominent. Sampson (2012: 105) posits that there is neither a scientific representation of the numerical strength of these religious groups nor of their geographical distribution, nonetheless, the Islamic faith is preponderant in the north-western and north-eastern parts of the country, Christianity is more prominent in the south-east and south-south geographical zones, and the south-west and north-central zones have a reasonably balanced number of Muslims and Christians. Before Islam and Christianity penetrated the societies that constitute modern-day Nigeria, traditional religions and paganism dominated the region. Traditionalists are typically those who worship inanimate objects which are said to represent deities or ancestors. Sometimes, rocks and trees are believed to be spiritual guides and are worshipped as deities. They are believed to speak to the people through designated priests who act as mediators between the people and the deity. Other times, dead ancestors are also believed to be sovereign authorities, and worshipped as mediators between people and deities. There are a large number of traditional religions in Nigeria, each ethnic or cultural group subscribing to its own beliefs. Popular amongst the traditional religious deities are the amadioha amongst the Igbo, sango amongst the Yoruba and iskoki amongst the Maguzawa subgroup of the Hausa people. The iskoki are, however, not considered as gods but as spirits.

Statistically, Nigeria is believed to have one of the largest Muslim populations in West Africa. Islam entered the Hausa and Kanuri regions of Nigeria through North African Berber

and Arab merchants from the Mediterranean. Extensive trade networks between North Africa and West Africa provided a medium through which the Islamic merchants transported their culture and religion from North Africa, where it had initially been introduced from Europe. A common culture made traders more trustworthy and willing to trade with each other and Islam provided this singular identity. In addition, the religion brought with it a common language, Arabic, which made trade relations a lot easier.

According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 29), the first appearance of Islam in the societies encompassing modern-day Nigeria was in the late eleventh century, when the King of Kanem³¹, Humai, is said to have converted. The reign of Humai brought about the spread of Islam to many of the Fulani kingdoms in and around the region. Humai had prior to his conversion, deposed the existing Duguwa dynasty³² of the Kanem Empire, and established the Saifawa dynasty³³ of which he was founder and first Mai³⁴. When he converted to Islam, this meant that state policies practiced in his court had to conform to Islamic laws.

In the late 14th century, the centre of the Kanem-Bornu Empire was moved from Kanem in Western Chad to Gazargamu in Northern Nigeria, and the state of Borno was established. This led to the spread of Islam to the surrounding Hausa states in the region. The Hausa states also received Islamic influences beginning in the fourteenth century from the Wangarawa traders and proselytisers who migrated to the region from the Kingdoms of Mali and Songhay in the Western Sudan, as well as from the pastoralist Fulani, who moved into the region in the fifteenth century (Falola and Heaton 2008: 29).

The first Hausa ruler to convert to Islam was Yaji of Kano who adopted the religion in 1370. Other Hausa states, recognising the political strength that the religion afforded them, followed suit and, by mid-17th century, many of the Hausa states had adopted Islam as their major religion.

³¹ Fulani Empire which encompassed regions of Chad, north-eastern Nigeria, eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Southern Libya, and which existed from the 8th to the 14th century.

³² System of governance which became influential under Dugu, son of Sef who was the first documented king of the Kanembu.

³³ Also known as Sayfawa or Sefuwa dynasty. This was the new system of administration, introduced by Humai. The establishment of the Saifawa dynasty, led to the Islamisation of state politics in the Kanem Empire.

³⁴ Kings of the Kanem-Borno empire

A common identity was deemed necessary in order to promote better trade relations with the people of the region, and Islam offered social and political advantages to the Hausa and Kanuri rulers as it effectively linked them to the wider Islamic world and, by virtue of this, to Europe. The religion also strengthened the power and influence of the Hausa States and Bornu both at home and abroad. The relationships garnered by Hausa and Kanuri rulers with other Islamic powers in the Sudan, Sahara and North Africa reinforced their own power: they could call on powerful allies in times of need and they developed strong trading relationships with other Islamic powers (Falola and Heaton 2008: 29-30).

In the following years, Islam continued to spread through Northern Nigeria by the establishment of Qur'anic schools for the propagation of Islamic learning. Hausa and Kanuri students were sent abroad to study and to become well versed in Islamic theology. In addition, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca afforded Muslims the opportunity to integrate with the wider Islamic world and to learn the tenets of Islam.

By the early years of the 19th century, the Fulani Jihad led by Usman dan Fodio, which resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate, helped to spread Islam through the region. The Jihad, which was essentially a war waged by the Fulani against the Hausa kingdoms of Northern Nigeria, resulted in the victory of the Fulani and the establishment of the Fulani Empire with its capital at Sokoto. The Sokoto Caliphate was dedicated to purging the region of what it considered "mixed Islam" in an effort to recreate the perfect pious society established in Arabia under the leadership of the Prophet Muhammad (Falola and Heaton 2008: 62). Although the Jihad failed to create the pure society which Usman dan Fodio had envisaged, it succeeded in consolidating all the previously autonomous states of the region under one administrative system. The new Islamic government which was centred in Sokoto brought about a political consolidation and cultural transformation which remarkably impacted Northern Nigeria and which to this date is still visible in the society and politics of Northern Nigeria. The Islamic government of the Sokoto Caliphate adhered strictly to the tenets of fundamental Islam, directing that all aspects of society and government be based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Sharia law was officially introduced to the region during this time, and the law set out juridical codes to govern political views, family and communal life, as well as suitable modes of personal conduct in

the Caliphate. With the demise of the Sokoto Caliphate and the establishment of British colonial rule in the early 20th century, the supremacy of Islamic and Sharia law diminished, and colonial policies were established as the new system of government in the region. Although Islam continued to be the dominant religion, Sharia law was no longer the basis for state administration, religion was separated from politics, and the region was gradually transformed to a secular state.

Christianity, the third dominant religion in Nigeria, was introduced in the mid-15th century. The first attempt at Christianising the region that is today Nigeria was made by Catholic priests from Portugal who had accompanied Portuguese explorers in their search for a sea route to India. European contact was made with the people of Benin in 1477, and by 1555, Augustinian and Capuchin monks, sent by the Bishop of the diocese of Sao Tome, visited the Itsekiri people of Warri in what is today Southern Nigeria, and their neighbours. The first indigene to be baptised by the monks was Atorongboye I, son of the Olu who was traditional ruler of the Warri Kingdom. He was given the name Sebastian after his baptism.

When Sebastian succeeded his father, he supported the activities of the Catholic missionaries, and in 1570, Christianity was established in the region under him. In 1600, Sebastian sent his son Oyeomasan to Portugal to study theology and to undergo the formation necessary to become a priest. Since the equatorial climate of the region greatly hindered European priests from successfully reaching the surrounding regions of the riverine area, the missionaries hoped that an indigenous priest would be better placed to expedite the spread of Christianity without suffering the ill effects of the climate. Oyeomasan was also required to familiarise himself with the Portuguese systems of government in the hopes that, on his return, he would re-organise the administrative structure of the Warri Kingdom. He was baptised, and adopted the name Dom Domingos. On his way back from Portugal, Dom Domingos married a Portuguese woman, contrary to the edicts of the Catholic Priesthood and he was, therefore, unable to fully qualify as a Priest. He succeeded his father in 1625, but his European training was not used to the advantage of his kingdom as his reign did not witness any significant spread of Christianity or even any administrative change to its political structure. Other attempts made to train indigenous priests also failed, with the result that the Itsekiri came to the conclusion that

the Almighty did not intend Africans to become celibate priests (Ryder cited in Erivwo 1979: [sp]).

About the year 1643, Oyeomasan's son with his Portuguese wife succeeded him to the throne of Olu. Obanighenren, also known as Dom Antonio Domingo, is credited as having written the oldest letter from Nigeria to the Pope in 1652, asking for priests to be sent to his kingdom. Unfortunately, his efforts to propagate Christianity in the region failed due to several factors. The most apparent constraint to the spread of the religion was the inability to train indigenous priests who would spread the religion to the hinterlands. Unfortunately, the climate was not only too humid for the Europeans, but the region was also infested with mosquitoes, and many of the European missionaries contracted malaria and died as there was no cure at the time. This proved to be a formidable menace to missionary work in the area until 1854 (Erivwo 1979: [sp]).

Apart from the unfavourable climate, there were several other factors which deterred the spread of Christianity in the region. Erivwo (1979: [sp]) posits that the Portuguese kingdom, experiencing a period of decline as a result, among other things, of her loss of naval power, was incapable of supporting Portuguese priests who worked among the Itsekiri for a long time. In addition, the indigenous people were deeply superstitious, and notwithstanding the fact that some of the Olu's since Sebastian had agreed to be baptised by the priests, they continued to believe that baptism would have adverse implications for them. The Itsekiri's, who inhabit part of the riverine area of Southern Nigeria, deeply believed in and even worshipped water spirits. They believed that they would be punished by the water spirits and that their children would die shortly after baptism if they dared to defy the spirits. As such, the inability to find indigenous people who were willing to become priests, Portuguese failure to support the mission, and an unfavourable climate all militated against the first attempt to spread Christianity in the region.

The most noteworthy deterrent of the spread of Christianity by the Portuguese missionaries, however, was perhaps, the fact that the trans-Atlantic slave trade was in full effect at the time, and not only did the missionaries arrive on gun boats, it is believed that some of them participated in the trade in a desperate bid to sustain themselves after the support from Portugal dwindled. Erivwo (1979: [sp]) argues that, although, on the whole,

the Catholic Church disapproved of the slave trade, she took no positive steps to discourage the inhuman traffic. Instead, there was an attempt to see the good side of the trade: the possibility of converting the Negro slaves once they were transported from the darkness of Africa to the marvellous light of Christianity which the Church in Europe believed to be in her possession to radiate. In truth, however, most of the slaves who were taken from West Africa were not transported to Europe, but were rather taken to South America where they worked on sugar plantations. As a result of this, the indigenous people were understandably quite wary of the missionaries, and by the end of the 17th century, and the early 18th century, Roman Catholicism had declined to an extent that it was virtually extinguished in the region.

The second attempt at Christianising Nigeria was at the end of the 18th century, when the abolitionist movement against the trans-Atlantic slave trade started. Since the first attempt which failed was associated with the slave trade, it was quite significant that the second attempt should be associated with the abolitionist movement. This fact endeared the new missionaries to the indigenous people, as the movement discouraged the trade in humans and, instead, encouraged the local chiefs to move towards a more legitimate form of trade. This contributed to the success of the second mission in the region because the indigenous people were more trusting towards the new missionaries. Meanwhile, at the time, Christianity in Europe was already divided between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and the abolitionist movement in Africa was initiated and championed by protestant countries, notably Britain. As a result, it was Protestant Christianity which was introduced at the end of the 18th century to the Itsekiri and their neighbours the Urhobo in Southern Nigeria.

By Mid-19th century, Christianity finally took a foothold in Nigeria and Christian missionary activities expanded rapidly. The Church of England reached Yorubaland in 1842, when a group from the Church Missionary Society (CMS)³⁵ arrived in Badagry, and its first mission was established by Henry Townsend, an Anglican missionary sent to the region. By 1846, the CMS missionaries had expanded their reach to Abeokuta and in the later part of the same year they were joined by the Wesleyan Missionary Society. In the Southeast, the

³⁵ A group of evangelical societies working with the Anglican Communion and other Protestant Christians around the world.

Presbyterian Church founded its first mission at Calabar in the 1840s, while, in the Niger Delta, mission work began slightly later with the establishment of a CMS mission in 1857 at Onitsha, under the leadership of Samuel Ajayi Crowther (Falola and Heaton 2008: 87). In 1864, Ajayi Crowther who was an ethnic Yoruba and a former slave, became the first black Bishop of the Anglican Communion and he was elected as Bishop of the Niger. Roman Catholicism returned in the latter part of the 19th century and its mission spread rapidly through the Yorubalands in Lagos, Abeokuta, Oyo and Ibadan, as well as through the southeast, but it was only in 1916 that Catholicism finally reached the hinterlands. Many other Protestant missions were quickly established in Nigeria and, today, the southern and central regions of Nigeria boast of a continually rising number of the Christian faithful. Missionary groups even attempted to compete with Islam in the north and the CMS made some headway among peoples in the savannah, particularly the Nupe and the non-Muslim middle belt societies around the river Niger. The group established missions in the emirates of Yola, Bida, and Zaria (Falola and Heaton 2008: 87). This explains the presence of a large Christian population in the north-western states of Kaduna, Kano and Katsina, and in the north-eastern state of Adamawa. However, Christianity made very little progress in the Islamic territories of the Sokoto Caliphate. These territories were firmly vested in Islam, and even when British rule was established in the early years of the 20th century, the communities of the far north were allowed to continue practicing their already existing religious and political systems.

According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 87), two factors helped the spread of the Christian missionaries throughout the coastal and forest zones. From a spiritual standpoint, many of the rulers of indigenous communities thought that inviting the Christian God into their realm might give them a supernatural advantage over local rivals. From a commercial standpoint, missionaries established schools which focused on speaking, reading and writing English, all of which helped Africans to trade more effectively with the British at a time when legitimate trade was being encouraged over slave trade. In addition, the missionaries made an effort to improve communication with the local communities by learning their languages and customs. Some indigenous languages were put into writing for the first time, and the Bible was even translated into these languages, making it easier for the people to read.

Christianity in Nigeria is a lot more diverse than Islam. Apart from the Catholic and many Protestant churches which were established in the region, there are a large number of Pentecostal and indigenous churches, making the country one of the most religiously diverse in sub-Saharan Africa. The country's Muslim population on the other hand is made up mostly of the Sunni Muslims, most of whom adhere to the Maliki³⁶ school of thought. The majority of the Sunni Muslims adopt Sharia as their governing law and some northern states have even incorporated sharia into their previously secular legal systems. There is, however, a significant Shia minority, especially in the north western states of Katsina, Kano and Kaduna, and a smaller minority of less than 5% follow the Ahmadiyya Islamic school of thought.

Unfortunately, mismanagement of Nigeria's religious diversity has resulted in constant clashes between the two main religions; Islam and Christianity. The religious violence has been closely linked to socio political, economic and ethnic factors, and the government's neglect, oppression and lack of adequate capacity to manage the conflict has been a major cause of recurring religious hostilities in the country.

RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

Violent religious clashes have been prevalent in Nigeria since the years immediately after the country became independent from Europe. The years after the Biafran war marked a surge in religious consciousness, which was characterised by the establishment of multiple churches and mosques. According to Akintola, cited by Abdulkadir (2011: 8), on every street in Nigeria, churches and mosques spring up daily. Preachers, miracle mongers, and wonder seekers mill around places of worship and even outside; in commercial vehicles and street corners, confirming the religiosity of the average Nigerian. With the rise in religious consciousness came a struggle for supremacy and recognition. Like ethnicity in Nigeria, religion entrenched affinities because of the regional divisions in the country. It even became a basis for gaining access to rights and privileges, and this gave rise to tensions between the different religious groups, leading to frequent clashes amongst them.

³⁶ One of the four major schools of religious law within Sunni Islam

CAUSES OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN NIGERIA

There are several factors which are responsible for the persistent religious and ethnic conflicts in Nigeria. According to Achunike (2008: 287), the wrong perception of other people's religion or faith, wrong religious orientation, low literacy level of religious adherents, selfishness on the part of religious personalities, pervasive poverty, government involvement in religious matters, among others, are responsible for inter-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Achunike's argument above adequately sums up the major causes of religious conflicts in Nigeria, which we will elaborate on below.

Abdulkadir (2011: 6) maintains that ethnicity is one of the major causes of ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria. He argues that ethnicity is generally regarded as the most potent and politically salient identity in Nigeria, and Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of their ethnic affinities than any other identity. Osaghae and Suberu, cited by Abdulkadir (2011: 7), also argue that ethnicity is demonstratively the most conspicuous group identity in Nigeria. This position is corroborated by a survey carried out between January and February 2000 by Lewis & Bratton (2000: 24-25). The survey, titled "Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria", found that almost half (48.2%) of those questioned, chose to label themselves with an "ethnic" identity, compared to almost one-third (28.4%) who opted for "class" identities. The next most common category was a religious identity of some kind, chosen by 21.0%.

From the 1970s, the focus on ethnicity was fuelled, on the one hand, by a scarcity of resources. Nigeria's resource allocation is largely based on indigeneity, and in some cases, only those indigenous to a state qualify to have access to its resources. As a result of this, those who are resident outside their ancestral homes are considered to be non-indigenes and are often alienated. On the other hand, ethnic affiliation was fuelled by the creation of more states and local governments which led to the expansion in the sphere of communal identities and conflicts and the manifestation of the Indigene and non-indigene paradigm. This resulted in frequent violent clashes between the so-called sons of the soil and the settlers. Since ethnicity is innately linked to religion in Nigeria, ethnic clashes almost always result in religious conflicts. A standard case of this sort of manifestation is the continuous fighting between the Hausa-Fulani settlers and the indigenous groups of Plateau state in

Nigeria. While on the surface, the conflict often seems to be based on ethnic differences, the fact that the majority of the Hausa-Fulani settlers are Muslims, and most of the indigenous people are Christians, suggests some religious undertones to the conflicts.

Abdulkadir (2011: 7) further expounds that after ethnicity, religion is the next most potent and politically salient identity in Nigeria. Religious conflicts are sometimes attributed to unorthodox tendencies which characterise the actions of some of the religious groups in the country. An example of this is the setting up of loud speakers outside worship places which are sometimes indiscriminately located in residential areas. During vigils, the loud speakers are used through the night, generating serious noise pollution to the annoyance of neighbours. Muslim worshippers even use these speakers during the call to prayer in the early hours of the morning, and this public disturbance has often resulted in religious conflicts in the country. Unfortunately, religion has sometimes been systematically manipulated to entrench division amongst Nigerians. In addition, with the multiplicity of religious houses came the struggle for space and recognition, especially in the States with an evenly distributed number of Christians and Muslims. The establishment of worship places in public offices has also served the purpose of politicising religion in work places, as both religious groups often compete for public spaces for worship purposes (Sampson 2012: 120).

Obstructive and disruptive modes of worship are also a main characteristic of religious groups in Nigeria, and these have sometimes triggered conflict. Abdulkadir (2011: 8) asserts that Pentecostalism is not only a Christian phenomenon, for it has permeated the Islamic religious movements too. Some churches and mosques in Nigeria have become prayer markets, where religious activities take place in public. For example, some churches tend to organise revivals on public roads, obstructing vehicles and people for long periods of time with little regard for legal responsibilities. Similarly, during Friday Juma'at prayers in Muslim dominated areas, most public roads are usually blocked, disrupting the movement of vehicles and people until completion of prayers. Many road users see this practice as an affront to their legal rights to the use of public roads as well as a demonstration of religious arrogance and insensitivity. The 2001 Jos religious violence was, in fact, caused by a melee that erupted after a Christian woman insisted on having her right of way through a public highway which was barricaded by Muslim worshippers on a Friday (Sampson 2012: 119).

Another cause of religious conflicts in Nigeria is the growing number of uneducated and unemployed male youth, especially in the northern region of the country. Due to a lack of employment opportunities, many of these young people have become frustrated and bitter with the political and social structures of their society, making them susceptible to manipulative forces, and hence a risk pool for violence. Although the problem of unemployment is a largely political issue, in many cases, these unemployed young people are responsible for burgling, looting and burning enterprises, mostly belonging to residents from other ethnic or religious groups. As a result, this form of violence is often labelled by the media and by mainstream society as religious. A standard case study and perhaps the most apparent example of a political situation which quickly transitioned into a religious conflict in Nigeria are the events which led up to the Nigerian civil war. A military coup which was largely political quickly degenerated into an ethnic war between the Hausa-Fulani of mostly Muslim religious affiliation and the Igbo Christian settlers in the north.

Another example is the April 2011 elections in Nigeria, which culminated in post-election violence that resulted in the death of 800 people and the displacement of thousands more across 12 northern states, in a 3 day period. Although hailed as one of the fairest elections in Nigeria's history, violence erupted with protests by Muslim supporters of the main opposition candidate at the time, Muhammadu Buhari, himself a northern Muslim, protesting against the re-election of Goodluck Jonathan who was incumbent president at the time. As with many other situations in Nigeria, the presidential election divided the country along ethnic and religious lines, and demonstrations which were initially aimed at protesting the alleged rigging of election results, quickly degenerated into sectarian and ethnic disputes in Northern Nigeria. In an article published in *The Human Rights Watch*, Diallo (2011: [sp]) states that Muslim rioters targeted and killed Christians and members of ethnic groups from Southern Nigeria, who were perceived to have supported the ruling party, burning their churches, shops, and homes. In predominantly Christian communities in Kaduna state, mobs of Christians retaliated by killing Muslims and burning their mosques and properties.

According to Sampson (2012: 120), disparaging preaching and stereotyping is also a common cause of religious conflict in Nigeria. Both Christianity and Islam claim to be the one true religion, and their adherents claim a monopoly of religious truths and entitlement

to heaven. Unfortunately, some clerics from either side go as far as to publicly condemn opposing religions and their prophetic symbols. With no censorship to their religious sermons, many fundamentalists use the media to propagate their extremist views and to promote disharmony and violence. The March 1987 religious violence in Kafanchan, Kaduna State, was allegedly caused by a Christian preacher, who reportedly used verses from the Qur'an to delegitimise Islam, while justifying the exclusive existence of salvation within the ambience of Christianity (Gofwen cited by Sampson 2012: 120). The resultant crises had far reaching effects, as clashes which started in Kaduna quickly spread to neighbouring towns like Katsina, Funtua, Zaria and Gusau. Many lives and properties were lost in the conflict, and this has left lingering hostilities in the relationship between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria over the years. Unfortunately, the publication of critical literature by many clerics and their followers alike has also contributed to religious violence in Nigeria. These publications often contain provocative remarks about opposing religions and their prophetic symbols and principles, thereby, inciting violence and retaliatory attacks from both sides. Some of the disparaging literature published is due to the wrong perception that the respective sides have of each other, and while all writers have the right to argue from the point of view of the side which they associate with, provocative remarks have only served the ultimate purpose of fuelling violence.

In addition to the above, stereotyping is a major habit for advocates of both Christianity and Islam in Nigeria. Religious stigmatisation has often led to bloody clashes, because, without understanding much about religion, many people tend to ridicule those who are not of the same faith as them. Sampson (2012: 121) states that Muslims, especially those from the northern part of Nigeria, are in the habit of referring to all non-Muslims as Arna or Kafir; Arabic words for 'heathen' or unbelievers; while it is fashionable for Christians to refer to all Muslims as terrorists and violence-mongers.

Another cause of religious conflicts in Nigeria is the dramatic media reporting of events. The Nigerian media, like many other media outlets even internationally, is known for being quite exaggerative in their reporting of the details of religious conflicts. These provocative reports have the effect of generating intense hatred, resulting in clashes and reprisal attacks in a continuous cycle of violence. According to Sampson (2012: 124), news headlines such as 'Islamic Assailants Kill Hundreds of Christians near Jos', and 'Muslims slaughter Christians in

central Nigeria' are very common during religious disturbances, and such alarming headlines, coupled with gory images of victims often trigger reprisal attacks. The ethno-religious conflicts which have engulfed Jos, in central Nigeria, in recent years have generated an unimaginable level of hatred between the locals and the alleged settlers³⁷ (who are generally divided along religious lines) as a result of the dissemination of gory images of victims on the internet. This has helped to sustain recrimination and reprisal attacks from both groups (Sampson 2012: 124).

An example of a case where media reporting incited more violence was during the 1987 Kafanchan religious crises. News reports alleged that Christians were killing Muslims indiscriminately, burning their mosques and copies of the Holy Qur'an, and banishing them from the town (Newswatch cited by Sampson 2012: 124). Although some of the media reports appeared to be true, the tactless reporting by the media only served to incite reprisal attacks by Muslims all over Kaduna state, causing an invaluable loss of life and property.

Perhaps a more critical cause of religious dissent in Nigeria is government interference in religious matters, marginalisation of religious groups, and the state mismanagement of religious violence. Unfortunately, preferentialism and nepotism are entrenched in the Nigerian political and social scene, depending on which religious group predominates amongst the people in positions of authority. For example, despite the constitutional prohibition of favouritism, many people in positions of authority tend to favour those who are of the same religious or ethnic affiliation as them. This has even gone as far as preventing the employment of highly qualified people in favour of those who are "fortunate" to be of the same religious or ethnic background as those in positions of authority. Depending on the religious group which has the higher number of adherents in a region, allocation of land for building worship houses, and even permission to broadcast religious events on the media is regulated. Oftentimes, this is seen as preferentialism towards one religious group, and marginalisation of others. Furthermore, one of the ways through which religious favouritism is manifested in Nigeria, is in the patronage of specific groups during

³⁷ Mainly the Hausa and Fulani Herdsmen who have clashed very often with other ethnic groups. In plateau state, Christianity is the major religion amongst the ethnic groups who are considered to be the original inhabitants, amongst them the Birom, Afizere and Anaguta, and Islam is the major religion amongst the settlers, consisting in most part of Hausa and Fulani groups from neighbouring states.

religious events. Sampson (2012: 122-123) posits that in many states of Northern Nigeria, public funds are used in the purchase and distribution of food items and other valuables for Muslim faithful during the Ramadan fast; however, government does not extend the same gesture to Christians during Christmas, or to traditional worshippers during their traditional ceremonies. This attitude is reversed in some Christian dominated states. Complaints about marginalisation in the political, professional and social scenes in Nigeria are therefore very common, and have led to inter-religious conflicts in the country. These tensions raise religious sentiments, not just in the political arena, but also in economic and social policy making. An example of this is the vehement opposition by Christians of the institutionalisation of Islamic banking in Nigeria and the inscription of Arabic symbols on some denominations of the Nigerian currency. In the same vein, Muslims have passionately opposed the use of crosses on medical sign boards and other hospital equipment. These attitudes, go to show the apprehension from both sides of allowing the use of religious institutions or symbols in public, which they see as an agenda aimed towards religious marginalisation.

The Nigerian government has set up various measures to curtail religious violence in the country. Some of these measures, among others, include the application of the principle of power sharing between the north and the south and between Christians and Muslims, the application of policies to prevent the preponderance of one religious group in government institutions³⁸, and the establishment of the Nigeria Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)³⁹. Unfortunately, these measures have been ineffective as they serve to curtail religious tensions only temporarily. The government has been unable to find long term solutions to conflicts, and as a result, religious and ethnic intolerance continue to be a critical security challenge in Nigeria. Onuoha, cited by Sampson (2012: 126), argues that since the 1980s, the Nigerian state's approach to the management of religious violence has privileged the deployment of retaliatory violence and occasional setting up of judicial panels of inquiry which often lack the requisite political will to implement recommendations. Accordingly, Sampson suggests that the Nigerian government seems to favour short term actions which

³⁸ This was effected through the establishment of the Federal Character Commission (FCC) in 1996. The FCC was given the mandate to ensure equal employment of people from different ethnic backgrounds and from different geopolitical zones in all government institutions.

³⁹ NIREC was set up in the year 2000, and was tasked with the mandate to promote religious tolerance and inter-religious understanding through the facilitation of cooperation and dialogue.

are effective in curtailing violent religious tendencies but which do not provide any long-term solutions, as opposed to comprehensive conflict management methods. These short term approaches, according to him, only serve to curb the visible actors in conflict situations, but do not deal with the more important factors like the political sponsors in the background, or the remnants of the religious fundamentalists who remain lurking in the background, ready to resurface at the slightest provocation. These approaches characterised the Maitatsine⁴⁰ state response, as the government relaxed with some air of accomplishment and conquest, after quelling the riots in the 1980s. Consequently, the complete absence of a post-Maitatsine engagement, such as the rehabilitation of combatants, or de-radicalisation programmes for the remnants of its cadres, led to the gradual but sustained incubation of its trace elements into more organised radical mass groups (Sampson 2012: 126). The current religious extremist groups in Nigeria are, therefore, traces of the sectarian violent groups which have not been properly managed over the years.

This leads us then to the next and most obvious cause of religious conflicts in Nigeria, namely, religious intolerance. Religious fundamentalism is a manifestation of religious intolerance, and this has been the major cause of conflicts in most societies with religiously diverse inhabitants. It is, indeed, the basis on which all other sources of religious dissents are manifested. Religious intolerance is defined by Balogun (1988: 166) as the hostility towards other religions, as well as the inability of religious adherents to harmonise between the theories and the practical aspect of religion. This inability to understand religion is caused by the wrong orientation and low literacy levels of some religious fanatics, and selfishness on the part of religious leaders. Some so-called religious leaders are so obstinate in their own opinions that they form the habit of encouraging prejudice amongst those who look up to them for guidance. By doing this, they fuel intolerance and animosity towards those who do not have the same beliefs as them. These tendencies have resulted in the loss of life and property in incessant clashes between religious groups, not just of differing beliefs, but even amongst those of the same belief who ascribe to different modes of worship. According to Sampson (2012: 115), religious fundamentalism seeks strict

⁴⁰ Mohammed Marwa (also known as Maitatsine), was a controversial Islamic preacher in Nigeria in the 1970s. The word was coined to refer to his speeches which publicly condemned the Nigerian state.

adherence to the orthodox principles of particular faiths – in the case of Nigeria, Christianity and Islam – and abhors modernism with its propensity to adulterate or diminish original doctrinal principles. Religious fundamentalism is, therefore, a form of organised warfare against modernism. Religious extremists believe that their doctrines are the only true faith and all systems, from political to economic and social, must adhere to their principles. They believe that those who do not conform to their tenets must be coerced into doing so through brute force. Although both Islam and Christianity preach peace, the approaches which their supporters have taken in trying to attract converts have sometimes been mentally and even physically coercive. In Northern Nigeria, the most common campaign method employed for Islamic conversion is the Jihad, which, according to Sampson (2012: 121), is epitomised by the Boko Haram declaration that Western culture, as represented by Christianity, is polluting and worthy of spiritual purging. In the south, Christian groups resort to the use of media outlets and public preaching to condemn the tenets of Islam. Christians' approach of 'evangelism' – a conversion campaign that favours house to house preaching as well as preaching in public places – has often outraged non-Christians, who find the common message of 'I am the way, the truth and the light; no one goes to the father except through me' as provocative and denigrating their own faiths (Sampson 2012: 122). The habit of viewing other religions as false and their members worthy of conversion, and the extremist disposition towards the use of brute force or mental coercion for conversion campaigns have, therefore, caused serious religious tensions in Nigeria and continue to be a potent trigger for religious violence. These have been the tactics employed by many extremist groups in Nigeria, especially the Maitatsine sect in the 1980s, and which are still employed by the current Boko Haram sect, one of the most violent religious extremist groups, not just in Nigeria, but in the world. Both groups are characterised by an inflexible belief in the supremacy of sharia law, and the necessity for a jihad in the conversion of "infidels". Boko Haram even goes as far as to condemn education and anything which they consider as Western civilisation. The name Boko Haram literally translates to "Western education is sin or forbidden" in the local Hausa language of Northern Nigeria.

BOKO HARAM AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

The Boko Haram sect was founded in Maidugri, the capital of the north-eastern state of Borno, by Mohamed Yusuf in 2002. The name Boko Haram is coined from the Arabic word

'haram', meaning forbidden and the Hausa word 'boko' which is thought to be a mispronunciation of the English word 'book', and which has now become popularly translated as 'western education'. The word Boko Haram is therefore often translated as 'Western education is forbidden'. This name fully reflects one of the groups' main ideologies, as Boko Haram is famously known for condemning 'makaranta boko', the government schools, where students are taught in English, and which, according to the groups' members, are imparting secular education on students, as opposed to 'makaranta alkorani', religious schools where teachings are based on the Qur'an, and where students are taught to read and write Arabic. The group has been known to attack schools, killing students and burning down school buildings in a bid to end western education in Northern Nigeria.

It is thought that the introduction of sharia law in 12 states of Northern Nigeria between 2000 and 2002 may have prompted the establishment of the group which was also initially rumoured to have links with political leaders in the north of the country. For the first seven years of its existence, Boko Haram conducted operations peacefully in remote north-eastern states of Nigeria. According to Usman (2013: 42), the group kept to themselves and operated as a sort of micro state within the larger Nigerian state. During this time, however, Yusuf established an Islamic school which attracted students from Nigeria and some neighbouring countries. He also recruited young unemployed Muslim men and children who were drawn to his constant criticism of the failures of the Nigerian government and his denigration of state corruption. Unfortunately, Nigeria's north has a very high number of unemployed and uneducated youth, providing a large pool of willing recruits for extremist groups.

The group started its openly violent campaign for Islamist rule in a series of attacks which lasted from the 26th to the 30th of July 2009. Nine Boko Haram members had been arrested by security forces on the 26th and several of their weapons confiscated. This led to a counterattack by Boko Haram forces on the Police, and widespread rioting started in the states of Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe. In response to the riots, a joint military operation was launched, and by the 30th of July, over 700 people had been killed, including police men and Boko Haram members. 3,500 persons were internally displaced, 1,264 children orphaned, over 392 women widowed, and several properties destroyed (Sampson 2012: 109). Amongst the destroyed properties were several government and social institutions,

including police stations, schools, government offices and churches. The uprising was eventually crushed by a police and military assault, with hundreds dead and the sect's headquarters and mosque left in ruins. Boko Haram's leader, Mohamed Yusuf was captured by the army and passed to the police for interrogation. He died in custody (Boko Haram attacks... 2012: [sp]). The death of Mohamed Yusuf was seen by many government and religious leaders as a huge success on the part of the government to stem the violence unleashed by the fundamentalist group. Despite widespread reports that Yusuf's deputy, Abubakar Shekau had survived the government crackdown and had succeeded Yusuf as the leader of the group, security in some of the northern states, especially in Borno state was undermined, and many residents and observers, both within and outside of Nigeria, did not anticipate the almost immediate resurgence of violence.

Unfortunately, this turned out to be a huge mistake on the part of the state and federal government. Similar to what happened with the death of Maitatsine, the leader of the Yan Tatsine who unleashed a series of violent attacks in the 1980s, the death of Mohamed Yusuf had unintended critical consequences. In September 2010, Boko Haram members, now led by Abubakar Shekau, attacked a prison in Maiduguri, releasing 105 of the group's members and many other prisoners and went on to launch a series of coordinated attacks in many states of Northern Nigeria. This marked the beginning of the Boko Haram insurgency which has claimed the lives of over 13,000 Nigerian civilians between 2009 and 2015 and forced, at least, 1.5 million people to flee their homes (Nigerian army frees...2015: [sp]). The group's actions became increasingly violent and more sophisticated under Shekau. Between 2010 and 2011, a series of bombings and assassinations left many civilians, security officials, political and religious leaders, both Muslims and Christians alike, dead. One of the most prominent political figures who was assassinated by the group was Abba Anas Ibn Umar Garbai, the younger brother to the Shehu of Bornu, who himself was a Muslim. It is unfortunately impossible in this study to cover the extent of the attacks unleashed by the group, but we will focus on the most notable cases, and the effects that these have had on Nigerian nationalism.

Since the breakout of the inmates from the Borno prison in 2010, there has been a steady string of deadly attacks in Nigeria, most of which have been blamed on Boko Haram. The group has also sometimes taken responsibility for some of the attacks in videos released on

the internet, where a spokesman gives conditions for what is required of the Nigerian government in order to end the string of violence. During the April 16 2011 presidential elections in Nigeria, riots broke out due to the imminent win of Goodluck Jonathan over his main opponent, Muhammadu Buhari who was the favourite for many northerners. Several supporters, mostly young people took to the streets, burning houses and attacking supporters of Goodluck Jonathan. Although the riots were mostly politically motivated, the ethnic and religious affiliations of both candidates soon came into play, changing the dynamics of the riots from political to sectarian. Buhari's defeat increased religious tensions in the country, as many northerners had hoped that a northern Muslim would be elected president of Nigeria. Unfortunately, many radical groups, one of which was the Boko Haram group, seized the opportunity of the increasing tensions to stage a series of violent attacks against those who were of differing political or religious views from them.

Shortly after the inauguration of President Jonathan in May 2011, there were a series of assassinations and attacks, including the bombing of a military barracks in Bauchi by suspected Boko Haram militants. The fact that the group could successfully breach army security led to wide spread speculation that the Nigerian security forces had been infiltrated, a claim sustained by a spokesman for the group who told the BBC Hausa service that the attack was aimed at testing the loyalty of those military personnel aspiring to join the group. This claim was strongly denied by the military. However, in January 2012, President Goodluck Jonathan did, indeed, reiterate the claim by the Boko Haram group that not only the army, but also the police, the executive, and the parliamentary and legislative arms of government had been infiltrated.

In June 2011, the previously low key attacks in Northern Nigeria progressed to include suicide bombings. On June 16, there was a suicide bombing at the Police Headquarters in Abuja, in which 6 people were killed. The attack was blamed on the Boko Haram sect and was thought to be in retaliation for the police crackdown which had led to the death of Mohamed Yusuf. Indeed, the police force had become the number one enemy of the group since the death of Yusuf and many policemen were assassinated in drive-by shootings and in attacks on several police stations. Shortly after the Police Headquarters incident, there was a similar attack on the UN House in Abuja on August 26 2011, where suspected sect members detonated a suicide bomb. 23 people were killed, including 11 UN personnel and

12 non-UN personnel (Sampson 2012: 111). Hundreds more were injured in the attack on the UN building, which was the first time the group had openly targeted a foreign institution. This brought international attention to the enormity of their activities and the extent to which the group had evolved. The new tactic of using suicide bombers was new to Nigeria and the Nigerian government had very little experience with dealing with the situation. Suicide bombing had only ever been used in Africa by al-Shabaab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This led many observers to speculate that the group was affiliated with AQIM which was at the time very active in neighbouring Niger.

The year 2011 was, indeed, a trying year for Nigerian security forces, faced with the increasing number of attacks and assassinations by extremist groups. On the 5th of November, a trail of attacks on several churches and police stations left more than 90 people dead and many properties burned to the ground. On the 25th of December the same year, the groups' 2011 campaign of violence ended with an attack on worshippers in a church during the Christmas day service, in which 45 people were killed. The trail of massacres and the conflicting strategies employed in many of the attacks led many observers to speculate that there was more than one group carrying out the attacks which were all ostensibly blamed on Boko Haram. This belief was reinforced by the fact that Boko Haram employed the tactic of releasing a statement after an attack to claim or deny responsibility for it. In November, the Nigerian State Security Service announced that four criminal syndicates were operating under the name Boko Haram (Dowden 2012: [sp]).

In 2012, despite a state of emergency declared in some northern states, Boko Haram militants intensified their attacks, and by only the first three weeks of January 2012, the death toll accounted for more than half of the total death toll of the year 2011. By early 2013, the group expanded its reach into the neighbouring countries of Niger, Cameroon and Chad. According to the US Department of States' Bureau of Counterterrorism (2013: [sp]), in February 2013, Boko Haram militants were responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in Northern Cameroon, and in November the same year, a French Priest was also kidnapped in Cameroon. The groups' expansion into neighbouring countries brought it added international attention, and in November 2013, both Boko Haram and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan, better known as Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram also

operating in Northern Nigeria, were designated by the US Secretary of State as Foreign Terrorist Organisations (FTOs).

The most brazen attack which the group has staged since its campaign of violence began in Nigeria is the April 2014 kidnapping of 276 female students from a government secondary school in Chibok, Northern Nigeria. The impudence of Abubakar Shekau, in a video released online, in which he acknowledged the groups' responsibility for the kidnapping and threatened to sell the girls into slavery as he claimed was permitted by Islam, gave rise to criticism from world leaders and from Islamic clerics and statesmen who condemned the actions of the group and who asserted that such acts did not portray the fundamental value of Islam which preaches peace. Despite joint efforts by Nigerian security forces, and even a small scale international intervention, the kidnapped girls remain missing more than one year on and Nigeria's government has come under heavy criticism for its inability to establish their whereabouts and free them.

In August 2014, Boko Haram attacked and took over Gwoza, a local government area in Borno state of north eastern Nigeria. This marked the adoption of a new strategy by the group, as they continued to invade and take over whole areas in the north-eastern region of the country. According to reports in *The Telegraph* (Nigerian Army Retakes...2014: [sp]), the militants had seized more than 20 towns and villages in the northeast in recent months, despite pledges by Jonathan to boost security. Areas which were captured were declared as part of an Islamic caliphate. In 2015, Boko Haram continued its campaign of violence in north-eastern Nigeria, and in some parts of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, prompting the formation of a coalition of military forces from all four countries to combat the group and repel their incursions on villages and towns.

In spite of the joint military action against the group, in an audio message posted on the internet on the 7th of March 2015, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This move was dismissed by Nigerian officials as a sign of weakness, prompted by the fact that the coalition forces had launched an offensive against the group and had succeeded in killing many of its members. The Nigerian Army spokesman, Colonel Sami Usman Kukasheka said the Boko Haram leader was like a drowning man and there is no surprise that he is craving for support from fellow terrorists across the world. In

addition, Mike Omeri, a spokesman for the Nigerian government, said Boko Haram needed help as a result of the heavy casualties, bombardment and degrading of their capacity (Boko Haram conflict... 2015: [sp]). However, despite attempts by the Nigerian government and military forces to downplay the implications of the move, a spokesman for ISIL, Abu Mohammad al-Adnani released an audio tape on the 12th of March 2015 confirming the pledge of allegiance as an expansion of ISIL's caliphate to West Africa and urging Muslims to join militants in West Africa.

Although the coalition of military forces has recorded a number of successes by regaining territory previously controlled by Boko Haram, the group continues to launch attacks in north-eastern Nigeria. The six-year long Boko Haram insurgency has claimed more than 13,000 lives and forced at least 1.5 million people to flee their homes over the years (Nigerian army frees... 2015: [sp]).

EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM IN NIGERIA

Because of the persistent religious tensions between the two largest religious groups in Nigeria, there is a continuous culture of mutual distrust and unhealthy rivalry between them. According to Kastfelt (2003: 203), during the 1980s and 1990s, Nigeria experienced a dramatic intrusion of religious matters into national and local politics. Antagonism between the Christian and Muslim communities has created a long series of political conflicts which have at times, threatened the very survival of the Nigerian state. This has led to a lack of trust in the feasibility of maintaining the country as one.

Nwaomah (2011: 101) argues that the resultant effects of religious conflicts in Nigeria are enormous. The effects of religious conflicts have pervaded not just the political, but the economic and social sectors of the country. One of the major effects which religious fundamentalism has had in Nigeria is the negative impact on the country's economy. The killing of people and destruction of property worth billions of naira have deprived the nation of the manpower and services which are much needed for the growth of its economy. In addition, due to the instability and frequent chaos in the country, many foreign companies are reluctant to invest in Nigeria, despite the availability of both human and natural resources. Nwaomah (2011: 101) further states that religious conflict in Nigeria has negatively impacted on investment options in the crises ridden areas. The political instability,

arising from the insecurity and uncertainty that pervades the region does not inspire the confidence of foreign investors and, thereby, deprives the nation of the economic gains. Arguing in the same vein, Abdulkadir (2011: 11) posits that incessant ethno-religious crises have negatively impacted the Nigerian economy over the years and have made Nigeria's economic climate not conducive and, hence unattractive, for investment. To add to this, the constant conflicts which are mostly concentrated in the northern region of the country have served to increase the economic divide between the north and the rest of the regions in the country. Businesses belonging to southerners living in the north are often targeted for looting during conflict situations and, as a result, many southerners are hesitant to open up businesses in the north. Nwaomah (2011: 102) maintains that, in some instances, the enterprising southerners who had established thriving businesses in the troubled areas in the north have relocated to other and safer places.

Partly because of their tendency to spill over from their initial theatres into other localities, states or even regions of the federation, ethno-religious clashes have proved to be the most violent instances of inter-group crisis in Nigeria (Abdulkadir 2011: 11). Generally, conflicts always give room for insecurity and mistrust, and religious conflicts in Nigeria have certainly bred a mutual distrust and discrimination between people from the northern and southern regions. There has been a continuing series of attacks and counter attacks between the two main religious groups and, by extension, between the northern and southern regions of Nigeria, resulting in a large number of casualties and huge losses on both sides. Many Christians in Nigeria are wrongly of the opinion that Islam brings violence in its wake, and the vicious strategies employed by Boko Haram and Ansaru have, unfortunately, not helped to assuage their fears. With the resurgence of Islam came a call for the implementation of Islamic Sharia law in the Nigerian constitution. Sharia law has, and will always be a bone of contention between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria, as Christians vehemently oppose its implementation. Their argument is that Sharia law forbids equality between Muslims and non-Muslims and recognises the co-existence of non-Muslims in a community only as second class or subordinate citizens. Under Sharia law, non-Muslims enjoy only a varying degree of rights, while Muslims enjoy full citizenship rights. Christians, therefore, regard Sharia law as an instrument of oppression and, as a result, they have been against all calls for Sharia law to be included in the Nigerian constitution.

Religious fundamentalism has also resulted in the decline of social structures and slow educational development mainly in Northern Nigeria. Boko Haram has consistently focused on destroying schools and any other institutions which they consider as Western. Schools, churches and even mosques have been burned down, preventing children from attending classes and preventing worshippers from attending religious services. Many schools in the north have been closed down for months on end and those students who are brave enough to attend school are at risk of attacks and kidnapping from militant groups. Some have refused to attend school, as the Nigerian government has been accused of not providing adequate security for them. Even government institutions, including army barracks' and police stations, have not been spared the violence and have come under heavy attack by militant groups.

Lastly, religious conflicts have served to deeply entrench the ethnic and religious differences in the country, leaving in their trail, a broken and divided society, where social harmony has become only imaginary. Nigerians no longer have faith in the unity of the nation and the feasibility of a nationalistic ideology. People who previously lived as neighbours no longer trust each other and friends have been accused of being the first people to attack each other once conflicts arise. According to Nwaomah (2011: 102), communities that, hitherto, co-existed peacefully now treat each other with mistrust and latent or open aggression. Consequently, settlement patterns begin to follow the boundaries of religion in these areas so that adherents can be swiftly mobilised in the event of future riots. The disrupted social harmony is sometimes felt in places far from the crisis scene and, thus, accounts for the reprisal riots in other parts of Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

According to Sampson (2012: 127), economic development and societal wellbeing can only be achieved in an environment where multiculturalism and multi-religiosity are guaranteed. He supports this argument by citing the significant growth in human development in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Malaysia. Religious diversity should not hinder our development of relationships with people of different beliefs, but should rather be seen as an instrument for personal and national development. A country which is open to cultural diversity attracts not only migrants, but also tourists and foreign investors, thereby boosting

the economy and the international image of the country. Adding to the argument by Amartya Sen, that the world is inherently heterogeneous, Sampson (2012: 128) opines that the religious faithful in Nigeria should, therefore, realise the fact that religious tolerance and harmony are both legally sanctioned and socially inevitable, as the world can never be composed of one religion or culture.

Abdulkadir (2011: 12) proposes that in order to curtail ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, religious and community leaders must evolve new ways of engaging the youth in order to divert their attention from violence. Indeed, young people are the target audience for religious fundamentalists, and the unemployed youth population in Nigeria has especially been susceptible to the wiles of extremist groups. It is, therefore, important that religious and community leaders make it their responsibility to educate the young people on the ills of religious intolerance. (Sampson 2012: 128) suggests that the desirable scenario of religious harmony can be achieved in Nigeria only through the establishment and sustenance of a neo-religious educational praxis that would generate a culture and orientation of multi-religiosity in our children and youth, as well as a commensurate programme of re-orientation of the adult population. The responsibility of educating young people to embrace religious diversity, therefore, does not only rest with religious and community leaders, but is also the duty of teachers and instructors at school, and family members at home. At all levels of social instruction, people should be taught to embrace diversity and the basic principles of all religions which promote harmony and religious ethics.

At the moment, religious education in Nigeria focuses exclusively on teaching religious dogma, which is aimed at getting people to embrace one religion as opposed to promoting religious tolerance and dialogue. In secondary schools, students, depending on their religious affiliation, are allowed only one form of religious instruction, either Christian Religious Studies or Islamic Religious Studies. Many Nigerians, especially children and the youth population are educated based on this model of religious instruction and are, therefore, disposed to adopting religious practices which they do not fully comprehend. This model of instruction does not allow for inter-faith understanding and harmony and it, inadvertently, promotes intolerance even amongst school children. To prevent this, it is important to change the school curriculum and introduce comparative religious studies which will expose students not just to the tenets of one religion, but to the basic principles

of all religions, one of which is the promotion of peace and harmony. Sampson (2012: 128) recommends that in order to promote religious tolerance amongst children and the youth population in Nigeria, all religious communities must understand that there is no alternative to inter-faith dialogue, as there can never be a universal religion or an exclusive society for adherents of a particular religion.

Leaders, especially those in the religious sector are seen as role models and they can very easily influence the decision making of their followers. These leaders must, therefore, be educated on the need to keep their sermons moderate and to desist from making provocative public statements which could very easily be misconstrued and which could stir up violence against those who are of different religious views. Sampson (2012: 128) argues that whereas every religious group has the right to uninhibited religious practice, this must be done with commensurate or reciprocal respect for the rights of other faithful to practice their own religious traditions. In order to prevent future manifestations of religious violence, religious institutions must be charged with the responsibility to strengthen inter-faith dialogue at all levels, and religious leaders should encourage their supporters to stay away from all conflict situations, especially those that do not even have any religious connotations. This way, religious groups will desist from appropriating conflicts which are not in the first place, religious in nature.

Another possible way of dealing with religious conflicts in Nigeria is for the government at all levels to ensure that religious activities are regulated to avoid any one religious group provoking the others through derogatory remarks in the media. The government should set clear standards that define what the role of religion in the state is and these standards should clearly delimit the role of religion in state affairs and vice versa. This can be done by defining the acceptable methods for evangelization and by setting out the punishment for acts that trigger religious violence. In this way, all religious groups will be clearly informed on which activities constitute criminal offences and should, therefore, be prohibited. The government should also establish an early warning system which will be able to identify potential crises situations and propose suitable ways of containing them through preventive dialogue. Sampson (2012: 129) suggests that the government should set up a committee, charged with the responsibility of establishing a de-radicalisation programme that will gradually eliminate the ideology of terror and also conduct psychological profiling of

remnants of radicalised religious cadres. He argues that the policy should design a strategy for the disarmament, de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of religious militants who have not just been brainwashed, but have also taken religious combat as a vocation.

Adding to the debate on possible ways of curtailing religious conflicts in Nigeria, Morris-Hale (1997: 212) suggests the dissolution of the existing religious structures in Nigeria. He argues, quite vaguely, that until the religious quagmire is nullified, the country may remain a geographical expression, a historical accident, but not a nation, and may never attain its much vaunted potential as an international as well as a continental superpower. In my view, this argument is quite ambiguous as he does not suggest any ways of “nullifying the religious quagmire.” Additionally, the cultural differences between the ethnic and religious groups in Nigeria, existed long before the country was amalgamated. How feasible then, will it be to reverse or invalidate a system which has existed for so many years?

The problem, in my opinion, does not lie in the ability or inability to do away with the religious structures. Instead, it lies with the political and socio-economic systems adopted in Nigeria by the colonial government. These are the systems which they passed on to the new indigenous government after independence even though the Nigerian people had no experience and no training on how to manage the foreign political system. Morris-Hale (1997: 209) argues that at independence, the British passed on to Nigerians, a quasi-unitary, parliamentary system of government, much like their own Westminster model, and tried to pass it off as federalism. They created 3 arms of government⁴¹ which were connected to each other, but which functioned independently from each other. In other words, they were no provisions for one arm to check the powers of the other. In addition, the British failed to instil in the Nigerian politicians, the concept of the loyal opposition. We can see this problem manifested in Nigerian politics and in the socio-cultural domain even to this day. Nigerian politics and, indeed, the politics of many African states in general have very little appreciation for co-existence with a healthy opposition. Anything or anyone who opposes one’s political ideologies or religious beliefs is to be eliminated. This has been the basis for the incessant political and cultural conflicts in the country which have been prevalent since the years immediately after the end of colonial rule.

⁴¹ In Nigeria, the arms of government are the legislature which is responsible for making laws, the judiciary which is responsible for carrying out the law and the executive which is responsible for implementing the law.

Morris-Hale (1997: 194) recommends more feasibly this time, that another possible solution for resolving Nigeria's penchant for ethnic politics and developing a truly politically integrated society with a sense of national identity would be to encourage the development of a responsive and responsible middle class. As the Greek philosopher Aristotle puts it, goodness itself consists in a mean; and in any state, the middle class is a mean between the rich and the poor. The middle class is free from the ambition of the rich and the pettiness of the poor; it is a natural link which helps to ensure political cohesion (Aristotle, cited by Morris-Hale 1997: 194). At the moment, Nigeria theoretically has a substantial middle class which, in practice, does not really exist. Nigerian society is basically divided between the rich and the poor, with no middle class standing in as a link between the two. The poor are, of course, frustrated with their inability to provide basic amenities for themselves and they, inadvertently, become easy targets for fundamentalist opinions.

According to Usman (2013: 49), it has become evident that the most likely option for peace with the Boko Haram group is through dialogue. There had, indeed, been some attempts to engage the group in talks, but these were stopped as some Nigerians were of the opinion that Boko Haram should be considered a terrorist group and the government should not engage them in talks. Following the breakdown in dialogue, Boko Haram escalated its attacks and, as of 2015, the military approach which the security forces have employed so far does not seem to be very effective in stopping the violence. At the time of writing, there have been calls by northern leaders to resume talks with the group, as conflicts resulting from religious differences have become more ingrained over the years and the inability of the Nigerian government to effectively tackle the problem has left a build-up of grievances unaddressed. Usman (2013: 49) states that religious violence poses a grave danger to national and regional security. The issue needs to be approached holistically as the recurrent nature of intra and inter-ethnic and religious crises will likely end in anarchy or the disintegration of the country.

Lastly, the most feasible way of dealing with religious conflicts is, as Amartya Sen and Wolfgang Welsch argue, to promote an understanding of the inherent heterogeneous nature of cultures. Nigerians should be made to understand that no one culture can exist in isolation from the others and no one society can consist of a unique culture. Welsch's argument is that transcultural identities cover both global and local, universalistic and

particularistic aspects of culture. It discourages the idea of cultures as homogeneous spheres, as this concept promotes separation and conflict. Instead, transculturality embraces the concept of cultures as hybrids which draw from each other and are therefore inherently linked. Welsch (1999: 203) argues that the concept of transculturality sketches a different picture of the relation between cultures. Not one of isolation and of conflict, but one of entanglement, intermixing and commonness. It promotes not separation, but exchange and interaction. An understanding of cultures as hybrids, therefore, allows us to accept difference as a normal phenomenon, and to embrace those who are of different cultural affiliations.

Amartya Sen, adding to this, proposes that to curtail conflict, we should always try to find common grounds on which we can associate with others. We must understand that as humans, we possess many affiliations, both physical and ideological, and in the unlikely event that we cannot find any physical common attributes with which we can relate to others, then our shared humanity should be the catalyst for promoting peaceful relations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The problem of diversity in Nigeria cannot be overemphasised as observed in the first chapter of this research. The achievement of a common national identity has become more unlikely, as the country continues to experience regional, political, economic and cultural conflicts in increasing frequency. These conflicts, especially those caused by ethnic and religious differences continue to dominate the headlines in Nigeria's body politic. Social differences, although having existed long before the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, only became prominent and problematic after Nigeria gained independence from Britain in 1960. Post-colonial Nigeria has, therefore, seen a succession of military coups and sporadic assassinations, and the interludes between periods of military rule have been plagued by corruption and intermittent communal violence (Nigeria's ethnic divisions 1999: [sp]).

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Chapter one set out the aims of this study, and outlined the scope and methodology employed in achieving this.

Chapter two dealt with the definition of some key terms employed in this study and also gave the historical background of pre-colonial and colonial Nigerian society. It highlighted the divisions that existed in the pre-colonial societies that make up what is today Nigeria, and pointed out that, apart from the major differences in culture, ranging from language to religion, these societies each had different political systems, the most organised at the time, being the Hausa/Fulani system, where the Sokoto Caliphate linked over 30 different independent Hausa kingdoms, creating the most powerful Islamic state in West Africa. As noted in this chapter, the caliphate provided the longest resistance to British colonial rule in Nigeria, and although it was annexed in 1903, some of its political systems adopted prior to British occupation, were retained by the colonial government.

Unfortunately, the gradual transition of British influence in the region that is today Nigeria, from slave trade to legitimate trade and then to colonialism did not allow enough time for the local people to mount any formidable opposition to British annexation. In the beginning, the growing British influence was seen as a welcome relief from the oppressive period of the

slave trade. The encouragement of legitimate trade and the coming of the missionaries led the local people to be more open to British occupation of the region, believing that this was for the greater good of the people. In addition, some traditional rulers who resisted British occupation were quickly subdued by the much more advanced military might of the British forces.

Nevertheless, throughout the period of British colonial rule in Nigeria, cultural differences, while extant, did not necessarily lead to conflicts as the political and economic systems were managed by the British administrators. In addition, by the mid-20th century, the wave of nationalism movements provided a distraction from the focus on cultural affinities. Nigerians saw the British colonial government as a common enemy and they, therefore, overlooked their cultural differences and regional affinities and, together, emphasised a common national identity and a collective goal of attaining independence from Britain.

When Nigeria became independent in 1960, the expectations for the country's future were positive. The population density provided a labour force and a consumer market which showed great potential for economic growth. This, coupled with the fact that commercial quantities of petroleum had been discovered in the Niger Delta region in 1958, led many people to believe that Nigeria was destined for a leading position, not just in Africa, but also in world affairs. Unfortunately, this was not to be, as independence from Britain did not bring with it the perfect society which Nigerians had envisaged. According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 158), by 1970, Nigeria's stability and prestige had been greatly damaged by a decade of political corruption, economic underdevelopment and military coups. Most damaging, however, was the culmination of these problems in a civil war from 1967 to 1970 that rent the country along regional and ethnic lines, killed between 1 and 3 million people, and nearly destroyed the fragile federal bonds that held together the Nigerian state.

The civil war highlighted the problems that Nigeria began facing not long after gaining independence from Britain. The country's federal system of government had been designed in 1947 by the colonial government to balance the distribution of political authority amongst the leading ethnic groups, which, as previously discussed, comprised of the mainly Hausa/Fulani in the north, the Christian Ibo in the east and the religiously diverse Yoruba in the west. Unfortunately, there was little or no consideration for the many other ethnic

minorities which existed in each region and this undermined the development of a unified national consciousness and the continuity of emphasis on national identity and common goals. The breakdown of national consciousness also led to sectarian and communal divisions which plagued the country in the years immediately after Nigeria became independent and which still cause tensions and conflicts even to this day.

The question of the viability of the Nigerian state has dominated world politics since the country gained independence from Britain. Nigerians as well as international analysts have questioned the feasibility of the borders drawn by Britain during colonial rule and the regional divisions established in the country. Soyinka, cited by Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 4), states that from its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced perennial crises of territorial or state legitimacy, which have often challenged its efforts at national cohesion, democratisation, stability and economic transformation. In addition, Falola and Heaton (2008: 158) propose that the underlying cause of all the problems that Nigeria experienced in the 1960s and has experienced since then is what is often called the “national question.” What is Nigeria? Who are Nigerians? How does a country go about developing a meaningful national identity? They argue that because the national borders were not drawn by the indigenous people but by the British colonial administration, the word Nigerians meant very little to the people whose lives continue to be primarily centred on local communities that existed for hundreds and thousands of years. Indeed, the word “Nigerians”, to many people, is little more than an appellation attributed to the people who live within the borders of the country that was created by the British colonial administration.

There are many factors which undermined the development of a national identity amongst Nigerians. Apart from the differences in culture, the political systems employed by the British did not do much to promote national consciousness amongst the people. The second chapter of this research, also pointed out, that the constitutions adopted in the 1950s determined that access to power at the national level was contingent upon holding power at the regional level. This meant that, in order to contest for power at the national level, a person had to have considerable influence at his regional political house. As a result of this, the largest ethnic groups politically dominated the minority groups in their respective regions and, oftentimes, only the large ethnic groups contested for power at the federal level. This situation highlighted the regional differences and gave rise to political conflicts

which were often underlined with cultural tensions. According to Falola and Heaton (2008: 159), within each region, ethnic minorities often opposed the political domination of the large ethnic groups and, as a result, they felt increasingly alienated from the political process, creating even further divisions of identity that detracted from the development of a single, encompassing Nigerian national identity. Since access to power at a national level was dependent on association at the regional level, many Nigerians did not consider it politically beneficial to identify at a national level and when Nigeria gained independence in 1960, diverse regional affinities were more predominant than a unified national identity. The British appeared to have left in their wake a state without a nation, and the political and cultural differences resulted in the Nigerian civil war that destabilised the country's national integrity. The civil war brought to light many of the problems associated with the national question in Nigeria, amongst them, the problem of identity formation and how Nigerians deal with cultural differentiation.

Chapter 3 emphasised the problem of identity formation in Nigeria. Ganyi and Allah (2015: [sp]) maintain that identity formation is desirable among human beings and can come in different forms or through different actions and activities. Speaking about identity in relation to language, they argue that the problem of identity is age old, and the search for identity, whether political, social, religious or even literary, has been a human indulgence right from creation.

Identity politics play a major role in contemporary Nigerian society. They seek to promote the interests of specific groups whose members share common experiences, usually centred on actual or alleged social and economic injustices. For example, a group of people who consider themselves an oppressed minority may create an identity around which its members can unite and try to assert themselves. This identity becomes the group's focal point, and it provides a basis for affiliation and recognition.

The assertion of greater rights by cultural groups in Nigeria has also been a basis for the recurring cultural conflicts in the country. Ethnic oppression and baiting have existed since the years immediately after Nigeria gained independence and these are still prominent in present day Nigerian society. The struggle for state control, resource allocation and citizenship has divided the country along cultural lines and has contributed to the rise of

cultural conflicts in the country. Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 4) argue that, by virtue of its complex web of politically salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in Africa. Unfortunately, many years after independence, conflicts continue to be on the rise. Rather than abate, these have become more or less pervasive and intense in the post-civil war period and disintegration continues to be contemplated by aggrieved segments of society as one of the possible ways of resolving the 'National Question'.

The chapter also examined the processes of identity formation as put forward by several political and social analysts. Samuel Huntington proposes that cultural identities and, to be specific, religious affiliations, will be the primary basis for conflicts in the post-Cold War world. He divides the world into classifications which he calls civilisations, representing the cultural groups to which people belong. While Huntington supports his stance by citing a decent number of conflict situations which have been based along cultural lines, his theory is refuted by Amartya Sen who argues that Huntington's civilizational partitioning is not credible as it does not adequately portray the multiplicity of identities that exist in the world. Sen suggests that no one identity can exist in a pure form and that human beings have multiple identities which they voluntarily choose to play up depending on the situation.

Derek Hook and Homi Bhabha, on the other hand, speak about identity politics in relation to differentiation or the 'us' and 'them' paradigm. They argue that human beings create for themselves, two distinct worlds. The world of 'I' which essentially belongs to the subject and those who are considered by the subject, as sufficiently alike to be able to fit into the world of 'I', and the world of 'them' which belongs to those who are considered as different and therefore not eligible to be part of the world of 'I'. Both writers argue that in order to understand and try to normalise difference, human beings create for themselves, a fetish or a stereotype. This process and other forms of discrimination arise from a nervousness based on perceived difference and the subsequent refusal to accept it as normal. The logical response to this refusal is, therefore, to discriminate against those who are considered as different.

Cultural identities are the most conspicuous forms of group identity in Nigeria and religion, as well as ethnicity, provide stronger group affiliations than class identities in the country.

Cultural identities are perceived by Nigerians as having some sort of historical backing, making them the most long lasting forms of identification. In addition, cultural, and specifically ethnic identities were reinforced by the colonial and post-colonial regimes, entrenching them more deeply in Nigerian society. Lewis and Bratton (2000: 25) concluded on the basis of a survey that Nigerians tend to cluster more readily around the cultural solidarities of kin than the class solidarities of the workplace.

Due to its many cultural groups, Nigeria is undoubtedly characterised as a culturally diverse society. Unfortunately, this diversity has been greatly mismanaged to the extent that cultural conflicts have become prevalent in the country. According to Smyth and Robinson, cited by Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 4), Nigeria is a deeply divided state, in which major political issues are vigorously - some would say violently – contested along the lines of the complex ethnic, religious, and regional divisions in the country. Chapter 4 of this study, therefore, focused on Nigeria's diversity, with an emphasis on religious differentiation. Nigeria presents a complex web of individual as well as crisscrossing and recursive identities, of which the ethnic, religious, regional and sub-ethnic (communal) are the most salient and the main bases for violent conflicts in the country (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 7). These identities are very often assumed by Nigerians, usually for political purposes, and they frequently underline the daily contestation and conflicts over citizenship, resource allocation, rights and privileges. These identities, and the conflicts which they sometimes incite, are interconnected and are mutually reinforcing. As such, conflicts in Nigeria are more often than not, caused by a mixture of forces, and are usually hyphenated as ethno-religious or ethno-regional, highlighting their complexities and the combination of identities that lie at the foundation of these conflicts.

The chapter also highlighted some of the major causes of religious conflict in Nigeria, ranging from ethnic differentiations which are also innately linked to religion, to scarcity of resources and unemployment which leaves a lot of young people jobless and therefore susceptible to manipulation by extremist groups. It noted the problems of religious fundamentalism and its effects on Nigerian society, like the emergence of extremist groups including the Boko Haram sect which has evolved to become one of the worst religious extremist groups in recent times. The activities of the Boko Haram sect have seriously

threatened Nigeria's security and national integrity and have reopened the debate on the national question amongst Nigerians and international analysts.

CONTRIBUTION OF STUDY

While this study does not claim to offer any immediate solutions to the problem of differentiation in Nigeria, it focuses on trying to understand where the problem stems from. The trajectory of identity politics in Nigeria can be traced to the colonial structuring, which inadvertently created an artificial state consisting of culturally diverse societies, without doing much to nurture a unified nation where the citizens have a common goal. Indeed, the colonial regionalist federal legacy fuelled big-tribe hegemonic ethnocentrism, ethnic minority insecurity, democratic instability, ethno-military infighting and secessionist warfare (Osaghae and Suberu 2005: 22). However, we cannot continue to blame the problems that Nigeria faces on colonial borders and political structures. While diversity does allow for differentiation and discrimination, it is not always a condition for conflict. The fact that a country consists of multiple cultural groups does not mean that these groups must inevitably clash. Diversity can have some positive aspects, as is evident in the opulent culture of the Nigerian people. Amartya Sen argues that, as human beings, we all possess multiple identities which do not necessarily clash with each other. The only time that these become conflicting identities is when we begin to place more emphasis on one aspect of our identity over the others. He recommends that, to prevent conflict, individuals should always refer to our shared humanity which is a common ground that every person has with others. In addition, Osaghae and Suberu (2005: 4) maintain that diversity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for conflict. Their argument is that empirical evidence shows that division and conflict are not dependent on the degree of diversity, as some of the most diverse countries, for example, Switzerland, Belgium, Malaysia, and Tanzania enjoy relative peace and stability, while some of the least diverse are the most unstable or violent, for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi and, perhaps, Sri Lanka.

On the above note, therefore, this study suggests some recommendations for checking, or at the least, reducing instances of religious extremism in Nigeria. Apart from the country's diversity, there are several other conditions that favour religious insurgency in the country, many of them politically motivated. The proposed recommendations are, therefore, mostly

dependent on government actions and policies which should be implemented. These include the regulation of religious activities in the country to prevent provocative and obstructive modes of worship, the creation of jobs for unemployed young people, the organisation of orientation and rehabilitation programs for those who have been actively implicated in previous cases of religious extremism, and updating school programs to include education on religious tolerance, amongst others. We must however note, that while there is still a lot of work to be done for Nigerians to truly embrace multiculturalism, and despite the violent conflicts that continue to plague the country, Nigeria's achievement over the years in accommodating and managing cultural diversity cannot at all be trivialised.

SOURCES CONSULTED

UNPUBLISHED PAPERS

Lewis, PM. & Bratton, M. 2000. *Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria*. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 3: 1-52.

Onuoha, FC. 2010. The state and management of religious violence in Nigeria: A case of the July 2009 Boko Haram revolt. Ph.D. Seminar paper presented to the department of political science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria.

Osaghae, EE & Suberu, RT. 2005. *A History of Identities, Violence and Stability in Nigeria*. University of Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), working paper No. 6.

Mboob, M. 2012. *Causes and Effects of Conflicts in Nigeria: A Case Study of Jos Ethno-religious Conflicts*. Thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Social Science in Strategy and Diplomacy, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan, Malaysia, Bangi.

PUBLISHED SOURCES:

NIGERIAN NEWSPAPERS

The Sun

Thisday

Guardian

Vanguard

Daily Times

Tribune

ONLINE ARTICLES

Abdulkadir, A. 2011. *A Diary of Ethno-Religious Crises in Nigeria: Causes, Effects and Solutions*. [O]. Available:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2040860

Accessed 4 February 2014.

Adichie, CN. 2012. *Things Left Unsaid*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v34/n19/chimamanda-adichie/things-left-unsaid>

Accessed 4 January 2014.

Akinjide, R. 2000. *The Amalgamation of Nigeria Was a Fraud*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.unitedijaw.com/amalgamation.htm>

Accessed 4 January 2014.

Bartolotta, C. 2011. *"Terrorism in Nigeria: The Rise of Boko Haram."* [O]. Available:

<http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/2011/09/terrorism-in-nigeria-the-rise-of-boko-haram/>

Accessed 8 January 2014.

Boko Haram Attacks – Timeline. 2012. [O]. Available:

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep//25/boko-haram-timeline-nigeria>

Accessed 16 June 2015.

Boko Haram Conflict: Nigerian allies launch offensive. 2015. [O]. Available:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31789412>

Accessed 17 June 2015

Boko Haram Crisis: Nigerian military chiefs given deadline. 2015. [O]. Available:

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33913305>

Accessed 17 August 2015

Cook, D. 2011. *The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-rise-of-boko-haram-in-nigeria>

Accessed 8 January 2014.

Danjibo, ND. [sa]. *Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' crises in northern Nigeria*. Peace and conflict studies programme, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan. [O]. Available:

<http://www.ifranigeria.org>

Accessed 3 February 2014.

Diallo, S. 2011. *Nigeria: Post-Election Violence Killed 800*. [O]. Available:

<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800>

Accessed 14 May 2015

Dowden, R. 2012. *Boko Haram – more complicated than you think*. [O]. Available:

<http://africanarguments.org/2012/03/09/boko-haram-%E2%80%93-more-complicated-than-you-think-%E2%80%93-by-richard-dowden/>

Accessed 16 June 2015

Farouk, C. 2012. *Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram Islamists?* [O]. Available:

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501>

Accessed 8 January 2014

Fenton, S. 2014. *Nigerian Muslim cleric opposed to Boko Haram shot dead*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-nigeria-bokoharam-idUSBREA120CK20140203>

Accessed 4 February 2014.

Foreign Terrorist Organisations. 2013. [O]. Available:

<http://m.state.gov/md224829.htm>

Accessed 17 June 2015

Ibrahim, J. Kazah-Toure, T. 2003. *Ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria*. [O]. Available:

<http://www.nai.uu.se/publications/news/archives/042ibrahimkazah/>

Accessed 4 February 2014

Nigerian army frees hundreds more women and girls from Boko Haram. 2015. [O]. Available:
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/02/nigerian-women-girls-boko-haram-rebel>.

Accessed 16 June 2015

Nigerian army retakes control of key Boko Haram town. 2014. [O]. Available:
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/11234662/Nigerian-army-retakes-control-of-key-Boko-Haram-town.html>

Accessed 17 June 2015

Nigeria's ethnic divisions. 1999. [O]. Available:
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/129493.stm>

Accessed 17 June 2015

Religions. CIA World Factbook. 2001. [O]. Available:
<https://www.cia.gov/library/>

Accessed 12 January 2014.

Religious Composition by Country, in Percentages. 2012. [O]. Available:
<http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/table-religious-composition-by-country-in-percentages/>

Accessed 12 January 2014

Rwanda: How The Genocide Happened. 2011. BBC News 17 May. [O]. Available:
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13431486>

Accessed 2 May 2015

Sina, A. 2003. Islam in Fast Demise. [O] Available:
<http://www.faithfreedom.org/oped/sina31103.htm>

Accessed 2 May 2015

Song, S. 2014. Multiculturalism. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. [O] Available:

<http://www.plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/multiculturalism>
Accessed 2 May 2015

Religious Adherents, 2010-*Nigeria*. World Christian Database. 2010. [O]. Available:
http://www.thearda.com/internationalData/countries/Country_166_2.asp
Accessed 12 January 2014.

Udebunu, C. 2011. *Nigeria and the Dialectics of Multiculturalism* [O]. Available:
<http://www.ajol.info/index.php/og/article/view/71757>
Accessed 4 February 2014.

Welsch, W. 1999. *Transculturality – the Puzzling Form of Cultures Today*. [O]. Available:
http://www2.uni-jena.de/welsch/papers/W_Welsch_Transculturality.html
Accessed 5th February 2014

Zenn, J. 2013. *Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru after the Mali Intervention*. [O]. Available:
<http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/cooperation-or-competition-boko-haram-and-ansaru-after-the-mali-intervention>
Accessed 4 February 2014.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Achunike, H.C. 2008. Religious practices in Nigeria as Source of Social Conflict. *Journal of Liberal Studies*, 12(1&2): 286–295.

Allen Jr, JL. 2013. *The Catholic Church: What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Alpern, SB. 1998. *Amazons of Black Sparta: The Women Warriors of Dahomey*. New York: New York University Press.

Ambe-Uva, TN, 2010. Identity Politics and the Jos Crisis: Evidence, Lessons and Challenges of Good Governance. *African Journal of History and Culture* 2(3): 42-45.

Anyadike, NO. 2013. Boko Haram and National Security Challenges in Nigeria; Causes and Solutions. *Journal of Economics and Sustainable Development*. 4(5): 12-23.

Awolowo, O. 1947. *Path to Nigerian Freedom*. London: Faber and Faber

Balogun, KA. 1988. Religious Intolerance as a Source of National Disintegration. In Brown, M. Coté, O. Lynn-Jones, S. Miller, S (eds). 1997. *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. London: The MIT Press

Bhabha, HK. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Baumeister, RF (ed). 1999. *The self in social psychology*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Campbell, J. 2013. *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink*. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Chafe, KS. 1994. *Challenges to the Hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate: A Preliminary Examination*. Frankfurt: Paideuma.

Cohen, SP. 2004. *The Idea of Pakistan*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Coleman, JS. 1971. *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. California: University Press.

Crowder, M. 1968. *West Africa under Colonial Rule*. London: Hutchinson & Co (Publishers) Ltd.

Eliot, TS. 1948. *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*. London: Faber and Faber.

Erivwo, SU. 1979. *A history of Christianity in Nigeria: The Urhobo, the Isoko, and the Itsekiri*. Knoxville: Daystar Press.

Falola, T. 2001. *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.

Falola, T. 2009. *Historical Dictionary of Nigeria*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press.

Falola, T. & Heaton, MM. 2008. *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Falola, T, & Salm, SJ (eds). 2004. *Nigerian Cities*. New Jersey: Africa World Press.

Fanon, F. & Markmann CL. 1986. *Black Skin, White Masks*. London: Pluto Press

- Garba, JN. 1982. *Revolution in Nigeria: Another View*. London: Africa Books.
- Ganyi, FM & Ellah, S. 2015. Socio-Linguistics, Oral Literature as Language Socialization and Representation of Identity among Young Nigerian Undergraduates: A study of Unical and Crutech Slangs. *American Journal of Linguistics* 4(1): 1-10
- Giddens, A & Sutton, PW. 2013. *Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Gofwen, RI. 2004. *Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria and Nation Building: The Throes of Two Decades 1980–2000*. Kaduna, Human Rights Monitor.
- Gu, MD. 2013. *Sinologism. An alternative to Orientalism and postcolonialism*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Heckmann, F. 1993. Multiculturalism Defined Seven Ways. *The Social Contract* 3(4):245-246
- Hernon, I. 2003. *Britain's Forgotten Wars: Colonial Campaigns of the Nineteenth Century*. Stroud: Sutton Publishing.
- Heywood, A. 2009. Multiculturalism, Identity and Diversity. *Politics Review* 19(1):1-10
- Hook, D. 2005. The Racial Stereotype, Colonial Discourse, Fetishism, and Racism. *Psychoanalytic Review*, 92(5): 701-734.
- Hopkins, AG. (ed). 2002. *Globalization in World History*. New York: Norton and Company
- Hroch, M. 1993. From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe. *New Left Review* 198:3-29.
- Huntington, SP. 1996. *The Class of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Imobighe, TA. (ed). *Civil Society and Ethnic Conflicts Management in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Spectrum books.
- Iwara, UE. 2006. Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causes and Consequences. *Sophia: An African Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (2): 153–157.

Kastfelt, N (ed). 2003. *Scriptural Politics. The Bible and the Koran as Political Models in the Middle East and Africa*. London: Hurst and Company.

Kymlicka, W. 1995. *Multicultural Citizenship*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Le Saint Coran. 2005. *Les Femmes*. Beyrouth: Presses de Dar Albouraq.

Mala, SB. (ed). *Religion and National Unity*. Ibadan: University Press.

Mamdani, M. 2001. Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43 (4): 651-664.

Mernissi, F. 1992. *Islam and Democracy: Fear of the Modern World*. Cambridge: Perseus Books.

Morris-Hale, W. 1997. *Conflict and Harmony in Multi-Ethnic Societies: An International Perspective*. New York: Peter Lang.

Nohlen, D, Krennerich, M & Thibaut, B (eds). 1999. *Elections in Africa: A data handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nwaomah, SM. 2011. Religious Crises in Nigeria: Manifestation, Effects and the Way Forward. *Journal of Sociology, Psychology and Anthropology in Practice* 3(2): 94-104.

Onuoha, FC. 2012. The audacity of the Boko Haram: Background, analysis and emerging trend. *Security Journal* (25): 134–151.

Said, EW. 1993. *Orientalism*. London: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group

Said, EW. 1994. *Culture and Imperialism*. London: Vintage

Said, EW. 1997. *Covering Islam: How The Media And The Experts Determine How We See The Rest Of The World*. London: Vintage

Salawu, B. 2010. Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Causal Analysis and Proposals for New Management Strategies. *European Journal of Social Sciences* 13(3): 345-353.

Sampson, IT. 2012. Religious Violence in Nigeria: Causal Diagnoses and Strategic Recommendations to the State and Religious Communities. *African Journal on Conflict Resolution* 12(1): 103-134.

Sen, AK. 2007. *Identity and Violence: The Illusion of Destiny*. Gurgaon: Penguin Books India.

Shavelson, RJ, Hubner, JJ & Stanton, GC. 1976. Self-Concept: Validation of Construct Interpretations. *Review of Educational Research* 46(3): 407-441.

Smith, AD. 1995. *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge. Polity Press.

Smith, AD. 2001. *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Smith, AD. 2004. *The Antiquity of Nations*. Cambridge. Polity Press

Smith, RS. 1979. *The Lagos Consulate, 1851 – 1861*. California: University of California Press.

Sterling, D. 1996. *The Making of an Afro-American: Martin Robison Delany, 1812-1885*.
Cambridge: Da Capo Press

Thornton, JK. 1999. *Warfare in Atlantic Africa 1500-1800*. London and New York: Routledge.

Usman, M. 2013. Religion and Violence in Nigeria: 1980-2012. *Bangladesh e-journal of Sociology* 10(2): 41-51

Valji, N. 2003. *Creating the Nation: The Rise of Violent Xenophobia in the New South Africa*.
Toronto. York University Press.

Visker, R. 1999. *Truth and Singularity: Taking Foucault into Phenomenology*. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.