

## CHAPTER FIVE

### **ORIGINATION AND MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: A SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING PROCESS**

#### 5.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on how foreign policy decision making takes place in South Africa and the People's Republic of China. Three systemic models of foreign policy making have been developed, the first of which is intended to represent a *normative* ideal system, that allows for policy imperative inputs, policy outputs, feedback and monitoring mechanisms; the remaining two systemic models are intended to represent what actually takes place in South Africa and the PRC respectively, in regard to foreign policy decision making.

In view of their demonstrable ability to influence the present South African and PRC leadership's world view, and thereby affect the form and direction of their respective foreign policies, relevant selected ideological sources, belief systems, historical events and trends, for the purposes of this study, are regarded as influencers of foreign policy that give rise to the *origination* of a state's foreign policy formulation and implementation. The concept of *origination* (paragraph 1.6 *supra*), as explored in this chapter, refers to the linkage between a state's contemporary foreign policy and the perceivable historical and cultural origins of such policy and is, in the larger sense, the manifestation of that state's particular *world view*, as articulated by its government; and supposedly shared by its people.

In addition, it is argued that the eight selected imperatives (*vide* paragraph 3.3.3. *supra*) may also exert their impact, separately or collectively, on SA and PRC foreign policy decision makers. Consequently, this chapter also looks at these various imperatives and the way in which they help shape the respective foreign policies of South Africa and the People's Republic of China.

## 5.2. Originators of foreign policy

It is argued that every state has a *world view* (Dushkin. 1974: 310) - an idea or particular way in which its leaders perceive the world (*vide* {12}WS. 2001) - and that a state's world view may influence both the dominant political group (political party organisation) and the dominant political authority (government of the day) toward particular actions, decisions or responses. In this context, *state* refers to the decision makers who are responsible for directly influencing or making public policy or, more specifically, foreign policy. In this regard the world views and perceptions of state leaders (Roy. 1998: 36) (who also are, or have been, party leaders) may be specially relevant.

World view originators, traumatic historical, cultural and ideological influences that have left a deep imprint on the national leadership and the national psyche over a long period of time, may also act as the originators of foreign policy. China, for example, appears to have a long history of cyclical unification and disintegration (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 70). Currently Taiwan symbolises disintegration. Consequently, the PRC Government remains steadfastly committed to the reunification of China, even after the return of Hong Kong and Macao. Foreign domination and colonialism facilitated the disintegration of China and for this reason respect for the concept of sovereignty (IWAAS. 1998: 389) is a cornerstone of PRC foreign policy. South Africa, too, has experienced colonialism and foreign occupation and a lasting by-product of such domination was the experience of racism and *apartheid* and the effective spiritual genocide of the African people (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: 299). World view originators may drive a nation's leaders toward a particular choice of foreign policy and may cause that nation's citizens to support, or at least not oppose, such policy. Consequently, perceived world view originators which are also often the originators of foreign policy should, it is argued, not be omitted from an analysis of a state's foreign policy relationships. By identifying some of the ideological and traumatic origins of the main themes that appear to drive contemporary South African and PRC foreign policy, it is anticipated that an individual world view, in respect of each state, will be clearly discernible (*vide* chapter seven *infra*). Although

Hodgkinson does not refer specifically to a *world view* he does conceptualise (1982: 108),

*... a realm of behaviour and action with its incommensurable affinity of possibilities. Behaviours manifest as observable facts connected by inference through chains of cause and effect to the psychological phenomena of attitudes, value orientations, value, motives, and self-concept.*

The psychological phenomena referred to by Hodgkinson are closely related to the *world view* concept. Party ideology, traumatic historical experience, and individual and national value systems, are also among core initiators that may shape a particular world view.

### 5.3. South Africa's World View

South Africa's world view, as articulated by the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) (*vide*. Makhanya. *Sunday Times*. 20 May 2001: 17), the ruling alliance of political, social, economic and labour interests, has not escaped the influence of ideology, more specifically Marxism-Leninism (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: 10-11), but is arguably far more affected by the trauma of historical experience. *Apartheid*, racism, colonialism, imported values and the experience of revolutionary warfare, have all helped to shape South Africa's world view (*vide*. {2}SA. 2000 *speech*).

The ideological sources of South Africa's current domestic and foreign policy, as articulated by the ruling ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance, can be traced to the historical experiences of *apartheid*, racism, slavery and colonialism, and a determination to continue to oppose both racism and colonisation; the ideological influence of Marxism-Leninism and socialism ({2}ANC. 1997); the historical influence of capitalism ({1}SA. 1999: *Black Management Forum Speech*) and free market economic principles; revolutionism or the revolutionary experience; and

African nationalism, Pan-Africanism and the more recent emergence of a vision championed and articulated by President Thabo Mbeki as the *African Renaissance* (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 178), a term first used by Nelson Mandela in a speech to the Organisation of African Unity's meeting of heads of state on 13 June 1994 (Mills in SAIIA. 1998: 39).

South African society remains, for the most part, divided between Euro-centric and Afro-centric political and cultural affiliations and preferences that are perceived (Mbeki. 1999. *Parliamentary speech*, 29 May 1998: 71-72) by some in economic and racial terms (*vide* Uys. *The Sunday Independent*. 22 April 2001: 7; DFA. 20000822). A consequence of this division is that the *world view* articulated by the government may not be wholly representative of the *world views* of other segments of South African society (*vide* Leon. *The Sunday Independent*. 20 August 2000), including the relatively small but powerful (in terms of intellectual, economic and material resources) South African *European* community. President Mbeki, himself, alluded to this division (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 188) in his May 1998 address to the National Assembly on *reconciliation and nation building*.

a) *Apartheid*, racism and slavery

The current ANC-led government of South Africa came into existence as a result of a long-lasting political, diplomatic, economic and military battle against the forces of the *apartheid* government which was, itself (from 1948 to 1994), the ideologically motivated political product of an anti-colonial war which the forces of colonialism (Britain) had won during the first decade of the twentieth century. Although Afrikaners, like Americans before them, had been predominantly white victims of British colonialism (Pakenham. 1993: 287), *apartheid's* victims were black. *Apartheid*, therefore, tended to be perceived as a unique form of South African colonialism (DFA. 20000822), enshrined in law and aimed predominantly at exploiting the labour resources of the black community for the general benefit of South Africa's white community, particularly the Afrikaner community. Although the *apartheid* system had originally been directed toward the survival of Afrikanerdom,

all white South Africans benefited (*vide* Suzman. 1993: *prologue*). Ultimately black South Africans had to contend with the enormous obstacle of *apartheid* being deliberately placed between them and their own social, economic and political advancement. Consequently, *apartheid* served to polarise South African society at practically all levels along racial and ethnic lines. *Apartheid* has left a deep imprint on the national psyche, as reflected in numerous statements by leaders of post-*apartheid* South Africa as well as in legislation of the post-*apartheid* years (*vide* Hadland and Rantao.1999. *Parliamentary speech*. 29 May 1998: 184-187).

Slavery, although officially abolished in the British-ruled Cape Province in 1833 (WS. 2002: 1), has also left a deep and lasting impression on the people of South Africa. Slavery's abolition in the colonies facilitated the creation of the independent *Boer* republics and thereby extended the territory of the future South Africa; and arguably led to the introduction of new non-European ethnic groups and cultures from Asian lands, including India and China. Slavery's existence contributed to the future course of race relations through the *apartheid* era; and the economic disparity between white and non-white races in South Africa that is still in evidence today. An unfortunate consequence of its impact on South Africa's *world view* is that slavery is incorrectly (Ronay. 1978: 96-98; Fukuyama. 1992: 62 and 217) perceived as an institution whereby the only victims were black people and the only slave-traders and slave-owners were white (*vide* SA. 2000; *vide* WS. 2002: 2). There is even a concept of neo-slavery in which the developing world is portrayed as being enslaved by the developed world (*vide* DFA. 19980831. Mbeki *speech*: 31 August 1998).

## b) Marxism-Leninism and Socialism

The South African Communist Party (SACP) has been in existence for some eighty years (*vide* statements by SACP Secretary General quoted in the *Cape Argus*. 31 July, 2000: 2) and has been allied to the African National Congress (ANC) for some forty years. It also has a strong relationship with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) which is, in many respects, the labour arm of socialism in South Africa. South Africa's current Government of National Unity (GNU) comprises the

ANC-SACP-COSATU alliance as well as its coalition partner, the *Inkatha* Freedom Party (IFP).

Marxism-Leninism is founded on principles that are atheistic and anti-religious, in direct contrast to the *apartheid* government which subscribed to Calvinistic Christian principles and was for most of its existence vehemently anti-Communist. In fact, most South Africans, regardless of race, ethnicity or political views, claim adherence to a religious belief (*vide* {25}WS. 2002: 3). Consequently, members of the black liberation movements were themselves initially hesitant about forming alliances with communists because they did not want to be allied with atheists and apparently only changed their opinions after Zhou Enlai ({1}PRC. 1999: *speech*) assured them that the PRC permitted religious worship in China (President Mandela confirmed this during a conversation with Premier Zhu Rongji in Beijing in 1999) (*vide* DFA. 19990511).

Despite the small number of SACP members in South Africa, reportedly (*Cape Argus*. 31 July, 2000: 2) thirteen thousand paid up members, the party is very effective in placing its leading members in positions of influence and its current leadership includes ministers, deputy ministers, premiers, ambassadors and trade union leaders, among others, in key government positions ({2} 2001: Interview; *vide* Mills. 2000: 284).

In addition, as Parsons (1999: 3) points out,

*... certain groups apparently remain fixed in the ideological cast of collectivism, or socialism. But an added problem in South Africa has been the perception by many blacks that capitalism and apartheid are identical. Socialism is seen by many blacks as the true harbinger of economic security, freedom and prosperity.*

Thus there appears to be a natural familial political relationship between South Africa's leadership echelon and the CPC leaders of the PRC; a relationship that, due to the South African leadership's uncritical admiration of the PRC, tends to make the possibility of an equal and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship less certain, to the possible enduring detriment of South Africa.

c) Colonialism

In terms of white, particularly Afrikaner, South African history, South Africa was once an amalgam of British colonial territories, occupied by British military forces and subsequently subject to the sovereignty of the British monarch. In terms of black South African history, black South Africans were colonised first by the Dutch, then by the British and finally by white South Africans (*vide* DFA. 20000822; *vide* {25}WS. 2002: 1). The subject of colonialism has therefore never been far from the thoughts of South African leaders, and for most of the twentieth century was an important factor in determining the world view of the South African leadership. The leaders of the various *apartheid* administrations were, themselves, victims of British colonialism and their ultimate anti-colonial goal, achieved in 1961, was to establish South Africa as a sovereign republic outside what was then the British Commonwealth. Unfortunately, in successfully rejecting British sovereignty and dominance, white South Africans imposed what has been perceived as a form of neo-colonial rule or "... colonialism of a special type ..." (DFA. 20000822), over black South Africans in the form of *apartheid*. In this regard, President Thabo Mbeki has (DFA. 20000822) stated that,

*... in our situation, because of the colonialism of a special type, the victory of the national liberation struggle did not result in the departure of the foreign ruling class .... Any honest person will also understand that in six years of national emancipation, it is impossible to wipe out a legacy of over 300 years of colonial domination and to transform ours into a truly non-racial society.*

Party political publications routinely refer to the legacy of colonialism: For example the African National Congress publication, *Umrabulo* (ANC. 1997: 3) has stated that “... the legacy of colonialism and minority rule ...” has identified the goals and motivated the social forces that aspire to those goals in their quest to transform South African society.

d) Capitalism and free market economic principles

South Africa’s political and economic institutions have largely been shaped by the political and economic experiences, expertise and influence of Western states, particularly Britain and Holland, and the United States. Despite the race-based exclusivism of *apartheid*, South Africa never experienced dictatorship and Marxist socialism was never able to displace the power of capitalism or usurp the role of existing free market economic principles within the South African market place. As President Mbeki has confirmed, South Africa is a capitalist country (SA. 1999: *Black Management Forum Speech*).

e) Revolutionism

At a time when the de-colonisation of Africa had begun, and the Cold War divisions between East and West, or between capitalism and communism, were well advanced, liberation movements in some African states, including South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, had already found it necessary to take up arms against perceived (DFA. 19980929) “... slavery, colonialism and neo-colonialism ...” in order to win their independence. The influence of the revolutionary experience is still reflected in SA’s political leadership, as acknowledged by President Thabo Mbeki (SA.1999) who declared:

*Because racism lives, the struggle continues! Because of that, the ANC must remain what it has been for many decades, a movement for the elimination of the legacy of the system of racism, in the interest of all South Africans.*



During preparations for the ANC's Conference held in December, 1997, it was made clear to South Africans that the ANC still considered itself to be in the midst of an ongoing revolutionary struggle.

*The character of the ANC must be determined by the nature of the core tasks that confront the national democratic revolution (NDR) in our country in any specific historical time. The democratic breakthrough of April 1994 was an important moment in our liberation struggle. ... Even with the ... enormous transformation that is underway, the legacy of centuries of colonial oppression, and decades of white minority rule, continue to be the reality that defines our society. The character of the ANC is informed by the over-riding, strategic imperative of overcoming the consequences of this legacy.* (ANC. 1997. *Umrabulo*: 3).

Even when discussing such topics as the African Renaissance South Africa's President sometimes draws on revolutionary analogies to inspire support for his vision when he compares African Renaissance activists to militants and revolutionaries (DFA. 19980929). Further reminders of *revolutionism*, or the revolutionary experience, occur when, even the Minister of Foreign Affairs (DFA. 20001222) occasionally chooses to refer to her diplomatic personnel, in military (Hanks. 1971: p. 243) revolutionary terms, as "... cadres of the Department ..."

f) Pan Africanism, African Nationalism and the African Renaissance

At the beginning of the de-colonisation era, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was Africa's champion of the cause of Pan Africanism which envisioned an African community championing African causes, protecting African interests and projecting African unity (*vide* Kornegay in *The Star*. 7 June 2000: 15). The Pan African Congress (PAC) in South Africa reflected some of these themes. African nationalism was more narrowly defined in that it was more directly linked to the immediate process of de-colonisation. African Nationalism's message was that African states were to be

governed directly by Africans and found a popular rallying cry in the slogan, “Africa for the Africans” (*vide* {26}WS. 1996). In South Africa the Black Consciousness movement (*vide* Suzman. 1993: 224) was part of this political culture as were organisations like the Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO).

The concept of an African Renaissance articulates the view that Africa is ready to renew itself and to develop economically, politically and socially (Mbeki *speech* in Hadland & Rantao. 1999: 170-183). The concept envisages Africans working together for the common good of Africa and the people of Africa; and aspires to the common, and global, recognition and appreciation of Africa’s cultural heritage and achievements. The African Renaissance aims, ultimately, to ensure that Africa is treated with respect by the rest of the world. Interestingly, the universal desire for recognition is a primary theme of Francis Fukuyama (1992: xvii) who, borrowing from Hegelian philosophy, contends that,

*... the desire for recognition, and the accompanying emotions of anger, shame, and pride, are parts of the human personality critical to political life. According to Hegel, they are what drives the whole historical process.*

In South Africa today, the theme of an African Renaissance has been vigorously developed and promoted by President Thabo Mbeki, who has stated:

*As every revolution requires revolutionaries, so must the African Renaissance have its militants and activists who will define the morrow that belongs to them in a way which will help to restore to us our dignity (DFA. 19980929).*

The impact of the African Renaissance concept on SA foreign policy is reflected in The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund Bill (DFA. 20001013) which is the first Bill, for a number of years, to be presented to Parliament by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The Bill’s main aims are to provide

development funds for use in Africa in accordance with the African Renaissance concept, and under the supervision and control of DFA (DFA. 20001013).

A branch of the Botswana-based African Renaissance Institute has also been established in South Africa (DFA. 20000822) with a view to the further study and promotion of the African Renaissance. This reflects on the one hand the seriousness with which South Africa is approaching the task of translating the concept of an African Renaissance into reality, although it should be pointed out that the establishment of the Institute emanated from Botswana; on the other hand, the establishment of the South African branch of the Institute symbolises, in practical terms, the permanency of the vision of African rejuvenation as an ongoing goal of the Mbeki administration (2000: *Interview*).

g) Imported values

Despite the quest for an African Renaissance South Africa's historical and cultural development has been deeply and unalterably affected by its European colonial experience which brought with it the influences of Roman-Dutch and English law; the Judeo-Christian value system; the Christian religion; sophisticated political institutions; and two of the eleven official languages (English and Afrikaans). The potential and actual influence of these imported values upon the world view of the South African leadership may be specially significant in South Africa's bilateral relationships with states that do not share similar experiences or similar values. In this regard it is worth noting that the PRC has relatively little in common with South Africa. Although the Christian religion has, over a period of more than three centuries, deeply influenced the lives of South Africans across the ethnic and political spectrum, other religions, such as Islam (*vide* {27}WS. 2002: Itano in the *Christian Science Monitor*. 10 January 2002) and Hinduism, particularly since the demise of the *apartheid* state, are also competing to help shape South Africa's evolving *world view* (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh.1997: 307).

In contrast to the situation pertaining to the Chinese mainland, South Africa's leaders often argue in favour of an African renaissance while conversing in an imported language and quoting, at length, the words of (the non-African) William Shakespeare (*vide* DFA. 20000822). Clearly, the impact of imported values has made South Africa what it is today and, for this reason, the world view exhibited by South Africa's leadership, under the country's existing constitution, is likely to reflect a balance between some imported non-African influences and the indigenous influences of Africa, such as the concept of *Ubuntu* (Mbigi and Maree. 1995: 1). There are some imported values, however, that have left their mark in both the PRC and South Africa, albeit in the latter case to a far less spectacular extent. These were the values of Marx and Lenin that gave rise to communist parties in both countries.

#### 5.4. PRC's World View

The PRC's major public policy ideological sources, including foreign policy ideological sources, constitute a combination of Chinese classical philosophical thought, as reflected, for example, in the teachings of Confucius (Kim. 1998: 259) and the military tactics and strategies of Sun Zi (Roy. 1998: 121; 207); the nationalism of Sun Yat-Sen (*vide* De Crespigny. 1992: 59); and the Marxist-Leninist theory and Marxist derivative philosophies and theories as developed by Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiao Ping (PRC. 2000. *Constitution: Article 12 as revised: 15 March 1999*) and, more recently, Jiang Zemin (*vide* Ching in *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 28 December 2000-4 January 2001: 29).

In the historical sense there is the experience, extending throughout China's history, of unification and greatness off-set by division and chaos (*vide* Jian *et al.* 1986: 17), occupation by foreign forces, foreign domination and humiliation (CPC. 1997: 137), enduring pride in past magnificent accomplishments, a deep sense of history (Jian *et al.* 1986: 242-243) and a belief in the historical inevitability of China's greatness and future success. Culturally, Confucianism, respect for education and the need for self-improvement, still exert profound influences on the people of the PRC (De Bary.

1998: 134-135). The PRC's world view is undoubtedly a product of these and many other influences.

a) Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiao Ping and Jiang Zemin

An examination of the contributions of particularly Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai (Lu. 1997: 155) and Deng Xiaoping (Lu. 1997: 157) toward the PRC's past and present foreign policy, may be a useful way to gauge how the PRC perceives the outside world. As Swaine (1995: 3) points out,

*China remains a country governed by personalities, not laws or institutions. In the history of modern China, individual leaders such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping have exerted an inordinately high level of influence over the course of events, especially in the foreign policy realm.*

Mao's influence on the foreign policy of the PRC extended from 1949 to 1976 (Zhao. 1996: 4). According to Zhao (1996: 46), in 1949 Mao established three principles as the basis for PRC foreign policy:

- *Lingqi luzao*: literally "to start up the fire in a new stove" meaning that the new China should initiate diplomatic relations with every country on a new basis;
- *Dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke*: "to clean house first and then invite guests" meaning to consolidate the regime internally and then develop foreign relations;
- *Yibiandao*: "leaning to one side" meaning (under Mao) to favour the Soviet Union.

It can be argued that Mao's three principles are still much in evidence today. For example, the establishment of diplomatic relations with South Africa appears to have followed the principle of *lingqi luzao*; the quest to join the World Trade Organisation and successful bid for the 2008 Olympic Games have arguably proceeded in terms of *dasao ganjing wuzi zai qingke*; and the PRC's reliance on third world support

(2001. *Interview*; Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 293) to counter perceived United States hegemony, isolate Taiwan, and avoid international censure for perceived human rights abuses, appears to be a manifestation of the principle of *yibiandao* whereby the anticipated third world response is predicated upon expectations by developing states that the PRC will continue to lean in their direction.

In the realm of foreign policy, as Lu Ning (1997: 2) has described,

*...by the end of the first decade of the communist victory a strong man model emerged in China's foreign policy decision making. Together with high level appointments and military affairs, foreign policy decision making became one of the three most centralised areas in China's political system. Mao, as Chairman of the Communist Party and its Military Commission, dominated foreign policy decision making until his death in 1976.*

The era of Mao, the revolutionary, was also an era of revolutionary foreign policy. In 1965 an editorial in the People's Daily (Zhao: 1996 : 48) specifically called for "world revolution" as a guide for Chinese foreign policy. "...Mao's idea that China was a revolutionary power and that it must support revolutionaries in other countries prevailed among the top leadership in Beijing..." (Zhao. 1996: 48). Mao's enduring influence was confirmed soon after his death by the principle of the "two whatevers" (*vide* paragraph 1.6 *supra*) which declared that his instructions and decisions were to be adhered to without question.

Zhou Enlai's contribution to PRC foreign policy took place during the era of Mao Zedong, whom he assisted with all the important decisions (Lu. 1997: 94). There is some evidence (Lu. 1997: 155) that Zhou's contribution was, up until his illness in 1974, more in the role of influencer and implementer of policy that was effectively decided by Mao. Nevertheless, Zhou's expertise helped give shape to China's foreign policy in ways that are relevant today. For example, during a visit to India in 1954 as Premier (he was also the PRC foreign minister), Zhou Enlai and the Indian prime

minister issued a joint statement (India-PRC.1954: *Joint Statement*) setting out what have since become known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

- mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
- non-aggression;
- non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
- equality and mutual benefit; and
- peaceful co-existence.

These five principles still form the basis upon which PRC foreign policy is constructed.

Deng Xiaoping's impact on PRC foreign policy commenced in 1978 (Zhao. 1996: 4). It was in that year, in a speech (Zhao. 1996: 51) making modernisation the priority for both domestic and foreign policy, that Deng Xiaoping (1984: 102) declared:

*Only if we make our country a modern, powerful socialist state can we more effectively consolidate the socialist system and cope with foreign aggression and subversion.*

In the beginning of 1980 Deng established three tasks (Zhao. 1996: 51) for the PRC to focus on during the decade ahead:

- to “oppose hegemonism” and to “preserve world peace”;
- to work on “China's re-unification” with Taiwan; and
- to “step up the drive for China's four modernisations”.

A consequence, for developing countries, of Deng's determination to replace Mao's revolutionary foreign policy with his own modernisation or development-focused (Zhao. 1996: 51) foreign policy, was that although “...the Third World rhetoric continued, ... Deng was no longer preoccupied with trying to build alliances among the have-nots, but rather sought to join the haves as quickly as possible by making a

separate peace with the global status quo...” (Kim. 1998: 156). Deng was very much a pragmatist. For example, in commenting on the requirements of *patriotism*, with regard to the administration of Hong Kong, Deng Xiaoping (Evans. 1997 :270) also revealed a degree of tolerance for the concept of *slavery* that, on the African continent and elsewhere, would be extremely unpopular, when he said:

*The qualifications for a patriot are respect for the Chinese nation, sincere support for the motherland's resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong and a desire not to impair Hong Kong's prosperity and stability. Those who meet these requirements are patriots, **whether they believe in capitalism, or feudalism or even slavery.** (my emphasis).*

Jiang Zemin has already begun to make his mark on PRC domestic and foreign policy. While his domestic focus has reflected the importance he attaches to the preservation of economic, social and political stability, economic growth, and the continued dominance of the Communist Party, his main military, foreign economic and foreign policy concerns have focused on the following:

- defending China' sovereignty;
- re-unification of China (re-incorporation of Taiwan);
- strengthening of the United Nations;
- opposing perceived United States hegemony;
- joining the World trade Organisation (WTO); and
- strengthening and modernising the PLA;

b) Marxism-Leninism and Socialism

As Denny Roy (1998: 14) emphasises,

*... the CCP regime came to power with a Marxist world view. A class struggle, a conflict between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', was thought to be the driving force of history, not only in individual*



*states but also in international relations. World history was moving through stages; it was inevitable that capitalism would give way to socialism and eventually the utopia of communism. Capitalist states would therefore see the rise of socialist states as a mortal threat and strive desperately to repress and destroy them. Imperialism by the capitalist states was considered the principal cause of war.*

The influence of Marxism-Leninism in the PRC is not only reflected in all facets of the institutions of government but is also enshrined in the country's Constitution, as reflected in the preamble of that document (*vide* {1}PRC. 2000. *Amendments to the Constitution*: article 12).

*Under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, the Chinese people of all nationalities will continue to adhere to the people's democratic dictatorship and the socialist road...*

This article of the Constitution, amended only to include reference to Deng Xiaoping, reflects yet again the political supremacy of the Communist party of China; the focus of PRC leadership, at any given time, upon a single individual; and long-term commitment to the socialist economic and political system.

c) Imperialism, colonialism and invasion

As David Landes (1999: 422-423) points out, although terms such as *imperialism* and *colonialism* are often used interchangeably, they can also have distinctive meanings. *Imperialism* may denote the system, principle or spirit of empire, “... the dominion of one country over others ...” (Landes. 1999: 423) whereby subject peoples are absorbed or dispersed. *Colonialism*, however, particularly in the modern sense, may be taken to mean any economically or politically dependant condition, regardless of whether it leads to the displacement of the indigenous population. In the history of

China, *invasion*, “... the act of invading or entering as an enemy ...” (Hanks. 1971: 835), has invariably accompanied *imperialist* designs. For example, the Mongol invasion of China established the *Yuan* dynasty that ruled over all of China during the period 1271-1368 A.D. (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 153). The *Yuan* were followed by more foreign invaders, in the form of the *Manchus* who established the *Ming* dynasty during the period 1368-1644 (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 177). Remarkably, however, China absorbed and survived these invasions and resultant imperialism, which lasted almost four centuries, without losing the essence of its Han Chinese identity. As Fairbank and Reischauer explain (1990: 152):

*The stability of the Chinese political order lay partly in its capacity to let non-Chinese, when they were strong enough, rule over it without changing its fundamental features.*

Subsequently, in the late nineteenth century, China was confronted by Japanese imperialism, which saw the invasion of the north-eastern region of the Chinese mainland (Hunt. 1996: 39; Roy. 1998: 11) as well as the occupation and subjugation of *Formosa* (present-day Taiwan) (Jian *et al.* 1981: 110; Roy. 1998: 130). By 1931 (Jian *et al.* 1981: 186), Japan had succeeded in establishing a puppet *Manchukuo* (Manchuria) government to rule over more than 30 million Chinese and two million square kilometres of territory that they had successfully conquered. It was the Japanese occupation, probably more than any other event, that set China on the road of Communism and Socialism because it was in reaction to Japanese imperialism (Jian *et al.* 1981: 140) that the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement (of 1919) came into being and, together with Russia’s October revolution, helped spawn the Communist Party of China. Consequently, it has been stated (Jian *et al.* 1981: 143) that:

*The October Socialist Revolution and the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement radically changed the course of Chinese history. The Chinese revolution became part of the world proletarian socialist revolution. The Chinese democratic revolution became a revolution led by the working class, and China passed from*

*the era of the old democratic revolution (Which overthrew traditional dynastic rule) into that of the new democratic revolution (which aimed to establish a new China), which was ushered in by the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement (My additions in regular type).*

But what of the impact of *colonialism* on the future of China? British Hong Kong (Jian *et al.* 1964: 89 and 112), Portuguese Macao (Fairbank and Reischauer. 1990: 329), and Japanese *Formosa* (Taiwan) (Roy. 1998: 167; Hanks. 1971: 1597), were all colonies of these various states. There were once, in the nineteenth century, also a number of mainland Chinese cities, or *treaty ports*, that came under the influence and jurisdiction of various great powers (Roberts. 2000: 34-35). These cities very much resembled *colonies* and became a source of national humiliation and impotence (Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 210) for successive generations of Chinese.

Following the first *Opium War* of 1839-1842, directed against the *Qing* government by foreign states, the victorious countries received extensive economic, political and social privileges within China through a series of treaties that effectively impaired Chinese sovereignty (Jian *et al.* 1964: 90) and which the Chinese, ever since, have regarded as unequal in substance and mean of spirit. According to Jian Bozan *et al* (1964: 103) "... after its defeat in the Opium Wars, China began to acquire the characteristics of a semi-colonial country."

d) Confucius and other classical Chinese thinkers

Apart from some negative perceptions about Confucianism during the first half of the twentieth century (Ding. 1997: 213; Zhang. 1999: 14), including influential elements of the PRC leadership during the Maoist era (Burstein and de Keijzer. 1999: 314), Confucianism exerted a profound influence on Chinese thought from 140 B.C. when it was first adopted officially.

*Throughout this long period the thinking and behaviour of people from all levels of society, from emperors and ministers to peasants*

*and craftsman, were invariably permeated with Confucianism. Whether in court politics or in the daily life of the common people, signs of his influence could be seen everywhere* (Ding. 1997: 214).

In recent years the influence of Confucianism has been increasingly acknowledged by the PRC's Communist leaders, among them President Jiang Zemin (Burstein and de Keijzer. 1999: 314). However, as some observers (Lam. 1999: 279) have noted, Confucian teachings are only selectively being utilised in the PRC to bolster the primacy of the Communist Party as, for example, in relation to "... obedience to elders (particularly party elders); and knowing and sticking to one's station in life (particularly as it was determined by the party) ...". As far as relations between states are concerned, and between individual statesmen, it is also useful to keep in mind that China is more than 5000 years old and that the PRC's senior leaders tend to be of advanced age. The leaders and people of the PRC therefore expect to be treated with a pre-eminent degree of respect (Roy. 1998: 37), sometimes to a point of perceived unreasonableness, as occurred during President Nelson Mandela's State Visit to the PRC in 1999 when he was expected to (and did) call on the Chairman of the NPC, Li Peng. In terms of protocol, Chairman Li (equivalent to South Africa's parliamentary Speaker) should have called on President Mandela.

In the realm of Chinese foreign policy a fundamental objective (as opposed to an incidental by-product of some other objective) is for the PRC and its leaders to learn, and gain information and knowledge, from other states. In this approach, there is also a Confucian element because, as Yang Muzhi (1999: 10) has noted, Confucius believed that wherever three people would come together, at least one of them would be able to teach the others something; and that this maxim encompasses a principle that the Chinese people have always followed in their dealings with others, including at the level of state-to-state relations. In similar vein, Griffith (1971: 178) has noted that the view of Mencius (*Ming Ze*), a disciple of Confucius, that a small state cannot successfully oppose a large state, that few people cannot successfully oppose many, and that the weak cannot defeat the strong (Yang. 1999: 21), is a maxim that is taken seriously by the Chinese and can be discerned in the world view of the PRC, in

regard to its own self-image. For example, in the wake of ineffective post-Tiananmen sanctions against the PRC, Qiao Shi, a leading member of the Central Committee of the CPC, declared (Roy. 1998: 38) in 1993:

*China, as a large country with more than one billion people, cannot be isolated. We ourselves are a world and not a small one. There is nothing to be afraid of.*

The writings of Sun Zi on the art of war have also exerted considerable influence on Chinese decision makers in the military, political and business sphere. For example, Griffith ( 1971: 45) states that Mao Zedong was “... strongly influenced ... by Sun Zi’s thought. This is apparent in his works which deal with military strategy and tactics and is particularly evident in *On Guerrilla Warfare*, *On the Protracted War*, and *Strategic Problems of China’s Revolutionary War...*”

Former General Secretary of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, had the following to say about Sun Zi:

*Since Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought is the crystallisation of the cultural and scientific riches of humanity and the ideological weapon for perceiving and transforming the world, and Sun Zi has been a brilliant gem in the treasure house of China’s ancient culture to be worked to serve the development of China’s new national culture, wouldn’t it very well accord with the basic demands of Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought to explore Sun Zi’s rich legacy under the guidelines of Marxism-Mao Zedong Thought to help improve our business management and promote China’s modernisation drive?*

The acknowledged ({{1}} 2001. *Interview*) influence of Confucius, Sun Zi and other classical Chinese writers and thinkers is apparent at many levels of government within the PRC today.

e) Revolutionism

The People's Republic of China has a system of government that, after fifty years, still resembles a revolutionary party (the Communist Party of China) in a governing role, that may be best described as government by committee. The first significant revolution of the twentieth century took place in China when Dr Sun Yat-sen overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911 (De Crespigny. 1992: 55) and founded the Republic of China (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998/1999*: 22). Thus began China's long period of revolutionism which encapsulated the May 4th movement (Roberts. 2000: 154), the founding of the Communist Party of China (Hunt. 1996: 85), the Northern Expedition, the anti-Japanese War (De Crespigny. 1992: 145) and the Civil War, which culminated in the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 (Ch'en. 1967: 312). The entire Mao Zedong era which lasted from 1949 to 1976 was a radical revolutionary period (Zhao. 1996: 40-41); an era which included the Cultural Revolution which lasted from May 1966 to October, 1976 and which was initiated and led by Mao Zedong (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook. 1998 1999*: 27).

*(Mao's) .. principal theses were that ... representatives of the bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionary revisionists had sneaked into the Party, the government, the army ... and leadership ... was no longer in the hands of Marxists and the people; that Party persons in power taking the capitalist road had formed a bourgeois headquarters inside the Central Committee ...; that the power usurped ... could be recaptured only by carrying out a great cultural revolution, by openly and fully mobilising the broad masses from the bottom up ...; and that the cultural revolution was .. a great political revolution in which one class would overthrow another... a revolution ... waged time and again. ... These theses were incorporated into a general theory - the "theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."*

Although Mao's theses were subsequently adjudged by the Communist Party to be "...erroneous ..." (PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 27) the Cultural Revolution was nevertheless a product of *revolutionism* that left deep and enduring effects on the PRC and its people.

f) Chinese nationalism

China's rulers have always sought to protect their country - the Middle Kingdom - from unwanted non-Chinese influences. Traditionally, the Chinese did not think in terms of other countries and civilisations. As Ching has pointed out (*Far Eastern Economic Review*. 9 July 1998: 32), "... their view was that there was China and then there were uncivilised barbarians. There was no notion of other countries that were China's equal." China's long history is full of unhappy encounters with foreign states, including wars fought against such states (Deng and Wang. 1999: 243); conquest, occupation and humiliation by such states (Roberts. 2000: 115-116); and destruction and theft of its historical and cultural treasures (Shen. 1997: 339) by such states. For most of its history, China also did not deliberately seek to export its culture although its arts, crafts and inventions did ultimately become known to the West through the activities of travellers, traders and European missionaries (Shen. 1997: 292-297). Even Admiral Zheng He's epic voyages into the Indian Ocean (*vide* Levathes. 1996: 173-174), which were aimed at commerce, not conquest, and which resulted in the commencement of trade between China and East Africa, proved far less spectacular in terms of their consequences than the subsequent voyages of the European discoverers. The voyage of a Chinese sailing ship around Cape Agulhas to the Atlantic ocean in 1420 (Shen. 1997: 191) might well have changed the course of South African, European and Chinese history, had these intrepid mariners been more curious about the land nearby.

Nationalism and xenophobia (Landes. 1999: 345), during most of China's history, served to lessen the impact of potentially disruptive imported values by either curtailing those influences, rejecting them entirely, or by absorbing and overwhelming them. Nonetheless, the former colonies of *Xianggang* (Hong Kong) and *Aomen*

(Macao) (Roberts. 2000: 276-277), and the territory of Taiwan (Roberts. 2000: 278), were penetrated by imported values and continue to be influenced by those values.

g) Imported values

The *globalisation* process may be perceived by some PRC leaders as politically threatening to the PRC because of the increasing difficulty of curtailing, controlling or rejecting the influences of imported values. Expressed objections to perceived American hegemony also include an implied objection to imported American values (*vide* Robinson and Shambaugh. 1997: 601). Deng Xiaoping reportedly (Hunt. 1996: 217) stressed that, “if China were going to open its doors, it needed to fit them with a socialist screen to keep out the pests, above all ‘*bourgeois liberalism*’ in all its troubling variety...” However, China has not rejected all non-Chinese values or non-Chinese ideas. Marxism-Leninism is an example of an enduring non-Chinese value system of economic practice and political ideology but even this imported political philosophy has been modified in China into a form now referred to as “... socialism with Chinese characteristics ...” (in much the same way as the imported Dutch language was modified in South Africa into the indigenous Afrikaans language). There are those (Chen. 1999: 86) who argue, however, that Marxism is not a purely foreign culture to China.

*As a theory concerning the proletariat of the world, Marxism is of international significance. Although Marx and Engels were German, Marxism is not just a German cultural element belonging only to Germans. Rather it belongs to the proletariat and progressive people throughout the world. ... More importantly, for the Chinese people, Marxism embodies their own creation and development, ... Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping's Theory ... This is Marxism that ... is itself ... the core and soul of modern culture in China.*

Important manifestations of western capitalism, legal practices, and political freedoms were also imported into China, but for the most part remained confined to



the former colonial territories (Roberts. 2000: 276-277). Taiwanese agriculture, as well as the island's railway transportation system, also benefited as a result of the Japanese colonial experience (Roberts. 2000: 278).

Religion, particularly Buddhism, described by Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 83) as, “.. an alien religion ..(that).. menaced the ideological basis of Chinese society...” is another imported value that has left an imprint on the culture of China although, even before the communist triumph in 1949, atheism was quite well-established. Official PRC sources ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 370) list the main religions in the PRC as Buddhism, Taoism, Islam and Christianity. There are no reliable figures regarding the number of adherents but PRC authorities have provided some statistics reflecting the number of recognised places of worship and registered clergy ({{2}}PRC. 1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 371) as follows:

	Buddhism	Taoism	Islam	Christianity	
				Catholics	Protestants
Places of worship:	9 500	600	26 000	4 000	28 000
Clergy:	170 000	6 000	40 000	2 700	18 000

Islam and Christianity and Judaism are among a few religions that are tolerated by the Chinese authorities; tolerated but not necessarily encouraged. All religious organisations in the PRC, as in the case of the eight recognised political parties (PRC. 2000/2001: *interviews a-g*), must acknowledge the supremacy of the Communist Party of China and can only exist if they are willing to make that acknowledgement. Consequently, the true Roman Catholic Church is not permitted to function in the PRC. Catholic Bishops who do operate in the PRC have therefore not been ordained by the Pope ({{3}}2002. *Interview*).

Buddhism, has been a part of China's culture for 2000 years ({{2}}PRC.1999. *Yearbook 1998 1999*: 371). Among the branches of Buddhism that have prevailed in China, the

Tibetan form of Buddhism, known as Lamaism, may be specially relevant, because of the impact of the concept of the living Buddha and the actual and potential influence, political and spiritual, of the exiled Dalai Lama.

In the Tibet Autonomous Region and Xinjiang Autonomous Region, particularly, many among the Tibetan and Uighur ethnic minority groups (Roberts. 2000: 275-276) are devout practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism and Islam, respectively. Nevertheless, in a population of 1.2 billion even 100 million faithful followers of Islam and Lamaism would represent a relatively small percentage of the total population. It has been argued by Fairbank and Reischauer (1990: 110) that Buddhism's "... lasting contributions tend to be additions to traditional Chinese culture rather than fundamental alterations of native values ...". Therefore, perhaps the major Buddhist contributions to the PRC's world view are their reinforcement of concepts such as the value of self-discipline, self-improvement and patience (Brahm. 1996: xi) that are also essentially Confucian, in which case, if this view is correct, religion in the PRC probably does not contribute significantly to the country's perceived world view as interpreted by the leadership of the PRC.

## 5.5. World view foreign policy matrix applicable to South Africa

### 5.5.1. Historical imperative

The historical imperative that appears to drive contemporary South Africa has important international significance arising from bondage imposed by history; those historical factors from which many South Africans, and their leaders, simply cannot escape and which collectively compel distrust of the former colonial powers and wealthy industrial states, particularly the United States and the states of the European Union. For example, South Africa's leaders exhibit fewer expressions of "friendship" (*vide* DFA. 2001 *Background*: 30) or "shared values" (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4) toward the predominantly white-ruled Anglo-Saxon Protestant democracies. In addition, those states that were perceived as having been close to the

*apartheid* government of South Africa, such as Israel and Taiwan (which the *apartheid* government and the first ANC administration both recognised as The Republic of China), have increasingly been kept at a distance by the South African Government. Although history is often used very selectively as a stimulus to political action, as in the case of arguments against colonialism and the quest for compensation in regard to slavery, it is the interpretation of history (*vide* Roberts. 2000: xiv) and not necessarily its accuracy, that gives rise to the historical imperative.

South Africa, unlike the United States and the People's Republic of China, does not appear to exhibit any recognisable affinity for the concepts of manifest destiny (*vide* Ranney. 1971: 571-572) or historical inevitability (*vide* Roy. 1998: 14). The closest that South Africa comes to reflecting on its place in history, from a future perspective, is its apparent recognition that it is capable of playing a leading role in the multilateral environment of regional international relations, particularly in the context of African politics; and that it ought to do so with a view to promoting world peace, respect for human rights and advancing black economic, political and social upliftment (*vide* SA. 2001. *Strategic Plan 2000-2005*: 29-30).

#### 5.5.2. Political imperative

The political imperative necessarily includes what would otherwise be described separately as the "ideological imperative" because, in the case of states such as the People's Republic of China and even the Republic of South Africa, Marxist ideology and the "ideology" of *apartheid*, respectively, have played, and continue to play, significant roles in the determination of the foreign policies of these states. The rejection of political and social discrimination in all its forms, particularly racial discrimination, is a manifestation of the traumatic *apartheid* experience; and the public displays of admiration for some Marxist states, such as Cuba, by South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs (*vide* Barber in *Business Day*. 30 March 2001: 4; *Sunday Times*. 8 April 2001: 2), among others, leave little doubt that Marxist ideology and practice is still much admired within the ranks of the current government of South Africa (*vide* WS. 2000. Kindra in *Daily Mail & Guardian*. 17 May 2000).

The ANC government, however, has generally given formal ideology a low profile, preferring instead to stay well away from the ideological rhetoric of the revolutionary era that, among other demands, called for the nationalisation of banks and mining houses (*vide* Mandela. 1997: 642). Instead, ideology has in a sense been replaced by the projection of a vision for Africa, in the form of the envisaged *African Renaissance* (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: *speech* in Hong Kong, 17 April 1998: 224). As a guide for South Africa's future this vision is drawn from a somewhat inflated historical record of African cultural achievement; a *renaissance* aimed at recapturing an African civilisation that some suggest may never have existed. As Huntington (1997: 47) points out, "... most major scholars of civilisation except Braudel do not recognise a distinct African civilisation. Historically, Ethiopia constituted a civilisation of its own. Elsewhere, European imperialism and settlements brought elements of Western civilisation ..."

The South African leadership's optimistic perception of Africa's historical achievements has been articulated most conspicuously by President Mbeki, and represents a very necessary foundation for his conception of an *African Renaissance*. Although it is essentially a vision, the importance attached to it by President Mbeki, and therefore the Government of South Africa, with additional support from a few other African leaders, has raised the *African Renaissance* to the level of a political imperative. As Mbeki (Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 178) has stated,

*in the political sphere, the African Renaissance has begun. ...*  
*... Our **history** demands that we do everything in our power to defend the gains that have ... been achieved... Such are the **political imperatives** of the African Renaissance which are inspired ... by our painful history ... and the recognition ... that none of (Africa's) countries is an island which can isolate itself from the rest, and that none of us can truly succeed if the rest fail (my emphasis).*

Apart from ideology and political vision, however, there are important factors that have to do with the maintenance of political power; and contribute substantially to the essential nature of the political imperative. Contemporary South Africa's political imperative has been effectively demonstrated by the successive administrations of the ANC government of the new South Africa; achievement and preservation of black political power in South Africa and the search for international assistance (Mills. 2000: 274-275) that will, in a variety of manifestations, support this domestic agenda. Thus the political imperative has an important domestic aspect which feeds and sustains its international aspect and *vice versa*.. Domestically the political imperative's objectives are as follows:

- the preservation of national security and sovereignty (as a means to the avoidance of future subjugation and in order to preserve constitutionally agreed civil liberties) (*vide* {4}SA. 1996. *Constitution*: paragraph 83 {b});
- delivery on promises made, and expectations raised, during the revolutionary anti-*apartheid* era (as a means to retaining political leadership and control) (SA. 2001. *Strategic Plan:2000-2001*: paragraph 2); and
- maintenance of control of the political leadership of South Africa (as a means to ensure the continuation of the political and ideological direction of the state) (*vide* Hadland and Rantao. 1999: 108).

Internationally, South Africa's political imperatives seem directed toward making South Africa and Africa relevant within the international environment. The battle fought against white overlordship by the liberation movements in *apartheid* South Africa, is being continued internationally by the Government of South Africa, most noticeably in the diplomatic multilateral arena (*vide* Mbeki. 1999: 275-281), in order to empower itself and other African states within the international environment; and to avoid being re-colonised or enslaved, through perceived or actual economic domination or diplomatic entanglement, by the world's big powers, particularly those predominantly white-ruled Anglo-Saxon Protestant countries that were once colonial

or slave-owning states. Among these political imperatives the concept of an *African renaissance* can be a significant inspirational force.

### 5.5.3. Economic imperative

The economic imperative has been encapsulated in the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) programme (Hadland and Rantao.1999: 95-96) which is essentially a domestic plan of economic action that must also draw upon resources emanating from the international or external environmental *milieu* if the programme is to be successful (*vide* DFA. 19980706). In this regard some of the following economic objectives are complementary to the GEAR programme.

- economic advancement of, particularly, black South Africans;
- the growth of the South African economy, inclusive of the promotion of foreign trade, incoming investment, increased export productivity and increased incoming international tourism;
- effective preparation for the impact of globalisation upon the South African economy; and
- making South Africa and the Southern African region more economically competitive.

However, for GEAR to have any chance of success South Africa needs to maintain positive, mutually beneficial, relations with the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands because these countries account for a substantial volume of South Africa's total trade (SARS. *Statistics*. 1998; *vide* Mills in SAIIA. 1998: 43).

### 5.5.4. Social imperative

There appears to be a deep-rooted need to project an African culture within South Africa and to shake off some of the trappings of European culture that, during the *apartheid* years, made South Africa seem more Western than African. A

manifestation of the social imperative is that, in the rush to project South Africa's *African* face to the outside world, the country's diplomatic service has chosen to fill South Africa's embassies and consulates with men and women of colour, sometimes at the expense of suitability or experience. There is an abundance of political appointments, as ambassadors and high commissioners, often with no diplomatic or managerial experience. One South African Ambassador is a boiler-maker by profession (SA. 2001. *Parliamentary question*).

An important component of South Africa's social development is derived from African cultural tradition in the form of the concept and practise of *Ubuntu*. As Mbigi and Maree (1995: 1) point out, *Ubuntu*, which may also be described as *brotherhood* or *collective security*, is a universal concept that can be applied to all poor communities.

*The cardinal belief of Ubuntu is that a man can only be a man through others. In its most fundamental sense it stands for personhood and morality. ... The key values of Ubuntu are: group solidarity, conformity, compassion, respect, human dignity and collective unity* (Mbigi and Maree. 1995: 2)  
(Authors' emphasis).

Although the *Ubuntu* concept appears suited to the tribal, communal or collectivist mind-sets, and the economically poor, it appears to hold little, if any, value for individualism, leadership, and the economically successful.

#### 5.5.5. Strategic imperative

South Africa's perceived strategic interests have focused on the need for peace and stability in Southern Africa, on the African continent and in the world. As the only country within the international environment to voluntarily give up its military nuclear capability (Rajghatta. *Indian Express*, 11 May 1995), South Africa has also demonstrated a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation (SA. 1995: 10). As a

major arms manufacturer, South Africa has attempted, outwardly at least, to follow policies of responsibility by not selling arms to belligerents. However, states under threat from insurgents and revolutionaries have been the recipients of sensitive major significant military equipment provided by South Africa (DFA. 20000328). The Department of Foreign Affairs plays an important role in vetting all arms sales and preventing such sales where necessary through recommendations to the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) (DFA. 20000328).

The strategic imperative also necessarily demands that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be protected but, in the absence of any credible military threat, other defensive needs come to mind. For example, illegal immigration, poaching of land and sea resources, smuggling (*South China Morning Post*. 22 April 2000: 5) and drug trafficking, require law enforcement capabilities that may be best suited to improved coastal patrol services, immigration and customs services, border guards and anti-poaching units.

#### 5.5.6. Scientific and technological imperative

On the question of science and technology there is an indubitable need to acquire new technologies and the latest scientific expertise, if South Africa is not to fall behind, in terms of scientific achievement, in a wide range of scientific endeavour and scientific progress. South Africa has entered into an Agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperaton with the PRC (*vide* paragraph 9.4 *infra*: Addendum 4) and although each country seeks to benefit from this agreement South Africa remains vulnerable in the absence of guaranteed safeguards against the loss of intellectual property rights ({2}2001. *Interview*).

#### 5.5.7. Moral imperative

It has been suggested by some that the government of the new democratic South Africa has never actively pursued a human-rights-driven foreign policy agenda, “always placing its trade and party political priorities before human rights” (Hartley.



Sunday Times. 19 April 1998: 19). In view of South Africa's past history of human rights abuse, particularly during the *apartheid* era, the inclusion in the country's new democratic constitution of a bill of rights designed to curb future similar abuse, is a logical reflection of past, present and future concerns. When South Africa's Minister of Foreign Affairs (SA 1998: *Nzo speech*) referred to the ending of human rights abuses as an objective of South Africa's foreign policy he articulated a commitment to extend domestic policy, derived from national domestic values, into one or more of the external environments:

*We will continue to oppose terrorism, exaggerated ethnicity, chauvinism and xenophobia in all their forms. We will continue to fight for the transformation of international relations so as to eradicate aggression, the usurping of power, unilateral coercive measures and unfair economic practices, foreign occupation and the use of force. We will focus on ensuring justice for the oppressed, equality for women and protection of children everywhere.*

Quoting from the Durban Declaration tabled by South Africa as Chair of the 1998 Non-Aligned Movement Summit and adopted by acclamation, Foreign Minister Nzo also said:

*We must seek a world order of compassion for the weak, of human rights and development for all (SA 1998: *Nzo speech*).*

Although the Minister was speaking in a multilateral forum it would seem logical to conclude that he also accepted the need for South Africa to seek the envisaged world order through bilateral as well as multilateral endeavours within the international environment.