


CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

4.1 Community Control in the Makuleke CBNRM Initiative

4.1.1 ANALYSIS OF IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATIONAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT ON THE DECENTRALISATION OF AUTHORITY OVER NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

The pre-conditions for community level control over CBNRM include the political empowerment of the community, secure tenure rights, the devolution of benefits from resource management to community level and the capacity of the community to manage the resource base (Figure 4.1).

**FIGURE 4.1: PRECONDITIONS FOR COMMUNITY LEVEL CONTROL IN THE CBNRM:
A SUMMARY**



At governmental level, it would seem that there has been political will to promote active community participation in natural resource management. In the Makuleke case, the shift towards active participation appears to have started after 1994 after the promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act. This statutory instrument appears to have provided the necessary impetus for the convergence of community roles in environmental governance, land ownership and entry into the benefits-stream emanating from natural resource management.

Following the promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act, there were some complimentary shifts in the Environmental Management policy (South Africa, 1997d) as well as the formulation of the SANP Policy on Land Claims in National Parks (SANP, 1998). These have provided for broader public participation in conservation and the integration of conservation and development objectives. There was

also the passing of the Communal Property Associations Act (South Africa, 1996b), which allowed the formation of community CBOs that are representative and legally accountable entities. The Makuleke CBO formed in terms of this statute has therefore been strengthened by legislation in its role as the appropriate authority in the land claim settlement and the CBNRM initiative.

At the CBNRM programme level, there has been attempt to enhance the conservation and business management skill and organisational capacity within the Makuleke community. The programme instruments compliment the government's effort at strengthening local governance and CBO structures, as well as the SANP's purported commitment to institutional capacity building for effective participation in environmental governance and management.


The various policies and instruments appear to have been set to enable the pre-conditions for community level control over CBNRM to be met. What remains to be seen is the extent to which this will actually lead to enhanced community control over CBNRM and, ultimately, active community participation in resource management.

4.1.2 ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE MCTP FORMULATION PROCESS

It has been suggested the most critical factor in the success of a CBNRM initiative is the degree of political participation in decision making by the stakeholder community (Murphree, 1994; Little, 1994). A common view is that the importance of community participation increases with the successive stages of the process, and local communities tend to participate more actively in the implementation than in the design stages of CBNRM (Finsterebusch & van Wicklin, 1987 cited in Manikutty, 1997:118; Little, 1994). This section analyses the modes and degrees of community participation in the Makuleke CBNRM process (Figure 4.2).

The Makuleke CBNRM process appears to have been set in motion by the promulgation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act in 1994. Stage 1 of the diagram represents the period from the passing of this statute to the initial part of the Early Phase of the land claim process in 1996. The salient features of this period stretch back from the 1969 forced removal of the Makuleke from the Pafuri area. The passive mode of participation at this stage was largely due to the top-down centre-driven conservationist approach that has traditionally characterised state protected area management in South Africa. The legacy of this approach appear to have persisted into the early part of the post-apartheid policy reform process, despite the purported shifts in approach by the NPB. This has been attributed to perceptions by some individual NPB members that the Makuleke land claim was a threat to the integrity of the KNP, rather than a lack of political will within the NPB as a whole (Fig, 1997).

FIGURE 4.2: A CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE PROCESS OF DECENTRALISATION OF THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY TO THE MAKULEKE COMMUNITY



Stage 2 of Figure 4.2 marks the commencement of the shift towards active community participation in institutionalised CBNRM. This period corresponds to the later part of the Early Phase of the land claim settlement process. This development was characterised by active consultation, mainly between the SANP and KNP officials on one hand and the Makuleke community and its advisors on the other. The consultative process included issues such as the Buffer Zone proposal by park officials, the SANP/KNP policy review and the KNP Neighbours' forums. Such consultations, however, did not concede any share of decision making, and the SANP and KNP agencies were under no obligation to take on board the views by the community. The Makuleke therefore opted to keep this consultative process separate from the land claim issue. By pressing further with their demand for ownership of the Pafuri area, they took their role in environmental governance to a higher level of participation.

Stage 3 represents the Intermediary Phase of the land claim settlement process. The period was characterised by consensus seeking through negotiation between various stakeholders, principal of which were the SANP and the Makuleke community. The community was required in terms of the Communal Property Associations Act of 1996 to form a CPA, which would be the appropriate authority in the land claim settlement. With the formation of the MCPA, the mode of community participation became functional. The implications of the formation of the MCPA, a legally constituted CBO structure, were that the other stakeholders were legally obliged to take the community views into

account. The Makuleke had to rely heavily on external assistance at this stage since the process involved highly specialised negotiation.

Stage 4 represents the Final Phase of the land claim process. The settlement agreement was reached during this period. The agreement resulted in an interactive form of community participation, whereby the authority vested over the Makuleke Region was shared between the SANP and the Makuleke community. The sharing of control was structured through formation of a Joint Management Board representing both the SANP and the MCPA. The co-management regime that emerged from the negotiation process meant that the control over the CBNRM by the Makuleke would remain shared for at least fifty years.

Through compromise, the Makuleke had conceded a significant share of their control, and it would take at least fifty years before the community could exert a significantly higher level of control over the CBNRM process (Stage 5). The implications of delaying active community participation in environmental governance had yet to unfold. However, the adaptive management strategy adopted in the MCTP may be effective to a certain extent in catering for changes in community demands as they arise. In this regard, one issue that seems important is the way in which the Makuleke people shared in the definition of the CBNRM initiative during the initial stages of the programme formulation process.

4.1.3 ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE INITIATION OF THE MCTP

The MCTP may seem from the outside as being a potentially successful CBNRM initiative owing to the implementation to near perfection of the universal principles of CBNRM. The potential for success of the MCTP may also seem to be a result of a popular peasant movement to gain rights over their natural resources, in interaction with a global movement for new participatory arrangements that involve local communities in natural resource management. A closer examination of the mode of initiation of the MCTP, however, reveals that the Makuleke initiative did not initially evolve in tandem with the global movement. Rather, the initial impetus for the Makuleke land claim is strongly linked to the historical political and social changes that have occurred within South Africa.

The findings of this study show that the Makuleke lodged their land claim of the Pafuri area on the basis of their grievances over the forced removal. It appears that during the negotiation process, the land claim issue was captured to become an integral part of a broader global process of decentralisation of environmental governance to local community level. The MCTP was then included in a region-wide plan to establish Trans-border natural resource management and conservation areas (TBNRMs &

TBCAs) within Southern Africa. This plan was already at proposal stage when the Makuleke lodged their land claim (Robinson, 1996:11; Pinnock, 1996).

The Makuleke had viewed the Pafuri area as an extension of the community's resource base. They had therefore envisaged that, in the event of restitution, they would engage in diamond mining in partnership with private institutions. This would then generate the sorely needed income for community development and employment opportunities. However, a pre-condition that was made prior to the granting of ownership rights to the Makuleke was that the Pafuri area would continue to be used as a protected area, with allowances for appropriate conservation-based tourism development in order to generate income and employment. The protected area, known as the Makuleke Region, was to be co-managed by the JMB consisting of representatives of the SANP and the MCPA.

This shows that the Makuleke community at that point did not have enough power to set the terms for its own participation. Their pressing need for income for community development and employment opportunities were therefore aligned with the broader interest by conservation agencies, environmentalists and tourism agencies at national and international level to create TBNRMs and TBCAs. However, there do not seem to be strong guarantees that the tourism option will generate the required income or employment, as past experience has shown that economic benefits to communities tend to trickle down as the greater proportion of revenue accrues to tourism agencies at higher levels of the hierarchy.

The study found that there were two different views on the issue of continued protection of the Makuleke Region. The prevailing view was optimistic that the continued protection of the Makuleke Region at Pafuri would generate the required employment opportunities and revenue from tourism. Another view that subsisted was that community interest would best have been served if the MCPA Executive Committee had insisted on maximum resource control rights, particularly for the purposes of mineral exploitation.

Little (1994) has iterated the importance of a shared definition of the CBNRM problem. Except for the initial impetus of the land claim, the conception of the MCTP appears to have originated almost entirely from a small group within government and NGOs. These have enabled the initiation of an innovative CBNRM programme, and then required of it a series of compromises on CBNRM principles. More obviously, the restrictions have been imposed by global conservation interests and conventions to which the state is signatory. However, there also seem to lurk in the background some interests by private tourism entrepreneurs who have a stake in the proposed TBCAs and TBNRMs. Thus, while the convergence of the community and the broader interests appears to have been achieved, what will determine the success of the MCTP is probably the capacity of the initiative to effect meaningful improvement in the livelihoods and wellbeing of the community.

4.1.4 ANALYSIS OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

At the time of this study, the MCTP structure was such that political decision making remained the prerogative of the MCPA Executive Committee, with assistance from the FoM, an outsider trust organisation. The larger population of the Makuleke community seemed to be making effort towards active participation in the implementation of CBNRM projects. It seems important therefore that the MCPA Executive Committee should be viewed as a legitimate structure by the community.

The legitimacy of the executive seems to derive more strongly from the extent to which it pursues community interests than from their democratic accession into office. The question of accountability is therefore critical. The extent to which the MCPA Executive acts accountably towards their constituency will contribute to whether or not the community considers the executive legitimate. In turn, the extent to which the FoM acts accountably to the MCPA Executive Committee will determine whether or not the committee views the trust organisation as a legitimate advisor. Perhaps an important consideration is that there should be transparency and no unjustified duality of function by the institutional actors at programme governance level.

With regard to projects implemented within the MTCP framework, an important factor seems to be the extent to which there is transparency and fairness in the selection of individuals or interest groups targeted by the programme. At the time of the study, the programme instruments included the development of the organisational skills of the Executive Committee. The extent to which the executive will use skills such as effective communication, ethical conduct and conflict resolution to strike an acceptable balance between the different social classes, competing political structures and different vested interests may determine the success of the programme within the term of the particular Executive Committee.

The question of transparency and fairness is probably a key decisive factor where the sharing of economic benefits is concerned. Following the restitution of land rights and the initiation of the CBNRM programme, expectations of improved livelihoods, employment opportunities and community development were raised. However, two issues may be problematic.

The first issue relates to the dialectics of cost and benefit sharing. In this instance, the members of the Executive Committee may feel justified in arguing that they should get some measure of individual benefit or reward for shouldering the community costs of the CBNRM initiative. Indeed two questions that were asked by members of the executive were:

- Should members of the MCPA Executive Committee who are involved in project planning be given incentives, or should they suffer individual costs for the larger community benefit?
- Where participation by Executive Committee members is required in research and consultancy work, why should the outsider consultants, researchers and facilitators derive individual benefit while the community-based committee members do not?

However, it is possible that the community constituency that elects individuals into office may misconstrue the rewards to committee members as a form of self-interest. On the other hand, it seems fair that individual cost should be balanced with individual benefit. At the time of the study the resolution of this problem had yet to be made. It is perhaps reasonable to surmise that while the community members themselves are best placed to settle problems of community dynamics, there is a need for outsiders to demonstrate that they do not take advantage of the community while accumulating their own benefits.

The second issue on economic benefits concerns the ability of the CBNRM initiative to deliver meaningful rather than trickle down benefits to the Makuleke community. Historical experience prior to the MCTP shows that the disadvantaged members community have generally not benefited much from development initiatives such as the Makuleke Irrigation Scheme (LRG, 1995). Historical experience with CBNRM initiative elsewhere has also shown that conservation-based commercial activities such as tourism have not yielded meaningful benefit particularly at household level (Ngobese, 1994; Koch, 1994). This reiterates the view by this study that the potential for success of the MCTP will probably depend largely upon the capacity of the programme to effect meaningful improvement in the livelihoods and wellbeing of the community.

4.2 Gender Issues in the Makuleke CBNRM Initiative

4.2.1 ANALYSIS OF GENDER ACCESS TO POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE MCTP

This study found that the MCTP derived some of its key principles from the MCPA Constitution. The MCPA Constitution makes provision for gender equity in the make up of the Executive Committee (MCPA, 1997:9; South Africa, 1996:5). The ideal gender representation in the MCPA committee is therefore fifty percent for both the women and the men.

An examination of the programme instruments revealed that attempt had been made to incorporate gender concerns into the design and implementation framework of the MCTP. The Stakeholder Analysis that was done at the beginning of the programme identified the various interests, roles,

resources and relationships of stakeholders ranging from community to international level. At community level, the different interests were also identified and specific interest groups targeted. Particular emphasis was placed on the role of women within the programme.

The findings of the study revealed however that the percentage of women members of the Executive Committee was below the target. Furthermore, the study found that more women than men considered that they did not participate in political decision-making (Figure 3.14 in Chapter Three).

The observed characteristics of gender participation in decision making probably relate to the programme model adopted by the Makuleke. Policy formulation and decision making has been undertaken within a community governance framework that merges the older traditional leadership and the newer, democratically elected political structures. Thus despite efforts by the MCPA Executive Committee to actively involve both women and men in decision making, access to programme governance has been greater for men than women. This seems to confirm the observation by scholars like Friedmann (1992) that gender roles are deeply imbedded within the cultural matrix. It would appear that the social structures and attitudes that favour male dominance remain entrenched within the community, militating against the strategic participation of women in the CBNRM governance.

Due to the persistence of social structures and attitudes that discriminate against women, it would seem that the MCTP has adopted a 'project approach' as a means of facilitating participation by women. While there are merits in the project approach, there is a potential danger that the approach that was observed at the time of the study may fail to significantly improve the lives of the Makuleke women and may probably further marginalise them from mainstream economic production. Part of the problem with the observed project approach relates to its emphasis on consumption rather than production, with many of the women's projects reinforcing the 'home economics' stereotype of appropriate women's activities.

For so long as the social and cultural restrictions on the participation by women lag behind efforts to promote women's access to political decision making, there is a danger that the women's interests may persist in being marginalised. Indeed, there were observations that although the needs for income and employment opportunities have been addressed, the livelihood needs strongly expressed by the Makuleke women do not seem to have been given sufficient attention. Rather, the formulation of the CBNRM initiative appears to have emphasised the community needs perceived by men. Given that women constitute a significant proportion of the productive population at Makuleke (LRG, 1995), there seems to be a need for a more equitable emphasis on gender needs. There is also a need to balance the promotion of women's participation in both the basic and strategic components of CBNRM.