

**A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EVOLVING
AFRICAN UNION - UNITED NATIONS COOPERATION
ON PEACE AND SECURITY: 2003 - 2009**

MR MAHLOMOLA VICTOR MOTJOPE

presented for as a partial requirement for the degree

Master of Diplomatic Studies (Dip 873)

**IN THE FACULTY OF HUMANITIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA**

2011

DECLARATION

I, Mahlomola Victor MOTJOPE, declare that the present work is original. It has never been presented at any other University or Institution, where other people's works have been used, references have been provided, and sometimes, quotations made. It is in this regard that I declare that this work is originally mine. It is hereby presented in fulfillment of the partial requirement of the Master of Diplomatic Studies (MDIPS) Degree.

Signature:

Date:

Supervisor

Signature:

Date:

Table of Contents

I.	Title page	1
II.	Declaration	2
III.	Table of Contents	3
IV.	Acknowledgement	5
V.	Abstract	6
VI.	List of Abbreviations and Acronyms	7
1.	Chapter one: Introduction and overview	9
1.1	Background	10
1.2	Literature survey	12
1.3	Research problem	18
1.4	Methodology	19
1.5	Structure of research	20
2.	Chapter two: The evolution of the AU-UN framework on peace and security	21
2.1	Introduction	21
2.2	AU-UN approaches to regional cooperation	22
2.2.1	Phase 1 (1990 to 1995)	23
2.2.2	Phase 2 (1996 to 2000)	25
2.2.3	Phase 3 (2001 to 2004)	27
2.2.4	Phase 4 (2005 to 2007)	32
2.2.5	Phase 5 (2008 to 2009)	37
2.3	Summary	42

3.	Chapter three: 2006 Cooperation Framework and the enhancing of the AU peace and security capacity	44
3.1	Introduction	44
3.2	Brief overview of the African Peace and Security Architecture	45
3.3	Conflict prevention	47
3.4	Mediation and Good Offices	51
3.5	Peacekeeping	54
3.6	Peace-building	60
3.7	Practical challenges to the AU-UN peace cooperation	63
3.8	Conclusion	65
4.	Chapter four: Some Case Studies of the AU-UN involvement and cooperation	67
4.1	Introduction	67
4.2	Liberian-Sierra Leone experience	68
4.3	AU-UN collaboration in the Burundi peace process	73
4.4	Reflection on the Darfur peace process	79
4.5	Conclusion	85
5.	Chapter five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations	88
5.1	Summary	88
5.2	Conclusion and Recommendations	93
	Bibliography	99
	Annexure	106

Acknowledgements

Undertaking this academic research project is a fulfillment of a wish that dates as far back as decade of the seventies which I could not realise due to the social and political challenges of the period. I am grateful to colleagues and friends who had always insisted that at an opportune moment and given determination, the dream would be achieved.

The years spent as an international relations practitioner without a solid academic training in the field presented its own frustrations as one sought to respond to foreign policy and diplomatic challenges confronting today's South Africa. I wish to express my profound gratitude to my workplace executive team for an opportunity provided through the financial sponsorship to enroll for the Master of Diplomatic Studies Programme (MDIPS) at the University of Pretoria (UP).

I am equally grateful to the academic and support staff of the Department of Political Sciences at UP, as well as visiting professors and lecturers, who contributed in my journey into understanding the complex world of international relations and diplomacy. I wish to mention in particular Professor Maxi Schoeman, the Head of the Political Science Department at UP and Dr Y Kemp-Spies, Director of the MDIPS programme at UP for the encouragement especially in the first year of my studies. Special thanks and appreciation goes to Professor Sandy Africa at UP who guided and supervised this research study. Her candid professional advice and feedback assisted in my overcoming challenges along the way.

Last but not least, I am forever indebted to the encouragement and loving understanding received from my wife, Mpho, and my son, Katileho, during the long periods I could not fully participate in family programmes.

Abstract

Almost four decades of decolonisation and independence of sub-Saharan Africa have been characterised by inter-state and intra-state conflict situations, denying the continent stability and development. The study critically examines the evolution of a vision for collaboration and cooperation on peace and security in the interface between the African Union and the United Nations. The post Cold War period allowed the institutionalisation of peace and security cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, in particular the AU.

The analysis argues that regional stability has been elevated into one of the key indicators of possible threats to international peace and that regionalism recognised as a necessary component of multilateralism in maintaining peace and security in the world. The UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council have developed a structured relationship that ensures information exchange on issues on common concern. Africa is assuming responsibility and ownership of its peace and security problems by seeking to find solutions in partnership. The complementarity and comparative advantage of the two organizations has contributed to the emerging continental stability, state institution building, governance structures and African Peace and Security Architecture.

The 2000 AU Constitutive Act and the 2002 AU Peace and Security Protocol had purposefully entrenched collaboration with the United Nations on peace and security. The signing of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation provides the framework and compass for building the AU capacity and access to resources. The evolving peace and security cooperation is not an easy matter as African leadership seeks to convince the international community, especially the UNSC, not to be indifferent to Africa's perennial prevalence of conflicts. AU and UN peace and security cooperation is in its infancy, African leadership political will is the key to its consolidation.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACCORD	African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
AMIB	African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ASF	African Standby Force, AU
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUPSC	AU Peace and Security Council
AUPSOD	African Union Peace Support Operations Division
AUPST	African Union Peacekeeping Support Team
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CFC	Joint Commission & Ceasefire Agreement
CNDD-FDD	National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for Defence of Democracy, Burundi
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DPA	Darfur Peace Agreement
ECOMIL	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FNL	Forces Nationales de Liberation (Paliphehutu), Burundi
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
JCC	Joint Ceasefire Commission
MCPMR	Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MONUC	United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo
MSC	Military Staff Committee, AU
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ONUB	United Nations Mission in Burundi
OSAA	Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
PCB	Peace-building Commission, UN
PCDR	Post Conflict Development and reconstruction
POW	Panel of the Wise, AU
PSC	Peace and Security Council, AU
RCM	Regional Coordination Mechanism
REC	Regional Economic Community
RPIB	Regional Peace Initiative in Burundi



RUF	Revolutionary United Forces
SCSL	Special Court on Sierra Leone
TCC	Troops Contributing Country
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	United Nations African Mission in Darfur
UNAMSIL	UN Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
UNDPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNECA	UN Economic Community for Africa
UNGA	United National General Assembly
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in Sudan
UN-NADAF	UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa
UNOAU	United Nations Office to the African Union
UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	UN Mission in Somalia
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSOA	UN Support Office to AMISOM

1. Chapter one: Introduction and Overview

“To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breach of peace”, Article 1.1 of the UN Charter, 1945.

The above paragraph articulates one of the main purposes behind the formation of the United Nations (UN), that is, the maintenance of international peace and security. The primary responsibility for this objective is assigned, through Article 24 in Chapter V of the UN Charter, to the Security Council of that body.

Notwithstanding the UN’s primary role, a vision for collaboration and cooperation on peace and security has emerged in the interfacing between the United Nations and African Union (AU). This is currently codified in a 2006 framework document, titled Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union (A/61/630:2006). The African Union’s participation in stabilising the African continent, however, is complementary and in the final analysis subject to authorisation by the UN Security Council.

The aim of this study is to critically assess the evolving cooperation on peace and security challenges between the two bodies, over the period 2003 to 2009. The institutionalisation of cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations on peace and security in Africa assumed prominence in the post Cold War era. An obvious starting point is to understand what has given rise to the cooperation in the first place. Having traced these origins, the study will explore whether there is a common comprehension and operational framework between the two institutions on what cooperation on peace and security entails. This will

be done with reference both to these bodies' independent and collaboratively documented frameworks.

Next, the study will explore the practical experience of collaboration on efforts in conflict prevention, and peacekeeping, using a number of illustrations and cases. The practical illustration of collaboration will be drawn from the experience of migrating from the ECOWAS initiated interventions on peace operation in Liberia and Sierra Leone to, respectively, United Nations Missions in Liberia (UNMIL) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); from the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB); and from the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the United Nations - African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). In addressing these cases, and in the overall argument, the study will explore what impediments there have been to effective cooperation, and how these can be addressed. Through this approach, the prospects of a strategic and operational partnership between the two organisations will be investigated.

1.1 Background

There are two primary bodies exercising authority over peace and security in Africa: the United Nations and the African Union. As stated above the study sets out to assess the evolving cooperation between the two bodies on this responsibility. The collaboration is informed by the international community's recognition that regionalism as a component of multilateralism is necessary and feasible as it introduces a shared role for maintaining international peace and security (S/2008/186:1). The exercising of the shared responsibility demands that the two bodies develop a common and mutual understanding of a structured partnership with a clearly defined basis and processes, and coordination and consultative mechanisms. Both entities bring comparative advantages to the cooperation including intimate knowledge of the environment, resources, capacity building and resolve to achieve stability in the region and contribute to enhancing legitimacy (S/2008/186:19-20).

The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed an expansion in the scale of UN peace operations on the African continent as intra-state conflicts have flared up and threatened the fragile African state institutions and sovereignty (Neethling 2004:48). From the end of the Cold War, African conflicts began to dominate UN initiatives in peacekeeping and conflict resolution, with more UN peacekeeping operations taking place there than in any other single region and with most important and challenging endeavours (Adebayo & Scanlon 2006:5; Neethling 2004:49).

The inauguration of regular consultations between the UN Secretary General and heads of regional organisations in 2003 marked a significant stage in the institutionalisation of relations between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, especially the African Union. Participants agreed on a framework of cooperation to confront new challenges to international peace and security, including international terrorism. The UN Secretary General is obliged to appraise the UN Security Council on progress achieved by these consultative forums (S/PRST/2007/7).

In September 2005, in conformity with the provisions of the UN Charter, the Security Council formally recognised the need to develop effective partnerships between itself and regional organisations, in particular the African Union and its sub-regional organisations, in order to enable early responses to disputes and emerging crises. A resolution passed by the Security Council stressed the critical importance of a regional approach to conflict prevention, strengthening of cooperation and communication between the United Nations and Regional Organisations/Arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII (S/Res/1625:2005).

Resolution 1625, further, encouraged African countries to closely cooperate with the UN Secretariat and regional organisations in the implementation of measures aimed at securing peace and security, stability, democracy and

sustainable development consistent with the objectives of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Both institutions were urged to fully cooperate in developing the capacities of the African regional and sub-regional organisations especially through the UN Secretary General's proposal to establish a ten-year capacity building programme of the African Union (S/Res/1625:2005). The resolution found expression in the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Capacity Building Programme for the African Union mentioned earlier. The Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation undertook to focus efforts on conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peace building with emphasis, *inter-alia*, on peace and security, assistance in institution building, political and electoral matters, rule of law, peace-building, humanitarian response and the environment.

The essence of the study is a critical assessment of the experience and lessons drawn from the implementation of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, which currently guides the evolving cooperation and interaction between the United Nations and the African Union. The prospects of a strategic and operational partnership in conflict analysis, strategy development and operational planning between the two organisations will be investigated.

1.2. Literature Survey

There are several bodies of literature relevant to this study. The first evaluates the efforts of the African Union's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in promoting peace and security in Africa. The OAU's founding purpose and principles emphasised sovereign independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, thus undermining any prospect of collective security (Berman & Sams 2000:45-47). The approach of the OAU to security was largely 'state-centric' with less interest in the human dimension of security, a phenomenon characteristic of the Cold War politics (Alao 2000:3). This approach was inherently flawed as the emphasis was on absolute respect of

sovereignty and the principle of non interference in internal affairs of states. A consequence of the weakness of this approach is that the OAU Charter provision for the Commission for Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration (Article XIX) as a dispute resolution structure never materialised. The goodwill of state parties to conflict to cooperate was taken for granted while in practice member states preferred the use of informal methods of conflict resolution like special envoys, ad hoc committees, etc. (Naldi 1999: 28-29). Despite the flaring up of intra-state and inter-state conflicts (as in Chad, Nigeria, Ethiopia-Somalia War) during the decades of the sixties to the eighties, the OAU could not undertake any initiatives on peace and security. Instead, the OAU was mainly involved in setting norms and standards which it was never effective in enforcing (Moller 2009:6). Moller (2009:7) refers also to the 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism that has not prevented the usage of mercenaries in prevailing conflicts (as in Sierra Leone, Angola) and to the 1996 Pelindaba Treaty on Africa as a nuclear-weapons-free zone which Libya attempted to undermine. Former OAU Secretary General, Edem Kodjo (1984:4-6) noted that the OAU Secretariat annual reports warned the African leadership of the negative effect of the increasing external interference in African conflicts. The Secretariat recommended the adoption of an integral and customised African approach to conflict management and resolution. Other writers who assess the role of the OAU in addressing conflict as being ineffectual were Ghebdinga (1987:95-96), Saxena (1993:216-217) and Muyangwa & Vogt (2000: 26-28). They took a step further by advocating for an inclusive approach that would benefit from universal experience in conflict resolution and management. Malan (2008:89-90) underscores the point by recalling the 1997 statement by Salim A. Salim (former OAU Secretary General) that member states cannot expect the international community to care more for problems that in most cases are an African creation as the world does not owe Africa, adding that Africa needs to act speedily to avoid uncontrollable conflict situations.

The second body of literature addresses approaches to peace and security in Africa since the end of the Cold War, and debates the conditions under which cooperation between the OAU/AU and the UN has emerged. The seeds for an effective African peace and security cooperation were only laid in the post Cold War period with the establishment of the OAU Mechanism for the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in 1993 (Field 2004:20-21; Berman & Sams 2000:61-68). This development led to some rapprochement between the OAU and the UN, as the African leadership through this instrument viewed the relationship with the UN as complementary to its own (Francis, Faal, Kabia & Ramsbothan 2005:104). A further expression of confidence was to be found in the AU Constitutive Act principles which called for a peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in respect to grave circumstances. Article 3(c) of the AU Constitutive Act further, encouraged international cooperation within the context of the Charter of the United Nations, whilst the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol provides for close cooperation with the UN Security Council in implementing its mandate (AU Constitutive Act, 2000; AU Peace and Security Council, 2003).

Some of the literature suggests that cooperation originated in the context of growing debate on Africa's place in the international hierarchy and the distortion of UN priorities away from development objectives beneficial for developing countries. Buo (2009:89-91) for example, argues that there has been a perceived indifference of the international community to the continent and its marginalisation, especially in treatment of its security crisis and need for financial and logistical resources. A segment of African countries therefore complains that the developed North involvement in conflict resolution is essentially driven by self-interest and are critical that the bulk of resources allocated revert back as remuneration for the employed experts and the procurement opportunities (Buo 2001:92). Conspicuously absent from contributing troops to UN peace operations in Africa, it has been argued, were those with the greatest military and financial assets – North Atlantic Treaty

Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) member states (Malan 2004:199). The UN Security Council's tardy and timid response to conflict situations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Liberia, suggests residual resistance to a more assertive UN involvement in peace mission in Africa (Bariagaber 2006:12).

As opposed to the argument that Africa has been systematically marginalised, other scholarly accounts suggest that Africa has enjoyed prominence in the efforts of the UN to invest in endeavours to prevent, mediate and manage the conflict situations in the post Cold War period (Field 2004:28-29; Berman and Sams 2000:30-31). In fact, certain parts of the international community assert that peacekeeping in Africa has absorbed enormous resources and energy but brought little stability and prosperity in return (Neethling 2004:50). The latter author however makes reference to some successes achieved in finding solutions in Namibia and Mozambique, and varying degrees of challenges encountered in places like Somalia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Neethling 2001:51-59).

Related to this strand of thought, is the school that suggests that cooperation has arisen from the international community's concern with the nature of conflict in the African continent itself and the internal distribution of natural resources between the people and the rulers. The 'greed and grievance' thesis emanating from the political economic analysis of civil wars in Africa argues that countries imbued with abundance of natural resources and an uneducated population are more at risk of conflict (Francis et al 2005:81). The protagonists of the thesis assert that the availability of 'lootable' primary export resources provide an opportunity to instigate conflict as 'income-earning opportunity' by some leaders (Collier 2000:92-97; Keen 1998:1-88). The intransigent leadership committed to self enrichment and perpetuation of cronyism is the greatest impediment to peace in Africa.

Finally, a third body of literature attempts to assess the implications of the institutional context in which peace and stability must be secured, for AU-UN cooperation to succeed. The UN Charter has deliberately not provided a precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies to allow flexibility for regional action which could contribute to maintenance of international peace and security ((A/47/277-S/24111 of 1992: paragraph 17)). The African Union is emerging as a more substantive actor and UN partner in addressing peace and stability in Africa. However, many hurdles in UN-AU cooperation remain, despite the closer political and operational collaboration (Andrews & Holt, 2007:3). The dominant consensus is that the AU lacks efficient and effective institutional structures, managerial capacity and resources; there is a need for UN to provide logistical, technical and other support to Africa and, lastly, the UNSC seems reluctant to authorise and commit resources to African peace operations that may continue for extended periods (Andemicael 1994: 119-138; Nicol 1978: 367-395; Vogt 1999:3-4).

Despite the UN Security Council being responsible for the maintenance of international peace, it is only through Resolution 1625 of 2005 that it recognised the need for effective partnership with regional organisations especially the African Union. The UN involvement in the African conflict situations, during this period, has been very slow, but in most cases crucial and some cases controversial, observes Nout Yoh (2008:261-262). The UN approach to conflict situations was hamstrung by Cold War geopolitics as epitomised in the sixties intervention in the Congo, dynamics in respect to Southern African anti-colonial struggles and the attitude towards inter and intra-states conflicts or nation-building challenges (Andemicael 1994: 121-122).

Assisting the development of the African Union capacities to prevent and manage conflicts is an international priority and according to Guicherd (2006:2) this is partly reflecting confidence in the AU's own initiative in developing a strategic vision and plan to address Africa's peace and security needs. To

ensure structured interfacing between the AU and UN, both organisations have to develop a common comprehension of African conflicts, strategic approach and communication guidelines, ensure timely humanitarian intervention, division of responsibility and envisaged outcome (Alao 2000:18-19; Olonisakin 2000: 83-96).

All of the above perspectives provide a rich framework within which to assess the evolving AU-UN cooperation. The literature on the OAU initial approaches reflects the dynamics of an emerging regional organisation in search of a role to play in continental peace and security field without undermining the principles of territorial sovereignty and non interference in internal affairs of member states. The post Cold War approaches opened an era for structured cooperation in international peace and security with economic development as one of the essential elements for stability. The continental organisation adapted and drew lessons from international experience hence the introduction of a regional mechanism that sought cooperation with the United Nations. The latter viewpoint in literature on institutionalisation of the AU-UN peace and security cooperation integrates a process that evolved for almost four decades.

The study synthesises the various strands in the literature and argues that the approach to peace and security issues in international relations has gravitated towards a multilateral cooperation with the United Nations Charter regaining its eminence. The approach adopted throughout the study is that the United Nations and the African Union are complementary to each others efforts and individually bring comparative advantages based on resources, experience and knowledge of the realities on the ground. The 2000 AU Constitutive Act and the 2002 AU Peace and Security Council Protocol provide the legal framework for the AU cooperation with the international community and the UN in particular. Africa has resolved to determine its future destiny and is increasingly placing African problems on the international agenda. In the final instance, the African Union – United Nations cooperation is situated within the framework that

suggests that unless democratisation, institutionalisation of good governance and economic stability take root in the continent, peace will remain illusive and peace efforts a self-perpetuating industry (Francis 2006:222-225; Ikome 2007:144-171).

1.3 Research Problem

The main question addressed by the study is how successful the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations has been from 2003 to 2009. This requires an understanding of whether progress and achievement has been recorded in ending conflicts, the promotion of the rule of law and democratic governance, institution building and respect of international instruments and conventions in the maintenance of peace and security. It becomes imperative to establish if the developing cooperation between the AUPSC and UNSC and the insitutionalised interfacing between the AU Commission and UN Secretariat, have contributed to capacity building and management of conflict situations.

Secondary and complementary questions are whether there is common understanding between the two bodies on the need for cooperation. Conceptual ambiguities, grey areas and the sharing of responsibilities will have to be clarified to avoid unnecessary contradictions. By reviewing outcomes of institutionalisation, the research will explore whether a complimentary and comparatively advantageous cooperation framework has evolved.

Finally the research will assess practical experience, and identify achievements and failures. It will be incumbent to determine whether the cooperation complies with the norms and procedures that govern the international system and community. Specific case studies (Liberia and Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Sudan (Darfur) will be examined and contrasted to establish an identifiable trend. It will be critical to further asses whether the majority of AU member states have bought into the process and are capacitating their own state institutions.

1.4 Methodology

The study involves the survey of existing literature on peace and security in Africa, especially the growing interfacing and interaction between specialised organs of the African Union and the United Nations. The key official policy documents and declarations on the unfolding cooperation and diplomacy, pronouncements by African statesmen, selected international figures and academics on the subject are reviewed.

Information is sourced from contemporary African and international scholarship on the role of the African Union in the maintenance of international peace and security. Journals on International Relations and Political Science shall be utilised to contextualise the unfolding AU – UN cooperation and partnership.

The implementation of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union and other relevant agreements shall be reviewed. The developing African Peace and Security Architecture as the expression of the AU vision shall be critiqued. The AUPSC and the UNSC shall be scrutinised given the pivotal role they play in promoting cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security at international and continental levels.

Analysis will be based on secondary sources; and primary sources in so far as they are accessible through libraries and electronic media. Consistent effort will be made to maintain objectivity and integrity in the research process, acknowledgement sources and respect the basic research ethics. Limitations of the methodology are insufficient academic material evaluating the AU-UN cooperation, AUPSC and UNSC resolutions are often crafted cautiously to accommodate all views and reliance on secondary sources. The researcher did not have first hand experience of the cooperation, did not interact or interview the role players as this would have been prohibitively expensive. The research

has laid the basis for further study and analysis of the challenges facing the AU-UN cooperation.

1.5. Structure of the Research

The structure of the study is as follows:

Chapter One of the research report has introduced the subject matter, exploration of the research problem, methodology and limitations of the study. It is a broad presentation of the envisaged study.

Chapter Two is dedicated to a critical overview of the evolving peace and security cooperation between the African Union and United Nations. By demonstrating how African institutions graduated from efforts to find solutions on their own, to collaborative efforts harnessing the resources of the AU and UN within a common framework, the framework for cooperation is discussed.

Chapter Three presents and assesses aspects of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation intended to achieve peace and security cooperation in Africa.

Chapter Four addresses case studies of involvement and cooperation of the AU and UN in peace and security in Africa. The countries that will be focused on to illustrate the lessons of such cooperation include Liberia, Sierra Leone, Burundi and Sudan (Darfur).

Chapter Five integrates and discusses the research findings, draws conclusions and makes recommendations on how the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation can be better implemented.

Chapter 2: The Evolution of AU-UN Cooperation Framework on Peace and Security

“Under the Charter, the Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.”¹

2.1 Introduction

The institutionalisation of cooperation between the UN and the AU on peace and security in Africa assumed prominence in the post Cold War era. Respectively mandated by the UN Charter and AU Constitutive Act, it is therefore important to map out the development of the framework of cooperation between the two bodies. Their cooperation within the international system is informed by the need to develop a structured and mutually agreed mechanism to regulate their respective roles. Cooperation or partnership does not necessarily imply agreement on all issues; it is a working medium that depicts a common strategic vision between the United Nations and the African Union.

This chapter describes and assesses UN-AU cooperation on peace and security from the immediate post Cold War period to 2009. Several phases can be discerned:

- Phase 1 (1990 to 1995) saw the international community of nations and International Relations academics and practitioners re-examining the role of the UN Security Council as the primary organ with responsibility to maintain international peace and security;
- Phase 2 (1996 to 2000) when the central thrust was the exploration of how best the UN-AU could cooperate in search of durable peace;

¹ Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace*, 1992:14

- Phase 3 (2001 to 2004) was characterised by challenges in the post 11 September 2001 period, of a new range of security considerations and vulnerabilities;
- Phase 4 (2005 to 2007) ushered in a period of codification of the cooperation mechanism through the adoption of a declaration enhancing UN-AU cooperation; and
- Phase 5 (2008 to 2009) sought to concretise the modalities in support of peacekeeping operations in Africa.

The chapter examines the impact of the reconfiguration of the international system on the UN approach to regional conflict situations, particularly those in Africa. It also discusses the AU's new approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution, and the subsequent signing of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union in the field of peace and security. The objectives and principles governing the mechanism for UN-AU cooperation and challenges are examined to bring in focus the conceptualisation and evolution of the cooperation between the two bodies, especially the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council.

2.2 AU-UN approaches to regional cooperation

The post Cold War period saw a changed international political landscape and improved cooperation within the UN Security Council in addressing conflict situations. Bariagaber (2006:12) aptly comments that the UN has returned to represent an ideal of national equality, and embodies the desire that international conflicts be resolved without war. Without the inhibitions of the earlier East-West tensions, peace and security challenges began to be approached in their national and regional contexts, a necessary development as the international community experienced a proliferation of intra-state conflicts and wars. In this global transition where national boundaries have increasingly been blurred by advanced communication and global commerce, regional

arrangements have been used to explore new ways to deepen cooperation in the world and states are agreeing to yield some sovereign prerogatives to larger common political associations (Cawthra 2004:28). The AU-UN emerging cooperation and partnership does not necessarily imply agreement on all issues but depicts development towards a common strategic vision on the African Peace and Security Architecture. The AU-UN approaches to regional approaches are discussed in line with the phases identified as follows:

2.2.1 Phase 1 (1990 to 1995)

The post Cold War period saw the international community of nations and International Relations academics and practitioners re-examining the role of the UN Security Council as the primary organ charged with the responsibility to maintain international peace and security. A system of multilateral approaches to international security intervention emerged under the auspices of the United Nations and regional organisations (Cawthra 2004:28).

Debate over how the United Nations could better cooperate with regional organisation escalated during the 1990's. The institutional cooperation between the OAU and UN witnessed some drastic and constructive changes (Andemicael 1994: 121- 122) like the establishment of norms for non intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes in Africa; and comprehensive approaches to peace making and peace-building. The nature of conflicts became increasingly intra-state though in many cases did not escalate to classical civil wars². Nevertheless, the instability generated by these conflicts had a destabilising impact on the immediate neighbourhoods of the affected states. Regional institutions in Africa and elsewhere were therefore called upon to play a greater role in resolving regional conflicts (Andrews & Holt 2007:1).

² Modern day Africa's inter-state conflicts tend to mainly destabilise the fragile state institutions of governance and are not manifesting themselves in formal army formations, loyal to parties in conflict, confronting each other in a conventional style.

In the 1992 Agenda for Peace Report to the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, broadly defines regional arrangements as having the potential to be utilised in serving preventative diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-making and post conflict peace-building functions (A/47/277-S/24111 of 1992: paragraph 17). The thrust of the report was to caution against absolute and exclusive sovereignty, and to call for a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world in safeguarding peace. The call breathed new life into Chapter VIII of the UN Charter governing the UN and especially the Security Council and the relationship with regional organisations in the maintaining of international peace and security. The decentralisation, delegation and cooperation that have emerged since the new approach to world peace and security, not only have allowed for burden-sharing but also contributed to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in international affairs (A/47/277-S/24111 of 1992: paragraphs 64-65).

Following the Agenda for Peace report, the UN system began validating the complementary roles played by regional agencies and arrangements in the prevention, management and resolution of violent or potentially violent conflict situations. Almost simultaneously, the African continent, through the Organisation of African Unity (predecessor to the African Union), had begun an institutional process to find remedies to the prolonged and destructive conflicts that threatened the cohesion and stability of many African states. In the post Cold War period, most of these conflicts assumed an intra-state character fueled by brutal ethnic, religious, social, cultural or linguistic strife. In 1993, the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Cairo Declaration on the Establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) whose primary objective was the anticipation and prevention of conflicts. The Declaration stipulated that in the event that conflicts degenerated to the extent of requiring collective international intervention and policing, the assistance or, where appropriate, the services of

the United Nations would be sought under the general terms of the UN Charter, especially Chapter VIII provisions (AHG/Decl.3/ (XXIX) 1993). Notwithstanding the weaknesses of the Mechanism in practice, the development led to rapprochement between the OAU and the UN. The African leadership began to view relationships with the UN as complementary, especially on problems that would be to Africa's advantage to have addressed at an international level (Francis et al 2005:104). The 1990s United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF), in consultation with the OAU, already identified focus on peace and security issues as essential for development (A/RES/46/152:1991).

2.2.2 Phase 2 (1996 to 2000)

The central thrust of this phase was the exploration of how the UN could best cooperate with the OAU/AU in seeking durable peace to the persisting conflict situations on the African continent. The potential of the regional and sub-regional institutions in Africa to ensure sustainable stability and peace in cases where responsibility is devolved in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter was put into focus.

Some African practitioners and technocrats in peacemaking were of the view that the OAU lacked efficient and effective institutional structure, managerial capacity and resources to manage peace operations properly. They contended that the peacekeeping task be left to the UN and the OAU role to be limited to preparation of African forces for the UN operations and to support UN efforts at peacekeeping (Andemicael 1994:119-138; Vogt 1999:3-4).

The United Nations theme of cooperation with Africa through its regional organisation was further explored in the 1998 UN Secretary General's Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. The document acknowledged that the United Nations would not always be the best answer to every problem in Africa but would make

a difference between peace and war (A/52/871-S/1998/318: paragraph 35). The UN Secretary General underscored the centrality and imperative for Africa and the international community to summon political will in confronting the challenge for peace and stability on the continent.

The 1998 UN Report on the Causes of Conflict in Africa was necessitated, *inter alia*, by the proliferation of intra-state conflicts, failure to protect civilians leading to humanitarian crises and the consequent threat that conflicts would reverse political and economic progress. The United Nations had to respond to the growing international perception of its neglect and failure in the wake of the 1992 Somali state collapse, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, 1989-97 Liberian conflict and the, then ongoing 1991-2000 Sierra Leone conflict (Francis, Faal, Kabia & Ramsbothan 2005: 90-96; Berman & Sams 2000: 30-38).

The complexities and challenges in the maintenance of international peace and security confronting the United Nations led former Secretary General Kofi Annan to appoint a panel of experts led by Lakhdar Brahimi in 2000 to advise on ways to manage the growing number and variety of UN missions (Moore and Pubantz 2006: 212). The recommendations of the Brahimi Report on the United Nations Peace Operations developed the strategic direction to ensure effective decision-making, rapid deployment, operational planning and support and the use of modern information technology to enhance the thrust and efficiency of UN operations (A/55/305 and S/2000/809). The Report urged the UN to seek means to share the peacekeeping burden through cooperation with regional and sub regional organisations. A note of caution (applicable to Africa) was sounded that regionalisation in peace operations was inherently problematic given disparities in resources and capabilities. African troops deployed in most crisis prone areas were often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping.

The respective UN General Assembly and the Security Council interpretation and understanding of the recommendations of the Brahimi Report were not

unanimous. The response from the two leading organs of the United Nations system, namely the General Assembly and the Security Council, reflected the fundamental suspicions that continue to overshadow North-South relations despite the thawing of the Cold War East-West dynamics. The North-dominated Security Council warmly acknowledged the report and approved its recommendations. The South-dominated General Assembly responded in a cautious and critical manner, and expressed apprehension about what it considered distortion of UN priorities by neglecting development objectives (Buo 2001:87-88). African views on the subject have presented a mixed and almost conflicting picture. Most of the African leadership bemoaned the perceived indifference of the international community, while others were determined to pursue African solutions to African problems through utilisation of sub-regional arrangements to address local peace operations (Buo 2001: 90-91; Moore & Pubantz 2006:213).

2.2.3 Phase 3 (2001 to 2004)

The beginning of the 21st century witnessed the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union and ushered in a New African Vision aimed at the regeneration of the continent. The question of maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent occupies an eminent place in the AU Constitutive Act. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act empowers the AU to intervene in a member State in respect to grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

The emerging relevance of regional organisations to conflict management and resolution emanated from the fact that the UN is vastly over-burdened and its capacity to realise its primary responsibility in the post-Cold War era is considerably limited (Francis 2006:94). Africa's commitment to the development of a peace and security architecture and to enhance cooperation with the United Nations was encapsulated in the 2002 Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of African Union. The AU Peace and Security

Council (PSC) is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, as well as a collective security and early warning arrangement. The tasks emanating from the notion of collective security in Africa are to:

- promote peace, security and stability;
- implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
- coordinate and harmonise continental efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism;
- develop a common defence policy and
- protect human rights (Field 2004:21)

The AUPSC, in realising its mandate, is directed to cooperate with the UN Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintaining of international peace and security.

The emerging relationship between the UN and regional organisations, especially the African Union, has been described through the usage of terms like cooperative security, task sharing, sharing security, co-deployment and burden sharing (Francis et al 2005: 51-56). The terminology seeks to convey a common understanding that the UN system and regional mechanisms endeavour to achieve international peace and stability through exploring each other comparative advantage. The divergent overall reaction to the Brahimi Report, referred to earlier, was not so much on substance, but rather on approach, detail and emphasis as the basic premise for the strengthening of the UN peace operations appears to enjoy broad support (Buo 2001:88).

The African Chiefs of Defence Staff of the African Union, in adopting the AU Policy Framework on the African Standby Force/Military Staff Committee (ASF/MSF) acknowledged the Brahimi Report recommendations as having far-reaching implications for regional peace support efforts (Exp/ASF-MSF/2(1)

2003).³ Areas singled out for improvement if the recommendations were to be implemented, were organisation, equipment, training, operational doctrine and capacities for mandate accomplishment. In reality the viability and sustenance of the mobilised and deployed sub-regional arrangements tend in the long term to depend on international donor contribution especially the United Nations system.

The new AU vision aimed at developing a continental peace and security architecture contributed to the United Nations issuing deliberate directives to the UN system into improving assistance in strengthening the institutional and operational capacity of the AU Peace and Security Council. The following areas were identified:

- development of the AUPSC's early warning system, including the Situation Room of the Peace and Security Directorate;
- training of civilian and military personnel, including a staff exchange programme;
- regular and continued exchange and coordination of information, including between the early warning systems of the two organizations;
- peace support missions of the African Union in its various member states, in particular in the area of communications and other related logistical support;

³ Guided by the 1993 Cairo Declaration and, subsequently the 2000 AU Constitutive Act and 2003 Peace and Security Council Protocol, the African Chiefs of Defence Staff conceptualised and approved a *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (Exp/ASF-MSC/2(1) 2003/2004). This initiative has since become the base mechanism for the AU peace support operations. The central approach called for the OAU/AU to undertake preliminary preventative action while preparing for more comprehensive action which would include the UN involvement. Throughout the Policy Framework on the ASF/MS, the AU initiative is presented as complementary and subsidiary to the UN Charter's provisions that guide regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.

- capacity-building for peace building before and after the termination of hostilities on the continent;
- support for the Peace and Security Council in taking humanitarian action on the continent in accordance with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; and
- establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (A/Res/59/213:2004).

The period after the terrorist attacks on US installations on 9 September 2001 ushered in a new range of security considerations and vulnerabilities, which saw international and regional organisations having to reconsider their strategies and alignment. The new security challenges led the international community into a critical review of collective security and realisation that no nation or region is an island by itself. The OAU/AU's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) programme urged that the building and strengthening of a peace and security mechanism was a sine qua non for Africa's development. The UN Security Council actions re-defined the threats to international peace and security to include elements hitherto considered as state sovereignty domain of responsibility, such as violation of human rights, domestic oppression, and terrorism. (Moore & Pubantz 2006: 184, 194).

Regional instability was elevated into one of the key indicators towards possible threat to international peace and security. It is against this backdrop that the 2004 UN Secretary General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change was convened. The Panel's Report outlined the following requirements:

- authorisation by the Security Council for all regional operations and in some urgent situations post facto;
- development of a formal consultation and cooperation framework ;
- on Africa, donor countries should make a commitment to a 10-year process of sustained capacity building support within the AU strategic framework;

- placing regional organisations capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping in the framework of the UN Standing Arrangement System;
- members States agreeing to allow the UN to provide equipment support from United Nations-owned sources to regional organisations, as needed; and
- amendment of the rules of the UN peacekeeping budget to give the UN the option on a case-by-case basis to finance regional operations authorised by the Security Council with assessed contributions (A/59/565 2004: paragraph 272).

The High Level Panel recommendations included strategies aimed at bolstering multilateralism and countering the numerous new security threats. A notable innovative element was putting on the agenda a debate on the link between development issues and security, as well as a focus to human security alongside the traditional military security approach (Adebayo and Scalon 2006:7). The 2004 UN General Assembly session adopted a resolution that reaffirmed the need to strengthen the synergies between Africa's economic and social development programmes and its peace and security agenda (A/Res/59/255:2004). The UN General Assembly noted the advancement in the development of the African peace and security architecture especially in prevention, settlement, mediation and resolution of conflicts with the establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council; and the enhanced coordination that ensures African initiatives are carried out in consultation and coordination with the United Nations and the clarification of roles in the subsequent implementation of mediated settlements.

The resolution endorsed the UN Secretary General's instruction to relevant agencies, departments and offices of the UN to explore new ways of collaborating with the African Union to boost its efforts in undertaking peace operations. Significantly, the resolution appealed to the international community, especially the donor countries and other development partners, to continue their

provision of technical and financial support to Africa in a coordinated and sustained manner.

2.2.4 Phase 4 (2005 to 2007)

The UN Secretary General Report entitled *In Larger Freedom*, in anticipation of the 2005 World Summit, responding to the High Level Panel on Threats recommendations, called for the establishment of an interlocking system of peacekeeping capacities that will enable the UN to work with relevant regional organisations in a predictable and reliable partnership. Since 1994 the UN Secretary General had been convening high-level meetings with regional organisations on peace and security issues, a practice which the Security Council also adopted in 2003. The 2005 World Summit was convened to review the implementation of the 2000 Millennium Declaration whose main goal is achieving human security based on twin aspects of development and security. The peace and collective security section of the World Summit Outcome resolution recognises that existing threats require collective and determined response, cooperation among principal UN organs, interlink and interdependence in today's world and that threats at global, regional and national level must be tackled in accordance with the UN Charter and international law. It reaffirmed commitment to work towards a security consensus based on the inter-linkage principle that development, peace, security and human rights are mutually reinforcing. The resolution further recognised regional organisations' contributions to peace and security as provided for under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, especially forging predictable partnerships and arrangements between the UN and regional organisations. Given the special needs of Africa, the resolution noted the importance of a strong African Union and explicitly expressed support of the European Union and other regional entities to the development of rapid deployment, standby and bridging arrangement capacities and the development and implementation of a UN ten-year plan for capacity-building with African Union (A/Res/60/1:2005).

The December 2005 UN Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa Seminar on cooperation between the United Nations and the African regional organisations in the field of peace and security allowed a broad consultative mechanism in the building up towards the signing of the November 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation in the field of peace and security. The seminar sought the establishment of consensual ground rules for the cooperation with regional organisations, especially in Africa, against background of UN Security Council Resolutions 1625 and 1631 (2005). Both resolutions, respectively, addressed the proposal for a 10-year capacity building for Africa, the determination to adopt measures that further cooperation with regional organisations in maintaining international peace and security and invited the Secretary General to present a report on the challenges and opportunities confronting the cooperation. The seminar made a critical assessment of the efficiency and effectiveness of African mechanism (s) for peace and security efficiency, as well as how the mechanism fits in the framework of the collective and security system established by the UN Charter.

The seminar concluded that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is developing as an integrated structure composed of sub-regional mechanisms and qualified to be part and parcel of the global collective security system established by the UN Charter. It called for particular attention to be paid to the following:

- critical undertaking for the reinforcement of the African peace and security architecture;
 - the principles and the priorities of cooperation in the field of peacekeeping;
 - the recommendations regarding the rules for the use of force and the full integration of the APSA in the system of collective peace and security established by the UN Charter and
 - structuring and streamlining of the cooperation and the capacity building.
- (S/2005/828)

In response to the UN Security Council Resolution 1631 (2005), the UN Secretary General tabled the 2006 Report on Challenges and Opportunities for Regional and Global Security Partnership. The Report underlined the importance of a new vision of global security that draws upon the resources and legitimacy of effective regional and global institutions. It urged for a clear division of labour between the UN and regional organisations, in close cooperation with the Security Council, and reflecting the comparative advantages of each organisation. An overview of the preceding decade reflected on the institutionalisation of the UN Secretary General's High-Level Meetings with heads of regional organisations on regular exchanges of views on issues of common concern. The July 2005 Sixth High-Level Meeting had established a standing committee to provide overall guidance to the process of creating a more structured relationship between the UN and regional organisations so that a genuine agreement based on comparative advantages can be realised.

Reporting to the UN General Assembly on the financing of the UN peacekeeping operations in conformity with the recommendations of the 2000 United Nations Panel on Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), the Secretary General outlined a reform strategy entitled "Peace Operations 2010". The 24th February 2006 report articulates a realistic road map towards an effective and coordinated UN peace operation concept. The reform strategy set out the policies and procedures to enable the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to support peacekeeping for the next decade. The reforms focused on five key areas:

- recruitment, preparation and retention of highly qualified personnel;
- development of a peacekeeping doctrine for the 21st century;
- establishment of frameworks for interactive partnerships (such as the Peace building Commission & Peace building Support Office);
- securing essential resources and capacity to improve peace; and
- establishment of integrated organisational structures at headquarters and in the field operations (A/60/696: 2006).

A milestone was reached in November 2006 when the UN Secretary General and the AU Commission Chairperson signed the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union. This development was to impact on the New Economic Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) which has hitherto been accepted as the blueprint of the UN cooperation and engagement in Africa, including issues of peace and security. The Declaration was premised on full recognition of the role regional organisations play in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, as well as relevant resolutions and presidential statements. It laid emphasis on the fast-tracking of conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peace keeping and peace building. A formal relationship and cooperation framework between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, which allowed UN capacitating Africa peacekeeping operations, was instituted. Integrated in the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation was the institutionalisation of the consultative process between the two executive officers, senior officials and talks (exchanges) at staff levels. The Declaration codified the consultative and cooperative framework between the African Union and the United Nations, as well as their respective subsidiary organs and agencies.

The operationalisation of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation prioritised the development and implementation of the African capacity on peace and security; and takes into account each other's (UN and AU) complementary capacities and comparative advantages. The 7th Regional Consultative Mechanism convened by the UN Economic Community for Africa (UNECA) to support NEPAD adjusted the workings of its interfacing clusters with the AU Commission to align with the ten-year programme and added a new cluster of peace and security. The Peace and Security Cluster led by the UN Liaison Office to the AU (on behalf of the UN Department of Political Affairs) and operated through three sub-clusters as follows: Peace and Security Architecture of the

African Union; Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development; and Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation. The African Union was well placed to understand the root causes of conflicts and to influence their prevention given its proximity and understanding the dynamics fueling the conflicts in the continent. The UN, on the other hand, abounded in capacity (technical and otherwise), resources (human and financial) and the disposition to better mobilise international community commitment, goodwill and support to the African peace and security architecture. The UNECA adopted the 2007-2009 Business Action Plan prioritising the needs of the African Union in peace, security and development.

The March 2007 UN Security Council special meeting on UN collaboration with African regional organisations, particularly the African Union, addressed the question of forging close and predictable collaboration and ensuring that UN meets its responsibility and obligation towards assisting the AU in its deployment of peacekeepers. The UN Secretary General was requested to develop specific proposals on how UN can better support arrangements for further cooperation and coordination on common security challenges with Chapter VIII organisations. The Secretary General was further tasked to promote the deepening and broadening of dialogue and cooperation between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (S/PRST/2007/7). The General Assembly, to operationalise the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, had earlier approved the establishment of the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team (AUPST) which came into effect in January 2007. This provided the necessary expertise and technical knowledge to the AU Peace Support Operations Division and others involved in peacekeeping. It focused its attention in three priority areas within the overall context of an integrated, inclusive and long-term approach: mission planning, mission management, and logistics and resources management (S/2008/186).

Closer operational cooperation and collaboration took place between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council (and Secretariats) with clearly defined procedures, among others, on information exchange, sharing experiences, best practices and lessons learned. Regionalism and its mechanism were recognised as component of multilateralism in the settlement of conflicts with emphasis that all enforcement action must be authorised by the Security Council.

The UN and AU began the practice of consultative meetings between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council, joint AU-UN field fact finding missions, and UN sponsored AU personnel training on peace and security norms, standards and operating procedures. Building on historical collaboration, especially in recent flashpoints like Sierra Leone, Liberia and Burundi, the Declaration Framework provided the legal basis for the conceptualisation of the joint peace operation in Darfur, better known as the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The so called hybrid joint operation was preceded by specially designed support packages to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). A detailed examination of the Darfur case study will be made in a later chapter of this paper.

2.2.5 Phase 5 (2008 to 2009)

Building on the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, the approach in the 2008 to 2009 phase sought to concretise the modalities in support of the peacekeeping operations in Africa. Both the African Union and the United Nations adopted an incremental approach to the development of the cooperation and partnership programme on peace and security in Africa. Forging of formal links was seen as a step towards enhancing the symbiotic partnership between the UN and the AU (Murithi 2006:256). While acknowledging the important role played by the African Union and its sub-regional security mechanisms in maintenance of peace and security in Africa, the UN Security Council continued to emphasise the need to strengthen the role of the United Nations in the

prevention of armed conflicts. Within this context, the African Union was urged to consider availing its capacity for the prevention of armed conflict or peacekeeping in the framework of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. The Security Council, through Resolution 1809 of 2008, undertook, *inter-alia*, to

- encourage continuing involvement of regional organisations in peaceful settlement of disputes, including through conflict prevention, confidence-building and mediation efforts;
- underline the importance of implementing the Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African, especially the operationalisation of the African Standby Force;
- call on the Secretariat in coordination with the African Union to develop a list of needed capacities and recommendations on ways the African Union can further develop military, technical, logistic and administrative capabilities;
- encourage cooperation between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission, including through supporting follow-up missions by the UN Secretariat staff to the AU Headquarters to provide further assistance, and share experiences;
- recognise the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations when undertaking peacekeeping under UN mandate, welcoming the creation of an African Union-United Nations panel to consider in-depth modalities of how to support such peacekeeping operations; and
- request the Secretary General to include in his regular reporting to the Security Council, assessments of progress on the cooperation between the United Nations and relevant regional organisations.

The endorsement by the UN Security Council of the setting up of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations was a significant progression in providing further clarity

in the UN and AU strategic relationship and cooperation framework, especially between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council. The Panel was tasked with exploring the possibility of enhancing the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing the UN mandated peace operations undertaken by the African Union. The Panel submitted far reaching recommendations impacting on the development of the AU capacity for peacekeeping, that is, its ability to respond to crises and the need for a capacity that is capable of promoting long-term stability on the continent. These were to be premised on a shared strategic vision that would minimise duplication of efforts and organisations working at cross purposes. The overall recommendations by the Panel can be summed-up as follows:

- the need for a formalised, clearly understood relationship between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission;
- encouraging the African Union to continue identifying and implementing appropriate structures and procedures, as well as ensuring that these are prioritised by capacity building partners;
- prioritisation of personnel training in areas of finance, logistics and administration;
- the need for funding mechanisms to support AU capacity building to be focussed at the continental level;
- establishment of a two pronged financial mechanism: based on voluntary funding and focused on capacity building; and another based on UN-assessed funding and designed to support peacekeeping operations;
- use of UN-assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis to support UNSC authorised AU peacekeeping operation for up to a six months period;
- development of an AU comprehensive plan for long-term capacity building, to be financed by a multi-donor trust fund;
- developing an African Union logistics capacity;
- consistent coordination between the AU and UN, allowing appropriate division of labour; and

- establishment of a joint United Nations/African Union team to examine the detailed modalities to support the recommendations (A/63/666 S/2008/813).

The Security Council requested the Secretary General to provide a detailed assessment of the above recommendations by the panel. In a report entitled 'Support to the African Union peacekeeping operations authorised by the United Nations' of 18th September 2009, the Secretary General underlines the importance of well considered peacekeeping operation and that it must be accompanied by a viable political strategy and a set of clear objectives (A/64/359-S/2009/470). The report provided an analysis on how to approach a long-term comprehensive capacity building plan, the creation of the multi-donor trust fund, coordination mechanism to address programmatic and administrative challenges impacting on both the African Union and the donors, and possible engagement with the African Union and partners on developing a harmonised administrative and financial management framework. An emphasis was made on the enhancement of the United Nations and African Union strategic relationship to ensure a clear and effective division of labour. This was to find expression in coherence of decision making on issues on the agenda of both organisations and shared understanding of mutual concerns. Both the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission are called upon to improve strategic and operational partnership in conflict analysis, strategy development and operational planning.

On the critical question of predictable, sustainable and flexible funding, the Secretary General underlined that the existing African Union financing mechanisms and methods had been inadequate and limited as reflected in recent operations in Burundi, Darfur and Somalia. He appealed for a proactive approach by the United Nations in which support packages were authorised early and receive all the required assets. The African Union was urged to maximise the effectiveness of voluntary contributions by considering the establishment of a standing flexible trust fund within the framework of the African

Peace Fund. The United Nations would assist the African Union with financial management and oversight of the trust fund and simultaneous building of capacity. African peacekeeping funding has benefited from a combination of various funding mechanism, namely UN logistics support packages (assessed contributions); voluntary contributions channeled through UN trust fund; and bilateral funding and support arrangements (A/64/359-S/2009/470). The AU was to continue to explore sustainable means for the peace funding including an increase of the percentage drawn from its assessed contribution and encouraging generosity from member states on voluntary contributions.

Building institutional capacity for peacekeeping operations was identified as key in the management, support and strategic planning functions. Expert support would be provided to the AU Peace and Security Department capacity in training, mission planning, military, civilian police, logistics, information technology and finances. This was linked to the immediate peacekeeping demands and the long-term goal of operationalising the African Standby Force of the African Union. The assistance was to be built around the following principles as reiterated in the UN Secretary General Report:

- consultation prior to deployment of a AU peacekeeping operation for which the UN Secretariat support may be needed;
- requirement identification by the AU and driven by the AU Commission capacity to absorb assistance;
- UN support to be provided within the context of concurrent demands to support UN field operations;
- African Union to ultimately develop a capacity that is best suited to its own needs; and
- UN technical assistance provision by the highest calibre personnel with current field experience in Africa based peacekeeping operations.

2.3 Summary

The immediate post Cold War period witnessed a progressive increase in UN peace operations in Africa surpassing the number of deployments in the preceding forty years of the existence of the United Nations. From 1990 to 2009, the UN and the AU individually and collectively continued to explore a common understanding on how cooperation can be enhanced towards the goal of peace, security and stability in Africa. The complementary and comparative advantage of each organisation was validated in the endeavour to prevent, manage and resolve violent and potentially violent conflict situations. Mutually set out objectives evolved and a framework for coordination took shape over the years. From the 1993 OAU Cairo Declaration on the Establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, a deliberate framework for institutional cooperation emerged. Lessons were drawn from the changing nature of conflicts in Africa, the importance of collective security and early warning arrangements.

Regional stability was elevated into one of the key indicators of possible threats to international peace and security. The international community recognised regionalism as a necessary component of multilateralism in the maintenance of peace and security in the world. Notable in this regard was the July 2005 Sixth High Level Meeting that established a standing committee to provide guidance to the process of creating a more structured relationship between the UN and regional organisations. By 2009, the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation had come to provide the legal framework that guided the interaction between the UNSC and the AU PSC, the UN Secretariat and AU Commission, as well as other subsidiary agencies. Annual consultations and exchanges have since taken place between the executives and staff of the two primary bodies responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. There is improved strategic and operational consultation in conflict analysis, strategy development and operational planning. The challenge remains in ensuring the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of funding to AU peace operations.

The on-going process points to the urgent need to develop a programme of action that would allow breaking the identified priorities into doable tasks. An incremental approach to the development of the cooperation and partnership programme is in place and emphasises the symbiotic nature of the relationship. The next chapter will examine in detail the agreed AU-UN framework of cooperation established for the ten-year (2006-16) capacity building programme for the African Union.

Chapter 3: 2006 Cooperation Framework and the enhancing of the AU peace and security capacity

“Even in a future situation in which various roles of partner organizations are clarified, the partnership (with the UN) will not be effective if the vast discrepancy in the capacities of the regional organizations around the world is allowed to continue”⁴

3.1 Introduction

Contemporary literature indicates that almost seventy-five percent of conflict situations and the bulk of current peace operations on the agenda of the UN Security Council are in Africa. The cyclic nature of these conflicts and absence of coherent intervention mechanisms has had a devastating impact on the socio-economic development of the continent. It is therefore not accidental that the 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) identified the lack of an international common strategy and benchmarks on post-conflict reconstruction as a challenge to the eradication of poverty. It is against this background that the United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome Document called for the prioritisation of capacity building in Africa.

This chapter examines the institutionalisation of the UN and AU cooperation towards enhancing the AU peace and security capacity. It explores the infancy phase in a codification process that seeks to entrench regionalism as an important component of multilateralism in managing the international peace and security challenges. The guiding strategic document is the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union. It prioritises the AU capacity building efforts with special focus on peace and security for the period 2006 to 2009 in line with the AU Strategic Plan for the stability and development of the African continent.

⁴ Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in *A Regional-Global Security Partnership – Challenges and Opportunities*, 2006:17

The endeavour towards AU's ownership and leadership in the implementation of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation will ensure that it confronts concrete challenges emanating from field operational experience. An evaluation is made of the development of capacity and capability within the following component elements of peace and security: conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peace-building (post-conflict reconstruction and development). These components are a united whole and are only divided for analytic purposes. An understanding of the UN contribution to the institutional memory building within the AU allows an appreciation of the mutual complementarity in ensuring the stability of the continent.

3.2 Brief overview of the African Peace and Security Architecture

The AU adopted the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2002 as the base and framework of an African collective security system provided for in the AU Peace and Security Council Protocol. The African Union in developing this architecture remains conscious that the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security lies with the UN Security Council. Its role is complementary and is aimed at ameliorating the immediate impact of conflict situations upon the countries on the receiving end, especially the civilian population. Article 17 of the PSC Protocol stipulates that the AU will cooperate and work closely with the UN Security Council, maintain close and continued interaction between the African Union Commission (AUC) Chairperson and the UN Secretary General and have recourse to the UN to provide necessary financial, logistic and military support. An important innovation by the Protocol from an African perspective is the encouragement of the non-governmental organisations, community based and other civil society organisations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa (Article 20). This is a radical break from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) tradition that used to consider the civil society in its various formations as a threat and not a partner in peace building.

The APSA component parts are the Peace and Security Council (including Regional Mechanisms), Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. The PSC objectives include promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa, anticipation and prevention of conflicts, and the promotion of peace building and post conflict reconstruction. The UN Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa ably summed-up the APSA essence as being premised on placing the continent under permanent observation and interpretation of any signals that may be symptomatic of a simmering crisis thereby triggering off remedial action (S/2005/828).

The United Nations 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, in authorising the development of a ten-year capacity-building programme for the African Union, resolved that regional organisations having the capacity for conflict prevention or peacekeeping should consider the option of placing such capacities in the UN Standby Arrangement framework (S/2006/719). The United Nations and African Union cooperation in the complex multilateral system is predicated within the framework of the Charter and the purpose of the United Nations. The African Union is recognised as major stakeholder in African regional peace and security situation given its close proximity to root causes of the threats. The United Nations, through this measure, had reached a principled acknowledgement of the critical role the AU plays and laid a firm basis for effective partnership based on a clear division of labour. The African leadership on its part, through the 2000 AU Constitutive Act and 2002 PSC Protocol, committed itself to building a capacity to react to potential conflicts and entrenched the AU right to intervene in any member state in the event of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. These two factors demonstrate that UN-AU cooperation in enhancing the AU capacity and capability goes beyond mediation, peace-keeping, peace building, conflict prevention and resolution.

The ten-year capacity building programme is a UN overall strategic framework for cooperation. The study reviews the Framework implementation after only three years of its existence, but noted that it was adapting to emerging challenges and thus assisting the AU Commission to develop action plans to improve its operational focus and efficiency. The implementation included aspects like institution- building; human resources development and financial management; human rights; political, legal and electoral matters; social, economic cultural and human development; food security and environmental protection. The latter aspects are, however, only included in this analysis whenever it allows for a better focus on peace and security collaboration theme.

3.3 Conflict Prevention

At the core of both the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act, is the ideal of arresting disputes in their formative stages and avoid having them exploding into fully blown conflicts. Lund (1997:3) defines conflict prevention as actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken to avoid the threat or use of armed forces and related coercive instruments, by states, as a way to settle political conflicts that can arise from destabilising effects of economic, social, political and international change. The UNSC in its continued endeavour to maintain international peace and security and informed by the growing role of regional organisations as immediate situations stabiliser mechanisms adopted guidelines on its role in the prevention of armed conflict in Africa. The UNSC Resolution 1625 of 2005 emphasises the importance of establishing effective comprehensive strategies of conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of armed conflicts and political and social crises. Closely linked is preventative diplomacy geared towards preventing disputes from arising between parties, existing ones from escalating into conflicts and minimise the spread of conflicts.

The signing of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation Document by the AU Chairperson and the UN Secretary General precipitated the birth of the African Union Peacekeeping Support Team in January 2007 under the

auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. This capacity acts as a mechanism for the provision of necessary expertise, logistical support and transfer of technical knowledge to the AU Peace Support Operations Division (Clement & Smith 2009:9). The UN Security Council, through the Presidential Statement of the 28 March 2007, reaffirmed the important role of regional organisations in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It underlined the importance of supporting and improving in a sustained way the resource base and capacity of the African Union (S/PRST/2007/7). It is within this context that a follow-up UNSC Mission visited the AU Headquarters in June 2007 to exchange views on wider African situations of interest and on how best to maximise the relationship.

The two bodies have since developed a stronger and structured relationship aimed at sharing information on conflict situations on the agendas of both and facilitating support to the African Union in areas such as planning and logistics. Joint meetings of the UNSC and AUPSC are annually held alternatively in Addis Ababa and New York in order to sustain viable interaction (S/2007/421:29). Prevention and management of conflicts, including increased field cooperation and flow of information between the UN and AU/Regional Economic Committees (RECs), is given special attention by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA). The practice is mutually reinforcing as the AU has a comparative advantage in better understanding the root causes of regional conflicts and the UN is able to provide both the material and political clout in addressing conflict situations. The dynamism of UNSC-AUPSC collaboration finds expression in a development of the last five years wherein the African region's rotating members of the UNSC and the AU Observer Mission to the United Nations facilitates, at the AU's behest, the convening of sessions dedicated to peace and security issues in Africa and exploring modalities for improved collaboration. The AUPSC, as a rule, shares with the UNSC, relevant communiqués on the outcomes of its sessions on areas of mutual interest (PSC/PR/Comm (CLLXXVIII) 2009).

The UN Secretariat and the AU Commission are exploring the development of dedicated follow-up mechanisms which would also make detailed preparation for principals meetings and monitor implementation (A/64/359-S/2009/470:3). The improved strategic communication between the UNSC and AUPSC has a positive effect on respective subsidiary entities notes the AUPST 10th Regional Coordinating Mechanism report (2009:4-6). Training programmes aimed at strengthening the substantive and operational capability of the AUPSC Secretariat are implemented by the Security Council Affairs Division. The training programmes held in Nairobi (2007) and New York (2008) focused on the working methods of the Security Council and the activities of the Division itself. The UN Development Programme provided funds for the recruitment and training of political analysts manning the secretariat of the AU Peace and Security Department. The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) is tasked with the coordination of UN headquarters peace and development towards greater synergy and coherence. Its review of the recommendations of the 1998 Report on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa – contribution to triennial review of the ten year programme - called for an integrated engagement beyond the peace and security to progressively strengthen fragile state institutions.

The leadership of both organisations is, at strategic level, in constant consultation to ensure the achievement of peace and stability objective in Africa and ensures coherent decision making. The successful UN support packages for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), its transformation to the UN-AU Hybrid Peace operation and the support office to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) owe much from such strategic consultation. Arising from the recommendation of the 2008 AU-UN Panel on modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations, the UN Secretary General and the AUC Chairperson have agreed in 2009 to set up a joint task team on peace and security to review immediate and long-term strategic and operational issues. Its formal launch is scheduled for

2010. The said task team will meet twice a year at UN Under-Secretaries-General and relevant AU Commissioners level. The AU Commission and UN Secretariat are maintaining a structured close interaction at executive, departmental and desk levels on prevention and management of conflicts (A/64/359-S/2009/470:4). A concerted effort is in place to promote all-round involvement of AU regional peace and security mechanisms as building blocks closer to the ground.

Joint UN-AU discussions seek to ensure a common understanding of conflict situations, joint identification of intervention needs and the necessary skills development where deficiencies exist. Desk-to-desk consultations between the UN Department of Political Affairs and the AU Peace and Security Department are a practical expression in the capacity building programme. Drawing lessons from each other's experience is an important element in the cooperation and capacity building framework. It has become a practice for all AU organs to involve relevant UN institutions in forums addressing specialised themes, including the special or extraordinary sessions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on resolution of conflicts on the continent. One such forum was the 30-31 August 2009 Tripoli Special Session on Resolution of Conflicts in Africa that urged an acceleration in the implementation of the AU Policy Framework on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (SP/ASSEMBLY/PS/Decl. AU 2009). The Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation provides guidelines for policies and strategies to consolidate peace promote sustainable development and enable growth and regeneration in countries and regions emerging from conflict.

The interactive cooperation between the two international and regional organisations charged with responsibility to maintain peace and security is to be understood within the context of the current multilateral diplomacy challenges. Peace operations in Africa are mostly taking place in environments wherein there are no ceasefire agreements and are entry points to stabilising conflict

situations. The UN is not always willing to provide massive resources needed in the deployment of contingents with a complex and multidimensional mandate in Africa. The AU conflict prevention initiatives has raised expectations despite the stark reality that the AU is wholly dependent on external role-players and partners to assist in addressing critical capacity gaps and provide much – needed cash (Neethling 2008:17). The AU's political will and commitment to early containment of conflicts bestows the continental organisation high moral ground as it assumed the lead in arresting African conflicts.

3.4 Mediation and Good Offices

Mediation and usage of good offices is a cornerstone for the peacemaking process defined by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:4) as the action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The importance of managing the peacemaking process is identified in the 2005 AU Memorandum of Prospects for Effective UN-AU Cooperation which underlined that necessary action would have to be taken not to allow crises to degenerate into conflicts and wars. Mediation is an important cork in the sustenance of security and stability in the continent and according to Nathan (2005:3) it demands an in-depth comprehension of the political and psychological dynamics that makes parties fiercely resistant to negotiations.

Preventative diplomacy has a potential to save the continent unnecessary bloodshed as emergent crises are timeously identified, thus allowing mobilisation of local, national, regional and international mechanisms into intervening (ACCORD 2009:21). The UNSC acknowledges the importance of continually engaging the potential and existing capacities and capabilities of the UN Secretariat and regional organisations in preventative diplomacy including mediation (S/PRST/2010/14).

The approach employed in the AU-UN mediation partnership is not restricted only to capacitating the AU but in also extends to developing a joint AU-UN mediation plan. The two organisations have created an environment to share mediation knowledge and expertise. Almost every mediation effort in Africa has benefitted from some level of cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations; and sub-regional organisations or groups and the United Nations (ACCORD 2009:21). The recent major pilot programme took off the ground through the 2007 AU-UN Joint Mediation Team on the Darfur Crisis led by the AU and UN Special Envoys, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliasson. The initiative brought about a platform for coordination and convergence of all Darfur mediation programmes under the African Union and the United Nations. An implementation team, known as the AU-UN Joint Mediation Support Team, provided technical and professional backstopping to the process. Building on the experience, the UN Secretary General's Report to the Security Council (S/2008/186) made far reaching recommendations that enhanced AU mediation, *inter alia*, by providing training and ensuring the development of specific modules on political analysis and mediation techniques; helping to identify areas of possible financial support for small a secretariat with research capacity and establishing a database of African mediators.

The UN Department of Political Affairs, through the Mediation Support Unit, and the African Union have agreed on three approaches to training:

- Participation of the African Union and African regional economic communities in United Nations tailored early warning and conflict prevention courses
- Annual training of AU staff and that of regional economic communities in political analysis
- Development of specific mediation training programme for the African Union and regional economic communities (S/2008/186).

The AU-UN Mediation scored some successes in Comoros, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania and Niger, as well as in the ongoing mediation efforts

in the Darfur region of the Sudan and Madagascar. Some in-depth analysis and review, institutionalisation and consolidation of some specific processes and mechanisms of mediation remain outstanding. This has encouraged the convening of two Lessons Learnt Workshops in Nairobi, Kenya, in April and August 2009 (AUPST RCM 2009:4-5). The key objective of the workshops was: contributing to the developing AU-UN mediation partnerships and establishing a common set of policy, strategic and operational guidelines on AU-UN cooperation during the various stages of the mediation process. In comparison to human and economic crisis associated with violent conflicts and the consequent financial costs of peacekeeping operations, developing the AU's mediation capacity and expertise would be an inexpensive venture (Nathan, 2009:15).

Arising from this symbiotic interaction, the UNDP, AU Commission and other Partners have finalised a Work Programme for 2009-2011: Enhancing the AU Mediation Capacity. The programme benefited from a Seminar on the same theme convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (16-17 October 2009) which considered the report commissioned by the UN DPA on the Plan of Action to build the AU's Mediation Capacity. Nathan (2009:2), author of the plan, proposed that the AU adopt a strategic approach to mediation based on the following principles:

- Parties owning the agreement;
- Mediation and negotiations to be inclusive of all significant political actors;
- Involvement of civil society in the mediation and negotiations;
- Mediators assisting parties develop a relationship of trust and cooperation;
- Mediation as a non threatening venture for parties;
- Impartiality of mediators;
- Non seeking of quick fix solutions in deep rooted conflicts;
- Addressing root causes of conflicts;
- Flexible, creative, responsive and adaptive mediation; and

- Drafting and implementation of peace agreements to be properly linked.

The programme advocates the creation of an AU Mediation Unit and a databank on AU mediators and technical mediation experts. This and other initiatives will contribute tremendously to the development of an AU mediation mechanism in close collaboration with the United Nations.

An important instrument in the AU mediation arsenal, albeit still in its infancy, is the Panel of the Wise (POW) launched in January 2007. The PSC Protocol mandates the POW to: advise the AUPSC and AUC Chairperson on issue pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa; and at the request of the Council or AUC Chairperson or its own initiative, undertake such action as deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Council and the chairperson for the prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa (Articles 11(3) & 11(4)). The UN Department of Political Affairs contributed the necessary expertise in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the Panel of the Wise and the setting up on an appropriate Secretariat. Much remains to be done in nurturing the POW and ensuring its effective interaction with the Peace and Security Council and other AU constituent organs. It is an evolving framework for AU mediation. The inaugural POW members had only held one formal session (6 March 2009) with the Peace and Security Council before its mandate expired early 2010. A Panel of the Wise Lessons Learnt workshop would be appropriate to ensure development of the necessary institutional memory.

3.5 Peacekeeping

The period since 2000 witnessed a new proactive approach by the OAU/AU leadership in search of new and effective ways to address the increasing conflict situation in the continent. The UN began acknowledging the important contribution by regional organisations to international efforts to assist states in transition from armed conflict to sustainable peace. Prior to the 2005 World

Summit Outcome, the African Union already featured prominently among the regional organisations that have collaborated politically, engaged in joint operations and co-deployment⁵ with the United Nations in peacekeeping operations. Consequently, the Secretary General in a seminal report on regional-global security partnership (A/61/204-S/2006/590) preceding the Declaration Enhancing AU-UN Cooperation recommended as follows:

- Promotion of regional organisations capacity, especially in Africa, for effective action undertaken within the framework of the Security Council's primary responsibility for peace and security
- Targeting of capacity building efforts, including common standards on the principles and practice of peacekeeping
- Reinforcement of a collective approach to security in line with the UN Charter.

It is thus not accidental that the theme of UN mandated peace operations by the African Union is occupying such a central place in the discourse on management of peace and stability in Africa. Since the pronouncement by the Secretary General above, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) has remained engaged with the AU Peace Support Operations Division (AUPSOD) to define both AU specific assistance requirement and the UN contribution.

The roots for UN involvement in assisting the development of the AU capabilities in peace support missions and peacekeeping operations pre-dates the signing of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation. The report of the 2000 Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report) identified deficiencies and gaps in the capacity of the UNDPKO to plan, deploy, and conduct peacekeeping operations (A/55/305/2000/809) and called for a focus on capacity challenges for regional organisations and their contribution to UN led operations. Lessons were drawn from the Cote d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone

⁵ In case of co-deployment there is separate strategic authority, as well as command and control, while joint operations has a greater degree of integration of operational command and control measures

experiences wherein, *inter alia*, two UNSC permanent members (UK and France) opted for selective engagement rather than operating under the UN flag.

The AU on its part has always understood its role in peacekeeping as complementary to the UN which is responsible for international peace and security. At the January 2002 UNSC Public Meeting entitled “The situation in Africa”, Amara Essy, then OAU Secretary General, informed the UNSC that the OAU intends reviewing the structures, procedures and working methods of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and appealed for better streamlined cooperation between the two organisations. Already a trend was developing in which the AU or its sub-regional organisations deployed peace operations without awaiting UNSC authorization in response to deteriorating humanitarian crisis (De Coning 2006:6). The OAU/AU engagement with the UN led to the UN agreeing in principle to provide political and logistical support before the UNSC authorise full scale responsibility for the conflict situation in question.

The AUPSC in 2003 deployed the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) which was later transformed into the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) in 2004. Prior to mission transformation, the AU and UN operated alongside in the political process with the UN taking a proactive stance by offering resources to AMIB from its Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). This coordination between the AU and the UN in Burundi created a new type of relationship between the two organisations in peace operations. The AU-UN collaboration adapted to the various phases of the Burundi peace process like the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme for ex-combatants. By 2006 the ONUB transformed into the UN Integrated Office in Burundi whose mandate was the management of the transition to the post-conflict reconstruction and development (peace-building). The UN-AU cooperation framework has drawn lessons from this experience. The international community embracement and subsequent UNSC acquiesce to

collaborate with AMIS and AMISOM reflects acceptance that the AU can and should deploy in advance to an UN peace operations given its proximity to situation on the ground. The launch of the African Security Architecture, especially the AUPSC, brought to the fore the urgency to build the support pillars, *inter alia*, Continental Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. The peacekeeping capacity building task of the UN also focuses on these two support pillars.

Continental Early Warning System

An Early Warning System is a vital instrument for the enhancing of the conflict preventative mandate and broadly the overall African Peace and Security Architecture. The UN DPKO has availed its early warning system model to the AU Conflict Management Centre to adapt it to its needs. The main thrust of the UN Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology Handbook is on developing the information assessment and analysis methodology to ensure a useful end product for use by the policy makers. The emerging Continental Early Warning System is linked to the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms through the Situation Room, allowing an integrated and multi-resourced mechanism. However, Fanta (2009:9) observes that there is no system yet for liaising to allow efficient coordination in early detection of emerging crises and policy formulation in prevention measures.

African Standby Force

The African Standby Force (ASF) is a multi-disciplinary contingent force of the African Union responsible for the deployment of peace support missions and any other interventions authorised by the AU Peace and Security Council. The ASF concept development, implementation and training of personnel benefit from the expertise of the UN especially its Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support. The priority lies in the development of the AU capacity for planning, deploying and managing peace support missions, including financial and logistics management. It draws from the OAU/AU peace

operations experience accumulated over the years especially in the AU missions in Burundi, DR Congo, Somali and the Sudan. The UN brought more flexible management and transparency to AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and reinvigorated the working procedures and norms within the AU Peace Operations Support Division.

During May 2009, the UNDPKO facilitated a senior level retreat for AU and its regional capabilities in Kigali, Rwanda. Its key objective was to develop a cadre of senior leaders for future AU missions as part of the ASF training and implementation plan (AUPST RCM 2009:8). The enhancing of capacity is notable in information exchange, sharing of lessons, development of mechanisms to monitor readiness and training capacity. Technical advice is provided in the ASF development of the military, police and logistics spheres, as well as current operations. Four AU regional standby forces are in an advanced operational stage in ASF training and implementation of the regional plan with the exception of the Northern (Maghreb) region. The litmus test on registered progress will be established post the 2010 Amani Africa Training Exercise. The latter takes place within the context of the African Union- European Union Strategic Partnership.

The support to current missions has significantly improved, reflecting AU's internalisation of standard operating principles as it relates mainly to finance, logistics, human resources and procurement. Direct coordination between the AUPSOD and UNDPKO contributes expertise and professional planning capacity among the AU staff. This finds expression in improved AU management of current operations like AMISOM and UNAMID, the crises in Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry, Kenya, and Madagascar. The year 2007 marked a significant phase in the peace missions' support and collaboration by the United Nations Security Council:

- Legitimisation of AMISOM and provision of military planners through an assistance cell based at the AU headquarters (S/Res/1744 of February 2007)
- Official authorising the deployment of UNAMID in July 2007 (S/Res 1769 of July 2007)
- June 2007, the UN General Assembly's Special Committee noted that logistic and financial support to the AU rapid deployment capability is of primary importance in strengthening the African peacekeeping capacity.

Despite the complexity of the political military situation in Somalia, the assistance cell has matured into the UN Support Office to AMISOM (UNSOA) which oversees logistics, personnel training and other related needs. A UN Support Office Trust Fund for AMISOM facilitates the reimbursement of Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) for contingent owned equipment. The UN does not have a logistic base wherein equipment can be sourced and TCCs (Burundi and Uganda), had to commit own equipment or enter into bilateral agreements with donor countries.

The UNSC continues to explore the modalities to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing regional organisations, especially the African Union, when they undertake peacekeeping under the UN authority. This is firmly on the UNSC agenda through UN Resolution 1809 (2008) which endorsed the setting up of the African Union-United Nations Panel to consider the modalities of supporting African Union peacekeeping operations. Compiling the Report, the Panel consulted broadly with the African Union and other stakeholders on the continent. The UNSC pronouncements emphasise the importance of effective strategic relationship between itself and the AUPSC, and between the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission. Arising from the UN Secretary General report on support to AU Peacekeeping Operations (A/64/359/S/2009/470), the UN committed itself to help the AU Commission develop a broad, inter-departmental, long-term capacity-building roadmap. A mutual comprehension of relations between the two organs as based on the

principle of subsidiarity and complementarity has to be properly managed. By the end of December 2009, the African Union Commission was in an advance stage in its internal reconfiguration in order to ensure developing institutional memory.

The key challenge for the African Union peacekeeping is securing sustainable predictable and flexible financing especially for those peace operations authorised by the UNSC. According to De Conning (2010:16) the single most important factor when considering the future of peace operations in Africa is the cost, and how they to be financed. Achieving clearly set out objectives and expectations cannot rely on voluntary contributions from international partners and the UN itself, the UNSC has to move beyond keeping all options open, it must ensure predictable and sustainable funding through UN assessed contributions. The situation is made worse by the current international financial crisis and to what some refer to as 'donor fatigue'. Many pledging international conferences have been convened for the Darfur region of Sudan, post conflict reconstruction and development in Sudan and the Somali deteriorating humanitarian situation but committed financial pledges have not been realised.

3.6 Peace-building

In his Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) underlined that peacemaking and peace-keeping operations would be successful if they include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and wellbeing among people. The statement drew the attention of the international community to the pivotal role peace-building can play as a peace consolidating mechanism wherein all those involved in post-conflict reconstruction develop medium and long-term sustainable institutions. The World Summit Outcome, cognisant of the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict created the UN Peacebuilding Commission

(PBC) as an inter-governmental advisory body (A/RES/60/1 of 2005: paragraph 97).

The foundation for sustainable post-conflict peace-building is laid during the peacekeeping phase as a prelude to national reconciliation and consolidating the fragile post-war peace situation. Dr A. Sarjoh Bah (2009:2) observed at a Symposium on Sustainable Peacebuilding: Regional Approaches and Pivotal States that peace-building is essentially a political process and, therefore, should not be approached as a technical process. The AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) adopted in 2006 is informed by the OAU/AU past experience in attempts to consolidate peace, promote sustainable development, and stabilise governance institutions of countries and regions emerging from conflict. The mandate is proffered by Articles 3a and 6 of the PSC Protocol which state, *inter alia*, that it is created to promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities and to consolidate and prevent the resurgence of violence (PCRD 2006: paragraph 5). The Banjul AU Executive Council resolved to institute the PCRD Unit within the AU's Conflict Management Center to provide political support and mobilise all the necessary and available resources for the implementation of the policy (AU EX.CL/274(IX) 2006).

Africa's conflict prone regions in West Africa (Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone & Liberia), the Great Lakes Region (Burundi) and the Horn of Africa (South Sudan) became immediate natural focus areas for the reconstruction and development project. The Executive Council decided that the PCRD Unit shall interface with the UN Peace-building Commission and be supported by the relevant units within the AUC through the Peace and Security Department. The formation of both the AU PCRD Unit and the UN PBC is rooted in the Chapter VIII of the UN Charter which outlines the role of regional organisations in the settlement of international disputes. The latter's immediate continent of call became Africa wherein it had to assist in building capacity for planning,

coordination, oversight and implementation of strategic peace-building and post conflict reconstruction programmes (2008:S/20008/186: paragraph 80).

The proactive interfacing between the AU PCRDC and the UN Peace-building Commission can be considered as an important tool in implementing an exit strategy in peacekeeping. Durable peace demands an effective and efficient handling of the competing agendas of the multi-dimensional agencies and donors especially in the current period of scarce resources. The integrating of international and regional approaches to reconstruction plays a valuable role in promoting productive national dialogue and understanding in post conflict societies. As civil societies organisations engage in the process, they gradually develop and nurture a group stake in peace-building, reconciliation and healing by addressing what they perceive as root causes of conflicts (Ragumamo 2009:7).

Burundi and Sierra Leone, as pioneering UN PBC focus of attention, are the well documented case studies of UN-AU collaboration and coordination in peace building efforts. Enormous international attention was given to consolidation of peace and the international donor community provided funds that contributed in reviving the collapsed states apparatus. In both situations the potential spoilers (FNL in Burundi and RUF in Sierra Leone) were persuaded and won over into participating in the reconstruction and reconciliation process. The principled approach of not only focusing on the state/governmental institutions but also to consulting and mobilising a broad spectrum of stakeholders (ex-belligerents and civil society) into contributing to the situation not relapsing into conflict again. In Southern Sudan, the AU-UN collaboration is pivotal to the rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for returnees (refugees and internal displaced persons), basic infrastructure development (socio-political and economic), as well the training of civil service core. The successful evolution of the pending 2011 Referendum in Southern Sudan and Abyei Region Status has potential for a lesson to be learnt in management of

transition through peacekeeping and peace-building towards identifying the opportune moment to withdraw and allow 'normal' development.

The UN Offices of High Commissions for Refugees and Human Rights (Africa) provide multi-faceted support in information sharing, policy research and development, fundraising, etc. They assisted in the development of the African Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons adopted by the October 2009 AU Special Summit on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons held in Kampala, Uganda. The UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights closely collaborates with the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in developing a comprehensive human rights strategy for Africa (AUPST RCM 2009:13). A Consultative Experts Meeting was held in Arusha, Tanzania, in November 2009 on the draft roadmap for the development and adoption of an Africa-wide human rights strategy.

3.7 Practical challenges to AU-UN peace cooperation

The AU-UN peace cooperation faces criticism emanating from various factors on the ground, as well as inherent contradictions and tensions between the structures and personnel of each organisation. The UNSC is criticised for its delay in responding to African crisis and the failure of the permanent members to deploy troops for African peacekeeping operations. The trend is traceable to the aftermath of 1993 UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) and the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The US contingent was humiliated by the Somali fighters under Farah Aideed and forced to make a hasty withdrawal despite the, then, continuing humanitarian disaster. In Rwanda, the French contingent is alleged to have focused on protection and evacuation of European nationals instead of stopping the genocide unleashed against the Tutsi ethnic group. Alao (2000:18-19) cites some of the criticisms against the UN as follows:

- The UN agencies are handicapped by bureaucratic restrictions that delay timely decision making;

- Over-coordination that result in arguments over who has a final say on specific operations;
- Reluctance to accept instruction or advise from OAU/AU which is familiar with local dynamics;

The weaknesses of the OAU/AU are highlighted by Olinisakin (2000:83-96) as follows:

- The UN is invited to intervene in conflicts which have reached crisis stage due to the OAU/AU ineffectiveness in containing and managing them;
- African regional organisation tend to be corrupted and sometimes aggravate crises in order to maximise material gain from crises; and
- Inherent problems with African conflict resolution strategies that make resolution difficult due to structural setups or leadership and management capability.

Peace-building in the post Cold War milieu in Africa is confronting multiple challenges which demand commitment and action from donors and strategic role players. In the presentation by Dr A. Sarjoh Bah (2009:2-4) referred to earlier, six such challenges are identified as follows:

- Ensuring coordination and coherence among the various actors;
- Inability of the UN and others to revamp the economies of post-conflict countries;
- Emergence of new security threats such as drug trafficking and other transnational criminal networks;
- Dealing with transitional justice especially in the era of International Criminal Court (ICC);
- Broader governance issues including security sector reform, public administration and public finance management; and
- Sustaining international commitment in the face of the current global financial and economic crises.

The above underscores that institutionalisation of peace-building is taking place within a complex international climate. There are multiple actors involved with conflicting agendas which limits focus on root causes and strategic issues. Both the UN and regional organisations have not yet developed common benchmarks. This situation leads, in most cases, to premature withdrawals as was the case with Angola in the early part of the decade when the country relapsed back into conflict situation. The weakness of state apparatus and desperation for foreign investments provides an opportunity for transnational crime syndicates to exploit the situation with terrible consequences for the country is question. The memory of Guinea-Bissau political tragedy is still fresh. Partnership should be designed from the outset to support and complement national efforts and be responsive and adaptable to realities on the ground. Satisfying national and regional expectations for justice and reconciliation must not be juxtaposed against the demands of some international conventions.

3.8 Conclusion

The three years implementation of the “Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity: Building Programme for the African Union” is a short period in the implementation of international conventions. The institutionalisation of the UN-AU partnership contributes to the developing African Peace and Security Architecture and avails UN resources and expertise to the African Union and its sub-regional mechanism. The current and potential conflict situation in the continent is under permanent observation and acted upon as the situation evolves. The enhancing of the AU capacity and capability goes beyond mediation, peace building, conflict prevention and resolution as a multidisciplinary and integrative approach is adapted.

The UNSC and the AUPSC have developed a structured relationship that ensures information exchange on issues on the common agenda. A viable interaction is sustained through the annual joint meetings, besides other follow-up mechanism, held alternatively in Addis Ababa and New York. The strategic

consultations between the two have led, *inter-alia*, to the successful UN support packages for AMIS, its transformation into UNAMID, support programme on AMISOM and the adoption of the 2009-2011 Work Programme: Enhancing the AU Mediation Capacity.

The first triennial review (2006-09) process is expected to evaluate progress in the cooperation and build on recommendations made by the AU Peace Support Team Regional Consultation Mechanism. It has to focus on migration from Framework to formulation of programmes that would strengthen the delivery processes. Despite the noted lack of proper ownership and leadership at middle management level and ignorance of the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme among officials on both organisations, considerable progress has been registered in strengthening the African Peace and Security Architecture.

The United Nations system is progressively improving its own internal consultation and coordination mechanism in its interaction with the African Union and sub-regional organisations. The conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peace-building programmes are emerging as flagships of the African Union. The international community is beginning to appreciate Africa's effort to assume responsibility and ownership of its peace and security problems by seeking to find solutions in partnership. The formal institutionalisation of the Joint United Nations-African Union Task Force on medium and long term strategic challenges scheduled for 2010 would better streamline consultation and implementation of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation. The next chapter will reflect on lessons learnt from selected case studies on the evolving AU-UN cooperation framework.

Chapter 4: Some Case Studies of AU-UN involvement and cooperation

“... we will bear in mind that in taking initiatives for the promotion of peace and security in Africa in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the AU is also acting on behalf of the international community, and we will examine the possibility of financing of a peacekeeping operation undertaken by the AU or under its authority, as requested in the decision of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Assembly/AU/Dec.145 (VIII))”⁶

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to evaluate selected case studies to illustrate some lessons of involvement and integrated cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations. The bold decision by the AU Peace and Security Council, since operationalisation in 2003, to deploy military observers and protection units (and later, full blown peace operations) in conflict situations, notwithstanding the hesitance of the UN Security Council to act, rekindled an in-depth examination of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VIII encourages ‘peaceful settlement of local disputes’ through regional arrangements and own mechanisms or per indication by regional states or reference by the Security Council. The theory of collective security rests on the assumption that all nations, and by implication the international community, share a primary interest in maintaining peace (LeRoy Bennett & Oliver 2002:146). Hitherto the UN only responded to inter-state conflict situations wherein inclusive ceasefire agreements were in place and the belligerents were consenting to its involvement. The case studies to be examined talk to internal conflicts which do not necessarily conform to the normal UN standards and conditions for intervention. The key compelling premise is that the international community favours some form of intervention in the face of the deteriorating humanitarian

⁶ Joint Communiqué Agreement by the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa, 16 July 2007

situation in African conflicts. The case studies are on Liberia/Sierra Leone, Burundi and the Darfur region of the Sudan.

4.2 Liberia - Sierra Leone Experience

The West Africa region experienced the most tumultuous period in the 1990s decade and the early 2000s. The Mano River Basin was the epicenter of uncontrollable intra-state and ethnic conflicts which were, also, fueled by economic interests of some regional African leaders. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) initiated peace intervention operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone, which preceded the subsequent UN peace operations. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) emerged as the pioneer instrument for robust peace enforcement in the region. The ECOWAS provided stabilising forces in situations wherein the belligerents had not agreed to any comprehensive ceasefire agreement. The interventions did not receive immediate support from the United Nations but a retroactive involvement and support from the UN Security Council. The UN in both cases did not immediately authorise deployment of military observer missions citing the absence of a tangible ceasefire agreement and lack of acceptance by both sides in the conflict.

Some observers (Annan 2003, 2006, Ayiya 2008, De Coning 2006, Kreps 2007, Neethling 2004, 2009) allege that the Somali and Rwanda episodes contributed to the reluctance of the UNSC permanent members to involve themselves and the UN in African peacekeeping operations. Despite several informal consultations, some in response to direct request for assistance by ECOWAS at the inception of 1990 Liberia and 1997 Sierra Leone conflicts, the UNSC failed to take action. The retroactive involvement of the UN referred to came in the form of 1993 UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the 1998 UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to help the ECOMOG implement its mandate. The ECOWAS initiative effectively created a precedent in Africa wherein the OAU/AU and sub-regional organisations assumed responsibility in

stabilising conflicts in their immediate neighbourhood at the time the international community, especially the UN Security Council, was reluctant to authorise peace operations in Africa. Both ECOWAS interventions in Liberia (1990, 2003) and Sierra Leone (1993, 1997) had to stabilise the situation for subsequent UN peace operations that assumed a multi-dimensional format. Former ECOMOG / ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) Force and Field Commanders observed that their task was an enforcement mission aimed at stabilising the security situation but without clearly defined mandates, guidelines on handling joint operations with UN and without provision of support equipment (ECOWAS International Conference Report 2010: 14-15).

The UN engagement with the African Union and sub-regional organisations in West Africa initially evolved as some kind of a reluctant partnership. This emanated partly from the ECOWAS dynamics and lack of consensus in addressing the Mano River Basin complex conflict situation. The first ECOWAS intervention in Liberia in early 1990s and subsequent deployment of UNOMIL ended in a fracas. The Sierra Leone conflict was almost four years when in 1995 the UN Secretary General appointed a special envoy to join with the OAU/ECOWAS to negotiate a settlement. The 1998 UNOMSIL mandate was to monitor the military and security situation; and respect for international humanitarian law by an ECOMOG Force. As the Abidjan peace process and subsequent Lomé Accord failed to stabilise the situation, regional appeals for UN intervention fell on deaf ears. It was partly the threat to the UN Secretary General by Nigeria in August 1999 to withdraw its ECOMOG component that led to the UNSC hastily transforming UNOMSIL into UNAMSIL (Aboagye & Bah 2004:2; Olunisakin 2008). Even with UNAMSIL in place, the UN was perceived as rather timid in its response to the Revolutionary United Force (RUF) selective engagement in negotiations and ceasefire violations (Bariagaber 2006:22). The UN handling of the Sierra Leone situation improved in 2003 with developments in neighbouring Liberia and the deployment of ECOMIL. Aboagye and Bah (2004:5-6) point out that ECOMIL had a clear and credible mandate, supported

by a rational exit strategy in the form of UNSC resolutions 1497 and 1509 authorising the creation of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

The transitional process from ECOWAS to UN operation exposed shortcomings of a rapid deploying force as it respond to the immediate humanitarian challenges and need to stabilise the situation. It highlighted the need for an early collaboration and coordination between the two given that AU and its sub-regional organisation are always acting in lieu of the UN which is responsible for maintenance of international peace and security. No UN consultation with and drawing of experience on the operational environment from the outgoing ECOWAS commanding structures took place. This led to vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the UN contingent operational responsibility, strength and culpabilities. The initial UNAMSIL deployment strength was at 6000 as opposed to ECOMOG's 11000 and the former had to learn from the humiliation suffered at hands of RUF spoilers. The 2005 UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA) report on enhancing collaboration with and effectiveness of ECOWAS made recommendations as follows:

- Adoption of a joint planning if there is a possibility of re-hatting;
- Establishment of common doctrinal guidelines;
- Striking a balance between planned tasks and known capabilities;
- Meeting minimum equipment and self-sustainment levels;
- Focus on essential capabilities;
- Prioritise command control; and
- Support for the strategic reserve proposal⁷

The United Nations actively participated in the negotiations of the 2003 Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement on Liberia held under the ECOWAS auspices. The UN's and associated agencies' goodwill and credibility almost suffered when towards the conclusion phase, the Special Court on Sierra Leone

⁷ Report of the ECOWAS Workshop: Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations 1990-2004 (available at www.un.org/peacekeeping/bestpractices assessed 27 December 2010)

(SCSL) unsealed an indictment and a warrant of arrest for the then President Taylor. Aboagye & Bah (2004:3) correctly observes that SCSL action to act without adequate consultation with ECOWAS had a negative impact on its relationship with the regional leadership.

The initial UN-ECOWAS engagement in Liberia/Sierra Leone was rancorous despite the latter's good intentions in the face of the deteriorating humanitarian situation. The political and humanitarian costs of the conflict are, however, attributable to the 1990s regional polarisation within ECOWAS and the sluggish response of the UN and the International community. The ECOWAS experience galvanised the attention of the international community and in particular the United Nations to a trend succinctly described by De Coning (2002:52) as follows:

- Recognition of the need to enhance Africa's capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations;
- Recognition that the undertaking of peacekeeping operations in Africa must be taken with UNSC authorisation and in this regard there is need for close AU-UN cooperation; and
- Acceptance that in exceptional circumstances, when the UNSC is unwilling to honour its responsibility, Africa will have to undertake such operations on its own.

The eruption of intra-state conflicts situations in West Africa and the indecision of the UNSC to engage took place against the backdrop of early 2000s ongoing High Level consultations and thematic meetings with regional organisations on peace and security cooperation spearheaded by the, then, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan. The Brahimi Report drew lessons from this West Africa experience and made far-reaching recommendations endorsed by the 2005 World Summit Outcome that authorise the conceptualisation of the ten-year capacity building programme for the AU. This was to be later followed by the UNSC adoption of Resolutions 1625 and 1631 of 2005 which identified priority

areas for implementation and strategic operational planning in realizing UNSC and AUPSC peacekeeping cooperation.

The Liberia-Sierra Leone post conflict reconstruction and development programme are beneficiaries of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation on capacity building. Peace and security are inextricably intertwined with development. The AU lobbying ensured that the two countries, together with Burundi, are included in the pilot UN Peace-building Commission (PBC) Fund focus countries. The PBC continues to promote international coordination, resource mobilisation and general support for the priority areas. These are youth empowerment and employment, democracy and governance, and judicial and security sector reform for Sierra Leone (Rugumamu 2009:5). Liberia's Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme, based on the pillars of national security, governance and rule of law, economic revitalisation, and infrastructure and basic services, is making a steady progress (Assembly/AU6 (XIII) 2009:13). By invoking the peace-building instrument of timely multidimensional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, the UN assisted the sub-region towards durable and sustainable peace. The UN and AU/ECOWAS collaboration has strengthened the role of civil society in peace-making, especially the gender mainstreaming across the board in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. A notable shortcoming, according to Aboagye & Bah (2004:16), was the sidelining of ECOWAS in the post conflict peacemaking process as its institutional involvement would have allowed ECOWAS early empowerment. It is critical for capacity building to take place at sub-regional level rather than experiencing capacity substitution or loaning in the form of sub-contracting to foreign expertise.

The analysis in this section is to be understood within the context of the geo-political complexities and fragility of the Mano River Union and West Africa in general. The Mano River Union intra-state conflicts in Guinea-Conakry and Cote D'Ivoire have a potential to destabilise the neighbourhood as a whole. ECOWAS proactive approach to conflict situations and in response to the accompanying

humanitarian crises abounds in valuable experience. Both AU and UN had in 2009 independently dispatched multidisciplinary teams to Liberia and Sierra Leone which unanimously concluded that the two countries are in a successful transition from conflict situation to functional statehood.

4.3 AU-UN collaboration in Burundi peace process

The Regional Peace Initiative on Burundi (RPIB) achieved a breakthrough on the 28 August 2000 when the government and warring parties signed the Arusha Accord which created conditions for exiled leaders of armed resistance to return to Burundi. However, the UN Security Council turned down an African Union request to authorise a military observer mission to oversee the process, insisting on a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. South Africa in its capacity as the Facilitation of the Burundi Peace Process was asked by the OAU/RPIB in January 2001 to provide a protection support unit for the returning Burundi leaders. The OAU/AU had to content with the challenge of sustaining the Arusha Accords into an appealing enterprise for those who remained outside or registered reservations.

The AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR) in February 2003 adopted a decision to create an African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) to which Ethiopia, Mozambique and South Africa were mandated to deploy in May 2003. The AMIB mandate entailed the following tasks:

- Establish and maintain liaison between parties;
- Monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement;
- Facilitate the activities of the Joint Ceasefire Commission and the technical committees or the establishment and restructuring of the National Defence and Police Forces;
- Secure identified assembly and disengagement areas;
- Facilitate safe passage for the parties during planned movements to designated assembly areas;

- Facilitate and provide technical assistance to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process;
- Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including to refugees and internally displaced persons;
- Coordinate mission activities with UN presence in Burundi; and
- Provide VIP protection for designated returning leaders (AU Central Organ April 2003).

AMIB deployment, the first African Union massive peace operation, served to focus attention on and to stabilise the situation in Burundi and gave confidence to armed groups to begin the assembly and cantonment processes. Joint AU-UN experts worked together on the ground to determine current capacities and future needs of AMIB and Troops Contributing Countries. AMIB benefitted from logistic support and information exchange and coordination from MUNOC in the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo. The United Nations Special Representative in Burundi presided over the Implementation and Monitoring Team in line with the Arusha Accords provisions. Intense negotiations and international pressure resulted in the largest Burundi armed group; the Nkurunziza led National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), signing two ceasefire agreements (7th October & 2nd December 2003) with the Burundi Transitional Government. The immediate impact of the development was the deployment of an international peace force and the creation of a Joint Ceasefire Commission.

The ground breaking AU initiative in undertaking a peace operation to resolve the decades old Burundi intra-state conflict has solicited mixed interpretation from scholars. According to Neethling (2009:45) peace intervention in Burundi is an interesting and relevant case of burden sharing and hybridisation between the African Union and the United Nations. De Conning (2004:21-22) describes AMIB as ‘being somewhere between the traditional peacekeeping and a complex multidimensional peacekeeping operation’ as it operated in a complex

mission environment with a peacekeeping mandate. It provided security dimension alongside the UN Political Office in Burundi and its function matched the hybrid operation model where a multi-national force provided security presence alongside a UN civilian presence. Despite considerable challenges, AMIB managed to stabilise most of the country, facilitate delivery of humanitarian assistance, coordinate Mission's activities with UN agencies and provide protection to returning leaders. In its maintenance of liaison between parties, and monitoring and verifying the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, it created conditions for the deployment of the UN Mission in Burundi (ONUB) in June 2004. Aboagye (2004:14) asserts that AMIB cannot be said to have facilitated the implementation of ceasefire agreements, nor was able to fully ensure that the defence and security situation in Burundi was generally stable and well managed by the newly created national defence and security structures.

AMIB brought to the fore the element of civilian protection which became part of the rules of engagement. Protecting civilians was a new responsibility and a challenge to peacekeepers. The uniqueness of AMIB further lies in the fact that its transformation into a UN peace mission (June 2004) created a platform for an exploration of the dynamics on the division of responsibilities between regional organisations and the UN. A number of lessons are to be drawn from AMIB experience and questions are still to be answered. All things being equal, the AU has the right to institutional pride and should be accorded the necessary recognition for its achievement. Mtimkulu (2005:35) observes that the UN-AU relationship has to provide answers as to whether or not the AU should continue to bear the brunt by deploying in conflict situations, only later to handover to the UN to re-hat AU-forces with blue helmets; literary preparing the soft landing for the well resourced UN Missions.

As noted earlier, by December 2003 all the Burundi armed political groups, with the exception of Phalipehutu National Liberation Front (FNL), had acceded to

the 2000 Arusha Accords and subsequent Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The minimum conditions for a United Nations peace operation were in place and as anticipated a UN multidisciplinary assessment mission was dispatched to Burundi from 16 to 27 February 2004 to expedite a UN peace operation. This culminated with the UN Security Council adopting Resolution 1545 of May 2004 establishing the United Nations Mission in Burundi (ONUB) effective from 1st June 2004 with the re-hatting of the AMIB as the core of the military component.

The ONUB sustenance of collaboration with the African Union through the UN Special Representative in Burundi and the Regional Peace Initiative reinforced the South Africa Facilitation task of rapprochement and reconciliation in the country. The mutual complementarity contributed to avoiding a political stalemate on the life of the Burundi transitional government. The Implementation and Monitoring Team on two occasions reached consensus that the various delays in implementation of the Arusha Accords warrant adjustments to the transitional phase. The initial deadline was extended from October 2004 to 30 April 2005 and a further extension made to August 2005 (S/2006/994: paragraph 66). Following the 26th August 2005 inauguration of CNDD-FDD leader, Pierre Nkurunziza, as the President of Burundi, a UN assessment mission (16-23 October) was dispatched to evaluate the post transitional period security situation, overall peace consolidation and national recovery process in order to identify the UN post-conflict reconstruction and development role. Consultation and exchange with the African Union and other international agencies resulted in the mooted of a Burundi Partners Forum as an interim mechanism towards the peacebuilding engagement (S/2005/728).

The acceptance of the United Nations as a neutral entity by the Phalipehutu FNL rebels benefited rapprochement with the Burundi Government. Both the UN and AU were to constitute an important component of the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism of the 7th September 2006 Phalipehutu FNL-Burundi Government Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement. The United Nations

assisted in creating conducive conditions for Burundi to fully implement the 2000 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement and facilitated communication and dialogue between parties. Important precedents were set in motion including systematic human rights monitoring, the institutionalisation of gender mainstreaming in peace and electoral processes, the revision of the Constitution and the electoral laws to include gender concerns. African Union – United Nations coordination made a significant contribution to the development of a UN peace operation code of conduct and by implication to the AU's African Standby Force by establishing the first conduct and disciplinary unit in a UN peacekeeping operation to specifically deal with sexual abuse against women.

It is noteworthy that on withdrawal in December 2006, shortly after the signing of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation in November 2006, the ONUB handed back the wrapping up of the Burundi peace operation to the African Union. The main outstanding task was to facilitate the implementation of the June 2006 Agreement of Principles towards Lasting Peace, Security and Stability in Burundi and the September 2006 Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement between the Phalipehutu FNL and the Burundi government. By April 2009, the Political Directorate (AU, UN, EU, Tanzania & Uganda) and the Ad Hoc Committee (Facilitation, Burundi Government and the Paliphehutu FNL) reached a consensus in Pretoria that led to the transformation of the Phalipehutu FNL into a political party on the 21 April 2009 (Assembly/AU/6(XIII)). The UN continued to avail its good offices and shared resources with the African Union in consolidating the peace-building phase. The Partnership for Peace in Burundi, (disbanded in December 2009) acted as a forum for mobilisation of the international community and advocacy on developmental needs of the country. It was composed by the Executive Secretariats of the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Political Directorate (ASSEMBLY/UN/3(XIV) 2010).

Since 2007, within the context of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union, the UN Peace Building Commission is focused on Burundi's post conflict reconstruction. The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants was successfully funded and implemented to the general satisfaction of all. The UN approved an initial seed fund of US\$35m for the capacitating of an independent human rights commission and enhancing the capacity of the National Land Commission. Public administration, registration of civil services and security sector reform have evolved as important government pillars. By the end of 2008, the Strategic Framework for Peace-building in Burundi was approved which provides the basis for UN PBC long-term engagement (2010-2014). Priorities are as follows:

- Support to national capacities for strategic planning and coordination
- Democratic governance, including the electoral process and related institutions
- Transitional justice and human rights
- Community recovery, with focus on those populations affected by the war (S/2008/745 paragraph 29).

The International Financial Institutions view Burundi as a country at crossroads and hope that the successful holding of national elections will be used as a springboard for economic development (Brouillaud 2010:3). The UN Integrated Office in Burundi is scheduled to drawdown its peace-building operation by 31st December 2010 and efforts are in place on the formulation of the post-BINUB strategy of involvement with the international community. The Burundi challenges are identified as achieving complete recovery and stimulation of equitable economic growth, the establishment and reinforcement of responsible institutions of governance; and the establishment of an effective mechanism for dialogue, reconciliation and governance.

4.4 Reflections on the Darfur peace process

The 2003 struggle for self determination in the Darfur region of Sudan, coupled with historical sub-regional political dynamics involving Chad, Libya and Sudan, unleashed the worst man-made humanitarian disaster in recent times. The Chadian and African Union mediation initiative on the Darfur conflict, with the support of the international community, culminated in the signing of the N'Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) on the 8th April 2004. Two AU led sub-committees, namely the Joint Commission and the Ceasefire Commission (CFC), were set up to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and provision was made for an AU observer mission and protection force. The 10th AU Peace and Security Council meeting authorised the AUC Chairperson to take necessary steps ensuring an effective monitoring of compliance (PSC.AHG/Comm. (X) 2004). This laid the basis for the deployment of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The 27-28 May 2004 joint Government of Sudan - Justice and Equality Movement – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army meeting held at the AU Headquarters agreed on the modalities for the creation of the Ceasefire Commission and deployment of observers. The UNSC Resolution 1556 of July 2004 welcomed the African Union's proactive approach to lead a peacekeeping and security initiative in Darfur and requested the Secretary General to begin contingency planning.

The United Nations and African Union began complementary peace support efforts in Sudan with the AU leading the political mediation as well as the ceasefire monitoring and verification efforts while the UN engages in delivery of humanitarian assistance and in reporting on the overall situation to the UN Security Council (S/2005/68: Para 47). As opposed to immediate previous African crises, the UN immediately authorised assistance to the AU with planning and assessment for its missions and preparations to support implementation of a future comprehensive agreement on Darfur. This reflected the United Nations recognition of the peculiarities of Africa's challenges on peace and security on the eve of the 2005 UN World Summit. One of the

Summit's significant resolutions was to explicitly support the development and implementation of a ten year plan for capacity building with the African Union. As early as August 2004, UN-AU experts embarked on a joint collaboration in developing a comprehensive plan that included the operational plan concept and all logistical, support and budgetary requirements for AMIS. This marked the birth of the United Nations Assistance Cell to the African Union under the auspices of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Office (UNDPKO). To ensure effective take-off, the latter deployed expert personnel at the AU headquarters and on the field in Darfur. The tasks of the Assistance Cell were as follows:

- Engage in map exercise with AMIS personnel in Darfur
- Strengthen the command and control of the AMIS headquarters
- Improve the ability of the AU force to deploy to maximum effect
- Support the integration of different components of the AU mission
- Support contingency planning

The UN commitment to support AMIS did not imply a problem free AU peace operation as the AU lacked the capacity and capability to deploy a multi-dimensional force, especially logistics, rapid response means, and a civilian police component to maintain order within Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps. The hostility of the Sudan government towards UN involvement in Darfur further complicated and slowed down the AU efforts. The AMIS deployment brought to the forefront two distinct areas of interest, that is, the humanitarian efforts to mitigate human suffering and the military aspect designed to create conducive conditions for conflict resolution and peace building, and thus necessitating joint strategising by the AU and UN. An AU-UN interactive collaboration became the hallmark as was reflected in the 26th May 2005 Joint AUC Chairperson and UN Secretary General co-chairing a Pledging Conference to support the expansion of AMIS hosted by the AU in Addis Ababa. The UN provided background support, infrastructure facilitation and participation of the rebel movement in the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the Conflict in Darfur in

Abuja (Nigeria) which culminated with the signing of the ill-fated May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).

The African Union's commitment to finding a lasting peaceful settlement in Darfur was never in doubt as well as its understanding that the maintenance of international peace remains a primary responsibility of the UN Security Council. Around June 2006, the AUPSC decided to review the AMIS mandate in case of Sudan's agreement for a transition to a UN peacekeeping operation. The UN Security Council adopted various resolutions during the first half of 2006, but the most significant one is the August 2006 UNSC Resolution 1706 which called for the re-hatting of AMIS and authorising the expansion of UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) mandate into Darfur. This was the strongest political statement to date despite the abstention of China and Russia. The UNSC requested the Secretary General to consult, jointly with the AU, in close and continuing consultations with the DPA parties on a plan and timetable for transition to a UN peace operation. This was the UNSC initial concrete conceptualisation of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). On the other hand, the UNSC authorised AU-UN convergence, coordination and consolidation of all political engagement programmes with the belligerents in Darfur. The AU-UN Joint Mediation Team on the Darfur Crisis led by AU and UN Special Envoys, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliason, came into being in 2007. The emerging optimism on large scale UN engagement in Darfur was boosted by the outcome of the 16th November 2006 High Level AU/UN Meeting that agreed on a three phase plan for technical and operational support to AMIS. The plan is based on the June 2006 Joint AU-UN Assessment Mission that recommended the sequencing as follows:

- Light support package;
- Heavy support package; and
- Deployment of UN peacekeepers.

Despite the AU experience accumulated in the complex intra-state conflicts of Central and West Africa, the Darfur conflict proved to be intractable. The Burundi-Sierra Leone-Liberia situations involved fragile or failed states scenario while in Sudan a suspicious, hostile and functional state remains central to a solution. The Sudanese government's alleged sponsoring of the Janjawid militia and its so-called concerns about protection of state sovereignty created many obstacles to the UN collaboration with the AU. Mansaray (2009: 36, 41-42) argues that the AU bold initiative to deploy in Darfur did not only expose the limitations of the AU to mount and sustain a robust peace operation but also the fault lines in the international system. Most of the deployed troops were inadequately equipped to impact on the situation on the ground. She further contends that a purely symbolic intervention can prove futile if humanitarian intervention is not undertaken with sufficient force to make an impact.

The Darfur humanitarian crisis captured the attention of the international community and the UN General Assembly (UNGA). In June 2007, the UNGA Special Committee on Peacekeeping noted that logistical and financial support to AU Rapid Deployment capabilities is primary in strengthening AU capacity. The pressure on the Khartoum government finally bore fruits when on the 12th June 2007, the Government of Sudan agreed to the Hybrid Operation for Darfur during an AU-UN High Level Consultation in Addis Ababa. This was confirmed by the Sudanese President in a meeting with the UN Security Council mission to Khartoum on the 17th June 2007(S/2007/421:paragraph 6).

By July 2007, the UNSC Resolution 1769 authorised the deployment of UNAMID effective from the 31st December 2007 with unity of command and control. This meant a single chain command, with command and control structures and backstopping provided by the UN to ensure AU/UN peacekeeping capability and institution building. The UNSC resolution mandated UNAMID to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that is, authorising the taking of necessary action

in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:

- Protect its personnel, facilities, installation and equipment; secure security of movement of its personnel and humanitarian workers;
- Support early and effective implementation of the DPA, prevent the disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan;
- Further decided that the authorised UNMIS strength shall revert to that specified in Resolution 1590 (2005) upon transfer from AMIS to UNAMID; and
- UN Secretary General, in consultation with the AUC Chairperson, and the Government of Sudan to conclude within 30 days a Status of Forces Agreement with respect to UNAMID.

The UNAMID provides, in principle, the best chance for larger, better funded and equipped mission with a stronger mandate and diplomatic muscle to protect the civilians and pave the way for a durable peaceful solution (Kagwanja & Mutahi 2007:14). However, as observed earlier, the Sudan government remains hostile to the United Nations involvement and some Arabic AU member states are sympathetic to Khartoum in a conflict with regional dynamics. The re-hatting of AMIS into UNAMID meant the latter inheriting the myriad of challenges that the African Union had to endure since 2004 in its dealing with the Khartoum central government. The Sudan government insists that the mission must maintain an African character, a condition that automatically weakens the UNAMID as most African troops contributing countries are dependent upon donor support for the deployment and acquisition of equipment. Three years on since its inauguration, UNAMID is near fully capacity as follows:

- 15 553 Military personnel, representing 79% of authorised strength;
- 4 625 police personnel, representing 71% of authorised strength;
- 4 045 civilian personnel, representing 73% of authorised strength (S/2010/50; Assembly/AU/3(XIV) 2010).

Despite the signing of the Status-of-Forces Agreement, the Sudan government continued to impose restrictions on the UNAMID operational scope, banning night movements and demanding that permission be sought for flights, and delaying the release of equipment from the ports. Darfur as one of the marginalised regions of the Sudan lacks communication and transport infrastructure which further complicates movement and response time to emergencies. The operational impact of the mission on its key performance indicator – protection of the civilian population especially the internally displaced persons (IDPs) - is aggravated by logistical constraints. These include inadequate supply of critical equipment and the continued absence of key military enabling units such as medium transport units, an aerial reconnaissance unit, a level-II hospital and 18 medium utility helicopters (S/2009/83 para:9).

The situation is further complicated by the disintegration of the Darfur rebel movement into several factions and groups, continued violation of the ceasefire agreement and rejection of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement. The October 2007 Joint Mediation re-launch of Darfur Peace Process in Sirte (Libya) failed to draw-in the DPA non-signatories into meaningful dialogue. The parties to the Darfur conflict seem to have relegated to the back stage the need for a negotiated political solution and a comprehensive and conclusive peace agreement. The renewed instability contributed to the deterioration of the security situation, parties displayed lack of trust and political will to cease hostility and negotiate in good faith. The implementation of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation ensured the AU access to UN resources and expertise that culminated in a review of the functioning of the AU-UN joint mediation strategy. An integrated approach was introduced with the appointment of a Joint Chief Mediator, Mr Djebri Basollé, in July 2008. UNAMID, despite its broad mandate for the protection of civilians and assistance to the peace process, is not designed to create a sustainable solution to the Darfur

crisis, a responsibility that belongs to the political parties to the conflict (S/2008/659: Para 74).

The above quoted report of the UN Secretary General further summed up the three-track approach by the Joint Mediation as:

- a) Working with belligerent parties to bring them to direct negotiations on a peace agreement for Darfur;
- b) Expanding the consultations with Darfurian civil society to create a substantive foundation for the negotiation and to bolster the willingness of the parties to engage in the political process; and
- c) Facilitating an improvement in relations between Chad and the Sudan.

The launching of the civil society consultations in Doha (Qatar) in November 2009 by the Joint Mediation marks an important development in the Darfur peace process. The major focus has hitherto been on the armed parties. The overall Darfur peace process has still to contend with the 4th March 2009 decision of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue an arrest warrant against President Omar Hassan Al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The pending indictment, despite the AU appeal to the UN Security Council for a deferral, continues to reinforce the hostile stance of Khartoum towards the United Nations.

4.5 Conclusion

The selected case studies on AU-UN overall joint involvement in exploring workable solutions to peace and security challenges in Liberia-Sierra Leone, Burundi and Darfur region of Sudan provide a vivid litmus tests of the political will and commitment. The ECOWAS initiatives of the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone laid the necessary precedent for the subsequent field cooperation between the United Nations and the African regional organisations. The West Africa sub-region had to first develop a common approach and consensus on the neighbourhood conflict situations. The UN engagement with the African regional

organisation in peace operations evolved as some kind of a reluctant partnership. The UN Security Council, especially the permanent members, had to draw lessons from the 1993 US debacle in Somalia and the French experience during the 1994 Rwanda genocide. In approaching African conflict situations, the AU and its sub-regional mechanisms comparative advantage had to be considered. The Brahimi Report drew lessons from this West Africa experience and made far reaching recommendations which were endorsed by the 2005 World Summit Outcome that authorise the conceptualisation of the ten-year capacity building programme for the African Union.

The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was implemented during the transitional phase from the OAU to AU, thus ushering a new era in evolving African Peace and Security Architecture. It brought to the fore the element of civilian protection, a new responsibility and a challenge to peacekeepers, which became part of the rules of engagement. Its transformation into a UN peace mission initiated a platform for an exploration of the dynamics in the division of responsibility between regional organisations and the United Nations. Joint AU-UN experts worked together on the ground to determine current capacities and future needs of the AMIB and the Troops Contributing Countries.

The 2004 humanitarian crisis in Darfur peace process began a unique complementary peace support effort in Sudan with the African Union leading the political mediation, ceasefire monitoring and verification while the United Nations engaged in delivery of humanitarian assistance and in reporting to the on the overall situation to the Security Council. Building on the Burundi experience, the AU-UN joint experts developed a comprehensive plan that included the operational plan concept and all logistical, support and budgetary requirements. The Darfur peace process pioneered the AU-UN joint mediation concept in 2007 with the creation of the Joint Mediation Team led by AU and UN Special Envoys, Salim Ahmed Salim and Jan Eliason. Darfur introduced a challenge wherein the host state continuously attempted to undermine unfettered UN involvement in a

peace operation under the guise of protection of sovereignty. This encouraged innovative ways in UN-AU peace operations and the concept of special support packages came into being. The traditional UN peacekeeping experience had to adapt to a situation wherein deployment of peace missions by regional organisations take place without a viable political and ceasefire agreement in place.

The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) has introduced new challenges to the joint AU-UN field operation. The UNSC Resolution 1769 authorised the creation of an integrated command and control; and for UNAMID to operate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The UNAMID provides the best chance for a larger and better funded and equipped mission with possibly a stronger mandate and diplomatic muscle for a durable peace in Darfur.

The joint AU-UN peace and security engagement is an emerging strategic partnership with a potential for both organisations to continue working closely together to address the many challenges on African conflict situations. Notwithstanding its infancy, the African Union seems to be on course towards overcoming its institutional capacity gaps (recruitment, deployment, logistical requirements and sustaining operations on the ground) and lack of doctrine and matching mandate to mission task.

Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Summary

The aim of this study was to critically assess the evolving cooperation and collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations on peace and security issues on the African continent. The immediate post Cold War period had witnessed the political tension of the past replaced by growing cooperation among the permanent members of the UN Security Council in addressing conflict situations, especially in areas of common geopolitical interest. The collaboration is informed by the international community's recognition that regionalism as a component of multilateralism is necessary and feasible within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The fundamental question addressed by the study is how successful the cooperation between the two organisations has been from the period 2003 to 2009. Exploring the question necessitated an understanding of the dynamics of the developing cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council and how the institutionalisation of the interfacing between the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat has contributed to the capacity building and management of conflict situations. An examination of the practical experience and identification of achievements and failures became necessary as the collaboration is in the formative stage. Specific case studies are explored to depict evolution of cooperation in the dying days of the Organisation of African Unity, through the transition and the early days of the African Union.

The research methodology used was a descriptive analysis as the study reviewed and assessed existing literature and factual data sources on peace and security in Africa, especially on the growing interfacing and interaction between the specialised organs of the African Union and the United Nations. The main subject of scrutiny was the conditions underlying the evolution of collaboration between a regional and an international organisation, taking place at international level with its own dynamics. The 2005 UN World Summit

Outcome Document on peace and collective security provided the legal basis for the cooperation by supporting the development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building for the African Union. The subsequently signed 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union by UN Secretary General and the AUC Chairperson is reviewed. The study has limitations as the assessment and analysis only covers a short period (formative and immature) in the development of the AU-UN cooperation. The current insufficient academic material evaluating the AU-UN cooperation, the AUPSC/UNSC resolutions often crafted cautiously to accommodate all views and reliance on secondary sources has been a handicap. The researcher did not have the opportunity to interact or interview the role players to gain first hand experience of the cooperation. The 2006 Declaration on Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation guiding and seeking to codify the cooperation is only three years in operation.

The importance of the study lies in that its findings could assist government officials, scholars, researchers and practitioners who are interested in how the emerging African Peace and Security Architecture impacts on the UN Security Council mandate to maintain international peace. The study has explored the preliminary phase of cooperation on peace and security as it is still too early to reach a definite response on the future of the broad cooperation as detailed in the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union.

The study began by mapping out the development of the framework of cooperation between the Organisation of African Unity/African Union and the United Nations. It contextualised the process within the changing post Cold War international political landscape wherein the community of nations is allowing space for multilateral approaches to the maintenance of international peace and security. The nature of the conflicts on the African continent emerges as predominantly intra-state and less between nation states but with a propensity towards destabilisation in the sub-regions. The developing international situation

dictated a critical review of the UN Charter and in particular Chapter VIII on the role of regional arrangements in the maintenance of peace and security. By 1993 the OAU/AU leadership conceptualised an African peace and security instrument in the form of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (MCPMR). The new OAU/AU initiative was developed as complementary to the United Nations. The dynamic engagement of the UN, OAU/AU and other regional peace arrangements led to the UN Secretary General commissioning a panel of experts on peace operations which culminated in the well known Brahimi Report.

Africa's commitment to a peace and security architecture and enhanced cooperation with the UN is encapsulated in the 2000 AU Constitutive Act and the AU 2002 Peace and Security Council Protocol. In the post 9/11 international security environment, the UNSC elevated regional instability into one of the key indicators towards possible threat to world peace. A milestone was reached in November 2006 when the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union was signed in line with the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome resolutions. A structured AU-UN consultative mechanism came into being. The recommendations of the AU-UN panel on modalities for support to AU peacekeeping is highlighted as a significant progression in the clarification of the strategic relationship and collaboration between the two organisations.

The period since 2000 witnessed a new proactive approach by the OAU/AU leadership in search of new and effective ways to address the increasing conflict situation in the continent. Responding to the deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the face of UN Security Council reluctance to intervene, the OAU/AU and sub-regional organisations deployed peace operations without the UNSC authorisation. It is thus not accidental that the theme of UN mandated peace operations by the AU came to occupy a central place in the debate on management of peace and stability in Africa. The UN and its agencies have

closely collaborated with the AU in the development of the Continental Early Warning System, the African Standby Force and professional planning capacity. The AU Peace Support Operations Division has significantly improved its management and coordination of peace operations as reflected in AMISOM and UNAMID. The identified challenge is how to ensure the enhancing of predictability, sustainability and flexibility in financing regional organisations, especially the African Union. The peace-building and post conflict reconstruction has emerged as pivotal to the development of a deliberate exit strategy for both AU and UN peace operations programmes. The evolving coordination and collaboration between the AU and UN on reconstruction and development ensures that a sustainable foundation is laid during the phase of peacekeeping operations. Peace-building and post conflict reconstruction are essentially a political process and should not be approached as technical process. The integrating of international and regional approaches plays a valuable role in promoting national dialogue and understanding in post conflict societies.

The institutionalisation of the AU and UN cooperation is elucidated upon in the section on the enhancing of the AU peace and security capacity as provided for by the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation. The African Union proactive involvement in the Declaration implementation ensured that practical challenges emanating from field experience are addressed despite lack of resources. The African Union and sub-regional organisations have earned themselves a recognised role as immediate situation stabilisers and important players in conflict prevention. Drawing from African experience, the UNSC Resolution 1625 of 2005 emphasises the importance of establishing effective comprehensive strategies of conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of armed conflicts and social political crises. A stronger and structured relationship has since developed with the objective of sharing information on conflict situations on the agenda of both organisations, particularly the UNSC and AUPSC. Mediation and usage of good offices, coupled with preventative diplomacy, have a potential to save the African continent unnecessary bloodshed as emergent crises are

timely identified. A significant development in this regard is the developing AU-UN mediation plan and strategy. The recently finalised 2009-11 Work Programme: Enhancing the AU Mediation Capacity would nurture and benefit the institutionalisation of the AU Panel of the Wise.

The study evaluated selected case studies to illustrate some lessons on involvement and integrated field cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union and its sub-regional organisations. Liberia and Sierra Leone in the Mano River Basin provided a pioneering experience in how to develop collaboration and overcoming the accompanying obstacles. The ECOWAS initial deployments did not conform to UN prerequisites that an acceptable ceasefire must be in place for a UN peace operation to take place. A broad spectrum of authors cited in the body of the study refers to the nasty outcomes of UN deployments in Somali and Rwanda as having fueled the UNSC reluctance to break with tradition. An observation is made that the UN engagement with ECOWAS began as a reluctant partnership. The ECOWAS drew the attention of the UN to the need to enhance Africa's capacity, UNSC's authorisation of peace operations and close cooperation with the AUPSC, as well as recognition that in exceptional circumstances the AU would undertake peace operations on its own accord. The UNSC indecision on support to African peace operations is further demonstrated with its refusal to immediately accompany the implementation of the 2000 Arusha Accords on Burundi. The AU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution had to adopt a decision to create an African Union Mission in Burundi to make the Accords an attractive enterprise to those who remained outside. The UN, at the time, accepted the softer option to preside over the Implementation and Monitoring Team as constituted in line with Arusha Accords. A formula was worked whereby the MONUC was authorised to provide logistical and other forms of support to AMIB even before the authorisation of the UN Mission in Burundi whose core was to be the re-hatted AMIB. The AU-UN cooperation in Burundi played a decisive role in ensuring the

signing of the 2006 Paliphehutu FNL-Burundi Government Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement that facilitated the final settlement.

The 2004 AU Peace and Security Council decision to create the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to be deployed in the Darfur region led to the development of unique approaches to cooperation that culminated in the hybrid 2007 United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The whole peace process in Darfur opened a new chapter of comprehensive and multi-dimensional cooperation between the AU and the UN. For the first time in African history, the State Party (Sudan) to the conflict rejected the involvement of the UN in peacekeeping despite a UN Security Council endorsement. Within the context of the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, the partnership pioneered a variety of forms of interfacing and collaboration. Despite the continued hostility of Khartoum government towards UNAMID, the mission has emerged as the best chance for a larger, better funded and equipped mission with a stronger mandate and diplomatic muscle. The three preliminary countries in the case studies (Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leone) are part of the UN Peace-building Commission's pilot programme.

5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations

The main research question is how successful the cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations has been from 2003 to 2009?

The international system emerging from the ruins of the Cold War created a climate conducive for mutual engagement between the approaches of the realist and globalist schools of thought. The approach to peace and security issues in international relations gravitated towards a multilateral cooperation with the United Nations Charter regaining its eminence. The easing of East-West tension enabled the activation of regional arrangements, especially the African Union, to proactively and objectively review their instruments in the maintenance of regional security and stability. The seeds for UN-OAU/AU collaborative

partnership took roots within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter that provides for some delegation, decentralisation and cooperation with regional organisations. The creation of the 1993 OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was a hallmark as the OAU abrogated to itself the responsibility to anticipate and adopt measures to prevent conflicts in the continent. The African leadership positioned the regional institution's relationship with the UN as mutually complementary. Africa began the road towards determining its destiny and increasingly placed African problems to be addressed at an international level.

Scholars are divided on the subject of the United Nations approach and its consistency in resolving African conflict situations in the immediate post Cold War environment. The significant development was, however, the rapprochement between the UN and OAU which allowed joint efforts in seeking ways towards durable peace on the continent. It suffices to mention that this is the period when the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations recommended the strategic direction towards enhancing the thrust and efficiency of UN peace operations in Africa.

The study pointed out that the African Union purposefully entrenched its collaboration on peace and security with the United Nations through the adoption of the 2000 Constitutive Act, whose article 4(h) explicitly provides guidelines on when to intervene in a member state. The subsequent promulgation of the 2002 Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council on collective security and early warning mechanism directed cooperation with the UN Security Council as the primary body responsible for maintenance of international peace and security. Preliminary systematic partnership in a conflict situation took root in the West Africa sub-region (Liberian and Sierra Leone conflicts) and later in Burundi (Central Africa). The institutionalisation of the partnership through the joint signing of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation; Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union ushered in the

phase of vibrant interfacing with inherent challenges. The establishment of the AU Peacekeeping Support Team and the institutionalisation of regular consultative interaction between the UNSC and AUPSC and between the UN Secretariat and AU Commission anchored the path to cooperation. The capacity and capability of the AU Peace Operations Support Division, in particular, in mission planning, management, logistic and resource management was improved.

The study further reflects on the developing AU-UN common understanding on the need for cooperation and clarifications of grey areas with a potential for contradictions. The adoption and implementation of the UNSC Resolutions 1625 and 1631 of 2005 contributed to both organisations establishing comprehensive strategies on conflict prevention and addressing the root causes of political and social crises and armed conflicts. The latter resolution stressed the importance of developing regional capability to rapidly deploy in peacekeeping operations. The UN command of resources and political clout, strengthened by the AU comparative advantage of being close to conflict situation, has ensured healthy interdependence and cooperation. There is a divergence of views on what constitute capacity building in the context of the broad Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation, but on the peace and security theme a common understanding prevails. This finds reflection in achievements and innovations in addressing issues at hand. The successful launch of the UNAMID and Joint Mediation in Darfur exemplifies what mutual understanding and conceptualisation can achieve against odds. There is constant review of the AU-UN consultative and implementation mechanisms on peace and security, from the 2007 AU Peacekeeping Support Team to the 2010 launch of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU), which bears witness to the commitment to move in tandem.

The evolving peace and security cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union is not an easy matter. The early years of the AU were

characterised by a concerted effort of the African leadership to convince the international community, especially the UNSC, not to be indifferent to Africa's perennial prevalence of conflicts. The so-called Somali and Rwanda syndromes which seem to have been informing the UNSC reluctance to authorise peace operations in Liberia (1989/97) and Sierra Leone (1991-2000) have to be overcome. The protection of civilians in war situations especially those fought over the distribution of natural resources between the rulers and the people has proved to be very complex. Too many forces are involved ranging from state actors and non statutory actors in the form of armed insurgents and international backers. The UNSC had to be lobbied into developing a 21st century peacekeeping doctrine commensurate with African realities where intervention has to take place in a situation wherein there is no ceasefire agreement. The AUPSC had so far succeeded in convincing the UNSC to acknowledge that deployment of peace operations can take place without its authorisation if the situation so demands. Even on such occasions, the lack of funding from UN assessed contributions leads to AU failure in determining the course of the peace operation due to reliance on unpredictable donor funding as was the case with AMIS and AMISOM.

The continued absence of pre-deployment agreements between the AUPSC and UNSC result in difficulties for mission planning to develop an integrated comprehensive strategic objective in a peace operation that would consequently impact on the exit strategy. The AU peace operations are solely driven by the belief that it is acting on behalf of the UNSC which has the primary responsibility to maintain international peace. Both the UN and AU engage in peace operations in order to help the country and people in question re-build state and civil society organisational institutions for effective good governance. Peacekeeping and building cannot be allowed to become develop into a self-sustaining industry and promotion of dependence on the part of beneficiaries. Experience in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Liberia points to a situation whereby both organisations have not yet developed explicit benchmarks to determine and

declare a country as having graduated from peace-building stage into 'normality' to run own affairs. The sustenance of durable peace and stability in Africa demands an integration of the agenda for peace and development. An important nexus towards this goal is the promotion and entrenchment of democracy and the rule of law. It is imperative for all AU member states to ratify and accede to continental instruments and conventions, *inter alia*, on respect for human rights, review mechanisms on good governance and adherence to constitutional change of government. The last few years had witnessed some regressions in some countries (Cote D'Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritania, Niger, Togo, Zimbabwe, etc.) where the outcome of elections were subject of controversy.

The peace and security collaboration and coordination between the UN and the AU is faced with the daunting task of satisfying the yearning for social justice and punishing impunity by those committing atrocities against civilians in conflict situation. This is to be juxtaposed to need for maintenance of a delicate balance and sensitivity by the UN and its specialised legal agencies not to act in a manner to be perceived as undermining African peace processes. The matter concerns both state parties and non statutory political and military leaders. The Sierra Leone Special Court issued indictments against Foday Sankoh of RUF at a critical phase of that country's peace process and repeated the same with former President Taylor of Liberia. The ECOWAS leadership, then hosting the Accra peace talks, felt that the UN and agencies were undermining the peace process by acting without adequate consultations on possible implications of their actions. A similar unsealing of war crimes indictment by the International Criminal Court against President Bashir of Sudan in respect to Darfur has irked the African Union leadership.

The African Union's lack of organisational and institutional memory building skills impacted negatively on the conceptualisation of the programmes necessary to implement the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation. The UN experts find themselves in the driving seat most of the time in guiding

the AU on how to identify needs. This found expression in situations whereby AU organs and leadership personnel failed to comprehend that the objective of the Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation emanates from the AU Strategic Programme and is not solely a UN initiative. The African Union functional organisational structures need to be regularly reviewed against the evolving broad peace and security mandate. Developing capacity to absorb and manage the assistance provided by UN and international community is critical. It might be advisable for the AU Assembly to request leading African countries to commit themselves to the policy of seconding expertise to identified sectors with deficiencies and given a clear task to transfer skills to the AU personnel.

The foundation for the African Union-United Nations long-term cooperation is in place and the 2006 Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation needs consolidation through developing practical and achievable programmes and plans of action on peace and security. AU sub-regional mechanisms as basic building blocks have to be strengthened, especially the African Standby Forces and continental early warning systems. The two bodies should accelerate deliberations and reach agreement to ensure modalities for predictable funding and logistical support from UN assessed contributions. The major responsibility lies with the African Union to assume ownership and leadership of mechanisms and programmes that enhance capacity and capabilities. The African leadership had to display unwavering political will and commitment to the promotion of democracy and good governance including an end to impunity against those contravening international conventions on the conduct of war. The African Union and the United Nations have to consistently continue exploring new strategic and tactical operational methods. The United Nations, especially the Security Council, remains pivotal to the maintenance of international peace and security. The AU Peace and Security Council as a regional arrangement, complements the UN Security Council given its close proximity to the conflict situations.

Bibliography:

- Aboagye, F. 2004. *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the First African Union Peacekeeping Operation*: In Conflict Trends, No 2, 2004. ACCORD, Durban
- Aboagye, F. 2007. *The hybrid operation for Darfur: A critical review of the concept of the mechanism*, Institute of Security Studies Paper 149, Pretoria
- Adebajo, A & Scalon, H. 2006. *A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations*. Sunnyside: Jacana Media
- African Union. 2003. *Communiqué, Central Organ/MEC/AMB/Comm. (XCI), 2 April*. (Online). Available: <http://www.african-union.org>. (accessed 30/10/10).
- African Union. 2000. *Constitutive Act of the African Union*. Addis Ababa
- African Union. 2003. *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council*. Addis Ababa
- African Union. 2006. *Report on the elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development, EX.CL/274(IX)*, Addis Ababa
- African Union. 2009. *Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa, Assembly/AU/6(XIII)*, Addis Ababa
- African Union. 2010. *Report of the Peace and Security Council on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa, Assembly/AU/3(XIV)*, Addis Ababa
- African Union. 2009. *Tripoli Declaration on the Elimination of the Conflicts in Africa and the Promotion of Sustainable Peace, SP/Assembly/PS/Decl. (1)*, Addis Ababa
- Alao, A. 2000. *The role of African regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution*. The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. New Issues in Refugee Research. Working Paper no. 23. University of London
- Andemicael, B. 1994. *OAU – UN Relationship in a changing world*: In El-Ayouty (ed) *The Organisation of African Unity After Thirty Years*, London: Prager
- Andrews, K. N. & Holt, V. K. 2007. *United Nations-African Union Coordination on Peace and Security in Africa*, Future of Peace Operations Program, A Better Partnership for African Peace Operations, Issue Brief August 2007, The Henry L Stimson Centre. New York

- Bah, A.S. 2009. *Long-term Peacebuilding in Africa: Challenges for the United Nations*, Center on International Cooperation, New York University.
- Bariagaber, A. 2006. *United Nations Peace Operations in Africa: A Cookie-Cutter Approach?* Journal of the Third World Studies. Vol XXIII, No.2. Association of Third World Studies, Inc. United States
- Berdal, M & Malone, D. (eds) 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars*: Lynne Rienner
- Berman, E. G. & Sams, K. E. 2000. *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*. Geneva:UNIDIR and Pretoria: ISS
- Betts, R.L. 1994. *The Delusion of Impartial Foreign Intervention*, Foreign Affairs 73, No. 6, Washington
- Bosco, V. 2008. *The United Nations-African Union Cooperation in Conflict Prevention, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Challenges and Opportunities*, Quarterly, Year VI, No 2, 2008, New York
- Brouillaud, J. 2010. *Membership discusses Peacebuilding Progress, Security and DDR Processes, and Ways Forward at the Burundi Configuration Meeting*: In Together for a Better Peace, World Federalist Movement-Institute of Global Policy:<http://www.betterpeace.org/taxonomy/term/33> accessed 17/11/2010
- Buo, S. K. 2001. *Reflections on United Nations Peace Operations in Africa: The Responsibility of African States* – International Law FORUM du droit international 3:87-94. Kluwer Law International, Netherlands
- Cawthra, G. 2004. *A Conceptual Framework for Regional Security*: In Field, S. 2004 (ed) *Peace in Africa – Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*. Institute of Global Dialogue. Cape Town: Creda Communications
- Clement, C & Smith, A. C. 2009 (eds). *Managing Complexity: Political and Managerial Challenges in United Nations Peace Operations*. New York: International Peace Institute
- Collier, P. 2000. *Doing Well out of War: An Economic perspective*: In Berdal, M & Malone, D. (eds) 2000. *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil Wars*: Lynne Rienner

- Declaration Enhancing UN-AU Cooperation: Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union.* 2006. A/61/630, Annex. New York
- Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity.* AHG/Decl.3/ (XXIX) 1993. Cairo
- De Coning, C. 2002. *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Next Decade*, Conflict Trends, Issue No 3, 2002, ACCORD, Durban
- De Coning, C. 2004. *Refining the African Standby Force Concept*, Conflict Trends, Issue No 2, 2004, ACCORD, Durban
- De Coning, C. 2006. *The Future of Peacekeeping in Africa*, Conflict Trends, Issue 3, 2006, ACCORD, Durban
- De Coning, C. 2010. *The Emerging UN/AU Peacekeeping Partnership*, Conflict Trends, Issue No 1, 2010, ACCORD, Durban
- ECOWAS International Conference Report. 2010. *Two Decades of Peace Process in West Africa: Achievements – Failures – Lessons*, ECOWAS Commission, Abuja
- Fanta, E. 2009. *The Capacity of African Regional Organisations in Peace and Security*, ERD Workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security Institutions, and Regional Integration Mechanisms, Florence, 16-17 April 2009
- Field, S. 2004 (ed) *Peace in Africa – Towards a Collaborative Security Regime*, Institute of Global Dialogue. Cape Town, Creda Communications
- Francis, D. J. 2006. *Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited
- Francis, D. J, Faal M, Kabia, J, & Ramsbotham, A. 2005. *Dangers of Co-Deployment: UN Cooperative Peacekeeping in Africa*. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited
- Ghebdinga, T.L. 1987. *African and OAU Diplomacy in the Decolonisation Issue, 1945-80: A study of African Foreign Policy Coordination*, Ph.D dissertation, University of Aberdeen.
- Guicherd, C. 2006. *Reviving Chapter VIII: The United Nations and Regional Organisations - Partners for Peace*. New York: International Peace Academy

- Kagwanja, P & Mutahi, P. 2007. *Protection of Civilians in African peace missions: The case of the African Union Mission in Darfur*, Institute of Security Studies Paper 139, Pretoria
- Keen, D. 1998. *The Economic Function of Violence in Civil War*, Adelphi Paper (IISS) 320, Oxford University Press,
- Kodjo, E. 1984. *Introduction*: In El-Ayouty, Y & Zartman, I. W (eds) *OAU After Twenty Years*. New York: A Praeger
- Kreps, S. E. 2007. *The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and prospects for success*, African Security Review, Vol 16, No 4, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria
- LeRoy Bennett, A & Oliver, J.K. 2002. *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*. 7th Edition, Upper addle, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall
- Lund, M. 1997. *Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners*, Washington, DC: Creative Associates International
- Malan, M. 1999. *Leaner and Meaner? The future of Peacekeeping in Africa*, African Security Review, Vol 8, No 4, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria
- Malan, M. 2008. *Africa: Building Institutions on the Run*: In Daniel, D. C. F, Taft, P & Wiharta, S. (eds) 2008. *Peace Operations: Trends, Progress and Prospects*. Georgetown University Press, Washington D.C.
- Mansaray, A.C. 2009. *AMIS in Darfur: Africa's litmus test in peacekeeping and political mediation*, African Security Review, Vol 18, No 1, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria
- Memorandum on Prospects of Effective Cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations: World Summit Outcome and the 10-year Capacity Building Plan for the African Union*. 2005. African Union. Addis Ababa
- Moore Jr, J.A & Pubantz, J. 2006. *The New United Nations: International Organisation in the Twenty-First Century*. Upper Saddle, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall
- Mtimkulu, B. 2005. *The African Union and Peace Support Operations: In Conflict Trends*, No 4, 2005, ACCORD, Durban

- Mubiala, M. 2007. *Cooperation between the United Nations, the European Union and the African Union for Peace and Security in Africa: In Peace and Security in Central Africa, International Intervention in Africa – NATO and ESDP*. Studia Diplomatica, Vol LX, No 3, 2007, Brussels: EGMONT
- Murithi, T. 2006. *Towards a Symbiotic Partnership: The UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Evolving AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework*: In Adebajo, A & Scalon, H. 2006. *A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations*. Sunnyside: Jacana Media
- Muyangwa, M & Vogt M. 2000. *An Assessment of the OAU Mechanism for Conflicts Prevention, Management and Resolution, 1993-2000*. New York. International Peace Academy
- Naldi, G.J. 1999. *The Organisation of African Unity: An Analysis of Its Role*. Second Edition. London Mansell Publishing Limited
- Nathan, L. 2005. *Mediation and the African Union's Panel of the Wise*. Crisis States Research Centre. London School of Economics
- Neethling, T. 2009. *Wither peacekeeping in Africa: Revisiting the evolving role of the United Nations*, African Security Review, Vol 18, No 1, Institute of Security Studies, Pretoria
- Nicol, D. 1978. *Africa and the USA in the United Nations*. Journal of Modern African Studies 16, No 3 (365-95)
- Olonisakin, F. 2000. *Conflict Management in Africa: The Role of the OAU and Subregional Organisations: In Cilliers, J & Hillding-Norberg, A (eds) Building Stability in Africa: The Challenge of the New Millennium*, Institute of Security Studies Monograph Series. No 46, Pretoria
- Organisation of African Unity. 1963. *Charter of the Organisation of African Unity*. Addis Ababa
- Rugumamu, S.M. 2009. *Does the UN Peacebuilding Commission Change the Mode of Peacebuilding in Africa?* Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper 8. New York
- Saxena, S.C. 1992. *The Organisation of African Unity: In Politics in Africa*, Delhi: Kalinga Publications

- Thobane, B, Neethling, T & Vrey, F, 2007. *Migration from OAU to the AU: Exploring the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability*. Supplementa ad Scientia Militaria II, Saldanha
- The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. 2010. *Towards Enhancing the Capacity of the African Union in Mediation*. ACCORD website www.accord.org.za accessed 31 September 2010
- United Nations. 1945. *Charter of the United Nations*, New York
- United Nations Joint Inspection Unit. 2009. *Towards More Coherent United Nations System Support to Africa*. JIU/REP/2009/5. Geneva
- United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa. 1991. A/RES/46/152:1991
- United Nations Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa*. 2005. Appendix S/2005/828
- United Nations Security Council President Statement*. 2007. S/PRST/2007/7
- United Nations Security Council President Statement*. 2009. S/PRST/2009/3
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1625 (2005). S/RES/1625 (2005)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1631 (2005). S/RES/1631 (2005)
- United Nations Security Council Resolution 1809 (2008). S/RES/1809 (2008)
- United Nations, Concept paper on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security, S/2007/148. 14 March 2007
- United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000
- UN General Assembly Resolution: 2005 World Summit Outcome*. A/RES/60/1. New York
- UN Secretary General Report, the Role of the UN in the 21 Century*. 2005
- UN Secretary General's Fifth Report on Burundi*. 2005. S/2005/728
- UN Secretary General Report, an Agenda for Peace – Preventative Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peacekeeping*. 1992. A/47/277-S/24111
- UN Secretary General's Report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. 2004

UN Secretary General Report, *A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities*. 2006. A/61/204-S/2006/590

UN Secretary General Report, on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organisations, in particular the African Union in the maintenance of international peace and security. 2008. S/2008/186

UN Secretary General Report, on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. 2009. S/2009/83

UN Secretary General Report on enhancing mediation and its support activities. 2009. S/2009/189

UN Secretary General Report, on support to the African Union Peacekeeping Operations authorised by the United Nations. 2009. A/64/359-S/2009/470

Vogt, M.A. 1999. *Cooperation between the UN and the OAU in the Management of African Conflicts: In Malan, M. (ed) 1999. Wither Peacekeeping in Africa*. Monograph No. 36. Pretoria

Yoh, J.G.N. 2008. *The Institutional Role of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Ph.D dissertation, University of South Africa

Annexure:

A/61/630

DECLARATION
ENHANCING UN-AU COOPERATION;
FRAMEWORK FOR THE TEN-YEAR CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMME
FOR THE AFRICAN UNION

We, the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union, united in our commitment to the maintenance of international peace and security and the enhancement of development of the African continent, and desiring, for that purpose, to develop stronger relationship between our respective secretariats, have agreed to the following in furtherance of the Cooperation Agreement between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity of 9 October 1990.

1. In view of the persistent needs of the African Union to address the peace and security situation in Africa; we underscore the importance of cooperation between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) in promoting international peace and security on the African continent, especially programmes and activities that take into account the special needs of grave toll conflict is taking in many parts of Africa, we undertake to focus our efforts, with priority, on conflict prevention, mediation and good offices, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We have together identified key areas for collaboration in these sectors so to build the capacity of the African Union and ensure that our organizations work effectively together to meet the challenges to peace and security in Africa.
2. Bearing in mind the wide range of fundamental challenges facing Africa, and pursuant to the World Summit Outcome, we further undertake to deepen and broaden the cooperation between our two organizations, as appropriate, through consultations between us and senior officials, and talks at the staff level, as well as through the implementation of the projects/programmes within the context of the evolving Framework for the Ten Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union (the Framework). We reiterate that the evolving Framework should be conceived as the UN overall strategic framework for cooperation with the AU, and whose main objective should be to enhance the capacity on the AU Commission and African sub regional organization to act as effective UN partners in addressing the challenges to human security in Africa, focusing on the areas described in paragraph 6 below.

3. We re-affirm that the evolving Framework should cover all aspects of the cooperation between the UN and the AU, including but not limited to the following areas: peace and security (including crime prevention); assistance in institution building, and political and electoral matters; peacekeeping operations; governance, human rights and the rule of law; peace-building; humanitarian response, recovery and food security; social, cultural, and health issues; and the environment.
4. We recognize that the ongoing cooperation between the AU and the organizations of the UN system at the AU headquarters is the operational component of the evolving Framework.
5. We agree to align the support of the organizations of the UN system for New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) with the evolving Framework.
6. Our cooperation will continue to develop in a practical fashion, taking into account each organization's specific expertise and capabilities, and contributing to improving collaboration among elements of the international community's response to the challenges of the African continent. We are also prepared to share best practices and lessons learned. In the context of the evolving Framework, we agree to give special emphasis to enhancing the AU's capacities in the following areas:
 - a) Institution-building, human resources development and financial management;
 - b) Peace and security;
 - c) Human rights;
 - d) Political, legal and electoral matters;
 - e) Social, economic, cultural and human development;
 - f) Food security and environmental protection;
7. We agree that existing cooperation arrangements between the organizations of the UN system and the AU will continue. In addition, new cooperation projects/programmes, as well as long-term partnership arrangements with the AU and the African sub-regional organizations, should be designed within/ in the context of the evolving Framework and

- should be consistent with their specific mandates and area of competence.
8. We undertake to implement the ongoing and envisaged UN-AU cooperation programmes on the basis of the evolving Framework, the detailed Joint African Union-United Nations Action Plan for United Nations Assistance to the African Union Peacekeeping Capacity Building and all subsequent sectoral action plans.
 9. We agree to periodically review the evolving Framework at three-year intervals.

Done at Addis Ababa, on 16 November 2006,

Kofi A Annan
Secretary-General of the United Nations

Alpha Oumar Konare
Chairperson of the
African Union Commission