

CHAPTER III

THE EVOLUTION OF CORDIAL POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC LINKS BETWEEN THE ROC AND THE RSA, 1971-1994

3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a historical account of the development of ROC–RSA political-diplomatic links during the period 1971-1994. To survey the evolution of the interstate relations between the two countries, the first section of this chapter explores the historical background and the main factors which drew the two remote countries to engage in cordial interactions. The second section reviews how ROC–RSA political and diplomatic ties developed and examines the nature of interstate relations between the ROC and the RSA during this period. Finally, the effects and impact of ROC–RSA political and diplomatic relations on the domestic, economic and political developments of the respective countries are assessed.

The development of a close relationship between the ROC and the RSA began in the 1970s, culminated in the 1980s, and then declined from 1990 when the NP government under the leadership of President F.W. de Klerk embarked upon a new political course. The turning point of ROC–RSA bilateral relations was the year 1971, although the actual commencement of diplomatic relations between the two countries was from 1976. If we take the year 1971 as the starting point of the ROC–RSA alignment, which lasted until April 1994 when the new democratic South Africa emerged miraculously, the overall history of the close ROC–RSA ties during these years can be broadly divided into two historical phases.

The first phase, from 1971 to 1989, witnessed the gradual expansion of co-operative ties. During these two decades, the ROC and the RSA opted to expand friendly exchanges and co-operation between the two countries in various fields in lieu of the previous reluctance to embrace each other. In the time span of this phase, the two

countries enjoyed a relationship of cordial ties which were based on mutual need, sincere friendship and complementary co-operation. This period was a phase of forging close links between the ROC and the RSA.

The second phase, from 1990 to 1994, was a period of transition from alignment to uncertainty. After the unbanning of the ANC in February 1990, and the subsequent dismantling of apartheid legislation, the RSA was gradually returning to the international fold. While South Africa began to shake off the enforced isolation and to reintegrate with the mainstream of the world community, it was inevitable that the ROC–RSA ties developed during the decades of isolation, should make way for international reintegration. Under the circumstances, from 1990 onwards, the interstate relations between the ROC and the RSA entered into a stage of transition, which further degenerated into a period of uncertainty after 1994 and finally culminated in the announcement made by President Nelson Mandela on November 27th, 1996 to sever the ROC–RSA diplomatic relations with effect from the end of 1997.

3.2 CONSIDERATIONS FOR FORGING CLOSER TIES WITH THE RSA

The reasons for the formation of close links between the ROC and RSA were manifold. The development of the close ties was not simply a result of the shared increasing diplomatic isolation of the two countries as many scholars have expounded.¹ The increasing isolation was merely one of the factors which led the two countries to forge closer ties both politically and economically through the 1970s and the 1980s. To understand the historical evolution of the relations between the ROC and the RSA, there is a need to review other important contributing factors during the period 1971-1989.

The first and foremost factor was the removal of the ROC from the UN in 1971. Freed from the annual diplomatic battle for the China seat at the UN, the ROC did not need the African votes any more. Therefore, the African countries became relatively

unimportant in comparison with the RSA which was the strongest state economically and militarily in the sub-continent south of the Sahara. This gave the ROC the freedom and opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations with the RSA for the benefit of economic development, trade and the supply of minerals. The ROC former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien-jen Chen, gave the following brief explanation:

After the ROC was ousted from the UN, the political consideration that by associating with the RSA, its apartheid policies might lead the ROC to offend other black African countries was removed, and the ROC's foreign policy towards the RSA was less influenced by factors of political stance. Therefore, we established ambassadorial-level relations with the RSA.²

The second factor was the change of American policy towards the ROC. The foundation of the ROC's security status and legitimacy was built on American support. As soon as American backing was downgraded, the future of the ROC became uncertain and it needed to form closer association with other isolated countries such as South Africa for various purposes. The ousting of the ROC from the UN was largely as a result of the changes of American policy towards the ROC.³ The fate of the ROC, a small state, is basically dependent upon the distribution of power within the international system, which is shaped, by major powers like the USA.

The survival of the ROC, as explained in Chapter II, was mainly reliant on the USA's support. The full support of the USA, which was given to the ROC after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, lasted for two decades. From the 1950s to the 1960s, when the USA was facing a concerted Soviet-PRC Communist challenge, the USA considered the ROC as an important part of the littoral islands extending from the Aleutians through the Philippine Archipelago to contain Communist expansion. Hence, a defence treaty was concluded between the USA and the ROC in 1954 under the Eisenhower administration, and the two countries maintained close ties and military co-operation. During the Vietnam War, Ching Chuan Kang Air Base in the middle of Taiwan was used by USA military cargo jets as a way station to provide military supplies

to the USA troops in Vietnam. Intelligence listening posts and aircraft repair facilities were established in the ROC to assist American military activities.⁴

In direct contrast to ROC-USA alliance, the PRC had signed a treaty of alliance with the USSR in February 1950 and a PRC-USSR defence assistance agreement was concluded in October 1957. The PRC considered the USSR as its primary source for political support and military aid in the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s. However, PRC-USSR relations turned sour in the latter part of the 1960s. Apart from the ideological differences of the two major communist countries, the split was partly due to Mao's independent self-reliant development strategy.⁵ In line with his revolutionary strategy, Mao intended to induce the leader of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, to assist the PRC to become a nuclear power. However, Khrushchev was reluctant to help Mao, unless the PRC allowed Soviet military forces to establish nuclear bases in mainland China. Mao refused to accept the Soviet's demands, and instead he pursued an independent nuclear programme.⁶ In the aspect of economic and political development, Mao also discarded the Soviet economic/political model and initiated the unprecedented gigantic social engineering of the so-called "Great Leap Forward" from September-October 1957 to July 1959. At its zenith, the whole country was transformed into "people's communes" which were expected to be self-sufficient and produce steel. The Soviet-trained steel engineers were redeployed to work in agriculture. The economy and steel industry were in a mess.⁷ From 1957 for nearly twenty years until Mao's death in 1976, Mao inflicted great disasters on Chinese society, in particular during the period of "the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (1965-1969). Mao's eleven million Red Guards, with the support of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), had virtually destroyed Chinese culture and the PRC's governmental hierarchy. The violent excesses of Mao's Cultural Revolution were so serious that the ten years from 1966 to 1976 were widely perceived as "the lost decade."⁸ The history of the PRC, from its founding in 1949 until the death of Mao in 1976, underwent "a series of jolts and internal struggles."⁹

The Sino-Soviet strain was, in part, attributable to Mao's adventurism. This was reflected by Mao's military intervention in the Korean War (1950-1953) and his ordering of a heavy bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, the islands of fortified outposts under the control of the ROC military forces, in July 1958. Khrushchev was alarmed by Mao's adventurism, and Mao was deeply disappointed by the lack of support from the Soviet Union in his failed "liberation" of Taiwan, the ROC.¹⁰ Khrushchev regarded Mao as "a madman who would wreck his country and blow up the world if he had means."¹¹ The troubled Sino-Soviet relations were further exacerbated by historical border disputes which culminated in armed clashes in April 1969 over the disputed islands in the Ussuri River in Manchuria.

While the Sino-Soviet hostility was deepening, a dramatic change in the relationship between the USA and the PRC was about to take place. The USA foreign policy of diplomatic non-recognition of the PRC, which lasted for nearly two decades from the 1950s to the 1960s, was soon to be replaced by a policy of normalisation of relations with the PRC. As the USA was bogged down in the Vietnam War, President Richard Nixon, after winning a narrow presidential electoral victory in 1969, was keen to seek the co-operation of the PRC on a negotiated settlement in the Vietnam conflict. The PRC not only provided vital military supply, economic aid and diplomatic support to North Vietnam, but also wielded considerable influence over the insurgent forces such as the Viet Cong forces, Pathet Lao and Cambodian communists in South-East Asia.¹² To achieve a face-saving disengagement in Vietnam, there was a need for the USA to establish relations with the PRC.

Furthermore, there was growing international acceptance of the fact that, as the Chinese Communists government has been in long-term effective de facto control of mainland China since 1949, it was the PRC on the mainland, and not the ROC on Taiwan, which was the legitimate government of China. There was also a growing awareness in the world community that with its enormous size, population and military power, the PRC was an important country in the international political system. While the PRC was gradually recognised as an important power, the PRC began to readjust

its foreign policy. After the period of Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s and its isolationism and identification with the third world in the 1960s, the PRC adopted a pragmatic approach since the 1970s to improve its image and to seek modernisation so as to form a global coalition against perceived Soviet expansionism.¹³ Beijing's new approach and its open door policy led many non-communist countries to normalise relations with the PRC forfeiting diplomatic relations with the ROC.

The change of international perception of the PRC was coupled with the emergence of the great power triangle of the USA, the USSR, and the PRC. Following the occurrence of an open schism between the PRC and the USSR, the new strategic balance of power of the post-war world had shifted. The previous bi-polar system was changed into a pattern of triangular relations. Among the great power triad, the USA viewed the USSR as the major threat, and the PRC a lesser enemy. To exploit the intensifying Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Nixon administration contemplated playing the "China card", so as to prevent the USSR from achieving its global hegemony.¹⁴ It was the above-mentioned strategic tactics that led the USA to formulate the policy of normalisation of relations with the PRC and to co-opt Beijing from 1970 onwards.

In 1971, the USA made a complete change in its China policy. Nixon was determined to normalise relations with the PRC and to phase out the USA-ROC diplomatic relations. On July 15th, 1971, an announcement was made by the White House that Henry Kissinger, the then Assistant for National Security Affairs and later the Secretary of State of the USA, had made a secret trip to Beijing from July 9th to 11th, 1971 to have talks with Chou En-lai, the then Premier of the PRC. Thereafter, Nixon decided to pay a state visit to the PRC in February, 1972.¹⁵

The decision of the Nixon administration to play the "China Card", or rather "equilibrium" as Kissinger named it,¹⁶ had enormous repercussions on the international relations of the ROC and the retaining of its seat in the UN. The change of the USA policy towards the PRC and the China initiative were construed by many smaller countries in the world community as the imminent dumping of the ROC and the diminishing of the ROC's

importance. The ROC's claim to represent China was viewed as fiction of anti-Communist ideology and the USA treated the ROC as dispensable. As a result of the change of USA policy towards the ROC, the USA government's "Taiwan fever" was "immediately replaced by a nearly unquenchable yearning of senior officials to visit Beijing on suddenly essential business."¹⁷

In the face of such a major shift in the USA's China policy, the ROC leadership, however, still stubbornly adhered to its "One China" policy and rejected the proposals for "dual representation" made by the USA. This would have admitted the PRC to the UN, while the ROC would still have been allowed to remain in the General Assembly of the UN as a separate member in a similar situation to West and East Germany in the past. Nevertheless, the then Ambassador of the ROC to the USA, James Shen, was instructed by the ROC government to call on Kissinger on July 1, 1971 before his secret trip to Beijing to lodge "an extensive objection to the State Department plan for "dual representation", which would have attempted to admit Beijing to the UN without expelling Taiwan."¹⁸ However, despite the upholding of the facade of the "one-China" policy, the ROC government had, after the passing away of the mainland Chinese leaders on Taiwan, already modified this rigid official stance in terms of its de facto practices behind the official facade. But the PRC still insisted that there was "but one China" and that "Taiwan is part of China."¹⁹

The shift of the USA's policy towards the PRC together with the rigid stance of the ROC leadership eventually led to the latter's loss of international recognition at the UN. As the annual debate at the UN on the issue of the representation of China approached in 1971, the timing of the debate coincided with Kissinger's second trip to Beijing in October 1971 to make arrangements for Nixon's forthcoming visit to the PRC. The USA government's declared policy of normalising relations with the PRC had effectively swayed the outcome of the debate in the UN General Assembly and its subsequent voting. It became apparent to other countries that the USA was eager to embrace the PRC. The USA's new advocacy of the PRC's admission into the UN, but preserving the ROC's seat in the form of "dual representation" further increased the PRC's support.

However, both the PRC and the ROC flatly rejected the American proposal of “dual representation”. The then Premier of the PRC, Chou En-lai, confirmed with Kissinger during his visit to Beijing that the PRC would not accept “dual representation” in any form, and Chou indicated that “the PRC had existed for a long time without membership in the UN and could wait a while longer.”²⁰ The leader of the ROC, Chiang Kai-shek, also rejected the formula of “dual representation”. This was evident from Chiang’s instruction to his Ambassador to lodge a protest to the USA as described above. Consequently, it became increasingly clear to many countries which were anxious to establish relations with Beijing that the formula of “dual representation” proposed by the USA was no solution to the problem of China.

Many countries also recognised the inevitability of the PRC’s admission into the UN. As the most populous country in the world and a great power in terms of its size and its military strength, so long as the PRC’s was not in the UN, the universality of the UN international representation was not complete. There was a common belief that it might be possible to delay the PRC’s entry into the UN for a year or two, but there was no way to keep the PRC out of the UN forever. Therefore, many countries saw fit to jump on the bandwagon and to extract some political advantage from supporting the admission of the PRC into the UN.

The end result of the voting at the twenty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly on October 26th, 1971 was that the American draft resolution was defeated and the draft resolution no. 2758 (XXVI) put forward by Albania, Algeria, Cuba, Iraq, Zambia, Tanzania, Pakistan, Romania and other pro-PRC countries to expel the ROC and to admit the PRC into the UN was adopted by 76 votes in favour to 35 against, with 17 abstentions.²¹ The above-mentioned UN resolution no. 2758 (XXVI) stipulated that the UN would recognise the representatives of the government of the PRC as “the only lawful representative of China to the United Nations and that the People’s Republic of China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.... and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occup[ied] at the United Nations and in all the organisations related to it.”²² Knowing

that the proceedings had taken an irreversible course against the ROC, the ROC delegation withdrew from the UN General Assembly before the adoption of the Albanian draft resolution which was passed by the UN General Assembly on October 25th, 1971.²³

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that during the crucial voting on the representation of China, the South African delegation voted in favour of the American proposal of “dual representation” and against the expulsion of the ROC from the UN.²⁴ The main reason for the RSA’s support for the ROC was explained by the Department of Foreign Affairs of the RSA as follows:

From our point of view, however, we can derive no comfort from Beijing’s presence in the United Nations. There is little doubt that she and the Soviet Union will try to outdo each other in currying favour with the Africans and since she is already hand in glove with some of the extremists on the African continent, who also happen to be our most hostile adversaries, namely Tanzania and Zambia, it requires little imagination to be able to forecast the role which she will be playing in matters concerning us in the United Nations.²⁵

The withdrawal of the ROC delegation in October 1971 from the UN General Assembly marked the end of the ROC’s participation in the UN. The loss of the ROC’s seat in the UN also resulted in the further deprivation of membership in all UN Specialized Agencies and affiliated organisations. The ROC was successively forced to withdraw from all but ten international governmental organisations. Among these ten international governmental organisations, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Asian-Pacific Economic Council (APEC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the International Union for Publication of Customs Tariffs, the Permanent Court for Arbitration and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) are or were of relative importance. Hence, the only avenue available to the ROC was to encourage its citizens to join the 781 non-governmental international organisations, including the International Olympic Committee, so as to

expand interaction with the outside world.²⁶ As a result of the deprivation of its international legitimacy, the ROC had entered a historical period of unprecedented isolation in terms of its participation in international governmental organisations since 1971.

In terms of bilateral diplomacy, following the ousting from the UN, the ROC's diplomatic isolation also deepened rapidly. During the two months from the ROC's withdrawal from the UN on October 25th, 1971 to the end of 1971, there were five countries (Belgium, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Lebanon) which severed diplomatic relations with the ROC.²⁷ If we take the whole of 1971 into account, 12 nations derecognised the ROC in that year alone. In the wake of Nixon's visit to the PRC in February 1972, the situation deteriorated further, as another 15 countries switched diplomatic recognition to the PRC.²⁸ It was estimated that 45 percent of those countries which had diplomatic relations with the ROC prior to 1971 had switched ties to the PRC during the period 1971-1973. In the years after 1972, the ROC was further buffeted by a series of diplomatic setbacks. In the five year span from 1972 to 1977, 34 countries forsook the ROC to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC.²⁹ By the end of 1977, there were only 23 countries which maintained full diplomatic links with the ROC compared to a total of 68 states which had diplomatic missions in Taipei at the peak of the ROC's foreign relations in 1970.³⁰ Further serious diplomatic adversity ensued in 1979 when the USA terminated its diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognised the PRC instead. From 1979 to 1992, an additional 10 states abandoned the ROC for the PRC. By the end of 1992, a total of 49 countries had switched recognition to Beijing.³¹ The ROC's diplomatic/political isolation was acute, although it still registered 29 diplomatic ties by the end of 1992.

The most serious blow to the ROC was the breaking of diplomatic relations with the USA, its only protector and principal trading partner. Following Nixon's trip to Beijing in late February, 1972 and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué on February 27th, 1972, the then USA president, Jimmy Carter, made an announcement on December 15th, 1978 to the effect that from January 1st, 1979, the USA would switch recognition

from the ROC to the PRC and terminate the 1954 ROC-USA Mutual Defense Treaty. Despite the legislation of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) enacted by the USA Congress in March 1979 to regularise the essential ROC-USA relations, a de facto moratorium of arms sales was imposed on the ROC by successive administrations of the USA. This moratorium was further put into a formal joint USA-PRC Communiqué signed on August 17th, 1982. In accordance with this Communiqué, the USA was to gradually reduce its sales of arms to the ROC, leading over a period of time to a final settlement of this issue.

It was only after the loss of diplomatic recognition of the major countries in the world community that the ROC government realised the mistake it had made before the 1970s. During this period, the ROC government had persisted with the “one China” policy. Those nations that chose to recognise the PRC were deemed to be unfriendly and the bilateral diplomatic relations were severed by the ROC. The leaders of the ROC also flatly rejected the “dual recognition” proposal. This non-compromising stance and ideologically rigid diplomacy had a negative effect on the foreign relations of the ROC. Many scholars believe that if the ROC had adopted a more flexible approach to contend with the PRC in the international arena, it would have been possible for the ROC to avoid diplomatic isolation.³² But it was too late for the ROC to alter its policy when 120 nations had switched sides. By that time, the ROC’s only alternative was to innovate a new mechanism to interact with the major powers and to formulate a more realistic and unorthodox diplomacy.

During the years 1971-1992, although the ROC recouped diplomatic recognition from 19 countries including the RSA, these were mainly micro states in the Caribbean and the South Pacific. Other countries that continued to recognise the ROC were mostly relatively poor developing countries in Latin America and on the African continent.³³ (For a complete list of the ROC’s diplomatic networks see Table 1). Most of the major powers, such as the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Canada and Japan, had replaced the lost conventional diplomatic links with the ROC with unofficial or semi-official relations. They established representative offices or quasi-embassies in Taipei, and

vice versa, to handle the bilateral political, trade, economic, financial, cultural, technological and consular exchanges. (For the details of the ROC's unofficial networks see Table 2). In the ROC official circle, the euphemism for these informal ties is called "substantive relations".³⁴ It is through the devising of an unorthodox system of interaction with other states that the ROC is currently able to succeed in maintaining, and even expanding, trade and various other ties with more than 92 countries worldwide.³⁵ Since this dissertation is mainly concerned with the evolution of ROC–RSA bilateral relations, the details of the ROC's external relations will be left to other scholars for further research.

In a nutshell, the PRC managed to unseat the ROC from the UN and imposed enforced diplomatic/political isolation on the ROC in the world arena after 1971. However, the PRC failed to cut off the ROC's "substantive relations" with the outside world. The ROC was flexible enough to find its own way for international survival and to look beyond its traditional allies for friendly partners elsewhere.

The third factor contributing to the ROC's forging of closer ties with South Africa was the ROC's deep sense of betrayal by the USA, as well as the need for national security and national survival. The people and the government of the ROC were both disillusioned and angered with the American policy of normalisation with the PRC. For the people of Taiwan, they were deeply shocked to learn of the announcement of the Shanghai Communiqué which was issued by the USA and the PRC on February 28th, 1972, Beijing and Taipei time (but February 27 Washington time).³⁶ The timing of the announcement might have been just a coincidence, or sheer ignorance on the part of the USA government of Taiwan's history. However, it was on the date of "February 28th" of 1947 that the mainland Chinese (Kuomintang) troops massacred 5000 to 20 000 native Taiwanese elite during the so-called "February 28th Uprising"³⁷. The Taiwanese could never forget this historical wound which had not yet been properly healed. The choice of the date for making such a major policy announcement was like putting salt onto the historical wound. Moreover, for the Taiwanese islanders, the USA declaration of "one China" and Taiwan as part of China rang the death knell of their long-cherished

hopes for the sovereignty or self-determination of Taiwan. The Taiwanese people felt that they had been stabbed twice in the back by their American ally. The first letdown was in 1947, when the Kuomintang's mainland Chinese troops killed the Taiwanese and the islanders reeled under the Kuomintang's authoritarian rule. Instead of helping the Taiwanese people to win their right to self-determination, the USA supported the Kuomintang for strategic reasons and said nothing, while the Taiwanese elite were suppressed by the Kuomintang.³⁸ Second, Kissinger and Nixon's visit to the PRC and Carter's subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC, were seen by the people of Taiwan as an act of abandonment.³⁹ They generally felt let down by the USA.

The government of the ROC also felt betrayed by what they perceived of as an old ally. The ROC leadership was deeply annoyed by the American government's apparent lack of concern for the sentiments of the ROC government. The then ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo, the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek, was informed of the USA's normalisation of relations with the PRC by being roused from his sleep at 2 a.m. on December 15th, 1978. The announcement was made in the middle of an important national election which was subsequently suspended by Chiang Ching-kuo.⁴⁰ A few months later, when Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's Adviser on National Security, visited Beijing in May 1979, he entered the PRC on the same day that the then ROC president, Chiang Ching-kuo, had been inaugurated president in Taipei one year previously.⁴¹ These events were not necessarily intended to deliberately hurt the ethos of the ROC's leadership or to reflect American special support for the PRC. Nevertheless, the sentiments of the government and people of the ROC were deeply offended by the American government's lack of concern for the ROC's psyche and dignity.

Deeply affronted by the abrupt change of American policy, the question of national security, national survival and national prestige became the guiding principles of the ROC's foreign policy. As both the ROC and the RSA were anti-Communist and both felt they had been abandoned by the Western democracies, the two countries shared a

common interest of banding together to devise a strategy of security against their perceived enemies.

In the absence of American protection and knowing that American arms sales to the ROC would be discontinued in the long run, the ROC government was determined to avoid its past mistakes of being used as a bargaining chip by the great powers and a passive party serving American strategic interests. The ROC leaders were keen to initiate a new strategy to safeguard the ROC's own destiny. For the sake of survival, both the ROC and South Africa needed to ensure their national security and to quest for international status and the legitimacy of their relevant governments. The most important dimension of national security for a state is national defence. As regards national defence, by 1975, the ROC's fighters and naval equipment were ageing.⁴² The ROC military was in need of advanced military armaments and self-sufficient technology to counter the Chinese Communists' threat during the 1970s to the 1980s.⁴³ In order not to provoke the PRC, the Carter administration was reluctant to sell the more advanced weapons and military products to the ROC.⁴⁴ Therefore, the ROC was eager to implement military co-operation with the RSA.

The fourth factor contributing to the ROC's forging of closer links with the RSA from the 1970s onwards was the economic need. The economies of the two countries were complementary. Despite its racial problems, South Africa was the leading industrial country in the southern African region. South Africa is rich in natural resources, but its manufacturing sector was not as competitive as that of the ROC. The ROC needed access to South Africa's markets as well as its maize, wood pulp, coal, gold, basic metals and minerals, including uranium, to develop the ROC's economy. On the other hand, the RSA needed the capital, expertise, and investments from the ROC, in particular its extensive and diversified manufacturing industries, to create jobs for its massive unemployed black population.

This mutual economic need coincided with the high tide of the relocation of Taiwanese industries to overseas areas. By the 1970s, the labour costs and land prices for

industry in the ROC were rising. Following the gradual political, economic, social and cultural changes which took place in Taiwan, after the death of Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, a continuing process of modernisation and democratisation began to unfold in the ROC. Taiwan was rapidly becoming a pluralistic society. An organised political opposition movement had been formed in 1979. The ROC was in transition from a one-party state towards a democracy. While the ROC was struggling with growing international isolation, pressures were exerted on the ROC government by the Taiwanese people to accelerate the pace of domestic political reform so that the ROC's status in the world and internal demographic composition could be more realistically reflected. The increasing international isolation and deteriorating diplomatic prospects had not only eroded the fictitious claim of the ROC's legitimacy as the sovereign government of China, but also endangered its existence as a country. These problems were compounded by labour shortages, militant independent trade unions, strikes for higher wages, the appreciation of the Taiwanese currency (the NT\$) during the 1980s and the emergence of strong foreign competition from Hong Kong, South Korea and other Newly-Industrializing Countries (NICs) for overseas markets, particularly in exports of clothing and footwear. The ROC could no longer base its economy on exporting low cost, low value-added consumer goods produced by labour-intensive industries. To salvage its economy, it became necessary for the ROC to move beyond labour-intensive export-led economic growth and to embark upon the transition to a new phase of economic development focusing on the promotion of high-technology and capital-intensive industries from the mid-1970s to the 1980s.⁴⁵

Consequently, many Taiwanese manufacturers in labour-intensive industries chose to move their assembly lines to the Chinese mainland and other parts of the South East and the East Asian regions to maintain their international competitiveness. Some saw an advantage to relocate their factories and equipment to South Africa particularly the homeland regions. The investments of the Taiwanese entrepreneurs in South Africa were largely due to their economic needs, which had nothing to do with South Africa's politics. They were attracted by the abundance of unskilled cheap labour, the incentives

of an industrial decentralisation scheme, the unpolluted living environment and good educational system in South Africa.⁴⁶

The fifth factor, which played a role in bringing these two countries together, was the mutual interest in nuclear collaboration. Both the ROC and the RSA were trying to develop independent nuclear energy production in the 1970s and the 1980s.⁴⁷ There were for example aspects of mutual interest in terms of the refining of uranium for nuclear fuel. As the ROC lacked sufficient energy resources, and its own limited hydropower coal and natural gas reserves could not meet the increasing energy consumption, the ROC needed to import a large quantity of oil from the Middle East for power generation.⁴⁸ But the cost of oil had suddenly quadrupled in the first oil crisis of 1973. The ROC was hard hit by the oil price hike, which spanned the years to 1976.⁴⁹ In view of the dramatic change of the American policy towards the ROC, it was feared that the USA might impose a nuclear fuel embargo on the ROC, if it intended not to subordinate itself to American political dictation. Therefore, there was a need for the ROC to proceed with its nuclear power programme and to collaborate with the RSA for an assured supply of uranium, so as to stockpile nuclear fuel for its future demands.⁵⁰ As for the RSA, it required the ROC's nuclear expertise, equipment and financing of the project.⁵¹

The sixth factor, was the importance of the RSA's strategic location, its relatively large landspan and long coastline with abundance of fishery opportunities, together with its fairly advanced agriculture, veterinary research and the various scientific and technical developments. Left with less than 30 poor minor diplomatic allies, the ROC was desperately searching for formal ties with some medium-sized countries with abundant resources and a certain degree of influence and standing in the international community so as to enhance its claim that the ROC is a formally recognised state with acknowledged international status. Based on these criteria, South Africa qualified as a desirable partner. Co-operation in the fields of transport links, fisheries, agriculture, medical services, science, loans and technical transfers between the two countries, thus

became some aspects of the basis of ROC–RSA association which was beneficial to both party’s self-interests.⁵²

For the ROC’s diplomatic operations in the region of southern Africa, the RSA’s geographic location was of special importance to the ROC. The RSA is the hub of the region of southern Africa and as it shares common boundaries with Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland (BLS countries), Mozambique, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia (South West Africa), it was regarded by Taipei as a springboard and a centre of logistical support for its diplomatic operations in the region. This was particularly necessary when the ROC was still maintaining full diplomatic ties with the BLS countries in the 1970s, because Lesotho and Swaziland are enclaves within the RSA. These three countries are members of the South African customs union and they are economically dependent on the RSA. Despite the lack of direct diplomatic representation between the RSA and the BLS countries before the 1990s, the RSA still retained some influence over these countries. To consolidate the ROC’s diplomatic relations with these neighbouring countries and to utilise the RSA as the stepping stone in the region, the ROC government saw the necessity of establishing diplomatic links with the RSA.⁵³

It was mainly the above-mentioned five factors which induced the ROC government to expand diplomatic and economic ties with the RSA from the 1970s. As for the government of the RSA, Pretoria also regarded the ROC as the springboard of its diplomatic operations in East Asia. Before 1992, the ROC was the only Asian country that maintained full diplomatic relations with the RSA, along with the three South African consular missions in Hong Kong, Japan, and Australia. As the international sanctions against the RSA were intensified, the position of the ROC and the ROC–RSA relations became even more important to Pretoria. Ever since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the ROC, the RSA has attempted to use Taiwan as “a bridgehead for Pretoria to expand its contact and collect information about the Far East.”⁵⁴

3.3 EVENTS WHICH LED TO THE RSA'S CHANGE OF POLICY TOWARDS THE ROC

While we saw a dramatic change in the ROC's foreign policy pertaining to the RSA, a combination of events also led the white dominated RSA government to change its attitude towards the ROC after 1971. For South Africa, the period of the 1970s witnessed the shattering of white confidence by unexpected domestic and external setbacks.

In the external setting, South Africa's search for Western alliance and support proved futile. In 1961, South Africa had withdrawn from the British Commonwealth and many other international organisations in the ensuing years. The white-controlled cordon of security in the southern African region was broken by the Portuguese withdrawal from Mozambique and Angola as a result of the 1974 coup. The independence of Mozambique and Angola in 1975 came as a bitter shock to the white minority government. As soon as Mozambique obtained its independence, Samora Machel's Marxist government began to provide assistance to African nationalist guerrillas. Ian Smith's Rhodesia was on the brink of crumbling. The civil war in Angola was spreading to the border of South West Africa. The tide of African liberation was rolling towards South Africa's doorstep. The South African intervention in Angola turned out to be a debacle. The regional balance of power was thus shifted, and the presence of Cuban troops complicated these regional conflicts. The entire external buffer zone was almost lost. South Africa stood isolated on the continent of Africa. The then South African Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster's "détente" initiative was short-lived and the external security threats to the RSA's white rule were intensified.⁵⁵

In the domestic setting, following the collapse of Portuguese colonial rule and the regional upheaval, militant black youths were motivated to challenge white dominance in 1976 starting in Soweto and then across the country. The South African government's harsh repression of the black revolts during the uprising of 1976 and the death of Steve Biko in September 1977 had not only stoked violent opposition, but also

led to the intensification of international pressures against South Africa. After 1975, the withdrawal of the European colonial powers had increased the RSA's conflicts with its African neighbours. These confrontations, in particular the intervention in Angola, added extra elements of friction between the RSA and the international community. As a result, South Africa became more isolated.⁵⁶

Meanwhile, the domestic political unrest had also exacerbated South Africa's international relations and the development of her economy during the 1970s. The suppression of black opposition provoked calls for more stringent sanctions to be imposed on the RSA. The advocates of sanctions organised various campaigns to mobilise support and a wide range of international organisations passed resolutions to enforce sanctions against South Africa. A case in point was an embargo on oil supplies to South Africa, which was adopted by the Arab OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) states in 1973 at the request of the OAU in spite of the objection of the Shah of Iran. A growing number of countries were in the process of imposing sanctions or restrictions on air links and exports of high technology goods, such as computers to South Africa, and/or on selected imports from South Africa, particularly of Kruger rands, iron, steel, coal, uranium, agricultural products and textiles. The often-cited perception of South Africa's as an economic powerhouse and her strategic importance faded away. The RSA was no longer regarded as vital to the West. There was widespread abhorrence of apartheid among the Western countries, and world opinion was shifting towards the imposition of sanctions on the RSA.⁵⁷

The South African economy was also affected by the political upheaval. Foreign investor confidence was undermined and a second wave of capital flight and disinvestment (the first had been after the 1960 Sharpeville shootings) was sparked off by the serious 1976-1977 black uprisings. As foreign investment was declining, the RSA was increasingly relying on foreign loans. The troubled economy was aggravated by the falling gold prices, which fell to USA\$275 an ounce in mid-1979.⁵⁸ As a result, South Africa's economy was dragged into a recession from 1974 to 1978. Consequently, in the ten years after 1974, South Africa's average economic growth rate

dropped from 5.5% per annum in 1960-74 to 1.9% in 1974-1984.⁵⁹ South Africa could no longer rely on its traditional Western allies to provide credit, investment, military equipment and technology – access to these essential ingredients for national survival was mostly restricted.⁶⁰

In sharp contrast to the RSA's situation, the ROC's work ethic, its political stability and the effective policies by the ROC government had enabled the ROC to accomplish the tremendous achievement of industrialisation within the three decades from the 1950s to the 1970s. The main financial source of investments was largely domestic savings, rather than USA aid. By 1965, 86% of finance for investment was from domestic savings.⁶¹ From the 1970s onwards, the ROC has already become a capital exporting country and one of the economic "tigers" of East Asia. The Pacific Rim had suddenly become an "economic giant" with a huge transfer of entrepreneurs and investments emanating mainly from East Asia to various areas.⁶²

As the ROC had gradually become a creditor nation, this made it look quite attractive to the RSA, despite the great cultural divide and geographic distance between the two countries. In order to preserve its national security and to survive all perils in a hostile international environment, there was a need for South Africa to search for fellow isolated states, such as Israel and the ROC, for the needed mutual advantages of diplomatic and economic alignments, trade, investment, technical co-operation and mutual benefits of other relevant joint projects. To this end, both the ROC and the RSA were prepared to readjust their traditional foreign policies of reluctance to embrace each other and to sail into uncharted waters after 1971.⁶³

3.4 THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROC–RSA POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The evolution of the ROC's political-diplomatic relationship with the RSA, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, may be broadly divided into two phases: the earlier phase (1971-1989) of the forging of close co-operative ties; and the more recent period of

transition (1990-1994) from alignment to uncertainty which eventually led to the severance of diplomatic links at the end of 1997. The earlier phase, however, can be further subdivided into two distinct stages. The first stage (1971-1975) saw the gradual warming of ROC–RSA relations and the start of the exchange of visits made by high-ranking officials and cabinet ministers to the respective countries to pave the way for the strengthening of bilateral relations. The second stage (1976-1989) was characterised by the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1976, the culmination of the state visits of the heads of the government of the two countries in 1980 and the ensuing expansion of co-operative relations between the ROC and the RSA until the stepping down of P.W. Botha as president.

During the initial stage of the evolution of the ROC–RSA bilateral relations, beginning around 1970 and lasting for five years, the relevant governments dropped the more than two decades' policies of reluctance and disassociation and instead made an effort to improve the inter-state relationship. Recognising the importance of each other for their own economic development, both countries were inclined to upgrade the low-level consular framework, so as to prepare for the formation of a wide range of alignments in the 1980s.

A noticeable breakthrough in the ROC–RSA relations occurred in 1970. It was in this year that the South African Consulate in Taipei, which was opened in 1967, was upgraded to a Consulate-General. After 1971, the bilateral relations between the two countries became even stronger. In 1973, apart from the Consulate-General of the ROC in Johannesburg, the ROC opened another Consulate in Cape Town to look after its fishery interests in the Atlantic Ocean and to liaise with Parliament. This office was elevated to Consulate-General seven years later.⁶⁴

The upgrading of the bilateral consular relations between the ROC and the RSA facilitated the growth of ROC–RSA economic ties. To cope with the growing economic relations, the office of the ROC Commercial Attaché was opened by the ROC

government in Johannesburg in May 1974 to handle matters related to trade and commerce.⁶⁵

In response to the expansion of bilateral trade, the South African government decided to remove trade barriers. To this end, the then Consul-General of the RSA in Taipei, John Kincaid, announced at the beginning of 1975 that in view of the tremendous increase in the volume of trade, the RSA would remove tariff discrimination against imports from the ROC, while the ROC would import more maize and iron ore from South Africa.⁶⁶ Soon after the announcement, a trade agreement was concluded in Taipei by the two countries on February 26th, 1975.⁶⁷ This agreement paved the way for regular annual consultations between the Ministers for Economic Affairs of the two states and also for the expansion of bilateral trade and economic relations. Most-favoured-nation status was accorded to each country, and tariffs were reduced. As a result of the bi-national annual ministerial meeting, which was held in Taipei and Pretoria on alternate basis, ROC–RSA economic relations were gradually strengthened.⁶⁸

As the ROC's trade with the RSA increased, the improved economic relations also led to the strengthening of closer political-diplomatic ties and co-operation in other fields, including prevailing public perceptions. Following the steadily expanding economic ties, the exchange of visits of high-ranking officials and cabinet ministers between the two countries also began to occur more frequently from 1975. In 1975 alone, there were three delegations of South African dignitaries who paid official visits to the ROC. They were mainly the VIPs of the South African Parliament, cabinet ministers, and high-ranking officials in charge of trade and commerce such as A.L. Schlebusch, then Speaker of the House of Assembly; C.P. Mulder, then Minister of the Interior and Information and G.J.J.F. Steyn, then Secretary of Commerce. While the ROC–RSA economic relations were deepening and the two countries' domestic views had been prepared for the forthcoming closer association with the other isolated state, the two governments considered that the time was ripe to establish full diplomatic links.⁶⁹

However, ROC government feared that the development of close links between Taipei and Pretoria would have a detrimental effect upon the ROC's cordial relations with the Arab countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, which was the most important supplier of oil to the ROC. A trade and aeronautics agreement was concluded with Saudi Arabia on February 26th, 1975. In order to ensure the oil supply, the Arab countries needed to be properly consulted before the ROC started to foster official cordial relations with the RSA.⁷⁰

For the said purpose, the ROC government assigned the then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the chief architect of the ROC's Africa strategy, Yang Hsi-kung (also known as H.K. Yang), to visit several Arab countries in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in 1975 for consultation and understanding.⁷¹ Yang's visit to the Middle East and South Africa in 1975 was a clear indication that the government of the ROC had begun focusing its attention on forging relations with South Africa, while taking precautionary measures to prevent the forthcoming ROC-RSA diplomatic ties from inhibiting the development of cordial relations with the Arab countries. It was only after the consultation with the Arab countries that Yang paid a visit to South Africa to discuss the matters of common interests before the establishment of ROC-RSA diplomatic relations in April 1976. During his visit to South Africa, the then RSA State President, N. Diedericks, and Prime Minister B.J. Vorster received Yang. The common ground of a strong anti-Communist ideology and aspirations for freedom had gradually led the two sides to have an appreciation of the other. Yang claimed that "South Africa and my country are joined in the fight against communism. We are in favour of free enterprise, democracy and freedom."⁷²

The establishment of diplomatic links was generally regarded as being in the common interests of the two anti-Communist countries. The ROC was praised by a National Party Member of Parliament as "one of the strongest anti-Communists bastions in the Free World", and "a natural trade partner for South Africa, because Taiwan needs our raw materials while we in turn provide them with a market for selectively manufactured goods."⁷³

On April 26th, 1976, the two countries established formal diplomatic relations to foster the bond of friendship and close co-operation. Embassies were opened in Pretoria and Taipei respectively. The two countries exchanged ambassadors to foster the closeness of their bilateral relationship. The ambassadors assigned by the two countries to cement ROC–RSA ties during the period 1976–1998 are indicated in Table 3 and Table 4.

The ROC's decision to enter into full diplomatic relations with the RSA was primarily attributed to the aforementioned factors and its needs for trade, markets, resources, economic development and national security. It was never the intention of the ROC to support the RSA's domestic racial policies. Non-interference was the policy of the ROC government with regard to its relation with the RSA. The ROC's official stance was that "We do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other countries" and "let the South Africans find their own solution."⁷⁴ In line with the non-interference policy, prior to the unbanning of the ANC and the PAC in 1990, the ROC never had any contact with the ANC, the PAC and the SACP.⁷⁵ By contrast, the PRC supported several black liberation movements in southern Africa, including UNITA, ZANU and the PAC.⁷⁶

In the wake of establishing diplomatic ties between the ROC and the RSA in 1976, the second stage of bilateral relations was unfolding. A wide range of co-operation between the two countries began to take shape. In addition to the 1975 Trade Agreement between the government of the ROC and the government of the RSA, several other agreements in various fields were concluded during the period of 1977-1979. Among these agreements, the Agreement Concerning the Exchange of Postal Parcels between the Postal Administrations of the ROC and the RSA was concluded on January 11th, 1977; the Agreement between the ROC and the RSA on Mutual Fishery Relations was signed on February 26th, 1978; and the Agreement for Technical Co-operation between the National Bureau of Standards of the ROC and the South African Bureau of Standards became effective on November 10th, 1979.⁷⁷ The conclusion of these agreements provided the legal basis for the citizens of the two countries to have mutual

access to the other country's postal service, fisheries and the application for registration of trade marks, licenses and patents in the foreign land. This in turn enabled the relevant entrepreneurs to conduct their business with ease and confidence of protection.

However, during 1976-1979, apart from expanding economic interactions and trade, the forging of ROC–RSA diplomatic ties did not bring about any immediate dramatic political alignment between the two countries. Before 1979, contacts between executive leaders, especially foreign policy formulators such as Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers or Secretaries of Foreign Affairs, had not come about. It was only after P.W. Botha's assumption of power in 1978 that the formation of some kind of common front began to gradually emerge. The real improvement of political-diplomatic relations started in 1980 when the then ROC Premier, Sun Yun-suan, and the then RSA Prime Minister, P.W. Botha (who later became the State President) exchanged visits.⁷⁸

During Prime Minister B.J. Vorster's era (1966–1978), the leaders of the governments of the two countries were not very keen on visiting the capital of the other country. The then ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, who was in his late 80s, was too frail to visit overseas. As for his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, the then de facto ruler of the country, was too busy consolidating his political power during 1971-1975 in his capacity as Premier of the ROC. He was also preoccupied with the challenge of the 1973 oil crisis and ten major domestic infrastructure projects. Chiang Kai-shek died on April 5th, 1975 at the age of 89. He was constitutionally succeeded by the then Vice-President, Yen Chia-kan. But Yen was only the nominal head of state. The real power was in the hands of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo who was subsequently elected President of the ROC in March 1978. Sun Yun-suan, a distinguished engineer and former Minister of Economic Affairs (1969-1978), was appointed by Chiang Chin-kuo as the Premier of the ROC in 1978. The appointment of Sun, a mainland-born technocrat, was intended to utilise his economic expertise to expand the economic development of the ROC in the face of diplomatic isolation.⁷⁹

As for the RSA, the then Prime Minister B.J. Vorster's diplomatic concerns were mainly focused on the issues of South Africa's immediate external environment such as the conflicts of Rhodesia, South West Africa and Angola, and his well-known détente initiative with black African states further north. With respect to his foreign visits, except his visits to black African states, Vorster only visited Europe, Uruguay and Israel. Before the end of Vorster's tenure, none of South Africa's Prime Ministers had ever visited the ROC, either in a private or an official capacity, although Vorster did accept the ROC government's invitation and intended to pay an official visit to Taipei during the period of October 14th-18th, 1978.⁸⁰ However, Vorster was prevented from realising this scheduled visit to the ROC because of his poor health (bronchitis) and the outbreak of the "Information Scandal" in 1978.⁸¹ The exposure of this issue seriously damaged the reputation and authority of Vorster and his close associates, in particular C.P. Mulder, the then Minister of Information and leader of the National Party in the Transvaal, and General H.J. van den Bergh, who was the head of the Bureau of State Security. The end result of this scandal was the rise of P.W. Botha, the then Minister of Defence, who overtook Mulder and obtained the position of the Prime Minister of the RSA in September 1978. Vorster became State President and eventually resigned on June 4th, 1979 to a political wilderness.⁸²

Following P.W. Botha's assumption of office as Prime Minister of the RSA in 1978, ROC-RSA bilateral linkages were visibly strengthened. Efforts were made by the two sides to befriend each other, and a series of measures were adopted to broaden mutual relations. High-level exchange of visits was accelerated. The summit meetings of the two countries were held in 1980. As a result of this consolidation process, most of the co-operation agreements between the ROC and the RSA were completed during the reign of P.W. Botha. Therefore, it was the Vorster administration that nurtured and formalised the ROC-RSA relations, but the flowering of the co-operation between the two nations was in P.W. Botha's era. It was during Botha's term of office that the two countries endeavoured to build a strong partnership and ROC-RSA relations grew into an axis of substantial importance.⁸³

It should be noted that before being elected Prime Minister in 1978, Botha had served as Minister of Defence for 12 years. Therefore, it can be argued that South Africa's increasingly deteriorating domestic and external situation, and his long-time experience of defence, had led him to develop a belief in a "Communist threat" and Communist-inspired "Total Onslaught" to overthrow white rule. He believed that South Africa faced a Communist-orchestrated onslaught in political, diplomatic, social, economic, propaganda, and military fronts.⁸⁴ To counter the "Total Onslaught" against South Africa, the "Total National Strategy" was formulated to fight the threat.⁸⁵

The military and security sectors were given a major role in the South African government's policy-making. The assignment of General Magnus Malan from his military post as Chief of the Army to the position of Minister of Defence reflected the military's influence. The State Security Council became the main decision-making body. The South African Defence Force (SADF), the Department of Defence, the South African Police, particularly its paramilitary units, and the various branches of the intelligence organisations such as the National Intelligence Service, the Military Intelligence Section and the Security Branch of the Police, played significant roles in terms of expressing its views and opinions in the formulation of policies of security concerns.⁸⁶

The same was true of Chiang Ching-kuo's rule on the island of Taiwan. As the eldest son of Chiang Kai-shek and his heir apparent (his other son was adopted), Chiang Ching-kuo was given control of the military and security agencies of the ROC government after its relocation to Taiwan in 1949. At the time of his arrival in Taiwan, this Russian-educated Chief of the ROC's Intelligence establishment not only brutally suppressed the Taiwanese elite, but also unleashed a white terror all over the island. In 1965, he became Minister of National Defence and in 1972, he was appointed Premier (Prime Minister) by his father. In many ways, Chiang's experiences, ideology (anti-Communist), style of rule and political reform were similar to Botha's. Interestingly enough, Chiang also excelled at toughness and was ruthless in suppressing opposition and Communist infiltration in his earlier years in Taiwan. As a result, he was called the

“Oppressor” by Hsu Hsin-liang, then former Chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the main opposition party in the ROC.⁸⁷ Botha, also had a clear-cut, dogmatic and strongly anti-communist view of the world.⁸⁸ Chiang was the initiator of the ROC’s political reform, while Botha can be regarded as the forerunner of the RSA’s political reform. In his later years in the 1980s, Chiang made some efforts to broaden the ROC government’s political base by bringing more native-born Taiwanese into the ruling party, legislature and executive system, which were dominated by the Chinese mainlanders. However, he had no intention of seeing majority Taiwanese rule in the ROC. Throughout his life, until his death in 1988, Chiang refused to recognise the Chinese Communist regime or to negotiate with Beijing for the reunification with the mainland.⁸⁹

The main indicator of the forging of closer ROC–RSA ties was the exchange of visits of high-ranking executives of the foreign ministries of the two countries which started to take place in 1979. The first significant visit of the head of the RSA’s Department of Foreign Affairs was made by Brand Fourie, the then Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in October 1979. At the time of his visit, Fourie was the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and he was a key figure in the formulation of South African foreign policy.

Fourie’s visit served as a precursor of a series of more important visits to be made by the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the two nations from 1980 onwards. As a matter of fact, the visit paid by Fourie and his wife during October 1979 was in lieu of R.F. (Pik) Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The invitation was extended to Pik Botha in September 1979 by Ambassador H.K. Yang on behalf of the ROC government while he paid a courtesy call to Pik Botha shortly after his assumption of duties as the ROC’s Ambassador to the RSA.⁹⁰ However, Pik Botha was preoccupied with the Rhodesian conflicts and the intense diplomacy relating to the Rhodesian situation. Conscious of the inevitability of majority rule in Rhodesia, Pretoria was prepared to separate its own fate from the fate of Ian Smith, the Prime Minister of Rhodesia, and to stabilise the Rhodesian situation by supporting an internal settlement based on majority

rule, with the Rhodesian whites retaining a prominent role in the government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. To prevent the “extremists”, in particular Robert Mugabe and the ZANU, from taking over the black majority rule, the moderate black leaders such as Bishop Muzorewa, Rev. Ndabiningi Sithole and a traditional ruler, Chief Chirau, were recruited to participate in the internal settlement. Smith was therefore pressurised by “the South African political, economic and military arm-twisting” to accept the formula of the internal settlement.⁹¹ Pretoria also expected the ROC government to provide financial and various support to the Smith-Muzorewa government.⁹²

According to South African intelligence, if a general election was inevitable, the Smith-Muzorewa interim government would win black majority support.⁹³ Nonetheless, this wishful thinking was dashed. The West did not accept the Rhodesian internal settlement and international recognition was withheld. From mid-to-late-1979, less than a year before Zimbabwe’s independence, the Smith and Muzorewa’s regime, which was backed by South Africa, was on the verge of collapse. The entire Commonwealth refused to recognise the Smith-Muzorewa government. The international pressure, based on an Anglo-USA plan, had been heightened to bring a black majority rule to Zimbabwe.⁹⁴ From a strategic point of view, Pretoria had no desire to see the Red Flags flying in Rhodesia, South West Africa (SWA) and other neighbouring countries. This would not only give impetus to South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), the ANC and the PAC, but also brought a serious security threat to the RSA. In this regard, Pik Botha stated clearly:

We believe that the next country to fall will be Botswana. That will leave right around us to the north, east, and south a stretch of land one thousand to one-and-a-half thousand miles wide, stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, either under direct or indirect Communist influence. We have no illusions as to what this will mean for our survival, and we are not going to sit back until it is too late to secure our survival.⁹⁵

In order to counter a prospective Communist-led victory in southern Africa, Pik Botha spent some time in September 1979 and again in October 1979 with Ambassador H.K. Yang and the political Counsellor, Wei-jen Hu, in Pretoria to discuss the prospects of ROC–RSA co-operation.⁹⁶

On the first occasion, Pik Botha frankly indicated that as the current development of a Rhodesian settlement was of critical importance to South Africa, he had to postpone his visit until 1980. Botha stated that he would either accompany Prime Minister P.W. Botha to visit the ROC in October 1980, or at another appropriate time. But he was hoping that the then ROC Premier, Sun, could lead a delegation to pay an official visit to South Africa in February or March 1980 before P.W. Botha's visit to Taipei. Both sides agreed that in the face of common increasing international adversity, the two countries should strengthen their bilateral ties and deepen co-operation in various aspects, including the development of technology and military self-sufficiency, at a low profile.⁹⁷

The two governments were however cautious as they did not want to draw the attention of the world. Despite the fact that the ROC was the most seriously isolated state in the world in terms of formal diplomatic ties, it was neither willing to associate openly with other "pariah states", nor willing to be identified with South Africa, Israel, Chile, or South Korea as one of the members of a group of "Pariahs International".⁹⁸ The reasons for this was the important consideration that as an island trading nation, the long-term economic growth and trade with other countries were perceived to be more important than the collective identification of the derogatory status of the "Pariah States". For the ROC, there was no need to embrace the RSA openly. After all, in spite of its diplomatic isolation, the ROC was rarely smeared by colonialism or racism, and its economic success was amazing to many countries of the Third World. In order to facilitate the mutual co-operation, Pik Botha also assured Ambassador Yang that the South African government would take measures to revise the relevant discriminatory laws against the status of Chinese in South Africa.⁹⁹

On the diplomatic front, Pik Botha revealed that the then Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland was terminally ill with cancer, and that the South African government was deeply alarmed by the intentions of the “crooks” of the Kingdom of Lesotho, namely Leabua Jonathan and his foreign minister, to bring in Cuban troops and other Communists such as the North Koreans.¹⁰⁰ This was contrary to the interests of the RSA. The ROC government therefore was requested by Pik Botha to assist the RSA in enhancing South Africa’s relations with Swaziland and Lesotho and tried to persuade the governments of these two countries to improve relationship with the RSA.¹⁰¹ If these two countries could improve relations with South Africa and accept its overtures, the RSA would, in turn, assist the ROC in re-establishing diplomatic ties with the Republic of Botswana which had switched its recognition to the PRC in 1974.¹⁰² Although Lesotho, under Jonathan, was inclined to establish diplomatic contacts with Communist countries, it maintained diplomatic links with the ROC until May 14th, 1983 when Lesotho severed its diplomatic links with the ROC. As Jonathan was politically against South Africa, Lesotho hosted a considerable number of ANC refugees as a politically symbolic act of opposing South Africa’s apartheid policies. Under such circumstances, Lesotho did not have full diplomatic links with the RSA during the 1980s. The relationship between Swaziland and the RSA was in a similar situation, although the RSA did set up a “South African Trade Mission” in Mbabane, the capital of Swaziland. The ROC has always maintained very cordial and close diplomatic relations with Swaziland since its independence in 1968. The ROC government was willing to help the RSA improve its relations with Lesotho and Swaziland.¹⁰³

On a second occasion when Pik Botha and his wife, accompanied by Brand Fourie and his wife, attended a dinner hosted by Ambassador Yang on October 6th, 1979 at his residence, Pik Botha spoke graciously about the close relationship existing between the two countries. He referred to the efforts of the ROC government to overcome difficulties resulting from world politics and Ambassador Yang’s role as an instrument of the ROC national policy.¹⁰⁴ In a letter written by Pik Botha to Ambassador Yang in October 1979, it was clear that there was a close rapport and cordial sentiments existing between them. “I had been looking forward with much enthusiasm and great expectation to a

visit to your country,” wrote Botha.¹⁰⁵ He also held high respect for the ROC’s achievements. He made the following comments:

The contemporary history of the Republic of China bears testimony to the ability of man under good leadership to transform adversity into prosperity. The will of your people and their achievements in modern society are an inspiration to nations who are burdened not only by physical but also political adversity.¹⁰⁶

Apart from the personal congeniality between the political elite of the two countries, the cordiality of ROC–RSA friendship was also reflected in the warmth of the reception and courtesy accorded to the Fouries by the ROC government during their visit to the ROC in October 1979. The outcome of the Fouries’ visit was fruitful. During their stay in the ROC, they met the then ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan, and held discussions with Y.S. Tsiang, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chen-hsing Yen, who was Acting Chairman of Atomic Energy Council (AEC); Shien-siu Shu, then Chairman of National Science Council (NSC), and other high ranking officials of the ROC.¹⁰⁷ The Fouries also visited the Nuclear power plants in Chin-Shan area of northern Taiwan, China External Trade Development Council (CETRA) in Taipei, and China Ship-building Corporation in Kaohsiung City of southern Taiwan.¹⁰⁸

Fourie and the aforesaid ROC leadership exchanged views on the world situation and the Communist-orchestrated threats in Rhodesia, Mozambique, SWA, and Tazara (Tanzam) railway.¹⁰⁹ They also discussed issues of mutual interest including co-operation in the fields of science, trade, economy, military and nuclear energy.¹¹⁰ Fourie was deeply impressed with the ROC’s remarkable achievements in various fields, and he was “heartened by the extremely positive approach adopted by the government of the Republic of China regarding the relations between our two countries and the expressed intentions of even closer co-operation between us.”¹¹¹ At the end of his visit, Fourie was awarded a medal by the ROC government for his contribution to cementing closer bonds between the ROC and the RSA.¹¹² However, notwithstanding the

increasing interest of the two countries in developing mutual co-operation, it should be noted that historically there was no formal inter-state alliance or a security/military pact which had ever been signed by the two governments. This subject had never been officially brought up for discussion.¹¹³ According to the ROC diplomatic records, although there were some informal talks and unofficial references made by a few South African government officials before Fourie's departure pertaining to forming a new type of "Fourth World" by the pariah states in addition to the First, Second and Third worlds, the real interest of the two countries in pursuing this idea was actually diminishing by the time of Fourie's arrival in Taipei.¹¹⁴ It was therefore a non-starter. The main reason for South Africa's lack of interest was said to be the sudden change of Iran's political situation which had shocked the leadership of the RSA.¹¹⁵ Geographic distance was also a great problem, and neither country could really safeguard or meet the need of the national security of the other. Each country still considered its long-standing relationship with the traditional major powers as crucial. But both countries were determined to expand bilateral ties, so as to break out of isolation and to use the other country as substitute for the traditional major trading partners.¹¹⁶

The highlight of ROC–RSA bilateral ties was the exchange of official visits by the then ROC Premier, Sun Yun-suan, and the then RSA Prime Minister, P.W. Botha, in 1980. This was the real beginning of closer South African links with the ROC. The visits ushered in a new era in the expansion of economic, political, cultural and military ties between the two countries.

Premier Sun and Mrs Sun, accompanied by an entourage of 31 delegates and 24 journalists from Taipei, paid an official visit to South Africa during March 1980. Among Premier Sun's entourage were the then Minister without Portfolio, K.T. Lee (in charge of science, technology and nuclear energy development); the then Minister of Transportation and Communications, Chin-sheng Lin; the then Chief of the General Staff of the ROC military, Admiral Chang-chih Soong; the then Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, Yi-ting Wang; the then Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edward Y.

Kuan; the then Director-General of the government Information Office, James Soong; and other high-ranking officials.¹¹⁷

The official visit made by Premier Sun and his delegation had far-reaching implications for the ROC–RSA bilateral diplomatic/political relations. As a result of this visit, the following six important agreements and one procurement contract for uranium were entered into and signed between the two governments:

- (1) Agreement on the Co-operation of ROC–RSA Defence Industries (Confidential).
- (2) Agreement on the Reciprocity of granting Most Favoured Nation (MFA) Status in respect of navigation and Shipping.
- (3) Aviation (Air Transport) Agreement
- (4) Agreement of the Reciprocal Exemption of the Income Tax on Aviation & Navigation.
- (5) Agreement on the Co-operation of Science and Technology.
- (6) Exchange of Personnel between the National Science Council (NSC) of the Executive Yuan (e.g. Cabinet) of the ROC and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) of the RSA.¹¹⁸

The above-mentioned six agreements of mutual co-operation and granting of most favoured nation status to each other had not only reduced tariffs and taxation, but also laid the foundation of ROC–RSA co-operation in the fields of national defence, navigation, shipping, aviation, science, technology and economy.¹¹⁹

In addition to the aforesaid bilateral agreements and procurement contract, Premier Sun and his entourage also held discussions with their South African counterparts on various matters of mutual interest during their visit. The first issue was about the status of Chinese in South Africa. The South African government agreed that it would try to do away with the chronic discrimination against the Chinese through the amendment of legislation.¹²⁰ But the South Africa side cautioned the ROC delegation that this matter

might cause complex implications regarding the treatment of the RSA's Asian population (implied Indian descendants) which numbered nearly one million. It was feared that if the Chinese were granted full constitutional rights as white South Africans, other racial groups, particularly the Asians, would make similar demands. Therefore, there was a tacit understanding that since the Chinese population in South Africa was relatively small, the South African government was willing to improve its treatment of the Chinese by granting them "honorary white" status, so long as the Chinese understood the complexity of the racial situation and the political sensitivity without openly publicising this tacit agreement.¹²¹ As a result of this, the Chinese population, including the Taiwanese immigrants and investors were consequently treated as "honorary whites" from the 1980s onwards until 1994.¹²²

However, although the South African government was prepared to give full rights to the Chinese population in South Africa, it intended to ascertain the Chinese community's views before implementing this tacit understanding. In response to this unprecedented overture, the Chinese community, nevertheless, was deeply divided. Some felt that as the Chinese community had been part of the disadvantaged in South Africa for generations, the Chinese should continue to side with the black majority rather than the privileged white population. Some feared that by accepting this overture, the loss might turn out to be heavier than the gains. For instance, it might alienate the black majority and result in the necessity of Chinese young men serving in the South African armed forces to fight in the war raging in southern Africa or other places. Some felt that there was nothing wrong with being granted the status of "honorary whites." After further consultations, it was decided later on that the small Chinese community in South Africa would be granted partial rights to live and receive education in white areas on the basis of the attainment of permits, but without full constitutional rights to vote or to take part in the various elections.¹²³

From the Chinese perspective, although the issue of rights of franchise for the Chinese in South Africa was not completely resolved, the improvement of Chinese status in South Africa was still a breakthrough and an important achievement. It not only

consolidated the support of the South African Chinese community to the ROC government, but also made it possible for Taiwanese investors to emigrate to South Africa, to live in white areas and invest in the black homelands and other areas in South Africa.¹²⁴

The second issue that the two Prime Ministers discussed was the formation of the “Fourth World”. The concept of forming a “Fourth World” by the pariah states such as the RSA, the ROC, Israel, South Korea, Paraguay, Chile and Iran was brought up for the first time by P.W. Botha during the second round of summit meetings of the two heads of government held on March 11th, 1980 in Cape Town.¹²⁵ P.W. Botha expressed his view that deeply disillusioned with Western vacillation and unjustified hostility to South Africa, the RSA government was in favour of the formation of the “Fourth World” by the medium-sized powers like South Africa, the ROC and the above-mentioned countries to strengthen mutual co-operation, so as to break out of isolation and to solicit the recognition and support for these states.¹²⁶

The ideal situation would have been the participation of Iran in this group. With Iran’s abundant oil, South Africa’s mineral resources, Israel’s technology in the arms industry, and South Korea and the ROC’s economic strength, the viability of the “Fourth World” could not be underestimated. Pik Botha further added that in October 1978, he had mentioned this idea of alignment to the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, and the Shah supported the formation of the “Fourth World”.¹²⁷ Pik Botha regretted that the RSA was unable to form the “Fourth World” before the fall of the Shah.¹²⁸ During the discussion, Pik Botha asked Premier Sun whether any of the ROC’s diplomatic allies in the Far East, Africa and Latin America could really support this proposed grouping.¹²⁹ However, from the ROC standpoint, the founding of the “Fourth World” was not viable. Therefore, the ROC preferred to expand ROC–RSA bilateral co-operation rather than form a collective pariah alignment organization.¹³⁰ The reasons were obvious. Despite the commonality of international isolation and the desire to break out of international isolation, each pariah state had its own agenda and different constraints. For the ROC, it had no desire to embrace Iran. The post-Shah Iran was a

liability to the ROC's national interests. The Shah had been overthrown in January 1979 and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini assumed control. By November 1979, Iran's relations with the USA had deteriorated to breaking point and the Iranian militants had seized the USA embassy in Tehran and 50 Americans were held hostage. The downfall of the Shah and the intense Iran-USA hostility made the alignment of the pariahs inadvisable. Any attempt made by the ROC to enter into alignment with Iran would definitely offend the ROC's security guarantor, viz. the USA, and the ROC's major oil suppliers, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The move would surely jeopardise the ROC's most important foreign relations. The ROC government feared that similar risks might impact upon the ROC's friendly relations with the Arab countries if the ROC had close ties with Israel.¹³¹

As for South Korea, Premier Sun frankly pointed out that as she was facing security threats from mainland China and the Soviet Union, and there was no formidable geographic barrier to prevent invasion from the north, South Korea had to rely on the USA for protection. Under these circumstances, South Korea sustained far greater pressure from the USA in terms of foreign policy formulation. As a result of this constraint, Premier Sun deduced that South Korea was unlikely to provoke the Soviet Union and the PRC by joining the beleaguered inter-pariahs' club to displease the USA and the Third World countries.¹³²

During the summit meeting, based on the above assessment, Premier Sun was of the opinion that the formation of a multiple "Fourth World" by these pariah states was unrealistic because of the security dilemma.¹³³ These countries basically depended on Western big-powers for survival and each pariah state had different national interests and no real control over its own fate. Therefore, Premier Sun replied that unless an effective solution could be found to safeguard each country's national security, the more feasible way of alignment would be the strengthening of inter-pariah ties.¹³⁴ In line with this direction, he indicated that the ROC government had no desire to form a "Fourth World", and he perceived that the formation of this group was not feasible. The suggestion was thus made by Premier Sun to start from the more feasible ROC-RSA

bilateral co-operation and to shelve the grandeur of multilateral alignment with other pariah states.¹³⁵

In response to Premier Sun's proposal, P.W. Botha agreed that the two countries should start to strengthen bilateral co-operation as the first step, and then gradually expand the scope of co-operation to other pariah states.¹³⁶ Consequently, the concept of forming a "Fourth World" never materialised. The two countries quietly put it aside after the meeting.

Premier Sun's visit also offered an opportunity for the two governments to exchange views on other related issues such as mutual diplomatic support and the ROC's assistance in obtaining oil from Saudi Arabia for the RSA.¹³⁷ As regards to mutual diplomatic support, a proposal was made by Pik Botha for each country to render necessary support to the other by lobbying its close diplomatic allies to improve their relations with the ROC or the RSA.¹³⁸ The ROC would try its best to convince Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland, Paraguay, Costa Rica, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Panama to improve their relations with the RSA; while the RSA would try to approach Botswana, U.K., France and West Germany to enhance these countries' relations with the ROC.¹³⁹ Premier Sun agreed to give the proposition of mutual diplomatic support a try because of the fact that at the time, the ROC had no diplomatic or official relations with the U.K., France and West Germany. It maintained merely substantive trade and economic relations with these major Western powers. The ROC needed to diversify its weapon procurement from the USA to the European countries and to smooth its relations with the U.K., so as to make Hong Kong, a British colony, more accessible to the ROC's visitors, trade, intelligence gatherings, and contacts with Mainland China. The RSA also needed to win over the above-mentioned Third World countries, which maintained cordial relations with the ROC. But Premier Sun explained to his counterpart that it would be difficult to convince Saudi Arabia to sell its oil to South Africa, because Saudi Arabia had agreed to sell oil to the ROC on condition that reselling and storage of oil were prohibited. He, however, assured P.W. Botha that the ROC government was

willing to co-operate with the RSA in other matters mentioned above, such as the ROC–RSA mutual diplomatic support and bilateral co-operation in other fields.¹⁴⁰

In spite of foreign policy differences and the constraints of the ROC's national security, which led to an indisposition to have association with Iran and Israel in forming a "Fourth World", Premier Sun's visit to South Africa in March 1980 was one of great historical significance. It not only provided the groundwork for the various forthcoming bilateral co-operation in ROC–RSA relations, but also nurtured mutual understanding and a value system between the leaders of the two countries.

In P.W. Botha's view, relations between the two countries had reached "a high level of cordiality, co-operation and mutual advantage."¹⁴¹ The visit provided an opportunity for the two leaders to find solace in their common anti-Communist ideological stance and the alienation of major international powers. Rightly or wrongly, as these two countries shared a similar outlook, similar external threats, similar international isolation and abandonment by the big powers, there was considerable solidarity between the leaders of the two governments. The friendly sentiments and common beliefs were evident in the remarks made by them during Premier Sun's visit.¹⁴²

At the state banquet held in Cape Town on March 12th, 1980, Premier Sun stated:

We all face the threat from the international communists. It is for this simple reason that we stand together shoulder to shoulder and co-operate with each other in the interest of our two countries and peoples. And I envisage a bright prospect for closer co-operation in the areas of economy, technology, trade and culture between our two countries.¹⁴³

P.W. Botha echoed the viewpoint of Premier Sun when he delivered his response by emphasising that:

We are both countries under threat from an aggressive alien communism, but we have made it clear that our freedom and the future of our children is not negotiable. We shall defend it, regardless of the cost.¹⁴⁴

To summarise the achievements of Premier Sun's visit to South Africa, P.W. Botha proclaimed that apart from the co-operation in the scientific and technological field, the two governments had signed an agreement instituting a reciprocal air service and another for the reciprocal treatment of navigation to facilitate contact over a broader spectrum and to assure more direct links between the two countries.¹⁴⁵ They had also signed an agreement for the reciprocal exemption from taxes on income derived from the operation of sea and air transport. These agreements were beneficial to bilateral trade, commerce, communication and future mutual co-operation.¹⁴⁶

The visit of Premier Sun had generated an unseen momentum of bilateral interactions between the two countries. Concerted efforts were made to boost the exchange of visits of more people from the two nations, including important officials and prominent leaders. The South African government made good on its promise to improve its treatment of the Chinese population, and the contribution of the Chinese community to the prosperity and economic development of South Africa were recognised and appreciated. In addition to the exclusion of the Chinese race from the definition of "Asiatic" in section 175(1) of the Liquor Act of 1928, the then Minister of Home Affairs, Chris Heunis, pledged to take concrete measures to mend the RSA's treatment of the Chinese immigrants, especially pertaining to the granting of residence permits to the ROC's investors in South Africa.¹⁴⁷ In compliance with the request made by the then ROC Ambassador, H.K. Yang, on February 19th, 1982, Heunis agreed that "the validity of their permits would be so extended that there would be no need for them to renew their temporary residence permits every year and that these immigrants' stay would not be limited to only five years."¹⁴⁸ The long practised regulation of the reclassification of white women who married Chinese, as Chinese, would be relaxed and their children would no longer live in limbo. Co-ordinating measures were also taken by the

Department of Home Affairs of the RSA to liaise with the provincial authorities of Orange Free State, to lift the ban on Chinese from residing and establishing businesses in the province.¹⁴⁹ Gradually, the discriminatory measures which impeded the expansion of the ROC's investments in South Africa were removed.¹⁵⁰ In the meantime, scheduled air service between Johannesburg and Taipei was introduced in November 1980.¹⁵¹

Subsequent to Premier Sun's visit, a high-powered South African official delegation led by Prime Minister P.W. Botha and his wife visited Taipei during the period of October 13th-17th, 1980 in a bid to further strengthen the bilateral ties between the RSA and the ROC. The delegation comprised 66 officials including the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, R.F. (Pik) Botha; the then Minister of Transport Affairs, H.S. Schoeman; the then Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism, D.J. de Villiers; the then Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information, Brand Fourie, as well as the wives of the officials and 19 journalists representing the major media of South Africa.¹⁵² The media group included: the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), the South African Press Association (SAPA), The Cape Times, The Star, Pretoria News, The Daily Despatch, Die Burger, Beeld, Die Transvaler, Vaderland, The Mirror, The Sunday Times, Rapport and The Rand Daily Mail.¹⁵³

This trip was the first official visit made by P.W. Botha in his capacity as Prime Minister. As this was the first time that a South African Prime Minister had set foot on the soil of Taiwan, the visit was covered with massive publicity in both the ROC and the RSA. In the ROC, this event was hailed as the milestone of ushering in a new era in the history of the ROC-RSA ties.¹⁵⁴ During his visit to the ROC, P.W. Botha met with the then ROC president, Chiang Ching-kuo, on October 15th, 1980 and held two rounds of talks with his counterpart, Premier Sun. They discussed the matters of mutual co-operation. The two sides reached a consensus that in view of the fact that both countries were strategically important and that the common enemy of the two countries was Communist expansion, the ROC and the RSA should make an effort to augment their national strength and strengthen mutual co-operation to further contribute to the cause

of the free world. Both of them were of similar opinion that while the ROC could be viewed as the cornerstone of security in the West Pacific, holding the key to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, the RSA held the strategic position of a gateway to the Indian and Atlantic oceans.¹⁵⁵

After two rounds of thorough discussion on the implementation of relevant mutual co-operation agreements which were held during the visit between the two government leaders and high-ranking officials, a decision was adopted to expand further co-operation in various aspects and to review the progress of co-operation on ministerial level from time to time. President Chiang expressed his satisfaction with the implementation of the agreements of mutual co-operation made and entered into between the two governments during Premier Sun's visit to South Africa in March 1980.¹⁵⁶ It was also agreed that the two countries should provide assistance in increasing food production in developing countries.¹⁵⁷

P.W. Botha and his delegation were impressed by the ROC's social, economic, cultural and technological developments. Having served as a Minister of Defence in the past, P.W. Botha was in awe of the ROC's well-organised and well-trained military forces. He was particularly amazed by the combat-readiness of the ROC Air Force. When he and his delegation paid a visit to C.C.K. Airbase, an emergency take-off drill was performed as he pressed the alarm. Within three minutes, the ROC Air Force pilots succeeded in getting their jet fighters zooming to the sky to defend the ROC's air space. He told the press, "I must say I am impressed by what I saw. The arrival here was exquisite and from a military point of view, having been minister of defence for 14 years, I was impressed with the defence force of this country, particularly the efficient and well-trained forces."¹⁵⁸

In the field of nuclear energy co-operation, although P.W. Botha himself did not have time to visit the nuclear power stations in Taiwan,¹⁵⁹ bilateral talks were held between members of the ROC cabinet and their SA counterparts to discuss the two countries' co-operation in nuclear energy development, in particular on the exchange of

technology and information.¹⁶⁰ It was agreed that “the application of atomic energy will only be for peaceful purposes.”¹⁶¹ In other words, the nuclear co-operation was mainly for the purpose of the development of nuclear energy to be used by the nuclear power stations, not for the development of nuclear weapons.¹⁶²

P.W. Botha’s visit was an important event with profound practical consequences. Over and above the cementing of bilateral co-operation, it enhanced mutual understanding between the leaders of the two governments and the people of the two countries through direct contacts with the people of the ROC and personal observation of the relevant situation of the island country. Before P.W. Botha’s visit to the ROC in October 1980, the government and people of South Africa did not know much about the ROC because of the differences in cultural background and geographical distance. For most South Africans, the ROC was a remote country half-way round the world. The cultural links and cultural origins of the two countries were very different from each other. Moreover, the liberal English newspapers in South Africa, except The Citizen, were quite unfriendly towards the ROC.¹⁶³ Very few journalists and academics understood the pathos of the history of the island of Taiwan and the aspirations of its people. Consequently, most South Africans were unconcerned with the ROC. Apart from its economic success, Taiwan was often considered as a renegade province of China, and the disputes between the PRC and the ROC were seen as the problems of Chinese civil war which remained unresolved.¹⁶⁴

Due to prominent media coverage, P.W. Botha’s visit to the ROC helped to change the perception of the two countries towards each other. The visit had also highlighted an awareness of the real situation of what each country could offer to the other. Prior to P.W. Botha’s visit, for the people of the ROC, Africa, including the RSA, was marginal. However, through P.W. Botha’s visit, a new perception was opened up. All three TV networks in Taiwan broadcast live the arrival of the Botha delegation at the Sungshan military airport, while all radio stations and morning and evening newspapers, both in Chinese and English, followed the activities of the Botha delegation closely. All of the newspapers published editorials, byline articles and titbits to inform the people about

P.W. Botha and South Africa.¹⁶⁵ The RSA was positively perceived as a regional power endowed with abundant natural resources and opportunities for investments.¹⁶⁶

For the people of the RSA, the SABC sent TV news reports via satellite back to South Africa and broadcast news of the visit for between five and seven minutes in its evening news program every night.¹⁶⁷ Reporters from other news media also reported on the visit. Many journalists were surprised to witness the remarkable progress and achievements of the ROC. Many of them did not expect to see that the ROC was so progressive in some fields of its developments, which were worth emulation by the RSA. For instance, at the end of the visit, Andrew Braid, a senior political correspondent of the SAPA and leader of the 19-member press group, had enormous respect and admiration for the ROC. He openly stated that “We didn’t know your country is so advanced. In some aspects, it is us who should learn from you”.¹⁶⁸ Ivor Wilkens of the English language newspaper The Sunday Times also admired the ROC’s accomplishments. He admitted that “we didn’t understand your country and your people too well before, but with the visit, things will surely be different.”¹⁶⁹

As a result of the visit, goodwill and trust developed between the leaders of the two governments. The exchange of visits thus had a tremendously positive impact on ROC–RSA relations. “South Africa is proud to have the Republic of China as a trusted friend,” proclaimed P.W. Botha. He further declared that “we have every reason to cooperate, not only because we have a common enemy, but more positively, because we have a great deal to learn from each other and a great deal to gain.”¹⁷⁰

In a sense, P.W. Botha’s manifestation was also a clear reflection of the growing partnership between the two countries. With the exchange of visits of the two Prime Ministers, the foundation of a long-term partnership between the ROC and the RSA had been laid. This close partnership lasted for almost one decade until P.W. Botha’s stepping down as party leader after suffering a stroke in February 1989. From the ROC’s perspective, the years of P.W. Botha’s stewardship (1978-1989) were seen as a period of cordial partnership in the history of the ROC–RSA relations. During this

period, the diplomatic/political links were very close. Various economic and strategic co-operation projects were under way and new economic frontiers were unfolding for ROC entrepreneurs in terms of investments and trade with the RSA.¹⁷¹

In the aftermath of P.W. Botha's visit to the ROC, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROC, Fu-sung Chu, accompanied by his wife and three officials, made his first official visit to the RSA for one week from May 28th to June 4th, 1981. He was the first ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs who had ever paid an official visit to South Africa in the ROC's history. Chu's visit signified that the ROC–RSA political/diplomatic links were growing closer.¹⁷² During his seven-day official visit to South Africa, Chu and his delegation met Pik Botha and Brand Fourie. Chu was decorated with the Grand Cross of the Order of Good Hope to honour his distinguished contribution in the promotion of ROC–RSA cordial relations. He also paid a courtesy call on Marais Viljoen, the then State President.¹⁷³ Before winding up his visit, Chu and his delegation also visited Valindaba (Pelindaba) in the company of F.W. de Klerk, the then Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, for a briefing on the progress of nuclear co-operation between the two countries.¹⁷⁴ While Chu was in South Africa, the ROC naval frigates were invited by the South African Navy to visit South Africa's ports for the first time. This was to celebrate the 20th anniversary of the RSA's Republic Day.

Although Chu was the only foreign minister who attended the celebration of the 20th anniversary of the RSA's Republic Day, he was gratified to see how South Africans treated the ROC nationals as brothers and sisters. South Africa's military strength, the abundance of resources and the advancement of technology and science particularly impressed him. During his visit, Chu held talks with his counterpart, Pik Botha. The main theme of talks held between the two foreign ministers was the co-operation between the two countries against international communism.¹⁷⁵ Chu urged the South African government to stand together with the ROC to fight international communism. Speaking at a banquet in his honour, Chu openly pronounced for the first time that as the two countries were allies, the ROC's strong armed forces should join hands with South Africa to fight against international communism. On behalf of the ROC

government, he expressed his hope that South African soldiers would visit the ROC in the near future.¹⁷⁶ This was the first occasion that a ROC cabinet minister publicly disclosed the ROC's intentions of implementing the ROC–RSA military co-operation in defiance of the world's sanctions against South Africa.¹⁷⁷

Prior to his departure from South Africa for Malawi, Chu made even more daring remarks at a press conference at Jan Smuts Airport on June 4th, 1981. He first spoke warmly of the ties of friendship between the ROC and the RSA, which he believed would be beneficial to the RSA. He declared that “we want to share our experiences with our friends (South Africa) and we also want to exchange information... to work out programmes against such communist infiltration and subversion.”¹⁷⁸ He further indicated that “you have resources in all aspects, both human and material. Your country has made tremendous progress in the past years... especially in science and technology... and we hope that in the years ahead, the co-operation between the ROC and the RSA will be even greater.”¹⁷⁹ When asked about the ROC's Africa ties, he simply made it clear that the ROC government was not concerned about its ties with other black African states, and he did not believe that the ROC's links with the RSA would really harm the ROC's ties with other countries in Africa.¹⁸⁰ From the above statement made by Chu, it was evident that the position of the ROC government was to consider ROC–RSA bilateral relations as equally important as the ROC's diplomatic ties with other African countries and that the ROC government was determined to strengthen its relations with South Africa no matter what the rest of the world thought. In other words, South Africa was no longer a liability to the ROC government, and it had no fear that its growing links with South Africa might jeopardise its friendly relations with black Africa and the Arab countries in the Middle East.¹⁸¹

3.5 THE ROC–RSA DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENT

The decision of the ROC government to enhance its relations with the RSA, as explained earlier on, was partly due to its growing resource shortage, its need to seek cheap labour and markets and the necessity of the restructuring of its economy. In

order to resolve these problems, and to maintain sustainable economic growth, the ROC government was determined to deepen ROC–RSA links after weighing the gains of resources and markets for the sustenance of its economy against the consequence of being labelled as a collaborator with the apartheid regime by anti-apartheid groups. In forging cordial political-diplomatic relations with South Africa, the ROC government foresaw many pragmatic advantages in the development of its economy, technology, nuclear energy and even national security. The most important consideration was economic. As the ROC's industrialisation and economic growth developed rapidly, the shortage of energy and resources became increasingly acute. How to hold down the costs of labour, energy and raw materials was one of the key factors for the ROC's continued economic development. These were the underlying factors that motivated the ROC government technocrats and businessmen to expand the country's ties with South Africa.¹⁸²

The ROC–RSA alignment in the 1980s was partly due to the fact that during this period, the ROC government based its national diplomacy largely on realism, pragmatism and at times, a cold calculation of diplomatic and strategic interests, in particular seeking diplomatic recognition to justify its legitimacy as a sovereign state.¹⁸³ Hence idealism and human rights had no part in its foreign policy formulation and domestic policies. We have to bear in mind that from its transfer from mainland China to Taiwan in 1949 until 1988 when the ROC former president, Chiang Ching-kuo, suddenly passed away, the ROC was close to a benign authoritarian anti-Communist state, which prohibited opposition political parties. During this period, the Kuomintang under the leadership of Chinese mainlanders such as Chiang Kai-shek, his son Chiang Ching-kuo and Premier Sun controlled political power. The native Taiwanese and aboriginal people were treated poorly in the political realm. It was only after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo that the ROC former vice-president, Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese, took over the presidency from mainland Chinese and started to implement far-reaching political reform. Ideology was another attributing factor. Influenced by its own strong anti-Communist ideology, the leadership of the ROC government had an antipathy to militant trade unions, leftist groups, Communist-controlled organisations and even the native

Taiwanese Presbyterian Church which advocated Taiwanese human rights and the Taiwan Independence Movement. These organisations were perceived of by the ROC government as a serious threat to the ROC national security and a political challenge to its legitimacy. The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also run by the mainland Chinese, not the native Taiwanese.¹⁸⁴

As a result of a combination of the above-mentioned factors, the ROC government embarked upon the highway of closer association with the white regime to preserve and enhance its diplomatic, economic, strategic and scientific interests, instead of dissociating from the South African state and voicing opposition to apartheid. The ROC foreign policy towards South Africa was based on the premise that the ROC recognised the long-term dangers resulting from apartheid policies, but as a relatively small country facing diplomatic adversity, it was in no position to change the firmly controlled domestic policies of the white government, as even the liberation movements and front-line countries were unable to overthrow the white regime by force.¹⁸⁵ In these circumstances, it was worthwhile for the ROC government to expand its diplomatic, economic, cultural and scientific interactions with South Africa so long as the ROC kept a low profile and did not provoke the black African states in the region which maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC. It seemed to the ROC government that by associating with the white state, the economic benefits would be larger than the political costs.¹⁸⁶

The convergence of the national interests of the two countries had thus prompted the expansion of both political-diplomatic and economic co-operation throughout the 1980s. The cordiality of ROC–RSA political-diplomatic ties was manifest in several dimensions during the 1980s. Throughout P.W. Botha's years, warm and friendly relations were maintained in the inter-state and inter-government levels.¹⁸⁷ In the inter-state dimension, the two states considered it in their mutual interests to continue to co-operate in various aspects. The bond of friendship was strong. Each country was perceived by the other as a partner of substantial importance. The tough-minded leadership of the two countries shared a common anti-Communist ideology and value

system.¹⁸⁸ The ROC chose to engage the RSA to serve its own national interests and ignore the international sanctions. The political goodwill was reflected by the conclusion of various bilateral agreements. Up to 1986, sixteen agreements of co-operation had been signed by the two countries, ranging from trade, investments, aviation, shipping, fisheries, minerals, agricultural and energy co-operation. Most of the thirty-nine bilateral agreements were concluded between 1976 and 1989.¹⁸⁹ With these agreements in place, the ROC–RSA inter-state relationship grew into an axis of importance. South African Airways increased its air service between Johannesburg and Taipei from once a week in November 1980 to twice a week in November 1987.¹⁹⁰ These developments indicated that the close inter-state relationship was developing in the wake of 1980.¹⁹¹

Regarding inter-government contacts, a variety of mechanisms of mutual consultation had been set up during the 1980s. A notable one was the formation of a ROC–RSA bi-national commission dealing with trade and investment, economic co-operation, science and technology, and other related matters. The said bi-national commission was set up in 1977, one year after the establishment of formal diplomatic ties between Taipei and Pretoria, and was designed to boost bilateral trade and economic co-operation, and to remove tariff and non-tariff barriers.¹⁹² The ROC–RSA bi-national commission meeting was known as “Annual ROC–RSA Ministerial Trade & Economic Meeting”.¹⁹³ The first meeting was held in Taipei in March 1977, and the next one was held alternatively in Pretoria in August 1978.¹⁹⁴ Shortly before the two Prime Ministers’ exchange of visits, the level of this bi-national commission’s annual meeting was elevated from the rank of senior government officials to cabinet ministers headed by the ministers of economic affairs or ministers of trade and industry as from November 1979.¹⁹⁵ The scope of discussion was further extended to cover aviation, navigation, shipping, science and technology.¹⁹⁶

Politically, the two governments had strong ties with each other during P.W. Botha’s years. Various delegations from different governmental departments visited the other country every year to chart the course of bilateral co-operation projects. Each government backed the other’s diplomatic stance. High-level exchange of visits was

further continued. On the ROC side, following the visit of the ROC's then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fu-sung Chu, the then ROC Minister of Finance, Hsu Li-teh, visited South Africa in September 1982. Two months later, the then ROC Minister of Economic Affairs, Chao Yao-tung, and the then Chairman (Minister) of the Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen of the Executive Yuan (Cabinet), General Cheng Wei-yuan, visited South Africa separately. In April 1983, the then Chief of the General Staff of the ROC Defence Force, General Hau Pei-tsun, visited the RSA and SWA to strengthen military co-operation. In May 1983, the then Vice Premier Chiu Chuang-huan and the then Minister of Transport, Lien Chan, paid a visit to the RSA respectively. In 1984, Premier Sun suffered from a stroke. As a result of his ill-health, Sun resigned from the government and became one of the Senior Advisors to the President. Sun's successor, Yu Kuo-hwa, paid an official visit to the RSA soon after his assumption of office in July 1984. The then ROC Vice President, Lee Teng-hui, visited South Africa for the third time in September 1984 to attend the ceremonies marking the inauguration of the new Tricameral Constitution. The then Vice Premier of the ROC, Lin Yang-kang, also came to South Africa one year later.¹⁹⁷

On the RSA side, there were also numerous visits made by South African ministers, officials, military personnel, scientists, academics and other important people to Taipei in the 1980s. Due to the sensitivity of some of the visits at the time, there are no press reports or detailed official records. Most of the ministers of P.W. Botha's cabinet, high-ranking military generals and police chiefs, Chairman of the Uranium Enrichment Corporation (UCOR) of South Africa Limited, the President of the Atomic Energy Board and the President of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) had spent some time in Taiwan either for a short visit or a relatively longer duration. Apart from exchange of visits, there were also other modes of co-operation such as holding of joint seminars and exchange of information, science and technology and co-operative research and development projects.¹⁹⁸

Since some of those who participated in the programme of the exchange of visits and training courses for the intelligence, security and military personnel are still in active

service in the South African Defence Force and security/intelligence organisations, it is necessary to withhold their names in order to protect their privacy and confidentiality. But the modes of co-operation and the nature of the military co-operation will be analysed in Chapter VI.

3.6 AN APPRAISAL OF ROC–RSA DIPLOMATIC ALIGNMENT (1976-1989)

Generally speaking, during the 1980s, as the respective interests of the two states were largely convergent, the two governments had intentions to align with each other, albeit the fact that P.W. Botha had foreseen that the alliance between two pariahs in the long run would be “a hazardous enterprise” and the alignment could turn out to be “the shifting fortunes and instability” because pariahhood would never be permanent.¹⁹⁹

However, on the diplomatic front, in spite of the good intentions and efforts made by the two governments to assist each other and to exchange information in regard to the diplomatic situation, the ROC–RSA diplomatic co-operation was, in fact, unsuccessful. The effect of political/diplomatic alignment on the isolated diplomatic situation of the two countries was, in general, insignificant. This was partly due to the limits of the national capabilities and influences of the two countries, and partly due to the divergence of interests of these two states.

The futility of ROC–RSA diplomatic co-operation could be exemplified from the following events:

Firstly, the two governments disagreed completely with each other on the issue of formation of the “Fourth World”. During Premier Sun’s visit to the RSA in March 1980, P.W. Botha proposed the formation of the “Fourth World”, but Premier Sun politely declined to join the proposed grouping for fear of offending the Arab countries and the USA. The ROC and the RSA had divergent national interests: the RSA intended to embrace Israel and Iran, while the ROC was reluctant to align with Israel and Iran, so as

to ensure its oil supply from Arab countries and arms procurement from the USA. Moreover, from the ROC government's viewpoint, developed countries such as the nations of Western Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan were called the "First World"; the USSR and Eastern Europe (formerly Communist states) used to be known as the "Second World"; the developing countries in the tropics or the southern hemisphere were commonly called the "Third World"; in 1971, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN classified those poor countries with per capita incomes lower than USA\$100 as "the least developed countries" which were commonly called the "Fourth World".²⁰⁰ However, these undeveloped countries couldn't be compared with the ROC. The success of the ROC's economic development in the four decades from the 1940s to the 1980s had already won international acclaim as one of the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in the world community. In 1980, the ROC per capita national income had already reached USA\$2,155.²⁰¹ Therefore, judging from the standard of living and the conditions of economic and social progress and development, the ROC government felt that if the ROC joined the "Fourth World", it would automatically degrade itself into one of the least developed backward countries which was contrary to the true situation of the ROC. Consequently, the divergent standpoints and the difference of national interests had made it impossible for the two countries to form the "Fourth World". The proposed plan of forming a "Fourth World" did not materialize.²⁰²

The second case in point was the two countries' futile attempts of mutual diplomatic support. It was agreed that each country was supposed to give necessary diplomatic support to the other by lobbying its close diplomatic allies to improve their relations with the other country. The ROC was expected to approach Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi as well as other developing countries which maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC such as Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Costa Rica, Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia and Nicaragua to mend relations with the RSA. The RSA undertook to urge Botswana, U.K., France and West Germany to enhance relations with the ROC. Although each government did try its very best to approach those target countries, attempts were unsuccessful with the exception of Malawi,

Swaziland and Paraguay. These three countries maintained cordial relations with the RSA mainly through the RSA's own efforts. The failure of the diplomatic efforts of the ROC and the RSA could be seen from the case of Lesotho. By the beginning of the 1980s, the relations between South Africa and Lesotho were deteriorating rapidly. This was mainly due to Lesotho's harbouring of the ANC activists and its frequent condemnations of apartheid policies in the world forums. In addition, Lesotho alleged that SADF assisted the dissident Lesotho National Liberation Army (LNLA). In order to improve relations between South Africa and Lesotho, Premier Sun was approached by Pik Botha to mediate a settlement. Therefore, during his visit to the RSA in March 1980, Premier Sun extended his visit to cover Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland. He paid an official visit to these three countries from 17th to 20th March, 1980. While he was conversing with the then Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, Premier Sun raised the issue pertaining to the improvement of relations between Lesotho and South Africa.²⁰³ The mediation, however, was fruitless. Unlike great powers, the ROC lacked effective leverage to resolve the conflicts. The animosity between Lesotho and the RSA was too deep to be bridged by a third country. After Premier Sun's failed attempt, the then ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fu-sung Chu, tried to persuade Lesotho to improve its relations with South Africa to no avail. He visited Lesotho during the period of June 8th-10th, 1981 after his official visit to the RSA to attend the 20th anniversary of the RSA from May 28th to June 4th, 1981. He also took this opportunity to call upon the leaders of Malawi during 4th-8th June, 1981 and his counterpart and the King of Swaziland during 11th-14th June, 1981. He didn't succeed either. It was clear that as a small country, the influence of the ROC on the leadership of Lesotho was limited. As a matter of fact, Lesotho severed its diplomatic relation with the ROC on May 14th, 1983 and recognised the PRC instead. While Lesotho was breaking off diplomatic relations with the ROC, the South African government was unable to help the ROC either. The case of Lesotho was evidence of the failure of the two countries' mutual diplomatic support. Despite the joint strenuous efforts, the two countries did not make much progress in restoring their international positions before February 1990 as a result of enforced isolation.²⁰⁴

Thirdly, in the case of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the joint diplomatic efforts of the two ideologically like-minded states turned out to be disastrous. As both governments detested the two Communist-supported liberation movements of ZANU and ZAPU, in particular the Mozambique-based ZANU wing of the Patriotic Front, the South African government sought the help of the ROC to provide financial assistance to the newly-installed transitional government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa so as to smooth the transformation from a white minority controlled Rhodesia under Ian Smith to a moderate black dominated Zimbabwe-Rhodesia under Muzorewa.²⁰⁵ From the standpoint of South African leaders, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was considered a strategically important country in terms of the RSA's national security perimeter and geographic proximity.²⁰⁶ Namibia was perceived as of similar importance. In order to prop up the moderate, anti-Communist transitional government in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Vorster government had provided eighty thousand Rand (R80,000) (approximately one million USA dollars at that time) in a secret fund to the electoral campaign of Bishop Muzorewa's party, the United African National Council (UANC).²⁰⁷ The Botha government, furthermore, stepped up its substantial support for Bishop Muzorewa's government.²⁰⁸ Four hundred motor vehicles were made available for the UANC.²⁰⁹ The South African based Anglo-American corporation secretly contributed USA\$5 million to Muzorewa's electoral campaign.²¹⁰ The South African government also sought the assistance of the ROC government in the provision of secret electoral funding to the UANC.²¹¹

Based on intelligence assessment made by the South African government, it was predicted by South African official circles that the moderate multi-racial composition of the Muzorewa regime would surely attain the electoral victory, and that the outside world would recognise Muzorewa's government and lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.²¹² The white intellectuals in Rhodesia and South Africa were of similar opinion. In December 1977, an opinion poll was conducted by the Department of Political Science of Rhodesia to survey the black voters. The result of the said poll showed that 65% of those polled black voters would "support" Muzorewa, 15% for Joshua Nkomo, 10% for Edson Sithole, and 5% for Robert Mugabe.²¹³ In fact, the majority of black Zimbabwean voters did not reveal their real intention and so the poll

was misleading. The ROC government was a bit sceptical about Muzorewa's electoral chances. Acting upon the RSA's advice, the ROC government provided fifty thousand USA dollars (\$50,000) for Muzorewa's electoral campaign in February 1980.²¹⁴ However, the election result turned out to be a great surprise for the South African government: Mugabe won the election. He had an overwhelming majority of 57 out of 80 seats in the Zimbabwean Parliament. Mugabe's victory had shattered the "constellation" blueprint of the Botha administration.²¹⁵ The misjudgement of the political development in Zimbabwe affected the confidence of the ROC government in the reliability of South African intelligence assessment.²¹⁶

As a result of the debacle in Zimbabwe, despite the extensive high-level exchanges and various forms of co-operation between the ROC and the RSA, there was growing concern in the ROC official circle that after the fall of Zimbabwe into the hands of Marxist Mugabe, South Africa would surely face a combination of reduced growth, higher inflation and serious payment imbalance in the 1980s. Both countries were worried by "the deteriorating international situation ...and the continuing pathetic indulgence in illusion and wishful thinking on the part of the West, and the Communist and Marxist debilitating and emaciating tactics".²¹⁷

This perception was clearly reflected in a confidential report filed by the ROC Ambassador H.K. Yang to the ROC government on August 15th, 1980 indicating that:

With regard to the diplomatic co-operation of the two countries in consolidating their international status, I had written a letter to the RSA Minister of Foreign Affairs Pik Botha on March 27th, 1980 on this particular issue expressing the hope of keeping in touch with him to pursue this matter. But as I see it, in the wake of Mugabe's electoral victory, South Africa is battling on several fronts: on the one hand, she needs to cope with the new Marxist Mugabe regime; on the other hand, she must concentrate her attention on South West Africa (Namibia) so as to prevent the repetition of the advent of another debacle; in the meantime, she is

increasingly worried about the international economic sanctions and the involvement of the UN in the problem of South West Africa. Therefore, in terms of international power politics, South Africa is actually powerless and not in a position to help us forge closer relations with other countries.²¹⁸

The above-mentioned evidence mirrored the limits of ROC–RSA diplomatic alliance. The two countries' different diplomatic policies were even more evident in regard to the homelands. The ROC government refused to recognise the homelands and they were regarded as inextricably part of South Africa.

Although there were constraints and limits for these two small and medium states' diplomatic/political alignment as described above in terms of the capability to give real effective diplomatic support to the other country, the inter-state linkages between the ROC and the RSA grew steadily during the 1980s. The strategic goals and national interests of these two countries were basically convergent throughout the years from the 1970s to the 1980s for almost two decades. For the purpose of continued national survival and economic development, the two countries strove to stand closely together to weather internal and external challenges. The setting up of diplomatic channels, together with the frequent high-level exchanges and the erection of the frameworks of bilateral agreements were the pillars of the close relation and co-operation between the ROC and the RSA during the era of alignment and diplomatic ties.

3.7 THE UNCERTAINTY OF ROC–RSA RELATIONS

However, the political situation in South Africa was rapidly changing by the year 1989. The collapse of Communist systems and the weakening of the South African economy prompted black and white South Africans to recognise the necessity of a negotiated political settlement in a no-win stalemate of the long drawn-out struggle.²¹⁹ In January 1989, P.W. Botha suffered a stroke. On February 2nd, 1989, F.W. de Klerk became leader of the ruling National Party, and on September 20th of the same year, De Klerk

was sworn in as Executive State President of the RSA. He was determined to accelerate the process of political reform initiated by P.W. Botha and to further embark on fundamental changes in the social, economic and political system. On the occasion of opening parliament on February 2nd, 1990, De Klerk proceeded to unban the ANC, the SACP and other black political organisations, and to promise to release political prisoners. On February 11th, 1990, he released Nelson Mandela after 27 years in prison. The apartheid laws were gradually dismantled. The Separate Reservation of Amenities Act was abolished in June 1990; the Land Act, Group Areas Act, and Population Registration Act followed a year later. The winds of change were blowing in South Africa. The release of Mandela and other political prisoners, the lifting of the state of emergency, the unbanning of the ANC, the SACP and other black political movements and De Klerk's announcement of the government's intention to repeal all remaining apartheid laws had paved the way for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement. In December 1991, a forum for negotiation, namely the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), was established to find a mutually acceptable form of transition and government for the new South Africa. Black and white leaders were working for a negotiated settlement with some form of power-sharing from 1990 onwards. It was through negotiation that a new South Africa was emerging and the old order came to an end. From 1990, the Afrikaners managed to successfully unshackle themselves from the bondage of apartheid, and both Afrikaners and Africans agreed to accept reconciliation, reconstruction and black majority rule in lieu of violent conflict and political fragmentation. During April 26th-29th, 1994, the first democratic election was held in South Africa. On May 10th, 1994, Mandela was inaugurated as President of the RSA, and an interim Government of National Unity (GNU) was formed to govern the new South Africa.²²⁰

The advent of the process of change in South Africa was to have a profound effect on South Africa's foreign relations, particularly on ROC-RSA ties. The ending of apartheid had enabled South Africa to rid itself of the stumbling block of the international isolation. As the legitimacy of the South African government was no longer questioned because of the domestic policies it pursued, South Africa had gradually discarded pariah status

and normalised its foreign relations. The gradual normalisation of South Africa's foreign relations and its reintegration with the world could be seen from Mandela's remarks made in the UN General Assembly in December 1991. He pronounced that "the New South Africa will seek to normalise its relations with the rest of the world, and gain full integration into the community of nations".²²¹ In February 1992, De Klerk was even more gratified to announce at the World Economic Forum in Switzerland that "Another major consequence of the process of change...has been the ending of our international isolation. The normalisation of our foreign relations has proceeded as rapidly as normalisation inside South Africa. It has been an enormously rewarding experience for us".²²²

In contrast with South Africa's return to normality, the ROC's pariahhood and isolation remains unchanged. Its isolator, namely the PRC, is still deliberately imposing wholesale enforced isolation against the ROC. Under the concerted pressure and enforced ostracism made by the PRC, the diplomatic situation of the ROC became even more isolated although it was still an economic power-house in the first half of the 1990s. In 1994, only 29 countries continued to recognise the ROC.²²³ Among them, South Africa was the largest. The number of countries which recognised the PRC was around 155 in 1994.²²⁴ The ROC is ostracised by the PRC, and prevented from participating in major international organisations such as the UN, IMF, the World Bank and UNESCO.²²⁵

The dawning of a new and democratic South Africa and the events leading up to this political transformation had brought forward a phase of transition for South Africa's China policy. During this transition period (1990-1994), as the PRC was emerging as a major world power, the De Klerk administration had come to see the need to improve South Africa's relations, and establish unofficial ties, with the PRC. To this end, Pretoria resumed its contact with Beijing and proceeded to prepare the ground for opening up relations with the PRC after 1990.

As a matter of fact, this was not a new policy, and De Klerk simply continued to pursue what had been started in the past. Prior to 1990, the NP government had made clandestine contacts with the PRC, and both the RSA and the PRC secretly provided weapons to UNITA.²²⁶ As early as the 1970s, attempts were made by the Department of Information of the RSA to establish some kind of contacts with the PRC.²²⁷ At a low ebb of relations with the Western powers when the South African government was deeply alienated by the indifference and hostility of the West, the Vorster administration, in particular the RSA Department of Information, was contemplating to shift the RSA's traditional Western alignment to befriend the PRC.²²⁸ The motives were manifold. The main objective was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was a real threat to Africa and the common enemy of the RSA and the PRC. Therefore, the RSA and the PRC should form an anti-Soviet coalition, but the close ROC–RSA links should not necessarily be jeopardised. By doing so, it was intended to send a clear signal to Western powers that their unjustified hostilities were actually compelling South Africa to approach the PRC. Besides, it was also envisaged that the vast size of market in mainland China would render some potential economic benefits for South Africa. In order to pursue the RSA–PRC anti-Soviet coalition, arrangements were made by Eschel Rhodie, the then Secretary of Information, to have secret contacts with ambassadors of the PRC in the Netherlands and Canada, and Chris Barnard, a renowned heart surgeon, was chosen by Rhodie to act as an unofficial envoy to meet with the PRC's ambassador in the Hague. The then Minister of Information, C.P. Mulder, even made public statement that “my enemy's enemy is my friend.”²²⁹ The PRC was willing to establish some contacts with the RSA and Barnard was prepared to visit Beijing for the discussion of further details of contacts. However, Mulder's statement of the said initiative had generated negative public response in South Africa.²³⁰ The negative public reaction led Vorster to veto Mulder's plan of establishing relations with the PRC in the 1970s.²³¹

Although the RSA's initiative to explore the possibility of establishing relations with the PRC during Vorster's era did not succeed, the PRC never ceased its trading with South Africa, throughout the 1980s to the birth of new South Africa in 1994, despite the PRC's

claim that it merely “resumed” trade and economic relations with South Africa in October 1993.²³² From 1979 when the USA switched recognition from the ROC to the PRC, the NP government started to assign its officials to visit mainland China secretly each year so as to approach Beijing to offset the Soviet Union's threat in the region of southern Africa.²³³ Nevertheless, it was apparent that the PRC did not consider it politically correct to have formal links with the RSA at the time, although Beijing had no problem in doing business and having contacts with Pretoria secretly through Hong Kong or a third country. However, after 1989, both the RSA and the PRC moved one step further to expand bilateral relations – the commencement of mutual exchange of visits by the high-ranking officials of the two countries.²³⁴

As from 1990, the PRC saw the change of South Africa's political situation and openly expressed its desire to establish diplomatic links with the RSA.²³⁵ On December 19th, 1991, the PRC and the RSA made a simultaneous announcement that semi-official representative offices would be set up in the other country's capital. In February 1992, the so-called “Chinese Centre for South African Studies” was established in Pretoria. A similar office under the name of “South African Centre for China Studies” began operating in March 1992 in Beijing.²³⁶ These two offices performed consular functions and enjoyed diplomatic status. They were de facto embassies without flags. In spite of its endeavours to open up relations with the PRC, the De Klerk administration, however, did not rush to cut off diplomatic relations with the ROC. The diplomatic links between the ROC and the RSA remained unaffected by Pretoria's engagement with the PRC during 1990-1994. The complex issue of the “two Chinas” was left to the incoming government to resolve. The year 1994 marked the end of the RSA's cordial partnership with the ROC.

3.8 SUMMARY

The period 1976-1989 witnessed the close partnership which existed between the ROC and the RSA. The two countries began to prepare the ground for the establishment of

diplomatic relations as from 1970 when the RSA upgraded its consular mission in Taipei to a consulate-general. However, it was 1971 that was the turning point of ROC–RSA relations. In this year, the ROC not only lost its seat in the UN Security Council, but also suffered a serious diplomatic and security adversity as the USA’s revised its China policy. The ROC experienced a series of diplomatic setbacks during 1971 to 1979. During this period, the RSA faced similar diplomatic ostracism and security threats, both from within and without. In the face of adversity, the two governments decided to forge closer ties from the mid-1970s. In 1976, the ROC and the RSA established full diplomatic relations. These relations flourished with the passage of time, as there were manifold considerations for the ROC and the RSA to form a close partnership, other than shared international isolation. Apart from this factor, national security, economic needs, nuclear and military co-operation and diplomatic alignment were important motives for the close partnership between the two countries. Both the ROC and the RSA enjoyed the warm cordiality of bilateral exchanges and co-operation throughout P.W. Botha’s years (1978-1989). Following the advent of F.W. de Klerk’s political reform, the underlying basis and common ground of the special relationship gradually disappeared. From 1990 to 1994, as a result of the change in the RSA’s domestic and international circumstances and the emergence of divergent interests, the ROC–RSA bilateral relations entered into a period of transition from alignment to uncertainty.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III

1. See R. Suttner, "Dilemmas of South African Foreign Policy: The Question of China" in South Africa and the Two Chinas Dilemma p.4; and M. Havenga, "The Dilemma of the Two Chinas: An Economic Perspective" in S.A. and the Two Chinas Dilemma, p.32.
2. Taipei Forum, 南非政局與中斐關係 (The Political Situation of South Africa and ROC-RSA Relations), pp.5-6.
3. W.J. Hu, The Strategic Significance of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Ph.D thesis, University of Pretoria, November 1988, p.310.
4. H. Feldman, M.Y.M. Kau & I.J. Kim (eds.), Taiwan in a Time of Transition, p.138.
5. M. Seldon (ed.), The People's Republic of China: A Documentary History of Revolutionary Change, 1979, p.97.
6. P. Johnson, Modern Times, p.451.
7. Ibid., pp.550-551
8. J.K. Fairbank, China: A New History, p.343.
9. J. Chesneau, China: The People's Republic, 1949-1976, p.10.
10. S. Long, Taiwan: China's Last Frontier, p.121.
11. Johnson, Modern Times, p.551.
12. W.J. Feld, American Foreign Policy: Aspirations and Reality, p.220.
13. Huan Xiang, "On Sino-US Relations" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 1, Fall 1981, pp.35-36; Also see M. Oksenberg, "The Strategies of Peking", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1971, p.15.
14. H.A. Kissinger, "Outrage Is Not a Policy", Newsweek, November 10, 1997, p.35.
15. Kissinger, The White House Years, p.759.
16. Ibid., p.764.
17. Ibid., p.761.
18. Ibid., p.733.
19. See the USA-PRC's Shanghai Communiqué of February 28th, 1972, in US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66, No.1708, pp.435-438.
20. Kissinger, The White House Years, p.773.
21. DFA Archives Depot, Union Buildings, Pretoria: Report on Proceedings At the Twenty Sixth General Assembly of the United Nations on Questions Affecting South Africa, 1971, p.9.
22. See the full text of the Albanian Resolution of the UN General Assembly Resolution No. 2758 (XXVI) attached to the above report, p.20.
23. Ibid., p.9.
24. Ibid., p.10.
25. Ibid., pp.12-13.
26. MOFA, White Paper, p.236.
27. Ibid., p.233.
28. H.M. Tien, The Great Transition, p.223, table 9.1.
29. MOFA, White Paper, p.228.
30. Tien, The Great Transition, p.221.
31. MOFA, White Paper, p.233, Table 4-1-1.
32. Y.S. Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan: An Unorthodox Approach, p.10.
33. MOFA, White Paper, p.196.
34. Ibid., p.28.
35. The Department of Legal Affairs, MOFA, 我國與世界各國關係 - 覽表 (The ROC's Relations with Other Countries in the World), Dec. 1997 edition, p.2.
36. V.H. Li, (ed.) The Future of Taiwan, p.2.
37. See Shanghai Communiqué, US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 66, No.1708, March 20th, 1972, pp.435-438.
38. W. Blum, The CIA, p.17.
39. Li, (ed.) The Future of Taiwan, pp.2-3.

40. Ibid. See also H. Feldman, M.Y.M. Kau & I.J. Kim (eds.), Taiwan In A Time of Transition, p.151.
41. Ibid. See also The Republic of China Yearbook, 1996, p.63.
42. H. Feldman, H.Y.M. Kau & I.J. Kim (eds.) Taiwan in a Time of Transition, p.148.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., p.149.
45. Kuo, Economic Policies, pp.155-156
46. Interviews held during October 1995 with a number of the ROC investors in the RSA, including Michael Lin, Alex Tsao, H.Y. Huang and Mike Koo.
47. Taipei Liaison Office (hereinafter referred to as TLO) Archives, Pretoria: 中斐核能合作案 (ROC–RSA Nuclear Energy Co-operation), Memorandum on Possible Collaboration between the ROC and the RSA in the Fields of Conversion and Enrichment of Uranium, March 1980, p.1.
48. The Republic of China Yearbook 1996, pp.164-165.
49. Ibid.
50. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 中斐核能合作案 (ROC–RSA Nuclear Energy Co-operation), Memorandum on the ROC–RSA Uranium Collaboration, March 1980, p.1.
51. Ibid.
52. L. Du, 南非大選暨中斐關係之展望 (South Africa's General Election and the Prospect of ROC–RSA Relations), pp.20-23, 31-34.
53. Ibid.
54. Hu, The Strategic Significance of the ROC, Ph. D. thesis, University of Pretoria, 1998, p.350.
55. R.S. Jaster, The Defence of White Power. South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure, p.119.
56. Ibid., pp.145-146.
57. M. Lipton, Sanctions and South Africa: The Dynamics of Economic Isolation, pp.14-16.
58. Business Day, December 29th, 1997, p.5. However, the gold price later rose up to US\$ 800.00 per ounce in January 1980.
59. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.10.
60. M. P. Doxey, International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, pp.48-52.
61. Kuo, Economic Policies, p.42, Table 6.2.
62. F. Fernández-Armesto, Millennium, p.637.
63. Bih-jaw Lin, "The Republic of China and Africa" in Y.S. Wang (ed.), Foreign Policy of the ROC on Taiwan, p.153.
64. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The Briefings of the TLO in Cape Town, November 2000, p.1.
65. Office of the Economic Counsellor of the ROC Embassy, Johannesburg: 一九八〇年南非經濟與外貿 (South Africa's Economy and Foreign Trade in 1980) Johannesburg, July 16th-31st, 1982, p.1.
66. Ibid. Also see G. St. John Barclay, "Strategy of Despair: South Africa and the Alignment of the Alienated, 1974-82", in Journal for Contemporary History, Vol. 7, No. 2, Dec. 1982, p.3.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid. pp.1-2.
69. Hsiang, 外交小卒瑣憶 (A Diplomat's Memoir), pp.69-70.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Quoted by J. Pickles & J. Woods, "Taiwanese investment in South Africa", in African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 353, October 1989, p.511.
73. The RSA House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), April 26th, 1976, Vol. 62. col. 5410-11.
74. "Quiet Diplomat: Yang Hsi-Kung", in Financial Mail, July 28th, 1989, p.61.
75. L. Du, 南非大選暨中斐關係之展望 (S.A. General Election and the Prospect of ROC–RSA Relations), p.14.
76. Ibid. Also see W. Breytenbach, "The Chinese Dilemma: Dual Recognition Is the Ultimate Solution", in The South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol.2, No. 1, 1994, p.55.
77. Office of the Economic Counsellor of the ROC Embassy, *ibid.*, pp.1-2.
78. D. Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations", in R. Schrire (ed.), Leadership in the Apartheid State, p.281.

79. On December 15th, 1978, the Carter administration announced its decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC from January 1st, 1979. This entailed the ROC's increasing diplomatic isolation. See Tien, The Great Transition, pp.222-224, 228, 234.
80. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The ROC Embassy's confidential telex No. 340 to the MOFA, September 11th, 1978.
81. TLO Archives, Pretoria: The ROC Embassy's confidential telex No. 345 to the MOFA, September 16th, 1978.
82. Muller (ed.), Five Hundred Years, p.549.
83. Hu, The Strategic Significance of the ROC, pp.349-350.
84. A. Van Nieuwkerk & K. Van Wyk, "The Operational Code of P.W. Botha: Apartheid, Realism and Misperception" in International Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 13. No. 3, 1989, pp.74-75.
85. *Ibid.*, p.76.
86. K.W. Grundy, The Militarisation of South African Politics, p.6.
87. See H.L. Hsu's comment quoted by Overseas Chinese Gazette, Johannesburg, January 13th, 1998, p.10.
88. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.248.
89. Chiang Ching-kuo's China policy was based on his "Three No" policy (no compromise, no contact and no negotiation). See Hung Chien-chao, A History of Taiwan, p.325. Also see Lee Teng-hui, The Road to Democracy, p.51 for the fact that Chiang had no intention of letting Lee succeed him.
90. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 南非外次傅履訪華案 (The Visit of Brand Fourie, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the RSA, to the ROC) (hereinafter referred as Fourie's visit), The ROC Embassy's telex No. 492, September 27th, 1979.
91. Barber & Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.218.
92. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 孫院長運璿訪斐案 (Premier Y.S. Sun's Visit to the RSA), The ROC Embassy's Confidential Telex No. 692, February 25th, 1980, p.1.
93. *Ibid.*
94. *Ibid.*
95. I. Butterfield, "Over there: Conversation with Pik Botha", in Policy Review, No. 23, p.75.
96. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 南非外次傅履訪華案 (Fourie's Visit): The ROC Embassy's telex No. 492 and Ambassador H.K. Yang's letter to Minister R.F. (Pik) Botha, Oct. 8th, 1979.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Ibid.* File: Premier Sun's Visit to the RSA, Premier Sun's telex to President Chiang, No.266, March 12th, 1980, pp.2-6.
99. *Ibid.* File: Fourie's Visit, telex 492, October 8th, 1979.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*
103. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Swaziland, Directory of the Diplomatic Corps and International Organisations, January 1988, pp.59-60.
104. *Ibid.*
105. *Ibid.*, Minister R.F. (Pik) Botha's letter of Oct. 1st, 1979 addressed to Ambassador H.K. Yang, p.1.
106. *Ibid.*
107. *Ibid.*, telex No. 407 of Oct. 19th, 1979 sent by MOFA to the ROC Embassy in Pretoria.
108. *Ibid.*
109. *Ibid.*, MOFA's official despatch No. 20602 of Oct. 23rd, 1979.
110. *Ibid.*
111. *Ibid.*, B. Fourie's letter to Ambassador H.K. Yang, dated Nov. 8th, 1979.
112. *Ibid.*, Fourie's letter to the ROC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fredrick F. Chien, dated Nov. 8th, 1979.
113. *Ibid.*, MOFA's telex No. 407.
114. *Ibid.*, The ROC Embassy's Telex No. 478, September 21st, 1979, p.3.
115. *Ibid.*
116. R.E. Harkavy, "The Pariah State Syndrome", in Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 3, Fall 1977, pp.645-646.



117. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 孫院長運璿訪斐案 (Premier Sun's Visit to the RSA), 駐南非大使館所撰行政院孫院長訪問南非綜合報告 (The ROC Embassy's Comprehensive Report on Premier Sun's Visit to the RSA), pp.1-10.
118. Ibid., p.10.
119. Ibid.,
120. Ibid., Premier Yun-suan Sun's telex to President Chiang Ching-kuo of the ROC, dated March 12th, 1980, pp.2-3
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid.
133. Ibid., pp.4-5.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Ibid.
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid., Speech made by Prime Minister P.W. Botha during a banquet hosted by Premier Y.S. Sun at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town, on March 12th, 1980, p.1.
142. Ibid.
143. Ibid., speech made by Premier Y.S. Sun at the dinner in honour of Prime Minister P.W. Botha at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town, on March 12th, 1980, p.2.
144. Ibid., P.W. Botha's speech at the Mount Nelson Hotel, Cape Town, on March 12th, 1980, p.2.
145. Ibid., Speech made by Prime Minister P.W. Botha during a banquet held in honour of Premier Y.S. Sun on March 11th, 1980 at Cape Town, pp.2-3.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., The ROC Embassy's telex No. 839 to the MOFA, February 26th, 1982, pp.2-3.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. Ibid.
151. The Star, August 18th, 1980.
152. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 波塔總理訪華案 (Prime Minister P.W. Botha's visit to the ROC), Vol. 1, The list of the persons accompanying Prime Minister P.W. Botha and Mrs Botha on their visit to the ROC, pp.1-3.
153. Ibid.
154. C.H. Chang, "ROC-RSA Ties: A New Era Ushers In" in Asian Outlook, Vol. 15, October 1980, p.31.
155. Ibid., p.35
156. Ibid.
157. Ibid., p.34.
158. Ibid., p.32.
159. TLO Archives, Pretoria: P.W. Botha's Visit to the ROC, telex 691, September 15th, 1980, p.2.
160. Ibid., Programme for the Visit of Prime Minister of the RSA and Mrs P.W. Botha to the ROC, October 13th-18th, 1980, p.2.
161. Ibid., Vol. 1., MOFA's telex No. 527, February 28th 1980, p.2.
162. Ibid.

163. Ibid., Vol.2., The ROC Embassy's telex No. 017 to MOFA of October 15th, 1980 reflected that the liberal English newspapers such as The Star, The Rand Daily Mail and Sunday Tribune often criticised the ROC Government, in particular the lack of freedom of expression in the ROC at the time.
164. Ibid. See also The Daily News, November 28th, 1996 and The Citizen, February 18th, 1997, p.12.
165. C.H. Chang, "ROC–RSA Ties", p.33.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. Ibid., p.35.
171. Ibid. pp.32-35.
172. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 朱部長撫松訪斐案 (The Visit of Minister Fu-sung Chu to the RSA), Vol. 1, 朱部長撫松訪問南非綜合報告 (The ROC Embassy's Comprehensive Report on the Visit of Minister Fu-sung Chu and Mrs Chu to the RSA attached to the ROC Embassy's dispatch No. 429 to MOFA dated June 10th, 1981), pp.1-4.
173. Ibid.
174. Ibid., p.3.
175. The Citizen, June 5th, 1981.
176. Beeld, June 4th, 1981.
177. Ibid.
178. The Citizen, June 5th, 1981.
179. Ibid.
180. Transvaler, June 5th, 1981.
181. Ibid.
182. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 波塔總理訪華案 (Prime Minister P.W. Botha's visit to the ROC), Vol. 2, 中國國民黨中常會第 189 次會議紀錄 (The Minutes of the Meeting of Central Standing Committee of the Kuomintang, October 22nd, 1980), pp.2-3.
183. See Y.S. Wang, "Foundation of the Republic of China's Foreign Policy" in Foreign Policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan, p.10. See also L.M.S. Slaweki, "The Two Chinas in Africa" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, January 1963, pp.398-409.
184. From 1948 to May 20th, 2000, when the DPP rose to power, all of the ROC's Ministers of Foreign Affairs were mainlander, with the exception of Lien Chan (half mainlander). See MOFA, Annual Statistics, 1998, pp.22-23, and Annual Statistics, 1999, p.21.
185. The ROC Embassy, Pretoria: 南非現況簡介 (Briefing on the Current Situation of the RSA), 1982, p.12.
186. Ibid.
187. Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations", p.281.
188. Ibid., p.278.
189. See MOFA 中外條約輯編索引 (Index to the Agreements and Treaties concluded by the ROC with various countries), May 31st, 1993, pp.45-47.
190. Hu, The Strategic Significance of the ROC, p.349.
191. Ibid.
192. TLO Archives, Johannesburg: Office of the Economic Counsellor of the ROC Embassy Johannesburg, 南非經濟簡報 (Briefing on the Economy of the RSA), 21st issue, July 16th-31st, 1983, p.19.
193. Ibid.
194. Ibid.
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid.
197. See TLO Archives, Pretoria: Files of Exchange of Visits between the ROC and the RSA, Vol.1, 2.
198. See the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs, the List of the Implementation of the ROC–RSA Annual Ministerial Trade and Economic Meetings, November 13th, 1996, Despatch No.85302032, pp.2-15.
199. Quoted by D. Geldenhuys, "The Head of Government and South Africa's Foreign Relations" p.281.



200. See the feature article entitled “第四世界” (“The Fourth World”) published by the KMT’s party organ, 中央日報 (Central Daily News), Taipei, on March 4th, 1984.
201. Ibid.
202. Ibid.
203. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 朱部長撫松訪斐案 (Premier Sun’s Visit to the RSA), 行政院孫院長訪問南非綜合報告 (The ROC Embassy’s Comprehensive Report on Premier Sun’s Visit to the RSA), Dispatch No. 0260, April 8th, 1980, pp.2-3.
204. Ibid., 朱部長撫松訪斐案 (Minister F.C. Chu’s Visit to the RSA), The ROC Embassy’s Comprehensive Report on Minister F.C. Chu’s Visit to the RSA, p.4.
205. Ibid., The ROC Embassy’s Telex No. 692, February 25th, 1980, pp.1-2.
206. Jaster, The Defence of White Power, p.84.
207. Ibid., p.85.
208. Ibid.
209. Ibid., p.87.
210. Ibid.
211. TLO Archives, Pretoria: 駐南非大使館專題報告: 羅德西亞概況 (The ROC Embassy’s Report on Rhodesia), March 20th, 1978, p.29.
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid.
214. Ibid.
215. Jaster, The Defence of White Power, p.88.
216. TLO Archives, Pretoria: Report on Rhodesia, p.29.
217. TLO Archives, Pretoria: Ambassador H.K. Yang’s Confidential Telex No. 909 to MOFA, August 15th, 1980, pp.1-4.
218. Ibid.
219. Barber, “Conceptualising For A Democratically Based South African Foreign Policy” in A.J. Venter (ed.), Foreign Policy Issues In A Democratic South Africa, p.6.
220. South Africa Yearbook, 1995, p.41.
221. Barber, “South African Foreign Policy”, p.6.
222. Ibid.
223. The Department of Legal Affairs, MOFA, 我國與世界各國關係一覽表 (The ROC’s Relations With Other Countries in the World), Taipei, December 1997 edition, p.2.
224. Ibid.
225. MOFA, 中華民國八十七年外交年鑑 (The ROC’s Diplomatic Yearbook, 1998), pp.639-641.
226. The Department of African Affairs, MOFA, 南非共和國國情簡介 (An Introduction to the Situation of the RSA), Taipei, August 1994, p.11. See also TLO Archives, Durban: The ROC Consulate-General’s telex No.DN083, 1994, Enclosure p.2. The leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, was trained by the PRC, and he graduated from Nanking Military Academy in Mainland China in the 1960s.
227. Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.115.
228. Ibid., pp.115-116.
229. Ibid.
230. Ibid.
231. Ibid.
232. The Department of African Affairs, MOFA, 南非共和國國情簡介 (An Introduction to the Situation of the RSA), p.11.
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid.
235. Ibid.
236. Ibid.; Also see Geldenhuys, “The Politics of South Africa’s ‘China Switch’”; South Africa Yearbook, 1994, pp.145-146. The South African Centre for Chinese Studies in Beijing was officially opened by the then RSA Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr Renier Schoeman, in September 1993.