

better take it to Mr. Osborn. We showed it to him, and told him what I had told Mnyamana, and he seemed quite astonished, and said that he should report it at once to Mr. Jan. So he crossed the river, and we went with him with the paper. Mr. Jan seemed quite angry, and said, 'What! Is Mnyamana to be told before the Governor? Is he an appointed ruler, then? Take back your letter!' So we took it back, and Mnyamana said, 'We had better bring it back to you (the Bishop),' and here it is! *

"The meeting had not taken place when I left. But Mnyamana told me that, when he was called, Mr. Jan in the Governor's presence told him 'Cetshwayo is coming back, the Queen is sending him back. But we want you now, Mnyamana, to separate for us what land shall belong to the Government,' and that he had replied, 'Since you yourselves, sirs, have told us that its owner is coming back, I can have nothing to do with dividing the land. You must settle yourselves with him these affairs of yours when he arrives.'

"I did not hear anything more. But already, before I got up, Mr. Osborn had called all the appointed chiefs or their indunas, and had told them 'Cetshwayo is coming back; the Queen is sending him; and any one who has got any of his property had better put it to rights.'"

The second statement is as follows:—

On November 20th, Nyokana and Batakati, Mnyamana's son, arrived at Bishopstowe. They were both present at Rorke's Drift, when Mnyamana went to the Governor (as above), and Mnyamana's son stated what his father told him, as follows:—"Mr. Jan began

* Here, as often before, it was an incautious speech of a Government official—the Secretary for Native Affairs—which alone gave the Zulus grounds for supposing that the Bishop of Natal had some peculiar power and influence beyond even that of the Governor himself. The latter's mail would seem on this occasion to have been delayed upon the road, since Mtokwane, coming from Bishopstowe, apparently delivered to Mnyamana and the Princes the published telegraphic news of the decision in favour of Cetshwayo's restoration before Sir Henry Bulwer had received it. The circumstance was a mere accident, but that it appeared to the Zulus to give proof of some occult influence on the Bishop's part was entirely owing to Mr J. Shopstone's indiscretion.

by asking Mnyamana 'What were the words which I spoke at the time of Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement?' Said Mnyamana, 'It is you, sir, who should repeat them.' But Mr. Jan said, 'No! the Governor should hear them fresh from your mouth, and then he will know that I spoke the truth.' So Mnyamana agreed, and said, 'Well, sir, you appointed some of the thirteen chiefs (naming them), and you were for appointing me, but I said 'No; am I not also going [off the scene] in that you are taking away the King?' And you denied it strongly, saying, 'Nothing of the sort! We are keeping you to be one of the chiefs.' But I declined, saying, 'No, I am chief already; I can have no new chieftainship. Appoint these chiefs of yours!' 'What?' said you, 'and so you approve them?' Said I, 'What have I to do with approving them? Am I not dead?' Then you said, 'Well, Mnyamana, we meant to appoint you; and still we leave the country in your charge. The regiments you will *tunga* (order to put on head-rings = marry) as you think best, leaving the young regiments; only in these latter you will raise an orphan (allow such to marry), as your custom is. Well, I received that word from you, and I endeavoured to carry it out. But I don't see that you told Zibebu about it; for they paid no attention [to me]; it has been nothing but sending *impis* and carrying off girls, and marrying even children [young lads]. Nothing has gone right since that day. You said that the thirteen chiefs were to be advised by me, and were to leave my own place undisturbed. They have done neither; nothing you ordered has been carried out. Said Mr. Jan, 'Yes, Mnyamana, I quite admit it. I have come to relieve myself of blame in this matter. I see that you remembered all that was said. Although you refused before, we shall appoint you now, and order that all your people, who are under Ntshingwayo and Hamu and Mfanawendhlela, shall return to you again. There is no great talk to-day, Mnyamana. Go now, and Mr. Osborn will follow, and will tell you what is decided. But there is one thing which I will tell you to-day, Mnyamana, and that is that your son [Cetshwayo] is coming back. I pray you for these appointed chiefs, Hamu and Zibebu. Can you not cut off for them a little bit of land, that we may have settled them before the King arrives?' Said Mnyamana, 'Out of what land shall I cut, sir? Are you, then, deceiving me, when you tell me that my son is coming back? If it is true, then it is for him to give them anything.' Said Mr. Jan, 'Very well, I understand what you say. We [Government] for our part, shall speak [at the proper time]. We shall now go on to Newcastle, and then

return home (to Maritzburg), and finally we shall return to you at Ulundi; it is there that we shall speak to you.' This was the end of the interview, and Mnyamana went back to his kraal to wait for Mr. Osborn. When he (Mr. Osborn) came, he went on to the old sites of the destroyed kraals, taking with him the Sutu indunas, Mgamule, Haiyana, Mangengeza, and Vunda. I (Nyokana) was present when Vunda and Haiyana arrived, sent back to Mnyamana to report what had passed. Haiyana spoke, saying, 'Several indunas of Zibebu, Sikizane, Mqubula, and others were there. Mr. Osborn told us to point out the ridges dividing Ndabuko's land from Zibebu's. Ngamule said, 'No, sir, let Sikizane do that.' Said Sikizane, 'How can I divide the land, when it is all the land of Ishaka?' Ngamule replied, 'If you say that, you do not know the boundaries. Is there not the hill Mongoma (a hill in the midst of Ndabuko's district)?'*

"Said our men, 'Speak you, then, if you know.' But he would say no more, though Mr. Osborn questioned him. Then Mr. Osborn said, 'Let the Sutus speak.' But they said, 'How can we speak of boundaries when the Sutu country stretches even beyond Zibebu?' Said Mr. Osborn, 'I am only taking back the Princes to their kraals—not the tribe.' Said Haiyana, 'What about all of us?' 'No,' said he, 'I have nothing to do with returning you; you will be settled by the King.'

"But when this was reported to them, the Princes said, 'Is this the Governor's word, that we are to return alone? Are not our people our garments? Are we to sit in our old kraals naked? Is this setting the country to rights? It is killing us again!' And Mnyamana agreed."

The third statement † is this:—

"About December 1st, messengers of rank arrived from Zululand, Fokoti, half-brother of Zibebu (but loyal to Cetshwayo), and two

* Here, plainly, Sikizane had some national feeling, while Mqubula wished to make Zibebu's point. There never yet was a powerful lord of any nation who had not followers devoted to him personally. Zibebu, as his father's son, had a large tribe of his own, and would have had a still more powerful personal following, but for the disloyalty to the King, into which he was persuaded by his white friends, and which lost him the support of many, even of his own family.

† There was a fourth male at another time by a fourth Zulu,

others, sent by Mnyamana and Undabuko, to report to the Governor that, inasmuch as at Rorke's Drift he had directed Mr. Osborn to restore the Princes and their people to their kraals, seven of the principal indunas of the Sutu tribe, together with a large number of the tribe, intended to accompany Mr. Osborn, on his announcing that he was about to carry out the Governor's promise. On seeing them, Mr. Osborn asked 'What is all this *impi*?' They replied, 'No, sir, it is no *impi*; it is only ourselves returning to our homes, as leave has been given for us to do; it is only ourselves, carrying our bundles.' Said Mr. Osborn, 'The authorities never said that you people, the tribe, were to return to your old homes; I am replacing the Princes only' [i.e. the Princes, and their "immediate followers" only]. Then he, together with Zibebu's indunas, cut off a small bit of land for the Princes, leaving all the land of the tribe with Zibebu. [Zibebu was himself a Sutu by birth, though of lower rank, of course, than the Princes, to whom he was second-cousin. He had, besides, lost influence with the tribe owing to his disloyalty to its head as well as King, Cetshwayo.] The Sutu indunas remonstrated, saying 'Did not the authorities say that we were all to return to our kraals? Why then do you separate the Princes to replace them alone? Finally they left, saying, 'Whither, then, is it meant that we should go, since all our land is given to Zibebu? Are we of our own accord to set our sheep (the Princes) alone in a tiger's den.'

"And when they reached Mnyamana and the Princes, these agreed with them altogether, saying, "You have done right, men of ours! For what purpose indeed were you taken out at all?' And, accordingly, they have sent down two of them to report this to the Governor, that "all that had come of his promises had been an attempt to hand over the Princes (to Zibebu), like a goat set in a trap for a tiger, and deprived of the people who had hitherto been their safeguard." *

but as it contains nothing that does not appear in one or other of these three, it is omitted.

* These men were kept waiting by Mr. J. Shepstone, S.N.A., for four weeks without receiving any "word" from him, and at last they found that he had started for Zululand without leaving any message for them except that "they might go." They had waited already two or three weeks before they came to Bishopstowe, and made the above statement. This is the favourite method of the

Although there is no official report of these conversations, Sir Henry Bulwer's short despatch [3466, p. 212] on the subject contains quite enough to show that the Zulu accounts are substantially true, that is to say, his summary of the Government propositions coincides with what the Zulus understood, and their report of their own replies may be depended upon.

Not that Sir Henry Bulwer allows anything of the sort. Having made up his mind that the Zulus could not possibly have any loyalty to Cetshwayo amongst them, proofs to the contrary had no effect whatever upon him. On November 24th he writes [3466, p. 235] inclosing

"a report I have received from the British Resident showing that Ziwedu and Ndabuko have now [?] raised a difficulty about returning to their kraals unless all the other people of the Usutu party belonging to Zibebu's territory are allowed to return also.

Then quoting a report that Mnyamana was beginning to interfere with some of Hamu's people,* he continues, "The fact is that though Mnyamana has ostensibly been one of the leaders of the party in favour of Cetshwayo's restoration, and his name has been made use of, and he himself has been made use of for the purposes of the agitation, now that the restoration is decided upon, he is exceedingly uneasy at the prospect. Rightly or wrongly, he is credited with having been the means by which Cetshwayo's hiding-place at the close of the Zulu war was discovered."

Natal Government in dealing with inconvenient applications from natives.

* There is no proof that Mnyamana did any such thing, though no doubt Hamu would lose no opportunity of bringing the accusation. "Some of Hamu's people" may have meant people claimed by Hamu, who acknowledged Mnyamana. The accusation against the latter does not appear to have been sustained.

This passage is a complete libel upon the loyal old Prime Minister Mnyamana.* Whoever supplied Sir Henry Bulwer with his notions must have broken the Ninth Commandment most deliberately. Nor is this all.

“His present object, the Resident thinks,” the despatch to Lord Kimberley proceeds, “is to secure, if possible, an independent position for himself before Cetshwayo’s return. He is possessed . . . of one of the largest and most powerful followings in the Zulu country, and he may entertain the notion that if he can only persuade the Government to give him an independent position, he will be able to hold his own, and be secure from the consequences of Cetshwayo’s restoration to power. Undabuko, for other reasons, is credited with a similar design. He also, it is said, aspires to be an independent chief; and it is just possible that this desire on his part may explain the present attitude of the brothers in

* “The clearest headed man in Native Zululand, if not in Native South Africa. He has one great fault, one besetting sin, which has well nigh ruined him, and it is his fidelity to his dynastic King. . . . His kraals are located between the upper millstone of Zibebu and the nether of Uhamu, but all their grinding has not ground his fidelity to Cetshwayo out of him. Uhamu robbed him of 2700 head of cattle. The robbery was so unmistakably apparent that Government was compelled to order Uhamu to restore at least 700 head. The order is still uncomplished with. Mnyamana is without his cattle, and is being persecuted to the death, because he dares to have a claim which has been recognised in a half-hearted way by the Government. . . . It seems a pitiful waste of specially good material that a man of Mnyamana’s ability, who could be so useful to Government if only utilised, should be misused in the way he has been and is.”—Mr. W. Y. Campbell’s Letters, see vol. i. p. 27, *in notis*.

Cetshwayo, after his return to Zululand, heard that these charges had been made against Mnyamana, and said, with a laugh at their absurdity, “Do you not see that this was but an attempt to sow dissension between us? Were there any truth in the accusation, would Mnyamana have taken all the trouble he has on behalf of my family all this time?”

raising a difficulty about returning to their district unless certain other people are allowed to return also; their object being to build up a strong party of their own. . . . When it is recollected how urgently, and with what persistence the two brothers have been moving to be allowed to return to their own district, and what a hardship their expulsion from their homes has been made to appear, and I can well believe has really been, it certainly seems as if some undercurrent of motive were at work that they should now, when they have obtained their object, about which they displayed so much importunity, be unwilling to avail themselves of it.* . . . But this does not satisfy Undabuko's purposes. He is a troublesome, turbulent youth, and I freely recognise that no one is likely to keep him in such good order as Cetshwayo.† But whether he is so anxious for Cetshwayo's return as has been supposed is another question. There is good reason to believe that he had his own views as to what the agitation of last April and May might lead to.‡ . . . In fact, the greatest danger of the agitation . . . was that it would bring on, and it very nearly did bring on, a civil war, Undabuko heading the Sutu party with the real design of making himself the king."

* They had *not* obtained that object. No Zulu chief can be thus separated from his people, or would choose to live apart from them. This is the old mistake of insisting upon Ndabuko and the other Princes being regarded as heads of small parties only. The *whole* of the people driven out of Zibebu's territory were their people, and they could not, of course, return with only those whom Sir Henry Bulwer calls their personal followers.

† Ndabuko is about fifteen years younger than Cetshwayo, i.e. he is between thirty and forty, and very like him in face and figure, though not as yet quite so stout. He is a man of peculiarly quiet and dignified manners and steady conduct. Throughout the troubles of his country he has always been the most moderate in council yet steadily faithful to his brother, and, although by no means wanting in spirit, he has always kept the utmost restraint upon himself and upon his people, with the one exception of the first retaliation upon Zibebu in consequence of that chief's unprovoked attacks upon his people after the "restoration," of which more hereafter. Nothing more ludicrously inappropriate than Sir Henry Bulwer's terms could well be applied to this prince.

‡ By the expression "agitation" Sir Henry Bulwer always describes the orderly and peaceable Great Deputation.

It is difficult to comment with any patience upon such a mass of prejudice and assumption as the whole of this despatch, and there is no explanation of its absurdities, except that Sir Henry Bulwer, having become possessed of one idea to the extent of monomania, cuts every circumstance to fit that idea after the unsparing fashion of a Procrustes.

The simple statement of the Prince Ziwedu sufficiently explains the matter.* He went "to thank the Resident personally for his trouble in the matter of his and Undabuko's kraals;" but adds that they

"cannot go to reside alone in their kraals, their people not being permitted to go to theirs. In the first place [*ibid.*, p. 237], they want their people to build their kraals for them, which they, the people, cannot do unless they are back at their own kraals. And, secondly, it would not be safe for them, Ziwedu and Undabuko, to reside by themselves near to Zibebu and his people."

Mr. Osborn's reply to this is that as he had directed Zibebu to allow not only the Princes, but also their personal followers, to return to their kraals (which the Resident describes as "spread over a tract of land of at least twelve miles long") therefore "the case is not as stated by you, that you and Undabuko would, under the arrangements made, have to reside there alone by yourselves."

Such a mistake might really have been made by a person knowing nothing of the Zulus or their language, and who was also slow of apprehension, but Mr. Osborn could not possibly have imagined that there was any falsehood in the Prince's speech, or

* And is corroborated by the Zulu statements previously given.

that he for a moment meant to imply that he and Undabuko would be "alone" by their two selves. The phrase was of course as figurative as the one given before—"Are not our people our garments? are we to sit in our old kraals naked?"

Amongst the people who were not allowed to return was Umsutshwana's tribe, still homeless in the "bush," and of whom Mr. Osborn had written on August 5th [3466, p. 171], that they "are suffering much hardship from exposure and want;" and of whose case he had then spoken as equally "important and urgent" with that of the Princes. No doubt there *was* "some under-current of motive" (as Sir Henry Bulwer says) in kindness towards their suffering people on the Princes' part. And, certainly, they had sufficient reason for feeling that with a comparatively small number of followers they themselves would not be safe within Zibebu's reach.

CHAPTER V.

ALL Sir Henry Bulwer's strenuous efforts to prevent Cetshwayo's return having failed, he turned his attention with equal ardour to the planning of arrangements which were well calculated to make that return as great a failure as possible. There were several palpable objects to be gained. He had always declared that Cetshwayo's restoration would be unwelcome to the majority of the Zulus, and dangerous to the peace of both that country and Natal,* and he owed it to himself to prove that he was right. Sir Henry Bulwer had said that the scheme could not succeed, therefore it must not succeed. It was also necessary to show both the King and his friends that they could not be permitted happiness and success against Sir Henry Bulwer's will, and it never seems to have occurred to him that there were really but two honourable courses open to him—either to resign his governorship, and decline to carry out the policy he had opposed so persistently, or to make up his

* Although so much was said beforehand in the Colony about the danger to Natal of the King's return, and although Zululand has been in so frightfully disturbed a state since his death, that particular argument has vanished altogether, having, indeed, been groundless from the first.

mind to it, and carry it out loyally, and in a friendly and generous spirit to the King. It is not easy to understand how the Home Government could possibly hope that the matter could be rightly managed in the spirit in which the Governor of Natal undertook it, especially as that spirit was shared by those through whom he worked. Unfortunately, also, there was no division in their councils as to the main point of keeping back as much territory as possible from the King, for in the proposed "Reserve" was realised the well-known Shepstonian project of a Black Kingdom beyond Natal, into which, many years before, Sir T. Shepstone himself contemplated leading off the native population of Natal to make room for the increasing number of whites. Such a proposition would naturally be very popular with the colonists, but it was open to the two objections, that the natives preferred to stay where they were, and where most of them had had their homes for many years, and that there was no empty country to send them to.* A plausible justification for taking part of Zululand for this purpose has been the alleged fact that the white population of Natal is crowded up by Zulu refugees, and that therefore it would be only fair, in the new settlement of Zululand, to secure their return to their

* On this point Sir Henry Bulwer writes, in August 1882 [3466, p. 149], "A restoration of the ex-King and the re-establishment of the Zulu power would be an effectual bar to the return of any of these people to Zululand. . . . The question is a very serious one to this Colony, and in dealing with the Zulu problem we ought not, I think, to lose sight of the bearing that the one question has upon the other, or neglect the opportunity we now have to deal with the Natal difficulty."

own country. Very easily might this have been done by simple agreement with Cetshwayo, who was quite willing to receive all who wished to come, but Sir Henry Bulwer would admit the possibility of no policy which would show any confidence in the King's good faith. He acted throughout, and in defiance of the most palpable facts, on the principle that the only way to induce Cetshwayo to keep his word, or the peace, was to put it out of his power to break either, although, as a matter of fact, he had no means whatever of binding the King, except by his word, and it is to Cetshwayo's scrupulous good faith that the Natal Government has owed its mischief-making power of the last two years.

But in point of fact there is no truth in the above plausible justification, and might, not right, is the only ground on which the white colonists of Natal can claim the land occupied by their native brethren. It is true that Zulus have left their own country, and settled in Natal since the latter became a British colony, but it is no less true that many of them, and of other tribes, have meanwhile left Natal, and settled in Zululand. It is impossible to learn the numbers in the latter case, as only the few who asked leave of the Government to go and live in Zululand are recorded, while most of those who went did so without leave, as, indeed, there was no reason why they should not. The two populations in Natal and Zululand lived in close friendship and intimacy, especially along both sides of the boundary streams, before the disastrous war of 1879, and Bishop Schreuder, "the oldest, most

able, and most experienced missionary in Zululand" wrote at that time: "The native tribes here on the border have these many years fraternised and had constant intercourse, partly intermarried with their Zulu neighbours on the Zulu side, and naturally their sympathies are divided between Natal and Zululand. And I have no doubt that many of the Natal border natives would think themselves safer over in Zululand, than in Natal" [2308, p. 70]. But that the emigration from Natal during the years of Cetshwayo's actual reign, from 1873 to 1878, was actually greater than the immigration into the Colony may be gathered from the colonial official returns, which show that the native population of Natal has not become larger during that period by even the number to be expected by natural increase. In 1854 it was reckoned at from 100,000 to 120,000,* and in 1877 it was 290,035.† In 1873 it was 279,895,‡ and through natural increase (say 2 per cent. per annum) would have been 302,965 in 1877, whereas it was only 290,035,§ so that since Cetshwayo began to reign it has been decreasing, through emigration from Natal to Zululand.

Now the native population of Natal in 1874 was

* 'Ten Weeks in Natal,' p. vii. By the Bishop of Natal.

† 'Natal Almanac,' 1879, p. 126.

‡ Official Returns.

§ "Yet most of Langalibalele's tribe had by this time returned to the Colony, who in 1873 had been terrorised out of it to an extent of probably double the whole number of people who have come from Zululand to live in Natal during the last six years." This was written, and all the above calculations made, by the Bishop of Natal in 1879.

281,797,* which by natural increase of 2 per cent. per annum, as in England, would have amounted to 287,432 in 1875, 293,180 in 1876, 299,043 in 1877, instead of 277,864, 252,024, 290,035,* a *decrease* being thus indicated of 9568, 41156, 9008 respectively.

It is, therefore, plain that Natal could found no claim to the practical annexation of part of Zululand on the grounds of having been hampered by emigration from thence during Cetshwayo's reign. As to what happened in and before 1856, if we go back to first causes it will be difficult to show that we have any right at all to Natal, except that of conquest, which right, when exercised by a civilised people, certainly should not involve the driving out of the natural possessors of the soil. On grounds of first principle the Zulu must have a better right to the country than any European people.

However, as no such return to first principles on the part of the aborigines would be for a moment permitted, do not let us commit the dishonesty of going back only just as far as suits our own interests, and stopping there. Let us rather consider what was the actual state of things when the largest immigration of Zulus since British occupation took place, viz. in 1856, for with regard to any of the original inhabitants we have no right even to raise the question of their claim.† During the civil war of 1856 some

* Official Blue-Books.

† One favourite argument is the assertion that the British found Natal almost empty of natives, who crowded into it after our occupation, from other parts, presumably for protection. But those

thousand Zulus, men, women, and children, took refuge in Natal, the native population of which was then about 120,000, where at that time there was plenty of room for them, and where, indeed, they were welcomed by the majority of the colonists, who obtained in them servants and labourers at a very low rate of wages, "the able-bodied men and boys, and the younger women and girls, being apprenticed out by the Government for three years, in the service of the white inhabitants, at the expiration of which time they were allowed to acquire the right to settle permanently within the borders of the Colony."* There may have been a few far-sighted individuals who foresaw that the day would come when the whites would want back the space in Natal then readily enough given, because not required by themselves, to the refugees, and who held that one stipulation of their reception should be that, when peace should be restored in Zululand, they should accept any arrangement which it might be found possible to make for their peaceable return to their own country.†

natives who entered Natal at that time were simply returning to their own country, from which they had been driven by successive waves of war, and would certainly have done so, sooner or later, in any case.

* 'Diocese of Natal: First Steps of the Zulu Mission.' By the Bishop of Natal, written in 1859. In 1881 the number of *Zulus* resident in Natal was calculated to be between 10,000 and 11,000, out of a native population of over 300,000.

† This might probably have been done without previous stipulation, and with the consent of all parties, at any time after Cetshwayo's accession in 1873, but certainly upon his "restoration" in 1883. Sir H. Bulwer's object, however, was to give the Zulu

But no such stipulation was made, and the refugees were allowed to purchase by three years' servitude the right to become Natal natives. The plan suited the requirements of the whites at the time, and we have no right to complain of the result, to turn the natives out, or to rob the Zulus of part of their country, in order that Europeans may have a larger share of colonial land.

Although very popular in Natal, and with the official clique, this plea for cutting off a third of Zululand from the King's dominions is but delicately suggested in the despatches home, which chiefly lay stress on the large numbers of actual Zulus who, it was assumed, would flock into the Reserve as soon as they knew of Cetshwayo's return, in order to escape from his rule, an assumption which was not borne out by circumstances when put to the test, but which was strongly urged by Sir Henry Bulwer in his despatch of October 3, 1882 [3466, p. 197]. This despatch requires careful examination, for it contains all the seeds of the lamentable condition of Zululand brought about by the Governor of Natal's marring of the good intentions of the Home Government. It would seem that the latter had not contemplated any division of the country, until urged thereto by Sir Henry Bulwer, for Lord Kimberley writes on August 17: "*We have accepted your advice that Cetshwayo's restoration should be partial*" [*ibid.*, p. 92], although at the same time

King not more subjects, but less land, and he was not anxious to make that restoration a brilliant success, pleasing alike to King, Zulus, and colonists of Natal.

intimating that H.M.'s Government were "unable to agree in your recommendation that the announcement to Cetshwayo should be postponed." The Home Government then decided that "on grounds of good faith, locations must be assigned to such of the chiefs as might not be willing to return under Cetshwayo's rule."* Well and good. To the equity of this no one could object, and Cetshwayo's warmest supporters would have approved of its extending further, and including *all Zulus* who were unwilling to accept the King. He himself agreed readily to the condition when it was fully explained to him, for he was sure that, if the land to be reserved was only in proportion to the reasonable requirements of those of his people who wished to leave him, it would be a small loss to Zululand. Lord Kimberley "concluded" that Sir Henry Bulwer "had ascertained from each of the appointed chiefs whether he would return under the rule of Cetshwayo, by communicating with them on the subject" [*ibid.*, p. 197]. But this the Governor did not attempt to do. He "had only seen three of the chiefs" himself, and had left the Resident to learn the wishes and feelings of the other ten. If there was any careful endeavour to obtain their genuine sentiments, no record of the attempt has been given to the public; yet it would have been quite possible not only to learn

* It should have been added, "and who have not forfeited their claim by breaking the conditions on their side." The *two* exceptions would have left none to provide for, except Mfanawondhilela, whose opposition cannot have been very strong, as neither he nor his people cared to remove to the Reserve.

the real views of the thirteen kinglets, but to obtain those of the other chiefs and heads of tribes and families by some simple system of ballot in each separate district, by means of which the voters might have been protected from the displeasure of the appointed chiefs if voting against their views. Nay, had the Governor been really as sure as he professed himself, that "not merely the majority of the appointed chiefs are individually opposed to the restoration of Cetshwayo, but that great numbers of the Zulu people have no wish to return under his rule, and would regard any obligation to do so as one of the greatest misfortunes that could befall them, and that many of them would be compelled to leave the country" [3466, p. 199], he would, as soon as he obtained consent from England to his proposed "Reserve," have caused every chief to be informed of the circumstances (not the kinglets only), and, fixing a temporary line, would have given notice that all who dreaded the King's rule might come over into the "protected" * district, the line to be advanced or withdrawn according to the numbers who crossed it. This, however, would by no means have answered the purpose of the annexationists, as in all probability not a single Zulu would have moved, and the line would have had to be withdrawn to the Tugela as before; for the converse direction that all

* This was the term proposed by Sir Henry Bulwer, but it was objected to by Her Majesty's Government (and "Zulu Native Reserve" substituted) on the grounds that it "would imply that the inhabitants are to depend for defence not on themselves, but on the British power" [3466, p. 217].

Zulus living within the proposed Reserve who wished to be under Cetshwayo's rule, should leave it, and cross into the territory assigned to him, was by no means equally fair. If there were people who would regard the King's return as "the greatest misfortune which could befall them," and who would "be compelled to leave the country," such would, of course, be glad of the refuge offered them, and accept it willingly, at the cost of a change of habitation and loss of accustomed homes and lands. But the Zulus inhabiting that part of the country next Natal, which Sir Henry Bulwer proposed to reserve,* did not at all see why they should be forced to choose between their King and their land and homes, when they desired *both*. So that while the number of people (if any) who genuinely and of their own will crossed into the Reserve really represent the proportion adverse to Cetshwayo's return, the fact that the inhabitants of the Reserve refused to go over into the territory left to Cetshwayo does not in the least show that they did not wish for his rule. Their argument was in effect, "We are Cetshwayo's people, and this is his country; we will not voluntarily give up either him or it."

Sir Henry Bulwer's calculation is that "of the appointed chiefs it would appear that five are disposed to acquiesce in the restoration, and that eight are not

* Of which Cetshwayo spoke as "the best piece of the country. The original Zulus live along there." And again, "The influential men occupying Dunn's territory, all along the Natal border, are favourable to my restoration; and that is why I want the reserved territory reduced" [3466, p. 245].

disposed to acquiesce." How this "would appear" when the above was written, we are not allowed to know, but the appearance was certainly a deceptive one.* Before considering the people, let us see what claims these thirteen kinglets of Sir Garnet Wolseley's had to be maintained by England as Zulu chiefs. Dunn may be set aside at once. To force him again upon the reluctant Zulus would have been a piece of tyranny which public opinion in England would never have permitted. Sir Henry Bulwer himself [*ibid.*, p. 204] acknowledges that Dunn, after the King's return, would have only some 500 or 600

* Mr. Osborn says, "The appointed chiefs, Chingwayo, Umanawendhlela, Umgitjwa, and Siunguza, took personally no part in the arming [of the Sutus against Zibebu and Hamu's threatened attacks after the return of the great Deputation], and I believe they discountenanced the proceeding as far as they could. At the same time large numbers of their people did take up arms, and joined the impis under Umnyamana and Ndabuko. Chingwayo, Umanawendhlela, and Umgitjwa exercise little or no control or rule within their territories; they are openly and persistently defied by the people, and as their own personal tribes are small and weak, they lack the means to enforce their authority."

If, as appears to be the case, the above are all the grounds upon which Sir Henry Bulwer held that *eight* of the kinglets were "not disposed to acquiesce" in Cetshwayo's return, he asserted it on meagre proof. Mfanawendhlela was always not "disposed to acquiesce," and the other two were what the Zulus themselves called weak-kneed and wavering. *On this very account* none of the three were respected by the people in their districts. Here we have from the Resident's own reports proof that large numbers of the Zulus in five out of the eight districts whose kinglets are claimed as opponents to Cetshwayo declaring in his favour, the three above and Hamu's and Zibebu's, while Dunn's large district was wholly for the King.

men at his command.* In addition to which, his slaughter of Sitimela's people was, if not a crime on the part of the Resident, a glaring breach of the conditions "on which alone" Dunn held his chieftainship. Therefore, as far as he was concerned England had not even to consider whether it would be more to her discredit to keep than to break a dishonourable engagement. Hlubi the Basuto, again, we had no right to force upon the Zulus. Not one man only, but a whole, though small, tribe of "400 to 500" (*vide* Sir Henry Bulwer) [*ibid.*], of alien, and at first, even unfriendly people, placed in possession of the land, and in authority over its inhabitants, was an intolerable grievance, which no one less indifferent to the feelings of the conquered race than was Sir Garnet Wolseley would have thought of inflicting upon them. Hlubi, indeed, was in a very different position from that of Dunn. The Basutos deserved reward for faithful service from the British Government to which they had ever been loyal and useful. We were bound to pay them for their services, but not out of our neighbours' pockets; we owed them something, much indeed, but we should have paid it honestly at our own cost, instead of at the cost of the Zulus. At the same time there need have been no difficulty about them, had we tried to settle matters amicably between them and Cetshwayo, as he would have accepted them as subjects, and they would readily

* This is far too high a calculation, and includes all the strays of various colours whom Dunn had "gathered round his fortunes," to use Sir H. Bulwer's phrase.

have submitted to his rule.* Hamu's claims can be disposed of in a word; by his slaughter of the Abaqulusi he had long forfeited his chieftainship. Zibebu had done the same, but to a much less undeniable extent. It is true that in his attacks upon his brother Haiyana, &c., in 1881, and upon Umbopa in 1882, lives were lost, and that those attacks were made without any provocation, except that the offenders had "prayed for Cetshwayo";† but they were single instances, and less easily fixed upon him because they have never been acknowledged by the

* Sir Henry Bulwer himself says of the Basuto Hlubi, that he will always do precisely what the Natal Government desire him to do; and from some of his men (Basutos) the present writer learnt, before Cetshwayo's return, that they and their chief would be perfectly willing to pass under the Zulu King's rule if he were satisfied to receive them, and if the Natal Government would permit it.

† That Zibebu did regard that "prayer" as "intriguing" against him is plain from the official report [3182, pp. 50-60] of his own words, and he was certainly encouraged, if not actually induced to do so, by white influence.

1. "I punished this man for leaving my territory with Ndabuko without permission, to go to the Resident to get a pass to go to Maritzburg for the purpose of prosecuting his request for the 'Bone' Cetshwayo. [It will be remembered that Sir H. Bulwer had challenged the Bishop's interpretation of 'the Bone,' as signifying Cetshwayo.] I will not allow this."

2. "I have ordered this man and others to leave my territory at once, because they threaten to go again to Maritzburg to apply for the 'Bone.' I insist on these people leaving."

3. (*Ngatsha* speaks), "Eight head of cattle were seized from me for going with Ndabuko, &c., to Maritzburg to pray for the 'Bone.' Zibebu: "The man went without my permission. I did make the seizure, and will again punish any one who goes on this errand. I will not allow it."

4. "I made all the foregoing seizures because the people went with Ndabuko to Maritzburg to ask for the 'Bone' without my

Government like the actions of Dunn and Hamu, whose exploits in the killing line had been altogether too extensive for concealment. But Zibebu had taken part with Dunn in the slaughter of Sitimela's people, and both these chiefs had on that occasion broken another condition of their chieftainship (No. 6), by sending impis out of their own territories to assist Mlandela when the Resident had, as yet, given them no authority to do so.* But although this was done, not only without leave from but against the express orders of the Resident, it may be argued that their offence was condoned by the fact that when Mr. Osborn found that they had already disregarded his orders, he gave them leave to do it.

As an actual matter of fact these three, Dunn, Hamu, and Zibebu, were the only ones who, left to

consent." (N.B. Although stress is laid upon "*without my consent*," it is plain enough that the prayer itself was the real offence.)

5. "The fact of your going to ask for the 'Bone' was *sentelela*-ing me." [This is a new word, which has come into use since the Zulu war, formed from "sentinel," understood as "one who watches and reports," but used here rather in the sense of giving offence.] To which Ndabuko replied, "*I have not understood that I am forbidden to bring to notice of Government acts oppressive against the people of the Government.*" And indeed Zibebu was acting in violation of the conditions of his chieftainship, by punishing those who went to Mr. Osborn to "*sentelela*" him.

* It is a fact, although an amazing one, that *afterwards* the Resident gave these chiefs leave to go and help Mlandela in driving out Sitimela, and killing his followers. Many of these were families including women and children, and had simply gone to see and greet their old chief's son Sitimela, who does not appear to have had any warlike intentions.

themselves, would have made any objection to Cetshwayo's return at all, and there is good reason to believe that, had Government efforts been as determinedly directed to inducing them all to accept the King, as it was to produce as much opposition as possible to his restoration, both Zibebu and Hamu would have returned to their allegiance under Cetshwayo, who was quite ready to forgive and forget in every case except that of Dunn. But this was not the object of those in authority. As Giusti remarks of his "officials," "the first thing necessary is to prevent the ruler and the ruled from understanding one another, for should a reconciliation take place, farewell to the golden age." *

Of the remaining nine appointed chiefs, Sir Henry Bulwer allows that five are "disposed to acquiesce" in Cetshwayo's return, which is a mild rendering of their eager desire for it. But of the other four whom he claims as holding his views on the subject, three were by no means averse to it, although sufficiently under the Resident's influence to be somewhat guided by his known opinions. They had all joined in the prayer for Cetshwayo, and two of them, Tshingwayo and the regent Siunguza (Gaozi's territory),† were amongst those who had sent money in 1881 to the

* Horner's 'Giusti and his Times,' p. 216. "Il Congresso de' Birri."

† Sir Henry Bulwer mentions Siunguza thus. Gaozi had been one of the most earnest in praying for the King (see vol. i.), and his people felt with him in the matter. Had Siunguza seceded from Cetshwayo he would not have taken a dozen followers with him.

Secretary for Native Affairs as earnest of their sincerity. The last one, Umfanawendhlela, was the only one of the Zulu kinglets who had not, by his own act, released the British Government from the foolish engagements made by Sir Garnet Wolseley—i. e. who had neither killed any of his neighbours' people, nor any of his own without trial, on the one hand, and who had not prayed for Cetshwayo's restoration on the other. He was the only one (except the Basuto Hlubi) who might with justice have demanded to be left in possession of the territory which he had neither forfeited, nor offered to resign, but of his claims Sir Henry Bulwer makes very light [3466, p. 213]—as he is unable or unwilling to come again under Cetshwayo's authority he will "probably be obliged to remove," but his removal "will not be attended with much loss," as the tribe of which he is the head is of "insignificant size."* It is apparent, therefore, that to keep good faith to the appointed chiefs was not Sir Henry Bulwer's object in insisting as he did on retaining Zibebu in power, for from that point of view Mfanawendhlela had by far the better claim. But the latter was a man of weak character and small influence, by no means so suitable a person as Zibebu to be left as a thorn in

* Sir H. Bulwer applies much the same argument to Tshingwayo and Umgitjwa, whose territories he also proposed to restore to Cetshwayo, but as they were not really averse to that restoration we need not consider their cases. Mfanawendhlela was a chief of comparatively small importance before the war of 1879, and, having been raised by the "Settlement" to a position which he could never have hoped to hold under other circumstances, he was, naturally, averse to losing it.

Cetshwayo's side, which was the real object of the retention of Zibebu as an independent chief.*

As for the people, who had a still greater right to be considered than the kinglets, their loyalty was very widespread indeed. Hamu and Zibebu, as princes of the blood royal, had each his own particular tribe, though even of their immediate followers many were loyal to the King, while large portions of their districts were inhabited by some of Cetshwayo's most devoted followers. The whole of Dunn's district was loyal to the King, and amongst the others it would have been hard to find any number of disaffected men together, though it is impossible to say that there may not have been a few here and there, since there never yet was any change of government pleasing to every individual in a nation. Sir Henry Bulwer, in fact, decided wisely, from his point of view, that to divide the country according to the feelings of the inhabitants was out of the question; and, truly, had those feelings been considered, it would not have been divided at all. He therefore fixed an arbitrary limit to his proposed

* The *Times of Natal*, a local paper, always opposed to Cetshwayo, and regarded until this change of front as the Government organ, says, on June 21, 1884:—"Just as we stated with good reason that Cetshwayo was presented with an ultimatum, that Zibebu was employed to intimidate him to surrender, and that eventually the King was poisoned at Ekhowe, and condemned the last two acts . . . so we now repeat that Zibebu was an agent of the Imperial Government, in so far as he was called in to intimidate Cetshwayo, and save the Government the cost of an expedition to arrest him; and so also we maintain that Zibebu was allowed to retain his chieftainship in Zululand, when all other chiefs were ousted, for what we will call prudential reasons."

226 *RESERVED TERRITORY ARBITRARILY SEVERED.*


Reserve, without any reference to the number of people who, according to his ideas, were to occupy it, and all the plans and precautions suggested by him were devised with the object of restraining Cetshwayo's imaginary cruel and revengeful inclinations, and restricting the power of which, as the Governor had said in 1880 [3466, p. 143], quoting the despatch at this time as expressing his opinion still, "he personally had made so ill a use." Mr. Osborn, of course, takes the same tone, and talks of protecting Zibebu's people from "the vengeance of Cetshwayo, which they know full well [!] will be very soon directed against them" [*ibid.*]; and again, saying that "they would almost immediately be made to feel the weight of his displeasure." *

* This is pure assumption, neither founded on past events nor justified by subsequent facts. The value of Mr. Osborn's memorandum as a statement of the truth may be gathered from his saying, "*This chief (Zibebu) and all the people in his territory are opposed to Cetshwayo's restoration, and will not again submit to his authority,*" and Sir Henry Bulwer only speaks of "inconsiderable exceptions" to the rule. Yet a great portion of the Usutus belong to Zibebu's territory, besides Umsutshwana's and Umbopa's tribes, and nine or ten of Zibebu's own brothers. Zibebu was told on one occasion by Ndabuko, in presence of the Resident, "Do you say that we are not to lament for the Bone? Does not all Zululand lament for it? Why, these very people of your own, who are now surrounding you, they lament for it too!" And all Zibebu's people present held up their hands, saying, "We agree! We are with you! We all lament for the King!" [Digest of Blue Books, by the Bishop of Natal, p. 278.]

True, Z'bebu had driven out many of the loyalists from his territory, but, from his own account, he does not seem to have held the influence over the remaining inhabitants attributed to him by Mr. Osborn and Sir H. Bulwer [3466, pp. 183, 184].

"I am getting into hot water with all my indunas and brothers,"

The Governor remarks in this despatch [3466, p. 199] "that he should have been disposed to recommend the partition of the country by means of the White Umfolosi River from its source to the sea,"



which would have produced the result given above, C standing for Cetshwayo, and R for Reserve.

he wrote on July 29th by the hand of his white "familiar," Colenbrander, and again, on the 30th, the latter writes, "I am also ordered to tell you that Zibebu's men are getting dissatisfied, and Zibebu fears that if this lasts much longer he will lose a lot of men. Undabuko has already succeeded in enticing away twenty-five kraals" [i. e. twenty-five kraals in Zibebu's territory had declared for Cetshwayo]. The supposed grounds of discontent, according to Zibebu's account, were that his men were restrained by the Resident from fighting, but however that may be, Zibebu's complaints betrayed the weakness of his position.

This astonishing proposition does not appear actually to have been made to the Home Government, but rather to have been thrown in to lessen by comparison the effect of what was to follow.

Mr. Osborn had suggested another means of curtailing Zululand proper, one which, under Natal Government management, has proved indeed a masterpiece of mischief, and which Sir Henry Bulwer adopted at once. The proposal was [*ibid.*, p. 199]:—

“That the appointed chief Zibebu should be left where he is, and that the territory now under him should, with certain modifications and changes, be constituted a separate territory under his separate authority.”

In support of this proposition the Governor proceeds to draw a remarkable portrait of the chief Zibebu, as follows:—

“He is a man of considerable force of character, moderate in counsels, strong in action, straightforward in his conduct, courageous, self-reliant. He was much opposed to the Zulu war, and urged Cetshwayo at the time to come to an agreement with the Government. Indeed, he spoke out his mind, it is said [by whom is this said?], on the subject with so much insistence as to give great offence to the ex-King.* But once the die was cast for war and

* Here the Governor assumes that Cetshwayo was not anxious “to come to an agreement with the Government,” yet no one is better aware than Sir Henry Bulwer how little the Zulu King wished for war with the British, and the Governor had himself repeatedly affirmed it. He writes [2584, p. 143, and 3466, p. 143], “I have never hesitated to say that I did not believe the Zulu King contemplated hostilities against this country. I have never hesitated to say that an invasion of Natal was one of the last things that would have occurred to the Zulu King to undertake, and one of the last things that would have found favour with the Zulu people.”

the British troops had crossed the frontier he was foremost in loyally taking his part against the invasion, although his district lay the most remote from the scene of war."*

Can this be Sir Henry Bulwer speaking, and his subject a Zulu! Ah! but a Zulu unfriendly to Cetshwayo, and with enough "force of character" (backed up by official encouragement, and white support) to make him a dangerous foe. With the exception of the little myth about his urging Cetshwayo (supposed unwilling) "to come to agreement with the Government," the description might reasonably have been applied either to the King or to his brother Ndadabuko. Zibebu's claim to it is, however, less apparent.

"His relations with his people," continues Sir Henry Bulwer, in praise of Zibebu, "are marked by a personal kindness and consideration on his part towards them such as the Zulu people are strangers to as a rule. It is said of him and Umnyamana that theirs are the only districts where the men live to be old men, a saying which in a Zulu mouth is full of significance. Beloved by his own people, he is also held in respect by the Zulus generally on account of his well-known straightforwardness of character, his personal courage, and his open-handed generosity."

This is certainly a new view of Zibebu, never put forward before. His cousins the Princes, and his brothers Haiyana and others, whom he turned out of house and home for praying for the King's return,

* I cannot learn that any such notion with regard to Zibebu's having urged the King against war with the English (to which no one could be more averse than the King himself) is known to any natives conversant with Zulu matters. Zibebu is, at all events, known to be the man who broke the three days' truce by firing at our soldiers while bathing, and so brought on the most needless slaughter at Ulundi.

the chiefs Umsutshwana, Mbopa, &c., with their many followers, whom he starved by hundreds in the wilderness for no other offence, would probably tell another tale; nor is any authority given by Sir Henry Bulwer for an eulogy, the truth of which he had himself no means at all of testing. It is to be supposed that it originated with Mr. Osborn, although in the memorandum about Zibebu to which the Governor refers in his despatch [*ibid.*, p. 210], no more is said than that "the chief is popular with all but the Usuto party" (i. e. with all but the majority of the nation).

Again, Sir Henry Bulwer says, "as he [Zibebu] will certainly be amenable to the advice of the Government, we may depend on him on his part not to do anything that would bring him into conflict with his neighbours." It is, indeed, sincerely to be hoped that the murderous attacks made without provocation by Zibebu upon the Sutus in 1883 and 1884 are not proof that he has been "amenable to the advice of the Government."

Up to this time the Home Government had consented to nothing more than that "a convenient territory should be assigned to such chiefs as might be unwilling to accept Cetshwayo," and there are certainly no signs of their having intended that such "convenient territory" should comprise the best half of the Zulu kingdom. Sir Henry Bulwer now having thrown out the bold suggestion as above, *appears* somewhat to moderate his extensive claims, and draws back his proposed line for a Reserve, some way

to the south of the White Umfolosi, but at the same time with great ingenuity, strikes off from the territory to the north of that river an independent district for Zibebu. This ingenuity is shown first by the sentence [*ibid.*, p. 200]:—

“ . . . I am disposed to consider that the establishment of Zibebu in a separate territory is advisable, and it will also be in accordance with the views of your Lordships . . . that a convenient territory should be assigned to such chiefs as might be unwilling to accept Cetshwayo,”

as though the Reserve had not already been permitted for that purpose, and this for Zibebu were not *additional*. And secondly, by a still more artful phrase [*ibid.*, p. 201]:—

“ But this arrangement taking, as it would, so much territory from the country north of the White Umvolosi river, it would be necessary to add to the portion to be placed under the ex-King an equivalent extent of territory in the country south of that river; and this might be done by assigning to his portion the territories now under the chiefs Umgitywa and Umlandela, which in fact would furnish more than an equivalent to that placed under Zibebu.”


Here the writer speaks as though the territories in question were to be *given* to Cetshwayo from beyond or outside Zululand. In fact, he assumes the arrangement in Diagram No. 1, which he had merely mentioned as what he “ *should have been* disposed to recommend,” as already made, and then proposes to *give* Cetshwayo some land south of the White Umfolosi in exchange for the portion retained for Zibebu north of it. Nevertheless, in spite of the repeated statements of the unanimity existing between Zibebu and the people of his territory, Sir

Henry Bulwer found it necessary to shift that territory, giving up to the Sutus [on paper]* all that part of the country from which the Princes and loyal chiefs had been driven out, and making over in exchange to Zibebu the whole of Umgojana's territory. This appointed chief was loyal to Cetshwayo, and had, therefore, apparently no claims on the Government, although if Sir Garnet Wolseley's engagements with the kinglets were worth anything, it is not easy to see how the territory of one of them who had broken no conditions, could justly be given to another, merely because the former was willing to give it up to Cetshwayo. Sir Henry Bulwer's actual proposal for the division of Zululand was as shown on the next page.

So infatuated was he by his belief in Cetshwayo's wickedness, that he writes, "I trust that this partition may be found sufficient for the several interests concerned. If it errs at all, it errs, I think, in respect of the territory which we shall retain, by making it, perhaps, too limited for all the purposes

* By what can only be described as a juggling trick on the part, principally of the Resident, and one which was not set right when it was discovered by his superior officers, the Princes never actually got their land, though Mgojana lost his. This and the fluctuating boundaries left between Zibebu and the Princes was the immediate cause of the disturbances which took place later. If Zibebu's position as an independent chief was sure to prove a thorn in Cetshwayo's side, this bad faith to the Princes, and the utter sacrifice of their interests to those of Zibebu on the part of the Government officials, may truly be called the very point and venom of that thorn. The case will, however, be fully considered in its proper place.

for which it will be required;" and several pages follow of elaborate arrangements for the government of the reserved territory, showing at every turn the grand error underlying the whole scheme, that of supposing that half the Zulu people would quietly submit either to be turned out of their homes, and



deprived of their land, or else to repudiate their nationality, disown their King, and become subjects either of Zibebu, or of the Natal Government. Sir Henry Bulwer had very little knowledge of the Zulu people, their feelings and ideas, and he does not, of course, understand their language. He was, therefore, wholly dependent on interpreters, and

mainly on the Secretary for Native Affairs,* and sometimes on his brother, Sir T. Shepstone, for his notions. How they and Mr. Osborn could have deceived the Governor, or allowed him to deceive himself to the extent of supposing his plans feasible, is only less astonishing than was the ignorance of the same gentleman in 1878 of what would be likely to follow from a British invasion of Zululand.

Perhaps Lord Kimberley's personal acquaintance with Cetshwayo prevented his altogether taking Sir Henry Bulwer's view,† or perhaps he saw that the latter's propositions would make the whole restoration a farce. At all events Her Majesty's Government demurred to their being carried out in their entirety, and the Earl of Kimberley writes on Nov. 30th [3466, p. 216]:—

“Proceeding on the principle that no more country should be reserved than is necessary to enable us to fulfil our obligations to the chiefs and people unwilling to remain in Cetshwayo's territory, Her Majesty's Government came to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to reserve more than the country now under the

* It was through the S.N.A. that Sir Henry Bulwer obtained most of the false reports of the Bishop of Natal's actions, which the Governor accepted so readily and forwarded so diligently. But Mr. Shepstone's official word is of so little value after his official conviction of repeated falsehoods in 1874 that it is not worth while to consider in detail accusations which are made solely through him.

† Sir Henry Bulwer never saw Cetshwayo. He did not even visit Oude-Molen on his way through the Cape to Natal in 1882, when it might have been supposed that he would be anxious to obtain as much direct knowledge of the Zulu King as possible, in view of his proposed restoration. This fact in itself was prophetic of the spirit in which he would carry out, or rather mar, the *intended* restoration.

chiefs Dunn and Hlubi, especially as a large tract of country is to be assigned to Zibebu." And his Lordship further remarks that it does not "appear to Her Majesty's Government to be possible to conclude with any certainty, until Cetshwayo is actually restored, that your view that many Zulus will be compelled to leave the country replaced under his rule is well founded" [*ibid.*, para. 10, No. 114].

Well would it have been for all concerned had the Home Authorities but acted fully on this their just view of the case: had they refused to allow any but a *temporary* line to be fixed, and insisted upon an accurate report of the numbers who *desired* to be protected from Cetshwayo's rule, before making any final decision about the partition line.

Sir Henry Bulwer's elaborate plans [*ibid.*, para. 22] for the government of the "Zulu Native Reserve" * are temporarily put aside in the following sentence:—

"So much must depend on the numbers and character of the chiefs and people who may elect not to remain under Cetshwayo's rule, that it seems to Her Majesty's Government that it would be premature at once to settle the details of the administration of this Reserve. It will be sufficient at present to appoint a Resident Commissioner, with the general functions described by you, to take the necessary preliminary steps."

It is to be observed, also, that while in all Sir Henry Bulwer's many pages he puts forward solely and repeatedly the necessity of protecting Zibebu and others from injury at the hands of Cetshwayo, Lord Kimberley manifestly looks at the other side of the matter as well. While plainly putting a certain confidence (markedly absent from the Governor's despatches) in Cetshwayo's [para. 21] "engagement

* The title finally selected.

not to transgress the limits assigned to him," he remarks that "the position of Dunn . . . would be such as to render it not difficult to prevent him from giving cause of offence to Cetshwayo, more especially as it appears from your report that he has little or no hold upon the Zulus living in his country" [para. 13].

He also negatives a suggestion made by Sir Henry Bulwer of further conditions to be imposed on the King, saying:—

"I do not see any sufficient ground for varying the other conditions* communicated to him (the King) in England. They were well considered at the time, and having been agreed to by Cetshwayo, it is better that, unless for any very special reason, they should not now be varied" [para. 15].

In fact the entire despatch is in keeping with the treatment of the Zulu King during his English visit, and shows plainly enough that the Home Government intended rightly by him, and by the Zulu people, and that those are responsible for the lamentable results of England's well-meant efforts, who deceived her and her Government by the following devices:—

1st. By making it (falsely) appear that Cetshwayo was not well received by the majority of the Zulu nation.

2nd. By making it (falsely) appear that the Zulus resident in the Reserve were satisfied with the new arrangement, and that their remaining on their own land proved the fact, and by coercing them to produce that effect.

* The additional condition here permitted is that recognising Zibebu's territory as an independent one.

3rd. By making it (falsely) appear that Cetshwayo had broken his engagements, and had collected *impis* to attack Hamu and Zibebu, whereas he scrupulously kept his promises to the day of his death, and the Zulus who gathered around him did so to protect him from Zibebu's threatened attack, which nevertheless took place, unhappily, at an unguarded moment.

4th. And, finally, by preventing the truth on all these points being made known, by the unjust persecution of the only editor* in Natal who dared and desired to tell the truth, and by the introduction of the Bill known in Natal as the "Colenso Extinction Bill," and which although never made law in the form in which it passed the Legislative Council of Natal,† has had by the working of native law the effect mainly desired by those who framed it, namely, that of suppressing the truth in Zulu matters.


These are four very serious accusations, but each one of them will be made good in the following chapters of this work.

It may reasonably be assumed that when Cetshwayo was in England, and the conditions of his return were framed, the authorities there had no idea of depriving him of so large a part of his kingdom as "the country now under Dunn and Hlubi," especially as Sir Garnet Wolseley had been pleased to make over

* Mr. R. F. Statham, Editor of the *Natal Witness*.

† "Any person who shall knowingly harbour any" Zulu coming from Zululand without permission and a "pass" from a Government official, "shall be liable on conviction to be imprisoned for a term not exceeding three months, with or without hard labour, or, at the discretion of the Court, to a penalty not exceeding ten pounds."

to Dunn in 1879, so large a portion of Zululand, including the best and richest part of it; but Sir Henry Bulwer's audacious proposal that half (and the best half) should be retained, would almost seem to have taken their breath away, and to have induced



XIX Beacon No. 19 C Cetschwayo in 1883 R. Reserve
 Z. Zibebu T. Country restored to the Tongas
 D The part of Zululand claimed by the Boers, adjudged to the Zulus in 1878 by British Commissioners, but made over to the Transvaal (then under British Rule) by Sir Garnet Wolseley after the War.

them to allow a partition, moderate in comparison with that displayed in Diagram No. 1, but still depriving the King of far more territory than can well have been contemplated in the first instance by Her Majesty's Government.

The boundaries finally fixed ran as given above, Diagram No. 3. To what a fraction of his kingdom

Cetshwayo was allowed to return may be best understood by a reference to this Diagram, which shows Zululand as it was just before the invasion of 1879, with the portion restored to him in 1883.

It was apparently simply on the principle of taking as much as possible from Cetshwayo that Sir Henry Bulwer made the Tongas a free gift of their country. There are no records of their ever having desired it, or of their ever having objected to being tributary to Cetshwayo, which state, as they were but a small tribe, had its advantages as well as its drawbacks, for it gave them a right to his protection in case of attack from the tribes beyond them. There are no signs even that the Tongas were consulted in the matter.

By this means Sir Henry Bulwer was again procuring those elements of discord which were the worst characteristics of Sir Garnet Wolseley's settlement, and on which the former himself lays great stress in his Report [3466, p. 138], speaking of "the weakness arising from the want of a duly recognised and adequate paramount authority,"* to his arguments on which point Lord Kimberley assents, pointing out that as Her Majesty's Government will not undertake to annex Zululand, "the only alterna-

* Sir Henry Bulwer appears to have foreseen that the same objection would be raised to his new settlement, for he gives an elaborate explanation beforehand of what he conceives to be the difference between the two. His argument sounds very like a riddle, and one which is quite beyond the comprehension of most people. ". . . By *paramount* authority," he says [*ibid.*, p. 139], "I do not necessarily mean *central* authority. . . . Supposing the paramount authority had been retained in the hands of the British Government under the settlement, it would have been paramount authority over every one of the thirteen states, individually and

tive which remained was the restoration, partial or complete, of Cetshwayo" [*ibid.*, p. 216, para. 5].

The closing phrase of the Earl of Kimberley's summary No. 115, "I concluded by instructing you to proceed with the restoration of Cetshwayo with as little delay as possible" [*ibid.*, p. 218], was plainly not a direction with which Sir Henry Bulwer was at all inclined to comply. The King had already been kept at his old prison, Oude-Molen, for more than two months when the above was telegraphed,* and he was left there still for another month.† Meanwhile, the Governor of Natal worked on with a perseverance worthy of a better cause. His suggestions for supplementary conditions had been put aside, except in the case of the supremely mischievous one of Zibebu's independence, into permitting which the Home Government was misled. But that was no reason for giving them up, and by dint of determination Sir Henry Bulwer succeeded in obtaining permission to "require Cetshwayo to engage that he will not punish girls of the royal house who have married during his absence from Zululand, and also

separately, and not a central authority over the whole Zulu country, although in that case the paramount authority, happening to be centred in the same hands, might have had the appearance of being a central authority."

* From September 24th to November 30th, 1882.

† Cetshwayo landed at Port Durnford January 11th, 1883. It is difficult to understand what the delay was for, as absolutely nothing was done in Zululand. Apparently Sir Henry Bulwer required the three months, as remarked by a local paper at the time, "to write his report on the affairs of the country which he has declined to visit."

that a general immunity shall be secured to all persons from molestation for acts done during that period” [3466, p. 219].

These conditions may be called rather an insult than an injury to Cetshwayo. Their framer assumed (as usual) the King’s alleged cruel and bloodthirsty disposition, and wilfully overlooked the many proofs of his kindhearted and forgiving character which had been obtained since 1879.* The conditions were totally unnecessary, and had there been the smallest doubt upon the point, Cetshwayo’s kind friend Sir Hercules Robinson might have been requested to ascertain what were the King’s precise views on these subjects, and they would have proved to be all that could be desired.

These two additional conditions Sir Henry Bulwer sent to Sir Hercules Robinson for Cetshwayo to sign. “I telegraph these conditions so that your Excellency may, should you see fit, communicate with Cetshwayo without waiting for my despatch. If you think that conditions should be put in another form, please alter.”

* No one can read Cetshwayo’s letters respecting the girls of the household without feeling satisfied of his right feeling about them, and surely some arrangement might have been made to release those who had been seized and appropriated by Zibebu, Hamu, &c., without their own or their parents’ consent. English readers would naturally gather from the official way of speaking that Cetshwayo’s downfall released a number of girls to follow their own inclinations in the choice of husbands, but in point of fact most of those who had married during his absence were forced into bonds which they and their parents regarded as degrading. Sir Henry Bulwer’s fresh condition simply protected certain of the appointed chiefs from being called upon, at the instance of the parents, to set free the women they had tyrannically seized upon.

By an error in deciphering this message the words "Her Majesty's Government" were substituted for "Cetshwayo," and Sir Hercules Robinson replies at once, "As I have no responsibility whatever for the settlement determined on, I do not intend to avail myself of the opportunity which you so kindly afford me of communicating with Her Majesty's Government."

The touch of severity in this answer had, probably a deeper and worthier cause than can be explained by the error in the message, for Sir Hercules Robinson knew something of Cetshwayo, and those who have had the welfare of the Zulu King and people most truly at heart, have often thought that very different might have been the result had his restoration been placed in the hands of the Governor of the Cape.

But Sir Henry Bulwer was not alone in working out plans by which the well-conceived scheme of the Home Government for the redemption of Zululand was thwarted, and made to bring about the complete ruin of that unhappy country. Plainly he was thoroughly imbued with the old Shepstonian idea of the Black Kingdom, although, of course, he had his own particular version of it. Circumstances favoured the first move in that direction, though that was not the case for very long. The belief in the name of Shepstone which Cetshwayo had cherished for so many years, clung to him still, in spite of every disappointment, and, no doubt, he was wise enough to see that it would be well for him and for his people if Sir T. Shepstone would consent to stand their

friend. While he was still at Melbury Road a letter was written for the King to Lord Kimberley requesting that Zulus visiting Natal should be received by Sir T. Shepstone, of whom the King was represented as saying [3466, p. 93], "he knows all the affairs of my country. . . . I want Sir T. Shepstone to take care of me, and to be my mouth in Natal." A copy of the letter was forwarded to Sir Henry Bulwer with the remark [*ibid.*, p. 114]—

"It is of course impossible that this request should be complied with in the form in which it is made, but I would suggest that it might be desirable for you to consult with Sir Theophilus Shepstone as to many details of the new settlement of the country, and I should wish you to consider whether Sir Theophilus would not be the most suitable person to conduct Cetshwayo back to Zululand when the time comes for his restoration."

This was another fatal mistake. Sir T. Shepstone had said [2695, p. 67], June 4th, 1880, "I look upon the restoration of Cetshwayo as certain to produce most disastrous consequences;"* and Sir Henry

* Sir T. Shepstone spoke of Cetshwayo as "the representative of the sentiment, and of all those that cherish it in South Africa, that is opposed to civilisation, Christianity, and progress," which no one who knows anything of the Zulu King will now credit, unless "civilisation" by means of the "grog-shop," Christianity enforced at the point of the bayonet, and "progress" in the acquirement of the vices of the lower classes in a civilised nation are implied. Cetshwayo, naturally sagacious—*wise*, even, it may be said—as he was, could only judge of what he knew, and, being illiterate, he had not the means of knowing how little the Shepstones were really his friends. Could he have read the "memorandum" by Sir T. Shepstone, in question, he would never have said, "I want Sir T. Shepstone to take care of me, and to be my mouth in Natal," and to take advantage of his ignorance of the

Bulwer quoting the above passage in his Report of August 1882, says [3466, p. 144], "I have reason to believe that Sir T. Shepstone has not changed the views he then expressed. He certainly has not modified them."* How was it possible that any scheme should prosper the execution of which was left entirely in the hands of men who had strongly protested against it, who had staked their credit on its being certain to produce disastrous consequences, and who had never by so much as a word shown the least sign of an intention to bend their own views to those of the Government they served? With Sir Henry Bulwer's convictions, and Sir T. Shepstone's inclinations it was impossible that they should carry

other's real sentiments concerning him was as unfair in those who were aware of them as was the triumphant quotation of his words [3466, p. 138] condemning Sitimela, and approving Dunn's action towards that chief, which were spoken after hearing only the garbled official account of those proceedings (to be found in Blue Book 3466), an official report of which alone could reach his ears.

* Sir Henry Bulwer here speaks of Sir T. Shepstone as "one who during a long lifetime has had opportunities of knowing the native races of South Africa such, perhaps, as no one else had, who was engaged for more than forty years in active responsible relations with them, and whose judgment in all matters relating to them is beyond dispute" [2222, p. 175 and elsewhere]. That he could say this, and that the Home Government should act upon it is truly amazing, when it is remembered that Sir T. Shepstone had shown in 1878 the most absolute and, as it happened, fatal ignorance with regard to the whole Zulu question; that his Transvaal policy had been condemned and reversed; and, to go further back, that the same can be said of the native policy of 1873, for which he was far more responsible than was Sir B. Pine, although, as usual, the latter was made the scapegoat in that affair.

out successfully the policy entrusted to them, and its failure was a certainty from the moment Cetshwayo's restoration was confided to them. In truth he never was restored, and it is from that fact that all the bloodshed and misery of 1883-4 in Zululand has resulted.

In accordance with his instructions to consult Sir T. Shepstone Sir Henry Bulwer sent him a copy of his long despatch of October 3rd on his proposed new settlement of the Zulu country "for the benefit of his remarks and suggestions," and Sir T. Shepstone in return expresses his warm approval of the whole, saying [3466, p. 221]: "I have no criticism to offer; I think that the despatch is as complete as under the circumstances it can be made." This, be it remembered, was the despatch curtailing to the utmost Cetshwayo's territory and power, of much of which the Home Government were bound to disapprove. Sir T. Shepstone confines his further remarks to two points. The first is the proposed rate of annual hut tax, which in the official mind was already imposed upon the Zulus resident in the proposed Reserve, and to which Sir T. Shepstone objects, being of opinion that it should not be lower than that levied in Natal, "which," he says, "produces so handsome and unfailing a revenue" for that Colony.*

His second suggestion is a very mysterious one.

* How much of it is used for their own benefit, and what would the Natal Government do without it, if the natives left the colony?

It is that the proposed amount of the Resident's salary,* 1000*l.*, is, in his opinion,

“much below what he will require for his actual subsistence, to say nothing of the expenses incidental to his position, that he will continually be put to; a few years' occupation of such a position with such a salary would ruin any man not possessed of ample private funds, and these it would be scarcely fair to expect an officer to sacrifice for the good of the public service.”

The “expenses incidental to the Resident's position” were additionally provided for in Sir Henry Bulwer's estimate in the despatch on which Sir T. Shepstone is commenting, to the extent of 1968*l.*, [3466, p. 238] and as the utmost amount of “entertainment” possible at the Residency for many years to come would be an occasional beef-eating, it is not easy to see how he could be expected to expend even the 1000*l.* per annum, which Sir T. Shepstone thought far too little, living in the simple manner which would be natural and suitable to the country.

In spite of the repeated directions received from Downing Street that no more time should be lost, it was not until December 4th that Sir Henry Bulwer wrote to Mr. Osborn [3466, p. 251]:—

“I have now received the final instructions of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and I *hasten* † to acquaint you with the nature of the arrangements which they have determined upon.”

And after doing so, he continues [*ibid.*, p. 252]:—

“It will be necessary that you forthwith communicate the deci-

* The salaries of the Secretary for Native Affairs, and of the Judge of the Native High Court (Mr. H. Shepstone and Mr. J. Shepstone) are 800*l.* respectively, and naturally there are in Natal much greater opportunities for spending than there could be in Zululand.

† Author's italics

sion of Her Majesty's Government and the reasons for it (!) to the several Zulu chiefs and headmen and to such other people *as you may judge convenient.*" *

While leaving the mode of communication to Mr. Osborn's judgment, Sir Henry Bulwer requests him to bear

"strictly in mind the necessity there is for the announcement being made without delay, and that it is of the greatest importance that the changes which are about to be introduced shall be widely and fully made known and explained to the people throughout the country."

That these instructions were very inadequately carried out is plain from the fact, since placed beyond dispute, that the greater portion of the Zulus did not know of the King's approach until after he had landed, which was one of the reasons why his enemies were able for the moment to telegraph to England that Cetshwayo had but a poor reception from his people. It is probable, however, that there was more to blame in the vagueness of the notice given as to time and place, than in the lack of the actual announcement. The Zulus may have been generally told that the King was to be restored on such and such conditions, but the majority certainly did not know to a day, or even to a week, when he might be reasonably expected, and without some very explicit information of this sort they would naturally be apt to take general news from the Government, in whom they had had such frequent cause to be disappointed, with "a grain of salt."

Mr. Osborn announces on the 10th December that he was sent to summon "the different appointed

* Author's italics.

chiefs," and also "the chiefs of tribes and headmen" to come before him without delay to receive the communications I have been instructed to make to them" [3466, p. 284]. Umfanawendhlela was the first to come, and he, of course, "regretted the decision." "I was appointed by the Government," he says [*ibid.*, p. 280], "and have not transgressed the laws (conditions) under which I accepted my appointment."* Nevertheless, he does not appear to have had any dread of the King, though he objects to losing his "appointed" position of dignity, for he continues:—

" . . . It is good of the Queen to restore the King, as he is the son of my sister. I am glad that he is returning, but I cannot remain under him. I wish to go into the territory reserved by Government, not immediately, however, but soon after the King comes, as I wish to greet him first."

This, at all events, does not look like the terror and consternation predicted by Sir Henry Bulwer, and, in point of fact, Mfanawendhlela never took the trouble to remove, and had he done so, would probably have gone with his family alone.†

Hlubi was spoken to next, and he replied, as he was sure to do: "I belong to the Government, and so does the country. I am satisfied with what the Government thinks it necessary to do in the country, I have nothing more to say about it." But, as the

* He was in fact, it must be borne in mind, *the only one of the chiefs* unfavourable to Cetshwayo's return of whom this could be said.

† Mr. Osborn says that he "pointed out that he (Mfanawendhlela) had hitherto been utterly unable to exercise efficient control in his territory.

writer can affirm from personal and satisfactory information, he would have been quite content to come under Cetshwayo's rule, had it been so arranged.

Siwunguza and Chingwayo are represented as asserting that they would not live under Cetshwayo, and would move into the Reserve, but, like Mfanawendhlela, they never carried out their intentions, and, like him, they had little influence in their territories.*

Umgitywa, while saying that he would prefer to reside in the Reserve, expresses himself in a way which leads one to wish for a Zulu copy of what he said. His speech ends with, "The country belongs to the Government, who has a right to bring back the King into it. *I thank the Government.*"

These are the three of whom the Zulus usually spoke as being *weak-kneed*, without the courage of their opinions, which yet, but for white influence, would have inclined to the King, for whom they had all three "prayed" more than once.

Hamu's representative said merely: "Hamu has no people of his own tribe; the people belong chiefly to Umtshegula. Hamu will not remain under the King." † But we are not told what Umtshegula and his people say, although the chief is mentioned as present.

Seketwayo, Faku-ka-Ziningo, Umgojana, and

* Chingwayo was afterwards killed, while in attendance on the King, in Zibebu's attack upon the latter at Ulundi.

† This was not surprising, seeing what atrocious actions Hamu had committed. The slaughter of 1200 of Cetshwayo's most faithful friends being only one of his evil deeds.