

CHAPTER VI

MILITARY AND OTHER ASPECTS OF ROC–RSA RELATIONS: 1976–1997

6.1 INTRODUCTION

Apart from political-diplomatic, economic and nuclear co-operation, there were military and other important aspects in ROC–RSA bilateral relations which had been developed prior to the severance of the diplomatic ties in January 1998. This chapter considers the relationships in the military, academic, sport and socio-cultural spheres during the period from 1976 to 1997. In particular, specific attention will be paid to the military co-operation between the two countries. It will explore the ROC's past military agreements with South Africa, including the implementation, results, constraints and limits thereof. As to the academic, sport and socio-cultural dimensions, efforts are also made in the chapter to provide insight into the origins and subsequent developments of the relevant links for the duration of the two decades.

6.2 MILITARY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE ROC AND THE RSA

Military links between the ROC and the RSA were established as from 1977 when the two countries exchanged military attachés. But the official military co-operation between Taipei and Pretoria began only on March 11th, 1980 when the then Prime Minister of South Africa, P.W. Botha, signed a secret Agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries between the government of the RSA and the government of the ROC with the then Premier of the ROC, Yun-suan Sun, in Cape Town.¹

Both the ROC and the RSA were isolated in the military domain, and both countries faced severe security threats. The ROC was and still is under constant threat from its arch-enemy, the PRC, although its military equipment supply from the USA, and its international economic links remained largely unaffected by its external diplomatic

isolation. Nevertheless, the ROC was and is denied access to other foreign sources of military hardware, know-how, training, aid and co-operation. By 1975, the superiority of the ROC Air Force over the PLA of the Chinese Communists was eroding as the ROC's main all-weather operational fighter planes, the American Lockheed F-104, designed in 1950, were ageing and becoming increasingly obsolescent. The F-5Es assembled in Taiwan lacked all-weather capability. The ROC Navy faced a similar situation.² Therefore, the ROC military eagerly sought superior technology and more advanced weaponry, especially radar-guided air-to-air, air-to-ship and ship-to-ship missiles, with greater range. In response to the PRC's military threats, the ROC has sought to develop its own strong national defence capabilities. The primary objective of the ROC's defence policy is to defend Taiwan, the Pescadores, Kinmen, and Matsu. As Taiwan is an island, to deter the possible invasion of the PRC from the sea and air, naval and air supremacy is a priority of its military defence strategy. The need for the ROC to maintain a strong military force numbering approximately 400,000 was clearly expounded by the then ROC President Lee Teng-hui in his speech addressed to the newly-promoted generals of the ROC armed forces on December 30th, 1994:

Although we have already unilaterally abrogated the Temporary Provisions of the Mobilization and Suppression of Communist Rebellion, and our policy is no longer aimed at reconquering mainland China or using military force to solve the issue of national unification, the PRC never renounces the use of military force against us. Moreover, the PRC is continuously isolating and bullying us. Under these circumstances, we have no other choice but to develop our own military armament, strengthen our national defence and upgrade our fighting power, so as to ensure that we have no fear of the PRC's military threats, and that we can initiate and conduct the normal development of the cross-Straits relations.³

The normalisation of relations between Washington and Beijing in 1979 was another serious blow to the ROC's national security. As a result of the severance of USA–ROC diplomatic ties, the cornerstone of the ROC national security, namely the 1954 USA–

ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, was abrogated as from January 1st, 1980. Although the USA Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in March 1979 to substitute the 1954 defence pact and to regulate the USA's substantive relations with the ROC, the ROC government was deeply alarmed by the change of American policy and the termination of the USA–ROC alliance in favour of recognition of the PRC for a rearrangement of the international balance of power. Although the TRA authorised the USA government to provide the ROC with such defence articles and defence services as was necessary to enable the ROC to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability, the PRC pressured the USA government to impose quantitative and qualitative restrictions on arm sales to the ROC as from August 17th, 1982. The ROC was also denied access to the more advanced military products. The American arms supplies were based mainly on the USA's political considerations and national interests. The ROC's arms procurement requests for upgraded F-5 fighters and the Harpoon ship-to-ship missiles were both rejected by the Carter administration on the grounds that the requested arms sales would be too provocative to Beijing.⁴ Under these circumstances, the ROC leadership felt that although the ROC government would continue to lobby the American government and congress to sell defensive arms to the ROC, there was a need to seek other sources of military technology to safeguard its national security. To this end, South Africa, with its fairly advanced arms industry, defence research projects and its manufacture of various armaments developed by the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) was considered a useful partner to upgrade the ROC's military equipment, armaments, tests and training.⁵

To cope with the unreliability of its major arms supplier, the ROC was in quest of the production of high performance weapons and alternative sources of arms supply and military training so as to strengthen its national defence, especially to maintain sufficient naval and air superiority to counter the threat posed by the Communists. It was for these reasons that the ROC began its military co-operation with South Africa in 1980. Yet the ROC's major security guarantor and arms supplier was still the USA from where they obtained weapon systems and military technology. In fact, with the American

connection, in particular the TRA, the ROC was militarily far less isolated than South Africa from the 1960s to the 1980s.

By contrast, South Africa was relatively more isolated than the ROC during the same period. Before 1960, Britain was South Africa's main arms supplier. After the 1960 Sharpeville killings and subsequent harsh repressions elsewhere, however, the British government was reluctant to provide arms to South Africa. In August 1963, the Kennedy administration announced that the USA government would start to impose a selective arms embargo on South Africa as from the end of 1963. The arms embargoes imposed by the USA and the UK were shaped in the Cold War environment primarily as a symbolic gesture of opposition to South Africa's apartheid policies in response to the increasing international outcry against Pretoria's internal policies. In the same year, the UN Security Council for the first time called on all states to voluntarily observe an arms ban against South Africa. France and Italy, however, ignored the UN's voluntary arms embargo and emerged to substitute the UK and the USA as the two major arms suppliers to South Africa during 1963–1977.⁶ Many other countries including Israel, Belgium, Canada, Jordan, India and Spain also sold arms to South Africa during the 1970s.⁷ Israel and the ROC were often singled out as having close military co-operations with South Africa. Israel reportedly sold South Africa six long-range gunboats equipped with guided Israeli-Gabriel missiles, Uzi submachine guns, counter-insurgency equipment, and improved tank armour.⁸

However, in November 1977, the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. UN member states were obligated to collectively implement the Security Council's mandatory arms embargo against South Africa in compliance with this resolution. However, it was reported that several communist countries, including Bulgaria and Communist China, continued to flout this arms ban, and that South Africa had secret arms dealings with the PRC even at the height of sanctions and the UN arms embargoes during the late 1980s and early 1990s.⁹ This arms embargo remained in effect until the dawn of the new democratic South Africa in July 1991.

The UN's mandatory arms ban was an impediment to South Africa. From 1978 onwards, most of the major Western powers and other member states of the UN refrained from selling weapons to South Africa and military assistance was also suspended. Even Israel announced its commitment to abide by the Security Council's mandatory arms embargo on South Africa.¹⁰ Although covert Israeli arms dealings with South Africa continued until 1987, when the USA put pressure on Israel to end its clandestine sales to Pretoria,¹¹ overt Israeli military co-operation was gradually drawing to a close by the year 1980.¹²

In the face of the gradual enforcement of the international arms embargo on South Africa, Pretoria was determined, on the one hand, to develop its own arms industry as from 1964, and on the other hand, turned to the ROC for military collaboration as from 1980. The ensuing military co-operation between the ROC and the RSA came about mainly due to four motivations.

Firstly, South Africa perceived the ROC as being in a relatively advantageous position because she still retained the USA as her de facto military backer and she was a wealthy country which needed to import an enormous quantity of armaments for her self-defence. Therefore, the South African government hoped that through the mutual military co-operation, Pretoria would be able to obtain components, spare parts, technology and know-how of the more advanced American arms system from the ROC to enhance its own arms industry. As the ROC was not a member of the UN after 1971, she was not legally bound to observe the UN arms embargo on South Africa.¹³

Secondly, the South African arms industry had achieved remarkable progress in self-sufficiency and had grown to become one of the world's top arms exporters by the 1980s. The ROC was therefore considered an ideal market for the products of the Armaments Corporation of South Africa (Armcor) and its ten subsidiaries. However, from 1984 to 1995, the total value of Armcor's arms export to the ROC was merely NT\$2 billion dollars which is equivalent to R465 million. The ROC only accorded 1.5 per cent of its defence budget to South Africa. Armcor was deeply disappointed by the

discrepancy between the reality and the originally perceived potentiality of the ROC market. From Pretoria's perspective, the ROC's arms procurement, mainly ammunition, from Armscor was insignificant. The disillusion eventually led to the winding down of the ROC–RSA military co-operation.¹⁴

Thirdly, to counter the Communist expansion in southern Africa, the ROC assisted the RSA in setting up a monitoring station in a Pretoria suburb as from 1980 to decipher the Chinese Communist broadcasts, radio announcements, electronic transmissions and intelligence communications, and to gather information on the broadcasts from Moscow in the Chinese language as well. The exchange of intelligence and the monitoring of Communist activities in South Africa were important facets of the military co-operation between the ROC and the RSA.

Last but not least, the ROC–RSA military co-operation was underpinned by the two countries' common anti-communist stance and common desire to safeguard their survival in their respective uncertain environments at the time. This was reflected by the remarks made by the then Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, on March 12th, 1980 when he welcomed the then ROC Premier Yun-suan Sun to Cape Town during the state banquet. In response to Premier Sun's assertion that the two countries faced a common threat from international communism and, for this simple reason, stood together and co-operated with each other, P.W. Botha stated clearly that, indeed, both countries had not only become the victims of international political expedience, but were also under the threat of aggressive alien communism.¹⁵

In a similar line, General Magnus Malan, the then Minister of Defence of the RSA, also stressed the need for South Africa to cope with the onslaught of Marxist enemies:

The threat against the principles and values we stand for continues to this day... Today we have a different enemy. But the SACP and its terrorist puppets that we face on our borders and inside South Africa have exactly the same objective as the enemy of the Second World War. That

objective is to destroy our values and what we stand for. They want to overthrow our present dispensation... If we capitulate in the face of this threat, we will wipe out everything that South Africans have worked for through the ages and have fought for in two World Wars.¹⁶

Therefore, for South Africa, it was the desire to obtain American arms technology through the ROC and to sell South African arms to the ROC, combined with the two countries' common beliefs and mutual need that led her to pursue military co-operation with the ROC. The ROC's military co-operation with South Africa was mainly in the technological field. This involved the development of the defence industries of the two countries, the exchange of information and know-how in respect of military equipment, the procurement of military armaments for the ROC's navy and air force, the reciprocal visits of personnel, and the training of the ROC's military personnel, in particular the ROC's air force pilots and naval officers, in the RSA. Of specific interest to the ROC was the South African Naval training courses for submarine commanding officers and the RSA's experience in flying the mirage fighter jets.¹⁷

The reason the ROC was so keen on learning warfare tactics and gaining experience from the RSA's navy and air force was the strategic consideration that as an island country, naval and air supremacy were deemed most important for her national defence. The military threat of mainland China was mainly from the PRC's missiles, submarines and air force. The ROC had two submarines during the 1980s and the ROC's air force intended to procure 60 French-made new Mirage fighter jets to augment its combat aircraft wings in addition to its 150 F-16 fighters as from 1993.¹⁸ Since the French-made Mirage fighter jets were the mainstay of the RSA's air force, and the RSA's navy had a Submarine Flotilla consisting of three modernised Daphne-class submarines, with one submarine training school in Simon's Town, and a Strike Craft Flotilla with nine missile-armed strike crafts based in Durban, complemented by a Mine Countermeasurer Flotilla comprising eight River and Ton class minehunters,¹⁹ the relevant training conducted in South Africa would be beneficial to the ROC military towards boosting its fighting capability.

Therefore, for the ROC, the procurement of armaments was not the main motivation. It was the above-mentioned broad strategic considerations of the two countries that had kept the ROC and the RSA on a course of military co-operation for one and a half decades from 1980 to 1995.

In 1980, the ROC and the RSA secretly entered into an Agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries of the two countries. The military co-operation agreement was signed by P.W. Botha and Yun-suan Sun on March 11th, 1980 in Cape Town during Sun's official visit to South Africa. Sun was accompanied by the then ROC Chief of General Staff, Admiral Chang-chih Soong, during this visit. The signing of this agreement marked the beginning of ROC–RSA military co-operation. The purpose of the agreement was to “promote and expand all areas of mutual interest in the military field in order to economise man-power, materials, finance and time, thereby facilitating the defence industry development of both parties.”²⁰

The ROC–RSA military co-operation covered all areas of military co-operation, and was not limited to the collaborative development of defence industries alone, albeit the agreement was called “Agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries between the ROC and the RSA.” In accordance with Article II of this agreement, the ROC–RSA military co-operation encompassed the following fields:

1. Research, development and exchange of know-how in respect of military/para-military equipment or armaments;
2. Exchange of information in other related fields as may be determined from time to time;
3. Bilateral training and reciprocal visits of personnel; and
4. Reciprocal sale of military/para-military equipment, materials or armaments.²¹

For the collaborative development of their defence industries, it was necessary for the two countries to facilitate bilateral co-ordination. The two governments, therefore, designated two levels of corresponding organisations as the mechanism for implementing co-operation programmes. On the policy-making level, the Ministry of National Defence of the ROC and the Armaments Corporation (Armcor) of the RSA; and on the execution level, the Combined Service Forces of the ROC and the senior management of Armcor of the RSA, while all liaison and correspondence between the two countries was directed to the Senior General Manager (Commercial) of Armcor of the RSA and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Service Forces of the ROC respectively via the respective accredited defence attachés stationed in Pretoria and Taipei.

In order to determine the type of co-operation programmes undertaken and to review their progress, a semi-annual ROC–RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference was convened in Pretoria and Taipei alternately. The hosting country sponsored the visiting delegates in all conference-related activities during their sojourn. The delegations of the two countries attending the conference were designated as follows:

1. The ROC Delegation:
 - Vice Chief of the General Staff, Ministry of Defence
 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics, Ministry of Defence
 - Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Planning, Ministry of Defence
 - Vice President, Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology
 - Ad Hoc members as may from time to time be required to facilitate specific projects entered into.

2. The RSA Delegation:
 - Chairman of Armcor
 - Executive Vice Chairman of Armcor
 - Nominee of the Chief of the Defence Force
 - Senior General Manager (Commercial) of Armcor

- Ad Hoc members as may from time to time be required to facilitate specific projects entered into.

Along with the said semi-annual ROC–RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference, each country also established its own permanent Defence Industry Co-operation Committee to effect the execution of the approved co-operation programmes and to handle any matters of technical, financial or contractual nature which were agreed upon at the Co-operation Conference.²²

The ROC Ministry of Defence and its armed forces and the South African Defence Force (SADF) generally handled the reciprocal training and exchange of personnel visits programmes. Due to the restriction of Article VII of the said Co-operation Agreement which stipulated that “the co-operation contents shall not be disclosed to a third country without prior consent of the originating country”,²³ the existence of this agreement and its contents were kept secret.

Based on the above-mentioned agreement, the ROC–RSA military co-operation was formally launched from 1980. The first ROC–RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference was held in Taipei on May 15th 1980, and the second in Pretoria on October 30th of the same year. From the third conference (1981) onwards, till the seventh conference (1985), the conference was held alternatively in Taipei and Pretoria each year. However, from 1986 to 1995, the conference took place every nine months instead of yearly. All together, there were eighteen co-operation conferences for the duration of the fifteen years from 1980 to 1995.

In 1995, as a result of its policy shift, the South African government decided to unilaterally put an end to the military co-operation between the ROC and the RSA as from 1996, although the ROC was looking forward to the continuation of co-operation even after South Africa’s establishment of diplomatic relation with the PRC. Therefore, 1995 witnessed the last ROC–RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference, which was held in Pretoria in May.²⁴

During the fifteen-year time span from 1980 to 1995, the ROC made considerable efforts to expand military co-operation with South Africa in a number of areas. There was, then, a close relationship between the ROC and the RSA. Some significant accomplishments were achieved in Research, Development (R&D) and the exchange of technology programmes. Many co-operation programmes were discussed and implemented over the 15 years with varying degrees of success. The notable successful projects included co-operation in the field of aerodynamics, especially wind tunnel model testing and the obtaining of special software; quality assurance programmes; composite materials; the research and development of smart shell ballistic system design; cellular automata and parallel processing; the development of superalloys and ring laser gyros; the development of RPV engine and airframe technology, sonar technology, underwater acoustics, sea mines, and anti-aircraft air defence systems.²⁵

Exchanges of technology were also conducted with regard to the maintenance of Gabriel missiles, target acquisition methods, the development of the air-to-air missile programme and fibre-optic guided missiles. In addition to the technical exchanges, there were many other joint R&D programmes that were implemented by the two countries. These included tank designs, installation of night vision on M41 tanks, plating chromium of 76mm quick gun barrels, millimetre wave radar, infrared ray (IR) countermeasures and simulation technology, third generation image intensifier tubes, 155mm artillery systems, explosive charges, autonomous target acquisition, FT5 rocket systems, 127mm artillery rocket systems, and even submarine attachments and mine countermeasures.²⁶

Most of these joint co-operation programmes were handled by Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) and Armscor. Some were implemented by CSIST and CSIR. The remainder were pursued by the ROC Metal Industries' Research & Development Centre and various organisations of the ROC military, such as the Combined Service Forces (CSF) and the planning and maintenance divisions of the

ROC Armed Forces, as well as subsidiaries of Armscor such as Denel (Somchem), Denel (Naschem), Atlas Aircraft Co., Kentron (Pty) Ltd., Pretoria Metal Pressings (Pty) Ltd., and Eloptro. Eloptro specialised in military electro-optics; Somchem supplied propellants and explosives; and Kentron made guided missiles. It was generally agreed upon by both sides that the ROC–RSA R&D co-operation and exchange of technology were successful from the commencement of the military co-operation in 1980 till its ending in 1995.²⁷

Bilateral training and reciprocal visits of personnel, as well as exchanges between the respective defence forces took place on a frequent and alternate basis. As regards bilateral training, the exact total numbers of military personnel who underwent various training courses in the respective defence forces, institutions and universities are not available to date, as military co-operation was shrouded in secrecy. According to the compilation of the ROC Embassy in 1995, 85 military officers from the ROC underwent various training courses in South Africa during 1989-1994; and in the same period, 2,647 military personnel were dispatched by the ROC to pay a short visit to South Africa. Among them, 2,469 were ROC naval officers and cadets.²⁸

The ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron visited South Africa twice during the period (1989-1994) – in 1989 and in 1992. The Squadron consisted of two destroyers, one supply vessel and approximately 1300 naval officers and cadets. Before 1989, the ROC had sent the Naval Goodwill Squadron to visit South Africa several times. In July 1985, the ROC dispatched a Naval Task Group of three ships with 1,400 officers and midshipmen to visit South Africa for 15 days. The visit coincided with the South African Navy Week, July 8-13th, and the Durban Tattoo. From 1994 until the severance of ROC–RSA diplomatic links in 1998, the ROC twice dispatched the Naval Goodwill Squadron to visit South Africa – in 1996 and in 1997. The ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron visited Cape Town, Simon's Town and Durban during 27th May - 8th June, 1996. The main purpose of the 1996 visit was to enable the ROC naval officers and cadets to engage in long-distance navigation training with the South African Navy (SAN). The ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron's visit in April 1997 was at the invitation of the SAN in celebration of

its seventy-fifth anniversary. This visit in 1997 marked the last presence of the ROC naval squadron on South African seas in the naval histories of the two countries. If we add the figures of the above-mentioned ROC Naval Goodwill Squadron visits to those from 1980-1988, the total number of ROC military personnel who visited South Africa or attended various training courses in the RSA is estimated at approximately 10,000.²⁹

Visits by the ROC military top personnel also took place. Twenty-three senior ROC military delegations with a total of 83 senior officers including generals, admirals and commanding officers were invited by the South African Defence Force to visit the RSA during 1989-1994. Altogether, approximately 203 officers of the ROC military's top personnel visited the RSA during 1980-1997.³⁰ This included the ROC Chiefs of General Staff, and Commanders-in-Chief of the ROC Army, Navy and Air Force. Most of the ROC Chiefs of General Staff visited South Africa. The Chief of General Staff is the highest commanding general of the ROC military command system and is in charge of military affairs and operational matters.

The ROC–RSA military co-operation was initiated during the term of office of Admiral Chang-chih Soong, the ROC then Chief of General Staff from 1976 to 1981. Admiral Soong accompanied Yun-suan Sun, on his official visit to South Africa in March 1980 and witnessed the signing of the Agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries between the ROC and the RSA on March 11th in Cape Town. While he was in South Africa, Admiral Soong met his counterpart General Magnus Malan, the then Chief of Staff of the SADF, and the then Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral R.A. Edwards, to discuss the framework of ROC–RSA bilateral military co-operation. Admiral Soong visited the South African Army College, Simon's Town Naval Base, Armscor, the SADF military bases and the frontline in South West Africa (Namibia) near the border of Angola to assess the regional military situation.³¹

But the ROC–RSA military co-operation truly flowered under the tenure of Admiral Soong's successor – General Pei-tsun Hau, the longest-serving Chief of General Staff of the ROC (1981-1989). Hau visited South Africa during April 24th - May 3rd, 1983.

During his visit, Hau met the then Prime Minister, P.W. Botha; the then Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan; the then Chief of the S.A. Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen; the then Chief of the South African Navy, Vice-Admiral A.P. Putter; and the then Head of Armscor, Commandant Piet Marais. Various discussions were held between the two sides. It was agreed by both that the ROC–RSA military co-operation, in particular the co-operation of defence industries, should be founded on the basis of non-profit seeking and that no subsidy would be provided by either country to the other. It was agreed also that the two countries would play different roles in the joint endeavour and share equally in the development of cost-reduced military equipment and armaments.³²

South African military personnel visited the ROC frequently during 1980-1995. According to the statistics compiled by the ROC Embassy, 31 high-ranking South African commanding officers and 171 middle-ranking South African military officers visited the ROC during 1989-1994; and 19 South African military officers underwent military training in the ROC.³³ In addition, there were approximately 64 middle-ranking South African military officers and officials who attended the political warfare course at the ROC Fu Hsing Kang College from 1980 to 1996. Each year, the ROC government sponsored 3 to 5 South African trainees to attend the above-mentioned course. The Fu Hsing Kang College (literally means Renaissance Hill College) was established in 1951 in a suburb of Taipei to train political warfare cadres for the ROC armed forces and those of countries friendly to the ROC. The college has 11 departments and a graduate school offering both master's and doctoral degree programmes. The training course focused on the understanding of the doctrine of international communism, various communist parties' political systems and their common tactics including the warfares of ideology, organisation, intelligence, psychology, mobilisation of masses, and strategy. The political warfare course was open to not only the South African military personnel, but also to the South African Police (SAP) and officials from other South African governmental organisations including the State Security Council, Bureau of Information, Department of National Education, Department of Home Affairs and provincial governments. The majority of the South African trainees of the said course were

nominated by the SADF. In 1989, at the height of ROC–RSA military co-operation, the ROC government unilaterally offered to set up a special political warfare class NO. 102 (training duration 6 weeks: from July 8th to August 19th) to train 25 South African military officers to combat the growing communist threat. However, the SADF was only able to send 2 military officers to attend the said course in 1989 and 5 officers in 1990.³⁴

Most of the top South African generals and military commanding officers at the time either visited the ROC or received various medals in recognition of their contributions towards promoting the close military exchanges and co-operation between the ROC and the RSA. As early as 1981, the ROC had presented medals for political warfare to the then South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan; then Chief of the South African Defence Force, General Constand Viljoen; then Chief of the South African Army, Lt-General Jannie Geldenhuys; then Chief of Staff: Operations, Lt-General John Dutton; then Chief of the South African Navy, Admiral Ronnie Edwards; and other top South African officers including Major-General Pieter Hanekom, Major-General Pieter van der Westhuizen and Brigadier George Wassenaar.³⁵

Although there was a common ground for the ROC and the RSA to pursue military co-operation, the fundamental divergence of interests between the two countries inhibited the deepening of the military co-operation during 1980-1996 and eventually led to its demise. The divergence of interests was primarily due to four factors. Firstly, the two countries are geographically far apart, and there was no common enemy or common national security threat. Therefore, it was difficult for the ROC and the RSA to form a real military alliance.

Secondly, from a security point of view, the threats to national security for the two countries were different. The ROC is an island country. She faced a serious external military threat from the Chinese Communists – a real menace of seaward and airborne military attack. Therefore, the ROC was, and still is, primarily concerned with her air and sea supremacy, while the army is for defence purposes. By contrast, South Africa is primarily a land power, and thus concerned with her landward defence. South

Africa's national security threats mainly originated from internal civil resistance against political, economic and social inequalities or injustices. The low-level bush war in SWA border areas and southern Angola was not a serious military threat to South Africa. The guerrilla menace of SWAPO and the ANC was limited; even the Cuban forces stationed in Angola at the time dared not launch a head-on attack against the SADF. Furthermore, other neighbouring countries lacked the military capacity to pose a real offensive military threat to South Africa. Under these circumstances, air defence and sea control were not that important for the RSA. The South African Navy is smaller than the Navy of the ROC. South Africa phased out most of the deep-sea patrol vessels, and built small high-speed missile-carrying vessels with limited operational radius. As the then Chief of the South African Navy, Rear-Admiral R.A. Edwards, indicated, the South African Navy was "a small ship fleet."³⁶

South Africa developed a wide range of military products for landward defence purpose such as G5 & G6 artillery systems, the Eland-90 armoured cars, Olifant tanks, Ratel-90 vehicles, the 127mm multiple Rocket launcher, the Hotnotsgod mine-detecting vehicle, the Casspir armoured personnel carrier, the Rooivalk attack helicopter, and Cactus surface-to-air missile system. This landward military equipment, however, was not required for the ROC defence establishment. The defence strategy of the ROC was different from that of the RSA. For the ROC military, the war would first be fought in the air and on the sea, not on the ground of the densely populated island. Naval and air supremacy, therefore, were given priority. From the ROC's perspective, the most likely threats from mainland China were and still are a naval blockade, low-level harassment (such as the missile tests) and missile attack. The PRC's deployment of its first generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and its testing of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) as from the 1980s raised serious concerns in the ROC.³⁷ The ROC needed to upgrade its sea and air defences with modern warships, an anti-missile defence system, warning and surveillance equipment, F-16 fighter aircrafts from the USA and the French-built Mirage 2000 fighter planes.³⁸ None of these armaments were being produced by South Africa.

The divergence of military strategies of the two countries was clearly specified by General Pei-tsun Hau on May 2nd, 1983 when he met Commandant Piet Marais during his trip to South Africa. Hau stated:

We are facing similar international situations, and we share a common ground for anti-Communism. But the intensity of military threat to each country is different. At this point in time, South Africa has no credible military threats from the sea and the air; but for the ROC, its major threats are from the air and the sea. Therefore, the priority of the ROC defence policy is to ensure the control of air and sea superiority. For South Africa, the priority of its defence policy is to focus on landward mobile fighting power and its capability of anti-insurgency or anti-guerrilla warfare.³⁹

The third factor of divergence was the difference of weapon systems between the two countries. In the 1950s and early 1960s, most of South Africa's weapon systems were of British origin with a mixture of American aircraft; and as from 1967, the French 'DMA' military-industrial system was selected by the South African government as a model for the development of the South African arms industry under the threat of an international arms embargo.⁴⁰ By 1972, South Africa's defence industry had made tremendous progress in the production of defence-related ammunition and armaments. On April 26th, 1972, the then Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha, announced that South Africa was absolutely self-sufficient in terms of internal demand.⁴¹ Thus, South Africa was no one's military client. On the contrary, in order to recoup the escalating cost of developing new weapons systems and to maintain the technological competence of its defence industry, there was a need for South Africa to pursue arms export.

By comparison, relying on American military and diplomatic support, the ROC has always been one of the faithful military clients of the USA, because it is not allowed to develop its own nuclear forces and arms industry.⁴² The ROC's weapons system was and is still a mainly American system, and its defence policy is firmly linked with American security planning in East Asia. All of the American arms sales to the ROC are

controlled by the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State of the USA. The licensing for the sale of arms, components and military equipment to the ROC strictly forbade her to resell these armaments and components to the RSA. Furthermore, although the ROC was no longer a member of the UN in the 1980s, the ROC had no intention of violating any UN ban on arms exports to South Africa. The main consideration for the ROC military's refusal to sell American military equipment, components or even technology to South Africa was due to the ROC leadership's longstanding guiding principle of its defence policy that any military co-operation with other foreign countries, including Israel, should not affect the continuance of American arms sales to the ROC.⁴³ It was apparent that the ROC did not want to displease, and so disrupt, its security links with the USA. After all, the military co-operation with South Africa was more peripheral, than vital, to the ROC.

The fourth factor was the difference of perception. The South African government expected the military co-operation not only to accelerate the rapid development of its defence industry through the attainment of sensitive foreign technology and components, but also to enable Armscor to expand its arms sales to the ROC, so as to earn foreign exchange to maintain the competitiveness of the South African defence industry. In contrast, the ROC perceived the bilateral military co-operation as a means to strengthen and safeguard the diplomatic ties between the two countries. In other words, the ROC emphasised the form which served merely as a means to an end, while the RSA emphasised the substance which was expected to bring about real results for its defence industry and big export orders from the ROC.⁴⁴

Due to the above-mentioned divergence of interests and perceptions, with the passage of time, there was growing disillusionment in South Africa, particularly among the leadership of Armscor, with the results of the military co-operation between the RSA and the ROC.⁴⁵ As the ROC was dependent on the USA for the supply of its sophisticated military equipment, the ROC had no intention to upset its relatively assured arms-supply source. Besides the acquisition of some ammunition, torpedoes and various electronic and avionic accessories, the ROC was reluctant to purchase

South African arms products such as G5 and G6 artillery systems and Rooivalk attack helicopters. She preferred technology transfers, exchange of visits and training of personnel.

In the face of PRC military threats, the ROC spent massive financial resources on national defence. The ROC's defence budget took up between 50.8 and 66.1 per cent of central government budget during 1970-1987, but has decreased gradually to 24.51% in 1995, and 15.8% in 2000. On an annual average, the ROC's defence spending was approximately 10% of its gross national product (GNP) and over 40% of the national budget during the period of 1970-1989. The percentage of the defence spending of the ROC decreased to approximately 25.3% of its total government budget in 1993 and then to 24.2% in 1994.⁴⁶ In the 1993 fiscal year, the ROC total government expenditure was USA\$71.5 billion, and the total national budget increased to USA\$73.5 billion in 1994.⁴⁷ In dollar terms, the ROC's defence spending was USA\$18.09 billion in 1993 and USA\$17.79 billion in 1994. Military procurement spending accounted for more than one-quarter of the ROC defence budget.⁴⁸ In 1997, the ROC spent USA\$4.49 billion on military procurement. From the above data, it can be seen that the ROC is one of the biggest arms importing countries in the world. But the ROC's acquisition of military equipment and weapons was mainly limited to American arms and French-made frigates and Mirage jet fighters that were sold to the ROC during 1991-1992.⁴⁹

During 1991 and early 1992, Armscor proposed to jointly develop the Rooivalk CSH-2 Combat Support Helicopter with and sell G6/G5 systems to the ROC. However, the ROC indicated that it had no interest in these items, and instead, purchased American helicopters and weapons. The failure of marketing South African arms products to the ROC upset relations between the two countries. The South African government and Armscor were deeply disappointed at the scant amount of arms sales to the ROC throughout 1980-1995. For the six years from 1984 to 1989, the RSA managed to sell a mere R4.9 million worth of ammunition and components to the ROC; and during 1990-1995, the ROC's total military procurement from South Africa was in the region of R140

million, with ammunition being the main item.⁵⁰ The ROC increased military purchases from the RSA to try safeguard the shaky diplomatic ties between the two countries. According to Armscor's statistics, the grand total of ROC military acquisitions from South Africa during the period from 1980 to 1995 was R465 million, approximately 1.5% of the ROC's annual defence budget.⁵¹ Consequently, the leadership of Armscor was extremely unhappy about the insignificant arms sales to the ROC and the fact that the ROC's large contracts were not awarded to the RSA. On May 12th, 1992, in its memorandum to the then President F.W. de Klerk, Armscor severely criticised ROC–RSA military co-operation by bemoaning that “the RSA is getting only the crumbs from the rich man's table.”⁵² One year later, Armscor belittled the significance of the annual ROC–RSA Defence Industry Conference as nothing but “drink drink, talk talk.”⁵³

By 1995, both Armscor and the SANDF were determined to terminate ROC–RSA military co-operation and establish diplomatic ties with the PRC. This could be seen from the following presentation made by Armscor's Foreign Procurement Manager, T.G. Shaefer, on May 23rd, 1995 at a meeting chaired by Aziz Pahad, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Diplomatic Guest House in Pretoria to review South Africa's relations with the two Chinas:

The ROC–RSA Agreement has petered out to a large extent and co-operation in the technological field has died down to almost zero. Therefore, although there have been some successes in the field of technology, especially in terms of aerodynamics, there has been no substantial involvement in recent years. The armaments bought by the ROC are relatively substantial in a South African context (R465 million), but in relation to the ROC's defence budget, it is insignificant (i.e. about 1.5 per cent was accorded to South Africa). The type of equipment bought was never of a long-term system investment commitment, and ammunition was the main item. In comparison, the PRC has shown considerable interest, and Armscor already has a representative in Beijing.

Armcor has also indicated to the ROC that the six-monthly meetings in terms of the ROC–RSA Agreement, should be winded down gradually.

In contrast, the PRC presents a huge potential, especially in the field of technology. Co-operation is increasing and there have been some exploratory visits. Whereas the ROC declined in the past under the UN embargo to assist Armcor to procure sensitive material, the PRC did not refrain from assisting Armcor. Equipment of about R230 million was sold to the PRC in the past.⁵⁴

It was apparent that Armcor was in favour of a shift in South Africa's diplomatic policy towards the PRC and the termination of ROC–RSA military co-operation. The representatives of the SANDF, namely Brigadier J.L. de Beer, Brigadier Groenewald and Colonel J.L. Croukamp, also revealed that the SANDF was dissatisfied with the ROC's failure of arms transfer. They indicated that "the ROC always kept its arms trade with South Africa within the limitations of the UN arms embargo, and would not facilitate access for South Africa to third countries in terms of military technology."⁵⁵

From the SANDF's perspective, South Africa received little benefit from the bilateral military co-operation between the RSA and the ROC, and therefore South Africa's real long-term interests lay with the PRC. The PRC's international position and influence, and the lack of substance of ROC–RSA military co-operation in the past were cited as main reasons for the SANDF to support the idea of establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC:

The PRC is very influential in the Security Council. Even the USA is seeking a closer relationship with the PRC although the latter perceives the USA as a potentially major threat. The PRC has strong ties with and influence in Africa. Of specific interest to the SANDF is the modernization programme of the PRC defence force which includes a vast improvement in technological hardware and which presents an important opportunity.

There has been a great deal of “noise” from the ROC, but not much substance. The PRC is a major power, and the potential ties with the PRC look very good.⁵⁶

The “noise” mentioned above was the pledge made by the ROC in 1994 to make a USA\$40 million dollar grant available to the Service Corps of the SANDF for the establishment of a vocational training centre as from 1995 for the training of rationalised servicemen. This project was perceived by the SANDF as an effort made by the ROC to save its diplomatic relation with South Africa. It was alleged that “according to the Department of Defence, the ROC will attempt to foster military co-operation in order to deflect South African interest in the PRC.”⁵⁷

Actually, before the above-mentioned meeting, the South African government had already sent Lt. General Verbeek, the then Chief of Staff in charge of intelligence; Major General Thikare, the then Deputy Chief of Staff (intelligence); and Brigadier J.L. de Beer, the then Director of External Affairs of the SANDF to pay a clandestine visit to mainland China in January 1995. The main aim of this trip was to commence a process of military contact and information exchange with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC. After returning to Pretoria, the delegation recommended that as the RSA had derived very little benefit from its military co-operation with the ROC, the SANDF regarded it of importance to build relations with the biggest military power in East Asia.⁵⁸

One year after the RSA had secretly established military links with the PRC in January 1995, the South African government officially decided to terminate its military co-operation with the ROC and to stop its arms sales to the ROC as from September 1996. The official decision was taken by the Cabinet meeting of the RSA on September 13th, 1996 chaired by President Mandela. The passing of the resolution was based on No. 13 Memorandum of September 5th, 1996 (File Ref. No. DS 5/1/9B) submitted by the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC).⁵⁹ The Chairperson of NCACC was Kader Asmal, then Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry. The main

consideration that prompted the NCACC to request the South African Cabinet to end its arms sales to the ROC was probably due to the concern that the continued arms sales and military co-operation with the ROC would have a detrimental impact on the future/further expansion of South Africa's political and economic relations with the PRC.⁶⁰ Strong reaction could be expected from the PRC as it regarded the sale of arms to the ROC as interference in its own internal affairs.

The last ROC–RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conference was held in Pretoria (Armcor's office) from May 10th to May 12th, 1995. This was the 18th Conference. From 1995 onwards, the South African government was no longer interested in continuing its military co-operation with the ROC, and by 1996, most of the original arms sales had been terminated, with the exception of a small amount of insensitive ammunition which was sold to the ROC during 1996-1997. Other than that, ROC–RSA military ties have ceased to exist as have the bilateral visits of military personnel and naval squadrons since April 1997.⁶¹

In sum, the ROC and the RSA secretly entered into an Agreement on the Co-operation of the Defence Industries between the two countries in 1980. The ROC–RSA military co-operation lasted for 16 years from 1980 to 1996 when, in a cabinet meeting held on September 13th, 1996, the South African government decided to terminate its military ties with the ROC. The geographically far-flung military co-operation came to an end soon after the ROC naval squadron paid its last visit to South Africa in April 1997. The ending of ROC–RSA military co-operation was timed for the shift in the RSA's China policy.

6.3 ACADEMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LINKS BETWEEN THE ROC AND THE RSA

This section examines the development of academic, educational and socio-cultural ties between the ROC and the RSA and their respective impacts on the two countries, as well as the limits of the politically motivated socio-cultural relationship.

Prior to the 1970s, the ROC's academic ties with South Africa were insignificant. The two countries have different cultural and educational traditions. The ROC's education system is USA-oriented and most of the ROC university graduates choose the USA as their destination for advanced studies. In 1986, there were 25,660 ROC students enrolled at USA universities and colleges.⁶² Other favourite destinations for ROC students to pursue their studies, according to statistics compiled in 1986, were Japan (182), West Germany (103), France (80) and Britain (36).⁶³ In 1988, over 98,000 students from the ROC went overseas for advanced education, with more than 90% of these students being educated in the USA.⁶⁴ As regards foreign students studying in the ROC, these are mostly South Korean and American students. In 1986, among the 3,660 foreign students at ROC institutions of tertiary education, 1,089 came from South Korea, 747 from the USA, 610 from Japan, 367 from Indonesia, 181 from West Germany, 179 from France, 165 from Thailand and 120 from the Philippines.⁶⁵ Overseas Chinese students are excluded from the above statistics. Students from these countries choose the ROC because of geographic proximity such as in the case of Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines, or because of the existence of co-operative arrangements between the related countries and the ROC. West Germany, France and the USA have entered into various governmental and non-governmental agreements with the ROC to provide scholarships for students from each other's countries.⁶⁶

In comparison with the ROC, the RSA's education system and cultural relations with foreign countries before 1994 were European-oriented. This was particularly evident in the 1970s prior to South Africa's establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1976. The RSA's Eurocentric disposition in culture during the 1970s is reflected in its cultural agreements, interactions and assignment of cultural attachés in foreign countries. In 1975, eight foreign cultural delegations visited South Africa, and in turn, eight South African cultural delegations went abroad; most of the destinations of the visits of the South African cultural delegations were European countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany. South Africa concluded a

number of cultural agreements, also mainly with European countries or countries with Western culture such as the Netherlands, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and Paraguay. South Africa maintained cultural links mostly with institutions in countries with Western heritage, viz. the academic links between the South African Institute at Amsterdam and the Dutch Cultural History Institute at the University of Pretoria. South Africa assigned its cultural attachés to the respective embassies in accordance with the cultural agreements.⁶⁷

As a result of cultural differences, the lack of interchange and the void of bilateral cultural agreements, very few contacts occurred in the fields of education, culture, science and technology between the ROC and the RSA before 1976.

The year 1976 marked the beginning of increased cultural and academic contact between the ROC and the RSA. In April 1976, the diplomatic representation between South Africa and the ROC was elevated from that of consul-general to ambassador. One of the consequences of the elevation of diplomatic representation was the budding of ROC–RSA cultural and academic interactions. In 1976, the then ROC Deputy Premier, Ching-chung Hsu; the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.K. Yang; and the then Director of the Institute of International Relations of the ROC, Wei-ping Tsai visited the RSA.⁶⁸

Although formal governmental cultural agreements had not been concluded during 1976-1988, the ROC and the RSA governments made a concerted effort to initiate a more than a decade's long process of information interchange and exchanges of visits between the two countries. In the course of twelve years, there was an increased exchange of visits by cabinet ministers, high-ranking educational officials, chancellors, vice chancellors, professors, scholars, educationists and teachers from one country to the other. Artists, actors, journalists, writers, performers, musicians, sports administrators and athletes were also encouraged by the two governments to engage in exchange visits, performances, tours, competitions and social association. Various "study tours" were organised for the academics, scientists and students of the

respective universities, colleges and research institutions. The ROC government regularly sent its official publications such as The Republic of China Yearbook, The Free China Journal and Free China Review to South African universities and libraries at no cost. After 1976, the ROC's Central News Agency stationed a special correspondent in Johannesburg to gather news items on South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa for the mass media in Taipei.⁶⁹

The ROC–RSA socio-cultural contacts took diverse forms. Nevertheless, the exact figures of persons who visited the other country under the relevant academic/educational and socio-cultural exchange programmes are not available. This is due to the fact that many such exchange programmes were conducted in a low profile manner and no press releases were issued. Some visits were concealed for fear that association might be construed as violating the cultural and sports boycotts imposed by the United Nations against South Africa and furthermore, some individual players and visitors simply arranged their own visits with their counterparts without informing the relevant authorities. As a matter of fact, most of the ROC sports persons who visited South Africa were either professional or junior players. They were not members of the ROC National Olympic Teams, which had to observe the regulations of the International Olympic Committee (IOC). The ROC National Olympic Committee affirmed its sports boycott position and refrained from engaging South African teams at the national level so as to avoid becoming embroiled in the international sanctions and being blacklisted by the Special Committee Against Apartheid of the UN.⁷⁰

The evidence of this can be seen from the following two historical events. Firstly, in January 1980, the ROC Badminton Association organised and hosted an International Badminton tournament in Taipei. As this tournament was an international event, many member states of the IOC were invited to send their national badminton teams to participate. In order to abide by the international sports boycott, the ROC Badminton Association, however, denied the South African national badminton team's participation in the event by making the excuse that the submission of the South African team was too late to be included in the tournament. An apology was conveyed to the South

African Badminton Union to avoid hurting the South African side's feelings.⁷¹ Secondly, in UN Special Committee Against Apartheid's report, published on October 25th, 1989 and in other related documentation, the ROC was never in violation of the international boycotts against South Africa. These boycotts were constantly monitored by the UN Special Committee. The UN Special Committee Against Apartheid's 1989 Register of Sports Contacts with South Africa contained the names of 3,404 athletes who had violated the international boycotts; among them, USA sportspersons constituted the highest number (868), followed by those of the United Kingdom (770), while those from the ROC did not appear in the UN Registry.⁷² This proves the author's point that the ROC's cultural and sports exchanges with South Africa were mainly conducted by university and college students, as well as professional and junior players. Examples of these exchanges include the visits made by orchestra of the University of Pretoria and the orchestra of the University of Port Elizabeth (in 1989), the participation of four ROC female golf players in the 1984 Western Province Women's Championships at Rondebosch, the Free State Youth Symphony Orchestra's 1986 tour to Taipei, the 1986 visit of the University of Pretoria's rugby team to the ROC (led by Naas Botha), the 1984 tour of SA Trim Gym Association, and exchanges of various youth goodwill teams of the two countries. If national Olympic team players wished to visit the respective country, they were usually advised to join the tour in their individual capacities, not as players of national Olympic teams.⁷³

Moreover, the two sides also ensured that the diverse cultural and sports exchanges were implemented in the name of different clubs, universities, colleges and civic organisations as ordinary civilian teams, not as the national teams or as government-involved interchange activities. For instance, in October 1983, the National Bowling Operations of South Africa invited the Bowling Association of the ROC to send a 16-strong bowling team to tour South Africa in February 1984. To avoid being registered by the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid and the IOC as violating international boycotts against South Africa, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the ROC Bowling Association to dispatch its team to tour South Africa under the name of "Chu Kuang (Light) Youth Visiting Mission", rather than "the National Bowling Team of the

ROC". The said bowling team toured South Africa from February 16th to February 28th, 1984 for 12 days without confronting any protest or bad publicity by the press. South Africa was expected to do likewise.⁷⁴

By exercising extreme caution and keeping a low profile, the ROC continued to maintain academic, educational, cultural and sports contacts with South Africa throughout the years 1976 to 1988. During this period, a two-way educational and socio-cultural interchange was actively pursued. The ROC–RSA bilateral exchanges in the fields of academics, education, sports, art, science, medical and socio-cultural relations were largely motivated by the two countries' common situation of international isolation and the desire of the ROC to utilise educational/academic and socio-cultural exchanges to consolidate its diplomatic relations with the RSA.⁷⁵ By affirming the importance of these interactions and various types of co-operation, the ROC government was heavily involved in the process of building bridges of understanding between the ROC and the RSA. A number of inter-governmental agreements in regard to academic, medical, scientific and meteorological co-operations were concluded between the ROC government and the RSA government.⁷⁶ (For details, please see Table 9).

The conclusion of these agreements and the increased frequency of the exchange of visits between the two countries illustrate that, as from 1979 onwards, there was a prevalent feeling that South Africa should "start broadening its fields and international friendships beyond the traditional ones of Europe and America."⁷⁷

In the midst of general feelings of good faith and gradual warm friendship, the two governments further stepped up the bilateral contacts and the exchange of visits at all levels – from cabinet ministers, speakers of parliaments and university rectors at the high level to the students, artists and reporters at the low level. Of these bilateral interchanges, the most notable visits included at the local government and inter-parliament level, the exchange of visits of the mayors of local governments and the Speakers of the two Parliaments. In 1979, the then Speaker of the House of Assembly of the RSA, J.J. Loots, was invited by the ROC government to pay an official visit to the

ROC from November 6th to November 18th, 1979. In return, the then President (Speaker) of the ROC Legislative Yuan (Parliament), Wen-ya Nieh, visited South Africa during 10th-19th June, 1981. The mutual visits of the two Speakers enabled the two parliaments to have some understanding of the real situation of the other country and to become friendlier towards each other, particularly as regards to the awkward status of the Chinese community in South Africa. Loots' visit not only resulted in the gradual improvement of the treatment of the Chinese in South Africa as from 1982 under apartheid policies, but also heralded the beginning of many more such visits by members of parliament from South Africa to the ROC. Reciprocal visits were also made by the members of Parliament of the ROC. In 1985 alone, there were 17 ROC parliamentarians, accompanied by 13 dependants, who visited South Africa. The exchange of visits between the two parliaments was frequent during the 1980s.⁷⁸

In addition to the steady strengthening of the ROC–RSA national parliamentary relationship through exchange of visits, bilateral links between local municipalities of the two countries were also established by the mayors and speakers of city councils. A notable case was the visit of C.P. Chang, the then Speaker of Taipei City Council, to the city of Johannesburg to attend its centennial celebration during August 30th-September 6th, 1986. Mayors of various cities also called on their counterparts to establish sister-city relationship. A number of mayors of ROC cities and counties such as Kaosiung, Hsinchu, Ilan, Keelung, Nantou, Taipei and Yungho visited South Africa during 1980-1988.⁷⁹ In reciprocation, many mayors and city councillors of the local governments of South Africa also visited the ROC during the same period. Of these, the then Mayor of Pretoria, P.R. Smith, visited the ROC in September 1982; the then Mayor of Johannesburg, Danie van Zyl, in October 1982; the then Mayor of Pretoria, S.R. van Jaarsveld, and the then Mayor of Stellenbosch, D.E.W. Schumann, in October 1983; the then Provincial Administrator of the Cape, E. Gene Louw, in October 1982; the then Provincial Administrator of Transvaal, W.A. Cruywagen, in October 1983; other successive mayors of Pretoria and Johannesburg in 1984 and in 1985; G.J. Coetzer, the then Mayor of Queenstown, in September 1987; and J.M. Pretorius, the then Mayor

of Bloemfontein, in October 1987. The then Governor of Taiwan Province, Lee Teng-hui, also visited South Africa in November 1982.⁸⁰

In the academic and educational field, the period 1980-1988 saw an intense desire among leading academics and educationists to explore the possibilities for academic and educational co-operation between the ROC and the RSA. The quest for such collaborations, in particular between the institutions of tertiary education, can be seen from the exchanges of academics and educationists. The ROC's traditional trend of no academic contact with South Africa was reversed, and the ROC became, instead, very keen to develop bilateral academic/educational exchanges with South Africa as from 1980. This is indicated by the frequency of the exchange of visits of high-ranking government officials and academics of various universities and colleges of the two countries to establish either "sister" relationships with their counterparts, or a co-operative mechanism for the exchange of teachers and students and joint research.

To this end, the then Minister of Education of the RSA, P.J. Clase, visited the ROC in July 1980, and the then Director-General of the Department of National Education of the RSA, J.J. van Wyk, visited the ROC in November 1980. Many South African academics visited the ROC during 1980-1988: Daniel Du Plessis, then Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of the Witwatersrand in October 1980; C. Garbers, the then President of Council for Scientific & Industrial Research (CSIR), in July 1982; F.T. van Wijk, the then Vice Chancellor and Principal of UNISA, in October 1982; D.M. Joubert, the then Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of Pretoria, in March 1983; M. de Vries, the then Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of Stellenbosch in October 1983; T. Van der Walt, the then Vice Chancellor and Principal of Potchefstroom University, in October 1984; Jacob van der Westhuizen, then Director of the Institute for Criminology of UNISA, in December 1987; the Student Representative Delegation of the University of Pretoria in June 1988; R.E. van der Ross, the then Rector and Vice Chancellor of the University of the Western Cape, in June 1988; W.L. Mouton, the then Rector of the University of the Orange Free State, in October 1988; and R.W. Charlton, the then Vice Chancellor and Principal of the University of the Witwatersrand, in

November 1988.⁸¹ Apart from the above bilateral visits of academics of the ROC and the RSA, the Ministers of Education of the two countries also exchanged visits. The then Minister of National Education of the RSA, F.W. de Klerk, visited Taipei in October 1985, and the ROC's then Minister of Education, Lee Huan, visited South Africa in May 1987.⁸²

During the period 1987-1990, the ROC–RSA interchange of academic/educational activities was heightened by the two sides. In the year of 1987, the University of Stellenbosch alone sent three delegations to visit the ROC: one was led by P.R. de Wet, the then Director of Student Affairs in March 1987; the second was the 23-person SRC Delegation of the University of Stellenbosch led by De Vries from March 25th to April 4th, 1987; and the third was led by S.J.P. (Faan) Oosthuizen, the then Head of Central Media Centre and Deputy Director of the Bureau for University and Continuing Education of the University of Stellenbosch, from November 17th to December 4th, 1987.⁸³

The acceleration of ROC–RSA academic/educational and cultural interactions during 1987-1990 was attributable to two factors. One was South Africa's worsening international pariah status after 1986. The other was the renewed action on the part of the ROC government to reinvigorate the ROC–RSA academic/educational and cultural co-operations so as to strengthen its diplomatic links with South Africa. On June 19th, 1989, the ROC government and the RSA government signed a cultural agreement in Pretoria for accelerated co-operations in the fields of cultural, intellectual, artistic, scientific, sports, educational and technical activities. According to Article 3 of this agreement, "the citizens of both countries shall be encouraged to study and attend training courses in the other country, and to support the exchange of youth groups, sports teams, individuals, scholarships and scientific experience with a view to promoting cultural co-operation and contact between the two countries."⁸⁴

In order to facilitate the bilateral educational/academic and cultural co-operation, the Ministry of Education (MOE) of the ROC established an Office of the Cultural Counsellor

in Pretoria in July 1990. The first Cultural Counsellor was Edward Chien-kun Yeh, who was succeeded by Dar-sheng Liu in 1994. With the bilateral cultural agreement and the ROC Office of the Cultural Counsellor in place, the ROC–RSA institution-to-institution exchange programmes were further expanded after 1990. Many prominent academics from various South African universities such as the Universities of Pretoria, Medunsa, Vista, Witwatersrand, Fort Hare, Western Cape and UNISA as well as the Peninsula Technikon had been invited to visit the ROC. Many prominent academics and educationists visited the ROC during 1990-1996. Of these, Franklin Sonn, the then Rector of the Peninsula Technikon, established contacts with the ROC's technical institutions in 1993. S. Bengu, prior to his inauguration as the first black Minister of Education in the government of National Unity (GNU) of South Africa on May 10th, 1994, visited the ROC while he was the Rector of Fort Hare University. A number of high-ranking officials and educationists from the Department of Education and Culture, the Certification Council for Technikon Education, the Transvaal Education Department and other educational institutions in South Africa were also invited to visit the ROC during 1990-1996.

A great number of reciprocal visits was made by the ROC academics and educationists to the RSA during this period. Among these visits, noteworthy ones included those of the ROC Deputy Minister of Education and three members of the Vocational and Technical Education Visiting Delegation who were invited by the South African Department of Education and Culture to visit the RSA during 1990-1991. The Director of the ROC National History Museum and many Taiwanese civil engineers and scholars came to South Africa to test the feasibility of academic/educational co-operation.⁸⁵

In the social-cultural dimension, a similar phenomenon of frequent interchanges between the ROC and the RSA occurred during the years 1980 until 1996. This period saw the two governments, in particular the ROC government, as indicated in the preceding part of this chapter, trying hard to bridge the cleavage between the two fundamentally different societies, so as to sustain the faltering diplomatic relations between Taipei and Pretoria. The ROC government exerted itself to strengthen the

ROC–RSA academic/educational and social-cultural links by allocating financial resources for the sending of various local-governmental, educational and cultural groups to visit South Africa. The ROC government's primary aim in implementing ROC–RSA academic/educational and social-cultural co-operations was largely based on its diplomatic need and, to a lesser extent, the demands of overseas Chinese communities. The plans were mostly short-term and no real long-term plan ever existed. The ROC's state intervention was, for example, reflected in the allocation of ROC governmental funds for sending cultural and music troupes to South Africa. When the ROC was maintaining diplomatic relations with the RSA, the ROC government would budget approximately NT\$10 million (equivalent to R2 million) to send youth goodwill teams to visit South Africa to stage or to attend the International Eisteddfod at Roodepoort. Other socio-cultural exchanges between the two countries were carried out in a similar manner. Most of the ROC–RSA interchange activities were government-sponsored or funded by the ROC public money of various institutions. Private individuals seldom took the initiative to engage in the strengthening of the ROC–RSA socio-cultural links, with the exception of a few students who pursued their studies in each others' countries.

As a result of the ROC government's active intervention, financial support and fervent encouragement, 16 ROC cultural groups came to South Africa either to stage cultural performances or to conduct arts exhibitions during 1990-1997. In addition, 12 ROC sport teams participated in a variety of sport events during this period. The ROC National Museum of History entered into a sister relation agreement with the Museum of Culture and History in Cape Town. Approximately 87 ROC students per year studied either short-term language courses or regular courses at South African universities or colleges.⁸⁶

Moreover, from 1993 to 1996, the ROC government provided youth scholarships, through the ANC Youth League, to 230 disadvantaged black students to study in various South African tertiary educational institutions including universities, colleges and technikons. In 1994, the amount for scholarships granted by the Office of the Cultural

Counsellor of the ROC Embassy in Pretoria was R232,644, and in 1995, the figure increased to R274,365. Approximately 55 black students benefited from the youth scholarship scheme each year. The total amount for scholarships spent during 1993-1996 was R1,180,094.⁸⁷

In addition, the ROC government handed over an educational grant of R25 million in mid-July 1996 to the South African government for the betterment of South Africa's overall education.⁸⁸ Special scholarships were also offered to seven South African postgraduate students to study Mandarin Chinese language in Taipei for one to two years. Among these, five students were from the University of the Witwatersrand and two from the University of Durban-Westville. Most of the students intended to pursue advanced studies on East Asia. The ROC government's special scholarship thus enabled them to have not only Mandarin training, but also personal exposure to East Asia which was helpful to their future research and career development.⁸⁹

The ROC–RSA academic/educational and socio/cultural links during 1976-1997 left a legacy of positive achievements, but also limitations. On the achievement side, the ROC–RSA academic/educational exchanges resulted in the establishment of more than eleven sister relations between South African universities and their ROC counterparts.⁹⁰ (For details, see Table 10). Through the establishment of sister relations, inter-institutional exchange programmes were organised to advance mutual co-operation and to share research expertise.

In addition to these sister relationships, various South African universities also set up several East Asia research projects. The University of South Africa (UNISA) established its Centre for Contemporary Asian Studies in February 1989, and from 1990 onwards, Mandarin Chinese was offered by the Centre as a UNISA distance teaching course. The Centre not only promoted research on East Asia, but also provided a series of audio visual programmes, video tapes and slide shows for interested persons, businessmen, diplomats and government officials on a variety of subjects including Chinese dance, music, painting and literature, as well as lectures on Asian business

opportunities, management methods and general economic affairs. The Centre's language course focused on giving a firm grounding in conversational Mandarin and a basic grasp of Chinese characters. The course was suitable for beginners who wished to have some understanding of the culture and civilisation of China and its neighbouring countries.⁹¹

The University of Stellenbosch and the University of the Witwatersrand undertook most of the research on East Asian politics and economics. The Department of Political Science of the University of Stellenbosch, under the leadership of Philip Nel, received USA\$100,000 from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation to launch a research project of Chinese Studies for the duration of three years from 1996 to 1999.⁹² Under the auspices of this research project, scholars such as Ian Taylor, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, University of Stellenbosch, were able to publish articles relating to the PRC's foreign policy and East Asian situation in various journals e.g. Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics (London) and Issues & Studies (Taipei).⁹³ Arrangements were also made for several academics from Taiwan, ROC including Yeong-kuang Ger of the National Taiwan University, to visit South Africa in 1996.

The Department of International Relations of the University of the Witwatersrand established the East Asia Project (EAP) in 1992 with funding to promote a greater awareness and understanding of East Asia. The aim of the EAP was, through "its teaching and research programme", to "educate South Africans as to the complexities of the Asian political, economic and social environment and, concurrently, develop local capacity and knowledge in all aspects of the study of the International Relations of Asia."⁹⁴ The EAP was funded by private donations, and thus maintained its political and administrative independence.⁹⁵ Chris Alden and Garth Shelton were responsible for the co-ordination of the research programme. The EAP publishes its own Working Paper Series, in which a number of research reports on topics relevant to East Asia have appeared.

The above-mentioned ROC–RSA academic/educational sister relations and research projects established by the various South African universities not only promoted research and studies on East Asia, but also aroused a few scholars' interest in the field of Asian studies. It was through these scholars' articles or academic works that the South African scholastic community was able to have a better understanding of the situation in East Asia.

As regards inter-relations between cities and provinces, by the end of October 1990, eight ROC cities had established sisterhood ties with their counterparts in South Africa.⁹⁶ The list of ROC cities that twinned with the relevant cities of South Africa during 1980-1997 is shown as Table 11.

Apart from the existence of sisterhood ties between various cities in the ROC and in the RSA, a Sister-Province Agreement was also entered into by the then Governor of the Taiwan Provincial government, Lien Chan, and the then Administrator of Transvaal Province, D.J. Hough.⁹⁷ The signing of the above sister-city agreements and sister-province agreement opened the doors for local government officials to visit the respective countries in the name of sisterhood ties. The exchange of visits between the officials of the local governments of the two countries enhanced the officials' mutual understanding of the culture and situation of the other country.

Despite the language barrier and cultural differences, there was a mood of genuine goodwill between the two countries in the people-to-people dimension during 1976-1997. South Africa had really won the ROC nation's heart. The RSA was considered the largest diplomatic ally and most important trading partner in Africa. The ROC government devoted much of its attention to South Africa, and even the opposition party, namely the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was deeply impressed by the miracle of South Africa's peaceful democratic transformation.⁹⁸ When the ROC government lavished massive diplomatic expenditure on maintaining its diplomatic links with South Africa, the ROC people were behind the government.

The ROC's second Armed Forces Attaché in Pretoria, Colonel Tang Fei, and its former Economic Counsellor, P.K. Chiang, voluntarily formed a "Protea Club" in Taipei in 1982, when they returned from South Africa to the ROC, to organise annual get-together functions for those who had been to South Africa for work or studies and also to promote friendly relations with South Africa. The "Protea Club" has more than five hundred members at present, some of whom have played prominent roles in the ROC political and military arenas. For example, Colonel Tang Fei later became General Tang, and held the positions of Commander-in-Chief of the ROC Air Forces, Minister of Defence, as well as Premier (Prime Minister) (May–October 2000).⁹⁹ P.K. Chiang was successively promoted to the Director-General of the ROC Board of Foreign Trade, Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, Minister of Economic Affairs and Minister (Chairman) for Economic Planning and Development. Among the members of the "Protea Club", there were 3 generals (including General Tang), 6 ministers or minister-rank officials, 3 vice ministers, 10 ambassadors or ambassador-rank representatives (the ROC's unofficial ambassadors in non-diplomatic countries), five consul-generals and several distinguished scholars. The potential influence of the members of the "Protea Club" can not be underestimated. This corps d'élite of the ROC was far more sympathetic to the idea of maintaining strong links with South Africa. The legacy of historical friendship and human goodwill hidden in various invisible corners of the ROC society was the most important achievement of the ROC–RSA diplomatic links for the past two decades. If the South African government could tap this human goodwill in time, the prospect of maintaining cordial relations between the RSA and the ROC remains optimistic.¹⁰⁰

However, following the presidential election of March 18th, 2000 which brought an end to the fifty-year rule of Kuomintang (KMT) and saw the rise of the pro-Taiwan-independence DPP, the political landscape of the ROC is changing fast. Members of the above-mentioned elite who are sympathetic to the cause of cementing strong ROC–RSA links are fading away with the passage of time or are about to retire in due course from public life. The three most important ROC ambassadors who had made great contributions in forging and defending the maintenance of cordial ROC–RSA relations – namely Edward Y. Kuan (1976-79), H.K. Yang (1979-89) and I-cheng Loh (1990-1997)

– have either passed away or bowed out of the ROC political arena. Tang resigned the premiership in October 2000. P.K. Chiang also lost his power to the DPP during the March 2000 presidential election. Others of the elite who have had vast experience with South Africa in the past may soon face a similar fate. The younger generation, unlike the generation of the post-Cold War elite, are more concerned with the ROC's domestic economy, its cross-Taiwan Straits relations and security links with the USA than its international engagement in the remote African continent.¹⁰¹ The passage from the pro-South Africa old generation to the younger generation of political elite in the ROC will mark a major departure from the historical epoch of ROC–RSA rapport during 1976-1997.

Even if the ROC's political landscape had not changed, the attempts of the ROC government to deepen ROC–RSA academic/educational and cultural/social links during 1976-1997 had insurmountable limitations. The endeavour was beset with three major problems. The first is that the two cultures are fundamentally too different to be bridged in a relatively short time span. Until 1990, the cultural policy of the South African government focused mainly on Eurocentrism, and the cultural affairs were largely dominated by white South Africans. For decades, South African cultural identity bore the characteristics of European culture. Against this background, the value of all South African cultural expressions during the 1970s-1980s was measured against European standards. There was a common assumption that Western music, dance, literature and fine arts were better than those of the Third World.¹⁰² After 1990, following F.W. de Klerk's opening speech in Parliament on February 2nd, 1990 announcing the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and the lifting of the ban on all unlawful organisations, the international community gradually started to lift the cultural boycott against South Africa. As from January 1991, several international cultural groups including an 18-strong Lambada group from Brazil, the Romanian State Circus and the first Russian film festival group, began to visit South Africa.¹⁰³ The end of cultural isolation cleared the ground for South Africa to gradually become a normal African state which finds its cultural roots in both European and African traditions. As South Africa

moves towards a full democracy, its cultural identification with Africa and the West has been acknowledged to be the focal points of its cultural development.¹⁰⁴

Under such socio-cultural circumstances, most South Africans are simply not interested in Chinese cultural performances or Chinese culture. This is partially due to the great cultural divide and partially because of the unfamiliarity of the ROC culture.¹⁰⁵ The majority of South Africans incline more towards African culture or the historically more familiar cultures of Europe and North America.¹⁰⁶ Some might be impressed by East Asia's economic success; but apart from that, East Asian civilisation is perceived as a kind of mystery.¹⁰⁷ It will take time for the average South African to accept the culture of East Asia. For example, in 1997, the then ROC Consulate-General in Durban devoted a great deal of effort to arrange for a well-known Taiwanese Christian cultural group, namely Ya-tung Drama Troupe, to perform in Durban North on May 17th. To the group's great disappointment, only four South Africans attended the performance – the pastor of Durban North Baptist Church, the deacon of the said Church who was responsible for the circulation of invitation letters, and another white South African couple. The rest of the audience was made up of local Chinese residents and the officials of the ROC Consulate-General in Durban.¹⁰⁸ Similar situations marked other Chinese cultural performances, traditional Chinese festivals and dragon-boat races. Very few South Africans bother to participate in traditional Chinese cultural activities. The people from the ROC also chose to do things their own way. They live in a distinctly different world. The two cultures lack convergence and acculturation despite the bridge built between the ROC and the RSA. At the end of the day, the two nations failed to draw on the best practices and values from each other's rich civilisations.

The second problem is the language barrier. The teaching media and official language in the ROC is Mandarin, while English and Afrikaans are the most important of South Africa's eleven official languages. To master the language of Mandarin, especially its four intonations and written characters, is fairly difficult. As a result of the language barrier, very few South African students dared to embrace the opportunities provided by the ROC. This is why, in 1992, no South African student accepted the ROC bursary to

study in Taiwan despite the goodwill of the ROC government, which had made five such bursaries available to South African students on an annual basis as from 1992 until 1997 to promote educational exchanges and strengthen cultural ties between the ROC and the RSA.¹⁰⁹ Between 1992 and 1997, only 7 South African students had been to the Mandarin Training Centre of the National Taiwan Normal University in Taipei to study Mandarin for one year and then pursue their East Asian studies for one further year.¹¹⁰

The third problem is that the ROC–RSA educational/academic and socio/cultural exchanges during 1976–1997 were basically government-controlled, not people-driven. The ROC's educational/academic and socio/cultural links with South Africa were just part of the multi-dimensionality of ROC diplomacy. In other words, the endeavour was just another aspect of the ROC's multifaceted pragmatic foreign policy which was politically/diplomatically motivated in essence.¹¹¹ This is shown from the remarks made by the ROC's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fredrick F. Chien, and the former Premier of the ROC, Lien Chan, during their terms of office. Premier Lien indicated that:

The fact is that 29 nations maintain full diplomatic relations with our country. While observing the obligations and enjoying the benefits of these formal relations, we also understand that we have many substantive, if not political, relationships with a much larger group of nations. These less formal relationships are of several types: economic, cultural, scientific and philanthropic.¹¹²

Chien, elaborated further upon this:

In upgrading substantive ties with those countries without formal ties with us, we have increased economic, scientific-technical, cultural and tourist contacts. At the present time, we have relations of this type in more than

120 countries, with main focus on the United States, Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia.¹¹³

It is clear that the ROC government's efforts in launching the drive of educational and cultural ties with South Africa were aimed at strengthening the ROC–RSA diplomatic relations. As Chien emphasised, “breakthroughs in our foreign relations will have to come through battle with the Chinese Communists internationally.”¹¹⁴

In brief, due to the above-mentioned three factors, the ROC–RSA academic/educational and socio-cultural ties did not get off the ground. The sisterhood ties between various South African cities and their counterparts in the ROC exist merely in name. Since November 1996, most of the afore-mentioned sister cities have not been actively implementing bilateral interactions and socio-cultural exchanges.¹¹⁵ Expectations that these ties would bring the two nations closer were not met. In terms of hard results, the achievements were limited. Although the bilateral academic/educational and socio-cultural contacts during 1976-1997 helped to break down the walls of mutual ignorance, the great divide between the two societies remains insurmountable.

6.4 SUMMARY

During the period 1976-1997, apart from close diplomatic, economic and nuclear relations, the ROC and the RSA also developed co-operative relationship in the military, academic, educational, sports and socio-cultural spheres. The ROC and the RSA started to seek military, academic/educational and socio-cultural co-operation as from 1976. In 1977, the two countries exchanged military attachés. But the real military co-operation between Taipei and Pretoria commenced from March 11th, 1980 when a secret military co-operation agreement was signed by the two Prime Ministers at Cape Town, and ended in 1996. The ROC–RSA academic, educational, sports and socio-cultural ties were mainly developed in the 1980s, peaked in the first half of the 1990s, and dissipated at the end of 1996.¹¹⁶

Contrary to some long-held notions, military co-operation between the ROC and the RSA was not simply due to the international isolation and “pariahhood” of the two countries.¹¹⁷ The nature of ROC–RSA military co-operation was, in fact, based mainly on diplomatic, strategic and pragmatic considerations. For the ROC, its military collaboration with South Africa was not intended as a means to form a “Fourth World” or “Fifth World” of pariah States,¹¹⁸ nor “to escape from its pariah status.”¹¹⁹ As the Taiwan Relations Act of the USA has guaranteed the ROC against the PRC’s armed aggression by authorising the USA government to provide the ROC with necessary defence weapons, the ROC, unlike South Africa in the 1980s, did not suffer arms embargoes. So long as the ROC did not offend the USA, arms supply was never a serious problem for the ROC. Aside from the ROC’s relatively assured security commitments and arms sales, there was the wide divergence of national conditions, which constrained the deepening of the two countries’ full military co-operation. The two states’ defence strategies were different. Therefore, Armscor’s military products such as the G5 and G6 artillery systems and the Casspir armoured personnel carrier were not suitable for the ROC’s defence need.¹²⁰ The ROC’s weapons system was mostly of American origin, and the selling to a third country was not allowed.¹²¹

The most serious dividing line was that the expectations of the two countries were also totally different. The RSA expected to attain, through the ROC–RSA military co-operation, sensitive American military technology and to expand its arms sales to the wealthy ROC. All of these hopes were dashed. In order not to break the rules of the USA arms sales and violate the UN arms embargo, the ROC refused to assist South Africa to obtain military technology from third countries.¹²² Over a decade and a half, the RSA’s arms sales to the ROC was disappointingly scanty in terms of the ROC’s total defence budget.¹²³ From the ROC’s perspective, the ROC–RSA military co-operation was simply a means to strengthen its diplomatic ties with South Africa. It served merely as an instrument to a much higher strategic end – to safeguard its diplomacy, to exchange know-how and visits of personnel, and to effect bilateral training for the navies and air forces of the two countries.¹²⁴

As a result of the above-mentioned differences, South Africa was disappointed by the insignificant result of the ROC–RSA military co-operation. In September 1996, the South African government unilaterally passed a cabinet resolution to terminate its military co-operation with the ROC and to stop its arms sales to the ROC as from September 1996.¹²⁵

In the sphere of sports interactions, although there was a frequent exchange of visits between various sports teams of the two countries, the ROC avoided dispatching its national teams to compete with their South African counterparts. The ROC also declined to accept the national sports teams of South Africa to compete in the international tournaments that were hosted by the ROC's sports authorities, so as to abide by the rules of the International Olympic Committee.¹²⁶ The ROC–RSA sports interchanges were not particularly significant because of the fact that the ROC has never been a great sporting nation. Baseball, basketball and Chinese martial arts are very popular in the ROC, but rugby and cricket are not. However, rugby, cricket and soccer are South Africa's favourite sports.¹²⁷ The RSA's sports contact with the ROC did not help South Africa to make a meaningful breakthrough in its international sports isolation. South Africa could only normalise its sports relations once the South African government started to abolish its apartheid policies and build a non-racial democratic society.¹²⁸

As regards academic/educational and socio-cultural links, a framework of inter-governmental co-operative agreements and sister relations between various universities of the ROC and their RSA counterparts were established during 1976-1997. ROC local city governments and the Taiwan Provincial government forged sisterhood ties with a number of South African city councils and the former Transvaal Province.¹²⁹ The ROC elite who had served or studied in South Africa also formed a very influential "Protea Club" in Taipei to promote people-to-people friendship and the reunion of old acquaintances. Some of the members of the "Protea Club" became prominent figures in the ROC government and its Foreign Service. This elite group was more sympathetic

to the idea of maintaining cordial relations with South Africa despite South Africa's recognition of the PRC. In a true sense, the ROC elite's in-depth understanding of South Africa and the human good-will that accumulated during the course of the ROC–RSA bilateral engagement are some of the most important achievements of the ROC–RSA social interactions.

However, owing to the fundamental differences of the two cultures, the language barrier, the lack of real interest, and the lack of grass-roots support, the ROC–RSA academic/educational and socio-cultural ties never took root. The bilateral academic/educational co-operation programme was driven by political/diplomatic motivations. The ROC's main focus is on the USA, Europe, Japan and Southeast Asia, and the RSA focuses on the West and Africa.¹³⁰ The efforts made by the two countries to establish academic/educational and socio-cultural ties were of limited achievement. The studies of this chapter proved part of the hypothesis pertaining to the limits of a "Pariah International" expounded by Robert E. Harkavy, a Senior Research Fellow of Cornell University, to be correct. The unstable relationship between the ROC and the RSA substantiates Harkavy's argument that "small-state alliances have historically been of questionable value" and that "the pariahs can be uneasy bedfellows at best, since close relations with any one of them constitutes an overall international liability."¹³¹ However, some of the myths about the ROC's violation of international arms embargo and the ROC–RSA pariah alliance have been proved to be unfounded.¹³²

In short, the ROC pursued a diplomacy of multidimensionality including military, cultural, economic, aid/developmental, educational, governmental and party interchanges towards South Africa to safeguard the full diplomatic ties. Although its aim was to defend its own national interests, the ROC's behaviour towards South Africa was basically pragmatic and "correct."¹³³ The ROC's former Ambassador to the RSA, I-cheng Loh, had this to say:

The ROC, unlike South Africa or Israel, has done nothing wrong. Since 1976, our relations have been correct. We have broken no arms

embargo; we have violated no oil embargo. We have no oil ourselves.
We buy our arms even elsewhere.¹³⁴

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI

1. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 中斐條約協定關係 (The Agreements between the ROC and the RSA), 中華民國與南非共和國國防工業合作協議書 (The Agreement on Defence Industries' Co-operation between the RSA and the ROC), March 11th, 1980, pp.1-6.
2. Feldman, Kau, & Kim, Taiwan in a Time of Transition, p.148.
3. Government Information Office, ROC, 李總統登輝先生八十三年言論選集 (Anthology of President Lee Teng-hui's Speeches), p.242.
4. Feldman, Kau, & Kim, Taiwan in a Time of Transition, p.149.
5. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The Agreement on Defence Industries' Co-operation, p.3.
6. Geldenhuys, Isolated States, p.504.
7. *Ibid.*, pp.504-505.
8. Adelman, "Israel/South Africa: The Club of Pariahs" in Africa Report, Vol. 25, No. 6, November-December 1980, p.10. See also G. St.J. Barclay, "Strategy of Despair: South Africa and the Alignment of the Alienated, 1974-82" in Journal for Contemporary History, December 1982, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp.2-11 for RSA-Israel military co-operation.
9. The Sunday Independent, June 23rd, 1996 (Apartheid South Africa had secret dealings with communist China, says businessman).
10. Adelman, "Israel/South Africa", p.10.
11. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.237.
12. K. Adelman, "Israel/South Africa", p.10.
13. Interview with Cmdr. Cheng-wu Chen, the ROC Naval Attaché in the RSA, on December 2nd, 1999 at 847 Thomas Ave., Arcadia, Pretoria.
14. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The ROC Armed Forces Attaché's Report on the ROC-RSA Military Co-operation, July 4th, 1995, No. 07042, p.4.
15. *Ibid.*, 孫院長訪斐案 (The visit of Premier Sun to the RSA), Vol. 2, P.W. Botha's speech delivered during a state banquet at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town, on March 12th, 1980, p.2.
16. General M. Malan's address to the SAR&H War Services Union, on October 27th, 1988, Pretoria, in South African Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 14, 1988-1989, pp.242-243.
17. Interview with Cmdr. Cheng-wu Chen, the ROC Naval Attaché in the RSA, on December 2nd, 1999.
18. The Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, p.125.
19. A. Du Toit, South Africa's Fighting Ships: Past and Present, p.180.
20. TLO Archives, Pretoria: Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the Republic of China on the Co-operation of ROC-RSA Defence Industries, March 11th, 1980, p.3, which is collected in TLO Archives, Pretoria: 中斐國防工業合作計畫案簡介 (The Briefings on ROC-RSA Co-operation of Defence Industries).
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, pp.3-5.
23. *Ibid.*, p.5.
24. *Ibid.*, The Briefings on ROC-RSA Co-operation of Defence Industries, p.5.
25. Agreement (Minutes) of Thirteenth Defence Industry Co-operation Conference Between the RSA and the ROC, No. 11, June 16th, 1990, pp.4, 14 & 17. The said minutes are collected in TLO Archives, Pretoria: 第十三, 十四屆中斐國防工業會議案 (The 13th and 14th ROC/RSA Defence Industry Co-operation Conferences).
26. Agreement (Minutes) of Eighteenth Defence Industry Co-operation Conference Between the RSA and the ROC, May 12th, 1995, p.29.
27. *Ibid.* p.28.
28. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 一九八九年至一九九四年中斐軍事合作與交流成果 (The Result of ROC-RSA Military Co-operation, 1989-1994): 我國軍方訪斐統計 (The Statistics of the visits of the ROC Military).
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*

31. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The ROC Embassy's Report on Premier Sun's visit to the RSA, April 8th, 1980, No.0260, pp.26-28.
32. Gen. Pei-tsun Hau (郝柏村), 八年參謀總長日記 (The Diary of the Eight Years as the Chief of General Staff), p.317.
33. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 一九八九年至一九九四年中斐軍事合作及交流成果 (The ROC–RSA Military Co-operation and Its Outcome, 1989-1994): 斐軍方訪問我國統計 (The Statistics of the Visits of South African Military Personnel to the ROC).
34. *Ibid.*, 遠朋班案 (Political Warfare Course): 外交部非洲司 1989.3.28 日致國防部總政治作戰部第 0506 號函 (MOFA's correspondence to MOD, No. 0506), March 28th, 1989, pp.1-2.
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36. L. H. Gann, "The USSR, The West and South Africa" in the ISSUP Strategic Review, September 1984, p.23.
37. P. Godwin, "Towards a New Strategy?", in G. Segal & W. T. Tow (eds.) Chinese Defence Policy, p.37.
38. M. Gurtov & B. M. Hwang, China's Security, p.270.
39. General Pei-tsun Hau (郝柏村), 八年參謀總長日記 (The Diary of the Eight Years as the Chief of General Staff), p.316.
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41. *Ibid.*, p.21.
42. United Daily News, January 5th, 2000, p.12 (丁大衛指台灣曾進行小型核試爆 / D. Dean alleged that Taiwan tested small nuclear devices).
43. General Pei-tsun Hau, The Diary of the Eight Years as the Chief of General Staff, p.407.
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45. *Ibid.*
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47. The Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, p.171.
48. Hsueh, "The Political Economy of Defence Spending", p.51.
49. South African Chinese Newspaper, January 28th, 2000, p.10 (Taiwan's arms procurement: the highest in the world).
50. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 中斐國防工業合作計畫案 (ROC–RSA Co-operation on Defence Industries): The ROC Embassy's telex to MOFA No. 166, March 30th, 1995, p.2; and the official dispatch No. 2769 sent from the ROC Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics, Ministry of Defence, to Ambassador I-cheng Loh, dated April 21st, 1995, p.5.
51. *Ibid.*, The Minutes of the Meeting on the RSA's interests in the Greater China region, held on May 23rd, 1995, at the Diplomatic Guest House, Pretoria, p.4.
52. *Ibid.*, The ROC Embassy's telex to MOFA No. 166, p.3.
53. *Ibid.*, p.2.
54. *Ibid.*, The Minutes of the meeting of May 23rd, 1995, p.4.
55. *Ibid.*, p.3.
56. *Ibid.*, pp.3-4.
57. *Ibid.*, p.3.
58. *Ibid.*, Report of the ROC Military Attaché in Pretoria to the Ministry of Defence, Taipei, on February 28th, 1995, p.1.
59. National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), the RSA Cabinet Memorandum No. 13, September 5th, 1996, Cape Town, File Ref. No. DS 5/1/9B. Collected in TLO Archives, Pretoria: 中斐國防工業合作計畫案(ROC–RSA Co-operation on Defence Industries), pp.1-3.
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63. Republic of China Yearbook, 1988, p.279.
64. *Ibid.*
65. Ministry of Education of the ROC, Education in the Republic of China, 1984, Taipei, p.48.
66. Republic of China Yearbook 1988, p.384.

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68. South Africa 1977, p.873. See also TLO Archives, ROC–RSA Exchange of Visits, Vol.1, 1976 List of Visitors.
69. See The Chinese World Almanac, 1995, pp.1006-1007 (Report on the RSA).
70. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 68.7-69.9 密件 (The Confidential Files During July 1979-Sep.1980): MOFA's telex No. 442, December 17th, 1979, pp.1-2.
71. Ibid.
72. The General Assembly of the United Nations, Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, October 25th, 1989, p.53.
73. TLO Archives, Pretoria, MOFA's telex No. 768, dated August 14th, 1984. It was clearly stated in this telex that the ROC was not in a position to compete with the South African national teams in the sports items of the IOC games.
74. Ibid.: 文化體育交流案, 1981-1989 (ROC–RSA Cultural and Sports Exchanges, 1981-1989), MOFA's telex No. 650 dated January 22nd, 1984; and the letter of Roy Menachemson, Managing Director of SA National Bowling Operations, addressed to H. K. Yang, the ROC Ambassador, dated January 30th, 1984.
75. Ibid., 中斐政要互訪案(四) (ROC–RSA Exchange of Visits, Vol. 4), 中南美洲及非洲地區使節會議議題及決議 (The Resolutions and Discussion Points of the Conference of Heads of Missions, August 10th, 1978), pp.3-4.
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79. Ibid., 聯合會報案 (Co-ordination Conferences), 民國七十七年八月-七十八年四月份駐南非各單位聯合會報紀錄 (The Minutes of Co-ordination Conferences, August 1988-April 1989), Minutes of 171 meeting, p.4 and Minutes of 172 meeting, p.3.
80. Ibid., 政要互訪案 (ROC–RSA Exchange of Visits, July 1985-November 1986), Appendix – A List of Recent Exchange of Visits.
81. Ibid., 教育(學者訪華) (Education: Visits of South African Academics to the ROC), MOFA's official dispatch to MOE, No. 77322310, dated September 7th, 1988, pp.1-2.
82. Ibid., 教育部長訪斐卷 (The Visit of the ROC Minister of Education to the RSA), the ROC Embassy's official dispatch No. 390, dated April 16th, 1987, p.1.
83. Ibid., 南非人士訪華卷(二) (The Visits of South African Academics II), MOE's official dispatch to Sun Yat-sen University and the ROC Embassy, No. 54453 dated November 11th, 1987, p.1.
84. Ibid., 中斐文化協定 (Agreement between the Government of the ROC and the Government of the RSA Relating to Cultural Matters), June 19th, 1989, p.6, Article 3.
85. T. Sono, From the East: Lessons from Taiwan for South Africa, p.74.
86. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 駐南非代表處文化組業務簡報 (Briefings of the Cultural Division of the TLO in the RSA), December 10th, 1999, pp.3-5.
87. Ibid., p.6.
88. Interview with Dr. Dar-sheng Liu, Chief of Cultural Division of the TLO in the RSA, Pretoria, December 17th, 1999.
89. Ibid., See also M.J. Davies' personal letter to the author dated April 24th, 2001. In the letter, Davies indicated that his academic research in Taiwan was "both academically productive and personally fulfilling."
90. T. Sono, From the East: Lessons from Taiwan for South Africa, pp.74-75. See also University of Pretoria Research and Creative Work, 1998, Vol. 1 – Review, p.23.
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