

hannesburg, a city of one hundred thousand population, has no municipal government, although several attempts have been made to establish one.

The Raads are burdened with the necessity of attending to all the details which govern the administration of every city, village, hamlet, and district in the entire country, and the time consumed in doing all this leaves little for the weightier affairs of state. If a five-dollar road bridge is required in an out-of-the-way place in the northern part of the republic, the Raad is obliged to discuss the matter. If an application for a liquor license comes from a distant point in the interior, the Raad is compelled to investigate its character before it can be voted upon. The disadvantages of this system are so evident that it is hardly conceivable that no remedy has been applied long ago, but the fear of local mismanagement has prevented the Raad from ridding itself of this encumbrance upon its time and patience.

Every legislature of whatever country has its idiosyncracies, and the Raad is no excep-

tion. Laws are upon the statute books of some of the American States that are quite as remarkable as some of those made by the Boer legislators. Bills quite as marvellous have been introduced and defeated in the legislatures of all countries. The Boer Volksraad has no monopoly of men with quaint ideas. The examples of Raad workmanship here given are rare, but true nevertheless:

A man named Dums, whose big farm on the border became British territory through a treaty, sued the Transvaal Government for damages, whereupon the Raad passed a law that Dums could never sue the Government for anything. The High Court sustained the law, and Dums is now a poor cab-driver in Pretoria. Another man sued the Government for damages for injuries resulting from a fall in the street. He was successful in his suit, but the Raad immediately thereafter passed a law making it impossible for any person to sue the Government for injuries received on public property.

During a severe drought in the Transvaal an American professional rain-maker asked the

Raad for a concession allowing him the exclusive privilege to precipitate rain by means of explosives in the air. The Raad had a long and animated discussion on the subject, owing to the opposition of several of the less enlightened members, who declared that the project was sacrilegious. "It is a sin," they declared, "to poke your fingers in the Lord's eye to make him weep." The abiding faith which some of the Raad members have in divine guidance is illustrated by a discussion that took place in the body shortly after the Jameson raid. One member declared that "the Lord will assist us in this matter if we will only bide our time," whereupon another member rose and said, "If we do not soon get down to business and do something without the Lord's assistance, the Lord will take a holiday and let the Transvaal go to hell." A law which was in effect for almost two years made it a misdemeanour for any one to sing "God save the Queen" or "Rule Britannia" in the country. Mass meetings are prohibited in the Transvaal, but Germany and other countries with less political foment have

equally stringent regulations on the same subject, so the Uitlanders' grievance on that account is nullified.

Second to that of the Volksraad, the highest power in the Government of the country is the High Court, which is composed of some of the ablest jurists in South Africa. From a constitutional standpoint the High Court has no right or power to review the acts of the Volksraad. The Constitution of the country gives supreme power to the Volksraad in all legislative matters, and when a chief justice of the High Court recently attempted to extend his jurisdiction over the acts of the Volksraad that body unceremoniously dismissed him. The purpose of that part of the Constitution which relates to the subjugation of the High Court is to prevent some influential enemy of the republic from debauching the High Court and in that way defying the authority of the Volksraad. In a country which has so many peculiar conditions and circumstances to contend with, the safety of its institutions depends upon the centralization of its legislative and administrative branches, and the wisdom

of the early burghers who framed the Constitution so that the entire governing power lay in the hands of the country's real patriots has been amply demonstrated upon several occasions.

The civil and criminal laws of the country are administered throughout the different political divisions by local magistrates, called land-drosts, who also collect the revenues of the district and inform the Volksraad of the needs of the people under their jurisdiction. The land-drost is the prototype of the old-time American country squire, in that he settles disputes, awards damages, and conducts official business generally. In the majority of cases the land-drosts are aged persons who have the respect and esteem of the members of the community in which they dwell and to whom they bear the relation of fatherly advisers in all things. In Johannesburg and Pretoria the land-drosts are men of eminent station in the legal profession of South Africa, and are drawn from all parts of the country, regardless of their political or racial qualifications. All the court proceedings are conducted

in the Dutch language, and none but Dutch-speaking lawyers are admitted to practise before the bar. The law of the land is Holland-Roman.

The military branch of the Government is undoubtedly the best and most effective because it is the simplest. It is almost primitive in its simplicity, yet for effectiveness its superior is not easily found. The Transvaal glories in its army, and, as every man between the ages of sixteen and sixty is a nominal member of the army, nothing is left undone to make it worthy of its glory. The standing army of the republic numbers less than two hundred men, and these are not always actively engaged. A detachment of about twenty soldiers is generally on duty in the vicinity of the Government House at Pretoria, and the others are stationed at the different forts throughout the republic. The real army of the Transvaal, however, is composed of the volunteer soldiers, who can be mobilized with remarkable facility.

The head of the army is the commandant-general, who has his headquarters in Pretoria.

He is under the immediate jurisdiction of the Volksraad and the President, who have the power to declare war and direct its conduct. Second in authority to the commandant-general are the commandants, permanent officials who have charge of the military affairs of the seventeen districts of the republic. Under the old South African burgher law each commandant in any emergency "commandeers" a certain portion of men from his district.

The various districts are subdivided into divisions in charge of field-cornets and assistant field-cornets. As soon as the commandant-general issues an order for the mobilization of the volunteer army the commandants and their assistants, the field-cornets, speedily go from one house to another in their districts and summon the burghers from their homes. When the burgher receives the call, he provides his own gun, horse, and forage, and hastens to the district rendezvous, where he places himself under the orders of the field-cornet. After all the burghers of the district have gathered together, the body proceeds into an adjoining district, where it

joins the forces that have been similarly mobilized there. As a certain number of districts are obliged to join their forces at a defined locality, the forces of the republic are consequently divided into different army divisions under the supervisions of the commandants.

In the event that Pretoria were threatened with attack, the order would be given to move all the forces to that city. The districts on the border would gather their men and march toward Pretoria, carrying with them all the forces of the districts through which they were obliged to pass. So simple and perfect is the system that within forty-eight hours after the call is issued by the commandant-general four army divisions, representing the districts in the four quarters of the republic and consisting of all the able-bodied men in the country, can be mobilized on the outskirts of Pretoria. It is doubtful whether there is another nation on earth that can gather its entire fighting strength at its seat of government in such a brief time.

The Transvaal Boer is constantly prepared for the call to arms. He has his own rifle



and ammunition at his home, and when the call comes he need only bridle his horse—if he is so fortunate as to possess an animal so rare in the Transvaal—stuff several pounds of biltong, or dried beef, in his pockets, and commence the march over the veldt to the district rendezvous. He can depend upon his wife and children to care for the flocks and herds; but if the impending danger appears to be great; the cattle are deserted and the women and children are taken to a rendezvous specially planned for such an emergency. If there is a need, the Boer woman will stand side by side with her husband or her brother or her sweetheart, and will allow no one to surpass her in repelling the attacks of the enemy. Joan of Arcs have been as numerous in the Boer armies as they have been unheralded.

The head of the military branch of the Transvaal Government for many years has been Commandant-General P. J. Joubert, who, following President Kruger, is the ablest as well as the most popular Boer in South Africa. General Joubert is the best type of the Boer fighter in the country, and as he represents

the army, he has always been a favourite with the class which would rather decide a disputed point by means of the rifle than by diplomacy, as practised by President Kruger. General Joubert, although the head of the army, is not of a quarrelsome disposition, and he too believes in the peaceful arbitration of differences rather than a resort to arms. By the Uitlanders he is considered to be the most liberal Boer in the republic, and he has upon numerous occasions shown that he would treat the newcomers in the country with more leniency than the Kruger Government if he were in power.

In his capacity of Vice-President of the republic he has been as impotent as the Vice-President is in the United States, but his influence has always been wielded with a view of harmonizing the differences of the native and alien populations. Twice the more liberal and progressive party of the Boers has put him forward as a candidate for the presidency in opposition to Mr. Kruger, and each time he has been defeated by only a small majority. The younger Boers who have come in touch

with the more modern civilization have steadfastly supported General Joubert, while the older Boers, who are ever fearful that any one but Mr. Kruger would grant too many concessions to the Uitlanders, have wielded their influence against him. Concerning the franchise for Uitlanders, General Joubert is more liberal than President Kruger, who holds that the stability of the Government depends upon the exclusiveness of the franchise privilege. General Joubert believes that there are many persons among the Uitlanders who have a real desire to become citizens of the republic and to take part in the government. He believes that an intending burgher should take an oath of fidelity, and afterward be prepared to do what he can for the country, either in peace or war. If after three or four years the applicant for the franchise has shown that he worked in the interests of the country and obeyed its laws, General Joubert believes that the Uitlander should enjoy all the privileges that a native burgher enjoys—namely, voting for the candidates for the presidency and the First Volksraad.

General Joubert's name has been connected with Transvaal history almost as long and as prominently as that of President Kruger. The two men are virtually the fathers of the Boer republic. General Joubert has always been the man who fought the battles with armies, while Mr. Kruger conducted the diplomatic battles, and both were equally successful in their parts. General Joubert, as a youth among the early trekkers from Natal, was reared amid warfare. During the Transvaal's early battles with the natives he was a volunteer soldier under the then Commandant-General Kruger, and later, when the war of independence was fought, he became General Joubert. He commanded the forces which fought the battles of Laing's Nek, Bronkhorst Spruit, and Majuba Hill, and he was one of the triumvirate that conducted the affairs of the Government during that crucial time. He has been Vice-President of the republic since the independence of the country has been re-established, and conducted the affairs of the army during the time when Jameson's troopers threatened the safety of the country. He has had a not-

able career in the service of his country, and as a reward for his services he is deserving of nothing less than the presidency of the republic after Mr. Kruger's life-work is ended.

General Joubert is no less distinguished as a diplomatist among his countrymen than President Kruger, and many stories are current in Pretoria showing that he has been able to accomplish many things wherein Mr. Kruger failed. An incident which occurred immediately after the Jameson raid, and which is repeated here exactly as related by one of the participants of the affair, is illustrative of General Joubert and his methods of dealing with his own people. The story is given in almost the exact language of the narrator who was the eyewitness:

“Shortly after Jameson and his officers were brought to Pretoria, President Kruger called about twenty of the Boer commanders to his house for a consultation. The townspeople were highly excited, and the presence of the men who had tried to destroy the republic aggravated their condition so that there were few calm minds in the capital. President

Kruger was deeply affected by the seriousness of the events of the days before, but counselled all those present to be calm. There were some in the gathering who advised that Jameson and his men should be shot immediately, while one man jocosely remarked that they should not be treated so leniently, and suggested that a way to make them suffer would be to cut off their ears.

“One of the men who was obliged to leave the meeting gave this account to the waiting throngs in the street, and a few hours afterward the cable had carried the news to Europe and America, with the result that the Boers were called brutal and inhuman. President Kruger used all his influence and eloquence to save the lives of the prisoners, and for a long time he was unsuccessful in securing the smallest amount of sympathy for Jameson and his men. It was dawn when General Joubert was won to the President's way of thinking, and he continued the argument in behalf of the prisoners.

“‘My friends, I will ask you to listen patiently to me for several minutes,’ he com-

menced. 'I will tell you the story of the farmer and the neighbour's dog. Suppose that near your farm lives a man whose valuable dogs attack your sheep and kill many. Will you shoot the dogs as soon as you see them, and in that way make yourself liable for damages greater than the value of the sheep that were destroyed? Or will you catch the dogs when you are able to do so and, carrying them to your neighbour, say to him: "I have caught your dogs; now pay me for the damage they have done me, and they shall be returned to you."'

"After a moment's silence General Joubert's face lighted up joyfully, and he exclaimed:

"'We have the neighbour's dogs in the jail. What shall we do with them?'

"The parable was effective, and the council of war decided almost instantly to deliver the prisoners to the British Government."

## CHAPTER IX

### CAUSES OF THE PRESENT DISSENSIONS

THE politicians and the speculators have been the bane of South Africa. Ill-informed secretaries of the British Colonial Office might augment the list, but their stupidity in treating with colonial grievances is so proverbial as to admit them to the rank of natural or providential causes of dissension. Until the Boer Government came into the foreground, the politicians and speculators used South Africa as a huge chessboard, whereon they could manipulate the political and commercial affairs of hundreds of thousands of persons to suit their own fancies and convenience.

It was a *dilettante* politician who operated in South Africa and could not make a cat's-paw of the colonial secretary in Downing Street, and it was a stupid speculator who was unable to be the power behind the enthroned poli-



tician. And South Africa has been the victim. Hundreds of men have gone to South Africa and have become millionaires, but thousands remain in the country praying for money wherewith to return home. The former are the politicians and the speculators; the latter are the miners, the workmen, and the tradespeople.

It is a country where the man with a million becomes a multimillionaire, and the man with hundreds becomes penniless. It is the wealthy man's footstool and the poor man's cemetery. Men go there to acquire riches; few go there to assist in making it tenable for white men. Thousands go there with the avowed intention of making their fortunes and then to return. Those who go there as came the immigrants to America—to settle and develop the new country—can be counted only by the score. Of the million white people south of the Zambezi, probably one half are mere fortune-seekers, who would leave the country the very instant they secured a moderate fortune.


These have the welfare of the country at heart only in so far as it interferes or assists them in attaining their desired goal. They

would ask that Portugal be allowed to rule all of South Africa if they received the assurance that the much-sought-after fortune could be secured six months sooner. They have no conscience other than that which prevents them from stabbing a man to relieve him of his money. They go to the gold and diamond fields to secure wealth, and not to assist in developing law and order, good government, or good institutions.

The other half of the white population is composed of men and women who were born in the country — Afrikanders, Dutch, Boers, and other racial representatives, and others who have emigrated thither from the densely populated countries of Europe, with the intention of remaining in the country and taking part in its government and institutions. These classes comprise the South Africans, who love their country and take a real interest in its development and progress. They know its needs and prospects, and are abundantly able to conduct its government so that it will benefit Boer, Englishman, Dutchman, Natalian, and native.

The defects in the Government of Cape Col-

ony and Natal are the natural results of the handicaps that have been placed on the local legislation by the Colonial Office in London, who are as ignorant of the real conditions of their colonies as a Zulu chieftain is of the political situation in England. The colonial papers teem with letters from residents who express their indignation at the methods employed by the Colonial Office in dealing with colonial affairs. Especially is this the case in Natal, the Eden of South Africa, where the dealings of the Colonial Office with regard to the Zulus have been stupidly carried on. South African men of affairs who are not bigoted do not hesitate to express their opinion that Cape Colony and Natal have been retarded a quarter of a century in their natural growth by the handicap of the Colonial Office. Their opinion is based upon the fact that every war, with the exception of several native outbreaks, has been caused by blundering in the Colonial Office, and that all the wars have retarded the natural growth and development of the colonies to an aggregate of twenty-five years. In this estimate is not included the great harm



Cape Colony Government House, at Cape Town.

to industries that has been caused by the score or more of heavy war clouds with which the country has been darkened during the last half century. These being some of the difficulties with which the two British colonies in South Africa are beset, it can be readily inferred to what extent the Boers of the Transvaal have had cause for grievance. In their dealings with the Boers the British have invariably assumed the rôle of aristocrats, and have looked upon and treated the "trekkers" as *sans-culottes*.

This natural antipathy of one race for another has given glorious opportunities for strife, and neither one nor the other has ever failed to take quick advantage. The struggle between the Boers and the British began in Cape Colony almost one hundred years ago, and it has continued, with varying degrees of bitterness, until the present day. The recent disturbances in the Transvaal affairs date from the conclusion of the war of independence in 1881. When the Peace Commissioners met there was inserted in the treaty one small clause which gave to England her only right to interfere in the political affairs of the Transvaal.

The Boer country at that time was considered of such little worth that Gladstone declared it was not of sufficient value to be honoured with a place under the British flag. To the vast majority of the British people it was a matter of indifference whether the Transvaal was an independent country or a dependency of their own Government. The clause which was allowed to enter the treaty unnoticed, and which during recent years has figured so prominently in the discussions of South African affairs, reads:

“The South African Republic will conclude no treaty or engagement with any state or nation other than the Orange Free State, nor with any native tribe to the eastward or the westward of the republic, until the same has been approved by her Majesty the Queen. Such approval shall be considered to have been granted if her Majesty's Government shall not, within six months after receiving a copy of such treaty (which shall be delivered to them immediately upon its completion), have notified that the conclusion of the treaty is in conflict with the interests of Great Britain, or of

any of her Majesty's possessions in South Africa."

When the contents of the treaty were published to the Boer people, many of them objected strongly to this clause, and insisted that it gave the British too great power in the affairs of the republic, and a strenuous effort was made to have the offending clause eliminated. In the year 1883 a deputation, which included Paul Kruger, was sent to London, with a view of obtaining the abolition of the suzerainty. This deputation negotiated a new convention the following year, from which the word "suzerainty" and the stipulations in regard thereto were removed. In their report to the Volksraad, made in 1884, the deputation stated that the new convention put an end to the British suzerainty.

February 4, 1884, in a letter to Lord Derby, then in charge of British affairs, the deputation announced to him that they expected an agreement to be contained in the treaty relative to the abolition of the suzerainty. In his reply of a week later, Lord Derby made a statement upon which the Boers base their strong-

est claim that the suzerainty was abolished. He said:

“By the omission of those articles of the convention of Pretoria which assigned to her Majesty and to the British resident certain specific powers and functions connected with the internal government and the foreign relations of the Transvaal state, your Government will be left free to govern the country without interference, and to conduct its diplomatic intercourse and shape its foreign policy, subject only to the requirement embodied in the fourth article of the new draft, that any treaty with a foreign state shall not have effect without the approval of the Queen.”

For a period of almost ten years the suzerainty of England over the Transvaal was an unknown quantity. With the exception of several Government officials, there were hardly any Englishmen in the country, and no one had the slightest interest in the affairs of the Transvaal Government. When gold was discovered in the Randt in quantities that equalled those of the early days of the California gold fields, an unparalleled influx of Englishmen and



foreigners followed, and in several years the city of Johannesburg had sprung up in the veldt.

The opening of hundreds of mines, and the consequent increase in expenditures, made it necessary for the Transvaal Government to increase its revenues. Mining laws had to be formulated, new offices had to be created, hundreds of new officials had to be appointed, and all this required the expenditure of more money in one year than the Government had spent in a decade before the opening of the mines. The Government found itself in a quandary, and it solved the problem of finances as many a stronger and wealthier government has done.

Concessions were granted to dynamite, railway, electric light, electric railway, water, and many other companies, and these furnished to the Government the nucleus upon which depended its financial existence. Few of the concessions were obtained by British subjects, and when the monopolies took advantage of their opportunities, and raised the price of dynamite and the rates for carrying freight, the Englishmen, who owned all the mines, natu-

rally objected. The Boer Government, having bound itself hand and foot when hard pressed for money, was unable to compel the concessionaries to reduce their rates.

At that period of the Randt's existence the speculators appeared, and soon thereafter the London Stock Exchange became a factor in the affairs of the Randt. Where the Stock Exchange leads, the politicians follow, and they too soon became interested in South African affairs. Then the treaty of 1883 was found in the Colonial Office archives, and next appears a demand to the Boer Government that all British residents of the Transvaal be allowed to vote. The Boers refused to give the franchise to any applicant unless he first renounced his allegiance to other countries, and, as the British subjects declined to accede to the request, the politicians became busily engaged in formulating other plans whereby England might obtain control of the country.

At that inopportune time Jameson's troopers entered the Transvaal territory and attempted to take forcible possession of the country; but they were unsuccessful, and only

succeeded in directing the world's sympathy to the Boers. The Jameson raid was practically Cecil J. Rhodes's first important attempt to add the Transvaal to the list of South African additions he has made to the British Empire. The result was especially galling to him, as it was the first time his great political schemes failed of success.

But Rhodes is not the man to weep over disasters. Before the excitement over the raid had subsided, Rhodes had concocted a plan to inflict a commercial death upon the Transvaal, and in that manner force it to beg for the protection of the English flag. He opened Rhodesia, an adjoining country, for settlement, and by glorifying the country, its mineral and agricultural wealth, and by offering golden inducements to Transvaal tradespeople, miners, and even Transvaal subjects, he hoped to cause such an efflux from the Transvaal that the Government would be embarrassed in less than two years. The country which bears his name was found to be amazingly free from mountains of gold and rivers of honey, and the several thousand persons who had faith in his alluring prom-

ises remained in Rhodesia less than a year, and then returned to the Transvaal.

The reports of the Rhodesian country that were brought back by the disappointed miners and settlers were not flattering to the condition of the country or the justice of the Government. Of two evils, they chose the lesser, and again placed themselves under the Kruger Government. When revolution and enticement failed to bring the Transvaal under the British flag, Rhodes inaugurated a political propaganda. His last resort was the Colonial Office in London, and in that alone lay the only course by which he could attain his object.

Again the franchise question was resorted to as the ground of the contention, the dynamite and railway subjects having been so thoroughly debated as to be as void of ground for further contention as they had always been foreign to British control or interference. The question of granting the right of voting to the Uitlanders in the Transvaal is one which so vitally affects the future life of the Government that the Boers' concession of that right would

be tantamount to presenting the country to the British Government.

Ninety-nine per cent. of the Uitlanders of the Transvaal are no more than transient citizens. They were attracted thither by the gold mines and the attendant industries, and they have no thought of staying in the Transvaal a minute after they have amassed a fortune or a competency. Under no consideration would they remain in the country for the rest of their lives, because the climate and nature of the country are not conducive to a desire for long residence. It has been demonstrated that less than one per cent. of the Uitlanders had sufficient interest in the country to pass through the formality of securing naturalization papers preparatory to becoming eligible for the franchise.

The Boer Government has offered that all Uitlanders of nine years' residence, having certain unimportant qualifications, should be enfranchised in two years, and that others should be enfranchised in seven years—two years for naturalization and five more years' resident—before acquiring the right to vote.

There is a provision for a property qualification, which makes it necessary for the naturalized citizen to own a house of no less value than two hundred and fifty dollars in renting value, or an income of one thousand dollars. The residence clause in the Transvaal qualifications compares favourably with those of London, where an Englishman from any part of the country and settling in the municipality is obliged to live two years and have certain property qualifications before acquiring the right of franchise.

In full knowledge of these conditions the Uitlanders insist upon having an unconditional franchise—one that will require nothing more than a two-years' residence in the country. The Boers are well aware of the results that would follow the granting of the concessions demanded, but not better so than the Uitlanders who make the demands. The latest Transvaal statistics place the number of Boer burghers in the country at less than thirty thousand. At the lowest estimate there are in the Transvaal fifty thousand Uitlanders having the required qualifications, and all of these would be-

come voters in two years. At the first election held after the two years had elapsed the Uitlanders would be victorious, and those whom they elected would control the machinery of the Government. The Uitlanders' plan is as transparent as air, yet it has the approval and sanction of the English politicians, press, and public.

The propaganda which Rhodes and other politicians and stock brokers interested in the Transvaal gold mines inaugurated a short time after the Jameson raid has been successful in arousing the people in England to what they have been led to believe is a situation unequalled in the history of the empire-building. But there is a parallel case. At the same time the British Parliament was discussing the subject of the alleged injustice under which the English residents of the Transvaal were suffering, the colonial secretary was engaged in disposing of grievances which reached him from the Dutch residents of British Guiana, in South America, and which recited conditions parallel to those complained of by the Uitlanders. The grievances were made by foreign residents of Eng-

lish territory, instead of by English subjects in a foreign country, and consequently demanded less serious attention, but their justice was none the less patent. The three thousand native Dutch voters in British Guiana have no voice in the legislative or administrative branches of the colonial government, owing to the peculiar laws which give to the three thousand British-born citizens the complete control of the franchise. The population of the colony is three hundred thousand, yet the three thousand British subjects make and administer the laws for the other two hundred and ninety-seven thousand inhabitants, who compose the mining and agricultural communities and are treated with the same British contempt as the Boers. The Dutch residents have made many appeals for a fuller representation in the Government, but no reforms have been inaugurated or promised.

The few grievances which the Uitlanders had before the Jameson raid have been multiplied a hundredfold and no epithet is too venomous for them to apply to the Boers. The letters in the home newspapers have allied the



name of the Boers with every vilifying adjective in the English dictionary, and returning politicians have never failed to supply the others that do not appear in the book.

Petitions with thousands of names, some real, but many non-existent, have been forwarded to the Colonial Office and to every other office in London where they would be received, and these have recited grievances that even the patient Boer Volksraad had never heard about. It has been a propaganda of petitions and letters the like of which has no parallel in the history of politics. It has been successful in arousing sentiment favourable to the Uitlanders, and at this time there is hardly a handful of persons in England who are not willing to testify to the utter degradation of the Boers.

Another branch of the propaganda operated through the Stock Exchange, and its results were probably more practical than those of the literary branch. It is easier to reach the English masses through the Stock Exchange than by any other means. Whenever one of the "Kaffir" or Transvaal companies failed to make both ends meet in a manner which pleased the

stockholders, it was only necessary to blame the Boer Government for having impeded the digging of gold, and the stockholders promptly outlined to the Colonial Office the policy it should pursue toward the Boers.

The impressions that are formed in watching the tide of events in the Transvaal are that the Boer Government is not greatly inferior to the Government of Lord Salisbury and Secretary Chamberlain. The only appreciable difference between the two is that the Boers are fighting the cause of the masses against the classes, while the English are fighting that of the classes against the masses. In England, where the rich have the power, the poor pay the taxes, while in the Transvaal the poor have the power and compel the rich to pay the taxes. If the Transvaal taxes were of such serious proportions as to be almost unbearable, there might be a cause for interference by the Uitlander capitalists who own the mines, but there no injustice is shown to any one. The only taxes that the Uitlanders are compelled to pay are the annual poll tax of less than four dollars and a half, mining taxes of a dollar and a quar-

ter a month for each claim for prospecting licenses, and five dollars a claim for diggers' licenses. Boer and Uitlander are compelled to pay these taxes without distinction.

The Boers, in this contention, must win or die. In earlier days, before every inch of African soil was under the flag of one country or another, they were able to escape from English injustice by loading their few possessions on wagons and "trekking" into new and unexplored lands. If they yield their country to the English without a struggle, they will be forced to live under a future Stock Exchange Government, which has been described by a member of the British Parliament as likely to be "the vilest, the most corrupt, and the most pernicious known to man." \*

The Boers have no better argument to advance in support of their claim than that which is contained in the Transvaal national hymn. It at once gives a history of their country, its many struggles and disappointments, and its hopes. It is written in the "taal" of the coun-

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\* The Hon. Henry Labouchere, in London Truth.

try, and when sung by the patriotic, deep-voiced Boers is one of the most impressive hymns that ever inspired a nation.

### THE TRANSVAAL VOLKSLIED.

The four-colours of our dear old land  
 Again float o'er Transvaal,  
 And woe the God-forgetting hand  
 That down our flag would haul !  
 Wave higher now in clearer sky  
 Our Transvaal freedom's stay !  
 (Lit., freedom's flag.)  
 Our enemies with fright did fly ;  
 Now dawns a glorious day.

Through many a storm ye bravely stood,  
 And we stood likewise true ;  
 Now, that the storm is o'er, we would  
 Leave nevermore from you  
 Bestormed by Kaffir, Lion, Brit,  
 Wave ever o'er their head ;  
 And then to spite we hoist thee yet  
 Up to the topmost stead !

Four long years did we beg—aye, pray—  
 To keep our lands clear, free,  
 We asked you, Brit, we loath the fray :  
 “ Go hence, and let us be !  
 We've waited, Brit, we love you not,  
 To arms we call the Boer ; ”  
 (Lit., Now take we to our guns.)  
 “ You've teased us long enough, we troth,  
 Now wait we nevermore.”

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And with God's help we cast the yoke  
Of England from our knee ;  
Our country safe—behold and look—  
Once more our flag waves free !  
Though many a hero's blood it cost,  
May all the nations see  
(Lit., Though England ever so much more.)  
That God the Lord redeemed our hosts ;  
The glory his shall be.

Wave high now o'er our dear old land,  
Wave four-colours of Transvaal !  
And woe the God-forgetting hand  
That dares you down to haul !  
Wave higher now in clearer sky  
Our Transvaal freedom's stay !  
Our enemies with fright did fly ;  
Now dawns a glorious day.

## CHAPTER X

### PREPARATIONS FOR DEFENCE

EVER since the Jameson raid both the Boers and the Uitlanders have realized that a peaceful solution of the differences between the two is possible but highly improbable. The Uitlanders refused to concede anything to the Boer, and asked for concessions that implied a virtual abandonment of their country to the English, whom they have always detested. The Boers themselves have not been unmindful of the inevitable war with their powerful antagonist, and, not unlike the tiny ant of the African desert, which fortifies its abode against the anticipated attack of wild beasts, have made of their country a veritable arsenal.

Probably no inland country in the world is half so well prepared for war at any time as that little Government, which can boast of

having less than thirty thousand voters. The military preparation has been so enormous that Great Britain has been compelled, according to the colonial secretary's statement to the British Parliament, to expend two and a half million dollars annually in South Africa in order to keep pace with the Boers. Four years ago, when the Transvaal Government learned that the Uitlanders of Johannesburg were planning a revolution, it commenced the military preparations which have ever since continued with unabating vigour. German experts were employed to formulate plans for the defence of the country, and European artilleryists were secured to teach the arts of modern warfare to the men at the head of the Boer army. Several Americans of military training became the instructors in the national military school at Pretoria; and even the women and children became imbued with the necessity of warlike preparation, and learned the use of arms. Several million pounds were annually spent in Europe in the purchase of the armament required by the plans formulated by the experts, and the whole country was placed

on a war footing. Every important strategic position was made as impregnable as modern skill and arms could make it, and every farmer's cottage was supplied with arms and ammunition, so that the volunteer army might be mobilized in a day.

In order to demonstrate the extent to which the military preparation has been carried, it is only necessary to give an account of the defences of Pretoria and Johannesburg, the two principal cities of the country. Pretoria, being the capital, and naturally the chief point of attack by the enemy, has been prepared to resist the onslaught of any number of men, and is in a condition to withstand a siege of three years. The city lies in the centre of a square, at each corner of which is a lofty hill surmounted by a strong fort, which commands the valleys and the surrounding country. Each of the four forts has four heavy cannon, four French guns of fifteen miles range, and thirty heavy Gatling guns. Besides this extraordinary protection, the city has fifty light Gatling guns which can be drawn by mules to any point on the hills



where an attack may be made. Three large warehouses are filled with ammunition, and the large armory is packed to the eaves with Mauser, Martini-Henry, and Wesley-Richards rifles. Two extensive refrigerators, with a capacity of two thousand oxen each, are ample provision against a siege of many months. It is difficult to compute the total expenditures for war material by the Boer Government during the last four years, but the following official announcement of expenses for one year will serve to give an idea of the vastness of the preparations that the Government has been compelled to make in order to guard the safety of the country:

War-Office salaries.....	\$262,310
War purposes .....	4,717,550
Johannesburg revolt.....	800,000
Public works.....	3,650,000
	<hr/>
	\$9,429,860

Johannesburg has extensive fortifications around it, but the Boers will use them for other purposes than those of self-protection. The forts at the Golden City were erected for the purpose of quelling any revolution of the

Uitlanders, who constitute almost entirely the population of the city.

One of the forts is situated on a small eminence about half a mile north of the business part, and commands the entire city with its guns. Two years were consumed in building the fortification and in placing the armament in position. Its guns can rake not only every street of the city, but ten of the principal mine works as well, and the damage that their fire could cause is incalculable. Another fort, almost as strong as the one in Johannesburg, is situated a mile east of the city, and overshadows the railway and the principal highway to Johannesburg. The residents of the city are greatly in fear of underground works, which they have been led to believe were constructed since the raid. Vast quantities of earth were taken out of the Johannesburg fort, and for such a length of time did the work continue that the Uitlanders decided that the Boers were undermining the city, and protested to the Government against such a course. As soon as war is declared and the women and children have been removed

from the city, Johannesburg will be rent with shot and shell. The Boers have announced their intention of doing this, and the Uitlanders, anticipating it, seek safety in flight whenever there are rumours of war, as thousands did immediately before and after the Jameson affair.

The approaches to the mountain passes on the border have been fortified with vast quantities of German and French ordnance, and equipped with garrisons of men born or trained in Europe. The approaches to Laing's Nek, near the Natal border, which have several times been the battle ground of the English and Boer forces, have been prepared to resist an invading army from Natal. Much attention has been directed to the preparations in that part of the republic, because the British commanders will find it easier to transfer forces from the port of Durban, which is three hundred and six miles from the Transvaal border, while Cape Town is almost a thousand miles distant.

But the Pretorian Government has made many provisions for war other than those enu-

merated. It has made alliances and friends that will be of equal worth in the event of an attack by England. The Orange Free State, whose existence is as gravely imperilled as that of the Transvaal, will fight hand-in-hand with its neighbour, just as it was prepared to do at the time of the Jameson raid, when almost every Free State burgher lay armed on the south bank of the Vaal River, awaiting the summons for assistance from the Kruger Government. In the event of war the two Governments will be as one, and, in anticipation of the struggle of the Boers against the British, the Free State Government has been expending vast sums of money every year in strengthening the country's defences. At the same time that the Free State is being prepared for war, its Government officials are striving hard to prevent a conflict, and are attempting to conciliate the two principals in the strife by suggesting that concessions be made by both. The Free State is not so populous as the Transvaal, and consequently can not place as many men in the field, but the ten thousand burghers who will

answer the call to arms will be an acceptable addition to the Boer forces.

The element of doubt enters into the question of what the Boers and their co-religionists of Cape Colony and Natal will do in the event of war. The Dutch of Cape Colony are the majority of the population, and, although loyal British subjects under ordinary circumstances, are opposed to English interference in the Transvaal's affairs. Those of Natal, while not so great in numbers, are equally friendly with the Transvaal Boers, and would undoubtedly recall some of their old grievances against the British Government as sufficient reason to join the Boers in war.

In Cape Colony there is an organization called the Afrikaner Bond which recently has gained control of the politics of the colony, and which will undoubtedly be supreme for many years to come. The motto of the organization is "South Africa for South Africans," and its doctrine is that South Africa shall be served first and Great Britain afterward. Its members, who are chiefly Dutch, believe their first duty is to assist the develop-

ment of the resources of their own country by proper protective tariffs and stringent legislation in native affairs, and they regard legislation with a view to British interests as of secondary importance. The Bond has been very amicably inclined toward its Afrikaner kinsmen in the Transvaal, especially since the Jameson raid, and every sign of impending trouble between England and the Boers widens the chasm between the English and Afrikaners of South Africa. The Dutch approve of President Kruger's course in dealing with the franchise problems, and if hostilities break out it would be not the least incompatible with their natures to assist their Transvaal and Free State kinsmen even at the risk of plunging the whole of South Africa into a civil war. W. P. Schreiner, the Premier of Cape Colony, is the leading member of the Bond, and with him he has associated the majority of the leading men in the colony. Under ordinary conditions their loyalty to Great Britain is undoubted, but whether they could resist the influence of their friends in the Bond if it should decide to cast its fortunes

with the Boers in case of war is another matter.

Of such vast importance is the continued loyalty of the Dutch of the two colonies that upon it depends practically the future control of the Cape by the British Government. Being in the majority as three to two, and almost in supreme control of the local government, the Dutch of Cape Colony are in an excellent position to secede from the empire, as they have already threatened to do, in which event England would be obliged to fight almost the united population of the whites if she desired to retain control of the country. With this in mind, it is no wonder that Mr. Chamberlain declared that England had reached a critical turning point in the history of the empire.

The uncertainty of the situation is increased by the doubtful stand which the native races are taking in the dispute. Neither England nor the Boers has the positive assurance of support from any of the tribes, which outnumber the whites as ten to one; but it will not be an unwarranted opinion to place the

majority of the native tribes on the side of the Boers. The native races are always eager to be the friends of the paramount power, and England's many defeats in South Africa during recent years have not assisted in gaining for it that prestige. When England enters upon a war with the Transvaal the natives will probably follow the example of the Matabele natives, who rebelled against the English immediately after Jameson and his men were defeated by the Boers, because they believed a conquered nation could offer no resistance. The Boers, having won the last battle, are considered by the natives to be the paramount power, and it is always an easy matter to induce a subjected people to ally itself with a supposedly powerful one.

The Zulus, still stinging under the defeat which they received from the British less than twenty years ago, might gather their war parties and, with the thousands of guns they have been allowed to buy, attempt to secure revenge. The Basutos, east of the Orange Free State, now the most powerful and the only undefeated nation in the country, would



hardly allow a war to be fought unless they participated in it, even if only to demonstrate to the white man that they still retain their old-time courage and ability. The million and a half natives in Cape Colony, and the equal number in the Transvaal, have complained of so many alleged grievances at the hands of their respective governments that they might be presumed to rise against them, though it is never possible to determine the trend of the African negro's mind. What the various tribes would do in such an emergency can be answered only by the chiefs themselves, and they will not speak until the time for action is at hand. Perhaps when that time does arrive there may be a realization of the natives' dream—that a great leader will come from the north who will organize all the various tribes into one grand army and with it drive the hated white men into the sea.

It is impossible to secure accurate statistics in regard to the military strength of the various colonies, states, and tribes in the country, but the following table gives a fair idea of

the number of men who are liable to military duty:

	Dutch.	English.	Native.
Cape Colony.....	20,000	10,000	175,000
Natal.....	7,000	5,000	100,000
Orange Free State.....	10,000	.....	30,000
Transvaal.....	30,000	20,000	140,000
Rhodesia ....	.....	2,000	25,000
Swaziland and Basutoland.....	.....	.....	30,000
<b>Total.....</b>	<b>67,000</b>	<b>37,000</b>	<b>570,000</b>

To him who delights in forming possible coalitions and war situations this table offers vast opportunities. Probably no other country can offer such a vast number of possibilities for compacts between nations, races, and tribes as is presented in South Africa. There all the natives may unite against the whites, or a part of them against a part of the whites, while whites and natives may unite against a similar combination. The possibilities are boundless; the probabilities are uncertain.

The Pretorian Government has had an extensive secret service for several years, and this has been of inestimable value in securing the support of the natives as well as the friendship of many whites, both in South Af-

rica and abroad. The several thousand Irishmen in South Africa have been organized into a secret compact, and have been and will continue to be of great value to the Boers. The head of the organization is a man who is one of President Kruger's best friends, and his lieutenants are working even as far away as America. The sympathy of the majority of the Americans in the Transvaal is with the Boer cause, and, although the American consul-general at Cape Town has cautioned them to remain neutral, they will not stand idly by and watch the defeat of a cause which they believe to be as just as that for which their forefathers fought at Bunker Hill and Lexington.

But the Boers do not rely upon external assistance to win their battles for them. When it becomes necessary to defend their liberty and their country they reverently place their trust in Providence and their rifles. Their forefathers' battles were won with such confidence, and the later generations have been similarly successful under like conditions. The rifle is the young Boer's primer and the grand-