

Lydenberg Volunteer Corps, which was raised among the foreigners at the Gold Fields and Diamond Fields, under the command of Captain von Schlickmann. During these three or four months, while Lord Carnarvon was induced to resolve on eventual annexation, there was no symptom of any danger that the Transvaal would be over-run either by Zulus or Bapedi. The latter made an attack upon Fort Burgers on the 29th of September, and were repulsed, but some cattle of the garrison were taken. Some excitement prevailed in the town of Lydenberg, on account of the proposed new war-tax; the goldfields had utterly failed, and the English speculative adventurers there denounced the Transvaal Republic as the cause of their disappointment. The Dutch inhabitants of that district, which had its own local interests and pretensions, were also discontented with the government at Pretoria. It was earnestly desired that the Republic should invite or allow the British Government, through Sir Henry Bulwer, to mediate on its behalf, and to settle all the disputes with Secocooni and Ketchwhyo. This was the prudent course recommended by an influential meeting of the Dutch citizens at Lydenberg on the 2nd of October. A petition to the same effect, addressed to the President and Executive Council of the Republic, was extensively

signed throughout the districts exposed in any way to suffer losses by the war. Nothing could be farther, it is evident, from their intentions or expectations, than that the Republic should be suppressed and that they should be made British subjects. The four hundred English, including the Irish newspaper editor, Mr. Phelan, may have looked to such a consummation; and some of them, as men of varied colonial experiences, probably calculated on the large expenditure of British public money. But the forty thousand Dutch farmers all over the country remained in perfect innocence and ignorance of the Downing Street decree with which Sir T. Shepstone was on his way back from England to do what he thought proper with the Transvaal. President Burgers, on the 4th of September, had opened the Session of the Legislative Assembly at Pretoria with a calmly business-like speech; for he was there quite at home, not flurried as in the late campaign. He proposed certain needful measures, a more efficient organization and discipline of the Burgher force, and the establishment of a Border Police, as well as the enlistment of Captain Schlickmann's foreign volunteer legion. Financial and other administrative business was also dealt with in that Session of the Volksraad. A report of its proceedings reached Lord Carnarvon on the 21st of October, and was simply

acknowledged ; this was a month after his despatch to Sir Henry Barkly undertaking to annex the Transvaal (of course by consent of inhabitants) to the British Empire.

No offer of British mediation or amicable intervention between the Republic and the Kaffir Chiefs was made by Her Majesty's Government. On the 12th of July, having been apprised that the Republic was going to begin the conflict with Secocooni, Lord Carnarvon had written a strong letter of remonstrance against "an aggressive policy." He had distinctly warned President Burgers that England would prohibit "any alteration or extension of the recognised frontiers" of the South African Republic which might affect the situation of the native tribes bordering on Natal or other British Colonies. Her Majesty's Government would object to "any proceedings or policy interfering with territory or tribes not heretofore under the government" of the Transvaal State. This admonition was rightly addressed to the President ; and it would perhaps have justified a forcible British intervention if the ultimate result of the Secocooni war had been a fresh territorial conquest effected by the Boers ; yet its practical enforcement should even then have been limited by our formal promise of 1852 not to ally ourselves with those tribes against the Transvaal.

But it is one thing to intervene peremptorily with the conduct of a foreign State, as Great Britain and France might do in order to prevent Greece from attacking Turkey ; it is another thing to suppress the very existence of that foreign State without leaving it a chance of better conduct. It is a third course, which British Governments have usually adopted in Europe, to await the fitting opportunity for earnestly and sincerely proffering our good offices between the belligerents, to arbitrate without prejudice, and then to use persuasion, or even compulsion, if our own interest in the general peace makes it worth while, to secure the acceptance of equitable terms.

Lord Carnarvon at the outset of this unhappy affair had a difficulty, in taking the third course if he had been so disposed, because President Burgers insisted on treating Secocooni as a rebel subject of the Transvaal Republic, and not as a belligerent. This is the same diplomatic hitch that has so frequently hindered British peace-making efforts, in Lord Palmerston's or Lord Clarendon's hands, from assisting the victims of civil war in Europe and America. The question of territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over the lands occupied by the Bapedi was industriously argued out between Sir Henry Barkly and Mr. Burgers, with abundant references to old maps and documents of

land transfer. Perhaps Sir Henry was right ; and this would possibly have afforded not to Lord Carnarvon, but to our Foreign Minister, if her Majesty's Government thought fit, a tolerable pretext for threatening war against the Transvaal Republic. One word in that tone would have quieted the President and the whole Boerish Commonwealth. The natives would have been left alone, and we should have been spared an unprofitable and discreditable—annexation ; but Downing Street had otherwise provided.

The Lieutenant-Governor of Natal, who in that and other instances has shown an equitable and generous mind, was really anxious to procure a friendly settlement of the Boers' quarrel with Secocooni by offering his own mediation. In his memorandum sent to the Colonial Office on the 27th of October, Sir Henry Bulwer with great discretion set forth the political impediments which had so far stood in the way of an amicable interposition. He had taken care, however, to inform the English "Defence Committee" at Lydenberg, and had desired them to inform the people of the Transvaal—which they never did—that his good offices were ready to be exerted to put a stop to hostilities ; and he had made a similar communication to President Burgers. No man in Sir Henry

Bulwer's position of authority could have acted more frankly and fairly. He listened to all the statements, wild as some were, that came to him from Lydenberg in the panic. He also sent Mr. Osborn, a Natal magistrate, to inquire. He believed that the Kaffir movements were not so important as people said. But he wished to restore peace without compromising the independence of a neighbouring free country. His despatch was briefly acknowledged by Lord Carnarvon, on December 23rd, with "Your proceedings appear to me to be eminently judicious, and have my entire approval."

President Burgers and his misguided supporters had recommenced the war in a different manner. The Swazies had long since quitted the country, and the Boers, despite the new Burgher Militia law, did not choose to turn out again. The foreign volunteer corps was therefore now employed almost alone, or with some local Kaffir auxiliaries, to hold Fort Burgers and one or two other posts, shutting up the enemy from the "mealie" grounds and pastures, that he might be starved into submission. A bitter personal animosity was felt by some of the English at Lydenberg against Captain von Schlickmann. He was a young Prussian officer, nephew to General von Man-  
teuffel, had been aide-de-camp to Count von Arnim,

and won the Iron Cross by his valour on the field of Weissemburg, in 1870. Why he left Germany and tried his luck at the diamond fields of South Africa may perhaps be imagined, without supposing him to be devoid of all principles of honour. Now, the diamond fields, rightfully belonging to the Orange River Free State, exhibited for some time, with a miscellaneous rush of foreign diggers, of all classes and nations, an extraordinary spectacle. Many gentlemen there at that time could not tell what government or jurisdiction the locality was to acknowledge. A British Commissioner was sent from Cape Town, but his regulations were at first resisted by force. Among the leaders of this opposition were Von Schlickmann and his friend Mr. Aylward, who afterwards succeeded him in the Transvaal as commander of the Lydenberg Volunteers. Sir Henry Barkly's unfavourable references to their "notorious" personal antecedents may thus admit of a tolerable explanation. The young ex-military Prussian had moreover given extreme offence to the Lydenberg opponents of President Burgers by haughtily saying at Pretoria that Lydenberg must be put down. Hence the publication of one or two monstrous stories against Captain von Schlickmann, as that he had murdered two Kaffir women, and caused a number of helpless prisoners to be slaughtered.

Lord Carnarvon and Sir H. Barkly, hearing of these atrocities, called Mr. Burgers to account, and he made inquiry. It turned out that, in a skirmish with some Kaffirs in a wood, the volunteers firing at a distance inadvertently killed a woman, not being able to distinguish her sex. Two other women, who had been taken prisoners, the Captain had ordered his Kaffir followers to release; the Kaffirs wanted to keep them as slaves, to which he did not consent, but detained them a short time, while he held a council of war, lest they should go to the enemy as spies; the council of war ordered them to depart unmolested. Even Sir Henry Barkly admitted that "it is but fair" to receive this explanation. But the extracts from anonymous narratives in the "Gold Fields Mercury" and the "Transvaal Argus" were diligently forwarded to London. The Aborigines Protection Society read them with little discrimination. One or two bad cases seem to have *prima facie* evidence; there was a killing of seventeen women and children by the Kaffir auxiliaries, in the presence, it is said, of Field-Cornets Abel Erasmus and Stephan Schutte, near Kruger's Post. There were two prisoners brought to a court-martial before President Burgers himself. One was a spy, who had led the commando into an ambush; the other was a Zulu assassin, sent into the



Dutch State to murder Ketchwhy's brother. These men were condemned, and should have been hanged, but there was no tree; or shot, but cartridges were scarce; the President and General, having ordered them to death, committed the error of letting their native captors stab them with assegais, which was a barbarous outrage upon the feelings of civilised humanity. On the other hand, it was proved that the State Attorney had ordered the liberation of women and children, after their kraals were broken up. And they were not kept in slavery, as reported; but the tide of prejudice had set in so strongly against the Boers, that popular opinion was now made ripe for the meditated *coup d'état* from the Colonial Office.

This was accomplished very quietly in the early months of 1877. The Transvaal Republic was very badly managed, and had fallen into shocking disorder. Its President and Legislature were then sitting at Pretoria, but its administration was failing in every official department; the exchequer was empty, the taxes were unpaid, the salaries were unpaid; the local magistrates, the gaols, even the post-office, were left almost without support. A revolution of some kind was inevitable, though in general the Boers want as little government and State service as any people on earth. The Kaffir war, indeed, with all its imagin-

ary dangers of invasion in other eyes than those of the Dutch, had been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. They had not conquered Secocooni, nor has he yet been conquered by all the efforts of British military power. But their effectual blockade of his rocky district, which yields no food, had obliged the Bapedi chief before New Year's Day to sue for peace, which was granted on his promise to refrain from molesting the Dutch, and to pay some compensation. All the hostile chiefs and tribes of the Transvaal territory were exhausted, if not subdued, by the scrambling sort of warfare that had been carried on; and no invasion or incursion was any longer feared. In the open central region, south west of Lydenberg and Middleburg, the Boers could have held their own against any Kaffir foe; but the foe was not in arms who would come against them, and the Transvaal Government was in no condition further to pursue any objectionable schemes of territorial extension.

Sir Theophilus Shepstone, K.C.M.G., Special Commissioner, with a staff consisting of Colonel Brooke, R.E., Captain Clarke, R.A., Mr. Henderson, Mr. Osborn, and one of Mr. Shepstone's sons, escorted by a score of Natal Mounted Police, arrived at Pretoria on January 22nd, 1877. He sat there quietly from that day to April 12th, when he produced Queen Victoria's Royal

Commission, dated Balmoral, October 9th, and thereupon issued his Proclamation, "that the territory heretofore known as the South African Republic shall be, and shall be taken to be, British territory." I do not pretend to discuss the reasons alleged in that proclamation; my endeavour has been simply to relate preceding facts. The President of the Republic said, in his formal protest of that day, "I am not strong enough to draw the sword for the successful defence of the independence of this State against a superior Power like that of England." The Executive Council said the same, adding that it had "no desire to take any steps by which the white inhabitants of South Africa would be divided in the face of the common enemy, or might come into collision with each other, to the great danger of the whole Christian population in South Africa." The Volksraad had recently instructed the State Government to take necessary measures for maintaining its independence, as well as "for preserving the friendly understanding between the Republic and the neighbouring States and Colonies of South Africa, and for the continuance of general order, peace, and the supremacy of the whites over the natives." The sole question that I would here put to the reader's judgment and conscience is this: Was it not feasible on the part of Her Majesty's Government

to co-operate for these good objects with the commonwealth of the Transvaal, under some reformed Government, without depriving it of political independence ?

The momentous discussions—they could not be negotiations—that must have taken place, in those ten weeks previous to April 12th, between Sir T. Shepstone and the members of the Transvaal Executive, would present a very characteristic and interesting study. But it is certain that whatever was really most important would be said in private conferences ; and to relate merely what has been revealed or put on record in official correspondence would produce a false impression. It is possible from a full consideration of all the circumstances to understand the argument which finally prevailed over Dutch ideas of resistance. This was not the expected approach of such a small amount of British military force as Sir Arthur Cunynghame was then enabled to send to the Transvaal. President Burgers had visited England, and could not think it likely that our Home Government and Parliament would sanction the actual shedding of blood for such a purpose as destroying a Free State of Europeans by descent and race and language and religion, after pledging our Queen's honour twenty-five years before to respect its integrity. No,

the argument which Sir Theophilus Shepstone had to use was one of a very different nature. It was a very sharp and severe argument ; but a knife will sometimes turn and cut the hand that holds it.

And the Dutch citizens of the stifled South African Republic, what is now their disposition, and what might it have been with fairer treatment? I will quote the parting words of their delegates to London, who waited on Sir Michael Hicks-Beach last July. "We know that as a subject people, who have been deprived of our independence by such means, there will lie before us many years of bitter heart-burning and ill-feeling, of desertion of homes for wild and objectless wanderings. On the other hand, with justice and freedom, there would be every reason to hope that the Transvaal may join hand in hand with the neighbouring States and Colonies, to work together for mutual prosperity and happiness, and for the extension of civilization and Christianity into the far interior."

## CHAPTER XIII.

### OUR LAST YEAR'S KAFFIR WAR.

The eastern border of the Cape Colony.—The Galekas, and their old feud with the Fingoes.—A casual squabble.—Warfare between the tribes.—Kreli, the Galeka chief, disobeys a summons.—Outbreak of this Kaffir war.—Use of fire-arms by Galekas.—Their boldness.—Commandant C. D. Griffith.—General Sir Arthur Cunynghame.—The Tembus or Tambookies, our allies.—Gangelezwe and his wife.—Campaign in the Trans-Kei.—Flight of Kreli.—Check at Umsitzani.—Reinforcements.—Insurrection of the Gaikas.—Kreli and Sandilli.—Tini Macomo.—Battle of Quintana.—Driven into the Perie Bush.—Concluding operations.—Annexation of Pondo Land.—Sir Bartle Frere goes to Natal.

It must be borne in mind that, since responsible government was introduced in the Cape Colony, the Imperial Government had gradually withdrawn its troops. The Border lands of the Colony therefore were left entirely to the defence of the Armed and Mounted Police. The Gaikas and Galekas had for some time been under the supervision of magistrates, whose equitable administration had removed many causes of complaint. They were beginning to entertain something like content under the new régime, when unfortunately, new disturbing elements came

into existence. The opening of the diamond-fields in 1871, and the progress of railway works, were the means of opening up to the natives a fresh source of employment; but with the possession of increased means came the facility of obtaining arms in exchange for their wages. Passes for guns were at first only supplied to the Fingoes; but these people, with their strong trading instincts, soon became engaged in the lucrative business of trafficking in fire-arms with the Gaikas and Galekas. I am sorry to say that many Europeans also engaged in this pernicious trade. With the acquisition of fire-arms among these Kaffir tribes came the wish to turn the new power to account against ourselves. The Galeka chief Kreli was evidently at that time undecided about going to war against a power which he had always found too strong for him. But the possession of arms had turned the heads of his younger warriors; and their jealousy of the Fingoes, who had been located upon the Galekas' old lands on the other side of the Kei, soon fanned the flame with irresistible effect. Then, as had always been the case in former wars, the old Chief, however reluctant he might be to sanction the movement, was once more carried away by the force of circumstances over which he had no control; and so found himself again plunged into hostilities.

The Fingoes, since they have been taken under our protection, have made gratifying progress towards civilization. These settled natives have not only acquired property to a large amount, but they have opened up roads, established schools, and received an industrial mission. Again, adjoining Fingo Land to the east is the reserve known as the Idutywa, occupied by a mixed body of Kaffirs and Fingoes under a British resident. The country still occupied by Kreli's people was the narrow slip of territory between Fingo Land and the sea, extending from the Kei to the Bashee river, and containing about a thousand square miles. Here the Galekas had increased in numbers to such an extent, that the land was of too limited extent for their wants. It was not surprising, therefore that they should look with jealousy upon the intruding Fingoes; or that they should yearn with regret for their old lands. The very fact of the Fingoes' superior prosperity augmented this hatred among the Galekas.

This seems to have been the position of affairs up to 1877. The war with Secocooni then broke out with the Boers in the northern districts of the Transvaal; and yet another disturbing element arose in the attitude of the Zulu King Ketchwhy, who was suspected of having sent messengers to Umquikela,



Sandilli, and Kreli, in British Kaffraria, but this was never proved. There were various causes which then combined to precipitate the outbreak of war. General uneasiness prevailed, and such being the position of affairs, a slight spark was sufficient to set the country in a blaze.

There was a quarrel at a Fingo wedding, to which two inferior Galeka chiefs, at the beer-drinking, came uninvited. This ended in a fight, in which a Galeka was killed, and several others were wounded by the Fingoes. The war-cry was then sounded; a raid was made into the Fingo location by the Galekas, and more blood was shed. Sir Bartle Frere, Governor and High Commissioner, was soon on his way to the Transkei, and lost no time in proceeding to Butterworth, on the boundary between the two tribes. He summoned Kreli to appear there before him. That Chief, who was nearly seventy years of age, declined to obey the summons. He was in fact, as he afterwards confessed, quite unable to restrain the impetuosity of his young warriors. To show his good intentions, however, the missionaries and English settlers remaining in his country were by his orders escorted to a place of safety. War was declared, and the fight of Gwadana took place, on September 26th. The Galekas attacked the Fingoes in three divisions.

They were opposed by about one hundred Mounted Police under Inspector Chalmers, supported by a thousand Fingoes and a field-piece. The field-piece, however, became disabled after a few rounds; upon which the Fingoes were seized with a panic and fled. In their flight they frightened the horses, which had been left under a guard in the rear of the camp; and this occasioned the loss of one officer and six men of the Mounted Police. The latter, however, still held their ground, and the Galekas retreated with the loss of between two and three hundred of their number. Our forces then fell back on the Ibeka, where they joined the main body of the police under Commandant C. D. Griffith. At the Ibeka, on the 29th of September, Mr. Griffith was attacked by seven or eight thousand Galekas. Here an entirely new feature in Kaffir warfare was exhibited. The Galeka Kaffirs, contrary to their usual habits, came boldly into the open ground. Three different times they came on to the attack within forty yards of the earthworks.

This boldness on the part of the Kaffirs arose from their having become so much more accustomed to the use of fire-arms; many of them indeed were in possession of good rifles. Here was a practical commentary upon the shameful negligence of the colonial authorities, which could allow the open

purchase of arms, as has been seen, at the Diamond Fields and elsewhere, without making the slightest attempt to check a traffic so fatal to the interests of the European settlers. It had been notorious for months past that this was the case. General Cunynghame and others had represented the matter strongly to no purpose; and the Transvaal Boers, alive to the danger of such proceedings, had taken effectual means to prevent the passage of natives with fire-arms through their own country.

In the engagement at Ibeka, on September 29th, the Fingoes gave way. The superior arms of the police, however, made the assailants turn, and the Kaffirs withdrew from the field with considerable loss. Mr. Griffith was promoted to the temporary rank of a Colonel in Her Majesty's Army. There were only two hundred police engaged, and two thousand Fingoes.

More frontier police had been ordered to the front; a portion of the 88th Regiment was forwarded from Cape Town, and volunteers from all parts of the colony were rapidly concentrated. The command of the united forces was, on September 21st, taken by General Sir Arthur Cunynghame. The Tembus or Tambookies, who occupied the north-eastern border of the colony, from the Gaika location to Basuto Land, and from the Kei to the Bashee, supplied a force of

3,000 men. This force, under the command of Major Elliot, marched into the Idutywa reserve. There was already a feud between the Galekas and the Tambookie chief Gangalezwe. General Cunynghame in his book, "My Command in South Africa," gives the following account of the quarrel, which illustrates a curious phase of Kaffir manners.

"Gangalezwe, the Tambookie Chief, had married a daughter of Kreli, the Galeka. Returning one day to his kraal, his wife is said to have displeased him by making use of a word in which one or two syllables of his name occurred, for this it seems is a fatal offence amongst those people. Gangalezwe thereupon, raising his knobkerrie, struck his unfortunate wife, breaking her leg. The poor creature crawled away into the bush, and found her way eventually back to her father's hut. Gangalezwe now becoming alarmed, sent messengers to Kreli. A native account of this interview is given. The first question was, 'By whom were they sent?' The messengers' answer was, 'By the people, and in pity to the motherless children.' Then Kreli asked, 'Where are the great men of the tribe? and where are so and so?' Here the names of four or five of Gangalezwe's wives were enumerated, who were said to have been killed. The reluctant reply was, 'Dispersed and driven away by

the Chief.' After much talk, the messengers were told to return and say, 'A child has been sent by the Galekas to the Tambookies, and after a time we have heard that she has been ill-treated, (or literally, how the bones of the child have returned). We reported the matter to the Government (English), who said we might bury the bones of the child, or do as we pleased regarding them. And is it reasonable that we shall now send back this skeleton to the man who, according to your own admission, has maimed his wives? and who is now said to be cruelly ill-using the orphans whom you profess to pity? Return and say, that we sent our daughter to the Tambookie Chief; but that she has not been returned to us; she is not here.'" The meaning was that, being maimed and disfigured, she was now but the shadow or skeleton of her former self, and was no longer fit to be the wife of a Chief. For this crime, Kreli had declared war against Gangalezwe, who was ignominiously defeated, but was eventually taken under our protection, receiving a small allowance. The whole of the Tambookie tribe was therefore subject to Great Britain. The portion of it which occupied the frontier had submitted to annexation, while other sections had been settled in colonial locations adjoining the districts of Queenstown and Wodehouse.

The Gaikas were early suspected of sympathizing with the paramount Galeka chief, Kreli; some of them indeed had been actually detected joining his forces. Sir Bartle Frere demanded explanations of Sandilli, the Gaika chief; but he professedly repudiated all idea of war with the English. "Who builds ships?" said he, "Who makes cannon and gunpowder, and who builds the railways? What can people with assegais do against the English?"

A general attack on the Galekas was now commenced; Kreli's great kraal was captured by Commandant-Colonel Griffith, on the 9th of October, with the armed police and burghers, Fingoes, and Tembus; the kraal was burned and eighty Kaffirs were killed. A party of volunteers attacking the Galekas the same day killed seventy more near the Ibeka; and a few days afterwards Sir Bartle Frere issued a proclamation deposing Kreli, and annexing his land to the Colony. Kreli then took shelter in the wooded kloofs near the Bashee. The whole colonial force, consisting of 800 Europeans (mounted police and volunteers,) 3,000 Fingoes, and 1,300 Tembus, advanced in four divisions converging towards the coast. The centre column, which was composed of 250 police and burghers, and about 2,000 Fingoes, with one nine-pounder gun, was hotly attacked by the Galekas; but

these were beaten back leaving sixty-seven dead on the field, with two Europeans killed and nine wounded on our side. A quantity of cattle and of sheep and fifty horses were captured. Major Elliot, with Gangalezwe and the Tembus, fought in another conflict, killing fifty Galekas, at the mouth of the Bashee. Here he endeavoured to prevent them from crossing the drifts into Moni's country. The Bomvanas made a show of preventing the Galekas crossing, but without materially affecting their progress. Twelve thousand head of their cattle, however, were captured. This was at the end of October, 1877.

It was soon reported that the Galekas had crossed through the Bomvanas' territory, and had gone over the Umtata and the Umzimvubu, or St. John's river, into Pondo Land, where they had taken shelter with Umquikela the chief of the Pondos. Commandant Griffith thereupon gave up the pursuit, as Kreli was already heavily punished. He had had at least 700 men killed, with several chiefs, while his tribe had lost more than 13,000 head of cattle, as well as horses, sheep, and goats, and Kreli himself was in hiding.

With needless and unwise haste, the Capetown Government now proceeded to parcel out the Galeka territory. Even whilst the Galekas were retreating, a notice was issued inviting applications from colonists

to settle on Galeka Land. Within a month, however, the unsettled state of the country made it necessary to rescind this abortive notice, and to postpone the occupation of the annexed territory.

At this time it was thought prudent to disarm Mapassa, who had been allowed to cross the Kei and settle in the colony, accompanied by McKinnon, a minor chief, who was a son of Umhala. Mapassa was amenable to reason ; but McKinnon defied those who were sent to disarm him. He made his way with his followers to the Gaikas under Sandilli, near the Kabousie river, carrying his cattle with him. The Mounted Police who were sent to secure the cattle were fired upon. Mapassa and McKinnon, however, eventually paid the fines levied upon them, and the former returned across the Kei, in compliance with the Government's orders.

Meanwhile affairs in Galekaland were in a very unsatisfactory state. Commandant Griffith had applied for a reinforcement of cavalry, to prevent the Galekas from recrossing the Bashee. This was refused him by the Capetown Ministry ; and shortly after, large bodies of Galekas made good their passage across that river, securing the remnant of their cattle in places of safety. On Sunday, November 2nd, a body of 800 or 900 of them made a spirited attack upon a patrol of Police,



Volunteers, and Burghers, at Umzitzani, near Ibeka. After a two hours' fight, they carried off several horses and men, killing one of our men and wounding seven.

There was now a general outcry against the supineness of the Colonial Government. The whole eastern part of the Colony was in confusion. Stock stealing was rife everywhere ; one farmer alone, whilst acting as a volunteer at the front, lost 1,000 sheep and some oxen. Trade was at a stand-still, everyone fearing instant attack. Detachments of the Royal Artillery and Engineers were now sent to the front. H.M.S. Active landed 160 men with a battery of seven-pounder guns at East London, with two Gatling guns. Simultaneously with the movement of the troops across the Kei and the occupation of the camp at Ibeka, on December 10th, Sir A. Cunynghame issued a general order, appointing Colonel Glyn to the command of the combined forces in the Transkei, and a new Burgher corps of cavalry and infantry was enrolled.

Many of the Galekas now submitted. On December 19th Botman, Kreli's chief Induna, surrendered at Ibeka, in the name of his tribe—and as he said, by order of Kreli ; who was hiding in the forests, being too frightened to appear. Colonel Eustace told him

that he could only accept the unconditional surrender of the Chief and his son, and the disarmament of his warriors. Three days were given them to decide. At the expiration of that time, the armistice was declared at an end.

On December 27th, a combined movement was organized to make a clean sweep of Galeka Land, by drawing a cordon of troops round the Kaffirs, with four columns. The head-quarter column was put under the command of Colonel Glyn; the left under Captain Upcher; the right under Major Hopton, and the Bashee column under Major Elliot. The forces advanced towards the Udwessa Forest, near the Bashee. On the 20th, Colonel Glyn captured 900 head of cattle, but the Galekas evaded pursuit.

Whilst the negotiation with Kreli was going on, Kiva, Kreli's general, eluding the guards at the drifts, recrossed the Kei, near the Kabousie, into the Gaika location. This step kindled into a flame the smouldering hostility of the Gaikas. On December 28, the Gaikas made a raid into Fingo Land, killing six Fingoes and assegaing a colonist. The Fingoes attempted reprisals, and fighting went on. The Gaikas even fired upon the foot-orderlies on the Kei road, near the Komgha. Major Moore, with thirty-two policemen, was sent out to guard the mails, which

the Kaffirs attacked, but were quickly repulsed. On the next day Major Moore took forty men of the 88th regiment, and twenty policemen, to escort the post; they were met on the way by about 1,000 Kaffirs, whom they drove off after a sharp conflict. The day following this occurrence, three Europeans, one of whom was Mr. Richard Tainton, a magistrate, were cruelly murdered. Several farmhouses and stores at the Komgha were at the same time burnt, and the colonists fled for protection to the towns and camps.

On the first day of the year 1878, martial law was proclaimed in the Border districts; and the Governor called upon the colonists for volunteers. General Cunynghame despatched Colonel Glyn to the scene of the fresh outbreak, to co-operate with the force moving against the Gaikas. Near the Quintana Mountain he surprised a large force of the Galekas, which was threatening Major Owen's column. The Galekas numbered from one to two thousand, while Glyn's and Owen's united forces consisted only of 500 Europeans, and 400 Fingoes. After an engagement of two hours, the Galekas were defeated with a loss of fifty of their number.

The Kaffirs next took up a position in the Chichaba, a densely wooded kloof, west of the Kei. From this they were hunted out by Colonel Lambert of the 88th

regiment, with Captain Brabant's volunteers and a number of Fingoes. One body of them made for the fastnesses of the Kabousie, the others escaping into Bomvana Land.

Towards the end of January, Gongobella, a Tembu chief, rose and was soon joined by Umfanta, a brother of Gangalezwe. In an encounter with 600 Burghers, he suffered a severe defeat, losing 100 of his followers. He then retired to a strong position at the junction of the White and Black Kei Rivers, where he baffled all attempts made to dislodge him. On February 4th, Commandant Griffith attacked him with a force of 1,200 men, divided into four columns, driving Gongobella out and effectually routing his forces. A strange desultory warfare now ensued. The enemy, always avoiding anything like a decisive encounter, moved about in detached parties, from place to place, in their mountain fastnesses. Their women and children were constantly giving themselves up in large numbers, which was a cause of great embarrassment to the Government. It was to the Kaffirs a convenient method of getting rid of an encumbrance, knowing that they would be well treated and handed back again to them on the termination of the war.

The Capetown Ministry had sadly complicated matters by removing the colonial forces from the

command of General Sir A. Cunynghame, the Queen's Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. Sir Bartle Frere very properly refused to allow this interference ; so the Molteno and Merriman Ministry was dismissed, and a new one formed with Mr. Gordon Sprigg as Premier.

Kreli and Sandilli now effected a junction of their forces, and had the audacity to attempt a combined attack upon Captain Upcher's column at Quintana. They advanced to the attack in three divisions, consisting of from four to five thousand men, in a most determined manner. This was the most decisive affair of the whole war. The enemy were defeated with a loss of five or six hundred of their number, the remainder making their escape over the Buffalo River. It was on the 7th of February that this battle of Quintana was fought ; the loss on our side was only two Fingoes killed, and five men wounded.

Sir Arthur Cunynghame's command having expired, Major-General Sir F. Theziger, now Lord Chelmsford, was appointed Commander-in-Chief. Tini Macomo, son of the Red Macomo of colonial celebrity, had now joined the revolt with a thousand followers, taking up his position in the difficult country of the Water Kloof. Colonel Palmer of the 90th Regiment was sent to Fort Beaufort, with four hundred men and

an artillery force, to conduct operations against him. This officer succeeded in clearing both the Schelm Kloof and Water Kloof, which he occupied, the Kaffirs flying after very slight resistance. Mr. W. B. Chalmers, the Special Commissioner who had accompanied the expedition, thereupon offered to the Gaikas the option of surrendering and laying down their arms. He promised them, if they did so, that he would guarantee from the Government protection for themselves and their cattle. This offer they refused, declaring that they could put no confidence in the promise of the white man. A combined attack was then made upon them, and the Kaffirs broke up entirely, retreating into the kloofs and ravines, and abandoning their cattle. The shelling of the bush brought out two hundred of their women and children, who were marched off to Fort Beaufort. Colonel Palmer, having posted strong patrols at various points to guard the approaches to their retreats, and to prevent their re-occupation of the country, returned to head-quarters.

Sandilli now sent offers to surrender and make peace. He had taken refuge in the neighbourhood of the Black Kei, with his son Matamzima, and with Gongobella. No conditions, however, were vouchsafed to him. A combined movement made against him by the colonial forces under Commandant Griffith

only had the effect of making him change his position. Suddenly, and by a clever manœuvre, he dodged back again into the Colony, where he contrived to establish himself once more in the Perie bush, a dense and almost impenetrable forest situated at the southern extremity of the Amatolas. It is only about twelve miles from King William's Town.

When news arrived of the return of the Gaikas to the Amatolas, Mr. Lonsdale, the magistrate at the Keiskamma, went out with a Fingo contingent, but was obliged to retire. Two companies of the 24th Regiment were then despatched from King William's Town, together with some volunteers. The Commander-in-Chief, Major-General Thesiger, directed the operations. The troops succeeded, by a series of forced marches, in arriving at the Perie bush before the Gaikas had time to scatter in the direction of the more remote and inaccessible parts of the Amatolas. A line of posts was established to prevent their retreat in that direction.

The Imperial forces had been joined by a body of 1,200 colonists, chiefly consisting of mounted volunteers. Notwithstanding this superior force, their efforts to dislodge a thousand Kaffirs who had taken refuge in the bush were unavailing. Captain Donovan, Lieutenant Ward, and Captain Bradshaw were

shot ; and Commandant Brabant, at the head of 150 mounted volunteers, fell into an ambuscade, and had to retire. Seyolo's and Jali's tribes, as well as Tini Macomo, now joined Sandilli, despite the cordon drawn around his position. These had been reported disaffected, and had therefore fled, from fear, probably, more than for any other reason, to the mountain stronghold. Some of them took up their position in the bush between the Debe Neck and the Tabinododa mountain, a little to the west of the Perie. An attack made on these by Colonel Warren R.E., with the Diamond Fields Horse, led to their further flight into the bush, where pursuit was impracticable.

For a while, Sandilli baffled all attempts to dislodge him ; but additional reinforcements raised General Thesiger's forces to 5,500 Europeans and 3,700 natives, with 2,000 horses and nineteen guns. The attack was again commenced with renewed vigour. Colonel Evelyn Wood, V.C., had an encounter in the bush-path, advancing from Burnshill ; Lieutenant Saltmarsh was here killed, and Captain Stevens was dangerously wounded. They drove back the Kaffirs, however, and killed several of them. During the fight, four hundred women came out of the bush, throwing themselves between the Kaffirs and the troops, thus enabling their men to escape.



After this, three or four times, Sandilli sent messengers to sue for peace; but nothing less than unconditional surrender would be accepted. The Kaffirs were now greatly disheartened. Their supplies of food had run short. They were occasionally found lying about, dead from starvation. At last both Sandilli and Dukwana, his best warrior, were killed in a skirmish with some Fingoes, in the last days of May. The old chief being dead, the defeat of the Gaikas was virtually accomplished. One by one the subordinate leaders were killed, or fell into our hands. It was like the winding up of a melodrama. Seyolo was killed fighting the volunteers; Tini Macomo, with two of the Sandilli, brother and son of the late chief, were captured, also Gongobella and Umfanta. The work of disarmament was carried out by degrees among their divided and disorganised followers. So the Gaikas, as a tribe, were at last utterly broken up. As they were disarmed, the natives were scattered about in different settled parts of the colony.

The campaign in the Transkei was meanwhile being finished in a very similar fashion. The troops were continually dispersing the remnants of the Galeka tribe there. Colonel Glyn, learning fortunately where Kreli's general Kiva had taken refuge, sent a force in command of Commandant Prattle in pursuit. They

overtook him, and he was killed, with his three brothers and two uncles. This last stroke of fate was too much for Kreli, who at length intimated that he was about to surrender. It was resolved to treat him as a State prisoner. The Galekas are still being gradually disarmed ; and both Gaikas and Galekas may be said to be utterly broken up and dispersed by the last Kaffir war, from September, 1877, to June, 1878. It was immediately followed by the annexation of all the remaining districts of Kaffraria, including the land of the Pondos, which is adjacent to the southern frontier of Natal. The British authorities here deposed Umquikela, the Pondo chief, who made no resistance; and the country on both sides of the St. John's River was taken into our possession.

It was estimated by Mr. Brownlee, the Commissioner for Native Affairs, that in this last Kaffir War there were six or seven thousand of the natives living within the colonial pale, west of the Kei, who took up arms against the British Government. The estimated number of those who did not join in the revolt was between nine and ten thousand, including those employed in our transport service, the labourers in private employment, and the people settled around missionary stations. In the work of pacification that followed, and the organisation of new direct British

rule for Galeka Land, Pondo Land, and East Griqua Land, Sir Bartle Frere was most beneficially employed during several months of last year. He was meantime frequently solicited by Sir T. Shepstone to intervene with his full authority, as High Commissioner, in the irritating land dispute between the Zulu kingdom and the administration of the Transvaal. The territorial question so long and so angrily striven about with Ketchwhy, under the Dutch and the English possessors of that country, had indeed been made the subject of an impartial arbitration, and its equitable decision was ready to be announced in July. But it was not till September 23rd, 1878, that Sir Bartle Frere arrived in Natal, for the first time in his life; and our present Zulu War then at once became imminent, where the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal was still hoping and pleading for continued peace on his own provincial frontier.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### OUR DISPUTE WITH KING KETCHWHYO.

Long-standing Transvaal disputes with Ketchwhy.—Sir Henry Bulwer disposed to friendly mediation.—He dissuades Ketchwhy from attacking the Swazies.—Rumour of atrocities in Zulu Land.—The King rejects British interference with his laws.—His angry speech.—The Transvaal boundary question.—The alleged cession of territory to the Dutch.—The English Commission of Enquiry.—Decision in favour of the Zulus.—Sir T. Shepstone now opposes the Zulu claim.—His equivocal position in the Transvaal.—Ketchwhy is “sold.”—Border disturbances.—Sir Bartle Frere already intent on conquest.—His war preparations.—His protracted controversy with the Natal Commissioners of Enquiry, and with Sir H. Bulwer.—The award rendered nugatory by impossible conditions.—The ultimatum of December 11th.—Moral responsibility for this unjust war.

THE Special Commissioner, Annexer and Administrator of the Transvaal, who had been during so many years Secretary for Native Affairs in Natal, held in his hands a bundle of threads of South African policy; one end of which was attached to the inconvenient Republic of the Dutch Boers, and the other to “Somtseu’s” adopted royal “son,” the Zulu King Ketchwhy. This was an “open secret” not officially to be noticed at the Colonial

Office, but well understood by those who had watched the progress of affairs ; and it is the key to some past transactions related in former chapters, and possibly to some future events which now appear to be looming in the political horizon.

The deceased Republican Government, which showed its fatal imprudence in so many ways, committed a huge mistake in August, 1875, when it sent a rather stern message to Zulu Land requiring Ketchwhy to pledge his word that he would not interfere with the Amaswazi, and to prevent his subjects trespassing on Dutch territory, and to deliver up murderers who got across his frontier. Mr. Shepstone's remark at the time was that he did not believe the Transvaal Government was in circumstances which would enable it to go to war against the Zulu King, or that it had any serious intention of doing so, but this message would have an irritating effect. His view of it was correct ; the causes of that dispute were already familiar to the Natal Government. One was the position of the Swazi people, over whom, as subjects of Chaka's historic Empire, Ketchwhy always claimed a sovereign title, and in whose blood, as he often said, he wished his young warriors to "wash their spears." They had preferred to put themselves under a Protectorate latterly extended to them by the Transvaal

Republic, which soon after this date, as we have seen, borrowed the aid of their ferocious valour in its war against Secocooni. The Dutchmen, following the English example with a formal coronation of their special *protégé*, installed a king of the Amaswazi, as Ketchwhyó had been crowned by Mr. Shepstone. They either instigated or allowed him to order all Zulus to withdraw from his dominion—which lay north of the Pongolo river. Here was a great insult to his Zulu Majesty; but there was another substantial matter of contention. This concerned the sovereignty of that portion of territory in the Utrecht district, north-west of Zulu Land, between the Buffalo and the Pongolo, which had for some years past been occupied by Dutch farmers. The Boers declared that it had been ceded to them by Panda, and that Ketchwhyó, then heir apparent, was party to the cession, as it were cutting off the entail. It has long been much more than a mere land dispute; to the King it became a point of honour, and to his Indunas or Council of State one of national policy. This is the leading question that has pervaded all the relations between the Zulu kingdom and the actual possessors of the Transvaal. We have taken it over along with the other responsibilities, a *damnosa hereditas* if ever there was, bequeathed to Her

Majesty's Government by the late independent Free State which we smothered with a paper proclamation two years ago.

Before Sir T. Shepstone's visit to England and conferences with the Earl of Carnarvon in 1876, the Lieutenant-Governor of Natal was taking pains, in a strictly impartial and friendly spirit, upon the information supplied by Sir T. Shepstone, to preserve peace between his two northern neighbours. He addressed counsels of moderation both to Ketchwhy and to the Government at Pretoria, endeavouring to put before each the most favourable construction of the other's motives, while he kept Lord Carnarvon informed of their dispute. During the absence of Sir T. Shepstone, the Lieutenant-Governor still watched every indication of the Zulu King's state of mind, employing Mr. Osborn and others to inquire about the affairs of that country. Messages were now and then exchanged through Mr. John Dunn, and by natives sent to and fro. Mr. Dunn wrote out for Ketchwhy a rather vague statement and argument upon the territorial question, which was early forwarded to the Colonial Office. Native messengers from Natal reported that the King talked of asking leave to attack some other tribe, he did not say whom, but they thought he meant the Swazies.

They learned that guns were now cheap in Zulu Land, and to be bought for calves; not only the young men had got them, but also the young women about the King's Kraal, who shot very well, killing numbers of birds. It appeared that some Zulus had been with the Bapedi in the Transvaal fighting, but these were only small detached parties on their own private account. Ketchwhyho was in correspondence with Secocooni. Sir H. Bulwer was also somewhat apprehensive of the "uneasy, restless, warlike feeling" in the Zulu nation, and of its exasperation against the Boers. He was requested in September by President Burgers to use his friendly influence and prevent Ketchwhyho making an attack upon the Swazies. In reply to further admonitions of the Lieutenant-Governor, Ketchwhyho said that he had not done anything which the Natal Government would think wrong, as he knew the Englishmen were just and peace-loving, and he looked on them as his fathers, but he could not understand why they would not give him leave to wash his spears, according to the custom of kings. The messengers on their road were told stories of the putting to death of girls and young men, and of the girls' parents, for disobeying the laws with regard to marriage. Sir Henry Bulwer inquired about this, but got no sub-



stantial evidence of the fact; he nevertheless sent to Ketchwhyho expressing a hope that such rumours were not true, and reminding him of the counsels given to him by Sir T. Shepstone at his coronation.

It was near the end of October, 1876, that this admonition was delivered. Upon that single occasion, as the native messengers reported on their return to Natal, Ketchwhyho vented his anger in a haughty and violent declaration that he would kill—he had never promised Mr. Shepstone not to kill—it was the custom of his nation—he had scarcely yet begun to kill. “Why do the white people start at nothing?” he asked. “Why does the Governor of Natal speak to me about my laws? Do I go to Natal and dictate to him about his laws? I wish to be friends with the English, but I will not agree to give my people over to be governed by laws or rules from Natal. I do kill; my people will not listen unless they are killed. Am I to throw the large kraal which I govern into the water? These white men treat me like a child, and keep playing with me. Go back and tell the English I shall now act on my own account. Rather than agree to their laws, I shall leave and become a wanderer; but I shall not go without having acted, and before I go it will be seen. Go back and tell the white men this, and let them hear it well. The

Governor of Natal and I are equal ; he is Governor of Natal, and I am Governor here." Such language might not be deemed unkingly, if it were not associated with the practice of cruelty and tyranny in his own dominions. But Mr. Osborn, at Newcastle, heard about this time those terrible reports, which have never been precisely framed, of the putting of young women to death in Zulu Land. He also heard that the King had been reproved by his brother Uhamu, who had in vain begged him to spare his people. "My own notion," says Mr. Osborn, "is that rum from Umhlati is to blame for all this." It was so with King Theodore of Abyssinia, and so it might possibly be with King Ketchwhy. But his ordinary personal demeanour, and his discourse before English visitors, have never been defiant or insolent ; and he has usually professed a great aversion to killing people except in war, or in the execution of sorcerers and other criminals. An interesting narrative which Bishop Colenso sent to "Macmillan's Magazine," of the conversations of a Christian Zulu with his Majesty in June, 1877, contrasts favourably with the outburst of passing rage and sudden fierceness just now reported. Sir H. Bulwer indeed regarded his language to these messengers as betokening a changed temper and war-like intention. "He has not only been preparing for

war apparently, but he has been sounding the way for a combination of the native races against the white men." That was Sir Henry's impression in November, 1876, but he observed that such a combination might or might not be possible among the different chiefs; and the Indunas at the court of Ketchwhy would dissuade him from any action likely to offend the English Government. It is observable that Mr. John W. Shepstone, then acting in his father's place as Native Affairs Secretary, states that the uncompromising speech in which Ketchwhy told the messengers he would not attend to English remonstrances about killing his own people was not uttered in the presence of any of the Zulu Indunas, or of the Princes, his brothers. Hence the leading men of the Zulu nation would probably not consider it a regular formal answer, or a deliberate act of the King's Government. It stands quite alone in the history of his past dealings with the official representatives of Great Britain. It may have been a casual display of intemperance, or of a passionate mood that day; for he said, a few days after that, "I have not got all I want, but it is peace."

In letters dated a fortnight later, Sir Henry speaks of Zulu warlike preparations against the Swazies, and of Ketchwhy's attempt to get Mr. Rudolph, who had

gone to him about the boundary question, to consent to his attacking that nation. This at first seemed inexplicable, for Mr. Rudolph was an official of the Transvaal Republic; but it presently appeared that Ketchwhyho had mistaken him for an envoy of the Natal Government, in whose service he had been at a former period. Sir T. Shepstone, however, was then on his voyage back to Africa, with his secret instructions by which the Transvaal Republic, and its existing claims, whatever they might be worth, should be converted into what we call British interests. Neither Ketchwhyho nor Sir Henry Bulwer had the slightest notion of such an intended transformation.

The result, in any case, of all that had transpired at the end of that year, was to give a strong colour to the opinion that the Zulu King meant to provoke and challenge a war against the Transvaal Republic; and this was doubtless the forcible argument by which Sir T. Shepstone convinced the Dutch Government at Pretoria, between January and April, that they could not resist annexation to the British Empire. He then assumed the rank and power of Administrator, or actual Governor of the Transvaal. Having to act in a different capacity, on behalf of different public interests, his attitude towards the Zulu Kingdom and other

Native interests was necessarily all at once changed. This appeared in subsequent novel developments of the disputed territorial question, till the award by which it ought to have been settled last year.

The grounds of that question are very precisely shown, with an elaborate analysis of the whole of the evidence collected, in the Report, dated June 20th, 1878, of the Commissioners of Inquiry appointed by Sir Henry Bulwer; which Report, with his own thoughtful comments and earnest recommendations, was in July forwarded by the Lieutenant-Governor to Sir Bartle Frere and to the Secretary of State.

It related especially to a tract of country, about eighty miles in extreme length and sixty miles in greatest breadth, situated east of the Blood river, which flows from north to south, and joins the Buffalo a little above Rorke's Drift. The country west of the Blood river is the district of Utrecht, concerning which also the Commissioners reported, but that was not so much in dispute. To the north of the above-mentioned tract of country is the large river Pongolo, flowing eastward and forming the northern boundary, as generally reputed, of the Zulu kingdom. A line of some hundred and twenty miles' length had to be drawn across, from the boundary of Natal, which is the Buffalo river above Rorke's Drift, to strike the

Pongolo. The drawing of this line, whether it should closely follow up the course of the Blood river, or this or that tributary stream, or whether it should be carried far away to the eastward, taking a large piece of territory from the Zulu kingdom, was the proper subject of this inquiry.

The Transvaal Dutch Republic had long claimed this piece of territory, in addition to the Utrecht district, under two alleged formal cessions by the Zulu King, the one in 1854, the other in 1861. It was agreed by everybody that the whole country belonged to the Zulus before either Natal or the Transvaal came into European possession, as both the Dutch and the English made treaties with the Zulus for their respective boundaries. In 1847, five Dutch farmers of Natal went over the Buffalo, and got from King Panda a license to occupy some of the grazing lands on the Zulu side. It was alleged that Panda ceded to these men, in 1854, all the country between the Buffalo and the Blood river, nearly a hundred miles each way, for the price of a hundred head of cattle. This deed of cession, with Panda's signature, which was not witnessed, is rejected by the Commissioners as a forgery. But the portion of country just mentioned, west of the Blood river, has become the settled and inhabited district of Utrecht, with a town of that name, which in

1859 was incorporated with the Transvaal Republic. It has never been proposed to restore that portion to the Zulus.

In 1861, a commission appointed by the Dutch Commonwealth for the purpose had some negotiations with Ketchwhy, who already grasped the ruling power in his father's lifetime. Panda had left his former alliance with the Boers, and had turned to the English of Natal. The Boers now, therefore, proposed to get Ketchwhy appointed his future successor, and meantime lawful regent, in order that he might be subservient to the Transvaal Government. They wanted, in fact, to do for the ambitious and energetic young Prince neither more nor less than what Mr. Shepstone presently contrived to do for him—to make him their puppet and tool. An officious Dutchman, instead of the Englishman, would then have paid his respects to King Panda; and would have procured from his Zulu Majesty, as Mr. Shepstone did, the honorary privilege of "personating Chaka," so that he might be qualified, as putative great ancestor of the Royal House, to occupy the post of guardian or "father" of Ketchwhy during his minority. And so, after the death of old Panda, in 1873, it would have been the Special Commissioner from the Transvaal Republic, instead of Mr. Shepstone from Natal, that would have

attended as "Chief Witness," and would have performed the Coronation ceremony.

Here let us sorrowfully observe that it seems to be by this paltry, mean, unworthy diplomatic rivalry between certain foreign-influence pretensions, belonging respectively to the Natal and the Transvaal Government, during the past eighteen years, that all the mischief among the Zulus has been caused. The opportunities of jointly exercising a just, wholesome, liberal civilizing and Christianizing influence by the faithful co-operation of the English and Dutch Governments have been sadly wasted. I fear, too, that the character of white men for truthfulness, integrity, and fair dealing, as well as the prestige of European knowledge and power, has been somewhat obscured in the native mind, both these civilised nations seeming ever intent on defaming and supplanting one another by underhand intrigues.

The Transvaal Dutchmen of 1861, who were not at all scrupulous, would have bought Ketchwhyó as cheap as they could, and the public rights of his kingdom into the bargain. He for his part wanted their help to recapture two of his brothers and two other Zulu chiefs who had resisted his title to rule. How much that title of Ketchwhyó's Regency was then worth, until it had been formally confirmed by Panda,



it is not easy to say ; but I have elsewhere cited Mr. Grout's statement, that the Great Assembly of the Chiefs in 1857 had already appointed him. It does not follow that Ketchwhy was competent in 1861 to cede public rights. The Transvaal people affirm that on the 3rd of April, 1861, at Sirayo's kraal on the Bashee, near Rorke's Drift, their Border Commissioners, P. Joordaan, G. M. Smuts, and F. Du Plessis, with D. A. Sandbrink, secretary, met Ketchwhy accompanied by his brother Uhamu and two of his captains ; having six days previously negotiated the business with Zulu plenipotentiaries. They produced a document, purporting to be signed by Ketchwhy and the others, which cedes to the Transvaal that large tract of country east of the Blood river ; the nominal payment for which, they say, was twenty-five cows and a bull, with a saddled and bridled horse ; but the delivery of his rebellious brothers, whose lives he promised to spare, was the real consideration. The signatures to this deed were not witnessed by any Zulus ; nor is there any record of the paper having been read over and explained to Ketchwhy, and the secretary, D. A. Sandbrink, does not know the Zulu language. Another document which is put in to support the cession being a pretended authorisation from Panda, has been clearly detected as a fabrication, for it refers

to the presence of Sir T. Shepstone, who was not there at the date. The next step is alleged to have been a confirmation by King Panda, on the 5th of August, of the cession of land said to have been made by Ketchwhy on the 3rd of April; "so far as his captains would point it out;" that is to say, the boundary of the ceded land was to be precisely ascertained. This document is said to have been interpreted by T. Potgieter to Panda, and signed by the old king in presence of three Dutchmen; but it appears that Potgieter cannot speak Zulu. Panda repeatedly denied, at a later period, and so did all his councillors, that he had ever agreed to such a transaction. But in December, 1864, there was a meeting of Dutch commissioners with two Zulus, Gebula and Gunjini, on the boundary line, to place "beacons" or piles of stones all along the proposed frontier, from the Buffalo to the Pongolo. The two Zulus were taken as representatives of Panda and Ketchwhy, but there is no proof that Panda had appointed either of them. They were persons of no importance among the Zulus. The Transvaal President, Martinus Pretorius, with Paul Kruger and Joseph Fourie, of the Executive Council, and with P. Joordaan, was present at the outset. But these did not accompany the two Van Staadens, Commissioners, with the two Zulus, along the new boundary