

a single and united great clan to contend with, in these districts the numerous strongholds afforded by dense forests and deep ravines which border the Keiskamma and Fish Rivers, and the vast natural fastness formed by the numerous deep precipitous and densely-wooded ravines which radiate from the central summit of the Kroome Mountain, furnish almost inaccessible dens and lurking places for large bands of lawless, well-armed, and desperate marauders, the most formidable of which consist of vagrant Tambookies and rebel Hottentots; but besides them, the Kafir Chief Macomo, who claims the Kroome range as his property, is still with his people in occupation of the Waterkloof and Fuller's Hoek; and Seyolo is as yet in undisturbed possession of his wooded kloofs on the Keiskamma, near Line Drift, which direct passage between Graham's Town and King Wilham's Town he has held closed for the last fifteen months. So active and enterprising are these marauders, that it is not safe to ride two miles from this place without arms, and in sufficient numbers to afford mutual support; and no one can travel, except at great risk, without an escort, from hence to Graham's Town.

In order to improve this state of things, and to separate duties of internal police, having in view protection of lives and property, from the military duties which call for employment of disciplined soldiers against an enemy in the field, and effectual support to the civil power when necessary, I have already prepared since my arrival here a draft of a General Order, a copy of which is enclosed, for the formation of a powerful mounted police, to be at the disposal of the civil commissioners of the disturbed districts, to patrol roads and intercept marauders, as well as to protect property; and if the right men can be obtained, of which I have little doubt, if they be vigilant, understand their duty, and be properly made use of, I have every reason to hope, that by giving alarm, and calling upon neighbouring farmers, both of Dutch and British origin, who are all armed and mounted, and willing and ready, a sufficient internal

protection may be obtained, without frequent call for military aid, and the necessity for numerous detachments.

This organisation will, if it succeeds, enable me gradually to dispense with numerous levies of a most expensive and inefficient description, being half military and half civil, mixed and scattered through the country, and entirely out of control, yet having claims for bounty, clothing, rations for themselves and families, loss of horses, shoeing, saddlery, and numerous other small charges, for which, being bargains on enlistment, and resting on General Orders and precedent of my predecessor, when vouched for by the civil commissioners, who have themselves but little knowledge or control, there is seldom any course open to me but to give my warrant for payment.

But here I beg to observe, that although I cannot avoid pointing out existing inconveniences in their full force, in order to show the object and necessity for measures by which I propose to remove them, I do not impute any blame to my predecessor for their existence, for the state of things I have described arose out of sudden emergencies and unavoidable necessity, and I have no doubt, when time would allow it, he would have adopted the same, or, possibly, better measures with the same view.

By the system of contract which I propose with the man for his services, his horse, food, raiment, forage, lodging, in short, everything, , without any opening for after claims of any sort. Although the daily rate of pay or wages may appear high, it will not prove expensive in the end.

But I have another most important consideration in view in the establishment of this local police force for purely local purposes of protection and security of lives and property; that is, that when once duly organised, and its benefits felt, as I have reason to hope they will, it may be easily transferred to the entire management and maintenance of the civil government, to which it properly belongs, and may be a permanent means of obliging those who live in more favoured districts to contri-

bute more adequately to the protection of their less fortunate fellow-colonists.

I have sent copies of the draft of my proposed General Order to the several civil commissioners, to ask for further suggestions and opinions on the subject; and all those civil commissioners, field cornets, and others with whom I have had as yet an opportunity of conversing on the subject, seem to approve entirely, and desire the measure.

The removal of my stationary head-quarters to this place, which has for its object the more convenient base, both in a military and civil point of view, from whence I can superintend all the important frontier concerns which require my immediate attention, with equal advantage, has been duly appreciated by the inhabitants of the districts within the colony; and I have received, within a few days after my arrival, several deputations of burghers, as well as settlers of British origin, many from great distances, who came to hail my coming amongst them, and to lay their grievances and requirements respectfully before me. We met cordially, and I listened attentively to all they had to say, carrying on the dialogue with those of Dutch origin through the medium of a very good interpreter; and I have reason to think,—although in answer to many points adduced I could only answer, that a parliament being about to be established, I could make no new laws by my own ordinance to meet their requirements, and that they would henceforward have a great share in legislating for themselves,—I would use all my influence in support of those measures which would be, in my opinion, conducive to their benefit. I have reason to think that they are convinced of the truth that my coming here at all is only with a view to doing my best for their benefit.

With regard to the Kat River settlement, and the investigation of that subject, I must wait for the return of my two Assistant Commissioners (with whom I think of associating Mr. Calderwood, civil commissioner at Alice) from their mission to the Sovereignty. The death of the old Mr. Read, the

missionary, which has occurred within these few days, has, I am told, rather favoured the prospects of a satisfactory investigation, by liberating testimony which otherwise might not have been freely given. But of the truth of this I can form no opinion, and I avoid in any manner prejudging the question.

I will not further lengthen this despatch respecting the affairs of the frontier districts within the colony, as my personal observation extends to little more than one week; and I will reserve my report on numerous other topics, concerning which I have not yet had time to form a confirmed opinion, till the next opportunity.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

The Right Hon. Sir John S. Pakington, Bart.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieut.-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir JOHN S. PAKINGTON, Bart

Fort Beaufort, May 20, 1852.

SIR,—From the circumstance of my relief of my predecessor happening to take place at King William's Town, my first personal observation was directed to the district of British Kaffraria, comprised between the Keiskamma and Kei Rivers.

Another despatch will more particularly report the military circumstances connected with this country, in which the war commenced, and has not yet been brought to a termination; and I propose to devote this more particularly to the political state of things within it, and the great value and capabilities which I believe it to possess, as well as some measures which I consider of immediate interest in order to provide for the maintenance of peace when the war may be brought to a close. I find that this comparatively small district of country

is perhaps more favoured by nature in respect to fertility, abundance of water, and capability of improvement, than any other part of Her Majesty's colonial possessions in South Africa. It possesses also a seaport at the mouth of the Buffalo River (East London), which, though far from being a good one, is the best on the extensive line of coast comprised between Natal and Simon's Bay, and which has proved perfectly efficient for commissariat purposes, and the landing of troops and horses, without an accident, during this war, and is capable of improvement; and, as I think, this port may, I would almost say must, become in due course of time one of the principal commercial outlets, not only of this district itself, but of those beyond the Orange River.

The acquirement of this territory, as you are aware, was a measure of policy originally considered under the government of the late Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and the object seems to have been the establishment of a better frontier to the colony, by an extension of territory to the river Kei.

I will not attempt to discuss the various opinions on the merits of this question. My own opinion as to the abstract view of a choice of a defensible frontier is, that in the existing state of things the advantage that may be gained from the removal of Her Majesty's dominions from the Keiskamma to the Kei, is, that future border forays and depredations may, so long as colonists of European origin are, as at present, debarred from promiscuous settlement among the natives in this district, take place between Kafir and Kafir, instead of between Kafir and colonist, which is a preferable state of things, and more easily managed. Generally speaking, when a territory is extended, the new frontier may for a time prove more easily defensible; but the increased distances for commissariat supplies, and the greater extent of front which expansion exposes, are inconveniences which are apt to neutralise that benefit. In the case, however, of British Kaffraria, I am inclined to think that, from the accidental circumstance of the great capabilities

of the country acquired, its own resources may, if properly managed, ultimately prove more than a compensation for the usual inconveniences of extension of territory.

This tract of country, as you are aware, is inhabited by clans of a remarkable race called Kafirs, each clan having a chief, who is assisted in governing by a council, and owning a certain portion of territory within defined limits.

These hereditary chiefs are, with but one exception, all descendants from the same patriarchal or royal progenitor, and they are all, therefore, related; but as their traditions do not extend back beyond three generations, and appear to centre in one common origin at that day, there is little doubt they came from some distant country, and obtained possession of their present territory by right of conquest, under a chief whose name is supposed to have been Kosa, as they call themselves Amakosa, the prefix Ama constituting the plural, and the designation Kafir is an Arabic nickname, signifying infidel, and not in use in their own language.

The present paramount chief of the whole race is Kreili, who resides on the farther side of the Kei, and, therefore, not being Her Majesty's subject, our relations with him are of a diplomatic character. We are still at war with him, my predecessor having invaded his territory to punish him for aiding and abetting the rebel Chief Sandilli; but though he has not complied with the terms dictated by Sir Harry Smith, he has not openly interfered, as far as I can find, in the contest since my arrival. A copy of a message I have recently sent him is enclosed; and I did not send it till I had satisfied myself I could enforce the threat it contains. The measure to which it alludes would be more effectual than another expedition of Her Majesty's troops across the Kei, and save the enormous expense of wear and tear.

By a certain declaration or oath made before my predecessor as High Commissioner, of which they recognise the validity, they hold themselves bound in allegiance to Her Majesty; and

in justice it must be admitted that this remarkable people have a strong sense of the moral obligation of good faith, and if they enter into any engagement at all are seldom found to promise one thing and do another.

This territory being beyond the colonial border, and having been found exclusively in possession of, and inhabited by, one race of people, though divided into clans, and under a sort of feudal organisation, having peculiar usages, some objectionable and absurd, but others of sufficient efficacy to place the powers of government and rude justice in the hands of the chief and his amapakati, or counsellors, it was, I think, judiciously arranged that this new acquisition to Her Majesty's possessions should not be annexed to the colony for the present, or any attempt made to subject it to colonial laws; and that no settlement of colonists of European race should be allowed to establish themselves, but that under British sovereign rule the chiefs should govern their respective clans with as little interference as might be consistent with the general interests of the newly-constituted Sovereignty, and with a due regard to the main object of its acquisition, viz. a medium under British control to be interposed between the colony and the less manageable, because independent, tribes beyond the limits of Her Majesty's dominions.

Therefore, since no statutes or laws can be made applicable to so rude a state of society, until civilisation shall gradually work its way amongst them, martial law, by which I understand arbitrary power entrusted to an officer in chief command, for the just exercise of which he is, however, responsible, is the only institution applicable to the purpose of its supreme government. This, I believe, to have been the theory of the measure of annexation.

So fully do I recognise the wisdom of this original theory, that my own line of conduct, now that the responsibility has devolved on me, will be entirely based upon it; and this course appears to be in accordance with the spirit of my instructions.

As there are so many confused and contradictory versions of the history and state of society of this people now current, I have thought it indispensable to make you acquainted with that which, from personal investigation, I believe to be the correct one, and which must at all events govern my policy in respect to it, as far as it rests on my own responsibility in this portion of my extensive trust.

I am inclined to think that some inadvertent or injudicious cases of departure from the theory of government I have adverted to have furnished useful lessons by their results, to warn and guide me back into a steady course of policy suited to the present circumstances; and I have guarded against any premature interference with or disparagement of the authority and influence of chiefs in respect to the government of their clans, because I am convinced that to remove one means of governing before you can possibly supply its place by another can only be productive of anarchy; whereas, if the chief be supported in the government of his clan, it is easy to govern the chief and his people through him.

The present war commenced with the deposition of the chief of the Gaika branch of the Amakosa family, or Kafir people. His immediate relations and sub-chiefs, with their followers, have adhered, and still adhere religiously, to his cause.

It is unnecessary for me to enter into the *casus belli*; but the rebellion and guilt of the Gaika chiefs and their followers are established by their harbouring and associating with deserters and rebellious Hottentots, and causing much expense of blood and money in the prosecution of their rebellion; and as they are a peculiarly warlike and restless race, the future peace of the community demands their permanent expulsion from the strongholds which they have hitherto possessed in the Amatola Mountains, and which have proved the citadel which effectually commands all the surrounding districts of country which lie at their base. I am now in permanent pos-

session of more than two-thirds of this natural citadel, and hope soon to effect the expulsion of the chief and his followers, who still occupy the north-western corner, into which they have retired, and then take means for its permanent and complete occupation.

The enterprising and warlike sub-chief Seyolo, who still inhabits his own small territory on the Keiskamma, who commands as yet the passage of that river by Line Drift, and who has as yet been but little molested, must then be dealt with; but I am taking previous measures for the permanent occupation of his territory by the establishment of a post on the Temacha River, which will in a great degree command it, before I resort to means of ejection; for such measures are worse than useless, unless some effectual and permanent result can be expected from them.

The T'Slambie branches of the great Amakosa family, who inhabit the whole sea-board of British Kaffraria, and one who borders on the Kei, have fortunately remained faithful to their allegiance throughout the war. Their fidelity is mainly to be attributed to the excellent management and personal influence of the T'Slambie Commissioner, Captain Maclean, whom I cannot too strongly recommend to your favourable notice; for, but for this circumstance, the whole territory must at the first outbreak have been abandoned.

I have taken measures, which will be sufficiently explained by some enclosures in this despatch, to confirm and establish this most essential good understanding; and I have reason to believe they have been attended with success; but if the great natural citadel of the Amatolas be secured, the other countries are much more manageable, and a comparatively small force, with a proportion of cavalry, concentrated at King Wilham's Town, would effectually control them.

I come now to the important consideration of what is to be done ultimately for the permanent occupation of this territory;

and this question, from what I have already said, I think will appear to centre in the permanent occupation of the Amatola district.

I am not called upon in my instructions to report prospectively on this head till after the present war shall have been brought to an end, and it might be considered premature my attempting to do so now; but since, after the most careful consideration on the spot, as the measures I am about to advert to require consideration, and if conceived practicable and expedient would take time in preparation for carrying them into effect, I think it right to lose none in submitting them.

It is evident that the forcible ejection of a powerful and warlike people from a country to which they are attached, of which they well know the great value in respect to its own natural resources, and the great influence it gives to the possessors over all surrounding districts, can only be rendered permanent by the occupation of it by some superior power.

This can be, and nearly is at this time, accomplished by military occupation; but not less than 3000 regular troops, with certainty of further military support in case of emergency, could hold it so as to keep the old possessors out of it, and prevent perpetual attempts for its recovery, at least for many years to come; so that this would imply a permanent military force of at least 5000 men for the security of British Kaffraria, exclusive of what might be required in the eastern district of the colony.

Occupation, therefore, by colonists, under some sufficient military organisation for mutual defence, with a comparatively small regular force of Her Majesty's troops for their support, appeared to me as worthy of consideration.

British military pensioners have been tried in this country, have proved a failure, and in two out of three villages which were established close to the border nearly all the male inhabitants were murdered at the opening of this war. Although I am inclined to think the precaution of establishing some

rallying post in the midst of each of these villages might have effectually prevented that calamity, the intemperate and idle habits of too many of the class of British military pensioners, and a natural carelessness and contempt of danger, would render them unfit to be placed with safety in an Alpine district, the nature of which renders constant vigilance peculiarly essential to security.

Ordinary settlers could not be brought together in villages and compact communities, or collected simultaneously in sufficient number to form a settlement, neither could they be made amenable to the control and restraints essential to their own interests.

To place a concentrated population of the now dispersed race of Fingoes there is another expedient that has occurred to me. This people, who at present live in separate tribes, and have been scattered in distinct and separate locations, in order to avoid the danger of a powerful and united nation within the colony, have behaved always faithfully, and often nobly, as armed levies in aid of Her Majesty's troops in this war.

Their location in the Amatolas, under long-continued and powerful military support from Her Majesty's regular troops, might be practicable. But, should that support be withdrawn, or even reduced beyond a certain point, a war between the Fingoes and the Kafirs would immediately take place, in which the more powerful and warlike race of Kafirs, uniting in one common cause of national hostility, would be almost certain to prevail against the Fingoes, and be likely to involve the British nation in a war which would probably be more formidable and difficult to deal with than the present one; besides which, even should the Fingoes be able to maintain themselves, and fill the magnificent pastures of the Amatola districts with their cattle, they would be totally unproductive.

The Fingoes, as indeed do the Kafirs, keep enormous herds of cattle for no use whatever. They very rarely kill any for food; they make no trade in hides, and they will not even sell

an ox ; but their object of pride is to possess the largest quantity of cattle, which they count and gloat upon as a miser does on his hoarded treasure.

Another expedient, however, suggested itself to me by accident, previously to my leaving England, and though I had not time to consider it then, and had not the advantage of local observation which I now possess, appeared to me to be so well worthy of consideration that I submitted it privately to Earl Grey, who also was of opinion that it merited consideration.

This was a project for raising two Swiss rifle regiments of 700, or, I should say, 1000 men each, with a view to colonisation after the war is ended ; a sort of military organisation for mutual support and defence.

I will not add unnecessarily to the length of this despatch, which is already longer than I could wish, by entering into details of this project, for no doubt the only information I possess as to the feasibility of the plan, copies of which I gave to Earl Grey, are to be found in the Colonial Office. I, however, enclose a copy of a memorandum I gave to his Lordship on this subject, in case the original should have been mislaid.

From what I have seen, the country is so analogous to Switzerland, and so capable of feeding sheep as well as cattle on the most luxuriant pastures, and abounding with the finest water, I am convinced that such a colony, if it could be formed, would not only flourish and maintain itself, but prove the means of rendering this territory ultimately remunerative, instead of a burden to the British nation, and serve at little expense as a secure barrier for the protection of this portion of the extensive frontier of Her Majesty's South African dominion.

I enclose a printed copy of a Proclamation which I gave on assuming the responsibility of the government of British Kaffraria under martial law, the heading of which is new, and contains some provisions I have made for the more convenient

and effectual management of the affairs of this infant government, and to prevent any mistake as to its being as yet distinct from the colony, and under Her Majesty's entire control.

I have, &c.,

GEO. CATHCART, Governor and
High Commissioner.

The Right Hon. Sir J. Pakington, &c. &c. &c.

ENCLOSURES.

Memorandum.

“ Quere.”

1. Whether it might be practicable to raise two battalions, of 1,000 men each, in Switzerland, with a view to serving Her Britannic Majesty, duly enrolled and under allegiance in Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa, under arrangements of which the following may be considered as the outlines.

2. Arms, rifles, made in Switzerland, of one uniform calibre would be desirable, such as the men are accustomed to use, but calculated for light voltigeur service.

3. Ditto, equipments of every description complete.

4. Clothing to be green or dark stone colour, and with no bright ornaments, but plain, suitable for light infantry.

5. The men to be young, i.e., between the age of twenty and forty, and for the most part married, and with small families not exceeding three children.

6. An assurance or certificate that each man knows the use of his rifle.

7. What would be the probable cost, including bounty on enlistment, journey to the “ rendezvous ” in England, at which they would embark for the Cape.

8. To have their passage provided for themselves and families to the Cape in good ships, with rations, &c.

9. To be entitled to pay, till the end of the present frontier contest, at the rate paid Her Majesty's regular troops, and for one year after at the same.

10. The families, as well as the soldiers themselves, to receive rations till the end of the present contest, and so long as active field service may be required, and for one year after, at the usual rates for Her Majesty's troops in the colonies.

11. Subsequently to have contiguous grants of land so appor-
tioned as to secure the formation of townships sufficiently united,
and so disposed as to ensure mutual military support for self-de-
fence after the actual warfare shall have ceased.

12. The wives and children and property to be in security and
good shelter until the time shall come for the formation of the
settlements, with rations as above provided.

13. When the settlements are assigned, each man to have a couple
of cows given him.

14. To be assisted by the Home Government in building their
houses, also towers or blockhouses requisite for the security of each
township, which last would be occupied militarily so long as may be
necessary during the formation of the townships, either by a small
portion of the battalions retained on pay, or by Her Majesty's
troops.

15. That they should be bound, as the tenure of their property,
to do military service for the protection of the frontier, and subject
to such militia regulations as might be framed, but only for local
service, and not to be removed from the neighbourhood of their
townships so as at any time to endanger their security; and, when
so called upon, to receive pay.

No terms are herein considered as to the officers. It would be
desirable that they should be Swiss gentlemen, and that ultimately
they should form the chief persons and magistrates in the respec-
tive settlements and townships, with powers to direct measures
necessary for the common protection and security of their respective
municipalities, and with all the rights and functions belonging to
others of Her Majesty's subjects who are placed in a similar posi-
tion. The particulars as to equipment, "rendezvous," passage, set-
tlement, &c. &c., would be on the same principle as that above
sketched as relative to the men; but a detailed project, embracing
every particular and probable cost in these respects, would be desir-
able as a proposal for consideration and further adjustment.

The district of British Kaffraria, and especially the Amatolas, is
peculiarly suited for this purpose; and, not forming part of the
colony of the Cape of Good Hope, but retained under Her Ma-
jesty's special control, and there being no colonists of British origin
as yet allowed to settle in it, except within the reserved area of cer-
tain military posts, it would be perfectly easy to give to a national
community of the description proposed the municipal institutions
and laws analogous to those to which they are accustomed.

Proclamation.

By the High Commissioner of British Kaffraria, and Commander-in-Chief of all Her Majesty's Forces in South Africa, by virtue of the authority vested in him.

It is hereby ordered, that the Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria, acting under the authority of the High Commissioner, shall, as regards the town of King William's Town and its surrounding jurisdiction, and the several posts where inhabitants of European origin are allowed to reside, be assisted by a Board of three or more officers of Her Majesty's service, to be appointed by the High Commissioner, in all matters which may tend to the maintenance of good order, the improvement of the place, its revenues and resources, and the condition of its inhabitants generally, provided that in all such matters they shall conform to the spirit and meaning of the following regulations, and abstain from all questions of a political or military nature, which rest on the responsibility of the High Commissioner or Chief Commissioner in the one case, and the Commander-in-Chief or senior military officer in the other. It being also understood that in all cases beyond what may be considered ordinary municipal matters, for which a general deputed authority may suffice, or such as may be already provided for in the following regulations, in which cases a special exertion of the authority of martial law being necessary, and the urgency of the occasion not conveniently admitting of previous reference to the High Commissioner, then, should the Chief Commissioner, or deputy during his absence, not be a military officer, or, being a military officer, not at the time senior in command in King William's Town, he will obtain the approval of the senior officer in command previously to any such act being carried into effect under the authority of martial law.

All money derived from licences, fines, or any other sources of inland public revenue whatsoever within British Kaffraria will be paid into the military chest at King William's Town, to be called Kaffrarian Ordinary Fund, and all money derived from the sale of captured cattle, or any other extraordinary source, being public money, will in like manner be paid into the military chest at King William's Town, and called the Kaffrarian Extraordinary Fund. No disbursements will be made from either of these funds, except on the warrant of the High Commissioner, or in his absence of the Chief Commissioner, or in his absence of the deputy duly appointed by the High Commissioner to act in his stead.

Estimates of perspective expenditure, accounts of past disbursements, and a general balance sheet of the state of the Kaffrarian funds, after they shall have been prepared by the Chief Commissioner, assisted by the Board, and countersigned by two members of the Board, will be submitted by the Chief Commissioner for the approval of the High Commissioner, quarterly, with a Report explanatory as to experience of the advantages gained by measures carried into effect during the past quarter, and reasonable anticipation of advantages to be derived from measures proposed for the ensuing quarter.

No public or official communication whatsoever shall be made to the Colonial Government of the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, or to any functionary of the said Government, by the Chief Commissioner of British Kaffraria, or, in his absence, by his deputy duly appointed, on matters of internal government or finance, otherwise than through the High Commissioner.

Given under my hand at King William's Town, this 3rd day of May, 1852.

GEORGE CATHCART,
Lieutenant-General,
High Commissioner.

George Mackinnon,
Colonel and Chief Commissioner in Kaffraria.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Governor Lieut.-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Fort Beaufort, May 20, 1852.

SIR,—Since my last report, the principal military circumstances worthy of remark are, that I have adhered steadily to the system I then announced—that of keeping possession of the Amatolas, and allowing the troops time to recover their energies; and I have also taken measures with a view to reopening the direct communication between King William's Town and Graham's Town, which has been closed for the last sixteen months, and remains still for the present impassable without some pioneering and a large escort.

With regard to the Amatolas—which comprise a district of most fertile and valuable country, enclosed by a precipitous mountain barrier of great elevation, some 80 miles in circumference, into which there are but few practicable passes—I have recently patrolled personally all through it, and visited the two stationary camps of Colonels Michel and Eyre. These most efficient officers, each of whom have about 1000 men of regular infantry, and their proportion of Fingoes and other levies, with a detachment of cavalry, and two guns, have complete command of more than two-thirds of this mountain district; so that as every Kafir field of Indian corn or garden has been destroyed, and not a single head of cattle can appear on the pastures with impunity, the Kafirs have abandoned those parts as a habitation, though they still haunt the woods and kloofs in small numbers, to watch the issue of events, hoping, no doubt, that I may relent. But I have every reason to believe that the Chief Sandilli, with his adherents, is still in possession of the north-western extremity of the district, and I have not yet the means of dislodging him, or time for it; and to do so without providing for subsequent occupation would be labour lost. This, however, if he does not migrate in the meantime, which I think he will, I feel quite certain of being able to provide for satisfactorily in due time.

I have caused a tower to be built in the centre of Colonel Eyre's camp, which is in the midst of the Amatolas. I am anxious to explain the nature of this tower, its cost, and its object; for there appear to have been, at some time or other, some most costly and useless martello towers built as telegraph stations, and what not, about this country, which, without explanation, might lead to the misapprehension that my system of tower has any analogy to those which have proved costly failures, and are unoccupied.

The tower which I have caused to be built in the centre of the Amatolas, on a most favourable site, is of stone found on the spot, rubble work, 15 feet square, and two stories high,

with a flat roof to carry a gun ; the cost will not exceed £300. The object is that for which church towers were originally, no doubt, intended in early stages of society, where a more civilised race planted themselves among aborigines, viz. a rallying point from whence a very few men, possessed of superior projectile weapons, might command a radius, within which the community, and even their cattle, might take shelter when suddenly beset by swarms of savages.

Had such a precaution been adopted in the military villages, the massacres which were perpetrated at the commencement of this war could not have taken place.

But in the erection of this tower in the centre of the Amatolas (which I propose to call Castle Eyre), I have in contemplation not only an unmistakeable manifestation of an intention of permanent occupation, but a prospective citadel, or central point of some future town of military organised settlers, capable of maintaining their position ; and in the meantime, it will enable me to call upon Colonel Eyre for a three or four days' expedition, in greater force than he could venture without this nucleus for the protection of his camp during his absence.

I have ordered a similar tower to be built, and a strong post established, at about twelve miles from King William's Town, and six from Line Drift, which drift is the ford across the Keiskamma, in the direct road to Graham's Town. This post will be near the source of the River Temacha. The object of this is to command the country of the Chief Seyolo, who is there now in full force, and perhaps the most warlike and active adherent to the cause of Sandilli. He has never yet been seriously molested, resides with no inconsiderable clan within twenty miles of King William's Town, and commands the direct communication with the colony. As soon as I have by this means, and by certain diplomatic arrangements with a friendly chief, provided for the permanent occupation of his territory, I will proceed to eject him ; but without this precaution, with a view

to occupation, an expedition against him, however successful, would be productive of no permanent or advantageous results.

With the exception of the contumacious Gaika tribe, headed by Sandill, and his relations and adherents, I am on the most satisfactory and peaceable terms with all the other Kafir tribes which are included in the sovereignty of British Kaffraria.

The second division of the force under my command, now in British Kaffraria, that is, to the eastward of the Keiskamma, which I have left under the orders of Major-General Yorke, is now in as good a state of military organisation as I could wish. But the first division within the colonial boundary, owing to its heterogeneous components, and the far more intricate and disturbed state of affairs, and greater natural difficulties of the country, requires much personal attention and support of the chief in command to bring it into a satisfactory state. And it is only since the recent removal of my head-quarters to this place, that I can fully appreciate the merit that is due to Major-General Somerset, when cut off almost entirely from head-quarters, in providing as well as he has done for the protection of these districts.

There are two or three exertions which have probably still to be made before the war can be brought to a satisfactory termination, but I am not disposed to make them till I have secured the means of retaining the advantages I may gain; but should the opportunity offer, and the occasion require it, I am prepared to supply my present deficiency of force, occasioned by severe service and the unfortunate loss of the "Birkenhead," by any temporary means in my power and at any cost, convinced that a speedy and effectual termination of this unfortunate war is the best economy; at the same time, I will use every endeavour, by improved organisation, and reduction of all superfluous and uncontrollable sources of expenditure, with the aid of a Board I intend to establish, composed of the Commissary-General, the Deputy Adjutant-General, and my Military Secretary, which will meet as soon as the Commissary

General arrives, to bring the further expenses of the war within the narrowest limits of economy which can be made consistent with efficiency.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. CATHCART, Lieut.-General, C. F.

The Right Hon. the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, &c. &c.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Governor Lieut.-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Fort Beaufort, May 20, 1852.

SIR,—In addition to my military despatch, I have the honour to enclose a summary of reports and events connected with the operations of the army under my command, since the 20th April last, which events, though not individually of importance, may serve collectively to give a clear view of the state of things in respect to the border troubles with which I have to contend.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. CATHCART, Lieut.-General, C. F.

The Right Hon. the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, &c. &c.

ENCLOSURE.

Fort Beaufort, May 20, 1852.

SUMMARY of REPORTS and of EVENTS connected with the operations of the Army since the 20th of April last.

1. Colonel Buller and the Rifle Brigade having joined the 1st division, he was posted with his corps at Bear's Farm on the 25th of April. and placed in command of the troops stationed round the Waterkloof range, to watch the approaches into those mountains, and intercept all ingress to, and egress from, them.

2. The army in the field occupied thus on the 25th the following position :—

First division, under Major-General Somerset, head-quarters at Fort Beaufort, having his posts established at Bear's Farm, Balfour, Retieff, Blinkwater, Cowie Mancazana, Eland's Post, and Hadden, for the purpose of blockading Macomo and his adherents, who had occupied the Waterkloof mountains.

Second division, under Major-General Yorke, head-quarters at King William's Town, having two strong camps established within the basins of the Amatolas, one on the Leniah at Mount Macdonald under Lieutenant-Colonel Michel, the other in the Keiskamma Hoek under Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre. These camps have been rendered stationary; and at the latter the building of a defensible tower, and the erection of substantial huts indicating the permanent occupation of the Amatolas, have for their object to reduce Sandilli to the necessity of quitting his haunts in that neighbourhood.

The Fish River line is protected by a force under Lieutenant-Colonel Perceval, and the inner line occupied by a number of small posts of burghers, against marauders who may penetrate into the colony.

The cavalry refitting at King William's Town.

3. On the 4th instant the Commander of the Forces moved his head-quarters from King William's Town, and having visited the camps in the Amatolas, and made an extensive reconnoissance of their localities, established his head-quarters at Fort Beaufort on the 9th.

4. The following is a "précis" of the Military Reports received during the past month :—

1st. From Lieutenant-Colonel Perceval, 21st April, reporting his march from the Gaboola in the Amatolas to the Governor's Kop, Fish River. On the 17th, near Fort Wiltshire, some Kafirs were seen, and a few head of cattle taken. On the 18th, he passed through Stack's Country, and found it perfectly clear of the enemy. Examined Tolas Kloof, which he found deserted. On the same day Major Horne, who had been detached towards Stack's Kloof, fell in with a small marauding party returning from the colony; one of their number was shot, and two wounded, and the cattle in their possession (eight oxen) retaken. The whole of that country abandoned by the enemy.

2nd Civil Commissioner Hudson, reporting Field-cornet William Bouwer having pursued a party of rebel Hottentots and Kafirs

with stolen horses, recaptured the horses, shot one Hottentot; one burgher severely wounded.

3rd. Civil Commissioner Chas. Uitenhage, reports Hottentot marauders having entered his district, and urging the necessity of continuing the burgher posts.

4th. Commandant Buckner reports his division free from the enemy, 22nd and 29th April.

5th. Major Holdsworth, 2nd Queen's, commanding at Fort Cox, reports on the 29th April, the Kafirs having shot one of his men within 200 yards of his post. On the 28th a party of Kafirs, showing themselves with intention of carrying off the cattle, were quickly driven back into the mountains. The Seven Kloof Mountain observed to be again occupied by the enemy.

6th. Major-General Somerset, with reports from Lieutenant-Colonel Perceval and Captain Hamly, 12th Regiment, the latter having, on the 28th, fallen upon a party of marauders and killed six of their number.

7th. Major-General Somerset, covering Colonel Buller's report of a patrol along the ridges of the Waterkloof mountains on the 29th April. The Kafirs who showed themselves were driven into the bush, having two of their numbers killed. Lieutenant Godfrey and two men of the Rifle Brigade were slightly wounded on that occasion.

8th. Major-General Somerset, with Colonel Buller's report of Major Horsford's patrol on the 6th of May, along the Bushnecke and adjoining ridges; also Colonel Buller's of the 8th of May, resulting in ascertaining that the Kafirs were in considerable numbers occupying the Waterkloof, and that Kafir women were seen trekking into those kloofs with provisions.

9th. From Major-General Somerset, with Captain Stevenson's (European Levy) report of a patrol, 8th of May, about the Waterkloof, in which fourteen Kafirs were killed, several wounded, and nine horses and some cattle taken from the enemy.

10th. Captain Robertson, with a report of Captain Pullen's (Native Levy) patrol, extending throughout the Zuureberg range, in consequence of an alarm that Kafirs had appeared in that quarter, but no spoor or any appearance of the enemy in that division was found.

11th. Major-General Yorke, 7th May, reporting a squadron 12th Lancers having marched to take post at the Kabousie, and three companies 45th regiment, with a detachment of Montagu Horse, and eighty Fingoes, had left King William's Town for the purpose

of opening the Line Drift, and to form a port at the Temacha, Seyolo having cut off all safe communication along this road since the commencement of the war, and a party of rebel Hottentots having, so late as the 1st of May, attacked two companies of Fingoes, marching from Peddie by the Temacha, killing four and wounding eight of their number.

12th. Major-General Yorke, 11th of May, reporting one levy soldier shot and another wounded by Kafirs near Fort Pato.

13th. Major Horne's report, 14th May, of his having examined all the drifts and passes of the Fish River, but found no trace of the enemy.

14th Lieutenant-Colonel Burn's report, 16th May, of a patrol sent to examine the Chumie valley and Swan Kloof mountain as far as Fort Cox. No enemy seen in those localities, and only the spoor of three women.

15th. Commandant Bucher, 13th May, reports his district free from the enemy.

16th. Major-General Somerset, 17th May, reports Kafirs having attacked some waggons under the Fish River, and within the district of Albany carried off five spans of bullocks.

17th. Major-General Somerset, 17th May, reporting a party of 100 Kafirs and rebel Hottentots having entered Lower Albany, attacked Mr Clayton's farm, killing Mr. Clayton's son, wounding a farming servant, and carrying off 100 head of cattle and twelve horses; Colonel Perceval, with a patrol, despatched to intercept the enemy; Captain Stubbs, with his rangers and parties of burghers, pursue and come up with the marauders, drive them into the bush, and capture fifteen guns, assagais, and other articles from them.

18th. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, 18th May, reporting his having dispatched a detachment to waylay the approaches to the Waterkloof, and his moving his camp from Blackwater to Nielands on the 19th, in accordance to orders received from the Commander of the Forces, in consequence of the enemy's foray in the Fish River land.

19th. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier's report, 18th May, of his way-laying parties having captured six Kafir women coming out of the Waterkloof, on their way to the Amatolas for provisions. These women give information that Macomo is at the top of the Waterkloof, and the Tambookie chief at the bottom, and that many of the Tambookies had left from want of food.

20th Colonel Buller's report, 18th May, of a skirmish with the enemy on the upper ridges of the Waterkloof, speaking highly of the

gallantry and good conduct of the troops, inflicting some loss on the enemy; our casualties, one severely wounded, four slightly.

21st. Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, reporting his having taken post at Nielands, and that the waylaying parties had found no spoor in or out of the Kroome heights.

(Signed) A. J. CLOETE, Quartermaster-General.

*Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieut.-Gen. the Hon. G. CATHCART
to the Right Hon. Sir JOHN S. PAKINGTON, Bart.*

Fort Beaufort, June 21, 1852.

SIR,—With regard to the political circumstances of the colony of the Cape, I do not find that any material alteration has taken place in the western districts since my last report. The return of the Ordinance granting the new constitution appears to be awaited without impatience, and all excitement on that subject seems to have for the present subsided.

Leaving Lieutenant-Governor Darling to report concerning matters of routine of business, and particularly those more immediately connected with the western portion of the colony, I will confine myself in this, to a report as to the present state of the disturbed districts, and the means I have adopted with a view to establishing the foundation of a constitutional organisation of police, which may in due time provide for the better security of the lives and property of the inhabitants within the eastern frontier, to be maintained at the cost of the colony, and supersede the necessity for a large portion of the regular troops and levies now employed in this service.

Indeed, by this measure I hope that in due time, when it shall fairly have come into operation, the occasion for the employment of Her Majesty's troops within the colonial frontier may be reduced to two or three concentrated stations for the purpose of affording military support in urgent cases to the civil power.

For the present, however, and until the new system shall be well established, I cannot, under existing circumstances, effect any immediate reduction, or dispense with the numerous small posts of troops, burghers, and levies, which I find established here; for although the hostile Kafirs appear to be disheartened and subdued, evade open conflict, and seem to meditate migration, there are certain desperate bands who, from motives of revenge, appear determined to do as much mischief as they can before they go, and openly declare that intention.

There are also bands of rebel Hottentots, amounting to some 300 or 400, associated with the Kafirs to a certain extent, or herding with them, about half of whom only are said to be armed, and one fourth mounted. These are much more mischievous and dangerous, from their far superior progress in civilisation, natural intelligence, and their skill in horsemanship, and the use of arms; and they are headed by very able leaders.

Large bodies of troops can afford little security against the sudden forays of these people, but a police constantly on patrol, with knowledge equal to theirs of all the intricacies of the country, and having the power of alarming the neighbourhood and calling for assistance the moment the traces of the marauders are found, will materially defeat their evil purposes, and ultimately, I hope, put an end to them.

I enclose a copy of the general order I have given for the formation of the police, together with certain rules and regulations for their guidance.

In the constitution of this force, I have in view its transfer as soon as it may be practicable to the civil government; but, in order to insure its prompt and immediate organisation, and in an efficient manner, I have framed it so that in its first coming into operation, and even during its transition state, I may hold it under military control, and give to its officers the powers of martial law possessed by those of any other military levies, which present circumstances render indispensable.

But it is my intention to consult the Attorney-General (which I have not yet had time to do) as to the legality and expediency of giving to the commandants the powers also of justices of peace, and the practicability of investing them with the powers of commandants, as under the old commando system, formerly so popular and efficient in this country; and in that case the lieutenants would assume the position of field-cornets.

Thus the advantage of a constant and permanent patrolling police, for prevention and immediate discovery and alarm, would be added to that of the power of enforcing immediate support and assistance in pursuing marauders and other offenders, and recovering stolen property, as possessed by the old commando system; and with security against the possibility of abuse by regularly established organisation, the diary of duties performed, and the monthly report to the civil commissioner of the district required by regulation.

In fact I think these advantages cannot fail virtually to result from the immediate formation of the force under martial law and present circumstances of alarm, but some legislative enactment may perhaps be necessary to give them permanent effect.

As to the expense of this establishment, it no doubt appears at first sight very costly. But it must be considered that by adopting a system of contract with the man for everything, the account with each individual is reduced to one fixed item; and innumerable, uncontrollable, and incessant contingencies incidental to all other modes of providing for an armed force are avoided.

No increase of duty, transport, or establishment, or expense from any other cause, is thrown upon the Commissariat department; and the only participation in the arrangement required of it is that of making monthly payments on certified pay lists, and the warrant of the Commander of the Forces for the present, and that will cease when the police force shall be

transferred to the colony, and those payments made through the civil commissioner.

The new Legislature will no doubt be called upon to provide for this force, which is solely for the protection and security of the lives and properties of the inhabitants of the frontier districts, and who bear the brunt and form the barrier against barbarism for their more fortunate brethren within.

Should this precaution not be maintained in an efficient manner, it is impossible for the mother country to afford sufficient military force to prevent that barrier being broken through; and the savage who has gained the use and possession of fire-arms, and acquired no despicable knowledge of the art of war, should he again recover his ancient strongholds of the Fish River and Zureberg, could not be dispossessed by any force and expenditure which the British Government would be justified in devoting to that purpose.

I enclose a comparative statement, showing the cost of the police force according to its intended establishment, as compared to the average pay, allowances, rations, and contingent expenses of other mounted levies of equal number, as I find them in this command, by which it will appear that the amount of expense of the two systems is nearly the same; and therefore the simplicity of that adopted for the police sufficiently recommends it as facilitating its transfer to the colony, and detaching it hereafter from all military interference, even if other constitutional advantages which it possesses, already pointed out, did not afford sufficient justification for it.

Men of the mounted levies now receiving pay, allowances, &c., will be allowed to transfer their services to the police, if individually approved by the civil commissioner; and by this and other means I hope soon that the efficient services of the police will enable me to dispense with those of levies, and thus afford a saving of expense far more than equivalent for that of this new police.

I am happy to say that this measure appears to meet with

general (indeed I may say, as far as I can learn, universal) approbation, and the zealous efforts of the civil commissioners and others concerned in carrying it into operation, have already made considerable progress in giving it effect.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief.

The Right Hon. Sir J. Pakington, Bart., &c. &c.

*Copy of a DESPATCH from Governor Lieutenant-General
the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir JOHN S.
PAKINGTON, Bart.*

Fort Beaufort, June 21, 1852.

SIR,—As to the political affairs of British Kaffraria, events of some interest have occurred since my last report.

The refractory and rebellious Gaika tribe, united under the supreme control of the Chief Sandilli, has been almost entirely expelled from the Amatolas, of which we are now, to a great extent, in permanent occupation, and hope to be able to prevent their ever regaining possession, so as to profit by its pastures and resources; but some few Kafirs still linger in its dense wooded ravines and forests. These I hope also to eject by a more complete occupation, as soon as time will admit.

The majority, however, of the Gaika clans, with their respective leaders and their paramount Chief Sandilli, have removed into the outer and more eastern ranges of hills and forests, where they still linger, but cannot long remain; and the movement by Major-General Yorke, which I have ordered, and is probably taking place at this moment, and which is detailed in my military despatch, may possibly hasten their departure to the Kei.

I have no doubt the mode of operations I find myself in duty bound to adopt as the only sure means of bringing this desultory warfare to a permanent and satisfactory close, may appear

to casual observers slow and inglorious; more rapid and brilliant achievements would be much more congenial to my own wishes, but would prove transitory and useless.

The hostile Kafirs appear generally disheartened, and are starving; they evade any hostilities unless forced in self-defence to resistance, but the difficulty of the country enables them to elude our attempts to bring them to action, and it is only by occupation and temporary destruction of their pasturage, and consequent starvation, that they can be compelled to retire. They have no herds of cattle in the Amatola district.

The T'Slambie tribes continue faithful and prosperous, and are sensible of the advantages of peace with us. Recent occurrences have tended to strengthen their attachment to British sovereignty, and almost turn neutrality into hostility to the rebellious Gaikas.

The arrest and indignities suffered by the Chief Toise are cordially resented by our staunch friends the Chiefs Pato, Siwani, and Umkye, who occupy the territory between the Buffalo and the Keiskamma, and between the Line Drift road and the sea. Umhala, whose territory extends along the seaboard from a short distance beyond the Buffalo to the Kei, it is suspected, continues to be insincere and temporising; but his country is easily assailed, and he dares not rebel so long as circumstances offer him no prospect of advantage by that course, which he well knows they do not at present.

Nothing can be more able and satisfactory than the management of the T'Slambie Commissioner, Captain Maclean, throughout this delicate business; but though the final answer of Sandilli has not been received, I do not anticipate any decisive results from this quarrel, beyond a stimulating influence to the friendly clans to assist us in ordinary occasions, which has been already evinced by Siwani and his people in aiding the defence of a missionary station at Mount Coke when attacked by Hottentot marauders, and a spirited and successful

recapture of the mail, which had been taken by these miscreants whilst passing through his father's territory, which was effected by the young Chief Tobai, son of Umkye, with fifteen of his followers, who voluntarily started in pursuit as soon as the fact came to his knowledge.

The establishment of a sufficient military post on the Temacha River, about twelve miles from King William's Town, and seven from the Keiskamma River at Line Drift, has enabled me to reopen the direct communication between King William's Town and Graham's Town; and whilst that measure gives important facility to commissariat arrangements, it also supersedes the necessity of employing Kafir post riders through a dangerous and circuitous route for the carriage of the mail, which has been so frequently intercepted. This military post will also, I have reason to think, since my recent patrols through the countries of the hostile Chiefs Stock and Seyolo, tend much to secure the permanent command of the country on the left bank of the Keiskamma as far as the Umdizini River, so that with a sufficient cavalry force, which I intend to station at Fort White, the remaining country between the Umdizini and the Amatolas, which I find favourable for the use of cavalry, will also be rendered untenable by the enemy for pasturage.

Thus, as the remaining country south of the Temacha belongs to friendly chiefs, the whole line of frontier on the left bank of the Keiskamma from the Amatolas to the sea is, I hope, already so far secured, that its wooded kloofs or ravines, which though numerous are not formidable, can only afford temporary shelter for marauding bands, who, deprived of pasturage, will ultimately disperse, or seek some other country beyond the Kei where they may rebuild their kraals, return to their congenial habits, and possess in peace their herds of cattle, which is the chief object of their ambition.

Thus the war-cry raised within these border districts will no longer have power to assemble the formidable bodies of clans-

men from surrounding kraals, which constituted the power of the enemy at the commencement of this war, and at former periods.

In this manner, keeping steadily to the task, I hope to effect the permanent removal of neighbours who have hitherto proved most troublesome to the colony, to a distance from whence they can only return in small bands, which the police and modified commando system proposed to be established within the colony may suffice to deal with in detail.

The views and opinions expressed in my last despatch with respect to the future occupation of the Amatolas remain unchanged, although I do not fail to bear the subject constantly in mind, and endeavour to improve my knowledge of it by every means in my power.

As belonging to the affairs of British Kaffraria, I have now still to notice perhaps the most important which has occurred since my last despatch.

In that despatch I inclosed a copy of a message I had sent to the Chief Kreili. This neighbouring and independent chief, although his territory had been invaded by my predecessor, and much cattle taken from it, has continued to aid and abet the Gaika rebellion more actively than ever, and has never acknowledged his submission; he harbours numerous rebel Hottentots, who seem to exercise much influence over his councils, and who, if not dispersed in time, may instigate and direct much mischief against Her Majesty's territory on this side of the Kei. There is little doubt also that he is intriguing with Umhala, and that mutual sympathy and enmity towards us exists in the breasts of those two chiefs, though not openly declared by the former, and carefully veiled in dissimulation by the latter.

By the voluntary deposition of a Hottentot prisoner, who recently surrendered, and who had been long one of the formidable band of rebels under Uithaalter, who had associated with Sandilli, and who deposes as an eye-witness of the fact,

there appears to be no doubt that large supplies of gunpowder in leathern bags, somehow carried on four horses, have been repeatedly brought through Kreili's country to the Amatolas, which, as this informant heard, came from beyond the Bashee, and was believed to be purchased from the Chief Moshesh, who, as you are aware, is one of Her Majesty's most powerful subjects in the Orange River sovereignty. This may be a libel against Moshesh, and I will hope it is so; but although most desirous of bringing this war to as speedy a conclusion as prudence and sound policy will permit, and most anxious to avoid an unnecessary expedition to a remote country, permanent security demands that the bordering Chief Kreili should be humbled and subdued, that the Chief Moshesh should be made sensible of the power of the British Government by that example, and that the dangerous and growing influence of the Hottentot rebels who have found shelter in the Chief Kreili's territory should, if possible, be broken up; in short, that the fruits of the recent invasion of my predecessor should be brought to maturity.

You will have observed by my last communication on this subject, that in my message to the Chief Kreili I put forward a threat in respect to an authorised invasion of burghers. On reference to my last despatch, I am apprehensive that the multiplicity of other matters which occupied my attention at the moment, caused me to neglect a sufficient explanation of my views in that respect. They are as follows:—

I have every reason to believe that I am on good terms with the burgher population, and I had ascertained that they are disposed to respond to my call. We have now apparently a large army in this command, but owing to its unavoidable diffusion under existing circumstances over a vast extent of country, I find a very small portion of it disposable without temporary abandonment of advantages gained.

This state of things I hope, by measures adverted to in this despatch, and already in progress, shortly to amend. But even

then, when this war may be concluded and the force reduced, as it no doubt would be, I consider it most essential to convince our neighbours that we have other powerful resources besides and in addition to Her Majesty's regular troops, sufficient to hold them in subjection; and now for that reason, since an expedition beyond the Kei has become imperative, I still intend to put forward the burgher force as the principal and active agents of merited castigation; it is, nevertheless, my intention to support them with a regular force of three battalions, four guns, one squadron of Lancers, and one of the Cape Corps of regular troops, besides upwards of 1000 irregular troops, in all about 3000 men, which would in itself suffice for the purpose in view. And in addition to this, I have received through the agent beyond the Kei, Mr. Shaw, the assurance of the co-operation of the powerful Chief Faku, who dwells beyond the Bashee River, and whose tribe is said to be in number equal to that of Kreili, who, as Her Majesty's ally, is ready and willing to enter the south-eastern portion of the territory of the Chief Kreili, and plunder his cattle to the greatest extent in his power; and as on a former similar occasion this chief had already captured 6000 head of cattle for his own use and benefit, and in Her Majesty's cause, when he was interrupted by the flooding of the Bashee, I have no reason to doubt the efficiency of his co-operation when I call for it.

With a view to this operation, which I hope to commence in the last week of next month, I intend, 1st, forthwith to summon the burghers by proclamation duly prepared and published at Cape Town.

2ndly. To warn the Commissary General to prepare a sufficient magazine of all supplies, which he will draw from the northern district at Shiloh, which will be the base of my operations, and from whence, as the route to the point on the Kei where I intend to cross is only three short days' march through an open country, the transport which may constantly come and go will be easily and cheaply managed.

3rdly. To give the rendezvous to the burghers coming from all parts, and the column which I intend to accompany myself, on the same day, at or near a point named within the enemy's country.

Previous to this operation, which I anticipate will not occupy above three weeks, I hope to have gained possession of the Waterkloof, and to have provided for the security of the frontier districts within the colony during my absence; and in British Kaffraria, from which I shall never be distant above three days' march, Major-General Yorke will have a sufficient concentrated force of cavalry and infantry left with him to enable him, with the aid of the newly-established defensible posts in the Amatolas and that on the Temacha River, to control that country until my return.

I have, &c.,
 (Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
 Governor.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieutenant-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir JOHN S. PARRINGTON, Bart.

Fort Beaufort, June 21, 1852.

SIR,—On military subjects I have little to add on this occasion to my other despatches, which embrace the strategic topics on which the progress of the war depends.

I find the circumstances of the extensive country in which I command still require the inconvenient diffusion of force which I found established in it, for purposes more of police than warfare, still unavoidable, and until the arrangements already in progress, and which are detailed in my other despatches, come into operation, they must remain so. So that, for the present, I have scarcely any disposable force; thus I can only undertake one operation at a time, and must wait a long time for the

safe withdrawal of a regiment from one remote service to bring it to bear on another.

Hence the bugbear of the Waterkloof, &c., which has proved so expensive on former occasions, and is only twelve miles, as the crow flies, from my present head-quarters, remains still in a state of blockade. It is strongly occupied by well-armed and numerous enemies, who are desperate from the circumstance of their inability to escape, as much as their attachment to their old haunts.

But as soon as an operation, which is probably at this moment in progress in Kaffraria under the command of Major-General Yorke, which I have ordered, and from which I anticipate important results, is accomplished, I mean to withdraw the 60th Rifles from the Second Division for a time, and uniting it with the Rifle Brigade under Colonel Buller, with about 1200 British riflemen, and four or five hundred enrolled Fingoes, who have proved throughout the war most valuable, gallant, and faithful assistants, and what other detachments I can collect, I have no doubt of being able to clear and finally occupy those remarkable and inconvenient fastnesses without serious loss or difficulty. In the meantime the blockade with which I have remained satisfied, has been so effectual as to prevent any serious inroads from that quarter into the colony. A recent satisfactory reconnoissance I have personally made of this remarkable country gives me perfect confidence in the result of this operation.

You will no doubt hear of many outrages committed recently in Lower Albany, where the capital of these eastern districts is situated, and whence, therefore, an abundant outcry is raised and circulated, on comparatively slight occasions.

It is too true that a band of desperate and lawless marauders, under a most active and mischievous partisan, has lately committed great outrages there, but these were all the work of one gang. I have, however, provided amply for the support of that district; and on my recent visit endeavoured, and I hope

with success, to remind the inhabitants of their power and duties of self-defence.

But those calamities are small in comparison to what have been constantly suffered by the inhabitants of this northern district, in which I have, for that reason chiefly, for the present taken up my abode.

No army can provide against these sudden outrages unless they become a police ; but a comparatively small police force, supported by troops, and the vigilant and prompt aid of the inhabitants themselves in their own cause, would amply suffice to put an end to them.

This I hope to bring about by the police measure detailed in another despatch of this date.

Nothing further of an exclusively military nature occurs to me worthy of communicating in this, except an arrangement I have made with a view to keeping possession of advantages gained, with the assistance of the Royal Engineer department and at small expense, without the necessity of crippling my force by large detachments, and which is fully detailed in the enclosure, which is a copy of a letter I have written to the commanding royal engineer under my command, with a view to its being forwarded by him in explanation to the Master General and Board of Ordnance.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
Governor.

Right Hon. Sir John S. Pakington, Bart., &c., &c.

ENCLOSURE.

Fort Beaufort, June 12, 1852. ,

SIR,—The plans and estimates for the two towers now in process of construction, according to my requisition, are perfectly in accordance with my views and intentions, but I put in writing now the objects I have in view to facilitate explanations

to the Master General and Board of Ordnance, as well as to show why the restoration of the Line Drift Post, also essential, would not serve as a substitute for the new Temacha Post, and require the latter without delay.

The rules in military fortification adapted to civilised warfare are totally inapplicable to the present circumstances of this country, therefore they must be entirely discarded, and we must find what is suited to our purpose.

The enemy have no cannon, and they have no artificial defences, or even buildings of their own; consequently, they cannot, for a century to come, I think, contemplate the battering of a wall or attack upon a defensible stone building.

The large enclosures, chiefly composed of mud, with bastions, &c., I see in this country, called posts or forts, appear to me, for the most part, to be preposterous, and must have been very costly. I find them most inconvenient, for, being constructed for a certain garrison, they are untenable without their complement, and it is sometimes a question with me whether to weaken my disposable force, to hold them, or abandon them altogether.

Besides which, the line of frontier having been twice advanced, most of the existing posts are now in the wrong places, and no longer available at all.

Now, my object being to retain possession of the country gained, what I want is, to have established in the right place, where present circumstances require it, a defensible nucleus adapted for a large or small force, in which ten men, perfectly safe themselves, may command a radius of two or three hundred yards by the fire of musketry, and with a gun six hundred yards, so that within that area a large camp may be covered and protected during the absence of the principal part of the force on patrol.

This may be effected by the construction of one small central keep or tower, of sufficient height to command and overlook all the low huts and tents outside of this tower I would

reserve a certain area enclosed with a low wall or breastwork, similar to a churchyard, and this had better be built of stone, without mortar, but connected with the iron clay mud, being more durable than mud embankments, which soon crumble in this dry climate.

Every experienced soldier knows how difficult it is to force regular troops out of a churchyard or similar enclosure, even when there is no provision for flanking fire; but there is no reason why the wall of the enclosure should not be so constructed as to afford that advantage.

I have ulterior views in the construction of these posts, and in the selection of their sites; I anticipate they may hereafter become villages, and in the centre of a village constructed of huts, all one story high, and roofed with thatch or slight materials, one tower two stories high, or other defensible stone building, placed in the centre, and with a flat roof, will enable a few men effectually to command and protect it.

In case of panic, if the defensible posts be detached and scattered all round the circumference, as is generally the case in this country in old forts, as Fort Beaufort for example, or the more modern construction of Fort Hare, and no central rallying point exists, the people as well as the garrison know not where to go. Now, if the rallying point be in the centre, and such as I have described as desirable, the detachments and mob will rally to it, and the voice of the commander will have power to direct and detach the requisite forces in the right directions, retaining a reserve, whilst the women and children would be safe within the enclosure and under the protection of the central tower till the storm had blown over.

It is obvious, therefore, that this system is applicable equally to military posts under existing circumstances, and to villages, especially military villages; and had there been this precaution in Woburn and other military villages at the opening of this war, with a proper organisation for "watch and ward," the massacres that took place in them could not have occurred.

That this measure is warranted by experience, and that there is nothing new in it, is evinced by the ancient church towers, and other towers which remain from the remote period of history in our own country, when a civilised race placed themselves in small numbers in the midst of savages, and ultimately supplanted or subdued them.

As to the particular case of the tower to be called "*Castle Eyre*," in the Keiskamma Hoek of the Amatolas, its intention is not limited to mere defensible objects.

Its purposes are, first, a demonstration to the warlike, restless, and troublesome tribe of Gaikas, that the Amatola country, their stronghold, is not again to be abandoned as soon as marched through, as heretofore, and that no hopes remain to them of ever being allowed to recover it, and feed their herds in the fertile pastures which its valleys and hill-tops afford.

Secondly. To enable the small force which can be afforded for its occupation, and permanently stationed there, to move out on patrol, leaving at home the smallest possible garrison that may suffice for the protection of the camp during its absence.

Thirdly. To form the central nucleus of some military settlement, which may in time relieve the necessity for military occupation by Her Majesty's regular troops.

With regard to the castle at the Temacha.

The two last objects stated in respect to the former are common to it, but a third rests on political grounds, which are as follows :—

All the T'Slambie chiefs and their tribes are faithful, and from their own interest likely to remain so, with the exception of the Chief Seyolo, who has sided with the hostile Gaikas; this chief's allotted territory borders on that of the friendly Chief Siwani, being divided by the high road from King William's Town to Graham's Town by Line Drift.. Between these two chiefs, although they are half-brothers, an inveterate enmity exists. Seyolo is now at this time personally the most

active, warlike, and inveterate enemy we have to contend with, though his followers do not appear to be so numerous as they were ; he has kept that road closed since the commencement of the war, and still harbours numerous bands of rebel Hottentots, who have proved very troublesome and mischievous. I have recently thoroughly patrolled through this country, and it is devastated and almost entirely deserted. Commissariat supplies have, for the first time, I believe, since the war, been passed through Line Drift, but this would be of no avail if I am not prepared to keep permanent occupation of this territory.

Under cover of the Temacha post, the Chief Siwani has declared his willingness to occupy the territory up to the Umbdizini River, and I have promised it to him if he can do so, but if he cannot, I will fill it with Fingoes ; and the portion of territory north of the Umbdizini, and between that river and the Amatolas, I find that I can effectually control by a cavalry post to be stationed at Fort White, and thus I hope permanently to secure the whole frontier on the right bank of the Keiskamma from the Amatolas to the sea ; but this important object cannot be accomplished without the support of a post on the Temacha.

The object of opening the road by Line Drift will be mainly assisted by this indispensable precaution ; but even that is a secondary consideration, and the restoration of the old post at that drift alone would, as you will perceive, prove no substitute for these objects.

The post at Line Drift must also be re-established as soon as possible, and I have to request you to take measures accordingly without delay. I wish a similar tower to those already alluded to to be placed there, capable of forming a safe nucleus for a large or small force, as circumstances may require, the maximum of which, however, is not likely at any time to exceed two companies of regular infantry, fifty enrolled Fingoes, and some thirty cavalry ; but I hope that ere long less

than half that infantry force will suffice : in the meantime a stone-wall enclosure is immediately indispensable for the security of the post, as it is in an exposed situation.

In addition to the above three posts, viz. Castle Eyre, Temacha Castle, and Line Drift, I shall shortly require five similar posts.

One on the top of the hill which commands Waterkloof and Fuller's Hoek, and one in the Waterkloof itself, somewhere near to Brown's Farm, as soon as that may be practicable. One will also be required at Middle Drift on the Keiskamma, which will secure that defile on the road between Fort Hare and Fort White, and thereby open a secure communication from hence to King William's Town.

Also, for the permanent occupation and security of the Amatolas, one will be required in the Lenea Valley, where Lieutenant-Colonel Michel was recently encamped, and another on the summit of Mount Macdonald immediately above it, for the protection of the guns which, by a practicable road, recently constructed, can be placed there, and where there is a spring of water ; this precaution gives the command of the western portion of the Amatolas as effectually as the post on the Keiskamma Hoek does of its eastern parts.

In addition to the construction of these towers, I have also to require of your department, as a work of immediate necessity, that the post at Fort White, which was admirably secured by a temporary arrangement of the officer in command of the detachment of the 6th Regiment during the war, should be put in a sufficient state of repair for present purposes, and that temporary accommodation should be constructed within its enclosure for a troop of cavalry ; but although I consider a post at or near the Debe Neck to be essential, it is possible that a better situation for a permanent work might be found, the present wattle-and-dab huts, of which the post consists, being of no value. I have to request you to consider this question, with a view to forming plans and estimates for the

future construction of a permanent post at that strategic point.

So extensive a demand for the immediate construction of no less than eight castles, considering the vast expense incurred in the erection of former works in this country, most of which are now perfectly useless, will, no doubt, at first sight, appear alarming to the Master General and Board of Ordnance, but when the costs of these castles, according to the estimate now before me for the two which have been commenced, amounting to only £162 10s. 2d. each, as well as the durability of the structures, come to be considered, and that the probable cost of the eight posts thus required at that rate amounts only to £1800 1s. 4d., I hope no objection will be made; for although it is perfectly easy to march through this country in all directions, and clear all its natural strongholds for the moment by force of arms, I know of no means of holding permanent possession of such an extensive territory with the force at present at my disposal without the aid of a few permanent posts established in those strategic points which the natural conformation of the country affords.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE CATHCART,

Lieutenant-General, C. F.

The Commanding Royal Engineer,
Cape of Good Hope.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieutenant-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir J. S. PAKINGTON, Bart.

Fort Beaufort, July 20, 1852.

SIR,—On this occasion I am happy to be able to report favourably of the affairs in British Kaffraria.

One great advantage gained is the decided and undoubted disunion, and even quarrel, which exists between the hostile

Gaikas and their Hottentot associates, which is confirmed by enclosure No. 3, which is a statement made by the hostile Chief Sandilli, and repeated by the hitherto most troublesome enemy we have had to contend with, Seyolo, who further corroborates information we have already received, that the greater part of the Gaika tribe have migrated beyond the Kei, and that no Kafirs or cattle are to be seen in the eastern and principal part of the Amatola country, in the midst of which we have now an established and secure station, with the purpose, which they can no longer doubt, of permanent occupation.

The other post on the Temacha, whilst it secures the direct communication between Graham's Town and King William's Town, continues, in conjunction with a cavalry force stationed at Fort White, to keep entirely untenanted by Kafirs the whole line of country, outside of the colonial boundary, from the base of the Amatolas to where it joins the lands of the friendly Chiefs Siwani and Umkye, who reach to the sea. When I say untenanted by Kafirs, I mean that no huts or kraals exist there, and no cattle can show themselves on the pastures; but the Chiefs Seyolo and Stock, with a few followers, lurk in kloofs near to where the river Umdizini falls into the Keiskamma, but no molestation or trouble is now given by these people.

These communications from the proscribed Gaika chiefs, you will observe, pass through a friendly chief to the T'Slambie Commissioner; for no public servant is authorised to communicate with them on this side of the Kei.

The combined movement, successfully carried into effect by Major-General Yorke, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre's column had the good fortune to surprise the Hottentot laager, and the excellent management of the quarrel between the T'Slambie chiefs and the Gaikas by the T'Slambie Commissioner Captain Maclean, under the orders of the Chief Commissioner Colonel Mackinnon, on occasion of the quarrel about the Chief Toise, have tended much to this favourable state of

things, which I think is capable of further benefit and improvement.

In the western corner of the Amatolas, as I have before on several occasions stated, there remain a considerable number of Kafirs who possess some cattle; these have never been seriously molested during this war, and I have not had time or troops to do so further than recently to go and surprise and burn their extensive kraals and dwellings, which the cold weather had induced them to move down into the sheltered kloofs near the ruined military village of Auckland; but they have given no trouble, and when I return from the Kei I hope to be able easily to dislodge them.

When I go to the Kei, which I must do next week, I leave British Kaffraria in perfect security under the command of Major-General Yorke, with three regiments of infantry and a considerable force of cavalry and levies, and there are no vulnerable points to be guarded, except the residence of the T'Slambie Commissioner near Fort Murray, where there is a sufficient garrison, and a missionary station at Mount Coke, situated in the districts of friendly chiefs, and for the security of which ample means of protection have been provided; and with the small force withdrawn for my expedition I shall probably never be more than four days' march from the centre of British Kaffraria.

I cannot close this without adverting to the conviction I have already often expressed, that no time should be lost in providing for the future occupation of this fine country, if it is to be retained by colonists capable of organisation for self-defence.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
High Commissioner, &c.

The Right Hon. Sir J. S. Pakington, Bart., &c. &c.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieutenant-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir J. S. PAKINGTON, Bart.

Fort Beaufort, July 20, 1852.

SIR,—The peculiar warfare in which I am engaged does not afford me any remarkable occurrences to report.

I have steadily adhered to the course I laid down for my guidance in the outset, with a view to progressive advances towards the attainment of the main object of my duty,—the establishment of a lasting peace; with this view I have endeavoured to gain every advantage I am able to do, and keep it, and with as little loss as may be.

When I last wrote I had not received the report of Major-General Yorke, respecting the successful result of an attack upon the laager of the leader of a formidable Hottentot banditti, who have caused great commotion of late within the colony, and who had established themselves for security amongst the hostile Kafirs, in a remarkably strong and well-chosen position, not far from King William's Town.

The enclosed General Order will place you in possession of the details of this operation, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre, 73rd Regiment, had the good fortune to fall upon the enemy by surprise, and inflict a severe chastisement upon them; and in which, under critical circumstances, that able and distinguished officer evinced the same military talent and presence of mind which he has on so many former occasions.

Since then, owing to the quiescent state of British Kaffraria, (which I am inclined to think is in some measure to be attributed to the system of permanent occupation by certain established posts in the right places,) I have been enabled to withdraw the 60th Rifles from that district; and the enclosed General Order of the 12th of July, 1852, will explain the use I have made of them, in respect to the abatement of the great nuisance, to the colony, of the Waterkloof as a harbour for hostile Kafirs and marauding Hottentots, which remained

so far within the colonial boundary, and has hitherto proved most detrimental to the colonists.

After that visit to the Waterkloof, the difficulty of access having only enabled me to provide the men with three days' rations, and the mountains being covered with snow, which, in this usually warm climate, is severely felt, I caused them to return to their respective camps below, for a few days; but, on the 14th instant, I reassembled the same force, consisting of the 60th Rifles, the Rifle Brigade, two squadrons of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, four guns, and a detachment with rockets, and some enrolled native levies, on the summit of the Kroome Mountain; and having personally selected a fit place for an encampment, and the site for two defensible redoubts immediately commanding the interval which separates the Waterkloof from Fuller's Hoek, I caused it to be occupied, leaving Colonel Buller to give all aid and assistance to the officer of Royal Engineers in the construction of the redoubts.

The position of this camp is secured on one side by a long range of cliffs, inaccessible even to Kafirs, and the two redoubts, which will be merely stone wall enclosures, a sufficient precaution in Kafir warfare, will secure a space capable of containing a large encampment, and be perfectly defensible against any Kafir attack, with a garrison of one company.

The effect of this demonstration has been already found to produce great consternation among the Kafirs, who appear to have flattered themselves, that by obstinate perseverance on their part they would ultimately obtain their object, and be allowed to keep permanent possession of these districts. Many spoors or traces have been observed, indicating that migration has partially commenced; and the establishment of a permanent post in the midst of the Kroome Mountains, with such powerful means of constant annoyance on our part, and the certainty of ultimate starvation on theirs, cannot fail ere long effectually to get rid of this last Kafir nuisance remaining

within the colony, without occasion for any violent measures attended with unnecessary loss to Her Majesty's troops.

This tract of mountain country, though, perhaps, almost unparalleled in the advantages it possesses for harbouring obstinate and determined defenders, is, after all, but of limited extent; it is also insulated twenty-five miles within the colony, and far removed from the support of any remaining Kafir chief who could now be found to raise the war-cry, and come with his clan to the assistance of the obstinate intruder Mocomo in so desperate and unprofitable a cause.

With regard to ulterior operations, political circumstances have rendered it, in my judgment, imperative that I should proceed without delay to invade the territory of the paramount Chief Kreili, who has aided and abetted the rebellious Gaikas throughout the war, and has refused to pay the fine, in token of submission, imposed upon him by my predecessor; there are many, and even more cogent reasons of policy, which will appear in other despatches, which render this measure imperative, and therefore need not be entered into in this.

The country in which I shall have to act is, I understand, perfectly open, and there are no difficulties to contend with; but the force I have at my disposal, without denuding the country I leave behind me of sufficient protection, will consist only of about 1860 regular troops, and 450 irregulars, exclusive of such burghers as may answer my call by proclamation, a copy of which is enclosed. This I intend to divide into two columns, the one commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Michel, of the 6th Regiment, who will join me at Bramneck, from King William's Town, with a commissariat convoy; his column will consist of the 6th and 91st Regiments, two guns drawn by mules, a troop of mounted levies, and a proportion of infantry, European and Fingoe levies; the second will consist of one squadron of the 12th Lancers, two squadrons of the Cape Mounted Riflemen with two guns, and four com-

panies of the Rifle Brigade with a proportion of levies, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Napier; and I intend myself to proceed with my own escort of cavalry, and about 300 enrolled Fingoes, under very able and active officers, which auxiliary force, when attached and properly commanded, I find to be most efficient, and capable of rendering good service, and which will be available for the reinforcement of either column, as occasion may require.

Besides this, I shall be joined by a mixed force of European and native levies, which has hitherto been employed under the command of Captain Tylden, of the Royal Engineers, and have done good service in very critical times against the Tambookies, but who, having now vanquished their enemies, I hope to be able to dispense with, or, at all events, greatly to reduce after the termination of this campaign; these may amount to about 600 good men, well armed, and a large portion mounted. I have also to expect the co-operation of a deputation of burghers from each frontier district, whom I have called upon by proclamation to join me in their own cause, according to the ancient commando system. If my call be duly responded to, these alone ought to suffice for the chastisement of the contumacious chief, as they will be all mounted and well armed, and formerly evinced great spirit and enterprise; but I am warned not to expect too much from them in these days, and I do not reckon upon more than 400 or 500 at the utmost.

My intention is to pass the Kei at one place, about 80 miles above its confluence with the sea, starting from Whittlesea or Shiloh as my base, and with the regular troops, making the principal residence of the chief my object, whilst the irregular troops, with requisite supports, may busy themselves in the capture of cattle to the extent which I may deem necessary for the purpose of example; and I hope by this means to convince the Chief Moshesh, whose territories will not be far distant, that it is his interest to pay certain fines which have been

exacted of him in the Sovereignty, without the inconvenience to which such stipulations are always liable, of the necessity of compelling their payment by force of arms.

When this operation is completed, I have great hopes that I may be able to make more rapid progress towards the satisfactory close of the war than I have yet been able to do; and by obliging the colonists to exert themselves for their own protection, in cases which are more properly those of police than warfare, I hope shortly to be able greatly to reduce the expenditure which at present is incurred by the British Government for their benefit.

I have the honour to enclose,—

Summary of military events connected with the operations of the army since 20th of June last.

Major-General Yorke's report of attack on the Hottentot Laager, near the source of the Buffalo, on the 20th of June, 1852.

General plan of the Kroome Mountain and Waterkloof.

Rough sketch, showing the site of the proposed redoubts and permanent post near Waterkloof.

Letter from Mr. M. B. Shaw, British Resident, Transkeian tribes, residing in the country of the friendly Chief Faku, beyond the Bashee, forwarded as an additional evidence of the necessity of the intended expedition against the Chief Kreili.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) GEO. CATHCART, Lieut.-General,
Commanding the Forces, &c.

The Right Hon. Sir J. S. Pakington, Bart., &c. &c.

Copy of a DESPATCH from Lieut.-General the Hon. G. CATHCART to the Right Hon. Sir JOHN S. PAKINGTON, Bart.

Fort Beaufort, July 20, 1852.

SIR,—Having closed my several despatches respecting the affairs of the Sovereignty and of British Kaffraria, as well as

my military report up to this date, to avoid the risk of missing the post, the communication with Cape Town being somewhat uncertain, owing to the bad weather, I now, avoiding as far as I can unnecessary repetition, proceed to frame a general summary of the affairs of the colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

The Lieutenant-Governor will, no doubt, with his usual ability and perspicuity, put you in possession of all that relates to civil matters, especially in the Western districts and seat of Government, with all of which he keeps me duly informed by every post; nothing of importance occurs without my knowledge, and no measure of moment is carried into effect by him without my entire concurrence; and I cannot express in too strong terms the obligations I am under to him for his cordial co-operation with me in our joint duties and responsibilities on every occasion.

As regards the affairs of these frontier districts, I have only therefore to report in detail those which relate to the main object of my mission,—the termination of this frontier warfare in as satisfactory and speedy a manner as may be.

My other despatches will explain the actual state of things in these districts, but there are one or two peculiar features of the case to which it is necessary I should call your notice.

Demoralisation of society, resulting from warfare in various ways, is too well known a fact to require comment, as applied to present circumstances generally; but there is a peculiar instance in the present case resulting from it.

I plainly perceive a habit of reliance on military aid without adequate exertion on the part of those most interested. Colonists within the frontier expect troops to do duty virtually not only as police, but as herdsmen and shepherds for their benefit, whilst they are becoming slow and apathetic in their own cause.

The removal of the Kafir enemy from the frontier was undertaken and nearly accomplished at great exertion and expense by Her Majesty's troops and of imperial treasure; but unfor-