

CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND FINAL CONCLUSION

-

Ⓜ

In Chapter 1, it was stated that the aim of this study was to analyze the institution and implementation of the 1977 mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by the United States. The reasoning behind this was that close scrutiny of the implementation of the arms embargo would allow the researcher the opportunity to judge the seriousness that the US assigned to the objectives of the arms embargo. Full compliance with the embargo would demonstrate the commitment of the US to end the policy of apartheid in South Africa. On the other hand, any relaxation of the arms embargo by the US would have been interpreted by international observers, especially from the Afro-Asian nations, as a retreat from the commitment to eradicate the policy of apartheid. Also, the enforcement of the arms embargo by the US often raised the important question on the ability of major arms producers like the US to reduce the threat of global violence by controlling the flow of arms to potential belligerents. Lastly, implementation of the arms embargo by the US tested the latter's capacity to put measures in place to successfully block arms and related items being exported to the country against which the measure was imposed.

The following questions constituted the problem statement:

- 1) Why did the US under the Carter Administration institute the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in 1977? Did it signify a more hard lined change in US foreign policy with regard to South Africa, or was it intended only as a limited measure to appease the Afro-Asian countries, while on the other hand maintaining the continued support of the South African Government with regard to anti-communism?
- 2) What regulations did the various US Administrations from 1977 to 1997 introduce to enforce the arms embargo, and to what extent did they adhere to or change the regulations? Was the adherence or changes linked to their foreign policy objectives with regard to South Africa?

- 3) Was it primarily in a defiant reaction to the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo by the US that South Africa turned to clandestine means to circumvent the embargo, and in the end, despite the arms embargo, succeeded in the build-up of a world-renowned defense industry?

In short, one can thus say that this research study was aimed at determining the objectives of the US in instituting the arms embargo, whether these objectives were met through the implementation and enforcement of the arms embargo, and whether the South African reaction to the embargo signified the failure of the embargo to meet its objectives.

The institution and implementation of the mandatory arms embargo was discussed in a chronological order of US Administrations during the period 1977-1997, i.e. the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton Administrations. A conclusion on each of these US Administrations' implementation of the mandatory arms embargo was already drawn at the end of each applicable chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a final summary and draw a final conclusion on each of the three questions constituting the problem statement.

8.1 FINAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ON PROBLEM STATEMENT 1

As stated in Chapter 1, the institution of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa by the US in 1977, should be viewed in the light of concerted efforts in the United Nations for punitive measures to be taken against South Africa. Three interrelated events were especially responsible for these efforts and the subsequent institution of the arms embargo in 1977: the policy of apartheid of the South African Government and the internal unrest that it caused; the military build-up of the South African Government, in spite of the United Nations arms embargo instituted against it in 1963; and the question of independence for South West Africa (Namibia), where South Africa's administration and military presence was regarded as illegal.

Jimmy Carter became president of the United States at a time when the above-mentioned factors had caused severe international and domestic emotions and outcries for steps to be taken against the South African Government. In addition to the abovementioned factors, the political turmoil in South Africa exploded in 1976 with the

Soweto uprising and the resultant violent strikes and riots in the whole of South Africa, which left more than 500 people dead and thousands wounded. Angry human rights activists worldwide demanded serious action against the South African Government from Carter, especially since he had declared himself a fierce supporter of human rights in the build-up to the 1976 US elections. He now had to prove that he was indeed serious about upholding human rights, and that his statements in this regard were not mere rhetoric.

Carter's first ten months in office signaled a hardening in US relations with South Africa. He appointed proponents of human rights and racial equality in top positions in his Administration and ordered a foreign policy review with regard to South Africa, South West Africa (Namibia) and Rhodesia. Furthermore, he and senior members of his Administration made it clear that they had no strategic interest in Southern Africa, did not wish to play any military role in Africa, and that economic interests would play no role in the Administration's South African policy. These statements constituted a significant departure from US policy prior to 1977. In addition, as a Democrat, Carter was very concerned with the national interests of the US. International issues therefore had to centre on the ideals of the American nation, i.e. a commitment to human rights. The message to South Africa was clear: relations between the US and South Africa was bound to deteriorate rapidly if the latter did not start to walk on a road of major domestic reform and a regard for human rights.

The South African Government remained deaf to the signals of a more hard line policy by the US. The South African defense budget for 1977 was increased sharply, amid rumors of a South African nuclear weapons program. When the Carter Administration in July 1977 moved to end all grey-area sales to South Africa that had been permitted during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, the South African Government refused to acknowledge the warning. In August 1977, Soviet allegations of a nuclear test site being built by South Africa in the Kalahari Desert became the catalyst of rapidly deteriorating US-South African relations. Unheard of before in the history of the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the US took a combined stand against South Africa. This should have warned South Africa that its fierce anti-communist stance would not rescue it from punitive action this time, as was the case with past US Governments. The Carter Administration viewed human rights as more important than being anti-communist. Instead, the South African Government answered the warning with increasing defiance

and bitter comments directed at the Carter Administration. The defiance culminated in September 1977 in the death of Black Consciousness leader Steven Biko in police custody, followed by a crackdown on two leading black newspapers, eighteen black and interracial organizations and several prominent individuals.

The defiance of the South African Government left Carter with no choice but to act. The international outcry as a result of the defiance became deafening. Yet, despite fiercely condemning the defiance of the South African Government, Carter refused to impose anything more than a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, and was even reluctant to denote the political turmoil in that country as a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Carter was only willing to declare that the supply of arms to South Africa was becoming a threat to international peace and security. He nonetheless warned that South Africa could expect further steps if it did not heed the warning constituted by the mandatory arms embargo.

In the light of the abovementioned summary, one can conclude that the Carter Administration's policy towards South Africa was based on political interests, of which a concern for human rights and human dignity was a significant ingredient. It can be asserted that the defiance of the South African Government collided with the strong human rights stance of the Carter Administration, and finally led to the institution of a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa. Several factors fuelled the fire caused by the collision, e.g. the international and US domestic pressure for action against the South African Government. In retrospect, however, the strong utterances about human rights by the Carter Administration versus its reluctance to impose stronger measures than the arms embargo just doesn't add up. If the Carter Administration was so serious about human rights, why the reluctance to impose stronger measures? The truth is that the mandatory arms embargo actually did not constitute anything new as far as US policy towards South Africa was concerned. On the contrary, the 1963 arms embargo was rather strictly enforced by Carter's predecessors, despite some weakening by the Nixon and Ford Administrations. Thus, although Carter imposed some restrictions regarding grey area items, it was merely a reinstatement of measures lifted by the Nixon and Ford Administrations. One can therefore assert that only the description of the arms embargo changed, i.e. from voluntary in 1963 to mandatory in 1977, and that Carter's actions were merely a case of anti-apartheid rhetoric, disguised under a shadow of nothing more than very limited action. One therefore comes to the conclusion that the

limited action was indeed only an effort to appease the Afro-Asian nations and anti-apartheid activists. Also, although the Carter Administration early in 1977 declared that South Africa's fierce anti-communism would have no influence on its policy towards South Africa, the limited action indicated that it was perhaps still a matter that the Carter Administration took into consideration behind the scenes. Furthermore, the high priority that the Carter Administration put on bringing peace, democracy and independence to Rhodesia can possibly be regarded as a factor limiting its action against South Africa. On the other hand, one should not disregard the fact that the mandatory arms embargo was imposed under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which made it a very important symbolic act of significant importance at that point in history. This indicated a hardening in US foreign policy with regard to South Africa.

8.2 FINAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ON PROBLEM STATEMENT 2

Although many critics regarded the Carter Administration's implementation of a mandatory arms embargo and the resultant United Nations Resolution 418 (1977) as disappointingly limited, some credit is due to that Administration for its efforts to strengthen and implement the embargo as effectively as possible. Unlike other members of the United Nations, when the mandatory arms embargo was instituted, the US already had extensive laws and regulations to govern the trade in arms and arms technology in place. The majority of these laws and regulations were embodied in the US Munitions List, and provided a legal basis for the implementation of the arms embargo. Furthermore, the term 'arms and related equipment' in United Nations Resolution 418, which created confusion amongst other countries, was effectively defined in the US as including all items and related technical data on the Munitions List, as well as other items with a military application that were not listed on the Munitions List. Technical data and defense articles and services sold on a government-to-government basis under the US foreign military sales program, were also included in the definition of 'arms and related equipment'.

In February 1978, the Carter Administration strengthened the arms embargo by announcing a ban on the export of any US-origin item or technical data to the South African military and police. These regulations went beyond the requirements of Resolution 418. Therefore, one can assert that it signified a tough line taken by the Carter Administration towards South Africa. It seemed that the initial anti-apartheid

rhetoric was now being followed up with some practical action, perhaps in an effort to silence the Carter Administration's critics. Carter had promised stiff regulations against South Africa and now acted by introducing comprehensive arms embargo measures. This could be viewed as an indication that Carter was genuinely concerned about human rights violations in South Africa. On the other hand, comprehensive measures can be very difficult to enforce. Therefore, despite the Carter Administration's best intentions to enforce those measures, many problems surfaced that actually disimplemented the embargo to a large extent.

Some of the problems encountered by the Carter Administration in its implementation of the arms embargo could be ascribed to loopholes in the regulations. Yet another problem was the illegal export of arms and technology to South Africa by US firms. The case of Space Research Corporation (SRC) was by far the most serious. The Carter Administration's handling of these problems is not commendable. On the one hand, the Carter Administration continually gave assurances that each sale to South Africa was considered carefully and individually before being allowed or denied. Contradictory to this, the Carter Administration on the other hand was reluctant to end all nuclear cooperation with South Africa, despite incidents and rumors that strongly pointed to South Africa having a nuclear weapons program. In addition, arms embargo violation offenders, when indeed caught, did not receive severe punishment. This raised many questions on how serious the Carter Administration was taking the implementation of the arms embargo. The truth is, the Carter Administration simply did not have effective machinery to implement and enforce the arms embargo regulations it had set down. In addition, the Carter Administration did not fully reckon with the South African determination to obtain whatever it needed through whatever way necessary.

In addition to the abovementioned problems, the defiant South African Government made the implementation of the arms embargo even more difficult by signing a cooperation agreement with Israel. Through this agreement, the South African Government obtained many US-origin military items or technology. This placed the Carter Administration in a foreign policy dilemma. On the one hand, it had pledged its unequivocal support to Israel. This support would be difficult to withdraw abruptly. On the other hand, Israel had links with South Africa, against which an arms embargo was in place. The dilemma led to many accusations that the Carter Administration complied with the transfer of military items to South Africa, by simply turning a blind eye and

doing nothing constructive to block the flow of military items from Israel to South Africa.

In the light of the abovementioned summary, the final conclusion on the Carter Administration's implementation of the arms embargo would be that although it had the best intentions of enforcing the arms embargo on South Africa, it was simply not able to fully implement the arms embargo regulations that it had set down. Furthermore, the Carter Administration's promise of unequivocal support to Israel weighed heavier than the fact that Israel was violating the US arms embargo against South Africa. If the Carter Administration was really committed to enforcing the arms embargo, then it would have rebuked Israel more strongly or even implemented punitive measures against it. The fact that this did not happen indicates that the Carter Administration's implementation of the arms embargo was directly linked to its foreign policy objectives. It slackened the leash on South Africa rather than losing its alliance with Israel.

Carter was defeated in the 1980 US elections by Republican Ronald Reagan. When Reagan became the US President, it raised South African expectations of a less rigid policy than that of the Carter Administration. The South African expectations were not in vain. During the first term of the Reagan Administration, i.e. from 1981 to 1984, South Africa once again became important as a strategic anti-communist ally. Many reasons led to this, e.g. the foreign policy crises' that had developed in Iran and Afghanistan. These crises' threatened the US' interests in the Middle East and Southwest-Asia, the stability and territorial integrity of the Third World and non-aligned countries, and the global balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union. Once again, as was the case with several US Administrations before Carter, the threatening of US international interests proved to be an important point in the framing of US policy toward South Africa. Towards the end of the 1980s, Reagan would be instrumental in events leading to the fall of the Soviet Union. However, before that could happen, the spread of communism in Africa had to be stopped. The South African Government was fiercely anti-communist, and thus won the support of many in the Reagan camp. Indeed, Reagan made no secret of the importance that he ascribed to South Africa being anti-communist. Shortly after he took office as US President, he told reporters that his Administration would place heavy emphasis on countering the spread of communism, and less emphasis on human rights.

The emphasis on countering the spread of communism once more raised the question of the strategic importance of South Africa being at the southern point of Africa – another positive point for support in the Reagan camp. However, the mandatory arms embargo kept the Reagan Administration from providing open support to South Africa. The embargo could not simply be lifted. Such a step would be extremely miscalculating and could result in severe international as well as domestic repercussions for the Reagan Administration. Thus, the latter faced the following foreign policy dilemma: how to support the South African Government in order to counter the spread of communism while being bound by a mandatory arms embargo prohibiting military support to that country.

The South African policy dilemma meant that the Reagan Administration had to act slowly and with extreme caution in its support for that country. Initially, Reagan and many of his senior officials often did not hesitate to cautiously voice the Administration's support for South Africa. However, they usually made sure that such statements were followed by a reiteration of the US' abhorrence of apartheid. The Reagan Administration furthermore adopted a policy called constructive engagement. They believed it would position the US as a broker between the various opposing parties in the Southern African region. Constructive engagement ruled out further embargoes or sanctions against South Africa.

As far as the arms embargo was concerned, the Reagan Administration adhered to its decision to support South Africa through slow and cautious steps. Step by step, the arms embargo regulations set by the Carter Administration were made less rigid. Several relaxations were announced in this manner, always with the motivation that the regulations set by the Carter Administration in 1978 unnecessarily included items that could have been exported to South Africa without contravening US policy. Indeed, the US Department of State at one instance boldly declared that the new regulations represented a significant but politically less sensitive first phase in what was anticipated to be a consistent process of eliminating trade restraints with South Africa. The South African military establishment interpreted the relaxations as indicating that many imports that were previously excluded would now be allowed.

The new regulations set by the Reagan Administration paved the way for increased grey area exports to the South African military establishment and even increased violations of

the arms embargo. Nonetheless, surprisingly few incidents in this regard occurred, except in the field of computers and computer-related software and equipment. South African firms or institutions involved in military research and development were still excluded from receiving such items by the arms embargo, but a number of instances occurred where sensitive computer-related equipment landed up in the hands of the South African military establishment. The question is – did the Reagan Administration know about the end users of sensitive computer equipment in South Africa, and violated the embargo willfully by concurring with the export thereof? It was not always clear whether this was the case.

In November 1984, Reagan was re-elected as US President after a landslide victory over the Democratic Party candidate. He was confident of continuing upon the path of cautious support to South Africa, including the relaxation of arms embargo regulations. However, due to extremely violent incidents in South Africa and crackdowns by the South African Government, he was soon forced to retreat. The relaxation of many arms embargo regulations by the Reagan Administration and the situation in South Africa had not gone unnoticed by the US anti-apartheid movement. This movement had built up strength during the early 1980's in all sectors of US life, and became a force to be reckoned with. It now demanded comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. According to anti-apartheid activists, the arms embargo was a joke because the South African Government was at that point in time militarily the strongest it had ever been. Lobbying for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa gained momentum by the day. Even the extension of the United Nations arms embargo in December 1984 to a prohibition on the import of South African-manufactured arms and related equipment could not satisfy the call for sanctions. The lobbying for sanctions snowballed in the US and although the Reagan Administration remained opposed to any further sanctions, boycotts or embargoes against South Africa, by September 1985 it realized that it would no longer be able to fend off the institution of economic sanctions against South Africa by the US Congress. To defend South Africa against the US Congress, Reagan in September 1985 announced limited economic sanctions against that country through an Executive Order. The Executive Order contained a number of regulations applicable to the arms embargo, mainly once more extending some of the regulations that were relaxed during the Reagan Administration's first term.

The Reagan Administration succeeded in fighting off a crisis in the US Congress, but this would only have a short-term effect. In May 1986, South Africa raided enemy targets in three neighboring countries, thereby eliciting a new spade of protest in the US. In the aftermath of the raids, it became clear that many in the US Congress would settle for nothing less than comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. In October 1986 Reagan was overruled when the Senate voted with an overwhelming majority to institute a comprehensive sanctions package against South Africa, called the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. The CAAA contained several measures that would strengthen the arms embargo against South Africa, together with a clause obliging the Reagan Administration to report to the US Congress regularly on the implementation of the arms embargo. Reagan was now bound to adhere to the measures instituted by the US Congress, although he maintained a sense of goodwill towards South Africa for the rest of his term. His Administration implemented the arms embargo strictly during the remainder of its second term – frankly, it had no choice! It was being carefully monitored by the US Congress. Very few violations occurred during the remainder of Reagan's second term. In the few cases that were indeed revealed, sentencing was strict. On the other hand, based on Reagan's feelings of support to South Africa during the whole of his Administration, one cannot help but wonder whether there had been violations of the arms embargo that some officials in his Administration knew about and secretly approved, to the benefit of South Africa.

Based on the above-mentioned summary, one can conclude that the Reagan Administration ushered in yet another new approach to South Africa, which directly influenced the US implementation of the mandatory arms embargo. Reagan's policy towards South Africa was linked to his anti-communist foreign policy objectives, which weighed heavier than the strict implementation of the arms embargo. However, his support of South Africa, embodied in the relaxation of quite a number of arms embargo regulations, was only tolerated up to a certain point. The opponents of apartheid would have no more of his actions, and he was forced to change his foreign policy objectives and therefore also his tactics concerning South Africa. This had a direct influence on the implementation of the arms embargo, which was significantly strengthened during the second term of the Reagan Administration, albeit with Reagan's disapproval.

George Bush, Senior, took office as US President in January 1989, after the Republican Party in 1988 won their third election in a row. Bush inherited the legacy of the showdown between Reagan and the US Congress, the resultant CAAA of 1986 and the strict implementation of the arms embargo.

During his Presidency, Bush witnessed the crumbling of the wall of resistance of white minority rule in South Africa. However, the majority of the credit for this did not belong to his Administration. The pressure from the US in the form of the arms embargo, economic sanctions and public renouncement of apartheid should not be underestimated as a factor leading to that moment in history. Just as important however was international occurrences like the demise of Soviet communism, the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) after many years of administration by South Africa, the continuing Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the Middle East, and the gross human rights violations and procurement of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein of Iraq. It was as if the arms embargo against South Africa dwindled in the shadow of the Bush Administration's attention to Iraq, which eventually led to the Gulf War in 1991. Furthermore, the Bush Administration wanted to make its mark as the Administration that ended the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, e.g. nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. All these occurrences kept the Bush Administration too busy to give focused attention to South Africa.

Bush, being vice-President during the Reagan Administration, was expected to continue with the policies of the Reagan Administration. However, the Bush Administration's shifting of its focus away from South Africa could perhaps be indicative of the fact that he did not always fully agreed with Reagan's policy objectives vis-à-vis South Africa. Bush, unlike Reagan, was happy to contend with the mandatory arms embargo and the legal requirements of the CAAA of 1986, which stipulated that South Africa had to adhere to five specific prescriptions before sanctions could be lifted. This was despite the fact that the Bush Administration on various occasions stated that it was increasingly optimistic about the political transformation taking place in South Africa. However, when these public statements were expected to be translated into practical encouragement from the Bush Administration, it was quick to say that F.W. de Klerk had to be given time to implement his reforms, and in the meantime, the US arms embargo and economic sanctions against South Africa would remain.

The Bush Administration's happy adherence to the arms embargo and the CAAA of 1986 was especially evident from the way in which it implemented the arms embargo. Many cases of illegal procurement of US military technology and items, which had been concealed for years, were revealed during the Bush Administration. This speaks of a commitment and dedication of Administration officials to implement the arms embargo strictly. Therefore, Bush Administration officials were quite baffled about the enormity and concealment during the entire Reagan Administration of one specific case that was revealed, i.e. the International Signal Control case. The revelation of the firm's smuggling activities led to unprecedented US action: indictments against three South African firms and seven South African citizens, in addition to the US compliants in the smuggling. In all the revealed cases since 1977, when the mandatory arms embargo was instituted, it was only the US firms and individuals that had been convicted. The ISC-Armcor case thus tellingly represented the commitment of Bush Administration officials to the implementation of the arms embargo, and also symbolized a watershed in the judicial prosecution by the US of international offenders of its laws.

Also telling of the Bush Administration's dedicated implementation of the arms embargo, was the fact that the guilty parties of arms embargo violation cases did not get away with relatively light sentences, as was the case during the Carter and Reagan Administrations. Furthermore, Bush did not hesitate to slap Armcor with even more sanctions after it became known that Armcor had collaborated with Israel in the development of ballistic missiles and that much US equipment were obtained for this program, in violation of the US Arms Export Act. The fact that sanctions were waived for Israel, speaks for itself about the commitment of the Bush Administration to the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. Although the reforms taking place in South Africa should have convinced the Bush Administration that there was no turning back in that country, it chose to adhere to the law books. On the other hand, as far as Israel was concerned the US law books was waived because of a fear that it might jeopardize the Middle East peace process. Ironically, South Africa was also involved in a peace process, with much more far-reaching consequences than what was happening in Israel. The difference perhaps was that a settlement in the Middle East peace talks would bear a clear US involvement stamp, whereas with South Africa, the Bush Administration could not say the same. After many years of embargoes and sanctions, the change in South Africa came from within. Also, Israel declared that it

would adhere to the MTCR, which, as said, was a showcase of US influence. South Africa refused compliance, and was therefore punished.

In the light of the abovementioned summary, it is clear that the Bush Administration's foreign policy objectives, as with his predecessors, were linked to the implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa. South Africa was low on the priority list of the Bush Administration's foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the fact that the arms embargo was strictly enforced by the Bush Administration almost leads one to make the conclusion that it did not want anything to draw the attention away from reaching its bigger goals, i.e. the Gulf War and fame as the Administration that ended the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. When the attention was indeed drawn away from these goals by the magnitude of the ISC case, the Bush Administration quickly had to take initiative to show that it was also in control of that situation. The result was the unprecedented indictments against the South African firms Armscor, Kentron, Fuchs Electronics and seven individuals. In the opinion of the researcher, the Bush Administration possibly wanted to use the case as an example to the world of what would happen if any country, firm or individual would dare to go against it.

Bush lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in the US elections in late 1992. The Clinton Administration witnessed many firsts in South Africa. When Clinton took office as US President, the political transformation in South Africa was already far advanced. Negotiations were underway between the South African Government and the ANC. The negotiations happened alongside remarkable transparency by the South African Government regarding military issues. Within three months of becoming President, Clinton witnessed two previously unprecedented acknowledgements by the South African Government: first, South Africa had an advanced ballistic missile program; and second, the country had an active nuclear weapons program between 1978 and 1989, thus within the time span of the mandatory arms embargo.

The voluntary disclosures promoted South Africa's image in the world tremendously, especially since it became the first country to destroy its nuclear arsenal without international pressure. However, the Clinton Administration kept on doubting that South Africa had come completely clean on its nuclear weapons activities, as was evidenced by spying activities and South Africa's retainment on a highly sensitive US watch list. As with the Bush Administration, the Clinton Administration pursued its policy towards

South Africa closely according to the book. One gets the impression that the Clinton Administration did not fully regard the political transformation in South Africa as being the real thing, even after the ANC won the first elections ever in South Africa based on the principle of 'one man, one vote', and Nelson Mandela became the first black South African President. On the one hand, in the light of South Africa's turbulent history, one can understand the cautiousness of the Clinton Administration. On the other hand, South Africa had a brand new political establishment, which needed the trust of superpowers like the US. One sign of such trust would have been the unreserved lifting of the US arms embargo against South Africa. However, an irritating thorn in the relations between the US and South Africa still remained - the unresolved Armscor case. Mandela asked Clinton to intervene to settle the case, but the latter declined because it would have meant that he was intervening with US judicial processes, which, in his own eyes, would have done him immense harm among the US voting body. This was something Clinton wanted to avoid, because he was aiming at being re-elected for a second term. Thus, despite promises to Mandela that he would do what he could to resolve the Armscor case, he left the case to run its course. This created much tension between the two governments, and although many other positive relationships were forged, it was always in the shadow of the Armscor case and the remaining arms embargo.

The Armscor case also stood in the way of the complete lifting of the arms embargo. This in turn caused a clash of interests. The US Department of Defense was much interested in South African-produced military systems and was eager to trade, but they were bound by the denial order against Armscor, its affiliates and its offshoot companies. This led to much frustration in both countries, especially after South African invited tenders for the upgrading of its defense force and the US was excluded because of the denial order. But the Clinton Administration remained stiff-necked, arguing that they could not yet fully trust South Africa not to sell arms to its enemies. Even after Mandela sorted out Armscor's law-violating image and imposed strict controls on the company, the Clinton Administration remained doubtful. For many observers, this implied distrust in the South African Government, which fuelled tensions even more. The Armscor case was resolved in 1997 after much political tug-of-war efforts, but the arms embargo was only lifted in 1998, although not unreservedly. Some clauses remained that kept Armscor and other South African arms production companies from

freely participating in the open military market until 2004, when these clauses were lifted unreservedly.

In conclusion, one can assert that the Clinton Administration was caught between two fires in its policy towards South Africa: trust in the new South African Government vs. his own domestic image. The latter seemed to weigh heavier and therefore Clinton stepped back from the responsibility to solve the Armscor case. He transferred the responsibility to his Vice-President, Al Gore, while himself maintaining observer status. The Armscor case dominated the Clinton Administration's implementation of the arms embargo, and effectively blocked the complete lifting of the US arms embargo for more than three years after the United Nations lifted its mandatory arms embargo in May 1994. Yet again, as was the case with the previous Administrations of Carter, Reagan and Bush, the implementation of the embargo was linked to the objectives of the Government of the day. Even after an acceptable deal was struck between Gore and South African Vice-president Thabo Mbeki, the Clinton Administration dragged its feet for another year before finally lifting the US arms embargo against South Africa. It is almost as if the US wanted the world to know that 20 years before, it had been the first to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa; thus it would also be the last to lift it. The lifting of the embargo completed a 20-year circle.

In a **final conclusion** to problem statement 2, one can draw the following similarities between the various US Administrations that had to implement the 1977 mandatory arms embargo: The implementation of the embargo was linked to external objectives of the Government of the day; in the case of Carter, Reagan and Bush it was linked to their foreign policy objectives, and in the case of Clinton, to his domestic image. Thus, the strengthening and/or weakening of the arms embargo regulations occurred according to the objectives that the Government of the day wanted to achieve. In retrospect however, the implementation of the arms embargo was generally very effective, especially when one considers the enormous amount of controlling that needed to be done. The researcher is of the opinion that although some exports of military-related equipment were deliberately allowed by each of the US Administrations, overall it was impossible to check each and every item being exported to South Africa for any possible military application. The researcher is also of the opinion that the violation cases that were revealed are in the minority – without a doubt there are still many that have never been revealed.

8.3 FINAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ON PROBLEM STATEMENT 3

When the research study is looked at in retrospect, one can make the conclusion that the US was perhaps not prepared for the defiance of the white South African minority Government. The institution of the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in November 1977 did not catch the South African Government unaware. It had expected that such an embargo would be instituted sooner or later. In March 1977 already, the South African Government announced a budget marked by sharp increases in outlays for defense and the police. Shortly afterwards, South African Prime Minister Vorster declared that the position of whites in South Africa was not negotiable. He commissioned the development of a 'total strategy' to stave off pressures for majority rule, which in effect meant that South Africa was put on a war footing. For this, Vorster needed weapons.

Vorster's successor, P.W. Botha's initial stance that South Africa had a strong enough arms industry to surmount an international embargo in a way that will astonish those seeking an end to white rule in South Africa dominated the South African Government's approach to the embargo until Botha was controversially succeeded as Prime Minister by F.W. de Klerk in 1989. After the institution of the mandatory arms embargo, the South African Government answered all efforts to implement or strengthen the embargo with renewed defiance and efforts to circumvent it. If it was countered on one terrain, it simply stood up, shook off the dust and tried another avenue. As a result, a sophisticated, intricate arms embargo violation strategy developed.

Three examples especially bear testimony to just how good the South African Government had become in violating the arms embargo and building up a world-renowned arms industry. First is the Space Research Corporation (SRC) case, through which Armscor clandestinely obtained the blueprints for an advanced 155mm artillery system, as well as shells, gun barrels, technicians and testing equipment related to the system. Armscor further developed the system into the world-renowned G5 and later the G6 artillery systems, which it then exported clandestinely in violation of the 1984 embargo on the import of South African military-related equipment. The second example is the International Signal and Control (ISC) case, through which Armscor obtained advanced ballistic missile components for its ballistic missile and space rocket program. This program was very far advanced when Armscor decided to end it during the

negotiations for a democratic South Africa and after pressure from the Clinton Administration in early 1993. It was however also the ISC case that landed Armscor in hot water in the US after the violations were discovered. Nonetheless, the magnitude of the case and the fact that it remained secret during the entire Reagan Administration serve as evidence for the commitment of the South African arms industry to excel in spite of the arms embargo. The third example is the South African nuclear weapons program. The ability of the South African Government to keep its nuclear weapons program secret in the midst of the arms embargo led to much disbelief in the US and even among South Africans. The US had its suspicions about a South African nuclear weapons program, but could never prove it.

The arms embargo was however not entirely ineffective. It did effectively withhold many sophisticated military equipment from South Africa. This started to become a crises for South Africa by the beginning of the 1990s. The country had many old equipment that needed urgent replacement. Although it was self-sufficient in small arms and successful in the development of its own fighter-bomber aircraft called the Cheetah, an attack helicopter called the Rooivalk, a range of infantry vehicles, and the G5 and G6 artillery systems, the cost of development simply became too much to bear. Furthermore, spares and components that could not be produced locally had to be imported clandestinely, which made the cost thereof much higher than on the open market. Lastly, as evident from the discussions of the implementation of the arms embargo during the Reagan Administration's second term and the Bush Administration, the web around the South African military establishment's clandestine activities was being drawn closer.

In final conclusion on problem statement 3, the researcher is of the opinion that the arms embargo indeed acted as main stimulant for the development of the South African arms industry. The South African minority Government of the day wanted to maintain its position of power in South Africa as well as Southern Africa. For that it needed weapons, thus the arms industry developed out of a determination to remain in power. When the motives for power however started to disintegrate with the independence of South West Africa (Namibia), the fall of Soviet communism, and the negotiations for a democratic South Africa under majority rule, the need to clandestinely obtain or develop weapons also evaporated. This in turn resulted in a desire to come clean on certain elements of the South African military industry and to start anew. In this regard, South

Africa became the first nation to fully develop a nuclear arsenal and then voluntarily dismantle it. That led to the country emerging as a world leader among non-aligned nations in promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Moreover, in April 1995, only two years after the revelation of the South African nuclear weapons program, South African diplomacy played a significant role in United Nations-sponsored talks that forged a consensus among member nations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty to extend the agreement indefinitely.

A new era in South Africa had truly begun.