

CHAPTER ONE

SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

1. INTRODUCTION

States continuously pursue strategies and implement policies aimed purportedly at ensuring the general welfare and well-being of their citizenry. With the increase in world production and consumption of goods, services and information, it has increasingly become impossible to satisfy individual needs and lifestyles. To ameliorate this condition, states have had to co-operate along a whole range of issues and areas of mutual interest for the benefit of their citizens. Most of the current collaborative mechanisms can be traced back to the formation of the United Nations (UN) at the end of the Second World War (WW II). The UN became a mother body responsible *inter alia* for establishing institutions such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and to introduce rules and customs which collectively would constitute international law. The UN-governed intergovernmental relations did not replace bilateral arrangements initiated by individual member states. Instead, the UN's rules-based co-operation regimes made the international system fairly stable and predictable, and contributed towards the codification of modern-day international law.

It is crucial for states to develop, through collaborative structures, conditions that would enable citizens to pursue their livelihoods without fear or threat to their lives, limbs and property. The generic term for this ideal societal condition is 'security'. Evidence abounds in the historical evolution or creation of states which confirms that the original *raison d'être* for the existence of states was the provision of security. This *raison d'être* defined the relationship between governments and the populations. This relationship is encapsulated in the phrase 'state idea' which describes "a set of distinctive purposes to which the bulk of a population subscribe, a complex of shared traditions, experiences and objectives."¹ It is this quest for the 'state idea' which is predominated by the constant pursuit for security that provides the impetus for states, through governments, to conduct domestic politics and international relations in a manner that seeks to satisfy security.

This chapter briefly looks into the various forms of international co-operation and comprehensively discusses the dimensions of security both in its traditional and modern senses. The evolution of security as an object for policy-makers and strategists is discussed within the contexts of its applicability at national, international and global levels. Security is ultimately viewed from the state-centric perspective, where states remain the dominant role-players in the international system, although the broader meaning of security is taken into account. The chapter concludes with a model – the ‘Security Pyramid’ – which seeks to explain the gradual progression of states through different levels as security priorities of states change. It also locates the nature of South Africa’s relations with the Mercosul/Mercosur² (Southern Cone Common Market) countries – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile as associate members – on the pyramid with a view to explaining the justifications and compelling reasons for cementing trans-Atlantic relations in the Southern Cone with security as a central issue.

2. INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The imperatives or incentives for states to co-operate are diverse and numerous. In addition to that, it is such incentives or motives which dictate the nature and form such co-operation has to adopt and, most importantly, the level of commitment among the party states.

2.1 IMPERATIVES AND MOTIVATIONS FOR CO-OPERATION

The evolution of the nation-state, especially during the latter half of the nineteenth century, imposed new and daunting challenges for the international system. One of the regular means of communication and interaction between and among such states was largely through war or threats of war. Violent inter-state conflicts were (and still are) a direct result of competition for possession of, or access to, natural resources and raw materials. These commodities enable states to sustain their military forces which, in turn, enable them to project power beyond national borders. It is this nexus between resources and the quest for power to which not only many violent international conflicts could be attributed, but also the widening gap between the global rich and global poor (also known as the Global North and the Global South respectively). As realists argue, "military power is a function of economic prowess".³ Although in the pre-WW II era the converse was true, as strong military states with expansionist proclivities managed to secure access to resources and raw materials, this is

arguably not true in the post-Cold War era. This could be attributed to the fact that democratic states, as a general rule, settle their disputes amicably. However, democratic states also happen to wield massive military resources that could be used in cases where their strategic interests are threatened. The 1990-1991 Gulf crisis bears contemporary testimony to this truism.⁴

Given the declining base of natural resources, general human needs (physiological, social, political and other spheres) exert great pressure on people to devise innovative means to satisfy them. Irreplaceable natural resources such as water and geophysical space aggravate pressure for innovation. To this end, no country could possibly produce all products sufficiently for its population without relying on other states. The notion of autarky or economic self-sufficiency, which dominated the pre-Industrial Age international system and therefore provided impetus to expansionism, lost favour and relevance during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The perceived justification or rationale for autarkic approaches was that military campaigns could be conducted with little or no fear of disruption of the country's commercial activities through military blockades and air raids. Autarkic countries, like Nazi Germany, would stockpile essential supplies and develop local substitutes for import commodities.⁵

Instead of the economic self-sufficiency approach, states opened their markets through the notion of comparative advantage. Comparative advantage refers to "the principle that any two states will benefit if each specialises in those goods it produces comparatively cheaply and acquires, through trade, goods that it can only produce at a higher cost."⁶ While this approach resulted in states concentrating and focusing mainly on those economic activities that were profitable, it also enabled them to reduce production costs and release financial resources for other social imperatives. Consequently, the international culture of global inter-dependence was engendered, thus making each country reliant on raw materials whose origins could be traced to any corner of the globe. Ever-increasing mass production, mass consumption demands and mass communication networks further facilitated, but also complicated, this process. For instance, the need for more consumables necessitated increased production which, in turn, meant increased use of energy, thus resulting in excessive emissions of hazardous gases into the atmosphere.

Another area of collaboration is security. The conduct of war is an extremely expensive and disruptive enterprise, and therefore if it can be avoided by creating common rules of dealing with conflicts or disputes, such an option should be followed. To this end, numerous international agreements have been spawned. In addition to diplomatic channels through which threats of war can be dealt with, there are also procedures for beginning and ending wars; treatment of prisoners of war (POWs); prohibitions of certain kinds of weapons in war such as chemical and biological weapons, and so forth. Most co-operation in the security field is attained through the formation of security communities. The concept of 'security community' was coined by Karl Deutsch in the late 1950s. He identified two types of security communities, namely pluralistic and amalgamated, where the latter would be characterised by the creation of institutions within the framework of a political community, and the former would be based on the compatibility of values, responsiveness to each other's needs and predictability of policy goals by political elites.⁷

Thus the motivations and imperatives for co-operation stem from pragmatic necessities induced by the eternal desire to survive. Common rules and regulations transcending national borders were therefore devised with a view to mitigating potential for disruption by either accident or design.⁸ However, as already indicated, the nature and form of co-operation between and among states are determined largely by the extent to which each state hopes to benefit from such co-operation.

2.2 FORMS OF CO-OPERATION

Co-operation among states could be conducted either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, but the former is more common. The strength of bilateralism lies in it being tailor-made to suit the unique circumstances and requirements of the parties involved. However, its glaring weaknesses include the fact that it fuels accusations of conspiracy among neighbours and has the potential of causing regional fragmentation, as one state's ally could be the other's foe. Furthermore, it reverts the international system back into the self-help approach which dominated the pre-First World War (WW I) era. Multilateralism recognises the interdependence and interconnectedness of regional and, in most cases, global needs. Multilateralism denounces isolationism and promotes constructive internationalism among states, thus compelling such states to consider the interests of other states before designing and implementing national policies. Co-operation among states could be in the political,

economic, environmental, security or in any other sphere of human endeavour. The compatibility of political systems facilitates co-operation in other fields. The post-Cold War era saw the emergence of economic co-operation taking the centre stage and becoming the international currency which compelled states to co-operate, especially in the security arena. The common feature of international co-operation is that it normally takes one or a combination of the following forms, namely *setting standards, obligations, allocations and prohibitions*.⁹

2.2.1 Setting standards

The concern about standards stems from a host of factors, including unequal levels of development, technological advancement, maturity of political and economic systems and, most importantly, the anarchical nature of the international system. The realist notions of self-interest and the quest for superior relative power *vis-à-vis* other states are as valid in the twenty-first century as they were during the previous one. Devising international standards remains an international responsibility, but the implementation and supervision rests largely with individual countries. This self-monitoring of individual states is made possible by all types of sanctions and punitive measures that are put in place for those who flout the rules. Such measures could include blacklisting involved role-players; withdrawing international funding; and the possibility of losing market share in the global economy. Services and products susceptible to such strict international controls include aviation services, medicines and drugs, goods, nuclear facilities and so forth.¹⁰

2.2.2 Obligations

States have obligations and responsibilities towards one another. Such obligations could be due to the geographic location of facilities owned by countries or where specific capabilities reside with some countries. For instance, it is not all the littoral states that have the capacity to conduct search-and-rescue operations in their territorial waters. Thus, it is not uncommon for neighbouring states to be obligated in terms of an international convention to assume responsibilities stretching beyond national borders. Since this arrangement is determined and agreed to within a multilateral framework — such as the UN — the obligated state cannot be accused of violating the territorial integrity of its neighbour. The United Nations Convention

on the Law of Seas (UNCLAS), for instance, also stipulates that states should not conduct activities detrimental to their neighbours.

2.2.3 Allocations

The Westphalian notion that states are sovereign and equal lies at the root of this specific form of international co-operation. The equality of states presupposes that states should share equitably the resources that are deemed to belong to all humanity. Whether or not a state is capable of optimally utilising the resource is immaterial. For instance, most littoral states in the developing world have Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) which stretch far beyond their elementary naval capacity either to protect, defend or monitor them. Some states are said to have massive oil reserves in their continental shelves, but they do not have the technology, expertise and financial resources to benefit from this. This does not necessarily mean that they should lose ownership of such untapped resources.

2.2.4 Prohibitions

As much as states agree to ensure that certain things are done (obligations), they also have to ensure that certain things are not done (prohibitions). Prohibitions are a variation of standard-setting in the sense that they force states to refrain from actions which might be nefarious to other states. Most of the agreements that cover obligations also include prohibitions. This is particularly important to prevent party states from, for instance, entering into agreements which negate others — thus causing instability in the understanding and interpretation of international law. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, for instance, specifically prohibits nuclear states from transferring nuclear technology and know-how to non-nuclear states.¹¹ Similarly, the Antarctic Treaty (1 December 1959) prohibits military activity in Antarctica.¹²

As will be demonstrated below, co-operation in the security arena incorporates virtually all these forms of collaborative interaction among states. The preceding discussion on forms of co-operation partially disguises the very important ways in which effective state co-operation is hampered. These become conspicuous when co-operation in the realm of security is scrutinised. In this regard, Snyder¹³ identifies three schools of thought, namely the *realists*,

neoliberal institutionalists and *constructivists*. Realists posit that states are power or security maximisers that are not keen to co-operate, despite sharing common interests, because of the anarchical nature of the international system. According to institutionalists, the realists' dilemma is resolved by the creation of institutions that shape the interests and practices of states through, for instance, standard setting, obligations or prohibitions. Thus, institutionalists advocate an international system based on reciprocity and symbiotic interaction. Unlike realists and institutionalists, constructivists argue that international politics are "socially constructed." Therefore, the international system is less about the distribution of material resources and/or capabilities and more about establishing and cementing social relationships. By understanding the social patterns of enmity and/or amity between and among states, the chances for co-operation, even on security issues, are increased significantly.

3. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF SECURITY

Since the beginning of the process of modern state formation in the nineteenth century, the quest for security has been a rallying point for populations living in independent and subordinate territories. Threats to security ranged from the denial of political and economic rights by colonial powers or governments serving sectarian interests at the expense of other citizens to the possibility of aggression by another power. All the efforts aimed at preventing or eliminating these conditions were generically referred to as 'security'. But this concept remains elusive as it expands and contracts with time, place and circumstance.

3.1 SECURITY: A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Despite the fact that for centuries 'security', as a concept, has been part of the military-political vocabulary among policy-makers and scholars of politics alike, consensus still does not exist as to what it really means. Thus, questions can be asked, such as: What is security? Who are the main objects / beneficiaries of security? To what extent can the security of the government or state be equated to that of the individual?

These questions do not only pose a challenge to the policy-makers (who have to provide resources to ensure 'security') and policy-implementers (who have to implement government policy in the name of vaguely defined objectives associated with 'security'), but also for

scholars of security (who have to interpret or ‘unpack’ the concept of security). Realising that there are numerous definitions of security, most of which differ slightly in terms of emphasis, Buzan concluded that “the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed generic definition.”¹⁴ It was this evasion by Buzan that drew criticism from scholars, such as Baldwin,¹⁵ who believe that conceptual analysis of security is an essential intellectual exercise required for both scholarly research and policy-formulation. Baldwin cites Oppenheim, who argues that “the elucidation of the language of political science is by no means an idle exercise in semantics, but in many instances a most effective way to solve substantive problems of research.”¹⁶

Concurring with Baldwin, Rothschild¹⁷ provides four compelling justifications for a definitional analysis of security. According to Rothschild, the principles or definitions of security provide, firstly, some guidance for the policies made by governments. While theorists (academics) might devise theories of security, they have to be understood and/or implemented by officials. Secondly, definitions of security are essential in guiding public opinion on security-related issues. Thirdly, a clear understanding of security, as a concept, is also important in order to effectively implement government policies that pertain to security. For instance, the international community was only able to criticise the nuclear weapons policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) when it understood security-related concepts such as deterrence strategies and confidence-building measures. Lastly, the definition of security will in the final analysis impact on the distribution of money and power.¹⁸ Aware of these convincing arguments for a conceptual elucidation of security, Mangold¹⁹ warns that the law of diminishing returns is as applicable to the search for definitions as it is for actual security. Mangold further observes that “a balance has to be struck between the siren call of intellectual precision and the untidy reality of a heterogeneous and rapidly changing world in which states differ substantially in what they are trying to secure.”²⁰ Put differently, Mangold cautions against the excessive insistence on finding an absolute definition as it could end up being counter-productive. However, a selection of attempts by other scholars to define security could be provided, including the following:

- *Ian Bellany* defines security as “a relative freedom from war coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur”²¹;

- *Laurence Martin* defines security as “the assurance of future well-being”²²;
- *John E. Mroz* defines security as “the relative freedom from harmful threats”²³;
- *Ole Wæver* is of the opinion that “one can view ‘security’ as that which is in language theory called a speech act: ... it is the utterance itself that is the act ... By saying ‘security’ a state representative moves the particular case into a specific area; claiming a special right to use the means necessary to block this development.”²⁴
- For *Arnold Wolfers*, “security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.”²⁵

A group of experts on non-military aspects of security, meeting in Tashkent, Russia, in May 1990, adopted the following operational definition of security:

Security is a condition in which states consider that there is no danger of military attack, political pressure or economic coercion, so that they are able to pursue freely their own development and progress. The security of individuals and communities of which states are constituted is ensured by the guarantee and effective exercise of individual freedom, political, social and economic rights, as well as by the preservation or restoration of a liveable environment for present and future generations. Security also implies that essential human needs, notably in the field of nutrition, education, housing and public health, are ensured on a permanent basis. An adequate protection against dangers to security should also be maintained. The ways and means to attain security may be defined in national, intergovernmental, non-governmental or global terms.²⁶

Unlike the first three definitions (as provided by Bellany, Martin and Mroz), Wæver’s and Wolfers’s definitions emphasise the centrality of values in the security discourse. However, all of these definitions recognise both the subjective and perceptual nature of security. The use of terms such as ‘well-being’, ‘threats’ and ‘values’ in defining security contributes towards its conceptual ambiguity and elasticity in meaning – thus making security a

permanently contested concept. In a nutshell, the condition of security presupposes the existence of a world free from physical, psychological and psycho-sociological dangers or threats and uncertainty.²⁷

This raises serious doubts as to whether or not the quest for security is not a futile exercise bordering on extreme idealism or utopianism because, as a general rule, no state or group of people experiences perfect security or absolute insecurity.²⁸ This is as true at individual level (individual security) as it is, if not more, at national and international levels (national security and international security). States are not perfectly secure or completely insecure, but rather experience either condition in degrees.²⁹ Even during the peace negotiations at Versailles at the end of WW I, many critics identified security as a relative concept and concluded that even bilateral and multilateral military agreements satisfied the security requirements only to a small degree. They argued that states are permanently in a state of mutual suspicion.³⁰ In the post-WW II era, mutual suspicion among states and/or groups of states was perfected into an art of sorts along an ideological divide which was premised on the ability of one state or group of states to predict and anticipate the actions of its ideological enemy. Despite the demise of the Cold War, this scenario of ‘benign’ suspicion continues unabated as the revolution in the security understanding continues to unfold.

3.2 CHANGING NATURE AND FOCUS OF SECURITY

The traditional conception of security emphasised the primacy of military threats and prescribed strong action – primarily military – as a response to such threats. This approach has gradually lost favour and support. For the greater part of the Cold War era, inter-state wars were rare, especially in those regions in which both superpowers were actively involved. This restraint in resorting to war stemmed from fear of possible escalation to nuclear exchange involving the superpowers. Thus, indirect and, mostly, non-military strategies were used. For instance, the United States (US) made extensive use of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its ‘containment strategy’, not only to gather information on the crucial elements of the Soviet Union’s economy, but also on how to sow political dissent inside that country. Realising that there was no immediate threat to its territorial inviolability, the US also concentrated on developing infrastructure such as new highways that could be used for rapidly transporting armaments throughout the whole country in the event of war.³¹ Similarly, the former Soviet Union launched massive misinformation campaigns and provided

support – financial and/or military – to socialist governments or to insurgent groups, which sought to overthrow governments aligned with the West. These include Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia. Some observers have even suggested that in most cases both the Soviet Union's as well as the US's involvement in such countries was not so much about security but ideology – that is, the East-West conflict was based on a dichotomy of capitalism and socialism.³² They viewed security through ideological lenses. However, the quest for security became even more complex when the concept of national security was coined.

The following sections use Hartendorn's classification of 'national security', 'international security' and 'global security'. Hartendorn³³ concedes, like many other analysts, that the evolution of the security paradigm from national security to international security and then to global security, demonstrates the changes that the international system has undergone over centuries. Specific values, threats and capabilities apply to each cluster of security type. The complexity of security challenges also indicates the evolution of political systems from those based on insular nation-states, through regionally-based inter-governmental interaction, to a highly interdependent global community of peoples.³⁴

4. NATIONAL SECURITY

Flowing from the preceding discussion on 'security', another concept which formed part of the political lexicon is 'national security'. Both concepts are sometimes, and in most cases, used interchangeably as if they are synonyms. National security, as a derivative of 'security' creates the impression of being much narrower in focus and much more circumscribed in applicability than 'security'. It also creates the impression that it is largely inward-looking in orientation and defensive in posture where the interests and welfare of the citizens are its primary objectives. Based on that premise, national security strategies would then be designed to achieve such objectives, and this would be reflected in the nature, character and elements of such strategies. However, this does not seem to be as neatly circumscribed as it is perceived to be. For instance, in a document issued by the US White House in May 1997, it is stated that the ultimate goal of the US's national security strategy is to ensure the protection of the country's fundamental and enduring needs, which includes protecting the lives and safety of people; maintaining the sovereignty of the country, with its values, institutions and territory intact; and also providing for the prosperity of the nation and its people.³⁵ But it further states that it would seek to create conditions "in the world where [the US's] interests

are rarely threatened, and when they are, we have effective means of addressing those threats.”³⁶ This contradicts the perceived inward-looking nature of national security and indicates a commitment to counter threats to national security irrespective of the geographic origin of such threats.

4.1 NATIONAL SECURITY: A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

There seems to be general agreement that the concept of security, particularly national security, is elastic and constantly adopting newer meanings. Since national security has apparently not reached a state of conceptual maturity where there is common understanding of what constitutes it and what does not, it is prudent to look at *classical* and *modern views* of national security.

4.1.1 Classic view of national security

A central question, which recurs in the security debate, is: Who is, or should be, the legitimate beneficiary of security to which national governments are always referring? Is it the individual, which is “an irreducible basic unit to which the concept of security is applied”³⁷, or the state which, in the Hobbesian view, has the primary responsibility to ensure security?³⁸ This paradox is further compounded by both the vagueness of the concept of national security and its relationship with individual security. Flowing from that, it could also be argued as to *how 'national' is national security?* For instance, at the height of colonial rule in Africa generally and Southern Africa, in particular, the colonialists constantly referred to national security that was misperceived as including the territory and all its inhabitants. But on the contrary, such national security concerned the personal security and freedoms of the European colonialists at the expense of the Africans and it was used as a pretext to suppress the individual security and freedoms of those African inhabitants.³⁹

Even though the use of the phrase ‘national security’ was first recorded in the early 1790s when Yale University undergraduates debated the question, “Does the National Security depend on fostering Domestic Industries”, the modern etymology of national security as a concept can be traced back to the post-WW I era, and by 1945 it was already widely used in political discourse. However, at that stage no attempt was made to clarify it – probably because then there was no need for such an exercise.⁴⁰

Numerous definitions of ‘national security’ have been provided and each one emphasises different aspects. The following definitions have enjoyed support:

- *Penelope Hartland-Thunberg*: "national security is the ability of a nation to pursue successfully its national interests, as it sees them, any place in the world"⁴¹;
- *Walter Lippmann*: "a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by a victory in such a war"⁴²;
- *William E. Barber* defines 'national security policy' as "that part of government policy that has the objective of creating national and international political conditions that are favourable for the protection or extension of vital national values, against existing or potential adversaries."⁴³
- *Amos Jordan and William Taylor*, (as cited by Romm): "national security, however, has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of the state"⁴⁴;
- *Charles Maier*, (as cited by Romm): "national security ... is best defined as the capacity to control those domestic and foreign conditions that the public opinion of a given community believes necessary to enjoy its own self-determination or autonomy, prosperity, and well-being."⁴⁵

Brown's definition of national security seems to encompass most, if not all, the elements of national security as contained in the above definitions. He defines national security as "the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."⁴⁶

The essence of these definitions lies in the *ability* of the government to follow a specific course of action to ensure national security by pursuing *national interests*, or protecting *core (vital) values* or defending the *physical existence of the state* and is largely directed at predominantly external (and often specific military) threats. The visible limitation of these definitions lies not only in their failure to recognise the multi-faceted nature of security, especially national security, but their over-emphasis on ‘action’ or the ‘ability to act’. These latter two aspects seem to ignore the perceptual nature of security. Even if such aspects were to be understood in Wæver’s conception of security as a ‘speech act’, they would still be misleading. While Brown’s definition already showed insights into the more modern view of national security by expanding it to include economic issues, it is still embedded in the classical mode of thinking which viewed national borders as impermeable and absolute.

4.1.2 Modern view of national security

The new conception of national security recognises the significance of territorial borders but it is not oblivious to extra-territorial factors beyond control of the nation state. National security is increasingly becoming dependent on the real or perceived security of neighbouring states. While recognising the significance of military prowess, the modern view no longer recognises it as an absolute guarantor of national security. National security is viewed as multi-dimensional in nature and therefore as requiring a multi-dimensional approach. These dimensions include socio-economic development, political stability, democratic and corruption-free governance, and non-offensive military postures. Increasingly the pyramid of priorities or instruments of national security is topped more by socio-economic development than military prowess.

As already indicated, the classic notion of national security emphasises the ‘ability to act’. This approach presupposes the existence of two preconditions: political will and abundant resources. Political will is a precondition for any action that the incumbent government may take in the name of defending national security. A common understanding between the political structures and the public as to what constitutes a ‘threat’ to national security is imperative to reinforce the political will. However, the main test is the availability of resources to carry out appropriate actions in defence of national security. In other words, poor states would be less capable of dealing with an action-driven national security approach,

as resources will, in all probability, be devoted to other spheres of human survival. The view, which sees national security as a ‘state of being’ as opposed to an ‘ability to act’, does not run the risk of diverting the much needed resources to projects aimed at improving national security as though the latter were an end in itself and a state of total security an achievable ideal. In fact, Garnett⁴⁷ observed that “[n]ational security is a complex term capable of both wide and narrow definition, but whatever its meaning, no state can ever achieve absolute security. Relative security is the best that a state can hope for and for all states this is a major policy goal.”

Recognising the failure of scholars to concur on the essential elements that constitute national security, Al-Mashat⁴⁸ identifies two categories of definitions that could be regarded as forming the basis of modern thinking on national security. These are: ‘strategic definition’ and the ‘economic non-strategic definition’. The first category concentrates on abstract issues such as values and preservation of independence and sovereignty of the state. The second category emphasises the importance of maintaining an open and smooth flow of vital economic resources and the non-military aspects of state functions. The value approach has as numerous flaws for analytical purposes as does the economic non-military approach. The value approach suffers from the complex nature of values. There is no universal understanding of what constitutes ‘core’ or ‘vital’ values, and this has numerous political and practical implications within the nation state. Individuals, states and other social actors have diverse values. The list of values could include public safety, economic welfare, autonomy and psychological well-being.⁴⁹

Widening the concept of national security, as suggested by the second approach also poses many challenges for the state concerned. This stems particularly from the view that the moment an issue acquires a national security status, it affects the order of national priorities as they exist and also the allocation of resources – thus making it susceptible to abuse by the political elites.⁵⁰ The lack of definition of national security provides a scope for power-maximising strategies by political and military elites.⁵¹ From a political practitioner's point of view, national security then becomes a concept of political convenience.⁵²

However, Mangold⁵³ provides two broad categories of interpretation for the definitions of national security, namely, the ‘romantic’ and the ‘utilitarian’. The romantic view of security, which is primarily suited to major powers, emphasises prestige, *rayonnement* and global role.

Closely associated with the traditionalist view of security, the romantic interpretation asserts that security should be viewed in broader terms than just people's homeland or their territories beyond the seas, but should also include respect for the people and the maintenance of their economic interests.⁵⁴

The utilitarian approach stresses the primacy of economic welfare and interdependence. From this view, security is deemed less in terms of threats to physical violation of territorial integrity of the country, but more in terms of threats caused by disruptions in international economic activity. Individual security for citizens through proper social security policies pertaining, for instance, to health care and employment, are deemed superior to striving for protection from perceived or imagined threats to territorial defence. Therefore, Mangold's categories of interpretation can be viewed as contrasting approaches in terms of prioritisation between 'high politics' and 'low politics' where the former deals with the protection of the state and the latter the protection of the individual.

Thus, these views on the interpretation of security are well represented in Brown's definition of national security as shown above. This definition incorporates aspects of both high and low politics and has elements of a strategic and economic view. It is also worth noting that despite the change in the notion of national security, the military remains significant. This stems from the uncertainty as to what extent will, for instance, conflicts related to environmental or economic issues lead to armed conflict?⁵⁵ While it is admitted that not all conflicts pertaining to the use of bio-physical space lead to violence, the mere potential could warrant considering the use of force as an option to defend non-renewable and vital resources like water.


The preceding discussion on national security shows beyond doubt the complexity of issues that are embedded within this area of security. The various definitions provided by Buzan and other analysts attempt to deconstruct the concept of national security. However, according to Mutimer⁵⁶, they all, almost without exception, suffer from two fundamental flaws. First, according to these analyses, the state remains the primary referent object where the latter refers to that entity which has to be secured. On the one hand Buzan acknowledges the role of the state in providing security but, on the other hand, he rejects the primacy of the state in security provision because it also has the capacity and, in some cases, the propensity to threaten it. This state-centricism in the analysis of national security is further confounded

by adjectivising security with ‘national’ — providing ‘national security’. The addition of ‘national’ to security euphemistically implies government responsibility, thus implicitly excluding other potential role-players.

Second, the analyses of national security by Buzan and other analysts acknowledge the fact that states are constantly interacting in an anarchical environment that is highly unpredictable. Arguments are advanced that security comprises various dimensions or sectors — ranging from the military to the economics and the environment. However, the unpredictable nature of the international system and the lack of mutual trust among states imply an eternal and intrinsic possibility of use of force. Consequently this places military security in a privileged position when compared to other forms or sectors of security. Unlike in weak, dysfunctional or collapsed states, military security remains the responsibility of the state in strong states. Under these circumstances the state 'securitises' all issues, thus requiring special measures to deal with them. It is worth noting that this situation dominated the strategic and national security thinking of even strong democratic states such as the US during the Cold War era. For instance, the US introduced the Freedom of Information Act, which was just as restrictive in terms of security information as the Protection of Information Act (1982) of South Africa during the apartheid era. The state assumes the sole right and responsibility to determine the nexus between the relevant issue and security which makes the role of the state in national security unassailable.⁵⁷

4.2 FOCUS OF NATIONAL SECURITY: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

The national security policy of a country normally has both internal (domestic) and external (international) dimensions. Wæver's 'hourglass' model of security illustrates this point (Figure 1).

Figure 1: WÆVER'S 'HOURLASS' MODEL OF SECURITY

Source: Buzan, B. 1991. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 329.

The focus of national security policies varies from country to country (that is from government to government) and it is very much the function of the dynamics within government and the latter's view of world politics. If the internal political system is not stable enough, such policies will tend to be inward-looking, while external factors will play a role to the extent that an 'internal connection' could be established. Authoritarian, illegitimate and, in most cases, military regimes adopt this approach to national security. In the 1970s and early 1980s, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa fell in this category. A country that still has an unresolved conflict with a neighbouring state to the point that war is a constant probability, adopts an outward-looking view of national security. An arms race normally characterises such conditions. India and Pakistan could be a case in point. States located in a geographically unstable region in which neighbouring states are involved in war or there are still unresolved conflicts, will tend to have a balanced emphasis on both the internal and external dimensions of national security (most countries in the Middle East would fit this description). In most cases, especially in the latter case, there is no clear distinction between the internal and external dimensions as these are interwoven in a complex web that is mutually reinforcing with a view to providing 'complete' national security. The mythical assumption that national security is supposed to be people-centred and inward-orientated seems to be dispelled or invalidated by the concept of 'human security'.

Unlike other analysts such as Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup and Pierre Lemaitre who, together with Wæver belong to what has now become known as the 'Copenhagen School of Security Studies', which seeks to broaden the concept of security, Wæver views 'society' as the main referent object of security.⁵⁸ As illustrated in the 'Hourglass Model' (Figure 1), Wæver places the 'human race' in the centre of all efforts aimed at ensuring security. This is in line with the post-Cold War thinking on human security, that is people first, then state second in the priority list of security concerns. From Wæver's point of view, it could be argued that the quest for international security has to be premised on the centrality of the people in the state's security dialogue.

There is a notable difference in the traditional perception of national security between the developed and developing world. While the developed countries are grappling with issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and global security, Third World countries would still be dealing with basic issues of survival such as food, poverty, nation-building, health and trade. This, according to Ayoob⁵⁹, demonstrates the Third World's lack of integration with the systemic security agenda. As most Third World countries are creations of the European colonial powers, and their national borders are therefore artificial, they spend a disproportionate amount of resources on nation-building, which includes dealing with ethnic and religious divisions. The lack of national cohesion is compounded by the non-coincidence of the state and the nation, resulting in internal conflicts spilling over to the regional neighbours. While these conflicts are not necessarily a unique feature of developing countries, they are pronounced in such countries because of the lack of resources to deal with most of them.⁶⁰ The Wæver model is equally applicable to developing countries in that conflicts in such countries have an equal potential of escalation to involve regional and international role-players for their resolution.⁶¹

One of the positive developments engendered by the post-Cold War security arena was the adoption of the concept of human security by both the Global North (developed countries) and the Global South (developing countries). It became the common currency and ultimate goal in international affairs. However, the understanding of the concept of human security is also still clouded by many factors including its conceptual parameters, its relevance to national security and the feasibility of its attainment.

4.3 HUMAN SECURITY

The question was posed earlier on as to who the beneficiaries are of security? The human being as an irreducible unit in the international system would logically be at the core of all human endeavours, including the pursuit of security. It was further indicated that the original *raison d'être* for states and governments was the protection of citizens. Viewed from this perspective, governments become the agents of the citizens and the former's activities should primarily be in service of the latter. The conflictive nature of international relations up to the last decade of the twentieth century could be attributed to the fact that states or nations assumed that they would be able to ensure the security of their citizens through the preservation of their territorial frontiers. Security of people was perceived as a by-product of a state's territorial security, that is state first, and then people. However, this scenario has changed dramatically as people-centred approaches to security — hence 'human security' — characterise most agendas of liberal democratic states. This is aptly illustrated by the assertion that security should be viewed in a holistic manner, namely both vertically (between states) and horizontally (within states).⁶² On the horizontal plane, the attainment of security (which includes military security) should be premised on factors such as political democracy, human rights, socio-economic development and environmental sustainability. On the vertical plane, security should recognise the supremacy and centrality of people as the main referent object of security.⁶³ There appears to be an intrinsic tension between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of security. States tend to address security concerns among themselves as though such concerns are separate from what happens from within.⁶⁴

According to the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 'human security' can be defined as "the sense that people are free from worries, not merely from the dread of a cataclysmic world event but primarily about daily life."⁶⁵ The fundamental philosophy of human security is that if states could pursue people-centred policies (including those pertaining to safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease, repression, and protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the patterns of daily life), the aggregate effect would be a totality of security for all humanity. Unlike national security which seeks to protect the interests of people within national territories, the focus of human security is much broader than the confines of national territoriality, encompassing the

total human race. Thus, human security cannot be viewed as a process, but an ideal to which states aspire and has to be pursued at global level. It impacts both on domestic and foreign policies, and therefore requires a concerted effort to harmonise both national and international programmes in a manner that individually and collectively benefits directly (and not implicitly) all humanity. This approach requires 'de-nationalisation' of issues and harmonisation of policies across territorial boundaries. The ideal of human security should not be viewed as an abdication by states of their primary responsibility of protecting national interests, but an answer to the question: What is in the interest of the people irrespective of their nationality and territorial boundaries within the context of a global village that is unfolding?

The quest for human security presupposes the existence of a stable and democratic political system within states, an acceptable level of economic development and rule of law. Regrettably, this is not always the case, especially in the Third World countries. Global South states are generally weak and vulnerable to a host of threats. Measured against Buzan's major components of state, namely, the state idea, the physical base of the state and the institutions of the state, Global South states do not score very high compared to their Global North counterparts. The state idea for Global South states is hampered by the artificial and arbitrary boundaries which divide people regardless of ethnic or consanguineous affinities. The colonisation — and later decolonisation — processes created states without nations and, in some cases, with many nations. Small states do not have a sufficient physical base for survival, while large states cannot exercise adequate bureaucratic control over the whole territory. Government institutions are often poorly developed, largely due to lack of national cohesion, corruption and also armed anti-government forces. National security inherently implies that security sought by the government is for the whole nation. With most countries in the Global South still struggling with issues of nation-building, it follows that their national security concerns are largely domestic in nature. Fighting insurgents, combating terrorism, strengthening law enforcement agencies and ensuring the physical survival of the population remain high priorities for such countries.⁶⁶ Thus, the perception of threats, or at least the significance of particular threats to national security in the Global South, differs from the Global North.

This discussion leaves no clear-cut answer as to whether or not the state should remain a primary referent object of security. There is an apparent tension between what is perceived to be national security and individual security issues. This tension stems from the reality that some of the very instruments of state which the latter claims to be providing security could be deemed by individuals as a main cause of their insecurity. For instance, in 1981 the Americans wanted to place some cruise missiles at Berkshire, Britain. A number of protesters encamped at what was to be called the Greenham Common Peace Camp and called initially for the removal of cruise missiles at Berkshire, and later expanded their agenda to include anti-nuclear weapons protests. Unlike the British government which saw the addition of cruise missiles to its inventory as enhancing the security of the country and its citizens, the protesters viewed such missiles as being the main source of their insecurity. Consequently, the cruise missiles were removed.⁶⁷ In the same vein, environmental issues could pose a threat to security, but it does not follow that all environmental matters or phenomena are security issues. For instance, environmental degradation or changes to the biosphere due to subterranean nuclear testing could pose a serious threat to human health or well-being. Thus, this only becomes a security issue, not so much because of the resultant disruptions to human activity, but because of the actual damage to the environment.⁶⁸ Based on these arguments, it could be posited that national security should be viewed both from the actor's and practice's points of view. The actor's view would emphasise the role played by the state in pursuing security-enhancing strategies or restricting actions by other potential security-threatening role-players. The practice perspective looks at the dynamics of events that lead to threats to security. In both cases, the state remains a primary referent object but with diluted powers and expectations as espoused by the traditionalists.

4.4. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

The elasticity of the concept of security and national security, in particular, implies a concomitant broadening of threat perception. During the Cold War the architects of national security policy displayed a common fixation with military developments in hostile states or on the opposite side of the East-West ideological divide. This had an immense impact on defence spending and precipitated arms races, thus creating security dilemmas for many states. However, with the demise of the former Soviet Union, the threat scenario changed. Security policy had to shift its focus to other forms of threats. For many states, but especially those in the Global North, security threats were redefined to refer to those "forces originating

from outside ... that can harm ... lives, property, or well-being. These forces include military aggression, political subversion, economic instability, and environmental destruction."⁶⁹ While emphasising that there is a distinction between threats and vulnerabilities, Buzan admits that threats are difficult to deal with because of their perceptual nature. It is also not easy to determine if all threats constitute a national security issue as threats may range "from trivial to routine, through serious but routine, to drastic but unprecedented."⁷⁰ Misjudgement of the immensity and urgency of a security threat could engender paranoia, waste limited national resources, generate aggressive defence policies, and create a disruptive domestic political climate. It is against this background that Buzan identifies some criteria to be used in determining if a threat could affect national security. These include the specificity of its identity (such as the nuclear stand-off between the US and former Soviet Union); its nearness in space and time (such as the uneasy relationship between India and Pakistan); the probability of its occurring (for instance, the ever-present threat of reducing oil supply by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries — OPEC — in order to manipulate the oil price); the weight of its consequences; and whether or not perceptions of the threat are amplified by historical circumstances (such as Rwandese fear of the repetition of the 1994 genocide). Thus, the more intense a threat, the more likely it is that it may affect national security. However, these are difficult to identify, quantify and predict with absolute certainty.⁷¹ For instance, it is undeniably true that as over-population, deforestation, nuclear disasters and the competition for resources increase, tensions between states are bound to increase. This does not necessarily imply that these issues qualify as threats to national security. A case-by-case approach could be applied as was the case when Israel went to war against Syria in 1967 following the latter's attempt to divert the flow of water off the Jordan River.⁷² Thus threats could be placed on a continuum on a sector-by-sector basis. Such sectors primarily include the following: military, political, economic and environmental threats.

4.4.1 Military threats

This type of threat represents the core of threat perception in the classic view of national security. It is predicated on the fear that another state or group of states could use military force to subjugate the incumbent government or to replace it with another one favoured by the aggressor(s). It is believed that the only means to counter military action is by military force.

This necessitates a disproportionate allocation of resources to enable the state to deal with coercive tendencies of other states. The immediate effect of this situation is an exponential rise in defence expenditure and possibly erosion of the socio-economic well-being of ordinary citizens. Approaches to military threats could indicate the propensity of political elites to exploit the national sense of vulnerability and insecurity for their own political survival. Military threats vary in terms of level (for example, harassment of fishing boats; territorial seizures, blockade and full-scale invasion) and objective (minor and specific, and major and general).⁷³ Traditionally, the main protagonists with regard to military threats were states. The new actors now include terrorists, drug cartels and international crime syndicates who command sizeable arsenals. These actors usually have an agenda that transcends national borders. These new role-players in some cases enjoy the support, *albeit* covert, of recognised states, thus making it difficult to deal with them.⁷⁴

4.4.2 Political threats

Some of the key functions of the state include establishing and maintaining national identity; providing an organising ideology; and creating institutions that reflect these both internally and externally. The successful execution of government duties depends largely on the ability to function as a state, in other words exercising bureaucratic control over the entire territory of the state. This is the function of a closely-knit political fabric of the state. Political threats are normally aimed at tearing this fabric through such activities as fomenting secessionism; unconstitutional changes of government; and undermining government authority.⁷⁵ Factors such as ethnicity, religion and irredentism could also be exploited in this process. Perpetrators of this threat could range from insurgents inside the country to covert operations by another country. In the core of the political threat debate is the question of sovereignty. The ever-increasing numbers and roles of inter-governmental and international organisations threaten to erode national sovereignty as understood in the Westphalian sense. The existence of political threats weakens the country, thus exposing or making it even more vulnerable to military threats.⁷⁶

4.4.3 Environmental threats

The threat posed by environmental factors to human survival was only recognised largely in the latter half of the twentieth century — giving rise to the notion of environmental security.

Environmental security is defined as that area of security that "concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend."⁷⁷ The biospheric aspects include the need for clean air and water, liveable temperatures, abundant agriculture, and varied plant and animal species. These could be threatened by phenomena such as global warming, ozone depletion and acid rain, thus causing nations to be unable to feed themselves. While populations are increasing at an alarming rate, the physical space on earth is shrinking. Over-population in many parts of the world has demonstrated the excessive strain that human beings can exert on the environment. In addition, new man-made environmental disasters such as nuclear accidents (for instance, the meltdown of the Chernobyl reactor), are a serious cause for concern. This is particularly worrisome as the proliferation of nuclear devices to state and non-state actors, who do not necessarily adhere to international regimes of nuclear control, implies a potential time bomb waiting to explode. Deforestation is another man-made environmental threat, as it denudes territories, thus killing plant and animal species some of which are crucial for food, energy, construction materials, pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals and natural pest control.⁷⁸ As already indicated, it is crucial to limit the elasticity in interpreting security, especially with regard to the environment. The mere existence of a negative environmental phenomenon does not automatically qualify as a security issue. Some analysts have concluded that at least if the link between environmental degradation and sustainable development is such that its impact could upset the natural balance both between and within generations, then probably the security aspect could become more salient. Therefore, the higher the potential severity and durability of the impact of man-made biospheric imbalance, the higher the chances that such an imbalance would be regarded as a security threat. However, there is still no unanimity on these conceptual interlinkages.⁷⁹

4.4.4 Economic threats

The post-Cold War environment has catapulted economic security issues to the top of the pyramid in international relations. However, understanding exactly what constitutes economic security is still as elusive today as it was during the Cold War. Buzan⁸⁰ defines economic security as referring to "access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power." Neu⁸¹ defines it as "the ability to protect or to advance [the country's] economic interests in the face of events, developments, or actions that may threaten or block these interests." It is true that increased commercial

interactions between states could generate wealth, thus alleviating poverty in the transacting countries — that is assuming that there is good governance and less fraud and corruption among state officials. It should be noted that increased economic competition could increasingly expose the country to various threats and vulnerabilities. For states, economic security means making efforts to ensure access to global markets, continuity of supply of essential resources and to buffer vulnerability to turbulent global market changes.⁸² Meaningful participation in the global economy has become the ultimate objective of every state. This requires adapting domestic economic policies to be in line with the best-performing economies of the world; engaging partners on a bilateral basis; and participating in regional integration efforts in order to achieve economies of scale and to minimise the potential impact of negative global market behaviour.

Economic threats include all those activities that have the potential to disrupt the state's ability to ensure economic security. The origin of threats to economic interests could be exogenous or endogenous, accidental or intentional. These could be internally or externally induced. While externally-induced threats such as the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s cannot be controlled by individual governments, internally-induced ones can. For instance, the over-commitment of a government's resources to counter perceived military threats or to project regional influence to remote geographic locations of the world, could hamper economic growth and erode citizens' standard of living. Paul Kennedy demonstrated this phenomenon for the US. This is particularly relevant for the Global South countries because they have a limited resource base and crippling debt repayments to make to the Global North.⁸³

4.4.4.1. *Economic facets of national security*

Central to the quest for economic security is the desire to ensure that the standard of living in a country does not decline but improves continuously. The other crucial element in ensuring economic security is the ability to influence international role-players in defining the rules in a manner favourable to the country. Economic security seeks to achieve economic prosperity, namely, economic growth, relatively full employment of citizens, low inflation and high levels of investment. This cannot be achieved without relying on other countries for support in international forums and co-operation in providing or receiving certain commodities and services. There is a distinction between 'current economic prosperity' and 'future economic

prosperity'. While the former deals with the present standard of living and level of economic development, the latter concentrates on what could potentially be achieved in socio-economic terms. The quest for economic security could be in conflict with current economic prosperity as the latter is short-termist while the former is characterised by sustainability in the extended long-term.⁸⁴

The Cold War fixation with military security has been eclipsed almost irreversibly by the ever-increasing significance of economic security. While in the past economic security was treated as an adjunct to military issues, the post-Cold War scenario is such that economic issues are viewed as "important political and broader architectural elements of both national security and the larger security order."⁸⁵ The US, for instance, wields massive military and economic power, but the latter power base is used much more frequently by manipulating the market forces.⁸⁶

There is growing concurrence among analysts that with the recession of military threats to global security, the new threats are going to require global efforts to deal with them. If left unattended they could pose a threat much greater than that ever posed by military threats. Utagawa⁸⁷ suggests that there is a package of elements, namely, poverty, physical resource depletion/scarcity, and population, that are interacting in various combinations, thus forming a potent threat to global security. Like other analysts, Utagawa argues that these elements on their own do not necessarily constitute a threat to national security, but any of their combinations does. This package represents a refinement of the Malthusian theory, or the so-called 'limits to growth' hypothesis, which asserts that there is a trade-off between economic development and environmental quality. These threats to national security necessitate strategic co-operation among nations of the world across national and regional borders.

Thus, the fundamental questions regarding the nexus between economic issues and national security include the following:

- a. To what extent should high technology exports be controlled by government? This arises from the possibility of being attacked with weapons based on own technology, as the Gulf War of 1990 amply demonstrated.⁸⁸

- b. To what extent could (or should) economic sanctions be used in the place of military strikes in order to achieve specific foreign policy objectives? Sanctions are known to affect both the imposing state and the target state.
- c. Should the import of sensitive defence-related materials such as steel, machine tools and semiconductors be limited, even if supplied by allies? Reliance on imported defence materials exposes the country to a relationship of dependency which could threaten its national security in the long term.⁸⁹

However, this nexus should not be construed as implying that the two varieties of security (economic and military) are mutually exclusive. Economic prosperity could be used to ensure military security. Conversely, military security could be used to engender economic security.

4.4.4.2. *Use of economic resources for military security*

There is an inextricable link between a country's economic power or access to massive economic resources and its ability to ensure military security. The geostrategic position (in economic terms) of a country enables it to command exclusive influence over commercial aspects that are also of military value. For instance, South Africa's Cape route is of great strategic value to other countries, especially when such choke points as the Suez Canal are blocked; it remains one of the most reliable routes for maritime traffic bound for destinations East and West. Added to this, South Africa's efficient maritime services, which include search-and-rescue, and onshore repair and refuelling services, make the route attractive even when there is no disruption in the choke points. However, an example of a critical link between economic and military issues augmented by geostrategic position, is that of landlocked countries *vis-à-vis* their neighbours. For instance, South Africa sealed off Lesotho's borders on many occasions between 1982 and 1985 in order to compel that country not to offer sanctuary to the anti-apartheid guerrilla forces, namely, the African National Congress' (ANC's) *uMkhonto weSizwe* (MK) and the Pan-Africanist Congress' (PAC's) Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA). More than 90 per cent of supplies to Lesotho go through South Africa. Almost all electricity and oil requirements for Lesotho and some neighbours are routed through South Africa.⁹⁰

The ability to command vast economic resources implies that there is at least a certain measure of current economic prosperity or an acceptable level of development. That enables a state to divert some resources to finance defence requirements, which include personnel, equipment and the capacity to venture into operations outside national borders.⁹¹ In addition, economic prowess enables the country to influence its neighbours to implement multilateral punitive agreements such as economic sanctions, embargoes and even blockades. Thus economic instruments can be used as ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ in order to enhance the effectiveness of military instruments.⁹² Like any other country, South Africa, for instance, used (and still continues to use) these combinations of military and economic instruments in pursuit of its national interests, especially in the regional context.

The sourcing of military equipment and/or accessories implies an economic relationship between the supplying country and the receiving country. Generally, political and economic relationships between the trading countries range from acceptable to good. The supplying states therefore have a leverage in terms of those specific items and can influence the military ability of the receiving state in many ways. These include delaying supplies, imposing stringent conditions on the use of weapons or accessories supplied, or even increasing prices in order to render maintenance difficult. The Lesotho example cited above amply demonstrates this vulnerability.

The use of economic power could also either provoke or prevent war. The negotiations at the end of WW I were focused on breaking the economic backbone of Germany. The rationale was that it was the economic power of Germany which enabled it to threaten peace on a massive scale. Thus the resultant Peace Treaty of Versailles left Germany with an astronomic US\$33 billion reparations debt. Numerous analysts have concluded that it was that humiliation which enabled Adolf Hitler to rise to power on the altar of nationalism. Hitler undertook to undermine these humiliating debts and to recover all lost territories. In the process of imposing stringent punitive measures against Germany at the end of WW I, the West European countries also suffered through lost trade and other restrictions designed to keep Germany at bay. It was the same mentality that dominated the peace negotiations at the end of WW II. However, in order to ameliorate the negative impact of the double-edge sword of sanctions imposed on Germany, General Douglas MacArthur and other negotiators resolved to design and implement a Marshal Plan with a view to rebuilding the economies of Japan and Western Europe.⁹³

4.4.4.3. *Use of military resources for economic security*

Economic considerations could also dominate when investing in military security. The central question in this regard is “To what extent will an investment in defence resources have economic spin-offs for the country?” The greater the spin-offs the greater the likelihood that defence expenditure could be increased. The decision to increase defence expenditure is not necessarily linked to the existence of a real or potential military threat. For instance, South Africa’s decision in 1998 to procure an assortment of arms, aircraft and ships was largely based on the economic spin-offs that would be engendered. According to the estimates of November 1998 when the strategic defence packages were approved by the Cabinet, there were going to be about 64 000 jobs created and the country would gain from an Industrial Participation Programme (IPP) which was valued at about R110 billion.⁹⁴

The role of the industrial-military complex in enhancing the economic well-being of a country becomes even more eminent when the defence resources are utilised in providing social services. The military have the capacity (troops, logistics, engineering, medical services, and the like) to perform specialised tasks such as airlifts, emergency assistance (search-and-rescue operations at sea), demining, and even nation-building (such as spectacular military shows during national events).⁹⁵ It is not uncommon for the country’s military intelligence capability to be used for obtaining information to the benefit of the country’s industries. This is particularly becoming more crucial as countries attempt to meaningfully integrate into the global economy. Thus, there is a well-established symbiotic relationship between military security and economic security. South Africa’s attempts at strengthening ties with the Mercosur countries reflects this realisation that socio-economic security would accrue to the country by also engaging its trans-Atlantic neighbours.

The preceding discussion on threats demonstrates a clear link between threats to one state's national security and those of other states. Thus there are inextricable linkages between national security concerns of a state and global security. These linkages require international strategies or mechanisms in order to be able to manage them.

5. INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY

One of the greatest challenges of the twentieth century has been the constant desire to ensure harmonious and peaceful inter-state relations with a view to preserving international security. Since the latter part of the nineteenth century, different approaches to the question of international (co-operative) security have been pursued. The central idea of international security is to create a sense of mutual interest in survival under all conditions, including nuclear deterrence, and that any potential or real adversary should be deterred from attacking out of self-interest.⁹⁶ These approaches varied from the 'balance-of-power' approach to the creation of supra-national bodies, to a combination of these approaches through alliance formations, which sometimes cut across traditional associations such as historical, cultural and geographic ties. However, the longest-lasting approach is that of the creation of supra-national bodies and the introduction of the concept of common security.

Common security could be regarded as a statement or pronouncement by states which recognises their mutual vulnerability to common or transnational threats.⁹⁷ In order to deal with threats to common security, states introduce mechanisms that include, but are not limited to, collective security arrangements and collective defence pacts. Both concepts — collective security and collective defence — are predicated on the existence or perception of the existence of a 'region'. Snyder defines a 'region' as "a set of states which are located in geographical proximity to one another."⁹⁸ This definition is particularly important for the analysis of the trans-Atlantic relations in the Southern Cone, namely South Africa's relations with the Mercosur countries, as the mass of water separating these countries ensures contiguity but not necessarily geographic proximity. It could be argued, for instance, that even though geographically South Africa shares the same continental land mass and tectonic plate with countries such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and politically belongs to the same regional organisation (Southern African Development Community — SADC), in terms of other human security threats such as environmental degradation, nuclear hazards, illegal harvesting of marine resources and piracy inside and on the edges of South Africa's EEZ, there is a more viable regional security link with Argentina and Brazil than with many countries on the African continent.

Unlike the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations was the first supra-national body with a truly global mission of maintaining global peace with ‘collective security’ as the rallying force. The success of the League of Nations was viewed to be largely dependent on the political will and co-operation of individual member states and also the ability to underpin it with international economic institutions. The vision cherished by the drafters of the Covenant of the League of Nations, especially Woodrow Wilson, the US President, was to replace the balance-of-power approach with that of community-of-power. Through the latter concept they hoped to provide security and justice for all. With hindsight, the League of Nations seems to have collapsed under its own weight, as the political developments of the 1930s in Europe indicated. The critical weaknesses of the League of Nations were its assumption that a harmony of interests existed among states, and the French-led efforts to leave Germany a weak state. It failed to deal with Fascism and Nazism, and its failure culminated in the outbreak of WW II.⁹⁹

Since the ideals of the League of Nations were deemed noble and its mistakes rectifiable, at the end of the WW II another supranational organisation — the UN — was established. The UN sought both to rectify the weaknesses of its predecessor, the League of Nations, and to introduce a new set of rules that would govern collective security. The main executive agency for this mission was to be the UN Security Council, comprising five permanent members, namely, Britain, the People’s Republic of China, France, the former Soviet Union and the US. The various provisions of the UN Charter dealing with collective security — from Articles 39 to 51 — obligate member states to contribute towards the attainment of this global ideal.

5.1 COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The introduction of the concept of collective security represented a shift away from a competitive, self-help approach to security, to one which was premised on collaboration. For it to be implemented, it had to be concretised within an institutional framework which would not only devise, regulate and monitor rules and regulations of co-operation, but would also arbitrate in cases of conflict among members of the collective security structure. For this purpose, collective groupings such as the Concert of Europe, then the League of Nations and lastly, the UN, were established.

The genesis of 'collective security' can be traced back to the formation of the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century, but its conceptual development started with the formation of the League of Nations at the end of WW I and, arguably, reached its 'maturity' both in political and academic circles only after WW II.¹⁰⁰ Like the other variants of security, there is no universal consensus on the definition of collective security. Premised on the principle that an attack on any member state is an attack on all states, collective security is broadly defined as "a method of managing the power relations of nation states through a partially centralized system of security arrangements. While the ultimate power remains diffused among independent sovereign states, authority in the specifically defined spheres of maintenance and enforcement of peace is vested in an international body."¹⁰¹ It could also be defined as "an organisational arrangement whereby all states pledge themselves to come to the support of members needing assistance."¹⁰² In simpler terms it could also be defined as "a system of world order in which aggression by any state will be met by a collective response from all."¹⁰³ It is crucial to note that all these definitions do not specify the level of involvement by individual states and the nature of resources pledged for such an eventuality.

The UN has a mottled record in terms of its achievement of its primary goal of ensuring international (collective) security. Much of its weakness can be attributed to the restrictions imposed by the bipolarity of the international system along the ideological divide led by the US and the former Soviet Union for the West and the East respectively. As was the case during the dying days of the League of Nations, national security became a dominant feature characterising the international system after WW II. However, with the demise of the Cold War, the UN system seemed to be rejuvenated and the concept of collective security was 'rehabilitated' in the wake of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1991. During that crisis there appeared to be unity in the purpose of ejecting Iraqi troops from Kuwait and enforcing the provisions of the UN Charter prohibiting states from using force as an instrument of foreign policy and for territorial acquisition, thus undermining the very concept of juridical statehood.¹⁰⁴

Even during the pre-historic period, states strove to increase their individual security by creating conditions of insecurity for their neighbours. This left the neighbours no choice but to increase their security, which led to a zero-sum situation or the so-called 'security dilemma'. State security was viewed as an 'appraisive' concept in the sense that it signified

or accredited some kind of valued achievement. Using the sports analogy, Baldwin argues that states would compete, like sports teams playing for a championship, to achieve more security than other states.¹⁰⁵ As a concept, collective security re-assured states that narrow and self-centred approaches to security produced an opposite effect, namely, insecurity. Through collective security states realise that security could be made a 'common good' which has to be shared and that it is indivisible.¹⁰⁶

The dominant factor in the collective security paradigm is the 'abstention' from the use or threat of use of force in settling disputes. This could be interpreted as almost equivalent to the cumulative effect of multiple non-aggression pacts that span across a defined region and where contiguity is not the dominant criterion. Collective security is a clear example of the neoliberal institutionalist approach to the analysis of security where there is an emphasis on the motives or forces driving state behaviour. In this regard, the neoliberal institutionalists argue that states make collective security arrangements by highlighting the significance of common interests which include common threats and "shared fears of unrestricted violence or unstable agreements, or insecurity about independence or sovereignty."¹⁰⁷

Over the years it has proved both an onerous process and a daunting task for the UN to launch operations aimed at ensuring collective security. Consequently, a new generation of security organisations emerged in which regional and/or sub-regional organisations became more associated with the concept of collective security (see Figure 2). Among the most active of these sub-regional organisations are NATO (even though this is essentially a common defence arrangement); the SADC which, until the latter half of 2001, was paralysed by the lack of consensus on the operationalisation of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security; and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In this process the UN Security Council became an over-arching body responsible for issuing mandates for peace-support operations in order to legitimise them in the eyes of the international community. The UN Secretary General sends observers to represent the world body in peace missions, which include peace enforcement, peace-building and diplomatic initiatives in resolving and/or managing conflicts. The reasons behind the proliferation of sub-regional organisations, and the subsequent increase in their utilisation in regional peace missions, include the fact that such regional groupings are familiar with regional circumstances, they have affinity to states involved (they have a direct interest in the resolution of the conflict) and it is much cheaper. Through collective security structures states stand to share the benefits of peaceful symbiosis

and reciprocity. However, where there is a semblance of a clear-cut threat or enemy, collective security arrangements could be supplemented with collective defence pacts.

5.2 COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

The other variant of co-operative security is 'collective defence'. Unlike collective security, collective defence is much narrower in focus, aim and geographic extent. The primary objective of collective (mutual) defence is to protect allies against external aggression¹⁰⁸. This has an inherent potential for exacerbating tensions rather than alleviating them. The signing of mutual defence pacts constitutes a balance-of-power and bloc-building approach which could potentially lead to the formation of other blocs or alliances — thus causing a 'security dilemma' on an inter-regional or inter-subregional level.¹⁰⁹ It may also be argued that a collective defence pact presupposes that the parties have undertaken not to be aggressively disposed towards one another, even in the absence of a signed non-aggression pact. While a collective security arrangement could include a collective defence component, both concepts are mutually exclusive but closely related in the sense that the latter enables the former to materialise. In this respect, through collective security, states undertake to refrain from using or threatening to use of force in settling disputes and also to collectively deal with any of its members which abrogate this rule.¹¹⁰

Collective defence partners would normally be like-minded in terms of their worldview, perception of threat or enemy, and would also be grappling with common or similar political issues. This like-mindedness is not only limited to military issues, but political exchange between partners also becomes easier. It could be argued that defence pacts are by nature an indication of a higher level of commitment by partners to come to the rescue of each other during a state of national defence.¹¹¹ Through such pacts member states emphatically and unambiguously demonstrate their willingness to sacrifice lives, national resources and political constituencies in defence or pursuit of another country's security objectives. Like collective security arrangements, collective defence requires harmonisation and co-ordination of defence policies, joint exercises and interoperability of defence equipment. However, unlike collective security, collective defence might engender a sense of insecurity among non-members of the pact in the region, thus precipitating an arms race.

As already indicated, collective defence is premised on the perception of common (military) threats. Its value lies in the collective capacity of member states to thwart foreign aggression by military force and to deter potential aggressors. However, this is not always possible, because partners should possess sufficient combined military strength to make such pact a formidable partnership. For instance, if South Africa was hypothetically aggressively disposed towards countries constituting the Indian Ocean Island Group (Comores Islands, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion and Seychelles), it is highly unlikely that their combined military strength would be sufficient to deter aggressive intent. It is against this background that most collective defence arrangements tend to be asymmetrical. That is, one or more states should be prepared to shoulder disproportionate burdens while tolerating free-riding by some of its partners.¹¹² This was particularly prevalent during the Cold War era when the two leading collective defence organisations, NATO and the Warsaw Pact — led respectively by the US and the former Soviet Union — were aggressively disposed towards each other.¹¹³

Asymmetry and level of commitment distinguish one defence pact from the other. The level of commitment is the function of the nature and gravity of the security threat as perceived by the major powers that would be prepared to enter into an asymmetrical partnership. There are numerous such cases where the US has entered into collective defence agreements with countries that have a limited level of commitment. Examples include the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) and the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (MST). In terms of both agreements, the US is supposed to consult the Japanese, Australians or New Zealanders "if any party considers that its territorial integrity or security is under threat and to act to meet such a threat in accordance with constitutional processes."¹¹⁴ Both agreements do not specify what type of action should be taken under what circumstances. However, it is apparent that states involved in both agreements are not obligated to assist the US militarily should it get involved in war but the reverse is not true, because the US is supposed to come to the rescue of the signatories in case the latter are attacked or threatened with force.¹¹⁵

One of the longest surviving and most effective examples of a collective defence pact is NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty (4 April 1949) provides clear and unambiguous *casus foederis* or 'hair-trigger clause' (the situation in which mutual commitments are to become operational). Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty states:

“The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercising their right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”¹¹⁶

In Africa there are currently three examples of collective defence on a multilateral basis, namely ECOWAS, the *Accord de Non-Agression et d'Assistance en Matière de Défense* (ANAD), and the Pact of Four which comprises Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia and Zimbabwe. ANAD which was concluded in June 1977 by Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, with Benin and Guinea having observer status at ANAD meetings, does not have any prominence in the continent when compared with ECOWAS. ANAD was created in 1977 by the Francophone countries with the assistance of France as a security arm of the economic integration organisation called *Communaute Economique L'Africa de l'ouest* (CEAO) which came into existence in 1971. The ANAD Protocol of Application was adopted in 1981 but the institutional framework of ANAD was already functional by then.¹¹⁷ The establishment of CEAO was aimed at ensuring a balance of power in the sub-region and countering Nigeria's dominance. Originally designed and signed as a non-aggression pact and later upgraded to a mutual defence pact, ANAD has maintained a low profile for a long period of time, but is currently broadening its scope and agenda beyond mere narrow defence issues to incorporate such issues as economic development, population migration, and so forth.¹¹⁸

In 1974 Nigeria, together with Togo, established ECOWAS which embraced the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone countries in the sub-region.¹¹⁹ Unlike ANAD, ECOWAS has played a prominent role in the resolution of conflicts in the region. Examples of its involvement in peacekeeping and peace enforcement include Liberia and Sierra Leone. Like ANAD, ECOWAS was originally established on the basis of a Non-Aggression Pact signed in Lagos on 22 April 1978; and three years later (on 29 May 1981) a Mutual Defence Pact was signed in Freetown. In terms of Articles 1 and 2 of the Non-Aggression Pact, ECOWAS member states undertook to firstly refrain from "the threat or use of force or aggression," and


secondly from "committing or condoning acts of subversion, hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other member states."¹²⁰ Through the defence pact member states declared that "any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member State shall constitute a threat or aggression against the entire Community" (Article 2), and they further resolved "to give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression" (Article 3).¹²¹ Despite limited resources and lack of common ideological background, ECOWAS has proved to be a formidable African equivalent of NATO.

Further south in Africa, SADC is still grappling with the modalities of a possible Mutual Defence Pact as envisaged in its SADC Organ Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security. The agreement on the institutional structure and framework for the SADC Organ was only reached on 14 August 2001.¹²² However, it is not clear how the clause on a Mutual Defence Pact will be implemented, particularly because a limited collective defence alliance within the SADC's collective security structure already exists. On 8 April 1999, Angola, the DRC, Namibia and Zimbabwe signed an agreement in terms of which member states pledged to support one another in case of threat or use of force against any of the parties. The danger in the Pact of Four is the fact that it allows 'unilateral and collective action', which threatens to bring about a schism within SADC. While the SADC Treaty prohibits states from entering into bilateral and multilateral agreements that could be contrary to the ideals of the Treaty (Article 24), it subscribes to the UN Charter's provision for the individual state's right to self-defence, which could include defence alliance formation. It could be argued that the finalisation of the Organ Protocol in 2001 and the concurrent negotiations for a mutual defence pact may result in the current Pact of Four being used as a model and the latter subsumed into the former. However, the provision that "an attack on one is an attack to all" might be diluted, if not totally omitted. The number and the geographic extent of countries constituting SADC are such that they preclude the feasibility of such a provision. It might be diluted by introducing a graduated approach which escalates as the conflict situation deteriorates. A graduated approach would include exhausting all peaceful means before resorting to the use of force under the conditions as might be determined by the UN Security Council and the African Union.

Figure 2 provides a schematic representation of the regional and sub-regional organisations within the UN collective security system. Most of these organisations were established with a

view to improving economic relations among member states. However, in due course, they incorporated security aspects.

Figure 2: THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS WITH SECURITY DIMENSIONS ¹²³



KEY:

- AMU/UMA: Arab Maghreb Union
- ANAD: *Accord de Non Aggression et d' Assistance en Matiere de Defence*
- ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations
- AU: African Union (This replaced the Organisation for African Unity — OAU)
- CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market
- CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
- ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
- IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
- MERCOSUR: *Mercado Común del Sur* (Southern Cone Common Market)
- NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
- OAS: Organisation of American States
- OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
- SADC: Southern African Development Community
- WEU: Western European Union

5.3 CONCERT SECURITY

The signing of the Pact of Four Accord within the SADC structure, demonstrates the difficulty of ensuring constant security guarantees especially against military threats. The decision-making process within a large collective security framework is onerous, cumbersome and unpredictable. The smaller the number of countries that constitute a security arrangement, the quicker and more responsive that organisation becomes. This is the basic argument of the concert security theory. In addition to the question of the number of the parties involved, power and level of exposure to threats are just as important for a concert security arrangement to function effectively. Unlike collective defence and collective security mechanisms, concerts are not obliged by a formal commitment to thwart aggression, but instead rely primarily on informal negotiation to resolve disputes or crises.¹²⁴ It could be argued that the now-defunct Front-Line States (FLS), led by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, operated along the lines of a concert, even though its achievements in respect of its initial objectives are dubious.

However, for concerts to be effective, additional criteria apply. These are, firstly, that each member state should be vulnerable to collective action. Phrased differently, states in the system should not possess such excessive power — military, political and economic — that any combination of other states would still not pose a serious threat to it. The post-Napoleonic Europe was characterised by the dominance of Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary and Russia, all of whom constituted what was known as the Concert of Europe. Together these states determined rules and norms by which all other states in the European international system had to abide. The post-Cold War era has a single superpower left — the US — but it too is vulnerable to nuclear weapons possessed by even smaller states which have limited military and economic resources.¹²⁵

The second dimension to any successful concert security arrangement is that major states have to accept the existing international order. This leaves no room for revisionism on the part of the major powers. During the period following the Napoleonic Wars up to 1848, revolutions in Europe were inspired by dissatisfied states which wanted to challenge the international order, but all to no avail. The post-Cold War era is marked by both a general acceptance of the current international order and the challenge posed by countries such as Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The final dimension of the concert system

requires that the political elites of the major powers should refrain from destructive competition and self-interest, and embrace the concept of an international community which has to be defended by all for all to exist.¹²⁶

In addition to the variants of international security such as collective security, collective defence and concert security, alternative approaches include *common security*, *comprehensive security* and *co-operative security*. These will be briefly discussed.

5.4 COMMON SECURITY

The concept of common security was first used and defined comprehensively in 1982 by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which was commonly known as the Palme Commission — named after the Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, who chaired the commission. According to the Palme Commission, the recognition of the concept of common security was a viable alternative to the bipolar international system based on a security system that had a mutually destructive capability. This recognition stemmed from the understanding that the unilateral self-help security system was rendered obsolete and inappropriate by nuclear weapons which, when used, would result in immeasurable mutual damage. Through common security the Palme Commission sought to rid the world of the arms race and nuclear weapons and introduce far-reaching arms control and disarmament programmes.¹²⁷

While common security was not perceived as prescribing abdication from the national right to self-defence as provided by the UN Charter, it suggested non-provocative defence. The concept of non-provocative defence requires that states should develop military forces that are purely designed for defensive purposes as opposed to offensive ones. Thus, weapon systems should be limited to those that would be sufficient for defensive purposes, but would not have long-range offensive capability. This essentially calls for static defence, where the use of mines, tank traps, fixed fortifications and the deployment of conventional forces on the border are crucial.¹²⁸

The notion of common security as construed by the Palme Commission has plausible ideals, but it is also based on a false premise that modern technology can neatly distinguish between

offensive and defensive capabilities. Most countries' military doctrine on defence requires the capability to launch hot-pursuits and to repel the enemy away from the national borders in order to cripple its destructive potential at safe distances. Thus weapons perceived to be for defence purposes, could be utilised for offensive purposes as well. This does not reduce, but exacerbates, the security dilemma.

5.5 COMPREHENSIVE AND CO-OPERATIVE SECURITY

The various forms of security at international level have focused largely on the military dimension. With the broadening of the concept of security to include non-military aspects such as socio-economic development, environment and politics, security has become more comprehensive — hence comprehensive security. To achieve comprehensive security, as argued by its proponents, states have to incorporate all aspects that could threaten their well-being. Such aspects would include access to and/or control of natural resources, the protection of trade routes and the side-effects of exporting sensitive dual-use technology to 'rogue' states.¹²⁹

The apparent limitations of the notion of comprehensive security are complemented by the introduction of co-operative security, which seeks to impress upon states the importance of gradually changing the attitudes of policy-makers towards security. Unlike the comprehensive security notion, the co-operative security view does not prescribe structural changes to the international system, *albeit* at regional level, but seeks to mould state behaviour through influencing the political elite. Both notions expand the understanding of security to include non-military issues, and they both emphasise the significance of co-operation rather than competition. The co-operative security approach, which is largely based on a regional system, promotes "consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and interdependence rather than unilateralism."¹³⁰ For these to materialise, various confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) are introduced. These CSBMs include joint training exercises, demilitarisation of common borders, exchange programmes of military personnel and weapon acquisition programmes.

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) represents a good example of co-operative security. Comprising 54 states, the OSCE co-operative security framework is based on the non-hegemonic behaviour of all member states and the adherence to the principles of mutual accountability, transparency and confidence at both domestic and foreign policy levels. While the OSCE does not have legal status under international law, its decisions are binding politically but not legally. It also has an institutional structure just like any other international organisation. It has undertaken numerous missions in Eurasia which include: Caucasus (Georgia), Eastern Europe (Moldova, Ukraine), the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia), Chechnya (assistance group), Belarus (advisory and monitoring group), Central-Asia (Tadjikistan, Khazakstan, Turkmenistan, Kirgisistan), Naorno-Karabakh and in South East Europe. The biggest missions are in the Balkans, namely in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The OSCE also provides for military co-operation by promoting openness and transparency on issues of arms control, CSBMs and military-to-military contacts. The implementation of the Dayton Accord which stabilised the security situation in Bosnia is under the auspices of the OSCE.¹³¹ In terms of the 1992 Helsinki Summit the OSCE received the mandate to launch peace support operations if there is a conflict within or among the member states.

Analysing the security system of Europe, Kolodziej and Lepingwell¹³² identified six institutional approaches to the collaborative security system being pursued by the European states in partnership with their North American counterparts. These approaches have now been adopted by other regions, *albeit* with varying degrees of success. They are: security community; hegemonic alliance *cum* consensual leadership; concert of states of big powers; concert of states based on spheres of influence *cum* hegemonic coercive; and multiple variants of balance-of-power arrangements, based on the countervailing military capabilities of real or perceived rivals. The notion of security community applies in the sense as coined, defined and conceptualised by Karl Deutsch.

The hegemonic alliance *cum* consensual leadership is based on co-operation among states where one state plays a leadership role and enjoys the general support of all in the alliance. The typical example is the role played by the US, not only in terms of leadership within NATO, but also in the balancing of power in Western Europe. This is in stark contrast with the concert of states on spheres of influence *cum* hegemonic coercive scenario. In the latter case, states that fall in the area of influence of a powerful neighbour are forced to comply with

the security requirements of the regional hegemonic power. The former Soviet Union, which was locked in an ideological struggle during the Cold War, coerced its neighbours to cooperate with Moscow and to become members of the Warsaw Pact. The origins of the concerts of states with a view to dealing with a superior military power can be traced back to the early 1700s when states in Europe joined forces to counter Louis XIV's designs that would see Spain and France, together with their respective overseas territories, being combined to form an incontestably powerful Bourbon. They also did the same with Napoleon in 1813 when they defeated his plans to create a gigantic state controlled from Paris.¹³³

The paralysing effect of the Cold War distorted regional perspectives on security and obscured opportunities as it promoted perceptions of insecurity. The post-Cold War scenarios of collective security seem much more promising than ever before. The main centrifugal forces are: economic interdependence, technology diffusion, the global audience and the emerging shared values. These forces facilitate the codification of rules governing international relations in which global peace and security would be the common goal. As shown in Figure 2, major regional countries, especially in East Asia — notably Japan and the People's Republic of China — which have not joined regional groupings, are collaborating on security issues, as in the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹³⁴

6. GLOBAL SECURITY

Security arrangements between states within the framework of international security, both at bilateral and multilateral levels, seem to have an inherent weakness of further polarising states along the fault-lines of alliances, blocs and allegiances. Thus, instead of generating peace, regional security agreements have a built-in negative potential for neutralising, rather than totally eliminating existing animosities among states. These agreements seem to bring about a relative absence of war - a condition which does not translate into the existence of eternal peace. Through (sub-)regional security structures states still fall short of peace efforts with a global perspective, in other words where individual state and regional efforts are geared towards global security, which Haftendorn¹³⁵ defines as "a system of world order or security." She further states that global security presupposes "a universal concept of security with a shared set of norms, principles, and practices which result in common patterns of international behaviour."¹³⁶ Since global security is more than just the cumulative effect of regional efforts

at achieving peace, but is rather a re-engineering of the systemic forces controlling the international system, it is crucial that global role-players — major economic and military powers, transnational commercial entities and supranational organisations such as the UN, should be decisive and their activities geared towards achieving global rather than parochial interests.¹³⁷

The rudimentary initiatives aimed at ensuring global security dates back to the international treaties such as those of Westphalia (1648), Vienna (1918), Versailles (1919) and San Francisco (1945). These peace efforts were premised on the assumptions, that if nations could accept the right of co-existence with their neighbours and lived in harmony and peace, then security would be global. With the demise of the Cold War and the introduction by former US President, George Bush, of the concept of a New World Order (NWO), a paradigm shift occurred. The NWO posited that politically stable and economically prosperous states tend to be peaceful. If states are peaceful, the net gain will be international peace and security. Thus, developmental aid to bolster democratic processes world-wide is viewed as an important instrument to help poorer countries contribute to this collective goal – global security.¹³⁸

The UN agenda regarding global security seems to be chequered and unstructured. Being the only organisation in the world mandated to bring about global peace, the UN approaches threats to peace by using a number of international instruments within the international security framework which includes its multiple structures and (sub-)regional organisations. Since global security is not only the cumulative effect of a peaceful, stable and prosperous international system, but also an ideal state against which the UN's performance should be measured, it could be argued that only phenomena with possible global consequences should enjoy priority. Viewed in this manner, therefore, issues such as fall-out from nuclear testing, debris in space and gross pollution in the seaways are construed as threats to global security. In addition to that, talks on nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, a global ban of land-mine stockpiles and conventional arms transfers, especially to rogue states, dominate the global security agenda.¹³⁹ When global security prevails, states would be able to dedicate the bulk, if not all, of their time and resources to improving the quality of life of their citizenry within the context of human security.

7. THE SECURITY PYRAMID


The variants of security have demonstrated linkages in a complex web that defies clear distinction from one another. Notwithstanding such complexity, this web can be dismantled and explained from one constant perspective: the *ultimate goal* of individual and collective state action. This ultimate goal explains, at least partially, why states would go to great lengths to pursue a particular course of action and not others. The resources (finance, personnel, time, infrastructure, equipment, etc.) dedicated to achieving a particular goal provide an indication of the general orientation of that state's ultimate goal, especially when it pertains to security. To what extent can the ultimate goals of weak and strong states, states ruled by military dictators and those ruled by elected liberal-democratic representatives be the same? The answer is obviously: highly unlikely. It also follows that states still experiencing serious internal political instability (civil wars, armed insurrection, etc) would, for instance, be less inclined to subscribe to and implement all international human rights instruments, but would possibly welcome those instruments dealing with, for example terrorism and banditry. In the same vein, developing countries would not pursue higher order human security issues such as combating global warming and environmental degradation, as vigorously as developed countries. This paradox could be explained partially by the *Security Pyramid* (Figure 3).

The 'Security Pyramid' identifies four levels of security: *national security*, *regional security*, *global security* and *individual security*. It seeks to explain the logical progression of states in terms of their security priorities in relation to their level of economic development and the maturity of the political system within and between states.

National security: States that have just acquired their independence or that are facing serious internal challenges to political power, will dedicate much of their effort to security issues (especially state or regime security aspects). Since national security has both internal and external dimensions as discussed above, a government would identify the origin of threats and appropriately tailor its national security policy to counter such threats. Argentina's 'National Security Doctrine' of the 1970s and South Africa's 'Total Strategy' of the 1970s and 1980s are examples in this category, even though they both had a very strong outward-looking component. However, if the threat is exogenous (as in a border dispute or contested territorial claims), the government would seek to manipulate the national psyche to convince the

population that the physical existence of the state is under threat (for example Israel). The actions of such a state are likely to engender a sense of insecurity with its neighbours — the security dilemma — possibly leading to an arms race. Chile, for instance, projected itself as a 'nation under siege' primarily prior to and, less so, after independence. In the nineteenth century Chile had to contend with the machinations of Argentina and Peru, which were then the most powerful countries in South America. After independence Chile wanted to establish its dominance over the whole of South America's Pacific coast.¹⁴⁰ Thus as a general rule, states tend to first secure alliances at bilateral and multilateral levels. These are evident in the thickness of the arrows in the 'Security Pyramid' as states seek alliances with a national security perspective. These arrows become thinner as the nature and ultimate goal of international interaction change (see Figure 3). Concepts likely to dominate the national political and security lexicon would include: national territory, national sovereignty, non-interference, self-sufficiency (autarky), and offensive-defensive military posture.

Figure 3: THE SECURITY PYRAMID



Regional security: Countries focussing on national security soon realise that an adequate sense of security cannot be obtained without the co-operation of other states or their neighbours. To this effect they conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements where security is viewed as an indivisible component of international relations — hence international security or (sub-) regional security, thus making the latter the next level in the pyramid. The arrows at this level are the thickest as states attempt to secure partnerships and alliances. Such agreements do not necessarily have to be concluded with neighbours. Factors favouring such agreements include vulnerability to similar or common threats; geographic proximity and contiguity (for example most states in SADC); the status of each state in the international system (for example states with a *pariah* status); convergence and compatibility of political values; and sharing vital natural resources such as water — as is the case with the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the Gulf, and the Nile river running through Egypt and Ethiopia.¹⁴¹ But the other conditions for ensuring common security at international level include the political cohesion of states, the nature of their military policy and their transparency to observation by others.¹⁴² Concluding international security or (sub-)regional arrangements provides the states that are still preoccupied with national security issues with a cushion to attempt to prevent external support to internal rebels or elements causing instability. Emanating from these agreements would be regional or sub-regional organisations such as ASEAN, NATO, Mercosur, SADC, etc. Common concepts at this level of the pyramid are: collective security; collective (mutual) defence; non-aggression pacts; and confidence- and-security-building measures. It should be noted that some states conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements, not with a view to dealing with internal instability, but largely to maintain good neighbourliness. As can be seen in the 'Security Pyramid', it is argued that most of the developing countries are still locked in the struggle for national security and have not gone beyond the regional security level.

Global security: After having concluded various bilateral and multilateral agreements within the regional security framework, states then attempt to establish co-operation among the clusters or groupings. For instance, SADC is currently at various stages of success in its attempts to secure co-operation with (sub-)regional organisations such as ECOWAS, Mercosur and the European Union (EU). The collective effect of interaction across geographic and organisational affiliations would bring about security at a global level or 'global security'. The quest for common security at a global level seeks to generate co-

operation among the nations of the world to strive to ensure harmonious relations and interaction among states, and to encourage such states to pursue economic, political, military, environmental and other policies that would not render the earth uninhabitable. Phenomena such as global warming, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, deforestation and other forms of environmental degradation threaten all of humanity. For instance, the quest for global security has resulted in large areas being declared nuclear-free zones such as the whole of Africa (through the Pelindaba Treaty) and the South Atlantic region (declared Zone of Peace and Co-operation in the South Atlantic — ZPCSA).

Individual security: Having achieved consensus within and among themselves on issues that could affect the human race, states remain the major but not the only referent objects of security and focus will be biased in favour of human beings/individuals. This level, which represents the apex of human endeavour in human security, can only be achieved by states which are relatively stable and mature liberal democracies with sufficient resources to credibly pursue agendas such as those pertaining to global warming, depletion of the ozone layer and deforestation. Most of these states with such capacity are in the Global North (see Figure 3). While the developing countries (Global South) have to be sensitised about the primacy of the individual human beings within the international state system, the existing circumstances in those states are such that they require inestimable resources to address them. It has to be impressed upon them that regime security cannot, and should not, be pursued at the expense of individual security. States should be viewed as the means and not the ends of security.¹⁴³ This represents a fundamental departure from the Cold War era dichotomies of East-West and North-South tensions. While the East-West dichotomy depicted peace that entailed a defensive-offensive posture, in which deterrence and compellance defined the bottom line of coexistence between two power blocs, the North-South dichotomy concluded that the key to security was economic development.

The post-Cold War human security paradigm combines military security with development and replaces the old zero-sum perspective with a negative-score-game perspective that recognises “possibilities for winning together and losing together.”¹⁴⁴ The relevance and role of the state is perceived to be generally that of a facilitator and an enabler (and not necessarily a guarantor) of security, while new issues and non-state actors play a significant role in defining the collective understanding of security. However, in order to avoid the debate

which pits the state against human security or where the advocates of human security perceive the state as the single most important impediment towards the achievement of human security, an alternative view of human security is advanced. This view distinguishes between “human security as an ‘integrative concept’ dealing with people as opposed to ‘territorial or military security’ which is defined as a ‘defensive concept’. In other words the focus is on security between people, as opposed to security only between states.”¹⁴⁵

As idealistic as the human security paradigm is, its adherents and advocates have become more vocal and enjoy more recognition in political decision-making processes than ever before the demise of the Cold War era. This is evident in the manner in which state security instruments such as the national defence forces are deployed in the name of either preventing human catastrophes or improving the quality of life of the people.¹⁴⁶ It is therefore clear that while the state has not been relegated into obscurity in terms of security definitions, the security parameters and role-players (not necessarily decision-makers) have been vastly expanded. As will be demonstrated in the next chapter, the quest for human security requires co-operation across the whole spectrum of security issues, including socio-economic security.

8. CONCLUSION

This chapter firstly focused on the various forms of co-operation among states and secondly on the etymology of security. Co-operation among states on a wide variety of issues has characterised the international system throughout the twentieth century. This was despite bloc-formation strategies which generated political and ideological animosities along the East-West divide. The need for co-operation was in most cases based on the realisation that unilateral and autarkic approaches to socio-economic and security issues were counter-productive. Notwithstanding the strains imposed by the Cold War, multilateral arrangements helped stabilise the international system and also established, with varying levels of acceptability, the ground rules for state-to-state interaction. To this end, states agreed on international standards, obligations, allocations and prohibitions.

Security was identified in this chapter as a contested concept whose meaning has developed over time to a stage where its conceptual parameters have become blurred and indefinite. This not only poses a challenge to scholars (who have to unpack and demystify the concept), but also to policy-makers (who have to formulate security policies) and the policy-

implementers (who have to execute such policies). The concept of security has developed beyond its traditional association with military activity to include issues such as economic development, environmental degradation and the well-being of citizens. Furthermore, security is no longer viewed only in terms of protecting and defending national territory, but has expanded to include security concerns of neighbouring states and the whole world.

The Hobbesian view of the primary role of the state being to ensure security for its nationals, leaves doubt as to whether or not modern states can fulfil this role despite the phenomenal expansion of security. The notion that states should react swiftly to security threats presupposes sufficient resources, and that the state's security and individual security are on the same conceptual plane. National security can no longer be the domain of the state alone. However, individual security is in practice still subservient to national security. International security, which is premised on the removal or reduction of mutual suspicion among states, requires continuous inter-state co-operation. This accounts for the general increase in the efforts to strengthen international collective security structures, and confidence- and security-building measures. While security based on (sub-)regional structures does not necessarily imply universal security or global security, it contributes towards making the quest for global security a possible eventuality. It has also become apparent that, only if states place human beings — the global citizen — at the centre of all security efforts, rather than state entities, will real human security be achieved.

Human security, as a concept, is still evolving and therefore its main building blocks are not yet clear. However, there is general consensus that it links development with state security where the latter is associated with the role of the national security forces. The perceived synergy that is expected from the human security debate has resulted in a number of 'side-effects', which include the threat of possible marginalisation or reduced role of the state organs and the demand by the national security forces for additional resources in order to deal with development issues as proposed in the human security paradigm. The basis for South Africa's relations with the Mercosur countries is rooted largely in this paradigm. This becomes evident in the nature and focus of activities involving South Africa and these countries.

The next chapter traces the historical development and the rationale for the formation of the Mercosur group. The latter aspect is particularly important especially when a comparative analysis is made between the development of Mercosur and sub-regional groups such as SADC. The concept of 'open regionalism' is also explored in relation to Mercosur with a view to establishing, whether, if at all, it has contributed to the success of Mercosur. The organs of Mercosur and their functions are also described. The analysis of the Mercosur organs provides a basis for the areas or mechanisms through which extra-regional states and other sub-regional groups such as SADC can co-operate with Mercosur.

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Besides, the UN Charter (Chapter VIII) bestows powers of maintaining peace and security on such
regional organisations provided that authorisation is obtained from the UN Security Council. In the case
of the OAU, it could be argued that it became a collective security organisation after the Cairo
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