

Chapter 6

Local Resistance

"[P]olitical action refers to the totality of cultural representations (deeds, symbols, aesthetic forms, religious or cosmological values, and so forth) and of the historical traces that provide them with significance and consistency. All these elements taken together form the dramatic texture of history, although power and forms of resistance to its exercise are not always located exactly where the observer seeks them"

- Bayart 1986b: 267.

"If I don't take it, someone else will"

- A harvester at Lake Sibaya on why she harvests immature reeds.

"Look at her, she thinks she is Mrs. Mandela"

- A remark at the Ubumbano craft market about a politically ambitious woman.

When I was doing my research, the number of politically and economically marginalised people in Maputaland expanded rapidly. Paradoxically, this came about as more actors entered the region to help in the socio-economic development of its people. These developers introduced gender- 'sensitive' development projects that reinforced separate domains for different sectors of this society. Developers clearly treated the women's spheres as less important than those of men, and Tribal Authorities had more direct access to political decision making and money than groups of women crafters managed by men. Women's voices remained largely muted in the development projects that targeted them.

On a larger scale, the LSDI's emphasis on the development of an eco-tourism industry and the declaration of a World Heritage Site in the region meant that successful land claimants could not move back onto their land. It also meant that land trusts, often just another name for Tribal Authorities, legally managed communal property and

development incomes. This tied regular people to the trusts (hoping that they would get their promised share of the development income) and ultimately to the developers' plans.

Most human relationships are based on non-verbal arrangements of power, rights and permitted actions. De Boeck (1996: 91-99) used the concept "*l'arrangement*" to refer to a specific mode of negotiation and compromise between the Zambian state and the traditional authorities it aimed to encapsulate. In this arrangement, the Zambian state sought to counteract its decay by incorporating ancient, traditional symbolism and local power structures on terms that legitimated its own domination. On the other hand, traditional authorities utilised their "currency" to aim beyond local encapsulation to regional and national integration. This situation was highly flexible and individualistic and no explicit rules of conduct were laid down. Both parties benefited from the anonymous informal negotiations and temporary agreements. In Maputaland, land use strategies and neo-liberal development plans muted dissent and enforced a specific arrangement upon developers, tourists, Tribal Authorities and other local people.

For instance, the Tribal Authorities who sat on the LSDI and other developers' committees knew that their presence at development planning sessions was often just window-dressing. Although they privately complained about their inability to influence development plans, they subscribed to the arrangement in which they showed up for meetings, had their pictures taken with the developers, and appeared at public ceremonies.

Likewise, women at the Ubumbano market subscribed to the patronising management of their domain, to the demands of developers who wanted them to produce more Zulu-looking crafts, and to the tourists' condescension. Within the Sodwana Bay

National Park, these women even kept to an arrangement whereby tourists were separated from locals. On the beachfront, tourists occupied the main beach while the locals took up a piece of beach on the other side of the lagoon. Local children and young women selling crafts were "allowed" onto the main beach as long as they did not use the space for leisurely pursuits. I once witnessed how a conservation official asked a group of young women swimming in their (conservative) underwear to clear off the main beach because their apparel shocked the tourists. On a beach where some white female tourists tanned topless, the double standard was obvious.

Similar arrangements existed between commoners and the Tribal Authorities that "represented" them, between crafters and nature conservation officials and between women and businesses in the service industry that employed them. In no instance of an arrangement were there any explicit rules as to conduct. For instance, no explicit rules prohibited women at Sodwana Bay from going onto the main beach to relax. Nor were commoners compelled to subscribe to the decisions of Tribal Authorities. Most of the time, these arrangements just represented the way of least conflict. They "worked" insofar as they allowed people to get on with their daily lives without having to negotiate procedures of power, authority and rights afresh each time they encountered a new person.

In this chapter, I will show how these arrangements sometimes slipped into hidden resistance, or where the arrangement totally broke down, into overt resistance. Men in Tribal Authority positions would often opt to openly resist those that threatened their positions of power and autonomy. Since these men 'owned' the land on which the conservation projects were centred, a total breakdown in arrangements left them with a

powerful negotiation card. Their strategic importance to development plans enabled Tribal Authorities to negotiate new arrangements. The breakdown of an arrangement allowed Tribal Authorities to build up political capital and to remind the developers of their importance as 'community' liaisons. However, the Tribal Authorities could only risk engaging in open resistance once they were sure that "the community" would support them. Otherwise a breakdown in the arrangement would expose the Tribal Authorities as illegitimate. They would thus leave the door open for those men who "worked politics" on the margins of the Tribal Authorities' sphere to take their places. Breaking an arrangement to build political capital was thus a strategy wrought with danger. For this reason, open resistance in the Maputaland region to development projects or any other intrusions on local people's autonomy was rare.

A more common strategy was for people to slip from the complicity of an arrangement to non-confrontational forms of everyday resistance. These everyday forms of resistance did not break the arrangement but subtly informed the other party that something was amiss. This created an anonymous space in which the arrangement could be altered without explicit negotiations between the parties concerned. In this situation, both parties were also spared "losing face", making the continued flow of daily interactions possible. I will argue that local people who were politically and economically marginalised by the development process were more likely to turn to hidden forms of resistance. Women, men outside of the Tribal Authority structures and youth resisted intrusions on their autonomy by turning to what Scott (1990) called the "weapons of the weak".

This chapter will be organised as follows. First, I will devote a section to the theoretical background of my investigation and examine resistance as an analytical construct. Hereafter, I will briefly describe a few instances of open resistance in Maputaland, the situations that prompted these, and the consequences of this form of action. This will be followed by a discussion of different forms of covert resistance, including over-harvesting, poaching, feigned ignorance and theft. Each of these forms of resistance will be examined and analysed separately. This does not mean to imply that they are unconnected or isolated.

Resistance as theoretical construct

The anthropological concept of resistance emerged largely from research in societies subjected to colonial rule or other forms of domination. In most part, these ethnographies concentrated on how dominated people used cultural resources such as "tradition", "religion", "kinship" or ethnicity" to resist their oppressors (Mayer 1980; Cohen 1981; Comaroff 1985; Lan 1985; MacGaffey 1994).

One of the most influential ideas to emerge from this discussion is Scott's (1985, 1990) concept of "hidden" or "everyday" resistance. Scott (1990) asserts that peasants often deny or mitigate the ruling classes' claims on them by turning to underhand activities such as false-compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson and sabotage. These forms of resistance require little or no co-ordination and planning; often present a form of anonymous individual self-help; use implicit understandings and informal networks; and avoid openly confronting authorities. Such techniques are well

suited to the characteristics of the peasantry: a diverse social class often lacking the discipline and leadership required by resistance of a more organised sort. According to Scott (1990), these individual acts of resistance, often reinforced by a venerable popular culture of resistance, can have a considerable collective impact.

Isaacman (1990: 3, 31-33) criticised Scott for the imprecise nature of the concept "everyday forms of resistance". He pointed out that activities such as sabotage were not everyday occurrences and that the intent of many of these activities was difficult to determine. Another critique on Scott is that he did not investigate the limits to everyday forms of resistance, failing to show the contexts in which weapons of the weak are weak weapons. Nevertheless, Scott's concept has been found to be indispensable to a broader understanding of domination, subordination and conflict, also among social classes other than the peasantry (Sluka 1995: 82-83).

During the 1980s and early 1990s, Africanist scholars such as Bayart (1986a and b) and Chabal (1992) drew attention to the corrupt nature of postcolonial states in Africa and to the civil societies that opposed them. They looked at "politics from below", in an attempt to correct the interpretative simplifications of development and dependency theories, with their excessive institutional focus. "Politics from below" brought a welcome shift of analysis to the hitherto neglected political processes within society at large.

However, this literature often posits a rather simplistic dichotomy between "civil society" and "the state". For example, Bayart (1986a: 111) defines civil society "...in so far as it is in confrontation with the state". Likewise, Chabal (1992:83, 85) defined civil society as a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals whose only

common ground is their exclusion from the state, their consciousness of this exclusion, and their potential opposition to the state. These scholars emphasised that even though civil society's resistance to the state is not necessarily violent, it does take place on a large scale. They noted that civil society takes its revenge on the state through innumerable flexible and variable tactics including informal economic activities that contribute to the state's decline (Bayart 1986 and MacGaffey 1994: 173-175). As Bayart (1986b: 265-266) argues:

Revolts, the refusal of some kinds of work, slowdowns, strikes, electoral abstentions, migrations, ... reference to transcendent religious alliances... smuggling, the burgeoning informal economic sector, the intensive circulation of information not controlled by the media, undermining authority by ironic humor, conflictual participation in the structures of political control: There is a long list of people's actions which limit and reduce the field of state action, and which thus assure a sort of revenge of civil society on state institutions.

By the 1990s, Africanist scholars such as Mbembe (1992), Werbner (1996) and De Boeck (1996) questioned this dichotomy and point to the interpenetration and mutual reinforcement of state and civil society. These authors asserted that the standard binary categories such as domination and resistance, hegemony and counter-hegemony, were inadequate to explain postcolonial relations of power. For Mbembe (1992), the emphasis changed from resistance to connivance. According to him, there is an almost domestic familiarity in the relationship between the state and civil society, which effectively disarms both. This familiarity links the ruler with the ruled to such an extent that subjects internalise the authoritarian epistemology to a point where they reproduce it themselves. In this context, ordinary people cannot be in "opposition to the state", or "deconstruct power" or "disengage" (p 25). Mbembe claims that domination and subjection is turned into a "magical song" at that point where the original arbitrariness produces terror,

banality and hilarity (cited in Hoeller 2002: 6). Chabal and Daloz (1999) have commented that all political actors seek to exploit the current disorder of the postcolonial state for their own profit.

Contrary to Mbembe's claim that everyone in the postcolonial state is complicit to an empty show of power, I assert that people "on the ground" are fundamentally excluded from the state. In my research area, only certain men had access to the privileged domain of negotiation with the state by virtue of their claim to be traditionally sanctioned mouthpieces of the local people. To a large measure, they used these negotiations to further their own private political and economic interests. They were not just puppets of the state. The large majority of regular people were excluded from these negotiations with Tribal Authorities, developers or the state. The fact that they frequently resisted the Tribal Authorities questions the supposed "domesticity" in the relationship between people and the state or its accomplices. It is exactly because local people did not have access to the negotiation tables of "their" leaders that they turned to everyday forms of resistance. In Maputaland, many men "worked politics" even though they were not part of the state or of the Tribal Authority Structures. The confusion about who exactly represented the state made it possible for con men to promise local people municipal services such as the provision of water for a small fee.

A point of critique to many of these scholarly writings on resistance is that they completely ignore gender and treat "civil society" as an undifferentiated mass. An exception to this rule was Webster's (1991) study of a society in Northern KwaZulu-Natal. Webster draws attention to the ways in which women at KwaDapha invoked a traditional Thonga identity to resist male domination within the context of apartheid.

Older women, in particular, called upon an imaginative reconstruction of Thonga kinship relations and language to assert their interests in the domestic sphere (p. 256-260). By contrast, men invoked a Zulu identity to accommodate themselves to the demands of migrant labour. This study is exemplary in drawing our attention to the differential interests of men and women in a single society, and to the strategies they used to protect such interests. It is in this context that I found Scott's concept of everyday forms of resistance useful in describing forms of protest and resistance that were embedded in gender relations as well as those which formed an integral part of class relations.

Capitalising on open resistance: Tribal Authorities in Maputaland

Open resistance often disrupts the flow of daily life. In Maputaland, there were just a few instances in which local people openly resisted intrusions on their autonomy by developers, Tribal Authorities and nature conservationists. Where open resistance occurred, it was often preceded by a total breakdown in the arrangement between the parties concerned. It usually took weeks if not months of protracted and costly negotiations to restore calm.

In October 2001, the Mabaso Tribal Authority (in the corporate guise of Funjwa Holdings) established a nature conservation area on communal land. In newspaper reports, chief Nxumalo, claimed that he consulted widely with the local "community" and asked that families inside the reserve relocate, pledging financial help for those who could not afford to move (Ka'Nkosi 2001: 4). However, local residents such as Nonhlanhla Zwelithini said that no one received any money to relocate and that the chief

sent his men at night to intimidate the twelve households that still lived in the proposed area.

For a long time, Nonhlanhla and the other people living on the proposed nature conservation site subscribed to the legal fiction that chief Nxumalo represented them and was the legal trustee of their land. This arrangement did not greatly influence their autonomy and they were allowed to go about their business as they had always done. However, when chief Nxumalo announced the plans for a nature conservation area, their lives were fundamentally altered. About six hundred people moved to other areas, severing friendship ties and leaving their means of subsistence (agricultural plots) behind. Others, like Nonhlanhla, stayed behind to be constantly harassed and to have their freedom of movement restricted by the newly erected fences. The chief's men assaulted people and made fearsome noises outside their homes. Nonhlanhla feared for her life but did not want to move. "Everything is here! We are not living in apartheid anymore... We cannot be moved like cattle!" Nonhlanhla also complained about the fence that Funjwa Holdings erected around the proposed nature conservation area. The new fence inconvenienced Nonhlanhla by cutting her off from the path she used to go to the Ubumbano craft market and to her fields. She suddenly had to scale a three-metre high fence at least twice a day. The intrusion on their autonomy was a violent breach of their original arrangement with chief Nxumalo.

In November 2001, this group launched an action in the Constitutional Court to stop Funjwa Holdings from establishing a nature conservation area on their land¹.

¹ The newspapers reported widely on the establishment of and resistance to Funjwa Holdings' community nature conservation area (See Bishop 2001b: 3; Ka'Nkosi 2001: 4; and Moore 2002a: 9).

Amnesty International paid all their legal fees². The applicants claimed that they were Zikhali, not Mabaso and that the land set aside for the nature conservation area encroached on their "tribal" land. In their court application, the group stated that they had launched this action to avoid a "bloodbath" in the renewed boundary conflicts between the Mabaso and Zikhali chieftaincies. The more "technical" side of the application dealt with the erection of the fence around the nature conservation area. The erection of this fence allegedly broke the lease agreement with the Ingonyama Trust in terms of which Funjwa Holdings could not "erect, repair, refurbish or construct any structure or improvements on the premises" (Ka'Nkosi 2001: 4). In response to this court action, chief Nxumalo pleaded his innocence. He claimed that he had followed all the correct procedures and that he had consulted widely with members of "his community" who were affected by the development. Chief Nxumalo described the tension as a conflict between a people who wanted to prosper and those who were jealous of their success (Ka' Nkosi 2001: 4). Some of his councillors blamed the trouble on the ANC, and said that the ANC wanted to stir up bad feelings so that they could replace the chief in negotiating between developers and the community.

This court case illustrates the extent to which the arrangement between chief Nxumalo and "his people" had broken down. The group of applicants did not ascribe to the fiction that he represented them anymore and pledged their allegiance to chief Zikhali. They emphasised this new allegiance by claiming that they had "always" been Zikhali. Chief Nxumalo was placed in a difficult position. When Funjwa Holdings applied for a lease on the land, they claimed that it was to establish a *community*

² Despite my repeated calls over seven months to Amnesty International, I could not get more information about their involvement.

conservation area. The donors were all too happy to throw money at the traditional leader of the "community" in question, believing that chief Nxumalo represented the interests of "his people". However, in the court case the "community" affected by the "development project" openly questioned chief Nxumalo as their legitimate traditional leader. This statement threatened the arrangement between Funjwa Holdings (of which chief Nxumalo was the director) and the donors. As such, this arrangement was premised on the legitimacy of chief Nxumalo *vis-à-vis* "the community". In order to save that arrangement, chief Nxumalo found it expedient to ascribe the "tension" to a rogue group within the "community". This explanation underscored his continued legitimacy and undermined the court applicants' claims by accusing them of the blackest of trespasses, jealousy. This accusation painted the applicants as an envious, grudging lot who wanted others to be just as deprived as they were by trying to stop "development".

In the chaos surrounding the breakdown in the arrangement between chief Nxumalo and "his people", chief Zikhali opportunistically entered the fray. He claimed to be the legitimate leader of portions of the irate "community". This was an overt demand to be included in the arrangement between chief Nxumalo and the donors. By claiming that two distinct "communities" were actually involved in the development project, and not just "Nxumalo's people", chief Zikhali had legitimate reason to want to be on (the) board. In this manner chief Zikhali augmented his political capital. In the court case, he pictured chief Nxumalo as a greedy chief who forcefully evicted large numbers of people from land that he and his councillors wanted to use for their own personal profit. Chief Zikhali was depicted as the champion of beleaguered and trampled people.

By January 2002, the court case against Funjwa Holdings (the Mabaso Tribal Authority) had still not been settled. As the intimidation and eviction of people continued unabated, people residing on the Mabaso Game Reserve became extremely impatient. At this point that the Mabaso Game Reserve fell victim to poaching and vandalism of its fence amounting to R200 000 in damages. In response, the Mabaso Tribal Authority appointed six game scouts, helped by bands of "volunteers", to patrol the area. Groups of workmen were also mobilised to salvage the posts and strands of wire. They patched up the fence until it could be properly replaced. Newspaper reports on the matter became increasingly unsympathetic to the plight of those staying on the reserve and empathised with chief Nxumalo's valiant efforts to save the project from vandals who wilfully destroyed development projects (Bishop 2002: 3; Liebenberg 2002: 6; Moore 2002a: 9; Moore 2002b: 5). The culprits were never named but there was general agreement that the people still living inside the Mabaso Game Reserve must have vandalised the fence. Although they remained "hidden" from the law, the cause of those living inside the reserve was severely undermined.

Since chief Nxumalo's claim to legitimacy was significantly strengthened by the negative publicity that the vandals received, chief Zikhali lost some political ground. His association with the earlier court case that attempted to halt the development project put him in the same camp as the vandals. In a last-ditched attempt to regain some of the lost political ground, chief Zikhali egged a group of his supporters ("the Zikhali community") to lodge an interdict to halt the construction of the Mabaso Game Reserve at the Pietermaritzburg High Court in March 2002. However, there was general agreement in

the area that this action was futile and that the Mabaso Game Reserve would be completed.

Another case of open resistance to a development project involved two rivals for the position of chief³. In the Kosi Bay area, a succession dispute raged for some years after the KwaDapha chief, Gilbert Ngubane ousted his brother, Amos Ngubane. Since his deposition, Amos had continuously contested the legitimacy of his brother. After all his efforts to rally supporters had failed, Amos was relegated to a marginal position on the Tribal Authority Council. However, with time people of Kosi Bay increasingly blamed chief Gilbert for the unemployment and for the lack of development in their area.

Then in 2000, Gilbert granted Attie van Tonder (an ex-policeman from Pongola) permission to erect a private residence and a tourist lodge on a piece of wilderness area. Attie promised that his lodge would create jobs for the people of KwaDapha and that he would enter into a profit-sharing agreement with "the community". If this project worked, Gilbert's position as chief would have been secured. Amos ran to the Ingonyama Trust and to KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife, spilling the beans on Gilbert's plans. KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife wanted to put an immediate stop to the proposed project. They warned Attie in an official letter that his building plans were in contravention of the National Environmental Affairs Act. Attie had broken the law when he cleared bushes in a conservation area without having the necessary environmental impact assessments done. Despite the threatening tone of the letter, Attie continued with his plans. The Ingonyama Trust then claimed that Attie's development project was illegal because he did not get a PTO from the Trust. Since neither the Ingonyama Trust nor KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife

³ Some of the "facts" of the case was confirmed by a well-researched newspaper article by Nicki Moore, "Trouble in Paradise", published in the *Natal Witness* on July 25, 2001, p. 9.

could put a stop to the project, they called on the Minister of Environmental affairs, Mr Vali Moosa, to put a moratorium on the developments on the site.

In this case, the arrangement between Gilbert and Amos faced total breakdown after Amos went to the Ingonyama Trust and KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife. Up to that point, the arrangement between the two brothers was that they could contest each other's legitimacy within the local sphere of politics. When Gilbert took over, he did not banish his brother from the area and tolerated his constant attacks. However, when Amos enlisted the help of the Ingonyama Trust and KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife, Gilbert was livid. The attack was no longer personal. Gilbert blamed Amos for endangering a development project that could bring jobs to the people of KwaDapha. He also framed Amos as an enemy of the "community". I later heard that Amos was chased out of the Kosi Bay area.

One of my informants, Hlubi Nongoma, who was an insider to these disputes, laughed about Amos's failed attack and reflected on his possible reasons for going to the Ingonyama Trust and KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife. Hlubi speculated that Amos "maybe thought that some people would support him if the Lodge failed". However, in challenging his brother, Amos had ventured onto the dangerous terrain where his lack of political support was laid bare.

In Maputaland, most open resistance movements could be traced back to men with public political aspirations. For the men involved, resistance was an outward show of their political acumen and power. However, open resistance was an uncertain and potentially extremely dangerous political strategy. For public political figures its success depended upon the arrangement between them and the people whom they claimed to represent. This latter arrangement was often slippery and depended on a whole range of

other factors. It was exactly this imprecise nature of the arrangement between people and public political figures that made politicians apprehensive of open resistance.

Protecting the "domestic": Everyday forms of resistance in Maputaland

Local people who did not have access to the public political sphere were more likely to turn to hidden forms of resistance in cases where their autonomy was threatened. Practically, open forms of resistance held little reward for women, men outside of the Tribal Authority structures and youngsters. Open resistance was time-consuming and required skilful co-ordination. Most women in the region had such busy work schedules that they could hardly afford taking time off without affecting the survival of their households. Furthermore, open resistance was no guarantee to success, and often had tragic consequences for its participants, such as imprisonment. Thus on a basic profit-loss scale, open resistance was not a viable option for most people in Maputaland.

Rather, most people would slip between complicity to an arranged (but unauthored) situation and non-confrontational forms of everyday resistance. These everyday forms of resistance caused subtle shifts in an arrangement without forcing the parties involved into a stand-off. As such, an arrangement did not necessarily imply equal power or "friendship" but allowed people to go about their daily tasks without open conflict. These observations underscore Scott's (1990) suggestion that by pragmatically adjusting to the exploitative circumstances that they were confronted with on a daily basis, the poor do not necessarily grant normative consent to these realities, nor rule out certain forms of resistance.

This strategy was amply illustrated by the actions of workers at the Sodwana Bay Lodge. The upmarket resort was well known in the region for its propensity to hire temporary staff at low wages rather than creating secure employment. As Thobile Zikhali exclaimed, “Everything is piece-jobs there. If you do not want the cents they pay, there are many others to take that job”. I met Thobile at Ubumbano craft market where she sold crafts for her aunt on weekends. During the week and over the summer vacation, Thobile tried to find work at tourist resorts or in the tourist camping sites at Sodwana Bay. In December 2000, Izaac Knowles at the Sodwana Bay Lodge hired Thobile and five other women to harvest grass and thatch a small canopy next to the pool. I was surprised to learn that they took two weeks to complete the job. From observations in my research area, I learnt that the harvesting of grass only took a day while the thatching can be done in another two days. Thobile laughed when I pointed this out to her. Her answer was that “when you work there you are on a go-slow. As long as the boss does not catch you sleeping, you will get paid. He cannot say anything because he does not know how to thatch”. There were limits to the “go-slow”. Thobile and her friends finished the job on the last day of the two weeks because Izaac had become suspicious. He came round to the site once too often and impatiently asked them to finish the job. Thobile said that they did not want to fight with Izaac and thus spoil their chances of future employment.

“Go-slows” at the Lodge was an effective way through which local workers could get their own back at the owner. They resented him for not employing people on a full-time basis and for paying starvation wages. Since Izaac paid a daily rate, the go-slows forced him to pay more and employ more workers for each job. Such go-slows were not organised by any particular person because the rate of labour turnover at the Lodge was

too high, prohibiting the establishment of any lasting organisation for resistance.

However, workers in the area somehow knew that “when you work there you are on a go-slow”. This form of resistance also avoided open confrontation.

I am not convinced that Isaac was totally duped by the women’s slow progress. Rather, he merely acted in a way that caused the least amount of conflict. Isaac needed the women’s labour and wished to avoid any open conflict over the ad hoc nature of his labour procurement practices and over his wage rates. Should this situation be scrutinised by for instance the Zikhali Tribal Authority, Isaac could be forced into paying his workers more, and could attract unwanted negative publicity for his establishment. In Isaac’s arrangement with his workers, there was an unwritten rule that he would not interfere with their work for as long as they did not demand higher wages. However, there were unwritten limits to the leniency of both parties. The workers accepted their end of the “bargain” for as long as they were employed for “reasonable” periods of time. In Thobile’s case, this was two weeks. Isaac left the workers alone for what he felt was a reasonable time. Since all these “rules” were unwritten and seldom verbalised, the workers looked for subtle changes in Isaac’s behaviour as signs that they had reached the limits of their comfortable arrangement. In this case, it was reached on the fourteenth day when Isaac showed up more than once to check up on them. The women then quickly finished the job, keeping the arrangement in place.

Unskilled women workers in Maputaland conformed to patterns of resistance widespread among the worker class in Southern Africa. As Van Onselen (1976: 244) writes:

The largely silent and unorganised responses of black workers offer eloquent testimony to the existence of a consciousness of who the exploiters were. Black workers did not require meetings, pickets, leaders and ideologies to make them understand who was oppressing them.

The fact that these workers were mainly women and were confined to the poorly remunerated service industry, was a consequence of eco-tourism in which political decisions were taken by men in the public sphere, and women's activities were confined to the domestic sphere.

More pertinent in this discussion will be a closer look at the instances where decisions by men of the Tribal Authorities threatened the control that commoners and women exercised over resources. Here tensions in the arrangement of boundaries between different spheres provoked considerable anonymous and everyday resistance. For the most part, resistance by marginalised men and women did not precipitate any major changes in the arrangements between conservationists, developers and Tribal Authorities. However, such resistance served as an escape valve for much resentment and discontent.

Widespread poaching by local men constituted a form of resistance to the intrusion that nature conservation areas made on their autonomy. During the colonial and apartheid eras poaching was the only weapon of local men against the strong-arm politics of nature conservation authorities. At Sodwana Bay for instance, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) used heavily armed military personnel to patrol the park. National laws empowered the conservation authorities to imprison those it caught trespassing on Sodwana Bay. In this context where overt resistance was extremely dangerous, local people embarked upon small-scale illegal harvesting and poaching.

Given the chance, most people I talked to had stories to tell about their near run-ins with conservation guards during the apartheid era. In these stories, the "hunts" were never co-ordinated, but were spur-of-the-moment affairs, involving the male occupants of a single household or two neighbours. On hunting trips, men and young boys generally just set and checked handmade traps for small antelope and rodents. They were not armed with guns. There was also the occasional tale of getting caught. However, individuals that were caught such as Kiphile Mlambo's father, were generally not regarded as morally reprehensible. In this regard, Turner (2001: 366) contends that the rural poor's experiences of apartheid and colonial rule meant that they redefined legitimacy and legality. This made it possible for one to have a criminal record without being morally at fault⁴.

However the cumulative impact of poaching and illegal harvesting activities was so intense that KZN Wildlife had to adopt a "conservation-based community development" approach at the end of the apartheid era⁵. They hereby acknowledged that their strong-arm policies would not be able to keep people out of parks. The conservation authorities now sought to limit poaching by promising local people a share in decision making and in profit sharing.

By and large, these measures reaped little reward. I frequently drove past roadside butcheries where men living next to the parks sold game carcasses and small rodents. Although the hunting stories were now more cautious, they still abounded in my talks with people in the area.

⁴ Contrasting with this view, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 78-79) believe that Africans conceive of legality and legitimacy differently than Westerners. They declare that patron-client relationships are so widespread in Africa that clients determine the legality of their patron's actions on how they distribute their gains rather

In terms of the rhetoric of KZN Wildlife and of developers, such behaviour was anomalous. These authorities attributed resistance to nature conservation during the apartheid era to the resentment that accompanied forced removals and the loss of natural resources. But now that the "community" owned the land and stood to gain financially from its effective management, it seemed that the poachers were eroding the source of their future income.

However, if one looked at the spheres of interaction that I identified, the poachers' behaviour was perfectly reasonable. These men (and boys) did not have access to the public political sphere in which decisions about nature conservation practices were made. Neither were they likely to gain financially from the profits of eco-tourism that were channelled into their "community" trusts. These men had hoped that the land claims process would give them access to the land and resources they had lost. Instead, the land remained protected and became the spill around which an industry "for women" was created. Many of these men had lost their jobs on the mines and were likely to remain unemployed. Bukhala Nhlozi said, "at least during apartheid we could go work in eGoli [Johannesburg]. Now we sit at home". Men who engaged in poaching were often nostalgic about the days of apartheid and full employment. This nostalgia was a form of resistance to the current situation; they were saying that the brutality of apartheid was preferable to what they were experiencing in the present.

It was a sentiment that many women in the region shared. At the Ubumbano craft market, older women complained that they were economically in the same position that they had been in thirty years ago, if not worse off. Their experience of the craft industry

than on how they obtain their resources. It is when patrons fail to distribute their legal or ill-gotten gains to their clients that their activities become criminal (Chabal & Daloz 1999: 79-80).

informed their disillusionment with the promises that developers made about the profitability of the tourist industry. Despite the women's objections to the promises of eco-tourism, male politicians pressed ahead and accepted the partnership-in-conservation deal. Publicly, the women accepted the deal and even went to the ceremony at Mbaswana in large numbers. In private, the women at Ubumbano expressed their unhappiness with this decision and remained cynical about the men's promises that they would be included in a profit-sharing agreement.

It was on the edges where men's public political interests (nature conservation) and women's interests (the crafts market) intersected that the women resisted the interpenetration of the two domains. As part of the agreement between KwaZulu-Natal Wildlife and the "communities" living next to conservation areas, women (with permits) were legally allowed to harvest plants in the parks. In the sphere of legal harvesting, where the interests of nature conservation and women intersected, women fiercely defended their access to resources.

On several harvesting trips to Lake Sibaya, Dudu and I noticed large bundles of reeds and sedges left to rot at the park entrance. There was nothing wrong with these harvested bundles and someone could easily have used them in the production of sleeping mats. We found the bundles in the rainy season when Lake Sibaya was very full. The high water level forced harvesters to wade into the lake up to their waists in order to reach the reeds. In this position, they were particularly vulnerable to the dangerous hippopotami that lived in the lake. Reeds and sedges were thus hard to come by, and would not have been carelessly forgotten at the gates. Furthermore, harvesters knew exactly how many reeds or sedges they could utilise at any particular time and did not

⁵ For writing on these policies, see Douglas (1998: 21); Harvey (1999: 37-39); Turner (2001:370).

make "mistakes" when harvesting. In this context, the large-scale over-harvesting⁶ we witnessed at the entrances to the reserve could not have been due to miscalculation on the harvesters' part. Moreover, it seemed odd that the harvesters would only realise their mistake when they were about to leave the park. The entrance gate was about two kilometres' walk from the harvesting spot. It seems very likely that the harvesters had purposefully chosen to dump reeds and sedges at the gate, because this was the spot where most traffic, and especially conservation traffic, passed. The visible destruction of resources that the nature conservationists were protecting can only be seen as an act of resistance.

Again, I found no proof that this resistance was organised. At the Tembe Elephant Park, legal harvesters also left bundles of reeds to rot at the entrance. The perpetrators remained anonymous and none of the harvesters I interviewed knew who had left the bundles of reeds at the entrance and no one assumed responsibility for it. John White, a conservationist at the Tembe Elephant Park, deplored the wanton destruction of a resource that KZN Wildlife had kindly allowed the local "communities" to use. Since the harvesters were too diaphanous a group, the conservationists could only lodge complaints to the Tribal Authorities or to other community representatives on the conservation boards.

In these meetings, local men promised to find the perpetrators or to do something about the problem. Due to the public conception that real men did not interfere with women's work, these men had no authority to stop the over-harvesting. In front of the conservationists and developers, the men could not admit their political impotence in the

⁶ This should not be taken to infer anything about sustainable utilisation of plant materials, as I am not equipped to make such judgements. My reference to over-harvesting just refers to people who harvest more

women's domain, as this would undermine their legitimacy as representatives of the whole "community". However, the mere fact that the conservationists knew about instances where local men could not control women, eroded some of the men's political capital.

Another area where the interests of powerful local men and those of women intersected was in the sphere where women interacted with the tourists. Men promoted and encouraged tourism as the activity with the highest potential to deliver economic salvation to local people. However, it was women who dealt directly with the tourists at the craft markets and in the lodges where the tourists stayed.

The majority of tourists arrived at Sodwana Bay with new four-wheel drive *Pajero*'s, *LandRovers*, *BMW*s, *Mercedes*, and *Landcruisers*. Regular sedans often stood out like sore thumbs in the parking lot close to the beach. In December when the humidity was almost at 100% and the daily temperatures soared to 40°C+, tourists descended from their air-conditioned cars barely creased. They wore *Nike*, *Billabong*, *Reebok* and other branded clothing and did not want the locals to copy these brands. Until recent legislation was passed, tourists with four-wheel drive vehicles were allowed to park their cars on demarcated beaches. These beaches became catwalks of wealth. In front of each expensive vehicle the owners camped out on beach chairs under umbrellas with cooler boxes full of chilled drinks. Some tourists used their four-wheel drive vehicles to tow their private boats to the water. The contrast between these tourists and the locals was striking and immediate.

At the craft market it annoyed the women that the rich tourists forever tried to bargain with them. They did not only accuse the tourists of being miserly but also

than they can use or carry at any one time

suspected that the tourists were cheating them. On a hot December day at the market, Dudu drew my attention to the transaction between a crafter and a tourist. The tourist was haggling over the price of a Zulu beer basket that had taken three weeks to complete. In her hands, the tourist had a *Magnum* ice cream (R8) and a bottle of *Savannah* cider (R12). Though the crafter wanted only R15 for the basket, she complained that it was "too expensive" and said that she did not have enough money on her. I do not think that it occurred to the tourist that most women at the market knew exactly how much money she had just spent on an ice cream and a cider. Although the women did not react to this particular tourist at that particular time, there was growing resentment about tourists in general. As Dudu remarked, "They come here and cry about this beautiful place and then give us R5. What will we do with this money? It is not even enough for a *Coke* at Elsie's shop!"

Given sentiments such as these, I expected that the women would show some kind of resistance to the development projects that taught them to make better crafts for the tourists. I was disappointed to find little more than jokes about the tourists or the developers. For the most part, it seemed as if the crafters were completely complicit in the processes through which they were marginalised. Then, completely unexpected, my informal interviews with South African tourists about crime in Sodwana Bay led me to the discovery of a women's hidden resistance "movement".

Many South African tourists pointed out that in recent years the crime rate had escalated dramatically in Sodwana Bay. Newspapers had reported on the sudden spate of thefts since 1997. From 1999, tourists reported an even bigger upsurge in the number of thefts from vehicles they parked on the beach, and in snatchings from them whilst they

were tanning (Moore and Masinga 1999: 12). In the newspapers, the head of KZN Wildlife at Sodwana Bay repeatedly traced the origin of the problem back to the fact that 95% of the people living in the area were unemployed and turned to crime to make a living (De Lange 1997: 9). What he did not say was that most of the crimes were committed by the young boys who sold monkey oranges on the beach. Many of these boys ran away from very poor households to live in gangs at Sodwana Bay. The wealthy tourists that swarmed into the area were an easy target since they often left their cars open or their possessions unguarded. The criminals knew that these tourists would almost invariably have some valuables on their person or in their cars.

When I talked to the women at Ubumbano about these boys, I was surprised that they did not condemn their actions. In any other context, theft was viewed as utterly reprehensible and met with severe punishment. Yet few women at the craft market had any sympathy for any of the tourists who were robbed. They were more concerned about the safety of the young culprits. The general feeling was that the tourists had money to spare and that they "had it coming". The women often knew who stole what from the tourists, but never reprimanded the perpetrators. These women were not encouraging theft from tourists, but then they were not discouraging it either. I contend that this moral ambiguity was a recent phenomenon, fed by the women's disillusionment with eco-tourism-led development and their resentment toward rich tourists.

These women's complicity to the arrangement with powerful men (that they would treat the tourists with hospitality) and the tourists (that they would sell cheap crafts to them with a smile) slipped into resistance in those instances where women stood sympathetic to the thieves that stole from the tourists.

Women at Ubumbano craft market also resisted the intrusions that KZN Wildlife officers made on their autonomy at the market. These intrusions were more tangible and direct than the intrusions that the tourists made on the crafters' lives. During the December holidays, a KZN Wildlife official ordered the Ubumbano craft market committee to tell its members that they could not sell slingshots at the market. The tourists were using the slingshots to shoot at monkeys and to break windows. The slingshots were a very popular item with the tourists and many crafters sold them. A week after he issued this directive, the official inspected the stalls at the market. Vimbela Zikhali still sold the illegal item. Vimbela lied to the official, saying that she did not come to the market often and that this was the first time that she heard about the new rule. She actually came to the market almost daily and was present at the meeting where the slingshot directive was issued. Vimbela promised to take the slingshots home and not to sell any that day. The next day, she displayed the slingshots prominently at her stall. Like many of the other crafters, Vimbela publicly feigned compliance to the nature conservation officials' orders. However, as soon as the official turned his back, this compliance slipped into resistance.

Conclusion

On face value, people in Maputaland welcomed eco-tourism as a potential industry that would deliver economic development to those living near nature conservation areas. Many "communities" opted for partnership-in-conservation deals rather than once-off payments for land that they successfully claimed in the land claims process. Outwardly,

this showed confidence in the promises of eco-tourism advocates. However, on the level where local people encountered nature conservation areas and its officials, resistance and erosion seemed to be the prime modalities. Here, local women sometimes willfully over-harvested reeds and sedges and left the surplus to rot where nature conservation officials could see it. Some local men also engaged in poaching activities from the reserves. Outside the nature conservation areas, local people supported poaching by buying "bush meat" and feigning ignorance of poaching activities and poachers.

On the surface, it also seemed that most people in Maputaland subscribed to the influence of Tribal Authorities. Despite the outward appearances of complicity to these actors' projects and plans, these arrangements constantly slipped into resistance. It was especially in the cases where men's political ambitions threatened women's control over resources in their "domain", that this slippage occurred. Women tended to resort to individual acts of resistance that required little or no co-ordination and which often resembled forms of self-help. These everyday forms of resistance were not, of course peculiar to women; they were also a feature of the political activity of the young men and those that "worked politics" on the margins of the public political domain.

For their part, Tribal Authorities were more likely to resort to open forms of resistance to either development or to the political authority of other men. Such open resistance was usually precipitated by a total breakdown in the arrangement between the Tribal Authority, developers, and the community. Open resistance was often an outward show of the political importance. But often resistance was an extremely dangerous tactic, given the imprecise and volatile arrangement between chiefs and commoners.

The difference between patterns of resistance embarked upon by men and women is indicative of a society stratified by gender, in which only men participated in public politics. Women- whose activities were confined to the domains of agriculture, trade and domestic duties- had very little to gain from open forms of resistance. Unlike men, success in resistance did not lend women political capital that they could later use to secure better positions in society. Furthermore, women were constrained by their material dependence upon the very organisations that they resisted. For instance, the harvesters at Sibaya Lake harvesters could not afford to be banned from the Park, as many of them relied on the sale of reeds and sedges contained in it for their families' survival. For the same reason, traders at the Ubumbano craft market could not afford to be barred from selling there. Furthermore, "women's work" was labour intensive and required sustained activity to meet the family's subsistence requirements. As such, everyday forms of resistance were particularly suited to the work schedule of women as they were not time-consuming, required little co-ordination, and could be sustained on an individual basis.

What was interesting was that large numbers of men were also becoming involved with such strategies of resistance and withdrawal. As I have indicated, not all men were involved in "high" politics and many of them were marginalised within the socio-political and economic spheres. Their living conditions were such that they could not bargain on the political capital that open resistance might bestow on them.

Chapter 7

Concluding remarks:

The violent nature of development

"When you come back, will you bring development?"

-A question addressed to me at my last visit to the field

The South African government launched the LSDI in Maputaland to force the region out of its supposed economic and political isolation. The LSDI declared that their network of roads would 'open' the region up to the world and that the region's inclusion into the globalised market-driven economy would benefit everyone living in Maputaland (Jourdan 1998:718). However, I showed that Maputaland had been included in the globalised market-driven economy since before the colonial period. It was exactly this inclusion that led to the region's impoverishment and to the exploitation of its people. The core-periphery model proved very useful in describing the process through which the region became impoverished. I showed how the establishment of nature conservation areas, the KwaZulu homeland and forestry projects led to overcrowded conditions in Maputaland and forced many men to become migrant labourers to Gauteng. Here they supplied cheap labour to white-owned industries while the KwaZulu homeland remained devoid of any big industries.

With the de-industrialisation of the South African economy, the usefulness of the core-periphery model to explain poverty is starting to expire. The ties between people in Maputaland and the 'core' of the South African economy became tenuous as many thousands of migrant men lost their jobs in Gauteng in the late 1990s. Unemployed men

in the area did not serve as a reserve army for the heavily industrialised South African economy any more. Maputaland was in danger of being 'delinked' from the South African economy.

As large numbers of jobless men returned to the region, the LSDI promised to bring economic development and employment. The 'fit' however between the industry-driven economy that the migrant labourers had been part of and the service-driven economy that the LSDI was promoting in Maputaland, was not seamless. The eco-tourism business was not labour-intensive, mainly employed women and generally offered seasonal and temporary jobs. Klein (2000: 231-257) claims that these features characterise a global economy in which, "[e]very corporation wants a fluid reserve of part-timers, temps and freelancers to help it keep overheads down and ride the twists and turns in the market". The upshot of the LSDI's emphasis on the development of an eco-tourism industry in the region was that many people and especially men remained unemployed.

Eco-tourism is the ultimate post-industrial enterprise¹ and fitted neatly into the government's neo-liberal macro-economic policy. As such, the emphasis on the development of the eco-tourism industry made the market rather than the state or developers responsible for the delivery of economic and political justice to impoverished rural people (Turner 2001: 372). People in Maputaland laid claims to the nature conservation areas from which they were forcefully evicted since 1913 in the hope that political justice would be served through the land claims process. The land claims process was central to the definition of the rights that had formerly been denied to black people

¹ An environmentally friendly service industry with no tangible 'products' (Anon 2001: 13-15).

under apartheid. The restoration of land was seen as a means of restoring rights of sovereignty and full citizenship to the African population (James 2002:3).

The emphasis on eco-tourism as economic salvation for people in the region however meant that contested nature conservation areas had to remain in their pristine state. Successful land claimants could thus not move back onto their land. Enshrined at the heart of these debates about political reform was a language of rights rather than property or ownership. In the subsequent negotiations with land claimants, the boundaries of land ownership became blurred. Although successful land claimants such as the eMandleni Trust owned the legal titles to the land, ownership as they understood it was effectively 'deferred'. They could not occupy the land, sell it or make improvements in terms of infrastructure on it. Furthermore, while KZN Wildlife made day-to-day decisions about the land, the Zikhali community was only marginally involved in the management of their property through participation in the eMandleni Trust. Property ownership made little if any impact on local people's lives. It was thus only in a very remote sense that these land claimants owned the land.

Local people were not given much choice in reaching this 'agreement' since the land that they claimed had already been incorporated into the Greater St Lucia Wetland Park World Heritage Site. Only lip service was paid to community consent and to democratic decision making. By treating local people as communities rather than individuals, the land claims commission and the LSDI paved the way for all kinds of violence directed at those who did not agree with the deal. People on the Mabaso Game Reserve were subjected to actual threats and physical violence, and old women were literally 'workshopped' into submission.

The “violent nature of development” (Sachs 1992: 5) in this region extended to the individual’s relationship with the state. In the development process, land claimants were not viewed as individuals but as part of ethnic groups, annihilating the individual in favour of the group that they supposedly belonged to. Tribal Authorities consistently mediated between local residents, the state and developers. James (2002:3) asserts that undoing the wrongs of apartheid and restoring the citizenship rights to black people required uncoupling the relationship between chiefs and communally held property. This was not effected in Maputaland. Local people became ethnic shareholders in an industry managed by nature conservation authorities and tourist advertisers.

Consumption as Salvation

As shareholders, local people were intimately tied to the demands of the tourist market. They were told that their participation in the development projects would improve tourism and ultimately increase the earnings from their land. This forced co-option muted open dissent to development plans and land use strategies.

In making the market responsible for the delivery of ‘development’, the LSDI fundamentally reconstituted the relationship between “hosts” and “guests”. Suddenly the tourist was no longer just a guest to the region, but a possible harbinger of economic salvation. As such, meeting the tourists’ expectations about the area, its people and products, became an important economic goal. In the LSDI’s rush to cater to the needs of tourists as consumers, local people’s public identities were reconstituted and their production processes altered. In their encounters with tourists, local people did not only

sell their products but also images of themselves. I showed how tourists' expectations about the ethnic identity of their hosts influenced their buying behaviour. Tourists bought crafts that they thought were truly indigenous to the area and that conformed to their expectations of the Zulu. Developers packaged and branded people in Maputaland as authentic (nineteenth century) Zulu. Local people were taught how to make 'real' Zulu crafts and to perform 'real' Zulu rituals and dances. In their search for authentic art and crafts, the tourists' attention was drawn to the surfaces of people and things, framed primarily as objects of visual interest (Alpers 1991: 25-32). In the context of the global market in consumer goods, surfaces are often demarcated, delimited and authenticated by brands. Objects, personalities, inventions and ethnic identities are all 'brandable' consumables.

Ironically, the consumers' emphasis on the shiny surfaces of things made it possible to gloss over truly authentic local products. It also undermined real cultural differences. The consumer obsessively tried to verify that which he/ she bought with the brand they were presented with. Crafts that betrayed anything of the world to which the tourists belonged were immediately discarded as 'fake' while those that conformed to ethnic stereotypes were eagerly bought as the 'real thing'. Things are dumb. Once removed from the continuity of everyday uses and offered for sale, the meanings of objects were transformed (Crew & Sims 1991: 159). As far as crafts in Maputaland were concerned, advertising agencies and tourist marketers mediated between craft producers (local people) and consumers and were the most powerful agents in the ascription of meaning. They imbibed their representation of local people with the authority of the media and forced local people to consume such identities. Authenticity as the tourists

understood it was thus not about factuality or reality but about authority. Local people's means of self-representation were thus muted in favour of the demands of the consumer market. In the development process, local people in their contact with tourists were emptied of their substance to become branded surfaces. It was a form of violence that attacked the full humanity of the locals.

In this context, consumerism was praised as the highest good and production was kept to the background (cf. J. & J. L. Comaroff 2000). This emphasis on consumption rather than production made it possible to ignore the backbreaking hours that crafters spent in producing crafts. Tourists did not pay the crafter for their labour but paid for the degree to which an object convinced him/ her of its authenticity. They paid only for what was immediately visible, the surface.

These observations seem to vindicate criticisms that portray development as a tool for creating and maintaining unequal power relationships. Those with money (tourists) were placed in a unique position of power vis-à-vis those without money (local people). Furthermore, the demand for cheap crafts created new inequalities within the 'target community'. Craft production was outsourced to the poorest sections of society. The labour-intensive and poorly paid nature of the production process did not allow these crafters to escape their position of dependence.

What these theorists failed to notice in their emphasis on economic dependence is that this brand-driven economy depersonalises both consumers and producers. As I have shown, the tourists' search for authentic objects was driven by feelings of alienation they experienced 'at home'. Tourists searched for existential authenticity among the many surfaces they were presented with. However, the primacy of the visual emptied the

possibility of real human contact. Local people on the other hand were depersonalised when they chose to consume the ethnic identities held up for them to copy. They lost their means of self-representation and were merely tasked with holding a mirror up to the tourists' expectations. In this role, the crafters were bounded by the limits set by the brand. They too were prevented from having full human interaction whenever they encountered tourists. For instance, at the Ubumbano craft market, crafters could not argue with the tourists that tried to bargain with them for fear that the tourists would complain to KZN Wildlife.

The LSDI and other developers attempted to facilitate trickle-down effects in the market by 'formalising' the craft industry. They built various craft markets in the region, hoping that this would offer the tourist a predictable, calculable, efficient and controllable shopping experience. In effect, they bureaucratised large parts of the industry. Robertson (1984)'s argument that development agencies are premised on the need to turn an unreliable citizenry into a structured public and that development interventions are thus the site of contest between people and bureaucracy have some relevance here. Through the development process, the vague 'local community' was defined and its boundaries delimited. The dispersed networks of the informal economy were broken up and were given 'permanence' at the built craft markets. At such markets, strict hierarchies were set in place while the occupants of stalls had to adhere to formal rules and regulations. Within these markets, a division of labour was imposed between traders, crafters and management. Men, who did not sell crafts, occupied positions on the Ubumbano craft market committee. Despite the negative unanticipated consequences of this bureaucratisation process, people did not resist bureaucracy itself. People enthusiastically

participated in meetings, imitated bureaucratic procedures with gusto, and used the structure to their own benefit. For example, the Mabaso Tribal Authority used the bureaucratic rules of the Ingonyama Trust against the Trust itself. By following the rules to the letter, the Mabaso Tribal Authority was able to regain control over land vested in the Trust.

Robertson's (1984) claim that development projects aim to create a more structured public and that people would resist this transformation, is thus perhaps too broad a statement. It would be more accurate to say that development projects often lead to increased bureaucratisation. Ritzer's (1996) theory of McDonaldisation offers a broad framework for the changes wrought by development projects premised upon the neo-liberal principles of economic.

Gendered spaces, violent clashes

In the implementation of 'development' in Maputaland, gender-specific spaces were created and maintained for local men and women. Local women were targeted as ideal recipients of development projects that aimed to improve the crafts trade, subsistence agriculture, nursing and all things 'domestic' while nature conservation and politics (the two were closely intertwined) became exclusive male spheres. I showed that the supposedly gender-sensitive development projects were largely informed by gender stereotypes of women as dependent housewives and men as providers. Women's projects centred on activities that women could do from home, using local skills. The developers paid very little attention to the money-earning potential of many of these projects. On the other hand, men's projects groomed participants for the labour market, for public political positions and

paid attention to the money-earning potential of the project. Developers thus reinforced the stereotypical dichotomy of public (men) / domestic (women). This dichotomy rested on the devaluation of the women's sphere and a disempowerment of the women in it.

Men were indeed tasked with public politics while women looked after the subsistence needs of their households. Unlike the stereotypical depiction of men as the dominators of women, local men did not have any say in the manner in which women organised their affairs or went about their daily tasks. Women had complete autonomy in their sphere and depended upon other women rather than men. In their role as providers of subsistence needs, women were linked to farming and food processing and were responsible for the reproduction of everyday life. Men were depicted as the "talkers" while women were acknowledged as the "doers". As such, the spheres were co-existent on each other and existed in parallel. This was still the case for many households in my research area.

With gender-sensitive development, the women's sphere became more permeable. Developers did not simply want men to represent women's groups, but also to act as managers who did low-level quality controls and mediated between the developers and women. John Mdluli's managerial role at the Ubumbano craft market had some disastrous consequences for the women whom he represented. Women's projects seldom provided a subsistence income for their participants and in their efforts to confine women to a single economic activity, developers broke down women's networks that used to provide economic safety. On the other hand, the men's political sphere remained closed to most women. Where women were allowed, it was to fill front positions. Such women seldom had any say in the decision-making process of the Municipal Council or Tribal

Authority. Powerful men often received generous remuneration for their services as community representatives. Overall, development projects opened the way for men to control women's labour and capital. This disempowered women within their own projects (spheres) and devalued women's work.

This outcome was not what the developers had envisioned. They had taken women's confinement to the domestic sphere as a sign of women's subordination. The developers were however insensitive to gender parallelism and to women's autonomy as producers. In their attempt to 'empower' women, developers focused exclusively on women and sought to allow women greater control over their own labour and resources. Yet ironically in Maputaland these attempts often led to a loss of women's autonomy. Goheen (1996)'s ethnography of the Nso proved invaluable in the conception of a society cleaved along the lines male (public) / female (domestic) that did not automatically devalue and disempower women.

Development projects and the land claims process created a space in which local chiefs and Tribal Authorities could stand as a link between local people and the developers. To legitimise their position as 'owners' of the land and representatives of local people, Tribal Authorities utilised discourses in which ethnicity and patriarchy featured as natural elements of the social landscape. Developers interacted with and supported these discourses since the reality it conjured (that a single chief was the mouthpiece of thousands of people) made it easier and cheaper to deliver 'development'. Thus a small group of local men constructed ethnic identities for and about the people in Maputaland. To a large extent, such constructions flowed from the agency of chiefs in the political sphere, not from a calculated move to 're-traditionalise' people.

These claims to traditional legitimacy excluded regular men from the lucrative development industry. Since the LSDI's focus was on the development of a service-orientated eco-tourist enterprise, few regular men entertained the hope that they would find employment in the new tourist resorts. Local resorts were well known for their tendency to employ women. In this context, elderly local men who were popular started to represent micro-level interest groups with the hope that they might snare a developer to fund a project with them at the helm. While canvassing for projects and help, these men were not paid. Young men were largely excluded from development projects and management positions while their female age mates were in high demand at tourist resorts as domestic workers. Thus, in negotiating exclusive access for themselves to the developers, the Tribal Authorities excluded and marginalised other men. In the process, women were forced to consume and reproduce these ethnic identities in their contact with the tourists that visited Sodwana Bay and environs. Women, by virtue of their employment in the service industry and their confinement to craft production, thus became the 'main vehicles' for the representation of difference and otherness to tourists. In Maputaland this role had dire financial and social consequences for women who became 'fetishized' by the market.

The clash of interest between and among men and women manifested in the home where violence became almost endemic to male-female relationships. At home women projected the resentment they felt towards development projects and men that kept them stuck in low-income generating activities. At home men also tried to reclaim the power that the developers effectively stripped away from them. The Tribal Authorities knew that they were basically dumb tokens to the developers' notions of democracy and 'local empowerment'. Although they were adequately remunerated for their services, Tribal Authorities acknowledged that their views and input would not change multi-billion-Rand infrastructure and nature conservation projects. Their enthusiastic echoing of developers' plans was to a large extent a face-saving mechanism.

Men who did not get into the Tribal Authority pound seats felt resentful towards local women employed in the tourist service sector. As their economic potential to earn wages

decreased, local men were also becoming less and less desirable as long-term sexual partners or husbands. In this context, husband-wife relationships were characterised by hostility, suspicion and mutual antagonism. These frustrations and tensions often built up to violent domestic fights. My female respondents at the Ubumbano craft market did not see themselves as 'victims' of domestic violence and often gave as good as they got. Kitchen utensils, brooms and sticks were seen as legitimate weapons in a domestic squabble. Many women also proudly recounted the harm they inflicted.

Perhaps the most violent reaction to the gendered nature of development projects was evident in the actions of gangs of unemployed young men. These gangs were widely regarded with fear as they mugged, raped and assaulted anyone with money. The Tribal Authorities could not 'control' them while few locals dared to give them up to the police in fear of retaliation. These gangs frequently mugged pensioners collecting their state pensions. Crafters were especially afraid of these gangs as they often raped women at the sites where they harvested. This was not just the delinquent behaviour of a group of bored men. Rather, it presented a violent attack on the reproductive capabilities of women in an environment where their own ability to be productive members of society was severely hampered by a lack of employment opportunities and strict gender role prescriptions.

Slipping or breaking into resistance

When describing resistance, I pointed to the differential strategies that regular men, Tribal Authorities and women utilised to oppose plans that threatened their autonomy. Although I relied heavily on Scott (1985)'s concept of everyday forms of resistance, I found his treatment of motive and class highly problematic. People in my research area did not share some diffused sense of class-consciousness that manifested in their dogged

everyday resistance to their would-be superiors. Instead, men and women had very different reasons to resist nature conservation authorities, developers and the Tribal Authorities.

I worked from the premise that most human relationships were based on loose arrangements of power, rights and permitted actions. De Boeck (1996: 91-99) used the concept "*l'arrangement*" to refer to a specific mode of negotiation and compromise between the Zambian state and the traditional authorities it aimed to encapsulate. I found that this concept could easily be applied to other social relationships. The use of this term allowed me to treat resistance as concentrated opposition to specific modes of intrusion.

For instance, powerful men sometimes deliberately broke an arrangement between themselves and the developers to create the necessary space for negotiating a new arrangement. This strategy was, however, fraught with danger as it opened the way for other local men to muscle their way into the arrangement. Furthermore, powerful men risked losing political capital in instances where they openly broke an arrangement and were not visibly supported by those whom they claimed to represent.

The relationships between developers and local people, Tribal Authorities and the people whom they represented, and between men and women, were not simply characterised by domination, subordination or by complicity. Even in the context of the large-scale LSDI development project, people found numerous ways to create and defend autonomous spaces.