



# MANAGEMENT OF URBAN IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

BY

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## **DECLARATION**

I declare that:

### **MANAGEMENT OF URBAN IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA**

Is my own work, that all sources used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references, and that this thesis was not previously submitted by me for a degree at another University.

---

**DR N S MATABOGE**

(iv)

## DEDICATION

This effort is dedicated to:

My late parents Kwena and Thekiso, my wife Thabo, my son Tshepo, my daughters Constance and Harriet, all of whom are the Alpha and Omega of my very being.

(v)

## **SUMMARY**

By

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This study has concentrated on the influence of the in-migration phenomenon. In order to understand in-migration and the processes, strategies and patterns of this phenomenon, it is essential to first study the influence and impact of in-migration internationally. Internationally it was found that since the fifties, the population growth has mostly been concentrated in the developing countries and South Africa is no exception. Populations of these countries will increase from 3,6 billion to 8,4 billion by the year 2150. In contrast, no further in-migration has taken place in the developed countries since the fifties. The in-migration rate can thus be defined as the difference between the urban population growth rate and the total population growth rate and other factors which will be attended to later. In-migration is therefore the measurement of the redistribution of the population between rural and urban areas. The in-migration process is related to other aspects of the economic, social and political environment.

Various factors have been identified as having an effect on in-migration. These factors are of social, demographic, cultural and non-economic nature. In-migration can be described further by purely economic factors, of which the pull and push forces are the most important. The availability of and compensation for resources, income and price elasticity, consumer supply and demand, factor productivity and factor allocation will also influence rural-urban migration. South Africa has a dualistic system, comprising 13 different population groups. In contrast with international in-migration, in-migration in

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South Africa is characterized by a political policy that resulted in the segregation of races.

This limited the mobility of people and their choice of land ownership. In-migration in South Africa is determined by the interaction between economic centripetal and political centrifugal forces. Where in the rest of the Western World in-migration was the result of the normal voluntary interaction between economics and social forces, in South Africa it was influenced by influx control, job reservation, legislation, migrant labour and commuting.

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## CHAPTER 1

### BACKGROUND, AIMS AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH

#### 1.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview by charting the course of South African in-migration and by endeavouring to chronicle the processes involved. For example, what circumstances and factors led to, or at least were correlates of, the emergence of the first South African cities? From these incipient stages, why did it take so long for the idea of urban living to become widely established? Subsequently, in the past 200 years, why and how has rapid in-migration come about? What are the main problems experienced by in-migration? It is only by seeking at least a partial understanding of these historical facets and processes of in-migration that a realistic appreciation of today's urban process in the developing and developed realms can be gained (Potter, 1985:19).

#### 1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study attempts to highlight the theoretical and practical foundations upon which urban in-migration are based and the negative or positive influence it has. If negative influences are experienced, what measures should be taken to curb this, and if the opposite is true, what should be done to encourage in-migration into urban areas?

There are several reasons why a study such as this would be beneficial. In the first place, there is a need for a systematic clarification of what urban in-migration is and what it has accomplished. Over the years, it has been a subject of much polemic commentary, but is very vaguely understood by most South Africans and outside observers.

Secondly, this study is designed to serve as a case study, examining urban settlement as a model instrument through which the Government of National

Unity is attempting to shape the economic, cultural and socio-political development of a subjected people who craves for greener pastures.

Thirdly, this study is an attempt to show that despite the fact that South Africa has to cater for its indigenous people, there are still those who come from rural areas and other countries who would like to share the riches or resources found in urban areas, especially Gauteng Province.

### **1.3 METHODOLOGY TO BE USED**

The aims and objectives of the research project necessarily call for a large amount of data, some of which are not easily available. For data which are not available alternative methods could be applied, such as census analysis and personal interviews. The importance of demography such as population statistics, government publications and others may give information on in-migration in South Africa.

#### ***1.3.1 A study of primary sources***

The primary sources which will mostly be used will be in the form of dissertations and theses, government notices, Regulations and Acts of Parliament, and verbal information. A unstructured interview will be administered with randomly selected officials responsible for migration issues.

Despite the value of the above primary sources to get information concerning urban in-migration, population statistics of South Africa and other related information will be used.

Details about interviews, samples, sampling methods, data collection and processing will be discussed together with a data analysis in chapter 8.

#### ***1.3.2 A study of secondary sources***

Secondary sources that will be used are reference material in the form of books, journals and related material as will be indicated in the bibliography. A literature study will also be used.

## 1.4 PROBLEM FORMULATION

In-migration has received increased attention during the past few decades, mainly because of a marked increase in the nature and magnitude of this phenomenon. In-migration is, however not a new concept, as it is generally accepted that the first cities date back to 4000 BC in Mesopotamia and Egypt, to 2000 BC in China and to 1000 BC in the Andes (Peteroon, 1975:402).

Landman (1980:42) feels so strongly about the postulation of the problem and he states emphatically that the researcher who does not formulate a problem suffers from blindness regarding essentials. De Jager, Coetzee and Bisschoff (1987:24) aver that the problem is formulated according to existing needs. The presence of needs and defects points to an existing entropic situation, which should be corrected. According to Landman (1980:44) problem formulation requires the exact formulation of questions that must be answered by means of investigation. Relevant questions direct and motivate the researcher to find meaningful solutions and to disclose the reality of the phenomenon under investigation.

To avoid suffering from blindness regarding essentials, towing the line concerning existing needs, finding meaningful solutions and disclosing the reality of the phenomenon under investigation, research has to be conducted to resolve these problems caused by in-migration. If these problems are, however, neglected or ignored, without taking into consideration the tremendous socio-economic and political forces being unchanged by this in-migration process, South Africa is faced by serious problems.

Urban in-migration has become more complex as a result of various present-day problems. The <sup>crux of the problem is</sup> crux of the problem is: How can urban in-migration in South Africa be most effectively managed and administered?

## 1.5 HYPOTHESIS

The following hypothesis will be tested in the research programme: That effective and efficient management of in-migration leads to the improvement of several factors such as quality of life, reduction of unemployment, promotion of progress, strict application of in-migration policy and an elimination of crime in the urban areas.

## 1.6 DEMARCATION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

In this study an attempt will be made to select subjects or to describe them in such a way that it could be assumed that they possess characteristics typical of the larger population from which they were drawn.

- (i) The aim of this investigation is to make an in-depth or exhaustive study of all the problems related to urban in-migration within a specified geographical area of Gauteng.
- (ii) The study will be confined to Gauteng province.
- (iii) The departments of Home affairs, Foreign Affairs, Housing and Land Affairs and important others will be approached for the relevant information regarding in-migration and other related matters.

## 1.7 TITLE AND CONCEPT CLARIFICATION

In order to gain a broad perspective with regard to the management and administration of urban in-migration in South Africa, it is necessary to clarify the title and define certain related concepts.

### 1.7.1 *Title clarification*

A keen inspection of the title of this study brings to light the importance of management for the successful and efficient control of urban in-migration. The mentioned concepts will subsequently be elucidated.

### **1.7.2 Concept clarification**

#### **(i) Management**

A workable definition of management, and one that will set the stage for the whole of this chapter, is the following: the art of getting things done through people. This definition calls attention to the fact that managers achieve organisational goals by arranging for others to perform whatever tasks may be necessary - not performing the tasks themselves. Management is that, and more, so much more, in fact, that no definition has been universally accepted (Stoner & Wankel, 1986:3 ef. Hellriegel & Slocum, 1986:8 ef. Kreitner & Sova, 1986:5).

McFarland (1974:4) contends that the word “management” has several meanings, depending on the context and purpose. There is no universally accepted standard definition of management. The word manage seems to have come into English usage directly from Italian “managgiare”, meaning to ‘handle’, especially to handle or train horses. It traces back to the Latin word ‘manus’, ‘hand’. In the early sixteenth century manage was quickly extended to the operations of war and used in general sense of taking control, taking charge, or directing. It was first applied to sports, then to housekeeping, and only later to government and business.

Management means different things to different people. Management refers to certain individuals with indistinct powers who are involved in making our lives difficult. According to Robbins (1980:6) management means the people who are to blame for giving poor service, increasing taxes, never listening to our complaints, and generally disturbing our lives. Unfortunately, even for the top level decision makers, management is far less glamorous. Nevertheless, management does accomplish things through other people, and they do make decisions.

A more accurate definition of management is the universal process of efficiently and effectively getting activities completed with and through other people. Its concepts are transferable between organisations, and are as applicable to non-profit organisations as they are to the profit sector. The process refers to the planning, organising, leading, and controlling that take place to accomplish objectives, and this process can take place in any type of organisation (Berkley, 1978:2).

In summing up, it is important to state that management is a process involving human beings jointly engaged in working toward common goals. Management covers much, if not most, of the more exciting things that go on in human society.

## **(ii) Urbanization**

Urbanization is a concept that requires definition before it is of any use. A great deal has been written about the urban phenomenon and urbanisation, although in the end two definitions of urbanisation have stood the test of time. Urbanisation is defined as:

- (a) the geographic concentration of population and non-agricultural activities in urban environments of varying size and form, and
- (b) the geographic diffusion of urban values, behaviour, organisations and institutions.

Urbanisation is thus the emergence and growth of towns and the diffusion of an urban way of life embracing attitudes and aspirations as well as behaviour patterns (A' Bear, 1983:34).

The most important reason for considering urban definitions is not, however, statistical but rather substantive, for in striving to recognise the essential attributes of towns and cities we are indirectly identifying the key dimensions of change that are associated with the urbanisation process (Potter, 1985:21).

### **(iii) Migration-and-In-migration**

The relaxation of influx control has resulted in rapid urbanization, people migrating or moving from rural areas to urban areas in South Africa. In-migration could be defined as the movement of people from rural areas to urban areas as to become permanent residents of that area. Migration is defined by (Barnhart & Barnhart, 1981:1316) as the action of moving from one place or region to another. Migration of people includes both immigration or in-migration which implies the movement of people into an area, and emigration or out-migration which means the movement of people out of an area.

### **(iv) South Africa**

South Africa occupies the southern most portion of the African continent, stretching from the Limpopo river in the north to Cape Agulhas in the south. This represents a longitudinal span of 13° (22°S to 35°S). Longitudinally the country reaches from 17°E at the mouth of the Orange river to 33°E at Ponta do Ouro (RSA, 1984:1).

To the North, South Africa shares common boundaries with the territory of Namibia, the Republic of Botswana, and Zimbabwe, while Mozambique and the independent Kingdom of Swaziland lie to the north-east. Completely enclosed by South African territory in the south-east are the independent Kingdom of Lesotho. To the west, south east, South Africa borders on the South Atlantic and South Indian oceans. Isolated in the greater Southern ocean 1920 km south-east of Cape Town, lie Prince Edward and Marion Islands taken into possession by the Republic of South Africa in 1948 (RSA, 1984:1).

South Africa consisted of four provinces, namely the Cape Province, the Orange Free State, Natal and the Transvaal. In terms of the South African Act, passed by the British Parliament, the four provinces merged into what became known as the Union of South Africa from 31 May 1910 as a self-

governing dominion within the British Empire. Chiefly by the action of the then Prime Minister, Dr H F Verwoerd, the Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa on 31 May 1961 (RSA, 1984:2).

Presently the independent South Africa consists of nine provinces, namely the West Cape with Cape Town as its capital, Northern Cape with Kimberley as its capital, Eastern Cape with Bisho as its capital, North West with Mmabatho as its capital, Gauteng with Johannesburg as its capital, Mpumalanga with Nelspruit as its capital, Free State with Bloemfontein as its capital, Kwa Zulu Natal with Ulundi/Pietermaritzburg as its capital and Northern Province with Pietersburg as its capital city. (Smit. 1981:107).

South Africa has a heterogeneous population comprising many racial groups of which the four main ones are Blacks, Whites, Coloureds and Indians, with eleven recognised official languages which include Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, Setswana, Sepedi, Xitsonga, Sesotho, SiSwati, Tshivenda, isiXhosa and isiZulu (Orkin, 1988).

## **1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT**

The study is composed of nine chapters. Chapter one is introductory and presents objectives and the methodology of the research.

Chapter two investigates the historical background of the management of in-migration in South Africa.

Chapter three deals with the planning and participation for in-migration.

Chapter four deals with in-migration in the third world.

Chapter five deals with policies, economic and social forces which affect in-migration.

Chapter six is focused on population growth and in-migration in developing countries of Asia.

Chapter seven is focused on the theories and models of in-migration.

Chapter eight deals with the analysis and interpretation of several factors affecting in-migration in South Africa.

Chapter nine is the close of the study in the form of evaluation, conclusions and recommendations.

The primary aim and purpose of this report is to propose a national development plan for Gauteng and other provinces and to set out the rationale for these proposals. A secondary aim, of equal importance is to integrate with and make available, in a systematic and orderly manner, in the same report, the development of spatial settlement patterns and in-migration trends in South Africa.

The remainder of the following chapter will be focussed on the management of in-migration for the satisfaction of basic human needs. Reference will also be made concerning African in-migration on the Rand between the 1920s and the 1960s with its social character, reasons for in-migration of Blacks in South Africa, factors promoting in-migration within Provinces and the implications of in-migration for public administration. Each chapter is followed by a conclusion of the main facts, implications and proposals of that chapter, so that the main points of the report are highlighted for easy reading and understanding.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

The twenty first century may come to be seen as the age of in-migration. Urban settlements were first established more than five thousand years ago, but as recently as 1900 only one in eight people lived in urban areas. Before this century is out half of mankind, three billion people, will live in urban settlements and two thirds of that number will live in the Third World (Gilbert & Gugler, 1982:1).

One of the most salient phenomena of the twentieth century has been the process of in-migration. The problem of in-migration and especially the in-migration to South African cities needs urgent attention from multi-disciplinary fields of study. The problem of in-migration is not only topical for the African continent concerning ethnic dimensions, but more so for South Africa with its diversified ethnic composition. The South African government of the future will face unique challenges concerning in-migration to urban areas. Speedy in-migration is not unique but should be seen against the background of world in-migration which occurred in countries such as the United States of America and Australia. Botha (1988:30) states that in-migration tendencies in the past indicated that the different ethnic population groups in South Africa were not to the same extent subjected to the in-migration phenomenon. Van der Merwe (1983:46) is partly supportive in this regard and states that a settlement pattern develops through the interaction of economic and political powers that were ethnically and sharply differentiated, particularly between whites and blacks.

Historically, in-migration in South Africa has consisted of two main components. Firstly, a natural in-migration process based on the economic and social mobility of the white population group. Secondly, a regulated in-migration process based on the control of the mobility of black people.

Moreover, South Africa has a long history of planned intervention in in-migration development for political, social and other non-economic reasons (Supra, :30). However, intervention in urban development has only succeeded in postponing the inevitable economic cause and consequences of in-migration, while the welfare losses from these policies have left South Africa with an under developed urban infrastructure relative to its general economic development (Mears, 1991:2).

In South Africa, in-migration has taken place, but has been contained for some groups of the population. The constraint was highest for Blacks and progressively less for Coloureds and Indians (Fair and Schmidt, 1974:164). The in-migration process in South Africa is in many respects comparable to that of other developing countries, it differs markedly from that of industrialized countries in the past. The character of in-migration in South Africa also differs in some respects from that of developing countries today. South Africa is classified as a developing country, inter alia, because of its relatively low level of in-migration, compared to the level of economic development in the country as a whole.

South Africa is facing severe development problems because of high rates of population growth, stagnant or declining agricultural productivity, and increased migration of the rural poor to large cities. Strategic planning of the location of development and investments in ways that will prevent or reduce excessive concentration of population and productivity in large primary cities is becoming increasingly important for the South African government. Rondinelle (1985: 173) states that encouraging more widespread distribution of the population in cities and towns and policies promoting investment in physical structures, marketing, small scale manufacturing, and agro-processing in secondary cities and towns can provide a stronger base for both rural and urban development in South Africa in the future.

According to Alikhan (1987: 7) within the next century most of the world's population will be urbanized. Most industrialized countries of the north are already regarded as urbanized, while the so-called Third World countries of

the south are generally experiencing a process of rapid in-migration. South Africa, as a developing country, is also experiencing an increasingly influx of people to its towns and cities, and this wave of urbanizing people is predominantly African since the other segments of society have already become largely urbanized. This influx into the urban areas is often perceived as a serious socio-economic and planning problem (Alikhan, 1987:7).

Up to 1986 South Africa pursued a policy of racially based migration control which, among other things, attempted to prevent people from entering and staying in the city, in search of better opportunities. Fair (1969 : 342) states that the abolition of the Influx Control Act, Number 68 of 1986 may have raised fears that the country's urban areas would be overwhelmed by migrants from the homeland areas and elsewhere, that squatting and informal settlement would become the order of the day, and that cities would therefore become areas of decay. Such a scenario was, in fact, to a certain extent sketched by Mostert, van Tonder and van Zyl (1985) which was met with some criticism from Graff (1986) who indicated that some of the assumptions made by Mostert et al. (1985) were most probably incorrect and that a massive influx of people to the cities should not be expected. It is too early to tell to what extent these two sets of assumptions became true during the latter half of the 1980's and early 1990's, but there has been a visible increase in the number of people in the cities. Whether this great visibility is due to rapid in-migration from the countryside, foreign countries or whether it should be ascribed to the notion that people are no longer hiding from the public eye in their backyard shacks and overcrowded rooms remains to be seen, and has to be managed effectively for the benefit of all involved.

That being the case, the hypothesis stated has relevance and states that, effective and efficient Management of in-migration will lead to the improvement of several factors such as quality of life, reduction of unemployment, promotion of progress and elimination of crime in both urban and rural areas.

## 2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF SPATIAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS AND IN-MIGRATION TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa included a close-knit group of independent states comprising the Republic of South Africa and the former TBVC-countries, that is, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei. These four independent states were also collectively known as the Economic Community of Southern Africa (ECOSA). South Africa had the same borders as the former Union of South Africa and therefore excludes Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. The former Republic of South Africa (RSA) included the self-governing national states of KwaZulu, Lebowa, KaNgwane, Gazankulu, QwaQwa and Kwandebele. Today, South Africa has nine provinces which are Gauteng, Free State, Mpumalanga, Northern Province, Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape, Kwa-Zulu/Natal and North West.

The Republic of South Africa's population was concentrated largely in four metropolitan complexes, namely the Greater Cape Town, Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging area (PWV), Durban-Pinetown and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. While these four areas constituted only 4% of the total land area of the Republic of South Africa some 53% of the total population and about 80% of the urban population were residing here in 1980. Except for the four metropolitan areas a few smaller urban agglomerations occurred on the Free State Gold-Fields around Welkom, in the East London-King William's Town, Klerksdorp-Orkney-Stilfontein, and Bronkhorstspuit-Witbank-Middelburg areas, and in the vicinity of Richards Bay and Newcastle. Of these settlements, 266 had populations of less than 2 000, accommodating only 1,6% of the total populations (Republic of South Africa, 1985:28-29 cf. Van der Merwe, 1982:15 cf. Esterhuysen, 1989:3).

Mineral discoveries set the pattern for urban development in South Africa and led to the shift in the center of economic activity from the coastal regions to the interior. Thus, an urban core consisting of four big metropolitan areas emerged. The growth of non-metropolitan regions, some with mining and agricultural activities and their associated towns, developed as an inner periphery. The outer periphery corresponded roughly with the non-urban

areas of the national states (Friedman & Wulff, 1976:11 cf. Smit & Booysen, 1981:9 cf. Far, 1982:43 cf. Thompson & Coetzee, 1987:50 cf. Natrass, 1988:131-160). Labour, potential purchasing power and surpluses of human capital were drawn from the outer periphery to the core. These cores have attracted people, both Black and White, and capital from the rural areas because of the disparity between advanced and less advanced areas. Mears (1991:67) found that in-migration is one of the processes directly responsible for the development of spatial settlement patterns. This process is necessary in the development of any urban settlement, it is a process that requires thorough planning and preparation. Within the South African political context, forty years of apartheid ideology had a negative influence on the natural development of the in-migration process. This apartheid ideology had, as a sub-strategy, the prevention of the in-migration process of the black population groups. As a result of this in-migration strategy, unique South African spatial settlement patterns have developed. Bos (1991:45) states that the recent shift in South Africa's government policy away from apartheid or separate development to one of integration, makes it possible to put special planning in South Africa on an economic foundation. These migration patterns have created settlement patterns in South Africa. The machinery of law enforcement and the rules and regulations of the country are of vital importance in moulding the in-migration process of that particular country.

Shannon (1937:164) made the observation that in-migration was in the forefront among the numerous social-economic problems confronting South Africa. The future trends of in-migration would depend primarily on the price elasticity of the demand for gold, and the future of in-migration would further be influenced to a large extent by the demand for agricultural produce, the nature of socio-economic legislation, and the handling of the social problems arising from the needs of the different race groups.

The current human settlement is characterized by three main features, namely, the dominant position of a few large urban concentrations, the numerical superiority of certain population groups in certain geographical

areas, and the much greater density of the population in certain parts of the country in comparison with the others (Republic of South Africa, 1985:27).

The in-migration process in South Africa gained momentum with the discovery of gold and diamond and coupled also with the accompanied industrial development after 1870, this momentum began taking place with Kimberley and Johannesburg as main centers. Road and rail networks began to connect the mining industries with the harbours. Smaller towns began developing all around these connecting lines all over the country and this encouraged in-migration, towns were linked with specific functions such as industrial, transport, harbour, market and mining towns (Kamarck, 1976:168). Botha (1988:29) states that, the boom in economic activities led to an increasing demand for labour, which again went hand in hand with extensive in-migration. As can be expected on a continent where in-migration takes place at such an enormous pace and where an estimated 46% of the population lives in poverty, huge shortages with regard to housing and urban services exist.

Very few Governments in developing countries, South Africa included, have the management structures or trained personnel to run unfamiliar sites and services projects. At the institutional level, it is doubtful if local and municipal governments have the management capacity and capabilities to manage sites and services projects. The ineffective nature of public housing as an accommodation measure for the poor is due to the fact that most housing projects are designed and planned by the upper-class professionals with little empathy or appreciation for the life-style of the poor. Sometimes important decisions, concerning for example, housing, are taken for the people and not with the people and this causes major problems for both parties concerned.

### **2.3 MANAGING IN-MIGRATION FOR THE SATISFACTION OF BASIC HUMAN NEEDS**

In managing in-migration in order to satisfy the basic human needs of its peoples South African policy-makers can learn several important lessons from

the experience of other countries. Rogerson (1993:47) states that significant inputs to local policy formation concerning job creation, the provision of shelter, basic urban services or managing the urban environment may be gleaned from investigating the successes and failures of other countries, issues identified include the following: the need to plan for sustainable immigration which involves recognizing and implementing adequate solutions to problems of poverty. The most important are those which relate to inadequacies of shelter and services, lack of income-earning opportunities, and accompanying problems concerning the environment and health in poor communities.

In terms of addressing urban poverty through job creation programmes it is clear from international experience that the informal economy will assume a major role in the satisfaction of basic human needs. Duncan (1987:5) states that policy-makers must not lose sight of potential job-creation possibilities that might be gained from industrial subcontracting and linkages to the formal sector. The international experience of homework and production subcontracting is varied and offers useful insights for potential application in South Africa. The fostering of subsistence food production in cities is one unconventional proposal for addressing poverty and unemployment in cities. Smailes, (1975:8) and Jones, (1975:19) state that valuable lessons can be gleaned from the experience of a string of industrial clusters at Emilia-Romagna in Italy, Budden-Wurtemberg in Germany and West Jutland in Denmark. These areas form the basis for what is styled industrial districts based on small firm co-operation.

The Industrial Areas such as Rosslyn, Port Elizabeth, East London, Pretoria West –East and North, Olifantsfontein, Isando, Van der Bijlpark, Secunda and the others with their different industrial products if properly managed could well be fitting within the South African context and could also be viewed as potential job-creation for the people living within those geographical areas.

## 2.4 IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Several researchers such as Leistner (1963) Cf. Wilson (1972) Cf. Houghton (1973) have conducted various studies on rural-urban migration as a determinant of in-migration in South Africa. Gulliver, 1960 (infra) states that the reasons for migration differ greatly. It is, however, possible that the most important reasons for migration in a specific country can be identified, given the prevailing circumstances.

In South Africa, all four different types of migrants identified are present and are mentioned below - some types to a larger extent than others. The most typical type of migrant in South Africa is probably the migrant moving between his or her rural home and work-place. In South African literature, reference is usually made to oscillating migrants, which refers to a person whose home is so far away from his work-place that he cannot commute on a daily basis and can only visit his family periodically (Wilson, 1972:1). It has been suggested that the movement of blacks to urban areas should be linked only to the availability of housing and job opportunities in the area of destination. These and other impediments on migrants may very well influence people to move to areas closer to their homes, where they can still strive to meet their desired needs and expectations. It is stated as an example of such a situation which involves people migrating from rural areas in the Northern Province or North West Province to townships such as Soshanguve, Seshego, Alexandra, Soweto, and Leratong.

The mining industry serves as a single largest employer of migrants in South Africa today. In 1978, the mining industry offered employment opportunities to 664 571 workers, most of whom have had very little or no formal education. It is estimated (Lipton, 1980) that the mining industry accounts for 35-40% of all the migrants, the majority of which can be classified as oscillating migrants, which means they have contracts with their employers to work in the mines for a specific period before returning to their homes for some time.

In a sense the migration patterns in South Africa are structurally determined, with the result that it is highly unlikely that the present system of oscillating migration will change drastically in the near future, despite the fact that there is a tendency towards more permanent in-migration of Blacks employed in the manufacturing industry, were they were permanently urbanized especially in the four large metropolitan areas (Koornhof, 1982:62-63).

The next section will concentrate on a specific question as far as in-migration in South Africa is concerned, namely why Blacks migrate in this country.

#### ***2.4.1 African In-migration on the Rand between the 1930s and the 1960s: Its social character and political consequences.***

The consequences of African In-migration have attracted the attention of many historians and social scientists. The actual process of African in-migration by which it is meant why and how it happened – has been much less closely scrutinized. Writers have for the most part contented themselves with push and pull models: that is to say, with the pressures pushing workers to seek employment in the urban labour centres – mainly land dispossession, taxation, animal epidemics like rinderpest and East Coast fever – and the attractions luring them towards the towns above all money wages and for certain categories of people greater freedoms and opportunities (Harries, 1994: xi-xv). For the most part, such explanations serve equally well to account for oscillating migrant labour – the constant moving back and forward between the labour centres and the country – as they do to explain permanent immigration – by which it is meant the setting of more permanent roots in the towns. Or, to put it another way – they explain why men and ultimately women went out to work, but they do not explain why they decided to set down roots and remain.

Such explanations as have been advanced tend to assume a rather abstract and stereotypical character, which run generally as follows. The first generation of African urbanites in the towns were primarily mission-educated Christians who gravitated to the cities in search of better paying jobs and a

more urbane way of life. Any disposition that other groups of Africans might have had to linger in the towns was dispelled by the operation of the contract labour system and influx control. Thereafter – particularly between the 1930s and the 1950s – the mass immigration of Africans to the towns began to take place in response to the rise of the manufacturing industry, above all on the Rand, the need for a more stabilised African work-force to fill the growing numbers of semi-skilled jobs to which the growth of manufacturing gave rise and the higher wages that industrialists were prepared to pay to secure such categories of labour (Walshe, 1970):

Over the last decade, historians have begun to challenge some of these rather narrow and economic notions, but the process of questioning has still a long way to go. The first to break the mould were students of migrant labour. What their research demonstrated was that which first forced migrants to leave the countryside for the town and then forced them back – but that it was also fashioned by migrant communities themselves. Drawing on the work of social anthropologists such as Philip Mayer, they have shown how male migrant labourers in many instances deliberately chose a migrant as opposed to an urban life, deliberately left their wives and children behind and consciously encapsulated themselves in migrant social networks which quarantined them off from the settled African urban population. To sustain these goals, a migrant culture – or, rather, a set of migrant cultures – were constructed which were designed above all to preserve and develop the rural homesteads from which they had come. (Mayer, 1968)

The roles of culture and consciousness have not been nearly so well explored when it has come to the question of in-migration. A number of social anthropologists and sociologists have proposed indices of in-migration that is measures by which one can determine when a person is urbanised. Ten years in town, the presence of a wife and family in town, a professed commitment to stay in the town have all been suggested, but, with the exception of Philip Mayer in his study of East London, none really explains why and how the process of in-migration occurred (Weish, 1971). They are able to describe and explain labour migrancy very well and they do a fairly

satisfactory job of analysing and explaining second-generation urbanites. This failure, may be the product of a hidden assumption – that is that those in between are in the course of a journey from migrant to urban and are as a result a transitional category not particularly worthy of attention. The term used to describe this category – semi-urbanised – seems to reflect this view. The same silence also reflects a profound gender bias, for the more or less universal assumption is that women, whose presence is a prerequisite of more permanent urbanisation, simply followed their husbands in the latter's quest for work in the towns.

For the student of African in-migration on the Witwatersrand this perception presents at least three problems. First, for the period of discussing, the early 1930s to the 1950s, the African urban population outside of the mines was overwhelmingly migrant or first-generation immigrant in character, much of it moving between the first status and the second. In contrast to Port Elizabeth, East London, Bloemfontein, Pretoria and Cape Town, only a tiny proportion of the urban population of this period was actually born in the towns and was hence unequivocally urban (Pauw, 1963). A survey of pass records of 20,000 African men employed in Johannesburg between 1936 and 1944, for example, disclosed that in its baseline year of 1936 more than 90% of African workers registered in Johannesburg came from a home outside of the Witwatersrand and that the overwhelming bulk of these came from rural rather than other urban areas. Similarly, something like 85% of all new male workers registered in Johannesburg over the following 8 years were from homes outside of the Reef. Other less detailed sources for both Johannesburg and the rest of the Reef confirm the same impression (Buitendag, 1953:8-9). The overwhelming bulk of the African male urban population on the Witwatersrand were first-generation immigrants who were in the process of becoming urbanised – the very category most neglected in the existing literature.

The second problem embedded in this perspective of in-migration is the idea that women joined men whereas in fact women often came independently to

the town, sometimes because of broken marriages and were liable to settle more permanently than men.

The third problem which this perception of in-migration presents is that it assumes a point of completion of the process of being urbanised which is all too often not borne out in practice. What is clear from life histories that researchers have collected is that urban life for many first-generation male immigrants remained conditional. They clung onto the option of returning to their homes. The consequences of this attitude for the kinds of activities in which first-generation immigrants might have involved themselves in the towns were of course immense. It is on these issues of the move from migrant to first-generation immigrants that attention is going to be given (Bonnet, 1996:116-118).

If we cast our gaze back to the beginning of what is generally thought of as the first phase of mass African in-migration on the Witwatersrand – that is to say, the mid-1930s and early 1940s – it becomes apparent that a very large percentage of the African urban population remained in some sense or other migrant or at the very least, dubiously urban. The study of pass records to which reference was made earlier, for example, discovered that of all those employed in Johannesburg in 1936, only one-third remained in employment in Johannesburg 8 years later. Of those newly employed between 1936 and 1944, 50% had by the end of that period returned to their homes in the African reserves. These job histories point to an African working population, which was predominately migrant. A survey of the places of residence of this urban African labour force confirms and perhaps partly explains this pattern. Out of a total male African labour force of 88,000 in 1938, 12,000 or one-quarter worked as domestic servants and lived in the backyards of their employers houses. A further 37,000 were housed in single-sex industrial or municipal compounds – leaving the rather meager total of 25,000-30,000 African workers living in the municipal locations and the African freehold townships on a more settled basis. Of this figure of 30,000, probably no more than one-half worked in industrial employment and an even tinier percentage were engaged in semi-skilled work – which, as we have seen, served as the touchstone of

in-migration for an entire generation of scholars. Many sources claim that as much as 80% of the African industrial labour worked in unskilled occupations in the late 1930s and early 1940s and even though the numbers of Africans employed in semi-skilled work may have swelled by the 1950s, there is no evidence that it grew to more than 30-40% of the African industrial labour force in this period. These various statistics help explain the unbelievably high levels of labour turnover among the Witwatersrand's urban male African population in this period, which exceeded 100% in most industrial sectors and caused Johannesburg's entire male African labour force to replace itself every 20 months (I.R.S, 1960:877-886).

To make this a little more concrete, let us cite the same survey of Johannesburg pass records that was mentioned earlier. This found that in the period 1936-1944, 50% of jobs for African workers lasted less than 12 months and only 10% for more than 2 years. Lest one might be tempted to think that a kind of footloose migrancy was responsible for this situation, let us mention just one other finding of the survey from which these figures are drawn – that is that no less than 30% of job changes were the result of dismissal – which a whole variety of sources indicate are a reflection of an exceptionally racist and despotic pattern of supervision on the factory floor (Infra,p881).

So by 1944, we are confronted by a picture of strange anomalies and contradictions. On the one hand, the Witwatersrand's economy had been transformed by an incredibly intense burst of industrialisation – the value of manufacturing output, most of which was concentrated in the Southern Transvaal, had trebled over the previous 10 years – and the infrastructure of South Africa's modern industrial economy had been substantially set in place. On the other hand, the rate of in-migration – at least of African workers – had remained far behind. The social character of the African urban population was still affected by the imprint of the mines and the migrant labour system, which it had set up. Appearances in this instance were, however, partly misleading. Behind this outward immobility, other forces were at work, which were gnawing away at the social underpinnings of the old order of segregation and creating the conditions out of which the new order of apartheid would

emerge. The fulcrum of these forces was centered on the Rand, where their combined weight was on the point of tipping the balance towards large-scale immigration of the previously migrant population and towards potentially permanent urbanisation (Posal, 1991:24-25).

The forces effecting this transformation were a curious blend of the trivial and the grand, this is nowhere better illustrated than in the movement of workers from the mines to the towns. The mines had always been an important conduit for African workers into the urban areas, but during the 1940s the traffic through it grew rapidly in volume, as steeply rising prices brought on by the Second World War were not cushioned by any increases in the wages paid to African workers in the mines. Whereas industry and commerce mostly kept up with inflation through cost of living allowances, the mining magnates adamantly refused to follow suit. A stream of miners consequently began to flow from the mines to the towns – a stream which took on the proportions of a flood after the 1946 black mineworkers' strike had been crushed (Moodie, 1986).

On the mines a formalised system of wage remittances and deferred pay had been constructed which enabled black mine workers to send back a substantial share of their earnings to their wives and families in the rural areas. In the factories, however, such arrangements did not exist. Factory wages were, moreover, paid on a weekly rather than on a monthly basis. Aside from the higher wages offered in the factories, this was one of the great attractions of industrial and some other kinds of urban employment. Botha Kolobe, who left the mines for the factories in 1947 – the date of the newspaper cartoon – recalled how excited he was at the prospect of being able to get his hands on his wages once a week rather than once a month. Lobiletse Sefako talks of craving weekly wages and consequently moving from the mines to the factories (Bonner, 1995:119).

Weekly wages, however, represented a standing temptation to neglect sending remittances home. Other features of the urban situation lured workers down the same path. By the early 1940s urban workers were finding

it increasingly difficult to find suitably priced residential accommodation as no new houses were being built and many second-generation African residents in the municipal locations and freehold townships took advantage of the situation to sublet to new arrivals and demand inflated rents (Bonner, 1990:92-94).

A final rupture of family ties was often associated with the former migrant entering a new relationship with another woman in the town. A classic example of this process is to be observed in Basutoland, now Lesotho, from which country a massive exodus of so-called unattached women flowed in the 1940s and 1950s – who were in reality married and seeking out husbands who had left them unsupported at home. This quest was in many instances unsuccessful, at which point these women usually settled in town and made a living from illicit beer brewing, knitting or other informal income-generating activities (Bonner 1990:226).

Migrants living and working in the town attempted to protect themselves from the enticements of urban living by forming migrant associations which would police the behaviour of their fellows who were in danger of breaking ranks. One such migrant association was the **amalaita**, made up mainly of young men from the Northern Transvaal. The **amalaita's** main leisure pursuit was a form of boxing between rival regionally based factions, but it had a deeper purpose as well.

This sport helped men by not forgetting home and be assimilated in the location and be attracted by township women. The work of the amalaita was not to steal but to discipline anybody who does wrong. This helped people from exposing ourselves to prostitutes and shebeens. If we came across our homeboy who moved around with urban women we would attack him and beat him until he joins us. We did this because here on the Rand we came to work, not to look for wives. A woman on the Rand will never come home with you. She is going to force you to erect a home on the Rand. This would mean that you are married to her and would join her family, which is the opposite of custom (Bonner, 1995:120). Today the man lives with his urban

family in Daveyton on the East Rand, a powerful individual testimony to the subversive and siren urban forces operating in those times.

An event of truly momentous significance in shifting the balance of social forces away from migrancy and towards immigration was the wave of squatter movements, which spread across the Rand in the mid- to late 1940s. By the mid- 1940s as already suggested, every African residential area was bursting at the seams. In April 1944 a civic leader in Orlando East, took a bold initiative to remedy the situation and led the subtenant families of Orlando East onto vacant municipal land where they set up a shanty town of hessian sacks – Masakeng, the place of sacks. This single act set in motion an avalanche of movement. Men who wanted their families to live with them summoned their wives to Johannesburg to peg out a site in Masakeng. Women who lived in fear of their families dissolving once their husbands secured a job in the towns came independently in pursuit of the same goal. One gets the feeling that many people living through these events had the sense of a profound structural shift-taking place, and self-consciously placed themselves better to handle its results. One of the first arrivals at Apex squatter camp on the East Rand, informed the people about the movement of people towards resources, and we agreed that the mines were moving to the Orange Free State, so the people decided to move to Apex (Bonner, 1995:120). A woman, whose husband was a boss boy on the mines, arrived at a similar conclusion. She decided that mine accommodation was unreliable and proceeded to stake out a site at the squatter camps called Tent Town. These examples could be multiplied many times over. As a result, in the years following the initial land invasion of 1944, wave after wave of squatter movements swept over different areas of the Rand until in excess of 100,000 persons had housed themselves in these settlements. (Bonner, 1990:92-93).

The land invasions of the late 1940s and the squatter settlements that resulted forced the hand of white officialdom and ultimately produced a radical shift in state policy under the new nationalist government. Despite initial beliefs to the contrary among white officialdom and the white citizenry, it quickly became established that virtually all of the camp dwellers were in bona

vide employment on the Rand: they therefore, had to be housed somewhere (C.A.D; 1947). The squatter settlements in which they had congregated were, however, viewed as serious threats. They were self-administered and totally out of the control of the authorities. They were unhygienic and they were consequently deemed to be both a short-term and long-term menace to social order and public health. After an agonizing policy reappraisal, the Johannesburg City Council decided to accept the permanent presence of these communities in town, but to convert them into controlled site and service camps.

Once the Afrikaner Nationalist Government came to power, another component was added to the policy equation. One of the most powerful constituencies that had carried the nationalist to power in 1948 was a white farmer who had become increasingly agitated at the draining away of the labour supply to the towns. In flat contradiction of the old conventional wisdom on apartheid – which saw it as endeavouring to turn all African urban workers into rightness temporary sojourners in the towns – the new Nationalist Government decided to stabilise the existing urban population in family units and family accommodation and use this to provide for the city's labour supply. This meant, among other things, the provision of rudimentary housing and education for this newly settled urban population. At this point they hoped to draw the line and employ more stringent influx control measures to keep new immigrants out and reserve their person for farming and mining's labour needs (Bonner, 1993:23-33).

Squatter movements, site and service schemes and, ultimately, the scores of matchbox houses that were erected in the newly built townships decisively altered the dynamics of African urbanization on the Rand. From the 1940s until the mid-1950s virtually no new single-sex male hostels were built either by the municipalities, who were prohibited from doing so by their resources into family housing or by employers, who were prohibited from doing so by the Department of Native Affairs and were enjoined to employ township rather than migrant labour. At the same time, the old inner city locations and the African freehold townships like Sophiatown which had housed so many

migrant subtenants were dismantled while the peri-urban areas were gradually cleared of their shack dwelling populations (Lebelo, 1970). For those who wanted to maintain a migrant life style, the problems of acquiring the appropriate space – and, as we shall see, of finding suitable employment niches as well – were growing steadily more intractable. Increasingly, to gain access to accommodation, it became necessary to gain access to a site in an area and service scheme. And to do this one was expected, in the language of the times, to be ‘in family circumstances’. Many men who had hitherto worked on the Rand as migrants now took the critical decision to bring their wives to live with them in the towns.

The consequences of this shift to the site and service camps were incalculable. Once a man’s wife was living with him in the town, his ties with this natal home invariably weakened and he tended to return much less frequently. Those who established new relationships with other women found it next to impossible to maintain a family in the countryside and a family in the towns. Apart from the costs of supporting another wife and the higher rents that were usually charged in the new townships, the very form of the housing exerted its own insistent and insidious pressures.

‘This kind of house whispers to you that it needs more furniture’, one new immigrant told Philip Mayer’s research team in East London and hire-purchase sharks were always at hand to enable the immigrant to fill up the accusing spaces – which again involved additional charges on income. All too often the outcome of these larger and smaller changes in living arrangements meant the abandonment of the migrant/immigrant’s family in the rural area. A policeman in the East Rand observed, that broken marriages are due to lack of housing. But this was by no means one-way traffic or a one-way process. The abandonment of men and women was common, because marriages were not arranged according to proper procedure. The image that was encountered in the 1947, newspaper cartoons and the idea that is so deeply embedded in most of the literature on urbanization of the more or less orderly movement of families to the town – the simple transposition of family life – is thus at least partly misleading. So

too is the notion of a permanent and unconditional move to the town. Many who retained access to rural resources might enter purely temporary urban liaisons. Only those without land, without stock or without parents would unproblematically cut their ties with their homes.

#### **2.4.2 Social character of in-migrants**

Within these rapidly changing material and social circumstances the character of social and political life went through a correspondingly radical series of shifts. By the early 1920s the outlines of a core urban culture were beginning to take shape on the Rand. Much of this was being moulded in the inner city slumyards, places like Doornfontein, the Malay location and Ferreirastown. In some respects this new urban culture mirrored any other urban culture of poverty, with its multiplicity of mechanisms of sharing and social insurance, but what was particularly noteworthy about the culture of Johannesburg's slumyards – especially given the nature of the wider South African society – was its multiracial character. Here Africans, coloureds, Indians, Chinese and whites lived side by side in some kind of symbiosis and many of the key institutions of the new urban society bear the dual stamp of poverty and racial admixtures: the stokvel from the Eastern Cape, the shebeen from the Western Cape, marabi music with its rich blend of musical forms, 'flaaitaal' a mixture of African languages, Afrikaans and a bit of English, and so on (Coplan, 1985:560).

The composite culture that was forged in these slumyards has had a major influence on black urban culture on the Witwatersrand today, but this was only accomplished after a lengthy period of contestation with other cultural forms imported from the outside. From the late 1930s to the mid- 1950s this urban culture was being swamped by repeated waves of immigration to the Reef. During this period immigrants streamed in from every corner of South Africa, bringing with them a breathtaking diverse set of experiences and cultures which repeatedly remoulded the urban culture that had been formed.

A few experiences will be explored and in particular to plot some of the journeys that brought such people to the towns, for they are not only remarkable in their own right, but also left a deep imprint on the consciousness and attitudes of those that undertook them. The first example is that of long-distance migrancy to the Rand. A common thread in the life histories of many African migrants to the Reef is a contract – a join – or a series of contracts on the mines. In the early years of the century many tramped the weary miles to the mines on foot. Among the most grueling and indeed, epic journeys, were those undertaken by labour migrants from Mozambique.

A man, for example, left his wife and child in 1932 to set out for the Rand. Together with three friends, he walked through central Mozambique, through the Kruger and other game parks to the Rand. It was wild country and they were often worried by lions. At night they slept up trees: during the days they often had to literally scavenge to survive – a lion kills provided welcome sustenance, for example. At times swollen rivers and swollen legs delayed them for days before they ultimately arrived in Pretoria and then joined up on mines on the Rand. After working a 6 month contract, this person escaped the party that was taking him back to the train which would have transported him back to Mozambique and made his way to the West Rand where he ultimately found work as the caretaker of a school.

There followed a job as a dishwasher and then a chef in a restaurant – at which point his patient climb up the job ladder was arrested, literally, for not being in possession of a proper pass. On his release Herman sought sanctuary in the anonymity of the major freehold township of Newclare in the western suburbs of Johannesburg, where he suffered from gang assaults from a second-generation urban youth and the theft of his possessions by the women with whom he lived. Shortly after this his fortunes began to improve: he met and married another South African woman, acquired a pass by underhand means and moved into the squatter settlement in Kliptown. After several successive changes of job and place of residence he was ultimately

able to secure a safe haven at the site and service scheme at Chaiwelo, where he lives now (Coplan, 1985:112).

What is so graphically evident in the first person's life is its hardship, its instability and insecurity and the constant changes of tack he was forced to make in order to survive. The second example – while different from the first example in a host of respects share these characteristics at least. The second person was born on a farm near Vryheid in Northern Natal. The terms of his father's tenure were that his children worked 6 months on the farm each year. For him this meant backbreaking labour from dawn to dusk – he claims he could always distinguish people who came from the reserves from those who came from white farms because those from the reserves – here I quote him – always lagged behind with their jobs compared with the person from the farms who grew up under the harsh control of the Boer farmer. He spent the other 6 months of the year working as a gardener in Vryheid, but on returning from the town found himself coming into conflict with his employer and particularly his employer's sons. They began to perceive him as putting on airs – this seems to have consisted mainly of wearing proper clothes instead of rags – and as infecting his fellow workers with ideas above their station. He was picked on and assaulted by the farmer's sons and his family began to fear for his safety and even his life. They therefore happily acceded to his idea that he takes a contract on the mines. After a 6-month contract at Anglo Mine – during which time he took night classes with mine clerks – he made his first move to break his way into the increasingly barricaded world of the towns.

The year was 1953 and by now newly legislated and more restrictive influx control laws were making entry in the urban areas an increasingly hazardous business for newcomers. He was consequently obliged to seek a bridge into the towns with a company whose low wages and bad working conditions required them to recruit illegal unregistered labour. His place of residence was the twilight world of the peri-urban plots – the smallholdings around the Rand's towns, which were intermittently subject to the raids of mounted police. After being caught for a third time in these swoops he was subjected

to one of the formative experiences in the lives of many – a spell behind bars. For 14 days Shadrack witnessed or was subject to various forms of humiliation and abuse, mainly from the prisoners but sometimes from the guards – such as beatings, homosexual assault, being forced to sit for long periods on an imaginary chair and so on. Such was his despair at the end of his sentence that a warder took pity on him and interceded with the Bantu Commissioner's Office to enable him to get a legal job in one of the major engineering factories in Alberton's old township, where he subsequently married. When asked whether these abuses and injustices had drawn him towards political organisations, he replied. Not at all, I think that was because we were only preoccupied with our survival (Bonner, 1995:124).

Other people came more or less directly to the Rand. More common was for immigrants to come via more staggered and circuitous routes. One of the principal sources of immigration to the Rand was the farming and reserve areas of the Northern Transvaal.

In the later 1930s and early 1940s, many young men ran away from their homes without the permission of their parents because they wanted money – above all, it seems, to buy respectable clothes – or, as one after another of them says long pants. Another person for example, ran away from his home near Bochum in 1936 in the company of several friends. A spell of work on an orange and biltong farm near Acornhoek ended after his employer assaulted him for some misdemeanor and he ran away. Then, after several false starts, he found work on a farm near Mariepskop in the Eastern Transvaal where he learnt of better paying jobs on the neighbouring Eastern Transvaal mines. Having taken up employment there he married in 1941 and only then, after 6 years, re-established contact with his family. This person was by this stage either consciously or unconsciously gravitating towards the Rand. Through his father in-law he found a job on the railways, after which he took employment with a construction company in Benoni, only to run away shortly afterwards because the work was too hard.

There followed an 8-year spell with Benoni Municipality, during which he lived in a municipal compound. In 1949 Stimela finally broke into the magic circle of the firms – initially into heavy manual labour with the engineering firm Head Wrightson and then into much coveted semi-skilled machine operative work. Only in 1950 did Stimela bring his wife from Marble Hall to the newly formed Apex Squatter Camp. Only then after negotiating a lengthy obstacle-strewn route did he finally establish roots in the town (Coplan, 1985:111).

Many women arrived on the Reef in the same way as others did, but the journeys of others were accompanied by much more hardship and heartache. Mrs K, for example dutifully waited for 5 years for her husband to return home without him putting in an appearance. This put obvious strains on her marriage, but her mother-in-law was equal to the challenge. She was, as Mrs K recalls, firm. There were three brides of three brothers at her homestead and she would check them every night. She would come asking for matches or some other pretext. If your door was not locked she would assume you were expecting someone. Mr K, meanwhile, having moved from the mines to the factories, was behaving in a much less exemplary fashion, spending his time and his money on women and liquor. Eventually, Mrs K's parents intervened to save what was beginning to look like yet another broken marriage and instructed Mrs K to go herself to the Rand to seek out her husband, which she successfully did.

Other women were not so fortunate. A certain lady was born in Teyateyaneng, Lesotho, in the early 1940s. Her family was desperately poor, possessing not even a calf. In her late teens she was abducted by her husband-to-be in a fashion that was becoming increasingly common in Lesotho at that time. It was customary in such instances for the man to pay compensation to the wife's family, but in this instance her husband did not. Instead, after fathering two children he vanished to the Rand. She was left destitute, and she migrated to the Rand, where she joined women friends in the same position and earned a living in the slums of Johannesburg and Benoni brewing beer and knitting woolens. Before long she acquired – the leader of a Basotho ethnic gang called the Ma Rashea or Russians. In this

matter she had little opinion. In those times, it was not possible to live without a man, but Russian men conferred little security on their women. Men would declare – that a woman is not a good investment and desert her. A pervasive vulnerability thus marked their lives as well – a point driven home in this case when the husband was hanged for the murder of two policemen (Bonner, 1995:124-125).

A number of points emerge from these individual histories – the driving pressure of poverty, social instability and a curious mixture of caution, determination and unquenchable hope. Time and again these remarkable individuals, were shaken by adversity and misfortune. Time and again they surmounted it. They did this by drawing on their own spiritual resources, but they also found support and insurance in other forms. It is to these that we now wish to turn.

Once thrust into this extraordinarily fluid and heterogeneous urban environment – and it is the heterogeneity which is revealed in these life histories which marks the Rand off from any other urban center in South Africa – both migrants and immigrants sought islands of security within the prevailing anarchy of the towns and did so most often by clustering together with those from their home region. As a result, particular jobs and particular neighbourhoods often became the preserve of particular ethnic groups. A distinct occupational and regional ethnic geography of the Witwatersrand began to emerge. Flat cleaning and hotel work, for example, became largely the preserve of migrants from the Zululand and Natal Reserves. Building workers were drawn disproportionately from the Transkei. Municipal workers hailed mostly from East Griqualand and Tembuland, commercial workers from the Orange Free State farms and heavy industrial workers from Basutoland (now Lesotho) and particular areas of Zululand. Partly reflecting this occupational distribution, particular areas of the city were colonised by different regional and/or ethnic groups. The north and north-westerly districts of Johannesburg, for example, were disproportionately made up of immigrants from the Western Transvaal, the central areas of Johannesburg from those from Zululand and so on.

A variety of social institutions also played a role in helping people to accommodate to and cope with this new and alien urban environment, the most important of which were religious sects, migrant/immigrant associations, squatter movements and gangs. Churches, particularly those of the faith-healing variety, were powerful sources of comfort, community and support in an otherwise hostile urban world. Casting out spirits, healing through prayer and the administration of holy water provided urban dwellers with ways of handling misfortunes, injustices and illnesses in the face of which they were otherwise powerless. These churches also provided new bases of discipline and order in an otherwise anarchic and, as migrants saw it, decultured urban environment. Mrs K,s husband was drunk until he joined a church in 1963. Rose M,s husband regularly chased other women and drank until, to quote her words, 'He joined the Twelve Disciples Church and became a responsible man (IWC, 1988:874-875).

The squatter movements, which became such a prominent feature of urban life on the Witwatersrand in the 1940s, can also be viewed in a similar light. The key need, which the squatter movements addressed, was obviously affordable housing, but what is so often overlooked is their role in providing order and stability in a rootless and impersonal urban world. Security is something which we are apt to take for granted until it is not there, as most people in South Africa are all too aware of now. One of the characteristic features of black urban life in South Africa has been the persistent abdication by the state of the ordinary duties of maintaining security and order. Policing of black communities has centered instead on bureaucratic offenses, such as infringements of pass and permit laws, liquor contravention's and so on and the authorities have sat idly by when crime, faction fighting or neighbourhood and domestic violence have broken out. In the late 1940s the squatter leadership stepped into the void, providing policing and forms of social regulation which the state largely withheld. Street and ward representatives were appointed, police forces were formed and squatter courts were set up to discipline those guilty of disturbing domestic harmony and neighbourhood peace. It was the performance of these latter functions, which almost certainly explains why the most active and vociferous supporters of the

squatter leaders were women. In the new townships that were built in the 1950s, Advisory Boards, civic guards and traditional courts – known as makgotla – continued to carry out these functions, often in the face of official censure. The street committees and people's courts of the 1980s thus have a longer lineage and deeper credibility than is sometimes imagined and constitute a tradition of popular self-governance upon which a new South Africa might be well advised to draw (Bonner, 1990:92-94).

The last immigrant institution, which is to be discussed, is the migrant/immigrant gang. The most influential and notorious of these was the Basotho ethnic gang called the Ma-Rashea or Russian. The origins of this gang can be traced back – perhaps not entirely coincidentally to 1947 the date of the newspaper cartoons – when increasing numbers of Basotho migrants on the mines were beginning to take jobs in the heavy engineering sector in the towns. To begin with these Basotho migrants/immigrants coalesced into two rival gangs, the Russians and the Japanese. As news of Hiroshima and Nagasaki began to filter through, the name Japanese was quietly dropped in favour of the common title of Russians and two new factions, the Matsieng and Ha-Malapo, based in different regions of Lesotho, took its place. From this point Russians engaged in an uninterrupted sequence of fights, between themselves, with youth gangs whom like all migrants and immigrants they loathed and with other ethnic groups, particularly Zulu, Mpondo and Bhaca. Benoni, Newclare and Soweto were the main sites of these battles – in which up to 1000 combatants would engage – but they also spread across the length and breadth of the Rand. At one level the Russians fought because of a love of fighting, in which they had been schooled as herd boys in the mountains of Lesotho. In other words, it was a product of rural socialisation. At another level, though, the Russians banded together to establish a measure of security and control in a forbidding urban world – security against the depredations of tsotsis, of which all migrant and immigrant groups were particular targets, control over housing and squatter camps at a time when residential space was at a premium – they, for example, literally evicted all non-Basotho groups out of Southern Newclare in 1953 – and especially control over the squads of Basotho women who were

flocking to the Rand. Two of these themes emerge in a celebrated fight between the Zulu hostel dwellers and the *Russian* residents of the Asiatic area of Benoni. Helen Khoesnoe took up the tale. 'The Zulus', she says,

Have a tendency to seduce a woman whether or not her husband is present. This happened on one occasion in the Asiatic section of Benoni, and the Basotho present beat the man. The Zulus at the Benoni hostel, therefore, decided on a fair fight. They went in person to the administrative offices on Third Avenue. The police discouraged them, but nevertheless gave them permission.

The ensuing battle was bloody. Both the Zulus and the *Russians* secured reinforcements from all parts of the Rand. The Zulus advanced at the appointed time from their stronghold in the hostel to the *Russians'* base in the Asiatic quarter of Benoni, where the *Russians* ambushed them and put them to rout with considerable loss of life.

In these stories we can identify some of the core values of immigrants and core elements of social conflict and unrest – the widening of an individual conflict to a broader ethnic constituency, the belief in police connivance in ethnic conflict, an idea which of course is alive and well today, the respective areas of turf's which each group dominated and protected, the extent to which competition over women underlay conflict between ethnic groups and the idea of a fair fight, a practice immigrants believed to be alien to urban tsotsis and urban youth in general and which was the source of a deep rift between these two groups.

What does all of this tell us about the political capacity or potential of black urban society in the 1940s and 1950s? The answer is a great deal. As we have seen, the majority of the African urban population of the Reef was immigrant. As the various journeys to the city that were described demonstrates immigrant life was a daily struggle for survival and daily quest, as it were to take roots. Urban society on the Witwatersrand was also highly heterogeneous and fragmented – infinitely more so than in any other urban

center in South Africa. Immigrants sought above all to create islands of security – islands which were in many ways isolated or cut off from other groups around them and very different from one another. Even the largest of these islands, the squatter camps of the 1940s evince this profound parochially. None of the squatter leaders was capable of cooperating with any other, still less with the national political leadership of the African National Congress. That leadership was in any case relatively uninterested in the bread and butter concerns of the locations, at least the Vigilance Association of Orlando East in the 1930s and, because the African National Congress was inactive at that level, only joined the organisation to which he was to contribute so much in 1940. His verdict on the African National Congress of the 1930s in many ways holds true for most of the 1940s as well. Trade unions for their part were crippled by the high turnover of labour and often remained isolated and based in single factories (Bonner, 1990).

These patterns began to change in the late 1940s and 1950s. The stabilisation of the African urban population in the new urban townships that began to spring up around the Rand had a generally leveling and homogenising effect on the Reef's population. Whereas previously it had been scattered and often atomised in the backyards of white householders, in smallholdings surrounding the towns or deposited in the congested yards of African stand holders in the locations, it was now brought together in a single area, under a common administration and sharing roughly similar conditions of life.

From the mid 1950s these much more broadly shared conditions of life included shared immiseration. Towards the end of 1954 the Minister of Native Affairs, H F Verwoerd, imposed economic rentals on all municipal housing, causing rentals to rocket up to 75% of their previous level. Since costs of transport to work had also doubled or trebled as a result of the distance of the new townships from places of employment and real wages had been declining since 1948, residents began to experience an intense common economic squeeze. This bred a sense of collective deprivation and common purpose among urban communities along the Reef and particularly among its growing

second-generation population, which by the late 1950s had begun to manifest itself in bus boycotts and one pound a day campaigns (French, Mpanza & Sofasonke party, 1980).

The new pass legislation, which was put into operation at the beginning of 1953, had an analogous set of effects. New immigration was obstructed and slowed down, allowing a common core urban culture to reassert itself once again. Many immigrants who might otherwise have returned to the countryside for longer or shorter lengths of time now chose to remain in the towns rather than run the risk of losing the urban foothold others struggled so hard to secure.

For a number of those who were to become future political leaders, the iniquities of the pass laws were the spur that drove them into political organisations. John Nkadimeng, subsequently an important African National Congress and, South African Communist Party leader recalls how he was jailed for being out of work in 1950 and sentenced to 21 days at Newlands: 'And I saw things there that I never expected to see. Terrible, I was absolutely angry, I was sick here, I just didn't know what to do with this thing. Because I knew I had not committed any crime. I knew that I hadn't done anything wrong! Except this bloody rubbish! And they took me to jail for such a long time, and they got me mixed up with terrible criminals!' Upon release he immediately volunteered for the Defiance Campaign. The key politicising moment in the lives of numerous other African political leaders is uncannily similar (Nkadimeng:1993-1994).

As a result of these developments a new sense of common identity can be seen to be stirring in the latter years of the 1950s which overrode many of the ethnic and social divisions which had characterised the previous two decades. This is not to say that new divisions did not simultaneously emerge, particularly those centered on generational differences, but they were not as subversive of collective purpose and action as the earlier forms of cleavage had been.

Youth gangs still engaged in ferocious battles with each other over township turf and football clubs remained parochial and small-scale – Orlando Pirates, for example was still a tiny neighbourhood club, just the same as all the rest. Trade unions often remained isolated and based in single factories. But a gradual process of coalescence was taking place, which would manifest itself in the political ferment of 1959-1961 and would then be masked by the blanket of repression that was thrown over South Africa in the following decade. It is in many ways the harvest of that generation that we are reaping now (Maguire, 1991).

### **2.4.3 Reasons for in-migration of Africans in South Africa**

African migrants in South Africa have been referred to by Houghton (1960:179) as *men of two worlds*, indicating the tribal world in which they are brought up and usually also retire; and the modern industrial world, in which they spend most of their working lives for longer or shorter periods. Mears (1991:48) prefers to see these people as *men of three worlds*, indicating the country home, the White town where they find employment and the adjoining African town where they live in *hostels*. This description of people from different worlds touches the roots of this phenomenon in South Africa, namely the non-permanence of migration, which is already in existence for more than a hundred years. The bridge which has been built to replace people from the area of origin to the area of destination has indeed become two-way-traffic lanes, with people moving in both directions, at short and long intervals (Koornhof, 1982:63).

Economic factors play a predominantly important role in the decision-making process of migrants, with non-economic factors in a supportive role in this process. On the in-migration process in South Africa, Mitchel (1958:23) writes that the key factor is the economic one: all other causes of migration can be removed, save the economic one, and there would still be in-migration. Further north in Africa, in the former Tanganyika, Gulliver came to a similar conclusion when he studied the migration process there; when he states that the incentives for labour migrants are primarily and pre-eminently a desire for

cash and material wealth which are not available away from work (Gulliver, 1960:161). It is these economic necessities, or lack thereof in the rural areas, that causes people to seek that which they desire in other areas, all other factors are secondary. In this regard Gulliver (supra) concludes that the reasons why so many thousands of Africans go away to work are not explicable in terms of man seeking travel and adventure, new experience, the wonders of the white man's world, wanderlust, the evasion of filial duties or political obligations, or others of the employers' and White man's stereotyped myth. Some of these kinds of factors may be involved marginally for particular individuals.

In a study by Leistner on the economic aspects of Black migrant labour, he confirms that economic factors do in fact play a dominant role in the decision-making process of migrants. In almost 72% of all the responses in his study, it was found that economic motives played a crucial role in the motivation for going to work (Leistner, 1963:116).

The roots of the decision to leave an area, mainly because of economic factors involved, are to be found in most cases in the rural areas, where lack of opportunities, poverty, illiteracy and population pressure often give rise to conditions of unemployment or underemployment, in which people simply have to leave in search of better opportunities. In this regard Leistner, (1963:199) concludes that growing population pressure on rural resources is the principal cause for labour leaving the land - non economic factors generally play only a subsidiary role.

In many cases the land tenure system is responsible for pushing people away from an area, for example where division of land among sons implies that each has too little to survive, with the result that they leave their rural area.

Economic pressure on people in rural areas in the form of poverty and overpopulation (Union of South Africa, 1946, par 59-1, cf. Lourens, 1979:53), often switches to a wish or for that matter a desire to earn money, in order to satisfy their many desires. Experts such as Dubb & Williams point out that to

earn money summarises the reasons why people move to urban areas (Dubb, 1937:44, cf. Williams, 1971:149).

Traditionally, African economies have been subsistence economies with little, if any, specialization and production for the less prosperous days to come. For this historical reason, many Africans have come to towns and cities to supplement a failing subsistence economy in the rural areas, which is normally used for one or more of the following purposes (Dubb, 1937:445):

- (i) to supplement the shortage of food in the tribal or subsistence economy;
- (ii) to purchase cattle for lobola (bride's price);
- (iii) to buy tools and implements for agricultural purposes and to buy consumer products;
- (iv) to pay for taxes imposed by administrations on the indigenous population;
- (v) to give financial support to members of the family in the rural areas;
- (vi) to enable children in the rural areas to attend school, and
- (vii) to satisfy the demands for European artifacts and foodstuffs.

If it is to be accepted that the motivation to earn an income does in fact play a significant role in the decision to migrate, one is tempted to ask in what way it will influence Blacks to migrate to urban areas inside the rural areas instead of migrating to the large metropolitan areas such as Gauteng. From this situation it can be concluded that the rural areas have apparently been incapable of creating the necessary job opportunities to, among other things, initiate a healthy process of in-migration. Benso (1980:111).states that in 1980/81 various authorities voted only 18,3% to be spent on the creation of job opportunities and the ways and means to earn an income in the various rural areas.

The general conclusion is that blacks migrate mainly for economic reasons. More specifically, the vast majority of blacks migrate in order to survive. This does not necessarily deny the fact that there are many other possible reasons for migration, as indicated earlier. These reasons may, however, to a large

extent be linked to the motivation to earn an income and to the desperate need to find accommodation and employment. Black in-migration is an unstoppable reality descending on the South African community, with effects that will be felt in virtually all spheres of life.

The socio-economic and political implications of such rapid in-migration in South Africa are indeed critical in that South Africa is least equipped to absorb its growing urban population. This means that the impact of future in-migration will press most heavily upon the societies of the world that are at present the most deficient in economic, technological and managerial resources that are essential for the accommodation of very high in-migration rates (Benso, 1980:113).

There are other factors which have contributed to the in-migration process in South Africa, especially in Gauteng Province. A closer look will now be taken at these factors.

#### ***2.4.4 Factors promoting in-migration in Gauteng and other provinces***

The crucial importance and implications of population growth in the world at large and in Africa in particular are cause for concern. South Africa, as well as the various surrounding national states such as Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, are no exception with regard to this phenomenon. The factors which have promoted in-migration in Gauteng and other provinces will be dealt with in the following paragraphs to indicate their effects on several issues.

The first factor contributing to the increase in the urban population in Gauteng Province and other provinces is experienced by the government of National Unity. This is done by the purchase of land which is added to the provinces. The result is that boundaries of these provinces are changed and that people who have resided in other areas are now included in Gauteng and other provinces (Smit, 1977:19). The greater part of such added land is geographically adjacent to other provinces. Sometimes these added areas

are proclaimed as townships and then regarded as urban areas. Such a step, when it happens, helps to increase the urban population of such a province.

A second factor contributing to the rapid increase of the urban population of Gauteng and the other provinces is the government programme to resettle blacks from time to time, either from badly located areas, or from white rural areas. It is, however, believed that this type of resettlement is substantial (Smit, 1977:20).

A third factor promoting in-migration in Gauteng and other provinces is the provision or availability of housing in the urban areas. The number of housing units in proclaimed townships have increased. The provision of adequate housing for all has been one of the new Government's priorities since it came into power in 1994. The Government undertook to build 2 million low cost houses in a five-year period (Mthembi-Mahanyele, 1997:6).

Since then the realities of South Africa's economic compounds and political transition period intervened. What intensifies the problem is that the Gauteng Province's population is set to double over the next 14 years, with more than 20 000 people moving into Gauteng Province every month. This puts pressure on the province's already strained resources and infrastructure. According to 1997 figures released by the Department of Housing, the tempo of housing has picked up, a total of 248 100 houses had been built or were under construction. However, with the rate of building industry's growth in the order of 4% in 1996, 1997 is showing significant growth in the provision of affordable and low-income housing, due largely to the concerted efforts government and private sector have made in this area. This growth is not only expected in the area of the provision of Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) housing, but involves the entire building and construction industry (Mthembi-Mahanyele, 1997:6).

A fourth factor contributing to in-migration is the depressed conditions in certain African countries such as Lesotho, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola affected by wars and in poor rural areas in South Africa. In many

instances people have no option but to leave the area in order to survive. They either go to a nearby township or migrate to a metropolitan area where they usually have some contact.

A fifth factor promoting in-migration is the drive to create job opportunities via the decentralization of industries. The Central Government encouraged industrial development just outside towns and cities since 1960 (Smit, 1977:25). These industries, which were established with the aid of concessions, needed a capital investment of R299,9 million and employed 21 693 Blacks (Benso, 1980:80). In retrospect, this approach was not very successful. The new dispensation to promote industrial development, which came into effect on 1 April 1982, offered incentives at a higher level, while the nature of the incentives had been changed. The emphasis has shifted from various forms of tax advantages and rebates to concessions offering more cash advantages and incentives, such as training, housing and relocation allowances.

The last factor promoting in-migration in Gauteng and other provinces are the so-called process of *stepwise migration* where migrants use such a township as a *stopover* before migrating to urban areas further away. Two factors stimulate this process: In the first place there is a tremendous overcrowding of people in the already poverty-stricken rural areas which leaves a section of these people with no option than to leave their area in order for them and their families to survive. Secondly, because of Government laws and regulations, and a shortage of houses and definite employment opportunities in an around metropolitan areas, many of these people and their families are prevented from settling in these urban areas.

In conclusion, it can be stated that economic factors, notably the urge to find a job which will have a compensation in cash or kind in order to survive, are primarily responsible for in-migration in Gauteng and other provinces, supported by political factors, sociological factors and individual preferences. Government - induced actions may either promote this process or prevent it. That is why today there are shanty towns, housing thousand of squatters,

around great industrial centers such as Alexandra in Johannesburg (Koornhof, 1982:77).

#### ***2.4.5 Implications of in-migration for public administration***

The changes facing South Africa may well affect our entire existence, and one would be unnatural not to feel a certain amount of fear and uncertainty about the future. However, these changes are inevitable, and we will live with them or be prepared to destroy ourselves and our country. The manner in which our public administration will be able to cope with radically changing conditions will be vital, and probably the most radical of these changes will be the public administrator's ability to deal with the process of in-migration.

The measure of success which South Africans will achieve in regard to in-migration will decide the destiny of our cities and country and also determine to what extent growth will be stimulated with resultant improvement of the economy. South Africans have reached a turning point in the in-migration process and South Africa has changed from a rural oriented country to a predominantly urban society requiring specialized attention. The future of South Africa, be it political, social or economic, will depend on the manner in which the phenomenon of in-migration is managed (De Beer, 1989:3).

The most important question every administrator has to ask himself is whether he is prepared to implement fully and unconditionally all policies flowing from these implications. Implementation of policies specifically includes policies which will affect our traditional concepts of public administration, and will inevitably require a radical change of our traditional perceptions.

Public administration's top officials have the tremendous task to acquaint themselves fully with the new circumstances, the contents, objectives and consequences of the several new policies and strategies; warning against impractical and unattainable objectives or policy ends; by exposing differences between reality and policy; influencing the negotiation process; avoiding surprises in the implementation process and creating unattainable

expectations. The involvement of these officials at the same time in the negotiation process for acceptable structures of Government on the national, regional and local levels demands almost supernatural qualities which will tax the will of contrivance of those in public administration to exhaustion (Griffiths, 1991:154).

The public administrators will have to be innovators, mentors and guides for the blending of traditional administrative principles with new demands. Their task will become extremely onerous, and some may find themselves unable to cope with the demands made on them by the administrative processes of the changing environment. But many will accept the new challenges with zest and zeal and these will be public administrators who will in the end ensure that the new era in South Africa will become known as the age of opportunity and development.

Lubout and Hanes (1991:28) state that the future is more promising, since there are options available whose effects are to relieve poverty. Policies that are intended to overcome the inequitable and inefficient design of the cities; to increase the number of jobs in poverty-stricken regions; and to improve working conditions on the farms; all of these constitute ways in which an in-migration policy can reach out to the poor. It would be a mistake, though for the public administrator to believe that an in-migration policy can, on its own, solve many of these problems deemed to be in-migration problems; many problems are found in cities or regions rather than actually being a problem of that city or region because the policies formulated are correctly utilized and implemented. Thus the Government might attempt to relieve the shortage of housing located within the city, but the central problem may actually lie with national economic policy and the slow growth of employment, which together prevent the poor from being in a position to afford their own housing.

The main task for public administration is to develop strategies and respond to certain challenges. There is, for example, the large and growing population of people from near and far with different cultural backgrounds, different trades, skills, attitudes, habits, status and power. This gives rise to the need for a

new system of social control, a cosmopolitan set of laws, regulations and conventions. Whether it be administration, defence or trade that has given rise to a town or city, the human factor is always prominent. Things tend to get accentuated in the city or town; the best and the worst of human activities become evident and therefore demand the public administrator's attention.

The main cause of accelerated in-migration are rapid population growth and the inability of the rural areas to support this growing population. New priorities, strategies and methods should be clearly established by the public administrator. One of the tasks of the public administrator is to ensure that sufficient land where people can settle, is identified. In this process, the present utilization of land and physical and socio-economic planning, as well as the people involved, communities and community structures have to be taken into account (De Beer, 1989:2).

## 2.5 CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that in-migration has reached such enormous dimensions that it may very well become a threat to mankind itself, if not handled properly. What is more important is the pace or speed with which this phenomenon is approaching mankind, especially in South Africa. Time will not permit mankind to deal with this problem on an *ad hoc* basis. What is needed is planning, logic and vision.

These are in short, the most important factors promoting in-migration in South Africa. The next chapter will focus more specifically on the planning and the people's participation in in-migration. As far as the contents are concerned, paragraph 3.1 of this introductory chapter contains a general explanation of what planning and participation for in-migration entails and that there is no assurance that the spontaneous workings of the private and public economy will lead us into a world it would be called our own, and so it behooves us to rethink planning in terms of conditions, understandings, and needs of our time. Reference was also made in passing to the actual planning involving local government in informal settlement in order to give some insight into the

way in which this plan could be utilised for accommodating strategies of in-migration such as physical, economic, social and cultural developments. The remaining part of the chapter consist of two parts. Part one contains all relevant information about planning requirements and principles such as equity, sustainability, validity and implications of planning and development which are relevant concerning planning and participation for in-migration. Part two deals with planning and people's participation which deals with the nature and the problems of public participation encountered which affect the welfare of communities and this warrants strict in-migration policy.

## CHAPTER 3

### PLANNING AND PARTICIPATION FOR IN-MIGRATION

#### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The post-industrial world into which we have stumbled is filled with terrifying uncertainties. It is revealed that there is no longer surety of the course to be taken. The environment has become murky. The inefficiencies of centralism have become apparent to nearly everyone. Yet it is precisely under such conditions that some form of planning for in-migration is needed. There is no assurance that the spontaneous workings of the private and public economy will lead us into a world it would be called our own, and so it behooves us to rethink planning in terms of the conditions, understandings, and needs of our time (Kok and Gelderblom, 1994: 1-2).

In-migration in South Africa is at present a fairly worrying phenomenon for the government concerned. At this stage it is not possible to say that South Africa will not suffer the same fate as places such as Mexico City, Cairo, Lagos, Calcutta and Shanghai that are referred to as examples of in-migration. Purposeful action to try and prevent large-scale land invasions as well as the provision of adequate physical and social infrastructure over a long term can contribute towards obviating such a scenario. In this process environmental conditions should be thoroughly taken into account, and planning should be undertaken more proactively than reactively as is now the case. Otherwise, the effective and efficient management of in-migration will be threatened and this will lead to crime, unemployment, low quality of life and progress will be affected negatively.

The phrase *planning for in-migration* has particularly become a misnomer in a number of Third World Cities. In some of these cities it appears that planning has been lagging behind developments, partly as a result of futile attempts to order the development of the city in the past. Will the same apply to the South African city of the future? The argument in this chapter will indicate that it need not necessarily come to that, provided that certain basic principles

such as equity, sustainability and viability are adhered to. The position is clear : South Africa will require sound planning and research to get through the current bottlenecks and policy transitions. A new kind of urban planning and urban policy framework is therefore needed. Such a framework will have to satisfy a number of criteria. These are the following:

- i) It must firstly be able to reach a decision to do mobilization from below. Given the level of mobilisation in communities, it seems unlikely that even a democratically elected government will be able to re-impose its will in any absolute way. Any attempt to plan in the traditional top-down style of the apartheid past is unrealistic and therefore bound to fall. It is also morally unacceptable. Community involvement in planning will have to move beyond the lip service that has been paid to it in the past. At the same time such a revamped planning framework must develop the ability to mediate between interest groups. This refers in the first place to conflicts between vested interests such as middle-class property owners on the one hand and inhabitants of informal settlements on the other, that is, between the powerful and the powerless. In such a case planning procedures will have to be worked out that give serious consideration to the interests of the powerless. Romanticised conceptions of the community as if it is something that always acts with a unified will, should be guarded against.
  
- ii) There are also some technical criteria, such an urban policy framework will have to satisfy. It should be able to encourage a more compact urban form, thus as well as the need for transport subsidies. It should be affordable, satisfying the burgeoning need for shelter and services. The mobility of people should be facilitated as much as possible, thus enabling them to move to areas of greater opportunity. Finally such a policy will have to be able to address the inequality of life opportunities between classes and between regions.

It will clearly not be easy to formulate a policy that can satisfy these requirements. The heritage of past policies and the lack of funds for

development impose strict constraints on our ability to implement new policies satisfactorily. The discussions that follow are an attempt to explore ways to overcome these constraints, yet satisfy these criteria.

### 3.2 PLANNING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Well functioning local governments in informal settlements, for example, are necessary if the violence in the country is to stop. The problem of violence cannot be solved only at the provincial and national level. Conflict at the local level is mostly about local resources and not necessarily only about national politics. This means that we have to give some attention to the link between local government and planning in South Africa.

Wren (1980a:148) states that it is undesirable to be dogmatic about the question as to whether the emphasis should be placed on either central or local levels of government, but then goes on to say that the responsibility for achieving development objectives should rather rest with first or second-tier governments. This is the area of government which has no contact with and feeling for the people, because they can not easily identify the problems encountered by their constituencies and be able to resolve them easily and faster, to the satisfaction of all.

The term “*development objectives*” used by Wren (Supra, 1980a) is probably too vague for our purpose. The level of responsibility surely depends on the specific objective to be realized. For example, the provision of electricity and water requires a large economy so that national or provincial utility companies such as Eskom and the Rand Water Board will be able to provide the services; while the upgrading of internal roads and streets probably fits in better with local governments. It is further doubted whether Wren’s quote necessarily applies to the main local governments of large cities such as Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town. It is possible therefore, that Wren’s conclusions reflect a generalization that does not take into account the potential roles of some local governments in the planning process.

It is proposed that, in spite of the fact that local governments are not necessarily closer to the **grassroots**, they have the potential to be the most

responsive in terms of community interests. This may be ascribed partly to the fact that local government officials live in the community itself and should therefore be more accessible. National government tends to be influenced by strong lobbies where ordinary citizens have no say because they are not present in the capital city. Local government therefore has an important role to play in the planning for in-migration. The local government officials should not only be visible during election periods but even after elections so that they can uncover the people's problems and to eliminate confusion and frustration the people experience.

### **3.3 LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AN INFORMAL SETTLEMENT**

In South Africa the development of informal settlements is likewise subordinate to the political process. Before the scrapping of influx control, squatter settlements were simply bulldozed. Although some categories of Africans did have the right to be present in the urban areas, most were tolerated there as long as they were gainfully employed. Squatters in South Africa according to Cole (1987:15) had to conduct intense political struggles in order to win the right to settle in the urban areas. The most famous such struggles were probably those of the people of Crossroads near Cape Town and Alexandra in Johannesburg. Since the scrapping of influx control in 1986 there has been, in principle, no legal obstacle to settle in the urban areas, but that, unfortunately, may be that the situation is merely transformed to one reminiscent of Latin America. The right of squatters to live in certain areas such as Diepsloot to the north of Johannesburg, certainly seems to be highly contestable. Leadership position in squatter settlements often seem to be usurped by self appointed leaders. Examples are Johnson Ngxobong-wana in Crossroads (Cole 1987) and David Ntombela near Durban in KwaZulu-Natal (Minnaar 1992).

Free-standing informal settlements are sometimes the personal power bases of individual strongmen, often referred to as squatter leaders. These squatter leaders run their settlements along highly autocratic lines, allocating sites and securing services in return for rent and allegiance from the inhabitants. They

often run private armies with which they maintain discipline and enforce their power, and sometimes mobilize the community for specific political purposes.

From the viewpoint of supplying basic services, the squatter leaders might be seen to facilitate informal settlement. But the cost in terms of insecurity, dependence and exploitation is often high (Minnaar, 1992:29). Relevant examples are those of Jeff's squatter camp in Saulsville, Mushengu squatter camp in Mamelodi, Gee Gee squatter camp in Soshanguve and Pholapark in Thembisa.

In South Africa the leadership of these self appointed leaders often also assumes quasi-traditional forms (Phillips & Swilling 1988:41), with some authority delegated to headmen appointed by the self appointed leader. The right to acquire land in an informal settlement is also subordinate to the acceptance of the political authority of the self appointed leader, which is similar to the situation in tribal tenure areas. Some informal settlements are located in areas of tribal tenure, in which case the leadership would naturally assume a traditional form. Informal taxes also have to be paid to the self appointed leader which are often not accounted for (Phillips & Cf. 1988:41&72; Cole, 1987:69, 84&110) and often seem to be nothing but an avenue for the enrichment of the leadership.

The establishment of a new system of local government in these settlements is another priority. Such a system must be as open and accountable as possible. Although it is furthermore probably impossible to remove national politics altogether from the local arena, local political outcomes and the effectiveness of local decision-making, should depend as little as possible on national politics. Local leaders should consequently be able to bargain on behalf of their communities without becoming involved in national patronage networks. To this end possible future roles of civic organizations in local government should be investigated (Phillips Silling 1988, cf. Shubane & Madiba 1992).

### 3.4 ACCOMMODATING STRATEGIES OF IN-MIGRATION

Accommodating rapid in-migration processes is a challenge in any country also in South Africa with its history of racial prejudice and apartheid policies. Since accommodating strategies should necessarily be aimed at the needs of the urban poor, the challenges are formidable in view of South Africa's past which caused major backlogs in the provision of urban housing, employment and land.

Accommodating strategies should be aimed at physical, economic, social and cultural accommodation of people, particularly in the major urban centres where influx of *outsiders* is usually the greatest.

#### 3.4.1 *Physical development and in-migration*

People should be housed in decent structures which can proudly be called home. Land for housing should be provided well in advance, but, because of the strong resistance by the more privileged groups, the State is experiencing numerous problems trying to provide such land. Given the existing and expected future housing shortages, land for Africans' housing should however be provided in the cities at a much higher rate than has been the case up to now.

Owing to the sensitive nature of housing for people in an urban context where a variety of vested interests are in question, there is a danger that poverty could be exported from the cities to the rural areas. Therefore, South Africa has over the years become accustomed to the fact that African informal housing is hidden behind the *curtain* of a rural boundary. Although it happens fairly often in other parts of the world also in South Africa, that the poorer segment of the population in cities commutes over large distances (Shryock & Siegel, 1976:89), such a situation is not necessarily desirable, since it can have far reaching implications for the quality of life of poor people.

The housing situation in South Africa is indeed unique. The present anomalous state of affairs in which simultaneous shortages and surpluses of housing are experienced is a direct consequence of the restriction imposed by

the Group Areas and Influx Control legislation on the natural expansion of residential areas, the downward trend in the economy, the lowering of real incomes and the decreasing demand for white housing (De Vos, 1989a:35).

The abolition of influx control in 1986 has made it necessary, however, to look afresh at the housing plight of the African urban population. Illegal forms of squatting are the order of the day in most African urban residential areas and elsewhere in the cities and South Africa is no exception. In various parts of the country migrant-labour hostels are sometimes heavily overcrowded with relatives and friends living unlawfully with the registered occupants. These observations point to the enormous housing need in the cities.

Housing needs according to Kok and Motloch (1992:162-167) often vary according to income. Those with no income or whose income is unstable, generally require institutional or other forms of welfare housing. People who earn stable and at least upper-middle incomes are more likely to prefer the security home-ownership. Persons with lower or lower-middle but relatively stable incomes are more likely to have a need for rental accommodation than for either welfare/institutional housing or a privately owned home. Housing also needs to vary according to the stability of residence. People who see themselves as only temporarily in town may not want to make permanent investments and may therefore prefer rental accommodation.

Whatever the current housing backlog in South Africa, the African population experiences large-scale housing shortages. This obviously applies to the Witwatersrand, *supra* (Glover and Adler 1987:36). In Urban Foundation (1991c:23) it is stated that there were more than 7 million people living in urban informal housing (such as in free-standing shack settlements, backyard shacks and outbuildings) in 1990. Of the 7 million, 5 million were said to be located in and around the major metropolitan areas of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) area, Durban, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, East London and Bloemfontein, while the remaining 2 million were found in and around other cities such as Pietermaritzburg and the Orange Free State (OFS) Goldfields, in smaller cities and towns such as Witbank/Middelburg,

Kroonstad and in dense settlements such as Bushbuckridge in Eastern Transvaal. This indicates the housing needs of the poorest segment of the urban African population, who cannot be expected to take full responsibility for the acquisition of land and for the erection of a relatively permanent housing structure.

It cannot be expected of any government to bear the full responsibility for housing its people. However in this respect South Africa can be singled out as a country that has achieved much in the field of housing. Housing for all population groups was provided to an unparalleled extent, and townships such as Soweto near Johannesburg and Atteridgeville, Soshanguve and Mamelodi near Pretoria developed rapidly, albeit without the necessary commercial and industrial components to provide the residents with shopping and job opportunities to reduce the need for relatively long-distance commuter transportation (De Vos, 1989:5).

The recognition of the permanency of Africans in the city and the abolition of influx control brought about opportunities that Africans did not have in the past. During the late 1980's notable progress was made with the provision of housing for middle and higher income African families. Large numbers of houses were built in new elite suburbs in the African residential areas. In this way provision was made for conforming the acquired upward social mobility of a large component of the urban African population and the scrapping of the Group Areas Act may have speeded up this process. The private sector is making use of the new opportunities and is contributing significantly to reducing the backlog in housing. These developments are promising with a view to the future, but the large number of African families who do not have the financial means to afford permanent housing should still be borne in mind (Kok and Gelderblom 1994:105-106).

Affordability in the housing context is defined by Kok, Hall and Nieuwmeijer (1992:218) as the ability of households to repay loans used for the construction and purchase of houses, and to pay for the provision of services and related infrastructure. The amount of money that a household has

available for these expenses depends upon the household's income and spending preferences.

Blair, (1971:231) states that not even with the aid of industry, foreign governments and international agencies can the housing problems be overcome if the major target is mass housing for wage-earning people because wage earners constitutes only a minute proportion of the able-bodied urban population. For every person employed in formal industries, business and government structures there are scores of self-employed artisans and traders, and thousands of unemployed migrants and their dependents. These groups form the human core of the urban housing problems, and are, therefore, the major markets for low-income and non-income housing. Therefore, when Tomlinson (1990a:84) states that the issue for the poor is not one of access to housing - this costs too much - it is one of access to serviced land, he may have to be taken seriously.

### **3.4.2 *Economic development and in-migration***

People should have jobs. This simple statement fails to indicate the enormous challenges it implies. If we are to face these challenges effectively, new economic developments and solutions are probably required, and we may be forced to move away from what Max-Neef, Elizade and Hopenhayn (1989:33) call the economic failures of the past.

An in-depth study of economic development and how urban growth relates to it is necessary to describe a framework within which economic development and in-migration can possibly function. A brief review about this will be dealt with.

The current way of in-migration has the potential of creating job opportunities and long-term activities on a huge scale, which will contribute to a new phase of economic growth in the country as a whole. The unavoidable fact of large-scale in-migration in the near future must be managed in a way which will ensure the maximum realization of its positive economic potential and an intensive investigation must be conducted in all fields by experts, in order to

find a method through which it can be accomplished. The creation and provision of job opportunities must be an important consideration in the establishment of informal settlements (du Plessis, 1993:164). Economic possibilities which are created by the daily needs of the growing number of urbanized people, such as the provision of goods and services, must be used extensively in order to stimulate urban economy, and create job opportunities. Every local authority must find ways to identify new opportunities as well as existing obstacles and create opportunities for formal and informal participation in the economy. In the light of the current unemployment, local authorities must give sympathetic consideration to labour-intensive methods to institute an infrastructure and supply services. While doing that, indirect benefits of the suggested policy such as social peace resulting from large-scale employment must be counterbalanced against possible economic disadvantages (President's Council, 1992:136).

Probably one of the best answers to the question of what economic development entails, is supplied by Kindleberger (1965:3) who states that economic development involves both more output (economic growth) and changes in the technical and institutional arrangement. It refers in other words to both functional and structural changes. Smailes (1975:17) is in agreement with this description by writing that development requires social and cultural change as well as economic growth hence, development means change plus growth. Economic development in this sense includes various forms of growth, including urban growth, because urban growth also involves functional and structural changes within a community. Development and growth are thus interrelated, at least up to the point where the urban economy is still dynamic (Conroy, 1975:10).

It could be stated that housing is a highly visible dimension of poverty. Perhaps that is why it represents such an emotive issue in so many Third World cities, with South African cities being no exception. The sight of thousands, and often millions, of people huddled in shabby accommodation with a minimum of servicing is certain to evoke some reaction from politicians and governments.

While economic development represents, on the one hand, changes in the allocation of inputs and in the structure of outputs by sectors, and changes in functional capacities on the other hand, that is in physical co-ordination or learning capacity, the best measurement of economic accommodation is the gross national income over a time period. A more efficient measure of the level of economic accommodation is income per capita, which serves as an indicator of the efficiency of individual production. As already indicated, there is a relationship between economic development and growth to the extent that growth is not an end in itself, but a performance test of development (Streeton, 1981:9).

This study is primarily interested in in-migration within the framework of economic development in South Africa, particularly in the Gauteng province. Urban growth can be described as the increase of population in an area or place earmarked for urban development. In the absence of economic development, there can be no urban growth, which implies that urban growth can be stimulated in the presence of economic development.

It has been earlier determined that people move primarily for economic reasons, that is, to find jobs and to earn an income. In Nigeria, one of the major reasons for migration is the wide income differential between urban and rural areas favouring urban workers (Fapohunda, 1980:33). Social amenities such as clean water, the availability of transport and housing, the concentration of industrial developments in urban areas and political factors have also supported urban growth. The same scenario is experienced in South Africa in, for example, Johannesburg in the Gauteng Province.

It is highly unlikely that high urban growth rates can be recorded without the stimulation of the informal sector in urban areas. It cannot be denied that the informal sector causes the growth of slums, but neither can it be denied that it can play a generative role in urban development, notably in the creation of jobs and entrepreneurship. A team of the International Labour Organization (ILO) noted in this regard in Kenya that it is in (its) workshops that practical skills and entrepreneurial talents are being developed at low cost (supra:44).

It is also capable of making a contribution to the non-market production of the gross national product of a country.

There are however, also positive economic consequences of in-migration in South-Africa. These include the creation of jobs and income through the concentration of people (which serves as an inducement to investment), the stimulation of many non-agricultural sectors (especially the secondary and tertiary sectors), and the stimulation of trade, especially in the export of locally produced goods and services. Urban development can also foster balanced regional growth in that it concentrates economic activities in certain centers, while also serving a large interland. It is these positive factors of urban development that should be pursued in an in-migration strategy (Koornhof, 1982:209/210).

From what has been said in this section, it can be concluded that urban growth and economic development are related in a positive way. In the second place it is possible to direct urban development to such an extent in a deliberate manner that it will be able to produce positive economic results, especially as far as balanced provincial or regional development in the wake of high population growth rates is concerned. Unfortunately, in South Africa the implementation of a political ideology has led to an unbalanced urban growth structure, especially as regards the urban growth in the rural areas. It is of crucial importance that this situation be rectified in a responsible and co-ordinated national in-migration strategy.

Following are specific strategies whereby the maximum job opportunities can be created by exploiting the in-migration process:

- (i) Informal settlements must be positioned close to urban growth points.
- (ii) Industrial development must be encouraged in areas where the potential for economic growth is highest.
- (iii) The possibility of de-regulation must be investigated further.

- (iv) Job opportunities inherently attributable to the process of in-migration must, where possible be provided, on a priority basis, to new urban people.

The potential of the informal sector to provide jobs and income to large numbers of people must be encouraged by creating the necessary opportunities. This can happen with the support of organizations such as the small business development corporation.

Due to the fact that the majority of the people who enter cities as squatters or as informal settlers are very poor and unemployed, and since these circumstances have a negative effect in the long run on these people personally and on the city as a whole, strategies must be planned by central government in conjunction with local authorities in order to find ways of improving the economic circumstances of the newcomers to assist them to overcome their problems in a dignified manner (President's Council 1992:136). In order to prevent false expectations for the naïve masses, the local authorities, in conjunction with the private sector and representatives from the communities concerned, must create realistic community and economic development strategies which must be implemented on a structured basis.

### **3.4.3 Social development and in-migration**

People require frequent contact with relatives, friends and other acquaintances. Social development means that people should be given the opportunity to make friends and interact informally with others of their choice and in their immediate vicinity. To what extent are long commuting hours (and therefore little leisure time) compatible with social development? How can new residents in an area previously occupied exclusively by people of a different race/culture be assisted in making friends in their new area of residence? These are the kind of questions planners will have to ask themselves if they are to play a significant role in accommodating people socially.

There are also other social factors which encourage people to move from one area to another in search of peace and harmony. Some people are forced by other factors which motivate them to want to change from the traditional and social restrictions which are placed upon them. Unwin (1989:25) agrees with above statement and states that social factors must be interpreted as the urge that people have to break away from traditional and social constraints placed on them in rural areas. The aggression of local leaders as well as the willingness of people to accept change fall in this category. Other social influences are people's perceptions, that is, specific preconceived ideas of thinking regarding change within their frame of reference, specific developmental ideologies and differences in class. The above-mentioned social factors influence the flow of resources between the rural and urban areas.

Further social factors that may lead to in-migration are internal rioting and wars. Refugees are driven from rural areas and look for refuge in the cities. It was especially the case in India during the late forties. It is currently the case in Rwanda, Congo, Lesotho and other neighboring states, with the result that refugees flee to countries such as South Africa. Civil division took place and approximately 16 million people have fled from the rural areas to the cities. Revolution made the rural areas extremely unsafe. The same situation prevailed in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, south Sudan and Zaire (Gilbert & Gugler, 1982:55).

#### **3.4.4 Cultural development and in-migration**

Cities are places of cultural diversity and cultural expression. People rely on their cultural values and norms in their interaction with others and their cultural identity (as expressed by the mother-tongue, the arts and artifacts) should be respected before one can speak of their cultural accommodation. What role can urban planners play in this regard? Perhaps our urban planners can do more in terms of a needs assessment before starting with designs and other plans, and not rely on architects, artists and the like to implement cultural development in the later planning stages.

to development. Maitlana continues and states that employment is seen as

This statement is supported by Du Plessis (1993:36) who states that the migration decision is not made in isolation and the decision to migrate is usually made by an individual or often by a group. Three patterns exist in the third world whereby migration takes place: temporary migration whereby men are parted from their families; migration of households to urban areas which return as a whole to the rural areas at a later stage; and permanent migration and eventual settling in the cities. Many of the migrants already have settled families in the cities and this *extended family* serves then as basic security when the decision to migrate is taken.

Having conceptualized the phenomenon of cultural diversity and having described the reasons for in-migration, the process of in-migration in South Africa in earlier days was culturally influenced because in places such as former Transkei, Lebowa, Bophuthatswana and the others, people were automatically classified citizens of these homelands without their concern but were classified accordingly to the language they spoke. As a result of these facts an increasing pressure is being exerted on the government of the day to do away with classification based on race, colour and religion.

### **3.5 PLANNING REQUIREMENTS AND PRINCIPLES**

Development is impossible without economic growth. It is, however, also true to say that real development cannot take place in the absence of equity, and that development which is not sustainable and viable cannot be real. Higher productivity, economic growth and employment are often put forward as the only criteria for development. It is true that people can only be productive if they are healthy, well-fed and properly housed, and that they can only be fully productive if the formal-sector of the economy provides them with the necessary opportunities. Economic growth is necessary to provide these opportunities, but it is not of overriding importance. Malhorta (1980:18) puts the economic issue into perspective by stating that economic growth, although much maligned in recent years, is still necessary; but it should not be the only goal and must be seen as one of the components of an integrated approach to development. Malhorta continues and states that employment is both a

means as well as an end in itself, in terms of the use of labour resources for production and for providing income to people as well as dignity and meaning to the lives of individuals (supra: 3.4.1). Strategies for providing accessible health facilities, sufficient and affordable housing, adequate food, security and suitable jobs are therefore needed. Planners have a vital role to play in this regard. (Emmett, 1990:52).

So far in this chapter a large number of planning requirements and developments have been discussed. In summary, it is necessary to touch upon a few of the most basic, and at the same time also the most important concepts. It is proposed that the basic objectives of development and planning at the national, provincial or local level should perhaps be: equity, sustainability and viability.

### **3.5.1 Equity**

Equity or distributive justice, is achieved, among other things, by meeting the basic needs of the underprivileged section of the population. The elimination of abject poverty should therefore be the crucial objective of a development and planning strategy. Basic needs not only refer to physiological requirements, but the concept should be seen as dynamic and relating to the socially acceptable minimum standard of living commensurating with the stage of development in a country at a given time.

Equity can only be achieved through true public participation. People's participation is both a means and an end, but perhaps it is more an end in itself, because in social and political terms, it is the sine qua non of development, particularly at a local level. Just as implementation is the touchstone of planning, people's participation may be looked upon as the touchstone of the unified or integrated approach to development.

People's participation is part of a true democratic system which allows everyone, even the smallest and the poorest, to participate not only through (genuine) representatives but also directly, and the devolution of political power to the smallest village to ensure real democracy at all levels. These

are the means of such great significance and importance for people's participation that they may be looked upon as ends in themselves. People's participation, in turn, is also expected to lead to the inculcation or development of democratic values, and thereby to strengthening democracy, which is an end in itself (Malhorta, 1980:19-20).

### **3.5.2 Sustainability**

Self-reliance, which is the will to make use of all available domestic resources and to rely on one's own resources for self-sustaining development is an essential component of sustainability. Reliance on external aid as the sole or major source of development has proved to be disastrous in many a country over the last few decades. Self-reliance again must be looked upon as a goal worthy of emulation not only at the national level but at all other levels – regional, local as well as intermediary. Max-Neef, Elizade & Hopenhayn (1989:48-49) believe that it is only by generating self-reliance, where people assume a leading role in different domains and spaces, that it is to promote development processes with synergetic effects that satisfy fundamental human needs.

The possibility of repeating a development successfully in another place at another time, which has come to be known as replicability in the literature on development, is also an important element of the concept *sustainability*. Another essential component of sustainability is the maintenance of an ecologically sound use and management of finite and renewable natural resources such as soil, water, air and forests. Maintaining an ecological balance is not only an important means but should be seen as a highly desirable objective of any well-integrated development strategy (Malhotra, 1980:20).

### **3.5.3 Viability**

Closely related to sustainability is the much needed objective of viability of development and planning strategies, programmes and projects. It is proposed that viability should be interpreted to include not only economic feasibility but also considerations of social, political and strategic viability.

An example of the consequences of non-viable strategies and programmes was the policy of apartheid cities for the Africans on the fringes of the metropolitan areas and the resulting programme of deconcentration-point development. One consequence was the fact that the incentives for industrialists under this programme may have been largely wasted, particularly on those industrialists who wanted to relocate from the central parts to the outskirts of the cities. Another consequence of the deconcentration-point policy was that it contributed to a deconcentrated form of in-migration by locating future industrial growth at dispersed points within about an hour's drive of the cities, in close proximity to areas of displaced in-migration (Tomlinson, 1990a:32).

Since the programme has not been altogether successful, billions of rands had to be spent on subsidising the large number of people to commute between these peri-urban settlements and the city because these deconcentration points did not offer sufficient job opportunities. Tomlinson (1990a:34) summarises the consequences as follows: Clearly, the apartheid city is an extraordinarily inefficient and expensive city, both for the government and for the majority of its inhabitants, whose quality of life, productivity and material circumstances are negatively affected.

Growth pressures on the larger cities are inexorable. In order to cope with these problems of commuting between these peri-urban settlements, South Africa needs an in-migration strategy that includes a variety of policies pertaining, for example, to transport, housing, services, and the local economy. Ideally, the location of industrial zones and investment in infrastructure will be of great assistance.

#### **3.5.4 Implications of development and planning**

In line with Malhorta (1980:21) it is for us to emphasize two points with regard to the objectives mentioned above. They are, firstly, not only inter-dependent and inter-linked but must be looked upon as a single package, which means that they should not be traded off against one another. Secondly, the

objectives should be stated clearly to devise appropriate strategies and mechanisms, among other things, for the purpose of monitoring and evaluation.

Some of the implications of development and planning objectives are the following:

- (i) Migration control and close-city policies, such as the influx control practiced in South Africa for about fifty years are not compatible with any of the goals.
- (ii) Accommodating strategies, including affirmative action, are needed to reduce the abject poverty we find in South Africa. Although apartheid cannot be blamed for all the ills in our society, it certainly contained major elements of inequity, lack of people's participation, very limited sustainability and, despite noteworthy attempts by the government to nullify its effects, it dampened productivity, and reduced economic growth and employment creation.
- (iii) Access to opportunities is a central implication of these goals, and that means a positive approach to in-migration. Opportunities which are not available are one thing, but restriction on access to those opportunities that are actually available is a recipe for disaster. If planning does not aim to maximize all possible forms of access to all the available opportunities, it is not worth practicing.
- (iv) These objectives also mean that facilities and services should be affordable for the target population. For example, private sector housing cannot meet this requirement if one takes into account the fact that a very large portion of south Africa's population cannot afford to pay for housing without forfeiting even more basic necessities such as food.

This section contains broad opinions and principles that are perhaps more relevant now than ever before. First and foremost is the principle of participatory planning, coupled with equity, sustainability and viability, which should accompany measures of increasing productivity (through education and other means), economic growth and employment creation. Without that, planning is bound to remain being seen as an euphemism for the bureaucratic disruption of people's lives (Manuel, 1990:15).

It was pointed out that strategies that are aimed at accommodating the poor should deal with the need to accommodate them physically, economically, socially, culturally and politically. People need access to opportunities, and such access should never be the sole privilege of the more fortunate members of society: it should be purposefully made applicable to the poor. The poor need growth and development to make them feel that they are part of the community they live and associate with, if they are able to access resources they will attach meaning to it and feel that the economic, political, social, cultural and physical factors are something to associate with and progress will be experienced and achieved. Their living style will be focused on progress and success for the benefit of all and they will ultimately feel that they are not poor but rich as human beings and they can then contribute to the success of the community in which they live.

Unfortunately, mere access to such opportunities may not be enough. People may have to be assisted to make full use of the available opportunities. This means that self-reliance, an important condition for sustainable development, should only come into play once access to opportunities has been ensured.

If this conclusion is taken to its logical consequences, people living in formal neighbourhoods which are threatened by land invasions may in fact be experiencing as much poverty as the squatters themselves. Everyone's needs should therefore be addressed. This is why it is important to take note of the implications of adhering to the following three basic planning requirements and principles: equity, sustainability and viability. Basic to all equitable, sustainable and viable planning actions in participation is needed

because without that planning is bound to remain being labeled an euphemism for the bureaucratic disruption of people's lives. It is proposed that planning for people should develop the rationale for urban planning and design that responds to the consistency and variability of human needs, motivations, perceptions and cognition. For the principles of equity, sustainability and viability to succeed, interdisciplinary, knowledge-based, cross-cultural participatory planning, and community-building are needed.

### **3.6 PLANNING AND PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION**

Representative democracy, particularly at the local level such as in the case of elected city councils, does not sufficiently address the needs of citizens to be accepted and is not the only form of democracy that is required. Representative democracy does not represent a large enough proportion of the people for a large enough time period to be satisfactory in all respects. There are various reasons for this statement. Firstly, elected representatives cannot represent all the diverse interests in a local community, and therefore cannot be allowed to act as the sole and sufficient representative of all the people. Secondly, infrequent voting (normally every four years) means that people often have to wait for a long time for an unaccepted representative to be voted out of office. Thirdly, very few people usually participate in local government elections, because many of the non-voters are unwilling or discouraged to do so for reasons of alienation or even irrelevance to their lives. Fourthly, the fact that only one representative usually gets elected per ward means that even a proportion of those who voted are not represented by someone of their choice.

This does not mean that representative democracy is not important. In fact, a formal, credible electoral democracy is absolutely essential for the operation of a universalist democratic system, whereby every voter, regardless of wealth, education, ethnicity, gender or level of sophistication, has an equal right to participate (Atkinson 1992:8).

Nevertheless, whatever one's philosophy about democracy, the idea of public participation in planning is here to stay. This statement is supported by Potter (1985:152) who states that public participation has by now endured sufficiently to be taken seriously: it needs no longer be considered the current 'planning phobia' is highly relevant. However, according to Potter (1985:153) the idea of citizen participation is a little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is good for you, clearly implies that the concept is still plagued by practical difficulties and impediments. People always attach meaning to things they were initially involved in and call them theirs. Without participation in planning for people chaos will reign and there will be no commitment, involvement and respect for whatever is planned, because they could feel that decisions were made for them and not with them, and consequently ownership and pride will be lost to destruction.

### **3.6.1 *The nature of participation***

People's participation in in-migration means involvement of the people in the planning process voluntarily and willingly. Such participation should not be coerced in any manner of speaking, but it should be comprehensive. People's involvement has to be understood in the following four senses:

- (i) participation in decision making;
- (ii) participation in implementation of development programmes and projects;
- (iii) participation in monitoring and evaluation of development programmes and projects; and
- (iv) participation in sharing the benefits of development (Yadav, 1980:87).

We should like to emphasise that the best form of people's participation in in-migration or urban development will include all four levels, but we understand that the appropriate level for a specific situation will depend on the nature of the project and local circumstances. These four levels have the following characteristics:

**(a) Information sharing**

Information may be shared with beneficiaries in order to facilitate collective or individual action. Although the sharing of information represents a low-intensity form of participation, its impact can be very positive, depending on the extent to which beneficiaries are equipped to understand and perform their tasks better.

**(b) Consultation**

Consultation is a higher intensity level of participation because beneficiaries are not only informed, but consulted on key issues during the planning process. Beneficiaries are given the opportunity to interact with and provide feedback to the development agency which the latter can then take into account in the design and implementation stages.

**(c) Decision making**

A still higher level of intensity may be said to occur when beneficiaries have a decision making role. Decisions may be made exclusively by beneficiaries or jointly with others on specific issues relating to in-migration. Decision making implies a much greater degree of control or influence by the beneficiaries than other consultation or information sharing.

**(d) Initiating action**

People's participation reaches its peak when the beneficiaries are able to take the initiative in terms of actions or decisions. Initiative implies a proactive capacity and the confidence to get going on one's own. This is qualitatively different from their capacity to act or decide on issues or tasks proposed or assigned to them.

In planning urban projects, governments and donors often tend to precept the initiatives that beneficiaries might have taken. In such cases, the latter can play only a reactive role. Urban projects can, however, be designed to encourage beneficiaries to initiate action. There are also cases where beneficiary groups which seemingly failed in some projects went on to initiate other projects on their own and with great success. The earlier projects

obviously had strengthened their capacity for cooperative action and had given them the confidence and skills to initiate action elsewhere (Paul, 1987:5).

It is proposed that the only viable approach to urban participatory planning is one which entails a decision-making partnership between planners and the community. This approach necessitates proper communication with the purpose of creating common understanding. Lamont (1992:293) states that this is reached by means of intersubjectivity, which entails the merging of perceptions or, put differently the ability of professional persons to put themselves in the position of another person. Common understanding does not necessarily imply the reaching of consensus: it rather implies a fundamental consideration of the issue concerned by both participants in terms of the same frame of reference, which is required in participation.

However, it would be naive not to acknowledge, from a pragmatic perspective, that there is simply no easy way of achieving true public participation.

### **3.6.2 *The problems of public participation***

Although there are, according to Emmett (1992c), many benefits associated with public participation, he identifies a number of costs and constraints associated with participation in planning.

Among these costs and constraints are the following:

- (i) Community participation can be very time-consuming and therefore costly;
- (ii) it can delay project start-up;
- (iii) it increases the demands for project personnel and managers;
- (iv) it can increase pressures to raise the levels and range of services;
- (v) it can bring latent conflicts to the surface; and
- (vi) runs the risk of the project being cooped by certain groups or interests.

These problems are certainly not insurmountable and are often over-emphasized. In our discussion of these constraints we link up with (Supra, 1985:153) who identifies the following four major problems that are said to plague urban public participation in planning:

- (i) A lack of public interest;
- (ii) Ignorance on the part of the public;
- (iii) The communication gap between planners and the public; and

(iv) public participation causes undue delays.

The assumption that participatory planning is necessarily a costly, time-consuming or a drawn-out process, is therefore not always true. Provided that the planners are trusted by the community, participation can be a very efficient process.

In spite of these and other costs and constraints, there appears to be consensus in the international community that the benefits of community participation outweigh its costs.

### **3.7 CONCLUSION**

It should be clear by now that, whatever one's philosophy on democracy, the idea of public participation is here to stay, it has endured sufficiently to be taken seriously. There are many reasons for this, but the three most important seem to be that (a) it is simply very pragmatic to consult people to get correct information from them on their needs, preferences and general local conditions; (b) it makes individuals more committed to plans because they have been involved in their preparation; and (c) people have a basic democratic right to be involved in matters affecting their own circumstances. An important benefit of participation that was discussed in this chapter is its potential for increased empowerment by building the capacity to take responsibility (and therefore become self-reliant) and to ensure that the objective of equity is in fact realised. The conclusion is reached that planners of urban development need to become more accountable to the people who live in the places they plan and they also need to treat planning as a two-way process; this is best achieved by being present, that is, becoming visible and trusted in the community to be planned.

In the course of chapter four, the experiences of in-migration in the third world were elucidated coupled with urban agglomeration and regional disparities as indicators. Contemporary spatial such as urban primacy, export-orientation phase and migration to urban centres of unemployment and underemployment were explained. A subsequent discussion on the extent of in-migration in the world were dealt with. The impact of trends in rural population growth will be argued in chapter four, with particular reference to the relevant date in the form of figures and tables.

## CHAPTER 4

### IN-MIGRATION IN THE THIRD WORLD

#### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

In this chapter attention will be given to the process of in-migration in the Third World. The Third World as explained by Tomlinson is composed of (1990:12) countries which have not developed with regard to some important areas such as financial markets, transport and communication systems. These countries may also lack a long tradition of effective local government and the administration of urban affairs. The world's population is becoming increasingly urban. In the Third World the pace of urban growth has over the past forty years been truly dramatic. Since 1950 the proportion of the Third World's population living in cities has roughly doubled from its initial 16 percent (Abu Lughod and Hay, 1977:90). Fuelled by high rates of natural increase, rapid in-migration, and changes in rural society, urban areas have grown immensely in most parts of the Third World and South Africa is no exception.

Today large areas of the world are integrated into a single economy. Rural areas and mining centers produce for distant populations and consume products manufactured far away within this world economy, individual cities perform specialised functions and their individual prosperity depends greatly upon their position in the economic system. Nevertheless, in so far as the development of the world economy has created an interlinked economic system, different cities perform the roles allocated to them within that system. If the cities and city systems of Europe and the United States have emerged in less grandiose scale, in-migration in the Third World would have been very different.

Third World societies will still lack major cities. In major parts of America and Africa urban development was superimposed by capitalism on essentially

rural societies. In Peru, Mexico, India, the Middle East, and China, where indigenous urban civilizations had already developed, urban forms were radically altered. The impact of European expansion from the sixteenth century onwards transformed urban structures in the Third World (Gilbert, 1982:12-13).

The cities of contemporary underdeveloped countries South African cities included are hybrid institutions, formed in part as a response of the indigenously developing division of social labour and in part as a response of the indigenously developing division of social labour and in part as a response to the impacts made upon less advanced countries by their integration into the world economy (Hoselitz, 1957:278).

The most obvious effects of European and later United States expansion in the Third World were the creation of new cities, the generation of new urban forms, and sometimes the destruction of existing urban cultures. The present forms of urban development in the Third World can be understood only as an outcome of the historical process of expansion by capitalist powers. At the same time, the effect of that expansion cannot be understood except in terms of the nature of raw-material production and forms of indigenous societies that were incorporated. What Gilbert, (1982:12-13) Cf. Hoselitz (1953:204) said is an indication that European expansion transformed urban structures and impacts made upon less advanced countries is through their integration into the World economy.

#### **4.2 URBAN AGGLOMERATION AND REGIONAL DISPARITIES**

Economic development tends to favour certain geographic areas. Certain regions and cities attract economic activity and population more than others. Of course this tendency is more marked in some economic systems; dependent capitalist countries exhibit wider regional disparities than do poor socialist nations, certain governments take more determined action to redress such inequalities than do others.

Today the essential decisions about technology, employment, and economic growth are made in the metropolitan centers of Europe and the United States, and Third World urban functions and form have come to reflect their provincial status. The Third World city forms part of the world economy but its population does not share equal access to the world's resources. For this reason, and despite the countervailing power of government, inequality is being perpetuated to lay with the Third World city.

Harvey's (1973) descriptions of the logic of capitalist expansion in Baltimore, with the parallel development of slum ghettos and affluent suburbs are applicable to a greater or lesser extent, throughout the world. In the Third World city the relative poverty of the black Baltimore slum-dweller is accentuated by absolute material deprivation. Some poor people in the United States suffer from malnutrition, most of the poor South African and Indian cities fall into this category.

Overcrowded tenement slums and too few jobs are abhorrent, but the lack of fresh water, medical services, drainage, and unemployment compensation adds to this problem in most Third World cities, South Africa included. Without wishing to paint Dickensian pictures of squalor, poverty, and crime it is far too easy to sketch the outline of a basically unfair and degrading situation. It is true that more poor people are living in Third World cities than even before, but this is a simple outcome of demographic growth; there are very many more rich people in those cities too; similarly, while levels of unemployment and relative numbers of shanty dwellers have risen in practically all Third World cities, this represents as much a transfer of rural poverty to the urban areas as the creation of a new group of the poor (Gilbert, 1982:25). It is stated that the objective is to describe and explain how major concentrations of population and economic activity have come about.

#### **4.2.1 CONTEMPORARY SPATIAL DISPARITIES**

Economic and social change has been associated with the emergence of wide geographical disparities throughout the Third World. These disparities

are linked to the nature of the economic model that underpins development in some of these countries and to the acute personal income disparities that have emerged. In this section it is sufficient to detail three broad patterns of spatial and social differences between urban and rural areas; economic and social disparities between different regions of a country; the degree to which one city dominates the national urban structure.

#### **4.2.1.1      *Rural-urban disparities***

Major differences are apparent in the standard of living in the urban and rural areas with the exception of certain socialist nations, where an effort has been made to reduce differentials. The rural areas of the Third World contain a high proportion of very poor people, are provided with a minimum of social services and infrastructure and offer little in the way of well-remunerated work. **Per capita** incomes are consistently lower than those in urban areas. In Thailand rural incomes in 1970 were only 41 percent lower than those in urban areas, in West Malaysia in 1970, 33 percent, in Indonesia in 1967, 62 percent, in Venezuela in 1961, 40 percent and in Mexico in the early sixties 43 percent (Friedmann and Douglass, 1976:352. Cf. UNECLA; 1971:105).

Similar disparities can be seen in terms of medical provision. In the late sixties there was one doctor for every 200,000 Ethiopians living in rural areas compared to one for every 3,000 urban dwellers; in India one doctor for every 40,000 rural dwellers compared to one for every 500 city inhabitants; in Nigeria the figures were 1:2,800 (OHE, 1972:26). These kinds of differentials can be replicated for most kinds of health provision throughout the Third World (Gish, 1971. Cf. Gilbert, 1974c. cf. Sharpston, 1972. Cf. Bryant, 1969).

#### **4.2.1.2      *Regional disparities***

However measured, regional disparities in Third World countries are extreme. In terms of medical provision, schooling, industrial activity, financial transactions, or the location of high-income groups, certain regions demonstrate a marked superiority over the rest of the country. In Senegal nearly 80 percent of all doctors compared to a mere 16 percent of the

population, nearly 80 percent of industrial enterprises, 66 percent of all salaried employees are concentrated in the Dakar region (Gugler and Flanagan, 1978(a):189). In Pakistan Karachi generates 42 percent of industrial value added and accommodates 50 percent of all bank deposits compared to its 6 percent of the national population (UNCRD, 1976:145). In Mexico the capital contained, in 1975, 46 percent of all commercial sales, 55 percent of service activities, and 52 percent of industrial production compared to 24 percent of the total national population (Unikel, 1976:68).

In general, regional disparities in less developed nations are far wider than those in developed countries. Regional income disparities have two other major characteristics. The first is that there is no tendency towards greater equality in most Third World countries; for every nation in which regional income convergence has occurred there is another in which divergence has been the pattern (Gilbert and Goodman, 1976:119). The second is that there is no relationship between per capita income among low- and medium income countries and the level of disparities. The level of disparities is more a function of national economic organization than of per capita national income.

#### **4.2.1.3 *Urban primacy***

In many Third World countries, most large-scale modern activities, most forms of infrastructure, and most decision-makers are found in one major city. This concentration is mirrored in the urban-size distribution by the way one city dominates all others. Thus Lima-Callao has ten times the population of Arequiipa, Peru's next largest city; Kingston, Jamaica, twelve times population of Montego Bay; Guatemala City, eighteen times the population of Quezaltenango; and Bangkok forty times that of the second Thai city, Chiangmai.

It is important to note, however, that twenty poor countries do not have primate urban-size distributions; for example, India, the Yemen Arab Republic, Zambia, and the Republic of South Africa. In addition there are countries in which a situation of dual primacy exists; two cities dominate the

urban-size distribution of Brazil (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo), Ecuador (Quito and Guayaqui D, Syria (Damascus and Aleppo), and Pakistan (Karachi and Lahore).

It is suggested that note has to be taken that while primacy is more prevalent in Third World nations it is by no means confined to them. Rather, eleven of the twenty-eight high-income countries with primate or high-primate, with the dominance of Paris, Vienna, or Copenhagen serving to remind us that primacy is not exclusively a Third World phenomenon. Indeed, various efforts to relate the degree of primacy to levels of urban development or per capita income have proved inconclusive (Berry, 1961; Mills, 1972; Mehta, 1964). If a relationship exists it is of a much more complex form.

In sum, therefore, while primacy is not limited to the Third World nations, it is highly characteristic of them. And if high primacy is not limited to countries with any single characteristic, it is especially common in those that are small, highly centralized, and of medium income. Whether such a phenomenon constitutes the social and economic problem that so many claim, is a theme that shall be explored in the coming sections.

#### **4.2.1.4      *The Export-orientation phase***

Throughout the Third World the growth of major cities was linked to the growth of international trade: Sao Paulo grew on the basis of coffee, Singapore on tin and rubber, Calcutta on jute, cotton and textiles, Johannesburg on gold and Buenos Aires on mutton, wool and cereals; Kimberley on diamonds, Witbank on coal, Cape Town on grapes, Malelane and Durban on sugar. Whether or not export-linked metropolitan development led to urban in-migration was dependent upon the degree to which one or several centers controlled the flow of international trade. In those few cases in which control over the production, transportation, and profits was spread among the variety of centers, non-primacy was the result. More typically, the national capital controlled the flow of exports, the revenues deriving from those exports, and the importation of goods financed by the

export flow. Primacy in the Third World countries, therefore, can be explained in terms of the geographical location of export production, the transport networks which emerged to ship those exports and, most fundamental of all, the location of the main beneficiaries of the profits generated by the international trade. Murphey (1969:79) said it is no coincidence that so many primate cities are major ports. The coastal cities such as Durban and Cape town generally benefited because they were located close to the centers of export production or commanded the main channels of trade.

Given this sea-orientated pattern, Singapore could easily serve the whole of the tin and rubber belt along the west coast of Malaya, as Colombo could for the quite compact plantation areas of Ceylon, Manila for the Philippines as a whole and Batavia for Indonesia, where commercial production was heavily concentrated in Java and along the east coast of Sumatra. In Latin America and Africa rivers were less often the main export channels and railways were built by British, French, and US capital to serve this role (Preston, 1979:16).

By contrast, the overwhelming primacy that developed in Argentina and South Africa was linked to the monopoly of one city over most administrative, commercial, and industrial functions. Buenos Aires just like Johannesburg combined physical proximity to the export areas of the Pampas or KwaZulu-Natal, stranglehold over imports, the ability to attract many of the massive flow of foreign immigrants, and most critically, a monopoly over political decision-making (Rogers, 1982:450).

If symbolically, the provinces gained a capital (in reality Buenos Aires and Johannesburg), seconded by other urban centers, continued to draw upon the resources, talents, and ambitions of the country and then left the other provinces and rural areas drained and depressed. Politicians might come from the interior or the countryside but in Johannesburg or Buenos Aires they quickly forgot their origins and adopted the life and attitudes of Pietersburg (Scobie, 1964:105).

Murphy, (1969:80) states that, in many countries indeed, it can be argued that it is the location of government and the paraphernalia of modernization rather than industrial growth that is the principal source of urban and regional concentration. In most African and Caribbean countries, where industrial growth is limited, expansion of the government bureaucrats constitute an important market for imported manufactured products, and for the shops which sell them for the construction industry and for domestic services. One of the incidental outcomes of modern administration and efforts of planning economic development has been the accentuated growth of urban complexes.

Whatever the level of industrial development, national governments have sought to mobilize savings and to centralize decisions over the allocation of investment. Thus the surplus created in rural areas and in the hinterlands of provincial cities tends to be channeled towards the primate city. As cities become larger, governments attempt to maintain political stability by controlling the prices of basic foods and transportation and by permitting land invasions or illegal urban subdivisions. Middle-income groups receive subsidized public housing and health services. Industrialists are wooed by governments turning a blind eye to environmental pollution; private-sector real-estate interests are allowed to dictate the terms of urban development and land use.

Once under way, urban growth is rarely channeled into directions that will maximize the public welfare. Rather, such growth is allowed to continue under its own implacable logic, whatever the eventual outcome. Bauer's (1954:36) statement is valid in stating that few governments can afford to face the political consequences either of a genuine policy of decentralization or of effective urban planning.

#### **4.2.1.5 *Migrating to urban centers of unemployment and underemployment***

Great masses of rural people are potentially mobile, and they appreciate the gap between rural and urban standards of living. A great many are prepared to move to town if they can be sure of a livelihood there, although the days when migrants found work in town for the asking, are long gone, substantial numbers nevertheless continue to come to face widespread unemployment and underemployment.

Some migrants come with exceptional qualifications or the right connections and can rely on securing a satisfactory income in the urban setting. Many others are not so fortunate. Two interpretations have been advanced to explain migration to cities characterized by unemployment and underemployment. Both argue that the decision to migrate is a rational response to economic conditions. The difference between the two interpretations is accounted for by variations in the structure of urban labour markets.

In tropical Africa analysis focused on migrants coming in search of jobs that offered wages and working conditions regulated by legislation and/or collective bargaining. They would spend several months trying to secure such a job, but, if unsuccessful, eventually return to the village. Thus in Kampala, Hutton (1973:61-2) found a clearly established pattern in the middle 1960's. Of the unemployed men she interviewed, three-quarters planned to leave if they could not find work, typically within less than six months. More than three-quarters of these intended to return to their rural home. Going home, however, was only a temporary measure; only 11 percent of the unemployed surveyed felt that they would stay there. The other people pick up casual work as it becomes available from time to time, whereas others work on their own, perhaps as street vendors, in lines that are open to newcomers, but where competition is fierce and earnings are low.

### 4.3 THE EXTENT OF IN-MIGRATION IN THE WORLD

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 3 percent of the world's population lived in urban places. This figure rose to about 15 percent by 1900, to 40 percent by the mid-seventies, and is expected to reach 50 percent by the end of this century (Hay, 1977:71). Davis calculated that if the world's urban population were to continue to rise at the 1950-70 rate, over 50 percent of the world's population would be living in urban places already by 1987, compared to 61 percent by the year 2000 and 100 percent by the year 2031 (Davis, 1972:52). His lowest projection, which indicates that the world will have more than 50 percent of its inhabitants living in urban places by the year 2000, corresponds with Hay's projection. Table 4.1 gives the world's projected population in rural and urban places, 1970-2000, according to the highest constant-rate-projection, while table 4.2 uses the lowest constant-rate projection.

From Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 it can be seen that the rate of increase in the urban population between 1980 and 2000 will be three to four times higher than the increase of the urban population as a percentage of the total population. For example, in the case of the highest constant-rate projection, the increase in the urban population between 1980 and 2000 will be 98 percent, while the increase of the urban fraction will be 60 percent. In the case of the lowest constant-rate projection, the increase in the urban population during the same period will be 72 percent, while the increase of the urban fraction will be 33 percent (Supra, 1972:124).

The projection of the World's total population by the year 2000 in table 4.1 and 4.2 compares favorably with the United Nations' "medium" projection of the total world population of 6200 billion people.

In considering the extent of the world's in-migration, it is advisable to make a clear distinction between the more developed countries, due not only to the different conditions that exist in these two sets of countries, but also to the considerable difference in the purview or in-migration. At present more than

two-thirds of the developed countries are urbanized, compared to about one-fourth of the less developed countries (UN, 1976, Supra, 1972:240). However, the urban populations of less developed countries are increasing at twice the rate of those in developed countries; for example, between 1920 and 1960 the urban population in the less developed countries rose at an annual average rate of 4 percent, compared to a rate of 1,9 percent in the developed countries over the same period. This trend was also visible in the increase in the rate of in-migration during the period 1920-1960, when the rate was 2,3 percent in less developed countries and 1,1 percent in developed countries (Supra,16:1969).

**Table 4.1 Projected population in rural and urban places, 1970-2000 (Highest constant-rate projection)**

Year	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Millions	%	Millions	%	Millions	%
1970	2 229'0	61,4	1 399'0	38,6	3 628,0	100,0
1975	2 321,6	58,3	1 659,6	41,7	3 981,2	100,0
1980	2,400,0	54,9	1 968,8	45,1	4 368,8	100,0
1985	2 458,6	51,3	2 335,6	48,7	4 794,2	100,0
1990	2 490'2	47,3	2 770,7	52,7	5 261,0	100,0
1995	2,436,0	38,4	3 899,3	61,6	6 335,3	100,0
2000	2 436,0	38,4	3 899,3	61,6	6 335,3	100,0

Source: Davis, Kingsley (1972). World In-migration 1950-1970, Volume II: Analysis of Trends, Relationships and Development, University of California, Berkley, USA, P 126.

**Table 4.2 Projected population in rural and urban places, 1970-2000 (Lowest constant-rate projection)**


Year	Rural		Urban		Total	
	Millions	%	Millions	%	Millions	%
1970	2 229'0	61,4	1 399'0	38,6	3 628,0	100,0
1975	2 352,8	59,1	1 628,4	40,9	3 981,2	100,0
1980	2 483,5	56,9	1 885,3	43,1	4 368,8	100,0
1985	2 621,5	54,7	2 172,7	45,3	4 794,2	100,0

1990	2 767,1	52,6	2 493,8	47,4	5 261,0	100,0
1995	2,920,9	50,6	2,852,3	49,4	5 773,2	100,0
2000	3,083,1	48,7	3 252,1	51,3	6 335,3	100,0

Source: Davis, Kingsley (1972). World Urbanization 1950-1970, Volume II: Analysis of Trends, Relationships and Development, University of California, Berkley, USA, P 126.

Figure 4.1 shows the growth of the world's urban and rural population since 1970 (according to Davis' lowest constant rate projection). From figure 4.1 it can be seen that the world's urban-population will surpass the total rural population in 1997.

**Figure 4.1 Growth of the Worlds Urban and Rural Population, 1970- 2000**



This rapid increase in the urban population of the less developed countries must be seen against the background of the rapid increase in total population in the Third World. Birth rates in less developed countries are twice as high as in developed countries, with the result that the natural increase in the former is far greater than in the developed countries. According to the United Nations population projections, the total population of the more developed

regions may grow by about 20 percent between 1975 and the year 2000, and that of the less developed countries by 75 percent (Supra, 1976:16).

Unesco projections put the probable population of South Africa at the year 2000 as follows:


**Tabel 4.3 South African Population Projection at the Year 2000**

Blacks	37 293 000	76%
Whites	5 910 000	12%
Coloureds	4 890 000	10%
Indians	1 215 000	2 %
TOTAL	49 308 000	100%

Source : (Cameron and Hurst, eds., 1983:364).

Currently there is a large gap in the level of in-migration between the more developed regions and the less developed regions of the world (see figure 4.2 and table 4.4). In 1985, 72 per cent of the population of the more developed regions resided in the urban areas. The urban percentage in the more developed regions is projected to increase only marginally to 79 percent in 2025. However a significant and rapid in-migration is projected in the coming decades in the less developed regions. The urban percentage in the less developed regions is projected to rise to nearly 40 per cent by the year 2000 and 57 per cent by 2025.

**Figure 4.2 Per cent of population residing in urban areas in the more and less developed regions. 1950-2025**



**Table 4.4: Percentage of population living in urban areas, by major area and region, 1970-2025**


	Percentage Urban											
Major Area and Region	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
World total	73.2	38.5	39.8	41.2	42.7	44.5	46.7	49.2	52.0	54.8	57.7	60.5
More developed Regions	66.6	68.8	70.2	71.5	72.7	73.8	74.8	75.9	76.8	77.6	78.4	79.0
Less developed Regions	25.5	27.3	29.3	31.5	33.9	36.5	39.5	42.8	46.5	50.0	53.5	56.9
Africa	22.9	25.3	28.0	31.1	34.5	37.9	41.3	44.7	48.7	51.4	54.6	57.8
Eastern Africa	10.3	12.4	15.2	18.6	22.4	26.3	30.1	33.7	37.2	40.8	44.4	48.0
Middle Africa	24.8	28.0	31.6	35.6	39.6	43.7	47.6	51.3	54.9	58.4	61.6	64.7
Northern Africa	36.0	38.0	39.9	41.9	44.3	47.0	49.9	53.2	56.4	59.5	62.5	65.3
Southern Africa	44.1	46.8	49.6	52.5	55.6	58.7	61.7	64.6	67.2	69.7	72.0	74.2
Western Africa	19.6	22.6	25.9	29.4	33.1	36.9	40.7	44.5	48.3	52.0	55.5	58.9
Latin America	57.3	61.4	65.4	69.2	72.3	75.0	77.2	79.1	80.7	82.2	83.5	84.8
Caribbean	45.7	49.5	53.2	56.6	59.8	62.8	65.5	67.9	70.0	72.1	74.1	75.9
Central America	54.0	57.4	60.6	63.6	66.4	68.9	71.1	73.2	75.2	77.1	78.8	80.5
South America	60.0	64.5	68.8	72.8	76.1	78.9	81.0	82.7	84.1	85.3	86.4	87.5
Northern America	73.8	73.8	73.9	74.1	73.3	74.6	75.0	75.5	76.1	76.7	77.2	77.9
Asia	23.9	25.3	26.6	28.1	29.9	32.2	35.0	38.2	41.9	45.7	49.4	53.0
Eastern Asia	26.9	27.6	28.1	28.6	29.4	30.7	32.6	35.3	38.6	42.0	45.6	49.0
Southeasten Asia	20.2	22.0	24.0	26.3	29.0	32.1	35.5	39.3	43.1	46.9	50.6	54.3
Southern Asia	19.5	21.3	23.2	25.3	27.8	30.6	33.8	37.3	41.2	45.1	48.9	52.6
Western Asia	43.2	47.9	51.7	54.9	58.2	61.2	63.9	66.7	69.4	71.9	74.2	76.3
Europe	66.7	68.8	70.3	71.7	73.1	74.6	76.0	77.5	78.8	80.1	81.2	82.3
Eastern Europe	53.5	56.8	59.3	61.6	63.8	65.8	67.6	69.3	70.7	72.1	73.2	74.2
Northern Europe	82.4	83.9	85.2	86.3	87.2	88.2	89.0	89.7	90.5	91.1	91.7	92.3
Southern Europe	56.1	58.5	60.5	62.5	64.6	66.8	69.1	71.3	73.6	75.6	77.6	79.4
Western Europe	76.4	78.2	78.9	79.6	80.3	81.1	81.9	82.8	83.7	84.6	85.4	86.1
Oceania	70.8	71.8	71.5	71.1	70.9	70.8	71.0	71.4	72.1	72.9	74.0	75.2
Australia	84.4	85.3	85.3	85.2	85.3	85.4	85.8	86.2	86.9	87.5	88.4	89.2
New Zealand												
Melanesia		15.1	17.5	18.8	20.2	21.8	23.7	25.9	28.6	31.7	35.0	38.4
42.0												
Micronesia	32.1	38.0	43.2	48.4	53.2	57.3	60.8	64.0	66.9	69.6	72.1	74.5
Polynesia	32.4	34.6	35.8	37.0	39.0	41.4	44.4	47.7	51.1	54.4	57.6	60.8
USSR	56.7	60.0	63.1	65.6	67.5	69.4	70.7	71.9	72.7	73.4	73.7	74.1

Corresponding to this rapid rise in the level of in-migration, the absolute number of urban dwellers in the less developed regions is projected in 1950 to over 4 billion in 2025 (see table 4.4 and figure 4.3). During the same period, the rural population will more than double, from 1.4 to 3.1 billion. (The total population in the less developed regions is projected to quadruple in the 75-year period, from 1.8 to 7.1 billion.)

**Figure 4.3 Urban population in the more and less developed regions.**



1950-2025



**Table 4.5 Total, urban and rural population by major area, 1970-2025**

Population in Million												
Population Group	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
<b>World</b>												
Total population	3697	4079	4450	4853	5292	5765	6251	6728	7190	7639	8062	8466
Urban population	1374	1568	1770	1997	2260	2567	2916	3307	3736	4188	4649	5118
Rural population	2323	2510	2680	2856	3031	3198	3334	3421	3454	3451	3413	3347
<b>More developed Regions</b>												
Total population	1049	1095	1136	1173	1205	1234	1262	1286	1307	1325	1340	1352
Urban population	698	753	798	893	875	911	944	976	1003	1028	1050	1068
Rural population	350	341	338	334	329	323	317	310	303	296	290	283
<b>Less developed Regions</b>												
Total population	2648	2984	3313	3680	4086	4531	4988	5441	5883	6314	6722	7114
Urban population	675	815	971	1158	1384	1655	1971	2331	2732	3159	3599	4050
Rural population	1973	2169	2341	2522	2702	2875	3016	3110	3150	3154	3123	3063
<b>Africa</b>												
Total population	362	415	481	557	647	752	872	1005	1148	1296	1441	1580
Urban population	82	105	134	173	223	285	360	449	552	666	787	913
Rural population	279	310	346	383	424	467	511	555	596	629	653	667
<b>Latin America</b>												
Total population	285	322	361	403	448	493	539	585	630	675	719	760
Urban population	163	198	236	279	324	370	416	463	508	555	600	644
Rural population	121	124	124	124	123	123	122	122	121	120	118	115
<b>Northern America</b>												
Total population	226	238	251	264	275	285	294	303	311	319	327	332
Urban population	167	176	186	196	204	213	221	229	236	245	252	259
Rural population	59	62	65	68	70	72	73	74	74	74	74	73
<b>Asia</b>												
Total population	2101	2353	2582	2834	3108	3404	3697	3973	4226	4463	4680	4889
Urban population	502	595	688	796	930	1095	1292	1518	1772	2038	2310	2589
Rural population	1598	1758	1894	2037	2177	2308	2405	2454	2453	2425	2371	2300
<b>Europe</b>												
Total population	460	473	484	492	497	503	508	511	513	514	513	512
Urban population	306	326	340	352	364	375	386	396	404	411	417	421
Rural population	153	147	143	139	133	127	121	115	108	102	96	90
<b>Oceania</b>												
Total population	19	21	23	25	26	28	30	32	34	35	37	39
Urban population	14	15	16	18	19	20	21	23	24	26	28	29
Rural population	5	6	7	7	7	8	9	9	10	9	9	10
<b>USSR</b>												
Total population	242	254	265	276	287	298	307	317	326	335	343	351
Urban population	137	152	167	181	194	206	217	228	237	246	253	260
Rural population	105	101	98	95	93	91	90	89	89	89	90	91

A positive rate of in-migration indicates that urban population is increasing at a faster pace than the total population. In the less developed regions, the rate of in-migration was 1.4 per cent during the 1970's and 1.5 per cent during the 1980's (see table 4.5). According to the present projections, the rate of in-migration at the less developed regions will peak at 1.7 per cent for the period 2000-2025, before declining steadily to 1,2 per cent for the period

2020-2025. These figures indicate that the rate of population redistribution from rural to urban areas in the less developed regions will remain strong for the rest of this century. In the less developed regions, the urban population has been increasing at a very rapid rate of 3.6 per cent per year. It is projected to increase at this pace until the end of the century.

**Table 4.6 Average rate of growth of total, urban and rural populations and rate of in-migration by major area or region, 1970-2025 a/**

Average annual rate of growth (percentage)											
Major Area or Region	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
World											
Total growth rate	2.0	1.8	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0
Urban growth rate	2.7	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.9
Rural growth rate	1.6	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.5	0.2	-0.0	-0.2	-0.4
Rate of urbanization	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0
More developed regions											
Total growth rate	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
Urban growth rate <sup>1</sup>	1.5	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3
Rural growth rate	-0.5	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4
Rate of Urbanization	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Less developed regions											
Total growth rate	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.3	1.1
Urban growth rate	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.4
Rural growth rate	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.6	0.3	0.0	-0.2	-0.4
Rate of urbanization	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2
A. Africa											
Total growth rate	2.7	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.9
Urban growth rate	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.5	4.2	3.8	3.4	3.0
Rural growth rate	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.1	0.7	0.4
Rate of urbanization	2.0	2.0	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1
A.1. Eastern Africa											
Total growth rate	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.3	3.3	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.1
Urban growth rate	6.5	7.4	7.3	7.1	6.6	6.1	5.5	5.1	4.7	4.1	3.7
Rural growth rate	2.2	2.4	2.1	2.1	2.2	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.1	0.7
Rate of Urbanization	3.8	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.3	2.7	2.3	2.0	1.9	1.7	1.6
A.2. Middle Africa											
Total growth rate	2.7	3.1	2.8	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.1
Urban growth rate	5.2	5.6	5.3	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.6	4.3	4.0	3.6	3.1
Rural growth rate	1.8	2.0	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.4
Rate of Urbanization	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0
A.3 Northern Africa											
Total growth rate	2.4	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3
Urban growth rate	3.6	3.8	3.9	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.1	2.8	2.4	2.2
Rural growth rate	1.8	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.5	1.1	0.7	0.4	0.2	-0.1	-0.3
Rate of Urbanization	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9

**Table 4.6 (Continued)**

Average annual rate of growth (percentage)											
Major Area or Region	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
A.4. Southern Africa											
Total growth rate	2.5	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3
Urban growth rate	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.2	1.9
Rural growth rate	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.1	-0.1	-0.4
Rate of urbanization	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.6
A.5. Western Africa											
Total growth rate	3.1	2.3	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.0
Urban growth rate	6.1	6.0	5.9	5.8	5.6	5.3	5.0	4.6	4.1	3.6	3.2
Rural growth rate	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.5	1.1	0.7	0.4
Rate of urbanization	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2
B. Latin America											
Total growth rate	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.1
Urban growth rate	3.9	3.6	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.6	1.4
Rural growth rate	0.4	0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5
Rate of urbanization	1.4	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
B.1. Caribbean											
Total growth rate	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7
Urban growth rate	3.5	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2
Rural growth rate	0.4	-0.1	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7
Rate of urbanization	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5
B.2. Central America											
Total growth rate	3.2	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.3
Urban growth rate	4.4	3.8	3.5	3.2	3.0	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.7
Rural growth rate	1.6	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.1	-0.0	-0.2	-0.3
Rate of urbanization	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4
B.3. South America											
Total growth rate	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.1
Urban growth rate	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.0	2.6	2.3	2.3	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.3
Rural growth rate	-0.0	-0.3	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.5
Rate of urbanization	1.5	1.3	1.1	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
C. Northern America											
Total growth rate	1.1	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
Urban growth rate	1.1	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.5
Rural growth rate	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.1	-0.2
Rate of urbanization	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
D. Asia											
Total growth rate	2.3	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9
Urban growth rate	3.4	2.9	3.0	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.3	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.3
Rural growth rate	1.9	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.2	0.8	0.4	-0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.6
Rate of urbanization	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.6	1.4

**Table 4.6 (Continued)**

Average annual rate of growth (percentage)											
Major Area or Region	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
<b>D.1. Eastern Asia</b>											
Total growth rate	2.1	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4
Urban growth rate	2.6	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.2	2.1	1.9
Rural growth rate	1.9	1.3	1.1	1.1	0.9	0.5	0.0	-0.5	-0.6	-0.8	-0.9
Rate of urbanization	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.2	0.6	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.4
<b>D.2. Southeastern Asia</b>											
Total growth rate	2.4	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.8	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.0	0.9
Urban growth rate	4.2	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.9	3.7	3.5	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.3
Rural growth rate	2.0	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.9	0.6	0.3	-0.0	-0.2	-0.4	-0.6
Rate of urbanization	1.7	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.0	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.4
<b>D.3. Southern Asia</b>											
Total growth rate	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.2	1.1
Urban growth rate	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.0	3.7	3.3	2.9	2.6
Rural growth rate	1.9	1.7	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.2	0.8	0.4	0.1	-0.2	-0.4
Rate of urbanization	1.8	1.7	1.7	1.9	1.9	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.8	1.6	1.5
<b>D.4. Western Asia</b>											
Total growth rate	3.0	2.9	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.1	1.9	1.7
Urban growth rate	5.1	4.5	4.3	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.8	2.5	2.3
Rural growth rate	1.2	1.3	1.6	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.2	-0.0
Rate of urbanization	2.1	1.5	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6
<b>E. Europe</b>											
Total growth rate	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.0	-0.1
Urban growth rate	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2
Rural growth rate	-0.8	-0.5	-0.7	-0.8	-0.9	-0.9	-1.1	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2
Rate of urbanization	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
<b>E.1. Eastern Europe</b>											
Total growth rate	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1
Urban growth rate	1.8	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4
Rural growth rate	-0.9	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-0.9	-0.7	-0.8	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7	-0.7
Rate of urbanization	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
<b>E.2. Northern Europe</b>											
Total growth rate	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.0	-0.0
Urban growth rate	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1
Rural growth rate	-1.5	-1.4	-1.4	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.4	-1.4	-1.4	-1.4	-1.4
Rate of urbanization	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
<b>E.3. Southern Europe</b>											
Total growth rate	0.8	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	-0.0	-0.1
Urban growth rate	1.6	1.5	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.4
Rural growth rate	-0.3	-0.2	-0.5	-0.9	-1.0	-1.1	-1.3	-1.5	-1.6	-1.7	-1.7
Rate of urbanization	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5

**Table 4.6 (Continued)**

Average annual rate of growth (percentage)											
Major Area or Region	1970-1975	1975-1980	1980-1985	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
E.4. Western Europe											
Total growth rate	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	-0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.2	-0.2
Urban growth rate	1.0	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	-0.0
Rural growth rate	-1.0	-0.5	-0.5	-0.6	-0.7	-0.8	-1.0	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2	-1.2
Rate of urbanization	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
F. Oceania											
Total growth rate	1.8	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9
Urban growth rate	2.1	1.4	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2
Rural growth rate	1.1	1.7	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.1	0.9	0.6	0.4	0.1	-0.1
Rate of urbanization	0.3	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3
F.1. Australia-New Zealand											
Total growth rate	1.7	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6
Urban growth rate	1.9	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8
Rural growth rate	0.5	1.3	1.5	1.0	0.9	0.4	0.3	-0.2	-0.3	-0.8	-0.9
Rate of urbanization	0.2	0.0	-0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.2
F.2. Melanesia											
Total growth rate	2.3	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.5
Urban growth rate	5.3	4.0	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.2	3.9	3.7	3.3
Rural growth rate	1.7	2.3	2.2	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.4	1.2	0.9	0.7	0.4
Rate of urbanization	3.0	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.8
F.3. Micronesia											
Total growth rate	2.5	2.1	1.9	1.7	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.5
Urban growth rate	5.9	4.9	4.2	3.8	3.0	2.5	2.2	1.9	1.7	1.3	1.1
Rural growth rate	0.7	0.3	0.0	-0.2	-0.5	-0.3	-0.6	-0.7	-0.9	-1.1	-1.3
Rate of urbanization	3.4	2.6	2.3	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.7
F.5. Polynesia											
Total growth rate	1.6	1.5	1.7	1.5	1.4	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.6	0.5
Urban growth rate	2.9	2.1	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	1.8	1.5
Rural growth rate	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.9	0.5	0.1	-0.2	-0.5	-0.5	-0.9	-1.1
Rate of urbanization	1.3	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.1
G. USSR											
Total growth rate	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5
Urban growth rate	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.4	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6
Rural growth rate	-0.6	-0.8	-0.6	-0.4	-1.5	-0.2	-0.3	0.0	-0.0	0.2	0.2
Rate of urbanization	1.1	1.0	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1

a/ Rate of in-migration is defined as the average annual exponential rate of growth of the per cent urban. The rate of in-migration equals the difference between the growth rate of the urban population and the growth rate of the total population.

The rate of in-migration in the more developed regions remains at a low level: 0.3 per cent per year during both the 1980-1985 and the 1985-1990 periods. Projections indicate that the rate of in-migration in these regions will remain low through 2025. The growth rate of urban population is also low, under 1

per cent per year. The small rate of growth of the urban population is due not only to the low rate of in-migration but also to the low total population growth rates the regions are experiencing.

#### **4.3.1 Levels and trends of in-migration at the country level**

Regional averages conceal the large variations among countries with respect to the levels and the rates of in-migration. Table 4.6 shows the level of in-migration in 1985 for those countries with the highest and lowest levels of in-migration. The 22 most urbanized countries exhibit levels of in-migration of over 80 per cent. The 22 least urbanized countries exhibit levels of 20 per cent or less.

**Table 4.7 Countries with per cent urban population in 1985 of 80 per cent or more and 20 per cent or less a/**

<b>C</b>			
<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Singapore	100	Viet Nam	20
Macau	99	Thailand	20
Belgium	96	Kenya	20
Kuwait	94	Afghanistan	19
Hong Kong	92	Botswana	19
United Kingdom	92	Mozambique	19
Israel	90	Mali	18
Iceland	89	Lesotho	17
Venezuela	88	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	16
Netherlands	88	Niger	16
Qatar	88	Papua New Guinea	14
Germany, Fed. Rep. Of	86	Bangladesh	12
Australia	86	Malawi	12
Argentina	85	Ethiopia	12
Uruguay	85	Kampuchea	11
Denmark	85	Oman	9
Malta	85	Uganda	9
Chile	84	Nepal	8
New Zealand	84	Burkina Faso	8

Sweden	83	Rwanda	6
Bahrain	82	Burundi	6
Luxembourg	82	Bhutan	5

a/ Countries with populations of 300,000 or more around 1985.

The highest levels of in-migration are found in the city-states of Singapore (100 per cent) and Macau (99 per cent). In five other countries, the percentage of the population residing in urban areas also exceeds 90 per cent, namely Belgium (96 per cent), Kuwait (94 per cent), Hong Kong (92 per cent) and Israel (90 per cent). Of the 22 most urbanized countries, 7 are in Asia, 9 are in Europe, 4 are in Latin America and 2 are in Oceania.

For the 22 countries, under 20 per cent of the population lives in urban areas. Seven of these countries exhibit levels of in-migration under 10 per cent : Bhutan (5 per cent), Burundi (6 per cent), Rwanda (6 per cent), Burkina Faso (8 per cent), Nepal (8 per cent), Uganda (9 per cent) and Oman (9 per cent). Of the 22 least urbanized countries, 12 are in Africa, 9 are in Asia and 1 is in Oceania.

Countries can also be delineated according to their rates of in-migration. Table 4.7 lists the countries with the highest (3 per cent per year or more) and the lowest (0.3 per cent per year or less) rates of in-migration. For the 1980-1985 period, there were 23 countries which exhibited high rates of in-migration. For the 1980-1985 period, there were 23 countries which exhibited rates of in-migration of 3 per cent per year or more. Mozambique and Tanzania exhibited rates of 8 per cent per year; Burundi, Swaziland, Yemen, Chad and Maritania displayed rates between 5 per cent and 8 per cent per year. Of the 23 countries with the highest rates of in-migration, 18 are from Asia. These countries were characterised by low levels of in-migration, as half were less than 20 per cent urban.

In the period 1980-1985, 25 countries experienced rates of in-migration of 0.3 per cent or less. Of these, 10 are from Europe, 9 are from Asia, 2 are from North America, 2 are from Oceania, 1 is from Latin America and 1 is from

Africa. Negative or zero rates of in-migration were estimated for the United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Australia, Singapore, Myanmar (formerly Burma) and the Netherlands.

**Table 4.8 Countries with a rate of in-migration in 1980-1985 of 3.0 per cent or more and 0.3 per cent or less a/**

Country	Percentage	Country	Percentage
Mozambique	7.9	Germany, Fed. Rep. Of	0.3
Tanzania	7.9	Italy	0.3
Burundi	6.0	Iceland	0.3
Swaziland	5.7	Denmark	0.3
Yemen	5.5	Bahrain	0.3
Chad	5.2	Belgium	0.2
Mauritania	5.1	United Kingdom	0.2
Botswana	4.6	German Democratic Republic	0.2
Cape Verde	4.6	Uruguay	0.2
Nepal	4.6	Hong Kong	0.2
Benin	4.5	China	0.2
Malawi	4.4	New Zealand	0.1
Rwanda	4.3	France	0.1
Lesotho	4.2	Sweden	0.1
Niger	4.1	Japan	0.1
Kenya	4.0	United States	0.1
Cameroon	4.0	Canada	0.1
Oman	3.7	Netherlands	0.0
Afghanistan	3.4	Burma (now known as Myanmar)	0.0
Togo	3.3	Singapore	0.0
Lao People's Democratic Republic	3.3	Australia	0.1
Angola	3.1	Mongolia	0.1
Guinea	3.0	Mauritius	0.3
		Srilanka	0.4
		United Arab Emirates	0.9

a/ Countries with populations of 300,000 or more around 1985.

In the period 1980-1985, 25 countries experienced rates of in-migration of 0.3 per cent or less. Of these, 10 are from Europe, 9 are from Asia, 2 are from North America, 2 are from Oceania, 1 is from Latin America and 1 is from Africa. Negative or zero rates of in-migration were estimated for the United Arab Emirates, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Mongolia, Australia, Singapore, Myanmar (formerly Burma) and the Netherlands.

### **4.3.2 Patterns of urban population growth**

In-migration patterns in the more developed and less developed regions indicate a number of regional differentials. In this section, four distinct patterns of urban populations growth are delineated. These four patterns are differentiated according to the level of in-migration (per cent urban) and the rate of urbanization (growth rate of the per cent urban).

#### **4.3.2.1 Regions with a high level of in-migration**

One group of regions is more than two thirds urbanized but exhibits urban population growth rates under 1 per cent per year. Europe, Northern America and Australia-New Zealand are examples of such regions. Projections indicate that the rate of in-migration in these regions will continue to decline from the current level, which is already below 0.5 per cent per year. Since the total population growth rate in these regions is also very low and is projected to decline, urban population growth is anticipated to be very low (see table 4.5)

#### **4.3.2.2 Regions with a high level of in-migration and moderate urban growth**

The major area of Latin America (including the regions of the Caribbean, Central America and South America) is also two thirds urbanized, but the rate of growth of its urban population remains at about 3 per cent per year. The rate of in-migration in Latin America is expected to continue to decline. However, because the total population growth rate remains moderately high (at around 2.0 per cent per year in 1980-1985), the rate of urban population growth is also moderately high. As indicated in table 4.5, urban population growth rates are projected to decline, corresponding to projected declines in both rates of total population growth and rates of urbanization.

#### **4.3.2.3 A region with a moderate level of in-migration and rapid urban growth**

Western Asia is distinguished by a moderately high level of in-migration (55 per cent urban) but a still rapidly growing urban population (4 per cent per year). The high growth rate of the urban population corresponds to the

region's high rate of total population growth. A decline of the region's urban population growth rate is projected, but nonetheless it is expected to remain above 3.5 per cent until the end of this century.

#### **4.3.2.4 Regions with a low level of in-migration and rapid urban growth**

In a fourth group of regions, less than one third of the population resides in urban areas. However, in these regions, the urban population is growing at 4 per cent or more per year. These are the five regions of Africa, plus the regions of South Eastern Asia, Southern Asia and Melanesia. The combined effect of rapid total population growth and high rates of in-migration have produced exceptionally rapid urban population growth.

The countries of Africa exhibit the highest urban population growth rates in the world, and these rates are projected to remain high to the end of the century. Afterwards they are projected to decline slowly as both the rate of total population growth and the rate of in-migration decline. Eastern, Middle and Western Africa have had the highest rates of urban growth in the recent past. Eastern Africa reached a rate of over 7 per cent per year in 1975-1980. This high urban growth rate was the result of a combined effect of a rising rate of population growth and a declining, but still high, rate of in-migration. A decline of the urban growth rate to below 6 per cent per year for Eastern Africa is expected after the year 2000 and to 4.5 per cent in 2020-2025. Even then, Eastern Africa is projected to have the highest urban population growth rate in the world. The same pattern, but at a slightly lower level, is projected for Western and Middle Africa.

The rate of in-migration in Southern Asia is expected to remain at a high level: 1.8 per cent in 1985-1990, 1.9 per cent in 2005-2010 and 1.7 per cent in 2020-2025. Nevertheless, since the rate of growth of the total population is projected to slow down, urban population growth is also expected to decline. In Western Asia the rate of in-migration is projected to decline to a much lower level than in Southern and South Eastern Asia, because the level of in-migration in Western Asia has already reached a much higher level. In

Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia, the rate of urban growth has also been on the decline, although the growth rate was still very high in Melanesia. Micronesia and Polynesia, the rate of urban growth has also been on the decline, although the growth rate was still very high in Melanesia (4.1 per cent per year during 1980-1985) and will still be high (3.3 per cent) for 2020-2025 (United Nations, 1986:36 and 1989:16).

#### **4.4 TRENDS IN RURAL POPULATION GROWTH**


Along with the rapid growth of the world urban population, the increase in the world rural population continues. This increase is, however, projected to end around 2010, when the rural population will have reached 3.5 billion inhabitants (see table 4.4) and figure 4.4). After 2010, the world's rural population is projected to decline.

In some regions of the world, the growth of the rural population remains important (see table 4.5). In Eastern, Northern and Western Africa, and in Malenesia, for example, the rural population is growing at a rate of about 2.2 per cent per year. In the rest of Africa and in Southeastern, Southern and Western Asia the growth rate is expected to stay above 1 per cent in the near future.

In the more developed regions, the rural population began declining in the 1970's as a result of very slow natural increase and a slow, but generally positive rate of in-migration. The projections presented here indicate a continuing decline of rural population size in the more developed regions, from 1985 until at least the year 2025. However, the rural population in Australia- New Zealand is to grow slowly until at least 2020.

**Figure 4.4 Rural population in the more and less developed regions  
1950-2025**

### Population



Source: United Nations, 1996:36

## 4.5 CONCLUSION

For many developing countries, the most remarkable effect of over two decades of deliberate development planning has been the unplanned but striking disparities in living conditions and opportunities in different regions of the country. A large part of these disparities had arisen because of the single minded devotion to the goal of economic growth with little or no concern for the social and spatial consequences of economic decisions. The corresponding growth of urban unemployment and under employment, particularly in the metropolitan centres, the general neglect of the rural areas, and in short, the creation of regional disparities with respect to the distribution of income and welfare have brought with them many unresolved problems of in-migration.

Not unexpectedly, this outcome of the development process set in motion in virtually all developing countries complex streams of population movements. In some countries, particularly those in Africa, the volume of this in-migration

from the rural areas began to create conditions of rural labour shortage and to affect the viability of agricultural production in many families.

At the same time, there is an accumulation of unemployed, underemployed and unemployable persons in the major urban centers, with associated effects on the rates of violence, crime and social insecurity.

It is clear that no one can deny that most governments, by adopting a strategy of planned development and taking decisions that affect many areas of national life, economic and otherwise, are already influencing patterns of population distribution. However, the results are largely unintended and in many countries are considered far from satisfactory.

If life as in society continue, Mears (1991:5) points out that certain conditions are to be met by the administrators of in-migration. From this follows the central importance of policies, which aims to transit societal norms and values, which provide the necessary homogeneity for society's survival.

These message transmitted is that certain policies, economic and social forces are required to fulfil roles in future administration of people coming to settle in a country.

Promotion of policies, social, and economic forces, that is a set of common ideas and sentiments, as pointed out by Mears (1991:37), is considered to be a service to migrants, as it equips them with the tools necessary to fit in friction free with society's demands. The man whom migration should realise in us is not the man such as nature has made him, but as society wishes him to be; and it wishes him such as its internal economy calls for (Stouffer, 1940:845). Individuals are thus molded according to the views held by society, and as a result internalise a regulated world view. Not only is this 'imposed role' passively accepted, individuals (in-migrants) are bound to adapt to the world as is.

Identification and integration occur when in-migrants are influenced such that they identify with the current culture and norms, and therefore 'fit in'. Were assimilation by implication legitimate the norms and values held by society. Demeanor not in line with those policies, norms and values is considered to be a deviant.

## CHAPTER 5

### POLICIES, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORCES AFFECTING IN-MIGRATION IN GAUTENG PROVINCE

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

In-migration and industrialisation are responsible for profound social, political, cultural and economic change throughout the present-day world. Old established values, ideas and practices have to be abandoned or at least re-assessed at a rate unparalleled in recorded history. As a consequence, the future today seems to be even more unpredictable and uncertain than ever before especially in Gauteng province.

If this is true of the world's economically advanced nations, it applies much more to the less advanced peoples – peoples that have only recently emerged from colonial and other rules and are now seeking to free themselves from poverty, ill health, ignorance and superstition, and to become nations in the full sense of the word. In Gauteng province the chasm that separates actual achievement for the goals they are striving for, far from being bridged, in fact appears to be widening. Ominous tensions are building up between the have and the have-not and this should be attended to timeously to avoid conflict.

One cannot meaningfully speak about, for example, the South African black peoples, transition to an urban economy if one ignores this global setting. In no other country can one find a more striking contrast between a highly sophisticated industrial society on the one hand and the persistence of time honoured social and economic patterns on the other. South Africa mirrors the international scene in many crucial respects, and Gauteng province takes the lead.

It is important to recognise that the Gauteng Black people are in the midst of an evolutionary process between a point of departure which is not truly understood and a destination that lies in an unknown future. All we can be

certain of is that there is no way back into tribal pattern and that Western technology will increasingly shape Gauteng Black South African society. Whether we like it or not, the Western way of life in its technocratic guise is the future pattern of living of the Black peoples on the African continent. This applies to an even greater extent to South Africa especially Gauteng province where more than three million Whites are playing a leading role in this process of development. Whoever refuses to acknowledge this and still wants to dream about the evolution of some autogenous culture or other for a Black man, is suffering from a form of romanticism which is simply out of touch with reality (Durand, 1970:2).

## **5.2 IMPLICIT POLICIES AND THE URBAN BIAS AS FACTORS AFFECTING IN-MIGRATION**

The point of departure for the present discussion of the effects of implicit policies and institutional factors on in-migration Gauteng is best indicated by Renaud (1981 6:6) who states that, in practically all developing countries the role of the state is dominant, so that a laissez-faire, do-nothing approach similar to that of most advanced economies at comparable levels of in-migration is in fact impossible. The Gauteng government has an inevitable influence through its policies, the location of infrastructure investment and the public enterprises it controls. In-migration in Gauteng is linked to underlying forces of economic and social change, and these forces are the structural factors that affect in-migration.

Although rates of natural increase can differ between rural and urban areas, the main cause of in-migration is rural to urban migration. This research therefore concentrates on the causes of urbanward migration in Gauteng. As Desmond (1971:77) has stated, individuals, firms, and other decision-makers wishing to maximise income, tend to settle in physical locations such as Johannesburg which they believe to offer the greatest opportunities towards the achievement of this objective. Large cities such as Johannesburg and Pretoria appear to provide the optimum conditions mainly as a consequence of scale factors from both investor and job-seeker points of view. With improvement in communications and transport facilities to increase their

mobility, individuals and firms both exercise income-maximisation objectives by locating in large cities.

An urban-rural per capita income difference is an almost universal phenomenon, and urban-rural income ratios of eight or ten to one are common in developing nations such as those in Gauteng. This pervasive income differential is based, in turn, on another well-established but less obvious economic fact of life – namely, that urban industrial productivity per worker is nearly always considerably higher than rural agricultural productivity per worker. Most households derive most of their income either from the sale of their own direct output or from the sale of their labour services to a production process managed by someone else. In either case, the income the household receives is based on the marginal value product of the labour services. This is an equilibrium condition. In the short run, traditional factors, strong labour unions, or misguided government policies can result in wages higher than the true productivity of labour. But over the long run, unless the economy perpetually receives massive foreign aid, the factor payments cannot exceed the value of output.

Gauteng government policies and programmes affect rural-urban differentials and interactions to the extent that they reinforce the natural tendency of the urban-industrial capital per worker ratio to exceed that of a rural sector. This means that more attention is usually given to urban growth at the expense of rural areas. This includes human capital formation as well as social overhead-type physical capital formation. Gauteng government policies can also create direct subsidies or increments to the income-consumption pattern of urban persons and subsidies not available to rural persons. The pull factor is concentrated towards cities at the expense of the rural areas. Direct relief payments, subsidised food rations, and range of less tangible amenities all add to urban incomes. These patterns which favour urban people increase the urban-rural income differences arising from the differences in capital per worker and productivity. Public policy experienced by Gauteng province therefore can best be seen as affecting the in-migration process by affecting differentially the capital infrastructure in the urban and rural areas and hence

the relative worker productivities, and also by affecting directly the relative well-being of persons in the two sectors because of the pattern of available public services. The opposite concerning these policies and programmes would at the end benefit the Gauteng as a whole. To reduce significantly the gap requires that considerable resources be made available to a huge rural population. Rural incomes have to be raised directly, for example, through a reduction in taxes, or through an increase in the prices agricultural products fetch.

### **5.3 THE NEED FOR NATIONAL IN-MIGRATION POLICY**

A national in-migration policy is especially important for developing countries such as South Africa especially Gauteng province because the location of new economic activities and the movement of population affect the efficiency of their national economies and the stability of their political systems. The core argument here is that all USA and Japan are better off with a national in-migration strategy that is the outcome of a careful national debate about economic, political, social, and cultural goals. Decentralisation is not always the issue, the USA, Japan and France do not need to work actively at decentralising economic activities from the main urban region. Their level of development makes it not yet an issue or they do not seem to be suffering from excessive urban concentration, however, the spatial effects of current national policies and government practices are never considered in spite of their great influence of patterns of in-migration. Whether these policies systematically accentuate the tendency towards urban concentration should be a matter of public concern, and the realism of various urban expectations should be reviewed carefully.

The need for a national in-migration strategy is much stronger among developing countries Gauteng included that it ever was in the economies that developed earlier. The rate of in-migration of developing countries is much faster than that experienced historically by the developed countries. By the year 2000 the entire world population will be more than 50 percent urbanised (Renaud, 1981:507; cf. Preston, 1989:37-38). Management of the process of in-migration should therefore be of great importance to all human societies. It

is foreseeable that rapid in-migration in Gauteng will cause certain social problems, and therefore local authorities should strive to lessen the impact of in-migration on the community as a whole (Preston, 1989:37-38). Crime will escalate, fertility will be rife and this will impact on the scarce medical resources, requests for formal accommodation will be made and this will ultimately impact negatively on the lifestyle of those already settled in Gauteng province.

To do this, local authorities within the Greater Gauteng Metropolitan areas should be prepared to manage, that is, organise, lead, and control the process of in-migration instead of trying to halt it, and at the end they should evaluate its successes or failures. The best way to manage in-migration is through the administrative tool of policy-formulation. By drafting an in-migration policy, local authorities can use the process of in-migration as an instrument with which communities could be developed (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992:1). In-migration problems usually manifest at local authority level and should therefore be dealt with at that level. It should hence be a priority for all local authorities within Gauteng province to establish a comprehensive in-migration policy for their area of authority. Only through the drafting of an in-migration policy on local authority level can local authorities take informed decisions in their areas of jurisdiction.

In the past ten years the growth in the urban population caused by rapid in-migration could be seen in all South Africa's major cities. This includes the Greater Johannesburg and Pretoria areas. The opinion may be held that in-migration is a national phenomenon, and should therefore be addressed on national government level. This may be true, but it should be realised that the problems caused by in-migration usually manifest on a local authority level and should consequently be dealt with at this level. It should hence be a priority for all local authorities to formulate an in-migration policy for their area of authority (Brynard, P & Smit, T 1999:104-105).

The local authorities within the Greater Johannesburg and other Gauteng areas should strive to combine all current legislation and policies applicable to

the process of in-migration into one policy document. The policy document should then be made applicable to the Gauteng Province as a whole. Only through the drafting of an in-migration policy at local authority level can the local authorities with the assistance of provincial authorities endeavour to bring about structured in-migration in their areas of jurisdiction. To bring about structured in-migration, an in-migration policy should be highly developed and soundly structured. The in-migration policy should therefore comply with certain standards or criteria (Gilbert & Gugler, 1992:1). The in-migration policy to be meaningful and effective it should feature on all spheres of government, from local to national government.

The existence of an organised modern national-state in Gauteng province will in itself be a type of implicit policy encouraging urban growth. The growth of a national capital and the creation of a centralised political, social, religious and economic system have always gone hand in hand. In the most basic sense the existence of a centralised political authority is in itself a policy encouraging in-migration and probably primacy as well. History is full of examples of nomadic tribes who, having conquered wealthy, settled areas and created states, quickly discovered the advantages of a centralised permanently placed administrative capital. Having been created as a center of administrative, fiscal, judicial, and military functions, the capital draws other economic and social functions to itself as well. Where the power resides, there also will everyone want to be. The corollary is that the more efficient and pervasive the political control exercised by the capital, the more the capital will tend to draw other functions as well (Davis, 1955; World Bank 1975:31 and McNeil & Adams, 1978).

Any modern developing country's capital city will inevitably exert an enormous drawing power. Social and economic power will cluster close to the political power, and people will be attracted by all three. Thus, the inherent policy alone may go a long way towards explaining rapid urban growth in the Gauteng province. Implicit in-migration policies arise from some purposeful exercise of government power, through its ability to enact and enforce laws, through taxation and controls, and through expenditures and the provision of

services. These are not explicitly aimed at encouraging rural in-migration and an increase in city size (Lipton, 1977:53).

Implicit pro-urban in-migration policies overlap with but are not synonymous with the often discussed urban bias in the developing world. Many writers have argued forcefully for their importance of this bias. Lipton (1977:54), for example, asserts that the most serious conflict in Gauteng province is not between capital and labour nor between foreign and national interests, but between the rural and urban classes. The rural sector contains most of the poverty and most of the low cost sources of potential advancement but the urban sector contains most of the organisation, articulateness and power, thus giving it the advantage. Lipton claims that a disproportionate share of public-sector spending on services and employment generation has been concentrated in the cities. Keyfitz, 1983:15 cf. Todaro and Stilkind, (1983:xiii) advocate three dramatic and perhaps unpopular steps to eliminate urban bias in development policies. The first is to end the special tax breaks, subsidised interest rates, excessive tariff protection, and other privileges enjoyed exclusively by urban large-scale industry. The second is to modify minimum wages by holding them to the level of average agricultural incomes while simultaneously slowing the growth of urban real wages at all levels in both the public and private sector. Third, governments such as Gauteng must curtail the expansion of urban public services and instead provide for them in rural towns and small-city service centers.

Analysis of validity of this bias by other authors (Yap, 1977; Jones, 1983; Renaud 1981a; Linn 1982, 1983a) can be summarised As follows. Two general sorts of urban bias have implicitly pro- in-migration effects. First are national economic policies, which have the effect of changing relative prices, including wages, so as to shift the intersectional terms of trade against agriculture, to widen the gap in rural-urban wage rates, and to decrease investment and technological advancement in agriculture. Second are policies regarding the placement and availability of public services, which discriminate in favour of urban households and productive enterprises.

Several specific policies which should be taken into consideration in Gauteng province:

- (i) Tariffs and controls on the import of industrial goods have the goal of stimulating a local import-substituting industry. Whatever their impact on industrial growth, they increase the price of the inputs to agriculture. Such policies are widespread in developing regions such as Gauteng (Rhenberg, 1978; Renaud 1981).
- (ii) Use of multiple exchange rates so as to provide a bonus to manufactured exports again have the goal of encouraging industrial growth. This reduces relative profitability of agriculture and tend to drain investment from agriculture in industry. The famous “export bonus” scheme of Pakistan provides a classical example, but there are many other as well (Stern and Soligo, 1965).
- (iii) Subsidisation of urban food (and other basic commodity) prices through fixed-price retail sales of imported commodities or local output obtained by the government through quasioercive means has the effect of increasing the real urban wage rate over the comparable rural rate (Robinson, 1978 and Rhenberg, 1978).
- (iv) Setting urban minimum wages for industry, paying government servants a higher than market rate, and allowing trade unions to set wages in particular industries or occupations above comparable rural levels are all measures that drive urban wage rates above the rural rates (Renaud, 1981b).
- (v) In practice access to credit is frequently restricted to urban dwellers, even if this is not the stated intention of monetary policy. Banks are typically government owned and private financial intermediaries none existent in rural areas except for traditional moneylenders. Branches of the regular banks rarely solicit loans in the countryside. Even when they do, the complex paperwork required for applying, lack of collateral

(including a clear title to land when it is owned), and the risking of agriculture tend to limit loans to small rural households. Thus most credit and money created by financial intermediation benefits the urban-industrial household or business.

- (vi) Government controls and regulations adopted for consumer protection, quality control, or to promote more detailed economic planning can make it impossible for an enterprise to operate anywhere except in the urban center because they require numerous face-to-face consultations with officials.

Such regulations and interference's with normal market processes often have the effect of restricting entry of new firms and creating market rents for existing firms. National economic policies affecting relative prices, wage rates, and real standards of living, rural and urban, all have the effect of increasing the economic attractiveness of urban places by creating higher industrial-urban productivity's and wages and better prospects for employment, regardless of the availability or lack of public services. Thus they undoubtedly encourage rural-to-urban migration. These policies also have a kind of mirror-image counterpart in ineffectual or non-existent rural development policies, which lessen the relative attractiveness of rural life. The policies in cities that encourage rural-to-urban migration will not necessarily discourage it if put into practice in the countryside.

There is growing consensus in the development literature that such policies are usually counterproductive and pernicious. Adding the in-migration consideration reinforces this conclusion. Such policies persist largely because planners think in sector-specific terms. Encouraging exports, for example, is set as a goal and the spatial or economy-wide implications are ignored. This tendency is not likely to change.

The second category of implicit policy is more straightforward. The public sector raises money (from taxes, the sale of commodities and services, or borrowing) and uses these funds to create a flow of services for some part of

the population. These services include education, health, sanitation and water supply, electricity and telephone, roads, public transport services, housing, and recreation and leisure facilities. There is no debate that a disproportionate share has gone to the large urban areas (World Bank 1975). These services are almost always supplied free or below cost because it is technically difficult or impossible to collect a user fee (roads, park); because they are judged to be meritorious goods, with great social spillovers, which should be freely available (health, education); or because the services are part of the infrastructure vital to the public sector itself (transport, electricity, telephone). Even when charges are made for such services, they are usually based on some type of average-cost pricing principle, not on the true marginal cost of supplying the services (Riew, 1973).

When these services are concentrated in the large urban areas such as Gauteng, they constitute a direct subsidy-in-kind to all urban households that widens the rural-urban income gap, and a subsidy to an urban-base enterprises, lowering their cost of production in relation to enterprises in small towns or rural areas.

Urban policies and programmes most likely to attract population to Gauteng are those that assist the individual to acquire income or consume, in the present or future, including opportunities to acquire skills and investments in human capital. The migration literature provides support for this generalisation since better education for the children is always an important reason given by migrants for moving to urban areas (Davounzo, 1981. Cf. De Jong & Gardner, 1981).

It is easy to assert that these policies affect in-migration by making the perceived standard of living or the income or employment prospects in the urban areas more attractive. The logic is straightforward, but how much they affect in-migration in Gauteng poses a more difficult question.

#### 5.4 URBAN GROWTH AND THE FERTILITY TRANSITION

Rapid urban growth may well be a necessary part of the overall process of economic development and structural transformation. According to Rogers and Williamson (1982:464) population growth is attributable to the *vital revolution*, the process whereby societies with high birth and death rates move to a situation of low birth and death rates. In-migration is attributable to the *mobility revolution*. These two revolutions occur simultaneously and jointly constitute the *demographic transition*.

The historical record suggest that rural-to-urban migration has played a vital role in the modernisation of agriculture, which is so necessary to the creation of a viable base for overall development. The productivity of the rural labour force remains low as long as agriculture remains swamped with excess labour. The traditional work-sharing ethic and labour intensive methods are a response to persistent high fertility. It can be shown logically that even a totally work-sharing, income-sharing approach reaches a limit when the total output level is threatened by further labour intensification and finer subdivision of tasks (Robinson, 1971).

Thus, what must occur in Gauteng province is an easing of demographic pressure in agriculture so that new technologies, cropping patterns, tenure arrangements, and factor proportions can be employed to increase labour productivity and ultimately the yield per unit of land.

At some stage, then, an industrialising province such as Gauteng must, if it follows the sequence common to the history of the now industrialised regions, look to the non-agricultural sector of the economy for the provision of employment opportunities sufficient for the whole increase in labour force. It is a reasonable, almost an essential, objective that within a generation or two most countries should plan to provide non-agricultural employment for the whole of their additions to the labour force. How greatly eased is the task if fertility is reduced rather than allowed to remain at current high levels (Coale (1969:82-84).

Rural natural increase is the fountainhead of demographic growth during the transition process. Except in rare cases, rural fertility remains higher than urban fertility until late in the development transition. Rural-to-urban migration is not much the depopulation of the countryside as it is a process of exporting surplus rural population, the surplus being created either by labour's having become too redundant to allow further work and income sharing or by the beginnings of productivity increasing technical change. Treating the problems created by migration-induced in-migration is treating the symptoms, not the ailment. The alternative policy approach is to keep the population in the Gauteng province through both positive rural industrialisation programmes and bans on further urban growth.

In most of the developed countries, the rural natural-increase tap shut itself off and this will only come about if the nations involved had become overwhelmingly urban and only after a structural and technological transformation had occurred in the rural areas. In the United States, for example, the convergence of rural and urban fertility occurred after World War II. As late as 1940, rural fertility was one-third higher than urban fertility. The great United States migration stream from the rural south to the urban upper Mid-west and Northeast did not finally end until the 1950's, nearly one hundred years after it had begun (Coale, 1969:84).

Policymakers are now coming to understand that any policy aimed at making the cities such as Germiston better places to live also probably involve an open-ended commitment to an ever-increasing volume of public expenditures on such services. They must also come to understand that policies aimed at redirecting urban growth into new centers or at providing large-scale, rural make-work schemes involve similar open-ended public sector fiscal commitments. Unless the policies of Gauteng province are linked to parallel policies to reduce rural fertility, there will be no real solution to the problem of excess in-migration.

In Asia, the structural and technological transformation of the countryside seems advanced enough so that one can hope that the tap of rural fertility will

be shut off in the near future. These countries are also the ones in which a clear, vigorous public policy supporting fertility decline exists. In other countries of the region, however, the rural outflow continues without notably decreasing population pressure in the rural areas. The necessary technological transformation of agriculture remains distant, and so does any sustained decline in rural fertility. There, any effort to construct an urban policy seems futile (Fuchs, Jones & Pernia, 1987:178-181).

## **5.5 LINKAGES BETWEEN EFFICIENT SECTORAL POLICY AND SPATIAL OUTCOMES**

It is useful to examine sectoral policies across countries and to reflect upon the spatial outcomes that might follow the modification of such policies, purely on macroeconomic grounds. Such reviews help to support the proposition that one condition for nudging cities towards their efficient size, is the adoption of sectoral policies that ensure a macroeconomic environment supportive of broadly based growth, backed by an orderly expansion of interregional investments in transport, communications, power generation, and education. Cities should be free to grow and develop with as little central regulation as is consistent with a sober assessment of national goals. This requires that local communities in Gauteng province take on a larger share of financing, planning, executing, and maintaining local public services, freeing the central government to use its scarce resources to intervene more selectively to shape the future of the country. Reform of sectoral policies involving national management of local government relations is therefore critical (Garn, 1984:2-3).

Public policies need not be explicitly spatial to have major impacts on the location of economic activity (Ruane, 1982). Sectoral policies can favour the economic development of some locations over others. Where these implicit spatial policies go unrecognised, their effects can create unanticipated barriers to goals of decentralised urban growth. These effects are difficult to measure with precision. The data involved are substantial, and the eventual impact of implicit policies depends on how factors of production (labour, capital, land) adjust to them (Tyler, 1983).

Looking across subsectors and across cities of Gauteng province, it is clear that the input requirements of different production processes vary widely, as do the supplies of inputs at different locations. Some inputs, such as easy access to an international airport, to government officials, or to economies of scope, may be available to only a few locations. Moreover, individual subsectors differ in the emphasis they place on such variables. Under these circumstances, policies promoting subsectors that feel location bound will result in long-term subsidies for particular urban areas. If the individual sectoral policies are ill-advised on macroeconomic grounds, the differential urban impact is one more reason to consider reforms. Should the promotion policies be justified but the economic environment is such that economic agents, in urban centers other than those benefited, are denied equitable access to resources with which to solve locational deficiencies, then the public sector in Gauteng province can act to remedy the matter. Whenever subsector promotion policies are reasonably efficient and there is no cost-effective way to attenuate the impact of severely location-bound factors, then the Gauteng government has little option but to remain passive to the spatial consequences of such policies. On balance, it appears that in countries such as South Africa, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Thailand, South Korea, Nigeria, Mexico and Zaire, there is considerable room for improving sectoral policies whose spatial impact would lead eventually to more decentralised and more efficient human settlement patterns (Hamer 1986 and Fuchs, et al 1987:205-206).

## **5.6 TERRITORIAL ENTITLEMENTS**

### **5.6.1 The in-migration equity argument**

Considerable confusion surrounds the issue of how best to promote equity objectives in national policymaking. A popular definition of equity includes the notion of providing low-income households with access to services that are defined as basic needs. The problem then becomes not whether to assist these households but how to fulfil these goals. Equity-oriented policies cannot be developed in a macroeconomic vacuum. All countries, especially developing ones, South Africa included, especially Gauteng province, must

confront the resources constraints that exist at each stage of development. If one looks across a wide cross-section of developing countries, certain propositions suggest themselves. This could be allowed if resources are budgeted for, applied or used correctly and increased as the demand prevails.

First, subsidies invariably threaten the fulfilment of equity objectives. With subsidies, the coverage of any programme is limited by the resource haemorrhage involved, making mass coverage unlikely. At best, some deserving households are made better off while most get nothing, this is the case in Gauteng province as well (Fuchs, Jones & Pernia 1987:206).

Second, the fact that subsidies are distributed by Gauteng government officials means that access to services in the open market is replaced with access through bureaucratic goodwill. This results commonly in the subversion of subsidy programmes by the better-connected middle- or upper-income households. All too often, housing subsidies go to civil servants and subsidised loans benefit large landowners and influential businessmen.

Third, since so many services are potential for inclusion in the basket of basic needs, it behoves the policymaker to be very careful in selecting services for subsidisation, introducing, where possible, unsubsidised but affordable solutions. For most basic needs there is a range of service standards, each with a different price tag. By providing low-quality services with cost recovery where none would otherwise be possible, the public sector fulfils its obligation to alleviate the social debt while husbanding scarce resources for all other competing claims. The only exception to this approach are likely to be services with enormous positive externalities, such as programmes for minimum literacy and certain health services, such as vaccinations (Fuchs, Jones & Pernia 1987:206-207).

An appropriate concern with providing basic needs to low-income households will mean that certain investments, including education or health subsidies, are targeted to some locations more than to others. But this location focus is incidental to helping particular households. The average income who live in a

metropolis that has high income are as deserving of access to basic services as the poor in an undeveloped rural hinterland. Conversely, there is nothing inherently equitable about providing subsidies to prosperous households simply because they happen to live in one area of Gauteng province the country as opposed to another.

### **5.6.2 The in-migration minimisation argument**

One of the more popular justifications for territorial entitlements is to control in-migration, especially between rural areas and metropolitan centers. Stripped of rhetoric, this approach appears to advocate providing each square kilometre of national territory with a minimal level of population or output, understood to be higher than that predicated on a continuation of existing trends. The approach usually calls for curtailing in-migration. Policies are suggested that would exempt selected regions from the consequences of investment decision rules applied to the rest of the Gauteng territory. In its crudest form, this approach would pour resources into an area even if it had limited potential in the long term.

As a token effort to earn political goodwill, this argument for territorial entitlements within Gauteng province is repeatedly overturned by macroeconomic imperatives. If nothing more is involved but special pleading, then any sizeable commitment of resources diverted to such efforts will be attacked both for its cost in output foregone in other areas or uses, and for its untenable assumption that people who vote with their feet in search of wider opportunities should somehow be bribed into staying in one place. In practice, the macroeconomic decision makers are not long swayed by attempts to prevent the very structural dislocations that are an inevitable part of economic modernisation. Territorial entitlements argued for on these grounds are therefore doomed to tokenism (Fuchs, 1987:207. cf. Lee 1985 & Murray, 1982:212).

### **5.6.3 The in-migration efficiency argument**

(Fuchs, Jones & Pernia, 1987:207-208) states that some who would agree with this line of argument might nevertheless support subsidies targeted to a

region such as Gauteng for the sake of promoting latent economic potential. Territorial entitlements are then championed on a long-term efficiency grounds rather than out of concern about poverty.

In this scenario, the public sector might try to anticipate future spatial patterns of comparative advantage by shifting resources towards disadvantaged or undeveloped areas. The rate of return on investments, public or private, would now include an infant region premium. This premium would allow investment decision makers to compute the rate of return to include a margin for moving forward the time when deserving locations could attract a wide spectrum of activities and thus become self-sustaining. Unfortunately, accurately predicting future outcomes is much more difficult for infant regions than it is for infant industries, where the record is also poor. Beyond certain token levels, such investment subsidies should be reviewed as rigorously as other proposals for special favours.

## **5.7 MANAGING CITY SIZE AND IN-MIGRATION**

There is widespread concern in developing countries, South Africa included, especially Gauteng province about their rapid rates of in-migration, the increased size of large cities, rural-to-urban migration, the increase in crime, and urban unemployment. Management of the scale and pattern of in-migration is an important issue, but those who would stem the tide of in-migration should bear three points in mind.

First, in-migration in itself is not bad for development but rather an integral and probably essential part of it. Moreover, large cities such as Pretoria are not necessarily more costly and less efficient than smaller cities from a social standpoint (World Bank, 1979. Cf. Linn, 1983b). Therefore, measures to control the speed and pattern of in-migration in Gauteng should deal with clear manifestations of inefficient spatial development and their underlying causes, rather than be generalised efforts to slow down urban growth.

Second, in-migration policies are a matter of national or regional/provincial concern and rarely lend themselves to effective treatment at the level of a

particular city such as Johannesburg or Pretoria. Many of the forces driving the pace and pattern of in-migration are related to such national policies as import substitution favouring industrial over agricultural growth or investment incentives favouring large-scale, capital-intensive development. These forces cannot be curbed by particular cities, but need to be dealt with at the national level (Renaud, 1981). It is reasonable to hypothesise that the national development pursued in East Asian countries, which are more efficient than those of many Latin American countries and South Africa, have contributed to more efficient in-migration in the former region.

Third, one important area in which city-level policies can contribute to efficient and equitable in-migration in Gauteng province is in the costing and pricing of urban services. If urban service prices are set at levels reflecting the social costs of those services (either directly through user charges or indirectly through appropriate forms of taxation that assign the costs of urban development to the individual firm or household), then a major cause of inefficiency in in-migration can be eliminated at its root. Appropriate pricing of urban services is also an important element in the successful internal management of cities.

Rural-to-urban migration is one aspect of in-migration that is often singled out for special concern by policymakers because of its supposedly detrimental aspects, and some East Asian countries have experimented with measures to curb in-migration. For example, in 1970 authorities in Jakarta introduced a system of identity documents that was designed to help enforce a limit on in-migration to the city.

According to a World Bank review (World Bank, 1984a), this and other measures, including physical removal of in-migrants to surrounding rural areas, appear to have had little effect on the pace of in-migration to the capital city. Many people are streaming into the capital cities South Africa included because of war, hunger, illiteracy and other factors which are driving them to cities such as Johannesburg, Pretoria, in search of protection, wealth and better standard of living. In contrast, the more rigorous restrictions on in-

migration imposed in the People's Republic of China appear to have substantial limited growth of urban areas in that country.

There, however, direct controls on in-migration were combined with measures designed to decentralise the location of employment opportunities. These experiences lead to the conclusion that in the market-oriented countries direct controls on urbanward migration alone are not likely to be effective and that indirect means have to be found to limit in-migration, if indeed this is an appropriate goal of urban management.

Cities are burdened with uneducated, unskilled, and unmotivated migrants is mistaken, as many surveys have shown is not fully supported. In South Africa it is true and worse still too many incidents of crime, drug traffic, rape, and the other related factors are experienced. The migrants tend to be younger, better educated, and more highly motivated than the population of origin, and they generally respond to the superior employment opportunities of the cities rather than to illusory city lights (Findley 1977).

This statement may be suitable to East Asian countries but not to South Africa where the unemployment figures are high, illiteracy being rife, and most of the people in South Africa are generally demotivated and discouraged by promises such as better education, health and housing facilities from government not being fulfilled. The problem of in-migration may lie more in rural areas of origin, where the departure of migrants may prevent the building up of a diversified labour supply.

Without such labour force, rural areas and smaller towns cannot attract private sectors, increase their productivity, or improve their management and public administration.

The main conclusions about success and failure of managing city size, migration, and urban employment in Gauteng province can be summarised as follows:

The undistorted national economic policies generally followed in East Asian countries have probably contributed as much to efficient in-migration patterns in the region as have direct interventions designed to affect in-migration. Gauteng province policies designed to limit in-migration and city growth, if they are to be effective, have to affect the location of employment opportunities; however, such measures are likely to be quite costly and not likely to be effective. Attempts to limit rural-to-urban in-migration through direct controls are not likely to be successful, and it is not clear that in-migration is much of a burden on the urban economy as is frequently presumed. Misplaced efforts to limit informal-sector employment have been common in cities of East Asia; appropriate support for such employment has been rare. Investments in essential urban residential services should not be delayed for fear of attracting an excessive flow of in-migrants; instead, emphasis should be placed on recovering the investment and operating costs of urban services.

## **5.8 CONCLUSION**

The urban centers of Gauteng province are an essential part of the structural change since innovation, change, and technology all emanate from these centers.

Here are some several conclusions regarding policy: Urban policy must be part of an overall development policy that aims at effecting industrialisation, structural-technological change, and reduced population growth as quickly as possible. The most basic and important public programmes are those that create public infrastructure needed to improve transportation, communications, and technological change throughout the Gauteng province – specifically roads, communications, electrification, and efficient administration of law and order. Efforts to build human capital – education and health systems especially – should not be confined to urban areas but created in rural areas also. Such efforts are entirely feasible and not at all akin to rural industrialisation or new cities as a policy. Allowing such services to be offered only in urban areas probably increases rural-to-urban migration needlessly. The effect on rural-to-urban migration of urban policies to provide

local services – water, sewers, and so forth, has probably been overemphasised. Such services nearly always lag behind population growth and needs rather than create them. The most powerful implicit policies encouraging in-migration have probably been economic policies favouring industry over agriculture. Experience has shown that they are largely ineffective and even pernicious to real growth since they distort market prices and protect inefficiency. Such policies are losing favour and should be discontinued for these reasons, but their possible effect on rural-to-urban migration may have been their most positive accomplishment (Fuchs, Jones & Pernia; 1987:181-182).

Finally, Simmons (1982:165) states that one should not lose sight of the fact that in-migration is an intervening process linking a wide range of social and economic transformations affecting regions, amenities, households and individuals in developing countries such as South Africa especially Gauteng province. In-migration from a village such as Mohlakeng to a city such as Johannesburg is both a cause and consequence of wider social and economic changes. Study of its effects is one way of gaining an understanding of these changes, so urgently needed by policy makers.

The World Population Plan of Action places emphasis on the negative effects of rural-to-urban migration (United Nations,1975:Chap.1). The material reviewed here, however, shows that in many circumstances the externalities associated with such migration are, on balance, beneficial. That governments such as Gauteng that seek to reduce urbanward migration across the board may be basing their decisions, in the words of the United Nations Secretariat (1984:34), on value judgement rather than on hard analysis.

The following chapter will be focussed on population growth and the impact of in-migration projections, trends and spatial transformation in Asia, which will act as an eye-opener for a country like South Africa, more especially Gauteng province.

## CHAPTER 6

### POPULATION GROWTH AND IN-MIGRATION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ASIA

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter first summarises in-migration trends, urban population growth, city size, and urban concentration in Asia, then turns to the projection of these trends. A brief exercise illustrates the potential errors that can occur in both in-migration and urban growth projections over a twenty-year period. Not surprisingly, the errors seem sensitive to changes in economic development indicators. The process is then examined in a review of the determinants of in-migration, from which conclusions are drawn about the factors that will influence the future of in-migration. In-migration is economic growth and capital accumulation, and these processes are global in their compass (Harvey, 1975:101). The major aim of this chapter is to assist in searching for better methods, ideas, and issues which will assist South Africa especially Gauteng province to manage in-migration successfully. The similarities and differences will be shown. The lessons South Africa is exposed to will be fully discussed at the end of the chapter.

#### 6.2 TRENDS IN IN-MIGRATION, URBAN POPULATION GROWTH, AND CITY SIZE

Levels of in-migration in Pacific Asia, with notable exceptions in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, are low by global standards. The estimates presented in Table 6.1 are based upon definitions of urban areas designated by the individual countries, rather than upon a uniform set of classification criteria. One justification for this practice is that national statistical offices are in the best position to distinguish between urban and rural areas in their own countries (United Nations, 1980:9).

The different urban definitions can cause problems, however, inferences may be sensitive to the inconsistency in urban definitions among countries and to definitional changes over time. It is important to note that the United Nations

figures are adjusted whenever changes in national urban definitions between censuses occur. The average level of in-migration for the world in 1980 was approximately 40 percent. Europe and North America average 71 and 74 percent urban respectively. The Soviet Union and Latin America had roughly 65 percent of their population urban. Africa was low with 29 percent. The least urbanised region was Asia, at 26 percent (United Nations, 1985).

Asia's low average, however, masks considerable sub-regional and international heterogeneity. Whereas South Asia and Southern Asia were only approximately 23 percent urban, East Asia was highly urbanised by 1980, at 71 percent. In-migration levels within South Asia ranged from 10 percent in Bangladesh to 28 percent in Pakistan. In Southeast Asia, Thailand was 17 percent urban while the Philippines was 37 percent urban. In East Asia, South Korea was 57 percent urban. The in-migration levels of centrally planned Asia were generally low, though also heterogeneous. North Korea had achieved a level approximately 60 percent, while the levels for China, Vietnam, and Kampuchea ranged from 20 to 14 percent. The increase in Asian in-migration levels over time can also be seen in Table 6.1. (Fuchs, Jones and Pernia, 1987:14)

The pace of in-migration, defined here as the average annual absolute change in the percentage urban, has not been high by historical standards, though in South and South-eastern Asia it increased during the 1970s. (Table 6.2). There is considerable variation by subregion and country. During the 1960s the pace for South Asia (0.20) and for Southern Asia (0.26) was below the world average (0.33). East Asia urbanised rapidly (0.89). The pace in centrally planned Asia (0.27) was also low, except for North Korea (0.99). During the 1970s the pace in South Asia increased to (0.35) and in Southeast Asia to (0.37). The pace in East Asia declined to (0.74), conforming to a commonly observed logistics pattern of in-migration over time. Ledent (1982) states that at high level of in-migration, the pool of potential migrants to urban areas declines as a proportion of the total population, and the pace of in-migration therefore declines. The pace, however, has also declined in centrally planned Asia, at relatively low levels of in-migration.

**Table 6.1: Actual and projected percentages urban: Selected countries and years, by region, 1960 – 2000**
**Table 6.2: Actual and projected pace of urbanization: Selected Asian countries, by region: 1960-70, 1970-80 and 1980-2000**

<i>Table 6.1: Actual and projected percentages urban: selected countries and years, by region, 1960-2000</i>					<i>Table 6.2: Actual and projected pace of urbanization: selected Asian countries, by region: 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-2000</i>			
Region	1960	1970	1980	2000	Region	1960-70	1970-80	1980-2000
World total	34	37	40	48	World	0.33	0.29	0.41
South Asia	17	19	23	33	South Asia	0.20	0.35	0.50
Bangladesh	05	08	10	18	Bangladesh	0.25	0.28	0.39
Burma	19	23	27	41	Burma	0.36	0.43	0.69
India	18	20	23	34	India	0.18	0.37	0.54
Sri Lanka	18	22	22	24	Sri Lanka	0.39	-0.03	0.13
Pakistan	22	25	28	38	Pakistan	0.28	0.32	0.49
Southeast Asia	17	20	24	37	Southeast Asia	0.26	0.37	0.66
Indonesia	15	17	22	36	Indonesia	0.25	0.51	0.71
Thailand	12	13	17	23	Thailand	0.07	0.38	0.31
Philippines	30	33	37	49	Philippines	0.26	0.44	0.58
Malaysia	25	27	29	42	Malaysia	0.18	0.24	0.61
East Asia	55	64	71	80	East Asia	0.89	0.74	0.41
South Korea	28	41	57	81	South Korea	1.30	1.62	1.18
Taiwan	58	-	77	-	Taiwan	0.95	0.95	-
Japan	63	71	76	79	Japan	0.87	0.50	0.15
Centrally planned Asia	17	20	21	27	Centrally planned Asia	0.27	0.12	0.33
China	17	19	20	27	China	0.99	0.96	0.66
North Korea	40	50	60	73	North Korea	0.14	0.22	0.49
Kampuchea	10	12	14	24	Kampuchea	0.36	.010	.039
Vietnam	15	18	19	27	Vietnam	0.36	0.10	0.39

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:16).

Although the rates of in-migration in developing countries are not exceptional, the growth rates of urban populations in developing countries are unprecedented (Preston, 1979:126). South African and Asian countries are no exception (Supra 6.3). World urban population growth averaged 2.95 percent annually during the 1960s, whereas the urban growth rate for developing countries averaged 4.1 percent. Growth rates in South Asia ranged from 3.4 percent in India to 6.5 percent in Bangladesh. Southeast Asia rates ranged only from 3.5 percent in Malaysia to 3.8 percent in Indonesia. In East Asia, Japan's rate was low (2.3 percent), whereas South Korea's was high (6.3 percent). The rates for centrally planned Asia ranged from China's 3.6 percent to North Korea's 50 percent (United Nations, 1985. cf. Fuchs, Jones and Pernia, 1987:16-18).

Urban population growth rates remained high during the 1970s. Although the rates dropped in many countries, they actually increased in some. In South Asia the rate increased slightly in India (to 3.9 percent) and Pakistan (4.0 percent), whereas it declined slightly in Bangladesh (5.9 percent). In Southeast Asia the growth rate increased substantially in Indonesia (4.9 percent) but declined marginally in the rest of the region. The rates in East Asia declined. The most dramatic declines occurred in centrally planned Asia, where China's rate dropped to 2.4 percent, Vietnam's to 2.9 percent, and Kampuchea's to 0.9 percent.

These growth rates have resulted in sizable Asian urban population. Between 1960 and 1980, for example, the urban population increased from 77.5 to 161.4 million in India, from 11.1 to 24.5 million in Pakistan, and from 14.0 to 33.5 million in Indonesia. Overall, the urban population of countries as could be seen in Table 6.3 almost doubled, growing from 309 million to 597 million (United Nations, 1985).

**Table 6.3: Actual and Projected urban populations growth rates**

Table 6.3: Actual and projected urban population growth rates (average annual percentage rates): selected Asian countries by region 1960-70, 1970-80, and 1980-2000			
Region or group	1960-70	1970-80	1980-2000
World	2.9	2.7	2.5
Developing countries	4.1	3.8	3.5
South Asia			
Bangladesh	6.5	5.5	5.3
India	3.4	3.9	3.6
Sri Lanka	4.3	1.6	2.3
Pakistan	3.9	4.0	3.9
South East Asia			
Indonesia	3.8	4.9	4.0
Thailand	3.6	3.3	4.2
Philippines	3.8	3.8	3.5
Malaysia	3.5	3.3	3.7
East Asia			
South Korea			
Japan	2.3	1.8	0.7
Centrally planned Asia			
China	3.6	2.4	2.5
North Korea	5.0	4.3	3.1
Kampuchea	3.7	0.9	4.9
Vietnam	4.4	2.9	3.6

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:18)

The low levels of in-migration in South, Southeast, and centrally planned Asia resulted from high rural growth rates rather than from the failure of cities to reach substantial sizes (Hackenberg, 1980). Eight of the world's largest agglomerations in 1950 were located in Asia. By 1975 Asia's share had risen to twelve. The number of cities with populations over one million in South, Southeast, East, and centrally planned Asia tripled, from twenty-three in 1950 to sixty-nine in 1980 (UN,1985). The population of the fifteen largest urban agglomerations in the selected countries appear in Table 6.4. The growth rates between 1950 and 1980 varied for these large cities, but their urban populations increased on average by a factor of 2.3.

**Table 6.4: Actual and projected populations of the largest Asian urban agglomerations**

Table 6.4 Actual and projected populations of the largest Asian urban agglomerations: 1950, 1980, and 2000			
Populations (in millions)			
City	1950	1980	2000
Tokyo-Yokohama	6.7	17.0	17.1
Shanghai	10.3	11.8	13.5
Calcutta	4.4	9.5	16.6
Beijing	6.7	9.1	10.8
Bombay (Greater)	2.9	8.5	16.0
Seoul	1.1	8.5	13.5
Osaka-Kobe	3.8	8.0	7.7
Tianjin	5.4	7.7	9.2
Jakarta	1.8	6.7	12.8
Manila	1.6	6.0	11.1
New Delhi	1.4	5.9	13.3
Karachi	1.1	5.2	12.2
Bangkok-Thonburi	1.4	4.6	9.5
Madras	1.4	4.4	8.2
Dacca	0.4	3.4	11.2

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:19)

Table 6.5 presents the percentages of urban populations in cities of more than 1 million and more than 4 million inhabitants. The percentage of the urban population living in cities of over 1 million remained fairly constant in Far East Asia (37 percent) between 1950 and 1980, but it increased from 22 to 35 percent in Southern Asia and from 16 to 29 percent in South Asia.

Changes in the estimated percentages of urban populations in cities of 100,00 or more inhabitants between 1960 and 1980 (Table 6.6) have not been uniform, nor have they been dramatic except for the large declines in Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, in China, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia.

**Table 6.5 Actual and projected percentages of urban populations in cities of more than 1 million and more than 4 million**

Table 6.5: Actual and projected percentages of urban populations in cities of more than 1 million and more than 4 million: Three Asian regions, 1950, 1980 and 2000						
	> 1 million			> 4 million		
Region	1950	1980	2000	1950	1980	2000
Far East Asia	37	37	38	24	20	19
Southeast Asia	22	35	37	0	20	23
South Asia	16	29	45	6	18	25

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS : (1985:20)

**Table 6.6: Percentages of urban populations in cities of 100,000 or more**

Table 6.6: Percentages of urban populations in cities of 100,000 or more selected Asian countries, by region: 1960 and 1980		
Region and country	1960	1980
<b>South Asia</b>		
Bangladesh	75	74
Burma	43	41
India	60	61
Sri Lanka	50	38
Pakistan	55	64
<b>Southeast Asia</b>		
Indonesia	76	64
Thailand	65	69
Philippines	53	58
Malaysia	45	43
<b>East Asia</b>		
South Korea	100	98
Japan	54	60
<b>Centrally planned Asia</b>		
China	68	55
North Korea	42	42
Kampuchea	70	64
Vietnam	90	55

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS : (1985:20)

Primary increased in eight out of twelve Asian countries between 1960 and 1980 (Table 6.7). The index of primacy for South Korea increased rapidly during the 1960s, then declined slightly in the 1970s. India, China, and North Korea experienced slight drops in primacy, while Sri Lanka's decline was more dramatic. (The estimates in Table 6.7 are from 1980 and have not been updated with results from the 1980-81 census round.)

Despite the varied urban experiences of individual Asian countries, regional trends can be summarised as follows. In-migration has increased slowly in South, Southeast, and centrally planned Asia, while East Asia has urbanised more rapidly. Consequently, the levels of In-migration in South Asia (33 percent), Southeast Asia (24 percent), and centrally planned Asia (21 percent) were still rather low as of 1980. East Asia, on the other hand, has achieved a high level of in-migration (71 percent in 1980). Although the pace of urbanisation in South and Southeast Asia has not been rapid, it accelerated during the 1970s. East Asia's high pace has declined somewhat. Centrally planned Asia's pace is low and declined during the 1970s.

Despite the slow pace of in-migration for Asia as a whole, Asia urban populations have been growing at very high rates, and the proportions of urban populations in the large cities has been increasing. These trends are expected to continue. Before turning to urban projections, however, we will discuss briefly the demographic determinants of past trends.

Urban population growth rates can be attributed to three causes: natural increase of urban areas, rural-to-urban migration, and a real reclassification. The major determinant of rapid urban growth in developing countries seems to be urban natural increase. Sixty percent of their urban growth has been attributed to natural increase (Preston 1979:198). The relative importance of natural increase and migration varies by region. In-migration is more important, for example, in ASEAN countries than elsewhere in the developing world.

At some periods during a nation's in-migration transition its urban population may grow primarily as a consequence of net urban in-migration, whereas at other periods natural increase is the major contributor. A sharp increase in the rate of rural-to-urban migration temporarily raises the urban population growth rate. However, "its ultimate effect is to urbanise the population more rapidly and thereby to depress the urban growth rate to a lower level than it would have reached in the absence of the increase" (Rogers 1982:505).

Whereas urban natural increase largely determines urban-growth rates, the principal effect of migration is to determine the levels of in-migration. Since rural rates of natural increase are slightly higher than urban rates in most parts of the world, this point is intuitive. This occurs because there is no proper control of birth rate and there is no law which prescribes to the people how, when, and how many children they should have (Ledent 1982). The estimated contribution of migration to urban growth will vary according to whether a narrow annual accounting procedure or a broader approach is used. Todaro (1975) has argued that high rates of urban natural increase are largely the result of high fertility among migrants. Keyfitz and Philipov (1981), noting the difference between the immediate and ultimate effects of migration, assert that the ultimate effect results from the births to migrants and their children.

**Table 6.7 Percentages of urban populations in the largest city and index of primacy**

Table 6.7: Percentages of urban populations in the largest city and index of primacy: selected Asian countries, by region: 1960, 1970, and 1980						
Region and country	% of urban populations in largest city			Index of primacy		
	1960	1970	1980	1960	1970	1980
<b>South Asia</b>						
Bangladesh	20	25	30	0.8	1.0	1.2
Burma	23	23	23	1.6	1.8	1.9
India	07	06	06	0.7	0.6	0.5
Sri Lanka	28	20	16	4.8	2.2	1.9
Pakistan	20	21	21	0.9	1.0	1.0
<b>Southeast Asia</b>						
Indonesia	20	22	23	1.1	1.3	1.5
Thailand	65	68	69	B	B	B
Philippines	27	29	30	3.6	3.7	3.7
Malaysia	19	23	27	1.0	1.0	1.2
<b>East Asia</b>						
South Korea	35	42	41	1.1	1.5	1.5
Japan	18	20	22	1.2	1.3	1.5
<b>Centrally planned Asia</b>						
China	6	6	6	0.7	0.7	0.7
North Korea	15	13	12	1.0	0.9	0.7

SOURCE: WORLD BANK (1980:21).

### 6.3 NATURAL INCREASE AND MIGRATION

The varying impact of natural growth and migration on population distribution makes it particularly important to analyse their respective contributions to urban growth. In its intensive analysis of patterns of urban and rural population growth, the United Nations attempted to identify the components of urban and rural population change. In contrast to the experience of more developed countries, the bulk of urban growth in the less developed countries is attributable to the natural increase of urban population and South Africa is no exception. (United Nations, 1980a:23). Based on the most recent observations for the 29 less developed countries for which data were available, 61 percent of the growth was attributed to natural increase, compared to only 39 percent to migration. This contrast sharply with experience of more developed countries where the proportions were almost the reverse, 40 and 60 percent, respectively. The difference is largely a function of much higher rate of urban natural increase in the less developed countries. Over four fifths of the difference in urban growth rates between the two groups of countries is accounted for by differentials in average rates of natural increase. Thus, in the less developed countries, only 15.8 percent of the differential in urban growth rates is attributable to the higher rates of urban in-migration in less developed countries (United Nations, 1980a:23).

In a number of countries, the urban populations are growing at rates of between five and seven percent a year; the rates in the big cities of these countries are even higher. As a result, even if migration contributes only 40 to 50 percent to such growth, such migration carries major responsibility for the exceedingly high growth rates of urban places. Moreover, this contribution to total growth is compounded by the fact that some of the natural increase occurring in the urban location is attributable to the fertility of the migrants themselves. The same scenario is experienced by South Africa, which is having an inflow of migrants from neighbouring countries affected by wars such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Angola (Fuchs, Jones & Pernia, 1987:76).

#### 6.4 PROJECTED TRENDS OF IN-MIGRATION

Although a steady, general increase in Asian in-migration levels is projected for the year 2000, the levels will remain low by global standards (Supra 6.1). The projected levels for South Asia (28 percent) are below the protected world average of 48 percent. The expected continued increase in East Asian in-migration, on the other hand, will result in populations averaging 80 percent urban. Intraregional heterogeneity is projected to continue. In South Asia, for example, projected in-migration levels range from Bangladesh's 18 percent to 41 percent for Burma. The pace of in-migration is projected to increase in South Asia (0.50), Southeast Asia (0.66) and centrally planned Asia (0.33) between 1980 and 2000 (see Table 6.2). The pace of East Asian in-migration is projected to decline. The projected urban population growth rates (Supra 6.3) remain generally high and are projected to increase in many countries.

The urban population of the region as a whole is projected to increase by 471 million (Supra 6.8). The urban populations of South and Southeast Asia, according to the projection, will increase by a factor of 2.2. Centrally planned Asia's urban population will increase by a factor of 1.6, while East Asia's will grow by a factor of 1.3. Trends in city growth are also projected to continue. The number of Asian cities with populations of more than 1 million is projected to increase from 69 in 1980 to 148 by the year 2000 (United Nations 1985). The percentages of urban population living in the largest cities, will continue to increase, except in Far East Asia (Supra 6.5).

**Table 6.8: Projected increases in urban populations**

Table 6.8: Projected increases in urban populations: selected Asian countries, by region, 1980-2000		
Region and country	Absolute Population increase (In thousands)	Proportional Increase
South Asia	216,447	2.1
Bangladesh	17,428	2.9
India	167,722	2.0
Sri Lanka	1,851	1.6
Pakistan	29,446	2.2
Southeast Asia	72,811	2.2
Indonesia	41,045	2.2
Thailand	8,653	2.3
Philippines	18,609	2.0
Malaysia	4,504	2.1
East Asia	30,503	1.3
South Korea	18,170	1.8
Japan	12,333	1.1
Centrally planned Asia	151,450	1.7
China	129,992	1.6
North Korea	9,180	1.9
Kampuchea	1,461	2.6
Vietnam	10,817	2.0

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:23).

## 6.5 EVALUATION OF THE PROJECTIONS

Assessing the reliability of these projections is probably an impossible, and possibly a trivial, pursuit. Demographic projections of urban and rural populations merely describe the implications of current demographic trends. Since the conditions assumed in the projections are likely to change, the likelihood that the projections will be realized is small (Goldstein and Sly 1975:14-15; Tekse 1975:89). Migration, for example, is liable to large and unexpected variations, influenced by policies and economic conditions (Tekse 1975:60). In one sense, therefore, the reliability of these projections is not at issue. The magnitude by which in-migration trends can change, however, seems worthy of investigation.

Two basic approaches can be taken in demographic projections of urban population growth, the macro-approach and the micro-approach. The macro-approach uses existing national populations and derives projections of urban and rural populations independently. The global, simple component and cohort methods are examples of the micro approach. (See Tekse 1975 for a detailed discussion of the various projection techniques.)

The United Nations method of projection is a ratio technique that uses existing projections of total populations. It then redistributes the projected populations into urban and rural sectors by extrapolating into the future the most recently observed urban-rural growth differential, calculated from past census results.

Table 6.9 presents the results of a simple evaluation exercise for this projection technique. Five Asian countries were selected, and the urban-rural growth differentials between 1950 and 1960 calculated. These growth differentials were then used to project the urbanization levels for the selected countries to 1980. Reclassification of rural areas was not explicitly taken into account in the projections.

**Table 6.9: UN method and modified UN method projection of in-migration levels**

Table 6.9 UN method and modified UN method projection of in-migration levels: selected Asian countries, 1960-80								
Country	Projections				Deviations			
	Urban-rural Growth Differential, 1950-60 (1)	Projected % urban, 1980: UN method (2)	Projected % urban, 1980: modified UN method (3)	Actual % urban, 1980 (4)	UN method Absolute % deviation-a (5)	Modified UN Method Absolute % Deviation-b Deviation (6)	Modified UN Method Absolute % Deviation (7)	Modified UN Method Absolute % Deviation (8)
India	.00767	20.3	24.2	23.4	-3.1	13.2	0.8	3.4
Indonesia	.01868	19.9	21.9	22.2	-2.3	10.4	-0.3	1.4
Philippines	.01550	37.2	39.9	37.4	-0.2	0.5	2.5	6.7
South Korea	.03449	43.3	43.2	56.9	-13.6	23.9	-13.7	24.0
Japan	.04986	81.8	79.3	76.2	5.6	7.3	3.1	4.1

SOURCE: FUCHS, JONES &amp; PERNIA (1987:25)

The in-migration trends during the 1950s are embodied in the calculated urban-rural growth differentials. The exercise merely gives some indication of how dramatically trend can change, causing deviations of the projected levels of in-migration from the actual levels in 1980. Since a projection is not a forecast, these deviations are not to be thought of as forecast errors.

The projections are given in column 2 of Table 2.9, and the actual percentages urban for 1980 are given in column 4. The absolute projection deviations range from 0.2 to 13.6, with an average of approximately 5, and the percentage deviations range from 0.5 to 23.9 percent, with a mean of 11.1. The projected in-migration level for South Korea has the largest deviation (columns 5 and 6).

In a modification of this projection technique (United Nations 1980,1985), urban-rural growth differential is permitted to change over time. As urban proportions increase, it becomes more difficult to sustain a particular growth differential because the pool of migrants declines as a fraction of the urban population. Therefore, urban-rural growth differentials tend to decline as urban proportions increase (see United Nations 1980-11). The most recently observed growth differential for a country is allowed to approach the expected differential based on a regression of urban-rural growth differential on the initial proportion urban in a cross-national sample of 110 countries.

The evaluation exercise was repeated for this modified United Nations method, and the projections appear in column 3 of Table 2.9. The modification generally reduces the projection deviations associated with the United Nations method. The average absolute deviation drops from approximately 5 to 4, and in percentage terms from 11.1 to 7.9. However, the substantial underestimation of South Korea's 1980 in-migration level remains (columns 7 and 8). The definition of urban in South Korea did not change during this period.

These urbanization projections can easily be translated into urban population projections. Gable 2.10 presents these projections using the modified UN method, based on a 1963 set of UN projections for the total populations of the selected countries (UN 1966). The absolute deviations range from 77 thousand to 4.2 million, and in percentage terms from 0.2 to 23.3. There is guarded evidence that projections of total populations are improving (Keyfitz 1981). Unfortunately, they do not necessarily generate more precise urban population projections. The 1980 urban populations for selected countries were estimated by applying the urbanization levels projected by the modified United Nations method (Table 2.9) to the actual 1980 total population figures, thus removing the component of the deviation associated with imprecise projections of the total population. The projection deviations change but are not reduced on average (Table 6.11).

**Table 6.10: Projections of 1960 urban populations to 1980**

Table 6.10 Projections of 1960 urban populations to 1980: selected Asian countries				
Country	Projected 1980 urban population (in thousands)	Actual 1980 urban population (in thousands)	Absolute deviation (in thousands)	% deviation
India	164,980	161,426	3,554	2.2
Indonesia	33,437	33,514	-77	0.2
Philippines	22,250	18,052	4,198	23.3
South Korea	18,738	21,678	-2,940	13.6
Japan	88,096	88,909	-813	0.9

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:27)

**Table 6.11: Estimates of 1980 urban populations using actual total populations**

Table 6.11 Estimates of 1980 urban populations using actual total populations: selected Asian countries				
Country	Estimated Population (in thousands)	Actual urban Population (in thousands)	Absolute deviation (in thousands)	% deviation
India	165,678	161,426	4,252	2.6
Indonesia	32,129	33,514	-1,385	4.1
Philippines	19,196	18,052	1,144	6.3
South Korea	16,176	21,678	-5,502	25.4
Japan	92,852	88,909	3,943	0.9

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1985:27)

The results of these exercises are not surprising. Deviations from in-migration projections can be quite large. The modification of the UN method seems to improve the projections, but deviations from urban population projections can remain large in absolute and percentage terms even in cases where total population projections are precise.

The GNP growth rates during the 1950s (Table 6.12) influenced the urbanization trends in that period. Since these trends were extrapolated to 1980 in the projection exercises, we would expect that a dramatic change in GNP growth rates after the 1950s would generate projection errors. The most dramatic change in GNP growth occurred for South Korea, and this may well explain that country's exceptional unanticipated acceleration in urbanization. In general, where GNP growth declined, the projections underestimated the actual urban population. The projections thus appear to be quite sensitive to changes in economic trends. It is not rapid economic growth per se that leads to the deviations, rather the dramatic change in economic growth rates.

**Table 6.12: Average annual growth rates in real GNP**

Table 6.12 Average annual growth rates in real GNP: selected Asian countries, 1950-60 to 1970-80				
Country	1950-60	1960-80	1960-70	1970-80
India	3.9	3.7	3.6	3.7
Indonesia	4.0	5.6	3.9	7.3
Philippines	6.3	5.8	5.1	6.4
South Korea	5.0	8.7	8.7	8.7
Japan	6.3	7.5	10.4	4.6

SOURCE; WORLD BANK (1980d, 1983d)

## 6.6 CITY POPULATION PROJECTIONS

Population projections for specific urban areas are especially important for planners. The United Nations method for projecting city populations is similar to the method used to project the aggregate urban population of a country. The projections begin with the calculation of the city - non city growth differential-that is, the difference between the growth rate of a particular city and the growth rate of the rest of the country. This growth rate differential is used to project a city's population in the same way that urban-rural growth rate differentials are used in the aggregate urban population projections described earlier. Allowance is mad for the fact that larger cities tend to grow less quickly than the general urban population.

The sensitivity of projections to changes in trends, with focus on city populations, is highlighted by the projected populations in the year 2000 for the fourteen largest Asian urban agglomerations (Table 2.13). The 1980 United Nations projections, made before the 1980-81 census round results were available, are in most cases much higher than the 1985 United Nations projections, using the identical methods. The differences between the projection are attributable mainly to the new estimates for the city populations in 1980 provided by the recent census rounds. Evidently, most of the large urban areas grew less rapidly than was anticipated during the 1970s. In the

case of Shanghai and Beijing, a second source of the much higher 1980 projections was the lower estimated for city populations before 1980. The 1980 estimate for the 1950 population of Shanghai, for example, was 5.8 million, whereas the 1985 estimate for the same population was 10.3 million. The estimated 1950 population of Beijing increased from 212 million (United Nations 1980) to 6.7 million (United Nations 1985). These upward adjustments resulted from including the surrounding rural counties in the 1985 estimates.

**Table 6.13: Population projections for the fourteen largest Asian urban agglomerations**

Table 6.13 Population projections for the fourteen largest Asian urban agglomerations: United Nations (1980 and 1985)			
Population in year 2000 (in millions)			
Agglomeration	United Nations (1980)	United Nations (1985)	% difference
Tokyo-Yokohama	24.2	17.1	34
Shanghai	22.7	13.5	51
Beijing	19.9	10.8	59
Bombay	17.1	16.0	07
Calcuta	16.7	16.6	01
Jakarta	16.6	12.8	26
Seoul	14.2	13.5	05
Madras	12.9	8.2	45
Manila	12.3	11.1	10
Bangkok-Thonburi	11.9	09.5	22
Karachi	11.8	12.2	-3
New Delhi	11.2	13.3	-17
Tehran	11.3	12.7	-12
Osaka-Kobe	11.1	07.7	36

SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS (1980. 1985)

## 6.7 DETERMINANTS OF IN-MIGRATION

The association between per capita General National Product and in-migration is very strong. Per capita income can be used, with considerable success, to predict levels of both urbanization and rural-to-urban migration (Renaud 1979; Mason and Suits 1981; Mohan 1984). This association is generated largely by increases in productivity (Suits 1985; cf. Suits and Ogawa 1985). Increases in per capita GNP, reflecting rising levels of productivity generated by technological change and the accumulation of physical and human capital,

generate structural shifts in the economy. The composition of employment thus shifts in favor of nonagricultural occupations, and this shift has spatial implications. Although a one-to-one relations does not exist between the change in employment structure and rural-to-urban migration, the change is a major force behind urbanisation. Historically, this process has usually been triggered by an initial increase in agricultural productivity (Mohan 1984:2-3).

Labor flows in response to its demand in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Labor demand is determined by the value of labor's marginal product. This value is determined by the worker's physical output and the price at which the output is sold. Rising productivity can raise or lower the value of marginal product in a given sector. The effect of rising productivity depends upon the elasticity of demand for agricultural and nonagricultural output. An increase in the productivity of agricultural workers for example, increases their physical output, which lowers the price of agricultural goods relative to nonagricultural goods. Moreover, since the demand for agricultural output is relatively inelastic, the decrease in price is large. This drop in price more than offsets the increase in physical product, reducing the value of the marginal product of farm labor. Simultaneously, the relative price of nonagricultural goods rises, increasing the demand for labor in the secondary and tertiary sectors and drawing labor out of agriculture. This argument assumes that prices are determined domestically (Fuchs, cf. Jones & Pernia, 1987:30).

An increase in nonagricultural productivity also increases the demand for labor in the secondary and tertiary sectors. Again, output prices fall, but the demand for nonagricultural goods is relatively elastic. The small price change only partly offsets the increase in productivity, and the net effect is to shift labor out of agriculture.

Productivity growth generates increases in income. The effect of rising income on the composition of demand is a crucial force driving labor out of agriculture. As productivity increases income, a grater proportion of income is spent on nonagricultural output (Clark 1957:493-94). As demand

proportionally shifts away from agricultural goods, labor follows. Preston (1985) notes that if food production can be exported, some of the influence of low income elasticity of demand can be averted. For example, New Zealand, because of agricultural exports, has a higher proportion rural than its national income would indicate.

Increases in productivity in either the agricultural or the non-agricultural sector raise income, but the magnitude of the effect upon aggregate income depends upon the share of employment in the sector experiencing the productivity increase. For example, an increase in agricultural productivity has a small effect on income in the United States, where only a small proportion of employment is in agriculture. The effect would be larger in many Asian countries (Suits and Ogawa 1985). Suits and Ogawa (1985) estimate the effects of increasing agricultural and nonagricultural productivity on the shift of labor out of agriculture in the United States, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia. The results they report are consistent with the theory.

This view of the role of productivity and income growth stands in contrast to the view that rural deprivation spurs in-migration. As Preston (1979:179) has stated, poorer countries in general have not only more deprived rural areas but also more deprived urban ones. The net effect of poverty seems to be to hold population in rural areas. Sovani (1964) and Kamerschen (1969) find little correlation between levels of in-migration indices of rural push. The lack of pull factors in rural areas such as job creation, housing, water, electricity developments and other factors have always pushed people to the urban areas and South Africa is no exceptions.

Rural push factors could become more important in the future, however, Mohan (1984), for example, concludes that agricultural stagnation in India's poorer states is likely to have contributed to the acceleration of their in-migration during the last decade. Although rural push factors may become more important, Preston (1985) asserts that the example of Bangladesh should make us think twice about this hypothesis. Bangladesh was one of the poorest and most densely populated countries in 1950. Since then its

population has more than doubled, landlessness has risen, and real wages have fallen. Yet Bangladesh continues to have a very low and slowly growing urban percentage. In commenting on an earlier draft of this chapter at the Conference on Population Growth, Urbanisation, and Urban Policies in the Asia-Pacific Region, Samuel Preston stated. There is simply no reasonable urban wage opportunity for the rural sector to push its population to. Urban people stick to their present working environment in the urban areas because there is no pull factor which will attract them or push them towards rural areas. The most important reasons being the lack of work, wages, accommodation, resources such as schools, hospitals and others.

The prospect for labour absorption in agriculture is an important issue. Expansion of cultivated areas is not possible in many parts of Asia (Jones 1983:2). Labour demand will be determined largely by multiple cropping, government-sponsored irrigation and other development schemes, the use of labour-saving technology and mechanization, land tenure systems and the concentration of holdings, and biological and chemical innovations (McGee 1982:11-12; White 1979; Young 1978). Certain of these developments will make some agricultural labour redundant, displacing workers. The extent to which they do so depends upon their effects on the marginal productivity of both labour and land. Mechanization, for example, raises the marginal productivity of agricultural labour. Several studies have provided evidence of the labour-displacing effects of mechanization (e.g., Squire 1981). Irrigation, on the other hand, raises both land productivity and average and marginal labour productivity in agriculture. Therefore, for a given increase in output, irrigation would retain a larger labour force in agriculture than would mechanization (Preston 1985).

The adoption of labour-saving technology has varied from country to country, reflecting the availability of labour. The experiences of Taiwan and Japan during the past few decades illustrate this point. In Taiwan the continued growth until recently of the agricultural labour force has tended to obviate the need for labour-saving technology. Japan's agricultural technology, in

contrast, has been labour-saving (Squire 1981:157-63; Hayami and Ruttan 1983).

Presentation of the occupational transition as the force behind urbanisation has been done but have said little about the pattern of this transition in Asia. Two aspects merit mention. The occupational transition in developing countries does not conform perfectly to Clark's (1957) generalization and the relation between the occupational transition and in-migration varies among countries and over time.

The occupational transition in developing countries differs from the historical experience of the developed countries in two respects (Squire 1981:11-14). Agriculture accounts for a larger, although declining, share in developing countries than it did in developed countries when they experienced comparable levels of in-migration. And within the nonagricultural sector, services have consistently accounted for a larger proportion of employment. The smaller employment share of industry has been attributed to high levels of technology and high capital-labour ratios in manufacturing, the importance of trade, the size of the public sector, and rapid population growth (Squire 1981:3-5; Jones 1983; Mior 1976:125; McGee 1982; Hackenberg 1980).

Hoselitz (1957), noting that developing countries have smaller proportions of their labour forces in industry than was the case for European countries at similar levels of in-migration, concluded that there was over-urbanization in developing countries. This bias against the service sector led to the hypotheses that rural push factors influence in-migration.

The service sector is larger and its role in the in-migration process of developing countries is more important than was the case earlier for today's developed countries (Jones 1983; Moir 1976). Thus the service sector, and the urban informal sector in particular, has received attention (Hankenberg 1980; cf. Squire 1981; cf. Jones 1983; Fishlow 1972; cf. Bellante 1979; cf. Yap 1976; & Mohan 1980). But our knowledge of the urban informal sector remains limited, and additional research is needed.

Nevertheless, urban growth in developing countries, including Asian countries, has not been associated with a decline in the industry-urban ratio—that is, the ratio between the percentage of the labour force in industry and the percentage of the population in urban areas (Preston 1979). Although the industry-urban ratios for Asian countries have fluctuated over time, increasing for some and declining for others, no general trend of decline has emerged (Jones 1983). This finding is consistent with the view that industrialization has been the engine of in-migration over the past two decades in developing countries.

Another interesting point is that Asian industry-urban ratios assume a wide range of values among countries (Jones 1983). Apart from problems of data comparability, several factors may cause the ratios to vary. Changes in occupational structure can occur without residential shifts, depending upon transportation and communication infrastructures, efforts at decentralized industrialization, the importance of rural service sectors, investment in agriculture, and the importance of small-scale industry, which is more easily located in rural than in urban areas (Jones 1983; cf. Renaud 1981; cf. Ho 1979; & Richardson 1977). Some Asian governments have tried industrial location policies and population policies to slow the growth of urban areas. These policies have had generally limited success. An exception is the rustication programs in some centrally planned countries. Ten to fifteen million urban secondary school graduates in China, for example, were resettled in urban areas between 1969 and 1973. The population of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam was reduced by 700 thousand between 1975 and 1977 (Fuchs 1983).

In-migration will be determined by future trends in economic development, government policies, and demographic behavior. This section has provided a framework for organizing these relationships. The list of factors thought to influence in-migration is bewilderingly varied; it includes technological change, productivity change, agricultural development policies, biological and chemical innovations in agriculture, capital intensity in manufacturing, mechanization in

farming, investment, interest rate and exchange rate policies, foreign capital flows, foreign trade, urban bias, decentralized industrialization, and population growth. Their influences operate through the channels we have discussed. They affect the occupational transition from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors through effects upon agricultural and nonagricultural productivity and prices. They affect per capita income and thus the sectoral composition of demand. Finally, they might also influence the relationship between the occupational and the urbanization transitions, determining the spatial implications of the shift from agriculture. With many factors influencing urban trends, the next logical question is, which factors are most important?

## 6.8 SENSITIVITY OF URBAN TRENDS

One method for gauging sensitivity of urbanization trends to various parameters is to develop a set of equations quantifying the interaction of economic and demographic variables, then pose counterfactuals, altering the parameters, and examine the net effect on variables of interest.

The first generation of demo-economic models is credited to Coale and Hoover (1958). A second generation includes the models of Bachue; Suits and Mason; FAO; Tempo-II; Simon; and Kelley, Williamson, and Chetham. Rural-to-urban migration is endogenous in these models, responding to intersectoral wage differentials, output-labour ratio differentials, or per capita income. A new demo-economic generation comprises the computable general equilibrium models. Migration represent the flow of resources between rural and urban sectors. This flow responds to sectoral demand and supply forces, which operate in general equilibrium models.

In These models, sectoral demand for and supply of factors of production and output determine relative prices, sectoral demand for and supply of factors of production and output determine relative prices, sectoral outputs, and the allocation of capital and labour throughout the economy. In the computable versions, supply and demand functions are generated by the somewhat arbitrary choice of specific functional forms for production and utility functions.

Producers are assumed to maximize profits and consumers to maximize utility.

Values for the parameters in these functions are determined by a process of calibration, in which the parameters are set so that the model reproduces a given data set. The data, however, do not usually identify a unique set of parameter values, and therefore some values are taken from other research. This places a heavy reliance on some sparse studies that sometimes present contradictory parameter values. Key parameters include elasticity of labour supply, savings, and commodity demands. The major weakness of the models is the difficulty in obtaining appropriate parameter values and in choosing between alternative model structures. Inferences are often sensitive to model configuration and parameter choice.

Two dynamic general equilibrium models of in-migration deserve brief discussion here. One, developed by Kelley and Williamson (1982, 1984a, 1984b), models the experience of a “representative” developing country. The other, developed by Mohan (1982), models India's in-migration.

The Kelley-Williamson model, with eighty-six variables and thirty-nine parameters, includes five urban sectors (manufacturing, modern services, informal urban services, “squatter” urban housing, and high-quality urban housing) and three rural sectors (agriculture, informal rural services, and rural housing). It neglects manufacturing in rural areas. Factors of production identified in the model include capital, skilled and unskilled labour, rural and urban land, dwellings, and imported fuels and raw materials. The growth in productivity of the factors is permitted to vary by sector. Land stock growth is included to assess the role of farmland scarcity as a rural push factor.

Migrants are assumed to move in response to expected earnings, adjusted for cost-of-living differentials. The limited land in the urban sector is allowed to affect rents and thus slow in-migration. Savings are endogenously determined and are allocated to physical capital, human capital and housing accommodation. Exogenous variables driving development are the values of

foreign capital and aid, size of the total unskilled labour force, sectoral rates of growth in productivity, prices of imported raw materials and fuels, and international terms of trade. The model's database is from forty developing countries.

Kelley and Williamson (1982) vary the parameter values, examining the sensitivity of urbanization to various factors. Rural land scarcity and net foreign capital inflows are found to have only minor quantitative effects upon urban growth. The effect of population growth is also found to be small. A simulated dramatic decline in the population growth rate (from 2.54 percent to 0.9 percent) produces only a small drop (of 0.2 percent) in the urban population growth rate for the 1960-73 period.

The terms of trade (relative prices) between agricultural and manufactured goods is found to be important, and urban growth is found to be very sensitive to productivity changes. Technical progress, in the sense of an economy-wide increase in total factor productivity growth, has a noticeable effect. The largest effects in the model, however, arise from the unbalanced productivity increases among sectors. A rate of total factor productivity growth of 1.0 percent instead of 1.8 percent between 1961 and 1973 would have resulted in an urban growth rate of 4.14 percent rather than 4.86 percent. If the 1.8 percent rate of total factor productivity had been maintained, but sectoral imbalances in productivity growth removed, the urban growth rate would have dropped from 4.86 percent to 4.32 percent. In fact, the average annual growth rate of labour productivity, for developing countries as a group between 1960 and 1970, was 3.7 percent – 21 percent in agriculture, 4.6 percent in industry, and 2.4 percent in services (Squire 1981:table 6).

Finally urban growth is found to be sensitive to employment conditions and rents in the urban squatter housing sector. Rising rents, for example, retard urban growth. This finding seems to have implications for the growth of very large cities (Jones 1983:3-4). It has been shown that growth rates of large urban agglomerations are influenced by each city's size, by whether or not it is the country's capital or largest city, and by the rates of population and

economic growth in the country as a whole (UN 1980). The growth of these cities is closely linked to industrial development, since most major manufacturing plants in developing countries are located in or near the primate cities (Richardson 1977). The reasons why plants are so located include the availability of skilled labour pools, accessibility to suppliers, proximity to the central government, existence of the necessary infrastructure, scale economies, openness of the economy, and location of markets. Kelly and Williamson point out, however, that counterforces limit urban growth. One counterforce is the scarcity of urban land, mentioned above. Another is the increasing level of unproductive investment in the housing sector, which reduces the pool of savings available for capital accumulation and thus retards economic growth.

The results from the Kelley-Williamson model are important. According to Preston and Greene (1985), they must be viewed with caution, however. An underdeveloped demographic component of the model makes the population growth rate results especially suspect. The model blurs the distinction between the urban growth rate and the in-migration level. It does not explicitly recognize of the separate roles of urban natural increase and net in-migration as sources of urban growth, nor does it provide for reclassification of urban areas.

When Kelley and Williamson use their model in a projection exercise, they project to the year 2000 a more rapid rate of in-migration than occurs in the United Nations projections, resulting in an in-migration level of 68.4 percent versus the United Nations projected level of 50.9 percent for the same countries. Preston and Greene (1985) claim that no convincing explanation of this more rapid in-migration is offered and note that the model produces too fast a rate for the 1960-73 test period. Kelley and Williamson acknowledge that the model is better suited for simulating what would happen under various conditions than it is for projection. The problem is that, in projecting in-migration, one has to forecast the demo-economic environment that generates it. Trends in relative prices, agricultural and urban land stock growth, foreign capital inflows, labour force growth, and total factor

productivity growth over two decades must be postulated for the model to project in-migration trends, and making these postulations can be hazardous.

Mohan (1982) developed a general equilibrium model of India's in-migration experience, in which changes in the composition of demand, rapid rates of agricultural productivity growth, and higher rates of investment are found to spur in-migration. Preston (1979) has shown that national rates of population growth exert a strong positive influence on the growth rates of cities. The rate of in-migration, however, does not necessarily depend on overall population growth, for declining population growth rates increase per capita income, which can generate more rapid in-migration (Mohan 1982).

## **6.9 A MULTILEVEL FRAMEWORK OF IN-MIGRATION**

It is important to begin by outlining a multilevel framework for the structural analysis of in-migration in both its economic and its spatial terms. At least three levels of analysis must be recognized: global, national, and regional. The point is not that in-migration may be studied at each of these levels, for this is obviously possible and has already been done, usually at the national level; the important issue is that in-migration can be meaningfully analyzed only by examining the impact of the interplay of forces at and between the different levels.

At the global, or world, level we must recognize two structural processes that have considerable implications for in-migration within the developing countries of Asia. First is the changing international division of labour involving the redeployment of industry to the periphery of the world economy, particularly to the so-called newly industrializing countries (NICs). Although this redeployment implies the rationalization of industry in advanced countries, new technological developments, and the deskilling of labour, it has enabled some of the more developed countries in Asia to begin to export lower-order manufactured products to the advanced countries. The second structural adjustment that is occurring at this level and, arising from the global division of

labour, is the emergence of a new regional division of labour within Asia. This development involves a complex pattern of relations between Asian and Pacific countries that will have implications for in-migration in this region (McGee, 1948b).

At the national level it is valuable to recognize different types of structural relationships and restructuring as each national economy deals with its external and internal economic relations. It was previously posed this issue in terms of a macrospatial framework that recognizes four models of national integration into the world economy and their implications for spatial integration into the world economy and their implications for spatial transformation of the national economy, including its experience (Lo, Salih, and Douglas 1978).

The Southeast Asian model is a tow-tailed approach involving, on one hand, import-substitution through capital-intensive industrialization, which reinforces urban primacy, and, on the other, resource export promotion, with forward linkages to the advanced country. These two processes can not yet be integrated to enable internalization of the multiplier. Urban growth rates may be U-shaped with respect to size, but the tendency is toward the primate city.

In the East Asian model, a changing comparative advantage has enabled countries of this region to shift to export-led industrialization, owing to redeployment processes. At the same time, they have policies to improve agricultural productivity through institutional reform and technological improvements. Thus agricultural-industrial integration and internalization of multiplier effects exist at both the local and global levels.

The South Asian model involves a limited capacity for surplus generation relative to population size. Industrialization is circumscribed relative to gross national product (General National Product), and the import or export component is small. Agriculture is stagnating. Expansion with little structural change.

The china model is characterized by delinking from the world system, although under its Open Door Policy there has been a gradual opening. It is based on socialization of production and centrally planned consumption, in-migration is dictated by ideology, although the usual urban problems still prevail (Rogers, 1982:485).

These processes at the national level, articulated with the international level structures, have further impacts on subnational or regional patterns of transformation. At the regional level in East Asia, efficiency and metropolitan decentralization are primary issues; higher industrial labour absorptive capacity permits a higher in-migration rate, a balanced urban system, and the achievement of demographic transition and the turning point in employment. In the Southeast Asian case, decentralization from the primate regions is the major concern, involving the search for new growth centers and, at the same time, the promotion of resource frontiers and propulsive regional development.

The effect is spatially limited because of the problem of linkage. In South Asia, where much of the population will remain in the rural areas the urban future is best seen as a regionalization of the in-migration experience with pockets of rapid urban growth throughout the system owing to the development of propulsive regions.

It is within this multilevel framework that in-migration should be broadly reviewed. Policy prescriptions can be made more realistic when structural limits as well as conjunctural considerations are taken into account.

## **6.10 TRENDS IN ASIAN URBANIZATION**

The available data are presented from Table 6.13. It is evident that, except for a few countries, Asian in-migration between 1960 and 1980 tended to conform with the world average and that this pattern was induced largely by the profile of industrialization and the level of development. Over the twenty years the national urban growth rates appear to have been converging to the 4 to 5 percent level per annum, with South Korea's growth decelerating, and

that of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and, to a certain extent, Malaysia, accelerating. The South Asian situation appears to be stable, with only Bangladesh showing a rate much higher than the rest of Asia.

Overall, however, Asian urbanization levels are still low, particularly among South Asian countries. In Southeast Asia, Thailand and Malaysia are particularly underurbanized in relation to their per capita GNP on the Chenery-Syrquin line, a fact that reflects their land-based resource development strategies. The acceleration of in-migration in Malaysia and Thailand between 1975 and 1980, however, is impressive and may suggest the impact of recent changes in their industrialization strategy. In contrast, Indonesia's economic development over the past decade has enabled it to shift from a slightly overurbanized situation toward the world norm. South Korea's situation is approaching the Japanese experience, largely because of a low natural growth rate and a high rate of urbanization during the 1960's.

In general, despite urban growth rates of 4 to 5 percent per annum in most of the low-income countries of Asia, the in-migration process outside the newly industrializing countries is slow owing to the low level of urbanization itself. This point can be made clearer by looking again at Table 6.13, which shows that rural-to-urban migration contributed roughly 30 to 60 percent to urban growth during the period 1970-80. In other words, between 40 to 70 percent of in-migration was due to natural increase. As a corollary, only about 0.5 to 1 percent of the rural population moved from rural to urban areas, except in South Korea and Japan, where the proportion was roughly 3 percent. For this reason, growth rates of the rural population moved from rural to urban areas, except in South Korea and Japan, where the proportion was roughly 3 percent. For this reason, growth rates of the rural population have tended to be nearly as high as the rate of natural increase in the rural areas.

**TABLE 6.14: Urban growth attributed to migration and reclassification**

Table 6.14 Urban growth attributed to migration and reclassification: selected Asian countries, 1970-80				
Country	Average Annual Population Growth Rate (%) 1970-80	Average annual urban growth rate (%) 1975-80	% of urban growth attributed to migration	% of rural population migration to urban areas
Bangladesh	2.6	6.9	61	0.52
Nepal	2.5	5.2	58	0.16
India	2.1	4.0	50	0.56
Sri Lanka	1.6	4.1	59	0.89
Pakistan	3.1	4.7	34	0.63
Indonesia	2.3	4.5	60	0.68
Thailand	2.5	4.5	39	0.28
Philippines	2.7	4.4	39	0.96
Malaysia	2.4	4.0	33	0.55
South Korea	1.7	4.6	59	3.33
Japan	1.1	1.9	39	2.66

SOURCE: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1980-1983)

Cities with populations exceeding 500,000 grew at an average rate of 5.7 percent per annum, compared with 3.1 percent per annum for cities with smaller populations. All countries in Asia share this general trend. It must be emphasised, however, that the growth rates shown in the second to last column (500,000+ cities) are higher than the average growth rate of individual cities in the 500,000+ category because they include the effect of cities moving into this category by surpassing the 500,000 population cutoff point. For the same reason, the last column (<500,000 cities) understates the growth rates of individual cities in this category.

## 6.11 REGIONAL SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION IN ASIA

To shed further light on the relationship between structural economic change and in-migration within the context of spatial transformation, here we briefly consider some of the major trends in Asian regional development since 1960. As a product of the various processes already discussed, these trends have important implications for in-migration in the respective countries. The regional development experience has not been fully documented, especially to take into account policy developments during the 1980s. Three basic trends in Asian regional development are discerned. The first in line with the tail end of the paradigm shift in regional-planning thinking (Friedmann and Weaver 1979:163-85), is a polarization reversal involving attempts to deflect development from the center to the less-developed, peripheral regions. This form of decentralized development is typified by the growth center strategy, which was in vogue in the 1970s (Lo and Salih 1978). On reflection, the growth center strategy proved successful in countries already undergoing accelerated industrialization, such as Japan (Lo 1978:25-51), where diseconomies in manufacturing industries had set in the Tokaido megalopolis, and South Korea (Kim 1978:53-77), where industries in the Seoul region were decentralized to Ulsan. It is not yet known, however, what the effect will be of applying the growth pole concept to the diversion of industries from already developed areas to lagging regions, including resource frontiers, in Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Salih et al. 1978:79-119). But the experience of Malaysia in the 1980s is already evident: the growth center strategy has not been successful (Malaysia 1984P181-85), mainly because of the hastiness with which the concept was applied (Higgins 1982). It highlights Higgins's point (1978:229-42) that for the growth pole to succeed the region must be able to generate and transmit economic activities, which in turn must be transformed into new economic activities.

The successful attempts at decentralization have also strengthened the existing major centers. The development of intermediate cities, or "diffused in-migration" (Hackenberg 1980), in Southeast Asia has involved major

investments in infrastructure as well as government sponsorship of incentives, made possible by hinterland growth. One important result of this policy is metropolitanization, as in Metro Manila, Klang Valley, the Bangkok Metropolitan Area, and the conurbation of Jakarta-Bogor-Tangaleng-Bekasi. This pattern of development in Southeast Asia is demonstrated by the high growth rates of the major city (except in Malaysia, where primacy is irrelevant), in contrast to the more industrialized East Asian countries of Japan and South Korea.

The second major trend in Asian regional development is propulsive development in which the quasi-agglomeration economies produce urban responses and growth of the lower-order centers (Taylor 1981). These towns perform essentially central place functions and their economies are based either on resource frontier development or Green Revolution activities. Resource frontier development usually involves the exploitation of resources, such as oil in Trengganu and North Sumatra, oil and gas in East Malaysia, and timber in East Kalimantan. In some cases the multiplier effects are leaked out, often to the regional center – for example, Singapore – and this for example reinforces its regional and international role.

Meanwhile, the immigration and importation of workers into these resource exploitation regions is a form of population redistribution that not only increases the total population in frontier areas but also makes it overwhelmingly male. Other examples of propulsive regional development are Green Revolution areas such as the Punjab (Bose 1982) and major agricultural development regions, such as the FELDA schemes of Malaysia, the latter typifying regional development authorities (Salih and Lo 1975). These regions are causing structural shifts in Asian economies' capital formation and patterns of labour absorption, especially for off-farm employment and the formal sector. Another effect of propulsive regional development is the growth of lower-order centers around metropolitan regions.

This brings the issue to the third major trend in Asian regional development, the growth of lower-order centers that is initiated by development not just from above, but mainly from below. The bottom-up strategy, in contrast to the top-

down strategy, marks a new era in regional development (Friedmann and Weaver 1979:186-211; Lo and Salih 1981; Stohr and Taylor 1981).

The emphasis is now on rural industrialization and infrastructural development leading ultimately to Friedman and Douglass's (1978) idyllic vision of cities-in-the-fields or agropolitan development. This change to a local-level development and to smaller-scale, more labour-intensive industries has contributed to the importance of off-farm employment to family income and has certainly restrained potential rural-to-urban migration in the short run. Such aspects of this type of regional development as attention to basic needs, self-reliance, and people's participation to varying degrees are evident in many of the Malaysian rural development authorities' policies. The point to stress here, however, is that these patterns reflect not only economic structural changes within subnational, national, and international economies, but also independent spatial strategies.

## **6.12 CONCLUSION**

Much has been said about the one-to-one relationship between national development and in-migration. Relationship by direct, though limited, statistical evidence of Asia were shown. Causal interconnections at the national level reflect not only international linkages, but also structural changes that are occurring in the countries themselves. Analysis has led to several propositions about Asian in-migration and its relationship to structural shifts during the last two decades of national development. The same scenario could be applied to the province under investigation.

Asian in-migration is low in comparison with the rest of the world, and rural-to-urban migration has as yet contributed little to it or to population redistribution in general. In-migration in Asia, particularly in densely populated South Asia and still unurbanised countries of Southeast Asia, is yet to come.

The particular experience of in-migration has varied among Asian countries over the last two decades, depending on the nature and speed of structural shifts in each economy. The estimates of the world average by Chenery and Syrquin (1975) have helped to interpret the various Asian situations.

In-migration and population redistribution in Asian countries, which vary among the regional types above, are a consequence of disparities in development. In-migration and population redistribution result not merely from disparities in development between the urban-industrial sector and the rural-primary sector, which, as we have seen in the analysis of relative labour productivity, have been diverging in most Asian countries over the past two decades. This divergence has been the product of capital-intensive industrialisation in the relatively underdeveloped Asian economies, which has generated limited labour-absorptive capacity in the industrial sector.

Although the gap between the industrial sector and other sectors has grown, massive in-migration does not seem to be the cause. The case of poorer South Asian economies, however, is different because the urban industrial sector is still very small in those countries, the absorption of excessive rural-to-urban migration, in absolute numbers if not in relative terms, tends to quickly reach a limit defined by the saturation of the urban labour market even in the urban informal sector. A process of income equalisation then sets in between urban and rural areas, in some cases inducing the return of migrants to their source areas. This has been the case in Bangladesh and India, and in parts of Java.

In conclusion, it can be said that in-migration is a consequence of industrial development. A high level of in-migration can be expected only when an economy has experienced a major shift in its industrial structure. Gauteng province is no exception. The contributions of industrial and nonfarm sources to rural towns are included in the calculation. The experiences of Taiwan and Japan suggest that rural industrialisation and off-farm employment will be critical to the solution of rural problems in the rest of Asia, particularly the low income countries, and this will have important implications for the in-migration process.

Projections of in-migration levels and the urban populations merely extrapolate recent trends. These trends, however, are sometimes subject to substantial changes as economic condition change.

Economic development draws labour out of agriculture and into the manufacturing and service sectors. Increases in labour productivity tend to make labour demand in the secondary and tertiary sectors higher than in agriculture. Increases in income levels alter the composition of demand in favour of nonagricultural goods. Economic models, including recent computable general equilibrium models, have attempted to estimate the importance of these factors. Because future demographic and economic trends in the Pacific Asia region are difficult to predict, in-migration, a concomitant of these trends, is projected with difficulty.

South Africa, especially Gauteng province should copy the good examples from Asian countries by conforming with the World urban average, by the utilisation of industrialisation and level of development directed toward neglected areas such as rural areas. There should be an acceleration of national urban growth rates which have to be converged towards an world acceptable 4 to 5 percent level per annum. The Gauteng province situation concerning in-migration should be driven towards stability. South African in-migration levels should be kept low particularly in Gauteng region with its smallest area of land. The industrial strategy should be well managed and changed to make it as impressive as Thailand and Malaysia. The levels of in-migration in Gauteng should be low by global standards as it also applies to places such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea (Info: 122. 6.2).

Gauteng economic development should in the coming millenium be able to shift from overurbanised situation toward the world norm. Levels of in-migration in Gauteng should be kept low by having proper control of the movement of people and by decreasing both illiteracy and birth control. The pace of in-migration in Gauteng should decline by having centrally planned control systems which work harmoniously with all levels of government, starting from local to national government. Controlled in-migration should not

only be promoted in Gauteng but to other provinces within the South African Government.

The areas which needs accelerated population growth rate should be given a chance of increasing their numbers and this could only be achieved if the South African government could shift most of the resources to those areas which are less populated, this will encourage a decline in heavily concentrated areas such as Gauteng area of land (1.4%) and people will willingly move toward Northern Cape (29.7%) with the biggest area of arid land with sparse population. The important reason with the suggestion is to encourage equal distribution and sizable urban population like in Asia (Infra:6.2).

The low levels of in-migration experienced in Asia should motivate South Africa to encourage its systems to implement policies which will encourage high rural growth rates rather than from failure of cities to reach substantial sizes. As a result even if migration contributes a fraction to such growth, such migration carries major responsibility high growth rates of urban places. Moreover, this contribution to total growth is compounded by the fact that some of the natural increase occurring in the urban location is attributable to the fertility of the migrants themselves.

South Africa should learn from countries which are experiencing population explosion such as East Asia which was in 1980 one of the poorest and most densely population countries with 71% in-migrants. Since then its population has more than doubled, landlessness has risen, and real wages have fallen. Yet areas such as Bangladesh continues to have a very low urban percentage of 10%. The prospect of labour absorption in agriculture is an important issue. Expansion of cultivated areas should be made possible in many parts of Gauteng Labour demand will be determined largely by multiple cropping, government-sponsored irrigation and other development schemes, the use of labour-saving technology and mechanisation, land tenure systems and the concentration of holdings, biological and chemical innovations. The pace of in-migration should decline like centrally planned Asia which experiences low levels of in-migration (Infra:123).

South Africa, especially Gauteng province should learn from the experiences of other countries such as Taiwan and Japan with the former having continued growth until recently of the agricultural labour force which tended to obviate the need for labour-saving technology and the latter's agricultural technology, in contrast, has been labour saving.

From this chapter it will be clear that a tremendous effort will have to be made to accommodate the future population of Gauteng province because it will directly affect in-migration process of the whole country. The economic consequences of the present strategy in Gauteng, their agents and other institutions involved seem not to focus on this problem of in-migration at large, but rather to focus on for example housing problems in the officially proclaimed towns only, where much capital, energy and work will required to accommodate the refugees, and the inhabitants of proclaimed townships.

The present policy of developing many smaller urban places should be replaced by a co-ordinated in-migration strategy, concentrating on the development of some rural areas and a few selected smaller towns. Such a policy will provide South Africa with a framework for the development of an in-migration structure which will be capable of absorbing the projected in-migration explosion.

The implementation of a policy directed at the promotion of healthy urban development in Gauteng will need political commitment and adoption of an population programme to bring the existing high population growth rate into line with he economic capacity of the country, region, because of the interdependence of different regions. This will require the development of an in-migration strategy which will have to be linked to a national in-migration strategy for South Africa.

South Africa, in a similar way to other developing countries, is experiencing rapid in-migration, resulting in the growth of slums and squatter settlements where people live under appalling conditions of poverty and deprivation. The

opposite is experienced in centrally planned Asia, because Ledent (1982) states that at high level of in-migration, the pool of potential migrants to urban areas declines as a proportion of the total population, and the pace of in-migration declines. In South Africa people in above mentioned settlements live in substandard housing with inadequate water supply, sanitation and other basic necessities. Associated with this lack of services is an increase in disease and ill-health of these growing peri-urban environments.

The most widely observed and acutely felt urban problem in developing countries is the large number of the poor and unemployed people in the cities. These countries account for two-thirds of the total (world) population and well over three-fourths of the population living in poverty. It is forecast that by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the urban poor may represent a quarter of humanity (Harpham: Lusty & Vaughan, 1988).

The actual projected populations of the largest Asian urban agglomeration should guide Gauteng province not to have the same experience like cities such as Calcutta, Seoul, Karachi, New Delhi and Dacca. Cities such as Johannesburg should follow the gradual population increase such as those experienced by cities like Shanghai and Tianjin (Infra: 127:6.4).

## CHAPTER 7

### IN-MIGRATION THEORIES AND MODELS

#### 7.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses a number of in-migration theories. These theories fall into two broad categories. The first category comprises theories which analyse the forces determining the nature, scope and direction of in-migration. Ravenstein's laws of in-migration and Lee's theory of in-migration are specifically dealt with. The second category comprises theories which analyse in-migration as an equilibrating or disequilibrating process in changing economy. The following theories are discussed: The dual economy model of development; Sjaastad's human investment theory; Todaro's model of rural-urban in-migration; the radical or dependency theory and its computer models which are used to analyse and determine in-migration. The model of Kelley and Williamson is outlined as an example.

#### 7.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION.

An increase in the urban population, as a whole, can be the result of natural population growth, a redefinition of geographical boundaries, or of rural-urban in-migration. Increased in-migration is the process that follows when these causal factors lead to an increasing percentage of the total population taking up residence in urban areas. The high rates of urban growth currently experienced, especially in developing countries such as South Africa, are attributable only in part to rural-urban in-migration. According to World Bank (1984:97) estimates, rural-urban in-migration on average accounts for only one-quarter to one-third of the increase in the urban populations of most developing countries, and South Africa is no exception. Natural population increase accounts for about 60 per cent of the urban population growth in both developed and developing countries, while approximately 8 to 15 cent may be attributed to the reclassification of rural areas to urban status. In a

study of 26 large cities in 20 developing countries between 1960 and 1970 the United Nations Population Division (1985c) found that 37 per cent of urban population growth was due to in-migration and 63 per cent to natural increase, and the latter implies high fertility rate.

Migration is the primary term used to describe a rural to an urban change in an individual's or group's place of residence. However in-migration is a term used to describe a similar process. It is used to describe the phenomenon whereby population growth leads to an increasing percentage of the total population taking up residence in urban areas. Since it is generally accepted that the natural population growth rate (births minus deaths) is higher in rural areas than in urban areas, this would lead to a decrease in in-migration, all other things being equal. If no rural-urban migration takes place the in-migration rate will therefore decrease because of the rural population's higher natural increase relative to urban areas. The main contributor to in-migration is therefore rural-urban migration.

The above estimates of the World Bank refer to absolute increases in the urban population. This should not be confused with urbanisation which is the process whereby an increasing percentage of the total population takes up residence in urban areas. Although it is accepted that migration and in-migration are not 100 per cent the same thing, this thesis concentrates mainly on rural-urban migration. Thus, differences in the natural population increase between rural and urban areas and the redefinition of geographical boundaries, are not explicitly considered. For this reason the term migration is assumed to be tantamount to the term in-migration resulting from rural-urban migration, unless stated otherwise. These terms are used interchangeably in this thesis to describe the process of rural-urban movement of people. Although intra-urban migration is also analysed it does not contribute to new in-migration, but only to changes in the character and distribution pattern of existing in-migration.

In South Africa the term migration is often used for workers who temporarily take up residence near the place of their work, that is migratory labour. In this

thesis the term in-migration is used to mean the difference between permanent immigration and emigration.

### 7.3 THEORIES OF IN-MIGRATION

There is no generally agreed definition of a migrant, or of in-migration. Neither has a definition yet been agreed upon that is independent of the measurement process. The phenomenon of territorial human mobility is usually referred to as in-migration. In this sense the term embraces four elements, namely space, residence, time and activity changes (Oberai, 1988:17-18). An understanding of the process of human or population mobility (in-migration) may be hindered by the tendency to condense, collapse or even ignore important distinctions in each or any of the four elements. Thus, an inherently heterogeneous process is sometimes treated as a homogeneous one by calling all processes pertaining to one or more of these variables of in-migration (Bilsborrow, Oberai & Standing, 1984:32). This is often inevitable as in-migration essentially means the movement of people from one location to another, that is one region to another.

In-migration theories may be divided into two broad categories namely those which analyse the forces determining the nature, scope and direction of migration, and those which analyse in-migration as an equilibrating or disequilibrating force in a changing Political, Socio-cultural and economy (Truu, 1971:170).

#### ***7.3.1 Theories which analyse the forces determining the nature and scope of in-migration.***

The first application of the gravity concept to social phenomena, developed as an analogy to Newtonian physics of matter, has been attributed to H.C. Carey towards the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (Isard, 1966:499). Theoretical explanations of rural-urban migration have a long history, dating from at least the 1880's when Ravenstein (1885 and 1889) first proposed his laws of migration.

### 7.3.1.1 *Ravenstein's laws of in-migration*

Ravenstein's laws of in-migration may be summarised as follows:

- a. The number of migrants between a place of origin and a place of destination is inversely proportional to the distance between the two places;
- b. In-migration is a diffused process which advances in stages from remote rural districts to the great centres of commerce and industry, until it affects all regions within a country;
- c. Each mainstream of in-migration produces a compensating counterstream;
- d. The residents of urban areas are less prone to in-migration than those of rural areas;
- e. Over relatively short distances, females migrate more often than males;
- f. Technological progress serves to increase the volume of in-migration; and
- g. Migrants are primarily motivated by economic factors.

Most subsequent in-migration models tend to be modifications or elaborations of Ravenstein's laws. However, they do not adequately allow for the selectiveness of in-migration, which is implied in laws d and e above.

Ravenstein's macro laws are usually expressed in the following general mathematical form (Isard, 1966:68):

$M_{ij} = P_j \text{ divided by } d_{ij} \text{ multiplied by } f(z_i)$  where,

$M_{ij}$  = volume of migration to destination  $i$  from origin  $j$ ;

$F(z_i)$  = some function of  $z_i$  which measures the attractive force of destination  $i$ ;  
 $P_j$  = population at origin  $j$ ; and  
 $D_{ij}$  = distance between destination  $i$  and origin  $j$ .

The emphasis placed on the basic elements in the above formulation by different migration models, varies. For example, Zipf's well-known  $p^1p^2$  divided by  $D$  hypothesis may be regarded as a general statement of the principle of least effort in human behaviour (Zipf, 1949:386-409; Heide, 1963:56-76). The hypothesis states that the volume of in-migration between two places is directly proportional to the product of the populations of those places, and inversely proportional to the distance between them (Truu 1971:171). The attraction of a given place of destination, relative to those at a place of origin, becomes reduced as the ratio of opportunities at intervening places to opportunities at the place of destination, increases. Stouffer (1940:846) postulates that the number of persons going a given distance is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening opportunities. Stouffer not only concentrates on Ravenstein's second rather than first law, but also suggests that the gravity of a region should be represented by a variable denoting opportunity rather than the size of its population.

A disadvantage common to any gravity model is that it tends to be descriptive rather than analytical in its content. Obvious difficulties remain in the identification, qualification and weighting of the relative variables. This is especially true with regard to the forces of attraction and repulsion at places of destination and origin, as well as at intervening places (Truu, 1971:171). Information is not only the necessary condition for migration to take place at all, but the information problem as such has a number of ramifications pertaining to the decision to migrate.

Based on Ravenstein's laws, Lee (1969) developed a general scheme into which a variety of spatial movements can be placed.

### **7.3.1.2 Lee's theory of in-migration**

Lee divides the forces exerting an influence on migrant perceptions into so-called push and pull factors. He divides the theory of in-migration into the following four related parts (Lee, 1969:283; Truu, 1971:172-174).

#### **7.3.1.2.1 Factors which influence the decision to migrate**

These are factors which either attract or repel migrants and which create regional interaction or cause friction. They consist of a mix of positive and negative factors at both the place of origin and the place of destination and include a set of intervening obstacles. In general, a person is motivated into migrating when he believes that the balance of positive factors at the place of destination exceeds the sum of the balance of positive factors at the place of origin, the intervening obstacles and the weight of normal human inertia. In-migration can also be caused by certain crucial events in an individual's lifecycle, which may be largely independent of Pull-Push considerations, for example attaining adulthood, joining the labour force, retirement, and so on.

A rural push in general may result from any, or a combination, of the following factors: population growth outstripping the carrying capacity of the land in the subsistence sector of the economy; mechanisation in commercial agriculture; the alienation of land; measures such as taxes or fines imposed, which force the households of subsistence farmers to engage in wage labour to earn the required cash; the extension of modern, urban-based education; cultural values and consumption patterns in the rural areas (Dewar, *et al.*, 1982:9; cf. Beier, *et al.*, 1975:1-2; cf. Sandbrook, 1982:50-52; cf. Mazumdar, 1987:1100). All these, as well as the migration flow itself, are facilitated by the expansion of transport and communication links between the urban and rural areas.

In general, urban pull factors may include the increasing demand in urban areas for labour which keeps urban wages above subsistence levels of income; unionisation which enforces high wages; the concentration of

services and the greater social opportunities and freedom offered in urban areas (Dewar, *et al.*, 1982:9). As migration and urbanisation proceed, the presence of family or friends in an urban area is an important factor in the decision to migrate. Established contacts and informal information networks become increasingly important in obtaining urban employment (Sandbrook, 1982:44-45. cf. Gilbert & Gugler, 1983:77-80).

Mazumdar (1987:1105) criticises Lee and states that step-wise migration is likely to be the prevalent pattern if there is a well-developed hierarchy in terms of the size of urban centres. When large principal or dominant cities play a significant role in the distribution of the urban population, short-distance in-migration may not be the dominant form of rural-urban movement. Large cities may develop their individual catchment areas from which migrants are drawn. These are not necessarily concentrically distributed in terms of distance.

#### ***7.3.1.2.2 Factors which determine the volume of in-migration***

These factors are largely determined by the power of the factors set out under the previous point. Intensified specialisation and growing economic diversification tend to raise the general propensity to migrate. Moreover, a high degree of social and occupational mobility increases the force of attraction of specific regions. Industrialisation and continued economic progress therefore promote in-migration. Uneven rates of economic progress within a country tend to entrench and magnify the factors of attraction and repulsion in different localities. The passage of time itself, if accompanied by technological improvements and the spread of information, will encourage in-migration. In-migration tends to become a cumulative process, the volume of further in-migration being a function of the degree of movement already reached.

### **7.3.1.2.3 Streams and counterstreams of in-migration**

These streams are developed where people proceed along well-defined routes towards specific destinations. The flow of information from the place of destination back to the place of origin induces more migrants to join the stream. A counterstream may come about for various reasons. For instance, the positive factors at the place of destination may disappear or lose some of their power of attraction. Migrants may also become aware of untapped opportunities at their place of origin and return to exploit these with their newly acquired skills. The efficiency of a in-migration stream is defined by Lee (1969:292) as the ratio of stream to counterstream, that is, the net redistribution of population effected by the opposite streams. Efficiency tends to be high if negative factors at the place of origin are primarily responsible for the development of the stream, if the intervening obstacles are great, and/or when general economic conditions are good. Efficiency tends to be low if the places of origin and destination are similar and/or when economic conditions are depressed (Truu, 1971:173). Any of these factors could apply and they may be influenced by each other.

### **7.3.1.2.4 Selectiveness of the in-migration process**

Different individuals react differently to positive and negative factors at the places of origin and destination. People also have different abilities in overcoming the intervening obstacles. In consequence, in-migration is inevitably a selective process. Migrants who respond primarily to the positive factors at the place of destination are positively selected. Those who respond primarily to the negative factors at the place of origin are negatively selected. The degree of positive selection tends to increase with the increase in difficulty of the intervening obstacles. The concurrence of certain life-cycle events and the act of migration makes migration an age-selective process (Truu, 1971:173-174). Moreover, the characteristics of migrant in general tend to be a blend of those of the populations at the places of destination and origin.

Lee's approach is not so much a theory as a conceptual framework for classifying factors in taking in-migration decisions (Oberai, 1988:38). Gravity models do not readily lend themselves to empirical testing as far as the motivational elements are concerned (Kok, 1990:15). Furthermore, any predictions resulting from such models tend to presuppose a degree of regularity that is normally not encountered in human behaviour. As such they are prompted by many forces and it is impossible to reduce the variety of forces in operation to a simple analytical model (Lachmann, 1970:5). Attempts to represent in-migration merely as a response to a finite number of seemingly relevant causes therefore invariably mask the real complexities of genuine human action and social behaviour (Truu, 1971:177).

### ***7.3.2 Theories which analyse in-migration as an equilibrating or disequilibrating process in a changing economy***

The dichotomy which prevails between the Classical and Keynesian viewpoints in Economics in general, is also found in the theory of migration as an interregional process (Truu, 1971:174). The Classical approach suggests that interregional deviation in real personal income levels tends to be self-correcting in consequence of the migration of labour and capital which they engender. The Keynesian approach again suggests that such deviations will be amplified by labour and capital migration. Converging regional income patterns would also tend to bring different regions into greater conformity in terms of general economic performance, while diverging income patterns would act to increase the economic inequality between regions.

The original Neo-classical models of rural urban in-migration are premised on the assumption that the migration process helps to establish spatial equilibrium in the earnings of the factors of production. In-migration thus occurs from low income (rural) areas to high income (urban) areas (Thompson & Coetzee, 1987:32). Moreover, the individual migrant is motivated by both push and pull factors.

The following statement by Ohlin (1967:116) may be regarded as a fairly representative classical viewpoint: As factors move from regions where their prices are relatively low to regions where they are dear, their scarcity and therefore their rewards in the former are increased, whereas their prices in the latter fall, unless there is at the same time some counteracting tendency. Interregional mobility tends to make prices more uniform in the regions concerned. The belief in ultimate regional convergence appears to be deeply ingrained in the classical viewpoint.

The Keynesian viewpoint, however, leads to a theory of regional divergence, rather than convergence. In Keynesian dynamics, the price (wage) adjustments brought about by the respective labour markets are too slow to compensate for the interregional differences in real income (or employment) which tend to become cumulative with the passage of time (Truu, 1971:175). Consequently there is no tendency towards an interregional equalisation of real wage levels. On the contrary, initial regional imbalances tend to become greater in the course of time.

The difference between the Classical (equilibrating) and Keynesian (disequilibrating) theories is due to the assumptions made about the adjustment behaviour of the two systems. In the short term, the Classical system adjusts to changes in money expenditures by means of price-level movements while the Keynesian system adjusts primarily by way of real income movements (Leijonhufvud, 1968:51).

As with gravity models, the Classical and Keynesian theories are also liable to provide an inadequate prognosis of human migration. Although economic factors may often predominate, they do not necessarily represent the only reason why people migrate (Kuroda, 1965:506). The economic causes of migration are themselves deeply embedded in a more general social environment. The economic models appear to have limited value in evaluating questions about economic causes and effects of in-migration (Kind, 1969:77). Moreover, the causes of in-migration patterns are more complex than, and not necessarily related to, employment.

### **7.3.2.1 *The dual economy model of rural-urban development***

The economic model of development devised by Lewis (1954) and later extended by Fei and Ranis (1961), was the first to include, as an integral element, the process of rural-urban labour transfer. The model is based on the concept of a dual economy. This comprises a traditional rural subsistence sector characterised by zero marginal labour productivity and underemployment and a modern urban industrial sector with high employment. Labour from the subsistence sector is gradually transferred to the urban sector (Todaro, 1989:69-73). Oberai (1988:38) considers in-migration as an equilibrating mechanism in this model. Wage equality in the two sectors is eventually brought about through the transfer of labour from the labour surplus to the labour deficit sector.

In terms of this model the marginal productivity of labour is either zero or very low in the subsistence sector. Moreover, wage rates exceed marginal products and workers are paid wages equal to their cost of subsistence. By contrast, wages in the modern urban sector are much higher because of higher productivity and/or labour union pressures. The difference in wage rates leads to migration from the subsistence to the industrial sector. Increased industrial production and profit which are reinvested in the industrial sector lead to further demand for labour from the subsistence sector. This process continues as long as surplus labour exists in the rural areas (Oberai, 1988:38). This may also continue while the population growth rate in the rural sector either exceeds or equals the rate of labour out-migration.

The dual economy model has a number of limitations. Firstly, in-migration is not induced solely by low wages and underemployment in rural areas. Secondly, the assumption of near-zero marginal productivity and surplus labour in agriculture has been widely criticised on empirical grounds. Thirdly, the model assumes a high expansion rate of employment opportunities through continuous investment of rural human capital surplus in the urban sector. In the modern industrial sector of developing countries, the

employment growth rate has generally not been sufficient to absorb the increasing labour supply resulting from both natural population increases in the urban sector and from net rural-urban in-migration. In-migration has instead caused a shift of underemployment from the rural to the urban sector (Oberai, 1988:39). Nevertheless, the analytical value of the model is that it emphasises the structural and economic differences between the rural and the urban sectors, as well as the central importance of the process of labour transfer between them (Todaro, 1989:275).

The postulated tendency towards regional disequilibrium in a changing economy was raised by Gunnar Myrdal (1963:6), to the status of a general principle of Circular Causation. This had positive spread-effects in prosperous and negative backwash-effects in backward regions. The combined result is to increase regional imbalances and inequalities which are regarded to be of a greater order in the developing than in the developed countries. Once spatial competition gives one area an advantage over another, an accumulative process of mutual interaction sets in whereby a change in the one factor will continuously be supported by the reaction of the other factor. Even if the original push or pull factors were to cease after some time, both factors will be permanently changed (Mabogunje, 1980:59). The process of interacting changes seems to continue without any sign of neutralisation.

Myrdal (1956:49) sees a circular cumulative causation in both ways between the relative lack of national economic integration and relative economic backwardness. A low level of economic development is followed by low levels of social mobility, communications, education and national sharing in beliefs and values. This implies greater impediments to the spread-effects of expansionary momentum for developing communities (Meier, 1989:385). For much the same reasons internal inequalities in the level of in-migration prevail in developing countries such as South Africa.

### **7.3.2.2 *Sjaastad's human investment theory***

Sjaastad (1962) advanced a theory of migration in which he sees the decision to migrate as an investment decision involving an individual's expected costs and returns over time. During resource allocation the market mechanism creates external costs and benefits which prevent the spontaneous attainment of a general equilibrium (Truu, 1971:176). Costs and returns comprise both monetary and non-monetary components, the latter including changes in psychic benefits as a result of location preferences. Monetary costs include transportation, disposal of property, wages foregone while in transit, and any form of training for a new job. Psychic costs include leaving one's familiar surrounding, adopting new dietary habits and social customs, and so on (Oberai, 1988:39). Since these returns and costs are difficult to measure, empirical tests in general have been limited to income variables. Sjaastad's approach assumes that people desire to maximise their net real incomes during their economically productive period. It further assumes that they can at least compute their lifetime income streams in the present place of residence as well as in all future destinations (Oberai, 1988:39).

### **7.3.2.3 *Todaro's model of rural-urban migration***

Todaro (1989:278-280) suggests that the decision to migrate is stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs. In-migration proceeds in response to urban-rural differences in expected rather than actual earnings. This includes a perception by the potential migrant of an expected stream of income which depends both on prevailing urban wages and on a subjective estimate of the probability of obtaining employment in the modern urban sector, which is assumed to be based on the urban unemployment rate (Mazumdar, 1987:1100). Todaro's model is basically an extension of the human capital approach of Sjaastad (Oberai, 1988:39).

The simple economic theory of supply and demand should lead to a reduction in wage differentials, both in areas of emigration and in points of immigration. However, such an analysis is not realistic within the institutional and economic framework of most developing nations. Todaro (1989:280) argues that developing countries face significant unemployment with the result that a typical migrant cannot expect immediately to secure a highly paid job. In making his decision to migrate, the individual must balance the probabilities and risks of being unemployed or underemployed for a considerable period of time, against the positive urban-rural real income differential.

In-migration rates exceeding the growth of urban job opportunities are not only possible but also rational and probable in the face of expected large positive urban-rural income differentials. High levels of rural-urban migration can continue even when urban unemployment rates are high and known to the potential migrants (Oberai, 1988:40). The Todaro approach therefore offers a possible explanation of a common paradox. Moreover, rural-urban migration acts as an equilibrating force which equates rural and urban expected incomes in Todaro's model.

Oberai (1988:400) argues that a major weakness of the Todaro model is its assumption that potential migrants are homogeneous in respect of skills and attitudes and have sufficient information to work out the probability of finding a job in the urban modern sector. Both the Todaro and the human investment models do not consider non-economic factors and abstract from the structural aspects of the economy. An analysis of the macro-economic and institutional factors that generate rural-urban differentials is also required. For example, a distinction needs to be made between socio-economic structural factors and the specific mechanisms, such as unemployment and wage differentials, through which the structural factors operate. Todaro's model analyses migration theory at the micro level by focusing on the individual as a decision-making unit (Theron & Graaff, 1987:34).

#### **7.3.2.4 *The Harris-Todaro model***

The basic Todaro model and its extensions by Harris consider the urban labour force to be distributed between a relatively small modern sector and a larger traditional sector (Harris & Todaro, 1970:127). Wage rates in the traditional sector are determined competitively and considered not to be subject to the non-market forces, such as trade unions, that serve to maintain high wages in the modern sector. Wages in the traditional sector are therefore substantially lower than those in the modern sector. The higher wages in the urban formal sector cause people to migrate from the rural areas. Most urban in-migrants are assumed to be absorbed by the traditional or informal sector of the economy while they seek employment in the modern sector (Oberai, 1988:40).

Thompson and Coetzee (1988:35) criticise the Harris-Todaro model on a number of grounds including the role it assigns to the informal sector, its neglect of the importance of family and other networks in urban areas, and its overemphasis on “pull” factors. Initially the model also failed to take into account the employment opportunities available in the urban informal sector. Moreover, both the Todaro and the Harris-Todaro models focus on the motivational factors of the individual migrant, and have as such been criticised from a neo-Marxist perspective (Thompson & Coetzee, 1987:32).

#### **7.3.2.5 *Radical or dependency theory***

The neo-Marxist school has not developed alternative models, but views the process of in-migration as explicable only within the specific social, political and economic context within which it occurs (Dewar, et al., 1982:12). Radical writers do not develop theories to predict migration (infra f below). They concentrate rather on analysing and criticising the development of rural-urban migration within its politico-economic context. The essence of their views can be deduced from their criticism of the neo-classical explanations of in-migration.

According to dependency theorists the two economic sectors, that is, the industrial-monetary and traditional-subsistence sectors, are not independent but closely intertwined. The modern sector forcefully imposes its demands on the subsistence sector, keeping it in a position of functional underdevelopment (Dewar, et al., 1982:13). The subsistence sectors differ sharply from their respective modern sectors in respect of income levels, quality of life, social values, technological achievement and political power. They serve only to supply cheap labour, raw materials and a reserve army of labour to the modern sector. The highly modernized sector of developing countries has far closer links with developed countries than with their own subsistence sectors (Theron & Graaff, 1987:10).

The issue which divides the two theoretical streams is inequality. This includes inequality of access to material and non-material scarce resources at both international and national levels, and in both spatial and intergroup dimensions (Theron & Graaff, 1987:1). Radical or dependency theorists analyse economic concepts mainly at the macro level and reject prices and wages in the market or push and pull variables as explanatory factors (Theron & Graaff, 1987:15). The framework in which these factors operate is itself structured by political class struggles.

Neo-classical or modernization theories predict that a country's developing process will take it to a situation of relative equality in the distribution of income and wealth following a period of inequality. The radical theory of in-migration, by contrast, foresees that inequality will be maintained or will increase over time (Theron & Graaff, 1987:1). The radical writers maintain that persistent inequality is necessary for the growth of a capitalist economy.

According to radical theorists the neo-Classical approach to in-migration is based on the following six basic premises, all of which are questioned by them (Theron & Greeff, 1987:2-3):

- a. In-migration is a rational response to prevailing political, cultural and socio-economic conditions. This implies a parallel assumption that reasonable knowledge of alternative conditions exists;
- b. Political, cultural and Socio-economic development follows a more or less inevitable path or progression and the broad features of the progression repeat themselves internationally;
- c. A dualistic process of development occurs within any developing country;
- d. The direction of the progression or path of development is towards equilibrium in the price of factors of production and in living standards;
- e. In-migration is consequently a self-correcting or self-balancing process; and
- f. Theories may be developed to predict levels and rates of in-migration.

The mainstream radical theorists start with a critique of the Rostovian and dual economy assumptions listed under points b and c above. Dependency theorists view developing countries as a mirror image, rather than a parallel, of development in the older industrialized countries. The needs of capital accumulation in developed economies are imposed on developing countries and actively serve to underdevelop them (Theron & Graaff, 1987:10). Moreover, they emphasize the surplus drain from the periphery or poor countries to the centre or rich countries (Todaro, 1989:104). Likewise, the surplus drain applies within countries from developing to developed communities.

The radical thinking can be criticized mainly on the assumption of universal applicability of political policy and on the overemphasis of economic factors. Radical writers assume that the parts of a social system are useful to the whole, irrespective of either time or place. Thus, they develop a political

policy based mainly on Marxian theory which they apply to arrive at their political, social, economic and in-migration policies. Due to the poverty and large unemployment rate in most developing countries, a strong economic growth rate with the emphasis on equal opportunities for all people may be more efficient (Mears, 1988:54). This is the Classical view, in contrast to the Marxian view of social and economic equality. In terms of the radical perspective, migrant labour is seen to have been useful to various capitalist sectors over considerable periods of time in South African history. However, circulating migration (infra 4.7 below), is not the same as migration as these people did not have a free choice of location. Radical writers see state policy merely as the outcome of the dominant alliance of ruling class interests. As Yudelman (1983) argues, this excludes the possibility of any independent influence by the state where policy might be based on political rather than economic considerations (Theron & Graaff, 1987:14-15). From an opposing point of view the aim of the migrant labour system in South Africa may have been to deny migrants access to political rights in the modern sector rather than to ensure cheap labour. Therefore, economic factors were not the only considerations of the migrant labour system, other factors such as political, social, economic and others played an important part.

#### **7.3.2.6 Computer models to determine in-migration**

Many computer models exist whereby in-migration can be estimated or predicted. One such computable general equilibrium model was developed by Kelley and Williamson (1980, 1982, 1984 and 1987:33). A distinctive feature of the model is that it can analyse the past and the present as well as predict the future growth of cities in the developing world. The model is in the neo-Classical general equilibrium tradition.

The model provides for eight sectors distinguishing between tradable goods and non-tradable goods or services. This is not the first multi-sectoral model to recognize non-tradables, but it is the first spatial development model to emphasize the importance of non-tradables (housing and services) as an

influence on spatial cost-of-living differentials, on in-migration behaviour, and thus on the urban growth rate (Kelley & Williamson, 1987:33).

Furthermore, the model is savings-driven with the aggregate savings pool generated endogenously from three sources. They are retained after-tax corporate and enterprise profits, government savings and household savings. This savings pool is allocated competitively and endogenously to three uses, namely, investment in physical capital (productive investment), investment in human capital (training), and investment in housing (unproductive investment). Some exogenous variables have helped to drive the economy over time and are alleged to have influenced city growth. These variables include the nominal value of foreign capital and aid available each year to help finance the development effort and forestall balance of payments problems; the total unskilled labour force as determined by earlier demographic events; the sectoral rates of change in total factor productivity, which favour modern sectors and are labour saving; prices of imported raw materials and fuels; and the terms of trade between primary exportables and manufactured importables, which are distorted by domestic price policy and the political economy of protectionist and liberal industrial nations (Kelley & Williamson, 1987:35).

From the approximately one hundred endogenous variables used by the Kelley & Williamson (1987:37) model, in-migration city growth and rural-urban migration are the most important. The urban population, city growth rates, net rural out-migration rates, and net urban in-migration rates are the four key aspects of urban development used. Urban land use and density, land and housing scarcity and cost-of-living differentials are other urban indicators generated by the model. In addition to land scarcity, excess demand for housing units in the short-term and rising costs of housing construction the long-term and rising costs of housing construction in the long-term may inflate the cost of city life.

According to the model the major determinants of urban growth can be divided into three parts: The size of the past and future changes in the

exogenous variable (in-migration) and its influence on endogenous rates of urban growth; the short-term comparative static impact of that exogenous variable; and the long-term forces set in motion by the short-term comparative static impact (Kelley & Williamson, 1987:38). To understand urban growth, the short-term comparative static elasticities and the impact on urban growth of some key macro-economic events, such as the oil price increase, are also explored.

The short-term elasticities of unbalanced productivity, world market conditions and price policy, investment, demographic change, and land scarcity, reflect the full general equilibrium impact of the exogenous variables in question, based on the initial conditions in the economy. Labour markets adjust through in-migration while urban land markets are severely constrained in the short-term analysis because old capital cannot migrate and new capital goods and newly trained skilled workers are not added to capacity (Kelley & Williamson, 1987:38). Investment responses are also ignored in the short-term analysis. It is thus assumed that recent historical experience with sectoral investment allocation will guide entrepreneurs who are slow to adjust to the new, unexpected and shock-distorted rates of return. From the above explanation it is noted that this is a comprehensive and complicated model.

A long-run general equilibrium model such as that of Kelley and Williamson cannot be expected to account adequately for the short-term trends that developing countries have undergone since 1979. The model predicted that exogenous economic and demographic conditions would have a powerful impact on in-migration in developing countries during the 1970's. The model indicated that rapid population growth rates are not the central influence behind rapid urban growth in developing countries. Capital transfers to developing countries and rural land scarcity have also played a relatively modest role. The most potent influence of urban growth appears to have been the rate and imbalance of sectoral productivity advances. Technological progress and prices which have favoured the urban modern sectors contributed most to city growth. Thus, Kelley and Williamson (1987:43) predict that trade policy in the industrial countries and price policy in

developing countries are likely to have the most important impact on city growth in the next two decades.

Virtually all economic theory, as well as the above model, has been developed with the concept of equilibrium at its core. Movements or changes in any variable are viewed as returns to equilibrium following some exogenous change. It is very difficult to break out of this method of comparative statics to the kind of theory needed to explain the continuity of successive rises and falls in economic activity resulting in cyclical behaviour (Dauten & Valentine, 1978:95). Moreover, a satisfactory theory of economic fluctuations, in which in-migration is one exogenous variable, has not yet been developed. Furthermore, in-migration models including the Kelley and Williamson one, are only as reliable as the data and assumptions on which they are based. Each assumption made can be criticized on the grounds that it may be static and therefore does not conform to the dynamic real world.

#### **7.4 LESSONS LEARNT AND IMPORTANCE OF IN-MIGRATION THEORY**

Migrant activity is far too complex to be incorporated into a single universal model that can be applied to every historical period. However, a great deal can be learnt from existing theory that may be relevant to the present situation. A comprehensive understanding of the in-migration processes should also adopt an interdisciplinary approach. In-migration models should ideally include inputs from fields such as Economics, Sociology, Social Psychology, Geography and Anthropology (Theron & Graaff, 1987:31) A variety of existing disciplinary approaches purport to explain how in-migration decisions are made. Traditionally the study of in-migration belongs to the domain of Sociology to a much greater extent than to other disciplines, dating back to the early work of Ravenstein (1885, 1889; cf Oberai, 1988: 35-36).

In-migration is a dynamic process of which the overall implications for national development cannot be stated a priori. It is necessary to analyse empirically the process of socio-economic change as it is taking place, as well as its

interrelationship with in-migration, to determine these implications (Oberai, 1988:70). It is also true that most positive conclusions on in-migration are contested by several other studies. For example, it is difficult to state unequivocally whether in-migration worsens or improves rural income distribution. A study conducted in Western Colombia, found that work skills acquired by migrants outside the village had little relevance for the local economy (Taussig, 1982; cf Oberai, 1988:62). Oberai (1988:65) also found some empirical support for various possibilities. For example, although in-migration may reduce overall fertility, migrants who are socialized in an area of high reproductive norms and high fertility behaviour are still likely to have higher birth rate.

Development does not reduce the impetus of migration but increases it in the short term. The transformation process from a predominantly rural to urban situation is essentially revolutionary and highly disruptive. It displaces many people from traditional livelihoods and past ways of life (Massey, 1980:384). On the positive side rural-urban migration and the growth of cities play an important role in the development process.

The magnitude of population movements make it increasingly important to understand the causes and consequences of migration in order to formulate appropriate policies for checking or channeling in-migration in socially desirable ways and for harnessing its potential role in development (Oberai, 1988:2). All development policies affect and are affected by in-migration.

An adequate knowledge of the causes and consequences of in-migration is vital to any attempt to determine the role played by in-migration in the development of the origin and destination areas, or to change the direction or magnitude of future migration streams in ways that are consistent with long-term development goals (Oberai, 1988:35). Without sufficient knowledge of specific characteristics the formulation of appropriate policies is severely handicapped.

The magnitude of population movements makes it increasingly important to understand the causes and consequences of in-migration. Real world conditions, however, differ from the hypothetical framework of the economists' development scenario (Oberai, 1988:11). In both market and centrally planned economics the factors that influence in-migration often change with a community's level of development. Transportation and communication systems, for example, not only reduce the cost of in-migration but also lessen the psychological and cultural gap between the origin and destination areas, thereby facilitating in-migration (Oberai, 1988:45). For example, most recent studies based upon survey data have shown that migrants are able to increase their welfare as a result of in-migration in spite of adjustment difficulties and urban unemployment (Oberai, 1988:51).

An integration process has started to take place within the national boundaries of the highly advanced industrialized countries. At a very high level of economic development expansionary momentum tends to spread more effectively to other localities and regions. In these developed countries inequality has also been mitigated through intervention in the play of market forces by organized society. In the highly advanced countries the national integration process has led to a relatively high level of equality of opportunity for all their inhabitants. In contrast to this small group of highly developed and progressive countries, all other countries are in various degrees poorer and generally less progressive economically. In a rather close correlation to their poverty these developing countries experience internal economic inequalities. Furthermore, these inequalities tend to weaken the effectiveness of their democratic systems of government (Myrdal, 1956:47-51; cf. Meier, 1989:385). In-migration theory should take cognizance of any changes that may effect or facilitate their validity in a changing world.

According to Oberai (1988:2) the problem arises when in-migration exceeds the income-earning opportunities available in urban areas. Large concentrations of people and economic activities in a few cities may involve greater social costs, and may lead to a breakdown of urban services.

## 7.5 CONCLUSION

In-migration embraces four elements namely space, residence, time and activity changes. Understanding the process of population mobility is hindered by the tendency to condense, collapse or even ignore important distinctions in each of these elements. Thus, an essentially heterogeneous process is treated as a homogeneous one by calling it in-migration.

A disadvantage common to theories which analyse the forces determining the nature, scope and direction of in-migration, is that they tend to be descriptive rather than analytical in their content. It is difficult to identify, qualify and assign weights to the different variables by means of gravity models, especially with regard to the forces of attraction and repulsion at places of destination and origin. Any predictions resulting from such models therefore tend to presuppose a degree of regularity that is normally not encountered in human affairs. Attempts to represent in-migration merely as a response to a finite number of seemingly relevant causes invariably mask the real complexities of genuine human action and social behaviour.

Theories analysing in-migration as an equilibrating or disequilibrating process provide an inadequate prognosis of human in-migration. Although economic factors may often predominate in both the Classical equilibrating and Keynesian disequilibrating theories, they do not necessarily represent the only reasons for the in-migration of people. The economic causes of in-migration are themselves deeply embedded in the social environment. Equilibrating economic models appear to be of little assistance in the evaluation of questions about economic causes and effects of in-migration because they overemphasize employment. In developing countries in-migration has shifted underemployment from the rural to the urban sector.

Long-term general equilibrium computer models cannot account for short-term fluctuations in economic activity. They view movements or changes in any variable as returns to equilibrium following some exogenous change. Moreover, the factors that influence in-migration often change with a

community's level of development. Furthermore, in-migration models are only as reliable as the data and assumptions on which they are based. Each assumption made can be criticized on the grounds that it may be static and does therefore not conform to the dynamic real world.

Migrant activity is far too complex to be incorporated into a single universal model that can be applied to every historical period. However, a great deal can be learnt from existing theory that may be relevant to the present situation. A comprehensive understanding of the in-migration processes also requires an interdisciplinary approach. Thus, in-migration models should include inputs from fields such as Economics, Sociology, Social politics, Psychology, Geography culture and Anthropology.

All development policies affect and are affected by in-migration. Thus in-migration is a dynamic process of which the implication for national developments is not easy to identify or predict. It is necessary to analyse empirically the process of socio-economic change as it is taking place, as well as its interrelationship with in-migration to determine these implications. In-migration differs in the various countries and regions within countries, resulting in most positive conclusions on in-migration being contested by several other studies. In developing countries the magnitude of population movements consequences of in-migration. Reliable statistics and empirical studies are therefore the only way to reconcile the theory and practice of in-migration.

Chapter 8 will describe the analysis and interpretation of several factors affecting in-migration in South Africa.

## CHAPTER 8

### ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF SEVERAL FACTORS AFFECTING IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

#### 8.1 INTRODUCTION

In October 1996, South Africans were counted for the first time as citizens of a democracy. More than 100 000 people were employed to collect information on persons and households throughout the country using a uniform methodology. Census night, or the night of the count, was 9 – 10 October 1996. In preparation, the country was divided into about 96 000 small pockets of land, called enumerator areas. (EAS). An enumerator was assigned to each EA to visit the structures within it.

Questionnaires were made available in all eleven official languages which are English, Afrikaans, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, Xitsonga, isiXhosa, isiZulu, siSwati, isiNdebele and Tshivenda. In addition, separate questionnaires were compiled for those living in hostels or institutions, and for the homeless. The information collected was processed in nine provincial centres, employing about 5 000 people to work in shifts for nine months to code the questionnaires and capture the data on computer. The captured data were then edited and made accessible for analysis. Census in brief summarises the findings generated by this process. These findings are going to be used to prove the hypothesis and the problem to be encountered, suggestions to be made and how to resolve these problems.

#### 8.2 THE LAND AREA OF SOUTH AFRICA

##### Analysis and interpretation

The biggest area of land (29.7%) as indicated in diagram 1.1 is the Northern Cape which is partly a semi-desert area and it has the smallest population distribution (2%) as seen in diagram 2.1. Gauteng province which attracts many people from within and from outside the country, has the smallest area (1.4%) of land and the second highest population distribution (18%) as

indicated in diagram 2.1, while KwaZulu-Natal has the highest population distribution (21%) on a (7.6%) proportion of the land. As indicated in the hypothesis this scenario will create economical, social, educational and other problems for the Gauteng province currently under investigation. This process will be clearly illustrated in the following table:

**TABLE 4.9 LAND AREA (SQUARE KM)**


**1.1 Area (square km) covered by each province**

	Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Northern Province	North West	Western Cape	South Africa
Square km	169 580	129 480	17 010	92 100	79 490	361 830	123 910	116 320	129 370	1 219 090

Source: Census (1996:2)

**DIAGRAM 1.1**

**Distribution of the land area of South Africa by province**



Source: Census (1996:2)

### 8.3 THE POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA

**TABLE 4.10**


**Population of South Africa by province**

	Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu Natal	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Northern Province	North West	Western Cape	South Africa
Total	6 302 525	2 633 504	7 348 423	8 417 021	2 800 711	840 321	4 929 368	3 354 825	3 956 875	40 583 573

Source: (1996:4)

**DIAGRAM 1.2**

**8.3.1 Percentage of the population in each province – October 1996**



Source: Census (1996:4)

TABLE 4.11

8.3.2 Data in total net population as depicted in table 1.1 and 2.1.

Taking Eastern Cape as an example:  $6\ 307\ 525 / 169\ 580 = 37.1$   
 persons per km<sup>2</sup>

Province	Persons per km <sup>2</sup>
Eastern Cape	37.19
Free State	20.34
Gauteng	432.01
KwaZulu-Natal	91.39
Mpumalanga	35.23
Northern Cape	2.32
Northern Province	39.78
North West	28.84
Western Cape	30.58

Source: Census (1996:6)

### Analysis and interpretation

The area under investigation, namely Gauteng, will naturally feel the pressure if people from other provinces in South Africa and those from other parts of Africa and elsewhere in-migrate into the overpopulated area. Problems will occur because people will start competing for jobs, land, housing and subsequently crime will escalate. As can be seen in the table above, Gauteng is the most densely populated area within South Africa with a factor difference of more than ten times that of other provinces.

TABLE 4.12

8.3.3 Country of birth by population group

	African/Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Unspecified/ Other	Total
SADC countries	413 133	7 792	2 140	102 529	4 091	529 685
Rest of Africa	7 395	329	657	11 358	296	20 035
Europe	4 661	529	783	209 144	2 081	217 198
Asia	405	377	17 888	9 194	690	28 554
North America	362	107	122	4 972	120	5 683
Central and South America	1 772	138	204	6 476	98	8 688
Australia and New Zealand	40	28	34	3 725	61	3 888
Unspecified/Others	75 420	4 522	5 670	55 682	3 162	144 456
Total	503 188	13 822	27 498	403 080	10 599	958 187

Source: Census (1996:16)

### Analysis and interpretation


Table 4.12 illustrates the distribution of people not born in South Africa by population and country of birth as a percentage of all people not born in South Africa counted 958 187 in total.

The following table 4.13 shows the highest percentage of people from each country.

**TABLE 4.13**

### **8.3.4 The number of people from foreign countries settling in South Africa**

	African/ Black	Coloured	Indian/ Asian	White	Unspecified/ Other	Total
SADC countries	<b>43.12</b>	0.81	0.22	10.70	0.43	55.28
Rest of Africa	0.77	0.03	0.07	<b>1.19</b>	0.03	2.09
Europe	0.49	0.06	0.08	<b>21.83</b>	0.22	22.67
Asia	0.04	0.04	<b>1.87</b>	0.96	0.07	2.98
North America	0.04	0.01	0.01	<b>0.52</b>	0.01	0.59
Central and South America	0.18	0.01	0.02	<b>0.68</b>	0.01	0.91
Australia and New Zealand	0.00	0.00	0.00	<b>0.39</b>	0.01	0.41
Unspecified/Others	<b>7.87</b>	0.47	0.59	5.81	0.33	15.08
Total	52.51	1.44	2.87	42.07	1.11	100.00

 Highest from each country

Source: Census (1996:19)

### Analysis and interpretation


From the above table it can clearly be seen that the bulk of the people not born in South Africa comes from Southern African Development Community (SADC) (55.28%) and Europe (22.67%). It can also be seen that the percentage for Gauteng (40.98%) is about four times that of the second and third largest provinces.

Nearly a quarter (22.16%) of the people not born in South Africa comes from the SADC and chose to settle in Gauteng, this also represents 40% of all the people coming from the SADC. About half (46.50%) of Europeans chooses to settle in Gauteng and this figure accounts for (10.54%) of all the people not

born in South Africa. More Asians settle in Gauteng (1.04%) than in KwaZulu-Natal (0.46%).

### DIAGRAM 1.3

#### 8.3.5 Percentage of the population not born in South Africa in each province and in South Africa overall – October 1996\*




\* Excluding those in institutions and hostels

Source: Census (1996:17)

#### **Analysis and interpretation**

Although 2% of the people enumerated in South Africa on census night were not born in South Africa (right hand column of the graph). Gauteng (second last column from the right) contains the largest population of people who were not born in South Africa (4.8%), while Eastern Cape contains the largest proportion (0.4%) (less than half a percentage point). This scenario confirms the hypothesis stated that Gauteng will experience several problems if immigration is not well monitored.

**DIAGRAM 1.4****8.3.6 Percentage of the population who were not born in South Africa by population group – October 1996\***

\* Excluding institutions

Source: Census (1996:18)

**Analysis and interpretation**

A large proportion of whites (8.3%), second column from the right, was not born in South Africa compared to the other population groups. The second highest population group settling in South Africa is Indians with (2.1%) which is equivalent to all groups followed by Africans (1.4%) and coloureds with (0.3%). The government departments in charge of controlling in-migration should monitor and control this in-flow of the in-migration of people not born in South Africa permanently settling here. Those who bring in expertise should be allowed to in-migrate and the rest to be refused permanent residence.

TABLE 4.14

## 8.3.7 Citizenship by province

	Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Northern Province	North West	Western Cape	South Africa
SADC countries	3 572	50 488	110 316	7 924	20 184	1 246	25 685	37 740	5 677	262 832
Rest of Africa	1 476	181	4 280	1 025	372	33	221	547	1 006	9 141
Europe	4 901	1 562	45 207	17 626	2 439	293	616	1 279	26 267	100 190
Asia	1 445	598	5 328	2 370	203	56	494	930	1 822	13 246
North America	321	64	2 011	768	182	39	33	88	1 417	4 923
Central and South America	927	274	4 622	2 981	530	66	200	245	2 013	11 858
Australia and New Zealand	190	28	1 034	536	52	11	31	50	824	2 756
Unspecified/Others	2 660	2 188	21 893	7 738	2 493	324	4 313	3 785	4 871	50 265
Total	15 492	55 383	194 691	40 968	26 455	2 068	31 593	44 664	43 897	455 211

Source: Census (1996:20)

TABLE 4.15

## 8.3.8 Citizenship by population group

	African/Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Unspecified/Other	Total
SADC countries	247 473	2 061	1 382	9 660	2 256	262 832
Rest of Africa	7 051	159	350	1 371	210	9 141
Europe	1 445	294	518	96 364	1 568	100 189
Asia	376	193	8 857	2 930	891	13 247
North America	222	75	93	4 300	234	4 924
Central and South America	249	94	236	11 114	165	11 858
Australia and New Zealand	33	35	37	2 582	68	2 755
Unspecified/Others	25 772	1 165	2 302	19 215	1 811	50 265
Total	282 621	4 076	13 775	147 536	7 203	455 211

Source: Census (1996:20)

**Analysis and Interpretation**

Table 4.15 indicates that Gauteng has the highest percentage (41.97%) of in-migration from Southern African Development Community (SADC) as compared to other provinces. The following people who acquired citizenship in Gauteng come from Europe (45.12%) and the least come from Australia and New Zealand (37.98%). With Gauteng's total population of 7 153 733 and combining it with people coming from all over the world the number is increased to a total of 7 348 432 which is an increase of 194 699 (2.64%). It is natural that people cannot be denied movement from countries of their birth to settle where they feel they can make a difference, input and contribution to the area of their choice. The in-migration process should be monitored

carefully and strictly so that resources of the area such as Gauteng should be enriched.

**TABLE 4.16**

**8.3.9 Economically active population by province amongst those aged 15 – 65 years\***


	Eastern Cape	Free State	Gauteng	KwaZulu-Natal	Mpumalanga	Northern Cape	Northern Province	North West	Western Cape	South Africa
Employed	786 818	701 175	2 564 243	1 570 573	605 925	215 523	570 129	725 287	1 374 174	9 113 847
Unemployed	742 427	299 948	1 007 766	1 008 944	297 290	86 060	486 554	443 546	299 114	4 671 649
Total	1 529 245	1 001 123	3 572 009	2 579 517	903 215	301 583	1 056 683	1 168 833	1 673 288	13 785 496

Excluding institutions

Source: Census (1996:44)

**DIAGRAM 1.5**

**8.3.10 Labour market status of the population aged 15 – 65 years by population group – October 1996**



Source: Census: 1996:46

### Analysis and interpretation

A larger percentage of Africans (45%: bottom section of the left hand column) and Indians (42%) compared to Coloureds (35%) and Whites (33%) are not economically active. Note that the unemployment rate (see next graph) is different from the percentage of unemployed people shown in this graph, because this percentage included those who are not economically active.

**TABLE 4.17**

### **8.3.11 Economically active population groups amongst those aged 15 – 65 years**

	African/Black	Coloured	Indian/Asian	White	Unspecified/Other	Total
<b>Employed</b>						
Male	3 506 509	633 417	234 583	1 060 736	46 658	5 481 903
Female	2 175 968	496 099	128 903	795 716	35 258	3 631 944
Total	5 682 477	1 129 516	363 486	1 856 452	81 916	9 113 847
<b>Unemployed</b>						
Male	1 810 570	141 555	29 312	45 938	12 543	2 039 918
Female	2 395 421	157 676	21 068	43 127	14 437	2 631 729
Total	4 205 991	299 231	50 380	89 065	26 980	4 671 647
<b>Total</b>						
Male	5 317 079	774 972	263 895	1 106 674	59 201	7 521 821
Female	4 571 389	653 775	149 971	838 843	49 695	6 263 673
Total	9 888 468	1 428 747	413 866	1 945 517	108 896	13 785 494

Source: Census (1996:47)


### Analysis and interpretation

The unemployed African male (18.75%) being the highest of the population groups compared to Coloureds (6.93%), Whites (2.25%) and Asians (1.43%). The female unemployed group distribution being the difference of their male counterparts. With African female unemployed being 91.02%, Coloureds 5.99%, Whites 1.63% and Asians 0.80%. This scenario clearly indicates the high level of the unemployed African males and females of the country and warrants urgent attention, otherwise many problems such as acquisition of

housing, paying for basic necessities such as water, electricity, sewage and dirt removals will not be accomplished. Crime rate will escalate and illiteracy will prevail. The inflow of migrants also aggravates the situation. The hypothesis stated (Supra 1.5) becomes, relevant and the authorities in charge should jealously guard against mismanagement of in-migration.

## DIAGRAM 1.6


### 8.3.12 Unemployment rates by provinces amongst those aged 15 – 65 years – October 1996



Source: Census (1996:48)

#### Analysis and interpretation

According to Diagram 1.6, unemployment rates were (33.9%) for the country as a whole (right hand column), but they were particularly high at (48.5%) in the Eastern Cape (left hand column), and (46.0%) in the Northern Province. Gauteng (28.2%) comes second best to the Western Cape (17.9%)

**DIAGRAM 1.7****8.3.13 Unemployment rate by population group and gender – October 1996**

Source: Census (1996:49)

**Analysis and interpretation**

According to diagram 1.7 unemployment rates were particularly high among African women (52.4% fifth column from the left) and African men (34.1% left hand column).

**8.4 THE MANAGEMENT OF IN-MIGRATION PROGRESS**

South African citizens pay millions of rands (of tax) to the government for public services. In return they demand a more careful allocation of scarce resources, proper management of human movement (in-migration) and evidence that the services rendered are of an adequate quality. These

demands have led the South African government to become much more attentive to quality and proper service delivery. Obviously there are various mechanisms through which improved service delivery is established. By far the most common way to do this is by transforming the internal component of management, namely organising, leading, control and evaluation. Indeed, the management of in-migration plays a major role in ensuring that private and public sector institutions will survive and prosper and in adding value to the management in a direct and indirect manner. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that government in its current transformation initiatives also pays attention to the in-migration management component .

Historically, in-migration management has been regarded largely as an administrative or technical matter rather than receiving the strategic management concern it deserves. In the past there have been rapid, turbulent and often strained developments in the government concerning in-migration. Some solutions in the previous dispensation included putting into operation systems to cluster people according to ethnicity, demography, wage income, status, exclusive areas, and other related factors, this trend has currently drastically changed. Although these projects were tackled with great enthusiasm, it was still done by means of the old-style people administration, which implies uniformly applied central rules and prescripts. However, post-1994 in-migration management faces a quite different set of trends and challenges. Currently it is regarded as a key activity in public administration and plays an important role in guiding future activities. Post-1994 the management of in-migration faces enormous challenges, both in terms of transformation within the broader context of change in the public sector, private sector and in terms of the transformation of the services which it provides to its clients. What brought this urgent need for change to the fore? Of course the most obvious reason is the tendency all over the world to embark on a thorough re-evaluation of the role, structure and functions of the state and public sector institutions in general, and in-migration management in particular. These challenges of in-migration are currently being addressed through a comprehensive programme of transformation by government and

manifest in different policy initiatives, most of which are underpinned by an integrated and strategic process of progressive new Acts, White Papers and other policy documents.

This section will seek primarily to provide a policy framework within which in-migration functions are currently managed and (in some instances) are expected to be managed in the future. Nothing affects the work of those in public sector institutions and private sector institutions more clearly than the problems in the environment. Of course the South African in-migration is no exception. It needs to be said at the outset that the existing South African public sector inherited enormous problems in 1994 when it took over from the previous National Party government, which was characterised by a number of problematic policies and practices. For this reason, it may be helpful to review some of the key problems currently experienced by strict application of in-migration managers – which application of in-migration managers – which in turn could be regarded as reasons for change. The management of migrants into South Africa are cause for concern because the control systems are not respected by those in control. There has occasionally been easy entry into South Africa of illegal immigrants from African States and abroad. The previous and present public administration were more concern with the application of rules and procedures which are not effective than with the development of a culture and ethos of quality service delivery to the community. This problem is referred to as centralised control or top-down management/ To date, the in-migration legislative framework which includes the Public Service Act of 1994, the Public Service Regulations issued in terms of section 41(1) of the Public Service Act of 1994, the Public Service Staff Code issued in terms of Section 42(1)(b) of the Public Service Act of 1994 and the personnel Administration Standards (that is, the grading system covering all work performed in the public sector) reflects and perpetuates the problem of centralised control. The content of these documents is structured in such a manner as to ensure that employees who are to manage these processes comply with the complex set of rules and regulations rather than concentrate on quality control, output and delivery. Overall, in-migration practices are ineffective discriminatory and inefficient. For example, it takes

around three months, and in extreme cases up to 12 months, to recruit a new entrant. One of the reasons for this inefficiency lies in the multiple provisions stipulated in the existing public service in-migration legislative framework.

Another important problem which needs to be managed in the control of in-migrants is a lack of accountability. Previously accountability within the public sector was limited to bureaucratic accountability. Public officials were almost always expected to adhere to the rules rather than strive for higher efficiency in order to be more productive. Despite the international shift towards operational accountability, where public officials even those dealing with in-migration are directly accountable to end – users, citizens and communities, public officials in the old South African public sector acted only according to the set of rules, policies and regulations. That this style of public management has had a negative effect on service delivery cannot be denied. The low productivity figures, particularly in terms of the ability to deliver services that meet the needs, demands, and expectations of the citizenry, illustrate this most dramatically national and provincial departments are extremely dissatisfied with current in-migration management practices, which are perceived to be overcentralised, excessively bureaucratic and rule-bound (White Paper on the Resource Management in the Public Service, 1995:18 of Sunday Times, 1997:22)/

That these problems have had a negative effect on general in-migration management in South Africa is undoubtedly true. In short, it appears that the public sector capacity to meet its in-migration control needs and demands is inadequate.

What lessons can be drawn from the ideas about the management on in-migration in South Africa that might guide the actions or thoughts of the contemporary in-migration manager? One way to begin to answer this question is to summarise the points of departure highlighted here. Many of the thoughts seem to suggest that the changing environment of the in-migration management with its infinite problems needs to be taken into consideration on a continuous basis. An understanding of the problems in-

migration management is faced with not only puts the negative affects into perspective, but also facilitates the change efforts of the future. The observation has also been made that in-migration management is not performing well at the moment. The New Constitution should be regarded as the supreme law for public human management and all actions be guided by it. This implies that constitutional provisions such as the increased emphasis on basic human rights for migrants and the setting of specific values to govern public management should be adhered to. Basically it suggests performing every human resource activity in the light of the anticipated conditions of the New Constitution, thus putting the relevant public in-migration management in the best position to deal with constitutional provisions.

It is clear that the contemporary in-migration manager faces enormous challenges. It can be accepted that public in-migration managers are in daily contact with the issues of the human control function. In order to enhance an understanding of the contemporary issues the in-migration manager should have proper knowledge of the content of the latest Acts, regulations, Bills, White Papers and codes. The in-migration manager is actually the one who deals with the organising, leading, control and evaluation function in its totality. Therefore, he or she must not lag behind but react positively to all the developments and implement them accordingly. This can be achieved through a proper study of all the latest documents, and attendance of courses, workshops, conferences and seminars which deal with the relevant in-migration topics. The manager of in-migration must also try to bring all the stipulations of these documents to the attention of all the relevant roleplayers, who include immediate subordinates, line managers, senior and middle managers and other colleagues.

## **8.5 CONCLUSION**

It is evident from above scenarios that legal migration is allowed but should strictly be controlled to ensure that it benefits the development of the relevant country, to raise more opportunities and in general to raise the socio-economic standards of the country. On the other hand, illegal in-migration has serious negative effects on the socio-economic situation of any country,

including South Africa. It undermines all efforts at structured planning, supplying and maintaining of infrastructure, economic growth, socio-economic growth and socio-economic upliftment. In the South African context, especially in Gauteng Province, illegal in-migration undermines the Regional Development Programme (RDP) and places a severe strain on resources.

South Africa has a population of 50 583 573 (census 1996:5) that is annually increasing by approximately 2.3%. It is expected that the population will increase to 74 million by the year 2025. South Africa's resources to sustain a population of this size are limited by the fact that arable land for food production is scarce, especially in Gauteng province. South Africa has 11 million hectares of a high agricultural potential. South Africa's water resources are extremely limited and water already has to be diverted from a neighbouring country to satisfy the demands up to the year 2020. Unemployment is rife with approximately 33% of the active economic persons being unemployed at present.

As depicted (Supra 2.2 and 2.3) various factors such as overpopulation, political strife, droughts or famine in many African countries are driving people to seek a better life. The influx of migrants is not just from Africa, but from other economical stable countries such as Europe, Asia, North America, Central and South America, Australia and New Zealand. South Africa, especially Gauteng is pressurised to provide services such as education, jobs, health, housing and others to its own citizens who are desperately in need of such facilities. It has been reported that Gauteng province is spending R200 million annually on the education of children of illegal immigrants. Gauteng hospital services had to go to the extend of writing off R300 000 in medical costs in respect of foreigners who did not pay their bills.

According to a survey done in 1995 by the Human Science Research Council, there are between 2.5 and 4.1 million illegal immigrants in South Africa and every year more are entering by either illegally crossing the borders or by entering legally through border posts, ports of entry and then overstaying the validity period or contravening the conditions of their temporary residence

permits. Recognising the rights of in-migrants is seen as a luxury for a country such as South Africa, especially Gauteng with limited resources.

Unfortunately, the state's reaction to the issue of in-migration is diverse and inconsistent. The different perspectives are not only between different provinces, but also between different departments, as well as local governments. Until 1991, the main criterion for in-migration in South Africa was race. A prospective in-migrant had to be readily assimilable by the white inhabitants and not a threat to the language, culture or religion of any white ethnic group (Hough, 1995:209)

Current policy responses are not only discordant with the post-apartheid normative shift, but are also non sustainable, as the following realities suggest that the continuing criminalisation of illegal in-migrants are influenced by the burgeoning corruption of the systems which are intended to control them and the increasing financial expenditure on apparently futile attempts at plugging and policing leaky borders and ports of entry into South Africa, the growing deployment of understaffed and over-extended security forces, which identifies increasing attempts by the South African public in identifying illegal migrants which can result in xenophobic witch-hunts, destabilising communities and adversely affect South Africa's relationship with in-migrant's country of origin and the unveiling of high crime rate caused by illegal in-migrants in the form of car hijackings, rape, robbery and other related matters are cause for concern.

In South Africa, as is the case in other Western states, it is characteristic that there is an ever increasing demand for a greater and better management of in-migration. This demand causes increasing pressure on the South African executive public institutions to render maximal qualitative and quantitative management services at the lowest possible cost within the framework of the boarder political and socio-economic environment. As a result of this, personnel in supervisory and management positions in public institutions are confronted with problems which require special administrative and management skills. Due to the fact that the personal experience of the

supervisory officials is probably not sufficient to find solutions for such problems, it has become necessary for persons aspiring to positions in higher echelons of the hierarchy of executive institutions, who manage the in-migration process and functions, to acquire some training in the administrative and management sciences. Because training in the administrative and management of in-migration also implies some knowledge of in-migration to enable the supervisory officials to have the correct cognitive approach pertaining to the in-migration functions, problems and questions. It should also enable the officials to identify and find solutions and timelessly bring about structural changes where necessary.

The government-of-the-day which comes into effect by means of free general elections has as its primary objective the maintenance and improvement of the country. Since it is impossible for political officer-bearers to manage all the activities related to their objectives, a multitude of public executive institutions are utilised to provide essential services, as well as to maintain the required infrastructure. As far as the nature, extent and number of executive institutions are concerned, it is interesting to note that circumstances peculiar to a state will be the determining factor. In this regard, South Africa is no exception, and depending on a variety of prevailing circumstances, executive departments have been established to make a reasonable existence possible for all citizens of the country.

The efficiency and effectively with which public executive institutions perform their functions concerning the management of in-migration are closely correlated with the organisation pattern of such institutions. Although government institutions tend to be structured in a mechanistic way due to statutory and other requirements, the adaptability of these institutions to in-migration influences may be increased by the selective use of suitable organisational systems (Roux, Brynard, Botes & Fourie 1997:57-63). When reflecting on the updating of procedures and methods of managing in-migration, all the relevant considerations should also be taken into account. Procedures and methods are carried out by officials, and if their co-operation and sympathetic attitude are not obtained all meritorious proposals

concerning the effective and efficient ways of managing in-migration will be doomed to failure.

## CHAPTER 9

### MANAGEMENT OF URBAN IN-MIGRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA : EVALUATION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 9.1 EVALUATION

The primary aim of this study was to assess the negative and positive impact in-migration has on South Africa especially in Gauteng province. By means of an investigation based on the hypothesis of this study it is stated that to verify this hypothesis data was obtained. To do this, data in the form of histograms, diagrams, pie chart diagrams and tables was obtained from the departments of Statistics, Home Affairs and Housing, as well as a study of relevant and recent literature. The conclusions and recommendations of this thesis will partly be based on these investigations. In-migration and industrialisation are responsible for profound social and economic changes throughout the present day world. Old established values, ideas, practices have to be abandoned or at least re-assessed at a rate unparalleled in recorded history. As a consequence, the future today seems to be even more unpredictable and uncertain than ever before. If this is true of the world's economically advanced nations, it applies much more to the less advanced peoples, South Africans included – peoples that have only recently emerged from colonial rule and are now seeking to free themselves from poverty, ill health, ignorance and superstition, and to become nations embraced by success in the full sense of the word. The chasm that separates actual achievement from the goals they are striving for, far from being bridged, in fact appears to be widening.

It cannot meaningfully be spoken about the South African peoples' transition to the urban economy if the global setting is ignored. In no other country can one find a more striking contrast between a highly sophisticated industrial society on the one hand and the persistence of time honoured social and economic patterns on the other. South Africa mirrors the international scene in many crucial respects. It is important to recognise that the South Africans are in the midst of an evolutionary process between a point of departure which is truly not understood and a destination that lies in an unknown future.

All that can be certain of is that there is no way back into a tribal pattern and that Western technology will increasingly shape the South African society.

The rate at which the South African in-migrants are becoming town and city dwellers has a crucial bearing on the economic, social and political destiny of the country. However, despite these various factors, the urban areas, especially the larger ones, are a catalyst of dramatic change in South Africa. New ways of thinking, new social patterns, a new awareness and sophistication arise that find their authentic expression in many South African way of living. Consciously or unconsciously, all this is a powerful magnet for a society that is no longer content with its old stationery mode of living and is awakening to the challenges and the frustration of the space age. Primarily however, it is the lack of employment opportunities, famine, illiteracy, poverty and other related factors in South Africa, Africa and the rest of the world that are responsible for mounting pressure of migrants seeking to enter the existing metropolitan areas. The pressure will abate only to the extent that alternative ways of making a living are opened up in the people's country of origin.

It would be fruitfull to evaluate the preceding chapters of this document so that the reader could grasp and get to understand the value of the area under investigation. The preceding chapters have described the extent, benefits, losses, consequences and other related negative and positive factors in the world, third world and South Africa in particular with a purposeful strategy of managing the process of in-migration successfully.

Chapter one dealt with the aims and objectives, methodologies applied to research the phenomenon of in-migration followed by the identified problems with a hypothesis which was utilised to prove that effective and efficient management of urban in-migration leads to the improvement of several factors such as quality of life, reduction of unemployment, promotion of progress and elimination of crime in the urban areas. For this document to be meaningful to the reader the title and important concepts were explained and the structure of the report concluded this chapter.

Chapter two revealed interesting scenarios about in-migration world wide, it also touched on the past ,present and future trends of in-migration in South Africa and elsewhere in the world. Urban settlements were experienced differently in all parts of the world with some originating in the form of legislations and others being economically or industrially taking a different route. The South African government of the future will face unique challenges concerning in-migration and this will warrant total onslaught by development of good strategies such as resources (human and material) skills, methods, systems and other important factors so as to be successful. The problem of in-migration was untapped to be not only topical for the African, Asian continents and other parts of the world, but more so for South Africa with its diversified ethnic dimensions. The settlement patterns revealed that developments occurred

through the interaction of economic and political powers that were ethnically and sharply differentiated, particularly between whites and blacks, especially in South Africa. It was also revealed in this chapter that most of the world population will be urbanised and this warrants proactive planning systems which will be applied so that in-migration can be successfully managed. To resolve the problems caused by in-migration the machinery of law enforcement and the rules and regulations should be speedily and seriously applied. The main cause of accelerated urban in-migration are rapid population growth and the inability of rural areas to support this growing population. New priorities, strategies and different methods should be clearly established by the urban administrators.

In Chapter three it was revealed that South Africa will require sound planning and research to get through the current bottlenecks and policy transitions. Given the level of mobilisation in communities in South Africa, it also seemed unlikely that even the present democratically elected government will be able to re-impose its will in any absolute way. Any attempt to plan in the traditional top down of the past is unrealistic and therefore bound to fall. Planning procedures will have to be worked out that gives serious consideration to the interests of the powerless – the needy and the dispreveledged. The urban

policy framework should be affordable, satisfy the need for shelter and services. The mobility of people should be facilitated as much as possible, thus enabling them to move to areas of greater opportunity. Since that the local authorities live in the community itself they should be easily accessible. To bring about planned and structured in-migration, an in-migration policy should be highly developed and soundly structured.

Chapter four deals with urban in-migration in the third world and it provides insight into the understanding of the necessity to realise that rural areas of the third world contain a high proportion of very poor people who are in the majority illiterate, are provided with a minimum of social services and infrastructure and are offered minimum wages and with high illiteracy background. It was also revealed that in some countries, particularly those in Africa, the volume of in-migration began to create conditions of rural urban shortage and that do affect the viability of agricultural production.

Chapter five introduces the reader to the various activities and processes related to the policies, economic and social forces that affect in-migration in South Africa, especially Gauteng province. It also states that an urban-rural per capita income difference is an almost universal phenomenon, and rural-urban income ratios of ten to one are common in developing countries. This pervasive income differential is based, in turn, on another well-established but less obvious economic fact of life – namely, that urban industrial productivity per worker is nearly always considerably higher than rural activity per worker.

Chapter six correlates the comparison between Asia and South Africa concerning both urban and rural urban concentration. The urban concentration of Asia is calculated as 26 percent with Africa indicating 29 percent with Europe being 71 and North America as high as 74 percent urban population. This is a clear indication that Europe and North America are already urbanised. The pace of in-migration in Asia varies considerably as indicated by East Asia with 71 percent and South Asia ranging from 10 percent in Bangladesh to 28 percent in Pakistan. South Africa's provinces experience the following in-migration of 18 percent in Gauteng, 21 percent in

KwaZulu-Natal. The low level of in-migration in some areas of Asia resulted from high rural growth rates and this could be encouraged in South Africa so as to balance the rural-urban settlements. Despite the slow pace of in-migration for Asia and South Africa as a whole, both countries urban populations have been growing at very high rates, and the proportions of urban populations in the large cities such as Johannesburg has been increasing. These trends are expected to continue because of high fertility rate and inflow of people from neighbouring countries and abroad.

Chapter seven concentrates on the different models and theories impacting on in-migration and how best it could be used to drive the in-migration process. The theories are categorised and analyse the forces determining the nature, scope and direction of in-migration. The increase in the urban population as a whole is ascribed to the result of natural urban growth, a redefinition of geographical boundaries, or rural in-migration. Increased in-migration is the process that follows when these casual factors lead to an increasing percentage of the total percentage of the total population taking up residence in urban areas. It is also important to note that migrant activity is far too complex to be incorporated into a single universal model that can be applied to any historical period. However, a great deal can be learnt from the existing theory that may be relevant to the present situation. A comprehensive understanding of the in-migration process also requires an interdisciplinary approach. Thus, in-migration models should include inputs from fields such as Economics, Sociology, Geography, Psychology and Anthropology to be more holistic and inclusive. It should also be noted that all development policies affect and are affected by in-migration. Reliable statistics and empirical studies are therefore the only way to reconcile the theory and practice of in-migration.

Chapter eight dealt with census 1996 to get a global view about South African population and the impact of foreigners on many facets of our country. The area under investigation, namely Gauteng, will naturally feel the pressure if people from other provinces in South Africa and those from other parts of Africa and elsewhere in-migrate into the overpopulated area. Problems will occur because people will start competing for jobs, land, housing and subsequently crime will escalate. Gauteng province is the most densely

populated area within South Africa with a factor difference of more than ten times that of other provinces. Another scenario experienced from this chapter is that the bulk of the people not born in South Africa come from Southern African Development Community (SADC) with 55.28% and Europe with 22.67%. It has also being proven that the percentage for Gauteng (40,98%) is about four times that of the second and the largest provinces. This scenario confirms the hypothesis stated that Gauteng province will experience several problems of in-migration if not well managed. The unemployment of both African male and female warrants urgent attention, otherwise many problems such as acquisition of housing, paying of basic necessities such as water, electricity, sewage and dirt removals will not be accomplished. Crime rate will escalate and illiteracy will prevail.

Chapter nine concludes this thesis by evaluating, concluding and making different types of recommendations for the present and future research.

## **9.2 CONCLUSIONS**

The under mentioned conclusions are to a large extent based on the findings, analysis and interpretation of data of the research, which is divided into a literature study and data analysis.

### **9.2.1 Conclusions concerning the literature study**

- (i) There should be provision for a stronger base for urban settlement in South Africa especially in Gauteng province.
- (ii) The influx into the urban areas needs some control to avoid congestion, but encouragement of equal distribution of the inflow of people into the urban areas should be emphasised.
- (iii) The statement echoed as stated is correct and needs some attention before chaos and confusion reign. Squatting and informal settlement are really becoming the order of the day, as seen in cities such as Johannesburg, Germiston, and Pretoria which are becoming areas of decay and should be well managed for the success of the country.
- (iv) The machinery of law enforcement and the rules and regulations of the country such as South Africa are of vital importance in moulding the in-

migration process. Special planning, integration and settlement patterns should be encouraged so as to put South Africa on a good economic foundation.

- (v) The fostering of subsistence food production and job creation possibilities is one unconventional proposal for addressing poverty and unemployment in towns and cities and should be encouraged.
- (vi) The roots of the decision to leave an area, mainly because of economic factors such as illiteracy, poverty, unemployment and population pressure should be discouraged.
- (vii) Policies concerning job creation and earning an income should be formulated and encouraged to attract rural settlement so that the population distribution can be balanced and to make it attractive for rural and urban dwellers.
- (viii) The future of Gauteng province, be it political, social or economic, should depend on the manner in which the phenomenon of in-migration is managed, that is, the planning, organising, leading and control of these movements of people should be high on the priority list.
- (ix) Public administration should develop strategies and respond to certain challenges. New priorities, methods and skills should be clearly established. One of the tasks to be performed is to ensure that sufficient land where people can settle, is identified and utilised.
- (x) South Africa, especially Gauteng province will require sound planning and research to get through the current bottlenecks and policy transition on in-migration. A new kind of urban planning and urban policy framework is needed.
- (xi) The Gauteng local government has an important role to play in the planning for in-migration and should be easily accessible for the people to contact them when they experience unresolved problems. These officials should have the potential to be most responsive in terms of community interests.
- (xii) Although it happens fairly often that the poorest segment of the population in cities such as Pretoria commutes over large distances, such a situation is not necessarily desirable, since it can have far reaching implications for the quality of life of poor people.

- (xiii) There should be a planned process to control migrant-labour hostels which are at times heavily overcrowded with relatives and friends living unlawfully with the registered occupants.
- (xiv) For the principles of equity, sustainability and viability to succeed, inter-disciplinary, knowledge-based, cross-cultural, participatory planning and community-building are needed.
- (xv) Since people attach meaning to things they were initially involved in and call them theirs, it is important to commit, involve and respect their input because they will then feel that decisions were made with them, and that ownership and pride must prevail and not be lost to destruction. The only viable approach to urban participatory planning is one which entails a decision-making partnership between planners and the community.
- (xvi) Since a positive in-migration indicates that the urban population is increasing at a faster pace than the total population, this process should be discouraged and proper control of in-migration should be put in place.

### **9.2.2 Recommendations based on this investigation and for further research**

- (i) Recommendations of the in-migration plan of action regarding data collection and analysis continue to be both valid and urgent and thus every effort should be made for their full implementation.
- (ii) Government, assisted by inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, are urged to provide individuals and families with all relevant information regarding in-migration and its implication for scarce resources.
- (iii) The Gauteng government is urged to base policies aimed at influencing population distribution on a comprehensive evaluation of costs and benefits to individuals, families, different socio-economic groups, communities, provinces local structures and the country as a whole.
- (iv) Population distribution goals should be pursued to the extent that they help to achieve broader societal goals, such as raising per capita incomes, increasing efficiency, making the distribution of income more

equitable, protecting the environment and improving the quality of life. In so doing, governments should ensure that the rights of indigenous and other groups are protected and recognised.

- (v) The South African government especially Gauteng province is urged, in formulating population distribution policies, to take into account the policy implications of various forms of population mobility, for example (circular, seasonal, rural-rural, and urban-rural, as well as rural-urban), to consider the direction, duration and characteristics of these movements and the inter relationships between territorial mobility and the levels and characteristics of in-migration.
- (vi) The South African National and provincial governments are urged to review their socio-economic policies in order to minimize any diverse spatial consequences, as well as to improve the integration of population factors in territorial and sectional planning, especially in the sectors concerned with human settlements.
- (vii) The National and provincial governments, especially Gauteng province wishing to minimize undesired in-migration should implement population distribution policies through incentives, rather than migratory controls, which are difficult to enforce and may infringe human rights.
- (viii) The governments which have adopted, or intend to adopt, a comprehensive in-migration policy, should seek to integrate such policies into the overall development planning process, with the aim of achieving, inter alia, a reduction in the current high migration to capital cities and other large urban centres, the medium-sized towns and a reduction of rural-urban and regional inequalities. Developed countries and the international community should extend the necessary assistance to the efforts of developing countries in this direction.
- (ix) The governments either national or provincial especially Gauteng should support programmes of assistance, information and community action in support of internal migrants and should consider establishing networks of labour exchanges that could allow potential migrants to have adequate information about social conditions and about availability of employment in receiving areas.

- (x) Rural development programmes should be primarily directed towards increasing rural production and efficiency, raising rural incomes and improving social conditions and rural welfare, particularly for small agricultural producers and rural women.
- (xi) Gauteng government should improve the accessibility of basic social services and amenities to scattered populations, regularise land ownership, facilitate access to credit, new technology and other needed inputs, and adopt pricing policies geared to the needs of small holders.
- (xii) Appropriate measures must be taken to carry out agrarian reform as one of the important factors which increase agricultural production and promote the development of rural areas,
- (xiii) Gauteng government should adopt effective policies to assist women migrants especially those who are agricultural workers, as well as men, children and the elderly left behind unsupported in rural areas.
- (xiv) Gauteng governments is also urged to pay special attention to the difficulties of adaptation encountered in the urban areas by migrant people of rural origin and take appropriate measures to overcome these difficulties.
- (xv) It remains true that the basis for an effective solution of in-migration problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation and, therefore, in-migration policies must always be considered as a constituent element of socio-economic development policies and never as substitutes for them.
- (xvi) An area of labour migration that continues to be a source of concern is that involving emigration of skilled personnel from developing countries such as South Africa. It must be pointed out, however, that persons with skills have emigrated not only from developing countries to developed countries, but also, and with significant frequency, between developing countries. Moreover the experience of Gauteng province has shown that scarcity of skills, at almost any level, may present problems for the successful implementation of an effective development strategy. Thus, it is recommended that it is necessary to recast the issues related to the emigration of qualified persons in more

general terms and not only focus our attention on the negative effects of in-migration.

- (xvii) It became apparent from this study that most regions of the world, urban populations continue to increase far more rapidly than total populations. On the basis of the point mentioned above, rapid urban population growth has become a matter of a growing policy concern to most governments, particularly in developing regions such as Gauteng in which the urban unemployment level remains extremely high.
- (xviii) This study also revealed that the flows of refugees are increasing in different regions of the world and are also a matter of increasing concern and Gauteng province is no exception.
- (xix) This research also revealed that there is persistence of high rates of internal migration, new forms of mobility, high rates of in-migration, and the concentration of population in large cities in developing countries where these phenomena have negative consequences for development. The need to find solutions to all problems related to in-migration should be high on the agenda.
- (xx) Being aware of the existing links between peace and development, it is of great importance for the Gauteng community to work ceaselessly to promote, among its people, peace, security, co-operation and disarmament, which are indispensable for the achievement of the goals of human population policies and for economic and social developments. Creating the conditions for real peace and security would permit an allocation of resources to social and economic rather than to military programmes, which would greatly help to attain the goals and objectives of the country.

Many of the above conclusions are addressed to the Gauteng government. This is not meant to preclude the efforts or initiatives of international organisations, non-governmental organisation, private sector, or families or individuals where their efforts can make an effective contribution to overall population or developmental goals on the basis of strict respect for sovereignty and regional legislation in force.

### 9.2.3 Conclusions based on analysis of data

- (i) The collection and analysis of population and related statistics are an indispensable basis for a full and accurate understanding of population trends and prospects for formulating population and development plans and programmes and for monitoring effectively the implementation of these plans and programmes.
- (ii) The Gauteng government is urged to monitor population trends and to assess future demographic prospects and their implications on a regular basis. Inasmuch as population projections provide basic tools for economic and social development planning, efforts should be made to prepare statistics relevant for this purpose. Co-ordination and co-operation in this work within and between provinces should be promoted.
- (iii) The area in kilometer square covered by Gauteng Province is (1,4%) and this is a clear indication that overcrowding, crime, unemployment, under resourcing and many other economic and social factors will be affected by this issue. The land is too small to accommodate people from Overseas, Africa, and from other provinces. In-migrants could be encouraged to settle and develop the Northern Cape which occupies the largest (29.7%) square kilometers of land. The investors from abroad could be encouraged to open up factories such as motorcar, diamonds, and several others which will give people jobs, and allow growth of the population in this area.
- (iv) The population distribution is experienced as unequal and uneven. The population distribution of South African provinces indicates that Gauteng with the area of land (1.4%) has the second highest population distribution of 18.1% with KwaZulu-Natal (20.7%) being the highest. Northern Cape with (29.7%) kilometer square of land accommodating at least (2.1%). This scenario emphasises that the latter province needs much attention to encourage people to settle and even invest in this area so that the pressures and discomfort experienced by Gauteng Province could be resolved.
- (v) Urban and non-urban population taking Gauteng as an example shows great disparities of 97% urban dwellers which indicates that

these urban areas are overpopulated and may experience divergence of problems such as unemployment, crime, rivalry for resources and a decline in facilities such as health, education, housing and others .

- (vi) As indicated in a diagram more than three-quarters (77%) of the population of South Africa are African. This poses a major problem since the majority of this high percentage of people are illiterate and are a threat for the economic development of the country. They are mostly found in need of professional, semi-professional, technical occupations, engineers and related technologies. The country is also recruiting medical practitioners, experts of education and related occupations, accountants, artisans, management personnel, executive and administrative personnel from countries such as Cuba, Australia and other African countries.
- (vii) The Gauteng government is strongly urged to integrate African people fully into all phases of the development process, including planning, policy and decision-making. The government should more aggressively pursue action programmes aimed at improving and protecting the legal rights and status of its people especially of Africans. This can be done through efforts to identify and to remove institutional and cultural barriers to Africans' education, training, employment and access to health care. In addition, the South African government should provide remedial measures, including mass education programmes, to assist Africans in attaining equality with other population groups in the social, political and economic areas of the country.

The promotion of community support and the collaboration (at the request of the government) of non-governmental organisations, particularly of African people, in expediting these efforts should be given paramount attention. The government should promote and encourage, through information, education, communication and also through employment legislation and institutional support, where appropriate, the active involvement of Africans in all areas of responsibility, including the culture of time, respect for authority, workethics,

and dedication, so that this development can be fully shared by those responsible for growth.

- (viii) The percentage of the people coming from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) settling permanently in Gauteng causes call for alarm because 40% of them has settled there, and the remaining percentage is shared by the remaining eight provinces. The same scenario of people from Europe is experienced by Gauteng with a total intake of 46% which is the highest as compared to other provinces.
- (ix) The citizenship gained by (SADC) countries who settled in Gauteng province is 41.97% with the Free State being second best with 19.20% and the rest of the seven provinces sharing the spoils. A very good 45.12% of the European people have acquired citizenship in Gauteng with the difference being shared by the remaining eight provinces. There are also other people from other countries gaining citizenship in South Africa but the majority of these people settle in Gauteng, that is people from Asia, North America, Central and South America, Australia and New Zealand.
- (x) National non-governmental organisations should be invited to continue, in accordance with the policies and laws, their pioneering work in opening up new paths and to respond quickly and flexibly to request from Government, intergovernmental, and international non-governmental organisations, as appropriate, for the further implementation of the in-migration plan of action. The Gauteng government should be urged, as appropriate, within the framework of national objectives, to encourage the innovative activities of officials dealing with the in-migration process, the government should draw upon officials' their expertise, experience and resources in implementing national programmes for in-migration.
- (xi) Members of legislature, the scientific community, the mass media, and others in influential positions should be invited, in their respective areas of competence, to create an awareness of in-migration issues and to support appropriate ways of dealing with these issues.

### **9.3 OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS**

It is important to realise that there are some loopholes regarding in-migration in South Africa and in Gauteng in particular which need to be addressed. Officials dealing with the movement of people into urban areas such as Gauteng need to know how to deal with this inflow problem which impacts negatively on several resources of the area under investigation. It is recommended that further research be undertaken with the aim of improving in-migration in general. This could also help to arouse the interest of those affected by the process of in-migration. This process should also be extended to rural areas and other provinces where there are problems regarding uncontrolled in-migration and its impact on the socio-economic factors and other related issues which are of importance to the people living in those areas.

Policy makers, parliamentarians, and other persons in public life should be encouraged to continue to promote and support actions to achieve an effective and integrated approach to the solution of in-migration problems by arousing public awareness and working towards the implementation of national in-migration policies and programmes. The National Government and the other organisations with vested interest in this field should be invited to continue providing support for such actions and should be urged to examine and support the recommendations for further implementation of this plan of action and to include population issues in their major priorities.

### **9.4 SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM AND ATTAINMENT OF GOALS**

With reference to the statement of the problem and the stated hypothesis the researcher holds the opinion that the above mentioned objectives have been satisfactorily reached.

### **9.5 CONCLUSION**

In many ways the problem of in-migration in South Africa and especially in Gauteng is similar to that of the rest of the developing countries of the world. It also emerged from the literature study of this research that the people

dealing with the general understanding of in-migration are almost entirely limited towards understanding the proper administration of migratory processes. The government departments directly involved with the management and administration of in-migration must operate effectively and efficiently. As professional leaders, the officials dealing with in-migration should have a proper, working, system of control within their working environment which assists them in making important correct decisions when dealing with recording, safe keeping and evaluating who comes into the country for what reason and how long that migrant stays in the country.

The South African government should respect the basic human rights and fundamental freedom of individuals as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and other pertinent international instruments. In keeping with these documents, receiving countries should adopt measures to safeguard the basic human rights of all migrants in their territory and to ensure the respect of their cultural identity. Measures should also be taken to promote the mutual adaptation of both immigrant groups and the population of the receiving country.

In planning for economic and social development the government of the provinces of South Africa should give appropriate consideration to shifts in family and household structures and their implications for requirements in different policy fields.

## **9.6 ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

In-migration is now generally recognised as one of the most significant socio-economic phenomena of the twentieth century. In the past decade or two it has assumed even greater prominence, not only as an intrinsic dimension of the development process itself, but also as an area of policy and research concern. As in the case of other major socio-economic changes of this century, however, the lag between the emergence of in-migration issues on the one hand, and the research necessary to address them and policy implementation on the other, remains wide. In addition, the co-ordination of

policy and research leaves much to be desired. This is one of the principal conclusions to emerge from the Conference on Population growth, Immigration, and Urban Policies in the Asian-Pacific Region.

While the chapters of this thesis may provide a flavour of the state of our knowledge and shed some light on knotty policy issues, they also raise important research questions. The issues dealt with in the different chapters are laid out as items for future research, with a view to policy improvement. It is also realised that several of these issues are not altogether new,- still, they remain critical and far from resolved.

In regard to the future of in-migration, there is a need to improve projection methods by expanding the factors that should be considered. These improved methods should be able to take into account market forces, institutional factors, and policy interventions. For instance, we should be able to project population under different in-migration scenarios, with and without various types of policy interventions.

Most importantly, we need to be able to project with some degree of accuracy the growth of particular urban places or cities. For purposes of urban policy it is the growth of particular places that matters, not of the urban sector as a whole. Aggregative projection methods are now available to some extent but methods for projecting the growth of individual cities to determine, for example, the needs for infrastructure and social services are still rudimentary at best. It has been claimed that projections are partly self-fulfilling prophesies; that is, if rapid growth is projected for a city and public services are provided in anticipation of that growth, the city may become more attractive for migrants. In the cities of Pacific Asia, however, such services tend to lag far behind demand.

Another research issue on which renewed efforts would be worthwhile is the relationship between structural economic transformation and spatial change. Conventional wisdom has it that structural economic change inevitably results in the spatial movement of labour, particularly from rural areas to urban

centers. But recent studies in several East and South East Asian countries suggest that this need not be so. Labour released from the farm, rather than moving to cities, can be engaged instead in non-farm economic activities in the rural areas or in small towns near agricultural lands. When rural-to-urban migration occurs, it is important to find out the extent to which such moves are permanent, temporary, or circular. Also requiring study is the seasonal reverse movement of labour from towns to farms during peak months of agricultural work. These are strategic questions because they bear directly on the issues of decentralisation and the design of appropriate spatial policy.

Before planners even consider adopting explicit dispersal or decentralisation strategies, they should have a good grasp of the special impacts of existing implicit policies and industrialisation factors. As researchers, we need to be able to demonstrate to planners at least the direction of these impacts. How useful and cost-effective might computable general equilibrium models be for this purpose? Would a partial quantitative analysis or careful analytical description suffice in case the rigorous requirements for a computable general equilibrium model cannot be met?

Assuming that we can reach some understanding of the role of implicit policies and institutional factors, the next question is, what decentralisation policies will be effective and not conflict with macro- and sectoral objectives? Also, what is the proper timing for intervention? Likewise, we need to know the scale economy requirements for various types of infrastructure and services to achieve viability in secondary cities. For these questions, we need to study closely economic and political structures that exhibit some success in decentralisation. Specific dispersal policies could also be examined in a comparative context, both intra-country and cross-national.

It has become increasingly evident that policies and programmes designed for the rural sector have urban effects as well. It is therefore essential to understand the effects of rural development policy interventions. For instance, does farm mechanisation induce out-migration whereas irrigation projects lead to retention of farm populations? What scales and types of

mechanisation and irrigation bring about these results? What are the effects of feeder roads? What is the role of agricultural growth in fostering rural off-farm employment under different land tenure, social, and political structures? What types and sizes of industries can be successfully decentralized to smaller towns and rural areas?

An important role of government is to try to internalise externalities, that is, to reduce the divergence between net private costs and net social costs. This entails empirical knowledge, still lacking, about the effects of in-migration of people outside the migration decision-making unit. Are pecuniary externalities such as redistributive of in-migration or rural-to-urban migration larger in countries where there is more public ownership of resources and services such as socialist economies? What, in general, are the efficiency and equity in terms of in-migration, that is, what difference does high versus low urban primacy or concentrated versus dispersed in-migration really make for economic efficiency and equity?

These questions raise the larger issue of the consequences of in-migration for individuals and larger social aggregates. How does in-migration differentially affect those living in different sizes and types of settlement? What are the comparative costs and benefits, not just economic but including the social-life effects of permanent versus temporary migration, in rural versus urban areas? For most of these questions, specialised longitudinal surveys and case studies, and approaches other than those of economists, may be required.

A key policy question about the welfare effects of in-migration has to do with user fees. If these can be effectively enforced so that the migrant pays the full cost of the services to which he gains access by migration, then the externalities from in-migration can be eliminated and there will probably be less in-migration. However, little is known about what is politically feasible and economically desirable insofar as user fees are concerned. It would be especially desirable to sort out the issue of user fees because of its distributional and efficiency implications.

In this connection, it is also necessary to examine the general issue of whether efficiency really does lead to equity and under what conditions, and whether policy should therefore simply focus on the efficiency concern. Because of the divergence of private and social benefits and costs, market forces need to be modified by policy. These issues are central to the debates about the need for and scope of policy.

Although our understanding of the intricate relationships governing immigration and labour markets, and of informal and formal sectors, have been improving in an academic sense, it still remains rudimentary in relation to the needs of policy. Many earlier studies on this subject suggest, for example that the informal sector represents a mere transitional phase for migrants, but more recent studies show that informal – sector activities can also be dynamic and provide stable employment. If governments are sincerely concerned about equal opportunity issues, we also need to know more about gender preference in employment and sexual stereotyping of occupations.

The increasingly critical area of urban management would benefit from further study of policy institutions and processes. To come to grips with a host of urban management issues, we need to examine political and administrative systems that seem to be working effectively in providing various public and social services and learn how they differ from those that are ineffective. We would also be able to help identify the types of social infrastructure that are best suited to a particular urban political structure. It would be useful to carry out an evaluation of housing and transport policies, pricing policies, and cost-recovery schemes (user fees) in the context of the efficiency and equity considerations discussed earlier. Here, too, we need to find out what really happens at the grassroots level when various policies are implemented.

National immigration policy, to be effective, requires both spatial and intertemporal co-ordination of economic and social activities by an appropriate government ministry. For this, anticipatory or proactive rather than reactive strategies are called for, and this requires forward-looking research. We should at least be able to help clarify the terms of the trade off between

interspatial and intertemporal choices that have to be made by government. Government needs sound formulas for resource allocation among those choices. For instance, should government spend more on areas where public services are most efficient, or on places where they are most needed, to raise everyone to the same level? Is this a matter of ethics, an area for political compromise, or an area where social scientists can provide clarification, if not guided?

There are several critical and sensitive issues having to do with the political process in policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation, about which anecdotal impressions abound but little hard documentation and analysis are available. We need to understand inter-ministerial and inter-departmental as well as central-local relations and interactions (or the lack thereof). A useful mechanism for such needed understanding would be increased by interplay between social scientists and policy actors. Social scientists may need to heighten their relations with the government, and vice versa, to achieve progress in this area.

Finally, to close on a theme introduced in the foreword, an improved understanding of in-migration processes and better urban policies will require a more comprehensive effort by wider array of social scientists than are currently engaged in Urban policy research. It is all too apparent that advances in urban theory and policy require an increase in the contributions of other social scientists and, on the part of all, the development of more holistic and truly interdisciplinary frameworks than have yet been achieved.

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